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EUROPEAN IDENTITY BEYOND BOUNDARIES:

CONCEPTUALISING A FUTURE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Nicola Tyrrell

Department of Political Science
McGill University, Montreal

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ABSTRACT

This thesis maintains that the study and practice of European integration is hindered by an unquestioned and all-embracing conceptual foundation, derived from 17th/18th century political thought. By virtue of identity-related assumptions including 'nation-state', 'nationalism', and 'sovereignty', which rest on an exclusive binary distinction between "self" and "other", this foundation is inadequate and anachronistic as a theoretical lens through which to understand the dynamics of contemporary Europe.

Chapter 1 reveals the inadequacy of existing theories of European integration, and *Chapter 2* traces this inadequacy to the issue of identity, tying it in with a modern identity crisis. It is argued that the theory and practice of European integration in the 1990's depends on a fundamental reconceptualisation of identity, to eliminate the conceptual rigidity of exclusive self/other binary distinction, and so to provide the basis for a new kind of European identity. In *Chapter 3*, the framework of a new "non-fixed", "non-essential" and pragmatic identity (and therefore European identity), beyond the self/other boundaries of contemporary thought, is elaborated through the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, and its effect on the study and practice of European integration is assessed.

RÉSUMÉ

L'IDENTITÉ EUROPÉENNE AU-DELÀ DES FRONTIÈRES: Conceptualisation d'une future Communauté Européenne

Cette thèse soutient que l'étude et la pratique de l'intégration européenne sont entravées par un fondement conceptuel indiscuté et omniprésent dérivé d'une pensée politique du 17ème et 18ème siècles. En raison des suppositions relatives à la notion d'identité telles que "la nation-état", "le nationalisme" et "la souveraineté", qui reposent sur la distinction binaire entre "soi" et "l'autre", ledit fondement théorique est inadéquat et anachronique pour la compréhension des dynamiques de l'Europe contemporaine.

Le chapitre 1 révèle l'inadéquation des théories existantes sur l'intégration européenne et *le chapitre 2* démontre que la cause de cette inadéquation est liée au problème de l'identité et plus particulièrement à une crise d'identité moderne. Cette thèse admet que le succès de la théorie et de la pratique de l'intégration européenne dans les années 1990 dépend d'une reconceptualisation fondamentale de la notion d'identité ce qui permettra d'éliminer la rigidité conceptuelle de la distinction binaire entre "soi" et "l'autre" et ainsi fournir la base d'une nouvelle forme d'identité européenne. Dans *le chapitre 3*, le cadre d'une identité (et donc d'une identité européenne) "non-fixe", "non-essentielle" et "pragmatique", au-delà des limites de "soi" et "l'autre" de la pensée contemporaine est élaboré à travers le travail de Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault et Jacques Derrida et les implications de cette nouvelle identité sur l'étude et la pratique de l'intégration européenne sont évaluées.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREAMBLE

"*Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made...*"

(Immanuel Kant)

Since the Single European Act of 1987, the revitalisation of the European Community under the presidency of Jacques Delors has represented an unprecedented level of advancement toward an 'ever closer union among the peoples of Europe' (Treaty of Rome, 1958).[1] Yet as a consequence, there is an increasingly evident gap between the theory and practice of European integration, in that events appear to have outstretched the theoretical concepts upon which the study of the EC has to date been based.

Various theories of European integration have, since the birth of the EC, ebbed and flowed in popularity, in tandem with the successes and failures of efforts toward integration. Theory and practice appear to have mutually influenced each other over time, in a dynamic relationship, such that theory has played both a passive explanatory role, and an active, event-shaping role. Yet in 1994, it would appear that fundamental normative concepts assumed in integration literature[2], derived from 17th/18th century political theories (such as 'the nation-state', 'sovereignty', 'national interest', 'citizenship', 'identity', 'nationalism', and even 'Europe' itself), are incongruent with the actual contemporary social and political configuration, and as such constitute an obstacle to both

the active and passive roles of theory, and thus to integration itself. It will be argued that this incongruence runs parallel to, and can be traced to, a fundamental threat to (individual and group) identity being posed by current developments in the EC, and by the dynamics of 'modernity' more generally. Inherent in the conceptual foundation upon which studies of the EC are based, is an unquestioned assumption of exclusive self/other opposition which underpins an apparently static conception of personal, group and national identity. This conception is being challenged in practice, but is implicitly resistant in theory, as little attention is paid to the possibility or desirability of conceptual alternatives.[3] Instead of being redefined in line with real political change, normative identity-related concepts such as 'nationalism' and 'sovereignty', are 'held on to' within political debate, to be used, in a conservative reaction,[4] as tools of justification for "retaining" an identity in crisis, and so slowing down the process of integration. The result is a general confusion, in theory and practice, as to where the EC is heading, what the member states' intentions are, and what actions are aiding and abetting their 'real' interests.

Therefore, the overall rationale of the thesis is to argue that European integration can only succeed to the extent that the citizens of Europe can identify themselves as 'Europeans', represented by the European Community. In an era of shifting territorial and political boundaries, instigating a complex relationship between the juxtaposed dynamics of unity and diversity, globalisation and localisation, a theoretical framework, or 'lens', is needed, which harmonises these opposite forces, and which allows for a form of individual and group identification which can accommodate to, and foster the direction of contemporary political change. In the context of a general argument for the desirability of furthering the integration process, the thesis will seek to elaborate a form of European identity[5] suitable for the 1990's and beyond, based on the work of Michel Foucault, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Jacques Derrida. The utility, impact and plausibility of this

new identity with regard to the study and future prospects of the European integration process, will become evident in the course of the argument.

Chapter 1 focuses on the body of "EC thought" which has attempted to explain and promote European integration since 1945. It will reveal the general insufficiency of the main theories of integration to date, and in doing so indicate the inadequacy of the conceptual foundation upon which EC thought is based. The (arguable) failure of 'EC thought' to provide a comprehensive explanation of European integration since World War II, indicates a generally misguided approach to and aim in the study of the EC.

Chapter 2 seeks to show how the inadequacy of EC thought can be traced to the issue of identity. It will be argued that the question of European identity, and of identity more generally, is insufficiently developed or addressed in EC literature, and yet is fundamental to the understanding of and success of European integration. This is true at both a practical and conceptual level. At a *practical* level, the reason for the lack of theoretical attention to the issue of European identity can be traced to a modern identity crisis, in which threatened (personal and group) identities are stubbornly re-affirmed in a reflex action. At a deeper *conceptual* level, the issue of identity conceived fundamentally in terms of exclusive self/other opposition, underpins and inherently limits the field of EC literature, debilitating it from an accurate reflection of contemporary 'European' dynamics. In elaborating the (practical and conceptual) nature of a modern identity crisis, it will become evident that the theory and practice of European integration in the 1990's depends on a fundamental reconceptualisation of identity, of the self/other relation, which will provide the basis for a new kind of European identity.

In *Chapter 3*, based on the work of Michel Foucault, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jacques Derrida, the framework of this new European identity will be articulated, and its fundamental heuristic effect on the study and practice of European integration will become evident.

CHAPTER 1 - OF BLIND MEN AND ELEPHANTS...

Since the creation of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) in 1952, a prolific body of literature has emerged to explain, encourage, and predict the process of European integration. In 1972, one theorist perceived that 'more than fifteen years of defining, redefining, refining, modeling and theorizing have failed to generate satisfactory conceptualizations of exactly what it is we are talking about...and what it is we are trying to learn when we study this phenomenon'.[6] Analogous to the universal story of the blind men describing an elephant, theorists of European integration have focused on diverse and increasingly more specialised aspects of the phenomenon, drawing diverse conclusions, arguably none of which have proved to have more than a narrowly temporal relevance. The fault would appear to lie not only in the methodology underpinning various theoretical efforts, but in the nature of the subject, constituting a multifaceted and multilayered series of inter-related but diverse and dynamic processes which defy theoretical systematisation or evaluation. As such, it can be argued that *the aim to account for European integration in terms of a systematised pattern, and on the basis of a 'rational' conceptual framework, is misguided.*

For the sake of simplicity, one can establish an analytic breakdown of "EC thought" into basic theoretical categories which have emerged as 'overarching

frameworks' at various stages in the development of the EC, and which are today used in an eclectic manner, in a struggle to explain new developments: Functionalism, the least ambitious approach, was inspired by the context of war-time collaboration; Federalism, the most ambitious, flowered in the context of postwar peace and hope for the future; Neofunctionalism reflected the increasing complexity of the EC's development in the 1960's; and Intergovernmentalism predominated in the period of 'stagnation' between 1965 and the mid-1980's. While these basic categories are not in practice mutually exclusive, they can be used as a framework through which to critique the somewhat amorphous body of EC literature, specifically to establish, and account for, the inadequacy of existing theoretical efforts to explain European integration. It will be seen that the basic categories, with the multiple variations they encompass, can be traced to a more general common foundation - concepts derived from 17th/18th century political thought, which for the sake of simplicity, may be termed the 'Enlightenment paradigm'.[7]

The purpose of this chapter is thus to reveal the *general inadequacy* of existing theoretical approaches to integration. By revealing the *temporal limitation, theoretical obscurity, and prescriptive inadequacy* of each approach, the intention is to indicate the need for a reorientation of 'EC theory' and so provide the context for the argument of Chapters 2 and 3. With a primary emphasis on evaluating EC literature according to broad theoretical categorisation, a brief focus will also be placed on the contemporary proliferation of eclectic theories, combining diverse strands of 'EC thought', in an attempt to reconcile apparently contradictory observations, and resulting in a tendency toward obscurity, or 'Euro-fudge'. In elaborating the deficiencies of the main theoretical approaches to the study of European integration, it will be argued that the *general insufficiency of EC theory is rooted in the apparent anachronism of the restrictive 'Enlightenment paradigm' upon which it rests*. Its aim to impose 'rational order', and its basic unquestioned identity-related assumptions, including 'sovereignty', 'nationalism' and 'the nation-state', are at odds with contemporary social and political transformations, and

as such are in need of reconceptualisation. Realisation of this fact will set the stage for a *re-orientation of 'EC theory', based on a fundamental re-orientation of the concept of identity*.

In the interest of parsimony, the aims of the chapter will be fulfilled by focusing on the work of theorists who are commonly acknowledged as being the primary 'founders' and spokesmen of each broad theory. The fact that there exist a multiplicity of theoretical variations will in itself strengthen the argument, but it is beyond the scope of this work to attempt such a general review.

FUNCTIONALISM (1940's-1950's)

An examination of traditional Functionalism as applied to the EC, reveals an *analytical short-sightedness and a purely contextual and temporal adequacy*, as only the first and perhaps most extreme example of a tendency which is arguably repeated in the various strands of EC theory to the present day. Thus, to highlight and explore the specific weaknesses of Functional theory is to tap a fundamental theoretical faultline, and to guide the way to a reconceptualisation of EC theory more generally.

The Functionalist approach

The emergence and early popularity of Functionalism as a theory of European integration may be attributed to a particular set of contextual factors in the aftermath of the second world war. A general concern to preserve peace and to reconstruct European society constituted a dynamic of converging practical goals among European states, and elevated the societal role of economic technicians, industrialists, and planners.[8] Against this background, the initial success of the ECSC, followed by the creation of the EEC (European Economic Community) in 1957, and the early growth of the European Commission through 'functional' logic, gave fuel to the Functional school led by Jean

Monnet. With a variety of prophets since its appearance in the 1870's,[9] the work of David Mitrany during and after World War II became the foundation for later theoretical adaptations of Functionalism.[10] Taken as a whole, Functional theory may be said to represent an *eclectic and fairly vague* body of thought, whose proponents are diverse in emphasis, and united only by a shifting set of general common attitudes and propositions.[11] Indeed, even the 'foundational' work of Mitrany proposes no gospel, but rather constitutes a set of ideas scattered in various books and speeches, which are not fixed but seem to alter subtly with events of the time.[12] As such, to achieve an adequate appraisal of Functionalism, it is appropriate to focus on the central tenets of the theory as a whole, using Mitrany's work as a basic foundation, rather than seeking to address full diversity of individual theorists' variations and interpretations.

The self-justification for Functionalism's disjointed eclecticism lies in its aim to avoid the apparent rigidity and dogma prevalent in Federal theory, and to provide an alternative to the 'scientific' Realist 'conceptual scheme' by way of a nonpolitical, unstructured approach to socio-economic problems. It sought to address politically sensitive issues such as national sovereignty and the development of a multinational social system, by strategically *bypassing*[13] them, breaking away from the traditional link between authority and a definite territory,[14] and proposing instead a *simple utilitarianism based on common welfare needs.* The dialectic of influence between theory and action, fact and value, is clearly exemplified in the apparent aims of Functional theory, as the Functionalist thesis appears to constitute, not so much an attempt at description, to explain integration, as an attempt to influence events, an 'analytical tool for criticising the present and an ideological prescription for ushering in a better future',[15] 'a useful concept in nudging sovereign national states toward unity...'.[16] *Its aims and assumptions are a clear reflection of specifically temporal aspirations*, and the popularity of an 'end-of-ideology' approach based on the experience of war-time collaboration. To this extent, the

ultimate abandonment of traditional Functional theory in favour of Neofunctionalism was an admission, not only of the fact that traditional Functional logic was not empirically at work in the integrative process as predicted, but more importantly that it was *inappropriate as a prescriptive tool.*

As with all theoretical approaches to the EC, Mitrany's Functional theory was fundamentally based on *rational, 'Enlightenment' foundations*, specifically on the assumption that the world was broken into self-identifying, self-centred communities, divided by jealous rivalries, and the turbulence of inconstants.[17] Yet a perception that the general trend in planning was nationalistic in intent but universal in method, combined with a belief that twentieth century technological developments necessitated frameworks of nonpolitical co-operation, served to foster the perception that the idea of the welfare state was broadening into a sentiment for a welfare world (exemplified, according to Mitrany, by the proliferation of newly independent states seeking aid and cooperation with the UN).[18] According to Functional theory, this sentiment could be nurtured to create ultimately a 'socio-psychological community', with a large number of international organisations administering common tasks, without the requirement of a central government.[19] The need for an overall political authority was undermined in theory by the fact that functional dimensions are subject to technical self-determination and self-definition.[20] With a narrow focus on the role of the expert, and on the assumption that functional institutions attract loyalties by efficiently satisfying welfare needs, the *dynamic of integration is here constituted by the learning process of citizens drawn into a cooperative ethos, and the strengthening of identitive relationships between citizens and functional institutions.*[21] It was naively predicted that functional collaboration would eventually absorb the political sector, and thus the territorial principle of representation and the distorting effect of the 'modern state' would in time be abandoned, to be replaced by the re-introduction of 'man', united in occupational groupings, performing creative work .[22]

On a *normative* level, Mitrany maintained that Functional theory not only served to reduce the 'democratic deficit', by diminishing the 'orthodox sovereignty' of the state, and increasing the 'sovereign rights of the people' ("Sovereignty cannot in fact be transferred effectively through a formula, only through a function"[23]), but it also stemmed the growth of bureaucracy through the clear definition of the powers of functional authority. Moreover, by leaving the question of coordination and membership open-ended, Functional theory could supposedly allow for and adapt to diverse functional 'situations', without imposing a static framework[24] which would impose a centralising influence and a regimented structure - "...the more scientific the less relevant it all becomes".[25] In such a way, the open-ended ideological substance of Functional theory justified, and indeed made a virtue, of its consequent lack of analytical rigour.

The inadequacy of Functionalist theory

Functional theory proved weak and ineffective as it *failed to anticipate the developmental path of the EC over time* (even despite its aim to be adaptable). Events had inspired Functional theory, but reciprocally, the theory's predictions as to what should and might take place were proved by events to be inappropriate and unrealistic. While Functionalism had been accurate to an extent in predicting the pattern of institutional behaviour, this behaviour had not led to an automatic 'domino effect' of integration into new areas, as predicted by Mitrany's 'doctrine of ramification'.[26] The fault lay in the theory's *narrow, monocausal explanatory scope*, in regarding the community as a simple sum of the functions performed by its members.[27] By forging an analytic distinction between political and economic/'technical' thought, and predicting that unity in the latter would lead to unity in the former, Functionalism failed to take into account the external pressures and political framework in which international activity takes place, including the motivations of elites, the force of nationalism, and the potential role of charismatic leaders.[28] Not only did governments prove unwilling to hand over

tasks to functional organisations which encroached on the political arena, but Ernst Haas' case study analysis of the World Health Organisation, and the participation of US and Soviet scientists in negotiations to produce a nuclear test ban, concluded that there was a tendency for experts to be *divided* on technical issues, according to the political positions of their governments, and indeed that the (political) issue of power could not be disentangled from the (technical) question of welfare.[29] Far from technical agreement leading to political unity, the reverse was true - political disagreement was seen to lead to technical disagreement.

Moreover, the assumption that welfare issues reflect universal expectations, and could generate new loyalties, as well as the attendant belief that interest groups, seeking to maximise their well-being, would be frustrated by nationally-oriented politico-economic systems, proved inaccurate. The Functionalists' conception of sovereignty, based on the loyalty of citizens, and of the citizen as a 'bundle of functional loyalties',[30] had led to an over-reliance on the ability of the functional imperative to engineer a world community. The supposed transfer of sovereignty through a transfer of functional allegiance, guided by 'leadership of the expert', was theoretically conceived in vague, 'fuzzy' terms,[31] without a comprehensive theory of interest politics,[32] and without accounting for the possibility of multiple loyalties. As such, Mitrany's Functional thesis was fundamentally flawed due to its *lack of theoretical attention to the dynamic and role of identity-formation, of self-perception*. Not only was he mistaken in his view that economic allegiance would automatically determine political allegiance, but he failed to sufficiently distinguish either of these from emotional allegiance, which was still firmly rooted in the 'nation'.[33]

Underlying Functionalism's apparently simplistic and inaccurate predictions, there is an evident obscurity in its basic concepts and assumptions. Even the Functionalist Robert Merton admits that "the large assembly of terms used indifferently and almost

synonymously with 'function' presently includes use, utility, purpose, motive, intention, aim, consequences."[34] As a result of Functionalism's eclecticism, its *theoretical terms are imprecise and variable in meaning, but are used to denote apparently well-defined concepts* when referring to Functionalism in general, presenting the illusion of a coherent and self-contained body of thought.

The definition of Functionalism's basic conceptual terms appears to depend on the particular aims and emphases of a given theorist. While Mitrany left open the end-situation of Functional logic ("..to harmonise the actions in the attainment of common ends..."),[35] thus arguably precluding a precise definition of '*integration*', other Functionalist and Neofunctionalist theorists have assumed diverse and predominantly vague definitions. For Charles Pentland integration is the 'circumvention, reduction, or abolition of the sovereign power of modern nation-states', for Donald Puchala 'a set of processes that produce and sustain a Concordance system at the international level', and for Karl Deutsch integration is 'a matter of fact, not of time'.[36]

In a similar manner, the concept of '*community*' is basic to the Functional argument, but is poorly conceived.[37] Alternately described by Mitrany as the 'sum of the functions carried out by its members', and the 'commitment by members to the common good', it is not clear whether 'members' are individuals, voluntary groups or organisations, and does not spell out the nature of the functions involved.[38] Relating Functionalism to the basic sociological analysis of 'community' by Tonnies,[39] Ernst Haas assumes that Mitrany's formulation for the development of a 'socio-psychological community' is akin to the shift from contractual 'gesellschaft' to a more integrated normative 'gemeinschaft'.[40] However, while Mitrany's reference to the development of a socio-psychological community would seem to describe an end-state akin to 'gemeinschaft', his crude utilitarianism, emphasising functional loyalties, at the expense of any 'written act of faith' or ascriptive ties, would appear more indicative of 'gesellschaft'. This begs the

fundamental question of how the progress toward a fully integrated community is achieved, and what this end-state goal looks like.[41]

Indeed, based on Mitrany's vague articulation, one may argue that the Functional program is *more disintegrative than integrative in its effect.* In response to the 'complexities of modern international life', he rejects the idea of autonomous regional union (which would constitute 'cutting up a somewhat loose but living world system'; 'whatever proclaims a difference creates a division'[42]), in favour of an 'open' universal system, with administrative devolution from functional central authorities. Not only does this ignore the issue of delays and failures of performance resulting from such complex co-ordination (thus defeating the purpose of devolution), but the idea of 'open' regional systems would appear to be a recipe for exacerbating the problem of individual 'anomie',[43] resulting from the fleeting and nebulous nature of relationships in modern industrial society. One could argue that a contractual relationship, to be stable, requires a precontractual underpinning,[44] as improved technical relations and a growth of complex interdependence is clearly not equivalent to the development of an international community, just as economic success does not automatically imply political success.[45] Addressing the issue of societal development, Mitrany fails to clarify his argument with respect to the above criticisms, claiming that the 'functional idea would tend to disintegrate existing polities, by calculated and proven degrees, so as to link up some of the functions into a more natural range of performance based on sociological continuity and the affinity of the now universal social aspiration.'[46]

In the context of an apparently deep-rooted theoretical imprecision, it becomes evident that the primary merit attributed to Functionalism, in breaking away from the restrictive cliches of Realist political theory, is illusory. Functionalist critique consists of disputing the validity of Realist assumptions,[47] by making a distinction between issues of power and welfare, the political and technical, so effectively questioning the assumption that the power and interests of the nation-state are irreducible, and focusing on schemes

for cooperation. While less probing appraisals of Functionalism may assert that it 'contrasts sharply with Realist theory, which places emphasis on competition and conflict as a principle feature of international politics',[48] it is instructive to note that Hans Morgenthau, the 'father' of political realism, commends Mitrany's A Working Peace System, in his introduction to the 1966 edition of the text. In its failure to visualise an end-state of functional logic, and in its assertion that 'government is a practical thing', that one should beware of elaborating constitutional bonds for the 'gratification of the visionaries', *Mitrany's political observations have much in common with the Realist school.*[49] Indeed, by granting the *existence* of a power orientation in the social dynamic, and in assuming an essentially conflictual model of society, the Functionalist approaches the Realist, and by modifying the absolute victory of power, some Realists join hands with the Functionalists.[50] Thus, despite its attempt to break away from the Realist paradigm of contemporary thought, Functionalism may in fact be seen to have remained rooted firmly within it (as will be clearly evident in the discussion of the self/other basis of contemporary thought in Chapters 2/3).

Summary

Thus, it is evident that the weakness at the root of Functionalist thought has ramifications for the whole theory. By insisting on a narrow, monocausal account of integration, it focused on no more than a part of the existing social dynamic, and so not surprisingly the account proved to be limited in temporal relevance. Its aim was to provide a pragmatic and flexible alternative for dealing with 'present and future' social problems, but its focus on pragmatic interest politics as the foundation of an irreversible process of integration, was inherently flawed, as it did not appreciate the dynamic of identity-formation, or acknowledge the ephemeral and reversible quality of incremental decision-making, and the role of ideological commitment. Inspiration for Functionalism's incremental method was evidently based on the disintegrated state of European society in

the postwar period, and an emphasis on the part of European interest groups to safeguard diverse *practical* group interests, as a priority over any common *ideological* desire to embrace supranationalism, or any sense of 'Europeanism'. Functional theory did not take into account any alteration in the social dynamic which would be brought about by its own integrative logic, and thus failed in explanation, as well as in its primary prescriptive aim to move from 'clear and present needs' towards a practical horizon.

Moreover, it is significant that Functionalism failed to address and critique the concepts of 'nation-state' and 'sovereignty' which serve to perpetuate the nation-state system. In failing to acknowledge the emotional pull of nationalism, in failing to appreciate the resilience of the sovereign nation-state, it may be said that Functionalism failed to realise the extent to which political thought rests upon these concepts, and to this extent it implicitly assumed these concepts as an unquestioned presupposition. Indeed, it will be seen in Chapter 2 that the conceptual foundation upon which 'nation-state/sovereignty' rhetoric rests, constitutes a self-perpetuating web of signification, which remains predominant and resistant to change by passing over in silence any critique of the foundation itself. As such, it may be said that EC theory is inherently precluded from adequately conceiving or instigating a truly post-national politics.

Based on the argument thus far, it would appear that a rigorous and universally valid theory of the EC is unattainable, given the evolving nature of the subject matter and the conceptual obstacles implicit in 'Enlightenment thought', and thus that the apparent weaknesses of Functionalism (and of any other theoretical approach) are inevitable. Yet whether inevitable or not, the fact remains that Functionalism, providing a partial insight into the integrative dynamic which gave rise to the EC institutions, is clearly inadequate as a heuristic device in accounting for the EC today. Even in its contextual heyday, Functionalism as seen was flawed due to its obscurity of terms, its failure to predict or prescribe events, and its failure to escape sufficiently the bounds of 'Realist thought'.

NEOFUNCTIONALISM (1950's-1960's)

As a broad generalisation, the term 'Neofunctionalism' emerged and flourished in the 1950's-1960's, in application to a body of literature comprising various attempts to revise the evidently faulty logic of traditional Functionalism, and to render the study of European integration more 'scientific', in light of analysis based on the experience of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community - 1952) and EEC (1957). While it is possible to articulate the basic features of the Neofunctionalist argument, the various versions of Neofunctionalism[51] are diverse in focus, resulting in a variety of specific integration models, an obscurity of basic terms within the field as a whole, and a consequent failure to establish a clear and coordinated analytical foundation to the Neofunctionalist 'argument.' To this extent, Neofunctionalism and traditional Functionalism share a similar methodological weakness. Relying (unavoidably perhaps) on the limited data provided by the short history of the ECSC and EEC, Neofunctionalism as conceived in the 1950's-1960's, based on the work of Ernst Haas, served to *limit its relevance temporally*, and was unable to account for developments in the 1970's, when the integration process apparently became stagnant. Theoretically influenced by the US model of a two party system with no deep ideological division, Neofunctionalism *assumed too much homogeneity, as well as unabated capitalist growth, and provided no explicit economic analysis* to account for an inevitable variation of pressures resulting from disparity in economic structures. As such, Neofunctionalism, while seeking to provide a more rigorous and explanatory alternative, in effect revised the immediate inaccuracies of Functionalism, but ironically served to perpetuate its basic methodological weaknesses, and indeed entrench them in 'EC thought', as subsequent theorists built on the Neofunctionalist argument.

The Neofunctionalist argument

While Functionalism seeks generally to provide a theoretical apparatus to pinpoint the causes of society's undesirable aspects, Neofunctionalism is a process theory, assuming a pluralistic and conflictual model of society, and focusing on the requirements for a procedural consensus, an agreed framework through which interests could be expressed. Suspicious of the Tonnian view of community (gemeinschaft), Neofunctionalism makes a virtue of dislocation, eliminating the need for majority support, by prioritising the psychology of elites, and downgrading the role of socio-pychological community as a condition of integration by focusing instead on how to harness the pressures produced by competing elements of society[52] - "The 'good Europeans' are not the main creators of the regional community that is growing up; the process...is dominated by nationally constituted groups with specific interests and aims" - (Haas).[53] The *integrative dynamic thus constitutes, not the perception of general gain, but a convergence of demands resulting from each group's perception of its own advantage*, and expressed in the interrelationship between national governments and the Commission. An emergent Community based on competing interests as opposed to common values, would eventually be expressed in the creation of a new state. Thus, where Functionalism stresses the change in popular attitudes as a test of integration, Neofunctionalism stresses formal structures and decision-making procedures, specifically the Commission's acquisition of formal powers from the national governments.[54] In attaching significance to different aspects of the integration process, Neofunctionalism is not so much a 'more adequate replacement' for Functionalism as a general theory of integration, but rather an alternative perspective rooted in, and relevant to, a different temporal context.

The inadequacy of Neofunctionalism

Focusing on the work of Ernst Haas, the founder and perhaps most sophisticated proponent of Neofunctionalism, it becomes evident that the theory's primary weakness lies in its *failure to elaborate a solid theoretical foundation.* Apart from the plethora of interpretations and variations on Haas' 'Neofunctionalist' theme, the thoughts of Haas are themselves revised over time, such that as a whole Haas' foundational 'argument' constitutes no precise analytical form. This is a clear reflection of the interplay between events and theory, but it nonetheless compromises theoretical coherence. Haas *attempts* to provide a far-sighted, predictive theory, but in the failure to achieve this, a pragmatic (and thus relatively short-sighted) approach to integration results.

To elaborate this argument, one can broadly trace the changes in Haas' views, with a specific focus on his concept of 'spillover'. In his early work, Haas *assumed* as permanent the superiority of step-by-step economic decisions over crucial political choices, as well as an absolute determinism implicit in the picture of the European economic and social structure.[55] Given this, the progression, or "*spillover*", from a politically inspired common market to an economic union and finally to a political union, was *assumed* to be automatic. Stressing the role of institutions, and the 'institutionalised pattern' as a measure of integration, Haas focused on the importance of functional linkages across sectors as a catalyst for widening the scope of policy-making, and for the 'politicisation' of the whole integration process - 'policies made in carrying out an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task itself is expanded'.[56] In other words, an integrative step may alter the conditions of competition and require new central policy decisions, of an economic and political nature, either to redress the balance of advantage, or because certain economic goals are affected by the new competitive conditions.[57]

This formulation was altered by Haas in the late 1960's, consequent to a belief that 'something was missing' in his analysis, and that he had underestimated the 'built-in' limits of pragmatic interest politics concerned with economic welfare.[58] In response to a general resistance to political integration inspired by Charles deGaulle, Haas modified the automaticity implied in his 'expansive logic' of spillover, conceding that some sectors comprising functionally specific and economically important tasks are more critical than others and have greater spillover potential, such that integrative forces do not *necessarily* infect other activities, even carried out by the same organisation.[59] In a new formulation, and addressing the specific question of the automaticity of the link between economic and political integration, he insisted that 'under modern conditions economic and political union had best be treated as a continuum', which is however mediated by three sets of intervening variables - 'background', 'process', and 'variables at the moment of economic union'.[60]

'The problem with Spillover'

The problematic concept of 'spillover' at the core of Haas' argument was originally inspired by the perception of a growing preference in the attitudes of decision-makers, bureaucrats and politicians for solving problems in the management of activities by way of further integration. Assuming a conception of sovereignty based on legal competence (in contrast to Functional theory), it was believed implicitly in early Neofunctionalist theory, and without rigorous theoretical justification, that spillover would lead to the transfer of sovereignty as it encompassed the 'high political' questions of defence and foreign policy. This evidently *ignored the importance of the authoratative element of decision-making*, the fact that continuous goal attainment is dependent on the power of government to effectively take decisions without being delayed by the need for unanimous agreement of all contending parties. Each goal attained changes the pattern of priorities under constant review, and requires a constant equalisation of rewards and

deprivations to assure the legitimacy of chosen goals. Thus a transfer of authority, or legal sovereignty, to the Community institutions, without first establishing clear Community competence for handling each state's individual redetermination of priorities, would effectively reduce the legitimacy and capacity of the Community system and the member-state subsystems to maintain system equilibrium.[61] The question of legitimacy, and 'authority-legitimacy' transfer, was not addressed by Haas until 1970.[62]

Related to this issue, an evident fault in the logic of "spillover" derived from its *failure to distinguish between 'functional' and 'political' spillover.* As late as 1970, Haas 'refuses to dichotomise the behaviour of actors between 'high' political and 'low' functional concerns'.[63] From the observation that the distinction between technical and political issues is often obscure, Haas drew the apparently faulty conclusion that integration in one respect would lead to integration in the other, thus failing to correct the mistaken relation between political and technical issues assumed in traditional Functionalism. Yet clearly, there is an important difference between, on the one hand, technical pressures leading to economic integration, and on the other, the build-up of political pressures toward integration as the focus of group activity gradually switches to the regional level. It may be said that functional spillover was in evidence in the transition from the ECSC to EEC, as 'problems of distortion and discrimination' created pressures for a common market to replace the experimental 'integration by sector approach'.[64] Yet the logic of *political* spillover failed to be legitimised by reality. From the start, the creation of the EC was the result of an assessment by politicians that it would be beneficial for their *own* economies, and indeed while the coal and steel industries were generally in favour of the EC, the attitudes of other industrialist groups ranged from positive support (eg., West Germany) to outright opposition (eg., French industrialists). Interest group activity remained at the national level through the 1970's, and the success of the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) did not, as spillover logic would predict, lead other sectors of the economy to seek benefits from similar policies.[65]

Even today, the disparity between functional and political 'spillover' is evident. The intended move from a Single Market to monetary union is inspired by functional logic (without a single currency, a single market cannot function properly), yet there has been significant political resistance to the idea (as manifested in the evident reluctance, particularly in Britain and Denmark, to ratify the Maastricht Treaty). Even after ratification, the attainment of monetary union is still far from being a certainty.

For Haas, an overemphatic faith in rationality had evidently resulted in a failure to account for the variety of factors determining political perception and allegiance, as he dismissed the possibility that governments may resist the extension of government authority - '...in the long run they tend to defer to federal decisions, lest the example of their recalcitrance set a precedence for other governments'.[66]

Assessment

Haas' broad aim was to de-emphasise the prescriptive intent of Functionalism, and to elaborate propositions to classify and analyse phenomena into relevant units, thus creating a conceptual scheme as a basis for empirical investigation.[67] In retrospect, it may be argued that Haas not only failed in this aim, but his *attempt to devise a more precise, 'scientific' foundation for the study of integration served to diffuse the meaning of his terms, and so limit the relevance of his general argument.* In seeking to detect a detailed pattern of integration, his argument was subjected to increasing modification over time, and the result was theoretical obscurity. For example, it is ironic to note that, in an attempt to limit semantic confusion about "integration", his definition of regional integration alters from one involving a shift in the loyalties of political actors, to one concerning 'how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours'.[68] Similarly, his definition of 'political community' alters from 'a condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political

authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographic space', to 'the likelihood of internal peaceful change in a setting of contending groups with mutually antagonistic aims'.[69]

In 1968, Haas acknowledged that he had previously neglected the world setting and the massive transformations of European society that occurred contemporaneously with the integration process, and had underplayed the importance of nationalism due to an implicit 'end of ideology' assumption drawn from US political science. He did not, however, attempt to provide any theory of nationalism to explain why it should persist,[70] (once again evading the issue of identity), by implicitly assuming that deGaulle's nationalism was 'a deviant case', an anachronism or aberration with no political function. His early belief that 'the advent of supranationality symbolizes the victory of economics over politics, over that familiar ethnocentric nationalism...',[71] was abandoned in the 1970's in favour of a conclusion that the whole focus of research on regional integration was mistaken, and should be switched to the wider issues of interdependence.[72] This not only reflected the stagnation of the integration process in the 1970's, but represented in effect an abandonment of integration theory, as Realist models of Intergovernmentalism, with painstaking empiricism, denied the possibility or desirability of transferring sovereignty as required for full integration.

It is thus evident that the 'foundational' work of Haas was not only faulty in its conclusions, but constituted a somewhat nebulous theoretical framework, which appeared to alter with new empirical evidence. Indeed, it may even be argued that Haas' fundamental *aim failed to remain consistent over time*. He set out to create a more 'scientific', thus descriptive and exacting approach to the study of integration,[73] but concludes in 1970, against the backcloth of a 'grab bag of nagging doubts and uncertainty', that 'the main reason for studying regional integration is thus normative'.[74] The consequent obscurity of Neofunctionalism's basic terms was confounded by the work of other theorists such as Phillippe Schmitter who further mystified the definition of

'spillover' by introducing the additional concepts of 'spillaround' (an increase in functions but not in authority), 'build-up' (an increase in decisional autonomy without entry into new issue areas) and 'spillback' (a retreat in scope and authority).[75] Joseph Nye criticised and built on the work of Haas and Mitrany to develop a Neofunctionalist model based on 'process mechanisms' and 'integrative potential'. He concluded that the linkage of tasks can produce spillover as well as 'spill-back', and that an increase in transactions may not widen the scope of integration, but simply intensify the capacity to handle a particular task.[76]

Basic terms such as 'integration' and 'political community' are subject to semantic diffusion by theorists who propose diverse definitions which depend fundamentally on value-judgments. For example, Karl Deutsch refers to integration as 'the attainment, within a territory of a sense of community and of institutions..strong enough...to assure...peaceful change', and sees 'political community' in terms of 'special groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance'.[77] For Amitai Etzioni, integration is the 'ability of a unit or system to maintain itself in the face of internal and external challenges', and a political community is a 'social unit that has self-sufficient integrative mechanisms'.[78] Leon Lindberg saw integration as an 'interactive multidimensional process' with a set of variable properties that 'bear a systematic relationship to each other at any given point in time and...over time as well'. Indeed, Lindberg's attempt to account for the complexity of factors affecting integration within a systematic theory is criticised for fragmenting states into parties, interest groups and committees, sub-national and cross-national, to such an extent that it becomes difficult to conceive of an intergovernmental process at all.[79]

The broad range of theoretical variations which constitute Neofunctionalism is clearly indicative of a continual struggle and inability to account for the process of

European integration. It is also indicative of the fact that the basic terms and concepts upon which theory has developed - "spillover", "integration", "political community", etc. - are unavoidably expressions for intangibles, which have been given spurious precision in the search for a coherent theory. The foundational work of Haas, interacting dialectically with the work of other theorists over time, has thus resulted in an increasingly diffuse set of generalisations and predictions. While the process of amending theory to incorporate new evidence is a 'valid' scientific procedure, one may argue, based on the foundational work of Lakatos' "scientific research programme" (1970) that the construction of such auxiliary hypotheses to protect a theory's hard core assumptions is justified, as long as the hypotheses are 'progressive', leading to new facts, rather than being ad hoc additions which simply 'explain away' uncomfortable anomalies. From this perspective, doubt is cast on the validity of Neofunctionalism's plethora of revisions and adaptations, which may be said to constitute an early example of theoretical 'Euro-fudge' as they serve, in subjective evaluation, to justify the failure of 'spillover' to function as originally and clearly predicted, and in effect serve to mystify the theory rather than clarify it.

It may be noted that, despite the evident failures of Neofunctionalist theory, which were acknowledged in the 1970's, the theory has regained momentum since the relaunch of the EC under Jacques Delors. The relative success of the Common Agricultural Policy, which accounts for 60% of the EC budget, and constitutes the EC's only truly common policy, has allowed the basic assumptions of Neofunctionalism to subsist, and impeded radical revision, in arguably showing that the EC does have growth inducing properties.[80] With its aim to increase production, set a fair standard of living for farm populations, and set stable markets, the CAP cannot be segregated from fiscal, industrial, regional and social policy, and its management encompasses the Commission, along with a complex bureaucratic machine reinforced by expert inputs at the national and Community level.[81] However, as an example of Neofunctionalism's perpetual

methodological weakness, no attention is paid to the reasons why agriculture is inadequate as a model for Community growth, including the fact that it is a sector with a long history of government intervention, and a basic unity of outlook among advanced industrial societies. Its application to areas where few purely 'technical' problems can be isolated and where diverse domestic pressures determine government horizons, is clearly inappropriate. Furthermore, if one *could* justify the CAP as a model for EC coordination and growth, it would not constitute an unambiguous example of successful policy-making, particularly in light of recent revelations of senior-level corruption in the Commission's management of the CAP, and increasing calls for CAP reform.[82]

FEDERALISM

An assessment of Federalism in terms of its theoretical contribution to the study of European integration, must be made in light of a distinction between European Federalism in practice as a *popular movement*, and as a *theoretical perspective*, parallel to a distinction between Federalism as a structure and as a process. In the early postwar period (1946-1960's), Federalism was prominent primarily as a movement, which focused on the elaboration of an institutional model for European unity, without establishing a rigorous theoretical analysis for how it may be achieved. This is undoubtedly reflective of the context in which the idea developed, such that political disillusionment and economic dislocation were conducive to agreement on an ambitious vision of peace, while its means for attainment were as yet unclear. It was only in the 1960's, with the development of the EC, that Federalism, in the work of theorists such as Carl Friedrich, RWG Mackay, Henri Brugmans, and Denis de Rougemont acquired a measure of theoretical sophistication as a means of describing the balance of power between EC institutions and member states, and evaluating the progress toward political union. The potential value of Federalism today lies, with regard to description, in its relevance to the

question of how to preserve local autonomy and diversity while establishing a merger of states,[83] and, with regard to prescription, in its ideological focus on the elaboration of a "European spirit". This value is nonetheless tempered by the fact that, on the one hand, Federalism has arguably *never established a firm base of popular credibility*, and on the other, it remains *theoretically ill-equipped* to explain the contemporary dynamic of European integration.

Indeed, theoretical application of the federal idea to the study of European integration is based primarily on the example and early operation of the American Constitution, which itself comprises a set of hurried remarks, without systematic theoretical reasoning. Over time, Federal literature has grown and diversified in tandem with the multiplication of Federal constitutions, producing an 'infinite variety in theory and in practice'.[84] Such heterogeneity is manifested empirically in the record of division and factionalisation in the European Federalist movement - the European Union of Federalists, formed in 1946, was first factionalised over the question of strategy upon failure of the treaty for a European Defence Community (EDC) and European Political Community (EPC) in 1954, spawning, among others, the moderate breakaway movement, Centre d'Action Européenne Federaliste (AEF) in 1956, and the radical MFE (European Federalist Movement).

The role of the Federalist movement and its various institutional theories as a whole diminished in the 1960's as the nation-state reasserted itself. It became evident that the transformation of a public sentiment into a political force was more problematic and required more rigorous analysis than Federalism had provided. De Gaulle vetoed Britain's entry to the EC in 1963, conflict over financing of the Community budget resulted in the Empty Chair crisis in 1965, followed by a clawback of the EC's powers in the Luxembourg Accord.[85] A period of apparent 'Eurosclerosis' following the 1973 oil shocks, and finally the failure of the federalist-oriented Draft Treaty on European Union in 1984, served to marginalise Federalism in the study of European integration. It was

only in the wake of the Single European Act, 'Project 1992', and proposals for economic and monetary union under the Presidency of Federalist Jacques Delors that Federalism appeared to acquire a new relevance.

The inadequacy of Federalist theory

As a counterpart to the Federalist movement (and as a reflection of its weakness), the *primary focus of Federal theory is on ends rather than means*, on politico-constitutional structure at the expense of providing an adequate theory of change. With a focus on solidifying unity while preserving diversity, it seeks to provide an institutional model for true 'democratic participation', for co-ordinate but independent regional governments, which would offer security against the 'tyranny of the majority'. These basic characteristics of Federalist theory belie a skeptical view of human society, such that heterogeneity and the existence of conflict are natural states, which can nonetheless be managed by way of authoratative institutions. Yet, significantly, its focus on preserving local diversity while forging unity necessarily implies that a constitutional model must be shaped pragmatically to the requirements of each particular case.[86] Clearly, this compromises the establishment of a solid theoretical underpinning, or basic "Federal model" against which the EC could be evaluated. If the appropriate form of Federalism is different for each case, and the requirements of each case are undoubtedly influenced by subjective interpretation, it would seem that the basic tenets of Federalist theory are inherently and necessarily vague.

Indeed, the idea that the constitutional model varies with each case creates a methodological problem, due to the fact that a Federal theory of the EC must have *some* starting point, must be based on some idea of federalism, thus inevitably on the example of an existing federal structure. This is clearly problematic, as it constitutes using one case (with the bias of its particular characteristics and assumed virtues) as the basis of theory and evaluation for an apparently dissimilar case. The predominant model giving

fuel to European Federalism is that of the United States, as will become evident upon analysis of the various assumptions underlying European Federalist thought. The extent of reliance on the US model is highlighted when contrasted to federalist thought based on alternative models. For example, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, an advocate of pan-Europeanism in the 1920's, believed that Europe must become a 'nation' *before* it can be federally united,[87] based on the experience of such federal enterprises as Germany and India. The more common assumption within European Federalism, that a European 'nation' *can develop after* the establishment of a federal framework is clearly drawn from the US example, which may itself be regarded as a peculiar, or unique, case. Thus, *to the extent that European Federalism relies on the dissimilar US model, its assumptions are questionable.*

At the same time, there is an evident gap in Federalist thought, constituting a *failure to focus sufficiently on the confederal system that was likely to precede federal union.* This may be illustrated by the example of Federalist Walter Hallstein, the first President of the European Commission, asserting, in the course of a single speech, that 'federation is one state but confederation is a league of states', yet concluding that 'there is no hard distinction between federation and confederation'.[88] In its pragmatic approach to the *process* of constitution-building, early European Federalism paid no attention to the nature of the executive, to the need for creating, parallel to any increase in the power of the European Parliament, a representative common executive to administer increasingly complex affairs.[89] This ignored the problem, apparently central to Federalism's concern for democracy, of the ratio between the powers of executive and parliament evolving in inverse proportion to one another, as government activity and complex decision-making increase (This tendency is apparent today in the concern over the EC's 'democratic deficit'). Despite efforts, such as those of Carl Friedrich, to treat Federalism as a dynamic process, in which the 'mutual relation and adaptation of clearly differentiated component

communities and an inclusive community is continuously at issue',[90] it was only in the context of Neofunctionalism that the Community was adequately analysed as a process over time.

As seen in the case of Neofunctionalism, the lack of a solid monolithic theoretical underpinning to the various versions of Federalism as applied to the EC, has resulted in *obscurity and contradiction in the definition and use of concepts, and an implication of basic assumptions without analytical justification.* Of contemporary relevance is Federalism's use of "Europeanism", of the "European spirit", both as a vehicle and as a goal of European unity.[91] An attempt to pinpoint the core elements of the European Doctrine in the postwar period reveals a lack of common ground among its proponents, except in their common usage of 'Europe' as a symbol. To Conservatives, United Europe implied the salvation of an ancient civilisation, while to Socialists European unity represented a mass movement built along class lines, designed to save the European economy from capitalism.[92] The nebulous character of the 'European Spirit' as used in European Federalist literature may be said to reflect the fact that it was to a large extent a contrived fiction, proposed by early 'Euro-enthusiasts' more as a hope than as an assessment of reality. The common European heritage which is invoked in Federalist writing is rightly perceived to constitute a consciousness in the form of a mosaic, simultaneously built upon the self-consciousness of each nation, and revolving around its particular cultural identity.[93] Cultural, political and geographical contours of Europe determine diverse conceptualisations of the 'common European home'. While this diffuse heritage is insufficient in itself to inspire a supranational identity, European Federalism is characteristically weak on how to *transform* it into a unifying spirit. Much can be said to reveal and promote the existence of a common European identity (See chapters 2 and 3), but European Federalist literature, again biased by the US model of a nation evolving *subsequent* to a federal structure, fails to do so. This being the case, the reliance on

public sentiment to create federal unity, combined with the failure of the federalist program to provide an adequate theory of change, or to focus more fundamentally on the issue of identity to compensate for the weakness of the European spirit, are highlighted as particularly serious flaws.

A further area in which European Federalism is seen to be weak concerns its *normative assumptions* concerning the advantages and guarantees of the Federal structure. In its concern to prevent a 'tyranny of the majority', it establishes a barrier to the legal reach of central government, but in practice, in the example of the US model, this is seen to have a negative effect in serving entrenched interests, benefitting 'capitalists, landlords, linguistic minorities and racists',[94] by holding up social policy, and encouraging general political frustration. At the same time, Federalism is seen to overstate the guarantees of local autonomy which accompany the definition of powers, glossing over the disparity between self-contained needs of a region and federally conceived priorities, which results in conflicts of jurisdiction.[95] To assume the benefits of a federal structure without rigorous theoretical justification is indicative not only of the biased perspective invoked by the US model but of an over-confident evaluation of that model. To highlight by contrast, if one were to use the federal structure of the USSR as the starting point for a federal approach to the EC, the nature of the argument and its presuppositions regarding the omnipresence of central government would appear very different.

Indeed, it may be said that the *association commonly made between federalism and individual freedom is a myth*. The individual is seen, in Federal writing, as a cell, the irreducible organic element of a society, but functioning only as part of a group. Thus the autonomy of the individual is not guaranteed, or even addressed *per se*, except with regard to the groups to which he belongs.[96] As such, from many perspectives, Federal ideas are akin to anti-democratic ideas, championing the 'concrete against the abstract,

definite freedoms against freedom in general, natural communities against the isolated individual.'[97] This individual-collective tension, this apparent contradiction between the autonomy of the individual and the needs of the community, will be addressed in the context of forging a new 'European identity' in Chapter 3.

Assessment

From the argument so far, it is evident that a simple and conclusive appraisal of Federalism as a theory of European integration, is precluded by its somewhat amorphous character as a body of thought, which is seen to alter according to temporal context and events in the development of the EC.[98] For example, John Pinder uses Federalism today as a measure by which to assess the EC's progress toward unity, and suggests a 'neo-federal' approach by which federal unity may be inspired. Combining classical Federalism and Neofunctionalism, Pinder focuses on the process toward federalism, stressing the need to combine the force of the federal aim with forces (ie., industrial and financial) having a particular pragmatic interest in particular steps. With forces lodged for and against Union, each positive step, according to Pinder, lends conviction to the idea that Community institutions can be entrusted with new tasks, so strengthening the Federalist case.[99]

It may be said that Pinder's approach constitutes an attempt to fill in the gap where classical Federalism failed to provide a theory of change. Nonetheless, it is evident that, evaluating the record as a whole, European Federalism has proved ill-equipped to serve as a source of explaining integration, while it is contentious in its prescriptive aims, and its ideological effect in practice on the process of integration has been insufficient to fulfil the Federal aim. The theoretical deficiencies of the Federal approach are rooted, as seen, in the reluctance and inability to provide a rigid and precise theoretical model, with the realisation that every context is unique, and that federal experiments may vary immensely. At the same time, European Federalism continues to be rooted in the US

model, without questioning the legitimacy of applying it as an ideal to the quite dissimilar socio-political context of Europe, and without due account to the divergence between the model in theory and its success in practice.[100] As in the case of Functionalism and Neofunctionalism, Federalism is problematic both in explanation and in prescription, arguably due to the misguided aim to account for integration on the basis of a select range of variables.

It may be concluded that Federalism, in application to the EC, constitutes more of an advocacy theory than a heuristic device. This being the case, it is instructive to stress that Federal union (however defined) is one possible outcome of European integration, but it is by no means an unquestioned aspiration, let alone reality. The Treaty of Rome is committed to an 'ever closer union among the peoples of Europe', which was a purposely vague aspiration, avoiding the issue of the EC's ultimate goal. Similarly, the Single European Act (Title III) establishes no more than an 'endeavour to achieve' a European foreign policy, and even the Maastricht Treaty fails to make a *firm* commitment to political and monetary union - if, in 1996, at least seven states are deemed ready for monetary union, they will at that point decide when the move to a single currency will occur.[101] The characteristically gradualist, sector-by-sector policy-making structure further reflects an essential pragmatism with regard to the eventual aims of the EC, and the reluctance of member governments to agree on a definition of problems they face or strategy to follow.[102] Not only is the future of the EC somewhat obscure, but (in the context of contemporary advancements toward integration) the idea of Federal union has continued to inspire opposition from states such as Britain, with no domestic history of federalism, and no intention to create one - "We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them reimposed at a European level with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels" (Margaret Thatcher, Bruges, September 20, 1988).[103] The fact that the idea of Federalism continues to inspire

opposition among the member states, is indicative of the continued conceptual predominance of the nation-state, and so is significantly indicative of European Federalism's failure to make a sufficient impact on the integration process.

INTERGOVERNMENTALISM (1970's-mid 1980's)

In contrast to the essentially pro-integration orientation of Functionalism, Neo-functionalism and Federalism, the Intergovernmental perspective focuses on political processes which have evolved in spite of the EC's institutional arrangements to promote eventual political union. Its legitimacy and prominence in the study of European integration derives from, and is reflective of, the predominance of the Realist paradigm as the basis of International Relations theory since 1945, and as such does not constitute so much a theory of integration as a theoretical *resistance* to integration. Stressing the supremacy of national sovereignty and self-interest, on the assumption that states are rational, unitary, self-seeking, power-oriented actors, Intergovernmentalism implicitly maintains that the goal of supranationalism is unattainable. Achieving prominence in the wake of the 1965 "Empty Chair Crisis" and Luxembourg Accord of 1966, and throughout the period of 'Euro-stagnation' in the 1970's, Intergovernmentalism has served as a reflection and barometer of pessimism and crisis on the path to unity, more than a source of insight into the integration process. It accounts for the apparent progress toward integration in terms of 'marriages of convenience', or mutual exploitation wherein governments seek to mobilise and accumulate the resources of neighbouring states for the purpose of furthering their own power.

Clearly, it must be conceded that the Intergovernmental perspective is useful and relevant as a descriptive device to the extent that member states do act autonomously within the EC, and to the extent that progress toward full political union is hindered by the reluctance of member states to yield national sovereignty. In addition, a state-centric

approach, while unable to account for the apparent moves toward supranationalism in the EC, may provide an insight into the dynamics that have led to cooperation (and integration) among a set of previously atomised and conflictual state units. More specifically, the creation of cooperation and trust among states may be explained with reference to the Realist's Prisoner's Dilemma. In the context of 'pre-integration', 'billiard-ball' interaction, each state prefers mutual cooperation to mutual defection, but also successful cheating to mutual cooperation, and mutual defection to victimisation by another's cheating. In a single play of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the result, due to a mutual lack of trust, is mutual defection. Yet as Robert Axelrod observes, cooperation may emerge from a strategy of 'tit-for-tat', with each player adhering to its promises for as long as its partners do. The more times the interaction is repeated, and the greater the prospects for future interaction, mutual cooperation is gradually perceived to be the optimal long-term strategy.[104] The PD analogy may suggest how the EC has overcome national divisions to reach its current stage of integration. The sectoral, gradualist strategy adopted by the EC is analogous to the dynamic of tit-for-tat, and one may argue that the logical extension of the continued reiteration of PD is, in the European case, full economic and political integration.

The weaknesses of the Intergovernmental approach

Yet in general it may be argued that the heuristic power of the Intergovernmental perspective exists *in spite of* and not by virtue of its adherence to a Realist 'billiard-ball' model of interstate relations. As will be seen, contemporary member state-EC relations are more aptly defined as a 'cobweb'.[105] A state-centric perspective can today be applied to characterise factors such as the continued supremacy of the Council of Ministers at the pinnacle of the EC legislative process; the limited scope of majority voting; the continued relative weakness of the European Parliament,[106] the entrenchment of the (Heads of State) European Summit since 1974; the prominence of COREPER

(Committee of Permanent Representatives) servicing the Council and providing ample opportunity for national government interference.

Nonetheless, it may be argued that the Intergovernmental perspective has lost relevance and credibility as the EC has developed. With the revitalisation of the Community since the mid-1980's, and the contemporary efforts to secure political and monetary union, the loss of state sovereignty, both legally and in general terms of authority and independence, is becoming an undeniable fact. Not only does increasing EC competence compromise member states' freedom of action, and EC law take precedence over national law in areas including banking and insurance, but proposals for a single currency and common defence union outlined in the Maastricht Treaty constitute a potential strike into the heart of national sovereignty.[107] As such, the Intergovernmentalist today cannot easily uphold the claim that each step a state takes toward integration is undertaken for self-interested reasons - the theorist must either deny the loss of sovereignty as a consequence of integration, or must counter the seemingly illogical fact that in the EC, states may be seen to be sacrificing the Realist's "end" (sovereignty) by way of the "means" (integration). Moreover, facts such as deGaulle's walk-out from the Council of Ministers in 1965, and the member states' self-interested reaction to the 1973 oil shocks, may be used to lend weight to a (negative) Intergovernmental evaluation of the EC's prospects for unity, but one may argue that such events cannot legitimately be generalised in a contemporary assessment of the EC, as the Community was, in the 1970's, at at less mature stage of development, and has moved a significant way along the path to unity in the interim period.

The Intergovernmental approach flourished in the wake of De Gaulle's re-affirmation of nationalism in the Community in 1965. A primary spokesman of the perspective, Stanley Hoffmann, proclaimed, in a vein of conservative agnosticism, the 'obstinacy' of the nation-state in Western Europe, suggesting that governments were proving capable and determined to resist attacks on their independence, and were

responding to integrative pressures by seeking to retain some semblance of control wherever possible.[108] Hoffmann's contribution to EC literature is a set of propositions which have been incorporated in the field of study, but which upon analysis and from a contemporary perspective prove weak. His distinction between 'high' politics (matters of state security, independence, provision of vital resources etc.) and 'low' politics (technical, economic, administrative matters), and his assertion that states are more likely to collaborate in the former domain than the latter, is over-simplistic and contentious. As discussed in the context of Functionalism and Neofunctionalism,[109] the relationship and distinction between political and technical issues is far from clear-cut. It would seem that each theory of integration seeks to clarify the relationship, and each draws a different conclusion, yet each errs in one direction or another. While Functionalism and Neofunctionalism assume too much fluidity in the boundaries between them, Intergovernmentalism errs in the opposite direction, perceiving them as mutually exclusive. In practice the two areas are both distinct and overlapping, in a complex relationship - a seemingly technical issue in practice may be rendered highly political depending on its interest to and effect on a government's support base in the electorate.

Moreover, the lack of conceptual sophistication in the Intergovernmental approach involves a *tendency toward contentious dogmatism* which misrepresents the empirical reality of the EC. Based on Realist premisses, state sovereignty is perceived as a non-negotiable, indivisible and unchanging element of statehood, and the 'national interest', a nation's 'vital interests', are assumed to constitute a generalised set of interests and priorities essentially related to independence and military power, which are basically uniform, not subject to domestic claim and counter-claim. The apparent validity of these claims rests on the dominance of the Realist paradigm in political science as a whole. However, it may be argued (indeed, it is a fundamental contention of this thesis) that Realism's unquestioned legitimacy, based on a claim to scientific objectivity, is unwarranted. Hans Morgenthau, the father of political realism, sought, in Politics among

Nations (1948), to elevate the study of politics to the status of a science, from which prescriptions for action could be attained. Yet far from following a deductive, 'scientific' progression from enquiry to conclusion, and finally to prescription, he bases prescription on a set of assumptions to which he invalidly grants an objective, 'scientific' status -"...politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature"; "statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power".[110] Robert Cox has accused (neo)Realism for constituting the "superficiality of positivistic atomism and structuralism's inability to account for change, with an ideological aversion to critical thinking about values", and for "taking a form of thought derived from a particular phase of history, and assuming it to be universally valid."[111] If, as will be argued, Realist premisses are ultimately a matter of perception, prescriptive rather than descriptive in nature, one may contend that the tenets of Realism constitute an outdated and acontextual conceptual foundation to the study of the EC, and to International Relations in general (See Chapter 2).

Having analysed the four basic theoretical approaches to the study of the EC in their temporal context, it may further be noted that none is adequate today as a tool to reflect or account for the nuances of contemporary member state-EC relations, the subtleties of concensus-building, and the diversity of pressures which affect policy formation. In practice, national governments must assume the role of mediator between the domestic and EC arenas, seeking to construct policy packages which represent both domestic claims and satisfy EC negotiations in Brussels.[112] The 'National interest', moreover, proves in practice to be far less than a highly orchestrated and impenetrable front, but can be more appropriately characterised as a set of conflicting and parallel demands seeking to be heard. The definition in practice of 'vital interests' is both subjective and fluid, determined largely by the extent to which various issues are bound to sway votes.[113] As such, negotiating in the EC cannot be adequately labelled a zero-

sum game, as national governments resemble 'the juggler who must apply himself simultaneously to the tasks of keeping several balls in the air and not losing his balance on the rotating platform.'[114] Ernst Haas' description of the EC in 1977 as a 'semi-lattice' form of organisation articulates the complexity of dynamics at work -' Lines of authority duplicate and overlap; tasks are performed in fragments by many sub-systems; sometimes authority flows sideways and upwards, at other times the flow is downward'.[115] Member states have clearly lost, and are increasingly losing a degree of 'sovereignty', of authority in practice as integration proceeds, but far from constituting a clear transfer of authority to 'the Community', it may be said that sovereignty is being absorbed by a decision-making network in which accountability is ill-defined.[116] As such, it would appear that the process of integration cannot be subjected to a simple black/white, either/or evaluation, but rather requires a perspective in which the complexity and nuances in the relations among various factors can be appreciated (See Chapter 3 - the new 'non-fixed', non-essential conceptual foundation).

CONTEMPORARY EC THEORY - A SYNTHESIS OR AN ALTERNATIVE?

Political and intellectual debates about the dynamics of integration today continue to lack agreed concepts or frames of reference.[117] As confirmation of, and as an attempt to escape the limitations of each broad conceptual approach, contemporary theorists tend toward a synthesis of approaches in an attempt to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the EC. These attempts, one may argue, constitute a theoretical struggle to account for developments within the EC as events outgrow the common conceptual foundation upon which all theoretical approaches are based. For example, Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann perceive the contemporary EC as a network involving the *'pooling of sovereignty'* (sharing the capability to make decisions among governments, as opposed to a 'transfer of sovereignty'), with a political process or style of decision-making which is

termed 'supranational', but which rests on intergovernmental bargains.[118] They use the term 'supranationality,' not to characterise the distribution of power between the EC and member states, but to describe a 'cumulative pattern of accommodation in which participants refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals' but who seek agreement by way of compromises upgrading the common interest.[119] 'Spillover' is not deemed to be automatic within this perspective, but occurs in the wake of intergovernmental bargaining based on a common policy orientation.

While it may be a legitimate exercise to synthesise a characterisation of the EC from diverse theoretical approaches, it has a tendency to lead to conceptual obscurity, or 'Euro-fudge'. In Keohane and Hoffmann's thesis, there is an inherent obscurity in juxtaposing the concept of 'spillover' and 'intergovernmental' bargains, as the former term by definition implies a *unifying* dynamic whereby one integrative move perpetuates another, and the latter implies pragmatic decision-making aimed at *safeguarding national interests*. For Keohane and Hoffmann to claim that national-oriented intergovernmental bargaining leads to integrative spillover, would appear to constitute a contradiction, which can only be avoided by way of a clearly explained conceptual modification of the two terms, but instead this modification is obscurely implied rather than articulated in their work.

Contemporary EC literature reveals a proliferation of such conceptual innovation which, one may argue, serves to obfuscate more than to clarify the field of study. Wolfgang Wessels, for example, rejects the notion of 'pooled sovereignty' in favour of '*cooperative federalism*', to make the subtle argument that national systems, while basically sovereign, do not retain absolute authority, but have been amalgamated into a new common system, which lies somewhere between a federation and an intergovernmental structure.[120] Juliet Lodge, in accounting for the integrative dynamic, has cast a positive light on an essentially problematic reality, with the notion of '*locked-in integration*'. Lodge maintains that conflict between the states and EC institutions

confirms the EC's role as a frame of reference for policy decisions formerly taken at the domestic level, and as such *entrenches* integrative ties. Further, her notion of *'spilldown'* maintains that an increase of demands placed on the EC framework will incite more groups wanting to be heard, and will thus encourage participation in the EC at the local level, so promoting unity.[121] Lodge's work may be seen as an example of a 'splintering' of theoretical coherence, as various theorists propose additions and modifications to existing theoretical formulations, resulting in diverse, and often conflicting, detailed intra-EC analyses. In the same vein, explanations of, and solutions for the 'EC's democratic deficit' have been proposed by Lodge, and others such as Shirley Williams, Peter Ludlow, and John Pinder, all of which vary in perception and prescription.[122]

The contemporary trend in combining theoretical approaches can be said to constitute a general shift away from an institutional-based perspective in favour of a policy-oriented analysis. An emphasis on the policy process indicates a shift away from the broad and apparently complex question of the EC's ultimate direction, in favour of description, a more pragmatic, intra-EC focus, with a greater awareness of the importance of seemingly mundane issues at the national policy level. As such, the policy-oriented approach may be seen as a reflection of the contemporary developmental stage of the EC, such that the complexity of vertical and horizontal pressures with which national governments must contend is becoming increasingly apparent. Since the revitalisation of the Community with the Single European Act in 1987, and the creation of the 1992 Single European Market, the EC has been confronted with a brick wall of public opinion. It would seem that the Maastricht Treaty (on European Union) has outstretched the European public's tolerance of the EC's reputation as a faceless, out-of-touch bureaucracy. The marginal result of the French referendum, the initial Danish 'No' vote,[123] and Britain's reluctance to ratify the Treaty have invoked the question of European identity, and an awareness of the need to include the European citizen on the path to unity. Indeed, a restructuring in 1994 of Directorate-General X (Information,

Communication, and Culture), is motivated by the will to revamp the European Commission's image, and to establish greater contact with the citizen. By encouraging greater 'openness' and 'transparency' in its actions, the aim is to inspire popular confidence and allow the citizen a more effective "participation" in the decision-making process.[124] The importance of compliance at the national level, and the difficulty in securing it, is clearly exemplified in the case of Britain, with Margaret Thatcher's deposition over the 'question of Europe', and John Major's battle with Tory hardliners and Labour opposition over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.[125]

CONCLUSION/PROJECTION

Having analysed and evaluated the broad field of EC theory according to a basic conceptual categorisation, it is possible to detect certain trends and consistencies spanning the theoretical field, which arguably constitute fundamental faultlines. It is evident that none of the four theoretical approaches is able to account for the range and diversity of factors which, in both space and time, contribute to the process of European integration. From the preceding critique, it may be said that EC theory is inadequate as a result of its unquestioned *ambition* to characterise integration according to a progressive pattern of development, as well as its implicit conceptual assumptions relating to identity, such as 'nationalism', and 'sovereignty'. These premisses and assumptions constitute the conceptual framework of contemporary Western political thought, the 'Enlightenment paradigm', upon which all academic approaches to the EC are inevitably based (See Chapter 2). As integration has progressed, this paradigm has been rendered incapable of accounting for the increasingly complex interweaving dynamics of the integration process. It is thus *the assumptions of this paradigm, attempting to impose order onto the chaos of European integration, that need to be redressed if a better understanding of the European Community, past and future, is to be attained.*

Admittedly, it may be argued by some that the phenomenon of European integration does not in fact challenge the foundation of contemporary thought, that it is entirely consistent with the concepts of 'nation', 'sovereignty', and 'self/other'. This debate clearly revolves around one's definition of 'integration'. Some maintain that the EC is and should remain primarily an economic integration, that ultimate political authority should remain in the hands of the nation-state. To counter this view, it may be argued that a Single European Market requires ultimately a single currency to facilitate the free movement of goods, and to prevent geographical fluctuations in value. In turn, a single currency constitutes a transfer of 'economic sovereignty' from the nation-state to the EC, and as seen in this chapter, the realms of the economic and political share a complex interrelation, such that a compromise of political sovereignty is inevitable. Maintaining therefore that European integration is by definition necessarily both economic and political,[126] *it will here be assumed that the implied end-state of European integration, to be distinguished from 'complex interdependence', is a social and political structure beyond the sovereign nation-state, beyond social and political compartmentalisation, and as such beyond the assumptions of contemporary political thought.* This definition will be justified as being both appropriate and desirable, by showing the debilitating effect of contemporary 'self/other' thought, as compared with the heuristic and 'morally' desirable effect of the 'new conceptual foundation' to be elaborated.

As will be seen in Chapter 2, the assumptions of the Enlightenment paradigm include a belief in Progress, as well as the concepts of Sovereignty, the Nation-state, National identity, Citizenship, and Democracy. These concepts are implicit in the study of the EC (even where national sovereignty is seemingly *challenged*), and serve to inherently limit understanding and promotion of the integration process.[127] As seen, the attempts of Functionalism, Neofunctionalism, and Federalism to challenge the nation-state and 'national sovereignty', involved the idea of a transfer of 'sovereignty' to a post-national entity. Not only were these predictions over-ambitious at the time they were

made, but in each case they were simplistically conceived, without due attention to various factors including the issue of identity, to the dynamics of personal and group allegiance. The fundamental concepts of sovereignty and nationalism were evidently left unchallenged as implicit assumptions (they were not subjected to critique *as concepts*), when, as will be seen in Chapter 2, it is precisely these concepts which are at issue in the process of European integration.

Inevitably, any explanation of European integration constitutes a set of ideas about a set of ideas, and to philosophise about political action is itself a political action. The history of the EC cannot be aptly depicted as a unilinear event, but is rather constitutive of a series of parallel, constantly evolving and interweaving events, concepts and values over time which appear to defy clear systematisation. If at the outset, the EC's development was inspired by security issues, its development today can be seen primarily as a response to 'modern' life; the heightened concern for quality of life and the environment, the alienation of local government and growth of transnational movements encouraged by advanced communications. To this extent, an understanding of the EC today is necessarily a philosophical and sociological understanding of a complex value structure. EC theorists are caught in a hermeneutic web, seeking to explain phenomena by 'explaining explanations of phenomena, and meanwhile making phenomena in explaining them'.[128]

Thus, in attempting to address and redress the theoretical weaknesses of EC theory, it is of central importance to acknowledge the obscurity in the division between fact and value, description and prescription, subjectivity and objectivity, self and other. Against the background of this acknowledgement, the legitimacy and value in seeking to subject the phenomenon of the EC to 'scientific', objective explanation is clearly questionable. Apart from the absence of an experimental 'control situation' characteristic of 'scientific' research, and the fact that much of the data is ethical in nature, and

constitutes an ever-changing series of dynamics, the selection of variables for study itself constitutes a value-judgement. In accordance with Hedley Bull, it may be said that the objective neutrality of the empirical questions, as well as their answers is doubtful - 'general propositions about this subject must derive from a scientifically imperfect process of perception or intuition'.[129] Indeed, within the main theories of integration as analysed, (and even within this analysis itself), there is a distinct and consequential element of value-laden prescription and subjective perception. Given this methodological dilemma, and the fact that thirty-five years of theorising have failed to produce a coherent and objective descriptive theory of the EC, and given the interplay between theory and action, *there is scope for advocating an emphasis on normative prescriptive theorising, at the expense of the predominant Realist emphasis on description.* To the extent that 'Europe will be made by its own idea of what Europe could be',[130] the subjective/objective dialectic may be used to positive effect, by realising the fluid inter-relation between the subjective and objective, and focusing on 'subjective' prescription, to affect the 'objective' reality.

Admitting thus the value of prescriptive theorising, it will be argued in Chapter 2 that the understanding and prospect of European integration revolves around the issue of identity. Not only is the present lack of, or obscurity of, European identity an obstacle to the development of a true European *community*, or gemeinschaft, but the essential concept of identity assumed in Western political thought, in the form of self/other opposition, determines and limits the study of the EC. Theoretical inadequacy in the study of the EC will be traced to a modern identity 'crisis', and in turn it will be argued that a *prescriptive* reconceptualisation of identity can be effective, not only in fostering a new European identity, but in promoting understanding of the integration process, past and present. Indeed, whether or not one concedes that theoretical inadequacy in the study of the EC is *primarily* rooted in the issue of identity, as will be argued in the next chapter,

the argument thus far has revealed the inadequacy of 'EC theory', and it will henceforth be seen that a focus on identity constitutes *at least* one way to enhance the study and the 'objective' progress of European integration.

[1]In the wake of a positive result in the second Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (May 18,1993),and a Federalist initiative to 'get on with European construction', there is still a belief that "the British view of the Community looks like it may prevail...the Single Market hasn't really happened, the monetary system is close to collapse and people don't trust Maastricht" (Sunday Times, London, May 23, 1993). I wish to suggest that the despondency which has arisen over the struggle to ratify the Maastricht Treaty, does not detract from the overall success of the integration project to date. Moreover, it will be henceforth argued that such despondency is rooted in the conceptual rigidity of contemporary thought, and as such it is the aim of the thesis to dismantle such 'obstacles' in the path of an otherwise successful process of integration.

[2]It will be argued that all theories of integration, including those which propose a European social and political configuration beyond the nation-state, implicitly assume and condone the conceptual foundation of the 'nation-state', by assuming fundamental self/other opposition.

[3]Where I refer to the 'conceptual foundation of integration literature', I am referring to the 'mainstream' of EC thought, and am not denying the possibility that attempts have already been made, on the fringe of modern political thought, to address and step beyond the self/other conceptual foundation of the nation-state, as I am seeking to do.

[4]The term 'conservative' is here being used to mean 'dislike of great or sudden change; attempt to maintain the status quo', and is not intended to ascribe anti-integration sentiment solely or even mostly to supporters of political Conservatism. Euro-enthusiasts and Euro-sceptics are not distinguished along party lines, as seen for example with regard to the Maastricht Treaty, where national debates have tended to cut across party lines. Indeed, in Denmark, the first referendum on the Maastricht Treaty resulted in a 'no' vote, due not to ideological reasons, but rather to a concern over excessive bureaucracy.

[5]A new European identity will be elaborated with an intended application to the 'European Community', as a tool for forging unity within the EC. However, because the boundaries of this new form of identity are fluid, the new European identity is not coterminous with the EC member states, but rather it is an identity which encompasses and goes beyond the Community of the 'twelve', conducive to enlargement of the EC and to the dynamics of modernity more generally (see Chapter 2).

[6]Donald Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration", Journal of Common Market Studies,Vol.X, no.3 , March 1972, p 267

[7]Throughout the thesis, the terms 'Enlightenment thought', and 'Enlightenment paradigm' will be used to denote the conceptual foundation of contemporary thought, which can be generally traced back to 17th/18th century political theories, and which include the concepts of nation-state and sovereignty. The term 'Enlightenment' is thus being used in a general sense, to imply thought which includes ideas developed *since* the time of the Enlightenment - it is understood that many Enlightenment thinkers may have considered themselves 'cosmopolitans',and were not necessarily stong adherents to the idea of the 'nation-state'. In maintaining that concepts such as sovereignty and the nation-state are predominant features of contemporary thought, I do not wish to delimit a specific starting point for this predominance, for I recognise that conceptual origins are subject to debate, necessarily affected by subjective perception.

[8]Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford University Press:California, 1968) pxix

[9]...including PS Reinsch, L.Woolf, GHD. Cole, HRG Greaves, P.Potter, E. Sevency

[10]Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford University Press: California, 1964) p8.

[11]"In contrast to the Federalists, the Functionalists have never organised themselves, but their ideas have spread everywhere"-Altiero Spinelli, in David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (Martin Robertson &Co., 1975) p240

[12]Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p8,13,21,23

[13]It is precisely this process of 'bypassing' which, I argue, lies at the root of theoretical inadequacy in the study of the EC.

[14]David Mitrany, "A Working Peace System (1943)", The Functional Theory of Politics, p125

[15]Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p6

[16]Gene Edward Rainey, review of A Working Peace System (1966) in the Journal of Politics, Gainsville, Fda., Vol.29, (1968), p240

[17]Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics , p 248

[18]David Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional?, International Regionalism, ed. Joseph Nye (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968) p62

[19]RJ Harrison, Europe in Question (Allen & Unwin Ltd.,1974) p28

[20]Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration", p66

[21]Paul Taylor, The Limits of European Integration (Columbia University Press: NY, 1983) p19

[22]Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p11

[23]Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics,p128

[24]It will be seen that Functionalism's aim to avoid the rigidity of an overarching framework, in fact belies an implicit assumption of the framework of the nation-state.

[25]Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, p248

[26]James E.Dougherty and RL Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations , 3rd ed. (NY: Harper Collins, 1990) p432

[27]Harrison, p39

[28]Harrison, p36. Thus, Functionalism's predictive power was undermined by its failure to account for the complexity of factors involved. The attempt to force the integration process within the parameters of a 'parsimonious explanatory scheme' failed, so supporting the argument that the attempt to do so is misguided.

[29]Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p14-19, p23

[30]Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration", p65

[31]Haas, Beyond the Nation-State,p30.

[32]Ernst Haas' Neofunctionalism reformulated Functionalism with a theory of interest politics.

[33]Clearly, Mitrany failed to realise the extent to which emotional loyalty to the nation is fundamentally tied up with self-perception, with personal identity, and thus with the self/other binary conceptual foundation of contemporary thought. His Functional logic was prescriptive in intention, yet it failed to realise the need to address and alter basic ways of thinking, so as to affect emotional allegiance. This failure is indicative of an implicit assumption of the contemporary concept of self/other (personal and group) identity, which as will be argued is constitutive of the restrictive nature of contemporary thought.

[34]Haas, Beyond the Nation -State, p3

[35]Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration", p60-61

[36]Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (London: Faber & Faber, 1973) p29; Donald Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration", p277; Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, 2nd.ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978) p198

[37]Harrison, p.37

[38]Haas' critique of Mitrany in Beyond the Nation-State, p35

[39]F.Tonnies, Fundamental Concepts of Sociology: Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (New York, 1940), as referred to by Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p22

[40]Haas, Beyond the Nation -State, p26

[41]It will be seen that the obscurity of conceptual terms is evident in all four of the main theories of integration. This is arguably indicative of an attempt to stretch existing concepts (unsuccessfully) to account for a complex and dynamic process.

[42]Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966) p27; "The Prospect of Integration", p46, p49

[43] ...as conceptualised by Emile Durkheim. Harrison, p.37

[44]Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society (NY:Collier-Macmillan,1968) p98

[45]The problem of moving from economic to political union is the primary problem being tackled in the EC today, most currently evidenced in the recent struggle to ratify the Maastricht Treaty.

[46]Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, p255 . Again, it is seen that the *simplicity* of Mitrany's argument served to render it inadequate.

[47]...that state is a sole, rational,unitary, self-seeking, power-oriented actor, and that international politics is a zero-sum game.

[48]Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p432

[49]Harrison, p31

[50]Haas, Beyond the Nation-State,p24

[51]For example, as expounded by Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg, Phillipe Schmitter, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye

[52]Taylor, p6

[53]Haas, Uniting of Europe (1968), p xxxiii

[54]Neofunctionalism here overlaps with Federalist theory.

[55]Haas' summary of his early views, "Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America", Journal of Common Market Studies, 5:4 (June 1967)

[56]Haas, Beyond the Nation State, p111

[57]Harrison, p82

[58]Haas, "The Uniting of Europe' and the Uniting of Latin America", Journal of Common Market Studies, (June 1967),p327.

[59]Ernst Haas, "International Integration: the European and the Universal process', International Political Communities (NY: Doubleday,1966) p102. It is interesting to note that Haas' reformulation continues to evade a critique of nationalism and sovereignty *as concepts*, leaving them unchallenged as implicit assumptions. As such, it may be said, in the context of this thesis, that Haas addresses the *fact* that spillover failed to work as expected, but ignores the question as to *why* this was the case.

[60]Ernst Haas and P.Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America", International Organisation, XVIII, (autumn 1964)

[61]Harrison, p90

[62]Ernst Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing", International Organisation, 24, no4 (autumn 1970)

[63]Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing", p608

[64]Economist 1956, quoted in Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community, 2nd.ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1991) p25

[65]George, p.27

[66]Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe, *Author's Preface 1968* (Stanford University Press, California, 1968), p xxxiv. As seen in the case of Functionalism, the simplicity of Haas' argument (its aim to provide a parsimonious theoretical model) renders it weak and inadequate. This is an example in support of my general argument (to be elaborated later) that EC theory is debilitated by its rational assumptions.

[67]Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p7

[68]Respectively, Haas, The Uniting of Europe (1958), p16, and Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing", p610

[69]Respectively, Haas, Uniting of Europe (1958), p5, and Haas, International Integration; the European and the Universal Process (1961)p366

[70]George, p30

[71]Ernst Haas, "Technocracy,Pluralism and the New Europe", A New Europe?, ed. Stephen Graubard (Boston ,1963)

[72]Ernst Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley, Calif.:Institute of International Studies, 1976)

[73]Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p9 - "Our task is the assessment of empirical data in an effort to determine whether and why development leading to the evolution of a community are taking place".

[74]Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing",p608

[75]P.Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration", International Organisation, 24,no4.(1970), p.846

[76]Joseph Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organisation (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971) p56-58

[77]K.Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) p5

[78]Etzioni, p11

[79]Pentland, p123

[80]Harrison, p88

[81]Juliet Lodge,"Community Decision Making: towards the Single European Market", Politics in Western Europe Today, ed. DW Urwin (NY:Longman, 1990) p212

[82]The suicide of a senior-level Commission 'fonctionnaire' (Quatraro) in March 1993, made public a network of corruption in the agricultural sector. Tobacco produced in Italy was being destroyed in Albania to collect EC subsidies. Investigations revealed Ecu270 million worth of fraud against the Community budget in 1992, believed to be the tip of an iceberg, stemming primarily from the agricultural sector, and non-payment of customs duties and VAT. For example, cattle declared for export to North Africa were instead slaughtered and sold in Europe. - The European, 29April-2 May, 1993, p15

[83]Harrison, p66

[84]Valerie Earle ed., Federalism: An Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, Illinois: Peacock, 1968)

[85]In July, 1965, Charles de Gaulle staged a French walkout from the Council of Ministers, boycotting all Community institutions, in his alarm at the EC's apparently rapid movement toward supranationalism. The Luxembourg Accord (Jan.1966) re-instated the French within the Community, agreeing to an indefinite hold on majority voting, and to increased consultation with the governments of member states on Community proposals.- Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community, p9-12.

[86]Henri Brugmans, La pensee politique du federalisme (Sijthoff-Leyde, 1969) p.8. Also in Harrison, p45. Federalism seeks to provide a prescriptive model which nonetheless must be altered for each particular case. This contradiction between seeking in principle a universal model, and needing in practice to keep this model open-ended, was also evident in Functionalism, and provides further support for my view that the aim to construct a 'scientific ' model (based on a select range of variables) for the study of integration, is misguided.

[87]Coudenhove-Kalergi, Die europaische Nation, (1953)

[88]Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration', p54

[89]Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration', p56-57

[90]Friedrich,Europe:An Emergent Nation?, (NY: Harper & Row, 1969) p28

[91]For example, see Denis de Rougemont, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi- analysis of the "European idea" will be taken up in Chapter 2.

[92]Haas, Uniting of Europe, p25

[93]For example, Friedrich, Chapter 1

[94]WH Riker , Federalism: Origin, operation, significance (Boston :Little Brown, 1964) p155

[95]Harrison, p66

[96]Harrison, p63

[97]Raymond Aron, "Suggested scheme for a study of federalism", UNESCO, International Social Science Bulletin, Vol.IV, No.1 (spring 1952) p47

[98]A view supported by Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: an introduction to the sociology of knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1936)

[99]John Pinder, European Community: The Building of a Union (Oxford:OUP, 1991) p216-218

[100]Indeed, Mitrany uses the US model, and its failures in practice, as a means of criticising Federalism.

[101]Since the time of writing, the European Exchange-rate Mechanism has collapsed, rendering the prospect of monetary union highly unlikely in the forseeable future. (August, 1993).

[102]William Wallace, "Walking Backwards Towards Unity", Policy-Making in the European Communities, ed. H.Wallace, W.Wallace, and C.Webb (London:John Wiley & Sons, 1977) p306

[103]Margaret Thatcher, College of Europe, Bruges, in Paul Taylor, "The New Dynamics of EC Integration in the 1990's", The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, ed. Juliet Lodge (London:Pinter, 1989) p23.

[104]For further explanation of the Prisoner's Dilemma, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic,1984).

[105]Carole Webb, "Theoretical Perspectives and Problems", in Policy-Making in the European Community, 2nd edition, eds. H.Wallace, W.Wallace and C.Webb (London:John Wiley & Sons, 1983) p1-41.

[106] The power of the EP was enhanced under the Single European Act (1987), with the instigation of the new "cooperation procedure". This demands collaboration among the Parliament, Council, and Commission, and devolves power away from the Council, granting more influence to the EP. Whereas the EP formerly had the power to submit an 'Opinion' on draft proposals to the Council, the Council can now act only after the EP has acted on a proposal. Nonetheless, this new grant of power is minimal given the growth in size and power of the EC as a whole since 1957. The 1984 Draft Treaty, proposing a Federal structure and granting the EP an effective voice, was rejected. There exists no Euro-wide party conference, no standard EC nomination procedure, and voting requirements/procedures are set by the national parliaments. The result is the EC's much-discussed "democratic deficit".

[107]The Maastricht Treaty proposes to 'build up WEU (Western European Union) as the defence component of the European Union...giving WEU a stronger operational role'. Treaty on European Union, Final Act. The debate over ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in Britain and Denmark has revolved around the Social Chapter, while the foreign policy provisions have passed without serious debate.

[108]Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete: the fate of the nation state and the case of Western Europe", Daedalus (Summer 1966)

[109]The recurrence of the high/low, political/economic distinction in the 4 main theories of integration, indicates that the differences among the approaches belie a foundation of (problematic) conceptual similarities.

[110]Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973) p4

[111]Robert Cox in "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (NY: Columbia University Press, 1986) p20

[112]See Carole Webb, "Theoretical Perspectives and Problems"

[113]William Wallace, "Walking Backwards Towards Unity" in Wallace, Wallace and Webb, Policy-Making in the European Community, p303

[114]Webb,"Theoretical Perspectives and Problems", p32

[115]Ernst Haas, "Is there a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence and the Construction of International Regimes', International Organisation, vol.29, no.3 (summer 1975) p827-876

[116]R. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, "Conclusions: Community politics and institutional change", The Dynamics of European Integration , ed. Wallace (London:Pinter, 1990) p293

[117]Point confirmed by Paul Taylor, "Introduction: the Dynamics of European Integration", The Dynamics of European Integration, p3

[118]R.Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann. "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980's", The New European Community, ed. Keohane and Hoffmann (San Francisco:Westview Press, 1991) pp1-39.

[119]...definition used by Keohane and Hoffmann in The New European Community, p15, based on Ernst Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe", A New Europe?, ed. Stephen R.Graubard (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964) pp64,66

[120]Wolfgang Wessels, "The EC Council: The Community's Decisionmaking Center", The New European Community, ed. R.Keohane and S.Hoffmann, p137.

[121]Juliet Lodge, "EC Policymaking: institutional considerations", The European Community and the Challenge of the Future (London: Pinter, 1989) pp26-58

[122] Lodge suggests the EP should exploit its existing powers, while mobilising national elites and public opinion; Williams suggests the EP should seek the power to confirm the nomination of Commissioners, move the EP to Brussels, extend joint EP-Council decision-making; Ludlow suggests abandoning collegiality, allow EP votes of censure of Commissioners, create a constitution to clarify the division of powers etc. ; Pinder suggests, in a starkly federalist vein, that the EP should become co-legislator with the Council, and that majority voting should be the general rule. See Keohane and Hofmann ed., The New European Community.

[123]Denmark voted 'no' to the Maastricht Treaty on June 2nd, 1992, and secured only a slight majority 'yes' in a second referendum on May 18, 1993, only after guaranteeing opt-outs to the Treaty's Social Chapter and timetable for monetary union. After the second referendum, Copenhagen witnessed its worst violence in riots since World War Two. (The Times, London, May 20,1993). France voted marginally in favour of Maastricht (50.95%) in September, 1992.

[124] In March 1993, the European Commission published a report (the "De Clercq report"), entitled "Reflection on Information and Communication Policy of the European Community" , with an aim to 'propose a communication and information strategy within a mid-term perspective, in which the Institutions and member states take account of the needs, preoccupations and hopes of the citizens in a decisive moment in the process of European integration'. The author of this thesis was working in DGX (Information, Communication, Culture) of the Commission during the period of restructuration in the wake of this report. A new approach to communication policy (adopted June 1993- see The Commission's Information and Communication Policy: A New Approach: SEC(93) 916/9) has established a clear focus on the need to include the citizen in the activities of the Commission. Motivated by the need for a demand-oriented communication policy, with more openness, transparency, and greater access to Commission documents, the new approach focuses on a more effective collaboration with the European Parliament and Member States as points of access for the citizen. It has established a Users Advisory Council (with representatives of the media and various socio-professional groups), to allow feedback and appraisal of the Commission's activities by vital outside audiences; a Strategy Group to give advice and alert the Commission on shifts in public opinion; a Steering Committee to establish a coherent approach for all communication strategy. More attention is to be paid to public opinion monitors, and to the importance of inter-institutional cooperation, including cooperation with local authorities.

[125]For example, see The Sunday Times (London), 14th February, 1993

[126]Perceptions of European integration vary widely in terms of the most desirable end-state, and in terms of whether it is possible to have economic integration without political integration. It is beyond the scope of this study to elaborate on the complexity of such issues, for in the context of a new conceptual foundation to be subsequently elaborated, such issues rooted in contemporary thought will be marginalised.

[127]This view is supported by William Wallace, in "Introduction: The Dynamics of European Integration", The Dynamics of European Integration, p7

[128]Philip Allott, "The European Community is Not the True European Community", Yale Law Journal, Vol.100 (June 1991) p2485

[129]Hedley Bull, "International Theory: the case for a classical approach", World Politics, V,xviii, (April 1966) p361

[130]Allott, p2490

CHAPTER 2 : IDENTITY CRISIS IN THE 1990's

"[W]e cannot...live much longer under the confusions of the existing 'international' economy and the existing 'nation-state'. If we cannot find and communicate social forms of more substance than these, we shall be condemned to endure the accelerating pace of false and frenetic nationalisms and of reckless and uncontrollable global transnationalisms" -(Raymond Williams)[1]

"There is, at the end of the twentieth century, the possibility that we may drown in the flood of our own words, falling into a sort of collective dementia under the stress of problems which seem to be beyond our capacity to formulate, let alone to resolve" -(Philip Allott, Eunomia)

"There is not, as such, a European public opinion... There is little feeling of belonging to Europe. European identity has not yet been ingrained in people's minds." -(Report for the European Commission, chaired by Mr.Willy De Clercq, Member of the European Parliament, March 1993)

It was argued in Chapter 1 that the body of thought relating to the European Community, as developed since World War II, is fundamentally incapable of explaining, promoting, and justifying the process of European integration. Arguably, the root of this failure is an implicit common conceptual foundation, with the unquestioned assumption of identity-related concepts such as 'the nation-state', 'nationalism', 'sovereignty', and more fundamentally, 'self vs other'. As such, the evident lack of predictive power and

obscurity of basic terms within EC literature may be considered symptomatic of repeated attempts to account for European integration from within a conceptual framework which is inherently unable to do so.

The argument of this chapter may be broadly summarised as follows. I wish to maintain that contemporary thought (and thus 'EC thought') is limited in conceptual scope as the result of its fundamental conceptual binary division between "self" and "other" (thus between unity and diversity, inside and outside, here and there, etc.). To this extent, and in this sense, the primary obstacle to adequate theorising about integration, and to the process of integration itself, concerns the issue of identity. More specifically, this 'obstacle' constitutes a failure in EC literature to analyse theoretically the issue of (conceptual, individual and group) identity and its role in theory formation. It will be seen that *contemporary thought is self-inscribed within a web of signification which precludes any fundamental critique of the self/other relation, or of the historically constituted 'self'*. This has given rise to a *modern identity crisis*, in which the conditions of modern life, the dynamics of modernity, are implicitly challenging the *conceptual* self/other relation, as well as challenging an already unstable *personal* identity, which rests on a tension between assumptions of Enlightenment rationality and the 'irrationalism' of the Romantic movement (It will be seen that this tension is inscribed within and thus runs parallel to the tension between self and other in contemporary thought). A general displacement of individual and group identity (the two are dialectically related) has incited a vicious circle, a *conservative response*, in an 'unconscious' attempt to hold on to an apparently 'outdated' and inapplicable conception of identity (eg., in the effort to 'prove oneself', and at the level of the group, in ethnic nationalism) while more appropriate conceptions are as yet undeveloped and are indeed resisted.

It is thus the aim of this chapter to suggest that the essential insufficiency of existing theoretical literature on European integration may be redressed by way of a focus

on the question of individual and group identity. Clearly, the issue of identity is here being addressed on two interconnecting levels, specifically the *conceptual* level of 'self/other' discourse, and the *practical* level of personal and group identity. Thus, the following critique constitutes a critique of the foundations of contemporary thought as well as a critique of 'Humanism', or 'historical identity'. As a parallel, it will be argued that a modern identity crisis affects the *process* of European integration at both a theoretical and practical level. At a theoretical level, an understanding of the crisis is fundamental to an understanding of the integration process to date, as it is this crisis, reflected in a fundamental self-other opposition, which not only restricts the conceptual scope of EC theory, but, as will be seen, inherently precludes conceptual innovation. By virtue of this, and at a practical level, a resolution to the modern identity crisis is a prerequisite to the practical attainment of European unity in the future.

Given the inter-relation between the conceptual and the practical issue of identity, the starting point for the following argument will be to elaborate the basis of modern individual and group identity, to show how this basis is subject to a contemporary challenge and transformation, which is manifesting itself as a modern (or 'post-modern') 'identity crisis'. Second, it will be seen how theoretical obscurity and inadequacy in the study of European integration is inter-related with this crisis, as both are symptoms of a restrictive and outmoded conceptual foundation based on self/other exclusive binary division. Further, this identity crisis acts as a self-debilitating mechanism, as there is a conservative effort to retain apparently outmoded concepts relating to identity, despite the evident need for reconceptualisation. Analysis of the concepts, '*nationalism*' and '*sovereignty*', '*democracy*' and '*citizenship*', will reveal the extent to which these notions, rooted in self/other opposition, remain predominant today, despite their arguable incongruence with the contemporary social and political context. Regarding the idea of 'Europe', from the point of view that theoretical failure in EC literature is symptomatic of

a resistance to fundamental challenges to identity posed by the integrative process, an apparent failure to pursue the theoretical development of a common European identity in EC literature constitutes an implicitly self-imposed obstacle to further integration. From the argument thus far, the *need* for a reconceptualisation of EC theory, based on the elaboration of a theoretical foundation for a common European identity in the 1990's, will be established.

THE ROOTS OF A MODERN IDENTITY CRISIS

Qualifications

A contemporary identity crisis affecting both the individual and the group may be described as a product of the 'culture of modernity'. The basic framework of modernity can be understood as roughly equivalent to the 'industrialised world', understood to involve the social form of the nation-state, the dynamic of capitalism, and the growth of massive organisational power.[2] Conceptually, 'modernity' implies a human-centred image of the world, a new consciousness of temporality and the contingency of modern experience,[3] with an emphasis on individuality, reason, and a preoccupation with method, all in the name of Progress.[4]

Clearly, in discussing the causes and characteristics of a modern identity crisis, one's sphere of reference must be qualified. It is to be understood that the ensuing argument is implicitly limited in reference, not only to the Western industrialised world, but, arguably, to a minority of that population. The dynamics of modernity are seen to have influence in a manner analogous to the diffusion of ripples in concentric circles when a stone is dropped into still water. Perhaps most affected is the business world, most exposed to the effects of capitalism and technological innovation, and least affected are those relatively untouched by the conditions of 'modern living', such as rural communities whose welfare continue to be tied to the land. Having established this

spectrum, it is to be understood implicity that the dynamics of modernity and thus the modern identity crisis, are widening their reach over time to larger portions of the population. Yet for the broad purposes of the present argument, to the effect that a modern identity crisis lies at the root of theoretical 'failure' in the study of the EC, it suffices to justify the claim that a modern identity crisis is at least prevalent in the core intellectual/academic sphere of society.

In elaborating the origins and dynamics of a modern identity crisis, the proceeding argument will not make a distinction between personal and group identity, for it will be maintained that an identity crisis at the level of the individual lies at the root of an identity crisis at the level of the group. Society is here perceived as the on-going collective self-creating of human beings, not as an organism of which human beings are only component parts.[5] As such, while the individual's relation to self and search for 'inner meaning' is analytically distinct from his/her relation to others, or sense of belonging within 'the group', the two are fundamentally interconnected with regard to the determination of the individual's overall 'identity', or 'sense of self'. As will be seen, one's search for personal meaning is necessarily both an internal and external quest, such that external recognition and a need to 'belong' ('group identity') is fundamentally linked to 'personal identity'. In the articulation of 'selfhood', 'personal' bonding at the level of the smallest social entity, the family, is simultaneous with 'social' bonding at the level of the largest available entity, the nation-state, such that the nation-state has become the 'apotheosis of the self'.[6] In accordance with Isaiah Berlin, 'the self that seeks liberty of action, determination of its own life, can be large or small, regional or linguistic; today it is liable to be collective and national or ethnic-religious rather than individual; it is always resistant to dilution, assimilation, depersonalisation'.[7] By virtue of this link between personal and group identity, I wish to make a methodological contention to the effect that the *issue of European identity and indeed the study of the EC as a whole may be effectively addressed by way of a focus on 'personal identity'.*

Two conceptual shifts

The causal dynamics of a modern identity crisis are seen to have their origins in two conceptual shifts relating to the search for ultimate meaning and certainty, and affecting the basis of identity formation.

As detailed by Benedict Anderson, communities prior to the Print Revolution were defined and integrated by way of objective vertical links with the divine. Individuals conceived themselves to be cosmically central, linked by way of a sacred language to a super-terrestrial order of power.[8] Non-arbitrariness of the sign was implicit in the status of sacred language, not as a representation, but as an emanation of reality. As such, reality, truth, and meaning were considered objective and unquestionable, and could be discovered through knowledge of the sacred language. This determined a heirarchical, vertical and objective social structure, such that the small minority of 'literati' constituted 'points of access to the truth', 'strategic strata in a cosmological heirarchy of which the apex was divine'.[9] In this context, identity was unproblematic - one's place and role in society was heirarchically fixed in relation to a divinely-ordained dynastic ruler, and the meaning of life was conceived as the fulfilment of a divine plan situated in vertical, 'higher' time, simultaneously past, present and future.

The origins of the first major conceptual shift are to be found in the advent of print-capitalism in the sixteenth century, and the development of vernacular languages as tools of centralised administration. The conception of language as being the property not of a god, but of a particular people, provided the basis for a strengthening of horizontal ties, and a notion of 'homogeneous, empty time', measured by the clock and calendar, and allowing for the idea of a solid community moving steadily through history. The essence of the first conceptual shift thus constituted a *move away from the divine as a source of ultimate meaning, in favour of the empirical world* as an ultimate source, observed through scientific lenses. This conceptual foundation provided the basis for, and was developed by the French Revolution and Enlightenment. As the divinity of kings was

undermined, the notions of 'popular sovereignty' and 'nation-ness' acquired the characteristics of religious imaginings, and served as a secular religion giving new purpose to life and fatality. While 'nationalism' and 'sovereignty' did not replace religion, they emerged from a religious cultural system to fulfil the need for legitimacy, purpose and fixity which had previously rested in the divinely-ordained dynastic realm.[10]

Simultaneous with the entrenchment of 'nationalism' and 'sovereignty' in Western political thought by virtue of the French Revolution, the eighteenth century Enlightenment fostered a belief in Progress, scientific knowledge, and the idea that man has an examinable nature, capable of being analysed and tested - correct objective observation of man's needs and what the world could provide, would lead to the necessary scientific knowledge to improve his life. The programme of the Enlightenment was thus, in a utilitarian vein, to provide for the greatest satisfaction of as many needs of as many individuals as possible. Yet notably, in continuity with the presumptions of the 'premodern' divine perspective, the Enlightenment view still conceived the world as an intelligible whole in which it was presumed that questions of value could be answered objectively, that universal truth was in principle accessible to all human beings, and that true values could not conflict with each other.[11] As such, the collapse of 'vertical' social heirarchy and its replacement with the 'horizontal' universalist and egalitarian notion of 'dignity' implicit in democratic society did not in itself eradicate the idea that self-definition was subject to 'objective' determination based on social roles. The source of personal meaning was still, in principle, discoverable objectively.

However, it is significant that the conceptual shift toward objective science as the source of ultimate truth and meaning, in effect compromised the unquestionably fixed status of objective truth. The aim to overcome the dogmas of tradition and custom by way of a rational pursuit of knowledge, was implicitly based on the methodological principle of doubt, and the constant possibility of falsification.[12] As such, it was always possible that any scientific theories concerning the ends of life were incorrect. As a

logical extension of this, the *quest for an ultimate arbiter in questions of value, purpose and identity led to a focus on man himself.*[13] To this extent, it may be argued that the popularity of the Enlightenment's scientific rationality provided a catalyst for the eighteenth century Romantic notion that human beings are endowed with an intuitive moral sense of right and wrong.

The nineteenth century Romantic movement, as articulated in the works of Rousseau, Herder, and Fichte, constituted a revolt against the straitjacket of Enlightenment reason. The glorification of the individual, national and historical, against the universal and timeless; the emphasis on genius, on the unaccountable, on variety in place of uniformity, on inspiration in place of tried and tested rules, on the inner life and irrationalism, gave rise to a new conception of Man. Romantic humanism provided the assumptions that man is the maker of his own values, and cannot be forced into a pattern with alleged objective authority irrespective of human aspirations.[14]

At the level of the individual, Romantic humanism fostered the idea that morality has a 'voice within' - it is still considered to be objective, in the sense of being discoverable, but discoverable within the individual rather than in God, or the Idea of the Good. It is from this notion of the 'inner voice' that the second major conceptual shift affecting meaning and identity formation can be seen to emerge. From the idea that morality could be *discovered* in the self, a subtle but significant step was taken toward the notion that *'being in touch' has an independent and crucial moral significance as an end in itself.* Thus arose the 'ethic of authenticity', the idea that personal meaning and identity are the result of a process of self-realisation, a search for 'inner depths', following one's 'inner light' to *create* the self rather than discover it.[15]

The emergence of the modern identity crisis can thus be traced to a conceptual turn inward, a slide to subjectivism, toward individualism and self-reflection as the ultimate source of meaning and identity.[16] The focus on the inner self as the *source* of

meaning, has had at least three significant consequences. First, it has rendered identity problematic, as the individual bears the burden for his/her own self-creation, which allows for the possibility that the individual may "fail to realise" his/her 'true' inner self. Second, the simultaneous and continued influence of instrumental reason has created a technologically competent but morally deficient social environment, Weber's 'iron cage of capitalism' with a 'work ethic' by which the individual is encouraged to emphasise mastery at the expense of morality.[17] To further compound the issue, a third consequence of the ethic of authenticity lies in its contradiction with the objective morality of Christianity, which preaches humility, acceptance of suffering and the hope of salvation in the afterlife, and dictates that a focus on the self (egoism, self-love) is morally suspect.[18] To the extent that Christianity is still a predominant force in Western society, the ethic of authenticity thus provides an added tension within which identity and meaning must be found. Within this overall context, the focus on the inner self has provided a void into which moral questions have been disposed, as the vital questions of life are left 'up to the individual' to answer.

From this argument, it may be said that the influences of the Enlightenment and Romantic movement feed off each other and serve to displace the individual's sense of self. The ultimate source of personal meaning and thus modern identity is not only subject to relativism and instability, but is in effect *lost in a void as the internally referential (Romantic) and external (Enlightenment) spheres mutually deflect the burden of responsibility on to each other.* Clearly, if the implications of the 'ethic of authenticity' are taken to their logical conclusion, they would lead to complete conceptual relativism, with identity and meaning for each individual being determined entirely by internally referential criteria, so undermining any sense of community. Yet if one analyses the possible source of internally referential criteria, it becomes evident, upon conceding that language is necessarily dialogical,[19] that the source of all 'internal' cognitive processes is ultimately rooted in a social background understanding, in 'inescapable horizons",[20] such

that a search for inner meaning leads inevitably to a reflection of the 'public sphere'. Put another way, modern identity crisis can be seen as the result of a tension between the remnants of the old universal, externally referential cognitive perspective, and the Romantic idea of the essential self.

Indeed, this tension constitutes one of the multiple and perennial contradictions of society, parallel to the tension between self and other, the one and the many, unity and pluralism, etc. For example, the Romantic notions of variety in place of uniformity, inspiration in the place of tried and tested rules, the worship of the irrational, and focus on the inner life, prevail in the modern ethic of individualism. Yet there is an evident paradox in this politics of universalism, which proclaims the equal dignity of all citizens in the idea that everyone should be recognised in their unique identity, as it constitutes in effect a universal demand empowering an acknowledgement of specificity.[21] As such, it is asserting an ethic of relativism, a 'politics of *difference*', yet the basis of the assertion is an implicit 'external' source of morality, a *shared* 'horizon of significance' maintaining the idea of a universal human potential in the form of a 'categorical imperative'.

As the foundations of identity 'float' between the public and private, internal and external realms, external recognition is vital to the realisation of the reflexively created inner self, to the extent that non-recognition can inflict harm, as for example minorities come to interiorise the image of their own inferiority. Indeed, in the modern age, it is not so much the *need* for recognition that is new, as the conditions (to be further outlined) in which identity and recognition can *fail*.[22] The notion of 'human rights', the equal dignity of all human beings, is a quest for personal meaning through public recognition, and an attempt to ensure that recognition. At the level of the group, modern ethnic nationalism is similarly a symptom of this quest for authenticity and recognition, as the fixity of nation-state nationalism is destabilised in a culture founded on relativism, where choice is deemed a virtue, and the diversity of actual and possible identities is multiplying.

The erosion of external meaning and the emphasis on an apparently elusive inner source of meaning thus raises a fundamental and complex question in modernity, concerning *what ultimately lies at the root of individual and group identity.* Membership to a group (the local community, the nation etc.,) is encompassed within one's self-definition, to which extent an analysis of personal identity encompasses an analysis of group identity. As a basic framework, it may be said that one's identity in contemporary thought constitutes being aware of one's relation to others and the external world, as well as being aware of oneself, in the sense of understanding one's own biography. Yet in the absence of any unquestionable fixed truths or pre-ordained standards (internal or external), it would seem that in practice the process of modern identity formation can be little more than a pragmatic exercise, a case of 'knowing how to go on' in the Wittgenstinian sense.[23] For Wittgenstein, the ultimate foundation of and verification for knowledge constitutes a 'form of life', an underlying consensus of linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour, assumptions, practices and traditions which is presupposed by and interwoven with language.[24] There is no objective reason why the number '9' should be the number to follow the series '1,3,5,7', but it is correct according to custom.[25] It is not possible to lay out any exact and definitive rules which determine how we 'go on' in life, how we use a word (or define our-'selves'), as our 'background understanding' in any given situation is too broad and wide-ranging to be quantified. Indeed, as seen in Gottfried Herder and developed in Wittgenstein, the 'background' and an individual's thought and speech are mutually influential in an on-going process, such that words cannot be understood in isolation, and one can never have a clear grasp of the 'whole' at any moment. To the extent that self-creation is the work of consciousness, its boundaries are neither clear nor fixed, and indeed it is the elusive attempt to determine clear boundaries which has resulted in the contemporary frenzy in the search for identity. [26]

From this perspective (to be further discussed in Chapter 3), it is evident that the 'ethic of authenticity' leads to an ultimately elusive search for exclusive 'inner meaning'. It masks the fact that in everyday life, individuals pass in and out of, and interact with many societies, willing and acting differently in each, such that one's sense of self and inner meaning is changeable in time as well as space.[27] The signs of existential anxiety resulting from the burden of responsibility on the self, on the need to 'find oneself', are prolific in the 1990's. For example, the search for meaning is evident in the popularity of New Age culture, and religious sects such as the 'Moonies' and 'Born Again Christianity'. At a more abstract level, the failure to stabilise one's identity within the social and cognitive context of a 'risk culture' characterised by uncertainty, can be linked to various 'dysfunctional' attempts to control one's environment.[28] For example, the contemporary growth in eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa can be seen as symptomatic of a psychological need for control and quest for certainty. While the cognitive and external empirical world are subject to doubt and change, the body is an accessible target through which to establish a sense of control over one's life. Anorectic behaviour is thus an 'extremely complicated response to a confusing self-identity, a form of protest against the plurality of options offered by modernity'.[29] A similarly dysfuctional reaction against the uncertainty of modernity and elusiveness of identity, is evident in the increasing appearance of prejudice and xenophobia in Western Europe.[30]

IDENTITY AND THE DYNAMICS OF MODERNITY

Having elaborated the problematic foundations upon which our modern conception of identity rests, it may be argued that the search for identity, within the self and as part of a group, has become even more elusive, has induced a modern identity 'crisis', as the result of a dynamic societal context. The individual and group are subject to, and destabilised by, an ever-changing matrix of pressures toward fragmentation on the

one hand, and unification on the other. Specifically within Europe, regions are "imploding" into localities while nations are "exploding" into the European Community, so forging an increasingly direct relationship between the local and the 'supranational'.[31]

The exponential increase in mass communications and information technology has allowed and encouraged a 'globalising' growth of regional associations and global organisations on the one hand, while simultaneously creating a 'localising' dynamic, in the form of an infrastructure allowing 'neglected' and oppressed groups to mobilise and influence public opinion. As a result of these transformative dynamics, the 'modern outlook' is characterised by a *cognitive reformulation of the relationship between time and space*, such that 'when' is still connected to 'where' but is not necessarily linked through physical place. The influence of the media is significant in this respect, in providing access to and creating the reality of simultaneous lives and events linked not through place, but understood and 'living' in phenomenological space.[32] The severance of the link between time and space according to physical place, is replaced by a new abstract link in the form of 'empty time', as the coordination of physically separate individuals is rendered more possible and necessary by virtue of technological innovation and the emergence of 'global issues'. Indeed, one may detect a growing inter-relation between the public and private realms, individual and group identity, as global issues and dynamics are seen to affect and determine personal dispositions. Given the efficiency of modern communication, and the prominence, accessibility and detail of media coverage, it is perfectly feasible for an individual to be more familiar with and absorbed by the debates relating to global warming than the issue of a leaking tap in one's own house.[33] As global issues increasingly require the input of individual effort (eg., the elimination of aerosols harmful to the ozone layer, the prevention of the spread of the AIDS virus, the elimination of racism and xenophobia), day-to-day lives are affected, to the effect that the local and global are fused at the level of identity formation. The dynamics of modern life are bringing into focus a new global 'public sphere' of communication.

Related to, and indeed constitutive of, the reformulation of the time-space relation, is the prevalent influence in the individual's day-to-day life of '*disembedding mechanisms*',[34] which serve to up-root social relations from local contexts and re-orient them across indefinite time and space. Abstract systems such as the use of money as 'symbolic tokens', and the reorientation of social relations around 'technical knowledge', have not only promoted the mobility of individuals, but have created a duality of identity, parallel to the distinction between time and space, mind and body. The individual is rooted bodily in place, but it is increasingly common for one's working life, and indeed mental life as a whole, to be rooted in 'empty time', with a global reach (particularly in the business world, where one's work is often conducted on the telephone). The emphasis and social status attached by a materialist society to the process of accumulating money and acquiring expert knowledge, in effect constitutes a social identity rooted in abstract, empty space, in which place plays no part.[35] The duality between mind and body is thus highlighted in modernity, in the form of distinction between local-based bodily identity, and globally-based abstract phenomenological identity.

To compound this duality, the individual's physical identity is itself subject to continual change as a result of Post-Fordist transformation of spatial relations. A loosening of family ties has been induced by the separation of home and working place, by female employment, and universal school education. The evolution from a process of accumulation centred around mass production and mass consumption, toward an emergent regime of 'entrepreneurial' flexible accumulation has meant increased mobility of the work force, and a greater tendency for individuals to alter career paths, home, country and lifestyle. The European Community's Single Market, allowing EC citizens to settle and work anywhere in the Community, is both a reflection of this tendency, and a further catalyst for it. Mobility ceases to be a privilege for the elite, and is becoming the norm for a growing proportion of the population, by virtue of cheap travel, and advanced international communication and business links.[36] As a result it can be said that the

individual's sense of identity based on geographical roots, the sense of having grown up in and belonging to a local 'home' community, is challenged by the dynamics of modernity (and more specifically by the efforts toward European Union). Modern society is increasingly multi-cultural and porous, composed of an increasing number of 'diasporai' whose centre is elsewhere, such that particularities of local culture, the notion of 'how we do things here', is being dispersed by a plethora of diverse influences.[37] A reflection and indication of this trend can be seen in contemporary developments in the field of broadcasting. Whereas European television channels have been traditionally contained within national borders by virtue of government regulation, a new complex of technological, economic, ideological and political forces, including the emergence of cable and satellite, is eroding national and technical barriers, giving rise to pan-European channels and influences.[38] Indeed, the EC, in its concern with the 'social dimension', has been pro-active in encouraging the elimination of television 'frontiers', so as to promote education, understanding and general cohesion among member states.[39]

Thus, it is evident that the dynamics of modernity generally serve to undermine permanence. The central tenets of contemporary political thought continue to create a psychological need and search for a fixed foundation, an ultimate source for one's identity, even as this search is becoming more elusive. The modern concept of identity, rooted in the tension between Enlightenment and Romantic thought, has (as seen) an inherent tendency toward invoking an identity 'crisis', by virtue of encouraging a search for something which cannot be found. Yet it is the context of modern culture which has brought this tendency to fruition, and which has thus emphasised the need to subject the concept of identity to critical analysis and reformulation.

IDENTITY CRISIS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Having outlined the conceptual origins of a contemporary (individual and group) identity crisis, and having indicated an exacerbation of the crisis by the dynamics of 'modern culture', it may be argued that this crisis bears an intimate relation with the fact of theoretical inadequacy in the study of the EC.

The concepts of 'nation-state', 'nationalism', and 'sovereignty', with their attendant concepts of 'citizenship' and 'democracy' have served as a basis for group identity-formation, and more generally as a foundation to political thought, at least since the French Revolution. The original sense in which these concepts were understood was determined by the Enlightenment notion that truth is objective and discoverable through reason, and as such they were upheld as inalienable certitudes. I wish to argue that this *original and now arguably outdated status granted to these concepts has been retained to date as a result of a conservative pressure caused by threatened identity.*

There is an evident resistance to any serious critical reflection on the historically constituted claims of 'sovereignty' and 'nationalism', not only because these concepts clearly and comfortably resolve the question of who we are and where we belong in relation to others, but because any effective re-evaluation would involve a critical analysis of the fundamental and universal binary oppositions of self and other, identity and difference, inside and outside, space and time.[40] From within a 'rational' perspective in which identity is determined in relation to the Other, such a re-evaluation of binary oppositions not only constitutes a 'leap into the dark', but is inherently precluded by virtue of appearing nonsensical. The political discourse which encases the contemporary conception of identity, determined in space and time and in relation to the Other, is based on a set of fundamental prescriptions, passing over in silence the contradictions and questions which have given rise to the modern 'identity crisis' as outlined above. I wish to argue that the dynamics of modern culture render the oppositional 'self/other' framework of 'sovereignty' and 'nationalism' inapplicable and indeed undesirable as a

contemporary basis for identity formation, and as such *demand* a re-evaluation of this discourse in an effort, in line with Michel Foucault, to 'think otherwise', to 'promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality that has been imposed on us for several centuries'.[41] It would appear that the problems of social identity today cannot be resolved by formal definitions, but instead the dynamics of modernity require 'new forms of variable societies, in which over the whole range of social purposes different sizes of society are defined for different kinds of issue and decision' (Raymond Williams).[42]

The issue of identity can be seen to permeate and indeed to constitute the basis of contemporary political thought, and more specifically the study of European integration. The basic binary opposition between self and other, identity and difference, is repeated in the parallel distinctions between fact and value, realism and utopianism, unity and diversity, internal and external, and indeed between International Relations and Political Theory.[43] As seen, these basic distinctions, which determine the limits of political discourse, are derivative of, and run parallel to, the contradictory influences of Enlightenment and Romanticism, which have in turn shaped modern identity (and a modern identity crisis). As such, it may be said that the *contradiction between two historically specific modes of thought has resulted in a conception of identity which, at the level of discourse, accommodates and silences the contradiction by way of binary opposition, but this accommodation (and identity itself) is under increasing threat by the dynamic flux of late-modernity.*

From this point of view, it may be said that, in order to understand the contemporary dynamics of European integration, (and of late modernity more generally), and to foster the integration process, it is necessary to transgress the restrictive conceptual limits imposed by the exclusive self/other distinction which is assumed in all approaches to the study of the EC. At present, the threat to this basic foundation, to concepts such as

"sovereignty" and "nationalism" in the context of a modern identity crisis, has incited in practice a conservative response in the form of an extreme affirmation of these very concepts, in an effort to maintain stability and status quo in a context of flux (eg., manifested in neo-Nazi movements in Germany, and gradually emerging elsewhere in Europe).[44] As such, the meaning behind these concepts is increasingly hollow, and a vicious circle is evident - a threat to these concepts incites in conservative affirmation, which renders them less flexible and more divorced from modern dynamics, which in turn increases their threatened status. To appreciate and overcome the crisis of modern identity, and its effect on the practice and study of European integration, *it is necessary to break the silences and to address the contradictions inscribed in modern political thought.*[45]

Breaking the silences: sovereignty, nationalism, democracy, citizenship

If one analyses the concepts of sovereignty, nationalism, democracy, and citizenship, a disparity is evident between role and content, between the rhetorical use of each concept within modern political thought, and an obscurity in meaning. It would seem that these concepts are 'held on to' in an attempt to secure and affirm personal and group identity, such that their role is more important than their meaning. Indeed, as a reflection of the modern identity crisis, the meaning of each term today would appear to constitute a mutated and obscure form of the original term. Not only are these terms in their contemporary form a hindrance to the study and practice of European integration, but in their unquestioned rhetorical acceptance, they preclude conceptual alternatives. *By revealing the contradictions inherent in these foundational concepts, the intention is to make possible a reconceptualisation of the self/other basis upon which they rest, and so to make way for a better understanding of European identity, and in turn promote the integration process itself.*

Sovereignty

The hindering effects of the modern identity crisis, and the conservative affirmation of a threatened identity, on the study and practice of European integration, is primarily exemplified in the concept of 'sovereignty'. As seen in Chapter 1, the sovereignty of the nation-state is challenged in practice by the process of European integration, while EC theory continues to hold on to, to assume without adequate critical reflection, the *discourse* of sovereignty. Minor variations on the theme, in the form for example of 'pooled sovereignty', are an inadequate response to the challenge, serving only to obfuscate the dynamics of integration and diffuse the meaning of 'sovereignty' itself.

The resilience of 'sovereignty' as a concept, despite its evident anachronism and hindering effect on understanding, is made possible and encouraged by its apparent resolution of the problem of modern identity. Indeed, the powerful *role of the concept renders the content relatively inconsequential*, as seen in the fact that the meaning of sovereignty has been historically shrouded in obscurity - as early as 1677 Gottfried Leibniz notes that, "In explaining the concept of sovereignty, I confess I must enter into - dealing as it does with so important and common a concept - a field which is thorny and little-cultivated".[46] Indeed it may be said that the attempt to substantively define the concept requires a certain historical and cultural amnesia, to allow for its pretensions to timeless permanence and absolute authority - while governments and regimes are temporally limited, sovereign states are assumed to go on forever.[47] This conception obscures the fact that the territorial configuration of the states system has been subject to continued variation over time, and the fact that the legitimacy and authority of states are challenged and need to be maintained in a daily struggle. Moreover, it obscures the variation in definition and in accounts of the historical emergence of the concept.

The significance of 'sovereignty' thus lies not in definition but in its more general *contribution of a spatial and temporal framework*, making political community and identity possible by resolving the contradiction between particularity and universality,

citizenship and humanity. By virtue of sovereignty, and the self/other framework upon which it rests, identity is 'temporally absolute and spatially fixed in an ethics of absolute exclusion', which allows for a juxtaposition of unity and diversity, self and other, internal authority and external anarchy.[48] These distinctions are *assumed and presumed* at the root of political discourse, such that critical reflection on their validity is precluded, indeed to the extent that any attempt at critical reflection is bound to repeat and condone the very distinctions being addressed.

This inherent conceptual limitation is evident, for example, in the fact that the academic fields of International Relations and Political Theory remain distinct. The conceptual framework of the field of International Relations (or more specifically of EC theory) assumes the fundamental binary distinction between self and other as an epistemological and methodological prescription, and as such does not allow for a theoretical questioning of this very issue, or of the principles 'sovereignty' and 'nationalism' (as seen in Chapter 1). This latter, more probing kind of theoretical discourse remains bound within the field of Political Theory. Further, the conceptual matrix of EC theory implicitly assumes that transformation must be rational and progressive, from 'here' to 'there', such that all interpretations of European integration and its prospects are automatically bound within a predetermined conceptual framework. Given that the dynamic of European integration arguably cannot be explained by way of a rational, binary 'here-there', 'self-other' political discourse, EC theory and the inadequacy of its assumptions is more interesting as an example of an inherently limited political discourse which needs to be explained, rather than as an explanation.[49]

The standard English language treatment of 'sovereignty' in the field of International Relations, is based on an idea expressed by FH Hinsley, seeing the root of 'sovereignty' in the idea that there is a 'final and absolute authority in the political community'.[50] This bears the implication that the state is territorially indivisible -

territorial reconfiguration leads to the creation of two new 'sovereign states'. The standard modern view[51] sees sovereignty as the protective shell for the state, and forges a conceptual distinction between internal and external sovereignty, demarcating the 'world within the state' from the 'world of states'. It is in this sense, the 'political', 'structural' territorial sense, that sovereignty is disputed and challenged in the theory and practice of European integration. However, to understand the emotive power of the concept, and its hindering effect on the study and practice of European integration, it is necessary to address the concept at a more fundamental level, at the root of Western political thought. It becomes clear that the *emotive power of sovereignty is today dependent on a misconception, on a leaking of the concept across discursive boundaries,* made possible by its 'thorny' character .

The idea of sovereignty, of an absolute and untouchable authority, provides a tool of administration and legitimation for political rulers, while providing, *by virtue of a conceptual shift,* a bastion of meaning and certitude for the population at large. To explain, the rhetoric of state sovereignty is conceptually fused with the idea of the 'sovereignty of the people', such that the state is perceived to represent ultimately the sovereignty of the individual, in being the protector of individual rights. As such, and to the extent that personal and group identity formation are linked, the notion of sovereignty has emotive appeal and inherent legitimacy for the group and the individual as, by virtue of a 'blanket, abstract acceptance', it implies for both a sense of being of worth and unique. In effect, the powerful emotions related to the search for 'authenticity', the feelings of individual/native place and formation, have been incorporated into an essentially political and administrative organisation, which as seen has grown up from quite different (power-oriented, territorial) roots.[52] The combination of political rhetoric and the emotive appeal of 'sovereignty' in determining and affirming identity, serves to perpetuate the concept, combined with the fact that the 'binary oppositional' discourse of sovereignty precludes the possibility of any alternatives.

If one attempts to deconstruct the idea of 'sovereignty', a number of contradictions are apparent. There is an initial paradox, a conceptual incongruence, in the fact that the standard conception proclaims sovereignty to be indivisible, even as it divides sovereignty along internal and external dimensions.[53] Further, it may be said that the principle of 'popular sovereignty' upon which the nation-state system rests, constitutes a politically powerful but analytically obscure compromise between the prescriptive principle of sovereignty and the principle of national self-determination (the rule of the people by the people). The principle of sovereignty grants state authorities a monopoly of legal force in the name of 'the people', but paradoxically, and in effect, the sovereignty of the individual is thereby compromised. Not only does the sovereign state have absolute legal authority, but the boundaries demarcating the rights of the individual and the rights of the group are obscure, such that the 'sovereignty' of the state can be seen nominally to represent "universal" rights, while in practice the voices of particular individuals are ignored. Human rights are deemed to be universal but are always called for by particular groups, and in turn it is in practice the rights of particular groups which are protected. As will be seen, it is this contradiction which has given rise to a distinction between 'old' nation-state nationalism and 'modern' ethnic nationalism, which may be characterised as a call for recognition by suppressed groups.

This incongruence in the principle of sovereignty is matched by an obscurity in the idea of national self-determination in which the boundaries of 'the people', the outline of the self-determining unit, are unclear, so allowing for political manipulation and redefinition of the sphere of various groups' rights (and the rights of the individual). In apparently seeking to accommodate the rights of the individual and various groups, national self-determination is in practice less permissive than its philosophical origins suggest. As a reflection of the uneasy compromise between sovereignty and national self-determination, the principle of 'popular sovereignty' is accompanied by an attempt to

freeze the political map,[54] forcing spheres of authority into fixed parameters and compromising flexibility to political change.

The evident contradictions at the root of the concept of 'sovereignty' have been masked and overshadowed by the aforementioned *utility* of the concept, emotionally and politically, which in turn has caused a disparity between the emotive value and analytical content of the term. This has been *possible*, as seen, by virtue of the unquestioned fact/value, self/other (International Relations/Political Theory) distinction which, by virtue of establishing exclusive conceptual boundaries, compartmentalises thought and so serves to accommodate contradiction by passing over it in silence. This disparity between the rhetoric of sovereignty and its conceptual contradiction is acutely exemplified in the example of the 1990 Gulf War, which was initiated to protect the 'sovereignty' of Kuwait, but proceeded to violate the principle of sovereignty by intervening in Iraq to protect the besieged Kurdish population.[55]

From this perspective, the resilience of sovereignty at the root of EC theory is seen to have an obfuscating effect on the study and practice of integration. Not only does the concept of sovereignty as it is used in political thought, fail to reflect the reality of actual contradictions in society, but it prevents the conceptualisation of a Community beyond 'sovereign units', which is in principle the end-state of integration. For the purposes of EC theory, therefore, the theoretical contradictions in sovereignty must be addressed, which involves a reconceptualisation of the fundamental self/other relation (See Chapter 3).

Nationalism

Related to, and in addition to the concept of 'sovereignty', the concept of 'nationalism' is arguably an anachronistic obstacle to the theory and practice of European integration. Again, it may be seen that nationalism is a *useful* concept, which appears to affirm and establish a continuity of identity. However, upon analysis its rhetorical utility is matched by a theoretical obscurity and contradiction, which may be said to reflect and exacerbate the modern identity crisis.

As discussed earlier, the essence and power of nationalism in its original form can be understood as a direct reflection of the conceptual foundation of Enlightenment rationality, combined with a residual influence of the pre-Enlightenment religious community. In accordance with Benedict Anderson, one can see a strong affinity between 'national' and 'religious' imaginings in their mutual concern with death and immortality, in the forging of links with the dead and the yet unborn.[56] As such, the sentiments attached to nationalism (eg., feelings of absolute loyalty and the willingness to die for one's country) are understood to be cultural artifacts, remains of a pre-modern mode of thinking. In place of the sanctity of the divine, the unquestionable 'sovereign' status of this new religion rested on the 'sanctity' and objectivity of Enlightenment reason, such that in nationalism, the religious was secularised and the national sanctified.[57] Thus, in its original context, nationalism provided an objective external source for a 'sense of belonging' to an 'imagined political community', and, in the place of religion, gave meaning to life and fatality. As the 'nation' came to be coterminous with the nation-state, the individual's relation to and attachment to society was subject to conceptually objective and fixed determination with clear territorial parameters. Indeed, it may be said that this 'old nationalism' as developed in the context of the nation-state, was a calculated and creative project, building upon the basis of pre-modern 'ethnic cores' whose myths and memories were amalgamated to create a sense of nationality for the purpose of political identity and legitimacy.[58]

This is essentially different from 'modern ethnic nationalism', which can be seen as the disintegration of this creation, the reaction of a collective self seeking authenticity in the context of a modern identity crisis, and, like a bent twig, 'forced down so severely that when released, it lashes back with fury'.[59] As such it is arguably a misnomer to refer to the modern cry for collective recognition as being the same concept as the old calculated project of 'nationalism'. It may be said that these two concepts of nationalism are essentially different, such that they require conceptual and terminological differentiation.

If old nation-state nationalism symbolises a positive 'sense of belonging', founded on an objective semi-religious basis, modern ethnic nationalism is clearly an expression of dysfunctional socialisation and unstable identity. Modern active and often violent ethnic nationalism is a manifestation of the ethic of 'authenticity' writ large - the same dynamic but a collective self. As modern nationalism is increasingly evident as a demand for recognition, the content or essence of the concept 'nationalism' is increasingly obscure such that the question is raised, 'Recognition as what?'. Factors such as language, ethnicity, religion, territory and politics all contribute to the essence of modern nationalism, are all factors according to which recognition is sought, but none are sufficient, and indeed these factors themselves are largely understood in terms of abstract theories, and as such tend to exacerbate rather than clarify the obscurity of 'nationalism'- today, 'nationalism may mean to a given people whatever they decide it to mean'.[60] In the absence of the territorial nation-state, there are no clear definitive criteria which delineate the 'ethnic nationalist' group. Instead, parallel to the individual's struggle to establish his/her identity on the basis of self-referential criteria, the content or essence of ethnic nationalism is arguably analogous to the individual's 'inner light'. Both the 'inner self' and ethnic nationalism are effectively souls, 'vessels of meaning', and in both cases the content of this soul is obscure, indeed indefinable.

Having established a disparity between an old 'nation-state' and new 'ethnic' form of nationalism co-existing today, it may be argued that the concept of nationalism, considered as a whole, is an anachronism and an obstacle rather than an aid to identity formation in the context of modernity. The rhetoric of the nation-state and nationalism continues to be 'useful' from the point of view of securing a social order, military protection, and as a source of political legitimacy and control, maintaining a sense of unity and allegiance to the state.[61] However, to the extent that the 'old' and 'new' forms of nationalism have been conceptually fused by virtue of being mutually inscribed within the single concept of 'nationalism', *the emotive force of nationalism, originally based on the semi-divine objectivity of Enlightenment reason, has significantly today come to be rooted in the ethic of 'authenticity'*. The character of nationalism today is essentially different from its original form, reflecting the ultimately personal search for recognition to counter a burgeoning threat of meaninglessness.

Thus, while nationalism in the original sense (now challenged by the dynamics toward European union) constituted a positive affirmation of the worth, the 'sovereignty' of the imagined 'nation', nationalism today can be seen as a fundamentally negative expression of the identity *crisis* elaborated previously. Indeed, from the preceding argument, it may be said that the contradictions in the original formulation have *resulted* in the 'negative' character of the modern formulation. While the sovereignty of the nation-state, thus of nation-state nationalism, is being challenged by an emerging European Union, the terminology of nationalism is perpetuated by 'subnational' groups who, subject to the 'ethic of authenticity', and having felt ignored, are trying to gain recognition by articulating a sense in which they are unique. The conceptual linkage between original 'positive' nationalism, and modern 'negative' nationalism, is intentional and encouraged. The term 'nationalism' bears connotations of being a source of meaning, of 'belonging' and thus remains a useful and 'valuable' term for the ethnic group, forging

conceptual and historical continuity with the 'nation' conceived as a source of meaning since the emergence of the 'imagined community' with print-capitalism. Yet this ignores the fact that the original idea of 'national culture', involving images and symbols, implies and requires historical specificity and spatial limitation, while the autonomous dynamics of modernity, of advanced industrial society, seem to defy any fixity, any sense in which the community, the 'nation' can be statically delineated or defined.[62] The result is an increasing diffusion of the concept of nationalism,[63] which in itself is an indication that the concept (and in turn the concept of identity, the self/other foundation) requires re-evaluation, 'modernisation'.

Democracy/Citizenship

The conceptual diffusion and anachronistic misconception seen in 'nationalism' and 'sovereignty' can be seen to permeate their dependent concepts such as 'democracy' and 'citizenship'. The concept of democracy today enjoys rhetorical ascendence in association with 'sovereignty' and the nation-state, implying a self-governing community of citizens, the 'rule of the people by the people', where the 'people' is an undifferentiated mass of consumers. Yet the transcendent value of the concept is, once again, co-existent with an obscurity in meaning - "Democratic theory is the moral Esperanto of the present nation-state system ...the public cant of the modern world ...and one which only a complete imbecile would be likely to take quite at face value..."(John Dunn).[64]

From the time of Plato until the mid-nineteenth century, 'democracy' implied a dangerous and unstable state of affairs. The Platonic conception implied a form of class rule by the 'poor', who would 'gain the upper hand, kill some and banish others', and divide control among the remaining citizens according to their own interests.[65] This conception was mutated in the eighteenth century to denote an attempt by private popular associations to control the government. Since the French Revolution and Enlightenment, the legitimacy of a party system acknowledging plural interests replaced fears of factional

domination, and the class-based conception of democracy was replaced by the rhetorical idea of universal rule for the people, by the people. Due to this change, democracy in *theory* no longer addresses the problematic issue of the relationship between political power and social class, so masking the continued reality of class divided society, and the alienation of individuals and groups from the political process.[66]

Thus, the emotive power and theoretical content of the term are incongruent with social reality, in which there is a tension between the freedom of the individual and of the group, and among various groups with conflicting interests (See Chapter 3 - the new 'non-fixed' foundation addresses this contradiction). The growing role of organisations such as state agencies, transnational interest groups, and new social movements, may on the one hand be hailed as democratic to the extent that they curb government domination, but in so 'protecting' the autonomy of the citizens (usually particular groups of citizens), they are detracting from the sense in which citizens can be said to be 'self-governing'.[67] A community of organisations as actors is not synonymous with a community of self-governing citizens, and as such the concept of *democracy has become little more than a 'hurrah word', a universalist aspiration in contrast to a particularist realisation, at once a universalist ambition and an achieved condition.*[68] It is today a rhetorical tool of administration and legitimation, which, rooted in the problematic self/other conceptual foundation, further contributes to the problem of modern identity formation, by providing an inaccurate conceptual reflection of the real heirarchical class-based divisions and inequalities in society.

Similarly associated with the concepts of 'nation-state', 'nationalism', 'sovereignty', is the concept of 'citizenship', which is thus similarly challenged conceptually by the conditions of modernity, and in a particular sense by the process of European integration.

The concept of citizenship emerged alongside the 'nation', and was crystallised by the French Revolution, which propagated the notion of "belonging" to a particular

sovereign territory. In its original form, the idea of the citizen bore connotations of an active role and participation in political life, such that 'citizenship' was a significant *fact* of everyday life and 'identity', indicating one's attachment to the community.[69] Yet, the process of European integration, in challenging the sovereignty of the nation (and in promoting mobility and resettlement in Europe), in turn brings into question the concept of citizenship. The idea of *national* citizenship has been complemented by the emergence of a notion of "European citizenship", and arguably this has been possible only by virtue of a conceptual modification in (and by) modernity of the original pro-active notion of the concept.

First introduced in 1985 in the Adonnino Report,[70] the idea of "European citizenship" focuses on rights and interests (eg., in the fields of health, culture, sport and information, and including the right to move, work and reside anywhere in the Community). As of 1993, the Maastricht Treaty, devoting a chapter specifically to European citizenship, allows a citizen residing in a member state other than his/her own to vote in municipal and European elections.

Yet if one defines citizenship according to its original pro-active meaning, the idea of a dual National-European citizenship would in general terms, appear problematic. One's active participation in political life at the national level would potentially clash in practice with one's active participation at the European level. As is often seen in the relations between member states and the EC institutions, the attempt to participate actively as a citizen of the nation and of Europe has an inherent tendency toward conflict, as the interests of the two spheres, while often complementary, are not necessarily congruent.[71] The emphasis of one's interest, 'participation' and *choice* of actions from a national perspective is likely to be different to one's choice from a 'European' perspective.

From this point of view, it is interesting to note that, as Michael Walzer has traced, *there appears to have been a mutation in the concept of citizenship from a pro-active to a passive notion.* It would seem that in modernity, politics has dropped out, or

at least been de-emphasised in the general meaning of the concept, such that citizenship is no more than an occasional, abstract identity, the individual being a bearer of rights more than an active and influential cell.[72] Indeed, upon analysis, this may be detected in the European Commission's treatment of 'citizenship'. In 1994, it is acknowledged by the Commission that "In struggling to move forward with European union, the citizen has been left behind", and it is this acknowledgement which has led to the Commission's new approach to communication policy, stressing 'openness, transparency, and access to Commission documents', "to clarify and stimulate the role of the citizen".[73] The very fact that the citizen has been 'left out' of the integration process is indicative of a "passive" interpretation of citizenship. Yet even within the new approach, which nominally seeks to encourage participation, there appears to be an over-emphasis on rights, on services to be provided *to* the citizen, as opposed to citizen *action*[74] - " *Un homme qui n'est pas informé est un sujet; un homme informé est un citoyen*".[75] Indeed, it would seem that a shift toward a passive emphasis, stressing a dual and complementary sphere of rights, is necessary in order to render the idea of dual national-European citizenship more coherent and less conflictual than in the case of the original pro-active emphasis.

To broaden the argument, it may be seen that the apparent modification of 'citizenship' is not restricted to, or caused by, the process of European integration alone. Rather, *it may be argued that the idea of European citizenship has been made possible by an on-going conceptual mutation of the term, resulting from the conditions of modernity.* The shift toward a passive notion of citizenship can be seen as indicative of the loosening of social bonds in today's highly differentiated society (discussed earlier). This new passive connotation is arguably linked with the ethic of authenticity, with its 'sanctification' of the private realm, on the inner self and individualism at the expense of community bonds. Combined with the general disembedding, up-rooting effect of modern culture, this has the tendency to lead to apathy as regards participation in public life. Thus, while the practical definition of citizenship is being challenged along with the

'erosion' of the nation-state, *the conceptual meaning, which is today largely passive, may be said paradoxically to reflect disintegration, the loosening of community bonds, in contrast to its original positive, pro-active meaning*. To this extent, the notion of European citizenship has depended on the disintegrating and disembedding dynamics of modernity.

It has been argued that 'sovereignty', 'nationalism', democracy' and 'citizenship' are cultural and conceptual artifacts, mutated remnants of 'yesterday's ideas'. As elaborated in the preceding argument, concepts determine the individual's (and group's) conception of self, such that conceptual change can be seen to represent a change in the self's relation to self (and society). Given this fact, the resistance of concepts such as 'sovereignty' and 'nationalism' despite evident conceptual diffusion and obscurity, can be significantly explained. Their continued emotive power and legitimacy can be seen as rooted in the fact that the ethic of 'authenticity' gives an essential role to memory as a foundation to self-continuity. In the process of self-creation, the self-reflective self of today may have evolved since the self-reflective self of yesterday, and the two are linked to form a continuous self through time, *on the basis of memory*. This explains the contemporary (twentieth century) emphasis on the past, on nostalgically preserving and cherishing tradition and heritage, not to learn from it, but for its own sake.[76] The concepts of 'sovereignty' and 'nationalism' nominally represent a continued stable and powerful source of identity by virtue of their emotive 'history', the fact that they have been fought for since 1789. Conceptual 'memories' can in theory be seen as webs, incorporating and establishing links with the histories and memories of others, past and present, and thus accentuating a sense of meaning and belonging for both the group and the individual. Yet, in practice, *memories are essentially unstable and changeable, such that a reliance on them for the purpose of self-continuity serves to exacerbate the modern 'identity crisis'*. The retention of a term such as 'sovereignty' despite its gradual loss of meaning

and applicability, is symbolic of the fact that we today 'stumble like drunkards over the sprawling canvass of our self-conception, throwing a little paint here, erasing some lines there, never really stopping to obtain a view of the likeness we have produced".[77] (See Chapter 3, where the 'problem of temporality', of relying on memory for our identity and theoretical perspectives, is addressed by undermining the unquestioned *assumptions* of rational linear thought).

This argument is of crucial significance for EC theory. Word-structures appear to shelter us from the 'hazards of the world', as we believe they contain the past, present and future, and as such they grant us a *sense* of permanence. Yet notably this 'sense' is none other than a powerful illusion, as words and ideas necessarily mutate and are fluid in interaction over time,[78] such that the attempt to define concepts such as sovereignty, nationalism, democracy and citizenship, as a means of maintaining a sense of permanence and continuity of identity, is bound to fail, to lead to conceptual obscurity. From this perspective, and if it is acknowledged that the theory and practice of integration is hindered by concepts rooted in a previous era (and a previous context), then steps may be taken to remove this hindrance through reconceptualisation.

The preceding argument has attempted to articulate and explain an evident paradox between the emotive power and theoretical obscurity of concepts such as 'nationalism' and 'sovereignty' (and democracy/citizenship). In showing that these concepts are rooted in an anachronistic context, and in explaining why they have been retained in modern political thought despite their hindering effect, the intention is to pave the way for a reconceptualisation of the sovereignty/nationalism foundation of political thought (and in particular EC theory). It has been argued that, to date, the failure to characterise adequately the integration process has been rooted in a basic failure within integration literature, to admit and understand the existence and symptoms of the modern identity crisis (rooted in the self/other conceptual framework) as previously outlined.

THE IDEA OF EUROPE

If one considers theoretically the impact of identity crisis on EC theory and practice, it becomes evident that the resilience of 'nationalism' and 'sovereignty', with their attendant concepts of 'democracy' and 'citizenship', is facilitated by the theoretical immaturity of conceptual alternatives for the purpose of identity formation. *One can detect a 'vicious circle', in that these concepts are resilient because there are no alternatives, and there are no alternatives because these concepts (and the self/other conceptual foundation) are resilient.* A focus on the 'idea of Europe' exemplifies this point. Nominally, the European idea may be considered a possible alternative and challenge to the sovereign nation-state and nationalism (Indeed, in the wake of two world wars, the original purpose behind European integration was to overcome the conflictual tendencies of nationalism). However, within the literature on European integration, the idea of Europe is poorly conceived, lacking in precise theoretical content, and in effect fails to provide or even offer an alternative way of thinking about identity. This may be seen as a symptom of the conceptual limitation which is hindering the theory and process of integration, and thus as a further indication of the need for reconceptualisation.

Indeed, it may be said that the failure within EC thought to develop and provide an effective sense of 'European-ness' among the citizens of Europe, is the result of a misguided attempt, based on the rational self/other conceptual framework of political thought, to define the idea of Europe by fixing it within certain geographical and conceptual boundaries. Not only is such an attempt bound to result in theoretical obscurity, given the multifaceted and diffuse nature of the subject, but it inherently fails to grant the individual an affinity or sense of belonging to Europe. To explain, the multiplicity of attempts to trace the origins of Europe geographically or historically, rest on a 'Eurocentric' state of mind. This state of mind is not only itself a product of modernity, but it implicitly claims as "European" whatever is characteristic of modernity, such that the idea of Europe is fundamentally *synonymous with* modernity. In turn, to the

extent that the project of modernity is no longer distinctly European, the idea of Europe may be deemed an 'empty' concept.

From this perspective, I wish to argue that Europe's consciousness of self, the 'idea of Europe', requires fundamental alteration, which will involve a philosophical reconsideration of what it is and a historical reconsideration of what it was. It will be argued in Chapter 3 that the idea of Europe which today has the potential to forge unity and accommodate the multifaceted and changeable dynamics of integration, is best characterised, not geographically or historically, but rather as a set of possibilities, a state of mind which accommodates and promotes constant change.

The 'history of Europe' and the 'European spirit', which have been referred to throughout the process of European integration since World War II (especially by European Federalists) characteristically imply a 'shared past' which supposedly identifies Europe as a unified whole (For example, Mr.Carlo Ripa de Meana, Member of the European Commission responsible for "A People's Europe", on launching the European flag in April 1986 - "*This flag... testifies to the Community's desire to become the centre and driving force of an integration movement which brings together all the countries of Western Europe united by a common history, tradition and heritage*"). Yet surveying the literature addressing the 'idea of Europe', European identity, or the 'origins of Europe', one detects a characteristic obscurity and incongruence which has recurred repeatedly in the analysis of 'EC theory' thus far. Any attempt to define Europe is bound to be affected by *subjective bias*, and by the *functional intentions* of the definition. In addition to the (perhaps inevitable) use of selective memory, definition varies according to whether *geographical, cultural, political, or 'spiritual'* factors are given priority. Moreover, each of these bases of definition are themselves problematic, unable to contain 'Europe' within fixed parameters.

Various attempts to trace the 'origins of Europe' *historically* have arguably resulted in little more than a diffuse record of diverse events and influences, retrospectively linked to form some kind of 'Eurocentric' mythical whole. Referring the term 'Europa' back to ancient Greece, the development of Europe is portrayed as a moral success story, traced through the Roman Empire, Christian Europe, the Renaissance, Enlightenment, and through to modern political democracy.[79] The exact *date of birth* of Europe is, not surprisingly, contested. Denis de Rougemont sees the word "Europe" coming into current vocabulary in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and yet traces a consciousness of a European entity back to navigation charts of 1300.[80] Christopher Dawson sees 'Western' or 'European' culture emerging in the eleventh century, with the end of the Dark Ages.[81] Karl Jaspers defines Europe in terms of Christian history, more specifically Christendom, the Bible, classical world, freedom and science.[82] Lord Gladwyn sees the nucleus of Europe in the creation of Feranghistan, in AD800 by Charlemagne. Indeed, the estimation of a birth date for Europe depends on one's choice of criteria. Using the analogy of a work of art, the birth date may be variously conceived as the day the outline is sketched, the day the idea is solidified, the day the first brush stroke is made, or indeed the day half way through completion when the 'character' of the work emerges.[83] The lack of a definitive cut off point beyond which chronologically linked events and influences can be classified as being distinctly European means that the roots of 'Europe' are left open to question.

In addition to the bias introduced by the inevitable use of selective historical memory, any attempt to trace the 'origins of Europe' *geographically* is evidently problematic, due to a lack of reliable data. Prior to the conceptual predominance of the nation-state, physical boundaries were of secondary importance to the control over men, and as such the accurate determination of a nucleus geographical Europe in the thirteenth century or before is seemingly implausible.

Moreover, depending on the *intentions* of a given theorist, the parameters of 'essential' Europe are seen to vary considerably. Diverse criteria for determining 'European-ness' elicit diverse and often obscure conclusions. For example, from a purely historical perspective, Lord Gladwyn traces a continuous line of development through the Norman Conquest of 1066, Medieval unity, the decline of the papacy in 1305, the Peace of Westphalia sanctioning the nation-state, the French Revolution, and a series of theorists from Liebnitz to Count Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1923, culminating in twentieth century Europe.[84] Such an account is problematic, not only by virtue of its mythical quality, the fact that it implies a *predetermined* awareness of unity, but it clearly links such a diverse spectrum of influences (Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Islamic) that it apparently fails to narrow down any 'core essence' of European identity. Indeed, it may be argued that the attempt to trace identity through time is precluded by the fact that identity evolves over time beyond prior recognition. A wide range of diverse influences are deemed over time to be influential precursors to contemporary Europe, none of which bear essential resemblance to contemporary Europe as evolved.

If the characterisation of Europe is inspired by *political* motives, the diversity and incongruence in definition is perhaps even more stark. From a modern day political perspective, the core of Europe, and thus 'European identity' is generally perceived to revolve around the European Community, or more generally 'Western Europe'. As an initial consideration, it is evident that if one defines Europe in terms of the European Community, one clearly abstracts the phenomenon from the rest of 'European history' and from 'non-community phenomena' occurring within the land-space and time-space of the Community.[85] Moreover, since 1945, the idea of Europe has been subject to a largely negative characterisation, fostered and shaped by an effort to avoid another world war, more than by any positive willingness to embrace a 'spirit of Europe'. This perspective has shaped *contemporary debates* over the enlargement of the EC, and specifically the issue of where Europe begins and ends. During the Cold War, Russia and Eastern Europe

were considered to be Eastward-looking, thus more akin to Asia as distinct from Europe, and indeed Russia showed no sign of friendliness to the European idea. Yet since 1989, the notion of a Common European Home (as propounded by Gorbachev) has been accompanied by a 'remembering' of Russia's Byzantine inheritance, by virtue of which it may be regarded as being as close to Mediterranean Greece and Rome as to the countries of north-western Europe.[86] This 'remembering' is occurring despite the fact that Communism (though now discredited) was a primary identifying factor of the ex-Soviet Union, and the long-time enemy of Western Europe, external to the European idea. Moreover, the idea of Europe today does not include Israel, despite the fact that its institutions and dominant outlook are largely derived from Europe. The only difference between the Jewish movement and other national movements of nineteenth-century Europe, was that the former found its territorial expression outside of the perceived parameters of geographical Europe *at the time*.[87] Clearly, the determination of European identity at any point in time involves a subjective and functional manipulation of historical fact, but such manipulation, however effective, necessarily comprises the construction of a retrospective (and inconsistent) mythology.

Indeed, it would seem that the tendency to articulate the European idea and to forge unity by way of constructing a retrospective mythology, is inspired by the 'mythological imagined community' of nationalism. However, there is a crucial difference between nationalism and the 'European idea'. The binding force of national unity is provided traditionally by the territorial nation-state. Yet as seen, *in the case of Europe there exists no obvious and primary factor (geographical, cultural, linguistic, political) which serves to bind all Europeans together with a sense of belonging over and above allegiance to the nation-state*. Not only is nationalism still a primary source of identity, but there is no *clearly circumscribed* 'larger Europe' which has existed through history *with clear boundaries*,[88] to which allegiance could be directed, and to which

individuals could feel that they clearly 'belong'.[89] On the contrary, the 'history' of Europe has been marked by conflict and diversity.

From the argument thus far, the question is left unresolved as to what is meant by the term 'Europe' today, what precisely identifies Europe in contrast to non-Europe. It may be argued in accordance with Samir Amin, that underlying the diversity in attempts to define European history, identity and culture, the essence of the European idea constitutes a *particular culturalist perspective, a 'Eurocentrism', an anti-universalist self-definition* which presents itself as universalist by claiming that imitation of its model is the only solution to world problems. This Eurocentric perspective constitutes a European self-definition according to the 'European' project of modernity, a 'yarn of how relations between Europe on the one hand, and the barbarians and the savages on the other, are transformed from a Hobbesian state of nature to a Grotian pastorale, ushering in the spirit of enlightenment and modernism'.[90]

Given the evident inconsistency in attempts to define Europe historically/geographically, and given the continuity of the Eurocentric point of view within these attempts, it may be said that the *idea of Europe is at root synonymous with the project of modernity.* Far from there being an essential European 'culture', the essence of Europe constitutes a future-oriented creed of progression, cumulation, and universalising aspiration, a technological imagination manifested in a 'culture' of industrialisation, capitalism and statecraft.[91] Characteristic of this 'culture' is a mentality of unlimitedness and constant change, 'evolution', by which yesterday's product is automatically unfit for today.

If one accepts this characterisation of Europe, it is possible to pinpoint the seed of a current crisis of European identity. From the start, this European 'project' of modernity was necessarily racist, in order to reconcile Europe's assumed superiority with its universalist ambition, and as such Europe came to define itself not by virtue of a

distinctive 'core' but by what it was not, by opposition with the Oriental 'Other'.[92] Moreover, the project of modernity, having started in Europe, was designed for and conducive to export, to extending its own reach across the globe, and as such it had no essence other than an abstract dynamism.[93] Clearly, 'modernity' is no longer exclusively European, as the creed of technological imagination, cumulation and progress today flourishes on the coasts of the Pacific Ocean, and is particularly rivalled by the United States.[94] At the same time, it would appear that the creed of constant cumulation is reaching exhaustion, manifested in the mass production of 'confectioned imagination'. The result is loss of meaning, with a questioning of the previously unquestioned in the form of postmodernism - "The real and the imaginary have become almost impossible to distinguish..."; "Self destructing images simulate each other in a limitless interplay of mirrors".[95]

Given these factors, it may be said that Europe's self-definition based on modernity, has resulted in a crisis of European identity. Indeed, the proliferation of ethnic nationalism in the twentieth century may be interpreted as an indication that Europe's nineteenth century identity based on opposition with the Other has turned in upon itself. In the absence of a positively identifiable European culture, the affirmation of identity within Europe in the twentieth century has continued to take the form of opposition to an Other, but the Other is now internal to Europe (as expressed in ethnic nationalism, and for example the resurgence of Nazism[96]). To this extent, it may be said that the 'old' Europe as identified by nineteenth century modernity, 'resembles a corpse whose hair and nails, wealth, and cumulative knowledge are still growing, but the rest is dead'.[97] European nations focus on cultivating the past, treating their cities as museums and essentially inventing tradition,[98] searching for meaning where the present fails to provide any.

In effect, and following this line of argument, European culture in the form of modernity turned out to be a life without culture, a tree without roots. Shakespeare and

Mozart, French cuisine and German philosophy can all be identified as components of 'European culture' is a sense, but they remain first and foremost distinctive of national culture, such that there exist no real 'supranational' cultural roots over and above the sum of Europe's parts.[99] It is this realisation that led Jean Monnet to conclude at the end of his life that, "If I should start it all over again, I would start with culture".[100] Today, there is an apparent 'emptiness' at the heart of 'Europe'. Its explicit boundaries have come to be equated with the starkly bureaucratic 'E.C.',[101] while the implicit boundaries of the contemporary concept of Europe, the 'true European community of the mind', appear to be those of modernity, which were geographically defined and characteristically exclusive in the nineteenth century, but which have been diffused in the twentieth, resulting in an identity gap,[102] and the need for a new form of identity for the 1990's and beyond.

It has been argued that the 'mythological' historical account of European identity, as upheld by the EC, belies a more fundamental implicit notion of the European idea, synonymous with the project of 'modernity', *such that a crisis of modernity is equivalent to a crisis of 'European identity'*. Historical perceptions of Europe within twentieth century political thought are based on the 'sovereignty/nation-state/democracy' conceptual framework and on the Eurocentric perspective of modernity. As such, *Europe is bound conceptually within its own subjective framework*, within a hermeneutic web which, as hitherto argued, is inappropriate in the context of contemporary European (and global) dynamics. European identity, or ways of perceiving the self as European, suitable for the 1990's and beyond, can be effectively achieved only by stepping out of the modern 'Eurocentric' conceptual framework, and by introducing new ways of thinking, beyond self/other opposition. If it is to be admitted that identity alters through time, such that a historical tracing of Europe through time provides little in the way of clarifying European identity today (and provides little affinity for the individual), then the foundation is laid

for the reconceptualisation of European identity for the 1990's. I wish to argue (in Chapter 3) for a conceptualisation of Europe as a kind of non-identity, a realisation of diversity, pluralism, nonconformism, and change, or in other words, as a refusal of fixed definition, the refusal of 'who we are'.

The European Community may be seen as a compromise between the forces of unification and globalisation, such that local cultures are suffused by external influences, are locally inflected manifestations of a European or even global culture[103] - "One may say, the home is common, that is true, but each family has its own apartment, and there are different entrances too" - (Mikhail Gorbachev, 1986).[104] Within this context, European identity in the 1990's must comprehend and incorporate otherness, avoid conceptual polarity and allow for 'play' between binary opposites, leave the future open by allowing for unity through diversity. Such an identity cannot be realised by way of mere prescription, but must be elicited through real and practical situations, through community of action.[105] However, *it is through prescription, through theoretical elaboration as here attempted, that the foundation may be set for thinking perceptively together, for forging a unity suitable for the present age.*

Summary

In summary, this chapter has argued for the existence of a modern (personal and by implication group) identity crisis, rooted in the tension between Enlightenment and Romantic thought, which has been incorporated and accommodated within contemporary discourse in the form of a binary conceptual foundation, an exclusive self-other opposition. At the level of the group, response to this crisis brought to realisation by the dynamics of modern culture, is taking the form of an affirmation of threatened identity, manifested in violent nationalism and an attempt to maintain the theoretical status quo (including the concepts of 'nation-state', 'sovereignty', etc.,) in the context of autonomous transformative dynamics. The fundamental self-other conceptual foundation not only lies

at the root of the identity crisis, but is self-perpetuating by precluding conceptual alternatives. This affects both the study and practice of European integration, by maintaining the predominance of the 'self-other/sovereignty/nation' conceptual framework, and so preventing an effective realisation of the European idea. Thus, the need for a new conceptual foundation, based on a reconsideration of identity, of self-other opposition, is clear. Not only will a new foundation lead to a new perspective on the European Community, which will in effect promote the process of integration, but the desirability of this exercise further lies in the simultaneous resolution of the modern (personal, group and European) identity crisis. Thus, in the following chapter, an elaboration of a new form of personal and European identity, beyond self-other opposition, and an understanding of how it is possible and desirable to refuse our present identity in order to attain it, will be addressed through the work of Michel Foucault, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jacques Derrida.

[1]quoted in Kevin Robins, "Reimagined Communities? European image spaces, beyond Fordism", Cultural Studies, vol.3, no.2, (1989-90), p145

[2]Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, Self and Society in the late modern age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p15

[3]RJB Walker, Inside/Outside: international relations as political theory (Cambridge:CUP, 1993), p9

[4]...definition adapted from Charles Taylor's characterisation of 'modernity' in The Malaise of Modernity (Ontario:Anansi,1991).

[5]Philip Allott, Eunomia (Oxford: OUP, 1990) p3

[6]Allott, Eunomia, p59

[7]Isaiah Berlin, "The Bent Twig", The Crooked Timber of Humanity (New York: Vintage Books, 1992) p258

[8]Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991) p13

[9]Anderson, p15

[10]Anderson, ch2

[11]Isaiah Berlin, "European Unity and its Vissicitudes", The Crooked Timber of Humanity ,p183

[12]See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)

[13]Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity ,p26

[14]Berlin, "European Unity and its Vicissitudes",The Crooked Timber of Humanity, p199

[15]Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity ,p26, and also in Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, p188

[16]Indeed, it may be noted that Michel Foucault, in his genealogy of the slow formation, in antiquity, of a hermeneutics of the self (History of Sexuality, vols.I,II,III), shows how, in Greek antiquity, 'the injunction of having to know yourself was always associated with the other principle of having to take care of yourself, and it was that need to care for oneself that brought the Delphic maxim (know yourself) into operation'- Luther H. Martin and Huck Gutman, Patrick H.Hutton eds., Technologies of the Self (Amherst: University of Massachussettes Press, 1988) p20. Foucault pinpoints the slide to subjectivism as outlined thus far, in his statement that 'our philosophical tradition has overemphasised the latter (know yourself) and forgotten the former'(care for self), (Technologies, p19); 'In Greco-Roman culture knowledge of oneself appeared as the consequence of taking care of yourself. In the modern world, knowledge of oneself constitutes the fundamental principle' (Technologies, p22)

[17] See Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity,ch.1. There is a growing concern in the media with the degeneracy of society's moral fabric. The murder in England of a 2 year-old child in February 1993, by two 12 year-old boys, raised the question of 'why little angels become monsters'.(The Observer, London Sunday, March 28,1993) A survey revealed that two thirds of young people between ages 14 and 19 think they are likely to be beaten up or mugged; one third know someone who has committed burglary; two thirds know someone who has stolen from a shop. (The Daily Telegraph, Monday, May 31,1993)

[18]Berlin, "The Pursuit of the Ideal", The Crooked Timber of Humanity, p8

[19]It is not within the scope of this argument to justify the dialogicality of language, and I thus take the liberty of assuming agreement on this issue, as well as a familiarity with the theoretical background relating to this issue , from the designative-instrumental view of language seen in Hobbes, Locke and Condillac, through to the dialogical view in Hegel , Mead, Habermas and Wittgenstein.

[20] See Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity, ch.4, and Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion of 'background understanding' (to be discussed in Chapter 3).

[21]Charles Taylor,"The Politics of Recognition", Working Papers and Proceedings of the Center for Psychosocial Studies (Chicago: Centre for Psychosocial Studies, 1992), p8. Also in Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton University Press, 1992)

[22]Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, p6

[23]Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953),no.323

[24]AC Grayling, Wittgenstein (Oxford: OUP, 1988) p84 - The thought of Wittgenstein will be further developed in Chapter 3.

[25]Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, no.226. See Chapter 3 for further explanation of this point.

[26]Allott, Eunomia, p57

[27]Allott, Eunomia, p64

[28]For an elaboration of this argument, see Giddens.

[29]Marcia Millman, Such a Pretty Face (New York: Berkley Books, 1981), quoted in Giddens, p106

[30]This is particularly evident in re-unified Germany, and ex-Yugoslavia. Both are extreme examples of a destabilised social context. Nazi race murders committed by swastika-bearing youth in Germany are a growing problem (The Daily Telegraph, May 31, 1993), and indeed there is evidence of an extreme right-wing tendency emerging within national governments. In July 1993, Nazi groups under names such as 'Fresh Start in Europe', convened at the Conservative Party conference in Britain. (Sunday Times, July 24, 1993)

[31]Robins, p150

[32]Giddens, pp25-27

[33]Giddens, p189

[34]Giddens, p17

[35]Giddens, p18

[36]...and thus the dynamics of modernity and identity crisis spread to wider portions of the population.

[37]Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, p20

[38]European MTV (Music Television) has been hailed as a prime promoter of 'European identity'. It is the fastest-growing television station in the world, with half a million viewers every month."The new trends are communicated through MTV on the so-called Euro-English, which is a simplified form of American-English and where local accents are a part of the game. Transnational cable and satellite channels have penetrated such a large proportion of European households that pan-European youth TV is an extremely powerful force." -"The True Europeans: One Generation Away", The New Federalist, 5-6, (1992) p12

[39]Gareth Locksley, "Television Business in Europe", The European Experience ,ed. Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (London: British Film Institute, 1989) p7-20

[40]Walker, p160

[41]Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", Michel Foucault:Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, eds. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, 2nd ed. (University of Chicago Press, 1982) p216

[42]Raymond Williams, Towards 2000 (London:Chatto & Windus, 1983) p198

[43]Walker, p17, p22

[44]See footnote 30

[45]This argument to the effect that we need to address the silences in modern thought,runs parallel to a similar argument in Robert Walker.

[46]Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, quoted in Nicholas Onuf, "Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History", Alternatives, vol.16 (1991)

[47]Walker, p166

[48]Walker, p66

[49]Walker, p6

[50]FH Hinsley, Sovereignty (New York: Basic Books, 1966)

[51]as for example depicted by Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986) p39

[52]Williams, p181

[53]See for example Hans J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967) p312-317

[54]James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge University Press, 1990) p41

[55]Bryan Urquhart,"The Limits to Sovereignty", New Perspectives Quarterly, vol.8, no4, (fall 1991) p24-27

[56]Anderson, p10-11

[57]Peter Alter, Nationalism, (Edward Arnold, 1984) p6

[58]Anthony D. Smith, "Towards a Global Culture", Theory, Culture & Society, vol.7 (SAGE: London,1990) p180

[59]Isaiah Berlin, in Nathan Gardels, "Two Concepts of Nationalism: An interview with Isaiah Berlin", New York Review of Books, no.19, (Nov.21, 1991)

[60]Louis Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism (New Brunswick,1954) p11

[61]Williams, p192

[62]Not only are the boundaries of the nation-state historically fluid in practice, but as seen in Chapter 1, the process of European integration combined with the dynamics of modernity, is challenging the exclusivity of national culture, national sovereignty, national identity etc.

[63]'Nationalism' is a characteristically obscure concept. For example, among others see AD Smith, Nationalism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc, 1955); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities ; EJ Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, (CUP, 1990)

[64]John Dunn, Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future (Cambridge: CUP, 1979) p2

[65]Plato, The Republic, as discussed in Russsell Hanson, "Democracy", Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, eds.Terrence Ball, James Farr, Russell Hanson (Cambridge: CUP, 1989) p70

[66]Russell Hanson, "Democracy", Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, p78-85

[67]Barry Hindness, "Democracy and Big Government", The Idea of Europe, eds. Brian Nelson and David Roberts and Walter Veit (New York: Berg, 1992) p103

[68]Walker, Ch.7

[69]Michael Walzer, 'Citizenship", Political Innovation and Conceptual Change

[70]Report from the ad hoc Committee on a People's Europe - Offprint from Bulletin of the EC - 3-1985

[71]...as seen for example in the collapse of the ERM; the immigration problems resulting from the removal of borders in the Single Market; the hostility by Britain and Denmark toward the 'Social Chapter' in the Maastricht Treaty.

[72]Michael Walzer, 'Citizenship", Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, p211

[73]Speech by Commissioner J. de Deus Pinheiro to the Conference "Communication Sciences: Higher Education and its Markets in the European Experience", Siena, 18-19 February, 1994.

[74]For example, see European Documentation text entitled From Single Market to European Union (Office for Official Publication of the European Communities: Luxembourg, 1992), p.19, "A Community of Citizens for citizens"

[75]Report entitled "Reflection on Information and Communication Policy of the European Community", chaired by Mr.Willy De Clercq, MEP- March 1993

[76] For an argument to the effect that present needs reshape past remains, see David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: CUP) 1985.

[77]Berger, Invitation to Sociology, p72, quoted in David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country, p199

[78]Allott, Eunomia, p9-11

[79]Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1982) p5. For an example of this Eurocentric history of Europe, see Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Europe; A history of its Peoples (London:Viking Penguin, 1990), and indeed a text published with the aid of the European Commission, The Origins of European Identity (Brussels:European Interuniversity Press)

[80]Denis de Rougemont, "Introduction", in Max Beloff, Europe and the Europeans (London:Chatto & Windus, 1957) pxv

[81]Christopher Dawson,The Making of Europe (New York:Mendian Books, 1970) p239

[82]Karl Jaspers, The European Spirit (Toronto:Macmillan, 1948)

[83]Denis de Rougemont, pxv

[84]Lord Gladwyn, The European Idea (London: Cox & Wyman Ltd., 1966)

[85]Philip Allott, "The European Community is not the True European Community", The Yale Law Journal Vol.100, (June 1991) p2487

[86]Beloff, p11

[87]Beloff, p6

[88]It will be argued in Chapter 3 that an identity (and specifically European identity) appropriate for the 1990's cannot and should not be circumscribed by clear boundaries.

[89]This point provides support for the legitimacy and appropriateness of the new 'non-fixed' conceptual foundation, which in principle undermines the rigidity of identity based on rationality and linear time- See Chapter 3.

[90]Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, "The Other in European self-definition: an addendum to the literature on international society", Review of International Studies, vol 17 (1991) p329. From the Eurocentric point of view, it is claimed that, prior to the Renaissance, Europe belonged to a regional tributary system including Europeans, Arabs, Christians, and Moslems, with its centre at the eastern end of the Mediterranean basin. From the Renaissance onwards, the capitalist system shifted its centre to the Atlantic, and a new European 'culture' circumscribed by capitalism, was constructed around a retrospective myth, opposing an assumed European geographical continuity with a world to the south of the mediterranean, so creating a new centre-periphery boundary. See Samir Amin, Eurocentrism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989) p10

[91]Agnes Heller, "Europe: An Epilogue?", The Idea of Europe,p13

[92]Neumann and Welsh. This argument is also put forward by Edward Said, Orientalism (Harmondsworth, 1985) p3 ; "European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self." Further, in Culture and Imperialism, Said argues that European 'culture' (identity) as symbolised in literature, has been determined by imperialism, by the experience of conquering and establishing superiority over the 'Other'. Each nation affirms itself by venerating the uniqueness of its tradition, and yet paradoxically, because of empire all cultures are involved with one another, are all hybrid and heterogeneous. Said seeks through this argument to stimulate discussion, reflection, and so to establish from the experience of a shared imperial past, the basis of a common present and future. His aim is thus similar to that of the present thesis, in seeking to overcome the exclusivity of the self/other, 'us' vs 'them' perspective (in his case by showing how that perspective constitutes a common bond). Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1993).

[93]Note: the crisis of modern identity as outlined previously is characteristic of 'project Europe'.

[94]Heller, p19

[95]Robins, p157

[96]See footnote 30

[97]Heller, p20

[98] For an account of inventing tradition, see Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: CUP, 1983)

[99]Amin, p107

[100]Jean Monnet, quoted in Sven Papcke, "Who needs European Identity?", The Idea of Europe, p68

[101]Allott, "The European Community is not the True European Community" p2498.

[102]See Richard Lowenthal, p39

[103]For a full characterisation of the emerging 'global culture', see Anthony D. Smith, "Towards a Global Culture",Theory, Culture and Society , pp171-191

[104] Quoted in Gwyn Prins, "Home is Where the Heart Is", Political Quarterly, (Jan-March 1991) p8

[105] A view supported by John Dunn, "Elusive Community: The Political Theory of Charles Taylor", Interpreting Political Responsibility (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) p190

CHAPTER 3: EUROPEAN IDENTITY RECONSIDERED

"Play is always play of absence and presence, but if one wishes to think it radically, one must think it before the alternative of presence and absence; it is necessary to think of Being as presence or absence from the possibility of play on, and not the other way around" (Jacques Derrida)[1]

In the previous chapters, it has been argued that the study of European integration is debilitated by its conceptual foundation, derived from 17/18th century political thought and assuming identity in terms of self/other polarity, and more specifically in terms of 'the inner self', 'nationalism', and 'sovereignty'. This foundation may have been, and may be, applicable to the study of integration to the extent that nation-states are the primary players and basic units of the integration process. Yet, clearly, a conceptual foundation which assumes the principle of sovereignty, and which precludes criticism of this principle as a principle, is incapable of conceptualising a social and political order which does not implicate states, or self/other, inside/outside sovereign state-like units as the basic foundation. The assumption of sovereignty restricts the use of analogies and metaphors to discourses in which this assumption is also taken for granted.[2] As such, the idea and project of European integration to date has constituted in practice a development toward

increasingly complex interdependence, a loosening of borders, and a partial 'transfer of sovereignty' to the EC, while the notion of a truly post-national organic European Community bears the status of an idealistic and indeterminate dream. The process of European integration is bound to remain locked in this status quo for as long as the abstract idea of European unity is in conflict with the 'self/other, sovereignty, nation-state' assumptions of contemporary political discourse.

To borrow from Emile Durkheim, contemporary political thought is capable of conceiving integration and European unity *mechanistically*, but not *organically*. In order to break this gridlock, to understand, promote, and perceive the desirability of European integration and unity (in effect by redefining them), it is arguably necessary to address the issue of identity, the basic binary distinction between self and other, which as seen has determined both the theory and practice of European integration to date. As such, it is the aim of this chapter to elaborate a form of identity, and of European identity more specifically, appropriate to the 1990's. The purpose is not to advocate (implausibly) a direct substitution for existing identities with an 'up-dated' version of static identity, but rather to elaborate the basis of an identity which is brought into focus and essentially understood as being a rhetorical strategy in the manner of Michel Foucault, a prescriptive lens through which to distance oneself from one's assumptions, and to serve as a catalyst for constant conceptual change. It is not the intention to undermine the reassurance implicit in contemporary forms of 'static' identity, but rather to supplement it by showing how this reassurance is illusory, and how a more effective reassurance is gained through the acceptance of "flux", the principle of constant change.

In elaborating a form of identity which encourages 'alternative modes of thought', it will become evident the extent to which the inherently oppositional basis of contemporary thought (making exclusive distinctions between self and other, fact and value etc.,) hinders the study and practice of integration. Not only will a new form of European identity emerge from this study, to serve as the cornerstone of a newly conceived

Community, but a new 'way of seeing' the integration process is intended to address the problems raised in Chapters 1 and 2, promote understanding (of past and present), reveal the desirability of integration and thus encourage integrative action. *The new identity is thus simultaneously meant as a formulation which may be applied to the identity of the self (the individual, group or nation), while it is also a conceptual foundation, a way of thinking which may reorient the study of the EC.* This thesis will not seek to evaluate, predict or prescribe the future of the EC in specific empirical terms, for this would contradict the dynamic non-fixed principle and intention of the new conceptual foundation.

The new identity

Having elaborated the purpose behind my conception of a new identity, its basic features may be outlined. I shall first discuss the new identity in terms of 'identity of the self', before considering its capacity as a conceptual framework (ie., as a reformulation of the self/other distinction). Thus, as one means of tackling theoretical inadequacy in the study of the EC (seen in Chapter 1), which in turn is related to a modern identity crisis (Chapter 2), I wish to propose a conception of identity which has the basic characteristics of being *'non-fixed', 'non-essential', and pragmatic*, by virtue of constituting the notion, not of a uniform, clearly defined homogeneous identity, but rather a set of *plural overlapping identities* (or characteristics) which are constantly transformed in interaction with each other and with other identities. This contrasts with the 'modern' notion of identity (discussed in Chapter 2) which assumes there is an essential authentic 'inner self' which can be discovered and developed. The idea of an essential self implies that the 'self' may be defined in exclusive opposition to an 'other',that it is thus inscribed within distinct boundaries on the model of a billiard-ball interacting with other billiard balls; that there is a continuity of the self through time.

The new identity here proposed cannot be exclusively defined, for it has no fixed boundaries, and no essential static core, but rather the identities of which it is comprised are

related to each other and form an overall identity in the manner of Wittgenstinian 'family resemblances'.[3] These plural identities are all defining characteristics of the individual or collective 'self' (eg., for the individual, one's occupation, age, marital status, nationality, and even one's favorite food, likes and dislikes), but none constitute a stable and continuous essence, none can be prioritised as a principal factor by which to erect exclusive and definitive boundaries with the 'other'.

As such, the primary difference between the modern concept of identity seen in Chapter 2, and the new conception, lies in the fact that the new identity does not allow for an exclusive, continuous and essential point of differentiation between self and other. This is not to deny the existence of static differences (for example, one's birth place or the possibility that one may live and work in the same place throughout one's life) but rather the new conception of identity does not allow for such 'fixed' characteristics to imply or constitute an exclusive boundary between self and other. The fact that one's identity is conceived as a set of overlapping 'sub'-identities (or characteristics) means that, while there may be certain fixed characteristics (and fixed points of difference), the individual's (or group's) identity as a whole includes criteria of identity which is not fixed (eg., age, knowledge, interests, experiences), such that there are always factors of one's self-identity which are subject to interaction with each other and other identities, and are mutually subject to alteration as a result of such interaction.

Indeed, it is a generally accepted fact that from infancy, individuals develop and learn in interaction with others, and in the process their personality and self-perception alter in various ways.[4] The significant point is that modern identity assumes that such changes take place against the background of an 'essential self',[5] while the new identity, in rejecting the 'essential self', perceives these changing characteristics to play a greater role in determining the individual's overall "identity". There is no deeper core beyond the multiplicity of characteristics, or 'sub-identities' of the individual. As will be explained, in

place of an essential core, there is an emphasis on certain characteristics in certain situations.

Conceiving the new identity in its capacity as a new conceptual foundation, it may be described as a certain way of thinking, which allows for no exclusive or definitive distinction in theory between oppositions such as 'self' and 'other' (ie., it does not allow for the *perception* of self as something exclusively distinct from the 'other', or of fact as something exclusively distinct from value, etc.,). Being non-fixed and pragmatic, it challenges the logical basis of contemporary thought such that nothing can be assumed, but rather ideas and concepts must be subjected to constant critique, constant re-evaluation, constant re-affirmation and justification. The new way of thinking perceives the distinction between self and other (the principle of opposition) not in terms of a clear boundary, but in terms of a set of similarities and differences which together constitute a somewhat indistinct boundary. Moreover, it will be explained that these differences are subject to 'play', such that, in interaction, the relation between self and other alters - points of difference may become points of similarity and vice versa. 'Self' and 'other' are no longer perceived to be exclusive (like two billiard balls) but rather share a complex inter-relation (more like a cobweb).

In practice, this formulation (this way of thinking and form of 'identity' in which self and other are no longer exclusive) encourages a mutually transforming interaction between and among 'selves' (between the identities of individuals, of nations etc.,). Through a constant dialogue with others (respectively, other individuals, cultures, nationalities etc.,) a web of links, of conceptual ties is forged. The forging of such links leads to an appreciation of similarities, compatibilities, mutual influence between self and other, such that to a greater or lesser extent, each becomes part of the other's self-definition, of the other's 'world-view'. Analogous to the kneading of dough, the more each side is open to influence, and the greater the interaction becomes, something new, a new identity (eg., a European identity), is created over and above the sum of the interaction

which alters both sides (as happens, for example, if one divides a large group of people into sub-groups - each sub-group develops its own 'personality', its own dynamic).

Given the principle that one's identity is non-essential, without fixed boundaries, and is seen to evolve and transform in interaction with other identities, the question arises as to where in practice the 'self' begins and ends. I wish to argue that one's self-conception *in a given context* is based more heavily on some factors than others, and it is these primary factors which form the 'core' of one's identity at any point in space or time. However, this core changes as different factors are emphasised depending on context (eg.,in a personal relationship or in one's place of work) and time (eg., as one's occupation, age, marital status changes).[6] There is no essential thread which links the self's various identities, but rather continuity of identity is based on the interweaving of one's multiple identities, of the family resemblances or threads of a rope which link up to form a whole, but which are not linked at a central point. Given this, it may be said that the individual primarily identifies him/herself at any given point in space and time according to his/her immediate context, according to influences and factors to which he/she is most immediately exposed (eg., occupation, family life, interests). As such, one's defining characteristics may be seen to form a spectrum, as some are emphasised and others are 'secondary' in any given context. To take a random example, one's identity (the composition of one's self-defining characteristics), is different in the context of a personal relationship and in one's role as an employee, and both of these identities mutate over time subject to age and experience. To elaborate, one's identity as a 'young ambitious naive lawyer' is different and simultaneous with one's identity as a 'young responsible husband', and both are different to one's later identity as a 'middle-aged, capable experienced lawyer', and as a 'husband and father'. In each case, the criteria by which one defines oneself is determined by one's role in a given context, thus the purpose of the definition.

It may be noted that this formulation of identity constitutes not so much a new theoretical perspective on the self, as *a description of the varying forms which identity may*

be seen to take in practice. It has been argued (Chapter 2) that identity (of an individual, a 'nation', or 'Europe') tends to be subject to various overlapping characterisations, depending on the function of the definition.[7] As an extension of this point, it may be noted that the individual tends in practice to act differently, to project different images depending on context. His/her comportment in the place of work, with friends and with family is likely to differ significantly as different aspects of his/her personality are emphasised in each case. This tendency may be interpreted to the effect that identity in practice is indeed constituted as a set of overlapping plural identities.[8]

From this perspective, it may be noted that the modern concept of identity which assumes an essential and exclusive self (Chapter 2) constitutes a formulation which applies equally and simultaneously to the individual and, writ-large, to the community and the nation - each is assumed to have an essential sacrosanct core. From the perspective of modern essential identity, one's 'roots' tend to be perceived territorially, fixed in the local community such that one's local identity as a member of a certain village is in effect more fundamental, more essential than one's identity as a member (for example) of the British nation. This notion of essential identity is in principle static, such that one is always 'at root' a Londoner and a Briton, regardless of context or time - one's roots are fixed. In contrast, the new concept of identity, being non-essential and non-fixed, changeable subject to context and in interaction with other identities, cannot be fixed according to territory, and so *allows in principle a fluid relationship among individual, group, national, and European identity*. The idea that my identity may alter in interaction with other identities, encompasses the idea that my identity as a Londoner may alter in interaction with my identity as a European. According to the new conception, one's identity as a European may in principle be emphasised over and above one's identity as a Briton, depending on context. For example, an individual who works in the European Commission in Brussels, is more likely to identify him/herself as a European than a farmer in rural Britain. Identity as such is dependent on real and actual social situations,[9] such that in practice, this new

conception of identity allows for the gradual creation and evolution of 'European identity' as the process of European integration progresses, and "the dough is kneaded" as the citizens of Europe are exposed to more European as opposed to local or national influences.

Implications

Having elaborated the primary characteristics of the 'new identity' (non-fixed, relative, pragmatic, non-essential, in the form of plural overlapping identities), the implications may be briefly outlined. Primarily, this form of identity, this way of perceiving the self, is *conducive to the development of a European identity*, as it allows for the self-perception of the individual and the group to incorporate new 'European' influences as integration progresses, whereas the modern essential notion of identity ensures the predominance of local and national identification.

Moreover, because the new form of identity is non-exclusive, open to influence and change, it may *undermine the contemporary 'conservative' dynamic* by which individuals and groups seek to affirm threatened identity (manifested in the form of racism and xenophobia). The modern pressure to affirm a threatened identity is replaced by an implicit willingness to adapt and evolve according to context. The new identity allows for re-assurance of identity (a secure sense of self) in the absence of fixity, without the need for an 'essential', stable self. This is a form of identity suited to the context of modern life, to the dynamics of modernity (see Chapter 2)

With respect to the study of integration, the new identity as a rhetorical strategy *subjects the Enlightenment conceptual foundation to fundamental critique* (including the assumption of nationalism, sovereignty, and the superiority of 'scientific explanation'). Whereas theory today is seen to be lagging behind the process of integration (as argued in Chapter 1), the new identity encourages the synchronisation of theory and practice. Because it is a form of identity rooted in a way of thinking which replaces self/other opposition with an interactive 'play' among differences, concepts such as nationalism,

sovereignty, democracy, citizenship, which are rooted in the modern essential exclusive concept of identity and are hindering the process of integration, are subjected to fundamental critique, to the possibility of change. From the perspective of the new identity, it becomes evident the extent to which these concepts have been assumed without sufficient critique in contemporary thought, and the extent to which they have determined our way of thinking about European integration (and indeed hindered the process of integration). The new identity encourages the re-orientation of EC theory based on the new conceptual foundation. The effect of the new perspective on the specific weaknesses in each strand of EC theory seen in Chapter 1, will be addressed subsequently.

Having briefly outlined the aims, characteristics and implications of the new identity, it may be elaborated in greater detail, using the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Specific conclusions may be drawn from each author. Wittgenstein's discussion of "games", of family resemblances in the Philosophical Investigations, may be invoked to clarify the idea of identity as an overlapping set of plural identities without fixed boundaries. Moreover, his 'private language argument' (maintaining the impossibility of a truly 'private language') will be invoked to support my argument that a notion of non-essential identity is compatible with a secure sense of self, and is indeed conducive to *reassurance* of identity.

The work of Michel Foucault will be invoked to provide a solution to the question of how the new identity may be realised in practice, how it may come to challenge the 'modern' conception of self seen in Chapter 2. The content and style of Foucault's work may be seen to constitute a rhetorical strategy to escape the thought patterns encompassing modern identity, and it is this strategy which provides a model for the realisation of the new identity. Indeed, this strategy constitutes an 'ethos of freedom' which it will be suggested serves as an example of the new identity in practice (so that in effect an adoption of the strategy constitutes a realisation of the new identity).

Finally, the work of Jacques Derrida (The Other Heading) will be used to focus specifically on the new form of identity in its capacity as a 'European identity'. The idea of a Europe which is 'non-identical' with itself, which comprises and encourages diversity, which shares a relation of 'play' with the other, and who's identity will be continuously negotiated rather than fixed, will be spelled out.

Having elaborated the argument as such, the plausibility, utility, and implications of the thesis for the study and progress of European integration, will be considered.

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN : Family resemblance, private language and European identity

The conception of identity (the perception of the self) in terms of a non-essential and evolving set of plural, inter-related sub-identities may be elaborated and clarified by virtue of Wittgenstein's notion of 'family resemblances', and his rejection of the idea of a 'private language' in the Philosophical Investigations. As such, it is the purpose of the present argument to focus on a clear and general articulation of these two themes and to apply each to the issue of European identity. It will not be a principal aim to analyse or criticise the areas of obscurity in Wittgenstein's argument (his discussion of family resemblance in PI65-88 is not entirely perspicuous),[10] as it is the application of the general sense of his argument which is of present interest.

Family resemblance

Wittgenstein introduces the concept of family resemblance through a discussion of games, specifically a discussion as to what is common to all the activities we call games (PI65-96).[11] He posits the general idea that the activities we call games have no common property by which we apply the same word to them all, but rather we use the word 'game' for a diverse range of activities, because they are all related to each other in different ways (PI66). Similarities crop up and disappear - card games may have certain features in

common, but 'when we pass to ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost - are they all 'amusing'?'(PI66). The relation among games in general is 'a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail'. Like the similarities which hold among the members of a family (resemblances of build, facial features, colour of eyes, gait, etc.,) (PI67), it is not by virtue of their a having a set of common properties that we group them together - no property is sufficient for membership to a group, nor is one necessary. Each example of a family resemblance or of a 'game' does not contain a general essence of the overall concept ('The Jones family', or the concept 'game'), but is rather a 'centre of variation'. Given this fact, Wittgenstein sees that the ability to give an exact definiton of a word is not a necessary condition for understanding - we cannot precisely define 'game' but we nonetheless understand and can explain it (PI69).

For the purposes of the present argument, I wish to maintain that identity may be classified and elaborated as a Wittgenstinian 'family resemblance' concept. Thus, in place of Wittgenstein's reference to the concept 'game', I wish to substitute the concept 'identity', and where he discusses the relation among examples of games, I wish to substitute 'characteristics', in other words the plural identities which constitute one's overall identity. As an implicit extension of the following argument, I wish it to be understood that my analysis of identity applies simultaneously to 'individual identity', 'national identity', and 'European identity'. In addition to the substitution of Wittgenstein's 'examples of game' and the concept 'game' with (respectively) 'characteristics' and the concept 'individual identity', I wish to make a parallel substitution with (respectively) 'individuals' and the concept 'national identity', and also 'nations' and the concept 'European identity'. The general implication here is that characteristics form individual identity, individuals form national identity and nations form European identity. Yet having posed this simple formulation, I wish to stress that the basic unit of national and European identity is ultimately the individual, such that the creation of a European identity

is ultimately determined by the identity of the individual (the self's perception of self). As such, the following argument will focus in the first instance on personal identity, with the implication (to be elaborated subsequently) that this has direct ramifications for the determination of European identity, and for the study of European integration.

With these qualifications, the notion of family resemblance may be further elaborated. Given that a family resemblance concept (eg., identity)[12] is composed of 'units' related to each other in diverse and interconnecting ways, yet not linked to a central point, *there can be no definable "essence", in the sense of there being no definitive description of the concept's 'core'*. Wittgenstein suggests that the nearest we can get to defining the essence of 'game' or 'leaf'(PI73) (or for the present argument, 'identity') is to posit a 'general sample', a schema, but this general sample must be understood in a particular way. For a schema to be understood as a schema, and not as the description, for example, of "a particular leaf" (or 'my identity'), requires seeing the leaf differently from someone who regards the leaf 'as, say, a sample of this *particular* shape'(PI73)[13]- it must be understood as a 'centre of variation'. In the case of identity, this means that a set of characteristics by which (at a particular point in space and time) an individual may identify him/herself, must be understood not as a definitive and exhaustive articulation of this person's identity, but rather as one in a set of possible identities (one among many possible configurations of characteristics). The definiteness of what is meant or understood by the term 'my identity', or for example, 'European identity', cannot be captured in a set of static meaning-rules about whose application there can be no doubt.

Apart from there being no 'essential core' to a family-resemblance concept, there is no clear or definitive cut-off point, *no necessary rules to determine where 'self' ends and 'other' begins*. Just as the answer to the question 'How long is a piece of string?' depends on the use to which the string will be put, one's definition of game, or the delineation of one's identity depends on the purpose, or context of the definition. To this extent, a family

resemblance concept (eg., my identity) is not a simple sum of its constituent 'units' (my defining characteristics), and thus it is not possible to give a definition in the form of an *exhaustive* list of examples, but rather *explanation may take the form of a multiplicity of examples which convey the sense in which the term is used.* This form of explanation is similar to pointing to a general area rather than demarcating a boundary - it does not specify a required range or degree of similarity with the given examples for an activity to fall under the concept of a game (for a characteristic to fall under the concept of 'my identity'), but it involves seeing what is common to all games (all of my 'sub-identities') without putting it into words. The implication for identity is that there can be no definitive and clear distinction between 'self' and 'other', as the composition of the boundary between the two is not only indistinct, but alters according to the context of the definition.

From this perspective, Wittgenstein suggests that 'my understanding' of what a 'game' is (or for present purposes, what my identity or European identity is), is completely expressed in the explanations I can give. Our understanding of 'game', 'my identity' or 'European identity' cannot be said to transcend our ability to say what it means (PI75). Rather, explanation by multiplicity of examples must be taken at face value, such that one is not supposed to see in the examples (eg., of identity...'he is British, he is married'), "the common thing which I was unable to express" but simply one is to understand "how to employ those examples in a particular way...the point is that this is how we play the game" (PI71). As such, an understanding of a family resemblance concept does not constitute knowledge in the form of an unformulated definition, such that 'if it were formulated I should be able to recognise it as the expression of my knowledge' (PI75). *The fact that the concept has not been demarcated by fixed boundaries is deliberate, as the concept's blurredness is intrinsic to what we understand*[14] *and indeed any boundaries that could be drawn at any particular time are subject to change.* As in the activity of playing a game, the rules by which we use the term 'game' (or delineate an individual's/'Europe's' identity)

cannot be formulated definitively, as we may make up rules and alter them as we go along (PI83).

Wittgenstein notes that, as a general rule, it tends to be assumed that 'Inexact is really a reproach, and 'exact' a praise...what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly than what is more exact"(PI88). Yet he argues that if a photographer says 'Stand roughly there' and points to a spot, this inexact demarcation is sufficient for his/her purpose, and nothing will be gained by demarcating an exact point in space to the nearest centimeter - 'has this exactness still got a function here: isn't the engine idling?'(PI88). Indeed, there may be specific purposes for which an exact demarcation is required, but more importantly *such exactness is not required to make the concept usable - the degree of exactness required depends on the context.* Where a rough demarcation will suffice, an exact demarcation may in fact be counter-productive by leading to a misunderstanding (or at least limited understanding). For example, if one were to explain the game of solitaire in very specific terms, one's general understanding of the concept 'game' will be obfuscated by detail, whereas a more general definition will more easily convey the general idea of 'game'-'Is it...always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one often exactly what we need?'(PI71).

Thus, the fact that a family resemblance concept (eg.,identity) has no fixed boundaries does not imply that it is in any way less useful, or more 'essentially contested' than sharply defined concepts. Indeed, Wittgenstein argues that there is always the possibility of doubt - even if one were to define and demarcate a concept with a strict set of rules like signposts, 'where is it said which way I am to follow it; whether in the direction of its finger or (eg.) in the opposite one..is there only one way of interpreting them?'(PI85). Exact definitions are not proof against disputed applications, and nor are terms otherwise explained particularly susceptible to them. Indeed, the distinction between an exact and inexact definition is not entirely clear-cut, as 'exactness' is determined by context - the exact time of day by one's watch is inexact relative to the determination of time

in a laboratory. This argument justifies the blurred character of a family resemblance concept such as identity by showing how exactness is a relative concept.

Thus, to summarise, Wittgenstein's discussion of family resemblance, applied to the context of identity, serves to articulate a notion of identity as being composed of overlapping 'units' which share various similarities but which have no common essential core. As such, while it is not possible to define identity in clear and static terms, an understanding of my identity (or national identity, European identity) is gained by way of multiple examples, by seeing how the term (eg., my identity) is used, by seeing the range of possibilities (the different formulations of characteristics) which it may encompass. Because the 'rules' which delineate the concept may change, a certain blurredness is intrinsic to what is understood by 'my identity' (or 'European identity'). Taken as a whole, Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance constitutes an attack on the idea that there must be something common to everything to which any concept-word is applicable.[15] His argument, as outlined above, serves not only to elaborate the form of a concept which is non-essential and without boundaries, but he provides a logical argument to justify the idea that such a 'blurred' concept is no less useful, meaningful, or comprehensible than a 'precise' definition. He offers, in application, a way of thinking about identity which is less essentialist than 'modern identity' as discussed in Chapter 2 - 'we feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not towards *phenomena*, but, as one might say, towards the '*possibilities*' of phenomena'(PI90).

By applying his argument to the context of identity (in particular personal identity and European identity), I have thus sought to elaborate, clarify and justify the idea of a non-fixed, non-essential, pragmatic identity, made up of interconnecting sub-identities, which I maintain is an appropriate formulation of identity for the 1990's. Significantly, Wittgenstein's intention is not to impose an explanatory conceptual framework onto reality, but to outline a descriptive conceptual framework which accurately *reflects* reality ("The

country is well known to us, we just need to be reminded of our whereabouts"). The new identity being here elaborated through his work is in a similar manner intended not as a theoretical construction to be *imposed* as a replacement for modern essentialist identity, but rather it is intended as a way of perceiving the self born out of a *description* of the ever-changing form which identity is seen to assume in practice.

Having formulated identity in terms of family resemblance, the utility of this formulation may be outlined. I wish to maintain that once it is realised and accepted by the individual, the group, the 'European', that the characteristics which bind and differentiate the self from 'the other' may alter in composition (in space and time), then the perception of the self in exclusive opposition to the 'other' is undermined and replaced by *a perception of 'play' between differences in self and other.* In other words, if it is perceived that the determination of identity is non-essential and dependent on context, then the 'modern' quest for an 'essential' self, the need to prove oneself, to demarcate one's territory and to defend one's 'sovereignty' in relation to the other (see Chapter 2), is undermined. Instead, the individual perceives his/her relation to the other as being not exclusive, not analogous to the interaction between two billiard balls, but rather analogous to an evolving cobweb of similarities and differences. The composition of, and emphasis on characteristics which determine 'my' identity is changeable according to context, as is the composition of another's identity, such that in one context I may share similarities of identity with 'x' (eg., we are both British nationals working in the European Commission), and in another context the emphasis is on differences (in a political rally, I am a Conservative and he/she is a Labour supporter). I may stop working at the European Commission, so terminating the similarity in the first example, and I may become a Labour supporter, so reversing the difference in the second example. The significant point here is that, if identity is non-essential and changeable, then the barrier between self and other cannot be fixed - a Frenchman is the 'other' in relation to my identity as a British national, but we

simultaneously share an identity in the context of being 'European', in particular as members of the European Community. As such, national and European identity can co-exist.

The utility of this formulation with regard to the study of European integration, particularly as a response to the weaknesses in EC theory (see Chapter 2), and with regard to the process of integration, will be outlined subsequently. In brief, it may be noted that the new identity, in challenging the exclusivity of the relation between self and other, in effect challenges the 'exclusive' concepts of nationalism and sovereignty which lie at the root of EC theory, and the Enlightenment foundation more generally. As such, the new identity encourages a fundamental re-orientation of the study of European integration.

Wittgenstein and private language

Having elaborated the characteristics of a new non-essential, non-fixed, pragmatic identity based on Wittgenstein's notion of 'family resemblance', I wish to invoke his argument against the idea of a private language (PI243-309), to specify further the sense in which this new form of identity is 'non-essential', and to justify my claim to this effect. Moreover, the following argument is intended to address the modern identity crisis seen in Chapter 2, by suggesting a notion of identity which is conducive to the dynamics of modernity, in being 'non-essential' and 'non-fixed', yet allowing for reassurance of the self.

Wittgenstein's argument against a private language constitutes an attack on the Cartesian tradition in philosophy, on philosophical scepticism, which maintains that the starting point and the point of justification for all knowledge and explanation lies in one's direct acquaintance with one's own experiences and states of mind (for example, John Locke - "Words in their primary immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them").[16] In contrast to this, Wittgenstein insists that language is dialogical, that when we use a word we use it according to a 'rule' which is necessarily

embedded in the linguistic community (the 'public sphere', the 'background understanding' upon which life and understanding are based).[17] It is not possible to have a language which is accessible to myself alone, because all meaning is dependent on external criteria. As will be seen, this line of argument in Wittgenstein significantly does not lead him to the camp of behaviourism, but rather his conclusion places him somewhere between the camps of Cartesianism and behaviourism, between inductive and deductive knowledge - our inner sensations such as 'pain' are "not a something but not a nothing either"(PI304).

It is this conclusion which I wish to explain, and apply to the context of identity. Wittgenstein uses the example of pain in his discussion of private language, and in substitution of this example, I wish to apply the concept of 'the inner self', or in other words, one's experience of 'sense of self'. *My intention is to show how it is possible to have a 'sense of self', and to be 'secure' in one's identity, even if it is perceived as being non-essential.* The logic of the following argument rests on Wittgenstein's perceived relation between the name and the thing named (eg., the concept of 'pain' and the sensation of pain, or for present purposes the concept of the inner self and the 'inner self' as experienced by the individual). More specifically, it will be argued that my experience of 'pain' or of 'my identity' is necessarily dependent on language, therefore cannot be essential but is rather necessarily affected by the instability inherent in language (We follow rules blindly and arbitrarily). At the same time, there exists an inner sensation of pain (or an inner experience of self) which cannot be articulated and therefore has no definable characteristics (it is not 'essential') but is isolated and secure in being 'so obvious as to be mundane'. In order to elaborate and clarify this argument, my use of the private language argument will focus on a basic articulation of Wittgenstein's reasoning, sufficient to explain, justify and apply to my ultimate conclusion that one's inner experience of sense of self is "not a something but not a nothing either"(PI304).

When Wittgenstein refers to a private language, "the individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language" (PI243). These sensations include physical sensations such as pain, as well as visual sensations (colour impressions) and visual sensations of the imagination (the mind's eye). For present purposes, I wish to include and focus on one's private 'sense of self', one's personal identity.

The sceptic assumes that, to justify knowledge about the public world, I must reconstruct the world from my private experience, which gives rise to the problem of how I can know the content of another person's mind if I cannot directly experience it - 'Only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it' (PI246). This philosophical position is based on the assumption that there is only a contingent rather than necessary connection between a sensation and its outward expression, such that the basis of one's experience is an 'essential' self which, encapsulated by fixed boundaries, experiences the outside world as 'the other' but remains essentially bound within the self's sceptical 'inner world'. In other words, there is a static boundary between self and other, between the internal and external world.

Wittgenstein counters the sceptic's position by stressing the active contribution of expression in knowing, maintaining that, when we use a word, we use it according to a public 'rule', which in turn requires the mastering of a technique. The practice of knowing or understanding a word or concept (including one's personal identity) is not, he claims, a mental process, although it may be accompanied by mental processes such as 'imaging' or feelings of familiarity. *Knowing* a word is an ability to use it according to a standard of correctness which is set by and embodied in the practices and behaviour of the linguistic community - '...the meaning of a word is its use in a language' (PI43). The underlying implicit and explicit consensus of linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour, assumptions, practices and traditions, (here including assumptions and perceptions regarding 'selfhood')

is presupposed by and interwoven with language, and constitutes a 'form of life'[18] ('background understanding'), which is the ultimate foundation of, and verification for, knowledge.

Wittgenstein's insistence on the dialogical nature of language is based on a logical argument concerning the use and meaning of words, specifically focusing on 'how the connection between the name and the thing named is set up'(PI244). He argues that expression is a necessary element in meaning, by maintaining that the idea of 'meaning without the possibility of expression' (ie., a 'private language') is nonsensical. Given that a private language is supposedly inaccessible to anyone but the individual, Wittgenstein notes (using the example of pain), that if I say that I will give the name 'pain' to a sensation I have ("S") whenever it occurs, I logically have a free rein in naming my sensations.[19] In 'my' private language, I am necessarily the sole arbiter of what it means for two sensations to be 'the same', such that my impression that I am being consistent in naming a sensation "S", cannot be distinguished from the *fact* of whether I am being consistent (PI258) - *Without an external check, not even I can be sure that I am giving the same name to the same sensation.* Given this situation, the idea of giving oneself a purely private definition of a word (or eg., of 'my-self') is similar to the idea of my right hand giving my left hand money - "When the left hand has taken the money from the right, etc., we shall ask: 'Well, what of it?'"(PI268). The mechanics of the action may be those of a gift, but the practical *consequences* of the action are not, and similarly the mechanics of devising a private definition does not have the practical consequence of giving the sensation 'S' definite meaning - "A wheel that turns though nothing turns with it is not part of the mechanism" (PI271). It is impossible to have a private definition (eg., a private self-definition)- the whole point of a definition is that it may be *communicated and verified.*

Indeed, Wittgenstein notes that, apart from there being no external check, the idea of a private language makes no sense in principle because *the whole practice of naming,*

defining, of seeing two things as 'the same', is rooted in common language, requiring the mastering of 'public' concepts such as 'sameness' and 'consistency'. The very fact that I am able to make first-person memory statements, that I can conceive of linear time, and associate the present self with the self of yesterday, are all public foundations, which are so general as to run the risk of being overlooked.[20] If my private language (private sense of self) is something that only I can understand, then it is surely inappropriate to use these common language terms when talking about it - "So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would just like to emit an inarticulate sound"(PI261). It makes no sense to speak of 'following a rule' in my private language if it can never be proved that I am *not* following that rule.[21]

As such, Wittgenstein perceives a great difference between thinking I obey a rule and actually obeying it. To say that I understand a word, and to use it correctly, means that I have grasped the 'public' rule which determines its use, and thus that I know 'how to go on' (I know what kind of associations I can make with the word). I may give someone a set of numbers which I have worked out with the formula 2x +1, and I tell him/her to 'go on in the same way'. He/she may proceed by adding 2 to the previous number, getting the same result as if they had used the formula (PI226). Wittgenstein maintains that, as we can't see what the individual is calculating in his head, it is an unimportant question as to how he got the result. As long as he/she continues to attain the correct result, it may be said that he/she is following the rule. Thus, *Wittgenstein maintains that a rule can only be obeyed in action.*[22] Whatever may take place inside the individual's mind beyond what is publicly accessible is of consequence only to the individual - each person may have a private sense of self, a private identity (this is not ruled out), but nothing can be said of its nature or existence - it is not 'part of the mechanism' of language and so cannot be affected by language.

Having argued that meaning resides in language, in the following of public rules, Wittgenstein maintains that rule-following is not something we consciously do, but rather

the *decision as to what constitutes 'going on in the same way' is ultimately arbitrary.* Wittgenstein's 'rules' are structurally and essentially indeterminate, such that they have no self-identical unitary form over time, but rather constitute temporary boundaries/ guidelines.[23] As such, if someone will not acknowledge and is not persuaded that what I am doing is 'going on in the same way', I have no further explanations or reasons to give, but must resort to saying 'It's simply what I do"(PI217). It is not possible to lay out the exact and definitive rules which determine our use of a word (or which determine our identity), as our 'background understanding' is too broad and wide-ranging, and indeed too changeable to be quantified at any point in time. The 'background' and the individual's thought and speech are mutually influential in an on-going process, such that our experience as language-users teaches us pragmatically 'how to go on', but in practice we follow rules blindly (PI219), and to question why we follow them is to step outside the 'language-game',[24] the context in which we live and understand - the question is nonsensical. *There is never an 'ultimate meaning', but rather understanding is made up of inexact, regional, shifting meanings.*

Applied to the context of identity, Wittgenstein's argument may be interpreted to support the idea that the articulation of one's identity (one's self-definition) is determined by meaning-rules which cannot be statically defined and which are followed blindly. As with the example of pain, I have a certain experience of 'my identity' but if I try to articulate it precisely and definitively, I reach the point where I must say "This is simply who I am" - I am unable to quantify the broad range of factors which contribute to my identity. To <u>try</u> to articulate a fixed definition (and to consider this exactness to be preferable) is to step outside the context of our understanding - blurredness is intrinsic to the concept of identity. The fact that I cannot statically define my identity does not render it unstable or insecure, or any less meaningful than a precise, static definition. Indeed, *by tying meaning to language, and showing how language is ultimately changeable and arbitrary, the implication is that*

one's identity, to the extent that it can be articulated, cannot be static but is necessarily non-fixed along with language.

Significantly, Wittgenstein's argument that the idea of a private language does not make sense given our frame of reference, does not lead him into the camp of behaviourism. He does not mean to imply that everything but human behaviour is a fiction - "If I speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction"(PI307). He does not deny that we have and communicate sense experience (or, by implication, that we have an 'inner self') - it does make sense when someone tells us that they are in pain. *Yet without denying the existence of private sensations (the inner self), he only denies that these are criteria for knowledge, that they can be structured as a language.* For something to be considered knowledge, it must be subject to doubt, to criteria by which it may be potentially falsified - knowledge requires language and language is public.

It is in this sense that pain (and as here argued, one's inner self,or 'sense of self') 'is not a something but not a nothing either'(PI304). Pain (inner self) exists, but not in a form that can be specifically articulated or questioned - 'the conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said'(PI304). Because pain (inner self) is not a 'something' to which the word 'pain' ('inner self') refers - it is not publicly accessible - and because there can be no private language to establish consistency in inwardly naming a sensation, *pain (inner self) itself is logically isolated and can have no determinate characteristics.*[25] Indeed, it makes no sense to say, 'I know I am in pain', (I know my inner self), because it is not possible to be mistaken about the sensation (only about the use of the word 'pain') (PI288).[26] My *saying* that I am in pain is ultimate proof - to ask, 'How do I know?' is once again to step outside of our frame of reference, and thus the question is nonsensical. In this sense, expression itself is a source of a criterion of identity.

To explain further, it may be seen that Wittgenstein's argument seeks to differentiate between one's inner life and knowledge, and to implicate language as having a centrally connective role. Having made the point that one's inner sensations are logically isolated, that they do not provide criteria for language, and yet that paradoxically we can and do discuss inner sensations, the relation between inner and outer in Wittgenstein may be further clarified. Evidently, for Wittgenstein, language provides the link between inner and outer, and it is from this perspective that it does not make sense, in language, to question as the sceptic does, the relation between inner and outer (ie., between the sensation of pain and pain behaviour). It is by virtue of language that our inner life, our thoughts and sensations are as complex as they are, and that we are able to subject them to such rich differentiation. Indeed, extrapolating from the argument thus far, Wittgenstein maintains that the pre-linguistic expression of pain (or awareness of 'sense of self'), is replaced by the mastery of expression, by which "pain" is incorporated into a rich variety of situations and uses. The pre-linguistic expression of pain (or one's inner awareness of 'self') is thus not the ground of linguistic pain behaviour (or respectively, one's public expressible definition of self), but rather the *concept* of 'pain' is seen to arise from a process in which expression (linguistic or otherwise) is a necessary part. Language is not situated between pain and its expression, but rather *language allows us to 'gather up' a bodily disturbance into a locality and treat it as something distinct.*[27] In this sense, there is a necessary connection between the name and the thing named. It is from this perspective that an individual's sensation cannot be felt by another person, but is nonetheless accessible to another person's understanding.

The implications of this argument for identity are significant. In the context of discussing family resemblance, it was argued that one's identity (or national identity, European identity) cannot be delineated in time or space, as the composition of 'defining' characteristics alters according to context. As a complement to this analysis, the 'private

language argument' as here elaborated, provides the basis for arguing that this notion of non-definable, ever-changing identity, *is in fact compatible with a secure 'sense of self'* (in other words, it does not imply a sense of identity crisis).

Following Wittgenstein's example of pain, *one's inner self (one's 'private awareness of self') is beyond doubt, does not itself constitute knowledge, and indeed does not even provide criteria for knowledge or understanding of identity - it is 'not a something but not a nothing either'*. It is true of any private experience, including one's sense of self, that each person possesses his/her own exemplar, but more importantly, 'nobody knows whether other people also have *this* or something else' (PI272). As such, "What we call descriptions are instruments for particular uses"(PI291). The way I describe my personal identity is intimately connected to my inner sense of self, for indeed it is through language that I can 'gather up' my sense of self and treat it as something distinct. Yet whatever instruments of communication I use, my inner sense of self is inalienable and secure. The attempt to describe my identity in its multiple forms may give the impression that my identity is something ineffable, but the ineffable is only ineffable in the context of trying to and being able to articulate. My inner sense of self is beyond doubt - language allows me to treat it as something distinct, but nothing can be directly said about it and it cannot be directly questioned, as the words I use to describe my identity do not directly *refer* to my private sense of self.

Significantly, *the idea that the inner sense of self is beyond doubt and inalienable, does not imply that it is "essential"* - it does not contradict the previous argument that 'my understanding of my identity does not transcend my ability to say what it means'. In the present argument, the idea of an essential self (as seen in Chapter 2) implies a fixed and definitive 'core' to the self, a solid reference point by which the individual defines him/herself through time. As Wittgenstein shows, private sensations, or the private self, in order to be private cannot be underpinned by the 'public' concepts of time, sameness, consistency etc. Rather, the inner self is 'not a something but not a nothing either' - it is

not something consistent and tangible which I can consciously refer to and define as my 'inner being', as is assumed to be the case with the modern 'ethic of authenticity' outlined in Chapter 2. The inner self from the perspective of the new identity may be best described as an amorphous and abstract awareness, akin to that seen in Buddhist teaching - 'There arises a cognition which is homogeneous, without object, indiscriminate and supramundane. The tendencies to treat object and subject as distinct entities are forsaken, and thought is established in just the true nature of one's own thought.'[28] The 'my'-ness of my experience is so obvious as to be transparent and mundane, yet because this awareness of inner self has no definable characteristics, because it is not a 'something' to which language refers, it cannot constitute an 'essential core' - it does not constitute 'the common thing which I was unable to express'. Instead, 'it is not a something but not a nothing either' - it exists but is inaccessible to language.

In summary, Wittgenstein's private language argument, applied to the context of identity, serves to illuminate and specify the sense in which the new identity is non-essential and yet conducive to reassurance, to a secure sense of self. There is a distinction between our knowledge of identity (the way we discuss it) and our inner awareness of identity, such that my *knowledge* of my identity comprises the notion of something pragmatic, non-fixed, changeable with time and context (with the dynamic flux of modernity), yet this does not affect my private assurance of my-self. My inner awareness of identity is logically isolated and thus beyond doubt (yet not 'essential' in the sense implied by modern identity).

It is from the perspective of this argument that I wish to maintain that the acceptance of dynamic change, and the new conception of non-fixed identity, promotes reassurance where the essential fixed notion of modern identity hinders it. In Chapter 2, it was seen how the modern notion of identity as something continuous through time, as something essential which needs to be discovered and held on to in the face of change or challenge

(eg., manifested in modern ethnic nationalism) has resulted in a modern identity crisis. The dynamics of modernity serve as a challenge to the idea of an 'authentic self' by virtue of the multiplicity of diverse influences and the ever-changing temporary nature of modern culture. In contrast to this, the new identity here outlined incorporates the dynamic of change while eliminating the elusive modern search for an essential authentic self. Once the individual begins to perceive identity as something which is inherently changeable, tied to the fluctuating dynamic nature of language, he/she will replace the search for a static essential self with this acceptance, and in doing so will arguably supplement reassurance of self. In elaborating the new conception of identity, my aim has been to *reflect* and accommodate the dynamic changes in the 1990's which in effect destabilise modern personal, group, and national identity, and which bring into question the idea of European identity.

The argument thus far has focused on an application of Wittgenstein's argument to 'personal identity', on the understanding that *ultimately the creation of a European identity is dependent on the individual's conception of identity.* To explain, once the individual perceives his/her identity as being changeable with context yet secure, comprising a set of overlapping and simultaneous identities rather than an essential static core, then his/her identification as a "European" is more likely. As individuals interact as Europeans (in the context of the European Community), perceiving identity according to the present formulation, a European identity may evolve as the "European dough", comprising a multiplicity of individuals and national influences, is kneaded. From the new perspective, one's identity as a European can co-exist with one's national, local and personal identities, and may come into force and be strengthened as individuals interact at a European level.[29]

Having focused on the new identity from the perspective of the individual's self-perception, it is necessary to apply the new identity to the objective concept of 'European identity', to a characterisation of the 'idea of Europe'. The idea of a non-fixed, pragmatic,

non-essential identity which is nonetheless secure in its logically isolated inner abstract awareness, is here intended as a framework for the elaboration of an objective 'European identity' for the 1990's. Based on Wittgenstein's 'family resemblance' and 'private language argument', I wish to imply a framework of European identity as something which may be described in general terms by giving a mutiplicity of examples/characteristics, but which cannot be exhaustively defined. As argued with reference to personal identity, the inability to give a precise definition does not render European identity less meaningful or useful - blurredness is intrinsic to our understanding of the concept. Thus, the idea of Europe in general terms encompasses a multiplicity of diverse and changeable influences which together constitute the (fluid) defining characteristics of 'Europe'. More specifically, the new European identity accommodates (and indeed prescribes) the fact that the range of characteristics which are seen to define Europe alter according to context, according to the purpose of the definition.

Thus, to conclude, it has here been attempted to elaborate the characteristics of a new identity appropriate for the 1990's. Thus far, it has been the intention to clarify the idea of a non-fixed, pragmatic, non-essential identity, structured as a set of overlapping identities. The characteristics of this identity have been formulated in response to the weaknesses in EC theory evident in Chapter 1 (ie., the inadequacy of the nationalism/sovereignty framework in the study of the EC). Further, it has been the intention to show how this formulation of identity is compatible with and indeed conducive to reassurance in one's identity, contrary to the modern notion of identity seen in Chapter 2.

MICHEL FOUCAULT: *The ethos of freedom and the new identity*

Having sought to articulate and justify a "new" non-fixed, non-essential, pragmatic form of identity for the 1990's, through the work of Wittgenstein, the question arises as to *how this identity may be realised in practice.* In other words, there is a question as to how modern identity seen in Chapter 2 can make room for this new conception (how this new conception can make an impact on the individual's identity), and further how it can become effective in the realisation of a new European identity.

To answer this general question, I wish to invoke the work of Michel Foucault. In the content and overall style of his work, it may be argued that Foucault provides an example of a rhetorical strategy, a way of thinking by virtue of which the individual is compelled to 'free thought from what it thinks silently and allow it to think otherwise'.[30] He induces the individual to challenge his/her preconceptions and assumptions, to question his/her habitual patterns of thought, with the intention to 'promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality that has been imposed on us for several centuries'.[31] For Foucault, adherence to this mode of thought constitutes an 'ethos of freedom', a way of living by which the individual may realise 'true freedom'.

For the purposes of the present argument, I wish to focus on this ethos of freedom in Foucault's work, with an aim which is two-fold and inter-related. First, I wish to address the content and style of his work with the specific purpose of indicating a *strategy by which the new identity as outlined in this chapter thus far, may be incorporated into the modern process of self-identification* (and to the identification of Europe). It will be seen that, in the style of his work, Foucault strategically refuses to establish and fix any conceptual foundations, but rather assumes an anti-historico-anthropological, anti-universal, anti-judgmental, anti-humanist and anti-foundational stance. The sceptical ethos seen in the *style* of Foucault's work may be taken as an example of the ethos of freedom which he simultaneously seeks to articulate in the *content* of his work. As such, Foucault is at once describing in the content and exemplifying in the style of his work, a mode of

living/thinking which simultaneously constitutes a strategy for loosening the hold of our 'modern identity'. In providing such a strategy, my intention is to provide a means, a first step towards resolving the modern identity crisis seen in Chapter 2, which is hindering the study and process of integration. By providing a way in which the individual, group and nation can be made to feel secure in a non-fixed non-essential identity, then by implication (based on the reasoning in Chapters 1 and 2), I shall be providing a way to challenge the identity-related nation-state/sovereignty basis to EC theory, and so a way to reorient EC theory.

Second, I wish to show how Foucault's ethos may be considered an *example of the 'new identity' in practice*, by virtue of its refusal to be fixed within a static conception of the self, and its refusal to establish fixed conceptual boundaries. Foucault's ethos coincides with the new identity, as both suggest a way of living and thinking which is pragmatic, changeable, and which denies any fixed or essential foundations.

Given that I intend to use Foucault's work for the attainment of these specific ends, and within the context of my elaboration of an identity for the 1990's, it is not within the scope of the present work to address and counter the numerous and wide-ranging criticisms, general and specific, that have been directed at Foucault's philosophical project. Due to the sometimes elusive nature of Foucault's work, born out of his resistance to being categorised within any specific body of thought, it has been subject to a variety of interpretations. My current interpretation of Foucault is thus admittedly one among many, but my primary concern is to elaborate a new conception of identity (and a strategy for its realisation), and not to debate the coherence or 'true interpretation' of Foucault's work. I thus take the liberty of adapting this author's work to my present argument, without specifically addressing the efficacy of his arguments in isolation.

FOUCAULT and the ethos of freedom: a strategy for realising the new identity

Throughout Foucault's work, there is an underlying concern with the relation between subjectivity and truth, with discovering 'how the human subject entered into games of truth' by virtue of which one tries to work out, to transform one's self and to attain a certain mode of being'.[32] By way of a series of 'genealogies' ('histories of the present'),[33] Foucault seeks to trace the developmental path of our current assumptions and norms as a means of problematising, bringing into question our socially accepted practices. He perceives that society in general and the life of each individual is dictated by an all-encompassing web of omni-present power relations. These relations discipline, produce habitual forms of behaviour, and encase each individual within a concept "Man" - an essential, meaningful subject whose life is based on the transcendental goals of 'Truth', 'self-understanding', 'Knowledge', 'Freedom', and 'Morality'; in short constituting 'an object of knowledge and a subject that knows'.[34] As will be explained, these concepts upon which we base our lives are, for Foucault, all constitutive of a power-ridden, disciplinary, 'Panoptic' society,[35] with a totalising and penetrating gaze, controlling each individual not through force, but through inducing a practice of self-discipline.

In order to understand the sense in which Foucault provides a strategy for reconceiving identity, and to further understand his motivation for doing so, the following section will articulate Foucault's own reformulation of the (inter-related) concepts 'freedom' and 'power', which underpin his philosophical project. In elaborating these concepts, their application to the context of the present argument concerning the new identity, will become apparent. It is within these concepts that the strategy and justification for altering modern identity and realising the new identity lies.

The ethos of freedom

Foucault's concept of freedom constitutes a way of living and thinking which serves as a strategy for challenging modern essential identity, and making way for the new identity.

Because it is Foucault's overall aim to render thought dynamic, to encourage new ways of thinking, he nowhere gives a concrete definition of 'freedom', of what it means to live an 'ideal life of liberty'. Indeed, his notion of freedom can only be properly understood from the perspective of his strategically anti-foundational and anti-humanist standpoint - an appreciation of his style constitutes an appreciation of the ethos of freedom, just as an attempt to understand Foucault's freedom from an anthropological foundational standpoint leads to accusations of incoherence.[36]

To elaborate, freedom lies for Foucault (in his later work) in exposing the transparency and contingency of what we *think* constitutes freedom. One becomes free only when one learns to challenge one's assumptions and modes of thought, to create the possibility for change. This requires in the individual a constant scepticism, a non-judgmental, non-universal stance, a constant struggle. Implicit in this is the conscious resistance to systematisation - "Formally guaranteed freedoms always figure within some contingent historical practice... nominalist history contributes to our real freedom in exposing the nominal nature of our formal [freedoms]...No society could be based on our [real freedom], since it lies precisely in the possibility of constant change'.[37]

It is this basic principle of Foucault's freedom, this emphasis on constant change, which motivates his own struggle to evade the definition of his terms - power, freedom, truth - within the conceptual body of the human sciences. Indeed, if he were to articulate a concrete definition of 'freedom', this definition would itself harbour the implicit suggestion that it be used as a 'new foundation', a static replacement for our existing formal freedoms. Rather, underlying Foucault's own notions of 'freedom', (and 'truth', and 'power'), is the assumption that these notions are also subject to change - they are catalysts for change, and

may themselves be changed. As such, Foucault does not wish to articulate an 'ideal form of life' as an 'ultimate truth', because a 'free subject can mean many different things'.[38] Within the logic of Foucault's argument, a freedom today may potentially be an unfreedom tomorrow, and indeed *'who we are' is not given, and is not a source of freedom, but is rather that which is constantly opened up to question by freedom.* The free subject is the individual who makes his/her life a 'work of art', who practices Foucault's 'aesthetic of existence', by which the self is not perceived as essential, but is constantly questioned and subject to change, to re-creation.[39]

It is important to note that Foucault *at no point suggests that we necessarily discard our concepts and social practices, only that we shouldn't limit them to certain frontiers,* that we should open them up to the possibility of change. Indeed, Foucault's use of and encouragement of scepticism, far from advocating nihilism or a general abandonment of one's beliefs and concepts, is directed at specific details of life, advocating the role of the 'specific intellectual'. For Foucault, this specificity is required to bring into being and to perpetuate a transformative state of affairs - 'The intellectual no longer has to play the role of an adviser..What's needed is a ramified, penetrative perception of the present, one that makes it possible to locate lines of weakness, strong points, positions where the instances of power have secured and implanted themselves...".[40] The universal intellectual is incapable of explaining, or dealing with the complexity of society in its totality, and thus it is the individual's task, as an expert in a specific field, to problematise a specific element of life, to produce a specific, localised 'history of the present'.

Foucault's freedom, as a strategy for realising the new identity, *provides a set of prescriptive guidelines for the way one should live one's life.* The scepticism inherent in the ethos of freedom is not a general scepticism of 'life', but constitutes a rigorous questioning of the details of one's life. In living the ethos of freedom, the individual would be concerned with questions, not of the order, "How can I be free?" or "Who am I?", but with specific questions of detail, relating to the infuences one is subject to- "Who makes

decisions for me? Who programs my movements and my schedule? How are these decisions that completely articulate my life made?"[41] The individual's approach to life is one of scrutiny and intensity - no thought or belief is left unexamined. The constant awareness of the possibility of change, the dynamism and contingency of everything that appears necessary, grants Foucault's 'individual' (or 'the new European') a freedom which takes the form of an empowerment, in regaining the power of self-definition and self-creation.[42]

Moreover, it may be seen that Foucault's refusal to assume any static assumptions, his conception of freedom as the constant possibility of change (of thinking/acting otherwise), means that he in effect *dis-places the question of what we should be*, or the individual's search for 'identity' - "The target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are".[43] His philosophy denies a static essentialism as a rhetorical strategy, to preclude the individual from objectifying the self. To search actively for the self will, from Foucault's point of view, necessarily result in the creation of a historically contingent "Identity", moulded by the disciplinary society. While we are situated within the 'regime of truth' which constitutes the historical 'background understanding' of Western civilisation/ Christianity, our reflections on the self, and attempt to prescribe our identity, will be moulded by influences/concepts internal to this regime- 'The precritical analysis of what man is in his essence becomes the analytic of everything that can, in general, be presented to man's experience'.[44] Because there is no escape from power relations, the only 'way out' of the historically constituted identity, is to abandon the question of identity altogether, and to concentrate on opening up our conception of self to the possibility of change. It is in this new and dynamic practice that a new relation to the self, the new identity, will pragmatically come into existence (a relation which will be realised only in action).

As a further reason why the search for the self should not be consciously pursued, it is seen that any definition of self immediately posits a nonself, something which is

excluded from the self by definition. This necessarily leads to the admittance of logical opposition, of negation, and thus of a notion of repression/subjugation. The 'other' is thus not prior to discourse, but rather 'always inscribed in discourse...an inescapable conceptual condition of possibility'.[45] While the 'other' cannot be entirely eliminated (without eliminating all forms of differentiation), Foucault seeks to eliminate the negative exclusionary, repressive consequences of the self/other distinction by making it dynamic, changeable. It can be argued that, if the self is constantly redefined, the 'other' does not acquire any permanent characteristics which would become targets for exclusion and repression. Thus, a notion of 'identity' in Foucault must at the outset be one which is non-essential, unreflective and pragmatic, in accordance with the new identity as elaborated in the previous section. It is in this sense that Foucault's concept of freedom constitutes a strategy for challenging modern essential identity, paving the way for the realisation of the new identity.

Power

An understanding of Foucault's conception of power is necessary, not only to understand his ethos of freedom, but to understand his motivation for conceiving this ethos, his sense that modern discursive practices (including the modern notion of identity) are determined by a 'disciplinary', 'unfree' society. It is Foucault's conception of power which, for the purposes of the present argument, provides support for the idea that 'modern identity' is restrictive, negative in its effect on the individual and on the study of integration (Chapters 1/2), and that a 'new non-fixed identity' is more appropriate and desirable for the 1990's. In elaborating Foucault's ideas on power, the intention is thus to provide a *justification* for my attempt to challenge modern identity with the new non-fixed, non-essential identity.

In his text Discipline and Punish, Foucault develops a particular notion of power based on a description of Bentham's Panopticon,[46] which effects power 'without any

physical constraints other than architecture and geometry'. The effectiveness of this Panoptic power is based on the fact that it is visible yet unverifiable and omnipresent - the inmate constantly sees the outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon, but he never knows whether he is being watched at any one moment (he is sure that he may always be so).[47] Consequent to the possibility that he may always be watched, the inmate assumes responsibility for the constraints of power, inscribing within himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles (the watchman and the watched); he becomes the principle of his own subjection. At once individualising and totalising, the Panopticon summarises Foucault's analysis of modern forms of social administration, characterised by centralisation, increasing efficiency of power through moralisation, and oriented toward the production of regimented, isolated, self-policing subjects.

In his later work, Foucault develops his notion of power with a more sophisticated conception of 'pastoral' power, which "looks after" each individual in particular, by designating (in effect producing) behaviour. It is effective through knowledge of people's minds and souls, making them reveal their innermost secrets, by implying a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it.[48] As such, it is characterised, not as a force or domination, but as a *capacity*, existing only in action, in the relations between individuals. It is exercised, not directly on the individual, but on his/her actions, an action upon an action, upon existing actions or those which may arise in the future. It is a form of implicit "government", directing the conduct of individuals, designating relationships, and producing a habitual form of behaviour, at once individualising and totalising. In short, it is a 'strategy without a strategist',[49] a network of relations, of consequences, in other words a way in which certain actions modify others, not consciously implemented, but autonomous. Significantly, this form of power is by definition coterminous with human existence - it exists wherever there is a relation between individuals.

Yet it must be noted that, in order for a relation to be seen as a Foucauldian power relation, and not simply as an objective state of affairs or domination, each participant in the

relation must be capable of acting otherwise. In this sense, 'pastoral' power can only be exercised over 'free individuals, insofar as they are free' (and can act in a number of possible ways). By implication, power can never be fully dominating, and there can never be an ideal or absolute freedom - freedom is a condition of history and of power. Because power relations are coterminous with human existence, 'true' freedom is practiced, as seen, not in outright rebellion, but in strategies which lie between rebellion and submission, as an "agonism" or permanent provocation, a continuous transgression, a questioning of the limits imposed by society (thus, one sees that freedom cannot be the result of a liberation struggle, but the condition of its existence).[50] It is in this sense that the irreducible basis of Foucault's freedom is thought, by which one can reflect on, and problematise one's assumptions, so as to open the possibility for change.

It may be noted that Foucault's conception of power as here elaborated, *serves implicitly to support the general contention of this thesis, to the effect that the study and practice of European integration is restricted by its conceptual foundation,* derived from 17th/18th century thought. To recap, my general aim has been to elaborate a new form of identity, a new way of thinking, which may be instrumental in two ways. First, the new identity would promote the development of a true European identity, by opening up personal and national identity to change, to co-existence with new forms of identity. Second, (related to the first point), it would promote theoretical understanding of the European integration process. At present, EC theory is based on the concepts of sovereignty, nationalism, democracy, etc., which, I argue, have hindered the process of integration and have hindered the study of the process by encasing theory within a perspective clouded by 'nationalism' and 'sovereignty'. Foucault's characterisation of power (both the earlier Panoptic power and later pastoral power), his idea that our actions and thought patterns are 'governed' by a web of subtle and all-encompassing 'power relations', which restrict thought within disciplines based on 'Reason', serves to support this aspect of my argument. Further, his concepts of power serve as an implicit

justification of my attempt to formulate a new identity (and particularly an identity which subjects all thought patterns to constant critique). It supports the idea that a new form of identity, based on a principle of rendering thought dynamic, is desirable given the context of modern society.[51]

The ethos of freedom as an example of the new identity in practice

Having elaborated the characteristics of Foucault's ethos of freedom and concept of power, it may be noted that Foucault conveys his notion of freedom not only through passive description, but actively through his own philosophical standpoint. In his writing, he seeks to realise his own concept of freedom and to escape the confines of his own concept of power. I wish to argue that Foucault's freedom not only provides a strategy for escaping the bounds of modern identity (as argued previously), but it constitutes at the same time an example of the new identity in practice. This is by virtue of the fact that both the new identity and the ethos of freedom are seen to be rooted in non-essential, non-fixed, pragmatic premisses. Thus, in describing Foucault's active realisation of the ethos of freedom, I am suggesting a model of the new identity.

The nature of Foucault's argument *requires* that his own premisses and style remain consistent with the content of his work. His attempt to escape the bounds of rational thought, and to free the individual from subjugation by discourse, his characterisation of power as omni-present, functioning (in a circular relation) at the micro-level (intrinsic alignments, oppositions, effects) and macro-level of states and institutions, and as being coterminous with human existence, raises the question of the author's stance. Foucault is aware of the extent of his own indoctrination (stating that 'I have muddled around in knowledge')[52] and, given the nature of his project, he is self-implicated in the web of power to which he is opposed. Foucault described his work both as 'tool-boxes' and as 'fragments of an auto-biography',[53] such that the problems regarding his style of writing

are at the same time problems of a style of living. Just as Foucault's writing is unable to escape fully the premisses and assumptions (Freedom, Truth, Identity) which he wishes to problematise and render contingent (he simply opens them up to the possibility of change), so the individual will have difficulty in establishing a distance from his/her existing Identity to practice the ethos of freedom. In both cases, the aim and the difficulty lies in knowing "to what extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought from what it thinks silently and so enable it to think differently".[54] It is from this perspective that Foucault's philosophical project, his attempt to articulate an ethos of freedom, may be seen as an active struggle to *realise* the ethos of freedom. In his attempt to escape the bounds of rational thought, he does not allow for any negation or exclusion, (he does not *discard* any modes of thought or action) but is concerned only with opening up new possibilities, opening up existing practices and thought to change. As such, Foucault's ethos is not intended to replace our existing concepts and values and is not merely a passive prescription for action, but is to be actively incorporated into existing modes of life as a catalyst for change.

Foucault's writing is based on the foundations which he is at the same time describing and seeking to advocate. His active struggle to escape the bounds of rational discourse, is evident in the fact that the conceptual premisses upon which his arguments are based are seen to resist static definition - he leaves his assumptions open to change. Foucault's basic premiss is that the problems of philosophy change as discursive practices evolve - there are no transcendental interests or problems in philosophy, only practical humble ones which emerge in historical research.[55] As a result of this premiss, he not only leaves his notion of freedom open to change (as seen), but he is led to challenge, implicitly in his own style, the basic principles of 'Reason', 'Truth', and the 'subject/object' distinction. Implicit in his argument is the idea that "Reason" is not to be assumed, as our existing notion of rationality may be superseded or may come to exist alongside other currently unimaginable rationalities. As such, Foucault does not abide by the rationality of logical opposites. As seen, the subject is at the same time an object (subjectivity is not

something which is suppressed by processes of objectification); facts, seen as changeable, are characterised within the realm of an individual's or society's values; power is not an opposite of freedom, but rather the two are mutually dependent.[56]

Indeed, it is precisely the fact that Foucault's work is based on non-fixed premisses that has led to such a divergence of interpretations and criticism of his work. From within the historical, anthropological framework of modern thought, it would seem that many of Foucault's formulations are obscure, that ultimately his anti-foundationalism leads to a conclusion of nihilism. Yet Foucault makes it quite clear that "the questions I am trying to ask are not determined by a pre-established political outlook...If I have insisted on all this 'practice', it has not been in order to 'apply' ideas, but in order to put them to the test and modify them".[57] As seen, even his own anti-foundational, anti-epistemological, anti-historical foundations are provisional, a *strategy* to render thought dynamic. He refuses to be categorised into a particular philosophical tradition,[58] for as he states in the content of his work, the only way to alleviate the grip of power relations is to keep his own thought and assumptions open to change. By implication, any conclusion that can be drawn from Foucault's work is itself implicitly open to change.

Foucault's active attempt to subject the basic principle of Reason, of logical opposition (self/other, fact/value) to the possibility of change, gives his philosophical project the basic characteristics of the new identity - non-fixed, non-essential, pragmatic and open-ended. It may be noted that, once the premiss of exclusive opposition is removed (or at least opened up to the possibility of change), once difference ceases to be necessarily reduced to simple opposition, then the principle of 'play' between differences, between self and 'other', is put into action. The idea of a monolithic self in exclusive opposition with a monolithic 'other' is replaced by the notion that the self's relation to 'other' is changeable. There is no essential self; points of difference between individuals (or groups) A and B may become points of similarity, and vice versa, such that a static definition of the self's relation to 'other' is not possible. Once the rational order of logical opposition is replaced

by a notion of essential chaos, then 'the foreign-ness of accident' lies at the root of what we know and are, and 'becoming human' is seen to constitute a series of overlapping and simultaneous interpretations. There is no fixed identity, no fixed way of thinking, and as such the ethos of freedom and the new identity are both characteristicaly non-essential, non-fixed, and pragmatic. Foucault may thus be said to exemplify in his writing, the new identity in practice.

To summarise, I have sought in this section to implicate Foucault's ethos of freedom, his outline of a style of living, as a strategy for realising the new identity. As seen, the process of questioning the specific details of life implies and incorporates a much broader questioning of the basic principle of Reason, of logical opposition (ie., it blurs the distinction between fact and value, questions the relation between self and other). As such, the ethos of freedom, if adopted, serves in practice to extend infinitely the possible ways of living, the possible ways of thinking, of perceiving the self. It is at once a way to escape the bounds of 'modern' essential, static identity (seen in Chapter 2), and in effect constitutes a realisation of the 'new identity' by virtue of rendering all concepts, including identity, non-fixed, non-essential, and pragmatic.

JACQUES DERRIDA and a new European identity

A specific focus on European identity from the perspective of the new non-fixed, non-essential conceptual foundation will complete the construction of the 'new conceptual model of Europe appropriate for the 1990's'. Applying the argument thus far to the idea of Europe, with the aid of Jacques Derrida's text, The Other Heading, the outline of a new European identity will emerge to serve as the conceptual building block of a new European unity.

Derrida stresses the extent to which the idea of Europe consists in self-identifying itself as an 'example', the point of departure for discovery, invention, colonisation, 'the

elect portion of the terrestrial globe, the pearl of the sphere, the brain of a vast body' (Paul Valery).[59] As seen in Chapter 2, this exemplary status, granted to Europe since the eighteenth century by virtue of 'Modernity', is under threat, as European hegemony has declined, and the characteristics of modernity, having been exported, are no longer exclusively distinctive of Europe. Moreover, in terms of promoting unity, the *European Community's reliance on a 'common heritage' in its struggle to forge a union, is a reliance on a 'heritage' ridden with conflict and division.* The traditional idea of Europe, rooted in 'nation-state/sovereignty/democracy' rhetoric, is arguably not only anachronistic, but evidently obstructive in the conceptualisation of 'unity'. Combined with the ambiguity of Europe's geographical borders (inscribed by the European Community, Christian Europe?) these factors suggest that an entirely new perspective is needed to accurately reflect contemporary Europe and to promote unity.

The idea of European integration, of a 'united', supranational Europe, is a vision of something which has no precedent. It is not an example, a repetition, of something which has happened previously in Europe, but is entirely new, a new conceptualisation.[60] To date, European culture has in practice comprised little more than the sum of Europe's national cultures; European history is the history of the interaction of Europe's sovereign national units. It has been argued thus far that a new European unity in the 1990's and beyond cannot be adequately conceived upon these premisses. Yet, as seen, *to step beyond these premisses is to step beyond the foundations of contemporary thought, beyond our conception of self and other.* It requires disassociating yesterday's Europe from the Europe of tomorrow, rendering Europe's points of reference or 'identity' contingent and flexible, to think 'otherwise' and allow for the possibility of the 'impossible'.

In accordance with an axiom suggested by Derrida in his reflections on Europe, "what is proper to a culture is not to be identical to itself. Not to not have an identity, but not to be able to identify itself, to be able to say 'me' or 'we'; to be able to take the form of the subject only in the non-identity to itself or, if you prefer, only in the difference with

itself".[61] To elaborate this idea, an identity founded on this axiom is an identity which defines itself *based on the fact* that the substance of its identity is changeable. For example, underlying any particular characterisation of 'European identity' (the plural identities/characteristics which may be enumerated in any instance as a 'definition' of Europe), is a more fundamental understanding that this particular 'definition' is one among many, in time and space. This 'more fundamental understanding', this foundation to all articulations of 'European identity', constitutes a fundamental definition of the self, an ultimate identification of the self (of 'Europe') in terms of 'difference with the self', 'non-identity with the self' over time and space. In other words, *the first principle of 'European identity', (or of any identity) is the principle that the boundaries and characterisation of the identity are changeable, and thus that there is and can be no essential 'core' to the identity.*

The obscurity and ambiguity which currently surrounds the idea of Europe (see Chapter 2) is consequent on the fact that a culture, an identity, has no single origin. The attempt to trace a continuous identity through time from a distinct origin to the present day, constitutes an (arguably unfaithful) gathering up and suppressing of Europe's 'difference with itself'.[62] A more 'genuine' perspective, (or at least an equally valid perspective), particularly given Europe's intended imminent transformation into something unknown, is to incorporate the element of 'difference with oneself' into Europe's self-conception. By implication, and to borrow from Derrida, as Europe 'heads off' in an entirely new direction, towards 'another heading', it is enabled, by accepting the 'other of the heading' (of its own heading), to incorporate the 'heading of the other' within a new self-definition.[63] European identity is no longer conceived to imply an inscribed 'limit', but is opened up to the 'other', to allow for an intimate relation *with* the 'other' which does not obey the logic of self *versus* other. *Accepting 'difference with self' means abandoning the idea of a solid identity through time, which is always distinct from other continuous identities.* Notably, this new perspective allows for the fact that, at any point in time, Europe may be, and is actually inscribed in various ways, for example as the 'European

Community' (originally of 'the Six', now of 'the twelve', now named the European Union), as Western Europe versus the 'other' of Eastern Europe during the Cold War, or as the 'common European home' in the post-cold war period. Each of these identities is evidently inscribed by an 'other', but significantly the new perspective accepts and prescribes the fact that the 'other' is changeable in time and space, so allowing for the co-existence of various definitions, while rendering each of them changeable.

To explain, if the search for an essential uniform identity is abandoned, if the multiplicity and flexibility of European identities is accepted, then European identity is no longer defined *in opposition* to the other but rather through intimate *play* with the other.[64] In other words, implicit in any definition of Europe is the understanding that the boundaries which distinguish Europe from the 'other' (or others), the differences which serve to characterise Europe, are subject to change. As explained previously, the new identity is conceived as a series of diverse, overlapping and simultaneous identities, such that a point of difference in one definition of Europe may be a point of similarity in another, and vice versa. At a general level, *the 'identity of Europe' is non-specific by virtue of a constant 'play', or alteration, in the differences which determine any particular definition of Europe.*

This principle of play among differences determines a particular relation, or interaction in practice, between self and other (myself and 'x', or a 'European' and non-European). The idea that the identity of a European may 'play' with the identity of a non-European, means that the European perceives him/herself to share a dynamic relation with the non-European. For example, my identity as a European, when I define Europe in terms of the European Community (European Union), dictates that I perceive a Swiss person as the 'other', as a non-European. However, not only do I realise that Switzerland may gain membership to the Community and may therefore become a fellow European, but if I define Europe geographically, and in relation to a third party such as the United States, then I perceive a Swiss person as a fellow European and an American as the 'other'. Further, if the third party is Africa, then I may perceive an American to be 'historically European',

somehow a part of European identity when contrasted with Africa. It is in this sense that Europeans may be said to 'play' with non-Europeans - the 'new' non-fixed identity allows and encourages multiple and simultaneous self-definitions, such that in principle the European's relation with the identity of the non-European is constantly being altered. In one context a non-European may become a fellow European, and in another context, revert back to being a non-European.

This way of perceiving European identity automatically *promotes and forges an internal 'community'* by opening up each national 'self' to the other, through the realisation that each particular 'other' is at the same time part of the self in relation to multiple other 'others'. At the same time, it forges a kind of *external 'unity'*, as the identity of Europe as an entity is clarified (though not in static terms) by removing the ambiguity caused by contradiction among various 'universalising' definitions. Once diverse definitions are allowed to co-exist simultaneously and with equal validity, then the 'other' cannot be definitively articulated, and the boundaries between Europe and non-Europe are flexible and blurred.

Indeed, it may be said that this perception of European identity is nothing new, in the sense that it simply reflects the current status of 'Europe', with its ambiguous borders and multiple definitions. Yet, *the novelty lies in accepting this perception as a desirable and "unifying" form of identity, not simply as a transitional and ambiguous 'phase' in the development toward a more static Europe that will be ultimately identifiable from the 'other' once again.* Not only is this new form of European identity desirable from the point of view of being appropriate to the contemporary dynamics of European integration, but indeed one may argue that it is *conducive to community where a static conception of Europe is not.* At present, Europe is being transformed by virtue of simultaneous pressures toward unification and disintegration, centralisation (in Brussels) and decentralisation (ethnic nationalism, the cry for local autonomy). It is acknowledged by the European Community that neither of these extremes, monopoly nor dispersion, will result

in a European union, but instead a path must be forged between the two.[65] In other words, European identity requires a discourse that inscribes the alliance of both extremes, that accommodates this fundamental contradiction characterising contemporary Europe. Clearly, this requires thinking differently, perceiving the two extremes not as polar opposites but as two interconnecting parts of a larger whole. Indeed, in practice the forces of centralisation and decentralisation can be seen to feed off each other, as for example the prospect of hegemony imposed by Brussels inspires an affirmation of local autonomy and culture.

From the perspective of the new non-fixed conceptual foundation (and by virtue of it), the experience and experiment of European identity can be none other than the endurance of these contradictions, by opening them up to each other, transforming either/or opposition into both/and. This issue relates to the 'paradox of universality'.[66] It was seen in Chapter 2 how the 'Enlightenment conceptual foundation' accommodates contradiction by virtue of exclusive binary opposition (self/other, International Relations/Political Theory), which compartmentalises discourse such that contradictions are passed over in silence. As such, contradictions implicit for example in the concept of sovereignty are apparent and allowed to persist in practice, but are passed over in theory. As affirmed by Derrida, "no cultural identity presents itself as the opaque body of an untranslateable idiom, but always, on the contrary, as the irreplaceable inscription of the universal in the singular, the unique testimony to the human essence and to what is proper to man".[67] It is this contradiction which lies at the root of conflict and intolerance.[68] The value here of the 'new identity', with a conceptual foundation which subjects all thought to question, is to address this silence, and by confronting the contradiction, resolve it. Once the contradiction, the paradox, is realised and acknowledged, then by necessity the 'heading splits', sovereignty is no longer sovereign, the sovereign identity is de-identified, as it opens itself without being able any longer to 'gather itself'.[69] By acknowledging other calls to universality, each sovereign identity begins to hear and understand the 'other', its relation to self is altered and so indeed it opens itself to an 'other' that it can no longer even

relate to itself as *its* other. The sovereign identity's relation with the other can no longer be one of exclusive binary opposition, analogous to the relation between billiard balls, but rather, as explained previously, it is a relation of 'play', of interconnecting, overlapping and evolving similarities and differences, akin to the complex interconnections of a cobweb.

Because this new European identity is necessarily fluid, and based on a conceptual foundation other than that which underpins contemporary discourse, the new Europe can only be anticipated as the unforseeable, the unanticipateable, as that which is as yet incapable of having a memory.[70] This acceptance of an unforseeable future is not intended to undermine the reassurance that is gained from the idea of a continuous identity through time, from the idea that the future can be rationally anticipated. First, the prospect of an entirely new future, based on new conceptual premisses, is no more fearful than the prospect of a return to Europe's past, to bitter conflict and destruction as seen in two world wars. Yet, in addition to this, it may be seen that contemporary rational discourse makes a fundamental self-justifying assumption in the form of a contrast between a *de jure* world of order, as it might be if people were 'perfectly rational creatures', and a *de facto* world of imperfections where reasonable principles are violated in the name of practicality. Significantly, non-fixed discourse (undermining the exclusive relation between opposites) destabilises the 'a priori' status of this contrast by reversing it, to reveal a *de facto* world of reason and order imposed upon and stifling a *de jure* world of chaos.[71] As such, acceptance of the new non-fixed perspective serves to supplement and augment reassurance, by terminating the necessarily unsuccessful and anxiety-inducing struggle to force a reality characterised by flux into the static order of a rational discourse.

Based on the argument laid out in this chapter, the search for a temporally continuous essence is abandoned, to be replaced by a fluid series of overlapping identities. Europe may be identified variously depending on the context of the definition. These

identities are related on the basis of Wittgenstein's 'family resemblances', and as such form a whole 'European identity' which cannot be exclusively articulated by contrast with a definitive other, but rather exists as Wittgenstein's inexpressible - 'not a something but not a nothing either'. Individual parts, contributing factors to European identity may be articulated, but the whole can never be grasped in its entirity, and indeed as identities are created and replaced in the manner of fluid language-games, the whole changes. As such, there can be no static 'core'; the centre cannot take the form of a geographical metropolis,[72] but rather constitutes a framework, a 'public sphere' with no distinct boundaries, and which leaves the way open for constant change.

By implication, the individual European is identified as being fully a part of Europe, but not European 'in every part'. The non-fixed conceptual foundation dictates that the individual must be European *among other things*.[73] As a European, the individual's identity is not identical to itself over time, and cannot see itself in exclusive opposition to any other. This conceptualisation allows for the simultaneous realisation of the individual's identification with the local community, with the 'nation', and with Europe. This resolves the 'contradiction' between 'local' and 'European' identity, between localising and globalising forces, by ceasing to perceive them as oppositions.

CONCLUSION

Over thirty-five years have passed since the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1958, marking the technical birth date of the European Community (now called the European Union). The starting point for this thesis was the question as to *why the study of European integration has to date failed to provide a comprehensive and consistent account and explanation of the integration process, past, present, and provisionally for the future.* In Chapter 1, the main strands of 'European integration theory' were assessed, in order to elaborate the general inadequacy of 'EC thought'. It was seen that each strand of integration theory, based on a common Enlightenment foundation, was formulated in response to specifically temporal and contextual factors, and as such each was rendered apparently inapplicable as the EC evolved and transformed. It was further seen that each strand of EC theory suffers from theoretical obscurity, as a result of the attempt to explain the complex process of integration in terms of a 'rational', scientific framework. It was concluded that existing theories of integration may be considered on the one hand to be partial accounts of specific developmental stages of the EC, while on the other they constitute perspectives which perhaps provide a partial insight into the dynamics of integration today. The result is a piecemeal approach to the study of integration, as glimpses of insight are gleaned from various strands of thought, in the attempt to fathom a series of ever-changing integrative dynamics in time and space. Such an approach is

perhaps inevitable, given the general aim to *explain* within contemporary thought a complex process which in principle challenges the very foundations of contemporary thought (the nation-state, sovereignty, self vs other).[74]

The new identity and the study of European integration

To summarise and to link together the arguments of the thesis, it is possible to condense the arguments in Chapters 1 and 2 into two main themes. First, the specific weaknesses in each strand of EC theory were detailed and attributed to a common Enlightenment conceptual foundation, to the effect that Chapter 1 established the *general inadequacy of the Enlightenment foundation in the study of the EC* (theme 1). It was this foundation which led in each case to the implicit assumption of the concepts 'nationalism' and 'sovereignty' (through failure to analyse them sufficiently as concepts), and which accounted for the unquestioned intention to provide a 'rational', scientific explanation of integration (which led to theoretical obscurity). In sum, it is the obstinacy of this foundation which has led to the failure of synchronisation between theory and practice of integration - EC theory does not have the conceptual resources to account adequately for contemporary European integration.

Second, the obstinacy of the Enlightenment foundation was attributed in Chapter 2 to the modern concept of essential identity, which has led to *a modern identity crisis* (theme 2). It was seen how modern identity has an inherent tendency toward identity crisis as it is based on a fundamental contradiction between Enlightenment and Romantic thought (see Chapter 2), the result of which is a problematisation of identity, with each individual searching elusively to discover and develop an essential and 'authentic' inner self. Chapter 2 elaborated this identity crisis, showing how it ties in with the continued predominance of the 'nation-state' and 'sovereignty', and so with theoretical inadequacy and practical obstacles to European integration. The need for, and the obstacles to, the reformulation of

the conceptual foundation underpinning 'EC thought', based on a reformulation of identity (and thus European identity) was explained.

Having established these two main themes, it may be seen that the characteristics of the new identity outlined in Chapter 3 were determined by the problem areas identified in Chapters 1 and 2. Where Chapters 1 and 2 identify the source of a problem, the new identity in effect focuses on these problem areas and provides the outline of a solution. It is beyond the scope of the present work to undertake a comprehensive and specific *application* of the new identity to the study of European integration, for two reasons. First, the issue of the new identity and its relation to the study of European integration is not simple and unilinear, but rather complex, overlapping and multifaceted. The identity of the self, of the group, European identity, and the self/other relation are all on the one hand manifestations of each other, yet in their difference with each other, they bear different relations with each other and with the issue of European integration (theory and practice). To this extent the connections between various aspects of the preceding argument are multiple and cannot within the bounds of the present study be elaborated in their multiplicity.

Second, it is not possible, given the non-fixed nature of the new identity, to draw any definitive and static conclusions regarding its full implications for the weaknesses in EC theory (Chapter 1) or for the characterisation of a future 'European identity'. Rather, it has here been the purpose to provide a fundamental conceptual bedrock, *the basis of a non-fixed way of thinking* which may serve to re-orient the study and promote the process of European integration. The implications of the new conceptual foundation cannot be made fully explicit, precisely because it encourages a constant dynamism of thought, new ways of thinking. It is hoped therefore that an appreciation of the preceding argument is gained by way of an 'ever-sharpening focus' as the reader makes implicit connections and the substance of the thesis comes into focus.

Given this proviso, it is sufficient within the bounds of the present thesis to indicate *generally and briefly* the way in which the new identity may affect the study of integration, in response to the issues outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. As seen, and with regard to theme 1 above, the new perspective serves to alter the 'Enlightenment conceptual foundation' which lies at the root of all EC theory analysed in Chapter 1. In questioning the principle of identity, challenging the fixity of national loyalty and the exclusivity of sovereignty, these concepts are deprived of their fixed and fundamental status. The new identity does not suggest a *replacement* for these concepts, and their attendant concepts such as democracy and citizenship, but simply opens them up to the *possibility* of change, and denies their status as unquestioned and unanalysed assumptions within EC thought. It ensures a rigorous critique of all assumptions, so allowing for a re-synchronisation of, and an active interaction between theory and practice, as theory (eg., nationalism, sovereignty, the *aim* for scientific explanation) is encouraged to alter fundamentally in accordance with the progression of the practical process of integration. As such the new identity may be said to provide a *tool* with which to adjust the body of EC theory to the context of the contemporary dynamic process of European integration, and by virtue of this (and by virtue of the elaboration of a European identity), to promote the practice itself.

As regards theme 2, it was argued that the characteristics of the new identity (non-fixed, non-essential, pragmatic) provide a strategy to address the modern identity crisis. This specific argument was elaborated through the work of Foucault. Principally, the new identity undermines the elusive search for an 'inner self' while still allowing for reassurance, for security of the self. This applies at the level of the individual, the group, the nation and Europe, such that it addresses the issue of personal identity, as well as ethnic nationalism (threatened identity which like a bent twig, 'lashes back with fury'), and the development of a European identity. By allowing for flexibility in thought in general and in identity in particular, the new identity provides a conceptual foundation which is compatible with the 'dynamics of modernity', with the up-rootedness and transient character of many

elements of modern life. It provides, within the context of modern life, a security and reassurance without the need for a sense of fixity, of essential rootedness.

Having briefly indicated the effect of the new identity on the two main themes of Chapters 1 and 2, I shall now more specifically indicate the effect on each each strand of EC theory individually. As regards Functionalism, it was seen that the fundamental orientation of the theory was to prescribe a simple utilitarianism based on welfare needs, in the belief that technological cooperation post-World War II necessitated and encouraged the broadening of the welfare state into a welfare world, into a 'supranational' socio-psychological community based on the Functional imperative. This amounted to a prescription based on empirical factors alone, at the expense of theoretical analysis. Yet it was seen that Functionalism failed in its aim to prescribe, essentially because it failed to analyse, appreciate, and challenge the force of nationalism and sovereignty. It was argued that the failure to challenge these concepts amounted to an implicit *assumption* of the concepts, an assumption which apparently precluded the need for a theory of interest politics, or to account for the possibility of multiple loyalties, or to distinguish between emotional and political allegiance. In Chapter 1, it was thus concluded that Functionalism's downfall was its general failure to focus on the dynamic of identity-formation. It was influenced too heavily by the contextual aspiration to rebuild a disintegrated European society in the post-war period, by the emphasis on practical interests at the expense of adequate focus on theoretical, ideological factors. In seeking to provide a practical formulation to rebuild Europe, Functionalism's own theoretical coherence was compromised, as seen in the obscurity of its terms (eg., 'integration' 'community').

The new identity may be seen to highlight these weaknesses of Functionalism and to help provide a solution to them. The new identity stresses the role of theory where Functionalism does not, by virtue of its emphasis on the need to subject all thought to rigorous critique. While Functionalism (incorrectly) assumes the capacity of a practical

Functional imperative to alone create supra-national allegiance, a 'socio-psychological community', the perspective of the new identity stresses the power of *ideas* and concepts to promote or hinder action, of the need to provide, in addition to a practical basis, a *conceptual* basis for the individual's identification with a post-national entity. Further, conceived as a non-fixed, changeable way of thinking, the new identity precludes any *assumption* of identity-related concepts or indeed of rationality itself, so challenging the Enlightenment foundation. From the perspective of the new identity, the failure of Functionalism to question the principles of nationalism and sovereignty (ie., to analyse their role, their meaning, their ability to be theoretically superseded), is highlighted as a fundamental flaw. Indeed, related to this, the new identity in effect *addresses the theoretical obscurity* of Functionalism's basic terms, challenging its vagueness by stressing the need to critique, to define and redefine, to continually question and justify the meaning of one's concepts, to open them up to the possibility of change.

It may be seen that, in affecting the common Enlightenment conceptual foundation of EC theory, the new identity affects each strand of EC theory in a similar manner. The effects of the new identity on Functionalism (eg., subjecting its assumptions and theoretical basis to scrutiny, stressing the need to analyse the issue of identity, the role of ideas) may be equally applied to the case of Neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalism attempted to be more 'scientific' than Functionalism, but the result in practice was a further obscurity of its terms ('spillover', 'integration', 'community', etc.,) as the process of integration in practice defied systematisation. Not only was Haas' Neofunctionalism based on the narrow contextual experience of the ECSC, but it assumed too much homogeneity and capitalist growth based on the experience of the US system, and ignored the issue of nationalism altogether. Rather than incorporating and analysing the principle of nationalism within Neofunctionalist theory, Haas eventually concluded that his theory should be replaced by an interdependence model. From the perspective of the new identity, there is

once again an evident failure and reluctance to address, to subject to fundamental critique, the basic identity-related principles of nationalism and sovereignty. Indeed, as in the case of Functionalism, it was concluded that Neofunctionalism's primary weakness was its failure to elaborate a solid and clear theoretical foundation.[75]

Chapter 3, in elaborating the new identity, has provided a tool with which the individual, group and 'nation' may begin to conceive themselves as 'Europeans', beyond the static modern forms of identification. This tool is arguably a vital missing link in the Neofunctionalist thesis. Neofunctionalism eliminated the need for majority support and stressed the psychology of elites as a condition of integration. From the new perspective, it can be argued that the basic Neofunctionalist idea that convergence of demands may constitute an integrative dynamic, leading to a European Community based on competing interests, may indeed be viable, but only if the individual and group are capable or potentially capable of identifying themselves as Europeans. The new identity stresses the importance and role of this capability, and provides a strategy for its realisation.

With respect to Federalism, it was seen in Chapter 1 that the focus of Federalist theory was on ends rather than means, on the provision of a politico-constitutional structure, *at the expense of providing a theory of change*. Its focus on preserving local diversity while forging unity necessitated the principle that the Federal structure must be different for each case, and this precluded the development of a clear structure for European Federalism. Yet at the same time, it was seen that Federal theory assumed the supposed virtues of the US model (which as seen were themselves questionable), and more generally the guarantees of a Federal structure. *These guarantees were seen to be questionable* in light of the contradiction between the autonomy of the individual and the needs of the collective. Further, it was seen that Federalism relied on public sentiment to create a European spirit, and on a European spirit to provide a vehicle and goal of European unity, and yet it *failed to*

provide a clear and unified characterisation of the 'European spirit' or even to analyse the issue of European identity.

It may be seen that the new identity addresses these broad issue areas with respect to Federalism. The perspective of the new identity serves to subject the assumptions of Federalism to rigorous critique, and as such implicitly *encourages the development of a theory of change* (ie., a focus on how the progress of integration may be reflected theoretically, and how Federalism's concepts may change in accordance with the practice of integration). Further, with respect to the doubt regarding the assumed guarantees of the Federal structure in Federalist theory, it is seen that the new identity, focusing on the relation between opposites, alters the relation between self and other, and in so doing *addresses a series of contradictions* basic to Enlightenment thought (eg., between fact and value, unity and diversity, the individual and the collective - see Chapter 2). By virtue of this, the fact that Federalism suppresses the contradiction between the autonomy of the individual and the needs of the collective, is highlighted, so implicitly challenging the assumptions of Federalist thought.

Further, the new identity *provides the basis for a dynamic, non-fixed European spirit*, suited to the contemporary stage of European integration. This is of particular relevance with respect to Federalism, given that Federalist theory relied upon the European spirit as a vehicle and goal of European unity, yet failed to focus sufficiently on this very issue. Here the new identity is seen to address a significant gap in Federal theory.

Finally, it may be noted that the new identity applied to the context of Intergovernmentalism, serves implicitly to undermine the Realist basis of Intergovernmental theory. Indeed, the effect of the new identity on Intergovernmentalism need not be extensively elaborated, for it suffices to point out that the new identity directly undermines the tenets of the Intergovernmental perspective, which focuses on political processes which have evolved *in spite of* the EC's institutional arrangements to promote

political union. In maintaining the predominance of nationalism, sovereignty, and the idea that states are sole, unitary, self-seeking rational actors in the international arena, Intergovernmentalism is not as such a theory of integration, and any sense of European identity, any challenge to nationalism and sovereignty, is an anathema to it. It may be said that the effect of the new identity on Intergovernmentalism is similar to the effect on Functionalism, Neofunctionalism and Federalism, only in a more extreme form, as Intergovernmentalism, assuming a 'billiard-ball' perspective on International Relations, harbours in an extreme form, the characteristics which the new identity sets out to alter.

Having broadly outlined the ways in which the new identity addresses the weaknesses in EC theory elaborated in Chapter 1, it may be concluded that the new identity provides for a fundamental re-orientation of EC theory, by challenging its current Enlightenment conceptual basis, which at root assumes a static essential notion of identity. In effect, I have sought to elaborate a form of identity appropriate for the 1990's. More specifically, my aim has been to elaborate a way of thinking (about the self, the nation, Europe, and fundamentally about the distinction between 'self' and 'other') which may help to create a European identity, thus to promote the process of European integration. This way of thinking is intended not only to be forward-looking and prescriptive, but in addition to be retrospective, to provide a lens through which to study and understand the process of integration to date. It does not provide a new static conceptual basis but rather acts as a rhetorical strategy, encouraging rigorous critique of the existing one, so opening it up to the possibility of fundamental change. At the same time, it provides the basis for a new 'European identity' suitable for the 1990's which in effect may promote the process of European integration by removing the obstacle of dogmatic national identification (and ethnic nationalism, the attempt to affirm threatened identity). Thus, the new identity, intended in the first instance not as a simple replacement of contemporary thought (this would be implausible), but as a conceptual tool to free thought from its conceptual

'grooves', to initiate a movement toward a 'new way of thinking', may be effective both in the explanation of integration, and in the active promotion of the process itself.

The utility, impact and plausibility of the new identity

The utility, impact and plausibility of the thesis may thus be assessed. Inevitably, it will be argued by supporters of 'science', of International Relations Theory, that, contrary to the contention of this thesis, the formulation of laws, concepts and theoretical 'models' is a deliberate attempt to impose order on to an otherwise unmanageable and unpredictable reality, and that the development of parsimonious explanation serves a valuable heuristic purpose.[76] It is hoped that the preceding argument has implicitly countered this view by showing, in the context of 'EC thought', that ultimately the formulation of relatively static concepts does not necessarily secure predictability, and does not ensure adequate understanding (indeed hinders it - see Chapter 1). Instead it bears particularly negative consequences, for not only is force used to guard our 'certainties' (eg., national sovereignty') but as a result of these 'certainties', and of rational thought in general, the individual is subjugated in a web of power relations, and subject to a modern 'identity crisis'. The question as to whether it is worth giving up the reassurance of our 'historical' identity, and the reassurance of a 'rational world', must contentiously yet surely, based on the preceding argument, be in principle affirmative, particularly given the argument that this reassurance is ultimately illusory.[77]

It may be noted that, within contemporary discourse, the individual, the subject of consciousness, acts as a fulcrum along a continuum running from the extreme of 'rugged individualism' to an opposite extreme of 'community'. The conscious individual is immune from discussion - 'the centre is not the centre' (Derrida) - but is situated in the middle of this continuum and subjected to conflicting pressures, as efforts are made in theory and in practice (ie., 'Democracy') to balance the interests of the autonomous person

with the demands of collective life. It is a tension in which it is impossible to be 'right', and which leads to a social and political apathy, as the individual is caught between a tendency to feel selfish when individualistic and naive when collectivistic.[78] It is this tension which evidently lies at the root of the modern identity crisis as outlined in Chapter 2, where the ethic of authenticity dictates that each person looks for 'inner meaning' while simultaneously forging an identity as part of a group (or numerous groups). Indeed, this tension is apparent at the more general level of the European Community, such that national citizens are implicitly being asked to be true to the individual nation-state, while forging an identity with a collective EC.

As a response to this, it is seen that, by questioning Humanism, and our basic assumptions including the self/other relation, the new conceptual foundation puts the subject back into the centre of discourse,[79] re-activating and setting it 'free' in Foucault's sense, and in so doing resolving the modern identity crisis. While the contradiction between the needs of the individual and the demands of the collective remain a practical fact, the tension resulting from this contradiction and its negative effect on identity, are alleviated by virtue of being confronted and acknowledged. In the context of the new perspective, the individual subjects his/her assumptions and identity to constant critique, and thus it is the individual who is responsible for their active maintenance and transformation. To this extent, the individual, rather than letting reason be in charge of itself, is in charge of reason. Against this background, conflict among ideas is considered inevitable, but it need not be subject to dogmatism and result in violence. If allowed to take the form of a play among differences, conflict can be accepted as being productive, generating new ideas which are more than the sum of the 'conflicting parts'. As a parallel, once it is realised that even the most rugged individual is subject to 'public' forces that define his/her individuality (as seen in Wittgenstein), then the 'individual' and 'collective' are no longer perceived as two extremes along a continuum, but as two interconnecting, overlapping parts of a dynamic whole.

With regard to the *plausibility* of the thesis, it must be emphasised that the non-binary conceptual foundation, the 'new identity', does not entail rejecting our current identity, deconstructing the subject just because it is a construction. In admitting that there is no "real person", that meaning resides in difference, the self is subjected *in principle* to an infinite play of signification.[80] This is not a resort to nihilism, to a deconstruction of any ground upon which a progressive politics is at all possible.[81] It is not to kill the subject by pulling the rug from under its feet in a fatal blow, but rather to invoke a number of small deaths through which the battlelines can be redrawn, energies can be regrouped, and concentration may be placed on the silent spaces that 'give one room to breathe in the practice of everyday life'.[82] The new identity is to be used, and indeed can only be used, as a rhetorical tool, for to use it as an exclusive replacement for contemporary thought would be to practice and perpetuate exclusive binary distinction. As such, it allows for giving into the madness of flux in principle while allowing for de facto intelligibility.[83]

Admittedly, even if one concedes the utility and plausibility of the new conceptual foundation, there remains a valid question as to whether it will be *capable* of having any impact on a contemporary thought which is firmly entrenched in self/other opposition and temporality, whether it is capable of breaking the circle of signification. This question can be answered with reference to the argument, implicitly elaborated in the thesis thus far, that binary distinction is already riddled with silent excess. Meaning is made possible by the fact that nonmeaning, 'unreason', flux, is pushed to a silent fringe and ignored, but the crucial point which has been implicit but not directly articulated thus far, is that this fringe has never been exiled. As seen, meaning is not essential, but resides in difference, which implies that our understanding of temporality depends at root on a silent understanding of flux; order and 'rationality' depend on a silent understanding of chaos. It is not possible to choose ultimately between reason and nonreason, order and chaos, as they are analogous to

two sides of a sheet of paper where the existence of each depends on the other.[84] To this extent, flux is anterior to form, and constitutes the death of reason as well as its most essential resource. They are not opposites but rather differences, which give each other life through an intimate 'play of signification'.

In practice, this new conceptual foundation/ new identity may be introduced into the field of EC studies through education, the primary mechanism by which society takes power over our consciousness.[85] Through education, through schools and universities, Europe may be opened to what never has been and never will be Europe, as both reason and unreason, self and other, inside and outside are maintained and the pressure to exile one side of the contradiction is eliminated. To ensure against a relapse into exclusive binary thought, critique may be cultivated (by propagating the Foucauldian rhetorical strategy of non-binary thought), and itself be submitted to constant scrutiny, to 'deconstructive genealogy that exceeds it without compromising it'.[86]

Simultaneous to introducing the new counceptual foundation and identity within academic circles, the European Commission may itself play a role, promoting it within the general public (through Directorate-General X- Information, Communication, and Culture), with the support of the media. Indeed, at the time of writing, a debate is in progress with regard to how the European Commission may overcome the fact that "Europe's citizens are increasingly apathetic about the benefits of closer European integration".[87] It is already acknowledged that "The European message must concern Europeans...in terms of values, outlook and a commonly shared identity" and as such there is already scope for putting the new conceptual foundation and identity into practice. Indeed, it may be said that the new conceptual foundation has the potential to fill an apparent gap in the European Commission's current relations with the public. The Commission is already concerned with how to communicate 'the right message to the right people in the right way at the right time and in the right place',[88] but the substance of that message, of the 'idea of Europe' has received little critical analysis, rooted as seen in the idea of a 'common heritage'. In

allowing for a form of community which accommodates the transformative and fluid dynamics of contemporary integration, the message of this thesis, with adaptation for general comprehension and a specific strategy to make it 'come alive' for the public, may be instrumental in promoting the idea of a 'true' European Community.

The potential strength of this European identity in relation to national identity depends (as seen) on context, on the intensity and frequency of actual situations in which individuals relate to each other as 'Europeans'. Indeed, the European Community has developed and continues to develop programs which fulfil this aim - "Youth for Europe" and "Erasmus" encourage exchange schemes between students within the EC; "Comett" fosters partnerships between universities and industry among member states, enhancing advanced training in new technologies; "Science" fosters cooperation and exchanges between European researchers. Moreover, such programs are being developed today against the backcloth of a Single market, and the final ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which has led to the renaming of the European Community, hereafter to be referred to as the European Union. The free movement of EC (now EU) nationals among the member states, the harmonisation of academic qualifications, a Social Charter covering issues including employment and wages, living and working conditions, social security, health protection, vocational training, etc., all serve to promote the interaction of EC nationals, and the building of an identity through common action. Moreover, these advances in the process of integration are being accompanied by efforts in 1994 on behalf of DGX (Directorate-General for Information, Communication, and Culture) to promote the idea of Europe with a 'new approach to communication policy', which seeks to provide (eg., by way of information campaigns, public events, and by increasing the transparency and accessibility of EC institutions) a forum in which individuals may identify as Europeans.[89]

The 'philosophy' of identity here elaborated significantly dictates that European identity need not threaten national identity, but can exist alongside it, and that the strength of European identity does not depend on an essentialist definition, on a static delineation of

the boundaries of the concept. It suggests that a true European identity can develop and flourish through 'actual situations' in which individuals identify with one another as Europeans, and in which they perceive this identity as being a positive enrichment to their lives. It was seen in Chapter 2 that the concepts of nationalism and sovereignty continue to dominate the identity of the individual and 'nation', and it was argued that this way of perceiving identity is a hindrance to the process of integration. The 'new identity', on the other hand, may be seen to complement the EC's efforts, in the sense that it provides a potential framework, a philosophy against which practical policy may be realised.

Today there continues to be considerable disagreement over the ideal and most desirable future direction of the EC. At the time of writing, the European Community is emerging from a year of setbacks, which has left the Community institutions in a state of despondency. Securing support for the Maastricht Treaty developed into a struggle within national parliaments and against public opinion. Denmark and France each held a referendum on the Treaty, and managed to secure only a slight majority in favour, Denmark doing so only on the second attempt.[90] In Britain, John Major risked his political career as a result of cross- and inter-party dispute over Maastricht, including a deep rift within his own cabinet regarding the virtues of the Treaty.[91] Finally, the most recent and most considerable setback has been the collapse of the ERM (Exchange-Rate Mechanism), undermining any possibilty of moving toward a single European currency by the end of the decade, as laid out in the Maastricht Treaty.[92]

Various explanations may be put forward for these and other setbacks which the EC has suffered. Whatever contextual, economic and practical factors may be involved[93], there is a basic and undeniable underlying cause, in the form of a conflict in values and perception within and among the member states, and indeed between the member states and the Community institutions.[94] As such, this thesis has sought to show the extent to which our conceptual premisses and assumptions serve to restrict understanding and indeed create the fundamental obstacles to integration. We are inscribed within a self-created web of

signification, which we cannot escape (and indeed do not see the need to escape) as there are no obvious 'cracks in the circle'. This argument has sought to make such a crack in the circle, to forge a distance from our self-affirming conceptual foundation, to provide a lens through which it is evident that the theory and practice of European integration is fundamentally hindered by our thought patterns, essentially by our perception of self and other. The process of European integration was inspired by, and has reached its present stage of development, as the result of a dynamic (seen in Chapter 2) which is encouraging new forms of social order, beyond the nation-state. The forces of localisation and globalisation, of integration and disintegration, are autonomous in the sense that they are apparently beyond the control of the nation-state. As such, reality can no longer be forced within the boundaries of a 'nation-state/sovereignty' framework, but instead our conceptual framework, essentially formulated in the eighteenth century, needs reformulation to suit reality.

From this perspective, it may be said that those who intentionally approach politics as the imposition of form onto a chaotic world, have *chosen* order over chaos. Yet once the assumption of underlying unity is questioned, once the hegemonic discourse which sets the self up in opposition to an Other is rendered transparent, one is led to ask how those who choose such order can possibly feel *compelled* to make such a choice.[95] By revealing the damaging and debilitating effects of this discourse, it is hoped that this thesis, that the 'non-fixed' conceptual foundation, may spare us "the interminable self-righteousness of those who know what we cannot be because they are so sure of where we are."[96] The new identity may hopefully pave the way toward 'taking care of people and things without using them up' by forging a 'community without unity'. It may allow for a 'true' European Community, based on intimate and overlapping ties among differences (among 'language-games'), as seen through a non-binary lens which dissolves the tension between individual and community, the national and supranational, by relating them to each other and so

accommodating them. Becoming human, and becoming European, is thus none other than a series of interpretations. It has here been attempted to step beyond the bounds, the veil, of contemporary thought, to reveal a true 'European community' beyond our value-laden concepts and definitions - "*What is eternal and important is often hidden from a man by an impenetrable veil. He knows there's something under there, but he cannot see it. The veil reflects the daylight.*" (Wittgenstein)[97]

[1]Jacques Derrida, quoted in William Corlett, Community Without Unity (Duke University Press, 1989), p69

[2]RBJ Walker, Inside/Outside: international relations as political theory (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), p8

[3]...to be explained hereafter. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), #65-96

[4]For a detailed account of the Self (and self's sense of others) conceived as the result of transaction, social interaction, see Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1986), and Michael Carrithers, Why Humans Have Cultures (Oxford: OUP, 1992). These authors analyse the way individuals handle new and unprecedented situations. Bruner looks at the infant - 'the infant's principal tool for achieving his ends is another familiar human being'. Carrithers sees that 'Humans are available to each other, their abilities are only developed and transformed by others and in respect of a social setting' (Carrithers, p57).

[5]This 'essential self' may be more or less apparent to the individual, may be 'lost' or 'found', suppressed or brought to full realisation, but it is nonetheless in principle considered to be a static core, a source of stability and reassurance for the individual.

[6]This argument is developed from Foucault, "the ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom", an interview with Michel Foucault, Jan.20, 1984, p.4, in J.Bernauer and D.Rasmussen, eds., The Final Foucault (Philosophy and Social Criticism, 1991).

[7] For example, the difference between Europe defined geographically, politically, historically etc.

[8]...although this observation does not necessarily signify a 'non-essential' self.

[9]This view is supported by Raymond Williams, in Towards 2000 (London:Chatto & Windus, 1983), p.198- "We cannot say that these placeable self-managing societies could be 'sovereign'..we have to explore new forms of *variable* societies, in which over the whole range of social purposes different sizes of society are defined for different kinds of issue and decision."

[10]GP Baker and PMS Hacker, Understanding and Meaning (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1980),p316.

[11]In the following discussion, I shall use the notation (PI...), as is usual in academic texts referring to the Philosophical Investigations.

[12]In the following argument, where I refer to Wittgenstein's use of a 'family resemblance concept', the implication is that I am discussing identity.

[13]Baker and Hacker, Understanding and Meaning ,p326

[14]Baker and Hacker, Understanding and Meaning ,p318

[15]Baker and Hacker, Understanding and Meaning, p327

[16]John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 3,2.2 ,(1690)

[17]Wittgenstein's reference to the linguistic community suggests an influence by Gottfried Herder, and the notion of the 'background' as 'Volk'. This is the spiritual and moral collective unconscious of a people, which reaches into the past, constituting the basis of selfhood and nationhood, the individual and group's 'sense of belonging'. This language-identity link, by which language is seen as the medium for the expression of the Volkgeist (folk-spirit), is a significant implication of Wittgenstein's 'form of life'- the interconnected relation of conscious thought and the linguistic community in Wittgenstein implies that any conscious sense of self is embedded in the life of the community.

[18]AC Grayling, Wittgenstein (Oxford: OUP, 1988), p84

[19]PMS Hacker, Insight and Illusion (Cambridge: CUP, 1972), p226

[20]Sydney Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (Ithaca:Cornell, 1963), p240

[21]Hacker, p236

[22]The 'private language argument' as a whole leads toward this conclusion.

[23]Henry Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), p131

[24]"The term language-game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (PI23)

[25]JFM Hunter, Understanding Wittgenstein (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985), p112

[26]Hacker, p233

[27]Jeffrey Thomas Price, Language and Being in Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1973) ,p52

[28]Chris Gudmunsen, Wittgenstein and Buddhism (London: The Macmillan Press, 1977), p79

[29]With the current progression of integration, it is becoming more and more common for individuals to interact as Europeans, for example under the auspices of projects such as ERASMUS (Exchanges between universities),COMETT (Cooperation between universities and industry), LINGUA (promotion of modern language training), etc.

[30]Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure (New York: Pantheon, 1985), p9

[31]Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, ed. Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Paul Rabinow, 2nd ed. (University of Chicago Press, 1982), p216

[32]Foucault, "the ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom", p.4

[33]eg., Madness and Civilization, Discipline and Punish, History of Sexuality

[34]Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p312

[35]see fn 46

[36]Such accusations of incoherence have been directed at Foucault by, for example, Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth", Political Theory, vol.12, no.2, (May 1984), p152-183

[37]John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy (New York:Columbia University Press, 1985), p122

[38]John Rajchman, Truth and Eros. Foucault, Lacan and the Question of Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1991), p110

[39]Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress", The Foucault Reader , ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), p350

[40]Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p62

[41] Karlis Racevskis, "michel foucault, rameau's nephew, and the question of identity", in Philosophy and Social Criticism (no.12, vol.2, 1985-87) ,p142

[42]Paul Patton, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom", Political Studies, XXVII (1989) p276

[43]Foucault,"The Subject and Power", p216

[44] Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences , p341

[45]Mark Philp, "Foucault on Power: A Problem of Radical Translation?", Political Theory, vol.11(Feb.1983), pp43-44

[46]Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The Prison (New York: Pantheon, 1977),p206. The Panopticon, an architectural device advocated by Jeremy Bentham in C18, consists of a central elevated watch-tower surrounded by a circular disposition of cells, which permits its single inmate to be caught, silhouetted, in the light which passes through the cell from the outside. This arrangement makes it possible for a lone observer in the central tower

to supervise a multitude of individuals, and to create the effect of omniscient, constant surveillance.

[47]Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p201

[48]Foucault, "The Subject and Power" , p214

[49]See Foucault's explanation of power as a strategy in Foucault, "The Subject and Power", p225

[50]This is the implication of Foucault's argument in Foucault, "The Subject and Power".

[51]Foucault's concept of power and his thought in general is rooted in a highly individual historical vision, which centres on the transition from traditional to modern society, and as such is specifically concerned with the forms of knowledge and social organisation characteristic of capitalist modernity.

[52]Michel Foucault, Radioscopie de Jacques Chancel, Cassettes Radio France (3 March, 1975). Interview with Michel Foucault.

[53] Foucault in "Practicing Criticism", Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-84 ,ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York:Routledge, 1988), p156

[54]Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure , p9.

[55]Rajchman, The Freedom of Philosophy, p98

[56]Patton, p274

[57]Michel Foucault, "Politics and Ethics: An Interview", in The Foucault Reader, p374, p375

[58]Foucault has been accused of being 'a danger to Western democracy, a technocrat, an agent of the Gaullist government, a dangerous left-wing anarchist, a KGB agent' - "Politics and Ethics: An Interview", p376

[59]Paul Valery quoted by Derrida, The Other Heading (Indiana University Press, 1992), p22

[60]Derrida, pxxvii

[61]Derrida, p9

[62]Derrida, p11

[63]Derrida, p29

[64]This is to be understood in the sense of 'play of absence and presence...(which) must be conceived before the alternative of presence and absence". Further, "To conceive of play before binary opposition is to declare totalization not merely useless but impossible in principle, because there is no structure capable of covering a field that does not respect the limits and discipline of binary logic", Corlett, Community Without Unity, p58-59

[65]This issue is encompassed by and debated in the EC with regard to the principle of 'Subsidiarity'.

[66]Derrida, p74-75

[67]Derrida, p73

[68]Indeed, the field of International Relations traditionally focuses on how to 'protect sovereignty', and prevent war among sovereign states. The theoretical contradiction upon which sovereignty rests, and which can be designated as the ultimate cause of conflict, is not addressed, but is rather relegated to the field of 'Political Theory'. As such, it may be said (contentiously) that International Relations focuses on curing the symptoms of conflict while ignoring its root cause.

[69]Derrida, p75

[70]Derrida, p18

[71]Corlett, p181

[72]Derrida, p40

[73]Derrida, p82

[74]Again, as noted in Chapter 1, the fact of whether European integration challenges the foundations of contemporary thought may be disputed, depending on one's definition of 'integration'. Some maintain that European integration is and should be no more than an economic integration. This is ultimately a matter of perception. From the perspective of the

new non-fixed conceptual foundation, European integration is seen as the development toward a true 'community without unity', which accommodates the tension between localisation and globalisation, unity and diversity. In its apparent resolution of the tension between such fundamental contradictions, my definition of 'integration' as a phenomenon which challenges the foundations of contemporary thought, is justified.

[75]Notably, Haas in recent years has specifically focused on the issue of nationalism and why it persists. On the one hand, this implicitly confirms my critique of Haas' earlier work, as it is an admission that such a focus on identity-related assumptions was lacking, but it is interesting to note that Haas' study of nationalism is not undertaken in the context of a revised Neofunctionalist theory, but is rather considered in isolation, such that it cannot be said that Haas has revised the weaknesses of his Neofunctionalist thesis. See Ernst Haas, "What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study it?", International Organisation, vol.40, no3, (1986); and "Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction", Millenium, vol2.2, no3 (London School of Economics, 1993).

[76]For example, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979)

[77]It may be argued by some (Realists/Marxists) that the question of whether it is worth giving up our conceptual foundation and identity is in fact an evasion of the more important issue of real and practical interests and needs, and that the discussion of ideological or conceptual change is of secondary importance. It may be emphasised that the argument of the thesis, in elaborating and justifying the new conceptual foundation, implicitly undermines this view. It is seen that theory and action, ideas and real interests, are mutually influential and constitutive, not subject to exclusive binary distinction, and as such a proposition of conceptual change necessarily bears implications for 'real' interests. As a rudimentary example, if conceptual change leads to greater harmony, understanding, and cooperation among individuals and among the nation-states of the European Community, the prospects for economic prosperity and peace, and thus the welfare of all, are enhanced.

[78]Corlett, p10

[79] Within contemporary binary discourse, "The modern person plays the role of the fulcrum, a centre that is nevertheless somewhat immune from the struggle". The reference to self, because it is not subjected to essential critique, is and is not at the centre of discourse. In Derridian words, "The centre is not the centre" - Corlett, p33

[80]Corlett, p59

[81]Walker, p16. It may also be noted that this argument does not advocate an immediate rejection or deconstruction of the nation-state, or even of national identity. As such, the argument does not constitute 'end of the nation-state' rhetoric.

[82]Corlett, p185

[83]Corlett, p149

[84]Corlett, p15/p147/p149

[85]Philip Allott, Eunomia, (Oxford: OUP, 1990), p40

[86]Derrida, p77

[87]"Another Own Goal", The European (1-4 April, 1993), p1

[88]Reflection on Information and Communication Policy of the European Community, Report commissioned by Jacques Delors, and chaired by Mr.W. De Clercq, Member of the European Parliament, (March 1993), p5

[89]The Commission's Information and Communication Policy: A New Approach, adopted 30th June, 1993 - SEC(93) 916/9

[90]Denmark voted 'no' to the Maastricht Treaty on June 2nd, 1992, and secured only a slight majority 'yes' in a second referendum on May 18, 1993, only after guaranteeing opt-outs to the Treaty's Social Chapter and timetable for monetary union. After the second referendum, Copenhagen witnessed its worst violence in riots since World War II. (The Times, London, May 20). France voted only marginally in favour of Maastricht (50.95%) in September, 1992.

[91]In July 1993, Major threatened to call a general election unless agreement was reached to ratify the Treaty (The Daily Telegraph, London, July 24, 1993).

[92]It is beyond the scope of the present study to give a detailed account and analysis of the current debates, setbacks and successes of the European Community. A specific application of this thesis to the present context of European integration would in itself constitute a lengthy study. As such, I shall take the liberty of assuming a familiarity with current European issues, such that a practical application of this argument is implied but not made explicit.

[93].."the inability to adapt half the continent fast enough or on a wide enough scale to the knock-on effect of the collapse of communism: the tide of immigration to Germany and the sapping effect of unification's high costs on the economy that was the motor of European unity; the political profit made by the extreme right and the growth of nationalism;...the prolongation of a cyclical recession" (The Sunday Times, 4 April, 1993), p13

[94]For example, the seemingly endless debates over the desirability of political union; debates over deepening vs widening the Community; debates over Subsidiarity, or the most desirable balance of authority between the member states and Community institutions; debates over the fear of hegemony from Brussels...or from Germany; the feeling that the EC is a "club-class" Euro-elite with its own agenda oblivious to the concern of those at the back of the plane, etc. The phenomenon of European integration cuts at the heart of a society's and an individual's values and identity, and as such many of the obstacles to the integration process may be seen as being the result of subjective bias. Indeed, the European Commission has compiled a list of 'Euro-myths' which are circulating in the member states and which propagate a distorted impression of the Commission as an over-bearing bureaucracy. For example, there is a myth that a Commission directive will oblige fishermen to wear hair-nets when aboard their fishing boats, when in fact the relevant directive simply mentions that to ensure hygiene standards, head cover should be worn during fish-processing. ("Euromyths and Misunderstandings, Myth/1/92', Commission of the European Communities). For differences in values and perception among the member states, see Luigi Barzini, The Europeans (London: Penguin, 1983)

[95]Corlett, p88

[96]Walker, p183

[97]Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, trans. Peter Winch (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p80.

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