GERMANY'S ACQUISITION OF SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

GERMANY'S ACQUISITION OF SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
A STUDY IN BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICY (1880-1885)

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Chapter I

FOREWORD - THE RAISING OF THE GERMAN FLAG AT ANGRA PEQUENA

On the morning of August 7, 1884, the German flag was raised at Angra Pequena, a small bay on the south-west coast of Africa. As an accompaniment to this solemn act, Captain Schering of the German ship "Elizabeth" caused the following proclamation to be read:

"His Majesty the German Emperor, William the First, King of Prussia, has commanded me to go with his corvette Elizabeth to Angra Pequena, to place the territory belonging to Herr Luderitz on the west coast of Africa under the direct protection of His Majesty. The territory of Herr Luderitz is understood according to official communications to extend from the north bank of the Orange River to the 26th degree of southern latitude and twenty German geographical miles inland, including the islands belonging thereto, according to international law. (1) In executing this supreme command, I here hoist as external sign the Imperial German flag, and hereby place the above-named

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(1) The islands actually belonged to the Cape Colony.

territory under the protection and sovereignty of His Majesty Emperor William the First, and call upon all present to join me in three cheers for His Majesty; hurrah for His Majesty the Emperor William the First." (2)

It was thus that the German Empire, at a time when her energies were considered to be almost entirely taken up with the task of consolidation in Europe, announced to the world her official entry into the colonial field, and her determination to share in the partition of the only continent where considerable areas were still open to European annexation and development. The movement, initiated with some caution in regard to South-west Africa, was soon continued with greater precipitancy in other portions of the continent, and by the end of the year 1884 Germany had established the beginnings of a colonial empire in Africa.

This sudden breaking away of Germany from her Continental leading-strings was, in one sense, simply an indication of the fact that she had become involved in that general movement of expansion which, after 1880 and under the urge of the new industrialism, was carrying European nations farther and farther afield in quest of new markets and new territories. But it had a special significance for Africa, for when the Germans first began to have definite designs of acquisition on the south-west coast, the greater part of the continent

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(2) "The Times" (London), September 16, 1884.

was still unclaimed. True, its general topography had been outlined, and something of its possibilities as a field for European enterprise made known, but, politically, comparatively slight progress had been made. The possessions of the Powers, except, perhaps, those of Great Britain in the south and of France in the north, extended but little beyond the rim, while hinterlands and spheres of influence had not yet become things to conjure with for European statesmen. The action of Germany brought about a change, and precipitated that rush which historians aptly refer to as the "scramble for Africa." For if it be true that the activities of Leopold of Belgium on the Congo set the ball rolling, it is equally true that Germany gave it the first vigorous kick. And soon the Berlin Conference, with Bismarck as the leading figure, was to lay down some rules for the great game thus begun.

Angra Pequena lies about 150 miles north of the Orange River, and the appearance of a powerful European nation in this region was not relished in the Cape Colony, and was greeted with mixed feelings in England. Already Great Britain was admittedly the paramount power in South Africa, and it was generally regarded as only a matter of time until all the unclaimed native areas bordering on her territory would pass under British influence. The only European rival in South Africa was Portugal, and her interests were mainly confined to the east

coast. On the west coast her possessions did not reach southwards below the Cunene River, and between this limit and the Orange River, which formed the north-western boundary of the Cape Colony, lay a stretch of native territory about one thousand miles in length. This native territory was made up of the districts of Damaraland and Namaqualand, and since 1878 Great Britain had been in possession of its most important harbour, Walfisch Bay, while the Cape Colony was regarded by many as having what would now be called a "sphere of influence" over the entire region. "It is difficult to understand why the Cape did not formally annex Damaraland and Namaqualand as a result of the mission of Mr. Coates Palgrave in 1876. This extensive region seems, indeed, even before Mr. Palgrave's mission, to have been regarded informally as an appendage to the Cape, which had had relations with it . . . . since the end of last century." (3)

What then was the policy of the Cape Ministers and of the colonial authorities in England which thus permitted Germany to found her first overseas colony in a portion of the south-west coast of Africa where for many years previously the Cape Colony had deemed herself to have at least informal claims, and where Great Britain was definitely in possession of Walfisch Bay?

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(3) "Partition of Africa," J. Scott Keltie, p. 156.

Chapter II

OUTLINE OF CAPE EXPANSION (1815-1880)

It seems to be a characteristic of England to avoid formulating theories as a guide to practice, and to prefer making her policy fit the facts as they arise. Her whole constitutional development is an illustration of this, and when the march of events placed vast areas and scattered islands within her control, there was visible in it all no pre-conceived plan of expansion. The birth of a Greater Britain was scarcely perceived; no conscious design called it into being, no prescience revealed its import. As Sir J. R. Seeley has aptly said, "We seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind." (1)

Colonies having been once acquired, however, they could not be ignored, and the Home Government had perforce to deal in some way with the new situation. And as the light which had been conceded to England in this matter was scarcely better than that which had been given to earlier colonial powers, she fell into the prevailing custom and came to regard her colonies as possessions which ought in some way to benefit the mother

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(1) "Expansion of England," Sir J. R. Seeley, p. 10.

country. Thus grew up that system whereby in everything but the control of their trade, the colonists in the New World were left almost without restraint. "The early English colonists were in practice nearly independent of the mother country, except as to their external commercial relations." (2) And again, "In every thing, except their foreign trade, the liberty of the English colonists to manage their own affairs their own way is complete." (3) Unfortunately the limited interference which the Home Government permitted themselves was of a particularly noxious kind, and seemed in the eyes of the colonists to quite nullify the freedom they possessed in other respects. In the end the disagreement which arose under this old colonial system cost England the loss of her American colonies.

This was followed by a new phase of colonial development, or what might, perhaps, better be called an extension of the earlier interference, in which the mother country sought to control the few old colonies that remained and the new ones so quickly acquired, by governing them from home, "taking no service from them, but the expense on ourselves." (4) It was during this period that Great Britain took the Cape of Good Hope from the Dutch, and, at the settlement of 1815, decided to keep it.

The extent of territory taken over was comparatively slight, not more than 120,000 square miles, and effective possession did not reach beyond two hundred miles from the south coast. This

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(2) "Government of Dependencies," Sir G. C. Lewis, p. 159.
(3) "Wealth of Nations," Adam Smith, p. 262, col. 2.
(4) Quoted in "Life of Sir John Molteno," P. A. Molteno, vol. i, p. 57.

new colony was valued chiefly as a station on the route to the East, and few suspected that it was also the gateway to a continent. In keeping with the determination to rule dependencies from England, the administration was at first placed in the hands of a succession of military governors. There was no conscious wish on the part of Great Britain at this time to enlarge her possessions in South Africa by settlement, in fact the Cape was so little thought of that it came to be referred to as "a despised Cinderella among the colonial children of Britain." (5) Nevertheless, the history of the colony from the time of the British occupation might well be described, in one sense, as the story of the impact of civilised Europeans upon inferior native races, and in the nature of things, since it was a white man's country, expansion became inevitable. That the two European groups, the Dutch and the English, reacted unfavourably on each other was an added and unfortunate complication.

Many causes no doubt contributed to the checkered story of South Africa, but the one great sin of the British Government would seem to have been a lack of continuity, which showed itself not only in her relations with the Boers and with the natives, but also in her attitude to the vital and ever-recurring question of expansion. The Boers seeking escape from British rule found themselves followed, their right to independence now

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(5) "South Africa," A. Wyatt Tilby, p. 46.

denied, now agreed to, their lands now taken, now restored, until they came thoroughly to distrust the word and motives of England. As to the natives, the policy of Great Britain, while generally inspired by good intentions, was marred by an ignorance of real conditions, by the giving of a too credent ear to the tales of over-zealous missionaries, and by an unfortunate disregard of the sound advice so often given by the colonists and by her own representatives on the spot. In the interests of the natives the province created by Sir Benjamin D'Urban was given up, and Natal was annexed for apparently the same reason. Out of this vacillation came endless confusion and needlessly costly wars against natives and Dutch alike, and it is small wonder that South Africa so long remained a thorn in the flesh of the Colonial Office. But through all the confusion the colony went on expanding, and the native was compelled to yield bit by bit before the onward march of the white man, whether Boer or Briton.

It must now be shown how this expansion came about. The stretch of coast on the west, being barren and desolate, did not tempt the white settlers, and so it was towards the north and east that they sought new lands and came into contact with the natives pressing in upon the colony from east central Africa. Already in 1811 one of the great Kaffir wars had been fought, and Colonel Graham had driven the Kaffirs beyond the Fish River.

Grahamstown arose on the site of the successful leader's headquarters. In 1817 war broke out afresh and fighting continued for two years. Grahamstown was attacked by large numbers of Kaffirs in April 1819, and the situation was saved only by the timely arrival of reinforcements. At the conclusion of peace the territory between the Fish River and the Keiskama River was declared to be neutral territory.

The introduction of the first considerable number of British settlers was partly a result of this Kaffir war of 1817-19. Lord Charles Somerset, then Governor of the Cape, desiring to place a white barrier between the colony proper and the natives to the east, induced the Home Government to send out to South Africa between 4000 and 5000 emigrants. These people were settled in the region to the east of the Fish River which had just been taken from the Kaffirs. They founded Port Elizabeth and built up Grahamstown, and these two places soon became centres of English life. It seems quite certain that in 1820 Great Britain had no great scheme of African colonisation in mind, for the emigration was primarily to relieve distress at home and to secure the safety of the Cape frontier. But she builded better than she knew, for an element had now been introduced into the country which was destined to take firm root and to prosper greatly. All unwittingly, another seed of empire had been sown.

In 1825 English was declared to be the official language of the colony, and at the same time the first step on the long road to responsible government was taken by the establishment of an Executive Council to assist the Governor. Three years later there began that series of measures which gradually alienated the Dutch farmers, and in the end drove large numbers of them into unknown regions beyond the frontier. In 1828 an ordinance placed the Hottentots and other free coloured peoples on an equal footing with whites in the eyes of the law. This was followed by the imposition of severe penalties for harsh treatment of slaves, and finally in 1833-34 by the abolition of slavery itself. This last measure, so beneficent in itself, was carried through in South Africa in such a way as to rouse bitterness and deep resentment in the hearts of the Boer farmers, and to confer what was by no means an unmixed blessing on the colony and the slaves themselves.

It was at this period that the sixth Kaffir war broke out, bringing in its train the inevitable problem of expansion or non-expansion. Towards the end of December 1834, on a paltry pretext, some 12,000 Kaffirs hurled themselves across the frontier of the colony. Prompt action by the Governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, aided by Colonel Harry Smith, saved the day, and after severe fighting the Kaffirs were driven far into their own lands. A treaty of peace was concluded on September 17,

1835, by which all the territory as far as the River Kei was declared to be British. To this new province Sir Benjamin D'Urban gave the name of Queen Adelaide, and he placed in the western part of it loyal Fingoes and in the eastern the Kaffirs who were British subjects. King Williamstown became the seat of government and here Colonel Smith was stationed.

The plans of the Governor met with the approval of the majority of the colonists, and looking back now, it can be seen that it was a wise and statesmanlike settlement of a difficult problem. Unfortunately, however, it did not meet with the approval of Lord Glenelg, who, in April 1835, had become Colonial Secretary. Lord Derby once referred to the Colonial Office as "the office at war with all the colonies," (6) and this description would seem to be particularly applicable to the administration of Lord Glenelg. Nothing which he touched prospered, and he added greatly to the unpopularity under which the Colonial Office already laboured. "The high-water mark of opprobrium was reached between 1840 and 1850, and no one contributed more to that position than Lord Glenelg who was Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs from 1835 to 1839." (7) Lord Glenelg was a doctrinaire and a prominent member of the Clapham Sect, and probably it was his vaguely liberal views with regard to native races that led him to undo the work of Sir Benjamin D'Urban. He wrote a despatch to the Governor of

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(6) "Life and Times of Sir John Molteno," P. A. Molteno, vol. i, p. 311.
(7) "Dominions and Colonial Offices," Sir George V. Fiddes, p. 4.

the Cape, dated December 26, 1835, which contains the following passage: "Through a long series of years the Kaffirs had an ample justification of war. They had to resent, and endeavoured justly, though impotently, to avenge a series of encroachments. They had a perfect right to hazard the experiment, however hopeless, of extorting by force that legal redress which they could not otherwise obtain; and the original justice is on the side of the conquered, and not the victorious party." (8) Then having also stated that "the great evil of the Cape Colony consists in its magnitude," (9) Lord Glenelg announced that the country just taken over must be given up and that a lieutenant-governor would be appointed for the eastern districts, with authority to arrange border affairs in accordance with his views.

It was this action of the Colonial Secretary which finally decided large numbers of the Boer farmers to escape from what they considered the intolerance of British rule, and to seek in the far interior the freedom and isolation which had become the very marrow of their being. These trekkers would fain have spent their lives in the wide stretches of the veldt, content forever to remain beyond the busy march of events.

"What do we know of the city's scorn, the hum of a world amaze,
Hot-foot haste, and the fevered dawn, and forgotten yesterdays?
For men may strain, and women may strive, in busier lands to-day,
But the pace of the ox is the pace to thrive in the land of the veldt and vlei." (10)

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(8) "South Africa," A. Wyatt Tilby, p. 78.
(9) Encyclopaedia Britannica, 13th Edition, vol. v, p. 239.
(10) Cullen Gouldsbury. Quoted in "South Africa," A. Wyatt Tilby, p. 62, note.

The great trek of the Boers led to the founding of republican communities beyond the Orange and the Vaal Rivers, and also in Natal, but not for long were they to be left in peace.

As early as 1823, a small group of Britishers had established a trading enterprise on the coast of the fair land of Natal, and in spite of difficulties, they clung to their precarious settlement. As time went on, the trading venture grew into a little colony at Durban, and requests were made to the Home Government for recognition. These, however, were refused on the ground of expense. (11) But when the Dutch destroyed the Zulu power, established a republic in the interior, and got into difficulties with cattle-stealing Bushmen, Great Britain decided to interfere. The Boers were declared to be still subjects of the empire, and British troops took the field against them on behalf of the natives. After some blows and much negotiation, Natal became a British colony in 1843, and was added to the Cape two years later. It was made a separate colony in 1856.

Another result of the Boer emigrations was the creation by the Cape Government of a series of native states along the frontiers of the colony for the purpose of securing peace, preventing further migrations, and cutting off those who had already gone. These "Treaty States" were a failure, and after the Kaffir war of 1846, known as the War of the Axe, they were

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(11) "Colonization of Africa," Sir Harry H. Johnston, p. 166.

abolished by Sir Harry Smith, the new Governor of the Cape. Sir Harry Smith was extremely energetic, and under him a more active policy was adopted. In December 1847, just at the close of the Kaffir war, he extended the Cape Colony northward to the Orange River from its mouth to the junction of the Kraai, and eastward to the Keiskama River. The territory between the Keiskama and the Kei Rivers he then proclaimed a British possession, but to be kept for the use of the western clans of the Kosa tribe. (12) By this act, the Governor of Cape Colony reversed the decision of Lord Glenelg, and justified the step which had been taken earlier by Sir Benjamin D'Urban. The new province was named British Kaffraria, but was not immediately incorporated with the Cape.

This settlement did not prove to be as stable as was at first supposed. The Kaffirs, secretly resenting the loss of their lands, prepared again to fight, and in 1850 precipitated one of the most sanguinary of all the native wars. The British met with several reverses at the outset, and after two years of difficult fighting, Sir Harry Smith was recalled. His successor, Sir George Cathcart, finally brought the war to a successful conclusion in March 1853. The district of British Kaffraria had then to be re-established. It was annexed to Cape Colony in 1865.

Meanwhile the Boers seeking freedom beyond the Orange River were finding it as difficult to shed their British

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(12) "South Africa," (Story of the Nations), G. McCall Theal, p. 244.

citizenship as their brethren in Natal had done, and on February 3, 1848, Sir Harry Smith issued a proclamation, adding to the British dominions the whole territory between the Vaal River, the Orange River, and the Kathlamba mountains, under the name of the Orange River Sovereignty. (13) The angry trekkers made one despairing effort to throw off again this yoke of British rule, and for a moment succeeded, but the victory of the Governor at Boomplaats, August 29, 1848, sealed their fate.

The energetic policy thus pursued by the Cape was accepted only with reluctance by the Imperial Government, which had already explicitly declared that they had no intention of extending their responsibilities in South Africa. In November 1846, Earl Grey had written to Sir Henry Pottinger, Governor of Cape Colony, that, "It must be superfluous for me to disavow on the part of Her Majesty's Government any wish to extend the dominions of the Crown in Southern Africa. Considered in themselves, such acquisitions would be not merely worthless but pernicious - the source not of increased strength but of weakness - enlarging the range of our responsibilities while yielding no additional resources for properly sustaining them." (14)

In England, this view of Earl Grey with regard to expansion, met with the approval of those who were being influenced by the growing free trade movement, and who were generally of

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(13) "South Africa" (Story of the Nations), G. McCall Theal, p. 248.

(14) "Europe and Africa," Norman Dwight Harris, p. 189.

the opinion that colonies were a useless burden. But the Colonial Secretary's attitude was also affected by another circumstance. He was Secretary of State for War as well as for the Colonies, and Parliament was at this time unwilling to increase the army estimates for the home defences. (15) The only alternative was to withdraw or reduce outlying garrisons, and this was generally done. In South Africa, however, the presence of large numbers of natives, and the frequently occurring wars made such a step difficult, and this fact no doubt contributed to the British Government's disinclination to incur further expense and responsibility by expansion.

Meanwhile things were not progressing favourably in the Orange River territory. The increase of white settlers gradually led to trouble with the natives, and in 1850-51 the British Government had to fight an unsuccessful war with the Basutos in the eastern part of the Sovereignty. Earl Grey retired from the Colonial Office in 1852, but before doing so he left it on record as his view - that it ought to be the settled policy of this country to abandon the Orange River Sovereignty, (16) and had actually sent out directions to take steps for the abandonment of the territory. (17) This opinion was accepted by the British Government, which, weary of expense and trouble, consented to withdraw their sovereignty from the region between the Orange and the Vaal, by the Bloemfontein

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(15) "Unification of South Africa," Paul Knaplund, p. 3.
(16) Hansard, 3rd Series, vol. 133, col. 72.
(17) Ibid., col. 77.

Convention of February 23, 1854. The wishes of the considerable British minority in the territory were quite ignored, but some time afterwards they were awarded £45,000 as compensation for their losses. (18)

Great Britain had thus made an attempt to rule the Orange River Sovereignty and then abandoned it; but over the region beyond the Vaal she had never pushed any claim at all. Here Pretorius, the Boer leader, was firmly established, and in the disastrous Basuto war mentioned above, he had given timely aid to the British. This circumstance may have helped to bring about the Sand River Convention of January 17, 1852, by which Great Britain recognised the independence of the Boers beyond the Vaal River. These two conventions led to the definite establishment of independent republics, and while they may have represented an honest attempt to settle some of the differences between the Boers and the English, they could not be final, for they ignored the fact that the ultimate expansion of the British Empire could not thus be restricted, and that there was no room in South Africa for two European races with such divergent aims.

In 1854 the wise and able Sir George Grey became Governor of the Cape, and under him the representative government, which had just been granted to the colony, was put into operation. His administration is particularly noteworthy for having brought forth the first official suggestion for a union of all South

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(18) "South Africa," A. Wyatt Tilby, p. 158, note.

Africa. Sir George Grey saw the weakness of the British policy of avoiding responsibility, and in 1856 he asked whether the government "might not be disposed to retrace the step which had led to the abandonment of the Orange River Sovereignty;" (19) and urged the establishment of a "united South Africa under the British flag." (20) In 1857 he wrote again, stating "that the inhabitants of the Orange Free State intended to ask to be included in a Federal Government with Cape Colony," (21) and then in reply to a request for a full statement of his views, he wrote the notable despatch of November 19, 1858. In this document he outlined and strongly advocated the consolidation of all the European communities in South Africa. It is difficult to say whether or not this plan could have been carried through, but at least it raised no such opposition in South Africa as did the later scheme of Lord Carnarvon. In any case, the Colonial Office never gave it a chance, being thoroughly determined to accept no further responsibilities beyond the Orange River. Sir George Grey, however, by his earnest encouragement of the missionaries Livingstone and Moffat, was able to keep open a road through Bechuanaland into the interior. It was also during his governorship that the strange incident of the self-destruction of the Kosa tribes took place, which left large tracts of British Kaffraria without inhabitants. Into the depopulated areas, Sir George Grey sent a considerable

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(19) "Sir George Grey," Geo. C. Henderson, p. 168.
(20) and (21) Quoted in "Sir George Grey," Geo. C. Henderson, p. 168.

number of European settlers, including some of the German legion which had fought in the Crimea, and an industrious group of agricultural labourers from North Germany.

The abandonment of the Orange River Sovereignty was an unfortunate thing for the Basutos living in the neighbourhood, who were thus left to their own resources, after having been under a semi-protectorate of the British Government. These natives became involved in a long and exhaustive conflict with the Boers of the Free State, and in the end their chief petitioned to be taken under the protection of England. As a result, they were declared to be British subjects in 1868, and their territory was added to the Cape Colony in 1871.

Great Britain's next forward step to the north was due, not to native difficulties, but to the discovery of diamonds. One of the regions which suddenly assumed importance by reason of this discovery was Griqualand West. Here a group of British diamond-diggers set up a miniature republic in spite of the remonstrances of the Orange Free State, and in time Kimberley became the centre of activities. The diamond-bearing land had once been considered part of the Orange River Sovereignty, so that it seemed logical that it should now belong to the Orange Free State. Nor was the latter slow to advance her claim. But their was a rival claimant in the person of Nicholas Waterboer, a native Griquan chief, who received the support of the

British Government. The question was placed before the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal for adjudication, and he decided in favour of Waterboer, who promptly turned the territory over to Great Britain under promise of a pension, which, by the way, was never paid. (22) Not long afterwards, Britain had occasion to admit that Waterboer never had any real claim to the land, a circumstance which led the Free State to revive her demands, but without success. While it may be difficult to justify England's methods in this matter on ethical grounds, her position as the chief power in South Africa made it imperative that the diamond mines should not pass to another state. Moreover, President Brand finally received a solatium of £90,000, "in full satisfaction of all claims which the Orange Free State considered that it might possess in regard to Griqualand West." (23) On October 27, 1871, Griqualand West was declared a Crown colony; it was annexed to the Cape in 1880.

The opening up of the diamond-fields changed the whole economic and social condition of South Africa and may be said to have ushered in the modern era. It led to a great influx of white settlers and brought about a rapid industrial development. Nevertheless, one of Great Britain's chief concerns was still the problem of how to reduce the expense connected with her possessions, not only in South Africa, but elsewhere, and it became her policy to lessen her own responsibilities by gradually

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(22) "South Africa," A. Wyatt Tilby, p. 395, note.
(23) Quoted in "South Africa," A. Wyatt Tilby, p. 396.

turning them over to the colonies. The granting of self-government to the Cape in 1872 was a step in this direction, and as the self-governing colonies were expected to provide for their own defence, the withdrawing of the garrisons would be a means of lessening the burden on the British tax-payers. Moreover, the confederation of the Canadian provinces in 1867 had proved so successful in reducing the worry and expense attached to the government of that country, that the time seemed ripe to try a similar experiment in South Africa. Thus it came about that the principal question before the various colonies and states of South Africa, from 1874 to 1878, was a proposal for confederation.

Lord Carnarvon, who, as Parliamentary Under-Secretary, was believed to have influenced the condemnation of Sir George Grey for his union proposals of 1858, (24) was now Colonial Secretary and afire with a federation scheme of his own. His choice of Mr. J. A. Froude, the historian, as an advance agent and prospective nominee to the suggested conference of South African delegates, however, was not a happy one, and it seems safe to say that Froude's speeches in South Africa were, on the whole, productive of more harm than good. The Cape Ministry was decidedly unfavourable, and as no progress could be made in South Africa, the scene was shifted to England. Here the conference which was held at the Colonial Office in August 1876,

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(24) "Dominions and Colonial Offices," Sir George V. Fiddes, p. 217.

met with no success. Mr. J. C. Molteno, the Premier of Cape Colony, though in London at the time, refused to attend; President Brand was present only on the assurance that there would be no serious "discussion of the merits of South African Confederation;" (25) and the Transvaal did not send a representative at all.

Such ill-omens ought surely to have caused Lord Carnarvon to stay his hand, but in truth they seem rather to have confirmed him in his intentions. His project certainly had intrinsic merit, and he had at least endeavoured, though in a somewhat cumbersome way, to get the support of the colonists. But he now made the fatal mistake of trying to force confederation from without, when South Africa had clearly let it be known that if union were to come at all, it ought to come from within. Already he had chosen the man whom he thought best fitted to carry out his plan, and on October 13, 1876, he wrote a letter to Sir Bartle Frere containing the following passages:

"I venture, in what I consider a very important and critical matter, to ask whether you can give the Government the benefit of those valuable services which have so often and so signally been proved on other occasions?

"You are probably aware of the general position of affairs at the Cape. We have been on the edge of a great native war;

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(25) Quoted in "Unification of South Africa," Paul Knaplund, p. 8.

and, though I trust that the danger is passing, if not past, the position is one of extreme delicacy from its political as well as its native complications, and a strong hand is required.

"But the war between the Transvaal Republic and the natives has had this further effect: it rapidly ripened all South African policy. . . . . It brings us near to the object and end for which I have now for two years been steadily labouring - the union of the South African Colonies and States. I am indeed now considering the details of a Bill for their confederation, which I desire to introduce next Session, and I propose to press, by all means in my power, my confederation policy in South Africa. . . . .

"To do this a very early departure for the Cape is necessary, but I do not estimate the time required for the work of confederating and of consolidating the confederated states at more than two years." (26)

Sir Bartle Frere accepted the task, and reached South Africa in March 1877. In the meantime the Permissive Bill had been drawn up, and a Draft Bill, (27) which was practically a cut and dried constitution, had been sent to Sir Henry Barkly for presentation to the people of South Africa. This measure, however, met with no more favourable reception than the proposals for a conference had done.

The troubles in the Transvaal, mentioned by Lord Carnarvon, were now utilised by him to bring about the annexation of that

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(26) "Life of Sir Bartle Frere," John Martineau, vol.ii, p.161.
(27) This Draft Bill, amended, became the South African Act, 1877. It expired in August 1882.

territory, in the hope that it would be a step towards his scheme of confederation. (28) Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who had been appointed Special Commissioner to the Transvaal, with exceptionally wide powers, made the annexation somewhat hurriedly on April 12, 1877, and almost before the Colonial Secretary himself was prepared for it. This action, so far from facilitating the work of confederation, rendered it absolutely impossible of accomplishment. Sir Bartle's hands were tied from the outset, and he seemed to realise it, for on hearing of the seizure of the Transvaal, he exclaimed, "Good heavens! what will they say in England?" (29)

There is no need to discuss this further. The South African colonies and states remained hostile, and Sir Bartle Frere found himself hopelessly involved in native wars, and abandoned by Lord Carnarvon. Confederation could not be brought about, and Frere in a letter to Sir George Colley, written on August 26, 1880, showed that he understood the real cause of its failure. "One great mistake hitherto seems to me to have been trying to hasten and push on what can only result from natural growth, which must of necessity be tardy if it is to be enduring." (30) Even Froude admitted this: "If South Africa is to rule itself under a constitutional system, we must cease to impose English views of what is expedient on a people unwilling to act upon them. We cannot force them at once to govern themselves and to govern in the way which we ourselves desire." (31)

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(28) "Oceana," J. A. Froude, p. 53.
(29) "Life of Sir Bartle Frere," John Martineau, vol.ii, p.179.
(30) Ibid., p. 387. (31) "Oceana," J. A. Froude, p. 59.

Sir Bartle Frere has other claims to notice apart altogether from the question of confederation. He was a man who saw from the outset what Great Britain's position as the paramount power in South Africa involved, and as early as December 19, 1877, he wrote to Lord Carnarvon: "Your object is not conquest, but simply supremacy up to Delagoa Bay. This will have to be asserted some day and the assertion will not become easier by delay." (32) Frere later advocated the extension of British authority up to the Portuguese boundary, not only on the east, but also on the west, and he was chiefly responsible for bringing about the annexation of Walfisch Bay in March 1878. This point will be dealt with more fully in the next chapter.

Meanwhile, Britain's cup of woe in South Africa was almost full. The serious and costly Kaffir war of 1877-78 was followed by a still more serious and costly struggle with the Zulus, the general conduct of which, together with the annexation of the Transvaal, furnished Mr. Gladstone with the rhetorical thunderbolts which he so dexterously hurled in his Midlothian campaign. But when the new Liberal Government got its opportunity, it could do little better than its predecessors had done, and their gift of quasi-independence to a people rightly struggling to be free was made, after all, in the shadow of Majuba.

It was in the aftermath of these troubled events that Great Britain found herself faced with a new problem - the appearance of Germany at Angra Pequena.

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(32) "Life of Sir Bartle Frere," John Martineau, vol.ii, p.259.

Chapter III

NAMAQUALAND AND DAMARALAND TO 1880

It is necessary now to consider the region on the west coast, reaching up to the Portuguese boundary, and to seek to discover why this vast tract of country was so long neglected, when, as has been shown, steady if reluctant progress in the work of expansion was being made towards the north and east.

The inlet on which the Germans raised their flag was discovered by the adventurous Portuguese navigator Bartholomew Dias in 1486, while seeking an ocean route to India. He named the inlet Angra Pequena or Little Bay, and set up upon its desolate shore, as a token of possession, a marble cross which stood for more than three hundred years. (1) The Portuguese, however, found nothing to interest them on the barren south-west coast, and after the rounding of the Cape by Vasco da Gama, were content to touch at points on the east coast on their way to the Indies. No attempt was made to form a settlement or even a permanent place of call anywhere on the southern shore of the great continent which they had done so much to make known. That work was left for their rivals and successors, the Dutch.

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(1) "History of South Africa" (1486-1691), G. McCall Theal, p.2.

As early as 1595 the Dutch began to touch at the Cape of Good Hope on their way to the East, and in 1602 the East India Company received its charter at the Hague. In the days of sailing vessels and long voyages, when storage of fresh food was impossible and the havoc of scurvy had to be added to the ordinary dangers of the sea, the possession of suitable points of call where new supplies could be obtained was extremely important. The Dutch soon realised the value of the Cape in this respect, especially when it was found that considerable numbers of cattle could be had from the natives, and in 1651 it was determined to establish a permanent refreshment station there for the fleets which were constantly passing between Europe and India. The station thus founded soon grew into a settlement, and Dutch influence in South Africa became a factor forever to be reckoned with.

As previously mentioned, the southern boundary of Portuguese territory on the west coast was the Cunene River. Between this and the Orange River lay the native districts of Damaraland and Great Namaqualand, the line of division between them being in the neighbourhood of Walfisch Bay; while the country to the south of the Orange River and north of the Cape Colony was known as Little Namaqualand. There were several small islands off the coast, the most important being those which stood close to Angra Pequena Bay. The nature of this country between the

Orange and Cunene Rivers was not such as to attract white settlers for it lacked fresh water, and in many parts was but little removed from desert. Even the natives, Hottentots in Namaqualand and Damaras or Hereros to the north, were not numerous, and lived chiefly by the rearing of cattle.

When the Dutch had become thoroughly established at the Cape, they began to make a number of expeditions into the interior. One of the most important of these was that undertaken by Commander Van der Stel in 1685, which carried him through Little Namaqualand to the famous Copper Mountains. It was on this journey that the first authentic information concerning the Orange River was obtained, though the river itself was not reached owing to the difficulties of travel in a barren and waterless country. (2) Indeed, it was not until 1761-62 that an expedition succeeded in crossing the Orange River, and penetrating into Great Namaqualand as far as 26 deg. 18 min. south. Another journey, undertaken in 1791-92, also crossed the Orange River, and brought back some information concerning the Damara tribes to the north of Namaqualand. Of more importance, however, was the voyage of exploration by sea in 1793, during which Possession Island, Angra Pequena, Walfisch Bay, and other places were taken over by the Dutch in the name of the East India Company. (3) This was how matters stood on the west coast when the Cape Colony passed into British hands.

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(2) "History of South Africa" (1486-1691), G. McCall Theal, pp. 289-299.
(3) "Partition of Africa," J. Scott Keltie, p. 80.

The general attitude of Great Britain towards expansion in South Africa has already been dealt with, and it was shown that further responsibilities were shouldered only under the disagreeable pressure of native wars, or when some question touching her vital interests as the paramount power arose, as in the case of the Griqualand diamond-fields. On the west, the natives were neither so numerous nor so aggressive as on the east, and during the Dutch administration the tribes on the coast as far north as Walfisch Bay had been decimated by small-pox. In the early days of British rule, the Earl of Caledon, Governor of the Cape, took away the powers of the Hottentot chiefs within the colony, made them subject to European law, and checked the wandering habits of the tribes. Several small groups of natives, who preferred not to submit to this control, crossed the Orange River into Great Namaqualand. From this time on British influence was gradually extended up the west coast until, in 1847, Sir Harry Smith issued a proclamation which made the mouth of the Orange River the north-west boundary of the Cape Colony. (4) The limit of the political control of the Cape on the north-west thus fixed by Sir Harry Smith in 1847, was still the same when the Germans raised their flag at Angra Pequena in 1884.

Attention has already been drawn to the presence of a number of small islands lying off the coast of Great Namaqualand

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(4) "South Africa" (Story of the Nations), G. McCall Theal, p. 244.

and close to the Bay of Angra Pequena. These suddenly assumed a new importance when it was discovered, in 1843, that the vast quantities of guano which they contained could be sold for $35 a ton in England. (5) A thriving trade was carried on for a time, and when the islands had been cleared, a company of Cape merchants took possession for the sake of the fresh deposits. In 1861 the largest of the islands was annexed by Great Britain, and the others were taken over in 1866.

During the period of African exploration which began about the middle of the nineteenth century, the region under discussion was visited by both missionaries and traders. In 1849, Livingstone crossed the Kalahari Desert and reached Lake Ngami; while at a later date Galton, Andersson, and Baines journeyed through Damaraland. (6) A considerable trade in ostrich feathers and ivory was opened up with the Damaras, and the tribes were thus brought under European influence. (7) Something will be said later of the work of the Rhenish Missionary Society in the same region.

Namaqualand and Damaraland were entirely unsuited to agriculture, but it was early believed that they might possess mineral wealth. As already mentioned, the Copper Mountains of Little Namaqualand were visited by one of the Dutch Cape Governors in 1685, but at that time it was not considered possible to convey the ore to the sea. Nothing further was

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(5) "Progress of South Africa," G. McCall Theal, p. 274.
(6) "Partition of Africa," J. Scott Keltie, p. 104.
(7) "Colonization of Africa," Sir Harry H. Johnston, p. 179.

done until 1837, when Captain Alexander, a British military officer, who had travelled north as far as Walfisch Bay, brought back some specimens of copper ore which he had found on the southern bank of the Orange River. (8) This led to the formation of several mining companies by merchants in Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, and although the operations set on foot did not prove to be quite so profitable as was expected, there were still two successful companies working in 1854. These continued to make good progress, and between 1869 and 1875 a narrow gauge railway was constructed from the principal mine at Ookiep to Port Nolloth on the Atlantic, a distance of ninety miles. (9)

It was about this time that the Governor of the Cape Colony, Sir Philip Wodehouse, began to urge upon the Home Government the advantage of extending British territory north of the Orange River for the sake of the minerals which the region might contain, as reports had reached him of considerable deposits of silver. A correspondence was carried on during 1867 with the Duke of Buckingham, then Colonial Secretary, and in August, the following communication was addressed by the latter to Sir Philip Wodehouse:

"Sir, "Downing Street, August 23, 1867.

"I have received your Despatch of the 14th of June, stating, as you were requested to do, the boundaries which it

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(8) "Progress of South Africa," G. McCall Theal, p. 334.
(9) Ibid., p. 335.

will be requisite to specify in order to describe the country situated to the northward of the Cape which you proposed to declare to be British territory.

"I observe that it extends from the 22nd degree of south latitude to the mouth of the Orange River, which is situated in about the parallel of 28 deg. 37 min. The boundaries proposed by you on the eastern side are evidently designed to restrict the territory to as small a distance as may be from the coast; and you describe the tract as for the most part a desert of rock and sand, only occupied here and there by half-breed Hottentots and others who have wandered thither. Nevertheless the country extends along the coast for upwards of 6½ degrees of latitude or 450 English miles.

"Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to assume British rights over so long a tract of country, without some stronger evidence of its necessity, and more information than it appears to have been in your power to communicate when you wrote your Despatches of the 11th of March and 14th of June on this subject. It must be borne in mind that a great power cannot declare its sovereignty over an extensive territory, however barren and thinly peopled, without the possibility of responsibilities that cannot at the time be foreseen. A proof of this is afforded by the little uninhabited islands annexed to the Cape in the neighbourhood of the very country now under

consideration, those islands having been the scene during the late Civil War in America of occurrences which might have led to difficult questions.

"I should wish therefore to know exactly what information you may by this time possess on the nature, quantities, and site of the supposed minerals, and whether the information rests on the authority of persons who are in themselves trustworthy and also competent judges of the subject. It will also be desirable to know from you whether it may be anticipated that the Cape Government would offer any objection to eventually annexing the territory to the Colony.

"If possible, I should desire you to take no step in the matter until you should have had an opportunity of receiving further instructions from hence after the receipt here of that information." (10)

The effect of the above letter was to negative the proposals of the Governor of the Cape, and no steps were taken to extend British authority at this time.

Strangely enough the question of annexation of territory north of the Orange was next urged by the German missionaries working in the region, and by Prince (then Count) Bismarck. On September 29, 1868, the Rhenish Missionary Society forwarded a memorial (11) to Lord Stanley, then at the Foreign Office, giving a detailed statement of troubles which had arisen in Damaraland, and asking that the British Government consider the

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(10) Parl. Paper C.-4265, p. 7, Appendix I.
(11) Ibid., pp. 8-11, Appendix II.

situation of the missionaries there, and, if possible, extend to the territory its protection. This memorial may be summarised as follows:

The Rhenish Missionary Society began its work in South Africa in 1830, and soon had fourteen mission stations operating in the Cape Colony. In 1842 it crossed the Orange River and began labouring in Great Namaqualand, and later in Damaraland. In spite of considerable hardships, the influence of the Society continued to spread, and by 1864 twelve stations had been established, the principal one being at Otjunbinque. In 1863, civil war broke out between the Hereros and the Namaquas, in the course of which the Society suffered considerable damage to property, and some loss of life. By 1866, the position had become more critical, and a number of English traders were killed at Walfisch Bay, while the fate of others was left in doubt. Commenting on this the memorial continues: "The events last mentioned produced a strong feeling in Cape Town and induced the principal persons of the town to beg the Governor of Cape Colony to take steps for the protection of the lives and property of the European residents in Hereroland. His Excellency the Governor with noble promptitude sent a man-of-war to Walfisch Bay. But as Otjunbinque is now fully cut off from the coast the troops were not disembarked, and after three weeks the ship returned to Cape Town without any

further information as to the fate of the Europeans in that land."

The natives responsible for the unrest were not numerous and were located in the northern part of Great Namaqualand. The Namaquas to the south and the Hereros to the north were peaceful, and it was suggested that with their help a British Commissioner and two hundred soldiers would be sufficient to restore order, "particularly when at the same time the Walfisch Bay besides a small adjacent territory might be declared British property, as it lately happened with the Angra Pequena Bay."

The memorial then goes on to say: "Should the whole Hereroland be declared British territory taken under British protection and be brought into regular order this would be indeed the most desirable thing for the missions, civilisation, and the opening of the western part of the south of Africa. A small force near Walfisch Bay and a resident civil officer would be quite sufficient to secure good practical results from such an arrangement. The Hereroland, on the whole a fertile pasture land, forms the western passage to the inner part of South Africa, and the region of the Lake Ngami, and to the newly opened country southward of Cunene. . . . . When about 1835 a trader or British subject was killed in Namaqualand, the Government of the Colony required the delivery of the murderers. It followed, and the malefactors were shot

according to the Articles of War in the Cape Colony for the murder committed outside of the British territory. Since that time until late years the opinion was general in Namaqua and Hereroland that the lives of Europeans in these lands were under British protection. In the last two years this prestige of the British name has been lost in the above-mentioned lands which adjoin the Cape Colony. . . . . The public opinion in the Cape Colony as shown in all the organs of the press, expresses itself more and more in the sense of this memorial, therefore it may be permitted here to enclose a leading article of the Cape Town 'Volks Vriend' for Wednesday, July the 8th, 1868, which, in the interests of missions, civilisation and trade, earnestly desires the intervention of the British Government, and the taking possession of Walfisch Bay and its environs."

It is evident from this memorial that the members of the Rhenish Society were eager to have Great Britain restore order north of the Orange River, annex at least Walfisch Bay and a small adjacent territory, and give consideration to the question of taking over the whole of Damaraland to the Portuguese boundary. The missionaries appear also to have been of the opinion that Great Britain had already annexed Angra Pequena, and that the lives of Europeans in Namaqua-Damaraland were under her protection.

On November 9, 1868, Lord Stanley also received a communication from the German Chargé d'Affaires in London, in which the latter urged him, under the authority of the Chancellor of the North German Confederation, to give a favourable consideration to the proposals of the above memorial.

Lord Stanley sent these papers to the Colonial Office, but the Secretary of State for the Colonies could not see his way to carry out the German wishes, and a golden opportunity was lost of settling, at very little cost and effort, a question which was destined to increase in difficulty. All that was done at the time was to send a commissioner to Namaqualand through whose influence a peace was concluded between the warring tribes in 1870.

The movement for extension of British authority north of the Orange River continued, however, and by 1875 requests for annexation from both European traders and natives had become so frequent, that the Cape Parliament passed a resolution in favour of the extension of the limits of the colony so as to include Walfisch Bay and as much of the country inland as, with the approval of the Crown, it might be found expedient to acquire. (12)

As a result of this resolution, Mr. Coates Palgrave, who was familiar with the tribes north of the Orange River, was sent as Special Commissioner to the Namaqua and Damara chiefs,

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(12) Parl. Paper C.-4265, p. 4.

with instructions to explain to them "the benefit they would derive from colonial rule and government which they had from time to time in past years expressed themselves desirous of securing." (13) Mr. Palgrave made an extensive trip through the entire country, and succeeded in securing the submission of all the important chiefs. He placed his Report before the Cape Parliament in 1877. This Report gave a detailed statement of the situation, and besides demonstrating the activity of the German merchants in South-west Africa, included signed petitions not only from natives, but also from Europeans settled at Walfisch Bay and from hunters and traders of the interior, expressing their satisfaction that the Cape Government were directing attention to the country and hoping that they would soon be taken under British protection.

The exhaustive and valuable document of Mr. Palgrave was brought to the notice of Lord Carnarvon, then Colonial Secretary, in a long and able despatch from Sir Bartle Frere, dated November 13, 1877. The despatch contains the following passage: "Neither he (Dr. Hahn of the German Rhenish Society) nor the other missionaries who accompanied him in his interviews with me, nor the many respectable Damaraland traders whom I saw, had the slightest national or colonial bias in the matter. They were none of them Englishmen or Cape Colonists by birth, though the Cape was their adopted country, and their trade

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(13) Quoted in "The Germans and Africa," Evans Lewin, p. 75.

centred at Cape Town. But they were unanimous in expressing from various points of view their hope that Mr. Palgrave might be sent back to finish the work which he had so well begun. His mission, they felt assured, would secure peace and good order up to the Portuguese border, the Lake N'gami, and the Transvaal, whilst any delay would risk a renewal of those intestine broils which had caused so much bloodshed and misery in former years." (14)

It might well be said that the Report of the Special Commissioner was one long plea to "take up the white man's burden," and the whole history of Africa goes to prove that the native has made progress towards civilisation only when and where that burden has been taken up. Surely now was the time when Great Britain, with most advantage and with the least expenditure of money and effort, could have increased her authority in the region of South-west Africa between the Orange and the Cunene Rivers. The day was soon to come when the missionaries, merchants, and traders who were German, were to find a new and greater zeal in the hope that the protection, which they now so earnestly sought from England, was to be obtained under the flag of their own beloved Fatherland.

Sir Bartle Frere, Governor of the Cape from 1877 to 1880, was one of the few statesmen of the time who possessed real vision, and who saw that the true policy of Great Britain lay

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(14) Imperial Blue Book C.-2000, p. 3.

in accepting responsibilities and not in evading them. On August 10, 1878, he wrote in a letter to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach: "You must be master, as representative of the sole sovereign power, up to the Portuguese frontier, on both the East and West Coast. There is no escaping from the responsibility which has been already incurred, ever since the English flag was planted on the Castle here. All our real difficulties have arisen, and still arise, from attempting to evade or shift this responsibility." (15) Frere's suggestions to Lord Carnarvon, as stated in his despatch of November 1877, were as follows: "The first step required appears to be that Her Majesty should issue an Order in Council empowering the Cape Parliament to legislate for the purpose of annexing the coast up to the Portuguese boundary. . . . . Meanwhile no time should, I think, be lost in hoisting the British flag at Walfisch Bay. There is nothing I am told in the shape of a good harbour for a long distance north of that place; but there are many reasons of practical convenience for extending the protectorate under the British flag up to the Portuguese boundary. Eastward the protectorate should, I think, extend to the Transvaal, whilst to the north I see no alternative but a geographical line between the Portuguese boundary and the northern limit of the Transvaal." (16) Lord Carnarvon consented to the raising of the flag at Walfisch Bay,

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(15) "Life of Sir Bartle Frere," John Martineau, vol. ii, p. 260.
(16) Imperial Blue Book C.-2000, p. 3.

but as he was grinding an axe of his own in South Africa at this particular time, in no way connected with the increase of Imperial responsibilities, he turned a deaf ear to the larger proposals.

Walfisch Bay, with a strip of territory extending about forty miles along the coast and twenty miles inland, was duly taken over on March 12, 1878, (17) and the credit for having won this concession - meagre enough as it was - from the Colonial Office, is generally given to Sir Bartle Frere. There is reason to believe, however, that at least some of the preliminary spade work had already been done by another man, Sir John Molteno, the first Premier of the Cape Colony, and a study of this question throws some light on a particular phase of Lord Carnarvon's policy.

Sir John Molteno had devoted almost all his energies in the Cape Parliament to the securing of responsible government, and when he achieved his end, he was rewarded with the Premiership. He took his duties seriously, had a great faith in the future of South Africa, and was keenly sensitive on matters touching the newly won rights and privileges of the Colony. The work of developing the institutions and the physical resources of the Cape were his special interests, but he also lent his aid in furthering matters relating to the welfare of South Africa as a whole. In the first Session after responsible

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(17) Annexed to the Cape Colony in 1884.

government was introduced, a resolution was passed in the Cape Parliament to annex the islands off Angra Pequena which Great Britain had taken over in 1866, and the annexation was formally carried out in the following Session. About the same time, the Government turned its attention to the mainland between the Orange and Cunene Rivers and initiated measures for irrigating the region by leading out the waters of the Orange River; while the Secretary for Native Affairs suggested the appointment of Residents with the native chiefs in Great Namaqualand and at Walfisch Bay. Then during the Session of 1875, at the instance of Mr. Molteno, a resolution was passed by the Cape Parliament approving of the annexation of Walfisch Bay and the surrounding territory. (18) Why, then, was it only in 1878, and as a result of the earnest appeals of Sir Bartle Frere, that Lord Carnarvon consented to make this annexation?

In order to answer this question, it is necessary to recall that during the years 1874 to 1878, Lord Carnarvon's federation scheme was the one great topic before the people of South Africa as a whole. Such a unification had been brought forward by Sir George Grey, Governor of Cape Colony from 1854 to 1862, at a time when it would have been welcomed in Africa and could probably have been carried out. Lord Carnarvon was then strongly averse to any such policy, yet it became his

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(18) "Life of Sir John Molteno," P. A. Molteno, vol. i, p. 285.

misfortune to revive the same proposal at a much less opportune moment. His principal aim, in this connection, seems to have been the lessening of Imperial responsibilities in South Africa, and the reduction of the British forces maintained there, and his plan included ridding the Home Government of the expense and trouble of Griqualand West, annexed in 1871, by making it a unit in his scheme of federation.

When Lord Carnarvon found that his plan of unification was not being well received in South Africa, he summoned a Confederation Conference in London early in 1876. The Cape Parliament refused to have anything to do with it, but Mr. Molteno agreed to go to England to discuss with Lord Carnarvon and President Brand of the Orange Free State, the question of the annexation of Griqualand West. Mr. Molteno sailed in July, but when he reached London he found that President Brand's difficulties had already been removed by the payment of £90,000. The fact that Lord Carnarvon had not had courtesy enough to await his arrival may have tended to make Mr. Molteno delay unnecessarily the annexation of Griqualand West to the Cape Colony. (19) At the outset he made it plain that he was against any plan of including the territory with the Cape under a confederation, and stated that he preferred a scheme of incorporation. Meanwhile, the Cape Government had again proposed the annexation of Walfisch Bay, and also of a region in the east

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(19) "Life of Cecil Rhodes," Sir Lewis Michell, vol. i, p. 112.

known as Tembuland. In his reply to Mr. Molteno's views as given above, Lord Carnarvon made the following important statements, through the Colonial Office.

"There are two other suggestions proceeding from the Cape Government for the annexation of territory to the Cape, which Lord Carnarvon has for some time had under his consideration, and which you have in conversation urged upon him; but his Lordship is of opinion that he cannot properly or safely advise the Queen to sanction these annexations unless the case of Griqualand West, which is now pressing, and has for a longer time demanded settlement, is at the same time provided for.

"If the Cape Government should be prepared to undertake at the same time the government of the three districts, those of Griqualand West, Walfisch Bay, and Tembuland, Lord Carnarvon is disposed to think that arrangements might be made for annexing them to the Colony, subject, of course, to the reservation of the necessary power of revising the boundaries, or even of again separating the newly added territories from the Cape in the event of any fresh provincial sub-division or any form of confederation becoming desirable.

"Lord Carnarvon trusts that you may be able to give him an early and definite reply on this subject, as his Lordship is most anxious to come to some satisfactory arrangement with you, and would for many reasons greatly regret your departure

from this country without making provision for a condition of affairs which demands immediate attention."

Mr. Molteno's reply to this was as follows:

"I would briefly advert in conclusion to that portion of your Lordship's letter which refers to the proposed annexation to the Cape Colony of the Walfisch Bay country and Tembuland. After most careful perusal, I have failed in discerning the precise bearing which these proposed annexations have in your Lordship's view upon the question of Griqualand West, but I would most respectfully record my decided opinion that it is very desirable to avoid any unnecessary delay in dealing with the two proposals in question, and I cannot escape from the conclusion that any lengthened postponement of the extension of British jurisdiction to the districts referred to would be calculated to leave matters open to serious complications hereafter."

Lord Carnarvon replied by granting another personal interview, and then commented on the last part of Mr. Molteno's letter:

"Lord Carnarvon feels constrained to add that if the delay which you deprecate in arriving at a settlement of the question of the Walfisch Bay and Tembuland is open to so much risk, the delay which you think yourself obliged to interpose in the settlement of the Griqualand difficulties appears to his Lordship to be not less fraught with objection and danger." (20)

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(20) "Life of Sir John Molteno," P. A. Molteno, vol. ii, pp. 100-102.

What is to be understood from this correspondence between Mr. Molteno and Lord Carnarvon? Just how much blame should be placed upon the Cape Premier for raising objections to the taking over of Griqualand West, or whether the Colonial Secretary would have hastened the annexation of Walfisch Bay had Molteno been more amenable, it is difficult to say; but it seems clear that Lord Carnarvon confounded the two questions and made the annexation of Walfisch Bay dependent upon the annexation of Griqualand West. Moreover, when Mr. Molteno finally consented to the annexation of Griqualand West, as he did before leaving England, (21) Lord Carnarvon still withheld his hand in the matter of Walfisch Bay. The cross purposes at which the two statesmen were working was further emphasised when Lord Carnarvon sounded Mr. Molteno on the question of a general federation, including possibly the Transvaal, "if the cession of it to the Crown, as from recent information seems not improbable, should take place." (22) Mr. Molteno strongly disapproved, and it became evident that he would be a stumbling block to the success of the plan, which soon became almost an obsession with Lord Carnarvon, unless some strong leverage were brought to bear upon him. This was how matters stood when Mr. Molteno returned to the Cape.

Meanwhile, Mr. Palgrave had been making his survey of conditions in Namaqualand and Damaraland. His Report, as has

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(21) This was sanctioned by the Cape Parliament in 1877, though annexation to the Cape was not fully completed until 1880.
(22) "Life of Sir John Molteno," P. A. Molteno, vol. ii, p. 104.

been shown, was extremely favourable, and a proposal of annexation, to include all the coast between the Orange and Cunene Rivers, was duly passed by the Cape Parliament. All that was necessary to place this important region under the administration of the Cape, was Lord Carnarvon's assent to the letters patent. This assent he apparently withheld because he believed he could use it as a lever to force Mr. Molteno to comply with his wishes in the matter of confederation. (23) In every subsequent Parliament of the Cape Colony, the subject of the annexation was mentioned in the Governor's speech, but Lord Carnarvon would make no move. He entrusted his plan of confederation to Sir Bartle Frere, and it was only when this far-sighted statesman pointed out the importance of extending British authority on the south-west coast, as elsewhere, that he consented to the annexation of a small territory around Walfisch Bay. When it is remembered that there were no European complications in South Africa at this time, it seems clear that if Lord Carnarvon had given proper weight to the cumulative evidence in favour of annexing the whole region north to the Portuguese boundary, there need never have been a German South-west Africa.

Between 1878 and 1880, the tendency of both the Home Government and the Cape Colony was to lessen rather than to increase their responsibilities on the south-west coast, and

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(23) "Life of Sir John Molteno," P. A. Molteno, vol. ii, p. 103. Also "Life of Cecil Rhodes," Sir Lewis Michell, vol. i, p. 112.

the justification for this is stated in the Earl of Derby's Despatch of December 1884. The Imperial Government "had been put to vast expense by the Cape, Zulu, and Sikukuni wars, the affairs of Bechuanaland (then called the Keate Award Territory), were unsettled, and the condition of Zululand was commencing to cause anxiety. The Cape Colony had its hands full with the rebellion in Basutoland, and lawlessness in the Transkei." (24) Moreover, the Government of Mr. Gordon Sprigg, which had assumed power on the dismissal of that of Mr. Molteno in 1878, was in no way disposed to any extension of responsibilities north of the Orange River.

To add to the cares of an already over-worked Colonial Office, war now broke out, in July 1880, between the Damaras and the Namaquas. Great Britain refused to interfere, and the Cape Government recalled Mr. Palgrave, the Special Commissioner north of the Orange, and ordered Major Musgrave, the Resident at Okahandja, to withdraw to Walfisch Bay. "These instructions were based on the fact that the 'moral force hitherto exercised' was 'no longer producing the desired results,' and it was also expressly stated that it had 'been decided from the very first that no attempt to employ any other kind of force should be made.'" (25)

Meanwhile, the activities of the Germans in Namaqualand and Damaraland had been rapidly increasing, a circumstance

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(24) Parl. Paper C.-4265, p. 4.
(25) Ibid.

which ought to have been of some concern to the Cape Colony. Moreover, the influence of the colonial party in Germany had now made itself felt, and not only were the German people being aroused to colonial possibilities, but the great Chancellor himself was responding, however reluctantly, to the movement. Thus it was that when German life and property became endangered as a result of the war between the Damaras and Namaquas in 1880, Bismarck, possibly feeling his way, communicated a memorandum to Earl Granville, then at the Foreign Office, requesting that, since there could be "no question as to an independent proceeding on the part of Germany for the protection of life and property of its subjects in those regions," the "British Government would direct that any measure ordered or intended for the protection of life and property of English subjects might be extended likewise to the German missionaries and traders living there." (26) Having regard to the decision of the Cape Colony against interference, and to the already involved position of Great Britain in South Africa, Earl Granville replied that the Cape Government would extend to German subjects, as readily as to the subjects of Her Majesty, such protection as it might be in their power to give, but that Her Majesty's Government could not be responsible for what might take place outside British territory, which only included Walfisch Bay and a very small portion of country immediately surrounding it. (27)

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(26) Quoted in Parl. Paper C.-4265, p. 5.
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(26) Quoted in Parl. Paper C.-4265, p. 5.
(27) Parl. Paper C.-4265, p. 5.

The final renunciation of British claims to Namaqualand and Damaraland at this period, was made by Lord Kimberley, Colonial Secretary, in his despatch of December 30, 1880, to Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor of the Cape, in which the latter was expressly reminded that, "It is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that the Orange River is to be regarded as the north-western frontier of the Cape Colony, and the Government will not give its support to plans for extending British jurisdiction over Great Namaqualand and Damaraland." (28) Thus, as late as the close of 1880, the territories under discussion were virtually no-man's-land; Great Britain did not claim them, and no one else appeared to want them.

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(28) "Prince Bismarck," Charles Lowe, vol. ii, p. 218.

Chapter IV

THE GERMAN COLONIAL MOVEMENT

In the year 1884, Germany thrust herself, for the first time, prominently into the colonial field, and began seizing with an eager hand, such portions of extra-European lands as the satiety or indifference of other Powers had still left unappropriated. Her pickings were extremely valuable, and were secured with such an amazing rapidity and apparent suddenness, that some have been led to suppose that the German colonial movement was created, as it were, overnight. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The German colonial movement, like most other great movements, was of slow growth, and had its roots in deeper soil than the mere ambition of a new and powerful nation become suddenly conscious of its strength. Back of the new colonial zeal lay the traditions of the past, and as the eager biographer tends to find in every early word and act of his hero the evidences of future greatness, so the Germans of the 1880's were quick to trace, in the general history of their race, the hand of destiny pointing to an ultimate empire beyond the seas.

From very early times the Teutonic peoples manifested a colonising impulse, and in the European lands which later came to be distinctively the home of Germans, migration built upon migration. During the tenth century, there developed a movement eastwards into the Slavic lands between the Elbe and the Oder, and out of Otto the Great's belief in the efficacy of the Church among conquered peoples, came the founding of the important bishopric of Brandenburg. Other colonists, advancing southwards, left their mark in various parts of Hungary. Prussia itself, which in association with Brandenburg was destined to become the nucleus of a powerful state, was won by the zeal of the Teutonic Knightly Orders in the thirteenth century. Then these same Orders, pressing still farther eastwards, penetrated into the Baltic lands of Livonia, Courland, and Esthonia. At the same time there grew up that amazing activity on the part of the North German merchants which led to the formation of the Hanseatic League, spread German influence along the coast to the east, linked up the Baltic Sea with Western Europe, and scattered afar many busy marts of trade. Even more remarkable, as an attempt at actual colonisation, was the acquisition of the province of Caracas in Venezuela by the Augsburg banker Welser, about the middle of the sixteenth century. (1) But as at that time it was easier to acquire distant lands than to hold them, this and

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(1) "The German Empire," W. H. Dawson, vol. ii, p. 168.

other similar efforts at colonisation in South America, were soon abandoned.

About a century later, however, a much more definite attempt to found a colony was made by the Great Elector of Brandenburg. Believing that "navigation and commerce are the staunchest pillars of a state," (2) he formed an East India Company in 1647, which, however, never functioned. He next turned his attention to West Africa, and in 1680 an expedition was able to conclude a treaty with the native chiefs by which Prussia secured the territory on the Gold Coast between Axim and Cape Three Points. In 1682, the Great Elector established a Commercial Company, and under its auspices Gross Friedrichsburg was built on the land acquired in West Africa. But this venture never prospered, and, in 1717, Frederick William the First found it advisable to cede to the Dutch the island of Arguin and the establishment of Gross Friedrichsburg for a small indemnity. The Great Elector had also made attempts to gain a footing in America, and to acquire the Antilles, but without success.

These early endeavours of Prussia to colonise could not help but fail. The country was too small and still agricultural, distances were too great, and rivalry was too keen. Moreover, such ventures lacked support from within the nation. Yet while they made no deep impression, and quickly passed

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(2) "The German Colonial Empire," P. Giordani (trans. by Mrs. G. W. Hamilton), p. 4.

from memory, they served their purpose at a later date, when it became expedient to work them into a general tradition of national expansion.

When Prussia passed into the hands of Frederick the Great, that ruler had no mind to chase the will o' the wisp of a colonial empire. He had more practical work at hand to do, and expressed the opinion that, "All distant possessions are a burden to the State, a village on the frontier is worth a principality two hundred and fifty miles away." (3) Consequently he turned a deaf ear to the African colonial proposals of that strange old rover and worthy citizen of Colberg, Joachim Nettelbeck, who confessed in his memoirs that, "The Prussian patriotism became alive within me, and I pondered and pondered how my King, too, as well as England and France, might come to possess colonies producing sugar, coffee, and other such wares." (4)

But willy-nilly, the German peoples continued to seek new homes beyond the seas, and from the close of the seventeenth century on free German settlements were established in practically every civilised land, the movement being aided by the creation of a number of emigration societies about the middle of the nineteenth century. Between 1800 and 1880 some four and a half million emigrants quitted their homeland, America claiming the lion's share. This ever-increasing

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(3) "The German Empire," W. H. Dawson, vol. ii, p. 169.
(4) "Prince Bismarck," Charles Lowe, vol. ii, p. 201.

outward flow of population tended to strengthen the hands of the later colonialists who urged that German emigrants ought to have German lands to go to.

In Germany itself, the colonial idea was gradually taken up by a number of able writers - professors, historians, and political scientists. These men were long regarded by the official and commercial classes as theorists and doctrinaires, and their views, at first, had little circulation outside of the academic world.

One of the earliest of these writers was the economist Friedrich List, who, in his "National System of Political Economy," published in 1841, strongly advised a thorough-going national colonial policy. "Colonies," he wrote, "are the highest means of development of the manufacturing power, of the internal and external commerce proceeding from it, of any considerable coast and sea navigation, of extensive sea fisheries, and consequently of a respectable naval power." (5) Then commenting on the Zollverein, he continued: "In anticipation of the inclusion in the Zollverein of the German seaports and Holland, it would be desirable that Prussia should now make a commencement by the adoption of a German commercial flag, and by laying the foundation for a future German fleet, and that she should try whether and how German colonies can be founded in Australia, New Zealand, or in or on other islands of Australasia." (6) The ideas of List were taken up by others, notably

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(5) "National System of Political Economy," F. List (trans. by S. S. Lloyd), p. 216.
(6) Ibid., p. 348.

Ernst Friedel, who in 1867 published a book entitled, "The establishment of Prussian-German colonies in the Indies, the Pacific Ocean, and especially in the eastern portions of Asia." "Maritime commerce, ships of war, colonies," wrote Friedel, "are three complementary terms. The value of each is diminished if one of the three be wanting." (7)

A much more forceful and outspoken writer, however, was the nationalist historian Treitschke, that somewhat tragic figure whose impress was to lie so deeply on the German soul. Treitschke wielded both an academic and a political influence, for besides being a university professor, he was also a member of the Reichstag for nearly twenty years after 1870. In his "Politics," he wrote: "All great nations of history, on becoming powerful, have sought to impose their characteristics on barbarous lands. To-day we behold the nations of Europe seeking to establish a mass aristocracy of the white peoples over the entire earth. The nation that does not participate in this great world struggle, will in later years play but an insignificant part. It is now a vital problem for a great nation to pursue its colonising efforts." (8) And in relation to the British position in South Africa he spoke with even greater emphasis: "In the South of Africa circumstances are decidedly favouring us. English colonial policy, which has been successful everywhere else, has not had a lucky hand at the Cape of

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(7) "The Germans and Africa," Evans Lewis, p. 23.
(8) "Die Politik," Heinrich von Treitschke, vol. 1, p. 121.

Good Hope. The civilisation which exists there is Teutonic, is Dutch. The policy of England in South Africa, which vacillates between weakness and brutality, has created a deadly and inextinguishable hatred against her among the Dutch Boers. . . . . If our Empire has the courage to follow an independent colonial policy with determination, a collision of our interests and those of England is unavoidable." (9) Finally in 1885, Treitschke summed up his earlier views when he stated that only those States which possessed naval power and ruled territories across the sea could rank in future as great Powers. (10)

The works of such writers made colonisation a subject of discussion, and gradually familiarised the German people with the idea of colonial expansion.

A no less important, and somewhat more practical, contribution towards the furthering of the colonial idea, was the work of the various German explorers and missionaries, especially in Africa, which became an object of general European interest after the middle of the nineteenth century. Gustav Mann explored Nigeria in the interests of natural science; Dr. Bastian toured the world and wrote a book on Africa; Heinrich Barth penetrated into the hinterland of the Cameroons; Gerhard Rohlfs, later returning from exploration in the same region, made the appeal, "Is it not deplorable that we are obliged to assist, inactive

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(9) "Deutsche Kampfe," Treitschke. Quoted in "Modern Germany," J. Ellis Barker, p. 27.
(10) "Treitschke," A. Hausrath (English translation), p. 204.

and without power to intervene, in the extension of England in Central Africa;" (11) and Karl Mauch became so impressed with the Transvaal, that he wrote, "Would to God that this fine country might become a German colony!" (12) In East Africa, the activities of Dr. Otto Kersten, Baron von der Decken, and Richard Brenner, led the Sultan of Wituland to ask for the official protection of Prussia; (13) and in August 1864, von der Decken wrote from the River Juba that he was convinced that a colony established there would be a profitable undertaking, especially after the opening of the Suez Canal. (14) This work of exploration was stimulated by the formation, in 1873, of the "German Society for the Scientific Exploration of Equatorial Africa," and also by that of the "German African Society" in 1876. About the same time, the penetration of the Congo region by Stanley roused the cupidity and the interest of Leopold of Belgium, and led to the International Brussels Congress of 1876, and the formation of the "African International Society." This action of King Leopold marked the first definite step taken by a European ruler towards the final opening up of the Dark Continent, and it added weight to the store of colonial theory now rapidly growing in Germany.

Missionary enterprise supplemented the work of the explorers, and paved the way for merchants and traders. The

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(11) "The German Empire," W. H. Dawson, vol. ii, p. 173.
(12) Ibid.
(13) "Geschichte der Deutschen Kolonialpolitik," A. Zimmermann, p. 7.
(14) Ibid., p. 4, note 5.

Barmen Rhine Mission, by far the most active and influential of the German missionary societies, established a settlement at Bethany, in Namaqualand, in 1842. Bethany was situated about one hundred and twenty-five miles east of Angra Pequena, and the Rhenish missionaries soon came to exercise considerable authority throughout this region. Nor were their interests entirely spiritual, for they soon began to build up a trade with the natives which went on increasing steadily year by year, and in 1864 they made the important purchase of the ground and buildings of the Walfisch Bay Copper Company at Otymbingue. The activities of the Rhenish Society in Namaqualand and Damaraland after 1868 have been dealt with in the previous chapter. Meanwhile, the Basel Mission was spreading its influence in Togoland on the Gold Coast, and other German missionaries were active in the South Seas.

To the appeals of academic writers, explorers, and missionaries for the inauguration of a colonial policy, there were now added the more weighty arguments of merchants and traders. The great commercial houses of the Hanse towns, with a glorious tradition behind them, were placing settlements throughout the world wherever peaceful conditions rendered their establishment possible, and year by year German trade and capital were becoming more involved in overseas ventures.

As early as 1844 the first ship was sent to East Africa, and this was followed by the founding of trade connections with

Zanzibar in 1850, under the auspices of the firms of Hansing and O'Swald. Progress was rapid and by 1859 a trade treaty was arranged between the Hanse towns and the Sultan of Zanzibar, which was subsequently extended to the North German Confederation in 1869, and later to the German Empire. By 1874, the Sultan was so far under German influence, that he offered to place his country under the protection of the Empire, an offer which was refused by Bismarck. In West Africa, the firm of Woermann entered Liberia in 1849, and soon penetrated and spread through all the territory between the Gaboon and the Cameroons. Its vessels carried on a regular trade, supplying salt to all this part of the West African Coast, and also Hamburg gin to the natives. The trade of the mission stations in Africa also went on increasing, for besides the purchase of land by the Rhenish Mission at Otymbingue already mentioned, the Basel Mission on the Gold Coast established a trading factory at Akra.

The Hanse merchants were also the founders of numerous trading settlements in the South Seas, where, after 1857, the powerful House of Godeffroy rapidly gained a monopoly of the Samoan trade. German influence was soon extended to New Britain, the Caroline Islands, and the Fiji Islands, and even the possibilities of New Guinea were not overlooked. (15) This rapid extension of German commercial interests overseas

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(15) This account of trading ventures in Africa and the South Seas is condensed from "Origins of Modern German Colonialism," Mary E. Townsend, pp. 36-41.

was to furnish new and potent arguments in favour of a colonial policy, and, after 1871, it was inevitable that the traders and settlers in distant parts should wish to be taken under the protection of the new Empire.

The unification of Germany, which was brought about between the years 1866 and 1871, was probably the greatest factor of all in directing the minds of the German people towards a possible political expansion beyond the seas, for it gave birth to a new and virile nationalism, and few paused to consider the flaws which might have been discovered in the means by which union had been achieved. Bismarck, whose genius had created the new structure, and who was to be at such efforts to preserve it intact, might well consider that enough had been done; but a younger generation, forgetful of the difficulties under which the Empire had been formed, soon came to seek other worlds to conquer.

In the first decade of the Empire, however, other forces were at work besides those of a triumphant nationalism. Many of the requisites for a successful colonial policy, which had formerly been lacking, were now in evidence. A stable government at home made it possible for men to look outwards; a rapidly growing population made available a surplus of workers for the establishment of new settlements; and the industrial revolution caused an over-production of manufactured goods,

and created a demand for new markets, and for the reservation of sources of raw materials. Moreover, improved means of transportation, both within Germany itself and on the great world routes beyond, was an added incentive to production, and rendered it easy to control and develop distant lands. These are some of the things which gave a new impetus to the colonial movement, and led many enthusiasts to believe that, "The German with his flag was destined no more to be an appendage of foreign nations; to go through the world with his cap in one hand and a piece of gold in the other." (16)

But it must not be supposed that the whole German nation was at once united in a determination to acquire an empire across the seas. Had this been the case, Germany could have taken her choice when lands were plentiful, and need never have been under the necessity of inaugurating an eleventh hour rush in 1884 in an effort to grasp the few places which were then still available. The truth is, that during the first years of the Empire, the commercial and other interested groups still represented only a small minority; while on the other hand, the Government and the official classes were almost solidly against colonial expansion, and the great mass of the people were but lukewarm or indifferent.

The attitude of Bismarck himself towards the colonial question is not always easy to determine. His utterances were

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(16) Quoted in "Origins of Modern German Colonialism," Mary E. Townsend, p. 44.

often contradictory and seemed, at times, merely made for the occasion. But taking his whole career as a guide, and remembering that the cardinal point of his policy for Germany was always the strengthening of her position in Europe by judicious alliances, by the isolation or diversion of France, and by the maintenance of friendly relations with England, it seems reasonable to assume that Bismarck yielded only reluctantly, and against his inner beliefs, to the idea of colonial expansion. Colonialism "was not his own idea, the product of his own original and creative gifts," (17) and that in itself was almost enough to make him distrust it. Bismarck, however, was a master opportunist, and when in 1884 he finally embarked on a colonial policy, it was largely because the foreign situation was favourable, and because he had need of new support at home. Moreover, the weight of German public opinion had greatly increased, and public opinion was a thing which Bismarck never really despised or ignored.

John Morley, in his "Life of Gladstone," relates that the Dutch Minister told the British Ambassador in Vienna that in 1865 Bismarck had said to him that "without colonies Prussia could never become a great maritime nation; he coveted Holland less for its own sake, than for her wealthy colonies." (18) This would seem to be one of Bismarck's earliest statements on the colonial question. But on January 9, 1868, he wrote

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(17) "Bismarck," C. Grant Robertson, p. 417.
(18) "Life of W. E. Gladstone," John Morley, vol. ii, p. 320.

to von Roon: "All colonial enterprise must be left to private industry - the North German Confederation cannot meddle with it. All the advantages claimed for the mother country are for the most part illusions. England has had practical experience and is abandoning her colonial policy on the ground of expense, and France likewise appears to place little worth in the enterprise of new colonies. . . . . Germany has no navy and conflicts with other powers are inevitable." (19)
So, too, during the peace negotiations at Versailles in February 1871, when France suggested that Germany take her colonies in China and elsewhere in place of Alsace Lorraine, Bismarck replied, "I will have no colonies. For Germany to possess colonies would be like a poverty-stricken Polish nobleman acquiring a silken sable coat when he needed shirts." (20)
The Chancellor was equally deaf to the numerous proposals made by the commercial houses and others, at this time, that such places as Cochin China, Tahiti, the Marquesas Islands, Reunion, Martinique, Saigon, St. Pierre and Miquelon, should be taken from France. And in 1873 he said to Mr. Odo Russell, "Colonies would be a source of weakness, because they could only be defended by powerful fleets, and Germany's geographical position did not necessitate her development into a first-class maritime Power." (21)

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(19) "Geschichte der Deutschen Kolonialpolitik," A. Zimmermann, p. 6.
(20) "Bismarck als Volkswirt," Poschinger, vol. i, p. 63. Quoted in "Origins of Modern German Colonialism," Mary E. Townsend, p. 18.
(21) "The German Empire," W. H. Dawson, vol. ii, p. 175.

The rebuffs to the commercial colonialists, however, did not discourage them; propaganda became more active at home, and petitions from abroad demanding acquisitions continued to pour into the Government offices.

The advocates of a strong navy, those who saw no reason why Germany should not become "a first-class maritime Power," added their arguments to those of the merchants and traders. Discussions concerning a naval policy for the German people date back to the middle of the nineteenth century, and it is interesting to find Charles Greville relating in his "Memoirs," that when visiting Germany in 1843, he was surprised to learn that there was "a great wish to have colonies and a navy," and that "Prussia was already beginning to build ships of war." (22) The principal leaders in the demand for an increased navy and all that goes with it, were Prince Adalbert of Prussia, Chief of the Navy, and Vice-Admiral Livonius. In 1875, Livonius submitted a report, in which he urged the foundation of German colonies, and particularly stressed the value of Zanzibar and East Africa. (23) And Prince Adalbert expressed the opinion that, "For a growing people, there is no prosperity without expansion, no expansion without an overseas policy, and no overseas policy without a navy." (24)

Another active agent in the furthering of colonial aims during the early seventies was the "Central Society for

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(22) "Memoirs," C. C. Greville - A Journal of the Reign of Queen Victoria, entry for July 5, 1843.
(23) "The Germans and Africa," Evans Lewin, p. 31.
(24) "Origins of Modern German Colonialism," Mary E. Townsend, p. 15.

Commercial Geography and German Interests Abroad," which had been founded in 1868, by the explorer Dr. Otto Kersten. To aid its propaganda, it published a monthly magazine, "Der Export."

External events now brought the colonial question more prominently into view, and gradually forced the hand of the German Government. In October 1874, England annexed the Fiji Islands, and this action raised an outcry among the German interests represented in the South Seas. Bismarck was at first unmoved; but the British measure which cancelled all debts contracted by Fijians before the year 1871, and evicted the German settlers without compensation, soon led to a demand by Germany for indemnities, and a lengthy correspondence was opened up between Berlin and London. From this time Bismarck adopted a much more vigorous policy in the South Seas, and entered into numerous treaties of trade and amity, the two most important being the Tongan Treaty of November 1, 1876 (by which Germany acquired the right of establishing a naval station on the Vavao Islands), and the Samoan Treaty of January 24, 1879. In presenting the latter before the Reichstag for ratification in June 1879, von Bulow, the Foreign Secretary, was careful to emphasise that the Government's intention was only to afford trade protection and not to establish colonies. "We regard it as our duty," he said, "to protect German settlers and trade

in Samoa, but not to have those settlements regarded as colonies. We do not wish to found colonies. We desire no monopoly against others. We only wish to guarantee the rights of German shipping and trade." (25) Conditions in Samoa had long been unsettled, and Great Britain and the United States at length interfered. The German Consul was then able to conclude with Sir Arthur Gordon and the Commander of the United States warship "Lackawanna" a Convention which practically placed the Samoans under the joint protection of Germany, England, and the United States. (26) It is evident from these various acts that the German Empire, whether she realised it or not, was travelling along the logical road to a definite state-directed colonialism.

After 1878, there was a marked change in the position of the German Government in its relation to both home and foreign affairs. The forces of Liberalism were weakening and falling apart, and Bismarck hastened the process of disintegration by his return to protection, by his deft exploitation of the movement for social and industrial reform, and by his "opening up of the road to Canossa." He sacrificed the majority of the National Liberals, but gained the support of the Conservatives and the Clerical Centre. Moreover, his abandonment of the principles of free trade was welcomed by the commercial colonialists, and ranged them, for the first time, on the side of the

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(25) "Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reishstages," June 13, 1879, p. 1603. Quoted in "Origins of Modern German Colonialism," Mary E. Townsend, p. 72.
(26) "Origins of Modern German Colonialism," Mary E. Townsend, p. 74.

Government. It seemed a good omen, too, that Bismarck himself took over the Ministry of Commerce in 1880.

In the foreign field changes were no less evident than at home. A French alliance with another power against Germany was ever the nightmare of Bismarck, and when he found that his policy of isolation was breaking down, he quickly substituted another - that of diversion. Hence France was encouraged to seek a new empire abroad that her eyes might be taken away from the "gap in the Vosges." And if in the colonial field she were to fall foul of Great Britain, as seemed likely in view of the growing crisis in Egypt, then so much the better for Germany. The Dual Alliance of 1879, and the Triple Alliance of 1882, were also born of this dread of France. With their completion, German hegemony in Central Europe was secured, and Bismarck had an easier mind.

Meanwhile, the colonial enthusiasts, acting on the principle of the Latin proverb, "gutta cavat lapidem," continued their activities. The "Central Association for Commercial Geography and German Interests Abroad," which had been founded in 1868, was reorganised, and appeared in October 1878, as a new society though still retaining the old name of the "Central Association." It still continued to publish "Der Export." Fabri, who later became known as "the Father of German Colonisation," founded the "West Deutsch Verein fur Kolonisation

und Export" at Dusseldorf in 1880, and in conjunction with writers like Hubbe-Schleiden and Moldenhauer, kept up a steady stream of colonial propaganda.

It was about this time that something in the nature of a colonial crisis occurred in the Pacific. The House of Godeffroy suddenly collapsed late in 1879, and as heavy loans had been secured from British firms, it was feared that the vast German interests in the South Seas would fall into foreign hands. Moreover, Bismarck and other state officials were believed to have indulged in overseas speculation, (27) and the merchants and traders now looked to the Government for support. It was this situation which led Bismarck, in 1880, to introduce into the Reichstag the Samoan Subsidy Bill, a measure which proposed to grant an annual subsidy to the House of Godeffroy. But in spite of the active support of the colonial party, the Samoan Subsidy Bill was rejected by 128 votes against 112. Throughout the country, it was recognised that the Bill was a test case for the whole colonial movement, and the "Norddeutscher Tageszeitung" thus commented on the vote: "It is probable that if the country had been consulted on a question such as this, its verdict would have been quite different from that of the Reichstag. The project was the prelude to a German colonial policy." And the "Post:" "If there exists a people fitted for coloni-

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(27) "Origins of Modern German Colonialism," Mary E. Townsend, p. 111.

sation it is the German. A great part of the world's commerce is in their hands. We require markets or rather outlets for the development of our commerce and our industries: we want breathing spaces or rather reservoirs for our overflow population. We are now a united and powerful nation; we want German colonies." (28) But Bismarck seemed to interpret the rejection of the measure as an indication that public opinion was not yet ready for the establishment of a colonial policy. "As long as I am Chancellor," he remarked in 1881, "we will carry on no colonial policy. We have a navy incapable of going far and we cannot afford to own waste places in other parts of the earth which will only revert to the French." (29)

The failure of the Samoan Subsidy Bill, however, did not discourage the colonialists; on the contrary, it brought about a union of their scattered forces which enabled them to strike the harder. The "Kolonialverein" was founded at Frankfort on December 6, 1882. This organisation was mainly the work of Frieherr von Maltzan, von der Bruggen, and Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg, and the last named became its President. The "Kolonialverein" stated its aims as follows: "Its principal work is to educate public opinion; . . . . to form a central organisation for colonial ambitions; . . . . not to found colonies which would involve the Government in serious political difficulties; but to confine its efforts to the establishment

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(28) "The German Colonial Empire," P. Giordani (trans. by Mrs. G. W. Hamilton), p. 15.
(29) "Furst Bismarck und Die Parlementarier," Poschinger, vol. iii, p. 54. Quoted in "Origins of Modern German Colonialism," Mary E. Townsend, p. 131.

of small trading stations and to strive for the official protection of the administration." (30) It gained the support of the "West Deutsch Verein" in 1883, and began publishing an official paper, the "Kolonialzeitung," in January 1884.

Another important society which did much to influence public opinion in favour of colonialism was "Die Gesellschaft fur Deutsche Kolonisation," founded by Karl Peters at Berlin in April 1884. Its principal aim was to rouse interest in East Africa, a region in which Peters himself was soon to play such a conspicuous part. In November 1887, this society united with the "Kolonialverein" in the formation of one great colonial organisation, "Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft."

In the meantime, the activities of the merchants and traders went on increasing. The firm of Woermann started a steamship line from Hamburg to West Africa in 1882; the successors to the House of Godeffroy continued to thrive in the South Seas; and in February 1884, the German North Borneo Company was formed. Most important of all, the action of the merchant Herr Luderitz in seizing the harbour of Angra Pequena in April 1883, had fired the imagination of the German people, and set them clamouring for the active intervention of their Government.

Foreign affairs at this time were also affording Bismarck an opportunity for direct action in the colonial field. France

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(30) "Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft," pp. 9, 10. Quoted in "Origins of Modern German Colonialism," Mary E. Townsend, p. 143.

was rapidly extending her influence in North and West Africa, and in June 1882, she concluded a Colonial Convention with England concerning the hinterland of Sierra Leone, which much displeased the German merchants in the region. A month later came the English bombardment of Alexandria, which led to the tightening of Britain's hold upon Egypt. In this connection, it may not be without significance that whereas the bombardment of Alexandria took place in July 1882, the first meeting of the "Kolonialverein" was held in August of the same year. But whatever relation may have existed between these two events, it is certain that Bismarck utilised England's later difficulties in Egypt as a lever to further his colonial aims. During 1882-83, trouble arose between Germany and Australia over the question of New Guinea, and German claims in Fiji were still outstanding. Then in February 1884, England and Portugal signed the Congo Agreement. (31) These various events rapidly engendered an anti-English attitude in Germany, and Bismarck carefully fanned the rising feeling. A little Chauvinism would be useful in rallying public opinion to the support of colonialism.

Feeling that he now had the weight of the nation behind him, Bismarck, in April 1884, proclaimed Luderitz's settlements in South-west Africa under the direct protection of the Empire, and in August the official ceremony of the raising of

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(31) This Agreement was upset by Bismarck, who, in conjunction with France, brought about the Berlin Congress in November 1884, at which he sat as President.

the flag was carried out. Germany thus secured her first overseas possession, and a state-directed colonialism became an accomplished fact. (32)

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(32) The acquisition of South-west Africa, and the other acquisitions which soon followed, received national ratification by the passing of the Steamship Subsidy Bill in March 1885.

Chapter V

THE VENTURE OF HERR LUDERITZ

It will be remembered that Lord Kimberley's despatch of December 30, 1880, definitely stated that the Orange River was to be regarded as the north-western boundary of the Cape Colony. This meant that all the territory on the west coast north of the Orange and south of the Cunene (except Walfisch Bay) and with an indefinite hinterland, was virtually open to all-comers. Within this region the most active agents were the German missionary-traders of the Rhenish Society, and their numbers and influence kept steadily increasing. In 1868 they had requested the protection of the British Government, but in 1880, having no doubt in the meantime become deeply conscious of the increased power and prestige of their own land, they sent their second appeal direct to Germany. Bismarck, as has been shown, referred this appeal to Lord Granville, but without result, and there the matter rested.

The Rhenish Mission, in 1881, again decided to approach their Government, and addressed a petition to Bismarck asking for protection. The Chancellor, however, smarting under the

defeat of the Samoan Subsidy Bill, and also disgusted at the Reichstag's contemptuous disregard of his memorial pointing out the necessity of a state subsidy for a proposed steamship line to the East, was in no mood to raise the question of taking further responsibilities overseas, and he therefore refused to consider the petition from the missionaries in South-west Africa. (1) He did, however, send another communication to the British Foreign Office, but the latter again repudiated all responsibility outside of Walfisch Bay. (2) Bismarck's views about this time may be gathered from his reply to a request for the annexation of Formosa, made early in 1883: "In order to support colonies, it is necessary to have in the mother land a national feeling which is stronger than party spirit; but with this Reichstag it is already difficult for the Empire to maintain what it has. As long as the Empire is not consolidated financially, we must not think of such expensive undertakings." (3) Nevertheless, Bismarck found other means of aiding the colonial movement than trying to secure support from a stubborn Reichstag, and nowhere do these show to better advantage than in his dealings with the adventurous Bremen merchant, Herr F. A. E. Luderitz.

In the early days of the Empire, there were many German travellers and merchants who became enamoured of the possi-

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(1) "Origins of Modern German Colonialism," Mary E. Townsend, pp. 155, 156.
(2) "Partition of Africa," J. Scott Keltie, p. 178.
(3) "Geschichte der Deutschen Kolonialpolitik," A. Zimmermann, p. 46.

bilities of South Africa as a field for colonial enterprise, and they did not hesitate to bring their views before the German Government. One of the most aggressive of these was Herr Luderitz, a wealthy trader who had the support of the principal leaders among the German colonialists. As early as 1876, Luderitz and a friend secured a personal interview with Bismarck, and laid before him a fully developed plan for founding a colony in South Africa. They suggested the establishment of a steamship line to South Africa, the acquisition of Delagoa and St. Lucia Bays, the construction of a railway from the coast into the Transvaal, and the promotion of German emigration to that region. And to finance the scheme, they asked for a state subsidy of 100,000,000 M. for ten years. Bismarck received them kindly, and showed considerable sympathy with their proposals, but concluded by saying that "the colonial question was one which he had already been studying for years, and he was convinced that Germany could not go on for ever without a colony, but as yet he had failed to perceive any deep traces of a movement in this direction in the nation itself, and without that he could meanwhile neither give them a promise nor a hope." (4)

It soon appeared that a somewhat similar answer to this had already been given by the Chancellor to the schemes of Ernst von Weber, as was revealed by the latter's remarkable

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(4) "Prince Bismarck," Charles Lowe, vol. ii, p. 210; also "Origins of Modern German Colonialism," Mary E. Townsend, pp. 49 and 77.

article published in the "Geographische Nachrichten" for November 1879. "It was this free unlimited room for annexation in the north," wrote Weber, "this open access to the heart of Africa, which principally inspired me with the idea that Germany should try, by the acquisition of Delagoa Bay, and the subsequent continual influx of German emigrants to the Transvaal, to secure the future dominion over this country, and so to pave the way for the foundation of a German-African Empire of the future. I gave expression to this idea of mine in a memorial, which I sent in March 1875, from South Africa to the Emperor and Prince Bismarck. . . . . My representations had, unfortunately, no result, except that Prince Bismarck expressed his approbation of my patriotic sentiments, but held out no prospect of these projects being entertained by the Imperial Government." (5)

This article aroused some alarm in the mind of Sir Bartle Frere, and led him to send a translation of it to the Colonial Office with the following comment: "It contains a clear and well-argued statement in favour of the plan for a German colony in South Africa, which was much discussed in German commercial and political circles even before the Franco-German War, and which was said to have been one of the immediate motives of the German mission of scientific inquiry which visited Southern and Eastern Africa in 1870-71." (6)

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(5) "Prince Bismarck," Charles Lowe, vol. ii, p. 210, note.
(6) Ibid.

The suspicions voiced in Sir Bartle Frere's letter were evidently sent by the Colonial Office to the British Ambassador in Berlin, Lord Odo Russell (afterwards Lord Ampthill), for verification. But Lord Odo Russell at once allayed any fears which might have lurked in the minds of statesmen in London by making light, not only of the schemes of von Weber, but also of the whole German colonial movement. On September 18, 1880, he wrote to England that "Herr von Weber's plan will not meet with any support either at the hands of the German Government or on the part of the German people, while German emigrants feel far more attracted by a republican form of government than by that of a Crown Colony. The German Government feel more the want of soldiers than of colonies, and consequently discourage emigration. The German Parliament has marked its disinclination to acquire distant dependencies, however advantageous to German enterprise, by the rejection of the Samoa Bill. Under present circumstances therefore the plan for a German colony in South Africa has no prospect of success." (7)

It seems strange indeed that Lord Ampthill could have written in such a strain so late as 1880, and in estimating the causes of Great Britain's failure to forestall the German action in South-west Africa, his influence must be taken into account. Lord Ampthill had had a long experience at Berlin,

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(7) "The Germans and Africa," Evans Lewin, pp. 86, 87.

was a close friend of Bismarck, and did much to preserve good relations between Germany and England during his period of office. Yet he seems to have failed entirely to gauge aright the strength of the colonial movement, and his communications to London on this subject served only to confirm the already existing opinion of the British Government that there was nothing serious in Germany's desire for colonies. Small wonder then that Lord Granville and Lord Derby, and still more the Cape Ministry, only awoke to the real situation when they were presented with a "fait accompli." The views expressed by Lord Ampthill were no doubt those held by the official circles in which he moved, by a majority of the Reichstag, and, for a time at least, by Bismarck himself. But Bismarck, whatever his personal opinions, was always careful to keep his hand on the pulse of the nation at large, and he never failed to mark the quickened beat which told of rising feeling.

By the year 1882, the German colonial movement was in full swing. The first meeting of the "Kolonialverein" was held in August, and four months later it was officially established. Herr Luderitz, who had not allowed the grass to grow under his feet since his interview with Bismarck in 1876, now deemed the time propitious to approach the Chancellor again. Accordingly, on November 16, 1882, he announced

to the Foreign Office his intention to found a factory somewhere on the West African coast, between the 22nd and 28th degrees of south latitude; and begged to know whether, and under what conditions, the protection of the Empire might be accorded him. (8) Bismarck, after having received a very non-committal reply from London to his cautious inquiry regarding British rights in the region, informed Luderitz that he could count on Imperial protection provided he was able to secure a harbour to which no other nation might rightfully lay claim. Thus assured, Luderitz matured his plans, and sent his agent, Herr Vogelsang, to the Cape to collect information and prepare the way for direct action. An expedition followed in the "Tilly," which reached Angra Pequena, 150 miles to the north of the Orange River, and 280 miles to the south of Walfisch Bay, on April 9, 1883. Herr Vogelsang and his party then proceeded inland to the mission station at Bethany, and with the aid of the German missionaries established there, concluded a treaty (May 1) with the native chief, Joseph Frederick, by which they acquired, in the name of Herr Luderitz, 215 square miles of land on the Bay of Angra Pequena, including all rights of sovereignty. These adventurous colonial pioneers then returned to the coast, and it can be imagined with what pride and joy they raised their country's flag over the region that was soon to be recognised

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(8) German White Book, published in "The Times" (London), December 13, 1884.

as the first German colony. The beginning thus made was quickly followed up, for in August 1883, Herr Luderitz himself appeared on the scene and negotiated the purchase of the entire tract from the Orange River to the 26th degree of southern latitude, and extending twenty miles inland.

These enterprises of Luderitz and his associates would hardly have been undertaken without the promise of Government support from Bismarck, and that such a promise was given seems evident from the instructions sent to the German Consul at Cape Town on August 18, 1883: "Herr Luderitz can count on the protection of the Imperial Government, so long as his actions are based upon justly won rights and do not clash with the legitimate claims of others, be they native or English." (9) And to render this protection real, the German gunboat "Nautilus" was despatched to Angra Pequena. Thus whatever may have been the views of the Reichstag in Berlin as to the adoption of a national colonial policy, Bismarck, by his active aid of German merchants abroad, was strengthening his position, and rallying to his support, not only the various commercial interests, but also an ever increasing number of the general public.

Meanwhile, the Cape Colony and the British Government were slow to realise the full significance of the German activities. True, a storm of protest was aroused at the Cape,

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(9) Weissbuch, 1885, pt. i, p. 79. Quoted in "Origins of Modern German Colonialism," Mary E, Townsend, p. 157.

but it owed its origin as much to the audacity of the intruders as to any feeling that the British position was in danger, and it did not lead to action. No attempt was made at the outset to dispute the German claims, and it was not till October 31, 1883, that the Government made the admission that "it is impossible to ignore the complications which may arise from the creation of a rival interest in a country which has hitherto been considered as a kind of commercial dependency of this colony." (10) Moreover, the first acquisition of Herr Luderitz was, after all, only a small one, and if the Cape Ministers had been awake to the situation then, and willing to incur the expense involved, they could easily have annexed the great stretch of coast still left untouched. But instead, they suffered a second and larger acquisition to be made, and only when it was too late did they decide to send an English warship, the "Boadicea," to Angra Pequena to assert British rights. (11) This vessel was met by the German corvette "Carola," whose commander informed the British captain that he was in German territorial waters and could exercise no authority. (12) The "Boadicea" returned to Cape Town on November 3, 1883.

The first intimation that the public in England received of the events in South-west Africa was a telegram to the "Daily News" of July 12, 1883, which stated that "Angra Pequena

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(10) "The Germans and Africa," Evans Lewin, p. 92.
(11) Six weeks earlier (Sept. 8, 1883) the Cape had sent the gunboat "Starling" to Angra Pequena, but it took no action with regard to the mainland.
(12) "Partition of Africa," J. Scott Keltie, p. 185.

harbour, on the west coast, between Namaqualand and Damaraland, has been bought from the natives and occupied by a German trading company, under an alleged guarantee of the German Government. Possession has been taken of some miles inland." (13) It will be observed that the telegram mentions that the land was bought only under an "alleged guarantee," and this indicates very well, the key-note of the whole British attitude. Many people in England expressed anger at the German action, others treated it with ridicule, some few were even prepared to welcome it; but scarcely anyone realised that a new and formidable rival had entered the colonial field. It was regarded as extremely unlikely that the German nation as a whole, and Bismarck in particular, could suddenly abandon a traditional policy and come in a moment to entertain ideas of overseas expansion. Such was the ignorance in England of the German colonial movement, and of the various steps which were rapidly bringing it to a climax. The British Ministry itself was but little better informed than the outside public, and was evidently satisfied that the movements of the German traders represented only legitimate commercial enterprise. If, in their zeal, these traders had committed an unfriendly act towards England, it was sure to be repudiated soon by the German Government. Moreover, Mr. Gladstone had no inclination to urge a forward Imperial policy of his own

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(13) "The Germans and Africa," Evans Lewin, p. 90.

at this time, especially in South Africa. That country had too many unhappy recollections, and had already caused him a considerable loss of prestige. He was not really at home in foreign and Imperial affairs, and with his Government already deeply involved in Egypt, the activities of a few German traders on the barren coast of South-west Africa seemed relatively unimportant. There was no need for aggressive measures to settle the Angra Pequena affair; it could easily be disposed of through the usual diplomatic channels.

The particular line which the British diplomacy took in this matter will be the subject of the next chapter, but it will not be out of place here to give one more instance of the disinclination of both the Cape Colony and the Home Government to accept responsibilities in South-west Africa. At the very time when Herr Luderitz was making his plans to seize the harbour of Angra Pequena, the Governor of Cape Colony, Sir Hercules Robinson, received the following petition, dated January 5, 1883, from an important native chief asking that his lands might be taken under British protection:

The humble petition of Piet Haibib, of Rooibank, Chief of the Topnaar Tribe of Namaquas.

Sheweth,

That I, Piet Haibib, am the lawful and acknowledged Chief of the Topnaar Tribe of Namaquas.

That in 1876 I agreed to the annexation to the Cape Colony of that portion of my country now known as Walfisch Bay territory.

That my country extends for a considerable distance beyond the limits of the Walfisch Bay territory.

That G. Evenson and H. W. C. Wilmer have discovered and opened up valuable copper deposits within my territory.

That I have leased all such deposits within my territory to G. Evenson and H. W. C. Wilmer for a term of thirty-one years.

That I now humbly beg that the boundaries of the Walfisch Bay territory be extended so as to include the whole of my territory, in order that I and my people may live in peace and security under the Colonial law. (14)

Sir Hercules Robinson submitted this document, on February 15, to the Cape Ministry for consideration, and received the following reply:

Colonial Secretary's Office, Cape Town,
February 23, 1883.

In acknowledging the receipt of His Excellency the Governor's Minute of the 15th instant, with reference to a petition from Piet Haibib, Chief of the Topnaar tribe of the Namaqua nation, praying for an extension of the Walfisch Bay territory, Ministers request that His Excellency may be

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(14) Imperial Blue Book C.-3717, p. 109.

pleased to inform petitioner that they are at present unable to entertain the application.

(Signed) Thomas C. Scanlen. (15)

On February 26, 1883, the Governor of Cape Colony sent copies of this correspondence to the Earl of Derby at the Colonial Office in London, where they were received on March 21st. The Earl of Derby apparently concurred in the decision of the Cape Ministry not to accept further responsibilities in South-west Africa, and this despite the fact that the communications from Bismarck with regard to the intentions of Herr Luderitz had already begun.

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(15) Imperial Blue Book C.-3717, p. 110.

Chapter VI

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN BISMARCK AND LORD GRANVILLE

Early in 1883 there began a correspondence between Bismarck and Lord Granville on the subject of South-west Africa, which ended only in the autumn of 1884 with Great Britain's acknowledgment of German claims to the region, and the definite establishment of Germany as a colonial power. This correspondence affords an interesting study in diplomatic method, and a striking contrast in personality. On the one side Bismarck, direct yet cautious, technically correct in his procedure, conscious of the end he has in view but not always willing to show his hand, peevish when crossed, and occasionally openly insulting; on the other, Lord Granville, evasive, acting with the leisure of a school that was passing, apparently ignorant of the aims of Germany and hardly knowing those of England, but through it all, the perfect gentleman.

In November 1882, as previously mentioned, Herr Luderitz had asked the German Foreign Office if he could rely on Imperial protection for a factory which he was about to

establish on the south-west coast of Africa, and it was this request which led Bismarck to open up negotiations with England. The record of the Chancellor's first inquiry on this subject is contained in the following minute (February 7, 1883), by Sir Julian Pauncefote, of a conversation with Count Herbert Bismarck: "Count Herbert Bismarck says that a Bremen merchant is about to establish a factory near the coast between the Orange River and the Little Fish River, and has asked protection of the German Government in case of need. The latter desire to know whether Her Majesty's Government exercise any authority in that locality. If so, they would be glad if they would extend British protection to this German factory. If not, they will do their best to extend to it the same measure of protection which they give to their subjects in remote parts of the world, but without having the least design to establish any footing in South Africa." (1)

Lord Granville answered this communication by a note addressed to the German Embassy on February 23rd. "With reference to the inquiry made by Count Bismarck at this department on the 7th instant, ... I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency, that, having consulted the Colonial Office upon the subject, I am informed by that Department that the Government of the Cape Colony have certain establishments along the coast, but that, without more precise infor-

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(1) Parl. Paper C.-4265, p. 12, Appendix IV.

mation as to the spot where the German factory will be established, it is not possible to form any opinion as to whether the British authorities would have it in their power to give it any protection in case of need. If, however, the German Government would be good enough to furnish the required information, it would be forwarded to the Government of the Cape Colony with instructions to report whether and to what extent their wishes could be met." (2)

In view of the fact that England had all along disclaimed any right to the territory in question, and definitely asserted in 1880 that the Orange River was the north-western boundary of the Cape Colony, it might seem strange that Bismarck troubled to make inquiries at all in 1883. And, in truth, it is not quite clear what his objects were in doing so. He himself admitted later that he acted out of courtesy to Britain, and in order to keep Germany on strictly correct ground. On the face of it, the note would seem to indicate that if the British Government had agreed to accept the responsibility of protecting the settlements of Herr Luderitz, Germany would have been obliged to stand aside and would have done so willingly. But if Bismarck actually had ulterior motives at this time, he hid them carefully from unsuspecting statesmen in London by the statement that Germany had not "the least design to establish any footing in South Africa."

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(2) Parl. Paper C.-4265, p. 13, Appendix IV.

In England, as Lord Derby afterwards explained, the request appeared merely "to amount to a reiteration, in a new and modified form, of the demand, so often made in German interests, that British influence should be extended north of the Orange River." (3) But there was a new element introduced, namely, that Germany now offered to act independently if Britain failed to do so, whereas in 1880, she had definitely stated that independent action was out of the question. Lord Granville was only too prone to avoid facing responsibility, and unfortunately, his colleague at the Colonial Office, Lord Derby, was not the type to offset this failing. The latter lacked faith in himself, was averse to prompt action, and though his policy on the whole was careful and correct, it was never impressive. Thus it may have been the difficulty raised by the change in Germany's attitude which led to the sending of the somewhat evasive reply, quoted above, to Bismarck's inquiry.

On the other hand, Lord Granville's note implies that Germany should have sent an answer giving the information asked for with reference to the exact location of the proposed factory, but none of the sources consulted gives any indication that such an answer was ever sent. As a matter of fact, there is a long break in the correspondence at this point which renders it difficult to determine just what was taking place,

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(3) Parl. Paper C.-4265, p. 5.

especially on the British side. Most authorities condemn the dilatory methods of the British Foreign Office and the Cape Government, but say nothing whatever of the nature of the communications which no doubt passed between them. In one instance only, is the definite statement made that "England proceeded to employ the time gained by her vague reply to Germany of February 23, 1883, by attempting to make the Cape Government assert its claim to the territory beyond the Orange River." (4)

But while some doubts may exist as to the steps taken by Great Britain and the Cape Colony at this time, there is less uncertainty as to Germany's actions, for during the interval Luderitz made the acquisitions at Angra Pequena Bay, which were described in the previous chapter. Then Bismarck, his hand thus strengthened, renewed his inquiries, and on September 10, 1883, Baron von Plessen, German Chargé d'Affaires in London, stated that it was the "desire of the Imperial Government to be informed whether Her Majesty's Government claim suzerainty of the Bay of Angra Pequena." (5) No reply was given to this, and on November 16th, Count Herbert Bismarck made official inquiry as to whether the British Government had claims on Angra Pequena; and if so, on what these claims were based. Lord Granville still saw nothing in these requests to indicate that Germany intended to establish a protectorate

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(4) "Origins of Modern German Colonialism," Mary E. Townsend, p. 167. Her authority is Correspondence in British Sessional Papers.

(5) "The Germans and Africa," Evans Lewin, p. 92. (Harris, in his "Europe and Africa," p. 74, states that von Plessen misrepresented the extent of Luderitz's acquisitions).

over the region, in the event of England not having any control there, and he regarded them as simply raising the old question of protection for German commercial enterprises. Further, this British viewpoint had recently been strengthened by a communication (August 31, 1883) from Sir John Walsham in Berlin, which stated that "it would be a mistake to suppose that the Imperial Government have any present intention of establishing Crown Colonies, or of imitating, as the Press adds, the practice adopted by France of assuming a Protectorate over any territory acquired by a French traveller or explorer. The German Government are opposed to any plan which might hamper their foreign relations, and I believe what Lord Ampthill stated in his despatch is as true to-day as it was in 1880." (6)

The German position in South-west Africa had now become much stronger, and so sure was Luderitz of Imperial support, that on November 20, 1883, he announced publicly the nature of the acquisition which he had made in August, namely, the strip of coast extending from the Orange River to 26 degrees south latitude and twenty miles inland. (7) It was probably this action which at length roused Lord Granville and caused him to break his long silence, for on the very next day, November 21st, he replied to the German inquiries, stating that "although Her Majesty's Government had not proclaimed

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(6) "The Germans and Africa," Evans Lewin, p. 91.
(7) "Geschichte der Deutschen Kolonialpolitik," A. Zimmermann, p. 49.

the Queen's sovereignty along the whole country, but only at certain points, such as Walfisch Bay and the islands of Angra Pequena, they considered that any claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction by a foreign Power between the southern point of Portuguese jurisdiction at latitude 18 degrees south and the frontier of the Cape Colony would infringe their legitimate rights." (8) Germany, not unnaturally, refused to accept such a reply, being at a loss to understand how Britain could have legitimate rights in a region over which she claimed no sovereignty.

Bismarck was never wildly enthusiastic about overseas possessions, and to the end they remained extraneous to his main policy; but he was fully aware of the strength of the colonial movement, and was prepared to support it on his own terms. He had opened his negotiations concerning Angra Pequena in a formal and cautious manner, and no doubt both hoped and expected to win the good offices of England. The above reply sent by Lord Granville, however, created the impression in Germany that England was placing obstacles in her way, and from this time Bismarck's attitude became more aggressive. On December 31, 1883, he issued a long despatch to Count Munster, German Ambassador in London, in which he tried to prove that Great Britain had no claim to sovereignty in the region, and pointed out the necessity of the German

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(8) "Life of Lord Granville," Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, vol. ii, p. 349.
It seems strange that no reference was here made to the Dutch acquisition of Angra Pequena and other points in 1793, or to the considerable interests of British traders along the coast.

Government affording protection to its own subjects in districts where no adequate civil authority was established. As an instance he cited the common protest of England and Germany against the sovereign pretensions of Spain over the Caroline and Pelew Islands. The despatch concluded by saying that, "if the Government of Great Britain should claim sovereignty over the wide territory, hitherto considered independent, between the Orange River and the 18th degree of south latitude, the Imperial Government would, on account of the protection it owes to German trade, esteem it of importance to learn upon what title this claim is based, and what institutions England there possesses which would secure legal protection for German subjects in their commercial enterprises and justly won acquisitions, and would relieve the Empire from the duty of itself providing directly for its subjects in that territory the protection of which they may stand in need." (9)

Lord Granville referred this communication to the Colonial Office for consideration, and in Lord Derby's view there was still no suggestion that Bismarck intended colonisation. He stated later (Memorandum of October 7, 1884) that "he thought he saw merely an inquiry as to whether it would suit England to annex a larger territory than Walfisch Bay, and perhaps an encouragement to do so, and, in any case, an encouragement to establish effective institutions for the protection of

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(9) "Life of Lord Granville," Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, vol. ii, p. 349.

trade." (10) And the same idea was conveyed in his despatch of December 1884, to Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor of Cape Colony, when he wrote: "It appeared to us from the language used in the Ambassador's note of December 1883, that such a proceeding (i.e., an independent one) would only be resorted to as an alternative, from which Germany would willingly be relieved by action on the part of the British Government. I fully understood that the choice was before us of annexing the country or acquiescing in a German annexation." (11)

Thus, at the end of 1883, Great Britain had been driven into a position in which she found that it would be necessary either to annex the disputed territory or to admit that Germany had a free hand in it. And if she had followed what had been her avowed policy down to 1880, and even a year or two later, she would not have hesitated to reaffirm that she exercised no authority north of the Orange River, except at Walfisch Bay. But now that Germany was showing an interest in the region, the British Government suddenly discovered that they had legitimate rights there, and conveniently interpreted Bismarck's notes as an invitation to take over more land. Certain other considerations, however, also influenced Great Britain's decision at this time. It was realised that conditions had now changed since 1880 when Lord Kimberley had put such a decided negative upon the extension of the colony to the north, and that no matter how

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(10) "Life of Lord Granville," Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, vol. ii, p. 350.
(11) Parl. Paper C.-4265, p. 5.

friendly the existing relations between England and Germany, the Cape Government might reasonably object to the establishment of German control at the other side of the Orange River. Moreover, native affairs generally had greatly improved. As Lord Derby himself stated, "The Transkei was quiet, and the Colony had been relieved of the charge of Basutoland, whilst what was hoped would be a satisfactory solution of the Bechuana difficulty, was on the point of being concluded." (12)

So it was that Lord Derby began a belated correspondence with the Cape Government in order to ascertain their views. In a communication of December 13th, he had asked them to consider the advisability of extending their jurisdiction to Angra Pequena. (13) The Cape Ministry responded by sending a letter, dated January 30, 1884, in which they urged the British occupation of the region between the Orange River and latitude 26 degrees south on the ground that the "interests of order and civilisation (would be) best served by annexation." (14) But as such a step would involve considerable expenditure, Lord Derby telegraphed on February 3rd, "inquiring whether there was any prospect of the Cape Government undertaking the control of Angra Pequena, which was the only point then prominently in contemplation, in the event of that place being declared British, because it might be difficult otherwise to resist the representations of Germany, that,

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(12) Parl. Paper C.-4265, p. 6.
(13) "Europe and Africa," Norman Dwight Harris, p. 75.
(14) Ibid., p. 76.

failing other protection for German subjects there, that country would be compelled to assume jurisdiction over the place." (15) The reply of the Cape, made on February 6th, was a request that the matter be left open pending a meeting of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister then being absent.

It seems clear from this exchange of messages, that one stumbling block to a speedy settlement of the affair was the question of expense. The British Government were evidently not disposed to undertake the upkeep entailed by the acquisition of new territories, however desirable they might be in themselves; and since the Cape Government were equally unwilling to incur the cost incident to annexation, nothing was done. Unfortunately, a further delay was now caused by the defeat of Mr. Scanlen's Ministry, and three precious months passed without any word from Cape Colony.

Lord Derby, in consequence of certain communications from the German Government, at length sent an urgent telegram to the Cape on May 7th saying that "it was necessary to tell the German Minister what was intended by Her Majesty's Government as to Angra Pequena, and that if the Colonial Government desired that it should be under British jurisdiction, they should immediately express their readiness to accept the responsibility and cost." (16) But as the new Ministry had not had time to consider the matter, no answer was sent until

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(15) Parl. Paper C.-4265, p. 6.
(16) Ibid.

May 29th, when Sir Hercules Robinson informed Lord Derby that the Cape Government would recommend Parliament to undertake the control of the whole coast from the Orange River to Walfisch Bay, including Angra Pequena. Lord Derby referred this decision to the Foreign Office with a recommendation that the German Government be notified; but it was now too late, and Lord Granville knew it - Germany had acted.

Bismarck was a man who had little sympathy with British constitutional methods, and throughout the negotiations he insisted on dealing directly with Lord Granville. The delays consequent upon the passage of notes between the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and the Cape Government, were no concern of his, and all he saw was the irritating fact that his message of December 31st remained unanswered. He was at the height of his power at this time, and his word was practically law in European counsels; it therefore piqued his sensitive pride that England should appear to thwart him, and that her Ministers were beyond his dictation. (17) Thus when a year had elapsed without any definite decision having been arrived at with reference to Angra Pequena, Bismarck determined to take his own line. In April 1884, Herr von Kusserow happened to ask him if he should again inquire from the British Government when an answer might be expected to the note of December 31st,

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(17) C. Grant Robertson in his "Bismarck," p. 329, makes the statement that, "There is clear evidence that Bismarck between 1880 and 1885 tried to get both Lord Derby and Lord Granville dismissed, and their places taken by ministers more amenable to German dictation."

and Bismarck replied, "Now we will act!" (18) Accordingly, on April 24th, he despatched the following telegram to Herr Lippert, the German Consul at Cape Town: "According to the statements of Herr Luderitz, the colonial authorities have inquired whether his possessions north of the Orange River are entitled to German protection. You will therefore officially declare that he and his settlements are under the protection of the Empire." (19) And at the same time, the Chancellor notified Lord Granville of what he had done.

The German Consul at the Cape communicated this telegram to the Colonial Government on April 25th, but the latter quite ignored it when they sent their note of May 29th, and Lord Derby, on June 2nd, urged the Foreign Office to send a British warship to Angra Pequena that there might be no ground "for alleging that the continued absence of British protection made German intervention necessary." (20) Moreover, the Cape Premier informed Herr Lippert that the Cape Colony had decided to take over Angra Pequena with full responsibility. This move was not to the liking of Bismarck, and he flatly declared that he had nothing whatever to do with either the Colonial Office or the Cape Government, and could not recognise their decisions. Then in a lengthy despatch of June 10th to Count Munster, he stated that he had been misunderstood, that in his note of December 31, 1883, he had simply asked for a

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(18) "The German Empire," W. H. Dawson, vol. ii, p. 184.
(19) German White Book, "The Times" (London), Dec. 13, 1884.
(20) "Life of Lord Granville," Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, vol. ii, p. 352.

declaration that Great Britain had then no claim to the disputed territory, and that he could not accept the position of England as indicated by the earlier despatches of Lord Granville that one country had the right to exclude others, while still failing to assert its own jurisdiction and sovereignty. The Chancellor concluded his review of the controversy as follows:

"My intention was to obtain by these inquiries a formal acknowledgment from England that this strip of land was in European opinion 'res nullius,' with no shadow of mistrust or offence on either side. My intention was to receive on this point a positive declaration from England that she had up to that time no pretension to, or rightful claim over, that strip of land. Our question could have been answered by England in a week, without referring it to the Cape; it was only a question of a declaration of the recognised possessions of England at that moment.

"This simple question became so complicated by England, that Lord Granville, and even more Lord Derby, understood it as a question whether it would suit England to annex still more than Walfisch Bay on that coast. A reference of the question to the Cape Colony, and the awaiting the solution of the ministerial crisis there, would only have been necessary if they required to be assured whether England or its province,

the Cape Colony, desired to annex fresh strips of coast in that vicinity. In order to answer our question, a simple inspection of the register of the former English possessions would have sufficed; but this register excluded the entire coast north of the Orange River, excepting Walfisch Bay.

"This is the point on which, according to my conviction, we have not been treated fairly by England. This feeling has been strengthened by the explanations which several English statesmen have given, with the purport that England has a legitimate right to prevent settlements by other nations in the vicinity of English possessions, and that England establishes a sort of Monroe doctrine in Africa against the vicinage of other nations; and, further, that England, always premising that that strip of land is 'res nullius,' and the Cape Colony depending on England, allows herself the right to seize this unclaimed land, and dispute the right of any other nation, and especially ours, to claim it." (21)

It was at this time that the Chancellor's son, Count Herbert Bismarck, was sent to London in order to confer personally with Lord Granville, and at the same time to look after colonial affairs at the German Embassy, where Count Munster was considered to have been too lax in pushing his country's interests. At the interview which soon followed between Count Herbert Bismarck and Lord Granville, the whole question of

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(21) German White Book, June 10, 1884. Quoted in "Life of Lord Granville," Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, vol. ii, p. 352.

Angra Pequena was fully discussed. The British Foreign Secretary said that there had been misunderstandings on both sides, and that while the German Government could act directly and was strictly correct in dealing only with the Foreign Office, still it was necessary to realise the difficult and more complicated conditions under which British colonial affairs were managed. He also denied that Lord Derby had deliberately utilised the delay in order to encourage the Cape to annex the disputed region, and concluded by promising to give immediate attention to the note of December 31st, the reply to which, he regretted, had been so long delayed. (22)

Lord Derby, meanwhile, telegraphed the Cape Ministry on June 17th, stating that in view of the fact that the wishes of the German Government were now better understood, it would be advisable not to bring forward the vote for the control and cost of the coast-line and Angra Pequena at present, in order to avoid any misunderstanding between Great Britain and Germany pending negotiations.

The responsibility for a final settlement rested with Lord Granville, and it is important to remember that in coming to a decision with Germany he was not at liberty to judge the Angra Pequena incident on its own merits. He had to take a wider survey, and consider the foreign and colonial situation as a whole. Almost at the same time as Bismarck sent his

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(22) "Life of Lord Granville," Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, vol. ii, p. 353.

strong despatch of June 10, 1884, Germany, working in close co-operation with France, refused to recognise the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of the preceding February relating to the Congo, and organised the European protest against it. And in April, the Chancellor had again reminded England that nothing had been done to meet his demand for a Joint Commission to settle long outstanding Fijian claims. The British position in Egypt, moreover, was still uncertain and perplexing, and Lord Granville realised full well that Germany's influence in this matter could not wisely be ignored. As a member of the British Cabinet once remarked to Herbert Bismarck, "Your father might have upset our apple-cart in Egypt, if he had liked."(23) And that Bismarck knew the value of Egypt as a lever to gain his ends elsewhere was soon evident, for Count Munster now informed Lord Granville verbally "that the German Government could not maintain a friendly attitude on Egyptian matters if Great Britain maintained an unfriendly attitude on colonial questions." (24) Weighing these various considerations, the British Cabinet decided, on June 21st, to recognise German sovereignty at Angra Pequena, and this decision was at once conveyed to Count Munster. There quickly followed the formal abandonment of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, and the establishment of a Joint Commission to inquire into the German claims in Fiji.

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(23) "Europe and Africa," Norman Dwight Harris, p. 69.
(24) "Life of Lord Granville," Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, vol. ii, p. 354.

Yet even now the British Government showed an amazing lack of tact, for instead of making their submission concerning Angra Pequena with as good a will as possible, they were ungracious enough to append a wholly unwarrantable condition. On July 19th the Foreign Office, through Lord Ampthill, officially announced the "readiness of Her Majesty's Government to recognise the right of the German Government to protect its subjects at the aforesaid place, so soon as the two Governments can come to an agreement, giving security that a penal colony shall not be established at any point of the coast in question." (25) Bismarck was so disturbed by this communication that he wrote himself, from Varzin, on July 24th, characterising the request as so extraordinary that he could not lay it before the Emperor, (26) and he refused to give England the security demanded on the ground that she had no right to ask for it. Thus brought to task, the British Government finally accepted the German annexation unconditionally on September 22nd. Germany was welcomed as a colonial neighbour in South Africa, and her protectorate was recognised as extending from the Portuguese frontier at 18 degrees south latitude to the Orange River.

Meanwhile, the Cape Government were still in the belief that the territory could be won for the British Empire, and on July 9th Sir Hercules Robinson telegraphed to the Colonial Office that the Cape Ministers were anxiously awaiting

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(25) German White Book, "The Times" (London), Dec. 13, 1884; also "The German Empire," W. H. Dawson, vol. ii, p. 187.
(26) German White Book, "The Times" (London), Dec. 13, 1884.

information relative to the negotiations with Germany, and indicated that the feeling in the Colony was strongly in favour of the retention of British authority over the coast-line from the Orange River northwards. On July 14th Lord Derby replied to this indicating that Her Majesty's Government did not consider themselves in a position to oppose the German claims as he understood them, and that "so much therefore of the country in the neighbourhood of Angra Pequena as may be, after careful inquiry, found to have been acquired in proper form by Mr. Luderitz, would be under the protection of the German Empire." (27) He also suggested in conclusion that the coast north of the 26th degree of south latitude should be placed under British protection. It seems incredible that Lord Derby could still have been so blind to the real intentions of Germany in South-west Africa, and it was no doubt his attitude which encouraged the Cape Parliament, on July 16th, to declare in favour of the annexation of the whole coast-line from the Orange River to the Portuguese frontier, and to express a hope to the Governor, even so late as August 25th, that the whole territory might yet be secured for Great Britain.

Such resolutions were now worthless. On August 7th, Captain Schering of the ship "Elizabeth" made the proclamation with which this paper opened, declaring a German protectorate over the coast between the Orange River and the 26th degree

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(27) Quoted in Parl. Paper C.-4265, p. 6.

of south latitude. Then on August 22nd, three days before the Cape resolutions were received in England, the German Chargé d'Affaires notified the Foreign Office of the existence of German claims to the north of the 26th parallel, and gave the impression that his Government intended to take over the acquisitions of their subjects in this region. This information made it difficult to act upon the Cape resolutions when they arrived, and while the question was under consideration, the German warship "Wolf" set all doubts at rest by declaring the remainder of the coast, except Walfisch Bay, under the protection of the Empire. Soon after this the Cape Government made their final appeal, writing on September 17th that "no weight has been attached to the wishes of the colony with regard to the coast-line from the Orange River northward, notwithstanding the offer of the colony to undertake all responsibility and cost in connection with the coast." (28) They also urged the British Government to annex the remaining unappropriated interior of Damaraland and Namaqualand, but to this Lord Derby, on November 11th, made the cautious reply that "it would not be in accordance with international comity to annex the territory immediately adjacent to the existing German limits." (29) Then in a long letter of December 4th to Sir Hercules Robinson, Lord Derby sought to explain to the Cape the British position, and in his conclusion made some

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(28) "The German Empire," W. H. Dawson, vol. ii, p. 188.
(29) Ibid.

rather candid admissions. "The German Emperor," he said, "had acquired for himself, by the recognised means, a strip of territory to which the Queen of England had no sufficient legal title, and in which German trading and missionary interests were apparently more considerable than those of her own subjects. Great Britain, which already possesses large tracts of unoccupied territory, could not fairly grudge to a friendly Power a country difficult of development, with regard to which it might have been said that we had never thought it worth acquiring until it seemed to be wanted by our neighbour." (30)

A consideration of the questions raised in the British Parliament and the replies made thereto, serves to throw some further light on the peculiar attitude of the British Government, and emphasises their complete failure to realise the seriousness of Germany's intentions. In the Upper House the chief opponent of the Government's policy was Viscount Sidmouth, a man who had always taken a keen interest in South African affairs, and who, as early as 1876, had written to "The Times," pointing out the great advantages that would result to coastal shipping by making use of Angra Pequena Bay. During the controversy with Germany, Viscount Sidmouth kept the question continually before the Lords, showed the seriousness of the situation that was developing, and demanded

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(30) Parl. Paper C.-4265, p. 6.

to know what steps were being taken by the Government to protect British rights.

On May 12, 1884, in answer to a question by Viscount Sidmouth, Lord Granville stated that, "The German Government has never assumed any sovereignty over any portion of these territories that I am aware of."(31) Such a reply shows how little weight Lord Granville attached to the announcement made by Bismarck, on April 24th, that both Luderitz and his settlements were to be regarded as under the protection of the Empire. Viscount Sidmouth again raised the question of the British position at Angra Pequena, on May 19th, and received the following reply from Lord Derby: "We have never formally claimed it as far as I am aware. We have never established any Government there. I am not forgetful of the fact that nearly ninety years ago a British vessel, under Captain Alexander, touched there and took possession of the place in the name of the British Crown. (32) But, as that transaction took place ninety years ago, and was not followed by any notification to Foreign Powers, the question might fairly be raised how far a nominal claim of that kind would be held to be valid now. The language we have held with regard to that territory is that, although we have not formally claimed the Bay, we have claimed the right to exclude

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(31) Hansard, 3rd Series, vol. 288, col. 5.
(32) The Cape Government, in their efforts to establish a claim to Angra Pequena, discovered a letter relating to this voyage of Captain Alexander, the text of which will be found in "The Germans and Africa," Evans Lewin, p. 92.

Foreign Powers on the general grounds of its nearness to our Settlements, and the absence of any other claims; but we have never set up any Government there, and never attempted to make it a settlement or a Colony. There is, as the House is aware, a German Agent lately established there. But the establishment of trading stations does not in itself constitute any claim to the territory, and has nothing to do with the question of Sovereignty." (33)

A few days previously (May 16, 1884), Lord Derby had expressed similar views to a deputation of South African merchants, who had urged that Angra Pequena should not be given up to Germany, and that the British Government should establish a larger measure of authority over the south-western coast of Africa. "We had not claimed the place itself as British territory; but we had claimed a sort of general right to exclude Foreign Powers from that coast up to the Portuguese territory. The German Government had made various inquiries into the nature of our claims, but so far as the correspondence had yet gone he did not understand that Germany had actually disputed those claims. He apprehended that the question was not really so much one of any intention on the part of the German Government to set up a colony there as an inquiry upon their part whether we claim the possession of the coast, and in that case whether we will give security to the Germans trading or

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(33) Hansard, 3rd Series, vol. 288, col. 646.

settling there, and if we are either unable or unwilling to give them security whether we shall object to the German Government doing it themselves. . . . . He might say that he did not share the apprehension which some people felt as to the desire of the German Government to establish colonies in various parts of the world. Colonisation was not the German policy; they believed that concentration was the secret of their strength, and they were not at all disposed to weaken themselves by occupying distant possessions in various parts of the world." (34)

Then on June 30, 1884, still in answer to questions raised by Viscount Sidmouth, Lord Granville stated that the results of the communications between the German and British Governments "gave every reason to hope that the question was likely to be settled, which, at one time, seemed calculated to lead to considerable friction. Her Majesty's Government, after considering the whole circumstances of the case, and after considering the statements of the German Government, and more especially with regard to the declarations made some years ago by the Government as to the limits of the Cape Colony, came to the conclusion that it was not possible nor desirable for them to oppose the protection of the German Empire being extended to German subjects having establishments in Angra Pequena. Her Majesty's Government would be ready to

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(34) "The Times" (London), May 17, 1884.

give a formal recognition to that protection after an agreement was come to which, he had no doubt, would secure all acquired rights, would prevent any chance of a convict establishment being founded there, and would secure the interests of British subjects, whether they had had concessions from the Native Chiefs, or whether they were Englishmen trading in those parts." (35) In view of the fact that Lord Granville gives as one of his main reasons for agreeing to the German protectorate the circumstance that his own Government had already made very definite declarations as to the limits of the Cape Colony, it seems strange indeed that it should have taken him over a year to admit this. An earlier statement of British limits and responsibilities in the region might have prevented much of the ill-feeling which arose between Germany and England. The answer given by Bismarck to Lord Granville's stipulation that a convict establishment should not be set up has already been mentioned.

The affair of Angra Pequena itself having been settled, there remained the question of the coast-line to the north and south of it. Here again both Great Britain and the Cape Colony showed as little knowledge of Bismarck as they had done in connection with Angra Pequena, for, having neglected to secure some or all of this territory, as might easily have been done in the first instance, they now proposed to annex

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(35) Hansard, 3rd Series, vol. 289, col. 1655.

the whole of it when it was certainly too late. On July 29th, 1884, in answer to a question on this subject asked by Sir Henry Holland in the House of Commons, Mr. Evelyn Ashley, Under Secretary of State, made the following statement: "It is proposed that the coast between the Orange River and the Southern Portuguese boundary, including the British settlement at Walfisch Bay, shall be brought under the control of the Cape Government; but this control will not be exercised within the territory at Angra Pequena, which will be under German protection." (36) Sir Henry Holland then inquired if German protection meant formal annexation and the hoisting of the German flag, or merely German protection of German subjects, to which Mr. Ashley replied, "As at present assented to by the German Government, it is merely German protection," (37) Such a misconception of Germany's ambitions in South-west Africa, at so late a date, is almost unbelievable; and Mr. Ashley must have felt the awkwardness of his position when it fell to his lot to announce to the Lower House, four months later, that the Protectorate proclaimed by Germany extended from the Orange River to the Portuguese frontier, excepting Walfisch Bay, and for twenty miles inland.

Outside of Parliament, the colonial question was one which easily lent itself to the play of prejudice and passion, and throughout the Angra Pequena controversy, a considerable

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(36) Hansard, 3rd Series, vol. 291, col. 851.
(37) Ibid., col. 852.

sentiment, hostile to Germany, made itself manifest. To many Englishmen the sudden rise of Germany to Continental importance had made necessary a sufficiently troublesome readjustment of ideas, and it now seemed preposterous that this upstart nation should invade the colonial field, concerning which Britain's long supremacy at sea had engendered a satisfaction with existing things, and a desire to preserve them undisturbed. Thus many harsh things were said about Germany by the less responsible British newspapers. On the other hand, the London "Times," and many of the leading magazines adopted a very conciliatory attitude towards Germany, and reproached their own Government with having given Bismarck reason to believe that England was jealous of his first colonial endeavours. The following quotation from a leading article in the "Times" is typical of this more moderate attitude: "The Angra Pequena business, which is really of small concern to us, has suddenly swollen to vast dimensions in German eyes, and it must be regretted that our Government are to blame for this magnifying of a molehill into a mountain. There is a feeling in Prince Bismarck's mind that he was not well treated by England when he first asked whether this country had any objections to urge against a German settlement at Angra Pequena; and an impartial review of the facts compels us to own that he has some justification for his displeasure. Africa is large enough to offer

scope for the peaceful enterprises of Germany as well as of England. Not even the most Imperialist of Englishmen could view with jealousy any attempts of Germany to open markets for herself or found colonies on the South-west African Coast. Of such good work in exploration, populating, and civilising as is to be done in those regions, she is welcome, so far as our nation is concerned, to take her share; and this is what our Government might have plainly and graciously said when questioned on the subject. But the Circumlocution Office is not extinct yet, and Prince Bismarck has grounds for complaining that when he approached our Government in a spirit which showed that he had no intention either of disturbing our interests or alarming our susceptibilities, he could not get Lord Granville to speak out. The question as to whether Angra Pequena was in British territory or formed part of No Man's Land, was referred first to one authority, then to another; and meanwhile, these delays spread a belief in Germany that we wanted to follow the dog-in-the-manger policy of keeping others out of land which was useless to ourselves." (38)

Among statesmen, perhaps the sanest and most sober note was sounded by Mr. Chamberlain, a man who was himself destined, at no distant date, to bring about a revolution in Colonial Office methods, and to become the leading interpreter of Britain's new Imperialism. Speaking at Birmingham on January 1,

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(38) "The Times" (London), August 20, 1884.

1885, Mr. Chamberlain stated that, "It would be humiliating indeed if England, the mistress of half the world, were to be driven to imitate the conduct of an angry scold, and indulge in a fit of hysterical passion because Germany had snapped up some unconsidered trifles of territory which we have hitherto not thought it worth while to acquire. If it be necessary, as I think it may be, to review our foreign and colonial policy in the light of recent events, let us face the altered circumstances of the problem in the spirit of full-grown men and not with the pettish outcry of frightened children." (39)

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(39) "The German Empire," W. H. Dawson, vol. ii, p. 205.

Chapter VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Having outlined the story of Angra Pequena as told in the official correspondence between Great Britain and Germany, there remains but to sum up and attempt to draw some conclusions.

It has been shown that back of the German colonial activities which became prominent after 1880 there lay the traditions of the past, and that these were augmented by the writings of economists and historians, and by the more practical endeavours of missionaries, explorers, and merchants. Then with the welding of national unity in 1870 by the sharp arbitrament of war, there grew up a new consciousness of strength, a tremendously increased prestige, and a natural desire for the appurtenances of empire. The industrial revolution and increased facilities for communication stimulated a search for new markets, while continued emigration showed the need of German lands for German settlers. A further impetus was then given to the colonial movement by the formation of the various commercial societies, notably the

"Kolonialverein," and by the general re-awakening of European Imperial instincts consequent upon the opening up of the African continent.

The winning of the support of Bismarck was a slow process. His political system was anchored in the hegemony of Germany in Europe, and he was unwilling to undertake anything which might weaken its hold. At the same time, however, he was keenly observant of the trend of affairs both at home and abroad, and showed an amazing skill in manipulating new situations to his own advantage. Thus when a combination of forces in the early eighties clearly indicated that it would be to his interest to give direction to the colonial movement, Bismarck grasped the opportunity and cautiously withdrew his opposition. The foreign situation was extremely favourable; the Triple Alliance had been formed and the activities of France successfully diverted, while the embarrassments of England, especially in Egypt, invited exploitation. Moreover, in domestic affairs, Bismarck had need of strengthening his own position, and of satisfying a clamorous public opinion. Speaking in the Reichstag as late as January 1889, Bismarck remarked, "For the sake of two million marks I cannot throw myself against the great impulse of the nation, or offer opposition to the will of the whole country. To this day I am not 'a colonies man,' and I entertain the gravest apprehension on

the subject; but I was compelled to decide upon yielding to the general demand of the nation. . . . . If the locomotive of Empire has struck out a track for itself, I shall not be the one to throw stones in its way." (1)

It must be admitted that Germany's desire for colonies was perfectly legitimate. But Bismarck, in acceding to his country's wishes for overseas expansion, apparently did so less from any intrinsic value which he attached to colonies, than from the opportunity which it gave him of working out his policy in his own peculiar way. The Chancellor was inordinately vain; he must ever be the great ring-master of Europe at the crack of whose whip all other governments responded, and nothing delighted him more than a chance to show the skill with which he could bring a stubborn performer, or one whom he made appear to be stubborn, into line. His diplomacy, therefore, was seldom simple; it was usually of such a nature as to rouse just the amount of opposition which he felt sure he could overcome or easily smooth away.

In 1883 a considerable amount of criticism began to be levelled at Bismarck from within Germany itself, and it was in order to win support in the Government and to reinstate himself in the eyes of his countrymen that he decided to manipulate the existing foreign situation and the colonial movement. At the beginning of the negotiations on Angra

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(1) "Bismarck," C. Grant Robertson, p. 423, note.

Pequena, the Chancellor indicated that he had no intention of establishing a footing in South Africa, and when Great Britain took him at his word and proceeded, in a very leisurely way it is true, to learn what might be done to protect German interests, he chose to interpret the delays which arose as evidence of British opposition. He was then able to point to the selfishness of England and to work up an anti-English sentiment in his own interests. His communications thereafter became more aggressive, and as he grew surer of his ground, he acted. It was easy then to make all Germany believe that the final triumph was a triumph of Bismarckian diplomacy over a hostile Britain.

Lord Ampthill, while he failed to realise the full import of the colonial agitation in Germany, did at least warn the British Government of the use which Bismarck was making of it. In March 1884, he pointed out that Bismarck's interest in colonial policy was greatly increasing because of the prospect of a general election in the autumn, and on August 2nd of the same year he wrote, "I am in perfect despair at Prince Bismarck's present inclination to increase his popularity before the general election by taking up an anti-English attitude. Compelled by the colonial mania, which has gradually come to the surface in Germany, to act contrary to his better convictions in the Angra Pequena question, he has discovered an

unexplored mine of popularity in starting a colonial policy, which public opinion persuades itself to be anti-English; and the slumbering theoretical envy of the Germans at our wealth and our freedom has awakened and taken the form of abuse of everything English in the press." (2) It was one of the most unfortunate features of the whole colonial dispute that even when the German and British Governments settled their differences, the anti-English feeling aroused at this time was left to rankle among important sections of the German nation.

Bismarck had a fine sense of limits, and it is certain that he would never willingly have provoked a war with Britain over colonial questions. Nevertheless, there were times when he was prepared to go to considerable lengths in order to gain his own ends. In a despatch to Count Munster, dated May 5, 1884, the Chancellor frankly offered to throw his weight on the British side in Egypt, on condition that Great Britain would give a friendly hand to Germany in colonial affairs. Then some time later, during one of his fiery speeches against England, he produced this despatch in the Reichstag and informed the deputies that no reply had been received to it. Lord Granville's answer to this announcement was a statement that no reply had been sent for the simple reason that the note had never been received. Bismarck's explosion of wrath in the Reichstag had alarmed Count Munster, who hastily made

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(2) "Life of Lord Granville," Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, vol. ii, p. 358.

a search of his papers. "I had a talk with Munster," Lord Granville wrote to Mr. Gladstone on February 4, 1885. "He was frightened out of his wits, and went home to consult his archives. He found the famous despatch, but a telegram not to act upon it. He begged me to keep this secret." (3) On January 24, 1885, Bismarck read the despatch to Sir Edward Malet, Lord Ampthill's successor at Berlin. "This despatch," the Ambassador wrote to Lord Granville, "was a very remarkable one. It stated the great importance which the Prince attached to the colonial question, and also to the friendship of Germany and England. It pointed out that in the commencement of German colonial enterprise England might render signal service to Germany, and said that for such service Germany would use her best endeavours in England's behalf in questions affecting her interests nearer home. It pressed these considerations with arguments to show the mutual advantage which such understanding would produce, and it then proceeded to instruct Count Munster to say if it could not be effected the result would be that Germany would seek from France the assistance which she had failed to obtain from England, and would draw closer to her on the same lines on which she now endeavoured to meet England."(4)

Bismarck undoubtedly had cause for complaint against Great Britain and the Cape Colony during the negotiations on South-west Africa; but at the same time it is reasonable to

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(3) "Life of Lord Granville," Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, vol. ii, p. 428.
(4) "The German Empire," W. H. Dawson, vol. ii, p. 185, note.

suppose that if he had stated his needs and intentions more clearly at the outset, on the lines of the cancelled despatch of May 5th, and offered concessions to England in other fields in return for her support in colonial matters, he might have gained his object without arousing ill-feeling. That he chose a more tortuous method shows the impossibility of separating his actions in colonial affairs from the exigencies of domestic and foreign politics, and leads to the conclusion that he valued the strengthening of his own position and prestige by the rousing of Germany's latent dislike of England, even more than he valued England's good-will.

On the British side it has been shown that the relations with South Africa were difficult from the beginning, that expansion was slow and reluctant, and that the situation was complicated by the presence of the Dutch and the natives. Successive Colonial Secretaries from Lord Glenelg to Lord Kimberley registered their unwillingness to increase the responsibilities of the British Government; but as the march of events proved stronger than the general tendency of the Colonial Office, Great Britain went steadily forward to the position of paramount power in South Africa. The west coast, being barren and unattractive, and leading in the interior to the Kalahari Desert, was naturally left alone while other and more suitable areas were available for expansion. But even

here British traders, explorers, and missionaries became active, and the far-sighted Sir Bartle Frere pointed out what ought to be the logical development of British power, and urged the expansion of British control clear to the Portuguese frontier. Even such zeal as his, however, could wring from the Colonial Office only a grudging consent to the taking over of Walfisch Bay, the principal harbour on the coast.

This was the situation when, in 1880, the Gladstone Government took office. The election had been won partly because the country was weary of the Imperialism of Disraeli, and the Liberals had pledged themselves to a more just and less aggressive policy in external affairs. The interests of Mr. Gladstone himself were domestic - finance, the franchise, and above all the Irish question; and he disliked the overseas problems which the dawning of a new world era suddenly thrust into prominence. Moreover, his Ministry was not homogeneous, and even his own great authority and prestige proved unable to keep it intact to the end. Lord Granville, at the Foreign Office, was constitutionally indolent, and he tended to meet responsibilities either by passing them on to others, or simply ignoring them. His policy, therefore, was generally of a negative and pacific kind. "It was impossible," said Lord Cromer, "to get him to give a definite answer to a difficult question when he wished not to commit himself. His power

of eluding the main point at issue was quite extraordinary. Often did I think that he was on the horns of a dilemma, and that he was in a position from which no escape was possible without the expression of a definite opinion. I was generally mistaken. With a smile and a quick little epigrammatic phrase, Lord Granville would elude one's grasp and be off without giving any opinion at all. . . . . Lord Granville always seemed to me to make the mistake of confounding the cases in which the dawdling 'laissez-faire' policy was wise, with those in which it was necessary to take time by the forelock and have a clearly defined policy at an early date." (5) At the Colonial Office, Lord Derby, while having the reputation of possessing the highest quality of the statesman, "aptness to be right," was nevertheless so given to turning a subject over in his mind in quest of that rightness, that he frequently postponed action until action was too late. (6) Bismarck had little use for the Liberalism of Mr. Gladstone, merely tolerated Lord Granville, and positively hated Lord Derby; and it cannot be doubted that he took some relish in exploiting the weakness of this Government in Imperial affairs.

South Africa presented a difficult situation to the Liberals at the outset, and the failure to redeem their election pledges concerning the Transvaal in the same generous spirit in which they appeared to have been made, led to the

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(5) "Modern Egypt," Lord Cromer, vol. i, p. 392, note.
(6) Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition.

tragedy of Majuba Hill. This disaster was the first stain on the good name of the new Government. It was quickly followed by the crisis in Egypt, the bombardment of Alexandria, and the whole unhappy train of events that culminated in the death of General Gordon and the fall of Khartoum. It is necessary to remember these things for they show the difficult and embarrassed position of the British Government when they were called upon to deal with the colonial ambitions of Germany in South-west Africa.

Lord Kimberley's despatch of 1880 definitely placed the north-western boundary of the Cape Colony at the Orange River, and between that and the Portuguese frontier the only British possessions were the guano islands off the coast and the important harbour of Walfisch Bay. And even so late as 1882, both Great Britain and the Cape rejected the offer made by a native chief to place his territory in the neighbourhood of Walfisch Bay under British control. It is evident then that no idea of British expansion in this region was even contemplated when Germany approached Lord Granville, in February 1883, on the question of affording protection to the proposed factory of Herr Luderitz. The answer given by Lord Granville to this question, and indeed the whole trend of the correspondence on the British side, is intelligible only when it is borne in mind that Germany had previously made many similar

requests, and that Great Britain still tended to think of the old Germany with her interests primarily on the Continent and in the consolidation of her Empire. Perhaps the most serious condemnation of the British statesmen is the fact that they failed to recognise the new strong tone of a young and vigorous nation, with Imperial aspirations that could only be met, if they were to be met at all at so late a date, by resolute and speedy action. The good faith of men like Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, and Lord Derby, cannot be questioned, but it hardly excuses their lack of vision on this particular point.

It cannot be doubted, in view of the strength and zeal of the colonial party in Germany, that the expedition of Herr Luderitz was something more than a private trading venture. Luderitz had the backing of powerful commercial interests, and the step which he took was probably meant to try the temper of the British Government, and to force the hand of Bismarck. But while the intentions of the German traders may not present any difficulty, it is less easy to determine just how much support Bismarck was prepared to give them at the outset. If he were not still undecided as to the advisability of creating protectorates, then his statement that he did not intend to establish any footing in South Africa has every appearance of a deliberate attempt to deceive the British Government. In any case, the Chancellor's communications were worded with

considerable care and skill, and at no time led British statesmen to suppose that anything more was intended than simply trade protection. But it was the misfortune of Lord Granville and Lord Derby, with their preconceived views of German policy, to see in them also an invitation to extend England's authority in the region, and so they made no attempt to encourage even German commercial enterprise. In the eyes of international law the whole extent of coast, with the exception of Walfisch Bay, was independent, and the British Foreign Office must have known this no less than Bismarck. Lord Granville's declaration, therefore, that any claim to sovereignty by a foreign Power in the region between the Orange River and the Portuguese frontier would infringe his Government's legitimate rights, must have seemed high-handed to Germany, and Bismarck cannot be blamed for having resented it. And to a man of Bismarck's stamp, even the shadow of opposition was enough to rouse all the fighter that was in him. Thus misunderstandings quickly developed on both sides, and once words had been bandied, even civil words, a peaceful settlement of the affair that would leave no aftermath became impossible. From this time Bismarck seems to have decided to support the commercial colonialists with more vigour, and so to present to Britain a series of "faits accomplis." This was the plan followed throughout all his later colonial activities, though he was more prompt and

less scrupulous in these than in the Angra Pequena affair. Moreover, the provocation given by England, exaggerated by Bismarck for political purposes, won for the colonial cause in Germany a host of new supporters, and greatly strengthened the Chancellor's position.

In the light of later developments, a good deal of abuse has been showered on the British Government of the time for the weakness of their policy in connection with South-west Africa, and no doubt much of it is deserved. Nevertheless, in justice to England, the question has to be looked at with the eyes of 1884, and the Angra Pequena incident was certainly not then regarded by British statesmen, who after all were only human, as of major importance. In fact, it is possible to read through the life of Mr. Gladstone and not find Angra Pequena even mentioned. The same, however, cannot be said of Egypt. That was where British anxiety chiefly lay, and when the colonial dispute had passed from Africa to New Guinea and the Pacific islands, Mr. Gladstone expressed his views to Lord Granville in a letter written on March 6, 1885: "A word by way of postscript to my note of yesterday, in which I conveyed to you that, according to Herbert Bismarck, there is and can be no quarrel about Egypt if colonial matters are amicably settled. Now I do hope that you are pressing forward the 'Pauncefote' settlement of the north coast of New Guinea,

which seems to me the main or only point remaining. It is really impossible to exaggerate the importance of getting out of the way the bar to the Egyptian settlement. These words, strong as they are, are in my opinion words of truth and soberness; as, if we cannot wind up at once these small colonial controversies, we shall before we are many weeks older find it to our cost." (7)

Britain's chief fault was not so much her inability to read the future, as her ignorance of the existing serious colonial aspirations of Germany, and her blindness to the fact that she herself could not indefinitely hold a kind of mental Monroe doctrine over unoccupied lands until such times as she could, in her own leisurely way, annex and develop them. Lord Granville, later made painfully aware of his shortcomings concerning Germany's real needs and aims, sought to lay some of the blame, where it no doubt rightly belonged, on the shoulders of Lord Ampthill. In a despatch of February 7, 1885, to Sir Edward Malet, he wrote: "Until the receipt of a report from Lord Ampthill of the 14th June last, of conversations he had had with Prince Bismarck, and up to the interviews which I had about the same time with Count Herbert Bismarck, I was under the belief that the Chancellor was personally opposed to German colonisation. The reports of Lord Ampthill were continuously and strongly to that effect, and on the 15th March, 1884, his

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(7) "Life of Lord Granville," Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, vol. ii, p. 431.

Excellency, referring to the agitation on the subject among the shipping and commercial classes in Germany, stated that it was well known that the Prince was absolutely opposed to their ardent desire for the acquisition of colonies by Germany, and was determined to combat and oppose their growing influence." (8) It was undoubtedly this condition of affairs which put British statesmen in the wrong, and made possible the unconscionable delays of which Bismarck so justly complained and led him to make the verdict, on March 2, 1885, that, "It was a miscalculation on England's part to disapprove of our modest colonial endeavours." (9)

The discussion of the British side of the question may well be concluded by giving the explanation made by Lord Granville himself in a note which he wrote to Sir Edward Malet on February 5, 1885, in answer to the Ambassador's account of a conversation with the Chancellor. "The misunderstandings," he stated, "referred to by Prince Bismarck in his conversation with your Excellency are due to the suddenness with which Her Majesty's Government became acquainted with the departure by Germany from her traditional policy in regard to colonisation." (10) These words excuse nothing, but they at least make it possible to understand how Great Britain came to put herself in the awkward position of neither extending a friendly hand to Germany in South-west Africa, nor yet adopting a

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(8) "The German Empire," W. H. Dawson, vol. ii, p. 204, note.
(9) Ibid., p. 206.
(10) Ibid.

vigorous policy of her own in that region.

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The land won by the initiative of Herr Luderitz, and the skilful management of Bismarck, later became known as German South-west Africa. A Joint Commission dealt with the question of private claims, and treaties with Portugal and England settled the boundaries. By the agreement with Portugal, made in December 1886, the River Cunene was recognised as the northern limit; and the eastern boundary was determined by the Anglo-German agreement of July 1890, which gave Germany access to the Zambezi. The total territory thus acquired had an area of 340,000 square miles. But in the meantime Germany had also secured Togoland, the Cameroons, a valuable section of East Africa, part of New Guinea, and numerous islands in the Pacific; and in 1898 she added Kiao-Chau in China. Moreover, after 1888, Germany began the forging of the great iron way which was to carry her direct from Hamburg and Berlin, clear across the Asiatic Dominions of the Sultan, to the very shores of the Persian Gulf.

Looking back from the vantage point of the present day, it can be seen that the Angra Pequena incident was not the isolated affair which it may at first have seemed to be, but

was rather the prelude to Germany's bid for recognition as a world power. The forces which carried her forward were common to all the principal countries of Europe, and had their origin in conditions which developed only in the nineteenth century. These conditions gave rise to a new economic Imperialism which led inevitably to extra-European rivalries among the Powers, and was an important contributary cause of the World War of 1914. In that great conflict, Germany's colonies were wrested from her, South-west Africa being won by the victorious campaign of General Botha, Prime Minister of the South African Union. Thus in the short space of thirty-five years - from the first proud raising of the flag at Angra Pequena in 1884, to the submission at Versailles in 1919 - Germany won and lost a colonial empire. But so long as there remain the needs which called that empire into being, and the energy which built it up, who can say if the simple statement that "Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions," (11) really writes 'finis' to the story of German colonial endeavour?

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(11) Treaty of Peace - Versailles, June 1919, Article 119.

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