ANSELM'S *CUR DEUS HOMO* FOR A PEACE THEOLOGY: ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF NON-VIOLENCE AND SACRIFICIAL ATONEMENT

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Abstract in English

Although the interpretation of Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo* in the tradition of Albrecht Ritschl, Adolf von Harnack and Gustaf Aulén has led to a suspicion about its usefulness for a Peace Theology, a reading through the lens of more recent scholarship, which assumes its original Catholic, sacramental and sacrificial framework, reveals a beautiful understanding of the cross in this medieval classic that is perfectly compatible with a commitment to nonviolence. Three Mennonite scholars writing in pursuit of an Anabaptist Peace Theology, John Howard Yoder, John Driver and J. Denny Weaver display varying degrees of dissatisfaction with the explanation that Anselm provided in *Cur Deus Homo*, and none held out many prospects for its usefulness. Yoder highlighted the weaknesses, Driver essentially repeated them, and Weaver went a step further to charge that *Cur Deus Homo* depicted divinely sanctioned violence and ought to be rejected. They did not demonstrate much awareness of or reliance on the contributions of scholars who have focused on Anselm's theology and context. Reading *Cur Deus Homo* through the lens of more recent anselmian scholarship reveals that the honour and justice of God are one with the mercy and love of God. Humanity is restored not through punishment, but through the means of satisfaction and reward, while the whole explanation is seen in a sacrificial framework. Anselm's insistence upon human participation, and on satisfaction are very congenial to certain emphases of a Peace Theology, namely, discipleship and restorative justice. The real death understood metaphorically as a sacrifice does not violate the commitment to nonviolence, but strengthens it. A rejection of Anselm's metaphysic, ontology and sacrificial framework, a failure to distinguish between punishment and satisfaction, a failure to reflect from the

perspective of the guilty, and a neglect of or ambivalence about the doctrines of the two natures and the trinity all lead to a distorted impression of *Cur Deus Homo,* concealing the contribution *Cur Deus Homo* might make to a Peace Theology.

Abstract in French

L'interprétation du texte d'Anselme *Cur Deus Homo* dans la tradition d'Albrecht Ritschl, d'Adolf von Harnack et de Gustaf Aulén amène à penser qu'il ne serait pas utile pour une théologie de la paix. Pourtant, en le lisant au moyen de l'érudition contemporaine qui suppose le contexte originel, sacramentel et sacrificiel, se dégage une image de la croix qui est compatible avec une option pour la non-violence. Trois spécialistes mennonites à la recherche d'une théologie anabaptistes de la paix sont John Howard Yoder, John Driver et J. Denny Weaver. Ils ne trouvent pas beaucoup de mérite dans le *Cur Deus Homo*. Yoder a souligné les faiblesses du texte, Driver les a répétées, et Weaver est allé plus loin en affirmant que *Cur Deus Homo* représente une violence divinement sanctionnée et devrait donc être rejeté. Ils n'ont pas démontré une connaissance de la littérature concernant la théologie et le contexte d'Anselme. La lecture du *Cur Deus Homo* avec l'aide de cette littérature revèle que l'honneur et la justice de Dieu s'accordent avec son amour et sa miséricorde. L'humanité est rachetée non pas par la punition, mais par la satisfaction et la récompense, et tout ceci dans un cadre sacrificiel. L'insistance d'Anselme sur la participation humaine et la satisfaction ressemble à la vie de disciple et à la justice restorative accentuées dans la théologie de la paix. La mort présentée comme sacrifice métaphorique ne contredit pas la non-violence, mais la confirme. Rejeter l'idée de sacrifice, ignorer la différence entre punition et satisfaction, ne pas adopter la perspective du coupable, l'incertitude envers les deux

natures du Christ et la trinité donnent une impression fausse du *Cur Deus Homo*, ce qui empêche de reconnaître ce qu'il pourrait offrir à une théologie de la paix.

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I must pay tribute to the late George Hunston Williams for taking the time to respond to my early musings and pointing me to his helpful work. I acknowledge with gratitude my first Theology professor and advisor, Douglas John Hall, for introducing me to the whole of the 2000 years of Christian tradition and giving me confidence to pursue doctoral studies – but only if I *had* to. I also acknowledge the friends and former colleagues at Bluffton University who gave support in a host of institutional and personal ways, including a Bluffton College Summer Study Grant. I thank Douglas Farrow, my supervisor, who has kindly, wisely and patiently given me guidance to bring this long project to completion. On another level, I thank Andrew, Wilfrid and Elsa for their patience and love, as well as our parents and all of the rest of our family.

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INTRODUCTION

What could a church of the 21st century, committed to nonviolence, aiming to combat oppression and injustice, learn from an 11th century archbishop of Canterbury, part of a conquering power, a land holder in a feudal society, who was in charge of sending soldiers to support the king's battles -- a bishop in the time of the Crusades? One might well wonder. In fact, I intend to show that Anselm's careful and intricate argument on atonement provides a rich and useable resource for those in the Peace Theology tradition. On the difficult matter of the ghastly cross he explained just how it could be said to be necessary. When his friend, Boso, asked how God could be omnipotent, wise or just if God saved sinners by condemning a just man, Anselm had a ready answer. "God the Father did not treat that man as you apparently understand him to have done; nor did He hand over an innocent man to be killed in place of the guilty party. For the Father did not coerce Christ to face death against his will, or give permission for him to be killed..." In the following chapter he added, "Rather, he underwent death of his own accord, not out of an obedience consisting in the abandonment of his life, but out of an obedience consisting in his upholding of righteousness so bravely and pertinaciously that as a result he incurred death."[1] The interpretation of Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo* in the popular tradition of Gustaf Aulén has evoked grave doubts about its usefulness for a Peace Theology. However, Anselm scholarship of the last century has provided a different lens through which to read his work.

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[1] *Cur Deus Homo* I, 8 & 9, "Why God Became Man" trans. Janet Fairweather, *Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works*, ed. Brian Davies and G.R. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 275, 277.

Background to the question

There has been a widespread interest in the rejection of violence, domination and the abuse of power articulated by Christian theology on this continent over the last decades. Naturally, the violent and bloody story of the cross at the heart of Christian faith has elicited much scrutiny. Especially problematic is the traditional claim that this death was necessary for the salvation of the world. Feminist discussion has struggled with these claims, fearing among other things that the language of a father giving up his son was actually a model of divine child abuse. The language of 'substitution' in association with theories of atonement has long raised concern, but it became even more suspect when Delores Williams pointed out that substitution is too reminiscent of the oppressive surrogacy roles that whites have imposed on African American women over the centuries. Some inheritors of the Historic Peace Churches[2] in particular have wondered about the place of a 'necessary cross' in a theology that has nonviolence at its heart.

Some of this discussion has focused quite explicitly on Anselm of Canterbury's influential work, *Cur Deus Homo (CDH)*. In 2001, Anthony W. Bartlett published his study of the Christian theory of atonement, giving special attention to the way in which "...a logic of violence and sacrifice" has been integral to the "key Western doctrines of atonement." The subtitle of his book was "The Violent Grammar of Christian

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[2] The designation "Historic Peace Churches" refers to the Mennonite Church, the Society of Friends (Quakers), and the Church of the Brethren. The three groups originated in different centuries but share a commitment to pacifism and began to use this name as they began working together in the 1930's.

atonement" and he termed Anselm's classic work, "A Master Text of divine Violence."[3] In the same year, J. Denny Weaver, from the Mennonite tradition, published *The Nonviolent Atonement* that concluded Anselm's explanation involved divinely sanctioned or divinely required violence.[4] Three years earlier, Darby Kathleen Ray had published her exploration of the atonement from the perspective of the awareness of abuse, *Deceiving the Devil: Atonement, Abuse, and Ransom.* As the title suggests, she opted to move away from Anselm's view, choosing to retrieve instead what she regarded as an earlier model, which was not violent.[5]

Within a decade of these three publications on atonement, two other works again associated Anselm with violence and retribution. In 1996 Timothy Gorringe published *God's Just Vengeance: Crime, Violence and the Rhetoric of Salvation.* He perceived Anselm's Satisfaction theory to be involved with revenge in the penal practice in criminal justice in the West. He drew a connection between Anselm's atonement theory and retributive criminal law.[6] Giles Fraser concluded similarly about Anselm in his brief

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[3] Anthony W. Bartlett, *Cross Purposes: The Violent Grammar of Christian Atonement* (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2001), 76. There are still references to this work indicting Anselm with no reference to Anselmian theological scholarship. See Robert J. Daly, S.J., "Bad Theology Leads to Bad Morality," (Daly @COV&R July'05: 1-7. http://www.cla.purdue.edu/academic/engl/conferences/covar/Program/daly.pdf. Accessed August 12, 2005.)

[4] J. Denny Weaver, *The Nonviolent Atonement* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001).

[5] Kathleen Darby Ray, *Deceiving the Devil: Atonement, Abuse, and Ransom.* (Cleveland, Ohio: The Pilgrim Press, 1998.) She built on the work of Gustaf Aulén and Eugene TeSelle.

[6] Timothy Gorringe, *God's Just Vengeance: Crime, Violence, and the Rhetoric of Salvation* (Cambridge, 1996), 22.

evaluation of how or whether Christianity breeds violence. He wrote in response to René Girard's *Violence and the Sacred,*[7] discussing Nietzsche, Anselm and Desmond Tutu. He argued that Anselm insisted on a necessarily retributive justice, and that precisely this logic perpetuates violence, according to his reading of Girard. Furthermore, he asserted it was just "this theological mind set that Jesus is out to eliminate."[8]

These examples readily indicate the place of dishonor that Anselm has occupied in recent decades in the pages of many theologians and other educated Christians who have been writing with expressed concern for a restorative type of justice and the struggle against violence, oppression and the abuse of power. In fact, there is nothing new about this suspicion of Anselm. There is a longer history, stretching back into the 19th century, to Albrecht Ritschl and Adolph Harnack.[9] Their version of Anselm was carried forward in the 20th century by people like Hastings Rashdall, J. K. Mozley and, perhaps most notably, by Gustaf Aulén,[10] who made his own influential contribution.

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[7] René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979)

[8] Giles Fraser, *Christianity and Violence: Girard, Nietzsche, Anselm and Tutu* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2001), 34-5. See also Fitzpatrick's relatively recent essay on sacrifice and redemption in the Middle Ages. He referred to Anselm's "tit-for-tat" scenario. P.J. Fitzpatrick, "On Eucharistic Sacrifice in the Middle Ages" in *Sacrifice and Redemption: Durham Essays in Theology*, ed. S.W. Sykes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 131.

[9] Adolph Harnack, *History of Dogma IV*, trans. Neil Buchanan, third edition (circa 1900; New York: Dover Publications, 1961). Albrecht Ritschl, *A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, trans. John S. Black (Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas, 1872).

However, a glance at the Anselmian scholarship of the last sixty years reveals that some reconsideration of this dismal view of *CDH* is in order. There is a great canyon between the understanding of *CDH* in some contemporary thinkers interested in practical matters of justice and the interpretation of Anselm's work offered by scholars of Anselm. There is also another contextual factor that suggests this scholarship needs to be considered. It is the conviction that the family of classic motifs, reintroduced by Aulén, and championed in some form by many of the people who had rejected Anselm, is not adequate. It is clear that Aulén's classic model met certain needs of the twentieth century, at least for those who were modern and humanist enough *not* to be preoccupied by a sense of guilt, but sober enough to find the optimism of the 19th century regarding human possibilities too naïve. Even if some people are not overly concerned with life after death, they might still face the temptation to despair, and the possibility of meaninglessness. The language of liberation from despair, and the objective nature of the victory won by Christ, was and is hope for those who face the realities of structural and systemic evil. This language of liberation and victory also made sense for the theologies of liberation, addressing the oppression of people and their need to be liberated rather than only forgiven for their sins.

However, it is not at all clear that the language of liberation is ultimately adequate to speak to the reality and needs of middle-class, white people in North America. The same liberation theology that made us aware of the inappropriateness of speaking only in

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10 Hastings Rashdall, *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology* (London, MacMillan and Co., 1919; reprint ed., 1920). J. K. Mozley, *The Doctrine of the Atonement* (London: Duckworth, 1915; reprinted, 1947). Gustaf Aulén, *Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of the Atonement* (London: SPCK, 1931; reprint ed., 1970).

terms of guilt to people who are oppressed, also revealed the evils of complicity, and the social and structural realities of sin. If the oppressed needed a theology of liberation, what do the oppressors need? Presumably, they do not need the same thing. As a white, middle class North American woman, I am not part of an oppressed and weak minority. Mennonites, as a group in North America, are part of a religious minority but are not oppressed or powerless at this point in history. Minorities are not by definition persecuted or even disadvantaged.[11] My professor Douglas John Hall alerted his students to the importance of context and place for theology. He proposed that what we in North America need to work out is a theology for the oppressor rather than for the oppressed. "When liberation is pursued by Christian communities that are part of an oppressing society, it is necessary to ask whether this theme does not function more to conceal than to reveal the truth."[12]

In a similar manner, Thelma Megill Cobbler, in her 1992 study of two feminist interpretations of the cross, concluded that white, middle-class women in North America could hardly rely entirely on an understanding that addressed them only as oppressed people needing liberation. They, as people in possession of relative power *vis à vis* most people in the world, are also in the role of victimizers, and need to be addressed as such in a doctrine of the Atonement.[13] Similarly, Gayle Gerber Koontz, in a paper on

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[11] Gerald Schlabach once identified the danger of facile, "low-cost" ways of being in solidarity with the poor in "Identification with the People in a Revolutionary Situation," (Mennonite Central Committee Occasional Paper, No 2, May 1988), p 6.

[12] Douglas John Hall, *Professing the Faith*: *Christian Theology in a North American Context* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 421.

Anabaptist Feminist perspectives on Atonement, highlighted the way in which each of us has the role of oppressed or oppressor in different aspects, moments or relationships of our lives.[14] This would suggest the need for a theory of Atonement that would speak to these various aspects of lostness. Given the acknowledged participation in oppression, simply by virtue of our place, the rejection of guilt as a category that matters seems altogether too convenient and suspect.

Since Anselm's has been recognized as the model that dealt with guilt, it is time to revisit his work. What I discovered is that too often, as noted above, contemporary theologians, committed to nonviolence, liberation of all sorts, and restorative justice have not bothered to consult Anselm since he had already been put in his corner by Aulén. Or perhaps, I should say, Anselm has not been read except through the lens provided by Aulén, which appears to follow Ritschl and Harnack. There are references to Aulén's treatment of Anselm, even in recent publications, as though there have been no challenges to his interpretation.[15]

However, there have been serious critiques of Aulén's portrayal of *CDH* since the 1950's. What is more, his reading of Anselm does not even figure in the Anselm scholarship. A dissertation discussing the sources of Anselm's theology, showing continuities with Irenaeus, Athanasius and Gregory Nazianzen completed in 2001 at

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13 Thelma Megill-Cobbler, "Women and the Cross: Atonement in Rosemary Radford Ruether and Dorothee Soelle" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1992), 437-440.

14 "Gayle Gerber Koontz, "The Liberation of Atonement," *Mennonite Quarterly Review,* (1990): 192.

15 See for example, P.J. Fitzpatrick, "On Eucharistic Sacrifice," 150.

Oxford, did not even mention Gustaf Aulén.[16] Although there no mention of Aulén the basic claim of his work was challenged. This illustrates the isolation of the various scholarly and theological communities. It is as though there have been two largely separate conversations going on. For the best prospects in theology these various conversations must be brought together, namely, the Protestant with the Catholic, and the Anselm scholarship with the contemporary theological quest, whenever that quest involves any reference to Anselm. There have been fruitful works that have bridged various gaps suggesting great possibilities. They have addressed Anselm's notion of justice as redemptive and meaningful in the contemporary setting, providing a way of bringing together the spiritual and the practical, which are too easily torn asunder. Even the charge that Anselm portrayed a violent God has been addressed.[17] Here is another attempt to further that conversation with a slightly more specific question, born in the Historic Peace Churches. The question is whether Anselm's *CDH* is compatible with a commitment to nonviolence, which lies at the heart of a Peace Theology.

Introducing Peace Theology

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[16] Giles E. M. Gasper, "Anselm of Canterbury: The Making of an Oecumenical Mind in the Late-Eleventh Century" (D.Phil. Diss., Christ Church, Oxford, 2001), published as *Anselm of Canterbury and his Theological Inheritance* (Ashgate, 2004).

[17] Hunter Brown, "Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo* Revisited," *Église et Théologie*, 25 (1994): 189-204. See also Joseph Komonchak, "Redemptive Justice: An Interpretation of the *Cur Deus Homo*," *Dunwoodie Review* 12 (1972): 35-55. Paul Gilbert, "Violence et Liberté dans le *Cur Deus Homo,*" in *Cur Deus Homo: Atti del Congresso Anselmiano Internazionale,* ed. Paul Gilbert, Helmut Kohlenberger, and Elmar Salmann (Rome, 1999), 673-695.

The term Peace Theology emerged in the Anabaptist community as it became increasingly engaged with questions of justice, peace, society, and theological reflection in the 1980s. Conversations and publications sponsored by the Institute of Mennonite Studies, at the Associated Mennonite Biblical Seminary, were at the center of this nascent theological identity. The words 'Peace Theology' are found frequently in the titles of the conferences, colloquia and publications. The quest was for a theology that has pacifism as an integral, central shaping element, rather than as an optional specific appendage to an otherwise typical Protestant theology. The idea grew that nonviolence must have implications for all aspects of theology. There was an increasing awareness that pacifism ought to have implications for domestic matters, and all aspects of life, not just on the question of participation in war.[18] A 1984 collection of essays entitled *Explorations of Systematic Theology: From Mennonite Perspectives*, signaled the beginning of such self-conscious Anabaptist peace explorations in systematic theology. I will use the term Peace Theology to denote this praxis-oriented Anabaptist theology that locates a commitment to nonviolence at the heart of the Gospel of Jesus Christ.[19]

The general sense in this Peace Theology conversation has been to move away from Anselm's understanding of the cross, just as it has been in the Feminist, Black and Liberation theology circles, following the Liberal Protestant trend of the past century. In

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[18] There are disagreements within the Peace Theology conversation about what kind of pacifism is appropriate, distinguishing, for example, between nonresistance, nonviolence, nonviolent active resistance, and whether the pacifism is for the whole society or only for Christians. I will use the terms pacifism and nonviolence in a general sense.

[19] See the Institute of Mennonite Studies, housed at the Associated Mennonite Biblical Seminary, Elkhart, Indiana. For example: Willard Swartley, ed., *Explorations of*

order to assess the compatibility of *CDH* with a Peace Theology, I will explore three treatments of Anselm's Satisfaction theory, and weigh them in light of recent Anselm scholarship. First, I have chosen to examine John Howard Yoder's work, simply because of his stature and influence in the Mennonite theological community. Yoder (1928-1997) is also well known beyond the Mennonite church as a result of his *Politics of Jesus*,[20] and many other publications on social ethics, presenting the Christian case for pacifism in the world. It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of Yoder's work in the Mennonite church since the 1950s. We will look primarily at his section on Atonement in his *Preface to Theology*.[21] There he set forth an introduction to atonement and a critique of Anselm's views, which clearly served as a starting point for the other two I will investigate. Second, it seemed appropriate to look at John Driver's study of the atonement, since he is part of the Peace Theology conversation and published the first treatment of the subject in that connection.[22] Driver (b.1924) was a Mennonite missionary in Puerto Rico, Uruguay, Spain and Argentina. *Understanding the Atonement for the Mission of the Church*, published in 1986, was a biblical study, rather than one that belonged exactly in the realm of systematic theology, but he sought theological clarity and answers for a particular context. Finally, I must engage the work of J. Denny

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Systematic Theology: From Mennonite Perspectives, Occasional Papers, no. 7 (Elkhart, IN: Institute for Mennonite Studies, 1984).

20 John Howard Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Agnus Noster* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1971; reprint ed., 1994).

21 John Howard Yoder, *Preface to Theology: Christology and Theological Method* (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2002).

22 John Driver, *Understanding the Atonement for the Mission of the Church* (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1986).

Weaver, who has devoted the most energy to this specific question, resulting in his book, *The Nonviolent Atonement.* Weaver taught at Bluffton University from the 1970's until 2006, and has been very active in the Anabaptist scholarly community. Although *The Nonviolent Atonement* does not deal only with Anselm, one of the chief concerns is to demonstrate that "satisfaction atonement is based on divinely sanctioned, retributive violence."[23] Satisfaction atonement here might denote something broader than Anselm's own explanation, but Weaver's judgment was certainly intended to include it.

These three works reveal varying degrees of dissatisfaction and rejection of the explanation that Anselm provided in *Cur Deus Homo*, and none of the three held out many prospects for its usefulness. Nor did they demonstrate much awareness of or reliance on the contributions of scholars who have focused on Anselm's theology and context. They do, however, reflect a reading of Anselm and Atonement resembling that of Ritschl, Harnack and Aulén. According to their interpretation, *CDH* depicts a God who is unable to forgive without being paid, or without punishing, but who waits for satisfaction so that salvation is really bought instead of by grace, and God is the subject rather than the author of human salvation.) Although this tradition has led to a suspicion about its usefulness for a Peace Theology, a reading through the lens of more recent scholarship, which assumes the original Catholic, sacramental and sacrificial framework, reveals a beautiful understanding of the cross in this medieval classic that is perfectly compatible with a commitment to nonviolence.

In the first chapter, I will first set forth Yoder, Driver and Weaver's interpretations and critiques of *CDH.* I will point to possible sources and parallels, ways

in which these readings reflect each other and Aulén's work as well as the tradition upon which he built. I will also draw some more contemporary links. The second chapter will present a rereading of *CDH*, focusing on the nature of God, the nature of justice and the integral connection between these two. In the third chapter, I will take up the matter of how humanity is restored through the problematic means of satisfaction and reward with attention to the notion of sacrifice. In both of these chapters I will rely on the scholarship of the last several decades, which presents *CDH* in a light quite different from that used by Aulén. This different light comes from the addition of Catholic (Roman or Anglo-) perspectives, interpretations of Anselm in his setting, and reading *CDH* alongside Anselm's other writings. Next, I will suggest ways in which this reinterpretation of *CDH* is in fact compatible with emphases of a Peace Theology. This will involve an elaboration on the nature of a Peace Theology, and then a demonstration of the presence of similar commitments in *CDH* as well as answers to some of the objections raised by Yoder, Weaver and Driver. Finally, I will consider what gave rise to some of the remaining charges or suspicions about *CDH*. I will propose reasons for the misunderstandings, identify the actual points of disagreement and suggest the contribution *CDH* offers a Peace Theology.

In all of this, my contribution will not be to provide a new reading of Anselm. It will be to bring two communities into conversation. Anselm scholarship has not addressed all of the contemporary questions, nor need it. On the other hand, contemporary theologians do not necessarily consult the proceedings of international Anselm Studies conferences. However, the two need to be brought together somewhere.

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23 Weaver, *The Nonviolent Atonement*, 225.

I am convinced that the contemporary questions and concerns with justice and nonviolence, the rejection of dominance and oppression, are critical and must be addressed by theologians. However, I am equally convinced that the answers to these questions are not as easy as they might first appear. The simple fact that Anselm inhabited a very different world does not mean that he had nothing to offer Christians of the 21st century. There is much negotiating to do, much critical retrieval to undertake in relation to the traditions – a plumbing of the depths of the theological tradition. The reading of *CDH* provided by recent Anselmian scholarship reveals that the clear thinking 11th century archbishop, who was beloved not only for his reasoned arguments but also for his prayers, meditations and letters, has been too hastily dismissed in some circles. This pertinence of Anselm's theology for the present has been well argued by others. My contribution is to view the specific question brought by Peace Theology to *CDH* through the lens of this scholarship. This question has relevance for others interested in the rejection of violence and domination. What I will provide is an encounter between the newer reading of Anselm and the contemporary question regarding nonviolence. It is true that a few works have defended Anselm's *CDH* and affirmed non-violence, but as that was not the focus of these studies, the compatibility was not elaborated or demonstrated.[24] With these encouraging omens, the task here is to set this forth more fully in conversation with the exponents of Peace Theology.

Overview of the History of Anselm Scholarship

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[24] See for example, William H. Shannon, *Anselm: The Joy of Faith* (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1999), 152.

CDH is a short book wherein St. Anselm of Canterbury set forth his explanation of why God became human, and why that was necessary, even though it involved the death of Jesus, for the salvation of the world. Since then, this brief but intricately reasoned explanation has been influential in shaping understandings of the cross and salvation, not only in the Catholic church, but also in Protestant churches. In the 19th century, the tide turned against Anselm's satisfaction theory of the atonement, or at least against versions and variations of it that had developed in the different parts of the church since the Reformation. Many Protestant thinkers in the 19th century found the work of Anselm's younger contemporary, Peter Abelard, more congenial. Albrecht Ritschl, Adolf von Harnack, Hastings Rashdall, and others attempted to express more contemporary understandings of the cross. Of course, not all Christian theologians and leaders bought this modern understanding. Some believed it necessary to enshrine what they called a "substitutionary atonement" view as an article of faith.

In 1930 the Swedish bishop, Gustav Aulén jumped into the middle of this controversy and brushed both options aside. He argued that neither Anselm's nor Abelard's explanations were as helpful as a third view which was actually that of the ancient church. He presented this as the 'classic' or '*Christus Victor*' model. The importance of this book can not be overestimated for reintroducing the notion of *Christus Victor*, which brought a breath of fresh air to many Christians who found the strictures of some penal, substitutionary, satisfaction theories too rigid or ugly, and the moral influence view too naïve. But the book was also critical in shaping the understanding of Anselm's *CDH* for a couple of generations of students of theology, albeit not those engaged in Anselmian studies. Aulén's small book, with a simple categorization of

atonement models into three types, was much more accessible than the heavier and earlier volumes of Ritschl, Harnack, or Rashdall. This is where Yoder, Driver and Weaver entered the scene and it is here that I take up the discussion.

Before turning to them, let me give a brief account of the Anselmian scholarship since the 1950's. So many scholars have expended so much effort to understand Anselm's thought in the decades since Gustaf Aulén's time that it would be truly irresponsible to ignore it. James Gollnick provided a fine overview of the critical editions, translations and discussions of Anselm's work in the past century.[25] Jasper Hopkins has compiled a comprehensive bibliography updated online. All of these testify to the dynamic conversation with Anselm in the past 50 years. On the question of the *Cur Deus Homo* specifically, some have addressed Aulén directly, including John McIntyre, *St. Anselm and his critics: A Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo (*1954) or Eugene Fairweather, "Incarnation and Atonement: An Anselmian Response to Aulén's *Christus Victor*" (1961), but many works simply enable a fuller understanding of Anselm. The international Anselm studies and conferences provided a better understanding of his other works, of his setting, and consequently, of the *CDH.*

Spicilegium Beccense I, a collection of Anselm essays was published in 1959.[26] In 1969 and 1970's 4 volumes of essays were published under the name, *Analecta Anselmiana.* To honour the 75th birthday of Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, who had edited the critical edition of Anselm's works, there was an Anselm studies conference in 1969.

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[25] James Gollnick, *Flesh as Transformation Symbol in the Theology of Anselm of Canterbury* (Lewiston/Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1985), 1-4.

[26] *Spicilegium Beccense* I, Paris, 1959.

Papers from this conference were published under the title *Sola Ratione (1970).*[27] In 1979, the Third Anselm Conference of International Anselm Committee met in Canterbury and launched *Anselm Studies*, an international occasional journal.[28] The first regular International Conference was held at Bec in 1982 and resulted in the publication of *Les Mutations Socio-Culturelles au tournant des Xie-XIIe Siecles.* The following year, 1983, saw the publication of the *Anselm Studies I: An Occasional Journal.*

The second regular international conference took place in 1985 at Villanova University. The second volume, *Anselm Studies II,* appeared in 1988. It contained the Proceedings of the Fifth International Saint Anselm conference, which took up the topic of St. Anselm and St. Augustine. The third regular international conference addressed Anselm as a thinker for the present as well as the past. It was held in Paris, in 1990, resulting in the publication of *Saint Anselm – A Thinker for Yesterday and Today* (2002).[29] In 1991 Saint Anselm College, New Hampshire, brought together a number of papers dealing with *Faith Seeking Understanding*, and subsequently published them under the same name (1991). In celebration of the nine-hundredth anniversary of Anselm's enthronement as Archbishop, there was a conference at Canterbury in 1993. The many various papers from that gathering were collected in *Anselm: Aosta, Bec and*

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[27] Kohlenberger, Helmut, ed. *Sola Ratione* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1970).

[28] *Anselm Studies: An Occasional Journal* I (Millwood/London/Schaan: Kraus International Publications, 1983).

[29] Coloman Viola and Frederick Van Fleteren, eds., *Saint Anselm – A Thinker for Yesterday and Today: Anselm's Thought Viewed by Our Contemporaries* (Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002).

Canterbury: Papers in Commemoration of the Nine-hundredth Anniversary of Anselm's Enthronement as Archbishop, 25 September 1093(1996).[30]

In 1996 *Anselm Studies III* appeared, reviewing twenty-five years (1969-1994) of Anselm studies,[31] since the collaboration of F.S. Schmitt and Sir Richard Southern on *Memorials to St. Anselm.* In 1996 another international conference took place, this time in Lublin, Poland. The theme was *Saint Anselm: Bishop and Thinker*, and the papers appeared in a volume with that name in 1999.[32]

The *Cur Deus Homo* became the actual focus of the whole conference held in Rome in 1998, with the approximately 45 papers, from as many presenters, being published in 1999.[33] In celebration of the year 2000, St. Anselm's College in New Hampshire hosted a conference and published the papers under the name, *Saint Anselm: His Origins and Influence.*[34] This resulted in the foundation of the Institute of Anselm Studies, and the *Saint Anselm Journal* (2003). A second Saint Anselm Metaphysics Colloquium was held at Saint Anselm College in 2003, sponsored by the Institute for

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[30] D.E. Luscombe and G.R. Evans, eds., *Anselm: Aosta, Bec and Canterbury* (Sheffield: Academic Press, 1996).

[31] Frederick Van Fleteren and Joseph C. Schnaubelt, eds., *Twenty-Five Years (1969-1994) of Anselm Studies: Review and Critique of Recent Scholarly Views, Anselm Studies* III (Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1996).

[32] Roman Majeran and Edward Iwo Zielinski, eds., *Saint Anselm: Bishop and Thinker* (Lublin: The University Press of the Catholic University of Lublin, 1999).

[33] Paul Gilbert, Helmut Kohlenberger and Elmar Salmann, eds., *Cur Deus Homo: Atti del Congresso Anselmiano Internazionale* (Roma, 1999).

[34] Fortin, John R., ed., *Saint Anselm – His Origins and Influence* (Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001).

Saint Anselm Studies. The Colloquium invites philosophers and theologians from the New England area to discuss and debate issues in metaphysics with a view to offering the ecclesiastical and scholarly worlds insights and principles upon which to ground their work. In 2004, the Institute for Saint Anselm Studies sponsored the Third Saint Anselm Conference, and some of the papers were published in the *Saint Anselm Journal* (2004).

In addition to these many volumes that together contain hundreds of essays, there have been the vital contributions of Sir Richard Southern, Gillian R. Evans and Sally Vaughn. Southern's important biographies, *Saint Anselm: Portrait in a Landscape* (1990), following his earlier, *St. Anselm and his Biographer* (1983)[35] are supplemented by Sally Vaughn's *Anselm of Bec and Robert Meulan: The Innocence of the Dove and the Wisdom of the Serpent* (1987).[36] The body of Gillian R. Evans' work, published since the 1970's, includes a concordance of Anselm's work and so not only belongs to, but also enabled the recent scholarship.[37] Walter Fröhlich rounded out the corpus of Anselm's work available in English with the translation in the 1990's of Anselm's letters to his monks, to bishops, popes, kings, and friends.[38]

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[35] Sir Richard Southern, *Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape* (Cambridge: University Press, 1990); *Saint Anselm and his Biographer* (Cambridge, 1963).

[36] Sally N. Vaughn, *Anselm of Bec and Robert of Meulan: the Innocence of the Dove and the Wisdom of the Serpent* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

[37] See for example, among the many works: Gillian R. Evans, *Anselm* (Wilton: Morehouse Publishing, 1989). Gillian R. Evans, ed., *The Concordance to the Works of St. Anselm*, 4 vols. (New York: Kraus International Publications, 1984).

[38] Walter Fröhlich, ed., *The Letters of Saint Anselm of Canterbury,* Vol. 1-3. (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1990, 1993, 1994).

These colloquia held in France, England, Rome, Poland, and more recently in USA, have brought together scholars of history, philosophy, theology and more, of many languages and religious persuasions. They have encouraged investigation that treats not only the philosophy or the theology of Anselm, or even the integral relation of the two for Anselm. They have also set these in Anselm's socio-cultural and philosophical context. Further, they have pointed to Anselm's method of reasoning and praying. They have considered his reliance specifically upon Augustine, but another conference explored more broadly, researching all of the origins and his influence. A follow up conference considered his relevance as a thinker in the present. In all of the conferences there is the constant question of the tension between Anselm as a monk and his role as archbishop. The translations and studies have made it possible for the *Cur Deus Homo* to be placed in the context of Anselm's other types of writing – his prayers, meditations and letters.

Three doctoral dissertations treating Anselm's theology have been published in the first decade of the new millennium. Giles Gasper explored the sources of Anselm's theology,[39] David Hogg looked at the aesthetics of Anselm's theology,[40] while Dániel Deme examined his Christology.[41] These demonstrate the ongoing intrigue of Anselm's thought.

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39 Gasper, 2001 and 2004.

40 David S. Hogg, *Anselm of Canterbury: The Beauty of Theology* (Ashgate, 2004)

41 Dániel Deme, *The Christology of Anselm of Canterbury* (Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2003).

Translations of Anselm's works are now widely available, and in addition, there is the wealth of secondary literature.[42] There is no longer any reason not to read Anselm's writing instead of relying upon second or third-hand versions. And yet I have often had the impression that it is still too often the case that regarding atonement, Anselm is a theologian whom, as Charles Hartshorne put it in 1966, "it is fashionable to discuss, but quite unfashionable to study." As we shall see, there is still a tendency among some to refute "him essentially unread, so decisively that reading him would be needless toil,"[43] or to "present their wretched little caricatures as serious accounts of the subject."[44]

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[42] I will refer to Janet Fairweather's translation of *CDH* unless otherwise specified.

[43] Charles Hartshorne, "Introduction to Second Edition," *St. Anselm: Basic Writings*, trans. S.N. Deane (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1966), 1.

[44] Ibid., 2.

CHAPTER I

THREE MENNONITE CRITIQUES OF *CUR DEUS HOMO*: ECHOES OF HARNACK AND AULÉN

Introduction

John Howard Yoder, John Driver and J. Denny Weaver each had different projects, and the interpretation of Anselm was not central to any, but there are definite continuities in their treatment of Anselm despite certain distinguishing features. Their general criticism of Anselm resembles a very popular one that stems from the influence of Ritschl, Harnack, Rashdall and Aulén, even if there are certain major disagreements with Harnack's critique of Anselm that do reflect the Anabaptist emphasis on discipleship and peace. The commitment to non-violence was not the basis for the rejection of Anselm's Atonement doctrine, although eventually, the compatibility of nonviolence and a Satisfaction theory of Atonement came into question.

We will begin with Yoder, whose assessment of Anselm is the most complex of the three. Yoder claimed not to be engaged in the task of systematic theology. The reason for the avoidance of a system was in order to be sure that nothing should take precedence over the biblical witness. It is beyond the scope of this study to assess to what extent he managed to avoid this pitfall, but he did remain true to this commitment to be accountable to Scripture. His field was social ethics, but he did teach theology, and the notes were published as *Preface to Theology: Christology and Theological Method.*[1] Otherwise, there is an *ad hoc* nature to the theology that can be pieced

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[1] Yoder, *Preface to Theology: Christology and Theological Method* (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2002).

together from his hundreds of articles addressing contemporary issues.[2] At times one can glean perspectives and insights from these articles that reveal his assumptions about atonement. However, his assessment of Anselm is most fully available in *Preface to Theology*. Although he summarized what appear to be devastating flaws in Anselm's theory, he also credited Anselm with providing the most serious answer so far. The weight of Yoder's discussion certainly deals with the flaws, nevertheless his mention of certain strengths should not be overlooked. Yoder's essays discussing other ethical issues demonstrate that his thinking was not as foreign to Anselm's as his "outline of the flaws" of Anselm's *CDH* might at first suggest.

We will turn next to Driver, albeit briefly. Driver wrote as a missionary with a theological agenda. He wanted to use the Bible to counter allegedly biblical, but more conservative, evangelical teachings on atonement. He made no attempt to be systematic in his theology, but attempted only to present what the Bible had to offer on the question of Atonement. It was not part of his project to deal carefully with Anselm, but his criticism of Anselm illustrates the tendency with which we are concerned.

Weaver is the one of the three who has undertaken a more systematic task. He is motivated by the desire to write theology from the perspective of the Peace church, which is 'free' and non-violent. Weaver is both dismissive of Anselm and bold enough to offer an alternative to Anselm's Atonement teaching.[3]

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[2] Mark Thiessen Nation, *A Comprehensive Bibliography of the Writings of John Howard Yoder* (Goshen, IN: Mennonite Historical Society, 1997).

[3] Weaver, *The Nonviolent Atonement.*

John Howard Yoder

The Critique

Yoder's critique of Anselm's atonement theory is multivalent and more complex than one might at first conclude. It grew from a Liberal Protestant theological ground, watered with Anabaptist commitments. It is multivalent because he approached the question from the point of view of biblical studies, theology, and ethical commitments. It is more complex than one might be tempted to believe, because he did grant Anselm a lot, despite the serious weaknesses he outlined. At the outset of his lecture notes on the *CDH* he highlighted the arguments in favour of Anselm's theory, namely, "it answers the question... it takes sin seriously... and it is also capable of integrating the various imageries in which the Bible speaks of the Work of Christ, especially those of sacrifice (and blood) and of redemption."[4] At the end of his discussion of Satisfaction theories, he summarized "two clear findings." First, he asserted that

> ...the satisfaction theories are the most serious answers found in the history of Christian theology, in the sense that they answer the question of piety. They make sense in prayer. They call forth praise, gratitude, (and) commitment. Therefore, they are deeply rooted in the life of the common believer. We need to recognize and respect the theory *(sic)* because of that moral strength.[5]

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[4] Yoder, *Preface*, 220.

[5] Ibid., 224.

At the same time, he concluded that "...it is not a biblically satisfactory theory."[6] It is easy to skip over the first observation, but there it is as a sort of warning or reminder to maintain a degree of humility in the face of a tradition that has called forth "praise, gratitude, (and) commitment." The warning almost gets lost because the bulk of the discussion is a presentation of all that is wrong with Anselm, capped with a thumbnail sketch of the necessary elements of a better theory. The summary of his views on Anselm's Satisfaction theory is outlined in his *Preface to Theology.* The works on Atonement which he recommended to the reader are listed at the front of the chapter on "Christ as Priest: Atonement." and none of them deal specifically with Anselm, but are of a more general nature. He listed Theodore R. Clark, J. Denney, P.T. Forsyth, Robert Frank, Martin Hengel, Hendry, J. Knox, Leon Morris, C.F.D. Moule, R.S. Paul, Vincent Taylor, and William J. Wolf. The sources of his discussion of Anselm are not always explicitly indicated. Some of it arose apparently from NT scholarship and his own reading of Scripture, while other views were simply representative of the current reading of Anselm in Liberal Protestant (broadly defined) circles. A comparison of the critiques of Anselm in the various books that he recommended to his students will show this commonality.

Critique from a Biblical point of view

Yoder cited what would then have been relatively recent biblical scholarship in order to evaluate Anselm's argument in *CDH* and to find it biblically unsatisfactory. What was so unsatisfactory? First, according to Yoder, Anselm saw God's offended holiness as the definition of perdition, which for Yoder is to abandon the NT notion

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6 Ibid., 224.

that God is the *agent*, not the object, of reconciliation (II Cor 5:18-20). The Christian God is not angry like the pagan God, for the Gospel proclaims that it was God who took the initiative, and humanity who was in need of reconciliation.[7] Second, Yoder maintained that in Scripture Christ died for us, on our behalf, or as our representative, but *not* as our substitute. However, he understood Anselm to portray Christ as our substitute. A third problem from the point of view of certain biblical scholarship is that in the biblical account, the guilt of (past) sin is not the real problem of atonement. Yoder explained: "The NT has two other foci ...that define the lost condition: separation from God and incapacity to do the good. Thus salvation is not primarily the remission of guilt or the cancellation of punishment, it is reconciliation (reestablishment of communion) and obedience, i.e. discipleship."[8] A further exegetical problem has to do with the meaning of the Israelite sacrificial system, which is not well understood. In Yoder's estimation, the power of Anselm's theory rests on the "...easy juxtaposition of civil punishment with bloody sacrifice" which is to misunderstand sacrifice in the Hebrew Bible. Sacrifice was not about punishment and death, but about gift and offering and identification with God.[9] Finally, Yoder considered that Anselm omitted the biblical idea of "union with Christ."[10]

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7 Yoder, *Preface*, 299.

8 Ibid., 300.

9 Ibid., 300, 301, n.6.

10 Ibid., 306.

Yoder's statement which integrates the various exegetical problems with Anselm's *CDH* goes like this:

> Every strand of NT literature makes clear that God's purpose with humanity is to establish obedience in His communion, not only to expiate juridical guilt... Forgiveness in the sense of removal of an obstacle to communion with God is evidently part of His purpose; but we do not find Him preoccupied with our guilt, in the sense of our deserving punishment. Guilt in this sense seems rather to be an anthropopathism carried over by Anselm from human concepts of just retribution.[11]

Yoder's Critique from a systematic theology point of view

In addition to the exegetical issues, Yoder identified weaknesses from the point of view of systematic theology. First, he maintained that *CDH* forces us to a tritheistic doctrine of God. "The idea of Father and Son as having separate wills and identities to the point of having transactions with one another has no grounds in the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, and still less in the New Testament."[12] Second, there is a danger of an *opus operatum* view of Christ's work, which tends to have universal validity, whether individuals want it or not. Yoder observed that Anselm's theory does not need the faith of the believer. Third, *CDH* grew out of the penitential practice where human work has saving merit, so Christ's death remains a human initiative directed Godward. Finally, Anselm worked pardon into a legal system where the legal

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11 Ibid., 301.

12 Ibid., 302.

structure remains intact, whereas God's grace is in fact a bending of the law, not its rigid, destructive application.[13]

Critique from a discipleship point of view

In addition to the biblical and systematic considerations, Yoder brought questions from the point of view of the Anabaptist emphasis on discipleship. He suggested that it is significant that proponents of Anselm's view have had trouble relating sanctification to justification since his view was formed in a state-church context, where, in Yoder's words, "...sacraments mattered more than ethics..." In Yoder's estimation, "the concept of discipleship is most clearly taught in precisely those New Testament texts which speak of the Christian's sufferings (or "cross") as somehow parallel to Christ's."[14] However, in the satisfaction theory, these passages make no sense, claimed Yoder, for the believer's sufferings "...do not placate an offended Holiness" nor are they "...a transaction with the Father." The only way to make sense of the parallel of the Christian's cross with that of Christ in the New Testament is if the cross of Christ has an ethical sense. Yoder saw a connection between an Anselmian atonement theory, a down-playing of the parallel between the cross of Christ and the cross of the Christian, and a down-playing of discipleship. Yoder determined that the early Anabaptists who did emphasize discipleship managed to hold an Anselmian view only by adding their own qualification. Michael Sattler and Jacob Kautz (and Hans Denck) used the language of satisfaction but with a proviso,

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[13] Ibid., 302.

[14] Ibid., 303. He cited Mt. 10:38; Mk. 8:34f; 10:38f; Lk. 14:27; Jn. 15:20; II Cor. 1:5; Phil. 1:29; 2:5-8; 3:10; Col. 1:24f; Heb. 12:1-4; I Pet. 2:21f; Apoc. 12:11

according to Yoder: "the benefit of the death of Christ applies only to the person whose acceptance of it includes discipleship, the inward appropriation of the broken will and the outward following in his steps."[15] The Satisfaction theory alone, without this added stipulation of obedience, makes no required link between the cross of Christ and Christian's obedience or even acceptance of the cross. Yoder noted another aspect of a missing link regarding obedience. The description of how atonement is brought about has no necessary relationship to the life of Jesus as a man - his particular life and obedience.[16] So, obedience is not linked to salvation for people, and salvation is not linked to the obedient life of Jesus.

Various additional problems

Having outlined the exegetical, theological and discipleship problems with Anselm's theory of Atonement, Yoder threw in a couple of final observations that might be flaws. From the point of view of the history of dogma, naïve people who imagine that Anselm's theory is straight from the Bible should note that it was actually the youngest of the theories (only from the 12th century). Also, in comparison to the other theories, it is the one, which is "tied most precisely to a particular model of thought, namely the court room."[17] In Yoder's estimation *CDH* would be a more

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[15] Ibid., 303.

[16] Ibid., 303.

[17] Ibid., 304.

adequate explanation of why Jesus had to die if *CDH* needed the resurrection and if it were in history, rather than in the mind of God or in some heavenly courtroom.[18]

It is interesting that Yoder dismissed the objections that New Testament scholar Vincent Taylor laid on humanitarian grounds, namely, that punishing an innocent one is immoral, and that "imputed righteousness is nonsense." In Yoder's estimation, these objections only reflect Taylor's prejudices. God is free to do these things.[19] Yoder was not intending to base any objections on a shifting "humanitarian" ground, but only on the firm foundations of "Scripture."

To sum up, then, in Yoder's view the weaknesses with Anselm's Satisfaction theory concern an inappropriate preoccupation with guilt instead of future obedience, a depiction of God as unwilling to forgive without the payment offered by the Son as our substitute, suggesting a fractured Trinity with transactions between members of the Godhead, and finally a portrayal of God as the *object* rather than the *agent* of the reconciliation, so that salvation is a result of human efforts and payments, even if real human beings are not required to be obedient.

The Parallels and the Partings

The Harnack-Aulén Line

A brief consideration of Ritschl and Harnack's estimations of *CDH* will suggest the history of the interpretive framework used by Yoder. It is the same one that is rehearsed by countless others. Clearly, it does not matter whether Yoder ever read

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18 Ibid., 307.

19 Ibid., 304.

Ritschl or Harnack on *CDH.* The similarities are evident because of the school of thought to which he belonged or from which he learned.

Albrecht Ritschl characterized Anselm's framework as "legal" and noted that it had no relation to the Bible, but was developed in a rational manner, straying from the patristic images.[20] Ritschl compared Anselm to Abelard and argued that the former used *legal* conceptions, whereas Abelard thought in *moral* terms. He charged that fundamentally, the doctrine of Anselm has no relation to Scripture, but uses 'natural reason.' Anselm, in this work, was trying to make the case appealing to reason rather than to revelation, in a way that would be available to people without faith. This was a weakness according to Ritschl's estimation.[21] He maintained that "Anselm develops the traditional idea of redemption into that of atonement, or legal propitiation of God. He controverts the patristic treatment of the death of Christ as a ransom paid to the devil, inasmuch as neither he nor sinful humanity has any right outside of the power and will of God."[22] Further, Ritschl claimed that Anselm focused on redemption from "the wrath of God or His will to punish sinners" rather than on other possibilities, such as redemption from "sin, from hell, from the power of the devil."[23] Ritschl also found the language of satisfaction problematic, and attempted to show that there was a logical

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[20] Albrecht Ritschl, *A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, trans. John S. Black (Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas, 1872), 24.

[21] Ibid., 24.

[22] Ibid., 24-5.

[23] Ibid., 25.

impossibility in Anselm's argument, which Anselm himself recognized, and so toward the end of the book Anselm traded in the language of 'satisfaction' for that of 'merit.'[24] Ritschl seemed to find it regrettable that for Anselm "the satisfaction to God is valid for the whole sinful race, whereas the example of Christ is only efficacious upon his 'kinsfolk.'" Apparently, Ritschl preferred Abelard who fixed our attention "exclusively upon the number of the elect."[25] According to Ritschl, one more weakness in Anselm's theory is that it takes into account "towards the satisfaction and example of Christ, only the *opus supererogationis* of His death, which was not a matter of duty."[26] Ritschl judged that it would have been better for an idea of reconciliation to take meaning from the whole of Christ's life since all of these were part of Christ's duty to God. It is certainly possible to see some connections between Ritschl's view of *CDH* and that of Yoder.

Likewise there are similarities between the respective critiques of Anselm's theory of atonement offered by Yoder and by Harnack, despite certain critical differences (which will be identified below). Yoder's critique resembles Harnack's concluding summary of the "gravest objections to be urged against the whole character of the Anselmic doctrine."[27] Here Harnack noted that a fundamental problem with Anselm's Satisfaction theory is that salvation is not linked to the particular life and obedience of Jesus. The theory is abstract, with no mention of anything Jesus said.

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[24] Ibid., 30-1; 40.

[25] Ibid., 39.

[26] Ibid., 39.

[27] Harnack, *History of Dogma*, 75.

"The death of Christ is entirely severed from His life-work on earth, and isolated. This God-man need not have preached, and founded a kingdom, and gathered disciples; he only required to die (*sic*)."[28] Furthermore, God is depicted as a "mythological private man" who is unable to forgive without payment.[29] He charged that Anselm perpetrated the "frightful idea" that humanity was "delivered from the wrathful God." Harnack went on to speak of an "...illusory performance" between the Father and the Son, "for according to Anselm the Son offers Himself to Himself (II.18)" and of a "gnostic antagonism between justice and goodness" where the Father is just and the Son is good.[30] This resembles Yoder's claim that *CDH* leads to "a tritheistic doctrine of God" for it depicts "the Father and Son as having separate wills and identities to the point of having transactions with one another..."[31] Both critics saw an inappropriate division within the Trinity, involving some sort of transaction between the First and Second persons of the Trinity.

Harnack claimed that there were logical inconsistencies, and among them was the problem of Anselm clinging to the doctrine of the two natures of Christ, which was, Harnack judged, clearly impossible. Harnack suggested that Anselm could not make the doctrine of two natures intelligible. Anselm simply said "this he did as God and that as man" (and whatever does not suit his divinity he did as human.) Harnack

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[28] Ibid., 77- 76.

[29] Ibid., 77.

[30] Ibid., 77-8.

[31] Yoder, *Preface,* 302.

believed that because of Anselm's refusal to relinquish that old doctrine of two natures, a "quite Nestorian direction of the person is the result..."[32] Presumably, Harnack's point here is that Anselm held to two natures but had them separate according to their roles, denying, as Nestorius did, that whatever could be ascribed to one could be said of the other.[33]

Another similarity between Yoder's critique and that outlined by Harnack is the claim that Anselm's whole scheme rests on "the principles and the practice of penance."[34] According to Harnack, Anselm framed his theory of the necessity of the appearing of the God-man, and of the necessity of His death "by making the principles of the practice of penance the fundamental scheme of religion in general."[35] Harnack noted that no one before Anselm had applied this notion of merits to the work of Christ. It was a matter of innovation in the form of reflection "on the nature, the specific worth, and the effect of the redemption contained in the suffering and death of Christ."[36] This reading recalls Yoder's comments regarding the buying of forgiveness.

The work of Hastings Rashdall on the work of Christ and redemption also deserves mention here as one in this line that Yoder's interpretation resembles. He

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32 Harnack, *History of Dogma*, IV, 74.

33 For discussion of Anselm rejecting Nestorianism, see Jasper Hopkins, *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), 199.

34 Harnack, *History of Dogma*, IV, 56.

35 Ibid., IV, 56.

36 Ibid., IV, 55.

lauded Anselm for appealing to justice,[37] but regretted Anselm's notion of justice which he caricatured as "...the barbaric ideas of an ancient Lombard king or the technicalities of a Lombard lawyer rather than the ideas which would have satisfied such a man as Anselm in ordinary human life."[38] Rashdall, like Ritschl, deemed Anselm's language legal rather than moral, and regarding the ideas of guilt, merit, honour, debt, satisfaction and punishment, he regretted that Anselm "never gets beyond the most confused and superficial idols of the market-place."[39] He skipped over some of the problematic tendencies to get to the "fundamental defect" which was that "...no civilized system of law permits the attribution of guilt to all humanity for the sin of one..."[40] It follows that a payment by one cannot make up for the penalty that individual human beings owe for their own sins. Obviously, Rashdall did not share Anselm's worldview, which Rashdall termed "that old bastard Platonism," characterizing the Platonic universal 'human nature' as "an entity separable from any and all individual men"[41] It might be better to stress the *participation or connection* of all individual human beings in this universal "human nature" as a corporate reality, for this would aid in grasping Anselm's theory which to Rashdall was so frightful. It is worth quoting him in order to convey his impression of Anselm's reasoning: "A God who really thought that His honour was increased by millions of men suffering eternal

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[37] Rashdall, 351.

[38] Ibid., 355.

[39] Ibid., 356.

[40] Ibid., 355.

[41] Ibid., 353.

torments, or that it was a satisfactory compensation to Himself that in lieu thereof an innocent god-man should suffer upon the cross, would not be the God whom Anselm in his heart of hearts really worshipped."[42] Anselm's attempts to insist on justice, and that God acts justly are spoiled by the fact that Anselm tends to "treat sin simply as a personal insult to God, and the satisfaction for it as a tyrant's delight in feeling that His honour has been vindicated and His rebellious subjects compelled to lick the dust beneath His feet."[43] Rashdall did try to be fair to Anselm, granting that he did portray God as co-operating in the scheme of redemption, showing that "the atonement is the work of the Holy Trinity."[44] Still, Rashdall discerned a risk inherent in the abandonment of the notion that anything was due the Devil. It was now from God that humanity was delivered, and this meant that Anselm's theory courted the temptation to imagine that the Father's justice was in tension with the love or mercy of the Son. Rashdall was careful to defend Anselm against Harnack's charge that Anselm did not escape this trap but admitted that Anselm's theory does tend in this direction.[45]

Rashdall's interpretation, although he at points differentiated himself from Harnack, is very similar to Harnack's and Ritschl's. He referred to the legal tenor of the whole theory; of the problem of God the Father tending to have transactions with the Son, where the former is just and the latter merciful; where God the Father suffers personal insult and is appeased either by millions of people suffering, or by an innocent

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[42] Ibid., 356.

[43] Ibid., 357.

[44] Ibid., 357.

[45] Ibid., 357 & n.2.

one suffering. He is as offended by the notion that some kind of suffering should please God as by the notion that one person could pay the penalty that another incurred. As to the matter of whether there is a difference between satisfaction and punishment, he believed the distinction insisted upon by Anselm was really not very significant. He believed Anselm thought it less offensive to speak of God receiving a satisfaction than it would be to say that God the Father punished the innocent Son. However, Rashdall actually found satisfaction more offensive than punishment, since it was just "...the demand for reparation to personal honour..." whereas punishment called to mind "...some objective ethical demand."[46] Here he differed slightly from Harnack, who regarded the distinction as significant, but the general reading is similar and the objections circle around the charges of legalism and a punitive, wrathful God, needing to be appeased, even by an innocent person instead of by the guilty.

Yoder's interpretation is also in continuity with those of J.K. Mozley, Karl Barth and Gustav Aulén, as well as with many contemporaries, some better known than others, such as John Knox, William J. Wolf, Theodore Clark, and Vincent Taylor. (These are the works that were recommended reading for Yoder's class in the published notes.)

J. K. Mozley described what he regarded as an important internal inconsistency. He insisted that Anselm described a forgiveness that was bought, but then the idea of forgiveness is deprived of all relevance: "a satisfaction which more than pays a debt

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[46] Ibid., 352, n1.

that is owed leaves no room for forgiveness on the part of the Creditor."[47] In addition, he summarized several grave faults of which we have already heard. First, God the Father and God the Son represent different moral qualities, indicating, as Yoder put it, some level of division within the Trinity. Secondly, sin is conceived of in so external a way that it sounds commercial and mathematical and so is treated quantitatively rather than qualitatively. Another serious flaw is that "The rational method employed entails the construction of a dogmatic edifice built up in complete independence of Holy Scripture..."[48]

In his *Church Dogmatics*, Karl Barth wrote an excursus on Anselm's theology of Incarnation and forgiveness that provides a more detailed discussion of the problem of forgiveness being paid for - an objection also raised by Yoder. Barth took Anselm to task for allegedly making the Incarnation a prior condition to God forgiving us, and asks whether the Incarnation is not *itself* the "real accomplishment of His pure, absolute and unconditional forgiveness, His forgiveness *sola misericordia.*"[49] Yoder was no doubt familiar with this critique.

One of the more important works that provide the background to Yoder's critique is Gustaf Aulén's *Christus Victor.* Aulén's chief criticism of Anselm's *CDH* is that there is a "break" in the work of God, and a *legal consistency*, whereas the work of salvation should be portrayed as entirely, and continuously the work of God, with the

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[47] J.K. Mozley, *The Doctrine of the Atonement* (London: Duckworth, 1915; reprint, 1947), 130.

[48] Ibid., 131.

[49] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, IV/1, trans. G.W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956), 487.

discontinuity lying in the order of justice. Anselm portrayed the relation between God and humanity as a legal one and he struggled to describe the atoning work in accordance with justice. Instead, the Atonement should be understood to have been accomplished *in spite of* the demands of justice.[50] This is like Yoder's words about forgiveness and grace being about the relaxing of the law. With regard to the break in the work of God: Aulén criticized Anselm for insisting on the dignity of humanity, and that it is humanity who must pay the debt or make the satisfaction.[51] Anselm, he noted, asked: "where can a man be found, free from sin and guilt, and able to offer himself as an acceptable sacrifice to God?"[52] (It is surprising, given this observation involving sacrifice, that Aulén characterized this language or framework as legal, transactional and rationalistic, rather than *cultic and relational.*) Yoder too suggested that *CDH* failed to portray the work of atonement as God's doing, for he claimed that God becomes the object rather than the subject, whereas in the NT, God is the author or subject.

Two further concerns expressed by Aulén relate to the notion of satisfaction. He noted that *CDH* does not actually take sin as seriously as Anselm claimed, since God can accept a satisfaction, and a remission of sin is provided, but there is no taking away of the sin itself.[53] Furthermore, he maintained that although Anselm

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[50] Aulén, 91.

[51] Ibid., 86-7.

[52] Ibid., 87.

[53] Ibid., 92.

distinguished between satisfaction and punishment, it was easy for the former to turn into the latter: "the idea of satisfaction passes over naturally and easily into that of punishment, since the satisfaction which Christ made consisted in the vicarious endurance of a death which, if men had endured it, would have been their punishment...In any case, the ideas of penance, satisfaction and punishment are all closely related."[54] This is reminiscent of Rashdall's comments noted above. For Aulén, the language of satisfaction is problematic because of the initiative or agency it gives to humanity, as well as because of its legalistic and substitutionary nature, and its closeness to punishment and penance. The resemblance to the line we have been tracing is unmistakable.

In a book entitled *Saved by His Life: A Study of the NT Doctrine of Reconciliation and Salvation*, published in 1959, Theodore R. Clark, then of New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, gave a critique of Anselm which resonated at many points with that of Yoder and the Harnack-Aulén line of interpretation. Anselm, he claimed, set forth a "rational works-merit system" which the medieval mind could not recognize as utterly inconsistent with the New Testament doctrine of salvation by grace through faith.[55] Anselm, being a child of his day, was influenced by the "feudalistic system" and consequently

> God appears in the *CDH* as a stern and unbending feudal lord whose "honor" at all costs must be defended. Full satisfaction must be paid to His "honor." As a result, such basic NT concepts as grace, love, mercy, and so on, could

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[54] Ibid., 94.

[55] Theodore R. Clark, *Saved by His Life: A Study of the NT Doctrine of Reconciliation and Salvation* (New York: MacMillan, 1959), 44-5.

> not find full expression in such a context of thought. Then, too, Anselm's theory stood in opposition to the NT emphasis on the oneness of God's working in Jesus the Christ. Anselm, like those before him, and like many after him, saw God and Christ as two different "persons," one dying in obedience and love to satisfy the other's honor, justice, or law. Paul's sweeping assertion that "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself" had been here turned into a coldly legal and transactional arrangement involving distinctions between God and Christ that the NT does not uphold.[56]

I quote Clark here at length, not because of the originality or brilliance of the observations but in order to give one more example of their popularity, even though Clark may take some positions that others would find extreme. These arguments are much like those of Yoder, and at this stage in our discussion, sound quite familiar.

A few additional works will demonstrate more fully the popularity of this legalistic, transactional reading of Anselm that allegedly does not need the life of Jesus. The text of William J. Wolf is one to which Clark referred, and it strikes a similar chord. Wolf referred to the "troubling," "legal framework" where sin is an "entity which can be manipulated in quantitative terms. The whole image is "plainly inadequate as the final expression of the relationship between God and man."[57] It results in a failure to take sin seriously, despite Anselm's claims. God's alleged radical opposition to evil is weakened if "as the alternative to laxity, he can be pictured as

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[56] Ibid., 46.

[57] William J. Wolf, *No Cross No Crown: A Study of the Atonement* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957), 107.

being paid a satisfactory price."[58] Wolf also made the now familiar observation that Jesus' teaching about the meaning of his passion or the quality of God's love, or the resurrection, or even the whole of his life is without significance, except as a prelude to the death.[59] The whole drama, in Wolf's eyes, is non-personal even in the treatment of Christ's death, and lacks any dimension of "faith-union and of the Church as an atoning society." All that Anselm allegedly offered to explain how Christ's atoning work can become effective in the character and motives of human beings is a passing reference to Christ as an example. Anselm, said Wolf, "...lacks the dimension, common to both Paul and the Greek fathers, that humanity is one with Christ in his dying and rising again."[60] It is difficult to fathom how one could make this statement about Anselm's theology, given his, what some would even call platonic, realism, and his medieval understanding of kinship. However, for Wolf, Anselm's appears to be a *legal*, rather than a *personal* framework.

It is a legal framework, and therefore, claimed Wolf, not concerned with the problem of curing human beings, which is a personal problem. He explained: "the understanding of salvation... has been drastically cut down from its NT dimensions. Anselm's theory deals with God's judgment on sin and opens up a restoration of the

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[58] Ibid., 107.

[59] Ibid., 107.

[60] Ibid., 107-8.

impaired order of creation. It does not deal with the more radical problem of curing man of his sinfulness in a redeemed world."[61]

The fundamental problem, for Wolf, is that the cross is not clearly shown to rest upon God's love. The order of law demotes love to a secondary attribute. So, in the end, salvation is given by God as a sort of 'reward' for the gift offered by Christ, and salvation is not a free gift. Aulén was right, he concluded: there is a "legal consistency" and a "discontinuity in Divine operation."[62] Here we are back to the problem of the legal framework, where salvation is not a free gift, but bought.

One last example of a critique of *CDH* that can be compared to Yoder's is the work of New Testament scholar, Vincent Taylor. Taylor is one of Yoder's sources even if at certain points Yoder found Taylor's assumptions inadmissible.[63] Taylor argued that in Anselm, the "emphasis upon the work of Christ as a satisfaction of the wounded honour of God, threatens the unity of the Persons of the Godhead; but it does this, not because it is an attempt to meet conditions grounded in the Being of God which are necessary to the attainment of reconciliation, but by reason of its fundamental assumption that the conditions are those of wounded honour."[64] Yoder also voiced the concern that the unity of God was being compromised and that the wounding of God's honour was not the primary issue.

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[61] Ibid., 108.

[62] Ibid., 108.

[63] Yoder, *Preface*, 221, 224.

[64] Vincent Taylor, *The Atonement in New Testament Teaching* (London: Epworth Press, 1950), 212.

By way of summary, the consensus of the scholars quoted above is in continuity with Harnack's assessment of Anselm's *CDH*. All of them refer to the juridical, framework, describing a transaction between the Father and the Son, dividing the Trinity, and diminishing the role of love and of grace because forgiveness is actually bought. The agreements outlined above should not be taken to indicate general consensus on the details of atonement and Anselm. There are in each case points of divergence and it will be worth pointing out a few of these in order to reinforce a sense of the controversial and complex nature of the interpretation of Anselm on the question of Atonement. It is also by noting the disagreements that we can discern where there is any originality in the Yoder's discussion of Anselm, and any problem with *CDH* that would pertain specifically to a Peace Theology.

Parting ways with Harnack and Aulén

Although Yoder's objections to *CDH* resemble those of many Protestant scholars there is an added element, namely, the concern for discipleship. The most striking, perhaps, of the differences from Harnack and Aulén is where Yoder identifies problems with Anselm that are exactly opposite to the issues they cited. Harnack charged that *CDH* only provides the *possibility* of salvation for a response is still required. He wrote: "whether they shall be saved depends ... on how they fulfill the commandments of holy scripture."[65] He gathered this from Anselm's response to Bozo's confidence that "God rejects no human being who approaches Him under this

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[65] Harnack, *History of Dogma*, Vol. VI, 68

(the Son's) name."[66] Anselm added that he could not imagine God turning anyone away who "approaches as he ought. Sacred Scripture everywhere teaches us how we are to approach the participation in such great grace and how we are to live under this grace."[67] Harnack perceived that for Anselm, one's salvation depended upon one's keeping the commandments of Scripture. This demonstrated that *CDH* is "unevangelical" in character, and that Anselm is obviously "an old-world, a mediaeval, in a word, a Catholic Christian, inasmuch as he is satisfied with having made out that in virtue of Christ's provision some certainly from the "mass of perdition" can be saved, and in fact shall be saved, because they live piously."[68] Yoder, on the other hand, feared that *CDH* tends toward universalism; also, that people who follow Anselm have trouble incorporating sanctification with justification, while Harnack complained that Anselm *required* this.

Another area of disagreement between Harnack and Yoder concerns the matter of substitution and penalty. A problem for Harnack was that Anselm did not depict the innocent one paying the penalty on behalf of the guilty. He concluded that Anselm's was no theory of penal suffering, for Christ does not suffer penalty, and further, it was no theory of vicarious representation; he does not suffer penalty in our stead, but provides a benefit.[69] By contrast, Yoder maintained that Anselm portrayed a

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[66] *CDH,* II, 19; Hopkins and Richardson, 135.

[67] *CDH*, II, 19; Hopkins and Richardson, 135.

[68] Harnack, *History of Dogma*, Vol. VI, 68.

[69] Ibid., 68.

substitutionary role for Jesus rather than just a representative one. Yoder identified the force of *CDH* in its "juxtaposition of civil punishment with bloody sacrifice."[70] He apparently believed that punishment was involved in *CDH*. Harnack found the notions of penalty and of vicarious penal suffering entirely eliminated. Consequently, despite Anselm's effort to express it as strongly as possible, in Harnack's view "the gravity of sin (*pondus peccati*) is not treated with sufficient earnestness..."[71]

Another contrast is between Harnack and Yoder's estimation of the place of guilt. Harnack congratulated Anselm for recognizing the basic issue as that of guilt. This was one of the theory's excellences! To his credit, Anselm recognized that the need was for redemption from guilt and not as "the Greeks had always thought primarily of redemption from the consequences of sin, liability to death."[72] Furthermore, Anselm properly conceived of guilt as "exclusively guilt before God (disobedience)" rather than seeing redemption as satisfying the devil.[73] Yoder dismissed the obsession with "the guilt of past sin" as unbiblical. He maintained instead that the real issue is one of a hindrance to relationship and to obedience.[74]

A final difference is perhaps most directly relevant to a peace theology, although the foregoing are certainly related to this last. Yoder held that in *CDH*, the

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[70] Yoder, *Preface*, 300, 301, n.6.

[71] Harnack, *History of Dogma,* VI, 69.

[72] Ibid., 70.

[73] Ibid., 69-70.

[74] Yoder, *Preface*, 300.

cross of Christ is not parallel to that of the believer. For Yoder, the cross had implications for the way Christians are to live: it is in fact the source of pacifist commitment. Yoder's emphasis on future obedience rather than past guilt, his concern that salvation not be imposed on all and the rejection of a penal substitutionary view: all of these relate to a theology that emphasizes the need for discipleship, following Jesus in his taking up the cross. Yoder regarded it as appropriate that some kind of faithful response is required, whereas Harnack found this problematic.

It might appear that these differences in the interpretation and objections are highly significant, even to the point that it would be meaningless to speak of a continuity between Yoder and Harnack. There is nevertheless a common approach to Anselm, a ground from which they read and interpret *CDH.* The differences arise due to their prior theological disagreements, and their consequent divergence over what is actually in *CDH:* both object with their opposite requirements. Could it be that one is simply misreading Anselm? Or is it that Anselm is more complex, more dialectical than either realizes? That each emphasizes and ignores one aspect of his teaching – and that together they eliminate certain aspects of his approach, namely, those parts of his world view that were rejected by the Reformers and those rejected by Enlightenment modern people? Certainly, these competing views should give us pause, and suggest that a rereading of Anselm would be warranted. Clearly, the Peace Theology people cannot simply rely on Harnack's reading, especially since they part ways on some very basic convictions.

On a number of these disagreements with Harnack Yoder would find company with some of the other interpreters mentioned above. Where Harnack apparently

wanted a vicarious suffering of a penalty in our stead,[75] many of the others shared Yoder's aversion to these. The question arises as to whether any new objections to *CDH* arise as a result of an Anabaptist, peace church or pacifist commitment. The answer in Yoder's case could be that there was nothing unique, but that he did emphasize certain objections arising out of his interest in discipleship, or the response of faithful obedience. Perhaps there is nothing entirely new. He was influenced by a tradition inherited from Ritschl, Harnack and Aulén, that itself contained a certain variety. Yoder focused the discussion for the purposes of a theology that emphasized discipleship and sharing the cross of Christ.

Before concluding this discussion of the parallels and distinctions of Yoder's interpretation of *CDH* with others, it should be noted that the use of Harnack, Ritschl or Rashdall was not necessarily direct. There is no reference to their works in his discussion of Anselm in *Preface to Theology*. The reliance is perhaps second-hand, which might account for Yoder's selective use of their critiques, and his lack of attention to the inconsistencies in Anselm interpretation.

John Driver

Driver's interpretation of Anselm relied heavily upon Yoder's treatment of *CDH* in *Preface to Theology*.[76] Since Driver's project in *Understanding the Atonement for the Mission of the Church* was not to expressly to examine Anselm, but rather to catalogue the images of Atonement in the Bible, he did not need to examine

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[75] I am referring to the second and third items on Harnack's list of what Anselm's theory was not. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, VI, 57-68. See also his greatest objection on p. 77-8.

[76] Driver, 55-64.

Anselmian scholarship and Yoder's interpretation sufficed. Driver attempted to do justice to the host of images found in the Bible, not settling on just one theory. As such, he did not explicitly dismiss Anselm's Satisfaction theory of Atonement. Nevertheless, his critique of the "Satisfaction view" emerges as a refrain throughout the book. He did not grant the place to Anselm that Yoder did. (Admittedly, the force of Yoder's argument is such that what most people pick up from Yoder is that Anselm can be rejected without much consideration. However, as noted above, Yoder *did* acknowledge the strength of *CDH*.)

Driver mentioned a few traits of Anselm's theory that appear to be "in its favour," but which under closer scrutiny, turn out not to stand "the test of faithfulness to the biblical vision as well as might be desired." In addition, he detected "damaging criticisms" to which he deemed the satisfaction theory "vulnerable".[77] He identified these problems as variously exegetical, theological, historical and practical, following Yoder's critique very closely, and therefore they need not be repeated here.

There is one point however, where Driver did go beyond Yoder's lead, and that is on the matter of grace. Anselm's view of the atonement, he noted, depended upon a medieval understanding of sacramental grace. The objective, cosmic-historic atonement presupposed "the medieval subjective, experiential, sacramental means of appropriating the effects of the act. This kind of grace is imparted in the context of Christendom where people are viewed as individual sinners.... (and) was easily adapted to classical Protestantism, which simply perpetuated the presuppositions and realities of

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[77] Ibid., 55.

Christendom."[78] The problem here is apparently that Anselm's understanding provides an objective theory that conveniently proved useful in a situation where "everyone in society needs to be considered Christian..." "The saving benefit of Christ was applied sacramentally in Catholicism and by means of sacraments and *solafideism* in the case of classic Protestantism."[79] Whether Anselm's theory is at fault simply because it outlines an objective, cosmic, historical reality is not quite clear, but this appears to be part of Driver's concern. Another aspect of the critique seems to be that Anselm, along with his contemporaries, "perceived people as individuals." This is a strange criticism, indeed, coming from an inheritor of the "free church" tradition, where one must be baptized upon one's own confession of faith, and become a member of the church as an individual. At all events, the underlying issue seems to be that grace is received (or applied) as a legal transaction.

This borrowing of extra-biblical categories and the question of legalistic grace became the issue again when Driver discussed Anselm's notion of sin and redemption. Driver understood Anselm to be influenced by the "Germanic feudal ideas" of personal honour, and so to emphasize God's pride over God's "grace or mercy or saving or liberating intent." Driver surmised that Anselm's "understanding of redemption was probably determined more by contemporary Irish and Germanic legal concepts than by the biblical view."[80] It is worth noting here that he cited George Williams as a source for this reference to Irish and Germanic legal concepts, but Williams himself was only

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[78] Ibid., 60.

[79] Ibid., 60.

[80] Ibid., 62.

listing this traditional view of Anselm, and did not do anything to either uphold this view, or to build on it, with the effect of diminishing its importance if not questioning its legitimacy.[81] Certainly, others have challenged this old assumption and argued convincingly that Anselm's notions grew up in the church, and that he transformed the meaning of what the church borrowed.[82]

Throughout his discussion, Driver dropped comments that reinforced the impression that he found Anselm's views problematic. There is a refrain in the book, objecting to Anselm's portrayal of God's need for retribution, and of salvation as freedom from indebtedness rather than from slavery.[83]

Driver's critique, like Yoder's, reveals a concern for ethics and discipleship, and in an indirect, or preparatory manner, might be relevant to a Peace Theology -- since an emphasis on discipleship is key to a Peace Theology. (Certainly, the two have been paired in the Mennonite tradition.) Driver also made mention of a subject that is more directly related to a Peace Theology, namely, the question of capital punishment. He did not explicitly draw a connection between Anselm's *CDH* and support for capital punishment, but there is an implied connection in his critique of the foundations and presuppositions of *CDH*. According to Driver, the "Roman juridical system" provided the presuppositions and categories for Anselm. Indeed, it was the compatibility of his theory of atonement with "Western legal structures" which accounted for its triumph

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[81] George Hunston Williams, "The Sacramental Presuppositions in Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*," *Church History* XXVI (September 1957), 246.

[82] See John McIntyre, *St. Anselm and his Critics. A Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo* (Edinburgh & London: Oliver and Boyd, 1954), 82-92.

[83] Driver, 137, 175, 243, 249, 255.

over other models of atonement. Two examples served for Driver to illustrate this "basic compatibility between Western juridical structures and the Anselmian view..."[84] First, he noted, there is the example of the church's approach to discipline. While the New Testament highlighted the restoring function of discipline, as outlined in Matt. 18:15-20, in the church subsequently, discipline has involved "retribution, pedagogy, and defense of the church's honor. In fact, Roman law provided the conceptual categories for the church's sacrament of penance..." and the notions of punishment, merit, satisfaction, and absolution. Although Protestantism rejected the penitential system, they too have often proceeded, argued Driver, "more in the spirit of Western law than in the gracious spirit of biblical covenant, which is revealed most fully in the saving work of Christ." [85]

Driver's second example of the compatibility of Western Law and the Anselmian view turns out to be an example of "recourse to secular Western legal concepts for our way of understanding how God deals with sin and the appropriate way for the state to deal with crime..." He referred to "the widespread Christian defense of the practice of capital punishment..." Driver suggested that since the biblical word on the subject of capital punishment is hotly debated, the fact that "most Western Christians have traditionally assumed the position which is most compatible with Western legal theory and practice seems to lend credibility to the view that Christendom has indeed depended strongly on secular juridical categories for its understandings of the work of Christ and matters of ecclesiastical and civil

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[84] Ibid., 61.

[85] Ibid., 61.

discipline."[86] Although the logic is not tight here, Driver implied that capital punishment was either an obvious corollary of Anselm's satisfaction theory or that it sprang from the same source. Either way, somehow Anselm's satisfaction theory appeared to be very compatible with support for capital punishment. Driver concluded that by taking categories from sources other than the Bible, namely, Roman civil law, Anselm arrived at conclusions that "...run counter to the gospel."[87]

Driver's case against Anselm, then, might be summarized in the following terms. Anselm used extra-biblical categories and assumptions that were legalistic and retributive, thus missing the restorative and merciful spirit of the Gospel. The tone of this critique is the same as that of Harnack, recalling Harnack's "mythological private man" who is unable to forgive without payment.[88] (Some of the specifics, again, are contrary to those of Harnack.) The matters of implications for the lives of Christians, and questions about punishment continue in the critique articulated by Weaver.

J. Denny Weaver

The critique

In Weaver's earlier writing, he assumed the general approach of Yoder and Driver offering a similar type of critique. As his work on atonement proceeded further, he focused more explicitly on what he regarded as the one, underlying flaw that is critical for a peace theology. This flaw makes all of the other discussion of Anselm's *CDH* essentially irrelevant for Weaver.

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[86] Ibid., 61.

[87] Ibid., 62.

[88] Harnack, *History of Dogma*, IV, 77.

Weaver's earlier summation of the problem with *CDH* can be found in *Keeping Salvation Ethical*. There Weaver provided a brief outline of Anselm's argument, and a quick summary of its weaknesses identifying three problems and tracing their roots to the genesis of *CDH* in the post-Constantinian church, where ethics had become detached from the teaching of Jesus. First, he observed that "Anselm's satisfaction theory does not make inherently necessary any specific or particular knowledge of the way Jesus was human or divine, nor does it require any particular knowledge of Jesus' teaching."[89] He took this to mean that there is no ethic implied in the atonement doctrine. Furthermore, the resurrection of Jesus does not figure as an integral dimension in Anselm's understanding of atonement.[90]

A second, albeit related, way in which Weaver judged Anselm's atonement theory to be conformed to the Constantinian ecclesiology is in its adoption of a "minimal ethic"[91] for Christians.

> Rather than envisioning a change in orientation, church leaders typically assumed that Christians would continue to sin in ways that reflect the fallen character of the social order. When theologians spoke of a debt payment or of satisfying the requirement of God's law, that accommodated itself well to the ongoing nature of sin. Debt payment cancels the residue of past sin (as well as original sin), but does not deal in a fundamental way with the future life of the Christian.[92]

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89 J. Denny Weaver, *Keeping Salvation Ethical* (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1996), 45.

90 Ibid., 45.

91 Ibid., 47.

92 Ibid., 47.

Put simply, in Weaver's estimation "the satisfaction theory enables one to claim Jesus' salvific work without incorporating his life and teaching."[93]

The third Constantinian trait of Anselm's explanation of atonement, claimed Weaver, is that it is individualistic. "The satisfaction or substitutionary theory of Anselm defines the problem of the sinner in inherently individual terms. The sinner owes a debt, and the debt is personal to that sinner. When paid, the sinner is saved."[94] (This charge of "individualism" sounds as strange here as it did with Driver.) Weaver acknowledged that Jesus' death did satisfy God's justice in the universe, according to Anselm, but still charged that this universal satisfaction did not change the individual nature of the "debt-penalty arrangement with the individual sinner."[95] It is not evident just why Weaver finds Anselm so one-sided. It is worth recalling that Yoder perceived rather a drift toward universalism, since the debt was paid for everyone, regardless of individual participation. The individual conception of salvation and of sin is appropriate to the Constantinian assumption that societal structures are already under the rule of God, since society was assumed to be Christian, therefore there was no perceived need to construe salvation in social terms. The problem, then in Weaver's estimation, was that Anselm's satisfaction theory allows one to be forgiven and saved, but without changing one's life. Anselm's salvation is *not ethical* – that is, salvation is not linked to ethics.

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93 Weaver, "Some Theological Implications of *Christus Victor*" *Mennonite Quarterly Review*, 1994: 484.

94 Weaver, *Keeping Salvation Ethical*, 47.

95 Ibid., 48.

Weaver's subsequent work focused the critique more sharply: the problem is not simply that an ethic derived from Jesus is not intrinsically required by Anselm's Satisfaction theory. In fact, it is worse than that, for there *is* a value or an ethic that is assumed in *CDH*, but it is not a Christian one, according to Weaver. In Weaver's attempt to articulate a contemporary atonement theology, he concluded that Anselm's satisfaction theory of atonement is "based on divinely sanctioned, retributive violence." [96] It depends upon the assumption that "doing justice means to punish." Anselm's doctrine of atonement must therefore be rejected by Christians who are "uncomfortable with the idea of a God who sanctions violence, a God who sends the Son so that his death can satisfy a divine requirement..."[97] Weaver recognized that many scholars and church people have attempted to reinterpret Anselm to answer the concerns of those who have found a substitutionary or Satisfaction theory of Atonement offensive. His response, however, was to dismiss their various attempts to nuance, draw distinctions, change emphases or perspective or to reread Anselm, claiming that in the end, no amount of "blunting the edges or camouflaging" will cover the fact that it is still an image where "salvation depends on the necessary death of Jesus as a debt payment. It is still salvation based on voluntary, passive submission to necessary suffering." It is, in Weaver's eyes, a depiction of "passive, innocent suffering that is owed to God." [98] Here, the question of violence is brought to bear explicitly. In the end, for Weaver, Anselm's atonement theory depicted God as *sanctioning* violence.

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[96] Weaver, *The Nonviolent Atonement*, 225.

[97] Ibid., 225.

[98] Ibid., 196.

Weaver specified three ways in which Satisfaction atonement exhibits or accommodates violence. First, removing the devil from the "atonement equation" leaves an image of God who saves by violence, and of an innocent Son who passively submits to that violence, i.e. God-orchestrated and God-directed violence. His reasoning is that if there is no devil toward whom the death was directed, or who required the death of Jesus, then it must have been God who made the bloody and violent demand. Second, Anselm assumed that justice required retribution, which is violent. Finally, Weaver noted that the abstract and ahistorical character of the theory does not challenge, but in fact accommodates violence in the social order.[99] Still, he did admit, "it is not that satisfaction motif promotes violence *per se*."[100]

The Distinctive Element

The key aspects of this critique obviously resemble those of Harnack as filtered through Yoder. Recall that Harnack's summary case against *CDH* was a conclusion about the *whole character* of the teaching. For Harnack, *CDH* portrayed a salvation that is not linked to the particular life and obedience of Jesus, and it depicted God as the "mythological private man" who is unable to forgive without payment.[101] These same points are made by Weaver and form the basis of his rejection of Anselm whose theory is based on retribution. The framework with which Weaver reads Anselm is this

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99 J. Denny Weaver, "Violence in Theology," *Cross-Currents* 51, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 150-176.

100 Weaver, *Nonviolent Atonement*, 97.

101 Harnack, *History of Dogma*, IV/75.

Liberal Protestant one, which today is shared by a number of others within the Mennonite Peace Theology community.[102]

Perhaps the main difference from Harnack arises from an increased awareness of "the underside" of history, and a rejection of the appropriateness of retribution and of violence. And here we must take note of the influence of the feminist, black, and womanist voices which also have come to a large extent out of Liberal Protestantism, even if they are in part reactions to that movement. The occasion for Weaver's more recent work on Atonement was, in fact, to answer certain challenges from feminist and womanist perspectives. He aimed to demonstrate that the cross and atonement did not need to be rejected by people who are aware of violence against the oppressed. Instead, one need only to interpret the cross and atonement correctly. Weaver, therefore, accepted part of the feminist and womanist critique, namely, the view that much of traditional teaching about the cross and atonement has depicted "divine child abuse," and "surrogacy" in ways that are destructive to women, and in particular African American women, and children.[103]

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[102] Sometimes the similarity is in the critique of CDH and at other times, in the assumption about the ethical implications of a satisfaction atonement view (without mention of Anselm). Tom Finger, for example, who wrote a systematic theology as an Anabaptist, rehearsed the familiar litany of problems with Anselm's atonement teaching. Thomas N. Finger, *Christian Theology: An Eschatological Approach*, vol. I (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1985), 307-308. Ted Grimsrud and Ray Gingerich have wondered about the assumptions of a satisfaction theory of atonement and the implications for how Christians treat each other. Ray C. Gingerich, "Reimaging Power: Toward a Theology of Nonviolence" in *Peace and Justice Shall Embrace: Power and Theopolitics in the Bible: Essays in Honor of Millard Lind*, ed., Ted Grimsrud and Loren L. Johns (Telford, PA: Pandora Press, 1999), 192ff; Ted Grimsrud, "Scapegoating No More: Christian Pacifism and New Testament Views of Jesus' Death" in *Violence Renounced: René Girard, Biblical Studies, and Peacemaking*, ed. Willard M. Swartley (Telford, PA: Pandora Press U.S., 2000), 49ff.

One of the dimensions of Anselm's satisfaction theory that Joanne Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker found problematic was "the idea that justice is established through adequate punishment." God is depicted as a tyrant who was not free to forgive until the Son submitted to death, sacrificing himself. Here is a story which glorifies "suffering as salvific."[104] Parker and Brown referred to Walter Rauschenbusch's denouncement of a teaching that features a "despotic conception of God and the universe" which functions to sanction the present order and to sanctify its victims through their suffering.[105]

Weaver did not dispute such claims. He also accepted to some extent the insights of Delores Williams and other womanist theologians on the matter of the cross and atonement. Williams' identification of a parallel between Black American women's surrogate role and Jesus' work as described by some substitutionary,

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103 Weaver, *Nonviolent Atonement*, 178

104 Joanne Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker, "For God So Loved the World?" in *Patriarchy & Abuse: A Feminist Critique,* ed., Joanne Carlson Brown and Carole R. Bohn (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1989), 8.

105 Brown, "For God So Loved," 8. They cited Walter Rauschenbusch, *A Theology for the Social Gospel* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1917), 174, ch. 15. Brown & Parker also brought a charge arising from the roots of Anselm's theory in sacrifice and blood. It was that the notion of Jesus' redeeming blood giving us birth/life usurps the place of women's blood, and women's giving birth. It is interesting to note that the source for their discussion of blood and sacrifice in the Hebrew Bible was John Driver, *Understanding the Atonement*, 9-11. This matter of blood and the degradation of women's experience was not taken up by Weaver. Rita Nakashima Brock is another feminist theologian who shares Weaver's sense of the violence of certain theories of atonement. She pointed out the severely negative effects of a doctrine of atonement where salvation is contingent upon the abuse and sacrifice of the one perfect child. Although she did not discuss Anselm in particular, some of her critique would seem to have him in mind. Rita Nakashima Brock, "And a Little Child Will Lead Us: Christology and Child Abuse" in *Christianity, Patriarchy and Abuse,* ed., Joanne Carlson Brown & Rebecca Parker (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1989), 51-3.

satisfaction theories of atonement resonates with Weaver's own view. She was categorical about moving the focus of God's redeeming work away from the cross to the "ministerial life" of Jesus. However, she did concede, "as Christians, black women cannot forget the cross. But neither can they glorify it."[106]

The underlying concern here is about the abuse of power, which is violence. It was not a commitment to non-violence *per se* which elicited the feminist and Womanist critiques of Anselm, but a commitment to the defense of women, children, African American women, and a critique of the abuse of power.[107]

Weaver's interpretation of Anselm is thus based on a "Harnackian" reading, which has been modified by the perspective of the underside of history, picking up challenges from Feminist, Womanist and Black perspectives. What is distinctive (vis-à-vis other peace theology thinkers) is the claim that *CDH* is not compatible with a commitment to non-violence. Although this claim is new, it is an outgrowth of the other views already discussed. That is, the view of a tyrant requiring payment in order to forgive assumes a retributive sort of justice, which Weaver deemed incompatible

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[106] Delores S. Williams, "Black Women's Surrogacy Experience and the Christian notion of Redemption" in *After Patriarchy: Feminist Transformations of the World Religions,* ed., Paula Cooey, William R. Eakin, and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 12-3.

[107] Perhaps these are all on some level pertinent to the rejection of violence, but this would have to be examined more closely. What is more violent, no punishment or punishment? Perhaps it depends for whom? The complaint of survivors of abuse that was for a long time covered up or denied seems to be that free forgiveness and no punishment or accountability for the perpetrators of abuse turned out to mean victimization and violence for women and children. (Although, we do not want to equate overlooking and denial with real forgiveness, because forgiveness presupposes that the sin has been named and not simply overlooked or denied.)

with a restorative justice and non-violence. These critiques themselves do not depend upon a commitment to non-violence. However, Weaver argued that, from the point of view of a pacifist, the assumptions and categories of *CDH* that are identified by Harnack and the feminist and womanist voices, are incompatible with a commitment to non-violence.

What Weaver proposed as an alternative to *CDH* is what he termed a narrative *Christus Victor* motif. It is simply "a way of reading the entire history of God's people, with the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus as the culminating revelation of the reign of God in history."[108] It is the people of God making "God's rule visible in the world by the confrontation of injustice and by making visible in their midst the justice, peace, and freedom of the rule of God."[109] It emerges directly from the NT – from the Gospels to Revelation. It is like the classic *Christus Victor* so named by Gustav Aulén, in that it describes the victory of Christ over the powers. It differs from this early view, however, in that it does not envision mythological creatures, or cosmic beings, and God does not pay a ransom, or deceive the devil in any way. Instead, it is the biblical story of "the event of Jesus and the church around Jesus unfolding in the realm of history."[110] The "sacrifice of Jesus' life revealed the full character of the powers that enslave sinful humankind and that oppose the rule of God. Through the resurrection, God in Christ has in fact defeated these powers "for us."[111] By the term Narrative *Christus Victor*

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[108] Weaver, *Nonviolent*, 69.

[109] Ibid., 68.

[110] Ibid., 69.

[111] Ibid., 76.

Weaver intended to include "victory in both human historical and cosmic realms, as well as emphasizing Jesus' life and ministry."[112]

The story, as retold by Weaver, begins with the Revelation which he described as "virtually an extended, multifaceted statement of the *Christus Victor* image – a confrontation between good and evil, between the forces of God and the forces of Satan, between Christ and anti-Christ."[113] After looking in detail at the various scenes of Revelation, he highlighted three points, which are relevant to his conviction that the rejection of violence belongs to the essence of Jesus' life and work. First, the victory of the reign of God over the forces of evil was won by the death and resurrection of Christ. Second, "Christians contribute to the victory of the slain lamb by their testimony." And third, the battles described in Revelation are not real battles, but pictures used to depict "the cosmic significance of the resurrection of Jesus.' He noted, for example that the rider on the horse in chapter 19 killed by the sword from his mouth, not a normal sword. Furthermore, he was already bloody going into battle, indicating that this is the resurrected, victorious Christ. His weapon was the word of God.[114]

Weaver then turned to the Gospels to continue the image of his narrative *Christus Victor.* Whereas he believed the Revelation provided the "universal and cosmic story of the confrontation of reign of God and rule of Satan" the Gospels depict

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[112] Ibid., 22.

[113] Ibid., 20.

[114] Ibid., 32-3.

the same confrontation from the "earthbound perspective."[115] Weaver also discerned the victory motif in the writings of Paul and the Letter to the Hebrews. He argued that contrary to popular assumptions, Paul's language about the cross, sacrifice and fulfillment of the law do not provide a foundation for satisfaction atonement.[116] He aimed to show that Paul's message was like that of the gospels where "Jesus' mission was to save by making present the reign of God. It was not God who organized the death of Jesus but rather "human beings."[117] He noted that "texts such as 2 Corinthians 5:21 do not constitute incontrovertible proof of satisfaction atonement."[118] Similarly, he challenged the assumption that the Letter to the Hebrews might appear to support sacrificial and satisfaction atonement. By saying that Hebrews rejected the sacrificial system, reinterpreted sacrifice, emphasized Jesus as high-priest rather than as sacrifice, he believes that Hebrews actually overturns satisfaction atonement and is compatible with his narrative *Christus Victor.* Finally, Weaver claimed that the narrative *Christus Victor* actually began with the history of Israel. The mission of Israel was to make God's rule visible on earth, in history.[119]

The merits of this view according to Weaver are that it is not a legal construct, but takes place in history and provides a challenge to oppression in history. It does not

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[115] Ibid., 34.

[116] Ibid., 49.

[117] Ibid., 58.

[118] "For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God." Ibid., 58.

[119] Ibid., 66.

declare that the death of Jesus was necessary – and it is not God who requires or orchestrates the death of Jesus. The justice and mercy of God are not split. There is an active role for humankind, rather than the passive role of observer. The life and ministry of Jesus indicate how to live if we choose to be on the side of God, living the reign of God, struggling against evil. It is a non-violent way of resisting evil. This is how evil was/is overcome.

Interestingly enough, Weaver admitted that Anselm distinguished between satisfaction and punishment, and that CDH was about satisfaction.[120] He also even acknowledged that "the particular images most objectionable to feminists and womanists are not Anselm's images." But soon he disregarded this distinction, claiming that whether through punishment or satisfaction, there is a death and it balances out the evil. The main problem is the claim that sin/evil is balanced by violence/punishment.[121]

Conclusion

The summary of the charges in the forgoing was that Anselm's Satisfaction theory is legal, juridical, and transactional, where a wrathful, tyrannical Father refused to forgive without being paid in blood, by a merciful, passively obedient Son who suffered even death. One claim is that the scenario upholds retribution, but others add that it promotes passive submission to suffering and is therefore oppressive to oppressed people. Furthermore, it divides the Trinity with the Father being just and the Son merciful, and the satisfaction is offered by the Son, as a human work rather than an

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[120] Ibid., 192.

[121] Ibid., 195-6.

entirely divine one. The theory was problematic then, for Mennonites, even without the additional concerns of the Peace church tradition that can be listed as two, although they are closely related. The first is that the *CDH* does not require or encourage Christians to see the cross as indicating a way of life for Christians, and most specifically, a pacifist or non-violent way of life. The second, brought by Weaver, is the contention of a divine sanctioning of violence. The question is whether Yoder, Driver and Weaver have properly represented Anselm. Weaver, although he (of the three) has written the most on Anselm, has not engaged much of the Anselmian scholarship in a thorough manner.[122] It is time to visit that scholarship, to see how Anselm's argument in *CDH* sounds from the point of view of scholars who attempt to understand it in the context of Anselm's whole theology, and his own setting -- a setting which is foreign to North American Protestants writing almost 1000 years after Anselm lived.

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[122] In the chapter that dealt most with Anselm, Weaver cited Richard Southern's important biography of Anselm extensively, and referred to John McIntyre's 1954 work once.

CHAPTER II

THE HONOUR OF GOD IN *CUR DEUS HOMO*: RECONSIDERING THE "MIGHTY PRIVATE MAN"

Introduction

In Chapter 1 we considered the interpretations and critiques of *CDH* offered by three contemporary Mennonite scholars, Yoder, Driver and Weaver. It is time now, to discuss alternative readings of Anselm's work on the Incarnation and on the restoration of humanity. The problems with *CDH* according to Yoder, Weaver and Driver were that Anselm's assumptions were legal and retributive, where forgiveness is bought rather than free, thus missing the restorative and merciful spirit of the Gospel. The implied depiction of God in this view is of a wrathful Father God at odds with a merciful Son. In addition, the *CDH* does not require or encourage Christians to see the cross as indicating a way of life for Christians, and most specifically, a pacifist or non-violent way of life. Even more serious is the claim that, according to Weaver, Anselm assumes a retributive instead of a restorative notion of justice, and depicts God requiring or sanctioning violence. I noted that there are reverberations of Harnack's "mythological private man" who is unable to forgive without payment.[1]

In fact, *CDH* sounds quite different from this when read through the eyes of Anselm scholars or theologians who, since the 1950's, have considered *CDH* in relation to Anselm's other works, and within the framework of his medieval world and Catholic church. In order to address the critiques brought by the contemporary Mennonites here in

question, the theology of Saint Anselm in *CDH* can be treated under two headings, namely, the nature of God and of justice, the subject of the present chapter, and the restoration of humanity, which will be undertaken in the next chapter. Under the first heading I will discuss Anselm's understanding of the justice, rectitude, honour, and aseity of God, as well as of beauty and fittingness, highlighting how one cannot be understood without the others. Under the title "the Restoration of humanity," in the following chapter, I will consider the meaning of debt, satisfaction, sacrifice, reward and the obedience of Christ. It is evident that Anselm's God is the very opposite of a petty "private man", or a blood-thirsty, vindictive tyrant. Rather, God is supremely honourable, just and merciful, whose righteousness corresponds to the right-ordering of the universe and the well-being of all creatures, and who became incarnate in order to restore the beauty and order of all creation, of humanity and human beings. Before looking at the scholarship, here is an outline of Anselm's text.

Outline of *CDH*

"By what logic or necessity did God become man, and by his death, as we believe and profess, restore life to the world?"[2] Despite the objections of some unbelievers, this was not an insult to God, precisely because it was necessary for the salvation of the world. The solution to this problem could be made "intelligible to all, and appealing because of its utility and the beauty of its logic."[3] The argument is in the form of a

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1 Harnack, *History of Dogma*, IV, 77.
2 *CDH* I,1
3 *CDH* I,1

dialogue: Boso asks the questions and Anselm answers, and the whole work is divided into two books.

The first book demonstrates that the redemption of humanity could only be brought about by a divine person. If it were otherwise, then humanity would have been in debt to someone other than God, who is the only one to whom humanity should need to be a slave. The liberation of humanity can rightly be called a ransoming, a driving out the devil, even though the devil actually had no jurisdiction over humanity. God could not simply command the devil to be gone, but needed to come down to accomplish this. This coming down in no way implies that the divine nature suffered, but only that the human nature that God took upon himself suffered. Boso objected that it was also problematic to say that God allowed his Son to be put to death. However, it was Christ who "of his own volition underwent death in order to save mankind."[4] God did not coerce this, but Christ out of obedience, upheld righteousness and so incurred death. In this sense, it is therefore possible to say that God willed the son's death, only because it was the only way that humanity could be saved.

Although it might not be self-evident just how Christ's death can bring about this salvation, it is so.[5] He argues under the assumption that whatever is inappropriate is impossible for God, and whatever is most logical is inevitable. Anselm posits that humanity was "created for a state of blessedness which cannot be had in this life, and no one can arrive at that state if his sins have not been got rid of, and that no man can pass

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[4] *CDH* I, 8, p. 275

[5] *CDH* I, 11, p. 282

through this life without sin..." The remission of sins is necessary. By what rationale does God forgive sins? What is sin? What is it to give satisfaction for sin? To sin is not to render unto God what is owed to God, namely the subjection of our wills. "Therefore, everyone who sins is under an obligation to repay to God the honour which he has violently taken from him, and this is the satisfaction which every sinner is obliged to give to God."[6]

It is not fitting for God to forgive sin out of mercy alone, without any restitution because if a sin is not punished where no satisfaction is made, then it is not regulated. Then, there is no difference between sinner and non-sinner, and sin is subject to no law – like God. Human beings are to forgive, but it is the role of God alone to take vengeance. It does not belong to God's freedom or benevolence to release a sinner unpunished who has not repaid God. It is utterly intolerable, in the universal order, that a creature should take away honour from the creator and not repay what he has taken away. Therefore, God should not tolerate this greatest injustice. In fact, the greatest thing for God to defend in the universe is God's honour. This is supreme justice. If God did not regulate things, assuring that there was either voluntary recompense for wrong-doing, or the exaction of punishment, then the universal order and its own regulatory beauty would not be maintained, and it is God's job to maintain this.[7]

God intends to replace the fallen angels from out of the human race, but they cannot be the equals of angels who have never sinned if they have not made recompense

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6 *CDH* I, 11, p. 283

or been punished.[8] So, humanity cannot be saved without recompense for sin, and that satisfaction should be proportional to the size of the sin. But human beings, who already owe themselves and all they have to God, have nothing with which to make recompense for sin.[9] When humanity allowed itself to be conquered by the devil, humanity dishonoured God and stole from God – what God intended to do with regard to the human species.[10] What humanity needs to do is to conquer the devil. The fact that humanity is not capable of this does not excuse them because it was by their own fault that they are in this state of incapacity.[11]

God cannot simply forgive that which humanity is unable to pay, because it would simply be God forgiving what God could not get. God's mercy is of a different sort. If a person does not repay what he owes and wishes to, he will not be happy, and if he does not desire to do so, he will be a wrong-doer. Either way, he will not be blessedly happy.[12] So, since humanity cannot be saved without paying what it owes, but cannot pay what it owes, we seem to have an impossible situation – apart from Christ. But Anselm reasoned that it is impossible that no human beings should attain the state for which humanity was created. Therefore, it does seem necessary that humanity should be saved through Christ.

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[7] *CDH* I, 15, p. 289

[8] *CDH* I, 19, p. 300-1

[9] *CDH* I, 20, p. 304

[10] *CDH* I, 23, p. 308

[11] *CDH* I, 24, p. 310

The Second Book begins by reasoning that "man, being rational by nature, was created righteous to the end that, through rejoicing in God, he might be blessedly happy."[13] And God must bring to completion what God began, although it is not out of a necessity that diminishes graciousness that God does this, but out of an obligation to uphold what is honourable.[14] Now, we can see that it is only a God-Man, who is perfect God and perfect man, who can pay what humanity needed to pay but could not pay.[15] It is fitting that the human nature should be from the race of Adam because it is this race who owes the debt. Furthermore, this God-Man should be born from a woman and no man, since God already brought forth a woman from a man and no woman, in creating Eve from Adam.[16]

This God-Man did not need to die because he did not sin. He was however, capable of dying, only by his own freedom and will, because mortality is not a character of his pure human nature.[17] His life, if it is given for all sin outweighs them all.

Boso insisted that even though Christ died of his own free will, it is the case that he could not *not* die and that it was *necessary* for him to die. This calls for a clarification: In God there is no necessity and no impossibility, and one must distinguish between a

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12 *CDH* I, 24, p. 312

13 *CDH* II, 1, p. 316

14 *CDH* I, 5, p. 318-9

15 *CDH* II, 6-7, p. 320-1

16 *CDH* I, 8

necessity which compels and a necessity which does not compel. There is no necessity that is antecedent to the divine will. Rather, the things were of necessity, because God so willed them – or similarly with the God-Man. It is because of this kind of distinction that we can speak of God bringing forth non-sinful human being from sinful humanity, and of the Virgin Mother being preserved from sin based on Jesus' work.[18]

Now, because the Son offered himself up voluntarily to the Trinity, listeners are moved to devotion.[19] Further, this gift offered voluntarily by the Son is so great, that it deserves a reward. Since there is nothing that the Son does not already have, it is both just and necessary that he should hand over his reward to those for whom he "set an example, by his death, of dying for the sake of righteousness" – to those who are bound by such an enormous debt. This way the debt that they owe would be excused and "they would be given what, because of their sins, they are deprived of."[20]

Now we can see how great the mercy of God is, and so consonant with justice that a greater and more just mercy cannot be imagined. It is expressed most fully in God saying to the people condemned with no means of redeeming themselves: 'Take my only-begotten Son and give him on your behalf', and that the Son himself should say, 'Take me and redeem yourself'. And what "could be juster than that the one to whom is given a

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[17] *CDH* I, 11

[18] *CDH* II, 16-17

[19] *CDH* II, 18 p. 351-2

[20] *CDH* II, 19, p. 353

gift greater than any debt should absolve all debt, if it is presented with the feeling that is due?"[21]

The Justice of God

Anselm's argument in *CDH* is founded on what is just, what is right, what is fitting. God is just and the nature of justice is conformity to the will of God; that is what the created universe owes God the creator. We will consider what Anselm himself said about justice (*justitia*) and rectitude (*rectitudo*) in *CDH*, and then also what Anselmian scholars have said about his understanding of justice to demonstrate that the justice at play in *CDH* is not a juridical or legalistic matter, but profoundly integral to the well-being of creation.

Justitia Dei

Let us consider the text of *CDH* itself, in order to understand what Anselm understood by the justice of God, but with the help of scholars who have attempted to read Anselm in his context. Careful attention to *CDH* itself, as well as to his context enables an understanding of Anselm's notion of justice so that we do not make the mistake of reading some other definition of justice into his work. What we are after, in the end, is not only how Anselm would define the term justice, but also what his arguments demonstrate his understanding of justice to be. It seems that it is a justice that consists in the right ordering of creation in relation to the creator, which includes the well-being of the creatures.

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21 *CDH* II, 20, p. 354

In I, 13 Anselm articulated very clearly the nature of supreme justice: "Supreme Justice (which is identical with God himself) keeps nothing more justly than God's honor in regard to the governance of things."[22] After Boso concurred, Anselm added: "Therefore God maintains nothing with more justice than the honor of his own dignity." Clearly, Anselm was impressing upon his reader the integral and essential relationship between God, justice, and maintenance of the order and beauty of the universe.

When we add to this the argument from in I, 12 regarding whether it is proper for God to pass over sin 'undischarged,' that is with neither compensation nor punishment, we see that what God wills is "just" in that it is fitting, not arbitrary. God cannot leave sin 'undealt with' because that would be to acknowledge no difference between the guilty and the "not guilty." Since it "is not fitting that God do something unjustly," then it "does not pertain to His freedom, or kindness, or willingness that He forgive --- without punishing him --- a sinner who does not repay to Him what he has stolen."[23] God's justice here is not arbitrary but deeply rooted in the ordering and reordering of the universe.

Canadian theologian Robert Crouse addressed the complaint brought against Anselm that his treatment of the Atonement is "legalistic" or "juridical." Harnack, Rashdall and Aulén claimed that *CDH* was the result of the Latin importation of legal concepts, especially by Tertullian and St. Cyprian, and a transformation, which was carried out more and more thoroughly under the influence of the penitential discipline of

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[22] *CDH* I, 13, Hopkins & Richardson, 71.

the Western Church.[24] To Rashdall, Anselm's "notions of justice" were "the barbaric ideas of an ancient Lombard king or the technicalities of a Lombard lawyer."[25] Crouse, however, argued that Anselm's understanding of *justitia* was not determined by legal categories. Justice was for Anselm a philosophical and theological term. In Anselm's time, the term *justitia* was used in a theological, moral and legal sense. It meant, Crouse maintained, "rectitude of order, which has its source in God Himself, and embraces the whole order of creation, regulating the relations of man to God, of man to man, and mutual relations within the interior being of man."[26] In this way Anselm followed the tradition, and specifically, Augustine. Crouse reminded that in Greek philosophy, justice is a virtue of balance and harmony in the relationships between human beings, and in the mutual relationships of the parts of the human soul. In the Jewish tradition, God's justice is central and is expressed in the ordering of creation. Human justice is a matter of being in right relationship to God.[27] According to Crouse, there is no reason to look to the legal realm instead of the theological tradition to gain an understanding of what Anselm meant by his central term, *justitia*. Anselm did sometimes use the language of positive law, Crouse admitted, and there are legal as well as moral aspects to *justitia*.

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[23] *CDH* I, 12, Hopkins & Richardson, 70.

[24] Robert D. Crouse, "The Augustinian Background of St. Anselm's Concept *Justitia*," *Canadian Journal of Theology*, 4 (1958):113.

[25] Rashdall, 351. Cited by Eugene Fairweather, "'Iustitia Dei' as the 'Ratio' of the Incarnation" in *Spicilegium Beccense* I (Paris, 1959), 327.

[26] Crouse, "The Augustinian Background," 114.

Nevertheless, concluded Crouse, "we must not allow these legal illustrations to obscure the more fundamental theological meaning of *justitia* as universal rectitude of order."[28] This definition concurs with that provided by John Sheets who explained that "rectitude" is "a genus of truth," and that justice is simply 'the rectitude of will preserved for its own sake.' [29]

Eugene Fairweather, another Canadian theologian, made an argument similar to that of Crouse regarding the place and meaning of "*iustitia dei*" in Anselm's theology of the incarnation. In Fairweather's straightforward words: "As Anselm sees it, for God to act *iuste* is simply for him to act in accordance with his nature, and has nothing to do with some abstract juridical standard."[30] Fairweather cited Anselm's own statement in *CDH,* to which I just referred, where he indicated the most integral relationship between God's honour and the arrangement of things. "Again, if there is nothing greater or better than God, there is nothing more just than supreme justice, which maintains God's honor in the arrangement of things, and which is nothing else but God himself."[31] As regards human

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[27] Ibid., 115.

[28] Ibid., 114.

[29] John R. Sheets, "Justice in the Moral Thought of St. Anselm" *The Modern Schoolman*, 25 (1948), 132. Sheets translated from *Dialogus de Veritate*, 13 (PL, CLVIII, 482).

[30] Fairweather, "'*Iustitia Dei*' as the 'ratio' of the Incarnation," 330.

[31] *CDH* I, 13, Vose, 206. Alternate translation by Hopkins and Richardson: "...Supreme Justice (which is identical with God Himself) keeps nothing more justly than God's honor in regard to the governance of things."(71)

beings and *iustitia*, then, it is not simply a matter of "submission to an inscrutable divine will" but of conforming to the ordering of the universe.[32] Consequently, God's maintenance of God's honour is, as Fairweather put it, "not the tyrannical insistence of a despot on absolute submission to his arbitrary will; rather, it is the upholding of an order which reflects that incorruptible and changeless honour which is God himself."[33]

Joseph E. Komonchak picked up the matter of justice in Anselm's work, interpreting it as redemptive justice. In line with the thinking of Crouse and Fairweather, he maintained that the whole problem of Anselm's argument appearing juridical or transactional arose because of a "restrictive notion of justice, conceived in terms of appropriate rewards and punishment."[34] If one *assumes* that justice means only this then one will misunderstand Anselm for whom justice was about redemption and the restoration of all. Komonchak quoted from the *Proslogion* to make the case that in Anselm's view there are two ways in which God is just. God is just when God punishes the wicked because "it accords with their merits," but God is also just when God *spares* the wicked because it befits God's goodness. Whatever God wills is just, for the "transcendent rightness of God's will, unmeasured by any norm but itself, is the criterion

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[32] Fairweather, "'*Iustitia Dei*,'" 332-4.

[33] Ibid., 334.

[34] Joseph Komonchak, "Redemptive Justice: An Interpretation of the *Cur Deus Homo*," *The Dunwoodie Review* 12 (1972): 42.

of justice and injustice. Nor is this the arbitrary whim of some feudal lord." [35] This might sound circular, and therefore arbitrary after all, but the fact that God's justice/will is indistinguishable from the right ordering of the universe makes the term arbitrary seem inappropriate. God's will is indistinguishable from the right order of things. For Anselm, the foundations for justice or morality are ontological.[36] Justice is not based on law, but on the order, nature of the universe.[37]

Hunter Brown also rejected the claim that Anselm's logic was too juridical. He wrote to address the rift that exists between the liturgical priorities and social justice, studying *CDH* as an example of a Catholic soteriology with a "...sense of the elusive complexity of divine-human relations."[38] Like the authors previously discussed, he maintained that a juridical reading of Anselm's argument is not what was intended. "Anselm's understanding of justice is far richer than it may first appear."[39] Anselm himself was aware of the difficulties of outlining the role of justice in salvation. Brown observed that Anselm preempted the force of his critics' objections when he himself raised the thorny problem "...it is a strange thing if God so delights in, or requires, the blood of the innocent, that he neither chooses nor is able, to spare the guilty without the

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[35] Ibid., 41-2.

[36] Ibid., 40.

[37] Hogg, 177.

[38] Brown, "Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo* Revisited," *Église et Théologie* 25, (1994) 190.

sacrifice of the innocent."[40] Anselm needed a nuanced and more sophisticated notion of justice. Brown quoted this and other passages to demonstrate Anselm's concern with justice, highlighting what he described as Anselm's sense of the "breadth of divine justice, which involves not only mercy and forgiveness but also material creation and human action." [41] According to Brown, Anselm's sense of justice then, is not a narrowly juridical one, but one which has in view the well-being or right ordering of the whole creation.

A. E. McGrath came to the same conclusion. He clarified an important distinction between two types of justice, similar to Komonchak's point already outlined above, noting that many critics of Anselm's *CDH* have misunderstood his use of justice. He argued that if justice were understood as *lex talionis* or in the Ciceronian sense of "giving each his/her due" then it would not be possible "to consider God's redeeming of mankind as an act of justice." [42] God's justice, however, requires the redemption or restoration of humanity. McGrath distinguished between "supreme justice" (i.e. that of God) and "strict

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[39] Ibid., 191.

[40] *CDH* I, 10, Vose, p 200.

[41] Brown, 192.

[42] A.E. McGrath, "Rectitude: The Moral Foundation of Anselm of Canterbury's Soteriology," *The Downside Review* 99 (July 1981), 210. See also Paul Gilbert, "Violence et Liberté dans le *Cur Deus Homo*" in *Cur Deus Homo: Atti del Congresso Anselimiano Internazionale*, ed. Gilbert, Kohlenberger, Salmann (Rome, 1999), 673-695. Gilbert challenged the more traditional interpretation of *CDH* that suggested a violent, juridical God, presented by J. Rivière. He cited Hans Urs von Balthasar, Michel Corbin and Walter Kasper.

justice" (that of humanity). He recalled that Augustine was prepared to acknowledge the Ciceronian definition of justice, but turning to the parable of the labourers in the vineyard he maintained that this civil justice could not be applied to God. "Strict justice cannot accommodate the concept of grace; supreme justice can," concluded McGrath.[43] Whether Crouse and Fairweather would agree on the details of his argument, they are all of one mind on the view that the legal or juridical nature that some interpreters have perceived in *CDH* arises from some other definition of justice and are not in Anselm's own theology. For Anselm, Supreme justice, or the justice of God, is reconciling and merciful.

This unity of justice and mercy in God is also what Klaus Kienzler argued. In addition, he referred to two doctoral dissertations completed in Germany in the decade spanning the late 80's to early 90's, one in the Catholic, the other in the Protestant tradition, that drew similar conclusions regarding the mercy and justice of God in Anselm's *CDH*. Kienzler concluded that for Anselm, in *CDH*, the merciful God is 'greater' and also more just than a strictly, or narrowly just God.[44] In fact, it is difficult,

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[43] McGrath, 208.

[44] Kienzler, Klaus, "Der ' Barmherzige' Gott ist Der 'Grössere' Gott. Zum Verhältnis Von '*Cur Deus Homo*' Und '*Proslogion*'" in *Saint Anselm Bishop and Thinker,* ed. Roman Majeran and Edward Iwo Zieliński (Lublin: The University Press of the Catholic University of Lublin, 1999), 264. He referred to Gerhard Gade, "Eine Andere Barmherzigkeit. Zum Verständnis der Erlösungslehre Anselms von Canterbury" (Ph.D. diss., Germany, 1989) and to Georg Plasger, "Die Notwendigkeit der Gerechtigkeit. Eine Interpretation zu "*Cur Deus homo*" von Anselm von Canterbury" (Ph.D. diss., Germany, 1993).

given the foregoing, to understand Harnack's claim that Anselm failed to unite God's mercy and justice, and so fell into a gnostic dualism.[45]

***Rectitudo* is not Legalistic**

Intimately related to *justitia* in *CDH* is the understanding of *rectitudo*. In a 1963 dissertation, George Heyer, Jr. examined its place in Anselm's theology. He explained that *rectitudo* is simply "right order." In the realm of ontology, it has to do with the order present in beings themselves. In ethics, it is justice, and with regard to knowledge, *rectitudo* is truth.[46] He concluded that *rectitudo* was at the center of all the doctrines. The *rectitudo* of God gives meaning to the *rectitudo* of the creation.[47]

In 1964, the French Benedictine theologian, Robert Pouchet, published a study of the significance of *rectitudo* in Anselm's theology. He essentially accepted Fairweather's estimation of the meaning of *iustitia* and of *rectitudo* for Anselm. The problem or the need for redemption was due to the absence of *iustitia--rectitudo*. Redemption was precisely the restoration of rectitude. According to Pouchet, Fairweather had effectively demonstrated that rectitude answered the "why" of the incarnation, but he did not take the next step, which was to show that rectitude also answered the "how" of redemption.[48]

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[45] Harnack, *History of Dogma*, VI, 76-7.

[46] George Heyer, "*Rectitudo* in the Theology of St. Anselm" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1963), 5.

[47] Heyer, 6.

[48] Robert Pouchet, O.S.B., *La Rectitudo chez Saint Anselme. Un Itinéraire Augustinien de l'âme à Dieu* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1964): 168.

One way in which he differed from Fairweather was in being more willing to accept that there *was* a 'juridical' nature to Anselm's language and argument. But this is not a problem since Pouchet argued that there was a 'juridical' aspect to the *Gospel* itself. In particular, he mentioned some parables, and noted the use of the language of debt payment in the Lord's Prayer.[49] Pouchet did not, however, regard Anselm's portrayal of justice as juridical in the inappropriate way that was suggested by Anselm's critics. If "juridical" uttered as a criticism meant "too legal" or "too financial" or "too narrowly juridical," then Crouse, Fairweather and Pouchet would all be making the same claim about the juridical element in *CDH,* for, as Crouse argued, *justitia* for Anselm included the juridical or legal elements, but it was not confined to them, being also a theological and philosophical term.[50]

Others are in agreement with this view that Anselm held a broad understanding of justice. Komonchak questioned the confinement of justice or rectitude in Anselm's thought to the juridical realm. He observed that God's rightness and justice are self-originating, self-sustaining, and self-measured.[51] The foundations for justice or morality

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[49] Pouchet, 168. See also Katherin Rogers, who made the same observation about the presence of financial imagery in the context of soteriology in the NT. "In Defense of Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo* Argument," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Associatio*n, 74 (2000), 187-200.

[50] In the 1960's G. Söhngen also studied *rectitudo* in Anselm's work as a major category that included both truth and justice. He argued that Anselm is an excellent resource for a "*Theologie des Rechtes"* and that for Anselm the mercy of God is built on God's justice. See "Rectitudo bei Anselm von Canterbury als Oberbegriff von Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit" in *Sola Ratione*, ed., Helmut Kohlenberger (Friedrich Fromman Verlag, 1970): 71-77.

for Anselm are ontological, therefore, it is "a serious mistake to restrict the notion of ... *rectitudo* to the juridical order."[52] Engelbert Recktenwald published a monograph studying the ethical structure of Anselm's thought, highlighting his understanding of *rectitude.*[53] He discussed Anselm's identification of God with *Gerechtigkeit* and *vice versa*. In a slightly different approach, Peter M. Schmiechen defended Anselm's theology from the charge of legalism. He discussed the meaning of divine honour, the impassibility and sovereignty of God, the justice and love of God, and the judgment of God. He acknowledged that Anselm's language of debt-payment or debt-satisfaction risked sounding legalistic, but when properly understood it is helpful. Critical is the recognition, he argued, that the language of debt-payment was analogical, and must be comprehended in the "particular theological context which Anselm gives the reader along with the motif."[54] The framework Anselm provided, according to Schmiechen, is one where justice and honour sound very much like what we have already seen.

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[51] Komonchak, 38.

[52] Ibid., 40.

[53] Engelbert Recktenwald, *Die ethische Struktur des Denkens von Anselm von Canterbury (*Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1998).

[54] Peter M. Schmiechen, "Anselm and the Faithfulness of God," *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 26 (1973), 152.

Hans Urs von Balthasar rejected the characterization of Anselm's doctrine of redemption as juristic.[55] He directed attention to the way in which Anselm's understanding of *rectitudo* ended in a mutuality of love between God and humanity. In fact, Anselm preempted the juristic charge when he rejected the notion of a God, as Hunter Brown noted above, "who would so delight in or stand in need of the blood of the innocent that apart from his death he would not pardon the guilty."[56] Von Balthasar pointed out that this is exactly what would be implied if God had actually been "reconciled through the sacrifice of his Son in such a way that the God 'reckoned' the merit of this death to the guilty and therefore let them off their punishment."[57] It is not a matter of *reckoning* then, but of "inner ontological union."[58] The guilty ones, through their ontological union with Christ, are made just, they have paid the debt, and are washed pearls. Anselm certainly holds onto the reality of humanity paying the debt, the dirty pearl not just being returned to the box, but also cleaned. In addition, Balthasar suggested that on the level of debt (*debere*) Anselm's theory cannot be considered juristic because the reckoning simply cannot be settled. Creatures already owe everything to God, even the excess. Whatever Anselm's logic was, it was *not* juristic. Anselm did

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[55] Hans Urs Von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics*, II, *trans*. Andrew Louth, Francis McDonagh and Brian McNeil C.R.V. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984), 249.

[56] *CDH* I, 10 (p 200) Cited in Balthasar, 249.

[57] Balthasar, 249.

[58] Ibid.

write of debt and payment but it was in the realm of the infinite and the incalculable. Glenn W. Olsen provided a helpful summation of Balthasar's claim that Anselm's teaching on redemption is not simply a juridical transaction. Humanity owed everything, and Christ offered himself "with a love that goes beyond all expectation and calculation."[59]

Finally, Michael Root, in his study of Anselm's use of the notions of necessity and "unfittingness," concluded that Anselm's vision of God was not "a juridically narrow" one, but "a vision of God who remains true to the intentions embodied in creation."[60] Surely, this is another way of speaking about the order of creation, or the "right ordering of things" – rectitude. Concern for this rectitude, or order of creation, is a profound and all-encompassing view, which cannot be confused with the limitations of a simply legal or juridical concern.

Forgiveness Without Betrayal

These arguments about the meaning of *iustitia* and *rectitudo* in *CDH* are very convincing. It might not, however, be evident that they answer the concerns of the critics who have accused Anselm of holding a legal or juridical notion of justice. Their accusations were not necessarily only based on their assumptions about the meaning of *iustitia* or *rectitudo*. It was also the fact that Anselm insisted that sin could not simply be forgiven, that the offence to God's honour could not be overlooked, that satisfaction must

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[59] Glenn W. Olsen, "Hans Urs Von Balthasar and the Rehabilitation of St. Anselm's Doctrine of the Atonement," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 34:1 (1981), 57.

be rendered, that the debt must be paid. It is quite simply, the claim that "...it is not right to cancel sin without compensation or punishment;... It is, therefore, not proper for God thus to pass over sin unpunished."[61] This might well be the place that some have perceived his logic or reasoning to reveal a *quid pro quo* mentality, where forgiveness is actually bought. The arguments about Anselm's understanding of *justitia* or *rectitudo* might not seem to address their concern directly. However, upon further reflection, it is clear that all of these arguments are related. When Anselm spoke of God's honour being offended, saying that sin could not simply be forgiven, since *iustitia,* or *rectitudo* required that satisfaction needed to be made, the whole approach might sound legalistic or reminiscent of a tally sheet, depending on how one understands God's honour, justice and rectitude and what these require.

If the only two possibilities were either punishment or forgiveness with no satisfaction, then Anselm, by process of elimination, would seem to be opting for punishment since Anselm declared that forgiveness without payment would be unjust. We can, however, imagine a third possibility, namely, forgiveness with restoration or satisfaction. That is what Anselm argued. His claim was that God could not simply forgive *if no payment had been made.* It is not fitting for God to forgive sin, and let the sinner go unpunished, "apart from any repayment of the honor stolen from Him" or to put

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[60] Michael Root, "Necessity and Unfittingness in Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 40 (1987), 224.

[61] *CDH*, I, 12, Vose.

it otherwise, "in the absence of satisfaction."[62] It would, however be fitting for God to let the sinner go unpunished who made some return to God of what the sinner had taken from God. At the end of chapter twelve he reiterated the conditions of a just, fitting, or orderly forgiveness: either punishment or repayment. It would not be appropriate for God to forgive a sinner without either punishment or repayment. Punishment was not required, however, if payment was made. Restitution is a form of payment. Anselm's insistence that God cannot dismiss sin without payment is like an advocate of restorative justice who regards some kind of restitution to be part of restoring the offender to community. Anselm's understanding of justice is in fact, then, a restorative type.

McIntyre made this point regarding forgiveness and justice in his answer to J.K. Mozley's critique of Anselm. McIntyre chided Mozley for complaining that if satisfaction is made to cover for all the sin, then there is nothing left for God to forgive. This only reveals a misunderstanding of forgiveness. Contrary to Mozley's assumption, forgiveness is not "God's indulgent condonation of the sins committed against Him."[63] Instead, as I noted above, forgiveness can accompany restitution or payment. Forgiveness (or mercy, as Söhngen noted) without justice is just cheap sympathy ("*billige Mitleid*")[64] or a betrayal of victims.

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[62] *CDH* I, 12.

[63] McIntyre, 200.

[64] Söhngen, 77.

Iustitia or *rectitude* required that satisfaction or restoration be made because things have gone amok and they must be restored or repaired. In Anselm's image, the dirty pearl could be picked up out of the mud, but that would not be good enough: it must also be washed.[65] Or, in more social terms, forgiveness is not enough, because the chaos resulting from sin remains. The creation needs to be restored. The fact that things *need to be put right* – or that they are disrupted -- is surely not in question. The issue is *how* the disrupted order is put right, and here one's worldview, ontology and/or metaphysic or lack thereof, will clearly be determining factors. [66]

The honour of God

In the discussion of *justitia* we saw that Fairweather referred to Anselm's notion of the "supreme justice, which maintains God's honor in the arrangement of things."[67] This raises another concept that is key to Anselm's argument, but that is also not readily understood in the present day. Mention of the honour of God, and specifically of maintaining, defending or restoring the honour of God, might sound like the concern of a petty and jealous God concerned for his own appearance or reputation. Richard Southern has attempted to correct this misunderstanding by explaining the meaning of honour in the 11th century. In Anselm's context of feudal tenure, "a man's honour was his estate. The central feature of this estate was his landed property. But it also embraced his due

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[65] *CDH*, I, 19.

[66] William Shannon's work on Anselm for a popular audience relied on this type of interpretation of Anselm. He used Southern and Thomas Merton's readings.

place in the hierarchy of authority, his family background, and his personal honour." It was not then, as it has come to be, a term "denoting private feeling and reputation." [68] Southern summarized the meaning of God's honour in a way that sounds very much like the above description of the *justitia* of God and of *rectitudo*. "God's honour is the complex of service and worship which the whole Creation, animate and inanimate, in Heaven and earth, owes to the Creator, and which preserves everything in its due place. Regarded in this way, God's honour is simply another word for the ordering of the universe in its due relationship to God."[69] For this reason, he explained, the refusal of service is rebellion or the attempt to take away God's honour, and it "requires a counter-assertion of God's real possession of God's honour, *not to erase an injury to God, but to erase a blot on the universal order.*"[70] Perhaps, Southern could have said that it was both the injury to God and the blot on the universal order that needed to be erased. However, for Anselm the idea of human beings causing 'personal' injury to God is problematic. At times he seemed to write of the injury to God as though it were harm done to God as when Boso asked why God could not forgive an "injury to himself."(I,12, JF 285) Yet Anselm was careful to explain that God's honour actually could not be violated. When a created being does what it ought, we say that it honours God, the creator, even though it bestows nothing on God.(I, 15, JF 288-9)

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[67] *CDH* I, 13.

[68] Southern, *Saint Anselm*, 225-6.

[69] Ibid., 226.

In thinking about Anselm's feudal imagery we must distinguish between the reality and the ideal. The reality of the feudal lords was no doubt, as Southern reminds, that they "more often than not, were brutal, licentious, and violent."[71] Southern excused Anselm for using these models that belong to an oppressive social framework because it was the only one he knew. Furthermore, he explained that Anselm valued order, and at least the feudal arrangement provided some order.

Anselm was certainly thinking of the ideal feudal social arrangement. That web of relationships was defined by reciprocal duties that belonged to the different roles and places in society.[72] It is understandable that Anselm should use the feudal order as a model for his theology. But it is evident that he was able to think beyond what was, and to critique abuses. He did, for example, declare himself against slavery at the council of London 1102, following St. Wulfstan.[73]

Even without the medieval background provided in Southern's work, we can read what the *honor dei* meant in terms of *rectitude*, debt and beauty, in *CDH* itself.

> But when any creature whatever maintains, either by natural instinct or in response to reason, the station in life which belongs to it and has

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[70] Ibid., 226 (emphasis added).

[71] Ibid., 224.

[72] See Asa Briggs, *A Social History of England* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), 60.

[73] From: J. D. Mansi, ed., *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio* Vol. XVIIIa (Paris: H. Welter, 1902), p. 345; Vol. XX, p. 1152; Vol. XXII, p. 123; reprinted in Roy C. Cave and Herbert H. Coulson, *A Source Book for Medieval Economic History,* (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1936; reprint ed., New York: Biblo & Tannen, 1965), 285-286.

> been, as it were, taught to it, this creature is said to be obeying God and honouring him. This is so most of all in the case of a rational being, to whom it has been given to understand what is right. When such a being desires what is right, he is honouring God, not because he is bestowing anything upon God, but because he is voluntarily subordinating himself to his will and governance, maintaining his own proper station in life within the natural universe, and, to the best of his ability, maintaining the beauty of the universe.[74]

Hunter Brown also discussed Anselm's use of honour setting it in the Germanic and early medieval feudal system, making points similar to those offered by Southern as just outlined. Most significantly, he noted on the matter of the offense against God's honour, "the object of offense is 'not the lord's personal honour, but his social status by which he is the guarantor of the public peace.'" [75] It is not, as Walter Kasper put it, "'God's personal honour which has to be restored, but the disfigured and out-of-joint world, which is in order only as long as it upholds the honour of God.'"[76] Paul Gilbert made use of this understanding of honour as well, referring to Kasper's discussion.[77]

Peter Schmiechen outlined two different definitions of divine honour, and maintained that only the second supported Anselm's argument about the necessity of the incarnation in a debt motif. This understanding of honour was as 'covenantal

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[74] *CDH* I, 15, p. 288. On honour and beauty see Komanchak, 43.

[75] Brown, 194. He cited Walter Kasper, *Jesus the Christ*, trans. by V. Green (London: Burns & Oates Ltd., 1976), p. 220. Kasper was indebted to Gisbert Greshake, "Erlösung und Freiheit. Zur Neuinterpretation der Erlösungslehre Anselms von Canterbury" in *Theologische Quartalschrift*, 153 (1973): 323-45.

[76] Kasper, 220, cited in Brown, "Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo* Revisited," 195.

faithfulness', where "God is in the process of fulfilling a design which he can not abandon."[78] Divine honour could not have meant 'moral sovereignty' alone, since that would not have required the incarnation: "moral sovereignty alone allows for the possibility of divine wrath consuming the world."[79] It is only the notion of divine honour that includes the divine 'estate' (to use Southern's terms) or relationships that necessitates a restoration or satisfaction instead of simple destruction or penalty. Similarly, in his discussion of justice and judgment, Schmiechen focused on the maintenance of the integrity not only of God, but also of humanity and of the world.[80]

Katherin Rogers developed an argument for the appropriateness of the word honour in speaking of God in *CDH*, demonstrating how it informs the claim that God could not simply forgive, and treat the sinner the same as the just.[81] She highlighted the part of the definition that referred to God's "place in the hierarchy of authority," noting God's "place" as absolute source of all, source of all value in the universe. It might be that we human beings are allowed simply to forgive, but the source of all norms could not simply forgive the affront to God's honour - which is an affront to the source of all value. Rogers put it concisely: "To deliberately choose against the will of God is to deny His role. But since in fact all other goods are reflections of the *summum bonum*, if you reject

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[77] Gilbert, 680-3.

[78] Schmiechen, 156.

[79] Ibid., 29.

[80] Ibid., 165.

God's will, you are denying value to everything."[82] It is God, after all, in Anselm's universe, who served as the "objective ground of moral truth and happiness..." If God treated sinner and just alike, then God would be abdicating, *(per impossibili,* according to Rogers*)* God's own role as the source of objective moral value. If this were the case, there would be no value -- no distinction between good and evil. Rogers proposed that this logic is what lay behind Anselm's arguments.[83] It certainly is in keeping with the claims already outlined identifying God's nature or honour with the justice, rectitude or right ordering of the universe.[84]

Richard Campbell expressed compatible views in a short article on the conceptual roots of Anselm's soteriology, although he made no mention of Southern's work. Campbell treated the meaning of honour and debt. His thesis was that although "the key notions in CDH may have been evocative of the feudal and legal concepts of Anselm's day, they are fundamentally metaphysical rather than sociological in character, and derive from a centuries-long synthesis of ancient Greek and biblical themes."[85]

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[81] Rogers, 8-12.

[82] Ibid., 12.

[83] Ibid., 9-10.

[84] For a similar argument, see Söhngen. See also Hansjürgen Verweyen, "Die Einheit von Gerechtigkeit und Barmherzigkeit bei Anselm von Canterbury" in *Internationale katholische Zeitschrift.* 14,1(1985):52-55. Verweyen argued that the failure to see the unity of justice and mercy in Anselm's theology, as exemplified in von Harnack, begins with confusion about the meaning of *debere.*(52)

[85] Campbell, 258.

Drawing on Anselm's other works, especially *De Veritate*, he noted that for Anselm truth is "*rectitudo* perceived by the mind", justice is "*rectitudo* of will kept for its own sake."[86]

Another way of talking about the inappropriateness of God simply forgiving the affront to God's honour, or rather the abuse and distortion of creatures or creation, is to consider the point of view of the victim. Rogers held that the source of objective moral value cannot simply overlook the wrong done to someone, but must insist on some reparation, satisfaction, justice for the offended one. God's insistence on reparation is not simply for God's sake -- since God is in need of nothing, and cannot be robbed of anything -- but for the sake of the wronged creature, and the creation.

Although Anselm's historical context enhances our understanding of his use of the term honour, his use of the term in the text itself indicates it is not a private matter of personal reputation that he had in mind. We already saw what Anselm said about how one honours or does not honour God, in I,15. This discussion began in chapter 11. What we owe God is to be subordinate to the will of God.

> Boso: What is the debt which we owe to God?
> Anselm: The will of every rational creature ought to be subordinate to the will of God.
> Boso: Nothing is truer.
> Anselm: This is the debt which angels and men owe to God...This is the sole and complete honor which we owe to God and which God demands from us.(I, 11)

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[86] Ibid., 261.

Since the will of God is not arbitrary, but rather indistinguishable from justice and the right ordering of all things, therefore, honouring God is in essence having a just will -- and living justly *vis à vis* other creatures. This is spelled out even more clearly in I, 15 when Anselm insists that "nothing can be added to or subtracted from God's honour considered in itself." We see then that it is not only about God, and what God needs or desires, but also about other people, society and the universe. He explained: "When a rational nature wills what it ought to, it honors God -- not because it confers anything on Him but because it willingly submits itself to His will and governance. And, as best it can, it stays in its proper place in the universe and preserves the beauty of the universe."[87] To speak of the honour of God, then, is to speak of the right ordering of the creation, or to use a more contemporary phrase, of the integrity of creation.[88]

The Aseity of God

This discussion of the honour of God, and whether anything can actually be taken from God raises the matter of the impassibility and the aseity of God. In *CDH* we have not a monstrous divinity, who is jealous for his honour and prestige, but in Fairweather's words, the "serene majesty of transcendent truth, whose every act upholds the right and good and just."[89] This may sound too much like an impassible God of Greek philosophy

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[87] *CDH* I, 15, Hopkins and Richardson, p. 72-3.

[88] On the beauty, honour, order of creation as integrally related to God, see David Hogg, Chapter, 6 "'Nailed to the racking cross...So did I win a kingdom.'"

[89] Fairweather, "'*Iustitia Dei*,'" 334.

rather than the passionate Yahweh of Hebrew scriptures, however, we would do well to consider what Anselm meant by impassibility and aseity.

McIntyre argued that the concept of *aseitas* is of "supreme importance" in Anselm's theology. Translated into English, *aseitas* means self-sufficiency, independence, self-origination in volition, freedom, grace and graciousness. [90] He insisted that a full understanding of the notion of *aseitas* was necessary in order to "refute the charges that the book is an exercise in Scholastic logic at its worst, that God's justice is overemphasised at the expense of God's mercy, that ... God is simply a feudal baron writ large, and that forgiveness is commercialised, if not rendered impossible...."[91]

In *CDH* we cannot take away from God's honor, or take anything from God. In his discussion, Peter M. Schmiechen provided an important reminder regarding the doctrine of divine impassibility. It is not the responsiveness or relatedness of God that is denied, but simply God's "subordination to the activity of others." God is not passive in the way that we are. He specified, "activity upon us causes us to change our intentions and views, it provokes us to action contrary to our true interest, it brings us to defeat and death." [92] This passivity is clearly not appropriate to God, for, as George Heyer put it, God does nothing from coercion.[93] It is evident then, that "...the denial of such passive

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[90] McIntyre, 165.

[91] Ibid., 204.

[92] Schmiechen, 167.

[93] Heyer, 187.

states does not rule out the possibility of other inter-personal relationships such as love and activity."[94] God's love need not be denied in order to speak of God's aseity, impassibility, or sovereignty.

John Morreall considered Anselm's *Monologion* and *Proslogion*, and reported what Anselm meant by aseity. Put simply, it means that God does not have any of the limitations that the creatures have, and is causally independent of everything else. God is *a se* and *per se* (from Godself and through Godself) "in the sense that He is eternally complete and sufficient unto Himself."[95] Catherine Pickstock used the term "replete" to speak of this completeness and sufficiency.[96] This does not mean aloof or unloving. Komonchak noted that God is wholly self-sufficient, in need of nothing.[97]

Clearly, the impassibility and the aseity of God do not mean the inability to love because of the inability to suffer or to need. It is evident that Anselm aimed to uphold God's transcendence and sovereignty which is not incompatible with God's love. Anselm claimed that God's love was concretely demonstrated in God's taking flesh, dwelling among us, suffering and dying for our sake. Furthermore, the very fact that we cannot take away anything from God, as noted in the discussion of God's honour, means

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[94] Schmiechen, 167

[95] John Morreall, "The Aseity of God in St. Anselm," *Studia Theologica* 36 (1982): 45.

[96] Catherine Pickstock, *After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998)*, 156.

[97] Komonchak, 8.

that God's protection of God's own honour is really about the protection of creation, and again a demonstration of love.

Beauty, Necessity and Fittingness

Another set of Anselm's concepts that is involved in the discussion of the justice and honour of God are beauty, "necessity" (*exigit*) and "fittingness" (*deceat* or *conveniens* 98). Anselm argued from what was fitting or proper and what was necessary given the order, reason or beauty of the universe and the goodness of God.

> Since, in this inquiry, you take the place of those who are unwilling to believe anything not previously proved by reason, I wish to have it understood between us that we do not admit anything in the least unbecoming (*inconveniens*) to be ascribed to the Deity, and that we do not reject the smallest reason if it be not opposed by a greater. For as it is impossible to attribute anything in the least unbecoming to God; so any reason, however small, if not overbalanced by a greater, has the force of necessity.[99]

Of course, in arguing that something was necessary for God because it was proper, Anselm provoked questions about whether it was proper to say that God was constrained to do certain things. Boso asked if God was not simply free to decide what was fitting and so make it necessary, and at another point Boso worried that "God seems as it were compelled, for the sake of avoiding what is unbecoming..."[100] As we shall see below, Anselm upheld both God's freedom or sovereignty and the notion of necessity and fittingness.

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[98] necessity in *CDH* I,8,9,10; II,5; fittingness in *CDH* I,12.

[99] *CDH* I, 10, Vose, 200-1.

Relating to this correspondence between what is fitting and what must be, Susan Krantz claimed that Anselm belonged to the school of the "logical criterion of being" where "the laws of thought rule."[101] In Anselm's conception of the relationship between God's will and goodness and the universe, there is an integral connection between what one can reason ought to be because it seems right or beautiful, and what ultimately is. She called Anselm's philosophical approach his "Spiritual Metaphysics." In addition to this logical criterion of being, she described a second key element, namely, the notion that introspection provides insight about what is real. If it seems fitting and necessary upon careful reflection, then with regard to God it must be so. She maintained that something in Anselm's idealism that went beyond logic and introspection, "conveyed all the charm of nature and the 'beauty of holiness,'" managing to preserve it from becoming too austere a worldview. [102] For Anselm, she argued, there was no mind-body dualism, but a "medieval notion of spiritual senses," and the real understanding that introspection was the activity of a creature, who "knows the humble joy of a sensuous life as well as the greater joys of the life of the mind and its creative, interpersonal relationship with the divine."[103]

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[100] *CDH* I,12 and II, 5, Vose, 242-3.

[101] Susan Krantz, "Anselm's Spiritual Metaphysics," *Saint Anselm - His Origins and Influence*, ed. John R. Fortin (Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), 46. Regarding the "logical criterion of being," she referred to Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 2-2, q. 162, a. 6, c. Krantz compares the interpretations of Katherin Rogers and Richard Campbell on Anselm's philosophy in note 6, p. 53-4. Those distinctions need not be considered here.

[102] Krantz, 46-7.

Anselm's argument from what is necessary and what is fitting or unfitting of God is not welcomed as positively by all. It has led some to ask along with Boso about God being compelled by some sense of justice, as though there is some set of external rules that is being imposed, not only on the universe, but on God, restricting God's freedom. Michael Root deemed Anselm's God too bound by necessity.[104] McIntyre argued, by contrast, that it is important to heed Anselm's distinction between posterior necessity and prior necessity, a necessity which precedes and one that is consequent.

> In establishing the reasons why there should be a God-man he is not thinking of logical premises which, as it were, causally compelled God to become man, of a prior necessity which determined God to act in this way and in no other, so that, given the premises or knowledge of this necessity, we could have forecast the Incarnation. It is posterior necessity which attaches to the Incarnation, because, God having willed it, His Will is free. The Incarnation took place, therefore it was necessary that it should take place; and not --it took place because it was necessary that it should take place.[105]

Anselm also explained this in terms of the difference between "a necessity which compels" and "a necessity which does *not* compel."[106] The critical example of this principle is that of God requiring Jesus' death; and of Jesus needing to die, although it is also the case that he died freely, voluntarily. Anselm maintained that we can say that

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[103] Ibid., 51.

[104] Root, 211-230.

[105] McIntyre, 166.

[106] *CDH* II, 17, Hopkins and Richardson, 125.

Jesus' death was necessary, or in a certain way, that God "required" the death of Jesus. *However,* it is clear that Anselm worded this kind of requirement carefully, so as not to make it sound as though God were constrained by some external power, or that God would require something offensive. Anselm was as aware as anyone of the problem inherent in speaking of these particular 'requirements.' That is why he exercised such care as he spoke of the relation, or in effect, the unity of God's goodness, will, intellect, justice and power. He answered Boso's concern about God's freedom and explained the integral relation between God and truth or goodness. So essential is this connection, that Anselm asserted "when it is said that what God wishes is just, and that what He does not wish is unjust, we must not understand that if God wished anything improper it would be just, simply because he wished it. For if God wishes to lie, we must not conclude that it is right to lie, but rather that he is not God."[107] Essentially, God cannot do what is evil, for to be able to do evil is a weakness, since evil is the privation of good.[108] God only does what is good or fitting – and this is also what is necessary.

Let us consider more specifically the place of beauty (*pulchritudo*) - for that is a way of speaking about what is fitting, in proportion, balanced in the universe. Many scholars have written about the importance of aesthetics in Anselm's theology,[109]

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[107] *CDH* I, 12, Vose, 205.

[108] See Linda L. Peterson, "St. Anselm on Justice, Retribution and the Divine Will" in *Cur Deus Homo: Atti del Congresso Anselimiano Internazionale*, ed., P. Gilbert, H. Kohlenberger and E. Salmann (Rome, 1999). 669-70.

although it has often been ignored by those who believe that only logic, and a misunderstood reason were operative in *CDH*. It is evident, though, that Anselm's attention to order and balance in his understanding of justice and salvation, is really an appreciation of beauty. Dániel Deme, in his recent study of Anselm's Christology, noted that the concept of beauty in Anselm's work is actually a "...theological proposition of some significance..." He pointed to the relationship of aesthetics, the order of creation, goodness and justice.[110]

David Hogg presented a convincing case for the integral role of aesthetics in Anselm's works, where there is a premium on unity, harmony, symmetry, proportion and fittingness. He wrote: "The overarching impression Anselm leaves on the reader of the *CDH* is that God is a God of order, harmony and beauty, and he must and will act in accordance with those aspects of his nature."[111] There is good reason to accept his claim that "the idea of the atonement and all that it entails (i.e. incarnation, overcoming sin, etc.) is, in Anselm's mind, best described and discussed in categories that suggest an aesthetic perspective."[112] This is not to say that morality or ethics are neglected but that they are integrally related to aesthetics for Anselm. We have not been able to speak of the justice, mercy and honour of God without referring to the others, and the intimate

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[109] See for example: Stephen R. Holmes, "The Upholding of Beauty: A Reading of Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*" *Scottish Journal of Theology* (2002) 54, 2: 189-203; and Hogg.

[110] Dániel Deme, *The Christology of Anselm of Canterbury* (Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2003), 46.

[111] Hogg, (2004), 4.

relation between God's honour and the well-being, or the right ordering of the whole universe. This is certainly not only an ethical or moral matter, but one of aesthetics, of beauty as well. In fact, these ethics and aesthetics are inseparable, and Hogg demonstrated how Anselm made his case both in terms of moral necessity and in terms of beauty. What was fitting or proper had to do with right order (*convenientia),* and being 'in character' (*decentia),* as well as with moral necessity (*oportet).*[113]

Anselm signaled the centrality of beauty to his argument very early on. He began by pointing out "how fitly" the redemption was won, and how there was an "indescribable beauty to our redemption as thus procured."[114] Boso was not convinced. He insisted that they were after an explanation that was not only beautiful, "like so many pictures," painted in the clouds. He asked Anselm for "a solid foundation," namely, to show "the rational existence of the truth" that would satisfy the sense of justice of those asking the questions – those who thought Christian faith was doing an injustice and dishonouring God. Only once the solid painting was made should Anselm bother with the "harmonious proportions" to make "the truth shine forth more clearly." Anselm's response seems to deny the separation that Boso made. He wrapped together justice and beauty. "Does not the reason why God ought to do the things we speak of seem absolute enough when we consider that the human race, that work of his so very precious, was wholly ruined, and that it was not seemly that the purpose which God had made

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[112] Ibid., 278 (2000)

[113] Ibid., 138 ff.

concerning man should fall to the ground...?"[115] Reason, truth, justice and order pertain to beauty.

Answering the Critics

Anselm's adamant argument from what is right and necessary, seemingly constraining God by certain rules, and his concern with God's honour, has made many people hear his explanation in *CDH* as juridical, legal or transactional, eliciting the language of "stock exchange divinity."[116] However, what Anselm described was the maintenance of justice in a relationship that involved action and giving on two sides. He used the language of necessity, of what is fitting and not, of what God is constrained to do and not, of what detracts from God's honour, and how God cannot simply forgive sin, but must require either satisfaction or punishment.

It is noteworthy that Weaver wrote of God's honour as though he had not read, or understood Southern, as though honour were an entirely personal thing. In order to illustrate his point, he provided the example of a teacher maintaining authority, and imagined that the problem was a student sassing her teacher.[117] A better analogy would have been to picture a teacher dealing with the problem of one student hurting another.

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[114] *CDH* I, 3, Vose, 183.

[115] Ibid., I, 4, Vose, 183-4.

[116] Edward Irving's term cited in Stephen Holmes, "The Upholding of Beauty: A Reading of Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo,*" *Scottish Journal of Theology* (2002) 54, 2: 190.

[117] J. Denny Weaver, "Violence in Christian Theology," 156. An abridged version of this essay, without the teacher analogy is published in *Teaching Peace:*

That is more like what sin is about, and the disrupting of creation. The point about the meaning of God's honour is that sin and offending God's honour is precisely NOT only about a person insulting God. It seems that although Weaver rehearsed Southern's explanation of honour, he did not entirely take into consideration the significance of that meaning. He was, however, as a direct result of Southern's explanation, willing to acknowledge that the particular images objectionable to feminists were not so much from Anselm, but from other exponents of a 'penal substitutionary' atonement.[118] Still, he soon returned to speaking interchangeably of Anselm's satisfaction theory and of penal substitutionary theories, using the critique of the one to dismiss the other. Furthermore, his first, and ultimately his final, case against Anselm's theory, is that Anselm's various defenders do not all agree. This point does not provide a strong case against *CDH.* One is left wondering, given what has been accepted as consensus about the social meaning of honour, how Anselm's own depiction of God can be construed as juridical, transactional, or petty, rather than as profoundly just, in a victim-defending and creation-centred way.

In the end, the interpretations provided by Fairweather, Crouse, Pickstock, Hart and others do not leave God or Anselm sounding juridical. Although something in the modern Protestant reading made *CDH* sound that way, it was not in Anselm.[119] Even

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Nonviolence and the Liberal Arts, eds. J. Denny Weaver and Gerald Biesecker-Mast (SanDiego: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc, 2003): 39-52.

118 Weaver, *Nonviolent Atonement*, 194-5.

119 See for example, John Milbank, *Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon* (London & New York: Routledge, 2003), 103. Tillich referred to Anselm's juristic mind. Paul Tillich, *History of Christian Thought: From its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism*. Ed. Carl E. Braaten (Simon & Shuster, 1967), p 166-7. It was not only

Weaver acknowledged that the problem is more since the Reformation, and did perhaps not lay with Anselm at all. Therefore, *CDH* ought not to be dismissed along with the whole assemblage of 'satisfaction or substitutionary' theories, articulated by various people since the Reformation.

Conclusion

The picture that emerges from the *CDH* according to the above interpreters is of God as just and merciful, whose nature is one with the right ordering of, or justice in the universe, which is also the beauty of the universe. God, who has created and ordered all things, and willed the well-being of all, is owed all things. God is replete and possesses the quality of *aseitas*, and therefore, to dishonour God is not just to insult God "personally." Rather, to dishonour God is to fail to render to God what is owed to God, disrupting the whole creation. The dishonouring of God, which is going against the grain of the universe, cannot simply be overlooked, because that would be effectively to deny the difference between good and evil. Somehow that distinction between honouring and dishonouring, between good and evil must be upheld, but so must the possibility of the restoration and fulfillment of creatures and indeed the creation. The justice, honour and mercy of God so clearly expressed in ethical terms are also a matter of beauty, for the right ordering of the universe is beautiful.

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modern Protestant readers, of course. The Catholic theologian, Emil Mersch, for example, characterized *CDH* as more of "a juridical process than as a mystery of vital solidarity enabling the head to satisfy for His members." Emil Mersch , *The Theology of the Mystical Body*. Trans. Cyril Vollert, S.J., S.T.D. (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder Book Co., 1950), 251.

Given this depiction of God, and this unity of the mercy and justice of God it is difficult even to fathom how Harnack could have claimed that Anselm held a 'Gnostic dualism,' ripping God's love and justice asunder.[120] With the foregoing understanding of the honour of God, one might wonder, too, about the origin of the caricature of Anselm's God as vindictive and unmerciful, the "mighty private man" needing to see the blood of an innocent victim in order to forgive those who have offended God's own honour. It is surely the result of Anselm's claim about the need for satisfaction, and the death of Jesus. Let us look again at Anselm's description of the need for satisfaction in order to restore humanity, just what form that satisfaction took, and how Anselm believed it leads to the restoration of humanity.

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120 See Klaus Kienzler, "*Cur deus homo* aus der Sicht des mittelalterlichen jüdisch-christlichen Religionsgespräches" in *Saint Anselm – A Thinker for Yesterday and Today*, ed., Coloman Viola and Frederick Van Fleteren, (Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), 285-315. See also Georg Plasger, "Die Macht der barmherzigen Gerechtigkeit Gottes. Die Erkenntnis der Treue Gottes in Jesus Christus nach Anselms *Cur Deus homo*" in *Cur Deus homo. Atti del Congresso Anselmiano Internazionale, ed.* P. Gilbert, H. Kohlenberger, E. Salmann (Rome, 1999), 697-708.

CHAPTER III

THE RESTORATION OF HUMANITY: SATISFACTION, REWARD AND SACRIFICE

Introduction

According to Anselm's estimation, in the *CDH*, the universe has been disrupted by sin and reparation must be made in human relationships and in the created order. God could not simply forgive sin because things needed to be repaired. Anselm held that the incarnation was necessary for the restoration of creation, of humanity and of human beings.[1] Anselm insisted that what was necessary was not just the pardon of human beings, but the transformation or rectification of human beings, and of human nature. That would be the fulfillment of God's intention for God's own creation. Humanity could not be happy without some kind of reparation. It is in this context that Anselm introduced the term *satisfaction*, a term which is not immediately understood in the New World, almost 500 years after the Reformation, and nearly 1000 years after Anselm's time. If Anselm spoke of satisfaction, is salvation bought instead of free? Is it by grace or is it a transactional matter, as Yoder and Driver maintained, following a popular interpretation of Anselm?

According to Anselm, the restoration of human nature is accomplished through participation in a sacrifice that provided the necessary satisfaction and by receiving the reward. It is accomplished through the action of the *Deus homo*, and

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[1] Anselm used the language of the "*humana restauratio*" in I, 3. Hopkins and Richardson translated this as "restoration of human nature," 52. Vose translated this "human redemption," 183. Janet Fairweather translated this "the restoration of mankind," 268. Redemption carries the connotation of buying that restoration does not.

the participation of human beings. The restoration of humanity was made possible because God in Jesus, as fellow human being, made the satisfaction, so that punishment was not necessary, although justice was nevertheless distinguished from injustice. The satisfaction returned to God what was owed - namely, full obedience, and compensation (thereby conquering the devil). If anyone wants to think in terms of justice being distinguished from injustice, then God has not overlooked the difference, but has borne the cost, made satisfaction through sacrifice. The world had gone amok, and forgiveness was not enough, because the world, and human nature, had to be restored. The spontaneous offering of himself, a life of obedience even unto death, was a gift, or a sacrifice that provided the satisfaction, transforming the world. Only God could do that; but it was necessary that humanity do it. Only humanity owed the debt of obedience and compensation, but only God could make things right. That is why the incarnation was not the condoning of violence on God's part, but was absolutely necessary. And it was not the *deus-homo* doing it all as God, but the *deus-homo* as humanity and as a human being offering the gift, the sacrifice. In so offering such an extravagant gift, he well deserved to be rewarded, but since there was nothing he did not already have, he gave the reward away, naturally, to humanity. Human beings can participate in that offering and in the receiving of the reward, and so be restored, be reconciled, be forgiven, and be moved to make reparation. They can know that their sin has been "named" or judged, that there is forgiveness and hope for the future, that reconciliation is possible. Human beings can participate because in Anselm's view, they are connected to the *deus homo* ontologically, sacramentally and intimately.

Let us consider then, what Anselm meant by satisfaction, in what sense Jesus' life and death were sacrificial, and further, how the reward for the immeasurable gift was given away. And, finally, because the death or sacrifice of Jesus can only be necessary if it affects humanity, we must ask about the connection between Jesus' sacrifice and humanity's salvation, that is, about participation by human beings, through ontological or sacramental union, imitation and intimacy.

Satisfaction

A Debt Requires Satisfaction

The term satisfaction is central to the argument of *CDH*, and it has been the source of great controversy, for it is no longer commonly understood. It is perhaps not surprising that some people find a Satisfaction theory to be lacking in grace, or to have missed the Gospel, portraying forgiveness as something that is bought rather than free, or by human works instead of by grace. And yet the satisfaction theory has been popular in Protestant traditions, in spite of the fact that satisfaction can conjure up images of penance, indulgences and buying one's salvation. Why did God require satisfaction, according to Anselm? Or why was satisfaction necessary?

Before discussing satisfaction we must consider the closely related terms *debitum,* a debt, and *debere*, "owe" or "ought." It is helpful to bring the word "ought" into the conversation because in English, the words owe and debt, at least in North American culture, carry heavy financial connotations. Because the link between owe and ought has almost been lost in English, there are not the financial overtones to "ought" as there are to "owe." Satisfaction is the act of paying back the honour of which one has robbed God, including something more than what one had

initially taken/owed.[2]

The concept of the *debitum* is integrally related to the honour and justice of God, already discussed in the last chapter. The *debitum* consists in a creature doing what it ought. In *CDH* Anselm outlined that human beings have an original *debitum*, namely, to obey God's will. When Boso asked about the "ought" (*debitum*) that we "owe" (*debemus*) God, Anselm answered simply, "All the will of a rational creature ought (*debet*) to be subject to the will of God."[3] As Southern and Rogers suggested, so also Campbell claims, this debt is not the arbitrary requirement of "some feudal overlord with a tender ego," but "arises from the very purpose of God's creation of 'Adam's race.'"[4] Here, Campbell has not gone much beyond what was already offered by John McIntyre, Desmond Paul Henry, Joseph Komonchak and others discussed in the last chapter. McIntyre pointed out that "a *debitum* is something I ought to do, an obligation I ought to fulfill, *as well as something I owe.*"[5] He, along with the others, defended Anselm's use of *debitum* and *debere*, explaining that its meaning should not be restricted to the juridical or commercial order, but must be understood in religious and moral terms. In fact, Komonchak writes that agreement

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[2] *CDH* I, 11. For a discussion of satisfaction in Anselm and nine other theologians up to John Duns Scotus see J. Patout Burns, S.J. "The Concept of Satisfaction in Medieval Redemption Theory" in *Theological Studies*, 36(1975):285-304.

[3] *CDH* I, 11, p. 283.

[4] Campbell, 262.

[5] McIntyre, 73, emphasis added.

on this matter was becoming general. In addition to those already mentioned, he cited Eugene Fairweather, George Williams, Balthasar and Philippe Delhaye.[6]

What Anselm claimed is that if we do not do what we ought since we owe it to God, then we have sinned and must repay the honour that we have stolen from God. And it is not difficult to understand why Anselm claimed that we cannot be happy if we do not fulfill this obligation that is in keeping with what is right. "This is the satisfaction which every sinner is obliged to give to God."[7] Here we see how a debt or what humanity "ought" leads to the need for satisfaction.

Let us consider the meaning of the term satisfaction, and its origins. In the 1950's McIntyre made the case that the way to understand what Anselm meant by satisfaction was simply to read carefully Anselm's own work. This was an alternative to the assumption that Anselm was bound by former interpretations of *satisfactio*.[8] McIntyre noted that Tertullian, Cyprian, Hillary and Ambrose, even St. Augustine, all used the term, but it does not mean that the notion had not evolved over the course of the 800 years. Tertullian himself did not simply take over the notion from Roman Law without altering it on the basis of the Christian faith. The Church had also not simply embraced the Irish system of commutations or the Teutonic practice of *Wergild*, although these may have had an influence in shaping the system of

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6 Komonchak, n.33, p 40. Jasper Hopkins discussed Anselm's understanding of ought (*debere*) in *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1972), 195-8.

7 *CDH* I, 11, (*deo debet facere*), p., 68. Vose translated: "owes to God." 203.

8 McIntyre, 88.

Penance.[9] McIntyre argued that it is by first understanding Anselm's theological concepts of the justice, righteousness, honour, love and the *aseitas* of God, and considering "God's act of salvation in the *Deus-homo* and not in the setting of Roman law or Teutonic *Wergild* that the notion of satisfaction finds its proper place."[10] Patout Burns, in his study of satisfaction in medieval redemption theory, also undertook to deduce the meaning of satisfaction from the theology of the authors themselves.[11]

The notion of satisfaction, then, was not something imported from Germanic Law, but had been a part of the church's teaching from a very early time in the practice and teaching of penance. George Williams maintained that Anselm made it more explicit, by developing a theology that went with it but he also *corrected* it.[12] D. Bentley Hart also suggested that it is not clear that Anselm's language simply reflects the logic of sacramental penance, since Anselm's argument actually subverts that discipline's logic and would seem to reorient it entirely.[13] McIntyre was more

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9 On this McIntyre agreed with previous opinion, as set forth by Cremer, Loofs, Harnack and Franks, but not on their assessment of Anselm's use of satisfaction. McIntyre, 84-88.

10 Ibid., 88-9.

11 Burns, 285-304.

12 Williams, "The Sacramental Presuppositions," 252-5.

13 D. Bentley Hart, "A Gift Exceeding Every Debt: An Eastern Orthodox Appreciation of Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*," *Pro Ecclesia* 7, no. 3, 340. From a different point of view, J. Patout Burns also suggested that Anselm's theory did not lend support to the penitential system: "The inability to deal with the devotion to the suffering Christ and the tradition of penitential works as part of the forgiveness of

explicit in explaining how Anselm's argument for satisfaction undercut the penitential system of his time. He reasoned that if everything we can do is already owed to God, there is nothing that can be offered to make up for the additional debt, which we incurred by sinning, that is, there is nothing to offer as satisfaction. "By a single stroke St. Anselm here destroys what had obviously become a misconception of the early medieval penitential exercises, namely, that *of themselves, apart from the Work of Christ*, they achieved forgiveness for the sinner."[14] So, although Anselm used the notion of satisfaction of his day, affirming the need for satisfaction, he called into question the possibility of making satisfaction. Or, he pointed to the only *real* satisfaction. Let us look at what satisfaction is in *CDH*.

Satisfaction, Not Punishment

Satisfaction occurs in *CDH* as the *alternative* to *poena*, punishment. Satisfaction must therefore be understood in contrast to punishment rather than as a synonym for punishment. Either punishment or satisfaction must follow sin, because the sin has disrupted the order of the universe, otherwise there would be a violation or marring of the order and its beauty.[15] Punishment is extracted when the offender is unwilling to pay whereas a satisfaction is offered willingly. The punishment involves subjection to torments to show that "God is the Lord of man." "Either the sinner

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sins may have been the fatal weakness of Anselm's doctrine of the redemption." Burns, "The Concept of Satisfaction," 304.

[14] McIntyre, 77-8 (emphasis added).

[15] *CDH* I, 15. Hopkins and Richardson, 73.

freely repays what he owes or else God takes it from him against his will."[16] Put differently, Anselm said, "the honour taken away must be repaid, or punishment must follow..."[17] Komonchak noted that the way of punishment is the way of retributive justice, whereby the wicked receive according to their merit.[18] This is what Anselm called human justice (*iustitia secundum nos*) in the *Proslogion.* God is certainly just in rewarding the good and punishing the wicked, mused Anselm. But he went on to affirm that God is also apparently, not only merciful, but also just in sparing the wicked.[19] Komonchak argued that the alternative to punishment, namely, satisfaction, accords with God's justice (*iustitia secundum se)* of the *Proslogion.*[20] This justice is not the retributive justice, but the fulfillment of God's purposes. When God acted to make human satisfaction for sin possible, God was just, "in that general sense which is not opposed to mercy."[21]

Hunter Brown elaborated insightfully on Anselm's attention to justice, to law and compensation, explaining why God could not simply forgive, which is the reason for satisfaction. Brown argued that "God's attentiveness to justice in *CDH* ...is a function of divine goodness and love of creation." For God to "fail to respond to the

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16 Ibid., 72.

17 *CDH* I, 13, trans. Vose, 207.

18 Komonchak, 48.

19 *Proslogion*, 10:I.

20 Komonchak, 48-9

21 Ibid., 51.

concrete destruction of creation would be tantamount to an implicit approval of that destruction..."[22] It would be to disregard the difference between good and evil. This would not be in the interest of the victims of injustice or of the defiled creation. Brown's words highlight the mercy in God's justice, by looking at the situation from the point of view of the inarticulate, distorted creation, or it could be from the point of view of the voiceless victim. "Anselm's God, *in* his mercy and forgiveness, cannot overlook his created order and so is bound to seek a course of action which respects the integrity of the real world."[23] From the point of view of the victims, or the abused creation, it is not enough simply to forgive the offenders. It is not a matter of Anselm subscribing to a hierarchy where "mercy and forgiveness are subservient to cold justice..." Instead, Anselm presents "a constellation of relationships in which mercy, grace, forgiveness, repentance, prayer, justice, punishment, satisfaction, compensation, restitution, divine omnipotence and human autonomy all function in consideration of each other."[24] Forgiveness alone is not enough. Satisfaction is required for the sake of the creation.

The Incarnation was necessary, therefore, because God could not simply forgive sin, because restoration/reparation had to happen, and because humanity had to have a role in it. According to Anselm, humanity owed or was indebted, and needed to have the dignity of making the amends. Satisfaction was just that, making up for the offence, so that the wrong was acknowledged and righted, though

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[22] Brown, 195, 196.

[23] Ibid., 196.

[24] Ibid., 196.

punishment was not required. Once again, for Anselm, satisfaction was an *alternative* to punishment. They were not interchangeable. God did not put Jesus to death, or punish humanity. Jesus made satisfaction, and therefore punishment was not necessary. The very fact that the Incarnation was necessary indicates that punishment was not an option -- because God wanted the fulfillment of creation not its destruction.[25] Punishment would not have required the Incarnation, nor would it, however, have brought about the fulfillment of God's creation. As Komonchak explained, using the *Proslogion*, it would not have been just in the sense of the justice of God.[26] So, in effect, the Incarnation shows that punishment is not the ultimate justice. But this is done without denying the difference between good and evil, without ignoring evil. The only way God could bring about the ultimate justice, without denying the difference between good and evil, without betraying the offended, without depriving the offenders of their dignity was to make reparation or satisfaction, bearing the cost of all the evil, yet allowing humanity to participate in the making amends, in bearing the cost. Forgiveness without satisfaction was not enough, for things needed to be made right, and humanity had to have a part in making things right, or turning toward the right.

Anselm's statement on the matter of the necessity of satisfaction is clear. "*In the absence of satisfaction*, to order sin rightly is only to punish it; therefore, if sin is

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25 Paul LaChance also noted this inadequacy of punishment and the need for satisfaction. Paul LaChance, "Understanding Christ's Satisfaction Today," *The Saint Anselm Journal* 2.1 (Fall 2004), 4.

26 Komonchak, 51.

not punished, something disordered is forgiven."[27] This is critical. Anselm did *not* say simply that to order sin rightly is only to punish it; therefore, if sin is not punished, something disordered is forgiven. Rather, he said, *if no satisfaction has been made*, that is, if the offender has not made any attempt to repay, or to restore, but is impudent or impenitent, then punishment is necessary. Recall that Anselm's understanding of punishment was the forcible extraction of 'payment' from the unwilling, guilty party.[28] This might be requiring the payment of a fine, and does not necessarily involve violence (although it does mean force). The distinction between satisfaction and retribution that I have described here is supported by Paul LaChance's discussion. He referred to the work of Jeremy Wilkins and Bernard Lonergan's who also reminded, as I have here, that satisfaction need not be equated with retribution.[29]

If we imagine sin to be simply an insult to God as a private, personal being, then perhaps one might dare to suggest that God forgive our sin even if we have not provided any compensation, although, it would be presumptuous to insist that God should be willing to forgive me without my making any compensation. If however, we acknowledge the social, relational nature of sin, so that it is others and ourselves who are being hurt and distorted, and we owe others, then how can or why should

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[27] *CDH* I, 12, trans. Hopkins and Richardson, 68 (emphasis added).

[28] *CDH* I,14.

[29] LaChance, 2. He referred to Jeremy Wilkins, "Lonergan's Appropriation of Anselm's Disjunction *Aut poena aut satisfactio,*" a paper delivered at the Third Saint Anselm Conference at Saint Anselm College, (Manchester, NH. April 23, 2004).

God overlook sin that has not been addressed, "paid" for, or where an attempt at restoration has not been made? If we recall that the honour of God included the whole realm of God, then to think individualistically is to hear Anselm wrongly. Social and liberation movements have challenged the individualistic worldview, recognizing the social nature of our existence. Anselm had that same awareness, although he put things differently, and therefore a translation is necessary. Put in terms of people and relationships, it is evident that for Anselm, in demanding satisfaction, God is not acting as "a private man," but is defending the whole of creation, the voiceless oppressed or weak - refusing to abandon them or overlook their suffering. But God is also not insisting simply on punishment for the offender, preferring instead the restoration of the offender, and therefore opting for satisfaction (or reparation).

Satisfaction and Forgiveness

So far, then, we have established that humanity owed God a debt, and that a satisfaction could be made in order to avoid punishment and restore the distorted universe. The insistence upon satisfaction can be understood as a way of acknowledging the rights of sin's victims. Now, what about forgiveness? Boso wondered why God could not simply forgive the sin or the debt. With Brown, we saw that God could not simply forgive without any payment for the sake of the victims, and the spoiled, hurting creation that needs to be set right. Anselm argued that it was not "fitting for God to forgive sin out of mercy alone, apart from any payment of the debt..." or "apart from any repayment of the honor stolen from

Him."[30] Here, we recall the broad meaning of God's honour. Human beings are called to forgive but it is God's place, as ultimate arbiter of justice, to see that reparation is made. Similarly, he stated: "believe most assuredly that without satisfaction (i.e. without voluntary payment of the debt) God cannot forgive (*dimittere*) unpunished sin (*peccatum impunitum*) and the sinner cannot arrive at happiness..."[31] But is there forgiveness here at all if satisfaction has been made?

The question is really whether forgiveness and satisfaction are mutually exclusive. Some of Anselm's critics apparently see it that way for they argue that if satisfaction is made then there is no room for forgiveness.[32] Boso also wondered. He asked why it would be necessary to ask God to forgive us if we have already paid for our sin. Anselm turned things around and suggested that satisfaction and forgiveness actually belong together. He explained that one should not even bother asking for forgiveness if one has not "made payment." Or, put in another way, one who has "made payment" still asks for forgiveness -- for, he said, "...this making-of-supplication belongs to the payment."[33] It is not, then, a matter of *either* making satisfaction for sin *or* having sins forgiven, for Anselm. It is not the case that *either*

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30 *CDH* I, 12, Hopkins and Richardson, 68.

31 *CDH* I, 19, Hopkins and Richardson, 85.

32 See Mozley's argument outlined in *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, 130. Joseph Houston challenged this claim that the satisfaction allowed no place for God's forgiving mercy, in "Was the Anselm of *Cur Deus Homo* a retributivist?" in *Cur Deus Homo: Atti del Congresso Anselmiano Internazionale,* ed. Paul Gilbert, Helmut Kohlenberger, Elmar Salmann (Rome, 1999): 621-640.

33 *CDH* I, 19, Hopkins and Richardson, 86.

we pay back our debt *or* it is forgiven. The analogy at work is not one of a debt in the form of a loan that was taken out agreeably with the understanding that when the money is returned the debt is paid. In this case, the lender could choose to cancel or forgive the debt. Here, it would be a matter of either the debt is paid or it is forgiven. By contrast, the debt we owe God, in Anselm's words, was a matter of *stealing* and dishonouring, not simply taking out a loan. Sin is a heavy burden. "*Quanti ponderis sit peccatum.*"[34] Therefore, Anselm insists that even if we were to repay what we had stolen, forgiveness would *still* be required. Forgiveness does not eliminate restitution or satisfaction and forgiveness needs to be present even when restitution is made. Michel Corbin argued similarly that Anselm's insistence on both the satisfaction and the asking of forgiveness, reflected the holding together of justice and mercy, and the paradox in the Sermon on the Mount where The Lord's Prayer linked being forgiven to a person's willingness to forgive others.[35]

Anselm insisted that sin must be dealt with, either by satisfaction and forgiveness or by punishment. Note that this alternative to punishment is offensive to some for it appears to be easy on sin.[36] This alternative is, however, quite in keeping with the vision of restorative justice.[37] According to this vision, there is critical

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34 *CDH* I, 21, 23.

35 Michel Corbin, " L'Intercession du Fils" in *Saint Anselm—A Thinker for Yesterday and Today,* ed. Coloman Viola and Frederick Van Fleteren, *Texts and Studies in Religion*, vol. 90 (Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), 263-268. See CDH I, 19.

36 Harnack claimed: "In the idea that sin can be compensated for by something else than penalty, there lies an underestimate of its gravity that is extremely objectionable." Harnack, *History of Dogma*, VI, 69.

attention to naming the offence, and acknowledging the need for restitution or recompense if not punishment, with a view to the vindication of the victim and the restoration of the offender, through the assumption of responsibility. They do not promote forgiveness alone, with no 'satisfaction' (and no punishment). Restorative justice provides a contemporary illustration of Anselm's principle, as we shall see in the next chapter.

Anselm held an understanding of forgiveness that did not necessarily forego restitution or satisfaction, although it did not require punishment.[38] Forgiveness can accompany payment, and need not always be absolutely free. Victims are not required to forego all restitution in order to forgive. When I ask for forgiveness I do not assume that I do not need to "pay" or give anything. Therefore, the picture is more complicated than the simple matter of either payment/punishment or forgiveness. For Anselm, there are more possibilities. Payment and forgiveness belong together. Forgiveness is not what McIntyre termed "...God's indulgent condonation of the sins committed..."[39] Why can sin/debts not simply be forgiven, with no payment? Because of justice and God's honour, which we have already suggested includes the sake of the victim.

God loved us before Christ died for us, and in that sense already forgave human beings, in the sense of still loving us, wanting a relationship, giving us another

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[37] For an introduction to restorative justice see Howard Zehr, *The Little Book of Restorative Justice* (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2002). This will be discussed in Chapter 4.

[38] McIntyre, 200.

[39] Ibid., 200.

chance. But Anselm says there was more that needed to happen – sin cannot just be overlooked, dismissed. Creation needs to be restored – the damage needs to be repaired, we need to be liberated. That is what he is getting at by satisfaction or punishment for the sake of God's honour.

Satisfaction, a Human Desire

A critical remark regarding satisfaction in *CDH*, concerns perspective. The position of the writer of *CDH* is that of the human being, thinking from a human point of view, and more specifically that of the offender, the position of one who owes. It is written from the perspective of the debtor, not the "debtee." From this position of compunction, the emphasis on satisfaction, on payment is perfectly understandable. Words take on entirely different meanings depending on who is saying them, and the requirement for satisfaction sounds less harsh when uttered from the mouth of the guilty, who desire to make reparation. Joan Nuth emphasized the nature of *CDH* and its source, that is, the place of the person writing, or perhaps, we should say, praying. She recognized that it is grounded in the human need for grace, deliverance from sin, and longing for union with Christ.[40] It is grounded in compunction. In a similar manner, Martin Thornton described *CDH* as colloquy leading to penitence.[41] Daniel Deme maintained that one could only understand Anselm's Christology if one has experienced one's own or one's neighbour's

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[40] Joan M. Nuth, "Two Medieval Soteriologies: Anselm of Canterbury and Julian of Norwich," *Theological Studies* 53(1992) 621-2.

[41] Martin Thornton, *English Spirituality: An Outline of Ascetical Theology According to the English Pastoral Tradition,* Ch. 14 "St Anselm" (Massachusetts: Cowley Publications, 1963), 161.

"impurity as a real crime against heaven and earth..."[42] *CDH* is alert to human agency and guilt, with the desire to make amends. *CDH* addresses us as agents, guilty agents, rather than just as helpless captives, victims, or as third party agents who are sympathetic to the plight of the debtors or the captives. Satisfaction in this context is not a rigid or juridical demand but a longing born of love and compunction.

Satisfaction Through Sacrifice

According to Anselm's *CDH*, the satisfaction is made through a gift, an offering, or more specifically, a sacrifice. Although sacrifice is not discussed or even mentioned explicitly very often in *CDH*, it is presumed and forms the context or 'mode' of the whole argument. Despite the prominence of terms such as payment, debt, satisfaction, required, or necessity, the whole economy of *CDH* is one of gift or offering-up rather than one of punishment or even equivalent exchange. If one ignores this sacrificial mode, then this economy of gift will not be apparent. Instead, it might appear to be an attempt at bartering. In fact, outside a Eucharistic context, it might be quite natural to overlook this sacrificial or gift tenor of the whole demonstration. There is evidence in *CDH* itself, as well as in Anselm's prayers and meditations, and George Williams, Robert Crouse, Eugene Fairweather and D. Bentley Hart all point to the sacrificial and Eucharistic assumptions in *CDH.*

Sacrifice in CDH

Anselm's goal was to demonstrate that it was absolutely necessary for God to become human and to suffer death, in order to convince detractors that the Christian

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42 Dániel Deme, *The Christology of Anselm of Canterbury* (Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2003), 246.

claims do not dishonour God. He established that humanity was created for happiness, but that humanity has sinned, and God cannot simply overlook the sin, or forgive it without punishing unless there is some sort of satisfaction. He also establishes that it must be humanity who makes the satisfaction, since if it were some other creature, then humanity would be indebted to some other creature. But humanity has nothing to give God as a satisfaction, since everything human beings have they already owe to God. Only God could make the satisfaction, but humanity must pay the debt in order to be happy. Humanity needed to make recompense in proportion to the sin. What would that take? The only solution was for God to become human, and make the satisfaction as a human being.

It is when we get to the matter of how Christ made this satisfaction, that we find the evidence of a sacrificial framework. Christ lived a life of obedience, and did not turn from that even if it meant death. So, he died voluntarily. Christ's death was not something that was owed, because he had not sinned. Therefore, it could be a recompense of infinite value. The life of Christ is recompense paid to God for the sins of mankind, so the salvation of humanity follows from his death.

Let us look at how Christ died voluntarily, or of his own power.(I, 9; II, 10,11) This is important if his life and death were offered as a gift. Anselm spent quite a few lines to defend this voluntary nature of Christ's offering. It was not demanded or owed. "God, therefore, did not force Christ to die, there being no sin in him. Rather, he underwent death of his own accord, not out of an obedience consisting in the abandonment of his life, but out of an obedience consisting in his upholding of

righteousness so bravely and pertinaciously that as a result he incurred death."[43] In II, 11, he is even more explicit about this offering that will make recompense. It must be either himself or something from himself, and not just his life and obedience which every creature owes the creator. To give his life or hand himself over to death for the honour of God would be an extravagant offering. "For this is not something which God will demand from him in repayment of a debt, given that, since there will be no sin in him, he will be under no obligation to die."[44] II, 18-20 deals again with the problematic claim that Christ was not obliged, and yet in a way was obliged, to suffer, how the life of Christ is recompense for the sins of humanity. Anselm used the word "offering" to speak of Christ's life and death. And then, the result of this offering, in II, 18, is that "a feeling of immense pious devotion is aroused in the hearts of listeners, since the Son is said in this way to be making supplication to the Father on our behalf."[45] This bringing together of offering, supplication and arousing of pious devotion sounds a lot like sacrifice. Finally, he set forth in Chapter 19, how the salvation of humanity follows so appropriately from his death. His death was such a great gift that he should be rewarded or recompensed. Anselm insisted that it was a gift, and that is why it should be rewarded. In the end, there is a logic of gift or offering that is critical. And that is what sacrifice is about.

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43 *CDH* I, 9, J. F., 277.

44 *CDH* II, 11, J. F., 331. See Also II, 18, on how Christ was obliged and was not obliged to suffer, and how he did not owe to God what he did.

45 *CDH* II, 18, J. F., 351-2.

II, 14 and 20 also reveal this gift mode reminiscent of sacrifice. Anselm spoke of Jesus giving his life to God. Chapter 14 argues the infinite worth of the giving of a life, not only of obedience but obedience that resulted in death, and a death that is not owed. It is important that the life is a gift, in order that it function as a satisfaction. "Therefore, you see how His life would overcome all sins if it were *given for them.*"[46] In II, 20, when Anselm aimed to illustrate the great and just mercy of God, he imagined that the Father is saying to us: "*accipe unigentitum meum et da pro te*" ("receive my only begotten son and render him in place of yourself" according to Hopkins and Richardson, or "...make him an offering for yourself" according to Vose; or "Take my only-begotten Son and give him on your behalf," or perhaps we might translate simply, "...and *offer him/give him* for yourself"*)*. Similarly, the Son rejoins*:* "*tolle me et redime te*" ("take me and redeem yourself.")[47] It is certainly not a stretch to see in this language of "taking" and "giving or offering Jesus" "for ourselves" allusion to a sacrificial offering, indeed, to the Eucharistic offering, recalling Jesus' own words before his death: "*Accipite, et manducate ex hoc omnes, hoc est enim corpus meum.*" "Take and eat ye all of this, for this is my body."

If we look to Anselm's prayers and meditations, there are additional, and more explicit references to Jesus' death as a sacrifice. In the "Prayer Before Receiving the Body and Blood of Christ" Anselm wrote: "... you gave yourself/ willingly as a holy

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46 *CDH* II, 14, (emphasis added) Hopkins and Richardson, p 117.

47 *CDH* II, 20, Hopkins and Richardson, p.135-6.

sacrifice to the Father."[48] Here the connection is made between the Eucharist and the sacrifice of Jesus himself on the cross. In this way Anselm was simply keeping with his context, but subsequent Protestant rejections of Eucharist as sacrifice might make the sacrificial understanding of the cross different.[49]

George Williams and the Sacrificial Mode of CDH

More than half a century ago George Williams highlighted this sacrificial mode of the *CDH,* when he argued that Anselm interpreted the cross and atonement through the lens of the Eucharistic-penitential theology rather than through the lens of baptism. It was as sacrifice that Anselm understood the cross. Williams demonstrated his thesis through the inclusion, in his discussion, of various prayers and meditations to enhance the interpretation of *CDH*, as well as through attention to his monastic context. Williams noted that it was the

> strictly rationalist character of Anselm's demonstration which has hitherto tended to divert attention from the sacramental presuppositions of the theory of redemption contained in *CDH.* Many historians of dogma and most systematic theologians have been content to analyze the *CDH* in terms of early scholastic logic without reference to the sacramental and disciplinary life of the eleventh-century Church.[50]

Using texts from Anselm's prayers and meditations, as well as from *CDH,* Williams argued convincingly for the eucharistic-penitential presuppositions that

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[48]Anselm, "Prayer Before Receiving the Body and Blood of Christ" *Oratio* 3, lines 16-19.

[49] Kenneth Stevenson explored this difference in understanding of the Eucharist and sacrifice between Protestants and Catholics, in his book, *Eucharist and Offering* (New York: Pueblo Publishing company, 1986).

[50] Williams, "The Sacramental Presuppositions," 245-6.

determined Anselm's understanding of the cross and redemption.[51] These are pertinent here, because if Williams is right, this would make even more evident the claim that Anselm understood the life and death of Jesus in sacrificial terms. According to Williams, "(in) the *Oratio IV ad sanctum crucem*... Anselm distinguishes two ways in which the work of the cross is made available to the believer, first, in the cleansing water of baptism removing the natural sin in which he had been conceived and born, and then, in the recleansing from the sins committed after baptismal rebirth."[52] This recleansing happens through the daily Eucharist. Williams continued:

> The action on the cross wipes out one's sins and mortifies the old life and resurrects one into the new life of justice. Although Anselm has in mind here baptism, penance, and the sacrament of the altar, it is clear that the eucharist is uppermost in his mind and that 'rebirth into the new life of justice' (a phrasing derived from the baptismal passage of Romans 6:3ff.) is thought of as renewed in the daily eucharist rather than as taking place once-for-all at infant baptism.[53]

Williams found Anselm's stress on a Eucharistic redemption also in Prayer 3, "Prayer Before Receiving the Body and Blood of Christ." In this case Anselm used Paul's baptismal language of dying, being buried and being resurrected with Christ

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51 The point here is not the priority of the eucharistic-penitential presuppositions over the cross and redemption in a hermeneutical circle linking these two. It is the highlighting of Eucharist over baptism as the lens through which Anselm understood the cross.

52 Ibid., 256.

53 Ibid., 256.

from the dead into a new life (Romans 6:3ff) to describe the effect of Eucharistic incorporation. For Anselm, this happened "through mouth and heart, through faith and feeling."54 Although Williams' task was to point out the Eucharistic lens through which Anselm understood the cross, since the Eucharist is about sacrifice, this also serves to highlight Anselm's sacrificial assumptions about the cross. The satisfaction is accomplished through sacrifice.

Fairweather also observed that sacrifice was at the heart of *CDH,* even though sacrificial terminology is not present. Anselm tried "...to show how the atonement is related to the nature of God and man, and to the exigencies of the human situation -- *all in terms of the deepest meaning of the sacrifice of the God-Man,* rather than with the help of the images to which the great Biblical and patristic symbol of man's redemption from bondage had been reduced by lesser writers."[55] Anselm did not deny the human need for liberation, release from slavery, sin and death, or the need to conquer the devil.[56] He did not simply relate *that* this was accomplished, but took on the much more risky and difficult task of explaining *how.* This is where sacrifice was involved, for the release was brought about through the incarnation, and the ultimate sacrifice. Fairweather's reading then, concurred with that of Williams, when he maintained: "*Despite the absence of sacrificial terminology, the core of Anselm's*

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54 Ibid., 257.

55 Eugene Fairweather, "Introduction," *A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham*, ed. and trans. Eugene Fairweather (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), 55.

56 *CDH*, I, 3; II, 19.

soteriology is an explanation of the work of redemption along the lines of the most profound and authentically "classical" presentation offered by Hebrews.[57] In an argument that differs somewhat from Williams' overall, Robert Crouse nevertheless drew attention to the intimate connection between the doctrines of the Eucharist and atonement in Anselm's theology (as well as in patristic theology). He maintained that the Eucharist is spoken of as a sacrifice in patristic theology, because

> they mean that the liturgy recalls -- that is, makes present for mind and heart -- the once-for-all atoning act of Christ in the fullness of all its dimensions, expiatory, exemplary and victorious. Indeed, as Jaroslav Pelikan makes clear in his fine volume on the history of Early Christian doctrine, liturgical language (especially the words of Christ at the Last Supper) seems to precede and serve as a model for the more explicit elaboration of the doctrine of the atonement.[58]

There is no question of the repetition of Christ's one and all-sufficient oblation. But Crouse explained, Christ's sacrifice is recalled, or represented sacramentally; and inasmuch as the Church is *in Christo*, it is the sacrifice of the Church.[59]

Defending Anselm's *CDH* before critiques from an Eastern Orthodox perspective, D. Bentley Hart argued that sacrifice, which was the mode of operation

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[57] Fairweather, "Introduction," 55.

[58] Robert D. Crouse, "Atonement and Sacrifice: 'Doctrine and Worship: St. Augustine and the Fathers'," in *The Idea of the Church in Historical Development*, ed. D.A. Petley (St. Peter Publications, 1990), 4. Crouse cited Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition, I: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition* (100-600) (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1971), 146-7. I need not here arbitrate between the apparently competing claims of Williams, Crouse and Pelikan regarding the interpretation of patristic theology. Our interest here concerns only their agreement about sacrifice, atonement and Eucharist in Anselm.

[59] Ibid., 4.

in *CDH*, was about gift and excess, and not part of an economy of credit and exchange. *CDH* is not, as Anselm's detractors would have it, about "an arbitrary arrangement of jurisprudential transaction calculated to effect a forensic reconciliation..."[60] Hart maintained convincingly that Anselm realized that Christ's sacrifice was "...ultimately not an *economic* gesture, (meant to insure the stability of a universe founded upon unyielding laws of equity and retribution), but belongs instead to the infinite motion of God's love, in which justice and mercy are one and can never be divided one from the other..."[61] He elaborated:

> as Christ's sacrifice belongs not to an economy of credit and exchange, but to the trinitarian motion of love, it is given entirely as gift, and must be seen as such: a gift given when it should not have needed to be given again, by God, and at a price that we, in our sin, imposed upon him. As an entirely divine action, Christ's sacrifice merely draws creation back into the eternal motion of divine love for which it was fashioned.[62]

Dániel Deme, who did not quite see this sacrificial framework in *CDH*, nevertheless made the link between satisfaction and sacrifice, saying that it was not unknown to Anselm. He granted that the connection between Christ's cross and the notion of sacrifice is unambiguous in "Prayer before Receiving the Body and Blood of Christ," but he regarded this as "an isolated statement." Since it was made only in his Eucharistic prayer, Deme concluded that Anselm made this connection between

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[60] Hart, 347.

[61] Ibid., 347.

[62] Ibid., 348-9.

the cross or satisfaction and sacrifice based on the liturgy.[63] There is no reason why Anselm would not continue to see this connection when discussing the cross in *CDH.*

When Jesus' death is understood sacrificially, through the lens of a sacrificial Eucharistic rite, then it is not seen in terms of a punitive, penal substitutionary theory. It is not transactional, nor does it resemble a financial exchange but is understood in the mode of offering, or of gift. It is precisely the excess nature of the gift that makes it a more than adequate satisfaction. It is not a matter of an infliction of punishment.[64] If the language of satisfaction still conjures up payment and exchange threatening to eclipse the overwhelming mercy that Anselm claims is involved, we must recall that the requirement of satisfaction is for the sake of the honour of God, the whole created order, including human happiness. Consider as well the nature and circumstances of the satisfaction, and who makes it to whom. If the satisfaction is made through a voluntary self-offering, and if this giving of self is done by God in the *Deus Homo*, then the rigid, juridical, and transactional appearance dissolves. Instead, this sacrifice or satisfaction is worked through love, gift and excess, which are all in the realm of mystery.

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[63] Deme, 214.

[64] Anselm does not reject biblical notions of Isaiah 53, and NT references to the Son of Man bearing consequences, or punishment of sin/wrath. It is the results of human sinfulness that Jesus bore, resulting in his death, and Anselm even at one point referred to the Son's death as enduring punishment (*poena*) –which the Father did not like.(I,10) But Anselm's reasoning is in terms of sacrifice and satisfaction. The voluntary nature of Jesus' work gives it the form of satisfaction rather than punishment.

The Reward for Humanity

How did humanity gain from the work of the *Deus homo*? Anselm wrote of the reward that Christ received and handed over to his kin. A few related questions come to mind. Why was a reward necessary if Christ had simply made satisfaction for the debt? If it was possible for the *Deus Homo* to pay the debt on behalf of humanity, then he could also simply receive the reward on behalf of humanity. Why or how did Jesus *hand over* the reward? Or what is the relation between Jesus and humanity? Finally, if the salvation is not simply received by all of humanity in a universal fashion, then how do individual human beings receive it? How can human beings appropriate or participate in what was accomplished by the *Deus homo* on behalf of humanity? The following paragraphs suggest that human beings do not simply have the reward applied to their account, because there is a real union between Christ and humanity. There is also participation for individuals through sacraments and imitation. So, the action of Christ described by Anselm is *not* substitutionary in the sense that he offered the sacrifice, lived the life of obedience, made the satisfaction *so we do not have to*. It was not external to humanity. It is substitutionary in the sense that he did what we could not have done, so that we are able to join in. Human beings participate in what Jesus accomplished by receiving the reward, through sacramental union, intimacy and imitation.

Why is it necessary to speak of a reward, when the satisfaction had been made that was required? If satisfaction is the repayment of the debt as well as the 'something extra' that was *owed*, then why is there a need for a reward? That was Ritschl's question, and he suggested that Anselm himself was admitting the

unsatisfactory nature of the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction by the introduction of the language of merit.[65] According to Deme, Anselm's theory was "utterly contradictory" at the point where he asserted that Christ's death could offer for superabundant value.[66] But Anselm is not doing arithmetic. Satisfaction was indeed the 'payment' of the debt. But Jesus' sacrifice was of infinite value. And the offering was a gift, and therefore a reward was a just response. The sacrifice more than compensated for the sin, and therefore could provide the satisfaction. If it had simply been a repayment of a satisfaction, then no reward would have been necessary. But it was more than a payment. The excess of the gift that was offered more than compensated for the debt, and it was so voluntarily offered and was of such inestimable worth that it was an extravagant gift: there was excess. And it was offered by one who did not have to make satisfaction for himself – one who did not have ever to die. Even though, as Deme correctly observes, the death was necessary under the historic circumstances, Christ was not destined to die because he was without sin.[67] That is why the reward is an appropriate response. The whole economy is not one of arithmetic but of gift and reward, and the 'exchange' is a holy one.

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65 Ritschl, 34-35.

66 Deme, 212.

67 Ibid. Deme was perhaps not distinguishing between the ways in which Christ's death was necessary and was not necessary. *CDH* II, 17.

Anselm turns to the matter of "how very reasonable it is that human salvation results from this death."[68] He has made the case that a satisfaction was necessary in order to avoid punishment, to deal with the debt/disorder -- and that a sacrifice of himself would certainly be more than a satisfaction. Such an extravagant gift must be rewarded. Boso agreed that it was necessary that "the Father should compensate the Son." Anselm maintained that if God would not give a reward, God would seem either unjust or unable. Regarding the nature of the reward, Anselm reasoned that someone who gives a reward "either gives what that person does not have or excuses what cannot be exacted from him." But there is nothing in the world that the Son did/does not already have, so the reward must be given to someone else. And who better to receive it than "those for whose salvation He became a man...?"[69] The reward is salvation for the family of Adam and Eve.

In fact, the theme of Book II, chapters 19 and 20, is one of excess or abundance regarding God's merciful rewarding and Christ's extravagant gift or sacrifice. Anselm ends by pointing to this excess on both sides: "What could be thought to be more merciful than for God the Father to say to the sinner, condemned to eternal torments and having no way to redeem himself: "Receive my only begotten son and give him on your behalf," and for the Son to say, "Take me and redeem

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68 *CDH,* II, 19, Hopkins and Richardson, 133.

69 *CDH* II, 19, Hopkins and Richardson, 134.

yourself'?"[70] What is most beautiful is that this extravagant mercy is in perfect harmony with God's justice.

Why must Anselm speak of Christ giving away the reward to the kin whom he represents, as though there is a separation? He paid on their behalf, and then he accepted on their behalf and handed it over. It is a matter of union, identification, but also of distinction. The *Deus homo* is kin, and humanity does participate in the same nature as the *Deus homo*, but there is also a distinction. The *Deus homo* did not need to die, or make satisfaction, but did it on behalf of those who did - as one of them. So also, he received the reward and handed it over to his own kin who needed it. The connection between the work of Christ, in making satisfaction, and human salvation is the giving of the reward to humanity.[71] But this giving is an appropriate kind of sharing of one family member with the rest of the family and happens through sacramental sharing.

For Anselm, humanity was bound together by bonds of kinship creating solidarity and making the idea of representation possible. Here we turn to the bond between Christ and human beings. He called human beings the Son's own kinsmen or parents and brethren ("*parentes et fratres suos*").[72] All human beings are descended from one human being, and are therefore, according to Anselm, of the

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70 *CDH*, II, 20, J. F., 354. The Latin is "*accipe unigenitum meum et da pro te; et ipse filius: tolle me et redime te?*" Anselm von Canterbury, *Cur Deus Homo: Warum Gott Mensch Geworden: Lateinisch und Deutsch* (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellscahft E.V.: Darmstadt, 1956), 152.

71 *CDH*, II, 19.

72 *CDH* II, 19.

same "race"(*generis*). It is important to note that what he meant here by race or *generis* is not simply nature, but also bonds of kinship. He contrasted humans and angels in this regard. Angels, although they are all of the same *nature*, are not all of the same "race" because they do not all share a common ancestor.[73] Walter Kasper described how this sense of kinship was lost with the rise of modern individualism. It is clear, as Kasper noted, that people influenced by the Enlightenment, with an individualistic mentality, could only think of the legal concept of 'imputation' to answer the question of how the merits of Jesus Christ could benefit us.[74] For Anselm, it was the sharing of a reward that was won by a gift offered on behalf of the family by a family member.

The French scholar, Louis Richard, also referred to this inability on the part of Liberal Protestants to understand the solidarity, or unity of humanity with Jesus. He argued that "... liberal Protestantism, both by its individualism and its anti-intellectualism, disregards a truth that is fundamental to Christianity: our two-fold solidarity in Adam and in Jesus Christ, the spiritual Adam."[75] This individualism and resulting imputation or reckoning, however, should not be read into Anselm's

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[73] *CDH*, II, 21.

[74] Kasper, 221.

[75] Louis Richard, "The Mystery of the Redemption in Protestantism" in *The Theology of the Atonement: Readings in Soteriology*, ed. John Sheets (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967):37.

theology.[76] In his introduction to Anselm's work, Fairweather also pointed out this bond between the *Deus-homo* and humanity, arguing that for human beings to receive the reward earned by Christ was not simply a transaction nor a mere matter of pronouncement, or of "forensic imputation" to those only "juridically" related. He highlighted the shared race/family, as outlined in II, 8, where Anselm argued that the human being through whom "the race of Adam is to be restored should be taken from Adam's progeny."[77] In addition, Fairweather noted that "in his devotional writings in particular, he gives eloquent expression to his sense of the communion of Christians with the Son of God in his incarnation and Passion."[78]

Augustinian philosopher, Katherin Rogers, also described this solidarity through family bonds. "(T)he key to how Christ, though sinless, can save his human brethren is not to be found in Anselm's realism." There would be deep philosophical problems with such a move, and it might involve an "excessive" realism – such as Abelard mocks, rather than what Rogers called "Anselm's exemplarism."[79] The exemplarism contrasted with the realism because it regarded the humanity that all human beings shared to be 'an example' of or a reflection of the perfect idea in the mind of God. This nature in the mind of God could not have been ruined. It was the actual family of Adam and Eve that was ruined, and so the one to make the

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[76] See also Hunter Brown on solidarity and Anselm's social insights, Brown 201.

[77] *CDH* II, 8, J. F., 322.

[78] Fairweather, "Introduction," 57-8.

[79] Rogers, 197.

satisfaction had to be of their family, and not a newly created human being. Here Rogers disagreed with Southern, who claimed that Anselm tended to "see the species as more real than its individual components."[80] She argued instead that for Anselm the biological family of Adam owed the debt and since Christ is a member of the family, although he did not personally owe the debt, as a member of the race (family), he can pay.[81]

Similarly, in an article on the Realism of Anselm and his contemporaries, Iwakuma Yukio rejected the classification of Anselm's realism as platonic. Although Anselm believed in the existence of universals, in the sensible world there are only individuals, and universals are in the individuals.[82] Yukio explained that for Anselm's theology, it was necessary "...to have the concept of *homo* common to Adam, to his descendants, and to Jesus." But this was not a strictly platonic realism, with "...a world apart from and beyond the sensible world..."[83] Anselm was influenced by current perceptions of Aristotle, and for him, "universals can be grasped by reason only in the sensible world itself."[84] What is important for our

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80 Southern, *Saint Anselm*, n.29, 214.

81 Rogers, "In Defense of St. Anselm's," 198.

82 Iwakuma Yukio, "The Realism of Anselm and his Contemporaries" *Anselm: Aosta, Bec and Canterbury. Papers in Commemoration of the Nine-Hundredth Anniversary of Anselm's Enthronement as Archbishop, 25 September 1093*, ed. D.E. Luscombe and G.R. Evans (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 125.

83 Ibid., 122-3.

84 Ibid., 124.

discussion is that there is such a thing as *homo*, an *essentia*, or nature, which links Adam, human beings and Jesus, and even more than that, the bonds of kinship between Jesus and the whole family of Adam and Eve.

Catherine Pickstock, in her discussion of the middle-ages, noted the bonds of kinship that mattered in Anselm's time. Following the historian John Bossy, she outlined how in Anselm's thinking, "Christ was one of our kin, and could take our debt upon himself."[85] In Pickstock's estimation, before the dissolution of the bonds of kinship in the late medieval-early modern period, and the framing of the Atonement in judicial terms, the believer was understood to be "incorporated into the Son...thereby achieving an affective state of reconciliation with the Father..."[86]

Pickstock's emphasis on kinship rather than judicial terms is not unlike von Balthasar's argument that in *CDH* it is not a matter of *reckoning*, but of "inner ontological union."[87] The guilty ones, through their real union with Christ, are truly made just, they have paid the debt, and are washed pearls[88] or people who do not bear the stain of sin, who are being restored. Similarly, Williams wrote of Anselm's use of a philosophical realism to express the human participation in the 'humanity' of

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85 Pickstock, *After Writing,* 156.

86 Ibid, 157. Pickstock noted Anselm wrote when there was this sense of kinship between human beings, the dead and God. Ibid., 149ff.

87 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics. Vol. II: Studies in Theological Style: Clerical Styles.* Translated by Andrew Louth, Francis McDonagh & Brian McNeil C.R.V. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984), 249.

88 *CDH* I, 9.

Christ.'[89] For the purposes of this discussion, we do not need to choose between 'ontological union' and union resulting from kinship or family bonds that are real. What matters is that for Anselm there is a union between Jesus and the rest of humanity so that there is a sharing that is not an extrinsic or judicial sort of reckoning or imputation. Jesus can pay the debt on behalf of humanity because he participates in that humanity; and human beings can receive the reward naturally, which he receives and shares because they are united to him — part of the same family.

Satisfaction, Human Agency and Happiness

The holy exchange that is operative here, has humanity involved in giving and receiving – humanity in Christ offering the sacrifice, handing over the reward to humanity, and human beings receiving it through sacramental union, intimacy and imitation. Anselm gave a prominent place to human agency and human happiness, even as everything begins and ends with God. This is accomplished by his taking seriously the *deus-homo*. It is necessary to look further at the meaning and role of humanity -- in Christ and in human beings since it is controversial.

In explaining the need for repayment in dealing with sin, Anselm mentioned the happiness of human beings. He believed that they could not be happy if their debts were not paid. Anselm said of the person owing: "So long, however, as he does not repay, he will either be wishing to repay, or not wishing to do so. But in the event that he has a desire to do what he is incapable of doing, he will be a person in

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89 George H. Williams, *Anselm: Communion and Atonement* (Saint Louis, Missouri: Concordia Publishing House, 1960), 66. This is also found in the article, of which the book was a slightly enlarged version: "The Sacramental Presuppositions," 268.

want: in the event that he does not have this desire, he will be a wrongdoer... Now, whether he is in want or whether he is a wrongdoer – in neither case will he be blessedly happy."[90] He asserted that in order for there to be happiness, sins need to be forgiven (*dimissis*, i.e. *dimitto*, which involves dismissal or payment).[91] But forgiveness involves repayment, restitution, recompense or satisfaction. Here he is acknowledging a role for humanity in Christ, but also for human beings.

Humanity must have a part in putting things back, in making satisfaction in order to be happy. "(N)o one can arrive at happiness if that one is sinful or can be freed from sin if that one does not repay what he/she seized by sinning."[92] Joan M. Nuth summarized Anselm's meaning as follows: "'God's compassion seems to fail' if God forgives the sinner without demanding satisfaction from the one who committed the offense, for ... the sinner will be either needy or unjust, and in either case not happy."[93] Anselm assumed that humanity ought to have some role in restoring the

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[90] *CDH* I, 24, p. 312.

[91] *CDH* I, 10. There are several worlds in *CDH* behind the English word "forgive": *remissio* (send back), *dimissio* (discharge), and *dimitto* (dismiss). *Delere* is also used ("blot out a single sin"). *CDH* I, 21.

[92] *CDH* I,19, Hopkins & Richardson, 86. "Anselm: Therefore, consider it settled that, without satisfaction, that is, without voluntary payment of the debt, God can neither pass by the sin unpunished, nor can the sinner attain that happiness, or happiness like that, which he had before he sinned; for man cannot in this way be restored, or become such as he was before he sinned."(I,19)

[93] Nuth, 629. She cited *CDH* I,.24, Vose, 236. Or, as Hunter Brown put it, following Walter Kasper, it was a matter of divine mercy seeking concrete historical justice without disenfranchising the accused. Brown, 200.

universe that was disrupted by human sin.[94] Anselm was adamant that no human being could ever make satisfaction by him- or herself.[95] That was precisely the problem that gave rise to the necessity of the Incarnation! Humanity needed to pay, in order to be happy, but could not. The solution of the Incarnation was not that God paid instead, but that in the *Deus homo*, humanity was able to pay.

Not everyone agrees on this role for humanity. Southern did not see this emphasis on humanity's role in Anselm. He claimed that Anselm featured "the sovereignty of God: human nature contributed nothing to its redemption."[96] Walter Principe mused that "(s)ince Southern, of course, accepts the role of the human *in Christ*, he must be thinking of the role of other humans in redemption." Principe, however, could not understand how one could miss the role for human beings in redemption in Anselm's thinking which emphasized the need for a "human subjective response." Principe quoted what Southern himself also cited: "'Sacred Scripture,' he

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[94] Komonchak, 54. Christopher Armstrong drew attention to Anselm's emphasis on the "human contribution of Christ..." Christopher Armstrong, "St Anselm and His Critics: Further Reflection on the *Cur Deus Homo*," *The Downside Review* 86, 355. McIntyre emphasized the divine role, but he clearly defended the human role in Christ as Anselm described it, against Aulén's protestations. McIntyre suggested that perhaps Aulén did not rightly grasp Anselm's understanding of the *Deus-Homo*. Further, he argued that Aulén's classic view of atonement is deficient in its depiction of the involvement of Jesus, as a human being. Anselm was right, McIntyre maintained, in upholding the "part played by human nature of Our Lord in the Incarnation and the Atonement." McIntyre, 199. This was objectionable to Aulén because it seems to give human beings a role in their own salvation, leading to Pelagianism, or justification by works.

[95] I, 20 is entitled "...Man cannot make satisfaction by himself." and after some quizzing, Boso conceded that, "I have nothing with which to make payment for my sin." Hopkins and Richardson, 86, 88.

[96] Southern, *Saint Anselm*, 453.

says, 'teaches us everywhere how we are to approach so great a grace in order to share in it and how we are to live under its influence'..."[97]

Southern did highlight Anselm's expectation that human beings need to respond, or that the restoration of humanity is not universally applied without any participation on the part of human beings. He noted that according to Anselm's logic, requiring the salvation of humanity, satisfaction was made either for all or just for one: for 'the human species or all human beings.' But Anselm opted for neither, instead opting for a means of offering salvation to those who met certain requirements. He pointed out Boso's introduction of more hopeful possibilities, which were not refuted by Anselm, that God might not turn away any under the name of Christ.[98] However, Southern observed that salvation, for Anselm, had strict conditions of service attached to it (which he wished to emphasize).[99] Anselm used the parable of the king, where whoever calls upon the 'event' although not present can benefit from the event. This suggested that people need to respond, in order to appropriate or benefit from what is available to them.[100] It might only be a response, or a plea, but it is an action. Still, Anselm's emphasis was, as Southern claimed, on God, and on humanity finding itself by losing itself in God. The role of human

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[97] Walter H. Principe, review of *Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape* by R. W. Southern, *Theological Studies* 54, no. 2 (June 1993): 349. *CDH* II, 19.

[98] Southern, *Saint Anselm*, 214-6.

[99] Ibid., 225.

[100] *CDH* II, 16.

beings in responding, was overshadowed by the sovereignty of God, or the "enlargement of God's role,"[101]

Competing understandings of humanity would account for the disagreement between Southern and Principe and others below. Principe connected humanity in Christ with humanity in human beings, whereas for Southern these were distinguished. Interpreters disagree about the level of human agency or participation, but on some level Anselm acknowledged the need for human participation – both in the *Deus homo* and in human beings. There is, from the human point of view, the desire to make amends, to participate in the reparation. In *CDH*, it is not a simplistic universalism, where God saves people no matter what they choose, effectively denying human freedom of choice.[102] Nor is it a matter only of imputed righteousness, and substitution, which is what is required if there is no human agency/role/participation in the *Deus-homo*, or in human beings -- and no restoration of human nature. There are different levels of language about humanity and human agency. There is humanity as a species, there is the humanity of the *deus-homo*, and there are human beings. Humanity was a real nature for Anselm, and not just a collection of individual human beings. Hopkins explained that for Anselm the term *homo* designated not just individual human beings, as it did for the Nominalists of his

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[101] Southern, *Saint Anselm*, 453.

[102] Although in some places it seems that God simply saves some and not others. In *Proslogion* Anselm could understand how God's compassion springs from God's righteousness but there was something that he could not understand: "reason certainly cannot comprehend why through your supreme goodness you should save some, and through your supreme justice condemn others, when both are equally evil." *Proslogion* 11, 422-4. Ward, 253.

day, but also designated human nature as it is shared by all human beings.[103] The various designations of *Homo* (as human nature, or as individual human beings, or in the *Deus homo*) though distinguishable, are nevertheless connected for Anselm. If he held to the necessity of a response on the part of human beings, then we need not be surprised that Anselm guarded that very thing in his reasoning about the human involvement in the *Deus-homo*. There has to be human participation/assent/response, or there is no freedom, and no happiness.

CDH has often been called an objective theory of atonement because it happens 'out there,' without the involvement of human beings.[104] The event of the cross is an objective reality. But that is not to say there is no connection to human beings. That is only if there is no connection between the *deus-homo* and human beings. It is strange that for Aulén it was precisely because there *is* a role for humanity in *CDH* that it is problematic. Yoder, however, criticized Anselm because the logic of his argument led to universalism: if Jesus made the satisfaction, and the reward is passed along to humanity, then it seems that there is universal salvation and there is no element of human choice or participation. At the same time, Yoder objected to the paying for forgiveness, and the fact that the *Deus-homo*, as *homo*, took the action, rather than God being the agent. So, for Yoder, and Aulén, the problem is that God did not do it all, but humanity was active in the *Deus homo* (as *homo*). Yet Yoder seemed to object that there is no role for human beings. Apparently, Anselm

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[103] Hopkins, 201.

[104] Deme rightly points out the problems with the categorizations of "objective" and "subjective" in regard to atonement. Deme, 223ff.

caused offence by making the humanity in the *Deus-homo* active. Yoder's objections suggest that it should have been a matter of God's action entirely in Jesus, and human beings, individually, responding. Perhaps Anselm complicated the picture by taking seriously the *Deus-homo*, in whom both God and humanity are active, and by seeing humanity's real connection to the humanity of the *Deus-homo*. McIntyre claimed that Aulén misunderstood, or rather did not properly emphasize the significance of Anselm's conception of the *deus-homo*.[105] Fairweather also highlighted this strength in Anselm when he pointed to the weakness in Aulén's understanding of the two natures of Christ, suggesting that Aulén diminished the humanity of Christ when he criticized Anselm for giving humanity a role. He acknowledged that there is a danger in forgetting that the work of redemption all began with the downward movement. However, "to forget that the atonement is actually consummated by the Godward movement of the human will of the God-Man is to lapse into that kind of partial denial of the incarnation against which the greatest teachers of the ancient church fought so long and so wisely."[106] For Anselm, there was human agency or participation, both in the *Deus homo* and in human beings.

It is, however, true that the focus of *CDH* is not on how individual human beings can appropriate or benefit from the salvific work of Jesus, although as we shall see Anselm did make some significant comments. It is true that the logic could lead in the universalist direction mentioned by Yoder. It is also true that Boso observed

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105 McIntyre, 197-8.

106 Fairweather, "Incarnation and Atonement: An Anselmian Response to Aulén's *Christus Victor*," *Canadian Journal of Theology*, vol 7, no 3 (1961), 175.

this and was not entirely corrected.[107] Nevertheless, Anselm did not present a universalist position. In fact, Michel Grandjean deemed it worthwhile to entertain the question of whether in Anselm's view there is any salvation outside the cloister![108] Drawing on certain letters, Southern also believed that Anselm was inclined to a very stern view, sometimes suggesting that only very few will be saved, and that most of these would be monks because only they had fully surrendered to God's will.[109] Still, as Boso saw, *CDH* is open to the possibility that all might be saved.[110]

Turning now from humanity in Christ, interpreters disagree about the role Anselm gave human beings. Daniel Deme and Aulén were of one mind in their conviction that humanity does not have a role in salvation but they disagreed about what Anselm said. Aulén thought Anselm gave a too large role to humanity, while Deme reassured his readers that Anselm did not. Deme emphasized that human beings bring nothing – we only participate as those who crucify him. Without

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107 *CDH* II, 19

108 Michel Grandjean, "Hors Du Cloître Pas de Salût? Note sur l'Ecclésiologie d'Anselme de Cantorbéry et de Son Milieu," *Études Théologiques et Réligieuses* 70, no. 3: 349-57. Grandjean referred for example to Anselm's letter to Matilda, Countess of Tuscany wherein he counsels her to keep a veil handy, secretly, to take on at the moment of death, since for some reason she was not called to enter the cloister already. Letter 325, *The Letters*, vol. 3, 38-9.

109 Southern, *Saint Anselm*, 215. He cited Epp. 2 (I, 2), 51 (I, 43), 167 (iii, 18), 184. The first number refers to Schmitt, *S. Anselmi Opera Omnia*; the second, to that of *Patrologia Latina*, ed. J.P. Migne, (Paris, 1844-64), vol. 158-9.

110 Note that one of the claims established by Anselm's excurses on human beings making up for the fallen angels is that the number of saved human beings will be more than the number of fallen angels. I,18. It would certainly be more limiting if the number were to be exactly equal. Since it is not, Anselm assured us that no one needs to rejoice in the fall of another.

indicating where, Deme declared that "Anselm clearly states, we participate directly in the Christ-event, in his redemptive death, only as those who crucify him; we are there in his death only as sinners."[111] Humanity's role is that of "active reception" rather than cooperation. He elaborated: "(w)hatever needs to be done by me does not concern my salvation or anyone else's salvation."[112] We may well need to suffer, but whatever suffering or offering we do is not for our salvation. It is interesting that he quoted Barth here and not Anselm: "My cross is not Christ's Cross, 'this has been carried once for all, and does not need to be carried again. There can be no question of identification with him, or a repetition of his suffering and death.'"[113] He reiterated at various points that as humans we have nothing to offer, and this is one of the main points of Anselm's Soteriology.[114] It is true that humanity could not pay the debt, and had nothing to offer that is not already owed, as I already noted. However, Anselm did give humanity a role in the *deus-homo,* and for Anselm, there was a sharing between human beings and Jesus.

Deme is right to say that humanity, as human beings only accept/receive, if he there includes Anselm's imitation, offering/sacramental union; and that Christ offers the satisfaction – if he acknowledges humanity in Christ. But for Anselm there is a joining; Christ as humanity, on our behalf offers, and shares with his family; we

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111 Deme, 225.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid., 225-6, Deme cited Barth, CD IV/2, p. 264.

114 Ibid., 108, 206.

receive by sacramental union. Imitation is involved for Christ provides the example, too.

For Anselm there seems to be the possibility of participation in the work of Christ, so that what we do really does have significance for our salvation and that of others, in as much as it is a participation in the work of Christ. This is so because of the connection or participation of the humanity of human beings and humanity of Christ. But for Deme there is a clear separation between individuals and Jesus, and between the work of salvation and the work of the rest of life. There is a separation between "imitation of the example that Christ set on the Cross" and "participation in the merits of the ontological event" or "the merits of his death."[115]

Deme wanted to be sure to avoid any kind of synergism and believed that there is nothing of this in Anselm.[116] For this reason he took exception to the notion of a subjective aspect to the atonement in Anselm. "The subjective transformation that a believer goes through as a result of God's liberating act does not unveil or add a subjective side to the atoning death of Christ, and therefore cannot result in a subjective soteriological concept either."[117] However, he did clarify that universal *satisfaction* does not mean universal *redemption* – but the difference between the two is not established or eliminated by human imitation or appropriation. What determines redemption is one's *approach*: those who approach the grace of what was

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115 Ibid., 224.

116 Ibid., 225.

117 Ibid., 224.

done on the Cross "with grace in affection will be saved," and those "who approach with contempt will perish."[118] He quoted from *Meditation on Human Redemption* but there is a very similar passage in *CDH.* In II, 19, Anselm wrote of Christ leaving an example of suffering and death to preserve holiness, of imitation of Christ for those who partake in his reward, of coming aright, of how to approach in order to share the favour, and how to live under it. In this passage, there is a human response, or participation in, and the imitation of, Jesus' example. There is a response on the part of human beings that is critical for Anselm. This much Deme admits. He wants to be sure, however, that this response has nothing to do with *earning* salvation. That was done by Christ. Human beings only need to *accept* it. This did not seem to be Anselm's preoccupation. Anselm was more ready to involve humanity in the work of salvation, albeit in the work of humanity in the *deus-homo*. Yet the humanity in Christ is united to the humanity in human beings.

The need for human agency can be further explained by the fact that God had no need to conquer the devil; but humanity did have a need to conquer the devil. Since humanity had been defeated by the devil, Anselm reasoned that humanity needed to defeat the devil. That is the only 'debt' humanity owed the devil. That is, humanity "should defeat the devil and should pay recompense by means of righteousness, having previously offended God through sin."[119] It is humanity that needed to conquer the devil, or make satisfaction, humanity that needed to be

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118 Ibid., 225. He cited *Meditation on Human Redemption* III, 88, 125-8; 89, 140-7.

119 CDH, II, 19, J. F., 354.

restored, and humanity that needed to have the dignity of making amends. Anselm insisted on human agency in the work of salvation – both in the *Deus homo* and in human beings. That was necessary for human happiness.

Human happiness was, after all central to the discussion. Anselm's argument is that humanity was created for happiness.[120] And it is because of the lack of happiness that the incarnation was necessary.[121] It is too easy to skip over this theme in *CDH*, perhaps because of the focus on the reparation to the honour of God. But it is worth contemplating. Anselm's notion of happiness calls to mind St. Augustine's reflection on the happiness that all seek, but cannot attain without immortality and hence without the Incarnation. Aquinas, too, took up this theme of human happiness, as he reasoned about the goal of human life, namely, happiness, which cannot be attained as long as there is any desire that has not been fulfilled.[122] This theme of happiness reveals the beauty of Anselm's argument, where the *goal* is the maintenance of God's honour, the order and beauty of creation, to which the happiness of humanity belongs. Human happiness cannot be fulfilled apart from goodness. Here we find the reason for the human agency, or satisfaction, the need to make reparation, in order to be happy – truly and fully. It would not have been merciful on God's part simply to have dismissed the sin without restoration, for it

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120 *CDH* I,10; II,1

121 *CDH* I, 24.

122 Augustine, *On the Trinity*, XIII, chapters 4-10; *City of God*, Book 19. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, FS (First part of Second Part), QQ 1-5.

would not have allowed human happiness.[123] Therefore, it would not have been truly merciful for God, either to have paid the debt without human involvement, or to have simply overlooked the debt. For the sake of human happiness, God as human being paid the debt.

Participation through Sacrament and Imitation

Anselm did not say much in *CDH* that distinguished between the reward for humanity and that for individual human beings. That is he did not elaborate on how individual human beings avail themselves of this gift. Christ made the satisfaction on behalf of humanity, and humanity received the reward. However, as noted already, not every human being receives the benefit. There was some kind of condition.[124] Evidently, Anselm did not assume that *all* human beings will necessarily be saved because of the work of Christ.

How, then, do human beings avail themselves of the reward that Christ has bestowed upon "those for whose salvation...he became man; and for whose sake... he left an example of suffering death to preserve holiness"?[125] How do individuals receive the benefits of the inheritance that was passed on to Christ's "parents and siblings"? Based on the text quoted above, regarding those "who come aright," Southern noted the strict conditions of service attached to salvation which Anselm wished to emphasize. This "coming aright" for Anselm seemed to involve love and

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123 *CDH* I, 24.

124 Southern, *Saint Anselm*, 214-6.

125 *CDH* II, 19, Vose, 284.

imitation as well as incorporation through the sacraments. The reward or inheritance from Christ as salvation is not just imputation of righteousness, but involves the restoration or human nature, in union with Christ through sacrament and imitation of Christ. Anselm assured Boso that human beings will not imitate Christ in vain, but will partake of his reward.[126]

James Gollnick wrote of this union and imitation of Christ in terms of transformation. The whole goal of Anselm's theology, as of his monastic devotion was the transformation of human life, to be conformed to the second Adam.[127] Rectification, restoration, transformation, imitation: all of these suggest that receiving the reward won by Christ is through some means other than a juridical reckoning, transaction or imputation. Gollnick pointed out that for Anselm "eating the eucharistic bread... actually effects the union that it symbolizes." He argued that the "eucharist as the flesh of Christ is the motif of Anselm's entire theology."[128] He made these claims drawing on the whole of Anselm's theology and here specifically referred to the Meditation on Human Redemption. Deme also saw that Anselm desired "...to experience rebirth through the liturgical participation in the blood of Christ."[129] He referred to Anselm's "Prayer on Receiving the Body and Blood of Christ," and specifically, to the following lines: "Thank you for the good gift of this

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126 *CDH* II, 19.

127 Gollnick, 10, 207.

128 Ibid., 180.

129 Deme, 224 citing Oratio a*d accipiendum corpus domini et sanguinem* III 10, 16f.

your holy Body and Blood, which I desire to receive, as cleansing from sin, and for a defence against it.... A sinner, I presume to receive these gifts so that I may be justified by them."[130]

The Eucharistic way of appropriation is also presented in *CDH*, as we saw in the discussion of the sacrificial, Eucharistic mode of the whole *CDH*.[131] Anselm suggested that human beings receive the reward through participation in the sacrament, even if the imitation of Christ is closely related. Jesus as humanity had a role, and human beings are united to that humanity, so that in offering the sacrifice, Jesus 'paid' on our behalf, as a member of the family. Human beings are joined to each other and to Christ as they share in the Eucharistic sacrifice. They are ontologically united, members of one family, as members of the body. George Williams explained that it is "through the eucharist that the *penitent* believer is ever anew reincorporated through the *oblatio* into the universal *humanity* of the Redeemer present under the accidents of bread and wine on the altar."[132] Although there is a relationship of kinship between Jesus and the descendants of Adam, there is a fuller union through Eucharistic participation – approaching in the right way. What

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130 Oratio a*d accipiendum corpus domini et sanguinem, The Prayers and Meditations of St. Anselm with the Proslogion,* trans. Sister Benedicta Ward, S.L.G. (Penguin Books, 1973), l. 9-12; 20-1, p. 100.

131 "Take my son and give him on your behalf..." and "take me and redeem yourself..." *CDH* II, 20. It is interesting that Robert Strimple regarded this as evidence that the appropriation of the salvation made available through Christ is only through faith. Robert Strimple, "St. Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo* and John Calvin's Doctrine of the Atonement," *Anselm: Aosta, Bec and Canterbury*, 360. Participating in the Eucharist is perhaps just an action of faith, but it is an action of offering and receiving, and corresponds to a life.

132 Williams, "The Sacramental Presuppositions," 268.

Williams called the "subjective appropriation of redemption" is that all people "may participate in the action of the one Man, not preeminently through the sacramental death of baptism... but through the sacramental obedience of the eucharist."[133]

Yet, it is evident in the *CDH* that beyond Eucharistic participation there is also imitation. It is a matter of participation in the obedience of Christ. Even as Anselm spoke of the reward that Jesus had earned, and how he could give it to his kin who desperately needed it, he spoke of imitation. He would fittingly give the reward to those to whom "by dying, He gave an example of dying-for-the-sake-of-justice" and who "would imitate Him in vain if they would not share in His merit."[134] There is the expectation that they will not just share his reward, but will imitate him who gave an example. "Do you not realize that when He endured with patient kindness the injuries, the abuses, the crucifixion among thieves -- which were all inflicted upon Him... for the sake of the justice which He obediently kept -- He gave... an example, in order that they would not... turn aside from the justice they owe to God?"[135] It is an imitation that is possible through the union with Christ. When he speaks of Jesus' kin wondrously becoming heirs of the reward that He did not need, he spoke of participation in grace. Boso thrilled at the assurance that God would reject "...no human being who approaches Him under this name." Anselm responded that surely God would reject no one who approached as one ought. "Sacred Scripture

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133 Ibid., 268.

134 *CDH* II, 19, Hopkins and Richardson, 134.

135 *CDH* II, 18, Hopkins and Richardson, 130.

everywhere teaches us how we are to approach the participation in such great grace and how we are to live under this grace."[136] What is this approaching as we ought, and living under this grace? Receiving the body and blood of Christ aright is linked to a life of obedience, repentance and confession of sin. Eucharist cannot be separated from the rest of life. Anselm explained that the reward, or salvation, included both that "what they owe for their sins may be forgiven them and what they lack on account of their sins may be given to them."[137] Salvation involves both being forgiven of the past and being transformed for the future.

As we saw in discussing satisfaction for human happiness, and therefore the human participation in satisfaction, there is some disagreement about the participation of human beings. Deme was adamant that for Anselm the imitation of Christ was only a sign of being blessed and not a condition of it. This clarification in order to avoid the mistaken notion that human beings earn their salvation is understandable. So is his claim that nothing human beings do has anything to do with their salvation. This reminds us that salvation is due to Christ's work and not human. Yet, there is something un-Anselm-like about this careful separation of human obedience from salvation. Anselm was much less afraid of emphasising the need for human work. Such effort was such a natural and necessary response to Christ's sacrifice. In *MHR* he contemplated this: "How can I rejoice in my salvation, which would not be without your sorrows?... Thus I must condemn their cruelty, imitate your death and sufferings, and share them with you, giving thanks for the goodness of your love.

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136 *CDH*, II, 19, Hopkins and Richardson, 135.

137 *CDH*, II, 19, Hopkins and Richardson, 134.

And thus may I safely rejoice in the good that thereby comes to me."[138] Here again, as in *CDH*, we have integrated the receiving, the imitation and the sharing. The sharing is not only in the reward, but the desire is also to share in the suffering and death.

In receiving the body and the blood and in imitation of Christ there is love. David Neelands highlighted this aspect of the relationship between human beings and the salvation made available through the *Deus-homo*. His purpose was to counter the claim that the *CDH* offered a model of Christ's work as "remote," and "alien from the human subject." He argued that there was a linkage of compassion between Christ and human beings, evident in Jesus' willingness to live justly at the ultimate cost. There is not only the feeling of intimacy on the part of the redeemer, but also on the part of the penitent one.[139] This points to the union through love, which is also undeniably present in the *CDH.* Surely, the coming aright mentioned above involves love. The participation, then of human beings in the work and rewards of Christ is real, through the Eucharist, loving imitation, and through ontological sharing in one family. And if the sharing is real, then the action described in *CDH* is not remote or juridical, even if it is objectively real.[140]

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138 *MHR* 175, 184-7; Ward, 235.

139 David Neelands, "Substitution and the Biblical Background to *Cur Deus Homo,*" *The Saint Anselm Journal* 2.2 (Spring 2005), 187.

140 Although not directly in discussion of Anselm's theology alone, Cessario Romanus wrote of the communion between the head and the body or the members of Christ, and of love, conformity, and solidarity with the Trinity. Cessario Romanus, O.P. *The Godly Image: Christ and Salvation in Catholic Thought from Anselm to*

Answering the Critics: Holy Exchange and Divine Action

The foregoing should put to rest the claim that *CDH* is juridical or transactional, and the notion that because there is some kind of offering on the part of humanity, and the insistence upon satisfaction, that there is a transaction, and that forgiveness is bought and not free. Yoder, Driver and Weaver paraded this refrain, echoing Aulén for one. Rivière also claimed that Anselm failed to establish an intimate solidarity between Jesus and humanity, so that the merits are transferred to human beings by "a mechanical and artificial scheme." Indeed, he regarded this to be the weakest point in St. Anselm's system.[141]

In fact, according to Anselm, there *is indeed* human action, cooperation, in the form of offering, and a sort of *exchange*, but it is not a buying sort of exchange. It is the exchange of gifts that involves extravagance, and desire and takes the form of sacrifice. It is Eucharistic – neither juridical, legal, nor transactional.

Lest this notion of exchange sound suspicious and fated to be ungracious, I would compare it to Dietrich Bonhoeffer's notion of grace that is 'free' but not 'cheap.'[142] The point of Bonhoeffer's contrast is that there is something to be 'returned' by humanity, there is some kind of "exchange" between God and humanity. Salvation and forgiveness are a free gift, for they cannot be earned, but to receive it is also

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Aquinas (Petersham, MA: St. Bede's Publications, 1990), 206. Imitation, conformity, communion, participation, and love are all involved.

141 J. Rivière, *The Doctrine of the Atonement: A Historical Essay*, vol. II. Trans. Luigi Cappadelta (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1909), 42.

142 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *The Cost of Discipleship*. Trans. R.H. Fuller. London: SCM, 1949.

"costly," for it elicits a response, demanding one's whole life. This is a type of holy exchange, in a relationship between God and humanity. To return to Aulén's language of the direction of action; it has to be two ways, and not just the "one uninterrupted action of God," in his terms.[143] This is certainly something that should be prized by an Anabaptist Peace Theology. In *CDH*, Anselm depicted a holy exchange between humanity and divinity, one into which human beings can enter, joining in the offering of Christ and receiving life. There is no question that a sacrifice or an offering can be reduced to a crass sort of buying, or paying for, or an attempt to manipulate God. There is also no question that a relationship requires exchange, gifts and return, receiving and the desire to offer. That is what is assumed and described in *CDH*: a holy exchange.[144]

The desire and the need to make satisfaction might be human, but the provision of the satisfaction was a divine initiative, and at a divine cost, with human involvement since Anselm assumed a classical Trinitarian and Christological orthodoxy. Given the trinitarian view on the relation of the *Deus-Homo* to God, it was God who suffered and acted on our behalf. God did not just require and wait. Nor did God only send. The whole of *CDH* crumbles if God is not the one who became incarnate, who offered the sacrifice, who made the satisfaction. Anselm held to the trinitarian teaching, distinguishing between the three persons, even as they are one, so that there are some things that we can say of the first person that we cannot

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[143] Aulén, 88.

[144] See Catherine Pickstock on holy exchange in "Is Orthodoxy Radical?" *Affirming Catholicism* (Summer 2002), 6.

say of the second person and *vice versa*. From a trinitarian point of view, God offered, as well as received, on behalf of humanity, as a human being. Because of the relation of the *Deus-Homo* to humanity, as outlined in the Chalcedonian definition, there was a real connection between the *Deus- homo* and human beings: they shared a humanity. Jesus, the *Deus-Homo*, was one of us, sharing our humanity. If he did not, then humanity did not make the satisfaction that was necessary; and we human beings do not receive the reward, that was given to his race/kin. And there was no point in the incarnation. But the D*eus-homo* did share our humanity, and so human agency was involved even as it was God who was active in the *Deus-homo*.

Conclusion

So, it appears that the notion that has elicited the most objection, namely, that of satisfaction, is at the heart of a beautiful vision. Anselm insisted that either satisfaction or punishment was required to deal with sin, and that only satisfaction could bring about restoration. The extravagant sacrifice that makes satisfaction calls forth a reward, which is justly shared by those on whose behalf the sacrifice was offered. At every stage of this reasoning, there is love and desire, on the part of God, the *Deus homo*, and the penitent recipient. There is a holy exchange, but it is not a buying and selling sort of exchange. Perhaps, what is critical in all of this is the understanding of the social or horizontal dimensions of justice, and of the exchange, or action between God and the *Deus-homo*. That was highlighted in the previous chapter, regarding the nature of God, and of justice. But it is evident here as well, in the talk of satisfaction and why it is necessary, for the sake of the honour of God, which includes the happiness of the human agent, as well as the human beings

affected by the sin of others. Finally, the reward is received and human beings participate through the sacraments, ontological sharing and loving imitation. This is not a remote transaction, nor is it the fulfillment of external demands. It is the restoration of human beings – of creation. This is precisely the concern of a Peace Theology, and to that question I will now turn.

CHAPTER IV

CUR DEUS HOMO AND PEACE THEOLOGY: AN ANALYSIS

Introduction

Having outlined the contemporary Anabaptist objections to *CDH* from a Peace Theology perspective, and considered a reading of *CDH* through the lens of contemporary scholarship, it is now time to make explicit just where and how Anselm's understanding of the cross and salvation are in fact compatible with the aims of the Peace Theology. At the same time we will be able to answer the objections raised in Chapter I. Peace Theology emphasizes the human response to God's merciful action in communities of disciples, serving justice and peace, advocating a restorative justice, and rejecting lethal violence, even in the face of death. This human agency and offering of obedience, in restorative justice, even unto death are supported by *CDH*, if we understand satisfaction and sacrifice aright, not as retribution and condoning violence, but as restoration and the offering of self -- a gift. The fact that Yoder, Weaver and Driver did not perceive this compatibility is due to a different framework or set of assumptions.

Features of a Peace Theology

At the outset of this study, I provided a brief explanation of 'Peace Theology' but it is time to provide a more detailed description of the notion in order to evaluate how it might find a resource in *CDH*. Rather than attempting a comprehensive outline of Peace Theology, I will highlight signature elements. Peace Theology has been used, in contemporary Mennonite theological circles, to denote a theology that emerges in a Peace Church Tradition and supports the commitment to non-violence. Alternatively, it might

be regarded as a theology that results when a commitment to non-violence is regarded as essential or at the heart of Christian faith. It assumes that the commitment to non-violence in the Historic Peace Churches will have implications for Christian Theology, shaping perceptions and articulations of doctrine. It would be fair to say that the movement grew out of the "Anabaptist Vision" school, and this Anabaptist vision provides a good outline of its emphases, roots, and assumptions. Figuring prominently in this development was John Howard Yoder and more recently, J. Denny Weaver.

It was H. S. Bender who coined the term "the Anabaptist Vision" as he attempted to portray in a favourable light the roots of his own tradition, which until then had received little positive press in the accounts of the Reformation. He presented the 16th century ancestors of the Mennonite church as modern thinkers, whose views were amazingly compatible with Liberal-minded, Protestant people of the mid-20th century. Bender's influential essay, first presented as the presidential address to the American Society of Church History in 1943, opted for the interpretation of Anabaptism as the "culmination of the Reformation, the fulfillment of the original vision of Luther and Zwingli, and thus makes it a consistent evangelical Protestantism seeking to recreate without compromise the original New Testament church, the vision of Christ and the Apostles."[1] In this tradition, he argued, there were "three major points of emphasis; first, a new conception of the essence of Christianity as discipleship; second, a new conception of the church as a brotherhood; and third, a new ethic of love and non-resistance."[2] Although it is important to note that these are highlighted as the distinguishing features,

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[1] H.S. Bender, "The Anabaptist Vision," in *The Recovery of the Anabaptist Vision*, ed. Guy F. Hershberger (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1957), 37.

[2] Ibid., 42.

rather than a systematic outline of the whole Anabaptist theology, it does serve as an indication of the emphases of the Peace Theology a generation or so later.

Peace Theology still shows the same concern with discipleship, or ethics, community and non-resistance. In addition, it has been learned from liberation Theology, and other social awareness movements for justice and peace. What is still central is the emphasis on living or ethics rather than on doctrine, on the church as a community, and on pacifism, even if that is defined or practiced in a different way, favouring 'non-violence' over 'non-resistance.'

The writings of John Howard Yoder have featured prominently in this Peace Theology quest. Weaver, in *Becoming Anabaptist*, depicted Yoder's definition of Anabaptist as slightly different from that offered by Bender, but the continuities are clear. Weaver saw Yoder's vision in the following terms which are at the heart of the Peace Theology in question: "a countercultural community posing itself as a prophetic alternative to the existing social order. This view shows a willingness to generalize from Anabaptist principles to other issues, as in arguing today that opposition to violence demands a reform of the American penal and judicial system."[3] This view is drawn from pamphlets of the "Concern Movement," and from Yoder's best-known work, the *Politics of Jesus*, as well as other writings. There have been colloquia, conferences and publications as well, aiming to articulate a Peace Theology.[4] Weaver's attempt to

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[3] J. Denny Weaver, *Becoming Anabaptist: The Origin and Significance of Sixteenth-Century Anabaptism* (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1987), 116.

[4] For an indication of the sorts of works that are part of this tradition, see the publications and conferences sponsored by the Institute for Mennonite Studies, Elkhart, Indiana.

describe the themes of Anabaptism included secondary, or derivative themes or principles, but he concluded that three "first-level principles" of the "believers church tradition" could be identified. He noted, first, that Jesus is the norm of truth and life, that is, for discipleship. Second, he designated the conviction that "the church which follows Jesus is a new social reality -- a community."[5] Finally, Weaver focused on one particular aspect of discipleship, namely, "the rejection of violence" or the commitment to non-resistance. [6] These are essentially the same as Bender's list, highlighting ethics, community, and non-violence, except Weaver specified the leader of the disciples, namely, Jesus. This was assumed of course, with Bender, whose point was that for Anabaptists, the focus was on following Jesus, rather than believing the right things about Jesus. In both cases, the emphasis is on following Jesus in life, which makes the church a visible community, with pacifism being the most noteworthy focus of this discipleship.

When Weaver went on to outline what these principles might mean for contemporary Christians in North America, he did so under four headings: Community, Discipleship, Peace and Separation. His treatment of "separation" is in effect, an elaboration of the vision of the church as an alternative community, providing Christians with an allegiance or loyalty to something that is other than, and perhaps in conflict with, societies or nations. It is perhaps worth noting, though, that along the way, he highlighted "...the emphasis on peace as integral to the Christian message" as "...perhaps the single most important contribution to the modern world."[7] To take seriously this

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[5] Weaver, *Becoming Anabaptist*, 120.

[6] Ibid., 120.

claim of peace, and more specifically, non-violence, as integral to the Christian message, and to consider all the implications for theology is the project of the Peace Theology under discussion.

These emphases have already emerged as evident in the critiques of Anselm brought by Yoder, Weaver and Driver in the first chapter. Recall, that the summary of their critiques included concern that Anselm's Satisfaction theory is legal, juridical, transactional, where a wrathful, tyrannical Father refused to forgive without being paid in blood, by a merciful, passively obedient Son who suffered even death. One problem with a legal scenario, in their view, is that it is not then by definition a real change or justification but perhaps only a 'legal fiction.' Further, the scenario is said to undergird retribution, an inherent acceptance of violence, and passive submission to suffering, and is therefore oppressive to oppressed people. And, finally, even more specifically reflecting the Peace church tradition, is the fact that the *Cur Deus Homo* does not require or encourage Christians to see the cross as indicating a way of life for Christians, and most specifically, a pacifist or non-violent way of life. The concern is that the cross is only for Jesus, who made the payment so that human beings need not, allowing Christians to avoid the cross, to be 'called' justified/just, even though they are not, all the while, not expecting Christians to follow Jesus in his "way of the cross." Peace theology wants to see more results in human lives -- peace in this world, in society and not only in hearts or in heaven. The emphasis is on the presence of the Reign of God already, if not entirely, as a social reality, and not only a private, inner one.

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[7] Ibid., 136.

This focus on the Reign of God becoming a social reality, along with the new ethic of love, expressed most radically in non-resistance or non-violence, has also resulted in a heavy emphasis on service, relief and development work, and as noted above, in the Restorative Justice Movement. This includes the movement for the abolition of the death penalty, but also Victim Offender Reconciliation programs, mediation services, and proposals for alternatives to prison sentencing. A peace theology cannot condone revenge or violence among people. Instead, it strives for reconciliation, and justice as restorative rather than retributive. It highlights the biblical notion of Shalom, including seeing this at the heart of Christian life in the world.

This emphasis on the church as a community of disciples who follow in the way of non-violence and restorative justice involves an expectation of human transformation. The belief is that Christians must be made or become just, or that righteousness must be real and not a mere "legal fiction." This is implied in Bender's understanding of the church as a community of believers who practice a new love ethic. The expectation is that members of this church actually love their neighbours, and are actually (or actually aim to be) made righteous, reborn, and form a community of disciples who are accountable to each other, i.e., to the church. This accountability is a more contemporary version of older church discipline, which was at some points exercised through the ban or shunning.

Affinities Between *CDH* and Peace Theology

There are certain areas of affinity between Anselm's *CDH* and the emphases of contemporary Anabaptist Peace theology. Anselm's insistence on the need for satisfaction is grounded in the same sense as the need for reparation or restitution in the

restorative justice movement. Anselm maintained a role for the humanity of Jesus and for a human response of obedience in salvation, as we noted in Chapter III, that would be welcomed by the stress on discipleship. Anselm was also concerned with the transformation of life, or the restoration of humanity, and the whole creation -- and not simply with a *declaration* of justification. He held to certain conditions of salvation. Finally, the sacrifice Anselm depicts is similar to the offering of one's life that is part of a Peace Theology. Although Yoder, Weaver and Driver did not see it this way, the claim here is that if they had understood Anselm aright, they would have appreciated their agreement with him on these matters.

Satisfaction and Restorative Justice

Anselm's insistence on the need for satisfaction reveals a deep resonance with the notion of restorative justice that Peace Theology has embraced. Whereas Weaver suspected that Anselm described a divine need for retribution and violence, what we have seen is that both Anselm and a Peace Theology make the case for an alternative to retribution. It is not that punishment or retribution is inherently wrong, but that there is a better way. *CDH* does not rely on divinely required retribution let alone divinely required violence, although Anselm does not reject the legitimacy of punishment. Payment of a debt in *CDH* is not unlike making restitution in restorative justice. Finally, a death in the story does not mean a punishment.

The Third Way of Satisfaction and Restorative Justice

Anselm did allow for satisfaction rather than punishment. In fact, Anselm's reasoning about satisfaction is precisely the sort of thinking that grounds the restorative justice movement: both opt for a third way, an alternative both to punishment for the sake

of punishment and to free forgiveness with no accountability. Howard Zehr outlined the need for reparation in restorative justice.[8] From a sense of justice, and out of respect for the victims, crime cannot simply be forgiven, or overlooked, even if one wants the best for the offender. That was exactly Anselm's claim. Fortunately, the options are not limited to either punishment or nothing. Both Anselm and Howard Zehr upheld justice when they argued for a third way, namely, reparation or satisfaction. The offender must make some sort of reparation, restitution so that the offender is held accountable, the victim is vindicated, and so reconciliation can be established. Whereas retributive justice and restorative justice have sometimes been cast as polar opposites, they are not opposite in what they assume. Howard Zehr has come to this conclusion as well. He explained that both approaches acknowledge "a basic moral intuition that a balance has been thrown off..."[9] The disagreement between the restorative and retributive approaches lies in what they propose will make things right. For restorative justice, it is holding offenders accountable and attempting to address the needs of all parties, in order to restore the community. In Anselm's view, the offender is the human race and its members, and the offended party is God/God's creation/other humans. God is, of course, not only the offended one, but also in the 'judge' position, or 3rd party, the one who maintains justice, protects the victim, and as such must require reparation or restitution. This justice requires more than punishment. That is, for both Anselm and the restorative justice vision, in contrast to Harnack and others, who criticized Anselm because there

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[8] Howard Zehr, "Justice: Stumbling Toward a Restorative Vision" in *Justice: The Restorative Vision* (Akron, PA: MCC, 1989), 9.

[9] Howard Zehr, *The Little Book of Restorative Justice* (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2002), 59.

was not a real punishment, but only a satisfaction, [10] punishment is not an end, but might be a means toward the end of justice, and therefore punishment can be replaced or circumvented by another means of creating justice: namely, satisfaction or reparation.

Weaver's fundamental case with Anselm was his allegation that Anselm insisted justice requires punishment, and that God requires or sanctions the violence of Jesus' death.[11] It is true that Anselm regarded retribution and punishment as legitimate, as we saw in the discussion of justice, but he also argued that the supreme justice of God was restorative. Anselm most explicitly did *not* maintain that justice simply meant punishment, for he allowed for satisfaction *instead* of punishment.[12] It is not in assuming that punishment or retribution are legitimate that Anselm could be said to be unbiblical. However, Anselm did not stress the 'tit-for-tat' notion quite the way Weaver characterized it.

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10 Harnack, *History of Dogma*, VI, 69, 77. See also Harnack, *What is Christianity?* 156-60. There he explained why the cross can be seen as having the effect of an expiatory sacrifice, that it answers a deep religious need, that "injustice and sin deserve to be punished, and that everywhere that the just man suffers, an atonement is made which puts us to shame and purifies us." (159) This affirms the need for punishment. Another critic of Anselm's option for satisfaction instead of punishment is Robert Strimple who preferred Calvin's idea of the need for punishment. He wrote: "Instead of the Anselmian disjunction, either punishment or satisfaction, Calvin offered the dictum satisfaction by punishment."(354) Strimple specified "Anselm's error is not in conceiving of satisfaction as made to God's honour rather than to his justice, but rather in not perceiving the absolute necessity of the penalty being paid as the only possible way by which satisfaction for sin against a holy God can be made. "(357)

11 Weaver, *The Nonviolent Atonement*, 201 & 203.

12 The Bible does not shy away from the notion of punishment and even of retribution; even in the New Testament there is the story of the punishment of Annanias and Saphira. The Gospels of Luke and Matthew present Jesus telling parables that involve punishment. Luke 12:46ff; Matt 24:45ff

Anselm insisted that justice involved reparation: God could not simply forgive. Howard Zehr seemed to agree. He wrote that since harm is personal, not abstract, and it creates obligations to make right, "reparation ought to be at the centre of justice."[13] Reparation sounds remarkably like satisfaction. But Weaver termed the satisfaction theory retributive. There seems to be a misunderstanding of Anselm and satisfaction. Whereas many have assumed it to bolster a retributive notion of justice, it in fact presumed a restorative type of justice. At any rate, Weaver misunderstood and misrepresented Anselm's argument in *CDH* when he claimed that for Anselm, justice required punishment. There was a better way, and on this Peace Theology and *CDH* seem to be in agreement.

Perhaps the most pointed charge against *CDH* is Weaver's claim that it actually depicts God requiring or sanctioning violence. He reasoned that if there is "no devil in the equation" and if Jesus' death was necessary, or required, then God must have required it. Even further, he used the language of God "orchestrating" Jesus' death. But according to Weaver, the underlying problem is even subtler. It is the violence of retribution itself; it is the notion that a death balances out death or evil, and that doing justice means inflicting punishment.[14] He sees in *CDH* a clearly retributive notion of justice, which is inherently violent. It seems to him to be an understanding of justice that is all about retribution rather than about restoration.

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13 Zehr, "Justice: Stumbling Toward a Restorative Vision," 9. See also *The Little Book of Restorative Justice*. Here Zehr more explicitly revised his earlier near dismissal of retribution.

14 Weaver, *The Nonviolent Atonement*, 201 & 203.

Although neither Yoder nor Driver went quite so far as to charge the inherent violence of retribution, and Yoder explicitly argued against it, Weaver is not alone in his thinking.[15] In fact, this charge has come to be a common one. Giles Fraser and Timothy Gorringe have made similar claims.[16] Weaver wrote of retribution and punishment in the satisfaction view as though he did not distinguish it from a penal substitutionary view, as though there were no difference between punishment and satisfaction/payment; and as though Zehr's restorative justice eliminated all payment and punishment. In fact, restorative justice emphasizes the need for restitution, payment by the offender to the offended party, holding the offender accountable, recognizing crime as an offence against an individual and a community and not just against the state, or against a law. Therefore, requiring a payment or restitution is part of restorative justice, suggesting that the notion of satisfaction really belongs to a restorative model of justice, and could not be called inherently violent. Yet it is precisely the insistence upon 'satisfaction' that is seen as the root of the problem, because it ultimately involved the requirement of a death.

Punishment as Legitimate but Secondary

Before turning to the problem of the death, let us consider further the matter of the legitimacy of punishment. There might be not only misunderstanding, but also genuine disagreement between Anselm and Weaver on this question. Anselm did not reject the

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[15] John Howard Yoder, "The Case for Punishment" (unpublished, 1995), http://www.nd.edu/~theo/jhy/writings/home/ind-punish.htm. Also available as "You Have It Coming: Good Punishment: The Legitimate Social Function of Punitive Behavior" (Shalom Desktop Publishing, 1995) and "Noah's Covenant & the Purpose of Punishment" in *Readings in Christian Ethics*, Vol.2, eds. David K. Clark & Robert V. Rakestraw (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1996), 479.

[16] Fraser, 34; and Gorringe.

whole notion of punishment as legitimate, and perhaps this is a problem for Weaver, suggesting that retribution or punishment is inherently violent. Yoder, however, acknowledged the goodness or place of punishment. He argued that the case against capital punishment for Christians, for example, ought not to be made on the grounds that the whole idea of punishment is illegitimate or barbaric, but rather that for Christians explicitly, the price has been paid, or the cultic ritual has been carried out, based on the fact that Jesus has borne the punishment, or made an appropriate sacrifice.[17]

The acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the concept of punishment or retribution does not conflict with a restorative justice. In fact, the Feminist movement, which has considered the perspective of the injured party, and objected to Anselm's Satisfaction theory, and to violence, associating violence with patriarchy, has not, in the wake of the revelations of domestic and sexual violence, rejected the justice of punishment out of hand. Feminist voices have been strong on holding offenders in situations of domestic abuse and violence accountable, implementing consequences.[18] The objection in Feminist critiques such as that of Rita Nakashima Brock or Brown are not to punishment *per se*, but to the infliction of punishment or violence on an *innocent* one. This is quite a different matter.

There is no reason to reject the whole notion of retribution and punishment entirely on the basis of pacifism or restorative justice. Consider that the difference

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17 "The Case for Punishment" or "You Have It Coming: Good Punishment: The Legitimate Social Function of Punitive Behavior," or "Noah's Covenant & the Purpose of Punishment," 479.

18 See the writings of Marie M. Fortune. For example, "Calling to Accountability: the Church's Response to Abusers" or "Forgiveness: the Last Step" in *Violence Against Women and Children: A Christian Theological Sourcebook*, ed. Carol J. Adams and Marie M. Fortune (New York: Continuum, 1995), 451-463 & 201-206.

between satisfaction (reparation) and punishment is not necessarily in the objective nature or shape of each, but may be in the attitude of the offender. If the offender complies, voluntarily makes the payment then it is satisfaction; however, if not, and something is forced from him/her, then it is experienced as, and is called punishment. Surely, we cannot dismiss what is required of the offender just because he or she is unwilling to pay. It is not the actual payment, what is offered or exacted, that determines whether a payment is simply retribution or whether it constitutes a restitution, but it is the process of arriving at the appropriate restitution/which might be experienced as punishment by the offender. Both punishment and reparation have a cost to the offender, but the goals are different, and the attitude of the offender is different in one from the other. The goal of retributive justice might be limited to punishing each crime in order to uphold justice. The goal of restorative justice, however, goes beyond that, making the penalty serve the restoration of people in community by holding the offender accountable, and compensating or vindicating the offended one.

Perhaps, one further comment on Anselm's defence of punishment as the necessary alternative in the absence of satisfaction is in order if I am claiming that *CDH* is not incompatible with non-violence. The acceptance of punishment as just does not undermine Christian pacifism: God's right to punish is acknowledged; even though significantly, what is operative in *CDH* is the satisfaction route. A Christian commitment to non-violence does not deny *God's* right to exercise judgment or punishment, and to have the final say, doing what human beings cannot do – even to overcome death and raise people from the dead. It simply upholds the Christian's duty to follow Christ, God incarnate, whose part for the redemption of the world led him to the cross, trusting the

triune God to do the rest – to bring the victory. When Boso asked about why we are asked to forgive but God cannot simply forgive, Anselm distinguished between what was appropriate for human beings and what was only God's place. Anselm did propose that society might exercise vengeance on behalf of God. If this is a defense of a certain type of violence, then it is the right of the state to bear the sword of justice. This has also been defended by many Christian pacifists. The acknowledgement of the legitimacy of punishment does not deny the presumption against violence that is manifest in the choice of satisfaction and the sacrifice of the cross.

Payment in Restorative Justice

The distinction between punishment and satisfaction might be subtle, but it is nevertheless, critical. Giles Fraser, in his exploration of Christianity and violence, however, did not find the "debt-language" less offensive than the punishment-language. He referred to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, and the Jubilee 2000 movement as examples of the free forgiveness that Jesus intended when he spoke of forgiving the debts of others. The atonement theories that assume some kind of need for payment allegedly fall into the category of retributive justice. Fraser claimed that "According to Girard, it is this very logic of retribution that serves to perpetuate violence and it is precisely this theological mind set that Jesus is out to eliminate."[19]

Now the question is whether Fraser has really shown that the decision to forego repayment and punishment in Jubilee 2000 and the TRC means that all requirement of restitution or payment is indistinguishable from punishment and serves to perpetuate violence. The reference to Jubilee 2000 is telling. It is important to note that the biblical

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[19] Fraser, 35.

notion of the Jubilee did not eliminate all repayment of debt. For forty-nine years people were to repay debts: it was only on the fiftieth year that there was an amnesty. Nor did Fraser argue for an elimination of all debt repayment. What the Jubilee notion did was to implement a system to assure that a person will at some point be released from debt, and not be forever trapped because of compounding interest or some other misfortune. The problem that the Jubilee addressed was not the reasonable repayment of debts, but the vicious cycle from which there is no escape. The countries whose debts "Jubilee 2000" wanted forgiven had already made significant payments on the original debt, but were being crippled by payments and would not be able to repay because of the interest.

Fraser did not distinguish between punishment and some form of payment or restitution. He cast this all as retribution. The repayment of debt plus interest by poor countries is a punishment. But what would he say about the restitution that is involved in restorative justice? Although that is a payment it is decidedly different from punishment as retribution, and is aimed at restoration. He wrote of restorative justice (as opposed to retributive justice) and his example is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission -- where the only restoration is the telling of truth, and the confession. But one might argue that this in itself is a sort of payment, or restitution. The quotation he provided to demonstrate that payment is not a part of restorative justice is from Archbishop Desmond Tutu's forward to the report. "Certainly, amnesty cannot be viewed as justice if we think of justice as only retributive and punitive in nature. We believe, however, that there is another kind of justice -- a restorative justice which is concerned not so much with punishment as with *correcting imbalances*, restoring broken relationships -- with healing,

harmony and with reconciliation."[20] It is not clear from this quotation just how the balances will be corrected, the broken relationships restored, and what it will entail to bring healing, harmony and reconciliation in various cases. One element is simply telling the truth, the weight of which cannot be underestimated. The TRC was deliberately not simply a blanket amnesty, just as it was not just about retribution. It attempted to steer a middle course between the two – a third way. It was a matter of holding people accountable and establishing guilt, for the purpose of reconciliation. Might there be other elements involved in working toward restoration and reconciliation? The difference between restorative and retributive justice is not in the presence or absence of payment/punishment, for a punishment could be much like a payment. One cannot necessarily distinguish between the systems by looking at the 'payment.' The problem with punishment is not so much in just what the punishment involves -- which might in fact, be much like what restitution involves. The critical difference between retributive and restorative justice is the goal. In the former the goal is simply retaliation, infliction of a similar or equivalent or appropriate pain/penalty. In Restorative justice, the goal is reconciliation. Apparently, Fraser assumed that retributive justice involves punishment (or payment) and that restorative justice is free forgiveness with no payment.

Once again, I note that Howard Zehr, however, insisted that reparation was at the heart of restorative justice. Surely, one element of reparation will sometimes involve restitution or payment. Zehr's restorative justice does not eliminate all 'payment'.

Using a slightly different argument Joseph Houston also defended Anselm against the accusation laid by Gorringe of being a retributivist. He referred to God's prior

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[20] Ibid., 42 (emphasis added).

merciful favour towards us, to God's honour, and to Anselm's insistence that humanity needed to be restored and not just forgiven. He too pointed to the fact that for Anselm debt-paying was part of restoration and not plain retribution, concluding that "debt-paying is an aspect of cosmic restoration, the restoration of the order which in all things accords with God's good will."[21]

Death as satisfaction

The foregoing distinction between punishment and satisfaction, and the identification of satisfaction with restitution appear so evident that it is surprising that the charge of divinely sanctioned violence should even be brought. However, there are some subtle distinctions to be maintained, ones that have too often been overlooked. Furthermore, it is true that Jesus did really die, and that Anselm claimed that his death was necessary, and that satisfaction for sin was necessary. If one is not extremely careful in how one tells the story with these three elements, it can easily sound as though God punished Jesus with death to pay for sin. Of course, everything I have discussed so far demonstrates that Anselm was reasoning in terms of satisfaction and not punishment. That is not to say that Anselm denied the way in which death is a punishment, or the consequence of sin, and that Jesus' death was the result of human sin, and in that sense he bore the consequence of human sin, or a punishment. Anselm even referred at one point to the punishment that Jesus suffered in dying, saying that God did not like it.[22] Nevertheless, it is his offering himself, voluntarily bearing the consequences/punishment that puts this in the realm of sacrifice and satisfaction. Punishment is not necessary when

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[21] Houston, 635-9.

[22] *CDH* I,10, J. F., 281, "he 'wished' his Son to endure death in this way, so dutifully and so beneficially – even though he did not like his punishment (*poenam*)."

satisfaction has been given. "If no satisfaction is given, the way to regulate sin correctly is none other than to punish it."[23]

Anselm did insist that sin cannot just be dismissed, but he did distinguish between satisfaction and punishment. It is true that there was a death (a death that Anselm did not arrive at through 'speculation' but that was the problem he tried to account for), that is, there was violence. In fact, what Anselm describes in *CDH* sounds worse than punishment because Jesus died. It is difficult at first, to see that this death, although it is called a satisfaction, is different from punishment. But it was not a punishment. Anselm held to the conviction that sin cannot simply be forgiven: people cannot just get off scot-free, and not be held accountable in any way. Some people think this free forgiveness (no payment) is necessary; others chafe at the thought. Anselm claimed that God answers both the insistence on payment and the impossibility of paying. That is why satisfaction is better than punishment.[24] Something had to be done, and punishment would not bring about restoration, but a satisfaction would. But there is the sticking point, that the satisfaction involved an innocent and violent death.

However, it is absolutely critical to emphasize who did the dying. There is certainly violence involved at the heart of the story, but it is just as certainly not violence inflicted by God. To the contrary, it is violence *borne* by God in Christ. Yes, Anselm carefully argued that it is possible to say that God required or desired the death of Jesus, *but only in as much as God desired the voluntary, faithful, loving and just action of Jesus*,

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[23] *CDH* I,12.

[24] Crouse's description of *justitia* sounds very much like the notion of justice outlined by Howard Zehr and other Mennonites.

which resulted in his death. And in as much as Jesus' death was an offering, or sacrifice, which satisfied for humanity what needed to be satisfied, it was not a punishment inflicted by God. Anselm had a restorative notion of justice, and the only violence that is involved is borne by God in Christ. These values are in keeping with those of a Peace Theology.

Human Agency and Discipleship

The emphasis on discipleship in the Anabaptist Peace Theology is also well served by several aspects of Anselm's reasoning for satisfaction. Recall that satisfaction was necessary for the happiness of humanity and it gave humanity a role. Satisfaction was important because the goal was the restoration of humanity, and not just taking care of the past. In addition there is the human perspective that is essential in *CDH.* Finally, we can discern the attention to reconciliation and incorporation into the body of Christ that is ongoing and fits well with the discipleship of Peace Theology.

Anselm's Role for Humanity

A Peace Theology ought to find attractive the fact that in *CDH* there is the possibility that salvation is not automatic or assured universally by the work of God in Christ. It is possible for someone to opt out of the salvation or restoration that was made possible by Christ. In fact, Anselm's own life and letters indicated that it required a lot of discipline and effort on the part of human beings. That is certainly compatible with the Peace Theology emphasis on discipleship in community, and the rigorous ethic of non-violence. It seems that a human being can opt out, can refuse the life that is offered by God; and it is actually an effort to remain "in."

Here, on the question of humanity's role, the disagreement between Peace Theology and Harnack or Aulén becomes apparent, demonstrating a resonance between Anselm and the Peace Theology. Harnack criticized Anselm because according to *CDH* there was only the *possibility* of salvation rather than the assurance for human beings.[25] Aulén complained that Anselm gave humanity a role in Christ's work of salvation whereas the church needs to proclaim that the work of salvation is God's uninterrupted work, from beginning to end. He admitted that Anselm does recognize the atonement as "in a sense God's work" since "God is the author of the plan, and He has sent His Son...Nevertheless, it is not in the full sense God's work of redemption."[26] The objection here is to the role given humanity in Jesus, the *deus-homo*, whereas the objection of Harnack concerned the role given to humanity in human beings. However, the two are related, as already noted in Chapter Three. Peace theology emphasizes the humanity of Jesus, and the need for human beings to follow Jesus. It would seem odd to criticize Anselm for including a role for the humanity of Jesus, instead of seeing it as God's work from beginning to end, and at the same time to chide Anselm for not making Jesus and his cross something that all Christians must share. The intention of Aulén and Yoder in complaining that the work must be acknowledged as God's is clear. It is to avoid the pitfall of depicting God as the angry judge waiting for humanity, or Jesus, the Son, to provide sufficient payment. It is to recognize the grace of God, and that it was God who came and God who provided what was necessary, rather than waiting in judgment. However, Yoder and the Peace Theology, along with Anselm, are also

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25 Harnack, *History of Dogma*, VI, 69, 77

26 Aulén, 88.

determined to maintain the need for the human response and participation. Anselm located this human participation both in Jesus and in human beings, as we saw in chapter three. If a Peace Theology emphasizes the need to follow the *deus homo*, then the full humanity of Jesus must certainly be emphasized, even though not to the exclusion of the divinity. Furthermore, it should not be objectionable to see an offering up by the humanity of Jesus or the obedience of the human Jesus having a role. Clearly, Anselm's insistence on humanity's role, both in Jesus and in human beings, fits very well with the concerns of the Peace Theology here under discussion.

This place for human cooperation has also been a matter of concern from a Christian feminist perspective. The feminist inclination, as articulated by Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendell, is to embrace mutuality, community, and embodiment and to eschew a picture of the relationship between God and humanity as one of super-hero and helpless victim.[27] The feminist desire was to empower human beings, and to indicate the mutually empowering encounters of women with Jesus. This might seem to risk overlooking the great power difference between creature and creator. However, no one would accuse Anselm of overlooking that difference, yet he also highlighted this human agency that Moltmann-Wendell and others prized. It may be surprising, but this is precisely what Anselm sought to maintain: the dignity, the agency of human beings, even as he would not deny the utter transcendence, immutability of God, who mercifully enabled human action by taking the initiative.

There was a high expectation for humanity found in Anselm, a great humanism, but not one founded on the denial of God's reality, action or mercy. To the contrary, it

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[27] Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendell, *A Land Flowing with Milk and Honey: Perspectives on Feminist Theology* (New York: Crossroad, 1988), 121-4.

was a humanism grounded on God's omnipotence and immutability. Wayne Hankey used the work of Williams, Southern, and Pelikan to point out how Anselm's theology developed a strong humanistic view.

> The redemption is wrought in the humanity of Christ and the change is in humans, not in God, the beginning and the end. This is the basis of a humanism which maintains, indeed depends on, and is supported by the omnipotence and immutability of God. Therefore, Sir Richard Southern has suggested that the Christian humanism of Mediaeval theology has never been surpassed.[28]

Williams contrasted Anselm's notion of humanity partaking in the humanity of Christ, with the earlier, eastern belief in the deification, or the *theosis*.[29] This too would seem congenial to a contemporary Peace theology.

Satisfaction and Future Obedience

Yoder and Driver did not discern this discipleship requirement in *CDH*. They charged that the Satisfaction theory emphasized too much the guilt of past sin, whereas the focus of the Bible is on future obedience. Furthermore, Yoder added that under the Satisfaction theory there is no ethical sense to Christ's cross – no indication of what obedience might be. There is no connection between the cross of Christ, and the cross for Christians although this is made clear in the New Testament.[30] On the other hand, Weaver maintained that there was a message in Anselm's account of the cross for

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[28] Wayne J. Hankey, "St. Anselm and the Medieval Doctors," in *Atonement and Sacrifice* (Charlottetown: St. Peter Publications, 1990), 7.

[29] Williams, *Anselm: Communion and Atonement*, 65.

[30] Yoder, *Preface,* 301-3. Driver, 56.

Christian behaviour, but it was a destructive one. It advocates passive suffering and obedience even unto death.

It would be difficult to gauge exactly the right emphasis on past sin and future obedience. Yoder submitted that Anselm laid too much emphasis on the guilt of past sin. The defence of Anselm might be that dealing with past sin is critical, and that he did have in mind future obedience. That is the whole point of the restoration, and of the inclusion of the human role, as well as his talk of Christ's example.

Forgiveness is mysterious, and can involve compensation (the offender doing all she can to restore). Christians are invited to pass along the forgiveness that they have received, and that might seem like past sin is not to be harped on, but from the point of view of the offender, there is something to be done and it is not just living differently in the future (which we might not be able to do as well as we hope) but also involves addressing/redressing the past offence.

Yoder's claim that God's focus is on the future would be true as a corrective, when it replaces the *exclusive* focus on past sin. However, there does not seem to be reason to bring this charge to Anselm in *CDH*. As we saw in Chapter 3, opting for satisfaction was a means of bringing about the restoration of humanity. Past sin is dealt with in order to go differently into the future. The reward dealt with the past and gave human beings what they were lacking, presumably in order to be enabled to live obediently in the future – precisely the concern of Peace Theology.

From the Perspective of the Guilty

Another expression of the focus on human participation in *CDH* is, as I already noted, the perspective from which it is written. This explains the appropriate concern

with past sin. Anselm wrote as a guilty party, as though past guilt mattered, and as though forgiveness cannot simply be presumed. As Balthasar put it: "The place from which he prays is the place where one is lost, hell as existential reality. He has considered *quanti ponderis est peccatum.*(*CDH* I, 21)"[31] It is fruitful to consider the perspective from which one approaches the question of past sin: whether from the perspective of the sinner, the offended party or a third party. Mercy and justice might lead in different directions depending on which of these is the subject.

From the perspective of the guilty one, the most just and merciful response to past sin, one's own past sin, is penitence and compunction. Compunction involves a desire to make amends for the past in any way possible in addition to living well in the future. It does not allow one to presume that as long as one avoids the sin in the future the sins of the past can be forgotten. Past sin is an issue. Furthermore, if the past sin can be dismissed *based on future obedience* then the future obedience is *the condition* -- one that the penitent one can not assure. In effect, the emphasis on future obedience rather than on past sin, such that past sin need not be atoned for (or paid for) because what God is really concerned about is future obedience, might be a more elaborate self-justification. It means that if one can avoid sin in the future, then the past can be forgotten. That is a rather big 'if,' and a payment most of us cannot afford, no matter how genuine the desire. It is a way not of avoiding the need for atonement, but of making a different, and impossible condition. Here human beings do not need to be forgiven, do not need to pay, make satisfaction for the past, because they are now living in such a way that the past becomes irrelevant – it is made up for and reconciliation has occurred. By contrast, the

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[31] Von Balthasar, 254.

desire to make amends somehow for past sin, in addition to hoping for increased virtue in the future, seems a surer sign of remorse on the part of the offender.

Things might look quite different from the point of view of the offended party, who might well find that the most merciful and even supremely just path forward, in a restorative understanding, would be to forgive the past even without requiring any compensation. However, this would certainly not be something that a third party would require of an offended party. Even less, would this request for a total dismissal of the past offence, without any form of payment, be regarded as appropriate coming from the guilty party. Far from being an expression of mercy, it would be an indication of a *lack* of any sense of justice, charity or mercy.

It seems therefore, that the demand that God not dwell on the guilt of past sin, and not even require satisfaction, can only come legitimately, as an expression of mercy, from the perspective of the offended one. When human beings ask God to be as generous in forgiveness as they themselves are (or intend to be), they are in effect denying that their actual role is that of offender. They are in fact, complaining that God demands satisfaction. Out of consideration for the victims of history, if God is recognized as the defender of the weak, it is appropriate that God demand satisfaction, so that the offences to the offended are not overlooked. If past sin is overlooked by a third party, it is not even merciful to the offender. I am reminded of Marie Fortune's advice to churches dealing with sexual abuse and domestic violence, not to hand out cheap grace but to hold offenders accountable by instituting structures of accountability and consequences. She reported that a group of incest offenders had a message for the clergy: "Tell the clergy for

us that they should not forgive us so quickly."[32] This accords with Anselm's insight that offenders need more than forgiveness of the past; they need to be enabled to do good in order to be happy. It is certainly not merciful to the offended.

Both Peace Theology and *CDH* acknowledge the need for dealing with past sin, or debts, in order to be not only merciful but also just. Yoder and Driver wanted a focus on future obedience, but from the perspective of the offender, which is the human perspective in Anselm, dealing with the past is appropriate. It can lay the ground for future obedience.

Salvation involves reconciliation and incorporation

Intimately related to this matter of roles or perspectives in relation to past sin, is the question of reconciliation to God. Anselm wrote from the perspective of a guilty person, from which perspective, it is charitable to dwell on satisfaction. From that perspective of guilty one, reconciliation with God is a goal. Anselm did assume that Christian salvation is about being reconciled to God and being incorporated into Christ, (and so finding forgiveness, hope, liberation). Although this is not expressed only in terms of following Jesus, following Jesus is certainly included, as we saw in Anselm's talk of example. Pickstock described this belief in Anselm's time, that human beings are "incorporated into the Son...thereby achieving an affective state of reconciliation with the Father..."33 Following Jesus grows out of the reconciliation, the incorporation and the being nurtured by the sacraments. This relates again to a more organic view, and perhaps a metaphysic which actually makes incorporation an ontological reality, and

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32 Fortune, "Calling to Accountability," 453.

33 Pickstock, *After Writing*, 157.

comprehensible. But it is about following Christ as well. And so there is a relationship between the cross of Christ and that of the Christian in *CDH*. The "on our behalf" nature of Jesus' death does not make it, for Anselm, a substitutionary death in the sense that no one else need participate in or go the way of the cross. In Anselm's theology, there is no question that Jesus was the example and Christians are incorporated into Christ, so they also participate in his obedience, suffering and victory, through imitation, as well as Eucharistic participation, and ontological sharing, as already outlined in Chapter 3. For Anselm, then the way forward to future obedience was through dealing with the past sin, being reconciled and incorporated into Christ for participation and following in the way of the cross.

So far, then we note two significant points of convergence between *CDH* and a Peace Theology. First, there is a common understanding of justice in a restorative way, which requires satisfaction or restoration, as a preferable alternative to either punishment or simply overlooking or forgiving sin/crime. Second, both Anselm and the Peace Theology emphasize the human role of Christ and the human response of obedience.

Sacrifice and Non-violence

A third and crucial affinity between *CDH* and a Peace Theology lies in the matter of sacrifice. A sacrificial understanding of Jesus' cross lies behind *CDH* and the notion of sacrifice has been scrutinized in recent decades as a one that relied on violence, something that would not seem compatible with a Peace Theology.[34] The question of sacrifice and its meaning in the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament is indeed a complicated one and cannot be taken up here fully. Certain it is that there was some

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[34] Grimsrud, 49-52.

understanding of cultic sacrifice in the first generation of Christians. Some of the New Testament writers used the language of sacrifice, metaphorically, to express the meaning of Jesus' death for salvation. Beyond that, the road is extremely rough.[35] There is a question to be asked in order to consider whether sacrificial terms of understanding the cross are compatible with a Peace Theology. Does speaking of Jesus' death as a sacrifice condone violence? Fortunately, the question has been addressed, and by the very person who is the expert on violence and the sacred: René Girard. Peace Theology scholars have engaged his work. In fact, the New Testament does, in some places, speak of Jesus' death as a sacrifice – even if sacrifice is reinterpreted. Sacrifice is the model that is used to understand the cross in the Letter to the Hebrews. Furthermore, serious reflection on the meaning of sacrifice suggests that interpreting Jesus' death as a sacrifice is not incompatible with a commitment to non-violence. Although a careless depiction of Jesus' death as a sacrifice might appear to involve a justification of violence, and therefore to be incompatible with non-violence, this is not necessarily the case. This is evident in Girard's later, and according to his own estimation, less "rash"[36] judgments concerning Hebrews, and other scholarship on the nature of sacrifice. Here is not an exhaustive survey of views on sacrifice and non-violence, but an illustration of how the

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[35] The complexity of the question is evident in an excellent collection of essays dealing with sacrifice in the contemporary church, from a variety of perspectives (i.e. Roman Catholic, Anglican, Greek Orthodox, Lutheran and Methodist). See S.W. Sykes, ed., *Sacrifice and Redemption: Durham Essays in Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[36] Girard referred to some of his early judgments as "rash and inadequate". See Girard, "Violence Renounced" in *Violence Renounced: Rene Girard, Biblical Studies, and Peacemaking* (Telford, PA: Pandora Press, 2000), 320. See also René Girard, "Violence, Difference, Sacrifice: A Conversation with René Girard" *Religion and Literature* 25.2 (Summer 1993), 29.

language of sacrifice and a commitment to non-violence can be perfectly compatible, if the meaning of sacrifice is understood as gift, if sacrifice is transformed, and is understood metaphorically.[37]

The Problem with Sacrifice

The notion that sacrifice is inherently violent and that depicting Jesus' death in sacrificial terms served to reinstitute a victimization or scapegoating mechanism, rather than to expose violence would suggest that this language would not be appropriate for "people of goodwill."[38] This path of thought was made well known by René Girard. It is furthered in the collection of essays discussing Girard's work and peacemaking, and Anabaptist scholar Ted Grimsrud provided an example of the suspicion, or even rejection of sacrifice for the sake of pacifism. Grimsrud acknowledged that there is indeed a sacrificial theology in the NT, but he chose to focus on selected texts that are "more relevant to Christian pacifism and more congruent with how Jesus himself portrayed God."[39] He went to the heart of the problem, and asserted that "(s)acrificial theology stands in tension with thoroughgoing pacifism because it posits a violence deep in the heart of God. Such violence ultimately undergirds inter-human violence."[40] The reason

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[37] Willard M. Swartley, ed., *Violence Renounced: Rene Girard, Biblical Studies and Peacemaking* Studies in Peace and Scripture, Volume 4 (Telford, PA: Pandora Press, 2000). This collection of essays from a symposium illustrates the need to discuss sacrifice from the point of view of a Peace Theology.

[38] René Girard, *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World, trans. Stephen Bann and Michael Metteer,* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 182.

[39] Grimsrud, 52.

[40] Ibid., 51-2.

he could claim that a sacrificial theology posits a violence deep in the heart of God is because he understood it to involve the notion that God needed a blood sacrifice, and that God holds humanity accountable for the death of the innocent One, the death that God "both anticipated and required."[41] When a sacrifice includes the deliberate infliction of death, then there is violence involved. The case for the connection of sacrifice with the condoning of violence was spelled out in Girard's classic, *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World*. He therefore dismissed the sacrificial reading of Jesus' death, even the sacrificial reading of Hebrews. The statement is pointed and captures so well a popular reasoning that it is worth quoting at length.

> It must be admitted that nothing in what the Gospels tell us directly about God justifies the inevitable conclusion of a sacrificial reading of the Epistle to the Hebrews. This conclusion was most completely formulated by the medieval theologians, and it amounts to the statement that the Father himself insisted upon the sacrifice. Efforts to explain this sacrificial pact only result in absurdities: God feels the need to revenge his honour, which has been tainted by the sins of humanity, and so on. Not only does God require a new victim, but he requires the victim who is most precious and most dear to him, his very son. No doubt this line of reasoning has done more than anything else to discredit Christianity in the eyes of people of goodwill in the modern world. However acceptable to the medieval mind it might have been, it has become intolerable for us, and it forms the major stumbling-block for a world that is entirely (and quite justifiably) hostile to the idea of sacrifice, even though that hostility remains tinged with sacrificial elements which no one has succeeded in rooting out.[42]

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[41] Ibid., 51. Grimsrud cited Walter Wink, *Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992), 149.

[42] Girard, *Things Hidden*, 182.

This, however, was not Girard's last word on sacrifice, violence and the Letter to the Hebrews.

Sacrifice, Violence and Hebrews Revisited

Sacrifice did sometimes involve violence and death, but not necessarily, and much more needs to be said, for the exact circumstances of the death are critical. If a person willingly undergoes death, because of a refusal to do something unjust that would be required to avoid death, or because of a refusal to refrain from doing what justice and love require, then although there is a death, it is clearly not an acceptance or justification of violence. If that death is then figuratively referred to as a sacrifice, then it is still not an acceptance of violence. This would appear to be self-evident. Perhaps, the confusion arises when the language of sacrifice is taken in a literal rather than a metaphorical manner. This would certainly be a distortion. But the problem remains, when we are not careful with our metaphors, in speaking of who offered whom or what to whom and how. If Jesus were offered as a human sacrifice by someone else, then this would be a case where one offering the sacrifice sees violence as justified: one person kills another in order to spare the lives of others. A "smaller" violence/evil is thought to be justified in order to avoid greater violence/evil. But in Anselm's understanding, Jesus voluntarily offered himself, or his life of obedience. Anselm went to great pains to insist that it was a voluntary offering - voluntary obedience and acceptance of death and not a death demanded by the Father, even if the Father willed the just and loving life of Jesus which involved death.[43] Therefore, to speak of Jesus' life and death in sacrificial terms is not an acceptance or blessing of violence.

This conclusion about the compatibility of a sacrificial reading of Hebrews and non-violence is also no longer contested by René Girard. In later discussions Girard reconsidered his initial rejection of a sacrificial reading in Hebrews. He granted that although the notion of sacrifice was found throughout the Bible, there are distinctions between various types or contexts, and regarding the human significance.[44]

He drew a distinction that is absolutely critical, between sacrifice that makes another victim, and sacrifice that makes the offerer the victim. Even further, he distinguished between two types of sacrifice that make the self victim. Simply to make self the victim is masochistic and problematic, but to give up one's life out of love for the other is good.[45] I would add that, in fact, there is no commitment to non-violence or pacifism that does not allow one to give up one's own life for the sake of another. The presence of violence in a story does not mean the absence of a commitment to non-violence on someone's part. More directly, Girard held that the word sacrifice is not to be rejected, but clarified. He argued that because of the Trinitarian idea, both the notion of "sacrificer" and victim, of sacrificing self and other, are involved "in God." This might sound like "the selfish sacrifice of others" but "the basic fact remains that the Christian conception belongs to the "selfless sacrifice of oneself"-- out of love for another.[46] In the Bible he discerned a dynamic that led to the elimination of violent sacrifice. It was a move from "*other*-sacrifice to *self*-sacrifice," which represents a "momentous change"

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[43] *CDH* I, 9.

[44] René Girard, "Sacrifice in Levenson's Work," *Dialog* 34, 1 (Winter 1995), 62.

[45] Ibid., and "Violence, Difference, Sacrifice."

[46] Girard, "Sacrifice in Levenson's Work," 61-2; and "Violence, Difference, Sacrifice." 30.

although there is a "symbolic continuity."[47] In his essay, entitled "Violence Renounced," Girard distinguished carefully between two different meanings of Jesus' death, one that would work *through* the old myths and the other that would *expose* its myths. "God willingly becomes the scapegoat of his own people *not* for the purpose of evacuating internal violence through the old mythical misunderstanding *but for the opposite reason*, for clearing up once and for all all such misunderstandings and raising humankind above the culture of scapegoating."[48] He was willing eventually to accept that to see Jesus not only as *the end* of sacrifice, but also as *the last* sacrifice was not to recapitulate to the old myth.

Regarding the Letter to the Hebrews, Girard declared that he had been mistaken in *Things Hidden*. It was a matter of different meanings of sacrifice. Girard's understanding of sacrifice was specific. In his view, "sacrifice is indeed rooted in the natural tendency of human beings to elude intractable conflict by shifting their violence to an expendable third party, an animal, a child, even a marginal adult, as in the case of the *pharmakos*, the human scapegoat of Greek cities."[49] In addition, he admitted to sharing the phobia about the word 'sacrifice' under the influence of psychoanalysts. Girard reminded his readers -- and himself -- that the meaning of the word sacrifice has evolved over time, and throughout cultures.[50] He concluded that the language of 'the *last* sacrifice' in Hebrews

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[47] Girard, "Sacrifice in Levenson's Work," 62.

[48] Girard, "Violence Renounced," 319.

[49] Girard, "Sacrifice in Levenson's Work," 61.

[50] Girard, "Violence, Difference, Sacrifice,"29. To gain a sense of the difficulty in understanding the various meanings or dimensions of sacrifice, see Bruce Chilton, *The*

is actually compatible with his views. Jesus on the cross might be understood as the *last* sacrifice, as well as the *end* of sacrifice.[51] They were simply using different language.[52]

Michael Hardin, Loren Johns and Marlin Miller discussed the meaning of the sacrificial language in Hebrews, in conversation with Girard, and an interest in the renunciation of violence. Through their complicated discussion it becomes evident that advocates of a Peace Theology were not necessarily rejecting the language of sacrifice, and that sacrifice does not require violence. The Letter to the Hebrews employed sacrificial language and images, but was the author upholding sacrifice through the offer of a 'better sacrifice,' ending sacrifice, repudiating it, or subverting it? Hardin highlighted that while the Letter to the Hebrews employed the language of sacrifice, it "...rejects all connections between violence and the sacred, offering instead a new paradigm of what real self-giving (human and divine) is all about."[53] Johns took a different view. He noted that "it is quite possible for a 'once-for-all' death to sustain and even support a sacrificial understanding of Jesus' death...." and was not convinced that Hebrews represented "as clear a repudiation of the sacrificial hermeneutic as do the Gospels..."[54] in his estimation. The question was whether Hebrews uses sacrificial

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Temple of Jesus: His Sacrificial Program Within a Cultural History of Sacrifice, especially chapter 3.

51 Girard, "Violence, Difference, Sacrifice," 28.

52 This sounds like Harnack who said that, historically, according to his reading, Jesus' death was indeed the end of blood sacrifice. *What is Christianity?* Trans. Thomas Bailey Saunders (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 156-7.

53 Michael Hardin, "Sacrificial Language in Hebrews: Reappraising René Girard," in *Violence Renounced*, ed. Willard Swartley (Telford, PA: Pandora Press, 2000), 21.

language to escape a sacrificial view of the world, as he believed the Gospel writers did. Or, he asked, "does it in fact explicitly – or even worse, implicitly – support the scapegoating mechanism?"[55]

Marlin Miller provided helpful comments on the suspicions about sacrifice, the way that sacrifice is used and critiqued in the New Testament, and the way the language or meaning of sacrifice is ultimately transformed – into the offering of self in obedience, rather than the cultic sacrifice. It is precisely "...the *ongoing use of the offering language*... which results in the transformation of sacrifice."[56] Here it is enough to note that a sacrificial reading of Jesus' death is presented in Hebrews, although it is a transformed understanding of sacrifice, and that this does not condone violence. It is sacrifice as offering of the self and through the offering of one's life. This is an ethical, practical understanding of sacrifice.

James Williams wrote of the transformation of sacrifice as well. He argued that "Jesus is the king who neither confirms nor overturns the sacrificial system but rather exposes and interrupts it. The meanings of kingship and sacrifice are transformed: kingship becomes servanthood and sacrifice becomes service."[57] He perceived the

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54 Loren Johns, "'A Better Sacrifice' or 'Better than Sacrifice'? Response to Michael Hardin's 'Sacrificial Language in Hebrews'" in *Violence Renounced*, ed. Willard Swartley (Telford, PA: Pandora Press, 2000), 128.

55 Ibid., 121.

56 Marlin Miller, "Girardian Perspectives and Christian Atonement," in *Violence Renounced*, ed. Willard Swartley (Telford, PA: Pandora Press, 2000), 40.

57 James G. Williams, "King as Servant, Sacrifice as Service: Gospel Transformations," in *Violence Renounced*, ed. Willard Swartley (Telford, PA: Pandora Press, 2000), 196. (See also his book: *The Bible, Violence and the Sacred.*

critique of sacrifice and kingship already present in the Hebrew Bible, so the New Testament is in "a dialectic of continuity and discontinuity" with the Old Testament.[58]

Another prominent scholar who has engaged Girard's theories, Raymund Schwager, whose work Weaver used, dealt thoroughly with the place of sacrifice for understanding the death of Jesus and salvation. He did not eliminate the language of sacrifice. In *Jesus and the Drama of Salvation: Toward a Biblical Doctrine of Redemption,* he explored the meaning of sacrifice in the Old Testament, in order to interpret the sacrificial terminology in Hebrews. He concluded that the New Testament, both in the Gospels and in Hebrews point to the dilemma of sacrifice and atonement in the Old Testament.[59]

This did not lead Schwager to a dismissal of all language of sacrifice in the understanding of the death of Jesus. Hebrews did present the drama of Jesus against the backdrop of a sacrificial cult, but, maintained Schwager, only because the author radically transformed the meaning of sacrifice and of priest. After dealing with the problematic matter not only of sacrificing the other, but of sacrificing self as aggression directed toward the self, and whether this is really any better, he concluded with an ambiguity. "Like the image of bloody sacrifice, the image of self-aggression can be used to point to depths where only the power of the Spirit can find the appropriate distinctions

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58 Williams, "The Sacramental Presuppositions," 194.

59 Raymund Schwager, *Jesus in the Drama of Salvation: Toward a Biblical Doctrine of Redemption*, trans. James Williams and Paul Haddon (New York: Crossroad, 1999), 178, 181-3.

each time."[60] Later, he explained that the "surrender of Christ on the cross can only be appropriately interpreted from the viewpoint of the post-Easter experience of the Holy Spirit." The sacrifice that is acceptable is that of obedience. It does not have so much to do with blood. However, as Schwager noted, the obedience of Jesus was to accept a mission, which did involve suffering and death.[61] Schwager could say that "the Son gives himself to the Father in dying, the latter answers in the resurrection, and both together send out the Spirit."[62] It does not seem inappropriate to see the link between sacrifice and this giving himself in dying. In the end, Schwager also ties this offering to the Eucharistic celebration as a sacrifice.[63] This intertwining of cross, sacrifice and Eucharist is what we find in Anselm.

Yoder apparently also did not see that a reference to Jesus' death as a sacrifice was incompatible with non-violence. He acknowledged that this was a New Testament metaphor. It is true that Yoder's project was to emphasize Jesus as teacher and example, but that was not because Jesus' life and death did not also need to be understood in sacrificial terms. He emphasized what was overlooked or underemphasized, and did not bother to rehearse what was already well understood. It is significant that Yoder explicitly rejected the notion that one must choose between Jesus as sacrifice and Jesus as teacher or sovereign. He was adamant, if brief, on this matter in his most famous work,

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60 Ibid., 191.

61 Ibid., 209, 208.

62 Ibid., 215.

63 Ibid., 227-8.

The Politics of Jesus.[64] Furthermore, he explicitly recognized that the New Testament portrayal of Jesus' death as sacrificial is a major gap in some understandings.[65]

There is another way in which Yoder dealt with the question of sacrifice and that was in relation to punishment, and again, he did not see it necessary to rule out entirely either the notion of a legitimate punishment or of understanding Jesus' death as a sacrifice. In his arguments against the death penalty, to which I already referred, he presented the cultic nature of the death penalty in the OT, seeing it as a sacrifice. Rather than objecting to the deep-seated human need for punishment, he argued that Jesus' death as a sacrifice fulfilled this need, once for all. He did not for whatever reason deem it best to deplore the desire for punishment on the part of human society. Nor did he find it repugnant to speak of Jesus' death as a sacrifice, for fear that this would foster more human violence, retribution and punishment. Instead, he acknowledged the logic and justice of punishment for crime; and found it useful to be able to say that it is no longer necessary to take human life in order to deal with that (perhaps legitimate) need for punishment. Here is a way of talking about the cross as ending the need for sacrifice, or for violence. So, it can be understood as sacrifice without meaning that it condones or calls for more violence or sacrifice. This is not unlike Girard's reading of Jesus' sacrifice as the last and the end of sacrifice.

A Metaphorical Sacrifice but a Real Death

Running through this whole discussion of Jesus' life and death as sacrifice is an assumption that must be made explicit, and that is the metaphorical nature of such

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[64] Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, 226.

[65] Yoder, *Preface*, 220.

language. It is necessary to be embarrassingly intentional about this because it is in the very nature of metaphors, after great use, to lose their metaphorical stature – and to be regarded as literal. It is easy to settle on a few metaphors to speak of the unfathomable, but it is important to be reminded that the metaphors are not literal – even the original referent is lost and their whole meaning has become associated with the mystery. Colin Gunton provided a very thorough and articulate analysis of the metaphorical nature of Jesus' sacrifice in *The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian Tradition.*[66]

But just as it is critical to be aware, in an analysis, of the metaphorical nature of the sacrificial language in regards to Jesus, it is equally important to recognize that the word sacrifice in common, secular, society, apart from reference to Jesus, only has a figurative sense. Robert J. Daly contrasted cultic, ancient, and modern secular understandings of sacrifice. The first is offered to God, joyfully and thankfully, as generously as possible, with the emphasis on the giving. The last is not offered to anyone, is as small as possible, with regret, the emphasis being on the giving up or the deprivation.[67] In the absence of any cultic sacrifice, we have lost the original function of the word. However, when it is used to speak of Jesus, it is not clear whether people are using it to conjure up a literal cultic sacrifice, or whether we are using it in the figurative sense of deprivation, or what. Are we contorting ourselves to get back to the

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[66] Colin Gunton, *The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian Tradition* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1989), Ch. 5 & pp196-99.

[67] Robert J. Daly, S.J. *The Origins of the Christian Doctrine of Sacrifice* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), 3.

original referent that we have lost, in order to understand the metaphor? Should we get a new metaphor since this one is dead? That is the question Gunton addressed and Frances Young [68] before him. They concluded that the metaphor was still needed. This mention of the history of the word sacrifice is to signal the care that is needed in these disagreements about sacrifice. It is easy to misunderstand the intent of the other given this complexity of meaning.

Girard described how this problem of meaning, or of definitions, interfered with his own conclusions. The use of sacrifice metaphorically is not unlike the transformation of sacrifice, and it has a long history. There has been an ongoing reinterpretation of sacrifice throughout the Jewish history. Already the ancient prophet Hosea claimed that God desired loyalty, love and not blood sacrifice. Judaism has reinterpreted blood sacrifice to include study of Torah and keeping of Torah. Sacrifice has been used figuratively and metaphorically, then for a very long time. Daly described this development in the understanding of sacrifice within Israel. This spiritualising of sacrifice is what was continued in the New Testament meaning of sacrifice as primarily ethical and practical, rather than cultic or liturgical.[69] To speak of the transformation or the reinterpretation of sacrifice from blood sacrifice to loyalty is another way of designating a metaphorical use. Blood sacrifice and loyalty are both a means of drawing near to God. They both involve joyous offering.

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[68] Frances M. Young, *Sacrifice and the Death of Christ.* (London: SPCK: 1975).

[69] Daly, *Origins*, 6, 7, 82. David Neelands wrote that in Hebrews Jesus' obedience was the issue in the sacrifice.(2005), 185.

Sacrifice as Gift, a Holy Exchange

One more element in this language of the sacrifice of Jesus concerns its nature as gift. I already addressed this in Chapter Three specifically concerning *CDH*. Here I make the point more generally, in regard to sacrifice. Just as it is easy to forget the metaphorical aspect of sacrifice in theological discussions, the meaning of sacrifice in modern society is, as just noted, often lost entirely, where it has become "a mere figure of speech."[70] Since it is not familiar in life, when the word sacrifice is used to speak of Jesus it conjures up not only blood and death, but also propitiation. It sounds more like bribing, "buying-off," or contracting with the deity, than offering a gift. But a sacrifice, as an offering is a gift. Much has been written in recent years on the subject of 'gift' and this need not be engaged here.[71] What is significant here is how gifts, and a particular gift, for a sacrifice is a gift, are at the heart of Christian faith, according to these post-modern interpretations. They might not agree, but there is a revision of the paradigms, and it is possible for us to see the extent to which modern Protestant readings of Anselm might well have been distorted not only by a failure to understand such concepts as honour, debt, merit, satisfaction and sacrifice, but also by an entirely different economy that was no longer based on gift but on profit.[72] In exploring the notion of 'gift,' in

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[70] J.S. Whale's words in *Victor and Victim*, (Cambridge University Press: 1960), 42. Cited by Colin Gunton in *The Actuality of Atonement*. 115.

[71] See, for example, Stephen H. Webb, *The Gifting God: A Trinitarian Ethics of Excess* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[72] Lester K. Little, *Religious poverty and the profit economy in medieval Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978. Little outlined the change in worldview from the gift economy to one based on profit.

response to Jacques Derrida and others, John Milbank noted, significantly, that what distinguished gift from a self-interested contract was not the absence of some sort of return or exchange, but the unpredictability, the surprise and the "asymmetrical reciprocity."[73] A gift might elicit a return, that is, it might involve a sort of 'exchange' but it is still a gift; and has not thereby been rendered a mere contractual exchange. That is why it is possible to speak of the "exchange of gifts" of joyfully offering to God and receiving, or participating in a "divine-human interchange" – a holy exchange.[74]

Non-violence and Self-offering

It is time to say that not only is a sacrificial understanding of Jesus' death not incompatible with non-violence, it is the foundation for non-violence. The sacrificial bearing of violence by Jesus that Anselm depicted is most congenial to a Peace Theology. After all, the Christian pacifist hope is not that they can eliminate violence from history, but that they will themselves not kill, and would rather die than kill. What we see in the cross as it is portrayed in Anselm's telling, is how sin is conquered in the world, namely, by the loving offering of self, (sacrifice) even unto death. I need to stress that this sacrifice is of self, and not of the neighbour, or even the enemy. It is a sacrifice of self that is not incurred while trying to kill the other, but by refusing to kill the other. It is a sacrifice of self that is not masochistic or aggression directed toward the self (as Girard and Schwager explained). It is odd that Weaver objected to the "passive" suffering of Jesus, because he is writing to support the pacifism of a Peace Theology. The critical

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[73] John Milbank, *Being Reconciled*, 154, 156. In an attempt to think about the Trinity in terms of gift, Webb also worked with an understanding of gift as somewhere between excess and exchange, not eliminating some sort of reciprocity, *The Gifting God.*

[74] Pickstock, "Is Orthodoxy Radical?" 6.

distinction that he emphasized is that between active non-violent resistance to evil, and passive submission to evil. Both of these are non-violent, but one is passive, the other active. This distinction is perhaps clearer on paper than it is in the messiness of life. At any rate, Anselm did not depict Jesus as passive, but as knowing what he was about, actively *refusing* to veer from a course even though it meant death.[75] It could be that only God, knowing the hearts and intentions of people, can discern between active resistance and passive submission (or active submission), because these can take myriad forms. The difference between active and passive cannot be determined simply by watching the body. Yoder articulated the nuanced yet critical distinction between plain submission, and "revolutionary subordination" in his discussion of the Household Code (*Haustafeln*) found in the New Testament epistles.[76] The notion of bearing injustice or violence in order to overcome it does not conflict with Christian pacifism as outlined by Yoder, but lies at its very heart. In addition, to regard Jesus' death as a sacrifice, recalled in the Eucharistic sacrifice could strengthen Christian commitment to non-violence. It allows the offering of the Christian obedience and life to be taken up in that of Christ, in a mystery. In this way, the non-violent way is not thought to be a sure way of accomplishing one's goals, but a participation in the mystery of cross and resurrection. It illustrates what Yoder was describing when he wrote, "the relationship between the

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[75] *CDH* II, 18, p. 349.

[76] See Yoder, *Politics of Jesus*, Ch. 9 "Revolutionary Subordination." The Household precepts are found in Colossians 3:18-4:1; Ephesians 5:21-6:9; and 1 Peter 2:13-3:7.

obedience of God's people and the triumph of God's cause is not a relation of cause and effect but one of cross and resurrection."[77]

Anselm and Non-violence

I have said that *CDH* strengthens the basis for Christian pacifism. This is true of his theology, even if Anselm was an archbishop in a feudal society during the time of the crusades.[78] Perhaps, this begs a question. Did Anselm not realize it? In *CDH* Christ provides an example of refusing to turn from the path of love and righteousness, offering up his life for the sake of the other. Furthermore, the way by which sin is conquered, satisfaction is made, and humanity is restored, was by bearing the evil, through self-sacrifice. More explicitly, humanity was restored not through punishment of the evildoers, or condemnation to death, but through love and self-offering. However, the implications are on an ultimate level and do not spell out a rejection of the Just War

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[77] Ibid., 232.

[78] F.B.A. Asiedu, "Anselm, the Ethics of Solidarity, and the Ideology of Crusade," *The American Benedictine Review* 53, no. 1(March 2002):42-59. According to Asiedu, although there is no record of Anselm being an explicit or vocal supporter of the Crusades, there also does not seem to be evidence that Anselm rejected the Crusades. He counseled certain individuals against participation, but gave no clear general statement against the whole enterprise. There are even accounts of his interaction with crusaders and his joy at receiving relics from the Holy Land that suggest he was not entirely opposed, if at all to the campaign. Earlier, James A. Brundage and Aryeh Grabois had seen more reason to believe that Anselm's relative silence on the crusade when it was such a major motivation in his time spoke volumes, indicating a lack of support, or at the least a reluctant support. "St. Anselm, Ivo of Chartres, and the Ideology of the First Crusade," *Les Mutations Socio-Culturelles au Tournant des XI^e^-XII^e^ Siècles*, ed. Raymonde Foreville. (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984), 175-187. See also Aryeh Grabois, "Anselme, L'Ancien Testament et l'Idée de Croisade," *Les Mutations Socio-Culturelles au Tournant des XI^e^-XII^e^ Siècles*, ed. Raymonde Foreville (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984.), 161-173.

theory. This reading could set forth a presumption against violence, which many advocates of the possibility of the Just War express. The case for the Just War is not built on the goodness of violence but on the desire to minimize violence in the world.

Anselm could have seen the non-violent implications of *CDH,* but accepted the notion of the Just War. This would have been perfect for a Benedictine monk, committed to the counsels of perfection of the cloistered life, who found himself in the seat of archbishop. We can fairly expect that Anselm believed in a non-violent or pacifist way, as a monk. But there were different expectations for the whole of society. Anselm was acutely aware of the difference between the cloister and the world. The people in the world did what they had to do, and their best hope was to do what they could, support the monasteries, the church, and maybe even eventually enter the monastery at some point. This dual view might help to explain how he could have refrained from pronouncing against the crusades, though also not being an avid supporter. Either way, he could have enjoyed the relics that were brought back from the Holy Land.[79]

This kind of distinction between what Christians are called to and what is necessary in the world is not unfamiliar in the Mennonite tradition either. It has been common for Mennonites over the centuries to teach that Christians are called to non-resistance or non-violence, but that in the world the state must "bear the sword." Members of the Peace Theology conversation are not in agreement regarding this dilemma. Of course, there is a difference between saying that all Christians must refrain from taking up the sword and saying that Christians might wield the sword on behalf of

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[79] Aseidu, 42-59.

the state. My point is that the Christian presumption against violence, or the basis for Christian pacifism is maintained in *CDH.*

Sources of Misunderstanding

So, if *CDH* and a Peace Theology actually share the emphasis on a human role, a justice with satisfaction, and self-offering, then why the misunderstanding? Along the way we have already seen that Peace Theology interpreters do not share certain of Anselm's assumptions that might interfere with an accurate perception of *CDH.* A different metaphysic or ontology, and understanding of sacrifice and sacrament are significant. There is one more element that might be involved, namely Christology, specifically, the doctrine of the two natures, and the Trinity.

The Rite of Sacrifice

Above I discussed the matter of violence and sacrifice. There is one more aspect of sacrifice that poses a problem, especially for some people living outside of the sacramental or eucharistic tradition. Douglas Davies, in his study of sacrifice, claimed that rites "provide a dimension which goes beyond that of the mere use of language as a basis for communication and access to knowledge."[80] Davies suggested that this possibility of meaning being communicated in a way that transcended or circumvented 'reason' and the "thin thread of conversation" (in response to Peter Berger) has not always been recognized since Descartes. It is not surprising that Enlightenment Christianity should eschew sacrifice. However, the reason for the rejection might not be so much that sacrifice condones or fosters violence, but that it is simply extra-rational,

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[80] Douglas Davies: "Sacrifice in Theology and Anthropology" *SJT* 35(1982), 352.

and for that reason, incomprehensible. It is not useable, because it cannot be explained rationally. This misapprehension of, or failure to 'read' rituals has no doubt contributed to the misunderstanding and rejection of Eucharistic sacrifice and consequently, Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*.

A Division within the Trinity?

Yoder, Driver and Weaver charged that the *CDH* divides the Trinity, portraying different wills and even transactions between the First and Second person. Anselm assumed, of course that there were distinctions within the unity of the Trinity. That is how he could speak of different roles or persons. But there was no clash of wills, and one wonders where such a charge might be based. Perhaps if one failed to see the concord between justice and mercy in *CDH*, one would see division within the Trinity. Harnack made the charge based on his perception that Anselm held or displayed a dualism between justice and mercy, leading to a tension between the just Father and the merciful Son. However, we have already seen that for Anselm, God's justice and mercy are one.[81]

I am led to wonder whether the transactional nature, and the division within the Trinity appear if one does not hold adamantly to the doctrine of the Incarnation and the two natures of Christ. When one reads *CDH* with a firm commitment to the Incarnation

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81 Jürgen Moltmann deals with the question of division and unity within the Trinity, maintaining that the suffering of God, and God's mercy is upheld by the Trinitarian God in a way that is not possible with monotheism. *The Trinity and the Kingdom*: The Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), 25. His work on theopathy and Trinity is helpful here. He warned about the modern tendency among both Catholics and Protestants, to be only Christian monotheists. *Trinity and the Kingdom,* 1. His discussion of the passion of God in *The Crucified God* is furthered in The Trinity and The Kingdom, to demonstrate the implications of the suffering triune God, for the kingdom of God, or for ethics, namely, freedom and mutuality. *The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology,* trans. R. Wilson and J. Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1974).

(which was after all the precipitating factor for the work) then one can hardly fathom where the charges of God being petty or vindictive or in any way lacking in mercy, arise. Perhaps an unflinching adherence to the doctrines of the Incarnation and the two natures of Christ would help one to perceive the agreement Anselm depicted between God's justice and mercy.

Whereas *CDH* is written entirely with the belief in and explanation of the God-human at the fore, it is not so clear in Weaver's text. In one paragraph he ventured to say that the references to the Trinity or to the Incarnation do not help the matter. The reference to the unity of divinity and humanity in the *deus-homo* do not address the fundamental problem, according to Weaver, which is that there is still the assumption that "doing justice means punishment." It is surprising that he could make this claim since it is so obviously not what Anselm claimed, since it fails to distinguish between punishment and satisfaction. Still, it suggests that perhaps the unity of the divine and human in the *deus-homo* is not a fundamental aspect to Weaver's narrative, but rather a problem, or tension in Satisfaction Atonement.[82] (It might be fruitful to consider whether Weaver's narrative *Christus Victor* requires the Incarnation.) He dismissed the attempts of Anselm's defenders to remind of the unity of humanity and divinity in the *deus-homo*, and of God's suffering.[83] He has vociferously objected to the Peace Church giving the Creeds of the Ecumenical Councils any authority. Although he has not rejected the actual claims of the Nicene Creed or the Chalcedonian Definition, or any aspect of Classical Orthodoxy, he has maintained that the language of the two natures is not

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82 Weaver, *Nonviolent Atonement*, 202-3.

83 Ibid., 225.

relevant in the contemporary context where a narrative Christology is preferable to one expressed in ontological terms. He has insisted that the Peace Church theology need not be accountable to the Nicene and Chalcedonian statements.[84] This sense that what is affirmed in the creeds might not be embraced by Weaver, even if it is not denied also seems to be intuited by at least one other reader. In a review of Weaver's earlier book, *Anabaptist Theology in the Face of Post-Modernity*, Mennonite theologian Harry Huebner took issue with Weaver's downplaying of the creeds. He noted in particular that the "...the creedal affirmations of the two natures and the trinity are exactly the theological affirmation a proper peace theology today needs."[85] Although Weaver did not reject these, the fact that he insisted on not being bound by them leads one to doubt that he values them. The implication is that he wants the freedom to disagree with the doctrine of the two natures, which was certainly integral to Anselm's explanation of the incarnation.

Yoder and Driver did not reject the doctrines of the Incarnation, the two natures of the Trinity. However, in as much as they strove to be biblical rather than systematic, and that these terms are not actually biblical, there is a sense in which these doctrines are always held at arm's length. These doctrines that developed in the church are always

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84 See eg. J. Denny Weaver, "The John Howard Yoder Legacy: Whither the Second Generation?" *MQR* (July 2003) vol. 77, No. 3: 451-471.

85 Harry Huebner, Review of *Anabaptist Theology in Face of Postmodernity: A Proposal for the Third Millennium* by J. Denny Weaver, *Mennonite Quarterly Review* 77,2 (April 2003):348.

open to question, even if Yoder and Driver themselves held to a high Christology based on their reading of the New Testament and the traditional Mennonite teaching.[86]

It is certainly worth noting the views of Harnack, Ritschl, Rashdall and Aulén on the question of the doctrines of the two natures and the Trinity, since it appears to be their readings of Anselm that have held sway in the Peace Theology circle. It would seem likely that their assumptions on the relationship and identity of God and of Jesus would be critical in shaping their perception of Anselm's discussion of the Incarnation. The doctrine of the two natures was not embraced by all of them: Rashdall referred to the doctrine of the two natures as the "bugbear of all Ritschlians."[87] One cannot eliminate a fundamental aspect of Anselm's theological assumption, and then assume to understand and portray his theology accurately. Theologians who eliminate, ignore or reinterpret the doctrine of the two natures and the Trinity cannot hope to understand *CDH* properly. It sounds like this is precisely what has occurred. Ritschl and Harnack's readings have been received and passed along too often unquestioned – even by those who would not necessarily accept their assumptions. Whether explicitly denied, or neglected, as perhaps in the case of Aulén, these different assumptions will distort the interpretation of Anselm's explanation. Deme made this very point, attributing Harnack's transactional view of the Satisfaction theory to his failure to read Anselm in his strong Trinitarian framework.[88]

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86 See for example, Yoder, *Preface*, Ch. 9. "Chalcedon and the Humanity of Jesus"; Driver, 58-9.

87 Rashdall, 356n.

88 Deme, 211, 218-9; 223.

It has been evident in the discussion of *CDH* how integral a role is played by Anselm's metaphysics, his ontology, and his acceptance of the two natures of Christ. The whole explanation unravels when these are removed. Ritschl and Harnack are associated with the rejection not only of metaphysics, and the doctrine of the Two natures, but also with a rejection of the unity of spirit and nature, and of faith and reason. Hankey traced the interpretation of Anselm through Ritschl, Harnack, Rashdall and Aulén warning that Anselm cannot be properly understood through that lens.[89]

Regarding Aulén, who did not reject the classical orthodox affirmations, it will be necessary to say a little more to demonstrate how even a weakening of the Christological doctrine can distort *CDH*. Crouse, Fairweather, McIntyre and Hankey argued this point. Crouse alleged that Aulén misrepresented both the patristic doctrine and Augustine specifically as just presenting a *Christus Victor* understanding, rather than as a combination of the three views outlined by Aulén, (*Christus Victor*, the Satisfaction View and the Moral Influence view). Crouse maintained that all three models were present in Augustine and the Patristic writings just as they were present in the Scriptures. He explained:

> It is not the work of Christ as Son of God or of Christ as Son of Man; it is the work of Christ who is both God and man in distinction of natures and unity of person. Indeed, the full development of the patristic understanding of the atonement depends upon the working out of the Chalcedonian understanding of the integrity of the divine and human natures in Christ. To deny the humanity of Christ has an essential role in the work of redemption implies a distortion of Christological doctrine in a docetist or a monophysite direction.[90]

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89 Hankey, "St. Anselm."

90 Crouse, "Atonement and Sacrifice," 4.

Just as the doctrine of the two natures is essential to a grasp of the Patristic understanding of the atonement, so is it to Anselm's.

Fairweather's comments about Aulén's are similar to Crouse's. He took Aulén to task for emphasizing so much the divine action in Christ, afraid to give any role to the humanity (as already discussed) that he tended toward a monothelite view.[91] Similarly, McIntyre hazarded that Aulén would be hard pressed to avoid the charge of docetism.[92] Hankey referred to an underlying abolition of ontology (and persons and natures) in Aulén's theology, thus effectively destroying the foundations for both an orthodox doctrine of the Trinity and the Incarnation.[93]

Although it might not account entirely for the claim that Anselm divided the Trinity, uncertainty about (or even a rejection of) the doctrines of the two natures, the Trinity and the Incarnation, on the part of the readers, would affect their perception of his explanation given that he assumed all of these. Anselm did speak of the Father and of the Son separately, acknowledging their distinct roles. But there was no disagreement and no different style but perfect agreement about what needed to be done. If one does not bear in mind that it was the reality of the Incarnation that gave rise to the *CDH*, or if one did not have strong Trinitarian convictions the distinct roles of the Father and the Son might look like a division – especially if one had missed the merciful nature of God's justice, or the distinction between satisfaction and punishment.

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91 Fairweather, "Incarnation and Atonement," 171.

92 McIntyre, 199. Hankey's discussion of Aulén's critics is again helpful here.

93 Hankey, n.52.

What *CDH* Might Offer

If we read *CDH* with the assumptions (just outlined), then it could well make a valuable contribution to a Peace Theology. There is first of all, the fact that it addresses the need for forgiveness and restoration or reconciliation to God. As I noted in the introduction, that was one of the reasons for undertaking this study in the first place. But there is more. By entering into Anselm's thinking and assumptions we find a way of understanding the cross that involves union and holy exchange. The discipleship of Christians is not just following a leader. It is a matter of being incorporated into Christ and so being enabled to follow. The work or obedience of Christians is joined to that of Christ. The whole of life is taken up into an endless cycle of offering and receiving. This union shines through the *CDH* with its assumed doctrines of the Incarnation, the two natures of Christ and the Trinity and the belief in the eucharistic sacrifice, the offering of self and bread to be transformed, and the receiving the bread of life. There is a wonderful affirmation of both the grace of divine action and the need for human obedience – obedience that is enabled and sustained through joining to Christ. This would be good for a Peace Theology.

Conclusion

Anselm's thinking in terms of satisfaction and sacrifice and giving a role to humanity are very much in keeping with the interests of a Peace Theology. The logic of satisfaction is surprisingly similar to that of restorative justice. Anselm wrote of humanity in Jesus offering the sacrifice, and of human beings approaching rightly, in a way that suits the Peace Theology emphasis on discipleship. The conclusion, then, given the discussions of sacrifice, of Hebrews and of violence, is that a Peace Theology need

not reject Anselm's explanation of the cross because it is sacrificial. What Jesus offered was his obedience, his life entirely, even unto death; that was his "sacrifice." For Anselm, all humanity can participate in that offering of obedience, that sacrifice, and be drawn near to God, to receive and be sustained in that body, by that bread. George Williams wrote beautifully of how Anselm understood the "*penitent* believer is ever anew reincorporated through the *oblatio* into the universal *humanity* of the Redeemer present under the elements of bread and wine on the altar."[94] This is a gracious and joyful exchange: holy and mysterious. It is not a sacrifice that suggests the killing or the violating of another would be justified; nor that God requires a killing, if we know the whole, holy story. It is self-offering out of love for the other.

This offering of one's life, of oneself to God is just what is required of humanity, and this is just what Jesus did, as a human being. Anselm maintained a role for humanity, in Jesus and in human beings, demanding a response so that all creation is restored. This model of sacrifice is a holy exchange. There is the giving and giving again and the return and the excess, and the restoring. In this holy exchange, we can perceive the notion of a restorative justice where God's justice and God's mercy are not at odds, and there is a love and endurance, even unto death. The proponents of the Peace Theology should not take exception to Anselm's role for humanity. They would be pleased that an alternative to punishment was found that would restore creation rather than destroy it. Sacrifice is what brings all of this together, the sacrifice of Christ, and the participation of Christians in this sacrifice still – by union with Christ, offering and receiving the benefits.

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[94] Williams, *Anselm: Communion and Atonement,* 66-7.

Here is the foundation of non-violence. If one misses this, it might be because one has rejected certain of Anselm's assumptions. Acceptance of the doctrine of the two natures of Christ and the Trinity are critical to *CDH,* as is the sacrificial, eucharistic lens. If a Peace Theology must reject *CDH* it is not for its incompatibility with a commitment to non-violence, but for some other reason, which ought to be made explicit for careful consideration.

CONCLUSION

The interpretations of *Cur Deus Homo* in three Mennonite exponents of a Peace Theology reveal a relationship between the three even though there are distinctions. The interpretations used by John Howard Yoder, John Driver and J. Denny Weaver are similar to that provided by Gustaf Aulén, which is reminiscent of von Harnack and Ritschl's readings of Anselm. This is not surprising given that what Aulén offered was not a new reading of Anselm, but an alternative to both Anselm's Satisfaction view, as he inherited it, and to the Abelardian view. In all of these contexts, *Cur Deus Homo* sounds legalistic, or juridical, suggesting a God who is keeping a tally sheet, at best, or perhaps worse, a God who cannot forgive when 'He' is insulted, so we are 'forgiven' not by grace, but after the forgiveness is bought. In this scenario *God* is not merciful but Jesus *is*. Although there are differences between the critiques brought by Yoder, Weaver and Driver, this gist is common. The differences emerge in the degree to which they are each willing to reject *CDH*. Yoder noted the problems but did not seem inclined to reject it outright. Instead, he invited attempts to improve on it. Driver pointed to weaknesses in the Satisfaction theory, and obviously saw the need for Anselm's theory to be critiqued, and relativized if not actually ignored. His conclusion regarding atonement was that many models or motifs were necessary, so presumably each one would be inadequate in *some* way. Weaver, on the other hand, saw *CDH* as antithetical to a Peace Theology. He perceived that the underlying notion is that of justice as retribution, and divinely sanctioned or divinely required violence. Despite their differences, the understanding

that runs through Harnack, Aulén, Yoder, Driver and Weaver is that in *CDH* God is not merciful but punishing, while Jesus is merciful.

A very different reading of Anselm is available in Anselm scholarship since Aulén's time. In this literature, the nature of God in *CDH* is loving and just, both at once, or put otherwise, the nature of God's justice includes mercy. It is a justice that is ultimately defined by the restoration of creation, rather than by sin being punished. According to medieval scholars, to speak of the "honour of God" is not to refer to God's feelings or personal reputation, but rather to God's whole 'estate.' To dishonour God is objectively going against or disrupting the creation, which is God's. The creature honours God when the creature does what it ought, and dishonours God when it is not what it ought to be in relation to itself, its creator, and the rest of creation. In Anselm there is a notion of 'ought' and of what is fitting, what is beautiful, what is just. The creature can go against all of this and so dishonour the Creator, even though the Creator exists *a se*, and is not diminished by any of the offences. God upholds the justice, the goodness of all of creation with regard to all creatures, and therefore, sin must be dealt with, forgiveness must be granted without betraying the victims. God's insistence on justice, and that sin cannot simply be overlooked is because things must be made right.

In the third chapter, I discussed just how things are made right according to *CDH*, and this is close to the heart of what many find objectionable. It is here that we faced the notion of the need for satisfaction given the debt, given what was owed, or what we *ought* to do. Anselm did insist that either sin needed to be punished or satisfaction needed to be made. I emphasized that satisfaction was *not* the same as punishment, and that the satisfaction route was chosen by God, mercifully, and justly. Satisfaction was a means of

restoring or making things right, instead of simply punishing. Forgiveness is still required, even when satisfaction is made, so forgiveness is not thereby bought. And even further, and finally, it was significantly a voluntary offering or sacrifice by Jesus Christ, who is truly God and truly human, which constituted the satisfaction. It was satisfaction through sacrifice, or gift. This is the realm of love and offering. Although talk of satisfaction might seem to contribute to the portrait of the petty God, it in fact gives dignity and happiness to humanity, emphasizing human agency. Punishment might have left humanity ever recalcitrant and condemned. Satisfaction is offered by the guilty party. Anselm wrote as a human being, explicitly using human reason, and it is appropriate that human beings desire to make satisfaction. Humanity could not be happy, fully restored to happiness without making satisfaction for what it owed. But it is not a human being who could make satisfaction; but only God in humanity. This is God's agency and mercy, enabling human action, participation, doing on behalf of humanity what we could not do, but in order that we might also participate, imitate.

Beyond satisfaction and sacrifice, there is also the matter of the reward, and the question of just how the reward won by Christ benefits human beings – individually or collectively, across time. First, the notion of a reward being returned to Christ for his wondrous self-offering is not out of place in an economy of gift, nor is it in any of love. Why would not God give something, something appropriate, to one who has given all? This does not make the reward returned to Christ something that was bought. Next, the reward is shared with humanity. Is it with all of humanity or with certain individuals, and how is this shared? This is not where Anselm went into detail. There have been various models used to speak of the unity between Christ and humanity, explaining how

humanity receives the reward given to Christ, namely ontological union through Eucharistic participation, and through love and relational intimacy. There is a real union and participation between Christ and human beings. Ultimately, this union extends to the offering and the receiving.

There are evident affinities between this reading of *CDH* from recent Anselm scholarship and a Peace Theology. Peace Theology is related to the "Anabaptist Vision," and grew out of that self-understanding which highlighted the church as a community that fosters discipleship, with a particular emphasis on pacifism. The focus of Peace Theology, as the name suggests, is pacifism or non-violence, but a deeper or broader basis for this is the discipleship, or real human transformation, insisting on the visibility of the church. Another aspect of the Peace Theology is the adoption of the biblical language of Shalom, and the notion of restorative rather than retributive justice, which grows out of the integral relation between justice and peace. It is precisely this option for restorative justice rather than retribution that I noted in Anselm's description of satisfaction rather than punishment, for the restoration of creation.

Secondly, there is also, significantly, agreement between the Peace Theology and Anselm, over against Aulén and Harnack, about the role for humanity. A weakness that Yoder cited is the claim that *CDH* is too preoccupied with the guilt of past sin, whereas the Bible portrays God as focused on future obedience. From the perspective of the guilty, or those who are in solidarity with the injured, past sin does matter. Perhaps, it does not matter so much to a merciful one who is offended. That person is allowed to forget the past sin of their offender. It seems then that Anselm is perfectly justified to speak from the perspective of the guilty one, and on behalf of the ones who have been

offended, in relation to God. This is not to reject the importance of future obedience, but to see it as made possible through reconciliation and incorporation, that is, through first dealing with the past sin.

A third natural affinity between Anselm's reasoning in *CDH* and a contemporary Peace Theology, is that between sacrifice and non-violence. To some minds, Anselm's reliance upon sacrifice would make his understanding of atonement problematic for a Peace Theology. However, consideration of sacrifice through discussion of René Girard's treatment of sacrifice in Hebrews and Mennonite encounters with Girard's work, confirms that the use of the metaphorical language of sacrifice does not at all condone violence. This is especially the case, given that the 'sacrifice' in question was a voluntary self-offering. The real death that was involved in what was called a sacrifice was a voluntary self-offering. It was not a sacrificial killing. It was not a killing to offer a sacrifice.

I addressed the charge that Anselm has God sanctioning or requiring violence. This charge is the result of a failure to distinguish between violence that is divinely borne, and violence that would be divinely sanctioned. This failure arises out of another failure, namely, the failure to distinguish a third way between no punishment and punishment. The notion of restitution, or payment, to restore or compensate, in the vision of Restorative Justice is such a third way, and this was precisely what Anselm called Satisfaction: an alternative both to simply overlooking sin, and to punishing it. The fact that the satisfaction involved a death does not mean that it is indistinguishable from punishment. The context and meaning of a death matter. A peace theology that promotes pacifism is certainly willing to accept the need for a willingness to accept death, and a

notion of justice that involves payment as restitution. This is different from a promotion of mere retribution and the infliction of death as punishment.

Since Yoder, Weaver and Driver did not see these affinities, I presented possible sources of misunderstanding. First, not sharing Anselm's acceptance of the rite of sacrifice, and second, his Christology. Yoder, Weaver and Driver mentioned Harnack's accusation that Anselm has pictured a division within the Trinity. Perhaps, the division here is actually in the eyes of the beholder. If the doctrines of the two natures and of the Trinity are not assumed, then *CDH* will read quite differently from what Anselm intended with his orthodox convictions. There were certainly distinctions within the Trinity in *CDH*, but that is allowed within the doctrine of the Trinity. There is, however, no disagreement. There is a unity of love and justice in Anselm's understanding of justice, as we already saw.

Finally, I noted that *CDH* might offer Peace Theology a way of understanding the cross that addresses human beings as agents who are guilty and not only trapped. It does so in a way that holds together the transcendence of God as well as the self-emptying love of God who took flesh. It affirms at once the freedom of human beings as well as the providence and mercy of God. It presents all of this in a vision that relies on union and participation so that human beings are taken up in this cycle of offering and receiving.

If a Peace Theology holds the doctrines of the two natures of Christ, and of the Trinity, and accepts the real possibility of union with Christ, then Anselm's *CDH* is not incompatible, for it does not sanction violence. It does hold out the invitation to participate in the sacrifice of Christ, in the self-offering, which might involve death, but

that is the sort of death that a Peace Theology already expects its proponents to accept. Lest this sound too oppressive, and an invitation to suffering, I should emphasize that Anselm insisted that Jesus chose obedience and faithfulness to justice, and not simply suffering. It is an invitation to participate in the loving work of Christ for the restoration of creation, to be reconciled and incorporated into Christ. In the end, then, although the interpretation of Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo* in the tradition of Ritschl, Harnack and Aulén has led to a suspicion about its usefulness for a Peace Theology, a reading through the lens of more recent scholarship, which assumes the original Catholic, sacramental and sacrificial framework, reveals a beautiful understanding of the cross that is perfectly compatible with a commitment to non-violence.

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