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***Alliances as Institutions:
Persistence and Disintegration in Security Cooperation***

by

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Contents

List of Tables and Figures	iii
Abstract	v
Acknowledgements	viii
PART I: INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	
Introduction	1
One Alliances and the Contemporary International Order	10
Two Alliances as Institutions: A Model of Persistence and Disintegration	60
PART II: ALLIANCES AS INSTITUTIONS: COLD WAR PERSPECTIVES	
Three Institutionalizing NATO in the Cold War Era	107
Four The Warsaw Pact: An Institutionalist Analysis of Dissolution	167
Five The Asian-Pacific Alliances: An Institutionalist Reinterpretation of ANZUS and SEATO	233
PART III: POST-COLD WAR PERSPECTIVES AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS	
Six NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Explaining Persistence	316
Seven Conclusion: Institutions, Norms, and Allies	372
Appendix	405
<i>Bibliography</i>	425

List of Tables and Figures

Figures

1.	A Model of "Alliance" Strategies	51
2.	An Application of the Model	57
3.	A Model of Alliance Behavior	96
4.	NATO's Institutionalization in 1949	110
5.	NATO's Institutionalization in 1952+	127
6.	Institutionalization of the Soviet Alliance System	189
7.	Alliance Behavior of the Warsaw Pact	200
8.	ANZUS Institutionalization, 1951-1986	244
9.	Development of the ANZUS Alliance System	248
10.	ANZUS Institutionalization, 1986	268
11.	SEATO's Institutional Development	284
12.	Phases of SEATO's Duration	290
13.	NATO's Evolution in the Post-Cold War	333
14.	NATO's Institutionalization in the Post-Cold War	338
15.	A Model of Alliance Behavior	377
16.	The Dynamics of Alliance Behavior	389

Tables

1.	Alternative Conceptions of Alliance Agreements	32
2.	Bilateral Treaties between the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact States	181
3.	Foreign Military Sales to New Zealand, Australia, and Japan, FY1984–FY1987	251
4.	Eurobarometer Polls on NATO's Value	322
5.	A Comparison of Alliances	388

Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, the central puzzle of alliance theory is no longer why or how do alliances form, but 1) *why do some alliances persist beyond the conditions in which they were created* and 2) *of these, why do some evolve in new directions?* Traditional realist scholarship cannot account for the persistence or evolution of military alliances when threats recede. This dissertation devises a model of alliance institutionalization and norm formation to explain and predict these processes.

When multidimensional threats exist, states facing a common threat ally, but they formalize and institutionalize the alliance so it can better manage multiple threats. Institutionalization encourages conditions conducive to persistence and evolution in two ways. First, by facilitating consultation and cooperation, it increases transparency, improves the performance of the alliance, and makes it costly for allies to renounce commitments or otherwise abandon one another. Second, institutions foster norms that in turn induce a form of attachment, or "loyalty" to the institution.

The strength of the norms embodied in the alliance and the allies' assessment of performance determine the behavior of institutionalized alliances. The alliance *persists* unaltered when performance is satisfactory, but norms are weak. It *evolves*, or expands its purpose and activities, when satisfactory performance combines with strong constitutive norms. *Erosion* occurs when strong norms encourage allies to salvage a poorly functioning alliance by curtailing its scope. *Dissolution* takes place when unsatisfactory performance and weak norms fail to prevent exit.

The most significant findings of this dissertation are that given institutionalization and norms, states do not exit an alliance immediately following a significant alteration in the strategic context or a decline in performance, but they try to preserve it. Only when these efforts fail will they curtail or dissolve the relationship. The dissertation tests the model by engaging in a comparative analysis of Cold War institutionalized alliances: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Warsaw Pact, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. alliance. Therefore, policy makers should not assume that evolving institutionalized alliances are adversarial or rush to respond with destabilizing counter alliances and, to minimize the possibility of conflict, allies engaging in evolution must clearly communicate their objectives to non-participants.

Résumé

Depuis la fin de la guerre froide, les raisons et la manière dont les alliances sont établies ne constituent plus la question centrale de la théorie des alliances. Désormais le puzzle est 1) pourquoi certaines alliances persistent-elles au-delà des circonstances dans lesquelles elles ont vu le jour, et 2) parmi celles-ci, pourquoi certaines évoluent-elles dans de nouvelles directions ? L'école réaliste traditionnelle ne peut pas expliquer la persistance et l'évolution des alliances militaires lorsque les périls diminuent. Cette thèse présente un modèle d'institutionnalisation et de création de normes au sein des alliances qui explique et prédit ces processus.

En présence de dangers multidimensionnels, les Etats qui font face à un péril commun s'allient, mais ils formalisent et institutionnalisent leur alliance afin de mieux faire face à de multiples périls. L'institutionnalisation encourage la persistance et l'évolution de deux manières. Tout d'abord, elle facilite la consultation et la coopération. Elle augmente ainsi la transparence et améliore la performance de l'alliance, ce qui rend onéreuse toute décision de revenir sur ses engagements ou d'abandonner ses alliés. D'autre part, les institutions produisent des normes qui créent une sorte d'attachement ou de « loyauté » envers l'institution.

Le comportement d'une alliance dépend de la vigueur de ses normes et l'évaluation de sa performance par les alliés. L'alliance *persiste* inchangée lorsque sa performance est satisfaisante mais ses normes faibles. Elle *évolue*, tant dans ses objectifs que dans l'ampleur de ses activités, quand une performance satisfaisante est accompagnée de solides normes constitutives. Elle subit une *érosion* quand de fortes normes poussent les alliés à sauver une alliance non-performante en limitant son champ d'activité. Enfin, elle *se dissout* quand de faibles normes et un manque de performance ne posent aucun obstacle aux alliés désireux de quitter l'alliance.

Lorsque le contexte stratégique change considérablement ou que la performance d'une alliance se détériore, si cette dernière contient institutions et normes, les Etats cherchent à la préserver non pas à la détruire. L'alliance n'est restreinte ou terminée que dans le cas où ces efforts échoueraient. La thèse teste ce modèle par le biais d'une analyse comparée des alliances institutionnalisées de la période de la guerre froide: l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord, le pacte de Varsovie, l'organisation du traité sud-est asiatique, et l'alliance Australie-Nouvelle Zélande-Etats Unis. Les politiciens ne doivent donc pas présupposer que les alliances institutionnalisées sont antagonistes et ils ne doivent donc pas se presser de créer des contre-alliances déstabilisantes. Pour minimiser le

risque de conflit, les alliés qui envisagent l'évolution de leur alliance doivent clairement communiquer leurs objectifs aux pays non-membres.

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Introduction

Military alliances have preoccupied scholars for thousands of years, with one of the earliest treatments being Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War. More recently, the Napoleonic and Bismarckian alliance systems, stretching from the close of the 18th century to the late 19th century, have provided a wealth of material for analysis. In fact, the tendency among political units to form pacts to safeguard security is the one trait all political systems share.¹ The continuing fascination of International Relations scholars with interstate alliances is a function of their relationship with the outbreak of war and peace. Most traditional analyses of alliances focus on this connection, usually with the normative expectation that understanding the relationship will contribute to the reduction of levels of conflict among states. This was particularly true during the Cold War era when analysts most feared that the stability of the great power alliance system posed the only impediment to a third (and nuclear) war.² Consequently, analyses sought to uncover: 1) the effect of significant transformations in the great power alliances on levels of

¹ Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973).

² Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962).

systemic conflict, and 2) the necessary and sufficient conditions for maintaining the existing (and stable) alliance systems.

With the abrupt end to the Cold War in 1989, academics and policy makers began to raise questions regarding the role and relevance of maintaining great power alliances in the absence of significant systemic conflict. Were alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact—rigid collective defense pacts led by a single superpower—really the most appropriate instrument to manage interstate relations? Although the members of the Warsaw Pact dissolved their alliance at the earliest opportunity, the members of NATO have chosen to redesign and enlarge their alliance, even as the threat of an interstate conflict involving these states has declined. With NATO adopting new functions and new members, the central contemporary puzzle is no longer why or how do alliances form, but rather why do they persist and evolve. In particular, it is important to know 1) *why do some alliances dissolve when threats recede while others persist beyond the conditions in which they were created* and 2) *of the latter, why do some evolve in new directions?* In fact, NATO is not the only alliance to draw our attention to these questions. Over time, there have been numerous cases of alliances that have persisted and/or evolved: the Concert of Europe's Quadruple Alliance, the interwar Little Entente, the Rio Pact, and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Furthermore, some of these alliances have been very

significant in shaping their particular international system. NATO is a case in point, and can be expected to serve as a model for future military alliances, even as it evolves away from its original mandate.

This dissertation argues that for all of its contributions to our understanding of alliance behavior, the realist approach has proven unable to provide a strong, general theory of it. Despite George Liska's classic observation that a comprehensive theory of alliance behavior is so difficult to achieve because it is nearly akin to a comprehensive theory of interstate behavior,³ progress can still be made in this direction. Realist approaches to alliance theory have made only limited progress because they suffer from two problems: first, they are too narrowly focused and, second, they are more concerned with theoretical innovations than with theory building. Realist approaches focus on the systemic effects of alliance formation and disintegration and neglect the dynamics of alliance behavior, even though these are significant for understanding processes of persistence and evolution.⁴ The assumption that states are unitary and

³ George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 3. Liska states: "It is impossible to speak of international relations without speaking of alliances; the two often merge in all but name."

⁴ Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan and Ward provide thorough reviews of the traditional realist alliance literature. These works successfully demonstrate that a) there are persistent puzzles in the study of alliances, b) there is a lack of theoretical consensus on the areas in which theorists have directed their attention, and c) in the case of the former, evidence does not support any one explanation over another. Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, *Unity and*

rational actors primarily interested in maximizing their security in a hostile international environment leads realists to focus on the formation of highly fluid alliance systems. These systems are created with the primary goal of aggregating the military capabilities of their members so that they can resist any challenge. To do anything but dissolve the relationship as soon as the threat recedes might limit their future policy options. For these theorists the most interesting research questions focus on the relationship between such pacts and the onset and termination of conflict, particularly great power war: What are the conditions most conducive to the formation of cohesive alliance systems? Do such alliances increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict breaking out? Are they better suited for winning a conflict once it has erupted?

The persistence and evolution of NATO beyond the Cold War has not prompted realist scholars to seriously reconsider their fundamental assumptions and arguments about alliance behavior.⁵ Chapter 1 argues

Disintegration, 1973; and Michael D. Ward, *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics* (Denver: Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver 1982). Furthermore, neither of these works suggests feasible alternatives.

⁵ One of the very few attempts to deal with this issue in a general way is Stephen Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival* 39,1 (1997): 156–179. For treatments of why NATO persists see for example Fred Chernoff, *After Bipolarity: The Vanishing Threat, Theories of Cooperation, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995); and Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," *Political Science Quarterly* 111,1 (1996): 1–34. In contrast to this approach, Dan Reiter engages in a broader historical and theoretical inquiry, as does Robert G. Kaufman. Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University

this is because the existing literature has been driven by a need to be innovative above all else. In fact, much of the literature has been contradictory, and one analysis after another attempts to "rediscover" the true nature of alliances. In part this follows from a fundamental failure to reach a consensus on the concepts under study. Although all theorists require evidence of military cooperation for an alliance to be classified as such, they do not agree on the nature or degree of cooperation necessary. Broadly conceived, the term includes numerous disparate behaviors that frustrate any attempt to build rigorous theory, while narrow conceptual usage encourages explanations and theories that are of limited application. It is hardly surprising, then, that one analysis after another arrives at fundamentally opposing conclusions,⁶ and researchers continue to probe the same questions in search of a definitive solution.

Yet in themselves, these questions provide an incomplete understanding of current trends in alliance behavior. Chapter one proposes a set of research questions that should be at the core of contemporary alliance theory. The mutable, capability-based alliance is merely one of several alliance strategies available to states. When an

Press; 1996); Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," *Security Studies* 1,3 (1992): 417-447.

⁶ Structural realist theorists in particular have been unable to develop a cumulative body of theory in part because there is evidence to support contradictory theories. See Patrick James, "Structural Realism and the Causes of War," *Mershon International Studies Review* 39 (1995): 181-208.

imminent threat emerges, states are not limited to a choice between entering a fluid alliance or not. They might opt instead to create an alliance that is more formalized and binding (that is, institutionalized). Alternatively, states might choose to adopt a nonaligned stance, or even turn to isolationism. An examination of the factors contributing to the choice among these alternative strategies can lend significant insight into the dynamics of alliance behavior and thus elucidate the reasons why alliances *persist* beyond the conditions in which they were created and even *evolve* in new directions.

Chapter two focuses on the class of institutionalized alliances and argues that the very process of institutionalization may impede dissolution (1) by increasing the costs (material and nonmaterial) of dissolving the relationship and (2) by creating alternatives to dissolution. The effects of institutionalization are evident even following a significant transformation in the strategic environment or a precipitous decline in performance. Material costs rise as allies structure cooperation through regular and reliable channels such that more issues become linked and, ultimately, states gain access to a larger range and better quality of information. Nonmaterial costs rise as constitutive norms induce a form of attachment to the institution and thereby instill in it a value independent of the material benefits it provides. When abrogating the alliance is the only means available to protect one's interests, allies will do so even if the

costs are high in an absolute sense. However, as institutionalization produces new and ever-more encompassing mechanisms for consultation and cooperation, such as expanded diplomatic channels or operational procedures, states have the option of protecting their interests from within the alliance. The result is that states do not exit the relationship immediately following a significant alteration in the strategic context or a decline in performance. Rather, they actively try to preserve the relationship, or at least the most valuable aspects of it. Failing such efforts, they may pare it down, gradually reducing their commitments (a "partial exit"). They only engage in a total exit after other efforts have failed.

The manner in which the allies proceed is determined by the strength of the norms embodied in the institution as well as their assessment of its performance. The alliance persists when allies choose to maintain it without fundamental alterations. This occurs when performance is satisfactory, but norms are weak or not present. Evolution, or an expansion of the alliance's purpose and activities, occurs when satisfactory performance is combined with strong constitutive norms. Allies seek out new avenues for their cooperation and consultation. Erosion is the opposite process. It occurs when norms are strong, but performance is weak. Their "loyalty" encourages allies to salvage the alliance, usually by curtailing its goals and activities. In the absence of satisfactory performance and norms, there is no obstacle to exit and allies

dissolve the alliance. Significantly, the model is dynamic, for as performance or norms transform (the latter of course being a far more gradual process) allies respond in kind. For example, an alliance can evolve then erode, and ultimately dissolve.

Chapters three through six of the dissertation examine each of these processes by engaging in a comparative analysis of 20th century institutionalized alliances. Although the cases were originally chosen for their values on the independent variables, they each lend insight into different processes. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is illustrative of processes of persistence and evolution, whereas the Warsaw Pact is an excellent example of alliance dissolution. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the misapplication of a strategy of institutionalization, demonstrates how erosion occurs. The Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. (ANZUS) relationship illustrates the difficulty of persisting and evolving in the absence of strong institutionalization, when exit is less costly.

This dissertation has both theoretical and policy significance, as it begins to address the puzzles that traditional alliance theory has neglected, but it does so by placing the argument within the context of existing theory and thereby contributing to a cumulative theory. It also employs a comparative research design to evaluate the model. Thus, the explanation is not limited to NATO, but recognizes that other alliances have undergone similar processes and can lend insight. The policy

implications are also noteworthy. If alliances can evolve in new directions, non-allies should not be too hasty to form destabilizing counter alliances. Indeed, the longer the alliance exists, *perhaps*, the less threatening it becomes to its original adversaries. Furthermore, the complexities of the contemporary international system suggest that many future alliances will institutionalize to manage multidimensional threats. If alliances are evolving in this direction, so too should theory.

Chapter 1

Alliances and the Contemporary International Order

This chapter addresses current research puzzles at the center of alliance theory and, in the process, challenges the traditional realist assumption that alliances can only persist or evolve in the context of a military threat. It claims that this view is mistaken because it is based on a limited consideration of the range of alliance strategies that are available to states. By considering a broader range of strategies, the chapter argues that alliance persistence and evolution can occur even after a military threat recedes. Second, it argues that an approach to understanding alliances in the contemporary international order requires a cumulative theory that draws on the insights of alternative approaches to alliance theory. This chapter develops these arguments in four sections. The first two review the dominant realist scholarship on alliances in order to identify problems in the literature. The third proposes an alternative explanation of alliance strategies, and the final section develops a theoretical approach that will explain one of the alternative strategies through a reappraisal of conventional approaches to alliance theory.

Alliances and Realist Theory

Realism has not produced a strong, general alliance theory because its approaches are too narrowly focused and are more concerned with theoretical

innovations than with theory building. This section examines the factors that lead realists to focus on the processes of alliance formation and disintegration by analyzing the two dominant traditional interpretations of alliance behavior—classical realism and neorealism—followed by neoclassical realist critiques of these approaches.

Both classical and structural realists share a number of fundamental assumptions about the nature of international relations and state behavior that direct their focus toward the formation and disintegration of military alliances over their persistence and dissolution. To begin with, rational, unitary states are the relevant actors in the international system. This is not to say that other actors do not exist or cannot influence state behavior but, in the end, states matter most. Furthermore, the interstate system is anarchic in that it does not have any hierarchical ordering principle, like a government, that may force states to keep promises or prevent them from using force to pursue their objectives. For the classical realists in particular, this international “state of nature” is coterminous with a “state of war.” States must always prepare for the possibility that others may use force against them, thus increasing uncertainty and the risk of war. Because states believe war may break out at any time, they are preoccupied with issues of security and survival. To achieve these goals they engage in self-interested, purposive behavior that often relies on power maximization and even war initiation. When all states behave in this manner, interstate relations are inherently conflictual, even if each state’s motives are purely defensive.

Classical realism

The classical realist tradition draws heavily on sociology and history to provide a comprehensive and sophisticated examination of alliance behavior, including the timing, composition, and even duration of pacts. Such analyses significantly contribute to our understanding of the place of alliances in a given international order. They are especially useful for the insight they provide into particular historical alliances. However, this strength is simultaneously a weakness, for as theorists achieve higher levels of sophistication and accuracy of description, they become less successful at satisfying the demands of prediction and generalizability. Thus, while this approach lends insight into particular alliances, and even small classes of alliances, it provides only a very general explanation for alliance behavior more broadly.

Theorists in this tradition share a set of assumptions in addition to those listed above. They emphasize interests and power as the driving force behind state behavior. The latter concept is not merely a means to some end as it is for their neorealist counterparts, but it may also be an end in itself. Furthermore, the distribution of power, especially capabilities, within a given state system does influence the behavior of its constituent parts. But capabilities are measured relatively such that it is not the absolute capabilities of any one state that influences foreign policy decisions; it is, rather, the relative distribution of

capabilities among a particular group of states.¹ In the classical balance of power tradition, the primary sources of alliances are to be found within a system of states.² Imbalances in the systemic distribution of power or the emergence of an external threat (especially to the existing balance) impel states to ally. The primary function of these pacts is to maintain the stability of a particular balance by deterring or defeating any nations seeking to destroy it.

All of these realist theorists agree on some basic points. Alliances are triggered by the emergence of an external threat to national security and are primarily a means to aggregate capabilities in order to maximize gains and minimize losses for the participating states while attempting to deter or defeat the common adversary. They add precision, predictability, and transparency to international affairs by distinguishing one's friends from one's adversaries in a given strategic environment. However, any particular alliance may also have secondary benefits and costs that can make them appear more or less costly as a

¹ Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," *Mershon International Studies Review* 41,1 (May 1997): 7.

² In the classical realist tradition, the system is composed of its units, their interaction (also known as process), and a structure. Process is not a defining component of the neorealist conception of the system, however. The *balance of power* within this system is subject to a number of different interpretations: it may be considered an equilibrium or roughly equal distribution of power among states; an automatic outcome of developments within a multistate system; a goal to pursue, or any distribution of power. Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 118-122; Hans J. Morgenthau "Alliances in Theory and Practice," in *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, ed. Arnold Wolfers, 184-212 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959). For a further critique of the uses of the term balance of power, see also Inis L. Claude Jr., "The Balance of Power Revisited," *Review of International Studies* 15,2 (1989).

security strategy for any given state. Alliances confer several advantages: they contribute to the internal stability and status of its member states by demonstrating to their respective domestic constituents that the state holds legitimacy among external actors. They also grant a degree of influence over allies, the right to be consulted in their foreign policy decisions, or even a role in the broader management of international or regional politics. Finally, membership may also be a bargaining tool, to be traded in return for concessions from the adversary (members of the Warsaw Pact, for example, promised to break their alliance in return for the dissolution of NATO).³

At the same time, however, an alliance may limit its signatories' policy options. The creation of an alliance may provoke adversaries to form a counter alliance, or even to engage in a preemptive or preventive war. Furthermore, no matter what its benefits, every alliance tends to generate fears of abandonment and entrapment among its member states. Each is worried about its allies deserting them in times of crisis. When abandonment does occur, the alliance becomes a cost for the remaining allies in terms of security lost. Yet allies must worry about entrapment as well. Whenever one state makes security commitments to another, it takes the risk of being drawn into a conflict in which

³ Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 22, 28, 49-50; Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1914: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, ed. Klaus Knorr (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), 228; George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 39, 116.

it has no interest. In such cases, alliances entail a significant loss of autonomy. They also may prove such a strain on a state's resources that ultimately it is incapable of fulfilling its own interests.⁴ Finally, every alliance entails a distribution of benefits (and costs) that tends to reflect the distribution of power among the allies. While such a disparity has always been a fact of alliance politics, it has grown even greater in the nuclear age as the gap between super, medium, and small powers has grown.

It follows from the classical realist understanding of the nature of states and the state system, as well as the potentially high costs of alliance building, that alliances do not arise from a "community of interests," but only from a pressing need to ward off common threats to national security. Because they are "against, and only derivatively for, someone or something,"⁵ alliances are merely strategies and instruments—a matter of expediency, to be employed only when states are unable to defend themselves, or when the benefits of such a relationship far outweigh the costs. States will also forego an alliance opportunity "when their interests so obviously call for concerted policies and actions that an explicit formulation of these interests, policies, and actions in the

⁴ Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 181. Snyder's work emphasizes the significance of abandonment and entrapment under conditions of multipolarity, when alliance commitments are more fluid. It is certainly more complex in such an environment, but allies do worry about these issues in bipolarity as well—especially once nuclear weapons enter the decision-making calculus.

⁵ Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, 12.

form of a treaty of alliance appears to be redundant."⁶ Furthermore, when alliances do form, these theorists expect them to be rather temporary and fluid phenomena. As Wolfers argues, "...any diminution of the external threat or of the will to meet it will tend to undermine cohesion and render futile any attempts to save the alliance by inward-directed 'diversions.'"⁷ An alliance is most cohesive and thus most likely to endure when the interests underlying it are significantly stronger than are the other interests of the nations concerned. It follows that an alliance *cannot* outlive a significant deterioration in threat. When threats recede members begin to pursue their own conflicting foreign policy interests, and cohesion weakens. There may be a brief lag, but the alliance will shortly disintegrate.

Of course, even in the face of an ongoing threat such an alliance may not endure. In addition to defeat, a number of factors may weaken the cohesion of the members, prompting them to dissolve the relationship. If costs increase substantially, forcing allies to turn to other, less expensive means of defense, they might reduce their commitments by limiting the scope or membership of the alliance or by turning to unilateral measures. Alternatively, the alliance may not perform to the initial expectations of its members, especially when the scope of the pact is sufficiently broad that the objectives of members overlap or even

⁶ Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," 185.

⁷ Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, 29.

conflict. In such circumstances, allies will abandon the alliance for a more effective strategy. Indeed, alliance relationships can erode because of severe coercion, intra-allied conflicts of interests and strategies, or transformations within the allied states that fundamentally alter their foreign policy interests. According to this approach, states that continue to face a unifying threat can bolster the alliance by fostering similar values, complementary interests, and an equal distribution of benefits, risks, and concessions, but such actions will *not* preserve the alliance in the absence of threat.⁸

Classical realist theorists also argue that particular types of alliances are especially prone to shorter life spans independent of levels of threat. The weaknesses of such arguments are twofold. First, such arguments are often contradictory and thus make only a limited contribution toward a general understanding of alliance behavior. Indeed, the existence of opposing theories that do have some empirical support indicates the need to reassess the literature as a whole. Second, these arguments do little to reveal the reasons for which a particular alliance disintegrates at one time and not another. For example, alliances among nuclear powers tend to be short-lived because security guarantees are not as credible as in a nuclear-free world; when nuclear weapons place the very physical survival of a state at stake, it will be unwilling to go to bat

⁸ Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), 29; George Liska, *Alliances in the Third World* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 56; Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, 56.

for its allies. Yet NATO remains *the* example of longevity. Although the nuclear guarantee has certainly been a source of tension among allies, the alliance persists. Likewise, some argue rigid alliances may also dissolve more easily, as they are less likely to achieve their goals, or members can become frustrated by an inability to influence policy. Others propose that the purpose of an alliance—that is, its offensive or defensive character—may also encourage persistence. Yet while some argue that offensive alliances disintegrate easily, others contend just the opposite. And in practice, it is often difficult to distinguish effectively between the two. Finally, some realists also suggest that general or broad alliances, composed of diverse interests and purposes, are more prone to deterioration.⁹ Again, the case of NATO raises serious questions. Although the alliance was created to deter the Soviet Union from engaging in a direct military attack and to prevent the spread of its Communist ideology, each member certainly entered the alliance to pursue its own interests and purposes. Even if the Communist threat was significant enough to bind the allies during the Cold War, why does the relationship persist? The arguments presented so far do not provide a convincing answer.

⁹ On these arguments see K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 119; Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration*, 25; Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems," *American Political Science Review* 59, 3 (1965): 601; A. M. Halpern, "The Emergence of an Asian Communist Coalition," *Annals* 349 (1963): 117; Liska, *Alliances in the Third World*, 39-40; Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," 191.

Summarizing this approach, alliances are but a means of distributing the costs of defense and of war. Because they limit the policy options of signatories, and tend to be more costly than other forms of military commitments, a "nation will shun alliances if it believes that it is strong enough to hold its own unaided or that the burden of the commitments resulting from the alliance is likely to outweigh the advantages to be expected."¹⁰ It follows that alliances are largely a matter of expediency, requiring convergence on other interests, only to the degree that such convergence allows the alliance to form and achieve its objectives.¹¹ Furthermore, classical realists tend to be less interested in the endurance or evolution of an alliance over time than in the cohesion of the partners and the overall performance of the alliance in the face of an imminent threat. These theorists pay little thought to the dynamics of the relationship, but instead treat alliances much as they treat the state—like a black box. The concern is less how allies formulate alliance strategy (this seems to follow from transformations in capabilities and interests), but how the alliance itself affects the stability of a given interstate system.

¹⁰ Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," 185.

¹¹ Of course, if there is complete agreement of interests, then there is no need for an alliance. It is merely redundant. *Ibid.*, 185.

Neorealism

Structural or neorealism emerged in response to classical realism's historicism and lack of cumulative theorizing. With an aim to create rigorous theories of state behavior, neorealists create systemic theories that draw on the principles of microeconomics. They look to the nature and functions of the interstate system to explain the behavior of its units (states), including the formation and dissolution of alliances. Although the differences between the two approaches are mostly methodological, the implications for the study of alliance behavior are great. While questions of conflict and war retain their centrality, neorealism is guided by an attempt to make the study of international relations more scientific and theory-driven. It critiques earlier scholarship for its emphasis on history and policy prescriptions and a concomitant inability to thoroughly explain and predict state behavior. Neorealist theorists distinguish themselves from classical realists by their efforts to link theoretical concepts with only a few variables to create explanations from which hypotheses can be inferred and tested.¹² Thus they turn to the idea that systems matter—that the organization of states affects their behavior and interactions. They take this idea even further by focusing on the system-wide distribution of power, or the polarity of the system (not merely inequalities among great powers).

¹² Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 17.

Yet there are multiple difficulties in applying neorealism to explanations of the contemporary great-power alliance system. The first is that at its core it is a general theory of state behavior, not especially intended to explain or predict the actions of individual states in particular circumstances. For instance, neorealists predict that states in an anarchic environment will engage in balancing behavior, but they cannot predict which coalitions will form.¹³ Furthermore, neorealism has a problem explaining change—or the lack thereof, as in the case of alliance persistence. It cannot account for the ongoing persistence of a great power alliance, like NATO, in the absence of a major systemic threat. Indeed, NATO is no longer an example of an alliance in which states balance against or bandwagon with a particular (and imminent) systemic threat.

The core assumptions of neorealism are highly specified. States, the dominant actors in international politics, are unitary and rational entities, much like firms in a market economy. In the formulation of policy in the military security realm each tends to act with one voice and in such a manner as to seek out the most efficient means for achieving their preferred ends.¹⁴ The international system in which they coexist is anarchic in that there is no

¹³ For this example, and a more general critique of Neorealism, see Patrick James, "Neorealism as a Research Enterprise: Toward Elaborated Structural Realism," *International Political Science Review* 14, 2 (1993).

¹⁴ The idea is not that domestic conflicts never influence policies at the international level, but that we can generally expect to see a coherent policy emerge in the military security realm, especially during periods of crisis. In other issue areas, various domestic groups may have better opportunity to exercise some voice and thereby lessen policy coherence. *Ibid.*, 126.

overarching authority to ensure that actors comply with agreements or normative orders. Because states must always be concerned with safeguarding their very survival, the environment is a highly conflictual one. States seek wealth and power above all else (the former being easily converted into the latter) as a means to this end. They are motivated by absolute as well as relative gains in power, although relative gains dominate their decision making calculus—even in relations among allies, since today's ally can easily become tomorrow's enemy.

Neorealists of all stripes de-emphasize the factors that drive classical realist analyses, such as states and statesmen, élites and bureaucracies, and subnational and transnational actors. For these approaches, international political outcomes are determined by "what states are like." Neorealists, in contrast, compare the operation of the state system to the operation of a market economy. As Waltz describes it:

The market of a decentralized economy is individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended. The market arises out of the activities of separate units... whose aims and efforts are directed not toward creating an order but rather toward fulfilling their own internally defined interests by whatever means they can muster. The individual unit acts for itself.¹⁵

In neorealist theory, it is transformations in systemic conditions that propel states to enter alliances. There are two primary alliance strategies within

¹⁵ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 61.

this perspective. The dominant strategy is to *balance* with the weaker side against a preponderant state or coalition to protect one's own position in the existing distribution of power. The alternative is to *bandwagon* with the preponderant power. Neorealist balance of power theorists expect balancing to be the dominant strategy because states are not interested in power for its own sake, but only as a means to ensure their security within an anarchic environment.

In one of the theory's more significant modifications, Stephen Walt argues that alignment decisions are not primarily determined by the distribution of capabilities within a given system, but by imbalances in threat. According to balance of threat theory, power is only one of several factors that make a particular state or coalition of states threatening. In such situations, the threatened states have two options: to balance against the threatening state or to bandwagon with it. In the modified theory, the concept of balancing does not significantly change: it is to ally with others against the perceived threat. As Schweller indicates, however, bandwagoning is understood quite differently in balance of threat theory, and becomes something akin to "capitulation."¹⁶

According to these structural perspectives, states then dissolve their alliances when the preponderant power is checked or the threat has been eliminated, and they will not create new pacts unless another such threat emerges to unify them once again. Neorealists have no systematic explanation

¹⁶ Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 68.

for alliance persistence *unless* a new threat emerges to rally the allies as the old threat declines or, alternatively, unless the new balance of power is equally as threatening to those states.

Yet NATO's persistence despite the fall of the Soviet alliance system and the end of bipolarity, has proven a challenge to neorealists. It has been argued, for example, that a threat continues to exist in the guise of a resurgent Soviet Union or Germany, and that there is a hegemon (that is, the U.S.) willing and able to keep the allies from straying. Another explanation is that NATO remains significant as a symbol of the credibility and resolve of the allies to defend their interests.¹⁷ The possibility of a resurgent threat was most plausible immediately following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, but in the following years, it has become less so. Not only does it appear that Germany has no interest in reasserting military control over Europe, but Russia (even if it had such an interest) has become incapable of doing so. In the contemporary environment, perhaps the two alternatives provide more plausible explanations for NATO's persistence—but for how long? It is not immediately obvious why the U.S. would remain willing to maintain such a burden in the absence of a significant systemic threat. From the neorealist perspective, it is even less clear why it was so strongly committed to the idea of inviting new allies into the club.

¹⁷ See for example, Stephen Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival* 39,1 (1997): 156–179; Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," *Political Science Quarterly* 111,1 (1996): 1–34.

Finally, the neorealist perspective does not indicate for how long the alliance may be expected to remain a symbol of credibility and resolve beyond the Cold War, bipolar conflict, or what conditions are necessary for its credibility to erode.

The greatest weakness of the neorealist approach is that "any foreign policy and its opposite can sometimes be deduced" from it.¹⁸ In hindsight, neorealism can provide an explanation (or even several) for why NATO persists, but had NATO dissolved immediately following the end of the Cold War, neorealism could have explained that too. The fact is that without a corresponding transformation in the systemic distribution of power or threat, the approach has difficulty explaining alliance formation or disintegration without resorting to ad hoc explanations. The same is true when alliance persistence occurs despite the occurrence of such change. Thus, the post-Cold War era poses significant challenges to neorealism, as the international system's rapid transformation from military bipolarity to unipolarity was not followed by the dissolution of *both* alliance systems, but only the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, the alliance that persists, NATO, continues to enlarge and evolve in the absence of an imminent military threat.

¹⁸ Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization* 44 (Spring 1990): 138.

Critiques of Neorealist Interpretations

Just as neorealism emerged as a response to the historicism of classical realism, another literature has developed in response to neorealism's focus on external sources of state behavior and the formalistic and rigid descriptions that result. This diverse literature attempts to reintegrate some of the sophistication of classical realism while ultimately achieving a more systematic and rigorous body of theory. As above, the tendency within this literature is to seek an innovative solution to the same sets of questions. While these scholars clearly are attempting to systematize the classical realist and neorealist traditions, they are less successful in building upon one another. The common thread in these critiques is a realization that the state in IR theory is not simply a "black box," co-acting with other like actors. Rather, states are differentiated in the international system, and their dissimilarities may be significant for their foreign policy decisions.

The staunchest critics argue that classical realist and neorealist theories emerged in response to the experiences of the European powers, which, once they had developed fairly legitimate and stable political systems, did not face serious internal threats. The greater threat originated from an external source, and in particular from other states. It has become more widely accepted in the post-Cold War era that the assumptions that operate well in this context are not as appropriate in other state systems and, especially, in the developing world where the distinctions between state, regime, and individual security may be very great. In these states, internal considerations may be equally (and

sometimes more) influential in the decision to enter an alliance. However, theorists continue to disagree on the significance of these internal considerations relative to external threats and interests.

Some scholars argue, for example, that many of these states are still engaged in a struggle to create a stable internal hierarchy of authority, and thus, their internal politics have elements of both hierarchy *and* anarchy. In these highly fragmented and often weak domestic systems, the government (which may not be coterminous with the state) is necessarily preoccupied with maintaining its power, often vis-à-vis domestic opponents.¹⁹ Thus, these actors tend to conceive of their security not in the narrow, traditional sense of *national military* security. Regime, economic, and societal interests often become important parts of the decision calculus, such that an externally oriented strategy may be a means for countering internally as well as externally originating threats.

One approach is to grant nearly equal weight to domestic and external threats. Stephen David argues that in particularly weak and illegitimate developing states in which the leadership often faces internal as well as external

¹⁹ For a detailed discussion of the differences between the established and the emerging states in the global system, see K.J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). In the postwar era, as norms of nonintervention have begun to take hold, even the weakest states have achieved "juridical sovereignty." See Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist," *World Politics* 35, 1 (1982); 1-24. Thus *overt* armed attack by a neighboring adversary is far less likely to pose a threat than is internal aggression, the spill-over of internal upheaval in a neighboring state, or some sort of externally originating *covert* aggression in support of domestic groups.

threats, a strategy that ignores threats from one source to manage those arising from another does so at its peril. Instead, such states will engage in a strategy of *omnibalancing*. That is, they will appease secondary adversaries as a means to balance against a primary threat. In practice, the state may engage in a bandwagoning strategy (that is, allying with a stronger external adversary) not for the traditional reasons, but to free up resources to manage a greater threat (which may be of an internal or external origin).²⁰

Another approach, labeled neoclassical realism, is to argue that systemic pressures are translated through intervening domestic level variables.²¹ Barnett and Levy's work provides an illustration of this perspective in the area of alliance theory. They argue, drawing on the case of Egypt, that states with weak or developing economies rarely have the option to use internal resources (such as building up armaments) to balance an external military threat. Such a strategy has multiple implications. In the long-term, it may deplete the economy of scarce resources, whereas in the short-term, as it redistributes very scarce resources to non-productive sectors of the economy and impoverishes the masses, it may

²⁰ Stephen David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 7.

²¹ Neoclassical realism is described as an approach to foreign policy that relies upon external as well as internal explanatory variables. In particular, theories that fall within this approach argue that power capabilities set the basic parameters for a state's foreign policy decision. Power is not easily converted into outcomes, because it must be translated through intervening variables at the domestic level. Thus decision-makers are constrained by both international and domestic politics. Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51,1 (1998): 144-172.

encourage political unrest that is threatening to the regime. Thus, domestic politics matter in the formation of alliance strategy, but only to the extent that they limit the state in the range of strategies it may choose to counter an external threat.²²

Such critiques of the earlier alliance literature are significant for highlighting the importance of domestic factors in foreign policy (and particularly alliance) decisions, but they do not bring us any closer to a theory of alliance persistence or evolution. Indeed, they cannot. Because power and survival remain fundamental to the approach, there is no provision by which states might become willing to remain allied once the threat is countered. That is, states will willingly ally "against" a threat, but there is nothing "for" which they will maintain the alliance once the threat recedes.

Alliance Classification and Theoretical Gaps

Thus far, the chapter has argued that assumptions and normative underpinnings of realist scholarship have contributed to its neglect of questions of alliance persistence and evolution. This section argues that there is a second reason as well. Although analysts do agree that the purpose of an alliance is to safeguard military (or national) security, in the drive to be innovative they have

²² Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73," *International Organization* 45:3 (Summer 1991): 369-395.

as of yet failed to reach a consensus in their operationalization of the concept. This failure to agree has proven an obstacle to the pursuit of a rigorous and systematic theory of alliance behavior on several levels. In fact, it is a significant contributing factor to the inconsistency in the findings of various alliance analyses, because in many cases, alliances are so broadly conceived as to include what are actually very different state strategies (as alliance *and* alignment). In such cases, analysts can do little more than provide broad generalizations of the behavior under scrutiny. Thus, it follows that "alliances seem fated to remain the subject either of generalizations which are too ambiguous to enlighten the analyst or of empirical studies which are too narrow to provide theoretical guidance."²³

The root of this problem lies in the phenomenal population of empirical examples, all based upon a common pledge to cooperate in the pursuit of military security, yet varying according to purpose, content, and form. An alliance may be unilateral (as in a security guarantee), bilateral, or multilateral. Furthermore, each ally may be of roughly equal size and strength, or there may be great asymmetries between them. The pact may be formed to fight a war or to protect the peace; to pursue purely offensive or purely defensive ends (although it is often difficult to fully distinguish the two); to be temporary or permanent; or to be institutionalized or not. The terms may be very general or limited to a

²³ Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, 57.

particular adversary or a precise threat. They may include one party's guarantee to protect the other(s), or promises of mutual assistance.²⁴ With so many variations in alliances, it is no wonder that a uniform conception has yet to be reached.

Table 1 presents a comparison of alternative conceptions of alliance agreements (most drawn from authoritative works in the field) to demonstrate how the lack of conceptual clarity, or of a single common usage, encourages these weaknesses and impedes the development of a cumulative body of theory. The table demonstrates that beyond an initial point of agreement on the pursuit of national security, analysts conceive alliances very differently in terms of their purpose, content, and form.

Considered together, these three traits determine the scope of the alliance. Analyses that employ a very broad conception are likely to present findings very different from those that employ a highly restrictive definition. Definitions 1 and 2 illustrate the latter case. In such instances, a military relationship may only be

²⁴ The following works elaborate on these distinctions among alliances: Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," 188; Robert Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 25.

Table 1
Alternative Conceptions of Alliance Agreements

	<i>I. Alliances</i>	<i>Formal</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Minimum Nature of Commitment</i>	<i>Means</i>	<i>Scope</i>
1	"a formal agreement pledging states to cooperate in using their military resources against a specific state or states, usually obligating one or more signatories to use force, or consider the use of force in specified circumstances"	Yes	Specified	Capability aggregation; employ force	Requires military force	Restricted
2	"formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership"	Yes	Specified	Use military force	Involves military force	Restricted
3	"a written, formal agreement among two or more states which is designed to serve, for a specified term, the interests of those states, or of their statesmen and bureaucrats, in regard to national security"	Yes	Unspecified	Unspecified	Highly flexible	Broad
4	"an agreement to cooperate on a national security problem, made explicit through written treaty"	Yes	Unspecified	Unspecified	Highly flexible	Broad
5	"a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states"	No	Unspecified	Unspecified	Highly flexibly	Very Broad
6	"formal or informal security cooperation, with mutual expectations of policy coordination on security issues under certain conditions in the future. Neither the degree or form of coordination or the conditions under which it would take place need be explicit"	No	Unspecified	Policy coordination	Flexible	Very Broad
7	a formal or written treaty or agreement "between or among sovereign state members of the international system," subsuming defense pacts, neutrality or nonaggression pacts, and ententes"	Yes	--	Policy coordination/ military cooperation	Highly flexible	Broad
8	<i>Alliances are formal and public agreements between two or more states to consult or collaborate on national security issues, stipulating the general conditions under which cooperation is to take place, and the nature of the commitment, but not always the precise degree or form of cooperation necessary to fulfill it.</i>	Yes	Specified	Policy coordination	Flexible	Moderate

II. Classes of Alliances		Formal	Purpose	Minimum Nature of Commitment	Means	Scope
9	Defense Pact	Yes	Specified	Intervention	Low/Force	Restricted
10	Nonaggression Pact	Yes	Specified	Non-intervention	Limits Force	Restricted
11	Entente	Yes	Specified	Consultation and cooperation	Flexible	Restricted
III. Other						
12	Alignment	No	--	None/pre-disposition	Highly flexible	Extremely Broad

ⁱ Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*, 25.

ⁱⁱ Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 4.

ⁱⁱⁱ Roger V. Dingman, "Theories of, and Approaches to, Alliance Politics," in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 249.

^{iv} Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 57.

^v Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) 12.

^{vi} Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments," 370.

^{vii} Bueno de Mesquita and Singer, "Alliances, Capabilities, and War: A Review and Synthesis," in *Political Science Annual: An International Review* 4 (1972), 243.

categorized as an alliance when it is based upon a formal agreement to cooperate, usually expressed in the form of a written treaty. Furthermore, the allies' goals and the means of achieving them are clearly specified in the agreement. The agreement is not totally inflexible, though. Such restrictive conceptions might specify, for example, the use of military force or the aggregation of capabilities, but allies may nonetheless exercise some discretion. (In practice, of course, one's interpretation of the conditions that call upon the allies to act is also left open.) The advantage of such definitions is that they are rigorous and are easily applied. The disadvantage is that by placing such a strong emphasis on formally expressed goals and the means to achieving them, the analyst is predisposed to slight the less tangible functions of alliances, like gaining influence over allies or increasing domestic stability.

In the other case, when alliances are understood very broadly (e.g., definitions 5 and 6), a formal agreement to cooperate may or may not be necessary, and their underlying goals, as well as the means to achieve these goals, may be ill defined or even unspecified. The issue of formality is very significant. Many such broad conceptions do not require that the goals of the pact or the minimum nature of the commitment be specified, thus they subsume everything from very explicit attempts to cooperate in a narrow issue-area to informal agreements for general cooperation. For example, if informal agreements are included, how is the analyst to determine if a particular instance

of cooperation is based on the informal agreement, or if it simply reflects a policy convergence?

Furthermore, the disparate relationships encompassed by the concept may have different implications for the analysis that is being undertaken. Theory testing and theory building are ultimately compromised because analyses are likely to present findings that are little more than generalizations. If one is making the argument that allies hesitate to enter alliances because of fears of abandonment, some kinds of alliances are going to be less likely to generate such fears. A formal agreement that has concrete goals and specifies the general conditions under which cooperation is to take place but leaves the allies some flexibility in exactly how they will meet those commitments will probably generate fewer fears of abandonment. One that simply calls for "security cooperation" does not communicate the same degree of commitment or credibility, and hence may foster such fears.

In this research, alliances are conceived in the following manner:

Alliances are formal and public agreements between two or more states to consult or collaborate on national security issues, stipulating the general conditions under which cooperation is to take place, and the nature of the commitment, but not always the precise degree or form of cooperation necessary to fulfill it.

From this perspective, alliances require a formal and "contractual" obligation, and the parties must publicly acknowledge that the alliance exists—for example,

via a written treaty or public pronouncement.²⁵ Furthermore, the agreement itself must stipulate the general conditions under which it would come into force, such as the presence of an imminent military threat, or a direct military attack. It may even pledge to counter threats originating from sources internal to one or more allies. These conditions need not be limited to those indicated here, but they need to be specified. A relationship that is left ill defined in this respect is better considered as an alignment than an alliance.²⁶ Finally, the agreement must also indicate to the minimum nature of the commitment. Allies may merely aggregate their capabilities to deter or counter a common threat, or they may coordinate their resources and policies. Some may even consider a joint command and operation. However, the details of the commitment may be left open to allow for flexibility in implementation

Thus, from this perspective, the *ends* (or purpose) of a given alliance and the *nature of the commitment* must be specified. This emphasis on a specific

²⁵ The term "contractual" is used to indicate not only that the agreement is formal, and that there is some element of reciprocity involved. An agreement that is a one-sided guarantee is not an alliance in the truest sense.

²⁶ An alignment is a much broader relationship, defined by actions rather than formal treaties; "a behavioral disposition of some states to employ a predisposed posture of a collaborative and cooperative nature with other states. ...more a matter of degree than of kind." It is a predisposition, or an expectation, rather than a formal agreement to engage in military cooperation with a particular partner. It may become most visible when both parties face threats, but it is usually based on a prior foundation—common ideologies, ethnic composition historical experiences, or geo-strategic location. Some confusion is understandable, as nations in alignment may frequently enter alliances with one another. However, the reverse—that nations in alliance tend to also be in alignment—generally is not true. Michael D. Ward, *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics* (Denver: Graduate School of International Studies, University

purpose has an additional benefit. Alliances are often created not only to aggregate capability or to gain promises of assistance, but frequently they are also a means, even implicitly, to communicate one's intentions and ascertain the intentions of others. Alliances that are so broad as to be nearly void of substance cannot fulfill this function. The minimum nature of the commitment is consultation or collaboration, but nothing precludes allies from engaging in a more binding commitment—up to and including the joint use of military force. The precise *means* of implementing the commitment may be left open, to allow some flexibility to achieving the ends and to not give too great an advantage to the adversary.

This conceptualization has the additional advantage of allowing classes of alliances to be distinguished. Part II of Table 1 compares defense pacts, non-aggression pacts, and ententes according to the same criteria used to compare alliances. The form of cooperation among partners distinguishes these three alliance strategies. In a *defense pact* allies agree to intervene on behalf of a treaty partner that is attacked, whereas in *non-aggression* pacts they agree *not* to intervene. In an *entente* they agree to consult and cooperate to pursue national security interests, particularly when facing a common military threat.²⁷ Each of

of Denver 1982), 7.

²⁷ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and J. David Singer define ententes in this manner. "Alliance Capabilities and War: A Review and Synthesis," in *Political Science Annual: An International Review* 4 (1972): 243. Some theorists have made the reverse argument that an entente is actually a less formal and more flexible relationship than is an alliance. R.A. Kann, for example, defines an entente as a flexible agreement of cooperation

these relationships is of a very limited scope, but falls squarely within definition 8. Lastly, Table 1 also illustrates the ways in which an alignment is different from an alliance strategy. An alignment is not a formal commitment, but rather a predisposition to cooperate. As an informal agreement to employ flexible means toward unspecified ends, it is really too broad a strategy to be considered an alliance.

Clearly there is nothing in this discussion to indicate that realist approaches to conceptualizing alliances have become inapplicable. The definition I present here does not contradict the existing literature, but rather, attempts to synthesize it. In fact, one really cannot adequately discuss interstate military alliances without turning to this tradition.

Thus far, this research does not definitively solve the problem of analyses arriving at fundamentally opposing conclusions. Rather, it has suggested why it is that realist scholarship has tended to focus exclusively on a narrow set of research questions. The short answer, in summary, is that realist approaches are limited by their starting assumptions and by a tendency to emphasize theoretical innovation over cumulation. Thus, even as evidence accumulates that is not easily explained by this narrow view of alliance behavior, realists have not been seriously challenged to probe new (and highly relevant) research questions.

between two sovereign powers, while Snyder conceptualizes them as "agreements that tacitly raise expectations of mutual support by reducing the amount of conflict between the parties." Kann, "Alliances Versus Ententes," *World Politics* 28 (July 1976): 611n; and Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 11.

Instead, they continue to probe the same issues in search of a definitive solution. The following sections suggest how one might elaborate upon existing approaches to arrive at a solution to the new research questions regarding alliance persistence and evolution.

Alliance Persistence and Evolution

The narrow assumptions that underpin realist theory and the drive to produce innovative explanations (exemplified by the numerous conceptions of "alliance") have impeded the development of a general theory of alliance behavior. Even as NATO has undergone processes of expansion and evolution, researchers have yet to seriously question the existing literature on these points. Section three suggests a starting point: that not all alliances fit squarely into the realist alliance model. Alliances that must deal with multidimensional threats can evolve into a tighter (and less fluid) relationship capable of withstanding significant transformations in their strategic environment. This section examines alternative approaches to alliance theory, in particular theories that emphasize intra-alliance bargaining, international norms, public goods and joint product models, and institutionalization. In discussing issues of alliance management in some depth, these approaches indirectly suggest how alliances may persist or evolve. The insights they provide into these processes imply theoretical innovations that ultimately can contribute to the development of a cumulative body of alliance theory. In the end, these approaches fall short of providing a

theory of alliance persistence and evolution, as they (like the realist theories discussed above) require there be an adversary or an external threat to fuel the alliance.

Intra-alliance Bargaining

Glenn Snyder offers the most comprehensive treatment of alliance management from this perspective.²⁸ He argues that states manage their alliances to preserve the relationship and to maximize the benefits they receive from it, including control or influence over allies. The joint and divergent interests that underlie every alliance will create centrifugal tendencies that threaten to tear the alliance apart. If it is to persist, the membership must counter these tendencies. To maintain the relationship and maximize their own rewards, allies negotiate the coordination of military plans, burden sharing, the scope of the alliance agreement, the membership of the alliance, and even how to manage intra-alliance conflicts. Each ally's position and bargaining power reflect its dependence on and commitment to the alliance as well as its comparative interest in the particular object of the negotiations. In short-term conflicts, allies will seek to maximize individual interests, whereas in conflicts with long-term implications, they will attempt to manipulate a mix of security and autonomy within a given alliance.

²⁸ Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, chapter 6.

Norms

Yet do “alliance commitments carry any weight beyond the interests that underlie them,”²⁹ as an emphasis on bargaining might suggest? Some scholars argue that they do; that they have normative underpinnings. An analysis can become far more “realistic” and sophisticated with the incorporation of norms; that is, guides of behavior that prescribe and proscribe certain actions. The works cited here do not address issues of alliance persistence or evolution directly; indeed, their contention is that “alliances have no meaning apart from the adversary threat to which they are a response.”³⁰ However, they do provide an explanation for “delays” in the dissolution of alliances and can be modified to lend insight into long-term persistence and even evolution.

Whether theorists explicitly acknowledge it or not, all alliances operate within a particular normative order. One kind of alliance norm regulates how binding commitments should be. Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond, for example, compare alliance commitments under the norm *causula rebus sic stantibus* (“as matters stand”) and *pacta sunt servanda* (“pacts made in good faith are binding”). Even those theories that emphasize the fluidity of alliance commitments (either following changes in system structure or the interests of the

²⁹ Ibid., 353.

³⁰ Ibid., 192.

actors involved) implicitly acknowledge norm-driven behavior. They assume the interstate order is driven by the former norm of *causula rebus sic stantibus*, which prescribes that states abrogate alliance commitments whenever conditions change. That is, commitments are binding only so long as the conditions under which they were negotiated still hold. Alternatively, by the norm of *pacta sunt servanda*, states should not renege on their commitments simply because there has been a change in circumstances. In theory this norm should encourage rigid alliance systems, yet to what extent are states really willing to allow their obligations to prevail over their interests? ³¹

Although Kegley and Raymond are most concerned with the impact of alliance norms on the international system, their distinction between binding and non-binding alliance commitments can lend insight into the emerging research agenda of alliance persistence and evolution. In particular, the suggestion that “the correspondence between alliance norms and alliance performance will never be congruent” indicates that there may be a significant delay between transformations in the global alliance norms and the behavior or performance of alliances. Although these scholars ultimately expect that the alliance will dissolve, the possibility of alliance persistence emerges—especially if a new normative order were to develop.

³¹ Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 89–93.

A second kind of norm influencing alliance behavior regulates the kind of support allies should provide one another. Significantly, allies tend to extend support short of the *casus foederis*. In fact, allies often expect cooperation on lesser issues, especially political issues related to the ultimate military commitment, but sometimes to other military contingencies as well. Snyder emphasizes four issues in particular:

...the making of the alliance tacitly entails a recognition that the parties have a wide range of common interests going beyond the common interest in mutual defense. Second, the allies will strive, so far as possible, to agree on a common policy of joint action with respect to those interests. Third, they expect to consult and to be consulted before undertaking any significant unilateral moves toward the adversary. Fourth in any dealings with the adversary, and indeed, in their foreign policy generally, they will consider and promote the interests of the ally, so far as this is consistent with their own vital interests.³²

Snyder argues that states adhere to alliance norms for moral and practical reasons. They may believe it is a good thing to keep promises, for example, but at the same time, as allies practice the norm and do keep their promises, their trust in one another grows and ultimately reduces their fears of abandonment. As their behavior becomes more predictable, levels of uncertainty (regarding their interactions) decline. The norm of consultation similarly mediates fears of entrapment and decreases the costs of intra-alliance bargaining.

³² Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 357.

Here the implications for alliance persistence are even greater. Once these practices become standard operating procedures among a group of allies—especially in an alliance that endures over a long period of time, like NATO—one would not expect the allies to terminate them immediately after a threat recedes. Rather, it would seem that these practices would continue to have a significant practical value in the new (and presumably uncertain) security environment—even if there is no new adversary to counter.

Public Good Models

In contesting some of realism's most important claims regarding alliance formation, these theories begin to address questions of alliance persistence and evolution. Public good theories of alliance behavior contest the realist claim that states are likely to shun security pacts. In fact, some actually may be more inclined to enter alliances if a stronger or wealthier power will provide the security they are unable or unwilling to supply themselves.³³ However, these theories tend to be less concerned with formation and disintegration issues than with the particular distribution of burdens among alliance partners.

This approach characterizes alliances as producing a public good—defense or deterrence. For deterrence to be a public good, it must be

³³ Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 48, 3 (1966); Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

nonexcludable and nonrival among the allies. A nonexcludable good is available to all of the allies (i.e., it cannot be apportioned to some and withheld from others), and a nonrival good can be consumed by one ally without diminishing the benefits available to the others. In fact, the opportunity for each to consume the good does not decline, even as the number of allies may increase. Because public goods are nonexcludable and nonrival, an independent allocation process results in an unequal sharing of defense burdens, such that the greatest burdens go to the strongest members, who also happen to have the most to lose from an attack. Since they place a greater value on the public good of deterrence (or defense), they are willing to shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden of providing it. Furthermore, because the good the alliance provides is nonexcludable the smaller members can enjoy the benefits of the good without having to contribute "their share"; they *free ride* off the security which the dominant ally or allies provide. This is the *exploitation hypothesis*.

Modifications of the model question the conception of deterrence and defense as public goods. Rather, they may not be totally nonexcludable and nonrival goods. According to the joint product model, when multiple products are present (e.g., deterrent weapons like long-range strategic weapons *and* protective weapons like anti-submarine weapons) the benefits of military activity may be purely public, impurely public and/or private. Deterrent weapons, which rely on the threat of retaliation, are traditionally viewed as producing pure public benefits; so long as there is a common enemy, they are nonrival.

Defensive weapons, in contrast, are viewed as producing impure public and private benefits. They are intended to limit damage once an attack begins, but cannot do so equally for all allies. In fact, increasing the conventional defense of one ally may increase the vulnerability of another. Yet in practice this distinction (deterrence = public and defense = private) is not so easy to maintain, as deterrent weapons can be used with a degree of exclusion and defensive weapons can have a significant deterrent value.³⁴

It follows that free riding will decline as the private and impure public benefits of defense increase. As the proportion of defense spending that results in private or impure public goods increases, so must the contribution of each ally; "allies will increasingly reveal their true willingness to pay."³⁵ A second implication is that the size of the alliance takes on new significance. When the goods the alliance provides are nonrival and nonexcludable, the size of the alliance is irrelevant. The alliance can take on new members without diminishing the security available to all. However, private and impurely public goods are subject to thinning such that not all allies benefit equally from their provision.

³⁴ On these models see Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, *The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present and Into the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Todd Sandler, "The Economic Theory of Alliances," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, 3 (1993): 446-483; James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler, "NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change: Further Observations" *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (March 1991): 109-114; John Duffield provides a review of the "waves" of economic theories of alliances in "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory" in *Explaining International Relations Since 1945*, ed. Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 345-351.

³⁵ Sandler, "The Economic Theory of Alliances," 463.

Indeed, some allies may even become more vulnerable, as when mobilizing troops on one ally's border reduces the number of troops available to protect other allies. Such alliances can only enlarge until "the marginal benefits from the reduced cost...match the marginal thinning costs imposed on the alliance."³⁶

Another approach refines the idea of multiple goods still further. Alliances produce multiple public goods like financial aid, international monetary and economic stability, and political solidarity. Within the coalition, allies may specialize in the provision of these goods according to their comparative advantage. As they trade these specialized goods for the public good of military defense the efficiency and security of the alliance increases and the problem of free riding becomes less divisive. Allies are more likely to tolerate free riding in one policy area if the free rider is contributing in other areas. This facilitates agreements among allies and encourages a more optimal provision of goods within the alliance.³⁷

These variations on the public goods approach contribute significantly to the alliance literature, for seriously examining the dynamics of alliance maintenance and indicating the conditions under which an alliance is likely to perform to the satisfaction of its members. The public goods approach can begin to answer questions like, why does the U.S. continue to maintain NATO and

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Mark A. Boyer, *International Cooperation and Public Goods: Opportunities for the Western Alliance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

what is the value of alliance enlargement? On the latter point, the approach can also draw insights into why NATO chose to invite Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to become allies, but not Slovenia or Romania. That is, as opposed to neorealist theory, this approach can explain the form that an alliance takes.³⁸

Institutionalization

Coalition theorists can provide a stronger account of alliance persistence, because while threats persist the membership creates institutional means, like veto or broker rules, for settling disputes that arise within the coalition. When the external threat later declines, these coalitions may persist because 1) there are real benefits to be gained by each member and 2) the means of settling any disputes over the distribution of these benefits have been institutionalized. Withdrawal, or exit, may occur "[w]hen the rewards of coalition participation become very small or future capacity to command benefits is estimated to be poor...."³⁹ This approach introduces a number of arguments novel to the classic alliance literature; namely, regarding the problem of alliance persistence beyond the presence of a common external threat. However, in spite of this advance, it

³⁸ For a comprehensive treatment of these issues, see Sandler and Hartley, *The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present, and Into the 21st Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

³⁹ Kelley, E. W., "Theory and the Study of Coalition Behavior," in *The Study of Coalition Behavior: Theoretical Perspectives and Cases From Four Continents*, ed. Sven Groennings, E. W. Kelley, and Michael Leiserson: 481-489 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970).

still does not achieve a model, let alone a theory, of alliance persistence/disintegration. While it does provide some understanding and explanation of why an alliance may persist as threats recede, because the argument relies so heavily on calculations of benefits and expected utility, it really only can be used to provide an *ex post facto* explanation of alliance decisions. It is unable to predict the persistence or disintegration of alliances.

While none of these approaches to alliance management examines alliance persistence directly, each suggests some causal factors that can be incorporated in such a theory and thereby contribute to our general understanding of alliances, as well as alliance persistence more specifically. It is not the purpose of this chapter to synthesize these four literatures, but to suggest (in a preliminary way) how they can contribute to a theoretical approach capable of explaining alliance persistence and evolution as well as formation and dissolution.⁴⁰ The alternative does not wholly reject the classical or neorealist arguments for alliance persistence and disintegration, for as I have attempted to indicate, both remain valid for understanding various aspects of alliance behavior. The alternative, however, suggests how one might go about filling in the theoretical gaps that these traditional approaches generate.

The tendency for some alliances to institutionalize, as discussed in section three's model, should be considered as a condition that enables alliance

⁴⁰ This argument is developed much more thoroughly in chapter 2.

persistence. Institutionalization occurs when states face multiple kinds of threats, and it allows allies (1) to increase the costs of exiting the relationship and thereby ensure that they will not abandon one another in a crisis, but also (2) to maximize the performance of the alliance by facilitating consultation and cooperation. To the extent that the institutionalized alliance does meet this second condition and thereby reduces uncertainty in the interactions of these states, the practical value of the relationship may provide it with some rationale for persisting beyond a significant decline in systemic threat. However, this is not sufficient to explain an evolution in the substance or the membership of the alliance. Here the literatures on norms and public goods lend insight. As an alliance institutionalizes, the norms upon which it is based will formalize and strengthen and may engender a higher level of commitment to the relationship, and may even encourage allies to transform the substance and scope of the alliance to meet their needs in a transformed environment. Public goods models, in evaluating the contributions prospective allies can make to the provision of the alliance's goods, suggest the directions in which an alliance may enlarge to most efficiently meet the new security needs.

Model of "Alliance" Strategy

This section attempts to demonstrate how the traditional power-politics alliances that have so dominated the international relations literature are merely one of *four* types of "alliance" strategies available.⁴¹ A typology of "alliance" policy choices (see Figure 1) presents the other three strategies—institutionalized alliances, nonalignment, and isolationism—that are largely neglected in the mainstream theoretical literature. States adopt the strategy that will most effectively and efficiently reduce the mix of threats they face as well as assist them to meet their other foreign policy goals.

The horizontal axis gauges the degree of military threat states face.




Figure 1: A Model of "Alliance" Strategies

⁴¹ I place the word alliance in quotation marks in this context, because the range of behaviors it subsumes is not limited to alliances per se, but rather incorporates decisions to enter and abstain from alliance strategies. Unfortunately, no single term

Traditionally security has referred to national *military* security, which includes the freedom from war and other external threats, and the capacity to pursue successfully one's present and future interests.⁴² Indeed, states do not enter military alliances in the absence of threats of this nature. Stability and status, in contrast, represent *nonmilitary* sources of threat. Stability⁴³ refers to the absence of major disruptions in the political and economic configurations of the international system. Instability may occur if, for example, there is an abrupt shift in the balance of either order, the emergence of a political or economic vacuum, a rising challenger to the system, or a significant change in the number of actors. (Such threats to the military realm, while potentially destabilizing, fall squarely into the *military* security realm.) Finally, status indicates the prestige a state has in relation to other members of the system. All else being equal, states will adopt the strategy that maximizes their global or regional prestige.

Figure 1 illustrates how different combinations of threats can influence alliance choices. Traditionally fluid power politics alliances fall in quadrant 3, because they emerge when pure national security threats dominate the strategic

adequately encompasses this range of behaviors.

⁴² Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 4-7, 16-17.

⁴³ Stability can refer to both the domestic and interstate realms, and indeed Liska uses the term in *Nations in Alliance* in reference to both domains (p. 30). For the most part however, traditional realist literature has discussed the importance of stability in the international/systemic military balance, and more recent critiques have focused on the importance of internal political stability in influencing foreign policy decisions.

environment. It need not be true that in any absolute sense there are *no* threats to stability and status, but rather, threats of a military nature are significantly stronger. Alliances as the traditional realists conceive them fall into this category. Collaboration is necessary to counter such threats, but no greater cooperation is sought for all the reasons realists elaborate. For example, states would shun efforts to make cooperation binding or long-term, fearing that doing so would restrict their ability to act quickly in their own national interest. They might also reject such efforts for fear that they will strengthen a state that could one day become an adversary.

Yet situations arise when states encounter significant threats on both military *and* nonmilitary dimensions; that is, when there is a threat to security as well as to status and/or stability (quadrant 1). States thus threatened will respond by creating an alliance, but not of the fluid nature that realists predict, for in this context self-seeking behavior on the part of any one state can profoundly destabilize the entire system. Whereas when a state faces primarily military threats it may be in its best interest to act to ensure its own survival. In contrast, when threats are multidimensional, unilateral measures that are taken without regard for the interests of others may weaken an already unstable economic, political, or security environment and thereby augment the threat to all states. To prevent the corresponding destabilization, states become willing to give up some freedom of action to a consultation process. They create an

alliance—necessary to counter the military threat—but tailor, or otherwise institutionalize, it so that it is capable of managing the multiple threats.⁴⁴

Indeed, many empirical examples of alliances that have been analyzed in the traditional manner might actually fit in this category. Consider, just for example, the Quadruple Alliance created at least in part to counter the potential political threat emanating from France in the years following the revolution. Alternatively, the Bismarckian alliance system was intended not just to maintain a particular balance of power, but to manage and maintain some influence over the foreign policies of neighbors.⁴⁵

In the second quadrant, states perceive that threats to stability or status are actually *more* severe or imminent than military threats. Under these circumstances, states tend to opt for a strategy of nonalignment or neutralism; these are foreign policy orientations in which they avoid involvement in great power alignments and alliances, particularly those that are intended to manage great power disputes. These represent conscious, and often active, efforts to exercise an independent foreign policy.⁴⁶ Finally, in quadrant 4, if there are no

⁴⁴ These alliances take one of two forms. They are either true multilateral alliances or they are networks of bilateral alliances. Bilateral alliances will rarely institutionalize because it is easier to cooperate through existing diplomatic and intergovernmental channels without creating new structures. As soon as the number of states increases, the new channels are necessary for efficient communication and coordination.

⁴⁵ Schroeder provides a highly persuasive argument regarding the management function of many alliances. "Alliances, 1815-1914."

⁴⁶ Philippe Braillard and Mohammad-Reza Djalili, *The Third World and International Relations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986); Y. Etinger, ed., *NAM History*

strong threats on either dimension, states will tend to choose isolationism. Unlike neutrality, an isolationist course is not grounded in international law, and "neither relies on commitments by other nations to give assistance in defense nor involves the country in such commitments to others."⁴⁷ In effect, isolationism is a policy by which a state withdraws from the international sphere.

Each of these alliance strategies may be pursued to differing degrees. In fact, some alliances may move within a quadrant or across quadrants over time. That is, all else being equal, the stronger the military threats states face in the absence of other threats, the more fluid one would expect their alliances to be. The stronger the threats on both dimensions, the more institutionalized we would expect them to become.

Figure 2 below suggests how several alliances might be placed on this diagram. NATO was created not as the institutionalized alliance we know today, but as a traditional military alliance. Although postwar Europe faced serious

and Reality: A Study (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Private Limited, 1987); and D. R. Goyal, *Nonalignment: Concepts and Concerns* (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1986).

⁴⁷ Arnold Wolfers, *Alliance Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), 50. Isolationism is conceptually distinct from neutrality. The latter refers to a special status under international law by which a state has the right not to be drawn into international conflicts. In return for this right, it is obligated to remain outside of all great power military disputes. Holsti, *International Politics*, 87-88. Neutrality, although a legitimate foreign policy strategy, is not included in the typology because it "is a status chosen by a state confronted by an imminent or existing war, and accepted by the belligerents in that war." That is, it is a wartime strategy that is not so much the choice of the neutral as "the exercise of a choice by the belligerent." Peter Calvocoressi, "Neutrality Now," in *Neutral States and the European Community*, ed. Sheila Harden (London: Brassey's, 1994), 144, 155. The other strategies are pursued in both times of peace and war.

threats in the military, social, and economic realm, the war-ravaged states perceived that the greatest threat emanated from a resurgent Germany or an expansionist Soviet Union and that security had to be achieved before economies and societies could be rebuilt. However, it very quickly became apparent to these states that non-military threats (such as communist subversion) might prevent military security from being achieved if they were not countered simultaneously. Thus in 1950, NATO began its process of institutionalization. This process has continued until the present day. The Warsaw Pact, in contrast, was created in an environment in which both military and non-military threats loomed large. These allies did fear a military threat emanating from NATO, but they feared the threat of a resurgent Germany even more so. They simultaneously perceived a threat to the Communist system or way of life, since the Cold War was as much an ideological confrontation as a military one.

The placement of SEATO on this diagram is significant, for it demonstrates that "all else is *not* necessarily equal." SEATO was created as a fairly fluid alliance with a loose organizational structure. While a number of allies would have liked to have the organization become a robust institution on the NATO model, this was not to be, largely due to U.S. resistance to the idea. But in reality, even a SEATO designed according to the NATO model would not have been appropriate to the strategic context in which it was intended to




Figure 2: An Application of the Model

operate. Thus, there are two references to SEATO on the diagram. The SEATO in black refers to the actual organization, as just described. In gray, SEATO falls in the nonaligned quadrant. In fact, SEATO should probably have not existed at all (or certainly not as a military alliance), as the primary threats to the regional members were not so much military threats, but the threat of communist infiltration and subversion. A military alliance with Western powers and the U.S. in particular in some cases increased these latter threats. Their individual security *might* have been served better by remaining neutralist.⁴⁸

The purpose of this section has been to illustrate how some alliances can form under conditions distinct from those hypothesized by realist theorists, and thereby evolve into a stronger cooperative relationship than realists posit. This model does not assert that realist theory is wrong or inaccurate, but that it

⁴⁸ Although this is perhaps more true by the 1970s than during the 1950s and early 1960s.

applies to a narrower range of circumstances than its proponents often acknowledge. A claim that to understand this narrow range of behavior is to understand all there is to know about alliance theory is simply erroneous. Furthermore, it contributes to an analysis of international relations that is unable to isolate alliances from similar, but distinct, relationships among states.

Conclusion

This critique of the realist literature on alliances has attempted to demonstrate how realist theories have difficulty fully accounting for particular alliance behaviors that are present in the international system: alliance persistence and evolution. Because of the nature of the questions these theorists ask, as well as their underlying assumptions about the nature of states, the interstate system, and state behavior, they are unable to provide a systematic explanation of these phenomena. Rather they must rely on ad hoc explanations that do contribute to our general understanding of how various alliances can operate, but that do not encourage the creation of a general theory of alliance behavior. The alternative offered here argues that in fact realist theorists are really examining only one aspect of alliance behavior. If we recognize that narrow military alliances are only one kind of "alliance" strategy that states can pursue, we begin to understand the process of alliance persistence and evolution—two processes that have not received adequate attention in the literature. Chapter two addresses these puzzles in arguing that the process of

institutionalization that occurs in some alliances may actually promote alliance persistence, evolution, and even erosion. This occurs as institutionalization increases the absolute costs of dissolving the relationship and as it creates alternative mechanisms for consultation and cooperation such that states are better able to protect their interests from within the alliance than from without it.

Chapter 2

Alliances as Institutions: A Model of Persistence and Dissolution

Chapter 1 challenged the traditional realist assumption that alliances can only persist or evolve in the presence of a military threat. The basis of the argument was that realist explanations are subject to two weaknesses: they are too focused on a narrow range of alliance strategies and they are more concerned with theoretical innovations than theory building. As a result, realist explanations of alliance behavior cannot satisfactorily explain a number of behaviors present in postwar and post-Cold War alliance relationships, including the persistence, evolution, and enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But there were also a number of alliance transformations during the Cold War that traditional alliance theory cannot easily explain. For example, why did France pull out of the joint military structure of NATO, but not the alliance itself? Why did Romania follow a similar path in its Warsaw Pact relations? Furthermore, why did the allies allow a partial withdrawal in these instances, but not, for example, when New Zealand, a small Pacific state with no direct bearing on the Cold War conflict, attempted to change the terms of the alliance with its superpower ally?

This chapter begins to address such puzzles in the alliance literature by developing the following argument: The process of institutionalization that occurs in some alliances may impede dissolution since institutionalization

promotes alliance persistence, evolution, and even erosion (1) by increasing the costs (material and nonmaterial) of dissolving the relationship and (2) by creating alternatives to dissolution. The effects of institutionalization are evident even following a significant transformation in the strategic environment or a precipitous decline in performance. Material costs rise as allies structure cooperation through regular and reliable channels such that more issues become linked and, ultimately, states gain access to a larger range and better quality of information. Nonmaterial costs rise as intra-alliance norms induce a form of attachment to the institution and thereby instill in it a value independent of the material benefits it provides. When abrogating the alliance is the only means available to protect one's interests, allies will do so even if the costs are high in an absolute sense. However, as institutionalization produces new and ever-more encompassing mechanisms for consultation and cooperation, such as expanded diplomatic channels or operational procedures, states have the option of protecting their interests from within the alliance.

The argument adopts Albert Hirschman's model examining the interplay of exit, voice, and loyalty¹ as it elucidates the conditions under which states will prefer persistence (and the use of voice) to dissolution (exit). The chapter argues that states will be unlikely to exit institutionalized alliances immediately following a significant alteration in the strategic context or a decline in

¹ Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

performance when they have developed mechanisms to facilitate the use of voice. It is expected to be cheaper and more effective to use the existing alliance structures to manage such situations. The decision to rely on the alliance in changing circumstances is further affected by the attachment, or “loyalty,” states hold toward it. The more the allies value the relationship in its own right, the more likely they are to seek change from within—even as the value of doing so seems otherwise to be limited. Of course, any such attachment will not prevent allies from exiting in the end, but they are expected to employ political mechanisms first. If these efforts fail, then they may cut back the alliance by gradually reducing their commitments. States only dissolve the alliance after the alternatives have failed.

The chapter develops this argument in three sections. The first section demonstrates how institutionalized alliances are different from traditional, non-institutionalized alliances. It explains how institutionalization affects cost-benefit calculations among allies in a material sense and through norm formation. The second section introduces Hirschman’s model and evaluates the relative utility of exit and voice strategies in the international arena. It also considers the significance of “loyalty” in forestalling exit from interstate relationships. The third section formulates a model to explain more explicitly how assessments of performance interact with loyalty-inducing norms to determine whether the alliance will simply persist, or whether it will evolve, erode, or ultimately

dissolve. Finally, the last section of the chapter introduces the research design and methodology that will be employed in the remainder of the dissertation.

International Institutions as Barriers to Exit

Institutions get a mixed review in the international relations literature and in alliance studies in particular, depending upon whether one is a realist or a neoliberal. For the former, institutions are almost irrelevant in the international arena, whereas for the latter they can significantly influence state behavior. This section considers what an institution is and argues that some alliances undergo a process of institutionalization that differentiates them from traditional power politics alliances. Institutionalization affects cost-benefit calculations among allies, in both a material and non-material sense, such that they perceive the costs of alliance dissolution to rise, and perhaps become prohibitively high. But institutionalization does not just raise the costs involved in dissolving alliances; it also produces alternative avenues for pursuing one's interests from within the alliance. Once these alternatives exist and can be employed at an acceptable cost, the opportunity for an alliance to persist beyond changing circumstances emerges.

International relations scholars generally agree that institutions embody sets of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should interact with one another, although there is some controversy as to how inclusive the concept should be. John Mearsheimer argues that they prescribe acceptable forms of

behavior and proscribe unacceptable forms.² Some scholars critique such a conceptualization for being so broad as to make anything and everything an institution, so they try to add greater precision to the concept. Robert Keohane, for example, defines them as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”³ Oran Young goes further, suggesting that institutions are “social practices consisting of easily recognized roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles.”⁴

For the purposes of this research institutions are defined as *collective patterns of practices and the formal organizations structuring them which define the acceptable range of interactions among a set of actors and thereby shape their expectations of future interactions*. This conceptualization incorporates the sociological idea that institutionalization “coordinate[s] and pattern[s] behavior, [and] set[s] boundaries which channel behavior in one direction as against all

² John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19,3 (1994/95).

³ Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 3-4.

⁴ Oran R. Young, *International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 32. International regimes are a type of institution, and indeed, the concept is increasingly used interchangeably with that of institutions. Krasner’s definition of regimes as “implicit or explicit rules, norms, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue-area of international relations” has gone nearly unchallenged. Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2.

others which are theoretically and empirically possible.”⁵ It also is more “concrete” than the traditional neoliberal approach because it includes, in the historical institutionalist perspective, the formal organizations that often emerge to structure these collective practices. While it is true that many organizations are not institutions in and of themselves, neither are they necessarily just freestanding “material entities.”⁶

In this sense, alliances can institutionalize.⁷ Chapter 1 defined alliances as formal and public agreements to consult or collaborate on national security issues, stipulating the general conditions under which cooperation is to take place and the nature of the commitment. States enter alliances as a formal and contractual obligation to cooperate on security matters, and they may choose to create a formal organization to facilitate the pursuit of their collective objectives. This relationship defines the acceptable range of interactions among the allies,

⁵ John Ruggie, “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends,” *International Organization* 29,3 (1975): 559.

⁶ Oran Young argues that organizations, in contrast to institutions, “are material entities possessing physical locations (or seats), offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets. ...[O]rganizations generally possess legal personality in the sense that they are authorized to enter into contracts, own property, sue and be sued and so forth.” The UN and NATO, for example, are organizations but not institutions. *International Cooperation*, 32–33, 36. Although institutions and organizations are conceptually distinct, organizations can do more than administer institutions; they can also embody institutions.

⁷ Wallander and Keohane actually define alliances as “institutionalized security coalitions.” They have “rules, norms, and procedures to enable members to identify threats and retaliate effectively against them.” Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, “Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions,” in *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste

and between allies and non-allies. It communicates who are one's friends and one's enemies and defines the acceptable range of behaviors in relation to each. In this regard, alliances shape state's expectations of their relations with others. For example, in any future interaction, one can generally count on allies to be cooperative, and non-allies to be non-cooperative and even hostile.

Three criteria are significant in determining whether a particular practice is an institution. First, there must be a *pattern* to the practice. That is, repeated and predictable instances of the practice must be observed. This pattern can be discerned through the behavior and rhetoric of actors. For example, how strongly do actors adhere to the pattern? Do they adhere exclusively or only when it is in their immediate interests to do so? The former indicates a robust institution exists, while the latter indicates the absence of an institution, or at most the presence of a very weak one. Second, there must be some *expectation* that others will adhere to the practice. This expectation can also be discerned through rhetoric and behavior, as when states proclaim their belief in the practice or criticize those that do not adhere. They may also employ punitive sanctions on those who do not follow the practice. The use of sanctions, however, is not a necessary condition for the institution to exist. Indeed, the strongest institutionalized behaviors may occur without question. Finally, there may be *formal organizations* to assist states in defining and practicing the acceptable range

of behavior. These organizations are neither necessary nor sufficient, but they can embody patterned and expected processes.

The traits of depth and breadth further differentiate institutions. Institutional depth, as described by Krasner, is "the extent to which the institutional structure defines the individual actors," or the degree to which participation in some larger social environment influences actors' identities and self-images. Breadth, in contrast, refers "the number of links that a particular activity has with other activities, to the number of changes that would have to be made if a particular form of activity were altered."⁸ In other words, the more complex its relationships with other institutions and activities, the more likely that a change to any single activity will affect all related ones.

Costs and Benefits of Alliance Institutionalization

This section considers the material benefits that accrue to states through institutions. It argues states institutionalize alliances to facilitate cooperation in an uncertain environment, and that the material costs of abrogating these alliances rise as the institution broadens, or allies structure cooperation through regular and reliable channels. More issues become linked through this process and, ultimately, states gain access to a larger range and better quality of

⁸ Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," in *The Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. James A. Caporaso (Newbury Park, CA: SAGE, 1989), 77, 79.

information. States may or may not intend to make the costs of dissolution prohibitively high, although this is certainly a very significant product of institutionalization.

Neoliberals offer the prevailing account of institutions in the international relations literature.⁹ According to the dominant rational choice perspective, states will develop institutions only when they will benefit jointly from them because cooperation does not occur automatically in an anarchic environment. Rather, it requires planning and negotiation (although institutions certainly can be planned and imposed by a powerful actor). Institutions provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, and establish focal points of cooperation. They reduce uncertainty by linking various issues and thereby improving the range and quality of information available to states. Furthermore, states will create institutions when the costs of communication, monitoring, and enforcement are low relative to the benefits to be achieved. This situation is most

⁹ Realists do not attribute much in the way of explanatory value to international institutions, arguing that they can only reflect the power relations within a given international order. On realists and institutions see: Randall L. Schweller and David Preiss, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," *Mershon International Studies Review* 41, 1 (May): 10; Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 6. Joseph M. Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 28–29, 41–44. Zacher and Sutton note that "an important kind of regime based on mutual interests may be compatible with the theoretical postulates of realism: regimes based on the protection of states' political autonomy through recognition of their rights to control activities within their territories and within areas adjacent to their territories." These types of regimes do not promote dependence on other states or affect relative power. Mark W. Zacher with Brent A. Sutton, *Governing Global Networks: International Regimes for Transportation and Communications* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19–20.

likely to arise when states expect to interact with each other repeatedly and regularly. In such cases, establishing an institution may be cheaper than cooperating on an ad hoc basis. From this perspective, states then maintain their institutions so long as the benefits they offer are greater than the maintenance costs. In the end, institutions are merely efficient solutions to problems of collective action; they affect the costs of cooperation, but do not fundamentally shape the preferences of the states that create them.¹⁰

The argument developed here uses neoliberalism as a point of departure, but ultimately it goes further. First, institutions emerge from an environment of preexisting institutions which influence (but do not determine) actors' preferences, actions, and even identities.¹¹ Existing institutions also structure

¹⁰ Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, chapter 1. Krasner, *International Regimes*, 2; Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security* 20, 1 (1995): 41-42; Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*. This rational choice argument assumes that states have a fixed and ordered set of preferences exogenous to the institution. Furthermore, states are rational in the sense that they choose among all available options those strategies that will best serve the attainment of their preference set, given their expectations of how others will behave. See also, Lisa Martin, "An Institutionalist View: International Institutions and State Strategies," in *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, ed. T.V. Paul and John A. Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 78-98.

¹¹ This position draws on that of the sociological institutionalists, that even the most basic concept of rationality is socially constituted. These theorists, however, have an expanded definition of institutions, which includes conventions and customs, as well as social and cognitive features like symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates. This dissertation does not take the approach, however, that institutions are not consciously created by human beings, as the "reflective" approach would indicate. On these points see: Martha Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism," *International Organization* 50,2 (1996): 326; and Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies* 44 (1996): 947-48; Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, chapter 4; Thomas A. Koelble, "The New Institutionalism in Political

access to resources such that some actors have more influence than others do in the creation and management of the institution. Second, states institutionalize alliances to reduce the costs of cooperation in the longer-term. Institutionalization will occur when the net benefits are positive (that is, when linkage benefits exceed linkage costs).¹² Transaction costs that can be reduced by institutionalization include those of search, negotiation, agreement, and policing and monitoring agreements. With regular and reliable channels for cooperating in place, allies receive more high quality information regarding the preferences and potential behaviors of partners. They can thereby reduce the time and resources involved in decision-making. Indeed, states institutionalize alliances in order to solve problems of collective action. Of course, *net* benefits must be positive. For example, any benefits that accrue through gains in efficiency and improved security and transparency cannot be offset by the costs of maintaining the decision-making and enforcement structures or costs incurred from the loss of autonomy.

A brief reference to the North Atlantic Treaty illustrates some of these processes. The treaty was negotiated in an environment in which states valued more fluid commitments. The U.S. in particular refused to negotiate anything more binding than a traditional alliance; anything stronger would reap more

Science and Sociology," *Comparative Politics* 27, 3 (1995): 235.

¹² On net transaction benefits and the design of institutionalized alliances, see Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, *The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present, and into*

costs than benefits and would threaten to pull the U.S. into European conflicts. Institutionalization began only after the treaty obligations were in force, and once the allies perceived an institutionalized alliance would confer greater net benefits in an environment in which threats were of a military, political, and societal nature. NATO's institutionalization then influenced the development of other Cold War alliance systems, as allies to the Rio Pact, the ANZUS treaty system, the Manila Pact, and even the Warsaw Pact sought military and political commitments along the NATO model. The international community's perception of what NATO was and what it stood for shaped junior allies' expectations of the net benefits available from an alliance with the U.S..

Once an institution is in place, it can become significant beyond its purposive and efficient functions. As the above example illustrates, it can also generate unintended consequences and even inefficiencies.¹³ For example, the very manner in which information is processed can influence the interpretation of a situation in ways unforeseen by those who designed the institution. An institution influences perceptions by the manner in which it filters information to its members. When a formal organization exists to handle this task, the particular organizational staff and the standard operating procedures by which information is acquired, processed, and disseminated will influence the interpretation of a

the 21st Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), especially chapter 8.

¹³ On inefficiencies and unintended consequences see Hall and Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," 948-49.

situation. For example, in NATO the procedures for the appointment and advancement of civilian staff were likely to produce a staff that identified with the institution, whereas the procedures employed in SEATO ensured that the staff would remain very nationalist in their perspective. In the absence of a formal organization, expectations can be influential as well.¹⁴

Although institutions are created for very practical reasons, they are not fluid agreements like traditional alliances. Institutions are not dismantled or created anew with every transformation in their environment or in the preferences of actors.¹⁵ Persistence may occur through sheer inertia, but inertia only produces a lag between the system's transformation and the dissolution of the alliance, especially if the allies' common interests break down.¹⁶ In contrast, long-term persistence is expected when the institution continues to produce benefits more cost-effectively than any available alternatives, or when the cost of switching to a substitute is prohibitively high. In other words, the cost of

¹⁴ On standard operating procedures see for example, Jack S. Levy, "Organizational Routines and the Causes of War, *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (1986): 193-222. On expectations, Robert Jervis argues that decision-makers are likely to be "too wedded to the established view and too closed to new information" such that they see what they want or expect to see. Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics* 20 (April 1968).

¹⁵ Indeed, Krasner argues that "an institutionalist argument must assert that institutions will not change in lock step with every change in environmental conditions." In "Sovereignty," 88.

¹⁶ For example, one or more states may try to use the institution to pursue their own interests. Captured institutions tend to stifle exit and voice, and thus have more difficulty recovering from any erosion of performance. Edward D. Mansfield, "International Institutions and Economic Sanctions," *World Politics* 47, 2 (1995): 602-604.

abandoning the alliance is higher than the costs of maintaining it. An institution that encompasses many interconnected activities or is part of a larger network of institutions will prove more resistant to dissolution, because dissolving cooperation in one area will impede the attainment of linked interests and threaten overall interests. When the costs of exit increase in this manner, allies are unwilling to abandon the commitment without first trying to implement it in the new strategic context.

Institutionalization and Intra-Alliance Norms

Institutionalization does not just raise material obstacles to dissolving alliances. Institutions also foster norms,¹⁷ which in turn generate a form of attachment, or "loyalty,"¹⁸ to the institution and thereby instill in it a value independent of the material benefits it provides. Even when the alliance becomes less effective in meeting its original goals, or when transformations in its

¹⁷ The realist position is that norms "are relatively unimportant to understanding state actions...and should not influence foreign policy." Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some Conceptual and Measurement Issues," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36, 4 (1992). Since the end of the Cold War, however, there has been a burgeoning literature on the formation and effect of norms in the international system. See for example, Zacher with Sutton, *Governing Global Networks*; Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

¹⁸ In Hirschman's model loyalty is a "special attachment to an organization," valuable for activating the use of voice and, at least temporarily, preventing exit. Here the term is used to connote the idea that states place an inherent value in the institution.

strategic environment threaten to make it unnecessary, states do not exit immediately. Instead, they try to revive the relationship; in fact, they may try to strengthen it even when the alliance is not threatened by changing circumstances or declining performance. Of course, the inherent value they place in the alliance will not necessarily prevent them from exiting in the end if these other efforts have failed.

In the international relations literature scholars widely conceive of norms as expectations, a classic definition being "standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations."¹⁹ An alternative is a behavioral conception in which norms exist "to the extent that individuals usually act in a certain way and are often punished when seen not to be acting in this way."²⁰ Although this understanding of norms is also widely accepted, it cannot differentiate between norms and mere learned behavior. When sanctions are necessary to instill a behavior, the outcome is a learned response to avoid punishment, and not a

¹⁹ Krasner, *International Regimes*, 2. Finnemore provides a similar definition of norms as "shared expectations about appropriate behavior held by a community of actors" in *National Interests in International Society*, 22. Other theorists with a corresponding approach include Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher, "The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions," in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," *International Studies Quarterly* 40, 3 (1996).

²⁰ Robert Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," *American Political Science Review* 80, 4 (1986): 1097. This behavioral conceptualization of norms requires the application of sanctions for reinforcing norms. Other proponents of including sanctions include Goertz and Diehl, "Toward a Theory of International Norms"; and John Finley Scott, *Internalization of Norms: A Sociological Theory of Moral Commitment* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977).

norm.²¹ This is not to say that sanctions cannot be employed, but if actors rely entirely on sanctions, it is unlikely that the behavior they are promoting will ever achieve the status of a norm—and particularly a strong constitutive norm. Thus, this research defines norms according to the first approach as *expectations of behavior consisting of general rights and obligations that guide how states engage in the collective patterns of practices that define a particular institution.*

Norms may simply regulate behavior or they may “constitute, create, or revise...actors or interests.”²² In the former case, norms provide standards for how dissimilar states act in a given situation, whereas in the latter they actually define the identity of states. The following example illustrates the point. If members of NATO adopt consultative norms as a *means* to ensure their security, the norms are regulative. If however, they adopt these norms not to gain any kind of strategic advantage, but as *ends* in themselves, “as affirmations of value about the kind of world people wanted and the kind of behavior that was

²¹ Florini makes this argument in “The Evolution of International Norms.” The nuclear taboo provides a good example of the difference. This is a true norm (against nuclear use) because states follow it out of a fear of “the danger or the unforeseeable consequences involved in nuclear war.” T.V. Paul, “Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39,4 (December 1995):701. The threat of punishment is minor compared to these other considerations.

²² For this distinction see Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, 129; Martin Hollis, *The Cunning of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 137, 138; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 54.

acceptable,"²³ then they are constitutive. However, a regulative norm can evolve over time into a constitutive norm. For instance, states adopt consultative norms to ensure security, but they gradually come to believe in the value of consultation for its own sake. It is something they think "good" states do, and indeed a group of states may come to define itself as a community according to these standards of behavior.²⁴

One reason traditional scholarship tends to downplay the significance of norms is simply that they are very challenging to operationalize and analyze. First, norms are "ubiquitous" and it is difficult to determine which norms are most influential in shaping behavior. Second, it can be exceptionally difficult to demonstrate the strength of a particular norm, as actors themselves can influence the development of norms. They can also deviate from them and be manipulative and deceptive in their efforts to justify their actions.²⁵

²³ Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, 129.

²⁴ Finlayson and Zacher, "The GATT and the Regulation of Trade barriers," 276. Adler and Barnett define communities by three characteristics: 1) shared identities or values, 2) direct relations in numerous settings, and 3) reciprocity expressing long-term interests. See Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," in *Security Communities*, eds. Adler and Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 31–32. For the purposes of this research, this is interpreted to mean that a community exists when states that share common values directly interact in numerous settings and in regards to numerous issue-areas. Relations among these states are reciprocal, but not necessarily immediately. Reciprocity occurs over the long-term.

²⁵ On these and other challenges in the study of norms see: Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed., Katzenstein, 484–494.

The literature generally agrees that an analysis of both behavior and rhetoric is necessary to fully comprehend the strength, or robustness, of a particular norm. However, measuring norms can be an inherently subjective process, prone to biases. Jeffrey Legro adopts three criteria to systematically evaluate the strength of norms, but even these criteria are not easily measured objectively.²⁶ *Specificity* is the degree to which the actors define and understand the norm's prescriptions and prohibitions whereas *durability* refers to how long the norms have been in practice and how states react to violations and fundamental challenges. Finally, *concordance* measures the degree of "intersubjective" agreement as incorporated in diplomatic discussions and treaties. Norms that score high on all of these counts are robust ones.

The analysis of norms in the remainder of the dissertation draws on an approach that arises out of both international relations and international legal scholarship. Anthony Clark Arend has created an authority-control index for measuring putative rules in international law,²⁷ which can just as easily be used to evaluate the robustness of international (and alliance) norms. The index evaluates the extent to which relevant decision-makers perceive a particular legal rule to be authoritative, and the degree to which it is actually reflected in state practice. It provides a systematic set of questions that can reduce (but certainly

²⁶ Jeffrey W. Legro, "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the 'Failure' of Internationalism," *International Organization* 51, 1 (1997): 34-35.

²⁷ Anthony Clark Arend, *Legal Rules and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford

not eliminate) the subjectivity of the exercise. To evaluate authority one looks for formal and informal manifestations of the rule within treaties, domestic laws, judicial decisions, parliamentary speeches, diplomatic letters and memoranda, and so forth. One must also evaluate how universal and significant these manifestations are. For example, how many of the relevant states accept the rule as authoritative? Do those "whose interests are especially affected" accept it? As more states accept the norm, it becomes more authoritative. Finally, are there contrary rules or norms to which the states also adhere? Control is measured in much the same manner: are there violations to the rule? If so, how many violations have occurred and which states are at fault? As the number of contrary actions and pronouncements increases, the robustness of the norm diminishes.

It is generally agreed that there are three means by which norms can arise and be maintained: (1) spontaneous evolution incorporating a degree of learning, (2) conscious negotiation, or (3) active promotion and nurturing.²⁸ Of course, these three processes may also materialize in some combination. Indeed, it is most likely that "[n]orms may emerge through learning in a small group and subsequently spread to a large[r] population by some other mechanism"—such

University Press, 1999), 87-101.

²⁸ See Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 21; and Cristina Bicchieri, "Learning to Cooperate," in *The Dynamics of Norms*, ed. Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, and Brian Skyrms (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 24.

as, nurturing or negotiation.²⁹ For example, some accounts of NATO's formation suggest that the norm of consultation was learned by the U.S. and Britain and was then nurtured and/or negotiated with the other Atlantic allies. It is argued here that alliance norms can emerge through any one of these means to reflect or promote mutual interests, but over time they may become internalized such that actors "behave in the way the norm reinforces—at a spatial or temporal remove from its sanctions."³⁰ Internalization is often an indication that the norm has become constitutive. States no longer calculate the benefits of adhering to the norm. They simply follow it, even when it may be incompatible with their immediate self-interests, because it is something that states "like them" do.

Norms can transform or be displaced, but neither process is generally a quick one. Transformation is most likely to occur in two circumstances: when a contradiction emerges between (1) the norm and the overarching principles comprising the institution or (2) the norm and its environment. In both cases, harmony must be restored for the norm to survive. In the second instance, the norm may be displaced by competing norms if such a harmony is not reached. The existing norm becomes outdated and new norms evolve or a group of states negotiate their creation. The norm will propagate more widely if this group is strong or persuasive enough to introduce the new norm as a competitor to pre-existing norms.

²⁹ Ibid., 24.

Norms are significant in the analysis of alliance strategies in two ways. First, regulatory norms have an implicit practical value in that, by specifying a range of legitimate behaviors, they eliminate the need for states to scan the entire range of alternatives available for a given decision. Such norms also provide *roles* for states in a particular international and institutional context, for example, prescribing that one state take the position of "leader" or of "conciliator" in conflict situations. These regulatory norms serve the practical function of reducing the costs of cooperation among these states.

Second, constitutive norms instill in the institution an inherent value, independent of the benefits it produces. These norms become part of the identity of the state and shape its interests such that the state pursues policies that it believes to be "good" ones, regardless of whether they maximize its material interests.³¹ As these norms emerge and strengthen, states begin to believe that the institution is valuable in its own right. They become "loyal" to it in the sense that they are committed to its normative basis. This has a number of implications for institutionalized military alliances. First, states will not exit immediately as alliance performance wanes or the strategic environment alters. Instead they will try to save the relationship. Of course, the inherent value they place in the alliance will not necessarily prevent them from exiting in the end, for even "the

³⁰ Scott, *Internalization of Norms*, 88.

³¹ Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, 129.

most loyalist behavior retains an enormous dose of reasoned calculation.”³² Second, even if the alliance continues to perform satisfactorily, states may attempt to alter its goals so that it can better achieve more “good” policies that are consistent with the normative underpinnings of the relationship.

Institutionalization and the Growth of Organizations

Institutionalization can also affect decisions to dissolve alliances by creating alternative avenues for pursuing one’s interests from within the alliance, including new diplomatic and bureaucratic channels, committees, and joint civilian or military structures. In the case of the institutionalized alliances discussed in this dissertation, there are a number of forums in which consultation and cooperation are encouraged. Foreign and Defense Ministers, and even Heads of State, may meet regularly (perhaps a few times a year) to discuss issues of broad concern to the alliance. This is a forum in which true “politicking” occurs. In some cases, like NATO, allies appoint a permanent representative of ambassadorial rank to attend more regular meetings. These individuals are generally headquartered in a central location so that they can be called to meet on very short notice. On a daily basis and outside of formal meetings they can interact with their counterparts more closely.

³² Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, 78, 79.

Intergovernmental and transnational links can grow in other ways, providing ever-more avenues for a state to communicate and ultimately pursue its interests from within the alliance. These links (which may frequently require new committees, agencies, and staffs) develop as military and political consultation deepens and as cooperation further expands into logistical and infrastructural decisions and to other issue-areas less directly related to the ultimate military commitment, such as economic, scientific, environmental, and societal affairs.

Exit, Voice, and Security Cooperation

This research is an advance on traditional theory in introducing political and normative considerations that can impede decisions to exit alliances abruptly. The phenomena of alliance persistence and evolution (and indeed formation and dissolution) cannot be properly understood without considering both "political" and "economic" processes: Cost-benefit calculations and normative constraints influence the decision to enter and exit alliances. To this end, this section adopts Albert Hirschman's model of exit, voice, and loyalty. The model relies on expected cost-benefit calculations and loyalty to explain the decision to adopt political mechanisms (voice) in market situations (such as a structure like the balance of power), and both political *and* economic mechanisms

(voice and exit) in non-market situations.³³ Alliances exhibit traits of both situations.

Given that alliances exist in an institutional environment and can perform functions in addition to defense, pure exit is not always an effective strategy to communicate and achieve one's interests. In fact, as the linkages between allied states increase in complexity, the value of pure exit diminishes because it requires sacrificing *all* of the goods that the relationship provides, even those from which a state derives great benefit. When exit is too costly, the alternative is to speak up and demand change, as through diplomatic means. To speak up for change is a form of voice, or an "attempt to change, rather than to escape from an

³³ This model has been used to explain numerous other political and social behaviors like state-building, voluntary organizations, political parties and elections, legislative policy-making, social mobility, and even employee and manager relations. It has received no more than passing attention in the international relations literature even though the traditional approaches in this field have relied heavily on economic methods of analysis, as chapter 1 argues. Indeed, this may be the very reason why the model has not received such attention in this field. As Brian Barry indicates, Hirschman offers an economic analysis of non-market, or political, mechanisms ('voice') affecting the quality of a firm's output in a market situation and of both economic and political mechanisms in organizations operating outside of a market situation. Brian Barry, "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty," chap. in *Democracy and Power: Essays in Political Theory I* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 196. The following two examples demonstrate how IR theorists do draw on the model: Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 105–106; Edward Mansfield, "International Institutions and Economic Sanctions," 603–604. Hirschman has refined the model in "'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty': Further Reflections and a Survey of Recent Contributions," *Social Science Information* 13,1 (1974); "Exit, Voice, and the State," *World Politics* 30,2 (1978); *Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); "Exit and Voice: An Expanding Sphere of Influence," chap. in *Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays* (New York: Viking, 1986), and "Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic," *World Politics* 45 (1993).

objectionable state of affairs."³⁴ It may be exercised through individual or collective petition to allies or other actions and protests that are meant to mobilize the opinion of non-allies as well.

In Hirschman's initial formulation of the concept, exit and voice are two contrary processes. When members become dissatisfied with the quality of a good or service an organization³⁵ produces, they exit the organization or voice their dissatisfaction directly to its leadership in an effort to improve the undesirable state of affairs. To exit is simply to "escape from an unfavorable situation." It is the "economic" of the two mechanisms because actors favor it in market situations as a means for directly and inexpensively communicating their dissatisfaction. In such a context, it presents a very clear signal to the leadership, alerting it to reverse the deterioration in the quality of its product or service.³⁶ As the "political" mechanism for expressing dissatisfaction, voice actually includes every means *but* exit. Voice is far less direct, less transparent, and often more costly to employ.

³⁴ Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, 4, 15-16.

³⁵ This analysis emphasizes exit and voice in organizations. Alliances are more like organizations than firms because they are non-market situations in which both market and non-market forces operate.

³⁶ The organization will be able to recover if the proper amounts of exit and voice are used. Within every organization there is "slack," or a gap "between the actual and potential performance" which allows it to ride out periods of decline by drawing on reserves of political resources. For exit to have a positive effect there must be some alert members—to provide feedback through exit—but also some inert members to provide a "cushion" and time for the organization to recover. *Ibid.*, 14, 23-25.

States use both exit and voice at the international level. Like individuals, they leave relationships that become too costly, or simply fail to accomplish their goals,³⁷ but an exit strategy can be very “messy” in the international arena. Although relations between states often do involve exchanges of one kind or another, they are far more complex than transactions involving a single good. In fact, in international politics there is far more at stake than the mere exchange of goods and services. States create ties with one another not only for security and defense, but also for numerous nonmaterial benefits including communication, management, status, and autonomy. The loss of one of these benefits may reduce benefits to be accrued in other areas. Alliances generally encompass a broad spectrum of issues related to the ultimate military commitment, even if very tangentially. When cooperation spills over into nonmilitary areas like trade, socio-cultural, and environmental issues, “partial exit” becomes a feasible alternative. That is, a state that finds one aspect of a relationship particularly unsatisfactory has the option of exiting that linkage without abrogating the whole relationship—just as France and Greece did when they withdrew from NATO’s joint military command in 1966 and 1974, respectively.

However, the very act of exiting an interstate relationship (even if the break is clean and complete) does not communicate an unambiguous message unless one employs exit in combination with voice. In the international arena, the

³⁷ Alternatively, states may choose non-exit. This strategy may be a passive or an active one. The former occurs when one simply remains in an existing relationship; the

political involves any attempt to improve a given state of affairs, either by securing a collective good (like a change in alliance policy or an improvement in alliance administration) or a private benefit.³⁸ It may include, for example, appeals to reform decision-making structures and practices, or actions and protests directed toward mobilizing domestic and/or international opinion. For instance, once France exited the joint military command of NATO, it continued (and has until this day) to voice its desire for a stronger European presence in the alliance. As well, when New Zealand's Labor Government unilaterally forbid U.S. nuclear-powered ships from entering its ports in the 1980s, it was attempting to make a statement about Cold War international politics.³⁹

However, even when states are dissatisfied with the whole of a relationship there are instances in which they do not have the option of exiting.⁴⁰ In such cases, as when a preponderant power insists on maintaining the alliance, or when allies rely so heavily on the security commitment that they cannot afford to exit it, states must rely on voice to protest. The junior allies of the Warsaw Pact

latter occurs when one enters into a new relationship that did not exist before.

³⁸ See Barry, "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty," 203–204, for this critique of Hirschman's concept of voice.

³⁹ Interestingly, New Zealand did not intend to exit the alliance although that was more or less the effect when the U.S. responded by reducing its alliance commitments.

⁴⁰ In such cases, Hirschman considers voice to be "residual." Those who cannot exercise exit have only the option of exercising voice. One's choice is limited in this manner in relationships with the state, ethnic group, family, or church. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, 33.

were in the former position. Romania, for example, could not exit the Warsaw Pact, but it did exit one linkage in refusing to participate in the Pact's joint training exercises. It simultaneously sought (unsuccessfully) to reduce Soviet dominance through alliance-wide reforms like joint decision-making in nuclear matters and rotating the position of commander-in-chief among all the allies. The regional members of SEATO were in the latter position: they could not afford to dissolve the alliance, so they used voice in an attempt to reform it. Thailand in particular spoke up for an institutional structure and a joint military command that (in its view) would make the military commitment more binding and would facilitate the goal of protecting the Asian allies from Communist infiltration.

When both exit and voice are readily available the choice among them becomes more complex. States will weigh the expected utility and the relative costs of each strategy. For example, once one exits from the relationship the effectiveness of one's protests declines considerably.⁴¹ Thus it may pay to remain in the alliance and vocalize one's concerns; in particular when the net benefits that accrue from speaking out are greater than the highest benefits that could have been obtained by remaining in the alliance without turning to voice.⁴² States also consider the expected costs in switching to a substitute (increasing one's

⁴¹ Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, 37. This is particularly true in the relationships Hirschman addresses. Firms and even political organizations tend to produce goods primarily for consumption by their customers and members. They disregard the protests of individuals who do not (or are unlikely to) consume their goods.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 202.

own armaments or turning to another alliance) and possibly back to the original. Allies are more likely to exit when close substitutes exist, like an alliance that provides the same benefits at a lower cost. However, in the international system, this may rarely be the case. First, in a system comprised of a small number of actors, close substitutes are necessarily limited. Second, states have their own reputations to consider—less a constraint in the behavior of customers. States cannot afford to appear to be unreliable or less than credible alliance partners, because then they will not receive assistance when they really need it, and they will lose status. For these reasons states are likely to attempt to find means short of exit to meet their interests. In fact, in some instances, as when they anticipate that protests and demonstrations will be ineffective or that others are more willing or better equipped to employ them, states may remain allied for a time in relative silence.⁴³

However, the presence of loyalty can forestall exit and encourage allies to turn to voice. Loyalty is a contentious concept, subject to numerous interpretations. Within Hirschman's own work, loyalty is both an attitudinal state influencing behavior (the decision to exit or not) and it is a behavioral response (as to refuse to exit and to suffer in silence), although the former is the dominant usage. Brian Barry similarly describes loyalty as "a positive

⁴³ Although, rarely will they wait in total silence as standing up for their own interests, no matter how futile the attempt, may increase their prestige—at least among some states.

commitment to further [a collectivity's] welfare by working for it, fighting for it and—where one thinks it has gone astray—seeking to change it.”⁴⁴ Others critique this dual meaning for being confusing. Joanne Leck and David Saunders, for instance, suggest the term “patience” should be used in place of behavioral loyalty to “disentangle the cause (loyalty as attitude) from the effect (patience as behavior).”⁴⁵ In this research, the concept of loyalty is used in the attitudinal sense. It is the commitment to the alliance institution that develops through the evolution of internalized and constitutive norms. This commitment is expected to produce a particular behavioral response that includes working for the betterment of the relationship, protecting it from diverse threats, and changing it when it has gone off track or the environment in which it operates has transformed.

This commitment is important because it raises the cost of exit and it activates the use of voice. As applied to alliance politics, the presence of a strong commitment to the institution delays the decision to exit when performance falters or when the strategic environment alters. States first attempt to seek change from within the alliance, either by reforming the decision-making structures and procedures or by modifying the overarching goals. Allies are not expected to exit the relationship until these efforts fail to bring about the desired

⁴⁴ Ibid., 78, 38; Joanne D. Leck and David M. Saunders, “Hirschman’s Loyalty: Attitude or Behavior?” *Employee Responsibility and Rights Journal* 5:3 (1992): 220; Barry, “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty,” 209.

changes. Even at that point, they have the option of engaging in a partial exit. That is, when there are numerous linkages within the alliance they can dissolve one linkage without abrogating the relationship in its entirety. A complete and irreparable break is expected to be the last option exercised.

It should be noted here that Barry contends that the use of loyalty is problematic. He argues it is an "error term" and "the equation can always be made to fit the fact *ex post*, by imputing loyalty in sufficient quantity to a person, who, on the basis of the first term (the cost-benefit calculation), should have switched but in fact has not done so."⁴⁶ This poses a potential methodological problem, which this research attempts to deal with through a systematic application of norms in the case-study analysis. This concern will be assessed in the concluding chapter.

In sum, when the performance of an alliance declines or when the strategic environment fundamentally transforms, states may not choose to exit their alliance commitments. After a consideration of the costs and benefits provided by the alliance (including the availability of substitutes, their reputations, and their goals in the new environment) and the level of their commitment to it, states may prefer to retain the relationship. In fact, if states

⁴⁵ Leck and Saunders, "Hirschman's Loyalty," 222.

⁴⁶ Barry, "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty," 207.

have an opportunity to seek change from within the alliance they will attempt such a strategy first and will only exit the relationship when this has failed.

A Model of Alliance Behavior

This section presents a model that illustrates the factors ultimately influencing "*alliance behavior*." This dependent variable has four dimensions: persistence, evolution, erosion, or dissolution. In the model, two variables interact to determine which outcome is expected. The first of the independent variables is *performance*. An alliance performs effectively when it satisfactorily serves allies' collective and individual goals within the parameters they establish, such as cost, manpower, weapons commitments, but also autonomy and status. In other words, the alliance that performs effectively provides positive net benefits to the allies.⁴⁷

The second independent variable is *strong norms*. Of particular importance are strong *constitutive* norms, or those that are adopted as ends in themselves rather than as a practical means to facilitate the achievement of some other end. In alliances that exhibit effective performance in combination with strong norms that induce a positive commitment to the maintenance and improvement of the alliance, states attach an additional, non-material value to membership. They are committed to the alliance not only for the functions it performs, but also for what

⁴⁷ Note that the alliance may not *maximize* allies' objectives, but allies perceive that they are achieving their goals sufficiently and at an acceptable cost.

it represents. The substance of the norm can include the inherent value of cooperation or a strict prohibition on war, although the actual content is not relevant for the model. The conjunction of internalized and constitutive norms and effective alliance performance produces a situation in which states are expected to broaden the purpose, functions, and/or scope of the alliance's activities to transplant the norm into other issue areas. While the membership remains essentially intact, the relationship begins to change in form so that it appears less like a traditional military alliance. In particular, the emphasis on national security issues begins to lose its primacy of place as cooperation in other issue-areas strengthens. In such instances, the alliance *evolves*. Thus,

H1: When an institutionalized alliance performs effectively and its allies share constitutive norms, the relationship will gradually evolve to take on new purposes and functions only indirectly related to the original mandate.

In contrast, effective performance in the absence of a strong normative commitment will produce a state of *persistence*. States have no incentive to exit the alliance, as its benefits continue to be greater than the maintenance costs. But neither do they have an incentive to fundamentally restructure the relationship. This is true both in the presence and absence of major transformations in the strategic environment. If the structure of the international (or regional) system holds constant and the alliance meets the expectations of its members it will persist unaltered. Even when the system's structure does transform, allies will

not dissolve the alliance if it continues to serve their evolving interests effectively and efficiently. In fact, the value of the alliance may actually increase following rapid and substantial changes in the strategic context. Uncertainty in this new environment is presumably much higher, at least at the outset, and allies already have in place an institution that allows them to pool resources, share information, and reduce the time necessary to make decisions. Thus, they already possess a means to monitor the environment and to communicate their interests, not only to each other but to outsiders as well. So long as the costs of maintaining the institution do not grow to exceed satisfactory levels, alliance persistence is anticipated.

H2: When an institutionalized alliance performs effectively, but the allies do not share constitutive norms, the relationship will persist, but it is not expected to undergo a fundamental transformation.

When the alliance performs ineffectively, erosion and dissolution are anticipated. The incentives to exit are greater here than above, because the alliance is not meeting the allies' objectives, or it is doing so at an unacceptable cost. In the absence of a normative commitment to the alliance, the allies' decision is an easy one: *dissolve* the relationship. In fact, there is no incentive to remain in the alliance, and to exercise voice is to waste time and other resources that could be used more efficiently elsewhere.

H3: When an institutionalized alliance does not perform satisfactorily and allies do not share constitutive norms, it is expected the relationship will dissolve.

However, ineffective performance is an insufficient condition for the allies to abrogate their commitment. When constitutive norms and ineffective performance occur in combination, allies are expected to engage in efforts to salvage the alliance and reverse its weak performance. Theoretically, the allies have a choice between expanding or reducing the scope of the alliance. That is, they can create new functions for the alliance to perform, or they can abandon those functions that have been the least successful. However, they are more likely to reduce the purpose or scope of the alliance so that it *erodes*. Although norms do generate a form of loyalty to the institution, it is expected that their own national interests will color their attempts to find a satisfactory next-best alternative. In other words, so long as the issue is one of rallying around a relationship everyone finds satisfactory it is less likely that substantial conflicts of interest will develop. However, when the issue becomes one of how to redistribute resources and authority to make the alliance operate more effectively, disputes are apt to arise. Furthermore, such disputes are likely to be most acute when the allies are simultaneously contending with significant systemic transformations (and hence uncertainty). Under these latter circumstances, agreement becomes exceptionally difficult on anything beside the

most inconsequential issues. Cooperation on matters of import will gradually occur through other avenues.

H4: When an institutionalized alliance does not perform effectively but its allies share constitutive norms, it is expected allies will attempt to reverse its weak performance by reducing (or eroding) the scope of the alliances' activities and simultaneously turning to other institutions to cooperate on the most salient matters.

This model is valuable for demonstrating the conditions under which a particular class of alliances—institutionalized alliances—can be expected to persist, evolve, erode, or dissolve. This begins to fill a serious gap in the literature on alliance behavior, as there is no systematic treatment of these processes. This model also can account for movement between cells. The following examples indicate the kinds of movement that are most likely to occur.

H5a: When an institutionalized alliance is performing effectively, but constitutive norms are gradually strengthening, the alliance is expected to move from a state of persistence to evolution.

H5b: If performance declines after evolution has occurred, the alliance is expected to erode as allies attempt to reverse the weak performance.

H5c: If an institutionalized alliance that has undergone erosion does begin to perform effectively, over time it may be expected to evolve.

Figure 3 illustrates the model. It applies only to institutionalized alliances that emerge to manage a complex strategic environment in which states face common military and non-military threats. It does *not* include the fluid alliance commitments that exist in an environment dominated by severe military threats. In other words, institutionalization is an antecedent variable.

Performance	Norms	
	Constitutive	Regulative
Effective:	H1: <i>Evolution</i> NATO 1990s SEATO 1954–1960	H2: <i>Persistence</i> Warsaw Pact 1955–1986 ANZUS 1952–1984
Ineffective:	H4: <i>Erosion</i> SEATO 1960–1972	H3: <i>Dissolution</i> Warsaw Pact 1986–1991 SEATO 1973–1977

Figure 3: A Model of Alliance Behavior

Research Design and Methodology

The object of this research is to attempt to fill existing gaps in realist alliance theory by providing a systematic explanation of why some alliances dissolve immediately following a significant systemic transformation while others persist, evolve, or erode. In particular, the dissertation seeks to provide an accurate and predictive explanation for the following questions: 1) *why do some alliances dissolve when threats recede while others persist beyond the conditions in which they were created* and 2) *of the latter, why do some evolve in new directions?* Of course,

there are obvious tradeoffs in achieving accuracy and predictability. The more accurate the analysis of a particular case, the less generalizable it will tend to be. However, a properly designed research program can allow for a highly truthful description of a number of cases as well as an accurate prediction.

The first goal of this dissertation is to engage in a *disciplined-configurative*⁴⁸ analysis that seeks to refute realist theories' arguments regarding the improbability of alliance persistence and evolution. It does so by employing general variables to describe and explain the formation and evolution of a number of institutionalized alliances, including the case of NATO. The anomalous nature of this latter case from the realist perspective highlights the need for new theory. *Theory testing* is the second objective. The analysis will evaluate the validity of an alternative explanation among a range of cases, of which some (the Warsaw Pact in particular) appear to be highly consistent with realist expectations. The strength of the alternative explanation hinges on its ability to explain or predict more than the realist research program it seeks to replace. This model purports to provide a more nuanced explanation of alliance formation and dissolution, as well as account for processes of evolution and erosion. The third objective is *heuristic*: to identify new variables, causal

⁴⁸ Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in *Diplomacy: New Approaches to History, Theory, and Policy*, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979). This is also similar to Lijphart's interpretive method. Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65, 3 (1971): 691-2.

mechanisms, and causal paths that will lend greater insight into the phenomenon of alliance persistence and evolution.

Since the objective of this research is not just to explain the final outcome, but also to identify the process by which it is achieved, a quasi-experimental method in which one statistically manipulates variables is inappropriate. The comparative case study method is better able to evaluate the continuous effects of the explanatory variables of institutionalization, norms, and alliance performance across time and space. Thus the argument is evaluated by an in-depth and comparative analysis of a few cases of institutionalized alliances.⁴⁹ The comparison is structured and focused in that in tracing the processes by which the independent variables affect the dependent variable, the analysis deals only with aspects of the case that are relevant for testing the alternative model.⁵⁰ The case studies undertaken here focus on the combined effect of institutionalization, norms, and performance on the decision to maintain or dissolve an alliance. Because this procedure allows the relationship to be examined in some depth, it

⁴⁹ Ragin notes that the method should be used to determine the size of the study. The type of analysis required here cannot be supported by a large-N statistical study. Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1987).

⁵⁰ George, "Case Studies and Theory Development;" and Alexander George, "The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: The 'Operational Code' Belief System," in *Psychological Models in International Politics*, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski, 95-124. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979); Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, "Research Design Tasks in Case Study Methods," Paper presented at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA), Harvard University, October 17-19, 1997.

is particularly useful for fulfilling all of the objectives of this research: to test the proposed explanation while explaining the historically anomalous case *and* to identify potentially new causal paths that may lend insight into existing theory.⁵¹

The analysis traces each case through a number of steps. It begins by evaluating the strategic context in which the alliance was created and institutionalization began. This strategic context is comprised of the allies' interests (collective and individual), their expectations regarding the alliance relationship, and the presence of pre-existing institutions capable of fulfilling their objectives (in whole or in part). The analysis then evaluates how effectively and efficiently the institutionalized alliance performs in meeting these interests. It also considers the underlying norms of the relationship to determine if cooperation occurs to pursue a given end, and if it is valued in and of itself or if there is an alternative motivation. Finally, it considers the combination in which performance and norms are most likely to produce the four alliance behaviors, persistence, evolution, erosion, and dissolution.

To keep the analysis focused, the design employs another set of questions. First, it asks how well the model stands up to alternative explanations. At no point does the analysis attempt to provide a complete chronological account of alliance behavior. Rather, it concentrates on instances of systemic and/or alliance

⁵¹ George, "Case Studies and Theory Development." Of course, the primary limitation of the method is that the analysis of a single case (or even a few) can neither verify nor falsify a theory. It can merely strengthen the certainty with which one makes causal inferences.

transformation so that the realist and the alternative explanations of alliance behavior can be closely compared. It also systematically evaluates whether the model's assumptions fit the facts and whether, indeed, its conclusions follow from its underlying premises. Finally, it also assesses the degree to which the empirical evidence confirms the model's implications.⁵²

Case Selection and Plan of the Dissertation

The dissertation examines each of the processes of alliance persistence, evolution, erosion, and dissolution by engaging in a comparative analysis of 20th century institutionalized alliances. Although the cases were originally chosen for their values on the independent variables, they each lend insight into different processes. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for example, is illustrative of processes of persistence and evolution, whereas the Warsaw Pact is an excellent example of alliance dissolution. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the misapplication of a strategy of institutionalization, demonstrates how erosion occurs. The Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. (ANZUS) relationship illustrates the difficulty of persisting and evolving in the absence of strong institutionalization, when exit is less costly.

Each of the above cases is included for the contribution it can make to the theory testing and theory building processes. According to Eckstein, the

⁵² These questions are drawn from Robert H. Bates et al. *Analytic Narratives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

strongest test of a theory occurs when it is applied to a “crucial” case, which is capable of confirming or disconfirming a theory. However, it is highly unlikely to find a case that so closely conforms to the hypotheses being tested so as to confirm or infirm them on its own merits.⁵³ Instead, one should seek out some combination of most-likely and least-likely cases. The former are cases in which the independent variables have values that strongly suggest outcomes consistent with the proposed hypotheses, whereas the latter are those in which the values of the dependent variables only weakly predict the hypothesized outcome. Most-likely cases are useful in that they can seriously weaken a hypothesis if the actual outcome is *inconsistent* with the expected outcome. In contrast, when least-likely cases exhibit an outcome *consistent* with that hypothesized, they lend greater support.⁵⁴ Understanding where a particular case falls on a continuum between these two ideal-types will strengthen its theoretical implications.

Part II analyzes the Cold War alliance systems. NATO, the Warsaw Pact, ANZUS, and SEATO emerged in the context of bipolarity and superpower conflict, although the alliances in chapters 4 and 5 institutionalized in response to NATO’s institutionalization. That is, NATO was part of their pre-existing

⁵³ As yet unrecognized variables may be influencing the outcome, and so long as there may be other hypotheses to explain the phenomenon, a single case cannot confirm it. Bennett and George, “Research Design Tasks.”

⁵⁴ Bennett and George add that a case can lend “strongest supporting evidence” for a theory if it is a least-likely case for that theory, a most-likely case for an opposing theory, and proves to be more accurate for the new theory. Bennett and George, “Research Design Tasks.”

institutional environment. Thus, chapter 3 analyzes the institutionalization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization throughout the Cold War. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the institutionalization the other alliances, given NATO's presence. These chapters evaluate what impact had NATO had on the decisions to institutionalize and they assess impact of these institutions on alliance performance and norm formation.

Of all of the cases, NATO most closely approximates a most-likely case. A rudimentary analysis suggests that over time the alliance has been characterized by relatively high evaluations of performance and fairly robust constitutive norms. These values should produce the expected outcome if the model is accurate. However, if a deeper analysis provides evidence that evolution is not occurring in the presence of these factors, or that it is occurring in their absence (the more likely concern in this example), then the proposed model is severely weakened. Thus, chapter 3 begins by examining the conditions under which NATO formed and institutionalized. The allies signed the North Atlantic Treaty to meet the dual challenge of deterring an enemy military attack and strengthening national free institutions against ideological infiltration. The early organization was really only a loose association of uncoordinated committees in which the costs of exit remained very low and the benefits of cooperation were not fully realized. However, events in the 1950s and early 1960s (such as the Korean War, the U.S.SR's attainment of an ICBM capability, and the Suez Crisis) stimulated military and political integration. In the 1960s, NATO encountered

the first serious challenges to its existence as significant transformations in regional power relationships eased tensions and opened room for intra-alliance strains to emerge. Yet the alliance persisted and only France and Greece have ever opted for an exit strategy, and a "partial exit" at that.

The Warsaw Pact is examined for nearly the opposite reason—in many ways it approximates a least-likely case for the model of alliances as institutions and a most-likely case for the traditional power politics model of alliance behavior. The model proposed in this dissertation will be significantly strengthened if it can provide a more accurate account of the existence and eventual dissolution of this alliance. The Warsaw Pact existed alongside NATO for well over thirty years, but unlike its Western counterpart, it was dissolved shortly after the end of the Cold War.⁵⁵ There are very few treatments of the Warsaw Pact in the mainstream international relations literature because many scholars have taken the view that the Pact was not a legitimate alliance, but merely a manifestation of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. Yet, because power was so elemental to the relationship, the Pact provides a most-likely case for traditional realist theory. Although there were a number of significant

⁵⁵ It is interesting to note that this alliance also did not dissolve "immediately" following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. While one might suppose that there was simply a lag between the end of the Cold War and the end of the Warsaw Pact, this does not explain the behavior of alliance members. Some members (namely the U.S.S.R) wanted to maintain the Warsaw Pact as a diplomatic counterpart to NATO. (There was considerable support in the West, and NATO in particular, for this option!) Even those members that did not support this prospect did advocate creating a new, Central/Eastern European alliance system (or security community), for much the same purpose.

incentives to dissolve it (most consistent with realist theories), the analysis in chapter 4 demonstrates that institutionalization did affect the actions of alliance members and in particular the decision to dissolve the alliance in 1991, rather than in 1989 or 1992.

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Treaty (ANZUS) are examined in chapter 5. Realists have tackled each case, but strong theoretical analysis has not seriously considered the effects of the attempted institutionalization of these alliances.⁵⁶ In neither of these cases was institutionalization terribly successful, although there was some variation in the normative underpinnings of the two. SEATO gradually eroded. ANZUS persists, but New Zealand has effectively exited the alliance. Because both power and institutional politics were at work in these cases, they also provide important theoretical and empirical insights into the model.

Part III of the dissertation evaluates the model in the post-Cold War era and examines its theoretical implications. Chapter 6 examines NATO's initial persistence and its later evolution. By the beginning of the 1990s, NATO was again in the midst of a potentially serious crisis, the crisis of peace. With the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the

⁵⁶ See for example, George Modelski, "SEATO," in *Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World*, ed. Francis A. Beer (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).

military and political threats that the alliance was designed to counter had receded. Current reforms are encouraging cooperation with non-NATO states and are expanding NATO's functions. This most recent phase of alliance behavior provides a particularly strong test of institutionalization and the relationship between performance and norms.

The concluding chapter of the dissertation engages in a comparative analysis of the cases. It reviews and compares the principal findings of chapters 3 through 6 with an aim to derive the theoretical and policy implications of the model. It also suggests directions for future research in this area. In this regard, it briefly examines other institutionalized alliances that deserve future consideration. The Little Entente⁵⁷ between Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia, for example, is one of the few alliances to undergo a process of institutionalization *prior to* World War II. The alliance was created to defend the territorial status quo and to oppose Habsburg revisionism, but it also undertook an interesting process of institutionalization in political and economic relations. Finally, the chapter evaluates the political and theoretical implications for the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the one contemporary alliance that dominates the headlines and the scholarly debate on the security of

⁵⁷ Thus far, the proposed cases have all been Cold War alliances. This is not entirely surprising since very few alliances prior to World War II actually began a process of institutionalization. The Little Entente attempts to control for this effect, as well as Cold War conflict.

Europe. It further considers what impact NATO's evolution and behavior may have on future military alliances in Europe and beyond.

Chapter 3

Institutionalizing NATO in the Cold War Era

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization poses several important puzzles for alliance theory. In the post-Cold War era, the most significant of these questions is the organization's persistence beyond the Cold War. However, since the earliest days of the East-West conflict, NATO has challenged our conceptions of alliance behavior on several key matters. First, the signatories designed the North Atlantic Pact as a traditional alliance system but, within two years of its inception, it began a process of institutionalization that would become unprecedented in the history of military pacts. Second, in order to preserve the unity of the alliance, a number of debates over strategy have been resolved by adopting the alternative that was the most appealing politically—but not necessarily militarily. Finally, while new states have joined NATO, none has exited the alliance, and only a few have engaged in a "partial exit," by which they abstained from cooperating in a particular issue-area.

This chapter addresses each of these puzzles by examining the origins and institutionalization of the North Atlantic Alliance. This analysis presents significant insights into the process of alliance institutionalization. First, the North American and European states created a traditional military alliance because they shared a fear of

renewed military aggression in Europe, but the design of the alliance reflected the fact that they differed in their perceptions of this "common" threat. The allies did not institutionalize NATO at the outset, but only after it became apparent that their military effort was linked to political and economic decisions. This case provides evidence that when military threats are predominant, allies will not institutionalize their alliance because they will want to maintain their freedom to choose which actions will best preserve their national interests. However, as related military, political, and economic interests come under threat, they become willing to sacrifice a degree of autonomy in order to make cooperation more efficient and to increase the reliability and credibility, and hence the deterrent and defense value, of the alliance.

Second, the chapter demonstrates that the value of institutionalization is not limited to its efficient and purposive functions. NATO also provides evidence of how institutions foster constitutive norms—in this case, norms that defined the allies as a community of liberal democratic states that tackle problems through consultation, and instilled the alliance with a value independent of the security it could provide. Third, institutionalization allowed allies to weather several significant challenges without any real prospect of alliance dissolution. Allies had a material and a normative incentive to employ institutional channels (and exercise voice) to improve performance and reinforce

norms. Moreover, when voice was unsuccessful, the dissatisfied allies were able to exit the issue area in which performance was unsatisfactory but still maintain other benefits that accrued from membership. Thus, despite numerous crises and challenges NATO persisted through the Cold War.

The Origins of the North Atlantic Alliance

The political, economic, and social systemic shocks following World War II sparked military as well as ideological threats in Western Europe. Yet, these states evaluated the strength and saliency of the common danger disproportionately. They reconciled their diverse interests through a series of compromises and a traditional military pact. Initially, the allies created a few loosely connected committees to coordinate their efforts to deter and defend the West against Soviet aggression. They institutionalized their alliance because several crises underscored the need for procedures that would allow them to make and act upon decisions quickly. Figure 4 illustrates NATO's placement on the model of alliance institutionalization at the time the treaty was signed.




Figure 4: NATO's Institutionalization in 1949

The Common Threat

The West Europeans shared a common threat in that World War II had devastated their military, economic, and social systems, leaving them defenseless against external military threats and internal political subversion. Immediately following the war, the possibility of German revisionism preoccupied their defense efforts. Fears of renewed aggression intensified as they witnessed that Germany's economy was undergoing a quick recovery in comparison to its own interwar experience but also when contrasted to the experience of the rest of post-World War II Western Europe.¹ For instance, France's economy was too

¹ After World War I, German reconstruction had occurred more slowly than in the rest of the industrialized world. In 1928–29, world industrial production had exceeded prewar levels by over 40 percent, but in Germany it exceeded prewar levels by only 14 percent. However, when growth did occur in the 1930s, it occurred quickly: in 1932, Germany's Gross Domestic Product

weak to finance the military restructuring necessary to provide an adequate defense of French territory. The British had exhausted their gold and dollar reserves in the war effort, and their industrial base had so eroded that they had to turn to the Americans for munitions, shipping, and even foodstuffs.² Most European countries were plagued with similar difficulties. Either capital equipment and plant facilities had become obsolete or they were destroyed in the war. Manpower, basic materials, and even food were in short supply. Even with U.S. assistance, West European industrial and agricultural production lagged far behind prewar levels.³

Over time, however, the perception of a Soviet threat overshadowed German revanchism because Moscow's goals seemed to include ideological and military dominance. As demobilization occurred,

(GDP) was only \$134.6 billion but, by 1939, it had climbed to \$241.2 billion. Immediately following the Second World War, Germany was much stronger economically. Wendy Carlin, "West German Growth and Institutions, 1945–1990," ed. Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo, *Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 460–461, 463. Werner Abelshaver, "Germany: Guns, Butter and Economic Miracles," in *The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison*, ed. Mark Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 124.

² William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth Century World: An International History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 270. Indeed, the situation in Britain was so critical that it purchased food and fuel with a \$4.4 billion emergency loan that the U.S. had dispersed for investment in productive enterprises.

³ For example, agricultural production had fallen to 83 percent of its 1938 volume, industrial production to 88 percent, and exports to a mere 59 percent. Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 30.

the Allied powers (except the USSR) reduced their combined armed forces in Europe to fewer than one million military personnel, but Moscow maintained over four million troops and it refused to surrender territories that it had occupied during the war.⁴ Evidence of ideological expansion accumulated more gradually. First, evidence mounted that the Soviets were backing fledgling communist movements in neighboring regions, including Iran, Turkey, and Greece. Second, in Eastern Europe the Soviets were driving potentially friendly regimes out of power and were installing Communist regimes in their place. The Prague Coup in 1948 was particularly sobering for the West, which had believed Czechoslovakia to be the most likely Central European candidate for a successful democratic transition. There were widespread concerns in the West that their own political systems were also too weak to resist Communist infiltration. Third, the USSR made several diplomatic gestures to European states *outside* its sphere of influence—gestures that in the East merely masked Soviet domination. For instance, in February 1948, the Kremlin offered Finland a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual help, and rumors circulated that it was about to make a similar proposal to Norway.⁵

⁴ Claude Delmas, *L'OTAN: Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique-Nord* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981), 16-18; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereafter, NATO) *North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1949-1989: Facts and Figures*, 11th edition (Brussels: NATO, 1989), 5; Keylor, *Twentieth Century World*, 266-267.

⁵ Although this particular report proved untrue, it did place the issue of

The perception of an ideological threat added a new dimension to the military threat. The Western governments believed that the Soviets sought to eliminate "capitalism from all parts of the world and to replace it with their own form of Communism... in a revolutionary struggle... assisted, should favourable conditions arise, by military action..."⁶ Thus, in the short run (that is, until these favorable conditions arose), they continued to fear that any minor miscalculation might trigger a series of events that could easily spiral out of control and toward continental war.⁷

Conflicting National Interests and Expectations

Although the future NATO allies shared this fear of Soviet military and ideological aggression, they did not necessarily agree upon the character or saliency of the threat. Their interests differed along two dimensions. First, some states were driven by national security interests, whereas others were preoccupied with regional security. The former

security at the top of the Nordic states' agenda. Sven Henningsen, "Searching for Security in the North: Denmark's Road to NATO," in *NATO's Anxious Birth: The Prophetic Vision of the 1940s*, ed. Nicholas Sherwen, (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1985), 44.

⁶ The British Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), cited in Beatrice Heuser, "Stalin as Hitler's Successor: Western Interpretations of Soviet Threat," in *Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-1962: Thoughts on the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 19-20.

⁷ The fear was expressed in September 1948 in the secret "Washington Paper." Heuser, "Stalin as Hitler's Successor," 20.

perceived a direct threat to their territorial integrity and sought a security guarantee in the event of a military invasion. For them an alliance was a deterrent and an insurance policy that their neighbors would not abandon them in such a crisis. The latter group did not anticipate an enemy attack, but they feared being drawn into another world war. These states sought a credible arrangement that would stabilize the region, but not entrap them in peripheral conflicts. Second, a few states sought purely military objectives through the alliance, while others were after significant secondary rewards, such as economic assistance or enhanced political status.⁸ Negotiations over these two issues determined which states would join NATO and what kind of alliance NATO would be.

The European powers were divided according to whether a U.S. military commitment primarily served national or regional security interests. Due to their location and historical experience, France and the Scandinavian countries found national military security to be more pressing than continental security. France was most concerned with safeguarding its own territorial integrity because a great power conflict would very likely begin on its soil, and an alliance with the United States

⁸ The greatest distinction in this regard exists between the U.S. and the other allies. Whereas the U.S. initially pursued purely military objectives, the others sought to enhance their status in intra-European relations and institutions. Nikolaj Petersen, "The Alliance Policies of the Smaller NATO Countries," in *NATO After Thirty Years*, ed. Lawrence S. Kaplan and Robert W. Clawson, 93-95; U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS]* 1950, 3: 105.

was a necessary short-term solution to the problem of neutralizing a potential German *and* Soviet threat. In particular, France anticipated at least two additional benefits from this alliance. First, it would receive U.S. economic and political support to rebuild its military. This support was also essential for an independent foreign policy in the long-term. Second, membership would confer greater influence (that is, "a say") over European, and especially German, reconstruction. Similarly, Denmark and Norway were willing to abandon neutrality (which had failed during World War II, anyway) in exchange for a credible military guarantee from like-minded, democratic states.⁹

In contrast, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (the Benelux states), Britain, and the U.S. sought an arrangement to prevent into another world war, because they would inevitably be drawn in to such a conflict. Although the Benelux countries were not vulnerable to a direct Soviet/East Bloc attack in the post-war period (Allied-occupied Germany served as their buffer), a continental war would spill over into their territories. Britain's circumstances were similar because it was an island nation with traditionally global interests. It did not fear a direct

⁹ Frédéric Bozo, *La France et l'OTAN: de la guerre froide au nouvel ordre européen* (Paris: Masson, 1991), 28 ;*FRUS*, 1950, 3: 105. Canada had still other reasons for expressing an interest in the pact: It anticipated that firmer political, military, and economic ties with the continent would offset its asymmetric relations with the United States. Joseph T. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945–1958* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 96.

military invasion, but it was aware that another European war would spillover into its territory or otherwise adversely affect its interests. Thus, it pressed for a small pact between the U.S. and a few North Atlantic states *central* to the defense of the Atlantic Community. Experience suggested that if peripheral states were invited, they might entrap the great powers in conflicts that could escalate into something much greater.

The United States also became involved in the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty in order to prevent being drawn into yet another European war. This motivation explains the timing of the negotiations as well as its preferences on the pact's membership and substance. The U.S. did not enter formal treaty negotiations until the Soviet blockade of Berlin (June 1948) signaled that if the Americans remained aloof, conflict could escalate to the point that they might not be able to prevent another war. Because its primary objective was deterrence, the U.S. supported a more inclusive arrangement than the British did. While it was crucial to include the "core" of Europe—Britain, France, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—the U.S. calculated additional strategic benefits from including states that were not properly "North Atlantic." First, a larger alliance would credibly communicate that peripheral states were not "fair game" for infiltration and it would strengthen the emerging containment policy.¹⁰ Second, the peripheral states had a strategic value

¹⁰ Elizabeth D. Sherwood, *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to*

that compensated for the possibility of entrapment. Portugal and Italy furnished naval and air facilities in the Azores and the Mediterranean, respectively,¹¹ and Denmark and Norway provided the U.S. with access to air and submarine bases on their territories and island possessions. If Scandinavian countries were not parties to the treaty, Moscow could be expected to secure these benefits.¹²

The Americans insisted on a purely military pact designed to deter and defend against armed aggression. They did not deny that an ideological threat existed, but they stipulated that regional institutions like the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) neutralize it.¹³ Since the Americans alone had the strength and resolve to fill the

Western Security, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 16-17. On the issue of the U.S. desire to contain Soviet ideological expansion, see Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis, ed., *Containing the Soviet Union: A Critique of U.S. Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1987).

¹¹ However, the Europeans obstructed U.S. efforts to invite fascist Spain, which was equally or more strategically valuable than Portugal, another non-democratic state. The U.S. position was that Spain did have legitimate security interests, but that a number of allies were "ideologically hostile" to the Spanish regime. The U.S. sought support from the British government, but in the end, Spain was not invited to enter the North Atlantic Treaty. *FRUS*, 1964-1968, 8: 795; Albano Nogueira, "The Pull of the Continent: Portugal Opts for a European as well as an Atlantic Role," in *NATO's Anxious Birth*, ed. Nicholas Sherwen, 70-74. Spain only joined NATO after it had begun its transition to democratic government in the mid-1980s. On Spain see for example Otto Holman, *Integrating Southern Europe* (New York: Routledge, 1996); Frederico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin, *Spain's Entry Into NATO* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988).

¹² Sherwood, *Allies in Crisis*, 16-17, 26-27; Henningson, "Searching for Security," 49-52.

¹³ The OEEC was created to disperse Marshall Plan aid and, in so doing, to make the Europeans work together to increase economic prosperity, weaken

power vacuum the war had left in Europe, the design and substance of the arrangement largely reflected their interests.

The North Atlantic Treaty and the Origins of "NATO"

In April 1949, twelve nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty, agreeing to deter (and, if necessary, defend one another against) an enemy military attack.¹⁴ First, although the treaty specifies both constitutive and regulative norms, the former were weak at the outset. That is, the paramount goal was to protect the community from external attack and not to strengthen it for its own sake. Second, the treaty did not create an institutional structure that would reduce the costs of cooperation enough to obstruct exit significantly. Institutionalization only began once the allies perceived a significant increase in the risk of a hot war. Moreover, the early committees were uncoordinated and inefficient, and they tended to obstruct, rather than to foster, a coherent alliance program. The outbreak of the Korean War (June 1950) and the Suez Crisis (1956) reinforced the

communism, and promote democratic norms. L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *Contemporary Europe and the Atlantic Alliance* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1988), 138.

¹⁴ The original twelve members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Greece and Turkey (1952), the Federal Republic of Germany (1954), and Spain (1984) joined later. Of course, in 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland also joined. Chapter 6 will examine their accession.

belief that greater political and military integration was necessary to increase NATO's credibility and its overall deterrent and defensive value.

Treaty Norms

At the outset, the need to deter a common aggressor united the signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty. Nonetheless, the allies did constitute a community defined by a common way of life based upon peace, democracy, Western civilization, and nonviolence in the conduct of international relations. In particular, the preamble of the treaty avows their "desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments," and their determination "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their people, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law."¹⁵ The weakness of constitutive norms is underscored by the fact that the remainder of the treaty does not define the community, but expresses the means that will be undertaken to protect it from external assault (that is, it presents the regulative norms). For example, Article 1 requires allies *to settle any international dispute by peaceful means and so as not to endanger international peace, security, and*

¹⁵ For all references to the North Atlantic Treaty, see NATO, *The NATO Handbook* (1995). It is significant that the liberal democratic principles that underlie this community tolerate a degree of diversity in political and economic systems. For instance, there was a higher level of state-involvement in European than in U.S. economic affairs, and Portugal (with an authoritarian political system) entered the alliance. This will be discussed in further detail below.

*justice.*¹⁶ Article 3 calls on allies to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack through self-help and mutual aid, and Article 4, to consult together whenever the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of them is threatened. And finally Article 5 pledges that "...an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and...each of them...will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking... such actions as it deems necessary...to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Even Article 2, which at first appears anomalous, is yet another means to safeguard the allies' security, and not a means to strengthen the community for its own sake. The Article calls on allies to strengthen their free institutions, eliminate conflict in their international economic policies, and encourage economic collaboration. Although one of the allies' objectives in including this provision was to strengthen the political and economic underpinnings of the Western, democratic community, their ultimate goal was to facilitate their military objectives.¹⁷

¹⁶ Ibid., all emphasis added.

¹⁷ Indeed, evidence of the weakness of this norm is to be found in the fact that Canada, which proposed the Article, had to weaken its language to overcome objections that the Marshall Plan's OEEC already handled such matters. Don Cook, *Forging the Alliance: The Birth of the NATO Treaty and the Dramatic Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy Between 1945 and 1950* (New York: Arbor House/William Morrow, 1989), 220.

The Early Committee Structure and Institutionalization

Article 9 of the treaty creates a Council in which each ally's Minister of Foreign Affairs has equal opportunity to participate in defining the common threat as well as the means to respond.¹⁸ It empowers the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to "set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary." By the end of 1949, the NAC had created two additional ministerial councils: the Defense Committee (DC) and the Defense Financial and Economic Committee, on which sat the Defense and Finance Ministers, respectively. The DC, responsible for establishing unified defense plans, had the most elaborate structure of auxiliary bodies—five Regional Planning Groups¹⁹ subordinate to a Military Committee (MC) composed of the allies' Chiefs of Staff.

¹⁸ Douglas L. Bland, *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of Structure and Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1991), 12–14. The decision-making rule within the Council is consensus. Ideally, all positions have the opportunity to be aired, and even the smallest ally can veto any decision that it deems in violation of its interests. Of course, in reality, the process is far more complex. The bigger power may wield influence over the smaller powers in a myriad of ways. Furthermore, as a former Norwegian ambassador to NATO observes, "For a small country, the right to prevent a decision which is desired by all or many of its partners is a very untempting tool. It is much easier to go against a proposal when you know that your negative vote merely indicated minority dissent than when you know that the position you take is decisive." Jens Boyenson, "Contributions of Small Powers to the Alliance," in ed. Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., *The Western Alliance: Its Status and Prospects* (Ohio State University Press, 1965), 109.

¹⁹ The five commands were: Northern Europe, Western Europe, Southern Europe/Western Mediterranean, Canada/United States, and the North Atlantic Ocean. The commands for Northern and Western Europe dissolved in 1951. The

The early institutional structure suffered from three significant weaknesses. First, it did not address the question of whether the allies should engage in military integration or mere contingency planning. Second, annual (or semi-annual) Ministerial meetings provided insufficient political guidance and oversight to the staffs responsible for military planning. Third, existing bodies were unable to reach an acceptable equilibrium between preserving national interests and satisfying the alliance's need to make and implement decisions quickly.²⁰ These issues became particularly important because shortly after the NAC created this organization, there was an apparent increase in the level of global threats. For example, in the second half of 1949, the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb. In China the Communist Party came to power after a long civil war. In June 1950, Communist-backed forces in North Korea invaded South Korea. Western governments, which shared a monolithic view of Communism, widely believed that Moscow was

Southern Europe/West Mediterranean Command dissolved in 1952. That same year, the newly formed Atlantic Command (ACLANT) took over the functions of the North Atlantic Ocean Planning Group (which included all allies except Italy and Luxembourg). NATO, *NATO Facts and Figures*, 36.

²⁰ Jan Willem Honig, *NATO: An Institution Under Threat? The Occasional Paper Series of the Institute for East-West Security Studies*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 19–20. Robert S. Jordan, *The NATO International Staff/Secretariat, 1952–1957* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 33.

behind these events and that it was willing to adopt military means to expand Communism globally.²¹

Initial efforts to strengthen the alliance focused on creating a unified military command structure.²² In September 1950, the NAC adopted a *forward defense* strategy in which the allies would try to check aggression at Germany's eastern border. Because this strategy required superior forces and a centralized command, the allies created a peacetime unified command, the Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe (SHAPE), under the leadership of the Supreme Allied Commander, SACEUR (an American officer). By 1951, SHAPE had an integrated staff in which every officer was instructed to shed his national perspective and to adopt the viewpoint of the alliance, and "SHAPE began to represent views based on a calculation of the interests of NATO as a whole."²³ Yet, these first steps toward institutionalization impeded political oversight: they increased the public profile of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the first SACEUR, such that he became "the public embodiment of NATO," overshadowing the NAC. For

²¹ It is now widely acknowledged that Stalin only reluctantly lent his support to the invasion after much prodding on the part of the North Koreans.

²² General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testifying before Congress in July 1950. Cited in Sherwood, *Allies in Crisis*, 33; David N. Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), 19.

²³ Chatham House Study Group, *Atlantic Alliance: NATO's Role in the Free World* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952), 95.

some time, the allies continued to solve problems unilaterally or by turning to Washington directly.²⁴

To strengthen the NAC and improve cooperation between the civil and military arms of the alliance, the allies reorganized the committee structure. In the first round of changes, early in 1951, the NAC created Council Deputies to meet in continuous session when the Foreign Ministers were absent. It authorized an international (civil) secretariat (including a Planning and Coordination Group, Office of Budget and Accounts, an Information Service) to be financed by an international budget.²⁵ However, these changes did not solve the problem of civil-military coordination and participants in the policy formulation process continued to complain of the lack of "continuing or authoritative direction"; in one view, the alliance functioned as a "body—or more accurately twelve bodies—without a head."²⁶ Moreover, "Long

²⁴ Jordan, *NATO International Staff/Secretariat*, 115.

²⁵ A "permanent civil organization" had been created in May 1950, but until the introduction of the international budget in May 1951, all officers of this organization were seconded by their national governments, which paid their salaries and dictated the terms of their employment. After the international budget, only some of the international staff were seconded (of these only some were paid by NATO); others were on permanent transfer from government service to the International Staff/Secretariat, and still others were free-lance hirings. *Ibid.*, 115.

²⁶ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 397.

memoranda were being exchanged... [but] without much result."²⁷ Indeed, for all of the allies' intentions to furnish a joint response to any external military threat, the alliance was no more than a multilateral framework, incapable of realizing the full potential of consultation and cooperation.

At their Lisbon Ministerial Conference in February 1952, the allies announced additional reforms, intended to make the international secretariat more influential, to facilitate multilateral cooperation, and to increase political oversight in the military bodies.²⁸ The NAC redefined its membership, formerly limited to Foreign Ministers, to include Defense Ministers and Finance Ministers. In effect, it became a council of Governments and not Ministers. Moreover, each government was to name a permanent representative (of the rank of Ambassador) who would sit on the council in the absence of the ministers, and who would be assisted by a national delegation. The allies placed this civil organization in Paris and created the post of Secretary General (SG) to serve as the chief executive officer of NATO and to add an element of continuity to the leadership of the alliance. Yet, even these changes did not resolve or reduce the problems of political control immediately. The first Secretary General

²⁷ Lord Patrick Lionel Hastings Ismay, *NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954* (Paris: n.p., 1954), 28.

²⁸ On this latter point, it was intended to examine the matter of "adequate military forces and the necessary financial costs...as one, and not as separate problems." Ismay, *NATO*, 28. See also Jordan, *NATO International Staff/Secretariat*, 57.

(Britain's Lord Ismay) diligently sought to ensure that military authorities would be subordinate to political authorities and that they would cooperate closely with the International Secretariat.²⁹ Yet in the first years, the political authorities continued to face resistance in obtaining the cooperation of military authorities that, owing to national interests and traditions, had little incentive to contribute to a common, integrated defense. Without correct and timely information, the SG could not provide the necessary political oversight. One Deputy Secretary General in the 1950s described the whole process as one of "multilateral and collective torture."³⁰

²⁹ He demanded certain rights to increase the authority and prestige of his office as well as the NAC. In particular, he insisted the right to chair the Council in the absence of its chairman (Lord Ismay was formally named Chairman in 1956) and total freedom of action in dealing with the Council—including the right to initiate business and to have direct access to member governments. Jordan provides a thorough account of the evolution of the SG and the NAC under the tenure of Lord Ismay. *The NATO International Staff/Secretariat*, chapter 4.

³⁰ Honig, *NATO*, 21–22, 26.




Figure 5: NATO's Institutionalization in 1952+

Figure 5 illustrates NATO's institutionalization as the alliance attempted to cope with a complex threat context. The allies continued to institutionalize NATO because this process produced a number of significant benefits. First, it made nuclear deterrence more effective and more credible. In forming regularized channels for intra-allied communications, it significantly cut back on the time required for allies to decide upon and implement a common response. It also communicated to the adversary that the allies were united in their resolve to counter any military threat. Second, it eased concerns regarding abandonment or entrapment. For example, it further bound the United States to Europe and the European allies to one another, for as military and civilian staffs became integrated, their security became truly indivisible. At the same

time, the allies anticipated that institutionalization and integration would reduce the likelihood that they would be drawn into conflicts unwillingly or unwittingly. Third, institutionalization increased voice and influence. The smallest states—even Luxembourg and Iceland—achieved a degree of access to U.S. leaders that would otherwise have been impossible. At the same time, it granted the United States a mechanism by which it could prevent its allies from acting independently. Fourth, institutionalization reduced the overall costs of defense because the European allies did not have to renationalize their militaries.

NATO's Normative Development

An analysis of the North Atlantic Treaty and its early institutionalization suggests that there are two kinds of constitutive norms in NATO: inviolability of liberal democratic principles and consultation among allies. According to chapter 2, constitutive norms define a common identity, whereas regulative norms provide standards for how dissimilar states act in a given situation. The two are not mutually exclusive: regulative norms initially created to gain a strategic advantage may gradually transform into constitutive norms. In theory, NATO has always been an alliance constituted of like-minded liberal democratic states. In reality, the allies initially emphasized consultation as a means to make the alliance a more credible instrument of military deterrence but, over time, it

became a defining feature of the community. This transformation occurred through a process of learning and through efforts to actively promote the norms.

Acceptance of Liberal Democratic Principles

Despite the Cold War rhetoric of NATO being a military alliance among liberal, democratic states, at one time or another several allies were ruled by authoritarian regimes, which the allies (and the U.S. in particular) supported. For example, in designing the North Atlantic Alliance, the United States insisted that Portugal be a founding member because it provided significant strategic value.³¹ Yet, when it came to Portugal's political system, "the United States opted for *realpolitik*, sweetened with a bit of hypocrisy and self-delusion, to justify its support for including the Salazar regime in an alliance committed to the preservation of democratic principles."³² Portugal did not become democratic until mid-the 1970s. Greece and Turkey, in contrast, were democracies when they entered NATO in 1952, but in both countries, coups brought military juntas to

³¹ Significantly, Portugal did not perceive a serious Soviet threat. Until the mid-1970s, Portugal's security interest lay in its colonies and after decolonization, its focus shifted to Spain, heeding Salazar's warning that "Portugal without the Empire will become a colony of Spain." Cited in Douglas Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems Since 1949* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 309.

³² *Ibid.*, 305.

power.³³ Despite their violations of basic democratic rights and freedoms, the allies continued to collaborate with the staunchly anti-communist Greek (1967–1974) and Turkish (1980–1983) military regimes.³⁴ Thus, through most of the Cold War this was a weak constitutive norm. Several factors undermined the norm, despite the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty had defined it, all future alliance communiqués promised to uphold it, and most allies practiced it. First, the norm weakened with each instance of a military coup. Second, it further eroded when democratic states allowed strategic considerations to prevent them from sanctioning the authoritarian regimes. It was especially damaging when the United States took this position, because it was fighting the Cold War to preserve this very way of life.³⁵

³³ Greece and Turkey were not founding members of the alliance because the Western allies feared that they lacked “the requisite cultural, social, and historical ties to the West to become useful members of NATO.” They were invited to join the alliance in 1952 “less by choice than by strategic necessity.” Richard N. Haass, “Managing NATO’s Weakest Flank: The United States, Greece, and Turkey,” *Orbis* 30,3 (Fall 1986): 457–458.

³⁴ In both countries, the military regimes declared martial law, suppressed political parties, and placed many politicians under house arrest. On Turkey see: Theodore A. Coulombis, *The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 160–161.

³⁵ By the end of the Cold War, all of the allies seemed to have stable, democratic governments such that it appeared that the norm had come to be practiced universally within NATO. However, it will be difficult to evaluate how well states really adhere to this norm until they are once again faced with a threat that forces them to choose between military security and democratic principles.

Political Consultation

As the preceding analysis suggests, there was an increase in the expectation of consultation. This increase came about through learning and through active promotion. For example, Britain learned through its experience at Suez that it could no longer engage in an effective military campaign without the support of its allies. This lesson was applied most dramatically during the Falklands War. However, allies also created institutional mechanisms to facilitate consultation. Both the Report of the Committee of Three (1957) and the Harmel Report (1967), for example, actively promoted consultation. The 1957 report is significant for defining consultation:

Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the NATO Council know about national decisions that have already been taken; or trying to enlist support for those decisions. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed. At best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.³⁶

The Harmel Report elaborates on this theme:

As sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decisions. The Alliance affords an effective forum and clearing house for the exchange of information and views; thus, each Ally can decide its policy in the light of close knowledge of the problems and

³⁶ NATO, *NATO Facts and Figures*, 389-390.

objectives of the others. To this end the practice of frank and timely consultations needs to be deepened and improved. Each ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe...³⁷

There is no doubt that the basic documents of the Alliance define consultation as a fundamental norm to be exercised by NATO states. Moreover, all of the allies accept the validity of the norm. For example, between 1970 and 1989 NAC communiqués contained, on average, 2.6 reaffirmations of NATO's consultation mechanisms or calls for continuing consultation.³⁸ However, the evaluation of NATO's political performance suggests that the allies did not consistently follow this norm. In particular, it suggests that when consultation threatened national security by increasing the time necessary to make or implement a decision or by potentially making military operations more transparent to the enemy, consultation was reduced. The United States was especially unwilling to compromise national security to maximize consultation, as the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated. At the same time, however, the failure to consult frequently instigated debates within the alliance regarding the necessity of consultation.

³⁷ Ibid., 403.

³⁸ These communiqués are available at <http://www.nato.int>.

In sum, allies' rhetoric and behavior do not match such that it is premature to argue that democratic principles and consultation are wholly constitutive among the NATO allies. However, over the history of the alliance, there are indications of a gradual (but not linear) strengthening of these norms.

NATO's Cold War Performance

It is difficult to disentangle the alliance's performance and its normative development. In several instances, when allies were dissatisfied with alliance performance or their partners' adherence to norms, they employed institutional channels to improve performance and reinforce the norms. Any evaluation of NATO's performance must focus on the political for three reasons. First, NATO was a political alliance as much as it was a military one. A credible deterrent relied upon a strong showing of political unity. Second, because political unity had to be maintained, many military decisions were a result of political compromises. Third, NATO never engaged in military action during the Cold War. It is very difficult to accurately or reliably evaluate the success of NATO's military forces in deterring a Soviet attack or to engage in a counterfactual analysis of NATO's capability to defend against such a contingency. This analysis focuses on political performance for another reason as well: it is in political relations that the most evidence for or against the presence of

norms will be found. The discussion emphasizes consultation on two areas: (1) nuclear planning, an issue in which discussions are continuous,³⁹ and (2) crisis consultation, which is infrequent, but is most likely to pit national interests against alliance interests.

Nuclear Planning

The role of nuclear matters in the alliance has been highly contentious since the 1950s and it is in this issue area that national and alliance (that is, common) interests have come into such severe conflict that analysts have perceived several opportunities for dissolution. Three common interests were most salient throughout the Cold War: a credible deterrent, a strong defense should deterrence fail, and political unity to facilitate the accomplishment of the first two objectives. Yet, all allies also want to maintain control over their armed forces and military actions conducted on their territory.⁴⁰ Although nuclear planning is one area in

³⁹ Although nuclear force modernization has also been highly contentious, this analysis is limited to consultation over matters of control. As Buteux argues, shared ownership is irrelevant without shared control. The various hardware proposals (including MLF and INF) are simply the means by which non-nuclear allies would have some effect on the implementation of American decisions—either through physical access to the delivery systems or the potential ability to veto the use of the warheads themselves. Paul Buteux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO, 1965–1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 19, 37. See also footnote 54, *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Their national interests in preserving autonomy come into conflict with one another (and with alliance goals) when one country's forces are stationed or its weapons are deployed on another country's soil. It is notable that the tension between autonomy and security would seem to be greater in highly integrated

which these objectives came into severe conflict during the Cold War, in each case dissatisfied states did not exit but turned to institutional channels to attempt to harmonize alliance strategy and national interests.⁴¹

The United States has always had a disproportionate amount of influence in determining alliance strategy. During the Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961), the U.S. adopted a strategy of *massive retaliation*. The goal of this strategy was to confront

the potential aggressor with NATO forces which are so organized, disposed, trained and equipped that he will conclude that the chances of a favourable decision are too small to be acceptable, and that fatal risks would be involved if he launched or supported an armed attack. ...Our chief objective is to prevent war by creating an effective deterrent to aggression. The principal elements of the deterrent are adequate nuclear and other ready forces and the manifest determination to retaliate against any aggressor with all the forces at our disposal, including nuclear weapons, which the defense of NATO would require.⁴²

This strategy had the advantage of being cost-effective and highly credible in an environment in which the Soviet Bloc had the stronger conventional

peacetime alliances (like NATO) because troops and weapons are stationed outside of national territory during periods of reduced conflict. Indeed, Portugal, Spain, France, and Greece (the latter between 1974 and 1980) have withheld their militaries from NATO's integrated command for reasons of national sovereignty.

⁴¹ Buteux discusses tradeoffs between national and alliance interests in Paul Buteux, *Strategy, Doctrine, and the Politics of Alliance: Theatre Force Modernization in NATO* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), chapter 1.

⁴² North Atlantic Military Committee, MC 14/2(Rev) (Final Decision), *Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area*. 23 May 1957. (<http://www.nato.int/archives/strategy.html>).

forces, but NATO had the superior nuclear power. Under these circumstances, it was too costly for the allies to engage in a conventional defense buildup.⁴³ Instead, they deployed conventional forces only as an initial shield and a marker to indicate the line at which they would turn to nuclear weapons. If the enemy were to engage NATO's conventional forces, the allies would escalate to the nuclear level immediately. Moreover, they would target their nuclear weapons on the enemy's military, industrial, and population centers (known as a countervalue strategy). Because the Soviet Bloc did not have the means to retaliate in kind, it would be deterred from crossing this line. This strategy communicated that the Soviet threat was a generalized one (that is, directed to *alliance* rather than national interests) and that the allies' security was indivisible—that an attack on any one of the NATO allies would bring a generalized response in the form of collective defense.⁴⁴

Yet by the time NATO adopted massive retaliation, the U.S. was already reevaluating its nuclear strategy. When the strategic balance

⁴³ Eisenhower's "New Look" deployed tactical nuclear weapons to compensate for shortfalls in conventional forces. In 1957, the allies first agreed the U.S. would stockpile nuclear warheads in Europe and would make these weapons available to allies if needed. However, it was up to the President of the United States to decide when to use them, and they were to remain under American control until such a decision was made. Buteux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO*, 2; Catherine McArdle Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 35.

⁴⁴ Buteux, *Strategy, Doctrine, and the Politics of Alliance*, 19; Idem, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation*, 2–3.

shifted, the conditions under which deterrence functioned also changed, and Washington abandoned massive retaliation. Although the Soviet Union had had the bomb since 1949, it did not pose a severe threat in the absence of an inter-continental delivery system. In October 1957, the Soviets launched their first earth-orbiting satellite, *Sputnik*, announcing to the world that they now had this capability. The new Soviet delivery system leveled the playing field and for the first time, "New York was as close to Moscow as Moscow was to New York." The United States was finally "obliged to think about its security first"—before that of its allies.⁴⁵ This single event immediately eroded massive retaliation's credibility as a deterrent strategy. Indeed, one influential analysis argued: "if it is clear that the aggressor too will suffer catastrophic damage in the event of his aggression, he then has a strong reason not to attack, even though he can administer great damage."⁴⁶ This suggested that as soon as Moscow could target U.S. cities, Washington's threat to immediately escalate any conflict to the nuclear level lost credibility.

⁴⁵ Maurice Schumann, *La France et ses Alliés, Où en sommes-nous?* Les Conférences Des Ambassadeurs, directed by André David, Guy David and Jean Epstein. N. 27. Paris: IMP, 1966, 11. (All translations are those of this author, unless otherwise indicated.)

⁴⁶ Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* 37:2 (January 1959), 230. Moreover, in this new environment, "To deter an attack means being able to strike back in spite of it. It means, in other words, a capability to strike second." *Ibid.*, 213.

The U.S. used this argument when it presented the new strategy, *flexible response*, to the allies at the Athens Ministerial Conference in April 1961. In the new environment, an effective and credible deterrent required:

A *Flexibility* which will prevent the potential aggressor from predicting with confidence NATO's specific response to aggression, and which will lead him to conclude that an unacceptable degree of risk would be involved regardless of the nature of his attack.⁴⁷

The U.S. argued for flexible response on two grounds. First, in the event of an attack, the allies would launch an all-out conventional response and force *the enemy* to make the decision to escalate to the nuclear level. It would be deterred from doing so because of NATO's superior capability at this level. Second, the threat to employ nuclear weapons would be more credible because it would rely upon a counterforce targeting strategy that avoided population centers. This strategy would reduce the risk to American territory because it was assumed that the enemy would reciprocate with a counterforce strategy.

Although the U.S. made flexible response national policy in the late 1950s, NATO did not follow suit until 1967. In June 1962, the Americans submitted a draft proposal outlining the new strategy (Draft MC 14/3) to

⁴⁷ North Atlantic Military Committee, MC 14/3(Final), *Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area*. 16 January 1968. (<http://www.nato.int/archives/strategy.html>) Emphasis in original.

NATO's Military Committee. This issue—and the contents of the draft in particular—became a significant source of tension among the allies. The great power allies did not support the draft and France rejected it in its entirety. The smaller allies would not take a definite stand and risk alienating a great- or super-power ally. The Europeans criticized flexible response on five grounds. First, they believed it was a poor deterrent because the enemy would find the costs of conventional attack (and gradual escalation) more acceptable if they knew with certainty that NATO would not escalate to the nuclear level immediately. Moreover, “a balanced and proportionate response” did not communicate an unambiguous threshold at which the U.S. would escalate to the nuclear level. If a conventional conflict were to escalate to the level of theater nuclear weapons, the U.S. still might be unwilling to engage in a generalized nuclear war. Second, flexible response contradicted the notion that security was indivisible and therefore entailed a significant redistribution of risks and commitments within the alliance. If deterrence were to fail, those states on the front line, like Germany, would pay the greatest price, while others, in particular the U.S. and Britain, would receive little or no damage.⁴⁸ Third, the Europeans feared that the

⁴⁸ Buteux, *Strategy, Doctrine, and the Politics of Alliance*, 19–20. As early as 1955 NATO's first major combat exercise involving Germany, *Carte Blanche*, indicated that a major war would be devastating for Germany. In this simulation, 1.7 million Germans were killed and 3.5 million were wounded. Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons*, 36.

superpowers would exercise less restraint in their relations because flexible response would confine military conflict to Western and Central Europe. They would exercise real restraint only when the conflict threatened to spread to their territories. Fourth, a stronger conventional force posture required that the European allies increase their defense budgets during an era in which they were attempting to devote more resources to economic growth and social-welfare programs. Fifth, flexible response intensified debates about the right of European allies to participate in decisions regarding the control and possible use of nuclear weapons deployed on their territory.⁴⁹

The U.S. had great difficulty overcoming these obstacles because its nuclear planning process was shrouded in such secrecy that (1) the allies were unable to accurately assess the changes it proposed in strategic policy, and (2) it reinforced the asymmetrical relationship with the U.S. and fostered resentment toward any unilateral shifts in policy.⁵⁰ The allies,

⁴⁹ Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas*, 151–172. Britain and France attempted to supplement NATO's flexible response strategy by developing their own national nuclear weapons programs. However, flexible response provided the United States with a rationale to oppose the development of independent national capabilities: A small nuclear state was more likely to escalate early and to employ a countervalue strategy, inviting an enemy response and drawing in the allies. In order to manage escalation, the U.S. needed to maintain central control, either by obtaining a veto over the use of national forces, or by persuading its allies to abandon their national nuclear programs altogether.

⁵⁰ Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas*, 178–179; Fred Chernoff, *After Bipolarity: The Vanishing Threat, Theories of Cooperation, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995), 198.

including the Americans, agreed that a nuclear planning body would strengthen allied unity, and by extension general deterrence, by making the junior allies feel more involved in nuclear planning. The problem, however, was how to design it. U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara initiated efforts to regularize cooperation in 1965.⁵¹ In June of that year, McNamara proposed a special committee of NATO members to consider how the allies might better consult in nuclear planning. The allied reaction to his proposal was mixed. In particular, the smaller allies feared that such a body would facilitate cooperation among the great powers and thereby create two tiers of states within NATO.⁵² However, once both Britain and Germany were on board, McNamara's proposal gained enough support to come to fruition. In November 1965, ten of the allies participated in a Special Committee of Defense Ministers: Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, and the United

⁵¹ Between late 1962 and mid-1965 Multilateral Force (MLF) discussions dominated the alliance agenda, although the negotiations floundered. The Americans proposed the MLF as a solution to the problem of the American nuclear monopoly in NATO, and they intended that it would obviate the need for independent nuclear forces. Washington had toyed with the idea of MLF since the Eisenhower administration, but 1962's Cuban Missile Crisis pushed them to move ahead. As proposed, the MLF would consist of Polaris missiles deployed on a fleet of surface ships that were jointly owned and operated by the participating allies. Each ship would have personnel from several countries, so that no state could control a single ship or withdraw it from the force for national purposes. Paul Buteux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965–1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 23–24; Chernoff, *After Bipolarity*, 69–70; Barton J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?" *Political Science Quarterly* 95,1 (Spring 1980): 108.

⁵² Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas*, 181–182.

States. This committee split into three working groups, the most significant of which was devoted to nuclear planning (U.S., Britain, Germany, Italy, and Turkey sat on this committee). This group created a two-tier planning forum. The Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC) was open to all interested allies. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was limited to the U.S., Germany, Britain, Italy, and three members of the NDAC in rotation.⁵³ Although the NPG was subordinate to the NDAC, routine and ongoing discussions of nuclear matters would take place in the former.⁵⁴

The first significant policy issue for the NPG was the adoption of flexible response. The NPG proved successful in that the policy the allies finally adopted in 1967 was the result of serious negotiation and

⁵³ The initial structure of the NPG was a compromise, incorporating the preferences of the smaller allies and it resulted from deep and extensive consultations. Beginning in 1968 the rotations system began to weaken as rotating members sought more regular involvement in nuclear planning. Reforms, called the Hague Formula, were implemented allowing ministers who rotated out to participate through the permanent representatives and staff group levels. In the late 1970s, rotating members renewed their call for permanent status. "North Atlantic Treaty Organization Officials in the International Secretariat and many national delegations believed that the old two-tier system had simply eroded over time. The alliance as an institution had come to accept that everyone should be able to contribute to the NPG, depending on the circumstances, and that no one should be excluded from alliance functions." Chernoff, *After Bipolarity*, 203, 206. For an analysis of the evolution of the NPG, see Buteux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation*, especially chapter 4. There were no significant changes to the body after the reforms of the late 1970s.

⁵⁴ The allies did not intend the NPG to be a forum for consultation in crisis. Buteux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO*, 57–58, 203; Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas*, 183–185.

compromise. The American position, that articulated in Athens in 1961, advocated waiting as long as possible to employ nuclear weapons, but the European position (with Germany at the forefront) insisted upon a very low nuclear threshold. To accommodate both views and to maintain the "Alliance cohesion... critical to sustaining a situation of general deterrence," the allies intentionally made Flexible Response an ambiguous concept "that encompassed rather than resolved differences of strategy."⁵⁵

Institutionalized consultation in the NPG, according to one authoritative source, enhanced NATO's deterrent value in at least four ways. First, it provided the allies with a means to analyze the implications of American strategic decisions for European security. They also gained some influence in applying these decisions to the European theater. Second, the NPG isolated issues of nuclear planning and nuclear sharing from other contentious issues, including arms control. (It was less effective in this regard when theater nuclear force modernization was on the table.) Third, successful consultation in such a sensitive area had spillover effects into other areas, like a greater willingness to consult more generally on matters of common interest. Fourth, standard operating procedures within the NPG have created "organizational pressures" for agreement.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Ivo H. Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 13. See also, Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemma's*, 169–170.

⁵⁶ Buteux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO*, 194–196.

Consultation in Crisis

Although NATO's military performance was never challenged during the Cold War, a number of military crises threatened to draw the alliance into conflict. These crises had significant political repercussions, even though the alliance did not become militarily engaged. The Suez Crisis (1956) was the first significant crisis in alliance politics. It receives the deepest treatment here because it stimulated efforts, already underway, to reform the organization. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Falklands War are also examined to evaluate the success of these reforms.

Suez

The Suez crisis erupted following Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. Both France and Britain perceived this challenge as threatening to their great power status as well as their economic vitality and they agreed it would be appropriate to employ NATO facilities to protect these interests.⁵⁷ With Israel's assistance, they coordinated covert plans for a military intervention. Egypt had already denied Israel access to the Canal. The three parties agreed that Israel would attack the Sinai and Britain and France would intervene militarily to protect the canal and to

⁵⁷ In the case of France, the Government also perceived that Egypt's President Nasser posed an indirect threat to the very existence of the Fourth Republic (because of assistance he provided to rebels in Algeria). Richard E. Neudstadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 14–15.

end the hostilities. The two NATO allies intentionally withheld their plans from the United States and the rest of the alliance. They expected that if the U.S. had prior knowledge it would try to stop the intervention, but they also believed that it would support them in a *fait accompli*—at least to preserve the unity of the alliance. Instead, the U.S. introduced a resolution to the United Nations Security Council demanding a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the occupying forces. Britain and France exercised their veto, but with a revolution underway in Hungary and a U.S. presidential election on the horizon, Washington was unwilling to risk a confrontation with Moscow. It gave Britain an ultimatum: end the conflict immediately or face “war on the pound.”⁵⁸

Although NATO did not become involved militarily in Suez, the crisis posed a severe political challenge and revealed serious strains among the allies. In particular, France and Britain perceived the American refusal to intervene in support of its allies as a case of abandonment and a confirmation that the U.S. commitment was not credible. In the French view, “‘American treason’ [for not backing its allies] had disastrous consequences for our relations with the U.S.... If our allies had abandoned us in difficult, if not dramatic circumstances, they were capable of doing so again if Europe in turn found itself threatened.”⁵⁹ Among the rest of the

⁵⁸ Ibid., 22–26.

⁵⁹ Christian Pineau, 1956/*Suez* (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1976), 191.

allies, the crisis reinforced perceptions that they needed to strengthen and improve NATO's consultative mechanisms. There had been a great deal of consultation in the weeks before the invasion, but it occurred outside of NATO channels (even though Britain and France thought it legitimate to use NATO forces) and it was of very poor quality.⁶⁰ One analysis describes the pattern of behavior as "each 'friend' misreads the other, each is reticent with the other, each is surprised by the other, each replies in kind."⁶¹

Awareness of these problems gave added weight to preexisting efforts to increase intra-allied consultation and cooperation. Several months before the Suez invasion the NAC had created the Committee of Three "to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity

Sherwood argues that the British believed that *they had betrayed the alliance* and quickly acted to "re cement" their ties to the Americans and to undo any the damage done to the alliance. The British were not entirely altruistic in their attempts to repair their relations with the U.S. and NATO. They wanted to reinforce the Western political community and to preserve their influence over the alliance's security agenda. Sherwood, *Allies in Crisis*, 88-89. Chernoff presents the opposite view—that in both cases "their disappointment with the American position and their new understanding of the diminished role that alliance solidarity played in U.S. thinking... made a deep impression and colored their dealings with the United States on the whole range of security and alliance issues throughout the decade that followed. Because they saw the United States as unreliable, both France and the United Kingdom were more resolved than ever to have a nuclear deterrent force." Chernoff, *After Bipolarity*, 148.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 148.

⁶¹ Neustadt, *Alliance Politics*, 56.

within the Atlantic Community.”⁶² The report was largely completed by November 1956, although it was not submitted to the NAC until December. The report made a number of recommendations to strengthen the “internal solidarity, cohesion, and unity” of the alliance.⁶³ In particular, it proposed that the allies institute mechanisms for achieving the peaceful settlement of disputes and for expanding cooperation in non-military areas. For instance, allies should inform the Council of any development that significantly affects the alliance; members and the Secretary General have the right to raise for discussion in Council any subject that is of a common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic nature; in developing national policies, allies should take into consideration the interests and views of other governments; and when a consensus exists, it should be reflected in the formation of national policies.⁶⁴

Cuban Missile Crisis

There is conflicting evidence that consultation was becoming more regularized by the outbreak of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). The crisis erupted when the United States intelligence reported that the Soviet

⁶² NATO, *NATO Facts and Figures*, 384. The Committee included the permanent representatives of Italy (Gaetano Martino), Norway (Halvard Lange), and Canada (Lester Pearson).

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 384.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 391.

Union was placing nuclear weapons on Cuba, despite public and private assurances to the contrary. As U.S. President John F. Kennedy negotiated with the Soviets, he repeatedly suggested the need for a NAC meeting, arguing "I'm just afraid of what's going to happen in NATO, to Europe, when we get into this thing more and more, and I think they ought to feel that they've been a part of it."⁶⁵ However, when the U.S. announced its blockade of Cuba on October 22, 1962 the NATO allies received only a forty-five minute advance warning. According to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, Washington was in daily communication with London and officials there were in regular communication with the rest of the allies. He indicated that the allies "had no real grievance about non-consultation": they recognized that the U.S. could not consult with all allies equally in such a severe crisis and Dean Acheson's visit to Europe and the information filtered to the NATO Council were "more than correctness demanded."⁶⁶ Macmillan also reported that even the normally critical French recognized the constraints such circumstances placed on consultations and acknowledged that Kennedy had no other choice in his strategy for consultation.⁶⁷ Yet other accounts are more critical and suggest

⁶⁵ Quoted in Sherwood, *Allies in Crisis*, 118.

⁶⁶ Harold Macmillan, *At the End of the Day, 1961-1963*, (Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973), 219 and chapter 7.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

that the allies were very disturbed by the *lack* of consultation. French President Charles de Gaulle is reported to have asked Acheson at one point during the crisis, "Are you consulting or informing me?" Acheson's reply: "informing."⁶⁸ In particular, the allies feared that the crisis in Cuba could instigate yet another crisis over Berlin, if not another global war. In Canada, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was so troubled "by Kennedy's unilateral decisions during the crisis and so fearful that Canada might be dragged into war that he barred U.S. Strategic Air Command Bombers from the use of Canadian airfields during the crisis."⁶⁹

Yet, the lack of consultation with NATO is significant because there was a NATO connection in this crisis: the United States expected that if it were to attack Soviet missiles in Cuba, the USSR would retaliate by attacking the Jupiter missiles it had deployed in Turkey. Because these missiles were obsolete and provocative, the U.S. made a private verbal commitment to the Soviets to try to remove them. While the U.S. would not agree to a quid pro quo, it did indicate to the Soviets that it expected that "within a short time after [the] crisis was over, those missiles would be gone."⁷⁰ It made this opaque offer without consulting the allies, and in

⁶⁸ Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, "'I Don't Need Your Handkerchiefs': Holland's Experience of Crisis Consultation in NATO." *International Affairs* 66,1 (1990): 96–98, 99n; see also, Sherwood, *Allies in Crisis*, 121.

⁶⁹ Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," 115.

⁷⁰ Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*

fact, it withheld information on this topic. Once the crisis ended, the U.S. took the matter to the NATO defense ministers, but "Other states were not given a genuine chance to influence the shape of the proposal or the outcome." The Turkish government in particular felt "unhappy, coerced, and ignored...."⁷¹

Falklands/Malvinas War

Consultation was also limited during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War. The Falkland Islands chain was an archipelago claimed by both Britain and Argentina, but the inhabitants of the island regarded themselves as British subjects. Between 1965 and 1982 Britain and Argentina negotiated control of the islands, but Argentina broke off relations in 1982. Shortly thereafter, a group of scrap metal merchants planted an Argentine Flag on one of the islands. The British launched an

(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1971), 86–87; see also Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," 99. Because the Jupiters stood above ground, took hours to fire, and were inaccurate, they were only good for a first strike. This also meant the Soviets would target them if it were to strike first. The U.S. was eager to replace them with more mobile and sophisticated Polaris submarines.

⁷¹ Chernoff, *After Bipolarity*, 66, 67. Moreover, the crisis brought home to the Turks the possibility that the possession of some weapons made them a target in the East-West Conflict. It also shattered the illusion of unanimity within the alliance. In the Spring of 1963, they agreed to remove the Jupiter missiles (Polaris submarines would cover their targets) in an effort to reduce the likelihood that Turkey would become entrapped in a conflict not of its own making. George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–1971* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), 93–94.

official protest and sent an Antarctic survey ship into the region. The Argentine Government sent a small naval force to protect the group. On April 2, the Argentines invaded the Falkland Islands. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sent 100 ships and 28,000 troops to the South Atlantic and took the matter to the United Nations Security Council.⁷² UNSC Resolution 502 called for the hostilities to end and the withdrawal of both side's forces. Diplomatic efforts failed and military engagements began.

The Falklands Crisis had military and political implications for NATO. Although it was Britain's decision to respond militarily to Argentina's invasion, the crisis had repercussions for NATO's preparedness because Britain withdrew most of its forces from the North Atlantic. Moreover, the British argued that because the aggression targeted British territory, NATO's inaction would threaten the alliance's credibility. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher argued in front of the North Atlantic Assembly:

The fortunes of the Alliance are affected by the developments outside the Treaty area. Although the Alliance *cannot act collectively* outside the area, each of us must discharge his *separate* responsibilities. In doing so, each strengthens all... If we had not acted to repel aggression outside the [NATO] area, the Alliance's resolve *to act within* it might well have been questioned.⁷³

⁷² Chernoff, *After Bipolarity*, 161.

⁷³ Stuart and Tow, *The Limits of Alliance*, 156. Emphasis in original.

In terms of political repercussions, it seems the recommendations of the Report of the Committee of Three remained unheeded. Britain "consulted" with the NATO allies in order to inform and to enlist support, but not to formulate a position. Consultations on this matter were extensive, but they were mostly bilateral, and the object was to gain the allies' support for Britain's position. Britain did not consult to seek approval to send its fleet to the South Atlantic. Instead, it "consulted" to convince the allies "that the move was necessary."⁷⁴ However, Britain was careful to learn from the mistakes of Suez and to attempt to enlist U.S. support as the crisis unfolded.⁷⁵

Significantly, with the exception of Spain, the allies did not criticize Britain's unilateral actions and they responded with military and intelligence support. In contrast to Suez, the Falkland's crisis was a demonstration of allied unity. Within a week of Argentina's invasion, the

⁷⁴ Chernoff, *After Bipolarity*, 166. Fritz L. Hoffmann and Olga Mingo Hoffmann, *Sovereignty in Dispute: The Falklands/Malvinas, 1493–1982* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 165.

⁷⁵ The U.S. delayed publicly granting full support to the British because it was also allied to Argentina. For an analysis of Anglo-American consultations during the crisis, see Geoffrey Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher* (London: The Bodley Head, 1990), chapter 8. For a comparison to the Argentinean perspective, see T.V. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), chapter 8, esp. 157–159. For a treatment of Anglo-American relations, see Louise Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

European Union terminated arms shipments to Argentina and several countries provided training to the British. For example, Belgian pilots flew Mirage aircraft against British pilots to train them to confront the Argentinean Mirages. France offered the same service with its Super-Etendard aircraft. The United States provided almost all of the intelligence information used by the British in the campaign, and it even made available some of its military satellite channels. Later in the conflict, it moved one of its reconnaissance satellites from the North Atlantic to the South Atlantic.⁷⁶

Decisions to "Exit"

No NATO ally has engaged in a complete exit from the alliance, but in two instances (France and Greece), allies have withdrawn from the military command. In several other instances (Spain and the Scandinavian countries), allies have refused to fully integrate in the first place.⁷⁷ The

⁷⁶ Stuart and Tow, *The Limits of Alliance*, 159; Geoffrey Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher* (London: The Bodley Head, 1990), 85, 87. One source suggests that the NATO allies were so cooperative because this conflict allowed them the opportunity to test NATO's ships and arms. Hoffmann and Hoffmann, *Sovereignty in Dispute*, 165.

⁷⁷ Nils Ørvik describes such policies as *semialignment*: "partial participation within a formal alliance arrangement." Semialigned states are those "which are formally aligned, but which have made certain explicit reservations as to the degree of involvement in the alliance." *Semialignment and Western Security* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 6. This term is problematic because NATO is a political alliance as much as a military alliance. Thus, the Scandinavian states, for example, can contribute to the common defense and the general deterrent in ways other than basing foreign troops or housing nuclear

previous analysis indicates that all of the conditions for alliance persistence were present in NATO.

France

France was the first state to withdraw from participation in NATO's military command. This action was a result of its perception that the organization did not perform satisfactorily and that the allies (especially the U.S.) did not observe the norms that NATO was supposed to embody. France's evaluation of performance rested on a number of factors, but the most significant was its belief that the U.S. nuclear guarantee was not credible. This reservation became most acute when the U.S. abandoned massive retaliation for flexible response. The chief weakness of the latter strategy in terms of general deterrence was that so long as U.S. territory was vulnerable to nuclear attack, the American threat to employ nuclear weapons was not credible (or its credibility was seriously diminished). Moreover, because the conventional force ratio favored the East by an estimated 3:1, the American strategy exposed the Europeans to possible destruction.⁷⁸ France contended that the

installations. Indeed, such contributions would be *destabilizing*, given these states' proximity to the adversary. Moreover, the political unity of the alliance is as important as overall military capability in practicing general deterrence.

⁷⁸ France, Information Minister, "Le Dossier de l'Alliance Atlantique," n.d.

organization (which it argued was distinct from the alliance) exacerbated the threat. The Americans dominated the organization by the very nature of nuclear defense. Although allied military forces were "integrated" under an American commander, they had no real influence in determining how their forces would be employed. Moreover, it seemed that the crises most likely to escalate to world war erupted from *within* NATO—such as Suez and Vietnam—and threatened to entrap allies who may not have direct concerns.⁷⁹ France also argued that NATO was not an alliance of equals. France's experience at Suez was merely the first to indicate that the American guarantee came at the cost of autonomy—or even influence—over one's own foreign policy decisions.

Yet France continued to place the "highest importance" on maintaining the alliance which had numerous accomplishments, including: preserving the territorial status quo in Western Europe, preventing aggression and stabilizing zones of influence, and allowing Western Europe to survive in peace and freedom.⁸⁰ Since it was merely the performance of the organization that France criticized, and since it continued to value the commitment expressed in the North Atlantic Treaty, it did not exit NATO. Its initial efforts involved applications of

⁷⁹ Ibid.; Christian de la Malène, in *Journal Officiel*, No. 15 Second Session (Wednesday April 13, 1966), 681–682.

⁸⁰ France, "Le Dossier de l'Alliance Atlantique;" de Carmoy, "l'Alliance Atlantique Disloquée," 23.

voice to express its concerns and to propose reforms. It was never satisfied with the alliance's response. For example, in 1958, President Charles de Gaulle sent a memorandum to President Eisenhower, emphasizing France's concern that Washington did not engage in adequate consultation, and proposing that Britain, France, and the U.S. create a Tripartite Organization to make *concerted* decisions on political questions affecting world security and to create strategic plans for using nuclear weapons. He threatened to exit NATO if the Americans did not consider seriously these proposals, which it did not.⁸¹ De Gaulle began to carry out his threat and withdrew French naval forces from the Mediterranean. He refused to accept a U.S. offer to share information on the development and use of missiles (whose warheads would remain under American control). He also refused to allow French air defense to be placed under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Forces. De Gaulle announced France's new strategy—"the defense of France must be French"—and launched a national nuclear weapons program, the *force de frappe*. All of these actions were political, more so than military, gestures,

⁸¹ There is some question as to how sincere France was in its efforts to employ voice to reform the alliance. De Gaulle and his proponents argue that voice was employed throughout the 1950s, with no success. Others argue that in reality France never really intended for NATO to work; it merely created a pretense for withdraw. However, it is significant that France did not exit much earlier, but sought reform for at least ten years (that is, since Suez). Guy de Carmoy, *L'Alliance Atlantique Disloquée* (Paris: Maquette Impression, 1966), 27; and France, *La France et l'OTAN* (Paris, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1967), 19.

intended to convince the Americans to engage in a real dialogue with Europe.⁸²

When none of these efforts brought success, France retreated from the integrated military command, including the military consultative bodies like the NPG and the MC, but it remained an active member of NATO's political bodies. If conflict were to erupt, France would consult and cooperate with its allies, as Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty required. However, it would not integrate with NATO forces in either peace or war. Complete exit from NATO was not an option because it would have required sacrificing *all* of the goods that the North Atlantic Treaty provided. For example, France still required a military commitment in case of an attack and it did not have the capability to pose its own deterrent. Because total exit was too costly, France continued to participate only in those aspects of the alliance that benefited its security and its broader foreign policy interests.

Although it may not have seemed so at the time, France exercised a degree of "loyalty" throughout this crisis in NATO relations. For example, in justifying the timing of its retreat (1966), it claimed that had it waited until the Treaty was to come under review (1969) to announce the decision, it would have done far more harm to the Alliance: "Nothing would be worse than to pose the question of the Organization at just that

⁸² De Carmoy, *L'Alliance Atlantique Disloquée*, 27–32.

moment."⁸³ To do so, presumably, would also have brought the Treaty into question, but as France's memorandum announcing the withdrawal indicated, the retreat "does not lead the French Government in any way to question the Treaty signed in Washington on April 4, 1949."⁸⁴

Greece and Spain

Spain and Greece have also chosen to limit their integration into NATO's military command, but because they were not as strategically significant (or politically powerful), their exit did not threaten the cohesion of NATO in the same way that France's did.⁸⁵ Their decision was a product of two factors. First, through the Cold War, neither state

⁸³ Georges Pompidou, *Journal Officiel* No. 19 21 April 1966, 809.

⁸⁴ "Text of the Memorandum Presented 10 March 1966 by the French Government to the Fourteen Representatives of the Member Governments of NATO," in *Revue Générale de Droit International Public* 70, 2 (April-June 1966): 543. For domestic debates, see *Journal Officiel* April 1966. Significantly, France's withdrawal may have saved NATO, because without France's opposition, the allies implemented a number of reforms that increased voice among the remaining allies, and thereby enhanced their loyalty to the Alliance in the face of future strains. For the allies' response to France's withdrawal, see for example *Revue Générale de Droit International Public* 70, 2 (April-June 1966): 546; "The Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Council" (Brussels 8 June, 1966): *Revue Générale de Droit International Public* 70: 826; "Response of the Belgian Government to the Memoranda of the French Government of 10 and 29 April, 1966," *Revue Générale de Droit International Public* 70: 554.

⁸⁵ Denmark and Norway also do not participate fully in the integrated command, but they have always refused to allow nuclear weapons, bases, and foreign forces on their territories so as not to provoke the USSR. Glenn Snyder, "Spain in NATO: The Reluctant Partner," in *Spain's Entry into NATO*, ed. Frederico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin, 145.

perceived the Soviet Union to pose the gravest threat to their security. For Greece, the immediate threat was Turkey. For Spain, it was Morocco. Since NATO satisfied only a portion of their security requirements, they would not rely entirely on its commitment. Second, both had a history of authoritarian rule and a belief, because of that experience, that NATO would sacrifice democratic principles for enhanced security. The post-authoritarian governments believed that NATO had violated its underlying norms of liberal democratic governance and intra-allied consultation. Since they did not believe that NATO *embodied* constitutive norms, at least not among *all* of its members, these norms did not elicit loyalty to the institution.

In the case of Greece, complete exit was never an option because Greece is located too close to the Soviet Union. It engaged in a "partial exit" because military cooperation did not guarantee security from a Turkish threat, but continued political association did afford protection in the East-West Conflict. The decision to abrogate military ties followed Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus, which indicated to Greece that NATO was unable (or unwilling) to protect Greece from Turkish incursions. The invasion, according to Greece, clearly violated international law (the express goal was to divide Cyprus) and it could not have occurred without NATO's tacit permission and therefore indicated that the allies favored Turkey over Greece. It responded by withdrawing from the

military command, although it remained a participant in NATO's political bodies. Greece did not allow NATO military exercises to take place on its territory and it did not participate in exercises held outside of its territory.⁸⁶

Thus Greece engaged in a partial exit from NATO. It is significant that in Greece's case, the decision to employ a partial exit strategy was purely instrumental. If Greece had any illusions about NATO's norms, they vanished when NATO and the U.S. backed the authoritarian regime that ruled Greece between 1967 and 1974, and again when they seemed to lend implicit support to Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. They did not choose partial exit out of loyalty to NATO, but because it seemed to maximize their security needs. By exiting the combined military command, it was able to decide the best course of action to defend its interests; it no longer had to modify its actions to accommodate allies that (it thought) favored Turkey, the adversary. At the same time, by remaining in the political institutions, Greece maintained a degree of influence in the alliance's other activities, and it retained the opportunity to exercise voice to gain NATO's favor in its ongoing conflict with Turkey.

In 1977, Greece began to seek reintegration because it came to believe that Turkey was the real beneficiary of its exit and that it

⁸⁶ Because of its proximity to the Soviet Union, Greece has never allowed nuclear weapons on its soil and it has never fully integrated into NATO's military command. *Ibid.*, 146.

continued to reap the benefits of full NATO membership, unrestrained by military cooperation with Greece. Turkey's numerous vetoes over Greece's attempts to reintegrate would seem to lend some credence to this perception.⁸⁷

Spain had a still different experience with NATO. It was not welcome under the Franco regime (although it did have extensive bilateral military relations with the U.S.), and did not join the alliance until 1982. In December of that year, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party came to power with a strong record of opposition to NATO membership. On normative grounds, it did not view the U.S. as an ally of democracy (it had backed the Franco regime), and NATO itself was opposed to socialism. Spain also had significant strategic reservations: NATO's commitment did not extend to the defense of Spain's possessions on the North African Coast (and the source of conflict with Morocco); membership increased the risk of nuclear destruction; and enlarging NATO could spur enlargement or strengthening of the Warsaw Pact.⁸⁸ The military

⁸⁷ Constantine Melakopides, "Greece: From Compliance to Self-Assertion," in *Semialignment and Western Security*, ed. Nils Ørvik, 73–76. This argument does not hold for the period 1974–1978. During this period, relations between the United States and Turkey were very tense. As punishment for the invasion of Cyprus, the U.S. imposed an arms embargo on Turkey. It retaliated the following year by nationalizing U.S.-Turkish bases. By the time the embargo was lifted in 1978, Turkey's military forces were very weak. Stuart and Tow, *The Limits of Alliance*, 292–293.

⁸⁸ Eusebio Mujal-León, "Spanish Foreign Policy Under the Socialists," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 6,2 (1988):35–36.

advantages of NATO membership may have been minimal, but elements in the government viewed membership as a means to other, very valuable objectives: to modernize Spanish society, to professionalize the military and increase its loyalty to the democratic regime, and to participate in Europe.⁸⁹ The more pragmatic elements won the NATO debate, but because of the strategic reservations that existed, Spain never fully integrated into NATO military structures. For example, it refused to send troops to serve under NATO commands and, in particular, under Portuguese command. However, it did maintain observer status in the NPG and it participates in the Military Committee and the Defense Planning Committee.⁹⁰ As in the case of Greece, norms were not an issue.

Conclusion

The analysis of NATO's institutionalization and persistence during the Cold War lends support for the models of alliance institutionalization and alliance persistence and dissolution. It demonstrates that institutionalization creates material and normative benefits and that these

⁸⁹ On this last point, Spain's Socialist Prime Minister announced: "(I)f (Spain) wishes to be a political, economic, institutional and cultural part of Europe's destiny, then (it) must also make a contribution to that European destiny in terms of security policy." Ibid., 40.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 38; Stuart and Tow, *The Limits of Alliance*, 301.

benefits pose significant obstacles to exit when one or more allies perceive a decline in the performance of the alliance.

First, this analysis provides evidence in support of the model of alliance institutionalization. The founders of the North Atlantic alliance created a traditional military pact to counter what they perceived to be imminent threats to the security of the North Atlantic Area. Although these actors were cognizant of an ideological threat from the start, they were preoccupied with countering military threats and preventing another World War from erupting. Over time, it seemed unlikely that any state would intentionally instigate such a war by engaging in large-scale military invasion. The greater threat appeared to arise out of the possibility that minor military incursions and ideological subversion would set off minor conflicts that could spiral out of control. The allies agreed that institutionalization was a necessary counter-measure; greater consultation and cooperation would reduce the opportunity for misperception and accidental war, but it would also make them more prepared for such a contingency. The analysis also supports the argument that institutionalization is a continuous process. As the allies gained evidence of the benefits of cooperation and consultation, they steadily attempted to strengthen the institution and reinforce its underlying norms.

Second, the analysis demonstrates that there are both material and normative benefits that accrue from institutionalization and that both contribute to the development of a robust alliance. The material benefits are most easily measured and evaluated. As NATO institutionalized, the allies received higher levels of better quality information that increased their trust in one another, reduced levels of uncertainty in their international relations, and eased fears of both abandonment and entrapment. It also benefited military operations more directly (at least among those states participating in the integrated command structure). Integration made nationalization of defense unnecessary, which allowed resources to be redirected to other sectors of the economy. Equipment standardization (albeit limited in an absolute sense) combined with joint military exercises, increased the efficiency of military cooperation.

The normative benefits are equally significant. Public pronouncements and numerous committee findings (including the Report of the Committee of Three and the Harmel Report) leave no doubt that the allies intended the pact to embody norms of democratic governance and interstate consultation. Even though their deeds did not always match their rhetoric, especially when allies perceived fundamental national interests to be at stake (as in the Suez, Cuba, and Falklands crises), it is not necessarily the case that constitutive norms were weak, or did not have an impact on alliance relations. In fact, the analysis is particularly valuable

for demonstrating how norms can evolve and strengthen over time. Through each successive crisis, the allies attempted to go further in their efforts to consult along the lines called for in the Committee of Three Report (that is, consultation in order to *form* a national policy): in Suez the key players withheld information from allies; in Cuba they informed allies on at least some matters (the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba); and in the Falklands, they lobbied actively for allied support. Thus, while the absolute strength of the norms may be subject to disagreement, one can certainly say that they were "strengthening" throughout the Cold War. Chapter 7 will return to some of the problems involved in measuring and evaluating the strength of norms.

Finally, the analysis demonstrates that the combination of strengthening norms and satisfactory performance contributed to NATO's persistence through several challenges and crises, including the Suez crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the French withdrawal, and even the "crisis" of détente. Performance erected material obstacles to exit in the sense that even as NATO's consultative mechanisms faltered, NATO still provided a measure of security that was unavailable from outside the alliance. Norms created another barrier, even when one or more states became dissatisfied with the performance of the alliance. This was most evident in France's decision to engage in a "partial," instead of a "total," exit from NATO and to do so in 1966, rather than 1969 when such an

action would threaten to undermine the treaty and the very notion of a unified community of Western, democratic states.

In sum, NATO's behavior through the Cold War lends support to the argument that institutionalization can raise significant material and normative obstacles to exit. The next chapter will evaluate the effect of institutionalization in the Warsaw Pact to determine if this process *always* raises obstacles to exit.

Chapter 4

The Warsaw Pact: An Institutional Analysis of Dissolution

Whereas NATO poses several important puzzles for alliance theory, the Warsaw Pact seems to validate existing theory in that all of the allies (save the USSR) eagerly dissolved the alliance as soon as the strategic context altered. Nonetheless, it raises at least two interesting questions for the model of alliance persistence and dissolution. Whereas liberal democratic states seeking to prevent a third world war institutionalized NATO to balance against the potential military resurgence of communist and fascist states, the communist regimes created the Warsaw Pact to bandwagon with a preponderant power intent on securing its hold on the region. Because the Soviet Union wielded such control over its allies' domestic and foreign policies, there is a tacit assumption that the Warsaw Pact was not a *real* alliance. From this perspective, the only puzzle is why the USSR allowed the alliance to dissolve so quickly. Yet, in fact, the Warsaw Pact provides a valuable contribution to a cumulative alliance theory *precisely because it was anything but an East European NATO*.¹ That is, it encourages us to ask (1) does the

¹ Indeed, as one analyst observes, "What brought the Warsaw Pact into question has been the political reality of imposed rule in Eastern Europe, and not the nature of the military alliance that stemmed from the political imposition of occupation by the USSR." Ivan Volgyes, "The Warsaw Pact: A Study of

model hold in bandwagoning as well as balancing alliances, and, (2) if bandwagoning alliances are less likely to persist or evolve, does the model explain as much or more than the alternative explanations?

This chapter answers yes to both questions. It argues that, in fact, the behavior of the Warsaw Pact does conform to that expected by the model. First, the analysis supports the model of alliance institutionalization. In the immediate post-war strategic context, in which states faced potential external military threats and various internal political threats, the East European states bandwagoned with the Soviet Union via traditional bilateral security pacts because each was preoccupied with its own external security and internal, political stability. And since they did not perceive a generalized threat to the region, a bilateral pact with the USSR satisfied security requirements.

Second, institutionalization of this network of bilateral treaties only occurred when the participating states perceived a common military threat to their territories and a common threat to their domestic political systems. However, the experience of the Warsaw Pact is in sharp contrast to that of NATO. Institutionalization in the Western alliance was the

Vulnerabilities, Tension, and Reliability," in *The Future of European Alliance Systems: NATO and the Warsaw Pact*, ed. Arlene Idol Broadhurst (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 153. However, if ever there was ever a perception that the Warsaw Pact was a direct counterpart to NATO, Gaddis argues that it was erased in 1956 when the USSR used military force to prevent Hungary from exiting. John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 211.

product of intense negotiations over several years, and the objective was to improve the efficiency of *collective* defense. In the Warsaw Pact, institutionalization was managed entirely by the alliance leader to improve the effectiveness of its *national* defense—if necessary at the expense of its allies' security. Thus in the Eastern alliance, limited institutionalization did not produce significant material or normative barriers in the form of increased transparency, reduced uncertainty, greater influence over Soviet foreign policy, or a strong community of like-minded states.

Third, in the absence of the material and normative obstacles to exit that institutionalization is expected to erect, the Warsaw Pact persisted for two key reasons. First, Soviet power posed a significant obstacle to exit until the late 1980s. States that did attempt to exit the alliance or otherwise redefine their relationship to it faced the prospect of military sanctions (invasion, in the case of Hungary and Czechoslovakia). Second, for most states there were no satisfactory alternatives. They were too dependent upon Soviet economic ties and the military guarantee to make a clean break. Dissolution only became an option as these two obstacles eroded. As the Soviet economy weakened and eventually collapsed and East-West relations improved under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union lost the will to enforce membership, and the NSWP allies began to conceive of the possibility of alternative security arrangements. They recalculated the

costs of alliance, and in the absence of material or normative obstacles to exit, they chose to dissolve the Warsaw Pact.

The Strategic Context and the Creation of the Warsaw Pact

According to the prevailing view of the Warsaw Pact, "the Soviet Union was an expansionist nation primarily responsible for political and military contention, and...there was a real and global communist threat to independent but internally weak nations...."² Evidence emerging since the end of the Cold War suggests that neither side had a "master plan" for promulgating its own ideological system, but that diametrically opposing systems intensified perceptions of threat within a complex geopolitical environment.³ Moreover, although the Soviet Union had wanted (and was

² And according to the "traditional" view, the Cold War only slowly developed because the United States was slow to respond to the threat of Soviet/Communist expansion and to introduce Containment to its policy agenda. The "revisionist" view states that the Communist bloc was not united and that the Soviets had only a negligible influence over non-Soviet communist groups. According to this interpretation, the U.S. fueled the Cold War by exhibiting an "unreasonable" hostility toward Communism. Only the "post-revisionist" school has settled on a middle ground, in which neither side is fully to blame. Such interpretations find the origins of the Cold War to lie in the structure of the international system. For a description and analysis of each of these interpretations, see Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism," *International Security* 20,3 (Winter 1995/96):152-188.

³ For scholarly treatments of these records see, for example, Melvyn P. Leffler, "Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened," *Foreign Affairs* 75,4 (July/August 1996): 120-135; Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War," 152-188. In some instances, former government officials are also becoming more open about early Cold War events, now that the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union have dissolved and Europe is becoming more united.

preponderant enough to impose) a buffer zone in Central and Eastern Europe, the states of that region did have reasons of their own for allying with the Soviet Union. In particular, the West had proven itself an unreliable guarantor of their security, while the Soviet Union had offered to guarantee their territorial integrity and to support their communist regimes (which it had helped to install). In many cases, the choice was not an entirely free one, but it satisfied their immediate security requirements. The alliance system did not institutionalize immediately, but the process was consistent with the model of alliance institutionalization developed in chapter 1. That is, the allies found bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union satisfactory so long as the perceived threat was a moderate military one. Yet when the military threat intensified and stability and status were endangered, this group of states created a multilateral institutionalized alliance.

The Soviet Perspective

Archival materials indicate that Soviet foreign policy in the immediate post-war order was driven by a number of considerations, including configurations of power, protection of the USSR's immediate periphery, state and regime security, a potential resurgence of German

One such example is Raymond L. Garthoff, "When and Why Romania Distanced Itself from the Warsaw Pact," Bulletin 5 Cold War International History Project,

and Japanese power, and a wealthy and powerful United States.⁴ Evidence suggests that, late in the war, the USSR was uninterested in pursuing a policy of Westward expansion beyond its existing sphere of influence for three reasons. First, "Stalin ardently believed in the inevitability of a postwar economic crisis of the capitalist economy and of clashes within the capitalist world that would provide him with a lot of space for geopolitical maneuvering in Europe and Asia—all within the framework of general cooperation with capitalist countries."⁵ Although the U.S. was wealthy and powerful, the Soviet leadership adopted the Marxist-Leninist view that over time contradictions would emerge in the relations among the capitalist states and would drive them apart, leaving the USSR free reign in Eastern Europe.⁶ Second, the USSR was too weak to expand westward and it needed to concentrate on its own recovery. During the

Woodrow Wilson Center, Princeton University.

⁴ Leffler, "Inside Enemy Archives," 122. The last concern is reinforced in a memorandum dispatched from Nikolai Novikov, ambassador to the U.S., to Moscow. This memorandum has been compared to Kennan's Long Telegram. In it he analyzed U.S. foreign policy as expansionist and reactionary, with imperialist motivations (among some factions at least), and urged the Soviet leadership to be cautious in ensuring the security of the USSR.

⁵ Ibid., 34–35.

⁶ At this time, Stalin's foreign policy may have been consistent with Marxist-Leninist ideology, it may even have been reinforced by it, but it was not driven by it. Ibid. For an insightful treatment on the relationship between Marxist theory and the conduct of international relations, see V. Kubalkova and A.A. Cruickshank, *Marxism and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).

war, it had carried the brunt of the fighting on the eastern front and had suffered massive population and resource losses.⁷ Soviet sources estimate that monetary damages amounted to a minimum of 700–800 billion rubles.⁸ Third, some in Moscow believed that in the short term the USSR should cooperate with the West in order to receive assistance to rebuild its economy and to maintain an active role in shaping the geopolitical environment. The Deputy Foreign Minister argued for this view in a 1944 memo to Foreign Minister Molotov.⁹ Moreover, the outcome of the Yalta Conference (1945), which recognized Eastern and Central Europe as falling within the Soviet sphere of influence, seemed to indicate that the

⁷ It is estimated that in the territories occupied by Germany, 20 million Soviet citizens were killed and 5 to 15 million died of hunger and disease. Roger Hilsman, *From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World Without War: A History and A Proposal* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 108.

⁸ Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 31. Sources actually vary between 375 billion and 3,047 billion rubles. The former figure did not include damages to much of the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic countries, or Finnish Karelia. Soviet officials tended to emphasize the 700–800 billion range. According to the Deputy Foreign Minister, "Our direct material losses...surpass the national wealth of England or Germany and constitute one-third of the overall national wealth of the United States." Cited in *ibid.*, 31.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 31–32; Patrick Flaherty, "Origins of the Cold War: New Evidence," *Monthly Review* 48,1 (May 1996):36. According to Flaherty, this memo indicates that more than anything else, the Soviet Union wanted "breathing space to recuperate from the wounds of war."

Western powers had "fully recognized [the USSR] as a partner in managing the world."¹⁰

However, soon after the war ended there were indications that the West would be an unwilling and even a hostile partner. Three matters in particular set the USSR about formalizing its network of bilateral alliances. First, changes in U.S. and British leadership altered Stalin's perception of his ability to negotiate with the West. Stalin had believed that he could enter a partnership with Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, but he did not trust their successors: Harry Truman and Clement Attlee.¹¹ Second, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki signaled that the U.S. had become a world player, and because the U.S. and Britain had not told Stalin about the atomic bomb, he believed that they intended to use it to intimidate the USSR, extract concessions from it, and impose a postwar order consistent with their own ideological orientation. Third, Stalin also perceived that the Truman Doctrine, followed by U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall's offer of U.S. assistance to rebuild all of Europe, was an attempt to overshadow the Soviet Union and to gain preeminent influence

¹⁰ Both countries had posed numerous threats, first to Russia, and then to the Soviet Union. Regarding Germany, it was Stalin's belief that this country would become powerful again within twenty years—a fact that was born out by reality. Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 33, 47.

¹¹ William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War* (New York: Norton, 1982), 9, 99; Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 39.

in Europe, and to revive German military-industrial potential and direct it against the USSR. To safeguard its security and status, the USSR needed to demonstrate that it was powerful and not easily intimidated. It set out (1) to create a buffer zone that would protect the USSR from U.S. political and military maneuverings, and (2) to develop atomic weaponry to break the U.S. monopoly.¹²

The NSWP Perspective

The Central and Eastern European states did not share many of these security concerns. They were most concerned with regional and domestic instability following World War II. They sought military protection and agreed to bandwagon with the Soviet Union for three reasons. First, in the conduct of World War II, they already had forged military and political ties to the USSR. Second, their wartime experience indicated that the West was not a reliable guarantor of their security, as it had not defended their interests during the war and the peace settlement. Third, they shared with the Soviet Union an interest in countering a resurgent Germany and resolving regional territorial disputes. Finally, young Communist regimes, regardless of whether they had come to power through legitimate means or through Soviet intervention, required

¹² Ibid., 43–45, 50–54; Leffler, “Inside Enemy Archives.”

the political and military support of the Soviet Union in order to survive and to achieve international status.¹³ Significantly, the states of Central and Eastern Europe did not share the perception of a common threat until 1954, despite their common experiences. Thus the initial Eastern treaty system was no more than a network of bilateral military pacts emanating from the USSR.

First, the USSR had established a foothold in the region during the war. There were two trends in the East European states' wartime experience with the Soviet Union. In lands the Soviets had occupied or where there were historic antagonisms, like Poland, the USSR imposed control, but in states where these conditions did not hold, such as Czechoslovakia, influence generally was exercised more subtlety. In Poland, for example, the Soviets had treated the population harshly¹⁴ and had refused to recognize the government-in-exile. Diplomatic relations resumed only after the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union on June 30, 1941,

¹³ Marco Carnovale, "The Warsaw Pact at Thirty: Soviet and East European Successes and Failures," in *Continuity and Change in Soviet-East European Relations: Implications for the West* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), 164. For a discussion of how these regimes came to power and Stalin consolidated his hold on the region, see Geoffrey Stern, "Eastern Europe, 1944–85," in *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*, ed. George Schöpflin (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1986), esp. 188–194.

¹⁴ The élite and intelligentsia were pushed out of social and professional life, and over one million people were deported to Siberia, the Russian Arctic, and Soviet Central Asia. Joseph Rothschild, *Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 28–29.

but they broke down again in 1943 after overwhelming evidence implicated the Soviet secret police in the massacre of several thousand Polish Officers.¹⁵ Despite the resentments that developed over the occupation period, the Soviets fostered conditions that later would facilitate Poland's inclusion in the Soviet Bloc. For example, they created a Polish army and bureaucratic corps largely allegiant to Soviet interests, and after 1941 they raised a new Polish army commanded by Soviet officers of Polish ethnic origin. The organization of the Soviet army served as the model for this army, which, in turn, was the model for Poland's postwar armed forces. Furthermore, the Soviets backed the creation of the Polish Communist Underground movement to compete with the London-affiliated general resistance movement (the Home Army). Finally, drawing on Communist functionaries and leftist intellectuals in the Soviet Union, they organized a group called the Union of Polish Patriots, which would eventually provide an alternative to the Polish government-in-exile.¹⁶ In Czechoslovakia, in contrast, the long-standing friendship between the Czechs, Slovaks, and the Soviet Union was reinforced by the formers' belief that the Soviets had *not* been in league with the Germans to

¹⁵ The Katyn massacres were a great, but unspoken source of tension between the Poles and Soviets throughout the post war era. Only after the Cold War had ended did the Soviets (under Mikhail Gorbachev) finally acknowledge their guilt in this matter.

¹⁶ Rothschild, *Return to Diversity*, 30–31.

destroy Czechoslovakia, and their greater acceptance of Communism. The Czech Communist Party had been a legitimate and even respectable actor during the war and it consistently drew over ten percent of the vote in free elections. Furthermore, it was much more moderate on policy matters than other East European communist parties. Indeed, the Czech communist party was perceived to be "different" from (that is, more nationalist than) the other communist parties in the region.¹⁷

Second, regardless of how ties to the USSR were forged, they were reinforced by the perception that the West had not, or would not, ally with the East Europeans. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania felt the strongest sense of abandonment in this regard. The peace settlement compensated and secured the great powers, but it did not eliminate the German threat or resolve long-standing territorial disputes for these countries. The Poles, for instance, believed that the U.S. and Britain

¹⁷ This inclination toward the East strengthened following the skillful ascension of the Party to power in 1948. Through repeated intra-party purges until 1954, the Czechoslovakian Communist Party became one of the most Stalinist Parties in the region, second only to Albania. And the party remained immune to the ideological "thaw" underway in the Soviet Union through the mid-late 1950s. Such a thaw was undesirable because Czechoslovakia's Communist leaders had been directly implicated in Stalinist terror and purges, and to loosen control would be equivalent to signing their own death warrants. Furthermore, a thaw was not necessary for maintaining domestic stability because the country was undergoing such a period of economic stability and growth that traditionally politicized segments of the population (students, workers) remained depoliticized. Ibid., 167. For an overview of Czechoslovakia's affinity to the Soviet Union, See Dennis C. Pirages, "Resources, Technology, and Foreign Policy Behavior: The Czechoslovak Experience," in *The Foreign Policies of Eastern Europe*, ed. James A. Kuhlman, 57-78, 89.

essentially had "given" their country to the Soviet Union, despite their objections and even after their troops had fought alongside the Allies in the war. Not only had the British government refused to support the Polish government-in-exile's protest of the 1939 Soviet annexation of eastern Poland (London hosted this government), but in 1945 it also ratified this annexation at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. Over Poland's objections, the great powers agreed that the Curzon Line would become the new Russian-Polish frontier and the Oder-Neisse line would become the new German-Polish boundary, shifting Poland directly into the Soviet sphere of influence. Moreover, the British and Americans also withdrew their support for the liberal government-in-exile and granted it to the Soviet-backed Provisional Government. Thus, accommodation with the Soviets appeared to be Poland's only option.¹⁸

In the case of Czechoslovakia, the British and French had hoped to purchase peace with Germany at its expense. By the summer of 1943, Czechoslovakia's exiled leader, Eduard Beneš, had come to realize it would be the Soviets, and not the West, that would liberate East and Central Europe. Therefore, he quickly distanced himself from the Czech government-in-exile and began to ingratiate himself toward Stalin by inviting Communists into his government and requesting a Treaty of

¹⁸ James F. Morrison, "The Foreign Policy of Poland," in *The Foreign Policies of Eastern Europe*, ed. James A. Kuhlman, p. 145.

Friendship, Mutual Aid, and Postwar Cooperation.¹⁹ Hungary and Romania, in contrast, were treated more harshly in the peace settlement as former German allies. The treaties stipulated that Soviet troops stationed on their territories (presumably to protect the lines of communication between Moscow and troops stationed in Austria) were to remain until the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the occupation zone in Austria.

Third, alliance with the Soviet Union provided security against regional threats, especially German revanchism. Indeed, it has been argued that "it is an over-simplification to argue that the limitations placed on Polish foreign policy by the USSR [for example] are always the major determinant of Polish foreign policy. Many times there is a coincidence of interest—especially regarding relations with Germany."²⁰ At or near the top of almost every country's needs was assistance in the resolution of ongoing territorial and nationality disputes. Hungary, for instance, was involved in severe disputes with Czechoslovakia and Romania. In such cases, the Pact served as an insurance policy that traditional disputes, once settled, would not reemerge. In other cases, like

¹⁹ Beneš also had a theory that the Western and Soviet societies were on convergent tracks, leading to welfare-state socialism and social democracy, respectively. Under his government, Czechoslovakia could facilitate the transition by serving as a bridge between the two systems. Rothschild, *A Return to Diversity*, 39.

²⁰ Morrison, "The Foreign Policy of Poland," 137.

Table 2: Bilateral Treaties between the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact States

Treaty between USSR and:	Date	Adversary:	Regulative Norms	Constitutive Norms	Duration
Bulgaria	3/18/48	Germany	Military Assistance Develop and strengthen economic and cultural ties	None	20 years from date of signature
	Renewed 5/12/67	Unspecified	Military Assistance Coordinate national economies All-around cooperation	Strengthen unity and cohesion of socialist countries	20 years
Czechoslovakia	12/12/43	Germany	Military assistance Economic assistance	None	20 years from date of signature
	Renewed 5/6/70	Unspecified	Military assistance Economic ties and cooperation	Build Socialism and Communism Develop relations between the states of the socialist community	20 years
East Germany	9/20/55	Unspecified	Military assistance Stationing Soviet troops on GDR territory Economic assistance	None	Until German Unification
	Renewed 6/12/64	Unspecified	Military assistance German unification Coordination of national economies	None	20 years from the day it is entered into force

Hungary	2/18/48	Germany	Military assistance Economic and Cultural Ties	None	20 years from date of coming into force
	Renewed 9/7/67	West Germany (indirect reference)	Military assistance Economic ties All-around cooperation	Strengthen the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries	20 years
Poland	4/21/45	Germany	Military assistance Economic and cultural ties		20 years from date of signature
	Renewed 4/8/65	West German militarism (direct reference)	Military assistance Economic cooperation	Conform with principles of Socialist Internationalism	20 years
Romania	2/4/48	Germany	Military assistance Economic and cultural ties		20 years from date of signature
	Renewed 7/7/70	NATO threat West Germany (indirect reference)	Military assistance Economic ties and cooperation	Friendship and Cooperation between the socialist states The cementing of their unity in the interests of socialism	20 years

Source: J.A. Naik, *Russia and the Communist Countries. Documents: 1945-71* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980), chapter 1.

that of Albania, an alliance with the Soviet Union (a non-contiguous power) was far less dangerous than an alliance with neighboring Yugoslavia.²¹

Initially, the Soviet treaty system was composed entirely of bilateral treaties with wartime allies—Czechoslovakia (1943), Poland (1945), and Mongolia (1946)—but in 1948 it was enlarged to include the ex-enemies—Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.²² Table 2 summarizes the bilateral security commitments between the USSR and its satellites. Each of the initial agreements specifies Germany as the adversary but also pledges military assistance in case of attack by any other party. The substance of these treaties was limited to military cooperation. There were no references to a community of states (socialist or otherwise) until they were renewed in the 1960s (and 1970 for Czechoslovakia and Romania). That is, there is no formal specification of constitutive norms in these treaties.

²¹ For example, Czechoslovakia demanded that ethnic Hungarians be removed from its territory or that they declare themselves Slovak. Czechoslovakia and Hungary only normalized relations in 1949 after Hungary lost three frontier villages to Czechoslovakia in the post-war peace settlement. Hungary also had a long-standing dispute with Romania over the region of Transylvania, ultimately settled in favor of Romania. Sándor Balogh, "The Paris Peace Conference," in *Hungarians and Their Neighbors in Modern Times, 1867–1950*, ed. Ferenc Glatz, 213–216; István Vida, "The Hungarian Question in Paris," in *Hungarians and Their Neighbors in Modern Times, 1867–1950*, ed. Ferenc Glatz, 225. In Albania's case, the Soviet Union could offer protection against the claims that both Yugoslavia and Greece held against it Paul Lendvai, *L'Europe des Balkans après Staline*, (Paris: Fayard, 1972), 229.

²² Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 466.

These agreements were satisfactory until the mid-1950s—several years after NATO had been created and institutionalization begun. This time lag is significant, given the widespread perception on both sides of the “iron curtain” that the Warsaw Pact formed as a counterweight to NATO.

Nikita Khrushchev, for example, recalls:

In my meetings with people I am sometimes asked what caused us to create the Warsaw Pact. It was formed for the defense of socialist countries. The Cold War was declared by Western Europe on the Soviet Union and its socialist allies. It was Churchill who lit that torch—he initiated that war. ...He did not just want to prevent the development of socialism; he did all he could to destroy it. [U.S. Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles picked up where Churchill left off. He wanted to restrict socialism's base, to tear from the Soviet Union its socialist allies.²³

Five factors explain the delay between the formation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. First, prior to 1955, NATO did not pose a significant threat because Germany was an occupied country and not a member of NATO. This left a buffer between NATO's eastern flank and the Western edge of the Soviet sphere of influence. However, in May 1955 the Paris Agreements allowed for West Germany's rearmament *within* NATO and eliminated the shield between the competing alliance systems. While it is unlikely that the Eastern states expected an imminent attack from the West, they did fear that Germany would aspire to its “former dominant

economic, and thus political, role in East Central Europe."²⁴ However, even Germany's entry into NATO was not a sufficient condition for the formation of the Warsaw Pact because NATO membership would ostensibly restrain German revanchism. As a member of NATO, a rearmed Germany was probably less of a threat than one "not subject to any institutional restraints."²⁵ This is evidenced by the fact that the Warsaw Pact did not fundamentally alter or reinforce the security commitments expressed in the East Bloc bilateral treaties. The formation of the pact was clearly a political gesture that did not significantly affect the strategic balance.

Stalin's death in 1953 served as the second reason for the timing of the Pact's creation. Stalin's regime had relied upon such personalized rule that it did not require a more formal mechanism to maintain control (his primary objective) in Eastern Europe. Because his successors did not have the same stature, the bilateral system threatened to the unity of the bloc. If even one Communist regime were to fall, it would irreparably undermine

²³ Jerrold L. Schecter and Vyacheslav V. Luchkov, trans. and eds. *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 68, 70.

²⁴ Gerard Holden, *The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Security and Bloc Politics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 7.

²⁵ Carnovale, "The Warsaw Pact at Thirty," 163. Andrzej Korbonski, "The Warsaw Pact," *International Conciliation* 573 (1969): 8. On the Moscow Conference on European Security see *Ibid.*, 7. This issue would rise again with German reunification in 1990.

the Soviet Communist Party's leadership of the Socialist Bloc and would facilitate the collapse of other regimes.²⁶ In addition, Stalin's emphasis on political control had undermined the military capacity of the allies, turning them into "politically, economically, [and] militarily, wasting assets—little more than a secret policeman's paradise."²⁷ Stalin's successors needed a more formal and less personalized channel to maintain control and increase military capacity simultaneously.²⁸

In fact, Eastern Europe became a more valuable strategic asset as advances in delivery and transport systems and improvements in the speed of movement of ground forces granted a new role to nuclear weapons. This was the third reason for the timing of the Pact. Conventional forces were designated to invade Europe only *after* a nuclear first strike—at which point a war could be *fought* only by huge coalitions, and could be *won* only by a highly unified coalition. According to Soviet strategy:

"Because of the speed of nuclear wars it will be impossible to mobilize completely at the outbreak of hostilities. Therefore a number of troops must be kept in a high state of readiness. This in turn necessitates a unified military command, co-

²⁶ Nish Jamgotch, Jr. "Soviet Foreign Policy Perspectives," in *The Foreign Policies of Eastern Europe*, ed. James A. Kuhlman, 37.

²⁷ Malcolm Mackintosh, *The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact*, Adelphi Papers No. 58, June 1969: 1.

²⁸ Korbonski, "The Warsaw Pact," 11–12; Patricia Haigh, "Reflection on the Warsaw Pact," *The World Today* 24,4 (April): 168.

ordination of troops, and integration, for the purposes of mobilization, of all economic resources."²⁹

This leads to the fourth rationale for the Warsaw Pact's creation. It compensated for the stipulation in the Austria State Treaty (1955) that Soviet troops stationed in Hungary and Romania be removed once Soviet troops were withdrawn from the Austrian occupation zone. The Warsaw Pact provided a means by which the USSR could legitimize the continued stationing of troops in Hungary and Romania—a requisite for quick mobilization in case of war.³⁰

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Warsaw Pact was valuable for the status it conferred to individual members and to the bloc as a whole. A formal defense organization would be an important international player: It presented a common bargaining position and a conveyed a legal and moral status in negotiations on European security—in particular, those scheduled for Geneva in November 1955. It also produced such benefits for its individual members. For the USSR, "the

²⁹ Ibid., 166–167. See also MackIntosh, *The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact*, 2; and idem, "The Warsaw Pact Today," *Survival* 16,3 (1974): 122–126.

³⁰ As that deadline approached, the Soviet Union attempted to negotiate bilateral agreements to allow its troops to remain in place. Central and East European leaders pressed Western governments to condemn these efforts; they refused, fearing the effect such a condemnation would have on their own troop presence in West Germany and West Berlin. Sergiu Verona, *Military Occupation and Diplomacy: Soviet Troops in Romania, 1944–1958* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 71–72.

formation of a legally defined, multilateral alliance organization also reinforced [its] claim to great power status as the leader of the world socialist system, enhanced its prestige, and legitimized its presence and influence in Eastern Europe."³¹ The NSWP allies received additional status and closer contacts with West European states than would have been possible otherwise.³²

Figure 6 illustrates where the Warsaw Pact and the bilateral alliances fall on the model of alliance institutionalization. The bilateral alliances—especially those initially formed in wartime—were more fluid because the military threat was stronger than any non-military threat. The alliance system continued to function as a network of bilateral alliances so long as threats were predominantly military and not “common” to all the states of Eastern Europe. However, the multilateral institution, the WTO, was formed when three new conditions emerged indicating that a multilateral institution could be employed to achieve a wide range of foreign policy objectives. First, the inclusion of Germany in NATO seemed to endanger every member of the socialist bloc. Second, the Soviet Union

³¹ Karl Wheeler Soper, “The Warsaw Pact,” in *East Germany: A Country Study*, ed. Stephen R. Burant. 3^d ed. (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1988), 337.

³² Korbonski, “The Warsaw Pact,” 12, 25; Robin Allison Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), 17; Haigh, “Reflection on the Warsaw Pact,” 169; Soper, “The Warsaw Pact,” 338.

gradually needed the alliance for non-military purposes—to ensure its continued control of the regional communist regimes and their foreign policies. Third, all of the WTO states perceived that the multilateral institution could grant them greater status in international relations.




Figure 6: Institutionalization of the Soviet Alliance System

The Warsaw Treaty Organization: Institution and Norms

On May 14, 1955 Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union signed a multilateral "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance." Although there are many similarities between the texts of the North Atlantic and Warsaw Treaties, the latter had a far weaker normative and institutional foundation. Its architects designed and managed it to reinforce Soviet

military and political dominance at the expense of common foreign policy objectives. The treaty incorporates traditional allied rights and obligations—regulative norms—but it does not specify constitutive norms, and even expresses the goal of eliminating blocs altogether. To the extent that constitutive norms emerged among this group of states, they did so outside of the Warsaw Pact: by means of bilateral ties to the USSR and membership in other socialist institutions like the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance or the Cominform (1947–1956). Furthermore, institutionalization occurred slowly and with the express goal to consolidate Soviet influence. The USSR did not intend to facilitate genuine consultation or advance common objectives, but only to protect the unity of the bloc and its leadership within it.

The “Treaty itself presents the Pact as a military-political alliance of sovereign states,”³³ and the key text delineates very conventional military objectives. In Articles 1 and 2, the contracting parties agree to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations, and to settle their international disputes peacefully, without jeopardizing international peace and security. They also pledge to seek the “universal reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of

³³ David Holloway, “The Warsaw Pact in the Era of Negotiation,” *Military Review* (July 1973): 50. Holloway also notes that “From the start, the Soviet leaders disagreed about the Pact’s primary function.” Molotov, for example, perceived it to be an instrument of “Socialist consolidation.” *Ibid.*, 49.

mass destruction.” In Article 3, they agree to consult with one another “on all important international issues affecting their common interests,” as well as when any one of them is threatened by armed attack. Article 4 is almost identical to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: In the event of an armed attack, each of the parties agrees to come to the assistance of the state or states attacked, with all the means it deems necessary, including armed force.³⁴

In contrast to the North Atlantic Treaty, the Warsaw Pact does not contain a direct reference to a community of like-minded states. Three points in particular indicate that constitutive norms were weak or nonexistent. First, the treaty does not contain a direct equivalent to NATO’s Article 2 pledge to strengthen “free institutions” or the principles underlying them.³⁵ That is, nowhere in the Warsaw Treaty do the signatories pledge to strengthen socialist institutions or the unity among socialist states. As Table 2 indicates, the allies only incorporated this kind of pledge in the *bilateral* agreements renewed in the 1960s and 1970s. Second, Article 9 of the Warsaw Treaty offers membership to all states, “irrespective of their social and political systems, which express their

³⁴ For the full text and a comparison of the treaties, refer to the Appendix.

³⁵ In the Appendix, Article 8 is characterized as being an equivalent to NATO’s Article 2. This is true to the extent that both articles pledge economic cooperation. However, NATO’s Article 2 clearly pledges to strengthen a particular community of states, whereas the Warsaw Pact’s Article 8 does not.

readiness...to assist in uniting the efforts of the peaceable States in safeguarding the peace and security of peoples." And third, Article 11 (paragraph 2) calls for the *complete dissolution* of military blocs "[s]hould a system of collective security be established in Europe." The text of the treaty appears to advocate the dissolution of artificial divisions across Europe.³⁶

These three points lead to the following conclusions. First, constitutive norms were weak at the time of the formation of the Warsaw Pact, and to the extent that they did develop, the Soviet Union imposed them on its satellites. Second, at the outset these norms were more instrumental (or regulative) than constitutive. In the initial years, the emphasis was on the Pact's role as a bargaining chip in the Cold War conflict. It was not a real political-military alliance, but an instrument to undermine the Western Bloc and to increase the status of the Eastern Bloc states.³⁷

Articles 5–11 create the procedures and structures through which the allies were to implement their treaty obligations. The Warsaw Pact

³⁶ One could argue that the constitutive norm, then, was membership in Europe or the European community of states. Kis argues that the treaty actually does exclude non-socialist states because it only invites "pacific" states to join, and capitalist states, according to Marxist theory, are inherently aggressive. Théofil I. Kis. *Les Pays de l'Europe de l'Est* (Louvain, Belgium: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1964), 153.

³⁷ Soper, "The Warsaw Pact," 339.

was shadowed in great secrecy throughout the Cold War, and only vague hints of its structure were made public. Although there is evidence that the Warsaw Pact underwent a very gradual process of institutionalization, it took much longer than in NATO for the formal committee structure and military command to become operative. Moreover, they were never as complex or as effective at encouraging real consultation and collaboration. Article 3 of the Treaty creates the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) and confers it with the authority to appoint auxiliary bodies. The PCC was composed of general and first secretaries, heads of state and their deputies, Central Committee secretaries, and defense ministers and foreign ministers of member states. It prevailed as the main organ of consultation on the broadest political-military issues and, in this respect, it was the counterpart to NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC).

According to the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* (1976 edition), the PCC was to provide a forum for the "discussion of the most important foreign policy questions, collective decisions on international questions that affect the interests of all participants in the Treaty, and the most important questions connected with the strengthening of defense capability and carrying out the obligation of the states party to the treaty."³⁸ The PCC generally had no authority over the military command, except for

³⁸ Holden, *The Warsaw Pact*, 14–15.

decisions regarding the reinforcement of the defensive capability and the organization of Pact forces. In 1956, the PCC decided to meet at least twice a year, and rotate the presidency among the representatives of each state taking part in the committee. It also created a Permanent Commission charged with making recommendations on problems of international policy, and a secretariat (located in Moscow in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). However, during the first five years of its existence (1955–1960), the PCC met only three times, and none of these meetings heralded a fundamental transformation in bloc policy. In January 1956, it met to create the political and military structure of the Pact and to announce East Germany's participation. In May 1958, it announced the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania, and a reduction of garrisons in Hungary. Finally, in February 1960, it convened to call for a peace treaty with Germany.³⁹

Information on the military side of the organization is less readily available and is subject to diverse interpretations. The main issue is the extent to which institutionalization was intended to reinforce Soviet control or to make the distribution of rights and obligations more

³⁹ René Jean Dupuy and Mario Bettati, *Le Pacte de Varsovie* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1969), 16. Hutchings argues that by the 1970s the reason such meetings were so infrequent was that the East European states had gathered enough bargaining power that they could eliminate or modify unacceptable proposals. Robert L. Hutchings, *Soviet-East European Relations: Consolidation and Conflict, 1968–1980* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 139. See also, Korbonski, "The Warsaw Pact," 16.

equitable. The more orthodox view is that the objective of the joint exercises was not to prepare for war with NATO or to prepare a territorial defense—particularly in defense of one another or of the Soviet Union. Instead, the goal was to prepare the armies for a nuclear offense against the West so that they would not be able to engage in a conventional defense of their own territories, should an attack come from the *East*.⁴⁰ Evidence suggests that the Soviets pursued *both* objectives. The very command structure of the Pact's joint forces (established in Article 5 of the Treaty⁴¹) lends credence to the argument that they were only an extension of Soviet power. For instance, the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces was a Soviet (Marshall I.S. Koniev), while the Deputy Commanders-in-Chief were NSWP Ministers of Defense. The WTO's staff headquarters were placed in Moscow, and while military representatives of the Warsaw Pact High Command were later placed in the capitals of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact allies in order to manage the Soviet military

⁴⁰ Holden, *The Warsaw Pact*, 43–44; for examples of the more orthodox view, see Christopher Jones, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Warsaw Pact Exercises," in *Soviet Military Thinking*, ed. Derek Leebaert (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), 231; Edward B. Atkeson, "The 'Fault Line' in the Warsaw Pact: Implications for NATO Strategy," *Orbis* 30,1 (Spring 1986): 114; Jiri Polak, *Dependence Patterns in the Soviet Bloc: The Case of Romania and East Germany* (Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur, 1986), 169.

⁴¹ A communiqué annexed to the Treaty officially creates the Joint Command and subjects it to the authority of the PCC at least in "general questions relating to the strengthening of the defensive power and the organization." The text of the Communiqué follows the Treaty in the Appendix.

missions, no counterparts were sent to Moscow. Furthermore, although periodic joint exercises were instituted in 1962, they were never held without the participation of the Soviet Union. Even more significantly, East European units were never fully integrated, but maneuvered side-by-side or very close to one another. There is also evidence that these exercises were employed for political objectives: Military maneuvers alternated with political activities (such as "political rallies, friendship meetings, concerts, and visits to sites of historical and cultural interest") intended to legitimate the political and military commitment to the "gains of socialism against internal and external threat," and the frequency of joint exercises tended to increase during serious crises, such as 1968 and 1980–1982 (Czechoslovakia and Poland, respectively).⁴²

Nevertheless, there is evidence that the purpose of these exercises was not *purely* internal. For example, in 1961, the Kennedy Administration

⁴² Jones, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Warsaw Pact Exercises," 248; see also Carnovale, "The Warsaw Pact at Thirty," 158; Holden, *The Warsaw Pact*, 54; Hutchings, *Soviet-East European Relations*, 145–166; and Mackintosh, *The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact*, 3. Dupuy and Bettati argue that the military organization imitated the organization of the Soviet military at all levels. *Le Pacte de Varsovie*, 16. For a thorough discussion of Warsaw Pact military exercises refer to Jones, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Warsaw Pact Exercises," 225–258. Gitz explains the manner in which East European military personnel were socialized into the WTO, focusing on the officer selection process, the ideological indoctrination programs in the national armed forces, the role of the USSR in educating East European officers in Soviet military academies, and the "rewards and compensation extended to the NSWP military personnel." Bradley R. Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe: The Soviet/Communist Control System* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 94–110.

announced its intention to increase defense spending and emphasize conventional capabilities, it attempted the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion, and there was yet another crisis in Berlin in August. In response, the Warsaw Pact allies reaffirmed the importance of ground forces in their strategy and they held their first joint exercises (*Burya*, or Storm). A more accurate view of the relationship between the USSR and the NSWP states appears to be that the latter were strategically important, but the former did not perceive them as being strong or reliable enough "to ensure Soviet security interests independently of a Soviet-dominated defense organization."⁴³

All of this suggests that the Soviets dominated political and military relations within the Organization. There is little evidence that the PCC served as an arena of genuine consultation or the formation of a common policy in these early years. Its members did not have the authority to speak for their nations and the PCC met rarely and for very brief sessions. "On occasion, important questions [were] referred not to the Consultative Committee, but to other gatherings of representatives of the governments of the WTO powers."⁴⁴ Rather the PCC served to provide

⁴³ Holden, *The Warsaw Pact*, 54, 67; Simon provides a good overview of the origins of the joint exercises in Jeffrey Simon, *Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command and Control* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 18–22.

⁴⁴ Kazimierz Grzybowski, *The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations: Organizations and Institutions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 189–190.

a veneer of voice, to demonstrate to the publics of the NSWP allies that they have a channel for communicating their foreign policy interests.⁴⁵

"The absence of any evidence to show that either the political or military organizations of the Warsaw Pact was independent of existing Soviet institutions suggests that the Soviet Government wanted to establish an agency which could transmit the Soviet line of the day on foreign policy, co-ordinate its implementation, and prepare a unanimous East European expression of support for it."⁴⁶ While it was certainly in the security interests of the Soviet Union to use the Pact to control its satellites, it is naive to think that Moscow had unlimited control over its junior allies. The next section makes the argument that the alliance was a weak institution and merely an "arena of a recurring struggle between the Soviets, who attempt[ed] to employ the Pact for their own ends, and the East Europeans... who [sought] to use it as a means for increasing their autonomy vis-à-vis the Kremlin."⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Ibid., 190.

⁴⁶ Mackintosh, *The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact*, 3.

⁴⁷ Dale R. Herspring, "The Warsaw Pact at 25" *Problems of Communism* 24,5 (1980): 1.

Exit and Voice in the WTO

Shortly following the formation of the Warsaw Pact, Eastern European regimes began to stabilize and a new generation of nationalist communist leaders came to power seeking to pursue more independent foreign policies. By 1969, every NSWP state had openly challenged the Warsaw Pact and Soviet hegemony in some manner. While the Soviet and WTO reaction varied according to the strategic and political significance of the ally and its challenge, in no instance did the WTO allow national interests to supersede the good of the alliance. Most often, the USSR resolved such conflicts by means of bilateral political and economic pressure, but when they posed too great a challenge to the cohesion of the socialist bloc, it stepped in with military force. However, by the 1970s it was becoming clear to the Soviet leadership that such severe reprisals simply unleashed more forces in opposition to its leadership. Thus, in 1969 and 1976 attempts were made to strengthen multilateral mechanisms so that allies would not have to rely upon military means to resolve their conflicts. At the behest of the Soviet Union, they implemented significant organizational and procedural reforms purportedly to better integrate the NSWP states in the management and operation of the alliance. New forums seem to have created more opportunities for debate, but in fact, they were not intended to grant the NSWP states real influence over WTO

policy. Instead, they granted the allies only enough voice to prevent the pact from collapsing under the weight of Soviet domination.

Performance	Norms	
	Constitutive	Regulative
Effective:	Evolution N/A	Persistence 1955–1986
Ineffective:	Erosion N/A	Dissolution 1986–1991

Figure 7: Alliance Behavior of the Warsaw Pact

Yet, despite these challenges and the related reform efforts, the Warsaw Pact remained in a state of alliance persistence (Figure 7). As in the case of NATO, the pact's external performance was never seriously tested during these years, so its performance in this regard remained satisfactory. That is, the alliance and its network of bilateral treaties did provide some security against the threat of a military attack—especially for those states that continued to fear West German or NATO aggression. The Pact also functioned as a diplomatic counterpart to NATO and thereby provided the allies with greater international status than they otherwise would have received. The Pact's performance as a means of internal control was challenged at several points through the Cold War. From the Soviet perspective, it performed this function well because no

ally left the socialist bloc (even though the USSR did have to employ force on several occasions).

***The Northern Tier States:
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland***

The USSR had two sets of standards for dealing with its allies. It did not accept deviation from the northern tier states of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland. These countries were sandwiched between the USSR and NATO, and tended to be less vocal critics of the alliance because they perceived a real strategic purpose for it. Nonetheless, they did express varying levels of dissatisfaction with the pact. Poland and East Germany, for instance, were the most loyal allies over the duration of the alliance, but even they challenged the Soviet Union during the WTO's formative years. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, posed one of the most severe challenges the Pact was ever to encounter. Yet because these three countries were so valuable strategically, when they did raise a challenge, the USSR took it to be a far more serious affront to its leadership. It did not allow any form of exit and it was more hostile toward efforts to nationalize foreign policy.

Poland and East Germany have consistently instilled the WTO and Soviet power with greater value than have the other allies. The GDR, in particular, was perhaps the most loyal member of the WTO—largely because the very existence of the state relied upon the perpetuation of the

Cold War. Thus, it was strongly resistant to détente, fearing that bilateral agreements between other NSWP states and the FRG might legitimize the latter's claim to represent all German people and might ultimately lead to the East's recognition of the FRG without the West recognizing the GDR.⁴⁸ Moreover, the organization and development of East Germany's national defense was based on the Soviet model. In fact, Article 7 of the GDR constitution specified close cooperation between the two states: "The German Democratic Republic is for ever and irrevocably allied with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."⁴⁹

The first crises to challenge the Warsaw Treaty system developed in 1956 and were largely a response to Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign, which happened to coincide with the death of Poland's Communist Party leader, Boleslaw Bierut. Both events opened the way for the Poles to start removing Stalinists from government and fueled workers' strikes and riots in the city of Poznan. Wladyslaw Gomulka, elected over Soviet opposition to replace Beirut as leader of the Polish Communist Party, promised to restore internal order and to follow the Soviet model in external affairs, but he also indicated that if the Soviets

⁴⁸ Wolfgang Klaiber, "Security Priorities in Eastern Europe" *Problems of Communism* 19,3 (1970): 40–42; Simon, *Warsaw Pact Forces*, 29–30. See also, Adrian Hyde-Price, "GDR-Soviet Relations," in *The End of the Outer Empire*, ed. Alex Pravda, 151–167.

⁴⁹ Holden, *The Warsaw Pact*, 18–19; Polak, *Dependence Patterns in the Soviet Bloc*, 173.

were to intervene, they would meet massive, internal armed resistance.⁵⁰ Poland's loyalty to the alliance did not falter because it needed the Warsaw Pact to counter a perceived West German threat and to defend its socialist regime. Poland's leaders recognized that without a revolution of its own, only the support of the Red Army made it possible to begin the "transformation of Polish Society."⁵¹ This is not to say that there is no evidence of an independent foreign policy, but independence was bounded by these conditions. Poland did exercise some independence in 1966 when it was slow to respond to the USSR's call for assistance in Vietnam. The following year it provided unenthusiastic support for the Soviet position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. And, by 1969, it extended bilateral relations to West Germany.⁵²

Until 1968, Czechoslovakia was actually one of the most dependable NSWP allies, but after twenty years of central control, the Czech economy was on the verge of collapse and a liberal reformer,

⁵⁰ In this instance, Khrushchev relented. He reported back to the Soviet Presidium: "Finding a reason for an armed conflict now would be very easy, but finding a way to put an end to such a conflict would be very hard." Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 209–210; Soper, "The Warsaw Pact," 341–342.

⁵¹ Elie Abel, *The Shattered Bloc: Behind the Upheaval in Eastern Europe* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), 6–7.

⁵² By recognizing West Germany, Poland was pursuing its own interests (the promise of German economic assistance) at the expense of those of its allies (especially East Germany). Simon, *Warsaw Pact Forces*, 29–30; Klaiber, "Security Priorities in Eastern Europe," 41–42.

Alexander Dubcek, came to power. Dubcek lifted censorship and expanded civil rights, so as "to embark 'on the building of a new model of socialist society, one which was profoundly democratic and conformed to Czechoslovak conditions.'"⁵³ The other Pact governments (with the exception of Romania) feared that news of the Czech reforms would spillover into their societies and cause popular unrest, especially among students and the intelligentsia. Initially, only the GDR and Poland demanded that Czechoslovakia reverse its liberal reforms, but by July 1968, three more allies were on their side. The Czech government refused, and on August 20, Soviet, Bulgarian, East German, Hungarian, and Polish forces invaded on the pretense that they were putting down a "counterrevolution" and protecting local communist forces. Within a month, the USSR proclaimed the Brezhnev Doctrine, by which it named itself the "protector" of the socialist commonwealth.⁵⁴

***The Southern Tier States:
Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania***

The Soviet Union allowed more deviation from the southern tier states of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, which were the least valuable in a strategic sense and generally were ruled by hard-line

⁵³ Simon, *Warsaw Pact Forces*, 45.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 45–46; see also *New York Times* August 21, 1968; August 25, 1968.

regimes. Albania and Romania employed voice and partial (if not complete) exit from the WTO. Although they were the most vocal critics of the WTO, they escaped military reprisals. First, their territory was less valuable in maintaining the Soviet buffer so there was no significant strategic fallout if they appeared to be less loyal or to contribute fewer resources to the common defense. Second, the regimes were highly critical of de-Stalinization and, in many instances, they were more dogmatic than the Soviet Union. Moscow could not risk the unity of the socialist bloc by reprimanding such regimes. Third, Albania and Romania provided a moderate service to Moscow in keeping the NSWP states divided and hence unable to pose an effective challenge to its hegemony.

Albania was the first country to pose a direct and severe challenge to the Warsaw Treaty system, but it was only able to do so because it maintained a hard line regime and it had an alternative source of military and economic support. Albania was a founding member of the WTO because membership provided support to its regime (one of the most Stalinist in East Europe) and security vis-à-vis Yugoslavia. The breakdown in relations occurred as the Soviet Union entered the initial phases of de-Stalinization and signaled its intention to reconcile with Yugoslavia. Thus, "[i]n wooing Tito, the Soviets appeared willing to sacrifice Albania's security and independence to this presumptively predatory neighbor, and in repudiating Stalin, to abandon the values and policies that were

propelling Albania's modernization."⁵⁵ As relations deteriorated in 1960 and 1961, Khrushchev backed a coup attempt in Tirana and then publicly attacked Enver Hoxha at the Twenty-second Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. In response, Hoxha purged Albania's government of all pro-Soviet elements, quit attending the PCC meetings, and took an independent position on matters central to Bloc policy, like the status of Germany, on which it took a much stronger position than did the Soviet Union.⁵⁶

Albania's effective exit occurred in the context of the deepening rift between the Soviet Union and China, the latter being eager to supplant Soviet influence. Beijing provided an alternative source of military, political, and economic assistance. It sent advisors to Tirana, gradually replacing Soviet and East European advisors, and it granted economic aid to compensate for the assistance the Eastern Bloc had withdrawn in retaliation for Albania's defection. Moreover, China was strong enough that the USSR would not attempt to provoke a Sino-Soviet conflict by attempting to bring Albania back into the alliance by force.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Rothschild, *A Return to Diversity*, 174.

⁵⁶ Ibid; Amy Knight, "Government and Politics," in *Albania: A Country Study*, ed. Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 2^d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1994), 193.

⁵⁷ Lendvai, *L'Europe des Balkans après Staline*, 236. For a comprehensive treatment of this topic, see W. Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963).

Albania had become excluded from the Pact by June 1962, but the WTO invasion of Czechoslovakia served as the catalyst to its formal withdrawal. In September 1968, passage of Law No. 4425 in the People's Assembly formally denounced the treaty on the grounds that the Pact had become "an instrument of Soviet revisionism"⁵⁸ and was no longer a means to defend against imperialist aggression, but an instrument to exert control over its own members. Tirana argued that because all of the WTO members (except Romania and Czechoslovakia) had violated the pact in invading Czechoslovakia, under international law it had the right to abrogate its membership. In this regard, Albania was the first and only ally to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. Significantly, however, it never reported the denunciation to the UN, as required by General Assembly Resolution 97(1) (December 14, 1946). Under international law, it is unclear if Albania remained a contracting party to the treaty, but it was no longer a participating member of the Pact.⁵⁹

Romania also adopted a unique combination of exit and voice in its relations with the WTO and Soviet Union. It, too, was allowed a more

⁵⁸ John N. Washburn, "The Current Legal Status of Warsaw Pact Membership," *International Lawyer* 5,1 (1971).

⁵⁹ Simon, *Warsaw Pact Forces*, 51; Dupuy and Bettati, *Le Pacte de Varsovie*, 13–14; Washburn, "The Current Legal Status of Warsaw Pact Membership," 131–134; Remington, *The Warsaw Pact*, 52, 53n; and Knight, *Albania*, 194. The dispute had a very limited effect on the alliance's institutions and by the late 1970s, Albania gradually had moved away from the Chinese to adopt a policy of "rigid self-reliance."

independent foreign policy because (1) it maintained an orthodox regime, (2) the regime and population were united around a nationalist policy, and (3) it was less dependent upon Soviet economic controls than were most of its allies.⁶⁰ Thus, Romania was *willing and able* to counter any Soviet efforts to impose its will. The first real indications that Romania would not blindly accept Soviet foreign policy direction occurred in 1960 when Khrushchev attempted to strengthen integration within the socialist bloc by creating within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) a supranational planning body that would oversee a division of labor among member-states. Romania balked at the plan, which would have forced it to emphasize agriculture and oil production at the expense of industrialization. It asserted the right of each CMEA state to adopt economic policies best suited to its national interests. The Romanian Communist Party (RCP) Central Committee attacked Soviet economic planning goals and asserted its own right to engage in relations with the West in this ongoing battle.⁶¹

⁶⁰ For example, it had far more natural resources than its (more) industrialized neighbors and was not as dependent upon the USSR for oil as they were.

⁶¹ The CMEA was formed in 1949 to integrate East European economies and counter the influence of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe. When this changed in the late 1970s, it did have to adjust its policy and turn closer to the USSR. Alex Pravda, ed. *The End of the Outer Empire: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition, 1985–90* (London: SAGE Publications, 1992), 151–167. Roxana Iorga, "Romanian Perspectives on Security Risks," in *A Renewed Partnership for Europe*, ed. Bonvicini, Cremasco, and Rummel, 133; Klaiber, "Security Priorities

Although Romanian resistance was first manifest in the economic realm, it was equally visible in the security realm. In 1965, Romania effectively prevented the Soviet Union from engaging in further integration of the WTO. It countered Soviet reform proposals by calling for rotating the post of commander-in-chief among all members of the alliance, exercising joint decision making on all nuclear matters, and creating a fairer allocation of financial support for Soviet forces in East Germany, Hungary, and Poland.⁶² Moreover, Romania pursued friendly relations with China and it was the only Bloc nation to welcome friendly relations between China and the United States (this was one reason Sino-Albanian relations cooled in the 1970s). This and others of Romania's foreign policies alienated the Eastern Bloc, such as when Romania initiated efforts to strengthen relations with the West. In 1967, Romania incensed Poland and the GDR by becoming the first Bloc country to establish diplomatic relations with the FRG. In 1968 it openly supported the liberal Czech leadership and it publicly argued that "the Pact obligations...come into force only 'in case of an imperialist aggression against Europe, an interpretation which excludes both the application of

in Eastern Europe," 36; Lendvai, *L'Europe des Balkans après Staline*, 346–347, 358–359; Simon, *Warsaw Pact Forces*, 27; and Verona, "Government and Politics," 237.

⁶² Hutchings, *Soviet-East European Relations*, 32; Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "The Changing Warsaw Pact" *East Europe* 17,8 (1968): 9.

the Brezhnev Doctrine and the engagement of Romanian troops, for example, against China."⁶³

Perhaps the most significant divergence in Romanian foreign policy occurred in the area of national defense. In 1963, it adopted a defensive strategy of "war of the entire people." The regime resisted any integration in the WTO that would limit its ability to resist a Soviet invasion and it undertook domestic measures to ensure that if the Soviets were to invade, their intervention would be protracted and costly. In particular, it required its citizens to participate in civil defense organizations and paramilitary forces and it unilaterally reduced compulsory military service from 24 to 16 months. In June 1965 Nicolae Ceausescu began to stress territorial defense at the expense of Pact solidarity. The army reduced force levels from 240,000 to 200,000 and indicated its reluctance to participate in Pact exercises. It then refused to allow joint exercises on its territory. By 1968, it had quit sending military officers to Soviet academies and those socialized into the Soviet system were retired. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia later that year, Romania further altered its military relationship with the WTO and adopted a strictly defensive military doctrine. Romanian troops were no longer trained to participate in any military operations outside of the country, they were not allowed to

⁶³ Polak, *Dependence Patterns in the Soviet Bloc*, 172.

leave national territory and, unlike other WTO armed forces, Romanian forces were to remain under national control in wartime. They were to engage in allied combat operations only in defense of their homeland. Such limitations were codified in the 1972 "Law Concerning the Organization of the National Defense."⁶⁴ In 1974, Romania refused to grant the USSR the right to build a new wide-gauge railroad across the Romanian region of Dobrogea, so that it could transport troops and equipment to Bulgaria. It also refused to allow the passage of Soviet troops who were to take part in maneuvers in Bulgaria. Romania further distanced itself from the USSR after the invasion of Afghanistan: It abstained in the UN General Assembly vote on a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces, and it later refused to endorse the invasion.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Jonathan Eyal, "Military Relations," in *The End of the Outer Empire: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition, 1985-90*, ed. Alex Pravda, 45; Iorga, "Romanian Perspectives on Security Risks," 132; Andrew A. Michta, *East Central Europe After the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 34; Soper, "The Warsaw Pact," 346. Furthermore, At the Sophia PCC (March 1968) Romania declined to sign a statement on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It declared it was "unimpressed by the protection afforded by its inclusion under the Soviet nuclear 'umbrella.'" Romania wanted to link nonproliferation and disarmament and to secure guarantees that non-nuclear nations would never be the targets of nuclear aggression. Simon, *Warsaw Pact Forces*, 43.

⁶⁵ Polak, *Dependence Patterns in the Soviet Bloc*, 172; Verona, *Military Occupation and Diplomacy*, 239.

In 1956 and largely influenced by the Soviet compromise with Gomulka, Hungary became the first ally to attempt to withdraw from the alliance in favor of a strategy of neutrality. This effort was put down by force, although it was a Soviet rather than an official Warsaw Pact maneuver. The invasion was not coordinated through Pact channels, the PCC never discussed the crisis, and the Warsaw Treaty does not stipulate that the alliance may be directed against a member-state.⁶⁶ From that point forward, Hungary sought deeper relations with the West, but always from within the WTO. For example, in the mid-1960s onward, it attempted to increase and strengthen ties with Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia (Danubian states). It only engaged in the 1968 occupation of Czechoslovakia because it was economically dependent on the USSR and it had Soviet troops stationed on its territory.⁶⁷

The challenges posed by Poland and Hungary in 1956 led to an extension and clarification through bilateral status of forces agreements with Poland (December 1956), East Germany (March 1957), Romania (April 1957), and Hungary (May 1957). With the exception of the Romanian agreement, which announced the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country, the agreements formalized the strength and movement

⁶⁶ Holden, *The Warsaw Pact*, 19–20.

⁶⁷ Simon, *Warsaw Pact Forces*, 29–30; Klaiber, "Security Priorities in Eastern Europe," 39.

of Soviet forces in a host country, Soviet control and use of military installations, and local Soviet jurisdiction in matters connected with the presence of Soviet troops.⁶⁸

Soviet Reform Efforts

In 1969, a second reform effort followed the invasion of Czechoslovakia, although it was not a direct consequence of the invasion. Various accounts suggest that these particular reforms can be traced back to 1965 and 1966.⁶⁹ By 1965, it had become clear that the alliance required more regular and frequent meetings to coordinate foreign policies and resolve tensions within the bloc. Indeed, Brezhnev stated in the CPSU Plenary Session of September that year that the goal of Soviet foreign policy was "to strengthen the international socialist community in every way..." To this end, it engaged in a series of bilateral talks with East European states emphasizing the need to improve the work of the Warsaw Pact and "to set up within the framework of the Treaty a permanent and prompt mechanism for considering pressing problems."⁷⁰

⁶⁸ On the details of these treaties, see Grzybowski, *The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations*, 203–210; Remington, *The Warsaw Pact*, 17.

⁶⁹ Jones, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Warsaw Pact Exercises," 254; Neil Fodor, *The Warsaw Treaty Organization: A Political and Organizational Analysis* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), 59–60.

⁷⁰ Simon, *Warsaw Pact Forces*, 31; Fodor, *The Warsaw Treaty Organization*, 60.

Brezhnev proposed a permanent political committee to provide guidance to the allies and to further integrate their military establishments but there was too much opposition—particularly from Romania, which demanded a greater role in the decision making process.⁷¹

The allies only agreed upon a reform program in 1969, following the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. At that time, they created three more bodies to increase consultation within the Pact: the Committee of Defense Ministers (CDM), the Military Council (MC), and the Committee for Coordination of Military Technology. The CDM, which dealt with general questions of military doctrine and deployment, became the supreme military consultative organ. Because it was composed of Soviet and East European ministers of defense plus the Warsaw Pact commander-in-chief and chief of staff, it elevated the East European defense ministers to a position formally equal to the Soviet defense minister. The Military Council, composed of the East European deputy commanders-in-chief under the chairmanship of the Warsaw Pact commander-in-chief, served as the consultative arm of the Joint Command and dealt with issues of military operations and planning. The Committee on Military Technology was intended to increase the voice of NSWP states

⁷¹ Simon, *Warsaw Pact Forces*, 28.

in weapons research and development, but there is no public record of its work.⁷²

These were the most significant reforms since the creation of the WTO and they are credited with streamlining the structure of the organization and granting greater access to the European allies.⁷³ Yet, they were certainly limited and did not alter the decision-making process. They did not give the East European military establishments a “meaningful role as junior partners,” or grant the Pact institutions wartime functions. The WTO remained “an instrument of Soviet hegemony” intended to ensure socialism within the member states. “The net impact of the Budapest reforms seems to have been to improve the nominal access of the East European members to the levers of decision making, while at the same time increasing Soviet influence in East European military affairs by expanding the spheres of competence of the pact’s command bodies.”⁷⁴

⁷² Fodor, *The Warsaw Treaty Organization*, 56–59; Holden, *The Warsaw Pact*, 42–44; Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, 32–33; Herspring, “The Warsaw Pact at 25,” 5; Hutchings, *Soviet-East European Relations*, 71–72; Michta, *East Central Europe After the Warsaw Pact*, 36.

⁷³ Hutchings, *Soviet-East European Relations*, 75–76; Fodor, *The Warsaw Treaty Organization*, 56–61. It is significant (according to Ibid., 61) that the reorganization that was implemented in 1969 was not publicly amended after that time and no political reforms took place for another seven and one half years.

⁷⁴ Hutchings, *Soviet-East European Relations*, 76; Aurel Braun, “Whither the Warsaw Pact in the Gorbachev Era?” *International Journal* 53 (Winter 1987–88): 79–80.

A second set of reforms implemented in the mid-1970s was intended to increase unity, cohesion, and joint foreign policy positions of the WTO states to facilitate détente and arms control. The Bucharest reforms dramatically increased political and military consultation, yet there is little dispute that the Soviet Union remained the preponderant player in the alliance and it continued to favor ad hoc, bilateral instruments over the new multilateral instruments.⁷⁵ The allies agreed to create a new permanent Joint Secretariat (JS) and a Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM). Although a JS had been established in 1956 there is no evidence that it ever became operative. According to one source, "Perhaps the original secretariat had not functioned very well, and needed to be revived in 1976."⁷⁶ However, the Bucharest PCC Communiqué, states that "the decision was taken to *create*... a joint secretariat,"⁷⁷ thereby suggesting that the 1976 JS was an entirely new entity. The JS was to be "a full-time body that 'prepares the sittings of the Political Consultative Committee, attends to its current business and maintains a constant link to the CMEA.'"⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Hutchings, *Soviet-East European Relations*, 143.

⁷⁶ Holden, *The Warsaw Pact*, 16.

⁷⁷ Fodor, *The Warsaw Treaty Organization*, 47.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 65. Fodor provides analysis of Soviet sources to make the point that the extent to which the 1976 JS was an entirely new entity was unclear even in Soviet circles.

These same reforms produced a Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) to formalize the foreign ministers meetings that had been occurring outside of WTO channels since 1959. After Bucharest, foreign ministers began to meet more regularly (about once per year) and their meetings began to emerge as a forum in their own right to improve "the successful fulfillment of the foreign policy tasks of the fraternal parties." The CFM operated "by 'taking into account' PCC foreign policy resolutions and recommendations, which are seen as the 'common positions' of the member-states..." Thus, while the PCC offered political direction, the CFM offered concrete suggestions for achieving these directives. There is some evidence that this was the forum in which real debate took place and it was deemed by some to be the most important mechanism for foreign policy coordination. However, the USSR continued to place an equal emphasis on the value of the institutional *and* ad hoc reforms, "thus circumventing the intended role of the official structure of the WTO in intra-bloc affairs and its place in the international relations of the bloc."⁷⁹

In sum, NSWP states could pursue a nationalist foreign policy only to the extent that doing so did not undermine Soviet foreign policy interests. By 1970, it was well established that the exit option was not available. As compensation, the USSR implemented rudimentary

⁷⁹ Although there does remain some disagreement on this last point. Hutchings, *Soviet-East European Relations*, 139; Fodor, *The Warsaw Treaty*

institutional reforms to increase East European participation. But although some analysts argue that the NSWP states employed the new institutional structures to form alliances to oppose the Soviet position and prevent it from bullying them,⁸⁰ the dominant position seems to be the reverse: as NSWP allies gained voice, they turned it against each other and thereby strengthened Soviet dominance. The fact is, the changes in this period were minor and did not fundamentally alter the relative influence of the USSR and NSWP allies in formulating alliance strategy or policy. Nonetheless, these crises and reforms were significant for reinforcing the extent to which the WTO was a vehicle for pursuing Soviet foreign policy objectives, regardless of the national interests of the NSWP allies. The events of this period reinforced the fact that the Warsaw Pact performed very well so long as allies shared Soviet objectives. However, as their foreign policy interests deviated from those of the USSR, the Pact became an obstacle to their interests.

The Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact

An unquestionable deterioration of the Soviet and East European economic and political systems ultimately threatened the unity and the military viability of the Bloc at the same time that it made it too costly for

Organization, 64, 66.

the USSR to impose military (or other heavy-handed) obstacles to exit. The Soviet Union continued to draw net benefits from alliance. It attempted to salvage the pact by engaging in another round of reforms to increase the voice and participation of the NSWP states. However, a history of half-hearted reforms that had benefited the USSR reduced its allies' estimates of the WTO's future performance. Moreover, as East-West relations improved, NSWP allies anticipated direct individual benefits from cooperation with the West as they managed political and economic reform. They also came to expect that *European* security institutions would become viable alternatives to the Warsaw Pact.

The decline of the Soviet and East European economies by the mid-1980s had serious implications for the WTO. As the USSR had fewer resources available to manage its empire, it demanded greater contributions from its allies, who also had less to contribute. Budgetary limitations across the bloc severely curtailed already-limited weapons standardization and joint maneuvers. For example, Moscow began to sell its most modern weapons systems to non-Warsaw Pact clients (especially those in the Middle East, like Libya and Syria) able to pay in hard currency, which the East European governments could not. Consequently, NSWP weapons systems became obsolete—in several cases running

⁸⁰ Soper, "The Warsaw Pact," 359.

several generations behind NATO systems. The allies also curtailed the number and size of WTO joint exercises as a budget-saving measure. Moreover, the growing economic crisis threatened domestic regimes: riots and strikes began in Romania and Poland and threatened to spread across the socialist bloc. This, too, had implications for the WTO because, largely for reasons of its own economic weakness, the USSR did not step in to restore order, but attempted to strengthen the internal legitimacy of the NSWP regimes and reduce their dependence on its power for their survival.⁸¹

These events posed a dilemma in that the USSR needed to encourage autonomy and foreign policy independence in order to save its own resources, but it did not want to erode the unity of the socialist bloc. Its efforts produced mixed results. In 1987 Gorbachev set about increasing consultation within the Pact at the same time that he argued for the need to respect each state's autonomy but also the Bloc's collective responsibility for socialism. This was a real high point in terms of Soviet attitudes toward Eastern Europe, and by 1988 the levels of consultation had reached an all-time peak. First, a new special Disarmament Commission established joint positions for upcoming discussions with the West on conventional arms reductions. Second, the WTO foreign ministers

⁸¹ Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, 126–128, 134–35; Abel, *The Shattered Bloc*, 4–5.

and the Information Group each met three times. The Military Committee and the Defense Ministers met twice. While the WTO did formulate an arms control position in these meetings, there are a number of indications that real consultation was weak and that Moscow had encouraged more frequent consultations only as a means to convince the NSWPS to contribute more to Bloc defenses. Moreover, the East European states had two problems with the process. First, they sensed that although they had gained the right to *consultation*, they had not gained any real *influence* over the final decision. Yet, at the same time that consultation increase, "so ha[d] their responsibility in working out and enforcing proposals."⁸² Because of their limited input into the process, the NSWPS lent weak support the Soviet arms control proposals, and several presented alternative disarmament plans.⁸³

At the 1989 meeting of Warsaw Pact Ministers, Gorbachev took another historic step and renounced the Brezhnev doctrine. The new Soviet position was that there was no universal model of socialism, and

⁸² A Hungarian Party official, quoted in Eyal, "Military Relations," 48.

⁸³ Michta, *East Central Europe After the Warsaw Pact*, 43–44; Eyal, "Military Relations," 47–53; Idem., "Giving Up Illusions and Unravelling Ties: 1990," in *The End of the Outer Empire: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition, 1985–90*, ed. Alex Pravda, 210–211. Hungary, Poland, and East Germany put forth their own plans. Apparently, the USSR provided some support for these proposals in the international arena—out of the belief that the NSWP states "must be allowed their say"—but in the end, neither the East nor the West seriously considered them.

henceforth each state could pursue its own model.⁸⁴ The objective of the new course was to grant the NSWP states the room necessary to implement domestic reforms and to strengthen their socialist systems. In fact, the reverse process occurred. In 1989 Poland's communist regime fell. Other East Bloc regimes fell one-by-one and gradually were replaced with democratically elected governments. As this process developed, socialist bloc cohesion became less and less of an issue in alliance politics, but the USSR continued to insist that the pact be preserved to meet more traditional security needs. For example, throughout 1990 Soviet commentators stressed the value of the Pact as a source of stability and continuity in Europe; the key to the USSR's membership in Europe; an essential attribute of international power; the source of strategic symmetry; and an instrument of political weight in regional and international negotiations.⁸⁵

In the June 1989 PCC meeting, Gorbachev promised "every sort of transformation of the Warsaw Treaty, including various forms of

⁸⁴ The new doctrine was frequently described as the "Sinatra Doctrine" because it allowed each satellite to "do it its own way." Braun, "Whither the Warsaw Pact?" 67-68; Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, 134.

⁸⁵ Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe*, trans. Keith Martin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 240.

membership and obligation, would be welcome to sustain it."⁸⁶ Since there was still no alternative to the Pact in Eastern Europe, the Soviets suggested that its political rationale would take precedence over the military.⁸⁷ Again, the reaction of the East European states was mixed, as they were not in favor of any scheme that would revive the pact. Nonetheless, the NSWP allies (especially Czechoslovakia and Poland) were reluctant to dissolve the pact immediately because it contributed to regional stability in highly uncertain times.⁸⁸ First, they feared that dissolving the WTO would reduce Moscow's status in Europe and would give nationalist forces in the Soviet Union an excuse to challenge the Gorbachev government and to attempt to reverse its reforms. Second, the WTO allies initially agreed that they could employ the organization as a tool in ongoing East-West arms control discussions and that, through it, they would maintain a level of status that they could not achieve independently. Finally, they shared an expectation that it would be most cost-effective to adapt the WTO to be a component in a new pan-European political and security system, rather than to start from scratch.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, 155.

⁸⁷ Warsaw Pact Commander, Petr Lushev in United States. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS). FBIS Sov-90-107 p2. 4 June 1990.

⁸⁸ Eyal, "Giving Up the Illusions and Unravelling the Ties," 211.

⁸⁹ Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989*, 246; Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, 155–156.

Their reluctance to dissolve the Warsaw Pact faded through 1990. First, the liberalizing NSWP regimes were no longer in need of protection from their own populations or from the West, especially once Germany reunified and pledged to respect the existing border with Poland in the autumn of 1990. As the WTO lost its two primary justifications, membership actually jeopardized the new, liberal regimes in that it provided an opportunity for the Soviets to reassert control if Moscow were to reverse its policy toward Eastern Europe. Even without such a reversal, the organization perpetuated too high a level of Soviet involvement in the region, and it was a constant reminder of the poor treatment the NSWP states had received throughout the Cold War. Second, the absolute costs of maintaining the alliance were becoming too great for all concerned. The NSWPs had received cheap security during the Cold War. As one analyst argues—"With time and ingenuity, they had also reached an accommodation with the Soviet Union which allowed them to limit their military expenditure whenever possible as well as act as independent states on the international stage."⁹⁰ However, the Soviet Union could not afford to be as "generous" by the mid-1980s and its efforts to make burden sharing more equitable only intensified by the end of the decade. The creation of a "real" alliance in which burdens would be

⁹⁰ Eyal, "Military Relations," 50.

more equitably distributed would be too costly for NSWP states that were trying to rebuild their political, economic, and social systems.⁹¹ Finally, the countries of Eastern Europe, especially Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, shared a perception that their military association with the USSR would taint their own negotiations with the West and make it difficult to participate in (or with) Western institutions and to get assistance to support their political and economic reforms.⁹²

Gradual exit from the Warsaw Pact began in 1990, as the NSWP states disassociated their military establishments from those of the Soviet Union and renationalized their armed forces. They adopted new doctrines based upon the idea of territorial defense and implemented changes in their force postures. They began to employ smaller, more mobile light infantry units and placed a new emphasis on reserves that were available for quick mobilization. They adopted pre-1945 flags, uniforms, and insignia, ended the practice of sending officers to Soviet military academies, terminated their participation in large-scale military maneuvers, and had formal Soviet missions withdrawn from their defense ministries. For instance, the East German NVA, which had been the army most closely integrated in the Soviet military establishment, was formally absorbed into the German *Bundeswehr* and the majority of its personnel

⁹¹ Eyal, "Military Relations," 50.

were retired.⁹³ Moreover, in February 1990, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia agreed upon the complete withdrawal of all 73,500 Soviet troops from the latter's territory by July 1, 1991. Soon thereafter, Hungary completed a similar agreement with the Soviets. In both cases troop withdrawals occurred on schedule. Negotiations with Poland began in November 1990, after Germany promised to recognize the existing border.

The real catalyst for dissolution occurred in January 1991 when the USSR's military suppression of Lithuania's and Latvia's independence movements provided proof that a modest change in Soviet policy could threaten all of the post-1989 gains made in Eastern Europe. Yet, while the NSWP regimes all condemned the Soviet actions, their only common strategy was to expedite the removal of the Soviet presence from the region. None of their reaction occurred through the WTO or other multilateral channels. In fact, the Czechoslovakian parliament immediately voted unanimously to "accelerate negotiations for the immediate abolition of the military structure of the Warsaw Pact."⁹⁴ Poland and Hungary soon followed and called for the immediate dissolution of the military structures and a fixed date for the dissolution of

⁹² Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989*, 244.

⁹³ Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, 151, 153.

⁹⁴ Peter S. Green, "Czechoslovak Parliament seeks abolition of Warsaw Pact," *United Press International* (January 16, 1992).

the alliance. The allies threatened unilateral withdrawals if the USSR did not agree to their demands. As the Soviet Union could not accept the loss of prestige that would occur if its allies were to terminate the alliance in such a manner, it agreed to their terms.⁹⁵ The allies met on February 25, 1991 and agreed to dissolve the military structures of the alliance by March 31. The PCC agreed to dissolve the political alliance on July 1.

In sum, all of these factors suggest that after the end of the Cold War, there were no significant incentives to maintain the Warsaw Pact. From the perspective of most members, there was simply no rationale. As a diplomat stated in 1990: "the Treaty itself useless," because security can no longer be sought only among a small circle of countries.⁹⁶ Moreover, according to a Czech official, "The main threat isn't from any military alliance. The main threat may be from some unprovoked situation in the destabilized part of Europe where nationalism, economic misery, and lack of democratic political structures make for a very volatile environment."⁹⁷

Conclusion

This analysis of the Warsaw Pact contributes to our understanding of alliance behavior in several regards: It illuminates the difficulties in

⁹⁵ Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989*, 250.

⁹⁶ *Le Monde* (8 June 1990).

⁹⁷ *The New York Times* (July 2, 1991), 7:1.

institutionalizing an alliance at the time it is formed and in fostering constitutive norms in an imposed institution, and it demonstrates the several ways in which allies within such an institution may attempt to exercise exit and voice to influence its development and performance. As soon as the hegemon's power wanes or a feasible alternative presents itself, the dissatisfied allies will exit the alliance.

First, the Warsaw Pact provides an example of the difficulty in institutionalizing an alliance at the outset, that is, as the allies negotiate the military commitment. In fact, in this case, the allies did not express an interest in institutionalization until long after having negotiated bilateral military commitments. The most likely explanation for their reliance on the bilateral system was that they needed to satisfy immediate, *national*, security interests *and* some of the most severe of these threats originated from other states in the Soviet bilateral system. Thus, for example, they needed to rebuild their militaries, strengthen their fragile regimes, and resolve border disputes before they could focus on the less-immediate threat of Western military incursion or political subversion. Once these states had reinforced their infrastructure and ameliorated the conflicts amongst themselves, they could focus on the perceived common threat emanating from the West and NATO.

Second, this analysis has shown that when a preponderant power appropriates institutionalization, the process can impede satisfactory

performance as well as the development of constitutive norms (that is, material and normative barriers to exit). The only obstacles to exit, but nonetheless significant ones, are the sheer power and will of the alliance leader. In the case of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union designed the alliance to embody practices and expectations of Soviet superiority and it managed it to maximize its own national defense interests, even at the expense of those of its allies. Thus, while the alliance consistently performed in the interests of the Soviet Union, it prohibited the NSWP states from pursuing their own nation security objectives. For example, the development of a national perspective was impeded by the fact that national forces were led by officers trained in Moscow, who were also often under the supervision of Soviet officials. The conduct of joint exercises also obstructed the efficiency and effectiveness of collective defense, because NSWP forces were never integrated in these exercises (except with Soviet forces). In addition, standardization and interoperability remained limited, especially as the Soviet economy deteriorated.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union did not intend institutionalization to create or reinforce norms among the NSWP states. Because it feared that a unified Eastern bloc could challenge its dominance, it used the Warsaw Pact to strengthen its *bilateral* military relations with each of the allies. The WTO did not contain mechanisms to facilitate the development of a

community identity. Instead, it fostered suspicion and mistrust among the allies. Two tools were particularly effective in this regard. First, Moscow practiced favoritism. For example, it frequently demonstrated a preference for the northern tier over the southern tier states. Second, it employed WTO military forces to settle intra-allied disputes. A history of invasion by allies did little to foster constitutive norms.

This analysis is significant because, in the absence of the material and normative obstacles to exit that institutionalization is expected to produce, Soviet power was necessary to hold the alliance together and to rule out the exit option. And yet, with the exit option foreclosed, NSWP states were able to exercise "partial exit" and voice (albeit within bounds) to express their dissatisfaction with the performance of the alliance and to try to reform it. Those allies that were most successful in exercising voice and "partial exit" met two requirements: (1) they did not challenge the socialist bloc, but merely Moscow's management of it and (2) they were less dependent than their allies upon Soviet military support. Albania and Romania met both requirements. Albania was the only state to exit the alliance successfully because it found an alternative, and less costly, source of security in China and it continued to pursue a hard socialist line in its domestic and foreign policies. Had the Soviet Union employed military means to preserve Albania's membership, it would have undermined its own legitimacy across the rest of the bloc. Romania, in contrast, was

unable to break free of the alliance because it did not have such external support. Yet because it was more secure than most NSWP allies were and it was not as vulnerable to Soviet economic pressure, it pursued a more independent policy *within* the WTO. It exited those activities that were most threatening to its interests (like joint exercises), but it remained an ally and a staunch advocate of socialism.

Finally, to return to the questions asked at the beginning of this chapter, the model does hold for institutionalized bandwagoning alliances and it does provide additional insight into some processes of alliance behavior. While the model's explanation of alliance persistence and dissolution does not contradict realist theory, its expectations regarding evolution and dissolution are an advance. The alliance persisted through the 1980s because it satisfied Soviet security needs and because the NSWP states did not have a satisfactory alternative. It dissolved very quickly once the USSR lost the power and the will to enforce membership, leaving the allies free to act upon their evaluations of the alliance's performance. However, the analysis has broader implications in that it provides further evidence that evolution and erosion do not occur when there are no strong constitutive norms. In particular, when allies associate an institutionalized alliance with domination rather than collective defense, it is unlikely that the hegemon will be able to cultivate strong constitutive norms. It may impose norms for a time, but the allies are not expected to internalize

these norms and they will abandon them as soon as the hegemon declines. Without such a foundation, the institutions will not long survive the decline of the hegemon, especially as the common threat recedes or the strategic context significantly alters such that there is no material benefit to the institutions. The analysis also underscores the fact that when the exit option is foreclosed, states can employ other means to attempt to reform an alliance to better meet their security and political needs. Moreover, the greater the barriers to exit, the more creative and persistent states will be in these efforts.

Chapter 5

The Asia-Pacific Alliances: An Institutionalist Reinterpretation of ANZUS and SEATO

This chapter analyzes two of the United States' regional, Cold War alliance systems: the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Pact (ANZUS) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). An analysis of these two cases underscores the argument in the previous chapter that the institutional model of alliance behavior cannot replace traditional alliance theory, but must be employed in conjunction with it to explain the broadest possible range of behavior. In particular, it highlights that a preponderant power can forestall exit when maintaining an alliance is in its best interests. Yet the analysis raises other questions as well. For example, can an alliance institutionalize in the absence of a common threat? Moreover, is it necessary or sufficient for allies to have a common heritage if strong constitutive norms are to develop?

First, these alliances provide evidence of two very different processes of institutionalization. In both instances, one or more junior allies sought a level of institutionalization similar to that found in NATO. In ANZUS, in which the military threat was moderate and the allies did not share significant nonmilitary threats, there was very little institutionalization. In fact, ANZUS is the least institutionalized of all the alliances examined in this dissertation. In SEATO, there was a moderate-to-severe military threat in combination with a severe threat of political subversion. The core regional states perceived that there was a

threat to their interests, if not to their territory or political systems. A comparison of the two cases highlights the argument made in chapter 1 that alliance institutionalization requires the perception that the allies face military and non-military threats. It also emphasizes that common interests and objectives must underlie any successful military pact, and especially institutionalized pacts. Moreover, it suggests that when there exists a successful pre-existing institutional model, some allies will seek to emulate that model, but the institution will be rudimentary unless (1) non-military threats are also severe and (2) there are few common goals among the allies, especially regarding the core aspects of the commitment.

Second, the cases underscore the significance of the interplay of performance and norms in influencing alliance behavior. In ANZUS, the allies pursued different national goals through the alliance, but traditional military and intelligence cooperation seemed to satisfy each of their objectives. SEATO, in contrast, failed to perform to the expectations of any of its members, largely because there was no consensus on SEATO's purpose or its legitimate sphere of activity. More often than not, the allies chose not to put SEATO to the test and risk exposing the alliance's greatest weakness—their lack of unity. Instead, they turned to other international and bilateral forums to manage crises that affected the treaty area.

Both alliances were marked by the absence of strong constitutive norms. While the ANZUS allies shared a common heritage in the "Western" world, this

was not sufficient to facilitate the growth of constitutive norms. In particular, there was nothing to define these three states as a community distinct from other liberal democratic states in the Western tradition. There was no separate identity to preserve or strengthen. The SEATO allies, in contrast, did not share a common heritage, but the United States actively promoted the norm that they shared a common identity as non-communist states. However, this anticommunist norm was gradually displaced, because it was incompatible with transformations in the strategic environment.

The chapter begins with an analysis of the ANZUS alliance. In the absence of institutionalization or strong constitutive norms, there were no formidable obstacles to exit when an ally perceived the costs of alliance to have become too great. Thus, ANZUS dissolved quite suddenly—after years of very favorable performance and after various efforts to hold it together. The second half of the chapter analyzes the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which passed through a stage of evolution when the anticommunist norm was strongest and the allies had yet to truly test the performance of the alliance. The alliance eroded as performance declined and the constitutive norm began to erode. Once the norm was fully displaced, the process of erosion became one of dissolution. The chapter ends with a comparison of these two cases.

The ANZUS Pact

The Australia, New Zealand, and United States alliance is a case of a non-institutionalized alliance system. The allies conducted most relations bilaterally and they did not share strong constitutive norms. Weak institutionalization facilitated ANZUS's persistence so long as membership provided net benefits, but when the costs of alliance became untenable, there were no significant obstacles to exit. The trilateral alliance effectively dissolved, leaving in place two bilateral arrangements.

This argument is developed in three stages. First, it is claimed that in contrast to the other alliances examined in this dissertation, institutionalization probably would have posed an *obstacle* to cooperation in ANZUS. Whereas formal consultative mechanisms generally facilitate the formulation of a common policy and the resolution of intra-alliance disputes, the less formal channels employed in ANZUS actually *enabled* the allies to engage in military cooperation by allowing them to skirt discussion of their diverse (and sometimes incompatible) national interests. Second, it is contended that because the cost-benefit ratio of membership was acceptable to all, they had no incentive to address the compatibility of their interests for much of ANZUS's first thirty years. Third, drawing on the United States-New Zealand nuclear ships dispute of 1985, it is shown that the lack of institutionalization, which had formerly been an

asset, now facilitated dissolution because there were no significant material or normative obstacles to exit after efforts to exercise voice failed.¹

The Origins of ANZUS: The Weakest of Institutions

ANZUS is best understood as traditional alliance system that was simply one cog in much larger global postwar security system designed to deter and, if necessary, to conduct a third world war with the Communist Bloc. ANZUS was a minor and peripheral component of this system—indicated by the fact that the U.S. would not even consider a pact with Australia and New Zealand until the Cold War had spilled outside of Europe, and these states had demonstrated they could be loyal allies in that conflict. Yet although global communism served as the “common denominator” underlying ANZUS,² the allies did not share constitutive norms and each sought the Pact as a means to pursue an array of foreign policy objectives.³ In fact, the greatest threat to the ANZAC⁴ states did

¹ This analysis emphasizes the New Zealand-U.S. relationship and it ends with its termination in 1986. Although the ANZUS treaty remains in force, the U.S. effectively dissolved the trilateral relationship when it ended its security commitment to New Zealand. What remains is a bilateral relationship between Australia and the U.S. and another between Australia and New Zealand.

² Roderic Alley, “The Evolution of ANZUS,” in *ANZUS in Crisis*, ed. Jacob Bercovitch, 33.

³ The relationship between Australia and New Zealand was, in fact, a very deep one. It was “rooted in history, in being British colonies (or, in Australia’s case, a collection of colonies), in close family relationships, in shared attitudes toward Britain, in the same legal system, in shared experiences in wars, in shared institutions, and in a host of other ways—not the least of which is that New Zealanders and Australians may freely and permanently migrate to one another’s countries.” Stuart McMillan, *Neither*

not arise from Communist infiltration, but from Japanese rearmament and the possibility that Japan might be aggressive itself or fall into Soviet hands. The ANZUS Pact was also a means for these states to achieve a range of other benefits. For instance, it integrated Australia and New Zealand into a global war effort by means of a forward defense strategy, provided a "security credit" in case they were to face a regional threat, bound them to the Western community of states, and granted them a voice in global affairs. The United States, however, had much more limited goals in ANZUS: First, it viewed the alliance as a concession to get the ANZAC states to sign on to the Japanese Peace Treaty, and later it considered it to be one component in its global nuclear deterrence system. The only way to reconcile all of these goals was to negotiate a vague military commitment and to keep the alliance machinery simple.

All three states could agree upon the threat of Communist expansion, but they differed significantly in the extent to which they feared it. As anxious as the ANZAC governments were to join the defense of the Free World in 1951, other interests often took precedence and their common heritage in Western civilization was not sufficient to ground the alliance on constitutive norms. This is not to say that the fear of Communist expansion was not genuine. For instance,

Confirm Nor Deny: The Nuclear Ships Dispute between New Zealand and the United States (New York: Praeger, 1987), 125.

⁴ The ANZAC sobriquet originates in the Australia-New Zealand Army Corps, which were created in the Canberra Pact of 1944. It is now used as shorthand to refer to the alliance between these two states.

from the U.S. perspective, the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam and the revolution in China indicated that Communism was on the move across East and Southeast Asia. Despite the lack of hard evidence that the Soviet Union had designs on the South Pacific in 1951, the U.S. nonetheless perceived Australia and New Zealand to be valuable allies. Australia in particular perceived that China posed an indirect threat through its influence over the Communist Party of Indonesia and, to prevent infiltration, the Australian government implemented a staunchly anticommunist domestic policy well into the 1960s.⁵ Yet, because the ANZAC social and political systems were remarkably stable (especially for this region) Communist subversives would have great difficulty infiltrating them. Thus, the U.S. viewed these countries as examples to be followed by less stable neighbors in Southeast Asia.

In the early 1950s, these states perceived their greatest direct threat to emanate from the Japanese peace settlement and the attendant possibility of Japanese rearmament. Once North Korea invaded South Korea, the United States became eager to arrange a peace treaty that would invite Japan into the Western community on favorable terms and prevent it from falling into the Communist Camp.⁶ Once the U.S. decided to end its occupation, Australia and New Zealand

⁵ McMillan, *Neither Confirm Nor Deny*, 61. New Zealand's geographic isolation, in contrast, prevented Communist subversion from becoming a significant domestic policy issue.

⁶ W. David McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy, and Diplomacy, 1945-55* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 316-319. The U.S. regarded the ANZUS Treaty, the bilateral treaty with the Philippines, and the Japanese peace treaty

had to plan for the contingency that Japan might become aggressive again. This meant seeking a security commitment from the preponderant power in the region. The U.S. agreed on the grounds that a security pact with these states was an acceptable price to pay to get them to accept the Japanese peace settlement. Indeed, the pact was necessary "to foster conditions leading to peace and security in the western Pacific and to relieve the states therein of fears of any possible revival of Japanese militarism."⁷ It also did not hurt Australia and New Zealand's case that they had contributed resources to the conflict in Korea.⁸

Although ANZUS may not have been a priority for the U.S., it was the cornerstone of the ANZAC defense policies. They believed that because NATO had blocked Communist expansion into Europe, the Communist powers would

as individual, but adjoining, parts of a single alliance system that would possibly evolve into a wider collective security pact. The three treaties were considered mutually supportive; they made Japan the forward area of American strategy in the Pacific, with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand the rear bases from which supporting strength could be applied. Trevor R. Reese, *Australia, New Zealand, and the United States: A Survey of International Relations, 1941-1968* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 126-127; William T. Tow, *Encountering the Dominant Player: U.S. Extended Deterrence Strategy in the Asia Pacific*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 84.

⁷ John Foster Dulles, the U.S. Chief Negotiator in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 82nd Cong., 2^d sess., January 21-25, 1952*, 3, 62. This document provides a useful overview of the U.S. perspective on the relationship between ANZUS and the Japanese Peace Treaty.

⁸ John Ravenhill, "Political Turbulence in the South Pacific," in *No Longer an American Lake?* ed. Ravenhill, 3-4; In June 1950, Australia sent two warships and authorized the use of a Mustang fighter-bomber squadron and New Zealand offered two frigates. In July New Zealand and Australia agreed to commit ground troops (albeit, only after receiving word that the British were about to do the same). McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 272-73; 279-80.

seek new opportunities southward and eastward in Asia. If a conflict were to erupt in one of these theaters, Australia and New Zealand expected to divert forces from their own territories to fight along side the British, as they had done in World War II. They further expected the Americans to reimburse them for their global efforts in two ways. First, the U.S. would defend Australia and New Zealand if a global conflict were to expand to their territories while they were off defending distant theaters.⁹ Second, their contributions to the global security network would accumulate what has variously been called a "security credit," a "bank of goodwill," or an "insurance premium." The U.S. would not be bound to defend them only while their forces were off fighting in distant theaters. Rather, they would be able to draw on previous cooperation and call on the U.S. for military assistance if either of them were to become engaged in a future conflict with Japan, Indonesia, China, or any other country.¹⁰ Until 1951, these were mere expectations. ANZUS formalized the arrangements.

The Pacific Pact was also a source of priceless non-military benefits for the junior allies. First, their experiences in World War II had demonstrated that because of the sheer distances to be traveled, their lines of communication and their trade relationships with their Western allies were very vulnerable.

⁹ Coral Bell, "ANZUS in Australia's Foreign and Security Policy," in *ANZUS in Crisis*, ed. Jacob Bercovitch, 138.

¹⁰ Andrew Mack, "Australian Defense Policy and the ANZUS Alliance," in *No Longer an American Lake?* ed. John Ravenhill, 170–171; Alley, "The Evolution of ANZUS," 43; Tow, *Encountering the Dominant Player*, 83.

Although they were situated in the South Pacific, Australia and New Zealand considered themselves to be part of the West and, if another war were to erupt, they wanted to avoid diplomatic and economic isolation from it. Significantly, they considered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization a threat in this regard because they believed that it had a voice in global planning and therefore a say in policy decisions affecting the South Pacific.¹¹ Second, at the height of British influence members of the Commonwealth, including Australia and New Zealand, had been granted more involvement and influence in global affairs than their size and location would otherwise permit. And even as U.S. power began to displace British power, these states continued to exert some indirect influence (via the British). However, once the U.S. was clearly the predominant power in the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand sought direct access.¹² Drawing on their view of NATO, it became obvious to these states that membership in a formal association provided the highest degree of influence:

...it is clear enough that Canada, partly because of her association with NATO, is increasing rapidly in its [sic] world influence, a position which is denied to us primarily, in my view, because of our absence from membership of any effective planning body."¹³

¹¹ Reese, *Australia, New Zealand, and the United States*, 109–110; McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 251. In addition, these countries feared that Britain, their traditional protector, would lose interest in its commitments in the South Pacific as NATO grew.

¹² McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 211. Michael McKinley, "The New Zealand Perspective on ANZUS and Nuclear Weapons," in *No Longer an American Lake?* ed. John Ravenhill, 50.

¹³ Quoted in Glen St J. Barclay, *Friends in High Places: Australian-American Diplomatic Relations Since 1945* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985), 58.

Yet, the ANZUS pact was a very traditional treaty of alliance. It expressed a vague commitment to consult on matters of military security and it did not create any significant machinery.¹⁴ This outcome was more or less a compromise among each of the allies' initial preferences, although it certainly reflects the interests of the U.S. over those of the junior allies. The U.S. agreed to the lowest level of institutionalization that the ANZAC states would tolerate. Australia was by far the strongest advocate of an alliance designed along the NATO model, since it perceived various potential threats. Being more isolated geographically, New Zealand did not perceive direct threats to its territory and it preferred less formal networks of military cooperation that also incorporated arrangements to exercise voice in international affairs.¹⁵ Finally, because the United States saw ANZUS merely as the price to pay to get Australia and New Zealand to sign on to the Japanese peace treaty, it sought a traditional and limited alliance that would not require it to divert precious military resources to the Pacific, where it perceived threats to be particularly low. Figure 8 illustrates how these interests

¹⁴ The ANZUS Treaty does not contain an article to correspond to Article 2 of NATO or Article 3 of the SEATO Treaty. These articles pledge to encourage economic cooperation and to strengthen free institutions. See Appendix.

¹⁵ In fact, New Zealand initially pushed for a presidential declaration along the lines of the Truman Doctrine. Neither the U.S. nor Australia was interested. The former believed a declaration would allow New Zealand to free ride off the U.S. security commitment, whereas the latter believed a declaration did not provide a sufficient commitment. Malcolm McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), 121; McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 317.

converged on a very low level of institutionalization, according to the model presented in Chapter 1.




Figure 8: ANZUS Institutionalization, 1951–1986

The ANZUS commitment is expressed in Articles 2–5 of the treaty. The parties pledge to employ “continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid” and to “develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” (Article 2). When their territorial or political integrity *in the Pacific* is threatened, they pledge to “consult together” and “act to meet the common danger in accordance with [their] constitutional processes” (Articles 3 and 4).¹⁶ Unlike the “NATO formula” in which an attack against one is viewed as an attack against all (Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty), the “Monroe Doctrine Formula” simply calls for consultation in the event that an ally’s security is threatened. From the U.S. point of view “it was better to use the Monroe Doctrine language

¹⁶ The junior allies were not committed to defending the continental U.S., but they were committed to defending U.S. forces stationed in the Pacific—on Taiwan, Diego Garcia, or the Philippines, for example.

which...had proved to be an effective, workable declaration of policy for 125 years."¹⁷

The consultative machinery is also much more rudimentary in ANZUS than in NATO, primarily because the U.S. was never interested in making ANZUS anything more than a means to exchange views and to foster common approaches to problems. Thus, although Article 7 of the treaty creates a Council "consisting of [allies'] Foreign Ministers or their deputies," to be organized so as to be able to meet at any time, it was not expected to meet outside of times of crisis.¹⁸ Nor was it authorized to create subsidiary bodies to manage relations between its meetings. (The North Atlantic Council was given this authority.) At their first meeting,¹⁹ the Foreign Ministers did agree that the Council would meet annually and that special meetings of the deputies would be held as required in Washington to allow for "continuing" consultation. However, the machinery was

¹⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific*, 65. Of course, the heart of the issue was not that the Monroe Doctrine had worked so well in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, the NATO formula was working just as well in a region facing greater threats. The real issue was that the U.S. Senate was opposed to entering any treaty arrangement that offered the President the opportunity to commit American forces, and perhaps draw them into a war, without first consulting Congress. For evidence of the inflammatory nature of this debate in the U.S. Senate, see U.S. Congress, Senate, 82nd Cong., *The Congressional Record* 98 pt. 3: 3227-32.

¹⁸ Reese, *Australia, New Zealand, and the United States*, 143.

¹⁹ This first meeting was held in Honolulu in 1952, and after some delay. Even then Secretary of State Dean Acheson promised President Truman that there would be "no spectacular results" as regards the possibility of an ANZUS organization. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS] 1952-1954*, 12, pt. 1: 316-49, 336-337; Reese, *Australia, New Zealand, and the United States*, 145.

to be kept as simple as possible and was not to supercede normal diplomatic channels. In fact, any operational implementation of ANZUS would not have to be organized under the Council framework at all, and consultations or military measures could be organized through other diplomatic channels.²⁰

Although finally the parties did agree upon a modest institutional structure, it was clearly the American position that won out. The Council was authorized to give "continuous consideration to the political and strategic situation in the Pacific." One military representative from each government was accredited to the Council to advise it on problems of military cooperation; the U.S. Commander in Chief for the Pacific (CINCPAC) would serve as the U.S. military representative. Each government could assign to the offices of the other allies' military representatives not more than two liaison officers of a rank no higher than field grade.²¹ Otherwise, military advisors were to meet separately, and Australia and New Zealand would *not* receive direct access to the U.S. Joint

²⁰ The U.S. military chiefs, in particular, were incensed by the allies' insistence that ANZUS should grant them access to U.S. global planning. However, since Australia and New Zealand wanted to be kept informed of what was going on in other parts of the world so as to plan their own defenses accordingly, Australian Foreign Minister Robert Casey proposed that a military committee be created. Bowing to U.S. pressure, he did not suggest a large or complex committee structure, but rather suggested that a senior Australian and New Zealand military official be attached to the embassy in Washington and, in exchange, a U.S. representative be sent to Melbourne and Wellington. In effect, this would create three military committees—one in each capital—with the senior committee being located in Washington. *FRUS* 1952–1954 12, pt. 1: 170–175.

²¹ *FRUS* 1952–1954 12, pt. 1: 198–199.

Chiefs of Staff in Washington. All access to U.S. planning would occur through the CINCPAC.²²

In sum, security concerns were not sufficiently complex for the Australia, New Zealand, and United States military pact to require institutionalization. These states perceived neither a common, direct military threat, nor a common threat to status or stability. In fact, all of these states were models of stability and only in one instance (Australia) was there even the possibility of a military threat. The U.S. was unwilling to unnecessarily constrain its foreign policy options by applying the NATO model to the ANZUS alliance. However, institutionalization was attractive to the junior allies because it conveyed certain benefits, like global influence, that were difficult to achieve through unilateral measures. The United States made minor concessions to get a treaty signed within an acceptable time frame, but in the end the design of the alliance reflected U.S. interests far more than ANZAC interests. The junior allies did not make the issue divisive because the alliance did provide a large range of other, higher-level, benefits. The next section evaluates the various advantages of alliance.

²² McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 357; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 688. Acheson notes that the Honolulu meeting was finally called so that the U.S. could formally inform the ANZAC states that they would not gain access to the JCS. To compensate for any perception that the U.S. was "starving" its allies of information, Acheson decided to give them "indigestion"—to overload them with information. Ibid., 637, 689; *FRUS* 1952–1954 12, pt. 1: 202.

A Model Alliance?

Between 1952 and 1984, ANZUS existed in a state of persistence in which there were no fundamental alterations to the scope of the alliance's activities or its purpose (see Figure 9). Without constitutive norms, there was no incentive to expand the functions or the scope of the alliance and because ANZUS generated the lowest maintenance costs among all of the Western alliance systems,²³ there was no reason for the allies to decrease or dissolve the commitment. Indeed, ANZUS produced such significant benefits (like defense collaboration, military modernization, and intelligence gathering and sharing) that they never had to address the ever-increasing incompatibility among their objectives. However, over the course of these three decades the strategic context gradually changed

Performance	Norms	
	Constitutive	Regulative
Effective:	<i>Evolution</i> N/A	<i>Persistence</i> ANZUS 1952–1984 AUS 1986+ ANZAC 1986+
Ineffective:	<i>Erosion</i> N/A	<i>Dissolution</i> U.S. suspends commitment to NZ 1986

Figure 9: Development of the ANZUS Alliance System

such that a combination of domestic-level political changes, the diminution of regional threats, and intensifying superpower tensions forced the allies to

²³ Michael C. Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting, and Deterrence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 32–33. In the absence of truly constitutive norms, neither evolution nor decay occurred. Thus these cells remain empty in the table.

confront difficult questions regarding the purpose of ANZUS. The analysis illustrates the difficulty in maintaining a weakly institutionalized alliance as allies' interests diverge.

Defense collaboration has always been one of the key benefits of membership in ANZUS. Of course, for the junior allies the most valuable aspect of collaboration was the American security commitment. But collaboration also involved regular preparation to deter and defend against an attack in the Pacific territories of these states—that is, to improve self-help as well as the collective capacity to resist armed attack. To this end, the ANZUS states participated in joint exercises, military exchanges, arms purchase and logistics agreements, and ships visits. At first glance, these benefits would appear to be disproportionately directed to the ANZAC states. The military exercises were particularly important since they could not receive the same advantages from exercising with other Asian and Pacific States as they could in exercising with the United States. “The ANZUS connection gave a dimension and depth to mutual defense exchanges among the services of the three nations which went beyond those provided by other bilateral or multinational arrangements.”²⁴ Indeed, Australia and New Zealand had active security arrangements with many other states, such as the

²⁴ McKinley, “The New Zealand Perspective on ANZUS and Nuclear Weapons,” 50. Significantly, however, none of the agreements for defense cooperation among ANZUS states rely upon the treaty. The only such agreement to fall under the ANZUS agreement is a secret maritime surveillance arrangement (MARSAM). Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting, and Deterrence*, 41–44.

1949 ANZAM agreement between Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia²⁵ and the *Five-Power Defense Arrangement* which included the ANZAM states as well as Britain and Singapore.²⁶ There were also numerous *bilateral agreements*, such as those with the Philippines, Indonesia, Britain, and Canada. However, the exercises with the United States were credited with instilling in the armed forces a sense of purpose and commitment that they could not otherwise have achieved. These exercises also granted Australia and New Zealand the best opportunity to test and improve the capability of their regional defense forces.²⁷

The junior allies also benefited from military modernization. While real standardization with American systems was never achieved, in August of 1960 the U.S. and Australia signed a mutual weapons agreement providing for American financial and technical participation in some research and development projects. Allies have also gained the option to purchase advanced weaponry. Australia finds such advanced technology particularly valuable

²⁵ ANZAM was established in 1949 as a contingency planning organization for the Eastern Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific. Plagued by the New Zealand's fears of Australian domination, it was restricted to services planning and did not imply government commitments. McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, 114; McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*, 220.

²⁶ This agreement entered into force in November 1971. The commitment only extended to consultation "in the event of an attack externally organized or supported or the threat of such an attack against either or both Singapore or Malaysia." McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, 171.

²⁷ On New Zealand, see McKinley, "The New Zealand Perspective on ANZUS and Nuclear Weapons," 50; on Australia, see Joseph A. Camilleri, *The Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. Alliance: Regional Security in the Nuclear Age* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 23.

because of the need to defend a long coastline and long seaborne lines of communication, and because its population is concentrated in a few large and potentially vulnerable cities.²⁸ Of course, from the point of view of the U.S., Australia was an important customer for military equipment (refer to Table 3)—especially because it did not expect economic or military assistance in return.²⁹

Fiscal Year	FMS to New Zealand	FMS to Australia	FMS to Japan
1984	16.2	428.9	217.8
1985	15.6	301.9	325.9
1986	25.2	400.1	245.6
1987	15.0	200.0	200.0

Source: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, *Elimination of Security Assistance and Arms Export Preferences for New Zealand: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st sess., September 22, 1987, 63.*

Table 3: Foreign Military Sales to New Zealand, Australia, and Japan, FY1984–FY1987 (\$ millions)

Ships visits, on the other had, were deemed crucial to U.S. naval operations. A larger proportion of U.S. naval vessels were becoming nuclear

²⁸ Reese, *Australia, New Zealand, and the United States*, 145; Camilleri, *The Australia, New Zealand, U.S. Alliance*, 21; Ravenhill, "Political Turbulence in the South Pacific," 8.

²⁹ This last point also applied to New Zealand. As Sir Wallace Rowling, a former New Zealand Ambassador to the United States, notes, his country took "some considerable pride at being able to point out that the debt incurred during the Second World War was repaid in its entirety." Sir Wallace Rowling, "New Zealand and ANZUS," *Armed Forces and Society* 12,2 (Winter 1986), 170.

powered, and thus were becoming ever-more crucial to the total fleet structure.³⁰ The conversion to nuclear power was intended to make these vessels less dependent on foreign ports, but the fact remained that because crews could be on station in remote places (like the Indian Ocean) for as long as eight months without a break, they needed to have port access for rest and relaxation and to perform regular maintenance. Both Australia and New Zealand became of great logistical significance as "key transit points for American nuclear-capable air and naval units."³¹

ANZUS was also of great consequence for the access it conferred to the highest levels of allies' governments. Because senior representatives always attended the meetings of the ANZUS Council, the ANZAC states were granted the right to consult at the highest level within the U.S. State Department. And, as loyal allies, they gained entry to the White House and the Pentagon—although, as noted above, they were not permitted to participate in global military planning within the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³² The United States also benefited in

³⁰ *Department of State Bulletin* 84 (September 1984): 21.

³¹ Tow, *Encountering the Dominant Player*, 97; Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting, and Deterrence*, 70. Through the 1970s, port access became a significant source of controversy with many allies, who were fearful that it was unsafe to welcome nuclear powered vessels into their ports. Australia and New Zealand were no different in this regard. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting, and Deterrence*, chapter 9.

³² A number of high profile events signaled that consultation was weaker than the junior allies realized it was. In particular, Nixon's 1969 Guam doctrine calling for regional states to become more self-reliant in their military affairs came as a complete surprise to both the Australian and New Zealand Governments. For the U.S. perspective

regard to access as at various times the ANZAC states have acted as its intermediaries in the South Pacific and in relations with countries that were not open to dealing directly with the superpower. It is important to note, however, that access did not necessarily confer influence. Over time the ANZAC allies came to object that they actually had received very little of the latter.³³

Finally, some of the most significant benefits of membership flowed from intelligence cooperation. There was an active liaison between the Australian intelligence services and the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and the military intelligence agencies. "Defense officials have often claimed that the United States is quite generous in the volume and quality of intelligence information which it shares with Australia, and that such intelligence, particularly as it applies to new military technology and regional political developments, is vitally important to Australian defense planning."³⁴

on consultation, see John C. Dorrance, "ANZUS: Misperceptions, Mythology and Reality," *Australian Quarterly* 57,3 (Spring 1985): 215-230.

³³ For example, at the 1978 Special Disarmament Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the United States agreed not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) unless they were allied with a nuclear state. This promise, made without consulting Australia, eliminated the nuclear deterrent (that Australia believed) prevented Indonesia from attacking. Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting, and Deterrence*, 24, 30.

³⁴ Camilleri, *The Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. Alliance*, 23. This is another area in which cooperation does not occur directly within ANZUS, but is strengthened by the ANZUS connection. Thakur notes that the intelligence network actually exists between the ANZUS allies, Britain, and Canada. This network is so intimate that he describes it as an Anglo-Saxon Intelligence Club and it is governed by a whole network of agreements, treaties, and working arrangements, many of which are secret. Ramesh Thakur, *In Defense of New Zealand: Foreign Policy Choices in the Nuclear Age* (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1984), 40-41.

Likewise, Australia's contribution to intelligence gathering cannot be over-emphasized. Although the U.S. initially downplayed the strategic value of the ANZACs, beginning in the 1960s it negotiated a number of intelligence facilities that would become critical to the operation of the global C³I network (command, control, communications, and intelligence) that ensures nuclear deterrence and verifies arms control agreements.³⁵ New Zealand hosted only three American installations of any significance, and none were as sensitive as the joint facilities in Australia³⁶—especially those in North West Cape, Pine Gap, and Nurrungar. North West Cape housed a communications relay station that was crucial to maintaining communications between the Pentagon and the Pacific Fleet and it was a key component in naval intelligence and tracking operations.³⁷ Pine Gap, which has been described as more valuable than all of the

³⁵ The kinds of threats Australia might face within Southeast Asia do not require installations of this kind. Bell, "ANZUS in Australia's Foreign and Security Policy," 142, 152–54. Their contribution to global interests was fully acknowledged in 1983 by the "Hayden doctrine," which insisted that "U.S.-Australian military cooperation directly contributes to global and regional stability by providing early warning of Soviet strategic developments and better verification of existing arms control agreements." Tow, *Encountering the Dominant Player*, 114.

³⁶ A satellite tracking telescopic camera, located at Mt. John until its deactivation in 1983, was one component in the global network of radar, radio, and optical sensors that fed data to NORAD in Colorado. In 1982 the U.S. Naval Observatory Transit Circle Facility at Black Birch Ridge was established to collect scientific data, although there was some controversy that the data had military applications (for example, to improve the accuracy of ballistic missiles). Finally, Operation Deep Freeze in Christchurch continues to serve as a forward base for Antarctic Expeditions.

³⁷ The Battle-Barwick Agreement (1963) authorized the establishment of North West Cape and leased the installation to the United States until 1988. Although Australia received the right of consultation, the U.S. maintained control of the facility. Camilleri, *The Australian, New Zealand, and U.S. Alliance*, 15, 91–92; Mack, "Australian

rest of ANZUS put together, continues to house a satellite intelligence gathering system that is capable of mapping Chinese and Soviet early warning and air defense networks, monitoring missile tests, and intercepting telephone and microwave communications.³⁸ The recently deactivated Nurrungar installation housed a satellite and surveillance communications system that provided information for weapons targeting and damage-assessment. It was capable of detecting and identifying nuclear detonations and, during a nuclear, it was to feed data on Soviet missile launches and nuclear explosions to the American President's airborne command post.³⁹

Increasing Costs of Alliance and the U.S.-New Zealand Nuclear Ships Dispute

Through the 1960s, these benefits were sufficient to preclude any serious questions regarding the fundamental purpose of the alliance. As with any

Defense Policy and the ANZUS Alliance," 179–80; Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand*, 42; Frank P. Donnini, *ANZUS In Revision: Changing Defense Features of Australia and New Zealand in the Mid-1980s* (Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1991), 26; McMillan, *Neither Confirm Nor Deny*, 51.

³⁸ Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting, and Deterrence*, 47. In 1998 Australia and the United States re-signed the 1967 Pine Gap treaty, extending the life of the facility into 2008. This was one of the sites that monitored Iraqi Scud missile launches and troop movements during the Persian Gulf War. *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 10, no. 8 (August 1, 1998): 48.

³⁹ The Nurrungar facility became operational in 1971 and was deactivated in the early months of 2000. This facility was also employed in the conduct of the Persian Gulf War to warn American and coalition troops of incoming Scud missiles. Satellites now perform this job. *Jane's Missiles and Rockets* vol. 4, no. 1 (January 1, 2000); *Air Force Magazine* (March 2000), 19.

alliance, there were costs, such as a degree of dependence on U.S. foreign policy or the possibility of being drawn into a U.S.-Soviet conflict. However, they were deemed minimal and acceptable in light of the benefits accrued. Yet, as the 1960s wore on, significant transformations in domestic, regional, and global affairs disproportionately caused some allies to rethink the purpose of ANZUS and their roles in it.

First, regional threats—never significant compared to those in Europe or Asia—had declined to the point that the regional environment was more or less free of military threats. Japan had become a valued ally to the West and a cherished trading partner. Vietnam and China were perceived to be far less threatening by 1976, and relations with the latter were actually normalizing.⁴⁰

Second, rising global tensions granted ANZUS and the South Pacific new strategic significance. Events such as the revolution in Iran, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan indicated to the American government that détente was eroding and its global interests were under renewed threat. The perception that Soviet power was being thrust into

⁴⁰ Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting, and Deterrence*, 29. The National Party Government that was elected in November 1975 (led by Robert Muldoon) shocked the Americans when it attempted to argue the opposing position: that the Soviets were indeed aggressive and that their missiles and interests in the South Pacific posed a significant threat to New Zealand. McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, 196. For the Muldoon Government's (1975–1984) defense policy see B.E. Talboys, Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Afghanistan, Indochina, and ANZUS," *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review* 30,1 (January/March 1980): 3–14; Hugh Templeton, Deputy Minister of Finance, "New Zealand's Defence Policy for the 1980s," *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review* 30,2 (April/June 1980): 6–16.

the Pacific region further threatened the global military balance as well as growing trade routes with the West.⁴¹ According to one Defense Department official, "While the character of the Pacific threat has changed, the magnitude has increased; thus justifying not only continuance, but strengthening of the alliance." ANZUS had helped to prevent many potential conflicts from erupting and it was to remain valuable for providing "an umbrella of stability over the whole region."⁴²

Third, elections in New Zealand and Australia in the early 1980s brought to power parties strongly influenced by domestic anti-nuclear movements. The New Zealand Labour (NZLP) Government (1984) was most strongly swayed for both strategic and domestic political reasons. First, unlike Muldoon's National Party Government, David Lange's NZLP Government did not perceive New Zealand to be under any significant regional threat. In contrast, the party believed that the only threats the country faced followed from its membership in a U.S.-led nuclear alliance—that membership made New Zealand a target. Second, much of the public, although it continued to support membership in ANZUS by a wide margin, also supported a no-nuclear policy. By 1982, for

⁴¹ McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, 201; Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting, and Deterrence*, 33.

⁴² Testimony of James Kelly, Deputy Assistant Secretary of East Asian Affairs, Department of Defense in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, *Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States: A Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs*, 99th Cong., 1st sess., March 18, 1985, 161–62, 180.

example, four local authorities in New Zealand had declared themselves nuclear free zones, and by September 1983, thirty-seven other local authorities had done the same.⁴³ Most significant, however, was the fact that a vocal and powerful segment of the NZLP objected to membership in a nuclear alliance, and (although conference decisions were not binding on the leadership) Lange could not deviate too strongly from the mass party without losing his position.⁴⁴ In 1980 a majority of delegates voted to withdraw from ANZUS; in 1982, they voted that no nuclear weapons would be allowed to visit New Zealand under a Labour Government.⁴⁵

Antinuclear sentiment was less pronounced in Australia, and had less of an impact on ANZUS, for reasons of strategic interests and domestic politics. Australia felt the alliance remained crucial to its security in the 1980s. Not only is it situated closer to countries and regions prone to conflict, like Indonesia and Southeast Asia, but it also believed itself an attractive military target. It houses several very important U.S. installations, it is a significant source of strategic minerals (including uranium), and its long border (over 36,000 kilometers) is

⁴³ McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, 279–280.

⁴⁴ McMillan, *Neither Confirm Nor Deny*, 85.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 279. A bill to this effect was introduced in Parliament that same year. A similar bill had been proposed in 1976 outlawing all nuclear propelled ships from entering New Zealand ports as well. The fact that the later bill would have allowed nuclear propelled ships, but not nuclear weapons, highlights the shifting concern of the anti-nuclear movement from environmental safety to the threat of becoming a nuclear target in the Cold War conflict. For a comparison of the nuclear movement in the 1970s with that in the 1980s, see *Ibid.*, chapter 8.

particularly difficult to secure.⁴⁶ Turning to domestic politics, antinuclearism less directly influenced foreign policy because the Australian Labour Party (ALP) was more factionalized than the New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP) and only one faction (to the left) strongly advocated antinuclearism. The right and center factions remained committed to full participation in ANZUS, and because ALP Governments are bound by the decisions of conferences, the ALP was committed, once in power, "to cooperate with the people of United States and New Zealand within the context of the ANZUS treaty."⁴⁷

The 1982 ALP Conference also committed the Government to engage in a review of the alliance. Australia's review unequivocally reaffirmed that the treaty was "fundamental to Australia's national security and foreign and defense policies"⁴⁸ and that "U.S.-Australian military cooperation directly contributes to global and regional stability by providing early warning of Soviet strategic developments and better verification of existing arms control agreements."⁴⁹ At

⁴⁶ The vulnerability of its border was heightened in 1984 when a boat carrying Vietnamese refugees was undetected until it arrived within only a few kilometers of Australia's shores. *Ibid.*, 57.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 56-59; 115-17. The ships visit issue did arise in Australia in 1982, when the ALP was in opposition. The U.S. quickly communicated to Bill Hayden, the ALP leader, the value it placed on port access and the party reversed its position to recognize that "as far as Australia was concerned, ships visits were essential." *Department of State Bulletin* 84 (September 1984): 21. See also Camilleri, *The Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. Alliance*, 86-87.

⁴⁸ McMillan, *Neither Confirm Nor Deny*, 116.

⁴⁹ Tow, *Encountering the Dominant Player*, 114.

the same time, however, it found that as the treaty incorporated a vague commitment, it could not replace a self-reliant defense strategy entirely. Thus, after thirty years of defining its foreign and defense policies within ANZUS, Australia attempted to distinguish between the treaty system and the much broader U.S.-Australian bilateral relationship. It sought to maintain the strategic connection to the United States while becoming more self-reliant in its foreign and defense policies.⁵⁰ After undertaking its internal review, Australia went to the Council, in which all of the allies reaffirmed that the alliance and the Council were important in their foreign and defense policies.⁵¹

The NZLP's stand on nuclear weapons was well known before it was elected into Government in July 1984. When the allies convened at the ANZUS Council Meeting in Canberra in July 1984, Robert Muldoon's Government represented Australia since Lange had not yet taken office. Both the United States and Australia used this opportunity to exchange views with the Government-elect—before it made the no-nuclear policy the policy of the Government. The United States, represented by Secretary of State George Shultz, clearly communicated that "for an alliance to mean anything, it has to be possible for the military forces of the respective countries to be able to interact together;

⁵⁰ F.A. Mediansky, "The Nuclear Fragging of U.S. Alliances," *The Washington Quarterly* 9,1 (Winter 1986), 34–35; Camilleri, *The Australian, New Zealand, and U.S. Alliance*, 98.

⁵¹ See the ANZUS Council Communiqué in *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review* 33,3 (July/September 1983): 18–23.

otherwise it's not much of an alliance."⁵² Shultz attempted with the new NZLP Government the strategy that had succeeded in swaying the ALP's position on nuclear ships visits. He commented in the press conference following the ANZUS meeting: "I found myself when I entered government that there were a lot things I found out about that I didn't know when I was not in the government that represent important aspects of this relationship. So at any rate, I think what is called for here is some patience, and we'll try to work our way through these problems."⁵³

Australia attempted to maintain relations with both allies until the rift could be repaired. Prime Minister Robert Hawke indicated early in the dispute that Australia "intended to carry on normal relations with the United States, but would not bring any pressure on New Zealand to change its policy on port calls by United States Navy ships." In particular, "What New Zealand decides in this area, or in any other matter, is a decision for a sovereign, independent Government of New Zealand."⁵⁴ More than anything, it did not want to have to renegotiate the treaty with the United States, fearing the Senate would not ratify a new treaty or would water down the commitment.

Negotiations continued through 1984 as each party attempted—unsuccessfully—to sway the view of the other (Australia remained a minor

⁵² *Department of State Bulletin* 84 (September 1984): 17.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 22.

player in this bilateral dispute). New Zealand's position was that the treaty provided only a vague commitment to consult and that its defense relationship with the U.S. was actually far broader than one would suspect by examining the treaty alone. The U.S. interpretation of ANZUS as an instrument for nuclear deterrence was "bizarrely inappropriate to the defense of New Zealand," a country which was most concerned with contributing to international security by maintaining the political and economic stability of the South Pacific. Some members of the NZLP went even further and argued that New Zealand would become a nuclear target so long as the commitment was not renegotiated. Thus, Lange argued for "the retention of the ANZUS alliance in a form which is appropriate to the needs of the South Pacific."⁵⁵ He sought to renegotiate ANZUS as a non-nuclear regional alliance system and to emphasize other aspects of defense cooperation.

At the heart of the dispute was whether New Zealand would ultimately allow port access to U.S. nuclear-capable vessels. Whereas the policy of the Lange Government was that no ship carrying nuclear weapons would be granted access, the U.S. position was to "neither confirm nor deny" (NCND) whether its ships were nuclear armed. The success or failure of U.S. deterrence, it argued,

⁵⁴ *The New York Times*, February 8, 1985.

⁵⁵ *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, 35,3 (July/September 1985), 32-33.

hinged on NCND.⁵⁶ Rather than ask the U.S. to change its policy, Lange decided the responsibility for determining whether or not a vessel was nuclear armed rested with the Prime Minister, who would consult authoritative guides, like *Jane's Fighting Ships*.⁵⁷ This solution was flawed on two counts. First, activists in the Labour Party did not trust the Government not to cheat and grant some nuclear-armed ships port access. Second, from the United States' point of view, Lange's solution was not in the spirit of NCND, because if New Zealand could confidently determine which ships were nuclear-armed and which were not, it was safe to assume that the Soviets could do the same. The United States would only accept a policy of total ambiguity.

The dispute turned into a full-scale crisis early in 1985 when the Lange Government turned away a U.S. Naval destroyer, the USS *Buchanan*, because it could not be confident that the ship was *not* carrying nuclear weapons. (The *Buchanan* was fitted with Anti-Submarine Rockets (ASROC), which were capable

⁵⁶ Paul D. Wolfowitz, "ANZUS Alliance," *Department of State Bulletin* 84 (June 1985); George Shultz, "On Alliance Responsibility," *Department of State Bulletin* 84 (September 1985). On NCND policy see McMillan, *Neither Confirm Nor Deny*; and Pugh, *The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting, and Deterrence*, 64–68.

⁵⁷ McMillan, *Neither Confirm Nor Deny*, 83. Interestingly, an official New Zealand study reported that between 1960 and 1984, the U.S. Navy had made 148 visits to New Zealand ports but in only thirteen cases did it send nuclear-powered ships. James M. McCormick, "Healing the American Rift with New Zealand," *Pacific Affairs* 68,3 (Fall 1995): 394; Dora Alves, "New Zealand and ANZUS: An American View," *The Round Table* 302 (1987): 209. For a comparison of all ships visits to New Zealand between 1958 and 1984 see "Appendix 2," in Jacob Bercovitch, *ANZUS in Crisis: Alliance Management in International Affairs* (London: Macmillan Press, 1988), 250–254.

of delivering nuclear or conventional weapons.⁵⁸) The Lange government was explicit through the crisis that it had no intention of withdrawing from ANZUS and that the treaty remained in force until (or if) *New Zealand* chose to withdraw.⁵⁹ Furthermore, in the absence of a significant regional threat, Lange argued that: "New Zealand's main contribution in support of Western security interests is the substantial security and economic role it plays in the South Pacific. That will continue. Perhaps the Americans will one day come to recognize its value."⁶⁰

The U.S., however, interpreted the situation quite differently. The Americans considered periodic ship visits to New Zealand ports and through its waters to be an integral part of deployment planning and tactical operations. By withdrawing its cooperation in this way, New Zealand was not performing as a good ally should. The issue was one of allied unity, and not the loss of logistical

⁵⁸ Alves, "New Zealand and ANZUS," 210, 213–14; McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, 281; McMillan, *Neither Confirm Nor Deny*, 87.

⁵⁹ *New York Times*, May 1, 1986. Article 10 of the ANZUS treaty states that it "shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given." There is no provision in the treaty for one ally to withdraw its commitment to another.

⁶⁰ *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 13, 1986. The Lange Government also believed that if it were ever to face a real danger, the United States would come to New Zealand's rescue regardless of the nuclear ships dispute. While the U.S. in all likelihood would have defended it against Soviet aggression, the official Department of Defense position was that it would be extremely difficult to do so without port access, as New Zealand is geographically isolated and the logistics tail would be quite long. U.S. Congress, Senate, *Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States*, 164.

support, as the latter only marginally affected the U.S. forces in the Pacific. Nonetheless, New Zealand's attempts to change unilaterally the operational nature of the alliance seriously diminished the deterrent value of ANZUS and the entire Western security system in which it was embedded.⁶¹ U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz argued that "New Zealand has weakened regional stability, one of the most important links in the efforts to prevent nuclear war. And the erosion of Western unity only weakens the Western position and the chances for success in arms control."⁶²

The initial U.S. response was to continue to employ voice to alter New Zealand's behavior: to place pressure on the New Zealand government through its actions and public statements. But given the apparent failure of such actions (underway for months before the NZLP came into government), it also canceled joint ANZUS exercises ("Sea Eagle"), scheduled for March, stopped the flow of all processed and most raw intelligence to New Zealand, and postponed the upcoming Canberra Council meeting. When the Council finally convened, only the U.S. and Australia attended. It cancelled or "reshaped" twenty-two military exercises scheduled for 1985, and it ended preferential treatment in arms sales and training support.⁶³ In the diplomatic realm, all high-level consultations

⁶¹ Alves, "New Zealand and ANZUS," 211; U.S. Congress, Senate, *Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States*, 151.

⁶² Schultz, "On Alliance Responsibility."

⁶³ Alves, "New Zealand and ANZUS," 210-211; McMillan, *Neither Confirm Nor Deny*, 100. There was some question as to the degree to which this "punishment" really

effectively ended. Access to the State Department was downgraded to mid-level officials, while access to the White House and the Pentagon was terminated. Despite demands in Congress for even broader punitive measures, economic relations were not affected. In sum, the U.S. employed voice prior to and in the earliest stages of the crisis, but once New Zealand took official action, indicating the failure of voice, the U.S. returned to a hegemon's traditional tools and exerted military pressure to reprimand New Zealand for its "disloyalty" and to encourage it to return to the fold.

However, the Administration did communicate that the split in the security arena could not help but harm other goals that New Zealand pursued through ANZUS. It is worth quoting at some length an address made by the U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand, Paul Cleveland, to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs in April 1986:

Assessment of the value of the ANZUS alliance must be made by each of its members based on estimates of strategic, political, economic, and other considerations. We cannot make that assessment for New Zealand. We can, however, legitimately point

affected New Zealand. Karl Jackson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs testified that New Zealand's arms purchases, for example, were so small that the practical costs of loss of access were "minimal or non-existent." The level of U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to New Zealand in fiscal year 1986, for example, was \$25.2 million. That same fiscal year FMS to Australia totaled \$400.1 million, and FMS to Japan totaled 245.6 million. New Zealand was also unlikely to suffer greatly from loss of training privileges. As an ally, it received approximately a 20% "discount" on the U.S. fee for training. One significant loss was expected to be that of interoperability. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, *Elimination of Security Assistance and Arms Export Preferences for New Zealand: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., September 22, 1987, 55-58, 63.*

to some of the benefits of alliance.... In addition to the broad global and regional benefits that flow from ANZUS to both of us, ... the treaty brings a number of benefits to New Zealand specifically.... First, the security protection afforded you... is... the cheapest and most reliable in the world. Barring our ships is tantamount to forgoing part of our premiums, never a good way to keep an insurance company happy and willing.... Second, ANZUS not only provides good insurance, it enables New Zealand to contribute meaningfully to the worldwide disarmament effort.... Third, ANZUS has... bestowed on you... an ability to conduct a more influential role in the world generally than you might otherwise.... Few, if any, nations your size have had more or better influence, access, and ability to make their voices heard on international security, political, and trade issues in Washington.... Inevitably, ...the special clout you have had has already begun to erode. That is not unfair; it is straightforward accounting—balancing the books—it's the real world.⁶⁴

U.S. officials insisted that if New Zealand were to reverse its policy—or were to find some way to accommodate the NCND policy—they would welcome it back into ANZUS. However, the crisis took another turn when a bill prohibiting all nuclear powered and nuclear-capable ships from visiting New Zealand ports was raised in New Zealand's Parliament. This legislation posed a real dilemma for the United States, which would have to flout New Zealand's law (a violation of international norms that could undermine *all* of its alliance relations) or jeopardize its own NCND policy if it were to maintain access to port facilities there. As it became clear that the no-nuclear ships policy was going to be passed into law the conflict reached an impasse. It was announced in 1986 that

⁶⁴ *Department of State Bulletin* 86 (June 1986): 74, 77.

the U.S. commitment to New Zealand was suspended.⁶⁵ In June, David Lange met Secretary of State George Schultz at an ASEAN meeting in Manila. The two officials agreed "We part company as friends, but we part company, as far as the alliance is concerned."⁶⁶ The split was formalized in August 1986 in the Communiqué of the San Francisco ANZUS meeting (which only Australia and the U.S. attended). The communiqué effectively reduced ANZUS to two bilateral relationships.⁶⁷




Figure 10: ANZUS Institutionalization, 1986

⁶⁵ The legislation was passed as the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act in 1987.

⁶⁶ George Shultz, quoted in *The New York Times*, June 28, 1986.

⁶⁷ For the full text of the joint statement issued at the end of the U.S.-Australia Ministerial Session, see *Department of State Bulletin* 86 (October 1986): 43–49. The official U.S. position remains that ANZUS will become active again once New Zealand changes its anti-nuclear stance. For example, see "Albright Likely to Push ANZUS Stand," *The Evening Post* (Wellington) July 30, 1998.

Figure 10 illustrates how the de facto demise of ANZUS left in place two bilateral alliance systems. The treaty remained in effect between the U.S. and Australia and between Australia and New Zealand, but the trilateral relationship effectively ended. Security cooperation continued on a regular, and very weakly institutionalized, basis between the U.S. and Australia (AUS). In a joint statement following their August 1986 Ministerial Meeting, American and Australian representatives pledged that close cooperation would continue between their countries. "Both sides agreed that the relationship between Australia and the United States under the ANZUS treaty and the rights and obligations assumed by Australia and the United States toward each other under the treaty would remain constant and undiminished." To this end, they agreed to continue to hold (on an annual basis) bilateral ministerial meetings, political-military discussions, and arms control talks and to "maintain and enhance military-to-military links, including combined exercises...."⁶⁸

The Australia-New Zealand alliance (ANZAC), in contrast, remained more institutionalized than the AUS alliance or even ANZUS. Institutionalized security cooperation between these two states was rooted in the Canberra (or ANZAC) Pact of 1944 and strengthened with groups such as the 1972

⁶⁸ *Department of State Bulletin* 86 (October 1986): 48. In 1996 these pledges were reinforced by a U.S.-Australian agreement on new joint military exercises: "Tandem Thrust." These biannual exercises were to be supplemented by a series of smaller joint exercises that would bring U.S. Marines to Australia two or three times each year. The U.S. and Australia also affirmed that their bilateral "security relationship, having proved its value for five decades, will remain a cornerstone of Asia Pacific security into the 21st century." *Jane's Defence Weekly* 26,7 (August 14, 1996): 12.

Consultative Committee on Defense Cooperation (ANZCCDC; also known as the Joint Coordinating Committee, or JCC) and the 1977 Defense Policy Group. The JCC is a forum in which Defense Secretaries and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committees discuss the strategic and policy implications of defense cooperation; the Defense Policy Group assists the JCC in formulating proposals for advancing and coordinating the implementation of common goals.⁶⁹

SEATO: The Failure of an Institution

SEATO is another example of an alliance influenced by NATO's experience, but it differed from ANZUS in four key respects. First, SEATO underwent greater institutionalization, but it never became a robust, or an effective, institution. Second, the SEATO allies were a very diverse group with no common heritage to serve as a potential foundation for constitutive norms. Rather, they adopted an anticommunist constitutive norm largely because the U.S. actively promoted it within the alliance. Third, because of this norm, the alliance did not dissolve quickly in spite of strong evidence that it would not perform satisfactorily. Instead, it gradually eroded as allies tried to improve its performance. Dissolution then began once the norm was displaced. Fourth, even SEATO's dissolution was a lengthy process because the U.S. maintained a stake

⁶⁹ Thakur, *In Defense of New Zealand*, 39.

in the alliance as a tool to contain Soviet influence. It used its power and influence to hold SEATO together.

The first section examines the normative and functional foundations of the alliance to demonstrate that the allies' conflicting security interests (1) impeded attempts by the U.S. to impose a constitutive norm directed against communism, and (2) prevented the alliance from ever performing effectively. It argues that a very loose and flexible arrangement was necessary to accommodate diverse interests, but such an arrangement was insufficient for achieving these interests. As the allies recognized this dilemma, they created a limited institutional structure. The second section evaluates the weaknesses of this institution and argues that processes that were intended to maximize voice and discourage exit actually undermined the performance of the alliance. It is followed by an analysis of SEATO's failure to perform in the first two serious crises to occur within the treaty area. This third section demonstrates how with each successive crisis, the organization further eroded as allies sought alternative means for managing their security. The final section considers how U.S. power—by imposing norms and linking the fate of other (bilateral) alliances to SEATO's persistence—kept the alliance operational for so long.

***Normative Underpinnings:
The Strategic Context and Competing Interests***

The Manila Pact was negotiated to counter threats in Southeast Asia arising from Communist expansion by means of military intervention or political

subversion. Just as in Europe, the withdrawal of occupying forces (in this case Japan) produced an economic and political power vacuum. However, in Southeast Asia, states were not rebuilding systems destroyed by war, but were designing entirely new political and economic institutions.⁷⁰ Young governments, often with very tenuous societal support, were particularly vulnerable to Communist infiltration. In states like Vietnam and Korea, for example, indigenous communist forces (receiving various degrees of external support) militarily challenged the postwar regimes. These fragile states did not have the resources to counter such threats unilaterally, as an adequate defense required a military strong enough to deter or defend against an outright invasion, and sufficient economic and political stability to appease impoverished and alienated domestic groups. Initial efforts to secure Southeast Asia focused on the latter problems. In 1950 members of the British Commonwealth met in Colombo (Ceylon, now Sri Lanka) to discuss the distribution of economic aid to the region. Over time, the plan was extended to Asian states not in the Commonwealth. Negotiations for a multilateral security arrangement were only precipitated by the Geneva Accords (1954) that, in dividing Vietnam at the 17th Parallel, granted

⁷⁰ Senator Michael Mansfield, in U.S. Congress, Senate, 84th Cong., 1st sess. *Congressional Record* 101, pt. 1, (February 1, 1955): 1055; Colin Mackerras, ed. "Security and Political Relations in Asia After World War II," chap. in *East and Southeast Asia: A Multidisciplinary Survey* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 549–551; Sir Percy Spencer, *Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan* (New York: New York University Press, 1969), 199.

communist forces a permanent and legitimate role in the region.⁷¹ Given this new state of affairs, the U.S. pushed to create a security arrangement that would legitimate its own engagement in Asia while signaling to the Chinese and the Soviets that “they had reached the end of the line insofar as cheap and easy aggression is concerned.”⁷²

Eight states finally became signatories to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, also known popularly as the Manila Pact: Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. In this first international treaty to contain a counter-subversion provision,⁷³ the parties agreed to “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist *armed attack* and to prevent and counter *subversive activities* directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability” (Article 2, emphasis added). However, from the very beginning this association had an extremely weak normative basis. Four factors in particular explain why. First, these states—drawn from Europe, Asia, the Pacific, and North America—shared

⁷¹ Although the U.S. refused to sign the accords, which would have obligated it to refrain from military intervention in the region, President Eisenhower did state that the U.S. “would not use force to disturb the settlement.” Paul E. Eckel, “SEATO: An Ailing Alliance,” *World Affairs* 134,2 (Fall 1971), 98. Note that there were calls for a U.S.-led regional association prior to 1954, but the United States was unwilling to become engaged until the “loss” in Geneva.

⁷² Senator Alexander Smith, in U.S. Congress, Senate, 84th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 101, pt. 1 (February 1, 1955): 1053.

⁷³ Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, *The SEATO Record, 1954–1977: A Survey of the Activities of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization* (Bangkok: SEATO, 1977), 6.

no common heritage. While a common heritage is not necessary for robust norms to develop, it can provide a stronger foundation—as in the case of NATO. Second, differences among allies were magnified by a growing nationalism in Asia. Hostility toward the imperialist powers precluded many countries, like India and Indonesia, from considering membership, and at various times it forced Asian allies to back off from total support of the alliance.⁷⁴ A third obstacle to constitutive norms was raised by ongoing conflicts within Asia that prevented several key non-communist states in the region from being invited out of fear that they were aggressive (Japan) or that their inclusion would provoke Chinese aggression (South Korea and Taiwan). Indeed, the Australian Foreign Minister R.G. Casey argued:

We do not want to see South Korea, Japan and Formosa in SEATO, because the addition of each of these countries would inevitably mean an extension of Australia's responsibilities and obligations, in that we might (under the terms of SEATO) be obliged to come to their defence, if they got into trouble.⁷⁵

Finally, there were gross differences among allies in terms of the nature and degree of threats they faced. Whereas Thailand was on the frontline of any potential conflict, the United States, Britain, France, and even Pakistan were not

⁷⁴ SEATO could have been a much more vibrant alliance if other Asian states had joined, but there was significant opposition to it. India refused to abandon its nonaligned stance (especially after Pakistan joined) and Indonesia argued SEATO would transfer Cold War alliance politics to Asia. It is even more significant that countries that were clearly allied with the West, like Malaya, refused to join.

⁷⁵ T.B. Miller, ed. *Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R.G. Casey, 1951–60* (London: Collins, 1972), 176.

directly threatened by Communist expansion. More often than not, the allies' own national security interests conflicted with stated alliance goals.

In its struggle to contain Communism, the U.S. attempted to impose on its allies a constitutive norm directed against communism. For most of the allies, however, this was not a *purely* constitutive norm. In some cases (namely, the U.S., Britain, Australia, and New Zealand) it was both constitutive and regulative (that is, a defining norm as well as a means to achieve other objectives). In the remainder of the cases, it was almost purely a regulative norm that could be abandoned as soon as circumstances reduced its value.

For the United States, the Manila Pact was a psychological instrument intended to contribute to the United States' *global* strategy of containment by advertising a U.S. military presence. First, the U.S. had no real strategic interests in Southeast Asia outside of containment. Second, it did not need a multilateral agreement to defend Southeast Asia against Communist expansion, because it already had a bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral relationship with each of the signatories, except Thailand. Thus, the goal in creating a multilateral pact was to enhance the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence strategy. The Manila Pact did not fundamentally transform the range or extent of the U.S. obligation in Southeast Asia, but it did provide a more visible demonstration of its *resolve* to halt the spread of Communism in all corners of the world.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ Tow, *Encountering the Dominant Player*, 283. The treaty provided secondary benefits to the U.S., as well, including strengthening the power and prestige of the U.S.

However, "opposed to the objective of maximum psychological effect was the necessity that the United States retain essential freedom of action, and avoid treaty commitments that were inconsistent with Constitutional requirements and therefore prejudicial to support for ratification of the Treaty by the Senate."⁷⁷ In order to ensure ratification, the U.S. could not agree to too binding of a commitment. Consequently, it limited its commitment to act in two key respects. First, it refused to negotiate a near-automatic commitment to intervene in case of a military or subversive threat (that is, the "NATO model"). Rather, as in the case of ANZUS, it would only assent to a treaty designed according to the "Monroe Doctrine formula," in which "an armed attack within the treaty area would be 'dangerous to our peace and safety.'"⁷⁸ In the event of an armed attack the pact pledges each party to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes" (Article 4, paragraph 1).⁷⁹ Under any other kind of

and all Free World countries; preserving the territorial and political integrity of the Free World countries against Communist expansion or subversion; reducing Chinese power and prestige; and disrupting the Sino-Soviet alliance. "U.S. Policy in the Far East," in U.S. Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense*, Book 10 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 1128.

⁷⁷ "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense," in U.S. Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, Book 10, 747.

⁷⁸ Senator George, U.S. Congress, Senate, 84th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 101, pt. 1 (February 1, 1955): 1051.

⁷⁹ A. C. Davis, "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense" 14 September 1954, in U.S. Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, Book 10, 747. It seems one reason the U.S. succeeded adopting the less binding formula was that it convinced its regional allies that the commitment in the NATO formula was in point of fact not significantly stronger than the commitment in the Monroe Doctrine formula.

attack (such as political subversion), the parties pledge to “consult immediately” on matters of common defense (emphasis added, Article 4, paragraph 2). Thus, the treaty does not actually commit the allies to the *collective* defense of the region. Rather, they “declare publicly... their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area.” They “coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security” (emphasis added).⁸⁰ By carefully wording the provisions of the treaty in this manner, the U.S. received the benefit of a visible, deterrent alliance system, but it ensured that it would not find itself entrapped in any of its allies’ conflicts. In the end, “SEATO seems to have been designed with a view only toward deterrence. Defense, especially with U.S. ground forces, was not seriously contemplated.”⁸¹

The second limitation arises from the separate understanding that U.S. appended to the treaty, restricting its treaty obligations to cases of *communist* aggression, as this was the only kind of threat that had a direct bearing on its

Even in Europe, the U.S. had been reluctant to agree to an automatic commitment to war. Article 11 of the NATO Pact effectively negates the “automatic” commitment in Article 5 in that the provisions shall be “carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.” See Appendix.

⁸⁰ The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, in Leszek Buszynski, *SEATO: The Failure of An Alliance Strategy* (Kent Ridge, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), 227–230. Compare the phrasing of this principle to the underlying principle of the Washington Treaty: “They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense...” (emphasis added).

⁸¹ “NATO and SEATO: A Comparison,” in U.S. Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967*, Book 4, 2.

interests. This understanding immediately weakened the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia and consequently the deterrent value of the alliance. In particular, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, negotiating for the U.S., threatened that the treaty would not be signed at all if others attempted to append a similar understanding.⁸² Other allies perceived that they were disproportionately burdened for having committed themselves to act in *all* cases of aggression. Casey reports the Pakistani position as: "In effect the American reservation binds us all, in that if and when an incident occurs, if the United States were to decide not to intervene, it would, in practice, be impossible to conceive that the other signatories (with very much lesser forces) should intervene."⁸³

Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan were the only Asian signatories to the treaty. Although all were formally committed to halting the spread of

⁸² A number of allies sought a similar limitation for themselves, but were dissuaded by the United States. Australian Foreign Minister R.G. Casey, for example, was severely criticized by his own Government for having signed the treaty without attaching a similar limitation. Alan Watt argues that this action was taken by accident and as a consequence of a poor telephone connection. Casey understood that although Canberra wanted a similar reservation, he did have authority to accept the treaty text as it stood if his insistence on a reservation would otherwise prevent the Treaty from being signed at all. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles confirmed that if Australia were to insist on such a limitation, the signing of the treaty might be indefinitely delayed. By the time Casey was informed of the correct instructions—to sign the treaty only after he had attached his own reservation—the treaty was signed, the conference closed, and the Americans on their way home. The Government agreed to present a bill to Parliament authorizing ratification, but with a preamble emphasizing Communist aggression. Australia thereby limited its commitment as well. Alan Watt, "Australian Attitudes Toward SEATO," *Southeast Asian Spectrum* 1,4 (July 1973), 12.

⁸³ Miller, *Australian Foreign Minister*, 183–184.

communism, their foremost objective was to safeguard their own national security, rather than to contribute to a global containment strategy. On the front line of the conflict with Vietnam and the only ally without a pre-existing U.S. security agreement, Thailand needed a firm and binding security guarantee for itself and its neighbors: Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.⁸⁴ SEATO granted it the security of a buffer against the Communist world. The Philippines, in contrast, was a group of islands and far better insulated from Communist threats. It hoped that the SEATO commitment would bolster its bilateral agreement with the U.S., the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, and make military cooperation more automatic by incorporating the NATO formula.⁸⁵

Pakistan was even further removed from the threat of Communist infiltration, and it did not perceive any direct threat from China, or the diffusion of Communism within Asia. In fact, Pakistan later indicated to China that it had *never* had the intention of becoming involved in a Sino-American dispute!

⁸⁴ Donald Nuechterlein makes the argument that this military consideration overrode anticipated economic and military aid in Thailand's decision to enter SEATO, for "no amount of American aid would have been a substitute for the presence of American military power in Southeast Asia to protect Thailand. *Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), 115.

⁸⁵ The fact that the Philippines did not require the Manila Treaty for its security guarantee is highlighted in the conditions they placed on their acceptance of it. First, the treaty was to recognize the right of Asian peoples to self-determination and to pledge that "united action" would respect the independence of the peoples of Indochina. Furthermore, in case of an attack the agreement was to guarantee U.S. assistance under the Mutual Defense Treaty. These conditions did not make it into the body of the treaty, but they were adopted in the Pacific Charter, appended to the Treaty on the same day that it was signed. Buszynski, *SEATO*, 31.

Pakistan's relationship with China, in fact, suggests that it never accepted the norm of anti-communism.⁸⁶ Rather, Pakistan turned to the Manila Pact as a means to gain American support in its conflict with India over the territory of Kashmir. Pakistan's membership was most problematic, because it was assured from the outset that the pact would be directed *only* against communist aggression. In particular, the U.S. refused to engage in a commitment that would drive India directly into the Soviet sphere of influence, and the Commonwealth countries refused to be placed in a position in which they might be drawn into a military dispute between two of their own members.⁸⁷ Years later, once he had become President, Mohammad Ayub Khan stated: "I do not quite know the reasons that prompted the Government of Pakistan to join this Organization... If anyone thought that membership of this Organization would in any way strengthen the position of the eastern part of Pakistan, then he was obviously overlooking the fact that the real danger to East Pakistan was from India which surrounded it on all sides."⁸⁸ By all accounts the decision was an "accidental" one, occurring at the last minute and out of fear that the U.S. would withhold

⁸⁶ Sangat Singh, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Appraisal* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1970), 105.

⁸⁷ Miller, *Australian Foreign Ministe*, 183; Buszynski, *SEATO*, 33.

⁸⁸ However, once Pakistan did join SEATO, it became a zealous member (at least in the early years). The relationship with the U.S. was very important to its overall foreign policy and Pakistan did want to contribute its share. Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 156; Buszynski, *SEATO*, 33; S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, 2^d ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 168.

military assistance to Pakistan if it did not join—evidence of the U.S. applying pressure in support of its anticommunist stance.⁸⁹

Australia and New Zealand, in contrast, were united behind the U.S.-backed norm opposed to communist expansion in any form. However, this was not their primary objective and it is unclear the extent to which it was ever an end in itself. The Southeast Asian treaty never *superceded* ANZUS for two reasons. First, the latter obligated the U.S. to act in cases of Japanese or Indonesian aggression (the greatest perceived threat to Australia and New Zealand in the early 1950s). Second, its institutional arrangements offered a far more “intimate forum” for consultation and considerably greater access to U.S. strategic planning.⁹⁰ Australia and New Zealand were most interested in the Manila Pact as a *supplement* to the ANZUS Pact. These countries considered themselves part of the West, and yet they were geographically isolated from it. Without a European connection, ANZUS could not prevent the ANZAC allies from being cut off from Europe in the event of a major regional (or worldwide) conflict. However, in protecting Southeast Asia, SEATO could protect their ties to Europe:

⁸⁹ Buzynski argues that Pakistan actually did receive some material benefit from membership in the Manila Pact. First, there was evidence of increased military and economic support from the U.S. Second, until the early 1960s there were instances in which Pakistan turned to SEATO Council meetings to air grievances with India. *SEATO*, 60–61, 106–119.

⁹⁰ Reese, *Australia, New Zealand, and the United States*, 181.

If the whole of Indo-China fell to the Communists, Thailand would be greatly exposed. If Thailand were to fall, the road would be open to Malaya and Singapore. From the Malay Peninsula, the Communists could dominate the northern approaches to Australia and even cut our lifelines with Europe.⁹¹

SEATO was also attractive because Australia and New Zealand had been seeking ways to compensate for Britain's exclusion from ANZUS in 1951.⁹²

Finally, Britain and France also joined SEATO more out of national interest, rather than a commitment to participate in collective defense against communist expansion in Asia. Neither power whole-heartedly accepted the domino theory, by which the fall of one state to Communism would precipitate the fall of the entire region. They were more inclined to allow some countries to fall so that a general stability might be achieved. Plus, both countries were ending their high-profile military presence in the region. For the French, the Geneva Accords had marked the end of their military presence, and they sought an opportunity in SEATO to maintain some other form of influence. After their loss at Dien Bien Phu, they were not committed to the military defense of their allies. Similarly, the British did not join SEATO so as to establish a significant military presence in Southeast Asia, but to demonstrate that they maintained a global presence even as the colonial empire was in decline. The alliance also was

⁹¹ Australian Foreign Minister R. G. Casey in Miller, *Australian Foreign Minister*, 196; SEATO, *The SEATO Record*, 8.

⁹² Trevor R. Reese, *Australia, New Zealand, and the United States*, 181–182. This objective competed with those of regional allies, as most Asian states wanted to reduce foreign influence in Southeast Asia.

a means to strengthen the special relationship with the U.S. and thereby exert some influence over its policy.⁹³ In fact, Britain's preference was to focus on relations with members of the Commonwealth, arguing in favor of an international division of Labour. For example, Australia and New Zealand might take on more responsibility for the conventional defense of Southeast Asia, while the U.S. and Britain would continue to provide the nuclear deterrent. With Britain's general level of power in decline, it would seek to defend the "Free World" by non-military means, exemplified by its efforts to serve as peacemaker in the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia.⁹⁴

Institutionalization of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty

SEATO has been described as "the misapplication of an alliance strategy."⁹⁵ However, it is difficult to identify the exact nature of this strategy because those allies that most feared entrapment (the U.S. and Britain) perceived the alliance as a very loose and flexible arrangement, while those states that most feared abandonment (Thailand and the Philippines) believed it was more binding. As Figure 11 indicates, the Manila Pact (quadrant 3) creates a traditional

⁹³ As in Europe, they sought a loose, flexible arrangement that could deal with defense planning and political subversion, but that would not entrap them in a conflict far from home.

⁹⁴ Buszynski, *SEATO*, 120–121.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, xi.

alliance system with few barriers to exit or entry. The commitment is unspecified and not automatic. The only obligation is to consult and to meet the common danger. Furthermore, there is no formal organization. The regional allies, perceiving a complex array of security problems, pushed for the creation of an institutional structure along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Ultimately the U.S. conceded to a limited institutional structure (SEATO, quadrant 1). In reality, however, neither a fluid alliance, nor a weak institution, was appropriate to counter the threats that existed.




Figure 11: SEATO's Institutional Development

Two other strategies would seem to have been more appropriate. The first (a.), is a strategy of robust institutionalization. This could be accomplished either by fully developing military, political, or economic integration within SEATO, or by limiting SEATO to military functions and integrating it with other regional systems, like Colombo. Such a concerted and comprehensive effort would have been the most effective means of strengthening domestic systems against

communist infiltration, although the binding commitment necessary to create such an institution (or system of institutions) was completely unacceptable to the allies. In the absence of a robust institution, a strategy of nonalignment (or dealignment—b.) became an attractive alternative by the 1970s, as alliance with the U.S. became a source of threat.

In contrast to the North Atlantic Treaty, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty does not create any significant organization. Article 9 of the former creates a council that “shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. ... [It] shall set up set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary...” The Council of the Manila Pact, however, does not have such authority. The U.S. emphasized that its very limited objective of deterring Communist aggression could be achieved by means of frequent consultation among military advisors, increasing the combat effectiveness of indigenous forces, and integrating them with neighboring forces.⁹⁶ It was unnecessary to create a permanent secretariat or to share strategic plans or the availability of forces.

Yet several regional allies, with a more complicated threat assessment in which military and non-military threats co-existed, continued to lobby for an institutional arrangement along the NATO model. Thailand, for example, argued:

⁹⁶ “NATO and SEATO: A Comparison,” in U.S. Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967*, Book 10, A-25.

The Government and the people of Thailand are anxious to have as strong a pact as possible. ...While, in the matter of wording, there is a variety of models to choose from, it is the substance that counts; and, from this point of view, [Thailand] would desire to see a commitment which, in substance, is as near as possible to that of NATO.⁹⁷

The regional allies perceived that a fully institutionalized alliance would bind the U.S. to the region and prevent abandonment in the case of a crisis. It would also grant junior allies the opportunity to exercise influence greater than their size and location would otherwise permit, making them nearly equal in their dealings with the great powers. Institutionalization would erect an obstacle to U.S. exit at the same time that it would grant voice to the junior partners.

Initially the U.S. was reluctant to institutionalize the alliance precisely because it wanted to maintain the exit option; it did not want to become entrapped in peripheral conflicts. When it finally yielded to pressures for a permanent organization, it was not seeking to increase the effectiveness of the pact or to deepen cooperation for its own sake (both considerations were significant in Europe). Instead, the rationale was to maximize the pact's psychological effect. First, the U.S. feared that its ongoing refusal to make its commitment more visible lent credence to charges that it was no more than a "paper tiger." Second, at a time when it believed that neutralism strengthened

⁹⁷ Nuechterlein, *Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia*, 115. Australia, in contrast, argued that it did not matter "whether the treaty read like NATO or ANZUS: what mattered was the purpose and attitude of mind of the signatories." Miller, *Australian Foreign Minister*, 180.

the Soviet position in the Cold War conflict, the U.S. needed to maintain its credibility among its allies and prevent them from abandoning the Western-oriented alliance. Finally, if the U.S. were to take the initiative, it would be in a far better position to influence the design of an organization that would probably emerge any way.⁹⁸

The first advisory bodies were created as a means to promote the political objectives of the allies—including to increase the voice of junior allies in alliance decisions and to emphasize that the alliance was a legitimate regional association, rather than a mere justification for a U.S. presence. Each allies' ambassador to Thailand was to meet monthly as the Council Representative and pass recommendations on to the SEATO Council.⁹⁹ A Military Advisory Group also was created to approve contingency military plans, although military staff consultations were attended by relatively low-ranking U.S. officers who had very

⁹⁸ "NATO and SEATO: A Comparison," in U.S. Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, 885–886, 1043. There is evidence that within certain decision circles in the U.S., it was agreed that a small, permanent secretariat would forestall calls for a standing group or a combined staff. U.S. Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, Book 4, p. A-25. In point of fact, the U.S. was very embittered by the conduct of the Manila Conference in 1954, in which it perceived that the Southeast Asian states were less interested in contributing to their own security than in receiving U.S. military and economic handouts. Thus, the region significantly declined in significance for the United States, although it still could not risk losing it to the Communists. George Modelski, "SEATO," in *Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World*, ed. Francis A. Beer (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 207.

⁹⁹ To minimize the comparisons to NATO, the U.S. government actually attempted to avoid use of the name SEATO from the outset. Dulles suggested that MANPAC (for Manila Pact) be used. "NATO and SEATO: A Comparison," in U.S. Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, A-14.

limited authority. In the following year, 1956, the allies established an international secretariat with a Secretary General, a Deputy Secretary-General, and numerous subsidiary offices. A Permanent Working Group was also created to oversee the day-to-day operations of the secretariat. To reinforce SEATO's regional orientation, all Secretary-Generals were Thai or Filipino and Asians filled other key offices. In 1957 the Military Planning Office was created to revise alliance military plans and advise member governments on more technical matters like standardization of equipment and training. However, the allies made no moves in the direction of a unified command or standing forces. The United States remained uncooperative in efforts to engage in military planning. Although some members did begin to designate national forces for SEATO purposes, an integrated command was to be established only in the event of war.¹⁰⁰

Ultimately, a number of these reforms, intended to strengthen the regional orientation and psychological impact of the alliance, impeded the growth of an efficient collective defense organization. For example, the process by which individuals were selected to serve in the international staff ensured that national interests would predominate to such a degree that an independent organization and staff would never develop. First, all applicants were to be nominated by

¹⁰⁰ For a good overview of SEATO's organizational structure, see Russell H. Fifiield, *Southeast Asia in United States Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1967), chapter 5.

member governments; individuals could not apply to the organization to fill positions (as they do in NATO). About two-thirds of the staff were recruits from national civil services, and were to return after a two-to-three year (generally non-renewable) posting with SEATO. Second, governments had the power to recall those individuals who were performing unsatisfactorily. Thus, although recruits were required to pledge to conduct themselves in the best interests of the organization, short postings and the possibility of recall prevented the organization from fully institutionalizing and developing independent alliance (or organizational) interests.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, the same procedures that met political requisites by granting greater voice to junior allies obstructed military and security cooperation. For instance, at the annual meeting of the SEATO Council all decisions had to meet with the unanimous approval of the allies (represented by their Foreign Ministers or their representatives). The vote of the smallest ally was equal to that of the largest. However, this procedure also ensured that in a crisis situation, when the interests of the partners would most likely collide, deadlock would occur.¹⁰² In the end, procedures that were designed to protect national interests impeded the development of the constitutive norms.

¹⁰¹ Modelski, "SEATO," 210–211, 217; SEATO, *The SEATO Record*, 25–26.

¹⁰² Of course, NATO also operates according to a unanimity rule, but as allies were more strongly united in their perception of a common threat during the Cold War, deadlock in a crisis was less of a threat. In the post Cold War era, the threat of deadlock has risen dramatically. See for example, Ivo Daalder, "NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force," *International Peacekeeping* 5,1–2 (January–April 1999): 28.

In the long run and without such a foundation, the alliance would have a difficult time surviving a crisis of performance.

Performance	Norms	
	Constitutive	Regulative
Effective:	Evolution 1954–1960	Persistence N/A
Ineffective:	Erosion 1960–1972	Dissolution 1973–1977

Figure 12: Phases of SEATO's Duration

Figure 12 illustrates the phases of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. The initial phase of institutionalization (1954–1960) can be characterized as evolution. Without a serious test, the alliance was perceived to perform its deterrent function effectively. Through this period, the U.S. championed anticommunist norms and the allies sought to expand their activities into economic and social spheres in order to complement SEATO's military and counter-insurgency functions. At least one participant perceived evidence by 1958 that "these eight SEATO countries were beginning to realize what it is really possible to achieve in SEATO."¹⁰³ However, in the following period (1960–1972) SEATO failed to live up to the expectations of its members. In the first test of its deterrent and defense functions, the alliance failed. The next section examines its

¹⁰³ Casey contrasted the 1958 SEATO Council Meeting to earlier meetings in which individual delegates had allowed diverse national interests to override alliance interests. Miller, *Australian Foreign Minister*, 294.

ineffective performance to uncover why SEATO began to erode (refer to Figure 12).

***The Laotian and Cambodian Crises:
A Disappointing Performance***

Crises in two protocol states in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated without a doubt that SEATO could not perform to the diverse expectations of its membership.¹⁰⁴ The first crisis to the treaty organization was really a series of crises that occurred in Laos, one of SEATO's protocol states. When Laos gained its independence in 1954, its government was "mildly pro-Western" and received large amounts of assistance from the United States to ensure it remained that way. In 1957 (communist) Pathet Lao forces took control of two eastern provinces. When Viet Minh forces entered Laos to assist the Pathet Lao in its insurgency, Laos turned to the UN for assistance and neighboring Thailand brought the matter to the SEATO Council. Between the actions of SEATO and the United Nations (UN) this crisis ended satisfactorily for both Thailand and Laos. On September 26, 1959 SEATO issued a warning: "In the event of its becoming necessary to defend the integrity of Laos against outside intervention, SEATO has made preparations so as to be able to act promptly within the framework of

¹⁰⁴ This section does not address the Vietnamese conflict in any depth. Although SEATO also failed to prevent the fall of South Vietnam, another Protocol State, the organization was more or less dead by the time the U.S. engagement reached its height. The impact of the American disengagement on SEATO is discussed in the next section.

the Manila Treaty.”¹⁰⁵ And in the UN, the Western allies pushed a resolution through the Security Council calling for a committee of inquiry to study the situation. Almost as soon as the committee arrived in Laos the fighting stopped. Thus, at least initially, Thailand was reassured that SEATO would honor its commitment to defend Laos from Communist subversion and thereby protect Thailand’s own sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹⁰⁶

More significantly, this crisis exposed a growing divergence between the regional interests of the U.S., the French, and the British. Their conflicting interests would be most visible when aggression was indirect (and therefore ambiguous) and they would contribute to deadlock on SEATO. Following the 1959 crisis, the U.S. substantially increased its military assistance to Laos (as it was authorized to do by the Geneva Accords) to protect it against a communist threat. However, the French believed that the Pathet Lao was a nationalist, rather than Communist, organization and that the Laotians had staged the crisis to obtain more aid from the U.S. The British took an intermediate position, arguing that the threat was a political one and would only become significant if the Chinese and Vietnamese were to perceive that Laos was too closely allied to the West.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Nuechterlein, *Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia*, 149.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 150.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 151–152.

Within the year, events confirmed British fears. In August 1960 SEATO's (and in particular Thailand's) interests were again threatened when a military coup deposed Laos' rightist government (headed by General Phoumi Nosavan) and replaced it with a coalition government committed to a neutral foreign policy (led by Prince Souvanna Phouma). General Phoumi marched on the capital, forcing Prince Souvanna to flee to Cambodia.¹⁰⁸ A Laotian civil war was imminent and Thailand, the U.S., and SEATO were likely to be drawn in.

The SEATO Council met in Bangkok to consider alternative courses of action. Thailand, of course, was most concerned with preventing Communists from gaining a foothold in Laos. It shared a long border with Laos, and regarded its neighbor as a buffer against Communist infiltration. A prominent Thai newspaper noted the significance of this buffer, not only to Thailand, but to all of Asia:

Laos is the weakest point in the line of defense of the Free World in this part of the world. If the Communists are able to penetrate it, they will be able to destroy peace in this region. Once the Communists have seized the whole of Laos, a dread fate will face Asia.¹⁰⁹

To prevent such an outcome, the Thais, backed by the Filipinos, pressed for the U.S. and SEATO to intervene to restore General Phoumi's government. The interests of the Western allies, however, were so deeply divided that SEATO

¹⁰⁸ George Donelson Moss, *Vietnam: An American Ordeal* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), 97–98.

¹⁰⁹ *Kiattisak*, September 17, 1960, quoted in *Ibid.*, 168.

stalled. The U.S. was ready to call on SEATO, but Britain and France were unwilling to draw themselves into a military conflict. Indeed, they did not even recognize the same governments in Laos: the British continued to recognize General Phoumi's government (as did the U.S.), but the French recognized the neutralist government (led by Prince Souvanna).¹¹⁰

SEATO's deadlock was disillusioning to the Asian allies. One of Thailand's most influential papers editorialized that:

If SEATO continues to remain inactive, the situation in Laos will become increasingly dangerous to Thailand. ...The proposal made to SEATO by the Thai government [to have SEATO mediate the political dispute in Laos] ought to make it realize that danger occurring in any country naturally causes grave concern and anxiety to neighboring countries.¹¹¹

Furthermore, for the first time, the Thais faced the reality that if even *one* ally declined to cooperate, the treaty became inoperative. The Thai Prime Minister expressed dissatisfaction with SEATO in the following way:

Since the outbreak of the incidents in Laos, ...nobody knows for certain what action SEATO will take should the Communists be able to seize and rule over the whole of Laos. This has made people who formerly felt full confidence in SEATO now feel anxiety because it does not seem to be showing concern over the situation in Laos, although it is clear that the Communists are intervening in that country in every possible way.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Brian Crozier, *Southeast Asia in Turmoil* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), 105–106.

¹¹¹ *Siam Rath*, September 23, 1960, quoted in Nuechterlein, *Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia*, 167.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 171.

As the situation deteriorated in Laos, the U.S. came around to Thailand's point of view, promising that its SEATO obligation was to the individual allies as well as to the collective. In the Rusk-Thanat Agreement, Secretary of State Dean Rusk assured Thailand that the U.S. obligation to the SEATO pact "does not depend upon the prior agreement of all other parties to the Treaty, since this Treaty obligation is individual as well as collective."¹¹³ Just two months later, when General Phoumi's forces were faced with defeat, the U.S. decided to intervene on its own. It did not take the matter to SEATO. Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines followed with token forces. When SEATO's military advisors met in Bangkok in November 1960, the Thai representative announced that if SEATO could not agree on a Laotian policy, Thailand wanted to amend the unanimity rule so those member states that wanted to take action in the name of SEATO would be free to do so. Before such an action could be taken, the rightist forces took control of Laos.¹¹⁴

The second crisis to call SEATO's performance into question occurred in Cambodia in 1970 as the U.S. was beginning to disengage from the region.¹¹⁵ The

¹¹³ *United States Department of State Bulletin* 46: 498–499.

¹¹⁴ Thailand again turned to SEATO when the Soviets began airlifting support to the Pathet Lao forces. Again SEATO did not act. The allies could not even agree to send an observer team. Nuechterlein, *Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia*, 194.

¹¹⁵ After Richard Nixon was elected President of the U.S. in 1968 he promised to end the American conflict in Vietnam. The three main points of the Nixon Doctrine were: 1) the U.S. would keep its commitments but reevaluate its troop contributions, 2)

pro-Western Cambodian Defense Minister and Army Commander, Lon Nol, overthrew Prince Sihanouk. Sihanouk had allowed Vietnamese Communists to establish sanctuaries in his country as part of his effort to protect Cambodia's neutralism by pitting the Communist and non-Communist powers against one another. The North Vietnamese then launched a campaign to overthrow the new Lon Nol government, in order to protect these sanctuaries. The U.S. and South Vietnam intervened. To Nixon, Cambodia marked a decisive moment in the Cold War and he was determined to use this opportunity to maintain U.S. credibility with its allies as well as its adversaries.¹¹⁶ By the time the U.S. pulled out of Cambodia on June 29, 1970 it had managed to capture or destroy large quantities of enemy ammunitions and weapons, as well as all enemy installations and basing facilities. However, the enemy's main units had avoided a head-on confrontation and had escaped into the interior of Cambodia where they could rebuild.¹¹⁷

This crisis is significant for the fact that the allies tried to ensure that it would be resolved *outside* of the SEATO framework. For the regional states in

it would provide a shield if a nation vital to U.S. security were threatened by a nuclear power, and 3) it would help meet other forms of aggression by military and economic assistance, but it would expect the threatened nation to "provide the manpower for its own defense." *United States Department of State Bulletin*, 66 (March 13, 1972): 356.

¹¹⁶ Moss, *Vietnam*, 318.

¹¹⁷ This civil war lasted five years. On April 1, 1975 Lon Nol was forced to surrender to the Khmer Rouge, a Maoist revolutionary movement trained and backed by the North Vietnamese.

particular, the crisis was a purely internal affair that did not fall within the commitments of the treaty, nor its protocol because Sihanouk had renounced Cambodia's protocol status unofficially in 1956 and officially in 1965. He was told that the protocol was not rescinded, but that SEATO could no longer assist Cambodia unless the government officially requested aid. When Lon Nol came to power in 1970, he sent a request "to all countries of all blocs" to send assistance.¹¹⁸ However, SEATO allies agreed that this was not a matter for SEATO involvement. In fact, France did not attend the SEATO Council Meeting (July 1970) at which the Cambodia question was addressed, and Pakistan refused to sign the final communiqué, which expressed no more than an "understanding" of Cambodia's appeal.¹¹⁹ Even the U.S., determined as it was not to allow another domino to fall, argued that "the SEATO Treaty has not application to the current situation in Cambodia."¹²⁰

Significantly, the allies' declarations that Cambodia had renounced its protocol status directly contradicted their interpretation of their treaty obligations during the Laotian crisis. At that time, they had argued that removal of protocol status could only be accomplished by the agreement of the allies, not the state under their protection. According to this initial interpretation of the treaty, the Cambodia's protocol status was never removed, and even if Sihanouk

¹¹⁸ Eckel, "SEATO: An Ailing Alliance," 103.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 104.

had renounced SEATO's protection, Lon Nol had the right to restore it. However, the allies did not allow him this option. It would seem that they deliberately "misrepresented the nature of the protocol status to ensure that the alliance would be insulated from the crisis."¹²¹ In other words, the allies were unwilling to put their treaty obligations to the test because they knew they would not pass, and such a visible failure would invite SEATO's dissolution and would pave the way for Communist incursions in Southeast Asia.

The Dissolution of SEATO

Despite declining performance as early as 1960, SEATO's erosion occurred very slowly, primarily because the U.S. kept the organization afloat through its efforts to impose anticommunist norms on its allies. However, as the Americans normalized relations with China, they ceased encouraging such norms and instead advocated greater cooperation among indigenous allies, as expressed in the Nixon Doctrine. The costs of exit declined for all of the allies, substitutes emerged to manage regional security, and SEATO entered its dissolution phase by 1973 (refer to Figure 12). Yet it was still five more years before the organization would be disbanded because it continued to play a significant role in the U.S. global Cold War strategy by deterring Soviet and Chinese expansion

¹²⁰ U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record* Vol. 119 Part 8 p. 1421.

¹²¹ Buszynski, *SEATO*, 165.

in Southeast Asia. For several years, the U.S. continued to exert pressure to keep the organization intact for this express purpose. However, the parties could not long maintain an alliance system that was so closely associated with anti-Chinese sentiment.

In the absence of norms, a compilation of factors reduced the perceived costs of exit and thereby contributed to the decision to dissolve SEATO in 1975. First, the benefits of membership were becoming too costly for all states concerned. For example, Thailand found that with the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam it was particularly dangerous to be affiliated with such a traditionally anticommunist organization. In the U.S., there was significant domestic opposition to remaining military commitments in Southeast Asia.¹²² Second, alternative organizations, like ASEAN, provided viable substitutes for securing Southeast Asian states. Albeit not a traditional security pact, ASEAN encouraged economic cooperation among a wider array of Southeast Asian states,¹²³ and thereby countered a range of non-traditional threats that SEATO had been

¹²² For instance, the U.S. Senate passed the Cooper-Church Amendment stipulating that funding for all U.S. operations in Cambodia would end on June 30, 1970. (The House of Representatives did not pass the bill, so it did not become law.) It was reported in the *Bangkok Post* at the time that Thailand had begun to consider an alternate, regional alliance with South Vietnam and Cambodia to protect itself in the event the U.S. did abandon its allies. Buszynski, *SEATO*, 168.

¹²³ Indeed, the "promise of economic gains has also helped to contain political-military tensions among the participants in ASEAN." Edward D. Mansfield, Jon C. Pevehouse, and David H. Bearce, "Preferential Trading Arrangements and Military Disputes," in *Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security*, ed. Jean-Marc Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield, and Norrin M. Ripsman (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 100.

entirely unequipped to manage. Finally, the commitments expressed in the Manila Treaty (and in the network of separate bilateral agreements) were deemed sufficient to manage traditional threats of military invasion and to maintain the regional balance of power. In the end, SEATO was superfluous.

Declining costs of exit

As the constitutive norms within SEATO abated and alternative means of cooperation arose, the costs of exiting the organization declined dramatically. The transformation in norms and the emergence of regional associations were a product of several changes in the strategic context. The first such change involved great power relations. In 1971 the Nixon administration became receptive to the idea of normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China. Initial contacts were conducted in secrecy, but by February of 1972 President Nixon made the first official visit to China, thereby legitimizing China's role on the world stage. This visit was followed by a summit meeting in Moscow (May 1972) at which the two superpowers agreed that the conflict in Vietnam should not be allowed to threaten détente. While the U.S. remained concerned about the spread of Soviet and Chinese influence, it refrained from so visibly imposing anticommunist norms.

Second, the U.S. was attempting to disengage from the conflict in Vietnam without losing prestige. By the time the Paris Accords were negotiated in 1972–1973, the primary goal was no longer to defeat a Communist insurgency or

contain an expansionist China. Rather, above all else the U.S. sought to maintain its credibility and resolve. That is, it was amenable to almost any resolution that would not weaken its global standing, even if it came at the expense of the noncommunist regimes in Thailand or the Philippines. The U.S. was ready to disengage from whole of Southeast Asia and turn its attention to other regions (like the Middle East) and other issues (like arms control and disarmament).¹²⁴ The time had come to extricate itself completely from a conflict that was tarnishing its international prestige—and to do so before these other interests would be irreparably affected.¹²⁵

Third, beginning in the late 1960s, and continuing into the 1970s, the Thai-American relationship experienced a dramatic cooling as the cost of alliance rose for both parties. Debates were raging in the U.S. regarding disengagement from Southeast Asia. Neither Congress nor society wanted to extend any meaningful commitment to regional actors. Indeed, between 1968 and 1973, the number of U.S. personnel stationed in Southeast Asia declined from a maximum of 543,000

¹²⁴ Arnold Isaacs, "The Limits of Credibility," in *Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War*, ed. Robert J. McMahon (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 470–472. Isaacs argues, "Vietnam was part of a strategy in which everything was linked to the Soviet-American nuclear confrontation, and thus everything was also linked to everything else. The war there was limited, but to the extent that it was fought for the purpose of nuclear credibility, the stakes were unlimited." *Ibid.*, 472. Of course, there was also significant domestic opposition to the war effort. It was clear by 1972 that Congress would not approve of any effort that would enlarge the conflict. Plus, the U.S. public was weary of a war that has already cost over 45,000 lives. Moss, *Vietnam*, 378.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 256. And in fact, the U.S. objectives in Paris were extremely limited. In particular, it sought the return of all of its prisoners of war in return for a cease-fire and the total withdrawal of its forces and the removal of its bases. *Ibid.*, 343.

to a minimum of 240.¹²⁶ The American pullout left Thailand in a dilemma. It remained exposed to a Vietnamese threat, which was all the greater without such a strong U.S. presence, and it had to readjust to the new role for China. The best means of defense remained a security commitment from the U.S., and indeed, the Thais hoped that if Thailand were to be attacked the U.S. would come to the rescue. However, given the domestic climate in both the United States and Thailand, it could not appear to be too dependent upon its ally for assistance. In the U.S., Congress was unwilling to place itself in yet another Vietnam, and in Thailand, (especially after the democratic coup in 1973) the public was venting long-repressed frustration with the U.S. for having backed non-democratic regimes.¹²⁷

Finally, in 1972 newly elected Labour governments in Australia and New Zealand opposed maintaining the alliance because it did not contribute to their defense and it prevented them from achieving a greater regional military and diplomatic presence. With SEATO moribund and the British having effectively

¹²⁶ Ibid., 377.

¹²⁷ The short-term solution was to withdraw American troops from Thailand. Although Thailand demanded the withdrawals, the move satisfied both domestic audiences by making Thailand appear more self-reliant. Furthermore, in principle the withdrawal of troops did not significantly jeopardize Thailand's security as the U.S. continued to maintain military bases on Thai soil. In reality, though, the U.S. was unwilling to commit to the defense of Thailand. Until 1975, it valued its last remaining base as a key resource to be employed against Hanoi if it did not abide by the Paris Accords. W. Scott Thompson, *Unequal Partners* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1975), chapter 8. It quickly became apparent that the U.S. would not employ its base in this conflict, indicating a loss of resolve.

disengaged from the region as of 1967, both countries perceived a serious gap in defenses. ANZUS continued to provide U.S. protection to the territories of Australia and New Zealand, but it did not cover any neighboring areas. Their Five Power agreement with Britain, Malaysia, and Singapore provided some protection on paper, but it was more or less worthless without a British military presence. The only alternative was to establish stronger ties with aligned and non-aligned indigenous states, but ongoing membership in SEATO (even if it was defunct) precluded such ties because it was a high-visibility, U.S.-backed organization regarded as staunchly anti-Chinese in its orientation. The neutral and communist governments in Southeast Asia were hesitant to warm up to Australia or New Zealand so long as they remained in SEATO. All else being equal, these states preferred to create a new regional organization encompassing Thailand, Pakistan, China, and Indonesia, because such an organization would provide regional stability and make the Manila Treaty unnecessary.

Availability of Close Substitutes

At the same time as the normative and material costs of exit were in decline, regional efforts to engage in cooperation were becoming more successful and more credible. SEATO had failed on the fact that it was not a regional organization and it had relied primarily upon military means to bring political stability to Southeast Asia. Truly regional associations emerged to tackle the threat of communist infiltration and expansion from another angle: that of

economic cooperation and development. The earliest efforts did not meet with success. In 1959 Malaya proposed a Southeast Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty with the Philippines and Thailand to encourage regional political and economic stability. These same three states then created the Association of Southeast Asia ([ASA] 1961–1963 and revived briefly in 1966). In 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) superseded and enlarged the ASA by including Indonesia and Singapore. The goal of this organization was to reduce tensions between members (all non-communist Southeast Asian states) so that they could focus on internal challenges and development. In its first decade, ASEAN played a confidence-building role in relations among its members, but it did not provide a forum for formally resolving disputes among them. ASEAN was so successful because it approached security from a perspective opposite that of SEATO. It rejected military means to resolving Southeast Asia's problems and further recognized that any attempt to overlook or diminish the diversity of its members would undermine attempts to cooperate in non-military spheres. Because many of their differences were perceived to be irreconcilable, the members adopted a noninterference principle by which they excluded all internal affairs matters from ASEAN discussions.¹²⁸

¹²⁸ Jeannie Henderson, *Reassessing ASEAN*. Adelphi Paper 328 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999), 15–17. To the extent that military cooperation did occur, for example, it was restricted to bilateral border control

Dissolving SEATO

France and Pakistan were the first states to leave SEATO because they received few material benefits, they were the least committed to the anticommunist norm, and they were least susceptible to U.S. pressures to stay. The remaining allies (excluding the U.S.) attempted to reduce the military side of the organization and to emphasize its economic and diplomatic activities. The United States ultimately conceded to their demands in order to safeguard the underlying military pact, but in making this concession it acknowledged that as a military organization SEATO was no longer operational. This section argues that states that do not accept norms will rely on cost-benefit calculations to determine when it is time to quit an alliance relationship. States that have accepted the norm will rely most heavily on cost-benefit calculations only after the norm has eroded. However, a hegemon with a continuing stake in the alliance system can forestall exit, especially when the junior allies depend upon its support in linked issues.

France's interest in the treaty organization was, from the start, limited to maintaining prestige in the region. It had never been committed to the containment of communism or the security of Thailand, the Philippines, or any of the protocol states. Indeed, during the Laotian crises in 1959–1961 it could not even agree with its allies on what constituted a "friendly" regime. Thus, there

operations. Michael Liefer, *ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia* (London: Routledge, 1989), 3, 29–30, 69.

were no significant barriers to exit once France perceived the costs of membership to outweigh benefits, as it did in 1965. To express its dissatisfaction with the U.S. policy in Indochina and to implement its own strategy for détente, France withdrew from the military organization and announced it would send only an observer to the upcoming London Council meeting. From that point forward, it maintained only enough links to ensure that it would be kept informed of SEATO's activities.¹²⁹ In 1973 it stopped paying dues—withdrawing in principle, if not in fact.¹³⁰

Pakistan's membership underwent a number of strains through the 1960s, although it did not announce its intention to withdraw from the pact until 1972. Serious strains first appeared during the Sino-Indian War (1962) when Pakistan felt betrayed by the U.S. airlift of military equipment to India. These strains intensified under the Johnson Administration when the President made economic aid conditional on Pakistan curtailing its ties with China.¹³¹ From the mid-1960s onward, Pakistan's participation in SEATO declined. It continued to be represented in Council meetings, but its delegate participated as an observer. By 1967 it discontinued sending even an observer to Military Advisors' Conferences. Although bilateral relations did improve under the Nixon

¹²⁹ Busynski, *SEATO*, 104.

¹³⁰ *The New York Times* 29 May 1965; 10 June 1973.

¹³¹ Rafi Raza, *Pakistan in Perspective, 1945–1997* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 83–84, 98.

Administration (Pakistan served as an intermediary between Washington and Beijing) it abrogated its treaty obligations after the Indo-Pakistani War of November-December 1971. Withdrawal was possible because "the alliance was unnecessary for the purposes of obligating the United States to defend Pakistan against [Soviet-backed] India."¹³²

The remaining allies took the opportunity at the London (1971) and Canberra (1972) Council Meetings to push for downgrading the military side of the alliance. The Asian allies were caught in a dilemma of maintaining U.S. assurances of security without appearing to be making a claim on American resources. The fundamental difference in their strategies was a consequence of the fact that the Philippines had a pre-existing bilateral relationship with the U.S., whereas Thailand did not. The Philippines had always been very vocal about the weakness of the military side of the organization. But out of fear of its bilateral relationship, it hesitated to endorse the dissolution of SEATO and refused to support the abrogation of the underlying Manila Treaty. Instead, Philippine leaders made statements to the effect that the "collective security formula may not work so well in détente" and perhaps SEATO should concentrate on its civil functions, including economic cooperation. At the 1972 Council meeting, Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo argued for reconsidering

¹³² In its official statement, though, Pakistani officials did not provide a reason for their decision to leave the alliance. Ibid., 99; *The New York Times* 9 November 1972; Buszynski, *SEATO*, 114, 119.

SEATO's mission "in the light of the rapidly evolving times."¹³³ The Thais, not having a bilateral security relationship, were even more supportive of preserving SEATO. Yet they were in the unfortunate position of having to demonstrate that they did not, in fact, require it. Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman suggested reorienting the organization in the direction of a regional diplomatic arrangement so that the underlying treaty would not become subject to criticism in the U.S. Congress.¹³⁴

In contrast, the two remaining allies in the region, Australia and New Zealand, placed no real value in SEATO's guarantees. By 1969, both realized that SEATO was a dead letter and they began to pursue other means of increasing their regional presence. However, initial indications that they were reconsidering their SEATO commitments brought warnings from the U.S. that the ANZUS relationship would be negatively affected. In response to these threats, both governments promised that they would not actually exit the treaty or the organization. Yet they did not commit to maintaining SEATO, either. Instead they continued to press for the creation of a regional association of communist, non-communist, and non-aligned states that would supersede SEATO and allow it to be dissolved by the agreement of all parties.

¹³³ Buszynski, *SEATO*, 179.

¹³⁴ However, the Thais would not suggest reorienting the organization in the direction of more economic or counter insurgency work, as the Philippines had, for fear that U.S. critics would interpret the reorientation as another claim on their resources. *Ibid.*, 143–148.

The U.S. was the sole ally to remain completely in support of SEATO (at least publicly), arguing that "It makes no sense at all when it appears that the conditions in the world are improving... to cast aside the very alliances which have brought this about."¹³⁵ The only significant factor preventing the dissolution of the organization in 1973 was the value that the United States placed on it as an expression of its credibility in the Cold War conflict and in deterring Soviet expansion following American disengagement. The U.S. did not want to allow any military reversals to occur in the region, nor did it want to be the superpower willing to abandon those allies who most needed its support. However, the U.S. was also in a dilemma, as it could not afford to remain so closely associated to a high-profile organization designed to contain China. In fact, to further reduce its association with its past anti-Chinese policies, the U.S. did not send its Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, to the 18th (and last formal) Council Meeting in 1973. Instead it was represented by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush. Furthermore, at this meeting it agreed to reduce the visibility of the organization. For example, all future meetings would be held in New York, in conjunction with the opening of the UN session, and the military structure would be abolished. (The Military Planning Office was slated to be closed by February 1, 1974.) The entirety of the organization was reduced from eight to four offices, and the total SEATO staff was reduced from 254 to 177. The

¹³⁵ Secretary of State William Rogers in *The New York Times*, 28 June 1972.

international staff was reduced from 38 to 23, and the military staff from 36 to 11.¹³⁶

The United States finally gave in to demands to eliminate the military structure in order to preserve the Manila Pact and to maintain a degree of credibility. On the one hand, it hoped that these concessions would satisfy the allies and preserve the alliance, which represented the American commitment to the region. The pact had a residual role to play in preserving equilibrium in Southeast Asia by restraining the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the region and providing international support for Thailand.¹³⁷ On the other hand, because its allies were demanding the end of the organization, the Americans could effectively disengage from SEATO without appearing to be the immediate sponsors.¹³⁸ That is, they could disengage without losing credibility.

In July 1975, the allies finally agreed to dissolve SEATO, but not the underlying Manila Pact. The decision was formalized in September, and the Secretary General was instructed to prepare a detailed plan for phasing out the organization.¹³⁹ The last Council meeting was held in June 1977 and the organization was officially disbanded, with no fanfare, on June 30.

¹³⁶ Buszynski, *SEATO*, 198n.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 201.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 200.

¹³⁹ *The New York Times* 25 September, 1975.

Conclusion

This analysis of ANZUS and SEATO not only illustrates the process of alliance institutionalization, but also its findings further clarify the relationship between institutionalization, performance, and norm formation and the effect of these variables on the decision to exit a military alliance. First, even more so than the Warsaw Pact, these cases emphasize the significance of the institutional context in which an alliance system is designed. Both ANZUS and SEATO formed during NATO's initial stages of institutionalization, and the regional participants observed that this process provided numerous benefits to the NATO allies, including an uncommon degree of access to officials in the State and Defense Departments and a high level of economic and military assistance. Members of ANZUS and SEATO anticipated that by institutionalizing their alliance, they would also receive such benefits. However, the United States did not perceive the same combination of military and political threats in Asia and the Pacific as in Europe. Because it entered these alliances with much narrower objectives, it was unwilling to engage in too binding a commitment and only relented to limited institutionalization in order to ensure that it could shape the process. Thus, the cases underscore not only the significance of the institutional context, but also the need for the allies to have a common perception regarding the severity of military and non-military threats.

Second, both cases illustrate the complex relationship between institutionalization and performance. Allies generally initiate institutionalization

to improve the performance of their pact; that is, to increase the range and efficiency of cooperation. However, these two cases demonstrate that institutionalization is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for effective performance. In ANZUS, for example, institutionalization was not necessary for the alliance to produce very high net benefits, and indeed limited institutionalization facilitated performance. That is, in highly institutionalized alliances with military and political objectives—like NATO—military decisions often reflected political needs more so than military needs because political unity needed to be preserved at almost any cost. This is not problematic when the allies agree on the common threat and the need to present a united front to combat it. However, when such a unity of purpose is absent, as in ANZUS, institutionalization forces allies to confront their conflicting objectives. Rather, ad hoc bilateral arrangements allow allies to cooperate on narrow, common objectives without having to deal with the potential incompatibility of their broader interests.

SEATO, in contrast, demonstrates institutionalization is not necessarily sufficient for ensuring acceptable levels of performance. Its institutionalization was more robust than that in ANZUS, but it was nonetheless half-hearted. While the allies sought the military and political benefits of institutionalization, none were willing to limit their foreign policy autonomy. This was particularly true of the Western powers because they feared that if they were to become entrapped in conflicts in Asia, they would be unable to defend their own territories if the

need were to arise. Thus, although the allies had created mechanisms to collectively defend one another (and protocol states) from Communist expansion by military incursion or political subversion, they did not have the will to employ them, particularly in times of crisis, like Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Both cases have implications for the models of alliance institutionalization and behavior. They support the argument that institutionalization will not be robust unless all allies agree upon the existence of severe military and non-military threats to their security, and they emphasize that institutionalization involves more than creating organizations with formal procedures. Successful institutionalization requires the will to adhere to patterned practices and expectations, even when to do so may contradict one's immediate self-interest.

Third, these cases lend insight into the relationship between constitutive norms and decisions to exit a military alliance. Both alliances are characterized by the absence of strong constitutive norms. The only real basis for such norms in ANZUS was the allies' common heritage in Western civilization, but there was nothing to define these three states as a distinct community. This shared heritage was insufficient to erect an additional barrier to exit when estimations of material benefits altered such that allies perceived that the operation of the alliance threatened their national interests. These interests took clear precedence over any normative commitment to the alliance as New Zealand redefined its contribution

to ANZUS and the U.S. threatened to withdraw its commitment. Neither state was willing to compromise national interests to preserve the alliance.

SEATO illustrates a still different relationship between norms and exit. In this case, there was no common heritage to unite the allies. Rather, the United States actively promoted a norm directed against communist influence. The gradual failure of this norm demonstrates the fragility of such norms in comparison to those that gradually evolve among a group of states (as among the NATO allies or among the states of Southeast Asia). In particular, the U.S.-backed norm that was intended to unite the allies was subject to violation whenever national interests were threatened. That is, the allies defined themselves as members of the non-communist world, and the regional allies in particular wanted protection in the event of communist subversion, but otherwise they had very diverse interests. It was unlikely that such a norm would take root in this context. Instead, so long as the U.S. actively promoted this norm to willing allies, efforts were made to preserve the alliance through erosion. However, a norm that defined the community by what it was not and that required U.S. backing to grow, was not strong enough to withstand transformations in the regional strategic context. As the U.S. normalized relations with China and as Asian nationalism grew, a new norm emphasizing Asian cooperation evolved and displaced the norm underlying SEATO. Once SEATO lacked a robust constitutive norm, allies began to seek dissolution.

In conclusion, this analysis stresses the argument that the institutional model of alliance behavior cannot replace traditional alliance theory, but must be employed in conjunction with it to explain the broadest possible range of behavior. In particular, a common threat must underlie any robust alliance. Although a preexisting institutional environment does influence alliance formation and design, a hegemonic power still can limit or shape institutionalization as well as persistence and dissolution. In particular, SEATO provides evidence that such an asymmetric alliance can survive in a transformed environment for a brief time even without satisfactory performance or strong norms—so long as the hegemon is able and willing to maintain it. However, SEATO also illustrates the limits of the hegemon's ability. It cannot make its allies be enthusiastic partners and, as one of several allies (particularly in a democratically managed alliance), it cannot ensure the alliance will perform to its satisfaction. Thus, a hegemon can prevent a quick dissolution as the strategic environment changes, but it cannot ensure real persistence or evolution. These processes require institutionalization, satisfactory performance, and robust constitutive norms.

Chapter 6

NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Explaining Persistence

Thus far, all of the alliances examined have formed and operated in the context of bipolarity and superpower conflict. Moreover, each of the analyses has lent support to the models of alliance institutionalization and alliance behavior. However, by the 1990s NATO was the only one of these alliances to still be operational and thus was the only one to face the challenge of adapting to an entirely new strategic context. NATO faced a unique challenge: how to survive in the absence of the Cold War that had fueled its existence for over forty years. Beginning in 1990, the lines dividing Europe began to erode. East and West Germany reunited as a member of NATO, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and the Soviet Union collapsed. In the decade to follow, these systemic transformations have raised a number of serious questions for alliance theory and for the future of NATO in particular. First, why did NATO, in contradiction to realist alliance theory, persist so long beyond the end of the Cold War? Second, what factors account for the scope and direction of NATO's evolution and will these reforms allow it to persist indefinitely? Third, what prompted NATO to enlarge eastward, and will the accession of new allies reinforce or undermine the alliance? These questions have significant implications for alliance theory. In particular, *what conditions* are most conducive to

alliance persistence and evolution and *for how long* can persistence and evolution succeed? Finally, is *NATO unique*, or can its experience lend insight into the operation of other military alliances?

The chapter begins with an analysis of why NATO survived the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War. It then engages in an evaluation of how allies' calculations of performance interacted with their constitutive norms to facilitate NATO's evolution into a military-security institution that emphasizes crisis management *as well as* (or some would argue *over*) collective defense. The chapter argues that the model of alliance behavior provides an explanation for NATO's initial persistence and its later process of evolution. First, its initial persistence can be attributed to (1) its perceived effective performance throughout the Cold War, but especially its contribution to the resolution of that conflict, and (2) the allies' belief in its capacity to adapt to new circumstances. Yet, NATO did not merely persist. Indeed, as the Cold War ended, the allies began to broaden the scope of NATO's activities and to create mechanisms for cooperation with former adversaries.

The second section argues that evolution occurred because shared constitutive norms imparted the alliance with a meaning greater than the military security it could provide. The allies could employ the alliance to reinforce these norms, strengthen their community, and extend the community to include new members. NATO has engaged in two phases of

evolution. In the first phase, allies sought to increase political cooperation with former adversaries and other non-allies in order to erase the artificial divisions that had emerged in Europe in the postwar period. In the second phase, the allies emphasized new forms of military cooperation so they would be able to respond to a wide range of security contingencies without testing the unity of the alliance.

Third, NATO has also undergone a process of enlargement in the late 1990s that cannot be confused with evolution. Instead, it is the simple extension of a security commitment to new actors. Nonetheless, this process is significant for two reasons: (1) the enlargement process frequently violated one of NATO's most fundamental norms—consultation—and (2) the addition of new allies may make it more difficult to reach a consensus on core alliance objectives and policy. However, as the conclusion indicates, there is no guarantee that NATO will continue to evolve or that the reforms that have occurred to date will ensure its persistence into the twenty-first century. NATO's future depends upon (1) its capacity to provide cost-efficient security to its members and (2) the strength and substance of allies' shared constitutive norms.

Performance and NATO's Initial Persistence (1989–1991)

NATO persisted first and foremost because the allies believed it performed satisfactorily throughout the Cold War and, based on this history of strong performance, they expected that it had the flexibility to continue to preserve the allies' security in the new world order. "NATO is still in business today because its member states... wish it to be so" and, in fact, there is no evidence that any state has seriously entertained dissolution since the end of the Cold War.¹ But why did they wish it so when there was no longer a common military threat to unite the allies? Indeed, it has been argued that beyond the Cold War NATO's traditional purpose of collective defense "is now difficult to defend."² In sum, the alliance continued to provide substantial net benefits in addition to its long-established task of deterring and defending against Soviet attack. These benefits can be broken down into six categories: 1) military performance; 2) political performance; 3) the U.S. presence in Europe; 4) the emergence of new threats requiring a coordinated response; 5) the costs of renationalizing defense efforts; and 6) a lack of satisfactory alternatives.

¹ Martin A. Smith and Graham Timmins, *Building a Bigger Europe: EU and NATO Enlargement in Comparative Perspective* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 86.

² David S. Haglund, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Joel J. Sokolsky, "NATO and the Quest for Ongoing Viability," in *NATO's Eastern Dilemmas*, ed. Haglund, MacFarlane, and Sokolsky, 21.

First, the alliance is recognized, largely because of its institutionalization, as having satisfied the allies' military objectives at an acceptable cost. Its performance in three areas stands out. It is credited foremost with having deterred the Soviet bloc from attacking Western Europe. Although it is difficult to prove the degree to which deterrence was operating, it is significant that the NATO allies considered it to have been a successful strategy. In particular, they believed that the American nuclear guarantee and forward force protection were the reason the U.S. did not have to "come to Europe's rescue" as it had during the First and Second World Wars. The allies also acknowledged that NATO achieved a "rare harmonization of procedures, language, equipment and tactics" that reduced national defense burdens and created unprecedented levels of transparency and trust.³ Finally, NATO played a significant role in the negotiation and implementation of arms control agreements through the 1970s and 1980s by providing a forum in which a common Western position could be established. It also granted many Western European powers more influence in the outcomes of these negotiations than their size and stature would otherwise permit.⁴ NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept

³ Frederick Bonnart, "Either Get Back to Alliance Basics or NATO Is in Big Trouble," *International Herald Tribune* 24 July 1998: 8; Alfred Cahen, "Answers to Some Common Questions on NATO Expansion," *International Herald Tribune* 2 July 1998: 8.

⁴ For the Europeans in particular, the process of arms negotiation was crucial—for its own sake, as well as perpetuating the détente of the 1970s. Josef

emphasized the enduring value of NATO's traditional military functions in the following manner:

The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance...ensures that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to enhance their ability to realise their essential national security objectives.⁵

The allies agreed that NATO would remain a valuable tool for managing and reducing uncertainty in a new strategic environment. First, NATO was "To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including, possible developments posing risks for

Joffe, *The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States and the Burdens of Alliance* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), 10. Although NATO was not involved directly in the bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations, U.S. and its NATO allies consulted continuously throughout the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and II), and the talks preceding the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). NATO had a far more visible role in the multilateral negotiation progress. The North Atlantic Council served as the arena in which a common Western position was established prior to and during the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR), and the Committee and Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now the OSCE).

⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 7-8 November 1991, para. 18. (Hereafter, "Strategic Concept" [1991]). This document also reiterates the principles of the institution in paragraphs 36 and 37.

members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern."⁶ Second, the Article 5 commitment "that an armed attack against one or more of [the allies] shall be considered an attack against them all" remained the core of the NATO commitment and would be activated if Russia were to become resurgent or another threatening power were to emerge.

Question: Some people say that NATO is still essential to (your country's) security. Others say NATO is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?

	Percentage Indicating Essential			
	1980	1988	1989	1991
France	56.02	72.27	59.62	72.03
Belgium	74.07	74.80	64.44	73.83
Netherlands	70.93	70.90	65.65	78.63
Germany	92.04	84.55	70.62	75.95
Italy	68.31	63.80	61.89	69.39
Denmark	30.25	75.35	74.10	78.64
Ireland	**	68.56	69.89	67.23
Britain	85.65	81.35	80.09	82.79
Greece	**	50.85	52.13	62.44
Spain	**	26.66	34.41	50.86
Portugal	**	67.85	68.70	82.79
East Germany	**	**	**	44.67
Europe	77.25	70.63	64.57	70.92

Source: Eurobarometer data available from
<http://www.nsd.uib.no/english>; Internet; accessed
November 15, 1999

Table 4: Eurobarometer Polls on NATO's Value

⁶ NATO, "Strategic Concept," (1991) para. 21.II. For a restatement of these principles and tasks see North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington D.C., 23-24 April 1999

The Persian Gulf War experience reinforced the value of military cooperation. Even though this was not a NATO conflict, it nonetheless provided a good test of the allies' ability to respond collectively to a military challenge and, equally importantly, it demonstrated that military challenges would still exist.⁷ It also seems to have instilled NATO with a renewed value in the eyes of its domestic audiences. Table 4 indicates that in those countries that relied upon NATO to preserve European security, citizens had begun to believe that the alliance's relevance to their own national security was diminishing as the Cold War ended. For example, in 1989, with the first signs that this transformation was underway, the belief that NATO was essential for national security dipped by more than six percent across Europe.⁸ By 1991, support for NATO had returned to 1988 levels. It is plausible—and even probable—that the coalition's performance during the Persian Gulf War accounts for this renewed support for NATO.⁹

(Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1999). (Hereafter "Strategic Concept" [1999]).

⁷ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), 61–62.

⁸ This trend is not evident in countries that valued NATO for its role in managing non-Cold War conflicts, such as Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Portugal. Chapter three elaborates on this issue.

⁹ Data on this question were not available for 1990. Similar polls in the United States did not produce quite such high results, most likely because the

The second reason NATO persisted beyond the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War is that the allies believed it was a great success in the political/ideological realm. Performance here can be evaluated according to three goals: (1) bolstering political and economic institutions to strengthen the deterrence and defense capabilities of the allies and instill stability in Western Europe, (2) achieving victory over Communism both within and outside of NATO's area, and (3) mediating intra-alliance conflicts. Regarding the first goal, NATO is credited with having forged a free and democratic Europe in which security is based not only upon "realism" but also "law" (of course, it did so in combination with other institutions like the European Union [EU] and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]).¹⁰ It has accomplished this by encouraging and stabilizing democracy within all the allies, but in particular in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey (states that had

American population was not on the front line of the Cold War. In response to whether or not the U.S. should increase its commitment to NATO, most Americans wanted to maintain or increase the commitment (a maximum of 70 percent in 1986, and only 60 and 61 percent in 1990 and 1994, respectively). Lydia Saad, "American Support Active Role for U.S. in World," Gallup News Service, April 1, 1999.

¹⁰ U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "...we must also strengthen the proven alliances and institutions that provide order and security based on realism and law, for nations large and small. Institutions that deter aggression, and that give us a means to marshal support against it when deterrence fails. This is what NATO does." Madeleine K. Albright, "Statement on NATO enlargement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 24 February 1998. Available at <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/natoindex.html>.

authoritarian or weak democratic regimes upon entering the alliance). U.S.

Secretary of State Madeline Albright elaborates:

NATO's Cold War task was to contain the Soviet threat. But that is not all it did. It provided the confidence and security shattered economies need to rebuild themselves. It helped France and Germany become reconciled, making European integration possible. With other institutions, it brought Italy, then Germany and eventually Spain back into the family of European democracies. It denationalized allied defense policies.¹¹

Moreover, NATO is credited with having won the ideological battle, as the former members of the Soviet Bloc, including Russia, are adopting the liberal democratic and capitalist economic institutions that NATO embraces. The 1991 Rome Declaration paves the way for a renewed understanding of the relative strengths of these norms when it states: "Never has the opportunity to achieve our Alliance's objectives by political means, in keeping with Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington Treaty, been greater."¹² Finally, NATO has also had a very significant internal political function. NATO reduces conflict among its members by increasing transparency in their relations. Through frequent consultations, allies inform one another of their "activities and intentions" and they can

¹¹ Madeleine Albright, "Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger is Better," *The Economist* (February 15, 1997): 20.

¹² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 7-8 November 1991, para. 4.

convey any misapprehensions they may have.¹³ NATO has even been successful in stabilizing relations between Greece and Turkey. "All without firing a shot."¹⁴ In the new security environment these political accomplishments were equally, if not more, significant than NATO's Cold War military accomplishments.

Third, NATO has persisted because it keeps the U.S. engaged in Europe. Both the Europeans and the Americans have valued this presence to preserve the balance of power in Europe and to prevent any one state from seeking military domination of the region. For example, Manfred Wörner, NATO's Secretary General in the early post-Cold War period, argued: "If the United States disengages, I foresee a certain temptation for Western European nations to revert to past patterns of power politics."¹⁵ In a sense, even after the Cold War, NATO was still the most acceptable tool "to keep the Germans down."¹⁶ The Europeans have credited NATO (and especially the U.S. presence in the alliance) with having provided the

¹³ John Duffield, "Why NATO Persists," in *NATO and the Changing World Order: An Appraisal by Scholars and Policymakers*, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996), 106–107.

¹⁴ Albright, "Enlarging NATO," 20.

¹⁵ Cited in Yost, *NATO in Transition*, 289.

¹⁶ Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, is credited with describing NATO's three primary goals as being "to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down." There is no written source for this statement. For an elaboration of this argument, see Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," *Political Science Quarterly* 111, 1 (1996): 1–34.

security necessary to support regional political and economic integration. In the absence of the American presence, France and Germany might remilitarize and the EU might collapse.¹⁷ Moreover, "Europe's security is indivisible from that of the United States and Canada."¹⁸ Both countries have a significant economic, historical, and cultural interest in Europe and membership in NATO grants them greater political leverage over European (security) policies and contributes to their global prestige. This is particularly valuable for the United States for which "an unstable Europe would still threaten essential national security interests.... This is as true after as it was during the Cold War."¹⁹ Christoph Bertram elaborates:

If the link were severed, the security of both the United States and Europe would be impaired. If the United States turned its back on Europe, NATO would collapse and the European Union would be strained to the point of disintegration. Germany would stand out as the dominant power in the West of the continent, and Russia as the disturbing power in the East. The United States would lose much of its international authority as well as the means to help prevent European instability from igniting international conflict once again.²⁰

¹⁷ Charles A. Kupchan, "Reconstructing the West: The Case for an Atlantic Union," in *Atlantic Security: Contending Visions*, ed. Kupchan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 73.

¹⁸ U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, cited in "Fact Sheet: North Atlantic Treaty Organization," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, December 16, 1991.

¹⁹ Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (March/April 1995): 38; Duffield, "Why NATO Persists," 110–111.

²⁰ Christoph Bertram, *Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the*

The fourth reason NATO persists after the collapse of the Soviet system is to counter new threats that might arise on the regional security agenda, such as ethnic and nationalist conflict (as did occur in the former Yugoslavia), the rise of rogue states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism and sabotage. The risks to NATO in the post-Cold War era are "multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional,"²¹ and include challenges arising from social, economic, or political instabilities—especially in those states of Eastern and Central Europe that are in the process of establishing and stabilizing democratic political systems and capitalist economies. Such risks are most likely to arise from ethnic, national, or territorial disputes within these countries, for example as immigrants and refugees flee to neighboring states. Another source of threat includes a potential disruption in the flow of vital resources—as evidenced in the Gulf War. More specifically economic concerns that have been expressed in the early post-Cold War period involve the costs of encouraging (political and economic) development in Eastern Europe and the economic and political influence to be wielded by a reunified

Cold War (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), 85.

²¹ NATO, *Strategic Concept*, para. 8-9. Note that this strategic concept does not refer to "threats," but to "challenges."

Germany.²² Such potential instabilities threatened to “lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.”²³ Arms control and disarmament similarly remained important matters for cooperation. The future of Russia was (and remains) uncertain, especially in regard to issues of social and political stability and military might. Indeed, the allies argued that “[e]ven in a non-adversarial and co-operative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe.”²⁴

Fifth, the cost of achieving these goals was significantly *lower* than if the states of Europe had engaged in unilateral efforts and, more significantly for persistence, it would have been very costly to terminate the arms cooperation, equipment and training standardization, and so forth, that occur within NATO. These costs would not be purely financial, but would have drawn on economic, political, and even military

²² Alan Riding, “At East-West Crossroads, Western Europe Hesitates,” *The New York Times* 25 March 1992, A1.

²³ Albright, “Statement on NATO enlargement,” para. 10.

²⁴ Interviews with NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) representatives, Brussels, June-July 1996, hereafter interview data; “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” para. 13, 14; Albright, “Statement on NATO Enlargement.”

resources. Considerations of cost are especially important in an era in which all members are attempting to tighten their belts, including in the defense realm, and when some members, like the UK and Germany, have come to base their defense programs on their continuing involvement in NATO.²⁵ It simply is too expensive to renationalize defense programs that have become dependent upon integrated commands and structures. All of these factors indicate that NATO continues to be perceived as the most cost-effective means of ensuring security in a world fraught with uncertainty.

Finally, NATO persisted for the perceived lack of satisfactory alternatives. While there were several possible substitutes, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the European Community (EC), and the Western European Union (WEU), none seemed able to perform the entire range of NATO's military tasks effectively. Initially the CSCE seemed to be the most likely substitute for three reasons. All Western and Eastern European countries, the United States, and Canada were members, and it emphasized those areas of cooperation that seemed most appropriate for managing the new security environment (like collective security, human rights, East-West trade, disarmament, and confidence building measures). It also had a strong record of success in

²⁵ Interview data.

these areas through the Cold War. However, its inclusiveness proved to be a fault in the post-Cold War era. The CSCE failed in its efforts to intervene to prevent civil war in Yugoslavia, because the veto of the Yugoslav government obstructed it from taking any decisive action.²⁶ Neither the EC nor the WEU were perceived to be satisfactory substitutes because their membership was limited to West European states—that is, they did not allow for a U.S. presence. Furthermore, the domain of the EC was largely limited to external trade and to the coordination of diplomatic policy. Although the EC had received high praise for the lead it took in providing economic assistance to Eastern Europe during this period, it failed in efforts (along with the WEU) to engage in conflict management.²⁷

In sum, NATO persisted after the Cold War because “[i]t works.”²⁸ The security context had so transformed in the immediate post-Cold War era that there did indeed seem to be reason for NATO’s persistence, not as a “Cold War relic,” but as a cost-effective tool to manage a highly uncertain international environment. The allies had no incentive to exit the alliance, as its benefits remained greater than the maintenance costs. In

²⁶ Jan Zielonka. *Explaining Euro-Paralysis: Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics*. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 191–192.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 192–193. Zielonka argues that, in part, the EU had such difficulty incorporating a European Security and Defense Identity in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) because pro-NATO EU members like Britain and The Netherlands were resistant.

²⁸ Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 61.

fact, the value of the alliance increased following the collapse of bipolarity, because the new strategic context was characterized by significant uncertainty, and NATO was a time-proven means to pool resources, share information, and reduce the time necessary to make decisions in such an environment. In other words, because of NATO's prior institutionalization the allies already possessed a means to monitor the environment and to communicate their interests, not only to each other but also to outsiders. This was particularly valuable because the range and variety of potential risks facing the alliance were less predictable than during the Cold War. Indeed, the allies agreed "...the success of Alliance policy will require a coherent approach determined by the Alliance's political authorities choosing and coordinating appropriate measures, including those in the military field...."²⁹

Figure 13 illustrates NATO's alliance behavior into the post-Cold War era. Between 1989 and 1991 the alliance merely persisted as allies reevaluated the new strategic context and the benefits that NATO could provide within it. At the end of this period, the allies agreed that NATO could be adapted to meet new security contingencies at the same time that it practiced its traditional collective defense functions. It can be demonstrated that this decision was not just a product of material

²⁹ NATO, "Strategic Concept" (1991), para. 32-33.

calculations (that is, the benefits the allies anticipated), but also a normative interest in preserving, and even enlarging, the community of states that NATO had been so instrumental in forging. The next section pursues this argument.

Performance	Norms	
	Constitutive	Regulative
Effective:	Evolution NATO 1991+	Persistence NATO 1989–1991
Ineffective:	Erosion N/A	Dissolution N/A

Figure 13: NATO's Evolution in the Post-Cold War

Norms and NATO's Evolution (1993+)

The allies' expectation that NATO was flexible enough to adapt to new conditions and to meet new threats is insufficient to explain the unprecedented evolution that it has experienced through the 1990s. For example, since 1991 NATO has expanded its mandate to include (and indeed emphasize) conflict management functions. It also has engaged in dialogue and cooperation with former adversaries. These changes have been unprecedented in traditional, non-institutionalized alliances. Such an evolution in functions and scope has been made possible by the shared constitutive norms that have instilled the institution with a value greater than the security it provided throughout the Cold War. These norms have

produced among the allies a kind of loyalty to NATO, which has prodded them to adapt the alliance to better suit the demands of the new security environment in which the threats do not include traditional military transgressions. An analysis of NATO's norms as the Cold War ended³⁰ indicates that the allies believed that NATO "has always been more than a military organization. Above all else, it is a community of free, democratic nations, which has upheld common basic values."³¹ The two primary constitutive norms discussed in chapter 3—democracy and consultation—remained highly specified.

Norms

The two fundamental values NATO allies share are a commitment to (1) democratic norms and procedures and (2) political consultation. These norms first were specified in the preamble and the opening articles of the North Atlantic Treaty and they gradually strengthened throughout

³⁰ This period ranges from late 1989 until the end of 1991—between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is no single, agreed upon date for the end of the Cold War. In July 1990, the NATO allies invited Central and East European states to engage in military and political cooperation. At the November CSCE Summit meeting, NATO and Warsaw Pact allies signed a treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. In 1991, the Warsaw Pact (July) and then the Soviet Union (December) dissolved. Commentators declared the end of the Cold War as each of these events unfolded. The later date is the most appropriate, because only at the close of 1991 and the collapse of the USSR did it become impossible for East-West relations to revert to the tension that characterized the Cold War.

³¹ Helmut Kohl, cited in Smith and Timmins, *Building a Bigger Europe*, 96.

the Cold War. Indeed, NATO has been described as an institution “explicitly built around norms of democratic decision-making, that is, non-hierarchy, frequent consultation implying co-determination, and consensus-building.”³² As the Cold War ended, the allies continued to affirm these norms in almost every official declaration—one sign of a robust norm. For example, in 1990, they declared that the Alliance

can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. ...NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians, and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all of Europe.³³

This passage indicates that there was a significant perception that NATO has been, and can continue to be, used to bind democracies and to strengthen a particular way of life even after the loss of the alliance’s long-time adversary. The Strategic Concept, drafted the following year, reiterates the alliance’s basis on the common values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and indicates that NATO’s task of maintaining

³² Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 36.

³³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance,” issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5th-6th July 1990, para. 2, 4. In the revised Strategic Concept in 1999, they state that NATO “aims at enhancing the security of all, excludes nobody, and helps to overcome divisions and disagreements that could lead to instability and conflict.” para. 33.

a stable European security environment is grounded on "the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes."³⁴

NATO's emphasis on strengthening democratic norms and consultation, in combination with the fact that the alliance's performance remained untested in this early stage in the end of the Cold War, created very high barriers to exit and an incentive to employ voice. In a sense, allies were "loyal" to the norms embodied in NATO. They exhibited such loyalty in direct and indirect ways. Direct expressions of "loyalty" occurred in pronouncements to the effect that national security policies are driven by a commitment to the Alliance (rather than vice versa) and that the allies must "pursue change as actively as we advocate it."³⁵ Indirect expressions of loyalty include the apparent absence, or at least the limited nature, of real debates regarding the costs and the need for evolving and enlarging NATO. The German experience provides a good illustration. "German leaders have often focused on the underlying idea of NATO as a 'community of values' rather than a 'mere' military alliance," and they have consistently been "pro-NATO." Thus there was little domestic

³⁴ NATO, "Strategic Concept," (1991), paras. 16, 21; "Strategic Concept" (1999), para. 10. This text is identical in both documents.

³⁵ Sir John Weston, "The Challenges to NATO: A British View," *NATO Review* 40, 6 (December 1992): 9-14 (Web edition, <http://www.nato.int>).

debate or controversy regarding NATO's persistence.³⁶ German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has argued,

the key factor is not NATO's military achievements. Right from the outset, and today this is truer than ever, NATO has been an alliance founded on shared values... We Germans are partners in this Alliance and accept responsibility within this Alliance... because we know that we can rely on NATO's commitment to our common values.³⁷

To maximize NATO's ability to respond to the challenges of the new security order, the Alliance has undergone two kinds of evolution—not mutually exclusive—in the post-Cold War period. The allies have extended the range of NATO's tasks beyond the traditional mission of the common defense and collective security to include (1) crisis management and (2) outreach “with and among all democratic Euro-Atlantic countries.”³⁸ Such changes indicate that there is a true evolution underway in NATO—transforming the very purposes and functions of the Pact. Although the pledge of common defense remains at the core of the Treaty, allies have directed their efforts at cooperation toward instilling and maintaining stability in all of Europe.

³⁶ Smith and Timmins, *Building a Bigger Europe*, 95–96.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 96.

³⁸ “Strategic Concept” (1999), para. 33.




Figure 14: NATO's Institutionalization in the Post-Cold War

Evolution

NATO's evolution was initiated in 1991 with the NAC's Rome Declaration, but it has gone through two distinct phases, as Figure 14 indicates.³⁹ In the first phase (I), initiated in Rome, the allies responded to the perception that there were no immediate traditional military threats in Western Europe. Instead, they perceived the greatest threats to the alliance to arise out of the various instabilities that might emerge in Eastern and Central Europe and spillover into the West. To forestall and defend against such threats, they did not abandon NATO's traditional defensive objectives—safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of allies—but they emphasized increasing dialogue with Central and East

³⁹ "Rome Declaration"; NATO, "Strategic Concept" (1991).

European democracies to remove the conditions that might cause instability and to (re)integrate these states into the Western community of democratic states. Two institutional reforms facilitated evolution in this direction. The allies created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 as a forum in which they could engage in this dialogue with the former Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact States. In 1994, they created the Partnership for Peace (PfP) to provide a forum in which they could move beyond mere dialogue and engage in concrete military cooperation in order to transfer Western norms to Central and East European political, military, and social systems.

The second phase of evolution was formalized in 1996 in response to one of the lessons of the Bosnian war: dialogue is not always sufficient to prevent conflicts from erupting, so NATO must ensure it has the military capabilities and the resolve necessary to handle such disturbances when they erupt. Thus, in the second phase of evolution, after NATO's political success has been fairly well documented, NATO has begun to reemphasize improvements in its military effectiveness so that allies and partners alike are prepared to meet new and diverse military contingencies and to engage in effective crisis management.⁴⁰ Two

⁴⁰ A comparison of the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts illustrates the change. In fact, they back the observation of one analyst, who notes "with some surprise that NATO is becoming more military" and *not* more political (which it already was). In phase II, all of the discussions revolve around military matters like command arrangements, infrastructure, liaison, arms control, and so forth.

additional institutional reforms made evolution in the direction of crisis management possible. First, the allies created the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) in 1996 to make it possible to form “coalitions of the willing” so they (and interested partners) can engage in non-Article 5 (usually out-of-area) missions when one or more states (especially the U.S.) is unable or unwilling to participate. Second, in 1999, the allies launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to reduce the capabilities gap in NATO and to improve the ability of U.S. and European forces to cooperate in combat situations.

Phase I

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991–1997)

The first step in the direction of evolution occurred in July 1990 when, in an unprecedented step, the NAC declared that the Warsaw Pact states were no longer enemies and invited them to visit NATO headquarters in Brussels and to establish diplomatic liaisons there:

The member states of the North Atlantic Alliance propose to the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization a joint declaration in which we solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or from acting in any

The political purpose is getting lost. The Bosnian Crisis was a blessing because it offered NATO the “opportunity to do something concrete and efficient.” Willem Van Eekelen, “Europe’s Role and the CJTF,” In *CJTF—A Lifeline for a European Defence Policy?* ed. Edward Foster and Gordon Wilson, 60.

other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and with the CSCE Final Act.⁴¹

At the time, many commentators believed that this declaration would prove to be the alliance's deathblow, for they have long accepted that military alliances simply do not survive without an enemy. Yet NATO did not collapse. Instead, the allies agreed they could adapt to the new strategic environment by engaging in dialogue with former adversaries. In November 1991 they created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The NACC was a consultative forum in which representatives of the sixteen NATO countries would engage in dialogue with representatives of the five remaining Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states (East Germany was reunited with West Germany in October 1990), the three Baltic republics, and the USSR (although membership quickly grew beyond this initial group). The NACC had no decision-making authority, but it provided a forum in which NATO and non-NATO states could consult on numerous issues, like political and economic matters, scientific and environmental affairs, defense support issues, civil emergency planning, and military cooperation.⁴² The goal was

⁴¹ London Declaration, para. 6. For an analysis of the NACC and what it "is and is not" see William Yerex, "The North Atlantic Cooperation Council: NATO's *Ostpolitik* for Post-Cold War Europe," in *NATO's Eastern Dilemma's*, ed. David G. Haglund, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Joel J. Sokolsky, 181–194.

⁴² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, October 1995), 46–49.

to ease the transition away from authoritarian rule and erase the ideological and military divisions in Europe. Although there were preexisting programs for military cooperation, the NACC was "the first real attempt to systematize and order them so as to be able to provide for both NATO members and co-operation partners a greater sense of structure, purpose, and objectives."⁴³

NACC participants appear to have viewed the forum as a real success,⁴⁴ but outside observers have been more critical and have described it as merely a *partial* success. First, membership could not be equated to membership in NATO, which is what the Eastern states ultimately wanted. Second, the NACC lacked an infrastructure. It had neither a secretariat nor a substantial budget. Third, it was operationally weak. Because it operated by consensus, a single state could raise serious obstacles to cooperation. Some critics added that the meetings were too

⁴³ Smith and Timmins, *Building a Bigger Europe*, 107.

⁴⁴ At the time of its dissolution, members recognized the "NACC's valuable contribution to bringing together our countries following the Cold War period and to overcoming misunderstanding and mistrust. They underlined the historic importance of NACC... for helping to overcome the division of Europe by providing a multilateral forum for political consultations on security related issues and practical cooperation among states in the Euro-Atlantic area. They recalled that the NACC had laid the foundation for, and fostered the growth among its members, of ever deepening cooperation." NATO, "Chairman's Summary of the Meetings of the NACC and the EAPC in Sintra, Portugal— 29 May 1997." NATO Press Release M-NACC-EAPC-1(97)67 (30 May 1997). <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-067e.htm> (downloaded August 28, 2000).

formal to allow for a real exchange of views.⁴⁵ The one area in which the NACC did see significant success was peacekeeping, although there were limits to this cooperation as well. In particular, France opposed ministerial-level consultations, and in the absence of these political meetings there could be no civilian control over the military.⁴⁶ Thus, the NACC did encourage dialogue between former adversaries, but it was incapable of pursuing normative objectives, like fostering a military culture of civilian oversight.

In 1997 the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) replaced the NACC. The allies intended for the new forum to expand cooperation and to "provide the overarching framework for consultations among its members on a broad range of political and security-related issues."⁴⁷ The EAPC is open to Partners, as well as to Allies, to consult on numerous issues including crisis management, arms control issues, international terrorism, and the security effects of economic developments. Despite its

⁴⁵ Richard Latter, "Workshop 3: The Role of Political Consultation in the NACC and the WEU," in *Cooperation and Partnership for Peace: A Contribution to Euro-Atlantic Security into the 21st Century*. (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1996), 67.

⁴⁶ Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 66–67.

⁴⁷ NATO, "Chairman's Summary of the Meetings of the NACC and the EAPC."

claim to deepen and broaden cooperation, some have argued that the EAPC brought about a change in name only.⁴⁸

Partnership for Peace (1994+)

By 1994, the inadequacies of the NACC and growing expectation in Eastern and Central Europe were producing tensions within NATO and in NATO's relations with NACC states. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) was initiated to resolve these intra-alliance disputes and to pacify non-NATO NACC members in order to preserve material and normative gains made in 1990—that is, stabilizing much of Central and Eastern Europe and promoting democracy. The allies had four key objects in creating the PfP. First, they sought to preserve the unity of the alliance by putting off the very contentious question of enlargement—at least for a while.⁴⁹ While many non-NATO NACC states had begun to clamor for alliance membership, or at least some indication that membership would be available in the future, most NATO allies were not ready to move in this direction. Second, the allies believed that PfP would stabilize the East European region (especially Germany's eastern border) so that countries on either side of the border would be less inclined to remilitarize and

⁴⁸ Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 153–154.

⁴⁹ John Borawski, "Partnership for Peace and Beyond," *International Affairs* 71:2 (1995): 234.

could devote their scarce resources to political and economic reform. Third, they expected, based on their own Cold War experiences, that European security would be strengthened further if NATO's values were to spread into Central and Eastern Europe. That is, just as NATO had reconciled France and Germany, facilitated democratization in Italy, Germany, and Spain, and promoted integration and a sense of prosperity in Europe,⁵⁰ it could bring stability and democracy to relations among and within the states of Central and Eastern Europe. The PfP was also designed to provide the militaries in this region with an incentive to cooperate with the West because, more than any other domestic actors, the military had the power to oppose the reforms NATO sought.⁵¹ Finally, the allies intended for PfP to pacify Russia and prevent the reemergence of nationalist elements in Russia by sending a clear signal that a) NATO enlargement would not occur and b) partnership was open to all interested states, including Russia.

The Partnership for Peace Framework Document set about achieving these objectives in five explicit ways.⁵² First, partners were to strive to increase transparency in national defense planning and

⁵⁰ Albright, "Enlarging NATO," 20.

⁵¹ Goldgeier, *Not Whether But When*, 56; Smith and Timmins, *Building a Bigger Europe*, 108–109.

⁵² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Partnership for Peace Framework Document," 10 January 1994.

budgeting processes. The PfP also would introduce partners to the norm of contributing to one's own defense. Second, the PfP was to introduce civilian, or democratic, control over military affairs. It was to increase the legitimacy of the civilian leadership in the eyes of the military. Third, through PfP exercises and activities, partners were to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to future military operations under the authority of the UN or OSCE. Fourth, joint planning, training, and exercises were to prepare partners for participation in peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian missions. Fifth, in the long term, partner forces would be better prepared to operate with NATO allies in all sorts of crisis situations. The last two objectives had additional strategic significance. Although partnership was not to be equated with membership in NATO, the alliance offered active partners the opportunity to consult with allies in the event that they perceived a direct threat to their territorial integrity, political independence, or broader security interests. It also encouraged (though not officially) the belief that if a conflict were to erupt NATO would become involved in some way, whether it be politically or militarily. Thus, the PfP with its tie to NATO was a stabilizing force in the region, providing a sense of security as it deterred conflicts from erupting. PfP was also strategically valuable because it acclimated the partners to NATO's rules and procedures, and

would thereby facilitate the inclusion of new allies if another major military crises were to make the enlargement of NATO appear necessary.⁵³

The allies pursued PfP for many strategic reasons, but there were normative justifications as well. The most significant normative reason was to promote democracy and freedom in countries that had been denied these values for so long, and largely as a consequence of the conflict between the East and the West. U.S. Vice President Al Gore, in announcing the PfP to the American audience, declared:

“We did not spend years supporting Solidarity just to lose democracy in Poland. We did not celebrate the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia just to see that birth of freedom die from neglect.... The new NATO must address the concerns of those nations that lie between Russia and Western Europe, for the security of these states affects the security of America... those states are naturally concerned about whether they will again be rendered pieces of a buffer zone, prizes to be argued over by others.”⁵⁴

Many proponents of the PfP evaluate it as a grand success—perhaps more so than anyone believed at the outset of the program. For the new partners (twenty-four joined in the first year), the PfP was everything (short of NATO membership) that the NACC was not. For example, the PfP offered to move partners *beyond* dialogue and to

⁵³ Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace (PfP): After the Washington Summit and Kosovo” *Strategic Forum*. 167 (August 1999); Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 73.

⁵⁴ Cited in Goldgeier, *Not Whether But When*, 54.

emphasize cooperation in operational matters. It also had the infrastructure that the NACC lacked: NATO provided partners with offices adjacent to NATO Headquarters and SHAPE (the military offices were in the Partnership Coordination Cell, or the PCC). The accession process also alleviated fears in the East that Russia would be able to use the PfP to recover its former position of prominence. NATO-partner relations were conducted in the form of bloc politics, as East-West relations had been during the Cold War. Instead of negotiating a single program for all of the partners, each partner negotiated a bilateral treaty with NATO. The process was coined "16-plus-1 consultations" (there were originally sixteen partners). These Individual Partnership Programs (IPPs) allowed a partner to select from a "menu" of choices the activities, exercises, and programs in which it would participate. Later, a Planning and Review Process (PARP) imitating NATO's force planning system was created to help promote cohesion and (if it functions as it did in NATO) to exert diplomatic and political pressure so partners would live up to their commitments.⁵⁵

The PfP has fallen victim to criticism. For example, not all of the partners were enthusiastic about the new relationship. They (with Poland

⁵⁵ Beatrice Heuser, *Transatlantic Relations: Sharing Ideals and Costs*. Chatham House Papers. (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 64–65. On IPPs, see also Nick Williams, "Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?" *Survival* 38:1 (Spring 1996):102.

initially at the lead) perceived that PfP closed the door on NATO membership and made them “second-class citizens” in Europe—it was no more than a “Yalta II.”⁵⁶ Other critics have argued that it has intensified and not moderated competition between partners because it encourages them to improve ties with NATO at the expense of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and it has emphasized military-to-military cooperation to such an extent as to undermine civil-military reform. One analyst notes, “Political control over the military is, supposedly, not a problem. But the reality is that a proper civilian control over the armed forces is yet to be established.”⁵⁷

Both the NACC and the PfP are products of NATO’s high performance and the robust constitutive norms that its allies share. They represent new directions for institutionalization and, as such, are truly novel developments in the history of military alliances. First, they create structures, procedures, and norms for interaction and cooperation on military-security issues among allies and non-allies. Second, they are forums for transferring the norms embodied in NATO to its neighbors. Two consequences are anticipated from this evolution. First, as the participants reap the benefits of genuine consultation (as the NATO allies

⁵⁶ Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 71.

⁵⁷ Nonetheless, as Kay argues, “NATO as a whole was largely satisfied.” *Ibid.*, 71; Eyal, “NATO’s Enlargement,” 713; see also Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 73.

already have), they will begin to internalize the same norms that are contained in NATO. In fact, "cooperation changes attitudes by creating shared positive experiences to supplant the memory of dedicated antagonism,"⁵⁸ and can only serve to strengthen the development of free and democratic institutions within and among these states. Second, as Allies and Partners exercise voice to reach these ends, a loyalty to the Western Community and to Europe "whole and free" will be generated. Although the Partners are not allies in the traditional sense, the creation of such institutions and the opportunity to turn to voice mechanisms will discourage them from "exiting" or defecting whenever their security interests are threatened. Rather, they will be far more likely to turn to the established mechanisms for managing conflicts either among themselves or with external actors and this will provide for stability outside NATO's area.

Phase II

Phase II was rooted in the Bosnian civil war, which posed the first real military challenge to NATO's commitment to maintain stability in Europe. The war proved that military crises could erupt within Europe

⁵⁸ Warren Christopher and William J. Perry, "NATO's True Mission," *New York Times* 21 October 1997: A33. This statement was made specifically in regard to NATO-Russia relations, but it is equally applicable to relations with the partnership countries as well.

and that NATO needed the capabilities to respond to any spillover of military conflict. Otherwise, its very survival was in jeopardy. As the civil war intensified, the allies feared that if NATO did not act in the Balkans it would lose all credibility. They agreed to take on a peacekeeping role under the auspices of the CSCE and to support peacekeeping activities on a case-by-case basis only after NATO *and* its member states received an official request. The CSCE failed to act due to the inability to achieve a consensus within the EU or the OSCE over how to proceed. It seemed the Europeans could not take action without United States leadership. In 1993 the North Atlantic Council (NAC) did receive an official request. In response, it instructed NATO military officials to begin planning a peacekeeping force of about 50,000 and to prepare for activities like monitoring ceasefires and the withdrawal of forces, supervising disarmament and the control of weapons, and creating and monitoring buffer zones.⁵⁹

From the start, the allies were divided over how best to respond to the crisis in Bosnia. For example, early in the conflict the United States had wanted to employ NATO air strikes, but the Europeans refused to agree until the spring of 1995 when Bosnian Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic

⁵⁹ For a background to the crisis and the various responses of regional and international institutions, see Ernest W. Fischer, "The Yugoslav Civil War," in *NATO's Eastern Dilemma's*, ed. David G. Haglund, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Joel J. Sokolsky, 37–66.

refused to adhere to a newly negotiated ceasefire. NATO engaged in the air strikes, but in retaliation, the Serbs took several hundred UN peacekeepers hostage and fighting renewed. This direct challenge "paralyzed" the alliance into inaction. "NATO seemed to be irrelevant in dealing with the Bosnian crisis... It appeared...that NATO was in the process of unraveling."⁶⁰ In July, Bosnian Serbs overran UN safe havens and yet the UN refused NATO's request to employ air strikes in retaliation. The U.S. went to the NAC to get approval for NATO to use air power "more assertively" in the event the NAC was to make the decision to protect UN safe areas. Finally, and only once the U.S. was determined to take action, did the Europeans jump on board so NATO could quickly reach a consensus. In September, Operation Deliberate Force was initiated with the goals of ending the shelling of Sarajevo, opening the airport and roads around Sarajevo, removing all Serbs heavy weapons from a 12.5 mile radius around Sarajevo, and deterring attacks on other safe havens.

Thus after initial paralysis the NATO allies, with U.S. leadership, agreed to take assertive action. The NATO operation was certainly not the only factor in bringing the parties to the peace table, but it is credited as an important factor.⁶¹ The whole experience ended with several lessons for

⁶⁰ U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, cited in Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 80.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 80–81.

NATO. First, it indicated that NATO did have a military role to play in post-Cold War Europe, confronting various threats to regional stability. Second, it demonstrated that NATO could manage such threats, but only if the allies were not complacent. In particular, the experience suggested that NATO would work best when it acts early and resolutely. Third, it emphasized that the allies needed to engage in reforms to improve their capacity to counter such new threats.

Combined Joint Task Forces (1994+)

Bosnia vividly demonstrated the inability of the Europeans to act without American leadership because no one state besides the United States was able to provide "consistent or legitimate leadership." Germany was capable of being the dominant power in Europe, but it was both unwilling and constitutionally unable to take on the task. France's antagonism toward the Americans made it an undesirable leader in the eyes of the other allies and Britain's Atlanticism made it an unacceptable choice to France.⁶² Yet this one experience with paralysis highlighted the need for NATO to reform or risk dissolution. In 1993, as NATO was dealing with its inability to act in the absence of strong U.S. leadership, the

⁶² Gale A. Mattox and Daniel Whiteneck, "The ESDI, NATO, and the New European Security Environment," in *Two Tiers or Two Speeds? The European Security Order and the Enlargement of the European Union and NATO*, ed. James Sperling, 122.

Americans proposed a military reform that would improve Europe's ability to take the lead in future out-of-area crises: the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). In addition to increasing NATO's performance, the CJTF was designed to improve burden sharing within NATO and to increase alliance unity by responding to Europe's attempts to exercise voice from within the alliance. The allies endorsed the CJTF in 1994 at the Brussels summit and formally agreed to implement it at the Berlin Meeting in 1996. It is expected to become fully operational in 2004.⁶³

"A CJTF... is a deployable multinational, multi-service formation generated and tailored for specific contingency operations."⁶⁴ Within each of the CJTF's three "parent" headquarters is a nucleus staff that has normal NATO responsibilities. When a non-Article 5 crisis erupts, this staff can be pulled from its regular responsibilities for participation in the task force. Theoretically, it is capable of deploying within seven days of receiving orders. This initial group prepares for the remaining staff, which may come from both NATO and national organizations. These individuals

⁶³ The de facto importance of NATO's integrated operation resources was recognized in June 1993 when all WEU members (including France) agreed to fuse WEU and NATO flotillas under a single NATO command structure which would operate under the political guidance of NATO and WEU ministerial councils. Smith and Timmins, *Building a Bigger Europe*, 33"; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The Combined Joint Task Forces Concept," *NATO Fact Sheet*, updated April 9, 2000. (<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/cjtf-con.htm> [downloaded September 7, 2000]).

⁶⁴ Anthony Cragg, "The Combined Joint Task Force Concept: A Key Component of the Alliance's Adaptation," *NATO Review* 44:4 (July 1996):7.

are dual-hatted, meaning they have regular NATO or national assignments but they "know from the onset of their assignment their susceptibility for CJTF deployment" and their parent headquarters periodically bring them together for exercises and training.⁶⁵

CJTF has both political and military functions. Politically, the initiative was seen as the "the main practical dimension of the American commitment to support the building of the ESDI" (European Security and Defense Identity).⁶⁶ Militarily, the CJTF is intended to help the alliance perform its missions more efficiently and to facilitate operations in which non-NATO nations might want to participate. It makes non-Article 5, out-of-area missions (in which all nineteen allies are unlikely to agree) feasible. The forces are intended to carry out a variety of missions in a flexible

⁶⁵ Thomas Cooke, "NATO CJTF Doctrine: The Naked Emperor," *Parameters* 28 (Winter 1998–1999):128. On the operation of the CJTF see also Robert E. Hunter, "The U.S. and Europe—A Parting of the Ways or New Commitments?" in *CJTF—A Lifeline for a European Defence Policy?* ed. Edward Foster and Gordon Wilson, 74; and Cragg, "The Combined Joint Task Force Concept."

⁶⁶ Marc Bantinck, "NATO Structural Reform and the ESDI," in *CJTF—A Lifeline for a European Defence Policy?* Edited by Edward Foster and Gordon Wilson, 78–79. The CJTF idea is intricately linked to calls to strengthen the European pillar in NATO. In October 1990, Britain and Italy were the first to propose that the WEU act as a bridge between NATO and the European Community. The European NATO allies were split as to how to strengthen this pillar. Britain wanted a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) to be developed within NATO whereas France wanted it to be developed from within the European Community. Most of the other allies fell somewhere between these extremes. Smith and Timmins, *Building a Bigger Europe*, 30. For an overview of these various approaches to ESDI see Michel Fortmann and David G. Haglund, "Europe, NATO, and the ESDI Debate: In Quest of an Identity," in *From Euphoria to Hysteria*, ed. David G. Haglund, 21–44.

manner, employing capabilities that are “separable but not separate” from NATO forces. In reality, the political and military aspects of CJTF are inseparable: the object of the CJTF is to allow the Europeans to undertake lower-level military operations more “effectively, securely, and affordably” and to “give more muscle” to Europe’s defense policies.⁶⁷

The value of the CJTF concept lies in the ability to respond to problems that are not in the interests of all members and thus do not garner the consensus necessary for NATO to operate. That is, the CJTF is a means to allow some allies to employ NATO resources in non-Article 5 contingencies in which other allies (in particular the Americans) do not want to participate. The CJTF is not a mechanism for circumventing the consensus rule in NATO, as the NAC must approve any CJTF mission. This means there must be consensus within NATO regarding the goals of the operation, even if some of the allies choose not to participate. Furthermore, the CJTF is also not a means to avoid consultation with other European institutions, like the EU and the OSCE. As a crisis develops, it is intended that consultation will occur within NATO and between NATO and other European institutions.

Officially, the CJTF concept has not become operational and remains untested. However, the experience of the NATO Implementation

⁶⁷ Guido Lenzi and Richard Cobbold, “Introduction: CJTF—A Lifeline for a European Defence Policy,” in *CJTF—A Lifeline for a European Defence Policy*, ed.

Force (IFOR) can lend insight into the feasibility of the CJTF.⁶⁸ In December 1995, IFOR received a one-year mandate from the UN Security Council to replace the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia in implementing the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accord's military annex. Although IFOR was not officially a CJTF, the participants applied several of the above principles (which had been under development since 1994).

The goal of the Dayton military annex was "defined as the achievement of an atmosphere of military security, not peace *per se*, but a removal of the possibility of further fighting" to allow the civilian and political tasks to be accomplished.⁶⁹ IFOR had six specific military tasks: to (1) ensure self defense and freedom of movement; (2) supervise selective marking of boundaries and a zone of separation between parties; (3) monitor and enforce the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories and the establishment of zones of separation; (4) assume control of airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina and movement of military traffic over key ground routs; (5) establish joint military commissions to be central bodies for all parties in the peace agreement; and (6) assist in the

Edward Foster and Gordon Wilson, 6.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 8.

⁶⁹ Jackson, Lieutenant General Michael, "IFOR and Lessons for Future CJTFs." In *CJTF—A Lifeline for a European Defence Policy?* ed. Edward Foster and Gordon Wilson, 97.

withdrawal of UN forces not transferred to IFOR.⁷⁰ The military tasks were complete by D+120, in the summer of 1996 (120 days after the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR). IFOR had separated the warring parties so that nonmilitary aspects of rebuilding could begin and the OSCE and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) took over. At this point, NATO forces were charged with assisting the UNHCR and other organizations in their humanitarian missions.⁷¹

IFOR was deemed a success in its "contribution to the freedom of movement and to civil reconstruction, for example through clearing mines and repairing damaged bridges, streets, and railway lines."⁷² IFOR was also rated a success for the level of integration achieved with non-allies. Sixteen non-NATO countries were integrated into IFOR.⁷³ However, out of IFOR came several important lessons for CJTF, none of them easy to implement. First, any such operation must have a goal at the outset. Second, it is invaluable that forces exercise together before deployment is evident. PfP was invaluable in this regard. However, it is very difficult to

⁷⁰ "IFOR's Role in the Transition to Peace," *NATO Review* 44:4 (July 1996): 12.

⁷¹ Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 85.

⁷² Volker Rühle, "New NATO, New Bundeswehr and Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *NATO Review* 45-3 (May-June 1997):4.

⁷³ Admiral Leighton W. Smith, "The Pillars of Peace in Bosnia," *NATO Review* 44:4 (July 1996):14.

schedule CJTF exercises, because the CJTF is supposed to be prepared to respond to any contingency at “a moment’s notice.” Third, IFOR demonstrated the difficulty of agreeing in advance upon a force posture (in a multinational force)—another potential issue for CJTF.

Defense Capabilities Initiative (1999)

One of NATO’s most recent institutional reforms has been the creation of a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). This was another attempt to eliminate a potential source of tension within NATO. The allies adopted the DCI at their Ministerial Meeting (celebrating NATO’s fiftieth anniversary) in April 1999. It is a purely strategically driven attempt to overcome the growing capabilities gap between the United States and the European allies and to improve the extent to which allies can cooperate with the U.S. The Bosnian war in the mid-1990s showed clearly the extent to which the Europeans continued to rely upon American force. Then, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo (Spring 1999) further demonstrated the allies’ limited military capabilities. Over 70 percent of the firepower was American; only Britain was able to contribute cruise missiles; only 10 percent of the European aircraft were capable of precision bombing; and the Europeans lacked reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft. American superiority in information systems was so great that it experienced difficulties trying to communicate with its allies. The Europeans also

demonstrated their inferiority in mobilization. Their militaries comprised almost two million people (compared to 1.45 in the U.S.) and yet they could “draw up only half the number of properly equipped and trained professional soldiers required for Kosovo. The implications of this gap were ominous: the European militaries would soon be unable to operate with the U.S. military. Unchecked, this gap will also generate new tensions within NATO. This is especially likely if a situation arises in which the EU provides ground forces to do the “dirty work” while the U.S. soldiers get the “safe” jobs, like high-tech logistics, intelligence, and airpower.”⁷⁴

A Word on Enlargement

As early as 1990, voices in Central and Eastern Europe began clamoring for entry into NATO, or at the very least for another *pan-European* organization to take NATO’s place. The very idea of enlargement posed a classic security dilemma for NATO. In the absence of enlargement, a security vacuum would emerge to NATO’s east. It had to be filled by *someone* lest it become a continuous source of insecurity and an obstacle to democratization. However, if enlargement were to occur, it would produce new tensions with Russia as well as any other state not

⁷⁴ Elinor Sloan, “DCI: Responding to the U.S.-Led Revolution in Military Affairs,” *NATO Review* 48 (Spring/Summer 2000): 4–6.

invited to join.⁷⁵ Thus in the early 1990s there were serious divisions within the alliance regarding the very idea of enlargement. The United States initiated the first serious enlargement debate in 1993 and convinced the other NATO governments in 1994 to agree to future Eastward expansion, with the date and the invitees left open. Enlargement was driven by the United States in order to preserve its leadership in NATO and to cater to domestic audiences. The timing of enlargement seems largely to have been driven by the failure of the WEU in Bosnia, events in the European Union, and in American domestic politics.⁷⁶ Thus, although much of the enlargement debate is couched in normative language (that is, spreading Western values eastward), the rationale was not normative and in no way can the enlargement process be considered a form of evolution—no more so than the entry of Greece and Turkey (1952), Germany (1954), or Spain (1982).⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Andrew Cottey, "NATO Transformed: The Atlantic Alliance in A New Era," in *Rethinking Security in Post-Cold War Europe*, ed. William Park and G. Wyn Rees (London: Longman, 1998), 48. See also, Jonathan Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: The Anatomy of a Decision." *International Affairs* 73:4 (1997):703.

⁷⁶ Smith and Timmins, *Building a Bigger Europe*, 36.

⁷⁷ In fact, during the planning states of enlargement, it was argued in policy circles that "the United States had extended a security guarantee to Western Europe in 1949 to safeguard the postwar recovery and it should do the same for the central and eastern Europeans after the cold war." Stephen Flanagan, cited in James M. Goldgeier, *Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 31.

The United States made all of the key decisions in the enlargement debate because it was so much more powerful than its allies were and, after the WEU's failure in Bosnia, it gained renewed legitimacy as NATO's leader—as the only power that could make security cooperation work in Europe. The rationale for the enlargement policy was unclear and seems to have been determined *after* the policy was made. For example, *after* NATO's 1994 decision that enlargement would occur, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrooke wrote, "the rationale and process for NATO's expansion, *once decided*, will be transparent, not secret."⁷⁸ The view that finally prevailed in Washington emphasized enlargement as a means to consolidate reform and prevent future Bosnias. U.S. policymakers believed that NATO could help Central and East European states carry out political and economic reforms and the possibility of membership would provide "momentum" for reform.⁷⁹ The allies complained that the U.S. was unwilling to consult

⁷⁸ Holbrooke, "America, A European Power?" 45. Emphasis added.

⁷⁹ There were two other positions in the alliance. There were those who advocated NATO enlargement as a means to reassure Germany that it would not have to engage in unilateral initiatives to the east to ensure its own security. These individuals were afraid of a German "revival." Others advocated enlargement as a form of deterrence—that is, to deter Russia from attempting to reestablish its hold on Eastern Europe. The conflict management rationale won out in part because it had the support of U.S. President Bill Clinton and several of his most influential advisors. Moreover, the other two strategies were potentially destabilizing. A public deterrence strategy might have created the very situation it was designed to prevent—a classic security dilemma. If NATO were to make official the allies' fear of German revival, the unity of the alliance

with them on these matters—that it was “riding roughshod over its allies” and negotiating with Eastern Europe instead of consulting with NATO.⁸⁰

Two conclusions follow. First, NATO enlargement does not provide an example of alliance evolution. It is no more than a simple extension of a security commitment, but it has become more controversial because the international environment has so transformed from the time when the allies extended the commitment to Greece, Turkey, or even Spain. Although the rationale may continue to be unclear there is a perception that “the new NATO can do for Europe’s East what the old NATO did for Europe’s West: vanquish old hatreds, promote integration, create a secure environment for prosperity, and deter violence in the region where two world wars and the Cold War began.”⁸¹ In other words, NATO performed so well in the West during the Cold War and it proved itself to be so adaptable, that there was no reason to believe it could not adapt to perform similar functions in Eastern Europe. There was no need

could be seriously undermined. On these three camps within the U.S. policy circles, see Goldgeier, *Not Whether But When*, 94. See also Eyal, “NATO’s Enlargement,” 703–707.

⁸⁰ German Ambassador to NATO, Hermann von Richthofen, cited in Goldgeier, *Not Whether But When*, 85.

⁸¹ Albright, “Enlarging NATO,” 20.

for an explicit strategic rationale or military criteria (which were never articulated in NATO's own study on enlargement⁸²).

The second conclusion is that the process by which enlargement was undertaken violated one of NATO's sacred norms: consultation.⁸³ Throughout the Cold War the allies attempted to strengthen this norm so that they would not provide one another with dictates or merely inform one another of decisions already taken. There is evidence of some success in this regard (see chapter three). However, in the enlargement debate the United States blatantly violated this norm in order to pursue national interests. The U.S. initiated serious discussion in 1993 when it anticipated that a strengthening EU might challenge its leadership in Europe—even when its allies were very divided on the matter and preferred to let it drop. It unilaterally announced a timetable for enlargement during a presidential election campaign. And finally, it (again unilaterally) determined which states would be invited.⁸⁴ Because of their need for U.S. leadership, the allies went along, albeit begrudgingly.

⁸² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Study On NATO Enlargement," (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995).

⁸³ This also holds true in the determination of which states would receive an invitation in the first round. The U.S. insisted on limiting enlargement to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, whereas many of its allies also wanted to invite Romania and Slovenia. The U.S. announced its position just days before the 1997 Madrid Summit—even though the agenda was devoted to "consulting" on this matter—and made it clear that its position would not alter.

⁸⁴ It can be argued that this was for the good of the alliance, because the

Conclusion: Scenarios for NATO's Future

This chapter began with a set of questions: Why did NATO persist so long beyond the end of the Cold War? What factors account for the scope and direction of NATO's evolution and will these reforms allow it to persist indefinitely? What prompted NATO to enlarge eastward, and will the accession of new allies undermine the alliance? What conditions are most conducive to alliance persistence and evolution and for how long can persistence and evolution succeed? Ten years after the end of the Cold War analysts can offer definitive answers to only some of these questions. Others will be the subject of analysis and debate for many more years to come. Nonetheless, the model of alliance persistence and disintegration suggests some answers. In particular, NATO has persisted for so long beyond the end of the Cold War for the simple fact that it continues to provide security at an acceptable cost. That is, a high level of satisfactory performance and the anticipation of future performance have allowed NATO to persist. It "embodies years of investment in combined training and force inter-operability" such that "If NATO did not already exist, it is

U.S. Senate would be unwilling to enlarge beyond Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Indeed, it is true that the American administration (and hence, Europe) was constrained by the fact that the U.S. (Republican) Senate had to ratify the treaty. However, avoiding all pretense of consultation was a clear norm violation. On the very important role of U.S. domestic politics in the enlargement process, see Goldgeier, *Not Whether But When*; George W. Grayson, *Strange Bedfellows: NATO Marches East* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1999).

doubtful that Washington would now invent it."⁸⁵ Of course, this is no guarantee that NATO will persist indefinitely. In the past decade, numerous strains have emerged in the alliance over the scope of NATO's activities (minimalist versus maximalist conceptions of NATO⁸⁶) and whether and when NATO should employ military force. If tensions over such fundamental issues are not addressed adequately NATO's norms may wither, its performance may falter, and the alliance can be expected to gradually erode and then dissolve. The following issues have the potential to be most destabilizing.

Enlargement

First, the initial round of enlargement is already complete, with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia having joined NATO in April 1999. The alliance maintains an "open door" policy on enlargement and even has a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to help those countries that want to join to prepare for future rounds of enlargement. Each MAP "identifies issues that might be discussed (non-exhaustive) and highlights mechanisms through which preparation for possible eventual membership

⁸⁵ Jonathan Clarke, "Replacing NATO," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1993/1994): 23, 25.

⁸⁶ Peter Schmidt, "The Evolution of European Security Structures: Master Plan or Trial and Error?" in *From Euphoria to Hysteria: Western European Security After the Cold War*, ed. David G. Haglund (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 149–152.

can best be carried forward."⁸⁷ These issues include political and economic, defense/military, resource, security, and legal issues. Clearly, NATO cannot announce well ahead of time which states it will admit and when it will do so, because in military alliances "the moment of declaration is also the moment of decision."⁸⁸ Yet the promise to keep the door open and to offer MAPs to aspirants without announcing a timetable for future rounds of enlargement or which states will be considered entails many risks for NATO. It threatens to raise expectations of membership in countries that the allies may not even be willing to consider. It is also more likely to raise expectations that these countries fall under NATO's protective umbrella simply because they are part of the PfP/EAPC/MAP "club." If NATO fails to meet their expectations on either count, its credibility will be seriously eroded. This will undermine NATO's deterrent function and hence performance.

Second, NATO has been unwilling to agree upon a firm date for the next round of enlargement or to list conditions that an aspirant must meet to be invited into the alliance. This makes sense for strategic reasons, as indicated above, but it threatens to allow round two to proceed much in

⁸⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Membership Action Plan," issued at the meeting of the of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 23–24 April 1999.

⁸⁸ Robert E. Hunter, "Maximizing NATO: A Relevant Alliance Knows How to Reach." *Foreign Affairs* 78,3 (May/June 1999):198.

the same way that round one did: with one country (or a small group of countries) unilaterally determining who will join and when. NATO cannot long survive such breeches of its most sacred norms. The more often such violations occur, the more likely the norms will weaken, leaving NATO more vulnerable to dissolution the next time performance is seriously challenged.

Performance

NATO was never called to act upon its military commitment through the Cold War. It was victorious because it was never tested—which is not to say that it would have failed such a test, but that allies may have entered the post-Cold War era with a more realistic understanding of what NATO can and cannot accomplish. It is significant that NATO's first military operations occurred after the Cold War and in out-of-area conflict management missions. NATO's performance in these first missions will have a significant impact on its future alliance behavior. The civil war in Bosnia was crucial for demonstrating that the U.S. presence is still central to the effective management of security on the continent. More recently, events in Kosovo have reinforced this perception in NATO and across Europe. It is difficult to objectively evaluate the success of this mission, even a year beyond the completion of the military campaign to protect Kosovar Albanians from Serb human rights atrocities. It is still not entirely

clear what NATO's goals were: to protect its values or to save face and protect its interests.⁸⁹ The reality probably involves a measure of both. Nonetheless, accounts vary in evaluating NATO's goals and its use of military force as a grand success or an "ugly" failure.⁹⁰ Of course within NATO, the campaign was seen as a great triumph.

After months of escalating repression against the Kosovar Albanians and a string of broken agreements with the international community, NATO took a stand against the military machine of Slobodan Milosevic on 24 March 1999. NATO's air operation sought to force Belgrade to stop its brutal ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo, while at the same time NATO forces have been providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the onslaught. The success of the air campaign forced Milosevic to meet NATO's demands and laid the foundation for the implementation of peace.⁹¹

Proponents of NATO's actions in Kosovo argue that NATO succeeded because "ethnic cleansing was not only reversed but reversed in a way that kept NATO together, prevented the destabilization of neighboring countries, and kept Russia engaged without sacrificing

⁸⁹ Jonathan Marcus, "Kosovo and After: American Primacy in the Twenty-First Century" *The Washington Quarterly* 23:1 (Winter 2000):85. See also, Michael Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure: NATO's War Against Yugoslavia" *Foreign Affairs* 78,4 (September/October 1999):2-8.

⁹⁰ On NATO's success in Kosovo, see Javier Solana, "NATO's Success in Kosovo," *Foreign Affairs* 78:6 (November/December 1999):115-120. On NATO's failures, see Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure"; and George C. Wilson, "Kosovo May be NATO's Last Hurrah," *The National Journal* 32:16 (April 15, 2000).

⁹¹ Clark, General Wesley K. "When Force is Necessary: NATO's Military Response to the Kosovo Crisis." *NATO Review* 47:2 (Summer 1999):14; Marcus, "Kosovo and After," 80.

NATO's stated goals."⁹² For critics, the mission may have been a military success, but it was a political failure. Mandelbaum argues that four times as many people died after NATO intervened than before, and over six times as many Kosovar Albanians were displaced.⁹³

This debate will not be settled soon, and certainly not in this dissertation, but it brings to light the fact that NATO's Kosovo operation was far more complicated than anyone expected upon going in and NATO's KFOR (Kosovo Implementation Forces) will likely remain in Kosovo "implementing" the peace for sometime to come. This experience has the potential to cloud future humanitarian operations and, to the extent that it makes the allies hesitate before acting, it will weaken NATO's credibility and ultimately its performance.

Norms

NATO's record on adhering to norms in the post-Cold War era is mixed. It receives rave reviews for having engaged in dialogue with the states of Central and Eastern Europe and it certainly appears to have had great (initial) success in transforming its values eastward, as evidenced by the success of the Partnership for Peace and, to a lesser extent, the Euro-

⁹² James B. Steinberg, "A Perfect Polemic: Blind to Reality on Kosovo," *Foreign Affairs* 78,6 (November/December 1999):128.

⁹³ Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure," 2-3.

Atlantic Partnership Council. However, within NATO the record has not been as successful as one might have hoped upon entering the post-Cold War era. Despite all of their talk of the unity of the Western democratic community, now that the Soviet threat is gone the allies continue to adhere most strongly to norms when to do so does not infringe upon more pressing national interests.

It is still unclear exactly where NATO will head in the twenty-first century. The model of alliance persistence and disintegration suggests that for the next several years, as NATO recovers from its experience in Kosovo and from round one of enlargement, it will persist as a very unique military alliance. Further evolution and further enlargement are unlikely. Rather, one can expect that the allies will turn inward (with the PfP and the EAPC) in an attempt to reinforce existing constitutive norms and to strengthen their military capacity in the CJTF and the DCI. When another military crisis arises, they will want to be prepared to act swiftly, ably, and resolutely. NATO has survived evolution, enlargement, and military operations. That is indeed a grand success. But without retrenchment of this kind it is unlikely to survive another military test.

Chapter 7

Conclusion: Institutions, Norms, and Allies

The dissertation finds that institutionalization does indeed matter, and it goes a long way toward explaining why some alliances persist or evolve while others merely dissolve as soon as threats recede. This conclusion begins by evaluating the model of alliance institutionalization and demonstrating the various ways in which institutionalization increases opportunities for voice and raises material barriers to exit across alliances. It finds that the analysis in chapters 3 through 6 has provided support for the hypotheses presented in chapter 2. Institutionalization and constitutive norms do explain alliance behavior. Second, the conclusion offers directions for future research, which could include the several cases of alliance institutionalization preceding NATO. An analysis of these alliances will test the model further and possibly corroborate it. Finally, the chapter concludes by considering the theoretical and policy implications of this research. In particular, the research complements existing realist scholarship and it provides insights into the future study of international norms. Finally, it argues that policy makers should not assume that evolving institutionalized alliances are adversarial or rush to respond with destabilizing counter alliances as these alliances may have some functions other than defending against traditional security threats.

Alliance Institutionalization: Material Barriers to Exit

This dissertation has made several arguments regarding the institutionalization of military alliances. States create military alliances to aggregate their resources to counter potential military threats. However, when the strategic environment is very complex and there are threats to military and non-military interests, allies are expected to institutionalize their alliances to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their efforts. Although institutionalization is a costly process, it is expected that allies will agree to initiate it because it can produce positive net benefits and contribute to the solution of problems of collective action. It does so by reducing the transaction costs involved in processes of information search, negotiation, and the monitoring of agreements and by providing allies with a higher quality of information regarding their partners' preferences and actions.

Chapters 3 through 6 provide evidence in support of the model of alliance institutionalization, as allies institutionalized their military pacts to enhance the performance of their alliances in strategic contexts in which they faced threats to military and non-military interests. They did so in anticipation of net benefits. This hypothesis would be falsified if an alliance were to fail to institutionalize in such an environment or if it were to institutionalize when allies perceived significant threats on only one dimension. The analysis does not falsify the hypothesis: NATO, SEATO,

and the Warsaw Pact institutionalized to counter military, political, and ideological threats, while ANZUS failed to institutionalize without such threats.

The process of institutionalization is particularly clear in NATO, SEATO, and the Warsaw Pact. In each of these instances, the participants entered the system in order to combat a possible military threat by traditional military means. They then came to believe that the threats they faced were more complex and required a greater depth of cooperation. Of all the cases, the NATO allies shared the strongest sense of a common threat to territory and values. Consequently, these allies produced a very robust institution characterized by a complex joint military command and an intricate political mechanism. This system necessarily required a sacrifice of some autonomy, but it produced a very efficient military and political machine capable of fighting the Cold War in the military and diplomatic realms and at less of a cost to each ally than if it had gone it alone.

SEATO and the Warsaw Pact engaged in a similar process of institutionalization, but because the allies in these systems did not share the same perception of the degree or the nature of threat to their territories and values, the products of their respective endeavors were a much weaker alliance institutions. Both cases lend support to the model of alliance institutionalization in that the allies that perceived the strongest

threats to their military *and* non-military interests pursued institutionalization whereas those allies that only perceived military *or* non-military threats resisted attempts to institutionalize and only conceded to *limited* institutionalization in order to preserve the underlying military alliance (as in SEATO) or to avoid the possibility of sanctions (as in the Warsaw Pact). Thus in these alliances there was little or no military integration, fewer joint exercises, less equipment standardization and interoperability, and less political consultation.

Finally, ANZUS also lends support to the model of alliance institutionalization, even though it did not institutionalize to any significant degree. Australia and New Zealand, the ANZAC states, wanted institutionalization because they observed that in NATO it brought the junior allies secondary benefits in terms of greater access to American leaders and a degree of influence over American global strategy. However, robust institutionalization did not occur in ANZUS because the three allies did not share a truly common perception of threat to military *and* non-military interests. Instead, the ANZUS allies were able only to agree to engage in bilateral military cooperation on narrow, and traditional, military matters. Thus, ANZUS remained a traditional, non-institutionalized alliance in which each of the allies maintained a maximum freedom of maneuver.

The dissertation also argues that once allies institutionalize their alliances, they will not dismantle them with each transformation in the environment or in the preferences of individual actors. According to the model of alliance behavior, so long as the institution continues to produce net benefits more cost-effectively than available alternatives, or the cost of switching to a substitute is prohibitively high, the alliance will persist. In other words, the cost of abandoning the alliance is higher than the cost of maintaining it. Moreover, an institution that encompasses many interconnected activities or is part of a larger network of institutions will prove more resistant to dissolution, because exiting cooperation in one area will impede the attainment of linked interests. This is the underlying logic of hypothesis 2:

When an institutionalized alliance performs effectively, but the allies do not share constitutive norms, the relationship will *persist*, but it is not expected to undergo a fundamental transformation.

In other words, high net benefits are necessary and sufficient for the institutionalized alliance to persist. For this hypothesis to be falsified, an alliance would have to dissolve (or some allies would have to engage in an abrupt exit) despite satisfactory levels of performance, including anticipation of future performance. Alternatively, it would also be falsified if an alliance were to undergo a fundamental transformation in functions and scope given the presence of satisfactory performance but *not*

constitutive norms. Figure 15 indicates that NATO, ANZUS, and the Warsaw Pact existed in a state of persistence (H2) for at least part of their life cycles.

Performance	Norms	
	Constitutive	Regulative
Effective:	Evolution (H1) NATO 1990s SEATO 1954–1960	Persistence (H2) NATO 1949–1989 ANZUS 1952–1984 Warsaw Pact 1955–1986
	Erosion (H4) SEATO 1960–1972	Dissolution (H3) Warsaw Pact 1986–1991 SEATO 1973–1977 ANZUS 1984

Figure 15: A Model of Alliance Behavior

Again, NATO, the most institutionalized of the alliances examined here, provides the greatest evidence in support of this hypothesis. As NATO became a more complex institution and encompassed a wider-range of issues, it became more costly for allies to abandon the alliance. The issue of NATO's dissolution became significant during the détente of the mid-1960s. Several allies—especially France—suggested during such periods of reduced tension that NATO might be dissolved and the allies might pursue cooperation via other channels. This option was never taken seriously because cooperation extended into many related areas, like research and development (military and civilian), arms control and disarmament, civil emergency planning, communications and intelligence,

and environmental matters. As a result of all of these activities, the organization had many formal and informal channels that governments could turn to in order to consult with one another on a wide range of matters, even some very tangential to NATO's military mandate. Indeed, even France chose not to break its alliance ties. Instead, it chose to exit those linkages that it found most threatening to its national interests—in this case the joint military command. In other areas, it remained an active member of the alliance.

ANZUS and the Warsaw Pact also provided evidence in support of this hypothesis (H2). ANZUS was maintained through most of its existence—between 1951 and 1986—by the sheer extent of the net benefits it provided to each ally. The U.S. gained base and port access in a strategically valuable region, and the ANZAC states gained technology, weapons, and the opportunity to exercise with American forces. They also received access to the American policy process—at least more than they would have received without a military alliance. So long as all of the allies perceived such high benefits, they did not have to confront a growing incompatibility in their interests and the alliance persisted even as their foreign policy interests diverged.

In the Warsaw Pact, in contrast, the allies did not uniformly receive the same high level of net benefits. However, the alliance and its network of bilateral treaties did provide sufficient benefits to ensure persistence

into the mid-1980s. For example, the alliance system brought security against the threat of a military attack—especially for those states that continued to fear West German or NATO aggression. The Pact also functioned as a diplomatic counterpart to NATO and thereby provided the allies with greater international status than they otherwise would have received. For the Soviet Union, the Pact functioned very effectively as a means of internal control. This function did not contribute to the net benefits of those states that were the brunt of this control, but it was considered a net benefit for those states that perceived the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc to pose a threat (like East Germany). Such benefits held the Pact together, in a state of persistence, until the 1980s.

In the other alliances, weak institutions did not provide such a wide range of benefits and never succeeded in raising significant material obstacles to exit. This was particularly true when there were perceived to be alternative institutions that could contribute to security, like the Colombo Plan in Southeast Asia. SEATO did not provide a high level of material benefits to member states and over time all of the allies came to perceive net *costs* to alliance. For example, for the U.S., Britain, and France such costs included the possibility of entrapment in another conflict in Southeast Asia, or the loss of credibility that would result if they were to refuse to uphold their alliance commitments. For the Southeast Asian and

ANZAC allies, association with SEATO hampered efforts to strengthen ties with neighboring states not in the Western camp.

Normative Barriers to Exit

This dissertation has also argued that norms, and in particular *constitutive* norms, instill the institution with a value independent of the material benefits it produces. These norms become part of the identity of the allies and shape their interests such that they pursue policies that they believe to be “good” ones, whether or not they maximize material interests. As such norms emerge and strengthen, states begin to believe that the institution is valuable in its own right and they become “loyal” to it in the sense that they are committed to its normative basis. This means that states will not exit immediately as alliance performance wanes or the strategic environment alters, but they will try to save the relationship. Of course, the inherent value they place in the alliance will not necessarily prevent them from exiting if material costs are excessively high or efforts to salvage the pact fail. This is hypothesis 4:

When an institutionalized alliance does not perform effectively but its allies share constitutive norms, it is expected allies will attempt to reverse its weak performance by reducing (or *eroding*) the scope of the alliances’ activities and simultaneously turning to other institutions to cooperate on the most salient matters.

This hypothesis will be supported when allies are dissatisfied with the performance of their alliance, but constitutive norms are present and allies attempt to preserve the alliance, even as costs rise. Of course, there should also be some evidence that they do so for normative reasons. Alternatively, if allies quickly dissolve a poorly performing alliance, even in the presence of constitutive norms, the hypothesis will be falsified.

As Figure 15 indicates, SEATO's experience supports this hypothesis (H4). The alliance failed to perform well (or at all) in every major crisis—Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam—and yet the U.S. kept the organization afloat into the 1970s as it continued to promote anticommunist norms among its allies. These norms were gradually displaced as the Americans normalized relations with China, and new norms emerged advocating greater cooperation among indigenous allies. This opened the way for the regional allies to turn to new institutions, like ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian States) to find *regional* solutions to their common security problems. While anticommunist norms remained operational (albeit weakening), and performance unsatisfactory, the allies reduced the scope of SEATO's activities and the size of its staff and they increasingly attempted to solve regional military and political problems from outside SEATO. Thus, there is support for hypothesis 4. However, hypothesis 4 would find still greater support if there were more evidence of allies justifying erosion on normative grounds.

Even in those instances in which the alliance continues to perform satisfactorily, states may attempt to alter its goals so that it can better achieve more "good" policies that are consistent with the normative underpinnings of the relationship. This is hypothesis 1:

When an institutionalized alliance performs effectively and its allies share constitutive norms, the relationship will gradually *evolve* to take on new purposes and functions only indirectly related to the original mandate.

This hypothesis will receive the greatest support when there is evidence not only of constitutive norms, but also that these norms serve as the rationale for evolution. The hypothesis will be falsified when evolution occurs in the absence of constitutive norms or if such norms fail to produce evolution in periods of high performance.

The analyses of SEATO and Post-Cold War NATO provide evidence that when constitutive norms are present and performance is satisfactory states do indeed attempt to broaden the scope and purpose of their military alliance. In NATO, and at least for a period in SEATO, allies shared constitutive norms that made them perceive the alliance to have value beyond the military security it could provide. Constitutive norms induced a form of loyalty to the alliance such that states were willing to evolve, or transform the alliance, so that it was capable of addressing cooperation in a wide range of areas, not just deterrence and defense. In NATO, the contemporary case of alliance evolution, the allies sought a

new role for their military organization once the Cold War ended and the Soviet threat had disappeared. They did not abandon NATO's "core" commitment that an attack against one is an attack against all, but they increased the range of their activities to include dialogue and cooperation with non-NATO countries and to engage in crisis management. In SEATO, so long as the allies shared an anti-communist constitutive norm, they engaged in efforts to enlarge the sphere of the organization's activities. Because constitutive norms were weaker and were not equally shared in this alliance, attempts to evolve the alliance in its early years only met limited success.

The evidence suggests one caveat should be added to this hypothesis: constitutive norms are unlikely to produce evolution so long as the allies face an imminent military threat, as NATO did in the Warsaw Pact throughout the Cold War. That is, evolution will not occur when it may weaken the allies' ability to counter what they perceive to be a very real threat to their military security (for example, by diverting resources or attention away from the adversary). However, as threats recede or transform, allies that share constitutive norms will seek out fundamentally new forms of cooperation.

Finally, the dissertation also provides evidence that in the absence of satisfactory performance and constitutive norms, and the alliance will dissolve. Hypothesis 3 reads:

When an institutionalized alliance does not perform satisfactorily and allies do not share constitutive norms, it is expected the relationship will *dissolve*.

This hypothesis receives the greatest support when there is little or no time lag between the perception of poor performance and the decision to dissolve the alliance. The longer the time lag, the less support there will be for this hypothesis. This is particularly true with very low levels of perceived performance.

The Warsaw Pact, ANZUS, and SEATO provide degrees of support for this hypothesis. In each case, the alliance dissolved in the absence of institutional and normative barriers to exit. The Warsaw Pact began the process of dissolution in 1986 as the costs of alliance rose in a transforming regional and global context. First, the rationale for the alliance disappeared. As the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) regimes abandoned Communism, they were no longer in need of protection from their own populations or from the West. In fact, the emerging liberal regimes feared that membership would provide an opportunity for the Soviets to reassert control if they were to reverse the reforms they had initiated in the Eastern Bloc. Moreover, even without such a reversal, the organization was a constant reminder to them of Soviet dominance. Second, the absolute costs of maintaining the alliance were becoming too great. The NSWPs had received cheap security throughout the Cold War, but by the mid-1980s the Soviet Union could no longer afford to provide such security

guarantees. It began to demand a "real" alliance in which all allies would share burdens more equitably. Finally, the NSWP allies, but especially Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, shared a perception that their military association with the USSR would hinder efforts to participate in (or with) Western institutions and to get assistance to support their political and economic reforms. In the absence of constitutive norms, there were no obstacles to forestall exit from the Warsaw Pact as these costs accumulated. Thus, the allies dissolved the alliance in 1991. This lag does not seriously weaken the hypothesis because through these six years the alliance continued to perform satisfactorily for the USSR, which had the power and influence to keep it afloat. However, once the USSR lost the power and the will to maintain the alliance to pursue its own interests, the other allies were able to act upon their perception of net costs and the alliance quickly dissolved.

In the case of ANZUS, wide-ranging benefits were sufficient to preclude any serious questions regarding the fundamental purpose of the alliance through the 1960s, yet as the decade wore on, significant transformations in domestic, regional, and global affairs disproportionately caused some allies to rethink the purpose of ANZUS, their roles in it, and the benefits they received from it. First, regional threats had declined to the point that the ANZAC states no longer perceived an imminent military threat from neighboring states, but rising

global tensions made ANZUS and the South Pacific more strategically significant to the U.S. global deterrence strategy. This latter transformation increased the perception among the ANZAC states that they could become targets in a nuclear exchange. Second, elections in New Zealand and Australia in the early 1980s brought to power parties committed to anti-nuclear policies. David Lange's New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP) Government believed that membership in a U.S.-led nuclear alliance posed the most severe threat to New Zealand's security. Thus, the perceived costs of alliance began to rise for New Zealand. It sought to reduce these costs by banning U.S. nuclear ships visits to its ports. This policy initiated a crisis within ANZUS and, without institutionalized mechanisms for resolving the dispute or raising other barriers to exit, the trilateral relationship effectively dissolved. In 1986 the U.S. suspended its military commitment to New Zealand, leaving in place two bilateral alliances (U.S.-Australia and Australia-New Zealand). This case provides strong evidence for hypothesis 3 as, in the absence of strong constitutive norms, the U.S. was quick to dissolve the commitment to New Zealand and New Zealand did not challenge the action or otherwise fight to maintain the alliance.

Finally, SEATO also entered a state of dissolution as alliance norms were displaced and performance remained unsatisfactory. As new norms favoring regional cooperation supplanted anticommunist norms in

SEATO, several factors reduced the perceived costs of exit and thereby contributed to the decision to dissolve the alliance. First, the benefits of membership were becoming too costly. As the U.S. began to withdraw from the region, it became dangerous for states like Thailand to maintain a high-profile association with such a traditionally anticommunist organization. Continued membership in SEATO did not alleviate security concerns, but actually increased them. Second, emerging alternative organizations, like the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) which sought security through non-military means like economic cooperation, provided viable substitutes for securing Southeast Asian states. Such organizations were better equipped to counter the non-traditional threats that SEATO had been entirely unequipped to manage. Finally, the allies came to believe that the Manila Treaty itself was sufficient to deter traditional threats of military invasion and to maintain the regional balance of power. Thus, SEATO became superfluous and was dissolved. As in the case of the Warsaw Pact, there was a significant delay between the realization that the alliance performed unsatisfactorily and the decision to dissolve it, but this does not falsify the hypothesis. The U.S. continued to derive some benefit in maintaining SEATO as one component in its global deterrence strategy and it had both the power and the will to preserve the alliance. Nonetheless, SEATO would provide

much greater support of the hypothesis if it had undergone a significantly briefer period of dissolution.

Table 5 summarizes these findings.

	Institutionalization	Performance	Norms	Alliance Behavior
NATO¹	Robust	Net benefits	Robust	Persistence 1949–1991
		Net benefits	Robust	Evolution 1991+
Warsaw Pact	Limited	Net benefits	Weak	Persistence 1955–1986
		Net costs	Weak	Dissolution 1986–1991
ANZUS	Weak	Net benefits	Weak	Persistence 1952–1984
		Net costs	Weak	Dissolution 1984
SEATO	Limited	Net costs	Actively promoted, not internalized	Erosion 1960–1972
		Net costs	Displaced	Dissolution 1973–1977

Table 5: A Comparison of Alliances

The dissertation also tests movement in the model of alliance behavior. Hypotheses 5a through 5c (Figure 16) indicate the directions in which movement is anticipated.

¹ Norms were strengthening in NATO throughout the Cold War, but the combination of norms and performance did not produce evolution because the allies were focused on countering the Soviet threat.




Figure 16: The Dynamics of Alliance Behavior

For example, an institutionalized alliance may exist in a state of persistence. However, as constitutive norms develop among the allies it may move from a state of mere persistence, to one of evolution. This is hypothesis 5a:

When an institutionalized alliance is performing effectively, but constitutive norms are gradually strengthening, the alliance is expected to move from a state of *persistence* to *evolution*.

Post-Cold War NATO is the only alliance in this dissertation to provide evidence of this process. As the Cold War ended, the alliance remained in a state of persistence as the allies evaluated the emerging strategic environment. They perceived that NATO had performed its Cold War functions effectively and, even more significantly, they anticipated that it could perform these and new functions just as well in the post-Cold War era. However, because these allies shared robust constitutive norms, the end of the Cold War also provided them with the opportunity to enlarge their community by evolving the alliance to better cultivate democratic

and consultative norms to NATO's East. The allies initiated a process of evolution by engaging in dialogue and cooperation with former adversaries and by taking on crisis management functions (a form of collective security, rather than collective defense). If, however, NATO continues to evolve, but evidence of performance or constitutive norms declines, this hypothesis will not be supported.

The possibility for movement within the model does not stop here. If performance declines after evolution begins, further changes will take place. This is hypothesis 5b:

If performance declines after evolution has occurred, the alliance is expected to *erode* as allies attempt to reverse the weak performance.

SEATO provides some evidence of this process. In the early years of the alliance, before performance was tested, the allies attempted to engage in evolution to create a regional security institution that did not rely solely on military power to combat a potential communist threat. Their efforts were limited, for reasons elaborated above, but they did endeavor to create an organization that encompassed more activities than a traditional military alliance. Once the alliance failed its first serious test, the allies pulled back. They reduced their commitments through SEATO and began to turn to other regional and global organizations to safeguard non-military security interests. Yet the allies maintained SEATO to represent

their normative commitment to one another. Of course, once the normative basis for the alliance was displaced, SEATO dissolved.

The opposite process is also possible. Hypothesis 5c states:

If an institutionalized alliance that has undergone erosion does begin to perform effectively, over time it may be expected to *evolve*.

Hypothesis 5c remains untested, as the processes of erosion did not result in improved performance in any of the alliances examined in this dissertation. In fact, SEATO was the only case to enter a period of erosion, but its performance remained unsatisfactory despite the allies' intentions. In fact, this is the most likely scenario in erosion. However, if future research finds that erosion can produce satisfactory performance, the hypothesis will be corroborated as allies make efforts to evolve the alliance, all else being equal (that is, the norms that facilitated erosion remain unchanged). The hypothesis will not be supported if the alliance moves from erosion to persistence.

Directions for Future Research

This dissertation has examined Cold War alliances. It is difficult to escape focusing on such alliances since very few military pacts prior to World War II initiated a process of institutionalization. However, there are instances of pre-Cold War institutionalized alliances, and future research would benefit by testing the model of alliance behavior on these cases.

Two such examples are the interwar Little Entente between Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia and the Rio Pact, the U.S.-led military pact in Latin America. These cases demonstrate variation on each of the key variables and may provide greater insight into processes of alliance evolution and erosion.

The Little Entente is one of the few modern alliances to undergo a significant process of institutionalization prior to the creation of NATO. The allies engaged in a series of bilateral treaties in 1920-21 in order to overcome their collective military, political, and economic weaknesses and to defend the territorial status quo against Habsburg revisionism. They created a true multilateral alliance and initiated a process of institutionalization in the Little Entente with the signing of the 1929 Tripartite Treaty calling "for the peaceful settlement of all their disputes in accordance with the model treaty of arbitration and conciliation which the League of Nations had adopted in 1928."² For the next several years, the Little Entente exhibited a satisfactory, if not strong, record of performance. It was very active between 1922 and 1927 in the League of Nations, and its members anticipated that it might become a recognized player in international relations—another great power, as it were.³

² Harry N. Howard, "The Little Entente and the Balkan Entente," in *Czechoslovakia: Twenty Years of Independence*, ed. Robert J. Kerner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1940), 371.

³ Gerhard Schacher, *Central Europe and the Western World* (New York:

Institutionalization advanced again in 1933 when the Statute of the Little Entente created a Permanent Council of States, a secretariat with an office in Geneva, and an Economic Council to coordinate and strengthen economic relations. These reforms were a means to consolidate political cooperation and strengthen the status quo in Central Europe.⁴ The model of alliance behavior would expect to see this institutionalization raise significant material obstacles to exit, even as performance begins to decline.

The strength and type of norms associated with this alliance also is worthy of further scrutiny. Some scholars are emphatic that the only binding tie among these states was their fear of Hungarian revisionism, while others tend to emphasize the allies' commitment to collective security and maintenance of the territorial and political status quo—even to the degree of being constitutive.⁵ Regardless of whether the commitment was a constitutive or a regulative one, the alliance began to

Henry Holt and Company, 1936), 29.

⁴ Howard, "The Little Entente and the Balkan Entente," 374; Piotr Wandycz, "The Little Entente: Sixty Years Later," *Slavonic and East European Review* 59,4 (1981): 558; Nicolae Dascalu, "The Economic Little Entente: An Attempt at Setting Up a European Economic Community (1922-1938)," *Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Europeennes* 19,1 (1981): 85-86.

⁵ On the former, see Wandycz "The Little Entente," 552; and Andrew A. Michta, *East Central Europe After the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 23-24; on the latter see Schacher, *Central Europe and the Western World*, 94.

erode as the regional environment became more menacing and the allies pursued national interests at the expense of alliance interests. One of the greatest blows to the alliance fell in 1937 when Yugoslavia entered a bilateral pact with Italy, thereby contravening the principle of collective security enmeshed in the Little Entente.⁶ The model of alliance behavior would explain Yugoslavia's actions by examining both the material and normative costs of alliance. It would expect to find that such an action was a reaction to a more hostile environment that the alliance was not equipped to manage (that is, decreasing performance) in combination with weakening (but still present) constitutive norms. When the alliance finally dissolved, it was not by the choice of its members. Instead, Czechoslovakia was forced to withdraw following the German invasion in 1939—an invasion that the Little Entente failed to deter or to halt.

The Rio Treaty and the Inter-American security system provide another example of an institutionalized alliance worthy of analysis. The Rio Treaty was one of the first Cold War alliance systems *and* a precursor to NATO. In September 1947, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was signed as a military pact with political objectives. It underwent a limited process of institutionalization in which the allies created mechanisms for consultation, voting, and intra-alliance dispute

⁶ Wandycz, "The Little Entente," 561; and Eliza Campus, *The Little Entente and the Balkan Alliance*, trans. Delia Razdolescu (Bucharest: Editura Academiei

resolution. This much is consistent with the model of alliance institutionalization. The following year, the Bogota Pact further institutionalized the Inter-American security system in creating the Organization of American States (OAS), an official regional security mechanism to carry out the political, economic, and military sanctions in the Rio Treaty.⁷ Although it is often argued that this alliance system is less of a collective security organ than a system for formalizing the principal of nonintervention in Latin America,⁸ this alliance system can nonetheless be very useful in the analysis of institutionalized alliances—in much the same way that the Warsaw Pact illustrated the model of alliance behavior. That is, because it is a military alliance with the primary objective of managing allied relations, it can provide additional insights into the causes and consequences of institutionalization. It will corroborate the model of alliance institutionalization if it can be demonstrated that institutionalization did occur to better manage interrelated military and political threats. It will weaken the model if it finds that the military

Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1978), 134.

⁷ J. Lloyd Mechem, *The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889–1960* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), 281–284.

⁸ Richard J. Bloomfield, “The Inter-American System: Does It have a Future?” in *The Future of The Inter-American System*, ed. Tom J. Farer (New York: Praeger, 1979), 8.

rationale was (from the outset) no more than a pretense for creating a system of political control.

The model of alliance behavior would expect the inter-American alliance system to persist so long as it maintains satisfactory performance, but it would predict evolution if satisfactory performance occurs in combination with strong constitutive norms. Such an analysis may prove a very valuable contribution to our understanding of post-Cold War alliances because there has been some discussion of evolving the alliance's mission to fit the new environment. For example, the OAS's Santiago Declaration (1991) created a "rapid response mechanism to any 'sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's member states.'" ⁹ An analysis of the OAS's efforts to expand its mission (as the institutional manifestation of the Rio Pact) and an evaluation of its performance in these new roles can lend further insight into alliance behavior. Moreover, since the OAS is not purely (or even primarily) a military organization, such an analysis can suggest the possibility of applying the model to explain persistence, evolution, erosion, and dissolution in regional organizations other than militarized alliances.

⁹ Ted Galen Carpenter, *A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances After the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 1992), 133.

Methodological and Theoretical Implications

This dissertation has significant implications for alliance theory, especially research on alliance persistence and erosion. The cases have ramifications for realist alliance theories and institutionalist theories. First, the dissertation concludes that classical and neorealist treatments of alliances are unable to explain the full range of alliance behavior. Both traditions focus on the formation of highly fluid alliance systems that aggregate states' military capabilities. Classical Realists argue that alliances are merely a means to distribute the costs of defense and of war and states will not enter alliances when they anticipate net costs. In neorealist theory, transformations in systemic conditions cause states to form alliances. They *balance* with the weaker side against a preponderant state or coalition, or they *bandwagon* with a preponderant power. Both the classical and neorealist approaches focus exclusively on the processes of alliance formation and dissolution. Alliances that form only as a matter of expediency or in response to a change in the configuration of the international system are expected to dissolve once the threat recedes or the balance of power alters. There is no justification for a state to maintain an alliance beyond the conditions in which it was created and, indeed, it may be dangerous for a state to do so because alliances limit the foreign policy options of autonomous states.

These cases have demonstrated that alliances do tend to emerge and dissolve for all of the reasons that the realists indicate. However, alliance behavior is far more sophisticated than formation and dissolution. This is particularly true of the complex alliance systems that emerged during the Cold War. NATO, SEATO, ANZUS, and the Warsaw Pact have demonstrated evolution, erosion, and persistence. The dissertation concludes that to understand and explain these processes one must consider variables that realists tend to neglect: institutions and norms. The analysis has found that institutions affect alliance behavior by increasing the costs (material and nonmaterial) of dissolving the relationship and by creating alternatives to dissolution. Institutionalization will contribute to persistence when the alliance continues to produce benefits more cost-effectively than any available alternatives, or when the cost of switching to a substitute is prohibitively high. The analysis has also found support for the significance of norms in the processes of alliance evolution and erosion. When allies share robust constitutive norms, they are more likely to make evolutionary reforms in alliances that already work. In those that perform suboptimally, they tend to engage in reforms that reduce the scope of the commitment.

This dissertation also has implications for the analysis of international norms. As chapter 2 indicated, traditional scholarship tends to downplay the significance of norms because they are very challenging

to operationalize and analyze. Norms are not tangible and they are “ubiquitous,” making it difficult to determine which norms are most influential in shaping behavior. It also can be very difficult to demonstrate the strength of a particular norm, as norms are not always a product of evolution, but also of negotiation or active promotion. Moreover, states can also deviate from norms and they can be manipulative and deceptive in turning to norms to justify their actions.

The dissertation concludes that these are real problems in the analysis of norms, but it suggests ways to overcome them. The analysis draws on Arend’s authority-control index for measuring putative rules in international law.¹⁰ The index evaluates the strength of the norm on two dimensions. First, it looks for formal and informal manifestations of the rule within treaties, domestic laws, judicial decisions, parliamentary speeches, diplomatic letters and memoranda, and so forth. Second, it evaluates the number and kind of violations that occur. Of course, official sources often have a political purpose that may be difficult to decipher. For example, states may formulate a purely strategic interest in normative terms in order to get their allies to support a particular action. ANZUS provides the best illustration of this practice, although it is seen in each of the other alliances. In alliance documents, communiqués, and press

¹⁰ Anthony Clark Arend, *Legal Rules and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 87-101.

statements, the allies always cited their common Western heritage. Yet other documents and sources, particularly those directed toward domestic audiences, often belied these statements. The analyses suggest that this type of behavior is most prominent when states are attempting to sway the opinion of their allies. That is, states frequently use normative language to influence allies.

In other circumstances, in which there is a real normative rationale for a particular action, states justify the action in strategic terms. This type of manipulation is more likely to occur among democratic allies when there is a gap between elite and public opinion.¹¹ For example, chapter 6 provides evidence that the leadership in NATO countries favors alliance evolution for normative, as well as performance, reasons. And yet, much of the rhetoric used to sell the alliance to the public—especially in the United States—frames evolution and enlargement as solutions to strategic problems, like regional stability. Public opinion data suggests why this occurs: in 1986 “16 percent of Americans in polls favored reducing or ending US NATO commitments; in 1996 that share had risen to 33

¹¹ On the nature of such foreign policy gaps, see Benjamin I. Page and Jason Barabas, “Foreign Policy Gaps Between Citizens and Leaders,” *International Studies Quarterly* 44,3 (September 2000):339–364. An accurate assessment of these norms requires access to private documents, which tend to be far less readily available and which are subject to their own biases, especially when written long after alliance decisions have taken place. This creates a significant measurement problem in alliances like the Warsaw Pact, in which there now is a significant stigma attached to membership.

percent.”¹² An American leadership bent on NATO evolution had to express the policy in terms that its constituency would accept. In short, an awareness of the circumstances under which manipulation tends to occur will strengthen the analysis of norms in future studies.

Of course, the dissertation also finds that it is insufficient to rely upon public and written pronouncements to evaluate the strength of a norm. It is also necessary to examine state behavior, or how frequently states back up their rhetoric with their actions. As violations of the pronounced norms increase, especially on the part of those states most affected by the norm, the norm’s robustness diminishes. This leads to another conclusion. It is particularly difficult to measure the robustness of a norm in the absence of a threat to state interests because there is no conflict between the norm and interests. The true strength of a norm will become apparent when states are forced to choose between it and their national interests. All of the cases demonstrate that “alliance interests” rarely supersede interests when the national security of one or more allies is perceived to be at stake. For example, in NATO, which has at its heart a norm of democratic governance, the allies have tolerated undemocratic regimes when doing so has reinforced their security.¹³ In particular,

¹² Clay Clemens, “The Strategic and Political Consequences of NATO Enlargement,” in *Two Tiers or Two Speeds*, ed. James Sperling, 157n.

¹³ For the distinction between democratic norms and democratic interests, see Joanne Gowa, *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace* (Princeton:

neither Greece nor Portugal was sanctioned for having authoritarian regimes. While in the post-Cold War era, NATO has proclaimed an interest in producing democracy in Eastern and Central Europe, the goal is really to produce stability. There is no evidence to indicate that NATO allies will behave any differently than they did during the Cold War and enforce democratic norms, even if to do so conflicts with the desired goal of European stability. This is one implication worthy of further scrutiny.

Finally, this dissertation has produced some very significant policy implications. First, alliances tend to instigate or amplify security dilemmas. That is, once an alliance forms, non-participants, fearing that the alliance may be directed against them, tend to respond by forming counter alliances or by increasing their armaments. Such actions then "confirm" that the strategic environment is indeed hostile and set off a series of defense efforts that end up being destabilizing. However, alliances that persist for a long period and (even more so) those that evolve to take on new functions need not be destabilizing. However, for this to be the case, policy-makers need to reverse their Cold War mindsets and be willing to accept alliances as being far more than instruments of military statecraft. To ensure such alliances are not destabilizing, policymakers must be willing to engage in dialogue with one another, and policymakers in the evolving alliance must be willing to back up their

rhetoric with actions. They must go out of their way to demonstrate their intent is not aggressive.

Second, policymakers within the alliance must always act with an awareness of its military and non-military (or political) functions. Decisions taken in one area should not be allowed to undermine performance the other significantly, for if a delicate balance is not maintained the alliance itself could be jeopardized and all related benefits lost. For example, in their efforts to increase transparency and prevent a security dilemma from raging out of control, policymakers cannot neglect the military rationale of the alliance or engage in behaviors that may undermine military performance. If the alliance loses the capacity to perform its core military mission, it may become easier for states to exit, or at least to begin turning to other forums to solve collective problems, even as the alliance provides other benefits. Likewise, policymakers cannot become complacent and neglect to manage the political aspects of the alliance. If allies believe that they only receive military benefits, and there is no imminent military threat, they also may choose to abandon the alliance.

Finally, this analysis of institutionalization and norms in the security arena may also contribute to our understanding of relations between and within other kinds of international institutions, like the European Union, the Asian-Pacific Economic Community, the Association

of Southeast Asian States, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The ability to better manage such institutions is particularly important because the complexities of the contemporary international system suggest that in the future, many states will turn to such institutions to manage military threats as well as political and economic relations.

Appendix **A Comparison of Treaties¹**

NATO	ANZUS	SEATO	Warsaw Pact
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Preamble</i></p> <p>The Parties to this treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments.</p> <p>They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their people, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.</p> <p>They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Preamble</i></p> <p>The Parties to this Treaty,</p> <p>Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,</p> <p>Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Preamble</i></p> <p>The Parties to this Treaty:</p> <p>Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,</p> <p>Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,</p> <p>Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Preamble</i></p> <p>The Contracting Parties, reaffirming their desire for the establishment of a system of European collective security based on the participation of all European States irrespective of their social and political systems, which would make it possible to unite their efforts in safeguarding the peace of Europe:</p> <p>mindful at the same time, of the situation created in Europe by the ratification of the Paris Agreements, which envisage the formation of a new military alignment in the shape of "Western</p>

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,

Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for

earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to

European Union," with the participation of a remilitarized Western Germany and the integration of the latter in the North Atlantic bloc, which increases the danger of another war and constitutes a threat to the national security of peaceable states;

being persuaded that in these circumstances the peaceable European States must take the necessary measures to safeguard their security and in the interests of preserving peace in Europe;

guided by the objects and principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization;

being desirous of further

collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

promoting and developing friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of States and of non-interference in their internal affairs;

have decided to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance and have for that purpose appointed as their plenipotentiaries; (follow the names of the plenipotentiaries of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia), who, having presented their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

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Article 1

The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes peacefully and such manner as will not jeopardise international peace and security.

Article 2

The Contracting Parties declare their readiness to participate in a spirit of sincere co-operation in all international actions designed to safeguard international peace and security, and will fully devote their energies to the attainment of this end.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to

Article 3

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these

The Contracting Parties will furthermore strive for the adoption, in agreement with other States which may desire to co-operate in this, of effective measures for universal reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

Article 8

The Contracting Parties declare that they will act in a spirit of friendship and co-operation with a view to further developing and fostering economic and cultural relations with one another, each adhering to the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the others and non-interference in their internal affairs.

eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 2

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ends.

Article 2

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

Article 5

The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish a Joint Command of the Armed forces that by agreement among the Parties shall be assigned to the Command, which shall function on the basis of jointly established principles. They shall likewise adopt other agreed measure necessary to strengthen their defensive power, in order to protect the peaceful labors of their peoples, guarantees the inviolability of their frontiers and territories, and provide defense against possible aggression.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an

Article 3

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Article 4

Each Party recognizes that

Article 4

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

Article 4

1. Each Party recognizes that

Article 3

The Contracting Parties shall consult with one another on all important international issues affecting their common interests, guided by the desire to strengthen international peace and security.

They shall immediately consult with one another whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, a threat of armed attack on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty has arisen, in order to ensure joint defence and the maintenance of peace and security.

Article 4

In the event of armed attack

armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to

an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or

in Europe on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty by any State or group of States, each of the Parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defense, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the State or States attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force. The Parties to the Treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security.

the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

The territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North

Article 5

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or

with the consent of the government concerned.

Article 8

As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area

Measures taken on the basis of this Article shall be reported to the Security Council in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations Organization. These measures shall be discontinued immediately the Security Council adopts [sic] the necessary measures to restore and maintain international peace and security.

America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

The forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7

The Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under

on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article 6

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the

north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the Treaty of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty area.

Article 6

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any

the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of

Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 7

The parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their

of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 6

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 5

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of

Article 7

The Contracting Parties undertake not to participate in any coalitions or alliances and not to conclude any agreements whose objects conflict with the objects of the present Treaty.

The Contracting Parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties do not conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

Article 6

For the purpose of the consultations among the

them shall be represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a Defense Committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North

Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

Article 7

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, by invited to accede to this

Parties envisaged in the present Treaty, and also for the purpose of examining questions which may arise in the operation of the Treaty, a Political Consultative Committee shall be set up, in which each of the Parties to the Treaty shall be represented by a member of its Government or by another specifically appointed representative.

The Committee may set up such auxiliary bodies as may prove necessary.

Article 9

The present Treaty is open to the accession of other States irrespective of their social and political systems, which express their readiness by participation in the present Treaty to assist

Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other

Article 9

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as

Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 9.2-9.3

The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other

in uniting the efforts of the peaceable States in safeguarding the peace and security of the peoples. Such accession shall enter into force with the agreement of the Parties of the Treaty after the declaration of accession has been deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

Article 10

The present Treaty is subject to ratification, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

The Treaty shall enter into force on the day the last instrument of ratification has been deposited. The Government of the Polish

signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting

the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

signatories of such deposit.

The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

People's Republic shall notify the other Parties to the Treaty as each instrument of ratification is deposited.

Article 11.2

Should a system of collective security be established in Europe, and a General European Treaty of Collective Security concluded for this purpose, for which the Contracting Parties will unswervingly

peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are

Article 10

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

Article 11

The Treaty in the English language shall be deposited

Article 10

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 9.1

This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of

strive, the present Treaty shall cease to be operative from the day the General European Treaty enters into force.

Article 11.1

The present Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years. For such Contracting Parties as do not one year before the expiration of this period present to the Government of the Polish People's Republic a statement of denunciation of the Treaty, it shall remain in force for the next ten years.

Article 11.3-11.4

Done in Warsaw on 14th May, 1955, in one copy each

equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.

No corresponding Articles in the North Atlantic Treaty:

in the Archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

Article 8
Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective

the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that government to the other Signatories.

Article 11
The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.

Understanding of the United States of America
The United States of America is executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of

in the Russian, Polish, Czech and German languages, all texts being equally authentic. Certified copies of the present Treaty shall be sent by the Government of the Polish People's Republic to all the Parties to the Treaty.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and affixed their seals.

Communiqué on the Establishment of a Joint Command of the Armed Forces of the Signatories to the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance
(Warsaw, 14th May, 1955)

means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

In pursuance of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic, the signatory States have decided to establish a Joint Command of their armed forces.

The decision provides that general questions relating to the strengthening of the defensive power and the organization of the Joint Armed Forces of the signatory States shall be

subject to examination by the Political Consultative Committee, which shall adopt the necessary decisions.

Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Koniev has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces to be assigned by the signatory States.

The Ministers of Defense or other military leaders of the signatory States are to serve as Deputy Commanders-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, and shall command the armed forces assigned by their respective States to the Joint Armed Forces.

The question of the participation of the German Democratic Republic in measures concerning the

armed forces of the Joint Command will be examined at a later date. A Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the signatory States will be set up under the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, and will include permanent representatives of the General Staffs of the signatory States.

The Staff will have its headquarters in Moscow.

The disposition of the Joint Armed Forces in the territories of the signatory States will be effected, by agreement among the States, in accordance with the requirements of their mutual defense.

¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact: A Comparative Study* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1980), 10–20; Jacob Bercovitch, ed. *ANZUS in Crisis: Alliance Management in International Affairs*, (Houndmills: MacMillan Press, 1998), 247–249; Leszek Buszynski, *SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy* (Kent Ridge, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), 227–230.

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