

, ENGLISH CANADIANS AND QUEBECOIS NATIONALISM

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McGill University ENGLISH CANADIANS AND QUEBECOIS NATIONALISM

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A THESIS SUBMITTED

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

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FOR

THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

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July 1974

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ABSTRACT

The English-speaking minority in Quebec is a privileged socio-economic group with a whole range of institutions separate from those of the French-speaking majority. How are anglophones reacting to the Québec independentist movement? In terms of overt political preferences, anglophones display a high degree of unanimity in their opposition. However, with respect to a more subtle dimension such as sympathy for French-Canadian nationalism, English Quebecers display a wide range of variation. Those at upper socio-economic levels are the most sympathetic, because of their higher education and greater awareness of the inequalities between French and English, not because they are less threatened. Some further structural sources of sympathy are discussed, and a few theoretical propositions are advanced concerning variations in dominant group sympathy toward subordinate group nation-The study provides a detailed examination of the belief sys-" alism. tem of a dominant minority in a context of ethnic stratification.

RESUME

La minorité anglophone au Québec constitué un groupe privilégié avec un réseau distinct d'institutions. Quelle est la réaction des ang apphones au mouvement indépendantiste québécois? Pour ce qui est de leurs préférences politiques manifestes, les andlophones sont opposés à l'indépendance du Québec presqu'à l'unanimité. Pourtant. en ce qui concerne la dimension plus subtile de l'intensité des sympathies envers le nationalisme québécois, il ressort que les sentiments de la communauté anglophone sont des plus diversifiés, C'est parmi les individus appartenant aux couches sociales supérieures que le nationalisme québécois jouit de la plus grande faveur. Ce phén+ omène s'explique par des facteurs d'éducation et de conscience des inégalités entre francophones et anglophones, et non par l'hypothèse que les classes supérieures se sentiraient moins menacées. Nous discutons d'autres bases structurelles aux sympathies, et nous avançons quelques propositions théoriques concernant les variations des sympathies des groupes dominants envers les mouvements nationalistes des groupes dominés. La thèse est une étude approfondie du système de croyances d'une minorité dominante dans un contexte de stratification ethnique.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the many people who helped in carrying out this project. In particular, I would like to mention the following persons:

The anonymous respondents whose cooperation made the study possible.

Coleman Romalis, who provided the with the field notes of his own previous related research.

E. M. Schreiber, who taught me some of his impressive data-handling skills at a crucial time.

Special thanks yo to Maurice Pinard, who made the data available and advised me throughout the study. His careful reading of previous drafts and his many thoughtful comments have been invaluable.

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

In the past decade many structural changes have swept through Quebec society.¹ Along with these changes have come snowballing a renaissance of French-Canadian culture, a resurgent nationalism, and a separatist movement that is stronger than it has ever been. All of these transformations have affected the traditional position of the English-speaking population of Quebec: that of a dominant minority whose members, like the early Protestants, are "in the world, but not of jt". How are anglophones reacting to the current nationalist and separatist movement, which, determined to break down the many longstanding patterns of English domination, often takes on as targets many English-language institutions?

The object of this thesis is to systematically investigate the reactions of English-speaking Quebecers by analyzing responses of a representative sample of the entire non-French-Canadian population of Quebec. In more general sociological terms, the goal is to examine the reactions of members of a dominant group in a segmented society to a nationalist movement of the dominated group. It is hoped that the analysis will cast light on certain distinctive features of Quebec society. At the same time, it should add to our understanding of the responses of white and non-Spanish-speaking Americans, Southern English Britons, Protestant Ulstermen, non-Breton Frenchmen, non-Basque Span-"iards, and other dominant groups in ethnically stratified industrial societies.

A. THE SETTING

Let us begin with a look at the particular *intergroup* 'arena' in which French-English relations take place. Without going into any great detail here, several sociological features of Quebec society stand out in importance:

a) perhaps the most important feature of the ethnic stratification system in Quebec is the wide range of *inequalities* between francophones and anglophones.⁴ Anglophones are quite strongly overrepresented in the middle and upper class levels. The higher the income level, the greater sis the proportion of its occupants who are English speaking. French Canadians, who comprise 80 percent of Quebec's population, hold a near monopoly over working class jobs. English Canadians, on the other hand, hold the overwhelming majority of upper managerial and executive jobs, especially in the private sector, in large firms, and in Montreal.

b) another important aspect of French-English relations in Quebec is the overwhelming degree of segmentation between the two groups. Most anglophones live in areas where anglophones form the majority. Most institutions in which anglophones participate are dominated by anglophones, with the exception of politics. With the significant exception of the work world, most institutions are *parallel* and non-overlapping. Perhaps the best example of this is the educational system, which consists of essentially two autonomous systems, French and English, each giving instruction from kindergarten to the postgraduate level.

c) another key feature that cannot be ignored is the set of widespread social changes that is often labelled the "Quiet Revolution" beginning roughly in 1960. It is against the backdrop of these many changes³ that the independentist movement has grown strong, and that the English-speaking minority has had to call its traditional position into-question.

B. MATERIALS

Since we will begin referring to it in the next section, let us mention here that the main body of data examined in this study is part of a sample survey of the adult Quebec population carried out in late 1970 and early 1971. The survey was carried out under the direction of Maurice Pinard; the fieldwork was done by the Centre de Sondage of the University of Montreal. From this set of interviews was taken a subset of 346 structured interviews which serve as the basic body of data analyzed in this study. This subset consists of all those respondents in the sample who answered the English-language questionnaire.⁴ (The few French Canadians who answered the English-language questionnaire have been omitted).

C. THE SOCIOLOGICAL "PROBLEM"

Let us begin by noting that only a very few anglophones voted for the Parti Québécois in the 1970 provincial election (the first in which it appeared), while over a fourth of the francophones did so. Of those who answered the English-language questionnaire, 92% indicated they were opposed to the separation of Queber from the rest of Canada; 6%

were undecided, and 2% were in favour of it. Among francophones on the other hand, only 74% were opposed, 9% were undecided, and 16% were in favour. With respect to a new "souveraineté-association" arrangement between Ouébec and the rest of Canada, anolophone opposition was only slightly less unanimous. In response to the question "It has been suggested that Quebec become an independent country politically, while retaining economic links with Canada. Are you personally for or against political independence with economic association with Canada?", 79% of the English respondents were against, 17% undecided, and 4% were in favor of this proposal. In contrast, nearly 30% of francophones, favor such a rearrangement:

What all of this means is that both in their political behavior and in their political attitudes, most English Quebecers are quite strongly opposed to the independentist movement. This has been confirmed by the only previous empirical study of the topic, namely Romalis's work on the attitudes of the Montreal Jewish community.⁵

Given this near-unanimous opposition, a puzzling fact is that it has not been translated into any kind of *counter-movement*. To appreciate what things *could* be like, let us look briefly at newspaper accounts of the reactions of *two other dominant groups* in linguistically segmented societies. Both of the following incidents took place on the *same day* recently.

"FLEMISH, FRENCH CLASH"

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VILVOORDE, Belgium (AP)--Twenty thousand Flemings rallied here yesterday to protest what they claim is an increase in French-speaking influence in Belgium.

A counter-demonstration by 150 French-speaking militants (French speakers are the dominant group in Belgium; L.L.) resulted in an exchange of abusive language--in Flemish and

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French.

It was the biggest demonstration for two years in the long conflict between the Flemish and the French communities in Belgium...

(The Montreal Star, October 16, 1972)

"RIOTS OVER ROAD SIGNS: 15,000 PROTEST IN AUSTRIA" VIENNA--Fifteen thousand persons demonstrated against the government in Southern Austria yesterday after several nights of rioting in one of the nation's most serious domestic crises in recent years.

The demonstrators, most of them Corran-speaking (emphasis added. German speakers are the dominant group in Austria L.L.) rightists, oppose a recent decision by the regime of Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and the provincial government of Carinthia to provide dual-language road signs in areas with sizeable Slovene populations--as required by the 1955 treaty granting Austria its post-war independence.

Signs at the approaches to the 205 cities and villages have been ripped down almost nightly for two weeks by mobs in noisy caravans of up to 400 autos. Each morning they are replaced by road crews. Acting under strict central controls designed to avoid greater violence, police have made no arrests and have made no strenuous effort to protect the signs.

Late Tuesday, at ceremonies marking the 52nd anniversary of the plebiscite in which southern Carinthia voted to remain with Austria rather than Yugoslavia after the First World War, aides to Hans Sima, the governor of Carinthia, were roughed up and police had to use force to rescue Sima from the angry, German-speaking crowd...

(The Montreal Star, October 16, 1972)

A comment is in order concerning the above: the German-speaking population of southern Carinthia in 1961 was about 75,000. This means that 20 percent of the dominant group population was out protesting!

These kinds of collective behavior episodes suggest that we have to explain why_{\circ} the case of English Quebecers is different. Given the inequalities, the segmentation, the rapid social change, and the near-unanimous opposition of anglophones, why is there less overt conflict between francophones and anglophones than is the case in other

intergroup arenas? How can we explain the absence of any "radicalright" style formations? Why are there no equivalents of hard-hat demonstrations, no counterpart to the Rev. Paisley, no First of July marches heading east down Ste. Catherine Street singing "O Canada" in English, no more diffuse and general variants of the Jewish Defense League? These are the kind of sociological questions that the problem suggests. (To raise these questions does not imply, of course, that one wishes there were such movements).

These questions have no simple answer, and it is unlikely that there is any monocausal explanation that could account for the differences observed. Nonetheless, only one possible explanation will be suggested here. This concerns the *degree of legitimacy or sympathy* that anglophones accord Québécois nationalism. Could it be that the level of French-English conflict is relatively low partly because anglophones *agree* with many nationalist demands? The main object of this thesis will be to examine this *degree of sympathy* that anglophone Quebecers feel for Québécois nationalism, and to locate some of the ways in which such feelings are determined by the structure of Quebec society.

As Schermerhorn has noted, a low level of intergroup conflict can be due to both groups *agreeing* on the degree of legitimacy of the dominant group's dominant status, be it high or low.⁶ Thus the low conflict characterizing many caste-stratified agricultural societies over long periods may be due in part to both the rulers and the ruled agreeing that the setup is a just or "natural" one. Similarly, if both

groups believe that the power of the dominant group is anly partly legitimate, then the level of conflict will also be relatively low. This latter situation might apply to the Quebec case.

Coser has pointed out that ". . . legitimacy is a crucial intervening variable without which it is impossible to predict whether feelings of hostility arising out of an unequal distribution of privileges and rights actually lead to conflict."⁷

Phrasing this differently, legitimacy is one intervening variable, among others, between the *existence* of inequalities between groups, on the one hand, and the expression of conflict on the other.

To predict the occurence of ethnic conflict, it is important to take into account the question of legitimacy. This is not to say, however, that knowledge of the degree of legitimacy is sufficient for predicting conflict, but simply that it improves the accuracy of the prediction. In other words, most theorists would agree that the existence of inequalities between two groups in an intergroup arena will add to the probability of conflict between them, however high or low this probability is for other reasons. If the subordinate group sees the dominant group's power as illegitimate and the dominant group does not, the probability of conflict is increased further.

Empirical research on legitimacy is a relatively underdeveloped area in the study of ethnic relations. Thus, this study will take as its principal dependent variable this degree of legitimacy or sympathy which is a crucial intervening variable in an overall framework seeking to explain intergroup conflict. The study will not deal with the links between legitimacy or sympathy and the actual occurence or inten-.

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sity of conflict, nor will it deal with any *ether* possible factors that contribute to ethnic conflict.

Although a principal motivation and impetus for this study is to examine systematically the reactions of English Quebecers to the rapid social change of the last decade, this thesis is not primarily a study of social change because for the most part we present data on only one point in time. Rather, the study offers a snapshot view of the belief system of a dominant group in a segmented society at one point in recent history.

D. A BRIEF OUTLINE

The following is a short guide to the organization of the study.

Presently, this introductory chapter will conclude with the construction and validation of an index of sympathy for Québécois nationalism.

In chapter two, we examine how class and class-related structural features of the *stratification* system determine the distribution of feelings of sympathy throughout the anglophone community in Quebec.

Chapter three argues that one of the main conditions Under which dominant groups feel threatened is in periods of rapid social change such as the last decade or so in Quebec. The chapter goes on to examine the distribution of feelings of threat among English Quebecers, and specifies how these feelings influence the expression of sympathy.

Chapter four is devoted to an examination of the effects of

linguistic acgreentation and intergroup contacts on the distribution of feelings of threat and feelings of sympathy.

Notice that chapters two, three, and four each look at the impact, direct or indirect, of one of the principal structural features of Quebec society mentioned earlier: chapter two covers the issue of inequalities; chapter three deals with the consequences of rapid social change; and chapter four discusses the impact of sequentation.

It might also be noted that chapter three covers what Smelser, in his value-added scheme,^B refers to as *strains*. The topic matter of chapter four corresponds roughly to Smelser's *conducive factors*.

Finally, chapter five deals with the ways in which feelings of sympathy and feelings of threat vary by age. This is an important variable to consider in understanding the social basis of many social movements, and this particular case is no exception. Hence, theoretically speaking, this chapter winds up our understanding of the structural sources of sympathy.

E. AN INDEX OF SYMPATHY

Now we are ready to build an index of our basic dependent variable, the degree of favourableness with which English-speaking Quebecers perceive French Canadian demands. The following questions were included in our index:

Q2-36: When you think of all the demands of French Canadians in the last ten years, how many do you feel are justified: almost all, a good number, a few, or only very few?

Q2-38: What do you think of the position of French Canadians in the federal government in Ottawa: is it more important,

as important, or less important than it should be?

Q2-39: If you think of the probleme of Trench Canddians, would you say that the French Canadians themselves are mainly to blame, that other groups are to blame, that the blame should be shared, or that no group is really to blame?

The advantage of using an index such as this is that it provides a more reliable and uniform measure of sympathy than would be provided by responses to any single question taken by itself. Responses to the above three questions were summed to give a score on the index. Next, the sample was divided into 3 groups as follows:

> Low (Unfavourable) - 23.7° Medium (Indifferent)- 36.2° High (Sympathetic) - 40.1° (N - 629) 100.0%

We should mention at this point that missing data have been excluded before percentaging in all of the tables presented, unless otherwise indicated. Also, a weighting factor has been applied to the data to ensure representativeness. Since only the "weighted" number of cases will be reported throughout the analysis, special caution should be taken in interpreting conclusions based on small sub-samples.

It is important to note that the labels attached to the categories above are, above all, labels. Hence the 40% of the sample who are "sympathetic" to Québécois demands are so mainly in a relative sense, that is, relative to the others who are less so. Similarly, the 24% who are "unfavourable" to French Canadian demands do not constitute a discrete subset of the sample in any absolute sense of the term "unfavourable". Rather, those we have labelled sympathetic should be

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thought of as "the most unfavourable 24° " of the sample; and the "indiferents" should not be thought of as uncommitted in any sense other than that of falling between the two extremes $a_{\rm eff}$

F. VALIDITY OF THE INDEX

Before proceeding, we ought to ensure that the index just constructed is indeed a good measure of what it is intended to measure. This is especially important since this "degree of favourableness" will be our principal dependent variable through this thesis. Three criteria of validity can be applied¹⁰: all of them suggest that the use of this index is fully justified.

First of all, the three component questions are pertinent; all af them bear on the legitimacy of French Canadian demands. (Face Validity). Q2-36 asks)of this in straightforward fashion. Q2-38, pertaining to the power of French Canadians in the federal government, touches upon a critical issue. Francophones have always been underrepresented in the federal civil service, and severely so at the upper levels. In 1970, when the survey was undertaken, the government headed by Pierre Elliott Trudeau had been in power for over two years. In addition to being led by a French-Canadian, this administration had several French Canadians occupying key Cabinet posts. Furthermore, this affirmation of a francophone presence in the federal government was an important feature of Trudeau's anti-independentist platform. Thus this question taps sympathy for the redress of a basic, long-standing grievance. Q2-39 is included in the index on the assumption that an important feature of a sympathetic attitude towards French Canadian grievances would

be the view that French Canadians themselves are not mainly to be blamed for their problems, and that conversely, the view that French Canadians themselves are mainly to blame for their problems would in a sense be a key mark of an unfavourable attitude.

By a second criterion, the index is internally consistent. (Internal Validity). This can be seen in two ways. To begin, the three questions included in the index are interrelated.¹¹ Furthermore, each of the three items makes a clear contribution to the index. For example, let us compare extremes on each of the questions. Of those who answer that "all or most" French Canadian demands are justified, 83 per cent score high ("sympathetic") on the index; of those who answer "none", zero percent are sympathetic. Similarly, 2 per cent of those who blame French Canadians themselves for their problems are sympathetic, whereas 94 per cent of those who place the blame elsewhere are sympathetic. Finally, of those who answer that French Canadians have *more* power than they should have in Ottawa, 5 per cent are sympathetic; while 93 percent of those who judge French Canadians as having *less* power than they should have are sympathetic.

A third criterion we can apply is that of external validity. Is the index a predictor of responses to other items, not included in the index, but which are related to the phenomenon the index purports to measure? This is indeed the case, as Table 1.1 findicates:

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TABLE 1.1 - SYMPATHY, BY SELECTED RELATED ITEMS

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	A.	(Q2-33) Do you think French Canadian maintain their ways of living, or tha try to become more like the other Can	t they should	ع Sympathetic	N
		Maintain their ways of living	* . 	58	(255)
		Both Qualified answer		43	(112) (55)
		Become more like other Canadians		22.	(223)
		(Q2-35) Which would you say is the m a people to maintain: its language a its standard of living?		t)	
		Its language and culture		58	(57)
		Both Its standard of living		42 , 34	(239) (308)
	C.	(Q2-76) To what extend do you think and way of life of French Canadians a disappearing: are in great danger, i or in no danger of disappearing?	re in danger of	s Antoni	. /
		In great danger Qualified answer In a little danger No danger		54 46 45 36	(62) (22) (177) (351)
	D.	(Q1-61) When you have to speak Frenc public places, how often do you find because you have difficultiesoften, or almost never?	you get embarasse		
		Often /		54	(83)
		Sometimes Rarely	ę	51 39	(104) (87)
		Almost/never	\$	35	(240)
		Never/has to speak French	s	26	(106)
~	Ε.	(Q1-68) In general, how would you de toward French Canadians: as rather c fairly favourable, or very favourable	ool, indifferent,	ude	
		Very favourable		46	(306)
		Fairly favourable Qualified answer		45 17°	(199) (42)
٠.		Indifferent or rather cool		16	. (68)
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We would expect that belief in the legitimacy of Québécois demands would vary directly with awareness and recognition of the value of the French language and Québécois culture; this is confirmed by the 36 percentage-point difference in favourableness between extremes on the first question.

Similarly, one would expect, *cetevic paribue*, that favourableness would be related to an awareness and appreciation of the importance of cultural matters as opposed to strictly economic questions; this is borne out by the range of responses to the second question, in panel B.

The third question concerns the degree to which French Canadian culture is perceived to be threatened. One would expect that, the more sympathetic anglophones are to French Canadian demands, the more likely they would be to share Quebecois nationalists' concern about cultural survival. This is indeed the case, as the third panel in Table 1.1 indicates.

A more subtle-point is touched upon by the next question. One might expect that, irrespective of a person's fluency in the French language, or the frequency with which he uses it, as favourableness increased, so would the degree of embarassment felt when difficulties occured. The fourth panel shows that favourableness is indeed strongly related to embarassment over having problems communicating in French.

Finally, the external validation of our index concludes with a simpler but elemental item. It was expected that favourableness to French Canadian demands, as measured by the index, would vary directly with respondents' *self-reported* attitudes toward French Canadians. This is true, as panel E in Table 1.1 indicates.

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We might note here formally that the terms "favourableness", "degree of legitimacy", and "sympathy", are meant to refer to the same index of the basic dependent variable, and will be used interchangeably.

Now that our dependent variable is well-defined, we can turn to an examination of its distribution in the social structure of Quebec. This will be the topic of the next chapter.

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FOOTNOTES

¹The expression is used by R. A. Schermerhein, <u>Comparative</u> <u>Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research</u>, New York: Random House, 1940.

For further details on these inequalities, see for example John Porter, <u>The Vertical Mosaic</u>, Torento: Univ. of Torento Press, 1965; Sheilagh Hodgins Milner and Henry Milner, <u>The Decelonization</u> of Quebec, Torento: McClelland and Stewart, 1073: Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, vol. 3, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969. Some data are presented in Appendix B.

³For an overview, see Edward M. Corbett, <u>Quebec Confronts</u> <u>Canada</u>, Baltimore: Johns Mopkins, 1967; <u>Sheilarh Hodgins Milner</u> and Henry Milner, <u>The Decolonization of Cuebec</u>, Ioronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1973; Richard Jones, <u>Community in Crisis</u>, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977; Mauricé Pinard, "Separatism in Quebec: A Research Design", mimeo, Department of Sociology, McG211 University, 1968.

⁴Coleman' Bomalis, "The attitudes of the Montreal Jewish Commun-, ity toward French Canadian nationalism and separatism", M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1967.

^BThe sample design is discussed in Appendix A, and the relevant parts of the questionnaire are to be found in Appendix C.

^eSchermerhorn, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 70.

⁷See Lewis Coser, <u>The Functions of Social Conflict</u>. New York: "Free Press, 1956, p. 37, as cited by Schermerhorn, op. cit., p. 69.

^BSee Neil J. Smelser, <u>Theory of Collective Behavior</u>, New York: Free Press, 1962.

⁹The index was constructed by first recoding responses to the three questions in the following way:

Q2-36: Which demands justified?

"only very few" or "none at all" "a few" "qualified answer "a good number" "almost all" or "all of them"

Q2-38: Position of French Canadians in Ottawa

"more huportant then it should be" "as important" or qualified answer "less important than it should be"

Q2-39: Blame for French Canadian problems

"French Canadians mainly to blame" "no group to blame" or "the blame should be shared" or qualified answer "other groups mainly to blame"

The index score is then simply the sum of the codes of the three questions. The range of possible scores on the index is from 3 to 15. The trichotomization was done as follows:

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Unfavourable -- index positions 3 to 7 Indifferment -- """ 8, 9 Sympathekic -- "" 10 to 15

Cases with missing data for any of the three index items were omitted completely.

¹⁰These criteria, as well as the ensuing discussion, were stimulated by Gary T. Marx, <u>Protest and Prejudice</u>, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969, revised ed., p. 45.

¹¹The interrelations of the items which were combined to form the index of favourableness are given in the following table. The entries are gammas.

e	Position of French Canadians in Ottawa	Blame for French , Canadian problems ,
Demands justified?	.14	• 30
Position of French Canadians in Ottawa	ده ۰ ۰	۰.30 °
	>	· · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	6°	

CHAPTER 2 SOME STRUCTUPAL SOURCES OF SYMPATHY

We have just seen that among English-speaking Canadians, there are wide differences in the degree of sympathy toward French Canadian demands. In this chapter we will locate some of the structural sources of favourableness toward francophones in the context of the class structure of contemporary Quebec society. In order, we will focus on a) the ethnic stratification system b) certain status-inconsistencies and c) other grievances, such as the experience of unemployment.

A. SYMPATHY AND THE STRATIFICATION SYSTEM

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A recent observer of the Canadian scene has noted that there has been a historical tendency for most published studies of French-English relations to emphasize ethnic differences while overlooking the class differences within French-Canadian society.¹ The extent to which this has indeed been the case is not what concerns us here. The point is brought up in order to add the following to it: class differences among anglophones in Quebec have been similarly ignored, not the least by francophone intellectuals, though for understandable reasons. The past hegemony of anglophones over the upper levels of the economy has been so visible that it has in a sense blurred from view the presence of anglophones at all levels of the occupational structure. The range of occupations in which English Canadians can be found in Quebec is roughly identical to that anywhere else in Canada. The shape of the distribution of English Canadians in the class structure is top-heavy, however. Working-class anglophones are underrepresented in the province's working class, and they are also, of course, a smaller proportion of the Engligh-speaking community than are anglophone workers in other provinces. (See Appendix B).

Given this class structure, how does one's location within it influence one's attitude toward francophone demands? As can be seen from Table 2.1, favourableness is strongest at the upper levels of the stratification system, whether the measure of socio-economic status is education, income, occupation, or occupational prestige.

B. WHY NOT THE LESS PRIVILEGED?

Why is it that sympathy is strongest in the upper parts of the social structure? After all, there are theoretical and intuitive reasons to expect workers to be the *most* sympathetic occupational group instead of the least. Is not the Quebec independentist movement leftist to some extent, or at least left of center? Would not the anglophone working class stand to gain just as much as the francophone working class from the kind of social reforms advocated by the Parti Quebecois, for example? Is it not the workers who, unlike the more affluent sectors of the English community, have little to lose by supporting the kind of social change envisaged by leftists and separatist groups? Are not on-the-job as well as off-the-job contacts between English and French Canadians much more frequent at the lower socio-economic levels?

÷	Tai	RLE 2.1	۱ ب	
	SYMPATHY, BY VARIOUS	STRATIFICATION VAR	IABLES	,
		* *	\$	
		0	(% Sympa	thetic)
EDUCATION:			~	
8 -	7 yrs 11 yrs or more		30 ^{<i>a</i>} 31 49	(80) (228) (321)
INCOME :		. (
\$ 6K	ow \$6,000 to \$11K ve \$11K	×	36 33 50	(138) (217) (167)
OCCUPATION:				
Sal	f., Mgrs., and Technic es and Clerical e-Collar	cal ,	45 36 34	(297) - (119) (199)
QCCUPATIONAL	PRESTIGE: ^b			
Low Med Hig	ίψm	v	36 41 4 4	(151) (223) (223)
a Read: Read: education, 30	"Of the 80 responder % are sympathetic".	ts with from one t	,o seven year	's of

^b Low =	Duncan	Scores	₹ 32	m
Medium =	**	_ 11	$^{\prime}$ 33 to 64 ,	· · · · ·
High =	**	11	65 and above	an a

For examples of occupational titles assigned to different score intervals, see Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, <u>The American Occupational</u> <u>Structure</u> (New York: John Wiley and Sons), 1967, pp. 122-123.

More generally, of course, working class and lower-middle class anglophones have in common with most French Canadians their subordinate position in Quebec society. Why does all this were lead to sympathy?

Could it be that the blue-collar and lower-white collar groups are more threatened by the prospect of an independent Quebec, especially since their occupational skills are often less transferrable than those of the upper-middle class? Could it be that even if anglophone workers do recognize the progressive social aspects of the independentist movement, they may still be scared by the nationalist aspects? This whole issue of the sources and variablility of perceived ethnic and linguistic threats, as well as the impact of these feelings of threat on sympathy, is so important in understanding anglophone reactions that it will not be discussed further here, but will be the topic of detailed analysis in the following chapter. Let us simply note in advance that class differences in perceived threats do not explain class differences in sympathy.

Another possible explanation has to do with the alleged broadening effects of formal education. It can be seen from Table 2.1 that differences in sympathy are linked more to differences in education than to differences in any of the other stratification variables.⁶ Other studies have suggested that dispositions found to be closely linked to formal education are often, more specifically, functions of the degree of intellectual or cultural *sophistication*.⁴^a Cross tabulations of sympathy by both education and independent measures of intellectual sophistication reveal that intellectual sophistication *does* have an independent effect on sympathy, but that this effect is limited. This

means that there is something else, besides sophistication, associated with educational and class differences among anglophones in Quebec which explain differences in sympathy among them. What is this something else?

I suggest that anglophones at the lower socio-economic levels `are less sympathetic to Québécois nationalism because of more specific kinds of class differences in perceptions of the ethnic stratification of Quebec society. Briefly, the argument is as follows:

- a) working-class anglophones are much *less* aware of the wide range of inequalities between French and English-speaking Canadians
- b) they have much more egalitarian attitudes toward French-Canadians with respect to the comparative talents and capabilities of the two linguistic groups
- c) these factors lead lower-level anglophones to view Québécois nationalism as a demand for *privileges*; French Canadians are more likely to be perceived as *already equal* to English Canadians in terms of wealth and status. Hence, there is little sympathy for those who are perceived as wanting *more* than their equal share.

T	A	B	L	Ε	2	2

PERCEPTIONS OF ETHNIC STRATIFICATION, BY OCCUPATION

Q	,	PROF. & TFCH. & MGR.	SALES & CLERICAL	WORKERS
Α.	"Which of these groups is generally the wealthier: French Canadians or English Canadians?"	62 ₍₃₁ 1)	⁵⁸ (120)	⁴³ (238)
	(% saying English)			
	"Do French Canadians or Eng- lish Canadians hold the most important place in the world of business and finance in Quebec?"	$t 72_{(200)}$	⁷³ (135)	⁵⁸ (241)
	(% saying English)			
B.,	¹¹ In which of the following two groups do you think one finds the greatest scientist among French Canadians, or among English Canadians?"	ts: 52 ₍₂₇₃₎	⁶⁰ (113)	³⁴ (192)
	(% saying English)	i.		
	"Which do you think are in g eral the best doctors: Free Canadian doctors, or English Canadian doctors?" (% saying English)	$hch 24_{(202)}$	³² (126)	⁰⁸ (227)

The distribution of responses to the questions in Table 2.2 Ectually range across four choices: people could name either the English Canadian group or the French Canadian group, or they could answer that the two groups are equal, or, finally, they could give a qualified answer

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(e.g. "for physical scientists I'd say English but for social scientists I'd say French"). Each entry in the table is the percentage of respondents giving an unambiguous answer of "English Canadians".

>

In the first two panels of table 2.2 we can see that even the most basic facts about the well-researched and documented inequalities between English and French Canadians, so familiar to social scientists and intellectuals, are not perceived by substantial segments of the population. The interesting question of why so many people did not give the "correct" answer is not our concern here. Rather, the finding of interest is the *elass difference* in the likelihood of perceiving English Canadians as the richer and as the business leaders.

In the third and fourth panels of the table, the same pattern is revealed. Workers are much less likely than the two white-collar groups to say that the best doctors and scientists are English Canadians. The fact that the questions ask about the *best* doctors and scientists indicates that workers have more egalitarian attitudes with regard to the talents and capabilities of the two groups.³ The table also shows that workers are much more likely to view French Canadians as *already occupying* important and high-status positions in Quebec society.

Now we are ready to discuss how these factors influence sympathy, keeping in mind that other education-linked factors (such as intellectual sophisticaion, as seen earlier) are operative at the same time. Their joint impact is specified in Table 2.3.

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TABLE 2.3

SYMPATHY, BY EDUCATION AND PERCEPTION OF FRENCH-ENGLISH UNEQUALITIES (% SYMPATHETIC)

		' "Which group is the wealthier: French Canadians or English Canadians?"				
	۰.	"French" or "Equal" or "Qualified answer"	English"			
EDUCATION	11 yrs	³⁴ (141) -	^{?9} (12?)			
LUCATION	1? yrs & up	³⁵ (94)	56(174)			

We can see that perceiving English-Canadians as richer than French Canadians does not raise sympathy among the low-education group. Nor do the broadening effects of education raise sympathy unless one also sees the English as the richer group. In short, *both* a high education and a basic awareness of French-English inequalities are *necessary* conditions for an individual to be highly sympathetic.

It might be mentioned that the analysis that has just been advanced is similar in *form* to Leon Samson's explanation of the failure of socialism in the United States, often mentioned by Lipset.⁴ Samson argued that socialism has never flourished in the United States because Americanism is so *similar* to socialism in terms of its value content. Here I have argued that non-French-Canadian workers are least sympathetic to Québécois nationalism because they are more likely to perceive French Canadians as being already equal to English Canadians. This is perhaps in part due to, and reinforced by, the fact that anglophone workers are most likely to have frequent and equal-status interactions with French Canadians, as will be seen in Chapter 4.

C. A THEORY OF DOMINANT GROUP SYMPATHY

The preceding analysis suggests certain tentative propositions that can be applied more generally to other contexts of inequalities between ethnic, communal, or linguistic groups. The basic idea is that the level of sympathy of dominant groups depends on the perceived correlation between class and ethnicity, and that this perceived correlation depends in turn on certain structural features of the ethnic stratification system.

Other things (especially feelings of threat) being equal, dominant group sympathy will be a direct function of the proportion of the dominant group that perceives the under-privileged group as being so. In other words, within any dominant group, we should expect sympathy for subordinate group nationalism to be highest among those subsets of the dominant group within which the perceived correlation between class and ethnicity is highest. Conversely, we should expect sympathy to be lowest within the subsets least likely to perceive the dominant group as being rich and the subordinate group as being poor.

This perceived correlation depends, in turn, on two structural features of the society:

real correlation between class and ethnicity perceived correlation between class and Sympathy ethnicity

First, the perceived correlation is, of course, in every case very much a function of the *real* correlation. It is also, however, dependent on a second important feature of ethnically stratified societies, namely the relative size of the two groups. This is important in the following way: if the relative size of the two groups is such that a *majority* of the society's peep are members of the *deminint* group, the perceived correlation between class and ethnicity is reduced among dominant group members, hence reducing sympathy. This can be seen by examping a few specific cases.

In Quebec, it is clear that a vast manorial of the poor or lower class are members of the autordinate group. This ensures that the perceived correlation between class and ethnicity is minimally high, thus raising sympathy. In New Brunswick, in Northern Ireland, and in the U.S. on the other hand, the situations are different. In these three contexts, the relative size of the dominant and subordinate groups is such that in each case a majority of the society's poor or lower class are members of the dominant ethnic group. Thus, in New Brunswick a majority of the poor and of the lower and working classes is English. In Ulster, a majority of poor people are non-black and non-Spanish speaking. In these three cases, the structural effect keeps the perceived correlation between class and ethnicity minimally low, thus reducing sympathy among dominant group members.

To be sure, the above is not meant to be a *comprehensive* theory that accounts for all the subtle variations in dominant group reactions in contexts of ethnic stratification. The variety of historical differ-

ences is just one factor among others that would necessarily impose a high level of abstraction on such a theory. Rather, the intent here is to specify one causal path that operates independently of others. Other important variables that have been held constant in this discussion and will not be dealt with further are the severity of the inequalities and the degree to which the perceived inequalities are seen as injustices.

D. STATUS INCONSISTENCIES AND SYMPATHY

It was seen earlier (Table 2.1) that sympathy for Québécois nationalism is concentrated at the upper levels of the class system, regardless of the measure of social privilege used. In order to further specify the relative effects of these different dimensions of socioeconomic status, an overall index of social class was constructed by combining the variables education, income, and occupational prestige. The utility of such an index derives from the fact that it is a more reliable measure of social privilege than any single dimension taken by itself. Furthermore, it allows us to assess the extent to which education, income, and prestige have an *additive* effect on sympathy. The impact of the composite index of social class can be seen in Table 2.4.

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	Тав	LE 2.4	-		
	Sympäthy, by Ind	ex of Soc	IAL CLASS		م
		Socia	1 Class'	t 	
	LOW (0, 1, 2)	3	(4, 5)	High (6)	¢
% Sympathetic	30	33	46	49	
**(N = 497)	100% (134)	(100%) (88)	(100%) (175)	(100%) (100)	·
 Index Compose prestige as f 	d by combining educ	cation, inco	ome, and occur	pational,	5
	for a grade school some high school (
1 point fo	'or below \$6,000 or \$6,000 - \$10,999 'or \$11,000 or above	e		۲.	

c) O points for Duncan Scores 1 - 32 1 point for Duncan Scores 33 - 64 2 points for Duncan Scores 65 - 96

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** Here again, the reduced number of cases is due to the elimination of those cases for which data was missing on any of the variables used to construct the 2 scales.

The variation in sympathy explained by the composite index of social class (49% - 30% = 19%) is no greater than that predicted by education taken by itself, even though the independent variable is broken into four categories instead of three as in Table 2.1. This suggests that the three components taken together exert only a *limited* additive effect on sympathy. Why is this?

An examination of the joint effect of education and income reveals that these two dimensions *do* contribute additively to sympathy, as Table 2.5 skows.

TABLE 2.5

SYMPATHY, BY INCOME AND EDUCATION

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$\frac{<\$6K}{\texttt{EDUCATION}:} \frac{\$6 \text{ to }11K}{\texttt{S6 to }11K} \frac{\$11 \text{ K, and }up}{36(44)}$ $\frac{30}{96} \frac{25}{(117)} \frac{36}{36(44)}$ College and up $\frac{50}{42} \frac{43}{100} \frac{54}{123}$ $\frac{54}{123} \frac{50}{167}$	- det		Income	(% Sympathet
High School or less $^{30}(96)$ $^{25}(117)$ $^{36}(44)$ College and up $^{50}(42)$ $^{43}(100)$ $^{54}(123)$ TOTALS: $^{36}(138)$ $^{33}(217)$ $^{50}(167)$	-	<u> <\$6K</u>	Q 0	\$11 K and up
TOTALS: $36_{(138)}$ $33_{(217)}$ $50_{(167)}$		³⁰ (96)	²⁵ (117)	³⁶ (44)
(138) (217) (107)	College and up	⁵⁰ (42)	⁴³ (100)	⁵⁴ (123)
u v		³⁶ (138)	³³ (217)	⁵⁰ (167)

Average effect of Income = .05 (comparing extremes)

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Why then is there no additive effect when all three dimensions are combined as in the index above? The answer is that this is due to \cdot the interaction between education and occupation. This unexpected finding can be seen in Table 2.6.

TABLE 2.6 " A. Sympathy, by Education and Occupational Prestige*

t	13	o		. '9	Sympathetic
t o			PREST		
```		LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	· }
EDUCATION: High School or less		³⁰ (115)	²⁷ (115) ⁻	⁴⁶ (50)	³² (280)
College and up	•	⁵⁶ (36)	⁵⁶ (108)	⁴³ (173).	⁴⁹ (317) ·
		' 36	ć 41 ⁴	.44	Total 100% (597)
			с.		
* Scores trichotomiz	ed same	as in Tab	ole 2.4	• ,	6 К. Жа
X	c	ι	,		*****
B. Sympati	HY BY	DUCAT	n and Occ	UPATION	<del>ر</del> ۲
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		<u> </u>	~ ~	۰ ۵	د *

% Sympathetic % Sympathetic % Prof., Tech., Mgr. . . Sales & Clerical Workers

College & up 46 ₍₂₁₆₎		
High School or 41(81) less	²⁸ (65)	²⁵ (152)
EDUCATION:	Y	, 0

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Among the highlu-educated group, it is those who have working-class and low-priving jobs who are the most sympathetic. How can this be explained?

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Many studies have focused on the effects of such status inconsistencies on liberalism and radicalism.⁶ Other studies have found that people with status inconsistencies are disproportionately supporters of conservative and right-wing movements. Other reported consequences of status inconsistencies are "preference for extensive change of the distribution of power in society",⁸ increased social isolation as well as the increased incidence of psychosomatic symptoms.⁷

In light of all this evidence, it seems reasonable to look upon a status inconsistency as no more than a special type of strain. The consequences of this strain will depend, however, not only on the nature of the inconsistency, but also on such conducive factors as determine the available targets against which resentments may be vented, the existent protest movements, and so forth.

From this theoretical vantage point, then, we might have expected a priori, that English-speaking Canadians with status-inconsistencies would be either more or less sympathetic toward Québécois demands. Why, then, are highly-educated workers so much more favourable than anybody else? I suggest that the answer to this lies in the nature of the strain this group is experiencing. These highly-educated workers have the same "problem" as many French Vanadians: namely, their occupational status is incommensurate with their educational attainments. This explanation certainly has intuitive appeal, but can it be tested empirically?¹⁰ We shall now attempt to do so in several ways'..¹¹

Dne objection to this hypothesis that could be registered immediately has to do with the direction of causality. We have posited that being highly-educated, and having a working-class job, produces a status inconsistency which in turn increased an individual's sympathy toward Québécois demands... But could it not be that being highly educated (i.e. a student at a university) increases one's intellectual sophistication and awareness, makes one very favourable to Québécois demands, and that this in turn leads one to seek out a working-class job as a concrete expression of one's sympathy!

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If the group of highly educated workers contained a disproportionate number of young people,¹² for instance, we would have to give this counterhypothesis some serious consideration. However as the marginals in Table 2.7 indicate, this group is not especially young.

~	TABLE 2	2.7	
Sympathy II	NCREASES WITH AGE, WORKERS C		DUCATED
	1. 5%	, the state	
AGE	1	%-Sympathetic)	<u>(N)</u>
18 - 24	1	54.\$	(11)
25 - 34	1	60.0	(5)
35 - 54	,	62.5	(*24)
55 +		71.4	(7)

Furthermore, the young workers are the least favourable members of this group. Hence, these workers with education are not privileged young anglophones expressing their sympathy concretely. Why are the young workers the least sympathetic members of this group? Is this of import-

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ance in assessing our status-inconsistency hypothesis?

As Malewski has noted, the effects of status-inconsistencies are greatly dependent on the degree to which the lower status-factor can or can not be changed; he advances the following hypothesis: "if an individual of incongruent status cannot raise the lover factors of his status, he will tend to reject the system of evaluation which justifies his humiliations and to join those who are opposed to that system. If these others represent a tendency towards changing the existing order, the above individual mentioned will be particularly inclined to accept their total program".¹⁰

I suggest that the findings of Table 2.7 support this proposition. The older a worker gets, the more he perceives his chances of getting a better job as diminished; this in turn *increases* his sympathy towards Québécois nationalism. A similar finding is reported with respect to the effects of age on the relationship between statusinconsistencies and the incidence of psychosomatic symptoms. Jackson found that "younger inconsistents, who had status profiles which could become consistent through mobility, had *lower* levels of psychosomatic symptoms than older inconsistents with similar profiles."¹⁴

So far we have indirect support for our status-inconsistency hypothesis. Another indirect confirmation is to be found if we compare the favourableness of men and women in different occupational groups. Several conclusions can be drawn from Table 2.8. First of all, we can note that there is little difference in sympathy between men with full-time jobs in different occupational categories, and the non-working wives of men in these same occupations. Secondly, we can note that

TABLE 2.8

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# SYMPATHY, BY SEX, OCCUPATION, AND OCCUPATIONAL STATUS

% Sympathetic

Man with full- time job	Prof., Tech., <u>and Mgr.</u> ⁴⁵ (123)	Sales and <u>Clerical</u> ³⁶ (36)	<u>Workers</u> ³⁴ (104)	³⁹ (264)
Housewives of men with full time jobs	⁴⁴ (78)	³⁶ (55)		⁴¹ (133)
Women with full- time jobs	⁵⁶ (39)	³⁷ (59)		⁴⁴ (100)

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there is little difference in sympathy between women with full-time sales, corical, or blue-collar jobs and men in these same jobs, nor is there much difference between these working women and their housewifecounterparts whose husbands are in similar jobs. A third conclusion to be drawn from the table is that women who have full-time professional, technical, and managerial jobs are much more sympathetic to Quebecois demands than are their male colleagues or any of their sisters. Here again, these women are the ones who are most in a structural position similar to that of French-Canadians in these occupations, namely high on their achieved occupational status but perceived as low on an unchangeable status, sex in the one case, and ethnicity in the other.

All in all, then, there is some evidence to support the contention that one additional source of sympathy for Ouébécois demands is a special kind of strain based on status-inconsistencies similar to those experienced by many French Canadians, especially middle-class French Canadians who are the strongest supporters of nationalist movements in Québec.

#### E. UNEMPLOYMENT

An initial working hypothesis of this study is that since we are dealing with reactions to an ethnic movement, an important factor in the reactions of anglophones will be ethnic grievances. These are examined in the next chapter. A serendipitous finding, however, is that deprivations completely unrelated to ethnicity, such as economic grievances, can have a strong *independent* role in increasing sympathy. One such grievance is unemployment. As Table 2.9 indicates, the inci-

dence of unemployment in the family raises favourableness considerably, at every level of the class structure.

## TABLE 2.9

# Sympathy, Unemployment in the Family Increases

% Sympathetic

⁵⁹ (29)
⁵⁹ (34)
⁴³ (21)
⁸⁹ (9)
⁶⁰ (33)
⁷² (18)
48(21)
71(14)

Presumably, those protesting on this account are more likely to sympathize with other forms of protest as well.¹⁵

### F. CONCLUSION

We have seen that anglophone sympathy comes disproportionately from several sources: from the higher socio-economic status groups, and more specifically the highly-educated; from anglophones beset by certain kinds of status-inconsistencies similar to those faced by many francophones in modern Québec; and finally, from those whose families have been hit by unemployment.

These findings reveal a striking pattern that can only be mentioned here,namely, that the above sources of sympathy have their direct parallels in the sources of support for separation hy French-Canadians. Some evidence for this is presented in Table 2.10.

It should be noted that the first panel of the table reveals a further cause of the sympathy of the educated. We know that social contacts occur most often with class peers. When highly-educated anglophones meet French Canadians, they are disproportionately likely to meet people who are themselves nationalists and independentists. The effects of contacts will be examined in detail in chapter four.

TABLE	2.	10
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	BY EDUCATION	AND UNEMP	LOYMENT STATU	S
	FOR	AGAINST	Separatism - <u>DON'T KNOW</u>	(N = 100%)
EDUCATION				· · ·
0 – 7 yrs	15	64	21	(205)
8 - 12	11	68	21	(266)
13 and up	28	58	14	(100)
UNEMPLOYMENT				
. Yes	23	61	16	(171)
No	12	68	20	(401)

SUPPORT FOR SEPARATISM AMONG. FRENCH-CANADIANS, BY EDUCATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT STATUS

This table is based on a representative sample of the francophone population (18 + yrs old) of the province living outside the Metropolitan Montreal area. Source - The April 1972 poll on the split in the Ralliement Créditiste, carried out under the responsibility of Maurice Pinard by the <u>Société de recherches en communications</u> (SORECOM); data made available by Professor Maurice Pinard.

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In summary, in this chapter it was found that the upper socioeconomic groups are most sympathetic to Québécois nationalism, because of their higher education and their greater awareness of the inequalities between French and English in Quebec. More specifically, *both* a high education and an awareness of ethnic inequalities were found to be necessary conditions for high sympathy. The overall level of sympathy among English Quebecers was linked to certain features of the ethnic stratification system in Quebec. Since the vast *majority* of Quebec's *working-class* are members of the *subordinate* group, the perceived correlation between class and ethnicity among dominant group members *is* minimally high, and this increases sympathy. It was noted, by way of a formal model, that this is not necessarily the case in other ethnic stratification settings where the relative size of the dominant and subordinate groups is different.

Certain status inconsistencies are another source of sympathy: blue collar workers with high educations, and women in professional, technical and managerial jobs are two groups that are especially sympathetic to Québécois nationalism. A suggested explanation for this was that these status-inconsistencies are similar to those faced by many middle-class French Canadians.

A final structural source of sympathy was located in a basic economic grievance: those whose families had experienced unemployment are much more sympathetic than others. This holds true at every level of the class structure.

Let us now move on to a consideration of the ways in which anglophones feel threatened by the independentist movement, and how these feelings of threat influence the expression of sympathy.

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### FOOTNOTES

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¹Richard J. Ossenberg, "Social Pluralism in Quebec", in Ossenberg, (ed.), <u>Canadian Society: Pluralism, Change, and Conflict</u> Scarborough, Ont: Prentice-Hall, 1971, pp. 103-123.

²After this analysis was completed, it was pointed out to the author that this <u>may</u> be a spurious finding due to the fact that <u>age</u> (which is strongly related to sympathy as we shall see in Chapter five) is much more strongly related to education than to income or occupation.

There is indirect evidence, presented later in the thesis, that indicates that education is still the most important variable even when age is taken into account. The interested reader is referred ahead to Table 5.1. There, the <u>independent</u> average effect of education on sympathy is shown to be .17. This is stronger than any of the independent average effects of income, occupation, or occupational prestage shown in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6.

^{P8}For instance, Marx found that among American blacks, militancy is strongly related to intellectual sophistication. See Gary T. Marx, <u>Protest and Frejudice</u>, N.Y.: Harper Torchbooks, 1969, pp. 72-92. In an earlier study, Trow found that political tolerance was unrelated to support for McCarthy. Political tolerance, <u>unlike</u> support for McCarthy, was found to be chiefly a matter of sophistication. See Martin Trow, "Small Businessmen, Political Tolerance, and Support for McCarthy", in Lewis A. Coser (ed.), <u>Political Sociology</u>, N.Y.: Harper Torchbooks, 1966, p. 181.

³Our questions deal with inequalities between groups as they are perceived to exist. The degree of inequality that <u>should</u> exist, is, of course, a different question. Nonetheless it is interesting to note, in this respect, the findings of Form and Rytina to the effect that in the American community they studied, the rich had the <u>least</u> egalitarian views about what the distribution of power in society <u>ought</u> to be. See William H. Form and Joan Rytina, "Ideological Beliefs on the Distribution of Power in the United States", <u>American Sociological Review</u>, (34), 1969, pp. 19-31.

⁴Leon. Samson, <u>Towards a United Front</u>, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1933, cited by S. M. Lipset, <u>The First New Nation</u>, New York: Anchor Books, 1967, p. 202.

⁶For discussions of the statistical concrite of additivity and interaction between two independent variables, see John E. Freund, <u>Modern Elementary Statistics</u>, 4th edition, Englewood Cliffs. Frentice Hall, 1973, or Hubert M. Blalock Jr., <u>Social Statistics</u>, 2nd edition, New York: McGraw Hill, 1972. ⁶See the list given by Gerhard Lenski in <u>Power and Privilege:</u> <u>A Theory of Social Stratification</u>, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1966, p. 87.

⁷See the list given in Stanley Eitzen, "Status Inconsistency and Wallace Support", in Bernard E. Segal (ed.), <u>Pacial and Ethnic Relations</u>, second edition, Boston: Crowell-Collier, 1972.

⁸Irwin W. Goffman, "Status Consistency and Preference for Change , in Power Distribution", <u>American Sociological Review</u> (22), June 1957.

⁹See the discussion of these by James A. Geschwender, "Continuities in Theories of Status Consistency and Cognitive Dissonance", in Edward O. Laumann, et al. (eds.), <u>The Logic of Social Hierarchies</u>, Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970.

¹⁰For an interesting discussion of the methodological problems involved in untangling the independent effects of status-inconsistencies from those of the status variables themselves, see Robert W. Hodge and Paul M. Siegel, "Nonvertical Dimensions of Social Stratification", in Edward O. Laumann et. al (eds.), op. cit. These authors point out that it is sometimes impossible to distinguish between these sets of effects, though this is not the case here.

¹¹This is stimulated by Stinchcombe's discussion of how "a multiple test of a theory is more convincing than a single test". See Arthur L. Stinchcombe, <u>Constructing Social Theories</u>, N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1968, especially the sections "Multiple Tests of Theories" and "The Fundamental Criterion of a Strong Test of Theory", pp. 10-22.

¹²This reasoning is based on the assumption that those led to search out working-class jobs out of sympathy would have done so principally in the last decade, such movements of voluntary downward mobility occuring only in times of affluence; or rather, it is in times of affluence that the proportion of those with mobility credentials such as a higher education choosing not to make use of them will be maximized.

¹³Andrzej Malewski, "The Degree of Status Incongruence and its Effects", in Reinhard Bendix and S. M. Lipset (eds.), <u>Class, Status</u> and Power, second edition, N.Y.: The Free Press, 1966, p. 306.

¹⁴Elton F. Jackson, "Status Consistency, Vertical Motility, and Symptoms of Stress", unpublished Ph.D., Michigan, 1960, cited by James A. Geschwender, "Continuities in Theories of Status Consistency and Cognitive Dissonance", op. cit. ¹⁶A similar finding is reported in a study of participation in the American civil rights movement in the 1960's. The authors found that socioeconomic deprivations had an impact on the intensity of both white and black participants' activity in the sit-in movement, an effect independent on the effect of race-related grievances. See Maurice Pinard, Jerome Kirk, and Donald Von Eschen, "Processes of Recruitment in the Sit-in Movement", <u>Public Opinion Quarterly</u>, Vol. 33, Fall 1969.

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# CHAPTER 3 SOCIAL STRUCTURE, THREATS, AND SYMPATHY

This chapter will examine the role of *feelings* of threat, their sources and consequences, among English-speakers in Quebec.

### A. WHEN ARE DOMINANT GROUPS THREATENED

If one thinks of the wide range of ethnic stratification settings that have existed and do exist, it becomes clear that feelings of threat are very important in understanding the response of dominant groups in some contexts, and relatively unimportant in other contexts. Why are such feelings an important consideration here?

It has often been noted that intergroup relations in advanced industrial societies display quite different characteristics from intergroup relations in agricultural, pastoral, or other simpler societies. Van den Berghe, for example, has attempted to specify some of these distinctions in his typology of "paternalistic" versus "competitive" contexts of intergroup relations.¹

The ideal-typical *paternalistic* context occurs in pre-industrial or non-manufacturing societies with a relatively simple division of labor, little horizontal or vertical mobility, a rigid caste system and an integrated value system with little value conflict. The idealtypical *competitive* context is that of the large-scale industrial

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society with a complex division of labor, much horizontal and vertical mobility, and at least some conflict.  $\langle$ 

Our purpose here is not to discuss this theoretical perspective in any detail. Rather, this typplogy is mentioned to point out that it is *only* when the context of ethnic stratification moves *away from* the paternalistic type and toward the competitive type that there will be appreciable antagonism, suspicion, and real or perceived competition between the two groups. More specifically, it is only when the context of intergroup relations moves away from the paternalistic type that members of the dominant group will experience *feelings of threat* to any significant degree. In a pure paternalistic system, members of the subordinate group are in their place, and "know it". It might be mentioned that the same holds true for members of the dominant group. Thus a *non-paternalistic* type of ethnic stratification is a necessary condition for appreciable feelings of threat among dominant group members.

Even where the contexts of ethnic stratification are closer to the competitive type, not all dominant groups feel equally threatened, of course. Furthermore, the degree to which members of a given dominant group feel threatened can vary over time. What other factors account for these differences?

In general, feelings of threat will become more prominent among dominant groups in periods of *becial change*, whenever the "rules of the game" governing relations between the two groups appear to be changing. This is a second condition under which dominant groups are likely to feel threatened.

A third important determinant of the relative importance of

feelings of threat among dominant groups is the relative size of the two groups. If the numerical ratio is such that the dominant group is a small minority of the population, feelings of threat will become proportionately more important among dominant group members.

Finally, feelings of threat will be more prominent when the subordinate group has special claims to the *territory*: that it is the subordinate group's homeland, and the dominant group consists of "foreigners" of some sort. This will hold true especially in contexts of "migrant superordination" mentioned by Lieberson.¹⁸

We can advance the tentative proposition that feelings of threat will be *most* important in determining the responses of dominant groups when all of the above conditions are present. This appears supported when we note that the most threatened dominant groups in the world today are probably the whites of the several societies of southern Africa. There, the paternalistic type of ethnic stratification is being broken down by industrialization: the "rules of the game" governing relations between blacks and whites are increasingly called into question and are changing, aided by a world-wide sympathy for decolonization; the dominant groups of whites are vastly outnumbered; and finally, blacks do have a special claim to the territory.

It is doubtful that French-English relations in Quebec *ever* fully conformed to the paternalistic ideal-type of intergroup relations, even in the early post-Conquest period. In any case, the context is very much of the competitive type today.

There has, of course, been a great deal of social change over the past fifteen years or so governing the relative status of

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francophones and anglophones in Canada. The desire of French Canadians to be "maîtres chez nous" implies, by any logic, that English Canadians "should *lose* some of their power and prominence in Quebec. And, to many anglophones, the fact that the rules of the game *have* changed somewhat suggests, probably correctly, that they might change even more.

The dominant anglophone group in Quebec constitutes less than twenty percent of the population. This numerical minority status has, in the past decade or so, become more of a social-psychological reality than ever before. While the non-French-Canadian population of Quebec has remained remarkably close to twenty percent of the population for over a century, the *feeling* of being a minority is a relatively new development. For most of Quebec's history, anglophone Quebecers perceived themselves as part of the anglophone *majority* in Canada, and an important part at that. This increasingly salient *minority* status can be seen by examining the terms used by French Canadian nationalist leaders. For most of Quebec's history, the standard reference was to "les Anglais". Nowadays, the most often used term is "la minorité anglophone".

Finally, Quebec has had an overwhelmingly French Canadian population ever since the area was first "settled", and the majority of all French Canadians have always lived in Quebec. Because of this, the territory has come to be viewed as the "national homeland" of French Canadians.

For these reasons, an examination of feelings of threat is important in understanding the reactions of this particular dominant group. The rest of this chapter will address itself to the following

questions: Just how threatened are anglophones in Quebec? Which aspects of the nationalist and independentist movements are perceived as most threatening? Which socio-economic groups are most threatened, and by what specifically? How can such variations be explained? What impact do feelings of threat have on the class differences in sympathy noted in the previous chapter?

### B. HOW THREATENED ARE ENGLISH CANADIANS? AN OVERVIEW

Table 3.1 gives the distribution of responses to several measures of the degree to which various aspects of Québécois nationalism are perceived as threatening. It should be noted that some of the questions relate more or less directly to language and ethnicity; others bear on the possible independence of Quebec and its perceived consequences; one question deals with the degree to which the Parti Québécois is seen as being dangerous.

A distinction to be kept in mind is that the first three questions in the table tap the respondent's degree of personal worry or concern about the future of English Canadians, about French unilingualism, and about the possible consequences of an independent Quebec. The last three questions tap people's perceptions and assessments of a separate Quebec, of the job chances of English Quebecers after independence, and of the Parti Québécois.

As a quick glance at table 3.1 indicates, Québécois nationalism is a source of some concern for English Canadians in Quebec. It is also clear, however, that not all issues are equally threatening. One crude way of determining which aspects of the movement are most

## TABLE 3.1

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## PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO VARIOUS MEASURES OF THREAT

(Q2-32): How worried are you about possible future changes in the position of English-speaking Canadians in Quebec: are you very worried, fairly worried, not very worried, or not worried at all?

Very worried	19.9%	
Fairly worried	33.5	
Not very worried	21.9	
Not worried at all	16.9	
Qualified answer	2.8	
Don't know	2.8	
No answer	0.2	
	100.0	(N = 871)

(Q2-41): Some people suggest that Quebec become a French unilingual province, that is a province in which French would be the sole language in schools, at work, and in other public places. Does this worry you very much, moderately, a little, or not at all?

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Very much	40.1%	
Moderately	19.5	
Qualified answer	2.5	
A little	16.2	
Not at all	19.3	
Don't know	1.7	
No answer	0.7	
	100.0	(N = 871)

(Q3-77): When you think of all the consequences independence could have, does it worry you or not? (IF YES) Does it worry you a lot, somewhat, or just a little?

1 0	
Worries me a lot	38.6%
Worries me somewhat	31.0
Worries me only a little	12.2
No, does not worry me	15.7
Don't know	1.8
No answer	0.7

100.0 (N = 871)

TABLE 3.1 Con't.

(Q3-74): If Quebec became an independent nation, what do you think would be the effect on economic conditions in Quebec: would they become much better, slightly better, stay the same, become slightly worse, or much worse?

Much better		Ň	1.4%
Slightly better		-	1.5
The same			0.6
Qualified answer,	that	depends	3.6
Slightly worse		D	14.0
Much worse			70.7
Don't know			7.9
No answer		•	0.3
			100.0

- (Q3-76): If Quebec became independent do you think that in the long run English-Canadians would have better chances of getting ahead at work the same chances as now, or less chances?
  - Better 1.3 Same 19.4 Qualified answer, that depends 7.2 Less 61.9 Don't know 10.0 No answer 2100.0 (N = 871)

(03-72):

: Respondents were presented with a list of adjectives and asked to apply them to all four provincial political parties. The following shows the proportion of respondents applying the adjective "dangerous" to the four parties.

Parti Québécois	45.0 '	
Liberal Party	2.0	
Ra'lliement Créditiste	4.0	
Union Nationale	4.0	(N = 871)

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(N = 871)

threatening is to examine the relative skewness of the marginal distributions of responses.

The greatest unanimity among anglophones concerns their views of the economic consequences of independence. Over 70% thought things would be "much worse". In fact, when respondents were asked to explain, in their own words, *why* they were opposed to the independence of Quebec, fear for the economic consequences of such a move was the prominent theme among the answers. The following are examples of this emphasis:

- -- "Economic problems. Ireland became a depressed country".
- -- "People would starve".
- -- "Standard of living will be badly affected for a period of ten to fifteen years".
- -- "Quebec wouldn't be able to support itself for the standard of living people expect here."
- -- "It would lead to economic chaos".
- -- "I am afraid that Québec will lose more than it would gain and this in favour of the U.S. by their investments".

Next, over 60% of the sample see the job chances of anglophones being reduced after separation, and almost half view the Parti Québécois as dangerous. It should be pointed out that the three most skewed distributions that have just been referred to, are those of the measures of *expectations or assessments*. The first three questions in the table, concerning personal *worries*, all show less skewed distributions than the others. What this means is that English Quebecers are somewhat more convinced about the negative consequences of an independent Quebec for them should it come about, than they are worried about it. With respect to the specific subjects of worry, it is interesting that people are much more worried about the increased *use of French* than they are about "the position of English-speaking Canadians in Quebec". (Comparing the first two panels of table 3.1).

# C. THREATS AND THE STRATIFICATION SYSTEM

How do feelings of threat vary by class? There are theoretical and intuitive reasons that would lead us to different expectations as to which socio-economic group of English Quebecers is most threatened by Québécois nationalism and separatism. On the one hand, given the strong middle-class base of the independentist movement, the sophistication of its ideology, and the clear focus of its attacks on the various centers of English power, one could expect the higheststatus groups to be the most worried by such activity, since they are, after all, its chief avowed targets. On the other hand, it could just as easily be argued that the lower socio-economic groups should be the ones who feel the most threatened: are not the least affluent sectors of society also the the least mobile, with the least transferrable or marketable skills, with the fewest resources in general?

If we examine the breakdown of the various measures of threat by income (Table 3.2), we find no systematically large differences. The highest income group is the least worried about the future of English-speaking Quebecers. On the other language-related questions, the lowest income group indicates the least worry about the prospects of unilingualism but the most worry about the long-term job chances of

# TABLE 3.2

# INTENSITY OF THREATS, BY EDUCATION AND INCOME

1	Education		Income		
	< 11 yrs	≥ 12 yrs	<u> </u>	<u>M</u> 1	<u>    H                                </u>
(Q 2-32) English in Quebec (% High Worry)	⁵⁸ (434)	⁵⁸ (411)	⁵⁹ (204)	⁵⁹ (274)	⁴⁴ (198)
(Q2-41) Unilingualism (% High Worry)	⁵⁸ (444)	⁶⁴ (406)	⁵⁹ (218)	⁶⁶ (271)	⁶³ (196 <u>,</u> )
(Q3-77) Worry independ- ence (% High Worry)	⁶⁷ (444)	⁷⁶ (405)	⁶² (214)	⁷⁶ (276)	⁷⁹ (192)
(Q3-74) Econ. Conseq. Indep. (% "much worse")	⁷⁴ (410)	⁸⁰ (389)	⁶⁹ (187)	⁸⁰ (266)	⁸⁴ (186)
(Q3-76) English job chances (% "less chance")	⁶⁴ (387)	⁷³ (395)	⁷⁸ (187)	⁶⁶ (264)	⁷⁰ (182)
Parti Québécois (% saying dangerous)	⁴⁸ (456)	⁴¹ (415)	⁴³ (222)	⁴⁹ (276)	44(200)

anglophones. With respect to the prospects of independence, however, the *high* income earners are clearly the *most* worried. With respect to the Parti Québécois, there is little difference between the proportions of each income group who perceive it as dangerous, although the middleincomes are slightly more threatened than the others.

Edudational differences have relatively little effect on threats; where differences do occur, it is the higher educated group that is the most threatened. For example, 73 percent of those with some post-secondary education see the long term job chances of anglophones as being reduced after independence, whereas the corresponding proportion among the less educated group is 64 percent. Similarly, the higher-educated worrry more about the economic consequences of independence, and perceive these as being worse. The only exception to this pattern is that the lesser-educated group is slightly more likely to label the Parti Québécois as dangerous.

How do threats vary by occupation? As Table 3.3 shows, those employed in sales and clerical occupations are the most threatened by nationalism, separatism and the Parti Québécois; in short, according to every one of our measures. Furthermore, within the sales and clerical group, unlike in the two other occupational groups, it is the lesseducated who are most threatened.

Before attempting an explanation of what has just been presented, let us simply retain two findings as a summary: a) sales and clerical employees are consistently more threatened than others;^{it} and, b) especially with respect to the specific issue of the independence of Quebec and its possible consequences, the highly-educated and

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TABLE 3.3					
INTENSITY OF THREATS, BY EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION					
		PROF., TECH. & MGR.	SALES & CLERICAL	WORKERS	
(Q-2-32) English in Quebec. ≼	11 y.rs	⁵¹ (106)	⁶⁶ (87)	⁵⁶ (222)	
(V) Utah	12 yrs	⁴⁶ (278)	⁵¹ (69)	⁵⁷ (60)	
(Q-2-41) Uniling- ualism) ≼	11 yrs	⁴⁶ (106)	⁷² (91)	⁵⁷ (232)	
(% High Worry) >>	12 yrs	⁶⁵ (276)	⁶⁷ (69)	⁶³ (57)	
Q-3-77) Worry about≼ independence	il yrs	⁶⁴ (106)	⁷⁹ (91)	⁶¹ (228)	
10/ Usimb Using 1	≽l2 yrs	⁷⁶ (272)	⁶⁸ (69)	⁸³ (60)	
(Q-3-74) Econ. Con- sequence of Indep.≼ (% "much worse"	il yrs	69 (106)	⁷⁸ (89)	⁷⁶ (198)	
	≥12 yrs	⁸⁰ (258)	⁹³ (69)	⁶⁶ (58)	
(Q-3-76) English ≼ job chances	-	(9/)	⁸⁰ (82)	⁶⁰ (193)	
(% "less chance")	>12 yrs	⁷⁵ (266)	⁷⁴ (65)	⁶⁵ (60)	
PQ Dangerous? (% "yes" ≤	:11 yrs	⁴⁰ (106)	⁵⁷ (93)	⁴⁷ (236)	
Ş	212 yrs	³⁸ (282)	⁵⁷ (69)	³⁷ (60)	

TABLE 3.3

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those with high-incomes are somewhat more threatened than others.²

#### D. AN EXPLANATION

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Now can we account for this pattern of threats? As Allport has suggested with respect to a related topic, prejudice, we can think of the range of possible explanations of this phenomenon as forming a continuum starting with broad historical explanations at one end, moving on to intermediate explanations that stress such factors as conflict, competition, or social change, with the other end of the spectrum being rounded out by approaches that put causal emphasis on personality structure or other psychological variables.³ In such an overall perspective, these different levels of analysis are not meant to be mutually exclusive; in fact, each "theory" brings out aspects of the problem not covered by other approaches. In the analysis to be presented here, however, we will not dwell at any length on the history of French-English relations in Quebec, nor will we discuss personality factors that might affect the distribution of perceived threats. Instead, the discussion will be limited to one "middle range" hypothesis. Briefly, it will be argued that the findings just reported can best be explained by what we might call a "vulnerability theory" of ethnic threats.

The crux of this argument is contained in two main points. First, the main arena of French-English occupational competition in Québec is located at the white collar, or put differently, above the blue collar, level. And secondly, of all anglophones employed in managerial, professional, technical, sales or clerical occupations, it is those at the *lower levels*, namely the sales and clerical group, who are most susceptible of losing their jobs to francophones or to anglophones who are more bilingual than they. Let us examine each of these points in more detail.

The main reason there is relatively less competition between francophones and anglophones at the blue-collar level than at the whitecollar level is that francophones have a near-monopoly on all hlue-collar jobs in Québec. Furthermore, where this is not the case, as in certain service industries such as domestic service or clothing or textiles, it is because francophones have passed through these occupations in larger numbers in the past, but are now finding better-paying jobs, leaving more of the low-paying work to immigrants.

Furthermore, there is evidence that indicates that French-English competition is becoming more intense. In the 1954 study undertaken by Rocher and De Jocas, it was found that English Canadians had a higher rate of upward mobility than French Canadians.⁴ Ten years later, Dofny and Garon-Audy replicated this study; they found that the difference between French and English rates of mobility was decreasing.⁶ We have argued that French-English competition today is largely a whitecollar affair. Let us turn now to the second point put forth at the beginning of this section. Why are sales and clerical employees more consistently threatened than members of the professional, technical, and managerial group? It would be hard to argue that there is significantly more competition at the sales and clerical level than at higher white collar levels. In fact, students of the question have argued just the opposite: ". . . c'est plutôt dans la partie *supérieure* de la classe

moyenne que se situe la compétition, le conflit."⁶ (Emphasis added).

True, there is little doubt that, to the extent that francophone nationalists aim at a transfer of jobs from English to French hands, it is the jobs at the upper white collar level that are⁵ the main targets. English hegemony of the upper levels of the occupational hierarchy has long been prominent on the list of French-Canadian grievances. I would argue, however, that despite this, the main 'payoffs' in terms of jobs passing from anglophones to francophones are more likely to occur at the lower white collar level. A main consequence of this would be that the sales and clerical group is the most threatened because it is the most vulnerable to replacement by francophones. This will be especially true in periods when anglophone employers are likely to feel pressured to increase the number of francophones they employ. The analyses of Guindon ⁷ for instance, would suggest that the independentist movement of the 1960's can be viewed as a strategy, in Keyfitz's words,  $\theta$  "to put enough pressure on the decision makers to offset their tendency to choose their own people."

Why is this group the most vulnerable? Firstly, by and large, sales and clerical occupations require less skill and training and involve less *responsibility* than do professional, technical, or managerial positions. Thus if an organization with a majority-anglophone work setting feels pressured to hire more francophone employees, this is likely to be perceived, in managerial eyes, as more "easily" or "naturally" done at the *lower* white collar levels than at the *higher* white collar levels. This is because extra occupational (ascribed) criteria such as ethnicity are likely to have an effect in hiring practices in inverse

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proportion to the *specificity* of the formal job prerequisites.⁹ And, of course, it is by and large true that the lower the job, the more its specific details are spelled out in advance. E. C. Hughes has made the point that the higher the position, the more its occupancy implies a tacit "vote of confidence" from one's superiors. And the crux of the dilemma of the French-English division of labour in Quebec is that such votes of confidence by anglophone employers are less likely to be given to those who are culturally or linguistically "different". The latter are more likely to be judged on the basis of how well they speak English and "fit in" rather than on their, competence. This is one reason behind the persistence of the process of (ethnic)" "like-recruitment" discussed by Porter¹⁰ and Keyfitz.¹¹

So far this argument has identified a source of vulnerability in the structural pressures present in recent years within anglophone work-organizations. Québécois nationalists attempt to pressure decisionmakers to hire more francophones at upper levels. The employers tend to respond by hiring them at lower levels, either for reasons just discussed or because anglophone employers feel less threatened themselves by hiring French Canadians at levels below their own.

The degree to which such pressures operate may vary greatly depending on the organization. Independently of this process, however, a second reason for the vulnerability of lower white collars is that sales and clerical employees have the least "credentialized" or otherwise transferable job skills.

Thus sales and clerical workers are the most likely to perceive themselves as vulnerable to losing their jobs. We might note that, /in

most cases, feelings of threat seem to be most intense when sales and clerical employees have a low Education. (Table 3.3). This is probably because they are the ones whose skills are *that much less* marketable than those of more educated sales and clerical workers.

In the professional and managerial group on the other hand, the ones who are the most threatened are, for the most part (4 out of 6 questions), the more educated. An explanation for this would be that, as hypothesized earlier, the highly educated are more likely to be more knowledgeable about the independentist movement and its English elite targets, and given the positions they occupy, more likely to include themselves as being among those targets.

" A third reason sales and clerical employees are more "expendable" than higher-level white collars is that any hiring of the former involves much less internal organizational change, actual or potential, than does hiring at higher levels.

A fourth reason could be that sales and clerical jobs are those for which the "rules of the game" with respect to language policy in work settings are changing the fastest. This is centainly plausible given the contact with the public that characterizes some of these occupations.¹²

É. Sympathy Under Conditions of Threat

What are the links between feelings of threat and feelings of sympathy? Certainly the most prevalent hypothesis linking these two phenomena holds that the relationship is a negative one, that feelings of threat decrease sympathy. This view of threats as having a *dompening* 

effect on sympathy is implicit in much of the literature on ethnic relations, even though the causal link is often left unstated.¹³


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There is, however, a contrary hypothesis that is advanced less often: namely that feelings of threat have an *intensifying* effect on sympathy. By this view, feelings of sympathy are *amplified* when one is threatened. The mechanism involved here would be one of conscious or unconscious compensation. One finding confirming this hypothesis is reported by Romalis, who found that intense threats *increased* sympathy for moderate nationalist demands, but at the same time increased opposition to separatism.¹⁴

Let us now look at the data. Table 3.4 shows that there is no case where feeling threatened increases sympathy. In fact, in most cases threats have a strong *negative* effect on sympathy, the only exception being the effect measured by Q 3-76 in the third panel of the table, where the threat has no effect at all. In general, then, the greater the perceived threat, the lower the sympathy.

A comment is in order concerning the direction of causality here. It is assumed that in most cases feelings of threat are causally prior to feelings of sympathy. It could be the case, however, that the causal order is reversed under certain conditions or among certain segments of the population. For example, it is not inconceivable that a very high level of sympathy might lead one to *deny* being threatened, if not actually reduce the feeling of threat.



## % SYMPATHETIC

<u>+IGH</u> ²⁷ (128) ³⁶ (396)	<u>MEDIUM</u> ³⁹ (214)	LOW 47(287)	
	³⁹ (214)	⁴⁷ (287)	
36 ( 200 )			
( 396 )		46 (228)	
40(410)		³⁹ (192)	
³⁵ (487) [.]		⁵⁵ (121)	ß
³⁴ (258) ⁴³ (204)		⁴⁷ (163)	
³⁴ (314)	·	⁴⁶ (315)	
	³⁵ (487)	³⁵ (487) ³⁴ (258) ⁴³ (204)	$\begin{array}{c} 35_{(487)} \\ 34_{(258)} \\ \end{array} \begin{array}{c} 55_{(121)} \\ 43_{(204)} \\ \end{array} \begin{array}{c} 47_{(163)} \\ \end{array}$

#### F. EDUCATION AND SYMPATHY UNDER CONDITIONS OF THREAT

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We have seen that sympathy for Québécois nationalism is strongest among the highly-educated. We have also found, however, that the most educated (among the professional and managerial group) are also the most threatened. How is the relationship between education and sympathy affected by feelings of threat?

Table 3.5 shows that education and threats exert strong *independent and opposite* effects on favourableness. Sympathy can be thought of as the net result, in this case, of two simultaneous forces acting in opposite directions: having a formal education increases sympathy, while feeling threatened decreases it. In every case, sympathy is highest among those with at least some post-secondary education who are relatively unworried by Québécois nationalism and separatism.

If education and a feeling of relative security are two important sources of sympathy, we might ask, which factor is the more important of the two? A computation of the average effect of each variable shows that education is the more important one. Another way to see this from Table 3.5 is to note that in every panel except the first, those who are highly threatened and highly educated are more sympathetic than the less threatened and less educated.

A more concise way of appreciating the combined effect of education and threats on sympathy is presented in the next table. (Table 3.6). It can be seen from this table that the positive effect of education on sympathy is made much stronger by the absence of threats.

			II	NTENSITY O	F THREA	T
<u> </u>	THREAT		HIGH	MEDI	UM	LOW
Q2-32:	English in Quebec ^a EDUC:	L	²⁷ (67)	27(1	05)	³⁶ (136)
		Н	²⁶ (61)	51(1	09)	⁵⁷ (151)
Q2-41:	Unilingualism? ^b	L	²⁸ (184)			³⁶ (122)
	-	Н	⁴⁴ (212)			⁶⁰ (104)
Q3-76 : 🕶	English job chances? ^c	L	³¹ (183)		· · ·	²⁸ (111)
		H	⁴⁸ (227)			⁵⁶ (79)
Q3-74:	Economic Conse- quences?	L	²⁴ (224)			⁴² (71)
	, <b>4</b> 00000	н	⁴⁴ (263)			⁷² (50)
Q3-77:	Worry about Independence ^e	L	³⁰ (135)	29	4)	35 (89)
x		Н	³⁸ (123)	⁵³ (1	20)	⁶² (74)
Parti Québécois dangerous? ^f		L	³⁰ (177)	-1		³² (131)
unge		Н	' ³⁹ (137)			⁵⁶ (184)

SYMPATHY, BY INTENSITY OF VARIOUS THREATS, BY EDUCATION

TABLE 3.5

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(% SYMPATHETIC)

Note: Footnotes on following page.

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average effect of education = .15 a -** negative effect of threats = .20 average effect of education = .225 a1 -** negative effect of threats = .075 average effect of education = .20 ъ -** negative effect of threats = .12average effect of education = .225 c -11 negative effect of threats = .025d average effect of education = .25 11 negative effect of threats = .23e average effect of education = .17511 negative effect of threats = .145average effect of education = .255 e, -11 negative effect of threats = .075average effect of education = .165f – 11 negative effect of threats = .095 - 65

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## TABLE 3.6

## THE EFFECT OF EDUCATION ON FAVOURABLENESS IS REDUCED BY INTENSE THREATS

(% Sympathetic among Highly Educated) minus

(% Sympathetic among Low Education)

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THREAT	AMONG HIGHLY THREATENED	AMONG - SLIGHTLY THREATENED	Δ
Q. 2-32: English in Quebec	-1%	21%	22%
Q. 2-41: Uniling- ualism	16	24	8
Q. 2-76: English job chances	17	28	11
Q. 3-34: Economic consequences	20	30	10
Q. 3-77: Worry about independ ence	- 8	27	19
Q. Parti Québécoi dangerous?	s g ."	24	15

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These non-zero deltas are a measure of the *interaction* between education and threats, since a perfectly additive relationship would yield a difference of differences equal to zero. This suggests that sympathy can best be expressed as a *multiplicative* function of education and feelings of threat. As can be seen in Table 3.5, *both* a high education and a feeling of relative security are *necessary* conditions for high sympathy.

Thus, feelings of threat do not account for our earlier observed relationship between education and sympathy. Rather, education and feelings of threat combine to cause sympathy in the special way just shown.

### G. CONCLUSION

This chapter began with the issue of variations in feelings of threat *between* dominant groups in contexts of ethnic stratification, and went on to examine such feelings empirically *within* the dominant anglophone group in Quebec.

Feelings of threat are important in this context for three main reasons. First, this dominant group is a numerical minority of the Quebec population. Secondly, the rapid social change in Quebec and Canada in the last fifteen years has brought with it a continual and very public renegotiation of the ethnic status order between francophone and anglophones. Finally, French Canadians have a special claim to the territory of Quebec: it is perceived as the national homeland of French Canadians by anglophones and francophones alike.

It was found that economic considerations are primary in

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people's concern about the possibility of an independent state of Quebec. Also, there is more unanimity among anglophones in the *perceptions and assessments* of the negative consequences of separation than there is in their degree of *worrying* about it.

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Sales and clerical employees are the most threatened. This was explained by reference to the greater "vulnerability" of this group. This vulnerability was traced to the "uncredentialized" nature of these jobs, as well as to certain structural pressures operating to various degrees in anglophone-dominated work settings in recent years in Québec.

Feelings of threat have a strong dampening effect on sympathy. The more threatened one feels by Québécois nationalism, the less on  $\notin$  is sympathetic to it. A feeling of relative security (absence of threats) and a high education are both necessary conditions for high sympathy.

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### FOOTNOTES

¹See Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Paternalistic vs Competitive Race Relations", in Bernard E. Segal (ed.), <u>Racial and Ethnic Relations</u>, second edition, New York: Crowell, 1972, pp. 24-38.

¹⁸See Stanley Lieberson, "A Societal Theory of Race and Ethnie Relations", <u>American Sociological Review</u>, 26 (December 1961), 902-10.

^{1b}Although it is true that women are significantly overrepresented in these occupations, controls revealed no consistent differences in perceived threats between men and women.

²A possible source of distortion here is suggested by certain findings of Bradburn and Caplovitz. They note that in the American communities they studied in the 1960's. the higher-education and higherincome groups had a higher frequency of self-reported "worries" of various sorts, whether or not the issues involved were of an especially threatening nature. See Norman M. Bradburn and David Caplovitz, <u>Reports on Happiness</u>, Chicago: Aldine, 1965, pp. 53 ff. The problem this poses here is that several of our indicators of threats use the phraseology of "worries", "worrying", etc. . Therefore we cannot exclude the possibility that these questions might not be pure measures of threat, and that they might partially reflect a tendency of the high feducation and high-income groups to report more "worries" of a wide vagiety.

³Gordon W. Allport, <u>The Nature of Prejudice</u>, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954, p. 202.

⁴G. Rocher and Y. de Jocas, "Inter-Generation Occupational Mobility in the Province of Quebec", <u>The Canadian Journal of Economics and</u> <u>Political Science</u>, vol. 23, February 1957.

⁵Jacques Dofny and Muriel Garon-Audy, "Mobilités professionnelles au Québec", <u>Sociologie et Sociétés</u>, I, no. 2., November 1969, pp. 277-301.

⁶Dofny and Garon-Audy, op. cit., p. 299.

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⁷Guindon stresses that support for the independentist movement is largely based on real or perceived blocked occupational mobility. See Hubert Guindon, "Social Unrest, Social Class, and Guebec's Eureaucratic Revolution", pp. 187-192 in W. F. Mann (ed.), <u>Canada: A Socio-</u> logical Profile, Toronto: Copp Clark, 1971.

For a similar analysis of many instances of linguistic conflict in Europe, see Ronald F. Inglehart and Margaret Woodward, "Language Conflict and Political Community", <u>Comparative Studies in History and</u> Society, vol. X, 1967-68. ł

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⁸Nathan Keyfitz, "Canadians and Canadiens", pp. 140-150 in W. E. Mann (ed.), <u>op. cit.</u>

⁹This proposition is stimulated inpart by H. M. Blalock, Jr., "Occupational Discrimination: Some Theoretical Positions", <u>Social</u> <u>Problems</u>, 9, (Winter 1962) pp. 240-247, as discussed in Lee Taylor, <u>Occupational Sociology</u>, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 338.

¹⁰John Porter, <u>The Vertical Mosaic</u>, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.

#### ¹¹Keyfitz, op. cit.

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× 372.

¹²For discussions of the problems posed by integrating information about social contexts with information given in survey responses, see the contributions in Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan (eds.), <u>Quanti-</u> <u>tative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences</u>, Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1969, especially Juan J. Linz, "Ecological Analysis and Survey Research", pp. 91-132 and Erwin K. Scheuch, "Social Context and Individual Behavior", pp. 133-156.

¹³See for example Gordon W. Allport, op. cit., p. 258 and p.

¹⁴Coleman Romalis, "The attitudes of the Montreal Jewish Community toward French Canadian nationalism and separatism", M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1967.

¹⁶This kind of multiplicative model also applies, of course, tp the joint effects of education and awareness of ethnic inequalities on sympathy discussed in Chapter 2. For a discussion of the theoretical relevance of interaction effects, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Theory Building and the Statistical Concept of Interaction", <u>American Sociological Review</u>, 30 (June 1965), pp. 374-80, reprinted in the same author's <u>Theory Construction</u>: From Verbal to Mathematical Models, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1969.

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## CHAPTER 4 THE EFFECTS OF LINGUISTIC SEGMENTATION

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There is, of course, a very high degree of segregation between francophones and anglophones in Québec. English-speaking Quebecers have a high degree of "institutional completeness" as a lang-Most institutions in which most anglophones participate uage group. are dominated by anglophones (with the significant exception of politics, especially at the provincial level), and have traditionally been structured so as to require little participation in francophone institutions. This is accompanied by widespread residential segregation. Three fourths of Quebec's anglophones live in the Metropolitan Montreal Both in Montreal and elsewhere in the province, francophones and area. anglophones tend to cluster in separate neighborhoods. This is true not only objectively but also subjectively, in the sense that people perceive themselves as residing in "English neighborhoods" and "French neighborhoods".

There are certainly many intuitive reasons to suspect that this high degree of segmentation is an important factor in shaping the kinds of reactions anglophones have toward French-Canadian nationalism. From a theoretical point of view students of segmented societies such as Després, M. G. Smith, R. T. Smith, Kuper, Lijphart, and Rose would agree at least that segmentation has important consequences on many

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areas of life in such societies, though there is wide disagreement on what these consequences actually are. $\epsilon$ 

As Benedict has noted, a common pitfall of those adopting this "plural society" or "segmented society" framework has been that segmentation variables have often been unwittingly confused with stratification variables.³ We might add that an emphasis on difference *between* cultural segments of a segmented society can often lead one to overlook class differences within each cultural group, as well as the existence of structural features, such as social class membership, that cut across community boundaries.

It is for this reason that we have postponed a discussion of segmentation until this point, and that each of the two previous chapters began with a consideration of the internal stratification of the anglophone community in Quebec. We have seen that there are many shades of opinion in the English-speaking community with respect to francophone demands, just as there is much diversity within the francophone community on this same set of issues, and that there are certain parallel sources of favourableness in the social structures of each of the language communities.

Similarly, just as it was found that anglophones fear for the economic consequences of an independent Québec, so it was found that francophones often express the same misgivings.⁴ At this point the ques-" tion arises, if both language groups are responding to similar social forces, where does segmentation enter into the picture? We can best begin to answer this by looking now at the effects of an independent variable that has been held constant up to this point in this study,

that is, which of the two main language communities that one is a member of. Several of the questions used as indicators of perceived threats in the previous chapter were presented to francophone respondents as well, and the distribution of responses to these, by ethnic origin, is presented in Table 4.1. We might expect, of course, with regard to those questions specifically mentioning the future of Englishspeaking people that French and English Canadians should display guite different response patterns. Yet the questions that were asked of both groups that are presented in Table 4.1 make no explicit mention of ethnicity; despite the general nature of the questions, however, it is clean that by every measure of threat, francophones feel less threatened than anglophones.

### A. SEGMENTATION AND INTERCOMMUNAL CONTACTS

How can we explain that, as we have just seen, anglophones are more threatened than francophones even when our measure of perceived threat refers to the broadest kind of worry about the economic consequencles of separation? I suggest that this is partly due to the ways in which much information is diffused in segmented societies. A main consequence of segmentation of the kind that exists between francophones and anglophones in Québec is that for the average individual, a very high volume of whatever information is received about the other language group's culture and folkways is transmitted by members of one's own linguistic group, rather than through direct interaction with members of the other group.⁵ The average anglophone in Quebec learns about French

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• TABLE 4.1.

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WHOLE SAMPLE COMPARISONS: THREATS BY ETHNIC ORIGIN

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¢		FRENCH CANADIAN	ENGLISH CANADIAN	OTHER*
Q3-74	: Economic consequen- ces: (% saying "much worse")	⁴² (4399)	⁷⁷ (531)	⁷⁰ (508)
Q3-77	: Worry (% Highly worried about inde- pendence)	⁵⁴ (4705)	⁷⁶ (554)	⁶⁶ (562) ⁻
• <b>P.Q.</b>	Dangerous (% labelling)	³² (4860)	⁵⁰ (555)	³⁰ (596)

*includes those whose usual language is French or some other language; in other words, not just those who were interviewed in English.

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Canadian society mainly from other anglophones or from the English-language media. There is, of course, a good deal of *contact* between the two groups. Before examining the impact of intercommunal contacts on anglophone reactions in light of the above discussion, it might be worthwhile to briefly focus on the nature and frequency of contacts between the two groups.

Very little systematic information exists concerning contacts between francophones and anglophones in Quebec. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that most contacts that *dc* take place are of a formal or "role-bound" nature. Whether contacts are formal or informal, impersonal or friendly, is of course very difficult to measure. However, we *can* compare how different occupational groups, for instance, vary in the frequency of their self-reported contacts with francophones in dif-'ferent situations. (Table 4.2).

As we might expect from knowledge of the occupational structure of Quebec, blue-collar workers are clearly *less* segregated from francophones than those in other occupations. It can be seen from Table 4.2 that the blue-collar group has the most contact with francophones both at work and elsewhere, that blue-collar workers are the most fluent in their knowledge of French, and are the most likely to use the language at work and elsewhere.

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Even if the main differences are between blue-collar workers and those above the blue-collar level, there are further differences between those at lower white collar and upper white collar levels. To be sure, if one compares the sales and clerical group to the professional, technical, and managerial group, it is clear that the two groups are

## TABLE 4.2

## INDIGATORS OF SEGMENTATION, BY OCCUPATION

(% High fluency, frequency of use or of contact)

		000	CUPATION	
	×	PROF., TECH., AND MGRS.	SALES AND	WORKERS
1.	Q1-58: Knowledge of French (% "fluently" or "nearly fluently")	22	19	29
2.	Q1-59: Speak French at work (% nearly all the time or very often).	, 08 ,	07	ُنْ ^{بَ} 29
3. ,	Q1-60: Speak French [°] in public places (% very often or fairly often).	27	• 13	36
4.	Q1-63: Contact with Franco- phone in everyday work: (% nearly all the time or very often).	د د 34 م	35	÷ 59
5.	Ql-64: Social Contacts (% very often or fairly often)	43	37	53 [°] ,
<del></del>		• •		<u></u>

(N.B. Vertical comparisons should be made only between panels giving the exact same proportions; for example panel 3, which gives the percent answering "very often" or "fairly often", should only be compared with panel 5, since this is the only other panel giving this <u>identically</u> worded percentage. Similarly, panel 2 should only be compared with panel '4.

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about equal in their frequency of contacts with francophones at work, and also that both groups manage to speak French equally rarely at work.

Beyond these similarities, however, important differences appear. The sales and clericals have less knowledge of the French language, make less use of it in public places, and have fewer social contacts with francophones than those in professional, technical, and managerial occupations. All of this might make for an additional reason for the more intense feelings of threat of the sales and clerical group. This would appear to be one instance of segmentation acting as an *amplifier* of perceived threats, an effect that will be discussed further in the next section.

Æ * A possible objection might be registered here. In the preceding chapter it was implied that anglophones in lower white collar jobs were in a sense the ones most in *competition* with francophones. How ' can this be so if they have so little contact with francophones? This apparent contradiction can be resolved if we realize that the vulnerability argument advanced in the last chapter implies intergroup rather than inter-individual competition. Thus, lower white collar anglophones do not necessarily have to be presently working with francophones in order to feel vulnerable and threatened. Notice that the sales and clericals do, however, have as much or more contact with francophones at work than the professional, technical, and managerial group. The point being made here is that their lesser fluency in French, their lower tendency to use French in public places, and their lower frequency of social contacts are a further source of their more intense feelings of threat. Before discussing this further, we might note a few other interesting feature of Frengh-English interaction that are

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revealed by Table 4.2.

It can be seen from comparing the second and fourth panels of the table that the proportion of anglophones who have frequent contact with francophones at work is much greater than the proportion who speak French often at work. Similarly, a comparison of the third and fifth panels shows that the proportion having frequent social contacts with francophones is higher than the proportion using the French language in public. These are rough measures of the degree to which francophones are (still) disproportionately laden with the burdens of bilingualism in Quebec. It should be noted that this is the case at all occupational levels, though the "speak/contact" ratio is highest among the bluecollar workers as can be seen from Table 4.3. This means that the blue collar group not only has the most contact with francophones, but also that the contacts at this level are more egalitarian than at higher occupational levels.

# TABLE 4,3

AN INDEX OF EGALITARIAN CONTACT AT WORK

(% of anglophones with High contact with francophones at work, who say their use of French at work is also high, by occupation.)

Prof., Tech., and Mgr.	¹⁸ (118)
Sales and Clerical	²³ (56)
Workers	⁴² (145)

### B. WORK CONTACTS, EGALITARIAN ATTITUDES, AND SYMPATHY

An important consequence of this concentration of *egalitarian work-contacts* in the working class is, of course, that it cannot help but contribute to basically *egalitarian attitudes* towards French Canadians. As discussed earlier, such attitudes are disproportionately located in the working class, and are an important source of the lower sympathy of anglophone blue-collar workers for Québécois nationalism.

There is also a further way in which this pattern of contacts contributes to low sympathy among blue collar workers. These workers, since they are most likely to use French at work, have a better chance than those who speak English at work to get the honest opinions of their francophone colleagues on the whole question of nationalism and independence. These francophone workers, however, are *not* the most nationalist segment of Quebec society. Thus anglophone workers are disproportionately likely to have close equal-status work relations with a subset of French Canadians who are themselves disproportionately less likely to be actively concerned with nationalist and language questions.

Indirect evidence for this is obtained by examining the impact of various types of participation in francophone society on sympathy. As Table 4.4A shows, those with the very *highest* degree of participation in French Canadian society (as defined in the table) are not the most sympathetic to Québécois nationalism. Thus, those who are the *most* fluent in French, those who have the most contact with French Canadians at work, and those who make the most use of the French language at work and in public places, are *not* the people who are the most sym-

	• 12 	in Fran	COPHONE	SOCIETY		
ŗ,			,	(	% SYMPATHE	TIC)
1.	KNOWLEDGE OF	FRENCH 1 (fluent)	2	3	4	5 (not at all)
		²⁵ (63)	³⁴ (91)	⁴⁸ (184)	⁴³ (176)	³⁵ (115)
2.	USE OF FRENCH	AT WORK 1 (nearly all the time)	2	3	4 5	5 6 · never
đ	· · ·	²⁸ (46 [,] ) 4	⁹ (41) ⁴⁰ (	(139) ⁵² (	106) ⁵² (1	110) ²⁸ (173)
3.	USE OF FRENCH	IN PUBLIC PL	ACES AND E	LSEWHERE		;
	ţ	· 1 <u>very often</u>	2	3	4	5 _never
<b>-</b>		29 ^{°;} (65)	⁵¹ (100)	⁴⁹ (157)	⁴² (159)	²⁷ (141)
١.	CONTACT WITH	FRANCOPHONES				
ł	\$	l (nearly all the time)	° 2	3	4 !	5 6 never
	-	²⁹ (130) ⁴	⁷ (128) ³⁹	(111) ^{.44} (	124) ⁴² (6	52) ³⁹ (51)

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TABLE 4.4A Sympathy, by Various Measures of Participation

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pathetic.

We know that these kinds of contacts are most frequent in the working class. It has been argued that the strong pattern of egalitarian on-the-job contacts of the working class can lead to perceptions of French-Canadians as already equal, and that these in turn preclude sympathy for Québécois nationalism which aims to redress inequalities. Ideally we should like to be able to test this hypothesis and specify the joint effect of the frequency of one's work contacts and the degree to which these are egalitarian (independent variables) on one's perceptions of ethnic inequalities (intervening variable), and how all of these combine to influence one's level of sympathy. Unfortunately, this was impossible to carry out conclusively because of the following methodological difficulty. As table 4.3 shows, our index of egalitarian contact at the workplace, the "speak/contact ratio", is (necessarily) defined in such a way as to be applicable only to the subset of anglophones whose level of work-contact with francophones is high. Any four-variable table necessarily reduces drastically the number of cases on which each bivariate relationship is based. When a variable such as this one, where the available number of cases is *already* reduced, is entered into a three- or four-variable table, a good number of the resultant bivariate relationships are based on an unreliably small number of cases.

Theorists nave attempted to specify the conditions under which contact between ethnic groups will lead to favourable inter-group attitudes. Allport, for example, in his classic formulation, has suggested that contact most reduces prejudice when the two-groups a), have

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equal status. b) have common goals c) are cooperatively dependent on each other, and d) interact with the positive support of authorities, customs, and laws.^d In more general terms, theorists have stressed that contacts are most effective when they are most likely to make members aware of the *intereste* they have in common, more aware of the values and beliefs that they do share.⁷ There is also much agreement that *canual* intergroup contacts do not mecessarily lead to more favourable attitudes; in fact, they may even increase stereotyping and hence reinforce negative attitudes.

Compared to what we would expect theoretically on the basis of Allport's formulation, the findings of Table 4.4A might appear quite contradictory upon first inspection. To be sure, those with very little participation in francophone society are less sympathetic than those whose participation is moderate, as we would expect.

According to Allport, however, we should also expect anglophones with the most frequent and mest equilibrian work contacts to be the ones who are most sympathetic to French Canadian nationalism. This contradiction can be resolved if we realize that in both Allport's theory and in the explanation advanced above, equal status contacts are said to make for more forourable attitudes. In Allport's theory, these "more favourable" attitudes consist of a reduction of prejudice. In the argument put forth in this thesis, these "more favourable" attitudes consist of more egalitarian perceptions of the other group. Recall that in Chapter 2, we found that blue collar workers are not only less aware of the inequalities between French and English in Quebec, but also have more egalitarian (or, in other words, less "prejudiced") attitudes

with regard to the *talents* and *capabilities* of the two groups. These perceptions, it is argued, in turn have the effect of reducing sympathy for Québécois nationalism.

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In short, we should make a distinction between a sympathetic or favourable attitude toward another group, and sympathy for a nationalist social movement of that group. Both Allport's theory and the explanation given here argue that equal-status contacts increase "sympathy for the group". Hence, there is no contradiction between these two lines of reasoning.

Put differently, I have argued that working class anglophones are less sympathetic to Québécois *nationalism* because they have a special i''kind of "sympathy" for French Canadians as a group.

In sum, the curvilinear relationships shown in Table 4.4A can be explained as follows. We are positing a linear positive relationship between these various types of exposure to French Canadian society and a sympathetic or favourable attitude toward *French Canadians as a* group. (For reasons of space, we are not presenting any new measures of the latter variable).

If this is true, then those with very little or no exposure to francophone society are the least sympathetic to French Canadians as a-group as well as the least sympathetic to Québécois nationalism. Those with the highest degree of participation in francophone society then have a high degree of sympathy for French Canadians as a group. Because of this, they have a low level of sympathy for Québécois nationalism.

This explanation is advanced here heuristically. More research

is needed to specify the causal links between the types of intergroup contacts and the contexts in which they occur, on the one hand, and the resultant effect on attitudes toward the other group and sympathy for its *social movement*, on the other hand. Space is not our only limitation in pursuing this here. A specific difficulty is that our index of sympathy for Québécois *nationalism* in fact contains one item (concerning who is to blame for French Canadians' problems) that measures attitudes toward French Canadians *as a group* rather than attitudes toward the independentist movement. Thus more refined measures of each of these dependent variables are needed before this research can proceed-

It might be noted that the logic of this tentative, formulation parallels to some extent Durkheim's explanation of the curvilinear relationship observed between social integration and the suicide rate.⁸ His heuristic construction was that *two distinct* types of suicide were involved: a *low* level of social integration led to *egristic* suicide, while a very *high* level of social integration led to *altruistic* suicide. Similarly, here it has been argued that the curvilinear relationship between segmentation and sympathy for Québécois nationalism may involve *two distinct* types of sympathy.

C. SOCIAL CONTACTS AND SYMPATHY

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We have just discussed several indicators of exposure to French Canadian society, and we have seen that there is a curvilinear relationship between each of the above measures and sympathy for Quebecois nationalism.

There is one type of participation in francophone society

that does have a clear linear positive effect on sympathy for Québécois nationalism. This is off-the-job social contact with francophones:

## TABLE 4.4B

## Sympathy, by Social Contact With Francophones (% Sympathetic)

	<u></u>	FREQUENCY	OF SOCIAL	CONTACT*	, 
-	Very Often	Fairly Often	Rather <u>Rarely</u>	► Almost Never	Never
EDUCATION High School or less (≤11 yrs)	⁶⁴ (53)	²⁴ (86)	³⁴ (88)	¹³ (47)	`12 ₍₃₂₎
Some College & up (≥ 12 yrs)	⁵⁷ (30)	57 (109)	⁴⁶ (102)	⁴² (60)	

*Based on responses to question 1-64.

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Outside your work, when you meet your friends or your neighbours, or when you are at other gatherings, how often are you in contact with Frenchspeking people -- very often, fairly often, rather rarely, almost never, or never? *

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As Table 4.4B shows, social contacts have a very strong influence on favourableness toward francophone demands. The minority of anglophones who socialize with French-speaking people "very often are much more sympathetic than the average, while those who are completely cut off from francophone society in this sense are significantly less sympathetic than the average. Moreover, this holds true among the more educated as well as among the less educated. As might be expected, the effect is stronger among the less educated, since the more educated are more favourable to begin with for other reasons.

Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that *oven* among the highly educated, social segregation from francophone society substantially decreases favourableness.

Social contacts have a similar effect among members of another dominant group. In a recent study of Protestant-Catholic relations in Northern Ireland, it was found that social segregation increased Protestants' readiness to defy basic political laws. The proportion of *Ultras* rose from 28% per cent in the least segregated group to 64 per cent in the most segregated. Among members of the dominated group, the same trend appeared, but much more weakly: 39 per cent of the least segregated Catholics approved of illegal demonstrations, while emong the most segregated 50 per cent did so.⁹

Why is this? We can note that this finding is a confirmation of Homans' hypothesis that ". . . if the frequency of interaction between two or more persons increases, the degree of their liking for one another will increase, and vice versa.⁴¹⁰ This much said, an explanation is *still* called for: why is sympathy for French Canadian demands

so strongly linked to social contacts? We say "linked to" rather than "caused by" to emphasize that the relation of causality can quite plausibly operate in both directions here. Social contact increases sympathy, which in turn may well increase the frequency of social contacts. Similarly, those who are indifferent or hostile toward francophones are less likely to seek out or encourage social contacts with them; this, in turn, adds to the probability that the negative attitude will be maintained.

To rephrase the question, why is the impact of off-the-job social contacts on sympathy for Québécois nationalism so different from the impact of other types of participation in francophone society? • Why is it that those with the most frequent *social* contacts with francophones *are* the most sympathetic towards the nationalist movement, while those whose exposure to francophone society is high in *other* ways are *not* the ones who are most sympathetic?

I suggest that the reason for this may we that off-the-job social contact is the least formal and least role-bound kind of contact between two groups. Unlike contact with francophones at work or in stores, social contact in non-occupational settings is voluntary in the sense that it is not imposed by the necessities of earning a living or going shopping. By definition, such social contacts provide more opportunity for self-revelation.

These voluntaristic and less-role-bound characteristics of social contacts are perhaps further necessary conditions for sympathy toward a social movement, beyond or in addition to the conditions required for a sympathetic or favourable attitude toward a group. It

could be that equal-status contacts of the kind found at the work-place, for example, are sufficient for changing one's basic predisposition toward the other group, but that further more informal and less rolebound contacts of the extra-occupational social kind are required to make one sympathetic to a social movement linked to the group. A reason for this would be that more intimate contact with members of another group may be required to make one aware of the group's disadvantaged posjtion in society, and especially to make one aware of the subjective and psychological dimensions of membership in a dominated or subordinate ethnic or linguistic group.

### D. SOCIAL CONTACTS, THREATS, AND SYMPATHY

There is one important hypothesis mentioned above that we can test empirically. This concerns the role of perceptions of common interests as an intervening variable. The theoretical claim is that social contacts increase people's awareness of the common interests they share, and that this in turn leads them to a more favourable attitude toward a nationalist movement of the other group. We can test this by examining the extent to which perceived threats act as intervening variables linking variations in social contact and variations in sympathy. This link is suggested by our previously reported finding that, despite the many similar strains affecting both language groups, francophones are significantly less threatened by the independentist movement than are anglophones. Francophones, just like anglophones, debate interminably on the economic consequences of separation, and express the same range of fear about potential disorder. Yet, they are *less* threatened than anglo-

phones. Could it be then, that the more an English-speaking person participates in francophone society, the less threatened he feels by the various aspects of the independence movement, and that this feeling of relative security in turn increases sympathy? Let us begin to 'answer this by examining the links between threats and social² contacts.

		ABLE 4	.5			
In	TENSITY OF THREATS,	BY SOCIAL	CONTACT	s with F	RANCOP	HÒNES
	· · · · ·		SOCI	AL CONTAC	:TS	*
, 	THREAT	1 very often	2	3	4	5 never
Q2-32:	Worry about English in Quebec (% High Worry)	⁴⁴ (117)	⁴⁹ (246)	⁵⁶ (265)	⁶⁷ (131)	⁶⁶ (82)
Q2-41:	Worry about uniling- ualism (% High Worry)	61 ₍₁₁₂₎	⁵² (250)	⁶⁷ (263)	⁶⁸ (133)	⁵⁷ (90)
Q3-77:	Worry about conse- quences of independ. (% High Worry)	⁷⁰ (117) .	⁷⁰ (250)	⁷⁸ (263)	⁷² (129) `	⁵⁵ (86)
Q3-74:	Economic consequences of independence (% High Threat)	⁵⁹ (107)	^{• 83} (228) •	⁷⁶ (253)	⁸³ (131)	⁷⁵ (76)
Q3-76:	English job chates (% High Threat)	⁴⁹ (104)	⁵⁹ (235)	77 ₍₂₄₄₎	⁸² (120)	⁷⁷ (75)
	Parti Québécois (% Saying Dangerous)	³³ (121)	³⁹ (254)	⁵¹ (267)	⁴⁷ (133)	⁵² (92)

TADLE /1 5

Two patterns are revealed in Table 4.5. The first pattern concerns the effect of social contact on *worries*. This effect is ambiguous. In the first panel, those with the least contact are the least worried. In the second panel, social contact has no clear effect. In the third panel, contact has no effect, except that those who never have social contacts with French Canadians are the *least* worried. Thus, *worrying* about various aspects of Québécois nationalism bears no clear relationship to off-the-job social contacts with francophones.

A different pattern is to be found concerning the effects of contacts on anglophones' perceptions of the independentist movement, and their assessments of its consequences. As the last three panels of the table show, in these respects social contacts with francophones very strongly "relieve" feelings of threat. This confirms our hypothesis advanced earlier that a key effect of segmentation in Québec is to amplify perceived ethnic and linguistic threats. Social contacts with francophones act as a buffer against feelings of threat. The key mechanism operating here of course is that social contact reduces categorical or stereotypical thinking, increases one's awareness of ideological differentiation within French-Canadian society. The less social contact with francophones, the more likely is the average anglophone to overestimate the degree of unanimity within the French community concerning the independentist movement. Without social contact with francophones, an English-speaking Quebecer is unlikely to be aware of the full range of political debate to which the average francophone is exposed almost daily. Hence, if an individual has a minimum of information about the main trends of Québécois nationalism, social segregation from franco-

> ₩2, ' \$`•\$}

phones often has the effect of leading to exagerrated or overestimated perceptions of the movement's strength.

Yet if social contacts decrease these feelings of threat, they do not eliminate them completely. What does occur, however, is clarified by comparing Tables 4.1 and 4.5: the greater one's social 'integration into the francophone community, the more one's level of perceived threats decreases until it approaches that of French-Canadians.

Thus, social contacts reduce the tendency to perceive the independentist movement as threatening, but they do not necessarily reduce one's personal *worrying* about various aspects of the movement.

If social contacts reduce feelings of threat, to what extent is this ensuing feeling of security responsible for the very strong relationship between social contacts and sympathy?

Table 4.6 shows that both social contacts and feelings of worry or threat are related to sympathy, though the two independent variables combine in different ways depending on the measure used. Social contacts reduce certain threats; but even among the very worried and the very threatened, contacts increases sympathy. This table also reveals that in the anomalous reversals shown in panels 2 and 5, there may be certain conditions under which threats increase sympathy slightly.

Notice that the main instance of this is shown in panel 5, and concerns Q 3-76, about English job chances. No explanation will be offered here for this deviant case. It should be noted, however, that we have already seen in the previous chapter how this measure has different effects than our other measures of threat. Furthermore, we shall see later in this chapter that this measure is much more sensitive to any kind

		TABLE 4	1.6	•
SYMPAT	HY, BY THREATS AND	Social	CONTACTS WITH	H FRANCOPHON
	• • • ·	/	% sympa	THETIC ³
	-	<b>~</b> #	SOCIAL C	ONTACT
	,	e	HIGH .	LOW
(Q2-32):	Worry about English in Quebec.	High	³⁹ (137)	³¹ (203)
	. 1	Low	⁵⁷ (141)	³⁷ (144)
(Q2-41):	Worry about uniling- ualism.	High	⁵¹ (151)	²⁸ (241)
		Low	⁴⁵ (122)	. ⁴⁸ (106)
(Q3-77):	Worry about conse- quences of independ.	High	⁴⁷ (197)	³² (261)
		Low	⁵² (81)	⁴³ (82)
Q3-74):	Economic consequen- ces of indenp. threat:	High	⁴² (202) [.]	³⁰ (281)
	· <b>L</b>	Low	⁵⁷ (58)	⁵² (63)
(Q3-76):	English job chances. Threat:	High	⁵² (142)	³⁴ (264)
		Low	44(120)	³¹ (72)
	Parti Québécois labelled dangerous?	Yes	³³ (113)	^{-, 36} (197)
,	-	No	⁵⁹ (165)	³² (150)

of exposure to or participation in French Canadian society than are any of the other measures.

These trends are the exception rather than the rule, however. Moreover, they are weak. In most cases, threats decrease sympathy whether social contacts are frequent or not.

• In summary, feelings of threat do act, to some extent, as an intervening variable between social contacts and feelings of sympathy. Social contacts increase sympathy in two ways: partly directly, and partly through reducing feelings of threat.

E. THE LANGUAGE QUESTION AND THE PERCEIVED FUTURE CHANCES OF ANGLOPHONES

We mentioned earlier that sympathy for francophone demands is more closely linked to social contact than to other kinds of interaction with French -speaking people. As might be expected, the situation is similar with respect to the links between various aspects of segmentation and perceived threats. Here also, social contact reduces feelings of threat much more strongly than simply knowing French, or speaking it in public, or being in contact with francophones at work. This holds true for all our indicators of threat, except one: as Table 4.7 shows, having a knowledge of French or using it at work or in public strongly reduces pessimism about the long-term promotion chances of English-speaking people in an independent Quebec d In this instance the use of French in these contexts is as much of a buffer against pessimism as is the experience of frequent *social* interaction with francophones. This suggests that when anglophones think about their opportunities "

Table	4.7、
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Knowledge and Use of French Reduces Pessism about English Promotion Chances After Independence

u	•	(% Saŷing	Engli¥sh wil chance	1 haye <u>less</u> 2)
V160:	Knowledge of French:			
	<ol> <li>Fluently</li> <li>Nearly fluently</li> <li>Some difficulty</li> <li>Lpt of difficulty</li> <li>Not at all</li> </ol>		54% 65 70 · 71 73	(79) (104) (220) (220) (159)
V161:	Have to use Fyrench at work:			
	<ol> <li>Nearly all the time</li> <li>Very often</li> <li>Fairly often</li> <li>Rather rarely</li> <li>Almost never</li> <li>Never</li> </ol>		46 - 65 - 66 - 68 72 74	(43) (48) (159) (136) (141) (2 <del>8</del> 3)
V162:	Have to use French elsewhere, public		. 1	
	<ol> <li>Very often</li> <li>Fairly often</li> <li>Rather rarely</li> <li>Almost never</li> <li>Never</li> </ol>	•	54, 55 64 82 75	(80) (121) (195) (182) (197)
V165:	Contact with French at work:	• • •		
۰ ب	<ol> <li>Nearly all the time</li> <li>Very often</li> <li>Fairly often</li> <li>Rather rarely</li> <li>Almost never</li> <li>Never</li> </ol>	, ,	69 60 68 76 65 73	(157) (143) (151) (149) (79) (75)
•	0 <del>+</del>			Ŷ

P.T

(This variable has less effect than the others)

N.B. See also panel 5 of Table 4.5.

in an independent Quebec, they think principally in terms of changes in the *language of work*: the more one works in French already, the less pessimistic one is about anglophones in the long-run. This is borne out by the very slight effect of *contact* with francophones at work, as shown in the last panel of Table 4.7. It is not simply contact at the workplace that is important, but the extent to which one already operates in the French language. This is an interesting specification that points to the key place of the language of work question in the future of French-English relations in Quebec.

### F. CONCLUSION

In this chapter we examined the impact of linguistic segmentation on anglophone reactions to Québécois nationalism. By any measure of perceived threat, francophones are less threatened than anglophones. In other words, even when the measure of threat makes no mention of ethnicity or language, and refers only to economic issues, francophones are less threatened. It was suggested that this is due to the way information is transmitted in segmented societies: members of one linguistic group get most of their information, including information about the other group, from members of their own group.

The high degree of segmentation notwithstanding, *contacts* between the two groups *do* take place. Anglophones in blue-collar occupations have the most frequent as well as the most egalitarian contacts with francophones at work. It was suggested that this might be a factor in explaining the low sympathy of this group: these contacts reinforce the view that French Canadians are *already equal*, and hence do not

need a social movement that aims to reduce inequalities.

Of all the possible ways in which anglophones can participate in French Canadian society, it is *social contacts away from work* that have the strongest effect on sympathy for Québécois nationalism. The explanation offered for this is that such contacts are the least "nole-bound" and least formal, and in general are more intimate than other kinds of participation in French Canadian society. It was suggested that perhaps such intimate contact may be a requisite for sympathy toward another group's *social movement*, as opposed to sympathy for another *group*, which may be increased by egalitarian work contacts, for instance.

One way in which social contacts increase sympathy for Québécois nationalism is through the effect that social contacts have in relieving feelings of threat. Social contacts with francophones reduce one's perceptions of various aspects of the independentist movement as threatening. Social contacts do not, however, necessarily reduce one's worrying.

Finally, it was found that the more anglophones are used to using the French language already, the less pessimistic they are about the future job chances of English-speaking people.

### FOOTNOTES

¹This concept is developed by Raymond Breton; "Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants", American Journal of Sociology, 70, September 1964.

See for example, Leo A. Despres, <u>Cultural Pluralism and</u> <u>Nationalist Politics in British Guiana</u>, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967; <u>M. G. Smith</u>, "Social and Cultural Pluralism" in <u>The Plural Society in</u> <u>The British West Indies</u>, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Califognia Press, 1969; Raymond T. Smith, "Social Stratification in the Caribbean", in Leonard Plotnicov and Arthur Tuden, <u>Essays in Comparative</u> <u>Social Stratification</u>, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970; Leo Kuper, "Stratification in Plural Societies", in Plotnicov and Tuden, <u>ibid</u>.; Arend Lijphart, <u>The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy</u> <u>in the Netherlands</u>, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968; Richard Rose, <u>Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective</u>, Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.

³Burton Benedict, "Pluralism and Stratification", in Plotnicov and Tuden, <u>ibid</u>.

⁴Detailed quotes of this will not be presented here. Suffice, it to say, however, that with respect to the economic consequences of separation, francophones and anglophones who were very pessimistic expressed themselves in very similar terms.

⁵For Karl Deutsch the matter of communication boundaries is <u>the defining</u> characteristic of a national group. See Karl W. Deutsch, <u>Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations</u> <u>of Nationality</u>, 2nd edition, Cambridge and London: The M.I.T. Press, 1969.

⁶Gordon W. Allport, <u>The Nature of Prejudice</u>, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954, Chapter 16.

⁷See for instance, Gordon Allport, <u>op. cit.</u>: Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Racially Separate or Together?" <u>Journal of Social Issues</u>, Vol. No. 1, 1969; Muzafer Sherif, <u>Group Conflict and Co-operation</u>: <u>Their Social Psychology</u>, London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1967; Pobin Williams Jr., <u>Strangers Next Door</u>: <u>Ethnic Relations in American Com-</u> munities, second edition, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

⁸See Emile Durkheim, <u>Suicide</u>, (G. Simpson, ed.), New York: The Free Press, 1951, chapters 2, 3 and 4.

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⁹See Richard Rose, <u>Governing Without Consensus</u>, op. cit., pp. 308-309.

¹⁰George C. Homans, <u>The Human Group</u>, New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1950, p. 112.

# CHAPTER 5 AGE AND SYMPATHY

Over the past several decades, there has been a continual and gradual shift in the relative status of anglophones and francophones in Quebec and Canada. Many are the issues over which what was perceived as a bold move for power on the part of francophones in the 1940's is taken for granted in the 1960's and 1970's. Perhaps the clearest examples or indicators of this trend are the norms and laws governing the use of the two languages in the federal administration as well as in private industry and in public places in Quebec. We can posit that over time, then, each generation of English Canadians has been exposed to a social milieu that is on the whole more open and favourable to French-Canadian nationalism than that which shaped the attitudes of previous generations. On this basis, we should expect that, other things being equal, favourableness toward francophones would be the strongest in the younger age brackets. Table 5.1 shows that this is the case; in fact, the independent effect of age is as strong as that of education.

We are assuming here for the moment that the strength of this relationship is due to features of the social structure at the time people were growing up, rather than being a function of experiences people face as they pass through certain age groups. This is not to

× '		IABLE 5.	1		
	Sympathy,	by Age an	ID EDUCATI	ON	
		r		 (% Sym)	Bathetic)
	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55 plus
High School or Less ( ≤ 11 yrs)	³⁶ (22)	²⁶ (49) .,	^{°40} (78)	³² (74)	²² (85)
College and up ( ≥ 12 years)	60 (70)	35 (60)	49 (75)	-56 (62)	41 (54)
	, 54 (92)	31 (109)	44 (153)	43 (136)	30 (139)

Average effect of education: 1/5(.24 + .09 + .09 + .24 + .19) = .17Average effect of age: 1/2 [(36 - 22) + (60 - 41)] = .17

ignore or dismiss the latter set of effects. On the contrary, it will be seen shortly that adult experiences are also very important in their indirect impact on sympathy. We have already seen one example of this in chapter 2, namely that highly-educated workers become more sympathetic as they get older.

There is, however, a further explanation for the high sympathy of the young. As Table 5.2 shows, young French Canadians are the ones who are most likely to be strong supporters of the independentist movement. And to the extent that social contacts take place between agegroup peers, when young anglophones *do* meet francophones, they are disproportionately likely to meet people who are themselves nationalists

and independentists.

		J	ب العمر م		¢
•		For	Against	Don't Know	(N = 100%)
ge:	18-34 yrs	24	62	`14, ``	(235)
	35-49	13	65,	23	(158 <b>)</b>
	50 and up	7	69	` 24	(180)

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* This data is from the same poll as cited in Table 2.10.

It should be noted that the relationship between age and sympathy in Table 5.1 is not a linear one. A reason for this may be precisely some kind of life-cycle effect. Before examining this further, however, let us look at how feetings of threat vary by age.

A. THREATS AND THE QUESTION OF AGE

Which age groups are most threatened by Québécois nationalism? Do different aspects of the movement affect different age groups in different ways? To answer these questions, let us refer to Table 5.3. Three patterns can be detected from this information. First of all, there is a *curvilinear* relationship between age and *worrying*. As the first three

panels show, the young and the old are less worried than the others about the prospects of unilingualism, less worried about the future of anglophones in Quebec, and less worried about independence.

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- a	AGE				
	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54.	55+
(Q2-32) English In Ouẹ. (% High Worry)	52 (141)		57 (185)	66 (194)	56 (193)
(Q2-41) Unilingualism (% High Worry)	52. (142)	68. (134)	64 (183)	68 (200)	52 (191)
Q3-77) Worry about inde- pendence (% High Worry)	62 (145)	70. (128)	76 (185)	84 (196)	63 (195)
(Q3-74) Econ. Conseq. Indep. (% "Much Worse")	61 (127)	75 (170)	87 (176)	75 (193)	83 (173)
(Q3-76) English Job Chances (% "Less Chạnce")	74 (129)		64 (172)	71 (181)	72 (172)
Parti Québécois (% saying dangerous)	36 (145)	41 (140)	45 (185)	50 (204)	48 (197)

- TABLE 5.3 INTENSITY OF THREATS BY AGE GROUP

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The second pattern concerns perceptions of the economic consequences of independence (Q 3-74) and perceptions of the Parti Québecois. Here, there is a difference between the young and the old, with the breaking point being around the age of 35. The young are somewhat less likely to be pessimistic about the economic consequences of separation and less likely to view the Parti Québècois as dangerous. The third pattern is that displayed by responses to Q 3-76, which is different from the others. All three patterns are maintained when education is controlled for.

How can these be explained? Let us begin with the first pattern, where those between the ages of 25 to 54 are the most worried. What this suggests is that those in their main working years are the ones who are most worried by the prospect of French being declared the only official language and the most worried about the independence of Quebec and the position of anglophones. A conclusion to be drawn from this is that English Quebecers evaluate potential changes in government and industrial language policy in terms of their cwn work-situation. The young worry less because they are less dependent on their work, have fewer vested interests in any given occupation, are less likely to be married or to have other dependents, and in general are likely to have fewer responsibilities. The old, for their part, judge that their ... chief occupational achievements are already acquired, or at any rate would not be largely affected, or for very long, by language policy shifts or other such changes.

It would seem that the above pattern of worries is mainly due to the effect of *age-group membership* rather than *generational* membership.¹ In other words, one should expect that as those who are presently

young grow older, their worries will increase also. Similarly, as today's middle-age groups grow older and reach retirement age, they will probably become less worried about these issues. ^{*} I would argue that this age-group effect is the principal one here because of the clear curvilinearity of the relationships.

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Let us now turn to the second pattern. Why are those under 35 less likely to be threatened by the economic consequences of separation and by the Parti Québécois? I suggest that this, unlike the pattern of worries, is due to *generational* differences. As mentioned earlier, there has been a considerable shift in the climate of public opinion concerning French-English relations over the past several decades. The biggest shifts, however, have occured since the late 1950's or early 1960's. Those over 35 at the time this survey was taken were at least 24 at the onset of Quebec's "Quiet Revolution". Growing up in the 1950's or earlier, the older group has not been able to consider as many of the recent changes as "givens". The younger group, who have been hearing about the whole issue of separation since their adolescence, are less threatened because the independentist debate is not a sudden or new thing in their lives.

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Finally, let us turn to the third pattern, mamely the relationship shown in the fifth panel of the table. When it comes to English job chances, those aged 18 to 24 are the most likely to see these as being unpromising. This is probably because these young people are just entering the labour market. Not only do they have less experience than those who are older, but also they have grown up in a period marked by continual debates about the language of work question. In

this respect they are perhaps the first generation of English Canadians to have been thoroughly sensitized to many of these issues in their formative years. Notice that the young are the most sensitive on this issue even though they are pot the most worried overall.

## B. Age, THREATS, AND SYMPATHY

It was noted previously that there is a strong negative correlation between age and sympathy for Québécois nationalism. (See Table 5.1). It was argued that this was a generational difference, brought about by the continual change in the climate of opinion concerning French-English relations in the past several decades. While this relationship between age and sympathy is strong, it is not monotonic, however. Particularly puzzling is the fact that the 25-34 age group is only slightly more sympathetic than those who are 55 or older.

In our discussion of threats, it was also seen that the middleage groups are the most *worried* about various aspects of Québécois nationalism. Could it be that one reason the 25 to 34 age group is realtively unsympathetic is because they are disproportionately *worried* by certain issues, in particular future language uncertainties, and that these worries are responsible for dampening sympathy disproportionately in this age group?

This hypothesis was tested in two ways. First, a set of three variable tables was run, giving the cross-tabulation of sympathy and worries for each of the five age groups (and for each measure of worry). In the 25-34 age group, no consistent pattern was found of sympathy being higher among the less worried, as the hypothesis would predict. The hypothesis was supported, however, since in these instances where the percent sympathetic was not higher among the less threatened, it was the case that the percent unfavourable (the other extreme of the index of sympathy) was smaller, with an increased percentage of indifferents.

A further test was undertaken using a statistical technique especially well suited to this problem. The coefficient of ordinal association gamma was computed between ago-and sympathy with each "worry" variable dichotomized as in Table 5.4.

#### TABLE 5.4

THE NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGE AND Sympathy is Stronger Among Those Least Affected by Morries

v		、	(gammas)
	••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	<u>High Threat</u>	Low Threat
Q2-32:	Worry about English in Quebec	.20	27
Q2-41:	Worry about unilingualism	.00	34
Q3-77:	Worry about independence	16	31

The reasoning here is as follows: under the assumption of a pure generational effect of age on sympathy, we should ideally expect each generation to be somewhat more sympathetic than its immediate predecessor. In other words, we should expect the negative relationship between age and sympathy shown in Table 5.1 to be monotonic, though not necessarily linear.

We have seen that worries about Québécois nationalism are disproportionately located in the middle age groups. Gamma is essentially a measure of monotonicity. Thus if the negative correlation between age and sympathy is stronger (more monotonic) among the less worried than among the highly worried (as is the case in Table 5.4), this means that intense worries effectively reduce the monotonicity of the relationship between age and sympathy. What this means theoretically is that the age-group effect is responsible for distorting the generational effect. In other words, this does confirm the suggestion that the disproportionate worrying of the middle-age groups does dampen their level of sympathy, reducing it below the level one would expect given their generational membership.

#### C. CONCLUSION

What we have just discussed is *one* specification of the links between one's age, one's feelings of threat, and one's feelings of sympathy. The other arguments that have been advanced in this chapter concerning the linkages between these variables can be briefly summarized as follows. To begin, threats are a product of both age-group membership as well as generational membership. The former influences

the pattern of worries over the life cycle, while the latter determines assessments and perceptions of the nationalist movement. Both of these processes in turn have an effect on sympathy, via the dampening effects of threats on sympathy. We have argued that sympathy is mainly linked to age by a generational effect. In addition, however, in chapter 2, we specified a direct aging effect on sympathy among the subset of bluecollar workers with of the ducations.

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### FOOTNOTES

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¹This is another "identification problem" where it is often impossible to decide which factor is actually operating. Here, I am not considering third possibility, that of <u>period</u> effects, principally decause I am assuming that these are less important than aging and cohort (generational) effects in this situation. See Richard Cohn, "On interpretation of cohort and period analysis: a mathematical note", pp.: 85-88 in Matilda W. Riley et. al., <u>Aging and Society</u>, Vol. 3, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972.

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# CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

The broad initial focus of this study centered on two general questions: What are the determinants of the incidence and intensity of ethnic conflict? and, How does the structure of an "intergroup arena" determine the kinds of collective behaviour and social movements to be found there? In particular, why is the level of conflict between French and English in Quebec relatively jow, compared to elsewhere?

In an attempt at a partial answer to the above questions, a further question was posed: what are some of the structural sources of sympathy for subordinate group nationalist movements among members of the dominant group in ethnically stratified and segmented societies? This thesis has answered this Tatter question in detail for one particular dominant group, English Quebecers. It is hoped that the study will be useful for a better theoretical understanding of the nature of the belief systems of dominant groups in different types of societies.

The few tentative generalizations that have been advanced can best be tested by comparison with other contexts of ethnic stratification. Not all parts of the study are necessarily equally "exportable" to other contexts for comparative purposes. Rather, the organ-

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ization of the thesis provides a clue as to which other intergroup arenas would provide the most relevant points of comparison with the Quebec situation.

Chapter 2, which deals with the stratification system, will be most relevant to the study of those intergroup arenas where there are appreciable inequalities between the two groups. The findings of this chapter will nonetheless be pertinent even when two groups are roughly equal in socio-economic terms. For example, the theory of sympathy advanced would suggest that when two groups have roughly equal status, the perceived correlation between class and ethnicity will tend to be low, and thus members of each group should have a relatively low level of sympathy for a nationalist movement of the other group. This appears to be the case in Guyana, for instance, where the Afro-Guyanese and Indian communities share power on relatively equal terms.¹

Chapter 3, concerning feelings of threat, will be most relevant for comparisons with other contexts of ethnic stratification wherever the dominant group is likely to feel especially threatened. More specifically, this chapter will be most useful for comparisons with other contexts where the dominant group is a numerical minority, where the "rules of the game" governing relations between the groups are changing, and/or where the subordinate group has a special claim to the territory.

Chapter 4 will be most relevant for comparative purposes whenever there is segmentation between two groups in an intergroup arena, with each group having its own institutions.

Chapter 5, concerning the effects of age, should be largely


applicable to most intergroup arenas in industrial societies.

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Finally, it is hoped that this study will be of help to all those involved in educating and sensitizing the anglophone population as to their role in contributing to the future shape of Québec society.

# FOOTNOTES

# ¹See Leo A: Despres, <u>op. cit</u>.



### SAMPLE DESIGN

The data analyzed in this thesis are part of a multi-stage stratified random sample of the Quebec population aged 18 years or over. The subset of interviews selected for this analysis consists of all those respondents who are *not* French-Canadians *and* who answered the English-language questionnaire. The interviews were carried out by trained personnel in the respondent's home.

The interviewer decided whether to use the French or the English language questionnaire according to the following instructions. As far as possible, the interviews were to be carried out in the respondent's mother tongue (the first language the person learned that he or she still understands). Thus those whose mother tongue is French were interviewed using the French questionnaire, and those whose mother tongue is English were interviewed using the English questionnaire. Those whose mother tongue is other than English or French were interviewed using the *English* questionnaire, unless the respondent indicated that he or she preferred to be interviewed in French because his or her comprehension of English was poor. A very small number of interviews were conducted in third languages such as Italian and Greek; these were recorded on English-language questionnaires.

A very small number of French-Canadians answered the English questionnaire. This was done either because the respondent considered English to be his mother tongue, or because the respondent requested that English be used in deference to the presence at the interview of a


spouse or other family member who did not understand French. In any case, anyone who identified himself as Prench Canadian.in terms of ethnic origin was excluded from the sample used in this analysis. The final sample consisted of 346 cases.

The respondents were selected by going through several stages. In Metropolitan Montreal, census divisions ("secteurs de dénombrement") were chosen. Then, subsets of addresses were chosen within each division. Finally, a sample of addresses was chosen from each subset such that each address had an equal chance of being chosen. Outside of Metropolitan Montreal, a sample of addresses was selected directly from each of the chosen census divisions. At each household, the interviewer made a list of all the residents aged 18 years or over, then chose the one to be interviewed by means of random number tables. Further details of this sampling process can be obtained in "Directives no. 3, Projet 107", Centre de Sondage, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, Montréal, Québec.

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The weighting factor applied to the data includes a correction factor that makes each *individual* over 18 have an equal chance of being selected, instead of each address or household.



## Appendix $\hat{B}$ - Table 1

DISTRIBUTION OF PERCENTAGES OF INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYEES IN SELECTED MONTREAL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES BY OCCUPATION AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND, 1934

	MANAGERIAL	SALES & . <u>CLERICAL</u>	SKILLED & UNSKILLED WORKERS	TOTAL
English	5.3	30.9	63.8.	100%
French	0.8	6.8	92.4	100
Other	1.2	5.8	93.0	100
Total .	2.2	14.1 .	83.7	100

Source: William H. Roy, "The French-English Division of Labor in Quebec" (unpublished Master's Thesis, McGill University, 1935).

Everett C. Hughes, <u>French Canada in Transition</u>, University of Chicago Press, 1943, 208.

# Appendix B - Table 2

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# PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS OCCUPATION BY ETHNIC ORIGIN, QUEBEC, 1970

		•		
۹.	, <u> </u>	FRENCH	· ENGLISH	OTHER
•	Prof., Tech., & Mgp.	30.6	51.7	38.3 <
-	Sales and Clerical	14.4	18.0	16.1
?	Blue-Collar	. 55.0	30.3	。 45.6
	*(N) = 100% =	(4860)	í (555)	(596)
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Prof., Tech. & Mgr.	French 74.4	English 14.3	<u>Other</u> 11.4	* N = (100%) (2002)
Sales & Clericals	78, 2	11.2	10.7	(896)
Blue-Collar	85.9	5.4	8.7	(3113)
ALL OCCUPATIONS	80.9	9.2	9.9	(6011)

Source: Province-wide representative sample, from which French-English comparisons in Chapter 4 were drawn.

*Weighted data.

## APPENDIX B - TABLE 3

Personnel of 36 Large Manufacturing Firms of Quebec , According to Salary and Language

SALARY	FRANCOPHONES (%)	ANGLOPHONES (%)
\$5,000 - \$6,499 6,500 - 7,999 8,000 - 9,999 10,000 - 11,999 12,000 - 14,999 15,000 - and more	36 35 25 19 15 15	64 65 75 81 85 85
TOTAL	31	69

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Personnel of Large Corporations (outside of Montreal) According to Salary and Language

SALARY	FRANCOPHONES(%)	ANGLOPHONES
\$ 5,000 - \$6,499 6,500 - 7,999 8,000 - 9,999 10,000 - 11,999 12,000 - 14,999 15,000 - and more	82 76 61 42 35 23	18 24 39 58 65 77
TOTAL	70	· 30

PERSONNEL OF LARGE CORPORATIONS IN MONTREAL ACCORDING TO SALARY AND LANGUAGE

SALARY	FRANCOPHONES	ANGLOPHONES
\$ 5,000 - \$6,499	<b>49</b> (	51、
6,500 - 7,999	- 41	59
8,000 - 9,999	27	73
10,000 - 11,999	· 23	77 乀
12,000 - 14,999	. 17	83
15,000 - and more	17	83
TOTAL	37	63
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Source: R. N. Morrison, "Corporate Policies and Practices of Large Manufacturing Firms", cited in Report of the Royal Commission on Biculturalism and Bilingualism, Volume 3B (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1969), Chapter XII.

> Also reproduced in Lysiane Gagnon, "Les Conclusions du Rapport B.B.", <u>Economie Québécoise</u> (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1969, pp. 247, 248), and in

Sheilagh Hodgins Milner and Henry Milner, <u>The Decolonization of</u> <u>Quebec</u> (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973, p. 66)

N.B. A comparison of Table 2 and Table 3 points out that the inequalities between Trench and English are much more pronounced within the uniate manufacturing sector than what would appear from an examination of the overall occupational structure of the province.

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## RELEVANT PARTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

- 1-51 Are you a French-Canadian, an English-Canadian, an Italian-Canadian, or a Canadian of some other origin? (If "OTHER ORIGIN" OR NOT CANADIAN): Of what origin are you? French Canadian _____ English Canadian _____ Italian Canadian Canadian of other origin (specify) _____ Not Canadian (Specify)
- 1-58 Do you speak French fluently, nearly fluently, with some difficulty, with a lot of difficulty or not at all? Fluently _____ Nearly fluently _____ With some difficulty _____ With a lot of difficulty _____ Not at all _____
- 1-59 In your <u>everyday work</u>, how often do you have to <u>speak French</u>: nearly all the time, very often, fairly often, rather rarely, almost never, or never? Nearly all the time _____ Very often _____ Fairly often _____ Rather rarely _____ Almost never _____ Never _____
- 1-60 In <u>other public places</u>, in stores, and restaurants for instance, how often do you find you have to speak French - very often, fairly often, rather rarely, almost never or never? Very often _____ Fairly often _____ Rather rarely _____ Almost never _____ Never ____
- 1-61 When you have to speak French <u>at work or in public places</u>, how often do you find you get embarassed because you have difficulties - often, sometimes, rarely or almost never?

Often _____ Sometimes ____ Rarely ____ Almost never _____ Qualified answer (depends etc) Never has to speak French

1-63 In your <u>everday work</u>, how often are you <u>in contact</u> with Frenchspeaking people: nearly all the time, very often, fairly often, rather rarely, almost never, or never? Nearly all the time _____ Very often _____ Fairly often _____ Rather rarely _____ Almost never _____ Never _____

1-64 <u>Outside your work</u>, when you meet your friends or your neighbours, or when you are at other gatherings, how often are you in contact with French-speaking people - very often, fairly often, rather rarely, almost never, or never? Very often _____ Fairly often _____ Rather rarely _____ Almost never _____ Never ____

1-68 In general, how would you describe your attitude toward French . Canadians: as rather cool, indifferent, fairly favourable, or very favourable?

> Rather cool _____ Indifferent _____ Fairly favourable _____ Very favourable ____ Qualified answer, mixed feelings, that depends _____ Don't know _____

2-29 Where you, or any members of your family living with you, unemployed at any time in 1969? (IF YES), How many people in all?

No Yes, 1 person Yes, 2 people Yes, 3 people Yes, 4 people or more Among French Canadians/ ____ Among English Canadians ____ Among both equally ____ Qualified answer (that depends etc.) Don't know ____

- 2-32 How worried are you about possible future changes in the position of English-speaking Canadians in Québec: are you very worried, fairly worried, not very worried, or not worried at all? Very worried _____ Fairly worried _____ Not worried at all _____ Qualified answer _____ Don't know _____
- 2-33

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Do you think French Canadians should try and maintain their ways of living, or that they should become more like the other Canadians?

Maintain their ways of living _____ Become more like the other Canadians _____ Both ____ Qualified answer (that depends, etc). ____ Don't know _____ '

2-35 Which would you say it is most important for a people to maintain: its language and culture or its standard of living?
Its language and culture ______ Both are equally important ______
Its standard of living _____ Qualified answer (that depends, etc.) _____ Don't know ______

- 2-36 When you think of all the demands of French Canadians in the last ten years, how many do you feel are justified: almost all, a good number, a few, or only very few?
  - Almost all (OR) all of them _____ A good number _____ A few _____ Only a very few _____ None at all ____ Qualified answer _____ Don't know _____
- 2-37 Which do you think are in general the best doctors: French Canadian doctors, or English-Canadian doctors? French Canadian doctors _____ English Canadian doctors _____ Both equally ____ Qualified answer ____ (that depends, etc) Don't know _____ ?
- 2-38 What do you think of the position of French Canadians in the federal government in Ottawa: is it more important, as importl ant, or less important than it should be?
  - More important _____ As important _____ Less important _____ Qualified answer ____ (that depends, etc). Don't know _____
- 2-39 If you think of <u>the problems of French Canadians</u>, would you say that the French Canadians themselves are mainly to blame, that other groups are to blame, that the blame should be shared or that no group is really to blame?

French Canadians' mainly to blame _____ Other groups mainly to blame _____ No group to blame _____ No group to blame _____ Qualified answer (that depends, etc) _____ Don't know

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- 2-41 Some people suggest that Quebec become a French unilingual ' province, that is a province in which French would be the sole language in schools, at work, and in other public places. Does this worry you very much, moderately, a little, or not at all? Very much _____ Moderately _____ A little _____ Not at all _____ Qualified answer (that depends, etc). _____ Don't know _____
- 2-43 Do French Canadians or English Canadians hold the most important place in the world of business and finance in Quebec? French Canadians _____ English Canadians _____ Both equally ____ Don't know ____
- 2-68 Which of these two groups is generally the wealthier: French Canadians or English Canadians? French Canadians ______ They are equal; neither is wealthier _____ Qualified answer ______ (that depends) _____ Don't know ______
- 2-76

To what extent do you think that the culture and way of life of French Canadians are in danger of disappearing: are they in great danger, in a little danger, or in no danger of disappearing?

In a little danger ____ In no danger ____ Qualified answer (depends, etc) ____ Don^et know ____

2-79 Here are a few questions of a different kind. Not everyone has the same interests and tastes. How often do you personally read books or magazines - regularly, fairly frequently, rather

rarely, or almost never?

Regularly _____ Fairly frequently _____ Rather rarely _____ Almost never _____ Never

2-80

(IF RESPONDENT READS BOOKS OR MAGAZINES) Would you describe the books or magazines you read as mostly serious reading, half serious and half light reading, or mostly light reading? Mostly serious ______ Half serious and half light _____ Mostly light _____ Don't know

3-19

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How often do you read serious books of news analysis: regularly, from time to time, rarely, or never? Regularly _____ From time to time _____ Rarely _____ Never ____

3-31 Personally, are you for or against the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada?

For ____ (Proceed to Q. 3-33) Against ____ (Proceed to Q. 3-33) Undecided (OR) Doesn't know _____

3-32 (IF UNDECIDED OR DOESN'T KNOW): Maybe you are undecided, but if you had to make a choice what would you be more inclined to be: for or against the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada?

More inclined to be for _____ More inclined to be against _____ Don't know ____ (Proceed to Q. 3-38.

#### 3-33

Is your opinion on the matter one that you could change very easily, fairly easily, with some difficulty, or only with a great deal of difficulty?

Very easily ____ Fairly easily ____ With some difficulty ____ With a great deal of difficulty ____ Don't Know ____

(3-33A) What is your main reason for being. . . (for OR against, AS THE CASE MAY BE) the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada?

3-34 (ASK OF THOSE WHO ARE <u>AGAINST</u> SEPARATION ) How strong is your opposition to the separation of Quebec - is it extremely strong, moderately strong or not too strong? Extremely strong _____ Moderately strong _____ Not too strong _____ Not too strong _____ Qualified answer (depends, etc) _____ Don't know _____ '

(ASK OF THOSE WHO ARE IN <u>FAVOUR</u> OF SEPARATION ACCORDING TO Q. 3-31). For how many years have you been in favour of the independence of Quebec: more than 5 years, between 2 and 5 years, or less than 2 years? More than 5 years _____ Between 2 and 5 years _____ Less than 2 years _____ Don't remember _____

#### ASK ALL RESPONDENTS

3-38

3-35

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It has been suggested that Quebec become an independent country <u>politically</u>, while retaining <u>economic</u> links with Canada. Are you personally for or against political independence with economic association with Canada?

For ____ Against ____ (Proceed to Q. 3-42) Undecided _____ (Proceed to Q. 3-44)

(3-70 to 3-73)

Among these adjectives (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 5), would you please choose the <u>one</u> which you think best describes <u>each one</u> of the provincial political parties. You may of course choose the same adjective for more than one party. Let us start with the Liberal Party: which adjective best describes it? (AND SO ON FOR THE OTHER PARTIES)

 Dynamic _____
 Worn-out ____
 Competent ____
 Dangerous ____

 Honest _____
 Old _____
 Strong _____
 Not Serious _____

 Don't Know _____
 ______
 ______

NOTE: (Asked of the: LIBERAL, NATIONAL UNION, PARTI QUEBECOIS AND SOCIAL CREDIT, parties).

3-74 If Quebec became an independent nation, what do you think would be the effect on economic conditions in Quebec: would they become much better, slightly better, stay the same, become slightly worse, or much worse? Much better _____ Slightly better _____ The same _____

Slightly worse _____ Much worse _____ Qualified answer (that depends) _____ Don't know _____

3-76 If Quebec became independent, do you think that in the long run, English Canadians would have better chances of getting ahead at work, the same chances as now, or less chances? Better ______ Same _____ Less _____ Qualified answer (that depends) ______ Don't know

3-77

When you think of all the consequences independence could have, does it worry you or not? (IF YES) Does it worry you a lot, 'somewhat, or just a little?

Worries me a lot _____ Worries me somewhat _____ Worries me only a little _____ No, does not worry me _____ Don't know ______

3-78

Are you single, married, widowed, separated or divorced? Single _____ Married ____ Widowed ____ Separated _____ Divorced _____

3-79

In terms of your work, in which of those categories would you place yourself:

A man with a job _____ A woman with a full-time job _____ A housewife (without a full time outside job) _____ A woman with a part-time job _____ A student _____ A person unable to work _____ An unemployed person _____ A retired (OR) voluntary inactive person _____

Α

IE 'A MAN WITH A JOB' OR A 'WOMAN WITH A FULL-TIME JOB' to Question 3-79:

4-19A What exactly is the main kind of work you do? (HAVE THE RES-PONDENT SPECIFY THE <u>EXACT</u> DETAILS OF THE WORK: Eg. IF THE ANSWER IS MACHINE OPERATOR, ask "ON WHAT KIND OF MACHINE?"

#### 4-20

Using this card (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 6), could you tell me. in which category you would place your salary or other income from work, <u>before</u> tax and other deductions? (ASSURE THE RES-PONDENT IF NECESSARY THAT HIS ANSWER WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL) You can give your answer in terms of weekly or annual income, whichever you prefer.

Category _____ Refused to answer Don't know

IF 'A housewife (without a full time outside job)', 'A woman with a part-time job', 'A Student', or 'A person unable to work' to question 3-79;

(4-19A) . What exactly is (was) the main kind of work your husband (father) does (did)? (HAVE THE RESPONDENT SPECIFY THE EXACT DETAILS OF THE WORK: e.g. IF THE ANSWER IS "MACHINE OPERATOR" ASK "ON WHAT KIND OF MACHINE?"

(4-20) IF THE HUSBAND OR FATHER IS DECEASED, CHECK HERE _____AND SKIP TO Q. 4-23). (IF HUSBAND OR FATHER LIVING, ASK): Using this card (HAND RESPONDNET CARD 6) could you tell me in which catetory you would place your husband's (father's) salary or other income from work before tax and other deductions? (ASSURE THE RESPONDENT IF NECESSARY THAT HIS ANSWER WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL). You can give your answer in terms of weekly or annual income, whichever you prefer.

Category No.

В

___ Refused to answer ____ Don't Know

IF 'An unemployed person' or 'A retired (OR) voluntarily inactive person' to question 3-79:

(4-19A) What exactly was the main kind of work you did? (HAVE THE RESPONDENT SPECIFY THE EXACT DETAILS OF THE WORK: eg. IF THE ANSWER IS "MACHINE OPERATOR" ASK "ON WHAT KIND OF MACH-INE?"


4-52 How many years of study did you complete yourself? Number of years

(IF LESS THAN 10 years, SKIP TO Q-4-54 and 4-55).

4-54

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(IF RESPONDENT HAS 10 YEARS OF SCHOOLING OR MORE, HAND HIM CARD 7 AND ASK): How far did you go in your studies? ______High School ______Technical, trade, or vocational school, (OR) equivalent _____Commercial school (OR) secretarial school OR equivalent _____Teacher's College (OR) School of Fine Arts (OR) Conservatory ______CEGEP _____College _____University OR Professional Schools (SPECIFY FACULTY OR PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL) _______ Others (Specify)



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