

Friendship in the Peace Movement

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Statement on Originality

If this thesis offers originality it does so in its application of Aristotle's theory of friendship to the problems of the peace movement. Some of the literature I came upon in my research did touch on peaceniks' friendship and warmth for one another (see, eg., *Greenham Women Everywhere*, p. 29) but none of it explored the issue using Aristotle. In "On Resistance", Chomsky writes that he hopes resistance (presumably by movement members) "will create bonds of friendship and mutual trust that will support and strengthen those who are sure to suffer." (p. 190) But he does not discuss peace movement friendship using a philosophical system. And the scholarly articles on Aristotle which I read made no mention of the peace movement.

Abstract

The thesis suggests a way in which the peace movement can make itself attractive to citizens. It begins with the assumption that the movement should satisfy some of their personal needs. One such need is that of relief from the pains of anxiety. Drawing upon Heidegger, the thesis outlines two of these pains -- impotence and *unheimlichkeit* -- and shows why we experience them. Then, using Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, it explains why true friendship is a positive response to the pains. True friends further each other's courage, a virtue whose possession helps them to weather impotence. True friends are , in fundamental ways, the same as one another: Their partial identity counters the effects of non-humans whose radical otherness makes the partners feel *unheimlich*.

A movement which promotes true friendship within its ranks -- and publicizes this fact -- will likely attract new members and have success in retaining old ones. The last chapter discusses, in concrete terms, how friendship among movement members can be fostered.

Resume

Cette thèse suggère au mouvement pacifiste une manière de se rendre plus attrayant aux citoyens. Elle débute avec l'hypothèse que le mouvement peut satisfaire quelques uns de leurs besoins personnels. Un de ces besoins est la délivrance des souffrances de l'angoisse. En se basant sur Heidegger, la thèse expose les grandes lignes de deux de ces souffrances-- l'impotence et *unheimlichkeit*--et montre pourquoi nous en souffrons. Puis, en utilisant les éthiques nichomachéennes d'Aristote, cette thèse explique pourquoi une véritable amitié est une réponse positive à ces souffrances. De vrais amis s'encouragent, une vertu dont la possession aide à surmonter l'impotence. De vrais amis sont, de manière fondamentale, semblables. Leur identité partielle défie les effets des non-humains dont la différence radicale est telle que les partenaires se sentent *unheimlich*.

Un mouvement qui promouvait l'amitié véritable dans ses rangs- et qui le rend public- attirera probablement de nouveaux membres et gardera ses anciens membres. Le dernier chapitre discute, en termes concrets, comment encourager l'amitié parmi les membres du mouvement.

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At its most basic this thesis is a discussion of ways in which the Canadian nuclear disarmament movement can make itself attractive. My premise is that in a society such as ours -- where citizens are relatively free to apportion their non-working hours as they see fit -- organizations bidding for our involvement must offer an incentive. If the peace movement is to persuade us to give up some television viewing or an afternoon of shopping, and join a peace march or petition campaign, it needs to hold out a powerful magnet.

Just what that magnet should be depends upon the sort of creature the movement is trying to entice. More precisely, it depends upon the creature's particular situation. Moral philosopher Onora O'Neill writes that " [a]nybody who aims to engage important audiences in discussion of nuclear issues must... adopt modes of discourse that are accessible and action guiding for those audiences as they actually are."¹ (O'Neill's emphasis) True, O'Neill's explicit concerns are the requisites for discussion of nuclear issues. But it is reasonable to assume that her point holds also for nuclear activism: the movement will attract citizens to its campaigns if it speaks to citizens as they really are, if it has some understanding of their needs and desires.²

¹ Onora O'Neill, "Who Can Endeavour Peace?", Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary #12 (1986). p.47.

² Of course speaking to citizens as they really are is

The movement must realize that in a capitalist society -- where individualistic values are taught from an early age -- it is dangerous to assume that altruism or concern for the planet will be sufficient to bring engagement. Given Canadian values, it is reasonable to assume that a substantial portion of the public will join the peace movement only if doing so furthers some personal end. O'Neill's statement is a caution against idealization.³ We must not assume that, because most persons would be killed in a nuclear war, most persons will work to prevent it. Most will not; and those who are active may well be active out of narrow self-interest. But if this is how people in our society actually operate, it behooves the movement to speak to them in these terms, at least for the present.⁴

necessary but not sufficient for attracting them.

3 At one point in "Who can Endeavour Peace?" she writes: "The various 'models of man' invoked in much ethical reasoning and social theory are meant as ideals, and what holds for 'non-ideal' conditions may be both different and underdetermined." p.53. I assume that, implicitly, the peace movement is warned against assuming the existence of ideal citizens.

4 If we want to change inactive citizens into active ones -- i.e., get citizens to join the peace movement -- we must speak to them in terms that are accessible to them now. In many cases this will mean appealing to their narrow self-interest. For example, we can tell them that joining the movement will give them desired social interaction. O'Neill writes: "All change in agents must start from what they now are. Change must be advocated and pursued in terms of categories and powers of action already available. ("Who Can Endeavour Peace?", p.69.) We might want citizens to join the movement out of, for example, duty. But if duty is not a category open to them, our arguments in terms of duty may well fall on deaf ears.

But one might argue that narrow self-interest is the force behind the war system. How, then, can the movement encourage members to join on this basis? The unfortunate answer may be: that's the only basis which, at present, is

The movement must show citizens that it can fulfill certain of their personal needs.

Clearly, it need not address all of these . But if its attraction is to be substantial it must address at least some. Come what may, Canadians will seek to satisfy themselves⁵. If they find little satisfaction in movement work, their ties with the movement will -- in many cases -- be tenuous; for their attention will largely be elsewhere.

In the following section I want to discuss a particularly pressing need: that of relieving ourselves of some of the pains of anxiety. Drawing upon Heidegger, I shall show that and why we suffer two of these pains, and attempt to establish the situation's gravity. Notice that the issue is not so much anxiety itself but the suffering that accompanies it. In subsequent sections I shall argue that the peace movement can effectively address this problem -- and hence help to satisfy an important need -- by promoting true friendship among its members.

Let us consider what, according to Heidegger, anxiety is and under what condition it occurs. To begin, we must dissociate the concept from some of its everyday

accessible to many people. The movement may not be able to reach people with any other line of argument. But -- perhaps -- once persons join the movement they can be massaged into living more communally.

⁵ I assume a rather bleak picture of the average Canadian. He/she is largely self-centred; he/she has some concern about world peace but -- in most cases -- will not work for it unless the work also brings some personal satisfaction. His/her membership in the movement -- in most cases -- cannot be maintained solely by the urgency of the issue. I would be pleased to be wrong here but fear I am not.

connotations. The old Nazi⁶ sees anxiety as a "fundamental mood" but does not connect it with confusion, panic, or fear. Indeed, he explicitly distinguishes anxiety from fear⁷ -- the latter, unlike the former, is experienced with respect to a particular thing. "We become afraid in the face of this or that particular being that threatens us in this or that particular respect."⁸ Thus, one is fearful, for example, of a wild animal. Anxiety, on the other hand, is experienced in the face of 'something' indeterminate. And this indeterminate 'entity' is indeterminate in its essence. What this 'entity'⁹ turns out to be is no secret: "... that in the face of which and for which we were anxious was 'really' -- nothing. Indeed: the nothing itself -- as such -- was there."¹⁰ So our first crucial point is that

⁶ I use this phrase having recently read a review of Victor Farias' *Heidegger et le nazisme*. I think it is important to remember the activities of the man whose work we are studying. Heidegger developed special terminology to describe human existence; he wanted to draw our attention -- continuously -- to our unique position: "Dasein is that kind of existence that is always involved in an understanding of its Being." (David Krell in Martin Heidegger's *Basic Writings*, p.48 footnote) So, too, I want us always to remember Heidegger's special role.

⁷ Martin Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?", *Basic Writings*, (David Krell, Editor), New York: Harper and Row. 1977. p. 102. "Anxiety is basically different from fear."

⁸ Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?" [Hereafter "WM?"] p.102.

⁹ 'Entity' and 'something' are in quotation marks because, strictly speaking, that in the face of which one experiences anxiety is not a thing or being at all.

¹⁰ Heidegger, "WM?", p. 103. Heidegger writes that we are anxious both in the face of the nothing and for the nothing. But what he is driving at in this distinction is not clear to me. That the distinction is not particularly important is suggested by Heidegger's failure to make an issue of it. In any case, the first formulation always entails the second: "Anxiety in the face of... is always anxiety for..."

anxiety occurs in the face of the nothing.¹¹

Let us be clear on what Heidegger is saying. His point is not that one 'looks out at' the nothing and then becomes anxious. The nothing is not found at a distance. Rather, it is encountered 'within' Dasein itself; the nothing comes to light in Dasein's own mood. "Anxiety reveals the nothing."¹²

but not for this or that." "WM?" pp. 102-103. (The ellipsis is Heidegger's.)

11 If anxiety occurs in the face of the nothing, can the nothing be said to cause anxiety? Heidegger does not speak in these terms. But if the nothing is that in the face of which one experiences anxiety, the nothing seems to be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of anxiety. And if this is true, it seems reasonable to call the nothing a cause. (Another cause would be Dasein.) On the other hand, Heidegger does not say that anxiety occurs only in the face of the nothing. If anxiety can occur without the nothing then the latter is not a necessary condition. In this case it could be a cause of anxiety but need not be.

An objection: If anxiety reveals the nothing, how can the nothing be a cause of anxiety? Does not Heidegger's claim suggest that anxiety exists before the nothing is revealed and that anxiety 'carries out' this revelation? Such an interpretation is possible. But remember, anxiety does not cause the nothing, anxiety merely reveals it. True, Heidegger says that anxiety "induces the slipping away of beings as a whole." ("WM?" p.103) But this cannot mean that anxiety somehow produces the nothing. Heidegger writes: "Beings are not annihilated by anxiety, so that nothing is left. How could they be, when anxiety finds itself precisely in utter impotence with regard to beings as a whole?" ("WM?" p.104) It is reasonable to assume that the nothing is existentially prior to anxiety and makes the latter possible -- i.e. is a cause of anxiety -- because it forms the 'content' of anxiety. If anxiety exists only as a revealer of the nothing, then anxiety cannot exist without the nothing. On the other hand, Heidegger does not say that anxiety exists only as a revealer of the nothing. If anxiety has, as it were, other jobs, then it may get along fine without the nothing. It seems that Heidegger does not give us enough information to discover anxiety's cause. But this may not be his interest. Perhaps we have to content ourselves with knowing at least one 'entity' in the face of which anxiety occurs.

12 Heidegger, "WM?" p.103.

Before we turn to our main concern -- the suffering brought by anxiety -- let us look briefly at two problems. The first is a radical objection brought by Rudolf Carnap. In his essay "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language", he argues that the sentences of metaphysics have no cognitive meaning. They do not assert anything, they do not express true or false propositions. In a word, they are pseudo-statements.¹³ "Anxiety reveals the nothing", for instance, is nonsensical, and this because it mistakenly employs the word "nothing" as a noun. Used properly, the word "nothing" operates as "a logical particle that serves for the formulation of a negative existential statement."¹⁴ Thus, "nothing" can be used meaningfully when it indicates an absence: "There is nothing (does not exist anything) which is outside."¹⁵ The problem with "Anxiety reveals the nothing" is that, counter to the rules of syntax,¹⁶ it does not have a noun or adjective in the third position. The third position is occupied by "the nothing", but this clearly cannot refer to a person, place, or thing, nor can it modify these.

If Carnap is correct, Heidegger's work -- from a philosophical perspective -- seems to be a load of rubbish. It may tell us something about Heidegger's feelings, but

¹³ Rudolf Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language", in A.J. Ayer ed., *Logical Positivism*. New York: The Free Press. 1959. p.68.

¹⁴ Ibid. p.71.

¹⁵ Ibid. p.70.

¹⁶ Ibid. p.67.

gives us no knowledge of anxiety. Unfortunately, there is no room here to conduct a Carnap-Heidegger debate. One point I do want to make, though, is that if Heidegger is unphilosophical on Carnap's terms, he is still very philosophical on his own terms. Carnap's criticism only holds if we accept that philosophy is rooted in logical analysis.

Heidegger is quite aware that any discussion of the nothing is an affront to positivistic logic. He states explicitly: "The commonly cited ground rule of all thinking, the proposition that contradiction is to be avoided, universal 'logic' itself, lays low this question [i.e. 'What is the nothing?']. For thinking, which is always essentially thinking about something, must act in a way contrary to its own essence when it thinks of the nothing."¹⁷ But Heidegger's point is that if logic raises an objection here we should abandon not the question, but rather logic. Come what may the question must be asked. "For questioning is the piety of thought."¹⁸ If logic stands in the way of inquiry, logic must be cast off. And cast it off he does: "The idea of 'logic' itself disintegrates in the turbulence of a more original questioning."¹⁹ Now Carnap, of course, sees this rejection of logic as, philosophically, a fatal flaw. But Heidegger's

¹⁷ Heidegger, "WM?", p.99.

¹⁸ Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology", in David Krell, ed., Basic Writings. p.317.

¹⁹ Heidegger, "WM?", p.107.

point is that the one who is truly philosophical views questioning as supreme. Hence his abandonment of logic in the name of a more radical investigation is -- on his terms -- eminently philosophical. He posed the question of the nothing in spite of its "formal impossibility".²⁰ Carnap's suggestion that Heidegger is no philosopher is valid, then, only if we accept Carnap's assumptions about the nature of philosophy.²¹

Assuming that Heidegger's work does have philosophical value -- that it allows us to ask and answer questions that would otherwise not be entertained -- we can raise a second problem. What argumentation does he offer for his claims? Why should we believe that anxiety reveals the nothing? Unfortunately, Heidegger is not particularly helpful in this matter. Before stating that the nothing is revealed in anxiety, he explains in some depth why the nothing could not, at least originally, be revealed through a negation of all beings. The fundamental reason is that the nothing is existentially prior to negation. "[T]he nothing is the origin of negation, not vice versa."²² Further, negation is

²⁰ Ibid. p.100.

²¹ But one may still ask: Do Heidegger's claims have cognitive meaning? My response is that, clearly, within Carnap's system they do not. And perhaps they do not have cognitive meaning -- do not assert any knowledge claim -- even in Heidegger's system. Still, they can have philosophical value -- on Heidegger's terms -- because they can foster a radical questioning. For example, "Anxiety reveals the nothing" might encourage us to ask about the nothing. [On the other hand, if the claims are nonsense how valuable can the questions be?]

²² Heidegger, "WM?", p.107.

an act of the intellect. If negation revealed the nothing, then the nothing would be revealed in an intellectual act. But logic and intellect will not let us even conceive of the nothing, for the nothing cannot be an intentional object.²³ Hence negation cannot reveal the nothing. If the latter is to be revealed it cannot be in an intellectual act. This much is clear. But from the fact the nothing cannot be revealed in this manner, must it follow that the nothing is revealed in anxiety? Are acts of intellect and moods the only means of revelation, so that if the nothing is not revealed through the former it must be revealed in the latter? These are important questions, ones that point to difficulties in the text. I can see strength in the argument that the nothing must be revealed either through intellectual or non-intellectual means, and because the former is ruled out the latter must obtain. But even if the nothing must be revealed in a mood, it does not follow that that mood must be anxiety.

True, the mood cannot be joy or boredom. For these, says

23 "... thinking, which is always essentially thinking about something, must act in a way contrary to its own essence when it thinks of the nothing." ("WM?", p.99.) The nothing is precisely what can never be an intentional object. I have written that the intellect cannot conceive of the nothing whereas Heidegger says that thinking cannot think of the nothing. I assume that these claims are essentially the same. I have spoken of intellect because it helps us to understand Heidegger's point: If negation brought us before the nothing, an intellectual act would bring us before the nothing. The intellect would understand the nothing as the negation of all beings. But once we start talking of an intellectual understanding of the nothing we are in trouble; for we imply in this that the intellect can 'hold' the nothing as an intentional object.

Heidegger, reveal beings as a whole and thus "conceal from us the nothing we are seeking."²⁴ We can only be placed before the nothing, he continues, in another, "correspondingly original mood..."²⁵ But why does this have to be anxiety?²⁶ Whence the (logical or causal) necessity? Heidegger does not say. He writes simply: "Does such an attunement, in which man is brought before the nothing itself, occur in human existence? This can and does occur, although rarely enough and only for a moment, in the fundamental mood of anxiety."²⁷ Heidegger's claim, then, at least as expressed in "What is Metaphysics?", seems not to be well substantiated. Something of an argument can be found, but it is far from conclusive.

The very weakness of Heidegger's argumentation, however, should give us pause. The philosopher is not incompetent; if his argument is lacking it may be that he considers it relatively unimportant. Not because of any process of induction or deduction do we believe "anxiety reveals the nothing", he might explain. Rather, we accept this statement as true because we come into contact with the reality about which it speaks.²⁸ In answer to our question

²⁴ Heidegger, "WM?", p.102.

²⁵ Ibid. p.102. When Heidegger says that only in anxiety are we brought before the nothing, he means that only in anxiety is the nothing revealed originally. Other means of revealing the nothing exist, but their revelation is distorted.

²⁶ That is, why is it that "only anxiety originally reveals" the nothing? (emphasis added) "WM?", p.108.

²⁷ Heidegger, "WM?", p.102.

²⁸ This contact theory of knowledge is drawn from Charles Taylor's class notes, McGill University, January, 1988. I

-- Why should we believe Heidegger's claim ? -- we can say it is credible because of Heidegger's promise that, if we 'position ourselves' in the right 'place', if we let anxiety come to us, anxiety's revelation of the nothing will just be apparent.²⁹ Asked to prove his claim, Heidegger might well say to us: 'Come over to where I am and see for yourself.'³⁰

I have singled out this claim for scrutiny because it is crucial in what follows. Only if we are fairly confident that anxiety reveals the nothing can we accept Heidegger's account of anxiety-related suffering.

Turning now to our central concern, we can say first that in anxiety "one feels ill at ease [es ist einem unheimlich]."³¹ The immediate question, of course, is 'What produces this feeling ?' To say one feels ill at ease is to say one feels unheimlich. That is, to feel ill at ease is to feel, among other things, not-at-home. If we want to explain uneasiness we must explain the experience of estrangement. Now in "What is Metaphysics ?" Heidegger does

stress that Heidegger sees argument as relatively unimportant. Clearly it has some importance but it is not pre-eminently important because -- following Prof. Taylor's explanation -- contact theorists use argument not to generate knowledge but merely as a possible aid in the recovery of knowledge -- i.e., argument can, in Prof. Taylor's words, "help us recover contact."

²⁹ Many, of course, find this explanation unsatisfactory. That may be due, in part, to our thorough 'indoctrination' in the closed -- i.e., proof-giving -- theory of knowledge.
³⁰ I am saying implicitly that we should believe Heidegger's claim -- that anxiety reveals the nothing -- because we have contact knowledge of anxiety revealing the nothing. [Of course if the claim is true, we can be sure that anxiety reveals the nothing, not that -- as Heidegger wants to say -- only anxiety reveals the nothing (originally).]

³¹ Heidegger, "WM?" , p.103.

not give an explicit account of the latter, but one can be put together. Before I offer an answer, though, let me stress that the question 'Why do we feel unheimlich in anxiety ?' can probably be resolved in several ways. What follows is only one solution, drawn primarily from "What is Metaphysics ?" and William Richardson's Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought.

To understand why Dasein feels unheimlich in a particular situation we must understand what, for Heidegger, constitutes Dasein's home. Here we turn to a proposition which, within the Heideggerian system, seems to be axiomatic. Commenting on Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics, Richardson writes that Dasein's "true abode is beyond" beings³² (emphasis added); discussing Being and Time, he explains that Dasein "is an already-begun-still-to-be-achieved-process of transcending beings to Being. This process is the very essence of the There-being, its existence. As such it distinguishes There-being from all other beings."³³ (emphasis added) Heidegger himself writes: "Going beyond beings occurs in the essence of Dasein."³⁴ If we assume that Dasein is at home in its essence, we can say it is at home when it has transcended, or is transcending, beings and is making itself open to Being. Now what can this mean in practice ? Many things to be sure, but for a

³² William Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967. p.273.
[Hereafter: Richardson]

³³ Ibid.pp. 50 - 51.

³⁴ Heidegger, "WM?", p.111.

start we can say that Dasein opens itself to Being when it leaves aside things' everydayness -- when it stops utilizing beings -- and starts to let beings come forward simply as beings. By "transcendence", writes Richardson, "Heidegger understands the passage beyond beings to Being, sc. the manifestation of beings as beings, therefore the disclosure of the Being of beings."³⁵ So Dasein is at home when it participates in -- or, perhaps more accurately, when it allows for -- the revelation of Being.³⁶

I said a moment ago that the claim that Dasein is at home transcending beings to Being seems axiomatic. I said this because, at least in "What is Metaphysics ?", Heidegger gives no argument for it. It seems to be just a foundational claim of the system. When we understand what Dasein is, we see the claim's truth. Dasein's "nature is to be open to Being..."³⁷, explains Richardson; "by its very nature" Dasein belongs to Being.³⁸ And I assume that what is -- in this sense -- natural to Dasein is heimlich for Dasein.

Now if Dasein is at home beyond beings, it stands to reason that when it is among beings it is unheimlich. This claim may seem counter-intuitive -- are we not comfortable with our everyday things ? -- but within the Heideggerian

³⁵ Richardson, p.272.

³⁶ Is Dasein at home when it is open to Being or when it participates in the revelation of Being ? It seems Dasein is at home in both. And the latter must entail the former.

³⁷ Richardson, p. 275.

³⁸ Ibid. , p.272.

system it is quite consistent. In the book *Earth and Gods*, Vincent Vycinas writes that, in "his familiarity with the needs and doings of his everyday life...[the common man] feels secure and at-home; but, verily, he is strange and homeless there (his home is in the neighborhood of Being)."³⁹ But what has this got to do with our question? Granted Dasein is *unheimlich* in the midst of beings. Why does it feel *unheimlich* in anxiety? The commentaries I consulted do not answer this explicitly, but I think two responses can be offered: anxiety (in revealing the nothing) "brings Da-sein for the first time before beings as such"⁴⁰; that is, anxiety opens Dasein's eyes to beings so that Dasein can, in a fundamental way, experience beings; and anxiety allows for the revelation of Being, the process which sets Dasein apart from, which estranges Dasein from, all other beings. These two responses depend upon a single fact -- anxiety lets beings come forward as beings; it allows Being to be disclosed -- but let us discuss them separately for the sake of clarity.

How does anxiety bring us before beings as such? In daily life we see beings as this or that particular entity; this is a pencil, that is a book. They seem ordinary and comfortable because they are placed in the usual categories. In anxiety, though, when "just the nothing crowds around"⁴¹,

³⁹ Vincent Vycinas, *Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961. pp. 111 - 112.

⁴⁰ Heidegger, "WM?", p.105.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* p.103.

beings are revealed precisely as beings. This means that they come forward as what they most basically are: things and not nothing. Against the 'background' of what 'is not', beings are revealed as themselves, namely as what *is*. To make this point clear, one commentator suggests we think of the Apollo astronauts.⁴² High in space, they were able to discern the earth only because its bright whiteness contrasted with the surrounding dark. This notion that the nothing reveals beings by offering a radical contrast with them is suggested in a statement from "What is Metaphysics?": "In the clear night of the nothing of anxiety the original openness of beings as such arises: that they are beings -- and not nothing."⁴³ So Dasein is brought before beings as such or, in other words, the original openness of beings as such occurs, when it is disclosed that beings 'are'. And this disclosure happens when beings stand out against the nothing. Writes Richardson: "Non-being [i.e., the nothing] repels attention from itself and directs There-being's gaze toward beings. Beings... are revealed by reason of the effulgence of Non-being as that which is not Non-being."⁴⁴

My first response should now be fairly clear. Dasein

42 Joseph P. Fell, *Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. p. 108. "What fascinates [in the astronauts' photograph of the earth] is the appearance of the earth, within a part of which we are normally preoccupied, as a whole standing out in isolation against a field of black and empty nothingness."

43 Heidegger, "WM?" , p.105.

44 Richardson, p. 203.

feels *unheimlich* in anxiety because this mood reveals, qua beings, the beings among which Dasein is not-at-home. In everyday life Dasein is amid beings but these are not revealed as such. That is, in the normal course of events Dasein is surrounded by 'strangers' but does not experience them as this; it does not feel *unheimlich*.⁴⁵ Dasein is completely caught up in beings' familiar functions. In anxiety, however, beings come forward as beings, and hence latent strangers turn into explicit ones. "It is dread [anxiety]", writes Magda King, "that reveals the commonplace in its utter strangeness and uncanniness."⁴⁶ My argument, then, is that if *unheimlichkeit* is experienced in the midst of beings, the experience can only occur if beings as such are revealed. And it is anxiety which allows for this revelation.

Now there may be a problem here. It may be that I was wrong when I suggested that Dasein can only feel *unheimlich* if beings are disclosed as such. Perhaps Dasein can feel *unheimlich* among beings which are disclosed merely as familiar implements. In this case one could feel *unheimlich* without the revelation which anxiety brings, and my first

45 I am making a distinction here between *being* not-at-home and *feeling or experiencing* not-at-homeness. It seems that, in everyday life, Dasein is not-at-home but does not realize this. Hence here Dasein is *unheimlich* but does not feel *unheimlich*. In anxiety, though, to the extent that it reveals that among which Dasein is *unheimlich*, Dasein is *unheimlich* and feels *unheimlich*.

46 Magda King, *Heidegger's Philosophy: A Guide to his Basic Thought*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1964. p.32. "Uncanniness" is sometimes the translation of *Unheimlichkeit*.

explanation of why we feel *unheimlich* in anxiety would be mistaken. But if Dasein is to experience *unheimlichkeit* among *beings* -- as opposed to this or that specific entity - must it not confront beings as beings ? And if Dasein felt *unheimlich* amid beings qua familiar things, it would feel *unheimlich* all the time. Yet this seems not to happen. Hence it seems plausible to argue that Dasein can feel *unheimlich* only when it is amid beings which are revealed as beings.

However this raises another problem. If Dasein is at home beyond beings -- and this means it is at home when disclosing beings as beings -- in anxiety it should not feel *unheimlich*. For in anxiety, as we have seen, Dasein is engaged in precisely this disclosure of beings as such. What can we say, then ? The most honest answer, though one that may strike us as odd, would argue that in anxiety Dasein feels both *unheimlichkeit* and 'at homeness'. To the extent that it meets the strangers as strangers, it experiences the former; to the extent that it transcends beings, it experiences the latter. This conclusion is not as neat as I would like it to be, but it does no serious damage to my argument. The fact that, from one vantage point, Dasein may feel at home in anxiety does not change that fact that, from another, it feels *unheimlich*. I have to maintain that the latter is true, not that the former is false.

Let me now offer my second explanation of why Dasein

feels *unheimlich* in anxiety. In the first explanation, I operated on the assumption that if Dasein is at home beyond beings, it must be *unheimlich* when among beings. The implication was that beings are strangers to Dasein simply because they are not Being itself. In the explanation I am offering at present, I want to suggest another reason why beings are strangers to Dasein: They are neither open to, nor able to disclose, Being. Openness to , and ability to disclose, Being is unique to Dasein and thus radically sets it apart from other beings. As we have already seen, Richardson makes this point in his commentary on *Being and Time*: Dasein's process of transcending beings to Being "is the very essence of the There-being, its existence. As such it distinguishes There-being from all other beings."⁴⁷

(emphasis added) And of course transcending beings to Being implies disclosing Being. In his commentary on *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Richardson gives further evidence: Dasein is the "strangest" of all beings "because, by its very essence, There-being is in the midst of the total ensemble of beings and exposed unto Being, the awe-inspiring Over-powering...; because it does violence to the Over-powering by gathering it together into a place of open-ness. And this prerogative is unique in There-being."⁴⁸ (emphasis added) At a later point in the commentary, Richardson

47 Richardson, pp.50 - 51.

48 *Ibid.* p.270. I assume that "exposed unto Being" is roughly synonymous with "open to Being", and that gathering Being "into a place of open-ness" is roughly the same as "disclosing Being".

explains: "The There is the most awesome and strange of beings because, open to Being, it is constitutionally estranged from the beings amid which it dwells..."⁴⁹ (emphasis added)

Now what has this got to do with anxiety? The argument I want to make is that, in anxiety, this crucial difference between us and other beings comes to the fore. In everydayness Dasein is caught up in the ontic and hence is not a participant in the revelation of Being. When Dasein is immersed in beings, "Being itself lies hidden..."⁵⁰ And with this closure, Dasein's radical distinctiveness is also hidden. In anxiety, however, Dasein reveals Being and thus demonstrates its special status. Anxiety -- by allowing Dasein to engage in the very process which makes it unique⁵¹ -- brings Dasein's uniqueness to the surface. Dasein's difference is made explicit and hence it experiences other beings as strangers; it feels *unheimlich*. Again: beings are always strangers but only in situations such as anxiety does this become apparent.⁵²

49 Richardson, p.275.

50 *Ibid.* p. 275.

51 I am thinking here both of Dasein's openness to Being and its disclosure of Being. I assume that in disclosing Being, Dasein also demonstrates its openness.

52 I am not saying, of course, that the state of anxiety is the only situation in which Being is disclosed. But it is one such situation, and that is all I need to maintain here.

Let me add that there are at least two ways in which we can understand anxiety's revelation of Being. We can say -- as I have said so far -- that anxiety reveals the nothing which lets beings come forward as beings, and that the latter process entails "the disclosure of the Being of beings." (Richardson, p.272.) But we can also argue that Being and the nothing are one and the same, and hence simply

I want to turn now to another pain of anxiety and explain why Dasein experiences it.⁵³ Again, I will concern myself with "What is Metaphysics?" and secondary sources, and ignore the discussion of anxiety offered in *Being and Time*.

by the fact of its revelation of the nothing, anxiety reveals Being. I must confess I find this identification puzzling, but Richardson assures us that Heidegger accepts it. Heidegger understands "Being and Non-being to be one." (Richardson, p.200) And in "What is Metaphysics?", the philosopher himself acknowledges that Hegel's claim "Pure Being and pure Nothing are therefore the same" is "correct", though Heidegger disagrees with Hegel's explanation of this. ("WM?", p.110) [Is Heidegger cautioning us against an easy identification of the nothing with Being by calling Hegel's claim "correct", instead of "true" ?] But if we assume the identification is valid, what is Heidegger's argument for the claim? "What is Metaphysics?" explains why Being and the nothing "belong together" (p.110), but it does not make clear -- at least to me -- why they are identical. Paul Edwards, in his *Heidegger on Death: A Critical Evaluation* (La Salle, Illinois: The Monist, Monist Monograph #1), offers one explanation, but then suggests it is not very strong: "Heidegger evidently identifies the Nothing with Being on the ground that both are 'other than' or distinct from beings. This is a highly dubious reason, for even if one grants that there are realities which transcend beings, it is not at all obvious that they must all be one and the same. The identification of the Nothing with Being is also completely inconsistent with all the Manichean passages found in the writings of the 1930's which seem to express an essential feature of Heidegger's 'ontology'." (p.71) So where does this leave us? I am not in a position to say whether Heidegger is justified in identifying Being with the nothing. My purpose here is simply to suggest that this notion of anxiety revealing Being can -- if the identification has some plausibility -- be explained in at least two ways: anxiety reveals the nothing and the nothing is Being; anxiety reveals the nothing and the nothing allows for the revelation of Being.

53 I do not claim, of course, that the two pains of anxiety which I discuss are the only ones. Indeed, there is at least one other: oppression. Heidegger explains that "The receding of beings as a whole that closes in on us in anxiety oppresses us." ("WM?", p.103.) Limitations of space prohibit me from discussing the pains of anxiety in their entirety. But my argument does not demand such a discussion. My claim is that true friendship is a positive response to at least some of the pains of anxiety.

What I want to explore here is impotence. Mid-way through "What is Metaphysics ?", Heidegger writes: "Beings are not annihilated by anxiety, so that nothing is left. How could they be, when anxiety finds itself precisely in utter impotence with regard to beings as a whole?"⁵⁴ Elsewhere in the essay he explains that anxious Dasein "can get no hold on things. In the slipping away of beings only this 'no hold on things' comes over us and remains."⁵⁵ My question, of course, is why is Dasein impotent ? Let me offer two answers. The first one argues that we are impotent because beings qua useful objects are receding.⁵⁶ The everyday utensils with which we do things, with which we make events happen and express our power, are losing their meaning as tools and revealing themselves simply as beings. But beings as beings are not functional, they do not help us to achieve anything. Thus, because in anxiety we cannot

54 Heidegger, "WM?", p.104.

55 *Ibid.* p.103.

56 Heidegger explains that, with anxiety's revelation of the nothing, there occurs a "slipping away of beings as a whole." ("WM?", p.103) But this does not mean that beings simply disappear. What 'slip away' in anxiety are beings' everyday meanings. Stephan Strasser, in his article "The Concept of Dread in Heidegger's Philosophy" (*Modern Schoolman*, XXXV, 1957 -58. pp. 10 -11) writes that nothingness "attacks what-is in its existential value, its meaningfulness, its relevancy." And Stanley Rosen, in "Thinking about Nothing" (*Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays* [Michael Murray, Editor]. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978. p. 132), concurs: "Anxiety detaches Dasein from its existential connections with things in the world by emptying these of meaning, not by erasing or obliterating them." And if beings' everyday meanings are slipping away, it seems to me the beings are receding as useful objects.

carry out our daily tasks, we experience powerlessness.⁵⁷

The second answer to why Dasein experiences impotence draws upon the fact that anxiety entails a revelation of Being. Now what we have to realize is that this revelation can occur when Dasein assumes an attitude of passivity. We are impotent in anxiety because here we participate in a revelation which involves our surrender.

In his book *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought*, John Caputo writes: "What Heidegger had to realize -- and what he very likely came to realize in his readings of the mystics -- is the impotence of Dasein to wrest the truth of Being from Being itself. He had to realize that the only 'power' of Dasein lay in surrendering its will and letting Being be."⁵⁸ Caputo's use of the word "wrest" is very telling. Dasein does not bring forward Being's truth here - - that is, Being's unconcealment⁵⁹ -- in a violent, straining manner. Indeed, to speak of a 'bringing forward' at all is not quite right. Dasein participates in this revelation not so much by *bringing* Being forward but more by letting it come forward. The process is clearly meditative.

57 That beings qua useful objects recede in anxiety is a point made by Magda King: the things which "shrivel up" in anxiety "are primarily the useful and indispensable things 'by means of which' we can do this and that." *Heidegger's Philosophy: A Guide to his Basic Thought*, p.130.

58 John D. Caputo, *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 1978. pp.25-26. [Hereafter: *The Mystical Element*]

59 That truth, for Heidegger, is unconcealment, is a point made by David F. Krell. He writes: "Disclosedness or unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*) is ... the most original meaning of truth." Introduction to "On the Essence of Truth", *Martin Heidegger Basic Writings*.p. 115.

Dasein steps back from the quotidian, stops its usual pushing and shoving, and takes on a peacefulness. In this state we expose what Caputo calls the 'inner man'. Caputo writes: "Heidegger's inner man has arrested his everyday activities in order to enter into a calm -- an eerie calm -- in which he experiences that which is not any being at all."⁶⁰ And of course that which is 'not any being at all' is Being itself.

I do not claim any profound understanding of the mystical. But if we say that revealing Being amounts (at least here) to disclosing beings as beings, it does seem plausible that this revelation occurs in a meditative passivity. In daily life, beings are objects of use and hence revelation of their Being is blocked. We are so busy manipulating them towards some end, we obscure their most basic fact. Thus, Dasein's meeting with beings as such is likely to occur in a state of surrender, a state in which it is not purposive, in which it does not use beings at all.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Caputo, *The Mystical Element*, p.23.

⁶¹ That anxious Dasein is meditative is suggested in the following: "Heidegger discussed anxiety in the 1929 treatise in terms of calm, serenity, rest, stillness, and silence. There was already contained implicitly in the early experience of anxiety the later notion of 'composure (Gelassenheit) of patient meditation'. In both anxiety and Gelassenheit Dasein is brought to a halt, withdraws from its outer running about with beings (*Um treiben an das Seiende*) and enters into relation with that which is other than any being." (Caputo, *The Mystical Element*, p.26.) My point, of course, is that if Dasein is meditative in anxiety, it experiences an impotence in anxiety. In the meditative state, Dasein cannot do anything. Its only "power", as Caputo suggests, lies in 'giving itself up to ' Being, in "surrendering its will." Dasein, then, has a kind of power here but it is a power that comes through surrender; hence

As an aside, it is worth noting that not only is Dasein impotent once it is within anxiety, it is also powerless before anxiety occurs; for Dasein cannot force anxiety to arise. "We are so finite", writes Heidegger, "that we cannot even bring ourselves originally before the nothing through our own decision and will."⁶² Christopher Fynsk explains that "... our opening to anxiety is not within our power."⁶³ Therefore, although anxiety has a meditative aspect, it is importantly different from meditation: one can decide to embark upon meditation but one cannot decide to enter anxiety. Anxiety -- or more precisely explicit anxiety⁶⁴ -

Dasein is impotent.

62 Heidegger, "WM?", p.108.

63 Christopher Fynsk, *Heidegger: Thought and Historicity*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986. p.123.

64 One must distinguish between explicit anxiety and what Heidegger calls repressed or concealed anxiety ("WM?", p.108). The philosopher's claim is that Dasein is constantly in anxiety but the latter is usually repressed. Dasein must be constantly anxious because anxiety allows for the revelation of Being which is the process in which Dasein exists. "If Dasein can relate itself to beings only by holding itself out into the nothing and can exist only thus; and if the nothing is originally disclosed only in anxiety; then must we not hover in this anxiety constantly in order to be able to exist at all?" ("WM?", p.106) [Where we see "the nothing" we can, of course, read "Being".] Most of the time Being (the nothing) is revealed only obscurely. We know it is revealed because in our lives we are bombarded with "nihilative behavior" (eg., failure, prohibition, privation) which is made possible by the nothing. The presence of nihilative behavior implies that the nothing -- the behavior's source -- is also revealed, although imperfectly. "The saturation of existence by nihilative behavior testifies to the constant though doubtlessly obscured manifestation of the nothing that only anxiety originally reveals. But this implies that the original anxiety in existence is usually repressed. Anxiety is there. It is only sleeping." ("WM?", p. 108) Heidegger's argument seems to be that, because the nothing is usually obscured -- Dasein is usually presented with nihilative behavior, behavior which indicates the presence of the nothing but

- simply comes over us. This second instance of impotence I mention only in passing; for it concerns Dasein's powerlessness prior to anxiety, while my concern is the powerlessness experienced within anxiety.

I said at the beginning I would show that and why Dasein suffers in anxiety, and attempt to establish the situation's gravity or seriousness. I have now offered some answers to the first question and would like to say a word about the second. Granted that Dasein suffers, we want to know whether the suffering is significant. Against the thrust of my paper, Heidegger suggests that the pains of anxiety are encountered infrequently. In a complex argument -- which I outline in a footnote (64) but need not expand upon here -- the philosopher explains that we are constantly in anxiety but most of the time it is repressed. "Anxiety is there", he writes, "It is only sleeping."⁶⁵ On rare occasions,

does not fully reveal the nothing itself -- anxiety is usually concealed. It is there, but most of the time it remains latent. On rare occasions, however, it springs: the nothing is revealed originally. We are then in explicit anxiety. My point is simply that we cannot choose to enter this state; anxiety does not become explicit through an act of our will. But one will object: cannot Dasein decide to let beings as a whole slip away and hence decide to enter into explicit anxiety? This seems to be a strong objection, and I am not sure how to refute it. Perhaps Heidegger would say that Dasein can decide to embark on meditation with the hope that beings will recede, but Dasein cannot ensure that this will result. It can decide to place itself in a position where beings can recede, but it does not have the power to guarantee this recession. But even if Dasein does have power here -- i.e., it can make anxiety explicit at will -- this does not harm my thesis. For all I am maintaining is that, once Dasein is within explicit anxiety, it is impotent. My question in this section is why does Dasein suffer in anxiety?

65 Heidegger, "WM?", p.108.

however, anxiety awakens; this is explicit anxiety. And during this, Dasein experiences the suffering I have discussed.⁶⁶

But if the suffering is not met with frequently, it does not follow that it is insignificant, nor that Dasein requires no support in the face of it. Any given Canadian encounters, for example, relatively few deaths in the family, but no one would say their impact on those affected is slight. The suffering of anxiety is serious not because of its quantity -- though what is infrequent for the individual becomes significant in the community as a whole -- but because of its quality. As we have seen, *unheimlichkeit* and impotence both stem from Dasein's participation in the unconcealment of Being. That is, they stem from Dasein's very essence. These are not accidental sufferings but sufferings Dasein is susceptible to in virtue of its existence. For Dasein to be, it must engage in a process which opens it up to these problems. They are frequently buried, but as long as Dasein exists they threaten to strike. What I want to suggest, then, is that

66 My textual justification for saying that Dasein suffers in explicit anxiety is the following: "It [original anxiety] is always ready, though it only seldom springs, and we are snatched away and left hanging." ("WM?", p.108) This suggests that in explicit anxiety (anxiety which has sprung) we are "left hanging". But we are left hanging when beings as a whole slip away (qua everyday things). The latter starts the process of beings coming forward as beings. And this unconcealment of Being is really the source of *unheimlichkeit* and impotence. So it is the rare (or explicit) anxiety which leaves us hanging, which involves the receding of beings and the revelation of Being. Thus suffering occurs in explicit anxiety.

the suffering is serious due to its fundamental and universal character.

At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested the peace movement will make itself attractive and increase its size if it helps us to satisfy some of our personal needs. This appeal to narrow self-interest is advocated by certain American commentators⁶⁷ who argue that the U.S. movement will expand if it publicizes the connection between militarism and loss of civilian jobs, and between conversion and increased employment. David Cortright, an activist with the SANE/FREEZE organization, writes that "[b]y focusing on pocketbook issues and promoting a vision of jobs and economic prosperity, the peace movement can widen its popular appeal among sectors of the population that have remained beyond its reach."⁶⁸ Cortright wants the movement to tell Americans 'Look, if you want the economy to improve, if you want the subways fixed, the roads repaired, new hospitals built; if you want to keep working, join the peace movement and help us dismantle the war-making institutions.'

67 Seymour Melman, in *The Demilitarized Society* (Montreal: Harvest House, 1988,), is among those who argue that, to increase its membership, the peace movement must educate people to the fact that militarism harms the economy and employment prospects, while conversion does just the opposite. Melman does not call this a self-interest approach to movement building, but that, in large measure, is what it is. [Admittedly, he wants the movement to argue that conversion brings not only individual jobs, but an improved society in general. For example, converted industries could repair the badly deteriorated American infrastructure -- or the Canadian infrastructure where it is lacking -- of roads, sewers, bridges, etc.]

68 David Cortright, "Shaping a Peacetime Economy", *The Progressive*, January, 1989. p.22.

I think Cortright's approach is a good one, but I believe it can be taken further. Citizens are plagued not simply by economic problems but also by existential ones. A movement which speaks to both of these concerns will (over the long term) have a much greater drawing power than a movement which speaks to only one of them. The movement preserves our jobs by lobbying for conversion legislation and disarmament treaties.⁶⁹ It provides support in the face of *unheimlichkeit* and impotence by helping us to make true friends. In the succeeding chapters I shall discuss Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and, to a lesser extent, *The Politics*, and explain why it is that true friendship is such a positive response to some of the pains of anxiety.

⁶⁹ This is Melman's approach and one I heartily support: the movement's overall goal is the dissolution of the war-making institutions (the Pentagon, its contractors and the university military researchers). The goal is achieved through conversion legislation and disarmament treaties.

Chapter 2

Having shown why we suffer and that the suffering is serious, I want to suggest a form of relief. It must be clear that what I offer will not make the pains of anxiety disappear; as we have seen, these pains stem from Dasein's very essence -- its involvement in the process of transcending beings to Being. As long as Dasein exists, it will -- from time to time -- suffer them. So the question becomes not how to eliminate, but how to cope with, the pains of anxiety. In the following pages I shall argue that true friendship is a good antidote, and I will demonstrate why.

Let me begin with impotence. As will be remembered, I offered two reasons for the occurrence of this problem: In anxiety beings come forward as beings, that is, as things which do not help us to achieve anything; and the revelation of Being in anxiety turns out to be the sort of process which entails Dasein's surrender.⁷⁰ Quite clearly, we

70 An objection will be raised: In Chapter One I quote Richardson as saying that Dasein "does violence to the Overpowering [i.e., Being] by gathering it together into a place of open-ness." (p.270) If Dasein does "violence" to Being, how can Dasein be in a state of surrender with respect to Being? A good point. One might reply that the unconcealment of Being can occur in both ways: through struggle and through passivity. In "What is Metaphysics?", Heidegger argues that the nothing [i.e., Being] is "encountered 'at one with' beings that are slipping away as a whole." (p.105) This suggests that Being is revealed not through Dasein's purposive action but through letting beings slip away in their everydayness so that beings as beings can emerge. Thus, in the unconcealment of Being that occurs in anxiety, Dasein assumes a passivity. This is not to say that the revelation of Being always involves passivity, only that it does when revelation occurs in anxiety. When Dasein

cannot change the basic facts of the situation: We cannot turn beings as beings into useful objects, objects which let us assert our power, nor can we make anxiety's revelation of Being into a fully active process. Being comes to light here in a "peculiar calm"⁷¹, in Dasein's loss of grip on everyday beings. "In the slipping away of beings only this 'no hold on things' comes over us and remains."⁷² But if impotence cannot be removed, it can certainly be countered, and here we turn to friendship.⁷³

I want to draw upon the theory of friendship articulated by Aristotle. It may be asked: Why this thinker and not some other? My answer is simply this: To show why friendship is helpful I need to explain what, in a fundamental sense, friendship is. Aristotle offers one of the West's earliest systematic accounts of it. If I want to understand this relationship, I need to consult one of the original sources of knowledge on the topic. I could have chosen Plato's *Lysis* -- another early examination of friendship -- but the *Nicomachean Ethics* provides a far

does violence to Being, Dasein is not anxious. We resolve the question -- How can the revelation of Being be both passive and violent? -- by seeing that these two means of unconcealment occur in different moods.

71 Heidegger, "WM?", p.102.

72 *Ibid.* p.103.

73 I do not claim that friendship is the only response to the impotence of anxiety, simply that it is a good response. Some existentialists, for example Sartre, would of course argue for a more individualistic response, rejecting friendship as it entails going outside the individual. In my defence, let me say that it seems strange not to draw sustenance from others if, as is the case for some of us, they do in fact provide support. [Prof. Linda Fisher brought this issue to my attention.]

richer discussion. Perhaps it is worth noting that this process of returning to the Greeks in order to discover original meanings was shared by Heidegger.

True friendship is a good antidote to impotence because friends help us to develop courage. That is, friends foster within us a characteristic whose presence entails a reduced sensitivity to hardships. In explicit anxiety the courageous person experiences impotence⁷⁴, but he is not troubled. For the courageous person -- according to Aristotle -- "... endures danger with joy, or at least without pain..."⁷⁵ And Aristotle remarks that "... no person endures what is terrifying more steadfastly than [the courageous man]." ⁷⁶ Impotence is neither dangerous nor particularly terrifying but it is painful; a courageous person weathers it more effectively than one who lacks courage. Our question now is how do friends promote this virtue ?

In order to answer this, I need to offer an Aristotelian definition of friends. Aristotle talks of three kinds of friendship but my concern here is only with true

74 I am not claiming, of course, that the courageous person -- who is potent in the Greek sense -- experiences impotence in the Greek sense. Rather, he/she experiences *Heideggerian* impotence. Everyone is susceptible to this. [But the courageous person weathers it better than others do.]

75 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*. [Martin Ostwald, Translator] Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1962. Book Two, 1104b 7 - 8. [Hereafter: *Nic.Ethics*.] Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from the Ostwald translation.

76 *Ibid*. Book Three, 1115a 24 - 25.

friendship.⁷⁷ Describing this sort of relationship, Aristotle states the following: "We count as a friend (1) a person who wishes for and does what is good or what appears to him to be good for his friend's sake..."⁷⁸ This is not Aristotle's only way of expressing what friendship is -- we could also say, for example, that a friend is one who "shares sorrow and joy"⁷⁹ with us -- but it is one of his most important. It expresses what is clearly essential to his theory: Friends wish for, and further, one another's good.⁸⁰ A crucial point for my argument is that friends do not merely want us to possess what is good, they actually help us to attain it.

Another point germane to my discussion is the fact that true friendship exists only between good persons. Why is this so? Aristotle's argument is that essential to true friendship is the partners' practice of befriending each other on the basis of what they are: Their "attitude is determined by what their friends are and not by incidental considerations."⁸¹ But only good persons can befriend one

77 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1156b 5 - 10.

78 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1166a 1 - 5. That this is a description of true friendship is suggested by the fact that the person wishes for his friend's good for his friend's sake.

79 *Ibid.*, Book Nine, 1166a 5 - 10.

80 Aristotle writes at one point: "Those who wish for their friends' good for their friends' sake are friends in the truest sense..." (Book Eight, 1156b 9 - 10). Elsewhere he explains: "...friends enhance our ability to think and to act." (Book Eight, 1155a 15). If the latter means -- as is reasonable to assume -- that friends help us to think and act virtuously, clearly they do what is good for us.

81 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1156b 10 - 11. "Incidental considerations" I take to mean the provision of pleasure and

another on this basis. Neutral or wicked persons cannot, for what they are essentially -- neutral or wicked -- is not one of the three things worthy of affection⁸². Such persons might sometimes prove useful or pleasant but these qualities are not intrinsic to them. Hence, persons of this sort like one another for the services they provide. Indeed, it is these services, and not the person of the other, which they befriend. On moving day, for example, a wicked man befriend's his partner's moving skills. "Those whose friendship is based on the useful dissolve it as soon as it ceases to be to their advantage, since they were friends not of one another but of what was profitable for them"⁸³ In the case of good persons, on the other hand, what they are -- namely, good -- is worthy of affection. Thus, "...good men will be friends on the basis of what they are, that is, because they are good."⁸⁴ Each befriends the other because he perceives virtue in the other.⁸⁵

usefulness.

82 "For, it seems, we do not feel affection for everything, but only for the lovable, and that means what is good, pleasant, or useful." *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1155b 17 - 18.

83 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1157a 13 - 15.

84 *Ibid.* 1157b 3.

85 True friendship exists between good persons, but it does not demand that the persons be wholly good, i.e., that they possess only and all the virtues. This may come as a surprise given some of Aristotle's statements -- he says that in the truest friendships "each partner is both good in the unqualified sense and good for his friend." (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1156b 13) -- but as John Cooper points out, and as other passages suggest, this interpretation is quite reasonable. Aristotle tells us that "Those who wish for their friends' good for their friends' sake are friends in the truest sense, since their attitude is determined by what their friends are and not by incidental

Having set out a definition of friends, I am now in a position to explain how they help us to develop courage. True friends, we recall, do what is good for us. Of course Aristotle's precise words are that a friend "does what is good or what appears to him to be good for his friend's sake..." (emphasis added) As we shall see, it is crucial to my argument that friends do what is *actually* good. Is there a problem? Could one be a true friend and offer his companion only what appears to be good? In fact, the issue is easily resolved. Because we are talking here about true friends, the persons involved are (at least partially) good

considerations." (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1156b 9 - 11) (emphasis added) That is, the crucial ingredient in true friendship is the fact the partners like each other for what they are. Now, liking people for what they are entails liking them because they are virtuous people. But that does not mean they have to be virtuous in an unqualified sense. They must be at least partially good -- otherwise they could not be liked for what they are; there is nothing in the being of a wicked or a neutral (neither good nor bad) person which is worthy of affection -- but they need not be more than that. Cooper explains that "one might be attached to someone because of his generous and open spirit, while recognizing that he is in some ways obtuse or not very industrious or somewhat self-indulgent. Such a friendship would belong to the type virtue-friendship [i.e., true friendship], because it would be based on the conception of the other person as morally good (in some respect, in some degree), even though the person does not have, and is not thought to have, a perfectly virtuous character..." ("Aristotle on Friendship" in A. Rorty, ed., *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980. pp. 306 -307) [Cooper uses the term "virtue-friendship" here but I think that "true friendship" can also be used. For Cooper tells us that virtue friendships are "based on the conception of the other person as morally good (in some respect, in some degree)..." and Aristotle, in describing the truest friendship says much the same thing: it is a friendship in which the partners' "attitude is determined by what their friends are...", i.e., by their goodness. (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1156b 11).

people. That means, at least for Aristotle, that what appears to them as good really is good. "[W]hat seems good to a man of high moral standards", he explains, "is truly the object of wish..."⁸⁶ And he adds that "from the standpoint of truth the object of wish is the good..."⁸⁷ Now because we can say that friends do what is good for us, we can say they help us to attain the good, and that means to attain that at which we aim.⁸⁸ For the good, Aristotle tells us in the first sentence of the *Ethics*, "has been well defined as that at which all things aim."⁸⁹ More specifically, friends help us to carry out our "proper

86 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Three, 1113a 24 - 25.

87 *Ibid.*, 1113a 23 -24. But one will ask: Can a partially good person be a "man of high moral standards" ? I do not see why not. One can have high moral standards even if one does not possess all the virtues. And if Aristotle understood the man of high moral standards to be only a person of unqualified goodness, surely he would have said so explicitly.

88 But some will object: This is altogether too grandiose an interpretation of 'friends do what is good for us'. Surely they can do something much more modest -- eg., give us some food -- and still fulfill this aspect of friendship. Must they help us to attain the good in the sense of help us to carry out our proper function. ? The answer is -- ultimately -- yes. No one denies that, when we are hungry, food is a good. But Aristotle says that "...one will wish the greatest good for his friend as a human being." (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1159a 11 - 12) (emphasis added) Admittedly, he goes on to say: "But perhaps not all the greatest goods, for each man wishes for his own good most of all." (1159a 12 - 13) However even if friends do not wish their partners to have all the greatest goods, clearly they wish them to have at least some of them. And that should mean they help each other, as much as possible, to attain these goods. In the Aristotelian system the greatest goods are the intellectual virtues; hence it is reasonable to assume that friends help each other to attain some of these, especially practical wisdom which allows us to function properly.

89 *Nic. Ethics*, Book One, 1094a 2.

function", for that is what we, qua good people, aim at.⁹⁰ The proper function of human beings is that activity which is ours uniquely. In the philosophy of Aristotle it is rational activity: "The proper function of man... consists in an activity of the soul in conformity with a rational principle or, at least, not without it."⁹¹ The interesting point here is that performing our proper function really amounts to performing our function well: "... the proper function of a harpist, for example, is the same as the function of a harpist who has set high standards for himself."⁹² Performing our function well entails performing it in accord with virtue, for arete "is that quality which enables its possessor to perform his own particular function well."⁹³ Putting the pieces together, we can say that friends help us to undertake rational activity in accord with the virtue appropriate to rational activity.

Now the soul, says Aristotle, has two rational elements: the calculative and the scientific. Both have as their function the acquisition of truth, but they differ with respect to their objects. The calculative element

90 Aristotle does not make this point explicitly, but it can be inferred. For if we aim at the good we aim at happiness, that is, at activity in conformity with virtue. "Virtue" can also be translated as "goodness" (Ostwald, Glossary to *Nic. Ethics*, p. 304.). So we aim at activity in conformity with goodness. Now Aristotle tells us that the goodness of man "would seem to reside in whatever is his proper function." (*Nic. Ethics*, Book One, 1097b 27) Thus, I conclude that we aim at activity in conformity with our proper function.

91 *Nic. Ethics*, Book One, 1098a 7.

92 *Ibid.*, 1098a 8 - 9.

93 Martin Ostwald, Glossary to *Nic. Ethics*, p.304.

apprehends contingent things, and the scientific element things which exist necessarily. The virtues of the former are, at least, understanding, practical wisdom and art; of the latter, scientific knowledge, theoretical wisdom and intelligence.⁹⁴ To give one example of what Aristotle means: A person possessing practical wisdom -- i.e., one who is good at deliberation and thus "can aim at and hit the best thing attainable to man by action"⁹⁵ -- has a calculative element which performs its job well. This person hits upon truth in the practical sphere: He uses true reasoning and chooses the mean⁹⁶.

When Aristotle talks of the virtue appropriate to rational activity he must mean (at least) the virtues of the rational elements listed above. Because friends do what is good for us, they help us to live in accordance with these virtues. Now the important point for my argument is that

94 Interestingly, intelligence seems to apprehend both things which are necessary and things which are contingent. "Intelligence grasps, on the one hand, the unchangeable, primary terms and concepts for demonstrations; on the other hand, in questions of action, it grasps the ultimate, contingent fact and the minor premise." I assume that, for Aristotle, the unchangeable primary terms exist of necessity. (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Six, 1143b 1 - 3.)

95 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Six, 1141b 13 - 14.

96 "... since moral virtue is a characteristic involving choice, and since choice is a deliberate desire, it follows that, if the choice is to be good, the reasoning must be true and the desire correct; that is, reasoning must affirm what desire pursues. This then is the kind of thought and the kind of truth that is practical and concerned with action." (emphasis added) *Nic. Ethics*, Book Six, 1139a 23 - 26. In other words, I take Aristotle to be saying that truth in the practical sphere is true reasoning. (And true reasoning urges us to choose the mean: "... the median is what right reason dictates." [Book Six, 1138b 20])

friends help us to follow, *inter alia*, practical wisdom. And I want to say that they necessarily do this. Such a claim seems problematic at first; for could not friends promote our good by ignoring practical wisdom and helping us to live only in accord with the other intellectual virtues? Apparently not. If friends are to further our good -- and they must -- they must help us to carry out our proper function; and "a man fulfills his proper function", explains Aristotle, "only by way of practical wisdom and moral excellence or virtue..."⁹⁷ (emphasis added) Clearly friends can help us to attain other virtues as well. My only point here is that, whatever else they do, they help us to attain practical wisdom.

What is the argument behind Aristotle's claim that one fulfills one's proper function only through practical wisdom and moral virtue? Recall that our proper function consists in activity of the rational elements in accord with the virtues proper to these elements. His argument may be the quite simple one that practical wisdom is one of the virtues proper to the rational elements; all such virtues must be present if we are to function properly; thus such functioning requires practical wisdom. If we accept this argument, we read Aristotle's "only" -- i.e., one fulfills one's function only by way of practical wisdom and moral virtue -- to mean that these virtues are necessary but not sufficient for proper functioning. We read the words "only

⁹⁷ *Nic. Ethics*, Book Six, 1144a 6 - 7.

by way of" as synonymous with "not without". The problem with this argument is that it employs the dubious premise that all intellectual virtues must be present in us if we are to function properly. I do not recall Aristotle making this claim explicitly. Some textual evidence can be found to support it⁹⁸, but I think we need a stronger argument to back the proposition that practical wisdom is necessary for our proper functioning. A good argument is needed because passages can be found which suggest we could function properly without practical wisdom.. If I said, for example, that practical wisdom is needed because proper functioning entails the possession of a virtue of each rational element -- otherwise the virtues of the entire rational part of the soul are not represented -- one could reply that art or understanding would serve just as well. Practical wisdom is a virtue of the calculative element, but it is not the only one. Another possible problem is the following: In Book One, Aristotle tells us that man's proper function or his good "is an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue, and if there are several virtues, in

98 He writes, for example, that happiness "requires completeness in virtue as well as a complete lifetime." (Nic. Ethics, Book One, 1100a 4 - 5). Now if happiness is the good of man and the good of man is functioning properly, we can argue that our proper functioning requires completeness in virtue; and "completeness in virtue" could be understood to mean possession and activity of all virtues. Hence our proper functioning could demand the possession and activity of all virtues. [On the other hand, "completeness in virtue" might just mean the possession and activity of a single virtue, e.g., theoretical wisdom. Theoretical wisdom is "one portion of virtue in its entirety..." (Book Six, 1144a5)]

conformity with the best and most complete."⁹⁹ (emphasis added) It is this qualification that is worrisome. For practical wisdom is clearly inferior to theoretical wisdom.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, theoretical wisdom is the highest intellectual virtue.¹⁰¹ If we interpret "the best and most complete" as referring to a single virtue, we must understand it to mean theoretical wisdom and hence draw the conclusion that our proper function is attained without practical wisdom. However what is to stop us from reading "best and most complete" as referring to more than one virtue? That is, why can it not refer to (at least) theoretical and practical wisdom? Theoretical wisdom is the best virtue of the scientific element, and practical wisdom seems to be highest among virtues of the calculative element. At the very least, practical wisdom is superior to art and understanding: "Practical wisdom issues commands: its end is to tell us what we ought to do and what we ought not to do. Understanding, on the other hand, only passes judgment."¹⁰² (emphasis added)

99 *Nic. Ethics*, Book One, 1098a 16 - 18.

100 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Six, 1143b 33 - 34. "... it would seem strange if practical wisdom, though <intrinsically> inferior to theoretical wisdom, should surpass it in authority..."

101 Martin Ostwald, notes to *Nic. Ethics*, p.155. Note 24.

102 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Six, 1143a 7 - 8. As well, in his notes to the *Ethics*, Martin Ostwald tells us that "practical wisdom is itself a complete virtue or excellence..." (p.154, Note 20) (emphasis added) That is, if one possesses practical wisdom one is virtuous, even if a particular act one commits does not display virtue. The artist or practitioner of applied science, on the other hand, only possesses virtue if his work turns out well: "... the excellence of art depends on the goodness or badness of its

Another, and similar, difficulty arises in Book Ten. Aristotle explains: "Now, if happiness is activity in conformity with virtue, it is to be expected that it should conform with the highest virtue, and that is the virtue of the best part of us."¹⁰³ If we read happiness (our good) as our proper function, and "the highest virtue" as theoretical wisdom alone, we again reach the conclusion that our proper functioning does not require practical wisdom. My reply here is essentially the one I gave earlier: Why must we read "the highest virtue" as referring to a single excellence? Why could it not refer to a group of virtues, namely the highest intellectual ones? And why could not "the best part of us" -- though one is tempted to see it as the scientific element alone -- be understood as the entire strictly rational part of the soul? Thus the strongest argument I can construct says that our good or proper function is activity in conformity with the best and most complete virtues of the scientific and calculative elements, all of which are necessary; practical wisdom is one of these virtues; thus activity in accord with practical wisdom is necessary for our proper functioning.

There is another argument I could give for Aristotle's product." (Ostwald, p.154, Note 20) If our proper function is an activity in conformity with the most complete virtues, it again seems to require practical wisdom. [Admittedly, Ostwald calls practical wisdom a complete virtue but not the most complete. Still, if we are reading "best and most complete" as referring to more than one virtue, we can argue that, as a complete virtue, practical wisdom can be one of the most complete virtues.]

103 Nic. *Ethics*, Book Ten, 1177a 12 - 13.

claim, an argument which fails but nevertheless proves useful for my project. At the end of Book One, Aristotle suggests that "the rational element of the soul has two subdivisions: the one possesses reason in the strict sense, contained within itself, and the other possesses reason in the sense that it listens to reason as one would listen to a father."¹⁰⁴ In arguing that our proper function is activity in conformity with the highest virtues of the rational element, I have, up to now, had in mind the rational element which 'possesses reason in the strict sense'. This explains why my concern has been with the intellectual virtues. But what if we turned to the other subdivision of the rational element. This other section is a rational element only in a secondary sense, for it is not rational intrinsically but has the power to follow reason. Aristotle calls it "the seat of the appetites and of desire..." and says that it "partakes of reason insofar as it complies with reason and accepts its leadership..."¹⁰⁵ Now if this secondary rational element is a rational element nevertheless, could not our proper function entail activity in accord with its highest virtues? This element is the seat of desire and hence its highest virtues are the highest *moral* virtues. ¹⁰⁶

104 *Nic. Ethics*, Book One, 1103a 1 - 3.

105 *Ibid.*, 1102b 30 - 32. What is confusing is the fact that the appetitive part is also part of the *irrational* element of the soul. Aristotle's point seems to be that the appetitive part can be part of the *irrational* or *rational* element, depending upon whether it accepts reason's "leadership".

106 That the *moral* virtues are proper to the seat of desire is told to us explicitly in a footnote of Ostwald's --

Consequently -- on this argument -- our good would be activity in accord with the highest moral virtues. But Aristotle tells us that the moral virtues can only be attained if we possess practical wisdom.¹⁰⁷ Thus, if we are to function properly we must possess practical wisdom. The problem with this argument, though, is the fact it requires the highest virtues of the secondary rational element to be among the best virtues of the entire rational element -- something they could never be. The ranking of a virtue depends upon the part it is a virtue of, and thus the virtues of a secondary element are themselves secondary.¹⁰⁸ Even the finest of the moral virtues is lower than the least of the intellectual ones. Furthermore, the seat of desire (secondary rational element) can be viewed also as a part of the soul's irrational element.¹⁰⁹ This again suggests the low standing, relatively speaking, of the virtues of the desiring part.¹¹⁰

p.169, Note 56.

107 "...there is no virtue without wisdom." *Nic. Ethics*, Book Six, 1144b 20.

108 For example, the highest virtue "is the virtue of the best part of us." *Nic. Ethics*, Book Ten, 1177a 12.

109 "Thus we see that the irrational element of the soul has two parts: the one is vegetative... the other is the seat of the appetites and of desire in general and partakes of reason insofar as it complies with reason and accepts its leadership..." *Nic. Ethics*, Book One, 1102b 28 - 31 (emphasis added)

110 One might object that in my stronger argument I call practical wisdom one of the best virtues of the whole rational element, yet it is clearly inferior to theoretical wisdom. If practical wisdom is one of the best virtues, why cannot the highest moral virtues also be? The answer is that practical wisdom, though inferior to intellectual wisdom, is still a member of the highest class of virtues, the intellectual ones. But no moral virtue is a member of

Now despite the weakness of this last argument, it does serve one important purpose: It employs the correct and very useful premise that moral virtue is only possible in the presence of practical wisdom. The next step in my overall argument says that, because friends help us to possess practical wisdom, they help us to live in accord with the moral virtues, including courage. How practical wisdom makes the moral virtues possible is my next question.

In Book Two of the *Ethics*, Aristotle concludes that "...virtue or excellence is a characteristic involving choice, and that it consists in observing the mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it."¹¹¹ This passage offers a synopsis of the argument. Necessary for possession of the moral virtues are the acts of choosing and attaining the mean relative to oneself. [These are not, however, sufficient to make one a good or virtuous person; becoming the latter entails not only choosing the mean but choosing it for its own sake.¹¹²] These activities require the use of reason -- reason tells us what the mean turns out to be in each situation -- and because they occur in the course of a concrete individual's life, they must entail a rational faculty devoted to the particular and contingent. Several faculties operate in this sphere, among them

this class.

¹¹¹ *Nic.Ethics*, Book Two, 1106b 35 - 1107a1.

¹¹² If one is a good man "his acts are due to choice and are performed for the sake of the acts themselves." *Nic.Ethics*, Book Six, 1144a 18 - 19.

intelligence, understanding, good sense and practical wisdom. It is possible that any of these could be a necessary condition for the possession of moral virtue, but all I need to show is that practical wisdom is such a condition. The crucial point is this: Practical wisdom is necessary because without it (though we might be able to choose the mean) we could not attain the mean.¹¹³ It tells us which steps will bring us to it. The practically wise person is excellent at deliberation, and thus correctly assesses "what is conducive to the end."¹¹⁴ This person has cleverness, argues Aristotle, and that is the capacity "to perform those steps which are conducive to a goal we have set for ourselves and to attain that goal."¹¹⁵ Thus, practical wisdom is necessary if we are to act virtuously, and by helping us to develop it, friends help us to develop courage. From an analysis of the claim that friends do what is good for us, we see it is in their very nature to offer this help.

Before I move on to an explanation of why friendship is a positive response to our *unheimlichkeit*, I want briefly to

113 "Now, it is virtue which makes our choice right. It is not virtue, however, but a different capacity, which determines the steps which, in the nature of the case, must be taken to implement this choice." (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Six, 1144a 20 - 23.) I assume that the term "virtue" here refers to moral virtue and that the "different capacity" is that which is possessed by a person of practical wisdom. Elsewhere Aristotle writes: "...virtue makes us aim at the right target, and practical wisdom makes us use the right means." (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Six, 1144a8)

114 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Six, 1142b 34.

115 *Ibid.* 1144a 25 - 26.

discuss some further objections. First, one might wonder whether courage is the sort of thing which is promoted with the help of others. As is well known, Aristotle believes the moral virtues are developed through habit -- one becomes "courageous by performing acts of courage."¹¹⁶ -- and it is not immediately clear that others can facilitate this process. In a couple of key passages describing the attainment of moral virtue, Aristotle makes no mention of any 'outside help': "...we are by nature equipped with the ability to receive [the moral virtues] and habit brings this ability to completion and fulfillment."¹¹⁷ And he adds that we acquire the virtues "by first having put them into action... [W]e become just by the practice of just actions, self-controlled by exercising self-control..."¹¹⁸ Where do friends enter the picture? The reply I want to offer is that even if these passages make no reference to friends -- or to others of any kind -- Aristotle is not saying they have no place here. On the contrary, he suggests at several points that courage, and the moral virtues generally, can be developed in a social context.¹¹⁹ In Book Two, for example, he tells us that "... in our transactions with other men it

116 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Two, 1103b 2.

117 *Ibid.* Book Two 1103a 24 - 25.

118 *Ibid.* Book Two 1103a 30 - 1103b 1.

119 I say that courage can -- and not must -- be developed in a social context of friends because I do not claim that friends are necessary for our development of courage. My argument says that true friends necessarily help us to develop courage, not that courage is impossible in their absence.

is by action that some become just and others unjust..."¹²⁰ (emphasis added) ; in Book Ten, he explains that "... a just man still needs people toward whom and in company with whom to act justly, and the same is true of a self-controlled man, a courageous man, and all the rest."¹²¹ Admittedly, in the first passage Aristotle does not say that others *must* be present if we are to become virtuous. But that is not a problem. I do not claim that courage is *only* possible if we have friends. Rather, I argue that if people are true friends of ours they will necessarily help us to develop courage. The first passage does not prove that my argument is valid; indeed, it makes no explicit reference to friends at all, speaking only of 'other men'. But it does make my argument -- an argument based only on philosophical analysis of the claim that friends do what is good for us -- more plausible. It suggests that when I move away from philosophical analysis and towards the *actual mechanics* of virtue development, I do not (at least to this point) run into inconsistencies. I theorized that friends *must* help us to grow in moral virtue, and the first passage suggests that friends at least *can* help us. ('Other men' can be friends.) The passage suggests that a crucial implicit premise of mine -- one's virtue can develop in the company of others -- is correct. The objection that Aristotle, in saying the virtues develop through habit, somehow rules out such a

120 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Two, 1103b 14 - 16.

121 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Ten, 1177a 31 - 33.

social setting for virtue, can be dismissed. Indeed, the second passage suggests that others not only can, but must, be present if we are to act virtuously¹²²: a virtuous person needs people toward whom and with whom to act virtuously.

Now given that the activity and development of one's moral virtue is fostered by other people, and that -- as we saw in my analysis - friends necessarily help us to live courageously, a critic might say the following: 'I would be more convinced by your analysis if you could explain how, specifically, friends carry out their task. Granted they must do it, what do they actually do ?' This is an interesting question, but one to which Aristotle -- at least in the *Nicomachean Ethics* -- does not give much attention. To help us to gain courage, friends must clearly help us to attain practical wisdom, but then the question arises as to how that is done. Practical wisdom, like the other intellectual virtues, "...owes its origin and development chiefly to teaching, and for that reason requires experience and time."¹²³ So friends offer some kind of instruction in practical wisdom, but just how this occurs is not completely

122 I appreciate that in this second passage, Aristotle is not concerned with *becoming* virtuous, but with doing virtuous acts after one has become a virtuous man. Now my point in this section is simply that (for Aristotle) others can help us to *develop* virtue. How does this second passage support my claim ? For this passage suggests others are needed not to *develop* our virtue but to *maintain* it once we have become virtuous. My reply is that if friends merely help us to maintain our virtue they still (in a sense) help us to develop it.

123 *Nic. Ethics* Book Two, 1103a 15 - 17.

clear. Aristotle offers the vague pronouncement that "[w]e may... get some sort of training in virtue or excellence from living together with good men, as Theognis says."¹²⁴ And Ostwald, in a footnote to his edition of the *Ethics*, quotes Theognis as saying "You will learn noble things from noble people."¹²⁵ But again the question arises: By what means? Toward the end of Book Ten, Aristotle explains that if the community does not do enough to make its citizens good, "...it would seem to be incumbent upon every man to help his children and friends attain virtue. This he will be capable of doing, or at least intend to do."¹²⁶ (emphasis added) But how, precisely, friends help one another to attain practical wisdom is not stated. After the above passage, Aristotle explains that one is "better capable" of helping others to attain virtue if one "knows something about legislation."¹²⁷ The argument is that such knowledge allows one to create laws and laws can help to make us good.

124 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1170a 11 - 12. The "good men" referred to in the passage are, presumably, friends. Aristotle's point here is that friends are necessary for our happiness; happiness is activity in accord with the highest virtue and friends (who are good people) can give us some training in this. Whether Aristotle has in mind here the intellectual virtues (including practical wisdom) is not certain. But he does tell us that these virtues are developed through teaching, and teaching could be roughly synonymous with training. In this case, he may well be referring to the intellectual virtues here. Also, if his argument is that friends promote our supreme happiness, he must be arguing that they promote the highest virtues in us, and these are the intellectual ones.

125 Theognis, line 35 (Diehl 3), as quoted by Martin Ostwald in his translation of *Nic. Ethics*, p.265, Note 30.

126 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Ten, 1180a 31 - 32.

127 *Ibid.* Book Ten, 1180a 33.

But surely Aristotle's concern here is the production of moral virtue: law can impose upon us a certain moderation in action.¹²⁸ It cannot, however, make us practically wise; it cannot teach us to deliberate well. Thus, it seems unlikely that friends' knowledge of legislation, or even their creation of laws, would be the tools by which they foster practical wisdom in us. Certainly one who legislates possesses practical wisdom -- law is the "rule of reason derived from some sort of practical wisdom and intelligence."¹²⁹ -- but this fact does not explain how one promotes the virtue in others.

The task facing our friends is that of developing our ability to determine what is conducive to the median. But this does not mean they tell us what to do in every possible situation. How could they? Nor can they give us formulae: 'Whenever in a bar, drink no more than three glasses of wine'. This limit may represent the mean in some situations but not in others. What friends do is promote our capacity to reason; they help us to build the rational faculty, to think clearly in the sphere of action, not memorize rules of conduct. And the way they do this, Aristotle suggests, is by living with us, by involving themselves in our activities, and by correcting our deliberative process when we go astray. By continually exercising our power of

128 To offer a modern example: Ontario's seat belt law forces Ontarians to achieve the mean between recklessness (driving without a seatbelt) and cowardice (not driving at all).

129 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Ten, 1180a 22 - 23.

deliberation and by heeding the advice and example of more experienced friends, we gain practical wisdom. "Friends help young men avoid error..."¹³⁰, explains Aristotle in his discussion of why we need friends; and he concludes that "... friends enhance our ability to think and to act."¹³¹ Concluding the second of his two books on friendship, he writes that good men who are friends "... become better as they are active together and correct one another: from the mould of the other each takes the imprint of the traits he likes..."¹³² That friends necessarily help us to develop courage is clear; precisely how the process works is less clear, but a rough outline can certainly be drawn. By providing such an outline, I do not prove that friends *must* help us to live courageously -- I proved that earlier. Rather, I make more plausible the claim that they *do* help us to live courageously.¹³³

130 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1155a 12.

131 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1155a 16.

132 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1172a 12 - 13. Admittedly, Aristotle is talking here about two good men who are friends, i.e., two people who already possess practical wisdom. But there may still be a useful point here: By following the corrections of a good man who is his friend, a man who has less practical wisdom may come to have more.

133 This is as good a place as any to raise an objection shown to me by Prof. M. DesLauriers of the McGill Philosophy Department. It goes as follows: You claim that true friends help one another to attain practical wisdom. But if the persons in question are true friends they are at least partially (morally) good and hence already possess practical wisdom. Can someone help you to get what you already have? Prof. DesLauriers points out that this is not merely a problem for my thesis but for Aristotle himself. One response is to argue that friends do what is good for one another but that need not mean they help one another to attain practical wisdom. (I respond to this criticism in footnote 88.) I think there is a problem here and I do not

claim to know its full resolution. But let me propose the following: If true friends do not help one another to progress from no practical wisdom to *some*, perhaps they can help one another to *increase* their wisdom from *some* to *more*. That is, by correcting one another, perhaps they can help each other to deliberate better, to become more proficient in assessing what is conducive to the median. And with this enhanced ability they may be more courageous, that is, better able to distinguish what ought to be feared from what ought not to be, and to act accordingly. I have written that friends help us to attain practical wisdom. It may be better to say that they help us to attain *more* practical wisdom. But even if the latter is true, they still help us to develop courage -- not to develop it from nothing, but to enhance the courage we may already have.

Chapter Three

I want now to discuss why friendship is a positive response to our feeling of *unheimlichkeit*. It must be remembered that friends cannot make this feeling completely disappear; they cannot eliminate it. As we have already seen, "The There is the most awesome and strange of beings because, open to Being, it is *constitutionally* es-tranged from the beings amid which it dwells..." (emphasis added)¹³⁴ That is, simply in virtue of being the creature we are -- a creature which is open to Being -- we are not-at-home among the non-Daseins with whom we live. Non-Daseins are *not* open to Being and this sets us apart from them, estranges us from them, in a radical way. Friends cannot change this: they cannot turn non-Daseins into beings which are fundamentally like us, nor, taking a different approach, can they help us to transcend beings to Being. Indeed, the latter suggestion is unhelpful because, as we have seen, in explicit anxiety Dasein is *already* transcending beings to Being. In one sense there is no problem here because, to the extent explicit anxiety entails this transcendence, Dasein is already at home. And yet, as we know, Dasein also feels *unheimlichkeit* in this situation, entailing as it does Dasein's participation in the very process -- revealing

¹³⁴ Richardson, *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967. p.275.

Being -- which marks it as different.

So what can friends do ? The answer I want to offer draws not so much on what they do as what they are. I shall argue that true friends are fundamentally the same as one another and that this works to offset the radical otherness of non-Daseins. I want to make both a philosophical and a psychological claim. First, it seems reasonable to argue that if the problem is that of profound otherness, a philosophical solution is profound sameness. Using Aristotle, I will argue that there exists (at least in theory) a strong partial identity between friends. Second, I will attempt to show that deep sameness between friends implies a deep knowledge of the partners' lives and hence a powerful ability to be helpful to one another when they feel *unheimlich*.¹³⁵ Friends' sameness, then, is both a theoretical and a practical response to *unheimlichkeit*.

But if the answer to our problem is sameness, the critic

¹³⁵ Strictly speaking, friends may not be able to help us precisely at the moment we feel *unheimlichkeit* in explicit anxiety. For in explicit anxiety, all *beings* are slipping away qua everyday beings and that means that our friends are slipping away too (for they are also beings). Friends may not be able to reach us when we are in this anxiety. So the comfort or help they show us may have to come just after or before explicit anxiety. Friends can help us through a period (say six months) during which we experience explicit anxiety from time to time; but that does not mean they can help us right at the moment of anxiety. One way they can help is by comforting us before *unheimlichkeit* strikes; they can soothe us and prepare us for it. In this way they address our problem, but not at the precise time it arises.

will object that friends are not the only beings that are fundamentally like us. Mere acquaintances -- provided they are human -- are also capable of transcending to Being, and if this process is Dasein's essence then a pair of acquaintances are the same in their essence. Why do I advocate friendship? My response is that, while acquaintances do have this crucial sameness, they have fewer fundamental samenesses than do true friends. Admittedly, a pair of good people who are acquaintances are alike (according to Aristotle) in their character, goals, and reasons for acting. And these are samenesses involving important aspects of a person's life. But true friends enjoy these too and, unlike acquaintances, are alike in doing good things, and feeling affection, for their respective other. Further, where true friends -- to the extent they are good -- will always be alike in character, ultimate goals and reasons for acting, a pair of acquaintances -- which might include a wicked and a good person -- might not be. I am arguing that any important sameness enjoyed by a pair of acquaintances would be enjoyed as well by true friends, and that the latter's deep samenesses are more numerous. Acquaintances have some ability to counter non-Daseins' otherness, but because they are less similar to us than friends are, they are less effective. They are closer than friends are to being strangers themselves, that is, part of the problem. And because we have fewer things in common with them, they have

a less profound knowledge of us, that is, they are less able to be helpful in the face of our existential suffering.¹³⁶ At both the theoretical and practical level, acquaintances are an inferior response to our problem.

In the following pages I will be illustrating the ways in which true friends are the same as one another. More specifically, I shall be describing their *fundamental* samenesses. This of course raises a question: What makes a sameness fundamental? Friends' agreement that a particular wine is pleasing would probably strike us as a fairly trivial sameness; their agreement on the goals of society would seem a fundamental one. But why this is the case is not immediately clear. I want to say that what makes a sameness fundamental is its occurrence in a fundamental aspect of the friends' lives, more precisely its occurrence with respect to something (eg., a good action) which stems from the partners' character. This implies that the importance of a sameness depends on the importance of the sphere in which it occurs. A sameness with respect to taste

136 Acquaintances do not, for example, do what is good for each other. (They do not, except accidentally, have a sameness here). But that implies they do not know, specifically, what is good for one another. They may know what is good for the other qua human being but not qua unique individual. They know the other needs food but not which food. They know (perhaps) that the other's happiness "is coextensive with study" (*Nic.Ethics*, Book Ten, 1178b 29) but they do not know the specific area that ought to be studied. And because they lack knowledge of our specificity, acquaintances have little ability to assure us that they know what we are experiencing.

in wine is not a fundamental one because it is merely a sameness with respect to bodily pleasure: the two drinkers are alike in getting pleasant sensations from the same drink. The friends' cooperation in a just cause, on the other hand, shows a sameness of action -- something which flows from their character -- and is thus a profound sameness. While Aristotle does not explicitly discuss the question of what constitutes a fundamental or profound sameness, the reasoning I am using to answer it is Aristotelian. Just as the highest virtue "is the virtue of the best part of us"¹³⁷ -- i.e., the ranking of a virtue depends on that which it is a virtue of -- so too the importance of a sameness depends upon the 'place' in which it occurs.

Now when I say that fundamental samenesses are ones involving character, I assume, of course, that one's character is fundamental to one. But this seems -- within the Aristotelian system -- to be an unproblematic assumption. Our character -- unlike our physical strength, for example -- is crucial to us because it so strongly influences whether we will be happy. External goods are certainly necessary,¹³⁸ but happiness or its absence depends primarily on the kind of person one is.

¹³⁷ *Nic.Ethics*, Book 10, 1177a 13. [All quotes from *Nic.Ethics* in this chapter are from the Ostwald translation unless otherwise marked.]

¹³⁸ *Nic.Ethics*, Book One, 1099a 31. "Still, happiness, as we have said, needs external goods as well."

I am tempted here to say that a fundamental sameness is one which involves the friends' essence. But this immediately raises a problem: Whose notion of human essence -- Aristotle's or Heidegger's -- should I use ? Heidegger's seems to be the one demanded as I used it earlier on. However it is simply not clear what samenesses friends would have with respect to transcending to Being, beside the basic one that they are both able to engage in the process. Would friends engage in the process in the same way ? Would they engage in it at the same time ? It is not clear how answers to these questions would be found. On the other hand, it is obviously inconsistent to adopt Aristotle's understanding of human essence here. The critic would say -- and rightly -- 'You must embrace either the German philosopher's or the Greek philosopher's notion of human essence, or show me that they are consistent one with the other'. I confess I cannot perform the latter operation and thus I continue to follow the notion offered by Heidegger. However because I think it is not terribly fruitful here, I am saying very little about any notion of human essence in this section. I want to say that a sameness is fundamental not because it involves our essence but because it occurs in a sphere which strongly influences our happiness. This allows me to offer an Aristotelian solution (the sameness of friends) to a Heideggerian problem (*unheimlichkeit*) without undermining my

Heideggerian assumptions.¹³⁹

Before I go to my main concerns, I want briefly to establish just how important is sameness to the *Ethics*' idea of friendship. That is, before I show the specific ways in which friends are alike, I want to demonstrate that sameness is not an incidental issue here; it is not a minor point to which I, for the purposes of a thesis, have given undue prominence. On the contrary, its importance is central and this fact is noted by Aristotle himself. "[E]very friendship," he tells us near the start of Book Eight, "is based on some good or on pleasure... and implies some similarity <between the friends>."¹⁴⁰ Granted, Aristotle speaks here of "similarity" while I have been using the term "sameness". But because the sameness I have in mind is clearly not *complete* sameness, is not sameness in every way, there is little difficulty. When Aristotle says friends are similar, he may simply mean that they are the same in some ways and thus, overall, are *partially* the same. But Aristotle puts the point forward more strongly: "Friendship is equality and *likeness*, and especially the likeness of those who are similar in virtue."¹⁴¹ (emphasis added) The Philosopher is perhaps imprecise in implying that friendship is only equality and likeness -- two stones could be, in

139 I realize that "fundamental" sometimes has "essential" as a synonym. But clearly I want to distinguish these two words here. When I use "fundamental" I have in mind synonyms like "profoundly important" or "of primary importance".

140 *Nic.Ethics*, Book Eight, 1156b 19 - 21.

141 *Ibid.* 1159b 2 - 3.

some sense, equal and alike -- but the basic point remains: There is no friendship without some sameness.¹⁴² Another way to make this point is to say, as Aristotle does, that "[f]riendship is present to the extent that men share something in common..."¹⁴³ Of course one might say, 'Granted friends share things; but where do you find sameness ?' My answer is that sameness is implied in the very notion of sharing or holding things in common. To say that friends share the ownership of a piece of land, for example, is to say that, with respect to the land they possess, they are alike. To say they share a notion of the good life is to say that, with respect to this issue, they have the same beliefs. So even if Aristotle does not explicitly say that friends are partially identical or in some ways the same, it seems he would not dispute this. And the forcefulness of his language here tells us that this component of friendship is crucial. Friendship does not merely involve sharing but requires sharing for its existence. "[F]riendship consists in community"¹⁴⁴ (emphasis added), Aristotle tells us; and that means that one's 'having things in common'¹⁴⁵ with the other person is at its

142 Notice that friendship is especially the likeness "of those who are similar in virtue." This suggests, of course, that the truest friendship is between good people. The point for me is that there is no mention here of *unqualified* goodness: True friends are alike (or similar) in virtue, but need not be wholly virtuous.

143 *Nic Ethics*, Book Eight, 1159b 29 - 30.

144 *Ibid.* 1159b 32.

145 Ostwald, in the glossary to his translation of *Nic. Ethics*, writes that "koinonia [community] is any kind of group whose members are held together by something they have

very heart. Ostwald notes that "for the Greek, it is the bond that gives different people something 'in common' that counts in *philia*..."¹⁴⁶ The corollary of all this is that where little or nothing is shared, friendship has little or no chance of developing. The relationship cannot form between humans and non-living things nor even between us and the animals: "... there can be neither friendship nor anything just in a relationship to inanimate objects. Nor can either exist with a horse or an ox, nor with a slave as slave, since the partners have nothing in common."¹⁴⁷

Aristotle overstates his case when he says they have *nothing* in common, but the basic point is clear enough. The differences between us and animals, and us and inanimate objects, are so profound it is as if we shared nothing. Modern arguments to the effect that humans and, for example,

'in common' with each other, i.e., by some kind of common bond." *Nic. Ethics*, p.309. If friendship consists in community, then clearly friendship entails, as a crucial ingredient, the presence of things (understood broadly) common to the partners. And things held in common are samenesses (or, in some cases, *imply* samenesses).

146 Martin Ostwald, *Nic. Ethics*, p. 214, Note 1.

147 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1161b 1 - 3. Another reason we cannot befriend inanimate objects is that they could not reciprocate the affection we would show them. As Aristotle says elsewhere: "... we do not speak of 'friendship' to describe the affection we feel for inanimate objects, since inanimate objects do not reciprocate affection and we do not wish for their good." *Nic. Ethics* Book Eight, 1155b 28 - 29. Reciprocal good will is, of course, a necessary ingredient of friendship. (See *Nic. Ethics* Book Eight, 1156a 3.) When Aristotle says friendship with a slave as slave is impossible he seems to mean that a free person cannot befriend him, and this is because of their profound differences. Aristotle does not say friendship with *all* animals is impossible; he speaks only of horses and oxen. But I assume he has in mind the entire animal kingdom.

dolphins have important similarities are irrelevant. The point is that, to Aristotle's thinking, the similarities are negligible or non-existent and for this reason friendship is impossible, or nearly so.

The same reasoning is present in Aristotle's discussion of friendship within the various political systems. Friendship plays a small role in tyrannies but a much larger one in democracies. His argument focuses on the relationship between ruler and ruled and asserts that in the former constitutions the parties have little in common, whereas in the latter much is shared. Aristotle is not saying that the tyrant's subjects cannot be friends with one another, but rather that they can have no friendship -- or only an insignificant one -- with the tyrant himself. The reason for this, of course, is that ruler and ruled are importantly different: They are never the same person, nor do they even have the same interest; the tyrant is concerned only with his good, the people only with theirs.¹⁴⁸ On the other hand, just as a slave and his master possess the most

148 In the *Politics*, Aristotle describes the most extreme tyrant as one "who rules over subjects all equal or superior to himself to suit his own interest and not theirs..." (*Politics*, Book Four, 1295a 20 - 22). This supports my point about different interests but suggests there can also be an important sameness: The subjects can be (in some sense) equal to the tyrant. How this squares with Aristotle's point in the *Nic. Ethics* (Book Eight, 1161a 32 - 33) that "in a tyranny, friendship has little or no place" -- i.e., there is little held in common -- is not completely clear. Perhaps Aristotle's point is that, in general, the tyrant is not (in important ways) equal to his subjects; in any event he is clearly politically superior.

modest sameness -- they are both human beings -- so too do tyrant and subject. And because of this Aristotle is careful here not to rule out friendship completely:

"...friendship and the just can play a small part even in tyrannies."¹⁴⁹ H.H. Joachim sums up the point excellently when he writes that "... in so far as slave and master are both men, there is something in common... outside the special relationship, and therefore some slight abstract possibility of justice and friendship."¹⁵⁰

In democracies the situation is quite different. Here friendship plays a larger part "since where the citizens are equal, they have many things in common."¹⁵¹ This passage offers something of a simplification -- for in at least some of the democracies Aristotle describes only members of the lower class, and not the nobility, rule, which implies inequality among citizens¹⁵² -- but it still makes the point. In a democracy there is more friendship than in a tyranny because (among other reasons) there is greater homogeneity. But let us be clear on what Aristotle is

149 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1161b 9.

150 H.H. Joachim, *Aristotle The Nicomachean Ethics: A Commentary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1951. p.252.

151 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1161b 10 - 11.

152 "A democracy exists whenever those who are free and are not well-off, being in the majority, are in sovereign control of government..." (*Politics*, Book Four, 1290b 15) (emphasis added) And he says elsewhere: "...when the poor rule, that is democracy." (*Politics* Book Three, 1280a 4) It may be more precise to say that there is, in democracy, inequality between the classes: the poor as a whole are politically superior to the rich.

saying. He is not necessarily saying that the masses in a democracy are more homogeneous than the masses in a tyranny. For among themselves the latter could have important samenesses,¹⁵³ perhaps most significant of which is their political equality: they are alike in all being powerless. Rather, his point seems to be that in democracies there is greater homogeneity between ruler and ruled. In a tyranny these parties differ with respect to their objectives and interests; in a democracy they largely coincide. In a democracy the rulers are either the poor citizens as a whole, or certain members of this class. And the ruled are also, for the most part, the poor; for this class comprises the majority of the total population. Clearly, some of the ruled will be wealthy, but because the latter are few in number, the goals of leader and follower will, in general, be consonant. So when Aristotle says friendship plays a larger role in democracies than in tyrannies, he seems to mean that the former offer greater possibilities for friendship between ruler and ruled, and this because here ruler and ruled are typically from the same class (with all the similarities that entails) and can even be the same

153 Aristotle tells us that the most extreme tyrant can rule over "subjects all equal or superior to himself..." (Politics, Book Four 1295a 20 - 21) This suggests that the tyrant can (in some sense, but not politically) be equal to his subjects. But it also suggests -- and this is my point -- that the subjects can all (in some sense) be equal to one another. For if they can all be equal to the tyrant, they can all be equal to one another (provided, of course, that we mean equal in the same sense in both cases.) So important samenesses -- equality implies sameness, here - can also exist among the masses living under tyranny.

person. I am really making two points, then. Sameness is a crucial ingredient in friendship, and the more there is of the former the more likely is the latter's existence.¹⁵⁴

Another way to demonstrate the importance of likeness is to examine Aristotle's claim -- already made in passing -- that friendship is equality. This proposition can have at least two meanings: It can mean that friends give one another the *same amount* of goods (material goods, good wishes, affection, etc.) or that they give one another goods based on the partner's desert. When friends follow the first scheme they observe strict equality, when they follow the second they observe "equality proportionate to merit."¹⁵⁵ In the former -- which holds between persons of equal rank -- there is a one-to-one relation between donation and receipt: The friends give and receive exactly the same thing or something of the same worth. In the latter -- which holds between unequals -- the superior¹⁵⁶ partner receives more goods, the inferior fewer. And the receipt of goods is proportionate to merit: A friend who is

154 These two are not the same point: To say that eggs are crucial in a cake (i.e., you cannot bake a cake without them) is not to say that the more eggs you put in, the more likely you are to get a cake.

155 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1158b 32.

156 What exactly makes the partner superior is not clear here. In talking of friendships between unequals, Aristotle has in mind, for example, the friendship of father and son and (unfortunately) husband and wife. As a rough and ready explanation we can say that the superior partner is, in some sense, "better and more useful." *Nic. Ethics* Book Eight, 1158b 25.

three times as virtuous -- if such a quantification is possible -- should receive three times as much. "In all friendships which involve the superiority of one of the partners," writes Aristotle, "the affection, too, must be proportionate: the better and more useful partner should receive more affection than he gives..."¹⁵⁷ Now in the present context, says Aristotle, "... the quantitative meaning <of strict equality> is primary and the sense of equality proportionate to merit is secondary."¹⁵⁸ It is not completely clear what Aristotle has in mind when he speaks of a primary and a secondary meaning of equality. But the interpretation I am venturing argues that he is here confirming the importance of similarity in the development of friendship. In calling strict equality -- the one which involves the greater amount of sameness -- the *primary* one, he implies that the higher the level of identity the more likely we are to find *philia*. One might argue, of course, that strict equality is primary in friendship -- i.e. more conducive to it -- not because it implies more *sameness*, but because it implies a truer equality. My response is that, in this case, a truer equality entails a greater sameness. Friends who follow the truer (i.e. one to one) equality have samenesses which those who follow proportionate

157 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1158b 23 - 26.

158 *Ibid.* 1158b 31 - 32. The "present context" means with respect to friendship; Aristotle is here comparing justice with friendship, and tells us that, in the case of justice, the primary meaning of equality is proportionate equality and the secondary is strict equality.

equality do not have. For example, they are alike in what they owe and give one another. [And I assume that any important sameness enjoyed by the proportionate equals would be enjoyed also by the truer equals.] When Aristotle suggests that greater equality means a greater chance of friendship, he implies also that greater sameness has this meaning.

Now if sameness and equality are so crucial in friendship -- "...if there is a wide disparity between the partners as regards their virtue, vice, wealth, or anything else... they are no longer friends or even expect to be friends."¹⁵⁹ -- the critic may ask how there can be friendship between unequals. The answer is implicit in what I have already said. First, it must be remembered that unequals -- for example, parents and children -- are not unequal in every way. They might be equal, say, in the amount of virtue they possess; a child could never attain the virtue proper to an adult but could have as much 'childish' virtue as his parent has grown-up virtue. But the more interesting point -- and the one I have touched on -- is that between unequals there can exist an equality, namely proportionate equality in giving and receiving. It is clearly an inferior equality and yet, as an equality nevertheless, it makes friendship possible: "... when the affection is proportionate to the merit of each partner, there is in some sense equality

¹⁵⁹ Nic. Ethics, Book Eight, 1158b 32 - 34.

between them. And equality, as we have seen, seems to be part of friendship."¹⁶⁰ (emphasis added) So unequals can be friends because they enjoy a sort of equality and they are not, in fact, without samenesses. They are not alike in what they owe one another, but they are alike in, for example, being obliged to use the same basis of distribution for their goods: Each should give things to the other based on the other's merit.¹⁶¹

I want now to illustrate the specific ways in which true friends are alike. To begin, we can say -- and I touched on this earlier -- that they both give affection. The amount given by each partner may differ¹⁶², but each partner must give at least some. The "giving of affection seems to constitute the proper virtue of friends, so that people who give affection to one another according to each other's merit are lasting friends..."¹⁶³ (emphasis added) Of course if the friends are alike in giving affection, they should be alike in receiving it. Aristotle reserves a lower position

160 *Ibid.* 1158b 27 - 29.

161 Whether they in fact *do* give out goods -- eg., their affection -- on this basis is an empirical question. The point is that, according to Aristotle, they *should* operate this way.

162 Even in the case of true friendship --i.e. the friendship I am concerned with -- there can be a disparity in the amount of affection given by each partner. For though each is at least partially good, it does not follow that they are *equally* good. And if one is superior in virtue, he should receive more affection. The sameness lies in the fact that affection is given by both, not in the amount of affection.

163 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1159a 35 - 37.

for the receipt of affection -- "friendship appears to consist in giving rather than in receiving affection"¹⁶⁴ -- but it is still something both parties enjoy. Friendship does not consist in it, but it is there nevertheless. Let me qualify that. It is possible (argues Aristotle) for friendship to exist where affection is not received by one of the partners. Aristotle gives the example of a mother who gives away her child in order that it be raised by others.¹⁶⁵ The child grows up not knowing who its mother is and hence, while the child can receive affection from the parent, the parent cannot receive affection from the child. This is a friendship in which one of the partners does not receive affection, and hence friendship is possible without both partners receiving it. But we have to ask some questions: Aristotle's suggestion notwithstanding, is the relationship he describes really a friendship? Friendship entails an awareness of mutual good will¹⁶⁶, yet it is difficult to see how this requirement would be fulfilled here. How could the child be aware of the mother's good will, if the child does not know her? And even if this problem were resolved, it would be difficult to see how the friendship could be a true friendship. For if the child does not know who its mother is, how could it befriend her precisely for her goodness? Aristotle's example, then,

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 1159a 27 - 28.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 1159a 28 - 33.

¹⁶⁶ To be friends, "men must have good will for one another... and must each be aware of one another's good will." (Nic. Ethics, Book Eight, 1156a 4 - 5)

does very little to show that friendship -- and much less true friendship -- could exist with only one partner receiving affection.¹⁶⁷ My rebuttal of Aristotle's point does not, of course, prove that both friends receive affection. But it does add some weight to my claim. And is the claim really controversial? The only reason the mother in Aristotle's example does not receive affection is because the child cannot give it.¹⁶⁸ But where -- as in the case of true friends -- both partners give affection, it is reasonable to assume they both receive it.¹⁶⁹ And because the giving and receiving of affection stems from the friends' character -- i.e. they feel mutual affection because each finds the other to be a good person -- the sameness here is a fundamental one.

True friends are also alike in feeling a sense of

167 Admittedly, Aristotle's aim here is not to show that friendship can exist even if one partner receives no affection, but rather to show that friendship does not consist in receiving affection. But the way he attempts to prove the latter is by trying to show that friendship can exist even if one partner does not receive affection.

168 "It seems to be sufficient for [mothers who give away their children] to see their children prosper and to feel affection for them, even if the children do not render their mother her due, because they do not know her." (emphasis added) *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1159a 30 -33) This suggests that the children cannot give their mother affection because they do not know who she is.

169 This sameness -- both partners give and receive affection -- is of course a sameness which is not enjoyed in the relationship of acquaintances. Affection, Aristotle says, is always accompanied by intensity and desire; and affection involves familiarity. Having these connotations, affection seems not to be something that is shared by mere acquaintances. (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1166b 33 - 34)

security. This point has at least two parts: The friends are confident the relationship will last, and they are confident they will not be betrayed by one another. To understand why the first part is true, we have to remember Aristotle's claim that "goodness or virtue is a thing that lasts."¹⁷⁰ This proposition seems to be true by definition: The friends' virtues are characteristics¹⁷¹ and, as Ostwald explains, that means they are "firmly fixed possession[s] of the mind, established by repeated and habitual action. Once attained... [they are] ever present, at least in a potential form."¹⁷² But if the basis of the friendship is long-lasting -- i.e. the friends' virtue is permanent, or nearly so -- then likewise the friendship is long-lasting. For friendship, writes Geoffrey Percival, "lasts as long as its motive..."¹⁷³ Because the reason or motive for being friends is continuously present, so too is the relationship.

The lower order friendships, by contrast, tend not to be permanent. These friendships are based not on what the partners are -- which never really changes -- but on what they offer: some pleasure or advantage. When these are no

170 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1156b 12.

171 *Nic. Ethics* Book Two, 1106a 11 - 12. "Thus, if the virtues are neither emotions nor capacities, the only remaining alternative is that they are characteristics."

172 Ostwald, glossary to his translation of the *Nic. Ethics*, pp. 308 - 309.

173 Geoffrey Percival, *Aristotle on Friendship*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1940. p. 16. I use the phrases "reason for the friendship", "motive for the friendship" and "basis of the friendship" interchangeably.

longer provided -- and this is bound to happen sooner or later¹⁷⁴ -- the friendship ceases. It was not based on the friends' characteristics¹⁷⁵ but on their "accidental qualities." Writes Percival: "This 'accidental' quality explains why these two [lower] types of friendship are lacking in the permanence which is universally regarded as desirable in friendship."¹⁷⁶ Of course from the fact that true friendship is long-lived it does not necessarily follow that friends are confident of this fact. It is possible they do not understand the nature of the friendship and thus worry that it may soon be terminated. This is an important objection. Perhaps we can say, though, that because the friends are virtuous they know something about the nature of the virtues, including the fact they are 'firmly fixed possessions.' This knowledge, combined with the knowledge

174 Aristotle points out: "Now, usefulness is not something permanent, but differs at different times." (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1156a 21 - 22) In other words, if usefulness is the basis of the friendship the friendship is precarious. For a person who is useful to me today may be of little or no use to me tomorrow when, for example, my needs are quite different. And "with the disappearance of the motive for being friends, the friendship, too, is dissolved, since the friendship owed its existence to these motives." (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1156a 22 - 23) The situation with friendships based on pleasure is similar: When young people, for example, "advance in years, different things come to be pleasant for them." (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1156a 34)

175 I suggest here that true friendship is based on the friends' characteristics, while earlier I suggest it is based on what they are. The point is that, in this situation, the friends' characteristics are part of what they are: Being good is what a good person is. Writes Aristotle: "...good men will be friends on the basis of what they are, that is, because they are good." (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1157b 2 - 3)

176 Percival, Aristotle on Friendship, p. 12.

(which one assumes the partners have) that virtue is the basis of their friendship, and that friendships last as long as their bases do, would result in the conviction that the relationship will be longstanding.

Aristotle also tells us that "[t]he friendship of good men implies mutual trust, the assurance that neither partner will ever wrong the other..."¹⁷⁷ The friends may experience insecurity in other aspects of their lives, but within the friendship they do not fear betrayal or mistreatment. And the principal reason for this is their knowledge that acting properly on a continuing basis is in virtuous persons' very nature. Aristotle employs the general assumption that the determinate and the constant belong "to the nature of the good."¹⁷⁸ This means that these qualities are found in good people: The virtuous stay what they are.¹⁷⁹ But that implies that true friends avoid mistreating one another both now and in the future. Thus, when one is a true friend, one is dependable. Writes Aristotle: Because virtuous persons "are steadfast in themselves, they are also steadfast toward one another; they neither request nor render any service that is base."¹⁸⁰ From the fact that each partner remains the good person he

177 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1157a 22 - 23.

178 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1170a 21. "...what is determinate belongs to the nature of the good."

179 "Bad people, on the other hand, do not have the element of constancy..." *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1159b 7 - 8.

180 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1159b 4 - 5.

is, it follows that he continues to treat his friend properly.¹⁸¹ And again, because the friends' sense of security stems from their goodness, the sameness here (i.e. both feel secure) is a fundamental one.

One might object, of course, that security is enjoyed only in friendships between the wholly good. Only these, it might be argued, can be counted on one hundred percent of the time. My response is that Aristotle is not completely clear on this point. He tells us that the partners never wrong one another when the friendship is between "good men"¹⁸², but whether these are utterly good or only partially so is not stated. But even if the security partly good persons experience in the relationship is imperfect, it is a security nevertheless. And this is in sharp contrast with the lower friendships where "there is no safeguard against slander and lack of trust."¹⁸³

True friends are also alike in having good will.¹⁸⁴ One might think this is the same as feeling affection, but Aristotle makes an explicit distinction: "... good will is not even affection: it lacks intensity and desire, the

181 Again, I am arguing not only that true friends will continue to treat each other properly, but that the partners know this, and hence feel secure within the relationship.

182 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1157a 22 - 23.

183 *Ibid.* 1157a 24 - 25.

184 Admittedly, this sameness could also be enjoyed by good persons who were acquaintances. But my overall argument does not maintain that acquaintances have no fundamental samenesses, only that they have fewer than true friends do.

qualities which <always> accompany affection."¹⁸⁵ The friends are alike in feeling good will for their respective other, and in having good will for themselves. A good man "wishes for and does what is good for himself..."¹⁸⁶ Now if this common offering of good will is to be a *fundamental* sameness, the offering must flow from the partners' good character. And clearly it does. Friends "wish for the good of the other [i.e. feel good will toward the other]," explains Aristotle, "on the basis of one of the three motives mentioned..."¹⁸⁷ That means I feel good will toward someone when he possesses or offers something worthy of good will, when he shows himself to be useful¹⁸⁸, pleasant or good. But in the case of true friends, of course, good will develops because of the last of these.

Referring to virtuous people, Aristotle writes: "In

185 *Nic. Ethics* Book Nine, 1166b 33 - 34.

186 *Ibid.* 1166a 14 - 15.

187 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1156a 3 - 5. The identification of "wish for the good of the other" with "feel good will toward the other" is my own. The phrases seem interchangeable because at least once Percival (p. 10) uses "wish one another well" where Ostwald writes "have good will for one another." (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1156a 3)

188 Whether usefulness or pleasantness would engender good will is not completely clear. Aristotle does say that friends "must each wish for the good of the other on the basis of one of the three motives mentioned." (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1156a 3 - 5) (emphasis added), suggesting that any of the three would be sufficient to call forth good will. On the other hand, he writes later that "what is useful or... what is pleasant... are not the basis of good will." (*Nic. Ethics* Book Nine, 1167a 11 - 13) [The argument is that when we befriend someone for his usefulness or the pleasure he brings we do not wish for his good, we wish only for our own -- indeed, that is why we embarked on the relationship.] But whether or not the useful and the pleasant can bring forth good will, the presence of virtue clearly can. And that is all I need to maintain here.

general, some sort of excellence and moral goodness are the basis on which good will arises..."¹⁸⁹ Percival, in his translation of *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Nine, has Aristotle putting the matter even more clearly: "Generally speaking... it is virtue... that calls goodwill into being."¹⁹⁰ Thus, because true friends find goodness in themselves and in their partner, they show good will to themselves and to their partner.¹⁹¹

Because true friends have good will for one another they wish each other to possess what is good. Particularly important among good 'things' is life itself. "We count as a friend", explains Aristotle, "... a person who wishes for the existence and life of his friend for the friends's sake."¹⁹² So from the fact that true friends feel mutual good will it follows that they are alike in wishing that their respective other be alive. And clearly they have this wish not because , as a living being, the friend can serve them but simply because the friend is (at least partially) a good person. Aristotle argues that friends have this wish for the friend's sake, but that really amounts to what I have just said. To wish for someone's existence for his own

189 *Nic. Ethics* Book Nine 1167a 18 - 19.

190 Percival, *Aristotle on Friendship*, p. 114. The passage is *Nic. Ethics* Book Nine, 1167a 18 - 21.

191 Let me make it quite clear that when I say the offering of good will flows from the partners' good character, I do not mean that I show good will to my friend because I am good. My good will toward him stems from his goodness (which I perceive in him).

192 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1166a 2 - 5.

sake is to wish for it simply because he is the person he is¹⁹³, and in the case of true friends that means because he is good.¹⁹⁴ The sameness here is with respect to a wish which follows from the partners' character -- because each finds virtue in the other, each has good will for the other and that implies that each wishes for the other's existence -- and thus the sameness is a fundamental one.

But we must step back for a moment. Let us examine the claim that life is a good thing. Aristotle writes: "Life is one of the things which are good and pleasant in

193 As Aristotle explains: "Those who wish for their friends' good for their friends' sake are friends in the truest sense, since their attitude is determined by what their friends are and not by incidental considerations." (*Nic. Ethics* Book Eight, 1156b 9 - 11). (emphasis added) On the other hand, if I wish for my friend's good for my sake, I wish for his good not because of what he is, but because of what he does for me. I want him to exist, for example, because his existence gives me pleasure or some advantage.

194 Cooper says at one point: "It is because his friend is just what he essentially is, a human being, that a character-friend wishes him well..." (emphasis added) ("*Aristotle on Friendship*" in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*. p. 312.) How does this square with the claim that true friends (or character-friends) have good will because they find each other to be good? If we move to the Aristotelian notion of human essence (and away from Heidegger's) for a moment, the answer can be given. Cooper wants to say that, for Aristotle, one realizes oneself as a human being by possessing the virtues. Hence, the person who is most fully human is the one who is most virtuous. Writes Cooper: "But on Aristotle's theory of moral virtue the virtues are essential properties of humankind: a person realizes more or less fully his human nature according as he possesses more or less fully those properties of character which count as moral excellence." (Cooper, p. 312) Thus there is no inconsistency in saying that a true friend bears good will toward his partner because the partner is a human being and because the partner is good; being a human being, in the full sense of the word, implies being (at least morally) good.

themselves, since it is determinate and what is determinate belongs to the nature of the good."¹⁹⁵ Though this passage might suggest that any life is good, clearly that is not Aristotle's belief. What is good is determinacy (order, the mastery of reason), and it is a life lived in line with this that is good and pleasant. Aristotle states explicitly that in our discussions of this matter "we must not take 'life' to be a wicked and corrupt existence, nor a life spent in pain..."¹⁹⁶ And what is his argument here? Precisely that "such an existence is as indeterminate as its foundations, <vice and pain,> are."¹⁹⁷ Life per se, then, is not good¹⁹⁸; but the life of a virtuous person is, and thus true friends are alike in wishing that their respective other possess this.

Aristotle suggests another sameness when he says that "... the actions of good men are identical with or similar to one another."¹⁹⁹ This is a significant point but one that needs some clarification. First, we need to realize that the acts need not be -- and indeed cannot be -- alike in every way. They are, after all, done by different people.

195 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1170a 19 - 21.

196 *Ibid.* 1170a 23.

197 *Ibid.* 1170a 23 - 24.

198 Percival clears up this matter somewhat when he explains that Aristotle's statement -- "Life belongs to the class of things that are good and pleasant in themselves..." (*Nic. Ethics* Book Nine, 1170a 19 - 20) -- really means that life is "good and pleasant to the good man..." (The latter quote is from Geoffrey Percival, *Aristotle on Friendship*, p.137.)

199 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1156b 16 - 17.

The Percival translation throws some light on the matter when it says that "the actions of one good man are the same, or of the same type, as those of another..."²⁰⁰

Aristotle's point seems to be that the acts of true friends are of the same kind. True friends, to the extent that they are both good people, are alike in doing good acts. Writes Aristotle: "... the mark of a good man is to work hard to achieve the good..."²⁰¹ Being a virtuous person entails doing acts of this sort. And thus the sameness here is a fundamental one: It is with respect to something (the act's type) which stems from the friends' character.

Also important to realize is the fact that the persons in question are of only limited virtue. As such, they perform a mixture of virtuous and wrongful acts. At any given point, one member of a pair of friends may be doing acts different in nature from those done by his partner. At these times the friends clearly do not perform acts alike in character. Putting the pieces together, we can say that true friends perform acts of the same nature on at least

200 Percival, *Aristotle on Friendship*, p. 16.

201 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1166a 15 - 16. Sometimes, to be sure, the friends' acts will be alike not merely in character (i.e., both are good acts) but in other ways as well. When, for example, both friends work to stop an unjust war their activities are the same not only because the acts are just, but also (let us say) because they are done in the same city. But my point is that the *fundamental* sameness -- the sameness with respect to something flowing from the friends' character -- is the sameness of the acts' nature or kind. That they do acts just in nature flows from the fact they are good people; that they do acts in a particular city does not flow from their character.

some occasions.

Now when I say that true friends' acts are sometimes of the same nature, I do not simply mean they are alike in hitting the median; I also mean they are born of the same motivation. To the extent that the friends act virtuously, they do what they do because it is noble. Not personal profit but a desire to instantiate the good is what moves them. "[A]n act is not performed justly or with self-control if the act itself is of a certain kind, but only if in addition the agent has certain characteristics as he performs it:... he must choose to act the way he does, and he must choose it for its own sake..."²⁰² In other words, if one wants to act virtuously, simply attaining the mean, simply performing an act "of a certain kind" is not enough. To steer between fear and confidence in order to impress others, for example, is not to act virtuously. Acting virtuously entails attaining the mean for the proper reason²⁰³, namely for its own sake or -- to put the same point in different words -- because attaining the mean is right. "[C]ourageous action ought to be motivated not by compulsion, but by the fact that it is noble."²⁰⁴

202 *Nic. Ethics* Book Two, 1105a 29 - 33.

203 My point here is that friends, when they act virtuously, share a motivation. But I also say that in this situation friends act *for the same reason*. It seems to me that these amount to the same, or nearly the same, thing. The motivation in acting is to instantiate the good, and this is also the reason for acting.

204 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Three, 1116b 1 - 2.

Now to show that the sameness with respect to motivation is fundamental, I need to show that the motivation flows from -- or is entailed in -- the friends' good character. Aristotle's discussion of the courageous man will allow me to do this. This man, he explains, "will fear what is fearful; but he will endure it in the right way and as reason directs for the sake of acting nobly: that is the end of virtue."²⁰⁵ (emphasis added) This passage suggests that acting nobly for the sake of acting nobly is what virtue -- and by extension the virtuous person -- is all about. In other words, part of what we mean when we say a person is virtuous is that she is motivated by a desire to do things because they are noble.²⁰⁶ Thus, true friends' motivation -- at least when they act virtuously -- follows from the kind of people they are.

One might launch the following objection here: You quote Aristotle as saying that true friends, to the extent they are acting virtuously, perform their deeds for the sake of acting nobly. But Aristotle also tells us that a good man -- and he could be a true friend -- "does what is good for himself and what appears good to him... and he does so for

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 1115b 12 - 14.

²⁰⁶ I mean, of course, that the virtuous person has this motivation when she is acting virtuously. Because the persons in question are not wholly virtuous, they may occasionally perform vicious acts. And at these times they have other motivations.

his own sake, for he does it for the sake of the intellectual part of himself, which of course is thought to constitute what each person really is."²⁰⁷ (emphasis added) Here it seems the true friend's action is not done for the sake of acting nobly but rather for the friend's own sake. Is Aristotle saying that true friends (when they do virtuous acts) can have either of two kinds of motivation -- one altruistic, one self-interested? I think not. For when each partner treats himself well for his own sake, he is doing so for the sake of what is intellectual in him. The argument is that the intellect is one's true self; therefore if one is really to do something for one's sake, one must do it for one's intellect. Now Percival reminds us that the intellectual part of a person "is the part which directs his actions to the attainment of what is good..."²⁰⁸ Thus, when one truly acts for one's own sake, one is acting for the sake of that which makes one virtuous. One's hope is to follow and strengthen this faculty. In other words, acting for one's own sake really entails acting only with a desire to further the good.²⁰⁹ But is this not essentially the motivation I attributed to virtuous persons earlier, namely

207 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1166a 14 - 17. Though I quote a passage with an implicit reference to Aristotle's notion of human essence, I do not mean to embrace this notion. I am simply trying to illuminate Aristotle's theory of virtuous persons' motivation.

208 Geoffrey Percival, *Aristotle on Friendship*, p. 107.

209 Acting for the sake of the appetites, on the other hand --i.e., with the desire of gratifying them -- would not be acting with a desire to further the good, for the appetitive part of the soul does not lead us to the good.

that they commit acts because the acts are noble ? When we unpack Aristotle's claim that, in doing good to themselves, good people act for their own sake, we see it is consonant with some of his other remarks about virtuous persons' motivation.

Another aspect of the claim that true friends' acts are alike in nature is the fact the acts share an overall political end. Earlier I said the acts are done in order to instantiate the median; now we have to see what that finally means. Good men, explains Aristotle, "wish for what is just and what is in the common interest, and these are their common goals."²¹⁰ That is, good persons want , ultimately, to build a morally good community. As we see in the *Politics*, their goal is to realize the objectives not of any particular group but of society as a whole. "The correct kinds [of constitution] aim at the common interest: kingship, aristocracy, 'polity';" writes Trevor J. Saunders, "the three others aim at the sectional interest of the rulers: tyranny, oligarchy, democracy."²¹¹ Joachim, in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* explains that "In friendship, as Aristotle conceives it, the agent enjoys the consciousness of the realization of his self... a self at one with other agents in so far as all are working for the

²¹⁰ *Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1167b 8 - 9.

²¹¹ Trevor J. Saunders, in his notes on Aristotle's *The Politics* (T.A.Sinclair, Translator) Harmondworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1981. p. 189.

same end..."²¹² And he adds: "The moral order, the morally good life of a community, the well-being of a society of fellow workers -- this (its achievement and maintenance) is the common end or work."²¹³ Joachim does not say explicitly that the friends in question must be true friends but he does imply that they are at least partially good. For if they were not they could hardly be expected to work for a good society. Granted this, we can ask what the sameness in their telos is due to. And here Joachim offers quite an exciting explanation: *Nous* (intellect) is that "in virtue of which men desire a common good: i.e. *Nous* is that in us which unites us in common interests and ideals..."²¹⁴ So if true friends are alike in wanting to produce a virtuous community, it is somehow because of their intellect. But surely we can be more specific. Joachim seems to be saying what Percival said earlier: The intellect leads us to do good actions. [We recall that, for Aristotle, "there is no virtue without wisdom."²¹⁵] If a pair of friends strive not simply for the same thing but for something good, it is

212 H.H. Joachim, *Aristotle The Nicomachean Ethics, A Commentary*, (D.A. Rees, Editor), London: Oxford University Press. 1951. p.242. None of this is to deny that between friends there are also important differences, as Joachim points out. The common work which friends do "requires for its achievement the co-operation of different agents, and is common and the same not as excluding differences but precisely as concrete of differences." (Joachim, p. 242)

But this does not harm my argument; I need only claim here that sameness is crucial, not that difference is absent.

213 Joachim, *Aristotle The Nicomachean Ethics, A Commentary*, p. 242. [Hereafter: Joachim, *A Commentary*.]

214 *Ibid.* p. 256. I have transposed the Greek term *Nous* into English letters.

215 *Nic. Ethics* Book Six, 1144b 20.

due to the fact they both obey the intellect. The virtuous person, "the man of strong character -- the self-controlled man -- is the man whose intellect (*Nous*) governs his passions..."²¹⁶, states Joachim. I have not attempted here to explain why the community interest ought to be put before any sectional interest. I have simply assumed it. But once we grant this, we know the final end of true friends' work.²¹⁷ And the sameness in their *telos*²¹⁸ is derived from the fact that they have, as it were, the same master.²¹⁹

But true friends' similarities are not limited to the sphere of things august. Friends, as Aristotle makes clear, are also alike in what they enjoy. The Philosopher's argument for this claim is not difficult to follow: "[N]othing characterizes friends as much as living in each other's company... But it is impossible for men to spend their time together unless they are pleasant <in one another's eyes> and find joy in the same things. It is this

216 Joachim, *A Commentary*, p. 256.

217 But is not our final goal *personal* happiness? For Aristotle the final goal must be a morally good *community* but the latter entails happiness for individuals: "[I]f all men were to compete for what is noble and put all their efforts into the performance of the noblest actions, all the needs of the community will have been met, and each individual will have the greatest of goods, since that is what virtue is." (*Nic. Ethics* Book Nine, 1169a 8 - 10)

218 That this sameness is *fundamental* is not difficult to see: It is with respect to something (i.e., to their *telos*) which is entailed in their character. It is in the nature of good people, of people who obey their intellect, to have as the final goal of their action a morally good society.

219 The intellect is their master, of course, only to the extent that they act virtuously.

quality which seems typical of comradeship."²²⁰ The reasoning is that fundamental to friendship is the partners' frequent interaction, is their practice of living together²²¹ : "since a man's perception that he exists is desirable, his perception of his friend's existence is desirable, too. But only by living together can the perception of a friend's existence be activated..."²²² The assumption is that, because friends want to live together, given the opportunity they will. Now if living together is to be possible (at least in the long term), the friends must derive some pleasure from their meetings.²²³ ["... no one can spend his days in painful or unpleasant company..."²²⁴] The partners must find one another pleasant -- which, being good people they do -- and engage in activities they both find rewarding. If they had very different notions of what is enjoyable, they would find it difficult to spend time

220 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1157b 18 - 24. Pat Easterling says that "comrade" (*hetairos*) can also be understood as "friend". "Friendship and the Greeks" in *The Dialectics of Friendship* (Roy Porter and Sylvana Tomaselli, Editors), London and New York: Routledge. 1989. p.15.

221 Whether this entails inhabiting the same dwelling or merely residing in the same community is not clear.

222 *Nic. Ethics* Book Nine, 1171b 33 - 35. Aristotle's claim -- that "since a man's perception that he exists is desirable, his perception of his friend's existence is desirable, too" -- needs some explanation. The hidden premise is that true friends are "another self" to one another. (Book Nine, 1166a 32) This implies that each true friend "has the same attitude toward his friend as he does toward himself..." (Book Nine, 1166a 31 - 32) Because each friend finds the perception of his own existence desirable, he finds the perception of his partner's existence desirable as well.

223 But pleasure is not, of course, the basis of true friends' relationship.

224 *Nic. Ethics* Book Eight, 1157b 15 - 16.

together. Because friendship involves lives intertwining, it involves the things which make intertwining possible.

But in what sphere does this sameness operate ? Must friends enjoy the same paintings and foods, the same music and books ? Or does Aristotle mean that friends are alike in the kinds of actions they enjoy ? With respect to the former, he is not completely clear. Living together can involve eating together so there can be at least some overlap in the matter of cuisine. Anthony Kenny in *The Aristotelian Ethics* stresses that friends' sharing does not occur solely in the elevated realm: "So we must study together and feast together and share the best things in life so far as we can attain them."²²⁵ "Feast together" suggests the common enjoyment of a meal, but whether friends typically have the same tastes in music and art is difficult to say. Persons might well be able to spend their lives together, aesthetic disagreements notwithstanding. When Aristotle says that friends "find joy in the same things" he need not mean that their sets of things enjoyed are identical. On the other hand, the differences cannot be so great as to make living together impossible ²²⁶

²²⁵ Anthony Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1978. p. 229.

²²⁶ If, in a pair of friends, "one partner were to remain mentally a child, while the other has grown to be a man in the best sense of the word, how could they still be friends, when they neither like nor feel joy and pain at the same things? They will not even have the same tastes in regard to one another, and without that, as we saw, it is impossible to be friends, since they cannot live together."

But even if friends do have numerous similarities with respect to taste, these are not of fundamental importance. For these sorts of preferences do not stem from character. It is not, for example, because one is morally virtuous that one enjoys the paintings of Da Vinci or the poems of T.S. Eliot.²²⁷ By way of contrast, there is a necessary connection between excellence of character and enjoyment at the performance of virtuous acts. To the extent they are good people, true friends have a fundamental sameness with respect to the sorts of acts they enjoy doing and seeing done.

A "morally good man, inasmuch as he is a morally good man, finds joy in actions that conform to virtue and is displeased by actions which display vice," explains Aristotle, "just as an expert in music feels pleasure when he hears beautiful tunes, and pain when he hears bad tunes."²²⁸ Aristotle's point seems to be that, precisely because one is good, one feels joy in the presence of virtuous behavior. A good person does not simply hit the median; he also feels the right emotions. "A man who

Nic. *Ethics* Book Nine, 1165b 26 - 30 (emphasis added)

227 It might be argued that the act of writing the Eliot poem or of painting the *Mona Lisa* is (somehow) a morally virtuous act and thus must give pleasure to a good person. But then the pleasure is due to the act of creation and not to the art object itself (if such a distinction can be drawn).

228 Nic. *Ethics* Book Nine, 1170a 8 - 11.

abstains from bodily pleasures and enjoys doing so is self-controlled..."²²⁹ (emphasis added) And he feels the way he does, at least in part, because of his upbringing: "...as Plato says, men must be brought up from childhood to feel pleasure and pain at the proper things; for this is correct education."²³⁰ Aristotle's analogy of the musical expert is apt: The musician has been trained to associate pleasure with certain sounds, the virtuous person has been trained to associate pleasure with certain sorts of acts. The parent inculcates this connection in the young for an obvious reason: Children, at least initially, will do what they consider enjoyable.²³¹ Later, people must come to do

229 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Two, 1104b 4 - 6.

230 *Ibid.* 1104b 12 - 13.

231 "... a love of pleasure has grown up with all of us from infancy. Therefore, this emotion has come to be ingrained in our lives and is difficult to erase. Even in our actions we use, to a greater or smaller extent, pleasure and pain as a criterion. For this reason, this entire study is necessarily concerned with pleasure and pain; for it is not unimportant for our actions whether we feel joy and pain in the right or the wrong way." *Nic. Ethics* Book Two, 1105a 1 - 7. Aristotle's point appears to be that pleasure, especially in the case of young people, will be a motive for action. The task of the educator or parent, then, becomes that of connecting pleasure with virtuous deeds in the minds of young people. To do virtuous acts because they are pleasurable is not, of course, to be a fully virtuous person. But it is a start. States Aristotle: "Thus our assertion that a man becomes just by performing just acts and self-controlled by performing acts of self-control is correct; without performing them, nobody could even be on the way to becoming good." (emphasis added) *Nic. Ethics* Book Two, 1105b 9 - 11. The educator's initial task is to encourage acts which attain the mean, even if the acts are performed from imperfect motives. At least the student is on the way to virtue.

virtuous acts for their own sake but at first the objective is simply that they do them at all. The upshot here is that virtuous persons' gladness in the face of good deeds is an *ingrained* emotion; what sort of act they enjoy is a function of their character.²³²

In concluding my discussion of the various samenesses, I want to show that friends have, at least partially, the same self. I begin with the premise that true friends are alike in possessing practical wisdom and, because the virtue is entailed in their character²³³, have here a sameness that is fundamental. Another way to put this is to say that true friends have developed their intellect to the point of having some practical wisdom at the very least. To be sure, this may not be the whole story: One partner may possess practical wisdom more fully; the pair may also be

232 Implied in this section is a reason why true friends find joy in one another: They both do virtuous acts. [And the partners' ability to "find joy in one another" seems to be one of the "chief marks of friendship." *Nic.Ethics* Book Eight, 1158a 9 - 10.]

233 True friends help one another to develop practical wisdom but they must also possess it (to some extent) when they first meet; for if they did not have it initially they could not be morally good and hence could not be true friends (i.e. persons who befriend one another precisely because they find the other to be good.) But one will object: 'Could not the partners possess only theoretical wisdom and thus have a true friendship in the absence of moral goodness?' Cooper suggests the answer is no: "There can be no doubt, then, that on Aristotle's theory what makes a friendship a virtue-friendship [i.e., true friendship] is the binding force within it of some -- perhaps, for all that, partial and incomplete -- excellence of the character..." (emphasis added) Cooper, "Aristotle on Friendship" in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, p. 308.

theoretically wise; or theoretical wisdom may be possessed by one partner and not the other. But the possession of some degree of practical wisdom as a minimum is something they must share.

Now because the friends possess some moral virtue their thinking is largely at one with respect to crucial moral and political questions. We have already seen this. They do not necessarily agree on the details, but with respect to its basic shape the belief system espoused by Partner A is very much the one espoused by Partner B. To the extent they are good people, they are in agreement as to what constitutes virtue and virtuous action, what the final *telos* of work is, which constitutions are just, etc. Aristotle explains that among good men there exists concord, and concord literally "designates the quality of 'being of the same mind', 'thinking in harmony'." ²³⁴ He argues that good men "are of the same mind each with himself and all with one another, since -- to use the expression -- they never shift their position: the wishes of people like this remain constant... They wish for what is just and what is in the common interest, and these are their common goals." ²³⁵

234 Martin Ostwald, footnote in his translation of the *Nic. Ethics*, p.256. Note 17.

235 *Nic. Ethics Book Nine*, 1167b 5 - 9. Admittedly, the quote says they are alike in wishing for what is just; it does not explicitly say they agree on what constitutes a just act (Yet I claim they do.) Is it possible they could disagree on this, or simply wish for what is just but not know what constitutes a just act? In the first case the answer is no because, at least for Aristotle, if the

Aristotle adds that concord's "sphere" -- i.e. the set of issues on which good persons enjoy concord -- "is what is in the common interest and what is important for life."²³⁶

(emphasis added) Thus, true friends are of one mind on not just any questions but on those of special importance, in particular questions concerning the good life.²³⁷

friends disagreed at least one would be wrong. That is, at least one would not understand the nature of just acts. But then when he tries to wish for what is just, he wishes only for what he thinks is just and not for what really is. But Aristotle says that good men wish for what really is just. Therefore good men must agree on what constitutes a just act (and of course be right.) Could they simply not know what constitutes a just act (but still wish for one) ? This seems extremely unlikely. For how can one wish for something (except accidentally) unless one knows what it is one is wishing for ? A person unfamiliar with the nature of just acts may have wishes, but it is difficult to argue that he (consciously, at any rate) wishes for what is just.

236 Nic. Ethics, Book Nine, 1167b 4.

237 J. H. Muirhead, in his *Chapters from Aristotle's Ethics* [London: John Murray, 1900], writes: "True friends are those who are of one mind with one another. But to be of one mind with an other is not merely to agree with his opinions. Such agreement, eg on a scientific question, does not necessarily lead on to friendship. On the other hand (we might add), mere difference of opinion does not estrange. The kind of agreement and disagreement which is important is that which springs from being of the same or a different mind on 'questions of the public advantage, and on all that touches life.'" (emphasis added) pp. 180 - 181. However, Muirhead also says: "... permanent friendships can only exist on the basis of interests which are permanent and important. But he [Aristotle] would not confine these to politics. Art, science, religion, education are examples that will occur to us as fields in which the right kind of unanimity may spring up..." (emphasis added) p. 181. So when Aristotle says true friends are of one mind on questions concerning the good life, he need not mean only moral and political questions narrowly understood. On the other hand, as I pointed out earlier, it is not clear how much agreement friends enjoy with respect to something like taste in art. I think we are safer when we say true friends are at one morally and politically -- this stems from their virtuous characters -- but it is certainly possible they will also see eye to eye in the areas Muirhead mentions. Whether their sameness on, say, a scientific issue is a

Furthermore, they are in agreement not only formally but substantially;²³⁸ for example, they agree not merely that citizens should work to produce a morally good community whatever that might be, they also concur in what constitutes such a community.²³⁹ There is concord in the state, claims Aristotle, "when the citizens have the same judgment about their common interest, when they choose the same things..."²⁴⁰ (emphasis added) Extrapolating from this passage, we can say that virtuous persons a) want to further the common interest and b) agree on what is meant by "the common interest." Aristotle also suggests that true friends' sameness of mind is not an intermittent phenomenon ; as we saw earlier, it is in the nature of good persons to be steadfast in their attitudes and beliefs.

The point I am making here is that the intellects of true friends are partially identical. What makes a pair of intellects the same is a fascinating question, one I can answer only imperfectly. But I want to say that likeness with respect to level of intellectual development²⁴¹ and

fundamental sameness, though, depends on whether their opinion on the issue stems from their character.

238 My point here is that true friends do not just agree, for example, that our telos is happiness; such an agreement is not particularly interesting and it could also hold between wicked persons. True friends agree on what happiness is -- and get it right, Aristotle would say.
239 Again, they agree broadly speaking: They agree, eg., that the morally good community is one that practices justice along the lines set out in Book Five of the *Nic. Ethics*.

240 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1167a 26 - 27.

241 More precisely, the friends are alike with respect to

unanimity of belief on important topics are at least two elements of this sameness. Of course one might argue that identity of intellect really centres on the brain's or mind's way of *functioning* : A pair of intellects are alike not because they hold the same *content* but because they work in the same way, because the way they combine and analyze concepts is the same. That such an interpretation may be valid I do not deny. Unfortunately I am not able, at least within the *Ethics*, to discuss the ways in which thinking is carried out. So I examine only the results. Whatever processes their intellects have used, the friends have reached (on certain questions) the same conclusion. I do not know which brain or mental processes led to the belief that virtue is a mean, but I know that this belief is part of the content of their thinking. And because they act on this belief, I know their intellects have been trained to the point where they possess some practical wisdom.²⁴²

My promise in this section was to show sameness with respect to friends' selves. All I have demonstrated so far, if anything, is a partial identity of intellect. How do we proceed ? We do so, of course, by employing Aristotle's

minimum intellectual development; each has at least some practical wisdom. And we can add, therefore, that each has a calculative element (of the rational part of the soul) which functions properly. This is another aspect of their intellectual sameness.

242 If I could say that friends are alike also in their *method* of thinking, I would have a stronger argument. Alas, I cannot, with confidence, say this.

claim that the true self²⁴³ and the intellect are identical. Let me briefly discuss Aristotle's evidence for this. "Just as a state and every other organized system seems to be in the truest sense identical with the most sovereign element in it, so it is with man."²⁴⁴ The principle at work here is that a "whole of parts"²⁴⁵ in some sense is its ruling part. [When we say Washington, D.C. do we not frequently mean the United States ?] Thus, the human self (a collection of parts) is "most properly identified " ²⁴⁶ with what ought to be -- and in a good person is -- its ruling member, namely the intellect.

Further, explains Aristotle, "we regard a man as being an independent and voluntary agent in the truest sense when he has acted rationally."²⁴⁷ That is, we regard him as a truly human actor -- a truly human self to whom acts are attributed²⁴⁸ -- when he obeys his intellect.²⁴⁹ H.H.

243 My hope here is to avoid the introduction of Aristotle's notion of human essence. But if the true self and human essence are completely synonymous, I have a serious difficulty. For in that case I am using a notion of human essence at odds with Heidegger's. In my defence, I can say that Joachim and Percival in their discussion of the identification of true self with intellect (*Nic.Ethics* Book Nine, 1168b 28 - 1169b 2) do not mention human essence as such. (Joachim, pp. 256 - 257; Percival, pp. 126 - 130.)

244 *Nic. Ethics* Book Nine, 1168b 31 - 33.

245 Joachim, *A Commentary*, p. 256.

246 *Ibid.* p. 256.

247 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1168b 35 - 1169a 1.

248 This point was clarified by Joachim, *A Commentary*, p.256.

249 Joachim sometimes understands Aristotle to mean the true self is the reason, other times that it is the intellect (*nous*). It seems we can say it is either. *A Commentary*, p. 256.

Joachim adds: "And the man of strong character -- the self-controlled man -- is the man whose intellect (*Nous*) governs his passions; in other words, the self is identified primarily with the intellect."²⁵⁰ The point is the person who is virtuous -- i.e., who has at least part of the true human self²⁵¹ -- is the one who follows *nous*. The argument seems to be that if we are most fully our (human) selves when obeying -- or being at one with -- the intellect, the intellect, more than anything else, is the self.²⁵²

To the extent they are alike in intellect, then, true friends have the same self. Aristotle does not use the argument I use²⁵³ -- partial identity of intellect implies partial identity of self -- but he offers statements which support my conclusion. He asserts, for example, that for

250 Joachim, *A Commentary*, p. 256.

251 That possession of the virtues entails possession of the true human self is suggested by John M. Cooper: "But on Aristotle's theory of moral virtue the virtues are essential properties of human kind: a person realizes more or less fully his human nature according as he possesses more or less fully those properties of character which count as moral excellence." "Aristotle on Friendship", p. 312. I say that the virtuous person has at least part of the true human self because I assume he possesses at least some of the virtues.

252 This point was clarified for me by Percival, *Aristotle on Friendship*, p. 127.

253 Indeed, if Julia Annas is right, Aristotle offers no proof for this claim. Annas writes: "Now it is true that Aristotle provides nothing remotely resembling a proof that a friend is another self..." "Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism", *Mind*, Oct., 1977, p. 543. I certainly agree that he provides no *explicit* proof. As I try to show in my text, though, I think an Aristotelian argument for the claim can be constructed -- provided, of course, we are thinking here of true friends.

each partner "[H]is friend really is another self..."²⁵⁴

This passage presents some difficulties. First, it seems to say that a true friend is precisely another -- in the sense of different -- self to his partner. But this reading cannot be right. For in the passage this quote comes from, Aristotle's concern is to demonstrate friends' sameness. In this section of *Book Nine*, he is arguing that friendship has as its basis self-love²⁵⁵ : a good man loves himself (more precisely, all his selves); his friend is 'another self'; therefore he loves his friend. A good man "has the same attitude toward his friend as he does toward himself, for his friend really is another self..."²⁵⁶ In other words, because the friend is another self in the sense that he is *me outside of me*, I treat him the way I treat my (primary) self. If Aristotle meant by 'another self' a different self, his argument would make little sense. It would read: a good man loves himself; his friend is not himself; therefore he loves his friend.

Another objection could be raised on the grounds that my interpretation is altogether too grandiose. Aristotle's claim that true friends are another self is quite modest, says the critic, and means essentially that they attach as much weight to their own wishes as they do to their

254 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1166a 31.

255 This articulation of the matter -- "Self-love as the basis of friendship" -- is Ostwald's. *Nic. Ethics*, p. 252.

256 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine 1166a 30 - 31.

partner's. Julia Annas, for example, writes: "[H]ere is the importance of the idea that a friend is 'another self'; I can, in fact, come to regard my friend in the way I regard myself. This need import no absurdities about thinking of his pains as if they were my pains; what is meant in the context is clearly regarding his desires, and their fulfillment, as I do my desires and their fulfillment -- that is, attaching as much importance to them, making as great efforts to fulfill them, and so on."²⁵⁷ (emphasis added except on "desires") But there is a problem in Annas' interpretation. She is attempting to tell us what the idea 'a friend is another self' means; she says it means regarding the partner's desires and their fulfillment as I do my own. But is it not actually the case that this is what the idea implies? Aristotle -- we recall -- says the good man "has the same attitude toward his friend as he does toward himself, for his friend really is another self..."²⁵⁸ (emphasis added) The Philosopher is saying true friends have the same attitude toward themselves and the other -- or, as Annas says, each regards his own desires in the way he does the other's -- precisely because the friend is another self. He takes the sameness of self as a starting point and then concludes there is a sameness of attitude. Why else would he say 'for his friend really is another self'? He is not saying that sameness of self means a

²⁵⁷ Julia Annas, "Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism", *Mind*, Oct., 1977, p.542.

²⁵⁸ *Nic.Ethics* Book Nine, 1166a 30 - 31.

sameness of attitude, but only that the latter follows from the former. If Annas' reading were correct, Aristotle would be saying that the good person has the same attitude toward his friend as he does toward himself because the friend is another self, and the latter idea means he regards his partner's desires as he does his own. This interpretation renders the passage almost free of explanatory power. It has Aristotle saying that friends have the same attitude toward self and other for the very reason that they look upon self's and other's desires in the same way. Does this really tell us why they have the same attitude? On the other hand, the interpretation which says 'a friend is another self' means the friends have at least partially the same intellect has more explanatory power. It offers the following chain: True friends enjoy partial identity of intellect which implies (as we saw) they have some practical wisdom, which implies they possess some of the moral virtues²⁵⁹, which implies they want good works to be abundant, which implies they want good people -- who carry out these works -- to prosper.²⁶⁰ Now both they and their friends are good; hence they want prosperity for both themselves and their friends. Thus, at least on the issue

259 Ostwald tells us that right reason, which is practical wisdom in the moral sphere, "lives in us and makes us virtuous." *Nic. Ethics*, p. 172, Note 62.

260 John M. Cooper writes: "Thus, a character-friend wishes his friend to prosper because he recognizes his good character and thinks that it is fitting for those who are morally good to prosper." (emphasis added) "Aristotle on Friendship", p. 311. My assumption is that, if good persons prosper, good works will be carried out in abundance.

of prosperity, we can understand quite well why they have the same attitude toward self and other.

But the biggest problem with Annas' reading is its failure to take Aristotle's identification of true self with intellect seriously. Time and again Aristotle tells us that the intellect or 'thinking part' is, more than anything else, what we really are.²⁶¹ To ignore this point when analyzing the meaning of 'friends are another self' seems to me a major error.²⁶² Admittedly, Annas might only be offering part of the passage's meaning. If so, her 'what is meant in the context' is misleading -- it suggests she is going to explain the full meaning of the statement in question.

Annas is useful here in pointing out the opinions of earlier thinkers on this question: "The phrase 'another

261 Aristotle says, for example, "... it is the thinking part of each individual that constitutes what he really is or constitutes it in a greater degree than anything else." (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1166a 23 - 24.)

262 Annas realizes, of course, that for Aristotle the true self is intellect or mind (*nous*) but she does not bring this fact up when discussing the proposition 'A friend is another self'. When discussing the claim that a *good person wishes what is good for himself for his own sake*, she writes in a footnote: "Aristotle adds, significantly, that his 'self' is really his mind, the intellectual part of him, but important as this is for the ideas of book 10, we can ignore it in the present context, as it does not affect the structure of what he is saying. "Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism", *Mind*, Oct., 1977, p. 541 (emphasis added). Clearly "the present context" includes both her discussion of the 'friend is another self' claim and the 'good person wishes for his own good for his own sake' claim.

self' (*allos autos*) has drawn, on the whole, derision from the commentators, who tirelessly point out that one cannot, logically, regard another person's thoughts, pains, etc. exactly as one does one's own."²⁶³ Of course my reading of *allos autos* avoids this objection. When I say true friends have partially the same intellect, I imply (among other things) they have numerous beliefs in common. But this is quite different from saying that each partner sees no difference between his own subjective experiences and those of the other. Friends can have the same thought-content -- eg., agree that the median is the mark of virtue -- and yet see their own thoughts and those of their partner as precisely that: as distinguishable, as those which belong to oneself and those which belong to another.

W.F.R. Hardie, in *Aristotle's Ethical Theory*, brings up another possible objection but this too can be met. He writes: "We should not ignore signs of caution in Aristotle's reference to altruism: *paraplesios* (almost so) on the friend as 'another self' (1170b 8)..."²⁶⁴ If the criticism is that I should not take the identity of self too far, I am in agreement. But I have stressed all along that the sameness of self I am arguing for is only partial.²⁶⁵

263 J. Annas, "Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism", p. 542.

264 W.F.R. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory* (Second Edition), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. p. 414.

265 Hardie also raises an objection of W.D. Ross'. Ross argues that friendships "involve two distinct selves" (Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory* (Second Edition), p.

Finally, one may ask whether the sameness of self is a fundamental sameness. Clearly it is. For what I claim in asserting this identity is that true friends are alike in possessing certain important beliefs and in their minimum level of intellectual development. But the holding of these beliefs and the attainment of this degree of intellectual achievement is entailed in their character. It is in the nature of good people to have these things. Thus, the partial sameness of self is fundamental.

I said at the start of this chapter that one reason friendship is a positive response to our *unheimlichkeit* is that -- since they are fundamentally the same as we are -- friends have the power to be deeply comforting. In closing, let me explore this point briefly.

I begin with the claim that friends enjoy the fundamental samenesses I have outlined: They are alike in the sort of actions they do, in what gives them pleasure, in their motivation for acting, in their *telos*, etc. Now because they have this partial identity, the partners speak a common language. When Partner A explains, for example, that he generally does virtuous deeds for their own sake or that the

324.) If this is true, how can friends have the same self? I think we meet this objection by saying that the selves of true friends are both distinct and partially the same. That is, the intellects are partially the same (in ways I have shown) yet partially different.

observation of good acts pleases him, Partner B knows what he means. And he knows because he himself functions that way. He understands A's behavior and motivation not because he has read or heard about them, but because in his own life he has experienced them.²⁶⁶ Were A and B markedly different, they would not possess this common vocabulary. Take the case of the married father and the bachelor. When the former tells the latter about the difficulties of married life and child-rearing, the latter finds the other man's words have little meaning. That is, he is unable to supply them with a personal content. Terms like "married life", "wife", "my kids" are not nonsense to him, but they express intangible abstractions. They call up no images or emotions from his own life. And how could they? For he has never experienced the things to which they refer. This is not to say that, when the bachelor marries and has a family, he and the other man will mean exactly the same thing by the words "wife" "my kids" etc. But there will, in this case, be a much greater common ground in their thinking.

266 The notion that we really understand only those things we personally experience is espoused by literary critic Paul Fussell. Speaking about the comprehension of armed conflict, he writes: "But what's at stake in an infantry assault is so entirely unthinkable to those without the experience of one, or several, or many, even if they possess very wide-ranging imaginations and warm sympathies, that experience is crucial in this case." "Thank God for the atom bomb", *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, February 5, 1989, p. 9. And Fussell adds in the same article: "Indeed unless they actually encountered the enemy during the war, most 'soldiers' have very little idea what 'combat' was like." p. 10.

Now true friends live together, and that means that they reveal themselves to one another. Aristotle writes that "sharing each other's words and thoughts... would seem to be the meaning of living together when said of human beings..."²⁶⁷ It is in the very nature of true friends to open up to one another, to engage in a process which makes for mutual understanding. But the point I want to make here is this: Because the partners have a common language, the understanding that results from their sharing of thoughts is a profound one. It is not the case that the partners unload their minds to an uncomprehending listener. On the contrary, each readily identifies with what the other says. And consequently each has a very good idea of what the other is all about.²⁶⁸

The next step in the argument is supplied by Aristotle explicitly. He writes: "...if a friend is tactful, seeing him and talking to him are a source of comfort, since he *knows our character and the things which give us pleasure or pain.*"²⁶⁹ (emphasis added) That is, from the fact that

267 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1170b 12 - 13.

268 Of course dialogue -- "sharing each other's words and thoughts" -- is not the only way friends come to know one another. They also do this by, among other things, observing each other.

269 *Nic. Ethics*, Book Nine, 1171b 2 - 4. Aristotle says that "manly natures" (Book Nine, 1171b 6) do not share their pain with friends, suggesting that friends should not comfort one another. (Comforting implies sharing pain.) But this goes against his earlier claim that a friend can be one who "shares sorrow and joy with his friend" (Book Nine, 1166a

friends have an intimate knowledge of us it follows they are comforting in our times of need. Why this is so is not set out precisely, but let me suggest one explanation. Friends provide comfort because -- in knowing 'how we work' -- they know what (in a profound sense) ails us. Our friends know 'the things which give us pleasure or pain', they understand what we are going through. When we say we feel *unheimlichkeit*, they do not offer uncomprehending stares. Now the point is when we observe our partner's comprehension of our ailment, we feel a degree of solace. In the case of existential -- as opposed to physical -- suffering there is comfort in the mere fact that another person finds our experience intelligible. It might seem, at first, that the feeling of something as intangible as *unheimlichkeit* could not be communicated. One who feels it might think that his deep pains will never come to light. He may feel they will remain inaccessible to all but himself; he may believe that no one can help him for no one can even understand what it is he undergoes. The friend assures him that this is not the case.

Thus true friends are a positive response to *unheimlichkeit* both in what they are and what they do: being fundamentally identical, they counteract the otherness

8.) Because he suggests repeatedly that friends can share our pain, I believe that this, in general, is his belief (See also Book Nine, 1171a 6 - 8.) And if this sharing can be one of the marks of friendship, are friends wrong to practice it?

1 of non-Daseins and ensure that they (the friends) are not surrounded only by strangers. As well, their sameness entails a profound mutual knowledge which lets them offer consolation to one another.

Chapter Four

In this, the last chapter of the thesis, I turn my attention once again to the Canadian peace movement. Having argued that Dasein suffers the pains of anxiety and that these pains are significant; having suggested that Dasein seeks relief from these pains; and having shown that true friendship is a positive response to at least some of them, I want to argue that a peace movement which fosters true²⁷⁰ friendship among its members -- and is known to do

270 The objection will be made: 'Should not the peace movement be practical and foster just the lesser friendships, that is, those based on pleasure and usefulness? Is it not expecting too much to ask the movement to promote true friendship?' First let me say that I am not against the movement fostering these lesser friendships. To the extent that lesser friends have fundamental samenesses they can help each other in the face of the *unheimlichkeit* of anxiety. A movement which fosters these friendships -- and publicizes this fact -- will have drawing power. But the point is true friendship is, in general, more effective in helping us with the pains of anxiety. [And hence a movement which promotes this friendship among members should be more attractive than one which promotes the lesser friendships.] For one thing, true friends are more reliable; being at least partially virtuous, they are unlikely to betray one another, to run off when their partner needs help. "In the other kinds of friendship, however, there is no safeguard against slander and lack of trust." (*Nic. Ethics* Book Eight, 1157a 24 - 25.) Furthermore, while true friends (to the extent that they act virtuously) have such fundamental samenesses as those of overall *telos*, motive for acting, and kind of action performed, lesser friends may not have these. For the lesser friendships can occur between persons of different character: "To be friends with one another on the basis of pleasure and usefulness is, accordingly, also possible for bad people, just as it is for good men with bad, and for one who is neither good nor bad with any kind of person at all." (*Book Eight*, 1157a 16 - 18.) And even if neutral or bad persons who are friends had as many samenesses (with each other) as do true friends -- that is, they were just as able

this -- will likely attract new participants and have success in retaining old ones. Members of the public not yet involved will be drawn by the prospect of making friends; those already involved will be getting some of the personal support they need, and thus will not (for the most part) be seeking this support elsewhere -- a crucial need will be satisfied within the movement. To be sure, none of this follows necessarily. Some members of society will be so satisfied with the friendships they already have that the prospect of making new, peace movement friends will have little attraction for them. Others -- those already involved -- may have movement friends and yet (due, say, to a sense of hopelessness) leave the movement. I do not deny this. But I do argue that a movement which implements my proposal will have a far better chance of attracting and keeping support than does a movement which ignores it.²⁷¹

as true friends to help us through *unheimlichkeit* -- it is hard to believe they would be able to help us to develop courage, i.e., a remedy for the impotence we feel in anxiety. For how could bad or neutral persons -- i.e., those who do not act virtuously themselves -- help others to become virtuous? (And even if bad or neutral persons could help us to weather impotence in some other way, these persons are unreliable.) Promoting true friendship is a difficult task. Perhaps all the movement can do in this sphere is help members to become good and thus increase the likelihood that they will befriend one another precisely because of this goodness. (If the movement did not promote virtue, members would have one less opportunity to develop it and hence to develop true friendship.) Asking the movement to promote true friendship by promoting virtue -- a crucial ingredient of this friendship -- is not unreasonable. Clearly this promotion can be done, often within the course of normal movement activities. The lesser friendships are not to be discouraged, but they are only second best.

²⁷¹ Of course there is an obvious objection one can raise

In the following pages my concern will, as much as possible, be practical. I shall be answering the questions, 'How can the peace movement foster true friendship among its members and publicize the fact it does this?' , with concrete examples. The theory of friendship I use will of course be that of Aristotle. Thus, a question immediately arises: 'How, according to him, is friendship promoted?' We have already discussed some of the things that characterize friends, but the issue of how friends are *made* has not yet been broached. To resolve this problem we need to remember what Aristotle tells us at the start of Book Eight: Friendship "is some sort of excellence or virtue, or involves virtue..."²⁷² Clearly it is, or involves²⁷³, a moral virtue. Hence it is reasonable to assume it is

here: Do citizens know that true friendship is a positive response to anxiety? And if they do not, why will peace movement friendship -- or the prospect of it -- be attractive to them? My reply is the following: At least some citizens (eg., the author of this thesis) know that friendship is helpful with respect to anxiety. But even if they do not know this, they will (in many cases) be attracted to a movement which offers them friends. For friends are desirable for many reasons, not simply because they help us through anxiety. The fact that I argue for a movement which fosters friendship on the ground that friends help us through anxiety, does not mean there are no other grounds for creating such a movement. On the contrary, there are.

272 Nic. Ethics Book Eight, 1155a 3 - 4.

273 Is friendship a virtue or does it merely involve virtue? Aristotle is not completely clear. But in either case its development must entail habitual action: If the former is true, it would be developed by, *inter alia*, repeated displays of good will. If the latter is true, it would be developed by, for example, repeated displays of courage. [As we shall see, a display of courage should elicit affection from those who witness it. And friendship consists in the giving of affection.]

developed the way the other moral virtues are: through habit. Just as one becomes courageous by doing acts of courage, so too, a pair should become friends by performing friendly acts. Being, or entailing, a virtue, friendship (like the other virtues) is a characteristic.²⁷⁴ And "characteristics develop from corresponding activities."²⁷⁵ Now which activities do we mean here? In other words, which acts are *friendly acts*? In chapter four of Book Nine, Aristotle sets out a definition of friendship, more precisely a list of activities which friends qua friends perform.²⁷⁶ The list -- which includes, *inter alia*, doing what is good for their partners for the latter's sake, spending time with their partners and sharing their sorrow and joy -- offers what I take to be friendly acts. None of these on its own is sufficient to produce friendship. But the performance of any of them moves one toward it. If the peace movement is to stimulate friendship among its members, it must help them to do at least some of these acts. But the issue is not resolved yet. For the definition of friendship set out in Book Nine, chapter four, is not Aristotle's only word on this subject. In Book Eight, chapter eight, for example, he tells us that "Friendship is equality and likeness..."²⁷⁷ and that "friendship consists

274 "Now, affection resembles an emotion, while *friendship is rather a characteristic or lasting attitude.*" (*Nic. Ethics* Book Eight, 1157b 28 - 29.) (emphasis added)

275 *Nic. Ethics* Book Two, 1103b 21.

276 *Nic. Ethics* Book Nine, 1166a 1 - 9.

277 *Nic. Ethics* Book Eight, 1159b 3.

in giving... affection."²⁷⁸ (emphasis added) So in addition to encouraging the performance of the friendly acts listed in Book Nine, surely the movement should promote among its members equality and affection. And furthermore, there are certain things which, though not definitive of friendship, are conducive to it. Two people cannot be friends, we are told, "until each has won the other's confidence."²⁷⁹ And Aristotle adds: "Moreover, time and familiarity are required."²⁸⁰ Elsewhere he tells us: "... a good temper and sociability are regarded as being most typical of and most conducive to friendship."²⁸¹ Thus, this relationship can be fostered in a few ways: by encouraging members to carry out friendly acts, by furthering equality between them, and by creating opportunities for the growth of such things as trust and familiarity. The peace movement may not be able to do all of these things. (I am not sure, for example, that it can promote "a good temper" in its members.) And even if it could, there is no guarantee that friendships would emerge. The movement could encourage the performance of friendly acts and find that the acts are not undertaken; it could offer numerous opportunities for the development of trust and familiarity, and discover that these things do not arise. But none of this harms my argument. I do not claim that the movement can make the

278 *Ibid.* 1159a 33 - 34.

279 *Ibid.* Book Eight, 1156b 29. I use "trust" and "confidence" interchangeably in this context.

280 *Nic. Ethics* Book Eight, 1156b 26.

281 *Ibid.* Book Eight, 1158a 3.

occurrence of friendship a certainty. Rather, I claim it can foster some crucial elements of friendship, and in so doing make its occurrence likely.²⁸²

The first step in this process is recognizing that friendship among members is important. Clearly the movement should not concern itself solely with this issue, but on the other hand it must not regard it as marginal. As I remarked at the beginning, the movement must be mindful of the kind of creature it is organizing: It is not a robot concerned wholly with external events, and utterly lacking in personal needs. It is a human being: deeply troubled about the world situation, about the possibility of nuclear holocaust, but also susceptible to existential anxiety.²⁸³ A movement which gives insufficient time to members' needs for support risks losing members. Suggesting ways in which a political group can make itself effective, the authors of one study ask: "Is it dealing creatively with the personal limits and natural needs for support of its members, in a way that will enable people to stay actively involved and growing for many years, as both tender and tough fighters for a new world?"

282 The objection will be raised: If the peace movement encourages only *some elements* of friendship, how can I say it promotes friendship? My response is that, in order to promote something, one need not encourage the development of every aspect of it. If you give a person good food and opportunities for exercise you promote good health in him, even if proper nutrition and muscular strength are not sufficient to produce health.

283 One could raise an objection: Are these separate problems? Does not the prospect of nuclear war increase anxiety? Perhaps. But anxiety in Heidegger's sense would exist even if nuclear war were not threatened.

284

One concrete way to recognize friendship's importance is to establish a peace movement social convener. This person would try to ensure that, whenever feasible,²⁸⁵ movement events and process support friendship's various elements. Perhaps the most obvious thing the convener could promote is the growth of familiarity. It may seem odd to make a special effort to do this; for surely movement events cannot help but promote familiarity. In attending demonstrations, canvassing for petition signatures, co-operating on a movement publication or doing any other activity of this sort, peaceniks get to know one another. Why should we assign someone the job of promoting what is promoted automatically? My response is the following: Aristotle does not tell us precisely what he means by "familiar" and "familiarity". He explains that, in order to be a true or perfect friend, "one must have some experience of the other person and have come to be familiar with him, and that is the hardest thing of all".²⁸⁶ (emphasis added) Whether

284 "Understanding and Fighting Sexism: A Call to Men" by P. Blood, A. Tuttle, and G. Lakey in *Off Their Backs... and on our own two feet*, Philadelphia: New Society Publishers. 1983. p.12. The authors may have in mind here groups fighting discrimination, but it seems reasonable to argue that the point holds too for peace groups.

285 Fostering friendship is not the peace movement's only concern; in some cases a procedure that would foster friendship might have to be avoided because it is too harmful to other aspects of movement work.

286 *Nic.Ethics* Book Eight, 1158a 14 - 16. The passage might suggest that familiarity is a requirement if people are to be in love with one another. But from Aristotle's statement at 1156b 26, it is clear that familiarity is necessary too between true friends.

"familiar with" is a synonym for "comfortable and at ease with" or something stronger such as "deeply knowledgeable about" is not clear. But in any case, familiarity is not something that comes easily; it is not the product of casual chats and brief meetings. If movement activities are to promote it, they need to offer opportunities for an interaction that is both qualitatively and quantitatively substantial. But opportunities for interaction of this sort are not always built into movement events.²⁸⁷

Demonstrations, for example, allow a great many peaceniks to see and greet one another, but do not always offer them a chance for meaningful discussion. Opportunities for substantial intercourse often need to be created specially. And here we call upon our social convener.

Now if we accept that familiarity is a state in which persons know one another at least reasonably well -- Aristotle's vagueness forces my definition to be imprecise - - we can ask 'How would the convener promote this ?' To begin, the convener should encourage members not only to attend events but also to help organize them.²⁸⁸

Organization often demands intensive interaction. Members work long hours together and try to solve a variety of practical problems. When organizational meetings are over,

²⁸⁷ But opportunities for substantial interaction are sometimes built into events, eg., when the event is a civil disobedience action organized by people in affinity groups.

²⁸⁸ Clearly, the more frequent and substantial the interaction, the greater the chance that members will become familiar with one another.

the convener should suggest, and urge participation in, a social event. While important communication can occur at the meeting itself, it does not always. Some members are too shy to talk; and even when participation is widespread, the range of topics discussed may be quite narrow. Members may discover each other's thoughts on peace and organizational issues, but not on a great many other topics. Participation in the social event helps members to gain a fuller knowledge of their co-workers. The social event can be as simple as going for coffee or a beer , or as elaborate as a communal meal. The last of these is particularly good. If time is limited, members can eat at a restaurant; if time is not an issue they can cook the meal themselves.²⁸⁹ In this relatively relaxed and cheerful setting, members may have the time and desire for significant socializing. Eating and drinking are euphoric²⁹⁰ experiences for some people, and this sense of well-being and security may make them unusually willing to open up. At the very least, eating tends to put us in a good mood (if only temporarily) and this seems to be conducive to the making of friends: "Friendship does not arise easily among the sour..."²⁹¹

289 If weather permits, a picnic could be organized. In England, Oxford Mothers for Nuclear Disarmament organized "peace picnics". "Women and peace: from the Suffragists to the Greenham women" by Josephine Eglin in Richard Taylor and Nigel Young, eds., *Campaigns for peace: British peace movements in the twentieth century* . Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1987. p.245.

290 So , at least, says master Chef Jamie Kennedy in the film *Special of the Day* ,made by Robert Kennedy in 1989.

291 Nic.Ethics Book Eight, 1158a 2.

Specifically social events should follow not only meetings but other movement activities as well. They are desirable at the conclusion of demonstrations, door-to-door canvassing to gather signatures for a petition, civil disobedience actions, 'tag day' fundraising events, etc. If the political activity is particularly successful or difficult, the convener may want to organize a party. This has to be done with some care. Not all persons are at home with loud music and alcohol. It is a mistake to assume that, just because many activists are young adults, everyone in the movement likes to socialize the way a twenty-one year old does. It is important that social events cater to as wide a range of temperaments as possible. The convener might do well to organize two sorts of affair: say a loud dance party at one place, and a quieter discussion group/ 'coffee house' at another. Whatever the exact configuration -- and "...the agent must consider on each different occasion what the situation demands..." ²⁹² -- the principle is clear: The better the fit between members and social events, the more likely members are to attend events and become familiar with one another.

But the critic will object -- and rightly -- that some persons do not enjoy any sort of party. They are ill-at-ease going with the group for coffee or a beer, and find that demonstrations and other political actions offer little more than loneliness. How does the movement help these

people to become familiar with other peaceniks ? If their problems are severe, the movement may not be able to do a great deal. It is not, after all, a therapy service. But if the problem is essentially that they have difficulty meeting people in large groups, the movement may be of some use. For the convener (or another organizer) can help them to form an affinity group. An affinity group is a small political community of, say, ten to fifteen persons who work together on an event or events. Although the best place to form one is at event-planning meetings²⁹³, one can also be created at the site of the event itself, shortly before it takes place. The convener could be of help to at least two sorts of people: those who already have some acquaintances in the movement and those who know no one.²⁹⁴ With respect to the former, the convener should simply emphasize the benefits of being in affinity groups -- for example, greater camaraderie and effectiveness and, in the case of civil disobedience actions, greater safety -- and then encourage acquaintances to form them. With respect to those who know no one, the situation is not so simple. The convener might encourage all those who lack a group to meet somewhere and form one (a kind of alliance of the non-aligned), but persons in such a grouping might find they have too little in common to sustain it. If that is the case, the convener

293 This is best because it allows members to work in an affinity group not just at the event but also during its preparation.

294 I assume that those who already have friends in the peace movement need no help in forming an affinity group.

might suggest that non-aligned members organize themselves according to such things as profession (or the lack of one), neighborhood, school, or important lifestyle preference (eg., vegetarianism). The point is not to divide people in any negative sense, but rather to help them to find a niche: a group of people with whom they have important samenesses and whose company they enjoy. Movement leaders cannot impose affinity groups nor can they create them. That must be done by members themselves. But leaders can facilitate the process, particularly in the case of newcomers. They can suggest a sameness around which new groups can form, and can urge veteran members to let 'rookies' join already-established groups.

Although I offered affinity groups as a response to the person who is uncomfortable at large affairs, clearly they can be helpful to other persons as well. For even if one is content at big parties and mass events, it is still easier in many cases to get to know people within a smaller unit. Leslie Cagan , in her article "Feminism and Militarism", writes: "It is in the smaller group that people have the chance to interact on a more human level. We get to know each other better and it is easier to give support."²⁹⁵ If we grant that affinity groups promote familiarity, we can ask how they actually do it. First, they provide a forum for debate: Because members can work in them while

295 "Feminism and Militarism" in M. Albert and D. Dellinger, eds., *Beyond Survival*. Boston: South End Press. 1983. p. 103.

organizing, carrying out, and evaluating events, they offer numerous opportunities for exchange of views.²⁹⁶ Practical and theoretical questions can of course be discussed, but so can those traditionally called personal. At preparation sessions prior to a civil disobedience action, for example, members might discuss theory, offering their readings of, say, Thoreau²⁹⁷ and John Rawls. During the action itself -- while sitting in the street, perhaps -- members might call a meeting to consider practical and 'personal' questions, such as how long members are prepared to stay in jail. In both these situations participants are revealing themselves to one another. And the revelation occurs not simply through dialogue. We learn also by watching, by seeing how our fellow peaceniks act in a variety of situations. So while affinity group members do not necessarily become familiar with one another, they clearly have opportunities for substantial interaction, especially if the group operates on an on-going basis. I have used as an example affinity group participation in a civil disobedience event; but my point holds too for other movement activities. When affinity group members plan and carry out a drive for signatures, a march, or a prayer vigil; or collaborate on a publication or other project, they embark upon an enterprise which,

296 Affinity groups can also foster participation in movement social events; for some members will be more likely to attend these events if members of their group attend (i.e., people they know and work with.) And at social events familiarity is furthered.

297 In fact The Alliance for Non-Violent Action actually does this.

intensive and democratically organized, offers numerous opportunities for significant association.²⁹⁸

The projects discussed so far are pretty much standard fare. Let me briefly mention three other -- and larger -- projects which also promote familiarity. Movement members -- perhaps working in affinity groups -- could organize a children's summer camp. Not to be confused with a peace camp of the Greenham Common sort -- about which I will talk later -- the summer camp would allow a group of young peaceniks and adult counsellors to engage in both the usual camp activities and the study of peace. Living with one another for a sizeable length of time, removed from many of the responsibilities of ordinary life, and able to see each other daily, participants would have an unusually good opportunity to enjoy the substantial interaction that brings familiarity.²⁹⁹ The movement can also arrange street festivals³⁰⁰ and trips. Again, the convener should encourage members -- especially new ones -- both to attend and to help organize the events. If newcomers begin to know one another before the event (because they have worked

298 Because the affinity group is democratically run, the views of all persons are voiced when decisions are made. That means, at least in theory, that members can become familiar with all persons in their group.

299 Of course familiarity is not the only aspect of friendship that would be nurtured at a camp.

300 These can have, as one of their activities, street theatre. The British WONT group employs this sort of theatre. "Women and peace: from the Suffragists to the Greenham women" by Josephine Eglin in R. Taylor and N. Young, eds., *Campaigns for peace: British peace movements in the twentieth century*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1987. p.241.

together on its planning), they have persons with whom to attend it, and are more likely to show up -- that is, come to an event which promotes further familiarity.³⁰¹ The newcomer who knows no one at a particular event may avoid the event for that very reason. Trips -- which could include an exchange with eastern European citizens, a journey to a rally, or visit to another region's peace movement to learn about its successes and failures -- involve some of the intensive co-habitation which marks the camp experience. And of course they need not have an explicitly political purpose; they could, with profit, be camping or canoeing expeditions. To be sure, the events I have discussed promote many elements of friendship beyond familiarity.³⁰² It is to these other elements that I now turn my attention.

In his list of acts definitive of friendship, Aristotle writes: "We regard as a friend also (3) a person who spends his time in our company..."³⁰³ This seems to be essentially the point he makes in Book Eight: "... nothing characterizes friends as much as living in each other's

301 Festivals promote familiarity by, among other things, affording opportunities for discussion, eating and playing.

302 By promoting familiarity, these movement events help peaceniks to carry out another act definitive of friendship: sharing another person's sorrow. The latter entails (at least) helping to alleviate the other's pain (*Nic. Ethics* Book Nine, 1171a 29). When we become familiar with another person, we are (or can be) in a position to do this. Seeing and talking to a friend can be comforting "since he knows our character and the things which give us pleasure or pain." (emphasis added) (*Nic. Ethics* Book Nine, 1171b 2 - 4.)

303 *Nic. Ethics* Book Nine, 1166a 6. - 7.

company."³⁰⁴ If virtues are developed through the performance of corresponding activities, and living together is a friendly activity, the peace movement can promote friendship by encouraging members to participate in this activity. That is, living together is not just something we do once we are friends; rather we can engage in it before we are friends and in so doing develop a friendship. But let us be clear as to what Aristotle means here. Toward the end of Book Nine, he explains that a good man "must also include his friend's existence in his consciousness, and that may be accomplished by living together with him and by sharing each other's words and thoughts. For this would seem to be the meaning of living together when said of human beings..."³⁰⁵ (emphasis added) In other words, living together need not entail -- as it does in contemporary thought -- sharing a dwelling. The latter may foster it but is not necessary. The movement's job in this regard is simply to encourage members to exchange ideas. Clearly the activities which promote familiarity can also promote living together. Let me show this, using two examples. In his "Lessons from the Sixties", Michael Albert writes that, by working in small affinity groups, members can "express themselves and seek

304 Nic. Ethics Book Eight, 1157b 18 - 20.

305 Nic. Ethics Book Nine, 1170b 10 - 13. True, Aristotle expresses uncertainty in his use of "would seem to be". But he says earlier (Book Nine, 1170a 18 - 19) that human life "in the true sense is perceiving or thinking." Thus it is reasonable to argue that living together (ie, living one's life with another person) means sharing one's perceptions and thoughts with another person.

support in a manageable environment."³⁰⁶ (emphasis added)

At least part of his point is that, if members are intimidated at the prospect of offering their thoughts to a large meeting, they may be willing to express them where the faces are fewer and more familiar -- in their affinity group. Peter Worsley, a contributor to *The CND Story*, shows that living together in the Aristotelian sense can be accomplished, if only briefly, by participating in peace marches: "What I remember most vividly about the coast-to-coast march of 1958 (apart from dropping out crippled near Manchester) was arguing for hours, on the road, with not just a pacifist, but an ultra-pacifist vegan called Carol about the ethics of killing and eating animals."³⁰⁷ To be sure, not every march will afford opportunities for this sort of in-depth debate; but clearly *some* will. And if the criticism is that living together means sharing thoughts on *significant topics*³⁰⁸ but discussions held during marches are always superficial, the above example offers excellent rebuttal. For what are the interlocutors discussing? Nothing less than ethics.

But let me turn now to some movement projects which would allow members to live together and were not discussed in the previous section. The first is that of organizing athletic events. The sports chosen and the level of formality would

306 "Lessons from the Sixties" in *Beyond Survival* p. 72.

307 "Words, Music and Marches" in *The CND Story*, London: Allison and Busby. 1983. p.118.

308 I do not recall Aristotle setting out this restriction.

of course be up to the group. Members could play against persons in their neighborhood or, if something more elaborate were desired, peaceniks from other regions.³⁰⁹ Opportunities for the exchange of ideas would likely exist during, and especially before and after, the game. Alfredo Cecchi, a left-wing political organizer in Italy, explains: "The people from Fontana di Sangue told me that for twenty years there had been no real discussion in the village -- and then five years ago we formed our group for football, and we began to talk about things, playing. We began to talk about the village school, about getting electricity."³¹⁰ Of course not all members will be interested in playing -- they will join neither as participants nor spectators. But if at least some members are interested and the task of organization is not so onerous as to be, on balance, more work than it is worth,³¹¹ the movement might do well to arrange these events. Again, no one can guarantee that opportunities for dialogue will arise here. Nor can anyone guarantee that opportunities --

309 The latter would involve travelling together, which of course encourages familiarity and living together.

310 Alfredo Cecchi, quoted in "The San Vincenzo Cell" by Jane Kramer, *The New Yorker*, Sept. 24, 1979. p. 120.

311 The movement needs to perform a cost-benefit analysis when considering the organization of sports events. Will the benefits in terms, eg., of friendships made outweigh the reduction in energy available for other movement activities? I do not know. I am simply outlining projects which foster certain elements of friendship. Whether the movement should carry them out in a particular situation depends on the results of the cost-benefit analysis. I will say, however, that the organization of athletic events need not be an onerous task (especially if things are kept informal) and the potential benefits are great.

if they do arise -- will be seized and dialogue result. But sports matches can afford opportunities -- perhaps especially for men; the latter sometimes find it easier to open up to one another within the context of a game.

The movement might also want to encourage the formation of specific caucuses.³¹² These could be groupings of , say, women, gays, men or young people. Members sometimes feel more comfortable expressing themselves when surrounded by their 'own kind'; by encouraging the development of caucuses, the movement³¹³ can facilitate members' exchange. Women may be more able to discuss an issue such as patriarchy in the absence of its chief beneficiaries; men may find it easier to examine their sexism in the absence of its chief victims. Caucuses may not foster inter-caucus friendship but clearly they can promote intra-caucus friendship. That they cannot promote both sorts is not a strong argument against them.³¹⁴ As long as they promote one -- and do not create excessive harm³¹⁵ -- they are worthwhile.³¹⁶

312 These could also be contexts in which joy and sorrow are shared. Thus, by encouraging their formation, the movement promotes opportunities for the performance of another friendly act.

313 I mean, more precisely, ordinary members of the movement. Caucuses cannot be set-up by the leadership and given to the various constituencies.

314 Inter-caucus friendships can, of course, be developed in other areas of movement life, eg., at rallies and parties.

315 It is conceivable, eg., that they could polarize movement constituencies. On the other hand, by helping members to gain confidence they might bring constituencies together.

316 Of course their ability to promote friendship is not the only reason for organizing caucuses.

I said earlier that, to promote living together, the movement need not foster the sharing of dwellings. This is true. But this does not mean that such a project would not be beneficial here. On the contrary, movement-organized communal living arrangements could be highly conducive to the exchange of ideas. The movement could organize at least two sorts of set-up: communes³¹⁷ -- in which the level of sharing would be high, members co-operating in, *inter alia*, the maintenance of a home, preparation of meals, and perhaps the growing of food -- and shared living quarters, where members would inhabit the same house or apartment but satisfy the necessities of life individually. Naturally, a hybrid -- which involves more sharing than the latter arrangement but less than the former -- is also possible. From a friendship-making point of view, greater interaction seems preferable; for the more things done communally the greater the opportunities for dialogue. From my own experience, I know that a deeply shared life offers numerous occasions for discussion. Shopping together, we debate the politics of food -- "We can't buy those oranges - they're South African; we can't buy that tuna as the netting kills porpoises" -- at the communal meal we discuss adventures of the day and romance; helping each other with school work, we

317 I assume that, at least for the time being, movement communes will operate within the formal economy. Later, perhaps, they could follow Rudolf Bahro and offer a way "to effect an exit from the formal economy..." (*Building the Green Movement*, Philadelphia: New Society Publishers. 1986. p.57.) Even remaining within the formal economy they can, of course, foster friendship.

argue about philosophy and literature. While the commune is preferable to the shared living quarters arrangement, the latter is certainly not to be discarded; for it too affords opportunities for interchange, especially if its members occasionally eat together.³¹⁸

But what would the movement actually do here ? Without going into great detail, I would say it could begin by calling upon the social convener or appointing a communal living organizer.³¹⁹ The convener or organizer would be responsible for tracking down inexpensive accomodation, and for finding members to live in it. Advertising this service in movement publications and at events, he/she would not only provide members with lists of addresses and the names of others seeking accomodation³²⁰, but would also suggest the whole idea of communal living to those who had not considered it. People should not be bullied into living together, but there is nothing wrong with vigorously publicizing its benefits.

The housing proposals, like others made here, will not appeal to everyone. Members with small children, for example -- overburdened already -- may be reluctant to take on the chores of communal living. Couples may resent the commune's relative lack of privacy. And again the movement

318 Here each member would buy her/his own food and prepare it alone, but sit down to the table with others.

319 Clearly this would be a part-time , voluntary job.

320 If the organizer had time, he/she might bring together members with similar interests, thereby furthering friendship (i.e., the recognition of sameness) even more.

has to determine whether the work involved in this project is justified by its likely benefits. Housing arrangements need not occupy a large portion of organizers' time -- especially as the number of members seeking accomodation at a given moment is generally not great -- but whether any time can be given to them depends on the particular group's resources. What I will say is that if this project is undertaken -- and peaceniks come to share a dwelling -- significant opportunities will be created for members to live, and grow familiar , with one another.

One special communal living arrangement is the peace camp. Set up at places such as Greenham Common and Parliament Hill, it invites members to break the normal pattern of their lives and become, if only for a while, full-time protesters. Naturally only a small number of peaceniks are able to participate fully -- that is, actually take up residence at the camp. But for those who do -- and even for those who only visit -- it offers a fine opportunity for intellectual interchange.³²¹ One of the Greenham women writes: "We try to work it out so that when women commit themselves fully to moving here and making it their home, *sharing knowledge with them is a priority*. We

321 Of course interchange will not always be easy here. Referring to a peace camp organized to protest Boeing's production of cruise missiles, one writer explains: "Because we were living together, the Peace Camp took on many of the characteristics of a dysfunctional family." "Looking Back: The Women's Peace Camps in Perspective" by Rachel Lederman in *Exposing Nuclear Phallacies*, p. 254.

have to give lots of time to that."³²² (emphasis added) In Brighton, England "women set up a peace camp [which]... was very well supported for two months and provided an opportunity for many women to get to know each other and to plan other activities."³²³

Finally, in concluding this point, let me say that thoughts are shared not only through discussion. The movement could promote Aristotelian living together by encouraging members, for example, to read each other's writing, view each other's art, and listen to each other's music. Movement-organized art shows, publications³²⁴, and concerts featuring members' work could all be useful here.

Also definitive of friendship are the offering of good will³²⁵ and affection. The movement's job is to encourage the repetition -- and ideally the long term practice -- of these offerings among its members. Aristotle explains that

322 Shushu Al-Sabbagh, quoted in *Greenham Common: Women at the Wire* by B. Harford and S. Hopkins, London: The Women's Press. 1984. p. 25.

323 A.Cook and G.Kirk, *Greenham Women Everywhere*, London: Pluto Press. 1983. p. 60. I assume that thoughts were shared both when members were getting to know one another and when they were planning events. And I assume, too, that at least some of the "many women" involved were peace movement members either visiting, or residing at, the camp.

324 These need not be narrowly political; the movement could help to organize a members' poetry journal whose themes are not generally considered political. Love poetry, for example, could be included.

325 Of course true friends do not merely wish for one another's good; they actually do what is good for one another. How can the movement encourage this friendly practice so that members can become friends? The same way it promotes good will: by helping members to become virtuous. For surely when we are virtuous we deserve not only others' good will but also their good actions.

if the showing of good will " goes on for a long time and reaches the point of familiarity, it becomes friendship..."³²⁶ (emphasis added) I am tackling the problems of promoting affection and good will in the same section because they have the same solution. The movement helps its members to give and receive these things by helping members to become worthy of them, that is, by helping them to become virtuous. Member A can feel good will³²⁷ and affection toward Member B when A perceives B's moral excellence.³²⁸ In a word, the movement can help members to deserve good will and affection. It cannot, of course, guarantee that they will actually receive these things. It can offer opportunities for the development of virtue which members do not take advantage of; and even if it leads members down a road which culminates in the possession of virtue, there is no certainty that virtue will receive its due: We do not always get what we deserve.³²⁹

The critic will immediately raise the following

326 *Nic. Ethics* Book Nine, 1167a 11 - 12. Of course the good will must be mutual and both parties must be aware of it. Aristotle points this out in Book Eight 1156a 3 - 5.

327 *Nic. Ethics* Book Nine 1167a 18 - 20.

328 True, affection for another can also be based on the other's pleasantness or usefulness. For we feel affection for "what is good, pleasant, or useful." (Book Eight, 1155b 18 - 19) But my concern here is with building true friendship; hence I want to encourage one member's affection for another to be based on the latter's goodness.

329 Members may be virtuous (ie, worthy of affection) but unable to convince each other of this fact. And in this case they may not receive the affection and friendship they deserve. "One cannot extend friendship to or be a friend of another person until each partner has impressed the other that he is worthy of affection..." *Nic. Ethics* Book Eight, 1156b 27 - 29. (emphasis added)

objection: Let us assume that the movement can help peaceniks to become good and that, recognizing each other's goodness, members come to feel good will for one another. Are they now on the road to friendship? Only if each has good will for the other for the other's sake.³³⁰ The problem is: How can the movement ensure that members' good will is born of the proper motivation? Again, the movement cannot ensure anything. It is quite possible that members will come to have good will for one another not for the other's sake but for their own; that is, they may have good will for Member X because the latter is useful or pleasant to them.³³¹ But what the movement can do is enhance the likelihood of members offering good will selflessly. To the extent that it helps members to become morally good, it increases the chances of their receiving good will (and indeed friendship) for their own sake.³³² For if we are good it is possible for others to give us their good will precisely because we are good, that is, to offer us good will for our own sake, and not because of what we do for

330 A true friend, we recall, is "a person who wishes for and does what is good or what appears to him to be good for his friends's sake..." *Nic. Ethics Book Nine*, 1166a 2 - 3. (emphasis added) [To wish for what is good for X is to have good will for X.]

331 Aristotle questions at least once whether Member X would be receiving good will at all: "But if someone wishes to do good to another in the hope of gaining advancement through him, he does not seem to have good will for that person, but rather for himself..." *Nic. Ethics Book Nine* 1167a 15 - 17.

332 I do not want to say that the movement makes possible the offering of good will for another's sake. For clearly some members will be virtuous -- and hence able to receive selfless good will -- prior to joining the movement.

them. 333

So how can the movement help members to become virtuous ? Let me suggest two approaches: First, it can help them to overcome certain vices and, second, it can encourage, and provide opportunities for, the commission of virtuous acts. I will discuss the first approach only briefly as it seems to be of less interest to Aristotle.

Clearly there are many vices of which we would like to free ourselves . But let me look only at two (a pair which movement members sometimes engage in) : racist and sexist behavior. These can be unjust in the Aristotelian sense because they can involve giving members who are equal in the relevant respect (eg., movement experience) unequal distributions of some good (eg., decision-making power): White males will typically get more than they deserve, black females less.³³⁴ One way to combat this problem is through

333 Of course to be friends, members must also be aware of one another's good will. Mutual but unrevealed good will is not sufficient. Whether the movement can encourage members to show their good will -- and hence achieve awareness of it -- is not clear. But perhaps the close contact of intensive movement projects invites this display. At the very least, it allows opportunities for it.

334 This is unjust because "Everyone agrees that in distributions the just share must be given on the basis of what one deserves, though not everyone would name the same criterion of deserving..." *Nic.Ethics* Book Five, 1131a 25 - 27. Just what the material principle for distribution (i.e., "criterion of deserving") of peace movement power should be need not concern us here. The point is that whatever the material principle is (experience, knowledge, etc.), sexism and racism are unjust because they assign different benefits to those who, in the relevant sense, are equal. Patriarchy, which perpetuates sexism, "is men having more power, both personally and politically, than women of the same rank." "More power than we want: Masculine Sexuality and Violence" in *Off Their Backs... and on our own*

caucuses. Caucuses of oppressed groups (gays, blacks, women) can alert the membership to its oppressive behavior and offer remedies. "The anti-war organization in a particular city would have a women's caucus and a black caucus which would use their special perspectives to enrich the organization's approaches and guard against internal oppressions."³³⁵ One solution, offered by the Canadian Peace Alliance, is to insist as far as possible on gender parity. Fifty per cent of the Alliance's committee members, spokespeople, and office staff are supposed to be women. Clearly this procedure will not remove all aspects of sexism, but by furthering equality of power it pushes the movement in the direction of justice.³³⁶ And by encouraging men to support the gender parity program, the movement encourages men to move away from their sexist behavior and toward a behavior which counters sexism.

One good way to get men to challenge their sexism is to suggest they raise the issue in their caucuses. Here, free of overly critical voices, men can talk candidly about their oppressive behavior and seek ways out of it.³³⁷ They can commit themselves to fighting sexism -- their own or others' -- and to supporting the women's movement.³³⁸ And by

two feet. p. 17. (emphasis added)

335 Michael Albert, "Lessons from the Sixties" in *Beyond Survival*, p. 73.

336 The assumption is that, because males and females are equally deserving of power, they should enjoy it in equal numbers.

337 Do not expect miracles, of course.

338 This point was suggested in "Understanding and Fighting Sexism: A call to men" in *Off Their Backs ... and on our*

participating in a caucus, they can embark upon this difficult process supported by other men. The authors of "Overcoming masculine oppression in mixed groups" argue that "We [men] should take responsibility for interrupting a brother who is exhibiting behavior which is oppressive to others and prohibits his own growth."³³⁹ And they add: "Men's groups must affirm the human qualities of men and be a space in which men can reclaim those qualities through trust and support."³⁴⁰ By urging men to join caucuses and to find ways out of their sexist behavior, the movement can help men to overcome a vice and thus move toward virtue.

But let me turn to the second or positive approach. It seems to me the movement can encourage the commission of several sorts of virtuous acts -- I will discuss only just and courageous ones -- and in so doing promote virtue among its members. To be sure, the performance of virtuous acts is not sufficient to produce virtue in us but clearly it is necessary.³⁴¹ One way the movement can foster the performance of just acts is by organizing³⁴², and urging attendance at,³⁴³ rallies which call for a transfer of funds

own two feet p. 15. [Hereafter: *Off Their Backs*]

339 "Overcoming masculine oppression in mixed groups" in *Off Their Backs*, p.28.

340 *Ibid.* p. 31.

341 Another necessary condition is that we do the act because it is noble.

342 And in organizing rallies, members can develop other elements of friendship, such as familiarity and living together.

343 Rally attendance can be promoted through the usual methods: posterings, ads in movement publications, press releases and press conferences, door-to-door canvassing, etc.

from nuclear weapons production to social services. By attending these rallies members engage in an act (namely, demonstration) which works toward rectification. If the rally moves the government even slightly in this direction, that is, if it gets the government to start transferring funds, then rally attendance -- which presumably contributed to this outcome -- is an act of rectificatory justice.³⁴⁴

Let me explain. I take as a premise that the production of new nuclear weapons -- that is, new world-threatening instruments -- is vicious. The weapons cannot be justified on the grounds that they are needed for deterrence because the superpowers already have adequate deterrents.³⁴⁵ The weapons serve to complicate arms control and disarmament, and increase the risk of accidental war. I also assume that money spent on these new weapons is money that, in some sense, is taken from social services spending. It is money that social services need but which is unavailable to them because it has been appropriated by the military. Now if producing new nuclear weapons is wrong and comes at the expense of social services spending³⁴⁶, rectificatory

344 Of course, there is no guarantee that the rally will bring about the desired effect. In this case the ralliers merely attempted to carry out an act of rectificatory justice. True, they did not develop the virtue justice but, by not fearing the performance of a just act, (and by fearing nuclear weapons), they developed another virtue, namely courage.

345 Some philosophers (eg., Anthony Kenny) have argued that nuclear deterrence is a morally bankrupt policy. I am not taking a position on this here. My point is simply that, even if one believes nuclear deterrence is morally tenable, new nuclear weapons production cannot be justified.

346 And I assume this sort of spending is not, in general,

justice demands a transfer of funds. A person who helps to bring that about is, in her activity, doing a just act.³⁴⁷ Ross, discussing rectificatory justice, states that "the wrongful act is reckoned as having brought equal gain to the wrongdoer and loss to his victim; it brings A to the position $A + C$, and B to the position $B - C$. The judge's task is to find the arithmetical mean between these, and this he does by transferring C from A to B..."³⁴⁸ Notice that I need not prove that social spending is a virtuous act; I need only argue that producing new nuclear weapons is wrong, and that this wrongful act brings X dollars gain to the wrongdoer (the military-industrial complex) and X dollars loss to the victim (social spending)³⁴⁹ There may well be other ways in which the movement can stimulate the doing of just acts³⁵⁰; my concern here is simply to suggest

vicious.

347 Provided, of course, that the act is done voluntarily. But attendance at a rally, at least in most situations, is voluntary; that is, it fulfills Aristotle's criteria for a voluntary act: "an act which lies in the agent's power to perform, performed by the agent in full knowledge and without ignorance either of the person acted on, the instrument used, or the result intended by his action."

Nic. Ethics, Book Five, 1135a 23 - 25.

348 W.D. Ross (Tr.) *Ethica Nicomachea* ("The Works of Aristotle," ed. W.D. Ross, Vol. IX.) Oxford, 1925. as quoted in *Nic. Ethics* (Ostwald, Trans.) p. 121.

349 It is difficult, of course, to say that the gain and loss are precisely equal. But even if they are not, the point remains: Justice demands some transfer of funds from the wrongdoer to the victim. (Not, of course, as punishment, but in order to "restore the equilibrium." *Nic. Ethics* Book Five, 1132a 9 - 10.)

350 The movement might, for example, encourage men to visit women's peace camps and do menial labour, thus freeing the women to develop themselves. This, it could be argued, is an act of rectificatory justice: It seeks to give back to women something taken from them (largely by men) all through

one of them.

Courageous acts are ones in which an individual, *inter alia*, fears what ought to be feared and does not fear what should not be. A noble death, according to Aristotle, ought not to be feared³⁵¹; disrepute, on the other hand, should be.³⁵² On the battlefield, one acts courageously if one fights for a just cause and does not worry about dying. The peace movement's job is to help us to fear only those things which really merit this emotion. Discovering which things ought and which ought not to be feared is never simple. But surely Aristotle would agree that we should not fear the commission of just acts (or acts which seek to remedy injustice) provided that their doing involves little or no vice. As I mentioned earlier, I believe that producing new world-threatening weapons is wrong³⁵³, and that non-violent

history: time of their own. But whether men alive today should pay for the wrongs done by their fathers is a difficult question to answer. [This whole idea came to me after reading a passage of Carolyn Taylor's in *Greenham Common: Women at the Wire*: "[at Greenham Common] the men for the most part were happy to do an ample share of the menial tasks and stay in the background. Many of us trusted and liked the men and appreciated their support. My letters home at that time were full of community spirit and affection between us all." (p.23) Perhaps the affection toward the men was due to a recognition of their justice.]

351 *Nic. Ethics* Book Three, 1115a 34.

352 *Ibid.* 1115a 12 - 13.

353 If Aristotle could imagine such weapons surely he would be against their manufacture. For they threaten to eradicate even the (practical but not logical) possibility of virtuous behavior. And the weapons makers choose to produce the weapons: "...if a man harms another by choice, he acts unjustly..."*Nic. Ethics* Book Five, 1136a 1 - 2. [Recall that the weapons I have in mind here are the new ones, i.e., those which are not need for deterrence.]

actions which help to transfer funds from this production to social services are just. Thus the movement's task here is to encourage members to fear the former (i.e., weapons production) but not the latter, and to act accordingly. It has to help members to overcome unreasonable fears³⁵⁴ -- eg., fears of embarrassment at joining a just demonstration, fears of ridicule from non-participants and even, perhaps, fear of arrest³⁵⁵ -- and to act mindful of reasonable ones.³⁵⁶

One simple suggestion is to encourage members to share their fears of activism with others, especially fellow caucus or affinity group members. The authors of *Greenham Women Everywhere* write: "It is only by talking through such fears [of doing protest actions, and more specifically of being embarrassed or arrested, or of losing others' respect] and seeing that others share them that they cease to be so monumental and become less of a block to taking action."³⁵⁷ No one is saying that airing fears miraculously removes them. But talking with others, especially those who have done the things which worry us -- eg., undergone arrest --

354 These are unreasonable because they are fears about doing just acts.

355 Would Aristotle ever allow us to break the law? Although in general Aristotle advocates adherence, Ostwald writes that "Aristotle... recognizes the possibility of unjust laws." Ostwald, *Nic Ethics*, p.140, Note 65.

356 For Aristotle, acting on a reasonable fear would mean, eg., joining a just war because one fears the disrepute of not joining it; today, one acts on a reasonable fear when one works to prevent nuclear war.

357 A Cook and G.Kirk, *Greenham Women Everywhere*, London: Pluto Press. 1983. p.32.

can sometimes ease our minds. By revealing that they too have had our fears, fellow peaceniks can sometimes help us to deflate them, perhaps to the point where we are able to do the feared activity (eg., door-to-door peace canvassing). And in doing the activity repeatedly, we often find that our worry decreases even further.³⁵⁸ So through dialogue with other peaceniks and by actually doing the worrisome act, we can sometimes overcome our unreasonable fears.

But the movement can help us in this endeavor not only by 'providing' others with whom to talk. It can also offer us a moral exemplar³⁵⁹, that is, someone who encourages us to, *inter alia*, worry about the genuine objects of fear, discard the illusory ones, and act. The exemplar could be a member of our affinity group, caucus, or commune. Aristotle explains: "We may also get some sort of training in virtue or excellence from living together with good men..."³⁶⁰ The problem, of course, is that not every grouping will contain such a member, that is, one who is already virtuous and able to help others become so. But if the movement cannot offer every peace community a live-in exemplar, it can certainly offer them a 'visiting' one. It can offer them the life and lectures of persons such as Dave Dellinger, E.P. Thompson and Dr. Helen Caldicott. Let me speak briefly about the last of these.

358 The fear of embarrassment while doing political street theatre, for example, might be dissipated by repeating performances.

359 This point was suggested by Prof. James Tully.

360 Nic. *Ethics* Book Nine, 1170a 11 - 12.

Caldicott influences us both by offering her life as a model and through the urgings of her talks.³⁶¹ She has consistently stressed that, coming deliberately or accidentally, nuclear war is a real possibility and that it, not Soviet takeover, should be our chief concern.³⁶² She has stressed that those who are desperately worried about the current situation are not crazy; on the contrary, what they fear is truly fearful.³⁶³ In an interview with this writer she said, roughly, that the world could be destroyed tonight due to computer error.³⁶⁴ After laying out the situation in its truth, she urges us to act, to try to change it. At a typical talk she will say something like: "There's a nuclear power station in your area. Close it down." She pushes us to transcend the fears which keep us from trying to save the planet.³⁶⁵ The content of her lectures does this explicitly; her position as an exemplar

361 I distinguish Caldicott's role as an exemplar from her role as a lecturer. Thus, even if she does not succeed in the first role (i.e., no one imitates her and becomes courageous), she can still succeed in the second, i.e., the content of her speeches can convince us that nuclear war (but not reasonable steps toward its prevention) is fearful, and that we should act accordingly. Her argument (as opposed to her life) can encourage us to work to overcome unreasonable fears and hence put us on the road toward courage.

362 I gleaned this point from various Caldicott talks; I cannot attribute it to a single source.

363 It would not be courageous to feel no fear at the possibility of nuclear war. "He who exceeds in confidence in a fearful situation is called reckless." *Nic. Ethics Book Three*, 1115b 28.

364 Interview for CIUT-FM (Toronto)'s *Peacetide*, November, 1989.

365 Of course fears of the consequences of activism are not the only things which can prevent activism.

may do it implicitly -- we witness her effort to overcome unreasonable fears in her own life and are sometimes moved to do likewise. Rather than shy away from hostile groups -- groups whose beliefs contradict hers -- she faces them and presents her position. She writes: "Tempers were hot among the supporters of uranium mining in Australia, and I knew these people meant what they said. But I also knew that they had to be spoken to by a physician, if they were to comprehend the full significance of uranium for themselves, their families, and future generations."³⁶⁶ Now there are at least two objections that can be raised here. First, in talking to the supporters of uranium mining, was Caldicott really overcoming a fear? The supporters were hostile but that does not imply that Caldicott feared them. If this is the case, then Caldicott does not present herself as a model of someone who *became* courageous but as someone who *is* courageous. The public can see in her not someone who *came* to fear only what is fearful but who *all along* feared only the right things. But in either case -- whether she demonstrates the process of becoming, or the state of being, courageous -- she is a good model. For in both situations she distinguishes the fearful from the not-to-be-feared and urges us to act with this in mind. The second objection may be more difficult. Granted that Caldicott is some sort of exemplar, how can I prove that people actually copy her?

³⁶⁶ Helen Caldicott, *Nuclear Madness*, Brookline, Mass.: Autumn Press, 1978. p.101.

The fact, of course, is that such a proof is difficult to obtain. For even if I could produce examples of persons who, immediately after studying her life, started developing their courage, it would still not be certain that she was being copied. The persons in question might be copying someone else; they might be copying no one. There is no necessary causal link between their encounter with Caldicott and their development of courage. But what we can say is that the empirical record shows Caldicott to be a highly influential woman. Many persons do attribute the beginning of their activism (or an increase in activism) to her efforts;³⁶⁷ it is at least possible that some are imitating her courageous acts.³⁶⁸

367 Even a brief survey of peace literature attests to this. "Becoming active is more a process of just peeling the layers of denial away. Sometimes just seeing someone speak, like Helen Caldicott, will rip the layers away and you'll realize your own responsibility." Barb Katt, quoted in "Tales of 12 Activists" by F. Crawford, B. Edmondson and H. Cordes, *Utne Reader*, March/April, 1988. p. 78. Describing one of the activists interviewed for the above article, the authors write: "Boakaer grew up in a politically active family, but was never drawn into activism in a big way until she heard Helen Caldicott speak in 1978." "Tales of 12 Activists" p. 73.

368 The following objection may be raised: Earlier in the paper you argue that friends help us to develop courage. Now you say that the movement (by, *inter alia*, offering the opportunity to do courageous acts and by providing exemplars like Helen Caldicott) helps us to develop courage. If the movement can do this without friends, (and hence help us through our impotence), why should it promote friendship? There are at least two replies I can make: First, even if a movement of non-friends could help us with our impotence, it would be much less successful (than a movement of true friends would be) in helping us with our *unheimlichkeit*. Second, the efforts of our friends and the efforts made by the movement (i.e., by its leaders) need not duplicate each other; they can both be helpful but in different ways. While movement exemplars can, to a degree, help us to gain

Finally, let me discuss briefly three other things which, though not acts definitive of friendship, foster this relationship: trust, sameness of project and equality. With respect to the first of these, the movement can be helpful in a few ways. For a start, it can bring to light and try to remove from it organizations the teachings of patriarchy. "Partriarchy teaches us [i.e., men] at very deep levels that we can never be safe with other men (or perhaps with anyone !), for the guard must be kept up lest our vulnerability be exposed and we be taken advantage of."³⁶⁹ My concern for the moment is fostering male-male friendship. As the above quote explains, the patriarchal system makes this difficult. It tells men over and over -- through the schools, the media, popular entertainment, etc. -- that they can never really be secure around one another. The peace movement may not be able to tackle the causes and manifestations of patriarchy in society as a whole. But by countering some of its messages -- for example, by setting up men's caucuses in which trust is shown, or by debunking patriarchy's myths at movement conferences -- the movement

practical wisdom, they cannot always be as effective in this area as our friends are; for the latter are with us continuously and thus are able to offer their corrections and teachings far more frequently. On the other hand, friends are less able to organize an event at which courageous acts can be performed. This is where the movement, in organizing eg., a rally, is highly useful. To develop courage we need to enhance our ability to deliberate, and we need the chance to do courageous acts. The combination of movement events and friends will be more helpful here than either would be on its own.

369 "More Power than we want: Masculine Sexuality and Violence" in *Off Their Backs*, p. 20.

can strive to remove patriarchal doctrine from itself. I do not for a minute underestimate the difficulty of this.

As far as I can tell, the *Nicomachean Ethics* does not explain how we develop trust. Let me propose, then, one way in which it can come about: Members could repeatedly put themselves in situations requiring the assistance of others and discover time and again that that assistance is forthcoming. In other words, they could come to trust others by continually 'testing' them and discovering that they 'pass'. Now by encouraging members to work within affinity groups, the movement can foster trust along these lines.³⁷⁰ Take, for example, the affinity groups' organization of a civil disobedience action. Members in this situation require help from each other of various kinds: emotional, legal, and sometimes financial. There is no guarantee, of course, that the support will be offered. But if it is,³⁷¹ and is offered consistently, trust will likely develop. The movement's role here is a modest one: It encourages members to put themselves in a setting where trust can grow. Can it not do more than that? Perhaps a little. It might, for instance, hold planning meetings at

370 Do not these groups presuppose trust among members? They presuppose a certain minimum trust required for their formation. But they also foster trust through their operation.

371 Two reasons why the support would be offered are: the persons involved may be virtuous and thus want to see virtuous persons prosper; and they believe that helping each other will increase the likelihood of this and future actions succeeding. So members may support each other both for their sake and the sake of the action.

which the importance of members' helpfulness is stressed. But I think the movement's power to push us toward trust is limited. It cannot, with much success, tell people how to act and feel.³⁷²

That friends possess certain samenesses has already been established. What I want to say now is that promoting sameness among persons who are not yet friends fosters friendship. Aristotle tells us: "Friendship is present to the extent that men share something in common..."³⁷³ By promoting a sameness of project among non-friends, the movement helps members to take on a characteristic of friends and thus puts them on the road to friendship. That the movement can stimulate samenesses other than that of project is quite possible. It might help us, for example, to have a common telos -- saving the planet, perhaps.³⁷⁴ All I need to show at this point, though, is how it can promote one sort of sameness.

The method here is familiar. The movement encourages sharing of project by making a variety of activities available and inviting participation. Working together on campaigns, newsletters, street theatre³⁷⁵, or peace

³⁷² The movement also encourages members to put themselves in a setting conducive to trust when it urges them to join movement communes. Here members require each other's help in maintaining the dwelling and in providing some of life's necessities. Trust develops when, for example, members pledge to help with the shopping and then do it. The commune here could, of course, be a peace camp.

³⁷³ Nic.Ethics Book Eight, 1159b 29 - 30.

³⁷⁴ But members might have this as their final telos before joining the movement.

³⁷⁵ Here the common project is that of moving audiences.

I camps³⁷⁶, members are holding something in common. Bob Overy writes: "CND united at a local, regional and national level all sorts of highly committed people from different political and social backgrounds who would not normally have worked together."³⁷⁷ (emphasis added) He adds that members are more likely to engage in projects if they are specific, rather than general. He criticizes the Peace Pledge Union's Campaign Against Militarism because "it doesn't present an issue, and hasn't selected a target specific enough to excite mass support and pressure across the country."³⁷⁸ I would add that campaigns should also speak to members' emotions, setting out quite clearly who the victims will be if the campaigns fail.

But the critic will ask: Is sameness of project a fundamental sameness? To answer that, we need to determine whether the projects are entailed in members' character. My response is that they are not. Let us assume that movement members are either partially good or neutral. From the fact that one is the former, it does not follow that one will take on peace movement projects -- one will do some sort of good action³⁷⁹ but not necessarily in the cause of world peace. And if one possesses the latter character, it does

376 Here the common project is, for example, stopping deployment or production of a given weapon.

377 Bob Overy, *How Effective are Peace Movements?*, Montreal: Harvest House. 1982. pp. 23 - 24.

378 *Ibid.* p. 62.

379 Doing good acts of some sort is entailed in a virtuous person's character. Hence true friends' sameness with respect to the kind of action performed is fundamental.

not follow that one will do good of any kind.³⁸⁰ But if sameness of project is not a *fundamental* sameness, it is a sameness nevertheless. And Aristotle suggests that any sort of sameness promotes friendship, at least to some extent: "Friendship is present to the extent that men share something in common..."³⁸¹ (emphasis added) To be sure, true friends hold many *fundamental* samenesses. But that does not imply that they hold no lesser ones, nor that promoting the latter in no way fosters true friendship.³⁸²

Friendship requires not merely the presence of sameness but also the recognition of it.³⁸³ The movement can be useful with respect to the latter as well. By urging us to attend rallies, for example, it pushes us to participate in

380 I assume that legitimate activities carried out as part of the above mentioned peace projects can be morally good acts.

381 Although he does say that friendship is "especially the likeness of those who are similar in virtue" (*Nic. Ethics* Book Eight, 1159b 3), he also tells us that "friendship consists in community" (Book Eight, 1159b 32). In a glossary, Ostwald tells us that "*koinonia* is any kind of group whose members are held together by something they have 'in common' with each other, i.e., by some kind of common bond." *Nic. Ethics*, p. 309. (emphasis added) The latter suggests that any kind of 'holding in common' (any sameness) contributes to the making of community, and hence friendship. (Though of course trivial samenesses will contribute only slightly.)

382 It is worth noting that, in helping members to become good, the movement also fosters a *fundamental* sameness: sameness with respect to the kind of actions performed.

383 Aristotle may not make this point explicitly, but surely he would agree with it. In arguing that friendship entails mutual awareness of good will, he asks: "...how can they [the two parties] be called 'friends' when they are unaware how they are disposed toward one another?" (*Nic. Ethics* Book Eight, 1156a 2 - 3.) If sameness is to play a role in persons' friendship -- and it must -- it must be recognized by them.

events where our oneness with others can be felt. Caldicott writes: "Our marches yielded many practical results...

[T]hey produced a tremendous feeling of unity and solidarity among people from all classes of society."³⁸⁴ And surely we can read "a feeling of unity and solidarity" as implying, *inter alia*, members' recognition of being in a common struggle. David Dellinger explains: "Despite the known failings of the organizers and the divisions of opinion among planners, speakers, and other participants about causes and cures, the dominant impression most everyone goes home with [after a rally] is of empowerment through solidarity and action."³⁸⁵ (emphasis added)

Before I turn to my final topic -- ways in which the movement can publicize the fact it fosters friendship -- let me say a couple of words about promoting members' equality. The first thing to note is that the movement may not be able to promote equality in all areas. Aristotle is particularly concerned that friends give one another (proportionately or strictly) equal good will and affection.³⁸⁶ I have argued that the movement can stimulate the offering of these

384 Caldicott, *Nuclear Madness*, p. 105.

385 D. Dellinger, "The Bread is Rising" in *Beyond Survival*, p. 27. I assume that Dellinger means we have an impression not only of our empowerment but also of our solidarity with other peaceniks. That is, not only do we have this solidarity, but we know we have it. We have an impression of it.

386 "Thus, each partner [a good man] both loves his own good and makes an equal return in the good he wishes for his partner and in the pleasure he gives him. (*Nic. Ethics*, Book Eight, 1157b 34 - 37.) "...people who give affection to one another according to each other's merit are lasting friends..." (Book Eight, 1159a 36 - 37).

things, but I have not claimed that its efforts will result in the right amounts being given. Thus, perceiving one another's virtue, members may offer good will and affection but not according to the 'rules' of equality: strictly equal offerings when the persons are the same in virtue, proportionately equal offerings when they differ. It may be the case that, through their movement work, members become just and thus give their affection and good will in the proper quantities. If this occurs, my argument is stronger. But it is possible that, while members develop some virtues in their work (eg., courage), they will not develop justice. And in this case they might not observe the rules of equality.

But even if the movement cannot foster equality in every sphere, it can certainly do so in some. I want to argue that it should promote (among members) strict equality of opportunity to gain power and proportionate equality of possession of power, and I want to suggest how this promotion can be done.³⁸⁷ When I say "power" I mean decision-making power, the ability to influence movement direction and campaigns. Now strict equality is primary (and proportionate secondary) in friendship, Aristotle tells

387 Would Aristotle agree that equality with respect to power, and the opportunity to gain it, fosters friendship? He does not say so explicitly. But at least one statement suggests that equality of any sort (between persons) fosters friendship -- though equality in virtue is particularly conducive to it. Aristotle says that "Friendship is equality..." (Nic. Ethics Book Eight, 1159b 3). My claim is that working for equality of power promotes friendship in at least a small way.

us.³⁸⁸ Presumably that means the former is more conducive to producing friendship. Why do I argue that members' power ought to be *proportionately* equal? I do so because this form of equality better meets the twin needs of stimulating friendship and being effective.³⁸⁹ A movement which granted members -- from the young person who joined yesterday to the 'veteran' of forty years -- exactly equal say might produce more friendship (though veterans' resentment could be a problem) but is likely to be very inefficient.

Proportionate equality, on the other hand, satisfies (at least to some extent) the need for equality and is far more likely to produce a sound organization.³⁹⁰ It says that members' power varies directly with their merit. I propose that, for purposes of the peace movement, "merit" be defined as knowledge and experience. The former implies some understanding of theory and strategy; the latter implies the person in question has put her ideas into practice.³⁹¹ I argue for *strict* equality of opportunity -- that is, for

388 *Nic.Ethics* Book Eight, 1158b 32 - 33.

389 Effectiveness is no small matter when the job is preventing nuclear war.

390 The sort of skills needed to run a successful movement are many; they include organizational and strategic skills. They are developed through experience. Allowing a neophyte to have power equal to that of an old-timer generally entails giving substantial power to a person who is not very well equipped to use it.

391 Michael Albert seems to agree with my position here when he writes that political education ought to help members to "develop a theoretical and strategic literacy commensurate to participating equally in movement decision-making." ("Lessons from the Sixties" in *Beyond Survival*, p. 72.) In other words, this literacy is necessary (or helpful) if one is to hold decision-making power.

the policy of placing no substantial or formal blocks in the way of members' rise to power, and of helping to gain power those members who need help³⁹² -- as it excellently serves the cause of friendship and seems to entail no serious inefficiency.

If gaining movement power is a matter of gaining knowledge and experience, the question becomes how can we promote equal opportunities for gaining these things ? Because they come, at least in part, through participation in movement activities, we need to ensure that nothing³⁹³ stands in the way of this participation. In the case of women, this entails providing such things as childcare during events and meetings.³⁹⁴ When such care is not available, mothers often have to stay home. Leslie Cagan writes: "... it is the relegation of women's issues to secondary importance that denies women full participation in this movement."³⁹⁵

But fostering equality of opportunity is not simply a matter of lowering the barriers to participation. For women can participate and still have fewer chances (than do men) to develop their knowledge and experience. They can attend

392 This is done not to give some members more opportunities but to help the disadvantaged to possess as many opportunities as others have.

393 That is, nothing within the movement's control.

394 Clearly childcare ought to be carried out by both parents. When I speak of it as a woman's concern, I mean that it is traditionally this. The point is that, as things stand now, lack of childcare will generally curtail women's -- and not men's -- participation in the movement.

395 "Feminism and Militarism" in *Beyond Survival*, p. 105.

meetings, for example, yet find they are blocked from speaking. No formal mechanism stops them; it is simply that their male counterparts are unwilling to give up the floor. And when women are, in effect, excluded from the debate³⁹⁶ they are denied an opportunity to gain the decision-making experience which lets one attain power. There are at least a few remedies for this situation. One is to raise the issue at a meeting, stress its importance, and charge the men's caucus with the task of helping males to modify their behavior. Change in this area is difficult but not impossible. Members of a men's anti-sexism group write: "We can also refrain from over-participation in conversations and meetings...[W]e can fight these pulls to take over a situation by trusting others to take and carry out responsibility, to make the right decisions, to hear our good thinking and take it into account."³⁹⁷ It is a matter of men going against society's teaching -- which urges them to succeed and dominate -- and showing some moderation.³⁹⁸ In situations where the men do not change, movement leaders may decide that, after a 'loudmouth' has spoken a reasonable number of times, he will not be recognized at the meeting

396 "Women and men who are less assertive than others or who don't feel comfortable participating in a competitive atmosphere are, in effect, cut off from the interchange of experience and ideas." "More Power than we want: Masculine Sexuality and Violence" in *Off Their Backs* p. 27.

397 "Understanding and Fighting Sexism: A call to men" in *Off Their Backs*. p. 13.

398 In restraining themselves at meetings, men act moderately and may develop the virtue of moderation -- which makes them worthy (or more worthy) of others' good will and affection.

again. This will not, of course, guarantee that women speak but will at least open some space for them. The chair of the meeting might also want to do something along the lines of the Greenham women: ensure that each person has a chance to speak by recording the names of those who did not speak, and formally offering them a chance to do so at the end of the meeting. "We try to give every woman a voice -- as in meetings where every woman speaks in turn around the circle -- and this makes us listen to each other."³⁹⁹ This would not preclude some persons from talking more than others but would ensure that every person is given a chance to speak at least once. Thus it moves the movement in the direction of equality of opportunity.

Fostering equality of opportunity also entails (in this situation) making equally available to members the kinds of jobs which bring the relevant knowledge and experience. These tend to be leadership positions. Making them available to all qualified persons is not just a matter of holding up no formal barriers to them. It may also involve placing some restrictions on those who traditionally horde them: male participants. Men are, in general, taught to want and strive for these posts; women are taught to play a more passive role. If no restrictions are placed on male leadership ambitions, men may 'buy up' all the decision-

399 B. Harford and S.Hopkins, *Greenham Common: Women at the Wire*, London: The Women's Press. 1984. p.3. The idea of recording the names of those who do not speak and offering them a chance to do so at the end is my own.

making positions, leaving none for women. If women are to have opportunities to become leaders, males may have to take a back seat on occasion, either voluntarily or due to the movement's insistence. Insisting on a male-female rotation⁴⁰⁰ of coordinator and spokesperson roles may be useful here. Countering the male tendency to dominate, rotation would ensure that half the time women did the jobs which bring power. The point is not to disempower men, but rather to ensure that they have no more than their fair share of opportunities. And, as history shows us, this concern is no idle worry. Referring to the American peace movement of the 1960s, Michael Albert writes: "... it was in their roles within the movement that activist women first discovered their own oppression and became feminists. *They did the cleaning, the organizing, the filing.* They provided the nurturance and often the strength and continuity of the movement. *But men made the decisions, played starring roles, and took credit for successes.*"⁴⁰¹ (emphasis added)

Publicizing the fact that it promotes true friendship among members will not be an easy task for the movement. Some will think it an act of absurdity. But if the movement

400 "Rotation of representatives and other devices will maximize the egalitarian character of the [political] structures, and reduce the incentive for people to develop and maintain masculine styles." "Understanding and Fighting Sexism: A call to men" in *Off Their Backs*, p. 9.

401 Michael Albert, "Lessons from the Sixties" in *Beyond Survival*, p. 51. The point is that, because men had more leadership positions, they had more opportunities than did women to develop the knowledge and experience which make one worthy of power.

does not make people aware of its activities on this front, how will its promotion of friendship be a magnet? Some will argue that the movement's efforts to produce *philia* do not have to be specially announced. Word of mouth, it is claimed, will make clear to the public what the movement is doing. Naturally, I have no objection to the spread of information in this manner. But I believe it is insufficient. For it will not get the information out to citizens who know no one in the movement. To reach these persons we need to undertake an advertising campaign. And that is the heart of my very modest proposal.

Let me be more clear. I am not suggesting the movement undertake an ad campaign whose only message is 'the movement helps you make friends'.⁴⁰² Rather, I am saying that advertising which the movement already does should push the friendship theme. Street posters inviting participation in a rally could highlight a linked social event and, using graphics, depict movement friends working together or having fun at a festival.⁴⁰³ Ads in mainstream and movement publications, or on the radio, could operate similarly. Introductory movement literature -- for example, a pamphlet introducing the Toronto Disarmament Network -- could outline a group's history, positions and activities, concluding with

402 Movement funds are scarce. I doubt such a campaign would be feasible since it would have to come in addition to a campaign advertising movement events.

403 Granted, this might suggest that movement members have friends, not that the movement promotes friendship. But at least it links the movement and friendship in people's minds.

a statement about how it builds friendship. Pamphlets might even include testimonials. Humorous as this suggestion may sound, it could be effective. Persons advertising resorts, summer camps, and holiday packages certainly use this technique. They want the public to associate their service with enjoyment, and thus in their literature quote the words of satisfied participants. Would the movement do so badly to include the following statement -- made by a Greenham Common activist -- in its introductory material ? "I'd never been to a peace camp before. I didn't really know what was going on here. But the warmth and the love that I was greeted with, the total absence of suspicion, was a fantastic feeling and I really felt that I'd made the right decision [in coming to Greenham Common.]"⁴⁰⁴ Certainly some persons -- myself included -- are a little uncomfortable about selling the movement the way one sells trips to Jamaica. A thorough debate has to be launched to determine whether members approve of this approach. But advertising is not per se vicious. If, using honest means⁴⁰⁵, it encourages persons to do a good thing -- and a thing they are at liberty to refuse -- I see no harm in it. Whether my advertising scheme is feasible for a particular group has to be decided case by case. But I see no moral

404 Sarah van Veen quoted in *Greenham Women Everywhere*, p. 29.

405 And they would be: The movement would be telling citizens that it promotes friendship and actually doing this promotion. Obviously, guaranteeing that citizens will make friends is wrong.

objection to it. The urgency of the situation is such that, provided they are decent and plausible, unusual approaches should be tried.

There may be no issue more pressing than that which concerns the nuclear disarmament movement. My assumption throughout the paper has been that, if it is to succeed⁴⁰⁶, it must be massive.⁴⁰⁷ Thus, my overarching interest here has been to suggest a way⁴⁰⁸ in which it can draw and retain citizens. David Kraft, an organizer with Greenpeace, writes: "Ultimately lobbying, political campaigns and other tactics will only succeed if they have the active and informed support of thousands (even millions) of people."⁴⁰⁹

406 Obviously, being massive is not sufficient for success.

407 Numerous authors take this position. "The movement needs to involve very large numbers in order to be effective." R. Babin, E. Shragge, and J.- G. Vaillancourt, "Directions for the Canadian Peace Movement" in *Roots of Peace*, Toronto: Between the Lines. 1986. p. 175. David Cayley writes: "It is clear that the goals of world peace and sustainable development can only be achieved by a mass movement." "View from the Summit", *The Journal of Wild Culture*, Vol.I, No.4 p.12. David Kraft, formerly of the Toronto Disarmament Network, explains: "Only an enormous social movement can effect any serious social change." "Perspectives for 1986", an unpublished paper prepared for the Toronto Disarmament Network. p.3.

408 That other ways exist I do not doubt. I claim only to offer one good way.

409 David Kraft, "Perspectives for 1986", an unpublished paper prepared for the Toronto Disarmament Network, p. 3.

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