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"Mitteilungen für die Truppe" : Ideology in Publication

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November 1994

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies  
and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the degree of Master of Arts.

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## Abstract

A vast amount of literature has been published about Germany's campaign in Russia during the Second World War. New attention has been focused on the role played by indoctrination in the conduct of the ideological war.

This thesis examines the thematic content of the German Armed Forces circular Mitteilungen für die Truppe for a period that coincides with the climactic confrontation on the Eastern Front. It illustrates the presence of a coherent propaganda policy designed to boost troop resilience.

The data have been derived from copies of the primary source, namely part of the captured German records microfilmed at Alexandria, Virginia. The evidence is augmented through other primary and secondary sources.

## Abrégé

Il existe une vaste gamme de littérature sur le conflit entre les allemands et les russes pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale. Un nouvel coup d'oeil à été jetté sur le rôle de l'indoctrination dans la conduite de la guerre idéologique.

Cette thèse examine les contenants thématique de la petite journal militaire Mitteilungen für die Truppe pour la période qui coïncide au moment de la confrontation sur la frontière Est. Elle démontre la présence d'une politique de propagandes cohérent et mise sur pied pour augmenté la résilience des combattants.

Les données sont obtenues de sources primaires, notamment une partie des rapports Allemand captivé et mis sur microfilm à Alexandria, Virginia. A celles-ci ont été ajouté d'autres sources primaires ainsi que sources secondaires.

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## Preface

Mitteilungen für die Truppe was a single sheet, instructional and propaganda leaflet manufactured for the benefit of all non-commissioned personnel in the German Armed Forces during the Second World War. In view of the mass audience it catered to, the scant attention that it has received is not deserved. To illustrate, the long-time chief of the office which produced Mitteilungen wrote a book about his department after the war and failed to even mention this publication.<sup>1</sup> It should not be considered as just another instrument of propaganda in the tide that set Germany awash in those years. Its importance lay in the part it played in the struggle for the hearts and minds of troops who protected the political regime of Nazi Germany by holding firm the boundaries of the Third Reich. Through such an indoctrination campaign it was hoped to maximize the performance of the steadily diminishing manpower resources and to thus increase their military value.

Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz produced a study shortly after the war which concluded that the social organisation and the primary groups of the army were paramount as factors in Wehrmacht cohesion and longevity. In their view, the key to the attitude and behaviour of the soldier was his relationship with his company --the primary group. National Socialist

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<sup>1</sup> Hasso von Wedel, Die Propagandatruppen der deutschen Wehrmacht (Neckargemund, 1962), passim.

political ideology had only a slight effect.' In their study Shils and Janowitz mistakenly alleged that Mitteilungen was conceived for "the indoctrination of the officer corps".'

There is a reference to its existence in the archives in a list of army newspapers<sup>4</sup>, and an all too brief mention in a dissertation.<sup>5</sup> Volker Berghahn took notice of Mitteilungen at the end of the sixties, referring to it in support of his argument for the Nazi Party infiltration of Wehrmacht 'care and guidance for the troops'<sup>6</sup> and again later as ballast for an exposé of propaganda tendencies.<sup>7</sup> In neither of Berghahn's articles, however, was Mitteilungen under examination per se.

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<sup>2</sup> Shils, Edward A. and Morris Janowitz. "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II." Public Opinion Quarterly v.12 (Summer, 1948), p.281ff. It is the discussion of this sentiment which culminates in Professor Bartov's response nearly forty years later, turning the picture upside down and conferring an important role on ideological indoctrination. Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York, Oxford, 1991). Safely and with good reason he admits that the effects of such indoctrination are 'unquantifiable'. Bartov, "Indoctrination and Motivation in the Wehrmacht: the Importance of the Unquantifiable." Journal of Strategic Studies v.9:1 (Great Britain, 1986), pp.16-34.

<sup>3</sup> Shils, p.308.

<sup>4</sup> Gerhard Buck, "Feld- und Soldatenzeitungen des 1. und 2. Weltkrieges im Archiv der Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte." Jahresbibliographie Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte v.39 (Stuttgart, 1967), pp.485-505.

<sup>5</sup> Jeffrey Robert Willis, The Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch: German Military Propaganda and Censorship during World War II (unpublished doctoral dissertation, U. of VA, 1964), p.240.

<sup>6</sup> Volker R. Berghahn, "NSDAP und 'Geistige Führung' der Wehrmacht 1939-45." Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte v.17 (1969), pp.33.

<sup>7</sup> Berghahn, "Tendances de la 'Wehrmachtpropaganda'." Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale v.21 (France, 1971), p.65.

Manfred Messerschmidt gave Mitteilungen substantially more consideration, quoting it at some length. He reviewed editorial trends exhibited in the content in relation to developments in the war, e.g. the apparent hopelessness of the situation faced by Frederick the Great (who nevertheless managed to endure) was brought up at a time when Stalingrad was cut off. Messerschmidt also isolated themes such as 'holy war' and 'Hitler myth'. His judgement placed Mitteilungen with the general body of National Socialist propaganda, which propagated knowledge of the Weltanschauung as part of the campaign to identify Germans with the collective 'National Socialist fate'.<sup>8</sup> Messerschmidt's is the most detailed treatment of Mitteilungen to date, but his purpose is primarily to show up the German Armed Forces Propaganda Office in the service of National Socialism.

Both Berghahn and Messerschmidt believed that ideological training for war played a more prominent role than had been previously admitted. A third author, Werner Stang in East Germany, also subscribed to this view, but his contribution was limited to providing some statistics on distribution of various publications including Mitteilungen.<sup>9</sup>

Within the last decade, Omer Bartov has drawn some attention to Mitteilungen in his monograph on the role of ideology in the 'barbarisation' of warfare on the Russian front.<sup>10</sup> Here

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<sup>8</sup> Manfred Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Zeit der Indoktrination (Hamburg, 1969), pp.322-31, 335-6.

<sup>9</sup> Werner Stang, "Organe und Mittel der militärischen Führung des faschistischen Deutschlands zur Meinungsmanipulierung besonders der Soldaten des Heeres 1939-1943." Militärsgeschichte 19 Jahrgang, 1/80 (DDR, 1980), p.57ff.

<sup>10</sup> Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare (Basingstoke/Oxford, 1985).



he did his best to smash Shils' theory on the primacy of the primary group as the preserving factor in the Wehrmacht in Russia. Bartov's arguments, especially as they are presented in his recent book, Hitler's Army (note 2), are lucid and convincing.

The works referred to above found Mitteilungen to have been useful as a repository of catch words, slogans, and quotations. It therefore functioned in these works largely as a provider of dressing for whatever line of thought was being expounded. This is true more for Berghahn and Bartov and less for Messerschmidt. But Mitteilungen is worthy of independent study. It has several characteristics which, when taken together, confer on it a uniqueness that incites curiosity.

Firstly, it was directed specifically at the private, or Landser, and not really at anyone else. It was meant, as its title suggests, "für die Truppe", unlike Die Wehrmacht for example, another periodical which was about the military but aimed more at a civilian audience.<sup>11</sup> Secondly, it reached every soldier on every front. It did not represent a particular unit or branch of the Armed Forces. Thirdly, it was a product of one bureau in the Army Propaganda Office. Therefore all troops read the same message.

This author proposes to go beyond the simple indoctrinational content of Mitteilungen to explore the entire picture that its pages portrayed to the soldier. The exploration shall start with some background to the ideological war in the East, a

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<sup>11</sup> Die Wehrmacht would nevertheless make an interesting study. This bi-weekly also originated with OKW but not at WPr. At the beginning of the war 96% of its subscribers were civilian (or at least not in the Wehrmacht). It was urged that Die Wehrmacht circulate below company level, that one copy be available to every 25 men: memo draft initialled by Wedel, Jodl, and Keitel, NAM, T77 roll 1010 fr.2476057-60.

look at the propaganda flow and at the organisation of the propaganda effort. Chapter II will explain the procedure used to analyze Mitteilungen für die Truppe. This will be the first time that a detailed, systematic quantitative approach will be applied to this source, resulting in the tables in the Appendix (the most important being Table D2). The tables serve to rationalize the data base and permit operations such as frequency determinations, in order to test hypotheses and draw meaningful conclusions. For example, by visualizing the place of ideological indoctrination in the model one might be able to judge how much the 'political soldier' concept was part of the propaganda drive directed to the troops. In Chapter III the thematic content of Mitteilungen will be bared and collated. The wide variety of subjects touched upon thus demonstrates the value of the data base and points to the fact that the possibility exists of obtaining relatively precise, objective, and reliable observations. In the concluding chapter the data shall be analyzed for trends or other indicators of policy. The image presented to the troops by Mitteilungen shall be examined for variance with the reality of the front. In doing so, it is hoped that the issue of political indoctrination will be illuminated.

The entire contents of the Mitteilungen für die Truppe under study, with a few regrettable exceptions<sup>12</sup>, can be found at the United States National Archives in microform. In the course of this investigation other documents relating to the Wehrmacht Propagandaamt may be brought forward, but the focus remains on the microfilm frames containing Mitteilungen from the beginning of April 1941 until mid-October 1944.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Nine issues were omitted, see note 81.

<sup>13</sup> National Archives Microfilm (hereafter NAM), series T77, roll 1040 frames 6514391-602, and roll 1041 frames 6514608-946, 6515139-40. To determine if a complete set exists

The author owes considerable thanks to a number of individuals who gave their time and patience to this very personal task. First and foremost is Professor Peter C. Hoffmann whose guidance and gentle persuasion remains a constant source of inspiration. Of my fellow students who were cooperative in the exchange of ideas, special mention should be made of Karen Bingel who assisted me in the translation of some particularly difficult passages. Recognition is also given to the staff of McLennan Library Department of Inter-library Loans. Not least in any way, my wife and children provided encouragement and exhortation.

In closing, this work is dedicated to the memory of Robert Vogel which continues to figure greatly in my endeavours.

end preface

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one must compare with the records at the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg.

On the 22nd June, 1941, more than 3,500,000 German troops commenced the invasion of the Soviet Union. Their objectives were the destruction of the Red Army and the occupation of nearly all of European Russia -- from Archangel on the Arctic Ocean to Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea. They were allocated at most five months to accomplish the tasks.<sup>14</sup>

It was considered by some the best and most efficient army that the world had ever seen.<sup>15</sup> It had conquered almost all of Europe, it was undefeated in the field. The troops who were now charged with the mission in the East were told that the invasion was an absolute necessity. It was, after all, fundamental to Nazi ideology that Lebensraum for Germans be created in the East. Ultimately this meant that space was to be taken away from the Russians and their 'Jewish-Bolshevik' regime, and that the so-called 'inferior' races were to be enslaved or eliminated as a prelude to resettlement by Germans.<sup>16</sup> It was to be a 'war of extermination'.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> See Hitler's Directives Nos. 21 (18 December, 1940) and 32 (11 June, 1941) in H.R. Trevor-Roper, ed. Hitler's War Directives 1939-1945 (London, 1973), pp.94 and 131 respectively. Directive No. 32 stipulated that strategic tasks (consolidation, etc.) were to begin at the conclusion of the campaign in the late autumn of 1941.

<sup>15</sup> Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport CT, 1982), p.163.

<sup>16</sup> The two fundamental tenets of National Socialist doctrine, or 'Weltanschauung', were to uphold the persecution of the Jews as a means of removing a threat to the integrity of the German "Volk", and the appropriation of lands east for the express purpose of colonization -- here Lebensraum was to be created, and Germany's position as a world power would be assured. Jäckel calls these the "two core elements of [Hitler's] Weltanschauung". Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler's Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power (Middletown, CT, 1972),

As we know, the Germans did not succeed in their plans. Moscow never fell. In fact, it seemed a miracle that most of the invading soldiers did not perish that first winter. Although they lost close to a million of their number (dead, wounded, missing, captured), or roughly a quarter, they held their positions for the most part and fought on for more than three more years.<sup>18</sup>

The anti-communistic and anti-Semitic elements of the Nazi ideology coloured the nature of the war in Russia. There became manifest a certain cruelty on both sides, a particular viciousness hitherto absent in the conflict with England and France. The wars in the East and in the West were very different in character.<sup>19</sup> The 'friendly' exchanges between the different troops, for example the sharing of cigarettes, the medical attention given, the respect conferred upon

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p.108.

<sup>17</sup> Förster cites Halder's Kriegstagebuch in the use of the terminology "war of extermination". See Jürgen Förster, "The Wehrmacht and the War of Extermination against the Soviet Union." Yad Vashem Studies on the European Jewish Resistance v.14 (1981), pp.13. A distinction needs to be made -- the term 'Vernichtung' (which is plentiful in the pages of Mitteilungen) can mean destruction or annihilation (e.g. an enemy, an army), as well as extermination (e.g. rats, poverty). The context of 'Vernichtung' is essential to making the proper distinction. Otherwise, when discussing "war of extermination" it is not clear whether military annihilation or the genocide of the Jews, or another 'inferior race', is meant.

<sup>18</sup> There are endless volumes about the Russian Front, never mind World War Two as a whole. A good short account of the opening moves can be found in Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War: Causes and Courses of the Second World War (Harmondsworth, 1979), pp.166-84.

<sup>19</sup> Schulte refers to the "conventional war ('Normalkrieg') in the West and the war of extermination ('Vernichtungskrieg') in the East." Theo J. Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia (Oxford, 1989), p.13.

officers, the rights granted to prisoners of war according to international convention, were not uncommon in the Western theatres of operations. And whatever elimination of 'undesirable peoples' did occur, did not appear so blatantly systematic as in the East.

In the East the humaneness had become obscured. Whatever moral or legal restrictions that existed in the West seemed bereft of potency in the forests and steppes of the Soviet Union. The laws of war had no meaning in Russia.<sup>20</sup> The value of life consequently became greatly diminished. By the time the first winter was over, about two million Soviet soldiers had died while in captivity.<sup>21</sup> SS-Einsatzgruppen, the mobile units which followed the regular army, set upon the luckless civilian population in the newly-conquered territories - intent upon fulfilling their deadly mandate.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Jus ad bellum, i.e. the law governing your going to war in the first place, had been effectively displaced by jus in bello, i.e. the law governing what you do when you get there. Just as international law has been described as the vanishing point of jurisprudence, the laws of war have been described as the vanishing point of international law. Reference to Thomas E. Holland's Elements of Jurisprudence (1880) in Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare: the Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts. (London, 1983), p.12.

<sup>21</sup> Bartov, Hitler's Army, p.83. In a letter to Wilhelm Keitel, the Chief of Staff of Armed Forces High Command (OKW), on February 28, 1942, Alfried Rosenberg, Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, reported on the brutalities committed against Soviet prisoners of war. He wrote: "Von den 3,6 Millionen Kriegsgefangenen sind heute nur noch einige Hunderttausend voll arbeitsfähig." Trials of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg, 1948), vol.25, pp.156-61 (this multi-volume source is hereafter cited as simply IMT).

<sup>22</sup> For a comprehensive overview of policies and operations of the Wehrmacht with regard to Red Army prisoners of war see Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden: die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen (Stuttgart, 1978). For a

The German army and the Einsatzgruppen acted upon orders, such as the "Kommissarbefehl" (page 17 below). Their actions could not be kept hidden indefinitely, and in time the Soviets responded accordingly. As the cycle of reciprocity developed, both sides in the East came to revile and fear each other to a degree that has rarely been seen. The fear of capture became very intense, the spirit of revenge had free rein, and the ferocity of the warfare became very elevated.<sup>23</sup> There have been arguments to support the view<sup>24</sup> that an unquantifiable portion of this 'intensity' or 'ferocity' of warfare was a consequence of deliberate National Socialist indoctrination.

It may be true that the German army owed its qualities to its internal organisation - a product of centuries-long evolution.<sup>25</sup> And this may have been what enabled it to endure, but this is not the point here. Endure it did. But the exigencies of movement and combat in the vast and unfriendly expanses stretched the aggressor's resources to the limit. Beginning with the deleterious effects of the first winter, the Wehrmacht suffered an acute shortage of manpower and matériel which progressively robbed it of its initiative. The early appearance of superior Russian arms demonstrated that the technical edge became blunted as well.<sup>26</sup>

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similarly thorough examination of the SS-Einsatzgruppen see Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges: die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938-1942 (Stuttgart, 1981).

<sup>23</sup> For a few examples that relate to conditions on the Russian front, see Alexander Werth, Russia at War: 1941-5. (New York, 1964), pp.441-581.

<sup>24</sup> E.g. of Bartov, Messerschmidt.

<sup>25</sup> Crevelde, pp.162-6.

<sup>26</sup> For example, the German Panther tank first appeared in action in 1943 in Russia, built in response to the Soviet T-34, which made its first appearance, albeit in very small

Thus the intended military method (blitzkrieg) was inoperable in Russia. Eastern front warfare underwent a process that has been called 'barbarisation'.<sup>27</sup> The Nazi views, proliferated through indoctrination and propaganda, became palatable to the rank and file. In due time the conditions of the Russian front had time to work on the bodies and souls of German troops, the Wehrmacht fell into line as Hitler's 'political' soldiers.<sup>28</sup>

It is the concept of the 'political soldier' that needs to be worked out. The SS, one could say, were harbingers of the most extreme political warfare, but we should not immediately fall into equating them uniquely with this concept.<sup>29</sup> The Totenkopfverbände were the cutting edge of Nazi ideology with regard to the Jewish question. It is also fair to say then that the Wehrmacht played a parallel role in the acquisition of Lebensraum. Fulfilling such an ideological goal made the Wehrmacht an instrument of politics, but is this sufficient to

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numbers, in July of 1941. United States War Department. Handbook on German Military Forces. (Baton Rouge and London, 1990), pp.387-9.

<sup>27</sup> In his first book Bartov relates the barbarism of the German side to the conditions of the front and to the influence of Nazi ideology. He writes that "the German army in the East [...] acted in strict accordance with the policies and ideology of Hitler's regime [...]". Bartov, The Eastern Front, p.152.

<sup>28</sup> This is the second instalment of Bartov's argument. Through demodernisation, destruction of the primary group, and increased discipline, the army in Russia had become a "willing tool of the regime". "The war had made the Wehrmacht into Hitler's army, and the Germans into Hitler's people." Bartov, Hitler's Army, preface and p.183.

<sup>29</sup> See for instance Bernd Wegner, Hitlers politische Soldaten: Die Waffen-SS 1933-45 (Paderborn, 1982) for a social study of the officer corps of the Waffen-SS. Messerschmidt observes that the SS were an embodiment of the Party's "Kämpfer", true followers of the national socialist Weltanschauung. Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht, p.218.



say that it was composed of 'political soldiers'?

The role that the army played in the rise of Nazism, and the entente between the German military and party leadership, has received much attention in the post-war era.<sup>30</sup> The subject of Wehrmacht complicity in Nazi crimes is very much a part of the Historikerstreit.<sup>31</sup> That the army and the party were connected is a gross understatement if one uses the loosest interpretations of the words. The question returns, however, to the pressure exerted by party ideology on the ranks of the Wehrmacht.

The vast conscript army of men comprising the Wehrmacht could not help but be linked to the civilian population of Germany, which necessarily had been exposed to National Socialist ideology for nearly a decade. Prior to induction, the men of the Wehrmacht shared in German society, not least as members of the Hitler youth, and so carried with them all of the cultural baggage of their earlier years. It has effectively been argued that the 'warrior' concept figured largely in this

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<sup>30</sup> Manfred Messerschmidt addresses this issue in Die Wehrmacht. For a more recent summary see K.J. Müller, The Army, Politics and Society in Germany, 1933-1945: Studies in the Army's Relation to Nazism (New York, 1987), pp.7-50.

<sup>31</sup> A good synopsis of the Historikerstreit can be found in the introduction to Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and the German National Identity (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1988). The sentiment that Maier's book is "the most sophisticated, measured, and wide-ranging of all the studies that have appeared so far in connection with the Historikerstreit" is expressed in Volker R. Berghahn, "The Unmastered and Unmasterable Past." Journal of Modern History v.63 (September, 1991), p.548. Also, Norbert Kampe, "Normalizing the Holocaust? The Recent Historians' Debate in the Federal Republic of Germany." Holocaust and Genocide Studies v.2:1 (Great Britain, 1987), pp.61-80 and Richard J. Evans, "The New Nationalism and the Old History: Perspectives on the West German Historikerstreit." Journal of Modern History v.59 (December, 1987), pp.761-97.

picture."<sup>32</sup> So, prior to whatever doctrine the army advocated, the recruits were already, to one degree or another, 'pre-indoctrinated'.<sup>33</sup>

Alternatively, one could say that the troops were changed by the Russian front experience to the point that they could no longer truly represent a 'normal' segment of German population. They belonged to the Army, and would probably remain so for the duration of the war. The regime sought to exploit the ideological continuity which bridged civilian and army life. The process of ideological penetration was undoubtedly facilitated by the volatile wartime environment.<sup>34</sup>

Stereotypes of the enemy, ambition, ideas of political order and military practise were some of the values shared by the Party and the Wehrmacht. Based on historical precedent, and

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<sup>32</sup> Baird's contribution is most enlightening and stresses the mythos which life in Germany must have been exposed to in those years. The myth of the "fighting, dying Germanic warrior" as visualized with Arminius in the Teutoburger Wald was kept alive in the Horst Wessel song, and through memories of martyrs like Herbert Norkus or the Bavarian university students buried at Langemarck cemetery, and in respect on Heroes Memorial Day, etc. To Baird, the German philosophy of death was linked to the hope for a national regeneration. Nazism was supposed to have represented such a regeneration. Jay W. Baird, To Die for Germany: Heroes in the Nazi Pantheon (Bloomington, 1990).

<sup>33</sup> For the military preparation of German youth see Jutta Sywottek, Mobilmachung für den totalen Krieg: Die propagandistische Vorbereitung der deutschen Bevölkerung auf den Zweiten Weltkrieg (Opladen, 1976), pp.73-85. This work maintains that the German people were exposed to long-term psychological preparation for war through a purposeful and concentrated media effort.

<sup>34</sup> A short exposition of the complex relationship between the soldiers and the Reich is given in Omer Bartov, "Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich." Journal of Modern History v.63:1 (1991), pp.44-60.

reinforced through political education, such influences helped keep resistance to the regime to minimal levels, in the Wehrmacht and society at large.<sup>35</sup>

The moral legitimacy that the Oath of August 2, 1934 conferred to Hitler in the eyes of the rank and file of the army was indicative of the close ties that were to be nurtured between army and party. To Hitler, the National Socialist penetration of the Wehrmacht was an important aspect of the Volksgemeinschaft.<sup>36</sup> In the longer view of history, oaths represent an important tradition. This declaration of loyalty and obedience bound officers and soldiers to Hitler's will, which was to find political and ideological expression in ways few at that time could imagine. It was also intended to serve as a deterrence to potential resistance to the regime's leadership.<sup>37</sup>

With regard to the climactic showdown in the East, plentiful orders were issued to legitimize the actions of the government and the behaviour of the Armed Forces. Among many orders, versions and drafts, perhaps the two most significant were the "Erlaß über die Ausübung der Kriegsgerichtsbarkeit im Gebiet

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<sup>35</sup> Manfred Messerschmidt, "The Wehrmacht and the Volksgemeinschaft." Journal of Contemporary History v.18:4 (1983), p.740.

<sup>36</sup> In a speech at the Bürgerbräukeeler on November 8, 1937, with reference to the demoralisation of the German army in World War I due to enemy propaganda, Hitler said: "Never again will the enemy succeed in disintegrating the army: it is the National Socialist army of the new Reich, and as year by year we send our National Socialist youth into this army it will become ever more closely united with our present-day people and with its spirit." Norman H. Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922- August 1939 (London, 1942), p.158.

<sup>37</sup> Peter Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance 1933-1945 (London, 1977), pp.27-8.

'Barbarossa' und über besondere Maßnahmen der Truppe" (Decree Concerning the Implementation of Wartime Military Jurisdiction in the Area of Operation 'Barbarossa' and Specific Measures Undertaken by the Troops) of May 13, 1941 and the "Kommissarbefehl" (Commissar Order) of June 6, 1941. The former alerted the troops to the dangers of the enemy civilian population and conferred the broadest possible decision latitude upon the troops dealing with civilian resistance, including the use of collective reprisal measures. It also urged leniency in the disciplinary actions taken against Wehrmacht personnel caught committing offences against hostile civilians.<sup>38</sup> The Commissar Order designated the Soviet political commissars as the focal point of the enemy resistance and urged that the strongest measures be taken against them. They were not to be regarded as soldiers and were to be separated from them and liquidated. The circulation of this order below the rank of Army Commander was to be conducted by word of mouth only.<sup>39</sup> The actual degree to which these orders were implemented is problematic but they are notable for their total disregard for international law and are contrary in spirit to commonly held soldierly values and sentiment.<sup>40</sup>

With the invasion in the summer of 1941, Army commanders were expected to press for the implementation of similarly inclined

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<sup>38</sup> IMT, vol.34, Document 050-C, pp.252-5. An English translation can be found in Schulte, pp.321-3.

<sup>39</sup> Nuremburg Document NOKW-1076. A translation of this document can be found in Helmut Krausnick et al. Anatomy of the SS State (London, 1968), pp.532-4.

<sup>40</sup> For a detailed exposition of these and similar orders refer to Helmut Krausnick, "Kommissarbefehl und 'Gerichtsbareitserlass Barbarossa' in neuer Sicht." Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte v.25:4 (1977), pp.682-738.

orders and declarations. General Walther von Reichenau, who drafted the oath of August 1934,<sup>41</sup> has been often credited in the general literature with the quote:

"Der Soldat ist im Ostraum nicht nur ein Kämpfer nach den Regeln der Kriegskunst, sondern auch Träger einer unerbittlichen völkischen Idee [...]"<sup>42</sup>

This order of October 10, 1941, and analogous orders of other high ranking officers<sup>43</sup> have done much to influence our interpretations of the Wehrmacht and its ideological penetration by Nazi doctrine. To say, however, that this is in all cases a fair practise would be inaccurate. The simple issuing or declaration of orders bears less weight in the judgement of criminality than does the effort exerted in implementing those orders.

Some officers were more lenient, or less inclined to close ranks with the national leadership, especially with regard to the finer points of the Weltanschauung. One such case is that of von Manstein who, it may be argued, nurtured some respect for the indigenous population in the East before it became fashionable. His often cited order of November 20, 1941 urged his men to exercise fair treatment toward the "non-bolshevik"

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<sup>41</sup> Calvocoressi, pp.45-6.

<sup>42</sup> IMT, v.35, Document 411-D, pp.84-6.

<sup>43</sup> Hoth, November 17, 1941 and Mackensen, November 24, 1941 to name just two. See Jürgen Förster, "New Wine in Old Skins? The Wehrmacht and the War of 'Weltanschauungen', 1941." in Wilhelm Deist, ed., The German Military in the Age of Total War (Leamington Spa, 1985), pp.314-6, and Manfred Messerschmidt, "The Wehrmacht and the Volksgemeinschaft." Journal of Contemporary History v.18:4 (Great Britain, 1983), pp.735.

segment of the population" and to show self-confidence rather than arrogance.<sup>43</sup> More important, in a final note, Manstein condemned measures which contradicted concepts of soldierly honour.<sup>44</sup> Such a declaration flies in the face of the spirit of orders such as the "Erlaß" and the "Kommissarbefehl" cited earlier (page 17).

High level studies are plentiful and revealing<sup>45</sup> but their application to the situation loses force as we devolve to the middle ranks of the officer corps and still further to the junior officers and the troops themselves, in whom we are most interested. The leadership may have issued orders and made 'political soldiers' nominally, but the soldier's life did not change outwardly. Unless he was spiritually or otherwise internally motivated, his actions were purely mechanical.<sup>46</sup> Any admission that ideological motivation played a part in the individual soldier's constitution serves only to justify the 'tarnishing of the shield', narrowing the distance between the

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<sup>44</sup> "Sie hat eine gerechte Behandlung aller nichtbolschewistischen Teile der Bevölkerung, z.T. jahrelang gegen den Bolschewismus heldenhaft gekämpft haben, zur Voraussetzung." IMT, v.34, Document 4064-PS, pp.129-32.

<sup>45</sup> "Selbstbewusste, nicht überhebliche Haltung aller Soldaten," Ibid., p.132. Messerschmidt has cited the same document from the same source and has left out this phrase. Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht, p.414.

<sup>46</sup> "Mit aller Schärfe ist einzuschreiten:  
Gegen Willkür und Eigennutz,  
Gegen Verwilderung und Undisziplin,  
Gegen jede Verletzung der soldatischen Ehre."  
IMT, v.34, Document 4064-PS, pp.132.

<sup>47</sup> One of the most notable of such studies that pertain to the East remains the seminal work by Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941-1945 (London, 1957) which focuses on goals, disputes, and methods at the top of the leadership pyramid.

<sup>48</sup> Hence the position "just following orders".

idealised traditional, apolitical vision of the German Army and the inherently criminal regime it served.

One may say that the prevailing elements of the Nazi Weltanschauung provided the motive force for Operation Barbarossa, but it is not quite as straightforward to say that the conduct of the war in the East, including the extremes in behaviour, were also a direct function of the ideology. The declarations of the leadership and the distribution of orders are one thing, but to transmit the message accurately to the millions of troops required extensive communication media resources. In that indoctrinational message the state took every opportunity to convey the image that its conduct was legitimate.

It was the propaganda machinery of the state which was generally entrusted with the task of suitably enlightening the population on topics of national socialist interest.<sup>49</sup> Propaganda was important in power, it was needed to mobilize mass support for the Völkische Staat.<sup>50</sup> Dr. Joseph Goebbels' Ministry, the Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und

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<sup>49</sup> There are a number of excellent works that deal specifically with the subject of propaganda in the Third Reich. Most recently David Welch, The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda (London, 1993) examines the relationship between propaganda and public opinion. For a recent treatment of propaganda and communications theory see Jorg Bohse, Inszenierte Kriegsbegeisterung und ohnmächtiger Friedenswille: Meinungslenkung und Propaganda im Nationalsozialismus (Stuttgart, 1988).

Other prominent contributions to this area of study include Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War 1939-1945 (London, 1979) and Robert Edwin Herzstein, The War That Hitler Won: The Most Infamous Propaganda Campaign in History (New York, 1978).

<sup>50</sup> "... to maintain a heightened level of enthusiasm and commitment for its ideological foundations." David Welch, "Propaganda and Indoctrination in the Third Reich: Success or Failure?" European History Quarterly v.17 (1987), p.407.

Propaganda (RMVP), inaugurated in March 1933, was mandated by Hitler for "all tasks of spiritual direction of the nation."<sup>51</sup> It was a matter of course that any developments in propaganda and indoctrination within the military had to operate in accord with this ministry, although Goebbels' influence wavered and declined as Germany became more embroiled in the war.<sup>52</sup>

Armed Forces High Command, or Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) took charge of military propaganda through the creation of a new department in April of 1939. The Abteilung für Wehrmachtpropaganda, or Wehrmacht Propagandaamt (WPr), was formed with the intention to coordinate war-time propaganda activities which fell within or impinged upon the sphere of the Wehrmacht.<sup>53</sup> It became part of Colonel-General Alfred Jodl's Operations Staff (Wehrmachtführungsstab, or WFSt). WPr underwent some internal reshuffling of offices during the war,

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<sup>51</sup> "The creation of the RMVP in March 1933 was a significant step towards the merging of the Party and the state." Ibid. Also see Z.A.B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda (London, 1973), pp.39-40.

<sup>52</sup> David Welch, The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda (London and New York, 1993), pp.90-124. There is a host of literature on Goebbels -- for a short bibliography see Ibid., p.190. Two dated but respectable titles which were examined in the course of this study are Willi A. Boelcke, ed., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels: The Nazi Propaganda War 1939-43. Trans. Ewald Osers (New York, 1970) and Ernest K. Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda 1925-1945 (East Lansing, Michigan, 1965).

<sup>53</sup> A large portion of WPr's staff was derived from the Press Section of OKW Interior Branch (OKW Abteilung Inland). For a detailed and sound, if dated, description of WPr's organisation and functions see Jeffrey Robert Willis, The Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch: German Military Propaganda and Censorship during World War II. (unpublished, 1964). Also, J. Desfrasne, "L'Organisation et l'Emploi de l'Arme Psychologique dans le Wehrmacht." Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale v.18 (France, 1968), pp.31-48.



but these need not concern us.<sup>54</sup>

The responsibilities of the Wehrmacht Propagandaamt included amassing and processing data for war reporting<sup>55</sup> and producing materials to be directed at the enemy.<sup>56</sup> One of the more important duties was to compile contributions to the daily Wehrmacht communiqué (Wehrmachtbericht) which passed directly through Jodl for perusal by Hitler prior to release to the media.<sup>57</sup> WPr was also entrusted with the 'spiritual well-being' ("geistige Betreuung") of the troops i.e. in their free time the men partook of theatres, concerts, films, reading, etc.<sup>58</sup> In time this came to embrace more and more

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<sup>54</sup> Willis seems unsurpassed in describing these changes. Willis, p.13ff. Departmental organisational changes were reflected at the top of the front page of Mitteilungen. Showing first the issue, month, and year, these changes are listed as:

113 06 41	heading: O.K.W./W.-Pr. (IIe) changes to OKW WFSt/WPr(IIe)
189 04 42	heading changes to OKW WFSt/WPr(AP2)
248 02 43	" " OKW WFSt/WPr(IVA)
368 10 44	" " N.S.F.O.

<sup>55</sup> Perhaps the most sophisticated product of this effort might be represented by the "Deutsche Wochenschauen" - weekly newsreels that were seen widely in the area of the Third Reich. For a look at this subject with respect to Russia see Bianka Pietrow-Ennker, "Die Sowjetunion in der Propaganda des Dritten Reiches: Das Beispiel der Wochenschau." Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen v.46 (1989), pp.79-120.

<sup>56</sup> Over 400 million leaflets produced by WPr were dropped behind Soviet lines by the end of 1941. John H. Buchsbaum, "German Psychological Warfare on the Russian Front, 1941-45" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1953) cited in Dallin, p.66.

<sup>57</sup> Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War 1939-1945 (London, 1979), p.105.

<sup>58</sup> In a memo dated 27 September, 1939, OKW addressed the subject "Weltanschauliche Führung der Truppe - Freizeitgestaltung" listing numerous activities for the

political education and indoctrination."<sup>59</sup> In the field, WPr's mandate was carried out by propaganda companies (PK).<sup>60</sup> The cameras of these units provided most of the material used in the Deutsche Wochenschauen, the renowned Nazi newsreels.<sup>61</sup>

The central office in Berlin was headed by Oberst Hasso von Wedel, formerly a major from Abteilung Inland of OKW. Von Wedel advocated in a small book of his the integration of general and military education with a view to the prevailing Weltanschauung.<sup>62</sup> Thus the Party viewpoint established itself

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troops. NAM, T77 roll 964, fr.4447429-34.

<sup>59</sup> For a most scholarly examination of how 'spiritual guidance' evolved into a euphemism for political indoctrination, culminating in the rise of the NSFO, see Volker R. Berghahn, "NSDAP und 'geistige Führung' der Wehrmacht 1939-45." Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte v.17 (1969), pp.17-71.

<sup>60</sup> Most AOKs (Armee Oberkommando), Air and Naval Fleets were assigned one such unit. Many memos listed the companies in detail. E.g. NAM, T77 roll 964 fr.4447255; roll 965 fr.4449033-4. The PKs averaged approximately 200 men, including officers, reporters, cameramen, drivers, etc. and could, in the course of operations, sustain casualties as regular units did. Their stories are highly interesting and crucial to any comprehensive account of Wehrmacht propaganda but tangential to the focus of this paper. The source book for most descriptions of the PKs in the secondary literature is Hasso von Wedel, Die Propagandatruppen der deutschen Wehrmacht. Die Wehrmacht im Kampf, Band 34. (Neckargemünd, 1962). The author was chief of WPr. We are cautioned against assimilating an altogether unrealistic picture by relying too much on his 'rosy' memories. Volker R. Berghahn, "Tendences de la 'Wehrmachtpropaganda'." Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale v.21 (France, 1971), p.73.

<sup>61</sup> For more on Wochenschauen and the PKs see Herzstein, pp.223ff. Also George Schmidt-Scheeder, Reporter der Hölle: die Propaganda-Kompanien im 2. Weltkrieg: Erlebnis und Dokumentation. (Stuttgart, 1977).

<sup>62</sup> He states in his conclusion: "Geistige und moralische Erziehung zu Wehrhaftigkeit ist ein Wesensbestandteil des Nationalsozialismus." Major Hasso von Wedel, Wehrerziehung und

at the very highest level within WPr."<sup>3</sup> Many of his section heads in WPr were similarly versed in propaganda and national socialist theory."<sup>4</sup>

The activities of WPr were accomplished under the scrutiny of the RMVP and in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry."<sup>5</sup> WPr liaison officers were stationed at the Propaganda Ministry and at subordinate Reichspropagandaämter throughout the Reich."<sup>6</sup> They attended the Daily Press Conferences of the Reich Press Chief, Dr. Otto Dietrich<sup>7</sup>, where Hitler's directives to the

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Volkserziehung (Hamburg, 1938), p.59.

<sup>3</sup> While with Abteilung Inland, von Wedel delivered a presentation entitled "Grundzüge der Propaganda im Zukunftskriege" as part of a series of weekly lectures delivered from October 1938 to June 1939 for the Kriegsakademie. He was among the "weltanschauliche Experten" who entered the Wehrmacht in its expansion. See Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht, pp.220-2.

<sup>4</sup> To mention just two names: Hans Martin, an "old and loyal follower of Goebbels" of WPr II (Truppenbetreuung) and later head of WPr IV (foreign propaganda) also lectured on "Wehrpropaganda im Frieden", Ibid. and Dallin, p.509; Major Dr. Hüsing of Ic (Abwehr liaison) wrote a 65 page memo dated May 1938 entitled "Wehrpropaganda und Wehrpolitik im wahren Staat" (see Chapter IV). NAM, T77 roll 1036 fr.6508835-906.

<sup>5</sup> From an overview of WPr for transmission to the Italian Military attache entitled "Organisation und Arbeitsweise der Wehrmachtpropaganda" and dated 18 October 1939. NAM T77 roll 964, fr.4447447-9.

<sup>6</sup> See Guides to German Records Microfilmed at Alexandria, Va. Book #19 (1960). Preface by James G. McDowell. The guide contains a wealth of information on materials of WPr provenance.

<sup>7</sup> Dietrich attained this position in November 1937. Alexander G. Hardy, Hitler's Secret Weapon: the "Managed" Press and Propaganda Machine of Nazi Germany (New York, 1967), pp.50ff. Dietrich was also one of Goebbels' bitter rivals. For an introduction see Balfour, Propaganda in War, pp.103-9.

press were delivered to its representatives.<sup>68</sup> It was in this department, then, where the RMVP interfaced on a working basis with the Wehrmacht.<sup>69</sup> At least this was the plan.<sup>70</sup>

The task of upholding the Weltanschauung among the troops was embodied in the 'geistige Betreuung' accorded to the men of the line (see above). Beyond whatever orders or decrees that were transmitted through the ranks, at the very lowest levels the fighting men were exposed to a virtual barrage of propaganda and indoctrinational material of all kinds. Thanks to Professor Bartov's exploratory work at the divisional level, we are able to assert with some confidence that the troops of the Wehrmacht were amply supplied.<sup>71</sup> Radio facilities were set up in the rear of the front lines with the primary task of catering to the needs of the troops.<sup>72</sup> Movies

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<sup>68</sup> Helmut Sündermann, Tagesparolen: Deutsche Presseweisungen 1939-1945 Hitlers Propaganda und Kriegsführung (Leoni am Starnberger See, 1973), p.13.

<sup>69</sup> This is also evidenced by the high number of communications in existence between WPR and the RMVP. For example, NAM T77 rolls 964-6, 1016-20, passim.

<sup>70</sup> The underlying struggle for supremacy in policy-making was really a function of many personalities. With respect to WPR, Goebbels attempted to expand his influence by gaining ascendancy over von Wedel who was supported by his immediate superior Alfred Jodl. Called "der Dualismus der Propagandakriegsführung" in Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht, pp.239-45, 347-51. Balfour believes "it is clear that the relative positions of Goebbels and Dietrich were continually changing, so that no statement can be made about them which is valid for the period as a whole. Balfour, pp.107,468n38-9.

<sup>71</sup> There is even evidence that such material was welcome and sought after. Bartov, The Eastern Front, pp.68ff. Schulte finds little evidence to support this in the Army Rear Areas. Schulte, p.268.

<sup>72</sup> See a draft entitled "Richtlinien für die Betreuung des Senders Smolensk", 16 September 1941. NAM, T77 roll 1034 fr.6505988-90.

were shown whenever possible. Books were available, periodicals<sup>73</sup>, daily newspapers, pamphlets, and information sheets were circulated.<sup>74</sup>

But of all the forms of ideological instruction, Bartov maintains that the face-to-face, junior officer to man, form was most effective.<sup>75</sup> The officer corps is admittedly paramount for the smooth evolution of an effective military force, and the Wehrmacht leadership harboured no illusions about how the Weltanschauung had to fit into play.<sup>76</sup> The expansion of the Wehrmacht in the 1930s populated its ranks with a more youthful junior officer corps - one potentially more sympathetic to national socialism.<sup>77</sup> Furthermore, the

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<sup>73</sup> A memo from WPr dated 22 September 1939 lists 75 periodicals under consideration for Wehrmacht use out of a possible 15,000 available in the Reich. Some of those with higher circulation include: Die Sirene (Deutscher Verlag, Berlin); Der Adler (August Scherl Nachf., Berlin); Die Wehrmacht (Die Wehrmacht, Berlin); and Wehrarbeit (Verlag der DAF, Berlin). NAM, T77 roll 1010 fr.2475180,2475191-9.

<sup>74</sup> Large quantities of such army indoctrinational material exist in the archives. A small sample of some of the printed matter can be found in NAM, T84 rolls 159,161,164-5.

<sup>75</sup> Bartov, Eastern Front, p.147.

<sup>76</sup> "Das Offizierkorps der Wehrmacht kann seine Föhreraufgabe in Volk und Staat nur erfüllen, wenn es die das deutsche Volks= und Staatsleben lenkende nationalsozialistische Weltanschauung in geistiger Geschlossenheit als persönliches Eigentum und innere Überzeugung besitzt. Ich messe daher der einheitlichen politischen Erziehung und Unterrichtung des Offizierkorps der drei Wehrmachtteile besondere Bedeutung bei." - Erlaß des Reichskriegsministers und Oberbefehlshabers der Wehrmacht von 30.Januar 1936 (Nr.5848/35 JIVb). Cited inside cover of Nationalpolitischer Lehrgang der Wehrmacht vom 15. bis 23.Januar 1937 (Berliner Börsen-Zeitung Druckerei und Verlag G.m.b.H., 1937, 253pp.), NAM, T77 roll 852 fr.5597776.

<sup>77</sup> From an OKW publication: "Der schnelle Aufbau der Wehrmacht hat die Verjüngung des Offizierkorps und der Unteroffiziere aller Grade bis nach unten hin durchgesetzt,

attrition of the Wehrmacht in 1942-43 depopulated its ranks of many older more experienced men, facilitating this ideological penetration. To accede to the view that officer-to-man ideological instruction was highly effective, and that National Socialist beliefs became more pervasive as the war progressed because of this, is one thing. But there is little possibility that any planned line of conduct could regulate absolutely the content and delivery of such instruction. The officers could conceivably be instructed in a uniform fashion, but in relaying the message to individuals or small groups, the variance of the personal dynamic in each case could not guarantee consistent interpretation by the recipients.

To sum up briefly, we can say that indoctrination, and the influence of Nazism that it carried, approached the soldiers from three different directions. In one sense it percolated down through the ranks by way of the officer corps. Secondly, this was augmented by controllable media to which the troops were exposed. Thirdly, life experiences, beginning with childhood, left many indelible imprints on the minds of the soldiers. And the Nazi perception had been at work in Germany for many years. Above all, we must accept that these effects were by and large unquantifiable.

Tapping into the indoctrinational message conveyed to the troops requires that we choose a controllable medium as the field for investigation. Mitteilungen reached every unit on every front without the slightest variation in layout or

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und diese blühende Führerjugend im Offizierkorps ist heute die Wirkung einer politisch und rassisch aufgeschlossenen Zeit. Sie hat damit einen neuen Typus des Leutnants gezeitigt, welcher von entscheidender Bedeutung für die innere Haltung der Truppe ist." OKW, Die Wehrmacht, 1940: Der Freiheitskampf des großdeutschen Volkes (Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1940), pp.138-9.

substance<sup>78</sup>, and was directed almost exclusively at non-commissioned men in the Armed Forces, be they soldiers, sailors, or airmen.<sup>79</sup> It originated in one department which was indeed linked to the highest levels of policy-making. With a tool of such ubiquitous presence, the state hoped it could couple the army with political instinct<sup>80</sup> and legitimize its actions in the eyes of the troops.

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<sup>78</sup> Individual commands at times also issued their own version of "Mitteilungen". For example, a Mitteilungen für die Truppe was put out by Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe D. Issue no.3 (Dec'43) was entitled "Der Westen vor der Entscheidung". NAM, T77 roll 1040 fr.6514514-5.

<sup>79</sup> Although Die Wehrmacht, a bi-weekly which also originated with OKW but not WPr, would make an interesting comparative study, its target audience was not the troops. At the beginning of the war, 96% of its subscribers were civilian (or at least not in the Wehrmacht). It was urged that Die Wehrmacht circulate below company level, such that one copy be available to every 25 men. In a memo draft initialled by Wedel, Jodl, and Keitel. NAM, T77 roll 1010 fr.2476057-60.

<sup>80</sup> Of course this is not a novel concept in propaganda theory. In 1933 Eugen Hadamovsky, the "media expert" and National Socialist intellectual, later (1942) staff director at the Reich Propaganda Central Office, wrote: "Today it is our task to breed a new political prototype, who, be he soldier or administrative expert, will be able to handle the problems of the present and the future with unfailing political instinct." Eugen Hadamovsky, Propaganda and National Power (Reprinted in New York, 1972), p.59.

All issues of Mitteilungen over a period of 43 months, from April, 1941, shortly prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union, until October, 1944, when Mitteilungen fell into the purview of the Nationalsozialistische Führungsstab, were examined for content. This comprises issue nos. 89 to 366 inclusive and represents a total of 269 issues examined.<sup>81</sup> This will henceforth be referred to as the 'total sample'.

Although nominally it was to be released twice a week<sup>82</sup>, over the abovementioned time period Mitteilungen averaged 6.5 issues per month. With rare exceptions, each issue comprised two pages printed on one sheet of paper. The vast majority of issues contained three, four, or five articles. Including special four page issues (e.g. no.358, a four page special on "Aims and Methods of Enemy Agitation")<sup>83</sup> there are 1,081 articles, an average of 4 articles per issue. Most of the information above has been summarized in Table A under the Total column.

When reading Mitteilungen für die Truppe, the soldier became subject to the influence of its propaganda. The writers of

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<sup>81</sup> Nine issues were not found available for perusal and not included. These were nos. 205, 212, 296, 299-303, and 349.

<sup>82</sup> Werner Stang, "Organe und Mittel der militärischen Führung des faschistischen Deutschlands zur Meinungsmanipulierung besonders der Soldaten des Heeres 1939-1943." Militärsgeschichte 19.Jahrgang, 1/80.

<sup>83</sup> Specific articles from Mitteilungen für die Truppe will be hereafter cited as follows: MfdT., issue number, month, year, title of article. In this particular example, MfdT., 358 Sep'44, "Ziele und Methoden der feindlichen Agitation". Sometimes a short elaboration on the contents of the article will follow the title.



Mitteilungen had no influence on the physical world, but worked to affect soldiers' perceptions of a variety of subjects, as well as to instill the ideas and beliefs of the Nazi ideology. Potentially, every reader faced a possible re-examination of personal values because of what he read. This in turn could have led to a subtle remodelling of attitudes, convictions, behaviour. It has been maintained that 'political' soldiers, or warriors of ideology, were the desired product of the continual indoctrination in the Wehrmacht. And it has been argued, as shown above, that this was to a large extent achieved on the Russian front.

Whether and how often this re-examination led to a change in priorities, however slight, would be a test of the effectiveness of a propaganda tool, as well as a test of an individual's will and convictions. Although it is impossible to see exactly how far WPr was able to influence personal priorities, a picture of what WPr, and hence the regime, expected of the German soldier can be obtained by looking at priorities accorded to the different elements of the soldier's life, i.e. how he was encouraged to perceive the world. This perception, or indoctrinational message, shall be depicted through use of the 'Perceptual Model' (Table D2).

This study is considered propaganda analysis insofar as it summarizes the content, and attempts to interpret the message of the propagandists.<sup>54</sup> While describing the content of Mitteilungen is lengthy and tedious, determining the inferences arising from the content proves to be the more

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<sup>54</sup> Alexander L. George, Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II (Westport, Connecticut, 1959), p.vi. During the war the content of foreign mass communications was analysed in the United States by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). This book scrutinizes the methodology employed by the FCC analysts in their pursuit of German radio and press output.

difficult task. In this study, enough of the general content could be interpreted to reasonably provide for a quantitative content analysis. From the outset it must be accepted that the difference between the communicator's precise intended meaning and the message understood by the receiver must be regarded as minimal, considering the difficulties in being exact in either case. This is a check that faces even an experienced diagnostician possessing expert linguistic skills. Only such a person could attempt a qualitative content analysis.<sup>85</sup>

This quantitative analysis lists and measures the frequency and occurrence of certain characteristics of Mitteilungen. These characteristics arose from the examination of the contents because they proved to be of a recurring (or otherwise interesting) nature. It would be impossible to rationalize any count or search without them. They have been dubbed 'themes' and are, in fact, the basic building blocks of this study. A total of 77 themes were identified as distinct and generally recognizable. These have been summarized by order of occurrence in Table B. Although their number seems unwieldy, their very creation adds a qualitative dimension to this otherwise quantitative analysis. The themes are described in the next chapter.

Although each article in Mitteilungen exhibited a salient theme or themes, it is important to realize that each article did not necessarily deal with only one theme. There was mixing and frequent repetition as has been noted by a previous study.<sup>86</sup> This practise is a fundamental trait of the

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<sup>85</sup> For a comparison of quantitative vs. qualitative content analysis see Ibid., pp.77-81.

<sup>86</sup> See Bartov, "Indoctrination...", pp.27-8.

propaganda process, propounded by Mitteilungen itself<sup>87</sup> and comes in no way as a surprise. A case in point would be an article which embodied the themes of marriage and children.<sup>88</sup> One can argue quite easily that most articles referred to a host of issues. Indeed many articles summoned up phrases, slogans, and allusions to things like the Wehrmacht, Volk, duty, and Germany all in a single discourse.<sup>89</sup> On the other hand, elsewhere a subject may have been only seldom referred to by name, or only in the title.<sup>90</sup> Therefore, though perhaps more scientific, a simple mathematical word count as a purely quantitative system of analysis, would be as impractical as it would be misleading.

Admittedly at times some difficulty in selecting themes was encountered. Take as a specific example an article where the soldier was inspired to thank the home front for the new weapons and the precision workmanship that went into their production.<sup>91</sup> Letters from the front were deemed instrumental in boosting home front morale. This article could easily claim four themes as defined thus far: encouragement;

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<sup>87</sup> Mitteilungen itself reveals its own commitment to the repetition of material as an important constituent of propaganda war. MfdT., 124 Aug'41, "Warnung vor dem Alltag" and 328 May'44, "Immer dasselbe?"

<sup>88</sup> MfdT., 314 Mar'44, "Kriegskinder und Kriegsehen".

<sup>89</sup> MfdT., 256 Apr'43, "Deutschland bei der Arbeit".

<sup>90</sup> In an article citing a letter written by an officer who died in the action at Orel (June, 1943). The themes assigned are death and duty. Duty is mentioned only once in the form of 'task' (Aufgabe). MfdT., 278 Aug'43, "So denken die Besten unseres Volkes".

<sup>91</sup> MfdT., 267 Jun'43, "Das gilt für uns alle!"

letters; home; and morale."<sup>22</sup> Additionally, subjects that were mentioned only once or twice were relegated to miscellaneous, unless they carried some profound significance<sup>23</sup>.

In all, 20% of the articles in the total sample were deemed to emphasize more than one theme, and this translates to 1.2 themes per article. The total occurrence of themes was 1321. It may be said that some themes were unnecessarily split and should therefore be combined for the purposes of this study. Seemingly superfluous differentiations of this sort, however, have been maintained in the body of data since they might yet prove to be useful in ways that are not immediately apparent.<sup>24</sup>

Some logical groupings presented themselves and this ultimately led to the differentiation between main 'elements' and various themes which were assigned to them. Elements define the parameters for this analysis and seven have been identified. Some elements naturally suggested themselves and these include News and Propaganda.<sup>25</sup> The elements Ideology and Influence are a function of the earlier queries regarding the 'political soldier' and are central to the subject of

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<sup>22</sup> Either the least controversial or the two most preferred were chosen. If a more embracing theme would include all or most of the subjects, then this was used. In this case the article was listed under 'encouragement'.

<sup>23</sup> All items rescued from miscellaneous will be found at the very bottom of the list in Table B.

<sup>24</sup> Probably the most obvious example of this are the themes pertaining to general wastage and wastage of fuel. This splitting of the term would be useful if we were investigating motorisation or the logistics of the front. Another similar case occurs with the Atlantic theatre and tonnage sunk.

<sup>25</sup> When referring to an element in the text, its initial letter will be capitalized. For example, the theme 'home' should not be confused with the element 'Home'.

ideological indoctrination. The element Army was unavoidable due to the sheer amount of instructional and related material that was in evidence. Personal and Home were created both for contrast to the others and because they were a large part of the soldier's 'other, civilian' life.

Each of the seven elements postulated laid claim to a number of suitable themes, but this distribution did not exclude the possibility that a given theme could be present in more than one element.<sup>96</sup> It is important to appreciate that the development of elements and themes was not a strictly sequential process. Tentative thematic construction had to be continuously reworked as the portion of the data explored became larger. Attempts were made to interpret and codify the results as they were accumulated, and to use this information in the re-definition of both themes and elements.<sup>97</sup> Tables C1 to C7 enumerate the elements and their respective themes.<sup>98</sup>

Vertical divisions were then introduced into the sample to extend analytical capabilities by allowing comparisons. This was done by breaking the total sample into four distinct time periods, or Stages, and is evidenced on all the Tables by the column headings preceding "TOTAL". Most simply, it means that there exist at least two sub-models.

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<sup>96</sup> In fact, 19 themes were present in two elements. The two themes Germany, and Volk were present in three elements -- Ideology, Propaganda, and Home.

<sup>97</sup> Thus a reciprocal relationship existed between element and theme creation. This relationship often forced the author to turn from one task to the other and back. Happily, this process succeeded in progressively sharpening the focus of the analysis.

<sup>98</sup> For example, to quickly view the themes belonging to the element Ideology, refer to Table C4.

Since the particular focus of this study is on the Wehrmacht soldier fighting in the East, it seems natural that the stages turn on the major military turning points of the Russian campaign. Of course the initial point would be June 22, 1941. Anything prior to this date is termed STAGE 0.

The two most important time frames for this study are STAGES 1 and 2. STAGE 1 ends with the capitulation of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad on February 2, 1943. Although the Wehrmacht still retained some initiative in Russia, the high tide had passed and the front lines moved closer to Germany from then on.<sup>99</sup> STAGE 2 ends with the Russian offensive on June 22, 1944 which resulted in the destruction of Army Group Centre and the general collapse of the situation in Russia.<sup>100</sup> Contemporaneously, it had proved impossible to throw the Western Allies back across the Channel, and in less than a month the July Plot would initiate repercussions in the Wehrmacht organisation leading to the elimination of a good number of high-ranking officers.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> An earlier turning point would be 7 Dec'41: Pearl Harbour, Hitler declared war on the United States four days later; the Russian counter-offensive around Moscow ended German hopes of a quick end to the war in Russia, and probably the chances of winning the war at all; and Hitler assumed personal command of the army less than two weeks later while simultaneously displacing some of the Wehrmacht's most able generals. See Fest, Hitler, pp.657-8. "...one of the most precarious moments of the war was reached and passed." Calvocoressi, Total War, p.179.

<sup>100</sup> The battle at Kursk in Jul'43 was another possible turning point since it marked the end of all German strategic initiative in the East. Including this and the 7 Dec'41, would have resulted in two additional stages.

<sup>101</sup> Among the estimated 200 who were executed or forced to commit suicide following the assassination attempt were Colonel-General Fromm, Field Marshal von Kluge, and Field Marshall Rommel. Hoffmann, pp.509-29.

The last stage includes the remaining time until mid-October. At that time, with issue no. 367, Mitteilungen became a publication of the NSFS (still part of OKW), and the overall responsibility for WPr passed from von Wedel to General Hermann Reinecke.<sup>102</sup> This STAGE 3, in conjunction with STAGE 0 above, serves to frame the two main phases of the war in the East. Appendix A summarizes the stages with respect to the data base.

Stacked by order of occurrence, and sub-divided by two distinct time frames, the seven elements form the Perceptual Model, as exhibited in Table D. Comparing the differences, if any, between the perceptual models extrapolated from the two different time periods may be instructive. Most obviously it will illuminate the writing policy of the WPr under two contrasting sets of conditions. Although such models cannot, of course, be seen as precise indicators of policy, certain trends may become discernible.

It can be said that the content profile of the propaganda stream directed at the readers must have conformed to some set of pre-ordained guidelines, be they written or not. It is doubtful if editorial policy at WPr was steered by such a thing as a 'perceptual model', and if it was then this label was certainly unknown. What went into Mitteilungen could only be a function of writer's convictions and the influence of superiors<sup>103</sup>, combined with the prevailing directives of the Daily Press Conferences<sup>104</sup>, which shall be reviewed in

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<sup>102</sup> Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht, p.331.

<sup>103</sup> In the 31 reels examined (see bibliography) no reference was found to the writers of Mitteilungen.

<sup>104</sup> As interpreted by Helmut Sündermann, Dietrich's deputy at the Reich Press Office, in Helmut Sündermann, Tagesparolen: Deutsche Presseweisungen 1939-1945 Hitlers Propaganda und

Chapter IV. The jockeying for power at the level of the RMVP has already been alluded to in Chapter I. Although the policies may not have rigidly originated from a singular source, their presentation in Mitteilungen conveyed to the troops a certain image. This image will be discerned with the aid of the Perceptual Model.

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Kriegsführung (Leoni am Starnberger See, 1973).



This chapter lists the elements and themes as they have been interpreted from the contents of Mitteilungen für die Truppe, and is essentially a brief verbal account of the data base. Each element has been accorded a section, starting with the element which is most prevalent in the total sample (see Table D), i.e. Propaganda. Within this section, the element of Propaganda will be described. The themes which comprise the element will be enumerated, identified with an abbreviation, and defined with the help of two or three examples in each case.<sup>105</sup> Succeeding sections will proceed in an identical fashion with the remaining elements in descending order of occurrence. In the case where a theme recurs in another section<sup>106</sup>, this will be duly noted as a repetition.

The information contained in the sections will be as follows:

- title of element (all capitalised); abbreviation used in Table D.
- its prevalence given as a percentage of all its themes' occurrences over total sample theme occurrences.<sup>107</sup>
- an introduction to the element by way of a brief description.
- the most dominant theme name (first letter capitalised);

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<sup>105</sup> Themes that scored less than 8 occurrences were accorded only one example.

<sup>106</sup> See note 96.

<sup>107</sup> For example, themes belonging to Ideology appear 252 times in the total sample where total theme appearances are 1321. So,  $252/1321 = 19\%$ .

abbreviation used in the Tables.<sup>108</sup>

- description of the theme, examples from source content.
- succeeding themes in importance.

The exact format for the following seven sections<sup>109</sup> is thus:

Section number<sup>110</sup>

Element title (abbreviation)                      Prevalence (%)

Element description

Theme (abbreviation)

Theme description

Additional themes...

The theme Miscellaneous will be described at the conclusion of section 7. Finally, a few tests will be conducted on the data in order to establish its validity. These are necessary prerequisites to the analysis in the following chapter.

#### SECTION 1

PROPAGANDA (PROP)

Prevalence: 42%

It is quite natural that the lion's share of attention was garnished on this subject, considering that Mitteilungen was after all a propaganda department publication. In its most general sense, all material in Mitteilungen was propaganda.

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<sup>108</sup> Note that there is no consistency in the form of abbreviation used for a theme. The letter codes, using from one to six characters, were part of the analytical process from the beginning and have remained unchanged.

<sup>109</sup> With the glowing exception of the first section (Propaganda) where sub-divisions were introduced.

<sup>110</sup> The section number actually corresponds to the Table C number of the element, i.e. Propaganda is listed in Table C1, Army is listed in Table C2, etc.

Perhaps because of its position at the summit, this subject was conducive to further elaboration through the creation of four sub-divisions evidenced in Table C1: a) anti-enemy; b) counter-enemy; c) pro-Germany; and d) troop. These sub-divisions with their themes are described below.

a) Anti-enemy PROPAGANDA: This represented the direct effort to lay low the reputations and qualities of Germany's foes. The target was denigrated and made the subject of mockery. This could be called an offensive campaign.

Great Britain (GB): Pertaining to articles whose principal subject deals with some consideration of England. For the most part, this can rightly be termed as propaganda directed by WPr against the British Empire. Refers also to articles that would be of interest or application to troops who confronted the British in their theatre of operations. Examples: Churchill as an object of disdain<sup>111</sup>; England's suffering working classes<sup>112</sup>; the British fear Germany's economic might.<sup>113</sup>

Soviet Union (SU): As above, but for the Soviet Union. Examples: what significance is the 'collective' in the East<sup>114</sup>; the story of Bolshevism on the run eastwards since 1918<sup>115</sup>; Russia's hatred of Germany fostered by men like Ilya

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<sup>111</sup> MfdT., 158 Dec'41, "Ein chaotischer Mensch".

<sup>112</sup> MfdT., 204 Jun'42, "Eine aufschlußreiche Rede".

<sup>113</sup> MfdT., 295 Nov'43, "Der Angriff gegen die deutsche Arbeit".

<sup>114</sup> MfdT., 118 Jul'41. "Was versteht man unter 'Kollektivismus'?"

<sup>115</sup> MfdT., 143 Oct'41, "Das Zurückfluten des Bolschewismus vom Rhein über die Weichsel in Richtung Asien".

Ehrenberg.<sup>116</sup>

United States (US): As above, but for the United States. Examples: the American value system as degenerate<sup>117</sup>; Roosevelt's ridiculous fear of German encroachment on South America.<sup>118</sup>

Jew (Jew): The absolute lowest form of life on earth. An international instigator élite that preys on mankind. The war against Germany is directed by the Jew. Examples: directly and quite simply put<sup>119</sup>; the racial war to free Europe of Jews<sup>120</sup>; the dollar-imperialism of the international Jew.<sup>121</sup>

Bolshevism/Communism (bol): The arch enemy of Germany, National Socialism, and humankind. A system of government that is unexceeded in brutality and dishonesty. Beneath contempt. Examples: the ideological nature of the war against the Bolsheviks<sup>122</sup>; the Communists regarded by their allies.<sup>123</sup>

Plutocracy (plu): The rule by an élite that was characteristic of the western democracies, and together with bolshevism in opposition to National Socialism. Examples: the

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<sup>116</sup> MfdT., 366 Oct'44, "Ausgeburten des Hasses".

<sup>117</sup> MfdT., 153 Nov'41, "Amerika meint, mit Geld könne man alles machen".

<sup>118</sup> MfdT., 243 Jan'43, "Zwei Behauptungen Roosevelts".

<sup>119</sup> MfdT., 147 Oct'41, "Juden".

<sup>120</sup> MfdT., 264 May'43, "Weshalb kam es zur Judenfrage?"

<sup>121</sup> MfdT., 283 Sep'43, "Schlagworte".

<sup>122</sup> MfdT., 123 Jul'41, "Der Kampf gegen die Bolschewiken ist wirklich ein 'Kreuzzug'".

<sup>123</sup> MfdT., 213 Jul'42, "Der Bolschewismus im Urteil seiner Bundesgenossen".

new Europe as perceived by the plutocrats<sup>124</sup>; intentions and methods of the plutocrats.<sup>125</sup>

b) Counter-enemy Propaganda: Here Mitteilungen responded to the flow of propaganda that was directed against Germany, its population and armed forces. Considering the breadth of this attack via the air waves and the printed word, it was impossible to ignore and had to be answered and defended against.

Enemy propaganda (en.prp): When referring to propaganda described as originating from the Allies in the general or collective sense. United States propaganda per se was rarely alluded to and so consigned to this theme. Examples: radio<sup>126</sup>; enemy reports about the Kiev pocket<sup>127</sup>; the insidious propaganda of Russia, Great Britain, and the United States.<sup>128</sup>

Soviet Union propaganda (SU.prp): When dealing with the Soviet Union on any level related to the transmission or reception of propaganda. This includes reports or news from the Soviet Union or the Russian front, accusations against Germany, etc. Examples: the incessant lies<sup>129</sup>; fairy

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<sup>124</sup> MfdT., 127 Aug'41, "Ein praktisches Beispiel, wie die Plutokratie sich ihrerseits das neue Europa vorstellt".

<sup>125</sup> MfdT., 229 Oct'42, "Pläne und Praxis der Plutokratien".

<sup>126</sup> MfdT., 107 May'41, "Gefährliches Kampfgift: Feindfunk".

<sup>127</sup> MfdT., 139 Sep'41, "Wie bringt man das auf einen Nenner?"

<sup>128</sup> MfdT., 298 Dec'43, "Drohungen und Prophezeiungen".

<sup>129</sup> MfdT., 248 Feb'43, "Kein Wort darf man den Bolschewiken glauben".

tales<sup>130</sup>; the "Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland".<sup>131</sup>

Great Britain (GB.prp): As above. Examples: British bad press against Germany<sup>132</sup>; misconceptions about Germany publicized<sup>133</sup>; Churchill's inconsistent stance vis-a-vis Communism.<sup>134</sup>

c) Pro-German Propaganda: Here the positive and uplifting aspects of the German homeland were touted. Instead of concentrating on the evil inherent in the enemy, the potential and the power of Germany and her people was brought to the fore.

Germany (GE): The national homeland of the new rulers of Europe. Germany was the well-spring of high culture and the standard-bearer of modern civilisation. It was the spiritual core of Germans, whose duty it was to ensure the continued existence of Germany through work and service. Examples: the virtue of German decency<sup>135</sup>; the tortuous path through history<sup>136</sup>; loyalty to Germany.<sup>137</sup>

Hitler (HT): A source of strength and unity, one with the Volk. Excerpts from speeches, exhortations to the troops, etc.

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<sup>130</sup> MfdT., 280 Aug'43, "Amnenmärchen".

<sup>131</sup> MfdT., 345 Jul'44, "Bolschewistische Lockrufe".

<sup>132</sup> MfdT., 152 Nov'41, "Sind wir eigentlich beliebt in der Welt?"

<sup>133</sup> MfdT., 313 Mar'44, "Englische Perversitäten".

<sup>134</sup> MfdT., 291 Nov'43, "Bekennnisse einer schönen Seele".

<sup>135</sup> MfdT., 125 Aug'41, "Für deutsche Anständigkeit unfäßlich".

<sup>136</sup> MfdT., 185 Mar'42, "Der Weg von der Kleinstaaterei zur Großdeutschen Reich".

<sup>137</sup> MfdT., 337 Jun'44, "Ideal und Wirklichkeit".

Examples: faith in the Führer of paramount import<sup>138</sup>; excerpt from speech at Sportpalast 30 Sep'42.<sup>139</sup>

National Socialism (NS): A system suited for Germany alone. It was superior to all other forms of government, was their envy, and was mortally opposed to communism. Examples: National Socialism as a wellspring of energy<sup>140</sup>; National Socialists being 'men of deeds'.<sup>141</sup>

Volk (Vlk): The people and the community of the people who are of German descent. The counterpart of the leader in National Socialism. That entity for which the German soldier dies if necessary. Examples: the strongest and healthiest people of Europe<sup>142</sup>; the close connection between the Volk and the men at the front.<sup>143</sup>

d) Troops Propaganda: This was intended to educate the men in the theory and methods of propaganda and psychological warfare, and to regulate the propaganda message encapsulated in Mitteilungen.

Propaganda (prp): In this application we mean propaganda in its most general sense, as an object of study. Examples: condemnation of tuning-in to foreign broadcasting<sup>144</sup>; the

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<sup>138</sup> MfdT., 143 Oct'41, "Führertum aus Glauben".

<sup>139</sup> MfdT., 226 Oct'42, "Diesen Krieg überlebt kein bürgerlicher Staat".

<sup>140</sup> MfdT., 289 Oct'43, "Der Nationalsozialismus als die Quelle unserer Kraft".

<sup>141</sup> MfdT., 350 Aug'44, "Wir und das Schicksal".

<sup>142</sup> MfdT., 144 Oct'41, "Das Lebengesetz im deutschen Lebensraum".

<sup>143</sup> MfdT., 254 Mar'43, "Deutsche Menschen".

<sup>144</sup> MfdT., 145 Oct'41, "Ein hartes aber notwendiges Urteil".

value of propaganda in protecting Germans against the enemy lies<sup>145</sup>; importance of disseminating papers.<sup>146</sup>

Mitteilungen (Mitt): Articles meant to draw attention to important information found in Mitteilungen. The paper promoted itself and its message. Examples: do not allow copies of Mitteilungen to languish on desks in orderly rooms but get them circulating<sup>147</sup>; the vital importance of the service provided by Mitteilungen.<sup>148</sup>

Rumours (rum): Rumours were probably the most pernicious manifestation of enemy propaganda and accordingly received due attention. The initial distinction between articles with information about specific kinds of propaganda transmission such as radio and leaflets disappeared after analysis. These distinctions were not deemed relevant to this study and were relegated to their nationality of origin, or just 'enemy propaganda'. Examples: dispelling the fear that the state retains part of the estate of those killed in action<sup>149</sup>; the countereffort to rumours.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> MfdT., 198 May'42, "Warum Propaganda?"

<sup>146</sup> Includes references to Front und Heimat and Der Politische Soldat. MfdT., 361 Sep'44, "Die Sache mit den Heinzelmännchen".

<sup>147</sup> MfdT., 170 Jan'42, "Hier kann nur die Schreibstube helfen!"

<sup>148</sup> MfdT., 218 Aug'42, "Kurze Antwort auf einen langen Brief aus einen Lazarett".

<sup>149</sup> MfdT., 215 Aug'42, "Eine völlig unbegründete Befürchtung".

<sup>150</sup> MfdT., 278 Aug'43, "Erfahrungen im Kampf gegen Gerüchte".



SECTION 2

ARMY (ARMY)

Prevalence: 21%

This grouping comprises subjects that have a bearing on army-related aspects of life. In other words, most of these themes would be of little application to anyone not in the Wehrmacht.

Instructional (ins): In the broadest understanding of the word, this theme, like propaganda, plays a part in all of the others. In the narrower sense intended here, leaning toward the non-ideological, we mean instructions or guidelines to do with day to day activities, and not with any particular higher purpose. Examples: careful not to send the potato beetle home<sup>151</sup>; take note of a special service provided by the Army<sup>152</sup>; the threat to security posed by writing on boxcars.<sup>153</sup> Many of the themes listed below can easily qualify as subsets of this theme.

Behaviour (beh): Articles addressing behavioural topics such as mood, humour, pessimism or optimism fit this theme. Certain attitudes were preferred to the exclusion of others. Examples: cannot accomplish the tasks before us if we are only able to see grey, we must be positive<sup>154</sup>; build your character, set the best example possible for those around you<sup>155</sup>; war is no excuse for poor behaviour and/or a

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<sup>151</sup> MfdT., 119 Jul'41, "Achtet auf den Kartoffelkäfer, er ist gefährlich!"

<sup>152</sup> A service that aided the men with regard to affairs such as injuries or relatives of those killed at the front. MfdT., 162 Dec'41, "Wehrmachtfürsorgeoffizier (W.F.O.) und Wehrmachtfürsorge".

<sup>153</sup> MfdT., 269 Jun'43, "Spart mit der Kreide!"

<sup>154</sup> MfdT., 112 Jun'41, "Menschen, mit positivem und Menschen mit negativem Vorzeichen".

<sup>155</sup> MfdT., 219 Aug'42, "Edles Blut".

slackening of discipline.<sup>156</sup>

Duty (dut): To the Wehrmacht organisation, to the Volk, and to himself. Each soldier was to feel honour-bound and forthcoming in his loyalty. Examples: diligence with regard to health and a healthy respect for authority<sup>157</sup>; a few wounds should not deter one from his duty, in the name of victory.<sup>158</sup> This theme closely associated with some of the following.

Soldier (sldr): Many articles had a personal note about them. When a soldier read one he could apply the case to himself. He could follow the advice, accept reassurance, or otherwise ingest the message. Examples: reassurance that the years at the front were not 'lost' but part of a good cause<sup>159</sup>; the issue of Germans at the front while foreign workers remain in Germany<sup>160</sup>; investigations proceeding for the missing.<sup>161</sup>

Praise (pra): General commendations for a job well done. Examples: the German soldier is the best by far<sup>162</sup>; our men represent propriety and decency.<sup>163</sup>

Detriment (det): Subjects that were detrimental to the German war effort were also addressed. These include primarily

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<sup>156</sup> MfdT., 286 Oct'43, "Es ist ja Krieg!"

<sup>157</sup> MfdT., 137 Sep'41, "Ungeschriebene Gesetze".

<sup>158</sup> MfdT., 325 May'44, "Bin ich frontuntauglich?"

<sup>159</sup> MfdT., 178 Feb'42, "Verlorene Jahre?"

<sup>160</sup> MfdT., 242 Jan'43, "Deutsche Männer im Kampf - ausländische Arbeiter daheim".

<sup>161</sup> MfdT., 295 Nov'43, "Nachforschung nach Vermissten".

<sup>162</sup> MfdT., 147 Oct'41, "Primitive Zumutungen".

<sup>163</sup> A blanket statement, be they soldier or officer, front line or rear area. MfdT., 244 Jan'43, "Auf die Anständigkeit kommt es an".

theft and treason. Examples: listeners of foreign broadcasts to be regarded as traitors<sup>164</sup>; men who complain of fatigue slow down the war effort.<sup>165</sup>

Caution (cau): This is the German version of Britain's "loose lips cost ships". It was quite undesirable to provide the enemy with intelligence through carelessness. Examples: indiscretion costs lives<sup>166</sup>; exercise of caution when speaking<sup>167</sup>.

Wastage (wnwn): The avoidance of wastage and the importance of conservation of resources. Care in rationing, 'waste not - want not'. Examples: refrain from squandering matériel, it's a burden on the home front<sup>168</sup>; condemnation of ammunition consumption by men on leave.<sup>169</sup>

Death in line of duty (gef): Here we refer to dead comrades, the 'Gefallene', whose numbers grew appallingly as the war in the East continued. Death in the line of duty was deserving of the highest accolade. Utmost respect was required for the dead heroes. Examples: the total dead in the first year of the war in Russia<sup>170</sup>; cemeteries<sup>171</sup>.

Leadership (ldr): This encompasses information that pertains to the leadership, usually military, from the

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<sup>164</sup> MfdT., 160 Dec'41, "Warum ist das Abhören fremder Sender ein Verbrechen?"

<sup>165</sup> MfdT., 239 Dec'42, "Gevatter Müdmann".

<sup>166</sup> MfdT., 207 Jun'42, "Was ist geheim?"

<sup>167</sup> MfdT., 260 May'43, "Achtung! Feind hört mit in mancherlei Gestalt!"

<sup>168</sup> MfdT., 204 Jun'42, "Sparsamkeit am richtigen Fleck".

<sup>169</sup> MfdT., 242 Jan'43, "Verschwendung infolge Gedankenlosigkeit".

<sup>170</sup> MfdT., 209 Jul'42, "271612 Gefallene".

<sup>171</sup> MfdT., 241 Jan'43, "Verhalten auf Ehrenfriedhöfen".

officers right up to Hitler. Quotes, commendations, information. Examples: Goebbels praises and thanks the victims of the war<sup>172</sup>; the enemy attack upon the leadership and the nerves of the people.<sup>173</sup> Comradeship (kam): The sharing of experiences and dedication to the common welfare that endeared one to the concept of brotherhood-in-arms. Examples: importance of relationships at the front<sup>174</sup>; the motorised troops should not slander the 'infantry in the ditch'.<sup>175</sup>

Volunteers (vol): Mostly with regard to those on the Russian front, commonly known as 'Hiwis'. It was necessary to reconcile the official view that ranked them with 'Untermenschen' with their usefulness to the German cause. Example: they must be made to understand that they contribute to the future of their own people as well.<sup>176</sup>

Mail (mail): The mail system itself was also given due attention. Example: risk of overstraining the system with unnecessary mail such as Christmas cards.<sup>177</sup>

Salute (sal): A sloppy salute was contrary to the image of efficiency modelled by the Wehrmacht. Example: do not be afraid to exclaim "Heil Hitler!" emphatically.<sup>178</sup>

German prisoners of war (gPOW): The war was not over for those who had fallen into enemy hands. By example and loyalty to Germany and credence in the final victory these men could

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<sup>172</sup> MfdT., 148 Oct'41, "Ehrenbürger der Nation".

<sup>173</sup> MfdT., 286 Oct'43, "Pläne des Feindes, die wir genau kennen".

<sup>174</sup> MfdT., 217 Aug'42, "Mein und Dein".

<sup>175</sup> MfdT., 330 May'44, "Das geht uns alle an".

<sup>176</sup> MfdT., 241 Jan'43, "Freiwillige und Hilfswillige im Osten".

<sup>177</sup> MfdT., 154 Nov'41, "Eine leicht durchzuführende Entlastung".

<sup>178</sup> MfdT., 315 Mar'44, "Antwort auf hundert Briefe!"

still serve the war effort. Example: draw enemy resources as much as possible.<sup>179</sup>

Fuel wastage (wnwn.f): A part of the theme, wastage. Example: the appeal for conscientiousness in fuel consumption.<sup>180</sup>

July plot (J20): Of particular significance to the upper ranks of the Wehrmacht in the closing stages of the war and duly noted. Example: gratitude for Hitler's survival as he is more than our leader, but the life and limb of Germany.<sup>181</sup>

Patrol (pat): Patrol duty is a fundamental part of operations and if any reluctance on the part of the troops did exist it would be treated with alarm. Example: its necessity and importance for maintaining discipline.<sup>182</sup>

Estates (est): Concerns about the handling of possessions of comrades who were killed. Example: the moral and morale factors tied to the proper management of estates.<sup>183</sup>

Decorations (dec): For motivation and morale. Example: the Iron Cross for a Hitler Youth.<sup>184</sup>

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW): Usually a quote from a directive or a reiteration of policy. Understandably, the frequency of this theme is low since all such communications were transmitted by channels other than Mitteilungen, such as Nachrichten des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht for officers.

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<sup>179</sup> MfdT., 128 Aug'41, "Auch der Kriegsgefangene kann noch seinem Vaterlande dienen".

<sup>180</sup> MfdT., 316 Mar'44, "Was geht den Frontsoldaten 'Kohlenklau' an?"

<sup>181</sup> MfdT., 344 Jul'44, "Lang lebe der Führer!"

<sup>182</sup> MfdT., 160 Dec'41, "Streifendienst".

<sup>183</sup> MfdT., 327 May'44, "Warum ist die Sorge für den Nachlaß gefallener Kameraden so wichtig?"

<sup>184</sup> MfdT., 237 Nov'42, "Das Eiserne Kreuz für einen Hitler-Jungen?"

Example: OKW Reports do not give exact details or truth about events at the front for security reasons.<sup>185</sup>

Enemy prisoners of war (ePOW): On the taking and surveillance of prisoners and defectors. Example: avoid fraternising the enemy POWs.<sup>186</sup>

Officers (off): A theme that is a very large part of any scheme that involves war or the military. They were responsible for their men and this included setting a standard for guidelines expressed in Mitteilungen. Officers received their own paper called Mitteilungen für das Offizierkorps which aided them in this function. But while it was acceptable for officers to think about men, it was better for the men to concentrate on the tasks at hand rather than dwell on their superiors. This is reflected in the low frequency of this theme. Example: questions about youths taking officer training.<sup>187</sup>

### SECTION 3

#### INFLUENCE (INFL)

Prevalence: 19%

This element involves the direct effort to make cognate the Nazi ideology by tying it to the life in the service. Appeals to reason and to emotion were designed to evoke a preferred response or attitude. Some of the most imaginative rhetoric is in evidence here.

Exhortation (exh): The appeal to maintain or surpass all efforts heretofor in making a bid for final victory, reminding one of duty to the community, be that community Germany or Europe, and of fearful consequences should the exertions on

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<sup>185</sup> MfdT., 315 May'44, "Antwort auf hundert Briefe".

<sup>186</sup> MfdT., 281 Aug'43, "Unmögliche Auffassung".

<sup>187</sup> MfdT., 284 Sep'43, "Ueberflüssige Sorgen".

the part of the soldier be insufficient. Examples: be tough, not soft, the enemy will not stop short of the destruction of Germany<sup>188</sup>; idealism will help us on to victory<sup>189</sup>; 100% needed in this fifth year of conflict.<sup>190</sup>

Behaviour (beh); Duty (dut): see ARMY.

Encouragement (enc): Different from exhortation. Anything that was meant to cheer, to raise spirits, such as good news from the front. Examples: the exploits of a courageous unit<sup>191</sup>; the advent of the V-weapons<sup>192</sup>; rejoicing over disappointed enemy hopes.<sup>193</sup>

Reflections (ref): A measure of articles seemed inclined to providing 'food for thought', or topics for reflection. Although one can rightly say that all material printed in Mitteilungen was meant to be pondered<sup>194</sup>, certain articles exemplified this. Examples: how to help pass the long winter evenings<sup>195</sup>; what the new year of 1942 means for us.<sup>196</sup>

Praise (pra): see ARMY.

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<sup>188</sup> MfdT., 157 Nov'41, "Nicht weich werden!"

<sup>189</sup> MfdT., 238 Dec'42, "'Zu ideal empfunden?'"

<sup>190</sup> MfdT., 327 May'44, "Warum eigentlich nicht hundertprozentig?"

<sup>191</sup> Tells of a security division engaged in Rear Area partisan warfare. References to particular units were relatively rare in Mitteilungen although anecdotes of army life were plentiful. MfdT., 272 Jul'43, "Treue in der Stille".

<sup>192</sup> MfdT., 341 Jul'44, "Moralische Entrüstung in England".

<sup>193</sup> MfdT., 280 Aug'43, "Enttäuschte Hoffnungen des Feindes".

<sup>194</sup> The subscript to the title of Mitteilungen was "Die Mitteilungen dienen als Unterlage für Kompanie-Besprechungen."

<sup>195</sup> Educate yourself, pursue intellectual activities, read Mein Kampf. MfdT., 157 Nov'41, "Unnötige Belastung?"

<sup>196</sup> MfdT., 167 Jan'42, "Sichere Grundlagen für 1942".

Women (wom): A theme tied to many others such as letter writing, leave, and so on. Although some women did serve in the Wehrmacht, few approached the front lines. Thoughts about women clearly did not diminish as intervening distances increased. Examples: informative sketch of women in the service of the Wehrmacht<sup>197</sup>; women of the Reich are entrusted to the protection of the front line men.<sup>198</sup>

Sympathy (sym): For the dead, the wounded, for the soldier's lot, etc. The Wehrmacht was not meant to be an unfeeling organisation and the expression of empathy with the soldier and his hardships was meant to be an expression of this. Examples: enduring such inconveniences as Christmas without gifts<sup>199</sup>; how difficult a matter it was for a soldier en route to the front to plead for a relative arrested for a crime back home.<sup>200</sup>

Death in the line of duty (gef); Comradeship (kam): see ARMY.

Mission (mss): The sense of mission, as the carrier of 'socialism' and culture, has also been noted. It is a theme very tinted with ideology. Our keynote article (see page 88) was designated this theme. Examples: the soldier fights for world peace<sup>201</sup>; the holy mission of the soldier.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> MfdT., 133 Aug'41, "Nachrichtenhelferinnen, Rote=Kreuz= Schwestern und andere deutsche Mädel im Wehrdienst".

<sup>198</sup> MfdT., 281 Aug'43, "Nochmals das Thema: Frauen und Mädchen".

<sup>199</sup> MfdT., 163 Dec'41, "Weihnachten ohne Geschenke?"

<sup>200</sup> MfdT., 286 Oct'43, "Eine schwierige Angelegenheit".

<sup>201</sup> The soldier fights for "das geistige Gesicht der Welt für die Zeit des Friedens entscheiden!" MfdT., 146 Oct'41, "Erkenntnisse und Entschlüsse".

<sup>202</sup> MfdT., 158 Dec'41, "Eine Bekundung souveräner deutscher Sicherheit".



Fear (fr): Fear of what the Russians have in store for a prostrate Germany, fear that the life of the Volk is in jeopardy. Examples: the Allies want to ruin us, allow hunger to rot us, exploit and destroy us<sup>203</sup>; be careful not to fall into Russian hands.<sup>204</sup>

Morale (mor): The soldier was exposed to a continuous stream of morale-boosting stimuli, some of which were categorized as themes below. Morale here is in the 'catch-all' category of themes. Example: ideas are power, we must steel ourselves and be courageous.<sup>205</sup>

Individual (ind): Sometimes the soldier was credited with his great importance as an individual, especially in the latter part of the war when demands became greater and greater. Example: value to the Volk and the community.<sup>206</sup>

Death (dth): An invariable part of any war, this subject was also accorded its due attention. Occasionally death was discussed in the abstract or philosophical sense. Example: death and honour transfixed in the deeds of an officer at Orel.<sup>207</sup>

Outposts (out): Men on duty at places far from the main fighting were not to feel abandoned or too isolated. This could apply to garrisons or strongpoints in the tactical or the strategic situation. Example: troops in the Balkans or in

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<sup>203</sup> MfdT., 187 Mar'42, "Das feindliche Kriegsziel ganz ungeschminkt".

<sup>204</sup> MfdT., 359 Sep'44, "Aus der Praxis der Bolschewisten".

<sup>205</sup> Slogans such as "Die Fahne hoch, die Reihen fest geschlossen" are mentioned. MfdT., 270 Jul'43, "Gedanken sind Kräfte".

<sup>206</sup> MfdT., 348 Aug'44, "Nie kam es so sehr wie jetzt auf den Einzelnen an!"

<sup>207</sup> MfdT., 278 Aug'43, "So denken die Besten unseres Volkes".

Norway were to stay ready, they were appreciated.<sup>208</sup>

#### SECTION 4

IDEOLOGY (IDEO)

Prevalence: 19%

Articles having to do with ideological themes were evident in abundance. Here was the Nazi 'Weltanschauung' expounded in the fullest degree. This would seem to be the indoctrinational core of the propaganda effort. This was where the mind set of the 'political' soldier was cast.

The War (TWr): The vital interests of all Germans were at stake in the present world conflict. It was the *raison d'être* for the suffering that the soldier had to endure. Consequently, the war was portrayed as an idealistic struggle to the death. Herein the rationale for continued efforts on the part of the troops was developed, on a more factual basis than through simple exhortation. Examples: a war fought on three levels - the front, the home front, and propaganda<sup>209</sup>; how far we have come and how much further we have to go.<sup>210</sup> Insofar as 'current news' is concerned, this was not generally forthcoming unless it was good news. The different theatres of war made up a substantial part of the thematic content of Mitteilungen as did discussion of the various belligerents that Germany faced.

Germany (GE); Hitler (HT): see PROPAGANDA.

Ideology (I): This theme is assigned to articles of general ideological content. Examples: the struggle between ideologies as a game played between bolshevism and plutocracy<sup>211</sup>; the

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<sup>208</sup> MfdT., 341 Jul'44, "Soldat in öden Gegenden".

<sup>209</sup> MfdT., 123 Jul'41, "Kampf auf drei Ebenen".

<sup>210</sup> MfdT., 230 Oct'42, "Wie weit haben wir es geschafft?"

<sup>211</sup> MfdT., 132 Sept'41, "Heraus aus der Zwickmühle!"

virtues of the 'community' versus the 'crowd'<sup>212</sup>; the stemming of the Asiatic tide.<sup>213</sup>

Jew (Jew); National Socialism (NS); Volk (Vlk); Bolshevism/Communism (bol): see PROPAGANDA.

Europe (EU): Seen as a community of nations bound geographically and by and large under German hegemony. Europe stood in direct opposition to Asia which was always encroaching upon her. This theme occurred usually in conjunction with another. Examples: the Europe of the future<sup>214</sup>; the importance of European solidarity in the war<sup>215</sup>.

Mission (mss): see INFLUENCE.

Anniversary (ann): Articles devoted to commemorating events or achievements such as the fall of France. Some like the revolution of November 1918, were deigned as intrinsic to the German identity. Examples: celebrating the 25th anniversary of the Battle of Jutland<sup>216</sup>; Heroes Remembrance Day reminds us that the fallen heroes urge us to do our duty.<sup>217</sup>

Plutocracy (plu): see PROPAGANDA.

God (God): A strong reference to the Almighty warrants some attention simply because of its obtrusiveness. Example: the place of God in our reality.<sup>218</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> MfdT., 139 Sept'41, "Herdenmenschen und Gemeinschaft".

<sup>213</sup> MfdT., 243 Jan'43, "Die Abwehr Asiens, eine geschichtliche Aufgabe seit 1500 Jahren".

<sup>214</sup> MfdT., 134 Aug'41, "Europa im Werden".

<sup>215</sup> MfdT., 248 Feb'43, "Verbündete und Kameraden im deutschen Freiheitskampf".

<sup>216</sup> At Jutland in 1916 Britain lost her first sea battle. MfdT., 106 May'41, "Zum Skagerraktage 1941".

<sup>217</sup> MfdT., 184 Mar'42, "Heldengedenktage 1942".

<sup>218</sup> The phrase 'Gott mit uns' says everything. MfdT., 245 Jan'43, "Soldat und Religion".

## SECTION 5

### HOME (HOME)

Prevalence: 13%

Although physically far-removed from the everyday realities of the front, this was a subject that the soldier had little difficulty conjuring up wherever and whenever he chose. Home constituted the vast majority of experience for those in the Wehrmacht who were not career soldiers. It represented the world that the soldier had left behind and was inaccessible to him. Home often meant the only reality outside of the army.

Germany (GE): see PROPAGANDA.

Letters (lft): A broad topic for discussion. Articles dealing with letters were often very instructional in terms of giving suggestions and recommendations on letter-writing. Because letters were such an important and private part of a soldier's life, and because so much mail between front and home was processed, it remained largely outside the purview of controllable media. Examples: the proper content of a letter, shunning the unpleasant and concentrating on the better side of things<sup>219</sup>; letters must uplift spirits, not demoralize<sup>220</sup>; tremendous value as a morale booster.<sup>221</sup>

Women (wom): see INFLUENCE.

Volk (Vlk): see PROPAGANDA.

Home (hom): The troops were happy to hear about home under any conditions. No distinction at this time is drawn between the private life or personal home and the home front at large.

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<sup>219</sup> MfdT., 163 Dec'41, "Macht die Heimat sich vom Krieg das richtige Bild?"

<sup>220</sup> Apparently 350 million letters per month were exchanged between home and front. MfdT., 174 Feb'42, "Auch die Feldpostbriefe sind Waffen".

<sup>221</sup> Letters are like mental (seelisch) vitamins for the homeland. MfdT., 252 Mar'43, "Soldatenbriefe".

Examples: how is shopping at the home front<sup>222</sup>; the confidence exuded by the home front in the soldiers and their leadership.<sup>223</sup>

Jobs (job): Many of the men were torn away from their businesses and normal careers in the call to arms. Examples: soldiers attempting to reestablish themselves in civilian occupations later will not be at a disadvantage<sup>224</sup>; many crafts and businesses idle due to the war effort, but it's necessary for victory.<sup>225</sup>

Leave (lea): Leave was a critical factor in the soldier's morale, and such a break from the fighting generally became more difficult to obtain as the ranks of the Wehrmacht became increasingly depleted of its more experienced men. Examples: extoll patience in waiting for holidays, be tough<sup>226</sup>; for men at the Eastern front it is rarer because of transport problems etc., but no room for envy.<sup>227</sup>

Wives (wiv): Many men were already married when they went to war and these received a share of attention. Example: the important duty performed by the wife at the homefront.<sup>228</sup>

Bombing (bom): The German people themselves were engaged in warfare at home. In a sense they were comrades-in-arms. A buttress to counter-propaganda, it touched the men who had

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<sup>222</sup> MfdT., 231 Oct'42, "Wehrmachtangehörige beim Einkauf in der Heimat".

<sup>223</sup> MfdT., 334 Jun'44, "Alle Gedanken Deutschlands sind an den Fronten".

<sup>224</sup> MfdT., 217 Aug'42, "Sind wir Kriegsteilnehmer später im Zivilberuf benachteiligt?"

<sup>225</sup> MfdT., 275 Jul'43, "Eine amtliche Erklärung zu des Stilllegungsaktion in Handel, Handwerk und anderen Gewerben".

<sup>226</sup> MfdT., 149 Oct'41, "Urlaub im Kriege".

<sup>227</sup> MfdT., 263 May'43, "Ist der Vorschlag vernünftig?"

<sup>228</sup> MfdT., 140 Sep'41, "Ein schlechter Rat".

friends and loved ones in the cities most often under attack. Example: our attitudes will prevail in this attack on our nerves.<sup>229</sup>

Family (fam): The kernel of the Volksgemeinschaft that faced certain extinction were it not for the man at the front. References to children have been included here. Example: the importance of children for the future of Germany.<sup>230</sup>

Marriage (mar): At a time when it became difficult to make long term plans, and prolonged separation tested faithfulness, this subject made its appearance. Example: to marry now or not to marry now.<sup>231</sup>

Home morale (h.mor): WPr felt that the sensitivity to morale at the front or at home was a reciprocal relationship. Often this subject is closely tied to letters. Example: home morale is in exceedingly good shape.<sup>232</sup>

Deaths from bombing (dth.b): Deaths occurred also at home and not only at the front. There is some accounting of the victims of the bombing raids. Example: take care in interpreting figures on civilian casualties resulting from the enemy bombing campaign.<sup>233</sup>

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<sup>229</sup> MfdT., 284 Sep'43, "Welche Bedeutung haben die anglo-amerikanischen Terrorangriffe auf unsere Städte für den weiteren Kriegsverlauf?"

<sup>230</sup> MfdT., 202 Jun'42, "Sieg der Waffen - Sieg der Wiegen".

<sup>231</sup> The brave should not be afraid to marry and raise children. MfdT., 276 Aug'43, "Soll man im Kriege heiraten, oder soll man warten bis zum Frieden?"

<sup>232</sup> MfdT., 189 Apr'42, "Wie ist die Stimmung in der Heimat?"

<sup>233</sup> MfdT., 285 Sep'43, "Vorsicht mit Zahlen".

SECTION 6

NEWS (NEWS)

Prevalence: 9%

Whatever news was communicated showed Germany or Germans in the best light and the enemy in the worst. Should reverses be suffered then these were interpreted in a positive manner so as to inspire greater effort. Generally speaking the ill fortunes of war were evaded, but the seriousness of the strategic situation, especially after Stalingrad, was not.

Russian front (Suf): After 1941 the predominant of two principal fronts on which Germany fought, both in casualties and in resources committed. This theme refers to articles that address operational or strategic aspects of the war in Russia, or deal specifically with some aspect of that front. It gave the soldier a picture of Russia beyond the immediate experience with his unit. Examples: statistics of the Kiev encirclement<sup>234</sup>; the challenges of problems with Russian civilians.<sup>235</sup>

Atlantic (Atl): The Atlantic Ocean, primarily aspects of the war at sea. Examples: nine months of intensive U-Boat warfare<sup>236</sup>; the attack on Russian-Allied communications.<sup>237</sup>

Strategic (str): Information on the progress of the European war, status reports from the various fronts in general, exploring the intentions of the enemy, discussing the objectives as set forth by the leadership. Examples: what about the second front that will rescue the Soviets<sup>238</sup>;

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<sup>234</sup> MfdT., 140 Sep'41, "Neue Zahlen und Räume".

<sup>235</sup> MfdT., 214 Aug'42, "Die Folgen einer Unüberlegtheit".

<sup>236</sup> MfdT., 226 Oct'42, "Der neunte Hammerschlag".

<sup>237</sup> MfdT., 243 Jan'43, "Die U-Boote im Kampf gegen die feindlichen Tanker im Atlantik".

<sup>238</sup> MfdT., 207 Jun'42, "Pakte und Taten".

appreciate German expansion by looking at the map.<sup>239</sup>

Allies (all): Articles pertaining to countries like Italy, Finland, and Japan. Examples: the women of Finland<sup>240</sup>; the non-German components in the Wehrmacht's struggle.<sup>241</sup> Strategic considerations for Japan are found largely in the theme Pacific.

Mediterranean (Med): Includes references to Africa, Italy, the Balkans. Examples: the strategic importance of Rommel's campaign<sup>242</sup>; the brighter side of Operation Torch.<sup>243</sup>

Western front (Wf): As with Russian front, but on the front where Germany faced Great Britain and her allies. This includes northern Europe, Normandy and afterwards. Example: the war at sea<sup>244</sup>; aspects of the British-American alliance.<sup>245</sup> The themes Mediterranean and Atlantic are subsets of this one, as well as the strategic air war (bombing).

Foreign (for): References to areas of the world that did not directly impinge on the theatres of operations (excluding Canada and the U.S.). Examples: the prospects of the Arabs rising against the British<sup>246</sup>; politics and the freedom

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<sup>239</sup> MfdT., 210 Jul'42, "Blick auf die Karte".

<sup>240</sup> MfdT., 159 Dec'41, "Die Lottas".

<sup>241</sup> MfdT., 275 Jul'43, "Die deutsche Wehrmacht und ihre Verbündeten".

<sup>242</sup> MfdT., 112 Jun'41, "Was geht uns Afrika an?"

<sup>243</sup> MfdT., 236 Nov'42, "Die Kriegslage nach den Unternehmen in Afrika".

<sup>244</sup> MfdT., 190 Apr'42, "Schiffsverluste, die England an die Nieren gehen".

<sup>245</sup> MfdT., 215 Aug'42, "Weltbeben".

<sup>246</sup> MfdT., 101 May'41, "Heiliger Krieg".



movement in India.<sup>247</sup>

Bombing (bom): see HOME.

Pacific (Pac): Events of and reflections upon Japan's war. Example: An entire issue devoted to Japan, giving background and course of the conflict to date.<sup>248</sup>

Statistical (sta): Articles that related figures in reporting on the progress of the war. These included losses of men and matériel on either side. Example: Soviet losses.<sup>249</sup>

Tonnage (tnn): A part of the theme Atlantic. The successes of the submarine war, a portent of doom for the British, was welcome news. Example: England starved of supplies.<sup>250</sup>

## SECTION 7

PERSONAL (PERS):

Prevalence: 7%

Largely a slice of HOME, but more restricted. This element lies closer to the heart of the soldier. It represents a propaganda challenge as to how to address the circumstances peculiar to each individual which virtually range the broad spectrum of humanity. It was created with the intent of seeing to what degree Mitteilungen addressed issues which fell outside of the strategic or political or ideological realm.

Letters (ltt); Home (hom); Job (job); Leave (lea); Wives (wiv); Family (fam); Marriage (mar): see HOME.

Money (mon): For immediate purposes or with regard to finances in the civilian or home front. Example: the National

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<sup>247</sup> MfdT., 218 Aug'42, "Wissenswertes über Indien".

<sup>248</sup> MfdT., 200 May'42, "Japans Krieg".

<sup>249</sup> MfdT., 207 Jun'42, "Die Verluste der Bolschewiken".

<sup>250</sup> MfdT., 112 Jun'41, "Ein Torpedo versenkt 40 Millionen Pfund Speck".

Socialist state precludes worries about inflation.<sup>251</sup>

Finally, concluding this part of Chapter III, mention must be made of one theme did not adhere to any element -- 'miscellaneous'.

Miscellaneous (misc): Certain topics have defied even a tentative grouping so they have been consigned to this theme. These would include items of a very specific or very vague nature so that their inclusion or exclusion would have no identifiable effect on the statistical aspect of our study. Examples: a bulletin board of events for Jan'43<sup>252</sup>; derision of the stringent Allied security for their own leaders.<sup>253</sup>

#### TESTS

Thus all 77 themes used in this study have been enumerated and it is hoped that some clearer understanding of the contents of Mitteilungen has accrued. Before piecing together the fragments of the puzzle, it would be appropriate at this time to conduct a few simple tests as a validation of our data. These would be in effect 'controls' and will help in judging whether the results of the analysis thus far make sense and are thereby suitable for extrapolation and interpretation. In other words, in a given case, does the data produce expected results?

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<sup>251</sup> MfdT., 271 Jul'43, "Sparen im Kriege?"

<sup>252</sup> Rosenberg's fiftieth birthday on the 12th of January, etc. Notable is the absence of any mention of the surrender at Stalingrad or the Allied Conference at Casablanca. See page 80. MfdT., 248 Feb'43, "Kurze Chronik des Januar 1943".

<sup>253</sup> Referring to the Teheran Conference of November, 1943. MfdT., 297 Dec'43, "Umgeben von der Liebe ihrer Völker".

The first such test has already been done. The observation that 'Propaganda' is dominant by a large margin across the board (Table D) seems natural for an information leaflet distributed by the propaganda office of the army. By any definition, if this theme had ranked near the bottom then this would indicate some incongruence in methodology.

As a second test, a comparison of the emphasis placed on different theatres of war was chosen. One would expect in this case for the Russian front to command the lion's share of attention, as it did in manpower, matériel, and overall resources. To conduct this test, a count of themes relevant to the different fronts was made and this has been summarized in Table F. Comparing the overall totals (West 195, East 162) would indicate that the Western front attracted more attention -- not the expected result. Since the Soviet Union was not invaded until June 1941, the counting will be revised to exclude STAGE 0. A swing in distribution toward the Russian front is the consequence, far enough as to be satisfactory.

A third test could involve a time period comparison. Mitteilungen conveyed to the troops statistics, facts, and events that were newsworthy (Table C6). These were meant to be informative and naturally good news was the best kind to report. As the war passed the winter of 1942-43, for Germany there was less and less good news to report. The occurrence of 'news' during STAGE 2 is a quarter of that in STAGE 1. In the last STAGE it tapers off to zero.

So far in the tests the data has been proven to be entirely consistent with reality. It should be evident by now that tests of this kind can be conducted endlessly. The comparison to Helmut Sündermann's book in the next chapter will in itself be a test. Given the results of three tests so far, and given the detail to which the data base has been worked, it is

entirely safe to say that the data presented is generally sound and workable.

How can one make sense of the information extrapolated? The possibilities in choice of inquiry are as intriguing as they are abundant. It is reasonable to assume that the distribution of subjects was not a random creation and the thematic breakdown creates a situation that offers more than the (correct) observation that Mitteilungen delivered a steady diet of national socialist inspiration. It should at least be possible to judge how closely the perceived priorities of WPr matched physical reality for the soldier of the Eastern front. In other words, to coin Professor Bartov's phrase, what was the "distortion of reality"?<sup>254</sup>

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<sup>254</sup> Bartov, Hitler's Army..., chapter 4.

This chapter is divided into four sections and will survey the data acquired in the previous chapter as a prelude to analysis. The first section will survey the elements of the Perceptual Model (Table D) noting any trends and discrepancies. Right off we appreciate the first rank position of the element Propaganda.<sup>255</sup> The second section shall comment upon individual themes. The third section shall compare Mitteilungen with the daily directives of the Reich Press Office as they were outlined by Helmut Sündermann. The last section will address the issue of the 'political soldier' as it was endorsed through Mitteilungen and the Wehrmacht Propagandaamt.

It should be pointed out at this time that prevalent themes can be referred to as having 'high' or 'medium' frequency. Medium frequency themes (MF) occur at an average of at least once every two months. High frequency themes occur at least once per month on average.<sup>256</sup> By keeping in mind the number of months in each STAGE (Table A), it is possible to determine with a glance at any Table whether a theme is MF, HF, or

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<sup>255</sup> For the purpose of analysis, all elements in Table D2 with a percentage of 16-24 are considered 'second rank'.

<sup>256</sup> This is taken over the total sample which is 43 months. Refer to the TOTAL column in Table B. All themes rating 22 (actually 21.5) or more are MF, while those rated higher than 43 are HF. Themes averaging twice a month or more are very high frequency (vHF). Themes taken over a shorter time period can also be defined HF/MF according to the same rules. For example: 'Russian front' (Suf) is MF for STAGE 1; 'National Socialism' (NS) is vHF for STAGE 3.

vHF.<sup>257</sup> In the survey of elements (section 1, below) the number of HF and MF themes included in each element is depicted after its name.<sup>258</sup>

## SECTION 1

## SURVEY OF ELEMENTS

### 1. PROPAGANDA

3/6

Concern about propaganda, whether offensive or defensive, was given the most space by far. Mitteilungen was conceived as a weapon in this struggle for the heart and mind of the German soldier, which had to be protected against the barrage of lies (Lügentrommelfeuer) of the enemy. The first issue in April 1940 was devoted entirely to this question.<sup>259</sup> The primary objective coincided with upholding the credibility and integrity of Germany in all domains and with diminishing the reputations of the opposing powers. The element Propaganda yielded more information when it was further dissected into parts -- parts that would still be viable for analysis because of the relatively large sample they are drawn from. Table C1 effectively summarizes the components.

Referring to Table C1, what is seen leading up to Stalingrad is a very strong emphasis on devaluating the enemy, evidenced by the preponderance of anti-enemy Propaganda. Humbled by the experience at Stalingrad, this abates substantially. 'Great Britain', the 'U.S.', 'bolshevism' and 'plutocracy' diminish

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<sup>257</sup> Rounding out the figures (for simpler calculation), the four STAGES are construed to have the following number of months: 3, 19, 17, 3.

<sup>258</sup> Format is "x/n" where x = HF or vHF themes in this group and n = MF themes in this group.

<sup>259</sup> "Sie haben keine Ahnung von der Gefährlichkeit der modernen Waffe -- der Feindpropaganda." MfdT., 1 Apr'40. "Eine gefährliche Waffe".

as targets, but the overall frequency of the element Propaganda actually rises. The slack is taken up in the other three flows of Propaganda, counter-enemy in particular. This indicates that German propaganda had gone over to the defense and suggests either a propaganda effort in response to an elevated enemy propaganda effort<sup>260</sup> or a calculation that it would motivate troops more.

Unfriendly propaganda fell more and more within the realm of the believable pursuant to the apparent turning of the tide. Apparent to whom? In a general sense one could say 'people' or 'leaders' but this is misleading. A few well informed people with sufficient perspective could grasp the greater picture of the war enough to understand that Germany was falling back. The rest could only discern that something was amiss through the steadily mounting tally of fallen sons. To recite or argue that the general confidence of the Allies soared and was matched by a loss of faith in Hitler by his allies and his own people<sup>261</sup> does little to express sentiments felt by the men at the front. The soldier saw only his portion of the front. What he learned from the grapevine and what he witnessed in the East especially (high attrition, etc.) must have tried to the limit his faith and confidence in the leadership.

The increase in the counter-propaganda effort is a sure sign that the enemy effort was succeeding in delivering its message of impending doom. We may deduce that, in the latter stages of

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<sup>260</sup> By the spring of 1943, the Nazi supremacy in the information war, both at home and at the fronts, had become largely nullified. Zeman, pp.168-9.

<sup>261</sup> Fest, Hitler, pp.665-6. On the weakening of the 'Hitler myth' through this period see Ian Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth': Image and Reality in the Third Reich (Oxford, 1987), pp.169ff.

the war, WPr devoted more and more energy to fending off bad news. We cannot say that it went over to the defense entirely, just that the stance had shifted slightly but perceptibly.

The weighty presence of 3 HF and 6 MF themes in this group shows beyond a doubt where the priorities of Mitteilungen lay. Mitteilungen was first and foremost a general propaganda paper, dedicated to educating its readers on the subject of propaganda, to defending against hostile enemy propaganda, and to disseminating propaganda of its own.

## 2. ARMY

1/2

The element Army is prominent in close to one fifth of the total sample, sharing second rank in importance with the next two listed elements. Although the primary function of Mitteilungen was propaganda/counter-propaganda, it was still an Armed Forces paper, tending to the needs of the troops. At the very top of such content was the HF theme 'instruction'. In the widest sense of the word, virtually everything dealt with in Mitteilungen was meant to be of an instructional nature - the soldier was expected to draw lessons from what he read. For example, an article whose subject was native volunteers at the Russian front also made suggestions about how to handle such volunteers.<sup>262</sup>

The overall occurrence of Army themes remains essentially unchanged between STAGES 1 and 2, suggesting a consistent emphasis. 'Duty' as a principal theme saw less coverage after Stalingrad, but this does not mean that it became less important. Reference to this subject could have easily been

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<sup>262</sup> MfdT., 246 Feb'43. "Dobrowolzy". We welcome their help, don't refer to them as "Panje" or "schmutzige Russen" because often they understand more than they admit to. In time they may become our friends(!).



channelled through other themes such as 'Volk', 'Germany', and 'comradeship', to which the concepts of loyalty and duty are intrinsic. Attention to themes such as 'detriment' and 'fuel wastage' increased in STAGE 2. This is understandable in view of the necessity, on one hand, to preserve the integrity and discipline of the Armed Forces in face of the mounting seriousness of the military situation, and on the other, to attempt in easing the chronic fuel shortages which only became worse as the war continued.

### 3. INFLUENCE

1/2

The personal and unrecorded experiences of deeds or words, as encountered on an everyday basis, are essential to the character make-up of all individuals. These experiences exerted a hidden influence on the actions and behaviour/attitudes of the men of the Wehrmacht.<sup>263</sup> Mitteilungen dedicated significant space to supplement or soften these experiences.

Propaganda itself implies information and opinions spread to influence people for or against some idea or doctrine. The element Influence seems part and parcel of the element Propaganda. But this exertion to influence the troops in attitudes and opinions was rather less obvious and not meant to be taken as propaganda at face value. It was more compatible with preaching. Moral advice was offered, doctrine was expounded upon, and emotions were rationalized in face of the war situation. Exhortations and commentaries on behaviour head this grouping.

There is a definite increase in the use of themes of this

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<sup>263</sup> Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that a large part of the picture can never be properly studied.

element only in the final stages of the war. This interestingly coincides with the appeal to faith in victory, as the material means for winning the war diminished. Neither 'faith' nor 'victory' made an appearance in the themes, but not because they were not mentioned. On the contrary, the "Endsieg" was a popular concept<sup>264</sup>, but it was never the point of an article. Final victory was ephemeral, a goal, the articles spoke not of it but of how to achieve it.<sup>265</sup> If hope and will were applied in sufficient quantity, it became inevitable. With the strategic collapse in the summer of 1944, hope and will were almost all that was left for inspiration. Both themes 'exhortation' and 'encouragement' are vHF in STAGE 3.<sup>266</sup>

#### 4. IDEOLOGY

0/5

Ideology is second rank across the board, but just barely in STAGE 2. It must have been a traumatizing experience for all Germans, and especially the soldiers, to discover that the enemy, who was supposed to be inferior, was instead tenacious and well-equipped. Moreover he was proving with increasing frequency his ability to inflict serious damage on the Wehrmacht. So, if German superiority was a fable, the soldier would ask, what else would fall from the edifice of national socialist ideology? Coping with such rising doubts forced changes in the writing pattern as 1942 passed to 1943.

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<sup>264</sup> A successful conclusion to war was imminent -- very matter of fact. MfdT., 293 Nov'43, "Der Kampf in Osten".

<sup>265</sup> MfdT., 313 Mar'44, "Nur gedämpft kommt nicht in Frage!" Victory is not 'a thing of the past' if the effort is made. MfdT., 354 Sep'44. "Glaube und Wille bringen schließlich die Entscheidung".

<sup>266</sup> 'Fear', which is at the low end of the occurrence scale, is HF in STAGE 3 as well.

The themes that were particularly hard hit are 'the War', 'Hitler', and 'ideology'. In the first case, it is quite obvious that the War became less popular as the tide turned. The enthusiasm was gone. In the second case, Hitler increasingly became a recluse as the tide of war reversed and, as Ian Kershaw suggests, his popularity declined overall (see Section 2 below). The theme 'Hitler' diminished but allusions to the name did not. In the case of 'ideology', understanding the philosophical high ground of national socialist doctrine became less important than simply obeying orders and trusting in the powers that be. The themes 'plutocracy' and 'bolshevism' were likewise less important (but not unimportant) - understanding the enemy doctrines took back seat to criticizing the enemies themselves.

The dip after Stalingrad does not necessarily imply that this general subject became less of a priority in the absolute sense, but as the war dragged on other issues increasingly demanded attention. The increased bombing of German cities and the plight of loved ones demanded that more respect be paid to the home front. A strategy of survival in the face of a determined enemy demanded more care to army matters. What the soldier must be made to believe in was that victory was still attainable provided that sacrifices were made. This was done on a diet of exhortations, encouragement, and expressions of confidence in the power of the individual -- all of which find expression in the themes of this group.

## 5. HOME

0/2

The home front ranked low as a priority overall. However, it must be said that all soldiers, regardless of how changed they may have been by the conditions at the front, traced an invisible line homeward. Home was part of their identity (hence the inspirational focus on theme 'Germany') and links

were cherished -- the most substantial link being reflected in the theme 'letters'.

It is true that the readers of Mitteilungen always had more pressing matters at hand than to give undue concern to the far rear. It did receive ample consideration nevertheless. The German soldier was after all the protector and champion of the people of the home front. While not prone to go into much detail with regard to the hardship and dislocation suffered on account of the Allied bombers, Mitteilungen nevertheless reported fairly about the home front.<sup>267</sup> This was a prudent step. The writers must have been keenly aware that too much variance from the truth about matters at home would eventually be contradicted by the information found in letters from home.

The element Home therefore was of prime importance to WPr, because of the existing intimate reciprocal relationship.<sup>268</sup> The troops were encouraged to acknowledge that the German population at large was 'in the front line' so to speak. But they were also not to dishearten people at home with vivid (and real) stories.

It is during STAGE 2 that the home front begins to garner more interest, and this coincides with the spreading of the 'total war' and the increased need for mutual reassurance between troops and civilians. The first eighteen months of war in Russia, with the notable exception of the first winter, were relatively good going for the Wehrmacht. It still had the initiative and resources for strategic movement in 1942.

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<sup>267</sup> There were two articles devoted to victims of bombing and related death statistics. MfdT., 275 Jul'43, "Bombengeschädigt" and 285 Sep'43, "Vorsicht mit Zahlen".

<sup>268</sup> A typical article alludes to the reciprocal effects in MfdT., 223 Sep'42, "Wenn aus der Heimat einmal sorgenvolle Briefe kommen".

Tidings from other fronts were stories of success. When this stopped the following year, and strategic air warfare mounted against the German homeland, the plight of loved ones and the courage born of Volksgemeinschaft went to fill the editorial void created by the lack of good news.

## 6. NEWS

0/0

News likewise was consigned to the lower end of the scale. This was not because there was no demand for it -- in fact, troops craved it. Most often reports from the fronts were cloaked by some propaganda message, so the count of News themes may be artificially low. But it is more accurate to say that news was more plentiful when the strategic situation favoured Germany. This is consistent with the observation that the frequency of news-dominated articles plummets by two thirds in the transition to STAGE 2 (see Table D2). Mention of the debacle at Stalingrad is conspicuously absent at the beginning of 1943<sup>269</sup> as is the failure of the attack on the Kursk salient six months later.<sup>270</sup>

Outright deflection from the realities of the situation, like the article which belatedly announced birthdays (e.g. Alfred Rosenberg who turned 50 in January) and openings of Kunstaussstellungen in Vienna and Berlin<sup>271</sup>, etc. seemed to have been more appropriate as news material. Whereas such issues may have been dear to Rosenberg or devotees of fine art, they could be but of little import to the millions of men stretched out over thousands of kilometres, enduring yet

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<sup>269</sup> Review of MfdT., 241 to 250, Jan and Feb'43. Messerschmidt has made the same observation. Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht, p.325.

<sup>270</sup> Review of MfdT., 270 to 275, Jul'43.

<sup>271</sup> MfdT., 249 Feb'43, "Kurze Chronik des Januar 1943".

another Russian winter, with few cheerful prospects in sight.

News is the only element with no HF or MF themes (over the total sample, see note 256). Consistent with the information to date, especially with regard to Home above, News shows its strength through optimism only in STAGE 1, where the 'Russian front' and the 'Atlantic' are of MF.

## 7. PERSONAL

0/1

At the opposite end of the spectrum, 'Personal' matters, acknowledged simply because of their presence in detectable quantity, garnered only a slight share of attention. In the letters received at WPr, the Mitteilungen staff preferred to receive questions or opinions about the war rather than respond to personal problems.<sup>272</sup> Subjects such as the home and family, jobs and pecuniary matters, were included it seems as a means of identifying with the men, sharing in their lot. Such themes were given a nod but were not to be dwelled upon since they distracted one from the situation at hand.

'Letters' is the only MF theme in this small group. They were, more than any other theme, of a highly personal nature and their high occurrence as a topic is not remarkable for reasons suggested earlier -- they fell largely beyond state control and had to be influenced somehow (see page 57).

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<sup>272</sup> MfdT., no.324, Apr'44. "Achtung! Achtung!"

At this point, a pause to rationalize some of the discrepancies between the STAGES at the thematic level is in order.<sup>273</sup> In terms of the model, three things happen as the switch is made from STAGE 1 to 2. First, nothing much happens - the frequency of a theme does not vary enough to draw attention. Such is the case for 'instructions', 'praise', and 'comradeship'. This first category need not detain us, except in one case (see 'HiWis' below). Second, a drop as in 'Russian front' may occur. Third, a significant rise may register as in 'enemy propaganda' which doubles. The most interesting cases are those where a theme gains or loses HF/MF status.

A good number of subjects dropped into relative obscurity as the tide slowly turned. The most remarkable of these drops occur within News where 3 themes fall below MF ('Russian front', 'Atlantic', 'strategic'). News from nearly all fronts declined dramatically, for the reasons mentioned earlier (pages 74-5). The tidings from Russia and the western front including the Atlantic and Mediterranean brought less and less cheer in STAGE 2. As long as there were no victories to report, silence was preferable.

Hitler as a main theme suffered something of a decline as well. This is consistent with evidence that his popularity among the general population was on the wane, something especially noticeable in 1943. The exultant rush of victory in the first half of the war had been throttled. The loss of Stalingrad, the commensurate draining of manpower, and the porosity of Germany's air defenses all contributed to a

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<sup>273</sup> In the interest of maintaining this study within manageable levels, we shall limit ourselves to themes of at least 8 occurrences.

detectable loss of confidence in Hitler's capabilities as a military leader. Although references to him in the general text of Mitteilungen were still common (he did remain as Oberbefehlshaber) his appearance as a theme of articles diminished noticeably -- as did his appearances in public in the later part of the war.<sup>274</sup> Interest in prosecuting the war, Hitler's project in a manner of speaking, accompanied this descent.

One notices that the HF themes 'ideology'<sup>275</sup> and 'reflection' also were reduced in frequency in the latter part of the war. This makes sense if juxtaposed with the increased tendency toward emphasizing faith and will as decisive for victory. Messerschmidt and Bartov are in accord that, as the war evolved, indoctrination sought less to make the soldiers understand Nazi ideology, than to convince them that they were fighting for a 'good cause'.<sup>276</sup> The troops were to increasingly substitute emotion, or 'gut feeling', for rational political/ideological doctrine.

Alternatively, the data do not necessarily support Bartov in his claim that indoctrination was not meant to foster national socialism. There is a distinct rise in this specific theme - which extols the virtue of the party ideology rather than analysing it. This could suggest an attempt to curtail cynicism and doubt about the Party and its ideals. In fact,

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<sup>274</sup> Ian Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth': Image and Reality in the Third Reich (Oxford, 1987), pp.192-9. Fest, pp.668ff.

<sup>275</sup> Not to be confused with the element Ideology, which maintained its second rank status in the Perceptual Model.

<sup>276</sup> Bartov, "Daily Life", p.207. Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht, pp.253-4.



few themes demonstrate so dramatic a rise.<sup>277</sup>

It is also significant that the theme 'mission' is nearly eradicated after the winter of 1942/43. This reflects not the absence of a purpose for the troops but rather the fact that the mission had changed. Initially Germany was to carry forth and make Europe safe for the future, the claim was made from the very beginning that the war in the East was defensive one, and clearly expressed in the last issue of June 1941. Germany stood before the greatest task of her history.<sup>278</sup> After Stalingrad this was no longer the case. The barbarians were at the gates, so to speak, and the preservation of Germany took precedence over the destruction of Russia.

The exploration of the themes in detail is a fascinating endeavour, but beyond the scope of this study since this would require an extensive qualitative analysis. An inquiry of the qualitative sort would multiply the effect of this analysis many times. This can be illustrated with a case in point that has relevance to the eastern front and the Nazi ideology<sup>279</sup> - that is, volunteers from the native population, or HiWis (Hilfswillige).

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<sup>277</sup> If one includes STAGE 3, where it went VHF, it is seen that 'National Socialism' had only three occurrences prior to Stalingrad but 16 after.

<sup>278</sup> MfdT., 112 Jun'41. "Warum Kampf gegen die Bolschewiken?".

<sup>279</sup> Caution is needed when discussing National Socialist ideology. Shades of difference did abound both in theory and application. How else does one reconcile the intent to acknowledge the different peoples of Russia, taking care not to antagonize potentially friendly segments of the population, with the concept of a war of extermination? In a memo dated 9 June 1941 entitled "Weisungen für die Handhabung der Propaganda im Falle 'Barbarossa'" IMT, v.34, Document 026-C, pp.191-5. Also cited in Dallin, pp.56-8.

By simply referring to the tables, it is evident that the frequency of the theme 'volunteers' was not elevated, nor did it change much in occurrence. A deeper look yields more information. The total sample reveals 7 articles on this question. But 5 of 7 occur in January and February 1943, at a time when the need for help in the east became urgent. Until then these workers did not warrant attention in Mitteilungen. With the difficulties of a second winter in Russia, it was a time perhaps when many of these men began to entertain serious doubts about ultimate German success.

The first article devoted to this subject urged the German troops to encourage the volunteers. The Hilfswillige were to be reminded that they contributed to the welfare of their own people as well as the Reich.<sup>280</sup> German troops were prompted to look more kindly upon these helpers.<sup>281</sup> No further articles appeared after that until March and June 1944, when the volunteers had been spiritually elevated to "good and brave comrades".<sup>282</sup>

Such specific changes in emphasis cannot be described in any table. While not intending to devalue the data, it must be realized that there can be practically no end to the depth to which we can pursue a determined investigation. Thematic investigation can be useful when specific studies require them, as Messerschmidt has shown in his proof of the existence of national socialist ardour at WPr.

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<sup>280</sup> MfdT., 242 Jan'43, "Freiwillige und Hilfswillige im Osten".

<sup>281</sup> MfdT., 246 Feb'43, "Dobrowolzy". Previously cited.

<sup>282</sup> Referred to as "unsere guten und tapferen Kameraden". MfdT., 316 Mar'44, "Unsere Kameraden, die Hilfswilligen".

It would be appropriate to measure up the content of Mitteilungen für die Truppe with the essence of the daily press directives, or Tagesparolen. To do this on a point-for-point basis is impractical, but a thematic comparison would suit our purposes admirably. An exposition of Tagesparolen themes has been gathered by Helmut Sündermann who was Dietrich's deputy at the Reich Press Office.<sup>283</sup> His main points, as they pertained to the Eastern front, shall be compared to the content of Mitteilungen.

It is important, however, to realize that the Tagesparolen must be viewed through the lens of the Wehrmacht -- being interpreted as they were by the writers at WPr. Consequently, some themes appear more often than others, or may find expression weeks or even months after the issue of the initial directive.<sup>284</sup> This inconsistency is only natural in view of the vast difference between the civilian audience at which most press was directed, and soldiers at whom Mitteilungen was directed. In the test below, some of Sündermann's observations have been corroborated generally by referring to appropriate themes or elements, while others have been corroborated specifically by representative articles.

Right off it is obvious to the researcher that in the first part of the war, up to the end of December 1941, all of Sündermann's themes were echoed in the pages of Mitteilungen. In his view, the commencement of hostilities was accompanied

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<sup>283</sup> See note 104.

<sup>284</sup> It is not uncommon for events to be brought up long after their occurrence. In 1943 an article appeared in August about Russian atrocities which happened during a breakthrough in February. MfdT., 278 Aug'43, "Der Fall Grischino".

by 1) declarations of Germany's retrospective disagreement with the course of Russian politics since 1939, and 2) the sudden burst of not only anti-bolshevik but also anti-Russian sentiment.<sup>285</sup> The former is expressed in an early post-invasion article.<sup>286</sup> The latter needs little elaboration -- there is an avalanche of the themes 'Soviet Union' and 'bolshevism'<sup>287</sup> in our data. Three other themes of import identified by Sündermann<sup>288</sup> and this researcher are: the evaluation of the political situation to the present<sup>289</sup>; the portrayal of Germany's accomplishments since 1939<sup>290</sup>; and the sustained attack on plutocracy and bolshevism, and their Jewish source.<sup>291</sup>

Mindful of the large number of Germans, civilians but particularly soldiers, who once sympathized with the Communist

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<sup>285</sup> Sündermann, p.166.

<sup>286</sup> MfdT., 116 Jul'41, "Aufmarsch und Abwehr der Bolschewiken seit 25 Jahren".

<sup>287</sup> Based on a more detailed breakdown of STAGE 1, in the first four months of the campaign, 'Soviet Union' appears in 18 articles and 'bolshevism' in 6.

<sup>288</sup> Tagesparolen that identify specific subjects are identified by TP and the date of issuance. In this case, TP 22.6.41 in Sündermann, pp.167-8.

<sup>289</sup> Bolshevism is described as in retreat in MfdT., 143 Oct'41, "Das Zurückfluten des Bolschewismus vom Rhein über die Weichsel in Richtung Asien".

<sup>290</sup> Two years of Hitler's leadership, the German soldier united with the Volk -- MfdT., 121 Jul'41, "Gedanken und Erwägungen, die vor zwei Jahren angestellt werden".

<sup>291</sup> Each corresponding theme claimed four articles in as many months. An average of one article per month is a high one. Consider that in STAGE 1 (19.2 months duration) only five themes exceeded this average i.e. more than 19 occurrences (see Table B) -- the vast majority of theme occurrences fall far below.

cause, it was important to propagate the view of the backward Soviet society as it became exposed by the occupying forces -- expressed by the term "Sowjetparadies".<sup>292</sup> Voice to this was found in an article that urged troops to describe in letters home what they saw.<sup>293</sup> It was also urged that the public press raise awareness of the tremendous threat to Europe that Russia represented.<sup>294</sup> In Mitteilungen this was illustrated by the enormous number of Russian tanks encountered in the first summer.<sup>295</sup>

Also called for in 1941 was silence on some themes, namely: the question of indigenous native ethnic aspirations<sup>296</sup>; the partisan war; and Stalin's 'scorched earth' policy.<sup>297</sup> These absences are also confirmed in the news-sheet under study, except for one article which chastises the 'scorched earth' policy for its effect on the native population.<sup>298</sup>

Throughout the following year, the principal anti-Soviet propaganda line continued. The new year was to begin with renewed vigour after the forced halt in winter. The Tagesparole of 31 December, 1941 lauded the great success of

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<sup>292</sup> Depict the "workers' paradise" as hell on earth. TP 5.7.41 in Sündermann, pp.171-2.

<sup>293</sup> The troops should be objective. Don't write of atrocities, but describe how the conditions of life in Russia really are, and how this poses a threat to Germany. MfdT., 148 Oct'41, "Sachberichte, nach denen die Heimat jetzt verlangt".

<sup>294</sup> TP 29.6.41 in Sündermann, p.175.

<sup>295</sup> MfdT., 130 Aug'41, "So groß war die Gefahr!"

<sup>296</sup> This can be interpreted as a contradiction to the tenet "against the system, not the people". Sündermann, p.170.

<sup>297</sup> TP 23.7.41 and TP 2.8.41 in Ibid., pp.177-8.

<sup>298</sup> MfdT., 152 Nov'41, "Grausame Folgen bolschewistischer Zerstörungen für die sowjetische Bevölkerung".

the past year, and the promise of 1942.<sup>299</sup> The first two issues of Mitteilungen in 1942 carried articles incorporating this feeling along with a determination to conclude the unfinished job in the East.<sup>300</sup>

The victories of German arms in the summer of 1942 were newsworthy and provided material for many press conferences.<sup>301</sup> For the three month period July to September no less than six articles were devoted to the offensive in Russia (theme 'Russian front').<sup>302</sup> The economic yield from the conquered regions was used as justification for eastern expansion.<sup>303</sup> This was reflected by articles on the topic of food shortages in the enemy camp<sup>304</sup> and the promise of extra Christmas rations for the troops -- a victory of German arms.<sup>305</sup> These and other themes are easily confirmed. But the contents of Mitteilungen and the Tagesparolen were, as initially noted, not always congruent.

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<sup>299</sup> TP 31.12.41 in Sündermann, p.221.

<sup>300</sup> MfdT., 166 Jan'42, "Tun, was vorliegt!"; and 167 Jan'42, "Sichere Grundlagen für 1942".

<sup>301</sup> Sündermann, pp.223-4.

<sup>302</sup> For example, the great successes like Charkhov and Sevastopol, MfdT., 210 Jul'42, "Ueberblick über die wichtigsten Operationen im Osten vom 1.5.42 bis Anfang Juli 42" or the matériel losses of the Russians, MfdT., 222 Sep'42, "Gedanken zu den Materialverlusten der Bolschewiken".

<sup>303</sup> TP 1.8.42 in Sündermann, p.231.

<sup>304</sup> In this instance, shortages in Great Britain. MfdT., 224 Oct'42, "Mehr Brot und mehr Fleisch!"

<sup>305</sup> MfdT., 236 Nov'42, "Früchte, die in der Stille reifen". The domestic food supply was purportedly acceptable throughout the war as is evidenced by an article about a boy who had gained weight while at a KLV-Lager (Kinderlandverschickung). This was characterized as unexceptional. MfdT., 315 Mar'44, "Antwort auf hundert Briefe!"

Just as an exception was found for the down-played 'scorched earth' policy, mention of the partisan war eventually became unavoidable for the soldiers, who were often directly involved. The restrictions on mentioning this topic in 1941 had lapsed in the pages of the news-sheet by the spring of 1942. The problem had become more acute, and a hard line was encouraged.<sup>306</sup> The directives in the summer of 1942 often embellished the role of Germany's allies, and this was no doubt due the need for their continued commitment.<sup>307</sup> Except for mention of Japan, whose position was too remote from Germany, no significant parallel existed in Mitteilungen until January 1943, when the Stalingrad crisis was all but resolved.<sup>308</sup>

While the general press stressed the value of Stalingrad as a strategic objective throughout September 1942<sup>309</sup>, there was naught in Mitteilungen. Only a few inconcise statements were made<sup>310</sup> and when the subject of developments in southern Russia was shut, with the encirclement<sup>311</sup> of the Sixth Army in November, these stopped as well. The curtain of silence was lifted at the RMVP nearly seven weeks later.<sup>312</sup> For the

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<sup>306</sup> Brutal harshness ("brutale Härte") was necessary. MfdT., 192 Apr'42.

<sup>307</sup> Sündermann, pp.229-30.

<sup>308</sup> MfdT., 241 Jan'43, "Wir und unsere Verbündeten".

<sup>309</sup> TP 3,7,15,16 of 9.42, Sündermann, p.232.

<sup>310</sup> For example, MfdT., 226 Oct'42, "Der deutsche Reichsaußenminister gibt einen Ueberblick (sic) über die Kriegslage".

<sup>311</sup> Comments on the difficulties were to be restricted until the situation became more clarified. TP 24.11.42, Sündermann, p.234.

<sup>312</sup> TP 16,18 of 1.43, Sündermann, p.295.

readers of Mitteilungen, however, Stalingrad remained for all intents and purposes a non-subject and received only passing mention.<sup>313</sup> Instead one saw the repetition of standard topics such as "the danger from the east" and "the importance of being positive"<sup>314</sup>, which generalized and did nothing to focus on any important details of the deteriorating strategic situation. Soldiers, after all, had better things to do than worry.

Sündermann points to measures for total war which followed the débâcle. In February the Tagesparolen heralded the inception of the "Geschäftsschließungsaktion" which suspended the activities of industries (mostly small businesses) not deemed essential for the war effort.<sup>315</sup> It can be assumed that WPr was sensitive to this action over the long term because correspondingly, the frequency of the theme 'job' jumps from 3 to 8 as the Stalingrad benchmark is passed. The action by the government only aggravated a problem already familiar in the army i.e. the concern of conscripts about their civilian businesses and careers laying idle or falling to ruin as the war continued. It was to become a subject on the minds of many soldiers.<sup>316</sup> The first war measure that Mitteilungen announced was the general mobilization of the population

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<sup>313</sup> As in "Aber wenn im vorigen Winter der bittere Schlag von Stalingrad kam, so bleibt dennoch die stolze Feststellung, daß der Bolschewik unsere Front nicht zu zerbrechen vermochte." MfdT., 265 May'43, "Auf welche Tatsachen gründet sich der deutsche Glaube an den Sieg?"

<sup>314</sup> For example, "Der Kampf an den Brennpunkten der Ostfront ist zum Symbol des deutschen Willens geworden, die schwere Bedrohung der Heimat unter allen Umständen und für immer zu beseitigen." MfdT., 244 Jan'43, "Nach keinen tapferen Männern richtet ein Volk sich aus!"

<sup>315</sup> TP 4.2.43, Sündermann, p.237.

<sup>316</sup> MfdT., 275 Jul'43, "Eine amtliche Erklärung zu des Stilllegungsaktion in Handel, Handwerk und anderen Gewerben".



through the Führer's "Generalbevollmächtigten für die Arbeitseinsatz". This was a total war measure but not the one stressed by Sündermann.<sup>317</sup>

By the spring of 1943, strong anti-Jewish themes asserted themselves in the directives<sup>318</sup>. Mitteilungen was not lacking in this area. The example below is typical of the racial hatred endorsed in the military:

"Daher ist dieser Krieg ein Kampf von rassischem Charakter geworden, ein Kampf der rassebewußten Völker gegen den ewigen, teuflischen Störenfried der menschlichen Gesellschaft, gegen den Juden in der ganzen Welt."<sup>319</sup>

The data, however, support the position that racial propaganda of this sort was significant and constant over the entire sample. The number of articles devoted to the Jewish question is 11 before and 11 after Stalingrad. By looking more closely at the theme Jew, as we did in the case of the Dobrowolzy, there is no spike of occurrences in the year 1943.

The "main theme" for 1943, as in the previous years, was the anti-Soviet line. The bolshevik danger was to be underlined daily.<sup>320</sup> Although the figures drop in STAGE 2 for 'Soviet Union' and 'bolshevism', the undercurrent remains strong. In Mitteilungen hardly an issue would go by without some

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<sup>317</sup> Starting on 27 January, 1943, all men aged 16 to 65 and all women aged 17 to 45 were to register for work. MfdT., 246 Feb'43, "Ganz Deutschland schafft nunmehr für die Front".

<sup>318</sup> Sündermann, pp.251ff.

<sup>319</sup> MfdT., 264 May'43, "Weshalb kam es zur Judenfrage?"

<sup>320</sup> TP 13.2.43, Sündermann, p.241.

reference to the communist menace.<sup>321</sup> In April 1943 an incident of huge interest and international consequence had been uncovered on the eastern front. The news that the bodies of some 10,000 Polish officers had been unearthed near Smolensk provided Goebbels with a propaganda coup. And although Sündermann devotes considerable space to the Katyn massacre<sup>322</sup>, Mitteilungen devoted no articles to this occurrence.

The observation that the 'eastern experience' remained a central theme was equally true for 1944.<sup>323</sup> In April 1944, as Sündermann notes, fear of the Russian army atrocities was exploited as a way to increase the will to resist.<sup>324</sup> What had begun as contempt prior to the invasion, the fear of the Russian-Asiatic enemy became manifest with the defeat at Stalingrad<sup>325</sup> and only became more acute as the strategic situation worsened. So, the writers at WPr were adept at this tactic well before April 1944. In October 1943:

"Niemand in Deutschland Gnade finden, wenn es den Sowjets gelingt, im Reich festen Fuss zu fassen. Blut und Tod ist die Parole der bolschewistischen Armee."<sup>326</sup>

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<sup>321</sup> This was checked by a separate verification of articles.

<sup>322</sup> It did not succeed in dividing the Allies as Hitler had hoped. Sündermann, pp.245-51.

<sup>323</sup> Sündermann, p.262.

<sup>324</sup> TP 24.4.44, Sündermann, pp.262-3.

<sup>325</sup> As the tide began to turn decisively against Germany, sentiments of a previous scourge to Europe were awakened: "Heute erleben wir den Mongolensturm in Gestalt der bolschewistischen Weltrevolution." MfdT., 243 Jan'43, "Die Abwehr Asiens, eine geschichtliche Aufgabe seit 1500 Jahren".

<sup>326</sup> MfdT., 286 Oct'43, "Spiel mit offenen Karten".

In support of Sündermann's observation, a relevant article did appear in Mitteilungen at the beginning of May which harped on the enemy's intentions to destroy Germany.<sup>327</sup>

Reviewing the main points of the daily Tagesparolen as they pertained to the east has added an appreciable dimension to this study. It is true that one perceives significant variance on a number of subjects, e.g. the treatment of question of Germany's allies in 1942, news about Stalingrad, and the Katyn massacre in 1943. These variances should not be looked upon as insoluble discrepancies. They prove the existence of a propaganda strategy -- procedures and actions behind the written word. An in-depth qualitative appraisal would be an absolute pre-requisite before any conclusions could possibly be endorsed. Speculation here, based on the quantitative thematic data, would be like walking on very thin ice. But equally true is that by and large the principal subjects as described by Sündermann, namely the emphasis placed on the 'eastern experience', are reflected in Mitteilungen true to form.

#### SECTION 4

#### POLITICAL SOLDIER

It had been mentioned earlier that by visualizing the place of ideology in the Perceptual Model one might be able to judge how much the 'political soldier' concept was innate to the organised propaganda drive directed at the troops. This is a natural place for us to turn our focus.

Mitteilungen spelled out its own ideal of the 'political soldier' in the first issue of the total sample. The keynote article "Unsere Aufgabe als politische Soldaten", appearing so close to the time when the drive to the East was to unfold,

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<sup>327</sup> MfdT., 327 May'44, "Wüste Phantasien".

seems a presentiment of the character of the war to come.<sup>328</sup> Just how closely did Mitteilungen conform to its own standard of 'political' soldier?

The 'political soldier', by this definition, had to fully understand that the Führer liberated Germany from the shackles of Versailles and enabled economic and military regeneration to take place independent of Jewish and other foreign support. He was to be cognisant of the deadly threat posed by enemy lies and deceptions, i.e. propaganda. He must acknowledge the inevitability of victory with a view towards a 'New Europe' and appreciate the power of 'the will' as a war-winning weapon. The objectives of the war were to be always uppermost in mind and pessimism, weakness, and rumour-mongering were anathema. A steadfast attitude and a healthy outlook was complementary of high self-esteem, and was to be the principal signal communicated by speech or letter.<sup>329</sup>

It is evident that each and every component of the brief sketch above is amply represented by the designated themes of this study.<sup>330</sup> Thus the writers and editors of Mitteilungen were true to the spirit of their definition of the 'political soldier' which suggests not only consistency but a conscious effort to peddle a particular concept. If the indoctrination effort directed at moulding the 'political soldier' failed, it

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<sup>328</sup> As expressed in MfdT., no.89, Apr'41. "Unsere Aufgabe als politische Soldaten." Messerschmidt cited this article as noteworthy. Die Wehrmacht, p.325.

<sup>329</sup> MfdT., 89 Apr'41. The article itself readily embraces a host of themes but was finally identified with 'mission'.

<sup>330</sup> Themes deemed to be related to concepts expressed in "Unsere Aufgabe als politische Soldaten" have been identified in Table E. They account for 349 out of the total 1321 occurrences, include 8 HF/MF themes, and if inserted as an element in the Perceptual Model would rank second after Propaganda.

was not through lack of effort on the part of WPr.<sup>331</sup>

Support for the view that this 'political soldier' concept was popular at WPr may be drawn from the conclusions of an educated staff member. Dr. Hüsing was one of the theorists who accompanied Wedel to WPr in its formative stage. In May 1938 he, through his own initiative, circulated a memorandum about propaganda and politics entitled (sic) "Wehrpropaganda und Wehrpolitik im wahren Staat (memorandum de propaganda re bellica)".<sup>332</sup>

This 65 page document was sent to 12 offices, including those of Goebbels and Hess, and may have helped to secure Hüsing's appointment as head of WPr/Ic (propaganda organisation in connection with the Abwehr).<sup>333</sup> In an attached covering memo, Hüsing called his work a contribution to point 22 of the NSDAP program. He believed that all professional soldiers in the Third Reich were National Socialists, citing paragraphs of the Wehrgesetz of 21 May 1935.<sup>334</sup> Hüsing's memo connected Weltanschauung with concepts that echo some of our observations about 'political soldiers' thus far:

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<sup>331</sup> Messerschmidt has pointed out the culpability of von Wedel in failing to "soften out the sharper edges" of national socialist doctrine found in Mitteilungen, and in the same breath admits that the chief of WPr was not directly involved in the publication. Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht, p.336.

<sup>332</sup> NAM, T77 roll 1036 fr.6508835-907. We shall refer to it simply as Hüsing's memo.

<sup>333</sup> For a compilation of all the sections and their heads we refer to Willis, p.13ff. Hüsing's memo has been mentioned but not elaborated on in Marlis G. Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans: Public Mood and Attitude during the Second World War (Athens, OH, 1977), p.21n57.

<sup>334</sup> Hüsing's memo, p.17-19.

- 1.) Die Idee Grossdeutschland (Allddeutschland),
- 2.) Die Idee: Ein Reich - Ein Volk - Ein Führer,
- 3.) Die Idee von der Einheit und Unteilbarkeit des Reiches,
- 4.) Die Idee vom ewigen Dritten Reich,
- 5.) Die Idee von der Berufung der Deutschen als Führervolk der weissen Rasse,
- 6.) Die Idee vom hohen inneren Wert des deutschen Menschen,
- 7.) Die rassische Idee (Brechung der Zinsknechtschaft),
- 8.) Die Idee vom wahren Staat (Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz),
- 9.) Die Idee vom echten Opfer,
- 10.) Die Idee von der unbedingten Rechtsgleichheit der Staatsbürger,
- 11.) Die Idee vom Primat der Politik und andere.

Diese Ideen, vereint und um weitere wehrpolitisch nicht unmittelbar einschlägige vermehrt, drücken die nationalsozialistische Weltanschauung aus."<sup>335</sup>

Note that the list above comprises many of the ideas which go to build the ideology embodied in the concept of 'political soldier'. These ideas are all purely ideological concepts meant to be applied to the profession of arms. The themes Germany, Volk, Hitler, Race = Jew or bolshevik, constitute the greater share of the themes found under the element Ideology (Table C4).

In his conclusion Hüsing points to the importance of differentiating between troops and the home front in use of propaganda<sup>336</sup>, which is significant because this was what actually happened. Not all subjects or modes of presentation were meant for both civilian and military consumption.<sup>337</sup>

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<sup>335</sup> Hüsing's memo, p.52.

<sup>336</sup> Underlined: "Die Propaganda bei der Truppe muss aber von jener in der Heimat verschieden sein." Ibid., p.61.

<sup>337</sup> An actual case of subtle differentiation going beyond simple content can be illustrated with regard to the listing of credits at the start of the Wochenschauen. Troops

This memo, not a policy statement in itself, is suggestive of an underlying intention to make soldiers into, not merely fighting men, but carriers of ideological conviction.

The purposes of this paper are well served by referring to comparable evidence from Captain Hans Ellenbeck, in whose department Mitteilungen originated. Messerschmidt has done preliminary work pointing out Ellenbeck<sup>338</sup> as a most lively activist ("rührigsten Aktivisten") in the field of 'total war propaganda'<sup>339</sup>. While this may be true, it should also be noted that his publications were very much attuned to the special role of the officer in relationship to the man.<sup>340</sup>

It is the person-to-person interaction that we spoke of earlier that dominated Ellenbeck's reasoning. To him 'geistige

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complained that there were 'endless' lists of cameramen but rare credit to the infantrymen. It was decided that for military consumption the credits for the camera crews be deleted, but for the home front the names should be left on. Memo from the office of Chief of OKW. NAM, T77 roll 1012 fr.2478160.

<sup>338</sup> Hüsing, on the other hand, receives no mention whatsoever even though both were section heads. Major Dr. Hüsing at WPr Ic, and Captain Ellenbeck at WPr IIe later major at IVa.

<sup>339</sup> As far as can be determined, Captain Ellenbeck supervised Mitteilungen, one among many papers and responsibilities, for STAGES 0, 1, and 2. Willis, pp.14-8, Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht, pp.315-8, 337,494.

<sup>340</sup> "In diesem Krieg geht es um das Leben des deutschen Volkes. Das Großdeutsche Reich, die Sehnsucht der Deutschen seit Jahrhunderten, wurde vom Führer geschaffen. Nun muß es sein Lebensrecht verteidigen. Das Volk in Waffen ist dazu angetreten. In diesem Kampf gibt es für den deutschen Offizier keine größere und beglückendere Aufgabe als die, seinen Soldaten Führer und Kamerad zu sein." Hans Ellenbeck, Der Kompaniechef (Leipzig, 1940), p.7.

Betreuung' was of paramount importance.<sup>341</sup> To be sure, his language was replete with National Socialist nomenclature just like Wedel's and Hüsing's. The expression that Ellenbeck gave to his adoration of the Führer and dedication to war was so typical of the material presented in the pages of Mitteilungen<sup>342</sup> that it would not be surprising if he had authored some of the articles himself.

In a pamphlet in 1943, Ellenbeck plotted a short course for the political instruction of men by officers under front line conditions.<sup>343</sup> In a nutshell, the officer should begin with a fifteen minute description of the war situation using whatever visual aids he can muster. It is important that all men be present and that the instructor not err in his presentation. Then the enemy propaganda issue was to be addressed. Here, Mitteilungen für die Truppe is cited as an excellent instructional tool -- it took three minutes to read and could be discussed openly for perhaps half an hour. If no "life-and-soul"<sup>344</sup> questions were then forthcoming, then discussion could continue about topics in Mitteilungen.<sup>345</sup>

Naturally the opinions of one man do not colour the picture of the writers of Mitteilungen, let alone the collective staff at WPr. Nor could the advice of one pamphlet dictate procedure

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<sup>341</sup> Ellenbeck, Die Verantwortung des deutschen Offiziers (Berlin, 1941), p.31.

<sup>342</sup> For example, "Der Krieg ist die schwerste Zerreißprobe eines Volkes, er ist der Vater aller Dinge." Ibid., p.16.

<sup>343</sup> The specific question is: "Wie legt man eine Unterrichtsstunde über politische Tagesfragen an?" Hans Ellenbeck, Der Offizier als Führer im Kampf gegen die feindliche Propaganda (Berlin?, 1943), p.13.

<sup>344</sup> Die Seele.

<sup>345</sup> Ibid., pp.13-14.



for all the German soldiers in the war. 'Political soldiers' were not assembly line products. Nevertheless it is indicative of the ideological/indoctrinational use to which Mitteilungen could be put. While Ellenbeck's thoughts cannot be used independently to derive conclusions, in conjunction with other evidence (e.g. Hüsing, Wedel) they may function as catalysts for interpretation and subject appreciation. That is what the greater picture of history must deliver in addition to its story.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

It does not require any breadth of imagination to see that endless questions can be applied to the models as they are depicted in the Tables. The nature of the data dictates that nothing here can be proven in an absolute sense. We can only hope to answer questions in a probable and plausible way.

Although it is generally agreed that the effects of propaganda are unquantifiable<sup>346</sup>, the intent on the part of the regime is not so obscure. The Perceptual Model has illuminated the subject by looking at priorities accorded to different aspects of the soldier's life, i.e. what WPr thought the soldier should concern himself with, how he should perceive his affairs.

The original premise of this thesis, i.e. the fact that a program for the political indoctrination of the troops did exist, was grounded in an exposé of the thematic content of Mitteilungen. Seeing what deserved attention in its pages helped to define the themes and elements which are the very building blocks of our Perceptual Model. At the same time, gauging the frequency or stress placed upon the various themes and elements made possible a reconstruction of the overall form of indoctrinational content that was deemed appropriate for reader consumption. Ultimately, it was necessary to determine the relative importance accorded by WPr (and by extension, the regime) to a number of broad topics.

This was done against the backdrop of the Eastern campaign because of fascinating questions raised by researchers like

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<sup>346</sup> Omer Bartov, "Indoctrination and Motivation in the Wehrmacht".

Schulte and Bartov -- questions pertaining to indoctrination, inversion of reality, and the metamorphosis of the average Landser into the 'political soldier'. Before proceeding any further, it would be instructive to examine some perceived anomalies and justifiable omissions.

It is quite surprising to see no significant text on Katyn. It represented somewhat of a coup internationally, and one would think that this would tend to discourage German soldiers from surrendering. On the other hand it may have been seen as a negative stimulus to general morale, but not by increasing fear among the men, which was desirable to an extent (cf. 'fear'). If the men were encouraged to talk about Katyn, they would also be more inclined to discuss it in their letter-writing. To the home population Katyn would become thus personalised, no longer an event of purely international significance. Anxieties brought on by the realization that relatives at the front faced a comparable fate at the hands of the Russians would be definitely detrimental to the nation.<sup>347</sup> While it is understandable that Stalingrad received little coverage because it represented a turn for the worse, Katyn represented a rare propaganda opportunity.

The German ecclesiastical community lacked presence in the pages of Mitteilungen, although foreign figures like the Archbishop of Canterbury were occasionally criticised.<sup>348</sup> Many men took their religion seriously so there existed a need. It is clearly here that the national socialist inclination present in the staff at WPr made itself felt. God

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<sup>347</sup> "Es dürfen jedoch aus der Feststellung dieser Tatsache keinesfalls Schlußfolgerungen gezogen werden hinsichtlich des Schicksals unserer eigenen Vermißten, die das deutsche Volk beunruhigen könnten." TP 13.4.43 in Sündermann, p.246.

<sup>348</sup> Included in theme 'Great Britain'. For example, MfdT., 173 Feb'42, "Der Teufelspriester".

himself was not forgotten (cf. 'God') but organised religion suffered a beating.

One would not expect to see anything published about the truly criminal acts for which Germans were indicted at Nuremberg, these including euthanasia, the Final Solution, the elimination of Russian prisoners-of-war, or partisan warfare, to list a few (partisan warfare did not constitute a theme but nevertheless received background attention. This is evidenced most often in Army themes<sup>349</sup> through suggestions like "don't walk alone at night"). For obvious reasons, truthful accounts of the economic or strategic situation would not be expected either.

The SS was never the principal subject of an article, even though it played an increasing role in the conduct of the military operations. SS officers were sometimes included in anecdotes but that is all. While high-ranking personages, including Rosenberg, Goebbels, and Ribbentrop, were mentioned (cf. 'leadership') from time to time, Himmler seems to have been overlooked. Two reasons could account for this: staff at WPr was hostile to the SS, at some personal or professional level, so that only cordiality was maintained; friction at a higher level, possibly Goebbels or Dietrich. No secondary sources provide evidence for either of these possibilities.<sup>350</sup> So although the SS men, in particular the Waffen-SS who were the combat arm of Himmler's organisation, were meant to represent the epitome of the 'political soldier', the Army either neglected or refused to admit this to its troops.

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<sup>349</sup> Especially 'instructional' or 'behaviour'.

<sup>350</sup> E.g. of Herzstein, Sündermann, Zeman.

If some subjects were ignored, this can only imply the existence of a propaganda strategy which this study is only partly able to discern. In spite of the limitations of a quantitative analysis, not only were seven broad topics (elements) established, they were also arranged by priority over two significant phases of the Russian campaign (Table A). Comparing the differences between the time periods proved that the writing policy of the WPr was not carved in stone -- contrasting conditions gave rise to shifts in emphasis.

It may be asked whether Mitteilungen's content attempted to guide events or whether it merely responded to them. After careful consideration it seems that this query is as unanswerable as the penetration of indoctrination is 'unquantifiable'.<sup>351</sup> Considerations such as those regarding the Dobrowolzy (page 79) show that the appearance of such articles were a response to a strategic situation. But they were an effort to guide as well. Sometimes the response was not to respond, as in the case of the débâcle at Stalingrad.

Unable to affect the strategic situation directly, WPr certainly did its best to guide soldiers in their beliefs and actions. After educating them in the nuances of the propaganda war (Mitteilungen's mandate, see p.67), this mattered most with regard to ideology and the need to rationalize or legitimize the prolongation of the war and the depth of the suffering.<sup>352</sup> It is plainly evident that Mitteilungen called

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<sup>351</sup> Men did correspond with the department through the mails, as is evident by articles responding or referring to such letters. In some record weeks apparently, over a hundred letters were received at WPr. MfdT., 315 Mar'44. "Antwort auf hundert Briefe!". If sufficient numbers of these letters survive is not apparent in the Guides. See Book 19.

<sup>352</sup> It is Bartov's belief that this effort to stir the troops to ideological passion, eased by the common experience of the Nazi Weltanschauung pervading German life in the years

for the winning of the war, the annihilation of the enemy, and by implication the killing of the adversary, and it couched these objectives in notions of value, duty, and honour."<sup>333</sup>

Although ideology played a large part in the editorial message, it was still secondary to propaganda itself, whose element dominates our model across the board (pages 67-9, Table D2). Army-related topics were also in second place, proving that Mitteilungen, whatever message it wished to impart at any given time, was still an army paper devoted to everyday concerns of army life. Von Wedel and his staff received their orders from Army High Command which was first and foremost a military organisation. The formalization of political/ideological intervention occurred when the Armed Forces National Socialist Guidance Staff (NSF/OKW) or Nationalsozialistischer Führungsstab, which bypassed Keitel's office, took the reins of WPr in October 1944."<sup>334</sup>

There is no denying that the message of German propaganda as it appeared in Mitteilungen was emotionally charged. The presence of specific themes (e.g. 'exhortation', 'praise', 'fear', 'sympathy') attests to this. But currents of feeling ran through the entire rhetoric and are probably the most repetitive elements - the feeling of pride in country, the

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of Nazi ascendancy, found fertile ground in the Eastern campaign where the susceptibility of the troops to indoctrination seemed to be greatly enhanced. Bartov, Hitler's Army, p.28.

<sup>333</sup> "The basic aim of a nation at war when establishing an image of the enemy is to distinguish as sharply as possible the act of killing from the act of murder by making the former into one deserving of all honor and praise." J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (New York, 1959), p.132.

<sup>334</sup> For a table of organisation of German Armed Forces High Command see Handbook on German Military Forces, p.16.

invisible bonds that stretch to loved ones at home, or the grief and honourable sacrifice associated with the victims of the fighting (the 'Gefallene').<sup>355</sup> In 1944 we see what could be interpreted as fervently pseudo-religious writing which reads like a prayer.<sup>356</sup> The trend perceived is that appeals to reason were gradually replaced by appeals to faith and emotion.<sup>357</sup> This line, however, cannot be proved effectively with the available data.<sup>358</sup>

It was possible to judge how closely the perceived priorities of WPr matched physical reality for the soldier of the Eastern front. At times the truth was hard pressed: victory was inevitable if only the extra effort was applied; reverses in the strategic situation were never detailed; the massacre at Katyn received no attention. But not all was distortion: the mission to expand and civilize had turned to one of defence and protection; the practical truth about shortages and the need for determination to endure. These are but some examples which prove that Mitteilungen dealt as much in the real world

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<sup>355</sup> "In the German language men never die in battle. They fall. The term is exact for the expression of self-sacrifice when it is motivated by the feeling of comradeship. I may fall, but I do not die, for that which is real in me goes forward and lives on in the comrades for whom I gave up my physical life." Gray, pp.46-7.

<sup>356</sup> In an appeal to faith in victory: "Ich will, mit meiner ganzen Kraft und all meinem Können will ich den deutschen Sieg..." MfdT., 326 May'44. "Nur nie nachgeben!" A small book issued by the Heerespersonalamt in February was riddled with jargon: "Die Ehre des Offiziers ist die Ehre seiner Nation und die Ehre der Nation ist die Ehre des Offiziers." Wofür kämpfen wir? (Berlin, 1944), p.72.

<sup>357</sup> "Fichte said that neither physical strength nor quality of arms but simply moral strength and the will to win were decisive in battle." Hadamovsky, p.9.

<sup>358</sup> The idea of testing articles for the degree of emotional charge they exhibited was impractical as well as tangential to this investigation.

as it did in fantasy.

One could extrapolate that indeed enough of a 'distortion of reality' was being created<sup>359</sup>, in the minds of a significant number of troops, to indirectly and subconsciously sanction normally abhorrent actions which were never mentioned in print. Those soldiers who acted with conviction and faith in Hitler and the ideology he represented were the true 'political soldiers', though their actual number will never be known. They were the regime's ideal fighters and the desired end product of a vast indoctrinational effort which we have barely tapped.

It is not plausible to deal in the domain of the Eastern Front at this level without some reference to the Final Solution, which was without a doubt the linchpin of all Nazi crime. The Wehrmacht's complicity has been emphasized in the demythologizing literature of the past two or three decades.<sup>360</sup> There is no evidence in Mitteilungen, however, to directly support, by way of instructions, status reports, and the like, the program of extermination conducted against the Jews. The countless references to 'Vernichtungskrieg' (note 17) were always directed against 'the enemy', or 'the Soviet system', or 'the opposing military', or even 'Jewish internationalism'. No hint of the systematic killing that characterizes genocide is present.<sup>361</sup> The requisite presence-of-mind may have been whole-heartedly encouraged, but the deed

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<sup>359</sup> Distortion along with caricature and bias belonged to the nature of propaganda. Hadamovsky, p.14.

<sup>360</sup> Cf. Streit, Krausnick, Förster.

<sup>361</sup> To be exact, if any such allusions were present, they were subliminal. Certainly no articles embraced a theme of this kind.



was not mentioned.<sup>362</sup>

The race hatred question has immediate implications here. The war against Russia could, in one view, be perceived as kin to a 'racial war' because the Soviets were doubly odious. Not only were they Slav, or Asian, but also Communist. To the National Socialists, the Soviet Union represented a victory for Judaism in the world -- Communism was equated to Judaism. It followed that Slavs were little better than Jews. In the war zone of the east people died under all kinds of circumstances, armed or unarmed, intentionally or by accident. Justification for most acts of violence was easily had. This is not an attempt to establish a specific link between criminal morality and malicious intent on the part of the personnel of the WPr Abteilung. But in their contribution to the propagation of anti-Semitism and the manifest hegemonic destiny of Germany in Europe, indeed the world, some share of blame must be borne by these men.<sup>363</sup>

In wartime, especially total war, soldiers are often called upon to act in ways that contradict their own moral values. How they react is a function of the individual, not all will behave identically.<sup>364</sup> Indoctrination was meant to help the

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<sup>362</sup> The term 'Ausrottung' which describes extermination in the sense of stamping out vermin (or their 'human equivalent') is virtually non-existent in Mitteilungen.

<sup>363</sup> It is informative that the two themes showing little or no change in intensity after Stalingrad (namely Soviet Union and Jew) happen to be associated directly to the two salient doctrines of national socialism (see note 16), namely those of race and space. So despite other pressures, in these, the kernels of the Weltanschauung, the propagandists did not relent. This is at least demonstrative of plentiful National Socialist zeal at WPr.

<sup>364</sup> An excellent and recent case study addresses this issue with respect to the Final Solution. See Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the

individual re-evaluate his personal philosophy so that the regime could more easily achieve its objectives, be they military or ideological.

In the case of the Russian campaign there exist abundant examples of universally immoral and illegitimate orders which could conflict with those more in line with proper military duty.<sup>365</sup> These moments of decision when they arrive are often traumatic, forcing thoughtful self-examination, a reassessment of values, a test of character. Ideological propaganda sought to exert decision-making power over these moments. And the Hitler regime made full use of its propaganda machinery under wartime conditions to achieve its ends.<sup>366</sup> Caution must be exercised not to overestimate the power of propaganda. It must be remembered that (in view of Bartov's descriptions of the front line troops and Schulte's contribution with respect to the rear area troops) ideological conditioning alone was insufficient to inure the soldiers to hardship, or to confer upon them extraordinary powers of resistance, or exaggerated cruelty.

Even assuming that indoctrination could be pivotal, it is possible that the 'political soldiers' could receive too much of 'a good thing'.<sup>367</sup> Can it be said that a saturation point existed beyond which no further stimulus would elicit a

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Final Solution in Poland (New York, 1992).

<sup>365</sup> "It is a crucial moment in a soldier's life when he is ordered to perform a deed that he finds completely at variance with his own notions of right and good." Gray, p.184.

<sup>366</sup> "War is the most conducive environment in which governments can adopt 'atrocities by policy' and encounter few difficulties in implementing it." Browning, p.162.

<sup>367</sup> Interesting is the "barrel of water filled to overflowing" metaphor mentioned in Guy Sajer, The Forgotten Soldier (New York, 1971), p.398.

response? Can we speak of an "ideological threshold"? If this is so, then is the threshold reached by deed or by thought, and how is one to know the correct intensity of indoctrinational input to be applied? This delicate balance was sought after by the theorists and writers at WPr for much of the war.

The events of the Second World War are rapidly passing out of memory. There will be no D-Day veterans at Normandy on the hundredth anniversary. The significance of the sacrifice among the broader population will change as we pass into the next century. Propaganda, mass education, and subliminal suggestion shall persevere as instruments of political will into the new century. We may choose to believe that the Nazi years were a "unique event" in the course of history, but we should not deny that something can be learned from the experience.

B.B.      End thesis.

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# APPENDIX A

STAGE 0	issue nos.	89-111	23/23 <sup>368</sup>
	dates	1 May'41 - 22 Jun'41	
	description	from the beginning of the sample until the commencement of hostilities in Russia.	
STAGE 1	issue nos.	112-245	132/134
	dates	22 Jun'41 - 2 Feb'43	
	description	through the first critical winter to the capitulation of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad.	
STAGE 2	issue nos.	246-337	86/92
	dates	2 Feb'43 - 22 Jun'44	
	description	to the destruction of Army Group Centre.	
STAGE 3	issue nos.	338-366	28/29
	dates	22 Jun'44 - Oct'44	
	description	until the end of the sample where <u>Mitteilungen</u> passes to the hands of the Nationalsozialistisches Führungsstab.	

TABLE A

## Summary of Data Base

	STAGE 0	STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3	TOTAL
themes	94	625	464	138	1321
articles	81	514	376	110	1081
issues	23	132	86	28	269
months	2.8	19.2	17.5	3.5	43.0

## AVERAGE

th/art	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
th/iss	4.1	4.6	5.4	4.9	4.9
art/iss	3.5	3.9	4.4	4.0	4.0
iss/mo	8.2	7.0	5.3	8.0	6.5

Abbreviations:    th = themes  
                      art = articles  
                      iss = issue  
                      mo = month

TABLE B

Themes by order of occurrence

theme		STAGE 0 months <u>3</u> freq.	STAGE 1 <u>19</u>	STAGE 2 <u>17</u>	STAGE 3 <u>3</u>	TOTAL <u>43</u>
GB	vH	22	44	19	5	88
SU	vH		48	32	6	86
en.prp	H	4	17	33	21	75
ins	H	3	22	23	3	51
exh	H	1	15	17	14	47
TWr	M	5	22	10	4	41
GE	M	2	16	17	3	38
ltt	M	2	19	13	4	38
SU.prp	M		17	15	6	38
US	M	3	20	11	1	35
prp	M	2	14	14	3	33
HT	M	2	17	7	5	31
beh	M	1	15	12	3	31
I	M	2	18	7	2	29
misc		2	7	15	1	25
Jew	M	1	10	9	2	22
dut	M	2	12	6	2	22
enc		1	5	8	7	21
ref		1	15	4		20
SUf			18	1		19
NS			3	6	8	19
sldr			11	7		18
pra		3	7	6	2	18
Mitt			8	10		18
wom		1	6	7	3	17
GB.prp		3	6	5	3	17
Vlk			6	8	2	16
Atl		2	13	1		16
rum		1	4	8	2	15
det			5	9	1	15
sym			11	4		15
str		2	10	3		15
cau		1	4	8	2	15
wown			8	5	1	14
all			7	7		14
hom			8	5	1	14
gef		2	5	5	1	13
bol			9	2	1	12
Med		4	7			11
job			3	8		11

TABLE B (con't)

theme	STAGE 0	STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3	TOTAL
ldr		4	5	2	11
EU		7	3		10
kam	1	4	4	1	10
lea		4	6		10
mss	1	8	1		10
ann	3	3	3		9
fr		3	3	3	9
Wf	3	6			9
for	4	3	1		8
plu		3			3
vol		3	4		7
wiv		5	1	1	7
bom		2	3		7
God		6	1		7
mail	1	5			6
mor		3	2	1	6
sal			4	2	6
fam		5		1	6
mar			6		6
ind			5	1	6
gPOW		4	1	1	6
Pac		5	1		6
wnwn.f			4	1	5
J20				5	5
h.mor		4	1		5
sta		5			5
pat		3	1		4
mon		2	2		4
est		2	2		4
dth		2	2		4
dec		3	1		4
tnn	2	2			4
OKW	2	1	1		4
out	2		1	1	4
e.POW		1	1		2
dth.b			2		2
off			1	1	2
TOTAL	94	625	464	138	1321

TABLE C1

## ELEMENT PROPAGANDA

	STAGE 0	STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3	TOTAL
<u>anti.en</u>					
GB	22	44	19	3	88
SU		48	32	6	86
US	3	20	11	1	35
Jew	1	10	9	2	22
bol		9	2	1	12
plu		8			8
<u>cntr.en</u>					
en.prp	4	17	33	21	75
SU.prp		17	15	6	38
GB.prp	3	6	5	3	17
<u>pro.GE</u>					
GE	2	16	17	3	38
HT	2	17	7	5	31
NS		3	8	8	19
Vlk		6	8	2	16
<u>troops</u>					
prp	2	14	14	3	33
Mitt		8	10		18
rum	1	4	8	2	15
TOTAL	40	247	198	66	551

## Summary of Table C1

	STAGE 1	STAGE 2
anti.en	139	73
cntr.en	40	53
pro.GE	42	40
troops	26	32
TOTAL	247	198

TABLE C2

## ELEMENT ARMY

	STAGE 0	STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3	TOTAL
ins	3	22	23	3	51
beh	1	15	12	3	31
dut	2	12	6	2	22
sldr		11	7		18
pra	3	7	6	2	18
det		5	9	1	15
cau	1	4	8	2	15
wnwn		8	5	1	14
gef	2	5	5	1	13
ldr		4	5	2	11
kam	1	4	4	1	10
vol		3	4		7
mail	1	5			6
sal			4	2	6
gPOW		4	1	1	6
wnwn.f			4	1	5
J20				5	5
pat		3	1		4
est		2	2		4
dec		3	1		4
OKW	2	1	1		4
ePOW		1	1		2
off			1	1	2
TOTAL	16	119	110	28	273



TABLE C3

## ELEMENT INFLUENCE

	STAGE 0	STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3	TOTAL
exh	1	15	17	14	47
ben	1	15	12	3	31
dut	2	12	6	2	22
enc	1	5	8	7	21
ref	1	15	4		20
pra	3	7	6	2	18
wom	1	6	7	3	17
sym		11	4		15
gef	2	5	5	1	13
kam	1	4	4	1	10
mss	1	8	1		10
fr		3	3	3	9
mor		3	2	1	6
ind			5	1	6
dth		2	2		4
out	2		1	1	4
TOTAL	16	111	87	39	253

TABLE C4

## ELEMENT IDEOLOGY

	STAGE 0	STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3	TOTAL
Twr	5	22	10	4	41
GE	2	16	17	3	38
HT	2	17	7	5	31
I	2	18	7	2	29
Jew	1	10	9	2	22
NS		3	8	6	19
Vlk		6	8	2	16
bol		9	2	1	12
EU		7	3		10
mss	1	8	1		10
ann	3	3	3		9
plu		8			8
God		6	1		7
TOTAL	16	133	76	27	252

TABLE C5

## ELEMENT HOME

	STAGE 0	STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3	TOTAL
GE	2	16	17	3	38
lth	2	19	13	4	38
wom	1	6	7	3	17
Vlk		6	8	2	16
hom		8	5	1	14
job		3	8		11
lea		4	6		10
wiv		5	1	1	7
bom		2	5		7
fam		5		1	6
mar			6		6
h.mor		4	1		5
dth.b			2		2
TOTAL	5	78	79	15	177

TABLE C6

## ELEMENT NEWS

	STAGE 0	STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3	TOTAL
SUt		18	1		19
Atl	2	13	1		16
str	2	10	3		15
all		7	7		14
Med	4	7			11
Wf	3	6			9
for	4	3	1		8
bom		2	5		7
Pac		5	1		6
sta		5			5
tnn	2	2			4
TOTAL	17	78	19	0	114

TABLE C7

## ELEMENT PERSONAL

	STAGE 0	STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3	TOTAL
ltt	2	19	13	4	38
hom		8	5	1	14
job		3	8		11
lea		4	6		10
wiv		5	1	1	7
fam		5		1	6
mar			6		6
mon		2	2		4
TOTAL	2	46	41	7	96

TABLE D1

## Occurrences of Themes per Stage

	STAGE 1	STAGE 2	TOTAL
IDEO	133	76	209
NEWS	78	19	97
PROP	247	198	445
ARMY	119	110	229
PERS	46	41	87
HOME	79	79	158
INFL	111	87	198

## THE PERCEPTUAL MODEL

TABLE D2

## Percentage Occurrence per Stage

STAGE 1	%	STAGE 2	%	TOTAL	%
PROP	40	PROP	43	PROP	42
IDEO	21	ARMY	24	ARMY	21
ARMY	19	INFL	19	INFL	19
INFL	18	HOME	17	IDEO	19
NEWS	12	IDEO	16	HOME	13
HOME	12	PERS	9	NEWS	9
PERS	7	NEWS	4	PERS	7

TABLE E

## TEST ELEMENT POLITICAL SOLDIER

	STAGE 0	STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3	TOTAL
en.prp	4	17	33	21	75
TWr	5	22	10	4	41
GE	2	16	17	3	38
lth	2	19	13	4	38
HT	2	17	7	5	31
beh	1	15	12	3	31
Jew	1	10	9	2	22
dut	2	12	6	2	22
Vlk		6	8	2	16
rum	1	4	8	2	15
EU		7	3		10
mss	1	8	1		10
TOTAL	21	153	127	48	349

TABLE F

## TEST ELEMENT THEATRES OF WAR

	STAGE 0	STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3	TOTAL
<u>East</u>					
SU		48	32	6	86
SU.prp		17	15	6	38
SUf		18	1		19
bol		9	2	1	12
vol		3	4		7
TOTAL		95	54	13	162
<u>West</u>					
GB	22	44	19	3	88
US	3	20	11	1	35
GB.prp	3	6	5	3	17
Atl	2	13	1		16
Med	4	7			11
Wf	3	6			9
plu		8			8
bom		2	5		7
tnn	2	2			4
TOTAL	39	108	41	7	195

end thesis