INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

SUFI ORDER AND RESISTANCE MOVEMENT:

THE SANŪSIYYA OF LIBYA, 1911-1932

By
Awalia Rahma

A thesis
submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

Institute of Islamic Studies
McGill University, Montreal
1999

National Library of Canada
Acquisitions and Bibliographic Services
395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
Acquisitions et services bibliographiques
395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-64184-8

Canada

Abstract

Author : Awalia Rahma
Title : Sufi Order and Resistance Movement: The Sanūsiyya of Libya, 1911-1932
Department : Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University
Degree : Master of Arts

This thesis is a study of the Sanūsiyya order, in which particular emphasis is placed on its role as a resistance movement. Based on a survey of the social, economic, religious and political activities of this sufi brotherhood and its involvement in the tribal system of the North Africa during the first three decades of this century, an attempt will be made to identify on the one hand the factors that contributed to the strength of its resistance to Italian invasion, and on the other, the elements that led to its failure. It is argued that its initial success in the resistance benefited from the network of the *zāwiya*s where *ikhwān* from different tribes were integrated socially and economically in accordance with strong Islamic values. However, lack of military training and weapons, dependency on a prominent figure, competing ambitions within the Sanūsī family and geographical distance ultimately weakened the resistance.

Résumé

Auteur : Awalia Rahma
Titre : Ordre sufi et mouvement de résistance: La Sanūsiyya de Libye de 1911 à 1932
Département : Institut des Études Islamiques, Université McGill
Diplôme : Maîtrise ès Arts

Ce mémoire porte sur l'étude de l'ordre Sanūsiyya, avec une attention particulière sur son mouvement de résistance. En se fondant sur les activités sociales, économiques, religieuses et politiques de la fraternité sufie, ainsi que son implication au sein du système tribal pendant la pénétration occidentale en Afrique du Nord durant les trois premières décennies, la recherche tentera d'identifier d'une part, les facteurs ayant contribué à la force de sa résistance à l'invasion italienne, et, d'autre part, les éléments qui ont causé sa chute. Il a été débattu que le succès initial de la Sanūsiyya dans la résistance a pu tirer parti du réseau des *zāwiyas* où les *ikhwān* des différentes tribus furent intégrés socialement et économiquement et ce, avec des valeurs islamiques solides. Toutefois, le peu d'entraînement militaire et d'armement, la dépendance à l'égard des leaders, les différentes personnalités au sein de la famille Sanūsī et les distances géographiques ont affaibli la résistance.

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude in the first place to Professor Eric L. Ormsby, my academic advisor and thesis supervisor, whose scholarly criticism, patience and encouragement have made this thesis possible. My thanks also go to Professor A. Üner Turgay, the Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies, for his insightful comments. I would also like to thank my teachers at the Institute, especially Professor Herman Landolt, my former academic supervisor, and Forough Jahanbakhsh who widened my insight into Islamic mysticism and the Persian language. My thanks are also due to Salwa Ferahian and Wayne St. Thomas of the Islamic Studies Library for their assistance in obtaining research materials. I would also like to record my thanks to Zakyi Ibrahim for his meaningful help in the very early stages of my study; and to Steve Millier for his editorial help, especially as he accomodated me in spite of his own busy schedule.

I wish to acknowledge here the generosity of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the McGill-Indonesia Project in providing me with a grant to study at McGill University. My thanks also go to Prof. Dr. Nourouzzaman Shiddiqi and Prof. Dr. Burhanuddin Daya of Yogyakarta for their moral

support and encouragement. I am likewise grateful to my Indonesian friends for their warm friendship during my stay in Montreal.

I would also like to express my heartfelt thanks to my parents H. Abubakar Chafid and Hj. Ismawati and to my younger brothers and sisters for their support; as well as to my father and mother-in-law who were so encouraging. Finally I dedicate this thesis to my husband, Kusmana, who deserves special honor and thanks for his constant love, criticism and support.

TRANSLITERATION

The system of transliteration of Arabic words and names applied in this thesis is that used by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. The table of transliteration is as follows:

b = ب	z = ز	f = ف
t = ت	s = س	q = ق
th = ث	sh = ش	k = ك
j = ج	ṣ = ص	l = ل
ḥ = ح	ḍ = ض	m = م
kh = خ	ṭ = ط	n = ن
d = د	ẓ = ظ	h = ه
dh = ذ	‘ = ع	w = و
r = ر	gh = غ	y = ي

Short : a = ـَ ; i = ـِ ; u = ـُ

Long : ā = ا ; ī = ي ; ū = و

Diphthong : ay = ي ا ; aw = و ا

tā’ marbūṭa (ة) : a; in *iḍāfa*: at

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The Sanūsiyya movement constitutes an interesting phenomenon in Islamic history, and particularly in that of North African sufism. This sufi brotherhood was named after its founder, Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Sanūsī al-Khaṭṭābī al-Ḥasanī al-Idrīsī al-Mahājirī (1787-1859 A.D), who was also known as the Grand Sanūsī, a prominent Sufi-scholar in nineteenth century North Africa. This *tarīqa* evolved from a religious to a political movement when it began to play a substantial part in the resistance against the French in the Sahara, against the British and Italians in Cyrenaica and in the emergence of the Kingdom of Libya. The latter was ruled at first by Sanūsī's grandson, Sayyid Muḥammad Idrīs, who ascended the throne in 1951, only to lose it in a military coup d'état led by Muʿammar al-Qaddāfi in September 1969.

Many scholars have discussed the Sanūsiyya and their corresponding political movement. Most have noted the role of the Sanūsiyya in resisting colonialism in their homeland. Barbar for instance, points out that the Libyan resistance during the years 1911-1920 depended heavily on Sanūsiyya forces, predominantly in Barqa. [1]

---

[1] Aghil Mohamed Barbar, *The Tarabulus (Libyan) Resistance to the Italian Invasion: 1911-1920* (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980), p. 10.

Ahmida discusses the social, cultural and historical background of modern Libya from the early nineteenth century to the end of the armed anticolonial resistance.[2] He believes that Sufi Islam, tribal military organization and oral traditions were crucial in the fight against colonialism. The political and cultural legacy of the resistance has also been powerful, strengthening Libyan nationalism and leading to the revival of a strong attachment to Islam and the clan. The memory of this period has not yet faded, and appreciation of this background is essential to understanding present–day Libya.

The great British anthropologist, Evans-Pritchard, on the other hand, interprets the Sanūsiyya's political development against their historical background in *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*.[3] Yet here the emphasis is more on the politico-historical perspective of the brotherhood rather than its socio-cultural development, tracing the history of the Sanūsiyya from its origins to the period of Italian colonization. The present thesis is however as indebted to this book as are so many other writings that focus on Libya.

A particular character is attributed to the Sanūsiyya by Nicola Ziadeh who sees the brotherhood's role as that of a revivalist movement. As revivalist

---

[2] Ali Abdullatif Ahmida. *The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization and Resistance, 1830-1932* (Albany, New York: SUNY, 1994).

[3] E.E. Evans Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954).

movement, the Sanūsiyya was conservative to the extent it did not recognize the development "the world had known since the advent of Islam."[4]

Research till now has covered various aspects of the order, such as religiosity, ethnic, economic, and social issues, and politics. However, only few scholars have tried to see the interconnection between the doctrines and the political movement of the *ṭarīqa*. One scholar who has, Knut S. Vikor, concluded that the political movement was not the central aspect of the Sanūsiyya order.[5] It was a practical, later development of this brotherhood. Thus the history of the Sanūsiyya is also the history of a Sufi brotherhood which welded the ethnic identity of the Saharan bedouin and neighboring peoples into an entity that some might call a proto-nationalist movement.[6]

The movement has also become my focus by reason of its distinctive characteristics: it is set apart from other Sunni *ṭarīqa*s in mixing *taṣawwuf* with Wahhābī doctrines, a unique blend that consisted in maintaining Sufi values and calling for a return to the fundamental Islamic sources, the Qur'ān and Sunna. I propose in this thesis to investigate why the Sanūsiyya became

---

[4] Nicola A. Ziadeh, *Sanūsīyah: A Study of A Revivalist Movement in Islam* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983), p. 3.

[5] Knut S. Vikor, "Al-Sanusi and Qadhafi-Continuity of Thought?" *The Maghreb Review* 12 (1987), 1-2, 25. See also his *Sufi and Scholar on the Desert Edge: Muḥammad b. 'Ali al-Sanūsī and his Brotherhood* (London: Hurst & Co., 1995).

[6] Vikor, *Sufi and Scholar*, p. 1

involved in resisting colonialism, and what factors tended to strengthen and to weaken the resistance. I propose to investigate the nature of the *jihād* (holy war)[7] which was such a major feature of the resistance and to compare this to similar nineteenth-century African movements which may have influenced the Sanūsiyya: the Tijānī Tokolor, al-Ḥajj 'Umar in west Sudan; the Sammānī Muḥammad Aḥmad; the Ṣalīḥī-Idrīsī, Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Allāh Ḥasan in

---

[7] According to Peters, modern theories of *jihād* falls into two categories; "those connected with the propagation of Islam and those connected with the idea of defense." The first type include: 1) "strengthening monotheism and destroying polytheism and false gods. This based on the nearly identical verses K 2: 193 and K 8:39 (Fight them until there is no persecution and the religion is God's [entirely]). 2) protecting the Islamic mission against those who stand in its way. This way also is also called protecting freedom of religion. This freedom of religion is to be realized by removing all obstacles that block free missionary activities. All men must be free to hear the call of Islam and to embrace Islam without any hindrance, oppression or persecution on the part of the authorities or on the part of their fellow-men. This cause is also scripturally founded on K 2: 193 and K 8: 39 ('...until there is no persecution...').

As for the causes connected with the idea of defence, these are:1) repelling aggression on Muslim lives and property in case of an actual or expected attack by enemy forces, founded on [2: 19]: "and fight in the way of God with those who fight you, but aggress not"; 2) preventing oppression and persecution of Muslim outside the territory of Islam. This is closely linked with the idea of protecting freedom of religion. It is based upon [4: 75]: "How is it with you, that you do not fight in the way of God, and for the men, women, and the children who, being abased, say, 'Our Lord, bring us forth from this city whose people are evildoers, and appoint to us a protector from Thee, and appoint to us from Thee a helper'"; 3) retaliating against a breach of pledge by the enemy. This is supported by [9: 12]: "But if they break their oaths after their covenant and thrust at your religion, then fight the leaders of unbelief; they have no sacred oaths; haply they will give over." See, Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publisher, 1996), pp. 120-121.

Somalia; the Fāḍilī-Bakkā'ī-Qādirī, Mā' al-'Ainain and his son Aḥmad al-Hiba in Morocco; the Mahdī in Sudan[8]; and the Qādirī 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jazā'irī in Algeria in the period 1839-1847[9].

To answer the question, I intend to employ a historical approach, addressing the problem descriptively and analytically. This method will involve, respectively, collecting, criticizing and interpreting the data and finally, narrating the results in the form of a complete story.

The thesis itself will commence with an introduction to the sources and research methods used, and then move on to the first chapter which will provide an account of the political setting in Libya during the first three decades of the 20th century. The second chapter will investigate the institution of the *ṭarīqa* and its doctrines, while the third will trace the forces working on behalf of resistance. Finally, in the conclusion, I will draw together the threads of my argument and synthesize the results.

---

[8]J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 240-241.

[9] Raphael Danziger, *'Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians : Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation* (New York, London : Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1977).

Chapter I

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF LIBYA IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

A. People and Land

It is difficult to find exact data on the population of Libya in the late Ottoman period, since a large part of the population consisted of nomads *(bawādi)* and semi-nomads *(urūba)* and because people hid the true number of family members from census takers in order to avoid paying a larger tax bill. This being said, scholars have estimated the population of Tripolitania for this period at between 800,000 and 2 million and that of Cyrenaica at between 190,000 and 500,000.[1]

The population of Libya in the early twentieth century was a mixture of Arabs, Berbers, Tuaregs, Dawada, Tebu and foreign minorities such as Jews, Italians, British, French, Spanish, Dutch, Greeks, Swiss, Austrians and Germans.[2] This population was spread throughout three areas: Tripolitania, Fezzan and Cyrenaica. Berbers and Jews were predominantly settled in the coastal Mediterranean city of Tripolitania, along with other foreign minorities.

---

[1] E.E. Evans-Pritchard, T*he Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 39 and Rachel Simon, *Libya between Ottomanism and Nationalism* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987), p. 5.

[2] Aghil Mohamed Barbar, *The Tarabulus (Libyan) Resistance to the Italian Invasion: 1911-1920* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980), based on the Ottoman statistical yearbook, *Trablusgarp Vilayeti Salnamesi* for 1911, pp. 6-9.

Arabs, descendants of the original conquerors, lived alongside the indigenous Berbers in Cyrenaica. Berber-speaking Tuaregs and Dawada lived in the interior in Fezzan, together with Tebu-speaking slaves.[3]

The European minorities had their own communities and maintained their own laws administered by their chiefs or councillors; however, they also interacted with other populations in the area, particularly for economic reasons.[4] Jews, on the other hand, led a different life compared to other minorities, being much more involved in the community in which they lived. Not only did they hold administrative posts, such as those of local tithe and tax collectors, but they also had a representative in the city council and two representatives in the *vilayet* council. Rabbis from this community played the same role as a district *shaykh*, acting as mediators between the community and the administration.[5]

---

[3] Wright, *Libya*, pp. 24-25. The Tuareg mainly live in the oases of Ghat and Ghadames, the area of western Fezzan and parts of the Sahara down to Timbuctu. Their relationship with north African sufi brotherhoods, including the Sanūsiyya may be found in Henry Duveyrier, *Les Touareg du Nord: Exploration du Sahara* (Nendeln: Kraus Reprint, 1973), pp. 301-315. See also, Francis Rennel Rodd, *People of the Veil* (London: Macmillan, 1926), pp. 48-49 and 200.

The dark-skinned Tebu, who live in southern Cyrenaica and Fezzan, are believed to be descended from an ancient Saharan race. See Wright, *Libya*, p. 24. See also, Else Fanter, *Libya: der Amazonenstaat der Tebbu* (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1933).

The Dawada, the "worm eaters," are said to be the stranger or remoter community, and have apparently lived for centuries, in three villages in the Ramla al-Dawada between the Wadis Ajal and Shatti in Western Fezzan. See Wright, *Libya*, p. 25.

[4] Barbar, *The Tarabulus*, p. 46.

[5] Barbar, *The Tarabulus*, pp. 50-51.

Bedouin of Cyrenaica, who played such a key role in the rise and development of the Sanūsiyya, were of mixed Arab-Berber stock. The Arab tribes Banū Ḥilāl and Banū Sulaym took Libya in the eleventh century. They were both originally from Najd and of Muḍar lineage, of which the Banū Sulaym were the senior branch. They moved into upper Egypt after the downfall of the Carmathian movement in Arabia, out of which they had evolved. The Banū Ḥilāl moved westward to Tripolitania and Tunisia while the Banū Sulaym mainly settled in Cyrenaica, where their descendants have lived down to the present day.

Meanwhile, the tribes of Cyrenaica belonged to one of two main groups, the Sa'ādi and the Marābuṭīn. According to Evans-Prichard,[6] the Sa'ādi were divided into two main branches, the Jibarna and the Ḥarābi, the Jibarna tribes being the 'Awāqīr, Magharba, 'Abīd and 'Araba, and the Ḥarābi tribes the 'Abaydāt, Ḥāsa, 'Ailat Fāyid, Barā'asa and Darsa. These tribes lived throughout Cyrenaica and shared the land among them in what they called *waṭan*. The Sa'adi also claimed descent for the Banu Sulaym. The Marābuṭīn, on the other hand, were either Arab tribesmen or Berbers who participated in the original invasion or came from Morocco to Tripoli and Cyrenaica. The

---

[6] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 49.

Marābuṭīn used the land, but did not have the right of ownership. Because they were only few in number and therefore weak, each clan was tied to a powerful Sa'ādi tribe.[7]

In Fezzan, the main tribe were the Awlād Sulaymān, the Ḥasāwna, the Faqaha and the Maqārḥa. The Awlād Sulaymān used to live in the Sirte area until about the middle of the nineteenth century. During their wars with the Qaramanlis in 1831-1835, the tribe moved to the south, where they occupied most of Fezzan and then held the political power in that region.[8] The Ḥasāwna were the second largest tribe there; they had once lived around the Sabha-Murzūq area but later invaded the area northwest of Sabha where they eventually settled once the Awlād Sulaymān came to occupy their former territory. The invasion of the Ḥasāwna forced the Magārḥa tribe in turn to move from the Sabha region further north to the Hurūj mountains area.[9]

In Tripolitania province, the Awlād Būsīf and Warfalla tribes lived in the Warfalla area. The other tribes and their locations were the Awlād Masallem, al-Hawātim, the Awlād Mu'araf and al-Darāhib of Tarhuna; al-'Amāmra of Masallāta; Fawātir, Awlād al-Shaykh, Barāhma, Awlād Ghīt, Firjān

---

[7] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 51.

[8] Barbar, *The Tarabulus*, p. 99.

[9] Barbar, *The Tarabulus*, p. 100.

and ʿAmāyim of Zlīten; Ziyāyna, Ma'adān, and al-Qaḍāḍfa of Sirte; al-Ḥarāba of Ghadāmis and al-Zintān; and al-Rujibān and al-Maḥāmid in the Jifāra and Jabal al-Gharbi or Nafūsa areas.[10]

The tribal way of life is one of adaptation to a given environment. In Cyrenaica, cow, sheep or camel herders moved from one place to another according to the season in order to obtain sufficient water and the basic needs of human beings and animals. Nevertheless, a few tribal groups stayed in the same place during winter and summer season, e.g., the Hadduth section of Bara'asa.[11]

Composed of 45 chief tribes[12] in the early twentieth century, the Bedouin of Cyrenaica retained the commonly accepted tribal understanding of *waṭan,* "homeland," and *buyūt* (sing. *bayt*) as a tribal sub-division that constitutes an extended family, the basic unit of tribal life. This segment may be described as a genealogical line or a political unity.[13] A collection of such families constituted a tribe and each tribe had its own leader, the *shaykh.* The relationship between the *shaykh* and his people was explained as follows:

---

[10] Barbar, *The Tarabulus*, p. 100.

[11] Peters, *The Bedouin*, pp. 30-31.

[12] Evans-Pritchard (quoting De Agostini), *The Sanusi*, pp. 34-35.

[13] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 55.

> Leadership is exercised in Cyrenaica when a camp is moved –every ten days or so in the rainy season- when decisions have to be made about ploughing, when the regular watering of animals is to begin, who is to use the water, how and where men are to gather for communal prayer in the morning of the Great Festival, and on a whole wide range of the other mundane occasions. It is no accident that the men who lead in these activities are also the men who are out in front when moments of high drama are enacted or who direct activities from their bases.[14]

In a wider society, the Bedouin of Cyrenaica built a system of relationship both within and without their own community that made it possible for them to establish and maintain their own government.[15] This depended upon a network of relations between the various *shaykhs* through whom they looked after their collective interests.

They were in an economic sense a self-supporting people, trading their home-made surplus products, e.g., hooves, skins, wool, clarified butter, surplus barley, honey and wax, for other consumer goods. Some commodities, such as tea, sugar, rice, and cloth had to be imported from other countries.[16] Due to inconsistency of rainfall and the distribution of water supplies, they became not peasants, but shepherds.[17] Consequently, it was largely animal husbandry

---

[14] Peters, *The Bedouin*, pp. 116-117.

[15] Peters, *The Bedouin*, pp. 1-2. He argues against Evans-Pritchard's statement that the Bedouin of Cyrenaica were unable to govern themselves and that a foreign power should rule them.

[16] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 38.

[17] This characteristic distinguishes the Bedouin of Cyrenaica from their counterparts in Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Egypt and the Maghrib, where peasantry is dominant. See Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 46.

that turned the rich vegetation of the country into milk, butter, meat, wool and hides.[18]

B. Economy

During the Ottoman administration, the Libyan economy was based on agriculture, pastoralism, handicraft industries and local and foreign trade. Agricultural activities were undertaken only in the small fertile area in the north of the country and in the oases of the hinterland, with the result that the country's economy depended mainly on livestock breeding. Yet, it was the land of Cyrenaica that was considered the most fertile terrain for cereal cultivation in the entire country; in fact, it was highly productive.[19] Barley, wheat and dates were important export commodities,[20] along with caravans which commercially linked regions within trans-Saharan Africa to one another and ultimately to Europe.[21] The Jewish population of coastal Tripolitania was

---

[18] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 34.

[19] Anthony J. Cachia, *Libya under the Second Ottoman Occupation 1835-1911* (Tripoli: Government Press, 1945), pp. 95-98.

[20] Africa exported ivory, ostrich feathers and African hides to Europe and imported silk, gun and gunpowder. See, Shukri Ghanem, "The Libyan Economy before Independence," *Social and Economic Development of Libya*, E.G.H. Joffe and K.S. McLachlan, eds. (Cambridgeshire: Middle East and North African Studies, 1982), p. 142.

[21] Libya was an important transfer point in the trans-Saharan trade between the interior of Africa (the area of Wadai-Borqu-Darfur) and Europe. There were also

involved in trade, crafts and money-lending, whereas the Italians were engaged in retail and wholesale commerce and food processing.[22]

The economy of the country in the first three decades of the twentieth century was closely related to the social and political spheres. This period was marked by the gradual implementation of a long term politico-economic project established by the Italians to develop their own colony, since Libya was regarded by then as Italy's fourth shore. The first phase, between 1913 and 1936, aimed at creating an infrastructure that would attract Italians to settle in Libya; this meant the construction of public buildings, transportation and communication facilities, all of which required a huge investment.[23] The next step, during the years 1936-1942, was to be devoted to developing the agricultural sector and pursuing land reclamation, largely in order to accommodate as many Italian peasants as possible.

---

significant trade routes between eastern and western Libya. For this reason, people of Libya took advantage of the need for services on the part of the caravans and provided camels and drivers.

[22] Barbar, *The Tarabulus*, p. 49.

[23] Ghanem, "The Libyan Economy," pp. 144-145. Public buildings like hospitals, banks and schools as well as fresh water supplies and a sewerage system formed the second most costly Fourth Shore project after the transportation projects which included roads, railways and ports, i.e. 10.175 billion Italian lira. See also, Claudio G. Segrè, *Fourth Shore: The Italian Colonization of Libya* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1974).

The economic aspects of the Fourth Shore project resulted in social discrimination that differentiated westerners from native Libyan in terms of economic and civic life. Italians and westerners enjoyed all facilities and privileges, whereas Arabs remained on the land, under threat of seizure and deportation to concentration camps, if they did not cooperate.

Meanwhile, the people of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan were involved in different work. Most of the population of the Tripolitanian coast and its surroundings, Jebel Gharbi, and a small part of the Cyrenaican coast, was agricultural. Simple trade in the form of barter was also carried on with agricultural goods, e.g. grain for dates.

The nomadic people of Cyrenaica were largely involved in herding camels and sheep and providing services for caravans. A pastoral economy also meant the exchange of dairy products, e.g., milk and buttermilk; there was also exchange of *rizq* (movable wealth), like gold, animals and agricultural products but also including any item that may be exchanged for money and inherited in succession on an individual basis. Lastly, there was exchange of *milk* (property), landed property which is inherited simultaneously.[24]

In term of commerce, Libya traded with European countries such as Italy, Great Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire and Austria, with all of

---

[24] Roy H. Behnke Jr., *The Herders of Cyrenaica: Ecology, Economy and Kinship among the Bedouin of Eastern Libya* (Urbana,Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1980), p. 184.

whom the ports Tripoli and Benghazi did active commerce, not to mention the ports of Misurata, Khoms and Sirte. Libyan products such as barley for the production of whisky and esparto grass for the production of high quality paper were mainly exported to Britain.

C. Political Situation

After the downfall of the Qaramanli dynasty (1711-1835 A.D), the land of Libya came under direct control from Istanbul, a situation that persisted until 1911. This was followed by more than a decade of Italian administration lasting until the eve of the second World War. How Libyans reacted to Ottoman and Italian control throughout this period and what ideology they depended on to strengthen their resolve will be discussed in the following pages.

1. Ottoman Administration

Libya and the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century have been described by one scholar as being "partners in pain," [25] since there was little else to share. The Ottomans were invited to Libya in the 1870's in order to help the Libyans defend themselves against continual attacks by the Spaniards

---

[25] Shukri Ganem, "The Libyan Economy before Independence." *Social and Economic Development of Libya,* eds. E.G.H. Joffe and K.S. McLachlan (Cambridgeshire: Middle East and North African Studies Press Ltd., 1982), p. 141.

and the Knights of St. John. As part of the Ottoman empire, Libya gained few advantages, and the country faced more than its fair share of material deprivation. Moreover, because of the remoteness of the central government in Istanbul, Ottoman control over Libya was weak. Military personnel was limited,[26] and the economic benefits unattractive. These conditions did not favour Ottoman attempts at governing the country as a whole. It was a challenge for Ottoman administrators to collect taxes from the nomads and the inhabitants of the interior, given the remoteness of certain regions and their unwillingness to bend to central authority. A large part of the population paid no taxes by the time the Qaramanlis came to rule the country. The growth of Western capitalism however also affected the provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The Qaramanlis were determined to collect tax directly and efficiently, making no exemptions in this regard. Any resistance by tribal chiefs was to be put down, with the result that some tribes chose to cooperate instead.[27]

---

[26] There were 1000 Ottoman troops in Cyrenaica in 1881, but the number had declined to only 300 by the late nineteenth century. With 20,000 men and modern equipment, the Italians took over Cyrenaica fifty years later. Wright, *Libya: A Modern History*, p. 21.

[27] Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, *The Making of Modern Libya* (Albany, New York: SUNY, 1994), p. 57.

Under Ottoman rule, Libya was divided into two administrative regions—Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Tripolitania (Tarabulus *al-Gharb*) was a province *(eyalet/vilayet)*, with a governor *(vali)* assisted by a provincial board *(meclis-i kursi eyalet)*. The governor's subordinates took the rank of *mutasarrif* and *kaymakam* and they, too, had their regional council. The status of Cyrenaica (Barqa) changed several times. But from 1888 it was a district *(mutasarriflik)* headed by a *mutasarrif* directly responsible to Istanbul. In matters affecting the army, posts, customs and judicial matters, the *vali* of Tripolitania was also responsible to Cyrenaica.[28]

On the eve of the Italian invasion of Libya, the province of Tripolitania included four districts *(sancak)*, each headed by a *mutasarrif*, under whose jurisdiction fell 21 sub-districts *(kaza)*, each headed by a *kaymakam* and 23 regions *(nahiye)*, each headed by a *mudir*. The district of Cyrenaica included five *kaza* and nine *nahiye*.[29]

Between 1835 and 1911, there were two distinct periods of Ottoman government, the Hamidian and Young Turk regimes, respectively. The administrative policy of both regimes towards the Libyan provinces was generally the same, particularly in the appointment of governors who were

---

[28] Rachel Simon, *Libya between Ottomanism and Nationalism: The Ottoman Involvement in Libya during the War with Italy (1911-1919)* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987), p. 22.

[29] Ibid.

charged with maintaining Istanbul's authority. Generally, Ottoman control over Libya was weak and this for several reasons. In the Hamidian period, for instance, the governor's reports on provincial administration were hardly accurate, since governors tended to use these as a forum to express personal hatreds. Later, under the Young Turks, there was an absence of parliamentary control, due to the brief existence of the constitutional-parliamentary regime (1908-1911) and the remoteness of the province itself.[30]

Under Ottoman rule, development plans were made, but few were realized, due to lack of funds and time. [31] The chief development projects were focused on Benghazi and Tripoli-- where water networks, sewage and municipal cleaning services, port development, roads improvement, schools, clinics, and public buildings were provided. The authorities also arranged for councils to investigate the development needs of Libyans in the fields of industry, agriculture, trade, communication, education, health and transportation, but their recommendations were not implemented.[32]

Several attempts to develop Libya were also made in the three years of Young Turk rule-- improved education and regional security being chief among them. Increased political activity in the form of clubs, and raised

---

[30] Simon, *Libya between Ottomanism*, p. 29.

[31] Ibid.

political consciousness through the medium of the press, helped to increase the feeling of connection and identification with the Ottoman empire. [33]

During their presence in Libya, the Ottomans found it difficult to defend the provinces from the Anglo-Egyptian forces to the east, the French to the west and south and the Italians' penetration to the north. There were some attempts at cooperation with the Sanūsiyya to push them out, but marginal territory continued to be lost. The Sanūsiyya's decision to collaborate with the Ottoman was based to some extent on common religious ties and the idea of Pan-Islamism.

2. Tripolitanian Resistance and the Emergence of the Republic of Tripolitania

The Sanūsiyya, centered in Cyrenaica, were not alone in the Libyan resistance movement: the people of Tripolitania had also taken steps towards autonomy, although it was not recognized by any Western country.[34] Resistance to the Italians began in October 1911 with an irregular force that consisted of a small number of tribesmen and their leaders, none of whom

---

[32] Simon, *Libya between Ottomanism*, p. 30.

[33] Simon, *Libya between Ottomanism*, p. 44.

[34] The leaders of the Republic asked for recognition from the Italian, British, French and U.S governments. But Italy had already secured their claims to Libya

was well-equipped. The Tripolitanians as a whole were in fact divided into two main groups: tribesman and city-dwellers, the latter consisting of traders, *'ulamā'* and the local janissaries of Ottoman descent. The urban-based group was also divided into three political camps: those with the will to collaborate with the Italians, called the *Efendiya*; another that fled to Egypt, Tunis or Turkey; and a third, "the wait and see group," whose members bided their time until a winner emerged.[35]

The tribal leaders included Sulaymān al-Bārūnī from the Nafūsa area,[36] al-Hādi al-Mustaṣir and Aḥmad al-Murayiḍ of Tarhuna, and 'Alī Tantūsh of the Tajura area. Together with a number of Ottoman forces they met the Italians in several battles during the years 1911-1912, such as in downtown Tripoli, Shāri' al-Shaṭ, 'Ayn Zāra, and Bir Ṭubrās. Although the resistance won several victories, the Italians had by 1912 succeeded in capturing Tripoli, Tajura, Sidi Bital and 'Ayn Zara. The resistance went on until the outbreak of the First World War, when it was interrupted by a period of accord following the Treaty of Ouchy-Lausanne, signed in October 1912 by Italy, Britain and

---

through agreements with England and France and their allies in World War I. See, Ahmida, *The Making of Modern Libya*, p. 125.

[35] Barbar, *The Tarabulus*, p. 185.

[36] Baruni's role in Libyan resistance movement was discussed by Tahir Ahmad al-Zawi, *Jihād al-abtal fi Tarablus al-gharb* (Beirut: Dār al-fatḥ li-al-ṭabā'ah wa al-naṣr, 1970).

the Ottoman Empire. One provision of the treaty was that the Sultan was to give full autonomy to the Tripolitanians. The Italians also offered an amnesty to those who had fought against them. This treaty ended Ottoman sovereignty over the province and their formal involvement in the resistance movement. However for the *mujāhidūn*, the Treaty had no significance, since they had declared that they would persist in their resistance until the withdrawal of Italian forces. [37]

The years 1916-1920 marked a decline, however, in this resistance. The period witnessed the British-Italian Coalition, conflict among the tribal leaders and the emergence of the Republic of Tripolitania. The resistance ended because of its lack of coordination within the province and among two other provinces; the withdrawal of Ottoman's forces and since the idea of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism did not help much for it was simply used for political legitimacy.

The new Ottoman administrator, Nuri Pasha, arrived in Tripolitania in 1917 and found that the Sanūsiyya had made a peace agreement with the British and Italians. This fact led another Tripolitanian leader, Ramaḍān al-Shutaywī, to decide not to cooperate with the Cyrenaicans and to attack the

---

[37] Barbar, *The Tarabulus*, pp. 228-241.

Sanūsiyya's followers in Sirte.[38] Since the emergence of Sayyid Muḥammad Idrīs al-Sanūsī in Cyrenaica, the Sufi order had adopted a diplomatic approach to Britain and Italy, a policy that was considered by the leaders of the Tripolitanian resistance to be equivalent to collaboration. This event awakened then to the necessity of having their own autonomous government, separate from that of the other province.

It was not until the autumn of 1918 that Tripolitanians witnessed the birth of the *Jumhūriyya al-Tarablusiyya* (Republic of Tripolitania). This occurred at a time when the country was in turmoil, both political and economic, and so it came as no surprise that the newly independent country expired after no more than four years (1918-1922) of existence. The Republic had no international sponsor to intervene with the Italians on its behalf; and once the Fascists came to power in Rome in 1922, the Italians took a much harsher line in their colony.[39]

The Republic of Tripolitania was the first formal republic in the Arab world. The driving force behind its founding was Sulaymān al-Barūnī, who beforehand had urged that an autonomous Ibadi-Berber province be formed in Jabāl al-Gharb under the Young Turks. The chance to establish his own

---

[38] E.A.V. de Candole, *The Life and Times of King Idris of Libya* (London, England: Published privately by Mohamed Ben Ghalbon, 1990), p. 38.

[39] Anderson, "The Tripoli Republic,"p. 44.

own government came after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne by Italy and the Ottoman Empire in 1912. The treaty resulted in a division of provincial leadership, by which Italy gained a few coastal towns while the Ottoman issued a declaration to Libyans giving them full authority over their own affairs and reserving the right to appoint an agent to protect Ottoman interests in the country.

After the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Ottoman administrators and provincial leaders of Tripolitania met at the 'Aziziyya Congress to decide their position on whether to accept autonomy under Ottoman protection or cooperate with Italy which had already declared its annexation of the country. No agreement, however, could be reached since the participants in the congress had split into two different interest groups; one wished to cooperate, the other to resist. The first group was represented by Farhat Bey who was inclined to cooperate with Italy, while the second group was exemplified by Sulaymān al-Barunī who decided to resist.

Even so it took several years before the Republic was officially established. President Wilson's declaration of his support for national self-determination in January 1918 more or less convinced the Arabs and Libyans of their right to liberate themselves. To realize this goal, the people of Tripolitania chose a council to rule the province, consisting of Sulaymān al-

Barūnī, Ramaḍān al-Suwayhli,[40] Aḥmad Murayyid of Tarhuna and 'Abd al-Nabī Bilkhayr of Warfalla. 'Azzam Bey was the council's secretary, and a twenty-four member advisory group was formed to represent most of the regions and interest of the republic. The aim was to achieve full independence from Italian rule by securing agreement in principle to a Tripolitanian amirate. Yet, they were far from united internally, with the result that civil war broke out. When the problem of the province was brought to the attention of Rome, Tripolitanians found support from Communists, Socialists and "troublemakers of all kinds."[41] Nevertheless, Giuseppe Volpi was appointed Governor of Tripolitania. Negotiations held in March 1922 between Volpi and the Central Reform Board to find a solution to the issue of an independent Tripolitania without Italian involvement failed in its effort. At the same time, a delegation of Tripolitanians turned to the Sanūsiyya leader, Idrīs, and requested that he takes up the post of amir of all Libya. Idrīs accepted the offer, although he knew that it would mean a confrontation with Italy. These were the events that caused the demise of the short-lived republic.

---

[40] On Ramadan al-Suwayhli, see Muhammad Mas'ud Fushaykhah, *Ramadan al-Suwayhli: al-batal al-libi al-shahid bi kifahihn lilitalyan* (Tripoli: Dar al-Farjani, 1974).

[41] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 147.

3. Italian Penetration

Besides the Ottomans, there were three main alien powers involved in Libya: France, Great Britain, and Italy. On the one hand, the French and the British had established more less firm footholds in Egypt, Algeria, and the Sudan. On the other hand, Italy was still trying to find its "promised land" across the sea. The active influence of Italy in Libya during the first half of twentieth century calls for further discussion here.

The ambition to annex the territory of Libya was due to several reasons. For Italy, Tripolitania was a question of national honor and of political and economic influence,[42] basically since Tripoli was the principal port and a major center of commerce and manufactures for the North African hinterland.[43] According to one scholar, Italy had three reasons for embarking on a policy of planned colonization in Libya once it had pacified it. First, it hoped to relieve its own high population density. Second, it wanted to keep other powers out of Libya. Third, it needed a cheaper and more effective way of garrisoning the

---

[42] Charles Lapworth, *Tripoli and Young Italy* (London: Stephen Swift & Co., Ltd., 1912), 79.

[43] The settlement was probably established by the Phoenicians in the 7th century BC as Ui'at later Oea. They established two other commercial cities in Libya, Sabratha and Leptis, and the busiest Mediterranean port Carthage, in Tunisia. Major manufactured goods were carried from Tripolitania to Central Africa by way of two great routes which met up about 250 miles south of Ghadames and continued as a single route to the River Niger. John Wright, Libya (London: Ernst Benn Ltd., 1969), 33-36. About the live of ancient Libyans see, *Herodotus, The History*, trans. George Rawlinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf; Toronto: Random House, 1997).

territory than by troops manning a barren shore and provisioned almost entirely from the homeland.[44] Furthermore, Libya was always considered a potential base for the Italian penetration of Africa to Lake Chad and beyond.[45]

The Italian political interest in Ottoman North Africa was pursued at first through a policy of "peaceful penetration" of the economic and social life of the territory, and not by conquest, starting in the 1880s. The financial institution known as the "Banco di Roma" was established in 1905 to begin an "economic penetration" of the land. The bank invested in local agriculture, light industry, mineral prospecting and shipping.[46] New businesses were financed and controlling interest was acquired in shipping and in many sectors of the export trade: cereals, wool, ivory, sponges and ostrich feathers. Expeditions to prospect for minerals in Tripolitania were funded, and within a few years the Banco di Roma controlled much of the domestic and foreign trade of Libya.[47] Italian trade had also extended to all the main Libyan ports, and schools were opened to spread the Italian language and culture. The

---

[44] Martin Moore, *Fourth Shore* (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1940), pp.13-14. See also, Claudio G. Segrè, *Fourth Shore* (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1974.

[45] Wright, *Libya*, p. 121.

[46] Wright, *Libya*, pp. 26-27.

[47] Wright, *Libya*, pp. 122-123.

Banco di Roma thereafter opened its first branch in Tripoli in 1907, and other branches in Benghazi and other Libyan towns. The effects of the European penetration of Africa on the Sahara and Sudan were primarily commercial, as the traditional trade between North Africa and the countries south of the desert was drawn away westwards and southwards along the new, secure railways and river routes to ports on the Atlantic coast.[48]

With the advent of Fascism, Italian colonial expansion entered a new phase which saw an end to the policies of previous Liberal governments. The rise of Benito Mussolini in October 1922 marked the beginning of a period of unabashed imperialism, best articulated in his statement: "We Fascists had the supreme unprejudiced courage to call ourselves imperialists."[49] The colonization of Libya, referred to as a "fourth shore" for Italy, was in addition, considered part of "creating a civilization" itself.[50]

The significance that the Fascists government attached to the conquest and the development of Libya was obvious from the high rank of the governors appointed there in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1925, Emilio de Bono, a leader of the March on Rome that had brought Mussolini to power in 1922 succeeded Count Volpi in Tripolitania, while Rodolfo Graziani came to be

---

[48] Wright, *Libya*, p. 15.

[49] Wright, *Libya*, p. 32.

known as the conqueror of Tripolitania. Then, in 1929 the Marshal of Italy, Pietro Badoglio, was appointed governor of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, which had been united for better coordination of military operations. Under Badoglio's direction Graziani completed the conquest of Fezzan.[51]

Fascist Italy needed nine years before it could completely conquer Libya, a result achieved through the aggressive military tactics adopted by Graziani. These were required in view of the fierce resistance offered by the Sanūsīyya. Graziani had come to the conclusion that no Cyrenaican could be trusted not to be a supporter of the Sanūsīyya. He tried to exploit the jealousies and hostilities which other tribes felt toward the latter. However, united by language and law, Libyans as a whole regarded the Italians as foreigners whom one might serve but not love. For this reason, Libyans participated either directly or indirectly in the resistance.

---

[50] Wright, *Libya*, p. 38.

[51] Wright, *Libya*, p. 34.

Chapter II

ROLES OF THE SANŪSIYYA: THE CENTRAL POSITIONS OF *SHAYKHS, IKHWĀN* AND *ZĀWIYAS*

A. Structure and Organization of the Sanūsiyya

Sanūsi followers may be divided into three categories; [1] *muntasibūn*, adherents; *ikhwān*, disciples; and *shaykhs*. A *muntasib* received no privileges, was not initiated, sought no blessings and could remain a follower of other orders. *Ikhwān* were initiated, resided as a matter of a duty in the *zāwiya* or the sufi lodge, usually had some sort of education and helped out with the affairs of the lodge when invited to do so. The chosen and most experienced *ikhwān* were designated as *shaykhs*, and were entrusted with the administration of the *zāwiya*. Over all was the Chief of the Order, the ruler of all *zāwiyas* and their *shaykhs*. The Chief of the Order was assisted by his councilors, the *muqaddam*, the *wakīl* and the *khalīfa*. These councilors, called *al-khawwāṣ*, acted on behalf of the Chief of the Order in the latter's absence, served as the appointed administrators and judges in the name of the Chief of the Order and attended the annual ʿId al-

[1] Nicola A. Ziadeh, *Sanūsīyah: A Study of A Revivalist Movement in Islam*, 2nd ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983), pp. 118-121.

Aḍḥā feast and conferences, among other duties.[2] The *wakīl* supervised the material and financial life of the *zāwiyas* and received gifts and tithes on behalf of the order. The *khalīfa*, responsible for indoctrination in the order supervised other *muqaddams* and transmitted all the instructions of the Chief of the Order to his subordinates.[3] However, for the purpose of this chapter, which surveys the roles of the Sanūsiyya, only the three principal elements of the brethren- *shaykhs*, *ikhwān* and *zāwiyas*- will be considered. It should furthermore be noted that the title of *shaykh* bestowed on the head of the *zāwiya* ought not to be confused with the same title borne by traditional tribal leaders, also referred to as *shaykhs*.

The *zāwiya shaykh* had two functions in the eyes of the *ṭarīqa:* one temporal and the other spiritual. The first devolved from his position as administrator of the *zāwiya*, which was his primary function. This role extended to acting as an agent of unification for tribesmen, a task made necessary by the incessant intra-tribal conflicts that arose over legal and economic matters. Land ownership and disputed borders were among the main such problems, and it was felt that the *zāwiya shaykh*, who benefited from the reputation of Mahdism

---

[2]Ziadeh, *Sanūsīyah*, p. 121.

[3] Ziadeh, *Sanūsīyah*, pp. 120-121.

attached to Sayyid Muḥammad al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī.,[4] was an ideal instrument of peace.

The second function stemmed from his duty as a religious patron to his disciples. In this respect, a *shaykh*, with the occasional assistance of his *ikhwān*, served as the *imām* of daily prayer or as a teacher. Sometimes, one of the *ikhwān* might read "religious writings" to a group of people.[5] Here, the term "*ikhwān*" is used in a broader sense, that is to say all adherents *(muntasibūn)* and disciples *(ikhwān)* of the Sanūsiyya. [6] [78]

---

[4] This idea was current in different regions of the Sudan, Chad and Libya at almost the same time. In the case of the Sanūsiyya it was developed not by Sayyid Muḥammad al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī himself but by Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf, although it was criticized by al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī. See, Horeir, p. 112, Ziadeh, *Sanūsīyah*, pp. 52-56, Muḥammad Ashhab, al-*Mahdi al-Sanūsī* (Tripoli: Maṭba'at Maji, 1952), pp. 87-99. For the Sudanese Mahdi, see P.M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1181-1898*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).

[5] Nachtigal recorded that Sanūsī *ikhwān* read a religious text to the Kuka people of Wada'i on certain evenings of Ramaḍān. See, Gustav Nachtigal, *Sahara and Sudan*, trans. Allan G.B. Fisher and Humprey J. Fisher (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), v. 4, p. 12.

[6] The tribal breakdown of Sanūsiyya membership included mainly the Bedouins, the Tuaregs and the Tubus. Prominent sub-tribes of the Tuaregs included the Aweelimmiden, Hoggars (Ahaggar), Asgars and Kelowis. According to Furlong, Asgars and the Kelowis were enthusiastic followers of the Sanūsiya, especially those who resided in Air and Ghat. See, Charles Wellington Furlong, *The Gateway to the Sahara: Observations and Experiences in Tripoli* (New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1909), pp. 93-94.

Likewise, Duveyrier writes that the tribe was largely split between the Sanūsī and the Tijānī orders. See, Henry Duveyrier, *Les Touareg du Nord: Exploration du Sahara* (Nendeln: Kraus Reprint, 1973, first published in 1864), pp. 300-310. Their involvement in the order seems certain since there is an evidence that a group of Tuaregs under Ṣāliḥ Abū Karīm served the Sanūsiya as a corps of "troupes d'élite" for years. See, Jay

Scholars give different opinions about the number of Sanūsiyya *zāwiyas*, followers, and the areas where this order spread. Since their research was conducted at different times, however, their findings tend to vary. At the latest stage of its development, the order had spread throughout North Africa, the Sahel, and beyond into large parts of sub-Saharan Africa. In 1883, on the other hand, when Duveyrier published his findings, there were 121 *zāwiyas* distributed in Egypt (17 *zāwiyas*), European Turkey (1), Asian Turkey and the Ḥijāz (2), Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (66), Tunisia (10), Algeria (8), Morocco (5), and other parts of Africa (12).[9] Later, Evans-Pritchard reported that the number had increased to 146 *zāwiyas*, spread throughout Egypt (31 *zāwiyas*), the Ḥijāz (17), Libya (84) and Sudan (14).[10] Ziadeh, for his part, dismissed reports

---

Spaulding and Lidwien Kapteijns, *An Islamic Alliance: 'Alī Dīnār and the Sanūsīya, 1906-1916* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1994), p. 16.

Tubu, Tibbu or Tebu is the name used interchangeably by several scholars to describe this tribe. According to Duveyrier, who calls them Toubou, there were six *zāwiyas* operating among this people mentioned in "other parts of Africa".[6] Kreda, the Tubu of Wada'i, was said to have been the first among the Tubus, Kreda or Karda, Koyo, Ngalamiya, Iriya and Kodera, to accept Islam. See, Gustav Nachtigal, *Sahara and Sudan*, p. 164.

[7] Furlong, *The Gateway to the Sahara*, pp. 93-94.

[8] See, Henry Duveyrier, *Les Touareg du Nord: Exploration du Sahara* (Nendeln: Kraus Reprint, 1973, first published in 1864), pp. 300-310.

[9] Henry Duveyrier, *La Confrérie Musulmane de Sîdi Mohammed ben 'Alî es-Senoûsî et son Domaine Geographique* (Paris: Société de Géographie, 1886), pp. 57-84.

[10] E.E. Evans Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 24-25.

that the Sanūsiyya had established *zāwiyas* as far away as South East Asia, especially Indonesia, describing them as only an exaggeration.[11] In fact, the Sanūsiyya had extended its influence to Indonesia, although for political reasons, it evolved into Idrīsiyya.[12] Therefore, it is the Idrīsiyya, not the Sanūsiyya that is recognized by the Indonesian Council of *Ṭarīqāt* (Jam'iyyah Ahlith Thoriqoh al-Mu'tabaroh an-Nahdliyyah) in its decision dated April 19, 1981, and in its list of the forty-five recognized *ṭarīqas*.[13]

---

[11] T.W Arnold refers to Riddel and Snouck Hurgronje as saying, "the religious orders moreover have extended their organization to the Malay Archipelago, even the youngest of them –the Sanūsiyah – finding adherents in the most distant islands, one of the signs of the influence being the adoption of the name Sanūsī by many Malays, when in Mecca they change their native for Arabic names." Ziadeh, *Sanūsiyah*, p. 103.

[12] Nevertheless, Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf once employed Haji Muammad As'ad, from the Buginese *'ulamā'* as his secretary for some time before his return to south Sulawesi in 1928 and then appointed him the *khalīfa*. However, it seems that he did not spread the *ṭarīqa*. See, Muh. Hatta Walinga, "Kiyai Haji Muammad As'ad: Hidup dan Perjuangannya" (B.A. thesis, Faculty of Letters, IAIN Alauddin, Ujung Pandang, 1980).

In the early 30's, 'Abd al-Fattah was also reported to have gone to see Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf who then gave him as *ijāza* to teach and spread the doctrines of the *ṭarīqa* to Indonesia. Aḥmad Sharīf also told him a *khalīfa* had already been sent to South Sulawesi. Later, Kiai 'Abd al-Fattah renamed the *ṭarīqa* as Idrīsiyya. This transformation was, according to van Bruinessen, to prevent political problems with the Dutch who might have associated the *ṭarīqa* with the the Sanūsiya resistance movement in Libya. The small scale *ṭarīqa* is now headed by Kiai 'Abd al-Fattah's son, Kiai Dahlan, centered in Pangendingan, Tasikmalaya (west Java) and spread in several local branches. See, Martin van Bruinessen, *Kitab Kuning: Pesantren dan Tarekat* (Bandung: Mizan, 1995), p. 202.

[13] See, Idaroh 'Aliyyah, *Thoriqoh Mu'tabaroh Nahdliyyah* (Semarang: Toha Putra, n.d), p. 38.

With regard to the importance of the *zāwiyas* themselves, Trimingham writes, "the *zāwiya* was a center for tribal unity and this gave it strength to survive".[14] The *zāwiya* functioned thus as a bridge between the tribal system and the Sanūsiyya organization, as Evans-Pritchard put it:

> Unlike the Heads of most Islamic Orders, which have rapidly disintegrated into autonomous segments without contact and common direction, they have been able to maintain this organization intact and keep control of it. This they were able to do by co-ordinating the lodges of the Order to the tribal structure.[15]

In a typical *zāwiya* complex, there were a mosque, schoolrooms, guest-rooms, houses for the *shaykh* of the *zāwiya* and his family, rooms for teachers and disciples and houses for *ikhwāns*, clients and servants, and their families, as well as, sometimes, a garden and a cemetery. [16] A *zāwiya* initially was built for the purpose of religious, educational, agricultural and social activities. To Ṣāliḥ Latawish of the Magharba tribe, al-Sanūsī wrote a letter, "We built you a *zāwiya* with a *shaykh* to lead the prayers and teach the Qur'ān so people can go back to their religion and so agriculture and settlement will flourish."[17]

---

[14] Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 120.

[15] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*. p. 11.

[16] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 74.

[17] Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib al-Ashhāb, *al-Sanūsī al-Kabīr* (Cairo: Maktaba al-Qāhira, n.d.), p. 24.

It was in the *zāwiyas* of the Sanūsiyya, in my opinion, that "ethos" and "worldview" [18] met and were manifested as a network of social, religious, commercial, judicial, military and political activities supervised by the *shaykhs*. Ziadeh explains that "... a *zāwiya*, as conceived by the Grand Sanūsī, was a place for hard work, toilsome labor and productive effort. Sanūsiyah forbids begging and abhors lazy life. Work is essential, and cooperation and full collaboration are the bases of Sanūsī activity."[19]

B. Socio-Religious Roles

The two most important aspects of the Sanūsiyya's role were religious and social, reflected in *dhikr* and the *zāwiya* network, respectively. The first one appears to have inspired a Sunnī and moderate sufism,[20] while the latter was the most original part of the Sanūsiyya program.[21]

1. *Dhikr* as the essence of the Sanūsiyya's teachings

The sufi doctrines or *taṣawwuf* of the Sanūsiyya focused on *dhikr*, even though the founder himself left numerous writings on different subjects such

---

[18] Both terms have been discussed by Clifford Geertz in his "Religion as a Cultural System," in *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*. pp. 3-4.

[19] Ziadeh, *Sanūsīya*, p. 98.

[20] J.L. Triaud, "Sanūsiyya," *EI*, ix, p. 24.

[21] Ibid.

as *fiqh, uṣūl al-fiqh, ḥadīth* and history.[22] Since the Sanūsiyya followers were mainly simple tribesmen, according to Horeir, it was regarded as sufficient for them to learn how to pray and how to recite *dhikr*, instead of a high level of reading and writing skills.[23] In elucidating the order's rules on prayer, we rely for our primary sources on al-Sanūsī's *Salsabīl al-Mu'īn fī al-Ṭarā'iq al-Arba'īn* (on the margins of his *Kitāb al-Masā'il al-'Ashr al-Musammā Bughyat al-Maqāṣid fī Khulāṣa al-Marāṣid* (Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Ma'āhid, 1934), *Kitāb al-Manhal al-Rawī al-Rā'iq fī Asānid al-'Ulūm wa Uṣūl al-Ṭarā'iq* (Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Ḥijāzī, 1954), *al-Anwār al-Qudsiyya fī-Muqāddimāt al-Ṭarīqa al-Sanūsiyya* (Istanbul, 1913) and Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf's *al-Durra al-Fardiyya fī-Bayān Mashā'ikh al-Ṭarīqa al-Sanūsiyya* (Cairo, 1903) respectively.

The *ṭarīqa*'s founder, Muḥammad ibn 'Alī al-Sanūsī (1787-1859) had studied under a number of Sufi masters, including the founders of the Darqawiyya and Tijāniyya orders, al-'Arabī al-Darqawī and Aḥmad al-Tijānī respectively. Al-Sanūsī had several other Sufi affiliations, such as the

---

[22] For summary of his writings see, Knut S. Vikor, *Sufi and Scholar on the Desert Edge* (London: Hurst and Co., 1995), pp. 218-239.

[23] Abdulmola S. El-Horeir, "Social and Economic Transformations in the Libyan Hinterland during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1981), pp. 108-109.

Shādhiliyya, Jazūliyya, Nāṣiriyya, Ḥabībiyya and probably other orders.[24] Thus the doctrines of the Sanūsiyya were clearly a blend of various beliefs, with borrowings from other movements and individuals, such also the reformist Wahhābī movement, the Malikite school of law, Ibn Taymiyya and al-Ghazālī,[25] although the Sanūsiyya distinguished itself from each of them. Al-Sanūsī himself claimed allegiance to the *ṭarīqa Muḥammadiyya*, the short chain linking him to Ibn Idrīs, by way of al-Tāzī and al-Dabbāgh.[26]

Al-Sanūsī considered the Sufi *dhiker* the only way to achieve spiritual ascendancy from *al-nafs al-ammāra*, the carnal soul, to the divine soul. The Sufis repeatedly performed prayers and *dhiker* to purify the heart and prepare it for this purpose, proceeding through seven spiritual stations, each having its own nature.[27] Performed collectively or in solitude, Sanūsiyya *dhiker* is intended to reach more "the vision of the Prophet" than "the vision of God," but one is

---

[24] B.G. Martin, *Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth-Century Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 101. However, it appears that his only direct link was with Ibn Idrīs and al-Tijānī, see, R.S. O'Fahey, *Enigmatic Saints* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1990), p. 132.

[25] Ziadeh suggests that the Sanūsiyya was a Ghazalian order, in the sense that the brotherhood combined the characteristics of the *'ulamā'* and the sufi recommended by al-Ghazālī, himself regarded as the possible prototype of this nineteenth century leader. See Ziadeh, *Sanūsiyah*, pp. 44-45.

[26] Al-Sanūsī, *Salsabīl*, p. 61.

[27] Al-Sanūsī, *al-Masā'il al-Ashr*, p. 105.

not supposed to reach an ecstatic state. To "see the Prophet," one should concentrate on the image of the Prophet in one's own heart until one sees him waking and sleeping and can pose questions to him.[28] Before being able to do so, however, one has to regard one's Sufi master as the spiritual representative of the Prophet

The Sanūsiyya treats the practice of *dhikr* like formal *'ibāda*, such as daily prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, etc., to the extent that before and during the ritual, one should comply with certain conditions. This attitude is interesting, since *dhikr* is not an obligation for a Muslim, whereas the latter are. *'Ibāda* practices are, moreover legal rituals rather than mystical ones like sufi *dhikr*,[29] yet, the brotherhood demanded that *dhikr* be preceded by such conditions and etiquette.

A *dhikr* performer is supposed to fulfill the following conditions:[30] he must sit in a purified place; face the direction of the *qibla;* spread perfume on each thigh and cover them with a cloth; sprinkle perfume in the place where the *dhikr* is to be held; purify one's *sirr* (secret) and *qalb* (heart) only for God;

---

[28] Constance E. Padwick, *Muslim Devotions: A Study of Prayer Manuals in Common Use* (London: S.P.C.K, 1961), p. 163.

[29] This is one of the examples that the Sanūsiyya is Ghazalian, who blend *sharī'a* and *taṣawwuf.*

[30] Al-Sanūsī, *al-Masā'il al-Ashr*, p. 106.

wear good, perfumed clothes; see that the room is dark and close one's eyes, imagining one's *shaykh* to be present; observe *ṣidq*, that is, balancing secrecy *(sirr)*, openness *('alāniyya)*, and sincerity *(ikhlāṣ)*, so as to purify one's deeds of all doubt; say *lā ilāha illā Allāh* in a loud voice and introduce the meaning of *dhikr* into the heart with every repetition; banish thought of every being from the heart with *lā ilāha* to establish the influence of *illā Allāh* throughout the heart; keep silent after the third emptiness *(farāgh)*, so as to focus and present the heart to the *dhākir;* and never drink water during the *dhikr* ceremony.

Furthermore, the reciter may not suspend a chain around his neck, but must carry it in the hand, instead; no musical instrument is to be played; no dancing or singing is to take place; no tobacco or coffee drinking is allowed, although tea is tolerated.[31] In addition, there are other regulations placed on *dhikr* which fall under the heading of etiquette. The five etiquettes *(ādāb)* of *dhikr* are: [32] repentance *(tawba)*, cleanliness *(ghusl);* quiet *(sukūt);* witnessing in the heart that there is a spiritual chain extending from one's master back to the

---

[31] Rinn, *Marabouts et Khouan*, pp. 503-504. Tea is tolerated as long as it is sweetened by cassonnade sugar, not the crystalized white sugar. In their daily life, the Sanūsis are prohibited from any kinds of luxury in the men's cloth, silk, embroideries and the ornaments, like also the money and gold utensils. These noble metals can legally be used only to raise the handle and the guard of the sword, because the sword is intended for the holy war. Women on the contrary, are allowed to wear such ornaments, silk, and gold. See, Duveyrier, *La Confrérie Musulmane*, p. 7

[32] Al-Sanūsī, *Manhal*, p. 105.

Prophet; and acknowledging the help of one's master, as a representative of the Prophet.

The *dhikr* of the Sanūsiyya generally consists of the following formulas:

1. "O my God, bless me at the time of death and in the tests which follow death," repeated forty times after the dawn prayer while lying on the right side, the head pressed on the right hand.
2. *Astaghfir Allāh*- repeated 100 times with prayer beads.
3. *Lā ilāha illā Allāh*- repeated 100 times.
4. *Ṣalawāt*, i.e *Allāhumma ṣalli 'alā sayyidinā Muḥammad al-Nabī al-ummiyy wa- 'alā ālihi wa- aṣḥābihi wa- sallam*- repeated 100 times.[33]

The second to fourth *dhikr*s are repeated three times altogether. And as an alternative to the second, the higher level sufis can read 100 times the following formula if there are no outsiders listening in on the gathering: *lā ilāha illā Allāh Muḥammad rasūl Allāh sayyidinā Muḥammad fī kulli lamḥat wa- nafs 'adada mā wasa'ahu 'ilm Allāh.* This formula, to which special graces are attached, is kept secret.[34]

---

[33] Duveyrier, *La Confrérie Musulmane*, pp. 9-10; Louis Rinn, *Marabouts et Khouan* (Alger: Librairie Adolphe Jourdan, 1884), pp. 502-503; Octave Xavier and Depont Coppolani in *Les Confréries Religieuses Musulmanes* (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1897), pp. 553-554. See also Ziadeh, *Sanūsīyah*, p. 89. There is a difference among these scholars concerning the third formula. Duveyrier and Rinn singularize the word *ṣaḥba, wa ṣaḥbihi*, while Depont and Coppolani pluralize it, *wa aṣḥābihi.*

[34] Duveyrier, *La Confrérie Musulmane*, p. 9.

In addition, the Sanūsiyya demanded that an individual recite a formula of *dhikr* for his initiation. There are three forms of the formula, called *al-wird al-Muḥammadī*, implemented for different levels of members: 1) *astaghfir Allāh*, 2) *lā ilāha illā Allāh Muḥammad rasūl Allāh fī kulli lamḥat wa nafs 'adada mā wasa'ahu 'ilm Allāh*, which sentence must be read 300 times and recited 100 times, and 3) *Allāhumma ṣalli 'alā sayyidinā Muḥammad al-Nabī al-ummiyy wa 'alā ālihi wa ṣaḥbihi wa sallam*.[35]

Al-Sanūsī considered the best prayer to the Prophet to be Ibn Idrīs' famous *al-ṣalāt al-azīm*, which he almost entirely incorporated into the *al-wird al-kabīr* of the Sanūsiyya.[36] According to Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf, there are three sufi recitations: *al-Lāmiyya*, *al-Fātiḥiyya* and *al-'Aẓimiyya*.[37] Among these three, the last is the best loved by the Sanūsiyya, which Padwick has translated as follows:[38]

---

[35] Duveyrier, *La Confrérie Musulmane*, p.10.

[36] See *al-wird al-kabīr* in al-Sanūsī's *Salsabīl*, pp. 14-20.

[37] Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf, *Anwār al-Qudsiyya*, p. 59. The other two are translated by Adams, cited in Ziadeh, p. 88. "O my Resource in every time of distress, the One who answers me on every supplication, my Refuge in every difficulty and my hope when my own devices fail. (Meaning, of course, God)," and "And unite me to his (that is the Prophet) as thou hast united the spirit and the soul (in man) outwardly and inwardly, waking and sleeping, and make him, O Lord, to become spirit of my own essential self, him, of all persons in the world, before the life of the Hereafter, O thou Great God."

[38] Constance E. Padwick, *Muslim Devotions: A Study of Prayer-Manuals in Common Use* (London: S.P.C.K, 1961), p. 165.

> My God, I ask Thee by the light of the Face of the Great God which filled the bases of the Great Throne, and by which uprose the worlds of the Great God, to call down blessing on our Lord Muḥammad the great in rank, and on the family of the Prophet of the great God.

2. Education

The educational system of the Sanūsiyya was promoted initially by the founder of the *ṭārīqa*, and further developed by al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī and Aḥmad Sharīf. Al-Sanūsī had established a program of voluntary education based on two types of school for the people of the hinterland: "permanent schools," and "mobile schools."[39] The former included the *zāwiyas* which were intended for permanent residents, whereas the latter were especially designed for nomadic tribes. In the "mobile school" teachers were appointed by Sanūsī *shaykhs* to accompany the bedouin camps which for economic reasons were constantly on the move.

In both kinds of school, teachers taught most aspects of Islamic studies such as the Qur'ān, *taṣawwuf*, *fiqh* (Islamic Law), *uṣul al-fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), and *ḥadīth* (Prophetic Tradition). In addition grammar, mathematics, astronomy, and other subjects were given to supplement these. Nor were intellectual pursuits the only concern, for sports and physical training

---

[39] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformation*, p. 94.

were offered (especially in the higher institutions), as well as vocational courses in bookbinding, carpentry, smithery, metal work, dyeing, mat-making, baking, cotton-spinning and weaving.[40] Some *zāwiya*s taught only one subject or two; in the Sudan, for example, Qur'ānic schools were found in Kawar and Bilma,[41] or Qur'ān and *fiqh* were taught in the *zāwiya* Msus among the 'Awāqir tribe.[42]

A more advanced level of education was also offered in large *zāwiya*s such as al-Bayḍā, Kufra and Mizdah. And those who intended to be teachers usually went to the Sanūsī University at Jaghbūb.[43] The university had 300 *murīd*s by the time of al-Mahdī [44] and 8,000 volumes of books in its library on Islamic law and jurisprudence, mysticism, philosophy, history, Qur'ānic exegesis, poetry, astronomy and astrology.[45]

---

[40] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformations*, p. 94. Al-Sanūsī himself was interested in a great range of subjects, including mathematics, astrology, geography, music, law and politics. See, Dajjani, *al-Ḥaraka al-Sanūsiyya*, 2nd ed. (Cairo: al-Maṭba'a al-Faniyya, 1988) , p. 47. See also, E.A.V. de Candole, *The Life and Times of King Idris of Libya* (London: Mohamed Ben Ghalbon, 1990), p. 6.

[41] J.L. Triaud, *La Legende Noire de la Sanûsiyya*, vol. 1 (Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1995), pp. 448-450.

[42] Ziadeh, *Sanūsīyah*, p. 114.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ziadeh, *Sanūsīyah*, p. 106.

[45] Duveyrier, *La Confrérie Musulmane*, 1886, p. 24 and Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 17.

The peak of this educational system was reached during the leadership of al-Mahdī (1859-1902). In Algeria, the number of Sanūsi followers was reported to be 511 by Rinn in 1882.[46] Depont and Coppolani estimated in 1897 that more than 5,000 *murīds* were enrolled in schools in Cyrenaica, with 2,000 in Jaghbūb alone.[47] By 1890, the Sanūsiyya had around 15,000 students in all.[48] In fact, when al-Mahdī moved the center of the order from Jaghbūb to al-Tāj in Kufra in 1894, the transportation of the library collection alone necessitated a caravan consisting of 3,000 camels.[49]

Under the leadership of Aḥmad al-Sharīf, al-Mahdī's successor, the educational system in the Libyan hinterland became especially indebted to his scholarship as well as his statesmanship. He criticized those "unqualified and insincere" teachers who held positions in the *zāwiya* educational system only because they brought high prestige and generous compensation. Consequently, the quality of education declined, a point he makes in a chapter of his work on educational philosophy and pedagogical theories emtitled *Fūḍāt al-Mawāhib al-Makkiyya bi-al-Nafaḥāt al-Rabbāniyya al-Muṣṭafāwiyya.* In short, he underlined the

---

[46] Rinn, *Marabouts et Khouan*, p. 514.

[47] Depont and Coppolani, *Les Confréries Religieuses Musulmanes*, p. 569-570.

[48] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformations*, p. 93.

[49] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformations*, p. 110.

fact that not all students could become successful teachers. The teachers must first master the methodological and philosophical aspects of teaching, as well as demonstrate honesty, good judgment, and sharp analysis.[50]

3. Tribal integration

When al-Sanūsī first travelled to the hinterland, tribal disputes and conflicts were endemic to the region. To cite but one example, his arrival there in 1822 came immediately on the heels of the defeat of Awlād ʿAlī and the Jawāzī by the joint forces of Aḥmad Bey al-Qaramanli and the ʿUbaydāt. In the two intervals preceding his next visit, many other tribal wars took place. Among them were conflicts involving the Jabārinah and the Fawā'id, the Jabārinah and the Ḥarabi and the ʿUbaydāt and the Bara'sah. In addition, there were intra-tribal conflicts like the war between factions of the Jabārinah and the conflict between the Khaḍra and the Mughayrbiyah, both of the latter being subtribes of the Bara'sah.[51]

The process of making peace was given its first impetus by the coming of Sanūsiyya *ikhwān* at the request of a given tribe to build a *zāwiya* in their territory. Then a *shaykh* and several *ikhwān* were sent to teach their children, to

---

[50] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformations*, pp. 96-97.

[51] Ashab, *Barqa* (Cairo: Maktaba al-Hawari, 1947), pp. 105-106.

direct Friday prayers and to solve their problems. The *shaykh* of each *zāwiya* functioned as representative of the Chief of the order; he was the mediator between the Bedouin and the Turkish administrator, dispensed hospitality to travelers, supervised the collection of tithes, directed cultivation of grain and care of stock, dispatched surplus revenues to the headquarters of the order, acted as an *imām* (leader of Friday prayer) and assisted in preaching and teaching.[52]

Gradually, tribesmen were integrated into the order and inevitably became dependent on the Sanūsiyya's *zāwiya shaykh*s all the more so since they could point to more successes than could their traditional *shaykh*s. Sanūsī members had once even solved internal conflict among sections of the Awlād Sulaymān and had tried to reconcile the Sulaymān and Tubu with the Tuareg.[53] In fact, by calling the tribes to Islam, the *ṭariqa* succeeded overall in creating "a less violent way of life."[54] Likewise in the case of the Zuwāyā tribe, the Sanūsiyya agreed to open a new *zāwiya* in Kufra when asked to do so, on the one condition that the Zuwāyā should stop their rapacious actions.[55] Similar

---

[52] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 80.

[53] Dennis D. Cordell, "Eastern Libya, Wadai and the Sanūsiya," *The Journal of African History*, vol. 18, 1, 1977, p. 29.

[54] Ibid.

results were obtained after the Islamization of the Biyedat and Tubu, who decreased their attacks on caravans.[56]

In dealing with the problems of disputed borders and land owners, the brotherhood took the *"ḥaram al-zāwiya"* policy or "endowment for the *zāwiya*."[57] Disputed areas were designated for the *zāwiya*'s use and the conflict of the tribes solved through cultivating the land together under the supervision of the *shaykh* of the *zāwiya*. This policy worked better than the traditional *libdah* or "tribal horse race" where borders were roughly marked.[58] When this caused disputes among tribes, the *zāwiyas* benefited by absorbing it into the *zāwiya* community's land.

---

[55] Despite their warlike and independent characteristics, the Zuwāyā soon offered allegiance to the Grand Sanūsī who had founded his capital in Jaghbūb. Under the peaceful guidance of the Grand Sanūsī and al-Mahdī, the influence of the Sanūsiyya spread far, and trade with Central Africa flourished. See, Ziadeh, *Sanūsīyah*, p. 58-59.

[56] Cordell, "Eastern Libya," p. 29.

[57] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformations*, p. 120. Besides, the properties of the Sanūsiyya were gained from *waqf*, *ṣadaqa* and from individual shares. The total lands belonging to the order amounted to around 200,000-500,000 hectares in 1919. See, Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, pp. 74-77. Although the term is used interchangeably, *ḥaram* may be the correct one, as the tribe was given the right to continue utilizing the land that the lodge itself did not develop; thus the transfer was not as complete as it usually is in a *waqf*. See, R.S. O'Fahey and Bernd Radtke, "Neo-Sufism Reconsidered," in *Der Islam* 70 (1993), p. 75. See also, Michel Le Gall, "The Ottoman Government and the Sanusiyya: A Reappraisal," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 21 (1989), pp. 97-99.

[58] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformations*, p. 120.

Marriage was also a tool of peace-making. In the case of the Zuwāyā, the men of the tribe married women from other lineages or, in other words, women were exchanged among the sub-tribes in order to maintain the peace agreement. This agreement eventually extended to fifty-six *shaykhs* and applied in an area of about 900,000 km² which extended from Ajdabiya to Egypt, Sudan and Chad.[59]

A different peace agreement related to the slave-trade. Duveyrier reports that nomads on the frontier of Egypt and Tripolitania captured a caravan of slaves from Wada'i and that when al-Sanūsī learned of this he bought, instructed and freed them, finally returning the slaves as missionaries to their homeland in Wada'i.[60]

C. Economic Role

The religious activities of the *ṭarīqa* were in reality closely intertwined with the commercial pursuits undertaken by the various *zāwiyas*, pursuits which included trading providing security for storage and exchange opening warehouses to goods in transit or awaiting sale, and maintaining the caravan route. Cordell says that, "the Sanūsiya played a multi-faceted role in trans-

---

[59] John Davis, Libyan Politics: *Tribe and Revolution* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1987), p. 184.

[60] Duveyrier, *La Confrerie*, p. 17.

Saharan commerce during the second half of the nineteenth century." [61] Al-Sanūsī's involvement in trade is seen by Abun-Nasr as having been influenced by Aḥmad Tijānī's ability to combine his sufi calling with the acquisition of wealth.[62]

The involvement of the Sanūsiyya in the life of the tribal communities also meant that it became deeply involved in the caravan trade, since the new trade route from Benghazi to Wada'i had been opened up by the Zuwāyā tribe.[63] This route was the most important culturally and perhaps also commercially of all the desert crossings.[64] And after the transfer of the Sanūsiya

---

[61] Cordell, "Eastern Libya," pp. 21-36. However, a leader of Chemidour, of the Tubu population in Sahara, saw the penetration of the *ṭarīqa* as having nothing to do with commerce, but rather with education. See, Triaud, *La Legende Noire de la Sanūsiyya*, vol. 1, pp. 445-447.

[62] It is known that the Grand Sanūsī was in Fez in 1814 (see, D.S. Margoliouth, "Sanusi," in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, xi, p. 194), that he came under the influence of Aḥmad al-Tijānī and received instruction from him; and that he was probably initiated into the Tijāniyya order, see, Jamil M. Abun Nasr, *The Tijaniyya: A Sufi Order in a Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 50.

[63] The tribe conquered Kufra about 1840. See, Ziadeh, *Sanūsīyah*, p. 58-59. It is also mentioned in this book hat there were four ancient trade routes connecting central Africa and the Mediterranean: the first, the westernmost route, was from Timbuktu to Algeria; the second, from Kano in Nigeria, Ain to Ghadames and Tunis; the third, the easternmost route, from Chad Bornu and Wada'i, through Tibesti mountains and to the coast of Tripoli; and lastly, 'the Garamantean Road', from the Libyan desert, to the Darb el-Arbā'in, Darfur in eastern Sudan to the Nile near Asyut in Egypt. See, Ziadeh, p. 58.

[64] Nachtigal, *Sahara and Sudan*, appendix, p. 398 taken from Boahen, *Britain...Sahara...Sudan*, pp. 109-110.

headquarters from Jaghbūb to Kufra in Central Sudan, the expansion of the order and the growth of trade reached its peak under al-Mahdī.[65]

The *zāwiyas*, leaders and members of the Sanūsiyya again played a significant role in this long-distance trade. *Zāwiyas* were established at the intersection of local, and along the trans-Saharan, trade routes,[66] whereas leaders of the Sanūsiyya controlled commercial affairs; collected tolls from caravans and conducted trade on behalf of the *zāwiyas*.[67] Some even became traders themselves.[68] Among the Sanūsiyya's *ikhwān*, for instance, the Majabra of Jalo and the Zuwāyā of Cyrenaica were the tribes most active in the trade. The Zuwāyā, who lived in Ajdabiya and the central Saharan oases, traded with and taxed merchants using the Saharan route, e.g. the Awjila and Jalo.[69] While competition between the two was fierce, according to Hasanayn Bey, the

---

[65] Cordell, "Eastern Libya," p. 28.

[66] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, pp. 14-16 and Ziadeh, *Sanūsīyah*, p. 113.

[67] Cordell, "Eastern Libya," p. 32.

[68] Duveyrier, *La Confrérie Musulmane*, p. 154.

[69] John Davis, *Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1987), pp. 184-185.

Majabra won the reputation of being the greatest traders of the Libyan desert, while the Zuwāyā gained the greatest influence with the Sanūsī family.[70]

In Wada'i, *zāwiyas* were founded at Jabal Marra and Abeche, and a school established in Nimro, an important trade depot.[71] In Darfur, *zāwiyas* were established at al-Fasher, Bir Ali in Kanem and at Faya, 'Ayn Galakka. The second headquarters of the brotherhood at Jaghbūb (1856-1895) was located where the routes to Egypt, Nubia and Arabia came together.[72] Kufra (1895-1899 and 1902-end of war with the Italians) was at the center of the trans-Saharan route. Qūrū or Qiru in Borku (1899-1902) lay on the main route linking the Benghazi-Wada'i road with the Kanem-Bornu route.[73]

In Kufra, merchandise from the port of Tripoli and the Saharan interior was exchanged – ostrich feathers, ivory, indigo-dyed cloth, hardware, sugar, tea, drugs, perfumes, silk and beads and slaves.[74] Libya's chief trading partners at

---

[70] "While the Majabras are the Great traders of the Libyan desert, the Zwayas have also their claims to prominence. The rivalry between the two tribes is always present under the surface and occasionally it flashes forth into the light. There is some envy of the Zwayas by all the other tribes of Cyrenaica because the man second in importance to Sayed Idris among the Sanussis is Ali Pasha el Abdia, who is a Zwayi." Hassanein Bey, *The Lost Oases* (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1925), p. 98.

[71] Cordell, "Eastern Libya," p. 31.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Cordell, "Eastern Libya," p. 32.

the time were England, the Ottoman Empire, France, Italy, Austria, Tunisia, Germany, Belgium, Egypt, the USA and several other countries. Italy and England were perhaps the most active of all. Having enjoyed prosperity during the Kufra period (1894-1912), the Sanūsiyya's commercial fortunes declined after the French attacked the caravan routes in Chad, and especially after hostilities between Arabs and Italians emerged in Cyrenaica and forced the caravan trade to move elsewhere in the country.

Chapter III

RESPONSES TO COLONIALISM

This chapter deals with the Sanūsiyya's resistance to Italian colonialism, which lasted from 1911, when the Italian military invaded Libya, to 1932, when the Sanūsiyya's resistance was effectively ended. In this chapter I will concentrate less on narrating the history of this resistance, and more on interpreting its character and motivations, taking into consideration all the elements that contributed to the process. To do so, I will focus in turn on the background of resistance; the resistance itself; and the role of Sanūsiyya leaders such as Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf (1873-1933), Sayyid Muḥammad Idrīs (1890-1983), and ʿUmar al-Mukhtār (1862 -1931).

A. Background of the Resistance

The political background of Libya in the colonial era has been sketched in the first chapter. In this section, the discussion turns to the reasons why Italy decided to annex Libya and why the Sanūsiyya saw Italy as a threat that had to be resisted.

The reasons why Italy put into effect the ambitious "Fourth Shore" project, and annexed the country by the end of 1911, were varied. Rome was

driven in these circumstances by political, economic, demographic, geographic, military, historical, ideological and even civilizational factors.[1] For the Italian prime minister Pascoli, Libya was the answer to Italy's demographic crisis, a vast land which, for emigrants, would be "a continuation of their native land," rendered even more familiar by building the necessary infrastructure. "Always seeing our tricolor on high, stirred by the immense throbbing of our sea." [2]

Pascoli also believed that Italy had a territorial right to Libya because of their geographical proximity and because of their shared Roman heritage. "We were there already,"[3] was his view, seeing in Roman imperial history the justification behind reclaiming a piece of Italy's heritage. This feeling of historical destiny had been expressed by Mazzini many decades earlier, in 1838, three years after Tripoli had become a Turkish *vilayet*. "North Africa will return to Italy. It has been ours once, and it must be ours again," [4] said Corradini, and in describing the potential of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica he also stated that these two regions "are all that remains to us as heirs of the empire which Rome

---

[1] For more details on the civilizational goals of the Italians see Paolo de Vecchi, *Italy's Civilizing Mission in Africa* (New York: Brentano, 1912).

[2] Claudio G. Segrè, *Fourth Shore: the Italian Colonization of Libya* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 22.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Charles Lapworth, *Tripoli and Young Italy* (London: Stephen Swift and Co., Ltd., 1912), p. 81.

established on the African coast."[5] Luigi Federzoni, a nationalist, stated even more ominously in an announcement in 1909 that "the new Italian generation, possessing the consciousness of its historic mission, cannot be other than nationalistic and imperialistic." [6]

Seen as *"La terra promessa,"* the promised land, the land of dreams, Libya pointed the way to a better future for Italy. [7] Among the advantages was Libya's water supply, which "extended in an uninterrupted layer from the mountains to the sea." Palm and fig trees, citrus groves and banana plants filled the land "like a full-bodied wine." [8] Strategic ports with links to Africa and the Mediterranean, Tripoli and Benghazi were in a position to transship goods from the main trans-Saharan trade routes to Europe and vice versa. The people were represented as an enormous resource and a potential labor force to support Italy: "The comfortable prosperity of a race of pastoral workers and industrial craftsmen will provide a more reliable element of support, both material and spiritual, to the homeland in the strenuous future that lies before

---

[5] Segrè, *Fourth Shore,* p. 25.

[6] William C. Askew, *Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya 1911-1912* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1942), pp. 25-26.

[7] For more on this project to 1940 from its beginning, see Martin Moore, *Fourth Shore: Italian Mass Colonization of Libya* (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1940), and Segrè,, *Fourth Shore,* which extends the survey to 1958/59.

[8] Sègre, *Fourth Shore,* p. 24.

it." [9] Giuseppe Piazza, an Italian correspondent in Tripoli described them as "kindly, peaceful, friendly."[10] The climate was "very healthful," blessed "with temperatures similar to those in Sicily."[11]

Italy's political, military, economic and cultural interest in Libya was emphasized by Crispi (1887-1896), a dominant figure in Italian politics, who admitted the political and military significance of North Africa and warned that Italy could not allow any power who might some day be her enemy to occupy territory in that region.[12] The Socialist Labriola, in responding to the condemnation voiced by German socialists against Italy said, "There rarely has been a war in which 'capitalism' played so small a part, in which the overwhelming, urgent reason was so purely political."[13] Many Italians believed

---

[9] Lapworth, *Tripoli and Young Italy,* p. 140.

[10] Segrè, *Fourth Shore,* p. 24.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Pagliano, *La Libia,* I, p. 28, in Askew, p.15

[13] Lapworth, *Tripoli and Young Italy,* p. 78. Lapworth also remarked that it was not basically based on any econo-capitalism factor, but rooted in a political aspect :

> "It is true that Libya is not so fruitful and prosperous as of old, and that, so far as we know, there is no fabulous wealth of gold and diamonds to be obtained, which, according to the peculiar logic of some critics, would have given the war a perfectly moral justification. But the fact only serves to strengthen the contention that Italy was urged on by political necessity, and not by greed of get-rich-quick capitalist." Ibid., p. 139.

But in fact Lapworth in fact contradicts here what he stated in the previous paragraph and in many other places of the same work, e.g. p. 164.

That economic interests provided the major incentive for the conquest has been criticized by McClure, "A remarkable feature of much foreign comment upon the

that Germany or some other power might claim Tripoli unless Italy acted; thus, Giolitti (the Italian Premier 1911-1914) declared, "if we had not gone to Libya, some other power would have done so either for political or economic reasons."[14] This of course was a matter of national security and defence,[15] and maintenance of the common interests of Britain and Italy in the Mediterranean. Another factor was national politics: Federzoni wrote to Mussolini in April 1927 a memorandum in which he stated: "the colonization of Libya must be a means more than an end: it must allow us to place a few hundred thousands of our countrymen there who will make a part of Africa's Mediterranean shores Italian in fact as well as in law. A problem of colonial politics in that its solution is the only means to guarantee our definitive possession; and a problem of foreign policy."[16]

The Italian colonization of Libya which actually got underway between 1886 and 1911, and which encountered strong resistance from local powers

---

situation is to be found in the suggestion that the Tripoli enterprise is the result of a sudden, unreasoning land-hunger- a greed for 'colonies' and 'empire'- which has recently beset the Italian nation." See, McClure, p. 3. This statement challenges Lapworth's idea that economy was not the main factor and argues as well that it was not the sudden conquest, "Italy has been charged with undue precipitancy, but if the conquest was her only motive, then her gunboats arrived off the Tripolitan coast much too late; some of her present moral mentors had "got there first." Lapworth, *Tripoli and Young Italy*, p. 159.

[14] Askew, *Europe*, p. 45.

[15] McClure, p. 14 quoted from A. Brunialti, *L'Italia e la Questione Coloniale*, published in 1885.

(particularly the Sanūsiyya), was deeply inspired by ideological and socio-economic motivations.[17]

Meanwhile, Italian nationalists, a small but influential group, exerted pressure of their own. They demanded that a more active foreign policy be pursued, beginning with the annexation of Tripolitania. Their founder, Enrico Corradini, wrote for the *Regno,* a nationalist review, an article published in 1903 which sounded the "first battle cry of the nationalists." A new and militant patriotism was echoed by two other nationalists: Federigo Garlanda in his *La terza Italia* (1903) and Mario Morasso in his *L'imperialismo nel secolo XX.* (1905).[18] In the following years, Corradini kept emphasizing that Italy needed colonies for thousands of immigrants; he voiced his support for an imperialistic policy, and declared that North Africa should be the focus of this imperialistic endeavor. He urged nationalists to force the government to go to Tripoli.[19]

The first congress of the nationalists demanded that the government observe Tripoli or capture it before the much desired Italian occupation could be effected, a demand that was to shape public opinion.[20] Under the leadership

---

[16] Segrè, p. 65.

[17] Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, *The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and Resistance, 1830-1932* (Albany, New York: SUNY, 1994), p. 104.

[18] Askew, *Europe,* pp. 24-25.

[19] Ibid.

of nationalists in the Parliament, public opinion was whipped up to a patriotic enthusiasm and finally, to war with the Turks.

A different view was put forward by the Socialist deputies in the parliament. They insisted that Tripoli had no significant value and that it was one of the poorest countries in the world. Italian workers could not live there, and to attempt its colonization would be to convert Tripoli into a vast Italian burial ground. Leone Caetani, an Italian deputy and a Socialist, denied that the Banco di Roma represented the interests of Italy in the provinces.[21] Meanwhile, Guicciardini, another Socialist and the former foreign minister, warned that Italian interests were suffering while other nations took advantage of the situation.[22] Mussolini expressed himself in the strongest terms when he said: "Every honest Socialist must disapprove of this Libyan adventure. It means only useless and stupid bloodshed."[23] Yet, the Socialists' and the Republicans' opposition to war never really influenced Italian policy.

Clearly, Italy had already begun to profit from its involvement in Libya in economic, social and political terms. The economy of Italy, one of the great powers in Europe at the end the nineteenth century and the beginning of the

---

[20] Askew, *Europe*, p. 26.

[21] Askew, *Europe*, p. 43.

[22] Askew, *Europe*, p. 42.

[23] Askew, *Europe*, p. 59.

twentieth, was one of the fastest growing in the world.[24] Imports had increased 243 per cent over this period, while exports had developed by a margin of 224 per cent. Agriculture and industries too had grown significantly. Yet the rich land of Libya, with its valuable minerals such as phosphate, sulphur, iron, zinc, lead and its other commodities such as sandstone and salt,[25] was still not fully explored. In addition, exports of cattle, sheep, esparto, sponges, olive oil, ostrich feathers, dates, skins, wool, eggs, old silver, butter, matting, henna, etc., transported by caravan trade from the interior of Africa to Tripoli and Benghazi, were reported to be of the value of 9,485,000 lires, while imports amounted to 11,892,000 lire by 1912. England and Italy were leading importers of flour, rice, sugar, cotton goods, tea and olive oil. Given, moreover, the caravan trade and the potential development for the hinterland, Tripoli's value was so remarkable that it was identified as "one of the richest trade centers in the world."[26] G. Rohlfs, an explorer in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, was moved to say, "Later I shall take it upon myself to prove that he who possesses that

---

[24] Askew, *Europe*, p. 23.

[25] The salt supply along the coast of Cyrenaica was said to be enough to salt the whole of Europe, see, Lapworth, *Tripoli and Young Italy*, p. 164.

[26] Lapworth, *Tripoli and Young Italy*, p. 159.

country will be the master of the Sudan.[27] For me, the possession of Tunis has not a tenth part the value of Tripoli."[28]

When Italy began facing problems of social demography, seeing its population increase in fact from 26,801,154 in 1876 to 35,845,048 by 1911, and with emigration rising from approximately 100,000 in 1875 to 651,475 in 1910,[29] its inclination was to turn to Libya. While her right to Tripoli had been acknowledged for many years by England and France, Turkey's mismanagement of Tripoli provided yet another argument for an aggressive colonial policy. "Turkey seemed not only indifferent but averse to improvements of any kind, apparently not wishing to encourage either native or foreign interests, thereby attracting attention to the country."[30]

However, Italy's policy of peaceful penetration adopted in the early part of the twentieth century as an alternative to the armed conquest of Tripoli was never very successful. The Italian contention was that peaceful penetration had

---

[27] Manfredo Camperio, an Italian explorer who traveled in Tripolitania (1879) and Cyrenaica (1881) also expressed himself differently, "whoever possesses these lands will dominate the trade from the Sudan." However, since the intervention of the British and French in the hinterland, the trans-Saharan trade had declined dramatically and shifted to other routes. See, Segre, p. 27.

[28] Lapworth, *Tripoli and Young Italy*, p. 159.

[29] Askew, *Europe*, pp. 23-24.

[30] Charles Wellington Furlong, *The Gateway to Sahara: Observations and Experiences in Tripoli* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), p. 294.

failed and that armed conquest had become necessary because the Turks discriminated against every enterprise. Although the Turks insisted on their willingness to grant Italy a share in the economic life of Tripoli, the Italians demanded a full and privileged position.[31]

Italy began preparations for the occupation of Tripoli in August 1911. An ultimatum was given to Turkey by Italy on September 28, 1911.[32] Turkey was accused of systematic opposition to every Italian interest in Tripoli[33] and was given twenty hours to answer the ultimatum. Turkey's answer was prompt and conciliatory. All hostility to Italian interests since the advent of the Young Turk regime was denied. There was no threat to Italians or other foreigners in Tripoli. Only one transport had been sent, and no soldiers were on board. Turkey asked what guarantees Italy desired and indicated that all demands would be granted if they did not affect the integrity of the provinces.[34] Italy refused to accept the Turkish reply and declared war on Turkey at 2:30 p.m. on

---

[31] Askew, *Europe*, p. 27.

[32] The full text of ultimatum may be found in Sir Thomas Barclay, *The Turco-Italian War and Its Problems* (London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1912), pp. 109-110.

[33] After the Young Turks came to power in Constantinople by 1908, tensions between the Turks and the Italians increased. There was opposition to Italian enterprises, refusals to carry on normal relations with the Italian consul, restrictions on the acquisition of land by Italians in Tripoli, persecution of Italians in Tripoli, etc. See, Askew, pp. 30-31.

[34] Barclay, *The Turco-Italian War*, pp. 111-112.

September 29, 1911. In anticipation of war, Italy had amassed 824,000,000 francs sufficient to finance the war over a year.[35]

B. Responses to Colonialism

1. Responses of the Libyan People

The response of Libyans to the peaceful penetration of their land by Italy generally took one of two forms: there were those who sought to cooperate with the Italians and those who refused to do so. The first group saw "alliances with the colonial state as the safest means to protect their authority and interests."[36] This group resided mainly in cities and coastal areas and its members were for the most part merchants or businessmen.[37]

Unable to maintain their economic and political independence due to the fact that competition among local tribes, on the one hand, and between local powers and foreign powers, on the other, was so intense, local traders felt obliged to ally themselves with colonial interests. In addition, the Italians tried to approach them through many avenues: bribery, positions, protection, etc.

---

[35] Lapworth, *Tripoli and Young Italy*, p. 35.

[36] Ahmida, *The Making*, p. 116.

[37] As in Tripolitania, most of the coastal urban population in Cyrenaica allied itself with Italians. This was due to the fact that they had only weak ties with the hinterland during the nineteenth century. On the other hand, the interior, which remained under the influence of the Sanūsiyya, resisted.

Large merchants, especially those affiliated with the Banco di Roma, for example, Muslim merchants like the Muntasir clan,[38] and Jewish merchants like the Halfuns family, collaborated with Italy in an effort to protect their economic interests. Hassuna Qaramanli, for example, received a subsidy of 4,000 lire a month and after the invasion was appointed Vice-Mayor of Tripoli.[39] These Libyans not only assisted Italian economic and cultural interests in Tripoli City, but also helped the Italian army to exert its control over the city.[40] Arab chiefs were often employed to purchase horses from the tribes at high prices, in an effort to "damage the war-making ability of the hinterland tribes."[41] In an effort aimed at co-opting the Sanūsiyya in particular, Italy used Mohammad Elui Bey, an Egyptian who had more than once rendered services to the Italian government, to establish connections with the

---

[38] By the late summer and fall 1912, the Italians had occupied Misratah, Gharyan and Zwarah, and through the Muntasir family they extended their influence into Sirt and the Fazzan. 'Umar Pasha, patriarch of the family, had been *qaim maqam* of Sirt and his son, Salim held the same position in Misratah. In Gharyan, they held administrative positions. Supported by the Italians, the family regain their prominence from the Turks. See, Lisa Anderson, *State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 189-190.

[39] The Banco di Roma often sold products for less than had been paid for them. This fact obviously led Hassuna to support the Italians. See, Askew, p. 28. This was one of the attempts, through bribery, to get supports from the indigenous population, a fact that alarmed al-Baruni and Aḥmad al-Sharīf. See, Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformation*, p. 292.

[40] Ahmida, *The Making*, pp. 108-109.

[41] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformation*, p. 211.

the Islamic University of Cairo.[42] 'Alī ibn 'Abd al-Raḥīm was also reported to have reached a compromise with Italian authorities through the Banco di Roma.[43]

Those belonging to the second group, on the other hand, were for the most part from rural areas, especially the tribes of the interior. These rejected collaboration with Italian penetration, wishing instead to maintain their economic and political independence. In fact, there were three different groups involved in resisting Italian penetration: the Sanūsiyya order, the Tripolitanian republic, and the tribal confederations. The Sanūsiyya sought to maintain control over Cyrenaica and the hinterland, the Tripolitanians over their own territory, and the interior tribes, like those of Gibla and Syrtica, the Awlād Sulaymān, the Tuaregs, and most of the Arabs of Wada'i al-Shatti, over the regions in which they were settled.

2. The Sanūsiyya's Responses

Generally, the attitude of the Sanūsiyya towards foreign penetration was manifested in three ways: avoidance, cooperation and resistance. There was no

---

[41] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformation*, p. 211.

[42] Askew, *Europe*, p. 42.

[43] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformation*, p. 293.

strict chronology to these three responses, although the first response was more common in the early period of the Sanūsiyya's existence when they felt the pressure of western and Turkish forces in their vicinity. Returning from the Ḥijāz in 1840, al-Sanūsī decided to enter Mustaghānim, Algeria, his own homeland, but he was not allowed to do so by the French, who feared that he would join forces with the Amīr 'Abd al-Qadīr in Algeria's resistance.[44] Perhaps this incident led al-Sanūsi to establish a distance between himself and "the enemy," although what he meant by "the enemy" was still undefined. Sanūsī's expression for this was, "seven walls between us and the enemy of Allah." [45] On another occasion he said, "every Muslim must be ready for the confrontation."[46] Taken together, the two statements imply that the order was to prepare in isolation for "necessary actions" if the situation required it.

Another example of the strategy of maintaining a distance was the establishment of the first Sanūsī *zāwiya*, al-Baydā', on the high land between Derna and Benghazi, where it was "easily defended and difficult to access." [47] Located several hundred miles from Tripoli, it maintained a considerable

---

[44] B.G. Martin, *Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth Century Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 105.

[45] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformation*, p. 221.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Martin, *Muslim Brotherhoods*, p. 106.

distance from Ottoman policy-makers who might have otherwise taken notice of the brotherhood. The order also moved its *zāwiya* from Kanem, where it had won great influence among the Awlād Sulaymān tribe between 1895 and 1899; this transfer was followed by the Sanūsiyya's withdrawal from Borku and Tibesti. In the year 1895, al-Mahdī removed his seat from Jaghbūb to Kufra, again in order to preserve the order from Turkish intervention.[48] Strict policies with regard to foreign explorers were applied "to preserve their independence and resist penetration by colonial influences,"[49] since explorers sometimes misunderstood the order to be a fanatical sect, as evidenced by Furlong's statement: "The Senusi were the most powerful and fanatical sect in Islam." [50]

It was the French threat from Chad and beyond, made more serious by the capture of the Sanūsiyya's caravan routes leading from Baghirmi, Niger, Kanem and Wada'i towards Libya, that finally convinced the Sanūsiyya to put their differences with the Turks aside and join forces against the French. After having refused for years to accept Turkish representatives in Kufra, in 1908 the

---

[48] E.A.V. de Candole, *The Life and Times of King Idris of Libya* (London: Mohamed ben Ghalbon, 1990), p. 10.

[49] Candole, *The Life and Times*, p. 11.

[50] Certainly apt to describe the brotherhood under the second leader, al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī. See, Furlong, *The Gateway*, p. 93.

Sanūsiyya welcomed them in the interest of gaining their protection.[51] However, Turkey could only provide a token force to protect such distant boundaries and Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf was forced to turn to Lord Kitchener, the British agent and consul general in Egypt 1911-1914, since the French had already taken Bornu and Tibesti, including Quru and Wajanga, and had nearly reached Kufra. The British intervened to stop the French at Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf's request, and finally the French withdrew to Tekro, on the Libya-Chad border, in 1910. According to Candole, author of a biography of Sayyid Muḥammad Idrīs, the fourth Chief of the Order and later King of Libya, these were actually the first contacts between Britain and the Sanūsiyya (contrary to claims that these only occured up to the 1940s when Sayyid Muḥammad Idrīs went into exile in Egypt).

The policy of resistance may be traced back to the leadership of the second Chief of the Order, al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī, and to the year in 1902, when the Sanūsiyya were defeated by the French and forced to leave *zāwiya* Bi'r 'Alali in Kanem. On the death of Sayyid al-Mahdī six months later, his position devolved upon Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf. The latter was in Kufra in 1911 when Italy declared war on Turkey, and he decided to hold a meeting, attended by

---

[51] Candole, *The Life and Times*, pp. 16-17.

members of his council and by many important *ikhwān* and adherents.[52] Some of them seemed hesitant to begin a new war given that they had just finished fighting one against the French and were now facing the Italians, who had already defeated Turkey. They felt that their chances of winning were small, and that the Italians could cut off any aid that might be forthcoming from other Islamic nations.[53] But Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf spoke to them forcefully, and tried to banish their thoughts of defeat by reading Qur'ānic verses concerning *jihād* to them. He emphasized that *jihād* was a duty that had to be carried out regardless of the difficulties or the power of the *kuffār*.[54] Finally, as Horeir tells us, he announced, "I swear to Almighty Allāh that I will fight them, even if I must do it alone armed only with my staff." The meeting adjourned, after having declared a *jihād* on January 23, 1912; from that point onwards Sayyid Aḥmad began leading the Sanūsiyya's resistance movement.

C. The Sanūsiya Resistance: Roles of the Leading Sanūsiyya Leaders

During the Sanūsiyya resistance, both Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf and 'Umar al-Mukhtār served as commanders in the field, while Sayyid Idrīs acted as the

---

[52] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformation*, p. 224.

[53] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformation*, pp. 224-225.

[54] Ibid.

chief negotiator. Furthermore, the emergence of ʿUmar al-Mukhtār after Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf proved the close and powerful social ties between the Sufi order and the tribes. Idrīs, on the other hand, maintained the view that only through negotiation could Libyans reach independence.

1. The Role of Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf (1873-1933)

Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf, the son of Sayyid Muḥammad Sharīf and the grandson of al-Sanūsī, was the third leader of the Sanūsiyya. According to Evans-Pritchard, he was "a man of medium height, stout, for an Arab on the dark side, with a firm and determined face adorned with a small moustache, close-cut whiskers on the upper jaw, and close-cut beard." [55] He was then in his forties. Moreover, he was headstrong, unpredictable in his judgements and impulsive in his actions. He was besides proud, quarrelsome, and fanatical. But he was a good Muslim and a defiant and loyal man, persistent in his beliefs, obstinate in upholding his principles and solemn when defeated.[56]

Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf's leadership of the order extended over three distinct periods: from 1902 to 1912, when he was confronting the French in the Sahara; from 1912 to 1918, when he and his Bedouin followers were

---

[55] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 132, quoted from Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division, 26 May 1915.

[56] Ibid.

resisting the Italians and the British in Cyrenaica; and from 1918, when he left the country to go into exile, to 1933, when he died at Medina.[57]

In the first period, he collaborated with the Turkish and the British in order to protect Kufra from French aggression. In the second period, however, Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf found himself opposed to both the British and the Italians. The British he attacked at the instructions of the Ottoman Sultan and the latter's German allies. His appointment by the Sultan as the Governor of Tripolitania in July 1915 made it difficult for him to refuse. But he may have been misled on several points. For one thing he was told that he would be supported by the Awlād 'Alī tribe, that the Central Powers could win the war then raging in Europe, and that the war with the British would be on a small scale.[58]

Yielding to Ottoman persuasion the Sayyid asked his followers in Cyrenaica, Chad, and the western Egyptian desert to resist the British, in spite of his reluctance.[59] He was deeply aware this decision would cut off most of his

---

[57] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 27.

[58] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 127.

[59] His reluctance was also reflected in two interviews on the frontier with Bimbashi Royle of the Frontiers Administration in November 1914. In these interviews, he had stated that the concentration was "not aimed at disturbing the frontier but solely directed against the Italians." Evans-Pritchard, p.125. He sometimes regretted his half-heartedness later in life, as he said, "Sometimes it occurs to me that I was wrong to heed the call from Istanbul, seventeen years ago...Was not that perhaps the beginning of death not only for Umar but for all the Sanusi? But, how could I have done otherwise

supplies which were obtained across the Egyptian frontier. Nevertheless, Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf finally attacked the British in late 1915. Although, the Sanūsiyya had initial success in the desert war, they were eventually defeated by the British whose forces were far superior in number, i.e., 60,000 troops as compared to the Sanūsiyya's 20,000. They were forced to leave Egypt and were "left nearly starved in Syrtica"[60] Furthermore, they were prohibited from entering Cyrenaica. Finding himself in a difficult situation, the Sayyid left Libya to go into exile. From 1918 to 1923, he lived in Istanbul. When Attaturk came in power, however, and declared Turkey a secular republic, Sayyid Aḥmad felt it was no longer the right place for him. He then left for Arabia, where he lived until his death in 1933. However, even during his exile between 1924 and 1933, Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf still kept in contact with his followers. He would write letters to the latter, offering them his support, his prayers and his willingness to return to Cyrenaica to lead the *jihād*.[61]

---

when the Caliph of Islam asked me for help? Was I right or was I foolish? But who, except, can say whether a man is right or foolish if he follows the call of his conscience?" See, Muhammad Asad, *The Road to Mecca* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 366.

[60] Ahmida, *The Making*, p. 122.

[61] "Be diligent in your sacred jihad and steadfast in confronting the treacherous enemy of Allah, for the enemy wants only to destroy you. Yet, he by the might and power of Allah will certainly depart from Tripoli. Do not become weak, lose hope or dispair, for relief is at hand. I am surely coming to you. My stay in the Hijaz is exclusively in your interest and the interest of your country. I pledge to you by the mighty and power of Allah, that I will shortly be amongst you, and that my being with you will be a source of joy and happiness for me..." See, Horeir, Social and *Economic Transformation*, p.

Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf's supporters in Libya, i.e., al-Khaṭṭābī, Hāshim al-Zuwalī, Muḥammad 'Abid and Ḥilāl.[62] Muḥammad al-'Abid served in southern Cyrenaica in Kufra, where he based his command at Fezzan. He was also involved in the events in Tripolitania and organized supply caravans to the north. His brothers were active in the north: Ḥilāl operated mainly in western Cyrenaica, while Ṣāfī al-Dīn and 'Alī al-Khaṭṭābī were responsible for the north and the east of that region. According to Horeir, Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf's influence extended not only to Cyrenaica, but also reached Tripolitania and Fezzan through the network of the *zāwiyas*.[63] He turned these institutions into military camps, organizing his people from one *zāwiya* to another and encouraging tribesmen to uphold *jihād* principles. His rally started in Derna and Bayda, then moved to the camp of Bara'sa. Before visiting the *zāwiya* of Msus,[64]

---

293. "Perhaps someone may say that Ahmad (al-Sharif al-Sanusi) seeks relaxation in the Hijaz and that he left the country and its people; by Almighty Allah, I will have no rest until I come to you. If I am physically far from you, yet I am with you in mind and action. Do not believe that this sacred struggle is merely as it appears to be; rather in it there are hidden secrets which you will see with your own eyes, Allah willing. May Allah, may He be praised and exalted, unite me with you soon by the glory of the beloved prophet, for Allah hears and answers..." Ibid.

[62] Zawi, *'Umar al-Mukhtār*, pp.38-39. Sayyid 'Alī al-Khaṭṭāb (1888-1918), Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥilāl (1893-1929) and Sayyid Muḥammad 'Abīd (1881-1939) were all the brothers of Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf.

[63] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformation*, pp. 241-242.

[64] Primarily composed of 'Awāqir tribesmen, the *zāwiya* of Msus was then established as a temporary headquarters with a council consisted of *'ulamā'* and *zāwiya* heads. The headquarters was a place where the council received reports from and

he went to the camp of Karu'ba, which was headed by two *wakīls*, 'Umar al-Mukhtār and 'Umran al-Sukuri. He continued his mission to the Sulaymān tribe and established a camp at al-Shulyzima, whence he led a successful attack on the Italian forces.

Knowing that the tribes had been integrated by Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf, Italy tried to sow discord by giving gifts to merchants and by promising to recognize and increase the *shaykhs'* tribal authority. The efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, however, and even convinced other tribes to unite, such as the Hasa and 'Ubaydat tribes which for example formed a guerrilla band in 1913.

In recognition of his influence, Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf was proposed as national leader by Cyrenaican *shaykhs*, primarily the Jabarinah, 'Awāqīr and Maghāribah, who sent a letter dated 1337 A.H. to the deputies of Sayyid Aḥmad in Tripoli and to numerous tribal chiefs making their wishes for national unity known.[65]

---

suggested solutions to *zāwiya* heads who could not solve their local problems. The council then sent a decision to the *zāwiya* head after being consulted to other members of the council or even Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf. See, Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformation*, p. 242.

[65] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformation*, p. 245.

2. The Role of Sayyid Muḥammad Idrīs (1890-1983)

Sayyid Muḥammad Idrīs, the son of Sayyid Muḥammad Mahdī, was born on 12 March 1890 in Jaghbub.[66] He was brought up like other members of the Sanūsī family, in an atmosphere of piety and simplicity. His strong attachment to his people led him to help mobilize the order in its resistance against Italy. For instance, he helped Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf to organize the movement at Ajdabiya after the Treaty of Lausanne in the early period of their war with Italy.[67] However, unlike his uncle who was a talented commander in the field, Sayyid Idrīs's talents ran more toward diplomacy. Muḥammad al-Zuwayy, for instance describes him as "a good man, but no warrior. He lives with his books, and the sword does not sit well in his hand." [68] Italian writers, who are, with some justification, scathing in their comments on most members of the Sanūsiyya family, speak of Sayyid Idrīs with respect. "They admit that he was intelligent, religious, and gifted with a profound moral sense and political intuition. He is firm in decisions once he has taken them and keeps his promises."[69] The British authority acknowledged Sayyid Idrīs as a political

---

[66] Muḥammad Fuād Shukrī, *Al-Sanūsiya: Dīn wa Dawla* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabi, 1948), p.183.

[67] Evans-Prichard, *The Sanusi*, p. 155.

[68] Asad, *The Road to Mecca*, p. 341.

[69] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, pp. 155-156.

leader who could act for the whole of his people in Cyrenaica. His position was of particular significance since the tribesmen would only move as a political unit under a Sanūsiyya leader. Sayyid Idrīs preferred peace to war and so he opposed Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf's proposal to attack the British in Egypt. Sayyid Idrīs believed that it would lead to a disaster for the order and he was proven right. When he realized how few troops he had left, Sayyid Idrīs was thereupon forced to make peace with the British and Italians in Libya. During the period 1911-1932, he negotiated the agreements of Zuwaytina (1916) and Akrama (1917), the Treaty of Rajma (1920) and the Pact of Bū Maryam (1921), respectively. These peace agreements were basically "the product of a situation particularly delicate for both," i.e., the Italians and the Sanūsiyya, because both were exhausted by the ordeal.[70]

The accord of Zuwaytina between the Sanūsiya, the British and Italy in 1916, had bought no real agreement since the Sanūsiyya and Italy were still suspicious of each other. Moreover, the Italians, who made more demands than the British, were insisting upon the hand-over of Italian prisoners and the disarming of the Sanūsiyya camps. The failure of the Zuwaytina negotiations was described by Sayyid Idrīs himself as follows:

---

[70] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 145.

> The main difficulty in reaching agreement was a British undertaking, previously made in Rome, not to come to terms with the Senussi without the concurrence of the Italians. Our main demand was for the ports of Sallum, Benghazi and Derna to be opened for trade without which we faced starvation. In return, we were prepared to hand over the Italian prisoners in our hands and expel Turkish officers in Cyrenaica. I found no difficulty in reaching agreement with the British: Colonel Calbot, who had served in the Sudan, was a very understanding man. Brigatani was much more difficult and insisted upon referring everything to the Italian government who refused to approve the agreement despite the fact it had been reached locally. In view of this, it was impossible for us to continue the negotiations and they were broken off in early October 1916. The British and Italian representatives returned whence they had come.[71]

Sayyid Idrīs opened another series negotiations with the British and the Italians in Akrama by January 1917. The British stipulated that all allied and Egyptian prisoners should be handed over and that no armed Sanūsiyya would remain on Egyptian territory or on the frontier. In return, the Sallum trade route was to be opened for food shipments from Egypt to Cyrenaica, though only on the condition that nothing should fall into German or Turkish hands. The property of Sayyid Idrīs in Egypt was to be inspected and the Jaghbub oasis was to be administered by Sayyid Idrīs.[72] Meanwhile, the Italians should give recognition to Sayyid Idrīs' political authority over the Tobruk hinterland, as well as freedom of trade for the Sanūsī tribes with Benghazi, Derna and

---

[71] E.A.V. de Candole, *The Life and Times of King Idris of Libya* (London: Mohamed ben Galbon, 1990), pp. 32-33.

[72] De Candole, *The Life and Times*, p. 34.

Tobruk. The *zāwiyas* in Italian territory would be restored to the Sanūsiyya but Sayyid Idrīs had first to disarm his people.[73]

In 1919, the provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were separated and made self-governing. Nevertheless, when Ramaḍān Suwayhilī tried to assert his authority over the former, the Italians insisted that no Libyan was able to lead the province. By the end of 1920, however, Tripolitanians had rejected the idea of Italian sovereignty, and three representatives in Italy's parliament won the support of opposition parties for official recognition of a fully independent Muslim state in Tripolitania.[74]

The acknowledgement of Sayyid Idrīs as the *amīr* of the autonomous administration of Jaghbub, Aujila, Jalu and Kufra was part of the Treaty of Rajma signed in November 1920 with Italy. He was also allowed to have his own flag, establish his own army and received a monthly allowance for himself and his family. However, he had to silence any political and military activity by his people.[75] Later, the Pact of Bū Maryam –an agreement to disband the Sanūsiyya camps in al-Abyar, Taknis, Slanta, Akrama and Makhili as a first step to disarming Cyrenaican tribesmen—was reached; this however did not work

---

[73] Ibid.

[74] Wright, *Libya: A Modern History*, 40.

[75] Candole, *The Life and Times*, p. 39.

out, since the tribesmen refused to give up their arms and surrender to Italian troops. Meanwhile, Sayyid Idrīs was faced with a dilemma when Tripolitanian notables proposed him as a potential *amīr* of Tripolitania even as he was trying to keep to his agreement with the Italians. Considering himself in a difficult position, Sayyid Idrīs left the country for Egypt. He said,

> At a conference of Tripolitanian notables at Gharian in November 1921, it was decided to form a Tripolitanian amirate and offer the *bay'at* (Oath of Allegiance) to me. They asked me to send representatives to Sirte to discuss the matter. I sent my cousin Safi al-Din to meet them, at the same time informing the Governor of Benghazi. The Tripolitanians repeated their offer for me to become their Amir. This put me in an extremely difficult position since while sympathising with the Tripolitanians's desire to have an Arab at their head, I did not wish to compromise my relations with the Italians. I therefore refused to give a decision but asked the Italian government for permission to mediate between them and the Tripolitanians. This request was forcefully turned down. The Italian government forbade me to take any part in Tripolitanian affairs as they regarded Cyrenaica and Tripolitania as two separate countries.[76]

One of the reasons that he gave for leaving was his unhappiness and disappointment with the Italian government's lack of faith regarding most of their agreements, the Treaty of Rajma which never worked satisfactorily, being one example. He was also concerned about the advances of the Fascists in Libya and was unwilling to be arrested under such a regime. Finally, he felt himself unqualified to lead the resistance in the field.[77]

---

[76] De Candole, *The Life and Times,* pp. 41-42.

3. The Role of 'Umar al-Mukhtār

'Umar was born in 1862 in Batnān, Barqa to a family of the Minifa tribe.[78] His father sent him at about the age of 16 to a Sanūsiyya *zāwiya* at Jaghbūb, to learn about Qur'ān.[79] The Sanūsiyya leader at that time, Sayyid al-Mahdī as-Sanūsī, then appointed him head of *zāwiya* al-Qasūr among the 'Abīd tribe in Jabal al-Akhḍār for two terms.[80] He was then shifted to *zāwiya* 'Ayn Kalak in Sudan until his return in 1903 to *zāwiya* al-Qasūr in Barqa. However, he was visiting the Sanūsiyya's *zāwiya* in Kufra when the Italians first attacked Libya in 1911. On returning from Kufra, he learned of the seizure of the town of Banū Ghāzī and he joined a *mujāhidūn* camp in the area. He formed a group of these *mujāhidūn* and prepared to launch an attack against the Italians, some of them moving to Rajma, and others to Banilanah, which is around 20 km. from Banū Ghāzī. They were on the point of attacking the Italians when Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf, the spiritual and military leader of the Sanūsiyya, appeared in Derna in

---

[77] Ibid., p. 44.

[78] Ṭahir al-Zāwī. *'Umar al-Mukhtār: al-ḥalqah al-akhīrah min al-jihād al-waṭanī fī Lībyā* (Tripoli, Libya : Muassasah al-Farjani, 1970), p. 38.

[79] Zāwī, *'Umar al-Mukhtār*, pp. 34-35.

[80] The 'Abid tribe were called "the lions" because to others they seemed difficult to control. 'Umar tamed their wildness by teaching them to use their minds to solve problems. He also taught them rules of behavior *(akhlāq)* towards others. This enabled them to work together with the Bara'asa tribe in supporting him as Sanūsiyya guerillas. See, Zāwī, *'Umar al-Mukhtār*, pp. 35-36.

May 1913, and took over the leadership of this operation.[81] However after his departure into exile, Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf appointed 'Umar al-Mukhtār as military leader of the order,[82] and 'Umar held the position continuously until his death, when his successor, Sayyid Muḥammad Idrīs, took over.

'Umar's strategy at that time, both as commander of the 'Abid band and as commander-in-chief of all the fighting forces on the plateau, was to hold its southern slopes with his guerrilla bands. From 1924 to 1931 the guerillas effectively used hit- and - run tactics against their enemy. Their success was due to their knowledge of the Italian army's movements and the geography of the valleys, caves, and trails in the Jabal al-Akhḍar. In 1931 alone, the guerillas carried out 250 attacks and ambushes against the Italian army.[83] The guerilla bands consisted of different tribes in Cyrenaica, and received volunteers from Tripolitania and Sudan.[84] Some of the bands included the 'Awāqīr, Magharba,

---

[81] Zāwī, *'Umar al-Mukhtār*, p. 37-38.

[82] The letter of appointment was signed by Aḥmad al-Sharīf al-Sanūsī, dated Shawwal 15, 1342 A.H.. (see Horeir, p. 294). "...to whom it may concern of our Mujahidin brothers of the Bara'sah, 'Awaqir, 'Abaydat, Darsa, Ḥasa, 'Abid Murabitun and to all our brothers and the *shaykhs* of *zāwiyas*, the people of Barqah and al-Jabal al-Akhdar. We have delegated the pious and blessed *shaykh* 'Umar al-Mukhtār as a representative of us, the Sanūsis and appoint him a general deputy to administer the *Jihād* affairs, and also for the defense of our mighty nation against the deceitful enemy..."

[83] Ahmida, *The Making*, p. 138.

[84] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 169.

Hasa and 'Abaydat, Bara'asa and Darsa, 'Abid and 'Arafa respectively. Each band had its Sanūsī flag and organized itself along simple lines of command. 'Umar maintained the resistance with strong discipline. For their safety, he sent the women and children to Egypt during the war, but allowed them to stay with the warriors in times of peace.[85]

Meanwhile, 'Umar had his foot and horse groups of *ikhwān*, supported by the tribes which paid them tithes to defray the expenses of battle. The collection of this fee was only one of his general administrative duties for all the bands which came directly under him. They maintained communications and worked out to a common strategy. 'Umar had also managed to arrange for caravans to convey supplies from Egypt, and to control their distribution to the armed forces and maintained also his correspondence with Sayyid Idrīs and Sanūsiyya elements and sympathizers in Egypt.[86]

The soldiers under 'Umar al-Mukhtār's command numbered about 1,500 in total – all of them armed but only some of them on horseback. With their old weapons they had to face Italy's modern military force equipped with

---

[85]Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 170.

[86] Ibid.

armored cars, aircraft, radio and trucks.[87] However, information about Italian troop movements and plans was easily passed on to guerilla bands, for 'Umar al-Mukhtār had agents in every Italian post.[88] The guerilla tactics basically suited the resistance and kept the Italians in a defensive position. It was especially difficult for them to follow the pattern of the resistance, as Teruzzi, a Governor in Cyrenaica said at that time,

> Thus, against 200, 500, 1,000, 2,000 rebels, dressed in picturesque rags and badly armed, often 5,000 or 10,000 of our soldiers are not sufficient, because the rebels are not tied down to anything, are not bound to any impediment, have nothing to defend or to protect and can show themselves today in one place, tomorrow 50 km. away, and the following day 100 km. away, to reappear a week later, to vanish for a month, to disperse to fire from afar on an unarmed shepherd, on a patrol of inspections, or on a column which files along the edge of a wood, or the foot of a hill.[89]

Graziani, the next military Governor of Cyrenaica also reported there were two governments in Cyrenaica. On the one hand, Italians were "the Government of the Day" and the Sanūsiyya, "the Government of the Night."[90] Their

---

[87] Giorgio Rochat, "the Repression of resistance in Cyrenaica (1927-1931)," in Enzo Santarelli et al., *Omar al-Mukhtar: the Italian Reconquest of Libya*, trans. John Gilbert (London: Darf Publisher, 1986), p. 44.

[88] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 163. These agents were the *sottomessi*, Libyans who surrendered to the Italian government. They provided information, soldiers and cattle, see Santarelli, p. 46. General Mezzetti, the principal commander of operations in Tripolitania after Graziani, warned the Italian government about this "Senusiya and the connivance of those who have submitted," as "the principal source and strength of the rebellion." Therefore he suggested that Italy's military operations should be accompanied by "an energetic, intelligent political programme" in order to eliminate them. Ibid.

[89] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 172.

[90] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 173.

superiority during that time was primarily due to their knowledge of the terrain and the fact that Italy's military governors were handicapped by their short-term appointments. Thus during the decade 1923 to 1933 there were five such governors, resulting in an ineffective response to the resistance effort.[91]

The Sanūsiyya were also faced with problems in that a division had appeared in their ranks between those who favored negotiations and those who insisted on the military struggle. ʿUmar's forces consequently decreased in number and began to suffer defeat more frequently. Italy was also taking harsher measures to bring the Sanūsiyya resistance to an end. Italian troops killed anyone they found belonging to the movement, seized their cattle and destroyed farms and houses, leaving ʿUmar and his forces without food or shelter. Barbed wire fences were also laid along the frontier to limit their movement. The latter worked well since it hampered Sanūsiyya communications, logistics and aid especially from Egypt. Some experienced guerilla leaders had already been killed, and the number of fighters decreased significantly. ʿUmar nevertheless continued the struggle, until he was wounded and captured on September 11, 1931. On September 16, he was hanged, becoming a *shahīd* for his nation and religion,[92] before thousands of witnesses

---

[91] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 179.

[92] In the trial conducted by General Graziani on 12 September 1931, when ʿUmar was asked why he fought the Italians ʿUmar answered, "for my homeland and religion."

among the people of Cyrenaica. The execution of 'Umar effectively ended the resistance movement. There were still around 700 fighters left, divided into three groups led by the lieutenants of 'Umar. Those three leaders experienced different fates: 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-'Abbar succeeded in breaking through the wire into Egypt; 'Usmān Shamī subsequently surrendered himself; and Yūsuf Bū Rahil was killed in an engagement in Marmarica.[93]

§¤§¤§¤§¤§¤§¤§

"The Italian policy-makers expected to occupy Libya with limited military operations, thinking that the natives hated 'Ottoman tyranny and backwardness.' Instead, they faced one of the longest and most militant anti-colonial movements in the history of Africa in that period."[94]Ahmida's

---

Graziani then asked, "Did you really think you could win this war?" 'Umar replied: "War is a duty for us and victory comes from God." See, Zāwī, *'Umar al-Mukhtār*, pp. 11 and 49. When Graziani asked him what if Italian government freed him and if he would promised to spend the rest of his live in peace, 'Umar answered, "I shall not cease to fight against thee and thy people until either you leave my country or I leave my life. And I swear to thee by Him who knows what is in men's hearts that if my hands were not bound this very moment, I would fight thee with my bare hands, old and broken as I am..." See, Asad, *The Road to Mecca*, p. 343.

[93] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 190.

[94] Ahmida, *The Making*, p.117.

statement leads us to ask what factors gave the Sanūsiyya the strength to defend their country, then what caused the resistance to decline.

It is obvious that the notion of *jihād* in defending their religion and their country was the driving force behind the resistance. Religious zeal also played a part in motivating their opponents as well. Italy for instance often used Christian Eritrean troops against the order.[95] According to Sayyid Idrīs, this was done in order to create a religious war, indeed it was confirmed somewhat by the Danish explorer, Holmboe, who saw the soldiers with a cross sewn on the breast of their uniforms.[96] Graziani confirmed this sentiment in his speech addressed to the Eritrean troops,

> My brave troops from Eritrea, you who have followed me through the campaigns in Tripoli against Murzuk and Fezzan, you who with me are fighting in order that the Italian eagle shall spread its wings anew over the old Roman Libya, accept the thanks of your General for what you have done. New battles lie before you, but I know that you will be victorious together with us Italians, who profess the same religion as you. Let us cry *'Evviva'* for Italy and her colony of Eritrea. [97]

In addition, the resistance was directly supported and guided by the Sanūsī family, especially Sayyid al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī, who built the Sanūsiyya into the most powerful Sufi organization of its time, and Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf who

---

[95] And they were still used by the Italians in their operations in 1928, constituted the biggest part (five battalions), compared to four Italian battalions, and two Libyan battalions. See, Santarelli, *Omar al-Mukhtar*, p. 41.

[96] Knud Holmboe, *Desert Encounter: An Adventurous Journey through Italian Africa*, trans. Helga Holbek (London: George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1936), p. 276.

[97] Holmboe, *Desert Encounter*, p. 191.

led the tribesmen against French in Chad in 1899-1913 and the British in 1915-1916 in Egypt, respectively. Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf, also maintained his position as the order's spiritual leader during the resistance by sending his messages from his exile in the Ḥijāz.

The resistance also benefited from the previous attempts of the Sanūsiyya to the educate people of the hinterland and organize them socially and economically under a system of religious values. One of the results was that different tribes were integrated, putting an end to the rapaciousness which had caused tribal disputes for years. In its place there was a network of *zāwiyas*, where *shaykhs, ikhwān* or adherents worked together for the resistance. Therefore we find several resistance leaders who were also Bedouin *shaykhs*, like Ṣālih Lataiwish, 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-'Abbār, Saifat and Muḥammad Bū Farwa, Ḥusayn al-Juwaifi, Brahim al-Fallāh, Fāḍil al-Mahashash, and Qtait Bū Mūsā. Among the Sanūsiyya *ikhwān* who constituted most of the leading figures in the resistance were 'Umar al-Mukhtār, Yūsif Bū Rahīl, Khālid al-Humrī, Sharīf al-Mailud, 'Abd al-Qadir Farkash, Fāḍil Bū 'Umar, Ṣāliḥ al-'Awwāmī and Muḥammad Bū Najwā al-Masmārī.[98] They were not only involved in the

---

[98] Evans-Pritchard gives an idea of their deployment during the war: "Ṣālih Lataiwish with his Magharba tribesmen were in Ajadabiya; Abū al-Qāsim al-Zintanī with an 'Awaqir band threatened the Italian bases at al-Abyar, al-Rajma and Banina; 'Umar with the 'Abid tribal band contained the posts in the Marj sector, and a detachment

military, but they also contributed tithes to meet the expenses of war under 'Umar's administration.

To a certain degree, especially in its early phase, the resistance also benefited from the idea of Mahdism--not that of the Sudanese Mahdi, Muḥammad Aḥmad,[99] but the version elaborated by the Sanūsiyya's Sayyid Muḥammad Maḥdi al-Sanūsī (1844-1902). For Muslims, the Mahdī, or Hidden Imām, has long been expected to appear to spread justice in a world dominated by evil and oppression. Mahdism in the Sanūsiyya was proposed by Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf, who knew his people could be easily integrated through this idea, although Sayyid Mahdī al-Sanūsī did not agree entirely with this idea. For his people, al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī had the advantage of a great personality and the great tradition founded by his father, which befitted the figure of a Mahdī. Ziadeh describes him as follows: [100]

---

under his lieutenant 'Alī Bū Rahayyim operated against communications between al-Marj and Talmaitha; Ḥusain Juwaifi's Bara'asa band worried the garrisons at *ẓāwiya* al-Bayḍā, al-Fayidiya and Slanta; and Qtait Bū Mūsā with his Hasa and 'Abaidat volunteers was camped opposite Khawalan." See, Evans-Pritchard, The *Sanusi*, p. 168.

[99] The Sudanese Mahdi in his letters to al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī urged him to support his cause, either by waging the *jihād* from his own region in the direction of Egypt, or by himself making the *hijra*, but the letter was never answered. See, P.M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898: A Study of Its Origins, Development and Overthrow*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p.113. See also, Haim Shaked, *The Life of the Sudanese Mahdi* (New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Books, 1978).

[100] Ziadeh, *Sanūsīyah*, p. 52.

> His name, some other physical signs, like the mole on his face, the fact that his father's name was Muḥammad and his mother's name was Fāṭimah, and that he would attain his majority in 1300 A.H.—all these convinced the masses that he was the expected Mahdī. Sayyid al-Mahdī himself, far from entertaining any such ideas, often denied them categorically and emphatically, but crowds do not always accept logical matters. They prefer their own convictions.

For the Bedouin, Sayyid al-Mahdī is still alive and it is often said that he rides a white horse, surrounded by white gazelles and antelopes. Wandering unseen through the desert, he suddenly appears among his adherents at certain times, sometimes in two places at once. Falls reports that in May 1906, it was officially announced that al-Mahdī had returned from a secret journey to the oasis of Kufra.[101]

Sanūsiyya resistance ultimately depended on one strong leader, so that when he left the scene, people were less encouraged to continue the struggle. This may be seen after Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf's exile in 1916, when the resistance inevitably declined. 'Umar al-Mukhtār, Yusif Bu Rahil and 'Alī Hamid 'Ubaydī were moved thereby to send a letter to Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf on Rajab 15, 1342 A.H., reporting that his absence from the country had demoralized the people's unity.[102] Then after 'Umar's appointment as representative general of the resistance by Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf, people were

---

[101] J.C. Ewald Falls, *Three Years in the Libyan Desert*, trans. Elizabeth Lee (London: Darf Publishers Ltd., 1985, first published in 1913), pp. 308-310. p. 310.

[102] Horeir, *Social and Economic Transformation*, p. 294.

reinvigorated until his capture and execution, the events which really ended the resistance.

An added difficulty was the fact that the Sanūsī family, the reference point for the *ikhwān*, was itself divided into two camps: those who resisted and those who compromised with the Italians. The reason for the division was the nature of their personalities: for instance Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf was described as "a proud and headstrong man,"[103] "extravagant and aggressive, who preferred direct involvement, activism, splendor and direct negotiations with local and foreign representatives"[104] whereas his successor, Sayyid Idrīs, was an introverted and solitary man, who avoided close contact with strangers and fond it difficult to make decisions.[105] The first insisted on opposing Italy, whereas the second tried to solve the crisis through a political approach after witnessing the Sanūsiyya's defeat in Egypt. This defeat in 1916 weakened the intents of the resistance movement considerably.

Prior to the Italian invasion, the Sanūsiyya were a prosperous Sufi Order, blessed with the largest amount of land in the hinterland,[106] the best land[107] in

---

[103] De Candole, *The Life and Times*, p. 19.

[104] Rachel Simon, *Libya between Ottomanism and Nationalism: the Ottoman Involvement in Libya during the War with Italy (1911-1919)* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987), p. 278.

[105] Simon, *Libya between Ottomanism and Nationalism*, p. 278.

[106] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p. 77.

terms of wells, date palms, gardens, and springs, and in addition the profits of the caravan trade. The Sanūsī family was overwhelmed by a surplus of revenue, so that they had to manage the wealth separately in four different *zāwiyas*. [108] This was useful for the administration of the order, but the distance seemed to make consolidation under one direction quite difficult, especially after the penetration by the Italians.

---

[107] Aghil Mohamed Barbar, The Tarabulus (Libyan) Resistance to the Italian Invasion: 1911-1920. Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980, p. 129.

[108] Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, p.77

CONCLUSION

Italy's invasion and occupation of Libya between 1911 and 1932 forced a religious, social and economic change on the country, and created the conditions which made it possible for a Sufi order such as the Sanūsiyya to become involved in the resistance movement. Its emergence on Libya's political stage was inseparable from the tribal situation in Cyrenaica, where the tribes had been united under the Sanūsiyya through the network of *zāwiyas* to which they had become adherents, *ikhwān* or *shaykhs*, of the Order. The religious and political responses to external threat were clearly those of a well-organized movement shaped and led by the Sanūsī family and its *shaykhs*.

The Sanūsiyya response to foreign penetration gradually evolved from avoidance, to defence when attacked, resistance, and ultimately, negotiation. The order was aware of alien political penetration in North Africa from the very beginning of its existence, especially under Sayyid Muḥammad 'Alī al-Sanūsī and the early period of his son, Sayyid al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī's rule. Later in 1902 the brotherhood revived its *zāwiya* Bir Alali in Kanem, Chad, which had previously been captured by the French. Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf, the next head of the order, helped the Ottomans attack the British in Egypt, then defended Cyrenaica from Italian encroachment until his exile in 1916. Witnessing the

failure in Egypt, Sayyid Idrīs tried to win political compromises from the British and Italians.

The Sanūsiyya resistance movement depended completely on the network of *zāwiyas*, *shaykhs* and *ikhwān*, as well as adherents from various tribes. It was successful in maintaining their mutual cooperation through religious teachings, education, social and economic activities. These activities, in turn, familiarized the tribesmen with the call for *jihād* by the Sanūsī family, its councilors and prominent *shaykhs* of the resistance movement. Their fight over the course of three decades was motivated by a willingness to be free from alien power and was influenced by the idea of the Mahdi, especially in the early stage of resistance.

The resistance waged by the Sanūsiyya was the longest and most militant anti-colonial movement in the history of Africa of that era. There were various circumstances that made this so. Psychologically, most Sanūsiyya members were a stubborn and aggressive people who did not want their land captured by an outside power. This resistance was thus a rebirth of their past experience of resolving problems over disputed land with another tribe through war. The tribes had been integrated through the efforts of the Sanūsiyya and owned their land collectively under the authority of the *zāwiyas*. Italy's invasion brought their instinct to the fore.

Jihād, on the other hand, was also a significant factor in this long-lasting resistance. Not only did the Sanūsiyya members find the notion in the Holy Qur'ān and in the religious pronouncements of their *shaykh*s, but it was a period of time when the Muslim world was being invaded by western, Christian nations. In Africa alone, Muslims had already witnessed other sufi brotherhoods such as those of Amīr 'Abd al-Qadir in Algeria, the Qādiriyya and Shādhiliyya in Somalia, etc., stand up against the invader. The *jihād* furthermore promised *mujāhidūn* a blissful existence in Paradise. Therefore they welcomed the opportunity. And although they lacked military training and were poorly-armed, they nevertheless knew their country's geography better than the Italians did. Through coordination between the *zāwiya*s, which provided weapons and food, the Sanūsiyya leaders had their *mujāhidūn* practice hit and run tactics to cope with this imbalance. This was not enough in the long run, however, as Italy had a larger supply of modern arms and more experience in warfare.

Among the weaknesses which caused the resistance to decline was its dependency on a charismatic figure, which caused it to become "a one man show." In the case of Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf and 'Umar al-Mukhtār, this dependency inevitably ended the resistance. Besides, the geographical distance

between the *zāwiyas* and the different priorities within the Sanūsī family made the resistance difficult to consolidate.

The Sanūsiyya's resistance may be seen as an early form of nationalism that shaped modern Libya. There are parallels between the Sanūsiyya and contemporary Libya. Both the Sanūsiyya and Qadhāfi reject Western influences; both prize independence; and both call for a return to an Islam that is pristine and austere. For this reason, discussing the Sanūsiyya forms a solid basis for understanding the phenomenon of today's Libya.

Bibliography

Abun Nasr, Jamil M. *The Tijaniyya: A Sufi Order in a Modern World.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965.

_____. *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Abushawa, Malik. "The Political System in Libya (1951-1969)." M.A. thesis, Cairo University, 1977.

Ahmida, Ali Abdullatif. *The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and Resistance, 1830-1932.* Albany, New York: SUNY, 1994.

Ali, Ahmed. *Al-Qur'an: A Contemporary Translation.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Anderson, Lisa. *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Asad, Muhammad. *The Road to Mecca.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954.

al-Ashhab, Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib. al-*Mahdi al-Sanūsī.* Tripoli: Maṭba'at Maji, 1952.

_____. *al-Sanūsī al-Kabīr.* Cairo: Maktaba al-Qāhira, n.d.

_____. *Barqa.* Cairo: Maktaba al-Hawari, 1947.

Askew, William C. *Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya, 1911-1912.* Durham, 1942.

al-Attas, Syed Naguib. *Some Aspects of Sufism as Understood and practiced Among the Malays.* Ed. Shirle Gordon. Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute Ltd., 1963.

Barbar, Aghil Mohamed. "The Tarabulus (Libyan) Resistance to the Italian Invasion 1911-1920." Ph.D dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980.

Barclay, Sir Thomas. *The Turco-Italian War and Its Problems.* London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1912.

Bennett, Ernest N. *With the Young Turks in Tripoli.* London: Methuen and Co., 1912.

Bey, Hassanein. *The Lost Oases.* London: Thornton Butterworth, 1925.

Boehm, Max Hildebert. "Nationalism." In *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences.* vol. 11. 231-240. ed. in chief. Edwin R.A. Seligman. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933.

Briggs, Lloyd Cabot. *Tribes of the Sahara.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Burke, Edmund. "Understanding Arab Protest Movement." *The Maghreb Review* 11, no. 1 (1986): 19-25.

_____. "Islam and Social Movements: Methodological Reflections." In *Islam, Politics, and Social Movements.* eds. Edmund Burke and Ira Lapidus. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

Cachia, Anthony J. *Libya under the Second Ottoman Occupation (1835-1911).* Tripoli: Government Press, 1945.

Chaker, Salem. *Berbères aujourd'hui.* Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1989.

Childs, Timothy W. *Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War over Libya 1911-1912.* Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990.

Cordell, Dennis D. "Eastern Libya, Wadai and the Sanūsiya." In *The Journal of African History* 18, 1 (1977), pp. 21-36.

Dajjānī, Aḥmad Ṣidqī. *Al-Ḥaraka al-Sanūsiyya,* 2nd ed. Cairo: al-Maṭba'a al-Faniyya, 1988.

_____. *Lībiyā qubayl al-iḥtilāl al-Īṭālī, 1882-1911.* Maṭba'a al-Fanniyya al-ḥadītha, 1971.

Davis, John. *Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution.* London: I.B. Tauris, 1987.

De Groot, A.H. "Shaikh Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sanūsī (1290-1351/1873-1933)." In *The Encyclopaedia of Islam,* new ed., eds. C.E. Bosworth, et al., vol. 9, 23-24. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995.

De Candole, E.A.V. *The Life and Times of King Idris of Libya.* London: Mohamed ben Galbon, 1990.

Deny, J. "Pasha." In *The Encyclopaedia of Islam,* new ed., eds. C.E. Bosworth, et al., vol. 8, 279-281. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995.

De Vecchi, Paolo. *Italy's Civilizing Mission in Africa.* New York: Brentano, 1912.

Duveyrier, Henry. *Les Touareg du Nord: Exploration du Sahara.* Nendeln: Kraus Reprint, 1973 (first published in 1864).

_____. *La Confrérie Musulmane de Sîdi Mohammed ben 'Alî es-Senoûs et son Domaine Géographique en l'année 1300 de l'hégire=1883 de notre ère.* Paris: Société de Géographie, 1886.

Eisenstadt, S.N. "Religion and the Civilizational Dimensions of Politics." In *The Political Dimensions of Religion,* ed. Said Amir Arjomand. Albany, New York: SUNY, 1993.

Evans-Pritchard, E.E. *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954.

al-Fathaly, Omar I. and Monte Palmer. *Political Development and Social Change in Libya.* Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath & Co., 1980.

Fisher, W.B. "Libya (The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)." In *The Middle East and North Africa 1998,* 44th ed. London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1998.

Furlonge, Geoffrey. *The Lands of Barbary.* London: John Murray, 1966.

Gardet, Louis. "Dhikr." In *The Encyclopaedia of Islam,* new ed., eds. C.E. Bosworth, et al., vol. 2, 226. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995.

Garia, Murtaza. "Nationalism in the Light of the Qur'an and the Sunnah," In *The Impact of Nationalism on the Muslim World,* ed. M. Ghayasuddin. London: The Open Press, 1986.

Geertz, Clifford. "Religion as a Cultural System." In *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*, ed. Michael Banton. London: Tavistock Publication, 1968.

al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid. *Ihyā' Ulūm al-Dīn.* Vol. 3. Baghdad: Maṭba'at Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya, 1356 H.

Hahn, Lorna. *Historical Dictionary of Libya.* Metuchen, N.J. and London: The Scarecrow Press, inc., 1981.

Hargreaves, J.D. *Decolonization in Africa.* London: Longman, 1990.

Herodotus. *The Histories.* Trans.George Rawlinson. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 1997.

Holt, P.M. *The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1181-1898.* 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.

Horeir, Abdulmola S. el- "Social and Economic Transformations in the Libyan Hinterland During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Role of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Califomia, 1981.

Ibrahim, Abdallah A. "Evolution of government and society in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (Libya) 1835-1911." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah, 1982.

Idaroh 'Aliyyah. *Thoriqoh Mu'tabaroh Nahdliyyah.* Semarang: Toha Putra, n.d.

Jameelah, Maryam. *Three Great Islamic Movements in the Arab World of the Recent Past: The Movement of Shaikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab, the Sanussi Movement, the Mahdi of the Sudan.* Lahore: Mohammad Yusuf Khan, 1976.

Joffe, George. "Umar al-Mukhtar." In *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East,* eds. Reeva S. Simon, et al. vol. 3. 1277-1279. New York: Simon and Schuster Macmillan, 1996.

Joffe, E.G.H. and K.S. McLachlan (eds.). *Social and Economic Development of Libya.* Cambridgeshire: Middle East and North African Studies Press Ltd., 1982.

Kamenka, Eugene, ed. *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea.* London: Edward Arnold, 1976.

Khadduri, Majid. *Modern Libya: A Study in Political Development.* Baltimore, Md: John Hopkins University Press, 1963.

Kucukcan, Talip. "Some Reflections on the Wahhabiyah and the Sanusiyah Movements." *Hamdard Islamicus*, 18, no. 2 (1995): pp. 67-82.

Lapworth, Charles. *Tripoli and Young Italy.* London: Stephen Swift and Co., Ltd., 1912.

Le Gall, Michel. "The Ottoman Government and the Sanusiyya: A Reappraisal." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 21 (1989), pp. 97-99.

Le Tourneau, R. "Dayi." In *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., eds. C.E. Bosworth, et al., vol. 2. 189. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995.

Lings, Martin. *A Sufi Saint of the Twentieth Century: Shaikh Ahmad al-'Alawi.* 2nd ed. Revised and enlarged. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971.

Mahmud, Ahmad. *'Umar al-Mukhtār: al-Ḥalqat al-Akhīra min al-Jihād al Waṭanī fī Ṭarābulus al-Gharb.* Cairo: 1353 H.

Malgeri, Francesco. *La Guerra Libica (1911-1912).* Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1970.

Margoliouth, D.S. "Sanusi." In *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. James Hastings, vol. 11, p. 194-196. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark 1980.

Martin, B.G. *Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth-Century Africa.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

_____. "A Future Sanusi Caliphate? Muhammad 'Ali al-Sanusi and his *Durar al-Saniyya.*" *Journal of Asian History*, 26: 2, 1992, p. 160-168.

McClure, W.K. *Italy in North Africa: an Account of the Tripoli Enterprise.* London: Constable & Co., 1913.

Mommsen, Wolfgang. *Theories of Imperialism.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

Moore, Martin. *Fourth Shore: Italian Mass Colonization of Libya.* London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1940.

Nachtigal, Gustav. *Sahara and Sudan,* trans. Allan G.B. Fisher and Humprey J. Fisher. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971, v. 4.

O'Fahey, R.S. *Enigmatic Saints.* Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1990.

O'Fahey, R.S. and Bernd Radtke. "Neo-Sufism Reconsidered." In *Der Islam* 70 (1993), pp. 52-87.

Padwick, Constance, E. *Muslim Devotions: A Study of Prayer-Manuals in Common Use.* London: S.P.C.K., 1961.

Peters, Emorys L. *The Bedouin in Cyrenaica: Studies in Personal and Corporate Power.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Renier, G.J. *History: Its Purpose and Methods.* New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965.

Rinn, Louis. *Marabouts et Khouan.* Alger: Librairie Adolphe Jourdan, 1884.

Sabine, George H. "State." In *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences,* ed. in chief. Edwin R.A. Seligman. vol. 15, pp. 328-332. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933.

Santarelli, Enzo, Giorgio Rochat, Romain Rainero, Luigi Goglia. *Omar al-Mukhtar: The Italian Reconquest of Libya.* Trans. John Gilbert. London: Darf Publishers Ltd., 1986.

al-Sanūsī, Sayyid Muḥammad ʿAlī. *al-Salsabīl al-muʿīn fī al-Ṭarāʾiq al-Arbaʿīn*, on the margins of *Kitāb al-Masāʾil al-ʿAshr al-Musammā Bughyat al-Maqāṣid fī Khulāṣa al-Marāṣid.* Cairo: Maṭbaʿa al-Maʾāhid, 1934.

_____. *Al-Masāʾil al-ʿAshr al-Musammā Bughyah al-Maqāṣid fī Khulāṣa al-Marāṣid.* 2nd ed. Cairo: Shirka al-Ṭibāʾa al-Fanniyya al-Muttaḥida, 1960.

_____. *Īqāẓ al-Wasnān fī al-ʿamal bi- al-ḥadīth wa- al-Qurʾān.* Algeria: Maṭbaʿa Thaʾālibiyya, 1914.

_____. *Al-Durar al-Saniyya fī Akhbār al-Sulāla al-Idrīsiyya.* 3rd ed. Cairo: Shirka al-Ṭibāʾa al-Fanniyya al-Muttaḥida, 1960.

_____. *Kitāb al-Manḥal al-Rāwī al-Rāiq fī Asānid al-ʿUlūm wa Uṣūl al-Ṭarāʿiq.* 1st ed.Cairo: Maṭbaʿa Ḥijazī, 1954.

_____. *Al-Majmūʿa al-Mukhtāra.* Manchester: Muhammad ibn Ghalbun, 1990.

Satyamurthi, T.V. *Nationalism in the Contemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspective.* London: Frances Pinter, 1983.

Santa Maria, Bourbon del Monte. *L'Islamismo e la Confraternità dei Senussi.* Rome: Città di Castello, 1912.

Segrè, Claudio. *Fourth Shore: The Italian Colonization of Libya.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.

_____. "Colonization in the French Maghreb: Model for Italy's Fourth Shore?" *The Maghreb Review* 12, no. 1-2 (1987):34-37.

Shaked, Haim. *The Life of the Sudanese Mahdi.* New Brunswick; N. J: Transaction Books, 1978.

Shalabī, Maḥmūd. *ʿUmar al-Mukhtār.* Cairo: al-Maktaba al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1958.

Shukrī, Muḥammad F. *al-Sanūsiyyah: Dīn wa Dawla.* Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1948.

Simon, Rachel. *Libya between Ottomanism and Nationalism: The Ottoman Involvement in Libya during the War with Italy (1911-1919).* Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987.

Simons, Geoff. *Libya the Struggle for Survival.* 2nd ed. London: Macmillan, 1996.

Stoddard, Lothrop. *The New World of Islam.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923.

Streiker, Allen. "Government and Revolt in the Tripoli Regency 1795-1969." M.A. thesis, Northwestern University, 1970.

Triaud, J.L. "Sanūsiyya." In *The Encyclopaedia of Islam,* new ed., eds. C.E. Bosworth, et al., vol. 9. 23-26. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995.

_____. "Enquête sur une Confrérie: Redécouvrir la Sanusiyya." *La Transmission du Savoir dans le monde musulman périphérique,* 12, (1992), pp. 1-7.

_____. *La Légende Noire de la Sanûsiyya.* 2 vols. Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1995.

Trimingham, J. Spencer. *The Sufi Orders in Islam.* London: Oxford University Press, 1973.

Van Bruinessen, Martin. *Kitab Kuning: Pesantren dan Tarekat.* Bandung: Mizan, 1995.

Vikor, Knut S. "Al-Sanusi and Qadhafi-Continuity of Thought?" *The Maghreb Review* 12, no. 1-2 (1987): 25-28.

_____. *Sufi and Scholar on the Desert Edge: Muḥammad b. 'Alī al- Sanūsī and his Brotherhood.* London: Hurst and Co., 1995.

Villard, Henry Serrano. *Libya: the New Arab Kingdom of North Africa.* New York: Cornell University Press, 1954.

Walinga, Muh. Hatta "Kiyai Haji Muammad As'ad: Hidup dan Perjuangannya." B.A. thesis, Faculty of Letters, IAIN Alauddin, Ujung Pandang, 1980.

Wright, John. *Libya.* London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1969.

_____. *Libya: A Modern History.* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982.

_____. "Mussolini, Libya and the 'Sword of Islam'." *The Maghreb Review* 12, no. 1-2 (1987): 29-33.

Xavier, Octave and Depont Coppolani. *Les Confréries Religieuses Musulmanes.* Paris: Maisonneuve, 1897.

Zāwī., Ṭahir al- *'Umar al-Mukhtār: al-ḥalqah al-akhīrah min al-jihād al-waṭanī fī Lībiyā.* Tripoli, Libya : Muassasah al-Farjani, 1970.

Ziadeh, Nicola A. *Sanūsīyah: A Study of a Revivalist Movement in Islam.* Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983.

_____. *Barqah: al-dawla al-'arābiyya al-thāmina.* Beirut: Dār li al-Malāyīn, 1950.

Map of Libya



(Source: E.A.V. De Candole. *The Life and Times of King Idris of Libya.* London: Mohammed ben Ghalbon, 1990, pp. xiv-xv.)

Nineteenth Century Caravan Routes



(Source: Dennis D. Cordell. "Eastern Libya, Wadai and the Sanūsīya: A Ṭarīqa and a Trade Route." In *the Journal of African History*, 18, 1, 1977, p. 25).



(Source: Lisa Anderson. The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 4)