

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

**Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600**

UMI[®]

McGill University

SHAKESPEARE AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE

By

Felicity Earnshaw

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Department of English

Montreal, Quebec

Fall, 1998



**National Library
of Canada**

**Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services**

**395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

**Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada**

**Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques**

**395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-50152-3

Canada

Shepherd: Nay, but hear me.
Clown: Nay, but hear me.
(*The Winter's Tale*, 4.4.690-1)

TO

my spouse -- a river of bounty

ABSTRACT

This thesis studies the human rights philosophy presented during the first productions of Shakespeare's plays, putting it in touch with that reflected in United Nations human rights law and the political theory of John Rawls. Its opening chapter discusses twentieth-century scholarship exemplary of the criticism relevant to human rights ideas in Shakespeare. The sixteenth-century historical context, so emphatically identified by historians with the institution of modern freedom, is kept in sight throughout, and provides, with the cultural context (especially the semantic context), the key to detailed explications of four plays: *King John*, *Much Ado About Nothing*, *Hamlet* and *All's Well That Ends Well*. Interpreted by these means, the first two plays are seen to have enacted, at the time of their first performances, the religious strife that ironically gave birth both to the ideal of freedom of conscience and ideological complications restricting its implementation. The latter plays unfolded arguments concerning the relationship between epistemology and freedom of conscience. The questions addressed in these four plays range from the relationship between social stability, moral values, and the practicability of freedom of conscience to the criteria whereby coercion and abuse of freedom of conscience may be distinguished from legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. The characteristics of epistemologies enhancing the implementation of freedom of conscience and the educational process that promotes the moral attributes and social conditions necessary for the adoption of these epistemologies are delineated. The freedom of conscience theory the plays proposed for those members of their first audiences attuned to its metaphoric language is remarkably thought-provoking as regards current challenges in human rights philosophy and law, and reinforces the argument that literature, and in particular theatre, have vital roles in social change and intellectual development.

Cette thèse étudie la philosophie des droits de l'homme telle qu'elle est exposée dans les premières mises-en-scène des pièces de Shakespeare. L'approche choisie tient compte de la philosophie adoptée par le droit international relatif aux droits et libertés fondamentaux développés par les soins de l'Organisation des Nations unies ainsi que la théorie politique de John Rawls. La note d'ouverture souligne certains exemples d'études du vingtième siècle pertinentes aux idées des droits de l'homme dans l'oeuvre de Shakespeare. Le contexte historique du

seizième siècle, étroitement associé par les historiens avec la liberté moderne, est gardé constamment en vue. Il fournit, avec le contexte culturel (particulièrement le contexte sémantique), la clef aux explications détaillées des quatre pièces: *King John*, *Much Ado About Nothing*, *Hamlet* et *All's Well That Ends Well*. Vues sous cette optique, les deux premières pièces semblent avoir exposé, au moment de leur premières mises-en-scène, le conflit religieux qui paradoxalement donna naissance à la fois à l'idéal de la liberté de conscience et aux complications idéologiques qui limitèrent sa mise en pratique. Dans cette même perspective, les deux dernières pièces tracent des arguments concernant les liens entre l'épistémologie et la liberté de conscience. Ces pièces soulèvent et traitent des problèmes qui touchent aux rapports entre la stabilité sociale, les valeurs morales, et la praticabilité de la liberté de conscience. La discussion mène aux critères qui permettent de distinguer la contrainte et l'interférence contre la liberté de conscience de l'exercice de la liberté d'expression proprement dite. Les épistémologies susceptibles de stimuler l'exercice de la liberté de conscience, ainsi que l'éducation visant à promouvoir les attributs moraux et les conditions sociales nécessaires à l'adoption de ces épistémologies y sont détaillées. La théorie de la liberté de conscience que ces pièces proposèrent aux premiers auditoires réceptifs à son langage métaphorique est remarquablement élaborée compte tenu des défis que posent encore aujourd'hui la philosophie et la pratique en matière des droits de l'homme. De plus, elle renforce l'argument que la littérature, et le théâtre en particulier, jouent un rôle primordial dans le progrès social et le développement intellectuel.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is often said we must return what we are given. If this is so, I shall always be in deep debt. Those to whom I owe the greatest gratitude are the builders of our society (most to be forever unnamed), who put into practice the ideals of freedom of conscience and universal education, without which I would never have experienced the joy of study. Of the many known to whom I am debtor, I owe profound gratitude to my supervisor Professor Michael D. Bristol for his perspicacious and clearly communicated guidance concerning the shape and development of the thesis, his unstinting encouragement, and invaluable teaching. To Professor Leanore Lieblein I am similarly deeply grateful for her wise suggestions, her advice on editing, her encouragement and kindness, and the opportunities she gave me for new avenues of scholarship. Professor Abbott Conway's interest and magnanimous support have been an added bonus, for which I owe him much gratitude. Professor Ashraf Rushdy's generous comments increased my confidence in the work and his astute pointers solved some of its difficult problems. Eleana Yun made a meticulous review of the final version. To these individuals, along with all my dear friends and family, I am truly thankful. For their patience and efficiency, I am indebted to the staff members at the several McGill libraries, the Folger Shakespeare Library, the University of Toronto Robarts' Library and the British Library. The Shakespeare in the Theatre Research Team, now an institution at McGill, organized activities which had a very significant impact on my scholarship; it made possible my first trip to the Folger and provided numerous other precious opportunities for learning, all of which broadened the base from which I could approach my subject. The assistantships from this Team, as well as those from the Department of English at McGill made it easier to continue in my program of study. I am also grateful for the fellowships provided by the Quebec government which permitted me to work full time on my thesis during my final term. Words are not sufficient to thank these individuals and institutions, how much less to count up the debt of gratitude I owe my spouse, whose deeds for humankind have been my inspiration, and without whom I could not have had the courage to do this work.

CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Chapter One	
Shakespeare's Plays and Human Rights Philosophy	14
PART ONE	
Strange Learning and Its Consequences on Freedom of Conscience	67
Chapter Two	
Borrowed Signs: Freedom of Conscience and the Problem of Unstable Values in <i>King John</i>	78
Chapter Three	
Horn-Tipped Staffs: Interference in Freedom of Conscience in <i>Much Ado About Nothing</i>	124
PART TWO	
Freedom of Conscience and the Sources of Knowledge	175
Chapter Four	
Skewed Skulls: Epistemological Limiting of Freedom of Conscience in <i>Hamlet</i>	189
Chapter Five	
Being Educated to Know: Epistemological Expansion of Freedom of Conscience in <i>All's Well That Ends Well</i>	253
Epilogue	302
Appendices	
Bibliography	310

Introduction

There's place and means for every man alive.
(*All's Well That Ends Well*, 4.3.328)¹

"[O]ur acting a part in a play, say of Macbeth or Lady Macbeth" does not "commit[] us to thinking that we are really a king or a queen engaged in a desperate struggle for political power."² The contemporary political theorist John Rawls maintains that the "political reasoning" we undertake does not require us to adhere to "a particular metaphysical doctrine about the nature of the self." Instead Rawls argues that the members of his model society will, in their political consultations, keep the kind of distance the playwright creates for actors and playgoers. This intellectual space will enable them, like Shakespeare's players and audience, to participate in a reasoning process whose aim is to improve human rights.

By drawing together Shakespearean theatre experience and human rights theory,³ Rawls unconsciously touches the nerve centre of Shakespeare's dramas as they electrified the people of London at their very first performances, for these performances elicited the same popular philosophizing for the practical purpose of improving individual rights as he envisages in his theory. Freedom of conscience

¹William Shakespeare, *The Riverside Shakespeare*, ed. G. Blakemore Evans (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974). Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from Shakespeare's plays are taken from this edition.

²*Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia UP, 1996) 27.

³This theory, originally published in his *A Theory of Justice* (1971), now revised in *Political Liberalism* (1993, 1996), separates moral justice from political justice, and provides for human rights that can be derived from a unifying political structure, achieved in a process of "public reasoning," and agreed to by the plurality of a democratic liberal society, whose members endorse "incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines" (xviii). Because Rawls's model is a nation he uses for what in terms of humankind is "human rights" the less familiar expression "basic goods and liberties." However, he is widely discussed in human rights studies and highly acclaimed for his human rights theory.

and freedom of speech were central concerns of the Elizabethan Jacobean culture, a fact that has led historians to single out this society as a significant moment in the institution of modern freedom.⁴ Those in the society most animated by these concerns saw them interpreted in Shakespeare's plays with complexity and depth. Looking back now at these plays through the perspective of current human rights philosophy, we see that Shakespeare is relevant to the most thorny questions of modern rights theory.

The pre-modern Europeans conceived of rights as a favour -- a freedom or power given by a sovereign authority, who had the privilege to bestow it exclusively or to revoke it. The modern concept of rights as *human*, however, provides for freedoms and rights granted to all individuals by virtue of their belonging to humankind and which are derived from the distinctive capacities and aptitudes common to the generality of humans. (Hence the universal right to education is said to be derived from the human aptitude for learning.) Human rights are therefore very different from these exclusive rights and from "the right thing" -- what is lawful or righteous, a second usage current in pre-modern Europe. They are also distinct from "the freedom of the individual apart from the law."⁵

⁴The recent historical series, *The Making of Modern Freedom*, begins with a volume covering this period: J. H. Hexter, ed., *Parliament and Liberty: From the Reign of Elizabeth to the English Civil War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1992). In his article on the foundation of human rights, Emmanuel Levinas refers to the Renaissance as the time in which they began to characterize law ("Les droits de l'homme et les droits d'autrui," *Indivisibilité des Droits de l'homme: Les Actes du IIe Colloque Interuniversitaire, Fribourg 1983* (Fribourg, Suisse: Editions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1985) 38. In my choice of the formulation "Elizabethan Jacobean culture," I am consciously implying a continuity in certain aspects of the English history and culture during the reigns of Elizabeth and James. English concerns pertinent to freedom of conscience are among these aspects, as evident in the persistence of questions on the matter raised in cultural, legal and political material of the period.

⁵Annabel S. Brett, *Liberty, Right and Nature: Individual rights in later scholastic thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 5.

Their distinction from these three meanings of right is noticeable when their context is considered. Where right in the second sense is the morally or legally right as opposed to the wrong (the sin or crime in a given ethical or legal system), and where right in the third sense is a human's natural freedom of will as opposed to pre-destination or determinism, human rights are rights as opposed to oppression and degradation by society (and in the context of a society); the human right to freedom, for example, is opposed to slavery and imprisonment. Where right in the first sense is an exclusive power held by a person or group of persons over something, a power which may be transferable from one subject to another or revoked, human rights are not an exclusive power or privilege; they universal and non-transferable; they are inalienable; one cannot give them up or take them away from anyone. As a further difference from right in the first sense, human rights are not possessed vis-a-vis another person or group or class or profession; they are possessed by every individual vis-a-vis the society -- indeed, in relation to the whole world. Human rights are an entitlement to a certain service and treatment from everybody else. When we consider some human rights, such as the right to freedom, the right to personal security, the right to have a family, the right to have a job, the right to education, to knowledge, the right to treatment when you are sick, we observe that all indicate that human rights are conceived as a deep founded merit in every person dependent as its counterpart on an equally profound duty to be carried out by others. While the plays portray examples of the pre-modern concept of right, it is human rights that are their focal subject, that are integral to almost every scene, and that inhere most profoundly in their design.

Both Shakespeare and modern human rights philosophers, in their own time and their own way, contemplate the possibilities for human rights in societies undergoing change. Each presents a common set of problems that are addressed as they imagine human rights within a given social order. The aim of the current

project is to create a dialogue between them. The first -- Shakespeare -- is the "composite" author of the plays.⁶ This composite author, though we can never fully identify all his component elements, is inferred in the text itself and in all that we know of the text's first audiences, that is, the *context* and hence that which is intrinsic to the text's meaning. These first audiences, themselves compositions constructed from the vast sea of primary materials that give us evidence about their culture, their habits, and their thought, include the author and the readership he envisaged as he was writing, and hence provide virtual components of the plays' author.* The second, similarly composite person is the creator(s) of modern human rights theory and legal instruments, of which Rawls and the United Nations are the examples. Shakespeare represented societies in different states of crisis, change, and consolidation, and showed the multiple factors pressing for and opposing the institution of freedom of conscience and other human rights. Because his dramatic representations reflected the harsh realities of his times, his image of human rights displayed the moral, ideological and epistemological issues that are so often mislaid in political theory and law. Modern human rights philosophy has, on one hand (as in Rawls), an ideal state from which principles of justice can be derived and, on the other (as in international human rights law), a vision of what must be if humanity is to survive. They therefore describe human rights goals and rules in abstract terms, and sometimes divorced from broad philosophical concerns.

* See Appendix One.

⁶The term "composite" is used here on the assumption that the readers of this thesis understand that whatever can be justly said of an author or his audience will always be to some degree tentative, will never be entirely equivalent to what was intended or interpreted at the time of writing and first performance, and is in fact what we ourselves construct from "traces" (Greenblatt's term) we have of them in their texts and in their *contexts* -- the culture and history that surrounded them and that impacted on what they wrote and what they interpreted.

Both Shakespeare and they, however, focus on a matter deeply important to people in the modern age. The promotion of a dialogue between them is thus both logical and timely. This dialogue has further importance because the differences between its two parties enable each to be for the other a backdrop against which the subject of human rights in literature is dramatically lit. Rawls's theory and the legal statements of the United Nations human rights instruments give theoretical expression to ideas similar to Shakespeare's, while the complex societies represented in the latter's dramas display the real life problems and solutions involved in their implementation. The contribution Shakespeare made in the human rights discourse of his own day is made again, and with greater acumen, when seen in the light of current more advanced theory. And his portrayal of a multiple range of behaviours in relation to human rights opens the gate to an understanding no theory or law can declare.

As I am dealing with two different kinds of texts, I need to employ two different kinds of explication. The methodical approach carried out for each play begins with the human rights question to be addressed. Then I look at its historical and cultural contexts and those of the play, before giving a detailed explication of the play in relation to the question. The discussion of each play ends with a consideration of the question in the light of Rawls's theory and some of the relevant United Nations human rights instruments.

Because Shakespeare's plays have been read so infrequently as expressions of the author's pondering the issues of human rights, I have to produce thorough explications of them. This is one reason I have readings of them from beginning to end. But it is also to understand how the plays provided for a process of reasoning about rights. The plays I have studied in depth all unfold as arguments developed systematically, from thesis, to anti-thesis, to synthesis. They mimic the inductive, experiment-based methodology being developed in the new science

of the period, thus promoting freedom of conscience in the very manner of expression and structural features they utilize. Their full analysis is therefore necessary for the present attempted reconstruction of the virtual thinking the author intended to present about human rights.

In the period when they were written, theatrical practice, theatre-going, reading, writing, and interpretation were very different from what we understand them to be today. So too was the general view of individual rights. Freedom of conscience and freedom of speech, though central issues in late sixteenth-century English culture, were double-sided concerns. The upsurge in the practice and desire for free speech and free conscience and the terror this trend struck in those who sought to maintain tradition and order made these rights the invisible centre of much of the important government action in the two half-centuries surrounding the period of Shakespeare's writing. On the other hand, writers, artists, philosophers, popular printers, preachers and, most significantly, parliamentarians were pressing for their formalization and development. Human rights commentary welled, though in primitive form (because of the newness of the subject) and in disguise (because of the severe censorship in force).

So, while the motto Shakespeare presented with his application for his father's coat of arms "Non Sanz Droit" -- Not Without Right -- states an interest in rights fairly plainly, their vast exposition in his plays hides in the garments of comedy, romance and tragedy. His theatrical dialogue about rights can only be seen in conjunction with a study of the allusions created at the moment of performance through the interaction between his word and his hearers' thoughts. These allusions often had to be discrete in order to prevent what might otherwise be the suppression of the whole play; but at the same time they had to be readable for at least a small portion of Shakespeare's audience. They had to reflect interpretive practices that were comprehensible in sixteenth-century England. A

comprehension of how the plays' first performances read as logical explorations of freedom of conscience and freedom of speech therefore depends on seeing them in relation to the history and culture of the period. (Inasmuch as the plays appealed to an audience of a variety of backgrounds and thinking, it further depends on the view that these performances had a multitude of meanings for those who saw them, of which their rights' philosophy was to be read discretely and perhaps by only a few, and therefore not so obvious as to incur recrimination for its author.) An understanding of the significance of these performances to modern human rights philosophy further requires an eye on current human rights law and theory.

The present study might be classed as new historical as regards the first endeavour. As regards the second, it is a "law and literature" study, though it only partly fits the two categories commonly identified with this approach according to a recent article by Barbara Shapiro. Its purpose is less to examine the plays for their "insight into and assessment of legal issues and problems,"⁷ than it is to reflect on the philosophy behind their similar rights issues and related ethical and social questions. It follows to a limited degree Daniel Kornstein's recent legalistic analyses of Shakespeare, in which he addresses freedom of speech using Supreme Court reports and American rights instruments.⁸

Rather than using American human rights law, as in Kornstein, this study looks to the United Nations human rights instruments and their commentators in its analysis of each play's representation of rights philosophy. Among the instruments frequently referred to are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

⁷Barbara Shapiro, "Circumstantial Evidence: Of Law, Literature, and Culture," *Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities*, 5 (1993): 219. She refers to Robert Weisberg, "The Law-Literature Enterprise," *Yale Journal of Law and Humanities*, 1 (1988) and Richard Weisberg, *Poethics and Other Strategies of Law and Literature* (1992).

⁸Published in the *New York Law Journal* and his recent book, *Kill All the Lawyers? Shakespeare's Legal Appeal* (1994).

and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Although not a treaty or a law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is in Paul Sieghart's words "the first complete and detailed catalogue of human rights and fundamental freedoms to be recognized and solemnly declared by the international community of sovereign states."⁹ Adopted on 10 December 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly, eight-four states attending a special UN review conference in 1968 "solemnly" proclaimed that it "constitutes an *obligation* for the members of the international community" (65). Its "moral, political and legal" impact on both national and international rights instruments, investigations of abuses, and governmental activities is widely acknowledged.¹⁰ The rights and freedoms delineated in the Declaration became law when the international community adopted them and then ratified them under two treaties, one of which is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (66).¹¹

The defining characteristic of human rights (as implicit in their derivation noted above) is the requirement that all human beings of whatever culture be guaranteed equal rights and freedoms. It distinguishes these rights from those of former societies, which belonged to only parts of the population. Human rights philosophy, unlike some of the static philosophies which have interested rulers in the past, intends a maturation of human society that entails not only peace among all nations and justice for all individuals but the participation of the generality of humankind in activities previously confined to elites. This is the democratic basis of human rights, endorsed in the Declaration's first article: "All

⁹Paul Sieghart, *The Lawful Rights of Mankind: An Introduction to the International Legal Code of Human Rights* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985) 63.

¹⁰Sieghart, 64; Asbjorn Eide and Gudmundur Alfredsson, Introduction to *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary*, ed. Asbjorn Eide, Gudmundur Alfredsson, Göran Melander, Lars Adam Rehof and Allan Rosas, with the collaboration of Theresa Swinehart (Oslo: Scandinavian UP, 1992) 5-7.

¹¹The other one is The United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are all endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood."¹²

However, statements such as these and the instruments derived from the Declaration do not provide all the answers, for government laws and policies cannot create just people. Consideration must be given to this fact, and also to the objections raised against these human rights instruments: that their application entails the loss of traditions, that they are almost impossible to put into practice, and that they restrict freedom for some groups. When these arguments are addressed in the coming chapters on freedom of conscience, and in a projected work on freedom of speech, they reveal the complexity of the issues involved in human rights and the incompleteness of current answers. Shakespeare's dramas suggest similar challenges. Interpreted in the context of their first performances when freedom of conscience was still an earth-shaking idea, they provide an imaginary medium through which these challenges may be contemplated. And in the light of Rawls's philosophy, which delineates a theoretical basis for human rights and their improvement, the plays yield even further understanding.

Rawls's model of a "well-ordered" society provides an interesting means of comparison between twentieth-century and Shakespearean sixteenth-century human rights, because several elements of it relate to the freedom of conscience problems in the plays. His different sorts of social stability and their relation to the practicability of human rights can be used, for example, to theorize comparable issues raised in the plays. Similarly, we see the plays' questions about freedom of conscience more clearly in the light of his differentiation between "burdens of judgment" that impinge or do not impinge on the universal

¹²United Nations, *Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments* (New York, 1983) 1.

implementation of human rights. In addition, his analysis of assumptions implicit in human rights law furnishes a link between Shakespeare's dramas and the United Nations human rights instruments.

The approach thus far outlined has the appearance of an interdisciplinary discourse. This is true to the degree that a study of the plays in the light of human rights instruments and theories sets in relief the complexities and problems of these instruments and theories. It is also true in that it uses a layman's language and seeks to be accessible to readers of several disciplines and none. But the primary focus is the rights philosophy depicted in the plays in their first performances, and in this sense the study is entirely literary. Our way into these performances is not easy, because there is little from Shakespeare's time, other than the occasional diary comment, that gives the *direct* information needed on the performances if we are to see how they related to the period's ideas of free conscience. Nevertheless, and despite its tentativeness, there is a great deal that may be *deduced* from considering the text in light of the theatre culture and reading and writing practices. Many "performances" might be extrapolated from the knowledge we have of Elizabethan Jacobean culture, none of which will reflect precisely what happened for the audience or what was intended by the author. But within an aesthetics that deems both the playwright's and the audience's work as directed to a variety of concerns, this inspecificity of interpretations is not problematic. This reading does not purport to be that which was most readily or widely available, but only one of a number evoked in a varied audience by means of polyvalent poetic figures and a multifaceted dramatic structure.

In many ways this study is not new. In tracing some well-known examples of twentieth-century scholarship, the first chapter illustrates that critics have in every decade of the century looked to Shakespearean drama to see what, in their eyes, it had to say in its own time about social order and power, spectacle and

authority, and theatre as a political institution. In its choice of subject, then, the current study is very much a part of the twentieth-century tradition of looking at Shakespeare in relation to political philosophizing.

It uses already established research methods to accomplish this aim. As Lee Patterson notes, the historicisms implicit in all literary studies have been genuinely remolded from what they were in the late nineteenth century as a result of "the deconstructive argument" and "the anthropological conception of culture," but literary history has nevertheless been the main tool with which we have striven "to tell the truth" about literature.¹³ The more we have striven the more we have found that our tool is contaminated by ourselves, our times, and the egos and politics of earlier times. In the attempts to clear away what is now generally acknowledged to be always to some extent unclearable, the resultant new understandings of history and literature have illumined each other. Sometimes the new knowledge can revolutionize our understanding. Our comprehension of the plays' social impact has increased, for example, with the information about the platea Robert Weimann has brought to the fore. We are discovering some true things about the plays we never knew before. In its appeal to this same methodology and its claim to this same end, the project embarked on here is part of a larger enterprise in studies of the Renaissance and Shakespeare.

The originality of this work therefore lies in its particularities. Two may be singled out as the most notable. The first is the attempt to locate the thinking in the plays within the big city of ideas built up between 1550 and 1650 and on the streets of discussion that from approximately 1590 to 1610 ran between the Inns of Court, the pubs, the palace, the church, the printshop and the theatre, and with which the author and some of his audience were likely familiar. Situating the

¹³"Literary History," in *Critical Terms for Literary Study*, ed. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990) 259-61.

plays within the flurry of reflection surrounding them demonstrates their author's versatile and innovative use of familiar cultural icons for the representation of a new concern in Britain and on the continent, as well as his formulation of a human rights philosophy that presages later developments. The distinctive base on which the plays are situated in the present work is a history that is enfranchised from historical and non-fictional narrative and that embraces material culture, fiction and popular print -- the stuff of the multiform picture we now have of what was topical for the people who lived in the period. The distinctive use of this base is in analyses that comprehend the play as a whole and as performed in the theatre.

The literary focus has necessarily incurred shortcomings in the historical frame; but whatever the failings may be in this regard, this study can at least claim to be drawing together some of what was being imagined in the theatre with some of what was real for a few of the people, and perhaps too for its author. Because it most often traces these contexts through primary documentation, it promises a closer view of the links made at Shakespeare's time between the plays and the serious matters that concerned the Elizabethan Jacobean London society.

The second point of originality is this study's claim for the plays -- that they advanced a particular theory of freedom of conscience, one that from a twentieth-century viewpoint not only fits in with sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century human rights ideas but treats some of the same concerns we face in the implementation of modern human rights instruments. Shakespeare's dramatized theory, that is, a theory put into practice in a model society, acts as a beacon illuminating the relationships between rights and ideologies, and in a manner more striking than many legal and philosophical writings on the same subject. While these claims will no doubt initially be viewed as a peculiarity, the solid arguments they stand on will eventually vindicate them -- not as the whole story about Shakespeare's plays but as a significant addition to that story. The first of these is

the identification of the motifs and plots of the plays with the human rights ideas pertinent to those in the real society of late sixteenth-century England. The second is that the interpretation of these plays as conveying human rights ideas makes sense within the whole of the play, and moreover identifies trends in plays composed around the same time.

Thus *King John* (1597 -- the date Sylvan Barnet argues for) and *Much Ado About Nothing* (1598-9) survey the practice of freedom of conscience under difficult conditions -- a society bereft of basic values and beset with quickly shifting ideologies, in which fraud is condoned; and *Hamlet* (1600-02) and *All's Well That Ends Well* (1601-04) delve into the relationship between epistemology and freedom of conscience. Naturally, the focus on this single human right, though it is widely regarded as the most basic one, limits the study. The work I mean to do next -- on freedom of speech, the flipside of freedom of conscience, without which the latter right is both useless to society and impossible for the individual -- will provide a clearer picture of the implications freedom of conscience has for social justice and personal happiness.

Chapter One

Shakespeare's Plays and Human Rights Philosophy

Play out the play. I have much to say in behalf of that Falstaff.
(*The First Part of Henry the Fourth*, 2.4.484-5)

Since Hardin Craig's remark in 1936 that in the Elizabethan age "we are usually confronted with dogma and not with a rational consideration of social conditions and human rights,"¹ the critical perceptions of Shakespeare's plays have changed. The expanded conception of history as a story of every aspect of human life has brought about this change, so that interpretations of the plays as related to rights ideas have become frequent. The perception that they support human rights ideas now coexists with the view that they oppose them. An example of the supportive perception is Annabel Patterson's book, *Shakespeare and the Popular Voice*, in which she discusses the democratic ideas in the plays. The latter outlook is best exemplified in the post-colonial criticism on *The Tempest*. Whether the plays are considered from a political or an aesthetic perspective, this evolution in Shakespeare criticism is evident. It appears that as people from a greater variety of backgrounds participate in literary scholarship, and as these twentieth-century intellectuals deepen their understanding of individual rights and become more conscious of the subtle ways in which we have been oppressed or have caused oppression in the past, they become more adept at perceiving the involvement of writers in this oppression, whether as victims, protestors, or complicit facilitators. The political criticism of Shakespeare, whose creators are not always aware of the pertinence of their work to this increasingly sensitive subject, may be seen to address roughly three themes: order, power, and rights. That focusing on

¹*The Enchanted Glass: The Elizabethan Mind in Literature* (New York: Oxford UP, 1936) 195.

aesthetic form -- specifically the theatre as public space -- deals with spectacle and authority, and theatre as a political institution.²

The findings of this scholarship are derived from diverse interpretations of the context of the plays' composition. Concomitantly, they are indicative of the diverse concerns of researchers and their particular historical situations, while nevertheless presenting a common thread in that they are all concerned with some aspect of justice in the body politic constructed in the plays. In the first part of this chapter, we look at these findings and the changing bases on which they are grounded. The move towards more inductive methodologies is, as indicated in this account, relevant to the perception of human rights ideas in Shakespeare. But while the new conceptions of history consequent to these methodologies have in the twentieth century opened a multitude of vistas onto Shakespearean literature, scholars do not always note how the now more clearly understood society of Elizabethans and Jacobean provided spectators with the possibility of reacting differently to theatre, how for example this society permitted plays to be proposals for new ideologies and matter for people to use in working out new political philosophies. In the second part of the chapter, we contemplate these conditions; we consider, for instance, how the history of the period provided an apt context for Shakespeare's dramas to relate to political philosophy and in particular human rights.

Political Philosophy in Shakespeare: Order

Hardin Craig, Eustace M. W. Tillyard, Theodore Spencer, and Allan D. Bloom figure significantly among the twentieth-century critics who judge Shakespeare's political philosophy through their interpretations of the political

²I am very grateful to Professor Michael Bristol for his insights about how to organize the relevant criticism.

order represented in his plays. Craig and Tillyard emphasize the uncritical reflection in Shakespeare's plays of Tudor policy and medieval political philosophy. Relying on a different conception of the history of the period, Spencer perceives a more complex political dynamic in the plays, one that marks a breakdown in the established order as well as a persistence in its sustaining powers. Bloom, on the other hand, reads a political order in Shakespeare relevant to modern concerns about moral and political order. The scope of this thesis does not permit a thorough discussion of the reasons for the noticeable differences in the perceptions of these well known critics, the lesser known Gayley and Thaler, and scholars of the later twentieth century. A brief account of their thought, however, is useful because it illustrates how significant the change has been.

For over half a century, from his first edition in 1912 (*Richard II*) to the *5 Plays of Shakespeare* he edited fifty-three years later in 1965, Craig consistently interpreted Shakespeare's political philosophy as reflective of the official order. In the first, *Richard II*, he observes that the play "is ill adapted to the end of raising a revolt, because it attracts sympathy for Richard."³ The anti-semitism of *The Merchant of Venice*, one of his last editions in *5 Plays of Shakespeare*, is for him a part of the order of things Shakespeare could not resist.⁴ He notes that "The earl of Essex, from whom Shakespeare seems to have drawn his political views, was Lopez' chief accuser and the friend and backer of Don Antonio" (144).

In this compilation of plays, Craig characterizes Shakespeare's writings as a "presentation" of the "insoluble problems of life" whose cause is a fatalistic order, and emphasizes their lack of philosophical thought (28-29) -- comments that accord with his opinions in two earlier books. In the first of these, *The Enchanted Glass: The Elizabethan Mind in Literature* (1936), his view is that the politics of

³*King Richard II*, by William Shakespeare (1912; reprint, New York, 1940) xiii.

⁴With Waldo F. McNeir (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965) 143-4.

the Elizabethan age "looked toward the past rather than the future" and, except for the Puritan movements, was entirely geared to upholding the traditionally orderly class structures and economic controls (190-91). Shakespeare was no exception to the principle that the literature reflected an ethos very limited in its conception of human rights. "Bacon was completely practical," he writes, "and there are not as many tears in Shakespeare, as in Galsworthy, over the miseries of the poor. The commiseration of poverty was perhaps a more or less stereotyped thing, for the rights of man was not yet a living doctrine" (194). Again in reference to Shakespeare, he observes, "The age took comfort in traditional culture and in action, to a greater degree than in reflection and investigation."

An Interpretation of Shakespeare (1948), published twelve years after *The Enchanted Glass*, would seem to contradict this view, especially the title of the last chapter, "Shakespeare as a Citizen of the World." But Craig's comments in this chapter on Shakespeare's "incurable popularity" suggest a generalized order is the point of unity between the twentieth century and Shakespeare's age:

On two great principles the ages agree. The one is the principle of order, which is heaven's first law, and is obviously the method and architectonic will of God. The material universe is imperfect, dumb, and subject to decay and death; but the correspondence (or similitude or analogy) they believed in was merely a logical form for expressing and rendering effective the other great principle, which is that the spiritual order contains, exemplifies, and expresses complete and perfect truth (384).

Here he has included the political and social order in a spiritual order, thus allowing for a sympathy in unspecific philosophic features. Craig's final views, then, are largely consistent with his first ones -- Shakespeare's specifically political thought is alien to that of later centuries.

The order that dominates Tillyard's views on the political philosophy in Shakespeare's plays is even more tied to the medieval past than Craig's. In the first paragraph of *The Elizabethan World Picture* (1943) he makes clear his belief that the Elizabethans, and among them Shakespeare, were so steeped in medieval tradition that they should not be interpreted as expressing any humanist idea. Hamlet's statement "What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculty . . ." he interprets as "in the purest medieval tradition" and not alluding to the humanistic "dignity of man."⁵ Quoting a statement of the fourth century bishop Nemesius similar to that uttered by Hamlet, he deduces that this thinking reflected the outlook of the people of the Middle Ages, and he concludes that "What is true of Hamlet on man is in the main true of Elizabethan modes of thought in general" (2). Tillyard bases these deductions on the belief that the Reformation did not usher in new ideas: "Protestantism was largely a selection and simplification of what was there all the time" (3).

He defends his view that a hierarchically orderly universe ruled the thinking of the era and that Shakespeare partook of this thinking on the basis of passages taken out of their dramatic and theatrical contexts. Thus, like Craig, he refers to Ulysses's speech on degree in *Troilus and Cressida* as an example of Shakespeare's belief in the necessity of both a "cosmic" and "domestic" submission to hierarchy (8). Tillyard comments several times on the images of disorder in the dramas of the period and the scarcity of commentary on order, concluding that the reason for this is that belief in order was well established (14).

His interest in establishing the enduring influence of this order is evident in his earlier book, *The Miltonic Setting Past and Present* (1938). At the end of his chapter on "Milton and Protestantism," he states that Milton "regains a potential faith . . . in the earthly order of things" and "in the end, though centrally

⁵*The Elizabethan World Picture* (London: Chatto & Windas, 1943) 1.

Protestant, spreads out quite beyond the proper and peculiar bounds of the Protestant creed."⁶ It is clear in this book that Tillyard interprets an author's political views from the general matter of his poetry -- thus Milton wrote *Samson Agonistes* because he was "disillusioned with his country" (199). Presuming that Milton shared the feelings of others who expounded on Britain's failures, Tillyard exclaims, "How, feeling thus, could Milton possibly write a patriotic epic" (199).

Sixteen years later in *The English Epic and Its Background* (1954) Tillyard still interprets the politics in Shakespeare as a presentation of the English desire "to celebrate the present miracle: the internal peace and the security from outside foes achieved by the Tudors generally and Elizabeth in particular."⁷ But the plays' official politics did not prevent them from also mirroring the medieval concept of order. The retribution that sin incurred was but one part of the "chain of being," in which all creation was connected and everything had an impact on everything else: "Common to Shakespeare and Daniel is a solemn political philosophy. It is a philosophy, much like that of Aeschylus, of the visiting of a crime on future generations but with the hope of expiation, The [sic] whole cycle of events from Richard II to Henry VII is a classic and awe-inspiring illustration of the process" (326). The history plays express Shakespeare's "awareness of the world order that was the background of all history," and his view of "history not as a series of unrelated events but as a pattern" (260-61). Like Craig, Tillyard does not find much political content in Shakespeare's comedies.⁸

The English Renaissance (1952), published nine years after *The Elizabethan World Picture*, states the objective of the earlier hugely influential work: "To this conviction that there was no break between the medieval and Renaissance worlds I

⁶*The Miltonic Setting Past and Present* (Cambridge UP, 1938) 88-89.

⁷*The English Epic and Its Background* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1954) 260-61.

⁸See *The Nature of Comedy and Shakespeare*. The English Association Presidential Address (London, 1958).

made a minor contribution in my *Elizabethan World Picture*.⁹ But by this time his opinion has changed. He qualifies his earlier thesis, "Granted there is no abrupt rift between medieval and Renaissance, it is yet true that in the later period certain trends, going back if you will to the twelfth century, were greatly speeded up and developed so as to present an impression of novelty" (15). His final answer to the question "was there an English Renaissance" is ambivalent -- "there was and there wasn't" (112). In the studies he cites as proof of this answer he excludes not only Shakespeare but the genre of drama altogether.

In the last decade of his scholarly publication there is again a slight change in Tillyard's views, as indicated in his *Some Mythical Elements in English Literature* (1962), where he discusses Shakespeare's progression from myth representation to myth-making, suggesting the creation by Shakespeare of something different from the medieval order. But of these made-up myths he mentions only Falstaff and Coriolanus. Instead he reverts to his idea about the Tudor myth, arguing that its politics "permeate his history plays" and restating his earlier expressed views on the promotion in the plays of the official political philosophy.¹⁰ Shakespeare thus wrote *Henry VIII* because "it was something he had meant to do years before" (65) -- to do his "duty," he in a later essay writes, of "glorifying the Tudors or at least England under the Tudors."¹¹

Even when he admits in a later chapter that "With the sixteenth century in western Europe there entered a general awakening of man's active side," he does not relate this change to an emerging belief in the possibility of all humans progressing beyond their traditional class and educational levels, but rather to a "cult of the superior man," of which the only example he gives in Shakespeare is

⁹*The English Renaissance* (The Johns Hopkins P, 1952) 14.

¹⁰*Some Mythical Elements in English Literature* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962) 56-57.

¹¹"Why did Shakespeare write *Henry VIII*?" (1960), in *Essays: Literary and Educational* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962) 51.

Talbot in *Henry VI, Part I* (66-67). Thus, while Tillyard occasionally departs from his belief about the medieval conception of order in Shakespeare's plays, he habitually subsumes any new trend as reaffirmation of something from the Middle Ages, a typical remark being that "they gave a new intensity to the old conflict."¹²

Published two years after Craig's *Enchanted Glass* and five years before Tillyard's *Elizabethan World Picture*, Theodore Spencer's essay "Hamlet and the Nature of Reality" (1938) proffers a different conception of Shakespeare's political philosophy, though one still linked to order. After describing "the hierarchical order" which was "the fundamental assumption" of the "average Elizabethan," Spencer observes that

in the sixteenth century each one of the interrelated orders -- cosmological, political, and natural -- which were the frame, the basic pattern, of all Elizabethan thinking, was being punctured by a doubt. Copernicus had questioned the cosmological order, Machiavelli had questioned the political order, Montaigne had questioned the natural order. The consequences were enormous.¹³

He explains that these new ideas were as much a part of the intellectual context of Shakespeare's drama as was the medieval worldview.

In addition to this different understanding of the Elizabethan historical context, Spencer's analysis of the plays' political philosophy represents conspicuous advances over Craig's and Tillyard's. The first is in the scope of his investigation. He does not simply look at excerpts from the plays; he does not look at only the history plays as political. Secondly, his theory that the Elizabethans had "two views of man's nature, two views of the world, two views

¹²*The Elizabethan*, 70.

¹³In *Theodore Spencer: Selected Essays*, ed. Alan C. Purves (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1966) 198, 200-201; first published in *English Literary History*, 1938.

of the state" allows for a more complex analysis.¹⁴ Before broaching his analysis of *Hamlet* he indicates that this is indeed his vision: "Drama could be not merely the conflict between romantic love and external forces, as in *Romeo and Juliet*; it could represent a conflict far more complicated and far more profound" (204). The remark after this, in which reference is made to "[t]he pressure of material forces, social and economic, the political and religious situation, the growth of a realistic and satiric school of literature, the recrudescence of an emphasis on death," reveals that Spencer saw many more aspects of the Elizabethan historical context as relevant to the analysis of a drama than did either Craig or Tillyard. In his commentary on *Hamlet*, in which he considers scientific and psychological developments, he draws on more diverse historical material. His remarks on Ulysses's speech about order in an essay on *Troilus and Cressida* published two years earlier (1936) stress its dramatic function -- to "maintain the opposite principles to those illustrated by the action,"¹⁵ thus showing its context within the play is vital to understanding the political philosophy it promotes.

Like Tillyard, Spencer had begun his reflection on the era of Shakespeare while considering another author. Where Tillyard reflected on Milton, Spencer thought about Donne. He is, however, already thinking about Shakespeare in the book on Donne he edited and contributed to in 1931 -- *Garland for John Donne*. His essay entitled "Donne and His Age" identifies the age of Shakespeare with that of Donne, a period he characterizes as "full of questioning, of intellectual ferment, of skepticism and disillusion."¹⁶ He relates the philosophy of this age, as exemplified in the living historical figure of Donne, to the dramatic character of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, thus prefiguring the new historicist and cultural materialist

¹⁴"*Hamlet and the Nature*," 204.

¹⁵"A Commentary on Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida*," in *Theodore Spencer: Selected Essays*, 249.

¹⁶*A Garland for Donne* . . . (1931; Gloucester, MS: Peter Smith, 1958) 179.

criticism. But not only has Spencer a broader understanding of Shakespeare's historical milieu and a better capacity to link this milieu to his plays, he is more aware of its limitations. Probably because he was himself a poet, he observes that "an emphasis on the history of ideas can make the artistic process seem a much more deliberate and self-conscious matter than it often is."¹⁷

The subject of Spencer's most influential work, *Shakespeare and the Nature of Man* (1942), is political philosophy in the broad sense of the word, as -- in the words of Michael Oakeshott, "the relation of political life, and the values and purposes pertaining to it, to the entire conception of the world that belongs to a civilization."¹⁸ Looking at Shakespeare's plays from a three-fold perspective -- historical context, "artistic medium," and "in relation to what we believe to be true of the human experience as a whole" -- he tackles the plays' representation of the moral nature of human beings and of the relationship between ethics and politics. He again demonstrates in this book that the plays' political philosophy is as much related to the breakdown of the medieval order as it is to the idealist conception of that order.¹⁹ Using more references to the literature and history of Shakespeare's contemporaries than Craig and Tillyard, he analyzes the attack on medieval concepts this literature and history effected and how it is reflected in Shakespeare's plays. The history plays he therefore views as a complex of conflicting trends. While he fails to realize the historicity of his own interpretations, Spencer sees much more political matter in the plays than his two predecessors. Reflecting on the political content not only in the histories and tragedies but in the comedies, his comments on *Loves Labours Lost* suggest Shakespeare's relation of moral

¹⁷"Lovejoy's Essays in the History of Ideas," in *Theodore Spencer*, 326; first published in the *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1948.

¹⁸Introduction to *Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, by Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955) ix.

¹⁹*Shakespeare and the Nature of Man*, 2d. ed. (1942; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961) vii.

philosophy to political philosophy: The king of Navarre, whose traditional political philosophy remains an intellectual and unpracticed ideal, is interpreted as opposing Berowne, who learns that the real problems of society must be addressed through moral action and sacrifice (86-87).

In his discussion of the tragedies and the last plays, Spencer expands on the themes of a renewed religious faith and of the disjunction between appearance and reality. He stops short of drawing conclusions about the promotion in Shakespeare's plays of a particular political philosophy, unless we identify this philosophy with his reference to Shakespeare's words about God's power over states and with the "reconciliation between man and the ruler of the universe," which he notes is the same philosophy as that of the sixteenth-century morality plays.²⁰ His conclusions thus seem incomplete, because they do not refer to his earlier distinctive views about the contradictory historical trends.

Allan Bloom's *Shakespeare's Politics* published in 1964, more than twenty years after Spencer's book, suggests by its title a more explicit discussion of the relationship between Shakespeare's plays and political philosophy. It resembles Spencer's criticism in its focus on the breakdown of the order Craig and Tillyard thought was so solid. Like Spencer's work, it delineates a tight relationship between ethics and politics, between the philosophy of the body politic and that of the political institutions. Accordingly, Desdemona's belief in the universality of Othello, he argues, has no power to support the thesis of a supranational, supraracial humanity because she lacks the moral value of truthfulness.²¹

But Bloom's outlook differs in important ways from Spencer's. In his analysis, the split Spencer observed between the Elizabethan ideals and the reality

²⁰From *The Two Noble Kinsmen* (5.1.63), in *Shakespeare and the Nature*, 190, 201.

²¹Allan Bloom, with Harry V. Jaffa, *Shakespeare's Politics* (New York: Basic Books, 1964) 59-60. Bloom is the author of *The Closing of the American Mind* (1987).

of their society is widened to a split between the highest aspirations of our own society and whatever is within the capacity of humankind. A political philosopher himself, Bloom is deeply concerned with the fact that in twentieth-century western society there is no unity of thought on the meaning of right and wrong, a concern he announces in the second paragraph of his book on Shakespeare's plays: "The constant return to and reliance on a single great book or author has disappeared, and the result is not only a vulgarization of the tone of life but an atomization of society, for a civilized people is held together by its common understanding of what is virtuous and vicious, noble and base" (2). The publication of his book he claims is motivated by a desire to find some solution to this problem in readings of Shakespeare accessible to the general population. As such, though respectful of the necessity to examine the plays in light of their historical context, Bloom's analyses are less concerned with finding relationships between dramatic representation and Elizabethan thinking than they are with the plays' discussions of the relationship between moral and political philosophy.

A second distinction is his concern with what is considered a definitive aspect of human rights -- their universality. Both his chapters on *The Merchant of Venice* and *Othello* deal with this point. (Is it pertinent to this development, I wonder, that his major work on Shakespeare was published after the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights?) *The Merchant of Venice* he sees as representing in Venetian life "a unity expressed in men's universal desire for gain," the consequences of which "must be either conflict or a bastardization of all that is noble and true in each of the separate points of view" (31). In *Othello*, Bloom sees Shakespeare "telling us" that "universality" or at least Othello's universality "is a lie," and goes on to generalize that the "hero . . . must believe somehow in the special importance and excellence" of the place he comes from. "[A] denial of the universal standpoint" he argues "is part of the necessary narrowing of the

statesman's horizon" (57-58). It is also not good for city-dwellers like Desdemona, for "Universality on the purely political level does not conduce to the city's good" (59).

His discussion of *Coriolanus* similarly addresses the subject:

Shakespeare is no democrat. It is not, as we shall see, that he lacks sympathy for the poor; it is rather that he is convinced that certain important virtues can be possessed by only a few and that those few require special training and long tradition. It is this concentration on virtue, and particularly certain political virtues, that leads him to emphasize the special rights of the patricians. If political rights were to be equalized, as happened under Augustus, the virtues of the few would have no field of action (80).

Bloom appears to believe the plays show that a beneficent implementation of universal political rights requires universal moral virtue, and inasmuch as universal moral virtue is impossible universal political rights cannot be beneficent.²²

This philosophy developed from the fact that people who are not moral misuse their political rights; it includes the belief that because not all people have reached a high standard of integrity they should not all be given rights. Thomas Floyd's *The Picture of a perfit Common wealth* (1600) illustrates this outlook; citing Cicero, he argues against giving liberty to the "common people" because they are "immoderate" and "void of discretion," and if given freedom they will only bring about extremism and destruction.²³ On this view, rights are bestowed selectively -- only on the virtuous; hence the people who get rights will change with every election, according to the ideology and moral philosophy of the leader. The outcome -- dictatorship and its attendant revolt, instability and depressed

²²Bloom's own belief in human rights is affirmed in his later books.

²³(London: Simon Stafford, 1600) 18.

economy -- makes this philosophy objectionable. In contrast, human rights philosophy prescribes rights to people because they are entitled to it on the basis of their birth as human beings. The assumption is that when there is more freedom, people behave more responsibly, there is economic improvement, and people learn to use their rights. Rights are thus seen as conducive to the development of individuals and society.

Bloom's intention of "making Shakespeare again the theme of philosophic reflection and a recognized source for the serious study of moral and political problems" (3) leads him, like Spencer, to read Shakespeare as a discourse about human nature. In his chapter on *Julius Caesar*, he observes that "Shakespeare's Romans are not Englishmen, but real Romans" of "interest" to people at Shakespeare's time and now "precisely because human nature has not changed" (76). He describes "Shakespeare" as a "man" who "looked to Rome and to the defenders of its liberties against Caesarism for inspiration in the establishment of regimes which respect human nature and encourage a proud independence" and "who saw that the times were against Brutus and Cassius; but their cause was right" (105).

His conclusion is supportive of a philosophy of rights that insists on a differentiation between the masses and their leaders: "The next time," he declares of Brutus's and Cassius's desire "to resurrect what is best in ancient Rome," "they would need a mind comparable to that of Julius Caesar to teach them and lead them" (105). Though ahistorical, his interpretation is nevertheless related to the idea of moral and political order that so interested Craig, Tillyard and Spencer. What is new in Bloom is his stated project of making Shakespeare's philosophy useful in the contemplation of current moral and political issues. He states his belief that Shakespeare can assist in the recovery of what he sees is lacking in

twentieth-century society, but does not go so far as to describe in detail these current issues.

Political Philosophy in Shakespeare: Power

The relationship between moral and political philosophy, whose centrality to the Elizabethan order is taken for granted but is without comment in Craig and Tillyard, is what we have seen the focus of Spencer's and Bloom's analyses. In the writings of Stephen Greenblatt and his successors interested in power, it explodes into a new dimension. Pressing the disruptive history Spencer perceived for more specific facts, and looking more closely at the forms of writing prevalent in the period, they find a Shakespeare conscious of and complicit with the power struggle that was part of this disruption. Today a liquor company adopts one of the old Christmas carols, "The Twelve Days of Christmas," for its newstime television commercial -- no one bats an eyelid; but, when in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the ordinary folk of western Europe began to become aware of this appropriation of cultural material serving one ideal for its use in the service of another, they were shocked. After the shock there was a plunge and a glorying in it. The power of the word -- the central authority and the law, which in uncorrupted religion is both the representative and medium of the ideal, was at first seen (by the Protestants) to have been usurped by the Church of Rome for illegitimate purposes. It was then taken over by the English State, a multitude of others, and in a multitude of ways, for deception and manipulation, the "fashioning" of the self, the creation of new institutions and new ideals, the production of new cultural materials, and the entrenchment of political, religious and social systems. The tools of Machiavelli's *Prince* became tools for everyone. Shakespeare, these critics observe, made a self-conscious commentary on this process.

Greenblatt's *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare* (1980), *The Power of Forms in the English Renaissance* (1982) and *Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England* (1988) are all concerned with this shift in religious thinking that allowed the sacred fire to be brandished for ordinary gain -- domestic, commercial, imperialist, recreational, etc. The power that in the medieval order was concentrated in certain centres was, according to the image drawn in these books, dispersed, and through processes of imitation, appropriation and negotiation could continually change the balance of these centres:

Thus separated from the imitation of Christ -- a separation that can, as we shall see, give rise to considerable anxiety-- self-fashioning acquires a new range of meanings; it is linked to manners or demeanor, particularly that of the elite; it may suggest hypocrisy or deception, an adherence to mere outward ceremony; it suggests representation of one's nature or intention in speech or actions.²⁴

"Self-fashioning," Greenblatt goes on to explain after a reference to the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, "is in effect the Renaissance version of these control mechanisms, the cultural system of meanings that creates specific individuals by governing the passage from abstract potential to concrete historical embodiment."

He takes a gigantic step away from the interpretations of Craig, Tillyard, Spencer and Bloom in *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*, firstly because of his reliance on the theories of anthropologists like Geertz and on the progress made between 1960 and 1980 in sociology, history, science, cultural and aesthetic theory, etc. For Greenblatt, understanding Shakespeare has many more prerequisites: it does not simply need a general idea about the history of his epoch; it needs knowledge

²⁴*Renaissance Self-Fashioning* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1980) 3-4.

of the peoples' "customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters" (to use the words of Geertz he quotes).

Secondly, in contrast to the critics on order and yet related to Spencer, Greenblatt is interested not in those who maintained the stability of this order, but in those who were transformed and who became instruments of transformation as a result of its instability -- the "six writers" he discusses in this book "are all displaced in significant ways from a stable, inherited social world" (8). This displacement is their social milieu, but their action is what is of interest to him: "they all manifest in powerful and influential form aspects of Renaissance self-fashioning." A third point of distinction is Greenblatt's inductive method -- he will look at "thousands of stories" and choose from them some "who both reward intense, individual attention and promise access to larger cultural patterns" (6). The method of those critics interested in order is, as we have seen, more deductive -- from an assumption about the Elizabethan mindset they deduce the philosophy of Shakespeare's plays.

Greenblatt's abandonment of the authoritative stance is another dividing line between their criticism and his. His book will present "a set of governing conditions common to most instances of self-fashioning" but only within the position that "[t]here is no such thing as a single 'history of the self' in the sixteenth century" (8). The process he examines is a power exchange: where the power of cultural material that serves certain interests is made to serve other ideals or interests there is a loss in the perceived value and real power of the originally authoritative interests, their agents and their subjects. Thus the subject, whose identity is transformed as he submits to a new ideal or interest, bears a mark of this exchange -- a mark of gain and loss -- in the cultural material he uses (9).

In *Shakespearean Negotiations*, Greenblatt's goal is primarily sociological -- "to speak with the dead." But it is also philosophical. He wants to understand

the power of cultural material and in particular the cooperative, or to use his term, "collective," action and thinking of author and society that permit a piece of literature to call forth creative (and necessarily diverse) responses over long periods of time and among a variety of peoples. Where the earlier critics believe this power to be the effect of the transcendent truth the story conveys, Greenblatt feels it is rather the result of the estrangement of this truth through a myriad of artful forms "determined historically" and "continually renegotiated."²⁵ Objects, images and signs -- cultural material -- and the action and agents of cultural exchange are the initially noted subjects. In this book Greenblatt is not just interested in the protean manifestations of an idea but in the protean ideas bobbing beneath each piece of cultural material.

He focuses on a study of what he calls the "ideological functions of the theatre" -- its transmission of ideas of truth.²⁶ The first chapter after the introduction gives the example of an event that occurred just before Raleigh's trial for treason: Someone, whose idea of the truth was that Raleigh was an atheist and perhaps too that his treason was a result of his atheism, distributed verses about an atheistic belief from an anonymous play and wrongfully attributed them to Raleigh. These fictional verses are the cultural material appropriated by the unknown someone to express his idea of truth and to hide or displace Raleigh's own idea of truth, which remains unknown because he was not permitted to or did not express it. However dishonest, this action "fulfills a strong cultural expectation," because in the minds of people treason was associated with atheism, Greenblatt states (25).

²⁵*Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1988) 8.

²⁶By way of emphasis to the argument in Appendix One, no one can refute that in making these interpretations he infers a first audience of this theatre -- he is talking about ideas in the theatre where the plays were first performed; they were thus ideas of truth for *its* audience.

In a second example, he argues that a Machiavellian atheism could be attributed to Thomas Harriot in his writings about the social function of the religious beliefs of the Virginian Indians, because these writings closely resemble Machiavelli's statements about the Christian religion (26). Here cultural material is being displaced not on his behalf (as in Raleigh's case) but by himself, and we are not sure whether its referent is changed or not. Greenblatt believes that Harriot chooses to write about the Algonquin Indians in order to demonstrate his agreement with the Machiavellian "sense of religion as a set of beliefs manipulated by the subtlety of priests to help instill obedience and respect for authority" (26). The cultural material does not then refer to the other idea of truth (not mentioned by Greenblatt but current in the same period) -- that religion is a set of beliefs having a social function but taught to people not for their manipulation but for their benefit and peaceful development and because it is true. Nevertheless, a pretension to this belief is part of Harriot's project and is probably what enables him to publish his work.

A third example, this time about the colonists, indicates it is this latter idea of truth they pretended to be referring to while in fact it was the "atheistic" belief they upheld and used to exercise power over the colonized. Greenblatt muses over the paradoxical outcome of the two uses of the same cultural material but fails to note that those who were not punished or maligned for their atheistic belief were pretending to believe in the integrity of religion, a pretense condoned by the state. Not the cultural material they employed, but their adhesion to this idea was what had power (in this case to keep them safe from execution for treason or atheism). (Of course the cultural material did have power in the sense that it allowed the colonists to manipulate the Indians as it did also allow Harriot to manipulate the censors, but it could have power only insofar as the religious ideas it propounded were believed.)

Here we see the complex web of relations between morals and politics that Greenblatt uncovers in his work. The official state approbation of the use of pretended religion had repercussions on the morals of the individual -- he would be punished if he told the truth about this pretense; and the morals of the individual likewise impacted on politics -- the willingness to lie to the Indians about religion was a means to establish colonies and expand national power; (Greenblatt does not mention any Europeans who taught religion for the people's benefit rather than to oppress them) (30).

Returning to Harriot's writings about the Indians, Greenblatt shows how, by linking his "subversive" support in a confirmation of Machiavellian atheism to a discourse about the material benefits the Indians' land could afford the colonists, Harriot is able to suggest that the first (honestly atheistic) idea serves the same purpose as the second (atheistic but pretending-to-be-religious) idea. This argument clearly demonstrates the power of the media, because it is the textual contiguity of Harriot's two statements, one subversive and the other in accord with state policy, that no doubt enabled him to publish his work and hence put up for circulation his support of Machiavellian atheism.

Greenblatt's essay on *King Lear* in *The Power of Forms* (1982) discusses "the supreme aesthetic self-consciousness" of the play "that leads us to celebrate its universality, its literariness, and its transcendence of all ideology."²⁷ Here he considers that the play's admittance of its exploitation of theatrical charm is not evidence of an adhesion to a particular ideology. But in "Shakespeare Bewitched" (1993), he sees similar self-revelation as an action having moral implications. Having moved beyond his initial observation of the sixteenth-century trend of fashioning and his analysis of the literary negotiation of beliefs, this later essay

²⁷"*King Lear* and Harsnett's Devil Fiction," in *The Power of Forms in the English Renaissance*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt (Norman, OK: Pilgrim Books, 1982) 242.

offers a consideration of the practical and moral effects of these writing, reading and performance activities by proposing how *Macbeth* exposes these effects. What was the consequence of *Macbeth* on the population of England at the moment of its first production? Was it morally justifiable or reprehensible? are the questions Greenblatt now addresses. One of the answers he gives is that this play does not only position witchcraft as theatrical illusion and does not simply expose its tragic outcome. It widens the meaning of witchcraft to include much else in life.

One might be tempted to say this is not much different from the appearance and reality arguments of earlier critics. But it is different; because in the light of Greenblatt's multisided presentation of the importance of the age's interest in and skillful use of pretense as an agent of power, this theme is laden with more meaning than it ever had before -- it addresses the foundation of belief and the very same question as does Harriot's *A Brief and True Report*. While not as self-revealing about its moral commentary as it might be, this later essay of Greenblatt's indicates that Shakespeare's drama served the rights of the population to information -- in this case to know more about how the media works and what painful results can come from illusions kept secret.

Like Greenblatt's, Alan Sinfield's interest in the relationship between religion and Elizabethan literature opens a door to a deeper understanding of the decentring of power structures represented in Shakespeare's plays. In *Literature in Protestant England: 1560-1660* (1983), he examines the conflicts within English Protestantism and between the Calvinist doctrines of the English Protestant Church and the humanist, liberal, materialist and Catholic viewpoints that permeated the thinking of the period's writers. His observations on the Elizabethan era, as related to the writings of Sidney, Marlowe, Shakespeare, and others, indicate that the setting was ripe from the beginning for the development of secularism, relativism, and independent thought. Within these trends were the axes that would

knock down the props holding up the traditional power structures of the society, and model new ones. Sinfield's chapters on "Heroic assertion" and "Providence and tragedy," for example, show how dramas of the period, including Shakespeare's, dealt with "contradictions" in the official ideology. His analysis points out that the dissolution of religious faith and the contradictions in the conceptions of God had a significant impact on the kind of society presented in these dramas, thus suggesting the importance of religious changes for the real society.

The collaboration of Sinfield with Jonathan Dollimore in their two editions of *Political Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural Materialism* (1985 and 1994) brings together the commentary of several scholars on how consolidation, subversion and containment of the multiple powers competing for authority in the Elizabethan Jacobean culture are reflected and effected in Shakespeare's theatre. This book contributes to the understanding of how power is configured in Shakespeare by demonstrating the conservativeness of his drama -- the underdogs, whether women, the deviant, the unruly, the foreigners or the workers, are all used to reassert the traditional hegemony. In this way, the articles reconfirm earlier interpretations that identify Shakespeare's plays with the established order, but with a different perspective -- the plays are agents of a malignant disease that threatens to erase diversity from culture. They are, however, concomitantly containers of contest sites, which if teased to the surface can reveal the complexities of sixteenth-century society. A consideration of these complexities is prerequisite to a study of rights ideas in Shakespeare's plays; because of the censorship practices, it is only in the subtext that an author could raise such ideas.

These complexities and the period's major disruptions in tradition, such as the transfer of power from the Catholic Church and its teachings to other centers of authority -- among them the English State, the Anglican Church, Calvinism,

materialism, humanism -- have been the focus of much influential historical research that has gone hand in hand with the development of a new understanding of Shakespeare's plays. Some of the most notable research concerns historiography, and specifically its transformation as a result of Reformation ideas about change and progress. A conception of historiography is an agent of power, because if widely propagated in a society it shapes that society's views of its possibilities, and hence impacts on its plans, politics, and structure. Phyllis Rackin's *Stages of History: Shakespeare's English Chronicles* (1990) charts the way Shakespeare's plays make use of different conceptions of historiography and their implications for a differentiated empowerment of people according to class and gender. The period's hierarchized yet in some ways ambivalent idea of genre made history a powerful tool for the playwright:

Moving uneasily between the debased world of the theater and the elite province of poetry, the playwright was located both below and above the historian. Conceived as a mercenary theatrical entertainer, the playwright degraded the history he represented to provide gross spectacles for vulgar eyes. Conceived as a poet, he drew his authority from an idealized and idealizing tradition that elevated history from a bare record of facts to a coherent and inspirational myth of national destiny and personal heroism.²⁸

In her chapter on "Patriarchal History and Female Subversion" Rackin shows how Shakespeare's history plays use history as myth to build up the male and subvert the female characters. Relating this habitual practice to the "complicated, troubling presence" of Elizabeth's "female authority," she observes an authorization of the established order in Shakespeare's chronicles (161-2). But she also sees in them

²⁸*Stages of History: Shakespeare's English Chronicles* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1990) 111.

the occasional departure from this historiographic practice, or a "marking" of it that reveals a consciousness of its injustice to the traditionally insignificant members of society (229).

Political Philosophy in Shakespeare: Rights

In their focus on power, Greenblatt, Sinfield and Rackin contributed toward the move away from the interest in political order exhibited by Craig, Tillyard, Spencer and Bloom. Their reasoning that the more important political concerns of the period were grounded in the power of thought and word (a power that was being shared by a larger and larger group) made the views of those critics interested in rights more pertinent. Like the development in other approaches to Shakespeare's political philosophy, that in rights was dependent on a new understanding of the social context of his literature. Thus we shall see that the later work in rights -- that of Annabel Patterson -- marks a significant advance.

Charles Mills Gayley is the first scholar to posit the promotion in Shakespeare's poems and plays of a popular rights and human rights political philosophy. Whether or not they mention him, his book on the subject *Shakespeare and the Founders of Liberty in America* (1917) appears to have influenced a number of important Shakespeare scholars, including Greenblatt.²⁹ A doctor of law, as well as a professor of English literature, a commentator on social and educational reform, a scholar of myth and comparative literature, and writing in the midst of World War I, Gayley's background and circumstances

²⁹Consider for example Gayley's and Greenblatt's comments on the words of Hamlet concerning the purpose of theatre -- "to hold as 'twere the mirror up to nature, to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure (3.2.21-24)." Besides the similar interest these words evoke in them, Greenblatt's thesis, though articulated with far greater finesse, is closely connected with Gayley's ideas. (*Shakespeare and the Founders of Liberty in America* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917) 116-17; *Shakespearean Negotiations*, 8-9.) See Appendix 2.

suggest his intentions like Bloom's were connected with the moral and political problems of his times. Unlike Bloom, however, his analyses are largely historicized. In his book he draws on historical material to prove that Shakespeare had friends in the Virginia settlement who believed in freedom of conscience, government by consent, and equal rights. Second, he shows that their thinking and that expressed in excerpts from a number of Shakespeare's plays have a close affinity with Richard Hooker's legal treatise, *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, which he believed advocates natural law and equal rights, and is the foundation of American liberty. His analysis of Shakespeare's thinking focuses, like Craig's and Tillyard's, on excerpts from the plays taken out of their dramatic context, but his historical investigation is much more meticulous and focused than theirs. He considers these plays as they concern the relationship between the individual and the state, and in light of Hooker's *Laws*.

For Gayley, unlike any of the critics so far discussed, Ulysses's speech has democratic and international import. It is democratic because the "degree" referred to is not of birth but of "worth" (146-7). It concerns peace among nations and warns against the "universal war" that will come as a result of "the neglect of law and degree": "In the last ten lines," he writes, "the poet has returned to the Platonic tradition; but he has transformed the 'wolf' of Plato's republic into a Wolf of the World" (152). Henry V's concern about the justice of his war with France, he interprets as Shakespeare's concern with international law and justice.

Gayley's evaluation of Shakespeare's political philosophy opposes all those who identified his views with those of the average Elizabethan:

... I am sure that not all the political beliefs and habits of thought of Shakespeare were "the average beliefs of the time." His judgments concerning autocracy, concerning political unity and the sovereignty of the people, concerning the recognition of merit in government, the

rights of the individual, the consciousness of justice and not of might in the administration of foreign as well as domestic relations, are differentiated from, and are above "the average beliefs of the time" (157).

He sees a Shakespeare in favour of Essex and of representative government, the poor who rise up to seek democracy, "freedom of art and speech," and respect for all regardless of birth (156, 160, 129, 119). "The whole course of our poet's political drama," he writes, "makes for the development of a national consciousness by directing the freedom of the individual toward the service of the common weal and ideal -- in cooperation, aristodemocratic according to just degrees of function and desert, under the moral leadership not of an autocrat nor an oligarchy but of the best" (148). This assumes the structure of society envisaged by Shakespeare was not that which existed or which would continue to exist for centuries to come, but one based on merit.

Though Gayley's own conception of human rights and of the universal -- the meaning of *all* in "all men" -- was (like that of the framers of the American constitution)³⁰ limited because of his class consciousness and Anglo-Saxon racism,³¹ his ultimate evaluation of Shakespeare's writings focuses on these rights:

Shakespeare's ideal state is, as I have tried to show, a state where freemen render service, each in his due degree, and each protected in his service by common interest and right. "Every subject's duty is the king's; but every subject's soul is his own." Shakespeare's state, in its

³⁰See "Equal Protection of the Laws," in Craig R. Ducat, *Constitutional Interpretation: Rights of the Individual*, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: West Publishing Company, 1995) 1294ff.

³¹See his reference to classes and the last chapter (144-5).

relation with other states, is bounded by legal sanction and regulated by Justice (221-2).

Twenty-four years later and in the midst of the World War II, Alwin Thaler published as his opening quotation in *Shakespeare and Democracy* (1941) the same verse with which Gayley had ended his *Shakespeare and the Founders of Liberty in America*: "We must be free or die who speak the tongue / That Shakespeare spake," adding to it the rest of Wordsworth's sentence: "the faith and morals hold / Which Milton held."³² Thaler initially discusses Shakespeare's attitudes towards democracy by citing interpretations of statesmen and writers known for their interest in freedom -- Lincoln, Jefferson, Adams, Emerson, Carlyle, Shelley and above all Whitman, to whose comments on Shakespeare he devotes a chapter.

Of his limited analyses of a few plays, his discussion of *Coriolanus* is the most detailed. In *Coriolanus* he concludes, "Shakespeare weights the case unfairly against the Plebs, but this play exhibits, fairly on the whole and always significantly, many vexed strands of the complex social, economic and political fabric of its own and later times" (23). He sees positive images of the populace in *Richard III*, *King John*, *Henry V*, *Henry VI*, and *Richard II* (32, 40-41). In an earlier book he observes Shakespeare's "failure to utilize Magna Charta in *King John*," noting that "these silent omissions . . . are of interest primarily to the student of Shakespeare's political ideas."³³ This initial skepticism concerning the support of American democratic ideals in Shakespeare remains with Thaler, though he still considers Shakespeare's ideas relevant to democracy. Arguing that "it is fairly clear that Shakespeare was not a radical," he nevertheless observes that he "has many significant things to say -- even in the few plays we have noticed -- of

³²*Shakespeare and Democracy* (Knoxville: U of Tennessee P, 1941) 3.

³³*Shakespeare's Silences* (Cambridge, MS: Harvard UP, 1929) 15.

problems that still concern democracy to-day: of the causes of war, for example, and of the rise of tyrants; of intolerance, of poverty, of the class struggle, and of public opinion."³⁴ His final argument is that poetry like Shakespeare's is the foundation and reflection of modern life, and therefore we should turn to it for answers.

The work of Gayley and Thaler can hardly be compared to Annabel Patterson's rigorous scholarship on ideas in Shakespeare relative to democracy, popular rights and human rights. Published almost half a century after Thaler's study of the relationship of Shakespeare to democracy, her *Shakespeare and the Popular Voice* (1989) conveys, with unusual eloquence, daring and cogency, her interpretation that Shakespeare "was one of our first cultural critics" and that his criticism was directed against the anti-democratic elements of his society's structure.³⁵ It cannot be claimed that the appearance of this work just six years short of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations indicates the establishment of human rights ideals in the minds of literary theorists as a result of the fifty years of international political consultation on them. Yet there is probably some relation between these developments and Patterson's publication of an interpretation that catches up that same interest Thaler had on the eve of its creation in 1945 and Gayley on the eve of the establishment of the League of Nations in 1918.

Patterson's first aim in *Shakespeare and the Popular Voice* is "to alter common opinion" that "Shakespeare's attitude to the 'common' people (who were by far the majority of the population) ranged from tolerant amusement to contempt" (1). She demonstrates by reference to historical events that this segment of the population had an unusual impact on public life during the period Shakespeare was

³⁴*Shakespeare and Democracy*, 34.

³⁵(Cambridge, U.K.: Basil Blackwell, 1989) 9.

writing, her interpretation in part dependent upon the new knowledge of historians such as Brian Manning, whose specialized study, *Village Revolts: Protest and Popular Disturbances in England, 1509-1640* (1988), proves that popular protest in London was at a height between 1581 and 1602 (34). She also establishes through literary analysis of non-fictional writing of the period "that there was a cultural tradition of popular protest" (38). What is the most difficult part of her argument for critics now accustomed to dispense with the idea of an author is her logical deduction that "Shakespeare would have been able to speak with men who had been eyewitnesses of these events" (43), and that he intended to address them or at least the ideas that animated them. Patterson argues too that the evolving Elizabethan Jacobean politics are reflected chronologically in his compositions. Hence *Hamlet* "marks Shakespeare's transition from late Elizabethanism to the new dynamics of the reign of James I" (93), and the later plays are "obsessed" with the questions of "political representation" and "political responsibility," which in the first decade of the seventeenth century troubled so greatly the King, the Church and the parliamentarians (97).

Her analyses of the plays show them to be filled not only with historical analogy relevant to popular concerns but with signs of their author's artful concealment of his own populist views. Her conclusion, for example, of a close reading of part of the grave-digger scene in *Hamlet*, in which she not only discusses other prominent scholars' comments on it but also the literary history of its songs and phrases, is that "Radical Hamlet, the Hamlet who spoke the language of popular sports and inversion rituals, when faced with a competing popular consciousness and the *upward* mobility of wit, rejoins the aristocracy" (103). In her chapter on *Henry V* she highlights the complexity of the plays' exposé of rights issues. If its lower-class character Michael Williams represents Shakespeare's political thought, then that thought is divided in its conception of the popular:

between "the nationalist leader [Henry V] whose populist style has established the mandate (if not the justice) of his cause, and the un(common) critic of that cause [Williams] whose intelligence prohibits a simple submission of his will to the idea of popular leadership, merely because it is of national interest" (91). While her in-depth study of parts of plays does not always allow an analysis of the play as a whole in relation to the populace, Patterson does undertake this in some chapters. Her final chapter on *The Tempest*, for example, works from the opening scene to the epilogue in its development of her thesis that the play speaks about "intellectual freedom" and that Caliban, whom she notes "loves music, has learned English, speaks as good poetry as the playtext has to offer, and knows something about the laws of inheritance," represents the "underclasses" -- as much interested in this freedom as others (155-7).

Patterson's other books and articles not focused on Shakespeare are also pertinent to the human rights ideas in his dramas. One of her articles, "'For Words Only': From Treason Trial to Liberal Legend in Early Modern England" (1993), demonstrates that freedom of conscience and freedom of speech were issues of the hour for many of the authors and writings established as having been relevant in the composition and or performance of the plays. In this article on "Holinshed's" *Chronicles*, a work we know Shakespeare used in the writing of his plays, she documents the interest in free speech expressed by writers, revolutionaries and government spokesmen from the mid 1500s to the late 1600s.³⁶ Her subsequent books, *Reading Holinshed's Chronicles* (1994) and *Early Modern Liberalism* (1997), which I have only discovered during the final editing of this work, expand this exploration immensely and extend it into the 1700s. The former book on Holinshed is extremely important in that it brings to the fore the complex interplay in the real society of sixteenth-century England of the opinions for and against

³⁶Published in *Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities*, 5 (1993): 389-416.

freedom of conscience and freedom of expression. The latter work is also highly significant because it demonstrates that human rights burgeoned both in Britain and in North America in the period immediately following Shakespeare's.

Furthermore, it reinforces the lines of contact between our present human rights philosophies and those of early modern England.

Political Philosophy and the Theatre as Public Space: Spectacle and Authority

In addition to the new understanding of the order, powers and rights ideas at play in Elizabethan Jacobean society, there have been increasing interest and advances in the knowledge about how theatre and theatrical elements were used to moderate, mediate between and communicate this order, these powers and these rights ideas. An understanding of these practices is essential to an interpretation of the human rights ideas in Shakespeare, because these ideas were generally represented metaphorically and had to be read this way by the audience. That such reading was traditional for Elizabethan audiences is indicated in Sydney Anglo's *Spectacle, Pageantry, and Early Tudor Policy* (1969), which elucidates the correspondence between political ideology and the icons, emblems and plots in Tudor pageants and plays, and demonstrates that it was readable for a portion of the population and sometimes for the generality of the people. Because pageantry and plays were used by the monarch and clergy to control the political thinking of the people, Tudor spectacle (he explains) cannot be understood without a knowledge of its political context. Plays were performed at the time of important political events, and their metaphors had a particular relation to government policy. Instances of this include Cardinal Wolsey's efforts to raise money for war, to prepare the population for a French-English marriage alliance, and later to entertain the French ambassadors, all of which were accompanied by specially arranged

pageantry, bonfires, or plays.³⁷ Similarly, the motive for Henry VIII's pageant series preceding the crowning of Anne Boleyn was to assert his new status vis-à-vis Rome (247).

Two books edited by Anglo, one on writers about magic -- *The Damned Art* (1977) -- and the other entitled *Chivalry and the Renaissance* (1990), expose a more complicated relationship between authority and spectacle. The performance, ritual and spectacle intrinsic to magic and chivalric duelling were being viewed in a new way. The revolution in attitudes to witchcraft and magic described in *The Damned Art* required that "thinkers had no longer to be overawed by the massive authorities of the past."³⁸ But where the dissolution of belief undermined witchcraft both as danger to be attacked and a practice to be sought, its effect on chivalry was to separate the art of killing from the ideals of honour and justice.³⁹ Spectacle as a proponent of official, popular or subversive authority was therefore under threat on a number of sides, as it became (like the verbal material Greenblatt writes of) an instrument for self-fashioning in the service of multiple interests, and as fewer and fewer believed it was anything other than pretense. The more skeptical interpretive role this engendered in the population meant (I would suggest) that spectacle could afford a way for people to mull over a diversity of political, religious and moral philosophies, but that it had less didactic power.

In his introduction to *The Tudor Interludes Nice Wanton and Impatient Poverty* (1984), Leonard Tennenhouse argues that the development of this skepticism was related to a number of factors, ranging from the Anglican directives concerning images to the debasement of the English currency, and that it was

³⁷"Magnificence: the Zenith of Wolsey's Power: 1522-1528," *Spectacle, Pageantry, and Early Tudor Policy* (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1969) 207-8.

³⁸*The Damned Art: Essays in the Literature of Witchcraft* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977) 246.

³⁹Introduction to *Chivalry in the Renaissance* (Woodbridge: Boydell P, 1990) xiiiiff.

reflected in the popular drama of the period. As the two interludes he looks at are at first glance moralities without political content, he wonders why the government imposed progressively more severe restrictions on their performance.⁴⁰ A careful examination of the transformations in the prodigal son motif (present in *Nice Wanton*) leads Tennenhouse to observe that "this theme, more than any other, allowed dramatists to revise earlier notions of authority" (7). Though the challenge *Nice Wanton* and *Impatient Poverty* raise against the older ideology is not evident within the plot, it takes place in the mental comparison the audience made with traditional formulae of the prodigal son and contemptus mundi motifs (12). Three decades later, in the plays of Shakespeare and Marlowe, these two elements would be present within plays as aspects of a dialectical dialogue and complex plot. The Tudor interludes, like the early Tudor pageantry, thus helped form a popular mindset that could respond to the new dramatic structure and political philosophy in Shakespeare's plays and those of other Elizabethan and Jacobean playwrights.

Tennenhouse's other observations suggest an important question about the function of drama. He notes that the materialist ethos and the Reformation *Injunctions* of the period (1536-1549) are reflected in both of the interludes studied, though one is Protestant and one is Catholic. Does this mean sixteenth-century drama was only a reflector of the popular mindset, or was it also an innovator of new philosophies? His later essay, "Violence done to women on the Renaissance stage," in which he finds similarly clear connections between the violence done to the female body in Shakespeare's plays and the conditions of Elizabeth's body politic at the time those plays were composed and performed,⁴¹ would seem to suggest that the popular drama of the era is merely an affirmation of

⁴⁰*The Tudor Interludes Nice Wanton and Impatient Poverty* (New York: Garland, 1984) 6.

⁴¹In *The Violence of Representation: Literature and the history of violence*, ed. Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse (London: Routledge, 1989) 77-97.

political conditions. His analysis of *Henry VIII* in *Power on Display: The Politics of Shakespeare's Genres* (1986) bears up this impression in its demonstration that this play "resembles the dramatic romances and masques that came into favor under James more than it does a chronicle history play as we know it."⁴² The reason for this change of genre, he explains, is to allow for an identification of "genealogy" with "providence" and for a "carnavalesque" unification and "continuity" between misrule and rule, both of which actions mimicked the political strategies James employed to maintain power (97-99).

However, these conclusions should be considered in the light of Tennenhouse's chief interest. This was not to make an analysis of the politics in Shakespeare's plays, but to look at "the historical process preserved for us in Shakespeare's use of certain cultural materials" (123). Because his study is limited to a few of these cultural materials as they relate to a few matters, he is able to chart a correspondence between aspects of the plays and some of the society's political features, thus illustrating that the playwright transformed his use of icons in accordance with their transformation in the political life of the nation. This evolution in imagery does not necessarily reflect the philosophy of the plays.

Stephen Orgel's studies of Elizabethan and Jacobean masques introduce a third function of spectacle in relation to authority. Where Anglo demonstrates the early Tudor pageants and plays were a means of molding popular opinion, and where Tennenhouse shows the interludes functioned to authorize emerging materialist ideals, Orgel illustrates the masques that developed concurrently with Elizabethan and Jacobean drama and later almost supplanted popular theatre were frequently a means of binding those in authority to an idealized image of that authority. Thus it appeared to some that the masque was for the king and his court

⁴²(New York: Methuen, 1986) 96.

as a divine revelation is for a prophet.⁴³ However, vis-à-vis the audience, the king or queen acted out the role of the prophet, all the while educating the on-lookers in their role as malleable selves ready to be transformed through his bounty and as recipients of a regal goodness endorsed by and originating from the divine. The presence of the monarch at the centre of the masque was its most essential characteristic. The action therefore had two aspects, one in reference to the monarch, who was not only the performer but recipient of the ideal, and one in reference to the other participants and the audience, who were witnesses to this relationship. Orgel describes this dual function:

The masque presents the triumph of an aristocratic community; at its center is a belief in the hierarchy and a faith in the power of idealization. Philosophically, it is both Platonic and Machiavellian; Platonic because it presents images of the good to which the participants aspire and may ascend; Machiavellian because its idealizations are designed to justify the power they celebrate. As a genre, it is the opposite of satire; it educates by praising, by creating heroic roles for the leaders of the society to fill.⁴⁴

Masques were held at gatherings in which courtiers, lawyers, university students, and the wealthy middle-class were present, so that a theatre which spoke to the monarch and in which the monarchy affirmed its power was familiar to a substantial portion of the population.

With an audience of this background, Shakespeare, whose locale of production was more often the public theatre, could say a great deal about the ideal state and the relationship between the state and moral philosophy. Because the

⁴³Orgel cites the comparison given by the theologian John Smith as a "valid metaphor" for the relationship between the masque's "action" and "audience." *The Jonsonian Masque* (Cambridge, MS: Harvard UP, 1965) 6.

⁴⁴*The Illusion of Power: Political Theatre in the English Renaissance* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1975) 40.

audience was used to seeing the masque speak to the monarch about government, it could (I argue) easily imagine Shakespeare's plays speaking to those in authority about political philosophy. "The central experience of drama at court," Orgel notes, "involved not simply the action of a play, but the interaction between the play and the monarch, and the structured organization of the other spectators around him" (11-12). Shakespeare's audience was an audience of a play rather than a masque. A masque was an acting out of something said to be real, but a play was the acting of something pretended. The play, if seen in light of the genre of the masque, could thus suggest a precariousness in the authority assumed by the masque. At the same time it could promote its proposals for new moral and political orders, like those of the masque, as real and as applicable to real life.

Orgel's studies of the monarch's and the aristocrats' patronage of the court and private masques, like Anglo's of their and the clergy's sponsorship of the pageants in the early Tudor days, show that patronage also had implications for the ideologic function of Shakespeare's drama. Later on the publication of plays led to another kind of fosterage, one no longer popular.⁴⁵ But in between these two moments of confined patronage was a period in which the establishment of a permanent public theatre enabled popular drama to be institutionalized.⁴⁶ The move from the undefined space of itinerant players to permanent public place occurred in 1576 when James Burbage built The Theatre -- the first or second permanent theatre in Europe, Orgel notes, since Roman times. Some fourteen or fifteen years later it would be the scene (with other public stages) of Shakespeare's plays. Thus the big patron of Shakespeare's work was *the public*, who saw plays in theatres built by businessmen such as Burbage. Because all classes were

⁴⁵"The Royal Theatre and the King," in *Patronage in the Renaissance*, ed. Guy Fitch Lytle and Stephen Orgel (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981) 272-3.

⁴⁶*The Illusion*, 2.

together, these theatres were "a democratizing institution."⁴⁷ It seems logical to conclude that their location within and yet separate from a constellation of different theatrical traditions, each of which situated authority differently vis-à-vis the audience and the play, meant they could be media for philosophizing rather than simply promoters of a given philosophy. The collection of all strata of society in a place independent from locations associated with either the state or the clergy would facilitate this process.

Theatre as Political Institution

For the editor of the 1821 French translation of Shakespeare's works François Guizot, theatre had to have these functions for it to develop in any society. In his essay "Shakespeare and His Times," published in this work and again separately in 1852, he observes that any good drama springs from a society in which people of different classes, backgrounds, occupations and tastes -- a "public at once homogeneous and various" -- have cultivated activities in which there is an exchange of views and shared social celebration.⁴⁸ The reign of Elizabeth, he argues, provided the ideal elements for good theatre, because the peace, prosperity and many time-honoured activities encouraged it. Drama had already been developing much more freely than on the continent owing to the clergy's and the population's encouragement of wandering minstrels (43f). Guizot's view that traditional popular culture had an impact on Elizabethan drama has been taken up by a number of twentieth-century Shakespeare scholars.

Robert Weimann, for example, ponders the theatrical experience in the public theatres of Shakespeare's time, in light of what he calls "the actor-audience

⁴⁷*The Illusion*, 8.

⁴⁸*Shakespeare and His Times* (London: Richard Bentley, 1852) 2-9. First published in French as *Sur la vie et les oeuvres de Shakespeare*. Paris, 1821.

contact" and "the oral and mimetic heritage of the popular culture."⁴⁹ He initially explains that the act of imitating is in itself political in that it is a way of offering a revision of the real society. This implies that drama even in its most primitive forms is a way for the population to participate in the reformation of the social structure and moral values. In Elizabethan times, the large stage surrounded on three and sometimes four sides by the spectators and seen both from above and below, and the frequent extension of the playing space into the place of the audience, offered a physical setting conducive to this function. Shakespeare's plays were designed, Weimann explains, to take advantage of this setting, so that some speeches and actions are purposely confined to the *locus* (the place of the "symbolic" and "illusionistic") and others are meant to be directed towards the *platea* (the area near the audience); in this way the play provides a dialectic appeal to two authorities -- the ideation enacted in the locus and that elicited from the audience.⁵⁰ As we shall see in the chapter on *Much Ado* and in the forthcoming study on freedom of speech, this had implications for the audience experience, especially the plays' power to evoke reflection about rights.

Weimann notes that there is "enormous discontinuity between the ritual origins and elements of folk culture, or even the medieval lay theater, and the Elizabethan stage," but is convinced there are also important continuities (xvi). Some have significance for our interpretation of Shakespeare's plays and the political philosophy they discuss, for they are part of the theatrical traditions to which the author and audience of Elizabethan and Jacobean dramas could refer. In her book *Mock Kings in Medieval Society and Renaissance Drama* (1991), Sandra

⁴⁹*Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theater: Studies in the Social Dimension of Dramatic Form and Function*, ed. Robert Schwartz (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1978) xv. First published in a slightly different version in German in 1967.

⁵⁰*Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition*, 212ff. See also "Bifold Authority in Shakespeare's Theatre," *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 39.4 (1988): 401-17.

Billington gives an account of one of them -- the Lord of Misrule and his "topsy-turvydom." The implications of this and other Carnival traditions for the interpretation of each one of Shakespeare's plays have yet to be fully explored.

Inspired by Mikhail Bakhtin, Michael Bristol has commenced this exploration, first by an analysis of it as related to authority in his *Carnival and Theater: Plebeian Culture and the Structure of Authority in Renaissance England* (1985), and second by some focused studies of the relation between aspects of popular culture and Shakespeare's plays.⁵¹ In *Carnival and Theater* he argues that the Carnival tradition was a means for the population to subvert the established order and thereby question it. Their displacement of weapons, war horses, etc. -- the materials of the traditional authorities -- by pots, pans, utensils -- materials representing the values of the population -- was a way for them to express their views and imagine a revision of the dominant ideology. Within the ethos of the sixteenth century, when English people moved beyond imagined changes to more vigorously believed in and attempted changes, the dramas performed for an audience of this tradition would be perceived as more powerful revisions than the Carnivals. For them, a play was more like a proposal of a new ideology having the possibility of implementation and therefore put up for serious consideration. The attempt of Essex's friends to use a production of *Richard II* as a means of inciting political action shows the currency of these attitudes, as does also the suppression of certain dramas and parts of dramas by the government censors. Carnival, Bristol explains, is less ambitious: It "is put into operation as resistance to any tendency to absolutize authority, and to the disruptive radicalizations of

⁵¹See, for example, "Funeral Bak'd Meats: Carnival and the Carnavalesque in *Hamlet*," in *Hamlet: Case Studies in Contemporary Criticism*, ed. Susanne Wofford (Boston: Bedford Books, 1994) 348-67; "In Search of the Bear: Spatio-Temporal Form and the Heterogeneity of Economies in *The Winters Tale*," *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 42 (1992): 145-67.

social life proposed and implemented by powerful ruling elites."⁵² This moderating function, however, operates within a moral framework. Bristol indicates in his analysis of *King Lear*, for example, that the Carnival rituals play a role in educating Lear and other characters in principles of justice.

The exploration of Carnival culture in Shakespeare's plays, along with the growing perception of the playwright's consciousness of that culture, and his possible employ of it to undertake "cultural criticism"⁵³ have repercussions for our comprehension of the dramas' function in their first performances. Bristol's article, "In Search of the Bear: Spatio-Temporal Form and the Heterogeneity of Economies in *The Winters Tale*" (1992), implies this: "The gift economy that was dominant in the first half of the play now must coexist with an active and aggressive market in commodities and commodity exchange" (163); the two conflicting economic orders whose competing forces were at play in Elizabethan society were presented in this drama as entailing sharply differentiated modes of life, thus analyzed for the audience in relation to other aspects of their life. That members of the play's first audience mused over multiple interpretations, realistic and allegoric, sociologic and nostalgic, might be inferred from his identification of some of the "manifold symbolic functions of [the] device," *Exit pursued by a Beare*. These range from the bear's folkloric association with "the winter season" and the tradition of "carnavalesque bear-man" to its representation of "deliberate making" and fantastic reproduction -- "boundaries and transformations, marking both the moment of ending or death and the moment of new beginnings or birth" (158-61). The double set of correspondences Bristol traces between events in the play and the traditional, natural and religious "spacio-temporal forms" and those of the emerging capitalistic and secular order speaks to changes occurring in the

⁵²*Carnival and Theater: Plebeian Culture and the Structure of Authority in Renaissance England* (New York: Methuen, 1985) 213.

⁵³Patterson's term.

London society of this play's first production. The complex management of traditional Carnival markers in the play and the interweaving of these markers with other story elements related to the moral and political challenges facing this society thus suggest that the play worked, at least for a few members of its first audience, as a profound philosophical reflection and an astute sociological analysis.

Dramatic Characters, Spectators and Political Philosophers

Against the background of this scholarship on the sixteenth-century aesthetics of the dramatic arts, the functioning of Shakespeare's characters as political philosophers and his plays as commentary on the society's problems is very plausible. The idea is encapsulated in one of the canon's best loved scenes. When Falstaff pleads, "Play out the play. I have much to say in behalf of that Falstaff," he is commenting on the role of Prince Hal, whose fictional character he is performing so as to be able to say in a play the good things about himself he wishes the Prince would say in real life. In this way he can express how he envisions the future of the state as it relates to people like him. In the position of king his statements will have the authority to define the politics of the society -- they will also formulate the dominant ideology. What happens in this play-within-a-play is identical, then, with what could happen in Shakespeare's plays when they were first performed in the real Elizabethan Jacobean society. The pronouncements about society and the state in his plays by other characters of greater and lesser power convey ideologies too. The reworking in the theatre of the ideas of these characters, some powerful, some having little power, was thus a reworking of dominant and suppressed ideologies -- the setting forth of new ideologies that constitute a political philosophy.

The surrounding life activity in a play, whether willed actions or unexpected occurrences, functioned as the supporting myths of these new ideologies, constructed by their author to a particular design that gave precedence

to "better myths" and "better ideologies." In this way a popular drama could embody a political philosophy. At the same time this drama might test or energize the political philosophy of the real society when it offered an example of the application of this philosophy. The testing occurred when putting a political philosophy into practice in the society of a play revealed unforeseen difficulties or results that did not accord with the assumptions and purposes of the said philosophy. On the other hand, the energizing resulted from the new knowledge produced when the application of the said philosophy in the "real life" of the play revealed added benefits and new avenues of potential development of which the audience was unaware. At a given historical moment the same play could do all of these; the extent to which it did was dependent upon the members of the audience, some of whom would give it one meaning, others another, each according to his or her political and moral aspirations and concerns.

The complement to the capacity of the plays to propose philosophies for people was therefore their audiences' capacity to philosophize. This, it would seem, was an activity carried to the extreme; James I complained that his people

left [nothing] untouched from the top to the bottom, neither in talking, nor writing of the highest mysteries of the Godhead and the inscrutable counsels of the Trinity, nor of the confused actions of the devils in the lowest pit of hell, such is the misery of this age that most men in their extreme niceness and curiosity spare not to aspire [to] God's secrets and audaciously to invade the deepest mysteries that belong to kings and princes, and to all regal government.⁵⁴

In view of the traditional connections between religion and politics, religion and theatre, and popular ritual and theatre, still strong in the sixteenth century, it can be

⁵⁴John Stow, *Annales, or, A generall chronicle of England begun by John Stow; continued . . . by Edmund Howes* (Londini: Richardi Meighen, 1631) 896-99.

assumed that for the general population and its leaders the theatre was very much a part of the process of the community's reformulating its political and moral views. Secondly, some of the main participants as spectators, playwrights, actors, and critics were lawyers, members of parliament, university students, lords and ladies, and the intelligentsia -- those intensely concerned with the future of England. The village folk who came to London to sell their goods and those in provinces who thronged the events put on by travelling players may also have been, as Falstaff shows us in his role as Prince Hal, interested in the future of the state and the welfare of English society. The deluge of popular material in the period expressly about the conscience and the processes of thinking and giving opinions was addressed to ordinary folk and would have encouraged them in the already growing trend of philosophizing.⁵⁵

Much of this material is also related to what John Wilks has called the "discourses of conscience," the English Renaissance religious philosophy concerning the relationship between human will and intellect, and the divine will.⁵⁶ His book *The Idea of Conscience in Renaissance Tragedy* (1990) and Camille Slight's earlier *The Casuistical Tradition* (1981)⁵⁷ concern the challenge and process of obtaining judgment that is holy, or at least not sinful, and the reflection of this concern in English Renaissance literature. Their focus is religious and therefore different from the question examined here.

⁵⁵Among this material were do-it-yourself manuals on how to arrive at a just judgment. Some popular pamphlets gave a moral value to thinking (See, for example, Leonard Wright's *The Pilgrimage to Paradise*, augmented ed. (H. L[ownes] for W. Leake, 1608) ch. 9, E1r-E1v).

⁵⁶John S. Wilks, *The Idea of Conscience in Renaissance Tragedy* (London: Routledge, 1990) 9.

⁵⁷Camille Wells Slight, *The Casuistical Tradition in Shakespeare, Donne, Herbert, and Milton* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981).

Human Rights Ideas in Shakespeare: The Historical Context

As the gleanings of history swept to the surface in the above discussion and in the first part of this chapter suggest, the events and debates within the period Shakespeare was writing provided an ideal environment for his spectators to develop ideas about rights. Whether in the political structure, the religious system, education, recreation, the judicial structure, or the treatment of women and foreigners, the transformations brought about at this time were an impetus to these new conceptions of liberty and justice. The changes in the English constitution during the Tudor reigns which culminated in Elizabeth's government, the accompanying growth in the number of parliamentary seats, the change of their occupancy from the aristocrats to the new gentry, and the shift in relative power from the upper house to the lower house⁵⁸ were among the numerous reforms in the English government that resulted from the ideological conflicts of the period and which both represented and impelled an increasing interest in democracy, for it meant that more citizens were involved in the consultative and decision-making processes of the government. This development towards a democratic form of government provided the political frame within which human rights law could be conceived,⁵⁹ and was thus an important aspect of the social context of human rights discussions in Shakespeare's plays.

A religious frame similarly conducive to the development of human rights ideas was shaped by the Protestant view that every individual had the responsibility to know and interpret scripture. Hooker's and the Puritan parliamentarians' view that reform and change in religion and law were desirable allowed for a vision in

⁵⁸G. R. Elton, ed. *Tudor Constitution, Documents and Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1960) 244; J. E. Neale, *The Elizabethan House of Commons* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1950) 372.

⁵⁹Human rights scholars concur that a democratic form of government is required for the implementation of human rights. See, for example, Norberto Bobbio, *The Age of Rights*, trans. Allan Cameron (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1996) 89.

which human society moved from a state of insufficient justice to one of greater justice. On the other hand the issue of freedom of conscience addressed by Thomas More in his *Utopia*, which describes a society where a greater than usual degree of freedom of religion is permitted, and his and others' courageous insistence on exercising their freedom of conscience (whether Catholic, Protestant or atheist) kindled people's interest in this freedom and encouraged the belief that it was a right. At the same time, writings concerned with human rights ideas became more accessible, among them Thucydides's statement that "certain rights inhere in human nature and should be respected by all organized societies"⁶⁰ and the story in Plutarch of Lycurgus's redistribution of landed property.⁶¹ The Pentateuch became another important influence; in its Old Testament form connected with the Gospel, it was the most widely circulated book. It had enormous and diverse usage by the Protestant population, and imbued the ordinary people with empathy for the Israelites, whose liberation from Egypt inspired them (as it would later the slaves of America) with a vision of freedom and justice. It was to this story (amongst others) that Christopher Goodman drew the attention of his readers in his book *How Superior Powers Oght To Be Obeyd* (1558), where he argues for the right to resist unjust government.⁶² M. Turchetti's "A la racine de toutes les libertés: la liberté de conscience" explains that Paul's writings in the New Testament also provided preliminary ideas of freedom.⁶³ The humanist doctrine of the dignity of man and the Protestant ideas concerning participation in worship and study and the submission of the conscience to God alone were promulgated in

⁶⁰*The History of the Peloponnesian War*, Great Books of the Western World, vol. 6 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952) 78.

⁶¹*Plutarch on Sparta*, trans. Richard J. A. Talbert, with an introduction and notes (Penguin, 1988) 16-17.

⁶²*How Superior Powers Oght To Be Obeyd Of Their Subjects: and Wherin they may Lawfully by Gods Worde be disobeyed and resisted* (Geneva: John Crispin, 1558) tp, 100, 192-5.

⁶³*Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, 56. 3 (1994): 627.

such influential texts as the writings of Marsilio Ficino, Luther, Zwingli, Melanchthon and Calvin. Turchetti credits these latter reformers with the theory of the most fundamental of human rights, freedom of conscience.

New attitudes to education and the greater accessibility of knowledge enhanced the exercise of this right. The dissemination of printed literature, even with Queen Elizabeth's censorship laws, was nowhere else in Europe less restrictive. The comings and goings of merchants and others, who also brought new information to the population were at an all-time high; and education, now seen by many as a prerogative for all male children, was in the humanist spirit, appropriating the ideas of every culture and every thinker available. Popular songs promoted the trend to liberty in all strata of society, using metaphoric language where they might not speak plainly. These activities suggest there was both an increased interest in expression of belief and in the formation of new beliefs, a situation that would augment interest in rights as it did resistance to the censorship laws and to the laws restricting religion and politics.

While controls on freedom of expression were strengthened even as opportunities for literacy and education were growing, the presence of recusants in the population kept concerns about these controls in the forefront of the parliamentary proceedings. The sensitivity of the subject for the government is evident in the repeated acts designed to produce conformity in education, language, and, above all, religious and political belief. The great importance of the freedoms of conscience and speech to public discourse is revealed in the frequency and specificity with which they were raised in Parliament. The Lords' Speaker Yelverton in his closing speech of 9 February 1598 mentioned, as separate values, freedom of conscience, which he calls "libertie of liking" and freedom of speech, which he calls "freedome of discourse":

If that comon wealth (most sacred and renowned Quene) was reputed in the world to be the best-framed, and most likely to flourishe in felicitie, where the subjectes had there freedome of discourse, and there libertie of likeing, in establishing the / lawes that should governe them; then must your Majestie's mighty and most famous realme of England (by this your most gracious benignitie) acknowledge it self the most happie of all the nations under heaven, that possesseth this favour in more frank and flowing manner then any kingdome doth besides.⁶⁴

In addition to the self-conscious manner in which these values were kept in sight, the economic revolution, the famines, the plagues, the dislocation of the peasants as a result of enclosure and conscription, as well as the new opportunities to change one's class and profession, all conduced to a thirst for equality and justice.

Questions about the judicial structure contributed to this trend, as the loosening of controls on the lives of those living in large urban centres alternated with the repression resulting from the cruel and the restrictive laws instituted during Elizabeth's reign. Like consequences resulted from the tightening of earlier limits on private corporations and guilds, vagabonds and beggars, paradoxically effected at the same time as liberalizing laws for the recruitment of apprentices and the care of the poor. The growing concern for justice is evident in the protests and demands for change being put forward, as for example the petition complaining of prison conditions submitted around 1596 by prisoners in the London prison, "the Hole of Wood Street Compter."⁶⁵

Discussions about the natives of the new world; the qualities of women; authority in government and religion; participation in interpretation, teaching,

⁶⁴Great Britain, House of Lords, *Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I*, ed. T. E. Hartley, vol. 3 1593-1601 (London: Leicester UP, 1981) 197.

⁶⁵George Ives, *A History of Penal Methods: Criminals, Witches, Lunatics* (NJ: Patterson Smith, 1975) 66; Richard Byrne, *Prisons and Punishments of London* (London: Harrap, 1989) 47.

learning and preaching; international sea law; the morality of war; marital consent; and the diversity of opinions shook the minds of many who could read, and were thus part of their background relevant to human rights ideas. The occasional emergence of concerns for women's equal rights represented another important experience for the people. In the 1601 "Tenth Parliament" Sergeant Harrys, for example, raised as problematic the fact that the punishment for adultery imposed "jus inaequale" on men and women when it was applied to the poor, because no property could be taken from the man but goods could be taken from the woman.⁶⁶ Although his protest against this injustice was strongly rejected, it is nevertheless significant that he raised it.

Equally important was the interest in other nations, "races," and religions fed by travel books, visitors to England and the unprecedented travel undertaken for purposes of trade and exploration. The following statement of Purchas's is one of many that indicate the concept of "human" had already extended beyond what was European and that these "others" were worthy of respect:

Things humane, are such as Men are, or have, or have done or suffered in the World. Here therefore the various Nations, Persons, Shapes, Colours, Habits, Rites, Religions, Complexions, Conditions, Politike and Oeconomike Customes, Languages, Letters, Arts, Merchandises, Wares, and other remarkeable Varieties of Men and humane Affaires are by Eye-witnesses related more amply and certainly than any Collector ever hath done . . .⁶⁷

⁶⁶Great Britain, House of Commons, "Townshend's journal, 27 October-19 December 1601," *Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I*, vol. 3, 360.

⁶⁷Preface to *Purchas His Pilgrimes*, vol. I (London, 1625). Grotius, for example, refers to the teaching of "sacred history . . . that all men are sprung from the same first parents" as one of the reasons it is wrong to harm "a fellow man" (*Prolegomena*, trans. Francis W. Kelsey, with an introduction by Edward Dumbauld (New York: The Liberal Arts P, 1957) 12). A similar liberal attitude to other nations is evident in Bacon's *New Atlantis*.

With this knowledge people began to identify themselves with populations outside their own, and to see other nations, "races" and religions as aspects of their own. As association with others increased because of changes in class structure and equalization of educational level, and through travel and books, the idea that human beings had certain characteristics in common grew. This is not to say that many of these ideas were not false; William Hamlin's *The Image of America in Montaigne, Spenser, and Shakespeare* and Stephen Orgel's "Shakespeare and the Cannibals" demonstrate how much authors rationalized in their perceptions of "the other."⁶⁸ But the increasing knowledge of others, as much as it gave way to domination and oppression, also generated respect.

Like the debates and events contemporaneous to the audience of Shakespeare's plays, the history that surrounds the years in which he was writing his dramas, roughly between 1588 and 1613, made for a cauldron of intense ideological strife in which early human rights ideas took more solid shape. Religious conflicts had been mounting for at least two centuries before the bloody persecution within England in the early and mid sixteenth century and the Spanish Armada on its frontiers in 1588; they would resurface in England in the Puritan-Anglican discord of the seventeenth century and in Europe in the last and fiercest of the great religious wars that ended with the Peace of Westphalia. The unbounded bloodshed, which in this latter conflict reduced the population in some regions by one third to one half, could not but awaken participants to the necessity of some law that ensured people's right to freedom of belief. Similarly, internal political conflicts concerned with the exercise of sovereignty wracked people's consciences in England before and after the relative quiet in which Shakespeare wrote his plays, moving them to call for freedom of speech and the right to representation.

⁶⁸(New York: St. Martin's, 1995); in *Cannibals, Witches, and Divorce: Estranging the Renaissance*, ed. Margorie Garber (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1987) 40-66.

Major political and legal changes also bracketed this period. Three and half centuries before, the rights of certain free men had been advocated in the Magna Carta, although it was not until the 1590s that the conception of this document as "a liberty document" was expressly commented on.⁶⁹ Three decades after Shakespeare's final dramatic composition, Levellers such as William Walwyn arose to fight for freedom of conscience. His remarks in a public letter to the prisoner John Lilburn that the "Magna Charta hath been more precious in your esteeme then it deserveth" show the development in conceptions of liberty that took place in that brief period.⁷⁰ The Habeas Corpus act of 1679, which enjoined restrictions on the detention without trial of any person, and the 1689 English Bill of Rights, which limited the powers of the crown and provided for the free election of members of parliament, were culminating landmarks in the history of human rights, to which the earlier debates contributed. In this same century, three important writers appeared -- Grotius, Hobbes and Locke -- all of whom have been widely recognized for their contributions to human rights philosophy.⁷¹ Of these, Hobbes, when he was in London as a tutor from 1608 to 1610, was in touch with the same society as was Shakespeare and his first audiences. Perhaps he attended Shakespeare's plays and mulled over the human rights ideas they conveyed before creating his own political philosophy.

⁶⁹It is William Lambarde's commentary *Archeion*, written in 1591 though not published until 1635, that is attributed with this breakthrough. See Faith Thompson, *Magna Carta: Its Role in the Making of the English Constitution 1300-1629* (Minneapolis: The U of Minnesota P, 1948) 186. Elizabethan lawyers put this idea into practice when they quoted it in favour of Puritan freedoms against Archbishop Whitgift (Maurice Ashley, *Magna Carta in the Seventeenth Century* (Charlottesville: The UP of Virginia, 1965) 8).

⁷⁰*The Writings of William Walwyn*, ed. Jack R. McMichael and Barbara Taft (Athens: The U of Georgia P, 1989) 148.

⁷¹Paul Sieghart, *The International Law of Human Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1983) 7.

Human Rights Ideas in Shakespeare: The Semantic Context

John Manning's comments that "Emblematic images and structures may be discerned in all sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literary forms" confirm the importance of the adjunctive analogical and allegorical interpretations Shakespeare's plays inspired. While he focuses on the dramatic genre's characteristic "combination of the visual and verbal,"⁷² this study looks as well to other images and structures to see how they might have been philosophically interpreted in the minds of some Elizabethan playgoers -- those who were pondering a new vision of a society in which freedom of thought would belong to everyone and would bring challenges and complexities along with its benefits. Icons like "bear" and "violated woman" had political significance, Bristol and Tennenhouse tell us, indicating the distinction between this semantics and that of today's North American English-speaking society. Reading characters as representative of ideas or of certain groups of people was in fact habitual in the early English Renaissance, for the moral allegories of the Middle Ages were still widespread at the time Shakespeare was writing.⁷³ So Angell Day's *The English Secretary* published in 1595 notes that allegory was commonly used even in the oral culture of Elizabethan England, calling it "a Trope most usual amongst us even in our common speaking."⁷⁴ The materials in use likewise suggest this -- the images engraved on furniture and buildings, produced on business signs, on clothing and packaging and in pageants, as well as the emblems printed on monuments and broadsides and in the title pages of pamphlets and books.

⁷²"*Symbola and Emblemata in Hamlet*," in *New Essays on Hamlet*, ed. Mark Thornton Burnett and John Manning (New York: AMS P, 1994) 11.

⁷³In some allegories, for example, one character represented the ensemble of relatives or cousins while another represented friends. Claude Gauvin, "Allégorie et caractérisation dans le théâtre anglais du moyen âge," in *Le Théâtre Européen Face à l'Invention: Allégories, Merveilleux, Fantastique*, ed. Irène Mamczarz (Presses Universitaires de France, 1989) 16.

⁷⁴Cited in Joshua McClennen, *On the Meaning and Function of Allegory in the English Renaissance* (The Folcroft Press, 1947) 4-5.

In the emblem books, of which there were a considerable number in circulation at the time, a "factual" story was frequently used to explain the truth in a myth and vice versa; and one myth was often used to argue for the veracity of the ideas in another myth. Metaphor, allegory, and analogy were also instruments used in education, not only in the religious education to which all citizens were obliged to submit on a weekly basis, but more importantly in children's education. In texts widely circulated among teachers and fifth form students, Erasmus, whose methods were followed extensively in English schools,⁷⁵ advises teachers to use metaphors and myths as explanations of whatever they are trying to teach.⁷⁶

Anthropological knowledge about the relationships between myths, histories and romances, as conveyed in Claude Lévi-Strauss's study "How Myths Die,"⁷⁷ suggests this manner of expression and education could have more importance than we have given it. If the readers and spectators of the period were in the habit of translating from history to myth and from romance to myth, then this would mean that the historical and romantic dramas of their time, connected as they were in the minds of the people with real history and romance, would have even further political and philosophical meaning than previously thought. The early censorship laws restricting all artistic media, including "prynted balades, playes, rymes, songes, and other fantasies,"⁷⁸ and the frequent controls on playhouses because of the seditious behaviour they provoked indicate that such narrative was understood to be easily read as political allegory, analogy and myth. Even games were considered ways of talking about political philosophy -- in Henry VIII's reign

⁷⁵T. W. Baldwin, *William Shakspeare's Small Latine & Lesse Greek*, vol. 1 (Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1944) 77; vol 2, 239.

⁷⁶*De Conscribendi Epistolas*, trans. and annot. Charles Fantazzi, in *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 25, *Literary and Educational Writings*, ed. J. K. Sowards (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1983) 33; *Re Ratione Studii*, trans. and annot. Brian McGregor, in *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 24 (1978) 676-8.

⁷⁷In *New Literary History*, 5.2 (1974): 269-82.

⁷⁸Statutes 34 and 35, [1543], *The Statutes of the Realm*, Hen. 8, c.I.

a "seditious May-game . . . of a king, how he should rule his realm" led to the prohibition in Suffolk of "games and unlawful assemblies," because of their political implications.⁷⁹ Translation in the other direction (from myth to narrative, political and historical) was widespread. The parliamentary proceedings, much of which is available to us verbatim, provides plentiful material evidence of this.

As both Leo Strauss in *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (1952) and Oscar Handlin in *Truth in History* (1979) have demonstrated and theorized about, the connotations of words vary not only with history -- time and place, but with individual and group peculiarities. The readings of the plays offered in the following chapters have in part been derived from the study of the connotations Shakespeare's words and tales had for the population from which his audience members came. In combination with a consideration of the history, this provides some proof that his plays were a means of philosophizing about rights ideas. An added proof is the habit of legal scholars and philosophers of looking to plays for knowledge in their own fields. Hardly a decade after Shakespeare's last play was penned, for example, it was on the basis of words in a drama -- Euripides's *Helena* -- that Grotius grounded his argument in *Law of War and Peace* (1625), the first major treatise on international law, widely regarded as presaging human rights law.⁸⁰ Looking to Shakespeare's plays as sources of rights ideas therefore fits in with the practices of the times. The proposal that they can also be a means for modern readers to ponder over the philosophy of human rights will be tested as the social theory presented in early productions is put in touch with current human rights theories and laws.

⁷⁹ *Letters and Papers of Henry VIII*, vol. 12, 557, 585 cited in Virginia Crocheron Gildersleeve, *Government Regulation of Elizabethan Drama*. (Westport, CT: Greenwood P, 1975) 6.

⁸⁰ Quoting this play, he argues that the most important knowledge (more important than "an understanding of things divine and human") concerns the just relations between peoples and nations -- the subject of his work (*Prolegomena*, 3).

PART ONE

Strange Learning and Its Consequences on Freedom of Conscience

. . . he wears his faith but as the fashion of his hat,
it ever changes with the next block.

(*Much Ado*, 1.1.68-69)

Freedom of conscience, central as it is to literature, has not often been the subject of literature. The focus on it in *King John* and *Much Ado About Nothing* therefore calls for a brief recovery of the circumstances of this concentration. For the sixteenth-century English government and religious leaders, amid the upheaval brought about by the Reformation and by other major changes, the principle of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion presented the most serious dilemma of the century. The new conceptions of justice demanded it, while the conditions of the state appeared to make it impossible. The contrast this presents to its current universal acceptance reflects the vast difference in the conditions for its application and its significance for individuals in these two historical periods.

Currently international law provides little control over thought, conscience and religion, but is intended to protect against restrictive national laws. The main controls are rather exercised by those who direct education and the media. These organs provide the ideological frame for the thought and fundamental beliefs of the people of their respective nations. The recent cases of freedom of conscience in western liberal societies, as well as the circulated literature on the subject, suggest the majority of individuals in these societies does not feel a lack of this freedom.¹

¹ A recent survey of human rights in Great Britain does not include a chapter on freedom of conscience, while it does discuss other human rights over eleven chapters (Paul Sieghart, ed., *Human Rights in the United Kingdom* (London and New York: Pinter Publishers for Human Rights Network, 1988)). In his commentary on the relevant article from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 18), Martin Scheinin observes that "because religion is not taken very seriously" in Nordic countries "freedom of thought, conscience and religion is not protected as well as several other human rights;" he cites only one case, which

On the other hand, cases relative to the freedom of expression and freedom of information are plentiful in such countries as Britain and the United States, though they usually represent protests against restrictions on means to influence public thought for commercial purposes. This is not to say freedom of conscience has not been an issue in western countries in the twentieth century; but the considerable advance since the 1947 Paris peace treaties with the former allies of Nazi Germany has taken it out of the severe fetters that bound it for so many centuries. In western Europe and North America, the imprisonment, banishment, deportation, torture, and execution of people solely on the grounds of their belief or their background are no longer current events.² Moreover, in these societies the domination of materialistic ideologies makes this freedom largely a non-issue.

concerns a plea for "Freedom from religion" in Finland (*The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary*, 272, 263-73). In a recent compilation of essays on religious rights, almost the same impression is gathered. In T. Jeremy Gunn's article, other than cases of the nature of Scheinin's, that is, concerning the indoctrination of children in religious or other fundamental beliefs and forced attendance at religious ceremonies, which may be rightly classed as freedom of conscience cases, the cases he cites as raising Article 9 claims under the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of conscience claims) all involve freedom of expression more than simply the right to freedom of belief. None of them involve the condemnation of people to prison or death, or discrimination against them regarding attendance at school or being hired for work solely because of their religion or belief. (See "Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights," *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives*, vol. 2, ed. Johan D. van der Vyver and John Witte, Jr. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996) 305-30.) While Peter Cumper's article in the same volume, "Religious Liberty in the United Kingdom," indicates an outdated attitude in England, embedded in the law for historical reasons, any fair evaluation of it would have to take into consideration the effects of its current enforcement on the combined implementation of all the human rights (205-41). In an earlier book (of broader scope), the freedom of conscience cases tried under the European Convention on Human Rights noted were very few and concerned members of political parties, none of whom were tried under Article 9. (Louis B. Sohn and Thomas Buergenthal, *The International Protection of Human Rights* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1973)). This is not to say that these conditions and attitudes prevail in regions outside western Europe and North America.

²The following sources do not report on any of these extreme forms of intolerance and discrimination in western Europe or North America: K. Boyle and J. Sheen, eds., *Freedom of Religion and Belief, A World Report* (London: Routledge, 1997); P. C. Moreno, ed. *Handbook on Religious Liberty Around the World* (Charlottesville: The Rutherford Institute, 1996).

In contrast, in Elizabethan English society there was no interest more vital and more problematic. The ethic of intolerance against all but one religion, exhibited in the Crusades and the four-century long banishment of the Jews, and enforced for centuries by canon law not only in England but throughout most of Christendom, had been disrupted by the sudden spreading of the belief that each person must individually judge in his or her moral questions. The first volume of Wilbur Kitchener Jordan's *The Development of Religious Toleration in England* traces the evolution of ideas on freedom of conscience in Elizabethan England. Jordan divides the development of these ideas in this period into two phases, before and after 1576.³ This year marks the culmination of trends and events tending to more severe religious persecution. They include rebellion in Northern England, a worsening of the Puritan attacks on Anglican policy, a heightening of dissension among Protestants in general, the 1575 "special commission . . . for the burning of two Anabaptists," the appointment of the more intolerant Edwin Sandys as Archbishop of York, and the mid-point of a ten-year program carried out under Pope Pius V to regain control of English governance (137-8, 151, 117).

The publication between 1572 and 1577 of differing views on toleration by two prominent thinkers, Cartwright and Whitgift, was another important development that affected the legislation relating to freedom of conscience. Cartwright opposed the idea that a state could create a church, or make up laws on how to punish followers of "false" religions; the state and its head, who was another believer like everyone else, should be subordinate to the Word of God, which he believed prescribed death for the followers of "false" religions (144-5). He advocated the "cutting off" of any who professed not to believe the "true" religion or who tried to make others change their "true" belief (147). Whitgift saw Cartwright's vision of governance as a threat to the whole English legal system; he

³See vol. 1 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1932) 82-238.

believed that Scripture was not the source of knowledge for governance and that the state could quite rightly decide on all aspects of the Church that were not dogma (140-1, 145). While his role in the prosecution of Puritan enthusiasts, such as John Penrys, John Greenwood, Henry Barrow, and a number of preachers, indicates a narrow view of freedom of religion,⁴ he nevertheless maintained that "liberty of conscience" was "given by God" to "every person" (146).

These early discussions of toleration sought to differentiate between religious belief and civil loyalty. "The Government pledged," writes Jordan in reference to Queen Elizabeth, "that so long as its subjects obeyed the laws of the realm, 'hir matys meaning is not to haue any of them molested by any inquisition or examination of their consciences in causes of religion.'"⁵ But Pius V's definition of Catholic obedience as disobedience to the English government and the actions taken by his followers in England to put his directives into effect made the implementation of the initial policy of the Queen difficult (117-18). Thus the laws enacted in 1571 against recusants "greatly increased the scope of Catholic repression" (129). The "Recusancy legislation" listed in Cumper's article, "Religious Liberty in the United Kingdom," shows this progression from less severe to more severe restrictions; it includes the 1548 restriction on prayer books in religious services to the Anglican Book of Common Prayer, the 1551 act requiring Sunday church attendance, the 1559 Act of Uniformity imposing punishments for not attending up to "forfeiture of all possessions, and two-thirds of all lands," and the 1592 act which decreed punishments of "imprisonment, exile, or death" for those who missed church "without lawful excuse."⁶ Other

⁴Patrick Collinson, *The English Puritan Movement* (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1967) 428, 403-17.

⁵Proclamation of 1 July 1570, *St P. Dom. Elizabeth*, lxxi, 16, as cited in Jordan, 127.

⁶207-8. Jordan observes of the 1592 bill, "This appears to have been abandoned," but notes that in 1593 another bill "covering the same ground" was passed (213-14).

laws that had an impact on freedom of conscience included the 1581 act and the 1583 amendment, in which teaching and preaching the Catholic Faith and hearing mass were punishable by fines and confiscation of property, and in which Jesuits and seminary priests were banished "on pain of death."⁷

While by modern standards these measures are extremely severe, some have considered they represent a significant step towards freedom of conscience because they were based not on difference in religious belief but on the treasonous renouncement of loyalty to government that this religious belief entailed (172-3). In fact, the freedom of religion argued for by a number of laymen and clergymen had some impact on the policies of Elizabeth. Compared to the 284 executions for heresy under her immediate predecessor and 51 under Henry VIII, Elizabeth's reign saw only 5.⁸ Nevertheless, the distinction between obedience to government, which was a public concern, and belief in the official religion, which was a private matter, was never fully implemented. Restrictions on Protestant dissenters were mitigated only towards the end of the seventeenth century; another century would pass before Catholics were relieved of most of the measures against them, while Jews had to wait until the middle of the nineteenth century.⁹

In the split between Whitgift's and Cartwright's views about the relationship between religion and state, in the variation among the leaders' attitudes to diversity of belief, and in the collision between the values these views and attitudes implied, lay the grounds for the political and religious factions that would break the fabric of England apart. A fear of such instability and ideological conflict was at the root of the religious uniformity legislation¹⁰ and is reflected in the polemical material of the period, such as Thomas Cooper's *An Admonition to the*

⁷23 Elizabeth, c. 1, c. 2, as cited in Jordan, vol. 1, 194.

⁸Jordan, vol. 2, 43. This does not include the many Catholic priests put to death for treason.

⁹Cumper, 210-11.

¹⁰Jordan, vol. 1, 213.

People of England (1589).¹¹ Because of the sensitivity of the matter, fictional works used allegory and humour. *King John* and *Much Ado About Nothing* are examples, in that they represent social instability and its consequences on individual judgment and belief in symbolic manner. Beatrice's remarks concerning Benedick's changing faith -- "He hath every month a new sworn brother, . . . he wears his faith but as the fashion of his hat, / it ever changes with the next block" (*Much Ado*, 1.1.66, 68-69) sum up the ideological instability treated in these two plays. The Bastard might say the same about King John, King Philip, Austria, the English and French Lords, and even the Dauphin, Hubert and the other citizens.

The close association of the main motifs of *King John* and *Much Ado About Nothing* suggest some liaison between them; it is for this reason I have chosen to write about them in one section. While the most recent studies on the relationship between *King John* and *The Troublesome Raigne* render the problem of *King John*'s date more baffling than it was before, it is still noteworthy that from among the dates various scholars have argued for (ranging between 1587 and 1597) the stylistic and thematic evidence places *King John* with dramas composed around 1596-97,¹² thus suggesting its composition may be associated with that of

¹¹(London, 1589) 117.

¹²This is the date chosen by the general editor of the Signet Classic Shakespeare Series (Sylvan Barnet). The Oxford Shakespeare (1989) argues that the "most persuasive" of the stylistic studies show its "close relation" to *Richard II* (1595) and *The Merchant of Venice* (1596-8), but concludes with the date 1595-6 (A. R. Braunmuller, 3, 15). The Riverside Shakespeare offers 1594-95 as "the safest guess" (Herschel Baker, 765). The Arden and the New Cambridge editions (respectively edited by E. A. J. Honigmann and L. A. Beaurline) argue for much earlier dates -- before the composition of *The Troublesome Raigne of King John* (1591). Brian Boyd's recent article "King John and *The Troublesome Raigne*: Sources, Structure, Sequence," in *Philological Quarterly* (74.1, 1995) further complicates the question by demonstrating the incongruity between the general dramatic ineptness of *The Troublesome Raigne* and its adept reorganization of history, a reformulation that mirrors unintelligently that in *King John* and that is of the sort we know Shakespeare was an expert at. However, Boyd does not consider the suggestion in Barnet's edition that the two plays could have as their source "some third play, now missing" (153). It is possible though hardly likely to be proven that this third play were written by another author adept at the restructuring of history -- Marlowe, for instance. In the absence of sure evidence for any dates

Much Ado About Nothing, dated 1598.¹³ These two plays, like *The Merchant of Venice* dated in the same period, are concerned with the shifting locations of name and value, and the resultant difficulty in exercising one's freedom of conscience.

As noted above, Beatrice's metaphor of fashionable hat for faith and the second metaphor it connects with, in which the vehicle "block" is specified but the tenor is not, reflect these concerns. We may read the "block" as the basic values on which the hat of faith is moulded. As in these metaphors, the two plays imply that changing faith is a consequence of the society's changing values, which are accepted without investigation, much as hats are shaped automatically to fit the block, without anyone's questioning its contours and having recourse to its carver.

Like all trusted beliefs, faith is spread to whomever comes in contact with it in the manner a fashionable hat becomes, for all those who see it as *the fashion*, what is good and right and true. This faith (ideology)¹⁴ becomes the basis of decision-making. But much like an old hat worn in public when the style has changed, an ideology becomes strange when the values on which it was first shaped have been obliterated. Once the values change, the signs no longer belong to the old signifieds; and yet they do not as yet either belong to the new -- they are "borrowed" signs. Consequently, decision-making becomes more difficult.

Both in *King John* and *Much Ado About Nothing* there are characters who note this condition of changing faith, and who eventually discover its cause and

except 1587 (Holinshed's *Chronicles*, from which much of the historical material is clearly drawn) and 1598 (Francis Meres' *Palladis Tamia*, which mentions *King John* as one of Shakespeare's tragedies) and in view of the play's strong links with the motifs of "wavering faith" and unstable belief systems in *The Merchant of Venice* and *Much Ado About Nothing*, Barnet's estimate (1596-97) appears to me the most logical.

¹³Anne Barton, Introduction to *Much Ado About Nothing*, *The Riverside Shakespeare*, 329; A. R. Humphreys, Introduction to *Much Ado About Nothing*, *The Arden Shakespeare* (London and New York: Routledge, 1981) 4.

¹⁴I associate the terms "faith" and "ideology" because both refer to systems of beliefs we use to evaluate, explain, plan, and form our identity. See Terence Ball and Richard Dagger, *Ideals and Ideologies: A Reader*, 2d ed. (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995) 1, 5.

remedy when they put to test the "borrowed signs" presented to them. Having conducted an investigation, they achieve a new knowledge and form a new ideology, which enable them to use their judgment with greater freedom, or at least with an awareness of the limitations on that freedom. Their movement towards specific ideological conditions for the implementation of freedom of conscience paradoxically implies restrictions on this freedom.

But in both *King John* and *Much Ado* much time is spent portraying societies whose ideologies are of questionable benefit, especially as regards freedom of conscience. The dominant ideology in the society represented in *King John* is one of commercialism and self-aggrandizement. These two preoccupations entail a hypocritical life-style for most of the society's members. This ideology impacts on the society of the play causing a disintegration of its institutions, most poignantly depicted in the split between the conventional signifier of leadership (Arthur), the possessor of leadership (John), and the embodiment of the attributes of leadership (the Bastard). The decomposition of the society's ethical foundations is likewise dramatized by this split. The consequences of this destruction on the practicability of freedom of conscience is serious: With the loss of integrity, the society's agents of meaning -- language, action, character -- lose their capacity to elicit belief and convey meaning, making the exercise of free conscience impossible.

The focus in *King John* is thus on the problems of freedom and judgment in a society where there is no agreement on basic values and no integrity. A plurality of basic values and ideologies are represented by the play's many leaders and the mothers who have formed them; as their power waxes and wanes, this multiplicity of authority centres confuses people's judgment and inhibits them from taking constructive action. The confusion is dissipated only when these authority

centres are reduced to one. At this stage all others are seen as having been only borrowed and thus as having illegitimately possessed the title of value and faith.

Much Ado About Nothing presents a little society where everyone is unaware of the rights of others as regards freedom of conscience, everyone that is except the two hilarious constables Dogberry and Verges. These characters disregard almost everything about the people they watch over -- their personal opinions, their rank, their morals, etc., even their petty crimes. All is tolerated, all is "comprehended" to use Shakespeare's word, except the grave transgression of the right of all to freedom of conscience. In contrast to the other social institutions represented in the play, which are inadequate to the proper implementation of freedom of conscience, the institution of the law (which at the same time is identified with the "common" people) is shown at the end to be capable of respecting it and of disciplining those whose disrespect of it goes too far.

The emphasis in *Much Ado About Nothing* is therefore on the limitations all ideology imposes on the free exercise of conscience. It works towards the view that the just society is obligated to restrict its ideologies to those that permit the greatest implementation of this right. It suggests the necessity of limiting freedom of conscience by means of a basic ideology prescribing specific purposes for human rights. The play is also concerned with the difficulty of putting into practice the principle of free conscience when there is no common beliefs, such as, "it is good to be honest." Thus like *King John* it demonstrates the liaison between ethics and human rights philosophy.

While the questions these two plays raise are the same as those still current in human rights philosophy, they couch their discussions in the context of the religious disputes that the society of the period was born out of and still heavily involved in. Both abound in allusions to the strife enacted between the Catholics and Protestants in the decades preceding their composition. While they have not

often been interpreted as allegories of this history, Eva Hartby's *Man-figures in Much Ado About Nothing* presents a well-documented argument that the play's main and sub plots reflect Elizabethan views on Roman Catholic and Church of England Protestant practices of Christianity.¹⁵ On the other hand, Julia Van der Water and Joseph Candido suggest some characters in *King John* may be interpreted as allegorical representations of moral attributes.¹⁶

The present reading focuses on the plays' articulation of ideas about values and human rights. Characters function as allegorizations of ideologies and users of ideologies that can be understood in relation to the social context of the play's audiences. The plays' religious vocabulary and their allusions to events, attitudes, and practices associated with the Reformation, considered alongside the motifs of free conscience, are seen to address the problems associated with the instability of the belief systems in Elizabethan society.

Consequently, the historical-philosophical interpretation here diverges from, though it by no means purports to disqualify, the more historically realistic or analogical readings of other critics. For example, where Rackin reads the female and male figures in the *King John* as analogous to the feminine and masculine paradigm used in Renaissance historiography,¹⁷ the reading proposed here accords to them their traditional symbolic positions of church and God. Rackin's interpretation enables her to see the play's "feminine voices" as symbolic of the history-destroying effects of an ideology that denies authority. Her reading

¹⁵*Publications on English Themes* (Copenhagen: U of Copenhagen, 1988). Earlier critics note the references to English Puritanism but do not suggest any connection between these references and the social commentary in the play. See for example Julia Grace Wales, "Shakespeare's Use of English and Foreign Elements in the Setting *Much Ado About Nothing*," *Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters*, 28 (1933): 380.

¹⁶Julia C. Van der Water, "The Bastard in *King John*," *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 11 (1960): 137-46. Joseph Candido, "Blots, Stains, and Adulteries," in "*King John*": *New Perspectives*, 118-19.

¹⁷"Patriarchal History and Female Subversion in *King John*," "*King John*": *New Perspectives*, 76-90.

thus pits the play's representation of reverence and irreverence, stability and instability, belief and skepticism, knowledge and conjecture against each other in a gendered binary opposition that breaks up the patriarchal project of history-making. In contrast, the interpretation facilitated by the reading here draws liaisons between the play and the philosophical problem in sixteenth-century England of exercising judgment in a society with unstable values. The disruption of traditional historiography Rackin perceives as an activity of the play relates to this instability, and in this sense our readings are similar.

Daniel Kornstein's legal commentary on *Much Ado* corresponds in the same indirect way to the present reading.¹⁸ His realistic interpretation facilitates an examination of the play's treatment of slander in connection with the defamation law of Shakespeare's period and twentieth-century American free speech law. The realism of his approach works well for the subject he focuses on; it would not work for my approach because it would not allow for questions on the relationship between ideology and interference in freedom of conscience. On the other hand, Kornstein's interest in the play's free speech ideas is very close to my study of the way coercion is used in the play to interfere with freedom of conscience. The spotlight he places on Hero's statement, "One doth not know / How much an ill word may empoison liking" (3.1.86), with the purpose of drawing attention to slander, at the same time draws attention to interference with people's "liking" -- the term used in the parliamentary proceedings in reference to freedom of conscience.¹⁹

¹⁸See chapter 10 of his book, *Kill All the Lawyers? Shakespeare's Legal Appeal* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1994) 156-175.

¹⁹"where the subjectes had there freedome of discourse, and there libertie of likeing" (Great Britain, House of Lords, *Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I*, vol. 3, 197).

Chapter Two

Borrowed Signs: Freedom of Conscience and the Problem of Unstable Values in *King John*

. . . there is no believing old signs.
(*Much Ado*, 3.2.41)

The acquisition of values depends on people's recognition of signs, which in childhood learning correspond with certain conditions that define a reality. When the signs are borrowed -- put up on highways to which they do not correspond -- further learning and believing become difficult, and the person is hindered in perceiving anything as real and true. The resultant suppression of information curtails freedom of conscience. This is the situation of the citizen characters in *King John*, where "majesty" and other signs of honour and power are "borrowed" by so many. Citizens refuse to exercise their consciences because they have no certainty about who is their proper king. Other characters react by changing loyalties in accord with the only authority they recognize -- commodity.

The Bastard, the single figure who achieves integrity, eventually dissipates some of the confusion about the hypocrites in the play. But in a society of borrowed names whose only real god is commodity he too must play the game. His sole escape is to put his attributes of courage, loyalty and sacrifice in its service, thus secularizing his moral motives from his ostensible purpose -- a gainful public life in service of the de facto regal authority.

These dramatic actions reflect the uses made of the Magna Carta, a document considered to be a historic step in the founding of human rights, and which has so far appeared to be unconnected with the play, whose central figure was its principal signatory. The dispersion of majesty in the play, for example, connects with the charter's division of the regal authority in favour of multiple

authorities, serving the barons' interests. On the other hand, the Bastard's rise to power reflects the charter's engendering of grounds whereby ordinary individuals could claim rights to powers hitherto denied them. The dissolution of one order thus becomes the groundwork for the building up of another; and the instability of values, exposing the tightly woven connections between ethics and human rights, on which depend the just use of human rights instruments (and the Magna Carta), becomes a signal for the renewal and restabilization of these values.

Metaphoric and Historic Contexts

As many critics have observed, *King John* and *Much Ado About Nothing* (discussed in the next chapter) are full of terms explicitly religious -- God, faith, sin, heretic, repent, forgive, belief, hell, devil, convert, conscience, sacred vows, church, confess, excommunication, etc. But there are also terms and images, which though not nuanced with religion in the secularized west of the current century would have been redolent with religious meaning for Shakespeare's first audiences, because at that time the trend to secularization was just beginning and many people still related religion to every aspect of their lives and thinking.¹ The term "majesty," for example, had a religious resonance for the Elizabethans, because it was considered an attribute of God. Calvin's statement that "it was to [God] *alone* that all majesty belongs"² was likely familiar to many of them, as also Luther's warning "that the devil can disguise himself as an angel of light (2 Cor. 11:14) and change himself into the majesty of God."³ Published sermons

¹Between the middle of the sixteenth century and the seventeenth century there is evidence of a significant shift from the conception of religion as the dominant culture of the people to religion as something separate from the culture. See C. John Sommerville, *The Secularization of Early Modern England: From Religious Culture to Religious Faith* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992) 14-17.

²Jean Calvin, *Institution de la religion chrestienne*, vol. 1, ed. Jean-Daniel Benoit (Paris, 1957) 114.

³Martin Luther, *Luther's Works*, vol. 4, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Walter A. Hansen (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1955) 389.

speak of the "glorious Majestie of God . . . revealed unto us as an everlastinge Light or unchaungeable Daye of Cleernes," and continue into the seventeenth century to focus on this attribute.⁴ The term even figures in Robert Burton's explanations about diseases related to religion. He reasons that one of the causes of "religious melancholy" is the metaphors used to describe the beauty, "divine majesty," and other attributes of God, which he writes can make people "adore him" in the "wrong way" if understood in the wrong way.⁵

Similarly, kingship was proverbially an attribute of God. The gods of certain peoples like the Egyptians were known to have been kings,⁶ and the kings of others -- as the kings of Israel -- were prophets, hence representatives of God. Henry de Bracton (d. 1268), on the other hand, whose legal and political writings were among the most important at Shakespeare's time, repeatedly compared the king's position to Christ's.⁷ The artistic use of the king /god icon was so common that it worked in both ways, for Christ, who was believed to be God incarnate, was typically depicted as king of the world and, as Orgel and Strong explain, audiences routinely read the god characters in masques as kings.⁸

⁴In C. Viterill, *Correction and Exhortation out of heartie love*, trans. Hendrik Niclas [Amsterdam, 1574] A4r. (STC 18554). The focus of Thomas Newhouse's *A Learned and Fruitfull Sermon* is "the Majestie of Gods Word" ("The Epistle Dedicatorie" (London, 1611) (STC 18494).

⁵*The Anatomy of Melancholy*, vol. 3, part 3, sect. 4, ed. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicolas K. Kiessling, and Rhonda L. Blair (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1994) 332-3.

⁶De Mornay observes that the "great Priest of the Aegyptians called Leon" knew "that all the Gods whom the Gentiles worshipped, were Kings of old tyme, of whom the memoriall had bin consecrated by their posteritie" (*A Woorke Concerning the Trewness*, Aa3v [374]). The large influx of gypsies in the sixteenth century into England and Scotland, where they were referred to as "Egyptians" had created a tremendous interest in things said to be "Egyptian," whether related to ancient Egypt or to the gypsies.

⁷He also compared his position to the Virgin's. Apparently, these comparisons were used to demonstrate respectively the king's duty to keep the laws of God and to humble himself before the customary laws of the people. Gaines Post, "Bracton as Jurist and Theologian on Kingship," *Proceedings of the Third International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, Strasbourg, 3-6 September 1968, ed. Stephan Kuttner (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1971) 113ff.

⁸Stephen Orgel and Roy Strong, *Inigo Jones: The Theatre of the Stuart Court* (London: Sothely Parke Bernet, Berkeley: U of California P, 1973) 11.

As shall be seen more clearly as the play is discussed in detail, there are a number of dramatic developments in *King John* that might have reminded the play's first audiences of these associations, and suggested a comparison between its king figures and the diverse conceptions of God current in sixteenth-century England and Europe. But briefly, to describe the context of this metaphor let me review one or two examples. At the beginning 3.1, the day of France's and Austria's conversion to the cause of King John is described as "a holy day" to be marked on the calendar and observed annually (3.1.81-82). That this conversion represents a change in the worship of God is suggested by Constance's opposite characterization of the day as a "wicked day" when "faith itself to hollow falsehood change" (3.1.83, 95). In the same scene, King John reacts to Pandulph's demand that he submit to the Catholic Church by assuming a direct association with God: "Under God" he will "alone uphold . . . supremacy . . . Without th'assistance of a mortal hand" (3.1.156-8). Arthur likewise assimilates his functions with those of God's representative when he alludes to Christ's shepherding of the people: "By my christendom, / So I were out of prison and kept sheep, / I should be as merry as the day is long" (4.1.16-18). (This allusion underscores, too, an aversion to the politicization of conceptions of God, so rampant both in sixteenth-century Europe and in the play.) The words used by the nobles to describe their political beliefs similarly hints at religion. In 4.3 Salisbury "forbids" his "*soul*" from obedience to King John, and Pembroke and Bigot "*religiously* confirm [his] words" (4.3.64, 73 my emphasis). In 5.2 Lewis takes the sacrament with Salisbury, Pembroke and Bigot, and considers it a rite that binds "their faiths" (5.2.6-7).

Even more popular than the association of king figures with God figures was the image of "woman," which was widely used as a symbol of knowledge (or its absence), ideology, virtue, philosophy, and religion, as it has been in a multitude of cultures past and present. One of the *Gesta Romanorum* is the story

of a hero who, as emperor of heaven, "weddid his owne moder, scil. holye chirche, the whiche is oure gostlye moder."⁹ Burton refers to the Psalmic comparison of the "Church" to a "Queene;" Crowley identifies the Catholic Church with "the whore of Babilon;" the translator of Caelius Curio II's "A Christian and learned Dialogue" describes the "truth of Religion" as an oppressed woman "driven . . . to lye close, and secretly to walke with *Nichodemus* by night for feare of Jewish Christians;" William Cuningham uses the image for "Ignorance," which he represents as a monstrous female "accompted so deformed and Vile, that those whose companie she frequented, were reputed not in the numbere of reasonable Creatures: but of brute beastes."¹⁰

The play's mothers and the institutions given maternal imagery in *King John* suggest their association with ideology and / or religion. Elinor is described by Chatillion as an Ate, literally a goddess of vengeance, but also a pun on the French term for atheist. Constance's cry to God, "be husband to me, heavens" (3.1.108), identifies her with the Catholic Church, seen traditionally (as noted above) to be the wife of Christ. Her use of the term "recreant" for Austria associates him not only with cowardice but with apostasy, that is, the denial of what she considers to be true faith (the cause of Arthur) and perhaps also the denial of the true representative of God (Arthur). Pandulph recalls this paradigm by his reference a few lines later to "the church, our holy mother." In no other play attributed to Shakespeare is the maternal presence so pervasive, except perhaps

⁹"The Legend of Pope Gregory," in *The Early English Versions of the Gesta Romanorum*, ed. Sidney J. H. Herrtage (London: N. Trübner, 1879) 262.

¹⁰*The Anatomy*, vol. 3, 333; Robert Crowley, "Reade all: or reade nothing," *Fryer John Frauncis of Nigeon in Fraunce* (London: John Charlewoode, 1586); W. P[erkins?], trans., *Pasquine in a Trance: A Christian and learned Dialogue (contayning wonderfull and most strange newes out of Heaven, Purgatorie, and Hell)* . . . , by Caelius Curio II, with an introduction by P[erkins?]. (London: Wylliam Seres, 1566) Aijr-Aijv. (STC 6130). William Cuningham, *The Cosmographical Glasse* (London, 1559) Aiir. (STC 6119).

Coriolanus. Until the fourth act, Elinor and Constance appear in every scene. Even in the fourth act, they are called to mind in King John's vehemently and repeatedly expressed sorrow over his mother's death and by the Messenger's report of Constance's death "in a frenzy" (4.2.122). After that, the references to mother continue but as an image of England and English nationalism: Salisbury drops "baby" tears when he considers how he and his fellows -- "the sons and children of this isle" -- will tread "Upon her gentle bosom" (5.2.56, 25, 28) as they maintain their newly professed allegiance to Lewis. The Bastard catches up and exploits further the same metaphor when he condemns these disloyal nobles for "ripping up the womb / Of your dear mother England" (5.2.152-3).

Another figure that had symbolic and religious resonances for Elizabethans is the "bastard." As studies show, Elizabethan society was preoccupied with illegitimacy, including bastardy,¹¹ and not only because Queen Elizabeth "had been declar'd by Act of Parliament a Bastard."¹² Lemecke Avale's preface to his argument against one of the bishops of London, whom he contends could not be bishop because he was a bastard, exemplifies this fascination:

Matters beyng yet in doubt, maie with questions and reasons, bee brought out of doubt: but thinges beyng without doubt, ought not with the subteltie of wordes, bee broughte into doubte. As without all doubte Edmonde Boner, late usurped bishop of London, was a bastarde, and also the sonne of a Bastarde: that is a Bastarde in grosse, and a Bastarde can not, neither maie not bee a bishop, Boner was a Bastarde, *ergo* no bishop, and this is a true conclusion. This is not true said an old *Dunsticall* felowe, sitting at the table with a grave

¹¹See footnotes to Michael Neill's article, and Lela Moore Gooding, "The Plague of Custom: Illegitimacy in Elizabethan Drama and Society," diss. Vanderbilt U, 1992.

¹²*Acta Regia: Being the Account which Mr. Rapin de Thoyras Published of the History of England* (London, 1733) 447.

true said an old *Dunsticall* felowe, sittying at the table with a grave learned Lawier of the common Lawe, and an eloquente Civilian, that were all three together: the one frowned, the seconde bite his lippe, the third in greate rage saied: men maie saie what thei will now a daies, & belye the truthe as you have doen, he was a blessed confessor, although a bastard, and a true bishop, bothe by Gods Lawes, the Canonick lawes, & the lawes of this realme of Englande. To this thei saied all *Amen* . . .¹³

As this excerpt indicates, the bastard is also one about whom others are uncertain. In line with this nuance, the traditional symbolic paradigm where God is father and the Church is mother provides another tenor -- the bastard beliefs of a church, whose relationship with God is improper. An apt image this was, because at the root of the period's religious contention was the legitimacy of the relationship of the various Christian persuasions with God, and the consequent difficulty of knowing which of their beliefs were legitimate. Without this certainty, people had more difficulty making decisions.

Avale's first statement, "Matters beyng yet in doubt, maie with questions and reasons, bee brought out of doubt: but thinges beyng without doubt, ought not with the subteltie of wordes, bee broughte into doubte," makes a distinction between these two kinds of doubts: The certainty of some main principles had to be maintained, if other matters were to be questioned, discussed and resolved. The reactions of the "old *Dunsticall* felowe," the "grave learned Lawier," and the "eloquente Civilian" suggest that main principles (or at least what the author considered main principles) were being questioned and "broughte into doubte;" the

¹³Lemeke Avale, comp., *A Commemoration or Dirige of Bastarde edmonde Boner, alias Savage, usurped Bishoppe of London*. (1569) A2.

problem of unstable values was thus pervading Shakespeare's society, as it does his plays *King John* and *Much Ado About Nothing*.

Already in 1593 Hooker points to this uncertainty, its effects and the reactions to it in his statement, "Thus much we see, it hath already made thousands so headstrong even in gross and palpable errors, that a man whose capacity will scarce serve him to utter five words in sensible manner, blusheth not in any doubt concerning matter of Scripture to think his own bare *Yea*, as good as the *Nay* of all the wise, grave, and learned judgments that are in the whole world: which insolency must be repress, or it will be the very bane of Christian religion."¹⁴

John Owen, commenting in the following half-century on a parallel trend writes, "Hardly a Divine of note could be named, either among the clergy or the Nonconformists, who did not try his hand at devising a system of Belief for the National Church."¹⁵ The implications of these and other changes were portrayed vividly in Whitney's emblem of an elephant slain when his foes "undermin'de the tree" under which he slept; it was entitled "Trustfulness is never sure."¹⁶

Suggesting the epidemic character of this instability, the bastardy images in *King John* and *Much Ado* are multiple, ranging from what Constance calls Philip's "counterfeit / Resembling majesty, which, being touched and tried, / Proves valueless" (3.1.100-101) to Claudio's "rotten orange," who he says is "but the sign and semblance of her honour" (4.1.32-33).¹⁷ In both plays, a bastard is crucial to the outcome of the main action, although his function is different.

¹⁴*Ecclesiastical Polity and other Works of Richard Hooker With His Life by Izaak Walton and Strype's Interpolations*, ed. Benjamin Hanbury, vol. 1, book II, sec. vii, 184.

¹⁵John Owen, ed., *Scep sis Scientifica: or Confest Ignorance, the Way to Science* by Joseph Glanvill (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1885) xxxiv.

¹⁶Whitney takes the quote from John Sambacus's 1564 emblem book. Henry Green, *Shakespeare and The Emblem Writers; An Exposition of Their Similarities of Thought and Expression* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1970) 210.

¹⁷See R. E. R. Madelaine's article, "Oranges and Lemans: *Much Ado About Nothing*, IV.i.31," *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 33 (1982): 491-2.

Because of their representation of ambiguous family relations and of distorted relations between name and character, Richard in *King John* and Don John in *Much Ado About Nothing* are apt icons for strange learning and borrowed signs, though in *King John* we discover that it is not the Bastard who lacks integrity but those who call others bastards. *King John* nevertheless makes use of the stereotypical bastard "uncertainty"¹⁸ in the concerns it raises about freedom of conscience and the dependency of this freedom on a framework of certitude.

Borrowed Majesty

Developing the ideas knitted so strikingly into the image of the bastard, almost every scene of *King John* presents us with borrowed signs and the conjunctive problem of wavering faith and muddled judgment. "The borrowed majesty" ascribed by the French ambassador to King John, given force by its utterance following the unmodified designation "the majesty," is immediately re-emphasized when John's mother Elinor echoes: "A strange beginning: 'borrowed majesty'!" Her qualification of this expression as "strange" knocks a crack in the political frame of the play's society as soon as it is set forth, suggesting to the audience in its first lines the question that will complicate every effort to judge -- Do the signs represent what they are displaying? While John silences his mother's interest in this expression and particularly in the word "borrowed," which would receive the inflected intonation, in favour of hearing Chatillion's embassy, the French ambassador maintains the play's focus on it by describing another instance of borrowed majesty:

Philip of France, in right and true behalf

¹⁸The bastard, Michael Neal notes, is uncertain about the most basic knowledge of himself or herself, of who his or her father is. "Imagining the Bastard in Renaissance Drama," *The Yearbook of English Studies*, 23 (1993): 272. Spurio in *The Revenger's Tragedy* (published 1607) notes that a bastard is "an uncertain man" (1.2.133).

Of thy deceased brother Geffrey's son,
 Arthur Plantagenet, lays most lawful claim
 To this fair island and the territories,
 To Ireland, Poictiers, Anjou, Touraine, Maine . . .

(1.1.7-11)

The King of France borrows from Arthur, the son of John's deceased brother Geffrey, the right to claim the territory currently ruled by John. The French ambassador concludes with another reference to borrowing when he requests John "to lay aside the sword / Which sways usurpingly these several titles" (1.1.12-13).

The situation is reminiscent of the religious struggle for control over the English people. Traditionally, religious "majesty" was believed to belong to the Catholic Church, but with Henry VIII's decision to take control of religion himself this power became *de facto* his possession. As the representatives of both held to their rights, there resulted what King John predicts in his answer to Chatillion, "war for war and blood for blood, / Controlment for controlment" (1.1.19-20).

King John's adoption of apocalyptic terminology to give force to his defiant response reflects the borrowing of religious majesty for national purposes: His lightning, thunder, trumpet, and destruction metaphors, signifying the necessity of the ambassador's speedy reporting of his anger and his aggressive intent to the French king (1.1.24-28), secularizes and perverts the biblical use of these same metaphors.¹⁹ The absence of similar metaphors in Arthur's or King Philip's discourse and the effective domination of King John over them suggest the actual situation of the Catholic Church in England vis-à-vis the Protestant Church at the time of the play's composition.

Elinor's observation that "This might have been prevented and made whole / With very easy arguments of love" (1.1.35-36) reflects the regret serious thinkers

¹⁹Matthew 24: 27; Revelation, ch. 6.

she expressed interest in the term "borrowed." A discussion of the true condition of John's majesty, along with a similar consideration of Arthur's "majestic" qualifications, might well have averted the military action. But King John, like Avale, does not want to bring into doubt things not in doubt; and in the world of the play, like in the Elizabethan world, there is not yet a forum for such discussion.

Confused Signs Bring Confused Judgment

Concurrent with the borrowing of signs, every scene presents characters having difficulty making judgment. The Bastard must decide between commodity -- the possession of the land willed to him -- and the embrace of his true identity. France must decide between peace and fidelity to the Church. Hubert must decide between mercy and obedience to monarch. John must choose between compromise with the pope and war with France. In every case the decision is complicated by the fact that the institutions involved lack integrity.

Characters in a passive position enable the audience to experience this difficulty judging vicariously. Thus Elinor, the passive listener at the beginning, queries the term "borrowed majesty" as an audience member might. Later she voices her unsettled conscience more clearly in objecting to John's assertion, "Our strong possession and our right for us,"

Your strong possession much more than your right,
Or else it must go wrong with you and me;
So much my conscience whispers in your ear,
Which none but God, and you, and I, shall hear.

(1.1.40-43)²⁰

The closing rhyming couplet brings together "ear" and "hear" as an organ and its function should be: The ear, representing the judgment of conscience, is an organ

²⁰As in the 1989 Signet Classic edition, ed. William H. Matchett.

The closing rhyming couplet brings together "ear" and "hear" as an organ and its function should be: The ear, representing the judgment of conscience, is an organ or instrument used in decision-making; what is transmitted as a result of its functioning should be heard by others', as by oneself, without distortion.

But this end rhyme belies Elinor's stated intention not to allow others to hear her true judgment, making the statement's clashing sense and form a linguistic analogue of the clash between actuality and ideal, between wrongful act and righteous principle; it further draws attention to the split in the learner's judgment when presented with confused signs. While Elinor's conscience tells her that John has no right to his "majesty," her berating Constance earlier for fighting for the right of her son to this same majesty indicates a different judgment, one in favour of John's kingship. This little exchange, itself a "strange beginning," provides the play not only with verbal and structural irony but with metadramatic commentary on its themes of integrity and doubt. As the sign of majesty becomes strange when it is acknowledged to have been placed on the wrong bearer, so Elinor's professed judgment of John's right is strange because it does not reflect her inner judgment.

The confused information that results from and has produced her judgment is a prelude to the sheriff's announcement to John of "the strangest controversy, / Come from the country to be judg'd by you" (1.1.44-45). The two young men, Robert and Philip Faulconbridge, disagree about which of them has a right to their father's inheritance, because there is no "certain knowledge" they are children of the same father. Philip's (the Bastard's) title of "elder" is eventually shown to be borrowed when Elinor and John recognize him as the son of Richard Cordelion, respectively her son and his elder brother. Ironically, the mix-up is a result of Richard's "borrowing" the husbandly role of Faulconbridge while the latter is on an embassy for him in Germany.

Restoration of Integrity

The second part of the first scene reads as a proposal of how to untangle confusing knowledge, so as to make freedom of conscience practicable. In contrast to the first part of the scene, the question of borrowed signs is not smothered but rather openly debated with a view to finding the truth. While we may agree that the "truth" discovered (through Elinor's observation of the Bastard's likeness to her son Richard) is only relatively true (it will only later be confirmed by his own mother), it nevertheless constitutes a standard agreed upon by all present which then serves as a basis for judgment. Elinor, the only one who has expressed the view that debate may resolve doubt, asks the Bastard to choose his identity -- as a Faulconbridge with land or as son to Cordelion without land (1.1.134-7). The process of addressing the controversy between himself and his brother through discussion enables the Bastard to arrive at a point where he has information about which he is sure enough to be able to make a judgment -- in short to choose his beliefs freely. This process includes a reconsideration of names. The borrowed signs the Bastard has been carrying are discarded, and he takes a new name that reflects his "real" status.

As if to underline the tight relation between his name and moral condition, he observes to his brother, "My father gave me honor, yours gave land" (1.1.164). *His* relation to his father is closer because land is an adjunct to a person where honour as a person's attribute cannot be taken away (except by one's dishonourable behaviour). The Bastard's identity is more solid than his brother's because knowledge of the Bastard as honourable is more certain than knowledge of his brother as possessor of land. Indeed, the Bastard's choice of an identity that has no legal basis but is rather correspondent to his "real" relation to Richard Cordelion seems to be taken with the understanding that he will put into practice the moral attributes associated with this identity. His declaration to Elinor,

"Madam, I'll follow you unto death" (1.1.54), suggests the identity his father has endowed him with physically must now be exemplified morally; he intends to do this by offering himself in battle in the manner he imagines his father did.

But despite this intended integrity, the Bastard's soliloquy, his description of Robert, and his statements to his mother's servant James Gurney indicate he is conscious of the manner in which "names" and "signs" may be used; they are in a sense always "borrowed," because they carry a heritage not always embodied in their bearers. Therefore they are capable of conveying "strange learning" and hence of manipulating (and thus limiting) the free consciences of others.

The Power to Name

In his soliloquy the Bastard muses on the consequences of his "conversion" to the belief that he is son to Richard Cordelion. He now has, he observes, the power to name others -- that is, to define them, and hence influence people's judgment. Dilating upon this new power, he sees himself adopting positions of superiority and stability vis-à-vis others, who are "travellers" he will feed and learners he will catechize. He is "my worship," who provides to the travellers the "mess" or food -- the nourishing knowledge -- they will gobble wholesale, and whose unswallowable pieces, like the sinews of meat stuck in the teeth, will be discarded by them openly with a toothpick, while he "sucks his teeth," seeming to say by this evidence of complete assimilation that all his teachings should be consumed and none rejected. And where others flatter him deceitfully, because to do so is the necessary submission to the ascendant myths, he will also deceive -- by playing the role of the great. His intention, however, is not deception but to avoid making people think he is not great. He thus sees himself able to "rise" to what he believes himself to be only when assisted by borrowed signs.

Almost immediately after this soliloquy the Bastard employs his new power to name names. Upon his encounter with his mother, where she calls his brother "slave" (1.1.222), he replies, "My brother Robert? Old Sir Robert's son? / Colbrand the giant, that same mighty man?" (1.1.224-5). Now, in a manner akin to King John's when he invoked biblical images to give force to his response to France, the Bastard, as he names his brother, recalls the myth of Guy of Warwick and Colbrand the giant. The image is apt because Robert with his land is materially large in the way the giant Danish enemy was, and because it aligns the Bastard with English Guy, the character whose power was seen as a co-attribute of his saintliness, therefore ultimately more legitimate than and superior to Colbrand's.

As a next step in the naming game, he curses his old name Philip -- now fit only for a "sparrow," and dismisses James Gurney with, "James / There's toys abroad; anon I'll tell thee more" (1.1.232), indicating more overtly his awareness of the superficial nature of "borrowed signs" and of his current power to make use of them. The climax of this sequence is at the end of the scene, where the Bastard uses his new found status to formulate for others the meaning of sin. While his mother believed her adultery with Richard Cordelion was a "transgression" and "offense" (1.1.256-7), his appeal to the myth of the fierce lion's powerlessness argues against this belief. He finally declares a sin would rather have been constituted by her failure to have conceived her son in this manner.

What happens to the Bastard reflects the change-over in the English power structures when the crown took over the rule of the Church. The Protestant clergy and those erudite figures given positions of leadership in religion by the crown obtained the power, previously possessed by the Catholic clergy, to pass on to the populace the learning they wished to, including definitions, as for example, of what constituted sin. The positions they occupied, like that of the Bastard's, were subject to their being named by the crown. Their intentions, again like the

Bastard's, must also have been (though perhaps not always) to put into practice the moral attributes associated with their names and positions. Through the Bastard's eyes, the play exposes and laughs at the seemingly accidental nature of this religious structure, but it nevertheless shows that when there is a consciousness of "borrowed signs" and their impact on people's freedom to exercise their consciences, it is possible to choose to act in the best interests of the whole. The Bastard demonstrates this by the choices he makes in the remainder of the play.

Borrowed Names in Power Games

In the first scene of the second act King Philip borrows the myth of Richard Cordelion just referred to by the Bastard and earlier alluded to in Elinor's remarks about the Bastard's likeness to him. But Philip uses it for a different purpose -- to set up Arthur as Cordelion's relative and to persuade him to put his trust in Austria, Cordelion's vanquisher. Like the Bastard when he was so identified, Arthur, once he feels empowered, defines the nature of sin and the manner of its forgiveness, observing to Austria, "God shall forgive you Cordelion's death / The rather that you give his offspring life" (2.1.12-13).

King Philip's and Arthur's assumption of authority instigates an argument with John, Philip accusing him of doing "a rape / Upon the maiden virtue of the crown," and John accusing Philip of "usurping authority" (2.1.97-98, 118). King Philip argues that he and Arthur derive their authority from God. The argument culminates in a battery of usurper-calling in which Elinor and Constance join. When Elinor accuses Constance of bearing a bastard (in her son Arthur), Constance refutes this accusation by arguing that Arthur's legitimacy is evident in his resemblance to his father, and raises the counter-accusation to Elinor that her son John is so much more like her than his father that *he* must be a bastard. If we recall the father / God, mother / church, belief / child or bastard paradigm, this

looks very much like the arguments carried on by the Reformation churches. Each one contended that the beliefs of the other did not reflect the "original" Faith of Christ, and hence were not legitimate. The articles of faith in those groups opposed to their own, each argued, were conceived by the mother church without the inspiration of God.

The dispute ends with the following remarks of Elinor and Constance, respectively: "There's a good mother, boy, that blots thy father" and "There's a good grandame, boy, that would blot thee" (2.1.132-3), pointing out the irony that, as women related to each other, the doubts they cast on each other's relatives are doubts cast on the whole family. Their remarks allude to the skepticism produced by contention within the family of Christian churches, a concern raised by Lord Archbishop Heath in his remarks to the first parliament of Elizabeth I (23 January to 8 May 1559):

If, therefore, the Church of Rome be not of God but a malignant Church, then we have ben deceived all this while when the gospell, the faythe and sacrementes must be of the same nature as the Church is of from whence it cam. And therfore in relinquishing and forsaking of the Church as malignant, th'inhabitours of this realme shalbe inforced to seeke further for an other gospell of Christe, other doctryne, faythe and sacraments then we hitherto receaved, whiche shall breed such a scisme and error in faythe as was never in any Christian realm -- and therfore of your wisdoms' worthie consideracion and maturelie to be provided for before you passe this act of supremacie.²¹

Hobbes would write sixty years later, "That which taketh away the reputation of wisdom, in him that formeth a religion, or addeth to it when it is already formed, is

²¹*Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I*, vol. 1 (1558-1581), 16.

the enjoining of a belief of contradictories: for both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true . . ."22

Austria's cry "Peace!" following this climactic exposure of the consequences of the mutual shattering of each other's authority strikes a terrible note of irony. It hearkens back to Elinor's remark that through discussion agreements may be reached that would prevent war, but with sadness, because their discussion has had no such beneficent results. At the same time this cry paradoxically commands a stop to the destructive name-calling and announces that peace shall come only in the event of the silencing of both women, that is, the destruction of both their authorities.

Like a genii appearing above the smoke of this conflagration, the Bastard's "Here the crier" -- probably directed to the platea and beyond -- echoes the cry, "Peace!" At these redounding exclamations, did the play-goers, we might ask ourselves, for a moment cut themselves away from the power of the fiction to reflect on the conditions of their own society? If they did, their grave thoughts would deflate immediately when after this didactic imperative Austria poses his informal question, "What the devil art thou?" and the Bastard answers in similarly colloquial language, "One that will play the devil, sir, with you" (2.1.134-5). The Bastard, positioned now as the "bastard" solution to all the other "bastards" previously bandied about by Philip, John, Constance and Elinor, must establish the peace. But how? Not, the informal language suggests, by assuming the heroic stance of his father, or of his father's vanquisher. However, his first action is to state his intention of becoming a victorious aggressor, one whose aim is a return to "original" purity. He will become a devil in the sense of its Latin etymon *diabolos*

22Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955) I.12 77.

-- the one who disunites.²³ But he is a good devil -- a good disuniter -- because, in the disunity he will demonstrate between the reality of and the claims to legitimate ideology and real virtue, he will break up what is held together by a lie, thus preparing the way for the establishment of a system that has integrity.

The Lion-Skin Returned to the Lion

To do this, the Bastard will "disinfect" Cordelion's lion skin which Austria took from him when he killed him. Shouting, in reference to this intention, "Sirrah, look to 't, i' faith I will, i' faith," he relates this act of purification to the recuperation of borrowed signs and the reestablishment of what is in his view legitimate faith. Blanch's response, "O well did he become that lion's robe! / That did disrobe the lion of that robe," counters the Bastard's claim that the legitimate bearer of the lion-skin label was Richard Cordelion and not Austria (2.1.141-2). The repetition "robe, robe" by Blanch after the "faith, faith" in the Bastard's concluding sentence hints at a correspondence between these two components of the play's philosophical commentary -- signs and faith, while the opposition of her opinion parallels its display of a disjunction between them.

The Bastard's next statement highlights this ambivalent correspondence:

It is as sightly on the back of him
 As great Alcides' [shows] upon an ass.
 But, ass, I'll take that burthen from your back,
 Or lay on that shall make your shoulders crack.

(2.1.143-6)

²³The idea was expressed in regard to *Hamlet* by Daniel Mesguich, "The times are out of joint," address in section on Post-Modern Shakespeare, *Shakespeare and Theatrical Modernism: McGill Shakespeare in the Theatre Conference*, McGill University, Montreal, 12 October 1997.

He intends to nullify the faith Austria illegitimately emblemizes by his wearing the borrowed lion skin, and hence destroy the grounds for belief in him as saviour of Arthur or equivalent of Richard Cordelion. He will either remove the borrowed label or reduce the authority of its wearer so much that the label will become meaningless to any observer. The Bastard does not, however, address the question of who can legitimately wear this label now -- of who can give the people peace, which here represents the basic instrument they need if they are to be able to employ their right to freedom of conscience.

Impossible Judgment

Before tracing how the Bastard helps solve the war over rightful majesty, a word about the people, who are represented first by the citizens of Angiers and then by Hubert. Looking up at the walls of the city at Hubert, who has appeared on the citizens' behalf in answer to a trumpet call, King Philip addresses them as Arthur's "loving subjects," while John warns them of France's warlike intentions,

They shoot but calm words folded up in smoke,
To make a faithless error in your ears;
Which trust accordingly, kind citizens,
And let us in -- your King . . .

(2.1.229-32)

The "calm words" are borrowed signs because they really represent violence, not calm. With this warning, John invites the citizens to decide freely to accept his claims to kingship; Philip does the same on behalf of Arthur.

Here, as in act one, those called upon to make judgment are in a dilemma because the labels of authority have been borrowed by so many, and those who must judge have no recourse to a firm standard by which they can recognize legitimate authority. The inadequacy of both men's claims is suggested by the

Bastard's identification of the "witnesses" on both sides as "bastards" (2.1.273-9). Indicating the people's difficulty to judge, Hubert declares on their behalf, "Till you compound whose right is worthiest, / We for the worthiest hold the right from both" (2.1.281-2). They will, as Hubert says, put their faith in the "King of England" but only when they "know the King" (2.1.363). The result of this indecision will be war and further oppression of conscience -- whoever by force will enter the city of Angiers will make the people drink down his truth.

The Bastard does not offer any alternative. He sees the battle as a means of proving who is the legitimate king. He himself will, through transformation into the animal to which the lion-skin now worn by Austria once belonged, recuperate a state of integrity representative of this legitimacy. A lion himself, he will bed Austria's lioness and make Austria a horned ox, merely decorated with a lion skin. As if to affirm that he has already effected his transformation, he shouts, "O, tremble! for you hear the lion roar" (2.1.294). But while the Bastard joins in the battle, fighting on the side to which he had previously given his allegiance, his comments point out the sad irony that "majesty" must be decided not by an intelligent evaluation of moral qualities but by war, until "confusion of one part confirm / The other's peace" (2.1.359-60).

It is the representative of the citizens, Hubert, who offers an alternative to the violence John and Philip agree to wreak on Angiers. He proposes a union between the two through the marriage of their relatives Blanch and Lewis. The play's metaphor for their free entrance to the city following the uniting of their two forces brings to mind an image Hobbes used to explain human freedom. Liberty he defines in his treatise "Of Liberty and Necessity" as "the absence of all impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of

the agent . . ." Using the image of a river, he then explains that the water "is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to descend by the channel of the river."²⁴

In Shakespeare's image of unity, where the progeny of both opposing sides are bound as a river between two banks, the two banks suggest (as in Hobbes's image) those defining certainties without which human beings are not human. The banks are not only controls on the waters between -- the values providing a general control or guide for the people, but also represent the two disputing kings, suggesting it is only when these kings establish themselves in a stable order like the two banks of a river that they can provide the citizens with the opportunity to exercise their rights. The implication is that the opposite of this -- war -- is an action contrary to their "intrinsic quality," to use Hobbes's expression. The kings' power to be just, therefore, lies in their maintenance of some stable condition. The citizens will remain caught in inaction until they have some such basic certainties on which to judge.

Stability for the Wrong Reasons

But agreement on certain standards is not in itself a satisfactory solution. The certainties presented in the play as agreed upon are continually represented as faulty, whether from the standpoints of integrity or the motivations of the parties to the agreement, or the oppression entailed on those whose interests are undermined by the agreement. For instance, Elinor conceives Lewis and Blanch's match not as a means to union with France but as a way to cut off Arthur and France from power. France too has other motives than union; the marriage will give King Philip land and prevent him from the obligation of waging war on behalf of Arthur's right. At the same time it entails a compromise for England and, for

²⁴In *Free Will and Four English Philosophers (Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Mill)*, ed. Joseph Rickaby (London: Burns and Oates, 1906) 63.

France, the breaking of faith with Constance. Thus while the marriage seems like an answer to the citizens' problems, it is not entirely motivated by the desire to do them good. The Bastard relates this oppression to John's and Philip's motives, which in both cases is "commodity," that is self-interest; not a principle of justice; not the right of law. The incident shows that not only are confusing values an obstacle to the exercise of free conscience, but the exercise of this freedom by one person impinges on the freedom of others.

The religious overtones of the Bastard's criticism could hardly go unnoticed in the play's early audiences, because commodity and self-interest were what the contending churches accused each other of. For Burton the pope's religion was "meere policy;" for Henry Vane, writing his *Retired Mans Meditations* in 1655, "Religion as Civil policy" in general was ruled by the "influence" of "that great Idol, SELF-INTEREST."²⁵ Hooker acknowledged the "politic use of religion" but condemned as "savage, wild, and cruel" the view "that religion itself is a mere politic device forged purposely to serve that use."²⁶ Even de Mornay picks up the idea of religion as policy when he promises his readers they will be "persuaded" by his *Woorke Concerning the Trewnesse of the Christian Religion* that "it [the Christian religion] is not a devise of man as other Religions are."²⁷ No doubt these accusations stemmed in part from Machiavelli's propagation of the idea that religion is used for political purposes, to gain and maintain power.²⁸

²⁵Burton, vol. 3, 350; Vane quoted in Paul Harris, "Young Sir Henry Vane's arguments for freedom of conscience," *Political Science*, 40.1 (1988) 39. It is noteworthy that religion was not the only sort of knowledge turned into an instrument for commodity. Sommerville observes, that if science "needed religion to get a hearing in the early seventeenth century, by the end of that century utility had become a sufficient argument" (155).

²⁶*Of the Laws*, vol. 2 (book 5), 19.

²⁷de Mornay, "The Epistle Dedicatorie," 3v. It is noteworthy that the English translation of this book (whose primary target was atheists) was first published in 1592, that is before Shakespeare's *King John*, if indeed Barnet's date is correct.

²⁸Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, trans. Leslie J. Walker, S. J., ed. Bernard Crick, with an introduction by Bernard Crick (1970; reprint, New York: Penguin, 1983) bk. 1, ch. 11-14; George T. Buckley, *Atheism in the English Renaissance*

A second religious resonance was historical -- part of the dispute both in earlier centuries, as reflected in the play's depiction of King John's quarrel with Pandulph, and in the sixteenth century, was over who should tax the people. These taxes were sometimes referred to as "commodities," as in item fifty-three of the Church of England's 1559 *Articles to be enquired in the visitacyon*, which orders the justices of peace to ascertain "who doth receive the tythes, oblations, and *other commodities* durying the tyme of vacation, and by what auctoritie."²⁹

The Bastard's disdain for action motivated by commodity elicits hope that at least *he* will not adopt the same motives; but his last lines, "Since kings break faith upon commodity, / Gain, be my lord, for I will worship thee" (2.1.597-8), tell us otherwise. As the tragedy unfolds and the supposedly rightful emblem of majesty -- Arthur -- is abandoned, the question arises whether this would have happened had the Bastard not chosen also to break faith. But could he have chosen to keep faith, we also wonder, and still remain an involved member of the society when no king could be found ready to do the same? Finally, what in fact does keeping faith mean, given the ineffectiveness of Arthur and the lack of care his mother shows for the lives of people?

The disillusionment expressed by the Bastard speaks for the disappointment of the reader looking for a character whose motive is not self-interest. For gradually each one proves to be selfish. Shortly after the Bastard's soliloquy, the consistency of Constance is shown to belie motives contrary to any general goodness. The grim images the play paints of the destruction that war will bring undercuts the view that the battle she calls to be waged in the name of law is

(Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1932) 31-42; Manfred Pfister, "Elizabethan Atheism: Discourse Without Subject," *Jahrbuch der Deutschen-Shakespeare-Gesellschaft-West* (1991) 65.

²⁹Church of England, *Articles to be enquired in the visitacyon, in the fyrst yeare of the raigne of our most dread soveraygne Lady, Elyzabeth by the grace of God, of England, Fraunce, and Irelande Quene, defender of the fayth*, 1559; my emphasis.

justified. A freedom of conscience motivated by law but whose expression will be "braying trumpets and loud churlish drums, / Clamors of hell" and "slaughtered men"(3.1.302-304) can be nothing more than a call for that law to be changed. Such a freedom is less acceptable than one motivated by commodity but which addresses the needs of the society for peace. Constance's professed motivation by the law is further discredited by Blanch's observation, "The Lady Constance speaks not from her faith, / But from her need" (3.1.210-11).

The next person in whom the playgoer expects to find belief motivated by principle or law is Pandulph, who appeals to "the Church, our mother," "the Church, our holy mother," and to "religion that doth make vows kept," as the authority whereby King John and King Philip should make their decisions (3.1.140, 256, 279). But the expectation is quickly dissolved, first by King John, when he rejects this authority outright and accuses the church of materialism, and later by Pandulph's own words when he gives an order to kill that contradicts the most basic Christian teachings:

And meritorious shall that hand be call'd,
 Canonized and worshipp'd as a saint,
 That takes away by any secret course
 Thy hateful life.

(3.1.176-9)

The statement of Robert Atkinson in the second parliament of Elizabeth I (11 January to 10 April 1563) suggests that an order like Pandulph's could evoke consternation in the English Christian society whether it was issued from Catholic or Protestant authorities:

. . . they [the preachers] much disliked them, callinge the bishops [in both Mary's and Henry VIII's reigns] "blood suckers" and bid fie on those that delighted in nothings else but in the death of innocents, that

threatened the whole realme with their fire and their fagottes,
 murtherers, . . . and that with such vehemencie and stomacke as I
 assure you I marvaile me how it can possibly come to passe that they
 should now desire to establish that as a law which they thought then so
 farr unlawfull.³⁰

Pandulph is a perfect emblem of these historical bishops. His lack of integrity and materialistic intentions are confirmed by his later revelation that his chief motivation for admonishing King Philip to be faithful to Rome is not to uphold the rights of Arthur and the spiritual principles of Christianity but to secure England's majesty for Lewis (3.4.144f).

Shifting Winds and the Ship of State

Even as late as act four, when Pembroke and Salisbury admonish King John for his second coronation and plead for the release of Arthur, expectation peaks that at least these lords might be motivated by the interests of their country. Their remarks indicate a dislike of any hypocrisy, reform, or change of faith. Salisbury compares John's second coronation to an outward change that will be read by people as an inward one:

In this the antique and well-noted face
 Of plain old form is much disfigured,
 And like a shifted wind unto a sail,
 It makes the course of thoughts to fetch about,
 Startles and frights consideration,
 Make sound opinion sick, and truth suspected,
 For putting on so new a fashion'd robe.

(4.2.21-27)

³⁰*Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I*, vol. 1, 98.

The image of the sail "shifted" by the winds and so engendering doubts relates to one of the emblems used in the period, in which a man is depicted with a sail around him as he stands naked on a wheel that lies flat on rough seas.³¹ To the left is a sinking ship tossed by the seas under a mighty wind; to the right another ship sails with full sail. As if to contrast with the wheel under his feet over which he has no control -- probably the wheel of fortune -- there is a sail-like cloth, which from its foldings around the lower body extends in a circle over the head, entangling in itself the man's long hair, and held firmly by his right hand, though ready to be cut by the knife held in his left. This emblem appears to reflect metaphors current at the time of the play, for it uses the same symbols as in Salisbury's speech above. The long sail circling round the man's head and upper body is clearly representative of "the Christian conscience," the individual's judgment, which makes effective use of society's basic values -- the powerful wind -- to stay on course or to progress. But when the wind or ideology is unstable, it causes "the course of thoughts to fetch about;" it "Startles and frights consideration, / Makes sound opinion sick and truth suspected."

The anxiety expressed by Salisbury and Pembroke over the King's uncertain integrity and unstable principles portends their own breaking faith and that of those who follow them. What may at first be read as a legitimate change of faith, because of the King's wrong treatment of Arthur, becomes illegitimate, when the two lords side with the French, kill their own people and then change sides when they discover they too will be killed (5.4.10f). Salisbury's expression of inward pain over his decision to fight against his own people does not clear him of what for self-interest he has done to them. The play does not speak much about those who follow these lords in their movement from one loyalty to another, but Salisbury's shout, "Away, my friends! New flight, / And happy newness, that

³¹Richard Curtis, *The Care of the Christian Conscience* (1600) tp.

intends old right" (5.4.60-61), indicates that there are many whose own decision-making has been influenced by their leaders' "wavering faith."

The arbitrary fixing of standards for the requisites of gain do not, the play seems to say, satisfy the conditions necessary for the people's exercise of free conscience. If we look to Hubert as representative of the ordinary citizen, then the constraints on his right to free conscience exemplify similar constraints on the citizens. Hubert's allegiance to John makes it hard for him to express his own judgment freely when it goes against that of his king. His is a stability for the wrong reasons. His first reaction to John's command to him to kill Arthur is to adopt his king's choice unquestioningly. Hubert is careful not to allow himself to consider the ideas of his victim. "Victim" because, once separated from his mother, Arthur gains a majesty and innocence he seemed bereft of in his connection with her. This majesty and innocence are evident respectively in his education of Hubert and in his abandonment of the ambitions of power. They are confirmed by Hubert's preference for Arthur's will over King John's, Hubert's endorsement of Arthur's legitimacy over the King's, the sympathy of the people for him, and the allegiance shown him by more and more of the play's important figures, including the Bastard.

Arthur is instrumental, too, in the play's citizen's move toward independent judgment. For while Hubert fails to reflect on his choice, and to ponder other options, and to make a decision of his own until the action is almost completed, the process of turning inward to consider his own thoughts begins with Arthur's friendly invitation to express those thoughts when he says to him, "You are sad" (4.1.11). It is Arthur's words too that, after Hubert has expressed his thought, indicate it is only when he chooses freely for himself that he is himself: "O now you look like Hubert! All this while you were disguis'd" (4.1.125). The real value of being human is therefore in the use of the human capabilities, including

the free exercise of conscience, the play seems to say. However, the move in this scene toward the exercise of this right is ironically undercut, because to judge freely Hubert must pretend that he has not done it, and because Arthur, once his (relative) legitimacy is recognized, is obliged to hide it.

The oppression of the freedom to express belief is thus a result of strange beliefs -- in this case, belief in the corrupted figure of King John, who has hitherto, despite hints at his illegitimacy, stood as successful emblem of majesty. With John's enforcement of an illegitimate law, first in his command of Arthur's death, then in his attempt to arrange a second coronation for himself, there comes a loss of faith in him -- by Hubert and by his advisors Pembroke and Salisbury. This loss of faith presages the deaths that are then announced -- of his mother Elinor and of Constance. It also presages the proliferation of minor and apparently superstitious religions, led by a prophet from Pomfret, "Old men and beldames," and followed by the people "strangely fantasied," who talk of Arthur's death and the threat of France, and who believe John will give up his crown. King John is dismayed at these developments, for which he blames Hubert's unthinking adoption of his choice. He is glad when he finds out his faithful servant has not maintained it. But his joyful greeting of Hubert's announcement that Arthur lives comes moments before the "rightful" emblem of majesty, disguised now as a ship-boy, leaps off the wall and by his accidental death abandons any prospect of guiding the state in the future.

The Cyclic Effect of Borrowed Signs and Oppressed Conscience

The Bastard's later vehement judgment of Hubert -- that if he "didst but consent / To this most cruel act" the smallest power will punish him (4.3.125f) -- suggests that Arthur's death, which occurs because of his obligation to hide true majesty under the borrowed sign of ship-boy, was a consequence of constraints on

freedom of conscience. These constraints existed because the standard values and beliefs were "strange." The knowledge that John was England's king was "strange," because he oppressed innocent life, an action that becomes for his lords "the crest / Of murther's arms" (4.3.46-47), an incontestable sign of his injustice, and the reason that he should be "dispossessed" of their allegiance. The homophony of "murther's arms" and "mother's arms" signals the grave paradox manifested in John's cruel reversal of his promise of protection to Arthur, an act which is furthermore a consequence of his cooperation with his mother's ambitious and illegitimate will. In his last soliloquy, the Bastard expresses similar disillusionment; having acknowledged the right of Arthur, he now sees John's majesty as "wrested pomp" in the throes of "imminent decay" (4.3.154).

Besides its allusion to the loss of religious sovereignty, the death of Arthur could have engendered a multitude of thoughts for members of the play's first audiences. The homophony of "Arthur" with "author" even now inspires images of originator, original value, integrity, and empowerment, while at Shakespeare's time these attributes must have been linked with conceptions of God (as in the author of life, reason and "our Religion"³²), as well as with recollections of the history of the Arthur who figured so importantly according to the *Annales Cambriae* in the establishment of Christianity in England, and who in Geoffrey of Monmouth's account possessed magical and mystical powers. The Bastard's sense of loss then speaks for the sense of lost values and lost history the Elizabethans were experiencing as they entered the modern age of skepticism, relativism, secularism, and change.

³²de Mornay argues that the order of universe must have an "Author" (*A Woorke Concerning the Trewnesse*, A2r). Hooker describes God as the "author" of reason (*Of the Laws*, vol. 2 (book 5), 20. While Burton says "the Divell" is "the author of lies," he refers to Lucian's confession to Eusebius that "God is the Author of our Religion himselfe" (vol. 3, 339).

The Institution of Secular Values

Though the Bastard's apprehension of the death of Arthur is without knowledge of John's intentions for his destruction, he has nevertheless been aware of John's shortcomings as king. He has criticized the compromise John made of England's land, and has identified his motives with selfish gain and finally with borrowed majesty. But the Bastard's only alternative is to continue in his allegiance to the de facto king. However imperfect his king's qualities, the Bastard's role is to make up for them by his own integrity and initiative, and by his encouragement in him of kingly attributes, for it is only this that will salvage England from the French forces. In the symbolic paradigm of conception of God / king and religion / mother so far aligned with the dramatic figures in the play, it would appear that, with Arthur dead and King John established as imperfect, the image of God is dead; and with the mothers devoid of magnanimity and love for the people (and now also dead), the image of religion too is dead.

There is now only one character whose name and qualities are sufficiently integrated for him to represent a worthy value -- the Bastard, who now enjoys a reputation of loyalty and strength. While his status of "bastard" has paradoxically made him a more likely sign of the absence of integrity, he has proved by his action that his honourable name accords with his true character, a status symbolically represented by his recuperation of his father's lion-skin. Interestingly, the lion was among other figures well known as a metaphor for God; Burton, for example, refers to a story about why "the *Jewes* God was compared to a Lion."³³ A real bastard, Richard is the product of majesty in his father Cordelion and undemonstrativeness in his mother, whose adulterous passivity is the virtue that has allowed his father's majesty to dominate, and whose silence about her relation has made it necessary for the Bastard to prove that relation by his

³³Burton, vol. 3, 379.

action. But while a bastard, he is also the only one who in character conveys what in the language of the play are the ideals of the leonine God.

The Bastard comes closest in the play to the ideals of humanity and of freedom of conscience that were emerging as the secularization in early modern England prepared the grounds for different, individualized belief systems, which would take root and grow alongside a multitude of others.³⁴ For the Bastard, these ideals are not the dumb labels whose only connection with reality is in the voices of their proponents; these self-proven names connect with real values by their own real being and action, all the more powerful because self-chosen. The Bastard, unlike all the others, has a certainty upon which he bases all his choices. Outwardly he shows allegiance to the *de facto* king. But his real allegiance is to the values of sacrifice for his country and courage that his real father embodied.

The decision to accept this identity in the first act was equivalent to the acceptance of a basic set of values, which constituted in turn the basis that made him capable of freely choosing his actions from then on. His support of King John despite the loss of esteem for him, his willingness to uphold his inexperienced heir as the new king, his encouragement of the traitorous Salisbury's and the other English lords' "mended faiths," his matter-of-fact dismissal of the wrongs of the faithless Cardinal Pandulph -- all of which attitudes and actions are in support of England's people and land -- are decisions he makes freely because of his sure knowledge of one thing -- the attributes of honour and patriotism embodied in Cordelion. While this development represents a shift of certainty from an assurance in a faith founded on God to one based on nationalism, it does provide a stable value system on which freedom of conscience can be exercised.

This shift, however, insofar as it also implies that trust is not anymore embodied in religious institutions, may also be viewed as a new placement of

³⁴Sommerville, 15-17.

allegiance that disregards the church, represented in the play by the maternal figure. Where John's and Arthur's incompetent kingships were influenced by their mothers, the Bastard directs his life without regard to his mother, but only with reference to the ideal figure of Cordelion. The Bastard's attitude, interestingly, is exactly that propounded in the most important legal and religious work published in the same period as *King John* -- Hooker's *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*. In this treatise, legal and religious institutions are considered as always imperfect and always in need of improvement, and God rather than the Church is thus made out to be the only stable point of reference.³⁵ Of course God, without religion, is just a personal imagination -- without any communicable meaning because it can mean anything, but the Bastard's God retains some meaning because of its connection with the figures of mother England and the national hero Cordelion.

The Magna Carta Connection

The Elizabethan struggles for freedom of conscience so vividly reflected in the play as regards religion were paralleled in the development of law. Law reform was intimately connected with the religious controversies of the time and was giving rise to similar dilemmas. Because what was happening in law related in part to the Magna Carta, about whose omission in the play so many remarks have been made, it seems pertinent to look briefly at how *King John* might have alluded to this development. Although the Magna Carta was well known and would have been associated with King John by every lawyer in the Elizabethan audience, although it is discussed in the works of the much read Bracton and was mentioned in Parliament from time to time, it was not appealed to very frequently in Tudor times.³⁶ The writings of Bacon and Coke attest the importance they gave

³⁵C. M. A. McCauliff, "Law as a Principle of Reform: Reflections from Sixteenth-Century England," *Rutgers Law Review*, 40.2 (1988): 464.

³⁶Thompson, *Magna Carta: Its Role*, 383.

to it, but these writings were not published until the seventeenth century. The Magna Carta, therefore, at the time the play was being written, may have figured as just one element of a broad debate about the reform of law.

This said, we do not know much about the discussions at the Inns of Court and elsewhere where lawyers met, nor how many of these conversations the author of *King John* was involved in. There may have been reasons for the Magna Carta not to be brought up in public debate (or in a play) that would not however have applied to discussion of it in private. The fact that this charter resulted from resistance to the monarch could itself have made it too sensitive at a time when the monarchy was reestablishing the grounds of its authority. We do know that both Bacon and Coke had been working in law for some fifteen years by the time Shakespeare wrote *King John*, and that Coke praises the great charter as "the fountaine of all the fundamentall lawes of the realm."³⁷ It is therefore almost unthinkable that it did not figure in the informal discussions among lawyers and jurists and the men of the theatre with whom they mixed.

What is sure from the records is that in the period Shakespeare was writing *King John* the reform of law was one of the most important controversies between the Puritans and the Anglicans. There had been attempts to reform the law from as early as 1547;³⁸ and the controversy over it was in part the motive for Hooker's *Of the Laws* (1593; 1597). The important speeches at parliament in this period harp frequently on the principle of reform, the following comment being typical:

And now (Mr Speaker) I aske these questions why may we not innovate. Nay, ar we not bounden in honour to the House, duty, honestie and good consciences to innovate good orders, as well as

³⁷Edward Coke, *The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England*, revised and corrected by Francis Hargrave and Charles Butler, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Robert H. Small, 1853) 81a.

³⁸*Commons Journal*, i, 8, as cited in Anne Pallister, *Magna Carta: The Heritage of Liberty* (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1971) 89.

good lawes; have not former parlamentes left us many presidentes therof to ther great and ay induring honor as examples of the power of the parlament for us to immitate, yes doubtles? . . .³⁹

Innovation was opposed for fear that "thinges beyng without doubt" might, "with the subteltie of wordes, bee broughte into doubte." Innovation could bring into question the authority of the monarch, the most sensitive of issues and one intimately connected with law reform. The reason for this was the spread of the idea that a tyrannical monarch did not have authority and therefore he or she along with tyrannical laws could be resisted. The opposing view was that the monarch was above the law; whatever issued from the monarch was by definition just. Some parliamentarians recognized only the importance of maintaining monarchical authority; others were deeply concerned about the need for new laws.

Broadly speaking, the two questions underlying these debates were, first, how to reform the law to suit the new needs of the times and render greater justice to a wider population and, second, how to give this reformed law the authority the old law had. The monarch could assist in this problem by acting as a connector between a new law and the old law, and hence could endow the transitional period of its initial use with stability. To be useful in decision-making, to be obeyed by the population, to be an instrument of justice, the reformed law had to become a basic value of the society. A basic value had to be right and have might, have justice and authority. These were precisely the problems faced and overcome at the time the Magna Carta was first instituted; it was a reform of law that received authority from the king. Its institution combined the two apparently contradictory processes of innovation and authorization, for it was an example of a change in which people (the barons) had exercised "the right of resistance," and an instance

³⁹"Speech on Freedom of Speech in Support of Peter Wentworth, prepared for 1 March [?]," (Parliament: 29 October 1586-23 March 1587) *Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I*, vol. 2 1584-1589, 329.

in which they had respected the king's authority.⁴⁰ And what was later perceived as not right in it had been subject to more reform and further authorization by Henry III. The process went on, for while the great charter is still said to be "justly regarded as the foundation of English constitutional liberty,"⁴¹ the nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw all but four of the thirty-seven articles of its Henry III (reformed) version repealed.⁴²

The changes to which it has been subject indicate there were reasons for the ambivalency of its earlier users. Both before, after, and during the period of Shakespeare's writing, the Magna Carta like other elements of the law was faced with this problem. Historical studies such as J. R. Maddicott's "Magna Carta and the Local Community: 1215-1259" show the charter had been the subject of dispute since it was first enacted, and that this was due to its contradictions and lack of clarity and authority.⁴³ It was the foundation of the local community's voicing their political will, but as Maddicott points out "the concessions specifically made to local opinion in the Charter were very limited." A half-a-century after the period of Shakespeare's writing of *King John*, William Walwyn and Richard Overton, the famous Leveller promoters of freedom of conscience, protested its inadequacy. Walwyn wrote in 1645 that the "Magna Charta . . . is but a part of the peoples rights and liberties, being . . . so little as less could not be granted without any pretense of freedom."⁴⁴ At Elizabeth's time, its chief problem was its lack of authority. It was quoted by some lawyers in behalf of Puritan interests but not successfully.⁴⁵ Another problem with it, which became clearer in the reign of

⁴⁰Post, 120.

⁴¹Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., 1990.

⁴²Pallister, 89.

⁴³*Past & Present*, 102 (1984): 25-65.

⁴⁴W. Haller, *Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution, 1638-1647* (New York: 1934) iii, 313ff.

⁴⁵Ashley, 8.

James, was the variety of interpretations it was subject to. One of these concerned the grievances over monopolies and patents that inhibited the free commercial activities of the majority in favour of a few. Where under Elizabeth when the Magna Carta was brought to bear on the subject it was ineffective, under James it was successful and operated "with the King's approval" (16).

The Magna Carta's basic problems, which as we have seen reflected those of law reform in the late sixteenth century, are conveyed in the play's contrasting figures of the Bastard and King John. Both in their own way emblemize the central issues of the justice and authority required if basic values are to be established and then used in the free exercise of conscience. The Bastard, standing alone in the play for justice, unveils the false signs, so that people may see what equals what and who is a hypocrite; and in accord with what is possible within the dominant culture of materialism he acts with integrity. But as a bastard -- with no legitimate link with an original purity or author -- he cannot have authority; he is as ineffective as the Magna Carta was during Elizabeth's reign when it was not given her authority. Concomitantly, the Magna Carta may be said to resemble him, for it was born out of wedlock so to speak, in the sense that it was a result of innovative thinking and was only later accepted and authorized. Secondly, one of its concerns was property and taxes -- in short, commodity. Its later relation to broader human concerns similarly reflects the evolution in the Bastard's character.

Playing out other aspects of the history of the Magna Carta, King John, in his initial offer of status and choice to the Bastard and in his acceptance of the citizens' plan for peace, acts justly, but in the ordering of Arthur's death and in the conciliation with Rome, he does not. The criticism so vehemently raised in the play against his arbitrary decrees, especially his compromise with the Roman Church, recalls one of Walwyn's criticisms, made a few decades after the play was written -- that the Charter upheld the authority of the Church's leaders, whom he

saw as "oppressors of the people."⁴⁶ Like the conflicting bases and terms of the great charter, the conflicting authorities in the play and John's compromises institute a disunity that makes impossible the consent to his rule that might have provided a basis for his authority even without its being based in past law. Unity is the greater bestower of authority, for even an old law lacks authority if there is no agreement about it. The lack of it in the play, as with the disparate views on the Magna Carta in Elizabeth's time, is the mountainous obstacle that blocks the road forward for the citizens, the marriage between Lewis and Blanch, the peaceful cooperation between England and France and, finally, the life and livelihood of a desperate king, his supporters, and his people.

The last scene of the play brings to a head the problems of law reform and those of stable basic values, both of which related to the use of the Magna Carta. The scene's focus on disunity as the dishevelled of authority is suggested in the opening comment that the King's blood, the source of his life, "is touched corruptibly," glossed "infected to the point of decomposition."⁴⁷ Death lays "siege . . . Against the mind, the which he [death] pricks and wounds / With many legions of strange fantasies" (5.7.16-18). These many and presumably disparate fanciful thoughts in King John's head "Confound themselves." "Confound" has the connotation of "defeat," "throw into disorder," "mix up in the mind."⁴⁸ It is repeated in the final utterance of King John, "confounded royalty," and comes as the ultimate explanation within a statement about basic values and judgment:

The tackle of my heart is crack'd and burn'd,
And all the shrouds wherewith my life should sail
Are turned to one thread, one little hair:
My heart hath one poor string to stay it by,

⁴⁶Haller, iii, 313ff.

⁴⁷Matchett, ed., 1989 Signet Classic edition.

⁴⁸The Concise Oxford, 1982 ed.

Which holds but till thy news be uttered,
 And then all this thou seest is but a clod
 And module of confounded royalty.

(5.7.52-58)

The sail, as we saw earlier in the play and in Curtis's *Care of the Christian Conscience*, is the medium of judgment, through which the wind -- the values or ideology -- can be put to use for our progress, tranquillity, or security. The sail image, redepicted shredded to bits and with only one thread remaining, and the simulation of this one thread to a single hair at once give notice of its fragility and recall the picture on Curtis's booklet, in which the man's hair was in harmonious arrangement with his sail. The organ of judgment here reduced to one fragile hair, is in King John's words the "stay" of his heart. Ripped up by a destructive ideology, shorn and battered by contending values, this instrument can no longer hold together, and becomes nothing more than a sign or "module" of "confounded royalty," a mere ineffective image of contending regal authorities defeating each other as they compete to be the foundation of society.

In a metaphor that might be identified with the document Magna Carta, he calls himself "a scribbled form, drawn with a pen / Upon a parchment," which against the "fire" of his divisive sickness "shrinks up" (5.7.32-33). Justice for England (the effect of the application of the great charter) and action and decisions (the signs of the exercise of free conscience) can only return when a new authority embodied in a new king "sets a form" upon this "shapeless confusion."⁴⁹ Justice and freedom can only come back when the people with "mended faiths" regain their integrity and, joining with the Bastard -- the sign of integrity, "come home again" to some set of basic values -- an effective charter of rights or a just king (5.7.75, 115).

⁴⁹Matchett's gloss for "indigest" in "To set a form upon that indigest" (5.7.26).

Stability for the Right Reasons

The problems with the leaders in *King John*, like the problems with the English law, are not so much because of the lack of legal or customary grounds for their claims to authority. They are rather because of the use of these claims -- commodity. Serving the interests of gain means opposition to social justice, the purpose for which these institutions were created.⁵⁰ In making commodity their authority, the English dispersed the pivotal function of justice into a multitude of functions serving greedy individuals. The problem was therefore ideological, not only in the political sense but also in the ethical sense, for slippage between professed purpose and real purpose is lying. When that slippage undermines the lives, livelihood and freedom and rights of the generality of the population it becomes much worse than lying.

The ideological basis and ramifications of human rights philosophy are evident both in the works of human rights theorists, such as John Rawls, and in twentieth-century human rights instruments, though it is rare to find them exposed there as clearly as in *King John*. Our discussion here will dwell first on Rawls's concern with the social and political means of creating "stability for the right reasons," the pertinence of these means to moral systems, and vice versa. Then we will consider the inherent relation of human rights law (especially that concerning freedom of conscience) to the society's moral systems.

When comparisons with *King John* are made, the kings and leaders in the play must be regarded as agents of various moral systems. This does not conflict with their earlier use as conceptions of God, because in the play these conceptions are made by the "mother" ideology and used by it to accomplish its design. Their mothers' thinking and behaviour represent the ideologies their actions serve or are

⁵⁰This is not to say that the structure of these institutions was suitable to the times.

derived from. The father of the Bastard (the only important father in the play) thus stands for "the real god," active only in a totally passive mother, and manifest only in a son whose mother has this quality of total submission.

The sensitivity of the question of the relationship between human rights philosophy and ethical systems is evident in Rawls's revisions to his *Theory of Justice* that appear under the title of *Political Liberalism*. The displacement of the term significant of an ideal ("justice") by one referring to a purely political system ("political liberalism") suggests this. The changes he makes are not cosmetic either, but represent a major effort to face the conditions of a society "deeply divided" in its views on morals and religious and philosophical ideals.

His solution may be considered as having two parts, in both of which he shows his belief that despite pluralism a way must be found to ensure the practice and belief in a given set of ethics. The first part of his solution is the "limitation" of his conception of justice to "the domain of the political,"⁵¹ and the delineation of this political conception not on the basis of utilitarian philosophy but on "an original position" that includes the golden rule (the principle of "reciprocity"). The second is to ensure that this conception does not "conflict too sharply with their [the citizens'] comprehensive views," for they must in their own way (and privately) relate it to their diverse religious and moral systems and so be able to believe in it enough to support it and defend it (40, 38).

Rawls's careful secularization of his conception "as a freestanding view" available to western democratic societies composed of groups that adhere to conflicting but "reasonable comprehensive doctrines" resembles the Bastard's behaviour. In separating himself from his natural mother and, instead, adopting an arbitrary maternal figure (Elinor), the Bastard makes a stance against those whose decisions are ruled by the unreasonable loyalties the mothers in the play demand;

⁵¹*Political Liberalism*, 38.

for although he ostensibly will follow Elinor "unto the death," and though he does so by putting his capacities and virtues in service of the de facto political structure ruled by her son, he is not motivated by his love for or belief in her or her values. He undertakes this not in order to serve that structure in particular, but rather to give himself a way to put in practice the attributes of courage and devotion he knows his father valued; and because of the assistance he can thereby render to an idealized England somehow related to those values.

Is this not what Rawls is asking for: that the citizens of his model society believe and practice the common ethics of their religious and moral systems that support their agreed upon political conception of justice, but that they do not bring into public life the disagreements, contentions, and irrational, factious loyalties sometimes current in these systems? In a sense he is limiting the manifestation of their philosophical thought -- their freedom of conscience -- for the purposes of maintaining freedom of conscience as a fundamental right for the whole of society.

The problem that may be predicted both for the Bastard's society and for Rawls's is one of continuity. As Rawls notes, to maintain stability the ethical systems (or "the reasonable comprehensive doctrines") must continue to have effect on people's thinking and behaviour so that the "unreasonable comprehensive doctrines do not gain enough currency to undermine society's essential justice" (39). In *King John* the Bastard is alone in this secularized but ethically motivated position; there is nothing that suggests others will adopt his stance. Indeed, there is a point at which he seems to have no choice but to adopt the ethics of gain that dominates his society. The ideals of courage and service to his country, for which his father stands, have no structure within which they can reproduce in future generations.

Rawls does not provide for any means of maintaining the systems of ethics that motivate people to support his political conception, but he assumes a society that at least for the moment has systems that support it. He does however

construct several mechanisms whereby his model society can maintain some stability. There is to be, for example, "an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines" that justifies this conception and "public discussion, when constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice are at stake" (44). But the most important of these mechanisms is the political conception of justice that "regulates" the "basic structure of the society."

This conception, though political, has the ethical features of justice and unity, for it is a system of social cooperation that guarantees the basic liberties that all members of the society agree to carry out "even at the cost of their own interests in particular situations" and for the sake of the "general good" (xliv, 16). The basic liberties are given as goods because of the moral conception of good. Goodness is only goodness when it allows all to share in it, when it entails reciprocal responsibilities and equal rights. This is a "justice aspect" of Rawls's political conception of justice. Secondly, the idea of basic liberties "presupposes various general facts about human wants and abilities, their characteristic phases and requirements of nurture, relations of social interdependence, and much else" (307). None of these requirements can be met, nor can any of these abilities be developed, nor can agreement be reached on his political conception of justice, without a unified and widespread practice of the ethical value of integrity. The "unity aspect" of his theory is therefore the required unified thinking on certain basic ethical values permitting the implementation of a law providing for diversity of thought on the vast array of other matters.

The discussion of *King John* indicates that not only is the ethic of integrity conspicuously absent, but Rawls's mechanisms for stability are not available to the society of the play. There is no agreement among the agents and representatives of comprehensive doctrines or ethical systems, and there is no free public discussion of the basic questions of justice. The "original position" in Rawls which might

have served in the play's society to replace basic ethical values, on which *King John's* leaders cannot agree, is also absent, so that there is no common value whether political or otherwise that can serve as a foundation for action and judgment. While it might be said that personal gain ("commodity") is a value they all agree on, its parading in the costume of justice and right does not allow for its proper recognition; therefore there are groups for whom this universal value cannot be available. In any case, it is not a value that can serve everyone equally, for its instruments are oppression, dishonesty, injustice. The political conception Rawls proposes for the establishment of a unity that promotes rather than oppresses freedom is thus also lacking. The only stability that can be achieved in *King John* is one established by oppression, hence a stability for the wrong reasons.

A Necessary Unity

The same problem of instability *King John* demonstrates and Rawls grapples with is evident in human rights law. Human rights law is not only derived from a philosophy that assumes a certain stability among ethical values, but the problems of its implementation have been viewed as a consequence of the discrepancy between its moral ideals and the ethics practiced by the community.⁵² The paradox, particularly ironic in a discussion of freedom of conscience, is that there must be a degree of unity in ideological thought in order for there to be diversity. Yet there are only occasional mechanisms in human rights law to ensure this. The implementation of the right to freedom of conscience is dependent, for example, on a restriction of beliefs against freedom of conscience or at least a restriction of their manifestation. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads,

⁵²Theodor Meron, *Human Rights Law-Making in the United Nations: A Critique of Instruments and Process* (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1986) 52.

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.⁵³

That this principle can give freedom only to people having belief, whose manifestation will not obstruct other people's similar freedom, is intrinsic to the article, but is explicitly specified in paragraph three of the parallel article in The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:

Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.⁵⁴

In practice this restrictive clause may be misused by oppressive governments. It has not often been interpreted to imply the necessity of a unified thinking as regards certain attitudes, such as for example attitudes to integrity, honesty, prejudice, or to the provision of the right itself to all people. Thus the idea proposed here -- that a degree of unity is necessary if this human right is to be implemented -- has not often been argued on the basis of the right itself.

On the other hand, this idea is frequently expressed in discussions concerning the necessity of the implementation of human rights in "total" and *erga omnes*, that is, all together and universally. One author, for example, raises the

⁵³United Nations, *Human Rights: A Compilation*, 2.

⁵⁴United Nations, *Human Rights: A Compilation*, 11. The European Convention qualifies the limitations as those necessary in "a democratic society": "Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others" (European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 9.2).

possibility of restricting freedom of thought in the cases of those beliefs that contradict "the goal of women's equality as a fundamental right."⁵⁵ The necessity of certain stable ethical values is in fact evident in all the discussions about implementing human rights. Article five's stipulation that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" is one of the most obvious instances where a stable system of moral values is needed for the implementation of a human right. Only if people can look to this right with the security and tranquillity that it means something certain, according to common standards or definitions, can they freely exercise their consciences in related matters. Moreover, a careful examination of each human right reveals that in every case its implementation requires a common belief in a particular set of ethical values. It may even be said that the implementation of human rights is meaningless where the basic ethical values related to them are not believed in or practised. Above all is this true for integrity. But, as will become evident in the projected work on freedom of speech and the consideration of the consequences on that right of the replacement of the goal of fairness by "commodity," it is true too of other moral values. So powerful has commodity as a goal become over the centuries that the people in North America have in protest instituted a "Buy Nothing Day" (28 November). The plea in *King John*'s subtext for a stability among at least some values as a prerequisite for the free exercise of conscience was no doubt related to the historical context of the play's first performances. That it should be so pertinent to present conditions and with regard to human rights law in general rattles the links between current issues and those of early modern Europe, and affirms the continued relevancy of the play.

⁵⁵Meron, 182.

Chapter Three

Horn-Tipped Staffs: Interference with Freedom of Conscience in *Much Ado About Nothing*

You shall comprehend all vagrom men.
(3.3.25)

Dogberry enjoins his men to understand all people and yet not to tolerate those who "lecherously" interfere with others; he thus sets out an important freedom of conscience question -- the difference between interference in the individual's right to freedom of conscience and the rightful exercise of freedom of expression. *Much Ado About Nothing* begins and ends with a commentary on the unavoidable interference of ideology in people's thought and conscience. This commentary brackets a story about groups who interfere in extreme, deceptive, straightforward, mild and violent ways with each others' freedom of thought, religion and conscience. The play fully legitimizes only one sort of interference; this is the interference by the representatives of the law (Dogberry and Verges) with those who have oppressed others' freedom of conscience by means of fraud. The political philosophy evidenced in this action accords with the principles in current human rights instruments and John Rawls's rights theory. A close look at *Much Ado's* plays-within-a-play and its allusions to Elizabethan perceptions of religion and atheism supply the path to these interpretations.

Strange Learning

Like *King John*, *Much Ado About Nothing* opens with a discussion between an authority figure and a messenger, and alludes to the strangeness of people's learning. Leonato, the governor of Messina, has "learned" from a letter delivered by the messenger that the Prince of Aragon will visit him that

evening. The letter presumably does not mention the number of men lost in the war, for Leonato asks the messenger, "How many gentlemen have you lost in this action?", to which he responds, "But few of any sort, and none of name." The absence of this information in the letter, the messenger's failure to supply it before requested, and his explanation that those who were killed were not "of name" construct the framework of "learning" in the society of the play. Knowledge in Leonato's and Don Pedro's society is determined by a value system in which rank, class, and reputation (the equivalent of name) take precedence over life and humanness. The letter and the messenger speak of Don Pedro because he is the Prince; they convey no knowledge of those killed in the battle because they are of "no name." To some in the audience this sequence might suggest that the letter is but a borrowed sign of what happened in the battle and what it conveys is strange knowledge; this would indeed be the case according to a standard in which the life and death of people is more important than the vacation of a Prince.

The motif of learning is carried forward as the scene unfolds. When Leonato observes, presumably from what he has read in the letter, that "Don Pedro hath bestowed much honour on a young Florentine called Claudio" (1.1.8-10), and when the messenger remarks that Claudio was "remembered" by Don Pedro because he merited honour, a contrast is set up between these remembrances and the forgetting of the nameless who gave their lives in the battle. The knowledge Leonato receives about Claudio from Don Pedro's letter is bolstered by other related facts about him remembered by the Messenger: "He hath borne himself beyond the promise of his age, doing, in the figure of a lamb, the feats of a lion: he hath indeed better bettered expectation than you must expect of me to tell you how" (1.1.13-17). This remembered learning will be remembered again and celebrated, for as Leonato remarks, Claudio has an uncle who "will be very much glad of it" (1.1.17-18). Part of the reason for the

celebration of Claudio's behaviour is because his accomplishments went beyond what was expected of him. In contrast to the characters in *King John*, who borrow the figure of the lion while they act in a cowardly manner, Claudio's "figure of a lamb" belied his "feats of a lion." The unstable relationship between the labels Claudio wears and the qualities he displays work in his favour because he has qualities esteemed by those who judge him and because the label he wears -- the figure of a lamb -- is likewise the legitimate appearance of a person of his young age. This sequence illustrates that people's thought, evidenced by what they give importance to, is largely influenced by their ideology.

As in *King John*, the characters of *Much Ado About Nothing* exemplify the impact each person's expression of free conscience has on others' exercise of the same right. But unlike the history play, *Much Ado* emphasizes less the repression of freedom of conscience that is a consequence of an unstable value system than it does the repression inherent in any expression of belief. In other words, it brings up the problem of ideology, so often raised in current human rights discussions: The freedom of conscience like any of the other freedoms is not absolute, at least not when manifested. It can only be expressed to the extent that it does not interfere with the freedom of others; but the criteria for judging this is based on one ideology, which is not necessarily adhered to by all those subject to it. Whether or not the belief expressed is acceptable under this ideology will largely determine not only its expression but also its perception as constructive or destructive of the society. So the significance bestowed on the deaths of those "of name" and the lack of concern for the nameless, in addition to the manifestation of this attitude in what is remembered, are a consequence of the society's ideology.

When a playwright wants to indicate to the audience that the ideology and the structure and myths that support it are not suited to the current needs of the people, then these mechanisms of social continuity -- knowledge and signs -- are

presented as strange and borrowed. The contrast drawn in the scene referred to above between the knowledge presented about the visit of a Prince and the feats of a young hero and the absence of any remembrance of the ordinary people who gave their lives in battle can be read as the author's attempt to make the reader question the ideology that dominates the society of the play. The allusions to the abuse of the freedom of conscience become more noticeable as the story develops, indicating this society has interference with belief built into it.

The Religious Background to the Metaphoric Language

For those in the audience who picked up these allusions -- and there were many young lawyers and parliamentarians for whom the question was important,¹ the series of battles -- the war from which Claudio and Don Pedro and the others have returned, Benedick's and Beatrice's battle of wits, and the dispute over Hero's purity -- might have been seen as battles over belief, an argument between atheists and believers, or contention among the churches. The question of free conscience was intimately connected with these struggles, because the diversity of religion was what brought it to the fore in sixteenth-century European and English society and because there were many who, for religious reasons, found the idea of this being a right unthinkable. Among popular writers who implicitly opposed freedom of conscience, especially of atheists, was the French Protestant Philippe de Mornay, who shows an unusual respect for Jews and a slight respect for other non-Christian believers, but who writes of atheists, "Surely unto him that treateth

¹ Andrew Gurr, *Playgoing in Shakespeare's London* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987) 5, 26, 118-119; Arthur Underhill, *Shakespeare's England: An Account of the Life and Manners of his Age*, ed. Humphrey Milford, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1917) 381. The diary notes of the young law student, John Manningham (1602-1603), about sermons he attended, indicate how important religious questions were for some of the lawyers of the period. See *The diary of John Manningham of the Temple, 1602-1603*, with an introduction, notes, and life of the author by Robert Parker Sorlien (Hanover, NH: UP of New England, 1976).

of Religion, it ought to bee graunted as an unviolable Principle, That there is a God; and all men ought too bee forbidden to call it into question, upon paine of not being men any more."²

Other writers had or were soon to put forward the right to free conscience as a principle basic to good government, among them Paul de Foix, who in the period of his ambassadorship in Scotland and England (1561-6) wrote to his government arguing in favour of freedom of religion for the Protestants in France, and in England tried to assist English Catholics to freedom.³ Paul Harris comments that Sir Henry Vane in his work entitled *A Healing Question* (1656) reasons that "freedom of conscience is so important that it deserves special protection within the nation: it must be made part of the fundamental constitution of the supreme power before it is erected . . ."⁴ While the writings of de Foix and Vane were produced before and after the period Shakespeare was composing his plays, they nevertheless indicate the seriousness being brought to the subject over a long period around the time of his work. Montaigne's essay, "De La Liberté de Conscience" (circa 1578-80) is again an indication of the growing debate. The familiarity of Shakespeare and his compatriots with Montaigne makes it likely that his thought had influence on the discussions of free conscience in England.

The characters of *Much Ado* may be seen to be associated with those who played parts in the religious controversies of the real society and with its arguments over the freedom of conscience: the superstitious "enthusiasts" (as Burton calls them), the "scoffing" atheists, the "libertines," the ill-willed ascetics, the satisfied and unthinking upholders of the dominant church, and (if one agrees that the play gives precedence to a particular ideology) the wise defenders of the

²de Mornay, *A Woorke Concerning the Trewnesse*, A1v.

³Malcolm C. Smith, "Paul de Foix and Freedom of Conscience," *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, 55.2 (1993): 305-7.

⁴Harris, 45.

true faith, who are also supporters of freedom of conscience. These characters' beliefs and the ideologies shown to condemn or tolerate them are put to test to enable consideration of five important conditions for the exercise of the right to free conscience: The first is a sense of tolerance; the second, an understanding of the nature and consequences of intentional and deceptive interference in people's belief systems; the third, an understanding, in accord with the goals of a just society, of the limitations of toleration and non-interference; the fourth, a background sense of justice requisite to the implementation of a proper freedom of expression; and, finally, an awareness of the current structures and attitudes that work against freedom of conscience but that inhere in the reigning ideology and dominant order. The female figures, as love objects, may be seen to represent different belief systems; they also, as well as each of the male characters, emblemize the society's perceptions of different sorts of believing.⁵ In the interaction between all these characters and representatives of belief systems, the drama comments on the above-mentioned questions about ideology and the limits of freedom of conscience.

Emblems of Atheists, Believers and Belief Systems

The young hero Claudio, for example, reflects the fanatic but ignorant believer who does not know much about the belief he adheres to and therefore surprises his fellows if he makes a big sacrifice. He is distinguished by his class from those of no name, who are expected to give their lives simply by reason of their subservience. Claudio's extreme fervour during the war, the exaggerated esteem he enjoys, his wordy sermons on love, and the scorn he elicits in Benedick

⁵A reader of Hartby will see that the interpretation set out below differs from hers, which relates the characters to specific religions; on the view that the members of the play's first audiences had some variation in their opinions, I present another one, which does not link every character to a particular religion.

and Don John by his mindless adoration of Hero suggest the symptoms Burton ascribes to a certain kind of "religious melancholy" (which he shows is a disease of "enthusiasts") -- "blinde zeale . . . vaine fears, blinde obedience, needlesse workes, incredibilities, impossibilities, monstrous rites and ceremonies . . ." (vol. 3, 366).⁶ There is, for example, his easy replacement of "war-thoughts" with a zealous and jealous love for Hero, without any interest in knowing her first; his blind acceptance of Don Pedro's "teaching" about love, and his participation in a wooing procedure that includes disguises, intermediaries, and an atmosphere of ceremony. In fact Claudio is typical of the religious person described by Burton as suffering from an over-attachment to what they "wrongly" understand to be God or God's representatives -- who are "very superstitious," and who will "prostrate their goods, fortunes, bodies, lives, and offer up themselves at their superiours feet, at his command" (vol. 3, 342, 351). In this paradigm, where the lover-warrior is the believer, and the love object is the belief or belief system, Claudio's love-object after the war is Hero. Like the fanatic's belief system, whose authenticity is often questioned by those who do not believe in it, her worthiness will be put to test as the play proceeds.

The long discourse over Claudio sets the stage for the contrasting image presented next of Benedick. The messenger has never heard of Benedick's title, Signior Mountanto. His remarks about him are terse and, although he notes that "He hath done good service in these wars" (1.1.44), he refrains from giving any details or from praising him in the way he did Claudio. He gives information about Benedick only as Beatrice draws it out of him question by question. The only knowledge Beatrice gathers is that he is "A lord to a lord, a man to a man,

⁶This similarity between Benedick's and Don John's attitudes towards Claudio's unthinking adoption of belief may seem odd; however, it serves, when later a distinction is drawn between their contrasting modes of expressing this different opinion, to underscore the contrast between legitimate and illegitimate manifestation of freedom of conscience.

stuff'd with all honourable virtues" (1.1.56-57). This remark, complimentary insofar as it attributes virtues to Benedick, also describes his shaping his character chameleon-like to fit the people he happens to be with. These practices could be understood both as evidence of his compassion and tact or of his undistinguished conforming behaviour. The image is further developed in an uncomplimentary way in Beatrice's comments that "he hath every month a new sworn brother" and that "he wears his faith but as the fashion of his hat" (1.1.73-77).

Beatrice also comments that Benedick is governed by only one of his "five wits" which, she advises, "let him bear . . . for a difference between himself and his horse, for it is all the wealth that he hath left to be known a reasonable creature" (1.1.68-71). The picture she presents of him as barely human seems to allude to the rhetorical treatment of atheists in the sixteenth century: "they hardly and scarcely seem to hold the place of human being," and by denying their "kinship" with God they become "a base and ignoble creature."⁷ Benedick's reputation for "squirmishes of wit" also identifies him with the image of atheist. Hooker, for example, states that some atheists have a "new method" of "turning things that are serious into mockery, an art of contradiction by way of scorn" and who "practise" this "with a wanton superfluity of wit, too much insulting over the patience of more virtuously disposed minds."⁸ The stance of the atheist and deists is, according to another writer of a slighter later period, to "set up for Wits and Virtuosos, and pretend to greater measures of reason and understanding, than their dull forefathers ever had."⁹

⁷Hooker, *Of the Laws*, vol. 2 (book 5), 17; Francis Bacon, *Bacon's Essays*, ed. F. G. Selby (London: Macmillan, 1948) ch. 16, 42.

⁸*Of the Laws*, vol. 2 (book 5), 18.

⁹Thomas Smith, *Two Compendious Discourses: The one concerning the Power of God: The other about the Certainty and Evidence of a Future State*. Published in opposition to the growing Atheisme and Deisme of the Age (London: For S. Smith and B. Walford, 1699) A2r.

While Benedick's changeableness, faithlessness and unreasonable wit are jovially accepted, because he is harmless, Beatrice continues to emphasize the conflict between herself and him. As a fickle person he cannot be trusted; therefore he is not fit to be in her books, in the sense of being her friend. Beatrice's comments that she would "burn" her study were Benedick in her books mark him with heresy, a designation she develops when she observes that he will lead others to "the devil" and that he will spread disease among the healthy. The burning no doubt alludes to the destruction of books and other properties conducted in the decades preceding the composition of the play in order to destroy literature thought not to conform with the official belief system. Not only were banned books routinely burned, but heretics (of which the worst were those who denied all belief in Christ) were also burned alive.

Beatrice's association of Benedick with disease and madness again speaks to contemporary attitudes towards atheism and heresy. Writers defending Christianity describe atheism as "a strange kind of madness," a "folly and madnesse;" and any atheist as "utterly voyd even of human sence," "a Foole and an Idiote," and like deists made "madde" by "too much learning."¹⁰ The atheist character "Derision" in Thomas Lodge's *Wits Miserie, and the Worlds Madnesse* (1595) "never sitteth but in the chaire of Pestilence."¹¹

Leonato's remark to Beatrice, "You will never run mad, niece," accentuates the difference between her and Benedick. She, unlike others who associate with him, will not catch his disease of madness. She is a model of Christian constancy in comparison to Benedick, who as the rhetoric of the period

¹⁰Hooker, *Of the Laws*, vol. 2 (book 5), 20; Burton, vol. 3, 408; de Mornay, "The Epistle Dedicatorie," *A Woorke Concerning the Trewnesse*, *3r; Thomas Nashe, *The Works of Thomas Nashe*, ed. Ronald B. McKerrow, vol. 2 (1958; reprint, with corrections and supplementary notes by F. P. Wilson, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966) 115; Burton, vol. 3, 401.

¹¹*The Complete Works of Thomas Lodge*, ed. Edmund Gosse, vol. 4 ([Glasgow]: for the Hunterian Club, 1883) 10-11.

indicates, can only be changeable. In *The Care of a Christian Conscience* (1600), Curtis describes the profane and the idol worshippers as having "no constancy in their mouthes," while de Mornay comments on "the perpetuall and invariable constancie and stedfastnesse of the Christian Religion."¹² The contrast between them will deepen when Benedick comes on stage and argues with Beatrice.

Members of the audience still reflecting on the distinction drawn in this conversation between the two could, upon Don Pedro's entry, relate his comments a moment later to Leonato, "The fashion of the world is to avoid cost, and you encounter it" (1.1.97-98), to Beatrice, who is distinguished from Benedick by her willingness to incur "cost." The fashionable Benedick changes as the fashion changes and so avoids encountering "cost," while Beatrice determines to be unmoved and uninfluenced by his (and presumably others') fashion and therefore encounters it willingly. Like the previous dialogue about Benedick's changeable character, this remark and the brief playful exchange between Leonato and Don Pedro about whether or not Hero is Leonato's legitimate child, draw attention to the contrasting implications of skepticism and belief. They thus prepare the audience for Benedick and Beatrice's battle of wits.

Her first comment to him, "nobody marks you," is characteristic of the religious person's attitude to atheists, whose views were held in little esteem.¹³ The subject of their debate is changing faith, which Beatrice characterizes as conversion and Benedick as heresy or treachery. In her retort to Benedick's calling her "Lady Disdain," Beatrice's reference to conversion, "Courtesy itself must convert to disdain, if you come in her presence," is countered by his calling courtesy "a turncoat" (1.1.118-24). The attribution of disdain to Beatrice is

¹²*The Care of a Christian Conscience: Ten Sermons on the 25 Psalme* . . . (London: Simon Stafford, 1600) (STC 6134); de Mornay, "The Epistle Dedicatorie," *A Woorke Concerning the Trewnesse*, *2v.

¹³Martin Fotherby, *Atheomastix: Clearing foure Truthes, Against Atheists and Infidels* . . . (London: Nicholas Okes, 1622) 150. (STC 11205).

balanced against Benedick's own disdain -- of the love offered to him by "all ladies." Disdain in the sense of thinking others beneath oneself was the natural consequence of puritanical judgment, and in the sense of scoffing and scorning it was the chief accusation against atheists. If "ladies" are interpreted as alluding to belief systems or religions, Benedick's insistence that though he is "loved of all ladies" himself loves "none" is also precisely the definition given to atheists, who have a "defect of this love of God."¹⁴ On the other hand Beatrice's diffidence about lovers may be seen as akin to a precept of the Protestant sects that taught the adherence to principle even if the whole world opposed it.

The images they apply to each other speak to the division between them, as well as to the ambiguity of their positions -- suggesting that, though there are differences, there are also some similarities between deniers and defenders of faith. Benedick accuses Beatrice of being "a rare parrot-teacher" because she repeats what he says but with a different nuance. She esteems "a bird of [her] tongue" to be "better" than "a beast" of his (1.1.138-40). Birds were connected with the human intellect, mind, soul and virtue, while beasts were linked with the body, the appetites and a lack of virtue; so that the pattern of the dialogue is to relate Beatrice's belief system and constancy to mental and spiritual power and Benedick's atheism and changeableness to physical power and lack of virtue.

But the images can be interpreted in a derogatory or complimentary way: For Benedick, Beatrice's bird is a mindless follower and his beast is a horse, which though not as fast as the bird is nevertheless his own. For Beatrice, Benedick's horse is an old unruly jade that plays tricks for no reason but a whim, and her parrot is a bird capable of subduing any such "body." While the dialogue gives the upper hand to Beatrice, it demonstrates (as did the play's opening exchange) that we make differences between practices very much alike because of

¹⁴Burton, vol. 3, 395.

our adherence to a particular ideology. The argument maintains a playful and affectionate tone in spite of what Beatrice calls Benedick's "pernicious suits" and her own hurtful comments to him.

Toleration for the Sincere

Similar to the way the first dialogues in *King John* prepared the audience for the remainder of the drama, their battle of wits is suggested to be exemplary of the rest of the play when Don Pedro, turning away from his private conversation with Leonato, reenters the public space with the words, "That is the sum of all" (1.1.146). The transition Don Pedro makes here from private to public space and the fact the audience does not know what "the sum of all" refers to frees his statement to float and settle on a number of referents. The most likely of these is the scene just witnessed, as it has finished and as such has become the subject of the audience's reflection, judgment, and symbolization. In an interpretation of Benedick and Beatrice as emblematic, respectively, of the atheist and true faith, and their battle of wits as typical of the disagreement between these two, Don Pedro's utterance implies the controversy concerning atheism has been exaggerated. While the argument has represented an ideological difference without hope of reconciliation, it also appears to be nothing but a battle of wits between two friends -- not worth "much ado." The logical adjunct of this view is that there is no justification for an ideology that admits only the legitimacy of the believer.

Don Pedro's concluding phrase of this first address to the group after his private conversation with Leonato, "I dare swear he is no hypocrite, but prays from his heart" (1.1.140-1), may also be read as referring to Beatrice and Benedick's battle of wits. It is an afterthought or aside, so may be platea-directed, and hence a cue for the audience to try to evaluate who are the "hypocrites."

Hypocrisy was again one of the characteristics typically attributed to atheists in the period, so they may think back to Benedick. Many, Manfred Pfister notes, considered atheism "a temporal aberration," a false show "to draw attention to their paradoxical ingenuity and to strike a fashionable figure amongst the fashionable wits competing with each other at court, in the schools or in the taverns," and many describe it "as a mere phase in a person's life," implying "that it is pretence or a pose rather than a real conviction."¹⁵

But Benedick we feel, despite his belligerence, is sincere, and viewing him through Beatrice's eyes we like him. Beatrice's spunk and her determination to stick to her opinion also do not fit her for the role of hypocrite. The question of who is the hypocrite is still afloat therefore when Leonato addresses Don John, the bastard brother of Don Pedro -- another scorned, but of the malevolent kind. Leonato welcomes him because he has recently been "reconciled" to this brother, and he replies with a curt expression of thanks. As the story unfolds Don John exhibits the morosity and meanness typically attributed to the self-centred bigot. His bastardy draws much less on its connections to uncertainty, as in *King John*, than on the myths of bastard jealousy, unbelief, and evil deeds.¹⁶

But the play continues to develop the images of Claudio and Benedick before it comes to Don John, and it will be helpful to consider the scene that follows the comment on hypocrisy before discussing Don John. All other characters having left the stage, this scene is a dialogue between Claudio and Benedick. As Leonato's exchange with Don John is extremely brief, some members of the audience may still have the question about hypocrisy in mind when Claudio opens the next conversation with a question to Benedick, "didst

¹⁵Pfister, 74-75. Fotherby was persuaded that atheists "deny there is a God, rather by outward perswasion, than by inward perswasion" (107).

¹⁶L. C. Knights compares him to Richard of Gloucester and Iago. (*Further Explorations* (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1965) 168.)

thou note the daughter of Signior Leonato?, and Benedick answers, "I noted her not, but I look'd on her" (1.1.163-4). The precision of Benedick's answer and its suggestion of non-interpretation confirms the earlier impression of his honesty. However, when Claudio presses the question further, Benedick's answer shows he does have two stances:

Do you question me as an honest man should do,
for my simple true judgment, or would you have
me speak after my custom, as being a professed
tyrant to their sex?

(1.1.166-9)

His "tyranny to their sex," which is "professed" but does not represent his "simple true judgment," aligns him with the current perceptions of atheists who, many were persuaded, "deny there is a God, rather by outward perswasion, than by inward perswasion."¹⁷ But his manner of answering -- "Do you question me as an honest man should do" -- similarly puts into question Claudio's sincerity.

The conversation that follows is different from Benedick's conversation with Beatrice, which now appears even more a battle of wits compared to this frank discussion with Claudio. The conversation with Claudio dwells on sincerity, each one accusing the other of being "in sport." It concludes, as did the dialogue between Benedick and Beatrice, with each one "keeping his way." Claudio is determined to maintain his high opinion of Hero and to marry her. Benedick can see no reason in his judgment. His last comment before Don Pedro's entry, although some authors have interpreted it as typical of scoffers at marriage, may also suggest the attitude atheists were perceived as having about religion: "Go to, i' faith, and thou wilt needs thrust thy neck into a yoke, wear the print of it and sigh away Sundays" (1.1.200-202). The sabbatarian debates of

¹⁷Fotherby, 107.

Elizabeth's reign gave reason to this comment, because some expressed the belief that every Christian should devote the whole of Sunday to religious exercises.¹⁸

Don Pedro's presence permits Benedick and Claudio to discuss further their differing opinions about Hero, and for Don Pedro to express his. Claudio "feels" that he "loves her." Don Pedro "knows" that "she is worthy." Both opinions are contrary to Benedick's:

That I neither feel how she should be lov'd, nor
know how she should be worthy, is the opinion that
fire cannot melt out of me; I will die in it at the stake.

(1.1.230-33)

None of the three give any convincing reasons for their opinions.

With Don Pedro's generalization of Benedick's opinion to one about all women, "Thou wast ever an obstinate heretic in the despite of beauty" (1.1.234-5), the conversation becomes focussed on his skepticism. In the exchange that follows, his vociferous scorning of women and love identifies him further with those who "scoffe at all religion,"¹⁹ while Claudio's dialogue with Don Pedro is analogous to a conversation between a new convert and an enthusiastic proselytizing priest. The evangelizing Don Pedro is more eager to "minister" to Claudio's love -- to confirm the bond he anticipates -- than to discover the reasons behind his feeling or to test its validity. Benedick's general prejudice against love thus contrasts with Claudio's and Don Pedro's blind infatuation with it.

Like the previous dialogue between Beatrice and Benedick, these are lines of comparison that draw together participants who supposedly are very different. None of the ideologies their beliefs and practices represent is based on anything

¹⁸Christopher Durston and Jacqueline Eales, eds., "Introduction: The Puritan Ethos, 1560-1700," in *The Culture of English Puritanism, 1560-1700* (New York: St. Martin's P, 1996) 22.

¹⁹Burton, vol. 3, 396.

but a whim. However, in contrast to the Beatrice / Benedick dialogue, here Benedick seems more sensible than Claudio and Don Pedro, because he at least is not infatuated with someone he doesn't know.

Interestingly this representation reflects both Burton's and Bacon's evaluations of superstition as compared to atheism. Burton describes at length the problems and disease conditions of the individual afflicted with "religious melancholy" caused by superstition, and gives lengthy advice about the remedy; however, his description of the results of religious melancholy caused by atheism is brief and concerns the society rather than the individual atheist, who appears to enjoy himself much more than other people (vol. 3, 343-95, 405-408). In his essay "Of Superstition" (which follows one on atheism) Bacon writes,

It were better to have no opinion of God at all, than such an opinion as is unworthy of him. For the one is unbelief, the other is contumely: and certainly superstition is the reproach of the Deity. . . . Atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation; all of which may be guides to an outward moral virtue, though religion were not; but superstition dismounts all these, and erecteth an absolute monarchy in the minds of men.²⁰

This bid for a respect of atheism accords with current sociological perceptions of Protestantism as a secularizing religion. More pertinent here, however, is the ambivalent statuses given to the contending ideologies. If atheism is less harmful, the play seems to be saying, it is still not more reasonable than superstition. This equalizing trend is, of course, a basis for toleration.

The second point the dialogue makes also concerns ideology. The freedom of belief exercised by Benedick, on the one hand, and Claudio and Don Pedro, on the other, is not subject to the same ideological constraints. Where

²⁰Bacon's *Essays*, 43-44.

Benedick, though he does not agree, still accepts Claudio's opinion on loving Hero, Don Pedro does not accept Benedick's views on love in general. He insistently and repeatedly predicts Benedick's conversion, while to Claudio he offers his full assistance. The use of love as a metaphor for belief in this scene sets belief in a favourable light, because audiences will usually side with the view that Benedick will one day choose a mate. Nevertheless, Claudio's thoughtlessness and the fact that he seems to be primarily motivated by sexual desire and the prospects of financial gain -- his comments focus on Hero's looks, her financial relations, and his desires -- cheapen his kind of belief; this sets out Benedick's unbelief as morally superior, thus implying a criticism of Don Pedro's exclusive ideology and a further support for tolerance.

Interference and Non-Interference

Scenes two and three form a pair in that each intimates differently how the exercise of freedom of conscience by other members of the society may enhance or impede an individual's freedom of conscience. In scene two Leonato is informed by Antonio (an old man who is his brother) about Claudio and Don Pedro's plan to achieve Hero's love. When Antonio suggests Leonato talk to Claudio about it, he decides not to interfere but rather to have his daughter informed of it so that "she may be the better prepar'd for an answer" (1.2.22). While this "preparation" will be designed to encourage the match, it appears to be a legitimate exercise of the freedom to expression and not a forceful interference. Leonato insists, when he states "we will hold it as a dream till it appear itself" (1.2.20-21), that the affair not be considered concluded, and hence not determined by others outside the acting agents of belief.

Scene three depicts a comparable exchange between Don John, his companion Conrade, and another friend, Borachio, who informs Don John about

Claudio's marriage intentions. The first part of the scene establishes the character of Don John as someone with extreme views on the free expression of conscience. Audience members might have connected him to those dissenters Burton describes as "Hereticks," who

will admit of no ceremonies at all . . . raile at our Church discipline,
will not hold their tongues, and all for the peace of thee *O Syon*. No
not so much as degrees some of them will tollerate, or Universities, all
humane learning, ('tis *cloaca diaboli*) hoods, habits, cap and
surplesse, such as are things indifferent in themselves, and wholly for
ornament, decency, or distinction sake, they abhorre, hate, and snuffe
at, as a stone-horse when he meets a Beare: They make matters of
conscience of them, and would rather forsake their livings then
subscribe to them . . . No discipline, no ceremonies, but what they
invent themselves . . .

(vol. 3, 386-7).

This peculiarly individualistic use of conscience that refuses even in the most minor matter to submit its public expression to "public reason"²¹ is suggested by Don John's remarks about himself; he seems to make his most mundane whim "a matter of conscience":

I cannot hide what I am: I must be sad when I have cause, and smile
at no man's jests; eat when I have stomach, and wait for no man's
leisure; sleep when I am drowsy, and tend on no man's business;
laugh when I am merry, and claw no man in his humor.

(1.2.13-18)

His attitudes reflect an absolute freedom in expressing one's conscience.

²¹Rawls's term.

His companions, however -- the melancholy Conrade and the pleasure-oriented Borachio -- hint more of those who "erre both in doctrine and manners" whose "grand sinne of Atheisme, or impiety," Melanchthon calls "monstrous melancholy" or "poysoned meloncholy," whose "*God is their belly*" and whose "Counsellor" is "Hypocrisie."²² These two could, in a system allowing absolute freedom of conscience, refer to Don John's principles as justification for their public actions.

But the play makes it clear that this exaggerated liberty of conscience will cause the oppression of the exercise of this right by others. It constructs the oppression resulting from excessive liberty even more poignantly when, in their conception of personal freedom of conscience, Don John and his crew include fraud as a means to interference with others' beliefs. In opposition to Leonato in scene two, Don John makes a plan to interfere very actively with Claudio's expression of belief and Hero's freedom to respond. His motivation is solely to give expression to his own desire -- to "do his liking," "build mischief," and feed his own "displeasure" (1.2.36, 46, 66). His companions, who similarly give an absolute value to their freedom of expression, promise to assist him "to the death."

The contrast between Leonato's lack of interference in scene two and Don John's forceful interference in the next scene provides structural irony to the latter part of the first scene of act one, because it parallels Benedick's refusal of participation in anyone's love games and Claudio's assisted and active participation. On the other hand, the close pattern of action in scenes two and three identifies them with each other as presenting contrasting attitudes to the appropriate exercise of freedom of expression and wrongful interference with people's freedom of belief. The music and happy tone in the twin scene depicting non-interference validate this attitude, where the unhappiness and mischief of the

²²Burton, vol. 3, 395-6.

characters in the scene depicting very active intervention undervalue interference. But the former scene may also be viewed as an image of the favourable conditions society affords when the belief expressed accords with the dominant ideology, conditions that make interference irrelevant.

But if non-interference were assumed to be identified with the dominant ideology, then the next two scenes turn the tables on this understanding, because they show Leonato, Don Pedro, Claudio, and Hero planning to force a change in the current beliefs of Beatrice and Benedick. Though thematically parallel to the scene in which Don John plans his interference and, as to their means, similarly deceitful, these scenes are different insofar as their goals are to create love, where the goal of Don John, Conrade and Borachio in interfering with the beliefs of Don Pedro, Claudio, and Hero is to make them cease loving and respecting each other. As will be pointed out in a minute, there are further distinctions in the deceptive means they employ; as these are unravelled, the play clarifies the difference between legitimate freedom of expression and improper oppression of freedom of conscience, while at the same time demonstrating the complexity of the issue.

Following the projections of Don Pedro and his supporters on how to modify Benedick's and Beatrice's beliefs, the play focuses on how "hearsay," "rumour," and popular culture affect people's beliefs (and hence on how the social supports of ideology influence people's belief and therefore limit their freedom). Benedick is alone in an orchard reading a book; he muses over the transformation in Claudio from warrior to lover, and wonders if he himself will ever "be so converted" (2.3.22). He imagines the features of the belief / woman that could convert him -- it must be one that has "all graces" though he does not care what colour her hair is (2.3.28-29, 34-35). Discovering his hiding-place, Don Pedro and Claudio have the musician Balthasar play a song noting the deceit and inconstancy of all men, and calling for women to be "blithey and bonny, /

Converting all your sounds of woe / Into hey nonny nonny" (2.3.67-69). The idea is that men who defy love and belief, who place their affections on war and adventure, will change, and will fall in love.

The image of the book, the remembrance of Claudio's conversion, and the song about all men's conversion is again one of how the dominant ideology, supported by social experience -- words in a book, and music in the air, will influence those in the society and gradually bring them to conform their beliefs to that ideology. It is however important to note that, in contrast to Claudio, Benedick thinks about the qualities his love-object must possess, so that even amid these influences he exercises his judgment with a degree of independence.

The conversation Benedick overhears between Claudio and Leonato has the same effect as these social influences, but whereas the first experience introduces the idea that all men are converted to love, the comments of these agents aim at his particular conversion. The interference with belief in this part of the scene, as with that in its first part, is not very clearly disvalued the way Don John's is. Claudio and Leonato's action is deceitful, but there is little in the scene to criticize it except for the way their pretense is made to look obvious.

The idea that the change from the refusal to the acceptance of love is an image for the change from atheism to belief is hinted at just before their exit. Leonato indicates a conditional knowledge of Benedick's piety, "If he do fear God," and Don Pedro confirms it: "the man doth fear God, howsoever it seems not in him by some large jests he will make" (2.3.193-8). Don Pedro thus suggests that though in appearance he may be an atheist he is really a believer. By the end of the scene Benedick is so changed that when he next meets Beatrice he reads unfounded meanings into her language that conform to his new belief. The fact that his interpretations do not accord with the real situation undermines the

means used by Leonato and Claudio to effect his conversion, thus permitting deceitful interference with another's freedom of conscience to be kept in sight.

A similar strategy is carried out by Ursula and Hero to achieve a change in Beatrice's outlook. In a previous exchange with Leonato, Beatrice has shown herself to be too heavenly incompatible with any men except such as are made "of some other mettle than earth" (2.1.59-60). If we see Beatrice as hearkening back to Dante's Beatrice (as Hartby notes),²³ she is representative of spiritual happiness -- a consciousness of the Creator, which without love Benedick cannot obtain although he might desire it. On the other hand, she is also an agent with freedom of belief and with the liability of limiting others' freedom of belief. This is what Hero and Ursula warn her about through the little play they enact in front of her. They will "counsel" Benedick "to fight against his passion," because if Hero should tell her of Benedick's love for her, "she would laugh me / Out of myself, press me to death with wit!" (3.1.83, 75-76). They indicate then that it is better to "let Benedick, like cover'd fire, / Consume away in sighs, waste inwardly" (3.1.77-78). As a believer rigid in her conceptions of men, Beatrice is unable to participate fully in the social life of her community. The too free expression of her high ideals also means the freedom of others to express their beliefs is limited: Hero will be laughed at and Benedick, who can never meet her criteria, will not be able to give expression to his newly adopted belief -- his love for her.

Ursula's and Hero's condemnation of Beatrice in their play-within-a-play acts as social pressure to effect a transformation in her. Resolving to change her attitude towards Benedick, she exclaims, "Stand I condemn'd for pride and scorn so much? / Contempt, farewell, and maiden pride, adieu!" (3.1.108-9). From the

²³Hartby writes that Beatrice "actually shares both her purgatory function and her sense of humour with Dante's spiritual heroine, who also teases the man about his beard" (34).

point of view of her role as agent of belief, this interchange reinforces the idea that the free expression of belief always incurs some oppression. Secondly, it indicates how the dominant ideology encroaches on the beliefs that oppose it. On the other hand, the scene implicitly points to the contrast between Hero and Ursula's duplicitous expression of their belief and Beatrice's frank and sincere expression of hers. Interestingly, where sincere and open expression allows others to continue in their different opinion or to change by fair means, duplicitous expression, which uses lies, pretense and social pressure, does not afford the hearer the opportunity for fair judgment, nor does it provide for his or her freedom to continue in the previously chosen belief.

This scene also introduces an explanation for why people sometimes go to extremes in expressing their belief and by doing so oppress others. The reason in Beatrice's case, as it was in Don John's, Conrade's and Borachio's, is a lack of respect for others. With regard to her insufficient respect, Hero observes, "So turns she every man the wrong side out, / And never gives to truth and virtue that / Which simpleness and merit purchaseth" (3.1.68-70). This is not true from the perspective presented in the play -- it is much too strong a statement, because Beatrice's judgment of Don John and Benedick is in some measure charitable; nevertheless it points out the role of respect in freedom of conscience. It is therefore because Beatrice has too little esteem for men that Ursula and Hero pretend to be afraid to express freely their beliefs about them, and it is because she will not respect Benedick's expression of his love that they want to counsel him to repress it.

One of the differences between Beatrice's extremism and that of Don John and his team, however, is that, where hers is limited to an individual and that individual's relationship with her, theirs affects a whole group and the relations between the members of that group. Secondly, she employs no strategies to

change the beliefs of others, while Don John and his group undertake an elaborate and deceitful scheme to undermine the beliefs of others. Thirdly, her evaluation of Benedick which, because she spends much time asking about and considering his character, is more thoughtful than those made by Hero, Claudio, or Don Pedro.

Non-Interference as an Ideal

Scene two of act three presents the successful accomplishment of the earlier strategy to change Benedick's attitude to love, and the first stage of Don John's plan to destroy Claudio's love and the mutually respectful relationships Don Pedro and his friends enjoy. It ends with Don John's comment, "O plague right well prevented! So will you say when you have seen the sequel" (3.2.133-4). This vehement prophecy and expression of superior knowledge are typical of some sermons of the time, so that they identify Don John with domineering self-righteousness.

This ending comment, which associates Don John's interference in people's beliefs with hypocritical and bombastic preaching, is juxtaposed with the first words of Dogberry, "Are you good men and true?" (3.3.1). In the original productions there was probably no scene change (there is no indication of one in the Quarto or Folio printings); therefore, it would have been possible that Dogberry utter these words as Don John, Claudio, and Don Pedro are exiting and just before his companions, Verges and the second watch, enter. In such a case the referents for the attributes "good" and "true" would be ambiguous; and members of the audience could as easily apply them to the departing characters as to those arriving; Dogberry's question could thus cue them to compare the actions and attitudes of the two groups of characters. (Shakespeare would thus be "interfering" with his spectators' consciences at the very moment he is commenting on the subject. But his action is not really interference, because it is

not an abuse of freedom of conscience; it is rather the exercise of freedom of expression for the best of purposes -- to encourage his audience to think for themselves.)

The audience already knows what sort of practices the departing Claudio and Don Pedro have undertaken to interfere with Benedick's beliefs, and they know what Don John's plans are. What sort of attitude will Dogberry display? The extremely humorous exchange that follows in fact centers on the idea of interference, though it is interference of a different sort: Dogberry is advising his subordinate constables on how and when to interfere with people who disobey the law or who have some problem with others, and what to do with those who refuse to cooperate. It provides a contrast to the ideology / interference / freedom of conscience pattern, because the law acts as a reigning but solely political ideology with a limited sovereignty that covers only certain aspects of the order. This political ideology nevertheless holds up a standard against which all beliefs and the degree of freedom allowed for their expression are measured. Those systems of belief that accept diversity and do not interfere with others are given freedom; only those which cross the lines of toleration are interfered with. As such, the interference Dogberry advises his constables to undertake conveys a pattern of toleration that goes beyond that advocated so far in the play.

The first part of the dialogue can be read as referring to Don John's preaching. Verges's comment about people's "suffering salvation" alludes to the religion so full of warnings about hell fire and hate as to be like a punishment; this Dogberry also suggests in his identification of "salvation" with "punishment." Dogberry indicates that such a "salvation" is a "punishment too good" for men who are "good and true." The contrast between this statement (on his entrance) and Don John's (as he exits) shows that from the start of the scene a distinction is made between Don John's behaviour and that advocated by Dogberry.

The distinction is developed as Dogberry repeatedly stands up for a broad-minded attitude and for non-interference with people's expression of their beliefs. His apparently accidental use of the term "comprehend" for "apprehend" is the first sign of his untraditional approach to freedom of conscience: "This is your charge," he says to his men, "you shall comprehend all vagrom men" (3.3.25). His position as commander invites comparison with two of the other commander-figures in the play, Don Pedro and Don John, both of whom exhibit little "comprehension" of others -- whether in the sense of understanding or inclusion or tolerance. With the second watch's question about what to do if some will not "stand, in the Prince's name" (3.3.26-27), the idea of "comprehension" expands to the idea of an even broader toleration. Dogberry's advice is to let him alone, because, as Verges says, "he is none of the Prince's subjects," and constables are "to meddle with none but the Prince's subjects" (3.3.31-34).

If we see this refusal to stand in the Prince's name in the manner Dogberry and Verges see it -- as a refusal of the political order (represented here as the Prince's law) -- then Dogberry is advocating a degree of non-interference not previously exemplified by any of the characters in the play. The "vagrom" person should, he suggests, be given the freedom to be vagrant -- to wander from the usual belief.* His admonition not "to babble and to talk" and to make noise in the street, and his preference for a "sleeping" watch rather than an interfering active one may even be the central message of *Much Ado About Nothing*. In a hilarious exaggeration of non-interference, Dogberry remarks,

If you meet a thief, you may suspect him, by virtue of your office, to be no true man; and for such kind of men, the less you meddle or make with them, why, the more is for your honesty.

(3.3.50-53)

*See Appendix 3.

The identification of "no true man" here with "thief" and one not subject to the order brings us back to the structure of public values, to which the opening exchanges of the play alluded. There was in place, we saw, an order, in which the deeds and lives of certain members of the society were, because of their social position and religion, more valued. The virtues of the atheist and the poor were undervalued. Dogberry, however, envisions a different structure of values. He still desires a structure, but his values disregard religio-social position and poverty, even loyalty to the Prince.

The structure he proposes makes a division between those who interfere with the beliefs of others through dishonest means and those who do not. Where in the old or reigning order the atheist (along with the poor) is the inhuman, in Dogberry's it is the interferer who is inhuman. Furthermore, as indicated when Borachio and Conrade are arrested and examined, atheism is redefined to be identified with the interferer, whether or not he professes belief. This is suggested when the constables ask Borachio and Conrade, "do you serve God?" (4.2.16). The ambivalency of their reply, "we hope," is underlined when Dogberry orders the statement to be written down as "they hope they serve God," suggesting they could be identified with those who don't serve God -- atheists.

Dogberry's comment after he has advised his men not to interfere even with a thief indicates that his respect for people is extensive: "Truly, I would not hang a dog by my will, much more a man who hath any honesty in him" (3.3.63-64). The tolerance he advocates in these and prior statements shows his naive confidence in the honesty of all people. In this sense his interpretation of moral goodness reaches the opposite end of the scale from Beatrice's, in which no man is honest. But more importantly, insofar as the question of freedom of conscience is concerned, his advice expresses a very strong belief that people should be free to express their beliefs, even when contrary to the prevailing ideologies.

Legitimate Exercise of Freedom of Expression

On the other hand, Dogberry's next comment suggests the legitimacy of mild and open expression, even when the intention is to influence the belief systems of others. He replies to Verges' statement about how the watch should work, "If you hear a child cry in the night, you must call to the nurse and bid her still it;" to the watch's question about what he should do "if the nurse be asleep and will not hear us," he advises, "Why, then, depart in peace, and let the child wake her with crying, for the ewe that will not hear her lamb when it baas will never answer a calf when he bleats" (3.3.65-72). Here he implies the inefficacy of force and the necessity of the agent's willingness. Willingness implies belief that the action is good; for example in this instance "hearing one's lamb" implies that one believes it is good to hear one's lamb; thus the good action -- "stilling the crying child" -- is dependent on belief. Belief, Dogberry is advocating, is not to be forced on others.

It can, however, be brought to the attention of all. The nurse may be reminded of her duty to pay attention to the needs of the child under her care. Anyone may be reminded of his or her duties -- even the Prince himself may be "stayed" as "with any [other] man that knows the statutes" (3.3.76-79). But Dogberry states that even this legitimate expression may be undertaken only under certain conditions -- "not without the Prince be willing, for indeed the watch ought to offend no man, and it is an offence to stay a man against his will" (3.3.80-82). Dogberry's own intervention in the watches' thinking, in the instructions he gives them, encourages the exercise of free conscience: "keep your fellows' counsels and your own," is his penultimate advice (3.3.86).

In the next part of the scene the watches go beyond the ideal of non-interference and the exercise of free expression spoken of above. When they overhear Borachio and Conrade's conversation about Don John's calculated and

forceful deception of the Prince, Leonato, and Claudio, they apprehend the two of them on the charge of "lechery." The conversation they overhear between Borachio and Conrade is reminiscent of the earlier conversation between Benedick and Claudio (when Claudio asks Benedick his opinion about Beatrice), because it relates to the question of sincerity.

Bora. Therefore know I have earn'd of Don John a thousand ducats.

Con. Is it possible that any villainy should be so dear?

Bora. Thou shouldst rather ask if it were possible any villainy should be so rich; for when rich villains have need of poor ones, poor ones may make what price they will.

Con. I wonder at it.

Bora. That shows thou art unconfirm'd. Thou knowest that the fashion of a doublet, or a hat, or a cloak, is nothing to a man.

Con. Yes, it is apparel.

Bora. I mean the fashion.

Con. Yes, the fashion is the fashion.

Bora. Tush, I may as well say the fool's the fool. But seest thou not what a deformed thief this fashion is? (3.3.107-24)

Conrade's two expressions of surprise "Is it possible that any villainy should be so dear?" and then "I wonder at it" are central to this play-within-a-play, because as interrogations they invite thought. The questions are more acutely brought to our attention by the fact that what surprises him is not what should. He is wondering why villainy -- wrongdoing (and at the same time the work of "villeins" or the lower class) -- should be so well paid. Keeping the wondering in the forefront, Borachio corrects him by advising him that he should rather wonder how it is that villainy (bad people like Don John) should be so rich. He then suggests that rich apparel can be used to hide a person's villainous intentions and

behaviour. As a phrase often used as an aside, "I wonder at it" has the capacity of attracting the empathy of the audience, so that Conrade's inability to understand is a further dramatic mechanism designed to draw the audience's attention to the questions he raises. He does not understand Borachio's explanation that fashion is "nothing to a man." But with these dramatic devices, the audience *does* understand -- he is explaining that outward show is a tool for the insincere and does not indicate a person's true qualities. The conversation brings back the image of fashion Beatrice introduced with her remark about Benedick's changing his best friend and her parallel statement, "he wears his faith but as the fashion of his hat, it ever changes with the next block." Don John makes an appearance of guiding people to the truth. Unlike Benedick, however, who as we have seen is sincere, he and Borachio use their fashion (their ideology) to deceive people.

As Borachio's and Conrade's conversation turns to fashion (it does at the same time they begin to talk about Don John's trick), the second watch makes an aside about Borachio that is pertinent to this question of sincerity: "I know that Deformed; 'a has been a vile thief this seven year; 'a goes up and down like a gentleman. I remember his name" (3.3.125-7). The remark must have been particularly poignant for *Much Ado's* first audiences, because like the conversation between Conrade and Borachio it is telescoped within a series of frames. The watches are audience and spectator of a scene whose performers are Borachio and Conrade, but they are also performers in a scene introduced by Dogberry, whose own introduction and performance is a sub-scene of a play, whose central figures are all "important" people -- a prince, a prince's brother, a war hero, a governor, etc. The play itself is set within the larger frame of the aftermath of a battle. The second watch's remark is thus situated at a distance from the larger frame of the story in a play-within-a-play-within-a-play, and is concerned with evaluating an exchange that is even more distant from the larger

frame. The characterization of this remark as an aside balloons it to still greater status -- as an evaluation of Borachio's behaviour rendered on behalf of the audience. Its significance is further expanded when, immediately after, Borachio's anxious question to Conrade "Didst thou not hear somebody?" lassoes the attention back to what has just been said about "that Deformed."

As the focus moves back to Borachio and Conrade, Borachio continues his discussion of fashion, ironically picking up the words of the aside, which he presumably has not heard: "Seest thou not, I say, what a deformed thief this fashion is, how giddily 'a turns about all the hot bloods between fourteen and five-and-thirty . . ." (3.3.130-33). The discussion of fashion reads as a commentary on the power of the dominant ideology to be used in different ways to sway people's thinking, examples of which the audience has witnessed in the "conversion" of Benedick and the softening of Beatrice's opinions. It also introduces Borachio's account of Don John's deception of Leonato, Don Pedro and Claudio, whose repercussions will be played out in the remaining scenes. Borachio's derision of fashion, though he makes use of it himself, picks up the motif of constancy and changeableness personified respectively in Beatrice and Benedick. The appellation "deformed thief" for "fashion," assigned because of fashion's power to affect the thinking of people -- to steal their beliefs -- echoes the motifs of borrowed signs and their power to create strange knowledge, thus pointing again to the use of ideology to restrict people's freedom of conscience.

The Consequences of Deceptive Interference

Once more reflecting these motifs, the metaphors Borachio employs for the fashions these young people adopt concern figures from history, who according to tradition adored false gods. The first are Pharaoh's soldiers, who did not adore the God of Israel, who therefore chased the Israelites, and who as a result were

killed; the others are the god Bel's priests, who were "slain by the King when [the prophet] Daniel revealed that they were imposing a false god on the people."²⁴ The fashionable crowd are thus like the followers or signs of the false gods that influence the masses by presenting them with a strange knowledge, an action which eventually leads them to their death. This metaphor gives a foreview of Borachio's and Don John's schemes and the very serious consequences of interfering with people's freedom of conscience.

It is also relevant to an important distinction between Don John's deception and Don Pedro's; Don John's deception entails the misrepresentation of objective truth -- the misconstruction of Hero's physical action, while Don Pedro's deception is an exaggerated interpretation of subjective truth -- a different belief from the one professed by Benedick and Beatrice. As the next scenes show, the result of the former, more reprehensible interference is death. This death has been foreshadowed in two exchanges: first, the comparison of the fashion followers with Pharaoh's soldiers and Bel's priests, who die because of their adherence to "strange knowledge" and because of their interference with people's beliefs; and second, in Hero's remarks about Beatrice, who she says "would laugh me / Out of myself, press me to death with wit!" and who would cause Benedick to "Consume away in sighs, waste inwardly" (3.1.75-78).

The first watch's characterization of Borachio's act as "the most dangerous piece of lechery that ever was known in the commonwealth" (3.3.167-8) introduces a similar series of sign-borrowings, which (like those above) illustrate the far-reaching consequences of interference in people's freedom of conscience, and which thus confirm the legitimacy of an interference that arrests it. First there is an inversion of the traditional metaphor of woman for belief system: Borachio's

²⁴A. R. Humphreys, ed., Footnote to *Much Ado About Nothing*, by William Shakespeare, The Arden Shakespeare (1981; reprint, London and New York: Routledge, 1994) 161.

presents Hero as loving the wrong man, therefore emblemizing the individual's adopting the false belief, and hence inverting the traditional man / person worships woman / belief system paradigm. Then this metaphor is replaced with a second traditional metaphor -- woman for the people: He forces this first false representation (Hero worshipping the wrong man) on those whom Don John has gathered as spectators, emblemizing the forceful interference with the free conscience of the people, who then become the woman (the people) loving the wrong man (the false belief). The mental susceptibility of the crowd, brought before the altar-like window to see "the truth," is thus lecherously steered towards an attachment to the wrong belief because of Borachio's own "lecherous" worship of the wrong emblem of love -- his adhesion to Don John. Finally, reversing the image to its old pattern (man / person worships woman / belief system), Borachio predicts Claudio's denunciation of the old "false" god (Hero) "at the temple" and "before the whole congregation," after which it may be "sent home" -- to the recesses of memory (and imagination) -- because no one will adore it anymore (3.3.156-8). Claudio, now converted to Don John's belief system, which as we have seen is based on nothing but his whim and provides for no love-object except oneself, will go on preaching it to the public. In becoming a part of the fashionable crowd that misleads the masses, he engenders for himself the same end that came for Pharaoh's soldiers and Bel's priests -- death. As we shall see in a few minutes, the instrument of this death will be the agent of the honest belief system: Benedick, once he has become a follower of Beatrice.

Between Interference, Legitimate Freedom of Expression, and Public Duty

The intervening scenes before Claudio's public denunciation of Hero are concerned with the difference between illegitimate interference in people's thinking and the proper exercise of the freedom of expression. In the first of these

Margaret says Beatrice has "turn'd Turk," suggesting her infidelity to her professed belief system (3.4.57). Implying a conversion by ocular proof and hence reminding the audience of Don John's methods, she states to her, "and how you may be converted I know not, but methinks you look with your eyes as other women do" (3.4.90-92). Her indirect references to Benedick and her long speech in which she implies Beatrice is in love are guileful ways of affecting Beatrice's thinking, and they succeed in influencing her without her being conscious of it.

In the scene that follows, Dogberry and Verges employ an opposite method to bring information to Leonato's attention. Verges is to convey the information. He and Dogberry take pains to assure Leonato of his honesty. Indeed, their point is to emphasize that Verges is the most honest person to be found and therefore someone whose information is worthy to be heard. However Leonato is impatient. He does not consider seriously that honesty is a prerequisite for a just intervention in the beliefs of others. Leonato is furthermore unaware that information from the mouth of an honest person must be borne in mind by anyone who wishes to form his judgment freely. Nor does he reflect on Dogberry's and Verges's role as government officers with the duty of protecting the rights of the public. The audience is aware that the information Verges has to convey is vitally important for his happiness, and they may even believe it is his duty to take responsibility for the case. So when Leonato dismisses him and Dogberry without a hearing, they must notice his unawareness of the prerequisite of information for the exercise of judgment, as well as his class prejudice and his ignorance about the criteria for the proper exercise of the freedom of expression.

Verges and Dogberry present a conspicuous contrast to all the other characters of the play, except for Benedick and Beatrice, who also up to this point have never tried to influence others' beliefs except through direct and self-conscious confrontation. These two scenes therefore can be understood to

function as an evaluation of the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. By connecting Margaret's wily methods of influence with Don John's, and then immediately presenting Dogberry and Verges's attempting a conspicuously and self-consciously honest interference, a line is drawn between these two behaviours; in this way the play makes a statement against the use of dishonest methods, even when they represent a traditionally acceptable form of emotional pressurizing, are motivated by the desire to help someone, or are in service of a belief system condoned in the dominant ideology. A second distinction is alluded to in the fact that those who are reprimanded by Dogberry and Verges are those who have used fraud to delude the public. Finally, Leonato's failure to be aware of these values points to the inadequacy of the present system.

The Endemic Nature of Interference

The marriage scene further complicates this situation by suggesting that the religious and governmental institutions of the nation routinely go beyond what they should in forming the consciences of the people. The quibble over "marry" and "to be married" in the following dialogue is one way the scene points to people's lack of agency in matters of belief:

Friar. You come hither, my lord, to marry this lady?

Claud. No.

Leon. To be married to her. Friar, you come to marry her.

(4.1.4-8)

The act of marriage is to be carried out by the Friar, not Claudio; and if read with its second meaning, as pertaining to conversion of belief, then the passage suggests that undue interference by society's institutions with people's freedom of conscience is laid down in its very structure. Authority figures like the Friar accomplish the union between the free agent's thought and the love-object / belief-

object. It is clear that Claudio himself has decided to marry Hero, but it will also become clear that his decision has been influenced by the religious institutions. This little exchange emblemizes the situation. By reminding the audience of the role of the Friar as agent of these institutions in Claudio's marriage, it points up the need for the individual's more active agency and the lessening of institutional interference. If Claudio had been a more active agent in his marriage, he would have known Hero much better and so would not so readily accuse her. This brief exchange also presages further interference by the Friar, who proposes to delude Claudio and the others by spreading the false information that she has died, a plan to which Leonato and Benedick agree, and which the audience is led to favour because he upholds her innocence.

Leonato's "daring" to answer on Claudio's behalf is another example of interference by the institutions of the society. Claudio's reply is highly ironic: "O, what men dare do! What men may do! What men daily do, not knowing what they do!" (4.1.19-20). It refers to the act of answering in the place of someone, an act that is equivalent to expressing on their behalf what is to be someone else's belief -- a blatant interference with freedom of conscience. Claudio's exclamation is especially ironic because he is already the victim of such interference, and when in the succeeding dialogue he stands in for the Friar, supposedly to ask and answer on his own behalf, the audience knows that the statements he thinks he is making because of his freely chosen judgment are all a result of Don John's manipulation.

The exchange of love vows between Benedick and Beatrice that follows brings up even more serious questions about interference in others' freedom of conscience. In their profession of love to one another, each one may be seen as a free agent of conscience and at the same time the love-object / belief system of the other. In her role as love-object / belief system, however, Beatrice uses the power

she acquires when Benedick subjects his belief to her in order to extend an exaggerated authority over other aspects of his belief. When she asks Benedick to kill Claudio for his action against Hero, his immediate reply, "Ha, not for the wide world" (4.1.290), shows his non-accord. But when Beatrice makes her love conditional on his agreement to this action, he changes his mind. This event introduces a more critical perspective on the belief systems in the play, as well as on all the deceptive actions that have led up to love of / belief in them.

The outcome of the trial scene (following this scene) offers a similar warning to those who willingly give up their freedom of conscience. The punishment for interference with others' freedom of conscience is the loss of that freedom for the criminal -- so it is suggested in Dogberry's condemnation of Borachio "into everlasting redemption" (4.2.56-57). Whether this "everlasting redemption" is the same as the "punishing salvation" referred to earlier is not clear, but both would appear to refer to belief systems. Is the play saying, then, that a harsher belief system is the necessary unpleasant restriction to which people who are "no true men" must submit once they are shown not to manifest their freedom of conscience in a just manner?

Dogberry's statement "Come let them be opinion'd" (4.2.67), which follows the Sexton's command that Borachio and Conrade be bound, is similarly structurally ironic in the sense that being "opinioned" or judged is a kind of binding in which a label is bound to a person's character, such that the members of society no longer judge that person freely but instead take on the already socially rendered judgment as their own. It is also dramatically ironic because Borachio and Conrade are being arraigned precisely because they have taken part in a scheme to carry out a similar binding on Hero, whose character has been submitted to the judgment and labelling of Don John.

Leonato's remarks to his old brother Antonio in the next scene underline the "false consciousness" inherent in these harsh belief systems and their supporting myths. Proverbs, traditional sayings, and scholarly arguments are the accessories and the supporting instruments of a belief system that sometimes function to integrate what people perceive as unpleasant or relatively "irrational" into the "rational" belief system which they have chosen to be subject to.²⁵ Leonato seems to protest against this method whereby people's consciences are brought into conformity with a particular belief system when he begs Antonio to stop counselling him, and instead states that only the counsel of a person who has experienced his loss can be meaningful to him:

Bring me a father that so lov'd his child,
 Whose joy of her is overwhelm'd like mine,
 And bid him speak of patience;
 Measure his woe the length and breadth of mine,
 And let it answer every strain for strain,
 As thus for thus, and such a grief for such,
 In every lineament, branch, shape, and form;
 If such a one will smile and stroke his beard,
 And sorrow wag, cry "hem!" when he should groan,
 Patch grief with proverbs, make misfortune drunk
 With candle-wasters, bring him yet to me,
 And I of him will gather patience.
 But there is no such man . . . (5.1.8-20)

²⁵The idea of perceived irrationality is grounded in a conception of irrationality and rationality as conditions that are relative rather than absolute. Hence what is perceived as irrational at one point in history or by one group may be perceived as rational at another or by others. This conception of relative rationality, therefore, is basically different from the Marxist conception, which sees rationality as absolute.

His inference that no person having had his experience will "Patch grief with proverbs, make misfortune drunk / With candle-wasters" pleads against belief systems not individually investigated and freely taken on. Obviously the only person who could fit this description is himself; he himself must counsel himself.

His next statement pushes the idea further:

I pray thee peace. I will be flesh and blood,
For there was never yet philosopher
That could endure the toothache patiently,
However they have writ the style of gods,
And made a push at chance and sufferance.

(5.1.34-38)

His cry to feel what he wants to feel, to set his own labels on his pain, and to "style" what he knows in his own language and not in "the style of gods" appears to be a rejection of belief systems whose apparatuses impose a meaning on life experiences that is unacceptable to him. His statement that all philosophers fail to practice what they preach is not true, but it is his way of saying he wants independence in his judgment. His "soul tells him" not to be patient in his situation but to resolve what he diagnoses as essentially a problem of public belief:

My soul doth tell me Hero is belied,
And that shall Claudio know; so shall the Prince,
And all of them that thus dishonour her.

(5.1.42-44)

His solution is to impose his knowledge (which he obtained from the Friar) on others -- the kind of interference with conscience he has been complaining about. The paradoxical no-win conclusion is that people cannot escape belief systems, nor the influences these systems bring to the exercise of freedom of conscience. Submission to any belief system, even one's "own" (as in the case of Don John),

entails submission not only to that ideology individually and freely chosen but also to some "strange knowledge" derived from someone else's choice or from "borrowed signs" -- the horns inevitable to every marriage. It is by means of "borrowed signs" -- Hero's borrowed death -- that Leonato proceeds (in accord with the Friar's advice) to delude Claudio and force him to "Know" he has "wrong'd" him and Hero (5.1.62-63).

But the play also raises the question of whether this "false consciousness" is really an inevitable part of all belief systems and of the transmission of all information, including that which is just and fair. The false news of Hero's death is not what causes Claudio to regain faith in her, as the Friar predicted. Nor do the threats of violence from Benedick move Claudio to change his belief. It is the true information "brought to light" by "shallow fools" -- Verges, Dogberry, and the watch -- that enables him to see Hero's "image . . . / In the rare semblance that I lov'd it first" (5.1.251-2).

In contrast to this picture of true and necessary information, Dogberry paints a vivid image of a reprehensible and deceptive interference in people's freedom of conscience,

And also, the watch heard them talk of one Deformed. They say he wears a key in his ear and a lock hanging by it, and borrows money in God's name, the which he hath us'd so long and never paid that now men grow hard-hearted and will lend nothing for God's sake. Pray you examine him on that point.

(5.1.307-13)

The "Deformed" the watch heard Borachio and Conrade talking of was "fashion," whom the watch immediately took for a person he knew who wore a lock. It is apt that the figure of fashion "wore a lock," as this pendant with a piece of hair in it is usually worn as a sign of love for the person whose hair it is; hence the image

speaks for the chaste relationship that should exist between ideology (fashion) and inner belief (love). Dogberry has now transformed the reference to lock of hair to lock as in a device to keep something closed. The original image of fashion takes on new features when it is personified as a deformed person with a lock and key on the ear; for the lock and key on the ear suggest the power of fashion over information and judgment, hence the power of the deceptive signs of the false ideology over people's exercise of freedom of conscience.

That fashion "borrows money in God's name" implies the illegitimate usurpation of the people's rights by those claiming an authority derived from God. The result of a fashion or ideology that does not truly represent what it pretends to is a loss of God's reality and authority, which has now become "strange knowledge" because it is no longer the *foundation* on which the fashion is based. Dogberry's penultimate utterance "God save the foundation" is a play on the invocations of the poor who receive alms from the founders of religious houses;²⁶ it becomes, in the context of the play's motif of freedom of conscience, a plea for what is the foundation that allows for the least limitations in people's exercise of free conscience -- truthfulness. This is not only the sincere, frank and straightforward representation of truth, but the curtailment of fashion -- the wholesale spread of a deceptive ideology or the politic use of belief to deceive.

Dogberry is the appropriate character to make this observation because, although he and his men easily misunderstand what is going on around them and have poor vocabulary (the signs of knowledge) and hence unintentionally convey distorted information, they are the only figures in the drama who combine truthfulness with an attempt not to interfere with others' beliefs. Perhaps, too, it is their lack of fluency in English vocabulary that enables them to disregard it and see what is really going on. Their "failure" not to interfere with Borachio and

²⁶Humphreys, ed., Footnote to Arden edition, 205.

Conrade indicates the impossibility of a system that allows for absolute freedom of conscience; it also shows that in order to provide the right of free conscience to all citizens a society needs a unified political conception of justice enforced by law.

The fact that the constables derive their belief from the "statutes" of the law (though their "own counsel" also is an element of this belief) indicates the always present ideological control over freedom of conscience and the legitimacy of this control when it is used to enforce toleration. Secondly, it shows that an ideology of this limited sort can be benign, that is, it can be instrumental in conveying the "truth" to the public and hence providing them with a foundation upon which they can exercise their freedom of conscience. Dogberry and his men's success in restoring to public knowledge what the play has shown to be the truth is also a statement about the other ideologies depicted in the play, inasmuch as it shows the superior importance of their political ideology -- the statutes and the law -- in providing for public justice. It is, of course, also a statement about the legitimate manner of influencing others' freedom of conscience -- that honest and plain, though perhaps unpleasant, confrontation with the truth is far better than deceit, no matter how valid the goal to be won.

While this radical philosophy of the play is delivered by the figures of its secondary plot and hence gains only the status of subtext, the drama's last two scenes, which bring to a close the main plot, support it in the sense that they do not validate the philosophy of the representatives of the dominant ideology, which condones deception as well as unthinking adoption of belief. Benedick and Beatrice maintain some resistance against the attitudes of Leonato, Claudio, Hero and the Friar, who support this ideology. Benedick, for example, never really takes on the pose of a deceiver or a pleaser. His song and remarks, "'The god of love, / That sits above, / And knows me, and knows me, / How pitiful I deserve' -- / I mean in singing; but in loving, Leander . . . Troilus . . . they were never so

truly turn'd over and over as my poor self in love" (5.2.25-36), may recall those around him that insisted his arguments against love were just a stance. But these comments also show that although his reality as lover is hidden because he lacks its typical signs -- the singing and "the festival terms" (5.2.41), he nevertheless possesses it. He can have a belief system that is different and ways of manifesting it that are different from theirs, and still find a place in society. His statement to Beatrice, "Thou and I are too wise to woo peaceably," speaks to the individual agency he tries to exercise and to the independent use of conscience which he sees as the appropriate practice of "this age," but not part of the "old" practice of the "time of good neighbours" (5.2.72-78). His and Beatrice's adoption of belief (falling in love) occurs not through the means of trumpeting the false or true consciousnesses of ideologies, whether Don Pedro's or Don John's, but through "Don Worm" -- the individual's own "conscience" (5.2.84),²⁷ whether true or false.

On the heels of this wisdom comes the announcement that "Don John is the author of all" the false accusations against Hero (5.2.98-99). It is followed by two scenes in which Claudio acts out his response to the latest false information he has readily embraced. In the first he is mourning at Hero's tomb and in the next he is expressing his willingness to think good of and marry any woman. The look of displeasure on Benedick's face when Claudio makes this extreme statement has been interpreted as dismay over the latter's willingness to marry an adulteress. It may also be understood as an expression of distaste at Claudio's persistently unthinking acceptance of belief systems. Marrying an adulteress is an apt metaphor for such a situation -- Claudio gives his love as a result of seduction or on the basis of others having given theirs; his agency is therefore discarded. This, everyone regrets.

²⁷"Worm" typically referred to conscience in the period.

But at their exchange of vows, Beatrice and Benedick realize that they too have derived their love for each other in some sense from the beliefs of others, and hence their judgment has not been completely independent, their exercise of conscience has not been entirely free. Accepting the fact of ideology (derived faith) Benedick can only, in reference to the old who walk not independently but leaning upon a "horn-tipped" cane, sing out: "There is no staff more reverent than one tipp'd with horn" (5.4.123).²⁸ The derived nature of most thought imposes limitations, he sees, which are implicit in the free exercise of conscience, like the elders' inevitable walking-stick which supports the bones of one with bone of another.²⁹

Much Ado's Idea of Interference and Rawls's Philosophy

There are many parts of Rawls's theory relevant to the play's discussion of interference in freedom of conscience. His "veil of ignorance," principle of toleration, and exclusion of "threats of force and coercion, deception and fraud," in the process of agreeing to "fair terms of social cooperation"³⁰ entail a general solution to the serious problems of oppression, discrimination, terrorism and war caused by the conflicting religious beliefs alluded to in the play. Perhaps the most important of his ideas is the concern raised about the necessity of some common good that is political rather than religious, given the fact of "reasonable pluralism" (xli); here the philosopher is advising that the emphasis be on the points of friendship rather than conflict. As noted in the previous chapter, he observes that it is in order to surmount the conflicts between different religions and other

²⁸Humphreys, ed., Footnote to Arden edition, 217.

²⁹The discussion of *Hamlet* in the next chapter mentions tales current in Shakespeare's time that link Moses's staff to a source of knowledge. The identification of cane or walking-stick with ideology reflects traditional symbolizations.

³⁰*Political Liberalism*, 23.

reasonable comprehensive doctrines that he revised his *Theory of Justice* and elaborated a wholly political conception of justice in *Political Liberalism*.

The toleration advocated in the play towards its representatives of atheism and different forms of Christianity, unless the behaviour instigates violence, suggests the toleration Rawls's latest theory advocates for all "reasonable comprehensive doctrines." In their practice of toleration, Dogberry and Verges wear the "veil of ignorance" Rawls says should occlude (from the minds of the people's representatives) "information about people's race and ethnic group, sex and gender, and their various native endowments such as strength and intelligence," as well as knowledge about their "social position" and "comprehensive doctrine" (24-25).

The restrictions imposed on Don John and his men and the hard lesson experienced by Hero and Claudius may, on the other hand, be seen to accord with his view that

The principles of any reasonable political conception must impose restrictions on permissible comprehensive views, and the basic institutions those principles require inevitably encourage some ways of life and discourage others, or even exclude them altogether (195).

The punishment of Don John and his men for their interference in others' belief through fraudulent means, as well as their temporary exclusion from participation in public life, therefore reflect the human rights principles advocated by Rawls. In fact the society of *Much Ado* could be viewed as generally reflecting the kind of society that would be produced and maintained under a system based on Rawls's theory. He speaks of people like Claudius who voluntarily give up their freedom because of the comprehensive doctrine they embrace, and of others like Benedick who choose not to have a religion.

The difference, however, between the society in *Much Ado* and one to which Rawls's theory could be applied is that in his society the public debates do not mention religious belief, although he concedes that these discussions will go on in society. The only purely political discussion in the play is that carried on by Dogberry and Verges. And even this identifies proper public behaviour with serving God. Their discussion may be said to conform to Rawls's structure in the sense that it categorizes all beliefs together and is interested only in the Prince's subjects and their honesty vis-à-vis the public. But the discussions of the other members of the society, although if judged strictly within Rawls's frame would not be relevant, suggest the huge impact of social interaction on peoples' freedom of conscience.

Much Ado's Idea of Interference and Human Rights Philosophy

The limitations of this political formula for the generation of the conditions necessary for the exercise of free conscience are also evident in the human rights instruments of the United Nations. Second to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,³¹ which after a lengthy period of consultation was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly on 25 November 1981,³² is the human rights instrument most pertinent to the discussion about interference in belief in *Much Ado About Nothing*. *Much Ado's* disvaluation of almost all its characters in terms of their views and behaviours relating to freedom of conscience is the most emphatic proof that the play made available, though probably to only a few of its first audience, a reading critical of practices and attitudes that in this century are considered contrary to human rights.

³¹United Nations, *Human Rights: A Compilation*, 48-49.

³²Bahiyih G. Tahzib, footnote 336 to *Freedom of Religion or Belief: Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection* (Kluwer Law International, 1995) 166.

The allegoric methodology employed in its analysis allows the characters to be seen to represent atheists and believers and, alternatively, belief systems. As representative of atheists and different sorts of religious believers, these characters can also be considered to stand for the diverse ideologic groups, associations, or communities of adherents within a nation or the world. In terms of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, they divide into two groups. Almost all belong to the group that interferes with freedom of conscience in ways not entirely consistent with current human rights philosophy. Thus Benedick, Beatrice, Claudio, Hero, Don Pedro, the Friar, Don John and his followers all infringe to some degree on the basic right to freedom of thought as elaborated in this Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Inasmuch as discrimination has been defined as a kind of hatred,³³ those who express hate of others because of their belief may, for example, be considered as opposing the practice stipulated in paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the said Declaration, that "No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution, group of persons, or person on grounds of religion or other beliefs." Likewise, all these characters contravene to some degree paragraph 1 of Article 19 of the Covenant, "Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference."³⁴ Only Dogberry and Verges fully demonstrate the tolerance, non-

³³The 12 December 1960 Resolution 1510 (XV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations "condemning 'all manifestations and practices of racial, religious, and national hatred in the political, economic, social, educational and cultural spheres of the life of society'" was given impetus by the problem of anti-Jewish and anti-African hate. The definition of discrimination given in the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in education (14 December 1960, enforced 22 May 1962) further "include[s] distinctions, exclusions, limitations, or preferences based, among other things, on religion, and having the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in education." See Natan Lerner, "Religious Human Rights Under the United Nations," *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective*, vol. 2, 103, 109.

³⁴United Nations, *Human Rights: A Compilation*, 11.

discrimination and non-interference these instruments recommend. Some of this discrimination is too mild to be considered hate, but later on becomes intrusive. For example, the mild discrimination against Benedick's "atheistic" views about love (belief) increase, at first manifested in Beatrice's refusing to offer him the respect she offers others, and eventually leading to deceptive tactics carried out by a group with the intention of changing his thought. Beatrice is the subject of similar deception to make her change her convictions about men in general and Benedick in particular. How seriously this sort of behaviour infringes on the goal of the Declaration cited above is debatable.

However, it does not apparently contravene paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:

Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

The line between the freedom to express one's conscience and the right of co-citizens to non-interference in their beliefs is a difficult one to draw. Don Pedro's efforts to persuade Benedick to love Beatrice and Hero's wily talk with which she plays on Beatrice's sense of justice in order to make her love Benedick would not likely constitute "moral pressure" equivalent to coercion; in the eyes of some human rights scholars the lie about Hero promoted by the Friar would.³⁵ But for others these actions might all be viewed as the legitimate "imparting of information and ideas of all kinds . . . in the form of art . . ."

The play, like these rights instruments, is clear in its condemnation only when an obviously fraudulent means is used to change others' beliefs. Don John and his men, alone, therefore, who use elaborate fraud to change the beliefs of

³⁵Lerner, 91.

whole groups, are condemned. This fraud constitutes coercion and therefore contravenes paragraph 2 of Article 18 of the Covenant and paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Declaration, both of which stipulate, "No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice." Not only does their action constitute coercion, the inflammatory image Don John constructs of Hero overlooks one of the most serious considerations on which the articles of the Declaration are based -- that the oppression of and disregard for the right to free conscience have "brought, directly or indirectly, wars and great suffering to mankind, especially where they serve as a means of foreign interference in the internal affairs of other States and amount to kindling hatred between peoples and nations . . . (48)" Hero as emblem of one ideology or faith and its members becomes the subject of war, all because Don John as a follower of another has kindled hate between his group and hers.

In addition, his behaviour goes against paragraph 2 of Article 20 of the Covenant, "Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law" (11). He does this not only through the fraudulent scene he sets up, but by his statements. When Claudio gathers from Don John's remarks that Hero is "disloyal," Don John urges him on to worse accusations, "The word [disloyal] is too good to paint out her wickedness, I could say she were worse; think you of a worse title and I will fit her to it" (3.2.98-100); as a result, Claudio's love and respect for her change to hate. If this and other statements of Don John's were judged as advocating "religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence," then, not only would he and his collaborators be regarded as having overlooked the basis of the Declaration, but they would also be subject to punishment by the law according to the Covenant. It is therefore interesting that within the play they are apprehended by the law.

The situation of the protagonists, however, draws attention to the fact that it is easier to condemn the initial oppressor than the oppressed who later become oppressors. Up to almost the end of the play, Beatrice and Benedick have confronted the different beliefs of others honestly and openly; but surprisingly they plan to interfere like Don John in the manner most strongly censured in the Declaration and Covenant -- through coercion. Beatrice's incitement of her "believers" to kill Claudio because of his "disbelief" in Hero (as a faith or ideology) and Benedick's attempt to carry out this killing might be construed, if the play made a more serious matter of it, as coercion to force Claudio to change his belief and to repress his expression of this belief.³⁶ If Benedick puts into practice this aspect of his religion (Beatrice), he will have contravened the victim's (Claudio's) human rights. On the other hand, Beatrice's incitement to kill does not exclude her from the religions people have the freedom to believe in. But in her role as believer, her advocacy of violence against Claudio is comparable to Don John's advocacy of hatred towards Hero, and therefore would be punishable by law for the same reasons. Worse than this, those of her believers who carry it out or try to carry it out (Benedick) would be punishable by law for coercion. It is significant that Claudio never recognizes Benedick's challenge as such; it is one more indication of his unawareness of how belief may be interfered with and hence his susceptibility to such interference.

The intent to kill Claudio can also be considered symbolic of a step towards genocide, for Benedick may on the same principle kill all those who disbelieve in Hero -- the attempt to destroy a group begins with the killing of one person. For this reason, the Genocide Convention is, Lerner notes, a human

³⁶Here the question of slander, which Kornstein focuses on in his legal analysis of the play, is set aside because Hero is read as an image of a belief rather than a person suffering abuse to reputation. See Kornstein's three articles on "Shakespeare and the Law, *Much Ado About Nothing* " in *New York Law Journal*, 200.41 (1988): 2-26; 200.37 (1988): 2-24; 200.39 (1988): 2-21.

rights instrument significant for the protection of both religious human rights and group rights (88-89). While the play does not provide for Beatrice's and Benedick's punishment as it does for Don John's, their behaviour appears reprehensible. Beatrice appears unjust when she says she will withdraw her love if Benedick does not kill Claudio. Benedick's behaviour is disvalued when Claudio and Don Pedro give as its cause not an interest in justice but his unreasonable infatuation with Beatrice (5.1.195f). His fanatic belief is made to appear the reason for his misbehaviour. As evident in the earlier detailed discussion of the play, every one of those who interfere with the beliefs of others in a deceptive or violent manner appears in a critical light.

The concerns expressed in the play are therefore generally similar to the basic ideas about freedom of religion, thought and conscience in the pertinent human rights instruments. The general thrust is, above all, that expressed in the preamble of the Declaration that "freedom of religion and belief should . . . contribute to the attainment of the goals of . . . friendship among peoples" (48). That Shakespeare titled the play as he did, itself suggests the conflicts caused by different beliefs represent an inappropriate emphasis on the intolerant attitudes of their followers, and that the emphasis should rather be on their central teachings about friendship. The ulterior message in the subtext affirms this. If Don John's lie is the "nothing" about which there is "much ado," then there is much to do about the misinformation that causes so much destruction.³⁷

³⁷The Concise Oxford indicates that "ado" comes from the Middle English "at do" meaning "to do." It gives atheism as one of the meanings of "nothing."

PART TWO

Freedom of Conscience and the Sources of Knowledge

This spirit, dumb to us, will speak to him.
(*Hamlet*, 1.1.171)

Amid the rising interest in freedom of conscience in late sixteenth-century England, a shift in epistemology, like the confusion in ideologies, was thwarting people's efforts to exercise this freedom. Even in societies that grant liberty of thought, people's use of this right is limited by the sources of knowledge accepted as legitimate and valid, whether they be tradition, reason, inspiration, or the senses.¹ Where there is a shift in the sources of knowledge their society upholds, a tension is created between those who base their judgments on the old sources and those who base theirs on the new, and within the individual who tries to make decisions using both the old and new sources. As interest grows in new sources but the old remain dominant, those who make use of the old continue to be at liberty to exercise and express their consciences, and those who embrace the new become objects of discrimination, and cannot exercise and express their judgments with society's sanction. Similarly, in a society where the new sources dominate those who adhere to the old are restricted in their freedom. The outcome of these conditions is that freedom of conscience is in practice never absolute, as its expression is always limited by society's conception of the sources of knowledge. This is a central theme in both *Hamlet* and *All's Well That Ends Well*.

The tension -- in the first play between Hamlet and most of the characters: Polonius, Gertrude, Laertes, and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern -- and in the

¹There are obviously many other limitations on freedom of thought -- social, political, cultural, and natural limitations; I do not mention them because they are not the focus of this section of the thesis.

second between Helena, Lafew and the Countess and the rebellious pair, Bertram and Parolles -- is largely a function of the different sources of knowledge the characters give authority to. The tensions *within* the more complex figures of these plays -- Hamlet and Helena -- are a consequence of their fluctuating adherence to conflicting sources of knowledge. From this perspective the plays resemble each other. But the plays' societies are opposite. Tradition dominates in *Hamlet*. *All's Well* favours inspired reason. In *Hamlet*, where tradition is looked up to by the dominant members of society, the play's central figure is prevented from expressing his beliefs, for they stem not from tradition but from inspiration and inductive reasoning. In *All's Well*, where the King in trusting Helena's intelligence defies tradition as a source of knowledge, reason becomes the preeminent authority. Because Bertram clings to the old source -- tradition -- he is censured when he expresses his conscience. The conclusion both plays reach, then, is that the individual's free expression of conscience is dependent on what knowledge source he or she embraces, as well as on support from other members of the society who accept as valid this same knowledge source.

In the two plays the kind of love characterizing the users of these knowledge sources introduces a further complication to the free exercise of conscience. The user of tradition engrossed with self-love (like Claudius) has a judgment different from the user of tradition whose prime attachment is to the patriarch (like Ophelia), or from the one bound with the same strong love for his conception of legitimacy (as is Fortinbras). The kind of love that motivates one person inevitably has repercussions on the freedom of conscience exercised by other members of the society; so Claudius's selfishness impedes the rights of Hamlet. It has consequences as well on the judgments rendered by the individual because it relates to the authority admitted to the knowledge sources on which the individual bases his or her judgments.

The correspondences and differences between *Hamlet* and *All's Well* make them a complementary reflection on the relationship between knowledge sources and freedom of conscience. Both argue against an unreasoning acceptance of tradition and suggest experimentation or experience as ways to validate intuition or inspiration. Both also demonstrate the imposition of the dominant epistemology on society as a whole, that is, on all individuals. *Hamlet*, however, presents the consequence of this dominance as far more devastating, because it is used in a corrupt manner and impedes the use of other knowledge sources. In *All's Well* the epistemology imposed is not as violently foisted on people; and because it is presented as more valid than the "old" epistemology voluntarily adhered to, the mild education used to propagate it appears beneficent.

Another distinction between the two plays concerns their different emphasis on tradition and experimentation. Where in *Hamlet* traditions unsuited to the times are the unquestioned springboards of disastrous, forced judgments, in *All's Well* experience and experimentation are the means to constructive, free judgments. In *Hamlet* where change of epistemology is resisted by the society, the central figure becomes an agent of disruption, questioning the dominant epistemology, striving but never succeeding to exercise his conscience on the basis of a new knowledge source. In *All's Well*, where such change is accepted as inevitable and beneficent, she is a means of knitting together the discordant elements of society and causing them to submit willingly to a new epistemology.

The end of *Hamlet* and the beginning of *All's Well* resemble each other in their similar focus on a heap of dead bodies and their corresponding expectations of learning. The pile of dead bodies at the end of *Hamlet* will act as an illustration of the story Horatio is to recount; the setting up of dead Hamlet "on the stage" as the hero will focus the lesson on reason, especially reason that accords with inspiration. But the dead who are the focus at the beginning of *All's Well*

introduce an active learning experience, for in the face of their loss the play's characters seek new sources of knowledge. Later the dead Helena, who in the middle of the play is set on "the stage of the minds" of those who have resisted change, becomes not just a part in their tragic story but an active medium for their transformation.

In *Hamlet* the knowledge sources refuse to bend before the resistance of those whose rights, desires, and aspirations cannot be served by them; in *All's Well* they yield and hence become to a degree molded by their users. This letting die a portion of their integrity, like the real and pretended deaths in the two plays, functions in *All's Well* as an education for their users, who through the flexibility permitted them come to be pleased with the new epistemology. Being given the freedom to use what knowledge source they will and to render the judgment they desire provides the rebels a means of testing their own knowledge source and their own judgment. When they find their knowledge source is not trustworthy and the new one is trustworthy, they do not hesitate to embrace the new one.

Thus where *Hamlet* focuses on an analysis of the properties of various sources of knowledge -- tradition, chance, fancy, intuition, inspiration, reason, sense experience, eventually finding that all are inadequate within a society dominated by outworn customs and illegitimate desires, *All's Well* offers inspired reason as a new and idealized source of knowledge, and proves through education that it offers the greatest love, trust and freedom. The sum of the lessons provided in the two plays is that the authority which enables a knowledge source "to speak" to a society is dependant on the fullness of trust its members give that authority; this trust, they teach, is a consequence of education, the proven trustworthiness of the knowledge source and its other users and, within a just society, the knowledge source's proven enhancement of the freedom of conscience.

The analysis of the plays depends on a fairly simple treatment of epistemology. The definition of knowledge could be adapted from Bertrand Russell -- knowledge is "what we firmly believe, if it is true. . . . What we firmly believe, if it is not true is called error."² Furthermore, the discussion here is generally limited to the four knowledge sources mentioned above (the senses, tradition, reason, and inspiration), as these were being referred to the philosophical, political and popular literature of the period. The philosophical theories related to more than one or only part of one of these sources are left aside, as it is not the point of the chapters to argue for or against any one of them. For example, there is no discussion of the instrumentalist view, which concerns one aspect of reason (scientific reasoning) and whose proponents believe scientific theories "describe nothing at all" that is true or real but are "mere instruments."³

Other theories not specifically addressed include essentialism, rationalism, and empiricism. Essentialism, which may pertain to religious tradition or to scientific reasoning, was the great debate at Shakespeare's time; followers of Galilean essentialism purported that truth about the world could best be obtained through scientific experimentation and therefore religious tradition should be confined to religious matters, and believers in Roman Catholic essentialism argued that all truth, including that of the material world, was to be obtained solely in religious traditions.⁴ While not explicitly addressed in this study, the conclusions in both plays that every epistemology provides only a relative certitude indicate an opposition to both scientific and religious essentialism.

Similarly, rationalism and empiricism might be seen as subjects of the plays, because of their pertinence to reason and the senses. On the other hand,

²Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1981) 81.

³Karl S. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, 3d. ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) 104, 98-99, 102.

⁴Popper, 104, 97-98.

strictly speaking these theories concern knowledge of two sorts, respectively intuitive and material knowledge; as these two knowledges are not strictly divided in the plays it is easier to look at them only as regards their sources. As we shall see in the chapter on *Hamlet*, reason, inspiration and the senses may give the same kind of knowledge. The crucial inquiry for the early playgoers of philosophic bent was how surely these knowledge sources could be used in a search for certitude that would in consequence allow the free exercise of conscience.

Though it is hard to find any who consider these questions in *All's Well*, scholars of *Hamlet* circumambulate endlessly the issues this play raises about knowledge and judgment. Among the very few of these who self-consciously embrace epistemology as a subject in *Hamlet*, William R. Morse in "Shakespearian self-knowledge: the synthesizing imagination and the limits of reason" (1990) offers a most interesting argument. It is his view that "Shakespeare's vision animates a thoroughgoing critique of the ideology of rationality" and that his plays are concerned with "the failure of the rising essentialist ideology to address the human need for belief as the absolute ground for any subsequent act of comprehension."⁵

A second of the more relevant studies is Naomi Scheman's "From Hamlet to Maggie Verver: The History and Politics of the Knowing Subject" (1989). Scheman is interested in "the development of a liberatory epistemology of the abandonment of even the sort of minimal foundationalism constructivism espouses, with its taking as given the identity of the knowing subject."⁶ She sees in *Hamlet* and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* a discussion of the relationship between "knowing subject" and "the objects of knowledge" as "one of sharply separated and allegedly wholly independent subjects and objects," while *The Golden Bowl*

⁵*Drama and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990) 48.

⁶*Poetics*, 18 (1989): 449.

and Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, she argues, reflect a view in which "subjects and objects are seen as interacting and mutually constituting."⁷ I have come across no similar studies on *All's Well That Ends Well*.

The perspective in this thesis differs from Morse's and Scheman's articles in its assumptions about epistemology and more particularly in its interest in the relationship between epistemology and justice in society, especially the just application of freedom of conscience. I agree fully with Morse that Shakespeare's plays "ponder the human need for belief" (48). But, while it is Morse's focus, it is not the focus of this study. Morse sees in *Hamlet* and other plays of Shakespeare a proposal that the imagination, Aquinas's "*ratio superior*," can through the constitution of "imaginative belief" save the hero from the "alienation" produced by inordinate discursive reasoning, that is, discursive reasoning "at the expense of that more comprehensive '*ratio superior*' by which the individual was intuitively to understand the metaphysical reality and thus give a meaningful context to the work of the lower faculty" (48-49).

In my analysis I consider imagination a stage in every reasoning process. This is because reason includes all interpretation, and imagination is an interpretive constitution of images as a result of the knowledge received through the senses, passed to us from our society (tradition), resulting from deduction and, if we believe in the transcendent, coming through inspiration. Thus, where Morse sees the problem in the world of Claudius as an excess of discursive reasoning and an absence of imagination, I understand every reasoning process including Claudius's to include "an act of imaginative belief." Claudius must imagine the result of writing to Fortinbras's uncle when he reasons this is the right action to

⁷ These two studies were heralded forty years earlier by James Feibleman's "The Theory of Hamlet" (1946); while Feibleman's first focus is ontology, his comments on the necessity of combining intuition with reason in the process of judgment relate to our discussion in the two plays (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, 7 (1946): 131-50).

take; Polonius must imagine Hamlet's intentions when he advises Ophelia to return her love tokens.

On this view every reasoning process and every imagination is contingent, as Bertrand Russell explains, on other knowledge; and hence may be faulty. To apply slightly differently Russell's example of Othello's belief about Desdemona's loving Cassius,⁸ we know from the play that for Othello this knowledge is based on other knowledge derived from the traditions passed to him by his parents. As a result he obtains a false knowledge, what Russell terms "error." Similarly, Polonius makes his judgment about Hamlet's relationship with Ophelia from the historical tradition in which men of higher rank misuse women. According to the interpretation of the play here, he too obtains not knowledge but "error." As Russell explains, the only person who can be in possession of this particular knowledge is the one who conceives it herself or himself, here Desdemona and Hamlet. This is not to say however that through reasoning one cannot obtain valid knowledge. Hamlet, for example, when he examines the note Rosencrantz and Guildenstern have with them, and in light of their earlier treatment of him, reasons correctly that they are to be the instruments of his death. Though the play does not make this point, we nevertheless know the validity of even this knowledge is not absolutely certain. They may have had a change of heart and be planning to destroy Claudius's instructions themselves and save Hamlet. While the certainty of this most accurate of the knowledge Hamlet obtains in the play is still contingent, that is, it is still relative, it nevertheless is true in comparison with the examples of false knowledge given above.

Thus, while I agree with Morse that the play shows reason is inadequate and must be combined with other knowledge sources in order to be really

⁸Russell uses it to demonstrate the privacy of many self-evident truths; that is, it is only Desdemona who knows with certainty that she does not love Cassius.

beneficial, I do not see that the play argues that imagination resolves its shortcomings. Claudius's and Polonius's cunning is flawed not by lack of imagination or too much reason, but because the ideology to which they put their imagination and their reason in service is egoistic, void of the principles of justice and honesty. Horatio and Hamlet on the other hand exemplify good users of reason, in part because they combine it with inspiration, and in part because the ideology of which they put it in service is oriented to the interests of justice. The play in fact seems to accord imagination an ambivalent function; consistent with the developing scientific attitudes,⁹ it is portrayed as dangerous. For example, before "finding out" the ghost is true, Horatio identifies it with an imagination that spoils Hamlet's reason; Claudius's misleading statements "teach" Laertes "to imagine" Hamlet's wrongdoing and a good revenge for it (4.7.35). As the coming chapter argues, even the "rash" feeling that rightly pushes Hamlet to investigate Rosencrantz and Guildenstern is not identified with imagination.

But Morse's view that the "solipsistic world of reason" confining the judgment of the "early" Hamlet contrasts to the "earlier world of custom" that was his father's relates closely to my concerns. Like him, I see the division between these two worlds as a separation between two societies adhering to two distinct epistemologies; Claudius's world is ruled by an epistemology in which corrupt and outdated tradition dominates, and not one fitted to the needs of the times, as we presume the tradition in old Hamlet's world was. Despite these differences, we agree on the main issue -- that the epistemology in Hamlet's world is inadequate, a view Scheman also expresses.

⁹Chapter 8 of Glanvill's *Scepsis Scientifica* (1665) opens, "Fourthly, we *erre* and come short of *Science*, because we are so frequently mislead by the evil conduct of our *Imaginations*; whose irregular strength and importunity doth almost perpetually abuse us" (80).

Like Scheman, I consider that epistemology -- theory of the grounds of knowledge or what she calls "study of the world" -- is theory, and does have a history and a socio-politics. Like her, I believe the knowing subject is not an "absolute given." The difference between our approaches is rooted, as will be more evident in the coming chapters, in my assumption that within each historical period there is an epistemology that better provides the inhabitants, as they are situated in group, nation, or world, with a way to approach the transcendent and particular goals of social justice, among which is freedom of conscience.

Such an epistemology is necessarily accompanied by particularly "constructed" knowing subjects, but inasmuch as a subject is subject to this transcendent goal, he or she bears the same attribute. On this view the individuals and groups within the particular historical time and place may appear to be de-particularized. But the transcendent goal of social justice nevertheless has *particular* conceptions and practices. Similar irony is evident in the processes of individual growth and physical evolution, where the forces of change (though responsive to a particular environment and productive of particular results) are geared to the never-ending goal of the survival of the organism and the species as a whole; "whole" necessarily implies similarities -- a species would not be a species if it did not have some common features; an organism would not be alive if its different systems were not cooperative, if each did not submit to the exigencies of the other and the whole. A society by definition is likewise bound by certain similarities, particular particularities in every instance necessarily being sacrificed.

Paradoxically, theories and practices that increase the diversity Scheman is advocating must increase the means to freedom of conscience for the greatest number of individuals and for the greatest variety of them (that is, in conjunction with Scheman's goals of including women and "third world" peoples). This implies that the choice of dominant epistemology is an ideological one. It

therefore requires "universal" limitations, but of a different variety than those traditionally observed. Her criticism of Rawls's assumption "that it's what we know (about how we are particularly placed in the world) that will hurt us in our attempts to think as legislators" neglects to take account that his construction of this condition is so constructed as within a particular society with particular problems and particular advantages.¹⁰

Like Morse's and Scheman's, there are many arguments that the reading of *Hamlet* and *All's Well* outlined in these chapters does not dwell on. Nevertheless, a number of interpretations of other critics are taken for granted. Though they may not be generally agreed upon, I need to assume them for my argument. I do not take the time to argue them because they are not central to my thesis. Therefore, if they are contentious for some readers, I hope these will suspend their disagreement for the sake of focussing on the question at hand, bearing in mind, as I note in the introduction, that this work does not presume to present the only correct reading of the plays available to its first audience, but merely some thoughts about one reading available to a few in that audience.

To give one example, I take for granted in this reading that the act of revenge represents an act of justice carried out in service to the ideal of justice, so construed in the culture of the old King and also at the time of Claudius. I agree with Alex Newell and others who believe there is a valid reading of *Hamlet* in which the "ethic of revenge" is questioned; it is true too that Elizabethan conceptions of revenge cannot be said to be reflected unthinkingly in the play.¹¹

¹⁰Its main problems relate to the fact that many of the moral, religious, and philosophical doctrines of its members would in public and political practice bring about the suppression of basic liberties for large numbers of the population. Its main advantages are that it is a democratic society in which these basic liberties are established and in which there is a unified conception of political justice that satisfies the majority of its members.

¹¹Alex Newell, *The Soliloquies in Hamlet: The Structural Design* (London: Associated UP, 1991) 49-55.

My point is not to argue about what the play says about the worthiness of this conception of justice (as may be quite rightly done in another reading), but rather to look at an interpretation of the play in which it stands in for that conception within a particular political and social system and hence has a place of significance for any person in that system who is undertaking decisions.

A second assumption made on the basis of arguments other scholars have developed is the presentation in both plays of conflicting social orders. My analysis of *All's Well* picks up on Jay L. Halio's "old order" and "new order" and Susan Bassnett-McGuire's "pre- and post-Machiavellian worlds," though not with their understanding of them.¹² The conception of conflicting orders that most closely parallels the reading here is that in the 1995 production of The Shakespeare Theatre (Washington, D.C.) directed by Laird Williamson, where the two orders were symbolized in the stage design: Large, world-like discs were rolled on stage; initially cast in orange light and backed by skeleton or ghost figures, they were later (after the healing of the King) lighted in green, which in combination with the green leaves decking Helena's and the King's heads suggested change and newness. The two orders in Williamson's mise-en-scène, thus, were distinguished not by a division between characters or classes but by a transformation in the initial sickly order and as different epochs in the development of one society.

To give another example, I assume that marital consent is an issue in *All's Well* that would have been interpreted realistically by Shakespeare's first

¹²For Halio "the old order" is "represented by the aged nobility and [is] centered in France," while "the new order" is represented by the aspiring young bourgeois (Helena and Parolles) and [is] centered in Florence." See "*All's Well That Ends Well*," *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 15:1 (1964): 35. Susan Bassnett-McGuire's "two worlds in opposition" parallel "the pre-Machiavellian world of the old King and the post-Machiavellian world of young Bertram." See "An Ill Marriage in an Ill Government: Patterns of Unresolved Conflict," *Shakespeare-Jahrbuch*, 120 (1984): 98.

audiences. This does not however preclude the issue of consent being also read by some playgoers as an analogy of freedom of conscience. It should be noted that, while my analysis here makes use of the analogical reading, this latter understanding of the play is dependent upon an assumption of the former. Similarly, my argument that Hamlet's heroic use of reason may represent an advocacy of epistemologies in which reason is given precedence is derived from an assumption made by others, such as Carole Diffey, that Hamlet is not mad but is an exemplary reasoner.¹³

Along with the several assumptions made use of in the two coming chapters, there are some important and widely accepted interpretations to whose absence from my discussion I do not attend. These omissions are inevitable in view of the narrow scope of my study and the immensity of the field of criticism. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to give a few examples. I do not for instance make use of or take for granted Freud's interpretation that the difference between the delay in Hamlet's action vis-à-vis Claudius and the speed of his action against Rosencrantz and Guildenstern is related to Hamlet's Oedipus complex.¹⁴ With regard to *All's Well*, I do not take up, as I have in an earlier paper and as many critics have, the problem of Bertram's disparagement and its socio-political relevance. I do not discuss these questions here because I am focusing on a different (though also valid) reading. The same may be said for the multitude of readings treating class, gender, sex, and masculine education in *All's Well* and those that treat the family, cultural and political dynamics of *Hamlet*.

These realistic interpretations are not in the least discounted; the reading proposed here is simply one of their adjuncts. The analyses of *Hamlet* and *All's*

¹³Carole T. Diffey, "'Such large discourse': the Role of 'Godlike reason' in *Hamlet*," *Hamlet Studies*, 11.1-2 (1989): 22-33. Her article is a response to Bertram Joseph's *Conscience and the King* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1953).

¹⁴Sigmund Freud, *The Origins of Psychoanalysis*, ed. Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud, and Ernst Kris (New York: Basic Books, 1954) 224.

Well in the following chapters place a spotlight on the philosophical questions and commentary that lurk in these plays' allusions to the period's archetypal folktales and traditional symbols. While they might not have come to the minds of most members of the audience, they nevertheless very likely struck the minds of a few. In *All's Well*, for example, the folktales of the beggar king, the impossible task, and the fox and the grapes are all seen to shed light on the play's representation of freedom of conscience as it relates to epistemology. Similarly, the search, find, and freedom paradigm of the archetypal folktales alluded to in *Hamlet* are understood to have significance in the knowledge source-freedom of conscience relationship.

Chapter Four

Skewed Skulls: Epistemological Limiting of Freedom of Conscience in *Hamlet*

Belike this show imports the argument of the play.
(3.2.145)

He sifts the dust with his fingers, looking for the jewel, digs further, and at last discovers it. Now he can do what he wants. But as he searches mud spatters his eyes and, when he brings the treasure into the light, it is caked with dirt, its shape and value hardly recognizable. In a nutshell, this story is the mental search we and Hamlet make when trying to judge. The manner of search and the dirt are the affections; the jewel, the knowledge sources; all may act as burdens impeding freedom of conscience -- what Rawls has called the "sources of the burdens of judgment." The play schematizes them in varying epistemologies, some less constraining than others. It thus indicates that some conditions are less burdensome to the freedom of conscience than others.

Epistemologies all give place to a variety of knowledge sources, but in a different hierarchy and in combination with different ideologies. In the sense that these theories of the grounds of knowledge burden the judgment no matter how much freedom is granted within a society, the discussion is outside the philosophy of human rights. On the other hand, the epistemology that dominates in a society impacts heavily on freedom of conscience as a right to be implemented with "universality" (for all members of society) and "paramountcy" (having priority over other rules and laws).¹ In this sense the subject is very relevant to human rights philosophy.

¹These terms accord more or less with the usage in L. J. Macfarlane's *The Theory and Practice of Human Rights* (New York: St. Martin's P, 1985) 3-13.

Hamlet presents an image of a "dismantled realm," in which the corruption served by its dominating tradition has created insecurity over which epistemology its citizens can use when making judgments. The play explores the defects of one epistemology dominated by tradition and used for the purposes of an egotistic ideology; it gauges the advantages of inspiration and inductive reasoning, and diagnoses the kind of love that allows for these sources of knowledge to be used successfully. *Hamlet* then unveils the inadequacy of any knowledge source within a society that gives this source no support; finally it calls into question all the epistemologies so far experienced in the society of the play.

Metaphoric and Historic Contexts

Consideration of the question of epistemology and its relation to freedom of conscience as it was relevant for the play's first audiences requires reflection on *Hamlet* in the light of the traditional metaphoric language and historical concerns of sixteenth-century England. *Hamlet* and *All's Well That Ends Well*, discussed in the next chapter, are here read as myths whose metaphors assisted in their representation of the relation between knowledge source and the exercise of free conscience. A statement of Bacon's in *The Advancement of Learning* indicates the currency of the first of the major metaphors, that of king for knowledge source: "For there is no power on earth which setteth up a throne or chair of estate in the spirits and souls of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge and learning."²

In the two plays kingship functions metaphorically to represent the different sources of knowledge that occupy this "throne" as director of thought and judgment. The kind of kingship looked up to parallels the shift in a source's

²Francis Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning and New Atlantis*, ed. Arthur Johnston (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1974) 57.

legitimacy, as so interpreted within the dominant and suppressed societies of the plays' worlds. Playing out the proverbial identification of king with brain or head and at the same time the traditional association between invisible thinking and manifest action, *Hamlet* and *All's Well* relate the kings' thinking to the characters' actions, and then, this relationship to the subject of the plays -- the correspondence in real life between the conception of the sources of knowledge and the related judgments as evidenced in action. Liaisons paralleling the varied relationships with the king or kingship thus draw together the characters' behaviour (their "manifest" actions) and the argument from which this behaviour is derived (the "invisible" source of knowledge that for them is valid).

An example of this paradigm in *Hamlet* is Polonius's relationship with King Claudius. Polonius's loyalty to Claudius functions as an adherence to tradition. In *All's Well*, Parolles's obsession with tradition makes him unsupportive of the king, who is at once a breaker of tradition and symbol of reason. Polonius's and Parolles's relationship with their kings are shows of their argument -- that judgment should be formed wholly on the basis of tradition. The plays themselves, then, are not the only shows functioning as indicators of the argument behind their composition and production, but the social configuration of each member of the imaginary societies within them carries out this same function, as each one by his action and belief shows his respective epistemology.

The second frequent metaphor in the plays recalls the traditional description of the "marital" relationship between the church and Christ, used to signify that the church's decrees and interpretations are correct because they are inspired by Christ. Marriage or sex as an allegory for learning also has interesting precedents in *Ovid moralisé*, Boccaccio's *Genealogie decorum gentilium* and Chaucer. One of the most well known is the web of stories about Paris's choice

of one woman among three, each of whom represents a different philosophy.³ His mating with one of them becomes for him the adherence to new knowledge. The same myth existed in Celtic folklore, where St. Columba's marriage to maidens symbolized the learning of new virtues.⁴

Sex and marriage in *Hamlet* and *All's Well* thus allude to the connection between knowledge source and judgment. In *Hamlet* for example Claudius's judgment and his adulterous union with Gertrude mirror his adhesion to an outworn tradition. Sex in *All's Well* represents the process of learning, whereby the user is familiarized with his knowledge source before he makes judgments based on it. Bertram, therefore, will not embrace the judgment of the King until he has experienced intercourse with Helena -- the knowledge source that initially inspired the King with a new way of thinking. The symbolization in *All's Well* is more explicit because of the play's focus on education as the necessary connection between the exercise of freedom of conscience and the knowledge source on which this exercise is dependent.

As to the historical context, one of the crises of the contemporary society concerned the authority of knowledge sources. The first audiences of *Hamlet* and *All's Well That Ends Well* were caught in the middle of a period in which the sources of knowledge were in flux -- between a time when tradition was looked to as the foundation of judgment and a time in which reason, experience and intuition were becoming accepted as equally or more valid criteria for judgment. The crisis about the relative value of these sources of knowledge is evident in philosophical, religious and political discussions surrounding the period of Shakespeare's

³Patricia R. Orr, "Pallas Athena and the Threefold Choice," in *The Mythographic Art: Classical Fable and the Rise of the Vernacular in Early France and England*, ed. Jane Chance (Gainesville: U of Florida Press, 1990) 162ff.

⁴A. O'Kelleher and G. Schoepperle, trans. and eds., *Betha Colaim Chille Life of Columcille*, comp. M. O'Donnell, 1532, *University of Illinois Bulletin*, 15.48 (1918): xxiii-xxiv, 51-53.

writing. These ranged from da Vinci's arguments about the epistemological character of painting to Galileo's concerning the "investigation of nature;"⁵ from Kabbalist and alchemist claims of magical knowledge to Bacon's promotion of inductive reasoning and his explanations of the faculties of the rational soul for knowledge; from Roman Catholic advocacy of the Church as source of divine knowledge to Protestant "unmediated" dependence on the Bible and the Anglican proposition of the divine right of bishops; and from the English Lower House's belief in the people as knowledge source to the monarch's conviction of the divine right of kings. The subject also flashed up unabatedly in popular material.

The background to this manifestation was largely religious though it was also scientific. On the scientific side the main contention was between the traditional deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning. On the religious side it began with criticism of tradition, moved to interest in individual intuition or inspiration and, in face of the resulting diversity and conflict, became fascinated with reason and "rightly placed" love. English Protestant Christianity was not only itself a break with tradition but it brought with it a criticism of tradition. The widely circulated *Acts and Monuments* of John Foxe, for example, described "the pope's law" as "a teaching of traditions" void of the "simple truth," while its summary of the "original" Christianity stated that "St. Paul's Doctrine . . . wipeth away all traditions, and constitutions of men whatsoever, especially from binding of conscience; calling them beggarly elements of the world."⁶ Intuition and inspiration intervened in this competition for authority, as the Protestant view

⁵See the following articles in Donald R. Kelley and Richard H. Popkin, eds., *The Shapes of Knowledge From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991): Claire Farago, "The Classification of the Visual Arts in the Renaissance," 23-48; Nicholas Jardine, "Demonstration, Dialectic, and Rhetoric in Galileo's *Dialogue*," 101-22.

⁶John Foxe, *The Acts and Monuments of John Foxe*, 4th ed., rev. and ed. Josiah Pratt, with an introduction by John Stoughton, vol. 1 (London: The Religious Tract Society, 1900) 61-62.

developed that ordinary individuals could sometimes be inspired with truth even as the Church fathers had professed they were.⁷ However, intuition or, to use the more common word, inspiration, was as a source of knowledge, problematic, because it could be confused with fancy. When it was fancy it was connected to falsity, egotism and traditional superstitions; when it was inspiration it was linked with reason and the divine spirit, whose revelation was in value akin to the scientific truth revealed in nature. Luther, for example, warns against accepting "any inspiration at all rashly and without a definite reason," but at the same time he credits "divine inspiration" with the success of the wisest leaders, Christian and otherwise.⁸

The number of different names given to this knowledge is an indication of its problems. Hooker described intuition as "a direct beholding or presentation to the mind through the sense or imagination," and considered it the source of the "greatest assurance generally with all men," to which reason by "strong and invincible demonstration" was second.⁹ Bacon differentiated between inspiration and fancy. According to him, the source of inspiration is God or the individual mind connected to God;¹⁰ this view entailed the belief that inspired knowledge was superior to other knowledge. Fancy on the other hand, which he called "fascination," he saw as the product of ceremonies and imaginations of one agent on the imagination of another, the real problem with it being "that it is not known how much of them is verity, and how much vanity" (115-16).

Multiple, diverse and contrary interpretations of the scripture arose with the application of the Protestant belief in the possibility of individual inspiration and in the duty of individual judgment and application of scripture, engendering

⁷See *Luther's Works*, vol. 20, ed. Hilton C. Oswald, 333.

⁸*Luther's Works*, vol. 4, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Walter A. Hansen, 389; vol. 13, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, 200-201.

⁹*Ecclesiastical Polity and other Works*, vol. 1, Book 2, Sec. 7, 181.

¹⁰*The Advancement*, 115.

further inquiry into the question of knowledge sources, and resulting in an increased interest not only in tradition but also in reason.¹¹ Thus in religious Protestant practice, the reliance on individual inspiration and scriptural revelation was more and more combined with deductive reasonings and classical and religious tradition. Writing about six or seven years before Shakespeare penned *Hamlet*, Hooker championed "the authority of man's judgment . . . in defect of proof infallible;" "Companies of learned men," he wrote "be they never so great and reverend, are to yield unto Reason . . ."¹² These reasonings were then considered in the light of experience, so that inductive reasoning too became an important source of knowledge.

For the Catholic Church, deductive reasoning based on religious tradition was the process used for judgment in all matters, from military and scientific to religious and governmental -- hence the omission of contradictory evidence resulting from scientific experiment or inductive reasoning; its complexly elaborated procedures, which covered the judgment of all domains of human activity, required professionals and therefore effectively excluded the participation of many.¹³ Changes in the practice of science weakened this monopoly and concomitantly assisted in the development of induction as a source of knowledge.¹⁴ Thus the Protestant Reformation and the spread of science

¹¹ The account of the trial under Henry VIII of one John Lambert, who was persecuted for his rejection of the doctrine of transubstantiation, reflects this immense influence of reason. The argument ends, interestingly, with recourse to "scientific" experiments on both parts -- Lambert's and Bishop Stokesley's. (See Charles H. H. Wright, ed., *Foxe's Book of Martyrs* (London: Morgan & Scott, n. d.) 348-53.)

¹² *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book 2, Sec. 7, 182-3.

¹³ The idea that church had a separate domain from state, though current especially among some Protestants, was not necessarily practised in all Christian countries.

¹⁴ Galileo promoted this kind of reasoning by his science and by his attitude to the use of scripture and its literal interpretations in the study of the material world. (Maurice A. Finocchiaro, trans. and ed., *The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1989) 49ff, 134ff. In the area of law, Barbara Shapiro explains that there was a movement away from procedures of deduction (from presumptions) and experiment (by torture) and accident (by

gradually encouraged the wider, popular adoption of less strict views of knowledge sources and forms of judgment.

There was a great deal of popular literature in circulation at Shakespeare's time that made connections between these varied sources of knowledge and choice or judgment. Much referred to God or the commandments of God as a legitimate source of knowledge; much also referred to reason. Frequently, more than one source is invoked, as in Abraham Fleming's 1581 series *The Diamond of Devotion*, which on its title page refers to the fear of God as the source of knowledge from which choice is derived, quoting the Psalms (25.11), "What man is he that feareth the Lord? him shall he teach in the waie that he shall choose;" and at the same time in its preface criticizes those who refuse to use their powers of intellectual investigation -- who, "pretending . . . a singular secrete knoweledge and judgment, condemne manie Bookes by their outward face, being nothing seene in the bowels of the same, and utterlie ignorant to what issue the conveiance of the matter is like to grow."¹⁵

The trend, as in the plays, was that reason following full investigation of the facts was the most important source of knowledge. Richard Bancroft, for example, in his argument against the Family of Love, does not base his conclusions simply on deductions from the principles of his own belief but claims to have carried out a careful study of the movement prior to pronouncing judgment on it; his treatise on the subject begins with a condemnation of people who refuse to carry out similar investigations into different ideas.¹⁶ Another example may be

duels) towards those which favoured induction (facts brought forward by witnesses) and what I will call politics (the king's, the bishops', the people's desire). See Barbara J. Shapiro, "Law," *Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of the Relationships between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature* (Princeton UP, 1983) 163-193.

¹⁵Abraham Fleming, *The Footeopath* ... (London, 1581) tp, [1]. (STC 11041).

¹⁶Richard Bancroft, *A Survey of the Pretended Holy Discipline* (London: John Wolfe, 1593) 1-3. (STC 1352).

found in publications about the Athenian writer Xenophon that emphasize reason and experience as sources of knowledge:

But Xenophon this Philosopher hath not onlie travailed in the generall knowledge of true reason to have right understanding what is good and bad in life, and what is true and false in nature, but also travailed by experience to se[e] the diversities of mens manners, and to acquainte him selfe with right ordre of Civile government, and therby hath attained to a greate estimation of worthynes among the wise and learned, and judged a man most worthy . . .¹⁷

The importance of experience as a source of knowledge is evident even among the writings of the religious. In his defense of "prophesying," the Puritan Grindal stated before the Queen that he was "very well assured, both by reasons and arguments taken out of the holy Scriptures, and by experience (the most certain seal of sure knowledge) . . ."¹⁸ Suggesting it was now an attitude assimilated by the population, authors in later decades exploited it to encourage readers to consider their arguments. James Sempill writes in 1619, for example, "Twentie twelve moneths are neere spent (good Reader) since I had studied this Lesson, whereof I doe heere now render thee an account: a Lesson, I say, not a Lecture, and so but to be read by entreatie, received as without authoritie, and censured freely . . ."¹⁹

The complicating factor of love in the use of knowledge sources was also considered in contemporary philosophic and popular commentaries on judgment. Bacon describes these love-objects as "Idols of the human mind," writing that

¹⁷William Barkar, preface to *The Bookes of Xenophon* (London: Reynolde Wolfe, 1550) 3. (STC 26066).

¹⁸Quoted in H. Hensley Henson, *Puritanism in England* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1912) 24-25.

¹⁹James Sempill, *Sacrilege Sacredly Handled* (London: W. Jones for E. Weaver, 1619) Ar. (STC 22186).

"The human understanding is no dry light, but receives an infusion from the will and affections . . ." ²⁰ In *The Advancement of Learning* he considers love or affection one of the three "means" of "disturbing" the reason in its ministering to the imagination and thence motivating the will (139-40). The widely accepted idea of an incompatibility between love and reason was reflected in the legal system, in that relatives and those with a special interest in the victim were excluded from juries. ²¹ Geoffrey Whitney's emblem on judgment equates the man who bases his judgment on love rather than wisdom with a person who takes "shaddowes" for substance. ²² The idea is implicit in many legends, proverbs and metaphors of the period. As the example of Whitney indicates, it is connected to the confusion over intuition, inspiration and imagination, in that fancy may be a manifestation of a deep held affection. Paradoxically, in combination with the tendency to see love and reason as incompatible, love in the sense of trust was held to be a requirement for the proper use of the knowledge source in the process of judgment. I will say more about this in the discussion of *All's Well That Ends Well*.

Folkloric Contexts

Archetypal folktales hovered in the intellectual offing of *Hamlet*, reinforcing its motifs of sources of knowledge and freedom of conscience for some of the audience. The citation of a few in detail will give access to an Elizabethan vocabulary no longer familiar to us. *Hamlet's* plot and imagery allude to the archetypal elements of a story about search for the lost beloved; these elements include the object of the search (treasure, truth, knowledge source, person); its action -- the finding of the object (through digging, analyzing,

²⁰Francis Bacon, *The New Organon and Related Writings*, ed. Fulton H. Anderson (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960) 44, 52.

²¹Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty*, 175-6. The same holds true today.

²²*A Choice of Emblems*, 1586, with an introduction by John Manning (Scholar P, 1989), 83 (L2r).

reflection, meeting); and its creative result -- the consequent obtainment of freedom (fulfillment of desire, exercise of will, freedom of conscience).

The first allusion to this archetype is at the end of scene one -- Horatio's expectation that the Ghost has secret knowledge of Denmark's "fate" or has kept a treasure hidden which it now may disclose. This recalls two groups of legends, those about ghosts guarding buried or cave-interred treasures and those whose formulae of search, find, and be free put an emphasis on the effort required in the search and the power resulting from the find.

Numerous examples of the first kind of legend have been gathered by Barbara Allen Woods in her *The Devil in Dog Form*, in which she refers to German as well as English and Celtic variants, thus indicating the lore was widespread.²³ Comments in the first scene of *Hamlet*, references by other dramatists, and some records of London folk practices suggest these legends had parallel Elizabethan forms. For example, Horatio's reference to the disenchantment of the Ghost with the cock's crow and the allusions at the end of the scene to the coincidence of morning light and the attainment of more certain knowledge relate to those legends in which the "Treasure reveals itself only on Christmas at midnight;" and in which the "best time for unearthing of treasure" is "between midnight and cock-crow."²⁴ (In some of these legends and in English and Scottish ballad variants the ghost or enchanter is not evil.) The threat uttered by Massinger's character Agatha in *Old Law* IV 1 (1656) seems to be derived from a related folk belief: "I'll bury some money before I die, that my ghost may

²³(Berkeley and Los Angeles: U of California P, 1959) 123.

²⁴Woods, 140. The currency of the relation between cock-crow and the disappearance of ghosts or their return to their graves is evident in numerous early English and Scottish ballads (Lowry C. Wimberley, *Folklore in the English and Scottish Ballads* (New York: Ungar Publishing, 1959) 248-53. The cock-crow's connection with the coming of new knowledge in the sense of Christ's birth is also legendary. See Andrew Breeze, "Welsh Poetry and the Crowing of the Cock in *Hamlet*," *Notes and Queries*, 34 (232).2 (1987): 212.

haunt thee afterward.”²⁵ Other indications of credence in similar folk beliefs were the practices of some sorcerers, such as the London apothecary, John Wheeler, who in 1613 was accused of “seducing the kings subjects by making them beleieve that by erecting a figure he cann helpe them to [find] stolen goods.”²⁶

A second group of legends emphasizing the digging, finding and resulting freedom stages of the archetype includes stories about the finding of Jesus’s cross. The wood of this cross according to some versions was from Adam and Eve’s tree of knowledge, and later was the substance of Moses’s rod,²⁷ thus indicating the tale’s metaphoric association with a search for knowledge sources. One of the most widespread is a story about Helena (mother of Constantine); this story would appear to have been proverbial by the reference to it in Chaucer’s *Pardoner’s Tale* -- “by the croys which that Seint Eleyne found.”²⁸ In Cynewulf’s Old English version the cross is discovered with the help of Judas, who “digged in the earth under the sod for the tree of glory;” the discovered cross and the nails used in the crucifixion are given to Helena after “she began zealously through the mysteries of the Holy Spirit to search out the truth;” they permit her to “win her wish in the world [‘will’ in some translations].”²⁹ The *Gesta Romanorum*, many of which were popular in England at Shakespeare’s time, also included variants of the archetype that have a digging element.³⁰

²⁵“The Old Law,” in *The Dramatic Works of Massinger and Ford*, with an introduction by Hartley Coleridge (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1875) 4.1, last line, 432.

²⁶William Le Hardy, ed., *Calendar to the Session Records, Middlesex 1612-14*, vol. 1 (London: Sir Ernest Hart, 1935) 199.

²⁷Charles W. Kennedy, ed., introduction to *The Poems of Cynewulf* (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1910) 36-37.

²⁸In “The Canterbury Tales” in *The Riverside Chaucer*, 3d. ed, ed. Larry D. Benson and F. N. Robinson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987) VI C, line 951.

²⁹Lucius Hudson Holt, trans., *The Elene of Cynewulf* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1904) 1148-52.

³⁰See No. 107 in *Gesta Romanorum*, ed. H. Oesterly, vol. 3 (Berlin, 1872) 91. Again in a text familiar to a portion of the Elizabethan audience, Boethius uses these images in another way -- he makes fun of people’s ignorance of “the location

In scene two of the play, the appearance of Hamlet in mourning, "seeking his noble father in the dust," recalls not only the digging in earth required for the uncovering of Helena's treasure, but numerous other fables and emblems depicting a search in dust or earth. One of the most widely circulated is Aesop's fable of the cock and the pearl, disseminated in Caxton's English edition³¹ and referred to by Bacon in *The Advancement of Learning*. Bacon in fact uses the fable of the cock "that preferred the barley-corn before the gem" as an image of the seeker who prefers the human sources of knowledge to the divine (59). One of Whitney's emblems, on the other hand, extols the "greedie Sowe" who because she continually searches "under foote" is always finding and therefore ever moving forward (53-G3r). In an argument to justify the search for knowledge even in places where it will not be found, Bacon refers to another digging fable of Aesop's:

And yet surely to alchemy this right is due, that it may be compared to the husbandman whereof Aesop makes the fable; that, when he died, told his sons that he had left unto them gold buried underground in his vineyard; and they digged over all the ground, and gold they found none; but by reason of their stirring and digging the mould about the roots of their vines, they had a great vintage the year following: so assuredly the search and stir to make gold hath brought to light a great number of good and fruitful inventions and experiments, as well for the disclosing of nature as for the use of man's life (31).

of the good which they desire." Although "men are skilled in knowing the hidden caves in the sea, and in knowing where white pearls and scarlet dyes are found," when looking for what they really desire "they dig the earth in search of the good which soars above the star-filled heavens." (Poem 8 in Book 3, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, translated by Richard Green, with introduction and notes (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1962) 56.)

³¹R. T. Lenaghan, trans. and ed., *Caxton's Aesop* (Cambridge, MS: Harvard UP, 1967) 74.

Here Bacon uses the fable to commend a perseverance and effort in the search for knowledge no less fervent than Hamlet's.

The Dismantled Realm

The play's opening images, dialogue, setting and the statuses of its characters introduce the concomitant problems of limited freedom and incertitude in judgment as difficulties related to knowledge sources. These dramatic elements create a crescendo of allusions to the diverse sources of knowledge on which people may base their decisions: sensual experience, reason, imagination, intuition, inspiration and tradition. At the same time, they highlight the interdependence of these sources and the fragility of their authority.

The first appearance on stage -- two figures who are sentinels -- hint at the relationship between precarious judgment and the tenuousness of the knowledge sources used in this judgment: As the eyes and defenders of the court, these men collect information from the sources of knowledge available to them. What they see on the horizon -- the knowledge they obtain through their senses -- must be combined with what they know to be the welfare of their country -- the knowledge they derive from their allegiance to a particular tradition. From this they will be able to decide whether or not what they see is dangerous. Without confidence in the validity of their sources of knowledge, they will never have certitude in the knowledge they obtain, nor will they be able to exercise their judgment freely.

The initial stage dialogue indicates the same. When the second sentinel approaches his place of watch the question he asks -- "Who's there?" -- emblemizes inquiry into the sources of knowledge. The refusing answer of the first sentinel "Nay" and his command -- "answer me. Stand and unfold yourself" -- indicate the knowledge sources' precarious authority. Here the source of knowledge can be activated only under the condition of trust; thus the seeker's relationship to the source must first be confirmed. The awaited answer "Long live

the King!" signifies to the first sentinel that the person approaching esteems as legitimate the same ultimate source of knowledge -- the same tradition -- as he does, and is therefore trustworthy.

This exchange introduces another element complementary to the prerequisite of trust, unity in epistemology. Getting at a knowledge source in order to make a judgment requires social cooperation. Trust between the trusters of a knowledge source depends on agreement on the hierarchy of the grounds of knowledge, that is, a common epistemology.

Barnardo's reference to Horatio and Marcellus as "The rivals of my watch" indicates an incertitude consequent to difference in epistemology. They are rivals not only because Horatio's perception of the ghostly knowledge authority has yet to be tried against Barnardo's and Marcellus's previous experience, and because Marcellus apparently has felt their experience is in need of confirmation by someone else's, but also because they appeal to rival epistemologies in their interpretation of their perceptions. Marcellus confirms this when he remarks, "Horatio says 'tis but our fantasy, / And will not let belief take hold of him / Touching this dreaded sight twice seen of us" (1.1.23-25).

Where the sentinels direct the audience's attention to sensual and traditional knowledge, the Ghost introduces another source of knowledge, which may be interpreted as fantasy or inspiration. Contrary to a tradition, fantasies and inspirations are usually limited to one or a few subjects; contrary to reason, both are difficult to communicate convincingly to others; so too is the perception of the Ghost. Fantasies and inspirations, like ghosts, are notorious for the ease with which they perturb their subjects. The Ghost, as an image of intuition, inspiration or fantasy, will compete with tradition, reason and experience for the belief of those who encounter it, and will engender more skepticism and incertitude. Thus, where the encounter between the two sentinels gives rise to a questioning of the

perceiver's relationship to tradition and the senses, the encounter with the Ghost leads to doubts concerning the authority of an intuition, fantasy and inspiration.

The setting of the scene likewise puts the focus on the difficulty in achieving certitude in sources of knowledge because of their indistinguishability and fragility. The darkness limits sight;³² the late hour brings on drowsiness; material phenomena blur with non-material; the difference between reason, sense, fancy, and inspiration becomes unperceivable. The location on the guard platform of the castle substantializes these crossroads between sources of knowledge, further weakening their traditional hierarchy and authority: The platform, which is a lookout, where information can be gathered by means of the senses, is as well a location between the outside world and its various kings and the land of the king in power, and a place high above the ground, nearer than normal to the ambiguous realm of the sky. The location of the guards thus emblemizes the conflict between the knowledges derived from these several worlds -- sensual experience, political and religious tradition, heavenly reason, revelation, and inspiration. In addition, the timing -- at the change of guard and when the midnight hour ends and the first hour of the next day begins -- endows the setting with a liminality reflective of the mental state of the skeptic.

The employment, social, intellectual and spiritual statuses of the figures who first appear on stage allude to a parallel haziness. The sentinels work for and are ruled by the king, and so adhere at once to courtly and popular knowledge. Of the generation of Hamlet, they have lived the idealistic period of early youth under the leadership of his father, and have only recently transferred allegiance to Claudius. Horatio, on the other hand, is between being a student and a teacher, a friend and a brother. As a university student, he has some knowledge, but not

³²In addition to darkness, mists have been employed in productions of the play; curiously one of Bacon's metaphors for tradition is mist. *The New Organon*, 79.

enough for him to have the certitude of a teacher. He is not family to Hamlet; yet he is a greater friend to him than any family member. The status of the other stage figure -- the Ghost -- amplifies this atmosphere of ambivalency. Ghosts could allude to the Holy Ghost -- a link between the Creator and human beings -- or to figments of the imagination that were real but not necessarily good. Thus the initial imagery, action, setting, and characters body forth a wavering -- between fantasy and sensual perception, loyalty and disloyalty, dependence on reason and trust in tradition, or intuition and inspiration.

The Intuitive Ghost

The slippery metaphoric and linguistic usages of "ghost" in the period of Shakespeare deserve a momentary digression, for the people linked ghosts to judgment in ways that are now impossible to imagine without some knowledge of Elizabethan culture. They were referred to then not only as ghosts but as spirits, spectres, phantoms, fantasies, fancies, shadows or images. Imagination was similarly referred to. So, in protest against the "unnatural" images in the church, Chaucer's narrator prays "Fro fantome and illusion Me save," and Hobbes (sometime later) writes that a "Ghost, or other Idol or Phantasme of the Imagination," represents "an inclination of the mind."³³ Puttenham defended "the inventive parte of the mynde" as essential to good judgment: "[O]f this sorte of phantasie are all good Poets, notable Captaines stratagematique, all cunning artificers and enginers, all Legislators Polititiens & Counsellours of estate, in whose exercises the inventive part is most employed and is to the sound & true judgment of man most needful."³⁴

³³See Chaucer's "House of Fame," *The Riverside Chaucer*, I, 493-4; *Leviathan*, Part 3, Chapter 34, 256-7.

³⁴George Puttenham, *The Arte of English Poesie*, 1589, ed. Edward Arber (Westminster: A. Constable, 1895) I, 8, 34-35.

Intuition, not a widely used word, was described in almost identical terms, and evaluated with like ambiguity. As a fancy it was called phantom, spectre, ghost. As immediate knowledge it was thought to be an inspiration from the Holy Ghost or one's own ghost. The above comment of Hobbes's is in the context of a discussion about spirit, and he goes on to describe the experience of another kind of knowledge source, sometimes attributed to "ghost," in which the prophets obtained knowledge "not by a ghost within them" but as he explains "some supernatural dream or vision." Similarly, he attributes the Spirit of God, the spirit of wisdom, etc. not to "so many ghosts" but to "eminent graces" given by God.³⁵ The idea was expressed in the Whitsunday liturgy: "the Holy Ghost came down this day from heaven . . . to teach them [the apostles], and to lead them to all truth."³⁶ *Pilgrims Perfection* (1531) speaks of "The inspiracyons of the holy goost."³⁷ Chaucer's poem entitled *Truth* identifies ghost with inspiration from one's own spirit, advising, "hold the heye wey and lat thy gost thee lede, / And trouthe thee shal delivere, it is no drede."³⁸ In another variation, the 1552 *Prayer Book* attributes relief of conscience to "gostly counsail, advise and comfort."³⁹

To add to this confusion, ghosts were also associated with illegitimate knowledge, as the spirits in Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus*, or those in the more recent popular *Second Report of Doctor John Faustus containing his Apparances, and the deeds of Wagner* (1594). Perhaps connected with *Hamlet*, this latter booklet includes a lengthy discussion about whether or not its spectral appearances were substantial and recounts how this phenomenon with further "testimonial &

³⁵*Leviathan*, Part 3, Chapter 34, 257-8.

³⁶John Edward Field, "The Liturgy of 1549," *The English Liturgies of 1549 and 1661, Compared with each other and with the ancient liturgies* (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1920) 46.

³⁷144b.

³⁸In *The Riverside Chaucer*, VI C, lines 19-20.

³⁹Church of England, *Communion*, in *The booke of common prayer* (E. Whytchurche, 1552) N iij b.

witnesse" was reported by Wagner in a letter from Wittenberg to the author of the report.⁴⁰ In the minds of Elizabethans, Wittenberg seems to have been figured with the use of reason and in opposition to imaginative, intuitive or inspired knowledge;⁴¹ it is thus logical that this place is associated with Hamlet's reasonable friend -- Horatio.

The Reasonable Skeptic

The skepticism engendered by the ambiguous ghost figure, as well as by the setting and initial action, becomes more manifest as Horatio tries to reach a judgment by putting together the knowledge from the repeated sensory or intuitive experiences of Barnado, Marcellus and himself with knowledge derived from tradition and reason. His actions provide a step-by-step foreview of the action of the play, in which several characters (though mainly Hamlet) try to obtain both certitude in knowledge sources and freedom of conscience. The process he goes through demonstrates the shortcomings of each knowledge source and the necessity of skepticism for an awareness of these shortcomings; it underlines the relevance of induction and the requirement of trust in the knowledge source.

The shortcomings of intuition / sense perception are the first to be observed. Employing what he interprets to be not an intuition or inspiration but a veritable sense, in addition to deductive reasoning, Horatio compares the vision of the old king to his remembrance of how he looked. Stunned by the exactness of the similitude between the two and by the incompatibility of the old king's

⁴⁰(London: Abell Jeffes for C. Barby, 1594) C1ff.

⁴¹See, for example, the 1595 *A Most Strange and Wonderfull Prophetie upon this Troublesome World*, in which the "translator's" opening statement contrasts what he presents to knowledge out of Wittenberg: "Oxford and Cambridge, Wittenberg and Padua, you glorious Universities of Christendom, take truce for a season with your deepe inspiring sciences, and vouchsafe to fixe your inienous judgements uppon this rare and wonderfull Prophetie . . ." Giovanni Cipriano, trans. A. Holloway (London: A. Jeffes, 1595) Aiiir. (STC 5324).

apparent presence and the time (after death), he is perplexed. His reaction to this incongruity is to refrain from concluding his judgment and instead to make a general deduction: "In what particular thought to work I know not; / But, in the gross and scope of my opinion, / This bodes some strange eruption to our state" (1.1.66-68).

This attitude is the first indication of Horatio's exemplification of a process of judgment in which knowledge sources are considered with skepticism. His character is a mirror image of the good scientist described by Joseph Glanvill some six decades later as one who has

a sense of his own fallibility . . . and never concludes but upon resolution to alter his mind upon contrary evidence. Thus he conceives warily and he speaks with . . . caution . . . with great deference to opposite persuasion, . . . he gives his reasons without passion . . . discourses without wrangling, and differs without dividing. . . . He suspends his judgment when he does not clearly understand.⁴²

In relation to the Ghost, therefore, Horatio stands out as a separate though not incompatible part of the judgment process. The two figures may even be considered variations of Hamlet, as in Daniel Mesguich's analysis,⁴³ or personifications of different aspects of Hamlet's thinking, as in Marthe Adam's recent marionette production at the University of Quebec in Montreal.⁴⁴

Similarly, Hamlet's relationship to the Ghost and to Horatio may be seen as his

⁴²*Plus Ultra, or the Progress and Advancement of Knowledge* (London, 1668) 147. I have borrowed the selection in part from Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty*, 116.

⁴³"The times are out of joint."

⁴⁴In Marthe Adam's 1996 production, almost all the characters in the play are aspects of Hamlet's psyche. Her combination of a real actor for Hamlet and life-size marionettes that he handles was an effective way of conveying this interpretation in performance.

concurrent uses of the different knowledge sources, intuition or inspiration and reason. As the plot unfolds, this relationship will provide one facet of the play's exemplification of the relationships between judgment and knowledge sources.

An Emblematic Scene, and Other Emblems

In the first scene, it is Horatio who is the focus and it is therefore he who furnishes the initial exemplar of these relationships as his way of thinking is distinguished from that of Marcellus and Barnado. Keeping up his scientific attitude, Horatio's conclusions, even in cases where the question may be more easily proven, are maintained with tentativeness. When Marcellus digresses to ask for knowledge about the recent preparations for war, he answers confidently on the basis of "the whisper" (rumours), historical reasoning, legal tradition and reasoned imagination, projecting that the purpose of young Fortinbras's military activities is to take back the territory now in their possession -- "to recover of us, by strong hand / And terms compulsory, those foresaid lands / So by his father lost" (1.1.102-4). Here he has more faith in these sources of his knowledge than he did earlier in his sensory perception / intuition, but his conclusion is still only conjecture (so his expression "I take it" indicates). For Barnardo, Horatio's deduction that the war preparations are linked to the appearance of the Ghost is sufficiently legitimate to be accepted as certain. A distinction is thus immediately made in their processes of judgment.

The next step in Horatio's thinking indicates that for him this deductive reasoning is not as valid as reason derived from experience (induction); as the scene progresses his explanations follow the course of inductive reasoning, which process gives him more assurance to judge. When he concurs with Barnardo's interpretation of the appearance of the Ghost, it is because there are experiences that validate it; though from the past, the supernatural appearances in Roman times

concurrent with important events argue for the normality of the present occurrence. Upon the Ghost's second disappearance Horatio further dispels his incertitude through induction when he combines information obtained from two sources of knowledge -- sensual experience and folk tradition: First he considers the Ghost's disappearance as the cock crows -- this is the experiential knowledge. Second, he considers the hearsay that at the cock's crow "Th'extravagant and erring spirit hies / To his confine" -- this is the traditional folk knowledge. His conclusion, "of the truth herein / This present object made probation" (1.1.155-6), suggests that to be considered useful for judgment, tradition as a source of knowledge must be confirmed by information obtained from induction. In this case it has -- as a result of sensory experience.

The distinction between these two ways of thinking is summed up in the concluding dialogue. After the remarks of Horatio, Marcellus refers to religious tradition to affirm the power of the cock's song to disperse unsettled spirits. The tradition, however, speaks of an event that has not necessarily taken place -- the singing of the cock all night before the celebration of Christ's birth. Horatio's response "So have I heard and do in part believe it" (1.1.165) suggests, that for full belief and to use this knowledge in judgment, he must have more than tradition as a source of knowledge. In this case he does not have it.

The scene ends with an intimation that trust and love are further prerequisites for freedom and certitude in judgment. The change in the setting -- the appearance on a "high eastern hill" of "the morn in russet mantle clad," which breaks up their watch and their investigation -- presages a clarification of the questions they have pondered. Horatio's comment about the Ghost's likely attitude to young Hamlet, "upon my life / This spirit, dumb to us, will speak to him" (1.1.170-1), carries us back to the beginning of the scene where Francisco would not speak to Barnardo because he was not sure he regarded the king as

authority. The Ghost, like an inspiration or any source of knowledge, can only speak effectively to those who trust it, love it, and give it authority. Who will do this more than Hamlet -- son of the old king?

Horatio's formulation of his judgment through the dialectical use of his intuition / sensory perception, deductions from the traditions he knows, imaginations about the future and inductive reasoning enables this first scene to constitute an image of what is to come. Like Hamlet in his experience with the Ghost, and Ophelia in her experience with the "unbraced," "ungartered" Hamlet, the extraordinary nature of his experience prevents him from obtaining a certitude and instills desire for validation of his knowledge source. As Polonius will try to do later by himself and through Ophelia, as the King and Queen will try to do through Rosencrantz and Guildenstern (all in efforts to validate Hamlet's actions), and as Hamlet himself will do when he tries to uncover the King's doings, Horatio tries to get the Ghost to speak, that is to have an experience that will serve in the process of induction. Foreshadowing the importance to be given to information about one's knowledge source, and hearkening back to the opening words of the scene ("Who's there?"), Horatio demands of the Ghost: "What art thou . . .?" (1.1.46). Then later in the scene, prefacing Hamlet's own later use of his knowledge sources, he seeks knowledge about what to do, and what treasures may be found and may be, because they were "Extorted," returned (presumably to their rightful owners) (1.1.136-8). This latter request alludes to two other returns that signify the restoration of rights occasioned by reliance on a trustworthy knowledge source. The failure and success of these returns -- the return of what is Hamlet's father's (and which is now owed to his son) and the return of what is Fortinbras's (and which is now owed to his son) -- will parallel the denial and maintenance of the right to freedom of conscience for these two sons.

The rest of the play explores the contrasting consequences produced as a result of reliance on the different sources of knowledge introduced in the first scene. The three kings of the play, the superseded king -- ghostly Hamlet, the current king -- carnal Claudius, and the king-to-be -- righteous Fortinbras -- allude, respectively, to intuition or inspiration, corrupt tradition, and legitimate tradition. (Fortinbras is qualified as righteous because the play appears to condone the view that the taking of another's possession by force, even if a pact is signed confirming its continuance with the heirs of the usurper, is still illegitimate and therefore the victim may rightfully take it back.)⁴⁵ The character who relies on ghostly Hamlet as knowledge source will eventually achieve certitude but will fail to put his judgment into practice. Those who rely on Claudius will in the very act of exercising their freedom of conscience relinquish it. For Fortinbras's followers, an obsession with a legitimate but trivial goal will result in loss of freedom; but for them this loss is temporary, because they will have a chance to learn a lesson from Horatio's account of the lives and deaths of Hamlet and Claudius. Horatio, not a king but a trustworthy friend, will, as the embodiment of the knowledge source reason, presumably impel this transition in Fortinbras.

Young Hamlet, the would-be-but-never-to-be king, is the thinker -- the helmet at the helm -- whose function it is to test these sources against each other and with that of the senses. He provides an image of the righteous user of knowledge sources, who fails not only because of the inadequacy of all these sources but also because the epistemology dominant in his society does not allow for the exercise of his right to freedom of conscience. In the first scene, the audience identifies with his role as thinker through Horatio's questioning of the

⁴⁵This may be a comment on England's colonial practices. Whether or not however, it is pertinent to the relationship between knowledge source and judgment. Where Denmark judges on the basis of a tradition saying "the sealed compact" gives the usurped land to old Hamlet's son, Norway judges on the basis of a tradition saying that possessions taken by force may be repossessed by force.

Ghost, and in the second through his own critical observations of King Claudius. But Hamlet and the other characters also represent knowledge sources for each other. The knowledge sources they represent depend on their relation to the King. For Ophelia, the royalist Polonius represents tradition, Hamlet reason and inspiration. The knowledge sources each king and each character exemplifies is evident in their actions and dialogue and in the other characters' reactions to them.

Tradition as Knowledge Source

In the second scene, for example, King Claudius conveys an image of tradition in the sense that his word has already been assimilated as natural and good -- the "better wisdoms" of all the court have gone "freely" with him in action as king and in his decision to take Gertrude to wife. Besides this, he is shown, like a corrupt tradition, to be opposed to reason, unconscious of legitimate tradition, and corrupted by excessive self-love. He appears unreasonable when he identifies young Fortinbras's judgment with "a weak supposal" and a "dream" while he himself *supposes* he can suppress Fortinbras's plans by writing to the young man's old sick uncle (1.2.18f). In addition he indicates a lack of awareness of legitimate tradition -- that the return of land taken by force to its original occupant is a righteous act, frequently recognized as so, and thus a logical outlook for young Fortinbras and his uncle.

However, the inadequacy of Claudius's comprehension is evident only as the play progresses; but this too is how the inadequacy of a corrupt or outdated tradition appears. Because people are so used to relying on the tradition as a source of knowledge, it appears reasonable until the knowledge derived from it is shown in practice to be faulty. In like manner, Claudius bears himself as if he is the epitome of reason: After dispatching the letter to the sick uncle of Fortinbras he sees Laertes approaching him to speak of another problem and says proudly,

"What is't, Laertes? / You cannot speak of reason to the Dane / And lose your voice" (1.2.43-45). His reason, as his tradition, however, is corrupt, for it has more to do with his own pleasure and power than it does with what benefits the country. To avoid competition to his power Claudius will let Laertes go abroad; but he is thereby weakening the Danish forces that under threat from Fortinbras may require the latter's assistance.

Claudius's characteristic self-confidence and lack of search for improved answers contrast with Hamlet's "searching the dust." Hamlet's search implies an awareness of the need for an answer beyond what he can construe himself, an attitude similar to the scientific attitude demonstrated by Horatio in the first scene. Not only is he looking for an absent source of knowledge but for one that opposes the easy tradition of Claudius. His anxiety over his father's death and his need to know are augmented by the pleadings of his mother for him to rejoice in her new husband, the setting of combined marriage and funeral thus an apt background to the grating difference which exists between this source of knowledge and his and which impels him to look for answers in unusual territory.

In the second half of the scene, he is informed of the accessibility of such a territory when Horatio speaks of his recent sighting of Hamlet's father. His declaration, "Foul deeds will rise, / Though all the earth o'erwhelm them, to men's eyes" (1.2.257-8),⁴⁶ inverts the statement made by his mother when he first appeared on stage ("seeking his noble father in the dust"), allowing the scene to end with the expectation of a certitude that will be obtained by looking beyond the limiting knowledge source of tradition. It as well alludes to the archetypal search story in some of its typical formulations -- those that refer to the power of

⁴⁶I quote "Foul" without brackets, as in the Signet Classic and Norton editions.

the sun (as metaphor for law, truth, God) to see into the inner parts of the earth and to reveal hidden knowledge.⁴⁷

In the next scene Ophelia is faced with a dilemma similar to Hamlet's; through her contrasting reaction, a distinction is drawn between the user of reason and intuition or inspiration and the user of tradition. She is pressured by both her brother and her father to suppress her love for Hamlet and her belief that he is telling her the truth. Unlike Hamlet, she receives no visit from a Horatio -- from anyone who can vouch for the merit of her love or the truth of her lover's word. Her quest for what to do is rather interrupted by persons intent on disvalidating her previous knowledge. The traditional ideas her brother and father communicate to her about princes and their treatment of women of lesser social status are thus accepted by her with little question. She does not consider making an independent judgment. While giving precedence to the conclusions her father and brother have drawn from tradition, Ophelia sets aside the experience she has had of Hamlet as a valid knowledge source, answering her father's question "Do you believe his tenders, as you call them?" with diffidence: "I do not know, my lord, what I should think" (1.3.103-4). Her unawareness of the relative validity of different sources of knowledge makes her open to be taught by tradition alone. Her father's "I will teach you" becomes her only source of knowledge. Her final words in the scene "I shall obey, my lord" suggest that her reliance on this source precludes any exercise of personal judgment.

Her reaction to the pressures of her father and brother is thus opposite to Hamlet's response to those of his mother and uncle; where he maintains his views and makes a plan to investigate something that could give him information about them, Ophelia abandons hers and relinquishes the right to continue communication

⁴⁷See for example Chaucer's English "Boece," Book 5, Metrum 2, in which the sunlight is said to "breken or percen the inward entrayles of the erthe" (*Riverside Chaucer*, 459).

with the only person -- Hamlet himself -- who can give her direct information about his true attitude to her. The contrast between their behaviours exemplifies the difference between those who investigate their knowledge sources before using them and those who blindly accept them, identifying the former with Hamlet as rejector of tradition and the latter with Ophelia as follower of tradition.

The Shortcomings of Tradition and Intuition / Inspiration as Knowledge Sources

The several scenes that follow expand the commentary on tradition and emphasize its shortcomings as a source of knowledge used in isolation. By hinting at similarities between tradition and deductive reasoning, and between tradition and intuition or inspiration, they also invite the reader to consider the shortcomings of intuition and inspiration, and of deductive reasoning when it is based on tradition. Only when intuition is identified with true inspiration and a knowledge providing greater accuracy than tradition is the hierarchy of intuition and inspiration over tradition fully asserted.

Early in the next scene (1.4), Horatio's brief statement about the Ghost's habits brings to light a distinction between tradition as a reasonable description and projection derived from repeated experience and as a source of false knowledge that impinges, like the tradition adopted by Ophelia, on reason. The initial comment -- on the newly known "wont" of the Ghost that in each of three appearances showed itself only after midnight -- is related by Horatio as a simple sensible phenomenon. By inductive reasoning, Horatio has concluded that the Ghost's walking at midnight is a custom in the sense of a natural law. Presumably once the Ghost ceases to do this, the perception of its activity as a tradition or habit will also cease. It is moreover assumed that the Ghost will cease this activity once the reason for it disappears. This is distinct from Claudius's keeping an old Danish custom -- drinking and dancing through the night to mark

"his pledge" (1.4.8f). Here there is no question of observation and induction of repeated phenomena in order to constitute knowledge; rather it is the derivation of action from what is believed to be a valid source of knowledge -- Danish tradition -- the process is therefore deductive. Hamlet's statement that it is "a custom / More honored in the breach than the observance" is a reasonable criticism of it, for he argues that as a result of this tradition the Danes' "achievements" have been diminished. Hamlet goes on to identify its dilatory influence with the enervating effects of a person's one weak point on the rest of his character, noting that this flaw is responsible for "Oft breaking down the pales and forts of reason" (1.4.28). Tradition relied upon too fully is thus seen to lead to decisions that are contrary to reason; therefore it is sometimes not a valid source of knowledge.

This discussion is juxtaposed against Hamlet's attempt to analyze the Ghost's behaviour from its action and the established beliefs about ghosts. His query, "Be thou a spirit of health, or goblin damn'd, / Bring with thee airs from heaven, or blasts from hell, / Be thy intents wicked, or charitable" (1.4.40-42) imports not only the doubtful validity of his intuition / inspiration, but also of the deductive process itself. For Hamlet, then, the inspired, sensory and traditional sources of knowledge are akin to each other, because the validity of each one is subject to deductive reason, which itself is dependent on tradition; each one requires further reasoning or investigation to be useful for judgment. The usefulness of each one, then, will depend on the skepticism with which it is evaluated. Unlike Claudius in his attitude to the Danish custom of drinking and Ophelia in her attitude to the traditional wisdom dispensed by her father and brother, Hamlet investigates and questions the source of his knowledge. His inquiry about the Ghost and its guidance indicates he requires reasonable explanations before he will make use of this intuition / inspiration.

The action and comments that follow this initial questioning by Hamlet further interrogate intuition and inspiration as valid sources of knowledge. As the Ghost beckons him, he follows it like a person who trusts it implicitly. Horatio sees this unthinking obedience as a threat to Hamlet's reason:

What if it tempt you toward the flood, my lord,
Or to the dreadful summit of the cliff
That beetles o'er his base into the sea,
And there assume some other horrible form,
Which might deprive your sovereignty of reason . . .

(1.4.69-73)

Hamlet, however, claiming to be drawn by "fate," insists on following the Ghost. (Ophelia's following of her father and brother too may be perceived as a following of fate, for the epistemology she embraces is a function of her social conditioning and her education.) Horatio pleads again, this time to the others, and against Hamlet's imagination -- "He waxes desperate with imagination" (1.4.87). Here he identifies the Ghost with imagination, recalling the Elizabethan perception that mistaken inspiration is fancy -- a potential danger. The liability to mislead, for which tradition was known, could thus be extended to intuition / inspiration.

Intuitions and inspirations force a knowledge on us we are not necessarily ready for. Although Hamlet's encounter with the Ghost is a means for him to receive knowledge, it is now not so much Hamlet who is seeking knowledge but the Ghost who desires to give it. To the Ghost's demand, "lend thy serious hearing / To what I shall unfold," he replies duteously, "Speak, I am bound to hear" (1.5.5-7). This is our relationship with intuition or inspiration -- it speaks to us and we must hear. (This is also of course our relation to sensory experience.) But intuition and inspiration cannot tell all -- their separateness from reason implies they are always mysterious; so too the Ghost cannot reveal everything to

Hamlet: "I am forbid, / To tell the secrets of my prison-house" (1.5.13-14). In these ways, Hamlet's intuition / inspiration is also like Ophelia's tradition -- it impels and refuses to explain.

The Superiority of "True" Inspiration

But while intuition, inspiration and tradition have some similar shortcomings, there is a distinction between them in that inspiration may be innovative and ultimately more reasonable than tradition. (This is true too of intuition, though we more readily employ the term "intuition" when confronted with a choice of known alternatives.) Thus the Ghost reveals to Hamlet the real reason for his replacement by Claudius -- who now as a new source of knowledge that has usurped the place of the old one is dispensing a false story about why the other died. It was not an accident -- the knowledge Claudius has so far claimed and that has become a tradition for the people -- but murder:

'Tis given out that, sleeping in my orchard,
A serpent stung me, so the whole ear of Denmark
Is by forged process of my death
Rankly abus'd, but know, thou noble youth,
The serpent that did sting thy father's life
Now wears his crown.

(1.5.35-40)

The distinction between tradition and inspiration is accented by the different meaning given to the imagery in this explanation. The serpent is a real one in Claudius's story and in the Ghost's an image. This juxtaposition recalls the story of Adam and Eve, in which also the real and the image are combined but the image comes out as the more plausible medium of truth. The destruction of Adam and Eve's initial knowledge by the new knowledge results from the supposedly real

serpent's tempting Eve, and it is the serpent as image of the source of knowledge -- the evil -- that wears the crown of human life, so to speak, after their derogation from obedience to the good. From that time on it is always the evil that is the source of knowledge. The more significant serpent of the story is, then, not a reptile but the false consciousness associated with the new knowledge source. In the same way, the land of Denmark, at once an image of the nation and an allusion to the Queen, is "abused" because the authoritative source (the tradition) on which it now relies for knowledge is not trustworthy.

The second difference between Claudius's corrupt tradition and the true inspiration represented by the Ghost and received by Hamlet concerns the capacity of these knowledge sources to be used for the free exercise of conscience. Because the corrupt tradition cannot be trusted and has abused its users, its connection to them is bereft of the "dignity" that characterized old Hamlet's love for Gertrude and that befits the relationship between source and users of knowledge. Dignity implies that what is given is correspondent to the value of or worthy of the recipient of the gift; it has the further implication of fitting the potential of this recipient. A source providing knowledge, which does not correspond to this worth by enabling the recipient to judge freely, has no dignity and can have no power to dignify or ennoble its recipient. For Gertrude (as for Eve), because of this injustice, the archetype is inverted -- the discovery of the beloved (the new source of knowledge) does not lead to the freedom befitting a human being but to oppression. She cannot judge freely because this source withholds significant knowledge from her. Claudius, as representative of tradition, is therefore less a knowledge source that can lead to freedom than is Hamlet's "noble" father, whose truth though inspired will not mislead.

The superiority of inspiration or intuition over tradition as a source of knowledge providing for people's dignity is emphasized by Hamlet's

identification of the Ghost with true inspiration. His exclamation "O my prophetic soul!" (1.5.40) links the revelation of the Ghost with the inspirations of his own human spirit. The analogy is now more clear -- with the expression of the belief that it has so far represented inspiration and not fancy as initially suspected by Horatio, the Ghost may, at least momentarily, be identified with a superior source of knowledge. It is not coincidental that, at the moment the play's emblem of tradition is shown to be faulty, its emblem of unusual knowledge is found to be true inspiration and therefore valid. The Ghost accents this distinction in attributing to tradition -- in its representative Claudius -- the bad qualities of false inspiration or fancy: "With witchcraft of his wits, with traitorous gifts-- / O wicked wit and gifts that have the power / So to seduce!" (1.5.43-45), Claudius has succeeded in misleading the Queen and the people, as a fanciful imagination influences an individual.

The allusion to the difference between these knowledge sources is kept in relief as the Ghost asks for one of the characteristic responses to tradition -- memory (1.5.91). On his request to "remember," Hamlet determines to remove the memorial records that characteristically serve to maintain tradition, and to put the message of the Ghost in their place:

Yea, from the table of my memory
I'll wipe away all trivial fond records,
All saws of books, all forms, all pressures past
That youth and observation copied there,
And thy commandment all alone shall live
Within the book and volume of my brain,
Unmixed with baser matter. . . .

(1.5.98-104)

Having relegated tradition to less significance as a source of knowledge, Hamlet continues to accord respect to inspiration. He commends its high status and notes the limitations of reason as represented by Horatio, "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, / Than are dreamt of in your philosophy." With his precedent invitation to "welcome" this "strange" knowledge, the stage is set for a progressive interaction between reason and inspiration. This said, it is still helpful to keep in mind that even this inspiration "to revenge" is correspondent to a particular ideology (not some absolute truth) and one that in the light of the end of the play is questionable, making every construction of the play thus subject to destruction.⁴⁸

Before this "welcome," Hamlet commends the Ghost jovially when the latter intervenes for the second time in his conversation with Horatio and Marcellus. Hamlet is asking his friends to swear they will keep secret the knowledge he is about to share with them, when from beneath the stage the Ghost reiterates his requests -- "Swear" and then again "Swear by his sword" (1.5.155, 161). Hamlet responds, "Well said, old mole, Canst work i' the earth so fast? / O worthy pioner!" (1.5.162-3). The terms "mole" and "pioner" refer to diggers -- the Ghost has spoken to them from beneath the ground each time they are about to make their pact, therefore digging quickly in the earth like a mole as they "remove" themselves to other ground. This staging device echoes the archetypal folktales referred to above and brings to a height the earlier allusions of Hamlet's searching for his father in the dust and his intuition that the truth will be known -- "Foul deeds will rise, / Though all the earth o'erwhelm them, to men's eyes" (1.2.257-8). The folktales related to these proverbial metaphors usually speak of the searchers digging for a treasure that will give them their desire, the treasure

⁴⁸I am grateful to Alex Newell who raised points which helped me to this understanding.

signifying the knowledge source and the desire the free exercise of will. The substitution of this with the treasure digging itself near to the searchers thus implies an accelerated phase in the relationship between the searchers and the knowledge source instrumental to their freedom -- the treasure. By the end of act one, then, the transformation in the mythic elements of the play, concurrent with its action, alert the audience to a coming conflict.

Inductive Reasoning as Knowledge Source

This new level of interaction between searchers and knowledge sources presages a series of revelations and experiments in the next scenes. First Ophelia, then Polonius, and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, are subjected to inspiration-like experiences in which Hamlet is the wrought-up ghost or spirit figure revealing to them more accurate knowledge than what they have been led to believe through their reliance on the centres of tradition (Polonius and Claudius) or their conceptions of personal advantage. The revelations function as moral and philosophic tests for the subjects, inasmuch as the knowledge they offer contradicts the knowledge on which the subjects currently base their judgments. The experiments, on the other hand, conducted first by Claudius and Polonius and then by Hamlet and Horatio, uncover hidden knowledge through induction. The contrast in their results brings to light the biased attitudes of the proponents of tradition; they thus underline once more the distinction between users of corrupt tradition and users of inspired reason. The bias of the traditionalists is identified with misplaced or selfish love, where the justice of the users of true inspiration and reason is aligned with their "rightly placed" or principled love.

Each experiment involves a similar method: First an effort is made to provoke a reaction in the source through which the knowledge can be obtained; then the results of this provocation are interpreted on the basis of tradition or

reason, etc. In other words the experimental method initially uses the senses and reason as sources of knowledge to gather facts through a process of induction. This information, seen in light of other sources of knowledge -- reason, tradition, intuition, inspiration -- is then transformed to subjective knowledge. The reliability of the knowledge is shown to depend not only on the source trusted but more importantly on the users' motivation or love.

Polonius describes the first step of this process to his servant Reynaldo, whom he is sending to Paris to get information about his son Laertes. He tells Reynaldo to find out in general about the behaviour of the Danes who are in Paris. He then asks him to tender some false information about Laertes's character while pretending not to know him well. The result he predicts is that the person who knows Laertes will then be encouraged to reveal full information about him. Polonius also asks Reynaldo to "observe" Laertes's behaviour himself (2.1.71). These will be the steps carried out in both the experiments that follow.

But to return to the inspirations or "revelations" prior to the experimental phase, Ophelia, Polonius and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern undergo strange experiences in which the appearance and statements of Hamlet perturb them in the way the revelations of the Ghost perturbed Hamlet and Horatio. In each case the recipient of the inspiration is informed of something true; and in each case this "strange" information is a test of the recipient's ability and willingness to make a change of judgment on the grounds of the new knowledge received.

Ophelia, in refusing Hamlet's letters or visits, has communicated to him her changed evaluation of his love, which represents her subjection to Polonius as knowledge source. Hamlet's appearance with all the traditional symptoms of love-sickness is an effort to let her and Polonius know that this evaluation was false -- that he was in fact in love with Ophelia. As a result of Ophelia's new account of Hamlet, her father revises his previous judgment: "I am sorry that with

better heed [one could pun this with "head"] and judgment / I had not quoted him" (2.1.111-12). But he does not revise his advice to Ophelia; he therefore fails to be responsive, at least in the normal way, to the new knowledge he has received.

Hamlet's "revelation" is also a test for Ophelia; she should now realize that her father and brother were not valid sources of knowledge. If she trusts her reason and Hamlet as source of knowledge, she should know that Hamlet really does love her. She should then feel justified in exercising her conscience independently. But she does not do this. Instead she continues to relinquish her right and to be directed by her father's knowledge. Her decision will have cruel consequences. The fate Horatio feared would be Hamlet's -- as he let himself be directed by the Ghost to the cliffs above the sea where uncontrolled fancy could draw him into the drowning flood below -- will, instead, be hers.

I don't mean that fancy will kill Ophelia; what kills her is the inner conflict created by her forced submission to tradition and her inability within the characteristically limited life of daughter / woman / subject, despite her desire, to exercise her rightful freedom of conscience. Like Gertrude, she is unable to rid herself of the initial abuse by a knowledge source she so completely trusted. Not only her lack of reasonable skepticism, but the untrustworthiness of an established knowledge source, contributes therefore to her failure to know. If Ophelia, like Horatio, had been able to recognize this corruption and to use her reason, she would not have experienced this conflict. But to do this she would have had to reject her family's customs and the traditions of her country, class and sex. What is the secret, then, of her position of esteem in the play as one loved both by the respector of tradition -- Laertes -- and his opponent, the respector of inspiration, reason and free conscience -- Hamlet, who claims his love for her is more than that of forty thousand brothers?

A Prejudicing Love

In the next scene, the discussion of experiments to test the cause of Hamlet's madness and, then, Hamlet's inspiration-like revelations to Polonius and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern answer this question; at the same time these developments bring to light the factor of love in the knowledge source-judgment paradigm. At the beginning of the scene Rosencrantz and Guildenstern submit themselves unthinkingly to the King's command; they will play the hypocrite with Hamlet in order to obtain some knowledge of his motives. Like Ophelia, they do not exercise their own judgment except insofar as they decide to submit themselves to the judgment of the King. They "both obey"; both "give up" themselves "in the full bent / To lay" their "service freely" at Claudius's "feet, / To be commanded" (2.2.29-32). Like Ophelia they will pay for their unthinking relinquishment of their right of free conscience with the loss of Hamlet's friendship. Like her, in giving up their friendship with Hamlet -- emblem of inspired reason -- and instead submitting themselves entirely to Claudius -- emblem of corrupt tradition, they die, thus in a symbolic sense suffering loss of their humanness. Unlike her, the kind of love that animates their choice and use of knowledge source is selfish. However, only when they show their behaviour to be like Polonius's does this distinction become evident.

On the heels of their blind swearing of fealty to corrupt tradition in the person of Claudius, Polonius enters and is acclaimed "the father of good news." Good news, good knowledge must accord with the King's love-objects; so does it here with the King's wish to enjoy his power over Denmark and over Gertrude. It is just this attachment that is fed by Polonius's "discovery" of the cause of Hamlet's madness -- that it is the result of his love for Ophelia and not as his mother thinks -- "His father's death and our o'er hasty marriage." Polonius has discovered he was mistaken about Hamlet's attitude to Ophelia, but he does not

interpret this knowledge in terms of his duty vis-à-vis his daughter; he does not, in service of her right to know and freely judge, revise his statements to her and thus rectify the false knowledge he has dispensed. Instead he uses the new knowledge in a manner that bolsters his position of esteem vis-à-vis the King.

Between this exchange of Polonius's with the King and their concluding an experiment to test his "discovery," a notice of the love-factor in judgment is posted, so to speak. Polonius raises in his hand one of Hamlet's love-letters to Ophelia, which in part reads,

Doubt thou the stars are fire,
Doubt that the sun doth move,
Doubt truth to be a liar,
But never doubt I love.

(2.2.116-119)

Beyond the ordinary meanings of the note as evidence supporting Polonius's interpretation of Hamlet's love-sickness or indicating the precedence Hamlet gives to inner feelings over external perception, the idea here is that the sources of knowledge on which we depend for judgment are all subject to change. The fire our sensual perception tells us is the substance of the stars may not be fire, because our senses are not an absolute source of knowledge. Inductive reasoning, which has been used (wrongly) to arrive at the conclusion that the sun moves around the earth, is also of relative value. Even the revelation of the prophet, regarded as truth, may under new conditions vary in reliability. But of love, Hamlet writes, there is no doubt. Love -- the act of adoration, the attachment and submission to an idol to put it less kindly -- is practiced by human beings, always. The only variation in love is its object -- the ideology and the source of knowledge to which we give authority and pay homage and for which we conceive affection. Relative to the knowledge and knowledge source, then, the love of an ideal or

knowledge source -- as worthless as Polonius's or as worthy as Hamlet's -- exerts effect in every exercise of the freedom of conscience with greater endurance and power.

The distinction between Ophelia's use of tradition as a source of knowledge and the use made by Claudius, Polonius, and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern is precisely the distinction between her love-object and theirs. Her use of tradition is motivated by love for her father and brother and devotion to the ideal of obedience to the patriarch, whilst theirs is personal and political advantage. The difference is emphasized in the play by the fact that Ophelia's love-object provides her with neither personal nor political advantage. It is perhaps this fact that endears her concomitantly to her brother and to Hamlet. In that she represents the healthy -- trusting -- relationship to tradition in a society "stable for the right reasons,"⁴⁹ Ophelia may also generate a nostalgia in Hamlet for his father's society. The intuition his father conveys would be a tradition within the context of a society free from Claudius's dissimulation (and in which revenge constituted justice). Much as this tradition may be questioned, even as the patriarchal tradition which Ophelia accepts from Polonius, we may assume it was at one time viable and look at it here simply as standing in for viable tradition in general; for tradition is essential -- communication, action, and judgment in any society are dependent on shared traditions, language itself being one of them.

Polonius's subsequent remarks reveal the prejudicing influence of affection on the conception of the sources of knowledge and hence on judgment. Recalling the archetypal tale of search in the ground alluded to earlier by Hamlet's mother and Hamlet, he announces zealously to the Queen, "I will find / Where truth is hid, though it were hid indeed / Within the centre" (2.2.157-9). Polonius thus echoes Hamlet's words when Horatio reported the sighting of the Ghost to

⁴⁹Rawls's term (*Political Liberalism*, 390-1).

him, "Foul deeds will rise, / Though all the earth o'erwhelm them, to men's eyes" (1.2.257-8), but his focus is "I" -- an intimation of the selfish love that will preclude his obtaining a just knowledge. Indeed, he is assured of the information he will discover even before carrying out his experiment: "If he love her not, / And be not from his reason fall'n thereon, / Let me be no assistant for a state, / But keep a farm and carters" (2.2.164-7). He assumes that if his prediction is not true his position vis-à-vis the King should be altered, suggesting his opinion has been formulated for his political advantage.

When Hamlet "reveals" himself, "reading on a book," he casts himself in the stance of one who, like Polonius, judges on the basis of tradition, book being representative of tradition. His appellation of Polonius, "fishmonger," indicates he has overheard the conversation with the King and Queen, and in particular Polonius's plan to "loose" his daughter to him. The sun-dog-maggots-conception imagery in their exchange relates closely to the role of love or prejudice in judgment. Hamlet alludes to the pernicious effects of knowledge when the conscience of its adherent is selfish; the sun (knowledge source) will in dead dogs (hard-hearted, selfish humans) breed maggots (false or evil ideas).⁵⁰ From

⁵⁰For Elizabethans the sun imagery would have been clearly related to knowledge sources and judgment: Emblems and woodcuts typically showed rays of light shining down onto the head or heart as an image of knowledge assisting judgment. For example, one English woodcut entitled "Directory of conscience" (1527?) depicts the baby Jesus in the haloed Virgin's arms with his eyes directed towards her breast, which she is holding to give him drink. Rays of light are drawn from her nipple to the baby's cheek, suggesting his conscience is enlightened by the nourishing knowledge he receives from the light of his divine mother. (L. Andrewe, in *English Woodcuts: 1480 -1535*, ed. Edward Hodnett (Oxford UP, 1973) fig. 199, 393ff.) A related emblem entitled "The meditative eye of the heart" (1635) shows the sun shining down onto an illumined heart (George Wither, in Michael Bath *Speaking Pictures: English Emblem Books and Renaissance Culture* (London: Longman, 1994) pl. 8. Whether in biblical, classical, folk or philosophical commentary current in Elizabethan times, the sun and other lights consistently relate to knowledge sources. See, for example, John Bale's commentary on Revelation xxii, 3-5; Chaucer's Boethius, Book V, Metre II; Bacon's usage as explained in B. Vickers's *Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1968) 189ff; and Whitney's comments on the Dog and Moon folktale. In the former three the light source is always a means of

Polonius's point of view (as interpreted by Hamlet), his daughter is one such dead dog -- she cannot be trusted to have her own conscience -- put her in the sun of knowledge and she will conceive, not a true judgment but a false "maggotty" one. Here Hamlet expresses his anger at Polonius's domination on Ophelia's conscience in advising him sarcastically to continue that control by "looking out" for the ill conceptions she may have as a result of exposure to Hamlet or any other knowledge source not consonant with the corrupt tradition he adores.

Hamlet's imagery in this speech is obtuse for twentieth-century readers, but his comments in his next speech, beginning "Slanders," show he is talking about the misinterpretation of knowledge in service of self-advantage or corrupt policy. In this second speech he swears what is true but, mimicking again the habits of Polonius, notes that he "hold[s] it not honesty to have it thus set down" (2.2.203). Here he is using the term "honesty" as Polonius would -- as the equivalent of what accords with time-honoured but no longer meaningful tradition. His response shows that Polonius's honesty is only "Words, words, words," that is, not supported by just action. Referring implicitly to the inversion Polonius accomplishes earlier by the politic honesty (dishonesty) that motivated his advice to his daughter and to the King and Queen, Hamlet replies to his suggestion to "walk out of the air" (that is to go into the castle -- the edifice ruled by Claudius

obtaining true knowledge. In the latter the moon represents "learned men, that shine above the reste" while the barking dog is "those fooles which baule, and barke" at them (213). The story of "God's Vengeance" in *The Early English Versions of the Gesta Romanorum* says "the hound, that berkith well in the nyzt, is thyne conscience" (274). Dog typically represented human beings; so a dead dog might easily be construed as a human without human qualities. But Shakespeare's own usage of the term in "dog-hearted daughters" (4.3.47) referring to Lear's corrupt daughters suggests more fully the sense in which it is used here. The term "maggot" as false conception, or as the OED defines it -- "A whimsical or perverse fancy" was also current elsewhere in Shakespeare. Berowne in *Love's Labours Lost*, referring to the silly customs by which he has been misled, complains, "Those summer flies, / Have blown me full of maggot ostentation" (5.2.409). The statement in Fletcher's *Women Pleased* is even more to the point: "Have not you Maggots in your braines?" (*The Dramatic Works in the Beaumont and Fletcher Canon*, ed. Fredson Bowers, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982) 3.4.132).

and the tradition Polonius bends his knee before) with the phrase "Into my grave" (2.2.207). The living air of honesty (in Hamlet's meaning of saying what is true) shall, by this action, be substituted for the dead earth of Polonius's honesty (in its meaning of saying what is politic). The corrupt custom has thus become so powerful a love-object that it displaces the valid source of knowledge, burying it in a grave. Under this dirt the treasure of true knowledge can never be seen.

The subsequent conversation with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern underlines the point Hamlet makes with Polonius about the displacement of knowledge source and corruption of judgment by a politic love-object. As he did with Polonius, but in simple language, Hamlet repeatedly observes to these two so-called friends that they are not telling the truth: "But your news is not true" (2.2.238-9); "Come, come, deal justly with me" (2.2.275-6); and finally,

. . . by the rights of our fellowship, by the consonancy of our youth,
by the obligation of our ever-preserved love, and by what more dear a
better proposer can charge you withal, *be even and direct with me* . . .

(2.2.284-8, my emphasis)

These direct references to their dishonesty do not succeed as do the Ghost's revelations to Hamlet; for they do not make them question their prejudices. They remain firm in their deception, as if it has become an indelible part of their thinking. Hamlet's comment "there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so" (2.2.249-51) seems to allude to this conditioning. The exercise of free conscience (that is, judgment) is the equivalent of morality (the choice of what is good and consequently the rejection of what is bad). A person's conception of the sources of knowledge along with his or her attachments, affections, customary likes, preferred traditions, desires -- in short his or her loves -- is the equivalent of his or her "thinking." Hence the morality or exercise of free conscience is dependent upon thinking or the combination of one's epistemology and loves.

But while morality is relative to thinking, it does not follow that all systems of judgment are equivalent in value. The play itself, its first audiences, as well as modern readers, pass judgment on the various ideologies and correspondent epistemologies and loves adhered to by different characters. Because Polonius's epistemology (Claudius) and his love (of being associated with those in power) are both portrayed as faulty, his judgment (his morality) is also seen to be faulty. For the same reasons the play elicits the same evaluation for Rosencrantz and Guildenstern's exercise of their freedom of conscience.

Within this frame, Claudius and Polonius's experiment in 3.1 might be expected to further widen the gap between Hamlet and his persecutors. Its purpose, as Claudius explains beforehand to Gertrude, is to test Polonius's hypothesis -- to help him and Polonius "frankly judge" whether Hamlet's suffering is caused by his love (3.1.33-36). Ophelia will be used to provoke a reaction and provide the data. In hiding her "loneliness" in a costume of piety, she provides an agent almost identical to the one Hamlet tendered to her and Polonius when he put on the guise of love-sickness. The purpose however is not revelation but deception. Claudius and Polonius's deceptive methodology, like that of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, will add to their difficulties in reaching accurate judgment and will provide a contrast to the conditions of judgment Hamlet and Horatio set up for themselves.

In their preparation for the show they will use in their experiment, Polonius and the King comment on politic pretense. A "show" of devotion, usually an act signifying adherence to the knowledge source religion and traditionally thought to be motivated by love for others, is used to "sugar o'er / The devil himself" (3.1.47-48), that is to hide a selfish motive. Claudius spells out the relationship between the means and the knowledge on which it depends: "The harlot's cheek, beautied with plast'ring art, / Is not more ugly to the thing

that helps it / Than is my deed to my most painted word" (3.1.50-52). Not only the beauteous art helps the harlot's cheek but the thing that beauty signifies. Beauty ostensibly indicates fecundity and adherence to knowledge of health, but in the harlot's case the beautiful cheek is unrelated to (seen as ugly by) these two things. In identifying himself with the harlot, Claudius appropriates the paradigm of faulty relationship to knowledge source, the faulty love that makes it so, and the resulting faulty judgment, a paradigm which has just been aligned with his followers, Polonius and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. During the experiment, in his conversation with Ophelia about honesty and beauty, Hamlet accentuates the difficulty -- perhaps the impossibility -- of dealing justly with the love factor. The power of beauty, which causes a person to love, makes honesty "a bawd" (3.1.111); that is, it displaces the power to make just use of the knowledge source -- to base one's exercise of conscience only on the knowledge source and not on affections.

Like the introduction to it, and Hamlet's comments during it, the results of Claudius and Polonius's experiment illustrate just how far the love factor can cause the user of the knowledge source to misread and misuse his source. Claudius indicates that through the experiment he has obtained knowledge about the real cause of Hamlet's behaviour, and that it is not "Love" of Ophelia. Polonius, on the other hand, still believes that it is her love. Polonius's attachment to his daughter, as well as his desire to propagate a belief agreeable to the King, make it impossible for him to come to the same conclusion as Claudius. The divergent results of their experiment are indicative of the failure of a reasoning process contaminated by misplaced love.

Conditions for an Unburdened Judgment

In contrast to Claudius and Polonius, when Hamlet conducts the Mouse-trap experiment in the next scene (3.2) the identical results he and Horatio obtain validate their thinking process. Furthermore, Horatio's and Hamlet's "rightly placed" affections are shown to be relevant to this validation. Prior to the test, Hamlet's remarks on Horatio's qualities of judgment suggest a comparison with Polonius. Where Polonius is biased, Horatio is "e'en as just a man / As e'er my conversation coped withal" (3.2.54-55). Where Polonius's interpretation must be "good news" and not one that puts him in an unpolitic position, Horatio's "blood and judgment are so well co-meddled / That they are not a pipe for Fortune's finger / To sound what stop she please" (3.2.69-71). Horatio, in other words, has his love rightly placed, such that his use of his knowledge source is not influenced by fortune or peer pressure. The qualities Hamlet attributes to Horatio identify him with himself, whose soul is "mistress of her choice" (3.2.63). As "mistresses" of their judgments, Hamlet and Horatio govern the love-factor in their exercise of conscience and the knowledge sources they use. This distinguishes them from Polonius, who is unaware of his own process of judgment, and Claudius, who is aware but who is too influenced by his wrongly placed affections.

It distinguishes them also from the Player Queen in the play-within-a-play whose poor judgment again highlights the liability of love in the attainment of certitude and the free exercise of conscience. Her initial comments, "Where love is great, the littlest doubts are fear; / Where little fears grow great, great love grows there" (3.2.171-2), suggest that love gives substance to things not real, to thoughts not true, thus deterring a person from the just and free use of his or her sources of knowledge. When her husband is poisoned, the audience expects the Player Queen to make the bad decisions he predicts are made by those whose

judgments are heavily influenced by misplaced love. Though the interruption of the action by Claudius, who appears to be moved by the poisoning, never allows this to happen, the assumption is that the Player Queen is corrupted by pretentious love. In light of the larger discussion of the impact of the love-factor on the knowledge source-judgment relationship, Gertrude's and Claudius's regime appears to be one like that in the play-within-a-play, in which misplaced love rules judgment with greater force than the principles of respect. This love is identified with a show because it is false -- it contrasts with reasonable love, whose function is as a connector only between arguments and actions proper to each other.

Hamlet's comment to Horatio aligns this displacement of proper knowledge source with the displacement of Jove by a peacock:

"For thou dost know, O Damon dear,
This realm dismantled was
Of Jove himself, and now reigns here
A very, very" -- pajock.

(3.2.281-4)

In this ditty, the divine source of knowledge -- Jove or God -- from whom it was believed revelation, reason, and inspiration were derived, is displaced by a peacock -- the symbol of show, ambition, ostentation and vanity.⁵¹ The peacock was also associated with Juno, who (in Vergil) represented "the practical life, submitting herself to the judgment of sense (i.e. the affective quality)."⁵² The verse conveys a marvelous image of a show without an argument and hence of the free exercise of conscience without the employ of a knowledge source. Hamlet proposes that "if the rest of [his] fortunes turn Turk with him" -- that is if he cannot live out in real life the role that would be his in a trustworthy order -- he

⁵¹See Aesop's fables of the Jaye and the pecok and Juno, the pecok and the nygtyngale (*Caxton's Aesop*, 99, 123-4).

⁵²Chance, *Medieval Mythography*, 446-7.

can at least join a group of players and put on shows, suggesting shows without arguments are all that are viable within the current dominant culture of his country. Misplaced loves have so distorted the society that a person can neither use the knowledge source he wishes nor exercise freedom of conscience.

Expression of Conscience and Social Support

Hamlet's jest foreshadows the difficulties he will presently undergo when he tries to express the judgment he and Horatio have just reached. Now that through the process of inductive reasoning they have obtained the certitude that their inspiration -- "the Ghost's word" -- is true, Hamlet can feel free to act, that is, to express his conscience. As he proceeds to do so, however, knowledge from other knowledge sources impede him, so that he is bound by sources other than the inspiration and inductive reasoning that have given him such assurance of what is right. The first of these, religious tradition, tells him revenge cannot be accomplished by the simple act of killing Claudius. To kill Claudius at prayer would send him to heaven and would not constitute a punishment. Justice requires therefore that he desist from killing him, at least for the time being. To kill him in the act of deception, however, would constitute just revenge -- this is perhaps the thought that leaps to Hamlet's mind when he stabs what he believes to be Claudius behind the arras in his mother's room. But he again fails in this act to express his conscience freely because his sensual knowledge is only partial -- the arras that veils his sight have reduced to error the just conclusions reached through inductive reasoning, inspiration and religious tradition. This act, in which the three knowledge sources assumed to be the most reliable grounds for judgment fail to provide the thinker with the means to exercise his conscience freely, is the turning point of the play's argument. The room itself -- the human condition and,

even more poignant here, the society inhabited by the individual self -- is not adequate to freedom.

Alone, and within a regime dominated by an epistemology opposite to his, it is impossible for Hamlet to express his conscience freely. Not only is he bereft of assistance from those in the society with power to support him, not only is he impeded by the difficulty of combining all knowledge from all necessary knowledge sources at once, but his exercise of his rights is viewed as a threat to the rest of society. "His liberty is full of threats to all," Claudius exclaims (4.1.14). His only successful expression of free conscience (the killing of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern) is executed outside the realm of Denmark, within the ambiguous territory of a sea between nations and among a population whose faculties of judgment, knowledge, and expression are asleep. Here he experiences judgment based on the easy coordination of the two knowledge sources well known to him -- inspiration and inductive reason, along with a third -- sensual perception. Following the "rash" and unreasonable "fighting" in his heart that something is wrong about Rosencrantz and Guildenstern (his intuition or inspiration), he searches them to find out (uses sensual perception), and from a reading of Claudius's "exact command, / Larded with many several sorts of reasons" gathers that he is to be killed in England (inductive reasoning) (5.2.4f).

Before this act, and as Hamlet is shipped away from Denmark to his death, he encounters one whose freedom, unlike his, is supported by his society. Fortinbras enters with army and captain, and Hamlet speaks with the captain. Their brief dialogue implicitly raises the difficulty of expressing one's conscience even when a firm judgment and sense of certitude have been reached. The war Fortinbras is embarked upon may conform to legal tradition, but, as the Captain explains, it has no reason -- it is for "a little patch of ground / That hath in it no profit but the name" (4.4.18-19). Hamlet argues that in this case the Poles will

not defend it. He is told, however, that they have already mustered a full defense. In addition, Fortinbras (with no greater reason than his honour) is leading a huge army to claim it. Because of their embrace of him as knowledge source, "twenty thousand men" will "for a fantasy and trick of fame / Go to their graves like bed" (4.4.60-62). The outward dramatic function of this dialogue is to impel Hamlet, whose judgment has far superior motivation than Fortinbras's, to action. On the other hand, it hints at the conditions of social solidarity which are necessary for the expression of conscience and which so far have eluded Hamlet, whose "friends" with social standing have abandoned him.

Following this analysis of Fortinbras, the play presents another prototype of the person who makes great decisions on the basis of little knowledge but who because of the support of the regime is successful. Laertes, a figure quite opposite to Hamlet, is ready to take his right to revenge the murder of his father even before he knows who killed him. Claudius, who is his first target, cautions him to know his enemies first, "Will you know them then?" (4.5.144). In her advice to him, Ophelia advises "remembrance" and "thoughts," recalling Hamlet's comments in the previous scene that human beings are made with understanding -- "Looking before and after" (4.4.37). Her council is not heeded by her brother, who quickly submits his judgment unthinkingly to Claudius.

The show the King envisages this time will not be for the purpose of obtaining knowledge in order to make a judgment; it will instead be the action taken as a result of judgment. Paradoxically, this action -- a duel -- is a traditional source of knowledge. In the old legal system, the truth was believed to be revealed by God in the fact of who won the fencing match. This source of knowledge (chance) had already in Shakespeare's time been relegated to

disrepute.⁵³ Claudius and Laertes's appeal to it further identifies them with outdated tradition and the oppression of freedom of conscience.

Their plan complete, Ophelia's death is announced, her demise paralleling the progressive extinction of free conscience in her family. Her sadness originated in the suppression of her freedom of conscience; mental illness invaded when her father gave up his conscience more fully to Claudius and was killed; now this same mental illness, at the moment of Laertes's inadequately reasoned submission of his will to the King, takes her life. But despite her death and the inadequacies of Laertes's process of judgment, his expression of conscience will be facilitated because the epistemology on which it is based has the support of the society's dominant strata.

The discussion about Ophelia's burial in the next scene provides insights into the regulation of judgment and its expression by a dominating epistemology of corrupt tradition. If the decision about her burial were wholly based on religious and legal tradition, it should prohibit a full Christian ceremony because she has taken her own life (5.1.1f). But in her case an impediment of love displaces this principle; because her class status is subject to preference by the state, that is, subject to a prejudicing love, the principle of justice is set aside and she is allowed a Christian burial. The allusions in the remaining action of the scene to the searching in the ground / finding / exercise of will archetype suggest this development represents a vitiation of the process and purposes of judgment.

The Clown, commenting on the displacement of knowledge source by love, states that the real gentlefolk are not these class-prejudiced elites currently in power but "gard'ners, ditchers, and grave-makers," who "hold up Adam's profession" of digging (presumably for the truth). The "arms" these people have,

⁵³Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty*, 173. Clearly *lex talionis* was an advance over this fortune-based law; its institution also represented a growing reliance on reason.

he puns, are not just signs but instruments for digging. In contrast, modern gentlefolk simply make a show that they have sought knowledge from the sources of knowledge; their arms are nothing but a sign. The implication is that the truly "great folk," of which Adam was one, dig with their arms and so produce good decisions and actions; that is, they rely on the sources of knowledge and do not displace them by love (here a privileging of class).

The Limitations of Every Epistemology

Following this discussion of the contrast between a prejudiced use of knowledge sources and their proper use, the significance of the archetype is further elucidated as it is played out in the grave-makers' digging. Skulls were typically representative of the place where thought resides, that is, a repository of knowledge.⁵⁴ The Clown sings as he digs,

But age with his stealing steps
Hath clawed me in his clutch,
And hath shipped me into the land,
As if I had never been such.

(5.1.71-74)

Hamlet, like the person in the song, has been "shipped" out of his place of being; he has been made impotent to express himself because the time when his father lived -- when appropriate tradition ruled -- has been "stolen" by his uncle, whose epistemology of corrupt tradition precludes his of inspired reason. Every epistemology follows the same path.

Hinting at this historicity and temporality of knowledge sources as the Clown tosses up a skull, Hamlet remarks, "That skull had a tongue in it, and

⁵⁴See the fable of the wulf and the dede mans hede (*Caxton's Aesop*, 98); the emblem of the scattered skulls (Whitney, 46); and legend of the speaking skull (O'Donnell, 129).

could sing once" (5.1.75-76). The skull is an icon of outdated knowledge sources and at the same time the treasure dug up by the seeker -- the beloved ghost so to speak moving underground and appearing from time to time to direct our judgment. That there was a time when this knowledge source was living and sang out its thoughts suggests that at some point its thoughts were viable, appropriate and productive of a judgment that could be freely expressed in the society.

The skull might be that of a murderer and politician, Hamlet considers, possibly alluding to Claudius. As he muses on this skull and another one thrown up a few minutes later, he imagines the persons they belonged to, who like varied sources of knowledge each had a different preoccupation, which to each one was valuable, but which in his description appears worthless or at best temporary. The analogy may be extended to the "woman" to be buried in the grave the Clown is digging; he comments that she is no longer a woman now that she is dead. Similarly, a source of knowledge is no longer a source of knowledge when the knowledge it gives no longer serves living beings. "Age" buries it -- "ships" it "into the land" -- for there is a limited duration for every source of knowledge.

The relevancy of knowledge sources is not only dependant on time but on place. Hamlet's madness will not matter in England, the Clown notes, because everyone there is mad. As a source of knowledge, Hamlet will be viable there because the society upholds his way of thinking. The effectiveness of the source of knowledge is therefore relative, as noted earlier, to the society's attitudes to it.

A few minutes later the Clown uncovers a third skull -- the skull, he says, of a madman -- "Yorick's skull, the King's jester." Hamlet remembers how much he loved Yorick, what an imagination he had, how kind he was. He is astounded at how repugnant he now finds the dead remains of this beloved wit. An analogous attitude grows up in the individual when the traditional source of knowledge is displaced by a new one. Even one with the power of Alexander

comes to this end. Ways of thinking, epistemologies, sources of knowledge are only empty helmets fit to be filled with dirt when their time is over. Digging them up will not serve the needs of the free conscience.

The knowledge sources are dead, because they are not conscious of the needs of the times and have no ability to change themselves. Like Ophelia without her exercise of freedom of conscience, they have replaced reflection with reliance upon what *was* true. Delving into the now useless but much loved traditional sources of the past, like jumping into the grave to embrace the beloved Ophelia, is fruitless, for these knowledge sources are just dead skulls, without intelligence to direct rightly, and which if followed will bring self-destruction. The "living monument" Claudius envisages on Ophelia's grave (5.1.297) will be constituted of a heap of lovers, who all gave up their judgments to sources of knowledge that were each, for one reason or another, dead.

Hamlet's acceptance of the duel with Laertes represents his submission to the direction of one of these dead knowledge sources -- the outdated tradition emblemized by Claudius. The decision to embrace tradition entails his failure to hold on to more viable knowledge sources, first reason, then inspiration. In refusing Horatio's reasonable council, "You will lose this wager, my lord" (5.2.210)⁵⁵ he abandons reason as a source of knowledge. In failing to "obey" "his mind" and to listen to the "ill" he feels "about [his] heart" (5.2.213-18) he sets aside inspiration and intuition as sources of knowledge. Laertes, too, relinquishes any reliance on intuition as he decides to act "almost against his conscience" (5.2.297). Reason, he has already given up when he did not investigate the cause of his father's killing. Laertes and Hamlet therefore join the Queen and Claudius in their self-subjection to corrupt tradition. The predicted "living monument" is built up of them. Only Horatio is spared, because he clings

⁵⁵I quote from the Signet Classic and Norton Critical editions here.

to reason and a rightly placed love that denies suicide for the sake of conveying a true report and embodying a trustworthy knowledge source.

Horatio's demand to Fortinbras, "cease your search," and Fortinbras's responding observation, "This quarry cries on havoc" (5.2.364), reinvokes the archetype that has echoed throughout the play. The search is over. The quarry here is not of excavated stones or gems or sacred crosses. But it still represents a treasure that will enable the free exercise of conscience. It is an accurate sign of a story Horatio will tell, of a true story about knowledge sources and freedom of conscience -- "Of accidental judgments, casual slaughters," wrongly reasoned deaths, "purposes mistook" (5.2.383-4). It is an ugly treasure, yet it "Becomes the field" because it brings to light a truth that has been hidden up to now. It is a "show" of "much amiss" but of an argument and knowledge important to be brought "to th' yet unknowing world" where still "men's minds are wild" (5.2.403, 379, 394). Returned from war, Fortinbras may be reminded of the havoc he and his men raised for a little piece of land; he will, no doubt, as he listens to Horatio, mull over the validity of the knowledge source and the love that spurred on his action there.

"The Sources of the Burdens of Judgment"

The problems in *Hamlet* concerning knowledge sources and their relation to freedom of conscience tie in with Rawls's description of limitations that inevitably are imposed on freedom of conscience and epistemology, even that epistemology adopted in a society that grants freedom of conscience. (The question of whether we can say that an epistemology is implied in Rawls's theory will be discussed in the next chapter. For the moment, we assume it is.) Before discussing these limitations, a word about a related problem that will be addressed more fully in the chapter on *All's Well* -- the necessity of providing an

epistemology that allows for social mechanisms of change. A society changes; to be just, its conceptions and institutions of justice must fit the resulting new needs and capabilities, and therefore they too must change. Hence the epistemology that is appealed to must be one that allows for transformation. The tragic end of *Hamlet* is a consequence of the absence of these mechanisms. For Rawls, the creation of a just society is an evolutionary process; the members of the society and their representatives are responsible for improving the justice of the governing institutions, including the rights instruments. There must be ways of undertaking this improvement. For him, freedom of conscience and thought is one of these ways; it is not only a basic liberty, whose implementation needs to be more just and more extensive, but a tool to establish a more just society. The society's epistemology must therefore be one that enhances freedom of conscience.

Acutely aware of the necessity of unity such as this kind for the establishment of a just society, Rawls considers over and over in his latest revision of *Theory of Justice* how to maintain a pluralist society while obtaining a political unity sufficient to uphold justice for all. His main instrument, as discussed earlier, is a political theory to which members of diverse "reasonable comprehensive philosophic doctrines" can all subscribe. In elaborating this theory, he considers the causes of diversity in judgment. These causes may be "internal" limitations on the individual's capacity to exercise his right to freedom of conscience. They are not therefore limitations to which there is likely to be any political solution; in this sense they are not relevant to the question of the extension of this right to all members of the society. On the other hand, these internal limitations relate to certain external features Rawls finds ways of curtailing, through for example the prioritization of the basic liberties and rights. Before looking at external controls such as this, let us consider the "internal" limitations inherent in every exercise of judgment, what he calls "the burdens of judgment."

The "burdens of judgment" Rawls delineates have some connection with the causes of difficulty in judgment raised in *Hamlet*. Initially he notes those that reasonable people must shoulder; then he refers to the unreasonable ways of thinking that affect judgment. He defines reasonable people as those "who have realized their two moral powers [these include the capacity for a sense of justice and a conception of the good] to a degree sufficient to be free and equal citizens in a constitutional regime, and who have an enduring desire to honor fair terms of cooperation and to be fully cooperating members of society."⁵⁶ We will assume that Hamlet and Horatio are in this category. Though there is no constitutional regime in the play, their vision of what principles should rule a society may be seen as according with a just regime.

Rawls lists six of the most obvious causes of the conflicting judgments -- what he calls "burdens of judgment." While not all the characters in *Hamlet* would fit his description of reasonable people, his causes for conflict all relate in one way or another to the effects produced by the prejudicing attachments of the characters in *Hamlet* and their adherence to different sources of knowledge.

The first cause of "the burdens of judgment" is the difficulty in making use of the senses and inductive reasoning because of the complexity or conflicting nature of the evidence gathered by means of the senses or experience. Examples of this in the play include the difficulty Hamlet faces when confronted suddenly by movement behind the arras and the confusion of his observers when they try to judge his strange behaviour.

The second problem, Rawls states, is that "Even where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that are relevant, we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different judgments." Here we recall the sentinel's reference to the King, the political tradition to which he gives authority; he signals

⁵⁶*Political Liberalism*, 55. The citations that follow are all from pages 56-57.

this source of knowledge because for him (and he expects the same for the man he is talking to) it merits more weight than, for example, another tradition -- which might be uttered as "I am friend to Hamlet!", or as the Bastard's utterance to Hubert in *King John*, simply, "A friend" (5.6.2). Again, in the dialogue between Horatio, Marcellus and Barnardo, there is a difference in the weight each one gives to tradition, with only Horatio requiring every tradition to concur with inductive reasoning.

The third source of the "burdens of judgment" Rawls refers to is the "vagueness" or "indeterminacy" of our knowledge, a problem most frequent in intuitions and inspirations, although it may arise in knowledge from all sources. For example, the intuition or inspiration signified by the ghost must be interpreted by Hamlet in order for him to make a judgment on how to respond to it. He has to find out what behaviour towards his mother is implicit in the revenge it directs him to; he has to verify the subject of the ghost's figurative language. In every one of these interpretations of his initial inspiration, his judgment is at risk and his freedom to judge the way he wants is subject to factors over which he has no control.

A fourth source of the "burdens of judgment" noted by Rawls is the different "total experience" of each person that limits judgment. A person like Ophelia, whose life has been regulated by a tradition in which her judgments are determined by her father, cannot be expected to carry out experiments to find out knowledge through inductive reasoning. Similarly, judgment may change with experience. After he has heard Horatio recount the story of Hamlet and Claudius, Fortinbras's judgment will be different, we expect, from what it was when he first embarked on war.

A fifth source of the "burdens of judgment" is "the different kinds of normative considerations of different force on both sides of an issue." This cause

of conflict relates to the problem of shared values considered above and in the discussion of *King John*, but it also concerns the dominating epistemology that in *Hamlet* has such a determining effect not only on most of the characters' exercise of free conscience but also on the freedom of the play's central figure to express his thought. Because the word of the king in power, the traditional knowledge, is seen by most of the society as the norm, there is a conflict between them and those few members of the society who base their judgments on a different epistemology -- a hierarchy of knowledge sources in which intuition, inspiration and inductive reasoning take precedence over custom and the king's law. This conflict can also be present within the individual, as when Hamlet must weigh the decision he has made to kill Claudius on the basis of his intuition and empirical evidence against the religious tradition that tells him that killing a person at prayer would be rewarding him rather than punishing him.

Rawls's sixth source of the "burdens of judgment" is the "limited social space" that requires "some selection" of values "from the full range of moral and political values." An obvious referent for this is the situation where a society must choose between an emphasis on freedom of speech or right to reputation; between tradition and what is newly reasonable to people; neither can be put in practice unlimitedly without restriction on the other. In the play, Hamlet's conversation with Fortinbras's captain brings to light what might be a burden of judgment were he in Fortinbras's situation: in this situation the dilemma for him would be between the defense of national honour that can only be undertaken by men dying for a worthless piece of land and his duty as ruler to protect the lives of his people that can only be carried out by abstaining from war.

The way out from these burdens would seem to be a process of reasoning that involves testing conditions, gathering more data, and using the reasoning of a number of reasonable agents. This is what Hamlet does when he involves Horatio

in the Mouse-trap experiment. However, most of the time he is on his own. Reasoning together is in fact also one of Rawls's solutions, partly illustrated in his idea of "overlapping consensus." The main point is that in Rawls, as in the play, reason must have a central place in an epistemology that would enable people to minimize the "internal" limitations to judgment noted above.

The Exclusion of the Unreasonable

Rawls sees other limitations necessitated because of the fact that freedom of conscience has hazards when it is granted unaccompanied by other rights, such as the right to information and the right to education, and when practiced in absence of certain conditions. This sort of limitation may be called "external." According to Rawls it must be politically imposed in order that freedom of conscience and other principles of justice be implemented. Hence, besides the burdens of judgment that necessarily impede the exercise of conscience by every reasonable person, Rawls also speaks of the "prejudice and bias, self- and group interest, blindness and willfulness" that "play their all too familiar part in political life," as well as the "individual and associative points of view, intellectual affinities, and affective attachments" that characterize diverse religious and philosophical outlooks (58). The former set of traits he characterizes as "sources of unreasonable disagreement."

In Hamlet's society, these impediments to judgment are very much evident; they have been called wrongly placed loves, whereas attachment to reason and justice are said to be loves rightly placed. In the society of the play, social unity, which for Rawls is requisite to the application of his theory of justice, is impossible; the main reason for this is the behaviour of its politicians; the King, Queen, adviser, and those who decide on Ophelia's burial are attached to their pleasure, prestige, and class distinction more than to the justice sought by Hamlet

and the members of the lower class (the grave-diggers). In accord with Rawls's theory, this lack of reasonableness and basic sense of justice preclude the equal distribution of basic liberties and "primary goods." The result is a society in which freedom of conscience is not available to all members, and one in which other basic liberties are also oppressed. Rawls invokes a harsh discipline in order to limit these limitations -- the "unreasonable" persons who bring with them these burdens are either excluded from his society or gradually brought under control.

However, those who bear the burden of "individual and associative points of view, intellectual affinities, and affective attachments" that characterize diverse religious and philosophical outlooks are not excluded from the "reasonable" society in which his theory would operate. The way in which these "burdens of judgment" are minimized is by the control of the non-political causes of difference in judgment by the abstention from public religious and philosophical reasoning in political discussions. Parties representing the people place "the content of persons' determinate conceptions of the good" and other "irrelevant, politically speaking" knowledge "behind the veil of ignorance" (79). The question is whether this subordination of the religious and philosophical comprehensive doctrines to a shared social concept of justice and cooperation in the interests of unity of political thought might be likened to the oppression of free conscience by a dominant epistemology, such as that experienced by Hamlet. Not if the structure of the play with Hamlet as hero and his right to revenge is accepted; because on this view the society that oppresses Hamlet is not "well ordered;" it is more like "the antebellum South," which could become ordered only with the intervention of a group of society, who argued for equality "on religious grounds" (249f).

If Hamlet's judgment agrees with public reason, and if his society is not well ordered, it would be acceptable for him (according to Rawls) to base his argument on his non-political knowledge and its sources. By this means, he

might transform his society into one that is well ordered, at which time the religious and philosophical knowledge and their sources should generally not be appealed to in the process of public reasoning. Within the regime of Rawls, then, freedom of conscience and the public expression of dissident beliefs are most useful to unjust, badly ordered societies; in a just and well ordered society "Invoking only political values is the obvious and the most direct way for citizens to honor the ideal of public reason and to meet their duty of civility" (248). This latter proviso might appear to restrict excessively the basic liberty of conscience; on the other hand it allows for the unified epistemology on which free expression of conscience depends. The "burdens of judgment" must be limited for freedom of conscience to find broad public application.

The "Inherent Dignity of all Members of the Human Family"

The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not specifically address the question of what epistemology people must adopt for the implementation of the principle of free conscience; nor does it comment on whether the knowledge sources to which people give authority have implications for the application of this principle. However, by taking the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as its normative source, it implicitly sets aside many of the traditions derived on the basis of epistemologies commonly adhered to, as it does also the deductions and interpretations some groups have made of certain (religious) revelations and scientific data that provide for the superiority of one racial or national group over others. It specifies the basic value on which this and the other human rights and freedoms is based: the "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family."⁵⁷ The Declaration and the Covenant mark a milestone of untold

⁵⁷*Human Rights: A Compilation*, 8.

significance in the history of the philosophy of human rights, for they are the first comprehensive universally accepted legal instruments that clearly identify "human" and "man" with all human beings. This in itself is proof of its appeal to a particular epistemology (or particular group of epistemologies).

In contrast to them, earlier comprehensive (though not universally accepted) rights instruments appear to have been derived on the basis of traditions that did not allow for this broad meaning of human. It is evident, for example, from the legal history of the American Bill of Rights that the understanding of all the terms of this expression has not been static. The terms "Inherent," "dignity" and "human" have had varied interpretations, under which it has been customary to exclude whole portions of humanity on the basis of colour and sex. Interestingly, it was in the 1950s -- after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights -- that the American Supreme Court began to scrutinize carefully constitutional interpretations for "sorts of classifications in law" that were discriminatory with regard to race.⁵⁸ Craig Ducat traces interpretations of the amendments abolishing racial discrimination which in the half century prior to this time were based on the doctrine "separate but equal" and which effectively promoted racial discrimination. He concludes that this injustice was a result of "the sociological beliefs" of the times (1298). In American society, then, until after the 1950s only a certain group of its citizens were in effect legally equally human, this because the conception of human was based on a traditional knowledge source that differentiated between people on the basis of the colour of their skin.

It is clear from this example that the epistemology dominant in a society provides, even within a just regime, a boundary to the freedom of conscience. In the society of *Hamlet* the dominant epistemology assumes the superiority of a

⁵⁸Ducat, 1293ff.

tradition that dictates a variation in the right to freedom of conscience dependent on class and sex. The fact that the play questions it however is evidence of its relevance to the development of human rights theory at its very early stages. In *All's Well* we shall see how a revision of epistemology may allow for boundaries of this sort to be expanded. In this second play the knower Hamlet, who in his own society had no freedom to use his knowledge, becomes the knower Helena, whose inspiration and reason are freely put to use.⁵⁹

⁵⁹Other critics have compared these two characters. For Warner Berthoff, "Helena possesses all along the perfected patience, the fitness of means to purpose, that Hamlet stormily advances to." See "'Our Means Will Make Us Means': Character as Virtue in *Hamlet* and *All's Well*," in *New Literary History*, 5.2 (1974): 345.

Chapter Five

Being Educated to Know: Epistemological Expansion of Freedom of Conscience in *All's Well That Ends Well*

The king's a beggar . . .
(Epilogue, 1)

In the cycle of transition from one epistemology to another, *All's Well That Ends Well* begins where *Hamlet* left off. The traditions, which dominate *Hamlet* as sources of knowledge but which in the end are rejected, have in *All's Well* lost their effectiveness. The play is thus set at the beginning of the reign of a king who will give precedence to an entirely different knowledge source. This king may be imagined to be like Fortinbras after he has heard Horatio's story; like Fortinbras he is initially a traditionalist, but his consideration of the difference between Hamlet's and Claudius's ways of thinking, we imagine, has transformed him into a lover of inspired reason. *All's Well* is situated, then, at the beginning of the domination of a new knowledge source, one that will gradually receive society's sanction and become the foundation for its citizens' "free" exercise of conscience. As in *Hamlet*, there are characters whose freedom is restricted because their conception of what is a valid knowledge source does not accord with the society's. But because the dominating epistemology allows for the valuing of freedom much more than that in *Hamlet*, these characters are permitted to a great extent to make decisions freely in accord with their chosen (different) knowledge source -- usually tradition. They continue for a time dependent on tradition as their source of knowledge; then they are educated through the events in their lives to accept the reign of inspired reason. This only occurs for everyone when the knowledge derived from inspired reason has gained the status of a tradition.

The learning through story-telling presaged at the end of *Hamlet* becomes learning through experience and, this, the central action in *All's Well's*. Indeed the role of education in the implementation of freedom of conscience is the most distinctive characteristic of this play insofar as this human right is concerned. *All's Well* posits trust and love as important elements in a familiarization that facilitates the society's change-over to a new epistemology. The love factor, which in *Hamlet* was generally a deterrent to the proper use of the knowledge source, in *All's Well* engenders trust, impelling the process of education required for the newly dominant knowledge source to be used as a basis of judgment.

The different emphasis in the play is also evident in the substitution of what was in *Hamlet* experiments performed by one character on another to prove a theory and show the impediments of prejudice; in *All's Well* these experiments are replaced by affective experiences freely chosen by the characters and which reveal the beneficent power of love when it is trustworthy. Hence, where *Hamlet* focused on the intellectual as impeded by the affective, *All's Well* concentrates on the affective as an assistance to the intellectual. *All's Well* argues that without such affective education there can be no firm establishment of an epistemology in which inspired reason dominates and so promotes the freedom of conscience.

Metaphoric and Historic Contexts

These differences are emphasized in the play's metaphors and its relation to the historical context. The king is still in this play representative of a knowledge source, but one that has somewhat different effects on freedom of conscience than the regal knowledge sources in *Hamlet*. For one thing his subjects eventually do only what they desire; this is true even for the most rebellious; and even for those he initially constrains. Though they all finally subject themselves to his direction, this subjection is in the end a desired one.

Another metaphoric distinction is the indirect representation of corruption. Where in *Hamlet* it is directly represented in the monarch's dishonest behaviour, in *All's Well* it is metaphorically suggested by the King's fistula. Claudius's "Blasting his wholesome brother" (3.4.65) seems far more real than the dangers of the fistula.

On the other hand, *All's Well* uses no metaphors for inspiration, which in *Hamlet* is symbolized in the ghost. Helena's argument against the King when he refuses her treatment refers plainly to inspiration as the source of her knowledge:

Inspired merit so by breath is barr'd.
It is not so with Him that all things knows
As 'tis with us that square our guess by shows;
But most it is presumption in us when
The help of heaven we count the act of men.

(2.1.148-52)

The King will not rely on her "inspired merit," she complains, because of her class (her "breath"). His judgment of her help as the help of ordinary men is, the citation implies, as presumptuous as considering divine assistance human. This statement and the demand that follows, "Dear sir, to my endeavours give consent; / Of heaven, not me, make an experiment," identify her with heavenly knowledge, that is, inspiration. The movement of inspiration from metaphoric representation in *Hamlet* to something real in *All's Well* has many implications when one considers the contrast in their genre and the outcomes of their plots.

On the other hand, the mention of people's judging "by shows" suggests *All's Well* pairs with *Hamlet* in the sense that it deals with the same subject -- the judgment process. But the two plays treat different aspects of this process. The ghost as a "show" representing inspiration is typical of the ways in which knowledge sources are theatricalized in *Hamlet* to bring to the fore the hidden

process of thinking. *All's Well's* affective educational process is in contrast represented by "real" emotions and actions.

There are also differences in how the plays use sex to represent reliance on a knowledge source in the exercise of conscience. Where the sexual metaphors in *Hamlet* are used to accentuate mislearning from knowledge sources, in *All's Well* they represent the learning that facilitates attachment to the dominant (and "best") knowledge sources. Where sex in *Hamlet* divides society, destroys trust, and breaks down the respect for the dominant knowledge source, in *All's Well* it unifies people, creates trust, and builds up respect for the new epistemology.

All's Well uses sexual metaphors to argue for the influence of education on judgment in ways typical of medieval interpretations, such as those of Bernard of Utrecht: The "day" in its obligation to "yield to the light of the sun" he understands as paralleling "the virgin who does not know how to yield as truth" and the followers of Christianity who must "do the works of light at the master's urging"--that is, they learn to do good in yielding to the advice of their leader.¹ The sexual allusion to moral learning ramifies the marriage for education metaphor that was so common, as for example in the marriage of Mercury and Philology.²

The political and philosophical background of the play's first audiences referred to in the chapter on *Hamlet* is also relevant to *All's Well's* arguments. In addition to the controversy over the validity of various knowledge sources and their relation to judgment referred to there, ideas about learning were concerned with freedom of conscience. Queen Elizabeth used spectacle to establish herself as

¹Jane Chance, *Medieval Mythography: From Roman North Africa to the School of Chartres, A.D. 433-1177* (Gainesville: UP of Florida, 1994) 390. In her introduction to the illustrations, Chance observes that these scholars' works had significant influence on some fifteenth-century mythographers (xi).

²This was a typical story "during a period when the wedding of human wisdom (to which Benedictine learning aspired) and divine eloquence (the Word as Christ) became the goal of education within the monastic school" (Chance, *Medieval Mythography*, 256).

an authority for the people and an influence on their judgments. To control the "diversity of opinions," the government unified education practices and made attendance at the official church an obligation for everyone.

On the other hand the enthusiasm to discover new knowledge engendered a diversification in methods of learning. In *The Advancement of Learning*, published about one year after the latest date attributed to *All's Well*, Bacon's contention was that the biggest obstacle to learning is an obsession with the familiar, our "despairing" to find knowledge that has never before been found, and not striving to get what we want.³ He observes that education is required if the source of knowledge newly available is to be trusted by the people:

For that knowledge which is new, and foreign from opinions received, is to be delivered in another form than that that is agreeable and familiar . . . For those whose conceits are seated in popular opinions, need only but to prove or dispute; but those whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; the one to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate. So that it is of necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and translations to express themselves. And therefore in the infancy of learning, and in rude times, when those conceits which are now trivial were then new, the world was full of parables and similitudes; for else would men either have passed over without mark, or else rejected for paradoxes that which was offered, before they had understood or judged (137).

³The latest date given for *All's Well* is usually 1604. *The Advancement of Learning* was first published in 1605. In *The New Organon* (1620) Bacon writes, "Concerning the grounds then for putting away despair, which has been one of the most powerful causes of delay and hindrance to the progress of knowledge . . ." (Aphorisms, Book One, CXV, 105). See also *The Advancement*, 108-109.

In the analysis of the play we will keep in mind a few of the similitudes Bacon and other intellectuals of Shakespeare's first audiences perhaps saw as relevant to the link between society and a new source of knowledge.

Folkloric Contexts

All's Well's focus on education is reinforced by at least three such archetypal similitudes or myths, the first a folktale about a king who appears as or becomes a beggar. In the Irish variation, which exists in records dated 1532 and was probably familiar to Londoners, the king who disguises himself as beggar is Christ. The story begins with a visit of a beggar, who is refused alms on two occasions from Saint Columba's almoner because he arrives after the poor have received their daily gifts. The following citation sheds light on the relationship between this folktale and its connection to knowledge sources: (The compiler refers to the beggar's third visit.)

And he came the third day, after the poor had been fed, and asked alms, and he gat but the same answer from the almoner of Columcille.

Then said the poor man: "Go to Columcille and tell him, except it be from himself he getteth what he giveth to the poor, he should provide not to feed an hundred only each day."

Then went the almoner to Columcille and told him the poor man's words. And when Columcille heard this, he rose up swiftly, staying not for his cloak nor his shoes. And he followed the poor man and overtook him anon in the place that is called the Right Turn to the Southwest of the big church of Derry. And he [Columcille] perceived that it was the Lord that was there [in the guise of a beggar], and he fell on his knees before Him and spake with Him face to face. And he was filled with grace of the Holy Ghost and among all the gifts that he

was given by God at that time, he received knowledge of every hidden thing in the Scripture, and the spirit of prophecy, so that naught was hidden from him that hath been or will be. And from that time he provided not for an hundred only, but the great gifts that he had without stint from God, these he bestowed without stint for God's sake.

And he used to manifest to all the knowledge of the mind and intent of the beasts of the sea, and of the singing of the birds of the air. . . .⁴

In this story knowledge and the power to teach it is acquired through humiliation. An example of analogous stories about a king or captain who circulates as commoner or soldier with the similar purpose of testing and educating people is the incident in *Henry V* when the king appears disguised as a fellow soldier in order to test his soldiers and make them more responsible (4.1). Here the king must assume a lower rank in order to convey his wisdom and educate his men.

As in the Irish and *Henry V* versions of the beggar king archetype, the King's yielding in *All's Well* is a means to bring the people closer to him and teach them. His accepting the performance of others' desires -- the Lords' desire to go to war and Bertram's determination to marry someone other than his designated consort -- reflects a humiliation similar to begging and, like Christ's begging in the Irish story, proves to be an education for the person yielded to. For great learning to take place, however, the yielding must be reciprocal -- only in their eventual humility before the king will the people (like Columcille) be able to acquire his knowledge and accept his direction. So at the end of the play Bertram must yield to the King.

Helena also functions as a begging king trying to educate and bring about change. Her yielding to Bertram's ridiculous demand, for example, is what

⁴O'Donnell, 69.

enables him to submit himself willingly to the knowledge of the King (that is, her knowledge). And it is her begging for him as husband, her plea for a parting kiss, that send him off to war with Parolles; while his action here might be viewed as a mistake, it comes to be an important learning experience. In this way the effective knowledge sources in *All's Well* yield to the consciences subordinate to them, and when there is a difference between their direction and the desire of their subjects they yield again, until at last their subjects accept their direction. Thus, although the play does not refer overtly to this archetype except in the epilogue statement "The king's a beggar," the King and Helena exemplify its implications.

The second archetypal folktale that underlies the play is the impossible task tale. The population in England, as on the continent and elsewhere, was familiar with many tales of this form. Some whose ending allows for the successful performance of the task conclude with a reward to the performer; some intend to reveal the truth; others provide failure as proof of the superiority of the one who assigned the task over the one who tried to perform it.⁵ These tales had a variety of elements one of which was the request Bertram puts to Helena:⁶ "When thou canst get the ring upon my finger, which never shall come off, and show me a child begotten of thy body that I am father to, then call me husband; but in such a 'then' I write a 'never'" (3.2.57-60). Conciliation as a result of a miracle is the bare structure of this archetype, for in every case the conflicting parties are "miraculously" brought together as a consequence of the impossible task. In *All's Well*, however, the miracle is in some ways not a miracle, because its details are

⁵See for example the medieval tale of the "impossible task assigned by plaintiff" (Domenico Comparetti, *Libro de los engannos et los asayamientos de las mugeres*, *Researches Respecting the Book of Sindibad* (London: Elliot Stock, 1882) no. 22).

⁶See for example: Marguerite de Navarre, *L'Heptameron*, with notes by Frédéric Dillaye, 3 vols. (Paris: A. Lemerre, 1879) no. 8; Pierre Champion, ed., *Cent Nouvelles Nouvelles*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1928) no. 9; A. C. Lee, *The Decameron, its Sources and Analogues* (London, 1909) 101. Scholars generally agree that the source of *All's Well* is the ninth novel of the third day in Boccaccio's *Decameron*.

exposed and explained, and the impossible task is seen as part of an educational process. The play thus shows that the seemingly miraculous transformation in a society, when loyalty to one epistemology is replaced by loyalty to another, in fact occurs through learning.

Shakespeare exploits a third archetypal folktale in *All's Well*, which like the other two relates to change and education. This third tale -- the fox and the grapes -- was known through Aesop's fables and many other sources. The most frequent version was a tale of a fox who could not reach the grapes overhead and therefore said he did not want them because of their sourness.⁷ This folkstory may have been alluded to in *Doctor Faustus* when grapes are produced miraculously for the greedy lady; here the miracle is carried out by Dr. Faustus himself, the character in Marlowe's famous play most obsessed with desire for knowledge.⁸ It is significant that the production of the grapes in *Faustus*, with which Shakespeare would have been thoroughly familiar, is undertaken by someone of great knowledge. Similarly, in *All's Well*, figures of knowledge, first Helena and then the King, provide grapes to the desiring fox. Shakespeare further extends the tale in a way that makes it connect with the impossible task and beggar king archetypes. The impossible task of reaching the grapes (healing the King) becomes possible once the fox (in this case the King) submits to the new idea that it is possible and acceptable to have them. The beggar king (in this case Helena) must beg to be free to perform this task before he will listen to her and as a result obtain his wish to be healed -- his grapes.

⁷See for example Whitney, 98; *Caxton's Aesop*, 122.

⁸Christopher Marlowe, *Doctor Faustus: A 1604 version edition*, ed. Michael Keefer (Peterborough: Broadview P, 1991) 4.3.11 ff. All further quotations from this play are taken from this edition. There are many connections between *Doctor Faustus* and *All's Well* and *Hamlet*, a discussion of which would require another study.

A Sequence of Steps

Using the language of sixteenth-century popular metaphors and folktales, and shadowed by the period's concerns about conscience, *All's Well* first depicts the sequence of developments that occur in an individual who moves from dependence on one knowledge source to dependence on another. The play then unfolds a series of steps in which the new relation between conscience and the sources of knowledge gradually becomes familiar to different members of the society, until such time as a social transition from reliance on one epistemology to reliance on another has been achieved. The developments that occur for individual and society include: first, becoming aware of the necessity of change; second, the identification through an educational process of the new knowledge and knowledge source with what is good and just; third, the wholehearted trust of the new epistemology; and finally its use in the exercise of conscience. The sequence is experienced by Helena in the first scene. The King and Bertram go through a similar sequence in subsequent scenes. The result is an increase in rights for the generality of the characters in the play, and benefits for all.

The First Step - Consciousness of the Inevitability of Change

Exemplifying this sequence, the first scene of *All's Well* opens with sad reflection on past and impending separations, and closes with the happy anticipation of a union, in which ordinarily disparate elements will come together. At the beginning, the mourners of lost husbands and fathers now mourning further departures raise the question of the necessity of change. Bertram contemplates the destruction of freedom that these and the earlier separations entail -- he must go to the King, to whom he is "evermore in subjection" (1.1.5). His observation to Helena as he leaves, "Be comfortable to my mother, *your mistress*, and make

much of her" (1.1.76-77, my emphasis) indicates that she too is "in subjection" to someone other than her father.

But this new subjection is not necessarily bad. Lafew comments to Bertram that, in the King, he will find a father and his mother will find a husband; his (and his mother's) new subjection to the King simply displaces a previous subjection (to the Count). As the next lines indicate, the King himself is not free from the condition of subject; he is dependent upon physicians; sadly they are incapable of his healing, but he nevertheless is dependent upon their knowledge. The sources of goodness and knowledge to which everyone is subject are thus from time to time substituted by others: the King's goodness will replace that of the Countess's late husband; the knowledge of the deceased de Narbon (Helena's father) seems irreplaceable, but it must eventually be replaced too, for as Lafew remarks, "knowledge could not be set up against mortality" (1.1.30-31).

The determination of Lafew, Bertram, Parolles, and Helena to go to the King exemplifies this change, and will become in the larger play a determination of everyone to go to the King, in the sense of their gradual gravitation towards him as the renewed centre of knowledge and justice. But this only occurs when there is a realization of a need for change. This process begins for Helena in the first scene, where three problems are posed, all of which require a change that is impossible. The first problem is that of the King's illness. "He hath abandon'd his physicians" (1.1.13), for he no longer has any hope of being healed. The second problem is Helena's love for Bertram. She is the "hind that would be mated by the lion" (1.1.91), who to carry out her wish must die. The third problem concerns Bertram's education in the "learning-place" of the court which will deter him from loving Helena (1.1.177).

As it turns out, the revision of his court learning, like the solution to the first two problems, will require a miracle -- the getting of his child and ring without

the consummation of their marriage. The new source Helena discovers as solution to her problems is in succeeding scenes recognized by others when they acknowledge her as solution to theirs. As this progression is repeated, the replacement of the old knowledge sources by the new one acquires an appearance of normality, thereby inducing an acceptance of the change.

The Second Step - Education

In conjunction with the changing subjectivity of those who depend on new knowledge sources for their exercise of judgment, the question of education (the second stage in the transfer from one epistemology to another) is interposed. Education is seen to be an instrument both for the formation of knowledge sources and in the development of users for these sources. Helena has inherited gifts, which the Countess hopes "her education" will make good (1.1.40). The Countess similarly counsels her son Bertram to learn his father's "manners" in the same way he has followed in his "shape" (1.1.62). Her statements imply that Helena and Bertram will learn (in the sense of know and practice) the knowledge of their fathers, and in this way become comparable sources of knowledge and goodness to which others will subject themselves.

Helena and Parolles on the other hand are concerned about how education relates to the use of knowledge sources. Helena sees education as an ambivalent power that may incline a person to unsuitable knowledge sources. She fears that in the "learning-place" of the court Bertram will acquire knowledge, beliefs, and loves that will put him in disaccord with those she would have him learn (1.1.165-77). For Parolles, as I shall discuss in a moment, learning is a means of becoming familiar with a new source of knowledge.

The movement and tone in the first scene reinforce the motifs of changing knowledge sources and education as two important elements in the process of the

transfer from one epistemology to another. At the beginning Bertram and Lafew are leaving; after a few minutes Parolles is introduced as a traveller too, following them to Paris; and finally, at the end of the scene, Helena herself determines to go to the same destination -- the King. For Bertram, the change of place presages a change of knowledge source and of judgment; for Parolles it is an action that will enable him to "return a perfect courtier" (1.1.207). Helena's change of mind-state precedes her decision to travel; and her journey will move her from role of learner to that of teacher or knowledge source. The movement towards the King is thus identified in each case with the acquisition of new knowledge.

In preparation for the play's affective and educational motifs, the tone throughout the scene is highly emotional. The emotions of the main characters vary immensely as they react to the changes that have occurred or are about to occur. The Countess is anxious about the departure of her son Bertram but becomes assured when Lafew expresses his confidence that the result will be good. Bertram is fearful and angry about his new relationship with the King, but at the same time eager to go to court. Helena pours out a flood of tears over Bertram's departure, painfully swallows the impossibility of marriage to him, then gives way to her yearning to be with him, and finally determines ecstatically to achieve his love. This affective transformation parallels the intellectual education she experiences as she changes her ideas from acceptance of the status quo to something new and daring. In the remainder of the play, other characters go through a similar change as they accede to a new society in which inspiration and reason take the place of tradition.

Education to Familiarize

The second "educational" step is described in the first scene as a familiarization with strange or new knowledge sources. Parolles comments that

“instruction shall serve to naturalize” Helena in such a way that she will “be capable of a courtier’s counsel” and “understand what advice shall thrust upon” her (1.1.208-210). The “courtier’s counsel” and the “advice thrust upon” one may be read as images for, respectively, the availability and imposition of sources of knowledge. Freedom of conscience is affected not only by which knowledge source is submitted to but by which is available.

The result of this familiarization, which paradoxically entails the loss of what was valued in the past, is the generation of greater freedom, a new society. In their discussion of virginity, Parolles and Helena depict such a gain produced by a loss: The progress obtained through yielding power and status, the increase and advancement resulting from using up is, Parolles argues, a good thing: “Loss of virginity,” he says persuasively, “is rational increase” (1.1.125). While the obvious intent of his comments is to add sexual humour to the play, the repetitions about loss and consequent gain surrounding this statement underline the motifs of yielding and subjection that will in the rest of the play be related to the familiarization with a new knowledge source.

That a person must be “familiarized” or “naturalized” by “instruction” in order to make use of a knowledge source introduces a notion almost absent from *Hamlet*, where there is little discussion of why and how the characters came to trust the knowledge sources they followed. Nevertheless the knowledge sources trusted by these users are frequently familiar -- Ophelia trusts her father, Polonius the adviser trusts the King, Gertrude trusts her husband. Hamlet is the only one who tests the information received from his familiar source (his ghostly father) by experiment and reason to see if it is trustworthy.

In *All's Well*, this “familiarity,” its construction through education, and its necessity, spoken about in the first scene by Parolles and Helena, become central; the sexual metaphors associated with it therefore dominate the play. Parolles’s

concluding remark in the first scene, "Get thee a good husband, and use him as he uses thee," accents the sexual allusions he makes earlier, and would have been read as such by most playgoers. There would also have been those for whom the "educational" reading would be of interest.

But to use the knowledge source (to "get" it in the sense of beget) also implies a control by the subject on the source he is subjecting himself to. The knowledge source yields and so in a sense is adapted to the needs of the user. Freedom and love thus become two components of a single educational process, for the knowledge source yields in the freedom it gives and its user yields in loving the source and giving its will to be directed by it.

The Third and Fourth Steps

Helena quickly undergoes the third development -- trust in the new knowledge source -- and so is prepared for the fourth -- using it in judgment. After Parolles has left, she observes reasonably that the "power" that enables her to "see" -- to know -- must also be able to let her "feed" -- to use, accomplish, participate (1.1.220f). This thought, which ends the scene, closely links the sources of knowledge with capacity for judgment, for it considers that the two are subject to one power. That is, knowing a source of knowledge inevitably entails trusting its knowledge in one's process of judgment. The term "feed" also conveys the idea that the knowledge source itself is fed upon, so that there is again a sense that the knowledge source yields itself to use as it is trusted. Helena's remark at the end of the scene reiterates this idea: "Who ever strove / To show her merit that did miss her love? / The King's disease." If the King can be healed by his subject, if he can be shaped into a whole by those who will then turn to him as source of knowledge and power, then the subject will be able to have her love. She will be able, much better able, to exercise her will freely.

The words that begin this closing speech, "Our remedies oft in ourselves do lie, / Which we ascribe to heaven; the fated sky / Gives us free scope . . ." (1.1.216-18), is a reminder that new knowledge is available to us by looking within and that innovation is dependent upon our choice. Helena's embrace of this freedom, the inspiration that comes to her that her way forward is through healing the King's disease, and her reasoning that if she can imagine a solution to her problem she can also accomplish it, enable her to undergo a change. The change she accomplishes in so brief a time is her rejection of the impossibility of having Bertram as her husband -- the traditional knowledge of her class-conscious society -- and her trust of the idea that it is reasonable for her to achieve "her love." Her decision to go to the King, as a judgment based on her new knowledge source, initiates her into the fourth stage of the transfer to dependence on a new epistemology.

Trust and Trustworthiness

As we have seen, what happens to Helena in the first scene follows the progressive transfer to a new epistemology through four stages: the dissatisfaction with the old in which the need for a new is recognized, familiarization with the new, trust in the new, and judgment based on the new. She appears to pass over the second stage, that of being educated in the new knowledge source, for she trusts her inspiration without being familiarized with it in any other way than through her reasoning process. With the close of the first scene, the process she has gone through continues for other characters, in particular the King and Bertram. The first stage (a consciousness of the inevitability or necessity of change in knowledge sources) has been introduced in the first scene; subsequent scenes develop the other stages more fully. The second and third stages, those of familiarization and trust, are treated sometimes simultaneously but more often in

inverse order. For this reason I shall do the same and consider what the play says about trust before looking at the question of familiarization.

Reaching the third stage is crucial, for trust and trustworthiness are prerequisites for the use of knowledge sources in the exercise of free conscience. Though she is a woman, young, inexperienced and unknown, the King must trust Helena before he is able to use her as knowledge source; when she proves her trustworthiness by carrying out his cure, his trust in her as knowledge source is established. Bertram's adoption of a knowledge source also entails his trust; only when his source is proven to be untrustworthy is he willing to reconsider it and adopt one that is more trustworthy. Helena's trust of an innovative knowledge at the end of the first scene portends the other characters' adoption of new knowledge sources; so does her decision to act upon it presage their use of it in the exercise of conscience. But prior to these developments, the play demonstrates the necessity of subjection to the knowledge source by offering examples of easy and difficult trust.

Easy Trust

In the second scene the King confidently repeats information he has heard. One of the lords remarks, "So 'tis reported, sir," indicating the information is only hearsay and hence possibly not true. The King responds, "Nay, 'tis most credible. We here receive it / A certainty, vouch'd from our cousin Austria" (1.2.3-5). The reply of the lord, "His love and wisdom, / Approv'd so to your majesty, may plead / For amplest credence" (1.2.9-11), suggests that the certainty the King has obtained from Austria's report is in part because he believed that Austria is wise and has a good (loving) intent. In other words the King can get knowledge from Austria because he trusts him. To borrow Parolles's words, he has been

"naturalized" by learning to trust him so that he can "be capable of" and "understand" the knowledge source, his cousin Austria.

Readers of *All's Well* have considered why Shakespeare calls Austria a cousin of the King of France;⁹ besides being "the term used in letters by contemporary monarchs to address their fellow-sovereigns"(257), a cousin establishes him as having "familiar" relations with the King, and as such may be seen in the context of the present reading as a logical reason for the King's use of him as knowledge source. However, he is also referred to as "our dearest friend." This distinguishes him from the Duke of Florence, who, though also referred to as "cousin" (3.1.7), is not a knowledge source on whom France relies.

The exchange between the Countess and the Clown at the beginning of the next scene gives an example of an even easier trust. The approval the Clown hopes the Countess will give for his marriage to Isbel, unlike the King's approval of Austria's unusual judgment, is not unusual. The reason it will be granted is not because of the Clown's wise and just argument, for when the Countess asks him why he wishes to marry he explains that his "holy reasons" are equivalent to his wishes. Jokingly he says, first, that his "poor body . . . requires it," and second, that he wants friends (1.3.28, 40). In other words he has no "important" argument. Despite his failure to cite any other reason, the decision to approve the marriage can be made easily (it is implicit) because there is trust that his judgment is based on the good (trusted) reasons that conventionally motivate marriage among people of the same class and because his action will not harm anyone or change the established structure of the society.

⁹Willem Schrickx, for example, who reads the play as a historical analogy, offers an interpretation in which the King of France represents King James and Austria the Austrian prince-count Albert who was a close friend of the King's. "*All's Well That Ends Well* and Its Historical Relevance," *Multiple Worlds, Multiple Words*, ed. Hena Maes-Jelinek, Pierre Michel, and Paulette Michel-Michot (Liège: U of Liège, 1987) 257-74.

Difficult Trust

In the second half of that scene, Helena confesses her love for Bertram to the Countess; in contrast to the Clown she provides an instance of an unconventional argument impeding the establishment of trust. The popular attitude to Helena's desire for marriage is opposite to that regarding the Clown's marriage, because what she wants will cause Bertram to be disparaged, which in the contemporary London was unlawful;¹⁰ it will as well bring about a change in the structure of society. Because it will bring together peoples of different social classes, her decision lacks the appearance of being motivated by arguments generally accepted, though it is, like the Clown's, equivalent to her desire.

The society's situation vis-à-vis her marriage presages that of the King regarding her capacity as healer: the Countess fears that the help of "A poor unlearned virgin" will receive no "credit" at a time when the most learned have abandoned his care (1.3.240). Helena, however, trusts the skill she learned from her father and believes in it, as she says, "knowingly" (1.3.250). Her near aloneness in trusting her knowledge exemplifies the difficulty of trusting non-traditional knowledge sources.

Lafew's description of the King in the next scene as a "royal fox" who will eat "No grapes" is, as a development following the self-revelations of Helena and the Clown, a notice for the audience of the relationship between the element of trust and the use of knowledge in the process of judgment. The tale is manipulated to suggest that a change in trust will transform the power to exercise judgment. In Aesop's fable, the fox is commended for transforming his desire for the attractive grapes too high for him into the opposite desire -- not to have them; this occurs

¹⁰A child's guardian was obliged to protect his wards from disparagement that could result if permission were given for marriage to someone of a lower class. Joel Hurstfield, *The Queen's Wards* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1958) 89.

concurrently with a transformation in the knowledge he trusts -- where earlier he conceived the grapes as within his reach and sweet, he now conceives them as out of his reach and sour.¹¹ This is the traditional paradigm -- he now trusts the conventional knowledge and therefore he wills not to have them. But Lafew observes that the King *will* eat his "noble grapes" *if* he can "reach them" (2.1.70-72). In other words, his exercise of free conscience is dependant on what knowledge source he trusts. This object of trust is quickly identified with "Doctor She" -- Helena and her untraditional knowledge.

Though the King is slow to trust her claims, observing that he "may not be so credulous of cure" (2.1.115), when he does trust her he obtains complete health. He then has power to carry out his will. The incident is emblematic of the link of trust that must be established between knowledge source and conscience in order for the knowledge source to have influence and for the person to make use of it for his exercise of will. The establishment of trust occurs through learning. As the King accepted Austria's knowledge because he had learned to "approve" his wisdom and love, so he accepts Helena's when he becomes familiar with it through Lafew's description of her and her own convincing words. In the case of Austria, his trust has become conventional; it is therefore easy to continue. In the case of Helena, he must be an iconoclast to trust her; this requires education.

Education through Reciprocal Familiarization

An important aspect of the representation of education in *All's Well* is the interaction between knowledge source and knowledge user. Parolles's counsels to Helena in the first scene -- to use her husband as he uses her -- are reflected later in the play in the active yielding between knowledge source and user, suggesting such reciprocal familiarization is a prerequisite to the society's achieving an

¹¹Caxton's *Aesop*, 122.

epistemology that allows people the freedom to do what is most needed at their particular epoch. Bertram and Helena, for example, who are alternatively each other's knowledge sources and users, will have to yield to each other. Bertram's ignorance of Helena is hinted at in her description of their relationship: "Indian-like, / Religious in mine error, I adore / The sun that looks upon his worshipper / But knows of him no more" (1.3.204-7); Bertram, the "sun" that knows nothing of "his worshipper" will have to replace his ignorance with knowledge. He is the knowledge source from whom Helena receives illumination; but she will only be able to use it freely when it has yielded to her will and thus come to know her.

In act two this reciprocity between the knowledge source and user is acted out when the King "prostitutes" his judgment to Helena's knowledge. Initially, he resists because of the non-orthodoxy of submitting to a knowledge source wholly unrecognized by the society and especially by the people who are said to know:

I say we must not
So stain our judgment, or corrupt our hope,
To prostitute our past-cure malady
To empirics, or to dissever so
Our great self and our credit, to esteem
A senseless help when help past sense we deem.

(2.1.119-24)

The King's use of the word "empirics" is pertinent in the context of the relationship between knowledge sources and the freedom of conscience in *All's Well*. While its obvious connotation is "quacks," it may also suggest that Helena's knowledge is empirical -- that it comes from experience and inductive reasoning. On the other hand, it may hint at something more complex, for the doctors who have been unable to help the King have been experts not only in traditional medicine (Galen)

but also in the new medicine, which used induction-based practices -- skilled observation of the patient (Paracelsus).*

As the King and Bertram gradually yield to Helena, so Helena in using her reason yields in a constructive way to their needs and wants. She yields as a beggar king to Bertram, first by submitting to his hate (when she leaves Rossillion), second by submitting to his lust (when she plays the bed-trick), and again at the end of the play when she conditions the continuation of their marriage upon Bertram's firm conviction that she is the one he has known. But like Columcille, he too must humble himself to gain her knowledge. This he does when he discovers his ignorance about the ring he offers his new fiancée Maudlin, and again at the end of the play when he begs "pardon" from Helena. The outcome is a unified society, in which the most peripheral members are drawn to the centre, seek association, and find benefits.

Familiarization through "Translation and Similitude"

A second important element relative to education in *All's Well* is the familiarization by means of what Bacon calls "translation and similitude." For the King and for Bertram, Helena represents the unfamiliar source of knowledge. The King learns to trust her but not without difficulty. Bertram will have to undergo an even more difficult education, in which the experience of her through "translation and similitude" enables him to believe she can really provide him with what he wants. The difference between the ease of learning from some kinds of knowledge sources and this difficulty is hinted at in the next scenes; the first (2.2) describes a situation where using the knowledge source is easy because it is familiar, and the second (2.3) relates an incident in which using the knowledge source appears so strange that the result is acclaimed a miracle.

* See Appendix 4.

In 2.2, the Clown discourses on the very limited education needed at court. He will “show” himself only “lowly taught” because he knows that his “business is but to the court” (2.2.3-4). He goes on to explain that at court there is nothing unusual required if one is to have acceptable manners. Therefore, the milieu requires not much education in order for one to use the knowledge source. Using it is simply a matter of form, “kissing a hand” etc., for which all that is required is a familiarity with traditional rituals. The stability of the hierarchy thus makes familiarization a negligible element. This normality, in which a person requires little learning, presages something abnormal in the next scene.

The conversation between Bertram, Lafew, and Parolles in 2.3 is ostensibly an exclamation over the miraculous cure of the King. At the same time it alludes to its historical context -- the discussions in England of the validity of traditional Catholic miracles. In the present reading, however, it relates to the process of familiarization with a new knowledge source. There is difficulty accepting that it is Helena’s knowledge that cured the King because no one is familiar with her; the cure is therefore considered a miracle. Lafew initially questions the dismissal of what appears to be a miracle at a time when society is being taught that no miracles should be believed in:

They say miracles are past; and we have our philosophical persons to make modern and familiar, things supernatural and causeless. Hence is it that we make trifles of terrors, ensconcing ourselves into seeming knowledge when we should submit ourselves to an unknown fear.

(2.3.1-6)

His comments are not only an expression of astonishment and an affirmation that Helena has effected a miracle; they also indicate his consciousness that others will not believe in her powers. For Parolles, the linking of the event with Helena as a

knowledge source is also difficult: "Why, 'tis the rarest argument of wonder that has shot out in our latter times" (2.3.7-8).

Lafew differentiates between a miracle and a normal change in noting that the miracle's cause is unknown -- "causeless" -- and not natural -- hence "supernatural," whereas when it is explained by philosophers it becomes "familiar." Their latter manner of judgment, he says, makes us interpret "terrors" as "trifles" and to feel complacent in our knowledge of them; instead we should "submit" to their existence and the unknownness of their cause. For Parolles the event, though he calls it an argument and thus implies it is reasonable, is still a "wonder." His terms "shot out" and "latter days" refer to the miraculous events associated with the return of Christ, which Christians frequently expected at times of incomprehensible change, and so emphasize his perception of the event as miraculous. Lafew's and Parolles's surprise makes it impossible for them to believe that Helena has effected the cure, hence Lafew's conclusion that its cause is -- the "Very hand of heaven" (2.3.31). In fact no one is sufficiently familiar with or "naturalized to" the source, whose knowledge has accomplished such unexpected, unnatural action -- the cure neither the "artists" of "Galen and Paracelsus" nor "All the learned and authentic fellows" could effect (2.3.10-12).

But the final words of Parolles's and Lafew's exchange call for the general acknowledgement of this new knowledge source of "heavenly" attribute and its "further use" for other purposes:

Par. . . . and he's of a most facinerosus spirit that will not
acknowledge it to be the --

Laf. Very hand of heaven.

Par. Ay, so I say.

Laf. In a most weak --

Par. And debile minister, great power, great transcendance, which should indeed give us a further use to be made than alone the recov'ry of the King, as to be --

Laf. Generally thankful.

(2.3.29-38)

The hesitant identification of this "great power" at the end of the scene with the "debile minister," Helena, demonstrates the necessity of a gradual education through "similitudes" in order that a new knowledge source become familiar to the people. Lafew underlines the need for this gradualness by cutting short Parolles's "as to be" -- what might have been the expression of a vision or plan to use Helena's power to make other changes in the society.

These two dialogues illuminate the great difference between being "lowly taught" and learning a difficult lesson. The "lowly taught" uses the familiar traditional knowledge to exercise his or her conscience in the traditional manner and with little consequence on how others exercise theirs. The resultant change is very little. The society therefore acquiesces without difficulty. But the one who learns a difficult lesson learns to trust a knowledge source that society has no confidence in. To those who are not naturalized to it the consequence of using it is a miracle (or a calamity). The person who is familiarized with it and trusts it makes untraditional judgments, which elicit changes in others and have great consequence. This is the fourth stage of the transition to a new epistemology -- after becoming familiar with and having placed trust in the new knowledge source one makes use of it as director of one's judgment; because it is new, the judgments it precipitates are unusual and as a consequence not easily accepted by the society that still adheres to the traditional epistemology.

Epistemology and Freedom

The immediate result of the transformation in the King is just such a judgment, for in a strictly class conscious, male dominated society he offers Helena the free exercise of her choice in the matter of a husband: "Thy frank election make; / Thou hast power to choose, and they none to forsake" (2.3.55-56). Where he himself would traditionally exercise this judgment, especially in the London society of the play's first audiences, he entrusts the choice entirely to Helena. Later he will also allow Diana to choose her spouse. These actions suggest that his innovative spirit gives freedom to others. But the event also relates to the question of how education facilitates the influence of new knowledge sources. Now a knowledge source requiring no mediation of the user's judgment, Helena's identification with a knowledge the King has accepted gives her the freedom to judge in a new way; she can now rely on her inspiration as source and disregard the traditional knowledge concerning boundaries of class that earlier made her restrain her desire for marriage with Bertram. The translation or parable of her cure has prepared the way for the new knowledge she will issue, a pattern of judgment that will go against "agreeable," "familiar," and "popular" opinions. Lafew, again inverting the story of the fox and the grapes, but this time in relation to Helena's situation, observes as she nears Bertram, "There's one grape yet" (2.3.99). With the support of the King, who now authorizes her knowledge source, she chooses her grape.

The King's accession to Helena's knowledge also represents his transfer from an epistemology dominated by tradition to one dominated by inspired reason. As he becomes more practised in his reliance on this new epistemology, he will make more decisions that are both untraditional and flexible. The forceful manner in which he initially imposes his will on Bertram, for example, will gradually give way to a degree of toleration. By the end of the play, his adaptability reaches a

stage at which he is able, using reason, to change decisions rapidly in response to quickly changing situations.

Bertram and the New Epistemology

The process, however, which has transformed the King into someone who opposes tradition, has not transformed Bertram; for he has not yet gone through the difficult lesson required to trust a new knowledge source. Maintaining his attachment to the traditional knowledge source, which precludes marriage to someone of lower rank, he refuses Helena. Only after being forced by the King does he agree to submit his "fancy" to the King's "eyes." Lafew characterizes Bertram's submission of his judgment to the King's in the matter of his marriage as a "recantation" (2.3.187). However, as a dissimulation of his true belief he cannot maintain it. It is against all he has learned, all he is familiar with. It will have to come "naturally" if he is to accept it, that is, if he is to learn to receive direction from the knowledge source of a King who has embraced new ways. Therefore in his embodiment of a new epistemology, the King initially brings greater freedom to only a portion of the population, who like Helena are interested in a regime that values reason and experience over tradition and heredity. For Bertram and others like him, this change is the institution of oppression because he will not, under the new regime, have a wife of his own social class -- something guaranteed him under the traditional regime.

However, Bertram does not submit long to this oppression. Instead he follows the knowledge source he believes in and with which he is familiar: Parolles. Parolles wants him to flee to war and amorous adventures, activities traditional for young courtiers. To Lafew's warning about him, "But I hope your lordship thinks not him a soldier," Bertram reaffirms his belief, finally declaring emphatically, "I do assure you, my lord, he is very great in knowledge, and

accordingly valiant" (2.5.1, 8-9). Parolles will remain the guide in all his judgments until he discovers his untrustworthiness.

A notice of the contrast between the traditional knowledge source Bertram is familiar with and the untraditional character of the knowledge that motivates the King is given in 3.1. The scene opens in the middle of a conversation about "the fundamental reasons" of the war. "[G]reat decisions" made on the basis of these different arguments (or knowledges) have "much blood let forth" (3.1.1-3), observes the Duke of Florence. The Duke expresses surprise, that in view of these reasons, which he has explained "from point to point," the King of France has refused participation in the war. The First Lord suggests that indeed his king has made an untraditional judgment, for it is difficult for even him to understand it; to him Florence's "quarrel" seems "holy" and the "opposer" terrifying (3.1.4-6). He notes, however, that some of France's young men might participate in the combat, indicating the King's decision has not prevented individuals from choosing freely in the matter. The inability of the First Lord to explain his king's reasons and the surprise expressed by the Duke identifies the cured King with untraditional knowledge, one which dares to be different from that which the leaders in surrounding countries submit to, and which is contrary to Bertram's thinking.

Again paralleling the different use of these two different knowledge sources, in 3.2 the Clown draws attention to the contrast between usual and unusual decisions. Once having been at court, he decides to abandon his marriage to Isbel. What he learned at court has "knock'd out" the "brains" of his "Cupid," therefore redirected his thinking and revised his reasons that motivated his love, described as "holy" just two scenes earlier. This change constructs the Clown as much less independent in his thinking and hence in a way less free than the King. Where the King is not influenced by the war habits of his neighbouring kings, the Clown is (or pretends to have been) influenced by the Isbels and courtiers at court.

His actions presage a parallel behaviour in Bertram. An instant after his remark, a letter from Bertram informs the Countess that he intends to remain away in order to avoid being near his wife. Bertram, then, like the Clown and not like the King, has maintained the traditions of the court; he refuses to side with a decision made by a King whose actions oppose customary attitudes. The remaining scenes play out the progression of Bertram from the confining tradition represented in Parolles to the inspired reason represented in Helena and the King.

Evaluating the Knowledge Source for Trustworthiness

This transition is accomplished through a process of education in which he discovers a difference in the trustworthiness of Parolles and Helena. The idea of education is brought to the fore in the next scene where citizen Mariana counsels the young woman Diana about chastity. Their dialogue introduces the arrangement Diana and her mother will make with Helena for the performance of the impossible task, which will then be a means of educating Bertram. Trustworthiness is held up for notice in the ladies' complaints about Bertram's dishonesty. The main threat Mariana explains is that these men are not trustworthy. This bringing to light for Diana what might otherwise be trusted by her foreshadows the dissipation of Bertram's own misconceptions about his source of knowledge.

At the moment the plan has been laid among the women for the correction of his understanding of Helena, a remedy is construed among the French lords to rectify his understanding of Parolles. These lords, friends of Bertram, insist that Parolles is nothing but a "bubble" and that it is necessary for Bertram to know the truth about him (3.6.5). "It were fit you knew him," admonishes the Second Lord, "lest reposing too far in his virtue, which he hath not, he might at some great and trusty business in a main danger fail you" (3.6.13-16). The naive Bertram cannot believe the lords' contention that he does "not know him" as they "do"

(3.6.90-91); but he agrees to go ahead with a plan to test him. Both the comments of the two lords about Parolles and the test they conceive focus on trustworthiness. The First Lord describes Parolles as "a strange fellow . . . that so confidently seems to undertake business which he knows is not to be done" (3.6.86-88). The trick they play on him proves he is untrustworthy, for the moment he believes his life is in danger he offers information that betrays the Florentines, the party on whose behalf he and Bertram are fighting (4.1.73). Bertram, however, does not witness Parolles's behaviour until after he has had his secret intercourse with the maid he presumes is Diana.

The scene in which he is to discover Parolles's real character begins with a conversation between the two lords about the news received from the Countess concerning Helena's death. The Second Lord reports Bertram's reaction: "on reading it he chang'd almost into another man" (4.3.4-5). This change is the beginning of a transformation that will take large dimensions as he is educated about Parolles. Only as a result of this learning will Bertram be capable of exercising his conscience both freely and in a manner that accords with the liberal epistemology of the King (and of Helena). Implying there is a connection between Bertram's exercise of conscience and the source of knowledge he esteems, the First Lord remarks, "I would gladly have him see his company anatomiz'd, that he might take a measure of his own judgments wherein so curiously he had set this counterfeit" (4.3.30-33). If his "company," namely Parolles, is "anatomiz'd" -- known in fine detail, Bertram will have better knowledge of his knowledge source. As a result, he will be able to evaluate his own judgments, which have been based on something "counterfeit" (literally against faith, that is, untrustworthy). He will find his knowledge source is counterfeit in the sense that Parolles pretends but does not do what accords with his long-term interests.

The Claims of Tradition and the Lesson of Experience

The connection between the trustworthiness of a knowledge source and its benefits is reinforced when Parolles is brought in front of Bertram for interrogation. Attention is drawn throughout to Parolles's role as knowledge source, in for example his claim to "speak truth," his attested interest in truth -- "a truth's a truth," his prefaces "By my troth" and "Upon my knowledge," and his repetitive claims to "know" in his reports on Captain Dumaine and Bertram. His failure to have these qualifications is demonstrated, however, first when he shows his promises are contrary to his intentions, and second when he verbalizes his lack of love for Bertram. Both failings are made plainer by the lords' comments.

As Bertram enters, Parolles is telling the army's secrets and offering to "take the sacrament on't" in whatever way they want (4.3.136). Pointing to the significance of this hypocrisy, the First Lord emphasizes the stupidity of anyone who would take him as his knowledge source: ". . . this is Monsieur Parolles, the gallant militarist -- that was his own phrase -- that had the whole theoric of war in the knot of his scarf, and the practice in the chape of his dagger" (4.3.141-3). The Second Lord speaks the conclusion they hope Bertram will derive from the experience, "I will never trust a man again for keeping his sword clean, nor believe he can have everything in him by wearing his apparel neatly" (4.3.144-6). Parolles's lack of love for anyone but himself is humorously revealed when, unsuspected by Bertram, he exposes his disparaging attitude towards him, the actions he has taken to betray him to Diana, his readiness to lie about the character of the two French lords, and his willingness to betray the Florentine Duke he has served, as well as his captain (Bertram).

The last remark made to Parolles, "If you could find out a country where but women were that had receiv'd so much shame, you might begin an impudent nation" (4.3.326-8), recalls the grave-diggers' about Hamlet having a place in

England. The shamed Parolles can only have a place in common with shamed women. He can live in harmony with them because both he and they have the same epistemology, just as Hamlet could live in England because, there, all the people were like him -- mad. The remark also recalls the comparison Claudius draws between himself and the harlot; Parolles's traditionally "painted word" like Claudius's is a show that bears little relation to his argument. Therefore he will be most at liberty in a society in which everyone's words, judgments and actions differ from his or her argument.

As the scene develops, the image of untrustworthiness set out in the interrogation is extended to Bertram, whose own dishonest intentions vis-à-vis Diana are exposed both by Parolles's verbal comments and his letter warning Diana about him. The two lords, who in arranging the test with the professed motive of proving Parolles's untrustworthiness, have thus at the same time shamed their friend, Bertram. Bertram should now be able to see that the judgments he makes are a function of his knowledge source.

The relationship Helena enjoys with her friends, the widow and her daughter, presents a contrast to Bertram's relationship with Parolles; as such, it underlines the difference between their two knowledge sources, thus preparing the way for Bertram's recognition of Helena. Helena plans to visit the King to give evidence of her accomplishment of the impossible task, but she needs their attestation. The widow's remark, "Gentle madam, / You never had a servant to whose trust / Your business was more welcome" (4.4.15) evokes the "great and trusty business" in which the Second Lord predicted Parolles might "fail" Bertram (3.6.15), and hence provides a contrast to Parolles's behaviour. The widow and her daughter will act as knowledge sources about Helena, just as Parolles has for Bertram in his interrogation with the two soldiers; but they will be honest.

We may recall that the element of sacrificial love evident in Diana's promise to Helena -- "Let death and honesty / Go with your impositions, I am yours, / Upon your will to suffer" (4.4.28-30) -- also characterized Helena's function as knowledge source to the King; she had promised to die if her remedy were not successful (2.1.187). The reciprocity and love between the trustworthy knowledge source (widow and daughter) and trusting user (Helena) contrasts with the clash between knowledge source and user when either one is not trusting or trustworthy. "O strange men!" Helena remarks of the pleasure Bertram had in her, "That can such sweet use make of what they hate" (4.4.21-22). Parolles's revelation in the preceding scene of his hate for Bertram, whose life he offers to betray and whom he calls "a foolish idle boy," also belies the "sweetness" with which he used him repeatedly in the past to carry out his own ambitions. This egotistical use is temporary. A knowledge source can only have enduring influence if it is trusted and, correspondingly, trustworthy. The trust Bertram has exhibited "of cozen'd thoughts" parallels Parolles's similar trust in the glory he will enjoy at Bertram's expense and without his motives ever being known. Parolles's delusions of self-aggrandizement are different from Helena's friends' expressed willingness to give their lives for her, and thus offer further means for evaluating Bertram's long-trusted knowledge source.

Renaming the Knowledge Source

The scene's closing couplet, "All's well that ends well! still the fine's the crown. / Whate'er the course, the end is the renown" (4.4.35-36) expresses an esteem for an end -- an ending "renown" or knowledge, but as something formed over the "course" of hardship rather than as a naked or original entity. With the preceding image "Our wagon is prepar'd, and time revives us," it hints at the formative influences of time and experience that lead the way to a state in which the

new knowledge will be "renowned" or "renamed." Presumably, as a result of their learning, the renamed knowledge source will be acceptable to the society it seeks to influence. In Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus*, the well established, desired and famous Grecian Helena -- the most fabulous representative of the cumulating knowledge sources in the drama -- takes the place of Christian knowledge and restores Faustus's soul in an instant, while yet excluding it from the traditional heaven;¹² in *All's Well*, the orphaned, undesired, and unknown Helena accomplishes a similar design through a long process in which she must lose even her name. Only through a false naming and then a renaming will there be a return from the "cozen'd" of Shakespeare and the "similitude" of Bacon to the "original" new source -- constituted as original by its difference from that previously identified with the official belief (the belief of the King in "authentic fellows"). Diana, accepted by Bertram because she was his choice and the object of his traditional but irresponsible fancy, and through whom Helena has performed the impossible task is "reknown" as and renamed "Helena." Only in this way will the latter be accepted by Bertram, and the epistemology of inspired reason that in *Hamlet* remained hidden under the ground be brought to the surface.

Prior to the completion of Bertram's education, Lafew and his mother, then the Clown and the King, reflect on his miseducation. Lafew protests, in response to the Countess's blaming Bertram, "No, no, no, your son was misled with a snipt-taffata fellow there, whose villainous saffron would have made all the unbak'd and doughy youth of a nation in his color" (4.5.1-4). The leaven in dough rather than the saffron was "used figuratively in the New Testament for teachings."¹³ The blame is not, he says, of Bertram's nature but of the teachings

¹²*Doctor Faustus* (1604 version), 5.1.95, 112.

¹³"Leaven," Alexander Cruden, *Cruden's Complete Concordance To the Old and New Testaments* (1930; revised, London: Lutterworth P, 1954).
See 1 Corinthians 5:6; Galatians 5:9; Matthew 13:33; Luke 13:21.

he has received, which have the potency of influencing all the youth of the nation. After this, the Countess attributes the misguidance of her son and the death of Helena to her own knowledge of Parolles: "I would I had not known him; it was the death of the most virtuous gentlewoman that ever nature had praise for creating" (4.5.8-10). Being connected with such a knowledge source, she implies, is itself a kind of miseducation that can constrain the ability to judge.

The dialogue continues between the Clown and Lafew, moving from the Clown's lack of knowledge (about herbs that correspond metaphorically to Helena) to his adulterous sexual services, which reflect his submission to a supernatural regal figure (the devil, prince of the world). These displacements appear to be a metaphoric parallel to the stages Bertram has gone through -- of ignorance about Helena's value, and of fornication, associated with pursuit of Parolles's interests or service to the "devil." The mislearning is symbolized in misplaced sex and service to the wrong (untrustworthy) knowledge source, here the "devil." The dialogue between Lafew and the Clown thus provides an indirect expression of empathy for Bertram.

As it moves to the task at hand, the care of Lafew's horses, their conversation seems to be alluding, again metaphorically, to the solution to Bertram's problematic education. A trick on the horses becomes the vehicle for the tenor of proper learning. Lafew warns the Clown not to play any tricks when he looks after his horses, and he replies (alluding to the legitimacy of Helena's bed-trick),¹⁴ "If I put any tricks upon 'em, sir, they shall be jades' tricks, which are their own right by the law of nature" (4.5.60-62).

In the present reading, this statement is relevant to the distinction between miseducation and proper education: The kind of trick that is legitimate is an

¹⁴This legitimacy is explained in Margaret Loftus Ranald, "As Marriage Binds, and Blood Breaks": English Marriage and Shakespeare," *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 30 (1979): 79-80.

educational device that provides the agent with a way to something within nature's law -- presumably something that accords with the agent's purpose. So the false naming or similitude that educates properly is one that enhances the agent's powers and enables her / him to be a willing subject of a superior epistemology, the assumption being that basing judgment on this epistemology is to the agent's benefit. The implication is that the agent can be legitimately "naturalized" to this epistemology, because it has been proven trustworthy. The decisions too that proceed from this education or naturalization are the agent's "right." This education thus belongs to the agent as a jade's tricks are proper to a horse. What Parolles has provided for Bertram, therefore, was in opposition to Bertram's rights, was not proper to a human being. However, within a society dominated by an epistemology that allows the freedom to make these mistakes and that concomitantly provides rightful education, Bertram is free to try out what is not proper to him.

The last to note Bertram's lack of proper knowledge is the King, who comments to the Countess about his attitude to Helena and his unreasonableness, "[Y]our son, / 'As mad in folly, lack'd the sense to know / Her estimation home" (5.3.2-4). In reply the Countess expresses the feeling that it was natural for him to want to have his own way, and that he therefore should be forgiven for the harm he has caused, "'Tis past, my liege, / And I beseech your Majesty to make it / Natural rebellion, done i' th' blade of youth, / When oil and fire, too strong for reason's force, / O'erbears it, and burns on" (5.3.4-8). What was natural to Bertram is qualified as rebellion, not esteem for tradition, as it might have been had the old epistemology endured; what he learns is "reason." His recognition of the worth of "she whom all men prais'd" (5.3.53) represents therefore his assimilation of what has become the dominant knowledge source.

The Necessity of Loss

At the moment of his recognition of her value, the King advises Bertram to forget Helena and ask for Maudlin in marriage, thus drawing attention to the inevitable replacement of a knowledge source, even when it has achieved ascendancy. For Bertram this is what has happened to Parolles, although the loss in this case was voluntary -- a turning away from an embodiment of knowledge when it was found to be not what it seemed. But he must also experience the loss of other knowledge before he can fully learn his lesson. To accomplish this, the discrepancy between his professed knowledge and that of his mother, Lafew, and the King is brought to light in an interrogation about the ring on his finger. As Bertram removes his ring to offer it to Lafew for his daughter Maudlin, Lafew recognizes it as Helena's. Four times Bertram protests that it is not hers. But Lafew, his mother and the King swear to the truth of their knowledge that it belongs to Helena. At last the King exclaims, "Plutus himself, / That knows the tinct and multiplying med'cine, / Hath not in nature's mystery more science / Than I have in this ring" (5.3.101-104). The King knows the ring because it belonged to him and he gave it to Helena -- he has had the experience of it before it became her tradition to wear it; besides this, the gift had meaning, inasmuch as it was in recognition of her inspired and reasonable knowledge. These assertions of the superiority of the King's knowledge over Bertram's prepare the way for the latter's acknowledgment of his own ignorance and the destruction of his knowledge about Diana and the ring which up to now he believes.

By way of aside, the circulation of the ring and the variation in the conception of its owner may be read as a comment on the way the knowledge that originated from one knowledge source is attributed by its various users to different knowledge sources and is given different significance, in accord with the diverse

mindsets and experiences of the users. Certain of them, like Bertram, only recognize its original source as a result of this displacement.

Earlier in the scene Lafew had remarked of Bertram that "He lost a wife / Whose beauty did astonish the survey / Of richest eyes, whose words all ears took captive, / Whose dear perfection hearts that scorn'd to serve / Humbly call'd mistress" (5.3.15-19). The word "mistress" recalls the term as it was applied in the first scene -- a reminder therefore of "subjection." Bertram's loss of what people judged good and willingly subjected themselves to, in short his loss of a prized source of knowledge, thus parallels his recognition of his ignorance.¹⁵ When he finally learns that the intercourse he had was with Helena, he concurrently accedes to the King's knowledge, recognizes Helena as the source of his pleasure and new knowledge, and gains her as wife.

The ring, representative of a circle of knowledge received as a result of reliance on an epistemology, has been unconsciously put on by Bertram in place of that which he had traditionally so carefully guarded and now has lost. The act of putting it on is an act of familiarization, naturalization, and education -- precisely the process required to gain trust in a new knowledge source, the prerequisite for its use in the exercise of free conscience. The opening words of the King's final speech describe this relationship in brief, "Let us from point to point this story know / To make the even truth in pleasure flow" (5.3.325-26). Knowing the story in detail -- "from point to point" -- means one must be wholly familiar with it before using it in judgment.

Full familiarity may also be needed with those knowledge sources that are not trustworthy: The phrase "from point to point," used here, recalls its occurrence

¹⁵Curiously, just prior to Hamlet's acceptance of the traditional duel, set up by the King and therefore signifying his transfer from dependence on one epistemology to another (the one dominated by tradition), he "dares not confess" he is "not ignorant," that is, he confesses his ignorance (5.2.130-3).

earlier, when the Duke of Florence explained his reasons for war "from point to point" and the King of France rejected him as a source of knowledge (3.1.1). Implicit in the King's use of this same expression, therefore, is the idea that the reason one must know the knowledge and its source in detail is to use it well; this includes *not* making use of it when one discovers it is not trustworthy. Catching up the same expression "from point to point" with a different usage underlines that reason, especially inductive reason (which by definition must examine and know part by part and "point to point") is always required, for the very knowledge source that poses as reason must be judged by reason before it is used in judgment. Presumably this reasonable investigation led the King of France not to accept the Duke of Florence as a knowledge source. The consequence of this education in or familiarity with the story -- the argument and the knowledge source -- is just judgment: the "flow" of "*even* truth." When full knowledge is acquired, this exercise of conscience will be free and eventually constructive, that is, made in a way that accords with one's pleasure and good, an act emblemized in Helena and Bertram's marriage, their expected child and the play's ending of union and anticipated new friendship for all.

Education to "Sustain" a Sense of Justice

For its practice, the human rights philosophy in Rawls and in human rights law takes for granted that a particular sort of epistemology is dominant in society. Evidence for this assumption can be drawn from their principles of education. Rawls considers education among the social forces that sustain beliefs about justice.¹⁶ Though he does not relate his conception of education to epistemology, an examination of his comments suggests that there is necessarily a connection between them. The same may be said of *All's Well*; though the play analyzed here

¹⁶He calls these beliefs "the background sense of justice" that informs all citizens. *Political Liberalism*, 420.

is mainly about the cultivation of a belief in rights through education, the question of epistemology is, as we have seen, relevant throughout.

To make a comparison between Rawls's theory and what happens in the play requires an interpretation of the King as maker of just laws, whose counterpart in Rawls's society is the people's democratically elected representatives. Secondly, what we understand to be whole groups of citizens in Rawls's society are single characters in *All's Well*. (In this understanding, Parolles and Helena have two metaphoric functions, one as knowledge sources and the second as groups within the larger society.) Thirdly, in the play there is no distinction drawn between what is political and philosophical, so there can only be a generalized comparison with Rawls's political society, whose public culture and reasonings are confined to the political.

This lack of differentiation in the play is not especially important in this chapter, because we are focusing on education, which for Rawls is a combination of political, philosophical, moral, psychological and cultural influences. The just society, according to his construction, is composed of citizens who not only cooperate with the system of justice in place but who do so willingly and with the desire to be so "recognized." Rawls roots this willingness, aspiration and sense of identity in the citizens' powers and capacities, "as these *are educated* to that ideal" (84-86, my emphasis). This education is to be accomplished largely by "the public culture and its historical traditions of interpretation." Taking the play as an example, the "public culture," or what becomes "public culture" (when it is officially enforced by the King) is the belief that rights are bestowed not according to heredity but because of humanness. Helena has the human qualities equivalent to those conceived as belonging to a person of the same class as Bertram, for there is no distinction between the qualities of people of different classes: "our bloods," the King remarks, "pour'd all together, / Would quite confound distinction"

(2.3.118-20). For these reasons she and Diana are given rights equal to those of the men and the noble. The "historical traditions of interpretation" in this instance, or what are becoming the historical traditions of interpretation (because the traditions are being newly formulated), are the understanding that Helena and Diana fit the criteria of humanness despite their being women, fatherless, poor, and of questionable class status.

Rawls explains that citizens acquire this education in a particular conception of justice through "public culture" by a combination of several means: belief in the justice of the society's institutions, familiarization with others' putting into practice the principles of these institutions, and trust in the enduring trustworthiness, both of the other members of the society and of its institutions.¹⁷ This education is the process Bertram must undergo in order to accept the conception of justice within which Helena and Diana can be given equal rights. He is familiarized with the new system, eventually believes in its justice, and finally trusts its members and institutions. A dissenter during the period of its gradual establishment, he has acquired the attitudes of society once this new system has become what Rawls calls "public culture" and has its own established -- traditional -- interpretations. In his longer discussion of this educational process in *Theory of Justice*, Rawls notes that its primary conditions are "an institutional setting" that is "just" and "publicly known to be such;" the King's validation of Helena's conception of fairness and the public's accession to the justice of her thinking provide these conditions for Bertram.¹⁸ In this sense the "education to the ideal" is similar.

The greater complexity of the education in *All's Well*, however, is evident when we consider that Rawls's "public culture" is largely constituted of what we

¹⁷First, "when they believe that institutions or social practices are just, or fair;" second when "other persons with evident intention strive to do their part in just or fair arrangements;" and third when "the success of cooperative arrangements is sustained over a longer time" (*Political Liberalism*, 86).

¹⁸A *Theory of Justice* (London: Oxford UP, 1976) 491.

have so far discussed as the knowledge source "tradition" or "traditional knowledge." In both his initial refusal and final acceptance of Helena, Bertram exercises his right to free conscience on the basis of this traditional knowledge. Only when the principles of justice or fairness are a part of this knowledge source will most citizens in Rawls's society (like him) make judgments that comply with these principles.

But the dissenter at the beginning of the play -- Helena -- was different. For what is by the end of the play "public culture" -- traditional knowledge -- was at the beginning of the play and for her only an inspiration from "heaven." Secondly, this inspiration was opposed to the "public culture," including its traditional knowledge. Through her deductive reasoning the inspiration became (for her) reasonable, and through inductive reasoning (with the application of her thought to the King) it was proved reasonable for an authoritative figure (the King), and gradually for other members of the society.

The play therefore treats an educational process that has as its outcome not the maintenance of an established sense of justice (as in Rawls) but the introduction and formulation of a new sense of justice. These processes are not dealt with by Rawls because he focuses on a society at the stage when traditions are already established (but not corrupt). The comparison between his constructed society and that in *All's Well* is nevertheless illuminating because both suggest that the period in which the greatest number of people have the right to exercise freely their judgments is one in which this principle has become part of the traditional knowledge. In such a society, those who do not "stray" to other sources of knowledge (that is, when these instruments conflict with the tradition) exercise their freedom of conscience in a way that permits the most widespread implementation of this right.

But this is a strange conclusion, because it indicates that if the right to free conscience is to be implemented and enforced, a unified adhesion to a dominant epistemology is necessary. This raises two questions, the first concerning the relevance of epistemology to Rawls's political conception and the second concerning the limitations on freedom implied in any unity.

Rawls's theory circumvents the question of epistemology, which is considered a metaphysical question to be solved in any number of ways by the diverse religions and philosophies in his model society.¹⁹ The unity he argues for is purely political. On this view citizens adhering to different epistemologies will still be capable of shared cooperation within his model of a just society. A number of aspects of his theory of justice, however, suggest that not all philosophies and religions would provide concepts of the grounds of knowledge compatible with his theory. That is, there seems to be a limited range of epistemologies that a person could embrace and at the same time take part in his model society.

There is, for example, the aspect of "a reasonable overlapping consensus," which he says is needed in order to "justify" a society's "political conception of justice" (387-8). While this involves a freely decided political agreement among people whose beliefs differ in their non-political aspects, the method of coming to this unity and maintaining it imposes some limitations that have implications for their epistemologies. Among the criteria to achieve this consensus is the citizens' exercise of their political power "in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason" (137). Only if the knowledge derived on the basis of a person's epistemology is within the limits of these citizens' "common human reason" will that epistemology be

¹⁹He emphasizes this characteristic of his theory in his reply to Habermas in which he distinguishes his "political conception of justice" from Habermas's "comprehensive doctrine" (*Political Liberalism*, 376-7).

acceptable. This in fact is just one aspect of his theory among many that give importance to reason. Inasmuch as it provides freedom of conscience as a basic liberty that cannot be abandoned through any legitimate political process, the epistemologies of the society in his model would necessarily have to be ones in which freedom of conscience could be exercised. The nature of the exercise of this right requires reason. Thus prominence would have to be given to this knowledge source in the epistemologies adhered to in his model society.

The same can be said for the play. While in *All's Well* Bertram does not accept the new conception of justice (represented by Helena's freedom to choose him as spouse) until the idea has been popularized and made traditional, the King, as well as other members of the society -- the Countess, Lafew -- base their decisions on reason and do not revert to a tradition-dominated epistemology. This is evident in that they all make changes in their plans for and attitudes to Bertram after Helena's death. In other words, they are prepared to gauge the needs and possibilities of the society anew and to make changes accordingly. Even Bertram must rely on reason; in his final decision to accept Helena it is by reason of her success in performing the task that he accepts her.

In addition to the deductions about epistemology in a Rawlsian society given above, Rawls himself explains that tradition and reason are at the basis of the "fundamental ideas" of his theory.²⁰ In *Theory of Justice* he lists traditional theories of justice and offers reasons for the way he ranks them and makes use of

²⁰Concerning the importance of tradition in his theory, Rawls notes, "Society's main institutions, and their accepted forms of interpretation, are seen as a fund of implicitly shared ideas and principles. Thus, justice as fairness starts from within a certain political tradition . . ." On the other hand, these traditions must be subject to reason: "The reason the original position must abstract from and not be affected by the contingencies of the social world is that the conditions for a fair agreement on the principles of political justice between free and equal persons must eliminate the bargaining advantages that inevitably arise within the background institutions of any society from cumulative social, historical, and natural tendencies" (*Political Liberalism*, 14, 23).

them (124f). If one concludes then that the group of epistemologies, adhered to by the followers of "reasonable" philosophies and religions in Rawls's society, give precedence to reason while still making use of tradition, then his theory would seem to require some assumptions about epistemology similar to *All's Well's*.

A question may be also raised about the epistemology that gives importance to inspiration. None of the changes in the *All's Well* society would have occurred if Helena had not heeded her inspiration, and had not the King gone against what was reasonable and conceded to let her try out her theory when nothing else worked. One might say that insofar as philosophical, moral and religious doctrines and the epistemologies they entail are kept out of the process of public political consultation, the sources of the knowledge up for use in public debate could be varied, and hence might include Helena's inspiration. However, the content of her inspiration would have to be subject to public reasoning and would have to accord with the fundamental ideas of Rawls's theory. The question remains: Is reason up to this? Above all, can public reasoning, formed through education and essentially bound by traditions, be capable of this? If not, can Rawls's vision of the necessity of a continual improvement to the justice of society provide for this? Rawls does envisage a transformation; citizens "are made aware of and educated" to a conception of themselves "as free and equal" in part because through the fact of their "rights, liberties, and opportunities" they "are presented with a way of regarding themselves that otherwise they would most likely never be able to entertain."²¹ A related question is whether a conception of themselves limited to the political suffices to ensure this transformation.

Another question concerns change. In the play, the fairness Helena conceives for herself, and which is later extended to other women (Diana in particular), is not the fairness Bertram conceived for himself. Given the conditions

²¹*Political Liberalism*, 71.

of the society of the play, its moral principles, and its goals, however, Helena's fairness is adopted as the most just or "the just." The system of justice in the play's society must therefore imply an epistemology on the basis of which a relative and enforceable justice may be derived, one that would provide for a system capable of adapting to changing social needs and aspirations.

As to the limitations imposed by a unified adherence to an epistemology, the unified reliance on reason implied in Rawls's theory would appear to be inadequate under certain conditions. His theory of allowing for any epistemology as long as it gives a prominent place to reason, so that when the knowledge derived on its basis is brought to the political public forum it is judged on the basis of "common human reason," will not permit the gap between *Hamlet* and *All's Well* to be spanned. Such a unity in belief in reason will only create a just society once the ideas of what is just have been established as reasonable. If these ideas are "out of joint" with the aspirations of greater justice or a new justice, then the grounds of knowledge that are looked to will have to be those that bring major new thinking, epistemologies that give a prominent place to "heavenly" inspiration, as well as to reason and ordinary inspiration.

Human Rights Law and Epistemology

Nevertheless, the history of the practice of law would suggest, as do *Hamlet* and *All's Well*, that it is especially with the increased reliance on reason that conceptions of justice have become more just. The practice of law, even in its early known forms, implied an epistemology in which reason as well as tradition, revelation, intuition, inspiration and sense perception were grounds of knowledge used in judgment. The evolution of justice systems in the western world, however, reflects a change in the proportionate value given to these various knowledge sources. With the development of judicial and legislative bodies, and

with the secularization of law, more weight has been given to reason, especially in the building up of principles and laws to guide the decisions of judges.

Concomitant to this development there has been a step-by-step divestment of previously accepted exceptions: That is, the idea of equal justice for humans, which was at the basis of the early systems, was encumbered by exceptions -- slaves were exceptions, women were exceptions, the poor, the captive and the unpropertied were exceptions. Over time these exceptions were gradually reduced, and with the development of the philosophy of human rights, law entered a new phase, one in which they are virtually eliminated, at least in theory.

What happens in *All's Well* may be interpreted as representative of these synergistic processes (the expansion of reason-dominated epistemologies and the reduction of exceptions to rights). The embodiment of governance and justice (the King) discards a system in which the right to choose is dependent on being a member of certain social categories, and instead takes on a new system in which the group possessing this right is widened to include the meritorious regardless of sex or class. The former system gave greater value to tradition: no matter how unwise, unjust and unworthy the person was, he had rights because he belonged to a class of people who traditionally had those rights. In the latter system reason has more weight than tradition: a variety of people -- all, if we note Bertram's freedom to choose Maudlin at the end, have the same rights to choose. The only persons whose rights are limited are those who committed a crime (as at the moment in the play when it is believed Bertram killed Helena).

From the perspective of the right to education, human rights law also concurs with what in Rawls and *All's Well* is conducive if not essential to the implementation of the right to free conscience: an education directed to the specific goal of establishing and maintaining belief in justice, for the attainment of which an epistemology dominated by reason or inspired reason is required. Paragraph 2 of

Article 26 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes the purposes of the right to education:

Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.²²

The first two of these objectives, "the full development of the human personality" and "the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms," would seem to imply an epistemology in which reason has a prominent place. The development of every aspect of the human personality is dependent upon the use of this faculty; and similarly, the deepening of any conviction in, and the improvement of the implementation of, any principle is best accomplished through judgment based on reason.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for three more objectives for education: "the development of the sense of human dignity; enabling all persons to participate effectively in a free society; and the promotion of understanding, tolerance and friendship among *ethnic* groups."²³ Again, the sort of epistemology required in a society with these purposes would be something other than one that perpetuates current traditions and hinders reasonable change.

The same paradox, observed in the play and in Rawls's theory, concerning the necessity of maintaining a particular sort of epistemology in order that the right to free conscience be accessible to the greatest number of people is evident in the

²²United Nations, *Human Rights: A Compilation*, 3.

²³Sieghart, *The International Law*, 247-8.

idea of compulsory education noted in the first paragraph of the Declaration's article on education:

Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit (3).

Paul Sieghart observes, "the right to education seems to be the only right which requires those who have it to be positively *compelled* to do something. Here, for once, there seems to be a real distinction between a right and a freedom."²⁴ The degree of compulsion is limited by the Article's third paragraph, "Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children." This limitation, however, has been interpreted in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to be "confined" to the "children's 'religious and moral' education," and in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to "education and teaching in conformity with the parents' 'religious and philosophical' convictions."²⁵ It would appear then that this limitation cannot hinder the state's obligation to provide a compulsory education that fulfills the purposes mentioned above. As such, the compulsory education would lead to a wide acceptance of a particular epistemology or set of epistemologies, presumably weighted in favour of reason. In the light of this explanation of human rights law, the compulsory education of Bertram in *All's Well* does not seem so bad.

²⁴Sieghart, *The Lawful Rights*, 144.

²⁵Sieghart, *The International Law*, 248.

Epilogue

Ibsen's motivation for his work -- "a question of human rights" -- which he said "if you read my books carefully you will realise,"¹ probably had nothing to do with the influences of Shakespeare, though we now know the Elizabethan poet is one of the few writers he read.² Whitman, who celebrates human rights in his own poetic expressions, thought frequently on Shakespeare's plays. The nineteenth-century François Guizot, whose "career" Michael Bristol tells us "was devoted to efforts to establish a constitutional basis for democracy, during the prolonged and complicated aftermath of the French Revolution," was a Shakespearean.³ But again, what importance was Shakespeare to their thoughts on rights when everywhere ordinary people were calling for them? (Tolstoy, whose life works also promote human rights, did not share this admiration for Shakespeare.) The suspicion of some connection between Ibsen's, Whitman's and Guizot's ideas and Shakespeare, and the concomitant, more compelling evidence of immediate, quite different historical and sociological influences reflect our present-day dichotomous relationship with early modern England and its prime poet. Displaying this in its account of twentieth-century critiques of order, power, and rights in Shakespeare, the first chapter of this thesis presents the

¹And not specifically "women's rights" as expected by The Norwegian Society for Women's Rights at whose banquet given in his honour he made this honest clarification of his literary intentions. Quoted in Michael Meyer, *Henrik Ibsen: The Top of a Cold Mountain 1883-1906*, vol. 3 (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1971) 297.

²Inga-Stina Ewbank, "Shakespeare, Ibsen, and Rome: A Study in Cultural Transmission," *Shakespeare and Cultural Traditions: The Selected Proceedings of the International Shakespeare Association World Congress, Tokyo, 1991*, ed. Tetsuo Kishi, Roger Pringle and Stanley Wells (Newark: U of Delaware P, 1991) 229-42. See especially 238-9.

³Michael D. Bristol, *Big-time Shakespeare* (London: Routledge, 1996) 203, 230.

views of some who pursue the side of this dichotomy that concentrates on the contrast between early modern and modern times.

But it also peers into the cultural house of Shakespeare's family of writings -- the social context of the production and first performances of his works. Because this house was built up of the materials of a former age, it and its inhabitants have appeared to many as very medieval. But anthropology and sociology now pry open history to show more of its aspects, some of which are like our own, built four centuries later. This new perspective enables the present work to interpret the text more closely within its first culture and hence to focus on the other side of our relationship with Shakespeare, in particular the common conceptions of an equal human dignity in all people and its implications in rights for the individual.

The mysterious tie, between modern human rights and Shakespeare, between the human rights of Ibsen and Whitman and Shakespeare's (which I have pointed to as examples of this tie that cannot be explained by influence), is one of cultural housing. Noting that "What characterizes medieval in contrast to modern society is its lack of individual freedom," Erich Fromm's *Escape From Freedom* looks to the period of the Reformation as a time in which peoples broke out of a secure but limiting world into one in which they had to embrace the freedom to govern themselves.⁴ He observes a "fundamental likeness in the social situation" of fifteenth and sixteenth-century Europe and today (54-55). While I might add that there is also a fundamental difference between the two eras, freedom of conscience (and other human rights) did emerge at that time as profoundly important to persons, although human rights did not become a central issue of

⁴1941 (New York: Avon Books, 1965) 57. While the historical causes of this radical change have yet to be fully explained, historians of freedom do agree on the timing of this movement toward a new level of freedom in human society.

multiple social actions until the nineteenth century, the term only coming in to use in the late 1700s.⁵ Nevertheless, using the old materials in an innovative way, Shakespeare "fashioned" his family of plays into a set of cultural critiques pertinent to human rights. The present analysis of four dramas has taken a print of the bare features of their modern rights philosophy. The analysis is made, not as a way of proving Shakespeare's plays occupy the same cultural house as Rawls's theory and modern rights instruments, but to enjoy and benefit from their dramatic exposé of ideas amazingly related to this theory and these instruments, and indeed illuminative of them and their problems.

Both pairs of plays look at two aspects of freedom of conscience, one that concerns mainly the conditions of society and the other that concerns mainly the possibilities for individual freedom within society. Thus, while the analyses of *King John* and *All's Well* explore features of the social setting that are relevant to the exercise of freedom of conscience, those of *Much Ado* and *Hamlet* consider how the individual is constrained to relate to these features if she or he is to express individual thought. On the other hand, the two sets of plays provide material for the discussion of two aspects of the philosophic basis of human rights, and in particular freedom of conscience. In *King John* and *Much Ado* we look at the ideological bases of freedom of conscience, and in *Hamlet* and *All's Well* the epistemological foundations. Epistemological foundations, while they are also ideological, refer to the grounds on which knowledge is based and their relevance to human rights. They are of special interest in a study of freedom of conscience, first because they are often taken for granted and therefore the impact of differences in them on the implementation of freedom of conscience is neglected, and second because of the link between them and human thought.

⁵In the writings of Thomas Paine.

The ideology or group of ideologies that *King John* and *Much Ado* show the necessity of may be divided into moral and political. *King John*, in the reading here, paints a picture of a society whose dominant ideology is without the moral value of integrity, and constructs characters who are impeded in their exercise of free conscience because of this absence of a moral foundation. This absence of integrity affects the political institutions and activities of the society, so that they become emptied of authority. Without the people's respect in them, they lose the power to govern and attract participation, while strange prophets and "Old men and beldames" draw firm belief and large followings. In *Much Ado* we see that the individual's liberty is constrained rather because there is little understanding of the society's political ideology that allows for liberty of conscience but interferes with those who prevent others from exercising it. Only Dogberry and Verges, and later Benedick, really come to terms with its implications. Very much like the disjunction between twentieth-century "intellectual" and "emotional" maturity that Fromm cites as a reason for modern persons' running away from freedom,⁶ *King John*'s society's slippage between value and name obstructs people's movement towards freedom and *Much Ado*'s society's lack of the basic values necessary for the full implementation of rights (most noticeably the respect of all members of society regardless of class, religion and belief, economic status and educational status) prevent its members' enjoyment of freedom of thought. But the latter play speaks more on the way ideologies have to be subordinate to a political one that guarantees this respect, if they are not to impinge unjustly on the individual's right to free conscience, and so offers a partial solution to the society's moral vacuity.

Hamlet and *All's Well* deal with the different relationships of epistemologies to the philosophy of free conscience, proving that some harbour

⁶Foreword to his twenty-fifth edition, xiv-xv.

the possibility of more freedom than others. As a means to this statement, the two plays are set at different stages of a shift in the society's epistemology from one giving precedence to a corrupt tradition that allows little freedom to one governed by an inspired reason that provides more freedom. These epistemologies differ in their manner of control, the first employing violence and indoctrination, the second trustworthy love and learning. In *All's Well*, because the epistemology is a new one, the focus is on its means of coming to influence, that is, on learning. The two plays also demonstrate a contrast in the behaviour between individuals who use opposing sources of knowledge in different ways, arguing on one hand that only those who have some skepticism concerning traditions as sources of knowledge can gain from the changes in the society, and on the other that their acting upon their reasoned judgments requires trust in and support from others. Ultimately, *Hamlet* and *All's Well* give precedence to the sources of knowledge that allow freedom's fullest application. In both plays these are shown to be inductive reasoning and an inspiration validated through inductive reasoning.

The theory of freedom of conscience these plays represent is, in simple terms, constituted of two generalizations: People's thought and its freedom depend on education. People all have capacity for and need to exercise freedom of thought. The first generalization, the factor of education in human thinking, including that dispensed by social conditioning and the dominant ideology and epistemology, suggests that procuring and maintaining this right in society is a far more complex endeavour than the institution of a law or political policy. It therefore indicates the intimations the author of the plays had of the sticking points modern human rights theorists and practitioners are grappling with -- the changes necessary outside law if human rights are to be implemented. The second, apparently contradictory generalization implies the independence in human thinking always available to individuals, a fact that has led human rights

philosophers to characterize freedom of conscience as the only "absolute" human right. Though *Hamlet* and *King John* demonstrate the ineffectiveness of this right in a society that deters or prohibits its expression, pointing to the counterpart freedom of speech plays in the institution of free conscience in society, all four plays construct characters who exercise freedom of conscience in the midst of an education and social conditioning that runs counter to their free thinking. It is to this problem that almost all the current human rights cases concerning freedom of conscience relate. While the plays examined here explore to a limited degree the intimate relationship between freedom of conscience and other human capacities and freedoms, other plays that focus on free speech expose these relationships with great clarity. A study of freedom of speech in Shakespeare's plays, the completion of which I shall give my attention to in the near future, will clarify the inextricable links between these two rights, as well as those between them and other human rights. Nevertheless, the connections between ideology and epistemology and freedom of conscience evident in the plays looked at here indicate that the thinking in these early modern plays ties in with the concerns of modern human rights philosophers about the indivisibility between social and educational rights and civil and political rights.

The failure, relatively speaking, of Shakespeare's plays to impact on the human rights projects of later critics, statesmen, poets, jurists and human rights philosophers, belies, therefore, the truth of the interest in rights they were directed to at the time of their composition and first performance. That in his 1995 commentary on Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Judge Iyer should refer to *Hamlet*, "What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculty . . .",⁷ as the perfect expression of the conception

⁷Iyer, V. R. Krishna, *Human Rights -- A Judge's Miscellany* (Delhi: B. R. Publishing Corporation, 1995) 2-3.

of human beings underlying the philosophy of human rights might be regarded as one of many ways Shakespeare's words have been borrowed by people to voice their concerns. But it also draws out threads that were, in Shakespeare's time, part of a pattern not entirely unlike the new one Judge Iyer puts them into. Future studies may reveal if Ibsen's, Whitman's, Guizot's, and Iyer's thoughts on rights were partly formed, as mine have been, by their perceptions of this pattern. Whatever their outcome, the link that the present study traces nevertheless points to the intermediary spot Shakespeare's dramas occupy between the fiction and the reality of something very important to all humanity. What was in one epoch an impossible dream and yet had existence as a dream, and was remembered in folktales and played out in folk rites, became in the next age something people believed was possible; and has emerged in the twentieth century as something widely practicable. So the medieval imagination that every subject might be king took shape in the early modern era -- here in the example of Shakespeare's poetry -- as a goal for the real society proposed in a drama. And though the goal of a "place and means for every man alive" became (in the several centuries that followed) an experiment hampered by the agenda of exploiting some peoples in order to bring independence and justice to others (what Paine described as charters of rights that excluded persons from rights),⁸ in the twentieth century its meaning has been revolutionized. Echoing some of their early sense, Shakespeare's words mean to us not just "every man alive" but "every man and woman and child alive," and not a "placement" and "means" fixed by heredity but given in accordance with the principles of equal dignity and respect for all.

⁸Thomas Paine, *The Rights of Man*, in *Common Sense, The Rights of Man, and Other Essential Writings of Thomas Paine*, with an introduction by Sidney Hook (New York: Meridian, 1969) 273.

Eric Bentley's comment about the impossibility of Brecht's goal to separate childish theatre from adult theatre sheds further light on the affinity between Shakespeare's human rights ideas and those in twentieth-century instruments and theories, in the sense that both are intended to be practiced. If we see the evolution of the function of theatre from one of identification and empathy to one of "alienation" and philosophizing, which while it permits more critical reflection maintains a playfulness (as Bentley insists it does),⁹ then Shakespeare's plays stand as a swinging door between the two, offering the auditor a sitting in both rooms. The Carnival festivities and medieval moralities, the ritual and pageantry of church and state, whose didacticism thrived on the people's empathy, ironically imparted a philosophy of social well-being whose only existence was in the imagination. This room of entertainment and social commentary remained open to the first audiences of Shakespeare's plays, allowing a vicarious experimentation with a new theory. But there was another room that was also open. It sheltered theories of freedom of conscience and freedom of speech, as well as other philosophies, posed one beside the other in a collection, which while it enhanced the perception of some ideas over others nevertheless afforded the "alienated" audience a chance to reflect critically on all of them. Paradoxically bringing fiction into life through stopping life going into fiction, this opportunity not to be wholly drawn in, but to reflect and theorize, may have made the experience of his drama in the realm of poesis and pretense available for praxis and reality.

⁹*The Life of Drama*, 1964 (New York: Atheneum, 1983) 161-3.

Appendix One

Because of questions raised by the external examiner and others, a word must be added concerning the conceptions of human being, author and audience which are taken for granted both in the principle of freedom of conscience and in the assumption that the four plays studied here were the product of an intelligent and intentioned author and that they provided a specific range of meanings to their first audiences that is currently partially knowable. In this thesis it has, for several reasons, been indispensable to reconstruct the author (Shakespeare), together with this first audience of his plays. The primary reason for this is that such reconstruction is implicit in any endeavour to find an interpretation of the text that purports to be within close margins of the meanings it offered at the time of its composition and early performance. An editor, as MacD. Jackson implies in his recent article on "Editing *Hamlet* in the 1980s," must undertake this reconstruction if, as in the case of *Hamlet* for example, he is to answer to the "readers and actors" who "desire editions that use the evidence of these three seventeenth-century texts to reconstruct a single version answering to Shakespeare's inferred 'final intention' for the play."¹ Every literary critic necessarily assumes and reconstructs an author of some sort. But because of the confusion that has developed over the meaning of author and his / her relationships to the text and to the readers and in order not to be mistaken for claiming the discovery of the whole and perfect meaning of the text, recent critics do not always acknowledge this inevitable step in the interpretive process.²

¹Jackson, MacD. P. "Editing *Hamlet* in the 1980s: Textual Theories and Textual Practices." *Hamlet Studies*. 11. 1-2 (1989): 66.

²Many however do refer to or quite obviously infer an author and first audience, which they describe and evaluate. See Tennenhouse, Sinfield, and Greenblatt. (*The Tudor Interludes*, 12; *Literature in Protestant England*, 82, 87, 101, etc.; *Shakespearean Negotiations*, Chapter One.)

The second reason for such reconstruction of author and audience in the text under study is that this is not the case with Shakespeare's plays: there is a consistency in the questions raised in his texts that is adequate enough to give evidence of the writer's political philosophy and provide the grounds to say he promoted a particular philosophy of human rights. (Not only is freedom of conscience a human right repeatedly represented, from his first plays to *The Tempest* (the latter as argued by Annabel Patterson), but freedom of speech, freedom of consent in marriage, the right to representation, the right of prisoners of war, the right of choice in fighting in a war are all human rights subjects discussed in his plays.) Third, the very subject (freedom of conscience and Shakespeare) that is discussed in this thesis is based on the assumption that human beings "are endowed with reason and conscience," a presupposition enshrined in the most important human rights instrument that guarantees freedom of conscience.³

This presupposition of reason and conscience in human beings entails a definitive conception of individuals; it assumes the belief that human beings have intelligence and are capable of intentions that do not characterize the other creatures. Two aspects of a creation are indicative of its having an intelligent and intentional creator; one is order, the second is difference. One discovers a vacant island covered with wild flowers of pink and red and blue, and then finds at one end of the island a circular bed of yellow tulips, hedged with another circle of green shrub. One immediately acknowledges that this orderly garden had an intelligent and intentional creator, the reason being its comparative orderliness and design. Concomitantly we can consider the example of a town in which all the homes have green lawns except two, which instead have yards covered with

³This instrument, agreed upon by the nations of the world "as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations," is The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (*Human Rights: A Compilation*, 1).

stones. If the phenomenon of lawn were a natural one -- unintentional and unintelligent -- we would expect the green lawn to be reproduced over and over in conformity with the nature of the land. But on investigation we find nothing indicates this; as to the stones, their context or environment is no different from that of the green lawns. We therefore consider that the fact of these two stone yards' being different is indicative of their authors' intention and intelligence. From their capacity for non-natural creation we deduce that humans are beings with intelligence and intention, reason and conscience. Because these capacities are universal and their exercise is essential to human well-being, development and progress, all individuals must, by law, be allowed to exercise them freely; hence the human right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

A piece of literature, like a circular tulip garden, or stone lawn, amid a relative wilderness or a mass of conformity, is clearly the creation of a creator endowed with intelligence and intention, hence reason and conscience.⁴ So the plays traditionally attributed to Shakespeare are implicitly the products of the intelligence and intention embodied in an author. As clear-cut as this may be, the relationships between authors and their creations and between their intentions and their intelligence and their creations entail complexities that in this century have been the subject of disputes so fertile that the methods of studying literature have been revolutionized. To trace the path of this revolution is too long for the purposes of this appendix; suffice it to say that we now understand the author and his or her intentions and intelligence as they pertain to the text to be only partially and relatively recoverable and the text's context -- social, literary, cultural, political, legal, religious, personal, etc. -- to be almost as significant for this recovery as the text itself.

⁴True, relatively speaking so is the wilderness or the grass lawn, both of which manifest degrees of distinction and order -- they too must have creators endowed with intention and intelligence.

As a result of the changes in knowledge about history, societies and individuals, the two relationships -- that between authors (as authorities) and their creations or texts, and that between their intentions and their intelligence and their texts -- have come to have a different significance for the meaning of literature.⁵ The conception of the relationship of author in the sense of authority to text has changed because the ideological commitments of authors have changed, and because ideals and ideologies are now widely considered to be largely corrupted by vested interests and at best only relatively good. The ideological commitments of authors may be divided into three categories: first, commitment to telling the truth (whether or not it argues for the beliefs I espouse); second, a commitment to write whatever will promote my social, political, or religious philosophy; third, a commitment to write what will earn me a living. Situated at the crossroads of great changes in literary production, when examples of these three categories coexisted and when some authors vied to be perceived in one while in fact endorsing another, Shakespeare likely partook of all three. Without taking time to delineate the evidence we have for this, the assumption is that he probably tried to be and was heard as: an authority of truth, an adherent of a particular social, religious and political philosophy, and a delighter of the crowd. Our way into how much he was committed to these three aims is only through what we can gauge from a reconstruction of his audience -- what, given the text and given the thinking and theatrical practices of the period, would it have been possible for them to gain from a performance of his text? But while his ideological commitments are then understood only tentatively -- as among these possibilities, repetition of certain patterns gives grounds for firmer conclusions. It is on this

⁵Reflection on an article by Donald E. Pease helped me to the understanding that follows. "Author," in *Critical Terms for Literary Study*, edited by Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990) 105-20.

basis that I dare to say that Shakespeare promoted a particular philosophy of human rights in his plays.

The second problematic relationship -- that between an author's intention and intelligence and his or her text -- has similarly inhibited recent critics from avowing a presupposition of a particular intention and reasoning behind the texts they study. There are at least five reasons why this relationship is problematic. Before listing them, I would like to note that in certain texts it may be impossible to determine the intention and reasoning of their author (and hence their meaning).⁶ On the other hand, I shall after each point show that in the case of Shakespeare's plays the problem of the relationship between text and author's intention and intelligence may be resolved in a reasonably satisfactory way.

The first reason for such a problem is the possibility of interventions made in the text by those responsible for its transmission. The editions now current have been established as closely reflective of the sixteenth-century English plays composed by one author, generally believed to be Shakespeare. We have the tremendous advantage of texts actually printed during the author's lifetime or shortly after. Even where discrepancies between Quarto and Folio editions make for an important change of meaning, the variations we as a consequence have of these plays are nevertheless all compositions that addressed the same social context and therefore their interpretation can provide us with significant insights into the meanings they had at one or another of their stages in the compositional process or for one or another of their first audiences.

⁶It may be barely possible or impossible to understand texts inconsistent with others by the same author or those we have only fragments of. An anonymous, undated, romantic poem, written in symbolic language provides another example. The poem may be referring not to a lover but to an idea, a philosophy, a country, etc. We know this because the authors of other comparable poems have sometimes specified their intentions. An instance is Shelley's *Epipsychidion*, whose intended subject he noted was not romantic love.

Second, there is the problem of the changes and adaptations made by the author during the process of the play's early stage production, some of which may have compromised his or her intentions. It is unlikely that in the case of Shakespeare's texts we can have any sure knowledge about these changes. This is so with the works of most authors, and therefore must be considered an unknown ordinarily beyond reach. In any case it is legitimately negligible in the sense that all writing is a process involving two voices and two ears: the voice and ear of the writer and the voice and ear of the readers or audience. The writer cannot be heard unless he or she speaks their language and hears with their ears; the writer's intentions are therefore always to a degree compromised.

Third, there are the particular limitations and possibilities that surround every author, as a member of a particular society and as a person with individual traits. (The authors of the stone lawn may have used stone rather than sea shells or cement for a variety of reasons relative to these limitations and possibilities.) Our knowledge of these is fairly substantial for Shakespeare. We know for example that by birth and profession he was of the group of people interested in "upward class mobility;" hence he was by experience familiar with the predicament of receiving less respect than people born into a higher class. The motto he chose for his father's coat of arms -- *NON SANZ DROIT* -- suggests a real interest in declaring the rights of those in society normally thought not to possess them. Furthermore, we know from the history of the period that the most frequent and far-reaching discussions of the nascent human rights ideas concerned freedom of conscience, so that the possibilities of writing about it were vaster than, for example, discrimination based on nationality, colour or sex. When a meaning is already (on other grounds) found to be evident in the text, information such as this may be confirmatory.

The fourth and most tricky problem of the text / author's intention and intelligence relationship is that we as readers and critics must become aware of the differences between our reading and reading at the author's time, or in the case of performance our playgoing and playgoing at the author's time. These discrepancies may be rooted in different theatrical practices, different semantics, different cultural and social contexts. An example discussed in chapter two concerns the term "majesty," which in our own time is most often used in the contexts of politics or government and descriptions of nature, but which in Shakespeare's time had a peculiarly religious significance. A consciousness of the effects of severe censorship on authorship in sixteenth-century England is also critical to dealing with this problem. One frequent effect is that in order to avoid censorship or punishment authors often pretended to be writing to delight, that is, to be writing something romantic, nonsensical, or humorous, when they intended to convey a serious message. Only if we are conscious of this fact shall we be able to begin to decipher the serious matter in Shakespeare's comedies, for example.

A fifth aspect of this relationship, one especially relevant in the current study, is that there is a vast difference in what we can know about the meaning of texts. Genre is of major importance. The meaning of a non-fictional document such as The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is far more easily known than that of an abstract painting, a postmodern poem, or even a short story. A play may be more easily interpreted when it is one of a large corpus of works by the same author, or when it makes plain reference to other literature by other authors of the same period. The genre of drama altogether, as that of the novel, makes for easier understanding -- especially as regards the political and social ideology it discusses -- because it generally represents a whole society, and puts its individuals in the context of a society. Shakespeare's plays, as dramatic texts, and

because there are an extensive number of them, and because almost all (if not all) make reference to and use of other known texts, have ample means of interpretation. Their dramatization of little societies, their dialectic presentations of arguments, and the relevance of these societies and arguments to the problems of the real society, as well as the repeated patterns of reasoning that may be noticed in the study of a number of plays, particularly those composed in the same period, should allow us to narrow down their meaning (that is, their author's intention and reasoning) relatively substantially.

Another critical factor is context. The context comprises the addressees of the text --the society, the audience, the culture, to which the author intended to speak, as well as the multiple individuals and facets that make them up -- but not only these. The materials available to the author and the audience are also part of this context. These materials include whatever was known to the society or the audience. But, more important for us (as for the author who composed the text), are those things known to more than one member of the society -- the commonly used symbols; folktales; frequently used methods of teaching, communication, or explanation; and literature, songs, allegories, beliefs, customs, practices, events, and concerns that were familiar to a number of people at the time.

Because we know so much about the addressees of Shakespeare's plays and have at our disposal vast evidence of the materials available to him and his audience, we are in a good position to establish a range of likely interpretations of his texts at the time of their composition and first performance. These interpretations are the closest we can come to unravelling the relationship between the text and the author's intention and intelligence or reasoning.

It is therefore by considering the audience's response to the author's text that we find out his or her intention and reasoning, that is, what can be known of this intention and reasoning. For the only point of contact between this intention

and reasoning and the audience was the cultural material available to the audience, and hence it is through our knowledge of this material that we reconstruct an audience and come to know the author who was speaking to this audience. The members of this first audience may also be viewed as the plays' authors or components of their author in the sense that they transmuted the performances they viewed (in accordance with their personal interpretations) into a multitude of different plays. Obviously some of these interpretations must have been foreseen and intended by Shakespeare and thus they lead us to his intentions and reasoning. Furthermore, as an author he had to function as vicarious audience of his own plays in order to make them convey to this audience his serious meaning. Hence an author is implicit in the assumption of audience, and so too is an audience in the assumption of an author. The interpretation of a text implies both.

Appendix Two

While there are significant differences in their methodology and interpretations, a few aspects of Greenblatt's *Shakespearean Negotiations* are strikingly reminiscent of the feelings and interests expressed by Gayley in his book *Shakespeare and the Founders of Liberty in America*, especially the chapter entitled, "Shakespeare's Views of the Individual in Relation to the State" (115-61). Greenblatt's passion for Shakespeare's "most satisfying intensity" -- the intense "life" Shakespeare's works represent (1) -- the enduring "life" of works like his and their "social energy" (6), and his central question, "How did so much life get into the textual traces of Shakespeare?" compare noticeably with Gayley's profound impression of Shakespeare's "vitality." While Gayley's interest in Shakespeare's social and political creed is not likely to have been significant to a critic of the second half of the twentieth century, Greenblatt's sociological approach to literature and his detailed comparisons between history and literature recall Gayley's very detailed historical research in which, for example, he notices connections between "words, phrases, figures, incidents" in *The Tempest* and the "True Declaration," a pamphlet which recounted historical events, mishaps, etc. of a real adventure. However suggestive these parallels, they do not necessarily give the impression that Greenblatt took an interest in Gayley and was influenced by him. What does give this impression is the similarity between their comments on the words of Hamlet they cite concerning the goal or "end" of "playing":

to hold as 'twere the mirror up to nature; to show virtue
her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and
body of the time his form and pressure. . . .

(3.2.22-24)

Greenblatt focuses on the word “pressure;” the purpose of a play is to “show . . . the very age and body of the time his form and pressure.” He observes that in the period the conception of the act of mirroring included the idea that something emanated from the object whose form was caught in the mirror and that something was exchanged so as to allow its reflection to be held in the mirror. Greenblatt uses this reference to introduce his view that we must “reinvest the mirror with a sense of pressure as well as form” -- so that it can convey something of “its original strangeness or magic,” so that, in plainer terms, we can hear the voice and see the drama as it was heard and seen at its time. The play was the mirror image; through a study of the exchanges that occurred between the real life of the society, the character of the age, the poet’s conception of virtue and scorn, and the production of this image, we can come to grips with the influence, the magic, the charm that image exerted on the population when it was first conjured up before their eyes on the Elizabethan stage. Like Greenblatt, Gayley also begins one of his important explanations about Shakespeare’s writing by focussing on the terms “form and pressure” drawn from *Hamlet*. Quoting an odd description -- “Shakespeare was like putty” -- he explains that Shakespeare bore the forms of all that was going on around him, but at the same time only accepted this shaping in accordance with his perception. In other words, Gayley considers that Shakespeare did not simply reflect his social context unthinkingly, but he was capable of showing it and how he interpreted it in dramatic form. It is precisely this capacity and activity Greenblatt is fascinated with and which he analyzes so perceptively in *Shakespearean Negotiations*.

Appendix Three

Dogberry's admonition to his subordinates, "Ye shall comprehend all vagrom men" suggests an analogy with Catholics, for the term vagrant was applied in the House of Commons to a particular group of Catholics whose freedoms of conscience and expression were not tolerated -- the "rabble of vagrant friars,"¹ itinerant Jesuits who wandered throughout England reinforcing English Catholic faith. Laws of increasing severity were passed to apprehend them and punish them between 1581 and 1593.² When Dogberry does not admonish his constables to "apprehend" all vagrom men but to "comprehend" them, his apparent error underlines the freedom of conscience theme developed in the rest of the play. If this statement were intended to allude to the laws suppressing the Jesuits, then it is one more proof of the play's radical philosophy of freedom of conscience.

¹J. E. Neale, *Queen Elizabeth* (London: Jonathon Cape, 1934) 252, 267.

²Ken Powell and Chris Cook, *English Historical Facts: 1485-1603* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1977) 124-28

Appendix Four

The discrepancy between the two kinds of knowledge sources these famous physicians (Galen and Paracelsus) were associated with suggests that Helena's superior knowledge involves sources different not only from tradition but also from the inductive reasoning on which the new learning relied. Claudius Galen, it is true, was associated with tradition. His theory of anatomy relied on book learning, and his manner of learning anatomy relied on books. His critics, however, relied on induction. Thus Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564) found through dissections he made that Galen's anatomy had many errors, and in 1543 he published his own work on the subject, in which he demonstrated that "anatomy could be learned only by dissection."¹

Unlike Galen, Paracelsus (1493-1541) was associated with empirical knowledge, and at the same time vociferously opposed tradition: He chose for himself the name Paracelsus "to publicise his contempt for Celsus and other authors who had been dead more than a thousand years, yet whose medical texts were still current in the Middle Ages;" he threw the medical textbook of one of the ancient erudite authors into a bonfire.² Like those of Vesalius, his methods were inductive, enabling him to make accurate diagnoses.

¹Jerome Blum, Rondo Cameron, Thomas G. Barnes, *A History: The European World* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1966) 87.

²J. Bronowski, *The Ascent of Man* (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1973) 140-2.

Select Bibliography

Primary Sources

Andrewe, L. "Directory of conscience." Woodcut. 1527? As reproduced in Edward Hodnett, ed. *English Woodcuts: 1480 -1535*, fig. 199. Oxford University Press, 1973.

Avale, Lemeke. comp. *A Commemoration or Dirige of Bastarde Edmonde Boner, alias Savage, usurped Bishoppe of London*. 1569.

Bacon, Francis. *The Advancement of Learning and New Atlantis*. Edited by Arthur Johnston. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974.

_____. *Bacon's Essays*. Edited by F. G. Selby. London: Macmillan, 1948.

_____. *The New Organon and Related Writings*. Edited by Fulton H. Anderson. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960.

_____. *The Wisedome of the Ancients*. Translated by Sir Arthur Gorges. 1619. Reprint, New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1976.

_____. *The Works of Francis Bacon*. Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, Douglas Denis Heath. 14 Vols. London, 1857-74.

Bancroft, Richard. *A Survay of the Pretended Holy Discipline*. London: John Wolfe, 1593. STC 1352.

Barkar, William. *The Bookes of Xenophon*. London: Reynolde Wolfe, 1550. STC 26066.

Barrow-Faustus [pseud.?]. *The second part of Barrow-Faustus Dreame*. Ballad. A. M[athewes, c. 1620]. STC 1527.7.

Bible. King James version.

Bodin, Jean. *The Six Bookes of a Commonweale*. 1576 in French, 1586 in Bodin's Latin. Translated by Richard Knolles (from both versions), 1606. Reprint, Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 1962.

Burton, Robert. *The Anatomy of Melancholy*. Edited by Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicolas K. Kiessling, Rhonda L. Blair. Vol. 3. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

Busher, Leonard. "Religion's Peace: or a Plea for Liberty of Conscience." 1614. *Tracts on Liberty of Conscience and Persecution*. Hanserd Knollys Society. London: J. Hadden, 1846.

Calvin, Jean. *Institution de la religion chrestienne*. Vol. 1, edited by Jean-Daniel Benoit. Paris, 1957.

Camden, William. *Annales, The true and royall history of the famous emperesse Elizabeth . . .* London: for B. Fisher, 1625-1629.

_____ *The History of the Most Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth, Late Queen of England; Containing All the most Important and Remarkable Passages of STATE, both at Home and Abroad (so far as they were linked with English Affairs) during her Long and Prosperous REIGN.* First published in Latin, 1615. 4th ed., 1688. Reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1970.

Charke, William. *A treatise against the Defense of the Censure.* 3 Vols. Cambridge: T. Thomas, 1586. STC 5009.

Chaucer, Geoffrey. *The Riverside Chaucer.* 3d. ed. Edited by Larry D. Benson and F. N. Robinson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987.

Cheke, Henry. *Free-Will.* 1568. Manuscript, 1573.

Church of England. *Articles . . . for the avoyding of the diversities of opinions, and for the stablishing of consent touching true religion.* London: Christopher Baker, 1579. STC 10041.

_____ *Articles to be enqyred in the visitacyon, in the fyrst yeare of the raigne of our most dread soveraygne Lady, Elyzabeth by the grace of God, of England, Fraunce, and Irelande Quene, defender of the fayt.* 1559.

_____ *Communion.* In *The boke of common prayer.* E. Whytchurche, 1552.

Cipriano, Giovanni. *A Most Strange and Wonderfull Prophetie upon this Troublesome World.* Translated by A. Holloway. London: A. Jeffes, 1595. STC 5324.

Coke, Edward. *The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England.* Revised and Corrected by Francis Hargrave and Charles Butler. Vol. 1. Philadelphia: Robert H. Small, 1853. The first American edition, from the 19th London edition.

Cooper, Thomas. *An Admonition to the People of England.* London, 1589.

Crowley, Robert. *Fryer John Frauncis of Nigeon in Fraunce.* London: John Charlewoode, 1586.

Cunningham, William. *The Cosmographical Glasse.* London, 1559. STC 6119.

Curtis, Richard. *The Care of a Christian Conscience: Ten Sermons on the 25 Psalme . . .* London: Simon Stafford, 1600. STC 6134.

Cynewulf. *The Elene of Cynewulf.* Translated by Lucius Hudson Holt. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1904.

_____ *The Poems of Cynewulf.* Edited by Charles W. Kennedy. London: George Routledge & Sons, 1910.

Cyvile and Uncyvile Life. London, 1579. STC 15589.

Daniel, Samuel. *Musophilus: Containing a General Defense of all Learning.* London, 1599.

de Mornay, Philippe. *A Woorke Concerning the Trewnesse of the Christian Religion*. Translated by Sir Philip Sidney and Arthur Golding. London: Thomas Cadman, 1587.

_____. *Two homilies concerning the meanes how to resolve the controversies of this time*. 1612. STC 18164.

de Navarre, Marguerite. *L'Heptameron*. With notes by Frédéric Dillaye. 3 Vols. Paris: A. Lemerre, 1879.

Descartes, René. *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*. In *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*. Translated by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931.

du Plessis-Mornay, Philippe. *See* Languet, Hubert.

Elyot, Sir Thomas. *The Book named the Governor*. 1531. Edited by S. E. Lehmberg. New York: Dutton, Everyman, 1962.

Erasmus, Desiderius. *De Conscribendi Epistolas*. Translated and annotated by Charles Fantazzi. *Collected Works of Erasmus*. Vol. 25, *Literary and Educational Writings*, edited by J. K. Sowards. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983.

Faust, Johann Dr. [pseud.?]. *The historie of the damnable life, and deserued death of doctor John Faustus*. Newly imprinted, and amended: according to the true copie at Franckfort. Translated by P.F. gent. E. Alde for E. White, 1610. STC 10712.5.

Ficino, Marsilio. *The Letters of Marsilio Ficino*. Translated by Language Dept. London School of Economic Science. Vol. 1. London: Shephard-Walwyn, 1985.

Fleming, Abraham. *The Footeopath ...* London, 1581. STC 11041.

Fletcher, John. *Women Pleased*. 1620? *The Dramatic Works in the Beaumont and Fletcher Canon*. Edited by Fredson Bowers. Vol. 5. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Floyd, Thomas. *The Picture of a Perfit Commonwealth*. London: Simon Stafford, 1600. STC 11119.

Forset, Edward. *A Comparative Discourse of the Bodis Natural and Politique, Wherein out of the principles of Nature, is set forth the true forme of a Commonweale, with the dutie of Subjects, and the right of the Soveraigne, together with many good points of Political learning*. London: John Bill, 1606.

Fortescue, John. *The Governance of England*. 1470s. Edited by C. Plummer. Oxford, 1885.

Foster, Elizabeth Read. *See* Great Britain.

Fotherby, Martin. *Atheomastix: clearing foure truthes, against atheists and infidels*. London: Nicholas Okes, 1622. STC 11205.

Foxe, John. *The Acts and Monuments of John Foxe*. 4th ed. Revised and edited by Josiah Pratt. With an introduction by John Stoughton. Vol. 1. London: The Religious Tract Society, 1900.

Freud, Sigmund. *The Origins of Psychoanalysis*. Edited by Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud, and Ernst Kris. New York: Basic Books, 1954.

Fromm, Erich. *Escape From Freedom*. 1941. New York: Avon Books, 1965.

Gentilis, Alberico. *See* Hall, Joseph and Rainolds, John.

Gesta Romanorum. Edited by H. Oesterly. Vol. 3. Berlin, 1872.

Glanvill, Joseph. *Plus Ultra, or the Progress and Advancement of Knowledge*. London, 1668.

_____. *Scepsis Scientifica: or Confest Ignorance*. Edited by John Owen. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1885.

Goodman, Christopher. *How Superior Powers Oght to be Obeyd*. 1558. Reprint, With a Bibliography and Notes by Charles H. McIlwain. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931.

Great Britain. *Acta Regia: Being the Account which Mr. Rapin de Thoyras Published of the History of England*. London, 1733.

_____. *Proceedings in Parliament 1610*. Edited by Elizabeth Read Foster. 2 Vols. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966.

_____. *Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I*. Edited by T. E. Hartley. 3 Vols. Leicester University Press, 1981.

_____. *Middlesex. Calendar to the Session Records, Middlesex, 1612-14*. Vol. 1, edited by William Le Hardy. London: Sir Ernest Hart, 1935.

_____. Public Records Office. *Calendar of State Papers: Domestic Series, the reigns of Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, and James I, 1547-1625*. London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, and Roberts, 1856-72.

_____. Stationers' Company. *A Transcript of the Registers of the Company of the Stationers of London 1554-1660 A.D.* Vol. 2, edited by Edward Arber. London, 1875.

_____. *The Statutes of the Realm*. Vol. 3. London, 1810-1828.

Grotius, Hugo. *The Law of War and Peace*. Translated by Louise Loomis. New York: Walter J. Black, 1949.

_____. *Prolegomena*. Translated by Francis W. Kelsey, With an Introduction by Edward Dumbauld. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957.

Hakluyt, Richard. *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*. 1589. 2d ed. 1598-1600. Reprint, with Preface of 1st ed. and additional maps. 1903. Vol. 2. Reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1965.

Hall, Joseph. *The discovery of the new world*. 1605. Also attributed to Alberico Gentilis. Translated from the Latin by John Healey. Edited by Huntington Brown. With Forward by Richard E. Byrd. Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 1937.

Harrison, William. *The Description of England*. 1587. Edited by George Edelen. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1968.

Herrtage, Sidney J. H. ed. *The Early English Versions of the Gesta Romanorum*. London: N. Trübner, 1879.

Hobbes, Thomas. *A letter about liberty and necessity*. London: J. Grover for W. Crooke, 1676.

_____. *Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil*. 1651. Edited by Michael Oakeshott. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955.

Hooker, Richard. *Ecclesiastical Polity and other Works of Richard Hooker With His Life by Izaak Walton, and Strype's Interpolations*. With numerous notes by Benjamin Hanbury. Vol. 1. London: Holdworth and Ball, 1830.

_____. *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*. Vol. 2, with an Introduction by Christopher Morris. London: J. M. Dent, 1907.

Inglelend, Thomas. *The Disobedient Child*. 1560. *The Dramatic Writings of Richard Wever and Thomas Inglelend*. Edited by J. S. Farmer, 1905.

Lambard, William. *Eirenarcha or Of the Office of the Justices of Peace, in foure Bookes, Revised, corrected and enlarged*. London: The Companie of Stationers, 1619.

Languet, Hubert. *A Defense of Liberty against Tyrants*. 1579. Also attributed to Philippe du Plessis-Mornay. Edited by H. J. Laski. G. Bell & Sons, 1925.

Lenaghan, R. T., trans. and ed. *Caxton's Aesop*. Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 1967.

Leylande, Johan. *The New Year's Gift*, 1546. John Bale, 1549. Reprint, in John Chandler. *John Leland's Itinerary: Travels in Tudor England*. London: Alan Sutton, 1993.

The Life and Death of Iacke Strawe, a Notable Rebell in England: Who Was Kild in Smithfield by the Lord Maior of London. London, 1593. STC 23356.

Linaker, Robert. *A Comfortable Treatise, for the Reliefe of such as are Afflicted in Conscience*. London: H. L[ownes] for William Leake, 1607.

Locke, John. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Edited by Alexander Campbell Fraser. Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.

Lodge, Thomas. *The Complete Works of Thomas Lodge*. Edited by Edmund Gosse. Vol. 4. [Glasgow]: for the Hunterian Club, 1883.

Luther, Martin. "On the Bondage of the Will." 1525. *Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation*. Vol. 17, translated and edited by E. Gordon Rupp, Philip S. Watson, A. N. Marlow, and B. Drewery. The Westminster Press, 1969.

_____. *Luther's Works*. Vol. 4, edited by Jaroslav Pelikan and Walter A. Hansen. Vol. 13, edited by Jaroslav Pelikan. Vol. 20, edited by Hilton C. Oswald. Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1955.

M., I. *A Health to the Gentlemanly Profession of Serving-Men*. 1598. Shakespeare Association Facsimile No. 3. With an Introduction by A. V. Judges. Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1931.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. *The Discourses*. Translated by Leslie J. Walker, S. J. Edited by Bernard Crick. With an Introduction. 1970. Reprint, New York: Penguin, 1983.

Manningham, John. *The diary of John Manningham of the Temple, 1602-1603*. With an Introduction, Notes, and Life of the Author by Robert Parker Sorlien. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1976.

Marlowe, Christopher. *Doctor Faustus: A 1604-Version Edition*. Edited by Michael Keefer. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 1991.

The Marriage of Wit and Science. 1569. Malone Society Reprints. Edited by W. W. Greg. London: Oxford University Press, 1960.

Massinger, Philip. *The Old Law. The Dramatic Works of Massinger and Ford*. With an Introduction by Hartley Coleridge. London: George Routledge & Sons, 1875.

Middleton, Thomas. *A Mad World. My Masters*. 1604-06. Edited by Standish Henning. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965.

Nashe, Thomas. *The Works of Thomas Nashe*. Edited by Ronald B. McKerrow. Vols. 2 and 3. 1958. Reprint. With Corrections and Supplementary Notes by F. P. Wilson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966.

New Custom. 1571. *Anonymous Plays*. Edited by J. S. Farmer. London: Early English Drama Society, 1906.

Newhouse, Thomas. *A Learned and Fruitfull Sermon*. London, 1611. STC 18494.

A new song of a young man's opinion. STC 22919.5.

Paine, Thomas. *Common Sense, The Rights of Man, and Other Essential Writings of Thomas Paine*. With an Introduction by Sidney Hook. New York: Meridian, 1969.

Parsons, Robert. *The Judgment of a Catholicke English-man, Living in Banishment for his Religion*. [Saint-Omer: English College P], 1608.

Perkins, William. *The First Part of the Cases of Conscience*. [Cambridge:] John Legat, 1604.

_____. *Christian Oeconomie*. London, 1609. STC 19677.

P[_____]?, trans. *Pasquine in a Trance: A Christian and learned Dialogue (contayning wonderfull and most strange newes out of Heaven, Purgatorie, and Hell)* . . ., by Caelius Curio II. With an Introduction by P[erkins?]. London: Wylliam Seres, 1566. STC 6130.

Pilgrims Perfection. 1531.

Platter, Thomas. *Thomas Platter's Travels in England, 1599*. Translated by Clare Williams. London: Jonathan Cape, 1937.

Plutarch. *Plutarch on Sparta*. Translated by Richard J. A. Talbert. With an Introduction and Notes. Penguin, 1988.

Popper, Karl S. *Conjectures and Refutations*. 3d. ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.

Powel, Gabriel. *A Consideration of the Deprived and Silenced Ministers Arguments, for their Restitution to the use and libertie of their Ministerie*. London: G. Eld, for Thomas Adams, 1606.

Purchas, Samuel. *Purchas His Pilgrimes*. Vol. 1. London, 1625.

Puttenham, George. *The Arte of English Poesie*. 1589. Edited by Edward Arber. Westminster: A. Constable, 1895.

Quarles, Frances. "Solomons Recantation." *The Complete Works of Prose and Verse of Francis Quarles*. Vol. 2. Edited by Alexander B. Grosart. Printed for Private Circulation. Edinburgh University Press, 1880.

Rawls, John. *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

_____. *A Theory of Justice*. London: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Rickey, Mary Ellen, and Thomas B. Stroup, eds. *Certaine Sermons or Homilies, Appointed to be Read in Churches in the Time of Queen Elizabeth I (1547-1571): A Facsimile Reproduction of the Edition of 1623*. Gainesville, FL: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1968.

Robin Conscience [pseud.?]. *The Booke in Meeter of Robin Conscience Against his Father, Covetousness, his Mother Negligence and his Sister Proud Beauty*. Newly corrected by the author. London: Edward Allde, [1590?].

Robin Hood. 1560. Malone Society Reprints. Edited by W. W. Greg. London: Oxford University Press, 1908.

Rogers, Jn. *The Displaying of an Horrible Sect of Gross and Wicked Heretics naming themselves the Family of Love*. London, 1578.

Russell, Bertrand. *The Problems of Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Second Report of Doctor John Faustus containing his Apparances, and the deeds of Wagner. London: Abell Jeffes for C. Barby, 1594.

Sempill, James. *Sacrilege Sacredly Handled*. London: W. Jones for E. Weaver, 1619. STC 22186.

Shakespeare, William. *The Riverside Shakespeare*. Edited by G. Blakemore Evans. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974. The focus will be on: *King John* (1596-97), *Much Ado About Nothing* (1598-1600), *Hamlet* (1600-01), *All's Well That Ends Well* (1602-04).

Smith, Thomas. *De Republica Anglorum*. 1583. Edited by Mary Dewar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Smith, Thomas. *Two Compendious Discourses: The one concerning the Power of God: The other about the Certainty and Evidence of a Future State*. Published in opposition to the growing Atheisme and Deisme of the Age. London: For S. Smith and B. Walford, 1699.

Stow, John. *Annales, or, A generall chronicle of England begun by John Stow; continued and augmented with matters forraigne and domestique, ancient and moderne, unto the end of this present yeere, 1631, by Edmund Howes*. Londini: Impensis Richardi Meighen, 1631.

Thucydides. *The History of the Peloponnesian War*. Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 6. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952.

Vane, Henry. *Retired Mans Meditations*. 1655.

Viterill, C. *Correction and Exhortation out of heartie love*. Translated by Hendrik Niclas. [Amsterdam, 1574]. STC 18554.

Walwyn, William. *The Writings of William Walwyn*. Edited by Jack R. McMichael and Barbara Taft. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1989.

A watchword for willful women. An excellent pithie dialogue between two sisters. 1581. STC 21826.8.

West, Richard. *The Court of Conscience or Dick Whippers Sessions*. London: G. Eld. for John Wright, 1607.

Whitney, Geoffrey. *A Choice of Emblems*. 1586. With an Introduction by John Manning. Scolar Press, 1989.

Winstanley, Gerrard. *A Discourse on the Family of Love, originally presented to the High Court of Parliament in the time of Queen Elizabeth*. 1561. Reprint, London: Giles Calvert, 1656.

_____. *The law of freedom, and other writings*. Edited by Christopher Hill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Winwood, Sir Ralph. *Memorials of Affairs of State in the Reigns of Queen Elizabeth and King James I*. 3 Vols. London, 1725.

Wither, George. "The meditative eye of the heart." 1635. Copperplate engraving by de Passe. As reproduced in Michael Bath, *Speaking Pictures: English Emblem Books and Renaissance Culture*, pl. 8. London: Longman, 1994.

Woodes, Nathaniel. *The Conflict of Conscience*. 1572. Edited by W. W. Greg. Malone Society Reprints. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952.

Wright, Leonard. *The Pilgrimage to Paradise*. Augmented and Edited by H. L[ownes] for W. Leake, 1608.

_____. *A Summons for Sleepers*. London, 1589. STC 26033.

Secondary Sources

Alfredsson, Gudmundur. See Eide, Asbjorn.

Allen, J. W. *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century*. 1928. 3d ed. London: Methuen, 1951.

Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)." *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. Translated by Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971. 127-86.

Alvis, John and Thomas G. West, eds. *Shakespeare as Political Thinker*. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1981.

Anderson, L. M. "'Every good servant does not all commands': Shakespeare's Servants and the Duty to Disobey." *The Upstart Crow*, 12 (1992): 3-15.

Anglo, Sidney. "The *British History* in Early Tudor Propaganda." *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*. 44 (1961): 17-48.

_____, ed. *Chivalry in the Renaissance*. With an Introduction by Sidney Anglo. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1990.

_____, ed. *The Damned Art: Essays in the Literature of Witchcraft*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977.

_____. *Spectacle, Pageantry, and Early Tudor Policy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.

Armstrong, Nancy. See Tennenhouse, Leonard.

Ashley, Maurice. *Magna Carta in the Seventeenth Century*. Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1965.

Axton, Marie. *The Queen's Two Bodies: Drama and the Elizabethan Succession*. London: Royal Historical Society, 1977.

Baeten, Elizabeth M. "Myth and Freedom." *Thought*. New York: Thought, 1992.

Baker, Herschel. Introduction to *King John*, by William Shakespeare. In *The Riverside Shakespeare*, ed. G. Blakemore Evans. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974.

Bakhtin, Mikhail M. *The Dialogic Imagination*. Translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Edited by Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981.

Baldwin, Dean R. "Style in Shakespeare's *King John*." *Language and Style*. 16 (1983): 64-76.

Baldwin, T. W. *William Shakspeare's Small Latine & Lesse Greek*. 2 Vols. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1944.

Ball, Terence, and Richard Dagger, eds. *Ideals and ideologies: a reader*. 2d ed. New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995.

Barish, Jones A. "Pattern and Purpose in the Prose of *Much Ado About Nothing*." In *Renaissance Studies in Honor of Carroll Camden*, ed. J. A. Ward. 19-30. Houston, TX: Rice University Press, 1974.

Barker, Francis. "Which Dead? Hamlet and the Ends of History." In *Uses of History: Marxism, Postmodernism, and the Renaissance*, ed. Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, and Margaret Iversen. 47-75. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991.

Barnet, Sylvan, gen. ed. "Shakespeare: Prefatory Remarks." *King John and Henry VIII*, by William Shakespeare. The Signet Classic Shakespeare Series. 1963. New York: Penguin, 1989.

Barton, Anne. Introduction to *Much Ado About Nothing*, by William Shakespeare. In *The Riverside Shakespeare*, ed. G. Blakemore Evans. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974.

Barroll, Leeds. "A New History for Shakespeare and His Time." *Shakespeare Quarterly*. 30 (1988): 441-64.

Barry, Norman. "Libertarianism: some conceptual problems." In *Philosophy and Politics*, ed. G. M. K. Hunt, supplement 26, 109-25. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Barthes, Roland. *Mythologies*. Selected and translated by Annette Lavers. St. Albans, Hert: Paladin, 1972.

Bassnett-McGuire, Susan. "An Ill Marriage in an Ill Government: Patterns of Unresolved Conflict." *Shakespeare-Jahrbuch*. 120 (1984): 97-102.

Battenhouse, Roy. "On *King John*: An Answer to Billington and Hobson." *Connotations*. 2.2 (1992): 172-81.

_____. *King John: Shakespeare's Perspective and Others*. *NDEJ*. 14.3 (1982): 191-215.

Bath, Michael. *Speaking Pictures: English Emblem Books and Renaissance Culture*. London: Longman, 1994.

Baylor, Michael G. *Action and Person: Conscience in Late Scholasticism and the Young Luther*. Leiden: Brill, 1977.

Beaurline, L. A. Introduction to *King John*, by William Shakespeare. New Cambridge Shakespeare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Bentley, Eric. *The Life of Drama*. 1964. New York: Atheneum, 1983.

Berthoff, Warner. "'Our Means Will Make Us Means': Character as Virtue in *Hamlet* and *All's Well*." *New Literary History*. 5.2 (1974): 319-51.

Billington, Sandra. *Mock Kings in Medieval Society and Renaissance Drama*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed.

Bloch, Ernst. *The Utopian Function of Art and Literature*. Cambridge, MS: MIT Press, 1988.

Bloom, Allan D. *Shakespeare's Politics*. With Harry V. Jaffa. New York: Basic Books, 1964.

Bobbio, Norberto. *The Age of Rights*. Translated by Allan Cameron. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1996.

Bonnefoy, Yves. "De la Rome troublée à la conscience elizabéthaine." *Cahiers de la Compagnie Madeleine Renaud Jean Louis Barrault*. 57 (1966): 49-62.

Boyd, Brian. "King John and The Troublesome Raigne: Sources, Structure, Sequence." *Philological Quarterly*. 74.1 (1995): 37-56.

Boyle, K. and J. Sheen, eds. *Freedom of Religion and Belief, A World Report*. London: Routledge, 1997.

Braunmuller, A. R. Introduction to *King John*, by William Shakespeare. The Oxford Shakespeare. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

Brecht, Bertolt. *Brecht on theatre: The development of an aesthetic*. London: Eyre Methuen, 1964.

Breeze, Andrew. "Welsh Poetry and the Crowing of the Cock in *Hamlet*." *Notes and Queries*. 34 (232).2 (1987): 212.

Brennan, Michael G. "'Now Gods, Stand up for Bastards' (*King Lear* I.ii.22) and the Epistle to the Hebrews 12:5-8." *Notes and Queries*. 37 (235).2 (1990): 186-8.

Brett, Annabel S. *Liberty, Right and Nature: Individual rights in later scholastic thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Bridenbaugh, C. *Vexed and Troubled Englishmen, 1590-1642*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Brigden, Susan. "Religion and Social Obligation in Early Sixteenth Century London." *Past & Present*. 103 (1984): 67-112.

Bristol, Michael D. *Big-time Shakespeare*. London: Routledge, 1996.

_____. *Carnival and Theatre: Plebeian Culture and the Structure of Authority in Renaissance England*. New York and London: Methuen, 1985.

_____. "Funeral Bak'd Meats: Carnival and the Carnavalesque in *Hamlet*." In *Hamlet: Case Studies in Contemporary Criticism*, ed. Susanne Wofford, 348-67. Boston: Bedford Books, 1994.

_____. "In Search of the Bear: Spatio-Temporal Form and the Heterogeneity of Economies in *The Winter's Tale*." *Shakespeare Quarterly*. 42 (1992): 145-67.

_____. "Where Does Ideology Hang Out?" In *Shakespeare Left and Right*, ed. Ivo Kamps, 31-43. Routledge: New York and London, 1991.

Brown, J. Howard. *Elizabethan Schooldays: An Account of the English Grammar Schools in the second half of the Sixteenth Century*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1933.

Brownlie, Ian, ed. *Basic Documents on Human Rights*. 2d. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.

Buckley, George T. *Atheism in the English Renaissance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932.

Buerghenthal, Thomas. *See* Louis B. Sohn.

Burckhardt, Sigurd. "King John: The Ordering of This Present Time." *ELH*. 33 (1966): 133-53.

Burke, Peter. *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe*. London: Temple Smith, 1978.

Byrne, Richard. *Prisons and Punishments of London*. London: Harrap, 1989.

Calderwood, James L. "Commodity and Honour in *King John*." In *Shakespeare: The Histories*, ed. Eugene M. Waith, 85-101. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965.

Candido, Joseph. "Blots, Stains, and Adulteries." In "*King John*": *New Perspectives*, ed. Deborah T. Curren-Aquino, 114-25. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985.

Canfield, Douglas. *Word as Bond in English Literature from the Middle Ages to the Restoration*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989.

Carrithers, Gale H. Jr. "City-Comedy's Sardonic Hierarchy of Literacy." *Studies in English Literature*. 29 (1989): 337-55.

Cassirer, Ernst. *The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy*. 1927. Translated by Mario Domandi. 1963. Reprint, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972.

Champion, Pierre, ed. *Cent Nouvelles Nouvelles*. 2 Vols. Paris, 1928.

Chance, Jane. *Medieval Mythography: From Roman North Africa to the School of Chartres, A.D. 433-1177*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994.

_____. ed. *The Mythographic Art: Classical Fable and the Rise of the Vernacular in Early France and England*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1990.

Charlton, Kenneth. *Education in Renaissance England*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965.

Cohen, Derek. *The Politics of Shakespeare*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.

Cohen, Walter. "Political criticism of Shakespeare." In *Shakespeare Reproduced: The Text in History and Ideology*, ed. Jean Howard and Marion F. O'Connor, 18-46. New York: Methuen, 1987.

_____. "The Reformation and Elizabethan Drama." *Jahrbuch der Deutschen-Shakespeare-Gesellschaft-West*. 120 (1984): 45-52.

Collinson, Patrick. *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967.

Comparetti, Domenico. *Libro de los engannos et los asayamientos de las mugeres, Researches Respecting the Book of Sindibad*. London: Elliot Stock, 1882.

Cragg, Gerald R. *Freedom and Authority: A Study of English Thought in the Early Seventeenth Century*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975.

Craig, Hardin, ed. *5 Plays of Shakespeare*. With Waldo F. McNeir. Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965.

_____. *The Enchanted Glass: The Elizabethan Mind in Literature*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936.

_____. *An Interpretation of Shakespeare*. Columbia, MO: Lucas, 1948.

_____. ed. *King Richard II*, by William Shakespeare. 1912. Reprint, New York, 1940.

Crosby, Ernest. "Shakespeare's Attitude toward the Working Classes." In *Tolstoy on Shakespeare*, by Leo Tolstoy. Translated by V. Tcherkoff and I. F. M., 127-65. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1906.

Cruden, Alexander. *Cruden's Complete Concordance To the Old and New Testaments*. 1930. Rev. ed. London: Lutterworth Press, 1954.

Cumper, Peter. "Religious Liberty in the United Kingdom." In *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives*. Vol. 2, ed. Johan D. van der Vyver and John Witte, Jr., 205-41. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996.

Curatorium of the C. G. Jung Institute in Zurich, ed. *Conscience*. Translated by R. F. C. Hull and Ruth Horine. Evanston, 1970.

Curren-Aquino, Deborah T., ed. "*King John*": *New Perspectives*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985.

Dagger, Richard. *See* Ball, Terence.

D'Amico, Jack. *Knowledge and Power in the Renaissance*. Washington, D C: University Press of America, 1977.

Danson, Lawrence. *See* Roche, Thomas P., Jr.

Davidson, Clifford. "Renaissance Dramatic Forms, Cosmic Perspective, and Alienation." *Cahiers Elisabethains*. 27 (1985): 1-16.

Davis, J. C. *Utopia and the ideal society: A Study of English Utopian Writings, 1516-1700*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Debus, Allen G. *See* Merkel, Ingrid.

Diffey, Carole T. "'Such large discourse': the Role of 'Godlike reason' in *Hamlet*." *Hamlet Studies*. 11.1-2 (1989): 22-33.

Dollimore, Jonathan and Alan Sinfield. *Political Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural Materialism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.

_____. *Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology, and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and His Contemporaries*. 2d ed. Durham: Duke University Press, 1989.

Drakakis, John. "Trust and Transgression: The Discursive Practices of *Much Ado about Nothing*." In *Post-Structuralist Readings of English Poetry*, ed. Richard Machin and Christopher Norris, 59-84. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Drescher, Seymour. *See* Koenigsberger, H. G.

Ducat, Craig R. *Constitutional Interpretation: Rights of the Individual*. Vol. 2. Minneapolis: West Publishing Company, 1995.

Durston, Christopher and Jacqueline Eales, eds. *The Culture of English Puritanism, 1560-1700*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Eales, Jacqueline. *See* Durston, Christopher.

Eide, Asbjorn and Gudmundur Alfredsson. Introduction to *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary*, ed. Asbjorn Eide, Gudmundur Alfredsson, Göran Melander, Lars Adam Rehof and Allan Rosas. With the collaboration of Theresa Swinehart. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1992.

Eisenstein, Elizabeth L. *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe*. 2 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Eliav-Feldon, Mariam. *Realistic Utopias: The Ideal Imaginary Societies of the Renaissance, 1516-1630*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.

Elton, G. R. *English Law in the Sixteenth Century: Reform in an Age of Change*. London: Selden Society, 1979.

_____, ed. *Tudor Constitution, Documents and Commentary*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

Emmison, F. G. *Elizabethan Life: Disorder*. Chelmsford: Essex County Council, 1970.

Engelberg, Edward. *The Unknown Distance: From Consciousness to Conscience*. Cambridge, MS, 1972.

Ewbank, Inga-Stina. "Much Ado About Imagination." *Critical Survey*. 1.1 (1989): 17-23.

_____. "Shakespeare, Ibsen, and Rome: A Study in Cultural Transmission." In *Shakespeare and Cultural Traditions: The Selected Proceedings of the International Shakespeare Association World Congress, Tokyo, 1991*, ed. Tetsuo Kishi, Roger Pringle and Stanley Wells, 229-42. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1991.

Farago, Claire. "The Classification of the Visual Arts in the Renaissance." In *The Shapes of Knowledge From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment*, ed. Donald R. Kelley and Richard H. Popkin, 23-48. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.

Feibleman, James. "The Theory of Hamlet." *Journal of the History of Ideas*. 7 (1946) 131-50.

Ferguson, Margaret M. "Hamlet: Letters and Spirits." In *Shakespeare and the Question of Theory*, ed. Patricia Parker and Geoffrey Hartman, 292-309. New York: Methuen, 1985.

Field, John Edward. *The English Liturgies of 1549 and 1661, Compared with each other and with the ancient liturgies*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1920.

Finocchiaro, Maurice A., trans. and ed. *The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History*. With an Introduction. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

Fleissner, Robert F. "Dr. Faustus as a Source for Hamlet." *Literatur in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*. 23.1 (1990): 68-71.

Fletcher, Anthony. *The Prince and the Professor*. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1986.

Fluchère, Henri. "Hamlet et la conscience moderne." *Bulletin de la Faculté des Lettres de Strasbourg* 1965. (1965): 75-87.

Fortin, René E. "Desolation and the Better Life: The Two Voices of Shakespearean Tragedy." *Shakespeare Quarterly*. 32.1 (1981) 80-94.

Friedman, Michael D. "'For Man Is a Giddy Thing, and This Is My Conclusion': Fashion and *Much Ado About Nothing*." *Text and Performance Quarterly*. 13.3 (1993): 267-82.

Frye, Roland Mushat. *The Renaissance Hamlet: Issues and Responses in 1600*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Gatti, Hilary. *The Renaissance Drama of Knowledge: Giordano Bruno in England*. Boston: Routledge, 1989.

Gauvin, Claude. "Allégorie et caractérisation dans le théâtre anglais du moyen âge." In *Le Théâtre Européen Face à l'Invention: Allégories, Merveilleux, Fantastique*, ed. Irène Mamczarz, 13-23. Presses Universitaires de France, 1989.

Gayley, Charles Mills. *Shakespeare and the Founders of Liberty in America*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917.

Gildersleeve, Virginia Crocheron. *Government Regulation of Elizabethan Drama*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1908.

Gooding, Lela Moore. "The Plague of Custom: Illegitimacy in Elizabethan Drama and Society." diss. Vanderbilt U, 1992.

Grannis, Chandler B. See Haight, Anne Lyon.

Grant, Patrick. "Imagination in the Renaissance." In *Religious Imagination*, ed. James P. Mackey, 86-101. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1986.

Green, Henry. *Shakespeare and The Emblem Writers; An Exposition of Their Similarities of Thought and Expression*. New York: Burt Franklin, 1970.

Greenblatt, Stephen, ed. *The Power of Forms in the English Renaissance*. Norman, OK: Pilgrim Books, 1982.

_____. *Renaissance Self-Fashioning, from More to Shakespeare*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

_____, ed. *Representing the English Renaissance*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

_____. "Shakespeare Bewitched." In *New Historical Literary Study: Essays on Reproducing Texts, Representing History*, ed. Jeffrey N. Cox and Larry J. Reynolds, 108-35. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

_____. *Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.

Gregerson, Linda. "Narcissus Interrupted: Specularity and the Subject of the Tudor State." *Criticism*. 35.1 (1993): 1-40.

Gruner, Rolf. *Philosophies of History*. Aldershot, U. K.: Gower Publishing, 1985.

Guggisberg, Hans R., Frank Lestringant, and Jean Claude Margolin, eds. *La Liberté de conscience (XVIe-XVIIe siècles)*. Geneva: Droz, 1991.

Guizot, François P. G. *Shakespeare and His Times*. London: Richard Bentley, 1852. First published in French as *Sur la vie et les oeuvres de Shakespeare*. Paris, 1821.

Gunn, T. Jeremy. "Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights." In *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives*. Vol. 2, ed. Johan D. van der Vyver and John Witte, Jr., 305-30. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996.

Gurr, Andrew. *Playgoing in Shakespeare's London*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

_____. *The Shakespearian Stage 1574-1642*. 3d ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

_____. "The 'State' of Shakespeare's Audiences." In *Shakespeare and the Sense of Performance*, ed. Marvin and Ruth Thompson, 162-79. London: Associated University Press, 1989.

Haight, Anne Lyon. *Banned Books: 387 B.C. to 1978 A.D.* 4th ed. Updated and Enlarged by Chandler B. Grannis. New York and London: R. R. Bowker, 1978.

Halbronn, Jacques E. "The Revealing Process of Translation and Criticism in the History of Astrology." In *Astrology, Science, and Society: Historical Essays*, ed. Patrick Curry, 197-218. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1987.

Halio, Jay L. "All's Well That Ends Well." *Shakespeare Quarterly*. 15:1 (1964): 33-43.

Haller, W. *Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution, 1638-1647*. New York: 1934.

Hamilton, Donna B. *Shakespeare and the Politics of Protestant England*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1992.

Hamlin, William. *The Image of America in Montaigne, Spenser, and Shakespeare*. New York: St. Martin's, 1995.

Handlin, Oscar. *Truth in History*. Cambridge, MS: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1979.

Harris, Paul. "Young Sir Henry Vane's arguments for freedom of conscience." *Political Science*. 40.1 (1988): 34-48.

Hart, W. H. *Index Expurgatorius Anglicanus: or A Descriptive Catalogue of the principal Books printed or published in England, which have been suppressed, or burnt by the Common Hangman, or censured, or for which the Authors, Printers, or Publishers have been Prosecuted*. New York: Burt Franklin, 1872.

Hartby, Eva. *Man-Figures in Much Ado About Nothing*. Publications on English Themes. Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, 1988.

Hartman, Geoffrey. *See* Parker, Patricia.

Hay, Denys. "England and the Humanities in the Fifteenth Century." *Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought*. Vol. 14, *Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of its European Transformations*, ed. Heiko A. Oberman. With Thomas A. Brady, Jr., 305-67. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975.

Henson, H. Hensley. *Puritanism in England*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1912.

Herendeen, W. H. "The Rhetoric of Rivers: The River and the Pursuit of Knowledge." *Studies in Philology*. 78.2 (1981): 107-27.

Hexter, J. H. "The Education of the Aristocracy in the Renaissance." In *Reappraisals in History*, by J. H. Hexter, 45-70. New York: Harper & Row, 1961.

_____, ed. *Parliament and Liberty: From the Reign of Elizabeth to the English Civil War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992.

Hobson, Christopher Z. "Bastard Speech: The Rhetoric of 'Commodity' in *King John*." *Shakespeare Yearbook*. 2 (1991): 995-114.

_____. "A Comment on Roy Battenhouse, 'Religion in *King John*: Shakespeare's View.'" *Connotations*. 2.1 (1992): 69-75.

Hodnett, Edward, ed. *English Woodcuts: 1480-1535*. Oxford University Press, 1973.

Hoffmann, Manfred, ed. *Martin Luther and the Modern Mind: Freedom, Conscience, Toleration, Rights*. Lewiston, New York: E. Mellen Press, 1985.

Honigsmann, E. A. J. Introduction to *King John*, by William Shakespeare. The Arden Shakespeare. 4th ed. London: Methuen, 1954.

Howard, Jean. "Renaissance Anti-theatricality and the Politics of Gender and Rank in *Much Ado About Nothing*." In *Shakespeare Reproduced: The Text in History and Ideology*, ed. Jean Howard and Marion F. O'Connor, 163-87. New York: Methuen, 1987.

Humphreys, A. R. Introduction to *Much Ado About Nothing*, by William Shakespeare. The Arden Shakespeare. 1981. Reprint, London and New York: Routledge, 1994.

Hunt, Maurice. "Art of Judgment, Art of Compassion: The Two Arts of Hamlet." *Essays in Literature*. 18.1 (1991): 3-20.

_____. "All's Well That Ends Well and the Triumph of the Word." *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*. 30.3 (1988): 388-411.

Hunault, Albert, ed. *Freedom and Serfdom, An Anthology of Western Thought*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1961.

Hurstfield, Joel. *Freedom, Corruption, and Government in Elizabethan England*. Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 1973.

_____. *The Queen's Wards*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958.

Hutchings, William. "'Much Ado About Almost Nothing'; Or, The Pleasure of Plotless Plays." In *Within the Dramatic Spectrum*, ed. Karelisa V. Hartigan, 107-14. Lanham, MD: University Presses of America, 1986.

Iyer, V. R. Krishna. *Human Rights -- A Judge's Miscellany*. Delhi: B. R. Publishing Corporation, 1995.

Ives, George. *A History of Penal Methods: Criminals, Witches, Lunatics*. NJ: Patterson Smith, 1975.

Jackson, MacD. P. "Editing *Hamlet* in the 1980s: Textual Theories and Textual Practices." *Hamlet Studies*. 11. 1-2 (1989): 60-72.

Jacobus, Lee A. *Shakespeare and the Dialectic of Certainty*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.

James, Mervyn. *Society, Politics and Culture: Studies in early modern England*. Cambridge: University Press, 1986.

Jardine, Lisa. *Reading Shakespeare historically*. New York: Routledge, 1996.

_____. "Cultural Confusion and Shakespeare's Learned Heroines: 'These are old paradoxes.'" *Shakespeare Quarterly*. 38.1 (1987): 1-18.

Jardine, Nicholas. "Demonstration, Dialectic, and Rhetoric in Galileo's *Dialogue*." In *The Shapes of Knowledge From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment*, ed. Donald R. Kelley and Richard H. Popkin, 101-22. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.

Johnson, Eric Aaron. *Knowledge and Society: A Social Epistemology of Montaigne's Essais*. Charlottesville, VA: Rookwood, 1994.

Jones, Emrys. *The Origins of Shakespeare*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.

Jones-Davies, M. T., ed. *Diable, diables et diableries au temps de la renaissance*. Paris: Jean Touzot, 1988.

Jordan, Wilbur Kitchener. *The Development of Religious Toleration in England*. Vol. 1. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1932.

Jorgenson, Paul A. "Much Ado About *Nothing*." *Shakespeare Quarterly*. 5 (1954): 286-96.

_____. "Shakespeare's Use of War and Peace." *Huntington Library Quarterly*. 4 (1953): 319-52.

Kantorowicz, Ernst. *The King's Two Bodies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957.

Kehler, Dorothea. "'So Jest with Heaven': Deity in *King John*." In "*King John*": *New Perspectives*, ed. Deborah T. Curren-Aquino, 99-113. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985.

Kelley, Donald R. "'Lord Deliver Us From Justice.'" (Symposium: Justice and Its Discontents: Dissent in the Renaissance.) *Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities*. 5.1 (1993): 159-67.

_____. and Richard H. Popkin, eds. *The Shapes of Knowledge From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.

Kemp, Anthony. *The Estrangement of the Past: A Study in the Origins of Modern Historical Consciousness*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Kennedy, Charles W., ed. Introduction to *The Poems of Cynewulf*. London: George Routledge & Sons, 1910.

Kirk, R. E. G. and E. F. Kirk, eds. *Returns of Aliens Dwelling in the City and Suburbs of London from the Reign of Henry VIII to that of James I*. 4 Vols. Huguenot Society Publications, no. 10. London: Huguenot Society, 1900-1908.

Knights, L. C. *Further Explorations*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1965.

Kocher, Paul Harold. *Science and Religion in Elizabethan England*. San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1953.

Koenigsberger, H. G. "Science and Religion in Early Modern Europe." In *Political Symbolism in Modern Europe: Essays in Honor of George L. Mosse*, ed. Seymour Drescher, David Sabean, and Allan Sharlin, 168-93. London: Transaction Books, 1982.

Kornstein, Daniel J. "Do not do such a wrong" (part 3), "Much ado about slander" (part 1), "Much ado about slander" (part 2), three articles on "Shakespeare and the Law, *Much Ado About Nothing*." *New York Law Journal*. 200.41 (1988): 2-26; 200.37 (1988): 2-24; 200.39 (1988): 2-21.

_____. *Kill All the Lawyers? Shakespeare's Legal Appeal*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Krules, Sonia. *Situation and Human Existence: Freedom, Subjectivity, and Society*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990.

La Charité, Raymond C. *The Concept of Judgement in Montaigne*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968.

Lee, A. C. *The Decameron, its Sources and Analogues*. London, 1909.

Leites, Edmund. *Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Lerner, Natan. "Religious Human Rights Under the United Nations." In *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives*. Vol. 2, ed. Johan D. van der Vyver and John Witte, Jr., 79-134. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996.

Levin, Harry. *The Myth of the Golden Age in the Renaissance*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969.

_____. *The Question of Hamlet*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.

Levinas, Emmanuel. "Les droits de l'homme et les droits d'autrui." *Indivisibilité des Droits de l'homme: Les Actes du I^{er} Colloque Interuniversitaire, Fribourg 1983*, 35-45. Fribourg, Suisse: Editions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1985.

Levy, F. J. *Tudor Historical Thought*. San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1967.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. "How Myths Die." *New Literary History*. 5.2 (1974): 269-82.

Lewalski, Barbara Kiefer, ed. *Renaissance Genres: Essays on Theory, History, and Interpretation*. Harvard English Studies, no. 14. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.

Lewis, Gordon K. *Slavery, Imperialism, and Freedom: Studies in English Radical Thought*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978.

Lohse, Bernhard. "Conscience and Authority in Luther." In *Luther and the Dawn of the Modern Era*, ed. Heiko A. Oberman. Studies in the History of Christian Thought, vol. 8, 158-83. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974.

Lorant, Andre. "Hamlet and Mythical Thought." *Diogenes*. 118 (1982): 49-76.

Lytle, Guy Fitch. See Orgel, Stephen.

Macfarlane, L. J. *The Theory and Practice of Human Rights*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.

Maddicott, J. R. "Magna Carta and the Local Community: 1215-1259." *Past & Present*. 102 (1984): 25-65.

Madelaine, R. E. R. "Oranges and Lemans: Much Ado about Nothing, IV.i.31." *Shakespeare Quarterly*. 33.4 (1982): 491-2.

- Maes-Jelinek, Hena, Pierre Michel, and Paulette Michel-Michot, eds. *Multiple Worlds, Multiple Words*. Liège: University of Liège, 1987.
- Maitland, F. W. *English Law and the Renaissance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1901.
- Manning, Brian. *Village Revolts: Social Protests and Popular Disturbances in England, 1509-1640*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Manning, John. "Symbola and Emblemata in Hamlet." In *New Essays on Hamlet*, ed. Mark Thornton Burnett and John Manning, 11-18. New York: AMS Press, 1994.
- Marcus, Leah. *Puzzling Shakespeare: Local Reading and Its Discontents*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Matchett, William. Introduction to *King John*, by William Shakespeare. In *King John and Henry VIII*, by William Shakespeare. The Signet Classic Shakespeare Series. 1963. New York: Penguin, 1989.
- McCauliff, C. M. A. "Law as a Principle of Reform: Reflections from Sixteenth-Century England." *Rutgers Law Review*. 40.2 (1988): 429-65.
- McClennen, Joshua. *On the Meaning and Function of Allegory in the English Renaissance*. The Folcroft Press, 1947.
- McGrady, Donald. "The Topos of 'Inversion of Values' in Hero's Depiction of Beatrice." *Shakespeare Quarterly*. 44.4 (1993): 472-76.
- McLachlan, John. *Human Rights in Retrospect and Reality*. London: The Lindsey Press, 1968.
- McMullan, John L. *The Canting Crew: London's Criminal Underworld 1550-1700*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1984.
- Meron, Theodor. *Human Rights Law-Making in the United Nations: A Critique of Instruments and Process*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
- Mesguich, Daniel. "The times are out of joint." *Shakespeare and Theatrical Modernism: McGill Shakespeare in the Theatre Conference*. McGill University, Montreal, 12 October 1997.
- Meyer, Michael. *Henrik Ibsen: The Top of a Cold Mountain 1883-1906*. Vol. 3. London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1971.
- Michel, Pierre. See Maes-Jelinek, Hena.
- Michel-Michot, Paulette. See Maes-Jelinek, Hena.
- Montrose, Louis Adrian. *The Purpose of Playing: Shakespeare and the cultural politics of Elizabethan theatre*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996.
- _____. "Renaissance Literary Studies and the Subject of History." *English Literary Renaissance*. 16 (1986): 5-12.

Moreno, P. C., ed. *Handbook on Religious Liberty Around the World*. Charlottesville: The Rutherford Institute, 1996.

Morse, William R. "Shakespearian Self-Knowledge: The Synthesizing Imagination and the Limits of Reason." In *Drama and Philosophy*, ed. James Redmond, 47-59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Mosse, George L. *The Reformation*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963.

_____. *The Struggle for Sovereignty in England, from the reign of Queen Elizabeth to the Petition of Right*. East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1950.

Mueschke, Paul. "Illusion and Metamorphosis in *Much Ado About Nothing*." *Shakespeare Quarterly*. 18 (1967): 53-67.

Nauert, Charles G., Jr. *Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Neale, J. E. *The Elizabethan House of Commons*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1950.

Neill, Michael. "Imagining the Bastard in Renaissance Drama." *Yearbook of English Studies*. 23 (1993): 270-92.

Newell, Alex. *The Soliloquies in Hamlet: The Structural Design*. London: Associated University Press, 1991.

Norford, Don Parry. "'Very Like a Whale': The Problem of Knowledge in *Hamlet*." *ELH*. 46 (1979): 559-76.

Oakeshott, Michael. Introduction to *Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, by Thomas Hobbes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955.

O'Connell, Laura Stevenson. *The Elizabethan Bourgeois Hero-Tale: Aspects of an Adolescent Social Consciousness*. Edited by Barbara C. Malament. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1980.

O'Donnell, M., comp. *Betha Colaim Chille: Life of Columcille*. 1532. Translated and edited by A. O'Kelleher and G. Schoepperle. *University of Illinois Bulletin*. 15.48 (1918).

O'Kelleher, A. See O'Donnell, M.

O'Neill, John, ed. *Modes of Individualism and Collectivism*. London: Heinemann, 1973.

Orgel, Stephen. *The Illusion of Power: Political Theatre in the English Renaissance*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

_____ and Roy Strong. *Inigo Jones: The Theatre of the Stuart Court*. London: Sothely Parke Bernet, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.

_____ *The Jonsonian Masque*. Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 1965.

_____ and Guy Fitch Lytle. *Patronage in the Renaissance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

_____ "Shakespeare and the Cannibals." In *Cannibals, Witches, and Divorce: Estranging the Renaissance*, edited by Margorie Garber, 40-66. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.

Ormerod, David. "Faith and Fashion in *Much Ado About Nothing*." *Shakespeare Survey*. 25 (1972): 93-105.

Orr, Patricia R. "Pallas Athena and the Threefold Choice." In *The Mythographic Art: Classical Fable and the Rise of the Vernacular in Early France and England*, ed. Jane Chance, 159-76. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1990.

Osborn, John Jay, Jr. "At Sea: An Exploration of Implicit Assumptions in *Hamlet*, *Oedipus* and *St. Joan*." *Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature*. 1.2 (1989): 199-210.

Owen, John, ed. *Scepsis Scientifica: or Confest Ignorance, the Way to Science*, by Joseph Glanvill. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1885.

Pallister, Anne. *Magna Carta: The Heritage of Liberty*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

Parker, Patricia. *Shakespeare from the margins: language, culture, context*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

_____ and Geoffrey Hartman, eds. *Shakespeare and the Question of Theory*. New York: Methuen, 1985.

Patterson, Annabel. *Censorship and Interpretation*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984.

_____ "Censorship and the 1587 'Holinshed's Chronicles.'" *Writing and Censorship in Britain*, ed. Paul Hyland and Neil Sammells, 23-35. London and New York: Routledge, 1992.

_____ *Early Modern Liberalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

_____ *Fables of Power: Aesopian Writing and Political History*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1991.

_____ "'For Words Only': From Treason Trial to Liberal Legend in Early Modern England." *Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities*. 5.2 (1993): 389-416.

_____ *Reading Holinshed's Chronicles*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.

_____. *Shakespeare and the Popular Voice*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989.

Patterson, Lee. "Literary History." In *Critical Terms for Literary Study*, ed. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin, 250-62. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.

Pfister, Manfred. "Elizabethan Atheism: Discourse Without Subject." *Jahrbuch der Deutschen-Shakespeare-Gesellschaft-West*. (1991): 59-81.

Phillips, James Emerson. *The state in Shakespeare's Greek and Roman plays*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940.

Popkin, Richard H. See Kelley, Donald R.

Popper, K. R. "From *The Poverty of Historicism*." In *Modes of Individualism and Collectivism*, ed. John O'Neill, 68-87. London: Heinemann, 1973.

Post, Gaines. "Bracton as Jurist and Theologian on Kingship." In *Proceedings of the Third International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, Strasbourg, 3-6 September 1968, ed. Stephan Kuttner. Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1971.

Prothero, G. W., ed. *Select Statutes and Other Constitutional Documents Illustrative of the Reigns of Elizabeth and James I*. 4th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949.

Rackin, Phyllis. "Patriarchal History and Female Subversion in *King John*." In "*King John*": *New Perspectives*, ed. Deborah T. Curren-Aquino, 76-90. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985.

_____. *Stages of History: Shakespeare's English Chronicles*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.

Ranald, Margaret Loftus. "As Marriage Binds, and Blood Breaks": English Marriage and Shakespeare." *Shakespeare Quarterly*. 30 (1979): 68-81.

Reese, M. M. *The Puritan Impulse: The English Revolution, 1559-1660*. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1975.

Rickaby, Joseph, ed. *Free Will and Four English Philosophers (Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Mill)*. London: Burns and Oates, 1906.

Rosador, Kurt Tetzeli Von. "The Sacralizing Sign: Religion and Magic in Bale, Greene, and the Early Shakespeare." *Yearbook of English Studies: Early Shakespeare*. 23. Special number (1993): 30-45.

Rosenbaum, Alan S., ed. *The Philosophy of Human Rights: International Perspectives*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980.

Scheinin, Martin. "Article 18: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion in other Human Rights Instruments." In *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary*, ed. Asbjorn Eide, Gudmundur Alfredsson, Göran Melander, Lars Adam Rehof and Allan Rosas. With the collaboration of Theresa Swinehart, 267-73. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1992.

Scheman, Naomi. "From Hamlet to Maggie Verver: The History and Politics of the Knowing Subject." *Poetics* 18 (1989): 449-69.

Schoepperle, G. See O'Donnell, M.

Schoenbaum, S. *Shakespeare's Lives*. Rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.

Schrickx, Willem. "All's Well That Ends Well and Its Historical Relevance." In *Multiple Worlds, Multiple Words*, ed. Hena Maes-Jelinek, Pierre Michel, and Paulette Michel-Michot, 257-74. Liège: University of Liège, 1987.

Shapiro, Barbara J. "Circumstantial Evidence: Of Law, Literature, and Culture." *Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities*. 5 (1993): 219-41.

_____. *Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of the Relationships between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature*. Princeton University Press, 1983.

Sharpe, Kevin and Steven N. Zwicker, eds. *Politics of Discourse: The Literature and History of Seventeenth-Century England*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.

Shanker, Sidney. *Shakespeare and the Uses of Ideology*. The Hague: Mouton, 1975.

Sheen, J. See Boyle, K.

Sieghart, Paul, ed. *Human Rights in the United Kingdom*. London and New York: Pinter Publishers for Human Rights Network, 1988.

_____. *The International Law of Human Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.

_____. *The Lawful Rights of Mankind: An Introduction to the International Legal Code of Human Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Simonds, Peggy Munoz. "Sacred and Sexual Motifs in *All's Well That Ends Well*." *Renaissance Quarterly*. 42.1 (1989): 33-59.

Sinfield, Alan. *Literature in Protestant England: 1560-1660*. London: Croom Helm, 1983.

_____. See Dollimore, Jonathan.

Slack, Paul. *Public Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Slights, Camille Wells. *The Casuistical Tradition in Shakespeare, Donne, Herbert, and Milton*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

_____. "The Unauthorized Language of *Much Ado About Nothing*." In *Shakespeare's Comic Commonwealths*, by Camille Slights, 171-89. Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, 1993.

Smith, Malcolm C. "Paul de Foix and Freedom of Conscience." *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*. 55.2 (1993): 301-15.

Sohn, Louis B. and Thomas Buergenthal. *The International Protection of Human Rights*. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1973.

Sommerville, C. John. *The Secularization of Early Modern England: From Religious Culture to Religious Faith*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Southern, A. C. *Elizabethan Recusant Prose 1559-1582*. London: Sands & Co., 1950.

Spencer, Theodore. *Shakespeare and the Nature of Man*. 1942. 2d. ed., New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961.

_____. *Theodore Spencer: Selected Essays*. Edited by Alan C. Purves. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1966.

_____, ed. *A Garland for Donne . . .* 1931. Gloucester, MS: Peter Smith, 1958.

Stirling, Brents. *The Populace in Shakespeare*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949.

Stone, Lawrence. *The Causes of the English Revolution, 1529-1642*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972.

_____. "The Educational Revolution in England, 1560-1640." *Past & Present*. 28 (1964): 41-80.

Strauss, Leo. *Natural Right and History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.

_____. *Persecution and the Art of Writing*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1952.

Strong, Roy. *See* Orgel, Stephen.

Suhamy, Henri. "Le droit, l'équité, la charité: Autour de quelques situations judiciaires dans l'oeuvre de Shakespeare." In *Société française Shakespeare: Actes du congrès 1980*, ed. Marie-Thérèse Jones-Davies, 23-33. Paris: Touzot, 1981.

Sylvester, Richard S. "Conscience and Consciousness: Thomas More." In *The Author in His Work: Essays on a Problem in Criticism*, ed. Louis L. Martz and Aubrey Williams. With an Introduction by Patricia Meyer Spacks, 163-74. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978.

Tahzib, Bahiyyih G. *Freedom of Religion or Belief: Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection*. Kluwer Law International, 1995.

Taylor, Henry Osborn. *Thought and expression in the sixteenth century*. 1920. 2d. rev. ed., New York: Ungar, 1959.

Taylor, Michael. "Much Ado About Nothing: The Individual in Society." *Essays in Criticism*. 23 (1973): 146-53.

Tennenhouse, Leonard. *Power on Display: The Politics of Shakespeare's Genres*. New York: Methuen, 1986.

_____. *The Tudor Interludes Nice Wanton and Impatient Poverty*. New York: Garland, 1984.

_____ and Nancy Armstrong, eds. *The Violence of Representation: Literature and the history of violence*. London: Routledge, 1989.

Thaler, Alwin. *Shakespeare and Democracy*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1941.

_____. *Shakspeare's Silences*. Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 1929.

Thomas, Keith. *Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century England*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971.

Thompson, E. P. *Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture*. New York: The New Press, 1993.

Thompson, Faith. *Magna Carta: Its Role in the Making of the English Constitution 1300-1629*. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1948.

Tillyard, Eustace M. W. *The Elizabethan World Picture*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1943.

_____. *The English Epic and Its Background*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1954.

_____. *The English Renaissance*. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952.

_____. *Essays: Literary and Educational*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1962.

_____. *The Miltonic Setting Past and Present*. Cambridge University Press, 1938.

_____. *The Nature of Comedy and Shakespeare*. The English Association Presidential Address. London, 1958.

_____. *Some Mythical Elements in English Literature*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1962.

Trinkaus, Charles. "Italian humanism and the problem of 'structures of conscience.'" *The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies*. 2.1 (1972): 19-33.

_____. "Marsilio Ficino and the Ideal of Human Autonomy." In *Ficino and Renaissance Neoplatonism*, ed. Konrad Eisenbichler and Olga Zorzi Pugliese, 141-53. Ottawa: Doverhouse Editions Canada, 1986.

Turchetti, M. "A la racine de toutes les libertés: la liberté de conscience." *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*. 56. 3 (1994): 625-39.

Underhill, Arthur. *Shakespeare's England: An Account of the Life and Manners of his Age*. Edited by Humphrey Milford. Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917.

United Nations. *Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments*. ST/HR/1/Rev.2. New York, 1983.

Van der Water, Julia C. "The Bastard in *King John*." *Shakespeare Quarterly*. 11 (1960): 137-46.

Vaughan, Virginia Mason. "Between Tetrologies: *King John* as Transition." *Shakespeare Quarterly*. 35 (1984): 407-20.

Vickers, Brian. *Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

von Martin, Alfred. *Sociology of the Renaissance*. Translated by Wolfgang Luer Luetkens. With an Introduction by Wallace K. Ferguson. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. First published in German as *Soziologie de Renaissance*, 1932.

Waddington, Raymond B. "Lutheran Hamlet." *English Language Notes*. 27.2 (1989): 27-42.

Waith, Eugene M. "King John, Henry VIII, and the Arts of Performing Shakespeare's History Plays. In *The Arts of Performance in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Drama: Essays for G. K. Hunter*, ed. Murray Biggs, Philip Edwards, Inga Stina Ewbank, Eugene M. Waith, 70-83. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991.

Wales, Julia Grace. "Shakespeare's Use of English and Foreign Elements in the Setting *Much Ado About Nothing*." *Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters*. 28 (1933): 363-98

Walker, D. P. "The Cessation of Miracles." In *Hermeticism and the Renaissance: Intellectual History and the Occult in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Ingrid Merkel and Allen G. Debus, 111-24. Washington: The Folger Shakespeare Library, 1988.

Walley, Harold R. "Shakespeare's Conception of *Hamlet*." *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America*. XLVIII (1933): 777-98.

Watt, Tessa. *Cheap Print and Popular Piety: 1550-1640*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Weimann, Robert. "Bifold Authority in Shakespeare's Theatre." *Shakespeare Quarterly*. 43 (1992): 401-17.

_____. *Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theater: Studies in the Social Dimension of Dramatic Form and Function*. Edited by Robert Schwartz. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. First published in a slightly different version in German in 1967.

_____. "Society and the Individual in Shakespeare's Conception of Character." *Shakespeare Survey*. 34 (1982): 23-31.

Weinberger, Jerry. *Science, Faith, and Politics: Francis Bacon and the Utopian Roots of the Modern Age*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1985.

Weisser, Michael R. *Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Europe*. Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester, 1979.

Wells, Robin Headlam. *Shakespeare, politics and the State*. London: Macmillan Education, 1986.

Wilks, John S. "The Discourse of Reason: Justice and the Erroneous Conscience in *Hamlet*." *Shakespeare Studies*. 18 (1986): 117-44.

_____. *The Idea of Conscience in Renaissance Tragedy*. London: Routledge, 1990.

Williams, Penry. *The Tudor Regime*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.

Wilson, Robert Rawdon. "Narrative Boundaries in Shakespeare's Plays." *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature*. 18.2-3 (1991): 233-61.

Wilson, Scott. *Cultural Materialism: theory and practice*. Cambridge, MS: Blackwell, 1995.

Wimberley, Lowry C. *Folklore in the English and Scottish Ballads*. New York: Ungar Publishing, 1959.

Wixson, Douglas C. "'Calm Words Folded Up in Smoke': Propaganda and Spectator Response in Shakespeare's *King John*." *Shakespeare Studies*. 14 (1981): 111-27.

Wofford, Susanne, ed. *Hamlet: Case Studies in Contemporary Criticism*. Boston: Bedford Books, 1994.

Womack, Peter. "Imagining Communities: Theatres and the English Nation in the Sixteenth Century." In *Culture and History, 1350-1600: Essays on English Communities, Identities, and Writing*, ed. David Aers, 91-145. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992.

Womersley, David. "The Politics of Shakespeare's *King John*." *Review of English Studies*. 40 (1989): 497-515.

Wood, Robert E. "Space and Scrutiny in *Hamlet*." *South Atlantic Review*. 52.1 (1987): 25-42.

Woods, Barbara Allen. *The Devil in Dog Form*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959.

Woodward, W. H. *Studies in Education during the Age of the Renaissance, 1400-1600*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1906.

Wright, Charles H. H., ed. *Foxe's Book of Martyrs*. London: Morgan & Scott, n. d.

Youngs, Frederic A. *The Proclamations of the Tudor Queens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Zwicker, Steven N. *See* Sharpe, Kevin.