

Four French Savants and Russia,

1870-1896

by

John Philip Desmarais

'Au profit exclusif de la France':

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RESUMÉ

Cette thèse examine les facteurs qui ont joué dans la rédaction de l'histoire russe et slave en France entre 1870 et 1896. Elle démontre l'attitude de quatre savants français devant les événements politiques de l'époque, ainsi que le sens et les conséquences de leur attitude. La thèse ne prétend pas traiter directement des événements en Russie pendant cette période, ni des historiens russes.

Aucun des savants considérés—Louis Leger, Alfred Rambaud, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu ou Albert Vandal—ira exigé le rapprochement politique ou militaire de la France et de la Russie. Cependant, leurs oeuvres, fruits d'un désir de former des liens, ont joué un rôle vital dans les changements d'attitude des français à l'égard de la Russie et des slaves afin de faire obstacle au rayonnement allemand. La conclusion voudrait que leur souci primordial était de reconstruire la France à la suite de la débâcle de 1870 et qu'en dernière analyse, la rédaction historique n'était pour eux qu'un acte de nationalisme dirigé "au profit exclusif de la France."

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the factors which affected the writing of Russian and Slav histories in France between 1870 and 1896. It shows why and how four French savants reacted to the political events of this period, what direction this reaction took and with what result. It does not pretend to be directly concerned with Russian history from 1870 to 1896, or with Russian historians.

Neither Louis Leger, Alfred Rambaud, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu nor Albert Vandal, the four savants considered, demanded French political or military rapprochement with Russia. Yet their writings, motivated by the desire to build a bridge over Germany, played a vital part in transforming Franco-Russian relations by overthrowing previously held French prejudices about Russia and the Slavs. The major finding is that their fundamental concern was to rebuild France after the débâcle of 1870 and consequently that, for them, the writing of history was a nationalistic act, directed "au profit exclusif de la France."

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ABBREVIATIONS

- A. A. F. - Archives de l'Académie Française.
- A. D. C. P. - Archives Diplomatiques, Correspondance Politique.
- A. N. - Archives Nationales (France).
- R. D. M. - Revue des deux mondes.

The student of behavioristic politics must look to each part, and study at first hand the creative efforts which produced it. Without postulating any freedom from the influence of external stimuli on the part of the players, he must seek to analyze the mechanisms by which effective stimuli are selected out of the mass and produce a given response, which, in conjunction with many other responses, results in the social situation with which the diplomatic historian is directly concerned. Putting the problem differently, one who is concerned with the control of foreign policy must use the data of the past not as the raw stuff of generalizations flowing from assumptions of causality or destiny, but as a means of minute analysis of men and motives which will illumine the fundamental patterns of politics as well as the nature of the whole State System into which they are woven.

Schuman, F.L., War and Diplomacy in
the French Republic.
pp. 129-130.

INTRODUCTION

I have . . . enjoyed the spectacle presented by French historiography. What life and energy, what creative power, what ingenuity, imagination and daring, what sharply contrasted minds and personalities! And all the time the historical presentation turns to be closely connected with French political and cultural life as a whole.

Pieter Geyl, Napoleon For and Against, p. 11.

Ernest Renan defined a nation as the common memory of great things done in the past and the desire to remain united in order to do yet more of them in the future.¹ Today one may, or may not, agree with Renan's definition; but it is obvious that there were many in the Third Republic who did believe that the nation was, as Renan pictured it, a creation of historical literature. What was more, this definition seems to have been accepted by many French intellectuals as their raison d'être.

The contemporary French historian Pierre Nora has pointed out that the role of the great German historians, as directors of national consciousness, has no recent equivalent in France. In the first decades of the Third Republic, however, historical writings and the teaching of history assumed this role. Reorienting thought and demon-

¹R. Girardet, Le nationalisme français 1871-1914, Paris, 1966, p. 6; R. N. Stromberg, An Intellectual History of Modern Europe, New York, 1966, p. 327.

strating the lessons to be learned from history became part of the national educational programme, a cure for the sick French soul. Was it not this thought which prompted Ernest Lavissee to remind the elementary school children of France that they were learning "l'histoire pour graver dans vos coeurs l'amour de votre pays."¹

The object of the present investigation is to show why and how French historians and teachers of history reacted to political events between 1870 and 1896, what direction this reaction took and with what result.

As self-assured as the positivist Third Republic may appear to-day, there was, from its beginnings in 1870 until after the first World War, a fearful insecurity not only concerning the fundamental concept of la nation, but also concerning the policies of the Republican government both in domestic and international affairs. A number of French historians clearly saw their duty, after the débâcle of 1870, to direct their countrymen in support of Republican aims by reinterpreting the history, or aspects of the history, of France. Others, conscious of France's isolation in Europe, and the necessity to reestablish French prestige internationally, initially encouraged a bridge to Russia and the Slavs.

Prior to 1870, studies of Russian and Slavic history had been few in number and superficial. The increased scholarly attention

¹P. Nora, "Ernest Lavissee: son rôle dans la formation du sentiment national," Revue Historique, Vol. 228 (1962), p. 103.

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given to this subject by a few French savants between 1870 and the visit of the Tsar to Paris in 1896, affords the opportunity for a careful examination of the factors which affected the writing of Russian and Slav histories in France, and, particularly of the motives for this awakened interest. This examination is not directly concerned with Russian history from 1870 to 1896, nor with Russian historians.

Louis Leger, a Slavist; Alfred Rambaud, an historian; Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, a political scientist; and, Albert Vandal, an historian, had a common means of communication: history; and a common goal: to rebuild France by the political education of their compatriots. These four French savants could not but have realized that their interest in the histories of the Russian and Slav peoples was dictated by a desire for the reestablishment of France. The problem becomes then, to determine to what extent the writing of history, for them, was a nationalistic act, directed "au profit exclusif de la France."

With few exceptions, what has to date been accomplished historiographically in France or elsewhere, are studies of the giants of French historical writing. It was perhaps the awareness of this fact which encouraged two eminent historians, Professors Pierre Renouvin and Jacques Godechot, to call for reconsiderations of the work of other historians through the means of historiographical forays.¹ Although

¹P. Renouvin, "Recherche historique et relations internationales," L'Education Nationale, Vol. 17 (1961), p. 16; J. Godechot, "Où en est l'historiographie?", Information historique, Vol. 18 (1956), p. 180.

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this study represents a small part of the large spectrum that remains, if an understanding of the motives for the writing of history during the Third Republic is to be gained, it is, together with other works recently published,¹ a beginning.

Leger, Rambaud, Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal are often referred to by historians, yet there exists no comprehensive analysis of their work. J.J. Gapanovich's Russian Historiography Outside Russia is a pioneer study of the period 1881-1933, but it is of limited value to this enquiry; Gapanovich preferred to recognize Rambaud and Leroy-Beaulieu exclusively as forerunners of later developments in the interpretation of Russian history.² Nor have more recent works contributed to an understanding of the historiography of the period. While acknowledging the role of French historical literature about Russia during the Third Republic, present day authors look no further than the assumed desire of Leger, Rambaud, Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal to see France allied with Russia. The reluctance to analyze the motivation underlying historical writing limits the usefulness of otherwise fine studies: that of Charles Corbet on the impact of Russian and French literatures about Russia in France throughout the Nineteenth Century, and, that of Michel Cadot on Russia in the intellectual life of France between 1839

¹Nora, op. cit.; Hans-Dieter Mann, Lucien Febvre: La Pensée vivante d'un historien, Paris, 1971.

²J.J. Gapanovich, Russian Historiography Outside Russia, Peiping, 1935.

and 1856.¹ An unpublished thesis presented to the University of Paris in 1967 by J.P. Bruchier has contributed a limited, but interesting, approach to the subject of the historical thought in France.² It is unfortunate, however, that the factual content cannot be relied upon.

In addition to the above works, two articles should be mentioned: Sidney Horowitz's "Albert Vandal and Franco-Russian Relations" and A.Z. Manfred's "De l'histoire des relations culturelles Franco-Russes, 1870-1880."³ While Horowitz's article concentrates upon Vandal's examination of Franco-Russian relations between 1740-1746 and thus must be regarded as an important contribution to the study of French historiography, his survey does not attempt to ask why Vandal was motivated to make such an enquiry in the first place. The single most consequential piece of work is that by Professor Manfred who tried to answer the question neglected by Horowitz. The object of his work was to demonstrate that increased Franco-Russian interchanges were closely related to the political rapprochement between the two countries in the late Nineteenth Century. His recognition of the link between culture and politics in this instance has made a dis-

¹C. Corbet, L'Opinion Française face à l'inconnu Russe, 1799-1894, Paris, 1967; M. Cadot, La Russie dans la vie intellectuelle française, 1839-1856, Paris, 1967.

²J.P. Bruchier, La Russie vue par la Revue des deux mondes, 1871-1890, unpublished thesis, University of Paris, 1967.

³S. Horowitz, "Albert Vandal and Franco-Russian Relations," Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. 14 (1954/55), pp. 123-142; A.Z. Manfred, "De l'histoire des relations culturelles Franco-Russes 1870-1880," Annuaire d'études françaises, Moscow, 1961.

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tinct contribution toward the better understanding of the events which preceded the Franco-Russian Alliance. Further enquiry by Professor Manfred beyond 1880, however, would have revealed that the intention of the historians discussed was not limited merely to the Franco-Russian Alliance and was thus more complex than appeared between 1870 and 1880.¹

A major difficulty in the study of the role of French historians is presented by the fact that material about lesser known historians is limited. The major portion of the work presented here is based on an extensive examination of material located principally in the Archives Nationales, the Archives Diplomatiques and the Archives de l'Institut de France, in Paris. The British Museum, the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek in Vienna, and the Bibliothèque Municipale de Saint-Dié (Vosges) also furnished information unobtainable elsewhere. Unfortunately, it was impossible to gain access to the material known to be in the State Literary Archives in Moscow.

Leger and Rambaud were both employed by the Ministry of Public Instruction and were interested in mass education. Commensurate with

¹There are, of course, other works of interest and value in related fields which cannot be considered here, as they do not fall within the scope of the present study. Among these are: F.W.J. Hemmings' The Russian Novel in France (London, 1950; F. Vial's "How French Authors discovered Russia in the Nineteenth Century," (The American Society, Legion of Honour Magazine, Vol. 33 (1962), Vol. 35 (1964; and, especially Pieter Geyl's Napoleon For and Against (London, 1964) —a survey of great scope and clarity dealing with various historians' attitudes toward Napoleon, including that of Vandal in L'Avènement de Bonaparte (2 vols., Paris, 1906).

their efforts, and forty years before the formation of the Bureau des écoles et des œuvres françaises à l'étranger at the Quai d'Orsay, the Ministries of Public Instruction and Foreign Affairs were made to recognize the value of cultural and academic relations as a tool of government policy.¹ Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal, on the other hand, taught in the independent Ecole libre des Sciences politiques and directed their efforts to the formation of an educated élite to fill the ranks of the most important ministries. Whether in a private or state organization, however, their collective need to convince others that France could once again secure her rightful place of leadership in Europe was only as strong as their need to convince themselves. Promoting an understanding of Russian culture and history after the defeat and dismemberment of France in 1870 was one of the means by which they served their common dedication to the steady growth of French national unity and consolidation of the Republic. Their sentiments may have at first seemed to some degree revanchard: their writings reveal the isolation and insecurity felt by many Frenchmen during the last third of the Nineteenth Century. But their desire for a greater understanding of Russia and the Slavs was inexorably linked with their desire to rebuild France.

¹Annuaire Diplomatique et Consulaire, 1911, p. 6. See also K. H. Norton, "Foreign Office Organization," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 143 (Supplement), pp. 12-14.

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Collectively, they are most widely known for their writings on Russia and the Slavs and for their advocacy of building a bridge over Germany to the East; no additional direct link between the writings of Leger, Rambaud, Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal and the diplomatic activities of successive French Foreign Ministries can be found. The major finding of this thesis is that, despite the interest of these historians in Russia and the Slavs, their fundamental concern was always France. None demanded political rapprochement, far less a military alliance with tsarist Russia. Yet their writings played a vital, undoubtedly intentional, part in transforming Franco-Russian relations by overthrowing previously held prejudices about Russia, her history and civilization and in substituting a much more sympathetic view. Increasingly, in the 1880's, however—as the Republic became more firmly established—the focal point of their attention shifted from preoccupations of an external nature to an involvement with the internal politics of the nation; an involvement with France and French affairs which became more and more compelling. In the final analysis, it is France, not Russia, which emerges as their predominant concern.

* * * * *

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The suggestions of my wife, Ellen, about what should be done with the thesis have been innumerable. Thankfully she has stopped short of putting them into effect. Instead, she has put up with it, typed and retyped with only a hint of occasional frustration. Behind her coöperation there lay a determination that drove the matter, finally, to completion. My thanks.

J. P. D.

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CHAPTER ONE

Two centuries of incomprehension:
French perspectives of
Russia, 1720 to 1870.

When, on September 3, 1870, after the Battle of Sedan, Napoleon III rode into captivity, what little remained of the Second Empire quickly followed him into oblivion. The following day, the Third French Republic was proclaimed in Paris and a provisional government was established. Shortly afterwards, Adolphe Thiers, who had refused to join the new government, spearheaded a diplomatic mission to bring the pressure of other European countries to bear against Prussia. Such activity may have given both hope and impetus to the new regime; but Thiers found the realities of his diplomatic tour on behalf of France sobering, even discouraging. Although in London, Lord Granville had offered his support to mediate an armistice, neither from Vienna nor Florence would aid be forthcoming. In St. Petersburg, Thiers found the Tsar actively intent upon taking advantage of French difficulties to rid Russia of the restrictions placed upon it by the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris (1856). In any case, Alexander II had no sympathy for a republican regime.¹

¹ A. Sorel, Histoire diplomatique de la guerre Franco-Allemande, 2 vols., Paris, 1875, Vol. 2, pp. 30-60.

Although Thiers had for some time viewed Russia as a counter-
ing force to Germany, it is difficult to understand why he should have
chosen Russia before which to plead the cause of France in 1870 (par-
ticularly Republican France); he must have been completely oblivious
to the historic relationship between the two countries, a relationship
which dated back to the crusades.¹ But Thiers can hardly be faulted
for his incomplete knowledge, since the centuries demonstrate not
only the ignorance of Russia on the part of learned men in France,
but their total lack of concern.²

A little more than 150 diplomatically turbulent years had elapsed
since a tri-state alliance had been signed by France, Prussia and
Russia (which had had no political or cultural consequence for either
Russia or France and was subsequently repudiated in 1726 by Cath-
erine I)³ and a little less than 150 years had elapsed since France
and Russia had established their first exchange of ambassadors.⁴

The history of early Franco-Russian diplomatic relations is, on
the part of France, a history of disdain. Because of French court
squabbles, but, more importantly, because France had not attempted

¹D.S. von Mohrenschildt, Russia in the Intellectual Life of
XVIIIth Century France, New York, 1936, p. 5.

²G. Lozinski, "La Russie dans la littérature française du moyen
âge," Revue des études slaves, Vol. 9, 1929; Caix de Saint-Aymour,
Vicomte de, Anne de Russie, reine de France et Comtesse de Valois
au XV^e siècle, Paris, 1896.

³A. Vandal, Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie, Paris, 1882, pp. 38-
39.

⁴A. Rambaud, Recueil des Instructions données aux ambassadeurs,
Vols. 8, 9 ("Russie"), Paris, 1890, Vol. 8, p. xxxiv. Comprendon was
appointed the first French ministre plénipotentiaire to St. Petersburg in
1721 while Prince Vasilii Dolgorukii was named to Versailles.

to recognize the importance of Russia, her policy had remained one of measured indifference. Voltaire's quip regarding New France: "Quelques arpents de neige" might have epitomized, equally well, the attitude of Frenchmen toward Russia. But one fact that could no longer be ignored by the French foreign office toward the end of the Eighteenth Century was Tsarina Catherine's growing empire. After Russia had finished her wars with Turkey and Sweden, a new understanding between France and Russia was sealed by a commercial treaty negotiated in 1787.¹ Although this treaty was "an illusory step toward a political rapprochement . . . swept out by the Revolution"² and although it was, as a result, of little immediate consequence (since the greater part of trade from Russia was monopolized by Holland and England), it was the high point of Franco-Russian relations in the Eighteenth Century.

If diplomatic relations prior to the 1770's may be characterized as disdainful, then so may the literature about Russia published in France. If Thiers had made an historical survey of the literature prior to the Enlightenment, he would have found that Frenchmen saw Russia at best as a terra incognita, at worst as an oriental despotism

¹Rambaud, op. cit., Vol. 8, p. lvi. See also J.L. von Regemorter, "Commerce et politique: préparation et négociation du traité Franco-Russe de 1787," Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique, Vol. 4 (1963), pp. 230-257.

²R. Portal, "Russia as seen by the French in the 18th and First Part of the 19th Century," French Society and Culture since the Old Régime, E.M. Acomb & M.L. Brown, Eds., New York, 1966, p. 182.

with an enslaved population.¹

With the verve of the Enlightenment to propel them, some in France undertook a mission civilisatrice to Russia. The France of the age of Voltaire and Rousseau envisaged Russia as a country without cultural development, in need of neither a political nor military alliance but rather, the cultural emprise morale of French civilization. Beginning with the reign of Elizabeth in 1740, actors, painters, sculptors, travellers, doctors and men of the French Enlightenment travelled to Russia. This cultural thrust was continued through the reigns of Catherine, Paul and, to some degree at least, through that of Alexander I.²

¹A. Olearius, Voyages très curieux et renommés fait en Moscovie, Tartarie et Perse, Leiden, 1719, 2 vols., Vol. 1, p. 218. This was perhaps the most widely read work on Russia in France after that of Sigmund von Herberstein, Rerum Moscoviticarum commentarii (Vienna, 1549). The reprinting of Olearius' voyages in 1659 and 1666 (The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth-Century Russia, Samuel H. Baron, trans., Stanford, Calif., 1967) attests to its popularity.

In general the word "Orient" or "Asie" was not used by Frenchmen as a derogatory term but rather a word which was to denote a geographical area as well as something somewhat mysterious. The word as applied to Russia was, however, another matter. To Frenchmen, the word Orientale when applied to Russia not only signified a land area, a non-Western European nation, but also a political and cultural inferior; a barbarian, in the ancient Greek sense. Philippe Avril's Voyages en différens endroits d'Europe et d'Asie entrepris pour découvrir un nouveau chemin à la Chine (Paris, 1692), though not in itself indicative of all Frenchmen's ideas of an oriental Russia, certainly demonstrates the idea of the unity by land of Moscovy and China. It reflects not only Europe's determination to penetrate China, but also the growing awareness of the entire Eastern area of the world of which Russia, for the French, had become an integral part. See also J.F. Bernard, Recueil de Voyages au Nord, 8 vols., Amsterdam, 1727, particularly Vols. V and VIII.

²von Mohrenschildt, op. cit., Chapters 3 and 4; R. Byrnes, "Some Russian Views of France in the 19th Century," French Society and Culture since the Old Régime, E.M. Acomb & M.L. Brown, Eds., New York, 1966, p. 205. It has been estimated that three-quarters of the books imported and read in Russia in the last third of the Eighteenth Century were published in France, and most dealt with France itself.

Many of those who had the interest and opportunity could and did travel to Russia, difficult though it may have been. They did not, however, always display the impartiality in their writings that would have signified even a slight change in feeling toward Russia, but rather continued to repeat many of the prevalent attitudes of the educated section of the French population. This was due, in part at least, to "the inherent difficulties which prevented the eighteenth century Frenchman from viewing impartially the moeurs barbares and general backwardness of the country."¹

One of those travellers, the Abbé Chappe d'Auteroche, having spent approximately five months in Russia,² wrote in the preface to his Voyage en Sibérie that, before the beginning of the Eighteenth Century, Russia was completely barbarian and unknown to Europeans.³ The Abbé devoted considerable space to the rudeness and ignorance of the Russian people, the debauched state of the clergy and the total lack of political liberty.⁴ D'Auteroche did not write of Russia, however, any differently from many of those before him, who not only expressed their contempt for the country generally but claimed that it was populated by lazy, dissolute and dishonest people.⁵ Russia was fixed in the mind of the

¹von Mohrenschildt, op. cit., p. 105.

²Jean Chappe, l'Abbé d'Auteroche, Voyage en Sibérie, 2 vols, Amsterdam, 1769, Vol. 2, p. 550.

³Ibid., Vol. 2, p. ii.

⁴Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 204-233, 261.

⁵Captain Jacques Margeret, L'Estat de l'Empire de Russe et Grand-duché de Moscovie (nouvelle édition), Paris, 1855, pp. 16-20. This book was originally published in 1607 and considered "probably the most important French source of information about Russia for that time." See von Mohrenschildt, op. cit., p. 7; also d'Auteroche, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 204-233, 261.

French public as "vraiment barbare."

Since most writers of the French Enlightenment were concerned with France's cultural mission to Russia, scant attention was paid to such publications as Pallas' Histoire des découvertes faites par divers savans voyageurs dans plusieurs contrées de la Russie (The Hague, 1779), in France.¹ Nevertheless, Voltaire, de Corberon and Levesque attempted, each in his own way, to identify the characteristics of Russia's history and to prepare the French reading public to understand Russia intellectually.

Voltaire recognized and properly analyzed the cultural relationship that was developing between France and Russia. His Histoire de l'Empire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand, was a serious attempt to portray Russia to his contemporaries as a society in a state of progress, from barbarism to enlightenment. But his efforts, though successful in a popular sense, met with considerable criticism from people such as the philosophe Pierre Chantreau, who claimed that Voltaire should have made better use of the documents sent him by the Russian court.² Whatever the indictment of Voltaire's use of documents, the purpose of the work was to give Frenchmen an histori-

¹Portal, op. cit., p. 180.

²P. Chantreau, Voyage philosophique, politique et littéraire fait en Russie pendant les années 1788-89, 2 vols., Paris, 1794, Vol. 1, p. 99. See also N. Wraxal, Voyage to the North of Europe, London, 1775, pp. 222-223; F.M. Grimm, Correspondance littéraire, philosophique et critique, 16 vols., Paris, 1812-1813, Part 1, vol. 3, p. 89; A. Lentin, "Voltaire and Peter the Great," History Today, Vol. 18 (1968), pp. 683-689.

cal appraisal of Russia, seen through Peter the Great's efforts to reform the country in the cultural image of Western Europe—efforts which some Frenchmen were quick to appreciate.

In general, however, any appreciation of a more distant Russian past by Voltaire or any other chronicler of cultural change was rare, for France herself became fully aware of her own medieval period only in the Nineteenth Century and, even at this late date, there were those who were not necessarily aware of this new appreciation as it applied to Russia. They tended to care little either about the country's indigenous historical development or about the disruptive incursions into Russia of their own civilization, and to see progress only from the time of Peter the Great.

Without doubt what attracted men of the Enlightenment to Russia was the enormity of the field there for French civilizing influence as well as Russia's seeming acceptance of French cultural incursions. Both flattered French national pride.¹ Adam Olearius, in the Seventeenth Century, was quite possibly the first to maintain that the introduction of Western influence into Russia was beneficial,² but in contrast to his view, Marie-Daniel Bourée, Baron de Corberon, writing in the Eighteenth Century, introduced a warning note into his work. He felt that it was precisely the introduction of Western European ideas, contrary to the fundamental nature of the people,

¹von Mohrenschildt, op. cit., p. 294.

²Olearius, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 210.

which had corrupted the Russians.¹ The only protection against total corruption of the state was to exorcise Western thought, thus ridding the country of alien ideas and allowing Russia to return to its original state of simplicity.² Although de Corberon was to modify his view concerning the degree to which Russia had become corrupted, his remarks indicate a breakthrough in the ethnocentric perspective through which France viewed Russia.

In his Histoire de Russie (1782), Pierre-Charles Levesque represented quite possibly the first conscientious attempt in France to discuss Russia's past in terms not of the inroads of the French Enlightenment, but in terms of the native Russian gifts and faith in the future of the land.³ Unlike other eighteenth-century writers, Levesque did not visualize the history of Russia as beginning when France, through the reforms of Peter the Great, plucked Russia from its backwardness. Rather, he saw Russian history as a continuous development of a people and their land. But as F.M. Grimm points out, the success of the work was limited because "on comprend aisément que

¹M.-D. Bourée, Baron de Corberon, Un diplomate français à la cour de Catherine II: Journal intime du Chevalier de Corberon, 2 vols., Paris, 1901, Vol. 1, 3 September, 1775, pp. 78-79.

²Ibid., Vol. 2, 19 September, 1776, pp. 74-76. On the same subject see the remarks of the Chevalier de Jaucourt in the Encyclopédie, Vol. 19, p. 542, as well as those of Rousseau who, though more interested in Poland than in Russia, believed that the primitiveness of Russia could never really be changed. See also, von Mohrenschildt, op. cit., p. 105.

³A. Mazon, "Pierre Charles Levesque: humaniste, historien et moraliste," Revue des études slaves, Vol. 42 (1963), pp. 7ff.

l'Histoire ancienne de Russie ne pouvait pas être susceptible d'un grand intérêt; ces premiers temps n'offrent que des monumens de guerre et des mœurs sauvages."¹

The advance of historical thought represented in France to some degree by Voltaire and more particularly by de Corberon and Levesque was shortlived. The prevailing eighteenth-century attitude would continue well into the Nineteenth Century when, for example, French literary critics, with the exception of the Marquis E.M. de Vogüé, in the "heyday" of Russian literature, viewed the works of Russia's authors in terms of Western European models. There was, then, little understanding of the Russian nature or land as something unique. Rather, Russia was interpreted in its relationship to a Western European model: only in its approximation to this model would it be considered to have become non-oriental, non-barbarian. As the French literary historian, Michel Cadot, perceptively points out, only those areas of Russian interest which weighed upon the French such as war, Poland, Catholicism and the spread of their own culture, were of interest to the nineteenth-century Frenchman; while certain profoundly original aspects of Russia such as religious life, changes in economic structures, philosophical and literary controversies almost completely escaped the French.² It was not until the publication of works by Alfred Rambaud, Louis Leger, and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu in

¹Grimm, op. cit., Part 3, Vol. 1, p. 327.

²Cadot, op. cit., p. 8.

the second half of the Nineteenth Century that French scholarship of Russia was to equal or surpass that of Levesque.¹

The Napoleonic epoch saw the beginning of changing relationships between the two countries. The arrangement at Tilsit, the confrontation of 1812, followed two years later by the disaster of the Emperor's defeat, transformed Franco-Russian political relations and so thoroughly polarized public opinion that throughout the remainder of the Nineteenth Century, Frenchmen would never again revert to their former disinterestedness.

The returned Bourbon émigrés brought back to France not only a more correct image of Russia, but also "a secret gratitude for a state that had reestablished the former social order."² The Russian emperor was well received in the more wealthy sections of Paris in 1815 with cries of "Vive Alexandre! Vivent les Bourbons!" Here the obvious division between the Russophiles and future Russophobes made its appearance, for much of the remainder of the city was unusually quiet on this occasion.³ But just as Liberals, and, later, Republicans, were to find it necessary to search the French past to defend the Revolution and to identify themselves with the principles for which

¹Ibid., p. 382: "Seul Pierre Charles Levesque a pu au temps de Catherine II, tenter une synthèse de l'histoire russe qui restera longtemps la seule entreprise de ce genre menée par un Français."

²Portal, op. cit., p. 184.

³S. Charlety, La Restauration, Paris, 1921, p. 6.

they felt it stood, while at the same time "freeing themselves from the charge of being revolutionary,"¹ conservatives felt that it was useful to identify themselves with Russia, whose face had been unmarred by social upheaval, a country which still preserved the conservative principles close to the hearts of those who had suffered most at the hands of the Revolution. In the years of Restoration, as well as during the rest of the Nineteenth Century, French opinion on Russia would continue sharply divided, conditioned as much by social milieu as by political conviction.

The Bourbons and their supporters looked benevolently upon Russia and Alexander I² (although this feeling was to change somewhat after 1825, when Nicholas I succeeded to the throne). Russia under Alexander I, however, seemed to the more conservative-minded a most generous victor,³ as well as a most able and experienced defender of the monarchical principle:⁴

¹S. Mellon, The Political Uses of History, Stanford, Calif., 1958, p. 6.

²This feeling, however, was not altogether reciprocal as the tsar had some misgivings regarding the Bourbon restoration. See H.D. Leys, Between Two Empires, London, 1955, p. 20.

³F.R. Chateaubriand, Vicomte de, Mémoires, A.T. de Mattos, Trans., 6 vols., London, 1902, Vol. 3, p. 61; Vol. 5, p. 398.

⁴A. Jubé de la Perrelle, Hommage des Français à l'Empereur Alexandre, Paris, 1814, p. 12.

There are other eulogies. See P. Fantelin, Ode à sa Majesté Alexandre I^{er} Empereur des Russies, Paris, n.d. (1814), lines 73-78:

Tempêtes, respectez une tête si chère:
Autour de lui, formant un rempart tutélaire,
Ombres de ses aïeux, veillez sur votre fils.
Saints noeuds d'une amitié dont la base se fonde
Sur le repos du monde
Unissez à jamais ALEXANDRE et LOUIS.

Il importe de signaler le commencement d'une nouvelle ère pour l'histoire de France, le terme des divisions, de l'incertitude, des fluctuations, et de l'interrègne, l'époque d'une alliance indissoluble entre les héros du Nord et le souverain légitime des Français, et de rappeler aux esprits turbulents qu'ils pouvaient renaître des cendres de nos dissensions éteintes, et troubler la sage constitution que le Roi va jurer; de leur rappeler, dis-je, la noble garantie, la médiation imposante de l'Empereur Alexandre à la tête de ses augustes alliés.

Furthermore, the Holy Alliance was regarded by the conservatives as the best means of organizing relations between states on terms of justice and peace. There were those who believed, for one reason or another, that Russia could play a more meaningful role in European affairs by lending support to France, thus extricating France from the position into which she had been thrown after 1815. Among this group, Chateaubriand, the Legitimist voice calling clearly for war in Spain in 1823, felt that Louis XVIII's then prime minister, Count Joseph de Villèle, "was missing great opportunities for bringing France forward in European politics."¹ Intervention in Spain, Chateaubriand argued, would reestablish French power, making the Rhine boundary more of a possibility, if France could only ally herself with Russia.²

But, in fact, Russia was not always to be regarded in flattering terms, even by the more conservative element of French society, as

¹Leys, op. cit., p. 125.

²It is interesting to note that Chateaubriand was awarded a Russian decoration by Alexander I and de Villèle was not. See Leys, op. cit., pp. 133, 134. See also Chateaubriand, Oeuvres Complètes, Vol. 12, pp. 181-182; Cadot, op. cit., p. 175.

Joseph de Maistre was later to demonstrate.¹ Frenchmen were only too aware of the weakness of a foreign policy which had placed their nation in an almost continuously inferior position since 1815 with regard not only to Europe in general, but particularly with regard to England and Russia.²

The increasing popularity of the Napoleonic legend is an indication that many Frenchmen had not yet given up hope that their country would again play the leading role in European affairs. The belief in the greatness of France and its civilizing mission was actually a prominent tenet in many political ideologies of the period.

If France had lost its dominant position in Europe and was greatly weakened on the international scene, Russia, on the other hand, enjoyed a stronger position and had become the bugbear of many who were "concerned with the place of their nation in the world. It was widely feared that the Russian colossus would not be satisfied with the recent annexations in Eastern Europe, but would continue its westward expansion and upset the balance of power."³ The memory of

¹J. de Maistre, Quatre chapitres inédits sur la Russie, Paris, 1859, pp. 26-27.

²K.W. Swart, The Sense of Decadence in Nineteenth Century France, The Hague, 1964, pp. 82-83. See also F. Guizot, History of Civilization in Europe (William Hazlitt, Trans.), London, 1873.

It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the idea of the civilizing mission which France felt she had to humanity, Emile Montégut felt that if France wished to save herself, she had to renounce this role. See his "Lettres sur les symptômes du temps," R.D.M., 15 April, 1 May and 1 July 1848, and "De la Maladie morale du XIX^e siècle," 15 August, 1849, pp. 675-677, 682-685.

³Swart, op. cit., p. 47. See also M. Fridieff, "L'empire russe vu par les hommes de la Restauration," Revue Internationale d'histoire politique et constitutionnelle, Vol. 6 (1956), pp. 108-124; O.J. Hammen, "Free Europe Versus Russia," American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. II (1952), pp. 27-41.

the defeat of the Empire by what appeared to be the greatest force in all Europe, and the exercise by Russia of the "de facto" protectorate over French politics [even after] the French state had been released from the bonds of dependence,"¹ left lingering thoughts of frustrated ambition and a general fear of the major contributor to that defeat, which only the Crimean War would erase.

From 1814 to 1825, although it was not readily conceded by all that Russia was menacing the European nations in general and France in particular,² there was the beginning of what proved to be a continuing Russophobia. Dominique de Pradt, whom Chateaubriand called "a mitred Mountebank,"³ epitomized this sentiment and set the anti-Russian tone for the first half century. "Ce n'est pas leur barbarie qui m'épouvante," he wrote, "mais leur civilisation. . . ."⁴ Segments of the French population, exemplified by Abbé de Pradt, were convinced that France was still "la grande nation" and maintained an

¹Portal, op. cit., p. 183. A most distasteful aspect of the Charter of June 14, 1814 granted by Louis XVIII had been the stress laid upon the fact that the rights of the King had been guaranteed by outside intervention, namely by England and Russia, not by the French people. See Leys, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

²E. Montulé, Voyages en Angleterre et en Russie en 1821, 1822, et 1823, Paris, 1825. See also A.L.D. Lagrande-Chambonas, Comte de, Voyage de Moscou à Vienne par Kiev, Odessa, Constantinople, Bucharest et Hermanstadt, Paris, 1824.

³Chateaubriand, Mémoires, Vol. 3, p. 98.

⁴D.G.F. de Pradt, Parallèle de la puissance anglaise et russe relativement à l'Europe, suivi d'un aperçu sur la Grèce, Paris, 1823, pp. 152-153.

eighteenth-century attitude toward Russia, doubting Russia's claim to cultural development and believing the Russians to be still half-civilized Tatars who were at best badly imitating the west.¹

This fear of Russia appeared as early as 1812 in "one of the most influential works in the entire history of Russophobia, Des progrès de la puissance russe by Charles-Louis Lesur . . . [in which he] published the infamous and much misquoted 'Testament of Peter the Great.'² It had continued unabated for years. Although it is understandable that French newspapers in 1814 were driven to a certain hysterical Russophobia in the face of the advancing Russian army,³ this trend continued after Napoleon's defeat and exile, not in the press itself⁴ and not as blatant propaganda, but in the writings of some of the most informed individuals.⁵ Its early proponents, F.M. de Froment

¹Cadot, op. cit., p. 173.

²R. T. McNally, "The Origins of Russophobia in France, 1812-1830," American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. 17 (1958), p. 173. See also C. L. Lesur, Histoire des Kosaques, Paris, 1813, pp. 315-317. Reissued in 1814 in 2 volumes with an addition: Histoire des Kosaques, précédée d'une Introduction, ou Coup d'œil sur les peuples qui ont habité le pays des Kosaques avant l'invasion des Tartares.

³The policy of Napoleon's control of the press seems, by the reporting, to have been to foster anti-Russian feeling. See Journal de l'Empire, 4 January, 1814; 24 February, 1814; 3 March, 1814. After 1 April, 1814, the Journal de l'Empire was known as the Journal des Débats. See also Journal de Paris, 20 March, 1814.

⁴I. Collins, The Government and the Newspaper Press in France, 1814-1881, London, 1959, p. 3. The press restrictions of October 21, 1814, imposed by the Bourbon government, effectively silenced criticism of Russia.

⁵See F. M. de Froment, Observations sur la Russie, Paris, 1817, as well as de Pradt.

and Abbé de Pradt took up the Napoleonic rationalization of defence against the barbarians, and amplified Napoleon's reminder that "la Russie est une puissance effrayante et qui semble devoir conquérir l'Europe. Elle peut mettre à cheval un million de cavaliers, avec ses Cosaques, les Tartares et les Polonais. . . ." ¹ Expansion was the principle of the Russian state—an expansion not for glory but "out of the pressing, everyday need of their voracious régime." ² Fear of a movement that eventually came to be identified as Panslavism had begun.

The statements of de Froment and de Pradt reveal, not only fear of Russia, but also the impression that some French intellectuals continued to view Russia as predominantly Asian. Abbé de Pradt, Napoleon's former confessor, published three books dealing with the European system between 1815 and 1823. In each of these he argued that the Congress of Vienna erred in failing to unite Western Europe against Russia. In his acceptance of the Enlightenment and his belief in progress, de Pradt was a liberal. He was also a Hellenophile and as such urged that the Greek struggle for independence should lead to a reorganization of European states against Russia's southward advance. ³

¹Napoleon to General Bertrand, 2 April, 1817, quoted from Général Bertrand, Cahiers de Sainte-Hélène (P. Flairiot de Langle, Ed.), Paris, 1959, Vol. 2, p. 209; see also pp. 99-100.

²de Froment, op. cit., p. 133. See also de Pradt, op. cit., pp. 156, 169.

³F. Bressolette-Mizon, "Les idées de l'abbé de Pradt sur l'équilibre européen et la question d'orient," Cahiers d'histoire, Vol. 7 (1962), pp. 333-354. See also J. Droz, "L'Abbé de Pradt: sa pensée religieuse et politique," Cahiers d'histoire, Vol. 7 (1962), pp. 213-245.

In his Parallèle de la puissance anglaise et russe, de Pradt issued an oblique warning to France: "Depuis Pierre-le-Grand jusqu'à ce jour, la politique de la Russie n'a pas cessé d'être conquérante Depuis 1799, la Russie est intervenue cinq fois avec ses armées dans les affaires du midi de l'Europe."¹

A more penetrating mind than that of de Pradt, that of the royalist playwright, Jacques Ancelot, saw in Russia what was to become the popular, if somewhat distorted image during his own lifetime: a socially divided country. His recognition of the varying conditions of the people, from serf to feudal lord,² enabled him to discern divisions within Russian society, not only between the aristocrats and the masses, but within the masses themselves where, he felt, the real patriotism of the country was to be found. In this, his approach was unique. But like many of his eighteenth-century predecessors, Ancelot considered contemporary Russians to be sons of Peter the Great rather than of Ivan the Terrible, arguing that Russia's claim to civilization began only when Peter the Great came into contact with Western Europe.³ And, like his nineteenth-century predecessors, de Pradt and de Froment, Ancelot saw a danger to France in the strength of

¹de Pradt, op. cit., p. 156.

²J. Ancelot, Six Mois en Russie, Paris, 1827.

³Ibid., p. 15. Standing before the church of St. Basil in Moscow, he concluded that it was a "bizarre creation of a disordered imagination, the product of an epoch of barbarism."

the Russian population. In the hands of an ambitious state, this heretofore passive instrument could be moulded into a powerful force. This, he believed, would strengthen Russia for the even more meaningful role in Western European affairs which, in fact, she had already begun to play.¹

An upholder of conservative French tradition who travelled to Russia and returned a convinced constitutionalist, the Marquis de Custine, whose importance as an analyst present-day French scholars of Franco-Russian relations are still debating,² presented Russia in a unique way: as a power profoundly different from others by virtue of her semi-Asiatic, semi-European nature, the despotic methods of her government and above all, her lack of common traditions with the West. Like his contemporaries, the Marquis cautioned Europe against the immense ambition of Russia, particularly in the light of Europe's dissentions which he believed, were fostered by Russia.³

¹Comte de Reiset, Mes Souvenirs, 2 vols., Paris, 1901-03, Vol. 2, p. 98. This sentiment, however wild at the time, was to be expressed in more ominous sentences by the Comte de Reiset, who, when writing of the ideas of Nicholas I some time later, noted that the tsar "... maintenait la nation enregimentée et disciplinée comme l'armée elle-même. Tout le monde portait l'uniforme: ... La passion militaire de l'Empereur l'empêchait de s'occuper des sciences et des arts, pour lesquels il n'avait aucune aptitude."

²Portal dismisses Custine's work after a few short but penetrating sentences, summing up by writing that "Custine was the most celebrated but not the most interesting." See Portal, op. cit., p. 186. See also Louis Leger's criticism of Custine's work in Nouvelles études Slaves, 2 vols., Paris, 1883-1886, Vol. 2, pp. 99-101. Cadot devotes 110 pages of his book to the voyage of Custine in Russia and the European reaction to La Russie en 1839.

³Cadot, op. cit., p. 207. See also Portal, op. cit., p. 184.

Thus France was divided politically and intellectually on the question of Russia. On the one extreme, some liberal, Bonapartist and anti-Bourbon groups stressed the non-European character of the country: they viewed Russia as a state with enormous proportions, heavily populated, despotically ruled, and quite capable of moving at will toward either Asia or Europe.¹ In contrast, the point of view upheld by the Legitimists, as well as by other conservative thinkers, was that Russia epitomized intelligent conservatism, which was especially needed in order to preserve existing institutions against the current trend of revolution and to restore France to her pre-revolutionary position.

Two events outside France sharpened the focus of many hitherto uncommitted Frenchmen against Russia. The death of Alexander I in 1825, pointing out to Frenchmen how intertwined their view of Russia was with their view of the Tsar, brought a rude awakening in the person of Nicholas I. His harsh suppression of the Decembrist revolt was not immediately known in France;² but this fact eventually enabled many to evaluate the attitude of the new Tsar; they did so with alarm. "Si la monarchie française continua de s'appuyer sur la Russie, au point de saluer de ses vœux la campagne contre la Turquie et d'envisager une véritable alliance à la fin du règne de Charles X,

¹Which perhaps goes some way to explain France's encouragement of Russia's aggressiveness in the Far East, much to the displeasure of the British government.

²McNally, op. cit., p. 184.

plusieurs publications commencèrent à dénoncer le caractère envahissant de la Russie. . . ."¹ Newspapers, a most influential medium in terms of public opinion (despite the application of strict controls governing the press),² fell back upon the easily aroused fear of the public by emphasizing the steady encroachments which Russia was making into Europe.³ Even the Revue des deux mondes, which was to become so important in the dissemination of Russian literature and history, did not refrain from venting its feelings with regard to Russian aggrandizement.⁴

The second major event was the Polish revolt of 1831, which aroused the feelings of a larger number of Catholics, not only against Russia, but, indirectly, against the Vatican.⁵ They felt that Russia's repressive measures endangered the faith and national feeling of the

¹Cadot, op. cit., p. 10. The same attitude can be seen in Léouzon le Duc's La Russie contemporaine, Paris, 1853. He denounced Nicholas I as an autocratic despot and rejected the Russian people as Asiatic. Furthermore, he reproached Russia for its conquests, particularly in Poland, and accused the Russians of fanaticism and barbarism. See also Louis Leger's appraisal of Léouzon le Duc in Nouvelles études Slaves, Vol. 2, p. 102.

²Collins, op. cit., p. 58.

³See the Constitutionnel, 14 January, 1826 as well as the Journal des Débats, 20 January, 1826.

⁴C. de S., "Guerre d'Orient: des projets de la Russie," R.D.M., August, 1829, p. 147.

⁵A.R. Vidler, Prophecy and Papacy, London, 1954, pp. 210-211. "The papal brief of 9 June 1832 condemned the Polish insurrection of 1830-1831 and called upon the bishops to see that the Polish Catholics were in future fully submissive to their legitimate sovereign, i.e., the Czar." See also F. Roulier, "L'Eglise et les Etats au XIX^e siècle," Lumière et Vie, Vol. 9 (1960), p. 61: "Cependant Grégoire XVI, peu porté par tempérament ni par formation à comprendre l'agitation du siècle . . . invite les Polonais à se soumettre au tsar (bref Superiori Anno du 9 juin 1832) et il attendes le 22 novembre 1839 pour protester contre la persécution infligée par les Russes aux Uniates."

Poles. This pro-Polish, anti-Russian feeling, fostered by the Polish émigrés in France, made itself felt at this early period among the French bourgeoisie through the writings of Jules Michelet, George Sand, Victor Hugo, Charles de Montalembert and Félicité de Lamennais.¹

¹The first article that Montalembert contributed to Lamennais' L'Avenir on 12 December 1830, "Révolution de Pologne," began with the sentence "Enfin elle a jeté son cri de réveil, enfin elle a secoué ses chaînes, et en a menacé la tête de ses barbares oppresseurs, cette fière et généreuse Pologne, tant calomniée tant opprimée, tant chérie de tous les coeurs libres et catholiques." See Articles de l'Avenir, 7 vols., Louvain, 1830, Vol. 1, p. 403.

Lamennais' personal feelings toward Russia as well as toward the Papacy (which he felt had betrayed Poland), are expressed clearly in his letter to Countess de Senfft: "... frenzied idiots who call upon the Tartars to re-establish in Europe what they call order, and who adore the savior of the Church in the Nero of Poland...." Quoted from Vidler, op. cit., p. 198. See also Lamennais' article "Prise de Varsovie," Articles de l'Avenir, Vol. 6, p. 240; and J. Michelet, La Pologne martyre, Paris, 1863.

Portal, op. cit., p. 189: Criticism of Russia "reached the point of pure and simple calumny in the attacks of Michelet (profoundly moved by the misfortunes of Poland).... In an article that appeared from August 18 to September 17, 1851 in the review L'Événement, entitled 'The Legend of Kosciusko,' Michelet described the Russian people and, carried away by his polonophile sentiment, brought up earlier affirmations of lying and dishonest spirit, the absence of a moral sense, that, he said, characterized them." Herzen's reply to Michelet's article (22 September, 1851) explained that the failing of the Russian people was due to their oppression. See Vidler, op. cit., p. 240.

Echoes of the Polish question were still being heard by readers of Georges Clemenceau when in Grandeur and Misery of Victory he wrote that "... the greatest crime in history, which leaves an everlasting stigma on the names of Catherine, Maria Theresa and Frederick II. No outrage had ever cried louder for a redress that had been indefinitely postponed. The wrong was so great that... it has become a byword in history as one of the worst felonies that can be laid to the charge of our "civilization." How many other crimes have grouped themselves around this unpardonable one!... So upside down were the effects of the Russian oppression that we saw Pope Gregory XVI seconding the Czar Nicholas against the Polish patriots, by requesting the clergy of Poland to preach universal obedience to the sovereignty of a heretic. What more striking evidence is there of the total perversion of conscience that can take possession of the heart of man to vent itself upon the unarmed and weak." (Toronto, n.d., p. 182.)

For the next forty years, the attitude of public opinion toward Russia would be governed wholly by the fluctuations in Poland's political fortunes, both at the hands of Russia and to some degree of French liberals.¹

An examination of the more popular material directly concerning Russia which was being published from shortly before the Polish revolt until well into the July Monarchy gives an indication of the diversity of opinions from which the French reader had to choose. On the one hand, he had evidence of Russian military superiority and visions of a strong, fear-inspiring Russian state, the inhabitants of which had become an indistinct mass living in an atmosphere of secrecy and submitting to an unjust and autocratic regime.² "These reflections of a Brobdingnagian Russia, a Biblical colossus with feet of clay, remained

¹See Portal, *op. cit.*, p. 191: Xavier Marmier "after showing the weight of Russian repression at Warsaw following the 1831 insurrection, the silence imposed upon Poland, the efforts of Russification . . . reproached Russia for its ambition to be a Western power, when its mission . . . was Asiatic."

²McNally, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-187. He discusses J.F. Gamba's Voyage dans la Russie méridionale, et particulièrement dans les Provinces situées au delà du Caucase fait depuis 1820 jusqu'en 1834. See also J. Aubernon, Considérations historiques et politiques sur la Russie, l'Autriche, la Prusse, Paris, 1827.

Cadot, *op. cit.*, p. 10, mentions, in addition to the above, the works of A. Rabbe, Histoire d'Alexandre I^{er}. Contemporary authors have pointed to individual Russophobic works published about the same time as in newspapers and journals of the time. All contained abundant evidence of a total disenchantment with the myth of Catrine liberalism which gave way, in France, to a cynical view of a regime that oppressed liberty both in Russia and possibly in the rest of Europe.

effective and appealing because Russia never found any talented apologists in France during this period."¹ Although effective apologists were not to be found for Russia after 1831 (when the Orleanist government was pursuing a not altogether popular pro-British foreign policy), there was some pro-Russian sentiment among conservative, property owning industrialists and bankers. By the 1840's, the Slavic East had become a cultural reality with which the French had to cope.

In April of 1840 Victor Cousin, Minister of Public Instruction, proposed, in the Chamber of Deputies, the establishment of funds for the creation of the first study of Slavic literature and language at the Collège de France.² The reasons Cousin gave for such a programme

¹ McNally, op. cit., p. 188: "After 1815, French knowledge of Russia rested in large part on the substantial works of the German statisticians, published in the first quarter of the 19th Century."

Portal, op. cit., pp. 185, 186. It was not until after the publication of Baron Auguste de Hauxthausen's study of the internal life of Russia and its rural institutions, however, that Herzen was prompted to remark, perhaps a bit facetiously, in a letter to Michelet in 1851, that, prior to its publication "the Russian people were as little known as America before Columbus."

² Louis Leger attributed to M. de Salvady the drafting of the proposal, the record for which he found in Christien Ostrowski's Lettres Slaves, Paris, 1857; however, in the official newspaper Le Moniteur, the proposal was listed over the names of the minister. See L. Leger, "Les langues d'utilité publique—L'enseignement du Russe," Revue des cours Littéraires, 18 January, 1868, p. 116.

On the situation at the Collège de France, Leger wrote: "Qu'on n'aille pas m'objecter que cette chaire existe déjà au Collège de France sous la rubrique: Langue et littérature slave. D'abord la langue slave n'existe pas plus que la langue germanique ou indo-européenne. Il y a une langue slave morte, le slave ecclésiastique, et quatre langues slaves vivantes; le tchèque, le polonais, le russe et le serbe. . . . Si le professeur consacre une année à chacune d'entre elles, le russe ne reviendra que tous les quatre ans; d'ailleurs le Collège de France fait de la science et n'a rien à démêler avec la politique et le commerce." (Ibid., p. 117.)

reveal a profound lack of knowledge concerning the Slav nations: he declared that Polish was the most widely spoken of Slavic languages, argued on behalf of the pre-eminence of the Poles over other Slavs, and almost completely ignored Russia. "La discussion à la Chambre fut pitoyable," was the Slavist Louis Leger's comment on the debate.¹

The establishment of Slavic studies in France received little official encouragement, which prompted Leger to ask, "serait-ce hasard que la Turquie pèse plus que la Russie dans la balance des destinées européennes? Ou serait-ce que l'idiome russe n'a aucune utilité au point de vue de la politique et du commerce?"² Clearly,

¹Ibid., p. 101. Leger further commented in Le Monde slave au XIX^e siècle: Leçon d'ouverture du cours de langues et littérature d'origine slave au Collège de France, Paris, 1885, p. 9: "Ce document atteste l'ignorance qui régnait à cette époque chez nous relativement au monde slave. Il prouve que l'on ne savait en 1840—du moins au Ministère de l'Instruction publique—ni la statistique exacte de la race slave, ni son histoire, ni sa repartition géographique. 'La Turquie, disait le projet de la loi, compte deux millions de sujets slaves.' Ce chiffre pouvait être exact à la rigueur pour les Serbes et les Croates de l'Empire Ottoman; mais les Bulgares étaient absolument passés sous silence. Le polonais était cité comme le plus parlé des idiomes slaves, au detriment du russe. . . . Cette erreur singulière s'explique évidemment par les sympathies dont s'était inspiré le rédacteur du projet."

²Leger, "Les langues d'utilité publique. . .," p. 116: "Serait-ce hasard que la Turquie pèse plus que la Russie dans la balance des destinées européennes? Ou serait-ce que l'idiome russe n'a aucune utilité au point de vue de la politique et du commerce? Je ne sais, en réalité, ce qu'on peut répondre. . . . Je ne veux pas, sur le terrain de la politique, m'aventurer plus loin que l'affiche de la Bibliothèque impériale. Je crois que pas un homme sensé n'hésitera à reconnaître que la Russie mérite d'être étudiée au moins autant que le Japon ou la Malaisie. Or, c'est un fait évident que personne ou presque personne ne le connaît chez nous."

the motive for establishment in 1840 was less "a disinterested desire to see East European studies placed upon a firm footing than a hope that by this move they might crystallize liberal opposition to the extinction of Polish nationhood."¹

The emigré Polish poet, Adam Mickiewicz, was appointed to introduce Slavic studies in France. His position had been clearly defined to him before his first lecture when Paul Foucher, the writer and dramatist, wrote to him that "la chaire à laquelle on vous appelle a un caractère politique. On veut créer un centre au moins littéraire à la nationalité polonaise dans l'exil."² Mickiewicz was faithful to these aims and to the political climate in France regarding Poland and Russia. Consequently, his lectures at the Collège were not the introduction to Slavic studies which he himself probably envisaged. Nevertheless, his work was one of the most original chapters on Slavic ideology at its romantic height. It was a "synthèse étrange

¹F.W.J. Hemmings, The Russian Novel in France, 1884-1914, London, 1950, p. 4. See also L. Eisenmann, "Slavonic Studies in France," The Slavonic Review, Vol. 1 (1922/23), p. 302.

²Paul Foucher to Mickiewicz, 11 April, 1840, quoted in L. Leger, Le Panslavisme et l'intérêt Français, Paris, n.d. (1917), p. 102. See also Leger, Leçon d'ouverture . . . au Collège de France, p. 13.

It is interesting to note that in the middle of May (1833) there had appeared a French translation, by Montalembert, of Le Livre des pèlerins polonais by Adam Mickiewicz which was based upon a Hymn to Poland written by Lamennais. "... This book . . . was . . . written to encourage the Polish exiles in their adversities. The Gallican paper, L'Ami de la Religion . . . described it as 'un éloge continuél de la révolte et une philippique contre les souverains.'" See Vidler, op. cit., p. 228.

de sentiments patriotiques et de sentiments humanitaires, et qui présentait comme solidaires l'un de l'autre l'avenir de l'humanité et celui de la Pologne."¹ Mickiewicz closely associated the cause of Polish national self-determination with the exaltation of race and with Messianism.²

Louis Eisenmann of the Institut d'études slaves has stated that the first chair of Slavic studies in France was established for political reasons and depended for its direction and emphasis upon French national interest and need.³ Mickiewicz, who had experienced the Russian domination of his homeland, passionately disliked the oppressors and consequently warned that Russia was not something with which France could come to terms; the West, he felt, needed to stop talking and start preparing to resist an invasion.⁴ Five years after his appointment, because of unsettled political conditions, he was suspended from his duties at the Collège.⁵

¹A. Mazon, "Les études slaves," La Science Française, Paris, n.d., p. 453. Mickiewicz's courses for the years 1840 to 1844 were published in 1849. They can be characterized as a record of Slavic sentiment and as a guide to the understanding of the movement which led to the unrest of 1848.

²E. Kratowski, Adam Mickiewicz, philosophe, mystique. Les Sociétés secrètes et le Messianisme européen après la Révolution de 1830, Paris, 1935.

³Eisenmann, op. cit., p. 295.

⁴Cadot, op. cit., pp. 476-491, 508.

⁵J. Michelet, "Lettre à la Direction du Collège de France," protesting the suspension of Mickiewicz, Le National, 4 January, 1848.

In the interim between Mickiewicz's appointment and dismissal, Thiers, and later Proudhon, both encouraged an alliance with Russia, perhaps more because of internal politics than from any belief in Franco-Russian understanding. Thiers was subsequently less certain of the benefits that would accrue to France and more aware of the dangers; but this did not prevent him from contemplating such an alliance in the future when the need was urgent; nor did it prevent the government of Louis-Philippe from signing a commercial agreement with Russia in September, 1846, only a year after Mickiewicz's dismissal.

It is an indication of the sentiment in France that the successor to Mickiewicz at the Collège de France, Cyprien Robert,¹ was the most vigorous spokesman of the pro-Slav attitude at the time. Uncommitted to the Polish cause, Robert introduced his audiences at the Collège to material on the Slavs of North-eastern Europe on whom he was the foremost authority in France. His lectures on the political conditions in the Slavic world gave a clear picture of what he thought to be their future.²

¹Mazon, "Les études slaves," p. 454. The actual dates for Robert's lectureship are confused and conflicting. Leger writes: "Survint la Révolution de 1848, Cyprien Robert tomba dans je ne sais plus quelle doctrine, le cabétisme, je crois, et un beau matin il disparut." See L. Leger, Le monde slave, Paris, 1873, p. xxvi. Mazon states clearly that Robert taught twelve years, from 1845 to 1857. The records of the Collège de France are ambiguous. Robert was chargé de cours and not professeur titulaire.

²C. Robert, Le monde slave, son passé, son état présent et son avenir, 2 vols., Paris, 1852, Vol. 1, pp. i, 3.

The thought of Robert can be followed in the Revue des deux mondes between the years 1842 and 1854. During these years, he covered a multitude of topics for the Revue, some of which were: "Le monde gréco-slave," "Les Bulgares," "Les Serbes," "L'Illyrie," "Le Panslavisme," and "La littérature slave."

The declaration of war against the democratic movements in Europe in 1848, however, and the Russian intervention on behalf of the Austrians in Hungary, brought a general return of Russophobia to France, which lasted for about two years.¹ Many thought Russia was on the move as it had been in 1830, when only the Polish revolt seemed to have saved France from the second Russian invasion in sixteen years. Both the Academician Saint-Marc Girardin and the novelist Prosper Mérimée expressed their apprehension, the latter saying that he was glad he had learned Russian as he would be able to converse with the Cossacks in the Tuileries!² It is obvious, however, that not everyone shared this facetious, yet real, apprehension. Lamartine, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government of 1848 and author of a history of Russia,³ was an early exponent of an alliance with Russia to counterbalance the growing force of Prussia.⁴

After the 1848 revolution in France, the continued fear of the loss of property and life was widespread among the bourgeoisie, who

¹P.J. Proudhon, "Le Panslavisme russe et la démocratie allemande," Le Peuple, 8-15 November, 1848, p. 6. See also Journal des Débats, 23 May, 1849.

²Cadot, op. cit., p. 511.

³A. de Lamartine, Histoire de Russie, 2 vols., Paris, 1855. Cadot writes, "On est surpris qu'un grand écrivain tombe dans les défauts des plus médiocres vulgarisations de son temps." See Cadot, op. cit., p. 384.

⁴A. Narotchnitzky, "Deux tendances dans l'histoire des relations Franco-Russes," Revue Historique, Vol. 237 (1967), p. 109.

saw the salvation of their country in terms of an alliance with Russia. This largely explains why the efforts of French intellectuals on behalf of Poland were insufficient to sustain a politically frightened public. The republican-minded liberal attitude toward Russia; alleged atrocities during Russia's occupation of Champagne after the defeat of Napoleon; Russia's absolutist image under Nicholas I, fostered by the diplomat polemicist, F.I. Tyutchev's political articles, not to mention the stance taken toward Poland—all of these notwithstanding, "'plutôt les Russes que les Rouges' was the favorite expression used by conservative deputies in 1849 and 1850."¹ Clearly the liberals and republicans had lost the political initiative. The question of struggling Poland, once so important in the minds of Frenchmen, was politically all but forgotten by 1856 at the Congress of Paris which concluded the Crimean War. Those who had supported Polish independence in 1848 found that their cause was now expendable: "... Pas une fois le nom de la Pologne ne fut évoqué. On avait vu trop de Polonais sur trop de barricades."²

For many Frenchmen, the Crimean War had presented the opportunity of redressing France's long-felt grievances against Russia while, for others, it lessened Russian pressure on Poland. Such a war was

¹Swart, op. cit., p. 87. See also R.C. Lane, "The Reception of F.I. Tyutchev's Political Articles in Russia and Abroad, 1844-1858," European Studies Review, Vol. 1 (1971), p. 205.

²Cadot, op. cit., p. 491.

absurd; but, as it dragged on, it became an act of exorcism by which French prestige could be restored and in which the Poles were forgotten. France had been able both to lose the fear of Russia stemming from the defeat of Napoleon I and to pursue anew diplomatic initiatives with the former enemy which resulted in the signing of a secret pact in 1859.¹

It is no coincidence that Russian literature, which had become known in France in the 1840's through the efforts of such early translators as Prosper Mérimée, Ernest Charrière, Henri Delaveau and Louis Viardot,² gained genuine influence with the presentation of Russian life by Ivan Turgenev: it was "largely through his efforts [that] Russian . . . literature [was] established in France as a living reality."³

¹J.K. Stevens, "The Franco-Russian Treaty of 1859: New Lights and New Thoughts," The Historian (of the Phi Alpha Theta), Vol. 28 (1966), pp. 206, 211, 212. See also A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918, Oxford, 1965; C. Corbet, L'Opinion française face à l'inconnue russe, 1799-1894, Paris, 1967, p. 310.

²Mérimée translated Pushkin's Nouvelles and Deux héritages (1853), and Charrière translated, badly, Turgenev's Mémoires d'un seigneur russe. See I. Turgenev in the Journal de St. Petersburg, 22 August, 1854. See also P. Mérimée, "La Littérature et le Servage en Russie: Mémoires d'un chasseur russe," R.D.M., 1 July, 1854, p. 183.

In fact, translations of Russian works were often so very bad that "Halpérine-Kaminsky, one of the most prolific translators of Russian works, and of Dostoevski in particular, in the last quarter of the century was subject to many attacks and to ridicule and his translations were dubbed to be not in French but 'en Halpérinois.'" See Vial, op. cit., p. 179.

³Vial, op. cit., p. 175. See also G. Monod, "Contemporary Life and Thought in France," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 44 (1883), p. 624.

Turgenev's descriptions of Russian character and social life were the object of considerable French intellectual interest (sometimes even of alarm) in the 1850's. "Nothing perhaps excited a greater curiosity among Frenchmen than the numerous descriptions of life led by men condemned to exile or to hard labor in Siberia";¹ and Mérimée, for example, commented at length on Russian slavery and the cruel treatment of the serf, all in the process of praising Turgenev's ability to see Russia clearly.

Although knowledge of Turgenev and Russian literature in general did not at this time go much beyond the review-oriented segment of the population and the Paris salons (particularly those of Madame Svechina and Princess Mecherskaia),³ it was through these two media that Russian literature became as well known in France as it did.⁴ Most,

¹Vial, *op. cit.*, p. 180. A propos of an interest in Russian life, an article by A. Herzen, "Les Années d'exil et de prison d'un Ecrivain Russe" (*R.D.M.*, 1 September, 1854, p. 857), should have whetted the appetite.

²Mérimée, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

³Princess Mecherskaia's husband, Prince Elim Mechersky, had from 1833 until his death in 1844 "... been more or less officially charged with a diplomatic mission by Uvarov, Minister of Public Instruction." As well as attending the Salons of Paris, he knew (and his wife often received), the most popular French writers of the time, de Vigny and Dumas père, and made known the works of Pushkin, Zhukovsky, and Krylov by his translations of their works into French. See Portal, *op. cit.*, p. 194. See also A. Mazon, *Deux écrivains russes en France*, Paris, 1964.

⁴Cadot, *op. cit.*, p. 11. Cadot points out that the presence of numbers of Russians in Paris presented problems as they exhibited various opposing tendencies which make generalizations impossible. Consequently, he divides the emigré group into two segments: the first emigration, which quickly became revolutionary, and the later emigrants, "simplement désireux de changer d'air et de se divertir

however, were not able to recognize the originality of Russian literature: they viewed it first in its relationship to Western European models, and then as an imitation of the literature they knew.¹ Although the literary settings were unusual, the political background against which the themes unfolded was familiar enough! Turgenev and others confirmed the French readers' suspicions that Russia was indeed a despotically ruled state.

The success of the Crimean campaign, the death of Nicholas I and the great Russian reforms of the 1860's, inspired a literature concerning Russia which, although somewhat better informed than it had been in previous years, was regrettably no more objective. Portal points out that the numerous publications:²

... should not create an illusion. The serious documented studies ... were in great part of German origin ... but apart from the serious works which had few readers, most descriptions of Russia ...

quelques mois à Paris."

Gabriel Monod, commenting on Turgenev's works, describes his own view of the Russian emigrés portrayed by Turgenev as "... those nomads whose incoherent brains are seething with all sorts of ideas, social, political and philosophical; those spirits in search of an ideal and a career, whom the narrow and suffocating social life of Russia has turned into idlers and weaklings; those worldlings with their eccentric or vulgar frivolity. ..." See Monod, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

¹See Léouzon le Duc, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-187; Portal, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-196; P. Mérimée, "La Littérature en Russie: Nicolas Gogol," *R.D.M.*, 15 November, 1851, p. 627. Gogol's writing in the *Inspector General* is compared by Mérimée with the English humorists; in depicting domestic life, he is compared with Balzac.

²Portal, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

perpetrated through omission, a deformed stereotyped image . . . it was not the Russia of the present that was evoked, but a Russia of the past, immobile under its western clothing.

The Russian suppression of the 1863 Polish insurrection brought swift reaction in France. Montalembert pleaded for French aid to Poland, believing that France had only to declare her determined intention to be obeyed, since her armies were invincible.¹ The historian, Henri Martin, threw his support to the Poles in Le Siècle and, reminiscent of the previous centuries, castigated the Russians for their oriental barbarism. Developing the theory that Russians were not Europeans in La Russie et l'Europe, Martin relegated them to a hypothetical group, half Turk, half Mongol, in Central Asia.²

The ever increasing number of Polish émigrés in Paris aided the cause of their homeland by influencing public opinion through articles in the Revue des deux mondes, the Journal des Débats and L'Univers. Caught up in this fever for Poland, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu sang her praises in a burst of Byronic poetry:³

Connaissez-vous la terre où sous les pins des bois
Les hommes sont traqués comme des loups sauvages,
Où les plus fortunés sont chassés de leurs toits
Vers de lointains rivages?

¹G. Duveau, Histoire du peuple français de 1848 à nos jours, Paris, 1955, p. 292.

²L. Leger, Souvenirs d'un Slavophile, 1863-1897, Paris, 1905, p. 22.

³A. Leroy-Beaulieu, Un Homme d'Etat Russe: Nicolas Milutine, Paris, 1884, pp. v, vi.

Où la veuve aux regards déguise ses douleurs,
 Où l'on suit les cercueils en gais habits de fête,
 Où l'enfant orphelin n'ose verser des pleurs
 Sans se cacher la tête?

.

Pologne, par trois fois morte en moins de cent ans,
 Comme un serpent coupé dont chaque anneau s'agite,
 Tu cherches à souder les tronçons irritants
 Où ton âme palpite.

Feeling the opportunity to act as the defender of the principles of national self-determination, Napoleon III invited Russia to participate in a congress of the powers to resolve the Polish question. It was Bismarck, however, who captured the moment and, at the expense of Poland, befriended Russia with his offer to allow Russian troops to pursue the insurgent Poles into Prussian territory—a most unusual step for a government against which (if Leroy-Beaulieu is to be believed), the Russian army was also moving to insure, not only the russification of their section of Poland, but also its de-germanization.¹ The spreading influence of Pangermanism in the Slav areas of Europe was also noted by Leger, who was to warn that the Germans were always ready to profit from dissension among the Slavs in order to subject them to German domination.² The fear of the growth of a German cultural hegemony was sufficiently great after 1866 to prompt Leger to write in the Revue moderne about what he believed would be the consequences of a larger Germany:³

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Un Homme d'Etat Russe: Nicolas Milutine," R.D.M., 15 November, 1880, p. 439.

²Leger, Le Panslavisme et l'intérêt Français, p. 249.

³L. Leger, "De Paris à Prague," Revue moderne, Vol. 54 (1869), p. 642. See also J. Fricz and L. Leger, La Bohême historique, pittoresque et littéraire, Paris, 1867.

Il est des noms qui pèsent lourdement sur l'histoire et qui entraînent les générations à travers une longue série d'erreurs et des préjugés. Tel est entre tous le nom de l'Allemagne. Il a longtemps exercé, il exerce encore sur les esprits un prestige d'autant plus grand que l'on connaît moins les limites du monde germanique, et que la vague même où elles se perdent ajoute à leur immensité. Entre la France et la Russie nous ne voyons guère que deux pays non allemands, la Pologne et la Hongrie. Nous croyons que l'Allemagne s'étend sans interruption de Hambourg à Trieste, du pont de Kehl à la frontière russe et hongroise.

Nor was Leger alone in his belief: the Academician Saint-René Taillandier felt that France (as well as her civilizing mission) was endangered by German unity. He did not doubt that further unification of "la Confédération du Nord" would be precipitated by war with France.¹

But if the Poles in France found their own cause against Russia frustrated by the appearance of Tsar Alexander II in Paris in 1867 and drowned in a sea of bravado by Charles Floquet, or outweighed in French considerations by a fear of a growing Germany, how much greater was their discomfort when it was found that some French writers supported the ambitions of Slav nationalism?

¹Saint-René Taillandier, "L'Autriche et la Bohême en 1869: La Question Tchèque et l'intérêt Français," R.D.M., 1 August, 1869, pp. 517, 539. This article was very well received in Prague, see Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 63.

Saint-René Taillandier was a rather prolific writer on Slavic affairs for the Revue des deux mondes. On the Caucasus he wrote "La Guerre du Caucase . . .," 1 November, 1853; on Siberia, "La Sibérie au XIX^e siècle," 1 August and 1 September, 1855, 1 November and 1 December, 1868, 1 January, 15 February, 1 April and 15 May, 1869. See also his article "Le Comte Spéranski," 15 October, 1856. For additional material see the Index, 1831-1874 of the Revue des deux mondes (Table alphabétique), p. 139.

The Czech nationalist leader, Ladislav Rieger, successor to František Palacký, the Czech national historian and organizer of the first Slav Congress in 1848, was in Paris before attending the 1867 Slav Congress in Moscow. Although Napoleon III gave no indication of direct support to Rieger or the Slav nationalist cause, it was understood that the interest of France lay in the reestablishment of the Kingdom of Bohemia and in a federalist Slav coalition. Saint-René Taillandier, in an article for the Revue des deux mondes (meaningfully entitled, "L'Autriche et la Bohême en 1869: La question Tchèque et l'intérêt français"), supported, not only the right of national self-determination for the Czechs and their union within a Slav federation, but encouraged French support for them as well.¹ Leger recommended that, "la France, si inquiète en face du Pangermanisme, si effarée au seul nom du Panslavisme, aurait peut-être le devoir de s'éclairer."² To the readers of the Revue moderne, he explained that Slavism was a natural consequence of the oppression suffered by the Slavs of Austria and the Ottoman Empire; that in their union the Slavs hoped to find their strength; that in Moscow in 1867 Russia was accepted as their ally.³

¹Saint-René Taillandier, R.D.M., 1 August, 1869, pp. 539, 540.

²Fricz & Leger, op. cit., p. ii.

³L. Leger, "Les Slaves en 1867," Revue moderne, 25 April, 1868, pp. 19, 20. See also A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Les Réformes de la Turquie: La Politique Russe et le Panslavisme," R.D.M., 1 December, 1876, p. 511: "... dans cet intérêt passionné pour les Slaves, les instincts religieux se joignent aux visées politiques, les tendances mystiques du passé aux penchans humanitaires du présent. Il y a là de l'esprit des croisades et de l'esprit de la révolution."

[Les Slaves] ne la voient pas du même œil que nous. Le spectre du panslavisme moscovite, le souvenir des Cosaques, le douloureux spectacle de la Pologne égorgée dominant toutes nos idées sur la Russie: nous frémissons à la seule pensée de quatre-vingt millions de Slaves montant sous les étendards du tsar à l'assaut de la civilisation européenne. . . . Cette théorie n'est ni comprise ni goûtée par les Slaves . . . ils croient que la domination russe (qui n'est pour eux que le dernier des pis-aller) serait peut-être moins dure que celle des Germains, des Turcs ou des Magyares.

Indeed, Leger identified that which most troubled both the Poles and the French: the sceptre of Panslavism, the vision of Russia provoking the Slavs to revolt in order to serve her own aims of aggrandizement. By lending the Czechs their support, however, France would be working to counteract an increase in the sphere of influence of both Germany and Russia. Saint-René Taillandier cautioned the Czechs:¹

Plus de fausses démarches, plus de paroles irréfléchies, plus de pèlerinages à Moscou. N'allez pas, même par une tactique d'un jour, rétrograder vers l'Orient; votre salut est du côté de la société occidentale. Souvenez-vous du martyre de vos frères de Pologne.

The affinity which Slav nations had expressed for Russia alarmed not only those in France who had been sympathetic to the Polish cause, but the Polish émigrés themselves. Their sense of defeat in the face of what they believed to be advancing Panslavism (mirrored in Julian Klaczko's 1867 article, "Le Congrès de Moscou et la propagande panslaviste"), left no room for further negotiation. In an assault upon the Czechs for having accepted Russian participation in their movement,

¹Saint-René Taillandier, R.D.M., 1 August, 1869, pp. 543-544.

Klaczko foresaw their continued involvement:¹

[La Russie] continuera ses congrès scientifiques, ses expositions ethnologiques et ses liens moraux avec les Slaves. Il excitera de plus en plus les Tchèques, les Ruthènes, les Croates; il plaidera leur cause, il sera l'intermédiaire généreux. . . .

Having twice been subjugated by the Russians prior to 1870, the Poles had, as a logical consequence, worked to discredit a Slav unity fostered by Russia. When France, following the Franco-Prussian War, aspired to closer friendship with the country to which most Slav nations also looked for sustenance, the inevitable concluding chapter was written in Franco-Polish relations, prior to World War I. "Le public français," Leger wrote, "se désintéressa complètement de la cause polonaise qui l'avait passionné naguère, mais dont il n'avait jamais bien compris tous les éléments." The Société d'histoire et de littérature polonaises, until that time one of the most active organizations in Paris on behalf of an independent Poland, "mourut faute de combattants . . . l'histoire a de ces cruelles ironies."² The result of the French policy of selective support for European national movements, in combination with the circumstances of Russian support of the aspirations of the Balkan Slavs and the Franco-Prussian War, had changed the fortunes of Poland in France.

The outbreak of war between France and Prussia in 1870 quickly subordinated all interest in the academic arguments of Slav national

¹Julian Klaczko, "Le Congrès de Moscou et la propagande Pan-slaviste," R.D.M., 1 September, 1867, p. 179.

²Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 70.

self-determination to the urgent consideration of French state interests. The once brilliant position occupied in Europe by the Second Empire disappeared with the smoke of battle, and the international reputation of France's army collapsed. For the first time in her military history France, which prided herself on her military tradition, had been swiftly annihilated in war.¹ Shocked by the sudden disaster and conscious that she had fought alone, France found that the Great Powers, while not hostile toward her, accepted her diminished position and acceded to Germany's growing hegemony.

The victory of Prussia, coupled with the social upheavals which occurred throughout France after the cessation of formal hostilities, prompted not only a passionate desire among Frenchmen for revenge against Germany,² but also a self-critical mood which found opinion

¹A. Horne, The Price of Glory, London, 1962, p. 3: "'Nous sommes dans un pot de chambre et nous y serons emmerdés,'" remarked General Ducrot. The words might have applied to the whole bitter sense of total disgrace felt by the French Army after 1870. It was a terrible slur to be faced by the heirs of Henri IV and Condé, Turenne and Saxe, not to mention the great Bonaparte—by soldiers who, down through the ages had considered themselves to be the warrior race of Europe.

²E. Vattier, La France devant l'Allemagne et devant Elle-Même, Paris, 1871. In what was as much an anti-Bonapartist as an anti-German pamphlet, Vattier used such phrases as: "Guillaume, Bismarck et Frédéric-Charles sont des conquérants de l'école de Tamerlan, fléaux qui détruisent tout sur leur passage" with, of course, the understood reason why: "Le Germain n'est qu'une ébauche de la nature." See pp. 22, 24. See also: Marquis de Gabriac, Souvenirs Diplomatiques de Russie et d'Allemagne 1870-1872, Paris, 1896, p. 127.

The desire for revenge against Germany often took the form of a bitter dislike of the Germans and things German. See Gabriel Monod, "French Politics," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 60 (1891), p. 921. Monod shows the extent to which anti-German feeling went, when in Paris in 1891, Wagner's Lohengrin was finally performed after years of delay due to public hostility. This hostility was caused in part by

divided on the cause of the débâcle. Questioning the causes of the defeat, the thought that France had indeed sinned not against religion but against science¹ were for the most part outweighed in popular opinion by the sentiments of those who felt either a desire for revenge or a sense of shame that the catastrophe was due to national decadence caused by a decline of faith: "Ce n'est donc pas à la Prusse, c'est à nous-même qu'il faut faire la guerre."² But as they probed deeper for the cause of defeat, the very basis of the French nation and its civilizing mission came into question.

Indeed, there were those who had advocated just such soul-searching years before: the theme of the decadent French nation in need of regeneration had been rampant throughout French political as well as literary life after 1830,³ and particularly after the revolution of 1848.⁴ "The doctrinaire belief in progress began to lose its intellectual respectability if not its popular appeal"⁵ and was seen as

Déroulède's paper Revanche which organized demonstrations against German art, science, and music, and was successful at least once in preventing Lohengrin from being performed by threatening a brawl. See Revanche, 26 March, 1887.

¹G. Monod, Allemands et Français, Paris, 1872, p. 21.

²G.A. Heinrich, La France, L'Etranger et les Partis, Paris, 1873, p. 25.

³Cadot, op. cit., p. 500.

⁴F. Ozanam, "Du progrès dans les siècles de décadence," Le Correspondant, Vol. 30 (1852), p. 257.

⁵Swart, op. cit., p. 86.

losing its sense of revolutionary direction and relinquishing its lead to two younger nations, Russia and the United States.¹ In the France of the 1820's and 1830's, there had been hope and enthusiasm for the principles of the revolution; by the late 1850's, however, French democracy had become no more than "une turbulente décadence."²

Whatever national groupings, geographical, racial or cultural, that were to be found in Europe there had always been in the minds of Frenchmen a distinction between English, Germanic and Slav, as well as Frenchmen who saw the solution to the ills of the French nation issuing from one of them. The Slav, embodied politically in Russia, was regarded as outside European civilization—he was a barbarian whose mission was to force Europe to renew perpetually its own outworn civilization.³ But proponents of both English and German political and cultural penetration were not lacking; and generally they had, prior to 1871, stated their case with much greater ability.

In La France nouvelle (1868), the diplomat and Academician Prévost-Paradol had analyzed French decadence, pointing out that

¹A. de Tocqueville, Démocratie en Amérique, 2 vols., Paris, 1835, Vol. 2, p. 449: "Il y a aujourd'hui sur la terre deux grands peuples qui partis de points différents semblent s'avancer vers la même but: ce sont les Russes et les Anglo-Américains. . . ."

²Charles de Rémusat, "Du pessimisme politique," R.D.M., 1 August, 1860, p. 721.

³E. Coeurderoy, Hurrah! où la révolution par les cosaques, London, 1854, p. 66; L. de Juvigny, De l'unity européenne, Paris, 1846; R.A. Lechore, History of the Idea of Civilization in France, 1830-1870, Bonn, 1935, p. 80.

France's population was in decline, and showing his readers that there was a national cycle of growth, maturity and decay.¹ He had urged his countrymen to give up their ideas of a utopia and imitate England with her respect for tradition and political compromise.² In criticizing his own country's political institutions, Prévost-Paradol had been doing no more than Robert and Coeurderoy before him.³

Whereas Prévost-Paradol had chosen England as the country from which France might derive the impetus necessary for its regeneration, there was yet another area to which many of France's intellectual élite turned for inspiration. In the eyes of men such as Ernest Renan, Gabriel Monod and Hippolyte Taine, Germany had achieved a cultural superiority from which the French nation could only benefit,⁴ a fact which the publicist Reynaud later indicated as being responsible for

¹P. Guiral, Prévost-Paradol 1829-1870: pensée et action d'un libéral sous le Second Empire, Paris, 1955. See especially chapter 7: "La France nouvelle et la pensée de Prévost-Paradol."

²Ibid., pp. 493-497.

³The Anarchist Ernest Coeurderoy contrasted the barbaric but vigorous Slavic nations with the more highly civilized but decadent nations of the West. He concluded that not until after the total destruction of the then corrupt society in the West by an invading Russian army would the cause of revolution triumph. (See Coeurderoy, op. cit., p. 66.)

A similar view to Coeurderoy's had been taken by Cyprien Robert, the successor to Adam Mickiewicz at the Collège de France, when he wrote that the Slavic world would play a major part in regenerating decadent old Europe which lacked the strength to bring about its own regeneration. (See C. Robert, Le Monde Slav, son passé, son état présent et son avenir, Vol. 1, pp. 1, 3.

⁴Monod, Allemands et Français. See also G. Monod, "Ernest Renan," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 62 (1892); and J.M. Carré, Les écrivains français et le mirage allemand, 1800-1940, Paris, 1947.

closing the eyes of certain French intellectuals to the political dangers of Prussia and for separating intellectual France from political France prior to the Franco-Prussian War.¹

What Louis Leger had suspected in 1866 as a cloud on the horizon of French cultural hegemony in Europe (predating Reynaud's thought that German intellectual domination prepared for future political domination),² had, for him and other intellectuals, become a storm by 1871. Prussia's victory over France seemed to confirm, not the gift of German cultural strength as Renan had hoped, but rather its imposition. To many in France, its presence confirmed the political threat and to a certain degree, the growing fear of the corollary: that French cultural hegemony in Europe would be superseded by the hegemony of German culture.

Faced with the war that was too short and the defeat that was too decisive for most of them to have made a contribution in the hour of France's need, savants, following the war, conscripted themselves in the service of la nation. Confronted with the proof of Prussian military strength and with their own belief in the consequent growth of German cultural dominance, intellectuals attempted to discern the cause of the weaknesses which had brought about the fall of France.

Taine wrote that as a result of the defeat "our duty will be publicly to confess our faults, to discover in those faults the causes of our reverses, to spread knowledge of languages and history."³ And

¹L. Reynaud, L'Influence Allemande en France au XVIII^e et au XIX^e siècle, Paris, 1922, p. 260.

²Ibid., p. 259.

³Quoted in G.P. Gooch, History and Historians in the 19th Century, London, 1913, p. 240. See also Herbert Tint, The Decline of French Patriotism, 1870-1914, London, 1964, pp. 71-80.

what profession, the Academician René Doumic rhetorically asked, had more right to encourage national solidarity among the citizenry, to demand their confidence in the destiny of their country, to demand a common effort to secure the nation's future—in essence to encourage patriotism—than that of the historian who knew more than anyone the cost of nation-building?¹

Ernest Renan, to whom Germany had been an intellectual mistress, had the courage to state shortly after the events of 1870 that, while he deplored the catastrophe, he could find no better model for French educational institutions to emulate than that which he felt had proved itself so successful for Germany.² Reform after 1870 became widespread. At the same time as initiating obligatory military service on the Prussian model, France initiated the German system of free, compulsory, non-denominational primary state education, secondary education for girls, and reorganized university education based upon the German method.

The German invasion had given a whole new orientation to the lives of men such as Renan, Taine, Sorel, Henri Houssaye, Lavis

¹R. Doumic, Ecrivains d'Aujourd'hui, Paris, 1898, p. 258.

Pierre Nora feels that, shortly after the defeat of 1870, men such as Paul Bert, Henry Waddington, Jules Simon, as well as Ernest Lavis, felt that "... à l'histoire est dévolue la mission essentielle: former de bons citoyens, des électeurs et des soldats. . . ." See Nora, op. cit., p. 102.

²E. Renan, Réforme intellectuelle et morale, Paris, 1871, pp. vi ff. See also G. Monod, "Ernest Renan," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 62 (1892), pp. 639 ff; and Tint, op. cit., pp. 80-96.

and many more. To breathe life into the body of reform was the role of the intellectual, not because he accepted the cultural domination of Germany, but rather because he wished to see the reestablishment of France. Behind all this, Elie Halévy admitted some years later, "there lurked some political arrière-pensée."¹

Albert Sorel (against the wishes of Gambetta), gave up a promising career in diplomacy to devote himself unconditionally to the service of developing an educated élite at the Ecole libre des Sciences politiques.² Henry Houssaye, son of the well known man-about-Paris, Arsène, had chosen classical history as a life's work but his experiences as a soldier in 1870 led him to concentrate on the experiences of yet another age. From the Napoleonic years 1814 and 1815, Houssaye plucked "consolation from defeat"³ and by so doing offered to the French public the theme of the regeneration of la nation.

Taking up an historical theme remarkably similar to that of Houssaye, no one was more resolved than Ernest Lavisse to work

¹Elie Halévy, "Franco-German Relations since 1870," History, Vol. 9 (1924/25), p. 22.

The relationship between the military and education in France during the Third Republic was not so strange then as it would be to us today. Lavisse wrote: "... si l'écolier ne sait pas que ses ancêtres ont combattu sur tous les champs de bataille pour de nobles causes ... s'il ne devient pas un citoyen pénétré de ses devoirs et un soldat qui aime son fusil, l'instituteur aura perdu son temps." (Quoted in Nora, op. cit., p. 102.)

²Gooch, op. cit., pp. 246-247.

³Ibid., p. 273.

for the reparation of France. While studying for his doctorate at a German university in 1875, he became convinced that the youth of Germany had been the instrumental force in bringing about unification. It is not surprising that as a result of this, he felt that France, by replacing her lost physical forces with intellectual forces, could re-establish her position.¹ To this end, Lavissee worked unceasingly toward the reconstruction of French universities and contributed in his own way to the work of reparation by assembling under his direction a group of scholars who would write the Histoire de France.

The most obvious manifestation of this movement among French historians was the reassessment of French history: Taine's voluminous Les Origines de la France contemporaine (1876-1894); Sorel's two volume Histoire diplomatique de la guerre Franco-Allemande (1875), and La question d'Orient au XVIII^e siècle: Les origines de la Triple Alliance (1878); and, Houssaye's 1814 and 1815 (3 vols., 1893, 1898, 1905).

Contemporaneous with this interest in reassessing French history was an increased interest by intellectuals in the history of other countries. Like their contemporaries, a small number of historians believed they could best serve the interests of both France and history through the study of Slavic countries in general and Russia in particular. The most influential of these prior to the turn of the century were

¹E. Lavissee, Etudes et étudiants, Paris, 1890, p. 257. See also R. Doumic, Ecrivains d'Aujourd'hui, and P. Nora, "Ernest Lavissee: son rôle dans la formation du sentiment national," Revue Historique, Vol. 228 (1962).

Louis Leger, Alfred Rambaud, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu and Albert Vandal.

The task of introducing Russia to the French people on an academic, let alone on a popular level, was not to be an easy one. Yet, as Ernest Denis said, time and time again, "France is a democracy guided by an intellectual élite; . . . to convince the democracy it was necessary to convince the élite; and . . . the élite could be convinced only by scientific work."¹ The prejudices which the academic Slavophile, or more specifically, Russophile, had to overcome in the French mind (in addition to those based on political rhetoric), were the still prevalent eighteenth-century views of Russia as a barbarous state,² and the fear of Panslavism which continued to be demonstrated in the works of Polish émigrés even after the war of 1870-1871 because of such writers as Danilevsky (La Russie et l'Europe) and Fadeev (Vues sur la Question d'Orient).³ Thiers himself, although disturbed at the idea of Russian studies being incorporated into the academic pro-

¹Eisenmann, op. cit., p. 303.

²M.S. Roux, Voyage au pays des barbares: La vérité sur l'Alliance Franco-Russe, Paris, 1895.

³See Renouvin, op. cit., p. 32.

N.Y. Danilevsky's book is more commonly known in France as La doctrine panslaviste (Bucharest, 1890), and it is Henri Martin's work, which Leger referred to as "un gros volume bien oublié aujourd'hui," which is known as La Russie et l'Europe (Paris, 1866). See Leger, Le Panslavisme et l'intérêt Français, p. 111.

A. Fadeev was born in 1824; died in Odessa in 1883. General in Chief of Russian armies in 1864, but was placed on inactive retirement in 1871 for his panslavist and anti-German ideas. In 1877 he took part in the war in Serbia and Montenegro, after which he was made press attaché! See La Grande Encyclopédie, Paris, 1904, Vol. 16, p. 1076.

gramme at Paris for fear that Panslavism might be taught there,¹ was nevertheless able to overcome his misgivings; for in Thiers "there was a curious blend of ignorance, prejudice and perhaps even a prophetic consciousness that the two great neighbours of Imperial Germany would need to join forces to resist her and, that mutual knowledge must precede alliance."²

Although the events of 1870 were eventually to have a salutary effect on Slavic studies in general, and Russian studies in particular, immediately following the débâcle, misconceptions continued to abound. "The diplomatic service tended to assume . . . that since French was universally understood in Russia—by the politer elements of society—the Frenchman going there would be wasting his time if he tried to learn the language of the natives."³ One cannot be over-critical of the service, however; for, as Louis Leger was to remark in 1873, there was still more opportunity for the study of Tibetan and Japanese than there was for the study of the language of the largest Empire in Europe.⁴

¹Leger, Le Panslavisme et l'intérêt Français, p. 113. There is a curious story related by Leger of how the Minister of Public Instruction, Batbie, in 1873, counselled Leger "surtout n'enseignes pas le panslavisme," to which Leger replied: "Le panslavisme à propos d'un cours de grammaire serbe!"

²Eisenmann, op. cit., p. 296.

³Hemmings, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

⁴Leger, Le monde slave (1873), p. 266.

The means of change rested with the few French intellectuals, Louis Leger, Alfred Rambaud, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu and Albert Vandal, who undertook to serve their nation by focussing the attention of their countrymen on matters Russian. By presenting the previously misunderstood Russia in a state of transition and, more important, as part of the European community, but having a culture uniquely its own; by presenting Russia as a country with which France might well have allied herself in the past, they could now serve France by offering Russia as the viable alternative to those countries which excluded France from the ranks of the first nations of Europe.

CHAPTER TWO

Louis Leger, Alfred Rambaud and
the inauguration of French interest
in Russia after 1870.

In the summer of 1872, General LeFlô, French ambassador to Russia,¹ described relations between the two nations as having reverted to what he believed they had been in 1856:²

... Le même courant d'opinion qui entraînait ce pays vers nous existe toujours, et serait plus marqué si les tendresses visibles de l'Empereur Alexandre pour la cour de Berlin n'en modéraient la vivacité... un temps d'arrêt s'est ainsi produit dans le travail d'une alliance... C'est le but de tous mes soins et de tous mes efforts...

It was the goal of Leger and Rambaud as well.

Professor F.W.J. Hemmings believes that "it would be unwise to underestimate the part politics played [after 1870] in directing the attention of the French toward Russian thought and art." And, once understood by the French, Russian 'thought and art' also played its part in directing the attentions of the French towards a political agreement, as did a new awareness of Russian history; for "anyone who

¹General LeFlô was French ambassador in St. Petersburg from June 1871 until March 1879. LeFlô was extremely well liked by the Tsar and, upon his retirement, was presented with the Order of Saint André (3 March, 1879). See E.M. de Vogüé, Journal du Vicomte E.M. de Vogüé: 1877-1883, Paris, 1932, pp. 116, 120.

See also A.D., C.P.: Russie: LeFlô to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Waddington, 11 March, 1879, Vol. 258, fo. 181.

²A.D., C.P.: Russie: LeFlô to Minister of Foreign Affairs, de Rémusat, 20 July, 1872, Vol. 246, fo. 162-163.

could or who pretended to be able to pronounce with authority on any subject connected with Russia was assured a respectful audience; for it was of first rate importance what was to be thought of this nation . . . were they merely a barbarian Asiatic horde or were they one of the youngest members of the European family?"¹

Following the Franco-Prussian War, three intellectuals were to play a major role in directing the attention of the French public toward Russia, with all the political consequences that were to be attached thereto. Louis Leger, Alfred Rambaud and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu were all in Russia in 1872² for the first time. Leger himself later wrote:³

Il y a deux ans encore, elle [la France] ignorait ce que pouvaient ses ennemis, elle s'appliquera maintenant sans doute à apprendre ce que valent ses amis. Malgré la différence des institutions politiques, malgré les nuances qui séparent Moscou et Paris, sur bien des questions, il existe entre ces deux pôles de l'Europe moderne, des sympathies, qui ne peuvent que s'accroître à mesure que les parties se connaîtront mieux.

Leger's interest in Slavic thought was considerably older than that of either Leroy-Beaulieu or Rambaud. It had begun in 1863 when he studied Polish language and literature with Alexandre Chodzko, who was chargé de cours in Slavic literature and language at the Collège de France. To finance these studies Leger gave lessons in Italian,

¹Hemmings, op. cit., p. 10.

²Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 122.

³Leger, Le monde slave (1873), p. 267.

a language he had learned well while at the Lycée, and he seemed to have been drawn toward both ancient Greek and Renaissance Italian literatures since he had proposed an aspect of these subjects for his theses in 1863.¹ It was the political situation in Poland, however, which shifted his interest from Italy and Greece to the "seul peuple de cette race avec laquelle la France fut, à cette date, en communauté de sentiment et d'intérêt."² Certainly, the large number of refugees grouped around Chodzko in Paris after the insurrection of 1863 made it easier for Leger to follow his interests.

In 1864, Leger had made his first voyage to the Slavic world of Central Europe: Bohemia. His friends thought he had gone a long way to learn German or "Austrian" and this elicited the comment from Leger that "on était dans ce temps-là fort ignorant de certaines questions, même dans le monde universitaire."³ It was in Prague, however, that he had become conscious "que les adversaires du peuple tchèque étaient aussi les nôtres."⁴

¹L. Leger, "Mes débuts dans l'enseignement," Revue internationale de l'enseignement, Vol. 51 (1906), p. 5: "J'étais passionné pour la poésie grecque et pour la poésie italienne. . . [M. Victor Leclerc, doyen de la Faculté des lettres de Paris] accepta une thèse sur Solon et refusa celle que je lui présentais sur Pétrarque: 'J'ai dit à ce sujet dans l'Histoire littéraire tout ce qu'il y avait à dire.' Je ne pouvais pas entrer en discussion avec le vénérable doyen et je lui promis de découvrir un autre sujet."

²Ibid., p. 5. See also A. Puech, "Notice sur la vie et les travaux de M. Louis Leger," Recueil de l'Institut de France, No. 22 (1924), pp. 8, 9.

³Leger, "Mes débuts dans l'enseignement," p. 6.

⁴Leger, Le monde slave (2nd edition), Paris, 1897, p. vi.

Upon his return to Paris, Leger, having "jeté à l'eau Solon et ses poèmes," opted for the "barbarians."¹ The Dean of the Faculty of Letters at the Sorbonne, Victor Leclerc, approved of Leger's new interest—first, because he liked Slavs, believing that they spoke French well; and second, because he felt that they shared his dislike for the Teutons—ample enough reasons for seconding Leger's new interests. From that time, Leger pursued his work with a passion, attempting to read every book written about the Slavs deposited in Paris libraries, attending the lectures of Chodzko at the Collège de France, and, forming friendships with various Slav writers in Paris. He felt that his research had to have a sound basis, in order that his results would show that the Slavic people had no less a right to the title of nobility than westerners.² This ambition would be constant throughout his life.

Then, in 1867, wishing to attend the Ethnographic Congress in Moscow, Leger applied for his first official mission from the Minister of Public Instruction.³ He wrote afterwards that he had been refused due to a lack of funds; but he always suspected that the real reason had been the French assumption that the "rue de Grenelle . . . n'avons rien à apprendre de la Russie."⁴

¹Leger, "Mes débuts dans l'enseignement," p. 6.

²Leger, Le monde slave (1897), p. vii.

³A.N., F¹⁷2983^A: Leger to the Minister of Public Instruction, Duruy, 6 May, 1867. Refusal dated 18 May, 1867.

⁴Leger, Le monde slave (1897), p. viii. See also Leger, "Mes débuts dans l'enseignement," p. 9.

Not to be denied, Leger made his own way to the Slavic nations, at the invitation of Bishop Strossmayer.¹ Leger visited Agram, Belgrade, Croatia, Prague and Slavonia where "la police de M. Andrassy essaya de me mettre la main au collet."² Throughout his career, Leger took pride in being a person whom the German and Austrian authorities, perhaps with reason, found guided by sinister motivation. In 1866 and 1867, prior to his sojourn in Central Europe, Leger had written one work on Bohemia and participated in the creation of another. The first, a short work: L'Etat autrichien: Bohême, Hongrie, Habsbourgs, was followed by Leger's co-authorship of La Bohême historique, pittoresque et littéraire.³ Although both works were praised by Czechs, La Bohême historique, pittoresque et littéraire was badly received in Vienna where, Leger wrote, it was "interdit par les tribunaux autrichiens. . . ."⁴

Through the action of the authorities against Slav nationalism, it became obvious to Leger, not only why his Slav friends had to go to Moscow, but why hostility on the part of the Austrian government

¹ Joseph George Strossmayer, born 4 February, 1815 in Essek in Slavonia, appointed Bishop of Diakovar (Diakovar or Diakovo or Djakova) 20 May, 1850. Episcoporum Ecclesia Catholicae, Ratisbonae, 1886, p. 80. See also Leger, Le monde slave (1897), pp. 117 ff.; E. de Laveleye, "L'Evêque Strossmayer," R.D.M., 15 June, 1885.

² Leger, Le monde slave (1897), p. ix.

³ This work was written in collaboration with the Czech poet Joseph Fricz, Paul de Saint-Victor and a dozen others, either Czech or French writers. See P. Boyer, "Louis Leger," Revue des études slaves, Vol. 3 (1923), p. 130.

⁴ Leger, Le monde slave (1897), p. viii.

should be demonstrated against him personally.¹

Mes amis slaves m'expliquèrent quelles raisons les avaient obligés à se rendre à Moscou, pour y manifester une vie nationale que MM. de Beust et Andrassy avaient entrepris d'anéantir. Je me fis le rapporteur de leur griefs. . . . Défendre des peuples qui se permettaient de le juger autrement qu'on ne faisait à Paris et à Londres, démontrer que ces apuvres Slaves n'étaient pas uniquement des barbares déchaînés sur notre civilisation, c'était là un crime irrémissible: c'était faire acte de panslaviste.

While Leger was in Bohemia, the Revue des deux mondes published the article by Julian Klaczko. Leger interpreted the publication of Klaczko's attack on the Slav Congress in Moscow as demonstrating the position that French interests dictated a policy of non-involvement in the nationalist aspirations of the Slavs:²

La Revue des Deux Mondes se chargea le 1^{er} septembre 1867 de nous faire la leçon. Elle traita comme ils le méritaient ces misérables Slaves d'Autriche et, d'ailleurs, qui prétendaient vivre en dépit des Allemands et des Magyars. . . . Nous n'étions pas en état de juger par nous-mêmes et il nous fallait accepter les appréciations d'un écrivain peu désintéressé dans la question.

It was an embarrassment to Leger that such an article should appear. He was the guest of Bishop Strosmajer, "un homme qui aime passionnément la France et qui lors de nos revers osa élever la voix en notre faveur." It was also a momentous occasion: "Un matin il entra dans ma chambre les larmes aux yeux. Il tenait à la main la revue, 'Voyez,'

¹Ibid., p. ix.

²Ibid. The article to which Leger alluded—"Le congrès de Moscou et la propagande panslaviste" by Julian Klaczko, so infuriated Leger that thirty years later he was able to recall the event with extreme rancour.

me dit-il, 'ce qu'on écrit sur nous à Paris.'"¹ It was this attitude that Leger determined to change.

Before returning to Paris, Leger became a corresponding member of the Royal Society of Science in Prague, a member of the Belgrade Society of Literature and Science and significantly, of the South-Slav Academy of Agram (Zagreb).²

Cyrille et Méthode, étude historique sur la conversion des Slaves au Christianisme³ was the doctoral thesis which Leger presented at the Sorbonne in July, 1868 to a committee headed by Professor E. Egger, with whom he had been associated since 1864 (when Egger had been the first president and Leger the first "administrateur" of the Société de Linguistique). Egger was chosen president of the jury by the new Dean of the Faculty of Letters, Patin, because although Egger was a classical specialist, he was "moins hostile aux nouveautés." Egger accepted the presidency of the jury, not because he was interested in the subject, but because he liked Leger. Leger wrote:⁴

Il y avait peu de grec dans mes thèses, sauf quelques textes byzantins. La nouveauté barbare des sujets que j'avais choisis ne laissait pas d'effaroucher un peu le savant helléniste: 'La Faculté,' me dit-il, 'en admettant des thèses si étrangères à ses études, a donné un rare exemple de tolérance. . . .'

¹Ibid., p. ix.

²A.N., F¹⁷25832. Leger's personal record with the Minister of Public Instruction.

³Leger's complementary thesis was De Nestore rerum Russicarum scriptore.

⁴Leger, "Mes débuts dans l'enseignement," p. 7.

It was the first time a Slavic study had been presented at the Sorbonne.¹ Leger was successful and received his doctorate.²

In the same year, Leger tried to persuade the Ministry of Public Instruction and particularly the Minister, Victor Duruy, to allow him to teach "un cours annexe" at the Sorbonne "sur les langues et les littératures slaves." Leger singled out Duruy because he knew that, as Minister of Public Instruction, Duruy had authorized a number of "cours libres." The director of personnel at the Sorbonne, M. Danton, had told Leger "à faire du slave, qui ne le mènerait à rien."³ Finally, in what was obviously a move of desperation, Leger offered to catalogue the Slavic books which he found in the Paris libraries if a

¹Puech, op. cit., pp. 9, 12.

²A. Himly, Livret de la Faculté des Lettres, Paris, 1883, p. 23. Leger presents an interesting picture of the reception his thesis received: "... à l'étranger, dans les pays slaves et en Allemagne, on leur prêta une sérieuse attention. Tel savant russe me reprochait des tendances catholiques et polonaises, tel fanatique de l'émigration, indigné de voir sa patrie noyée dans la masse du monde slave, me dénonçait comme un panslaviste dangereux. Un publiciste allemand qui devait être tué à Sedan, me signalait dans la revue Grenzböten, comme un homme à surveiller." See Le monde slave (1897), p. viii. For more on the question of the "publiciste allemand," see "Mes débuts dans l'enseignement," p. 8.

³A.N., F¹⁷25832. Leger to the Minister of Public Instruction, Duruy, 17 August, 1868. See also Puech, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

Leger was to comment some forty years later that "J'étais un 'sauvage' comme on dit dans les universités allemandes. Mes études étaient tenues en suspicion. Certains universitaires sceptiques ou rétrogrades se demandaient si elles constituaient une matière vraiment scientifique." See Leger, "Mes débuts dans l'enseignement," p. 13.

teaching post did not materialize.¹ However, on the 28th October 1868, Leger was authorized to give "un cours publique sur l'histoire littéraire des Slaves du Sud" which he did for that and the succeeding two academic years without pay.² "Bah!" remarked M. Danton, "je ne vous y laisserai que cinq ou six années."³

The major obstacle to the task Leger had set himself was the attitude of the French academic world. Leger believed that opinion in France had psychologically gone to war with Russia and an imaginary Panslavism in 1830 and had subsequently refused to understand the real danger, Pangermanism. To learn Russian or another Slav language, to study a Slav country, to attempt an understanding of Russia's relationship with another country, particularly Poland, was

¹A.N., F¹⁷25832. Leger to the Minister of Public Instruction, Duruy, 30 September, 1868. The job of cataloguing the Slavic books in the Paris libraries may have proved to be an exceedingly short lived employment, as Leger found that the Bibliothèque Nationale did not have even a Russian dictionary. See Puech, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²Unless it wished to give substance to the concept, it is curious that the Ministry would have used the term "Slaves du Sud," when Leger did not. A.J.P. Taylor credits Bishop Strosmajer with being "the real creator of the South Slav idea" which he admits "was an intellectual tour de force of a high order . . . [but] not the outcome of national development." See The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918, London, 1970, p. 204.

A.N., F¹⁷25832. A marginal note on an inter-departmental memo for the Minister of Public Instruction dated 5 September 1868, reveals not only an interest on the part of the Ministry in the career of Leger to that date, but a certain insight into Leger's ambitions to succeed Chodzko at the Collège de France!

³Leger, Le monde slave (1897), p. xii.

to court academic disaster: in short, to be pro-Slav in 1868 was to be a Russian agent! Nevertheless, Leger was determined to shed light upon the political tendencies of the Austrian Slavs, as he felt an Austro-German alliance would make the Slavs of the Empire the natural allies of France: to study the legitimate grievances of the Slavs was to help clarify their mutual interest.¹

In the opening lecture of his "cours publique" at the Sorbonne, Leger launched wholeheartedly into a most intense description of the history, geography and literature of the Slaves du Sud, "Jougo-Slaves,"² leading to the conclusion that these peoples had a proud indigenous culture for which they had had to fight, not only against Moslem oppression and Venetian exploitation, but against the German civilizing mission. The rise and fall of the city of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) exemplified the flowering and death of the culture of the Slaves du Sud:

"Raguse, en 1815, tombe aux mains de l'Autriche et le despotisme viennois l'étouffe dans son étreinte."³ In the face of opposition, the nineteenth century cultural renaissance of these people, having had as its source a long struggle for liberty, would continue, Leger believed, and become a lesson "de morale et d'histoire." French interest lay

¹Ibid., p. x.

²"Jougo-Slav, [un nom] qui s'appuie non sur le passé, mais sur le présent, et il est, pour ceux qui l'adoptent, un gage d'avenir." Leger, Le monde slave (1897), p. 36.

³Ibid., p. 28.

clearly in the continued encouragement of this growth.

By 1869, Leger had written numerous articles about them in order to "réagir contre certaines tendances du public français, alors fort mal informé sur la situation intérieure de l'empire autrichien, et qui s'était trop aisément laissé persuader que la prépondérance de l'élément allemand dans cet empire était absolue."¹ Being almost the exclusive representative of a relatively new area of study, Leger had the good fortune to be asked to write for many reviews in which he took the opportunity to discuss, not only the Slavs, but his own views of the contemporary political scene.² Consequently, Leger was one of the first men to indicate the support which the Slavic people could give France when the inevitable conflict with Germany occurred.

Théophile Homolle, President of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres was to write in 1923:³

Peu de savants peuvent se flatter d'influer sur les événements de la guerre et de la politique; Leger

¹Puech, op. cit., p. 13.

²Except for one article, "Les Contes populaires de la Russie," (1 September 1873), it is noteworthy that Leger never again wrote for the Revue des deux mondes. The policy of Buloz was never pro-Russian and, although this in itself would not have offended Leger, the hostility of the great editor did. In 1872, Buloz had invited Leger to write an article which Leger subsequently completed. However, Buloz considered Leger's favourable remarks toward Alexander II inappropriate. "'Je ne veux pas qu'on écrive du bien de la Russie dans ma revue,'" Buloz indignantly told Leger, "'Je ne veux pas qu'on dise qu'Alexandre II est un grand souverain; il nous a lâchés dans la dernière guerre.'" See Leger, Le monde slave (1897), p. xvii. Leger's article subsequently appeared in the Bibliothèque universelle et revue Suisse under the title "Voyageurs anglais en Russie," Vol. 47 (1873).

³T. Homolle, "Funérailles de M. Louis Leger," Recueil de l'Institut de France, No. 12 (1923), p. 6.

eut ce privilège de servir efficacement la cause commune de la France et de la Slavie. Les Nations affranchies se reconnaissent redevables envers lui, pour une grande part, de leur constance dans la lutte par l'idée, de leur héroïsme dans un long martyre, de leur vaillance victorieuse dans les combats, de leur résurrection enfin, avec l'aide et sous la garantie de la France.

In 1870 and until the Spring of 1871, Leger continued to teach "un cours annexe" in Russian grammar as well as in the history of Czech, Polish and Serbian literature at the Salle Gerson.¹ In the spring of the Commune, having served as a "sous-officier dans les mobilisés" as well as an "insurgé pendant deux jours sans le savoir," he left Paris for Prague to accept an editorial position on the Correspondance Slave, a French language newspaper published in Prague from July 1869 to June 1873.²

In order to promote their cause in France, the Czechs had established two newspapers, one published in Berlin—the Correspondance Tchèque,³ the other in Prague—the Correspondance Slave. It was through these two papers that French writers and journalists became better informed concerning Slavic affairs as well as more able "à

¹Leger, "Mes débuts dans l'enseignement," p. 13: "Le ministre [Victor Duruy] essayait de l'introduire en ouvrant à Paris seulement auprès de la Sorbonne des cours qu'il intitulait Cours annexes de la Sorbonne. Ils avaient lieu dans un bâtiment aujourd'hui [1906] disparu situé sur la place Gerson également disparue. On les appela Cours Gerson."

²Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 71

³Leger's friend, Joseph Fricz, moved to Berlin about 1867, "où il publiait une Correspondance Tchèque." See Leger, Le Panslavisme et l'intérêt Français, p. 230.

comprendre que le dualisme austro-hongrois n'est pas, en somme, la meilleure forme sous laquelle puisse se constituer l'état complexe des Habsbourg."¹ The programme of the Correspondance Slave, the programme which Leger undertook to support in 1871, was to propagate Slavic culture and political ideals, the latter summed up in two words on the masthead of the newspaper, "Libertés, Nationalités." The founding editors of the newspaper had expressed their ideals thus:²

Parmi les races ignorées en Europe, il n'en n'est pas une qui le soit plus que la race slave. Il y a là une grande injustice à effacer, un grand peuple à ajouter à ceux qui font oeuvre de civilisation; c'est la tâche que nous nous sommes imposée. Tous les hommes de coeur qui voudront nous aider dans son accomplissement seront les bienvenus.

Leger's hope was to "... retrouver mes amis Tchèques ... me replonger dans mes études favorites, servir deux causes qui m'étaient également chères, celle de ma patrie, celle des Slaves, en luttant encore—cette fois par la plume—contre l'Allemand."³ Leger was then and would continue to be of the opinion that, in the Austro-Hungarian state, the Czechs were the most energetic representatives of a federalist policy. If this policy were to triumph, if universal suffrage were established—giving the Slavs of Austria the majority voice which was refused to them by the existing system—Austria-Hungary would be

¹Louis Leger's preface to a review of Saint-René Taillandier's work, Bohême et Hongrie, Paris, 1869, Revue moderne, Vol. 54 (1869), p. 575.

²Correspondance Slave, 21 July, 1869.

³Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 72.

forced to realign its foreign policy.¹ In the April 1, 1871 issue of Correspondance Slave, Leger clearly showed where his, and France's, interests lay:²

Aujourd'hui instruite par une amère expérience, la France commence à se recueillir; elle voit où sont ses ennemis véritables, elle cherche ses amis et elle apprend avec une reconnaissance qui n'est pas exempte d'étonnement quelle sympathie ses malheurs ont excité chez les Slaves, quel écho ses gémissements ont trouvé chez ces nations d'outre-Allemagne qu'elle identifiait naguère si volontiers avec leur brutal oppresseur. . . . Notre rôle est nettement tracé: tout en continuant de mettre les Slaves au courant de la France, nous devons avant tout chercher à mettre la France au courant des choses slaves. . . . Ceux-là même en France qui accordent aux Slaves une valeur politique sont portés à nier, ou du moins à méconnaître leur valeur intellectuelle. Nous nous efforcerons autant qu'il est en nous de combler cette lacune et nous comptons sur le concours de tous les hommes de bonne volonté.

Never content with one task, Leger undertook while in Prague to write the first of what proved to be a regular series of articles entitled "courrier Slave" for the French Revue des question historiques.³ From

¹L. Leger, Les intérêts français en Bohême, Paris, 1906, pp. 4-5.

²Correspondance Slave, 1 April, 1871.

³Leger's letters, three in number, were published under the heading "Courrier Slave" in the Revue des questions historiques, Vol. 10, 1 October 1871; Vol. 13, 1 April 1873; Vol. 15, 1 January 1874.

It is interesting to note that in the issue of the Revue des questions historiques for 1 April 1874, another Eastern European letter appears supplanting those of Leger, this time written by J. Martinov, S.J., author of Manuscripts slaves de la Bibliothèque impériale de Paris (1858), and entitled "Courrier Russe" which continued until the column was dropped in 1894, the year of the Franco-Russian alliance.

these articles, each about the intellectual activities of a different Slavic country (Bohemia, Russia and Poland), it is obvious that his interests at this time lay with the Slavs in general and not with the Russians in particular. It was to all Slavs that Leger thought France should appeal:¹

Le jour où l'on voudra que notre diplomatie rende tous les services qu'on est en droit d'exiger d'elle on devra nécessairement instituer pour le russe et le serbe un enseignement analogue à celui qui existe pour les idiomes de l'orient. . . . Il faut, aujourd'hui, plus que jamais, que les Slaves et la France se rapprochent et jettent, pour ainsi dire, un pont par dessus l'Allemagne.

After Leger returned to France in December of 1871, he maintained his connection with the Correspondance Slave as a correspondent until it ceased publication in June, 1873. He did not hesitate to inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs, de Rémusat, of his ideas and experiences in Prague, as well as to chide him for the fact that the Ministry was not a subscriber to the Correspondance Slave: "Ce petit fait," he wrote, "en dit beaucoup sur les ignorances et les légèretés de la diplomatie impériale."² Leger was determined to push the French government into some action, however passive, thereby changing what, for him, seemed an intolerably short-sighted policy.

Without a position at the University, due to the still confused educational policy of the government following the civil war in Paris, Leger approached the Minister of Public Instruction, Jules Simon, as

¹Leger, Le monde slave (1897), pp. xiv, xv.

²Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 81.

well as his secretary general, Saint-René Taillandier, with the idea of being sent to Russia on a mission scientifique.¹ This mission would eventually take the form of an official enquiry into the state of historical and archaeological studies in Russia.² It was necessary, however, for Leger also to have the support of a well known political figure; and to this end he asked for and received the support of Henri Martin, the future first president of Déroulède's Ligue des Patriotes: "Il était profondément patriote et il comprenait que la France était isolée dans le monde. . . ." ³ Leger made a wise choice of political patronage indeed: not only was this mission approved,⁴ but he received a most cordial letter of introduction from Jules Simon to General LeFlô,

¹A.N., F¹⁷2983^A. Leger to the Minister of Public Instruction, Jules Simon, 18 April, 1872. Leger proposed in this letter to study "la philologie et de l'histoire slaves dans cette contrée." See also A.N., F¹⁷2983^A. Leger to the Minister of Public Instruction, Jules Simon, 23 April, 1872.

²Leger was to write a reasonable amount about this trip: see "L'Archéologie en Russie," Revue Archéologique, Vol. 25 (1873), pp. 420-421; "A travers la Russie: Sur le Volga," Bibliothèque universelle et Revue Suisse, Vol. 47 (1873), pp. 611-634; "A travers la Russie: Nijni-Novgorod," ibid., Vol. 48 (1873), pp. 322-343; "A travers la Russie: Kazan et les Tartares," ibid., Vol. 49 (1874), pp. 631-653 and Vol. 50 (1874), pp. 269-286.

³Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 83. Leger writes that Martin had changed his anti-Russian ideas for anti-German ones: "les événements avaient donné une terrible dementi à son rêve idyllique d'une fédération européenne et anti-Moscovite! Ce n'était plus le Moscovite qui était l'ennemi maintenant, c'était le Teuton."

⁴A.N., F¹⁷2983^A. The mission, including 5,000 francs for expenses (roughly half the annual salary of a full professor at either the University of Paris or the Collège de France), was awarded by Jules Simon the 11 May, 1872.

as well as a diplomatic passport from de Rémusat, the Foreign Minister.¹

By 1872, the year of this mission to Russia, Leger had become conscious of the power and importance of Russia with regard to France: "Les rudes leçons de ces dernières années seraient bien perdues pour la France si elle n'apportaient quelques modifications dans ses rapports diplomatiques et intellectuels avec la Russie."² His point had been made to the government; he had finally demonstrated the importance of the Slavs and the necessity of France's closer contact.

Before leaving Paris, Leger wrote to his friend Alfred Rambaud in Nancy, to tell him of his projected trip.³ By this time, Rambaud, an ardent republican and revanchard, viewed the Slavs as did Leger. Both men saw in the Slavs a means by which France might well "bridge" Germany. In his position as professor of history at the University of Caën, Rambaud did not himself lecture on the Slavs: at this time it was left to Leger to be their propagator. But the pressure of Leger's impending trip to Russia in 1872 left him little enough time that spring—"Si j'avais le temps, j'irais tout exprès à Caën pour faire une conférence sur eux [les slaves]," he explained.⁴ but whether he could give the lectures or not, Leger enjoined Rambaud not to

¹Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 84.

²Leger, Le monde slave (1897), p. 267.

³A. N., 81 AP 1, Leger to Rambaud, 12 May, 1872.

⁴Ibid.

neglect "de faire comprendre à vos disciples toute l'importance des Slaves et l'intérêt que nous avons à nous approcher d'eux."¹

Rimbaud's thoughts were far from any such neglect. To the end that he might better understand the Russians, in the summer of 1872 he also asked to be sent to Russia upon a mission scientifique. The purpose of his mission would be double: to study the letters of the German princes to the Kings of France during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (which had been stored during the Revolution of 1789 in the St. Petersburg libraries) and, to study the question of the German provinces of Russia.² On the 20 August, 1872, Rimbaud's request was granted by the Minister of Public Instruction.³ Clearly the government had ideas of its own, however, for it authorized Rimbaud to study only "l'état des sciences ethnographiques relatives au monde slave." The order was signed by de Rémusat.⁴ Before leaving for Russia, Rimbaud told Armand du Mesnil⁵ that it was in Russia "et pas ailleurs, qu'on peut trouver l'alliance qui redressera l'équilibre européen à notre profit; c'est un pays qu'il faut étudier sous tous ses

¹Ibid.

²A.N., F¹⁷25893. Rimbaud to the Minister of Public Instruction, Jules Simon, 5 August, 1872.

³A.N., 87AP 6. Rimbaud to Jules Simon, 16 April, 1878.

⁴A.N., F¹⁷3001. The mission was approved 20 August, 1872.

⁵Armand du Mesnil was directeur in the Ministry of Public Instruction during the ministry of Jules Simon and later directeur de l'enseignement supérieur under Jules Ferry.

aspects, gouvernement et population, histoire et littérature, agriculture et finances, armée et marine."¹

It was not, then, by chance that Rambaud and Leger met at the home of General LeFlô in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1872;² for although Leger may not have kept Rambaud informed of his itinerary, some correspondence must have passed between them. Leger and Rambaud had been friends since at least 1869, when Rambaud, a répétiteur at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes, studied Russian under Leger in Paris.³ However, their lives had taken different courses during the years 1870-1871: Leger had gone to Prague to work with the Correspondance Slave and continued his work in Slavistics for himself and on behalf of Franco-Slavic understanding; while Rambaud, a Byzantine scholar,⁴ like E.M. de Vogüé and Albert Vandal at a later time,⁵ had been led

¹A. du Mesnil, "Portraits Contemporains, M. Alfred Rambaud," Revue bleue, 9 November, 1895, p. 585. See also E. Lavissee, "Alfred Rambaud," Revue de Paris, Vol. 13 (1906), p. 347: "La guerre a été puissante sur les esprits de notre génération. . . . On devine bien aussi pourquoi il fut attiré vers la Russie, l'alliée possible de la France vaincue."

²Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 122.

³Ibid. Leger and Rambaud remained friends throughout their lives: "J'ai perdu de vue la plupart des élèves de ce cours [à la Salle Gerson]. . . . Mais il en est un qui était alors et qui est resté mon ami. C'est M. Alfred Rambaud." See Leger, "Mes débuts dans l'enseignement," p. 17.

⁴Rambaud received his doctorat-ès-lettres from the University of Paris in 1870 after having presented his thesis: L'Empire grec au X^e siècle. Constantin Porphyrogénète. His thesis was awarded a prize of 3,000 francs from the Académie Française, and the Greek government awarded him the Ordre du Sauveur. See A.N., F¹⁷25893, Rambaud to the Minister of Public Instruction, Waddington, n.d. (received by the Ministry 6 May, 1876).

⁵Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 122. See also, Louis Madelin, "Albert Vandal," Revue hebdomadaire, 17 September, 1910, p. 374.

to an interest in the Slavs from his work on the Byzantine Empire, which interest had been encouraged by his association in Paris with Leger. On his return to Nancy, Rambaud all but gave up his studies of Byzantine history,¹ and began his life-long association with politics, an association which was to reach a climax twenty-five years later when he became Minister of Public Instruction in the government of Jules Méline.

Having begun his career as a professor at the lycée in Nancy in 1864, Rambaud was moved the following year to the lycée in Bourges because of his impulsive character in dealing with his students.² In Bourges, similar difficulties arose, inducing the Inspector to write that Rambaud "n'a pas encore tout le tact nécessaire",³ yet from 1866 through the academic term of 1868 he taught at the lycée in Colmar, where he was regarded as the best teacher in the school and superior to the position which had been assigned to him!⁴

¹Rambaud's complementary Latin thesis De Byzantino Hippodromo et circensibus factionibus furnished him with material for his first article for the Revue des deux mondes: "Le monde byzantin, le sport et l'hippodrome," 1 August, 1871, p. 761. But for two additional articles "Digenis Akritas," R.D.M., 15 August, 1875, and "Michel Psellus," Revue Historique, Vol. 3 (1877), p. 241, he wrote little on the Byzantine world afterwards.

²A.N., F¹⁷25893. Inspector's report to the Ministry of Public Instruction, 12 July, 1865. When the Inspector was visiting, Rambaud gave a "coup de pied" to one of his students.

³A.N., F¹⁷25893. Inspector's report to the Ministry of Public Instruction, 10 July, 1866.

⁴A.N., F¹⁷25893. Inspector's report to the Ministry of Public Instruction, 5 June and 4 July, 1867.

Rambaud's success at the lycée in Colmar undoubtedly prompted a vain attempt to acquire a position at the lycée in Strasbourg in 1867. See Inspector's report to the Ministry of Public Instruction 4 July, 1867.

The years in Paris before the Franco-Prussian War did nothing to mellow Rambaud. When he returned to Nancy as a founder and, in 1871, editor of the Progrès de l'Est—the first newspaper during the Third Republic devoted to the Republican cause as well as to the early ideals of Gambetta's policy of guerre à l'outrance—his energies were directed against the Germans, a people for whom he had an aversion which permeated much of his early thought and work. Letters addressed to him as editor of the Progrès de l'Est stress their approval of his patriotic remarks and indicate his involvement with the idea of republicanism at that time.¹ This involvement brought him closer and closer to the political arena, which he entered only to be defeated in the August 12, 1872 election for the Conseil Général of the Department of Doubs, Canton of Roulans.² Armand du Mesnil, a long time friend of Rambaud's, attributes much of Rambaud's early

¹A.N., 81 AP 1, Jules Duvaux to Rambaud, n.d. (1871) and, C. Fabvier to Rambaud, 26 April, 1871.

²A.N., 81 AP 1. Candidate's hand leaflet. Rambaud was also in charge of press relations for the Republican committee of Nancy. See the Report of the Committee to Rambaud, 23 May, 1871. As an example of the level on which cantonal politics was being run, there is an amusing letter from Rambaud's friend Garie, 25 September, 1871, giving a breakdown of the votes for a M. Berval in the canton of Gerardnier:

3 curés	3
2 chantres	2
1 marguilliers	1
1 jardinièr [sic]	1
3 employes [sic] de	
l'église.	3
Total	10 voix.

failures in the political field to the fact that he was involved with the Progrès de l'Est, which made him appear a radical in the minds of many and which, for many years, precluded his holding a position at the University of Nancy where some of the faculty "se montrait hostile à sa candidature."¹ Rambaud applied to the Minister for a position at Nancy in the late summer of 1871 and again the following year, but to no avail. The Rector of the University of Nancy, summing up the situation for the Minister, felt that the faculty was opposed to Rambaud for the part which he played as editor of the Progrès de l'Est when that paper was mistakenly thought to have supported the Commune.² Rambaud later reapplied for the position at Nancy; but it was some years before he received the appointment.³

Du Mesnil was instrumental in having Rambaud named to the Faculté des Lettres at the University of Caën in the autumn of 1871.⁴ There he began by giving a series of lectures which were subsequently published as articles in the Revue politique et

¹Du Mesnil, op. cit., pp. 584, 585.

²A.N., F¹⁷25893. Burnony, director of the Ecole d'Athènes to the Minister of Public Instruction, Jules Simon, 5 December, 1871, recommending Rambaud for the position at Nancy. See also Rambaud to the Minister 26 August, 1872 and 14 October, 1872, and the Rector of the University of Nancy to the Minister on 14 November, 1871.

³A.N., F¹⁷25893. Rambaud to the Minister of Public Instruction, Waddington, 6 May, 1876.

⁴Du Mesnil, op. cit., p. 584.

littéraire,¹ and later, in book form, as La domination française en Allemagne.

It has been suggested that the early historical writings of Rambaud were popular because their content was composed of events which recalled days of a more powerful France.² But, more than this, the lectures give an indication of Rambaud's deep feeling about the national downfall and the loss of French grandeur as well as about the rôle of the newly emerging Germany. These articles indicate the early motivating force behind his work:³

¹See La Revue politique et littéraire for the following articles:
 "Les invasions françaises en Allemagne avant la Révolution et le premier Empire," Vol. 1 (1872), p. 1031;
 "L'Allemagne avant la Révolution française," Vol. 2 (1872), p. 124;
 "Napoléon I et les Prussiens 1806-1807," Vol. 2 (1872), p. 196;
 "La prise de Mayence 1792," Vol. 2 (1872), p. 364;
 "République de Mayence, 1792-1793," Vol. 2 (1872), p. 576;
 "Nos alliés de la Confédération du Rhin en 1806 et 1807," Vol. 1 (1873), p. 809;
 "Andréas Hofer et l'insurrection du Tyrol, 1809," Vol. 1 (1873), p. 1102.
 "Napoléon I et Marie-Louise; le mariage Autrichien, 1810," Vol. 1 (1873), p. 1173;
 "Le Rhin sous la domination française," Vol. 1 (1873), p. 647.

After 1884 La Revue politique et littéraire was known as the Revue bleue and will be so called from that date. Rambaud was editor of the Revue bleue from 25 January 1888 through September, 1890.

²C. Digeon, La crise Allemande de la Pensée Française (1870-1914), Paris, 1959, pp. 294-295.

³A. Rambaud, La domination française en Allemagne: Les Français sur le Rhin, 1792-1801, Paris, 1919, p. xi.

The preface to this edition is the one which Rambaud wrote in 1873 while at the University of Caën. It contains an interesting comment concerning German historians: "Tandis que nos historiens nationaux s'élevaient à l'impartialité la plus haute ou affectaient un désintéressement de cosmopolites, en Allemagne une certaine école d'historiens, dont la librairie d'outre Rhin reproduit sous toutes les formes et dans tous les formats les meurtrières théories, a pris à tâche de fausser les idées du peuple allemand sur ses rapports antérieurs avec la France. L'université, le gymnase ou l'école primaire, les gros

... même sous l'Empire, les interventions françaises en Allemagne ont différé essentiellement des invasions allemandes en France: elles apportèrent avec elles des éléments essentiels de progrès . . . dans tous les temps, sous tous les régimes, nous avons fait aux Allemands plus de bien que de mal, et l'Empire prussien fondé sur un prétendu droit de revanche de l'Allemagne contre nous, a pour base une injustice et un mensonge.

"Ah! le beau livre que m'envoie Rambaud," wrote Juliette Adam, after receiving La Domination française en Allemagne, les Français sur le Rhin:¹

Oui, oui, nous l'avons tenu dans notre verre, votre Rhin allemand, ne pensons qu'à cela; ne parlons que d'elle: de la revanche! et celui qui nous la prépare qui nous la rendra possible malgré toutes les résistances politiques de nos adversaires, celui-là, c'est Gambetta! Lorsqu'il sera à Bruyères, allons-nous en parler de nos espoirs, de notre Alsace-Lorraine, de notre France à guérir des atroces blessures.

Rambaud had made as distinct an impression with this book as he was to make in the future with others; but in his career, he dedicated himself to one essential theme: the reestablishment of France after the débâcle of 1870. It is this motive more than any other single purpose which unifies his widespread interests.

The "bridge" over Germany of which Leger was to write in 1873² was prefigured by Rambaud a year earlier in an article which he wrote ouvrages scientifiques aussi bien que les manuels élémentaires et même les livres d'enfants ont eu leur rôle assigné dans cette oeuvre de dépravation. Rambaud had in mind a book which he entitled Violences et perfidies de la France à l'égard de l'Allemagne depuis trois siècles. Ibid., pp. v, vi, vi (n). See Beate Gödde-Baumanns, Deutsche Geschichte in Französischer Sicht, Wiesbaden, 1971, pp. 42-44, 143-147.

¹J. Adam, Nos Amitiés Politiques avant l'abandon de la Revanche, Paris, 1908, p. 67.

²Leger, Le monde slave (1897), p. xv; Rambaud, La domination française en Allemagne, p. 13.

for the Revue politique et littéraire after attending the autumn review of Russian troops by the Tsar. Commenting on the appearance of the Tsarevitch, he wrote: "C'est un des beaux militaires de l'armée russe. Rien d'allemand dans la physionomie. . . . Il est le premier qui ait rompu avec les traditions et qui n'ait pas été cherché femme chez un des trente-cinq princes ou principicules de la Germanie."

Not content with pointing out the falling away of the Romanoffs from their German connections, Rambaud stressed for his readers the similarities between the Russian and French uniforms and troops:¹

. . . les hauts shakos pointus à plaque de cuivre du régiment Paulovski, sont rentrés dans les étuis et font place à un képi de forme presque française. . . . Les officiers prussiens ne retrouvent pas leur idéal dans le soldat russe . . . il a quelque chose de la négligence souple, de la désinvolture du soldat français. . . . Et parmi ces chefs, presque tous assez jeunes, il y avait de fort beaux types militaires. Plusieurs, avec leur képi, leurs moustaches et leur impériale, leurs yeux noirs et leur teint brun, avaient des têtes presque françaises.

Dismayed at the thought that France had fallen behind Germany in the race for intellectual leadership, Rambaud reminded his readers that Prussia's "mission civilisatrice" in Europe, and particularly in Eastern Europe among the Slavs, was destined to encounter more than one obstacle.²

¹A. Rambaud, "La grande revue d'automne," La Revue politique et littéraire, Vol. 2 (1872), p. 608. Rambaud was writing for this review throughout 1872, but his work, for the most part, represented his lectures given at the University of Caën.

²Ibid., p. 609.

But, in fact, Rambaud's task was not to be so easily realized. His commentaries on contemporary Russian life, during his first trip to Russia, were confined to the autumn review of the troops and the investigation of girls' schools,¹ for the very good reason that he could find few areas of genuine French influence—particularly in the academic fields where the influence of Germany was widely known to be pervasive.

The results of Rambaud's first mission were less than brilliant. Unquestionably, he was taken aback by the realization of the enormity of the task which he had undertaken (and perhaps somewhat chagrined by his own unpreparedness). He did not submit a report of this trip to the Minister, with the result that he was not reimbursed for his expenses. But his interest did not flag; and, willing to try again, he wrote to the Minister that he could not, in two or three months, come to know Russia, "sa littérature et ses arts, qui prennent un développement si spécialement original, son gouvernement, ses réformes, et ses tendances politiques. Aussi mon intention est-elle de continuer mes études russes, de retour en France et de faire un nouveau voyage le plus tôt possible."²

¹A. Rambaud, "L'Education des filles en Russie et les gymnases de femmes," R.D.M., 15 March, 1873.

²A.N., F¹⁷25893. Rambaud to the Minister of Public Instruction, Jules Simon, 14 October, 1872. This letter was seen by Du Mesnil. Rambaud, despite later letters to the contrary, fully expected at the time of acceptance, to have his mission financed (and in fact, was told that it would be).

In contrast, Leger's voyage of 1872 had not passed without arousing considerable interest in the French-language press in Russia. Both the Gazette de la Bourse of St. Petersburg and the Gazette Russe of Moscow emphasized that Leger was perhaps the only French scholar who knew Russian and other Slavic languages, and that he was a regular correspondent for a number of French reviews. "On peut espérer que, grâce aux observations d'un voyageur aussi compétent, la presse française s'enrichira de renseignements authentiques sur la Russie."¹

The year 1872 was one of the most important in Franco-Russian relations from an intellectual, if not from a political, point of view. "La science travaille le plus souvent dans l'ombre," wrote Leger, "mais ses efforts sont largement récompensés où la politique met à profit les résultats de son modeste labeur."² Rambaud and Leger had not only met professors of the Universities of Moscow, Buslaev and Pogodin;³ Leger had also begun an association of more than forty

¹A.N., F¹⁷2983A. Enclosure with Leger's letter to the Minister of Public Instruction, Jules Simon, 16 September, 1872.

²Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 122.

³Kavelin, a leading social and political thinker in Russia during the second half of the Nineteenth Century made the following remarks about Rambaud and Leger in Pis'ma K.D. Kavelina — Ia. K. Grotu, contained in Russkaia starina, Vol. 97 (1899), pp. 148 and 152: "Today there came to me, with recommendations, a professor of history, Rambaud from Caën, who travelled here to study the wealthy collection of documents and manuscripts in the Public Library . . . this man was pleasing to me in spite of the fact that he is French, whom, as you know, I do not like. Rambaud is a young man, a very attractive person, quite respectable and cultured, is not impertinent or boastful, without

years as correspondent for the Revue du Ministère de l'Instruction Publique de Saint Petersburg.¹ Writing to the Minister of Public Instruction in France, Leger could say that his mission was considered by the Russians as evidence of the desire of the French government to begin more direct contact with them, "sans se laisser prévenir par les jugements intéressés des Allemands et des Polonais."² It may have been to cement this contact that Leger was offered a post at the University of St. Petersburg, teaching French language and literature. Leger, however, refused: "Il me semblait que ma place était à Paris et qu'il serait encore plus utile et plus glorieux de propager la

any hackneyed phrases, and looks upon everything that he sees with interest. His judgements are well-founded and enlightened. He does not like the Germans but has to admit that there is good in them, knows German and some Russian. He reads in Russian . . . I introduced him to others who were also pleased with him." (p. 148.)

"In your letter you are very harsh with France. As you know, I also have little liking for them, but judging from some recent information, it seems that the recent program of 1870 was of some benefit to them. Everyone who travels in France lately agrees that there are noticeable changes for the better in the youth; they work hard, read German and generally seriously pay more attention to their own affairs. Not long ago a professor of the Caën faculty, Alfred Rambaud, came here with recommendations to me. If there are many such cultured, respectable and wise people then I am prepared to believe in the re-habilitation of France. I saw another Frenchman, Leger, . . . serious and studious. I am afraid to believe but I wish to believe in the resurrection of France; but I cannot, nor can I convince myself to be happy about the forming and strengthening of a 'single and undivided' Germany." (p. 152, dated 16 November, 1872.)

¹P. Boyer, "Louis Leger," Revue des études slaves, Vol. 3 (1923), p. 129.

²A.N., F¹⁷2983^A. Leger to the Minister of Public Instruction, Jules Simon, 16 September, 1872.

littérature slave en France que la langue française en Russie." It was to be an up-hill struggle. "Dieu sait pourtant si, jusque-là, mon pays m'avait encouragé!"¹

Leger had already made an effort to correct some common misconceptions about Russia. Writing an open letter from Kazan to the director of the Revue politique et littéraire, he pointed out several areas of misinformation concerning such things as the alleged banning of French political and scientific reviews (which were not, in fact, banned); the condition of professors at the universities, whom the French believed to be extremely badly paid; the university library resources and secondary education, which were believed inadequate. Although the article itself is extremely short, Leger made it amply clear that such erroneous notions had cost France greatly: "Nous avons sur la Russie une foule de légendes du même genre, mises en circulation Dieu sait par qui; ces légendes ont, dans des temps meilleurs, défrayé les colonnes de notre presse libérale; il est temps qu'elles finissent aujourd'hui." Then, in words remarkably similar to those to be used by Leroy-Beaulieu in his first article for the Revue des deux mondes almost a year later, Leger concluded, "Nous avons payé assez chèrement notre ignorance de l'étranger."²

¹Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 117. The post went to Jean Fleury, the father of Mme. Henry Gréville.

²H. Gaidoz, "Les préjugés français sur la Russie," La Revue politique et littéraire, Vol. 2 (1872), p. 307. Leger's letter, contained in this article, is dated 17/29 August, 1872.

In a strongly worded article written for the Revue politique et littéraire after his return from Russia, Leger remarked: "Nous sommes tout prêts à nous imaginer que l'absence de nos livres et de nos modes réduirait la Moscovie à une véritable disette sociale et intellectuelle." But he points also to the reverse situation: far from Russia needing France's intellectual output, Russia was relying more heavily upon the intellectual activity of Germany.¹ Leger was conscious of the fact that, in the Eighteenth Century, French philosophes had created a following abroad; but that, in the Nineteenth Century, Russian authors and scholars responded more sensitively to works published in England and Germany: Byron, Goethe and Schiller exerted more influence than did Lamartine, Hugo and Musset.² Leger's all

¹And so, for that matter, had many in France, as articles testify. One of the most republican and nationalistic of those, Ernest Lavis, co-editor with Alfred Rambaud in later years of the twelve-volume Histoire générale du IV^{ème} siècle à nos jours, was himself greatly influenced by the effectiveness of the German university system. See Nora, op. cit., p. 84.

The German states had been a continuing influence for many years in Russia and, in a major field (that of education), had actually been a model for a Russian university system. See D. Diderot, "Les Gymnases et les universités en Allemagne au XVIII^e siècle: Extrait du Plan d'une université pour le gouvernement de Russie," Revue internationale de l'enseignement, Vol. 1 (1881), p. 185, and Vol. 5 (1883), pp. 82-88. The probable date of the Plan d'une université is given as 1776.

²L. Leger, "La science allemande et la science française en Russie," La Revue politique et littéraire, Vol. 2 (1873), pp. 281, 282.

A.D., C.P.: Russie. For the Russian press' feeling toward French socialists, see letter of General Chanzy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Waddington, 23 October, 1879, Vol. 259, folios 248, 249.

Both W. L. Langer and Robert Byrnes subsequently substantiate Leger's belief that the influence of French politics and intellectualism on Russia had declined considerably in the Nineteenth Century: "... the Third Republic was even more dismal for Russia than the France of Napoleon III. It is clear from the Russian press before ... 1894 that

but parting remark to his readers was a blunt reminder of what Napoleon had said: "... gratter le Russe pour trouver ... l'Allemand."¹ Summarizing his own previously stated thoughts, Leger expressed the view that "Sur bien des questions où la France faisait jadis autorité, elle est aujourd'hui reléguée au second ou même au troisième rang ... c'est le triste rôle que paraît jouer ici la science française, vis-à-vis la science germanique."² He added a rejoinder that French intellectuals should rather admit their inferiority "pour chercher à la réparer que de la discuter et de la défendre par de mauvaises raisons."³

In 1873, Leger published a comprehensive resumé of his thoughts about his early Slavic voyages in Le monde slave. The major part of this book was devoted to the Slavs in general, the last four chapters with the Russians in particular. This is not to imply that Leger ig- the Third Republic was considered a 'hot bed of republicanism, atheism and anarchy' by those who were engaged in directing Russian destinies. . . . Moreover Taine and Renan . . . had little influence in Russia because Russia at this time was more connected with Germany and England. . . . Consequently, at the end of the 19th Century, Russian views of France were different from those that prevailed 100 years earlier. Marx, Hegel and Bismarck generally prevailed over Voltaire, Fourier and Comte, just as industry overwhelmed luxuries and fashion." See Byrnes, op. cit., pp. 217, 224 and W.L. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894, Cambridge, 1929, pp. 10, 90-92, 253-255, 270-271.

¹According to Leroy-Beaulieu, the Russian version of this remark was "... grattez le Russe et vous trouverez le Tatar." See A. Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, 3 vols., Paris, 1881, 1883, 1889, Vol. 1, p. 267.

²Leger, "La science allemande . . . ," p. 282.

³Ibid., p. 283.

nored Franco-Russian political and cultural relations; but he dealt with them more incidentally than did Rambaud, whose task would be the revelation of Russia's history to the French intellectual.

Both Leger and Rambaud had to wait until 1874 for another opportunity to visit Russia. In the meanwhile, neither of them missed an opportunity to promote an interest in Russia, or in the Slavs.

Having received an honourable mention from the Académie Française for his book Le monde slave, and having become a member of the Society of Russian Literature in Moscow,¹ Leger (hitherto without an official position in the educational structure in France) may well have been prompted as a result of these new honours, to promote his greatest personal undertaking: the offering of comprehensive courses of Russian and Slav culture. In 1868, Leger had attempted to initiate the first course in modern Slavic languages and had been successful in that he was able to teach Russian grammar, in addition to having given lectures on the history of Czech, Polish and Serbian literature. His lectures, however, had been considered "public" and part of the programme of the Sorbonne only insofar as they were approved by the Ministry of Public Instruction and were held in buildings belonging to the university. "In the XIXth Century, both in the domain of scholarship and of instruction, it long seemed less strange to busy oneself with Persian than with Russian, Czech or Magyar."² At the Collège

¹A.N., F¹⁷25832. Leger's personal record with the Ministry of Public Instruction.

²Eisenmann, op. cit., p. 295.

de France, both Cyprien Robert and Alexandre Chodzko, lecturers in Slavic studies and themselves masters of several Slavic tongues, had been faced with the problem of the slow development of the teaching of Slavic languages in the 1850's and 1860's. Both men eventually offered courses in ancient Slav (one calling it Slavon and the other Paléoslave); and both placed great emphasis upon the need to understand the people themselves.¹

Sometime between the years 1871 and 1873, the Ecole des Langues Orientales vivantes, undoubtedly upon the prompting of Leger, wrote to the Minister of Public Instruction stating that, since the school had been established "pour servir les intérêts de la politique et du commerce," it would be useful to authorize a course in Slavic languages, particularly Serb, Bulgar and Bosnian. "Les récentes catastrophes," the memorandum continued, "nous imposent le devoir d'étudier avec soin les peuples slaves dont les sympathies pour nous ne sont pas douteuses."²

Leger had in these years prepared his groundwork. It was no coincidence that he expressed many of the same sentiments as were contained in the memorandum from the Ecole des Langues Orientales vivantes. He proposed to the Minister "un cours de langues slaves de l'orient pour servir la politique et pour le commerce."³ Some time

¹L. Leger, Leçon d'ouverture . . . au Collège de France, p. 4.

²A.N., F¹⁷25832. Letter from the Ecole Spéciale des Langues Orientales vivantes to the Minister of Public Instruction, n.d. (ca. 1873).

³A.N., F¹⁷2983A. Leger to the Minister of Public Instruction, Batbie, 2 October, 1873. A comparison of the letters written by the Ecole Spéciale des Langues Orientales vivantes and Leger reveals an almost identical phraseology and reasoning.

earlier, General LeFlô had written to Leger that he approved heartily of the latter's plan to offer a course in Russian and Serb at the Ecole des Langues Orientales vivantes. It would be (LeFlô assured Leger) a service to the diplomatic personnel who, because of their ignorance of the Russian language, were incapable of reading a Russian newspaper. In addition, it would alleviate the embassy's dependence upon often unfaithful translators.¹ Leger conveyed all this to the Minister and (perhaps as important as any other consideration) added the assurance "... que je ne demande point à grever le budget de l'école et qu'aucun crédit nouveau n'aurait besoin d'être ouvert au ministère."² He had made previous arrangements. Granted an interview with Jules Simon a week after writing his letter, Leger was appointed to teach a "cours complémentaire" at the Ecole des Langues Orientales vivantes on December 30, 1873. He was to teach "les dialectes slaves orientaux et particulièrement ... la langue serbe."³ His salary for that year (and until 1876) was paid by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴

In 1874, Leger was authorized for the first time to teach a course in the Russian language.⁵ His inaugural lecture began significantly

¹A.N., F¹⁷25832. Copy of letter from LeFlô to Leger, n.d. LeFlô also offered to write to the Minister, Jules Simon, on behalf of Leger's project.

²A.N., F¹⁷2983^A. Leger to the Minister of Public Instruction, Batbie, 2 October, 1873.

³Ibid., marginal note. See also A.N., F¹⁷25832, Leger's personal record with the Ministry of Public Instruction.

⁴A.N., F¹⁷25832. Leger's personal record with the Ministry of Public Instruction. His salary was fixed at 1,500 francs per annum. In 1876 he was granted an increase of 1,500 francs.

⁵Ibid., 8 October, 1874.

enough with a recognition of the part played by both the Ministries of Public Instruction and Foreign Affairs in the creation of the programme of Russian language at the Ecole des Langues Orientales vivantes. Completely ignoring his own efforts in this regard, Leger attributed the awakening of interest in the Russian language to a reawakening of interest in modern languages generally, by virtue of a rebirth of scientific enquiry in areas other than in the Classical world. From the practical point of view, Leger argued, it was incumbent upon Frenchmen to realize that it was up to them to learn about the peoples with whom they were destined to undertake political, cultural and commercial relations, in order that France not fall behind the rest of Europe.¹

Le temps est venu où il faut faire table rase des formules toutes faites, des préjugés acquis et n'épargner ni peine ni recherche pour parvenir à la connaissance de la vérité et la faire tourner au profit de notre pays . . . jamais il n'a eu plus grand besoin de tous nos efforts, de toute notre persévérance.

Moderating the cause for his sense of urgency, Leger looked for other reasons for learning Russian and stressed that the idiom, although not an Asian language, was essential to the knowledge of the Asian world. By virtue of its geographic location, and "par la variété des éléments qui la constituent, la Russie prépare la transition entre l'Europe et l'Asie."² But Leger was unable to ignore what he obviously thought was the most important reason for the creation of the new course: the preparation of future French diplomats posted to Russia.

¹L. Leger, La Langue Russe, Florence, n.d., p. 4.

²Ibid.

Since the essential symbol of a nationality was its language, Leger argued, it was urgent that future French diplomats to Russia learn Russian. Leger warned that: "On se fait bien des illusions sur ce pays; on s' imagine trop souvent qu'il suffit de s'y rendre sans aucune préparation ni spécialité acquise. Cette erreur a coûté cher à certain esprits aventureux."¹ If France was to make any meaningful advance in its relations with Russia through exchanges and through the close to thirty important political and commercial posts which it had established throughout Russia, its representatives had to learn the language before going there. Leger also recognized that French was no longer the universal language of either diplomacy or the press.²

Leger's sense of urgency appears to have been shared by the Foreign Ministry. Not only had that ministry undertaken to finance the course in Russian language; but, Leger assured his audience, that the Foreign Minister, Decazes, "met à bon droit le russe parmi les langues dont la connaissance constitue une bonne note et une garantie d'avancement."³

To pique his audience, as though the reasons which he had already given were not sufficient, Leger reminded them that:⁴

La Prusse qui avoisine la Russie et qui l'observe
avec grand soin tient à ce que ses agents et même,

¹Ibid., pp. 9-10.

²Ibid., p. 8.

³Ibid., p. 9.

⁴Ibid.

assure-t-on, ses officiers d'état-major connaissent à fond le russe. . . . On a vu M. de Bismarck, pendant son ambassade de Saint Pétersbourg prendre chaque jour sa leçon de russe; au lendemain d'une journée néfaste pour nos armes, le chancelier allemand rappelait, dit-on, ce détail, à un diplomate étranger, et le citait parmi les faits qui expliquent notre infériorité vis à vis de l'Allemagne.

What better way to serve one's country and one's career? "Nous aussi dans la sphère modeste de nos travaux," said Leger as much of himself as of the assembled audience, "nous pouvons servir utilement la science et le pays."¹

Leger's appeal certainly made an impression which was felt beyond his immediate audience. The popularity of his course in Russian language at the Ecole des Langues Orientales vivantes prompted the school in 1877 to establish the course upon a firm foundation and to appoint Leger "professeur titulaire de langue russe (chaire nouvelle)."² This long sought after stability in his career had not been achieved without some sacrifice. In 1872, Leger had refused not only a position at the University of St. Petersburg, but also a permanent chair (which would have been created expressly for him), at the Institut Supérieur de Florence. The reason for this refusal, he wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was "pour me consacrer uniquement à mon pays."³ This was the objective which he had in mind throughout his long public

¹Ibid., p. 13.

²A.N., F¹⁷25832. 1 January, 1877. See Leger's personal record with the Ministry of Public Instruction. In 1878 his salary was raised to 7,500 Francs.

³A.N., F¹⁷25832. Leger to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Decazes, 10 December, 1875.

career.

Meanwhile Rambaud, as chargé de cours at the University of Caën, had been lecturing on the Germans at the time of Napoleon, rather than the Russians; nevertheless, he had written a number of articles upon Russia and was contemplating a joint project with Leger at the University of Caën which would involve familiarizing his students with that country. In fact, within a month of writing to the Minister indicating his interest in a mission to Russia later that year, his article, "Les Russes à Sébastopol" appeared in the Revue des deux mondes.¹ Later to be developed more fully in book form,² Rambaud's article centered on the common drama of France and Russia:³

Si l'honneur est grand d'avoir emporté cette forteresse [Sébastopol], celui de s'y être maintenu si longtemps est à peine moindre. Dans ce duel héroïque, la gloire française n'ôte rien à celle des Russes: elles grandissent au contraire et s'exaltent l'une par l'autre. La tenacité des soldats du Tzar fait partie intégrale de notre gloire, de même que l'ardeur et la bravoure souvent téméraire du fantassin français sont le rehaussement de la leur. Le souvenir de Sébastopol est en quelque sorte la patrimoine commun et indivisible des deux armées.

While attempting to make themselves and their nation better known to Russians by their voyages and writings and at the same time

¹Revue des deux mondes, 1 April, 1874.

²Français et Russes, Moscou et Sébastopol, Paris, 1877.

³A. Rambaud, "Les Russes à Sébastopol," R.D.M., 1 April, 1874, p. 498.

presenting Russia to France, Leger, Rambaud and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu (whose articles continued to be published on a regular basis in the Revue des deux mondes), were by 1873-1874 also becoming known to the Germans, who felt that the motive for the scholarly endeavours of these men was all too evidently nationalistic. The publication of Leger's Le monde slave aroused the ire of at least one German publication, which remarked that Rambaud, in reviewing Leger's book in the Revue politique et littéraire displayed exactly the same faults as had Leger—that is, the attempted destruction of German unity:¹

... because its point is directed against Germany. It is really deplorable that a review which is so highly esteemed [the Revue politique et littéraire] cannot be separated from the tone [of anti-germanism] which is so prevalent in the [French] press and that it would publish such a critique of an historical work which lacks, completely, the objectivity so necessary to an historian.

In his review, Rambaud had interpreted Leger's thoughts faithfully, stressing those themes which Leger himself had emphasized; among them, "les siècles d'indépendance de ces peuples [les slaves] aujourd'hui soumis à d'autres peuples." Emphasizing the rise of Slavic nationalism, Rambaud had made no attempt to minimize whatever anti-German feeling was present in Leger's book, pointing out that "les Allemands ne peuvent pas vouloir de bien aux Slaves." Although it is absurd to say that Rambaud was attempting the destruction

¹"Französische Aussichten über das Slaventhum," Magazin für die Literatur des Ausländes, 22 November, 1873, p. 697.

of German unity by this review, he did use the opportunity to express his contempt for Germans and particularly "... ces grands dadais d'étudiants allemands qui, l'an passé, sont venus se promener dans Strasbourg. . . ." ¹

Das Ausland of Stuttgart, while agreeing that in the writings of Leger, Rambaud and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu there were phrases injurious to German national feeling, observed that to ignore the more important parts of their works was no service to the German people: ²

... it would be difficult to find [in Germany] works like the study of Russia published by Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu in the Revue des deux mondes, or ... of Louis Leger whose knowledge of slavic languages is prodigious. . . . We have no right to jeer ... as long as our own knowledge of the subject is in as lamentable a state as it is now.

From both of these German reviews, and later from the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, it is evident that the political aspect of the work of Leger, Rambaud and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu was being sensed in Germany.

The political activity of these three men is evident, not only in their writings, but also in the travels which they undertook on behalf of their country. Well known in Russian academic circles since their first voyage in 1872, Leger and Rambaud, after learning from Russian colleagues that there would be a considerable number of objects from

¹A. Rambaud, "L'Unité des peuples Slaves," La Revue politique et littéraire, Vol. 2, 4 October, 1873, pp. 328, 329.

²"Volksmärchen der Russen," Das Ausland, 19 January, 1874, p. 42.

almost every period of Russia's history on display, applied for "missions" in 1874 to attend the Archæological Congress in Kiev.¹ Rambaud placed his petition forcefully before the Minister. He anticipated some difficulty in being granted this mission, since he had not submitted a report for his mission in 1872. To show that he had not been idle, he wrote the Minister:²

... J'ai fait cependant une œuvre très utile en faisant connaître, soit dans mon cours de Caën, soit dans mes publications, un grand nombre de travaux russes, et presque tout leur mouvement historique contemporain. Je pourrai vous soumettre beaucoup d'articles de journaux russes, parlant avec éloge de nos travaux sur la Russie, et concluant de là que la France se fait à étudier sérieusement leur pays. Je crois qu'à l'heure qu'il est montrer aux Russes que l'on s'occupe d'eux sérieusement avec sympathie, c'est une œuvre essentiellement utile.

Leger and Rambaud were both delegated to the Kiev Archæological Congress in August 1874. The possibility of some political "mileage" from this congress was not lost to France's chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg, de Faverney, who reminded the Foreign Minister, Decazes,

¹A. N., F¹⁷3001. Rambaud to the Minister of Public Instruction, de Fourtou, 8 January, 1874; A. N., F¹⁷2983^A. Leger to the Minister of Public Instruction, de Fourtou, 4 February, 1874.

In 1874, the Commission des Voyages et Missions scientifiques was listed for the first time in the Annuaire de l'Instruction Publique, and consisted of six members of the Assemblée Nationale: Albert Desjardins (Under-secretary of State), Beulé, Bardoux, Charton, Martial Delpit, Wallon, as well as fourteen members connected directly with higher education or attached to the ministry itself. At least three of the fourteen members, Armand du Mesnil, Gaston Paris and M. Schefer (of the Ecole des Langues Orientales vivantes) were friends of both Leger and Rambaud.

²A. N., F¹⁷3001. Rambaud to the Minister of Public Instruction, de Fourtou, 13 March, 1874.

that the congress promised to be immensely successful. A great number of savants from St. Petersburg, Moscow and Odessa were to attend. "Ainsi que votre Excellence le sait sans doute, M. Louis Leger, professeur et délégué du Ministère de l'Instruction Publique, représentera la France à cette conference."¹ Other than Leger and Rambaud, who willingly showed the flag at this first international congress at which Russian was the working language, there were no delegates from the non-Slavic countries. At this congress, in contrast to previous ones, "Les langues étrangères et les autres idiomes slaves n'étaient point proscrits, mais on ne les admettait qu'à certaines séances, qui prenaient alors le caractère le plus babélique."² The unique position of the French delegation undoubtedly added to the prominence given to Leger. His proficiency in Russian as well as in other Slav languages permitted him to chair the conference at which papers were given in Czech and Russian, and to assist the president, Count Serge Ouvarov, at a session in which papers were presented in German, Polish and Serbian.³

¹A.D., C.P.: Russie. de Faverney to Decazes, 14 August, 1874, Vol. 249, fo. 339. For a list of the more prominent people and societies in attendance at the congress, see A. Rambaud, "Kief et le Congrès Archéologique," R.D.M., 15 December, 1874, p. 785.

²Rambaud, "Kief et le Congrès Archéologique," p. 788.

³Ibid. Leger's paper to the congress entitled "Sur quelques fragments glagohsizues récemment découverts à la bibliothèque de Tours" was given on 9 August, 1874.

The participation of the French delegation was obviously appreciated by their hosts. "Le nom de la France a été salué par les plus vifs applaudissements," wrote Rambaud, "et l'un des convives a pris la parole pour affirmer que l'union souhaitée par les délégués français était déjà une réalité."¹ Nor was Leger unaware of the significance of his situation at the Kiev congress and what might be gained by it. At the close of the conference, he wrote to the Minister of Public Instruction:²

Les sympathies pour la France sont très vives ici et il ne tient qu'à nous de les développer encore. Au banquet de clôture du congrès j'ai cru devoir porter un toast au rapprochement intellectuel de la France et de la Russie des peuples latins et Slaves. Ce toast a été accueilli par des cris répétés de: Vive la France!

Later, Leger was to write the Minister again, proposing that the good relations already established be cemented by awarding four outstanding Russian members of the congress some mark of French esteem.³ Leger felt that these distinctions would make an excellent impression in the Russian scientific world.⁴ Count Ouvarov, president of the congress;

¹Ibid., p. 814.

²A. N., F¹⁷2983A. Leger to the Minister of Public Instruction, de Cumont, 3 September, 1874.

³Ibid., 13 October, 1874.

⁴Ibid. See also L. Leger, "Rapport à son excellence le Ministre de L'Instruction Publique sur une Mission Scientifique près le Congrès Archéologique de Kiev," Archives des Missions Scientifiques, Troisième série, tome 4, Paris, 1877. This report was submitted in two sections, on 7 April, 1875 and 1 July, 1875.

the Grand Duke Constantin Nicolaivitch; Ismail Ivanovitch Preznevsky, dean of the Faculty of Letters of the University of St. Petersburg; and, Vladimir Antonovitch, secretary-general of the congress and professor of history at the University of Kiev, accordingly received the Academic Palm.¹

Rimbaud seems to have failed to meet his obligations to the Ministry once again by not submitting an official report of the three-week congress in Kiev. This omission caused the Ministry to believe that Rimbaud's mission had not been entirely successful. Leger, on the other hand, conscientiously submitted a lengthy report and, so far as the Ministry of Public Instruction was concerned, amply earned his travel allowance of 3,000 francs. Not only had his participation in the congress contributed to the prestige of France; he had returned with numerous archaeological objects for display at the Musée de Saint Germain in Paris.²

Leger was not only aware of the need to teach Slavic languages in France; he was also conscious of the need to familiarize the French public with Russia and other Slav countries on a more popular level. According to André Mazon, Leger knew that, "pour acclimater ces

¹A. N., F¹⁷2983^A. Marginal note, dated 17th October, 1874 added to Leger's letter of 13 October, 1874.

²A. N., F¹⁷2983^A. Leger to the Minister of Public Instruction, de Cumont, 13 October, 1874.

The Musée de Saint Germain was founded in 1868; Louis de Mortillet was its first curator. See G. Bibby, The Testimony of the Spade, New York, 1956, pp. 45-54.

études slaves en France, un dernier défrichement était encore nécessaire, et, réduisant volontairement sa part de travail original et proprement scientifique, il s'était voué à cette tâche."¹

The trend toward the popularization of Russia and things Russian was carried over to other spheres, particularly after Russia was credited by the French press with having come to the aid of France during the war scare of 1875. Spearheaded by the display of Russian archaeological artifacts at the Musée de Saint Germain, the cultural push continued with the fiction of Mme. Henry Gréville. Although they lacked depth, Mme. Gréville's novels described "the manners and customs of a society that just now awakens the curiosity . . . of all Western people."² Having lived in Russia for many years, Mme. Gréville described her own experiences in that country in romantically novelized form, eliciting sufficient interest from the reading public that, after her first work (L'Expiation de Savéli, published in 1876), the Journal des Débats published her second novel, Dosia, in serial form. All that Gabriel Monod could find to say about this second work was that it gave a "pleasing genre picture." It was, in fact, more—it was a novel which certainly captured the imagination of French readers, for, by 1900, Dosia had had sixty-six editions! Although Mme. Gréville was still writing novels in 1900, the success of her

¹Mazon, "Les études slaves," p. 455.

²G. Monod, "Contemporary Life and Thought in France," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 33 (1878), p. 594. Henry Gréville was the pseudonym of Mme. Gréville (née Durant).

books published in the 1870's attests to the growth in the popularity of Russia and things Russian.

Yet another cultural form which had a wide appeal was the theatre. In January 1876, the Odéon Theatre presented the initial performance of what proved subsequently to be a most successful play, Les Danicheffs, by Pierre Newski¹ and Alexandre Dumas filz.² Although Zola found the comedy "abominable,"³ its success was assured, Le Gaulois reported, because of its Russian theme and because it was inspired by one of Alexandre Dumas père's many books. In fact, the plot of Les Danicheffs is based (at least in part), on an incident which is supposed to have taken place at the country home of Alexis Tolstoy. The actual characters said to be involved in this incident are a Frenchman, E. M. de Vogdé, a Dutchman, Count Bylandt, chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg, and the "écuyer" of the Russian court, Count Seuchtelen. During a bear hunt, the Frenchman is treed by one of the animals. His life is saved by the Russian diplomat in whose mouth the dramatist put the following comment:⁴

Un Français qui lutte avec une bête fauve qui l'a
pris par derrière, un Russe qui voit cela et qui

¹Pierre Newski is known more familiarly by his alias, Pierre de Corbin.

²Alexandre Dumas filz, married the Russian princess Narychkine (1826-1895, née Nadiejda Knorring), in 1864.

³E. Zola, Nos auteurs dramatiques, Paris, 1914, pp. 121-138.

⁴It is uncertain how Vogdé actually escaped the bear, but the portrayal of the incident in this play obviously pleased him, for he collected several newspaper clippings which mentioned it. See A.A.F., Collection Moulin: E. M. de Vogdé. "L'ours de l'alliance," Le Gaulois, 2 September, 1897.

tue la bête, c'est tout ce qu'il y a de plus simple,
et tant qu'il y aura des Français des Russes et des
bêtes fauves espérons que ce sera comme ça.

Large audiences applauded the rescue of the Frenchman by the play's Russian hero; and one of its authors, Dumas fils, is said to have remarked that he had sown the seeds of an alliance between the two countries!¹

The impact of Les Danicheffs was evident to Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, that most rational of Russia's interpreters in France. Feeling that the play lent itself, however indirectly, to Franco-Russian solidarity, he saw it as an attempt by a Russian author to show the moral superiority of the Russian peasant, resulting in "la conclusion peut-être inconsciente et involontaire" of the triumph of the man of the people at the expense of the privileged classes. Such a theme demonstrated to the French audience, not only one of the preoccupations of contemporary Russian literature, but was also "une des choses qui révèlent le mieux le travail intérieur et inachevé de la société russe."²

¹G. Charmes, Politique extérieure et coloniale, Paris, 1885, p. 26. See also L. Leger, Nouvelles études Slaves, 2 vols., Paris, 1880-1886, Vol. 1, p. 110. The popularity of the play is attested to by Juliette Adam. See Nos amitiés politiques avant l'abandon de la revanche, p. 314.

Paul Déroulède's play L'Hetman, which had been singularly unsuccessful prior to the Franco-Prussian War, was given again at the Odéon immediately following Les Danicheffs. Its portrayal of the "heroic" Cossacks' fight against the "oppressive" Poles was very popular with theatre audiences in this later presentation. See R.D.M., 15 April, 1877, p. 946.

²A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes: Les Classes Sociales: Le Paysan, l'émancipation des serfs et ses conséquences." R.D.M., 1 August, 1876, p. 644.

The desire of certain French intellectuals to have Russia better understood by their countrymen through academic publications and lectures, as well as through articles and public exhibitions, had met with a measure of popular success which surprised even them. Russia was becoming fashionable, "à la mode," as Leger wrote,¹

... à dire vrai, il n'est pas certain que cet engouement ait un principe absolument désintéressé. C'est surtout depuis les revers de 1870 que les Français ont commencé à rougir de leur ignorance des peuples étrangers, et qu'ils ont voulu les connaître sérieusement. La Russie a surtout profité de ce revirement, et on s'est appliqué à l'étudier, non plus avec des préjugés hostiles, mais avec une sympathie préconçue.

As "à la mode" as Russia may have been in 1875, she had not been so for very long. The "rare example de tolérance" demonstrated by the Sorbonne toward Leger's thesis in 1868 cannot be interpreted as an encouragement to others to pursue Slavic studies. Leger had been almost alone in battling the continuing indifference exhibited by the academic establishment prior to the Franco-Prussian War. Although he had received neither financial remuneration nor the status which an academic appointment would have given him, he was able to nevertheless maintain his position on the periphery of university activity. For three years, he had been able to present his material about the Slavs in a way that had sustained not only public interest but the interest of the university community as well. He had thus laid the foundation for an awakening of interest in the Slavs generally on the part of Alfred

¹Leger, Nouvelles études Slaves, Vol. 1, p. 107.

Rimbaud, Ernest Denis and others. As important as this may have been to him personally, it was to be of even more importance to the nation.

Leger's objective of drawing his countrymen closer to the Slavs met with greater official acceptance after the 1870 débâcle. Both he and Rimbaud strove, after that time, to aid in the reestablishment of France; however, an examination of the accomplishments of the two savants prior to 1875 reveals Leger to be certainly the more effective of the two. The means which Leger had used in his singleminded endeavour to contain the growing cultural and political strength of Germany and reestablish that of France was his special knowledge of the Slavs. He was never duped, as was Rimbaud, by the token homage paid in Russia to French culture. The years which he devoted to the study of the Slavic peoples, their languages, histories and cultures, gave him the necessary means by which to evaluate the cultural preponderance of Germany in Eastern Europe. His study had been undertaken with candour but also in the determination to rectify French misconceptions, thereby promoting his idea that an informed nation was a strong nation. Leger's persistent lobbying, articles and books convinced others of the value of establishing courses in Slav languages. The crowning event of the years 1870-1875 was attained by Leger when the Ecole des Langues Orientales vivantes inaugurated this programme; by 1875 Leger had placed the first of the many stones that were eventually to be seen as a bridge to Russia.

Neither Leger, Rambaud nor Leroy-Beaulieu had begun their careers with an overwhelming interest in Russia; but, after the Franco-Prussian War, they were convinced that a better understanding of that country and closer ties with it would assuredly bring about the relèvement of France and place her once again in the forefront of European politics. A sense of service to their country motivated them to continue the pursuit of this goal. If Leger's academic and personal dedication to a closer relationship with the Slavs had communicated itself to Rambaud prior to 1870, Leroy-Beaulieu had had no such advantage. The war provided the catalyst. Leroy-Beaulieu displayed no previous interest in either Russia or the Slavs (other than his youthful sympathy for Poland); but after the defeat, and for reasons similar to those of Leger and Rambaud, he began his prolonged and intensive examination of contemporary Russia—of a Russia in transition.

CHAPTER THREE

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu's Initial Considerations of Russia, 1872-1880.

It is extremely difficult to indicate exactly what initially motivated Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu to choose Russia as a subject in need of enlightenment. Apart from articles written for the Revue des deux mondes begun under the title "La Russie et les Russes,"¹ and from a scattering of articles written about him after his death in June, 1912, there is scant personal information to draw upon, as no known collection of his personal documents exists.²

A member of the haute-bourgeoisie, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu's grandfather had been a member of the parlement de Paris, as well as mayor of Lisieux, in 1789;³ his father became prefect under the July

¹The first article, August 15, 1873, was entitled "La Russie et les Russes." Subsequent articles, however, were given the general title of "L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes" without explanation on the part of Leroy-Beaulieu. It would appear that Ivan Turgenev on 22 August, 1873, wrote to Leroy-Beaulieu, asking him in the name of the widow of N. Turgenev not to use the title of the major work of her husband: La Russie et les Russes, 2 vols., Brussels, 1847. See J.P. Bruchier, "La Russie vue par la Revue des deux mondes," unpublished thesis deposited with the Bibliothèque Ernest Lavisse, University of Paris, 1965, p. 87, n. 2.

²A search by the descendants of Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu has revealed, regrettably, that virtually no personal correspondence of this extremely interesting personality has been preserved.

³P. de Quirielle, "Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu," Revue hebdomadaire, Vol. 7 (1912), p. 194.

Monarchy in the late 1830's,¹ then deputé for Calvados during the Second Empire.² Due to the financial independence of their family, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu and his brother, Paul, had the freedom and encouragement to pursue their own interests,³ and questions of political systems, religion and economics became major subjects on which they held very strong views.⁴ One may ask, then, why Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, himself a financially independent member of the haute-bourgeoisie, would have chosen to involve himself with controversial and heretofore unpopular subjects.

The war of 1870 was for Leroy-Beaulieu a tragic event; but, as for others, it was also the catalyst in his life which directed all his attentions toward a patriotic effort to enlighten his fellow-countrymen. After 1870, his travels took on an intense character: they were directed toward the study of "l'étranger avec un but nettement défini, celui de l'observation consciencieuse et méthodique au profit de l'intérêt français."⁵

¹F. Guizot, "La guerre n'est pas à craindre." M. Guizot à M. Leroy-Beaulieu, maire de Lisieux, Arras, n.d. (ca. February, 1839).

²Quirielle, op. cit., p. 194.

³Ibid., p. 192. R. Pinon, "Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu," R. D. M., 1 November, 1913, p. 75.

⁴Certainly Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu in his studies was influenced by the philosopher, Claude-Henri Saint-Simon—that is, by the conviction of the overriding importance of religion and the impact of industry, credit and machines in the life of civilized nations. Although religion was a favorite topic to Anatole and economics to Paul, their resemblance to Saint-Simon ends there.

⁵Quirielle, op. cit., p. 193.

Like Leger and Rambaud, Leroy-Beaulieu visited Russia for the first time in 1872. Earlier that year, he had published an article ("L'Empereur Napoléon III et la politique du Second Empire" in the Revue des deux mondes;¹ and it may well have been the acuity of the judgement shown in this article that drew François Buloz's attention to the critical ability of its author. Leroy-Beaulieu went to Russia on behalf of the Revue des deux mondes, as Buloz² put it, in order to "découvrir la Russie et de la présenter à la France par l'intermédiaire et pour le compte de la Revue."³ He thus had the support of the most important review in nineteenth-century France.⁴ The resultant articles were, for the time, unexcelled works and Leroy-

¹April 1, 1872. This work was later enlarged and reproduced as Un Empereur, un roi, un pape, une restauration, Paris, 1879.

²P. Chasles, "Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu et L'Empire des Tsars," Revue des sciences politiques, Vol. 29 (1913), p. 3; Leger, Souvenirs . . . , p. 122.

François Buloz (1804-1877) was editor of the Revue des deux mondes from 1831 to 1877. "Il est resté célèbre par son activité laborieuse, son autoritarisme et sa rare habileté à discerner la mérite des œuvres nouvelles." In 1847 and 1848, he was the administrator of the Comédie Française. His son, Charles (1843-1905), succeeded him as director of the Revue des deux mondes from 1877 to 1893. See Grand Larousse Encyclopédique, Paris, 1960, Vol. 2, p. 443.

³Quoted by Quirielle, op. cit., p. 194.

⁴G. Hanotaux, Histoire de la France contemporaine, 4 vols., Paris, 1908, Vol. 2, p. 904, "La Revue des deux mondes . . . fut longtemps la ressource intellectuelle des classes éclairées. . . ." The subscription list climbed from 300 names in 1831 to 18,000 in 1877. See Dictionnaire de Biographie Française, Paris, 1956, Vol. 7, p. 666.

Beaulieu's efforts to dispel the ignorance of his countrymen concerning Russian life by a systematic and thorough analysis of the country and the manners of its inhabitants established his reputation beyond France to Russia herself where his articles became a major topic of discussion.¹

But what the Vicomte de Vogüé called the ingenious inspiration of Buloz may well have been Leroy-Beaulieu's own idea: he had plans to go to Russia early in 1870, but was prevented from doing so by the declaration of war.² Like Leger, he saw that the unification of the German peoples would bring about the break-up of pre-1870 Europe,³ and his "pénétration surexcitée . . . s'appliquait à suivre la transformation des nébuleuses de l'emphrée européen en astres homogènes et solides."⁴ Leroy-Beaulieu was to do more, however, than follow this 'transformation,' as Fagniez, the vice-president of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques, was to write in 1912. Although Leroy-Beaulieu precluded himself from direct political involvement because of what he thought was his right and his duty to remain independent, the

¹E. M. de Vogüé (Vicomte), Journal, February 9-21, 1880, p. 173; February 27-March 10, 1880, p. 184; Chasles, op. cit., p. 13.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Vol. 1, p. viii.

³Leger, "De Paris à Prague," pp. 642 ff.

⁴M. Fagniez, "Discours prononcé . . . à l'occasion de la mort de M. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu," Séance et Travaux de l'Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, Vol. 178 (1912), p. 12.

totality of his work called the attention of the Academy to the central factors governing European politics—factors which he nevertheless tried to influence by his writings.¹ His work on Russia was to place him among the masters of political literature and, with Leger and Rambaud, among the initiators of a type of historical writing committed to the reorientation of France after the defeat.

Among this generation, de Vogüé exemplified the attitude of many of his colleagues who felt keenly the diminished position of France abroad.²

... humiliations dissimulées en Occident sous la courtoisie diplomatique, mieux senties en Orient, où l'on traite plus ouvertement chacun d'après la force qu'on lui suppose. Pour faire cesser plus vite ces humiliations, il fallait un appui; et il suffisait d'un regard sur la carte, d'une interrogation sur l'avenir probable, pour savoir où nous devons chercher cet appui. M. le duc Decazes était dans ces idées. J'allai le trouver; je lui exprimai mon étonnement de ce qu'aucun agent du service diplomatique à cette époque, ne possédait la langue russe

Little by little, Leroy-Beaulieu applied himself to the task. Vogüé wrote some years later that "il faut faire dans le mouvement de notre génération une place hors de pair à l'auteur de cette œuvre capital, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes."³

Leroy-Beaulieu was convinced that an attentive study of the various classes of society in Russia, although a difficult task for a foreigner,

¹Ibid., p. 14.

²de Vogüé to Halperine-Kaminsky, 27 August, 1892, published in Revue hebdomadaire, Vol. 4 (April 1910), p. 147.

³E. M. de Vogüé (Vicomte), Regards historiques et littéraires, Paris, 1893, p. 85.

would result not only in dissipating the errors which existed regarding Russia in France, but would indicate the future course of Russian development. When one understood the social state of Russia, one could then, without hesitation, predict "le jour où les progrès de l'esprit public lui permettront de prendre une part active à la direction de ses affaires et de ses destinées."¹

It is not difficult to perceive that Leroy-Beaulieu's conclusion was similar to that of Leger and Rambaud: that is, that a knowledge of Russia was in the French national interest, and that the acquisition of such knowledge would eventually dissipate the ignorance of foreign nations which had been.²

... l'un des principaux défauts de la France, l'une des principales causes de ces récents revers. A ce vice de notre éducation nationale, nous cherchons aujourd'hui un remède: nous nous décidons à apprendre les langues de nos voisins; mais pour nous être d'une sérieuse utilité politique, notre connaissance de l'étranger ne doit point se borner aux peuples qui touchent nos frontières. L'Europe est solidaire; dans un moment de surprise, elle peut sembler l'oublier; à la longue, il lui faudra

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes: Les Classes Sociales: Les villes, les mechtchané, les marchands et la Bourgeoisie," R.D.M., 1 April, 1876, p. 526.

²A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes: La nature russe, le tchernoziom, les steppes et la population," R.D.M., 15 August, 1873, p. 737.

It is interesting to note that Flaubert pointed to the same cause for the national disaster in 1871 when, in a letter to George Sand, 31 March 1871, he wrote: "Est-ce la fin de la Blague? En aura-t-on fini avec la métaphysique creuse et les reûques? Tout le mal vient de notre gigantesque ignorance. Ce qui devrait être étudié est cru sans discussion." See Les Oeuvres de Gustave Flaubert, 18 vols., Lauzanne, 1965, Vol. 14, p. 55.

toujours se le rappeler. Comme l'ancienne Grèce, l'Europe moderne forme une famille, dont au milieu même de leurs querelles les membres se tiennent tous dans une réciproque dépendance. Les intérêts de la politique extérieure sont généraux, ceux de la politique intérieure ne le sont guère moins. La connaissance de leurs ressources, de leurs tendances, de leurs institutions mutuelles, est un des premiers besoins des peuples et des gouvernements de notre âge.

France was anxiously looking, after 1870, for a power to which she could become allied. Eventually she was to turn to Russia, that European state which:¹

... malgré son éloignement, a plus d'une fois pesé d'un grand poids sur l'occident. Il est relégué aux confins de l'Asie; mais entre nous et lui il n'y a que l'Allemagne. C'est le plus vaste des états de l'Europe, c'est celui qui compte le plus d'habitants, et c'est le moins connu....

But by what criteria could Russia, or for that matter any power, be measured if the French were lacking the most basic data on which to base an enquiry? Perhaps Pierre Chasles overstated the case when he wrote that French sociologists knew more about the Australian aborigine than about Russian customs: the aborigine had been studied and written about by English writers whom the French found easier to read than Russian authors whose language in 1872 was not yet taught in France!² But in fact, "quelques souvenirs historiques et quelques visions de paysages" were all that Frenchmen of 1870 had of Russia.

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 15 August, 1873, p. 737.

²Pierre Chasles was a student of Leroy-Beaulieu at the Ecole des Sciences Politiques. He was the author of Le Parlement russe, son organisation, ses rapports avec l'Empereur, Paris, 1910, for which Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu wrote the Preface.

Even though his countrymen could look at a map and read the names of each river, town and province, in the view of Chasles, Russia and its people remained virtually unknown in France until the appearance of the articles of Leroy-Beaulieu for the Revue des deux mondes.¹

Leroy-Beaulieu proposed that Frenchmen should rid themselves of all their preconceived notions regarding Russia and try to envisage the situation as it was. He presented Russia as a peasant culture, deeply imbued with a faith common to both Catholicism and Orthodoxy. In his first three articles on Russia for the Revue des deux mondes, he attempted the initial steps in educating public opinion.² He pointed out (more from intuition than from factual evidence), that the Russian occupier of Champagne in 1814 "contrairement au préjugé vulgaire" was, under a rough exterior, "Plus souvent un homme affectueux, doux, tendre même. . ." and that, whether in the campaign in France in 1814 or in the Crimea, "le Russe reste le plus généreux ennemi." He showed Frenchmen that Russians were not at all barbarian. On the contrary, "doux et prompt à la commisération comme homme privé, le Russe peut dans ses luttes nationales ou civiles, devenir

¹Chasles, op. cit., pp. 2, 3, 4.

²This series of articles lasted for 16 years and was eventually published under the title of L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes in three volumes from 1881 to 1889.

Louis Leger wrote of this work in Nouvelles études Slaves (Vol. 2, p. 97) thus: "Tout le monde a lu les remarquables études de M. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu sur l'empire des tsars. Ce sont là des travaux dont notre littérature scientifique a le droit d'être fière et que la docte Allemagne lui envie."

impitoyable, [ou comme] soldat ou comme homme public: mais après la victoire, il redevient souvent aussi naïvement bon qu'il s'était montré naïvement dur et cruel."¹

Leroy-Beaulieu wanted the reader to make a distinction between the German occupation of France and the Russian. Further, in his third article for the Revue, he continued to point out the qualities of Russians by such statements as, "personne ne sait souffrir comme un Russe, personne mourir comme lui";² his readers would have to have been totally non-perceptive if they did not understand that it would be good to have this kind of man as a friend.

Leroy-Beaulieu never went so far as to write that revanche depended upon a rapprochement with Russia. Rather, he attempted to take a middle-of-the-road, "scientific" approach to the matter; but his feelings made themselves known all the time. In the second article for the Revue, he went to considerable lengths to show that Russia and Western Europe were not that different from one another: "Pour la race comme pour le sol, si la Russie diffère de l'occident, elle diffère encore plus de la vieille Asie."³

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "La Russie et les Russes: Le climat, le tempérament et le caractère national. Paysages et portraits," R.D.M., 15 October, 1873, p. 873; E. Lavissee, Souvenirs, Paris, 1912, pp. 110-111; Rambaud, Français et Russes. Moscou et Sébastopol, pp. xxv-xxvii, quoting Nicolas Turgenev, La Russie et les Russes, Vol. 1, p. 69.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 15 October, 1873, p. 872.

³A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "La Russie et les Russes: Les races et la Nationalité," R.D.M., 15 September, 1873, p. 281. It should be noted that Louis Leger's Le monde slave was a major source for Leroy-Beaulieu's comments upon the ethnography of Russia. See ibid., p. 271.

Four months later, Leroy-Beaulieu attempted to expose in detail the nature of the old and the new Russia and to ask whether the difference between Russia and Europe was in relative terms or in the principle of the civilization itself.¹ To answer this question, he felt that it was necessary to determine the basis of European culture and to compare the cultural elements of the two societies for his readers. He believed that Western culture was founded upon a union of Greco-Roman elements, Christianity and Germanism.² The Germanic influence was the first to make itself felt in Russia as was attested by the "soumission" of the Slavs of Eastern Europe acknowledged in both the Chronicle of Kiev and the Rousskaia Pravda. He declared that it was in the Tenth Century that the Slavs made contact with Christianity and the ancient elements of Western civilization via Byzantium, a contact which put the Slavs "dans une précoce intimité avec un empire en décadence."³ But this decadent influence was fortunately offset by the development of the Kievan empire ("un empire assis sur des fondations européennes avec des éléments déjà marqués d'originalité, un pays qui dans la chretienté semblait appelé à servir de lien entre l'orient grec et l'occident latin").⁴ The Tatar invasion which had retarded the growth

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes: L'Histoire et les éléments de la civilisation: L'ancienne et la nouvelle Russie," R.D.M., 15 January, 1874, p. 348.

²Ibid., p. 344.

³Ibid., p. 348.

⁴Ibid., p. 349.

of Russia for three hundred years: "Construit sur des fondations slaves par des princes germaniques, cimentée par le christianisme sous l'influence de la nouvelle Rome, la Russie que renversèrent les Tartares avait des bases européennes."¹

Leroy-Beaulieu attributed the historical foundation of the institution of autocracy to the Tatars. Because of the immensity of the country, "qui n'offrait aucun cadre à la vie locale,"² and because of the natural submissiveness of the people, the Russian princes had allowed themselves to imitate Tatar autocratic administration. This, together with the remnants of the influence of the Byzantine empire, contributed largely to the formation of the autocratic system. This system, being the result of an historical development influenced by geography and by the natural disposition of the Russian people, seemed to him the form of government most suitable for Russia.

From the Tatar invasions of the Thirteenth Century, Russia remained unchanged, according to Leroy-Beaulieu, until the time of Peter I. "Le Tsar ramenait brusquement vers l'Europe un peuple que les siècles avaient détourné vers l'Asie."³ Unlike many before him, Leroy-Beaulieu considered Tsar Peter to be the spokesman for the Russian people, who, well before Peter's time, had already begun

¹Ibid., p. 360.

²Ibid., p. 355.

³Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Vol. 1, pp. 265-266.

to adopt some of the measures which he was able to implement. Peter the Great did not drastically change the course upon which Russia was set: he only helped it along the path toward Europe, a path already chosen. Leroy-Beaulieu saw the moving together of Russia and the rest of Europe as the "aboutissement" of a natural evolutionary process begun under Ivan III and followed by Peter I.¹ But Tsar Peter harmed his people intellectually by the importation of Western ideas, as well as by widening the gulf between the aristocracy and the peasant.² "Moral ou intellectuel, social ou politique, tout le mal dont souffre la Russie depuis Pierre le Grand, se résume en un, le dualisme, la contradiction. La vie et la conscience nationales ont été coupées en deux: le pays remué dans ses fondements, n'a pu encore retrouver son équilibre."³

Leroy-Beaulieu felt that conditions could be corrected by the reforms of Alexander II which, he initially believed were sounder, better prepared and more national than those of Peter the Great. They were more national because they originated from the people through the abolition of serfdom in 1861. It was this reform "qui devait reconcilier la Russie avec elle-même aussi bien qu'avec

¹Ibid., pp. 261, 263. See also A. Rambaud, "Ivan le Terrible et les Anglais en Russie," R.D.M., 15 February, 1876, p. 863.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Vol. 1, p. 271.

³Ibid., p. 277.

l'Europe."¹

And, to answer the question of whether Russia belonged to Europe or not, Leroy-Beaulieu wrote that he saw a difference in Russian and European cultures in the degree of their development, but not in their nature. He attached Russia to Europe furthermore through its race—the Slavs, who had absorbed both Finnish and Tatar elements. Russian history had been in constant evolution, in the course of which it had moved closer and closer to an enlightened Europe—it was indeed a part of that whole.² Continuing social progress would eventually insure its acceptance as a wholly European country.

The event which propelled nineteenth-century Russia into the consciousness of Europeans was the emancipation of the serfs which, according to Leroy-Beaulieu, was "un événement sans analogue dans l'histoire des nations où le servage s'est effacé peu à peu."³ Leroy-Beaulieu devoted himself almost entirely to the emancipation theme during the year 1876, for he thought that he could recognize (and he

¹Ibid., pp. 280-281. See also Leroy-Beaulieu's articles, R.D.M., 1 August, 1876 and 1 March, 1879.

It is interesting that of all the articles in the R.D.M., on the question of serfdom, only Laveleye, 15 April, 1874, and de Vogtlé, 15 July, 1879, were strongly in favour of serfdom. Leroy-Beaulieu was on the whole critical, and true to form, his accounts are the most detailed of any.

²See also, Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 15 September, 1873, p. 281.

³Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 1 August, 1876, p. 648.

wished to point out for his readers), the importance of the rising liberal spirit, "L'esprit à la fois moderne et national dont a été animée cette grande œuvre de l'émancipation."¹

Leroy-Beaulieu underlined the fact that it had been Russian authors such as Gogol and Turgenev who had alerted Russians and other Europeans to the problems of the peasant prior to emancipation:²

La réaction de l'esprit national contre le cosmopolitisme superficiel du XVIII^e siècle, la réhabilitation de la nationalité dans l'art, la littérature, la politique, devaient naturellement profiter avant tout au paysan, qui était l'homme russe par excellence.

Within Russia herself, a large portion of the gentry adopted this view and, in this usually realistic country, "le serf à peine affranchi, le villageois ignorant, sale, grossier, devint ainsi un objet d'engouement et d'enthousiasme, un objet de respect et de vénération."³ Many in Russian society were overtaken by a kind of mysticism which, Leroy-Beaulieu felt, was induced by a combination of causes particular to Russia, together with the echo of democratic events which had been occurring in the West.⁴

Leroy-Beaulieu pointed out that both Alexander I and Nicholas I had been concerned with the issue of emancipation; but, no matter how

¹Ibid., p. 677. See also Leroy-Beaulieu's articles, R.D.M., 1 April, 15 May, and 15 November, 1876.

²Ibid., p. 645.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 646.

well prepared or desired by the nation or public opinion, freedom of the serfs had hitherto been retarded by tsardom's apprehensions of the revolutionary movements throughout Europe during the first half of the Nineteenth Century. In all probability, Leroy-Beaulieu estimated, the emancipation of the serfs would have been further delayed had the humiliating results of the Crimean War not given impetus to the need for internal reform. The war, although it precipitated a loss of pride throughout the country in the military prowess of the army, must be seen as the catalyst which caused transformation within the country.

After years of conscientious preparation, the act of emancipation promulgated in 1861 effected sweeping changes in the social structure of the country equal to those caused in France by the Revolution of 1789. The difference between the reforms in Russia and the revolution in France was in the way in which each was prepared and the way in which each was conducted. In Russia, Leroy-Beaulieu felt, the law was in advance of public demand. He was satisfied in 1876 that the evils which had beset France as a result of revolutionary turmoil would not plague Russia, where reforms had been deliberately and systematically instituted by the government. Leroy-Beaulieu wrote optimistically that:¹

... sous le règne actuel, elle [Russie] est définitivement devenue un pays moderne. A cet égard, l'œuvre encore inachevée de l'empereur Alexandre II ressemble singulièrement à l'œuvre aujourd'hui incontestée de notre

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 1 April, 1876, p. 524.

révolution française, et le terme final, le résultat capital en sera le même: l'égalité civile sans distinction de classe, de race ou de religion.

Leroy-Beaulieu was at pains to demonstrate the enormity of the project of emancipation; the enormity of the problem of arriving at a plan for the distribution of land and a suitable mode of payment; the difficulty of dealing with established custom and law; and the sensitive relationship between master and peasant which in each region of the empire had to be taken into consideration. In brief, he demonstrated to his readers that the task of emancipation was one of great complexity.

In 1876, Leroy-Beaulieu was convinced that, once the Russian government had accepted the plan for emancipation prepared by the "Comité de rédaction," it had followed as closely as possible its general principle of giving each peasant the amount of land necessary to support his family and that this rule had been wisely adapted to the varied conditions of the country. Although this general plan was as equitable as possible, to satisfy all those affected was impossible. Inevitably, there were complaints from both the gentry and the peasant: "C'est qu'étant impartiale, la sentence ne pouvait satisfaire entièrement aucune des deux parties."¹ But, while the major adjustment for land-owners was to realize a financial capital to replace their loss of "capital humain" (which was often only possible under most onerous conditions),

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 1 August, 1876, p. 660.

Leroy-Beaulieu wished his readers to understand that adjustment for the peasants was much more complicated. He felt that the major problem for the peasant was that of understanding the act of emancipation itself. The peasants considered themselves to have always been proprietors of the land which they had cultivated for their own needs for generations: "'Je suis à toi,' disait le serf à son maître, 'mais la terre est à moi.'" Thus, when the manifesto was proclaimed in 1861, many felt they had been cheated. Some did not believe that it was a genuine act of emancipation, while still others would take many years to understand the conditions of their freedom and reconcile themselves to it:¹

A vrai dire, ces pauvres serfs étaient pour la plupart hors d'état de comprendre les clauses de l'édit impérial (polojenie). Il leur manquait pour cela l'intelligence du langage juridique, une notion claire du droit de propriété, et la notion même de la liberté; il leur manquait en même temps la confiance dans leurs maîtres ou dans les autorités locales chargées de leur expliquer le nouvel ordre de choses. Dressé à la méfiance par des siècles d'oppression, le paysan ne voulait croire que les rêves de son imagination, les fallacieuses promesses des émissaires démocratiques, ou les menteuses chimères des prophètes de village. Le serf habitué à l'arbitraire et étranger à l'idée de légalité, le moujik qui d'ordinaire a peu le sens du définitif et de l'irrévocable, s'est difficilement persuadé que l'acte d'émancipation pût être définitif et irrévocable. Ce peuple encore enfant attendant tout de l'intervention du tsar ou de l'intervention de Dieu, espérait vaguement un soudain changement de fortune, une brusque métamorphose de sa situation.

It was Leroy-Beaulieu's opinion that the difficulties encountered by the peasants were due primarily to their own lack of knowledge, the

¹Ibid., p. 661.

result of which was an inability to profit from the advantages offered to them under the act of emancipation.¹ But, if Leroy-Beaulieu's opinion seemed to suggest to his readers that the peasants were unprepared for emancipation, his assessment for the future was that the dream of the peasant for both property and well being would be realized.²

... le paysan russe a cependant un grand avantage; si, comme le prolétaire d'Occident, le serf russe a eu ses illusions et ses rêves, il n'a guère encore de théories et de fausse science; s'il trouve lourd le joug du travail, il le supporte encore patiemment et n'est point en révolte ouverte contre lui. Chez le moujik à peine affranchi, les conceptions erronées de la liberté se pourront corriger par l'usage de la liberté; puis, grâce aux précautions de l'émancipation, le paysan russe n'est point un prolétaire: ses rêves même de propriété et de bien-être seront en partie réalisés. Aujourd'hui, et tant que durera l'opération du rachat, il sent tout le poids de sa nouvelle situation, mais quand le demi-siècle d'annuités sera écoulé, quand la terre qu'il a dû payer de ses sueurs sera devenue sienne, il pourra enfin comprendre les bienfaits de l'émancipation, et un jour, à l'inverse de leurs pères, les fils oseront se dire et se sentir libres.

"Il ne faut donc pas trop s'étonner," Leroy-Beaulieu advised his French readers, "du découragement qui se fait souvent jour dans l'opinion et dans la presse russe."³ Although emancipation had not created a panacea, he suggested that there were good results, visible throughout the country, the first of which was economic progress

¹Ibid., p. 668.

²Ibid., p. 670.

³Ibid., p. 672.

"grâce au stimulant donné à la production par la liberté." The second benefit of emancipation was moral progress, "grâce à l'affranchissement de la conscience populaire et au sentiment nouveau de la responsabilité"; the third, and most important, but least recognized benefit was the social transformation of the country "grâce à l'affaiblissement des habitudes patriarcales au profit de l'individualisme."¹

His assurance of Russia's progress through emancipation and the subsequent lessening of patriarchal ties and class distinctions left his readers no room to doubt that there was an encompassing unity in the act of emancipation which, despite misunderstandings, gave the country the aspect of a modern state moving along democratic lines.² It was Leroy-Beaulieu's view that the result of Alexander II's reforms would be the creation of an economically-minded, liberal, middle class—a factor necessary to Leroy-Beaulieu's concept of a new Europe—the result of which, he concluded, would be a Russia "vraiment européenne et moderne." Having traced historically the social impact of emancipation so that his readers might better understand the strides Russia was making, he concluded by reiterating his comparison between French and Russian reforms, the latter "... pacifiquement accomplie sous nos yeux sans bruit et sans éclat . . . ," certainly preferable to revolution. Without doubt, then, his French readers could agree with Leroy-Beaulieu when he wrote that the emancipation of the serfs was "une des plus

¹Ibid.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 1 April, 1876, pp. 523-524.

grandes choses que mentionne l'histoire et sera une de celles qui feront le plus d'honneur au XIX^e siècle."¹

In December of the same year in which his lengthy articles on emancipation and the social classes in Russia were published, Leroy-Beaulieu informed his readers of the economic transition which had taken place in Russia following the events of 1861. It was his opinion that Russia, after the Crimean War, had conscientiously avoided any diplomatic entanglements which would have drawn it into the affairs of the rest of Europe, in order to secure the social readjustments so necessary to its future stability. But, with the emancipation had come a period of economic strain which, in late 1876, "rendrait plus fâcheux pour lui [l'Empire Russe] tout ébranlement grave ou prolongé," with Turkey.²

Tracing the economic reforms from their arduous inception in 1862 (when the government for the first time publicly announced its budget), Leroy-Beaulieu was convinced that Russia was financially as well off as the constitutional states of Europe. After 1871, he noted, the Russian budget had been balanced. He added, however, that the financial reforms that had taken place were not as thorough as those in other areas:³

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 1 August, 1876, p. 677.

²A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes: Les finances: Le budget, le régime fiscal et le revenue," R.D.M., 15 December, 1876, p. 835.

³A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes: Les finances: Les dépenses, la dette et le papier-monnaie," R.D.M., 1 January, 1877, p. 153. See also the article of 15 December, 1876, pp. 836, 837.

... [le budget] a une grave, une irrémédiable infirmité
 ... un budget assis sur le papier-monnaie est comme
 une maison de glace dont les blocs polis demeurent in-
 tactes et solides tant que dure le froid; mais vienne le
 printemps et le dégel. . . .

Although the yearly revenue had increased and there was, in 1876, a surplus of 40 million rubles due to severe economic measures, a war scare in the autumn of that year had aggravated an insecure financial situation to such a degree that Leroy-Beaulieu was apprehensive of the effect of a difficult and prolonged state of war upon both the finances of Russia and the continued implementation of emancipation.

In August 1876, Leroy-Beaulieu had been quite confident that, despite the designs attributed by others to Russia, "la Russie s'est trop bien trouvée de la paix et en a encore assez besoin pour ne point l'aller troubler, à moins d'y être contrainte par les provocations d'autrui ou le salut même des chrétiens d'orient."¹ Five months later, in January 1877, he was certain that events were pushing Russia in a direction in which it did not wish to go. To become involved in a war with Turkey would result not only in the expenses of a military campaign (from which no compensation would be forthcoming); but the very triumph of the Russian army would occasion the cost of occupying, organizing and administering new possessions. Thus Russia needed peace to reestablish its already damaged financial situation, and time to allow its fiscal system, "une lourde machine aux ressorts primitifs

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 1 August, 1876, p. 677.

et grossiers," to recover from the beating which it had taken. "Malgré les défauts de son régime fiscal," Leroy-Beaulieu wrote, "les finances de la Russie avaient devant elles un bel et sûr avenir. . . . A l'aide de la paix et d'une sage administration, le pays triompherait rapidement de ces difficultés."¹

Unlike Leger or Rambaud, who maintained what can only be interpreted as a discreet silence, Leroy-Beaulieu was prompted, six days after Russia's declaration of war, to defend the action and policy of that country in the face of opposition even from the Revue des deux mondes itself. In an article entitled "Les préliminaires de la guerre Turco-russe" published in that review, the editor felt it necessary for the first and only time, to disclaim responsibility for the views expressed by Leroy-Beaulieu, all the while recognizing that the author's knowledge of the political events in Turkey and Russia did nevertheless give him the right to judge the question, at least from a personal point of view.²

The pro-English, anti-Russian bias of the Revue des deux mondes was challenged by Leroy-Beaulieu. He laid the blame for the troubles of Russia and the Balkans squarely at the feet not only of Germany, which (although it played a secondary role) might, he believed, have used its good offices to restrain Russia, but of England and Turkey as

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 1 January, 1877, p. 160.

²A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Les Préliminaires de la Guerre Turco-Russe," R.D.M., 1 May, 1877, p. 198.

well. Russia, he stated, faced with the prospect of backing away from a Turkish challenge to its rights over the Christian population in an obviously Slav area of Europe, could do little else to save its authority than meet the challenge.

Describing German action as national self-aggrandizement, Leroy-Beaulieu was certain that the one aim of that country was to see Russia weakened by its involvement with Turkey and thereby forced to rely more heavily in the future upon Germany. The predominant role in the affair, however, went to England, which was caught between Turkish intrigue and Russian national pride: "Le rôle prédominant joué par l'Angleterre dans les dernières négociations n'a eu d'autre effet que de remplir l'intermède entre la dernière guerre serbe et la prochaine guerre russe, et de donner au tsar et au sultan le loisir de s'équiper pour rentrer en scène les armes à la main."¹ Though granting that England was prepared to call for peace between the belligerents, Leroy-Beaulieu was of the opinion that England could no longer do so because of the division within the country between the government and the public. Affected at one and the same time by Turkish atrocities and by hostile feelings for an old adversary, Russia, England's governors were incapable of taking a stand and, "sont demeurés paralysés et impuissans." England's authority over a bellicose Turkey was thus nullified.

Turkey could boast of a well equipped army and navy, due to the money which both England and France had poured into that country, a

¹Ibid., p. 201.

support which might never again be forthcoming. Turkey had the choice of prolonging the then suspended state of war or (should Russia be forced to take the initiative), fighting a defensive campaign against a country which the Porte felt was better provided with men than with money. Leroy-Beaulieu demonstrated that Turkey, a country without industry and in a state of bankruptcy, had nothing to lose as a result of a war with Russia.

Leroy-Beaulieu believed that Russia, in contrast to Turkey, was a modernized state, but one which could no longer afford to support a state of undeclared war as its commerce, already interrupted, and its devalued ruble, indicated.¹ Although, on the one hand, Leroy-Beaulieu felt that the Turkish government was certain that the Russians only pretended to want a conflict without having the intention of provoking it, on the other hand, he was certain that Russia's inaction was caused by its efforts to reach an agreement with the Turks. It was unfortunate, Leroy-Beaulieu wrote, that this inaction "a été prise pour l'hésitation de la crainte et sa bonne volonté pour un aveu d'impuissance. . . . Cette opinion, imprudemment propagée par les adversaires de la Russie, est devenue une des principales causes de la guerre. . . ." ²

By virtue of precedents, Leroy-Beaulieu claimed that the European powers had had every right to intervene in Turkish affairs and should indeed have done so more effectively as Europe was, if not politically,

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 1 January, 1877, pp. 152-153.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 1 May, 1877, p. 209.

then morally, obliged not to abandon the Christians under Turkey's rule. But, as the European powers had not intervened, Russia was obliged to take account both of its faltering economy and, equally important, of Slav opinion within and outside Russia.¹ Russia could not back away without losing both materially and morally. Leroy-Beaulieu wrote, somewhat naïvely: "Les Russes engagent la lutte au nom du droit des peuples, au nom de la liberté contre l'esprit d'oppression et l'héritage de la conquête. . . ."²

In Leroy-Beaulieu, it seemed, Russia had found a solid champion, one who was prepared to characterize her civilization sympathetically, defend her reforms, and uphold her fiscal system and foreign policy. But his intellectual independence should have precluded any such assumption.

As acute or gullible as Leroy-Beaulieu's assessment of Russia may have been, it had hitherto been based upon the results of his study of Russia and upon personal observations made during his trips to that country. At no time had Leroy-Beaulieu been privy to the correspondence of the Tsar, his ministers or any other lesser functionaries of the Russian government: thus he could not have been expected to know, firsthand, of the discord within that body. His analysis of the conflict between the revolutionaries and the Russian government presented to the Société d'économie sociale in June 1880,

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Guerre d'Orient: Le sentiment public en Russie," La Revue politique et littéraire, Vol. 1 (1877), p. 1163.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 1 May, 1877, p. 211.

gives the first indication of the serious shift that was taking place in his thought. The theme of this conference was the origin and character of Russian Nihilism. In the course of his lecture, Leroy-Beaulieu characterized this revolutionary movement as scientifically baseless, objectively destructive, totally lacking in aims, and an exaggerated Russian expression of the century's negativism. But, he had arrived at the belief that the only constant in Russia was the autocracy of the tsar; and, the political action of nihilism was the result of the repressive system inaugurated by Tsar Nicholas, then it was upon the misuse of the autocratic system that blame for the troubles of Russia must fall.

On the theme of reform and the misuse of autocratic power, Leroy-Beaulieu said that the changes introduced by Alexander II, already passed in Russia, "offrent entre elles un défaut d'harmonie des plus choquants. Elles ont été élaborées par des commissions animées d'opinions très diverses, et bien qu'elles aient paru vers le même époque, elles présentent des caractères disparates et parfois contradictoires."¹ In addition, he stated that the reforms of Alexander II had not accomplished genuine change. Instead, they had aided the revolutionary movement by their haphazardness: "Elles ont encouragé des rêves qu'elles n'ont pu réaliser, éveillé des besoins qu'elles n'ont pas su satisfaire."² Moreover, he now felt that, in the months follow-

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Les origines et les caractères du nihilisme russe," Bulletins de la société internationale des études pratiques d'économie sociale, Vol. 7 (1880), pp. 314, 315.

²Ibid., p. 314.

ing the Russo-Turkish War (which had been fought by the Russian population as a "sorte de croisade philanthropique . . . dans la défense des frères slaves"), the administration had shown a continuing lack of skill by delivering their "frères slaves aux Allemands et aux Magyars," thus further alienating the population. The logical outcome was that "le nihilisme moissonna ce que la désillusion et la désaffection générale avaient semé."¹

From a comparison of this speech with his early and later work, one is able to conclude that Leroy-Beaulieu's views of Russia were undergoing change. In the series of articles published in the Revue des deux mondes four years earlier—prior to the Russo-Turkish War—it is evident that Leroy-Beaulieu did not feel that the revolutionary movement in Russia would pose a serious problem:²

Aujourd'hui [1876] . . . grâce aux réformes, l'atmosphère russe est devenue plus légère, l'homme civilisé y peut vivre, y peut respirer sans abattement, comme sans vaine et stérile excitation. Là, comme partout, l'accroissement des libertés a diminué l'esprit révolutionnaire.

However, in what subsequently proved to be a most acute observation, Leroy-Beaulieu warned the audience of the Société d'économie sociale that, although the mass of the Russian people in 1880 remained outside the revolutionary movement, "le mal peut se propager par des voies souterraines, gagner jusqu'au peuple; et il ne serait pas impossible

¹Ibid., pp. 315-316.

²A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes: Les classes sociales: La noblesse et le Tchine," R.D.M., 15 May, 1876, p. 361.

que la première partie du XX^e siècle assistât à un bouleversement."¹

Leroy-Beaulieu's purpose, which was to remain constant throughout his life, was to inform, instruct and influence the French population, in the national interest. Russia, which he undertook to explain to France, had begun to receive his more critical scrutiny as the result of what has to be called a fortuitous incident. In the Spring of 1880, Leroy-Beaulieu received from an anonymous source in England, a collection of the correspondence of Nicholas Miliutin which dealt with the emancipation of the serfs in Russia and the affairs of Poland in 1863.² These letters provided Leroy-Beaulieu with a fund of information hitherto not available to him (or to anyone else). On the basis of this material, he wrote a series of articles published in the Revue des deux mondes in late 1880 and early 1881. But, more important for the development of his thought on Russia, the correspondence showed Leroy-Beaulieu "les recoins les plus obscure de l'administration impériale et, pour ainsi dire, le fond même du gouvernement autocratique. Ces lettres . . . m'apportaient le plus sûr contrôle des mes patientes études sur le gouvernement et sur la société russes."³

Russia, seen through the eyes of the neophyte Leroy-Beaulieu between the years 1872 and 1878, had offered a picture of a still

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, "Les origines et les caractères du nihilisme russe," p. 316.

²A. Leroy-Beaulieu, Un Homme d'Etat Russe: Nicolas Milutine, p. i.

³Ibid., p. ii.

concentrated, yet evolving autocratic power. But, as he came to understand more fully the administrative operation of the country by reading the correspondence of Miliutin, it became more and more evident to him that what was lacking in Russia was well-defined goals, well executed by the proper use of that autocratic power. The acquisition of the Miliutin papers gave Leroy-Beaulieu the opportunity to discover for himself the "nit-picking," the abundance of hindsight, the inefficiencies and the contradictions in the Russian government and its legislation. It was these very things, together with abuses of administration, Leroy-Beaulieu concluded, which had undermined the effects of the best intentioned social reforms of the past and which had led to the upheavals following the end of the Russo-Turkish War.

Leroy-Beaulieu was singularly fortunate to have acquired the correspondence of a man whose career encompassed the period 1856-1864, one of the most curious and revolutionary epochs in Russian history, with all the illusions and contradictions of thought that went with it. Possession of this correspondence permitted him to present to his readers not just the rise of Miliutin through the Table of Ranks as a civil servant, but also, and more particularly, a segment of Russian political life.

In the first of the series of six articles for the Revue des deux mondes which he entitled "Un Homme d'Etat Russe: Nicolas Milutine," Leroy-Beaulieu stated that it was because of the interaction of the correspondence with his already long study of Russia that his opinions

of Russia had begun to change. His retrospective study of the actions of the Imperial government at the time of emancipation, in the light of the newly acquired correspondence, had brought him closer to what he thought was the true situation in Russia, and had forced him to admit that "c'est là une découverte, nous l'avouons humblement, qui, pour notre part, n'a pas laissé que de nous surprendre; car, en abordant la terre de l'autocratie, nous nous attendions à tout autre chose."¹

Leroy-Beaulieu characterized the régime of Tsar Nicholas I as immobilized by bureaucratic corruption and by a military system of administration which had ended only with the defeat of Russia in the Crimea. But there had been a general reaction in Russia to these thirty years of despotism. Although Leroy-Beaulieu may not have entirely agreed with the statement of an understandably anonymous Russian about the bureaucracy of his homeland, he nonetheless found it appropriate to quote: "qu'en Russie le gouvernement devait fatalement tomber un jour des mains des incapables aux mains des idiots."²

While the need for reform within Russia was being everywhere proclaimed during these years, Leroy-Beaulieu saw from Miliutin's correspondence that what was lacking was men capable of directing and executing a firm policy.³

Ce défaut d'hommes capables et d'agens [sic] intègres
était et reste encore une des constantes difficultés de

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Un Homme d'Etat Russe: Nicolas Milutine," R.D.M., 1 October, 1880, p. 555.

²Ibid., p. 564.

³Ibid., pp. 563, 564.

la Russie. En réalité cependant, alors comme aujourd'hui, cette disette d'hommes était peut-être plus sensible aux rangs inférieurs ou secondaires de la hiérarchie bureaucratique qu'au sommet, plus sensible surtout à la cour que dans la société. Le vaste empire, les événements mêmes allaient bientôt le montrer, possédait les éléments d'un haut personnel administratif; le malheur devait être que, parmi les ouvriers des grandes réformes, beaucoup, et non les moindres pour le talent et le caractère, allaient, comme Milutine lui-même, être congédiés avant d'avoir terminé leur œuvre ou, comme Milutine encore, être usés prématurément en d'ingrates besognes.

From the correspondence of Miliutin (who, as representative of the Minister of the Interior, had been in the forefront of the movement for the emancipation of the serfs), Leroy-Beaulieu was able to learn the background to the formation of the Emancipation Commission in 1859¹ and to understand more clearly that many of the members of the Commission were prejudicially influenced by their own positions within various ministries. These political as well as personal letters also permitted Leroy-Beaulieu to sense the indecisiveness of the Russian government in the 1860's, and the nature of the arguments which had been freely and openly carried on between those advocating the emancipation and those against it. Although, in the mind of Leroy-Beaulieu, the work of the Commission followed the western parliamentary system as closely as possible, he felt that it was unfortunate for the progress of the emancipation legislation that the Commission,

¹The actual drafting of the emancipation statutes was done by two editorial commissions collectively known as the Commission de rédaction. As the commissions sat as one body, I have chosen to use the singular word "commission," following the lead of Leroy-Beaulieu.

which sat for almost two years, was itself wracked by such internal struggle:¹

Le personnel en reflétait toutes les incertitudes et les anxiétés du pouvoir suprême. Aux représentants des intérêts aristocratiques ou des traditions autoritaires . . . on avait accolé des hommes suspects de radicalisme tels que Milutine, et, pour couronner le tout, à la tête d'une assemblée divisée était un président [Rostovtsev] indécis et flottant, inutilement conciliant, ballotté entre les opinions contraires et, par ses propres hésitations, peu capable d'imprimer aux travaux une ferme direction.

But what was eventually to prove the greatest piece of legislation promulgated during the reign of Alexander II was not only beset by internal problems. Whereas self-seeking bureaucratic jockeying for predominance occurred within the commission, outside it was felt that any attack on the right of property would create a dangerous precedent, and many fought the accompanying agrarian reforms. Between the adversaries of emancipation and agrarian reform, and those who believed in the rights of the peasants, was the Tsar, who was understandably incapable of satisfying the desires of both groups. "Le grand mérite d'Alexandre II," wrote Leroy-Beaulieu, "c'est, en présence de telles difficultés et de pareilles divergences, de n'avoir pas reculé devant une tâche aussi âpre. . . ." ² As an example, Leroy-Beaulieu cited the Tsar's appointment, following the death in 1860 of the president of the Commission, General J. K. Rostovtsev, of Count V. N. Panin, Minister of Justice and a well known opponent

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R. D. M., 1 October, 1880, p. 581.

²Ibid., p. 582.

of the reform, to head the Commission as a conciliatory gesture to the landed nobility: "Soit calcul, soit indécision, cette manière de compensation et de balance allait devenir presque un système."¹

What a contrast to his earlier enthusiasm! In 1876, Leroy-Beaulieu had written that "il n'y avait qu'un juge naturel, un arbitre désintéressé, la couronne"; that the Tsar's impartiality allowed him to reach equitable solutions; that the project had been assigned to a committee made up of "les plus distingués, des esprits les plus actifs" whose decisions were made in a most democratic manner. In his earlier reports, Leroy-Beaulieu had shown that the conditions of emancipation had been most favourable to the serfs, who had received not only their personal liberty but land as well.² The situation (as revealed in the Miliutin papers) made it obvious that his original interpretation had probably been too idealistic.

From the series of articles written in 1880-1881, it is obvious that Leroy-Beaulieu had begun to understand that autocratic power in Russia in the person of Alexander II was limited by the Tsar's own lack of determination, as well as by his inability to delegate necessary authority for the completion of programmes which were themselves inadequate to the needs of the Empire. Anxious to fulfil his promise and to have this legislation completed for the anniversary of his ascension to the throne, Alexander II, rather than follow the reforms

¹Ibid., p. 584.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 1 August, 1876, pp. 658-659.

to their ultimate conclusion, had, in Leroy-Beaulieu's view, proclaimed a less than total policy. Furthermore, Leroy-Beaulieu showed his readers that, as soon as the programme for the emancipation had been proclaimed, Alexander had dissolved the Commission which had prepared it and had dismissed Miliutin from his post as deputy minister of the Interior, thus preventing him from following through with the implementation of the programme which he had helped to prepare. Alexander II saw to it that both Miliutin and his supporters:¹

... devaient payer de leur crédit le triomphe de leurs idées. L'achèvement de la réforme ... allait être, pour ceux qui y avaient pris la principale part, le signal de la disgrâce. Quelques semaines à peine après la proclamation des lois qui leur avaient coûté tant de soucis, Lanskoï [Ministre de l'Intérieur] et Milutine devaient être congédiés, comme si, en acceptant leur œuvre, on eût voulu en rejeter la responsabilité et infliger une sorte de désaveu aux hommes qui en avaient pris l'initiative.

The emancipation of the serfs, followed two years later by the Polish insurrection, had exerted considerable influence upon Russia's internal situation, as had western European diplomacy which, by condemning Russia's acts in Poland, had caused unease in St. Petersburg. Travelling abroad for two years after his dismissal from the ministry, Miliutin could rationalize the Polish situation from France. He advised his brother, General Dmitri Miliutin, the Russian Minister of War, that a quick and total military victory was necessary if Russia

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 1 October, 1880, p. 588. He also discusses this matter at length in his article of 15 October, 1880, pp. 830-833.

was to maintain any vestige of its international reputation.¹

The sense of national mission felt by Miliutin, as well as a surge of national patriotism in Russia fostered by the Gazette de Moscou (and, especially by its redoubtable publisher Katkoff), temporarily displaced such national problems as the developing revolutionary movement. In 1863, Leroy-Beaulieu had felt none of this resurgent Russian nationalism. As a young man of twenty-one, Leroy-Beaulieu had been greatly affected, like many other Frenchmen, by the Polish uprising and was writing poetry not only to express his sympathies toward Poland, but toward all oppressed peoples.² Twenty-one years later, he was to write, "En 1863 et 1864 je faisais de la poésie et du sentiment; aujourd'hui . . . je fais de l'histoire et de la politique. C'est là toute la différence, et alors même que je pleurais les infortunes de la Pologne, je ne gardais guère d'illusion sur ses chances de resurrection politique."³ A review of Miliutin's correspondence from 1863 could indeed tell him why, as it afforded Leroy-Beaulieu a rare insight into the Russian attitudes toward Poland during that critical period.

¹Nicholas Miliutin to General D. Miliutin, 23 April, 1863, quoted in A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Un Homme d'Etat Russe: Nicolas Milutine," R.D.M., 1 November, 1880, p. 176.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, Un Homme d'Etat Russe: Nicolas Milutine, p. iv.

³Ibid., p. v.

The viewpoint of the Poles regarding the 1863 insurrection had been much more widely circulated in France and the West than had the Russian position vis-à-vis Poland. But, as Leroy-Beaulieu found, whatever may have been the resultant attitude towards Poland in Western Europe, the insurrection of 1863 killed any sympathies that may have existed for Poland in Russia. The Poles took on, once again, the appearance of the hereditary enemy: ". . . la Russie oubliait les difficultés, les illusions, les préoccupations et les déceptions de la veille. Toute l'attention, à Moscou et en province surtout, s'était reportée vers la Pologne. . . ." ¹ Only the revolutionaries, the Nihilists about whom Leroy-Beaulieu was to modify his opinion, dared to support the Polish cause, thereby turning national sentiment against themselves. Leroy-Beaulieu felt that, by taking this position, the revolutionary movement in Russia had been delayed by ten or fifteen years. ²

Although it is doubtful that Leroy-Beaulieu's sympathy for Poland was forgotten or that it even diminished, he continued to present the cause of Russia's antagonism toward Poland with impartiality. He explained that many Russians (and particularly the Tsar) felt that

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Un Homme d'Etat Russe: Nicolas Milutine," R.D.M., 15 November, 1880, p. 439.

²Ibid., p. 414. The reaction against Russian revolutionaries was a blow not only to their own movement, but also to that of emigrés such as Herzen and Bakounin. See letter of General Miliutin to Nicholas Miliutin, 8 May, 1863, quoted by Leroy-Beaulieu in his article, R.D.M., 15 November, 1880, p. 414.

Poland was a source of embarrassment to the Empire rather than a source of strength. To rid themselves of this embarrassment, there were those who would not only allow Poland great autonomy but even complete independence, if they could be sure that Poland would be self-sufficient and wise enough to refrain from demanding territory that was clearly in the Russian sphere of interest. But, in the eyes of all Russians, "comme aux yeux du souverain, les polonais, en réclamant la Lithuanie, en insurgant les provinces occidentales . . . exigeaient le démembrement de la Russie et appelaient l'étranger à les aider à l'effectuer. C'est ce qui explique le rapide soulèvement de l'opinion contre la Pologne en 1863. . . ." ¹

Until such time as the Russians, and the Tsar, could be convinced that Poland would be content within its borders, they were unable to conceive a solution for Poland other than total assimilation.

The meeting between Miliutin and the Tsar found them in accord on the subject of Poland: "Le Maître et le sujet ne trouvaient aucun moyen de conciliation avec l'infortunée Pologne." ² Leroy-Beaulieu shows that Miliutin was chosen for the position of administrator in Poland for precisely those reasons which had caused his dismissal from the Ministry of the Interior: his anti-aristocratic attitude and his support of the rights of the peasants; for, in order to split Poland,

¹Ibid., p. 419.

²Ibid., p. 421. The meeting was in early September, 1863.

the Tsar had decided to turn toward the peasants for support, wishing to rid himself of a Polish aristocracy which offered him only the likelihood of continued opposition.¹ With admirable restraint, Leroy-Beaulieu refrained from personal comment on the important question of the agricultural reforms in Poland promulgated after 1863. Nonetheless, he leaves no doubt that, from the Russian viewpoint, the reforms were, for Russia, not merely a measure in favour of the Polish peasants, but also a political expedient, "un instrument de répression en même temps que de pacification . . ." (and he added, choosing to quote Moravief, "un instrument de domination").²

The keystone of Leroy-Beaulieu's explanation of Russian action in Poland in 1863 was Russia's defence of Slavism against Germanic encroachments in its Western provinces:³

Aux yeux des patriotes de Moscou, c'est au fond la même cause que soutenait la Russie dans les provinces insurgées de la Vistule et dans les contrées du Danube, révoltées contre le joug ottoman. A leurs yeux, en 1863 et 1864 comme en 1877 et 1878, chez les Polonais comme chez les Bulgares et les Serbes, ce qui était en jeu, c'était toujours, sous des aspects différents [sic] la cause slave, non moins menacée aux bords de la Vistule par les traditions latines et occidentales de la Pologne que, sur les versans des Balkans, par l'inepte et stérile domination ottomane. Aussi ne saurait-on s'étonner de rencontrer les mêmes sentiments et les mêmes dévouemens, les mêmes inspirations. . . .

¹Ibid., p. 422.

²A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Un Homme d'Etat Russe: Nicolas Milutine," R.D.M., 15 February, 1881, p. 900.

³Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 15 November, 1880, p. 439.

Such an explanation of Russia's self-appointed mission to protect Slavism against Germanism should make it clear to Frenchmen that they must consider the significance of Russia's policy in Poland politically rather than allow their understanding to be overly influenced by sentiment: they must accept the fact that Russian domination in Poland in 1863 and afterwards was an attempt to solidify Slavism on its Western frontier and to prevent the encroachment of Prussia. A French reader in 1880 would have had to be totally insensitive if he could not draw the conclusion that an increased German influence was ultimately a threat to France.

However, Leroy-Beaulieu feared that too repressive a Russian policy in Poland would "backfire" and eventually reinforce Prussian influence in Poland, the consequences of which would threaten Russia. For reasons of French national interest, this could not be allowed to happen; and, in a complete reversal of his previous policy of objectivity and painstaking explicative reporting of Russia, Leroy-Beaulieu suggested his own solution not only to the Polish, but also to the Russian problem. Stressing that the ultimate choice lay with St. Petersburg, he advocated that Russia must grant either local autonomy or institute a programme of decentralization. The Russian people themselves could not have pretensions to freedom when their government preserved on its own frontier such a dictatorial régime as ruled Poland. As far as Leroy-Beaulieu was concerned, Russia could afford to make a magnanimous gesture by restoring the autonomy of Poland

and by granting the Poles their own national constitution. When he intimated that the Poles should accommodate themselves to Russia, it was not because he was indifferent to Poland or its problems. Quite the contrary—he believed that, while Poland might be eliminated from the map of Europe by conquest, such conquest would not eliminate the Polish people:¹

La nation survit à l'Etat, l'âme au corps. Les peuples européens qui ont une histoire, une langue, une littérature, ne sauraient entièrement périr. Les cent dernières années ont . . . montré quelle force vivace et persistante est la nationalité. Il s'est révélé là, au dix-neuvième siècle, une sorte de loi de l'histoire que l'évolution démocratique des sociétés modernes ne fera que confirmer, car la nationalité a ses racines au fond de la conscience populaire.

The remedy which Leroy-Beaulieu saw as necessary for both Poland and Russia was thus the adoption of a constitution and a system of representative government. It was only through liberalized institu-

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, Un Homme d'Etat Russe: Nicolas Milutine, p. x.

There is an amazing similarity of views between Leroy-Beaulieu and O. Halecki on this subject. See O. Halecki, A History of Poland, Chicago, 1966, p. 251: "[Poland] represented all the great ideas which were then [1863] revolting in vain against an order based exclusively on force. She was admirably qualified to represent that idea of liberty which had been the leading idea of the whole of her history, and the apparent failure of which, even temporarily, was more painful for her than for any other nation. She was no less qualified to represent the idea of nationality: because by the very fact of her existence she bore witness how false and artificial a thing it is to identify the nation with the all-powerful state, since a nation could survive, the destruction of her state and utterly refuse to be amalgamated with the victorious nations who dominated her politically."

tions that Poland would gain freedom and that Russia would achieve the respect which she so ardently desired from western European countries (as well as relief from internal pressures). The Russian empire was vast and comprised many different peoples: the road to liberty was thus open to Russia herself, if only she consented freely to the national self-realization of the various peoples under her domination. As for the Poles, in spite of their sufferings at the hands of the Russians, they had prospered; Leroy-Beaulieu was sanguine enough to hope that in time Russia would grant Poland "les droits et libertés dont aucun peuple européen ne saurait indéfiniment se passer."¹

Apart from patriotic reasons, Leroy-Beaulieu's original motive for the study of Russia, it must be concluded, was based upon the idea that she was about to make the transition from that of a feudal to that of a modern nation. Once Russia was understood, Leroy-Beaulieu would be able to observe and report upon the birth and development of a modern state equipped with all the necessities for nineteenth-century bourgeois living. But what he found instead was neither a new country nor new ideas.

As the acquisition of the Miliutin correspondence was the turning point in Leroy-Beaulieu's view of Russia, so the suggestions which he made for reform both in Poland and Russia mark the beginning of a

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Vol. 2, pp. 572, 576, 610.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 15 February, 1881, p. 920.

more critical analysis of that country. No longer would Leroy-Beaulieu write about Russia to satisfy an intellectual curiosity. From 1880 onward, Leroy-Beaulieu was to write and lecture about Russia believing that, should France and Russia join together to oppose Germany (a situation in 1880 which, despite the Hartmann Affair, was thought not altogether impossible), then France must understand with what kind of a partner she was becoming involved. Any combined Franco-Russian opposition to Germany would be truly effective only if France were able to gauge accurately the advantages and disadvantages of her ally. Russia had to be viewed, not idealistically as had been the case between 1872 and 1878, but realistically.

CHAPTER FOUR

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu reconsiders
Russia, 1880-1890.

In the decade of the 1880's, Leroy-Beaulieu's critical analysis of Russia and, subsequently, of Franco-Russian relations, was to become a more critical part of his research. Although he had heretofore been anxious to point out the enlightened Europeanization and continuing social progress of Russia, he had conscientiously attempted to paint a picture of contemporary Russia which was both objective and independent (especially independent of political pressures). In an address to the Union de la Paix Sociale de Lille, he told his audience:¹

... à notre époque ... il y a quelques idées que l'on voit se répandre autour de nous, qui peu à peu s'infiltrant dans les esprits et pénètrent jusque dans les masses. Une de ces idées est celle de l'omnipotence de l'Etat; ... C'est là, Messieurs, en toutes choses, à mon sentiment, le suprême péril de la liberté.

It was Leroy-Beaulieu's belief that no institution or individual had a monopoly on truth. He found himself, therefore, in opposition not so much to men such as Leger and Rambaud as to those whose work, if not written from the official point of view, did not express opposition to it.² Leroy-Beaulieu cast himself in the role, not only of a defender,

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "La liberté d'Enseignement," La Réforme Sociale, Vol. 39 (1900), p. 585. Leroy-Beaulieu was at that time president of the Comité de Défense et de Progrès social.

²The work of Leroy-Beaulieu was not popular with the Ministry of Education. Although there is no record of earlier works written by Leroy-Beaulieu, both Doctrines de haines, l'antisémitisme, l'anti-protestantisme (Paris, 1902) and Les Juifs et antisémitisme (Paris, 1893) were poorly reviewed and not recommended for purchase by the Ministry. See A.N., F¹⁷ 13443.

but also of a propagator, of independent political thought. He epitomized Victor Brombert's characterization of the French intellectual who "considers himself a voice. And not merely a voice crying out in protest, . . . but a voice that proclaims itself a conscience. 'To think sincerely, even if it means to think against everybody, still means to think with and for everybody'" ¹

Leroy-Beaulieu never revealed his final thought on any of the subjects which he treated. Rather, he continuously modified his comments, knowing that some part of the scene was in all probability in the process of continuing change and would therefore need continued examination in the future. In fact, Leroy-Beaulieu warned that: ²

Le lecteur trouvera peut-être parfois dans ces tableaux une sorte d'hésitation de la main, un dessin trop peu arrêté, trop de dégradations d'ombre et de lumière; dans quelques pages, il croira même découvrir certaines incohérences et comme d'apparentes contradictions. Il m'eût été facile de ne donner prise à aucun reproche de ce genre. . . . Pour cela, je n'eusse eu qu'à mettre moins de scrupule à saisir les traits souvent encore indécis de ma modèle, à rendre la couleur changeante, l'expression mobile et fugitive de son visage.

The essays written by Leroy-Beaulieu on Russia between the years 1872 and 1881 all seemed to have as their theme the anticipation of a convoluted Russia in the 1880's. But Leroy-Beaulieu could not have known what was about to take place in that country; for,

¹V. Brombert, "Toward a portrait of the French Intellectual," Partisan Review, Vol. 27 (1960), p. 495.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Vol. 1, pp. xi-xii.

when he began his study in 1872, Russia seemed as calm as it had been when Custine or LeDuc wrote. In the years before 1872, an observer of the Russian scene could quite easily discern the essential characteristics of the country without troubling himself to think of Russia in transition. From 1873, however, when the Revue des deux mondes began the publication of Leroy-Beaulieu's first articles, to the year 1881, when Hachette published the first volume of L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, there had been a great transformation within the country both socially and politically, culminating in the public assassination of Alexander II. This transformation is reflected in the work of Leroy-Beaulieu.

In his desire to portray as many aspects of Russian life as possible, Leroy-Beaulieu sensed the impending chaotic internal events which succeeded the war of 1877-1878. What Alfred Rambaud called Leroy-Beaulieu's profound and independent judgment was undoubtedly the most important factor which allowed Leroy-Beaulieu to make such a thorough examination of the Russian scene and to arrive at so many conclusions which subsequent events would justify.

In the Preface to the first edition of L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Leroy-Beaulieu emphasized his own awareness of the fact that the period 1872 to 1881 was one of transition by stressing that his own thought concerning Russia had been considerably altered during these nine years: "Dans ces volumes, le lecteur ne retrouve pas toujours les mêmes points de vue que dans mes premiers articles

... souvent même j'ai modifié les idées et les conclusions. . . ." ¹

And, as if to emphasize the confusion attendant upon this period, he made use of the contradictions which he had observed in Russian institutions and judicial reforms to demonstrate how established practice had often neutralized the effects of liberation. ²

In his earlier studies of Russia, there had been ample evidence of Leroy-Beaulieu's enthusiasm for his subject. There had also been evidence of a willingness to see France and Russia joined diplomatically, however loosely, to offset the power of Germany. But, as his articles progressed, and as he became more familiar with the country and its problems, he also became more aware of the inherent difficulties in any future relationship between France and Russia. By April of 1881, when he was preparing the Preface to the first volume of L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, as well as an article about Alexander II for the Revue des deux mondes, he was certain that the irresolution and incoherence of the reforms of Alexander II, together with the consequent reaction on the part of the Russian population, were the factors which had precipitated events leading to the

¹Ibid., p. ix.

²An extract of a chapter from the first volume of L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes was published in 1881 in La Revue politique et littéraire, entitled "Les Résultats de l'émancipation des serfs." (See Vol. 1 (1881), pp. 439-442). Here again, Leroy-Beaulieu mentioned the difficulties encountered in the study of Russian affairs "... les Russes vous donnent de la meilleure foi du monde les renseignements les plus contradictoires, chacun suivant son expérience ou son humeur personnelle."

eventual assassination of the Tsar. "Alexandre II," Leroy-Beaulieu regretfully wrote, "a laissé presque partout dans les institutions et dans la pratique gouvernementale, la marque de ses propres incertitudes et des incohérences et ses conseillers."¹

Little more than two weeks after the event, Leroy-Beaulieu's article, "L'Empereur Alexandre II," containing undisguised criticism of a regime whose ineffectiveness had led to the death of the Tsar, was published in the Revue des deux mondes. In accounting for the assassination, Leroy-Beaulieu wished to show that the greatest of all of Russia's autocrats had been responsible for creating the discontent which had led to regicide.

Leroy-Beaulieu felt that what the "Tsar Liberator" had changed of Russia's old institutions had created a shocking contrast with what he had not changed, and attributed this fissure in the social structure of Russia to the age and fatigue of the Emperor: "Les hommes vieillissent et inclinent au repos, les hommes se fatiguent, alors que les peuples, incessamment renouvelés par les générations, restent jeunes, entreprenants et avides de mouvement."² Leroy-Beaulieu stressed for his readers that, although many necessary reforms had been accomplished by Alexander II, the Tsar had eventually realized that the real problem was autocratic power itself. But Alexander II

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Vol. 1, p. xiii.

²A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Empereur Alexandre II et la mission du nouveau tsar," R.D.M., 1 April, 1881, p. 649.

could not bring himself to change this fundamental of Russian society; nor, unfortunately, could he delegate the necessary authority to those people best suited to carry out his programmes.¹ It was Leroy-Beaulieu's belief that, as a consequence of this inaction, Alexander II had isolated himself more and more from his task of reform, causing the belief to spread that no further change could be expected during his lifetime. "Cette croyance, presque universelle, a été, pour beaucoup, dans l'acharnement avec lequel de jeunes exaltés se sont attaqués à la vie du vieil empereur."²

The resultant lack of desire or spirit to follow his reforms to their ultimate conclusion, together with court squabbles which Alexander II did little to alleviate, left their imprint on his work. Leroy-Beaulieu again expressed the view that, in everything which Tsar Alexander did, one found "la marque des hésitations et des inconséquences du pouvoir",³ that, following the emancipation of the serfs, all the reforms which had been undertaken remained isolated and fragmentary. Trying to create a new Russia, Alexander II had taken as a base "les fondations du vieil édifice." All of this had been done without an architect capable of presiding over the work.⁴

¹For a lengthy discussion of the autocratic power of the Tsar, see Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Vol. 2, pp. 392 ff.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 1 April, 1881, p. 650.

³Ibid., p. 653.

⁴Ibid., p. 654.

De cette façon, en faisant çà et là des innovations coûteuses et en négligeant dans le voisinage des réparations indispensables, en accolant partout les constructions neuves aux vieux murs, l'empereur Alexandre II n'avait abouti, après beaucoup de travaux, qu'à faire, de la Russie des réformes, une demeure inachevée et incommode, où amis et ennemis des nouveautés se trouvaient, presque également, mal à l'aise.

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 further weakened the authority of the Tsar and his government, because it inflicted upon the country a considerable amount of suffering, which in turn fostered revolutionary tendencies already evident among the young. Early defeats of the Russian army, as well as suspected censorship on the home front, gave rise to feelings of hostility toward the civil and military administration. In fact, Alexander II, "premier volontaire de la Croix rouge," had done what he could as an individual; but "de toutes parts, on se mit à examiner le système qui, après vingt ans de réformes, valait à la Russie de telles humiliations. . . . Les Russes eurent la douloureuse surprise de voir que, malgré l'émancipation des serfs, la Russie d'Alexandre II différait moins de celle de Nicolas que ne l'eussent espéré les patriotes."¹ It was not difficult to see in the acts of Tsar Alexander the virtue of an individual, but not that of a tsar, Leroy-Beaulieu stated; and when, as the war drew to a close, Russia did not occupy Constantinople, but acceded a short while afterwards to the terms which the European powers pressed upon her, the personal popularity of Alexander II was compromised, and

¹Ibid., p. 656.

this further diminished the authority of his government. Leroy-Beaulieu added that financial problems—new taxes and devaluation—together with bad harvests during the last years of Tsar Alexander's reign, had led to a total disenchantment at the lack of implementation of the great reforms which had been carried out during the first part of his reign. These conditions were all the more understandable when one remembered that, while liberating the Bulgarians from Turkey, the Russians had themselves irresistibly reflected on their own emancipation:¹

On rêvait d'une autre émancipation, d'une constitution, d'assemblées représentatives. . . . La chancellerie impériale rédigeait un projet de constitution, mais ce fut pour les Bulgares, délivrés par les armes russes, et ainsi mis en possession de libertés refusées à leurs libérateurs.

Leroy-Beaulieu felt a note of frustrated promise at the death of Alexander II; for the Tsar had at last decided upon such political reforms as might have changed the headlong course of disenchantment into which Russia had been plunging. Leroy-Beaulieu had shown that this decision was too late in coming, however; events had overtaken the Tsar. Nowhere else in Europe, wrote Leroy-Beaulieu, could the revolutionary spirit have found a terrain better prepared. The current popular Russian literature devoted to the exaltation of the common soldier and the peasant reflected the general hostility toward authority and the system. Leroy-Beaulieu once again repeated his injunction

¹Ibid., p 661.

that: "Le 'nihilisme' a moissonné ce qui avait été semé par la désillusion et la désaffection."¹

Leroy-Beaulieu's evaluation of contemporary Russia as a country in which everything was in a state of change (without the change having yet been achieved in any one area) caused him to conclude that such reforms as had been made had been made to a large extent to impress the European powers ("beaucoup pour la montre"); and, that the laws, proclaimed in the capital, were not always respected in the interior of the Empire ("les volontés ou les intentions du souverain loin d'être partout obéies"). The result was that "entre la théorie et la réalité, il y a toujours eu un grand intervalle."² In this troubled situation, when Russia was suspended between what needed to be accomplished and what was indeed being done, the revolutionary spirit found the most favourable elements for its development.

Leroy-Beaulieu felt that this lack of genuine development in social reforms was not only causing an increase in revolutionary spirit: it was preventing the formation of a strong middle class, the development of which was so necessary to close the gap between the tsar and the people. In 1878, he had thought, in the light of such reforms as had already been made by Alexander II, that the reactionary measures taken at the close of the Russo-Turkish War were

¹Ibid., p. 662.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Vol. 1, p. xiii.

temporary; but he had warned that, if the Tsar and the government returned firmly to the pre-reform era, revolution would surely result.¹

The revolutionary spirit current in Russia had been imported from the West by Russian intellectuals, who had given it a special character and originality of its own.² In L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Leroy-Beaulieu described this spirit as being equal to the fervour of the first Christian missionaries.³

Les missionnaires du nihilisme semblent avoir voulu imiter les premiers apôtres du Christianisme. . . .
En quel pays voit-on . . . des jeunes filles bien élevées et instruites se féliciter de trouver une place de cuisinière chez un chef d'atelier. . . ?

Leroy-Beaulieu's own opinion of the philosophy of revolutionary organizations was, however, changing. In February 1880, he had sharply castigated Nihilist philosophy in the Revue des deux mondes.⁴

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes: Les états provinciaux et le régime représentatif dans l'administration locale," R.D.M., 15 July, 1878, pp. 387-388.

²A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes: Le parti révolutionnaire et le nihilisme." R.D.M., 15 February, 1880, p. 774.

³Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Vol. 1, p. 198; Vol. 3, pp. 3-8. By 1889, however, Leroy-Beaulieu remarked that it had become banal to say the revolutionary movement was like a religion. In Russia, the transference of faith from Christianity to revolution had been more rapid than elsewhere because "l'âme russe . . . a gardé, à son insu, les habitudes, les émotions, les générosités de la foi de façon qu'en devenant révolutionnaire elle n'a fait, pour ainsi dire, que changer de religion." (Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 5-6.) In 1907 Joseph Conrad nevertheless made exactly the same comparison in The Secret Agent. See the Penguin Books edition, London, 1972, pp. 93, 95.

⁴Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 15 February, 1880, p. 774. Louis Leger also examined the question of Nihilism in Russia, its history and its origins, and its development in Russian literature. His view of the situation paralleled that of Leroy-Beaulieu. See Leger, Nouvelles études Slaves, Vol. 2, pp. 57-63, p. vii.

... ce n'est guère qu'un matérialisme grossier et tapageur, presque dénué de tout appareil scientifique. En politique, c'est un radicalisme socialiste, moins soucieux des moyens d'améliorer la situation des masses que pressé d'anéantir tout l'ordre social et politique actuel. Ce n'est pas un parti, car il n'a d'autre programme que la destruction; sous ses étendards se rangent des révolutionnaires de toute sorte. . . .

Fourteen months later, in L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, his view of the Nihilist movement in Russia had become more understanding:¹

En philosophie, ce n'est guère qu'un matérialisme grossier et tapageur, presque dénué de tout appareil scientifique. En politique, c'est un radicalisme socialiste, fomenté par le despotisme bureaucratique et exaspéré par les rigueurs capricieuses d'un pouvoir sans responsabilité. Ce n'est pas un parti; car sous ses étendards se rangent des révolutionnaires de toute sorte. . . .

Although Leroy-Beaulieu was incapable of ignoring the repugnant aspects of Nihilism, the movement, he felt, revealed some of the qualities of the Russian character "et précisément . . . celles qu'on est souvent tenté de lui refuser." Having put themselves in direct contact with the people, having shared their work and hardships, the Nihilists revealed that there was a practical and generous spirit in their movement which was blended, in a bizarre way, with violence and destruction:²

Ce peuple, si souvent accusé de passivité et de torpeur intellectuelle, il nous le montre capable d'énergie et d'initiative, capable d'enthousiasme sincère et agissant, capable enfin de dévouement aux idées . . . j'oserai dire que ce triste phénomène fait honneur à la nation qui en souffre.

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Vol. 1, p. 184.

²Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 199-200.

Leroy-Beaulieu continued to discuss the early phase of Nihilism in the second volume of L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes. In his view, this period had been characterized by a spirit of revolt among the young against established ideas; it came to a conclusion toward the end of 1878 with the arrest, trial and subsequent imprisonment or exile of the élite of the young "utopistes." The trial of the '193' in Moscow in 1878 shook the "socialistes" from the dream of quiet reform: "Ces hommes, qui semblaient d'abord prendre modèle sur l'apostolat d'une religion de paix, s'inspirèrent tout à coup des exemples . . . des traditions révolutionnaires,"¹ and transformed themselves into militant socialists.²

Leroy-Beaulieu was of the opinion that the Russian government was trying, mistakenly, to throw the weight of blame for the activities of the Nihilists upon western European governments. Although Russia could legitimately protest the protection given by western European countries to revolutionaries, the tsarist government could hardly "rendre l'Europe responsable de ce que se passe chez lui."³

¹Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 548.

²Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 183. When Leroy-Beaulieu asked a Nihilist to explain his revolutionary doctrines, the following reply was received: "Prenez la terre et le ciel, . . . l'Etat et l'Eglise, les rois et Dieu, et crachez dessus, voilà notre symbole." Leroy-Beaulieu felt obliged to explain to his readers that "Le mot est, du reste, moins choquant pour une oreille russe que pour nos oreilles françaises; cracher joue un grand rôle dans la vie et les superstitions moscovites." (Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 189.)

³Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 559.

Before Plevna and the Congress of Berlin, the prestige of the Imperial power had been unquestioned. The disillusionment over the war against Turkey, the unrelenting campaign of the Nihilists, and the confusion within the government, had placed in doubt the strength of the nation.¹ The government of the tsar had the opportunity of choosing between liberty and glory. It chose to avoid the demands for reform and liberty by throwing itself into a war for which Russia was neither diplomatically, financially nor militarily prepared. This undertaking revealed "les vices d'un gouvernement et la nécessité d'un contrôle."² Although the termination of the Crimean War had been the beginning of the great reforms of Alexander II, the Russo-Turkish War was the signal for revolutionary terrorism. "C'est l'âme de son peuple et de la jeunesse russe qu'il doit pacifier, et cela il ne peut le faire qu'en réconciliant son gouvernement avec l'esprit du siècle. . . ."³

In the Preface to the English translation of L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Leroy-Beaulieu noted that all three volumes had been banned in Russia;⁴ yet it is known that many Russian scholars read Leroy-Beaulieu's work. The Russian sociologist M. Kovalevsky felt that Leroy-Beaulieu was "l'interprète le plus autorisé en France et

¹Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 608.

²Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 609.

³Ibid.

⁴A. Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians (Trans. Z.A. Ragozin), 3 vols., New York, 1896.

dans le monde entier de nos institutions."¹ Kovalevsky saw Leroy-Beaulieu's work, particularly that part devoted to the events of the epoch of Alexander II, as being second to none for its "objectivité scientifique." Knowing that his books had met with little official favour in Russia, Leroy-Beaulieu nevertheless had the satisfaction of influencing not only French students at the Ecole libre des Sciences politiques, but Russians as well. The French savant's popularity was attested to by Kovalevsky, who compared the lectures of Leroy-Beaulieu to those of Taine, Boutmy and Paul Janet: the subject was always substantial and "traité dans une forme d'exposition élégante."²

In 1881, at the age of 39, with his reputation as an intellectual, scholar and independent political analyst established, Leroy-Beaulieu had joined the staff of the Ecole libre des Sciences politiques, a school whose philosophy coincided so well with his own.³ The subjects

¹M. Kovalevski, as quoted in F. Lannes, "A. Leroy-Beaulieu d'après Kowalewski," Revue Internationale de l'enseignement, Vol. 64 (1912), p. 85.

²Ibid., p. 86. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu's brother, Paul, was also lecturing at the Ecole libre des Sciences politiques and the two are often confused. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu was an extremely well known economist, editor of L'Economiste français and author of De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes, Paris, 1874, and numerous books concerned with economics and international commerce.

³The aim of redirecting education so that a concrete national end might be achieved had been set out by the founder of the Ecole libre des Sciences politiques, Emile Boutmy, in 1871. Boutmy had had multiple reasons for wishing "de diminuer l'immense écart qui sépare l'homme du monde du savant et du lettré, le citoyen de l'homme politique." In a letter to his friend Ernest Vinet, Boutmy had set out the reasons which impelled him to establish an independent school. On February 25, 1871, he had written: "Il peut paraître singulier que je choisisse le lendemain d'une si terrible épreuve pour parler d'instruc-

broached by Leroy-Beaulieu in his lectures there¹ found their echo in both La Revue politique et littéraire and the Revue des deux mondes.

In two articles published in 1882, Leroy-Beaulieu's concern regarding

tion supérieure. Je le fais à dessein, et je crois le faire à propos. C'est l'Université de Berlin qui a triomphé à Sadowa, on l'a dit avec une raison profonde; et il faut être aveugle pour ne pas voir l'ignorance française derrière la folle déclaration de guerre qui nous a conduits où nous sommes." (L'Ecole libre des Sciences politiques, 1871-1889, Paris, 1889, p. 7.)

The Ecole was to be a bridge between the informed and the uninformed population, in order not only to reestablish communications between them, but also to provide a broad form of higher learning for the needs of those who wished, themselves, to act as intermediaries. "Refaire une tête de peuple, tout nous ramène à cela. L'instruction supérieure touche donc de très près au premier, au plus urgent de nos problèmes politiques." (Ibid., p. 7.)

¹Firmly convinced that the state educational system had left the future intellectual élite of France "dans l'ignorance de presque tous les éléments de la vie contemporaine," Leroy-Beaulieu undertook to discuss the contemporary political history of the major states of Europe, particularly after 1870. His course at the Ecole libre des Sciences politiques was entitled "Tableau de l'Europe contemporaine" (which later became "Histoire politique des principaux états d'Europe pendant les douze dernières années"). Leroy-Beaulieu divided his courses into three areas in order to offer an almost complete coverage of contemporary Europe and its political policies. Eastern Europe included Russia, Turkey and the Danubian states as well as the Egyptian question; Central and Southern Europe encompassed the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany, Italy, the Vatican, Spain and Belgium; the third area was devoted to an examination of the colonial policies of various powers, but particularly of England. (Ibid., pp. 9, 10, 133.)

Leroy-Beaulieu also discussed the reforms of Alexander II and "les raisons de leur inefficacité"; he discussed Nihilism, the evolution and organization of revolutionary parties; the consulate of Alexander II; rural politics; Russia and Germany; panslavic and slavophile movements; antisemitism and the beginnings of the reign of Alexander III. (Organisation et Programme des cours à l'Ecole libre des Sciences politiques, 1883-1884, pp. 23-24.

the state of Russia's internal affairs was made clear:¹

L'état intérieur du grand empire slave est fait pour provoquer les inquiétudes de tous les hommes qui s'intéressent à la marche générale de notre civilisation et au développement régulier des peuples de notre continent.

He posed questions and exposed aspects of Russia which had not previously been so openly discussed. Leroy-Beaulieu undoubtedly thought that Russia, during the early reign of Alexander III, was continuing to drift toward a state of anarchy. Whereas the government of Alexander II had at least been able to guarantee both material and personal security to the multi-racial and multi-religious elements of its society,² during this more recent period, the pogroms against the Jews and the antisemitic troubles in south-western Russia, which the government did little to quell, signalled a more serious national disintegration.³ How long would it be, Leroy-Beaulieu asked, before the persecution being carried out against the Jews spread to other minorities?⁴ The dissension caused between the different peoples of Russia was not only harmful to those involved, but would assuredly lend itself to revolutionary propaganda, or even worse, to the intrigues of ambitious neighbours.⁵

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Les troubles antisémitiques; La persécution des juifs en Russie," La Revue politique et littéraire, Vol. 1 (1882), p. 609.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 613.

The Tsar could no longer delay overdue reforms; every action or lack of action was being questioned either by public opinion, by revolutionary activism or by general scepticism. To offset this unrest, there was no longer any reserve of patriotism or national sacrifice such as had existed during the reign of Alexander II in 1856, 1861 or 1877 to which the Tsar could appeal. Indeed, Alexander III did have a war to terminate; but, as Leroy-Beaulieu pointed out, it was a war against an invisible and constantly reviving enemy which could not be terminated with a treaty of peace.¹

Encouraging his readers to see Russia in the light of her immediate past history, Leroy-Beaulieu painted what he believed to be an accurate picture of the state of affairs in that country, in unusually strong, personal statements. He did his utmost to caution his readers against the dangers inherent in the Russia of Alexander III by demonstrating that the last years of Alexander II, far from having been a period of progress and reform, had been in all respects a period of confusion, reaction and backward movement. In his own estimation, never had a government shown itself so irresolute or so much divided and in disagreement with the programme of reform which it had begun.²

Leroy-Beaulieu traced the difficulties of government to the ineffectiveness of the Conseil de l'Empire and the Comité des Ministres

¹ A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "La Russie sous le Tsar Alexandre III," R.D.M., 15 May, 1882, p. 376.

² Ibid. ,

conceived under the reign of Alexander I.

The benefits which had accrued from the early reforms of Alexander II's autocratic rule had been lost completely during the last uncertain years of his reign. What was needed in the Russia of 1882, what was awaited from Alexander III, was administrative reform of a kind that would free the country of its bureaucratic strangulation. Leroy-Beaulieu showed, however, that with the continuing lack of unity between ministries, authoritarian ideas and attempts at reaction could be as successful under cover of the widespread confusion as could liberal ideas, with the result that Russian legislation had often been fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential.¹ The anarchistic atmosphere which existed within and between ministries also infiltrated other branches of administration; and this disorder, "recouvert d'un trompeur vernis d'uniformité," aided, as did the pogroms, those who wished to see Russia reformed.² The rectification of this situation could not be accomplished, Leroy-Beaulieu believed, without modifying "tout l'organisme politique et en touchant au principe même du pouvoir [parce que] aucun état moderne n'a une machine aussi imparfaite."³

In Leroy-Beaulieu's opinion, Alexander III seemed more capable than his predecessors of ridding the empire of administrative abuses.

¹Ibid., p. 379.

²Ibid., pp. 383, 384.

³Ibid., pp. 376-378.

But, if one remembered the problems of autocracy outlined by Leroy-Beaulieu in earlier articles, it was obvious that the difficulties to which the country had been subjected would continue; for no matter what his ability and energy, Alexander III was condemned to helplessness by virtue of the fact that he could administer only "par les mains et les yeux d'autrui, et l'administration centrale, la cour et le haut tchinovnisme sont précisément les plus intéressés au maintien des abus et des anciennes pratiques."¹ "Tripotages" had become evident within the central administration. Recalling the declaration of General Ignatief to root out dishonesty, Leroy-Beaulieu stated that this programme had not only not been fulfilled—it was questionable whether it could ever be as long as the existing administration prevailed.² In an unusual and uncharacteristic condemnation, he gave rein to his feelings of repugnance at:³

... les vices invétérés de la bureaucratie russe, l'ignorance, la paresse, la routine, l'arbitraire, la vénalité surtout. La vénalité a fait des meilleures lois une lettre morte ou une menteuse étiquette, elle a tari dans ses sources le développement naturel de la richesse publique, elle a préparé au gouvernement et à la nation d'humiliants mécomptes sur les champs de bataille et facilité aux conspirateurs l'exécution des plus invraisemblables attentats. Je ne veux pas refaire ici la triste peinture des vices secrets du tchinovnisme et des honteux ulcères de l'administration impériale. C'est là un sujet trop

¹Ibid., p. 395.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 390, 395, 392.

répugnant pour s'y appesantir volontiers. . . . Une des choses qui m'ont toujours le plus frappé en Russie, c'est le peu d'ascendant moral de l'administration et des fonctionnaires. . . . De tous les états contemporains, la Russie est peut-être le seul où la chronique scandaleuse conserve encore un véritable intérêt pour l'historien.

In a country where the administration had become so corrupt, burdensome and complex, it was not surprising to Leroy-Beaulieu that a people who were generally so respectful of authority showed little respect for either the agents of the law or for the laws themselves. In another of those seeming contradictions which he had come to appreciate as part of Russian life, Leroy-Beaulieu found it ironical that a people who claimed to be so devoted to their sovereign, but who had so little confidence in the government that they were capable of rebellion, were thus capable of making themselves the instruments of their sovereign's enemies.¹

The contradiction existed only if one did not understand that the state religion was so much a part of the life of the diverse peoples of Russia, that it formed an integral link between the people and the tsar. "Tout le lourd édifice de la puissance russe repose," Leroy-Beaulieu wrote, "sur un sentiment, sur l'affection du peuple pour le tsar."² The Russian empire had, in the past, successfully sought the unity of the state in the unity of religion: the state religion, over the centuries, had become the only focus through which the people were permitted to give free rein

¹Ibid., pp. 396-397.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Vol. 3, p. 4.

to their religious as well as to their national feelings. The nation's character, Leroy-Beaulieu implied, had come to be reflected in the state religion; conversely, the tenets of the state religion had come to reflect the national character.

In the third volume of L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes (which was devoted to the subject of religion in Russia), Leroy-Beaulieu demonstrated the wholly religious basis upon which the power of the Russian state rested. Whereas the West had been able to substitute the ideal of progress through science and material well-being for state religion (or at least an official religious basis for the state), Russia, a relatively poor state, could not be expected to increase the material resources of its population for a considerable period of time; therefore, the structure of society in Russia could not survive "sans culte ni sentiment religieux."¹

But, if, as Leroy-Beaulieu stated, communism or socialism was the eldest son of disbelief, and the Russian "porte en lui . . . la révolution à l'état latent," then the implication was clear: in challenging his faith, the Russian challenged the only pillar of his relationship with the state. In 1883, Leroy-Beaulieu had cited the traditions of the Russian commune as having been responsible for the insinuation of communism or agrarian socialism into Russia:²

Grâce au mir, il [le communisme] circule inconsciemment dans ses veines et dans son sang. Le virus, à

¹Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 3.

²Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 603.

cette dose, restera-t-il toujours inoffensif? Sera-ce un préservatif contre la contagion du dehors, ou au contraire, déterminera-t-il un jour, dans l'organisme social, des désordres inattendus et des troubles graves? L'avenir nous l'apprendra.

It had been Leroy-Beaulieu's opinion that the obstacle to revolution in Russia had been the popular or national conscience.¹ He believed that the religious influences of the past were akin to moulds by which successive generations were shaped, and, that "l'empreinte persiste après que la moule est brisée."² But, by 1889, he had to report that only a remnant of their once strong religious faith, "un frein invisible mais plus puissant que toute l'autorité de la police," prevented Russians from becoming revolutionaries. Without this, he feared, Russia would already have become "plus révolutionnaire et . . . plus bouleversé."³

Leroy-Beaulieu was certain that "depuis sa grande expansion territoriale et depuis le déchirement intérieur de son Eglise, l'unité religieuse [de la Russie] ne saurait plus être . . . qu'une fiction légale."⁴ He suggested, for a continuation of order within the country, that a change (or, at the very least, a basic modification) of the principle of Orthodoxy as the sole basis upon which the relationship between the state and the people was established, had become necessary.

¹Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 516 ff.

²Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 2.

³Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 5.

⁴Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 655.

Popular cynicism in Russia was obvious; and, Leroy-Beaulieu concluded, "la place laissée vide par la foi chrétienne a été occupée par l'esprit d'utopie et les rêveries socialistes." Revolution in its most radical form, revolution which "agit à la manière d'une religion," had taken the place of Orthodoxy and thoroughly penetrated Russian thought.¹ But between the religious and the social question there was:²

. . . une corrélation qui éclate aux yeux les moins ouverts; et cette connexité deviendra plus manifeste à chaque génération . . . frustrées du paradis et des espérances supraterrrestres, les masses populaires poursuivent l'unique compensation qu'elles puissent découvrir. A défaut des félicités éternelles, elles réclament les jouissances de la terre. Le socialisme révolutionnaire prend chez elles la place de la religion. . . . Le sentiment religieux disparu, les luttes de classes deviennent fatales; l'ordre social n'a vis-à-vis des appétits déchaînés d'autre garantie que la force.

Leroy-Beaulieu's intensive yet reflective study of politics, the state and religion allowed him to make a unique, although futile, proposal that Alexander III take a leaf from the book of Frederic II and grant religious liberty, despite bureaucratic interests, public prejudice and official custom.³ In his view, it would cost the Tsar little in terms of his power; and, more important, it would lead toward the admission of political liberty. Once the Tsar had taken this step, the material interests of the country would improve; for Leroy-Beaulieu's

¹Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 5, 4.

²Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 4.

³Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 657.

historical perspective told him that Russia's confessional exclusivism had been one of the causes of her economic inferiority as well as of her political isolation.¹

In Les Catholiques libéraux, published in 1885, Leroy-Beaulieu had challenged the government of the Republic for being inflexibly anti-religious. At the same time, he had attacked Russia for having too closely tied her fundamental state institutions to Orthodoxy. Leroy-Beaulieu opposed the religious extremes of both the French and Russian governments. Offering a lesson to France through his analysis of the relationship of the state and religion in Russia, he tried to demonstrate to his countrymen the extent to which the inflexibility of state-legislated Orthodoxy had transformed the Russian people into unwitting instruments of opposition to the regime—an opposition which could only have the gravest consequences for the stability of the nation.

Those dedicated to defending and propagating the worth of Russia as a friend and ally of France paid little heed to the independent voice of Leroy-Beaulieu who warned that, without the immediate implementation of constitutional government in Russia (a step clearly impossible under the circumstances), there remained only two alternatives. The Tsar might maintain a strict adherence to the status quo, thus leading the state (perhaps more slowly but nevertheless inevitably) to revolution; or he might create a national diversion, a war, for which Leroy-Beaulieu

¹Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 660.

believed Russia totally unprepared, and which might end in the dismemberment of the empire without necessarily avoiding a period of confusion and anarchy, or even revolution.¹ Gloomy predictions for the future of the country which was viewed by many as the only potential ally of France.

Leroy-Beaulieu could not remain detached at a time when political understanding was tied so closely to his nation's foreign policy. In 1886, he set aside the series of articles on religion in Russia which he was writing for the Revue des deux mondes, to turn his attention to matters which were of direct political concern to France, and which inevitably would affect her position in Europe. Typifying those who, in the Third Republic, felt that colonial undertakings were justified, Leroy-Beaulieu nevertheless expressed alarm that both England and Russia, in the attempt to round off their positions, were finding themselves more and more in conflict by virtue of their close proximity in Afghanistan.² As European politics had come to cover the whole world, he feared that it would be a difficult task for the diplomats to extract themselves from matters which might well lead to a conflict between these two countries.³

The seeming ease with which the Anglo-Russian commission was formed to settle the dispute over the Afghanistan frontier, followed

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 15 May, 1882, p. 404.

²A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Les Rivalités Coloniales, l'Angleterre et la Russie," R.D.M., 15 January, 1886, p. 284.

³Ibid., p. 285.

closely by reports that Russia would not be a signatory to a renewed Dreikaiserbund, should have indicated to Leroy-Beaulieu that there might be talk in France of an alliance between England and Russia. By 1888, widespread rumour in France of an Anglo-French-Russian alliance impelled Leroy-Beaulieu to discourage the speculation which he had heard. In an article for the Revue bleue, of which Rambaud was then editor, he attacked the possibility of an alliance between Russia and England on the grounds of their conflicting interests.¹ He pointed out sarcastically that there was equally little immediate hope of any solid agreement between France and England: to understand this unequivocally, one had but to read English newspapers or attend the debates of Parliament. Between France and England, there had been only one effective alliance: that against Russia in 1855. Conversely, any alliance between England and Russia had always been directed against France!

Earlier in 1888, however, the question uppermost in Leroy-Beaulieu's mind was not Anglo-Russian or Anglo-French-Russian relations. Instead, he had become apprehensive about France's image abroad in view of what proved to be only the beginning of a series of spectacular alarms and demonstrations which were to disturb the country until the beginning of the Twentieth Century: the antics of General Boulanger, Déroulède and Rochefort; the Daniel Wilson scandal

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Angleterre, la Russie et la France," Revue bleue, Vol. 1 (1888), pp. 642-643.

and the subsequent presidential crisis in December 1887; and, finally, the attempted assassination of Ferry.

Possibly because he was newly elected to the Académie des sciences morales et politiques of the Institut de France in 1887,¹ Leroy-Beaulieu chose to write anonymously of his displeasure with the image which France was presenting to the rest of Europe. He castigated the government for allowing the current disintegration of French political life. Certain that the greater good of France was being sacrificed by the "caprices d'une chambre ignorante et . . . les considérations électorales,"² he saw no national institution possessing either the permanence or the necessary tradition to lend France the needed respectability to negotiate and work with other states.³ He told his reading public, moreover, that it took an awareness of well-defined interests and ends, as well as confidence and understanding between governments, to make alliances, and not just public enthusiasm for Russia, which was becoming more and more demonstrable.

In 1888, Leroy-Beaulieu attempted to account for the French passion for Russia and a Franco-Russian alliance by tracing the history of Franco-Russian relations. In France, Russia and Germany were being represented as natural enemies:⁴ the result was to encourage

¹Fagniez, op. cit., p. 13.

²A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "La France, la Russie et l'Europe," R.D.M., 15 February, 1888, p. 899.

³Ibid., p. 899.

⁴See Vicomte G. Combes de Lestrade, L'Empire russe en 1885, Paris, n.d.

Franco-Russian friendship. This, Leroy-Beaulieu claimed, was naive: for, although the old rivalries still existed between Germany and Russia, these had not prevented one of the longest and most solid alliances in European history. In fact, a stronger antagonism existed between Austria and Russia than between Germany and Russia. Pointing to the "pression des menaces d'outre-Rhin,"¹ he suggested that Russia could not have abandoned France to Germany after 1871, because to have done so would have further enlarged German hegemony. It was, then, neither Russia nor France which had precipitated the advances of one country toward the other. Rather it was Germany which caused her neighbours to the east and west to develop a deliberate (although non-political) solidarity:²

Ses plus ardents contempteurs, tels que Katkof, ceux qui avaient le plus raillé la légèreté français et maudit les idées françaises, oublièrent leurs longs dédains pour ne plus voir dans la France qu'une alliée éventuelle. . . . M. Floquet et M. Lockroy mêlaient leurs larmes aux pleurs du général Boulanger sur la tombe de Katkof, le grand pourfendeur des révolutionnaires. C'était, des deux côtés, une passion réciproque, où chacun, s'étonnant des froideurs anciennes, cherchait à les faire oublier. De ce rapprochement spontané des deux peuples peut-il sortir une alliance des deux gouvernements? Telle est la question.

But, judging from the demonstrations "sur la tombe de Katkof," Frenchmen seemed hardly to understand Russia any better in 1888 than they had at the time of Custine. Leroy-Beaulieu complained that, although

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 15 February, 1888, p. 907.

²Ibid., p. 910.

both he and E.M. de Voglé (later, he was to add, Leger and Rambaud),¹ had tried to give their compatriots an idea of that country,² "certains Français . . . ont l'air de vouloir jeter la France à la tête de la Russie . . . certains démocrates ont l'air de chercher moins un allié qu'un patron."³

For an alliance to be made between any two countries, it was not necessary that their interests be identical; it was sufficient merely that they be reconcilable ("les services doivent être réciproques et les avantages communs").⁴ But would there be equal contributions and common advantages in an alliance of France and Russia? Hardly. Mobilization, for example, which in France or Germany could be accomplished in hours, would be accomplished in Russia only in terms of weeks or perhaps months; and, even then, there was always the question of the number of men it could bring together:⁵

Une seule chose est certaine . . . la mobilisation de la Russie serait incomparablement plus lente que celle de ses voisins. Et comment en serait-il autrement? Avec

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, La France, La Russie et L'Europe, Paris, 1888, p. 90.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 15 February, 1888, p. 920.

³Ibid., p. 911. Louis Leger expressed the same concern: "Les hommes de science et de critique ont le devoir de réagir contre ces engouements puérils qui n'ajoutent rien à notre dignité nationale. Rendons au Tsar ce qui est au Tsar, mais ne lui offrons pas ce qu'il ne nous demande point et dont nous n'avons pas le droit de disposer." See Le monde slave (1897), p. xxii.

⁴Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., R.D.M., 15 February, 1888, p. 914.

⁵Ibid., p. 924.

des distances infiniment plus grandes, elle a beaucoup moins de chemins de fer, et ses chemins de fer sont moins bien orientés, moins bien outillés, moins bien desservis. . . . C'est surtout pour ses alliés que cette infériorité de la Russie risquerait d'avoir des conséquences désastreuses. . . . Cela suffirait pour que, dans une alliance franco-russe, les périls ne fussent pas également partagés entre les deux puissances. Dans une pareille partie, ce serait assurément la France qui mettrait le plus au jeu.

In yet another spirited foray, Leroy-Beaulieu pointed out that Russia was well protected for its own defence by its size and by the belt of Poland-Lithuania, which formed a western buffer to Russia proper. With France, however, the situation would be the reverse: "L'ennemi peut, à la première bataille, être en pleine Champagne, à la seconde, sous les forts de Paris."¹ But that which gave Russia its defensive superiority was an obstacle for an offensive campaign: "Que de temps lui a demandé le transport de deux armées en Bulgarie et en Arménie! . . . L'état-major russe a certes mis à profit ces dix ans; mais une guerre avec l'Allemagne et l'Autriche serait autre chose qu'une lutte avec la Turquie. . . ."²

Cautioning that the internal political situation of Russia, together with its financial and military systems, was still in need of change and, that, without such change, the country would remain a "lourd colosse," Leroy-Beaulieu felt strongly that the weight in any form of alliance between France and Russia would fall heavily upon France.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 925.

Being the most exposed, France was the most vulnerable, as it had to meet the enemy on all fronts and would not be sure that its ally would have either sufficient time or, equally important, financial means to lend France its support.¹

... au point de vue militaire, les avantages d'une alliance franco-russe seraient surtout pour la Russie, les périls surtout pour la France ... au point de vue politique ... l'alliance russe n'irait pas sans dangers graves. Elle lui aliénerait ce qui lui reste de sympathies en Occident au sud des Alpes comme au nord de la Manche. Elle aurait ... l'inconvénient de fortifier la triple alliance, dont le but ou le prétexte est précisément de contrebalancer une combinaison franco-russe. ... Les périls diplomatiques ... seraient surtout pour la France. Entre les deux pays, il est manifeste que les bonnes chances et les mauvaises seraient inégalement partagées.

Why would Leroy-Beaulieu have risked writing an article so critical of French political life and of a Franco-Russian alliance when, as Corbet has pointed out, it would be injurious to his career?² In the Preface to La France, La Russie et L'Europe (a slightly expanded version in book form of articles written for the Revue des deux mondes and for the Journal des Débats),³ Leroy-Beaulieu wrote that, by studying Russia (whether in 1872 or in 1888) he was serving France. Sympathies apart, he wrote what he believed to be true; if his views had varied, it was due to changing circumstances and to his belief that a political com-

¹Ibid., pp. 925-926.

²Corbet, op. cit., p. 429.

³A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Katkof," Journal des Débats, 6 August, 1887.

mentator must always remain objective. To this end he wrote that: "Si cet article a paru sans signature, ce n'est pas que l'auteur en voulût déclinier la responsabilité. C'est qu'il était plus conforme à son dessein que cet appel à la raison publique eût quelque chose d'impersonnel."¹ In the ten years since 1878, when Leroy-Beaulieu had been almost alone in defending the policies of Alexander II, a complete about face had taken place in France. The mood of the country had changed to infatuation, not only for Russian literature, but seemingly for rapprochement; and Leroy-Beaulieu warned that:²

La France doit, plus que jamais, se garder des chimères, des coups de tête ou de coeur. A une heure où, sur la foi de lointains sourires, elle semblait prête à se laisser compromettre dans une périlleuse aventure, nous n'avons pas hésité à lui jeter un avertissement.

Leroy-Beaulieu could do little to change public opinion other than to reiterate his caution that "... un Français n'a le droit de s'exalter qu'à bon escient."³ There is little evidence that his prudence had any effect on the general public; but can it be pure coincidence that the points raised by Leroy-Beaulieu were precisely those considered most important in the later negotiations between French and Russian general staffs?

Reaction from a press unconcerned with the realities of military preparedness was, as Leroy-Beaulieu indicated, vociferous. The russo-

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, La France, La Russie et L'Europe, p. iv.

²Ibid., p. iii.

³Ibid.

phile review, La Vie Franco-Russe, admitted that Leroy-Beaulieu had carefully examined the diplomatic question, but only from the point of view of French national interest:¹

Ses intentions sont bonnes, sans doute. Les aventures nationales lui font peur. Et, très bravement, il flagelle nos grossières idoles du jour. . . . Avec toutes ses bonnes intentions, ses audaces d'homme de cabinet, l'auteur me rappelle furieusement ce personnage à courte vue auquel les arbres cachaient la forêt. Il s'agit bien en effet de philosopher académiquement.

Later La Vie Franco-Russe had other thoughts and facetiously wrote of the "grand succès pour M. Leroy-Beaulieu, le 'courageux' auteur anonyme de cet article si 'éloquent,' si 'bien pensé,' si 'magistral,' qui vient de traiter enfin, comme elle le méritait, la chimère décevante d'une alliance avec la Russie."²

The reaction to Leroy-Beaulieu's criticism of the inequalities in a Franco-Russian alliance reverberated unfavourably throughout the Russian press as well.³ Yet, there were thoughtful individuals who did not consider his efforts either audacious or short-sighted. Writing to Halpérine-Kaminsky in 1892, E.M. de Vogüé unreservedly praised Leroy-Beaulieu for his foresight in introducing Russia to Frenchmen:⁴

. . . un nom domine tous les autres: celui de notre aîné et de notre maître à tous, Anatole Leroy-

¹La Vie Franco-Russe, Vol. 1 (3 March, 1888), p. 55.

²Ibid., Vol. 1 (10 March, 1888), p. 73.

³A.D.C.P.: Russie. Laboulaye to Emile Flourens, 10 March, 1888, Vol. 279, fos. 313 verso-315.

⁴E.M. de Vogüé to E. Halpérine-Kaminsky, 27 August, 1892, quoted in E. Halpérine-Kaminsky, "Le Vicomte de Vogüé, Revue hebdomadaire, Vol. 4 (1910), p. 152.

Beaulieu. Bien avant nous, dès le lendemain de la guerre, il a vu, prévu, il nous a graduellement et complètement révélé le grand pays ignoré, il nous a stimulés à marcher sur ses traces pour glaner le peu qui restait après lui. Si la vérité et la justice ne sont pas de vains mots, quand on fera l'histoire de la découverte du monde slave par les Français, on rapportera à ce ferme et persévérant esprit le gros œuvre, la meilleure part d'honneur, la cause première des plus grands effets.

Vogüé, the most widely known today of Russia's interpreters of this period, paid an unparalleled compliment to Leroy-Beaulieu. He failed to observe, however, the significant change which had occurred in Leroy-Beaulieu's attitude after the latter's acquisition of the Miliutin correspondence and the assassination of the Tsar. Leroy-Beaulieu wrote and lectured about Russia, not only with the idea of having her people and customs better known in France, but also, after 1881, in order to alert Frenchmen to the involvements and dangers inherent in an alliance. As an independent observer not only of Russian but of French politics, he was concerned with the seemingly unalterable drift of France toward a disparate commitment to the colossus of the North.

Leroy-Beaulieu had tried passionately to break the onrushing popular tide, but had subsequently been derided in both Russia and France for his outspoken analysis. Yet others previously associated with the resurgence of interest in Russia, notably Rambaud, as editor of the Revue bleue, refused the opportunity to react. Louis Leger, through the columns of the same review, obliquely defended Leroy-Beaulieu by interpreting what had been generally accepted as Leroy-

Beaulieu's condemnation of Russia as censure of the political climate in France.¹

The indication that Leroy-Beaulieu had shifted his priorities was clear: informing the French about Russia had, and would continue, to give way to informing them about those political matters in which France had paramount interests. Leger and Rambaud had ample opportunity at this time to defend the interests of Russia; but instead they demonstrated an acquiescence towards those who, like Leroy-Beaulieu, began to question the wisdom of French political involvements with that country. Indeed, in the 1880's, remarkable changes in the manner in which Rambaud chose to serve his country became apparent.

¹L. Leger, "La France jugée par un Russe," Revue bleue, Vol. 1 (1889), pp. 635-636. See also L. Leger, "L'Allemagne jugée par un professeur Russe," Revue bleue, Vol. 2 (1888), pp. 252-254.

CHAPTER FIVE

Louis Leger, Alfred Rambaud: their contribution to history in the interest of France, 1876-1890.

During his campaign for senatorial office in 1895, Rambaud referred to the consistency of his outlook as a professional historian. ". . . Même dans les travaux de pure science," he wrote, "j'ai toujours poursuivi un but pratique, actuel, patriotique, cherchant à éclairer les terrains où manoeuvraient la politique étrangère . . . de la France."¹ But as of January, 1888, when Rambaud assumed the editorship of the prestigious Revue bleue, there is little question that his once fierce ardour for Russia had mellowed.

Since its founding "pour servir les intérêts de la pensée savante,"² the Revue bleue had extended its objectives to include working for the national revival of France by supporting ". . . l'œuvre des intellectuels, qui, de leur côté, entendirent guider la nation dans les efforts nécessaires."³ Rambaud's new perspective—to see the reestablishment of France through republican and democratic means—coincided perfectly with the objectives of the review.⁴ While its pages were used by

¹A. N., 81 AP 1, Brochure for the Senatorial Election of 17 November, 1895.

²J. Lux, Histoire de deux revues françaises, Paris, n.d. (ca. 1911), p. 25.

³Ibid., p. 17.

⁴Ibid., p. 26.

Rimbaud to conduct a campaign against General Boulanger,¹ in the field of foreign affairs, contrary to what might have been expected from its one time Russophile editor, the review reflected many points of view. The editorial policy also reflected Rimbaud's sincere effort to enlighten his readers regarding France's position, both domestic and international. He endeavoured to present as faithful a picture of the status of France as he was capable of giving, thereby attempting, as in his earlier writings on Russia, to influence those who might be instrumental in affecting the destiny of France.

During his tenure as editor of the Revue bleue, which lasted until October 1890, Rimbaud wrote only one article on Franco-Russian relations: "La France et la Russie: les origines de la diplomatie russe."² Repeating the now familiar theme—that France had for too long remained aloof from Russia, that in previous centuries only individual Frenchmen, merchants and adventurers, had been drawn to her,³ he stated that a new era had dawned when the altruistic youth of France (himself among them) had been drawn to Russia after the events of 1870-1871. Although Rimbaud may have wished France's

¹A. Rimbaud, "Sagesse des abstentionnistes" and "Caesarisme," Revue bleue, Vol. 1, 1889, pp. 65 and 97-98 respectively; A. Rimbaud, "Les élections et la question de guerre," Revue bleue, Vol. 2, 1889, p. 289. See also A. N., 81 AP 1, Brochure for the Senatorial Election of 17 November, 1895; and C. Benoist, Souvenirs de Charles Benoist, 3 vols., Paris, 1932-1934, Vol. 1, pp. 54-56.

²A. Rimbaud, "La France et la Russie: Les origines de la diplomatie russe," Revue bleue, Vol. 1, 1890, p. 466.

³Ibid., p. 471.

interest in Russia to have appeared to be altruistic, he had not deceived himself. As early as 1876, in a letter to the Minister of Public Instruction, Rambaud had pointed out the good effect for France of a sincere interest in Russia as well as the favourable impression which he and Leroy-Beaulieu had already made there. "M. Leroy-Beaulieu et moi nous pouvons nous vanter d'avoir fait en Russie quelque chose pour le nom français. M. le Général LeFlô pourrait dire avec quelle faveur certaines de nos études ont été accueillies en haut lieu."¹

In 1876, Rambaud had made his first contribution to the study of Russian history with the publication of La Russie épique.² It is evident from the first pages that Rambaud's goal was to redress (and, ultimately, to obliterate) the concept of Russia's Asian origins. Not only did he refute this concept, he allowed himself to compare Russian and German civilizations, and concluded that Russia was morally superior. La Russie épique is judged today as clearly "un ouvrage de publicité russophile . . . et d'autant plus habile que ses intentions profondes se cachaient sous le couvert de la science objective." In 1876, when the work appeared, "les conditions de l'existence et de la survie de la France étaient telles alors que, pour des coeurs à la fibre patriotique, il était devenu impossible de parler de la Russie avec la froideur d'une

¹A. N., F¹⁷25893. Rambaud to the Minister of Public Instruction, Waddington, n.d. (received May 6, 1876).

²A. Rambaud, "La Russie épique," R.D.M., 1 July, 1874. Published in book form in 1876.

objectivité purement scientifique."¹ It was due to Rambaud, however, that subsequent French historians of Russia could approach their subject from a new perspective: "Il apprendra à le [Russia] connaître sous son vrai jour, avec ses sympathies et ses aversions, ses qualités et ses vices, sa grandeur et ses faiblesses."²

To pursue an intellectual goal was one thing; to establish an academic career based upon one's intellectual interests was quite another matter. Between 1876 and 1878 (his most prolific years of writing on Russian history), Rambaud endeavoured to establish his academic career as well as his scholarly reputation. Although he had been posted to the University of Caën, he taught at Nancy in the place of Professeur Lacroix.³ Rambaud's family had been located in Nancy since his editorship of the Progrès de l'Est, and he wished to be permanently transferred to that university; however, a large number of faculty members felt that Rambaud was too much a radical and opposed his candidacy. Rambaud therefore solicited the support of the Minister of Public Instruction, to whom he pointed out that he had received a prize of 3,000 francs from the Académie Française and

¹Corbet, op. cit., p. 363.

²J. Martinov, "La Russie épique: Etude sur les chansons héroïques de la Russie par Alfred Rambaud," Revue des questions historiques, Vol. 19 (1876), pp. 736-739.

³A.N., F¹⁷25893. Rambaud's request for a leave of absence dated 20 November, 1873. Annuaire de l'Instruction Publique, 1874, p. 82; 1875, p. 92.

had been decorated with the Ordre du Sauveur by the Greek government for the published version of his thesis. More particularly, he reminded the Minister that he had been working to forward the interests of France:¹

Grâce à trois années d'études continuées, j'ai ajouté à nos connaissances en langues vivantes celui du russe. . . . Mes travaux sur la Russie ont été dirigés dans le plus propre à augmenter dans cet empire le nombre de nos amis. . . . De la faveur du monde savant j'ai pour garant mon admission dans plusieurs sociétés russes, notamment la Société Archéologique de Moscou, placée sous le patronage du Grand-duc héritier et la Société Impériale d'Histoire de Russie, présidée par ce même prince et qui ne compte, à part moi, que deux correspondants étrangers, dont M. Ralston, directeur du British Museum, et le professeur Hermann, de Marbourg, l'auteur de la meilleure histoire de Russie qui ait paru à l'étranger.

Despite these credentials, Rambaud did not receive the position at the University of Nancy which he sought.²

During the following year, 1877, another of Rambaud's books appeared, once again an elaboration of an article for the Revue des deux mondes.³ Français et Russes, Moscou et Sébastopol contained not only the restatement of Rambaud's idea of the necessity of friendship between France and Russia despite prior hostilities between them, but his assertion that an intellectual recognition of Russia in France

¹A. N., F¹⁷25893. Rambaud to the Minister of Public Instruction, Waddington, n.d. (received May 6, 1876).

²A. N., F¹⁷25893. Rambaud's personal record with the Minister of Public Instruction.

³A. Rambaud, "Les Russes à Sébastopol," R.D.M., 1 April, 1874.

could clear the way for a diplomatic alliance:¹

... dans la situation nouvelle de l'Europe, on comprend que la France est nécessaire à la Russie, que la Russie est nécessaire à la France et que l'affaiblissement de l'une d'elles aurait pour résultat indirect, mais certain, l'affaiblissement relatif de l'autre.

A retrospective review showed Rambaud that France and Russia were indeed far from being natural enemies: they had managed, over two centuries, to come to formal mutual agreements no less than six times. Although there were great differences between them insofar as language and historical development was concerned, "on retrouve entre eux une certaine affinité de caractère, certaines ressemblances dans leurs qualités, dans leurs aptitudes, dans leur défauts."²

There had been and there was still no question in Rambaud's mind at this time as to the inevitable political outcome of the friendship of the two countries, a friendship Rambaud himself was endeavouring to foster. "La Russie, qui a réalisé tant de progrès économiques et sociaux depuis quinze ans," the Russia which had advanced into the Nineteenth Century by social changes such as the emancipation of the serfs, the creation of the Duma, judicial and educational reform, was as a result more closely associated with Europe than ever before, and held "chaque jour une place plus grande, non comme une ennemie de la France, mais comme sa puissante alliée dans l'œuvre de pacifica-

¹Rambaud, Français et Russes, Moscou et Sébastopol, p. vi.

²Ibid., p. xix.

tion, de justice internationale et de progrès."¹

Français et Russes, Moscou et Sébastopol was recognized and accepted in France as a patriotically inspired book.² Meanwhile, in Germany, the effectiveness of the intervention of an intellectual, at least in this one instance, was considered a menace. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung felt that "France, or at least certain Frenchmen, with or without mandate, are pushing over the head of Germany and with obviously hostile intentions, to establish friendships with Russia and the Russians. . . . Why was this book written if not with a view to a future war of revenge, to assure the support of Russia against Germany?"³

Rimbaud was furious with these remarks, claiming that the article in question was written at a time when diplomatic relations between France and Germany were strained. It was, Rimbaud felt, necessitated by a fear which the German newspaper felt for its own nation's alliances. Rimbaud denied having attempted to upset the League of the Three Emperors by what the German reviewer had called a political pamphlet; he further defended himself by emphasizing that it was a Russian and not a French bias which he had given to his

¹Ibid., p. xxx.

²Revue des questions historiques, Vol. 22 (1877), p. 652.

³Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 February, 1877 quoted in A. Rimbaud, "Correspondance: Réponse à un journal officieux de Berlin," Revue politique et littéraire, Vol. 1 (1877), p. 853. See also A. du Mesnil, op. cit., p. 585.

book. Was it that the Russians were not permitted to criticize Germany? He took pains to point out in his rebuttal that it was the Russians (and not himself) who had given the German army the epithet "l'armée sans pardon" parce que, 'avec eux rien n'y faisait, ni prières, ni larmes,' tandis que les vrais Français 'étaient très-bons.'" The insinuation that the book was written with a view to Rambaud's being decorated with Russia's Order of Saint Anne was haughtily dismissed: "J'avoue que j'ai des ambitions plus relevées."¹

Risking the possibility of further arousing German ire, Rambaud applied to Baron Watteville in the spring of 1877 to be appointed as delegate of the Ministry of Public Instruction to the fourth Russian archæological congress to be held in Kazan in August of that year.² In an article whose publication coincided with his request to the Minister, Rambaud underlined the need for a French presence at the Congress in Kazan: it would furnish an opportunity to keep abreast of academic investigations of the early history of Russia and thus enlarge French scholarly knowledge in this area.³

As the only non-Slav participants at the previous congress in Kiev, Rambaud and Leger had been enthusiastically received; and Rambaud no

¹A. Rambaud, "Correspondance: Réponse à un journal officieux de Berlin," pp. 853, 854.

²A. N., F¹⁷3001. Rambaud to the Minister of Public Instruction, Watteville, 30 April, 1877.

³A. Rambaud, "Les études archéologiques en Russie. Le congrès de Kazan," La Revue politique et littéraire, Vol. 1 (1877), p. 1029.

doubt saw the advantage in further cementing these academic relations. In his letter to Baron Watteville, Rambaud pointed out that Leger, who had just been married, would not want to travel to Kazan because of the heat! Further, to offset possible objections which the Commission des Voyages might raise because he had not submitted a report of his second mission to Russia (in 1874), he pointed out that he had published an article on the Congress of Kiev in the Revue des deux mondes.¹ In fact, Rambaud had not only failed to submit his report. He had also put aside two projects which were to have stemmed from the Kiev visit: one concerning Greek influence in Russia, and another which he had titled "L'Instruction publique dans l'ancien royaume de Kazan." On the other hand, he did point out that he had published La Russie épique which had been very well received in Russia, and Français et Russes, Moscou et Sébastopol "que je ferais absolument, au point de vue de notre politique internationale à éditer."²

Although Rambaud had indeed failed to comply with his own standard, he was nevertheless busy at work in Nancy on his Histoire de Russie, as well as giving lectures. Due to his talent, "et de la nouveauté du sujet qu'il traite," Rambaud's lectures ("Rélations de

¹ A. Rambaud, "Kief et le Congrès Archéologique," R.D.M., 15 December, 1874.

² A.N., F¹⁷3001. Rambaud to the Minister of Public Instruction, Watteville, 30 April, 1877.

la France et de la Russie pendant la période de la Révolution et de l'Empire"), were well received by some 150 persons, "hommes du monde, des professeurs, des dames et quelques étudiants."¹ The report of the Rector of the University at Nancy obviously was sufficiently impressive; for on May 29, 1877, Rambaud was given permission to attend the congress, should the Russo-Turkish war not interfere. It did not.²

Following his trip to Russia, Rambaud completed the second of his two articles on Rostopchin, the Governor of Moscow during the Napoleonic occupation. These articles were based upon documents brought to light in 1876 and published in Russia. Rambaud's interpretation of the events surrounding the Moscow fire in 1812 coincided remarkably with his own predisposition at this time to improve Franco-Russian relations. He concluded that, contrary to legend, Rostopchin had not been the legendary implacable foe of France and had not

¹A. N., F¹⁷25893. Rector's report to the Minister of Public Instruction, Watteville, 1 May, 1877. "Ses leçons, remplies de faits curieuses, de choses inédites, de rapprochements intéressants, sont faites sans apprêt, sans aucun appareil de méthode, non sans méthode pourtant, d'une parole facile un peu négligée parfois . . . rapide et vive . . . il a vu, surtout pendant les mois d'hiver, se presser devant sa chaire un nombreuse auditoire."

²A. N., F¹⁷3001. Rambaud received half of his 3,000 franc allowance, but only on 11 August, 1877. He was to write the Minister the 28th February, 1878 asking for the remainder, indicating that his report was being prepared. A marginal note asks "Et qu'a-t-il envoyé? des promiis seulement. Le prier d'envoyer son rapport." Rambaud sent his report 18 April, 1878, and the balance of the allowance was made 22 May, 1878. The report was published in the Archives des Missions, 11 December, 1878.

vindictively burned the city in order to drive out the French forces. "Les hautes classes," Rambaud wrote, "ont le patriotisme moins incendiaire que le peuple."¹ In fact, Rambaud emphasized that the city's burning was committed in the name of patriotism by "le peuple russe de toutes les classes, de toutes les conditions, sans en excepter les hommes revêtus de la puissance publique et parmi eux Rostopchine lui-même." In summarizing his conclusions, Rambaud thanked Professor Alexandre Popof for the service which he had rendered to both Russia and France by his study of the events of 1812 and by his debunking of the Rostopchin legend at a time when interest in the history of Franco-Russian relations was rising in France.² As an indication of the activity underway, Vogtlé had examined these same papers with a view to publishing his own exposé on the Rostopchin legend before discovering to his chagrin that Rambaud had pre-empted the idea.³

¹A. Rambaud, "Rostopchine: Gouverneur de Moscou en 1812," R.D.M., 15 September, 1878, p. 364. His previous article for the same review was entitled "Le comte Rostopchine: d'après une correspondance nouvellement publiée," R.D.M., 15 April, 1876.

²Rambaud, "Rostopchine: Gouverneur de Moscou en 1812," p. 364.

³Vogtlé to Henri de Pontmartin, 26 August, 1888, from Lettres à Armand et Henri de Pontmartin (1867-1909) par E.M. de Vogtlé, Paris, 1922, p. 62. "Je viens de dévorer une correspondance de Rostopchine, publiée ici il y a quatre ans, qui révèle tout simplement un Saint-Simon moscovite; plein de feu, j'allais bâcler mon article là-dessus en huit jours, quand je me rappelle que Rambaud a éventé la mèche dans la Revue en février 76 [sic] et sans en tirer le parti qu'il pouvait! Me voilà refait."

"Most historians assume that Russia is part of Europe, some passionately deny it. The bias of the historian can be judged by the hypothesis which he adopts."¹ Rambaud's greatest publishing success, Histoire de la Russie, claimed most emphatically that Russia was part of Europe. With this work, Rambaud attempted to dispel the tendency in France to associate Russia with Asia, first, by stressing certain geographical influences which created the unity of all Eastern European peoples and second, by demonstrating that the early influences in Russia had been European and not Oriental. In so doing, he touched upon a deep motive in Russia's relations with other European countries, that is, her "determination not to be ignored in Europe, not to be treated as a merely Asiatic power."² Perhaps to make his point even more obvious to his readers, Rambaud minimized the Mongol influence, for he believed that many of the peculiarities which had been traced to this Oriental people were, in fact, attributable to the European Slavs themselves, or to a Byzantine influence. Absolutism and communism, which were antithetic to Rambaud's political views, he characterized as being totally Asiatic features, and he assured his readers that Russia was indeed evolving away from both influences.³

¹E. H. Carr, What is History?, New York, 1966, p. 77.

²A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918, p. 214.

³A. Rambaud, Histoire de la Russie, Paris, 1878, pp. 143-145. Louis Leger considered Rambaud's Histoire de la Russie "le premier et le seul ouvrage digne de ce nom [scientifique] qui existe dans la littérature française." See Leger, Nouvelles études Slaves, Vol. 2, p. 97.

Rimbaud was thus engrossed with the evolutionary interpretation of Russian history. By demonstrating that Russia had been more reform-minded than had heretofore been generally believed in France and that her reforms had predated the Revolution of 1789 by a hundred years, Rimbaud was able to conclude that the reforms instituted by Peter the Great were not themselves revolutionary, as was popularly believed in France, but were begun at an earlier time, with the cultural developments under Alexis.¹ Rimbaud had thus pushed the beginnings of the evolution of reform in Russia backwards in time. By so doing, he was able to make yet another point in his argument that Russia was indeed a member of the European community. By this sweeping survey of the development of reform in Russia, Rimbaud boldly measured that country with a yardstick heretofore generally reserved for gauging the development in Western European nations—the concept of progress.

If Rimbaud attributed importance to developments in Russia under Alexis in the Seventeenth Century, he in no way minimized the role of Peter the Great. Tsar Peter had drawn Russia further into Europe.² in contrast to Nicholas I who, in later years, acted as a brake on the very progress made by the tsars before him. It was with Tsar Nicholas, however, that Rimbaud encountered a formidable obstacle to his theory of continual progress in Russia. But the delineation of extreme contrast between Tsars Alexis and Peter on the one hand, and Tsar Nicholas on

¹Rimbaud, Histoire de la Russie, pp. 380-381.

²Ibid.

the other, was necessary if Rambaud was to demonstrate not only the formidable obstacle to the theory which Tsar Nicholas himself created, but, the progress that had been made in Russia until 1825. Rambaud was thus better able to characterize Tsar Nicholas as a thoroughly reactionary individual whose reign,¹

... visait à être, suivant Lamartine, 'L'immobilité du monde'; il ne fut qu'une lutte constante contre les forces vives de l'humanité, contre le mouvement insaisissable et invincible des esprits. Nicholas fut un remora plutôt qu'un obstacle au progrès. Quand sa puissance se brisa, apparut sous ses ruines un monde nouveau qui était arrivé à sa maturité.

This new world perceived by Rambaud resulted from the Speransky reforms which had been carried out under Nicholas. But, if Rambaud's overall opinion of Nicholas was unfavourable, this can be explained not only in terms of the Tsar's reactionary nature, but also because he seems to have particularly disliked France and those things for which France stood.

It is unfortunate that Rambaud wrote only of the French participation in the reformation of Russia; but this was undoubtedly done to counterbalance the role which he believed was taken by Germany, especially during the reign of the Tsarina Anna. In contrast then, he chose to write of the national reaction during the reign of Tsarina Elizabeth as being a pro-French, anti-German, expression and not an anti-reform feeling.² Rambaud was naturally quite articulate regarding

¹Ibid., p. 638.

²Ibid., pp. 439-441, 445-451.

the question of the good influences of French civilization in Russia. He claimed that, although French cultural achievements could not have permeated all classes of Russian society, and although their influence upon the nobility might indeed have been superficial, in the long run, the impact of French culture was bound to have strengthened:¹

... chez les nobles russes ces idées de tolérance religieuse, de dignité morale, de respect pour la personne humaine même chez les esclaves, ces habitudes de politesse et de courtoisie, ces aspirations à plus de justice sociale et à plus de liberté politique qui à la longue devaient faire leur œuvre, adoucir la dureté des vieux boïars, préparer l'émancipation des classes agricoles et la régénération de la Russie.

This is certainly a sentiment that would have flattered the pride of French readers.

Originally published as part of Victor Duruy's Histoire Universelle, the Histoire de la Russie was an immediate popular success. It had five French editions prior to 1900, and was translated into Russian, Croat, Danish, German and English; Gabriel Monod described it as "un petit livre qui est un chef-d'œuvre et qui, traduit, est devenu classique en Russie même."²

¹Ibid., p. 484. It is interesting to note that Rambaud's successor, Emile Haumaut, was responsible for bringing Rambaud's Histoire de la Russie more up to date. He was not only Rambaud's friend, but the guardian of Rambaud's notes in the later years of Rambaud's life and after his death. Haumaut himself is the author of several books pertaining to Franco-Russian affairs, among them La culture française en Russie: 1700-1900, Paris, 1913.

²G. Monod, "Necrologie, Alfred Rambaud," Revue Historique, Vol. 90 (1906), p. 346; Vidal de la Blanche, "Notice sur la vie et les œuvres de M. Alfred Rambaud," Receuil de l'Institut de France, No. 2, 1908, p. 17. Leger also mentions that Histoire de la Russie was translated into Russian. See Leger, Nouvelles études Slaves,

When the Histoire de la Russie was published, Rambaud was still listed as professor of history in absentia at the University of Caën; he had been unable to secure a permanent position at the University of Nancy (although the lectures which he gave there continued to be well received and well attended). In 1878, Rambaud was lecturing on the history of Serbia to a class of some twenty-six registered students (in fact, some eighty townspeople and other students attended regularly).¹ In addition, he gave public lectures concerning Russia, Eastern Europe and France. One such lecture was entitled "Histoire de la péninsule du Balkan et de la politique française en Orient": it was (as had become usual), well attended, and received favourable comment from the Rector of the University in his report to the Minister of Public Instruction.² Vol. 2, p. 97. See also Lavissee, "Alfred Rambaud," p. 348.

In the spring of 1878, Rambaud sent a copy of the Histoire de la Russie to Jules Simon, who was one of the judges for the Prix Marcellin-Guérin. The result of the competition is unknown; but, in his letter to Simon, Rambaud wrote that he had begun the collecting of material as early as 1872 during his first mission to Russia, a mission which Simon had authorized as Minister of Public Instruction. See A. N., 87 AP 6, Rambaud to Jules Simon, 16 April, 1878.

¹A. N., F¹⁷25893. Rector of the University of Nancy to the Minister of Public Instruction, n.d. [ca. summer 1878]. "M. Rambaud a continué à professer avec succès le cours d'histoire sur un sujet intéressant par son actualité comme par sa grandeur même, et sur une époque très voisine du temps présent. Ses leçons, très nourries de recherches, sont fort instructives . . . un auditoire choisi et assez nombreuse demeure fidèle à ce professeur." See A. N., F¹⁷25893, Rector to the Minister of Public Instruction, Bardoux, 6 July, 1878.

²A. N., F¹⁷25893, Rector of the University of Nancy to the Minister of Public Instruction, Bardoux, 6 July, 1878.

Lavissee, "Alfred Rambaud," p. 348. Lavissee claimed that it was at this time that Rambaud gave up his interest in Russia: ". . . J'en ai assez des Russes; la preuve, c'est que je vais faire mon cours sur les Turcs," he quoted Rambaud as saying. But Rambaud had not yet rid himself of his interest or involvement with that country.

In his letter to the Minister asking for a permanent post at Nancy, Rambaud had stated in 1876 that some people had shown surprise at his insistence upon the Nancy post; while others thought they had seen in his attempted move from Caën "arrière-pensées" with regard to politics. Perhaps rhetorically, Rambaud had asked: "Serait-il bien sage, si l'on voulait s'occuper de politique, de commencer par devenir un fonctionnaire, et bien plus un fonctionnaire essentiellement révocable, un simple suppléant?"¹ In the meantime, however, between 1876 and 1879, Rambaud had kept himself in the forefront of public activity in the Nancy region through public lectures, publications and an interest in local and national politics.

In 1879, Rambaud's fortune changed markedly; he was chosen chef de cabinet to Jules Ferry during the latter's first tenure of office as Minister of Public Instruction (from February 4, 1879 to November 14, 1881).² Unencumbered by either his obligations to the faculty in Caën

¹A.N., F¹⁷25893, Rambaud to the Minister of Public Instruction, Waddington, 6 May, 1876.

²"The cabinet of the minister is an institution found in all great executive departments. . . . [It consists of a] small staff of personal assistants which each minister picks himself and brings into office with him. This group is not a consultative body, but a personal office staff, designed in part as a check on the influence of the permanent bureaucracy on the minister." F.L. Schuman, War and Diplomacy in the French Republic, New York, 1970, pp. 34-35.

As director of Ferry's educational programme, Rambaud was instrumental in preparing the measures enacted under the laws governing education, 9 August, 1879; 27 February 1880; 21 December, 1880; 16 June, 1881. For the principal parliamentary debates on these laws see P. Robiquet (ed.), Discours et opinions de Jules Ferry, 5 volumes, Paris, 1892-1897. See also A. Rambaud, Jules Ferry, Paris, 1903, Chapters 8 through 13; and, E.M. Acomb, The French Laic Laws,

or his desire to remain in Nancy, Rambaud moved to Paris to take up this important post, and to serve, in effect, as "eminence grise" to Ferry. Immediately, Rambaud received one boon which had eluded him for years: he was appointed Professor of History and Geography at Nancy in May, 1879, a title which he held in absentia until the autumn of 1883!¹

Throughout this time, Rambaud maintained his close association with Leger. Their mutual concern to promote French interests in Russia and Russian interests in France continued; and, through the influence of his office, Rambaud arranged for Leger to undertake two projects which were important to Franco-Russian understanding: to represent France at the unveiling in Moscow of the Pushkin monument, 1879-1889, New York, 1941. (Rambaud's part, though most often anonymous, must be regarded as considerable. A painting at the Sorbonne represents Ferry preparing to sign the act to reconstruct buildings of the Sorbonne. Facing him, while the architect explains the plans are Gréard, Albert Dumont and Rambaud.)

In addition to the work of educational reform within France, Rambaud was involved with the gallicization of Algeria. Since he believed that teachers could better pacify the Algerian population than could soldiers, he saw a time when an established French educational system would one day cement them to the side of France. For the report of Rambaud's mission to Algeria, see A Rambaud, L'enseignement primaire chez les indigènes musulmans d'Algérie et notamment dans la Grande Kabylie, Paris, 1892. See also Du Mesnil, op. cit., p. 587.

¹ A. N., F¹⁷25893, Rambaud's personal record with the Ministry of Public Instruction. Rambaud was replaced by M. Zeller in 1880, 1881, 1882. See Annuaire de l'Instruction Publique, 1880, pp. 316; 1881, p. 316; 1882, p. 350; and in 1883 by M. Homolle; see ibid., 1883, p. 362.

and to begin the teaching of Russian at the Ecole de Guerre.

In the meantime, Leger had continued to teach Russian at the Ecole des Langues orientales vivantes and been appointed to the newly created chair of Russian language there in 1877.¹ The year following Rambaud's publication of his Histoire de la Russie, Leger's Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie was published in the Histoire Universelle series.

In Leger's approach to Austro-Hungarian history in 1879, the year of the Austro-German Alliance, he did not dwell upon her external relations. Rather, he chose to examine the history of the Dual Monarchy in the light of the three fundamental groups comprising the basic national structure of the country: the Slavs, the Germans and the Magyars. Behind the academic were practical reasons. By pointing out the diverse aims of the minority groups in the Austro-Hungarian state, "dont l'équilibre définitif est encore à trouver,"² Leger would lead his compatriots to a better understanding of the future role of Austria-Hungary in European affairs.³

The implication in Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie, that the Slavs of Austria-Hungary were having to fight the same battle to contain

¹A. N., F¹⁷25832, Leger's personal record with the Ministry of Public Instruction.

²L. Leger, Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie, Paris, 1879, p. i.

³Neither the approach nor the motive was novel for Leger. He had evinced great interest in the internal composition of the Austro-Hungarian state as early as 1866, when he wrote a short pamphlet entitled L'Etat autrichien (Paris, 1866) and again in 1868 when, in the Revue moderne, he published "La crise autrichienne" (10 October, 1868).

"le germanisme" as was France, was clear.¹ In turning to Russia at the Slav Ethnographic Congress held in Moscow in 1867,² the Slavs had found a willing ally. This fact could not be disregarded by France. The Slavs, Leger pointed out, had not been appeased by the steps taken toward a federalist union within the Austro-Hungarian Empire after 1871. They would no longer be content with anything short of autonomy. By not supporting the creation of a Slavic Danubian state at the Congress of Berlin following the Russo-Turkish War, Austria-Hungary lost all hope of future good relations with the Slavs. The result of what Leger believed had been an incredibly short-sighted policy could only produce a "pomme de discorde, et le prétexte d'une crise aiguë qui ne paraît

¹The power of the kings of Austria had, in the course of time, dominated the kings of Bohemia and Hungary until, with the founding of the Dual Monarchy in 1804, their histories and cultures had come no longer to be considered individual, but an integral part of the history and culture of Austria and the House of Hapsburg. This had been an excusable mistake of the past; but in an age of republicanism and nationalism, Leger alerted his readers, it was no longer admissible: "On sait maintenant que les nations ont une existence indépendante de celles des familles princières, et que ces familles, si illustres que soient leurs origines, finissent toujours en somme par se subordonner aux aspirations nationales." (Leger, Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie, p. 2.) It had been only in recent years that the Slavs had realized that they had to fight Germanic domination for their national existence. "La mutualité Slave," which had been inevitable, had, within Leger's lifetime, become a reality. (Ibid., p. 485.)

²Despite what seemed to be at the time, "le triomphe de la politique allemande," the division between the Slavs within the empire and the Austro-Hungarians widened at the important Slav Ethnographic Congress (which Leger had been unable to attend due to the lack of sponsorship from an indifferent French government). It was there that the cause of fraternity between the Bohemian and Moravian Slavs and the Russians had been sealed. (Ibid., pp. 559-560.)

pas près d'aboutir."¹ Enemy of what he believed to be the ever growing Germanic hegemony, champion of Slav independence, Leger would write his last comments about the Dual monarchy in La Liquidation de l'Autriche-Hongrie on a triumphal note in 1915.

On a less academic level, the Nouvelle Revue was founded by Juliette Adam in 1879 as an organ for anti-German opinion in France. As it became evident that France had put aside the idea of immediately regaining her lost provinces, Juliette Adam concentrated her efforts and the columns of the review toward fostering a good opinion of Russia in France. The Revue became the organ of the Russophile republicans.² Among the contributors was General Chanzy, a man "passionné du désir d'une alliance avec la Russie." Prior to his posting as ambassador to St. Petersburg in 1879, Juliette Adam advised him "de lire les beaux livres d'Alfred Rambaud sur la Russie."³ Chanzy in turn encouraged her efforts by reporting from Russia that the review "y aura une sérieuse influence, surtout si la politique extérieure est dans les mains d'une personne qui nul ne pourra corrompre."⁴

¹Ibid., p. 583.

²Generally the Nouvelle Revue was banned in Russia; but the French chargé d'affaires, Ternaux-Compans, seemed to feel that it had the patronage of the Grand Dukes of that country. See A.D.C.P.: Russie, Ternaux-Compans to Freycinet, 21 May, 1886, Vol. 273, fos.228 verso, 229, 229 verso.

³J. Adam, Après l'abandon de la revanche, Paris, 1910, p. 373.

⁴Ibid. General Billot, former Minister of War in the cabinet of Eugène Duclerc (1882-1883), was proposed as ambassador to Russia in 1886 after the recall of General Appert. The Russian generals who had met him at the salon of Juliette Adam had a high regard for him per-

But General Chanzy's short, sphinx-like ambassadorial rôle in St. Petersburg was indicative of the tenuous relations between the two countries at the time. Chanzy was caught between his own left-of-centre political leanings and his desire for more solid relations between Russia and France; between official Russian displeasure with the granting of asylum by France to Social Revolutionaries and the division in France on this very subject; between diplomatic and political thought.

In 1878, General N. V. Mezentzov, hero of Sebastopol and chief of the Russian state police, had been assassinated by Social Revolutionaries.¹ In April 1879, an attempt was made on the life of the Tsar, followed in November of the same year by the blowing up of the Moscow-Kursk railway line.² In February 1880, yet another assassination attempt sonally and professionally. Mme. Adam's manoeuvres, however, were unsuccessful. The Russian court "s'était prononcé contre ce général que l'on représentait sans qu'on pût dire pourquoi, comme ayant des idées ultra-radicales." See A.D.C.P.: Russie, Ternaux-Compans to Freycinet, 6 May, 1886, Vol. 273, fo. 203 verso.

¹It was shortly after the assassination of General Mezentzov that the French chargé d'affaires, Viel-Castel, wrote: "Le Czar qui n'a jamais eu contact avec l'opinion publique n'a du reste, évidemment qu'une idée très vague de la situation. . . . Fort de l'incontestable popularité personnelle qui lui a valu le grand acte de l'émancipation, Alexandre II veut je crois, laisser à son héritier la lourde tâche de transformer un état de chose qui ne réponde plus aux nécessités de l'heure actuelle . . . l'avenir seul nous le dira, mais l'expérience de l'histoire suffit déjà pour démontrer que ce n'est point en comprimant trop longtemps les aspirations légitimes d'un peuple. . . ." See A.D.C.P.: Russie, Viel-Castel to Waddington, 7 October, 1878, Vol. 257, fos. 185, 186.

²E. M. de Vogüé, Journal, 28 February, 1880, p. 177.

on the Tsar occurred in which several people were killed and even more injured.¹ Understandably, the Russian press was disturbed by these revolutionary activities. Less plausibly, it chose as a focal point of its attacks, Louis Blanc and Henri Rochefort, two men believed by the Russian press to be dangerous social revolutionaries.²

What came to be known in both France and Russia as the Hartmann Affair had its roots in the November, 1879 attempt upon the Moscow-Kursk railway line. One of those involved, Sophia Perovsky,³ escaped immediate detection; but her fellow-revolutionary, Leo Hartmann, took refuge in France. The case for Hartmann's extradition all but ruptured relations between France and Russia in 1880 (as the Kropotkin Affair was to do six years later); for France was identified in the minds of many Russians as the home of revolutionary activists, particularly after the period 1877-1879, when Republicans gained control of the government.⁴ The French embassy in St. Petersburg showed

¹A.D.C.P.: Russie, General Chanzy to Freycinet, telegraphic dispatch, 18 February, 1880, Vol. 260, fo. 96. Vogtlé gives the figures five soldiers killed and nineteen wounded. See E.M. de Vogtlé, Journal, 17 February, 1880, p. 171.

²A.D.C.P.: Russie, General Chanzy to Freycinet, 23 October, 1879, Vol. 259, fo. 249.

³Others involved in this complicated adventure were Michael Frolenko, Vera Figner and Andrey Zhelyabov. Sophia Perovsky and Zhelyabov were later hanged for their participation in the plot, which in 1881 led to the death of the Tsar. For a concise appraisal of the 1879 plot against the Tsar, see R. Hingley, Nihilists, London, 1967, pp. 99-101.

⁴E. de Cyon, "La France et la Russie," Nouvelle Revue, 15 April, 1890; also E. de Cyon, Histoire de l'Entente Franco-Russe, Paris, 1895.

extreme concern over the Hartmann affair until May 1880; in France itself, the republican press (and in particular Clemenceau, Louis Blanc and Victor Hugo, who were always disposed to add their voices to those decrying tsarist Russia), fought for¹ and eventually obtained the government's decision to grant Hartmann the right of asylum,² although the French Foreign Minister himself had spoken against it.³ The result of France's action was Russia's recall of her ambassador in Paris, Orlov.⁴

Notwithstanding official tension between the two countries, it was still seen by many to be in the interest of France to maintain an appearance of cultural interest in Russia. In May 1880, the third secretary of the embassy in St. Petersburg, the Vicomte de Vogt  , in an article for the Revue des deux mondes, pronounced his conviction for all of France to read: that Russia was part of Europe,

¹E. M. de Vogt  , Journal, 17-29 February, 1880, p. 178.

²A. N., 270 AP 7, R  ponse au M  moire Russe, Paris, April 1880, fos. 776-780. The right of asylum was granted upon the basis that the identity of Hartmann was not sufficiently established by the Russian government. See also Nicolas Giers, op. cit., p. 14.

³E. M. de Vogt  , Journal, 6-18 February, 1880, p. 172.

⁴Ibid., 9 March, 1880, p. 183; A. N., 270 AP 7: General Chanzy to Freycinet, 7 April, 1880, folio 775. Chanzy reported that Orlov's recall, contrary to expectation, helped to stabilize relations between the two countries. "C'est    ses dispositions toujours si sympathiques pour la France . . . qu'il faut attribuer en grande partie la d  tente que je suis heureux de vous signaler." See also Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 125.

especially after the reign of Peter the Great.¹ Much more important, however, for a genuine cultural rapprochement between the two countries than Vogtlé's rather pompous statement, were the letters which Leger and Rambaud received from Ivan Turgenev, on behalf of the Société des Amis de la littérature russe of Moscow, inviting them to the unveiling of a monument to Pushkin,² the Russian poet killed in 1837 in a duel "par un étranger devenue depuis français et sénateur du second Empire."³ Leger wrote: "L'invitation était des plus flatteuses et des plus tentantes. J'admire profondément Pouchkine. J'aime beaucoup séjourner à Moscou."⁴

As a result of his appointment as Ferry's chef de cabinet, Rambaud had become a member of the Commission des souscriptions scientifiques et littéraires as well as of the Commission des voyages et missions scientifiques,⁵ which had sponsored both his and Leger's earlier voyages

¹E. M. de Vogtlé, "Le fils de Pierre le Grand," R.D.M., 1 May, 1880, p. 131. "Pierre prit la Russie au moment critique où, devant l'expansion de l'Europe moderne, elle hésitait, indécise, forcée de choisir entre la vie et la mort. De sa main puissante il la jeta à l'Europe, et l'appela à la vie."

²A.N., F¹⁷2983A. Dossier des missions, Turgenev to Rambaud, 29 April, 1880.

³M. de Heeckeren. See Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 125.

⁴Ibid., p. 124.

⁵Annuaire de l'Instruction Publique, 1880, p. 20; 1881, p. 20. An examination of the activities of these two commissions might well reveal even a greater number of interesting activities than those pertaining to Russia. For example, Chapman states that "In the autumn of 1882 Savorgnan de Brazza, returning after four years in the Congo River basin, presented the Chamber with a file of treaties with African chiefs. . . . [His work] strangely enough had been undertaken on the authority of the Ministry of Public Instruction. . . ." (See Chapman, op. cit., p. 253.) Sir Denis Brogan stated: "Officially an explorer

to Russia. When Leger wrote to Rambaud applying to attend the Pushkin ceremonies in Moscow at government expense,¹ Rambaud had the opportunity to aid the establishment of friendly relations between the intellectual élite of the two nations. The mission was granted without delay. Turgenev, however, wished France to send an official delegate; and on June 8th, Leger was asked to represent the Ministry of Public Instructions officially.² Twenty-five years later, Leger re-under the direction of the Ministry of Public Instruction, Brazza was in effect an agent of French expansion." (See Brogan, *op. cit.*, p. 249.) De Brazza's mission, authorized as it was by Ferry, had undoubtedly to be financed by either the Commission des souscriptions scientifiques et littéraires or the Commission des voyages et missions scientifiques, more likely the latter, although this is not mentioned in La France Coloniale edited by Rambaud in 1886.

Years later when Rambaud was himself Minister of Public Instruction (1896-1898), in the ministry of Jules Méline, he was the patron and organizer of a mission into the Sahara, under the direction of the then Commandant Lamy, the object of which was to unite French possessions in North Africa and the Sudan. (See Vidal de la Blanche, *op. cit.*, p. 29.) Rambaud was responsible for yet another mission, but this time it ended with the death of its leader, Captain Cazemajou, killed in Zindu [Zinder] in the southern Sahara, west of Lake Chad, in 1898. As Rambaud gloomily pointed out, "Ce ne fut pas le seul martyr de la science." See A. Rambaud, Histoire de la Civilisation contemporaine en France, Paris, 1912, p. 600; also Rambaud's cursory notations of the various missions undertaken, in Jules Ferry, p. 179.

¹A. N., F¹⁷2983A. Dossier des missions, Leger to Rambaud, 30 May, 1880.

²A. N., F¹⁷2983A. Dossier des missions. Notes dated 8 June, 1880. It should be pointed out that in 1880 Leger had applied for a mission to Bulgaria as early as March 20, in order to study elements of the Bulgarian grammar so that he himself could write a grammar of the language. His request was submitted to the Commission des Missions and a month later was passed, without a decision, to M. Schefer of the Ecole des Langues orientales vivantes. By June 23, Leger was in Russia with still no decision taken on his request; he was subsequently informed on July 20 that "l'état politique de ce pays lui a semblé un obstacle des plus sérieux aux recherches qui vous vous proposez."

called the importance of this mission:¹

Les circonstances politiques pouvaient donner à cette mission un intérêt tout particulier. La Russie et la France étaient alors en froid par suite d'un incident que l'histoire devra noter sous le nom d'affaire Hartmann. . . . Les relations étaient très tendues entre les deux pays. . . . M. Alfred Rambaud était précisément chef de cabinet de Jules Ferry, alors ministre de l'Instruction publique. Nul mieux que lui n'était en état d'expliquer l'intérêt et l'urgence de la mission.

Vogüé described the mood of the Pushkin celebration in his usual terse manner: "Fêtes de Pouchkine à Moscou, enthousiasme fou."² It was an opportunity not to be missed by France. General Chanzy, France's ambassador, though seemingly somewhat upset that he did not himself attend the ceremony in an official diplomatic capacity, informed his minister that Leger had been extremely well received.³ From General Chanzy's letter, it would appear that France had decided that for such an occasion a recognized Slavist and Slavophile would better convey the sentiments of the French government than would a diplomat. As a literary representative, Leger could and did avoid a discussion of the Hartmann affair.⁴

¹Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 125.

²E. M. de Vogüé, Journal, 18-20 June, 1880, p. 197.

³A. D. C. P.: Russie, General Chanzy to Freycinet, 22 June, 1880, Vol. 261, fo. 171. "J'ai beaucoup regretté de n'avoir pas vu officiellement, et de n'avoir appris que par les journaux, la mission confiée à M. Leger pour représenter la France à une cérémonie qui a attiré les regards de toute l'Europe. Cette circonstance m'a parfois embarrassé devant les questions qui m'étaient adressées. Je sais toutefois l'accueil sympathique qui a été fait au savant professeur."

⁴Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 130.

In another letter to the Foreign Ministry covering the event, General Chanzy pointed out that the Moscow newspaper Le Golos¹ had reported that, while not all Slavic nations were represented, a delegate of the French government had been present.² This fact, the newspaper stated, illustrated the popularity of Russian culture in a nation whose leadership with regard to world culture could not be doubted. Furthermore, Le Golos continued:³

L'ordre de la Legion d'honneur, envoyé par le Président de la république au président de la Société de la littérature russe, et l'envoi d'un délégué de la part du gouvernement français en la personne de M. Leger, ne peuvent pas ne pas être agréables à notre amour propre national. Ces marques d'attention provoquent les sentiments de la plus sincère et de la plus chaleureuse gratitude pour la nation française, dont les sympathies pour la nation russe, ont été exprimées par le chef du gouvernement française.

In addition to the above mentioned decoration, Leger, "pour confirmer la bonne impression que la présence d'un délégué française produisait sur la société russe," conferred the "palme d'officier de l'instruction publique" on three men whom he had singled out during this official mission: Prince Tikhonravov, dean of the Faculty of Letters in Moscow; Iouriev, director of the review Pensée russe; and Nicolas Rubinstein,

¹This Moscow newspaper was subsequently shut in 1883 for its too liberal political views. See A.D.C.P.: Russie, Admiral Jaurès to Challeml-Lacour, 7 March, 1883, Vol. 268, fo. 145. See also E. de Cyon, Histoire de l'entente Franco-Russe, p. 125.

²Leger seemed to enjoy noting that "J'étais le seul délégué de l'Europe entière." Leger, Souvenirs . . ., p. 129.

³A.D.C.P.: Russie, General Chanzy to Freycinet, 22 June, 1880, Vol. 261, fos. 175-176.

director of the Conservatory of Moscow.¹

The appreciation expressed by France's official recognition of Russian culture, and the commendations offered upon Leger's visit, were far from universal, however. Dostoievski, for one, is said to have turned his back upon Leger and reportedly did not wish to make his acquaintance. "C'était une vieille tradition que les Russes, et surtout les Russes de tendance slavophile, n'aimaient pas voir des étrangers se mêler de juger de littérature russe."²

Yet, despite Dostoievski's feelings in the matter, tensions declined following this successful cultural interchange between the two countries, at least insofar as Russian newspapers were concerned. This is not to say that from time to time unsympathetic remarks were not made;³ but the generally conscientious reporting of the Russian

¹Leger, Souvenirs . . ., pp. 135, 136.

²Corbet, op. cit., p. 385, fn. 1.

³Between March and December 1883, there were three incidents which caused some concern to the French embassy. The first had to do with Prince Kropotkin; see A.D.C.P.: Russie, Admiral Jaurès to Challeml-Lacour, 7 March, 1883, Vol. 268, fo. 148. The second concerned an article in Moskowski Viedomosti which had, as Jaurès pointed out, "pour objet de protester contre . . . tout projet d'alliance avec la France"; see ibid., 8 September, 1883, Vol. 269, fos. 170-171.

The third cause for alarm on the part of the embassy was the publication of Recueil des Traités et Conventions conclus entre la Russie et les puissances étrangères, edited by Professeur Martens and published by order of the Russian ministry of Foreign Affairs. Volume VI, Traités avec Allemagne was reviewed by the Journal de Saint Petersburg: "l'Allemagne et la Russie resteront, comme par le passé, deux grands pays unis par de bons souvenirs et de nombreux intérêts malgré les excitations du journalisme et des spéculateurs cosmopolites de toute espèce." See ibid., Vol. 269, fos. 272-275.

press by the French embassy, often on a twice weekly basis, reveals only isolated belligerence toward France from this time on.¹ Leger's mission, promoted by Rambaud, had been transformed by both men from a personal request by Turgenev for a French representative at a Russian literary function into a demonstration of cultural goodwill on behalf of the French government. Leger's mission had been a success both in a cultural and diplomatic sense, and as such it was envied by General Chanzy.

Although many additional hurdles would have to be overcome before any form of alliance would be considered feasible, the year 1880 was a turning point in Franco-Russian relations. The financial arrangements which were to become so important for the drawing together of France and Russia now became the concern not only of the Ministry of Finance, but of members of the diplomatic corps as well.² In addition, arrange-

¹Insofar as the French review of the Russian press in the earlier part of the 1880's was concerned, the French embassy was sending one report every two weeks concerning the Russian press. By 1887, there was one report per week and late 1887 saw these reports becoming 60 folio pages long. In 1888, the reports of the Russian press reached their pre-alliance peak with 2 reports per week.

²E.M. de Voglé, *Journal*, 25 January to 15 February, 1880, pp. 167-169. "Causé avec le général Chanzy. Vues assez justes sur l'intérêt qu'il y a à rattacher ce pays au nôtre, avant tout essai d'accord, par les seuls liens qui comptent aujourd'hui, des liens financiers. Pour cela, émission d'emprunts russes en France, substituée à l'Angleterre comme banquier de la Russie; puis expansion des capitaux français dans les entreprises russes. On ne se connaîtra, on ne se liera qu'à ce prix." (25 January, 6 February, 1880); "Le général X . . . à Petersbourg. . . . Il ne vient, je crois, faire danser que des écus fictifs, quelque amorce financière." (3-15 February, 1880). See also J. Desmarais, "The Financial aspects of late 19th Century Franco-Russian Negotiations," *War and Society in the Nineteenth Century Russian Empire*, J.G. Purves and D.A. West, Eds., Toronto, 1972, pp. 170 ff.

ments were in progress during the autumn of the same year to begin teaching the Russian language at the Ecole supérieure de Guerre. The Ministry of Public Instruction pointed out to the War Ministry that there were only two courses in Slavic languages currently being offered in France: one at the Collège de France (under A. Chodzko) and another at the Ecole des Langues orientales vivantes (under Leger).¹ Rambaud, asked to teach the course at the Ecole supérieure de Guerre, replied that he was "hors d'état de faire des examens sur la langue" and instead suggested that "Il faut nommer Louis Leger"² (who was in fact named by the Ministry of War to the new post at the Ecole on 12 January, 1881).³ As would be observed later, it was due to the teaching of Leger at the Ecole that the French General Staff was able to recruit personnel for a "section russe au second bureau du Ministre."³

That Rambaud considered, however briefly, the thought of a position at the Ecole supérieure de Guerre—a position other than that which he held in the office of the Minister of Public Instruction—was indicative of shifting priorities which were occurring in his mind. Shortly after

¹A.N., F¹⁷25832, Memo, 11 November, 1880.

²A.N., F¹⁷25832, Undated Memo written by Rambaud, probably in December, 1880.

³A.N., F¹⁷25832, Personnel file of Minister of Public Instruction.

⁴Peuch, *op. cit.*, p. 20. The need for information about the Russian army was serious, as was the need for properly trained French observers. See A.N., 270 AP 7, General Chanzy to Colonel de Boisdeffre, 29 April, 1879, fo. 725: "Il y a ici très peu de documents sur la question militaire. Pour étudier l'armée russe, il faut marcher avec méthode et s'appuyer sur des bases."

his nomination of Leger, Rambaud attempted to extricate himself from the Ministry by obtaining a position at the Collège de France. He wrote Professor Maury of the Collège to ask him to use his influence to have Alexander Chodsko's appointment to the Collège confirmed with the rank of professor, so that Chodzko could appoint Rambaud as his suppléant. Ferry had agreed to appoint Rambaud to the position officially, once it had been approved by the assembly of professors of the college. Rambaud offered to begin teaching in January, 1881, and would have taught the History of Russian Literature and the Political and Literary History of the Southern Slavs.¹ But, as Chodzko was not appointed to the rank of professor, he could not appoint Rambaud to assist him. While Rambaud was willing to seek employment as a professor, an even greater indication of change in his thought was indicated by what he was not prepared to do.

Early in 1880, Rambaud had declined an opportunity to exert a direct influence on behalf of Franco-Russian rapprochement by refusing an offered position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as sous-directeur politique² (a permanent position which did not depend upon the political fortunes of Ferry). Rambaud's qualifications for such a position should have precluded any hesitancy, for much work needed to be accomplished within the Quai d'Orsay after 1879, if French foreign policy was

¹MSS, Rambaud to Maury, 24 December, 1880.

²Du Mesnil, op. cit., p. 586. At the same time Maurice Paléologue (1859-1944) was attaché de cabinet of Freycinet, then Foreign Minister.

to be oriented toward Russia.

While French foreign policy under Decazes was characterized by the Journal des Débats as a policy of "Les Danicheffs,"¹ in 1879 Henry Waddington as foreign minister, was known as a "Prussien par peur."² Neither Waddington nor Freycinet in 1880 (nor for that matter, their successor as Prime Minister, Ferry), wished to provoke Bismarck by seeking an alliance with a continental power, Russia least of all. Such a thing would have been arbitrary and perilous for the country and was, in any case, not really plausible. The state of European affairs, Gambetta had said in 1878, forced upon France a policy of good relations for all, a policy of reason without danger for anyone.³ Waddington had consciously refused the advantage of the brief disagreement between Germany and Russia in 1879 which had resulted from the Congress of Berlin: while prime minister and foreign minister, he had officially rejected Russian overtures and informed Berlin.⁴ Then, during Jules Ferry's first tenure as prime minister, the permanent officials of the Quai d'Orsay were said to have been unfriendly toward Russia,⁵ because Ferry preferred co-operation with Germany (at least on a short term basis) to friendship with Russia.⁶ "On prétend," Giers wrote of Ferry,

¹Journal des Débats, 26 August, 1880.

²V. M. Khostov, "L'alliance franco-russe et sa portée historique," a paper prepared for the Travaux des historiens soviétiques pour le X^e congrès international des sciences historiques à Rome. Moscow, 1955, p. 67.

³La République Française, 27 July, 1878.

⁴G. P. Gooch, History of Modern Europe, New York, 1923, p. 33.

⁵H. Galli [pseud. of H. Gallichet], Les dessous diplomatiques, Paris, 1894, p. 17.

⁶W. L. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894, p. 91.

"qu'il avait recherché un moment un rapprochement avec l'Allemagne."¹ There was, without doubt, within the Quai d'Orsay, great scope for a man possessed of a missionary zeal for Russia. But, it was neither the pro-German attitude which had seemingly enveloped the Foreign Office nor the appointment of Barthélemy St. Hilaire, a recognized germanophile,² as Ferry's Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1881, which precluded Rambaud's consideration of the position in that ministry. The discord between Rambaud and Ferry which may have existed concerning Russia left Rambaud neither dissatisfied with his rôle under Ferry in the Ministry of Public Instruction, nor (as their later co-operation demonstrated) with Ferry himself. Rambaud chose to remain at the Ministry of Public Instruction until the first Ferry government fell in November, 1881; but he had already begun, in the autumn of that year, to extricate himself from the position of chef de cabinet, by accepting an offer to teach Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century History at the newly created Ecole Normale supérieure d'institutrices at Fontenay-aux-Roses.³ Simply stated, the offer of a position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came too late in the course of Rambaud's intellectual development.

¹Giers, op. cit., p. 10. See also Fondation Jules Ferry, Bibliothèque Municipale, St. Dié, "Entretien avec Mohrenheim, le 6 février, 1888."

²E. M. de Vogtlé, Journal, 22 May, 1881, p. 253.

³Annuaire de l'Instruction Publique, 1881, p. 76; 1884, p. 58. With Rambaud at this academically prestigious school, where he was to lecture until 1888, were Albert Sorel and Fustel de Coulanges.

Association with Ferry had assured Rambaud's future. Instead of the Quai d'Orsay, Rambaud chose to return to academic life; and Ferry (who had been instrumental in having Rambaud named chevalier of the Legion of Honour),¹ signed a decree appointing Rambaud "chargé de cours" in Contemporary History at the Sorbonne, on November 9, 1881, the day before the resignation of his first ministry, and as a parting gesture to his old friend.² Two years later, when Ferry was once again prime minister, the chair of Contemporary History was created in the Faculty of Letters at the University of Paris and Rambaud was named to the newly created position³—a position, it might be added, which Rambaud might well have used to further Franco-Russian rapprochement, but did not.

Rambaud's work within the education ministry between 1879 and 1881 had left him little time to keep abreast of the latest French scholarly analysis of Russia. It may be conjectured that, as a result of this inattention, as well as of a diminishing familiarity with the Russian language, Rambaud abandoned the field to those more willing. Certainly the Livret de l'étudiant lends support to this impression;

¹A. N., F¹⁷25893. Decret No. 8973, 9 February, 1880.

²A. N., F¹⁷25893. Rambaud's personal record with the Ministry of Public Instruction. In 1882, he taught Geography at the Ecole normale supérieure at Sèvres. See Annuaire de l'Instruction Publique, 1882, p. 54.

³A. N., F¹⁷25893. Rambaud's personal record with the Ministry of Public Instruction. See also Revue Internationale de l'enseignement, Vol. 7 (1884), p. 95; Annuaire de l'Instruction Publique, 1884, p. 91.

instead of a curriculum devoted to Russian history, Rambaud's time was more than generously given to such subjects as Colonial India, India in the Nineteenth Century, Germany 1813-1848, Europe in 1848 and French Africa.¹ Yet, to suggest that he was no longer either interested in Russia, or, that he no longer thought her necessary to France, would be amiss. In 1883, the year of his appointment to the chair in Contemporary History, Rambaud reviewed Leroy-Beaulieu's L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes for the Revue bleue. The significance of this review is not to be found in his good opinion of the work discussed, but in the rare personal reflection it revealed:²

On voit ce que l'auteur a gagné à ne vouloir être qu'un observateur consciencieux, impartial, traduisant exactement ce qu'il voyait, sans se laisser troubler par certaines allures énigmatiques du sujet soumis à son examen.

The credit which Rambaud gives to Leroy-Beaulieu's objectivity may have been by way of complimenting him; but Rambaud also revealed a certain regret for his own partiality for those very "allures énigmatiques du sujet soumis à son examen," and for the wholehearted support of a country which he now viewed as troubled, suspended between the past and the future. Rambaud feared that, because of the assassination of the Tsar in 1881, the hope for freedom in Russia would be crushed

¹ Livret de l'étudiant, 1887-88, p. 21; 1888-89, p. 24; 1889-90, p. 24; 1890-91, p. 24; 1891-92, p. 25; 1892-93, p. 24.

² A. Rambaud, "La Russie d'après M. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu," La Revue politique et littéraire (Revue bleue), Vol. 2, 1883, p. 815.

by a return to despotism.¹ Given such reflections, it would have been surprising had Rambaud not re-evaluated his thoughts with regard to the necessity of Russia's friendship in the rebuilding of the élan vital of France.

It was Rambaud's association with Ferry which had altered his view. It had brought him not only to the very core of the efforts to establish the Republic, but, through educational reform, to assist in the republicanization of the nation's future citizens. In helping to promote this goal, Rambaud had come face to face with the complexities of political lobbying. He had wholeheartedly endorsed Ferry's efforts of educational reform because he believed them to be in the interest of building a strong nation. During these years, Rambaud became convinced, not only that domestic concerns should take precedence over international matters, but, particularly, that the revitalization of France had to be found within France herself.

Rambaud's withdrawal from the centre of political activity, as well as his diminished interest in Russia, must in no way be construed as the negation of his ideal of working for the reestablishment of France. On the contrary, the period 1881-1883 was for him a period of reorientation. The change in emphasis from his focus upon Russia to a concern with France herself, necessitated new associations, and a new direction for his talent as an historian. After 1881, Rambaud committed himself, through the historical study of the French nation,

¹Ibid., p. 816.

to demonstrate how his countrymen could avoid repeating the errors of the past and become better able to work together to achieve the same ideal—a free, equal, prosperous and strong republican France.¹ Without a sense of the history of their own institutions:²

... verrions-nous tous les jours se produire des systèmes qu'on nous présente comme nouveaux, mais qui sont, depuis longtemps, condamnés par l'expérience la plus concluante. . . . Ceux qui, en politique, s'emportent à des conclusions hâtives et violentes prouvent simplement qu'ils n'ont pas observé ou pas observé avec assez de patience, ni tenu assez compte des observations et des expériences accumulées par leurs devanciers, c'est-à-dire des enseignements de l'histoire.

Ramnaud worked unceasingly toward this goal after leaving Ferry, closing out the chapters of his relationship with Leger and opening a life-long relationship with Ernest Lavisse. Like Ramnaud, Lavisse approached the question of rélevement from outside the nation, and he demonstrated the reasons for the defeat of the Second Empire by examining the history of Germany.³ In the later 1880's, both his-

¹A. Ramnaud, Histoire de la Civilisation contemporaine en France, Paris, 1888, p. x.

²Ibid., pp. viii, ix.

³Ernest Lavisse, Etude sur l'une des origines de la monarchie prussienne, ou la Marche de Brandebourg sous la dynastie ascanienne, Paris, 1875; La Fondation de l'Université de Berlin, à propos de la réforme de l'enseignement supérieur en France, avec une note sur l'Université allemande de Strasbourg, Paris, 1876; Etude sur l'histoire de Prusse, Paris, 1879; Essais sur l'Allemagne impériale, Paris, 1888; Trois empereurs d'Allemagne: Guillaume Ier, Frédéric III, Guillaume II, Paris, 1888; Le Grand Frédéric avant l'avenement, Paris, 1893. An extensive examination of Lavisse's work is made by Götde-Baumanns, op. cit., pp. 66-81, 114-120, 122-129.

torians became convinced of the indestructability of France and of what, for them, was providential, her resiliency.

Between 1880 and 1886, Leger continued to promote understanding between France and the Slav countries. With the co-operation of Rambaud, he had undertaken and successfully accomplished a mission to Moscow and he had been appointed to the Ecole supérieure de Guerre to teach Russian. After Rambaud left the ministry to pursue his interest in French history and civilization, Leger had the first volume of Nouvelles études Slaves published. In 1884, he was named officier de l'Instruction publique.¹ In 1885, following Chodzko, Leger reached the apex of his academic career with his appointment to the Collège de France, following which he was named honorary professor at the Ecole des langues Orientales vivantes.² In the same year, he was asked by the Bulgarian government to act as a "correspondant" for students of that country in Paris, a service which he performed until the appointment of Dr. Zolotovitch as the first diplomatic agent of Bulgaria in 1896.³ The following year, in 1886, the second volume of Nouvelles

¹A. N., F¹⁷25832. Leger's personal record with the Ministry of Public Instruction.

²A. N., F¹⁷25832. Ibid.

³A. N., F¹⁷25832. In gratitude for his interest in the Bulgarian students, Leger was decorated with the "Médaille d'Argent de l'Ordre pour les Arts et Sciences de Bulgarie" and became "Commandeur de l'Ordre de Saint Alexandre de Bulgarie" (with rosette) in November 1898.

Upon his retirement in 1906, Doctor Zolotovitch, a long time friend of French President Emile Loubet (having attended the University of Montpellier together as students), was replaced by Dimitar Stantchef.

études Slaves was published. Leger now joined Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal on the faculty at the Ecole des Sciences politiques as professor of Russian language.¹

Leger's writings, whether in the form of books, articles or published lectures, all have the imprint of his own endeavour to develop an understanding among his compatriots, of the work, the personalities, the history and the literature of Bohemia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Russia and Serbia. Rather than unduly beating the drum on behalf of better Franco-Russian friendship, Leger had done his best:²

... pour tenir la balance égale entre ces peuples d'importance si inégale, parfois en lutte les uns contre les autres, mais qui tous ont droit à nos sympathies, car leurs intérêts ont souvent été solidaires des nôtres, et à des titres divers, triomphants ou vaincus, glorieux ou obscurs, ils ont tous combattu pour la cause de la chrétienté et de la civilisation. . . . A côté de la Russie triomphante, j'ai tenu à faire figurer la Pologne dont l'histoire n'est point achevée et dont la littérature est assurément une des plus glorieuses de l'Europe.

Nor did he fail to note the cause of "la Bohême qui, dans ses luttes avec le germanisme, combat pour notre cause. . . ." Leger would have been remiss in his own mind had he not taken the opportunity, as he had done in his Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie, to demonstrate the similarity of the Slav and French struggle against "le germanisme." He was opportunistic. But his desire to expound the cultural heritage of the Slavs in France was sincere. Having begun, perhaps fortuitously,

¹Organisation et programmes des cours à l'Ecole libre des Sciences politiques, 1886-1887, p. 23.

²L. Leger, Russes et Slaves, 3 vols., Paris, 1890-1899, Vol. II, p. vi.

with the publication in 1873 of Le monde slave, he had unswervingly followed it with Etudes Slaves, voyages et littérature, two volumes of Nouvelles études Slaves and finally three volumes of Russes et Slaves. Nor had it ended there; for, although his collection of essays ended with the third volume of Russes et Slaves in 1899, Leger's interest in the Slavs remained constant until his death in 1923.¹

To fill the gap of neglect by French authors, Leger, through these essays over a period of almost thirty years, had appealed to the French public to recognize that there had been, from the middle ages onward, "tout un mouvement intellectuel, littéraire, artistique,"² among the Slavs, even though a large part of the efforts of these people had been given over to the struggle against their adversaries for their national existence.³

Est-ce à dire d'ailleurs que même pendant cette période si douloureuse, les Slaves soient restés absolument

¹L. Leger, La Mythologie slave, Paris, 1901 (course at the Collège de France, 1896); Prague, Paris, 1907; La renaissance tchèque au XIX^e siècle, Paris, 1911; Serbes, Croates et Bulgares, Etudes historiques, politiques et littéraires, Paris, 1913; La Russie intellectuelle, études et portraits, Paris, 1914; Les anciennes civilisations slaves, Paris, 1921; La vie académique des Yougoslaves, Paris, 1921.

²Although the following articles are not exclusively concerned with the Middle Ages, they contain anecdotes and short descriptions of events or places that certainly offer the impressions which Leger wished to give: L. Leger, "Les Slaves du Sud et leur littérature, in Le monde slave (1897); "Quelques documents tchèques relatifs à Henri IV," in Nouvelles études Slaves, Vol. 1; "La Bulgarie inconnue," in Russes et Slaves, Vol. 1; "En Bohême: Notes de voyage," ibid., Vol. 2.

³Leger, Russes et Slaves, Vol. 1, p. viii.

inactifs, qu'ils n'aient rien produit dans l'ordre intellectuel et moral? Les noms de Jean Hus en Bohême, de Kopernik [Copernicus] en Pologne suffisent à répondre. . . .

As the apologist of Slav culture, Leger worked to impress upon his readers the glories of Slav histories: that the Hussite movement in Bohemia was comparable to the Reformation in Germany;¹ that the Renaissance of Poland in the Sixteenth Century was no less brilliant than the Renaissance in Italy;² and that Russian intellectual activity had been no less great than that of other Slav countries.³ But he also worked to impress upon his countrymen the necessity of a French presence in the field of Slavic studies. Otherwise, how were Frenchmen to avoid earlier misconceptions regarding the Slavs, when their information had come from Poles, who viewed the Russians through their own unfortunate experience, or from Germans, who were convinced of the dependence of the Slavs upon Germanic culture? "C'était pousser trop loin," Leger wrote, "la bonté d'âme que de prêter créance

¹L. Leger, "Jean Hus," in Nouvelles études Slaves, Vol. 1; "Jean Zizka et les Hussites," in Nouvelles études Slaves, Vol. 2.

²L. Leger, "La Pologne sous les derniers Jagellons, 1495-1572"; "La Pologne, Henri de Valois, Bathory, Les Vasa, 1572-1648," in Histoire générale, du IV^e siècle à nos jours (E. Lavissee and A. Rambaud, Eds.), Vols. 4 and 5.

³L. Leger, "Les théâtres en Russie," in Le monde slave (1873); "Le drame moderne en Russie," in Le monde slave (1897); "Le roman russe dans la littérature française," in Nouvelles études Slaves, Vol. 1; "Les débuts de la littérature russe," in Russes et Slaves, Vol. 1; "Le développement intellectuelle de la Russie," in Russes et Slaves, Vol. 2; "La comédie russe au XVIII^e siècle, Von Vizine," in Russe et Slaves, Vol. 2.

à tous les récits des émigrés."¹

This theme was the focus of Leger's attention at the Collège de France, where his appointment in 1885 to the Chaire de langues et littérature d'origine Slave as full professor necessitated a public opening lecture.² Leger spoke not of the Slavs but of Russia and of the indifference which in the past had forced Frenchmen to depend for their information about that country upon those, however gifted, whose point of view did not coincide with the national interest of France.³ In the past, representatives of the liberal school in France, "... soit qu'ils datassent de 1830 ou de 1848, les fils de croisés ou les fils de Voltaire avaient érigé en dogme la haine de la Russie et le dénigrement systématique de tout ce qui touchait aux institutions moscovites."⁴ The fundamental belief that Russia had been beyond the pale of civilization had been blindly accepted in France until 1870. The events of that year, Leger told his audience, had brought the realization to certain intellectuals, Leroy-Beaulieu and Rambaud among them, "que cette Russie tant calomniée aurait pu, en y jetant son épée, faire pencher

¹Leger, Nouvelles études Slaves, Vol. 1, p. 107.

²Leger, Le monde slave (1897), p. xxi.

³Leger, Leçon d'ouverture . . . au Collège de France, p. 13. Leger warned his audience that: "De tous ces ennemis vous ne pouvez guère attendre un jugement strictement impartial. Si des Slaves sont en lutte les uns contres les autres . . . gardez-vous de les croire sur parole et tâchez de vérifier leurs assertions."

⁴Leger, Nouvelles études Slaves, Vol. 1, p. 108.

de notre côté le plateau de la balance."¹ Russia's absolutism could no longer be condemned by constitutional monarchists, radical republicans and Napoleonic democrats, let alone liberals, without their asking what kind of government could survive and what methods could be used to introduce the reforms which most Western European countries had already realized at the price of much work and revolution. Leger may have tried to maintain a balance between all Slav nations in his writings, but his purpose with regard to Russia was politically pragmatic.

Leger reminded his listeners that, in 1885, politics for France could no longer be a sentimental affair. Nor was his aim, like that of Leroy-Beaulieu, deterred by the events in Russia between 1880 and 1885. To regain her lost spirit, it was necessary for France to convince herself of her own greatness by an alliance with a great power. Leger made it clear that "Il était fâcheux pour un grand état d'être réduit à l'alliance du pape, des Polonais, des Irlandais, des Hellènes et des Roumains."²

In his lectures at the Collège de France and elsewhere, Leger encouraged his students to pursue their studies in depth by first learn-

¹Ibid., p. 109. In an article for the Bibliothèque universelle et Revue Suisse, Leger noted that since the publication of Russica (a bibliography of works on Russia) by the Imperial Library in St. Petersburg in 1873, when only 10% of the foreign works on Russia were in French, Russia, more than any other Slavic country, had profited by the awakening of interest in France. See L. Leger, "Les écrivains français et la Russie," Bibliothèque universelle et Revue Suisse, Vol. 29 (1886), p. 94. (Later published in Nouvelles études Slaves, Vol. 2.)

²Leger, Nouvelles études Slaves, Vol. 1, p. 110.

ing the language.¹ No longer, he told his audiences, would a serious writer be able to express his views of Russia without having a knowledge not only of its language but of its literature, and without having travelled widely throughout the country. By his work, Leger hoped to make a useful contribution not only to "science" but also to the re-establishment of France in the eyes of other nations and, particularly, of Russia. "J'ai la ferme conviction de servir non seulement la science mais le pays en vous apprenant à mieux connaître une race que, malgré son éloignement, a été plus d'une fois en contact avec la nôtre et dont le développement ultérieur ne sera pas sans influence sur notre avenir."²

It was obvious that some Frenchmen had already turned their attention toward Russia. Historians and political scientists had begun studying Russia's history; poets and novelists were looking for Russian themes "qui trouvaient chez le grand public l'accueil le plus favorable."³ At a time when political relations between France and Russia had verged on the apathetic, French enthusiasm for Russian subjects, Leger pointed out, had been evidenced by the success of Les Danicheffs and L'Hetman at the Odéon Theatre, and of the opera Dimitri at the Théâtre lyrique.⁴ Jules verne's novel Michel Strogoff (1876) was an enormous literary and theatrical success in the 1880's. Like Rambaud and Leroy-Beaulieu

¹Leger, Leçon d'ouverture . . . au Collège de France, p. 30.

²Ibid., pp. 15, 31.

³Leger, Nouvelles études Slaves, Vol. 1, p. 110.

⁴Ibid., pp. 110, 111.

before him, Verne tended to minimize the eastern and especially the Tatar influence in Russian history.

Two other popular works of this period which gratified the French appetite for Russian subjects were C. Courrier's Histoire de la littérature contemporaine en Russie (which Leger favourably reviewed in the Revue critique) and Eugène Viollet-le-Duc's L'art russe, ses origines, ses éléments constitutifs, son apogée, son avenir. Courrier examined the impact of the more well known works of Tolstoy, Dostoyevski and Turgenev as well as of other writers then unknown in France. Leger thought it filled a great need in France, where foreign literature was little known, and felt that it was a work of considerable merit.¹ In L'art russe (which was based on Russian documentation placed at his disposal), Viollet-le-Duc took up the theme of an indigenous Russian art which had flourished since the Fifteenth Century. According to Corbet, by publishing L'art russe, Viollet-le-Duc "travaillait à l'œuvre de rapprochement dans le même esprit que Rambaud dans une autre branche des recherches."²

But, by the late 1880's, the results of this popularization of Russia had still not overwhelmed academic institutions with the desire to offer either language or civilization courses. Apart from the Collège de France and the Ecole des Langues orientales vivantes, few centres in France offered courses upon a continuing basis in Russian language,

¹ L. Leger, Revue critique, Vol. 1 (1875), pp. 379-380.

² Corbet, op. cit., p. 365.

literature or history. Although there was a popular demand for courses in Russian language in lycées, Leger's opinion was that those who promoted this idea were not without self-interest. "Aujourd'hui on demande que l'enseignement du russe soit introduit dans nos lycées. C'est une erreur," he wrote.¹ He obviously felt that the undertaking of this form of instruction would certainly fall within the realm of popular enthusiasm; and, despite charges levelled against him from time to time that he was himself a popularizer of Slavic culture, he warned: "Nos futurs bacheliers sont hors d'état de s'embarasser d'une langue aussi difficile. En revanche l'enseignement du russe peut et doit être introduit dans les universités. Mais il faut qu'il soit confié à des savants et non point à des maîtres de langes."²

In the decade following the signing of the Franco-Russian alliance, a third centre of Russian studies was inaugurated with Leger's support, at the University of Lille; but the curriculum leading to the Diplome d'études russe (with the qualification: Langue russe or Langue et littérature russe),³ offered a period of study of two semesters and could be followed by correspondence! Proficiency in such a course could not, obviously, be obtained by those who had no prior knowledge of the language. Five years before the introduction of this diploma

¹Leger, Le monde slave (1897), p. xi.

²Leger, Russes et Slaves, Vol. 3, pp. 120-123. See also Le monde slave (1897), p. xi, note 3.

³See La Revue des études Franco-Russes, Vol. 4 (1904), p. 316.

course, Leger had made strong representation to insure academic standards, by recommending that only those candidates prepared in the French educational system be permitted to teach the Russian language to French students, and that the Ministry of Public Instruction appoint a committee of specialists from the Ecole des Langues orientales vivantes and the Collège de France to test candidates for the diploma in Russian studies.¹ To protect the integrity of the discipline, Leger acted as president of the first jury to test candidates for the diploma at Lille in 1904.²

Popularization and Panslavism were, metaphorically, two-edged swords in Leger's life. Inspired as much by contemporary needs as by the desire to produce scientific studies, Leger was himself often accused of being a popularizer; and it may have been this which prevented his earlier entry into the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres.³ To the Slavs he gave his full attention; nor did he limit himself to any particular period or aspect of their history. His work filled a genuine need, as was evidenced by the fact that his Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie had five editions between 1879 and 1907, and Le monde slave two editions (in 1873 and 1897). But, late in his career, after the publication in 1907 of two short works, Histoire de Russie and Histoire de la littérature russe, Leger was once again

¹Leger, Russes et Slaves, Vol. 3, pp. 133, 135.

²See La Revue des études Franco-Russe, Vol. 4 (1904), p. 316.

³Puech, op. cit., p. 26.

subjected to the charge of popularization. Leger's reported answer summarized perfectly his point of view and his purpose: "Le devoir du savant est d'empêcher que la composition de livres si utiles ne tombe aux mains des demi-savants qui les quêtent et enseignent plus d'erreurs que de vérités."¹ To those who charged that he was an agent of Panslavism, Leger replied:²

Le panslavisme—vrai ou supposé—des petits peuples s'explique par leur faiblesse. C'est une arme de combat, ce n'est pas un idéal définitif. Toutes les nations ont le droit de vivre. Les Polonais, les Tchèques, les Slovaques, les Slovènes, les Croates n'ont nul besoin de se fondre dans l'unité russe et dans l'orthodoxie. Les Serbes et les Bulgares ne gagneraient rien à passer du joug turc sous la domination russe. Aujourd'hui comme il y a trente ans, je répète ces beaux vers de Kolar [the Czech poet]: 'Celui seul est digne de la liberté qui sait respecter la liberté d'autrui: celui qui met des esclaves aux fers est lui-même un esclave.'

Kollar's idealism was the vision to which Leger had clung throughout the difficult years of establishing Slavic studies in France. In the early part of his career, he had been frustrated by the lack of understanding for his aims from his compatriots and from Poles, whose fear of a growing closeness between France and the Slav nations was made all the more pronounced by the dominant position which Russia was assuming in French sympathy. However, Leger had not wavered in his endorsement of the thought of Cyprien Robert. Robert had solidly condemned "le panslavisme tsarien" and endorsed an equal union of all

¹Quoted by Puech, op. cit., p. 29.

²Leger, Le monde slave (1897), p. xxii.

Slav nations—"un] panslavisme fédéral," and it was exactly that concept of which Leger dreamed.¹ Writing of his own efforts to awaken France to the friendship of the Slavs, Leger said that he had never ceased:²

... d'appeler l'attention de ses compatriotes sur la nécessité d'étudier les peuples slaves, de se rapprocher d'eux, et sur les avantages qu'elle pourrait retirer de leur union... de dire que le danger était sur le Rhin, sur la Meuse, et non pas sur la Néva.

The Slavs had found a talented and dedicated apologist in Leger, who believed that by 1897, "les slaves ont à peu près cause gagnée en France, sauf les Polonais qui semblent expier leur popularité de jadis..."³ But at the same time, Leger had become alarmed by the degree of senseless enthusiasm demonstrated by his compatriots. In particular, Frenchmen had fallen so much under the spell of Russo-mania that "nous la mettons partout même là où elle n'a rien à voir." With an ironical comment, Leger epitomized what he felt to be the tone of the time: "On traite d'artistes russes les Polonais du conservatoire de Varsovie qui viennent se faire entendre à Paris. On n'a pas encore fait de Chopin un musicien russe, mais on y viendra."⁴ Leger

¹Leger, Le Panslavisme et l'intérêt Français, p. 109. Robert wrote a pamphlet on the subject of Panslavism in which he distinguished between the question of Russian domination of the Panslav movement and federal Panslavism. See Deux Panslavismes, Leipzig, 1847.

²Leger, Le Panslavisme et l'intérêt Français, p. 112.

³Leger, Le monde slave (1897), p. xxi.

⁴Ibid. Leger was not alone in expressing his distaste for the infatuation of the French population. "L'accès inévitable de russo-manie se manifeste à tel point dans la vie quotidienne de la société que Cornély proclame: 'Nous sommes en train de devenir cosaques.' (Le Matin, 11 octobre, 1896)." See Jacques Kayser, De Kronstadt à Khrouchtchev, Voyages franco-russes, 1891-1960, Paris, 1962, p. 58.

was no more pleased with his compatriots' adulation of Russia than he had been with their extremes of ignorance or desire to implant the study of the Russian language in lycées. Once again, as he had done before, he asked that the Slavs be taken seriously and studied with the understanding which their culture and political progress deserved, not just as a fad. "Les hommes de science et de critique ont le devoir de réagir contre ces engouements puérils qui n'ajoutent rien à notre dignité nationale."¹

Leger maintained his close connection with the Slavs, despite his loss of support from Rambaud. His remarkable talent for Slav languages and his deep knowledge and understanding of the Slavs had been useful in furthering his aim of recruiting friends for France. Leger's objectives, however, were never concealed from either the Slavs themselves or from the French nation whose servant he always wished to be. Having been instrumental in the establishment and maintenance of Slavic studies in France, he turned his attention to the furtherance of French interest abroad by his participation in the creation in Prague of a branch of the Alliance pour la propagation de la langue française;² then, in Paris, with Ernest Denis and Leroy-Beaulieu, to the founding of the Association Franco-Slave.³ Few scholars, observed Théophile

¹Ibid., pp. xxi-xxii.

²L. Leger, Les intérêts Français en Bohême, Paris, 1906, pp. 1, 7. See also Puech, op. cit., p. 26.

³La Revue des études Franco-Russe, Vol. 10 (1910), p. 88.

Homolle, President of the Académie, had had so much influence on the events of war and politics, "Leger eut ce privilège de servir efficacement la cause commune de la France."¹

The eight-year period ending in 1883 had been momentous for Rambaud. He had left the Universities of Caën and Nancy and abandoned his interest in Russia, in order to enter the Ferry administration, before returning to academic life as professor of Contemporary History at the University of Paris, where he became a defender of Ferry's colonial policy. The years with Ferry clearly altered his aims as well as his involvement with Russia; by rejecting a career in diplomacy, he excluded himself at this critical time from direct influence on Franco-Russian relations. After 1881, Rambaud would devote himself directly to the service of the Republic by emphasizing its ideals and exalting its heritage.

¹Homolle, op. cit., p. 6.

CHAPTER SIX

Lessons from the past; sentinels
for the future.

The five years following Rambaud's departure from the Ministry of Public Instruction in 1881 were years of intense development for France in international politics. Characterized by A. J. P. Taylor as the period of French "entente with Germany,"¹ they were politically dominated by the person and spirit of Jules Ferry. Europe witnessed a redirected France occupying herself internationally with such diverse events as the acquisition of Tunisia, the beginnings of the Egyptian Question and the completion of the French Empire in Indo-China. But, in 1885, Ferry's political star waned dramatically over Lang-Son. Domestically, a patriotic revival arose with General Boulanger as its figurehead. As thorny a problem as it may have been to the French government and, in retrospect, as short-lived, Boulangism epitomized a form of nationalism approved by groups in other countries, notably Russia,² a country toward which advocates of revanche, particularly

¹Taylor, op. cit., pp. 297, 298, 301, 309.

²A. D. C. P.: Russie. Telegraphic despatch, 5 March, 1887, Vol. 275, fo. 262.

Boulanger was sent a sword from a group of ardent Slavophiles on the blade of which was inscribed: "Qui vive? La France. Dieu favorise les audacieux. Au plus digne. La Russie, Fevrier, 1887."

Déroulède, were pushing France.¹

Leger, during this time, continued to promote understanding between France and the Slav nations, choosing only select moments, such as his opening lecture at the Collège de France in 1885, to stress the advantages of a good knowledge of, and rapport with, Russia. In the 1880's, Rambaud and Leroy-Beaulieu began to choose new interests. Their desire to serve France by writing of Russia turned to serving her by writing of the spirit by which she was animated. Rambaud sought to awaken his compatriots to the resilience of their country and to a sense of pride in her accomplishments;² Leroy-Beaulieu drew the

¹A.D.C.P.: Russie. Ormesson to Freycinet, 2 August, 1886, Vol. 274, folios 3-6; Déroulède was warmly received by "un groupe slavophile militant désireux de voir donner à la politique étrangère de l'Empire une direction anti-allemande." The event was looked upon by the Russian government with great suspicion. See also Ormesson to Freycinet, 23 August, 1886, Vol. 274, fos. 60-69 verso; and, Telegraphic Despatch, 27 August, 1886, Vol. 274, fo. 74. Paul Déroulède was an ardent supporter of Général Boulanger. See Jacques Chastenet, La République des Républicains, 1879-1893, Paris, 1954, p. 182; and, F.H. Seager, The Boulanger Affair, Political Crossroad of France, 1886-1889, Ithaca, N.Y., 1969, pp. 193-195.

²Immediately following his departure from the Ministry, Rambaud attempted to reciprocate Ferry's kindnesses to him by editing fifty-seven pages of documents concerning the invasion of Tunisia—an event which had cost Ferry his government in 1881. Rambaud not only justified Ferry's action, but used the opportunity to demonstrate the resurgent power of French arms, and for the first time, his concept of the recuperative energy of France. These documents were published under the title of Les Affaires de Tunisie (Paris, 1882).

Paul Robiquet, editor of Jules Ferry's Discours et Opinions . . . confirmed the intent of Les Affaires de Tunisie with the statement that: "la pacification a été assurée et le prestige des armes françaises glorieusement rétabli jusqu'aux confins de la Tripolitaine." See Discours et Opinions . . ., Vol. 5, p. 526. See also Girardet, op. cit., p. 98.

attention of his countrymen to the duties imposed on them by the Revolution and the responsibility of their heritage.

During this same period, Leroy-Beaulieu was joined on the faculty of the Ecole libre des Sciences politiques by a former student of the school who had recently achieved recognition as a student of Franco-Russian relations—Albert Vandal. At the Ecole in 1883, Vandal found a group of men whose ideas corresponded with his own.¹

Encouraged by his family to make his career in the service of the state, Vandal himself would have preferred the field of diplomacy; but his father encouraged him to enter the Conseil d'Etat.² In 1877, at the age of 24, he had successfully completed both his doctorate of law and the examinations for the Conseil d'Etat.³ His career at the

¹Vandal's course at the Ecole libre des Sciences politiques, "Affaires d'Orient depuis 1856" was offered in alternating years as a complement both to Albert Sorel's lectures on the diplomatic history of Europe since 1789 and to Leroy-Beaulieu's course in contemporary Western European Affairs. Others teaching at the Ecole in 1883 were: Alexandre Ribot; T. Funck-Brentano; Albert Sorel; and, Francis Charmes, political director at the Quai d'Orsay in 1887.

Students of the Ecole became prime candidates for French governmental positions. This is evidenced by the fact that, from the year 1880, all candidates received into Inspection des Finances were trained at the school. But, perhaps more important, in 1890, 39 of the 47 men who had been accepted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were graduates of the school. See Organisation et programme des cours à l'Ecole libre des Sciences politiques, 1883-1884, pp. 6-7, 23; 1890-1891, p. 8.

²Philippe de Segur, "Albert Vandal," R.D.M., 15 November, 1910, p. 247.

³A.A.F., Collection Martignac: III, G. Saint-Paul to Jean de Martignac, 17 September, 1910.

Conseil, though not a failure, was a mistake:¹

Mon avancement fut entravé par mon nom; car quoique je n'eusse pris jamais aucune part à la politique militante, on se rappelait que mon père avait été directeur général des postes sous l'empire. C'est donc à mon origine, dont je suis très fier, car j'ai gardé un culte profond pour mon père, que je dois d'avoir cherché ma voie en dehors du Conseil d'Etat.

In his youth, Vandal had travelled widely, particularly in the Scandinavian countries and in Russia.² It seems to have been as a result of these travels that he began to examine France's connections with Turkey and particularly with Russia. He was of the opinion that it was the diplomatic situation in Eastern Europe, from the time of Peter the Great until the reign of Nicholas I, which had prevented the conclusion of an alliance between France and Russia.³ By a critical analysis of France's early relations with Russia, Vandal demonstrated that at no time in the history of France could she afford to be detached from the problem of north-eastern Europe: the maintenance, the ruin, or the reestablishment of France's influence in Europe depended upon the policy which she adopted with regard to that area.⁴

¹Vandal speaking of himself in the Gazette de France, 12 October, 1896. See also L'Eclair, 13 December, 1896.

²In 1875, Vandal published En Karriole à travers la Suède et la Norvège, memoirs of his travels. He also travelled in Greece, Turkey and Italy. See A.A.F. Collection Martignac: III, G. Saint-Paul to Jean de Martignac, 17 September, 1910.

³G. Monod, "Nécrologie: Albert Vandal," Revue Historique, Vol. 105, 1910, p. 351.

⁴A. Vandal, Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie, Paris, 1882, p. xv.

One year before he joined the Ecole libre des Sciences politiques, Vandal had demonstrated in Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie that France had been given two choices in the Eighteenth Century with regard to Russia. First, she might have turned toward Russia, even though by so doing she would have had to sacrifice her traditional alliances; or secondly, she might have tightened these alliances, and pushed Russia more toward Asia, shutting off her access to the civilized world. "Malheureusement le caractère de notre politique pendant le dix-huitième siècle, dans ses rapports avec la Russie, fut l'indécision . . . si nos hommes d'Etat eurent parfois l'intelligence du bien, il en eurent trop rarement la volonté!"¹ France had denied herself the friendship of Russia by maintaining traditional alliances with Sweden, Poland and Turkey. Subsequently, France had generally continued to ignore Russia and was interested in an alliance militaire only when Russia had allied herself with Austria. As a result of this vacillating policy, those allies for whom France had at one time sacrificed closer ties with Russia, were ruined; and France herself was "réduite à de mesquines intrigues, isolée en Europe, elle voyait la grand problème soulevé en Orient depuis le commencement du siècle se résoudre sans elle et contre elle par la triple alliance du Nord."²

Vandal considered a French alliance with Russia to be the prerequisite to a balance of power in Europe. He indicated its effectiveness as well as its limitations. A conservative and defensive alliance,

¹Ibid., p. viii.

²Ibid., p. 432.

he believed, would have stopped Germany's ambitions in the past and would be a support against future and possibly more serious disagreements with that country. The influence of Vandal's opinion was evident in an address on French diplomacy entitled "De l'Alliance Franco-Russe" given at the Ecole libre des Sciences politiques:¹

M. Albert Vandal . . . nous montre en maints endroits la France dans une situation analogue à celle qu'elle occupe aujourd'hui, et nous fait connaître à quelles alliances elle eut recours pour se défendre contre l'Allemagne, son ennemi séculaire. . . . Nous croyons donc pouvoir appliquer, comme conclusion à notre sujet, les paroles textuelles de l'éminent historien et dire: qu'au point de vue purement politique, la France voulant 'se défendre aujourd'hui contre l'Allemagne' ne saurait choisir de meilleure alliée que la Russie, cette dernière réalisant pleinement le 'premier principe de notre ancienne politique' énoncé par M. Vandal puisqu'elle est aussi bien, pour nous, 'une alliance dans le Nord qu'une alliance dans l'Orient.'

Vandal's influence reached beyond the Ecole to the diplomatic corps. Nicholas Giers, son of the Russian Foreign Minister, was secretary to the Russian embassy in Paris from 1861 to 1898. The aspirations for a diplomatic accord between Russia and France expressed in his retrospective Memoire were remarkably similar to those which had been expressed by Vandal in Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie in 1882. There had been the possibility of a serious alliance between France and Russia during the reign of Louis XV, Giers wrote; but the two countries, natural allies by geographical location as well as by lack of conflicting interests, had then and often

¹R. Chauvelot, De l'Alliance Franco-Russe, conférence diplomatique le 2 mars, 1898, Paris, 1898, p. 23.

since been involved in vain but disastrous wars with each other. Giers added that a Franco-Russian alliance in the 1880's would have made the two countries the arbiters of Europe: under their combined influence, a greater prosperity and grandeur would have once again been theirs.¹

Sidney Horowitz, writing in the Journal of Central European Affairs, has summarized in the most succinct way, the analysis of past problems in Franco-Russian relations which Vandal was attempting to put before the French public:²

Until the débâcle of Soubise at Rossbach, France, still 'la grande nation,' strove to exercise hegemony over Western Europe, while Petersburg was, in fact, the arbiter of the East since Poltava, Hango and Belgrade. A stable military and economic alignment of Versailles and Peterhof easily would have enabled both powers to consolidate their respective positions and to have achieved a bilateral domination of the Continent some seventy years in advance of Tilsit. It would have constituted a realistic and spectacular coup. How close did such a project come to fulfillment in the 1740's? . . .

What Horowitz neglected to ask in his analysis, was why Vandal felt it necessary to reveal this aspect of French history to the public. The answer lies in Vandal's belief in the use of history: "L'Histoire ne se refait pas, mais elle se continue et l'étude du passé, en jetant la lumière sur les desseins séculaires dont nous voyons se développer

¹Nicolas Giers, "L'Ambassade russe à Paris, 1861-1898: Les Mémoires de Nicolas Giers"(B. Jelavich, Ed.), Canadian Slavic Studies, Vol. 1, 1967, p. 228.

²S. Horowitz, "Albert Vandal and Franco-Russian relations, 1740-1746," Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. 14 (1954-1955), p. 123.

l'exécution, explique le présent et révèle parfois le secret de l'avenir."¹

According to Leroy-Beaulieu, Vandal knew how to disentangle the old and constantly recurring problems of the Near East and the Balkans which most scholars had found so complex, so confusing and always disturbing to the peace of Europe. "Il a toujours conservé pour cet éternel problème oriental, un intérêt passionné; il en connaissait les divers facteurs politiques, religieux, nationaux; il en a jusqu'à la fin suivi les complications et les phases successives."²

By the age of 29, then, Vandal had written not only of his philosophy of history; he had also published a book which Horowitz calls "still the fullest treatment of the subject,"³ and for which he received the Prix Bordin of the Academie Française.⁴ His father, Count Edouard Vandal, wrote to Jules Simon, sending him a copy of Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie and asked him to have the book reviewed.⁵ In due course, the Bonapartist newspaper Le Gaulois (the editor of which in 1881 was Elie de Cyon) published an exceedingly flattering review of the work and Vandal's career as an historian was launched.⁵

¹Vandal, Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie, p. 434.

²A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Albert Vandal," Annales des Sciences Politiques, Vol. 25 (1910), p. 590.

³Horowitz, op. cit., p. 123. Vandal also wrote an article on the same subject, "Louis XV et l'impératrice de Russie," La Revue politique et littéraire, Vol. 1 (1882), p. 343.

⁴Le Figaro, 5 September, 1910.

⁵A.N., 87 AP 7. Edouard Vandal to Jules Simon, 19 January, 1882, and 16 May, 1882.

⁶Le Gaulois, 13 May, 1882.

The three works written by Vandal between 1882 and 1896:

Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie, Une Ambassade française en Orient, and Napoléon et Alexandre I, all had as a theme the search by France for allies to the east of its continental rivals, Austria, the Germanic states and the coalitions of Central Europe, through whom it might create a perpetual diversion. Vandal implied throughout that it was this search which had governed French diplomacy for centuries and from which had resulted the period of greatest success for French hegemony and grandeur.

As with Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie, Vandal prepared his second work, Une Ambassade française en Orient by researching the archives in Constantinople, in 1887,¹ with the patriotic desire to sort out from the past that which had constituted French grandeur, that which had altered it and, above all, that which would rebuild it. After showing the desire of Austria and Russia in the Eighteenth Century to overrun Turkey (Austria thereby regaining its domination of the Balkans, while Russia pressed for access to the Mediterranean) Vandal demonstrated the role which France single-handedly played in reaction to this pressure. By regulating the destiny of the Balkans and of Turkey, France had acted as the enlightened arbiter of Europe.²

France posant la première un principe que d'autres gouvernements devaient reprendre plus tard et ériger

¹Monod, "Nécrologie: Albert Vandal," p. 35.

²A. Vandal, Une Ambassade française en Orient, Paris, 1887, p. iii.

en dogme absolu, elle déclara que l'existence de la Turquie importait au repos même de la chrétienté, puis, s'interposant entre les partis, par une campagne diplomatique menée avec habileté, terminée avec gloire, fit conclure sous sa médiation les traités de Belgrade qui assurèrent à l'Orient vingt-neuf années de paix; depuis lors, les efforts réunis des puissances et les délibérations des congrès n'ont jamais réussi à fixer pour une aussi longue période les destinées de cette région .

Vandal noted in 1887 that Austria had once again regained her influence in the Balkans, where French diplomatic successes in the past, under the Marquis de Villeneuve, had been able to contain the Habsburgs. According to Vandal, it had been Villeneuve (ambassador to Constantinople from 1728 to 1740), who convinced the Porte to place the destiny of its people in the hands of France. It was Villeneuve, shown as a man of the Enlightenment, who was able to instil in the Turks the needed courage to resist both Russia and Austria. It was Villeneuve who was the principal architect of the 1739 Treaty of Belgrade. It was Villeneuve who, by stopping the encroachments of Russia upon Turkey, also forced the Austrians to withdraw. As a result: "la paix de Belgrade . . . doit être considérée surtout comme un triomphe de la France sur l'influence germanique."¹

Although neither Villeneuve nor French diplomacy could foresee these long-range aspects of a policy which was entirely devoted to checking Russian and Austrian designs, the protection afforded by France to the Christians under Turkish domination did permit various

¹Ibid. , pp. iv, vi, vii.

nationalities to regain their rightful heritage. "Lorsque la Russie reparut dans ces parages, elle se trouva en présence de groupes nationaux déjà formés et dut les accepter pour auxiliaires."¹ Whereas, in the Eighteenth Century, Russia would have totally dominated these Slavic peoples, in the Nineteenth Century these same national groups, having been allowed to mature through past French intervention, were not only better able to withstand the force of Russia, but to act as Slav brothers and to provoke a national feeling within Russia.

As Vandal saw it, pressures imposed upon it from outside prevent even the strongest nation from charting its own diplomatic course. At the time of French supremacy in Europe, during the periods of Louis XV and Napoleon, France, by force of circumstance, had to turn toward Russia. No country commands circumstance; rather, all nations obey it. But never did Vandal end with simple determinism; nor did his work merely present the meticulous unfolding of calamities which befell the French nation. An alliance with Russia, he would state in Napoléon et Alexandre I, might have lasted if, in 1809, Napoleon had not reinforced Russian fears of a regenerated Poland.²

In Une Ambassade française en Orient, Vandal pointed out that:³

La poursuite consciencieuse de la vérité historique
nous apprend à nous défier des affirmations téméraires
et préconçues; . . . Vu de loin et considéré à la super-

¹Ibid., p. viii.

²A. Vandal, Napoléon et Alexandre I: L'Alliance Russe sous le Premier Empire, 3 vols., Paris, 1891, 1893, 1896, Vol. 1, p. xi.

³Vandal, Une Ambassade française en Orient, p. xi.

ficie, le passé apparaît tout d'une pièce, bon ou mauvais, suivant l'époque que l'on envisage et surtout le procédé d'optique que l'on emploie. Au contraire, à se rapprocher du passé par une étude minutieuse, à s'efforcer d'en saisir les côtés divers et complexes, on se prend à constater que les périodes les plus décriées de notre histoire ont eu leur grandeur, de même que les régimes les plus vantés ont éprouvé leurs défaillances. Même sous Louis XV, la monarchie française accomplit des œuvres considérables, mais leur examen ne fait que mieux ressortir à nos yeux les fautes qui vinrent [sic] trop tôt démentir et compromettre cet éclatant début.

The welding together of circumstance and policy depended, Vandal reasoned, upon whether the individual in a position of power had clearly foreseen the opportunity: the onus of taking the right decision for the nation lay with the individual. What Vandal discovered, the common theme throughout his work, was the principle of the possibility of error made by the individual. Vandal's works, but principally Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie and Napoléon et Alexandre I, brought into full light a chronicle of events between France and Russia, filled with human mistakes which could have been avoided, but which, unfortunately, had been prolonged well into the Nineteenth Century.

An examination of France's glorious but forgotten past did not "sert uniquement à provoquer d'amers retours sur le présent et d'attristantes comparaisons," but would reveal France:¹

... dans toute la plénitude de ses forces, sachant à la fois se faire estimer et craindre, soutenant avec éclat son rôle de grande puissance, se montrant enfin dans le monde tout ce qu'elle doit être. La France

¹ Ibid., pp. x-xi.

d'il y a cent cinquante ans est déjà la France; ses efforts nous intéressent, ses succès nous enflamment, et j'éprouve, pour ma part, à découvrir quelque'une des prouesses de notre ancienne diplomatie . . . un tressaillement de plaisir qui me réjouit et me console.

To have raised his spirit was one thing; but, as Vandal himself stated, there was yet another reason:¹

Cette recherche ne saurait être dépourvue d'enseignement. . . . Nous nous trouvons amené de . . . dégager les faits avec leurs causes, à les suivre dans leur ordre et leur enchaînement, à en apprécier la valeur relative, par suite, à distinguer ce qui fit la puissance française, ce qui l'altéra et ce qui peut la refaire.

In his inaugural address to the members of the Académie Française, Vandal would point to the need for France's intellectual élite to orient the population toward the proper understanding of past events in order to avoid similar mistakes in the future. In addition, his expressed belief in the necessity of re-educating the population was not only a personal conviction but a philosophy which he believed would bring about the rejuvenation of the country, the recuperation of lost grandeur, and thus benefit all humanity.²

Unlike his predecessors, Rambaud and Leroy-Beaulieu, Vandal was the most consistent in his attachment and dedication to the study of Russia. Unlike Leger, whose interests were pragmatic and purely contemporary, and ultimately lay with the Slavs in general, Vandal's

¹Ibid., pp. xi, xii.

²A. Vandal, Discours prononcés dans la séance publique tenue par l'Académie Française pour la réception de M. Albert Vandal le 23 décembre 1897, Paris, 1897, p. 12.

historic curiosity was directed to events wholly in the past. It was in the past that the greatness of the French nation could be perceived. "L'histoire de la France," Vandal was quoted by Le Figaro, "est celle de ses résurrections; son étude ne donne pas toujours le goût de présent, elle donne toujours foi dans l'avenir."¹

In the 1880's, as Vandal began his career with an examination of Franco-Russian relations, Rambaud opened the doors to another career. He turned his attention to the monuments of French history and of the Third Republic. In 1886, a year after Ferry's defeat in the Chamber, Rambaud took up the fight to demonstrate to critics of Ferry's colonial policies, that France, by virtue of these endeavours, was doing nothing more than taking her rightful place in the modern world.² La France Coloniale was clearly a defence of Ferry's re-organized educational system and the reconstruction of France's colonial policy. The success of two such important undertakings testified to the revival of the country and evidenced the viability of French resiliency "du coeur même et des profondeurs de la nation."³

In his writings during this period, and particularly in his three volume work on French civilization, Rambaud demonstrated his unbound

¹A.A.F. : Collection Moulin: 0026.

²A. Rambaud (Ed.), La France Coloniale, Paris, 1886, p. iv.

³Robiquet, op. cit., Vol. 5, pp. 210-211. Speech on the Affairs of Madagascar before the Chamber of Deputies, 28 July, 1885.

faith in the recuperative power of France.¹ From the fire of revolution and the ashes of the Old Régime, he believed, had come progress which had given France "scientific liberty" and made possible the social and political changes which had led to the Third Republic.² These three volumes have as their purpose the confirmation of established republican values, as well as the search for a source of inspiration and strength for the continued orderly rebuilding of France's influence and power. Rambaud examined the constitutional forms tested by France and concluded that, until the Third Republic, none had reconciled the ideal of "liberté," "égalité" and, "ordre public" which he obviously felt had to be the primary concern of any régime.³

Rambaud was not alone in drawing attention, however subtly, to the need for maintaining a balance between liberty and public order. Leroy-Beaulieu approached the same problem through an analysis of the inter-relationship of two subjects in which he demonstrated a life-long interest: the philosophy of statecraft and its relation to religion.

Leroy-Beaulieu had cast his mind to this problem in 1874 with the study, for the Revue des deux mondes, of the spiritual activity of

¹A. Rambaud, Histoire de la civilisation française, 2 vols., Paris, 1885-1887, and Histoire de la civilisation contemporaine en France, Paris, 1888.

²Rambaud, Histoire de la civilisation contemporaine en France, p. 794.

³Ibid., p. x. Girardet defines this concept of Rambaud's which placed the accent upon order and authority, as "république plébiscitaire." See Girardet, op. cit., p. 16.

the Russian people.¹ He had become convinced, over the years, that an understanding of this fundamental aspect of Russian life was essential to an appreciation of the popular political spirit in that country. Persuaded that religion still exerted great influence, Leroy-Beaulieu continued to emphasize that the state had to be based as much upon the free satisfaction of the religious needs of the people as upon political freedom.² He saw only continued peril to the orderly growth of the modern state in the form of periodic revolutions and constant political upheavals as religious faith declined. In Les Catholiques libéraux in 1885, Leroy-Beaulieu had insisted that religious faith was the necessary substructure to the modern state. In this work, as in his articles on religion in Russia, Leroy-Beaulieu saw socialism, anarchy or "l'esprit révolutionnaire" as the "fils aîné de l'incroyance."³ Historically, political liberty had always preceded religious liberty.⁴ In L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, he suggested that Alexander III grant religious liberty to the Russian people as a step to eventual

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes: L'Eglise russe, l'orthodoxie orientale et le culte grec en Russie," R.D.M., 1 March, 1874.

²A. Leroy-Beaulieu, Les doctrines de haine: l'antisémitisme, l'antiprotestantisme, l'anticléricalisme, Paris, 1902, p. 227.

³A. Leroy-Beaulieu, Les Catholiques libéraux, l'Eglise et le Libéralisme de 1830 à nos jours, Paris, 1885, pp. 15 ff. He continued this theme at a later time in La Papauté, le Socialisme, et la Démocratie, Paris, 1892; as well as in his pamphlet Pourquoi nous ne sommes pas socialistes, Paris, n.d.

⁴Leroy-Beaulieu, Les Catholiques libéraux, pp. 36, 37.

political liberty.¹ Clearly, the inference for both France and Russia, was that if religious liberty—the right of religions to exist freely within the state—did not exist, then one had to ask whether indeed political liberty yet existed.

The conflict in Leroy-Beaulieu's mind between liberty and the legitimate aspirations of the state for order, would continue. He was always certain, however, that to be true to her own ideals, to be faithful to the feeling of the century, France must exemplify those principles domestically which she had propagated throughout Europe and give to all Frenchmen, without denominational exception, the equal benefit of liberty of expression.² Leroy-Beaulieu's study of the relationship of politics and religion eventually led, at one of the most critical periods in the intellectual history of France, to the introduction, in 1896, of a course at the Ecole libre des Sciences politiques entitled "Les questions religieuses et la politique."³

The questions of civic responsibility, order and liberty, the continued steady growth of the Republic on all fronts, neither menaced domestically by the right of the left, nor threatened internationally by the conflict of her interests in Europe or abroad, was the aim not only of Vandal but of Rambaud and Leroy-Beaulieu as well. The ap-

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Vol. 3, p. 657.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, Les doctrines de haines . . ., p. 227.

³Organisation et programme des cours à l'Ecole des Sciences politiques, 1896, 1897, p. 53.

proaching centenary of the Revolution of 1789 was instrumental in provoking concern for the continuation of the revolutionary principles already established.¹ Leroy-Beaulieu encouraged Frenchmen at this time not to abandon their national political ideology, which he regarded as having been the vocation of France in Europe for an entire century. He believed that people were thrall to their past, and that France, which had played a major role upon the European stage, could only continue in the image created for her by drawing support from her past—drawing support from history. Leroy-Beaulieu, like Rambaud and Vandal, appealed for an awareness within the French public of the continuity of the spirit of the French Revolution.²

Leroy-Beaulieu, Rambaud and Vandal were putting their most energetic efforts into reminding Frenchmen of their responsibilities to their nation. Each, in his own way, had already made a major contribution to the French awareness of Russia and, in the 1880's, was endeavouring to direct the national consciousness of his compatriots towards resolving problems within the nation itself. But in the midst of the political unrest, public scandal and, increasing cynicism engendered by "la farce politique"³ toward the end of the decade, public

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, La Révolution et le libéralisme, Paris, 1890 (see particularly Chapter I); E.M. de Vogüé, "Réflexions sur l'Exposition du Centenaire," R.D.M. (9 articles), 1889. See especially Article IX: "Dernières remarques," 1 November, 1889.

²Leroy-Beaulieu, La Révolution et le libéralisme, p. x.

³A. Scholl, La Farce politique, Paris, 1887.

opinion had only just fully grasped the meaning and promise of a possible Franco-Russian alliance.

Leroy-Beaulieu had argued, in vain, through the pages of the Revue bleue, the Revue des deux mondes and, eventually, in La France, la Russie et l'Europe that popular enthusiasm was not sufficient grounds on which to base an alliance; that the weight of any alliance with Russia would have to be borne by France, and, that before any alliance could be considered, France had to resolve her own domestic problems.¹ His arguments, however, were swept aside by the increasing popularity of Russia in the Paris press. Russophile sentiment guided, to a large extent, by Elie de Cyon's La Nouvelle Revue, the newspaper Figaro and, after August 1887, L'Intransigeant² (although these were not the exclusive purveyors of pro-Russian propaganda). A number of specialized reviews were launched at this time in Paris, prompted, no doubt, by the current popularity of their subject. Arsène Houssaye's Revue de Paris et St. Petersbourg, founded in 1887, blatantly defined its purpose by explaining that its name symbolized the mutuality of feeling and political ambitions of the two capitals. The role of the review was to be:³

¹ See Chapter 4.

² E. M. Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870-1914, London, n.d. (reprinted, ca. 1967), p. 142.

³ La Revue de Paris et St. Petersbourg, Vol. 1, 1887, p. 186. "Suivre de près le mouvement de la vie politique, littéraire et artistique en Russie, signaler ses diverses phases et transformation," was the object of a feature by Ivan Rienko entitled "La vie Russe." In the first of the series of these articles, the author referred to Rambaud as the person who had introduced Russian history to France, and to Leroy-Beaulieu as the man who had given Frenchmen "le tableau exact" of contemporary Russia. Ibid., Vol. 2, 1888, p. 166.

. . . le fil sur lequel court la pensée du coeur de la France au coeur de la Russie. Voilà pourquoi les noms de Paris et St. Petersbourg seront sans cesse accouplés dans cette publication nouvelle, qui est, avant tout, une oeuvre d'alliance artistique entre les deux pays . . . d'une de ces viriles amitiés de race qui profitent également à la gloire et à la sécurité de deux grandes nations.

Following this review by one year, the short-lived but vociferous La Vie Franco-Russe¹ chronologically led La Russie, La Revue des femmes Russes, and La Revue des études Russes (which later became La Revue des études Franco-Russes) in a spirited campaign to produce a surfeit of articles, the intention of which was to foster closer Franco-Russian ties.

The amnesty of the anarchist Prince Kropotkin in 1886, as well as the recall of the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, General Appert, caused no long-term difficulties between France and Russia. Two years later, the financial transactions which were to play such an important part in cementing these two nations were begun. These would lead directly to the accord de principe of 1891 and the convention militaire of 1893-1894. The success of the Russian loans, the success of journals devoted to the betterment of Franco-Russian relations, the more pronounced popular pro-Russian attitude in France should have

¹The editors stated, in the third number of this weekly, that their two previous issues had sold 60,000 copies, proving that "La Vie Franco-Russe traduit un sentiment universel, des préoccupations générales." They also revealed encouragement from Alsace and from Russia, but ". . . les Anglais et les Allemands . . . donnent à La Vie Franco-Russe, le baptême définitif." See La Vie Franco-Russe, 3 March, 1888, p. 51.

gratified the efforts of Leger, Rambaud, Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal; it should perhaps have given them an impetus to pursue their advantage; but instead, in 1890, when Rambaud published the two volumes of Recueil des Instructions données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France (under the auspices of La Commission des archives des affaires étrangères), he did little more than demonstrate the level to which relations between France and Russia had fallen in the ancien régime.

It was Albert Sorel's sensitive analysis that characterized the two volumes compiled by Rambaud as merely "une histoire des relations de la France et de la Russie qu'il publie autour des instructions données aux envoyés français."¹ The admonition of Sorel confirmed that Rambaud was contributing neither originality of presentation (the Russians themselves had already published—in French—many of the documents used by Rambaud), nor objectivity of analysis. Preoccupied with the contemporary position of the Third Republic, Rambaud was led by his sense of historical perspective to emphasize France's past intransigence and missed opportunities.² By chiding Rambaud for the fact that his historical analysis was not borne out by the documentation which he had presented, Sorel revealed that he misunderstood the co-ordinating synthesis of all of Rambaud's work. Rambaud was doing no more in the

¹Albert Sorel, "La France et la Russie," Revue bleue, Vol. 1, 1890, p. 127.

²A. Rambaud, Recueil des Instructions données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France, depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution Française, 2 vols., Paris, 1890, pp. xiv, xxix, xxxiii, xlvii.

Recueil des Instructions than he had done in La France Coloniale—demonstrating the mistakes of the ancien régime and stating his belief in the resilience of France. If an alliance between France and Russia materialized, it would prove conclusively to all that France had recovered her former position in Europe and that the Republic had augmented her greatness.

Nor did Leger take any more advantage of the popular craze for Russia than had Rambaud. Whereas early in his career Leger had encouraged, for those same political reasons, a bridge over Germany to the Slavs, in Russes et Slaves his concern was to modify an increasingly meaningless idolatry of Russia by demonstrating that the Russians, as well as Slavs generally, were more than the common enemy of Germany, they were a race with a great cultural heritage. He appealed for a genuine understanding of the Russians and the Slavs through serious study of the origins of the diverse nations concerned. Not only did "les progrès récents de l'histoire et de l'archéologie nous permettent de constater chez les Slaves orthodoxes, chez les Serbes, les Bulgares, les Russes, même au moyen âge, tout un mouvement intellectuel, littéraire, artistique . . . " ¹ (although this movement was "moins intense que le notre"); but a serious approach was justified because, ". . . à l'époque où nous sommes, nulle race en Europe ne mérite plus sérieusement d'être étudiée que la race slave; aucune n'a donné depuis un demi-siècle plus de preuves de vitalité et d'aptitude au progrès." ²

¹Leger, Russes et Slaves, Vol. 1, p. viii.

²Ibid., Vol. 1, p. xiv.

While the four historians were agreed that France could not be reproached for wishing to move closer to Russia, they were nevertheless of the opinion that their countrymen had to better inform themselves before they could sanction diplomatic commitments. Superficial acquaintance was not adequate preparation for the kind of political alignment which the public was beginning to expect by 1891. This concern formed the unifying theme of articles about Russia published in the Revue Encyclopédique in that year, four of which were written by Leger, Rambaud, Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal—the only time that their work appeared together in a single volume. But, while the view of these four authors was undoubtedly meant to reach a wide market, neither Leger, Rambaud nor Leroy-Beaulieu presented anything more than they had already done in the past. The view Leger offered in "Le développement intellectuel de la Russie jusqu'au règne de Catherine II" was based upon the same cultural theme as those essays presented in Nouvelles études Slaves;¹ Rambaud's "Formation de la Russie: nationalité et état," dividing the growth of Russia into three distinct aspects—nationality, state and empire—was for the most part gleaned from his own Histoire de la Russie published in 1878;² Leroy-Beaulieu's "Le mir et la commune Russe" was based upon his findings recorded in L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes.³ While Leger, Rambaud and Leroy-Beaulieu

¹L. Leger, "Le développement intellectuel de la Russie, jusqu'au règne de Catherine II, Revue Encyclopédique, Vol. 1, 1891, pp. 741-744. Reprinted in Russes et Slaves, Vol. 2, pp. 1-21.

²A. Rambaud, "Formation de la Russie: Nationalité et Etat," Revue Encyclopédique, Vol. 1, 1891, pp. 777-785.

³A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Le Mir et la Commune Russe," Revue Encyclopédique, Vol. 1, 1891, pp. 805-811. See L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Vol. 1, pp. 416-447, 513-531.

rehashed the origins, cultural heritage and institutions of the Russian people, Vandal's contribution, "Rapports de la Russie et de la France jusqu'à la Restauration" (excerpted from Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie published in 1882 and the first volume of the just published Napoléon et Alexandre I), chose to expose the virtues and faults of earlier diplomatic relations: a subject whose relevancy in 1891 could not be disputed.¹ Vandal, motivated by the same concern for an informed public, recounted in Napoléon et Alexandre I what he believed to be the causative events of the downfall of the First Empire.

Vandal wrote that, although history would fall short of "son caractère," if it was not disengaged from "des tendances et des sympathies présentes"; he also stated that history would entirely miss "son but, si elle ne cherchait dans le passé des airs et des leçons."²

The three volumes of Napoléon et Alexandre I (which showed a marked bias for Napoleon³), began to appear when French enthusiasm

¹A. Vandal, "Rapports de la Russie et de la France jusqu'à la Restauration," Revue Encyclopédique, Vol. 1, 1891, pp. 786-789.

²A. Vandal, Napoléon et Alexandre I, 3 vols., Paris, 1890, 1892, 1896, Vol. 1, pp. xvi-xvii; Louis Madelin, "Albert Vandal," Revue hebdomadaire, 17 September, 1910, p. 369. "Sans prétentions à infliger des leçons à tel régime, il ne lui déplaisait nullement que l'histoire fût, sous sa plume, pour le pays tout entier, une constante et utile leçon."

³Among many who felt that Vandal may have overstated his feelings for Napoleon, Haussonville wrote that: "... vous aurez quelque peine à leur [vos lecteurs] persuader que Napoléon fut avant tout un grand pacifique, tourmenté du besoin d'assurer la tranquillité du monde.... Vous avez subi, plus que vous ne pensez, Monsieur, le charme de votre héros." See B. d'Haussonville, "Réponse de M. le Comte d'Haussonville, Directeur de l'Académie, au discours de M. Albert Vandal prononcé dans la séance du 23 décembre, 1897," Discours prononcés... pour la réception de M. Albert Vandal, p. 47.

Emile Boutmy, recommending the first volume of Napoléon et Alexandre I to the Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques,

for an alliance with Russia was at its height. Vandal's intention was "à faire connaître la politique extérieure de Napoléon sous le rapport spécial que nous avons entrepris d'étudier"—that is to say, the policy of France toward Russia.¹ On the one hand, Vandal, proceeding as the analyst and critic of a tragedy, knew that the events discussed in Napoléon et Alexandre I would not recur; but, properly interpreted, they could serve as examples, and would profit France by showing that the maintenance, the ruin or the reestablishment of French influence depended upon her relations with the North and East of Europe. Like a tragic dramatist, Vandal separated the movement of events into three acts. The first volume of Napoléon et Alexandre I, "L'Alliance," filled with the friendship between the two emperors, analyzed the first genuine attempt at a Franco-Russian alliance. The second volume, "Le déclin de l'alliance," presented a series of tragi-comic situations and marriage negotiations in which both sides were duped. The third volume, "La rupture," presented the tragic dénouement of the play: distrust

wrote that: "Peut être M. Vandal représente-t-il un peu trop Napoléon comme n'ayant en vue que la paix et ne prenant les armes qu'à contre coeur." Boutmy, nevertheless, proposed "très décidément une souscription." See A.N., F¹⁷13464, E. Boutmy to the Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 24 June, 1891. Boutmy also recommended the second volume. Ibid., 22 February, 1893.

From A.A.F.: Collection Martignac, III, it appears that the third volume was also approved as the Minister of Public Instruction, 14 January, 1897, ordered sixty copies of that volume.

¹Vandal, Napoléon et Alexandre I, Vol. 1, pp. xxii-xxiii.

between the two men, which turned eventually to war. As Vandal pointed out, the alliance between Napoleon and Alexander carried with it the seeds of its own destruction.¹

The tragedy for Vandal was the destructive circumstance underlying the alliance. It was an alliance for war and conquest, a despoiling and devouring association filled with mutual suspicion, which inevitably revived old rivalries and hates and led to an explosion between the partners:²

... les résultats de leur lutte, fatale à Napoléon
et à la France, furent de sauver et de grandir
l'Angleterre, de relever la Prusse, c'est-à-dire
de préparer à la Russie de redoutables adversaires,
sans la faire avancer d'un pas vers les fins normales
de sa politique.

Having introduced this element of Homeric circumstance into the drive of a state to achieve its ends, Vandal pointed out that, in the years following the defeat and exile of Napoleon, attempts at rapprochement continued between France and Russia; but although the attempts were supported all the while by sustained good intentions, there had been interruptions and, in the Second Empire, a backward step. In retrospect, Vandal believed that:³

¹Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 544. It is not inconceivable that Vandal consciously approached these historical events from the perspective of a playwright. He was very involved with the stage, not only as an ardent theatre-goer, but as a member of the selection committee for dramatic entertainment in the Union artistique. See Segur, op. cit., p. 255.

²Vandal, Napoléon et Alexandre I, Vol. 3, pp. 545-546.

³Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 546. It is interesting to note that Vandal was not alone in subscribing to the idea that the Franco-Russian alliance was a pact of the people of the two countries. See Gabriel Monod, "Contemporary Life and Thought in France," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 44, p. 112.

... il a fallu que la France et la Russie subissent jusqu'au bout l'une et l'autre ... les conséquences de leurs fautes, pour que le parallélisme des intérêts apparût évident, manifeste, indéniable, pour que le sentiment de cette solidarité s'imprimât des deux parts au plus profond de la conscience nationale, se traduisît en un élan d'amour et fît succéder à l'accord éphémère des souverains, tel qu'il avait existé en 1807 et 1808, le pacte des peuples.

In 1896, Vandal was named a member of the Commission des Archives Diplomatiques by Felix Faure, Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹ It is conceivable that, as a result, Vandal became privy to the reality of the alliance between France and Russia negotiated between 1891 and 1894 but kept from public knowledge until Nicholas II's visit to Paris in October, 1896. In that year, Vandal published the third and final volume of Napoléon et Alexandre I; and it was hardly coincidental that he took the occasion to advise his readers that both France and Russia now understood the necessity of balanced commitments toward each other, as well as the need to restrain their respective bellicose intentions. The new alliance, between nations which circumstance and individual misadventure had previously made rivals, promised to be "un sacrifice fait en commun à la paix et à l'humanité." Thoughts of revanche seem distant in the writing of Vandal; but the reconstituted France had her place of importance in European affairs and the alliance with Russia would assure it:²

Conservatrice et défensive, elle n'agira et ne peut agir que pour refréner les ambitions perturbatrices,

¹A.A.F., Collection Martignac, III, 15 September, 1896.

²Vandal, Napoléon et Alexandre I, Vol. 3, p. 547.

assurer la pondération des forces et substituer à toute visée conquérante d'équitables partages d'influence; c'est sa raison d'être, sa grandeur et sa limite.

It was Vandal's belief that, if the alliance between Napoleon and Alexander had been better used and better administered, it could have assured, not the conquest of the Continent, but its well-being. Peace might have been assured in the early part of the Nineteenth Century, had the characters of Napoleon and Alexander permitted it; and it was this power for peace which could well exist again. It was exactly this which Vandal had demonstrated to his readers in Une Ambassade française en Orient sous Louis XV in 1887. Vandal was willing to admit in Napoléon et Alexandre I, however, that France could no longer perform this task alone. Yet shared power was better than no power at all; and, in 1891, he sensed a more normal, more fruitful, future "aux destinées des deux peuples." With a greater understanding of each other's needs, with an understanding of previous failures, the peoples of France and Russia could once again assure the independence of Europe. What was more, "il paraît réservé à ces deux pôles de l'Europe d'exercer sur elle une influence modératrice d'en tenir ou d'en replacer les éléments divers dans un juste équilibre."¹

Vandal denied any interest in politics as such. He was, as he said himself, a "simple historien, assez ennemi de la politique pour n'avoir plaisir à l'observer que dans le passé et à distance."² This

¹Ibid., Vol. 1, p. xvii.

²Vandal, Discours prononcés . . . pour la réception de M. Albert Vandal [à l'Académie Française], p. 4.

observation was strenuously objected to by the Count Bernard d'Haussonville, director of the Académie Française:¹

Vous nous avez dit, au début de votre spirituel discours, que vous étiez 'assez ennemi de la politique pour n'avoir plaisir à l'observer que dans le passé et à distance.' S'il en était véritablement ainsi, vous me permettriez, tout à la fois, de vous en féliciter et de vous en blâmer: de vous en féliciter, car plus d'un déboire vous serait ainsi épargné; de vous en blâmer, car la chose en elle-même ne serait point louable. Les circonstances peuvent faire que quelqu'un de votre mérite n'appartienne à aucune assemblée, ou ne soit investi d'aucune grande fonction, et déjà cela est fâcheux. Mais si les esprits cultivés se désintéressaient, par système, des grands intérêts du pays; si la race des hommes politiques, qui considèrent la conduite des affaires publiques comme un des plus nobles emplois de l'activité humaine, était définitivement remplacée par la race des politiciens, pour qui la politique n'est qu'un instrument de fortune, il en résulterait, pour notre pays, un abaissement que vous seriez le premier à déplorer.

Perhaps Vandal's experience at the Conseil d'Etat, early in his career, had discouraged him from becoming involved in politics. However, his membership in La Ligue de la Patrie Française² and his

¹d'Haussonville, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

²A.A.F.: Collection Martignac, III. La Ligue de la Patrie Française, of which Vandal was a founding member, was an association founded during the Dreyfus Affair (in 1898) for anti-dreyfusard nationalists in opposition to Clemenceau's Ligue des droits de l'homme. In defence of his membership in this association, Vandal wrote: "En signant cette déclaration avec la majorité de mes confrères de l'Académie Française, j'ai voulu d'abord dire 'Quoique intellectuel, je suis pour l'armée, qui demeure la sauvegarde de l'indépendance et de la dignité nationales.' En outre, nous avons eu la pensée, entre un grand nombre d'amis de chercher et de préparer un terrain d'entente, où pourront se réunir prochainement tous les bon Français, tous les hommes de bonne volonté, pour servir le pays en défendant ses institutions vitales, ses traditions tutélaires, et pour ranimer dans la mesure des moyens, partout l'âme de la patrie." See La Patrie, 20 January, 1899. Vandal was an anonymous member of the Comité Central de l'Appel au Peuple, Association de révision constitutionnelle et de propagande plébiscitaire.

address to the Ligue patriotique des Françaises in 1904,¹ attests to to his interest in political questions.

By contrast, of the four historians of Russia who have been examined, only Rambaud became involved, as Haussonville expressed it—"dans . . . la conduite des affaires publiques," and this despite his early protestations to the contrary.² The wildly enthusiastic reception of the Russian fleet at Toulon, in 1893, together with Rambaud's promotion to Officier of the Légion d'honneur that same year, in recognition of his contribution to the preparation of the rapprochement between France and Russia, undoubtedly contributed to his decision to enter the senatorial election in 1895.³

Rambaud's last book on Russia, a translation of General Masslovski's study of the Seven Years' War, was published during this campaign. Russes et Prussiens: Guerre de Sept Ans, he felt, would

¹Le Gaulois, 8 February, 1904. Vandal spoke at the meeting of La Ligue Patriotique des Françaises, "dont il avait également accepté la présidence." Le Gaulois reported that "l'éminent conférencier a fait le procès . . . du gouvernement actuel qui ne gouverne pas mais qui tyrannise, gouvernement issue de M. Waldec-Rousseau. . . . Quelles solution s'impose alors? . . . M. Vandal m'hésite pas à le déclarer: 'Ce qu'il faut à la France, ce n'est pas un gouvernement de réaction, mais un gouvernement de reconstitution, de reconstitution nationale.'"

²A.N., 81 AP 1. In 1883, Rambaud was elected from Roulans to the Conseil Général of the Department of Doubs (Jura). Roulans was a solidly Republican area of the country, having returned a Republican to the Conseil Général in 1877, 1878 and 1881. In 1892, Rambaud was elected Vice-President of this Conseil Général.

³A.N., 81 AP 1. Brochure for Rambaud's Senatorial Election of 17 November, 1895.

be of particular interest to his readers, in view of the obvious (though officially secret) agreement recently reached between Russia and France, and for which, during the election campaign, he claimed some credit.¹ This work assured Rambaud's readers (and electors) that the traditional devotion and audacity of the Russian army could be relied upon.²

Toutes les qualités, toutes les vertus militaires qui se sont révélées dans la guerre de Sept Ans semblent s'être conservées intactes jusqu'à nos jours. Il s'y est seulement ajouté les perfectionnements techniques que cent cinquante ans de culture européenne et de progrès scientifique ont permis à la Russie de réaliser.

Rambaud demonstrated, as he had done in Français et Russes, Moscou et Sébastopol in 1877, that Russia was a sound military ally who would give the Republic support and security.

It was felt by some of his supporters, however, that Rambaud was conducting an overly intellectual campaign and was relying, perhaps too heavily, on the assumption that his constituents shared his republican and pro-Russian sentiments as expressed in his Histoire de la Révolution française³ and Français et Russe, Moscou et Sébastopol, both of which he distributed to promote his election. It was suggested

¹Ibid.

²A. Rambaud, Russes et Prussiens: Guerre de Sept Ans, Paris, 1895, p. 390. Leger recognized that such an historical study could answer, in advance, the question of the support which could be expected from Russia, in the event of a war with Germany. See L. Leger, "Russes et Prussiens, guerre de Sept Ans par Alfred Rambaud," Bibliothèque universelle et Revue Suisse, reprinted in Le Bon Sens Franc-Comtois, 27 October, 1895.

³A. Rambaud, Histoire de la Révolution française, 1789-1799, Paris, 1883.

that a better impression would be made upon the people of the Jura if a short resumé of his career was circulated.¹ Armand Du Mesnil and the Revue bleue, by supplying such a resumé, contributed in no small measure to Rambaud's eventual victory.²

Rambaud's faith in the resurgence of France may have been vindicated by the rapprochement with Russia; but the ten-week campaign during which he visited as many of the delegates in the Department as possible, was occupied, not with foreign policy, but with bitter quarrels between clerical and anti-clerical elements. Rambaud's moderate stand on this issue³ no doubt aided his bid for a senatorial seat.

¹A. N., 81 AP 1, Bullet to Rambaud, 23 September, 1895.

²The article of the Revue bleue was printed first in the Journal de Pontarlier. See A. N., 81 AP 1, Journal de Pontarlier to Rambaud, 8 September, 1895: "J'ai reçu de la Revue bleue les épreuves de notes biographiques vous concernant. . . ." A. Du Mesnil, "Portraits Contemporains, M. Alfred Rambaud," Revue bleue, Vol. 2, 1895, pp. 584-588.

³A. N., 81 AP 1. A. Pierson to Rambaud, 2 November, 1895. See also Charles Jouffroy d'Abbans (Député de Doubs, 1889-1898), to Rambaud, 6 November, 1895: "Il est à présumer que l'appui des modérés et des catholiques se portera vers le candidat qui affirmera le respect de la liberté religieuse—il y a une belle pensée dans votre lettre: d'après elle certains journaux vous accusent d'être l'ennemi systématique de la Religion, ils vous ont bien mal compris, s'il en était ainsi, vous ne seriez pas historien."

Rambaud's membership in the Masonic Order since 1861 caused the Catholic press to criticize him during this election campaign. See A. N., F¹⁷25893; La Croix, 20 October, 1895; also, R. P. Lecanuet, Les premières années du pontificat de Léon XIII, 1878-1894, Paris, 1931, p. 91, fn. 1. However, there is evidence that Rambaud had the support of both Catholic and Protestant clerics. See A. N., 81 AP 1.

"La bonne nouvelle nous a détendue," wrote Ernest Lavisse on the day following the election, "Je m'en réjouis encore . . . c'est que tu a trouvé la revanche des injustices et des misères qui t'ont été faites, a raison de l'honneur que tu a eu de collaborer avec J. Ferry."¹

During the campaign, Rambaud had become aware of the hostility which the religious question could cause within the Republic. It was undoubtedly as a consequence of this apprehension that, during his years as Minister of Public Instruction in the Méline cabinet, from 1896 to 1898,² he avoided conflicts involving religion for fear of opening a Pandora's box, and confined himself to the editorship of the Histoire générale and to continuing the reorganization of higher education begun by Ferry.³ As had been his aim since 1870, Rambaud remained dedicated to making France "plus imposante dans la paix qu'elle ne le fut jamais dans la guerre. Pour la grande oeuvre que

¹A. N., 81 AP 1. Lavisse to Rambaud, 18 November, 1895. Lavisse went on to write, ". . . te voilà fort au-dessus de la haine de M. M. de Franqueville et consorts de l'Académie des Sciences morales. . . ." Three years later Rambaud was elected to the chair at the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques previously held by the Duc d'Aumale. See Vidal de la Blanche, op. cit., p. 37.

²Jules Méline, forming a conciliatory cabinet in 1896, found a recalcitrant Paul Deschanel insisting upon the Ministry of Public Instruction after having been offered the portfolio of Colonies; however, Gabriel Hanotaux, together with Louis Barthou and others, including Méline himself, had already chosen Rambaud for the Ministry of Public Instruction, by virtue of his earlier collaboration with Ferry and because his "opinions bien connues étaient de nature à inspirer toute confiance aux républicains les plus ombrageux." Rambaud represented a continuation of a Republican tradition expressed by Ferry, but with the moderation needed for the Méline cabinet. See G. Lachapelle, Le Ministère Méline, Paris, n.d. (Ca. 1928), p. 21.

³Vidal de la Blanche, op. cit., p. 33; Lavisse, "Alfred Rambaud," pp. 350-351.

nous réserve l'avenir, il faut l'union cordiale entre tous les Français."¹

There is little doubt that, until cautioned by his advisors, Rambaud had used his association with things Russian during his senatorial campaign to further his political goal. But he did nothing more than both he and his confrères had done in years past—that is, the sponsoring of closer ties with Russia as an instrument to aid the rebuilding of France. Whether in matters of foreign relations or domestic political problems, Rambaud's concern was for the furtherance of France and of the Republican ideal.

For Rambaud, Leger, Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal, the visit of Tsar Nicholas II to Paris and vicinity in October, 1896, should have been a satisfying moment and, undoubtedly, it was. Ever mindful of the national dignity of France, Leger, at the prompting of Rambaud, had undertaken the supervision and publication, at his own expense, of an edition of the Evangélaire Slavon of Reims for presentation to the Tsar.² Rambaud, apart from attending the ceremonial laying of the corner stone by the Tsar for the new Paris bridge (Pont Alexandre III), remained inconspicuous and silent. Leger's suggestive remark in Rouen a year later insinuated his and Rambaud's disappointment with the results of the alliance: "La situation diplomatique qui s'est établie entre la France et la Russie . . . impose, à ceux qui comme moi ont l'honneur d'être chargés d'un enseignement officiel, le devoir d'être

¹A.N., 81 AP 1. Brochure for the Senatorial Election of 17 November, 1895.

²Puech, op. cit., p. 23.

discrets; de ne pas dire tout ce qu'ils savent, et parfois même tout ce qu'ils pensent."¹

But if Leger and Rambaud were unwilling or unable to voice their opinions regarding "la situation diplomatique," Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal had already spoken of the question which then concerned all four men—the Turkish massacre of the Christian Armenians and the lack of intervention on behalf of the Armenians by France and Russia.² For a long time, the Russian alliance had been the object of infatuation in France. When it had materialized, Leger, Rambaud, Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal had, in general, accepted it. But Leroy-Beaulieu felt that, having promised too much, the alliance, by 1896, "ne nous donnait point tout ce que l'âme de la France en avait attendu."³

... au lieu de relever notre prestige et de fortifier
notre crédit dans le monde, l'alliance russe, témoin

¹L. Leger, "Les Voyageurs Russes en France," a conference given in 1897 to the Société de géographie de Rouen, published in Russes et Slaves, Vol. 3, p. 28. Leger went on to say that: "Je suis donc obligé à une très grande réserve sur les questions de politique contemporaine, et pour nous mettre tout à fait à notre aise et en dehors des influences récentes de Cronstadt comme de celles de Toulon, pour me dérober à la pression de cet enthousiasme dont j'ai été témoin et dont vous avez entendu l'écho, j'ai choisi dans le sujet habituel de mes études une époque un peu reculée. Je ne dépasserai pas 1815; de cette façon nous serons tout à notre aise, car si l'on doit des égards aux vivants, envers lesquels on est parfois obligé à une certaine réserve, à une sorte de discrétion, par contre, l'on ne doit aux morts que la vérité."

Both Wm. Langer and G. Michon have stated that Rambaud was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the Franco-Russian alliance. However, neither can offer evidence of Rambaud's support of an alliance later than 1893. See G. Michon, The Franco-Russian Alliance, p. 73; and, Langer, op. cit., p. 315.

²Pinon, op. cit., p. 88; Segur, op. cit., p. 251.

³A. Leroy-Beaulieu, Etudes Russes et Européennes, Paris, 1897, p. v.

l'Orient, a plutôt diminué ce qui nous restait d'ascendant moral et fait déchoir la France, aux yeux des peuples, de son rang ancien.

In the decade preceding the Franco-Russian alliance, Russia had been all but forgotten by the four historians in their passion for a greater understanding of France and of those things for which France stood. What was it, Leroy-Beaulieu asked, which had finally pushed France into an alliance with Russia? The indifference of the public to the implications of the alliance; a national timidity as a result of the loss of the war of 1870—a lack of self confidence—but above all, a "perte de foi en notre mission":¹

Avant de sceller l'alliance, peut-être eussions-nous bien fait de nous assurer que l'amitié tsarienne ne devait rien nous coûter de ce que nos pères nous avaient appris à regarder comme notre honneur de chrétiens et notre vocation de peuple libre. . . .
 [L'alliance] n'a donc pas mis fin aux brutalités de la politique, l'alliance appelée, par tant d'ingénus, comme la grande réparatrice des torts du passé et des crimes de l'histoire. Elle n'a rien redressé, en Occident; et quant à l'Orient, Arméniens ou Grecs, anciens clients de la France catholique ou de la Russie orthodoxe, ceux qui avaient tant de fois bénéficié de l'appui du Franc ou du Slave russe, savent quel profit les chrétiens d'Europe et d'Asie ont retiré de cette alliance, sur laquelle l'Orient, en d'autres jours, eût entassé tant d'espérances. Beaucoup d'entre nous avaient, à vrai dire, attendu mieux de l'union des deux grandes protectrices de la Croix vis-à-vis du Croissant, des deux nations qui naguère se disputaient, les armes à la main, la gloire du patronat chrétien. Laquelle des deux, France ou Russie, a paralysé la main de l'autre? J'espère, pour notre honneur et pour notre conscience, que ce n'est pas la France.

¹ Ibid., pp. v, vi-vii.

In the 1880's all four historians had tried to draw the attention of their countrymen to their national heritage and to the principles which had been derived from the Revolution. In 1896, when Leger and Rambaud seemed unable to maintain this vigilance, it fell to Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal alone to remind the people of their national trust. Despite his feeling that it had been perilous for France to have played the revolutionary and nationalistic Messiah to the rest of Europe and, that nationalism could offer no rational solutions to international problems,¹ Leroy-Beaulieu and, later, Vandal, invoked the principle of national freedom during the year of Tsar Nicholas II's visit to Paris. Leroy-Beaulieu felt that this principle, which had originated with the Revolution, and had then spread to the rest of Europe, had to be revived on behalf of international justice and the liberation of all suppressed peoples. In the years before 1870, Leroy-Beaulieu, Leger and others had expressed their sympathy for the cause of Polish and Bohemian self-determination. In 1896 this sympathy was again expressed, this time on behalf of the Armenian Christians. Heavily stamped with the thought of Vandal, Leroy-Beaulieu proclaimed the respect which France had established in her relationship with Turkey—a respect which would guarantee the Republic, in 1896, the right to act on behalf of the Armenians. Both Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal encouraged their government to intervene in the Armenian question,

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, La Révolution et le libéralisme, pp. x, 193, 194-195.

where France's interests and those of humanity coincided.¹ But neither Leroy-Beaulieu's nor Vandal's pleas on behalf of either the Armenian Christians or the reestablishment of France's "place prépondérante dans le concert européen"² were heard above the cheers of the French population for the Tsar and the alliance.

"1896 à vu le Tsar à Paris et M. Vandal à l'Académie. C'est l'année franco-russe doublement."³ The public was entitled to believe what it wished; but, if Vandal alone among the four occupied the "fauteuil," he was the spokesman for all when he wrote:⁴

La France trouvera toujours dans l'observation de son passé des exemples à relever. C'est le désir d'établir à son profit exclusif ces fortifiantes leçons, c'est sa pensée seule, dégagée de toute autre préoccupation qui doit nous inspirer et nous guider dans l'étude de toutes les parties de son histoire politique, de même que nos anciens hommes d'armes, pour marcher à l'ennemi et s'animer au combat, ne poussaient qu'un seul cri: France!

¹A. Leroy-Beaulieu, Les Arméniens et la question arménienne, Conference given 6 June, 1896, Paris, 1896; A. Vandal, Les Arméniens et la réforme de la Turquie, Conference given 2 February, 1897, Paris, 1897.

²L. LeGall, "Opinions de Paul Cambon," Revue d'histoire diplomatique, Vol. 68 (1954), p. 202.

³A. A. F., Collection Moulin: 0012, Le Gaulois, 11 December, 1896; see also, 0007, L'Eclair, 12 December, 1896: "En l'élisant, l'Académie a fait sa cour à la Russie où M. Vandal jouit d'une notoriété légitime. On devait au Tsar de lui témoigner de la reconnaissance pour sa visite et l'on ne pensa pouvoir mieux faire, qu'en nommant un historien, qui s'était attaché à montrer quels liens étroits de sympathie nous unissaient aux sujets de Nicolas II"; and, 0020, Événement, 11 December, 1896. Vandal was elected by 24 votes to 3 for Zola, to the fauteuil of Léon Say.

⁴Vandal, Une Ambassade française en Orient, p. xii.

CONCLUSION

[From the victory parade in Paris, 1919]
"... one army was missing, one without whose aid the Miracle of the Marne could never have occurred and without whose allegedly bottomless reserves of men there would not this day be any victory celebrations—Russia, now sealed off from her former allies by revolution and civil war, and apparently forgotten."

A. Horne, To Lose a Battle, p. 7.

Suffering from a humiliating military defeat, from the imposition by Germany of the largest indemnity ever imposed upon a conquered nation, from the loss of the greater portion of two provinces, and from diplomatic isolation, France in 1870, was badly scarred as a result of the Franco-Prussian War. The newly created Third Republic, itself threatened by those who hoped to see the monarchy restored, was the inheritor of the results of the military disaster and further added to its own inauspicious beginnings with the bloody suppression of the Commune revolution—an event which alienated a segment of the French population for generations. Clearly the political road ahead was strewn with potential disaster for France—and for the new Republic as a viable political system.

Faced with German military superiority as well as with their fear of the consequent growth of German cultural dominance, Leger, Rambaud, Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal, together with other intellectuals, attempted to discern not only the cause of the weakness which brought

about France's downfall, but its remedy. The events of 1870 determined much of the intellectual and moral orientation of the élite of this generation: it is evident that many historians clearly saw their role as that of directors of the national conscience, and dedicated themselves to the recovery of France by reorienting their careers to that end.

In questioning the causes of defeat, some attributed it to national decadence caused by a decline in faith; others, to France's intellectual isolation from the rest of Europe. Leger expressed the sentiments of other intellectuals, among them Leroy-Beaulieu, Rambaud and Vandal, when he wrote that, "Nous avons payé assez chèrement notre ignorance de l'étranger." In his opening lecture at the Ecole libre des Langues Orientales, Leger had made it clear that, in order for France to make any political alignments, it was incumbent upon individual Frenchmen to learn about the peoples with whom they were destined to undertake political, cultural and commercial relations.

As early as 1868, Leger had warned of the dangers which would accrue to France, by virtue of the narrowness of her political perspective, when he had attempted, in vain, to encourage French interest in the Panslav movement in order to offset both German and Russian hegemony in the Slav countries. But, following the Franco-Prussian War, the diminished position of France made this impractical. The only alternative left for France was to join with Russia to contain the growth of German influence. The events of 1870 were directly responsible, Leger told an audience at the Collège de France, for bringing

the realization to certain French intellectuals that Russia, heretofore treated with aspersion, was the only possible counterbalance to German aggression.

Following the war, Leger, his friend and former student Rambaud, and Leroy-Beaulieu, all travelled to Russia for the first time, in 1872. As a result of this and several later trips, they were able to furnish their compatriots with new insights into many aspects not only of Russia, but of all the Slav nations. Considered collectively, their writings encompassed the history, the culture, the institutions and the languages of the Slavic peoples; collectively, they worked to correct the errors which existed in France regarding the peoples of Eastern Europe. Vandal later joined this effort by underlining the cordial relations which had existed between France and Russia in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, thus contributing to the dissipation of prejudices against Russia which had become cemented in France. Through their published works, these historians began the education of the élite, as well as of public opinion. Employed in private or state organizations, they laboured to instruct the young generation that France could once again secure her rightful place in Europe. By promoting an understanding of Russian culture and history, particularly between 1870 and 1880, whether through learned journals, reviews or by lectures, they served their common dedication to foster the steady rehabilitation of France. This fundamental ideal united these four historians; Russia and the Slavs were simply a means to this end.

Although the ultimate objectives of these men were identical, their contacts with each other were more through their writings and the reviews each wrote of the other's work, than through personal friendship or political ideology. Far from forming a school of Russian history, Leger, Rambaud, Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal were highly individualistic in their endeavours. This has precluded their careers and scholarly pursuits being considered conjointly.

Prior to the war of 1870, Leger had battled for a better understanding of Russia virtually alone against the indifference of the academic officials of the Second Empire. The almost total lack of interest of these officials in his work, best exemplified by the refusal of Leger's request in 1867 to attend the Ethnological Congress in Moscow, did not cause him to lose interest in his chosen field, however. Having received neither the hoped-for university position upon the completion of his doctorate, nor the encouragement of its expectation, he nevertheless managed to maintain himself and his interest on the periphery of university activity and to draw to his classes in the "cours libre" students who would maintain their interest in Slav cultures long after the discontinuance of the course. While his field of interest met with greater official acceptance after the 1870 débâcle—the Ministry of Public Instruction was prepared to grasp at any straw—he was still obliged to convince the Ministry of the utility of closer contacts with Russia, in order to have his project of attending both the 1872 and 1874 congresses held in Russia, approved—as, of course—

was Rambaud. But Leger's keen individual effort did not stop with the completion of missions to Russia. Having seen the necessity for the teaching of Slav languages in France, he alone was responsible, between 1872 and 1873, for enlisting support from members of the diplomatic corps, the Ecole libre des Langues orientales and the Quai d'Orsay in order, once again, to persuade the Ministry of Public Instruction to offer such language courses under its auspices. His ultimate success inaugurated the official acceptance of courses in Slav language in France in 1875.

In comparison with Leger, the efforts of Rambaud between 1872 and 1876 appear desultory. Under the same compulsion to know and understand Russia and to be known in Russia, Rambaud was neither linguistically nor culturally prepared to absorb what he found there. As a consequence, the foundations of the bridge which both he and Leger wished to construct between France and Russia depended heavily, during the first few years, upon Leger's awareness of, and appreciation for, Slav civilization and the Slav contribution to the world historical process. The support which Leger may have derived from Rambaud's presence in Russia, however, was jeopardized by Rambaud's recalcitrant attitude toward the Ministry of Public Instruction, which he antagonized by consistently neglecting to submit reports upon the completion of his missions to Russia—a procedure hardly designed to endear himself or his project to the government.

Rimbaud eventually carried his own weight in the struggle to have Russia better known in France; but it was not until 1876 that his contribution could be said to have been of any value. That year he demonstrated his particular viewpoint, by refuting the claims of Russia's Asiatic origin, in La Russie épique. This book, which was judged to have been a piece of Russophile propaganda, was however, followed one year later by his article "Français et Russes: Moscow et Sébastopol" in which, while not demanding a political alliance between the two countries, he indicated that the intellectual recognition of Russia could clear the way for such an alliance.

Until 1876, it had been Leger and Leroy-Beaulieu who, from the outset of their travels to Russia in 1872, worked meaningfully to reorient, by their writings, their compatriots' earlier prejudices concerning Russia. Despite this commitment, however, Leger's sympathy was divided on the question of the Slavs: between Russia—the only Slav nation to which France could logically turn for aid in her fight against the growth of "germanisme"—and the other Slav nations, particularly, Bohemia. Thus, in the late 1870's, while Leger turned to the history of Austria-Hungary to examine the question of the Slav desire for national self-determination, it was Rimbaud and Leroy-Beaulieu who tried to draw the lines for a major transformation of opinion concerning Russia in France.

Having been told in the pages of the Revue politique et littéraire by Leger, and in the Revue des deux mondes by Leroy-Beaulieu, that

Frenchmen should rid themselves of all of their preconceived notions regarding Russia and try to visualize the situation in Russia the way it really was, Leroy-Beaulieu had proceeded, between 1873 and 1878, to point out to his compatriots that the Russians were not barbarians. His readers would have been totally non-perceptive had they not understood from his articles that it would be good to have a nation with the steadfast qualities of the Russians, as a friend or ally. Leroy-Beaulieu's assurances of Russian progress toward modern statehood through emancipation and the subsequent lessening of patriarchal ties and class distinction, left readers no room to doubt that Russia had indeed the appearance of a modern state moving along democratic lines. Leroy-Beaulieu's assurances were corroborated by Rambaud's Histoire de la Russie, which established that Russia was moving away from the Asiatic clouds of absolutism which had obscured her for so long from the rest of Europe. Block upon block, the intellectual bridge to Russia was being built in France; and undoubtedly, toward the end of the 1870's, Leger, Rambaud and Leroy-Beaulieu would have welcomed an entente between the two countries. Such an entente would have signalled the end of the threat of single-handed war with Germany; and, perhaps as important, it would have confirmed the legitimacy of the Republic as a political system, the hook upon which the prestige of France ultimately hung. But the entente did not materialize.

In 1885, when Leger was appointed professor at the Collège de France, he warned his audience that politics for France was no longer

a sentimental affair. It was necessary for France, in order to regain her lost diplomatic influence, to make an alliance with a great power, and not be reduced to having to court the secondary European states.

But second thoughts about Russia had begun to occur to some of the four historians by 1880. A more critical attitude toward Russia was expressed by Leroy-Beaulieu after his acquisition of the Miliutin papers. He had defended Russia in the face of opposition even from his editor at the Revue des deux mondes at the time of the Russo-Turkish war; but, by 1880, he had come to accept the existence of a genuine malaise within Russia which he blamed on the repressiveness and inflexibility of the autocratic system. Leroy-Beaulieu had no hesitation in altering his position regarding Russia when new material showed him aspects of that country which had not previously been evident. Rather than seeking personal satisfaction from his already considerable accomplishments, Leroy-Beaulieu was prepared to revise his opinions in order to present an accurate picture of Russia to Frenchmen. How otherwise could Russia be judged if the facts were not presented faithfully and by someone who had the interests of France at heart? Coincidentally with Leroy-Beaulieu, Rambaud abandoned not only his pre-eminent position as an expert on Russian history, but the possibility of effective political action on behalf of Russia and his close intellectual association with Leger, for direct involvement in the issues currently dividing French domestic opinion.

Leger remained then, the only established savant of the three who found it opportune to promote Russia after 1880. Eventually, however, even Leger became alarmed by the Russomania which seemed to grip the French population in the early 1890's; and, when it became obvious that some form of military agreement did exist, Leger, Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal maintained what can only be interpreted as embarrassed silence; while Rambaud, who mentioned in his senatorial campaign that he had been partially responsible for the alliance, quickly de-emphasized this fact in favour of issues which pertained more directly to problems of the Republic domestically. Quite obviously, by the mid-1890's, these four men were not sufficiently sure of the unquestionable asset of the Franco-Russian alliance to lay claim to having promoted it.

When this study was first begun, it was thought that documentary evidence would provide a link between one or more of the historians studied and the alliance between France and Russia in the late Nineteenth Century. No such direct evidence was found. In fact, during the period of their greatest involvement with Russia, Leger and Rambaud were politically at their least effective; while both Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal avoided formal political involvement of any kind. Of the four men, the only one who seems to have had the opportunity to lobby politically for Russia was Rambaud, because of his association with Ferry between 1879 and 1881. Rambaud undoubtedly promoted French interest in Russia, yet he rejected the position offered him at the Quai

d'Orsay—the one position from which he could have influenced French foreign policy.

Without question, all four historians had tried to build a bridge to the Slavs and to Russia. They had endeavoured to penetrate French insularity. But, in their desire to achieve this, it is equally clear that their interest for France was all-pervasive. Simply stated, a knowledge of Russia was in the French national interest.

Revealing Russia to France demonstrated to Frenchmen the kind of partner with which their country was becoming involved. A truly effective alliance against Germany, Leroy-Beaulieu pointed out, could be formed only if France were able to gauge accurately the advantages and disadvantages of Russia as an ally. Leroy-Beaulieu had himself written and lectured about Russia with the idea of having that country, her people and her customs better known in France. But, after 1881, when he had discovered those problems in Russia which he felt were an obstruction to progress both to Russia herself, and ultimately, to France, he did not hesitate to alert his countrymen to the dangers inherent in their growing infatuation.

Leger had felt strongly enough about the need to serve both science and his country that, at a time when he could least afford to do so, he declined offers of two positions outside France in 1872, the first in St. Petersburg and the second in Florence. Quite obviously, his dedication was similar to that of Leroy-Beaulieu. When he ably represented France abroad, especially at the Slav congresses, Leger

delightedly reported results which he felt demonstrated goodwill toward France. Even though Rambaud may have been initially less effective in Russia than was Leger, he understood as well as did Leger the effects which their interest in Russia had there "pour le nom français." It was for that reason, and no other, that Leger's mission to Moscow for the Pushkin celebrations in 1880 was so readily agreed to by Rambaud, who was impatient for success. But political circumstances gave to this mission a particular character: Russian and French diplomatic contact, because of the Hartmann Affair, had become tenuous. By sending Leger on this critical cultural mission, both Rambaud and Leger attained the goal for which they strove. As Le Golos remarked: "Ces marques d'attention provoquent les sentiments de la plus sincère et de la plus chaleureuse gratitude pour la nation française."

Clearly the aim of these scholars was to serve France and, in the 1880's, all but Leger turned their attention, each in his own way, to the examination of France's domestic problems; first as a reflection of those in Russia, then ultimately to those problems which were uniquely French. Problems which were identified by Leroy-Beaulieu and Vandal as being specifically Russian were often in fact those which pertained to France herself. Vandal's retrospective review of the personality conflict between Napoleon and Alexander I was as much a review of the problems confronting French diplomacy in 1890 as in 1812. The decline of religious faith, whether in Russia or France, posed for Leroy-Beaulieu the greatest consequences for both countries:

his call for freedom of religion in Russia mirrored his own examination of possible solutions to the problem which he believed existed in France. The questions of liberty versus order, reform versus revolution, were themes that he examined in both their Russian and French context; but whether of a domestic or an international nature, all such problems had their parallel in contemporary French society, and were treated by Leroy-Beaulieu in the interest of France.

While Leroy-Beaulieu had become more openly critical of Russia following 1880, and more concerned with problems that pertained to France, Rambaud, having left the office of Ferry in 1881, was absorbed with France herself and the Republic which served her. It was with Rambaud that the cleanest break from Russia may be seen. Immediately following his departure from the office of Jules Ferry, this ardent Republican began a steady outpouring of material on French colonial policy and French civilization, two subjects which permitted him to treat some of the more important questions of the day. Gradually, Leroy-Beaulieu and Rambaud turned their attention to other areas of concern to the Republic. Sometimes they were to agree, as on the question of liberty and public order, and sometimes to disagree, as on the military aspects of empire building. From now on, with the exception of the publication of the final volume of L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes by Leroy-Beaulieu and Recueil des Instructions données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France by Rambaud, both men were to devote their energies exclusively to the problems of France.

More than any other single event, the centenary of the French Revolution provided the necessary intellectual pivot for an examination of the revolutionary principles which formed nineteenth-century France. It also provided the impetus for a break from Russia and as a consequence, gave Rambaud, Vandal and Leroy-Beaulieu the necessary time to reassess their previous total involvement, and to reevaluate the diplomatic situation to which France had committed herself. From the point of view of the republican apologist, Rambaud, the years leading to the anniversary gave him the opportunity to stress established republican values and remind school-children of their future responsibility to the nation. He also drew attention to those elements which he believed had built the Third Republic: the past greatness of France and her recuperative power, which had been responsible for raising the nation from the ashes of the Old Régime to even greater heights. It had been from the fire of the Revolution that progress had come: a progress which had made possible those changes which had led to the Third Republic.

But, if Rambaud chose to emphasize those things in the past which gave the Republic her strength, there were nonetheless troublesome aspects of the Republic discernible in his demands for liberty with order. Quite evidently, the political climate of France toward the end of the 1880's was not conducive to the continued orderly progress which he desired. It was undoubtedly the atmosphere of seeming instability in France in that decade which prompted Vandal, in contrast

to Rambaud, to assert that the state had become separated from its democratic principles. By the time of the Tsar's visit to Paris, Vandal felt that in the years between the Revolution and the Third Republic, the government, by virtue of the exigencies of state, had neglected those principles of national freedom and liberty upon which France rested. In his view the Republic and the principles of 1789 must be united in order that France be true to her ideals.

This same theme was also discussed by Leroy-Beaulieu, although he admitted that there were often insurmountable obstacles in attuning the world of politics to abstract ideas. Nevertheless, he too encouraged the population to draw support from the past, from history, and not to abandon its national political heritage. It was the role of France to rediscover her revolutionary position in Europe and to assure to all nations the liberty which she herself had won at such terrible expense. An alliance with tsarist Russia, consequently, threatened those very ideals which Vandal, Leroy-Beaulieu and even Rambaud, in his own way, felt were fundamental to the Republic.

All four historians, who had been originally drawn to the study of Russia, were, by the time of the alliance, concerned only with France and with the principles of her continuing political existence. In the light of what they believed should be the revolutionary mission of their nation, they accepted the alliance between tsarist Russia and republican France without enthusiasm. In 1870, Alexander II had told Thiers that he had no sympathy with a republic. In 1896,

four intellectual republicans who had worked to foster Franco-Russian understanding, no longer had sympathy for Russia.

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