La Patria de Coca: Exploring the Role of State Narratives on Government Trust within Coca-Growing Communities in Bolivia and Peru

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Abstract

This thesis examines the intricate nexus of state narratives, community dynamics, and governance within illicit economies by evaluating the results of criminalizing coca farming in coca-dominated regions in Bolivia and Peru, states with contrasting policies toward coca's role in society. Bolivian President Evo Morales (2006 – 2019), recognizing coca as a critical mechanism of economic empowerment and a symbol of indigenous culture, implemented a top-down reform of Bolivia's coca policy that permitted significant cultivation and domestic sales. Meanwhile, a series of Peruvian presidents maintained a security-first mindset regarding coca, bringing the state into conflict with local communities. The study compares the coca-dominated regions in both countries since the start of Morales' term to illustrate how governments' criminal framing of informal economic activity impacts the state's relationship with the populations engaged in the informal sector. The central claim of this research is that the policy of criminalization significantly undermines state-community relations within regions dependent on the production of illicit goods.

I conduct a two-case comparative analysis, examining coca-dominated areas to explore the influence of state narratives on two pivotal dimensions that reflect community reception: 1) approval of the national government and 2) public opinion on security and crime. This research contends that illicit economic activity can empower local order and social stability and serve as an efficient buoy for improving the well-being of marginalized populations, especially indigenous groups.

In contrast to Peru, Bolivia's case demonstrates that illicit economies can operate in harmony with their local environments through community enforcement of social norms. Examining the limitations of state power and the influence of state framing on such embedded economies is critical to understanding how states and communities can align their interests and develop effective policies that enhance the relationship between the government and its citizens while maintaining local legitimacy.

Résumé

Cette thèse examine les liens complexes entre les récits de l'État, les dynamiques communautaires et la gouvernance au sein des économies informelles en évaluant les résultats de la criminalisation de la culture de la coca dans les régions dominées par la coca en Bolivie et au Pérou, des États aux politiques contrastées quant au rôle de la coca dans la société. Le président bolivien Evo Morales (2006 – 2019), reconnaissant que la coca est un mécanisme essentiel d'autonomisation économique et un symbole de la culture indigène, a mis en œuvre une réforme descendante de la politique bolivienne en matière de coca qui a permis une culture et des ventes nationales importantes. Pendant ce temps, une série de présidents péruviens ont maintenu un état d'esprit axé sur la sécurité en ce qui concerne la coca, amenant l'État à entrer en conflit avec les communautés locales. L'étude compare les régions dominées par la coca dans les deux pays depuis le début du mandat de Morales afin d'illustrer la manière dont le cadrage criminel de l'activité économique informelle par les gouvernements a un impact sur les relations de l'État avec les populations engagées dans le secteur informel. L'argument central de cette recherche est que la politique de criminalisation nuit considérablement aux relations entre l'État et les communautés dans les régions qui dépendent de la production de biens illicites.

J'effectue une analyse comparée de deux cas, en examinant les zones dominées par la coca afin d'explorer l'influence des récits de l'État sur deux dimensions essentielles qui reflètent la réception de la communauté : 1) l'approbation du gouvernement national et 2) l'opinion publique sur la sécurité et la criminalité. Cette recherche soutient que l'activité économique illicite peut renforcer l'ordre local et la stabilité sociale et servir de bouée efficace pour améliorer le bien-être des populations marginalisées, en particulier les groupes indigènes.

Contrairement au Pérou, le cas de la Bolivie démontre que les économies illicites peuvent fonctionner en harmonie avec leur environnement local grâce à l'application des normes sociales par la communauté. L'analyse des limites du pouvoir de l'État et de l'influence de l'encadrement de l'État sur ces économies intégrées est essentiel pour comprendre comment les États et les communautés peuvent aligner leurs intérêts et développer des politiques efficaces qui améliorent la relation entre le gouvernement et ses citoyens tout en maintenant une légitimité locale.

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Innumerable people contributed greatly to this project, and I am very grateful to have been supported throughout my research by a truly excellent team of mentors, colleagues, and loved ones. My inspiration for this work comes from my childhood, from creating my own community in the woods behind my elementary school and building an alternative economy founded on diversity, inclusivity, and moral order. Years later, that same community helped this thesis take shape over many conversations, coffees, lunch breaks, and late nights.

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List of Abbreviations

AIN – Andean Information Network

CEDIB – Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia

CONALTID – National Council for the Fight against Illicit Drug Trafficking

CORAH - Proyecto Especial de Control y Reducción del Cultivo de la Coca en el Alto Huallaga

DEVIDA - Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida sin Drogas

DIGPROCOCA – Dirección General de Desarrollo Integral de las Regiones Productoras de Coca

CYCN - Coca Yes, Cocaine No

ENACO - Empresa Nacional de la Coca

EU – European Union

FEPA-VRAE - Federación de Productores Agropecuarios del VRAE

INE - Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Bolivia)

INEI – Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas e Informática (Peru)

IPE - International Political Economy

JCPOA – Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

MAS - Movimiento al Socialismo - Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos

UN - United Nations

UNGA - United Nations General Assembly

UNODC - United Nations Office of Drug Control

USAID - United States Agency for International Development

VRAEM - Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro

I. Introduction

The conventional understanding of the cocaine economy stems primarily from highly publicized "War on Drugs" stories characterized by extreme violence, para-governmental authority, and rampant criminality, which governments confronted with violence of their own (Toyne, 2023). As violence and organized crime syndicates have become "endemic" to the region (Blume, 2021), many scholars point directly to coca cultivation and cocaine trafficking as the cause (Goldstein, 1985; Angrist and Kugler, 2008; Briceno-Leön and Zubillaga, 2002; Nairn, 2006). However, the conventional narrative only shows one side of how the coca economy manifests in Latin America. By examining the dynamics of the illicit coca economy, state intervention, and community consensus in Peru and Bolivia, the second and third-largest producers of cocaine (UNODC, 2023), this thesis seeks to complicate the oft-told story of drug-fueled violence and explore an alternative conception of coca markets and their role in society.

Violent crime has been a sore point in Latin America's rapid development and democratization over the last several decades (Policzer, 2019; Howard et al., 2007). Academics and policymakers have long pointed to drug production and sale as a significant factor contributing to violence (Blume, 2021) and as a telltale sign of state fragility and government impotence (Felbab-Brown, 2017). And yet, the varying levels of violence among states involved in this illicit economy prompt us to dig deeper. Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico have suffered much higher levels of violent crime than either Bolivia or Peru (UNODC, 2019), and these states have confronted large, organized crime networks and powerful cartels that are unknown in Bolivia's coca market (Ministerio de Gobierno Bolivia, 2022).

A wealth of academic evidence supports a more nuanced picture of the relationship between illegal drugs and violence, with studies often pointing not to the drugs themselves but to the state policy

toward drug production and sale that contributes to violence (Másmela and Tickner, 2017; Ballvé, 2020). The drug trade and its attendant violence emerge from interactions between state and non-state actors as they contend for control of the illicit trade (Lessing, 2017; Durán-Martínez, 2017). Non-state actors involved in the drug trade are diverse, encompassing not only notorious brutal cartels but family enterprises, community unions, and subsistence farmers who rely on coca production for survival.

For this research project, I investigate this overlooked facet of illicit producers by evaluating the results of criminalizing coca farming in three coca-dominated regions in Bolivia and Peru, states with contrasting policies towards coca's role in society and economic development. My research question asks: **How do state's narratives of informal economic activity impact their relationship with regions dominated by the informal sector?** The overarching claim of my thesis is that a policy of criminalization hurts state-community relations within areas dependent on the production of illicit goods. I mobilize supporting evidence for these claims by analyzing three aspects of the state-community relationship drawn from coca-dominated regions of Bolivia and Peru. For each level of analysis, I draw theory-driven and context-specific hypotheses that together work to substantiate this larger argument.

Previous studies have identified various alternative explanations by looking at state behaviors correlating with violence, including democratization, subnational decentralization, and corruption and law enforcement reforms (Snyder and Durán-Martínez, 2009; Rios, 2015; Trejo and Ley, 2017). My thesis differs from these studies in that my research focuses on the conceptual framing states employ and how that is received by invested communities rather than on structural aspects of state institutions or how states implement enforcement, as others have. The role of policy framing (Schon and Reid, 1994) in state-community relations has significant implications for the future success of narcotic control policies, and the current academic literature still needs to dedicate space to it.

I conduct a two-case comparative analysis across several relationship indicators for this project. My study examines the effect of state narratives about coca on critical aspects of community-state relations – government approval and trust, as well as opinions on crime and security. These indicators within communities speak to their reception of the state policy frame. I also look at empirical indicators of policy implementation in these areas, including coca production, eradication, alternative development, and police activity. I cross-nationally compare the coca regions in Bolivia and Peru (Cochabamba and Las Yungas in Bolivia and the VRAEM and Alto Huallaga in Peru) to understand the differential impact of a criminalizing state narrative and analyze intranational differences between the different coca regions in Bolivia and Peru to see the downstream effects of regional policy variation.

Under the guidance of President Evo Morales (2006-2019), Bolivia recognized coca's critical role as a mechanism of economic empowerment and a symbol of Indigenous cultural resilience (Pearson, 2020). The country implemented a top-down reform of the nation's coca policy, permitting significant cultivation, domestic sale of coca products, and discontinuing USAID and American-backed eradication initiatives (Grisaffi, 2021). Over the same period, Peru, in contrast, maintained a security-first mindset regarding coca. Its enforcement policy brought the state into conflict with local governments and communities and reinforced its view of coca farmers as little more than profit-hungry thugs (Csete et al., 2016). By comparing first the regime rhetoric, then the implemented policies, and finally, the outcomes within coca-dominated regions in both countries since the start of Morales' term, I illustrate how governments' cultural or criminal framing of informal economic activity impacts the state's relationship with the regional populations dominated by the informal sector.

Through three lines of investigation into public opinion -- exploring locals' approval of government, views on security, and perceptions of violence -- I weave a forceful argument against traditional logic that regions dominated by illicit economies are "ungoverned" (Heuser, 2019), i.e., run by parallel

regimes characterized by violence and an absence of respect for human rights. Instead, I propose, following Grisaffi (2021), that informal economic activity can promote security, empower local social structures, and serve as an efficient economic buoy for marginalized populations, especially Indigenous groups.

For this aspect of my analysis, the critical question is: **How are the state and its institutions/agents perceived in regions dominated by the illicit economy?** In this case, public attitudes of the coca farmers towards government agents and institutions are a vital signal of popular discontent (Lupu, 2004). To address this, I conduct an original analysis concerning the perceptions of the state and state agents by individuals living in the coca-dominated regions using Vanderbilt University's LAPOP Americas Barometer data from 2006 to the present. I examine government approval, trust, and opinions on crime and security assessments to elucidate the consequences of criminalization policy on coca farmers. I hypothesize that Bolivians will have more confidence in the Morales administration based on their coca policies and enforcement tactics compared to Peruvians in their increasingly repressive regimes, mediated by regional variation in policy implementation.

The implications of this study are wide-ranging. In contrast to the Peruvian approach, Bolivia's case demonstrates that illicit economies can operate in harmony with their local environments through community enforcement of social and ethical norms. Examining the limitations of state power and the influence of state framing over such embedded economies is critical to understanding how states and communities can work together to align their interests and develop effective policies that enhance the relationship between the government and its citizens while maintaining local legitimacy and economic empowerment.

II. Background Literature and Case Selection

This thesis seeks to contribute to illicit international political economy, the oft-forgotten little brother of IPE, which Andreas (2004) defines as "the relationship between states and illegal international markets." However, rather than investigating the role of the state or the market, I seek to illuminate the repercussions of that relationship on the communities caught between state and market forces. In service of this focus, my work also incorporates public policy and social movement literature, highlighting the importance of political actors' issue framing in shaping citizens' attitudes and behaviors (Jones and McBeth, 2010). Schon and Reid introduce policy frames in their 1994 book, defining frames as "structures of belief, perception, and appreciation which underlie policy positions" that political actors use to create an intelligible narrative out of a complex policy challenge (Schon and Reid, 1994, 23). These frames can hold massive significance for political behavior because of their normative power; by framing the issue in a particular context, the framers put forth an implicit solution (Schon and Reid, 1994, 26).

Specifically, I use their definition of policy frame, the narrowest of their frames, which are constructed intersubjectively by institutional actors within a particular policy context (van Hulst and Yanow, 2014). Some states may frame addiction as a healthcare challenge, implying a medical treatment solution. In contrast, others utilize a criminalization frame and conceptualize addiction as a sin, implying societal punishment as the solution. Comparing the policy frames promoted by the government and state leadership to those embraced by the affected communities reveals underexamined areas of resentment and discord between those within the coca economy and those regulating it (Alimi, 2019). On an issue such as coca and cocaine production, where there is intense international scrutiny, especially from the U.S., Bolivia and Peru have struck divergent balances between local legitimacy and international appropriateness.

Another critical concept under examination in this paper is the moral economy. Following the work of many scholars, I argue that illicit economies, particularly the coca economy in South America, operate as moral economies (Thompson, 1971; Scott, 1977). They defy many of the assumptions in mainstream economic theory due to the social context in which they are embedded, which prioritizes norms such as reciprocity, customs, political hierarchies, and other moral concerns over profit maximization. Illicit economies, since they operate outside the arbitration of the state, have little option but to moralize – they become institutionalized through localized social contracts that rely on communal understandings of honor, trust, and expectation (Mauss, 1990; Piot, 1999; Sanchez et al., 2017). The coca economy is deeply "embedded" (Polanyi, 1957) in the distinct social processes of certain rural communities in Peru and Bolivia and in conflict with the state and international policy framing of the cocaine industry (Silva, 2012; Arias and Grisaffi, 2021). The dynamics of how the localized moral economy and the state policy frame collide are my primary line of inquiry in the paper.

Trust in government, also known as "institutional trust" by Sønderskov and Dinesen (2016, 201), is defined as "an individual's perception of the credibility, fairness, competence, and transparency of state institutions" straddling the public's perceptions of leaders in the office on the one hand, and the credibility of the underlying democratic system and its values on the other. Because it measures the perceived integrity of specific actors and structural systems, institutional trust is "the central indicator of the underlying feeling of the general public about its polity" (Newton and Norris, 2000, 53). Comparing the policy frames promoted by the government and how they are interpreted by the communities the state serves yields insight into how states can integrate international pressures, local customs, and national priorities. Discord between local and government ontologies about coca create opportunities for miscommunication, mistrust, and distance between citizens and state agents. Distrust of government by the people makes governmental provision of goods and services less

efficient, lowers citizen compliance with public policies, and diminishes participation in the political system (Nicholls and Picou, 2013). However, the political pressures levied by citizens in defense of their cultural traditions and moral economy are posed against the leverage exerted on developing countries like Bolivia and Peru by Western nations and international regimes. In crafting policy narratives on coca, both countries have been dually constrained and inspired by the American framing put forward on the global stage and adopted as the international standard thereafter.

a. Brief History of Narcotic Prohibition

Coca's criminalization in South America was not a homegrown endeavor; it was imposed from above through American neoimperialism as a pre-requisite to joining the Western international order. Narcotic prohibition became popular in the United States at the turn of the 20th century primarily due to the political influence of the medical and pharmaceutical industries, which wanted to monopolize the distribution of narcotics through patenting drug formulas, as well as social fervor over Prohibition, political tensions with China, and racist myths over the violent effects of cocaine on African Americans (Thorton, 1991). For many decades now, the world has maintained much of the American framing concerning narcotics and psychoactive substances introduced through Western-led international regimes in the aftermath of the Second World War. In 1961, the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs debuted a regime of global control of narcotics through scheduling, which prohibited cannabis and its derivatives, coca and its derivatives, and a slew of organic and synthetic opiates (UN, 1961). Bolivia and Peru both sent representatives to treaty negotiations.

The early version, while lacking the enforcement teeth that would come in the 1970s under President Nixon's War on Drugs, left little room for country-specific interpretation or cultural considerations for states with organic drug production and consumption customs (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2012).

Instead, it put forward prohibitionism as the international standard and sought to codify American-devised containment strategies as the "single" reference for a hegemonic "international regime" of drug control (Krasner, 1982, 186; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2008). The UNODC 1962 Bulletin proclaimed the convention's mandate would be shortly brought to fruition when "all non-medical use of narcotic drugs, such as opium smoking… and chewing of coca leaves will be outlawed everywhere" (UNODC, 1962). In the convention, the international community voices concern about the health effects of narcotics and drug addiction but focuses the bulk of its energies on prohibition to rectify economic and social issues associated with narcotic production, explicitly addressing the problem of illicit traffickers in Article 35. However, the convention offers little to no justification for its prohibition framing beyond recognizing that narcotic drug use "constitutes a serious evil…and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind" (UN, 1961, 1). The normative narrative around drug use is so ingrained it need not be demonstrated. Notably, the convention specifically names only opium, coca, and cannabis as narcotics in need of prohibition – cocaine is mentioned only once in the body of the convention. In contrast, coca appears more than 20 times, including two articles dedicated to its prohibition (Articles 26 and 27), which states in part the obligation of members to "so far as possible enforce the uprooting of all coca bushes which grow wild. They shall destroy the coca bushes if illegally cultivated." (UN, 1961, 14).

And yet, many of the social and economic dangers commonly associated with the drug trade – criminality, violence, corruption, rent-seeking -- are not inherent characteristics of the narcotics market, as claimed by scholars like Goldstein (1985), but rather outcomes of state intervention and efforts to enforce illegalization (Thorton, 1991; Werb et al., 2011). While illicit global markets threaten state regime legitimacy, undermine state economic control, breed rampant corruption, and disrupt state financial flows with large influxes of black-market cash (Babor et al., 2009), state and international

institutions' framing of the market as illicit is primarily to blame. Decades of globalization and market liberalization have degraded any one state's authority over market criminalization and, in doing so, made criminal trades more lucrative (Jojarth, 2009). In the face of ever-increasing demand and ever-more globalized supply chains, international drug trafficking reaches new heights every year (UNODC, 2022). However, the increasing gravity of international drug smuggling has not convinced many policymakers to change their frames. Nation states across the world have, by and large, only doubled down on their market criminalization framework - attempting to strictly define the boundaries of economic activity, engaging in "selective and intensive market criminalization," and building "barriers against 'undesirable' cross-border economic exchange" (Andreas, 2004, 643).

b. The Cases of Bolivia and Peru

The prerequisite component of cocaine, coca leaves, is cultivated exclusively in the Andean region of South America. In 2020, Colombia accounted for 61% of cultivated coca bush, with Peru and Bolivia representing the rest - 26% and 13%, respectively. (UNODC, 2023). All three countries have seen marked increases in coca cultivation since 2015, jumping by 35% from 2020 to 2021 alone (UNODC, 2023). However, some key aspects make Bolivia and Peru more similar and relevant to my research in comparison to the circumstances of Colombia. Gootenberg (2017) agrees with other scholars that the three countries share "remarkably similar illicit frontier economies" (Grisaffi et al., 2021): situated mainly in rural areas with little infrastructure or state oversight, cultivated as a cash crop by impoverished, unlanded and otherwise disadvantaged groups to supplement subsistence farming (Grimmelmann et al., 2017, 76).

However, Gootenberg (2018) notes traditional coca cultivation and consumption goes back thousands of years in Bolivia and Peru, especially within Indigenous communities, which are still significant

population blocs in those countries. Coca is still widely consumed today in both countries, although in differing social contexts. By contrast, coca use outside of cocaine production is a rare phenomenon in Colombia, where only a small fraction of the population is Indigenous, with most living on the fringes of society (Henman, 1987). While some of these isolated groups have continued their coca traditions, by and large, "coca came into Colombian national consciousness as an illicit and recent good in the 1980s" and one that was produced abroad (Gootenberg, 2017, 15). Early Colombian cartels in the 1970s were almost entirely dependent on imports of Peruvian coca paste until they managed to set up cultivation and processing in-house.

This cultural history is critical to my case study considerations because it creates a level playing field for comparison of state framing. While there are some important distinctions in how these two nations have conceived of coca, they share a foundation of coca integration and embeddedness in the local order and rural economic community. Both countries have significant Indigenous minorities that have normalized coca, its cultivation, production, sale, and consumption, separately from its potential role in the cocaine production pipeline (Troyano Sanchez and Restrepo, 2018). As Fischer (2003) and Silvia Rivera (2008) indicate, the conceptualization of coca that holds regional legitimacy in coca enclaves of Peru and Bolivia evolved over millennia of Andean civilization. There is archaeological evidence of intentional coca cultivation and chewing among many prehistoric cultures in the Andes (Stolberg, 2011; Plowman, 1984). Its association with cocaine, drug trafficking, and American prohibition represents a foreign and very recent intrusion on a normalized facet of economic and social life (Thoumi, 2003). From this shared cultural history, their national policies diverged over time as both states embraced American-funded eradication efforts to different extents, leading up to the Morales period.

These two cases also demonstrate significantly different policy frames over the period of study (2000s and 2010s). After a period of heavy criminalization and repression during the late 1980s and 1990s, during which there were bouts of violence between government agents and cocaleros, Bolivian public opinion turned against American interference, and traditional political elites were disempowered. Coca growers peacefully mobilized behind Evo Morales and his MAS party, which came to power in 2005 with a nationalist-*indigenista* policy platform (Brienen, 2015). Under Morales, coca "assumed an ever more positive, popular, and integrative Bolivian national meaning" (Gootenberg, 2017, 9). In keeping with this revitalized conception, Morales established a policy of "Coca Yes, Cocaine No" (Grisaffi, 2019), which poured hundreds of millions of dollars into coca-producing regions like Chapare for infrastructure, land allotments and crop subsidies while simultaneously disengaging from American aid and eradication efforts.

Peru became heavily embroiled in the illicit industry during the 1980s as the chief supplier of coca paste to Colombian cartels. Under Presidents Alan García and Alberto Fujimori, and with substantial American subsidies, the Peruvian state implemented a similar war on drugs policy of eradication of coca crops and violent repression of drug traffickers as their neighbors during the 1980s and 1990s (McClintock, 1988; Youngers, 2002). However, after the fall of the Shining Path and Fujimori, Peru reverted to the apathetic position it had adopted since the beginning of prohibition in the 1950s and 1960s. While coca consumption is still practiced among millions within Peru, its use is stigmatized and primarily concentrated within fringe Indigenous communities. The regional isolation and relative disempowerment of these constituents allowed Peru's government to maintain a policy of disengagement, what Gootenberg (2017) names "cocaine denial." Since those involved in the coca economy were so marginal to the political and economic power centers, they could be ignored. The state approached the coca economy with a hostile apathy that allowed it to operate in the shadows but

left cocaleros and their families estranged from the Peruvian state or a sense of shared national identity. Kernaghan (2009) asserts that those Peruvians living in coca regions know of the state only through firsthand experiences of military raids, abductions, and propaganda efforts.

c. State-Community Relations Under the Coca Economy

Communities in rural Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia, where the majority of coca is produced due to a combination of cultural tradition, economic marginalization, and environmental preservations, have been caught in the crossfire of this increasing conflict between drug cartels and state agents. While drug cartels terrorize some communities, Blume (2021) finds that small, rural, and previously marginalized communities with limited economic opportunity are more likely to be supportive of illicit industries in their environment. Moreover, she posits that communities where coca is produced are more peaceful than areas through which cartels trafficked cocaine. Criminal enterprises make a more prolonged, permanent investment in production communities, which relies on extended collaboration between criminal enterprises, the cocaine industry, and its broader geographic and social context (Blume, 2021; Magaloni et al., 2020; Durán-Martínez, 2015; Lessing, 2020).

Findings from Peru also show the differential impact of illicit economies on community attitudes toward the state. Van Dun (2014) and Heuser (2019) found widespread evidence of community support and the illicit economy within the coca production region where they conducted ethnographic fieldwork. Van Dun (2014, 396) observes that among Peruvians working in cocaine enclaves, "the drug trade is so extensive that the negative stigma loses meaning, and the inhabitants do not see its presence as socially disruptive or inherently violent." Instead, van Dun links the occasional violent incidents to "the actors or the lack of actions of the state security forces" (2004, 395) rather than the coca growers or refiners. These findings fit within a trend demonstrated by Durán-Martínez (2017)

and Lessing (2017), who find that rates of violence correlated with narcotics in Latin America are sensitive to the extent of market destabilization within the industry and not the volume of production or trafficking. Communities remain largely peaceful when coca producers can operate without state interference or even with state protection (Grisaffi, 2021). State actions against the narcotics industry, in turn, breeds bloodshed.

If findings from coca-producing regions in Peru demonstrate the stubborn economic and social embeddedness of the coca industry, Grisaffi's fieldwork in Chapare, Bolivia, also shows the potential for institutional and state integration. Grisaffi's interviews with Chapare locals involved in various aspects of the coca trade paint a picture of an illicit economy that "is a source of wealth and stability" where many thousands of participants cooperate "in dense networks of debt and mutual dependency, creating a regulatory dynamic over space and time" (Grisaffi, 2021, 579). Within these small rural communities, the coca economy enjoyed such embeddedness and legitimacy that it had evolved a robust set of informal governing institutions. The phenomenon Grisaffi finds in coca enclaves in Bolivia and Peru, as he names an earlier paper, is "The Moral Economy of the Cocaine Trade" (Arias and Grisaffi, 2017).

The scholarship looking at community-state relations in these illicit economic enclaves is primarily the work of anthropologists and qualitative political scientists using interviews and ethnographic methodology to give evidence of the exceptional social context in which coca economics operate. This literature provides necessary insights into variables and mechanisms at play between the narcotics industry, the local community, and the state policy; however, there are few empirical studies of this relationship, with little evidence beyond what the people involved are willing to say on the record. The existing empirics are based on case analysis mainly in Central America, where trafficking, not production, is the primary process at hand, and it often occurs within urban organized crime contexts,

not at the hands of Indigenous locals. The cases I look at are different because of the long-term embeddedness and institutionalization of coca into the social fabric of the region that has spurred the creation of a de facto civil authority in coca unions that efficiently handle conflict management and economic redistribution (Wolf, 2001; Grisaffi, 2021).

III. Contrasting Policy Narratives: Bolivian Coca Pride and Peruvian Coca Denial

a. Identifying State Narratives Frames through Textual Analysis

The independent variable of this study is the states' legal conception of coca and their policy towards its production, which varies in the extent of criminalization. The first step of my analysis considers the state narratives as elucidated through national and international speeches. I operationalize this variable through discourse analysis of official state texts. This text-based process tracing aims to demonstrate the differential conceptual understandings of coca within leadership in Peru and Bolivia and how those framings translate into law and policy at the national level. Analyzing discourse is an effective and widely used way to understand how an issue is defined and problematized and its effects on the broader discussion of the problem (Hope, 2010). Such analysis identifies how state leaders actively construct and employ categories in their public communication. (Barksy, 1994). Based on the literature, I hypothesize a more security-based conception of coca, linking it to narcotics and crime in Peru. In contrast, I expect Bolivian leadership to frame coca primarily within its traditional, Indigenous use.

I define the state policy variable as the narrative by key stakeholders and policymakers of the empowered party on the government's coca policy and the role coca should play in society. Data on these narratives is plentiful if scattered. Using NVivo textual analysis software and relying on traditional word embedding models, I identify the most common arguments, vocabulary, and framing toward coca within official state documents, such as UN General Assembly (UNGA) speeches by Bolivian President Evo Morales and Peruvian Presidents Alejandro Todelo (2001 – 2006), Alan García (2006 – 2011) and Ollanta Humala (2011 – 2016), Presidential state addresses, press conferences by foreign ministers, and other official press releases. Discourse analysis of textual documents of state

policy is the first step in my efforts toward explaining-outcome process tracing (Beach and Pedersen, 2013).

Official state speeches at national and international forums give critical insight into state priorities and policy preferences. Countries use addresses during the General Debate portion of the UNGA to declare their official positions on the year's issues for public records and outline their national priorities and concerns about broader geopolitical and international trends. These speeches give countries an open platform to bring the problems to the global community's attention and their regional neighbors or population. Baturo et al. (2017) assert UNGA speeches offer greater and more nuanced insight into state positions than other measures, like UN voting records, because "states face lower external constraints and pressures" and, therefore, "have more leverage with the positions they take and the issues they emphasize." This freedom is especially poignant for small countries, allowing them to strategically voice controversial opinions on contentious issues and critique their larger peers without fear of repercussions (Smith, 2006; Nicholas, 1959).[1]

After identifying the discourses used at the national level to frame coca cultivation, I assess the consequences of those frames on the public perception of the state among coca farmers. My dependent variable is the community response to national coca policy, which breaks down into a few indicators for each outcome I look at. When taken together, the relationships demonstrated at each

[1] These texts employ rhetoric highly strategically, as seen in the American and Iranian General Debate addresses during the fragile 2012/2013 JCPOA negotiations (Baturo et al., 2017). It can heavily influence the perspectives of other states and the trajectory of international action, as demonstrated by George W. Bush's UNGA General Debate address in 2002, which forcefully advocated for international intervention in Iraq and global cooperation in the fight against terror (Hecht, 2016).

level give a comprehensive view of the downstream ramifications of states' concept-building on the communities in question.

I systematically analyzed 39 official state documents concerning coca policy in Bolivia and Peru from 2005 to 2017. Twenty-four were speech transcripts and letters from the UNGA, and 15 were national addresses by the President or a high-ranking cabinet member.[2] Following (Chong, 2007) and much of the empirical work on values framing and public opinion (Brewer and Gross, 2005), I code for attitude- and values-based codes. I also use a definitional code as a baseline to identify relevant cases where coca or the narco-economy was under discussion. I define two attitudinal codes (positive and negative) and five top-level policy frames that hit on specific values with which the speakers wanted to associate coca and its adjacent economic activity:

(1) Economic Development

(2) Health

(3) Indigenous Culture and Tradition

(4) Security and Criminality

(5) Nationalism and Sovereignty

I then identified overlapping patterns between the attitudinal and values-based codes to define policy frames. Many of the frames were straightforward: economic development, health, and Indigenous culture were all associated with coca only in a positive way, so they translated directly to policy frames.

[2] The UNGA speeches and documents were sourced from the United Nations Digital Library (https://digitallibrary.un.org/?ln=en). I used the English versions of these documents. The Peruvian national addresses were sourced from Arnold et al. (2017) and translated by DeepL language software into English. Bolivian speeches were sourced from Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores – a public website run by the Bolivian government and translated from Spanish to English through DeepL to maintain consistency with the UN documents. See References for complete citations.

However, the security-based coca strategies were exalted and critiqued, and self-determination was expressed through both the promotion of nationalism and criticism of Western intervention. My definitional code for coca also coded both positively and negatively. Ultimately, I settled on two conceptualizations of the informal coca economy: 1) **a counter-narcotic approach that promotes security through criminalization, eradication, and substitution,** and 2) **a pro-coca strategy that decriminalizes, legitimizes, cultivates, and elevates coca and its role in society and national identity**. The two countries employ both these approaches in their rhetoric but with divergent emphases and results in their policies.

In my original coding of these texts, I employ various methods, blending inductive and deductive textual analysis to compare state rhetoric, tease apart conceptual differences, and observe relevant patterns that indicate specific policy preferences (Laver et al., 2003). Based on the qualitative and case study work of Gootenberg (2017), Grisaffi (2019; 2021), and van Dun (2014), among others, I started my analysis from the assumption of two fundamentally contrasting conceptions, pro-coca and counter-narcotic, and then developed more nuanced policy positions that stemmed from those divergent conceptualizations (see Figure 1).[3] Next, I identified key definitional words corresponding to both conceptual frames. I used word frequencies and crosstab queries to compare country and audience dimensions to the relative extent of state support for key aspects of coca legalization or securitization.

[3] See Appendix 1 for a complete list of definitional, attitudinal, and value frames and relevant examples.

Figure 1: Coca Frames and Policy Codes



b. Divergent Narratives: Coca on the Fringes of Peru and at the Center of Bolivia

My findings in analyzing Peruvian discourse on coca align with the attitude described in Gootenberg's (2017) ethnographic work of 'coca denial.' In both national and international addresses, Peruvian regimes consistently minimize coca – both as a legitimate industry and as a central security risk, especially when addressing international audiences. Despite studying a fairly even distribution of texts - 19 addresses by Peruvian leaders and 20 by Bolivian leaders across the international and national platforms - Peruvian addresses account for only 10% of the total sample on drug policy and discuss coca specifically 5x less relative to their Bolivian counterparts.

When discussing coca, the Peruvian strategy dually promotes development and securitization. On the one hand, they are strong advocates of alternative economic activity and aggressive state

institutionalization in coca-dominated areas, which are on the fringes of state control and national society. Almost a quarter (23%) of their discussion of drug-related issues centers on the importance of economic development to their national strategy (See Figure 2). Key aspects of this policy are investments in education, job training, formal business, and the provision of public goods, as discussed by President Humala at the 2016 UNGA General Debate, "in those areas that were previously exposed to such illicit economies as drug trafficking, we have brought roads, the Internet and scholarship programmes so as to give the children of farmers engaged in raising illegal products the possibility of receiving higher education." (UNGA, 2016, 1). On the other hand, Peru maintains a forceful and militarized approach to narcotrafficking, which they connect closely with terrorism and violence. More than 25% of Peruvian discourse about coca policy relates it to drug trafficking, terrorism, and its accompanying violent consequences. They address this through a strong police and military presence in the VRAEM and call for further coordination with international powers against transnational trafficking. Rather than attempt to integrate coca use into their society, they look to eliminate it by offering alternatives if possible and using force if necessary.

Figure 2: Prevalence of Coca Frames in Peruvian Speeches



Despite regime changes within Peru over the last two decades, the policy approach towards coca has remained relatively consistent through Presidents Toledo, García, and Humala. In 2005, President Toledo called for millions worth of investments for communities affected by violence and terrorism in VRAEM provinces deeply involved in coca production, such as Junín, in order to extend state services and promote decentralization and national integration "to the poorest, to the peasant communities, to the deepest part of Peru" (Arnold et al., 2017). President García followed up on this sentiment in his 2009 address to the UN General Assembly, asserting, "[l]egislation concerning illicit crops and their interdiction and eradication should be complemented by prevention and rehabilitation programmes aimed at comprehensive, alternative, and sustainable development. To that end, the concerted efforts of all international actors are essential under the principles of cooperation and, above all, shared responsibility." (UNGA, 2009, 6). The existing differences in rhetoric seem to reflect more the changing geopolitical conditions leaders faced rather than ideological shifts in their policy

positions. For instance, the extent of securitization rhetoric concerning drugs and terrorism increased by almost 1000% from Alan Garcia's congressional address in 2007 to his address in 2010, corresponding with a spike in violent crime and coca cultivation in Peru (UNODC, 2012). Interestingly, however, this trend is not visible in the Peruvian UN speeches; Garcia's 2010 General Debate address breezes past international narcotic-related security concerns, including "drug trafficking," in a diverse laundry list of issues on which "Peru reaffirms its resolve to cooperate" (UNGA, 2010, 34).

Under Evo Morales, the Bolivians approach coca differently, emphasizing its traditional antecedents in the ancient cultures of the Andes and the social, cultural, and medicinal benefits of coca and championing Indigenous coca users as fundamental to the history and identity of the Bolivian people (See Figure 3). This pro-coca strategy hinges on the separation of coca from its derivative, cocaine, something Morales stresses routinely, and the empowerment of Bolivian sovereignty to adopt a national policy contrary to the international standard, a choice that Morales also defends ferociously. Instead of minimizing coca and the challenges of cocaine and narcotrafficking within his country, as his neighbors do, Morales takes every opportunity to bring up coca on the international stage, even going so far as to bring a coca leaf to show the General Assembly at the United Nations in 2016 and request a formal amendment in 2009 to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) that would remove specific mentions of coca as a harmful narcotic substance and give up the goal of eradicating coca's traditional uses (Morales Ayma, 2009).

Figure 3: Prevalence of Coca Frames in Bolivian Speeches



Promoting alternative development in coca cultivating areas, a cornerstone of the Peruvian approach, does not appear once in the Bolivian texts (See Figure 3). This reflects the differential extent of national integration of these areas. The coca enclaves in Peru are perceived by the state as on the fringes, largely separate from Peruvian mainstream society and thriving in places where state agents and services "have been barely present" (UNGA, 2016, 1). In Bolivia, Morales sees coca as essential to all Bolivian identities and endeavored to legitimize coca and its producers as a necessary and innate industry within the Bolivian economy. He grounds his policy position by "recogniz[ing] coca leaf as a natural product that is a cultural property of the Indigenous peoples of Bolivia" and, as such, considers coca's protection a necessary part of respecting Indigenous rights and cultural expression (UNGA, 2008, 3).

c. Anti-Western Rhetoric and the Importance of Audience

While both Peruvian and Bolivian leaders heavily feature securitization – including crop eradication strategies, counter-narcotic police, and narcotrafficking and terrorism – feature heavily for both countries, Bolivia's framing of coca is significantly more diverse and balanced in both the national and international contexts. Like Peru, they are more focused on specifics of securitization in national speeches when responding to citizens who are negatively impacted by the insecurity and violence often associated with coca production. To the international audience, however, Morales makes his pro-coca stance very obvious, first and foremost, by criticizing Western-led criminalization initiatives and relegates any domestic security concerns related to coca to a backseat vis-a-vis the grand injustice of coca's treatment by the neoliberal powers that be and the overblown claims of violence they use as an excuse for intervention. For example, "the drug problem offered a crafty pretext for applying an imperialist logic of control of national police and armed forces in order to intervene in the administration of States. The empire authorized this hypocritical war to lower the profile of its interventionist geopolitical, military strategy in areas rich in natural resources in order to control and plunder them" (UNGA, 2016, 2). Though he does spend time making a positive case for the benefits of coca, his greatest priority on the international stage is to be against the narcotics-based imperialist agenda he sees dominating the policymaking space around coca.

Contrasting the international and national samples in Peru and Bolivia reveals more nuances to the dynamics of balancing the concerns of citizens with those of neighbors. For Peru, there is a sharp contrast between national and international rhetoric concerning their critique of securitization and the Western counter-narcotic regime. While steadfast in their commitment to ending narco-trafficking domestically through military and police actions, when necessary, Peru does log notable objections to the American-dominated status quo strategy when speaking to international audiences, particularly

under President Humala (2011-2016). Like Morales in Bolivia, Humala asserts the suitability of a domestic strategy that prioritizes their national needs, preserves their sovereignty, and speaks out against the encroachment of Western powers while still maintaining supportive ties to international regimes. He calls out the double standard imposed by wealthy developed countries in Europe and North America most strongly in his 2016 UNGA speech, asking, "What are the drug-consuming countries doing? Drugs are produced because there are countries and societies that are able to pay for every gram of cocaine. The question is what these consuming countries are doing to counter the high demand for cocaine and drugs in general that they have created. I believe that this is an issue of common but differentiated responsibilities. We believe that there has to be genuine political will on both sides" (UNGA, 2016, 2). Such critique is absent from the Peruvian national discourse, which heavily prioritizes what the regime sees as citizens' concerns – crime, violence, security, and economic development (See Figure 4). They address these issues by promoting prohibitionist policies that rely on demonizing drug traffickers and rely heavily on police intervention rather than addressing the more abstract threats of Western imperialism or capitalist extortion that Morales points to.

Figure 4: Prevalence of Coca Frames in Peruvian Speeches – National vs. International



While anti-Western critiques and assertions of sovereignty were decidedly more common in the Bolivian texts, they proved to be highly relevant, if more subtle, aspects of how Peru presents itself internationally. While not challenging the West's fundamental conception of coca through appeals to either Indigenous or health-related frames, it carries some of the same anti-Western attitudes toward their neighbors. Humala rebukes the West while also calling for collaboration and further aid. It's an alternative and more subtle approach to asserting independence than demonstrated in Bolivian rhetoric but seeks to highlight the same hypocrisy and neo-colonial tendencies.

In international speeches, more than 70% of the negative discourse around drugs in the Peruvian international sample is criticism of the Western counter-narcotic regime. In contrast, it is slightly more than 50% in Bolivia. Bolivia spends much more time criticizing coca's securitization and drug policy

more broadly, whereas Peru focuses its critique on the Western-dominated implementation of the counter-narcotic securitization strategy. Peru walks a careful line that does not outright attack the securitization system while still blaming the West for not doing enough within the framework. Bolivia outright criticizes both the system and its architects and calls for a much more dramatic overhaul of international strategy.

The Bolivian criticism is more deeply targeted towards the institutions and underlying prohibitionist ontology that upholds coca's securitization than the Peruvian criticism, which prods at the most prominent actors without dismantling the system in which they operate. Morales expresses not only frustration with Western leadership on narcotics policy but the broader international permission structure that enables such imperialism to be sustained in the modern era – weaving a compelling Bolivian narrative of Western-led injustice and domination over what is a safe, sacred, and sustained cultural practice.

Figure 5: Prevalence of Coca Frames in Bolivian Speeches – National vs. International



d. Striking the Coca/Security Balance

Through keyword analysis, I dig deeper into the varied uses of both states' pro-coca and pro-criminalization narratives. In creating keyword frequencies, I identified a handful of words from my sample that were the most characteristic of the pro-coca and counter-narcotic conceptualizations. Then, I calculated the frequency of the word relative to the total words counted. The differential between Peruvian and Bolivian rhetorical strategies became starker when layering policy narrative keywords with attitudinal codes. Looking at keywords alone (See Figure 6), there are few differences

in how Bolivian and Peruvian leaders seem to discuss coca across the national and international speech samples.

Figure 6: Comparative Frequency of Securitization Keywords in Peruvian and Bolivian Speech Samples



However, when layering attitudinal coding over this frame, we find that over 60% of the Bolivian discussion of securitization was negative or critical, whereas more than 80% of the securitization frame in the Peruvian speeches coded positively (in support of). The pro-coca keywords (see Figure 7) are a more representative demonstration of the ideological differences since they only code positively and, therefore, are used heavily by the Bolivians and not the Peruvians.

Figure 7: Comparative Frequency of Securitization Keywords in Peruvian and Bolivian Speech Samples



In Bolivian addresses, the positive discussion of coca leaf almost entirely overlaps with the health and Indigenous culture frames. Above, we can see that nearly every pro-coca keyword has a greater relative frequency in the Bolivian sample of texts than the Peruvian, especially for critical concepts connected to coca like "indigenous," "nature," and "respect." This is convincing evidence that supports the literature's suggestion that the primary narratives behind the Bolivian state's decriminalization are, on the one hand, the positive framings of coca's role in culture, society, and the human body and, on the other, criticism of the West and its neocolonial approach to securitization around coca.

For Peru, we see some overlap between the coca leaf and positive attitude; however, all but one of these references are also coded to crop eradication, as they discuss the success of coca plant eradication efforts by Peruvian forces with a single exception, when President Humala briefly asserts his regimes "respect for the ancestral use of coca leaves by the peoples of Peru and Bolivia." (UNGA, 2016, 1)

This is the only time coca is discussed with specific reference to Indigenous communities in the Peru case and again speaks to Peru's chronic minimization of coca at the international level. Keyword analysis between Peruvian national and international speeches tell a similar story: despite three out of the four most frequent keywords from the Peruvian international sample coming from the pro-coca side: "rights," "humanity," and "community," "security," is far and away the most associated word with coca policy. At the national level, while "security" and "terrorism" are mentioned less, more concrete drug-related policies come to the forefront, specifically discussions of "police" and "trafficking" in the counter-narcotic frame, and "health," "culture," and "social" float to the top of the pro-coca keywords. Moreover, when speaking at the UN, Peruvian presidents' mentions of "drugs" dropped by more than 44%, and "coca" fell by more than 75% when compared to their sample of speeches addressed to domestic audiences. This dramatic difference demonstrates the relative depreciation of the prevalence of coca within Peru at the international level, where strategic appearances are primary. To an international audience, Peru seeks to distance itself from coca, minimize the role it plays in Peruvian society, and reaffirm its commitment to international counter-narcotic efforts.

While both leaders incorporate aspects of prohibitionism and cultural sympathy towards coca, they present fundamentally contrasting policies centered around incompatible conceptual visions on the appropriate role of coca and coca users in society. In Peru, coca was dominated by the state and minimized in the national consciousness. Traditional use was monopolized through Peru's national commercial coca company, ENACO. Then, it was eradicated elsewhere, often through force and with American assistance in the name of fighting terrorism, violence, and criminality. In place of autonomous coca economies, Peru promised to introduce formal economic development, increase state presence, and support alternative crop substitutions. They did not support Western interference

but did appreciate international aid in a supporting role. Politically fractured and socially marginalized due to their long-standing association with violent insurgents, coca growers were easily demonized and scapegoated by Peruvian presidents (Ferreira, 2016). Morales, meanwhile, made coca a cornerstone of his regime's strategy and the Bolivian national identity, using narratives that firmly tied coca to Indigenous autonomy, left-wing populism, and anti-imperialism. Welding these narratives together allowed him to mobilize a fractured coalition of support from coca-producing regions (Conzelman, 2007), a wave of popular support he rode into power over successive elections.

As well-crafted and broadly appealing as these narratives were for state leaders on this issue, the policies they produced did not apply evenly across coca-producing areas. In both Peru and Bolivia, political leadership chose to selectively enforce and target their criminalization efforts towards particular growing regions, while others were left relatively untouched by state agents. In Peru, these decisions were motivated mainly by security concerns, though other structural biases such as race and class are also evident. In Bolivia, historical fractures between "traditional" and "non-traditional" coca growers and accusations of political favoritism colored the regional implementation variance between provinces. My next section introduces the coca enclaves I chose as cases within Bolivia and Peru and examines how these policy narratives broke down geographically and manifested in the cultivation, eradication, and government seizure trends over the past two decades.

IV: Policy Implementation in Coca Enclaves

a. Bolivian Coca Policy Under Morales in Caranavi, Villa Tunari and Chimore

To get a sense of how these differential approaches to policies impact coca-producing communities, I focus on measures of several types of outcomes in specific coca enclaves in both Bolivia and Peru, where I had access to data on the illicit economy – coca cultivation, production, eradication, and seizure, but also to opinion survey data. To understand the impacts of state actions on public perception of crime, economic prosperity, and governmental trust, I employ time-series survey data from Vanderbilt University's LAPOP project. I evaluate the responses of survey participants within municipalities where consistent and significant coca production occurs. These areas were identified using UNODC crop cultivation reports. Unsurprisingly, these areas of Bolivia and Peru were among the most poorly represented by the survey data. Still, these snippets give relevant insight into the dynamics of state-population relationships in these unique economic enclaves. In Bolivia, I focus on three rural municipalities that have been traditional havens of coca cultivation since before Morales' election in 2005, but with differing policies and characteristics. Before exploring the public opinion data, I will examine how the differential coca narratives demonstrated in our speech analysis translate into concrete policy within the selected enclaves.

The first is Caranavi, situated in the La Paz Department and one of three provinces that comprise Las Yungas (see Map 1 in Appendix 3). Las Yungas has been an area of traditional coca cultivation since before the 1950s and the seat of powerful indigenous and peasant unions that have advocated forcefully for coca protection for several generations (Heath, 1973; Lema, 1997). Even under the long-standing 1988 Law 1008 code, written with American acquiescence, traditional coca growers in Las Yungas were protected from state antinarcotic and criminalization efforts. As shown in Figure 8, when

comparing Cochabamba – the department where the other two enclaves of focus are located - Las Yungas and total cultivation in Bolivia, Las Yungas consistently accounts for more than half of the coca produced in Bolivia. Upon his election in 2005, Morales granted more substantial coca-growing rights to this population of long-term growers early on in his presidency through his "Coca Yes, Cocaine No" policy (CYCN). As a result, much of the region has continued coca cultivation, with the UNODC reporting in 2019 that 55% of the land cultivated in Las Yungas is dedicated to coca, accounting for more than 80% of the agricultural production value (UNODC, 2020).

Figure 8: Bolivian Coca Cultivation Total and Regional Breakdown (2003 – 2019)



However, few of those traditional growers lived in Caranavi, which instead was populated by later-coming, non-traditional coca farmers, who, until the passage of the 2017 reforms, grew coca illicitly and were subject to eradication efforts (Brewer-Osorio, 2021). Caranavi is a rural and tropical area with a population of slightly over 50,000. It is one of the major centers of Bolivian coffee production

(Hellin and Higman, 2003). This region is fascinating because of the aggressive alternative development program launched there (promoting coffee cultivation) and the continued eradication efforts that have plagued non-traditional growers. Even so, the UNODC (2017) maintains that coca is the largest crop despite alternative development efforts over the years. From a cultivation perspective, the fruits of this effort are evident (see Figure 9). Estimates of coca cultivation in Caranavi fell by more than half from 2006 – 2016, from 1,714 hectares to 755 hectares in 2016, and rebounded only slightly in 2017 (781 hectares) and 2018 (769 hectares) (UNODC, 2020). Compared to other areas of Las Yungas in the La Paz Department, the Caranavi province makes up only 5 – 6% of total coca crop acreage (UNODC, 2020). Caranavi is one of the provinces designated by the Bolivian Government through the 2017 General Coca Law as a legal zone for coca cultivation with registration and land restrictions, but not, as most other regions in Las Yungas, as a site of traditional or ancestral protection of coca growing. The passage of the General Coca Law in 2017, which permitted 2,500-meter sq coca plots for growers in Las Yungas, regardless of their "traditional" status, greatly expanded the capacity of coca farmers to cultivate more land in Caranavi, partially explaining the increase in production after 2017 (Brewer-Osorio, 2021).

Figure 9: Hectares of Coca Cultivated in Caranavi, Las Yungas, Bolivia (2003 – 2019)



The other two municipalities I investigated in Bolivia are from the Chapare region in the Cochabamba Department of Bolivia. A jungly, tropical climate, with lots of rain and lush vegetation characterize this area. Unlike Las Yungas, various agricultural products are grown here, including bananas, rice, pineapple, and citrus fruits. Because of this, coca unions and peasant political organizations for coca protection came later, as cocaine demand exploded in the 1990s (Farthing and Kohl, 2014). As a result, few growers here benefitted from the "traditional" classification of Law 1008. The reforms of Morales' Coca Yes, Cocaine No Policy only gave them marginal land plots with poor protections. As such, Chapare coca farmers have been targeted more heavily by eradication efforts, forced crop substitution, and state monitoring than the farmers in Las Yungas (Brewer-Osorio, 2021). While the hectares of coca cultivated Cochabamba on average is only 47% of that grown in Las Yungas from 2003 – 2020, Cochabamba has been disproportionately targeted by crop eradication and coca seizures by state agents (see Figure 10).

Figure 10: Proportion of Coca Fields Eradicated from Total Cultivated for Cochabamba and Las Yungas Departments (2003 – 2019)[4]



Villa Tunari and Chimore are both rural municipalities within Cochabamba (See Map 2 in Appendix 3). Villa Tunari is considerably larger (population 71,146 in 2012) than Chimore (population 15,264 in 2001), but they are both dominated by indigenous Quechua populations (INE). Coca production in these areas has been particularly controversial because both municipalities are home to El Parque Nacional Carrasco, a federally protected park where crop cultivation is illegal. Protection of these natural reserves from agriculture is one of the reasons for increased scrutiny of coca production around Chapare. Within Cochabamba in 2018, Villa Tunari accounted for 49% of all coca cultivation

[4] Data drawn from UNODC and Government of Bolivia Coca Cultivation Reports. In Cochabamba from 2011 – 2014, there are more hectares reported eradicated than were cultivated that year, this can be explained by differences in methodology between the UN cultivation survey and the Bolivian eradication reporting, indicating potentially previously unreported cultivation, or mismatching timing and methodology between the UNODC, responsible for the cultivation survey, and DIGPROCOCA, the Bolivian governmental agency in charge or recording both forced eradication and voluntary "rationalization" (e.g. reduction) of legal growers' plots. More about the methodology of these surveys is available at the end of the reports as listed in the references.

in the Department (3,657 hectares), while Chimore accounted for just 6% (461 hectares) (UNODC, 2020).

The passage of the 2017 General Coca Law dramatically transformed the landscape of government intervention in coca regulation. Rather than pushing non-traditional growers to eradicate while largely ignoring traditional growers, the government took on dual initiatives to stem the supply of illicit coca and minimize cocaine production. Firstly, they worked with coca unions and community organizations to compel compliance with the cato limits for all growers in both regions and eliminate "surplus production" that could be funneled to cocaine manufacturers. This proved much more challenging among the traditional growers in Las Yungas, who were used to doing things their way without government intervention, even though their cato allotment was much larger than Chapare cocaleros. Secondly, military units forcefully eradicated unauthorized crops, that is, those outside the designated regions or unregistered with local authorities (UNODC, 2020). However, unauthorized growing was significantly less of a problem due to some successful eradication efforts, primarily orchestrated in collaboration with coca unions and coca-producing communities in Chapare, but also to an increase in the allowance for coca plantations from 12,000 hectares in 2004 to 22,000 in 2017 (Brewer-Osorio, 2021). By the time the 2017 reforms were passed, very few unauthorized farms were operational.

Chapare growers benefitted greatly from these reforms and expansions, which raised the cap on cultivation and did away with the traditional/nontraditional grower division (Pellegrini, 2016). Since CYCN in 2006, non-traditional Chapare growers have been allowed one cato for coca cultivation, a land plot of 1,600 square meters (UNODC, 2020). Additional plots were subject to eradication until the 2017 law expanded Chapare production limits to 7,700 hectares and Las Yungas limits to 14,300 hectares. While this cato rule was largely ignored in its early implementation, strong local governance and union institutions successfully managed to curb illicit production through community monitoring,

collaborative and voluntary eradication procedures, and compensation schemes (Brewer-Osorio, 2021). Coca production in Cochabamba is about half what it is in Las Yungas in terms of hectares, but it historically accounts for significantly more illegal production and eradication (UNODC, 2020) (See Figure 11). In 2009, Las Yungas sustained 20,861 hectares of coca cultivation compared to Cochabamba's 9,700 hectares, yet 93% of eradicated hectares for the same year were in Cochabamba (UNODC, 2020). One of the most significant reforms of Morales' policy has been a change in the approach to eradication enforcement through the empowerment of localized political authorities and community accountability. This effort has been uniquely successful in Chapare, partly due to Morales' political clout there. According to Farthing and Ledebur (2014), 88% of coca eradication from 2006 – 2013 was conducted through this collaborative process. Over the same period, reports of forced eradication efforts in Las Yungas were six-fold those from Chapare (Brewer-Osorio, 2021).

Figure 11: Annual Eradicated Hectares of Coca in Bolivia (2003 – 2019)



Only since 2017 has Bolivia provided a consistent district-by-district breakdown of coca cultivation, but early indications show that cultivation in Chapare is thriving under the 2017 reforms (see Figure 12). Villa Tunari accounts for almost all the coca cultivated in Chapare and about half of the total for the Cochabamba region for 2017 – 2020. The difference in cultivation between Villa Tunari and

Chimore is unsurprising, given how much larger and more populated Villa Tunari is relative to its neighbor. However, Caranavi's low production levels over this period in comparison to their Chapare rivals demonstrate the hard-fought success of government efforts in Las Yungas and Caranavi in particular over the last two decades, though even at its peak in 2005, production in Caranavi never rivaled that of Villa Tunari. Conversely, despite eradication spiking in Cochabamba in 2018, with nearly 8,000 hectares eradicated, Villa Tunari's yield remains largely unaffected.

Figure 12: District-Level Coca Cultivation Levels in Bolivia (2017 – 2020)



The differential enforcement across provinces shows that even within a country that legalizes, legitimizes, and promotes coca, there are still areas and contexts in which a prohibitionist mindset prevails. This is partly due to the historical differences in coca cultivation within those regions, as discussed briefly above, and the contrasting political power within each area. Until the official repeal of Law 1008 in 2017, when the General Coca Law replaced it, there were significant disparities between securitization efforts in "traditional zones," like most in Las Yungas, and "non-traditional" zones like Chapare in Cochabamba. Much of the political organizing and social mobilization behind

Morales and the MAS party in the early 2000s reflected the pent-up frustration and political power of Chaparé coca growers and their coca unions (Durand-Ochoa, 2014; Oikonomakis, 2019). Harten (2011) and Aguilar (2014) attribute Morales' 2005 victory to the growing influence and organizing capacity of the Chapare cocaleros. Unlike cocaleros in Las Yungas, which had a long history of political organizing and successful government lobbying, evidenced by their privileged legal status, the passage of Law 1008 ushered in an era of repression, state violence, and resistance among cocaleros in Chapare, which catalyzed the political social movement from which Evo Morales emerged (Healy, 1991).

The plight of the Cochabamba cocaleros propelled Morales to the presidency, and he often references his responsibility to these Indigenous peasant farmers in his early speeches. To the UN in 2007, he proclaimed,

> "[f]or the first time in Bolivian history, the groups most forgotten, despised, hated and reviled throughout the history of Bolivia — we indigenous peoples — have assumed the leadership of our country to change our beloved Bolivia — to make political and economic changes, to reshape and re-establish our country, orienting it towards searching for unity, respecting our differences and respecting our identity" – Evo Morales (UNGA, 2007, 23).

However, it is also evident from the UN data that there is a significant gap between Morales' stated objectives and his policy outcomes. While crop eradication and seizure eventually fall over the course of Morales' terms, the changes are neither rapid nor linear (see Figure 13). Eradication and government seizures increased in Cochabamba in the years immediately after Morales' election and introduction of CYCN – eradication peaked in 2007, while police seizures in 2011.

Figure 13: National and Regional Coca Seizures by the Bolivian State (2003 – 2019)



We might expect public opinion to follow a similar trajectory as coca communities in Cochabamba experience an initial increase in scrutiny, followed by a loosening. Whereas in Las Yungas, where state intervention in coca production has been historically very low due to its protected "traditional" status, even small increases in eradication and crop seizure significantly ruffle the feathers of the community, as Brewer-Osorio (2021) demonstrates in her survey of forced eradication incidents (see Figure 14). Therefore, despite Cochabamba's much higher rates of eradication and seizure due to the historical precedent for state repression in that region, I hypothesize improved public opinion of drug policy, the government, and drug-related crime over time. In contrast, in Las Yungas, while state intervention and prohibitionist actions are less common than in Cochabamba, their extent has increased dramatically in recent years, potentially yielding more conflicting community opinions of government policy**.** The percentage of cultivated hectares eradicated in Las Yungas rose from 0.02% in 2004 to a peak of 22.47% in 2014, a change of almost 80,000%. In Cochabamba, eradication rates only increased 46% over the same period (see Figure 10).

Figure 14: Newspaper Reports of Forced Eradication Events by Region in Bolivia (2006 – 2016)[5]



Comparing Bolivian narratives to their agricultural outcomes shows inconsistencies between the UNODC data and the empirics quoted by leadership. For example, in 2016, Morales touted the success of the Bolivian strategy at the UN by citing a 34% reduction in coca-bush cultivation between 2011 and 2014 under his administration (UNGA, 2016). He directly references this data as coming from the UN statistics. However, my examination of the relevant UNODC report shows only a 25% reduction in hectares of cultivation during this period (UNODC, 2016). He further claims at the UNGA in 2016 that "we have the lowest rate of coca cultivation in 10 years", for which there is no statistical basis in the UN Monitor Report from that year (UNGA, 2016, 3). This discrepancy continues in national speeches also. In his Bolivian Independence Address in 2017, he accurately cites recent UN cultivation numbers but under-reports cultivation statistics from early in his presidency in 2005 by several thousand hectares (Morales Ayma, 2017).

[5] Graph sourced from Brewer-Osorio (2021, 589) based on data compiled from national Bolivian Newspapers between 2006 – 2016 archived at CEDIB (https://www.cedib.org).

b. Peruvian Policy Consequences for Coca Cultivation in Rio Tambo and Huánuco

My two communities of focus in Peru are the districts of Rio Tambo in the Junín department, in the VRAEM (Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro) region, and Huánuco, a district located in the department of the same name, 150 miles northeast of Lima in the Alto Huallaga region. These regions have similar populations and rural environments. Both provinces are sparsely populated and largely free from urban development, with poor and primarily Indigenous communities, and share histories of rampant insurgent activity and illicit coca production at the height of the Shining Path's power in Peru (Ponce, 2016; Cotler, 1999). They also share fertile terrain and unique rainforest mountain climates due to their proximity to substantial rivers and the Andes mountains. Unlike some other areas of coca cultivation in Peru, coca produced in Alto Huallaga and the VRAEM primarily feeds into cocaine production rather than traditional uses and licit sale through ENACO, Peru's national coca company in charge of licit commerce of coca-derived goods (Busnel and Manrique López, 2023).

Data on coca cultivation in Peru is less localized than in Bolivia, with most coca statistics from the UNODC only available by region and often not by department or province. While DEVIDA, Peru's Office of Drug Control, offers supplementary data with more geographic specificity, their reports vary somewhat from those reported by the UN. For consistency in my comparison to Bolivia, I only use the UN-verified data. However, even the UN data is approximate, and its methodology is inconsistent and opaque. Even with its limitations, this data reveals the apparent failure of repression-based tactics during the 2000s, as coca cultivation increased to over 60,000 hectares, making Peru the top coca producer in the world in 2012 and 2013, surpassing Colombia for the first time since the 1990s (UNODC, 2014). Regional breakdowns also show the contrasting results of repression in different regions (see Figure 15). While production in the VRAEM has increased at a steady pace over the last 15 years, up 51.4% from 2003 to 2017, cultivation levels in Alto Huallaga, once slightly higher than

the VRAEM, plummeted around 2010, dropping more than 90% between 2009 and 2017 (my calculations based on UNODC data). Despite relatively similar environmental, social, and historical contexts, these two areas had very different outcomes from Peruvian coca policies.

Figure 15: Peruvian Coca Cultivation Total and Regional Breakdown (2003 – 2017)



The Rio Tambo district (population: 27,793 as of the 2005 census) is located in Junín, one of the four departments comprising the VRAEM, the heart of traditional coca production in Peru. The VRAEM region has been a stronghold of the Shining Path since the early 1980s, which harnessed coca farms to fund its cause. The founders of the Shining Path capitalized on decades of peasant farmers' systematic impoverishment and neglect by the state in the VRAEM as a platform through which to advocate for the violent insurgency (Cotler, 1999; Ponce, 2016). Even now, its remnants remain in the VRAEM, subsisting through coca production and selling to distributors in neighboring countries (Ellis, 2020; Saffón, 2020). In 2017, 43% of coca crops identified by the UNODC were grown in the VRAEM, and VRAEM production accounted for 67% of the estimated national yield of coca leaves due to the incredible density of coca bush growing by farmers (UNODC, 2017). Within the VRAEM

region, however, Junín is a minor department, cultivating consistently less than 4,000 hectares of coca annually. However, it became increasingly relevant over time, representing only 9.6% of the regional cultivation in 2007 and more than 21% in 2015. Within Junín, Rio Tambo accounts for consistently around a third of all cultivated land (UNODC, 2018).

The VRAEM, particularly Junín, is also a hub of Indigenous coca cultivation. Many local native communities within Rio Tambo, such as the Quimaropitari, the Quempiri, and the Camantavishi, cultivate their hectares of coca (UNODC, 2017). The UN report identifies native groups' reliance on coca crops as a critical failing of the Peruvian state to supply sufficient working opportunities, formal employment, and sustainable community support to these Indigenous groups that are among the most destitute citizens (UNODC, 2017).

Huánuco is a somewhat more extensive and densely developed district, with a population of 72,642 as of 2005 and home to the departmental capital. This district is in upper Huallaga Valley (Alto Huallaga), an area also once a haven for the Shining Path and a hot spot for coca cultivation during the 1990s especially (van Dun, 2012; van Dun, 2014). In 1987, as the region pumped out tens of thousands of tons of coca leaves, the government estimated that 95% of the local economy was fed by illegal coca production and sale (Gonzales, 1994). However, due in part to this insurgent history, coca's encroachment onto state-designated protected natural parks and reserves like Parque National Tingo Maria and Cordillera Azul (UNODC, 2017; Salisbury and Fagan, 2013) and a renewed and coordinated eradication effort by CORAH (Proyecto Especial de Control y Reducción del Cultivo de la Coca en el Alto Huallaga*)* targeting terrorist-linked coca, production in this area has been highly monitored and restricted since the mid 2000s, leading to more instances of eradication than in the VRAEM, despite having similar total outcome before large-scale eradication effort targeting Alto Huallaga got underway. While starting in earnest in 2005, the most significant push to eradicate coca

in Alto Huallaga was spearheaded by the Humala administration (UNODC, 2017; Ponce, 2016). Since then, the Huánuco department has been a particular target, and its production levels have been severely impacted by the state's forceful eradication campaign, falling almost 96% from 2009-2017 (see Figure 16).

Figure 16: Departmental Comparison of Annual Coca Cultivation in Junín and Huánuco (2007 – 2017)



Peru's policies mirrored those of pre-Morales times in Bolivia. Like Law 1008 in Bolivia (passed in 1989), Peruvian policy towards coca was American-endorsed and prohibitionist centered while including some carve-out zones for traditional cultivation in an attempt to balance international pressures with risks of social unrest and violence in insurgent-control territories (Ponce, 2016). State use of repression, therefore, remained relatively low through the 1980s, and coca cultivation expanded under the guidance of the Shining Path. Despite urges from the U.S., Peruvian leadership resisted foreign military interventions for fear of exacerbating economic deprivation and provoking insurgent and peasant uprisings (Gurr, 1970; Cotler, 1999; Ponce, 2016). However, as violence intensified in the 1990s, Fujimori's government, coaxed along by American financial incentives, cracked down –

suspending civil rights, declaring militarized emergencies in coca-growing departments, and mobilizing battalions of armed peasants to revolt against insurgent groups (van Dun, 2012). This state-led campaign of violence against the Shining Path and other insurgent forces in the 1990s resulted in countless incidents of human rights violations and injustices towards civilians committed by both the state and the guerilla forces (Ponce, 2016). However, aspects of Fujimori's hardline approach towards coca were successful in their goals of reducing production. In 1999, national coca cultivation fell below 40,000 hectares for the only time in UNODC records (1983-2017) as a result of a passive manual crop eradication effort that year that destroyed almost 30% of the national total (UNODC; Ponce, 2016).

Coca eradication and crop replacement through alternative development initiatives have been mainstay elements in the Peruvian narrative and strategy towards coca even after Fujimori's downfall in 2000. These frames comprised 10% and 23% of drug policy discussions in our speech samples. However, successive administrations have employed them with varying ferocity and success. Presidents Toledo (2001 – 2006) and García (2006 – 2011) heavily invested in eradication policies as Peruvians became increasingly worried about drug trafficking's national prevalence (LAPOP Database), spending more than 280 million dollars on interdiction between 2002 – 2010. Despite promoting alternative development initiatives heavily, making up 3x more of their speech narrative than crop eradication, their budget tells a different story; over the same period, the government spent only 62.8 million on alternative crop substitution (Comisión Nacional, 2012). Ponce (2016, 140) characterizes this period as "highly repressive" towards coca cultivation and use, more so than earlier decades, due to the increasing economic pressure from Americans and improved security conditions due to the retreat of the Shining Path. However, due to continued risks of violence and terrorist activity, eradication forces avoided the VRAEM. They only cautiously made their way into Alto Huallaga in order to avoid peasant confrontations or provoke terrorist violence (Ledebur and Grisaffi,

2019). Toledo took a collaborative approach in 2003, working with cocaleros and CORAH to voluntarily remove and replace their coca fields with substitute crops, such as coffee and cocoa (Pachico, 2011; Salisbury and Fagan, 2013). This yielded small successes, with 887 hectares eradicated in 2003 and 252 in 2004 (UNODC, 2004). The impact became clear as cultivation levels in Alto Huallaga and Huánuco began to fall around 2009 (see Figures 15 and 16). Meanwhile, the government pursued no eradication in the VRAEM, where cooperative efforts with local coca grower coalitions focused entirely on alternative development and improving access to public provisions (Ferreira, 2016). [6]

Figure 17: Peruvian Coca Crop Eradication Nationally and in Alto Huallaga (2003 – 2017)[7]



[6] See President Alan Garcia's "Plan VRAE" (2009)

[7] Data sourced from UNODC and DEVIDA annual reports on Peruvian coca. Regional data is not available for Alto Huallaga for 2005 – 2011.

Upon the election of President Humala in 2011, he followed the same strategic framework as his predecessors but promised significantly greater results. This shift is especially noticeable at the national level. In his yearly address to Congress in 2010, President Garcia spent only three short paragraphs, a mere six sentences, on the issue of drug trafficking and linked it broadly to terrorism and the need for more police funding; by contrast, in his 2012 address, Humala spends 30% more of his speech time discussing the necessity of increased security in Alto Huallaga and the VRAEM in particular (Arnold et al., 2017). Furthermore, he singles out drug trafficking and the need for state control in these regions as defining issues of his presidency, "If there is one thing that distinguishes my government, it is its firm decision to confront drug trafficking and terrorism head-on, until they are definitively defeated." (Arnold et al., 2017). From here, we see levels of eradication increase significantly, both in Alto Huallaga and around the country, except for in the VRAEM (see Figure 17). Correspondingly, as instances of forced eradication increased, with annual eradication totals more than doubled from 2001 – 2013, so did reports of violence between state agents and cocaleros in Alto Huallaga and other heavily targeted regions of Peru (Pachico, 2012; Ledebur and Grisaffi, 2019).

Despite his focus on the VRAEM in his speeches and increased militarization of the area, Humala's attempt at direct confrontation with coca growing in the VRAEM was short-lived. After announcing plans to initiate forced crop eradication in the VRAEM in 2014, his administration quickly reversed course later that year, slashing their goal from 15,000 hectares to 5,000 and committing to end forced eradications and only proceed through collaborative crop replacement (Gurney, 2014; Soberón, 2014). This change in direction was prompted by local organizations staging massive peasant protests and threats from the Shining Path to support coca farmer's resistance efforts materially (Ferreira, 2016; Acción Directa, 2014; Gurney, 2014). Only in 2019 did a new administration again attempt eradication

in the VRAEM, resulting almost immediately in violence between security forces and locals (Ledebur and Grisaffi, 2019).

Meanwhile, forced eradication became increasingly common in Alto Huallaga, as did crop substitution, primarily coffee and cacao (see Figure 18). However, local farmers reported that coffee crops were labor-intensive and vulnerable to fungus, often yielding "more work than profit" (Ledebur and Grisaffi, 2019).

Figure 18: Extent of Coca Crop Substitution Compared to Coca Growth in Alto Huallaga (2012 – 2017)



All three Peruvian presidents during this period claimed a platform that championed crop eradication and substitution, improving economic opportunities and bringing coca-growing communities closer contact with the state. However, their priorities, methods, and results vary across time and regional implementation, resulting in disparate experiences for coca growers over this period of intensifying state repression. These unfulfilled promises partially indicate a broad failure of the government's

prohibitionist-based policies, but it is also the result of their uneven enforcement of these laws, which have cracked down hard in Alto Huallaga, resulting in a sharp decline in coca production and a series of violent clashes with locals. All the while, the VRAEM has remained mostly untouched, considered too much of a security threat for the state to intervene. Without state enforcement, coca cultivation has held steady, demonstrating a balance of power between the embedded economy and the low-level insurgency. Despite their securitization rhetoric, Peruvian presidents recognize that the coca economy holds together a relative peace that would be disrupted by the intervention of state agents against coca. Despite both Alto Huallaga and the VRAEM having similar "aura[s] of danger" during the 1980s and 1990s in the Peruvian national consciousness (Kernaghan, 2009, 13), Alto Huallaga slowly shed this reputation due to a long-driven state campaign to re-assert itself in the area (in which CORAH played a prominent role). The VRAEM, however, continues to be singled out as a region of lawlessness, in part due to the continued presence of the Shining Path, the political mobilization of farmers and peasant unions, most notably Federación de Productores Agropecuarios del VRAE, FEPA-VRAE, and the large Indigenous populations (Ferreira, 2016; Paredes, 2007; Cabieses, 2008).

Given the increasing repressive actions taken by successive administrations in Alto Huallaga, where the illicit coca economy had thrived for decades through eras of violence, insurgency, and isolation, in looking at the LAPOP survey data on public opinion, I anticipate greater dissatisfaction with the government administration, state agents like the police, and the current drug policies among respondents in Huánuco due to intensifying forced eradications and state military intervention in Alto Huallaga than in the VRAEM, which has been mostly left alone to cultivate coca, though historically has a very militarized relationship with the state. Due to the ongoing security concerns there – residents of Rio Tambo in Junín may start with a meager opinion of the state and its agents due to a contentious history – the VRAEM has been in a perpetual state of emergency since 2003. However,

following the coca cultivation trends, I hypothesize that these negative opinions will remain steady over time. Maybe there will be spikes around 2014 – a moment when the government tried to crack down on the VRAEM.

V. Gauging Public Opinion in Coca Enclaves

LAPOP conducts surveys for Bolivia and Peru every two years. In looking at public opinion data within my various coca enclaves, I examined survey responses from 2006 – 2018 that corresponded to my indicators, either yielding insight into the public's approval of the government or their sense of security and safety.

From there, I sought to understand how locals, for whom coca was not a legal conception but a part of their community economy, view state agents and interventions. Were they seen as welcome support to stimulate development, provide public goods, and help maintain peace? Or were they unwanted intruders who brought conflict, upended local orders, and undermined community authority? While my sample is too small to power regressions - a significant limitation of my survey data in this project - it is somewhat representative, and my results show correlations worth exploring further in an experimental setting.[8] In order to maximize the size and, therefore, reliability of my sample, I did not systematically consider subgroups, which could have a bearing on survey responses such as age, gender, education, or socioeconomic status. I also sought out questions that were asked consistently over several survey iterations and associated with the same possible responses. When there were variations in question format, such as including different Indigenous subgroups, I standardized responses by recoding consistently across all the years and regions.

[8] See Appendix 2 for observation specifications for each region/year.

a. Regional Divides and Distrust Among Coca-Growers in Bolivia

For the Bolivian districts of Caranavi, Villa Tunari, and Chimore, I had an average of 20.7 observations (individual respondents) per district per year. For Huánuco and Rio Tambo in Peru, there were only 11.4 survey respondents on average per year in each. Despite the small sample sizes increasing the risk of non-representativeness and limited generalizability, the respondents showed some positive indications that I was catching the relevant populations in my survey sample: those with ties to the coca economy. Firstly, I knew from the UNODC data that there are significant coca fields in these areas – flyover images from planes and first-hand reports speak to this: responses from these municipalities are universally characterized by the recording staff as rural and sparsely populated.

From there, analyzing the demographic information of respondents from 2006-2018 shows that the vast majority of the surveyed populations each year are members of Indigenous communities, the populations most closely tied to coca cultivation, use, and political mobilization around coca issues in Bolivia. Evo Morales tied Indigenous peoples and coca cultivation together in his narratives and policies. Therefore, high rates of Indigenous participation in the survey are critical to understanding the impact of his policies on the public. Over half of Caranavi respondents each survey year self-identify as indigenous, overwhelmingly as Aymara. Villa Tunari and Chimore are majority Indigenous almost every year but show more diversity in their ethnic make-up, with a plurality of Quechua, but also Aymara and other Indigenous communities, including Guaranis, Chiquitanos, Afrobolivianos, and Mojenos.

Moreover, from the snapshot we have into Bolivian coca habits (coca-specific questions were only asked in 2012), many of those surveyed use coca regularly through various consumption methods – a much higher percentage than the national average of respondents. While 35.2% of LAPOP

respondents across Bolivia in 2012 reported themselves as regular or frequent chewers of coca leaves, on par with the EU-lead 2013 study reporting 30% of Bolivians were regular coca chewers (CONALTID, 2013), these coca enclaves reported significantly higher rates of regular use, ranging from 50-65% (see Figure 19). The same trend holds for consuming coca through tea infusions; the targeted regions show significantly higher rates than the survey's national average.

Figure 19: Reported Frequency of Coca Chewing in Caranavi, Chimore, and Villa Tunari (2012)



Several LAPOP questions asked Bolivian respondents about their satisfaction with the current government. I specifically identified questions that asked about the government's ability to respond to relevant citizen concerns like security, poverty, and narco-trafficking. I also looked at their approval of President Morales as a champion of coca patriotism and a symbol of Indigenous power. Since Chimore and Rio Tambo are close to his local power base in Chapare, we would anticipate these

regions, in particular, to respond sympathetically to his regime. When asked to what extent the current government had improved citizen security, the Morales regime was rated highly (significant improvement, <4 on a scale from 1 – 7) by more than 70% of respondents from Villa Tunari (VT) and Chimore (CH), the districts in Chapare from 2008 – 2016 (see Figure 20). The government's average ratings (see Appendix 3) started high for all three regions in 2008, showing early satisfaction with Morales's policies around citizen security; however, they declined from there, mostly sharply in Caranavi (C), indicating increasing insecurity and disapproval of Morales' approach, before all areas showed a rebound in 2016. This decline in public safety assessment of the government in Caranavi corresponds to the dramatic uptick in forced crop eradication events in Las Yungas. Between 2008 and 2014, the hectares of coca annually eradicated in Las Yungas increased by 7.5x, and coca hectares cultivated in Caranavi fell by almost 50%, while Cochabamba only saw a modest increase in eradication (up 20% between 2008 and 2014).

Figure 20: Percentage of Respondents Rating the Government Above Average (>4) on Citizen Security (2008 – 2016)[9]



Also, in 2012, LAPOP asked Bolivians whether they agreed that coca production was more of a problem for cocaine-consuming countries than a problem for Bolivia (see Figure 21). This line of questioning highlights critical aspects of Morales' narrative on coca: the importance of accountability for Western nations. He asserts forcefully that the drug-consuming countries are the true drivers of the narcotics industry and, as such, should take the bulk of the responsibility for the failure of their prohibitionist approach and the havoc it has caused,

> "[…] the war on drugs has failed. Drug use has increased throughout the world… The rate of cocaine consumption in the United States is 1.6 per cent, while the world average is 0.4 per

[9] Number of observations (respondents) available for this data ranges form 20-25 participants, see Appendix 2 for details.

cent. By what standard of morality does the United States certify or decertify countries when we all know that nothing will be done to reduce this demand and that the highest number of cocaine users live in that country?" – Evo Morales (UNGA, 2016).

Nationally, there was robust agreement with this sentiment among respondents, with 67.6% agreeing at least somewhat with this positioning of blame. All three target regions also responded strongly in the affirmative, with Villa Tunari slightly below average at 65% and Caranavi and Chimore somewhat above average, at 68.8% and 84.2%, respectively.

Figure 21: Regional Distribution of Agreement Among Survey Respondents that "Coca Production is a Bigger Problem for Cocaine Consuming Countries than for Bolivia" in Caranavi, Chimore, and Villa Tunari (2012)



There is strong local identification with Morales' anti-imperialist rhetoric that united "traditional" cocaleros, primarily in Las Yungas, and "nontraditional" cocaleros in Cochabamba, behind Morales's vision of coca sovereignty. In a 2010 interview, an Indigenous coca grower from Las Yungas explained his support for Morales:

> "To keep voting for the parties of the past would have meant losing more sovereignty: Bolivia's sovereignty to the United States; the people's sovereignty to the elites. So, we voted for Evo because it meant that we were voting for *ourselves*. It means that *we* would become to government. Because Evo is the same as us; he has the vision of the common people; he is not like the rest. And we must keep supporting him because we must show that *we* can govern Bolivia." (Durand-Ochoa, 2012, 171).

Morales' strategic adoption of indigenous and anti-colonial discourse serves him well among previously heavily divided groups of growers. Durand-Ochoa (2012) asserts that, while growers in Chapare benefit more heavily from Morales' coca cultivation reforms and accordingly report voting for him because "now my coca is protected," Indigenous growers in Las Yungas were too compelled to vote for him due to his anti-colonial discourse and championing of Indigenous rights. Even so, it is unsurprising Morales does best among his hometown crowd of Chapare growers, especially within Villa Tunari, a district heavily dependent on coca production for its economic survival and historically persecuted by the state for doing so.

Despite initial cross-regional solidarity in favor of Morales, growers in Las Yungas faced more competition from the increased cato allotments for "non-traditional" growers of Chapare – especially taxing for Caranavi growers who were not protected as "traditional" like many in Las Yungas - and began to confront increasing enforcement through eradication initiatives in the early 2010s, much of

the early goodwill towards Morales neutralized. The political mobilization of cocaleros has a long history in Las Yungas, where many, despite their support for Morales and his values, have fiercely defended their exclusive legal status to sell coca and resented the state's formalization and regulation of their previously community-controlled industry (Conzelman, 2007). Chimore shows consistently increasing evaluations of Morales over his tenure, corresponding to his increasingly permissive coca policy in the region; while Villa Tunari was increasingly positive about Morales in his early years, his popularity took a hit as eradication efforts peaks and then plateaued in the early 2010s. However, nowhere does it show a more dramatic or negative change than in Las Yungas. As with security evaluations, Caranavi respondents again showed a dip in presidential approval around 2012 – 2014, when local eradication spiked and cultivation suffered.

This trend supports what I anticipated – that respondents in Las Yungas would respond negatively to increasing state scrutiny around coca. The decreasing approval of Morales in Caranavi gives credence to the perspective expressed by Tiburcio Mamani, a coca union representative from Las Yungas, in a 2010 interview, "There is inequality…We [Yungas] coca growers fee like stepchildren, while the Chapare is [treated as] the preferred son" (AIN, 2010). Moreover, after great initial success, such as expanding Indigenous autonomy and protections through the Constituent Assembly and Pacto Unido, progress on Indigenous issues stalled, mired in bureaucracy, decentralization, and increasing clientelism within the Morales ranks (Atchenburg, 2016; Farthing, 2017). Caranavi locals not only voiced their displeasure through surveys but also in the streets, where coca eradication initiatives and proposed limits in 2010 met significant local protests (Cabitza, 2010; AIN, 2010).

Figure 22: District-Level Evaluations of Evo Morales Presidency (2006 – 2018)



b. Indigenous Identity and Economic Survival in Peruvian Enclaves

As in Bolivia, understanding the demographics of the survey respondents helped demonstrate the relevance of coca to these populations and bolster the perspectives of these respondents as suitable representatives of coca economies. Most Peruvians (~60%) nationally identify as mestizo, descending from both European (primarily Spanish) and Peruvian indigenous ancestors (INEI, 2018). The largest minority is indigenous Quechua (~22%), with smaller populations of other Indigenous groups like Aymara and various Amazonian communities. While coca cultivation and mastication are traditional in several Andean cultures, coca holds a particularly sacred status in the Quechua communities of Peru and is a crucial element to most rituals and religious practices (Allen, 1981; 1982; Stolberg, 2011). Rural

areas tend to have relatively greater proportions of Quechua and Aymara communities, and Junín and Huánuco are among the departments with the highest percentages of Quechua peoples (34.9% and 42.9%, respectively) and below-average rates of Mestizo, Blanca, and Afrodescendiente populations (INEI, 2018). Demographic data from LAPOP respondents in the Peruvian enclaves of Huánuco (HU) and Rio Tambo (RT) shows above-average representation of both Indigenous populations, including Mestizo, Quechuan, and other indigenous identities.

Furthermore, evidence indicates coca cultivation and consumption are also concentrated in these areas, though LAPOP does not directly ask about coca use. The only relevant survey of coca consumption, conducted in 2004 by INEI and DEVIDA, estimates 4 million habitual or occasional users (14.2% of pop.), almost all of indigenous heritage, with the greatest use concentrations in the VRAEM departments, where they approximated 60% of rural populations over 12 were at least occasional coca chewer (Cabieses Cubas, 2005). Rio Tambo fits within all these criteria – heavily indigenous, rural, and within Junín in the VRAEM, making it likely many of our respondents from Rio Tambo are near the coca community if not a part of it themselves. Huánuco, however, is a more urban area with a heavily mestizo-leaning population. While the department of Huánuco has been a significant target of state eradication efforts, those living within the district, the department's capital city, may be more removed from coca as a primary political concern.

The LAPOP survey respondents of Rio Tambo and Huánuco also demonstrate their support for the illicit economic activities in their regions. When asked in 2016 and 2018 which illicit activities were improving the economies of their home departments, a majority in both Junín and Huánuco reported illicit activities were a boon to their departmental economies, with a plurality identifying narcotrafficking specifically as having boosted their regional economic growth in recent years (see Figure 23). However, their evaluations of illicit economies demonstrated positional nuance as well.

Even as 42% of respondents in Huánuco in 2016 admitted the economic success narcotrafficking had brought to their area, more than 80% of the same group agreed strongly that illicit economic activity was the principal cause of violence and insecurity. In Rio Tambo the same year, by contrast, less than 20% of respondents identified narcotrafficking as a major source of violence despite being in the center of the VRAEM, a region synonymous for many Peruvians with narco-violence (Ferriera, 2016).

Figure 23: Percent of Respondents Reporting Departmental Economic Growth due to Illicit Activity in Huánuco (HU) and Rio Tambo (RT) (2016 – 2018)



Unlike Bolivia, Peruvian coca growers have a persistent negative view of their government's capacity to provide citizen security. While most Bolivians, even in Caranavi, report satisfaction with their state's

security measures, the highest recorded response average in Rio Tambo and Huánuco between 2006 – 2014 didn't even reach a 4, the middle of the 1 – 7 evaluation scale provided by LAPOP. Interestingly, Rio Tambo is the district that shows a clear positive trend in evaluations of citizen security despite the persistent lack of state intervention or initiative in this area. In contrast, respondent assessments in Huánuco vary more, falling significantly between 2006 – 2008 and then again between 2012 – 2014. The more positive rating from residents of Huánuco between 2008-2012 corresponds to the most intense years of eradication in Alto Huallaga and the Huánuco department in particular, where hectares of coca cultivation fell from almost 18,000 to around 10,000, a decrease of 43%. The opposite trend appears in Rio Tambo, where average security ratings increase alongside increases in coca cultivation, which more than doubled between 2006 – 2014.

Figure 24: Average Evaluations (from 1 – 7) of State Capacity for Security of Citizens in Rio Tambo (RT) and Huánuco (HU) (2006 – 2014)



Moreover, data from 2012 shows that when respondents were asked if they felt their families were more, less, or equally secure compared to 5 years before, 50% of Huánuco respondents reported feeling less safe, and none reported feeling safer, despite the massive crackdown on coca cultivation initiated in Alto Huallaga during this period. In Rio Tambo, however, 25% reported feeling safer, and no one reported feeling less safe.

It appears from these survey responses, as well as those asking about violence and the illicit economy, that Huánuco residents experience or perceive coca production and the illicit coca economy as more of a security concern than do those of Rio Tambo, who are more dependent on coca (based on their production levels) and less likely to associate coca with narcotrafficking, violence or insecurity. Counterintuitively, but in line with what scholars have observed in other production enclaves in Bolivia, because Rio Tambo is such as cultivation hub within Junín, the community culture around coca production may be somewhat insulating against the trafficking violence because refinement, transport, and sale of the coca, the parts of the process often most violent, take place elsewhere, and the local embeddedness of the moral economy about coca cultivation enforces an informal code of conduct that minimizes locals' sense of insecurity (Arias and Grisaffi, 2021; Blume, 2021).

Despite state narratives about the VRAEM, which President Ollanta Humala identifies strongly with violence, terrorism, state repression, and poverty in his national addresses, reinforcing the demonization of the VRAEM within the Peruvian national mindset (Ferriera, 2016), it's clear even from preliminary survey data that locals understand their communities very differently. In his 2012 and 2013 national addresses, Humala singles out the VRAEM more than any other Peruvian region as in need of extensive reform and state control, "[t]he interventions of the Armed Forces in the VRAEM have increased considerably, managing to control the access routes and neutralize the influence of terrorist organizations in these jurisdictions" (Arnold et al., 2017). The majority of Rio

Tambo residents did not identify narcotrafficking as critical to their economy despite their evident dependence on coca production, signifying how, among cocaleros, coca and cocaine are viewed as almost entirely independent. Rio Tambo residents, from their responses, feel partially insulated from the violence and narco industry surrounding cocaine, a conceptual line that their government and the larger international regime struggle to acknowledge.

VI. Conclusion: Comparing How Coca Conceptions Manifest

This study has delved into Bolivia's and Peru's contrasting approaches to managing the complex issue of coca production, balancing the pressures of international expectations with local realities. While both countries shared a prohibitionist stance in the 1990s and early 2000s, Bolivia's 2005 election of Evo Morales set them on divergent trajectories with distinct outcomes. Since Morales' election, Bolivia has embraced coca cultivation as a critical aspect of national identity and a vital economic industry for Indigenous communities. Legalization and regulation have been critical components of Bolivia's approach, marking a departure from the previous prohibitionist stance. In contrast, Peru has maintained a policy of criminalization and prohibition, enforced by military-led eradication campaigns and state-monopolized legal markets.

This study has uncovered significant insights by analyzing state narratives, cultivation and eradication statistics, and public opinion survey data from within the coca-growing regions of both countries. Prohibitionist state intervention, as indicated by levels of eradication, crop substitution, and coca seizure, is linked to greater reports of dissatisfaction with the government and increased reports of insecurity and violence in Peru and Bolivia.

Moreover, this research underscores the primacy of narratives in shaping policy approaches, with implementation and public responses reinforcing these overarching themes. However, it is crucial to acknowledge the feedback loop between policymakers, who construct and deliver narratives, policy executors, the state agents responsible for implementation, and local communities whose lives are structured by public policy. As exhibited by cocaleros in the VRAEM, local resistance and on-the-ground realities play a significant role in moderating the implementation of policy goals and, from there, can shape the ideological positions espoused in state narratives, highlighting the importance of

considering regional diversity, political group dynamics, and local history. Enhancing quality of life and community political support in coca-producing regions requires collaborative initiative from the government and from local cocalero organizations that protect the embedded economy and local order while providing regulatory guidance and holistic state support for these communities, including education, transportation, and basic services. Furthermore, especially in rural coca enclaves, where these communities are often socially and politically marginalized, they create pathways towards economic empowerment, political organizing, and representative local governance.

While this study represents an initial exploration into these complex dynamics, it underscores the need for further research. Bolivia's coca strategy offers potential insights for broader application among other "illicit" markets; however, continued research is essential for a deeper understanding. Investigating the interplay between state narratives, policy implementation, and public opinion within informal economic enclaves requires a more focused and comprehensive approach and combines experimental empirical data and ethnographic work.

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Appendix 1: Coca Narrative Coding

See additional document.

Appendix 2: LAPOP Observations

Table 1: Number of LAPOP Survey Respondents in Coca Regions (2004-2018)

REGION/YEAR	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
BOL - Caranavi	20	20	20	20	20	24	24	25
BOL - Villa Tunari	20	20	20	20	20	24	24	24
BOL - Chimore	20	20	20	20	20	24	13	12
PER - Rio Tambo	NA	7	7	7	12	12	12	15
PER - Huánuco	NA	10	19	10	12	12	12	12

Appendix 3: Maps

Map 1: Coca Cultivation and Eradication in Las Yungas and Caranavi[10]



[10] UNODC and Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, "Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia: Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2013", 2014, 46.

Map 2: Tropic of Cochabamba – Villa Tunari and Chimore Coca Cultivation[11]



[11] UNODC and Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, "Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia: Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2013, 2014, 45.

Map 3: Departments of Peru

Map 4: Detailed Map of the VRAEM Region of Peru