McGILL UNIVERSITY

SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM AND SELF-RELIANCE: THE CASE OF SOMALIA'S 'INSTANT' FISHERMEN

BY

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RESUME

S'il faut en croire l'actuelle direction politique somalienne, ce pays d'Afrique est dans une phase de transition qui devrait le conduire du "tribalisme" au "socialisme scientifique". C'est cette affirmation que se propose de vérifier notre travail, d'abord en procédant à l'étude de la société des pasteurs somalis, dans le cadre d'analyse connu sous le vocable de "mode de production germanique", puis en intégrant l'héritage historique des colonialismes italien et britannique dans la région. Dans un deuxième temps, on tentera de cerner la phase actuelle de développement, et ce depuis que la Somalie a été proclamée un état socialiste en 1970, principalement à la lumière du secteur des coopératives de pêche qui ont été mises sur pied pour hâter l'insertion et la relocalisation des nomades déplacés. Il est permis de penser que ces tentatives représentent, pour plusieurs raisons, une illustration typique de la stratégie somalienne de développement dans le dernier lustre tout en symbolisant la transition dont il a été question plus haut. D'autre part, des informations en provenance des coopératives de pêche trahissent certaines des difficultés les plus importantes que rencontre le développement planifié dans ce pays: le secteur pastoral, en particulier, tendrait à s'éloigner des objectifs socio-économiques recherchés par le gouvernement.

ABSTRACT

According to the present Somali leadership, Somalia is in a phase of transition from 'tribalism' to 'scientific socialism'. This study seeks to determine to what extent this contention is justified, in the first place by analyzing traditional Somali pastoral society within the theoretical framework of the Germanic mode of production, while also examining the historical legacy of Italian and British colonialism in the area. Secondly, the developments in Somalia since it was declared a socialist state in 1970 are considered with special reference to the fishing cooperatives for resettled nomads which from several points of view are a typical representation of the country's development strategy over the last decade; at the same time, they symbolize the transition from traditional pastoralism. The data from the fishing settlements seem to indicate that Somalia's central development planning is facing a major difficulty in the fact that the main economic sector in the country, pastoralism, is moving away from the stated socio-economic objectives of the government.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

So many individuals have contributed in one way or another to this thesis that it would be impossible to mention them all. I will therefore have to restrict myself and just pay tribute to those who have been of greatest assistance.

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My research overseas was made financially possible through a series of grants from the McGill Graduate Faculty, as well as the Somali Ministry of Higher Education which through the Somali Studies International Association helped pay part of my last fieldtrip to Somalia.

Field research in Somalia would not have been possible without the very kind cooperation of Cusmaan Jaamac Cali, Minister of Fisheries in the Somali Democratic Republic, and various people associated with the Coastal

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PREFACE

Most of the library research for this thesis has been conducted at McGill University, though the need for some material of limited distribution and availability has made it necessary to conduct library research at more specialized institutions. These include Istituto Italiano per l'Africa and FAO's Fisheries Branch library in Rome, as well as Istituto Agronomico per l'Oltremare in Florence, all visited in the summer of 1977. In addition, some research was done at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, in February 1978.

The field research took place in two phases, in the summers of 1978 and 1980. At both occasions, the stay in Somalia amounted to approximately two months and all fishing cooperatives were each time visited at least once.

I will take the opportunity here to point out that the thesis contains a number of quotes that have been translated from Italian, French and German, respectively. All translations have been made by myself to the best of my ability and I apologize for whatever injustice I may unintentionally have caused to the original texts.

Finally, a word on transliteration. Since Somali did not become a written language until 1972, most sources use either Italian or English

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spelling for Somali place names. E.g., in the case of one of Somalia's two perennial rivers, Jubba is the official Somali spelling, but in most cases we would find it written either as Giuba (Italian sp.) or Juba (English sp.). In order to maintain a certain consistency while honouring the official language of the country, all geographical and personal names will be spelled according to Somali orthography throughout the thesis, except when mentioned in a historical context, i.e., before 1969. In those cases, English spelling is used.


ADEN
GULF OF ADEN
DJIBOUTI
Seylac
DJIBOUTI
Berbera
Burco
Hargeysa
ETHIOPIA
Badey (Eyl)
Gaalkaayo
Shabeelle
Belet Weyne
INDIAN OCEAN
KENYA
Luuq
Baydhabo
Jowhar
Cadale
MUQDISHO
Marka
Ceel Axmed
Jubba
Baraawe
Kismaayo
Equator
12
8
4
0
44
48
SOMALIA
International boundary
Surfaced road
Unsurfaced road
National capital
Town
Fishing settlement
0 50 100 150 Miles
0 50 100 150 Kilometers

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

From several points of view, Somalia is a unique country in Africa. Of all sub-Saharan countries, with the possible exception of Swaziland, Somalia is the most homogeneous in ethnic terms. Nearly the whole population speaks Somali as their first language, and while a small minority are not formally integrated in the traditional lineage system, all but a few thousand Arabs, Indians, and Bantu-speaking people in the far south, must be considered as part of the Somali people. Besides the language, they share the same religion (Islam), a common culture and tradition based primarily on pastoral nomadism; and also a common history in spite of the fact that present-day Somalia was occupied by two different colonial powers. Somalia is also one of the exceptionally few countries in the world where the majority of the population still consists of pastoral nomads, herding always having been the primary economic activity of the Somali people.

In addition, the country has the dubious distinction of being one of the least researched areas of Africa. As Pestalozza correctly points out,

> "Somalia has in fact remained in the sidelines of the great debate on Africa since the war, and this refers not only to recent events there. Not even the foremost

> Africanists normally devote more than a passing remark to her, whereas there are quite a few good reasons to consider her exemplary of certain typical African experiences in the last two or three decades" (1974:22).

There are probably several reasons for this relative anonymity. First of all, due to the scarcity of natural resources, Somalia was always at the outskirts of colonial interest. The Horn of Africa was one of the last regions on the continent to be colonized, and it was no accident that both the British and the Italians referred to their Somali possessions as the 'cinderellas' of their respective empires. Secondly, due to the traditionally close relationship with the Arab world through Islam and trade, Somalia has sometimes not been considered to be a 'true' African country by some Africanists, while Middle-Eastern specialists regard the country to be outside their principal sphere of interest. Thirdly, academic research overseas, particularly after World War II, has been very must dominated by English and French-speaking scholars, and since Somalia has tended to be regarded as 'Italian', little attention has been devoted to the country. Besides, the lack of any major exploitable resources has not given sponsoring institutions and governments much incentive to encourage research there. The result is that less is known about Somalia, from historical events to geological rock-formations, than most other countries in Africa.

Incidentally, one of the best researched academic areas in Somalia is anthropology, due largely to the outstanding works of two individuals, Enrico Cerulli and Ioan M. Lewis. Particularly Lewis has produced a long list of publications on various aspects of Somali society, and up to quite recently, Lewis not only was responsible for just about every anthropological article on Somalia, but for nearly a generation, he has contri-

buted to research in every branch of social science in the country.

However, and with all respect due to I.M. Lewis, it is obvious that one man alone cannot adequately record, analyze, and present every aspect of a whole country, and although in recent years there has been an increased interest on the part of scholars in conducting more research in Somalia,[1] the results of this new orientation are barely starting to trickle in. It is in this connection perhaps surprising that so few marxist scholars have paid any attention to Somalia, particularly since the country in the last ten years has 'solemnly and resolutely' declared itself a socialist state where everything is to be based "on scientific knowledge derived from Marx and Lenin" (Barre 1973:360). For some reason or other, it seems that a very limited number of marxist-oriented scholars, anthropologists not the least, actually take the opportunity to study socialist developments in the Third World. Lewis regrettably seems to strike at the root of the matter in maintaining that

> "the current vogue in Western Marxist social anthropology seems more concerned with its parochial pursuits than with the transformation of traditional institutions in contemporary Marxist states" (1979:14).

Background and Purpose

This thesis is an attempt to contribute to the still limited knowledge of Somalis, particularly the virtually unknown fisheries sector. It is also an account of a sudden and dramatic change from one economic activity to another, the exceptional transition from nomadic pastoralism to sedentary fishing which, at least on such a scale, is a unique event in the history of the world. But perhaps most importantly, the thesis is intended as a positive response to Kathleen Gough's impassioned appeal a

few years ago, namely to break out of the traditional and very restrictive shell of Western anthropology which is based on "erroneous and doubtful assumptions and theories that are being increasingly challenged by social scientists in the new nations" (1968:406). As Gough also points out, it is time concerned anthropologists take it upon themselves to examine developments in the Third World with the Third World's particular plight and history in mind, especially in those areas where some efforts to break away from the capitalist world economy are made.

According to the president of the Somali Democratic Republic, Maxamed Siyaad Barre, his country never entered the capitalist stage of economic formation, or at least it never became fully integrated as a capitalist state. Pointing to the traditional pastoral economy of the country, Barre contends that the present situation represents a transition from 'tribalism' to 'socialism', though without providing any particular eloquent definition of either term. In taking issue with this claim, this thesis is meant to provide a more analytical framework to test to what extent Somali society can be described as having been 'tribal' at the time of the Somali 'Revolution' and, on the other hand, to seek to understand to what extent the country is indeed following a road of development based on 'scientific socialism' with the stated objective of becoming "self-reliant'.

The question of defining and assessing 'tribalism' poses two distinct problems. First of all, it is not an analytical term, at least not in the marxist tradition. The type of society that would seem to come closest to this designation in Marx's original writings is 'Germanic society' the very tribally structured communities that at one point dominated Central Europe and even extended their influence to the Italian and Iberian

peninsulas. Since Marx's primary concern was the contemporary society he lived in, his studies of non-capitalist or pre-capitalist societies fell in the shadow of his monumental works on capitalism, though the obscurity that has surrounded his writings on pre-capitalist societies can to a large extent be attributed to the lack of interest on the part of his followers since his death.[2] It is only in the most recent couple of decades that there has been a renewed interest in Marx's writings on the subject, something that has resulted in a number of edited collections with long, explanatory introductions, those by Godelier (1976), Hobsbawm (1975), Krader (1974) and Nicolaus (1973) being among the foremost ones.

One of the consequences of this renewed interest has been the revival in using the mode of production concept as a method of analyzing pre-capitalist societies, particularly within anthropology. In his early writings, Marx made constant references to various articulations of the mode of production, of which the 'five fundamentals' are the best known. But he also acknowledged the existence of transitional modes of production, one of which he referred to as the Germanic mode of production. Few people have used this concept in social theory, though there are exceptions, e.g., Bonte (1974 and 1978) and Ribgy (1978), who both specialize in studies of pastoralism, and their use of the concept has proven to be appropriate as a methodological tool in the study of non-stratified pastoral societies. It is on this basis that the Germanic mode of production has been utilized in Chapter II to assess the stage of socio-economic integration of traditional Somali society.

This brings up a second problem in the analysis of whether traditional Somali society was indeed 'tribalist' at the time of the 'Revolution'.

Like most other Third World countries, Somalia has experienced a long period of colonial rule, and colonialism has of course tended to have altered many, if not most, traditional societies to a significant extent. Chapter III is therefore devoted to Somalia's colonial history in order to try to determine to what extent the colonial policies may have transformed the traditional economy of the majority of Somalia's population, the pastoral nomads. Since very little has been written on the economic aspects of colonialism in the country, and even less on the effects of colonialism on the pastoral society, the chapter has to rely mostly on the records of events extracted from a variety of sources that provide limited theoretical insight.

The chapter, incidentally, does not limit the discussion to purely colonial history, it also includes the Trusteeship period and the first years of political independence which may be described as part of Somalia's neo-colonial history.

Chapter IV is a general overview of what Somali socialism stands for. As mentioned above, few marxists have taken up an interest in Somalia despite its declared socialist objectives, and much of the discussion is thus necessarily based on the works of non-marxist writers. It also relies on the writings and statements of Somali officials, particularly those made by Barre, though the rather rhetorical nature of these statements makes it difficult to extract much material for a more analytical theoretical discussion. An effort has been made to take this into account by using general references on the various achievements of the Revolution and the actual socio-economic development in the country over the last decade.

But in order to gain a deeper understanding of what socialism stands for in Somalia, it is necessary to focus on a specific instance of development as a point of reference and discussion. An appropriate test-case here is the fishing cooperatives for resettled nomads which are discussed in Chapter V. For one thing, the people in question are the prime representatives of what Barre describes as the country's 'tribal' society, having been, until the 1973-75 drought forced them to seek assistance in government relief camps, full-time nomadic pastoralists who for the most part had fallen outside the state-directed socio-political developments in Somalia.

Secondly, the resettlement of nomads is an important part of the Somali government's long-term objectives, one of which is

> "the complete elimination of pastoral nomadism as a way of life as well as the social system of tribalism that it sustains as thoroughly and quickly as possible" (Barkhadle 1976a:57).

The resettlements are supposed to help reorganize the country's socio-economic system towards a more just and rational society.

Thirdly, the fishing settlements are to be part of the cooperative sector of Somalia's economy, which is regarded as perhaps the most important avenue for the achievement of 'scientific socialism'. This was already made clear in 1973 when the first Law of Cooperatives (Law No. 40) was promulgated. As stated in article 1,

> "The foundation of cooperatives outlined within this law will be an essential condition for economic, social and cultural progress and for the establishment of cooperatives based on social justice, equality and better life; together with the State sector, the Cooperative sector shall be the basis of the future socialist pattern in the SDR" (quoted in Iqbal 1980:3).[3]

The data on the fishing cooperatives have for the most part been

collected through my own fieldwork, and the discussion of them is put into the larger context of Somali socialism as a whole, particularly by reference to the newly created Union of Somali Cooperative Movements (USCM) which more than any other governmental office seems to represent the socialist strategy of the country since it comes under the direction of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP). In a sense, the cooperative development in Somalia, the fishing settlements included, is a test case for the party's overall strategies.

Finally, the last chapter is a summary of the major theoretical points in the thesis as well as a final attempt to formulate a concluding statement which can adequately assess to what extent it is correct, as Siyaad Barre maintains, to refer to Somalia's present development as representing a 'jump' from tribalism to socialism.

NOTES

[1]The Somalis themselves have recently also expressed a greater interest in having research conducted in the country. This has among other things resulted in the creation of the Somali National Academy for Sciences, Arts and Literature (1978), the foundation of the Somali Studies International Association (1979), and the organization of the First International Congress on Somali Studies in the summer of 1980.

[2]This is partly due to the fact that most of the writings on pre-capitalist societies were done by the 'early Marx' who many saw as distinct and indeed less reliable than those of the 'late Marx'. Another reason can be traced to the widely accepted, though erroneous assumption, that Marx believed all societies had to go through the capitalist stage in order to achieve socialism (cf Chapter II).

[3]Cooperatives are also seen as an instrument for the achievement of greater self-reliance, in the hope that in time the cooperatives will be able to support themselves entirely on their own. One of the stated objectives of the Union of Somali Cooperative Movements (USCM), for instance, is that it shall be

> "Promoting cooperative economy, leading and supervising the planning of production, balancing the produce and the investment of the coming years of the organizations of Cooperatives so that they can attain self-sufficiency" (Som. Dem. Rep. 1979a:A-4; my emphasis).

CHAPTER II

ANALYZING TRADITIONAL PASTORAL SOCIETY IN SOMALIA

Since the birth of anthropology as a discipline, pastoralists have occupied a special niche. As early as 1877, Lewis Henry Morgan wrote that the "domestication of animals provided a permanent meat and milk subsistence which tended to differentiate the tribes which possessed them from the mass of other barbarians" (1973:45), and ever since, anthropologists have had a tendency to continue to regard pastoralist peoples all over the world as a more or less uniform group, almost regardless of whether they are full-time pastoralists or mix herding with agriculture; whether they are engaged in nomadism or transhumance; whether they are egalitarian or highly stratified; etc. Definitions of pastoralism have remained remarkably flexible and encompassing; a typical expression of this generalization is Krader (1959:449) who defines pastoralists simply as "people who are chiefly dependent on their herds of domesticated stock for subsistence".

Consequently, and despite a large body of literature on the various pastoral peoples around the world, our knowledge and understanding of pastoral societies is still relatively poor or, as N. Dyson-Hudson (1972:2) suggests, "misleading". He even goes as far as describing studies of

of (pastoral) nomadism as "backwards", due to their "inchoate, non-cumulative character" (ibid.).

In addition, studies on pastoralism almost invariably tend to fall in line with Service's (1971) influential taxonomy of human societies where pastoralists are regarded as part of the 'tribal' level of social evolution, i.e., more advanced than the 'band', but not as evolved as the more stratified 'peasantry'. The major defect of this classification remains that it only takes into account a particular human activity and the means of production, with little regard for the relations of production.

Students of pastoralism also continue, to a large extent, to base their interpretations on variations or derivations of ecological principles; a typical representative here would be Spooner (1971 and 1973). Some anthropologists do not pay particular attention to ecological factors to explain the 'peculiarities' of pastoralism in the same way as Spooner, but as Rigby rightly points out, "most adhere...to fairly 'classical' forms of anthropological functionalism" (1978:1), and there is a strong inclination towards keeping pastoralism as a general category on the level of social organization as well as on more ideological levels. To be sure, it appears in different forms: it may be based principally on the position of nomads vs. sedentary populations as in Barth (1961) and Pastner (1971); the mode of extracting resources, e.g., R. Dyson-Hudson (1972), Gulliver (1955), Schneider (1957); migratory populations vs. the State, e.g., Bates (1971), Salzman (1974); or even on some pastoral 'characteristics' such as egalitarianism and individualism, e.g., Goldschmidt (1971), Lewis (1961).

This last point is of particular interest since it is the point of

view taken by the leading authority on Somali pastoralism, I.M. Lewis, although he himself, as well as others, recognizes that when Somali pastoralists are referred to as egalitarian, this is not necessarily an absolute truth.

It should here be noted that the concept of 'egalitarianism' as used by writers mentioned above is not a notion confined to studies on pastoralism, especially if we take egalitarianism to mean classlessness. It has been common thinking in all social sciences to perceive much of what we now refer to as the Third World as being essentially classless at the time of colonialization, and this perception has particularly proliferated in the field of African studies. The reasons are numerous and have varied over time, but they can be summarized as the effect of two principal factors, as Katz points out:

> "1. the opposition to and avoidance of class concepts within certain areas of social science; [and]
> 2. the use of inadequate notions of class..." (1980:9).

This is not to say, of course, that no society in Africa was classless when European powers started to occupy and colonize the continent; there is ample evidence to indicate that many African societies, including some pastoralist groups, were indeed without any class differentiations, at least if we take the general marxist notion of class.[1] Admittedly, the definition of social class has been subject to much disagreement among marxist scholars, partly due to contradictions in Marx's own concept of class (Dos Santos 1970). On the other hand, it is commonly accepted that social classes exist only within certain social formations, i.e., in societies where surplus labour is appropriated by (a) certain group(s) of social agents. These groups (classes) are defined by their place in

"the ensemble of social practices" (Poulantzas 1973:27), an ensemble which includes both the production process and the political and ideological relations. The production process, i.e., the economic sphere, nevertheless remains the principal denominator.

The major problem in traditional studies on Africa has been the absence of a methodology which adequately can deal with the question of classlessness; the various marxist schools have contributed little on this issue. The dilemmas in traditional marxist interpretations of non-capitalist societies can perhaps best be understood in that they almost invariably have been based on the principle of unilineal evolution. One of the many consequences of this dogma is that little attention has been paid to the writings in which Marx specifically deals with pre-capitalist societies since, according to 'orthodox' marxists (see e.g. Warren 1973), all societies will necessarily have to go through the capitalist stage of economic formation at some point in their history. Hence, trying to understand traditional societies in Africa and elsewhere, has been regarded as unworthy of consideration, at least in the question of transition to socialism.

It is only in more recent years that marxist scholars have started to pay more heed to Marx's original writings on pre-capitalist and non-European societies. They have 'rediscovered' the unequivocal fact that Marx himself never believed in the principle of unilinear evolution of society. The perhaps most explicit statement on this question can be found in his letter to Vera Zasulich in 1881[2] where he states that the 'historical fatalism' only applies to West-European countries (in Godelier 1976:255ff). Marx certainly was aware of the possibility that societies in other parts of the world might evolve differently.

Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production

The renewed interest in Marx's early writings has also spurred an on-going debate on pre-capitalist modes of production. Marx originally formulated five 'fundamental' articulations of modes of production, namely the communal, the slave, the feudal, the capitalist and the socialist modes of production, with some special cases we shall return to below. Up to recently, these fundamentals were regarded as the only relevant ones in marxist circles. The present debate, however, has tended to lean towards the opposite extreme. New modes of production are constantly being 'discovered' ever since Wittfogel (1963) reformulated Marx's original Asiatic mode of production. Suret-Canale borrowed Wittfogel's theoretical framework to analyze some African societies (1964), and this in turn led to Coquery-Vidrovitch's (1977) formulation of a theory on the African mode of production. Other writers have accepted the idea that two modes of production may co-exist simultaneously in a society. Among the best known works are Terray's (1972) re-assessment of Meillassoux's (1964) original study of the Gouro of West-Africa, which again has been re-assessed by Rey (1975); and Banaji's (1972) proposed 'colonial' mode of production, later followed up by Cardoso (1977) and criticized by McEachren (1976). Other and perhaps more curious propositions in this context include the 'maritime' mode of production (Antler 1977) and the Swazi mode of production put forward by Winter (1978), but this list could be extended considerably.[3]

More interesting for our purposes is the fact that mode of production analysis is increasingly being invoked by students of pastoralism, a major advocate being Talal Asad. In a short, but compact and highly critical article, he outlines several weighty arguments in favour of a more economic

oriented approach in the study of pastoralism (as in any other anthropological study). Taking issue with the common suggestion that "pastoral nomadic societies tend to be more egalitarian, independent and economically homogeneous than sedentary societies", Asad argues that there is neither economic justification nor sufficient theoretical discussion for such a claim (1978:57). Naturally, Asad does not maintain that traditional studies on pastoralism uniquely regard pastoral societies as egalitarian, but he raises an important point when he indicates that "still, the assumption seems to be that inegalitarian nomadic societies represent a deviation from the norm" (ibid.).

When referring to the importance of emphasizing economic factors in the study of pastoralism, Asad readily recognized that economic issues have indeed been discussed in various forms in traditional studies, but Asad questions their relevance considering the framework they are presented in:

> "The important economic point about nomads, surely, is not that they move about in order to take care of their animals, or that animal husbandry is subject to a number of biological and environmental restraints, but that their political and economic organization may be based primarily on production for subsistence" (1978:58).

In order to make a meaningful analysis, then,

> "we must take into account the <u>combined effect</u> of what some Marxists call relations of production, i.e. the social conditions that facilitate (or inhibit) the systematic production, appropriation and accumulation of surplus, on the one hand, and the labour process by which natural objects are utilized and transformed into products for human consumption, on the other hand" (ibid.).

In other words, Asad urges us to examine the mode of production which, to borrow Hindess and Hurst's widely quoted definition, is

> "an articulated combination of relations and forces of production structured by the dominance of relations of production" (1975:9),

the relations of production here described as defining

> "a specific appropriation of surplus-labour and the specific form of social distribution of the means of production corresponding to that mode of appropriation of surplus-labour" (ibid:9-10).

It follows, then, that the analysis of a mode of production is an investigation into the elements that together form the economy of a given system and, as Terray also reminds us, it is "not to be confused with a general description of the economy" (1972:97). The importance of such an analysis is perhaps best explained by Marx himself in A Contribution to the Critique of the Political Economy:

> "In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life in general" (in Tucker 1972:4; my emphasis).

This, of course, is one of the fundamental premises of historical materialism, namely that in the final instance, the economy determines all aspects of society and human existence, and therefore must be the point of departure of an analysis of society.

Among Marx's original writings on pre-capitalist modes of production, the three single more important ones are undoubtedly The German Ideology, Grundrisse zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie (henceforth referred to as Grundrisse), and Formen die der kapitalistischen Produktion vorgehen

(henceforth referred to as Formen). The relevance and importance of these writings within the total contribution of Marx's lifework has been subject to much debate which will not be dealt with here. However, it should be stressed that because the writings in question are all produced by 'early' Marx does not mean that the 'late' Marx no longer adhered to the ideas originally presented in them; in fact he was working on them while writing Kapital. Grundrisse, for instance, was the outline of the projected volumes IV and V of Kapital, which his failing health and subsequent death prevented Marx from completing.[4]

The Germanic Mode

In our analysis of pre-colonial pastoralist society in Somalia, the working hypothesis is that it was a classless society; hence our point of departure must be the communal mode of production, sometimes referred to as communalism or primitive communism. Marx recognized only three forms of class societies: the slave society, the feudal society and capitalist society, thus communal society was classless. It should here be remembered that Marx never saw the exploitation of man by man as an original condition, but rather as a historical consequence.

It is now generally accepted that Marx saw "three or four alternative routes out of the communal system", to use Hobsbawm's (1965:32) terminology. These are the oriental (or despotic), the ancient and the Germanic modes of production. Some may also want to include the Slavonic mode of production, but this is discussed only very marginally by Marx. Common for all these transitional modes of production is that some forms of social division of labour are already existing or implicit within them.

For a number of reasons which will be discussed further below, marxist anthropologists with an interest in pastoral studies have started to examine more closely and make wider use of Marx's theory on a Germanic mode of production. The name is perhaps a bit unfortunate and may partly explain why little attention has been paid to this paradigm in the past. It was, of course, never Marx's intention to confine his theory to any particular group of people, something writers like Bonte (1974 and 1978) and Rigby (1978) have readily recognized.

The principal components of the Germanic form of transformation from communalism that in the first place have led some scholars to attempt to apply this analysis to some pastoralist societies, can be summarized as follows:

a) All individual members of the community have access to the ager publicus, the common land. This land may consist of hunting grounds, pastures, woodlands, etc., but it is not communal property and the individual is not a co-owner of it (as for instance is the case in the 'oriental' society).

b) Each family in the community forms an autonomous unit of production, and each individual household thus contains an entire economy, working independently from the rest of the community; kinship is the central unit of social organization.

c) The community appears only as a 'coming-together' (Vereinigung) and not as a 'being-together' (Verein). The individual families live separately, often at great distances from each other and gather only for periodical reunions. This distinction is a very important one in that it represents the difference between "community in production and community founded", as correctly pointed out by Lefébure (1979:4; my emphasis).

d) In 'Germanic' society, there is no state structure, and there are no cities as in 'ancient' society. The people are migratory and not sedentary, and they share a certain unity only in terms of common language, religion, customs, etc.

We shall now try to apply these properties to Somali pastoral community drawing our empirical data mainly from Cerulli (1959 and 1964), Lewis (1955, 1962b and 1961), and Paulitschke (1967a and b). A cautionary note should be made here: both Cerulli's and Lewis' ethnographic studies have been undertaken at a time when colonial powers, Italy and Britain respectively, had already established themselves on the Horn of Africa. To what extent the colonial presence altered traditional Somali pastoral society, is a difficult question that will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter, but it should be mentioned at this point that compared to many other colonial situations, the impact of colonialism in Somalia was less obvious. This view is supported by Laitin (1977:81) who goes as far as maintaining that at the time of independence and reunification "the traditional Somali structure was very much intact", and by Hess (1966:186) who writes that even in Italian Somalia, where the colonial presence was strongest, the Somalis of the interior "continued to live as their ancestors had lived centuries earlier". Mirreh (1978), too, supports this view, though he expresses himself somewhat more cautiously.

If we now consider again the Germanic society described by Marx and apply the summary of it point for point to Somali pastoral society, we will find a number of striking similarities:

a) Except for cultivated lands, there are no property rights on land among Somali pastoralists. "Pasture is not subject to ownership [and] the right to graze in an area depends upon its effective occupancy" (Lewis 1961:49), the same is true for water holes. Even when it comes to livestock there is no property in the true sense of the word, "a man has primary, but not absolute, rights of possession" (Lewis 1961:83).[5]

b) Although among Somali pastoralists a nuclear family seldom moves alone, the single family is the unit of production independent of others. The numbers of families moving together are

usually two to four, and always closely related, e.g. wives sharing the same husband or the husband's closest relatives. Each unit produces exclusively for own consumption, except for a small surplus to be used towards a limited trade of basic commodities with outsiders.

c) The Somali pastoralists only come together in larger groups seasonally, particularly during the rainy season when pastures and water are abundant everywhere. During these 'comings-together', the hamlets are gathered close to other hamlets only when the families are within the same 'dia-paying group' (the lowest level of corporate integration) or within the same primary lineage. Still, they will be close enough to other lineages and clans to allow a certain interaction. This is crucial for the reproduction of society, since this is the only time prospective brides and bridegrooms can meet and court each other while their fathers arrange bridewealth payments, marriage usually taking place beyond the primary lineage level.

d) Traditional Somali pastoralists are highly nomadic, and they are not subjects of any State. A certain amount of political action may take place within the various units of the lineage structure, but rarely on a higher level than the clan unit. Most political and juridical decisions are made within the dia-paying group and always collectively by the councils (shir).

As demonstrated above, the similarities between the Germanic society envisioned by Marx and that of Somali pastoralists are less than superficial. On the empirical level, the similarities are actually more apparent than between Germanic and the five East African pastoralist groups analyzed by Bonte (1978) within the framework of the Germanic mode of production. Bonte chose these particular five groups because he found he could not apply the Germanic mode of production to the societies he himself has studied most closely, namely the Tuareg and the Moors. As he points out, Moors and Tuareg are quite distinct from most East African pastoralists in that among the former, the State is already apparent, and there exists distinct class relations (1978:174). This again should be a

reminder of the great diversity that prevails between the various pastoralist societies and also serve as a warning against treating them all under the same heading.

Using the Germanic mode of production in analyzing societies like the Somali does, however, raise a number of problems. Marx's writings on the subject are, as indicated earlier, extremely limited, and his analysis does not take into account a number of factors that are essential in order to make a complete interpretation. Perhaps the single most important omission made by Marx in his discussions of the communal mode of production and its transitional forms, is that he only pays nominal attention to the relationship between nature and social formation. As a consequence, Marx does not elaborate on the relationship between man's production and consumption, i.e., why man produces and how. In Grundrisse, Marx for instance states that "consumption creates the motive for production" (in Nicolaus 1973:91), thus production becomes a need reproduced by consumption. The problem here is that Marx never discusses the significance of 'need' to any extent, something that has already been noted by Sahlins (1976), Bonte (1978) and Rigby (1978). Writes Rigby: "the 'mediator', culturally and historically defined, between the process of production and consumption, is lacking in Marx's formulation" (1978:5).

Both Bonte and Rigby have in their studies identified several 'mediators' which function as relations of production among East African pastoralists. As Rigby points out, in the Germanic mode of production division of labour "is based upon the initial conditions created by marriage" (1978:14). He further lists four domains within East African pastoralist societies which function as relations of production, namely kinship, descent, affinal relations, and age-set organizations (1978:42).

What may be immediately concluded here, is that there is a degree of variation from one society to another as to which domain or domains may play the most important mediating role.

In most of the societies analyzed by Bonte and Rigby, the age-set organization seems to be an integral and crucial part of the relations of production, while descent is usually of minor importance, particularly among such peoples as the Karamojong, who seldom trace their descent more than three generations back.

The Somalis are here in sharp contrast. There are no institutionalized age-set organizations, although adolescent men are expected to perform certain specified herding duties and are not considered as adults until they get married. The most important cultural-historical domain that determines the relations of production among Somali pastoralists is unquestionably the lineage and the clan, i.e., the whole agnatic descent-line. What is interesting in this connection, is that the domination of descent in determining the relations of production is closely linked to religion, since all Somalis trace their descent back to the Prophet's lineage of Quraysh. Thus, Islam, the superstructure, helps reinforce the domination of descent.

There are also other problems that have to be pointed out when using the Germanic mode of production in the analysis of pastoral societies in East Africa. Among them is the presence of a semi-caste system, i.e., the marginalization of certain segments of the population. Among the Somalis, the most obvious examples are the Midgaans, Tumaals, and Yibirs, who traditionally have been regarded as pariahs or bondsmen to the Somalis. The Midgaans are the traditional hunters in Somali lands,

sometimes employed by their patrons as soldiers and to perform infibulation on Somali maidens. The Yibirs are linked with magic, hence feared by the Somalis who still employ them at ceremonial occasions. In addition to being witchdoctors, Paulitschke (1967a:30) identified them as leather-workers and manufacturers of praying rugs. The Tumaals are the blacksmiths and, as the case is for other pastoralist societies in East Africa, are therefore scorned but at the same time heeded for their invaluable work.[6]

Common to all three groups is that they are physically similar to their Somali patrons, speak the same language (although with a distinct jargon, presumably used in order not to be understood by the Somalis, as Cerulli (1959:101) suggests), but are still barred from being completely integrated into Somali society by a number of social restrictions.[7] According to Cerulli (1959:97-98), the lower castes in Somalia have pre-Cushitic origins, i.e., their ancestors are believed to have been the original inhabitants of the Horn of Africa, while their descendents in time became mixed with the invading Somalis adopting their language, religion and also to a large extent their culture.

Related to the problem of the presence of pariahs, is the alleged existence of slavery among the Somalis. Both Cerulli and Lewis report instances where slaves are kept by Somalis, but Paulitschke (1967a:243; 1967b:134) unequivocally states that there were no slaves to be found in the households of the Somali nomad, although he mentions a few instances of slavery in the Benadir, and also hints that Somalis would sometimes act as middlemen in the 19th century slavetrade (1967a:260). The Somalis would, on the other hand, never enslave their own people, nor would Somalis be sold as slaves to the Arabs,[8] and in the few cases where slaves were kept by (sedentarized) Somalis, they would be made free within a

short time.

If we now refer back to Marx's writings on communal societies, we find that he does not make any mention of groups which would be comparable to the lower castes among the Somalis and other similar peoples. However, in The German Ideology, he discusses slavery as a "latent" component of lineage societies which he expected to appear gradually

> "with the increase in population, the growth of wants, and the extent of external relations, both of war and of barter" (in Tucker 1972:115).

Thus, the Somali case can still fit in well in Marx's conceptual framework. It is possible to conceive the patron-bondsmen relationship between Somalis and Midgaans, Tumaals, and Yibirs as a form of 'latent' slavery, a relationship which eventually could have developed into that of master-slave. As for the few instances where slavery did occur among Somalis, it is interesting to note that they were limited to the settled regions of the Benadir, in other words where Somalis had the greatest 'extent of external relations' especially through 'barter', or trade with the Arabs.

Unfortunately, and as indicated previously, Marx never developed a strong theoretical framework on pre-capitalist relations of production and economic formations, and that may account for the reluctant attitude many scholars have displayed towards using a marxist approach in anthropological research. However, people like Meillassoux, Terray, Bonte, Rigby, and others, have demonstrated that the relatively limited writings by Marx on this topic nevertheless provide us with a useful theoretical base on which to build. Whereas at the first glance it may

seem farfetched to utilize such an 'obscure' concept as the Germanic mode of production in analyzing pastoralist societies like the Somali, the works that have been cited throughout this chapter show that it can be successfully applied as an analytical tool that can help us get a deeper insight into relations of production that govern a society like that of the traditional Somali nomad and which are the foundation of the further reproduction of such a social formation.

A fundamental problem which any observer of pre-capitalist societies today still has to face, is the question to what extent we can truly classify any society today as being pre-capitalist. The capitalist mode of production has directly or indirectly had a very definite impact on every human society in the world. The pastoral Somali are of course no exception; they have, even if only to a marginal degree, been integrated into the dominating world economic system for a long time. Their close relationship with Arab traders in pre-colonial days, and the imposition of colonial systems in more recent times are evidences of that, and even when using such pre-colonial sources as Paulitschke or Burton, we must bear in mind that even the remotest Somali hamlet as early as the 19th century reflected, to some degree, contacts with the outer world.

It is nevertheless possible and feasible that at least at the time of colonial penetration, Somali pastoralists were living in a state of communalism, albeit a transitional form of communalism, where absolute equality no longer existed. The relations of production were still dominated by descent and kinship, and they had not developed a character of exploitation whereby one sector of the society appropriated surplus labour of another. From this perspective, we can claim that it was indeed a classless society, very much comparable to the ancient Germanic society

described by Marx.

The next step in our analysis must then be to determine the impact of the colonial period in order to understand to what extent the relations of production among Somali pastoralists may have changed as a consequence of the forceful imposition of an economic system where class distinctions and class antagonism are distinct features.

NOTES

[1]It should here be pointed out that the absence of classes does not necessarily imply egalitarianism. Marx wrote that classes exist only in the class struggle, but that does not mean that a society without class struggles is conflict-free and egalitarian, an argument frequently used by African politicians such as Nyerere, M'Boya, Touré, Senghor, etc. in their propagation of the idea of an 'African socialism'. (See e.g. Ayi 1967; Friedland & Rosberg 1965; Hazard 1969; Katz 1979).

[2]This date is significant since it shows the letter was written only two years before Marx's death, thus helping to counter the recurrent arguments that there was a significant distinction between 'early' and 'late' Marx. Further evidence of the interest 'late' Marx displayed towards understanding pre-capitalist economic formations, as well as his refusal of the doctrine of historical fatalism, can be found in his Ethnological Notebooks, written between 1880 and 1882 and translated and edited by Krader (1972).

[3]An excellent review of the explosive interest in the marxist mode of production theory is presented by Foster-Carter (1978). Hindess & Hirst's Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production is a 'must' reading in this connection, especially when followed by the very detailed critiques by Asad & Wolpe (1976) and Taylor (1975 and 1976).

[4]Cf footnote 2.

[5]It is interesting to note that Marx, too, makes this distinction in Formen when discussing ownership among Germanic tribes. In the Germanic mode of production, "what exist is only communal property and individual possession" (in Hobsbawm 1975:75).

[6]The Yibirs, Midgaans, and Tumaals are not the only marginalized groups in Somali society. In the south, several small populations have a similar relationship with the Somalis who refer to them as Don ('Negro'). They are believed to be descendents of the Bantu-populations who originally inhabited this part of the Horn. Cf The Book of the Zenj (Cerulli 1967: 253-292).

[7]These include:
- prohibition against marrying Somalis;
- prohibition against entering a Somali house;
- prohibition against owning cattle or horses;
- prohibition against carrying spears and shields;
- limited or no rights to demand blood-compensation.

[8]According to Paulitschke (1967a:260), however, some Arab merchants would simply marry a number of Somali women whom they then would divorce and later sell as slaves.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL INFLUENCES

Due to the lack of written records, it has always been extremely difficult to reconstruct the history of non-literate societies. In the case of nomads, the task is even more formidable. Sedentary peoples usually leave at least some traces of their presence through time in the form of settlements, ecological interventions, and non-destructable debris, i.e., clues for future archaeologists and historians from which to deduct certain ideas of what happened in the past. Nomadic societies, on the other hand, leave very little behind them for coming generations to look for. The necessity for constant movement allows nomads to own only a minimum of material goods, mainly objects made of light-weight material such as leather, cloth or to some extent wood, in other words matters that nature will decompose very rapidly once they are no longer in use. Similarly, nomads live in dwellings that can easily be erected and dismantled and that are light enough for their animals to carry, again not the kind of objects most likely to be preserved for years to come.

Consequently, the history of a nomadic population is more often than not based on the nomads' own oral tales and the written records of outsiders who have been in contact with them, both cases representing distinct problems of interpretation. Oral histories tend to blend facts with myths,

besides the obvious difficulty in keeping a reasonably good track of events through time due to the limits of human memory. Written accounts by outsiders, too, have a tendency to bring in mythical factors in recording events in a foreign environment, something that can be attributed to the lack of understanding of a different culture, pre-conceived images, fear, scorn, abhorrence, racism, etc. At times the outsider also deliberately falsifies the evidence, a practice not uncommon among colonial officials of more recent times, not least the Italians in Somalia as Iraci (1969) has pointed out.[1]

Having stated these reservations, we can now proceed to take a closer look at the history of Somalia, paying particular attention to the impact of various outside influences on the nomadic pastoralist way of life. For analytical purposes, it is convenient to divide Somalia's history into the following periods:[2]

a) Origins and pre-colonial period
b) Colonial penetration up to Mussolini's march on Rome in 1922, a date which roughly coincides with the end of the dervish uprising in the Protectorate
c) The fascist era (1922-1941)
d) British military administration and trusteeship (1941-1960)
e) Post-independence

Origins and Pre-Colonial Period

There is little doubt that the Horn of Africa's first inhabitants were hunters and gatherers. Mousterian artifacts dating perhaps as far back as 100,000 B.P. indicate early occupation in Somalia (Battista 1969), while tools from the Acheulian-Lavalloisian culture indicate a subsequently fairly continuous human presence in the area (Cole 1963; Grottanelli 1976). In the Neolithic, Somalia and the surrounding regions were most probably

occupied by bushmanoid populations (Pirone 1969; Clark 1973), and today's Wa Sanye and Wa Boni hunters of the Tana river region are recognized as their possible descendants.

The next inhabitants were agricultural Bantu-speaking groups who migrated north-east during the great "Bantu-expansion" (Bohannan & Curtin 1974:216ff), but most of what we know about them stems from oral traditions and the saga-style Book of the Zenj (Cerulli 1957). Descendants of the Zenj are still present in Somalia, either as part of the few and very small Bantu-speaking minorities in the country or as "Somalized Bantu", as Lewis (1961:7) refers to them.

The Somalis themselves were probably the last to penetrate into the Horn of Africa, about the 5th or 6th century A.D. Several hypotheses have been formulated as to their exact origin, and today there is still no common agreement. According to the oral tradition, the Somalis are descendants of Quraysh of the Prophet's lineage, who was forced to leave the Arabian Peninsula during the religious purges at the beginning of the Islamic era. The Somalis, however, are not Arabs; their ancestors definitely originated on the African continent, although it also seems clear that Somalis are right in claiming to have Arab blood in their veins. I.M. Lewis (1960:213) cites blood group research to support this claim, though cautiously warning that such kind of research merely suggests that Somali blood-types are a blend of African and Arab or Asian characters.

Much more pertinent in this discussion are the results from studies carried out by linguists. Greenberg (1955) has classified Somali in the Eastern Cushitic branch of the Afro-Asiatic language family, together with Oromo (Galla), Saho-Afar, and the Sidamo languages. Not surprisingly, the

speakers of all these languages have a similar appearance and, as Lewis (1955 and 1960) points out, are closely related culturally. Greenberg's research has been followed up in greater detail by Herbert S. Lewis (1966) who supports the contention that both Galla and Somalis originated north of the interlacustrine district in what is today Ethiopia. From there, the ancestors of the Somalis are believed to have migrated north to the Gulf of Aden and then gradually moved southwards through centuries at the expense of the Galla who had previously occupied the eastern Horn after having dislodged most of the Bantu-speaking groups. This commonly accepted view has recently been challenged by Turton (1975) who claims that some Somalis were inhabiting the southern parts of Somalia before the Galla arrived.

What is more interesting for our purposes, however, is the question of how foreign traders settled along the Somali coast and to what extent they came to influence the nomadic clans of the interior. Even before the Somalis occupied the Horn, the Somali Peninsula had attracted traders from distant countries. The first recorded foreign expedition in the area dates back to Queen Hatsepsut's days (15th century B.C.), and through the accounts of an unknown author of the famous Periplus of the Erythraean Sea (3rd century B.C.), we know that a number of towns or villages engaged in overseas trade were already scattered along the entire coast of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean as far south as present-day Mozambique (Schoff 1912).

The traders of these African coasts were of Arab, Persian and Indian stock, and there is evidence that even Chinese traders ventured this far West in pre-colonial times. The presence of Arabs and Persians became even more prominent after the hejira and the rise of Islam, and it is

therefore important in our analysis to distinguish between the impact of mercantilism (e.g. development of inland trade, introduction of new goods and technologies) and Islam (e.g. Islamic law, nationalism) on the nomadic population. An appropriate starting point would be to examine the trade centres themselves.

In the north, Zeyla and Berbera early became important ports and centres of Arab settlement.[3] Zeyla was the most important of the two, and the earliest certain mention of it appears in the writings of al-Yaqūbī at the end of the ninth century A.D. (Lewis 1960:217). On the Indian Ocean, the first town to be mentioned by an Arab geographer, al-Idrīsī (A.D. 1154), is Merca (Trimmingham 1964:6-7; Cerulli 1957:91), but it is believed that Mogadishu developed as a major Arab trade centre at about the same time or perhaps even before. As Cerulli suggests, it "arose in the Xth century A.D. as an Arabian colony" (1957:135).

What attracted traders from all over the eastern world to the Somali coast? Since the earliest times, incense had led navigators to frequent these shores; in fact Somalia was known as "the true frankincense country" long before the birth of Christ (Schoff 1912:63). The Arab traders in later centuries were certainly interested in the aromatics and incense of the Somali Peninsula which "apart from its secular uses in the manufacture of perfumes and medicines, was indispensable in religious ceremonies" (Trimmingham 1964:3), but as trading became more vigorous, more important products such as livestock, "enormous quantities of hides and skins" (Paulitschke 1967a:288), ghee, precious gums, ivory, and ostrich feathers were brought in by the Somali nomads to the trading centres in both the north and the south. The Somalis also traded slaves, but as Paulitschke reminds us, only as Zwischenhändler - intermediaries -, and never Somali

slaves (1967a:260). In return, the nomads would receive cloth, dates, iron, weapons, and pottery (Lewis 1965:21), and often these goods would be traded again with the sedentary populations of Abbysinia.

Obviously, the increase in trade and the introduction of new technologies could not avoid exercising a certain impact on the nomadic society, "however restricted its influence" (Lewis 1960:20). As Goody has pointed out, the mercantilistic system that developed in Africa at the time was "not dissimilar to Western Europe of the same period" (1977:95). However, it is important to stress that the similarity in the mercantile economy does not necessarily imply similarity in the socio-political systems or in the relations of production. The crucial difference here has to do with property: while medieval Europe was characterized by feudalism based on centralized landownership, there was, with the exception of Ethiopia where the plow had been introduced, no African system built solely or predominantly on property of land. As again Goody explains, "while there were local chieftainships (a line organization) supported partly by agriculture, partly from trade, there was nothing equivalent to estates in land of the European kind" (1977:99). Implicit in this statement is the notion that large chieftainships could not develop out of or sustain themselves on trade alone, and that long-distance trade does not necessitate the presence of highly centralized governments, a topic Coquery-Vidrovitch has dealt with at some length:

> "Is it necessary...to associate long-distance trading and centralized power? This seems much more dubious. To be sure, the most striking examples have been studied within states: Ghana and Mali were tied to trade with Maghreb; Benin and Dahomey experienced a similar development with the slave trade; Zanzibar flourished in the 19th century with slave and ivory trading in East Africa. But recent studies prove that long-distance trade influenced the most diverse societies" (1977:82).

She then goes on to cite a number of examples of societies in Africa that were actively engaged in trading, but that nevertheless never evolved into or became part of systems even remotely resembling state societies. The same was the case of Somali society at this time. Agriculture was virtually non-existent, and trade was only pursued as a side-activity, which meant that Somalis did not settle down to any extent in the coastal towns. Thus, if there was any influence on the Somali political structure at all as a result of the predominantly Arab mercantilism, it must have been limited indeed. The only recorded evidence of any possible changes in this regard, took place in some of the trading centres themselves. Writes Trimmingham:

> "In the Benadir states the authority seems to have been originally a council of lineage heads, as in Maqdishu [Mogadishu], Brava and Suju throughout their independent history, one of whom came to be recognized as primus" (1964:14).

It is, however, not at all established that the lineages referred to were Somali. Trimmingham himself finds it "very unlikely that Somali were yet influencing the Benadir coastal towns" (ibid:6).

It is now time to turn to another major influence that followed the expansion of trade in the time period corresponding to the Middle-Ages in Europe: Islam. Although it is not possible to determine exactly when Islam was adopted by the Somalis, every indication seems to point at an early date, probably within two or three centuries after the Prophet's death. Moreover, and contrary to its influence on any other pastoralist society in East Africa, it spread rapidly and reached all members of Somali society.[4]

The most obvious impact of Islam on Somali society as a whole, was the role it came to play as a unitary force, particularly in the jihads

against the Abyssinians in the 16th century, the British in the 20th century and its contribution to the nation-building of Somalia in the last three decades, making the Somalis "the outstanding example of irredentism in Africa" (Touval 1972:34). As pointed out in the previous chapter, Islam became intertwined with the Somali lineage system which is the single-most important cultural-historical domain in the determination of relations of production in Somali pastoral society.

On the other hand, it can hardly be said that the centralized institutions which exist in many Moslem countries accompanied the religion into Somalia. It must here be pointed out that the relationship between Islam as an ideology and various economic formations, particularly capitalism, has been and still is a subject of much debate. While Weber saw Islamic ideology in sharp contrast to Christianity because it was allegedly inimical to the rationalism necessary for capitalist development,[5] recent writers like Rodinson see nothing in Islam that would oppose such development. To cite a few examples:

> "It is quite clear, in the first place, that the Koran has nothing against private property, since it lays down rules for inheritance, for example. It even advises that inequalities be not challenged, contenting itself with denouncing the habitual impiety of rich men, stressing the uselessness of wealth in face of God's judgment and the temptation to neglect religion that wealth brings... Wage labour is a natural institution to which there can be no objection" (1974:13-14).

Others emphasize that the Koran stresses equality, activism, responsibility, etc., the foundation of the "revolutionary tradition in Islam" (Hodgkin 1980), leading us to conclude, like Marx already had, that it is not Islam as an ideology that determines the relations of production in a society, but rather how Islam as a religion, being part of the total

superstructure, will remain an ideological elaboration of the base, i.e., the articulation of relations of production and forces of production. Since the base is different in the various Moslem societies, it is, from the point of view of marxist analysis, a contradiction to speak of Islamic societies as representing one particular type of economic formation or other.

If we now go back to the influences of Islam on Somali society, we can conclude that it was instrumental in shaping it in the way described in the preceeding chapter, though without bringing in either 'capitalist' or 'revolutionary' institutions with it. Even Islamic law was adopted to only a limited extent. Although the influence of laws as outlined in the Koran are evident among the Somalis, e.g., food restrictions, rules for polygamy, austerity and many ethical norms in general, this never created any Islamic institutions with legislative powers. The shir (assembly) always remained the central decision-making body in both political and legal questions, and such 'classic' Islamic elements as the purdah or hadd penalties have been virtually non-existent. Trimmingham even goes as far as saying that the Somalis "follow their own custom to the exclusion of Islamic law" (1964:153).

It would be misleading to conclude this section without pointing out that significant changes occurred among certain sections of the Somali people in the several centuries following Islamization. As indicated above, there was a clear, though not uniform migration from north to south. Arabic chronicles establish the presence of Hawiya clans in the Benadir as early as the 13th century (Laitin 1977:46), but at this time the Galla were still in control over large territories on the Somali Peninsula. Over the years, the Galla and various Somali clans continuously fought against

each other over territorial rights and, while either side could claim several victories, the Galla were in the long run forced to give up their lands to the expanding Somalis. As late as 1919, British military authorities found themselves bound to intervene in the Somali-Galla disputes in Northern Kenya (Lewis 1965:31). By this time, the wave of Somali expansionism had reached as far south as the Tana river.

It was not the long interaction with the Galla that was to have most influence over some Somali clans,[6] but rather the agricultural Bantu.[7] In particular, the members of the Rahanwiin and Digil clan-families gradually adopted agricultural practices from the local Bantu, and today "no single Digil or Rahanwiin clan is wholly devoted to nomadism,...and throughout this area where people of these groups do practice pastoralism it is ancillary to their fundamental concern with cultivation" (Lewis 1969a:61). Changes also occurred on the level of social organization. Property of land became an important factor in determining the relations of production leading to significant changes in the politico-legal structures, which can be summarized as follows:

> "the transformation of large, stable politico-legal groups in the south; the associated development of a hierarchical, though far from centralized authority system; and the widespread adoption of foreign clients in group formation" (Lewis 1969a:59).

This development did not occur among the Somali groups that remained fulltime pastoralists. Thus, here lies much of the two-fold distinction between the Samaale and Sab geneological groups reflected in the total segmentary lineage system of the Somali people, and it is from this time on that the analytical distinction between pastoralists and agriculturalists in Somalia becomes important.

Colonial Penetration

The Arab presence on the Somali coast up to the 19th century is sometimes referred to as colonialism, but as demonstrated above, the Arab traders and administrators had little control over the Somali population. Indeed, the moderate flow of influence that had trickled from the coastal trading centres on the inland populations had, by the mid-19th century, turned the other way. The hinterland, writes Lewis, "had come to exert a dominant political influence over the coastal settlements" (1966:18). This was perhaps most concretely manifested by the fact that several of the Arab settlements were being taken over by the Somalis themselves, though this had little effect on the pastoral groups, and the contact between the sultans on one hand and Oman and Zanzibar on the other were minimal.[8]

Somalia's colonial history only starts with the arrival of Europeans, particularly the Italians, British and French. It should here perhaps be mentioned that over three centuries earlier another European power had briefly taken some interest in Somalia. Around the turn of the 16th century, various Portuguese navigators had set foot on the Benadir coast only to leave death and destruction behind them, and they never made any attempt to settle down there. The European colonizers of the 19th century, on the other hand, had stronger territorial interests.

The first foreign power to gain a foothold in Somalia in the 1800's, though, was not European, it was African. Spurred by the dream of creating a gigantic Islamic state in the north-eastern part of the continent, Egypt occupied Berbera and Bulhar in 1870, despite British protests. In the following years, Egyptian presence along the coast was increased, and by

1877 Britain had come to regard the Egyptian occupation in line with Her Majesty's interests, the "only security against other European powers obtaining a footing opposite Aden", in Lord Salisbury's words (quoted in Lewis 1965:42).

Aden was in fact Britain's principal interest in the area. Ever since 1839, when Britain forcefully took over the port its importance had increased rapidly. Its strategic location as a stopover on the shipping routes to India became even more relevant after the opening of the Suez Canal thirty years later. Other European nations, too, had come to realize the potential importance of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. As early as 1859, France had purchased the Danakil port of Obock, although the French did not actually establish themselves there until 1880. With the acquisition of surrounding territories, Obock finally became part of the French colony Coté des Somalies. Meanwhile, the Italians had also struck a deal with the Danakil by acquiring the Eritrean port of Assab thus, from a British point of view, the security threat referred to by Lord Salisbury may have been justified. As was common among the colonial powers, little or no regard was given to the interests of the indigenous populations except when they actively rebelled against the foreign invaders.

This was precisely what was happening in northern Somalia. Several clans were getting more than troubled by the behaviour and policies of the Egyptian colonists, and their dissatisfaction resulted in several violent incidents. Word of the Mahdist rebellion in the Sudan was rapidly being spread among the Somalis who came to sympathize with the Mahdi to an increasing extent, and it was the Mahdist movement in the Sudan that finally forced the Egyptians to abandon their outposts in Somalia in 1885 (Battista 1969:36-37). By this time, the British had prepared themselves

to take over what the Egyptians were leaving behind, partly by signing a number of rather ambiguous treaties with local Somali clan leaders.

The British concern about Somalia was not merely military-strategic, it was also very much based on economic grounds. The shipment of meat in the form of live animals from the Horn of Africa was the virtual life-line for the Aden garrison, due to Yemen's scarce food resources. As early as 1869 "Berbera supplied all the animals consumed by the British garrison in Aden and by the local inhabitants" (Swift 1979:448-449). Thus, it was the British presence in Aden rather than in Somalia itself that came to affect the traditional subsistence pattern among Somali nomads, as we shall see later. At this point, it will suffice to emphasize that northern Somaliland, contrary to the rest of the territory, remained a British protectorate until the time of independence and never became a true colony. Consequently, the colonial policies which Britain so forcefully employed in so many of her other possessions, had a much more limited impact on the Somalis.[9]

The modern history of Somalia is primarily linked to Italian colonialism, despite the fact that essentially only the area facing the Indian Ocean was to become an Italian colony. As in the case of British Somaliland, little work has been done on the colonial history of Italian Somalia, particularly as far as understanding the impact of colonial policies and analyzing the socio-economic development of the Somalis in this period are concerned. Only two books have been written with specific and comprehensive focus on the former Italian colony, and both suffer from severe misconceptions and biases. E. Sylvia Pankhurst's Ex-italian Somaliland has correctly been described by Hess as

> "a garbled account, violently anti-Italian, and indignantly pro-Ethiopian, based on a somewhat untrustworthy use of published sources and on the author's crusading biases" (1966:242).

On the other hand, Hess' book can with equal justification be described as 'indignantly pro-Italian' and, as Iraci points out, "Hess does not even seem to suspect that in order to write the history of Somalia, something more than just the Italian documentation is necessary", documentation that moreover "is used very partially by Hess, since he ignores the very same Italian documents that do not tend to confirm the apologetic trend" (1969:43). Nevertheless, Hess provides a useful chronology of Italian colonialism in Somalia and the events that took place during that period.

The origins of Italian colonialism in East Africa are somewhat obscure. Italy was a very young nation at the time, busily trying to solve the many internal problems that followed unification and had thus presumably little reason to be concerned about uncertain adventures abroad. When the Italians nevertheless decided to join other European powers in the 'scramble for Africa' only a few years after having become a unified nation, it was not so much out of 'classic' imperial motives, i.e., a colonialism arising from capital growth which needed both raw materials and new markets in order to continue to grow.[10] Italy, however, was a very poor country by European standards and in no position to export capital, nor did the big industrialists in northern Italy wish to invest overseas until they had created a solid domestic industrial base. On the other hand, this does not imply that the Italian colonialist ideology differed to any relevant degree from the attitudes in vogue throughout 19th century Europe, as Hess (1966:1-2) seems to believe, but rather that the classic colonialist ideology was made compatible with the actual social and economic conditions in Italy at the time, as Iraci (1967 and 1968) has

pointed out.

Italy's interest in the Horn of Africa can largely be attributed to the influence of certain powerful individuals (Del Boca 1976), partly in order to "provide an outlet...for all the social tensions which, although latent, were slowly growing in Italian society" (Iraci 1967:320). One of these powerful individuals was Francesco Crispi who was to become prime minister in 1887 who more than anyone else was responsible for Italy's expansion in East Africa by creating, in Gramsci's words, "the myth of 'easy land'" (quoted in Iraci 1967:313). The motives behind Crispi's passion for acquisition of colonies is also explained by Gramsci:

> "...Crispi's colonial policy is a direct result of his obsession for unity. This enabled him to fully comprehend the political innocence of Southern Italy; the Southern peasant wanted land and since Crispi did not want to (or could not) give it to him on Italian soil, and did not want to carry on economic Jacobism, he created the mirage of colonial lands to be exploited. Crispi's imperialism was passionate, oratorical, but with no economic or financial basis" (ibid).

Italy's occupation of Somalia was a slow undertaking and not without problems. Again, it was a private entrepreneur that laid the groundwork, Vincenzo Filonardi, aided by the explorer and later consul general Antonio Cecchi. Through a series of treaties with the sultans of Zanzibar, Obbia and Mijjertein, as well as the British government, Italy gradually established a protectorate in Somalia, thanks partly to Crispi who "wanted to get control of the Somali coast mainly as an outlet for the empire [he] thought he had acquired in Ethiopia by means of the Uccialli treaty",[11] and also because Italy wanted to "preclude its occupation by any other European power" (Iraci 1968:29). In any case, the Italian state had no desire to

carry out a real occupation, so in 1893 the Filonardi Company was given a concession to establish itself on the Benadir coast and Filonardi himself drafted a provisional ordinance for the administration, stating among other things that "all uncultivated lands, unless their owners were properly ascertained, were to become the property of the Italian government" (Hess 1966:42). Since practically all of Somalia was neither cultivated nor owned by any particular individuals in any (European) legal sense, this soon led to armed clashes between Somalis and Italians, with the Italians suffering some embarassing defeats at times.

The Filonardi Company only survived for three years and was replaced by the Benadir Company until the Italian government took direct administrative control of the expanding colony in 1905.[12] Italian Somalia was formally established in 1908, although the Mijjertein coast and the district of Obbia were to remain merely protectorates until 1925.

The first period of Italian colonialism left few scars on Somali society as a whole, the main focus of Italian interest in the Horn remaining Ethiopia despite the defeat at the hands of Emperor Menelik's troops in 1896. As Iraci points out, "the Italian conquest did not rapidly bring about great changes in the traditional Somali society" (1968:29). This is not to say that this was a peaceful period in Somali history; many Somalis (and Italians) lost their lives in frequent battles and outright massacres. Del Boca provides a good summary of the Italian policies in this period:

> "It was a policy characterized above all by the lack of a precise objective, by a total inexperience of colonial affairs, by contradictory actions and the scarce understanding of the indigenous populations. If one adds to all this the bad administration of the first years, the broken promises, the unjustified

> retaliations and the despise for the cultural manifestations of the natives, one is perfectly able to comprehend the revolts, all smeared in blood, which took place from 1895 to 1928" (1976: 429-430).

The Italians soon discovered that "Somalia is not California", to use the words of Robecchi-Bricchetti (quoted in Del Boca 1976:421), and in 1905 it looked as if the colony was destined to sink into oblivion, with no more than 13 Italians left in the Benadir. It was a colony only in name, run by a handful of corrupt officials with no scruples who did not hesitate to assure themselves commissions on the slave trade despite the official anti-slavery rhetoric of the Italian government (Del Boca 1976:783-785).[13]

From 1905 on, Italy assumed direct rule of the colony, but it led to few changes. Although 46,800 hectars of the best agricultural land were allotted to fifteen Italians between 1907 and 1909, this enterprise soon ended in failure like those in the preceeding decades. Like British Somaliland, Italian Somalia was referred to as the "Cinderella of the Colonies", (Del Boca 1976:867), and as late as 1921, only 656 Italians lived in the colony.

In retrospective, the period of colonial penetration in Somalia was quite different from other sub-Saharan countries. By 1920, most black African countries had been solidly integrated in the world capitalist system, and their economies had to some extent become independent on this system. Somalia's position at the time can hardly be said to conform to the common definition of dependency (cf Chilcote 1977),[14] nor did Somalia fit into any of the three major patterns of colonial development in Africa outlined by Amin (1977).[15] Both British and Italian Somalia remained as

we have seen, the 'cinderellas' of their respective empires and, although the presence of the colonial powers obviously contributed to bloodshed and sufferings among the Somalis, not the least in the north where Somalia's national hero Mohamed Abdulla Hassan conducted a twenty year long fight against the British, the economic impact remained extremely limited.

It may here be argued that the British interests in assuring a steady meat supply to Aden contributed to the integration of the livestock-raising nomads into a full capitalist system; however, trade of livestock was small in volume and conducted more along the simple mercantilistic system based on barter already practiced by the Somalis before the arrival of the British. There is little evidence that the increased trade with Aden led to the emergence of a local capitalist merchant class, nor that the powers or prestige of the Somali abbaans (protectors) were substantially augmented (cf Swift 1977 and 1979). The only full-time traders continued to be the relatively few Arab and Indian merchants in the coastal settlements.

As far as colonial policy was concerned, it was virtually non-existent, and as late as 1920, Britain exercised less control over the population than at the end of the 19th century, primarily because of the long war with the dervishes. This rebellion, incidentally, may be described as the embryo of modern Somali nationalism.

In the south, the Italians initially had tried to profit from their colony through private companies, and had they succeeded, Italian Somalia could have become part of what Amin describes as "Africa of the concession-making companies" (1977:142). However, neither the Filonardi nor the Benadir Company were ever comparable to enterprises like la Compagnie

Française d'Afrique Occidentale or the British East Africa Company, nor were the conditions in Somalia receptive to such kind of business. When Italy assumed direct control of the colony, colonial rules and regulations were introduced, but they were impossible to enforce on the majority of the population whose nomadic lifestyle kept them out of reach of Italy's very limited contingent of colonial officers. The punitive actions conducted by the Italian military could not have long-lasting effects, though they could be extremely brutal. Here is how Del Boca summarizes the first period of Italian colonial presence:

> "...Italian colonialism of the last quarter of the 19th century and the two first decades of the 20th century was not 'different', i.e. more human, more enlightened, more tolerant than other contemporary European colonialisms... (Rather) it without doubt transmitted some dangerous inheritances to fascism: great aggressiveness, not even frustrated by the defeats, the practice of genocide, the despise for coloured people [and] the men ready to try again to achieve what previously had failed" (1976:Preface).

The Fascist Era

Mussolini's march on Rome in 1922 did not bring about any dramatic changes in the Somali colony, although the fascist period as a whole was of great consequence for the Horn of Africa. As again Del Boca points out, "the transition from the democratic-liberal state to the fascist regime occurred, within the sphere of colonial policies, without turbulence [and] without any significant turns which, even if unintentionally, guaranteed a perfect continuity" (1979:3). In Somalia, a major colonial development was under way, but it had already started a few years earlier with the arrival of Luigi Amedeo di Savoia, known as the Duke of Abruzzi, in 1919.

The Duke had not been discouraged by the fact that all agricultural schemes in Somalia so far had failed miserably, and after having surveyed the land, he went back to Italy in 1920 to found la Societă Agricola Italo-Somala (SAIS). When the Duke returned the following year, SAIS lands were already being cleared and labour was contracted through local agricultural clan leaders, particularly among the 'Somalized Bantu'. Droughts between 1920 and 1922 helped the company contract labourers quite easily since "poverty and lack of work at home drove many people to seek employment with the company" (Lewis 1965:94). However, when the rains returned to the Somali pastures and indigenous plots, so did many of the SAIS workers, and the company experienced an acute shortage of labour. Luigi di Savoia tried to encourage agricultural workers to settle on SAIS land by giving each family one hectar of land of which only half was to be cultivated for the company, but when this proved to be insufficient as an incentive, the Duke sought cooperation from the new governor in Somalia, the quadrumviro Cesare De Vecchi, who readily started to recruit labour by force.[16]

Besides "redimensioning considerably the legend of the farmer-prince", as the Duke was called (Del Boca 1979:83), the forced recruitment of labour signified the start of a new colonial era in Somalia, in which SAIS came to represent "a 'normal' capitalist colonialism" (Iraci 1969:64). It is here interesting to note than even if the colonial administration undertook several forages to collect workers, some of which "are still bitterly remembered today" (Lewis 1966:95), SAIS in 1930 had to go as far as Ethiopia to recruit labour.

Moreover, taxes were introduced in Somalia for the first time in its history, mainly in the form of hut taxes, business income and personal

income, taxes that skyrocketed in 1935/36 to help finance the invasion of Ethiopia. Understandably, however, "most of them did not affect the Somalis of the interior" (Hess 1966:161), and most of the revenues in the colony were derived from import and export duties.

De Vecchi's iron-hand governorship also contributed to an expansion of the colony with the annexation of the northern sultanates in 1925 which up to then had remained only Italian protectorates. Almost simultaneously, Britain ceded the Jubaland territory to Italy in return for having fought on the same side in World War I.

It soon became evident that De Vecchi's incumbency represented but the beginning of a brutal colonialist rule under fascism. A system of virtual apartheid was introduced, while the use of forced labour gradually became more widespread and cruel, leading even a proclaimed fascist, Marcello Serrazanetti, to voice his indignation in three lengthy memorandums to Mussolini and the Parliament:[17]

> "the forced labour which is being imposed on Somali natives in the last few years, cynically and vainly disguised by a labour contract, is considerably worse than true slavery, because the indigenous labourer is stripped of the valid tutelage of the slave based on his venal value, a tutelage that assured him at least of that minimum of care that the last of the carters has for his donkey in the fear of having to buy a new one if the latter dies. In Somalia, meanwhile, when the contracted native dies or becomes disabled, one immediately asks for a substitute at the nearest Government Office which provides a new one for free" (quoted in Del Boca 1979:204).

Meanwhile, the trend towards 'normal' capitalist colonialism initiated by the Duke of Abruzzi through the diversification of cultivated crops, returned to "predatory colonialism" in the 1930's (Iraci 1969:64-65) with the near monoculture of bananas, a crop not particularly well-suited to

the local ecological conditions and which benefited neither the Somalis, nor the Italian consumer "who had to pay almost twice as much for the small Merka-banana as other European consumers were paying for the Central American bananas" (Del Boca 1979:199).

When it comes to the alleged philanthropic aspect of the Italian colonialism and its 'civilizing' mission, the balance from the fascist era shows little support of this. Although the Italians, mainly through Catholic missions, opened a number of elementary schools in the main towns and villages, the number of Somali and Arab pupils attending such schools was only 1,776 in 1939 (Lewis 1965:97). Some additional education was provided to train Somalis for the increasingly bureaucratic civil service and administration which was modeled to some extent on the British system of colonial districts, a system that was superimposed on the traditional political structure which continued to function as before, particularly among the nomadic clans. Muslim judges or Kadis continued to preside over traditional courts, although the administration decided who was to be appointed. Crimes against Italians and disputes between Italians and Somalis were dealt with directly by the administration or, as Serrazanetti could report, by the Italian residents themselves through mostly corporal punishment, sometimes resulting in the death of the 'convicted' Somalis (Del Boca 1979:205). The imposition of fascist 'law' culminated in 1939 with the introduction of penal sanctions "for the defense of the prestige of the race" (Iraci 1969:61).

The British involvement in the northern Protectorate in this period was far less significant. The British, from the beginning, had minimal interest in Somaliland as exemplified by a characteristic comment made by Lord Salisbury in 1887 when Menelik II started his conquest of Somali

territories:

> "Her Majesty's Government consider that imperial interests in Somaliland Protectorate are insufficient to justify their contributing towards its defence" (quoted in Som. Dem. Rep. 1974:19).

Although, as we have seen, the British subsequently were forced to contribute considerable funds and men in the Protectorate during the dervish rebellion, this possibly only made Britain even more reluctant to make further funds available in the 1920's and 1930's.

A major development took place in the north during this period, though initiated by the Somalis themselves "without any assistance or aid from the Protectorate authorities" (Lewis 1965:102). It was the gradual adoption of agriculture in the western regions of the Protectorate, although the nomadic economy continued to prevail. No significant changes in the production cycle occurred in the pastoral sector since exports of livestock and livestock products remained relatively steady until the 1950's.

The British, too, attempted to introduce taxes, through levying a direct tax on livestock. However, it was soon discontinued due to violent opposition leading to the killing of the British District Commissioner in Burao (Lewis 1965:103). Since they received little capital from their Protectorate, the British consequently spent very little on social services. The number of schools established were even lower than in the Italian colony, although some additional financial support was provided to Koranic Schools.

As the case was in the south, the British made use of tribal elders who received small stipends to help the administration exercise its authority, and indigenous matters were left to the judicial power of the Kadis. However, as Lewis pointsout,

> "despite some superficial concessions to the principle of indirect rule, in practice the Protectorate was governed as directly as [Italian] Somalia, though with a much lighter hand and more restricted purview" (1965:105).

In summary, the colonial presence in the south was much more intense and dramatic than in the north, though it largely affected only a small percentage of the population. Even at the height of the forced labour schemes in Italian Somalia, for instance, 'only' 6-7,000 people were engaged in agricultural work for the Italians (Del Boca 1979:206), and Hess is probably right in claiming that "the Somalis of the interior continued to live as their ancestors had lived centuries earlier" (1966: 186). The only times the nomads came in direct contact with the Italians were during the latter's punitive expeditions against them, or as hired soldiers, particularly in the campaign against Ethiopia when at least a fifth of the 30,000 African soldiers led by General Graziani towards Addis Abeba were Somali zaptié.

Economically, Somalia never paid off for the Italians. SAIS remained "the only modern and substantial enterprise Italian colonialism managed to create in Somalia" (Del Boca 1979:216), and even SAIS had started to decline after the death of the Duke of Abruzzi in 1933. Somalia essentially continued to be but a stepping stone for the realization of the dream of an Italian East African Empire originally conceived by Crispi and finally implemented by Mussolini in 1936 through a conquest that was totally anachronistic and reminiscent of the 19th century predatory colonialism.[18] The British on their side continued their policy of control without involvement (unless challenged militarily), a policy that was extended to Italian Somalia and the Ogaden after the defeat of Mussolini's troops in 1941.

British Military Administration and Trusteeship

Italy had no problems occupying the understaffed British Protectorate in August 1940, but it was a short-lived triumph. Already seven months later, the British were back in control after having destroyed the five-year old East African Empire of the Italians. Because of the general war situation, and because the Protectorate bordered on occupied territories and the Vichy-administered Djibouty, Britain decided to install a military administration there, though "in practice little change in what had already been done was needed or occurred", to cite the official British view at the time (Rodd 1970:179). Without here discussing whether change was "needed" or not, it is clear that indeed, the Protectorate continued to be administered in the same fashion as before the war with minimal involvement on the part of the British in the Somali economy or social development, and to a large extent through the same individuals as before who had returned to their old posts as civil servants; only the highest authority had changed from civilian to military. It should also be mentioned that although Emperor Selassie had been returned to his throne, British military administration extended to the Ogaden region as well.

Any changes were necessarily greater in the south where Britain was replacing Italy as colonial ruler, also through a military administration. Among the immediate problems the British had to face, was the chaotic economic situation "created by the collapse of the various Italian para-statal monopolies" (Lewis 1965:117). In addition, there remained 8,000 Italians in the colony, and although some of them were arrested or interned, many Italian civil servants continued to perform in their old jobs. Even the head of the Mogadishu municipality retained his position for some time, despite being "an avowed fascist" (Rodd 1970:158). It was only the Italian

police that was completely disbanded, not because they were fascists, but "on account of their unreliability and bad discipline" (ibid:153).

The agricultural estates of the Italians were for the most part left untouched, despite the recognition on the part of the British that the fascist labour policy "was in fact indistinguishable from slavery" (ibid: 162). It soon became evident that the Italian landowners could not continue to enjoy the same incomes as before from their plantations, with the war, the banana-monopoly had collapsed, and taking advantage of the British occupation, "the Somali labour force had virtually disappeared" (Lewis 1965:117). The lack of agricultural labour caused an acute food-shortage in the colony, particularly affecting the European community, something that was partially alleviated when local Somali agriculturalists were "persuaded (sic) to agree to hand over to the Administration a portion of the yield from their cultivation" (Rodd 1970:163), allegedly in return for assistance in ploughing their fields.

The major development that took place in the period up to 1950 was undoubtedly the emergence of the first Somali political movements, of which the foremost among them was the Somali Youth Club which in 1947 changed its name to the Somali Youth League (SYL), and which was to play an important role both in the trusteeship and post-independence years. These political movements were strongly rooted in the growing nationalism, a nationalism that became more intense with the repeated claims by Ethiopia on the Ogaden and even Somalia itself.[19] For instance, in an imperial proclamation in 1941, Haile Selassie declared:

> "I have come to restore the independence of my country, including Eritrea and the Benadir, whose people will henceforth dwell under the shade of the Ethiopian flag" (quoted in Reisman 1978:14).

Some people within the British government were sympathetic to Somali irredentism, and the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, "sensibly proposed in the spring of 1946 that the interests of the Somali people would best be served if the existing union of Somali territories were continued" (Lewis 1965:124). The Ogaden was nevertheless handed over to Ethiopia in 1948, to the outrage of the Somalis who had vigorously opposed the transfer.[20] Six years later, also the Haud and Reserved Area along the Protectorate's border were to be given the Ethiopians.

Meanwhile, Italy was pursuing a very active diplomacy abroad in order to obtain control over Somalia again, something that turned into a virtual propaganda campaign assuming "formidable proportions" in 1947 (Lewis 1965:125). The Italians also sought support within their former colony, and since the Darood-dominated SYL was very much against the return of Italian administration in any form, the Italians actively supported political groups and lineages hostile to the SYL.[21]

The decision on Somalia's future was left to the Four Power Commission composed of France, Great Britain, the USA and the USSR. Unable to reach agreement, the four powers subsequently brought the problem to the newly created United Nations. After a series of lengthy deliberations, the UN agreed to leave northern Somaliland to the British and then made the unique decision of imposing a trusteeship on southern Somalia

> "which was not to be administered by the authority in control during the immediate pre-trusteeship period" (Finkelstein 1955:6).

The conditions stipulated included that Somalia be granted independence by December 2nd, 1960 (a date later moved to July 1st of the same year) and the implementation of fundamental objectives such as

> "promoting the political, economic, social and educational progress of the inhabitants in the territories under trusteeship" (quoted in Meregazzi 1954:6).

It may here be appropriate to ask why Italy showed such an interest in regaining control over her former colony albeit indirectly. It has been argued that it was mainly out of reasons of prestige, and that the Italians, since they had "joined the Allied cause after overthrowing Mussolini in 1943, did not consider themselves to be a defeated enemy" and consequently saw it as justified to claim back old colonies (Hess 1966:191), an argument that unquestionably was important in order to solicit popular support in Italy in the late forties. But the Italian interest in keeping a foothold in the former colony was due to more than "ideological and traditionalist motives", as for instance Triulzi proposes (1971:445). Rather, and as developments during the Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana in Somalia (AFIS) were to indicate, the Italians were concerned about creating conditions that by the time of the imminent independence would at least come close to what is commonly defined as a neo-colonial situation.[22] For instance, one of Italy's principal aims with education in Somalia was to create a "native middle class" to help take care of business interests in the up-coming nation (Costanzo 1956). The perhaps clearest expression of some of the true motives of Italy is embedded in the following statement by Vedovato in an article entitled "Somalia in face of the sixties":

> "Africa can represent an important source for primary products for Italy, as well as being a possible and interested market for the products of her industry. But in particular, Africa has the room and possibilities to receive...thousands and thousands of Italians and thus contribute to the solution of the number one problem in our country" (1959:208-209).

The Italian strategy during the AFIS period is particularly reflected

in the revival of the banana cultivation. As Iraci argues, "banana was what could least contribute to the long-term development of the local economy" (1969:66). Moreover, the emphasis on bananas allowed Italy to be in almost total control of the Somali economy, since Somalia, starting in the 1930's, derived most of her export earnings from bananas. Only during the forties, under British military administration, did most of the export value in the south come from livestock and livestock products, but this was not due to any significant increase in this production sector, but rather because the banana-industry had come to "a virtual standstill" (Karp 1960:44).

With the return of the Italians in 1950, the Somali banana industry became again "almost entirely dependent upon access to the Italian market" (ibid:89), a market totally controlled by the powerful Azienda Monopolio Banane (AMB). The areas utilized for banana cultivation increased over three times from 1950 to 1960, which "confirms to what point the sole objective of the Italian trusteeship was to repropose the Italian colonial presence in Somalia, to repeat, and indeed consolidate the old patterns of domination (Pestalozza 1974:98). Not only did the banana industry help Italy control Somalia's export economy, it also prevented the development of other agricultural sectors that could have helped the Somalis to become self-sufficient in food-products by the time of independence.

It has been pointed out that the banana industry never provided Italy with a profit and that it actually remained an economic liability both to the Italian government and the Italian consumer (cf Karp 1960). This, however, was but the price Italy had to pay for political convenience, something the Italians hoped to translate into economic profit partly because they expected oil to be discovered in Somalia. Of the total private

and public investment between 1954 and 1957, for instance, nearly half went to oil prospecting (Karp 1960:132).

The developments in the British Protectorate were quite different in this period, where everything "proceeded at a more leisurely pace" (Lewis 1965:148). No date was set for independence of the territory until the late fifties when it was obvious that the Protectorate would want to reunite with the AFIS-territory for independence. The British still had minimal interest in their 'Cinderella', and development programmes were limited to moderate improvements in education and infrastructure plus some assistance in the pastoral sector through veterinary service and water-storage basins.

The Protectorate nevertheless experienced great changes in the composition and volume of exports. Due mainly to the Middle-Eastern oil-boom, the traditional number one export from the Protectorate, skins and hides, gave way to a sharp increase in export of live animals to oil-rich nations, particularly Saudi-Arabia. From 1954 to 1959 "the increase in the value of exports of livestock reached 76 per cent, while animal units export rose by 40 per cent" (Konczacki 1978:84). This overwhelming increase naturally led to changes in the pastoralist economy, for instance in herd composition and grazing patterns, but perhaps more important, it "induced a shift from a principally subsistence economy to a much more market-oriented one" (Swift 1979:453), although this started to have consequences only in the 1960's.

The south did not experience the same increase in livestock exports in absolute terms, though the total weight of exported live animals nearly quadrupled between 1954 and 1959 according to AFIS figures. Still, this sector accounted for only 4.3% of the total export value in the year

immediately preceeding independence (AFIS 1959:212-213).

When comparing the colonial policies in the two Somalias throughout their turbulent history, there is one striking similarity to be noted. Both colonial administrations were highly centralized and had a limited influence on the majority of the population, namely the nomadic pastoralists. Even in Italian Somalia, where the colonial presence was strongest, despite certain changes in the fields of education and government, at the time of independence and reunification "the traditional Somali social structure was very much intact" (Laitin 1977:81). The economic changes in the Protectorate and the AFIS territory came too late to have any significant effects before independence.

Post-Independence

On June 26th, 1961, British Somaliland became an independent nation, but only five days later it joined former Italian Somalia, on the day of her independence, to become a new state named the Somali Republic. It soon became evident that the south would become the dominant partner, not only because the south, due to a much greater population was allotted the vast majority of parliamentary seats (90 vs 33), but also because the southerners had gotten the opportunity to gain more experience in the political and administrative matters of a modern state. As A.A. Castagno points out,

> "one of the most striking differences between the political developments of Somalia and Somaliland lies in the lack of maturation of political parties in the latter. Britain did not permit political party representation in the town, district or protectorate advisory council, or the Legislative Council until 1959" (1964:540).

Still, at the general elections of February 1960, four major parties in the Protectorate had presented candidates and they had all agreed on acting jointly with the southern parties on matters related to unification. A major problem remained in both territories, though, and that was that all political parties to a large extent had their roots in the divisions between clans and between lineages. Although many Somali nationalists sought to deny the existence of these divisive forces, "all political parties had, perforce, to utilize these bonds of kinship in attaining their political aims" (Lewis 1965:168). Hence, forming a government had to be based on the establishment "of an equilibrium of the major ethnic groups, including those of Somaliland, in the central government" (Castagno 1964:547).

It was the setting up of such a formula that allowed President Aden Abdullah Osman, a Hawiya, to be elected unanimously in 1960, while the prime minister, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, was a Darood. The first couple of years of the Somali Republic's existence was nevertheless turbulent, "marred by signs of northern discontent and dissatisfaction" (Lewis 1972: 393), particularly dramatized by an attempted coup d'état by a group of Sandhurst-trained officers. Still, unity was maintained, perhaps primarily because of the so-called pan-Somali issue, which became particularly relevant following border-clashes with Ethiopia and Kenya in the early sixties. The Somalis had never given up their claims for a greater Somalia, i.e., the reunification of all territories inhabited by Somali-speaking peoples, including Djibouti, the Ogaden-area of Ethiopia, and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. When the OAU passed its famous resolution on the intangibility of former colonial borders, for instance, Somalia immediately "declared it did not feel itself bound by it" (Touval 1972:89).

The Somali Republic at this time was a unitary state, headed by a president. It had a 123-member National Assembly to which deputies were elected by universal adult suffrage for a five-year term. It was a rather inefficient political system, "distinguished by weak extractive and distributive capabilities but a strong symbolic capacity" (Potholm 1970: 209). The Somali government's apparent commitment to 'democracy' and the fact that the country was, at least nominally, one of the few multi-party states in Africa, received wide praise from the Western industrial nations which poured in considerable amounts of money to the country. This aid was matched by large grants and technical assistance from various socialist countries. In the case of the USSR, for instance, it represented the largest per capita aid-commitment in sub-Saharan Africa (Esseks 1975), and in terms of total foreign assistance, Somalia received a per capita aid over three times the average aid to developing countries. Between 1963 and 1969 "Somalia's total receipts of development aid accounted for 85.1% of her development expenditure" (Mehmet 1971:37).

To what extent all this aid helped Somalia's development is certainly questionable, and although reliable economic data from this period are scarce, the UNCTAD Secretariat has estimated that between 1960 and 1970 Somalia's real GDP increased by a yearly average of only 1.7%, which means that the real product per capita fell an average of 0.4% a year (ILO 1977:7). As Mehmet (1971) has pointed out, most of the aid Somalia received in this period was either project-tied or country-tied, compelling Somalia to allocate funds to a number of low-priority projects and to buy goods from specific donor countries which could have been purchased at lower prices elsewhere.[23] Moreover, and partly because much of the aid was in the form of loans, increasing the national debt, this situation led to increased

dependency on bilateral aid and the economies of the donor countries.

At the same time, most of the foreign capital never got beyond the increasing and increasingly inefficient bureaucracy in Mogadishu, contributing to an explosive urbanization.[24] Between 1960 and 1968, the capital's population doubled from 102,000 to 204,000 (Arecchi 1977:94), following a pattern already well established in most ex-colonies in Africa.

Economically, bananas continued to play a substantial role but that could only benefit the Italian landlords and the AMB. The agricultural workers received extremely low salaries and had to grow subsistence crops after their working day was over at the plantations, as their pay could not cover the cost of food. The farm-workers of the banana-growing regions were thus probably the poorest in all of Somalia.

In terms of export value, however, livestock was becoming more and more important. The exponential rise in exports of live animals that had started in the mid-fifties continued, leading to substantial changes in the pastoral sector. As Swift summarizes:

> "The growth of livestock marketing in Somalia has had far-reaching consequences for the pastoral economy, for the pastoral producers, and for the pastoral environment. This increase, I contend, does not reflect a sustained increase in livestock production, rather it has been accompanied by the beginnings of major changes in the pastoral society, particularly in increased economic stratification, increased private appropriation of resources, and a breakdown - without adequate modern replacement - of some of the communal institutions and cultural mechanisms which had previously regulated economic life and ecological organization" (1977:287-288).

Did this 'increased economic stratification' and the change from subsistence to market pastoralism imply a change from a pre-capitalist to a capitalist

mode of production? By first glance it may seem so, but before drawing any conclusions, a number of factors must be considered.

First of all, we must take into account exactly how the commercialization of the livestock sector took place. As indicated above, trade traditions among Somalis go back hundreds of years, but only through limited barter. Trade was moreover structured along clan and lineage affiliations, where the employment of a patron or abbaan ensured the safe passage across territories controlled by other lineages (Lewis 1962a). The abbaan also acted as intermediate between foreign traders and Somali suppliers. The abbaan, however, acted individually on behalf of his lineage, thus one cannot talk of a class of exploitative abbaans versus pastoral producers, although it is clear that an abbaan was in the position to make economic gains through his appointment.

With the introduction of the money economy in the pastoral sector, which really did not occur until the late fifties, accompanied with the export-boom in live animals, the abbaan became much more like a full-fledged trader than a patron acting on behalf of his lineage. He would buy trucks in order to buy up livestock in the interior and invest capital in well-drilling and the construction of water-tanks (barkads), leading to "increased private appropriation of what had previously been communal resources" (Swift 1977:290). For the first time private ownership became of significance among Somalia's nomads. Also for the first time, trade became the primary source of livelihood among a small, but increasingly powerful group of individual entrepreneurs.

Nevertheless, it is important to point out that these entrepreneurs continued to have strong obligations towards their dia-paying group, and

commerce remained "closely bound with lineage politics" (Lewis 1962a:380), something that was very much reflected on the national political scene as well, culminating in the elections of 1968 when 68 parties, mainly "one-man lineage parties" (Lewis 1972:397), fielded candidates.

The continued domination of clan-membership on every level of political decision making illustrates the difficulties involved in understanding post-independence Somalia in terms of the new economic reality of market capitalism that was penetrating every sector of Somali society. Even if we look at the pastoral community as a separate entity it is no longer possible to argue that Somali pastoralists continued to live exactly as they had lived centuries before.

On the other hand, this does not necessarily imply that Somalia had developed into a class society. The relations of production in a society do not change overnight, and even 15 years is a very short time-span in a society's development. If we take 1954 to be the year when Somalia's pastoral economy started to become integrated in a market economy, it is obvious that the changes in the relations of production in the period up to the 1969 coup d'état could hardly have led in a total change in the combined effects of the accumulation of surplus in the pastoral society as a whole, not only because the changes occurred gradually, but particularly since the means of production continued to be controlled by the nomads themselves. The private appropriation of water-wells and barkads was still of little significance in relative terms.

The role of the state, which only emerged as a political reality in the 1950's, also remained on the fringe of the socio-economic life of the pastoralists. Whereas it is true that the accompanying bureaucracy

represented an emerging parasitical group in Somali society as a whole, they hardly affected the traditional division - or the lack of it - of labour among the nomads. There is, on the other hand, no question that the post-independence period represents a shift from subsistence oriented pastoralism to market pastoralism, but considering the limited time it was in existence, it can be maintained that the relations of production in the pastoral sector remained essentially the same as in pre-colonial times. The introduction of commercial marketing represented the introduction of a new mode of production, namely capitalism (cf Cardoso 1977 and McEachren 1976), without necessarily implying that the original mode of production as described in Chapter II was destroyed. As in so many other colonial or neo-colonial situations in the world, two modes of production co-existed simultaneously, but contrary to, for instance, India, as analyzed by Banaji (1972) and McEachren (1976), in the Somali case the capitalist mode of production had not as yet become dominant.

NOTES

[1]It is here important to mention that the Somalis did not get the chance to write about themselves until very recently. Somali as a written language was only introduced in 1972; before that, a Somali would have to learn a foreign language first in order to become literate. In most cases this would be English or Italian, although some of the early written accounts by Somalis were done in Arabic (see e.g. Cerulli 1957). For awhile, the locally developed scripture known as Osmania after the man who invented it, also was used to a limited extent.

[2]Although this periodization is based on dates and events directly pertinent to Somalia's history, it by and large - and not surprisingly - corresponds to the periodization of African history proposed by Copans (1977:19-31). In analyzing the developments and trends of social science in reference to Africa, Copans clearly illustrates their connection with the various stages of colonialization on the continent, which he lists as follows:

Up to 1860:	Exploration of Africa
1860-1920:	Colonial conquest
1920-1945:	Development
1945-1960:	De-colonization
1960- ?? :	Neo-colonialism

[3]Berbera has nothing to do with the Berbers of North Africa. The name comes from barbar, the Arabic name for the Cushitic speaking nomads, including Somalis and Galla.

[4]Despite its universal adoption, and despite the fact that Somalis at times are referred to as "fanatical Muslims" (Trimmingham 1964:153), Islam in Somalia is blended with some pagan beliefs and rituals. Cerulli (1957:177-210) offers a very detailed and systematic overview of this syncretism.

[5]It should here be clarified that Weber specifically referred to Islamic states, not so much Islam in itself. In his own words:

> "Industrialization was not impeded by Islam as the religion of individuals - the Tartars in the Russian Caucasus are often very 'modern' entrepreneurs - but the religiously determined structures of Islamic states, their officialdom and their jurisprudence" (1968:1095).

He then describes this structure as exercising a "negative anticapitalist effect" on modern money economies (ibid).

[6]Lewis mentions that some Digil and Rahanwiin and later even some Darood adopted the Galla warrior age-grade system, but only "temporarily" (1965:32).

[7]The Bantu-Somali contact also fundamentally changed the local Bantu communities. The Bantu had to accept the Somalis as patrons and they probably adopted Islam at this time. Gradually they also started speaking Somali which eventually became their only language. Thus Lewis' designation "Somalized Bantu".

[8]There had been a significant decline in Arab power and trade in the Horn of Africa in the 19th century, partly due to increasing importance of the ports along the coasts of Kenya and Tanganyka. Here the merchandise was more plentiful, particularly ivory and slaves. Thus, the Zanzibar sultanate paid practically no more attention to the Benadir ports. The French explorer Gullain who visited the area between 1846 and 1848 found that for instance in Mogadishu "the only remaining Zanzibari representative was an old Arab with an Indian as tax collector", while in Merka there was no one but "an aged customs official" (Lewis 1965:38-39). The major ports in the north, on the other hand, were by now under the Ottoman Empire, but the situation there was not very different from the Benadir. Burton (1966) in his famous expedition in northern Somaliland in 1854, for instance, reported Zeila to be terribly isolated and under an almost constant siege by Somali nomads.

[9]It should here be pointed out that despite their short tenure in Somalia, the Egyptians managed to introduce a number of new policies characteristic in colonial rule. As summarized by Laitin,

> "the Egyptian levied dock and transit dues, import taxes on goods from the interior, a health tax, light dues, grazing charges, and passport fees... The Egyptians also modernized the market at Bullaxaar, standardized weights and measures, appointed a sheekh who led prayers at the mosque, and thought the people 'to help understand their religion.' They attempted to build roads as well, and encouraged commerce in goats in their pacified territory. Both in Berbera and Seylac [Zeyla], the Egyptians built quays to improve the ports, and they established regular mail service from Berbera, Seylac, and Aden to Suez. In Seylac they also built schools, housing, and offices. They sent a team from the Agricultural Ministry to assess the potential of salt and nitrate deposits as well" (1977:47-48).

Lewis also reports that the Egyptians initiated public works through corvée labour (1965:43), but due to the limited time the Egyptians were present in Somalia, it is doubtful that this practice or the other policies listed by Laitin had any significant effect in the long-term on the Somali population of the area.

[10]It may perhaps be argued that Italian colonialism started even before unification, since Assab was acquired in 1869, the year before the occupation of Rome. However, this acquisition made by Giuseppe Sapeto was on behalf of the private interests of some Genoan shipowners, particularly Rubattino, rather than for the Kingdom of Italy (cf Del Boca 1976:33-49).

[11]The treaty of Uccially was signed on May 2nd between Menelik II and the Italian representative Antonelli, and it proved to become extremely controversial and eventually led to the battle of Adowa (cf Lewis 1965:50; Del Boca 1976:313-341 and 463-487).

[12]It is interesting to note here that Cecchi, who initially had been one of Filonardi's strongest supporters, more than any other individual contributed to the downfall of the Filonardi Company, partly in order to promote his own personal ambitions in Somalia (cf Hess 1966:50-56). Cecchi's efforts, however, never paid him the rewards he had hoped for. In November 1896 he was killed by Somali clansmen near Lafole.

[13]Indeed, the Italians had used the 'abolition of slavery' as a pretext to conduct several punitive expeditions against the Somalis, particularly those of the Bimal clan who were very much hostile to the Italian colonists. It is astonishing in this connection to see how Hess uncritically accepts the official colonial version of the 'bimal revolts' at the time which states that the Bimal were violently opposing the promulgation of "an ordinace outlawing the slave trade and permitting the emancipation of slaves" (Hess 1966:87), something that, as we have seen, is not the case. Nor can one accept Hess' contention that slavery was a "centuries-old institution" among the Bimal and that "slaves were necessary for their way of life" (ibid). Writes Iraci:

> "From the way Hess expresses it, it would seem that Sapelli and Mercatelli [Benadir Company governors] were committed opponents of slavery, something that, as is well known, is not maintainable. Anyhow, it is evident that here, too, [Hess] does not relinquish from an indirect apology of slavery: not only the fact that it was a centuries-old institution - which besides is not true - is referred to with elegy, but [also] the implicit suggestion that the 'way of Life' of the majority of the Somalis was based on the exploitation of slaves" (1969:48-49).

[14]Chilcote quotes the definition of dependency outlined by Theotonio Dos Santos:

> "By dependency we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of inter-dependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can become self-sustaining, which other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion which can have either a positive or negative effect on their immediate development" (1977: 128).

[15]Amin sees the development of "three macro-regions" of economic integration in Africa as a consequence of colonialism. The first, described as "Africa of the colonial trade economy", comprises coastal West Africa and its hinterland plus the Sudan; the second, "Africa of the concession-owning companies", includes the countries of the Congo River basin; and finally the third, "Africa of the labour reserves" includes most of the eastern and southern countries on the continent (1977:141-142). Amin specifically excludes Somalia, together with a handful of other countries from these three macro-regions.

[16]Quadrumviro was the term given to Mussolini's four closest collaborators at the rise of fascism, the ones who led the march on Rome. De Vecchi was the most controversial of the four and soon friction between him and Il Duce developed. His assignment as governor in a remote and relatively unimportant place like Somalia must be seen on this background.

[17]Serrazanetti was eventually arrested and sentenced to five years in jail shortly after his return to Italy in 1932 (Del Boca 1979:207).

[18]This is particularly reflected in the figures for military expenditures in the 1930's. In the period 1931-36, the Italians spent 39% of their total expenditures in Somalia on the military, a figure that increased to 55% in 1936-40. The expenditures for education were less than 1% of the total in the same periods (Pankhurst 1969:196). In terms of import/export value, the Italian colony imported almost five times as much as it exported between 1919 and 1939, giving an adverse balance of 2.5 billion lire for the period (ibid:201).

[19]For further discussion on the rise of Somali nationalism and irredentism, see Touval (1963) and Lewis (1963 and 1969).

[20]This led to one of the first explicit manifestations of Somali nationalism in Jigjiga, where the Somalis had hoisted the SYL-flag. When the British proceeded to take it down on the eve of the restoration of the town to Ethiopian administration, violent riots broke out in which at least 25 Somalis lost their lives (Touval 1963:135).

[21]The culmination of this active campaign against the SYL occurred in January 1948 when Italians and their supporters armed with bows and arrows and even hand-grenades sought to disrupt a peaceful SYL demonstration in Mogadishu. A full-fledged battle followed, leaving among others 51 Italians dead.

[22]Although neo-colonialism can hardly be defined in a few words, it can be said quite simply that it is a colonialism in a new form, based on indirect rather than direct rule, and although neo-colonialist methods are "subtle and varied" in Nkrumah's words (1965:239), neo-colonialism is basically intended to fulfill two main aims:

> "to serve the interests - economic, military, political - of external powers; and to create internal conditions in the developing countries which assist the retention of political power in the hands of those social strata which are prepared to cooperate with imperialism and which are best suited to carry through this collaboration" (Woddis 1967:117).

To ensure that the neo-colonial interests are preserved in any given country, it is essential that this country become so dependent on the economy controlled by the dominant one as to make development of a self-sustaining economy extremely difficult, if not impossible.

[23]For details, see Mehmet 1971:42.

[24]Significantly, all the 'aid' given to Somalia in the 1960's did little to improve the struggling economy or the living conditions of the majority of the population. A couple of examples given by Pestalozza should illustrate the situation. Between independence and the revolution, the agricultural output

> "was marked by increasing insufficiency due to the fact that only banana growing was incentivized, for export purposes...
> [At the same time] the canned meat and fish plants in Kismayu and Las Khoreh, put up with Soviet aid, while representing the sole instances of animal-based processing units, remained inoperative or produced at below their potential, and only for export" (1974:38-39).

CHAPTER IV

SOCIALISM

On October 19th, 1969, the President of the Somali Republic, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, was assassinated by a policeman. This happened while the Prime Minister Haji Ibrahim Egal was travelling abroad, and it would have been logical to conclude that the murder was part of a carefully engineered attempt to overthrow the government, particularly since there had been "rumours of military intervention" for quite some time in Somalia (Lewis 1972:400). However, the coup came only six days later, and to this day there is no evidence of any kind that could link the assassination with the people who eventually took power.[1]

The army only decided to act after the Prime Minister had returned to Somalia, apparently to "master-mind the National Assembly's election of a new President who would safeguard his own position" (ibid.), and when a decision on this point was reached late at night on October 20th, the military found the time ripe for a coup. A few hours later, in the early morning of the next day, troops aided by armoured cars and "une pluie diluvienne" moved into the capital to occupy key positions (Decraene 1977: 79), and by 11 o'clock, the situation was totally in control of a military body that was to assume the name of the Supreme Revolutionary Council. The

National Assembly was dissolved, political parties made illegal, and leading political personalities were either interned or imprisoned. But not a shot had been fired.

For many Western observers, who had come to look at Somalia as a remarkably stable and 'democratic' state, the coup came as a surprise. After all, the Somali military and police had traditionally kept outside the political scene and had seldom if ever tried to influence the policies of the administration. When the military nevertheless decided to take power, it was in reaction to the increasingly inefficient and corrupt regime which frustrated not only the military but most of the population as well. Laitin is most probably right in suggesting that "disenchantment with the performance of the civilians seems to have been the motivation for the actions of the armed forces" (1976:453), a contention that was partly confirmed by the tacit approval of the coup by the majority of the population.

Not surprisingly, when the composition of the all-military Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) was announced on November 1st, the President was declared to be General Maxamed Siyaad Barre, the Commander of the Army. Since the new military government was not representing any particular political faction, it was expected that the hierarchical structure of the army and police would remain pretty much intact in its new government role, with inclinations neither to the 'right' nor 'left'. This 'neutralist' expectancy seemed to be confirmed in the immediate foreign policy statements and by the appointment of an across-the-line selection of "a high proporation of the ablest civil servants" to the SRC's civilian secretariat (Lewis 1972:401). The First Charter of the Revolution also catered to a very broad base, a programme that was "traced along

undecisive contours and which enumerated some grandiose principles" (Decraene 1977:83).[2] In short, the initial task the new revolutionary task had set itself essentially amounted to putting the house in order.

It was only one year later, on the occasion of the 1st anniversary of the coup, which henceforth would always be referred to as the Revolution,[3] that it became clear what the political course of the new regime was going to be. In his anniversary speech, Barre declared: "We solemnly and resolutely proclaim ourselves a socialist state", adding that "it was with the objectives of socialist development that the Revolution took its first steps in the first years of its life" (quoted in Pestalozza 1974:29-30). The commitment to 'scientific socialism' was further consolidated in the Second Charter of the Revolution in January 1971.

The Question of Socialism in Africa

One of the problems in analyzing the various socialisms in Africa, has been the preconceived notions held by marxist scholars attempting to assess the various national situations. Clive Thomas has identified two groups of marxist-leninists in this context: the 'right', i.e., "those who have accepted the situation at face value and have tended to see the countries as being already as socialist as their leadership declared",[4] and the 'left', i.e., "those who have stressed that a socialist orientation depends exclusively on working class control and direction of social development" (1978:18-19). The result of this group conflict has been the emergence of a less dogmatic theoretical direction known as the non-capitalist path thesis, which essentially proposes the bypassing of capitalism as one possible path, though in practice "it is frequently projected as the <u>best</u>, if not the <u>only</u> realistic path of development"

(ibid:20). This approach is not limited to academic marxism, it is actually seriously considered by several of the "second wave socialist regimes" in Africa (cf Rosberg and Callaghy 1979).

Socialist ideology was quite widespread in Africa even before most states became independent, although it appeared in a number of quite distinct forms under the common umbrella of 'African socialism', whether this was Senghor's Senegal, Nkrumah's Ghana, Nyerere's Tanganyika (later Tanzania), or Touré's Guinea. Early African socialism was more than anything else an idealistic movement, based on the common belief that Africans in general were 'natural' socialists and that their egalitarian societies had only been afflicted by colonialism. Consequently, to achieve true liberation and independence, Africans had to go back to their cultural roots. This thinking saw perhaps its clearest reflection in the négritude socialism developed by Léopold Senghor, a socialism "that primarily must be regarded as kulturpolitisch, a reaction against the French assimilation policy which made the search for an African identity the central theme" (Grohs 1971:6). In other words, it was more an ideology than a socio-economic system or programme.

Another famous 'brand' of early African socialism is Nyerere's Ujaama-socialism. Although more pragmatic than the négritude, particularly since Nyerere's ideas were put into practice in the building and organization of the Ujaama-villages, the socialist experiment in Tanzania, too, is strongly ideologically based "on an appeal to tradition" (Cliffe 1970:39). Even Nkrumah, who proclaimed that "there is only one socialism - scientific socialism", tended to romanticize the African past, particularly reflected in his book Consciencism:

> "The traditional face of Africa includes an attitude towards man which can only be described, in its social manifestation, as being socialist" (1964:68).[5]

Thus, early socialism in Africa really amounted to a very idealistic philosophy which Sprinzak summarizes as follows: "the most important claim of the 'socialist' thesis is that the structure of thinking in Africa was communal" (1973:642). Ayi goes even further, by characterizing early African socialism as "a gimmick, a set of magical prop slogans, or... an ideology in the Mannheimian sense" (1967:27).

In the past decade, these early concepts have fallen more into the background. Many of the original advocates have either been deposed or killed or both (e.g. Nkrumah, Mboya, Keita, Dia), and a new generation of socialist leaders have emerged, particularly in the former Portuguese colonies. Although these new leaders tend to reject the idealistic notions of their forerunners, they face many of the same theoretical and practical problems, namely how to achieve socialism in the particular African context and how to 'bypass' the capitalist stage. It is nevertheless significant to note that "socialism is no longer in Africa just a popular word behind which hide philosophical ideas about exclusively African values" (Palmberg 1978:12). The new socialist nations on the continent are careful not to refer to their socialism as being distinctly African or national.

On the contrary, there has been a shift towards 'scientific socialism' with a greater emphasis on class analysis which was virtually absent in 'African socialism'. Although the acceptance of the existence of internal enemies of the Revolution indicates a major change in approach, Africa's new socialist leaders still have to face the constraints of being dependent on a capitalist trade network in a capitalist world system. As Rosberg & Callaghy aptly point out, this has the effect that in some countries on the continent,

> "capitalism thrives despite professed socialist orientations. Pragmatism has clearly ruled the day... The nature of economic relations make major structural changes impossible if economic collapse is to be avoided" (1979:6).

Despite the fact that some of the self-proclaimed scientific socialist regimes in Africa came to power through military coups d'état and others, specifically in the former Portuguese colonies, through revolutionary independence movements, there seems to be little difference between them and their 'African socialist' predecessors as far as true ideological commitment is concerned. Not even the presence of certain emminent ideologies such as the late Amilcar Cabral and Agostino Neto seem to have had more than a symbolic effect on their respective countries, leading one author to conclude that there is a profound "gap between the rhetoric and practice of African 'scientific socialist' elites" (Jowitt 1979:171). The fact remains that very few - if any - 'second wave' regimes have made any serious attempts to come to grips with scientific socialism, and despite the stated commitments to leninist ideology, there is a remarkable absence of leninist organization.

Socialism in Somalia

Somalia is considered to be one of these 'second wave' socialist regimes, i.e., the socialists of the seventies, and also a country that does not believe that socialism can come overnight, that it is a process that will require both careful planning and time, as reflected in the following statement by Dualeh:

> "Towards the end of the Century, Somalia hopes to break away from the [world capitalist] system which it sees only as a perpetuation of unequal exchange between the West and the Third World, the increasing distortion of her economy and marginalization of her masses" (1976:66).

Socialism in Somalia has so far received only marginal attention from the academic community. Although the country recently celebrated the 11th anniversary of the Revolution, or a whole decade of 'scientific socialism', there is still a profound lack of analytical material from this period. To be sure, two books and a number of articles have been published in this period with specific references to Somalia's socialism, but none of them provide enough insight to allow a deep theoretical discussion of the developments in the country since 1970.

Some authors have enthusiastically embraced the notion that Somalia is well on her way to achieving the socialist goals (e.g. Davidson 1975a, b and c; Kahsai 1976; Pestalozza 1974);[6] others have perceived the country's politics in the 1970's mostly in terms of the Soviet presence there which ended in 1977 (e.g. Bell 1975; Crozier 1975; Desfosses 1975; Lyons 1978); while a third group falls outside both of these tendencies (e.g. Decraene 1977; Laitin 1976, 1979a and b; Lewis 1979). The least useful of the three groups for our purposes is the second one, due to the lack of first-hand material and, with the exception of Lyons, the fervent anti-communist biases, but again it must be stressed that even the other authors provide only a limited base for any profound theoretical analysis, so the following profile of socialism in Somalia is necessarily somewhat superficial.

Offically at least, Somalia disassociates herself quite adamantly from the various African socialisms discussed above. In the words of Maxamad Siyaad Barre, "our socialism is scientific socialism founded by the great Marx and Engels" (1973:227), and that

> "our socialism cannot be called Somali socialism, African socialism or Islamic socialism. It is the original scientific socialism and emanates from the

> true principles of the noble products of thought of mankind and the sum-total of the experiences of man. Our socialism is independent and governed by its own specific conditions to produce a society based on equality, social justice and unity, in coherence with the general laws of scientific socialism" .(1973:171).

Statements like this alone, of course, cannot be taken as actual descriptions of the situation, indeed, it has been suggested that contemporary African regimes that have proclaimed themselves 'scientific socialists' have a common characteristic in "the absence of ideological commitments, developmental strategies, and institutional developments consistent with their formal identity" (Jowitt 1979:133).[7] Although this statement is far too generalizing and encompassing, and also based on a somewhat questionable use of sources, the point made is a good methodological clue that can be used in assessing the Somali situation.

As far as the ideological commitment to socialism of Barre and his regime is concerned, it has been fairly consistent since socialism was proclaimed, at least rhetorically. The fundamental thesis of the Revolution has been that there "existed no social classes in the properly Marxist sense of the term" in Somalia (quoted in Pestalozza 1974:31-32), though the presence of "a budding capitalist bourgeois system allied to the neocolonialist camp" has been admitted (ibid:33). But the main premise has been that Somali society as a whole never fully entered the capitalist stage, it has only been an involuntary victim of the capitalist system through colonialism and neo-colonialism:

> "Our socialism is the offspring of tribalism. Look! We have skipped over several stages. We have not passed through a monarchy. We have not known feudalism or capitalism. We have jumped from tribalism to socialism" (Barre 1977:95-96).[8]

Although Barre in his speeches makes constant reference to 'scientific

socialism', he has never attempted to discourage religion, in fact, Islam and socialism are presented as being perfectly compatible:

> "If both Islam and socialism advocate justice, equality and the improvement of people's lives, who can tell me where they differ? Where do they contradict one another? What harm is there having the faith of Islam, and at the same time applying socialism as an economic and political system through which our country can progress? I would say there is none" (1977:109).

The argument that Marx and Engels opposed religion is dismissed by claiming that the founders of socialism were not opposed to religion as such, but only the reactionary elements of it, particularly in the capitalist system explored by them.

On the other hand, this does not mean that religious men have had a free hand in their work. Whenever Islam has been invoked to government policies, the State has struck with an iron hand, perhaps best exemplified by the fact that ten sheikhs were executed in 1976 because they had been condemning the new laws establishing equal rights for women and banning polygamy.[9] This was the largest group of people ever to be executed in Somalia until October 1978 when 17 military officers were condemned to death for their participation in the abortive coup d'état in April of the same year.

Islam could hardly have been excluded from the ideology of Somalia's regime, any such move would most likely have triggered off a mass revolt. Nor does Barre try to impose any kind of universal formula of socialist ideology on his people:

> "We do not want our laws to be mere carbon copies of those of other countries. They must be representative of the customs and tradition of the Somali people. They must be such as can be grasped easily by the people and enable them to see what is just and what is not" (1977:35).

It is indeed very difficult to detect any particular 'brand' of socialism in Somalia on the ideological level. The country's close association with the Soviet Union for many years has not resulted in the general implementation of a Soviet model in the country, and Mao Tse-tung's writings have frequently been quoted. Nor have socialist models in other African countries been the subject of much attention, though there are some occasional references to Nasser's policies. If there is any country that has been a source of inspiration it must be, as Lewis (1979) suggests, North Korea. As the President himself has declared, "a good example of people who have tremendously improved their lives are our Korean brothers" (1977:195).

In an article entitled Kim Il-Sung in Somalia, Lewis explores to what extent North Korea has served as an example for Somalia or rather, how Kim Il-Sung has served as an example for Maxamad Siyaad Barre. It is an intriguing article and useful since it attempts to analyze the connection between the ideology of 'scientific socialism' with the reality of the situation. Barre has visited North Korea twice, and many Somali officials have been there on training courses. Lewis points out a number of factors that seem to make North Korea a suitable model for Somalia:

> "the shared military emphasis of the two regimes,... the Korean unification issue...and, crucially, North Korea's remarkable success in maintaining her independence while enjoying both Russian and Chinese patronage" (1979:19-20).

When it comes to Barre himself, it is obvious that he has borrowed many of Kim Il-Sung's (and Mao's) traits in his relation with the masses, creating a personality cult around himself that, although it has been subsiding in the last couple of years, has been a prevailing feature of his regime. Socialism in Somalia is indeed strongly associated with the person

Maxamad Siyaad Barre, and it has even been claimed that few of his closest associates are "either Marxists or even strongly pro-Communist" but support the President more out of "ambition and nationalism than ideology" (Crozier 1975:8). Coupled with this accusation is the indication that although in the original counsels held by the President "a number of socialist ideologues had important roles,...many of these people have since been excluded" (Laitin 1979b:196). Consequently, the formulation and propagation of the official ideology has been very much in the hands of 'Jaalle Siyaad',[10] a man who unquestionably understands his people well and who is an excellent orator. He is careful not to be dogmatic in his speeches, and makes ample use of folklore through traditional tales and proverbs. For instance, in explaining self-reliance, a key element of Somali socialist ideology, Barre has stated:

> "The Somali proverb that 'one can quench thirst only with the use of one's own hands' substantiates the correctness of this proverb which is a vindication of the principle of 'self-reliance'. What the proverb means in everyday language is that one's success is dependent on one's own efforts. The purpose of self-reliance is that it safe-guards the interests of the nation. It brings to surface the intrinsic values of the people and forces them to use their own resources, energy and brains to bring about economic prosperity" (1977:297).

Laitin (1977 and 1979a) in particular has pointed out the importance of the 'semiotic element' in Somalia's socialism, perhaps best reflected in the choice of the Somali word hantiwadaag for socialism,[11] Hantiwadaag literally means wealth- or livestock-sharing, thus identifying socialism with the traditions of pastoralism in Somalia.

Somalia's Socialist Strategy

Having outlined the rhetorical aspects of Somalia's 'scientific

socialism', it is time to look at what it has meant in practice. Ever since the October declaration in 1970, Somalia has officially set out to achieve rapid economic progress, egalitarianism, self-reliance (i.e. disengagement from the dependency on world capitalism), popular control of the means of production, etc., all goals one would expect to find in any socialist programme. In addition, emphasis has been put on solving problems more particular to the Somali situation, such as mass illiteracy, the reunification of Somali territories ('through peaceful means') and lastly, but most importantly, the elimination of tribalism, or more correctly 'clanism', which continues to be regarded as one of the greatest evils of society by the Somali government.

To start with the last, it is quite obvious that 'tribalism', as it is officially referred to, still has a very dominating role in Somalia. Although tribalism was already condemned by the early nationalists of the SYL in the 1950's, made illegal by the first national government, and officially 'buried' in 1971, the present government has hardly tackled the issue. In fact, Barre continues to stress the 'anti-socialist nature' of tribalism in his speeches and, as Lewis (1979) has pointed out, the composition of the Somali cabinet continues to try to preserve a tribal balance of representatives from major clan-families in much the same way as the previous civilian governments,[12] though many Somalis tend to perceive most essential power to be concentrated around three Darood lineages directly related to the President: his father's, his mother's and that of his son-in-law.

Tribalism apart, a better indication of how the government policies have worked out on the practical level, particularly in the context of 'scientific socialism', is a closer examination of the various programmes

that have led Kahsai to maintain that

> "the proper seeds for social, political and economic development have been planted and the harvest of the fruits seems more promising than for most African countries attempting development" (1976:29).

a) Foreign Policy

A country's foreign policy is sometimes taken as an indicator of what direction the country's internal policies are taking, an approach that has its disadvantages, particularly in the Third World where most foreign policies are determined by exterior economic and political factors rather than internal ideologies. Another problem is that all too often, a switch in foreign policies is interpreted as a complete reversal of the existing domestic policies. For instance the expulsion of Soviet advisors from Somalia in November 1977 led one author to conclude that Somalia had moved away from its "previous progressive policies", falling victim to "the machinations and intrigues of the imperialists and Arab reactionary states" (Azad 1978:44,50). Of course, this is an extreme example, from an article written in part for propagandistic purposes, however, and to some extent due to a common and rather restricted two-world vision; it is often assumed that if a country is not aligned with the USSR, it must necessarily be courting the USA, or vice versa.

Ever since independence, Somalia has tried to maintain a non-aligned foreign affairs policy, or a 'positive neutrality' stand, as it was expressed after the Revolution. History has shown that neutrality does not necessarily imply stability in foreign relations, and Somalia is a good example of this. The country has never fared well in the game of diplomacy, and has at times had to pay dearly for it. The strained relations with

neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya during the 1960's and 1970's need no elaboration. The point here is that Somalia has had serious problems in foreign affairs on a more global level as well (cf Laitin 1979b:109-111; Lewis 1965:183ff; Touval 1972:56ff). Already in 1963, the newly independent nation experienced the severance of relations with a country of some importance (later restored), namely Great Britain, and ever since the neutralist road has proved rather bumpy.

On the other hand, Somalia did indeed manage not to align herself too closely with either the 'West' or the 'East', and even if the Soviet Union obviously had a great impact on the country between 1969 and 1977, the Somali regime was careful not to cut off relations with Western countries, particularly EEC countries which Somalia is officially associated with. At the same time, relations with Arab countries were considerably expanded with Somalia's application and admittance to the Arab League in 1974. This move caused a certain unrest among some Somalis who worried that it compromised the country's primary loyalty to fellow Africans, but the President assured that there was no need to worry and that after all "the Arab Revolution acts in favour of unity, development and progress" (quoted in Decraene 1977:143). Needless to say, the regime saw obvious potential for aid from the rich oil-countries,[13] moreover, a large number of Somalis were and still are working in Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, and though it is impossible to measure exactly to what extent, it is clear that the money these Gastarbeitern send home contribute considerably to Somalia's economy. Last, but not least, Somalia's major export markets are in the Middle East. In 1978, for instance, SoSh 575 million worth of goods, or 85% of Somalia's total export value, went to Saudi Arabia alone.

It is also worth mentioning that China has been an important foreign presence in Somalia ever since Chou En-lai's visit in 1964. During the 'Soviet period', the Somali authorities were of course acutely aware of the differences between the USSR and China but, as an official expressed it at the time, they

> "are the greatest socialist republics in the world. We need help from both and we have therefore asked them to abstain from any polemics in Somalia" (quoted in Decraene 1977:134).

Compared to the Soviets, the Chinese certainly have enjoyed more popularity among Somalis as a whole who, in the words of Decraene, "appreciate the modesty, the diligence in work, the discretion, [and] the zeal of the Chinese experts" (1977:134). Although the Russian aid has been larger in absolute terms, the Chinese aid projects have definitely had a more long-lasting and positive impact. It was, for instance, the Chinese, aided by Somali workers, who financed and built the more than 1,000 km long paved highway between Belet Weyn and Burao, thus finally providing a permanent infrastructural link between north and south.[14]

It is here worth mentioning that although it has been claimed that "trade and aid deals between China and the Third World are very similar in the mechanics of their operation to those concluded by the Soviet Union" (Lyons 1978:25), it is clear that in the case of Somalia at least, the USSR had a much firmer grip on the local economy, enabling the superpower to exercise great political demands. For instance, it has been suggested that the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was created in 1976 largely because of Soviet pressure (Decraene 1977:181), and there are some indications that the Soviets were conducting a military-strategic build-up in the country well beyond the concessions given by the Somali regime.

This was exemplified in 1975 when the American Senator Dewey Bartlett had been promised by Siyaad Barre that his US military team could see "all the facilities in Berbera" (Laitin 1979b:100). The Soviets, however, did not agree and denied the Americans entrance to a key area, thus giving rise to the suggestion that the President himself really was not completely aware of what the Soviets were building in their leased military base. As pointed out above, the Soviet Union's ability to have such a free hand in the country was to a large extent due to the control it exercised on Somalia's economy. For instance, in the early seventies, more than half of the Somali external public debt was to the USSR, which also retained "control of Somali supplies of petroleum, oil and lubrication (sic)" (Laitin 1979a:194). Somalia's approachment to the Arab world must partly be seen as an effort to break away from this situation.

The relations with the US had started to deteriorate rapidly shortly after the Revolution. The Peace Corps contingent was expelled from the country three months after Barre took power, and the US became extremely upset when Somalia recognized North Korea and East Germany in April 1970. The following month, President Nixon invoked the Flag Shipping Provisions Act to cut off all aid to Somalia, because Somali ships were regularly bringing supplies to North Vietnam. The Somalis on their hand, suspected CIA-involvement in the May coup-attempt in 1970 led by police chief Jaamac Cali Khorshel, thus increasing the tension between the two countries. Diplomatic relations were maintained, though.

Not being comfortable with the increasingly dominating Soviets, the Somali leaders had attempted a careful reapproachment with the Americans in 1975, following the US's loss of influence in the Horn of Africa after its closest ally, Emperor Haile Selassie, had been overthrown in Ethiopia.

Senator Bartlett's visit was intended as a first step towards the improvement of Somali-American relations; however, "the Berbera incident only contributed to their deterioration" (Decraene 1977:142). But relations with the Soviet Union were also getting worse, particularly since the USSR leaders were courting Colonel Mengistu in their effort to create a Pax Sovietica in the Horn area (cf Haakonsen 1980b:39).

In June 1977, President Carter declared himself ready to sell Somalia "a limited number of defensive weapons" (quoted in Yared 1978:29), but when Somalia engaged directly in the Ogaden war, the State Department decided that "providing arms at this time would add fuel to a fire we are more interested in putting out" (quoted in Laitin 1979b:107). Despite the eviction of Soviet advisors shortly thereafter, the US presence in Somalia did not increase markedly until August 1980 when, after nearly two years of negotiations, the Americans obtained the lease of the Berbera base for the reportedly modest sum of $20 million in addition to increased foreign aid.

Somalia has also sought closer ties with other Western countries in recent years, particularly West Germany which feels a 'moral' commitment to Somalia after having received the full cooperation of the authorities in the raid on the hijacked Lufthansa plane in October 1977, though the Germans have never agreed to supply what the Somali government wants most, namely arms. It is interesting to note in this connection that the turbulent foreign affairs of Somalia since the Revolution have never threatened to destabilize the traditional relations with Italy.

As a whole though, Somalia's policy of 'positive neutrality' seems to have had mostly negative effects. Nevertheless, the country continues

to opt for the "Yugoslav solution" (Davidson 1979), and the reapproachment to the West may not mean a drastic change in the country's policies. It must rather be seen as an obvious consequence of the severance of economic and political ties with the Soviet block. It should also be remembered that relations with North Korea and China continue to be very good, while President Barre never ceases to reaffirm his commitment to socialism because, in his words, "the gains of the Revolution are enough evidence on the correctness of the socialist path" (1978:3).

b) Education and Political Education

While foreign policy is not always a reliable indicator of a country's internal policies, an analysis of the country's education and particularly political education system is often a better method to use in distinguishing between official rhetoric and actual ideological commitment. In socialist systems, general education and political education are expected to go hand in hand, a concept President Barre quite clearly agrees with:

> "The human being cannot realize his aspirations unless he has political foundation on which he can lean on. Education must have sound policies which can act as a foundation for it. Mathematics and geography are knowledge which can be taught, but society needs more than learning various subjects of knowledge. It needs a sound political foundation on which it can build its progress" (1977:121).

At the time of independence, Somalia had a very low level of education. Only a handful of people had been able to acquire any post-secondary education and 99% of the Somalis remained illiterate. The situation had not improved by the time the present regime came to power. 98% of the population continued to be illiterate, and the school population was only

42,000 or less than 5% of the school-age children (Hancock 1978:279). Moreover, education was reserved for a chosen few, since most schools were private.

One of the first goals of the Revolution was to fundamentally transform the educational system. It started with the nationalization of private schools because, in the words of the Minister of Education, "in these schools, the colonialists prepared only cadres useful for their rule" (quoted in Pestalozza 1974:203). This nationalization process was completed in October 1972 when even the embassy schools were taken over by the State, and the objective of linking education with political consciousness were again stressed by the Minister:

> "Students in a socialist society study to make themselves useful to the community...the students in the higher classes [have the task] of revolutionizing the country's education and fulfilling the purposes and the aims of the Revolution, for the achieving of scientific socialism in society" (ibid:206).

The ultimate goal was to make education available to the whole population, particularly through literacy, but here Somalia was facing a very difficult problem: despite being, together with the mini-state Swaziland, the only country in sub-Saharan Africa where practically the whole population speaks the same language, Somalia had no written language of its own. Any Somali who wished to learn how to read and write, had to learn a foreign language, which in most cases meant the old colonial languages Italian and English. The reason this absurd situation persisted into the seventies was that the previous regimes in the country had been unable to decide on which script to choose, a discussion that was cut short when, on the occasion of the 3rd anniversary of the Revolution, the President announced the adoption of the Latin script.[15] Written Somali was henceforth

introduced the following January.

The next problem facing the authorities was how to teach Somalia's population how to read and write in their language. The civil servants were simply given six months to adapt to the new Somali orthography which was to be the only official language, not much of a problem since they already could write either English or Italian, though some only knew Arabic. As far as the rest of the population was concerned, it was to be taught through massive literacy campaigns which started in the urban centres and culminated in 1974 with an unprecedented programme, the Rural Development Campaign "under the guidance of 'If you know, teach; if you do not know, learn'" (Mohamed 1976:96). All schools were closed for eight months, and all pupils and students over the age of twelve were sent out to the countryside to

> "teach the rural people reading and writing, basic civics, hygiene and some modern techniques of animal husbandry... They were equipped with blankets, a folding blackboard and a water-bottle, and were drawing an allowance of 2 Somali Shilling" (ibid:95).

Although it is difficult to assess the exact impact of the campaign, it is quite clear that indeed, it drastically increased literacy in Somalia, perhaps making as much as 60% of the population literate.

In terms of higher education, the Barre regime moved to establish a national university as early as 1970. Previously, there had only been a university institute with two faculties, law and commerce, built "with the by no means disinterested help of the Italians" (Pestalozza 1974:91).[16] In addition, there existed a Teacher's college built in 1963. All in all, Somalia has experienced great progress in the field of education since 1969. School enrollment, for instance, rose from 42,000 to 243,000 in 1978 (Geshekter 1979:28), but whether the schools have developed "in

accordance to socialist principles" and helped "accomplish the goals the nation has set for itself" (Barre 1973:64), is much more difficult to assess.

Political education in Somalia has not been limited to the urban classrooms and the rural blackboards. The Barre regime has used various means to spread its socialist message, particularly through the media and through political posters similar to those seen in China and North Korea. At the same time, it has attempted to integrate political messages with the historical and cultural traditions of the Somali people, a "virtual cultural revolution" in the words of Decraene (1977:116). As Barre does in his speeches, the radio makes ample use of folklore in its broadcasting, and the news may be transmitted almost in poetry form, fittingly so for a people labeled "a nation of bards" (Lewis and Andrzejewski 1964:2).

In January 1972, the government launched the Campaign for Scientific Socialism, to illustrate "the principles of Marxism, the realities of socialist countries, what imperialism and capitalism really are" (Pestalozza 1974:209), and last, but not the least, to eliminate tribalism. Of key importance in the Campaign were the guulwadayaal, or victory pioneers, "the vigilant, the untiring, and the alert" (Barre 1977:307), a sort of people's militia. The guulwadayaal led the iskaa wax u gabso or 'self-help' schemes which resulted in the establishment of political committees on every level of society. Part of iskaa wax u gabso has been the establishment of enclosed arenas in every urban neighbourhood and larger village. They may function as basketball courts or movie theatres, but they primarily serve as 'orientation centres'.

> "Orientation centres with their public-spirited attendants, are intended to provide an approved alternative basis for social and political activities,

> indeed to replace the old lineage structure which the government seeks to destroy. They represent the new nationalism based on friendship and patriotism, not kinship, and should be the nerve centres of the vibrant new revolutionary life" (Lewis 1979:24).

The orientation centres hold weekly political meetings with speeches, music and sometimes dance.

Orientation meetings are also held on a weekly basis at public work places, and special orientation courses are provided for civil servants with the stated aim of producing "honest men with a high sense of duty and unimpeachable morals" (Barre 1973:96). The major courses are held at Camp Hallaane, a former Italian military installation. All graduates and State officials are required three-to-six months courses "of political education, of professional updating and revision, of ideological formation and even paramilitary training" (Pestalozza 1974:95).

All political education in Somalia was directly managed by the President's Office until June of 1976 when the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party was formally constituted with an elected Central Committee of 74 persons, a Politbureau of five and, in the words of the President, with the objective of implementing "scientific socialism, in total union with the principles proclaimed in the first and second charters of the Revolution" (quoted in Decraene 1977:171). Thus, political education became the responsibility of the Party, though in practice it is still directed from the President's Office since the President is also Chairman of the SRSP.

Finally, it is worth noting that political education has not changed much either in character or in content since the expulsion of Soviet advisors. If there has been any change, it must be in rigidity. As pointed

out by Laitin, "Somalis are beginning to feel that they can talk and joke more freely in public places" (1979b:113), the ever-present National Security Service (NSS) people seem less threatening, and in March 1979 the Politbureau of the SRSP decided to "grant full amnesty for all Somalis who have run away from the country on political or other illegal grounds" (Halgan Editorial 1979:2). In addition, about half of the country's 3,000 political prisoners were released.

Whether the intensive political campaigns since 1970 have had any significant effect on the majority of the population is rather doubtful. The individualistic nature and the traditions of a nomadic political system without any real leaders make the Somalis little susceptible to any impositions from above. Only among some young people who have spent most of their formative years under the present regime does one find the 'revolutionary' dedication that is sought for.

c) Social Development

One of the fundamental goals of a socialist society is to achieve equality. In the transitional period, this would mean more equitable distribution of income, equal access to social services, economic security for everybody, and the elimination of the dividing lines between rich and poor. Now, Lewis (1961) has argued that traditional Somali society was essentially egalitarian, and in the previous chapters it has been argued that at least the pastoral sector of the population essentially continued to live in a type of society that can be identified with the Germanic mode of production, i.e., a pre-capitalist society in a traditional phase which still remains basically egalitarian in the sense that there is little or no capital accumulation, no private property, and no strata of the society

which exercised control over the means of production. Consequently, there was an absence of true political leadership; it continued to be acephalous, to use the traditional anthropological jargon.

It must here be pointed out, however, that this 'egalitarianism' has been limited to only one half of the society, namely the men. Women in Somalia have always had to play a subordinate role, a role that was reinforced by Islam and also pre-Islamic traditions that still persist, such as clitoridechtomy and infibulation. Although Somali women have been spared the veil, so common in other Moslem countries, they have had to abide to the Islamic laws of marriage and inheritance. From this point of view, the Somali government took a major step towards improving the conditions of women on January 11th, 1975, when it was announced that

> "as of this date the Somali men and women are equal. They have the same equality, the same rights and the same share of whatever is inherited from their parents" (Barre 1977:3).

Following this law, the Somali Women's Democratic Organization was created, and when the SRSP came into being, many women became members; according to Slottved, as much as 60% of the SRSP membership is composed of women, though only one of them sits in the Central Committee (1979:19). Perhaps the greatest advance for the women's cause in Somalia has been in the field of education: between 1970 and 1978, the proportion of females in primary and secondary schools rose from 20% to 35% (Geshekter 1979:28). On the other hand, the new laws and policies have had a very limited effect for the nomadic women, since these laws are difficult to implement among the constantly moving pastoralists. Although the government is trying to discourage traditional customs like polygamy and the genital mutilation of women, the large majority of the population pays little heed.

But Somalia's social policies go beyond the passing of 'progressive' laws. In the health sector, for instance, there have been some definite improvements. New hospitals have been built, and perhaps more significantly, health centres and infirmaries have been established throughout the countryside. Vaccination campaigns have been carried out with the aim of reaching the whole population, as first exemplified in 1970 during a cholera epidemic, and more explicitly in 1977 when the Somali government in cooperation with the World Health Organization launched an impressive smallpox eradication project, seemingly eliminating the disease not only from Somalia, but the world as a whole (Geshekter 1979:32-33).[17]

Improved health in Somalia is not only dependent on the expansion of medical facilities and services, for many of the most common diseases in the country are a direct consequence of the scarce availability of clean water and poor hygiene. Hence, part of the government's 'basic needs approach' is oriented towards these problems, and efforts have been made to educate particularly sedentarized nomads in the basic rules of sanitation that their mobile lifestyle previously had taken care of (cf ILO 1977:233ff).

All in all, there is yet much to be done in the health sector, but at least there have been some encouraging signs of achievement. For instance, according to Geshekter, the average life expectancy rose from 38 years to 41 years between 1970 and 1977 (1979:28), a modest, but nevertheless significant gain.

Part of the government's social development strategy has been to encourage the so-called self-help schemes which have led, among other projects, to the construction of some of the health centres mentioned above. The aim of <u>iskaa wax u gabso</u> has been to encourage voluntary labour for

the carrying out of "words of collective interest", though "in practice, the State takes a hand by financing or supplying the materials for a certain percentage of the budgeted expenses" (Pestalozza 1974:65). The perhaps most publicized iskaa wax u gabso, "the showpiece of the nation's many effective self-help schemes is the impressive sanddune stabilization project near Merca" (Lewis 1979:27), where the President himself participated in the work.

Linked to the self-help schemes are the Crash Programmes, which were initiated as early as 1970, mainly through the recruitment of unemployed and dispersed people in Muqdisho for a system of labour that "practically no other developing country has resorted to" (Cecchini 1975:129). The Crash Programmes have also been based on 'voluntary' labour and have been utilized principally to clear and cultivate new land, although the Rural Development Campaign, too, originally started as a Crash Programme.

While iskaa wax u gabso and the Crash Programmes have been carried out mainly in the rural areas in order to work towards self-reliance and greater equality between the city and the countryside, efforts have been made to reduce inequality within the city as well, particularly in the public sector. In the first years after independence, civil servants grew to become a very privileged and parasitic group within Somali society, awarding themselves salaries that were disproportionally high compared to the rest of the population and extremely generous in relation to the very questionable work performance. The Revolutionary government, however, set up review boards for evaluating both performance and salaries of the civil servants, with the result that most bureaucrats had their salaries cut so "the gap between their lifestyle and that of others has been reduced" (Laitin 1969a:185).[18]

The above examples of the social commitment of the government have by far been overshadowed by the massive relief operation following the 1972-1974 drought and, more recently, the provisions made for the massive influx of refugees from the war-torn Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The first case will be discussed further in the following chapter, though it should here be mentioned that contrary to Haile Selassie's Ethiopia at the time (cf Selassie 1980), the Somali government made no effort to hide the magnitude of the drought disaster, thus being able to receive essential emergency assistance from various countries. It should also be noted that the full effects of the drought were realized thanks to the Rural Development Campaign which consequently became "a desperate relief operation" (Lewis 1975:1), and although an estimated 20,000 died following the drought, the figures would most certainly have been several times higher had it not been for the government's prompt response.

The Somali authorities reacted in a similar way a few years later, when refugees started streaming in from the Ogaden in ever increasing numbers. Refugee camps, which now number 32, have been built and food and medicines have as far as possible been distributed to the new wave of destitutes. The effect of the refugees on Somalia's social and economic development is impossible to assess at present, but it remains abundantly clear that the catastrophe will have a major impact for years to come. One out of three persons in Somalia today is a refugee, and at least 850,000 were by November 1980 totally dependent on regular food rations for their survival. An immediate effect of the problem has been the reestablishment of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) as the governing body of the country. The SRC was dissolved following the election of a parliament in 1979, but due to the refugees, a state of emergency has been

declared in Somalia.[19]

In sum, Somalia has since the Revolution attempted to pursue a social policy designed to meet the basic needs of its people and to minimize inequalities. Some important social achievements are readily identifiable but, on the other hand, social inequalities have not been reduced markedly, in fact, they may even have increased (cf Swift 1977 and 1979), and there is no question that, in the words of Laitin, "a new military stratum has achieved considerable status and control of resources". Lewis goes even further when, in comparing Somalia with Ethiopia, he suggests that the former's

> "traditional institutions appear to present more refractory and challenging obstacles to radical change than those across the border. It is not too far-fetched to suggest that the direction of transformation from anarchic democracy to a monolithic militarism is actually in the reverse direction, and brings the present power structure in some respects closer to that of the ancien régime in Ethiopia" (1979:42).

In order to put these rather challenging statements more in perspective, though, it is necessary to briefly examine the economic performance of the country in general since 1969.

The Economics of Somalia's Socialism

The ultimate goal of socialism, i.e., communist society, can shortly be described as a system based on the popular control over the means of production. Since advanced communism, or the articulation of the communist mode of production requires a fundamental transformation of any society that exists today, a transitional period is required under which the means of production not necessarily fall under direct popular control. In most cases, this traditional period has been identified with a drastic reduction

of private ownership and the subsequent increase in direct State ownership, sometimes to such an extent as to create capitalism in a new form or 'State capitalism' as it is often referred to.

In most Third World countries that have chosen the socialist road, or at least the non-capitalist path, the first step has usually been the nationalization of certain economic sectors, industries in particular, while allowing and even encouraging small private enterprises. Since the economies of these countries often are structured around the production of one or two commodities for the export markets, the development of a 'mixed economy' is frequently the initial objective. We must here also bear in mind that contrary to advanced Western capitalist systems, African socialist states do not only face the question of a more equitable distribution of wealth, but also the question of creating 'wealth", including basic necessities like food and clothing. Most African countries experienced outright economic recession in terms of real GDP per capita in the years following independence which, besides being a good indication of how little economic independence the new states really had, clearly demonstrates the need for economic growth in these countries after long years of economic enslavement under colonialism and neo-colonialism (Hughes 1970). As Arrighi and Saul have pointed out,

> "A sophisticated socialist case in contemporary Africa must therefore fuse a concern for an increased rate of economic development with a perception of the role played in the development equation by the existence and emergence of classes and groups with differential interests and access to benefits...one does in fact find the productive potential of African societies, and therefore their development and structural transformation, constrained by the present pattern of world and domestic economy and society; the available surplus is ill utilized - drained away as the repatriated profits of overseas firms, or consumed by self-indulgent domestic elites - and the generation of a larger surplus from, for example, an aroused and mobilized peasantry discouraged" (1973:12).

Like so many other African regimes in a similar position, the Somali government has had to face the task of developing its economic potential while trying to free herself from the dependency on the world capitalist system. As mentioned above, self-reliance has been a recurring slogan since the Revolution, and hence a 'mixed economy' has been advocated with the first goal being the achievement of self-sufficience in food. As expressed in the first development plan of the revolutionary government, Somalia's limited resources and lack of technical and administrative personnel has made "the continued existence of a mixed economy, as a transitional stage, inevitable" (quoted in Kaplan et. al. 1977:205). Thus, provisions for having some private and foreign investments were made, and the economy as a whole was to be divided into a public, a private, and a cooperative sector.

The first concrete attempt to implement a new economic strategy of the government, was to expand the public sector in order to make it the leading force. Hence, a number of nationalization measures were implemented, most of them actually before Somalia officially opted for 'scientific socialism'. They started on May 7th, 1970, with the nationalization of foreign banks and insurance companies, the Jowhar sugar refinery, the electric company, and the oil distribution companies.

These measures undoubtedly had beneficial effects on the local economy. As Pestalozza has pointed out, the foreign operated banks and insurance companies were drawing large amounts of foreign exchange out of the country, making little effort to reinvest in Somalia. In the subsequent years, further nationalization measures were announced and by 1975, the State had acquired monopoly over the export of bananas and hides and skins, and the import of most goods. It is here significant to note that the increasingly

dominant livestock export has not been affected by nationalization measures, nor has the small industry, whether Somali or foreign owned, or the predominantly Italian-owned banana plantations.

The private production sector has remained essentially intact, although subjected to somewhat greater scrutiny on the part of the government, and private investments from abroad continue to be encouraged. One of the three principal economic objectives stated by an Extra Ordinary Congress of the SRSP as late as February 1979, was as follows:

> "it is necessary to encourage and appeal to private enterprises to participate actively in the economic development of the country, directing their investment to agricultural and livestock production, fisheries industries, mining, salt manufacturing and in any other sphere that contributes to the development of the national economy and to the general prosperity of the people" (Som. Dem. Rep. 1979d:II).

It must here be remembered that the economic backbone of Somalia remains the pastoral sector, which is still almost 100% private, both on the production and commercial level. It is this sector that has boosted the export economy year after year since the Revolution, actually steadily increasing its share of the export market, both in relative and absolute terms (cf Table IV-1), and it seems to be increasing even further. In 1978, nearly 90% of Somalia's exports came from the pastoral sector, i.e., meat, livestock, hides and skins (Som. Dem. Rep. 1979c), livestock alone accounting for 87%. Bananas, by contrast, only accounted for 8% of the 1978 export value (ibid.). These figures differ significantly from those in the early sixties; in 1961, for instance, livestock accounted for only 36% of the export value, while bananas represented 48% (Konczacki 1978), indicating an almost exponential rise in livestock exports since independence.

TABLE IV-1

Composition of Somalia's Exports 1973-77

(in SoSh millions)

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Livestock	196.7	222.4	328.0	301.9	299.5
Bananas	67.6	79.8	64.3	88.2	53.0
Meat	22.6	35.7	44.1	37.1	32.1
Fish	13.5	15.2	11.6	23.3	21.3
Hides and Skins	13.1	14.1	26.2	44.4	23.6
Myrrh	11.5	10.8	8.0	11.3	11.9
Other	15.4	20.6	21.4	4.1	7.7
Total	340.4	398.6	557.6	510.3	449.0

(Source: Som. Dem. Rep. 1979:36)

As indicated by Swift (1977 and 1979), the export boom has benefited private livestock traders, particularly a small group of them, and despite Somalia's official policy of social equality, the most powerful livestock traders seem largely unaffected. It is not far-fetched to claim that Somalia's export economy is essentially in the hands of a very exclusive and very small group of individuals.

On the other hand, largely because of the increase in livestock exports, Somalia experienced a respectable economic growth in the first years after the Revolution. Between 1970 and 1974 the total real GDP increased an average of 5.4% a year, with the effect that the per capita real product rose by a yearly average of 3.2%, compared to a decrease of 0.4% between 1960 and 1970 (ILO 1977:7).

When Somalia subsequently experienced stagnation in the mid-seventies, this can to a large extent be attributed to the effects of the drought.

As illustrated in Table IV-2, the drought led to a significant decline in the recorded offtake of sheep and goats which by far constitute the largest number of domesticated animals in Somalia (cf also Table IV-1). Another factor that has had a detrimental effect on the country's economy in the last few years (though seldom, if ever referred to officially in this connection) is obviously the war against Ethiopia in 1977/78. The dramatic increase in exports of livestock, from SoSh 299.5 millions worth in 1977 to SoSh. 588.7 millions in 1978, may partly have been deliberately encouraged to cover some of the costs of the war effort.

TABLE IV-2

Recorded Offtake of Sheep and Goats 1970-77

(in thousands)

Year	Exports	Slaughter	Total
1970	1,150	435	1,585
1971	1,184	438	1,622
1972	1,635	348	1,983
1973	1,384	259	1,643
1974	1,257	499	1,756
1975	1,536	454	1,990
1976	766	222	988
1977	881	185	1,066

(Source: Som. Dem. Rep. 1979:30)

Finally, the astronomical numbers of refugees that have been streaming in from Ethiopia in the last two years are bound to have significant economic (and social) repercussions. Many parts of the country have already been experiencing serious food shortages, prices are rising at unprecedented levels, and the government has had to allocate substantial amounts of money

for the refugees. According to the National Commission for Refugees, by July 1980, the Somali Government had already spent SoSh 232 millions to assist the refugees (Nat. Com. for Ref. 1980), a figure equivalent to more than a third of the country's export revenue in 1978.

If we were to summarize Somalia's economy since 1969, the main conclusion must be that the period has been characterized by an increased dependency on the export of livestock, a sector almost totally controlled by private merchants. Although such a development would seem to be quite in contradiction to the ideology of 'scientific socialism', the stated goal of Barre's regime continues to be a socialist society. The principal means to achieve this goal is supposed to be the third sector of the economy, the cooperative sector, stressing, in the words of a high-ranking government official, "the inevitability of cooperatives in a socialist state" (quoted in Pestalozza 1974:155). Nevertheless, this sector still constitutes a very minor part of the total economy, but the fishing settlements for nomads discussed in the following chapter are an example of the development strategy in this sector.

NOTES

[1]The military regime that took power has certainly not done or said anything to suggest such a link. As Lewis explains:

> "Indeed quite the contrary. Far from being a hero, the assassin was swiftly brought to trial, sentenced and executed; and the many allegations of corruption and nepotism which have been so freely applied to their civilian predecessors have most noticeably not been directed at all at the ex-President. He remains an official hero; after all he is dead" (1972:402).

[2]For details, see Decraene 1977, where the two Revolutionary Charters are reproduced in the appendix.

[3]The October Revolution in Somalia was, of course, very different from its namesake in Russia half a century earlier. There was no massive uprising, no violent overthrow of the existing system, and it was not even declared to be socialist until one year after. From every point of view, the military take-over was a coup d'état but, as in similar situations throughout the world, the word 'revolution' was chosen for its more appealing and symbolic power. The term is used throughout this thesis more for practical reasons than to describe the actual situation.

[4]Nyerere, too, has referred to socialism as an attitude. The opening sentences of a speech he gave in 1962 are evidence of this:

> "Socialism - like democracy - is an attitude of mind. In a socialist society it is the socialist attitude of mind, and not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is needed to ensure that the people care for each other's welfare" (1964:238).

Similarly, Tom M'Boya declared:

> "When I talk of 'African Socialism" I refer to those proved codes of conduct in the African societies... I refer to universal charity which characterized our societies and I refer to the African's thought process and cosmological ideas which regard man, not as a social means, but as an end and entity in the society" (1964:251).

[5]In the Somali context, Luigi Pestalozza may be described as a representative of this tendency (cf Pestalozza 1974).

[6]It should be mentioned, however, that Davidson has since taken a less fervent attitude, though without questioning the earnestness of Somali socialism (cf Davidson 1979).

[7]The regimes referred to by Jowitt include Guinea, Congo, Benin, Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, and Ethiopia.

[8]'Tribalism' has a somewhat ambiguous meaning in Somalia. On the one hand, it refers to the 'pre-revolutionary stage' of socio-economic formation in Somalia, the traditional pastoral society as discussed in Chapter II above. On the other hand, it refers to factionalism generated by the segmentary lineage system, though the more correct designation in this case would be 'clanism'.

[9]Sheikh in Somalia does not indicate a political position of any kind, it has purely religious connotations and can be translated as religious man or priest.

[10]Jaalle, lit. playmate or team-member, is the word adopted for 'comrade' and the official form of address. Thus, most official speeches start with Jaalleyaal! - comrades! The form is seldom used in the daily form of address, though, and some people - and not necessarily opponents of the regime - can occasionally be upset if addressed this way. "Don't you jaalle me!" is not an uncommon response in such cases.

[11]Incidentally, the term hantiwadaag in connection with socialism is of relative early origin. As Lewis has pointed out, it "was invented by announcers on the British Broadcasting Corporation Somali programme in the late 1950's to refer to communism" (1979:16).

[12]This is even reflected on the very top of the government hierarchy: the President, a Darood, is joined by 1st Vice-President Kulmie, a Haawiye, 2nd Vice-President Samatar, a Tuumal or one of the traditional 'sub-castes' (cf Chapter II), and finally 3rd Vice-President Abokor, an Ishaaq.

[13]Already the year following the country's admittance to the League, Somalia received $73 million in bilateral aid from various Arab OPEC states (Laitin 1979b:103).

[14]Much of the Soviet aid was, of course, in the form of arms and just before the exodus of the Soviet contingent in Somalia, the Somali army was considered to be one of the most modern and best equipped in Africa. At least 1,500 of the more than 3,000 Soviet advisors in the country are believed to have been military experts, and in the nearly 15 years of Soviet aid to Somalia, $250 million went to the military (Lyon 1978:10). Some of the USSR's allies also contributed considerably; East Germany, for instance, trained the National Security Service (NSS) and part of the Police, while Cuban advisors helped the military training. Ironically, the Cubans may even have trained guerillas of the Western Somali Liberation Front (ibid:11), the very same people Cuban troops currently are fighting in the Ogaden.

When it comes to civilian projects, the Soviets were less successful and at times made serious mistakes. For instance, in resettling the drought-stricken nomads to agricultural settlements, the site selected by the Soviet advisors for the largest group of 50,000, proved to be unutilizable already after a couple of years due to salination, and the whole scheme had to be moved further south (cf Slottved 1980:229). Moreover, the Soviet advisors were extremely unpopular on a personal level at times, causing a reluctancy "to implement certain projects, as if to 'get back' at certain dogmatic and arrogant Russians" (Laitin 1976:58). (I have been able to observe a similar attitude towards USAID workers in Somalia during my last visit there.) In addition,

> "the petty traders were disappointed that thousands of Russians saved their petty cash to exploit the Arab-dominated gold market, rather than lubricate the local economy. The factory managers were often in conflict with their Soviet advisors, accusing them of holding back production" (Laitin 1979b:99).

[15]The dispute had been over three different scripts: Latin, Arabic and 'Osmanya'. Latin was favoured by most of the intelligentsia because of its technical advantage; Arabic had the support from the more religious strata of the population, particularly the teachers of Koranic schools; 'Osmanya', named after its inventor Cusmaan Yuusuf Keenadiid (Osman Yusuf Kenadid), had the support of the ultranationalist since it was a purely Somali script. Unfortunately, it was also strongly associated with a particular clan, making other clans hostile to it. (cf Laitin 1977:84ff).

Whatever the future of Siyaad Barre and his regime may be, it is clear that the introduction of written Somali constitutes a landmark which will always be remembered.

[16]With the exception of the Faculty of Education, which is taught in English, Italian is still the medium of instruction in all faculties of the Somalia National University.

[17]The last recorded instance of smallpox in the world was registered in Somalia on October 26th, 1977. The WHO has since declared the complete eradication of the disease, although smallpox vaccination is still mandatory in several countries, Somalia included.

[18]The government also went as far as 'freezing' civil servants' salaries, and it was only in October 1980 that these salaries were allowed to augment. With a very high inflation rate in the late seventies, it seems that this freeze has had the unfortunate effect of increasing the instances of corruption in the public sector.

[19]For details on the refugee problem, see Greenfield 1979; Haakonsen, 1980b; Somalia Information no. 1 1980; UNESCO 1980.

CHAPTER V

THE FISHING COOPERATIVES FOR RESETTLED NOMADS

"Cooperation and cooperatives seem to be a very complicated matter to discuss", writes Widstrand (1970:11), a leading authority on cooperative movements. Indeed it is. There is no single definition of the word cooperative; moreover, since cooperatives always are linked to political systems, the word has strong ideological connotations. In the African context, the concept of cooperatives was widely applied in the period just after independence. African countries that tried to free themselves from the strong economic constraints imposed by their former colonial masters, in particular those countries that early attempted to develop their societies on an egalitarian basis within a socialist framework as opposed to the capitalist system that had been forced upon them in colonial times, embraced the cooperative idea with enthusiasm. Cooperatives were seen as a means to develop Africa from inside, an opportunity to build upon traditional systems of cooperation, and lastly to provide employment for the rapidly growing populations by creating labour intensive production rather than relying on the expensive technologies of the industrialized world which invariably would increase Africa's dependency on the West.

It soon became evident that cooperatives alone would not be the answer

to the needs of Africa's emerging nations. Most cooperative movements ran into unforeseen problems, problems that to some extent were rooted in conditions peculiar to each society in question, but which also had a number of common denominators. A major one was the lack of adequate planning of the cooperative systems themselves, bringing us back to the question of what a cooperative is or is supposed to be.

Widstrand identifies three principal categories of cooperatives: consumer, marketing, and producer cooperatives (1970:12). The first category is probably the one that is best known in the West, while marketing cooperatives were the type most commonly introduced in Africa, at least in the initial stages, and mostly through governmental decrees. The failure of many of the marketing cooperatives was to a large extent caused by the lack of integration between marketing and production. As Saul (1970) suggests, in the final instance, effective marketing cooperatives would seem to have to be based on effective producer cooperatives.

A very well known attempt to create cooperatives which would link production with marketing, is the Ujaama-village in Tanzania, though it remains somewhat of a special case since it is so ideologically based "on an appeal to tradition" (Cliffe 1970:39). What is interesting for our purposes, however, is that the Ujaama-village, as well as other cooperative systems in East Africa, have shown that just the establishment of producer/marketing cooperatives is not enough to ensure the creation of an efficient and economically sound system. Basing himself on such studies, Hydén (1970) has identified a number of socio-political restraints that may hinder or constrain such a cooperative: the prevalance of 'vertical' ties of social obligation (e.g. kinship, regionalism) rather than 'horizontal' ties of economic interest; the use of the cooperative by certain members to fight

for personal political interests; limited 'voluntarism' in the membership; insufficient or inadequate cooperative education; the emergence of entrepreneurial middlemen which the cooperatives may become dependent on; exaggerated control by governmental agencies; and bureaucratization of the cooperatives themselves.

Against this brief and necessarily non-comprehensive background, it is time to look at the structure and development of the cooperatives in Somalia, the economic sector which is supposed to eventually make the country as a whole a socialist society.

Cooperative Development in Somalia

Cooperatives existed in Somalia well before the Revolution, though they were essentially cooperatives only in name or "fake cooperatives" in the words of Pestalozza (1974:200). These 'cooperatives' which were organized shortly after independence, were limited to some agricultural districts, the crops grown were largely maize, sesame and pulses, and the cooperatives had more the characteristics of landowner associations than anything else.[1] As pointed out in a Somali government booklet:

> "The structure of the so-called agricultural cooperatives formed at the time was more a 'corporations" (sic) than true cooperatives working for the social and economic betterment of their members. Most of the so-called agricultural cooperatives had closed membership rights framed by them. The majority of the small farmers were outside these organizations while, on the other hand, some were drawn as wage earners but not as members" (Som. Dem. Rep. 1974a:23).

Despite the fact that Siyaad Barre and his regime early emphasized the importance of establishing cooperatives to achieve a socialist economy, it was not until October 4th, 1973 that an initiative was made to develop the

cooperative sector. On this date, Law no. 40 on Cooperative Development was promulgated with the following aim: "together with the State sector, the Cooperative sector shall be the basis of the future socialist pattern of the economy of the SDR" (quoted in Iqbal 1980:39).

Although the law was to encompass industries, handicrafts, fisheries, and retail trade as well as agriculture, it was only in this last sector that cooperatives were to play a relatively significant role. The law provided a very detailed organizational plan on cooperative organization in agriculture according to which there were to be three types of agricultural cooperatives: 'Multipurpose cooperatives', 'Group farming' and 'Production cooperatives'. The latter were to represent the final stage in the evolution of the agricultural cooperatives, a stage where "farmers consolidate their holdings into economic units or acquire new land to be cultivated collectively" (Som. Dem. Rep. 1974a:23). Though it has never been stated explicitly by Somali authorities, the structure of these 'production cooperatives' is quite reminiscent of and probably modelled after the collective farms in the Soviet Union where all acreage except for relatively small plots for private use are farmed collectively with the use of modern agricultural machineries. In the Somali case, the maximum allowed private land in the cooperatives is 1.2 acres (0.49 hectar) of rainfed and 0.5 acre (0.2 hectar) of irrigated land for each household.

Despite initial difficulties, the number of agricultural cooperatives that have been established since 1974 has increased significantly, and by 1980, 80,546 hectars of cultivated land were reportedly under the control of cooperatives (Iqbal 1980:9).[3] Similarly, the number of cooperatives in other sectors has increased considerably, as illustrated in Table V-1.

TABLE V-1

Cooperatives in Somalia

Sector	Cooperatives	Membership
Agriculture	315	34,187
Fisheries	19	2,443
Consumer	28	420
Handicrafts	17	6,450
Livestock and Forestry	16	8,150
Construction and Transport	8	2,300

(Source: Iqbal 1980:9)

It was particularly the establishment of the SRSP in 1976 that led to a greater emphasis on cooperative development, and the Party's Central Committee has determined the course of the cooperative movement as a whole. It was for instance the Central Committee that proposed the establishment of the Union of Somali Cooperative Movements (USCM) in 1978. The following year, the Cooperative Law of 1973 was amended through a new law (Law no. 9 of 1979) to make the USCM "an autonomous Socio-Economic Organization having legal entity" (Som. Dem. Rep. 1979a:A-1). This essentially means that the USCM is to take over control over all the cooperatives from the various ministries. Although the USCM is still very much in its formative stage, it already administers some of the cooperative sectors which are divided into six major organizations:

1. Organization of Agricultural Cooperatives
2. Organization of Fisheries Cooperatives
3. Organization of Livestock, Forestry and Incense Cooperatives
4. Organization of Building and Transport Cooperatives
5. Organization of Industrial Handicrafts Cooperatives
6. Organization of Consumer and Service Cooperatives

As it can be deduced, the Somali government and the SRSP in particular places great emphasis on the cooperatives as a means to achieve self-reliance and socialism, but so far only a limited segment of the population is part of the cooperative sector and most of them but in name. Moreover, almost all of the cooperatives are made up of the sedentary minority of the population which is also the least productive in terms of Gross Domestic Product. The most important sector of the economy, the pastoral sector, is only marginally involved in the cooperative movement. Although 12 livestock cooperatives exist, all in the Are Gawa district and are still administered by the National Range Agency (NRA), they have so far met with little success.[3]

Background to the Resettlement

In the long run, the stated goal of the Somali government has been to sedentarize most if not all of its nomadic population and make it part of the cooperative economy, but in the first few years after the Revolution there were few attempts to implement this goal. The nomadic or pastoral sector is, as we have seen, the backbone of the Somali economy and mass sedentarization at this point would amount to economic suicide. Why then sedentarize the nomads? The official government position is that only through sedentarization will the nomads be able to benefit fully from the social services like education and health services, and it is frequently pointed out that nomadic life is precarious and dangerous and that both animals and people are liable to suffer severely from the periodical droughts that seem to affect most of the country at least every four or five years. A typical expression of these sentiments is a statement made in 1975 by the chairman of the Relief Committee when it was decided to resettle

thousands of drought-stricken nomads to agriculture and fishing communities:

> "We want to free these people from this vicious drought which has become an almost chronic disease in their life. We want to give them a new and better life" (quoted in Mohamed 1976:104).

Indeed the drought reflected the precariousness of nomadic life in Somalia. An estimated 20,000 people died as a consequence, a figure that certainly would have been higher were it not for the government's spontaneous and impressive relief programme. The death toll among animals was even higher (cf Table V-2), and as a consequence a large number of families lost their entire stock. By May 1975, there were 270,000 people in relief camps, while 500,000 more were receiving food outside camps. It has been estimated that at one point 1.2 million Somalis were dependent on food from the government in order to survive (Kaplan et. al. 1977:242).

TABLE V-2

Estimated Animal Losses During the 1973-75 Drought

Species	# perished	% of total
Camels	300,000	6%
Cattle	1,000,000	25%
Goats and Sheep	5,000,000	20%

(Source: Som. Dem. Rep. 1979d:30)

It is here significant to note that although the drought in 1973-75 was unusually severe and long-lasting, the high death toll for both humans and animals also reflected the great changes that have been taking place in the pastoral sector of Somalia, with increased commercialization and less reliance on the traditional subsistence pattern in animal herding.

Writes Swift:

> "There are fewer animals available to fuel the traditional networks of animal loans and gifts by which social relations are created and maintained between individual pastoral households, and there is a smaller margin of animals above subsistence needs held within the pastoral economy as insurance against future disasters. Pastoralists become more dependent on their marketed animals for everyday food" (1979:455).

In any case, the effects of the drought provided the Somali government, albeit somewhat impromptu, with the opportunity to put some of its theories to practice. The destitute nomads were going to be resettled into 'true' socialist communities, thus bypassing all the "stages" of economic formation that are based upon the exploitation of man by man. The settlement programme was not just an emergency measure designed to alleviate pressure in the already overcrowded relief camps, nor was it simply a matter of airlifting a large group of people from one end of the country to another. The whole programme soon became an integral part of Somalia's wider development strategy, particularly as a vehicle towards the achievement of the goals of diversifying the economy and becoming more self-reliant.

Originally the plan called for the resettlement of 300,000 nomads, but the figure was eventually lowered to 120,000. The nomads were given the option of being resettled to either agricultural cooperatives or fishing cooperatives. 15,000 opted for the fisheries, a perhaps surprisingly high figure in view of the nomads' very limited respect for fishing as an activity and their unfamiliarity with the sea. Indeed, it has often been observed that Somalis in general, and Somali nomads in particular, have shown a distaste for fish and a scorn for fishermen. Already over a hundred years ago, the controversial explorer Richard Burton

reported that "'speak not to me with that mouth that eateth fish' is a favourite insult among the Bedouin" (1966:110).[4] He also noted with apparent puzzlement that the Somalis despised "the excellent fish with which Nature so plentiful stocked their seas" (ibid.). This attitude has not changed significantly over the century that has elapsed since Burton made his observation. The Somali aversion to fish has been readily noticeable to any foreigner who takes the time to study the culture and customs of the Somali people, and although 'aversion' may be a "misnomer", as Barkhadle suggests (1976c), it remains abundantly clear that the majority of the Somalis, and the nomads in particular, seldom or never make use of any fish-products.

Reluctance or downright refusal to eat fish is not religiously rooted, as some people tend to believe, for fish has always been regarded as 'clean' food in the Islamic tradition. The dislike for fish rather reflects the pastoralist heritage of the Somali people. With few exceptions, nomadic pastoralists all over the world have very little regard for either fish or fishermen, something anthropologists have attempted to explain in a number of ways, from simple culturological explanations to more complicated cognitive and symbolic interpretations. It is not our intention to contribute to this debate here, but merely to illustrate that the transition from nomadic pastoralism to sedentary fishing in Somalia represents not only a transition from one economic activity to another, but also a fundamental change in societal values. In addition, it represents an attempt to take advantage of a previously underexploited natural resource in a country remarkably poor in such resources.

The Non-Utilization of Somalia's Fishery Resources in the Past

Despite the country's 3,200 km long coasts, fishing has occupied a very marginal role in Somalia's history. The fishery resources and production potentials are still poorly known, but it is evident that the sea-products have always been exploited far below their potential.

The proportion of people engaged in fishing in Somalia has never exceeded 1 percent of the total population, and only a fraction of them can be described as full-time fishermen, most of them traditionally located in the Bajuun islands in the very south of the country where people never had a pastoralist background (see Grottanelli 1955).[5] Others, however, have had ancestors that were indeed nomads at one time or another, and their settlements are scattered all along the coast, particularly in the north and north-east. Thus, not all Somalis have always despised fish. Paulitschke, for instance, in his monumental ethnographic work written at the end of the last century, reported that while for the Somalis of the interior it was considered "a great shame to eat fishmeat", the ones along the coast would consume it, albeit "seldom" (1967a:155). He also noted that some catches made by Somali fishermen were used strictly for "industrial purposes", especially seals and turtles, which would be exported to Zanzibar after being processed (ibid:233).

In the colonial period, there was little - if any - progress in Somalia's fishery sector. The British showed no interest in fishing whatsoever, being principally interested in securing a steady meat supply to their garrison in Aden. Italy, on the other hand, made several attempts to establish a fishery industry but, like so many of her enter-

prises in Somalia, it failed miserably. As a colonial official in the early colonial period commented:

> "Whoever thought, on the basis of empirical observation of the abundance of fish [in Somali waters], that there is nothing to do but to collect it in quantities to make a profit, would easily encounter failure and delusion" (Vinciguerra 1919:511).

The fascists later tried to revive the interest for setting up a fishing industry in Somalia; but Italian officials who were sent to evaluate the feasibility of such a plan seemed unable to agree whether this would be profitable or not. Francolini (1930) and Isna (1930) were quite enthusiastic in their reports, while people like Bertoni (1926), Carniglia (1930) and Corni (1931) were much more reserved. Nevertheless, three tuna canneries were built on the Gulf of Aden in the mid-thirties, and their moderate output did not prevent the launching of an incredibly ambitious fishery development plan at the outbreak of World War II which included a projected acquarium in Muqdisho to be built after Italy's "certain victory" as part of the first hydrobiological station in tropical Africa (Cocchia 1941:926 and 925). Needless to say, these plans never materialized, and when the Italians returned to Somalia in the Trusteeship period, plans for the development of the fishery sector were much more modest. Concretely, they essentially only led to some fishery surveys (cf Ogilvie et. al. 1954; Johnson 1956), the revival through private management of the canneries in Kandala and Habo, and the establishment of a Maritime and Fishery School in Muqdisho.

After independence, fishing was given very low priority. The old canneries on the Gulf of Aden closed down and were replaced by a new cannery built with Soviet aid in Las Khorex. At the time of the Revolution,

this plant represented one of the two "sole instances of animal-based processing units" in Somalia,[6] as pointed out by Pestalozza (1974:39), who also comments that it did little to help the country's aims of reaching self-sufficiency in food since all the finished products were exported. Somalia, together with Iran, still had the lowest per capita consumption (0.4 kg/a) of all the countries bordering on the Indian Ocean (Tussing et. al. 1974:3).

It was not until the Five Year Development Programme 1974-79 was drafted that a major effort to develop the fishery sector was finally initiated. For the first time, "Fisheries" appeared as a separate rubric on a Somali development budget, actually listed as a priority sector (cf Som. Dem. Rep. 1974b). Among the immediate effects of this new government orientation was the establishment of SOMALFISH and the creation of several artisanal fishing cooperatives. At the time of implementation of the development programme, however, no one had yet conceived the possibility of resettling nomads into fishing cooperatives. But events beyond the control of man would soon make a reality of this apparently farfetched idea.

The Creation of Danwadaagta Kalluumeysatada - The Fishing Settlement

Three locations were chosen as sites for fishing cooperatives: Baraawe, Cadale, and Badey (Eyl).[7] In 1977, a group of fishermen from the Baraawe cooperative were removed to Ceel Axmed near Marka in order to establish a fourth fishing cooperative, while in 1980, 1,120 additional nomads were settled in Badey. Baraawe was the first one to be chosen in light of its infrastructure and established business community (Som. Dem. Rep. 1976:17); Cadale also had a fishing tradition, although it was chosen

only at the last moment as a substitute for Garacaad after conditions here were "found to be unsuitable for the pioneering settlers" (Barkhadle 1976b:21); finally, Badey became the choice for the relocation of nomads from the Kulmis relief camp near the township of Eyl, simply because of the close proximity (Barkhadle 1976c:21-22).

The initial problems were enormous. None of the sites chosen had the infrastructure needed to accommodate the mass influx of people. Housing was lacking and so were adequate social installations such as medical and educational facilities. Moreover, the infrastructure needed for the fisheries, i.e., boats, processing plants, mechanical shops, fishing equipment, etc., had to be provided, and lastly, there was a need for training into all aspects of fishing and seamanship. Food for the time being was going to be supplied by the World Food Programme, as it is still at present.

The first challenges the administration of the cooperatives were faced with, however, had nothing to do with the above. They may be described as problems of sedentarization. Writes Barkhadle:

> "[A] difficult problem in the enculturation of nomads is toilet training. The nomads were used to roam about the vast rural areas in which they used to live and they were not accustomed to live in so small and fixed an area for more than two months at a time. Moreover, since these rural areas are usually sparsely populated, the nomad is used to disappear behind a bush whenever he is obliged to answer the call of nature but never twice in the same spot. The use of a fixed latrine is therefore very abhorrent to a nomad, while sharing the same latrine by both sexes is absolutely unthinkable to him" (1976a:26).

This problem constituted a serious health hazard, not only because of the obvious risk that epidemic diseases may appear under such conditions, but also because human feces are among the principal sources of parasitical

illnesses such as anchylostemiasis, strongyloidiasis, ascaridis, and ossuriasis. As pointed out elsewhere (Haakonsen 1979), these diseases are still among the most common ones in the fishing cooperatives, although considerable improvements have occurred since the nomads first arrived.

Another problem initially, "by far the most difficult and serious one ever faced by the administrative authorities" (Barkhadle 1976a:26), was created by the decision to arrange collective cooking for the families in each Xubin (cf Figure I). Totally in opposition to the traditional customs of the nomads, this arrangement led to the largest, albeit temporary, exodus from the Baraawe cooperative.

When it came to building facilities for fishing, as well as equiping the new fishermen with tools and boats, the Somali government had to rely heavily on foreign assistance. Financial aid for the fishing cooperatives was provided by Sweden, Italy, and particularly the Soviet Union which was also to provide most of the boats and fishing equipment.[8] The Soviets were also to assist in the organization of the cooperatives as a whole and provide the basic training for the resettled nomads. As demonstrated in the preceeding pages, Somalia's historical experience in fishing is extremely limited, thus the Somalis themselves could contribute little to this sector. It should be mentioned, though, that a number of local professional fishermen were hired by the cooperatives to provide some of the basic training to their new colleagues, and many of them are still making indispensable contributions today.

As is often the case with development aid in the Third World, the foreign assistance to the cooperatives was not always in line with local needs and conditions. The Swedish grant, for instance, was tied to the

FIGURE I

THE BEEL-BULSHO-BIRJEEX-CUDUD-XUBIN SYSTEM



In addition a number of committees are part of this system.

* Madax = "headman"
** Qooys = families

purchase of Swedish fishing boats. Far too small and fragile for the rough Indian Ocean and totally inadequate for the fishing methods employed by the Somali fishermen, the boats rapidly become quite unusable, sometimes in a matter of two or three months. In 1980, out of a total of 41 Swedish boats donated to the fishing cooperatives, only 6 were still in operational condition. The statistics for the specially purchased Yanmar boats from Kenya, were even more appalling: only two were still functioning out of an initial total of 33 (cf Table V-3).

When it comes to training, this has been rather limited. The Soviet fishing experts originally in charge did not do a very satisfactory job, and although most of the resettled nomads have learned how to swim and to mend fish nets, these skills have for the most part been taught by local Somalis. The results of training the nomads in the art of fishing, on the other hand, have left more to be desired. One of the principal reasons seems to be that the Soviet experts never joined their trainees out on the fishing grounds.

But perhaps the greatest obstacle to a smooth and successful operation of the fishing cooperatives, can be traced to the overall organization of the cooperatives themselves.

The Cooperative Structure

The members of the cooperatives are organized into the Beel-Bulsho-Birjeex-Cudud-Xubin system (henceforth referred to as the Beel-system; cf Figure I), a system based on family units incorporated into five different levels. Each unit has an elected madax or 'headman' whose importance increases according to the number of units he is responsible for.

TABLE V-3

Motorized Boats

	TOTAL			BARAAWE			CADALE			BADEY			CEEL AXMED*		
Boat (Engine)	total	w	nw	total	w	nw	total	w	nw	total	w	nw	total	w	nw
Russian (Doron)	78	14	64	24	0	24	26	0	26	18	4	14	10	10	0
Swedish (Volvo-Penta)	41	6	35	13	1	12	18	2	16	4	1	3	6	2	4
Kenyan (Yanmar)	33	2	31	12	0	12	14	2	12	7	0	7	-	-	-
Kenyan canoes	14	0	14	9	0	9	2	0	2	-	-	-	3	0	3
Greek (Petter)	9	1	8	3	0	3	3	0	3	2	0	2	1	1	0
Italian	2	0	2	1	0	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0	1
Sri Lankan (Yanmar)#	56	55	1	14	14	0	15	14	1	12	12	0	15	15	0
Somali (Lister)	1	0	1	-	-	-	1	0	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	234	78	156	76	15	61	79	18	61	43	17	26	36	28	8
% Operational	33.3%			19.7%			22.8%			39.5%			77.8%		

w: in working condition
nw: not in working condition

* The high percentage of boats in working condition in Ceel Axmed is due to the fact that a team of British mechanics have just replaced the engines of some of the Russian, Greek, and Sri Lankan boats.

Most of the Sri Lankan boats are less than a year old.

This system first came into effect in the relief camps before the resettlement, partly as a means of ensuring a just and effective distribution of food, rations, and medicines. Both the agricultural and fishing cooperatives retain this system, in the latter's case members of the three largest cooperatives are organized into three beel each, although the number of families do not always coincide with the 'ideal' total of 400 (cf Table V-4).

Each madax has relatively little influence on the administration of the cooperatives and limited responsibilities as far as decision-making goes. Their duty is primarily to represent the voices of their respective units, to insure that rations are distributed properly, and to report to the administration on any demographic changes that may occur in their units through births and deaths. The actual daily running of the cooperative is still conducted by a team of civil servants appointed by the Mashruuca Horuumarinta Xeebaha (Coastal Development Project), a branch of the Ministry of Fisheries. The administrative positions are as follows:

- President
- Secretary/Vice-president
- Head of Cooperative Staff
- Administrator/Accountant
- Head of Marina
- Head of Processing Plant
- Head of Transportation
- Head of Construction

Somalia's limited experience with fishing is unfortunately reflected in the qualifications of the members of the administrative staff. A few of them have undergone training at the National Fisheries and Marine Institute in Muqdisho, but most administrators have no previous experience in either fishing, seamanship, or cooperative management. This, of course, is a major drawback which is further aggravated by the high turnover rate

TABLE V-4

Population According to Age and Sex

		Families	0-5	6-14	15-50	51+	Total	%	% increase since 1978
BARAAWE	Men		295	1,310	946	138	2,689	51.8	
	Women		265	940	1,146	161	2,507	48.2	
	Total	1,174	560	2,250	2,087	299	5,196	100.0	- .6*
CADALE	Men		331	1,062	1,490	34	2,917	54.5	
	Women		307	829	1,272	27	2,435	45.5	
	Total	936	638	1,891	2,762	61	5,352	100.0	+ 6.1
BADEY	Men		235	1,446	500	134	2,315	53.7	
	Women		213	970	696	118	1,997	46.3	
	Total	750¢	448	2,416	1,196	252	4,312#	100.0	+ 51.3
C. AXMED	Men		33	78	161	5	277	53.7	
	Women		28	58	151	2	239	46.3	
	Total	114	61	136	312	7	516	100.0	+303.1*
Grand Total		2,974	1,707	6,693	6,357	619	15,376	---	+ 16.3

* The figure is affected by the gradual relocation of some families from Baraawe to Ceel Axmed.

¢ Estimated.

The population increased drastically with the arrival of new nomads in June 1980.

N.B. Cadale age-groups differ slightly: 0-6 and 7-14

of administrators. It is not uncommon that an administrator will work in one particular cooperative for only a few months before being transferred to another one or back to the central office in Muqdisho, making it extremely difficult for the administrator to get acquainted with his job or to get the necessary confidence from the members of the cooperative.

This last point is extremely important. Whether we are talking about Africa or Europe, a community of people will always regard 'outsiders' with suspicion, not the least if the 'outsider' is put in a position where he can make decisions over the heads of the members of the community in question. A professional manager of a cooperative in particular must as far as possible seek to overcome this obstacle, he must become part of the system, not direct it from above. As pointed out in FAO's Manual on Fishermen's Cooperatives:

> "Whatever the aims of the members of a cooperative, it is certain that the adoption of the cooperative type of enterprise entails delicate problems, particularly if the marketing of fisheries products is involved. Although it is the preeminent form of democratic management, cooperative is not always easy to harmonize with business requirements. When this can be achieved cooperation leads to excellent results; otherwise it is a failure" (1971:1).[9]

In the long run, the best solution would be to have the members of the cooperatives themselves assume the administrative positions, except perhaps the more specialized ones like that of the accountant or the head of the processing plant. Today, the resettled nomads hold but a handful of the positions in the administration, though many of them have acquired skills and experience in fishing that often exceed those of the appointed administrators. Such a transfer of responsibilities, however, must be contingent on proper training and education in cooperative management (cf Hydén above).

The present cooperative structure cannot be said to be the most suitable system for efficient operation in the future. As mentioned above, the Beel-system was introduced as a means of ensuring proper distribution of rations, a role which in the long run should become outplayed. The motives for establishing the system thus had little to do with the fishing activity itself.

However, a fishing cooperative must necessarily be based precisely on fishing, an activity which on the one hand is based on the environment, i.e., its resources, weather conditions, seasonal variables, etc., and on the other hand on the interaction with the environment, i.e., the strategy for extracting the resources. Other activities in the cooperative, such as processing, transportation, maintenance, construction, etc., are secondary, since they all, directly or indirectly, depend on the success or failures of fishing. The Beel-system is too far removed from the realities of production to allow efficient operation within the various occupational units of the fishing cooperative, particularly as far as the fishing itself is concerned.

A cooperative structure centred around the fishing unit would, almost par consequence, allow more responsibility to be put on the individuals directly engaged in the activity, with several implications. For instance, this would mean that each crew would be held responsible for lost or damaged fishing gear, as opposed to the fishing cooperative as a whole, as the case is at present. Not only would this ensure proper care and handling of the gear, such a fundamental requirement in professional fishing, it would also fit in well with the traditional disposition of the Somali nomad. The individuality and self-determination of Somali nomads is often emphasized both by the Somalis themselves and in the literature written

on them. As Lewis points out,

> "Few writers have failed to notice the formidable pride of the Somali nomad, his extraordinary sense of superiority, and his firm conviction that he is the sole master of his actions except that of God" (1961:1).

It should at the same time be remembered that this traditional individualism has not stood in the way of cooperation among Somali nomads in their activities as pastoralists, thus, as also Barkhadle notes (1976c: 37-43), it is a question of integrating traditional values into a modern system.

It should also be remarked that the Beel-system contributes to unnecessary bureaucratization of the cooperatives, one of the dangers Hydén warns about (cf p. 13). Although having limited decision-making power, the madax on every level is nevertheless entrusted daily duties which can take up considerable time, particularly on the Beel and Bulsho levels. In fact, the Beeldajiye and the Bulshawade must almost be considered full-time bureaucrats.

One cannot leave the discussion of the cooperative structure without pointing out a problem caused by apparent shortsightedness at the planning stage of the resettlement programme, namely the size of the cooperatives. The three largest ones are simply too large to be supported through artisanal fishing. Even with motorized boats, the area in which one fishes should seldom be more than two-three hours away from the base due to the hot temperatures which accelerate the deterioration process of an already very perishable food resource. Consequently, the fishing grounds around each cooperative can only provide fish for a relative small number of fishermen. Elsewhere (1979:12-16) I have tried to illustrate the economic impossibility

of achieving self-sufficiency in an artisanal fishing cooperative of several thousand individuals, like the case is for Baraawe, Cadale, and Badey. Based on information gathered in Ceel Axmed and Badey, the two smallest cooperatives, it became evident that a cooperative with a population of a few hundred people had all the potentials of not only becoming self-reliant, but provide the cooperative with a comfortable profit as well.[10]

It now remains to be discussed how the whole system may fit into the goals of creating a socialist society in Somalia, and indeed to assess whether the fishing cooperatives may serve as an example or even an indication of socialist development in the country. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to evaluate the economic and social performance of the resettlement scheme, i.e., to examine the fishing activity and the progress of the resettled nomads themselves.

The Fishing Activity

As suggested previously, the problems of the fishing cooperatives for resettled nomads have their roots in a variety of difficulties to some extent connected to the technical and organizational aspects of the fishing activity itself. The catches as a whole are not particularly impressive, well below the estimated potential (cf Table V-5). The income from fishing in some cases does not even cover the cost of fuel, and other production sectors such as handicrafts and poultry farming in most cases provide relatively more income than fishing both on a community and individual level (cf Haakonsen 1980b). In the case of Baraawe, for instance, the gross value of koofie (cap) making by less than a hundred women is three to four times the gross value of fish caught in 1979 (ibid:18).

One of the reasons for the poor catch figures can readily be detected

TABLE V-5

Yearly Fish Catches in All Settlements

	Total	Shark	Fish	% Shark	Fishing Days	Boat Landings	Average Boats/ Day Fishing	Average Catch/ Boat/Day
BARAAWE								
1978	122,281	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	259	2,562	10.0	48.0
1979	120,048	47,836	72,212	39.8%	244	1,045	4.3	114.9
1980*	81,652	37,923	43,729	46.4%	151	702	4.6	116.3
CADALE								
1978	215,496	101,085	114,411	46.9%	318	6,314	19.9	34.1
1979	147,560	69,141	78,419	46.9%	284	3,832	13.5	38.5
1980*	126,927	59,756	67,171	47.1%	148	1,359	9.2	93.4
BADEY								
1978	212,203	137,032	75,171	64.6%	173	936	5.4	226.7
1979	260,256	170,468	89,788	65.5%	201	930	4.6	279.8
1980*	299,431	165,011	134,420	55.1%	122	1,051	8.6	284.9
C. AXMED								
1978	67,604	28,685	38,919	42.4%	237	1,729	7.3	42.4
1979	83,663	29,178	54,485	34.9%	253	1,690	6.7	49.5
1980*	73,522	35,876	37,646	48.8%	146	1,330	9.4	55.2
TOTAL								
1978	617,584	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	987	11,541	11.7	53.5
1979	611,527	316,623	294,904	51.7%	982	7,497	7.6	81.6
1980*	581,532	298,566	282,966	51.3%	567	4,442	7.8	130.9

*First six months only

from Table V-5. On the average, the number of boats operating each day is only 7.8 (1980 figures) in the four cooperatives, ranging from a high of 9.4 in Ceel Axmed to only 4.6 in Baraawe. Obviously, a community of more than 5,000 people cannot rely on barely five small artisanal boats fishing each day if it wants to become self-reliant. The technical problems involved with the motorized boats have already been pointed out, and although they contribute to the limited number of boats in operation each day, a comparison between Tables V-5 and V-3 indicates that technical difficulties are only part of the problem. For instance, to use Baraawe as an example again, a daily average of 4.6 boats have been fishing in the first six months of 1980, whereas the number of boats in operational condition is 15. The comparative figures for the other cooperatives are as follows: 9.2 vs 18 in Cadale, 8.6 vs 17 in Badey, and 9.4 vs 28 in Ceel Axmed, although as pointed out under Table V-3, there are special circumstances to account for part of the great disparity in the latter case.

Does this mean that the resettled nomads have been unable to adapt to their new life? Are the traditional aversions against fish and fishermen too strong to be overcome? This is hardly the case as will be discussed further below. Indeed it seems that the 'instant' fishermen have taken well to their new skill, as the improvement in catches per boat per day indicate (Table V-5). Nevertheless, it is clear that the fishermen are fishing less than they are technically able to.

One must here take into consideration a number of factors, all pertaining to the fact that within the present cooperative structure, the fishermen are not required to fish in order to survive or even be able to live a comfortable life compared to the rest of the population. Every

ablebodied adult receives a minimum salary of SoSh 60 per month almost regardless of his or her performance at work, and though this is not a substantial sum by any means, it must be remembered that all members of the cooperatives receive free food rations in addition to free housing, free medical services and free education. The food rations in particular are quite generous, giving a nutritional value of approximately 70g of protein and nearly 3,000 calories per day for each cooperative member aged six years and above. Indeed, in many cases the rations exceed the amount needed for human consumption to such an extent that part of them find their way to the black market allowing for not an insignificant addition to the income of each household. As pointed out elsewhere, the services and the rations in particular still give the fishing cooperatives "some of the characteristics of a relief camp, a sort of 'luxury' relief camp, and in the long run this may have the negative effect of making people too dependent on outside assistance" (Haakonsen 1980a:5-6).

The negative effect on the fishing activity is readily detectable: the income from fishing is simply not worth the risk of going out to sea every day. As has been noted in several reports made specifically on the fishing cooperatives in Somalia (cf Disney and Edwards 1979; Haakonsen 1979 and 1980a; Murdoch and Mohamed 1980; Larson and Åkerman1980; WFA 1979), fishing is a risky activity, as perhaps best expressed in the WFA report:

> "Fishing,...at any level, is also a dangerous occupation in which no reasonable precaution can completely eliminate the risk of disaster, of injury, loss of livelihood or even death. Nevertheless, a fisherman is prepared to accept these hardships and dangers provided that he has the right incentive" (1979:239).

Some of Somalia's 'instant' fishermen obviously do not feel they have sufficient incentive to set out in the treacherous Indian Ocean in a small

boat on a daily basis.

If we finally look at the average catches per boat per day, it is also clear that with the exception of Badey, where fish resources are richer than further south and where not all the fishermen are resettled nomads (many being traditional fishermen), there seems to be ample room for improvement in the daily catches. The relatively modest figures reflect a still limited knowledge of fishing and the utilization of but a few and not always adequate fishing techniques. Once these techniques are improved, the higher catches should provide further incentive for the fishermen to participate more actively in the activity.[11]

The Resettled People

The often quoted references to the Somali nomad's aversion to fish and disdain for maritime life in connection to the resettlement of nomads into fishing cooperatives fail to take into account some important considerations. First of all, although not particularly known to show much enthusiasm for fishing or maritime living, Somalis have long held a reputation as a seafaring people. Writes Lewis:

> "Since the earliest days of colonization it has been customary for numbers of Somalis to travel abroad, mainly as seamen and often as stokers (1961:269; my emphasis).

Secondly, it must be remembered that the nomads who were resettled, including those who went to the agricultural cooperatives, had very little to return to. Due to the drought their herds had perished. Some families had lost up to 100 camels, and it would take years to rebuild such a herd, leaving the nomads without any means for subsistence in the meantime. Even if many would perhaps have preferred to return to their traditional pastoralist way

of life, circumstances all but prevented this option.

This, of course, is not to say that all the resettled nomads embraced the new life with enthusiasm, and particularly older people still seem to have trouble adjusting to the fishing cooperatives. Some of them have left the premises all together, as have some younger people, but in the latter case, the reasons are usually not problems of dealing with the sedentary life-style, but rather opportunism.[12] This is illustrated in part by the fact that among the younger men, it is principally people who have received some kind of technical training, e.g., drivers, mechanics, electricians, etc. who are the ones who leave the cooperatives, more often than not in order to emigrate to the oil-rich Middle-Eastern countries which can provide salaries that would never be attained in resource-poor Somalia.

Contrary to what the case is in the agricultural cooperatives, relatively few of the resettled nomads have left the fishing cooperatives. Whereas in the agricultural settlements the population is only 55% of what it was at the time of resettlement and still declining, only about 20% have left the fishing communities, and as illustrated in Table V-4, the population has been steadily rising since 1978. Moreover, whereas there are more than two women for every man in the former case,[13] the proportion in the fishing settlements is almost one to one, indicating that, despite initial expectations to the contrary, former nomads may be more ready to adapt to a life as fishermen than as farmers.

What is then the reason for this perhaps surprisingly unruffled transition to sedentary life? The answer most probably lies in a number of factors. First of all, memories of the hardships endured during the drought are still very vivid in the minds of the resettled people. Most of

them had lost all their animals, and hardly a family had been spared the agony of having one or more of its closest relatives succumb to the mercilessness of the drought. Now they all get ample supplies of food and water, as well as medical attention, and their children are able to acquire education, something the ex-nomads have great appreciation for. Secondly, and despite the fact that the nomads in some cases had been transported more than a thousand kilometers away from their original homes and in spite of the regional differences, the change was not as dramatic as it might have been had this occurred in any other part of the continent. The resettled nomads were still in their own country, among people like themselves who to some extent shared the same socio-cultural background and with whom they could speak their own language.

Yet, these factors do not explain why more resettled nomads stay in the fishing cooperatives than in the agricultural ones, since the explanations given above should apply equally well to the agricultural cooperatives. Perhaps the reason is that fishing may after all be more compatible with a pastoralist tradition than agriculture is. Pastner (1980) offers an interesting hypothesis on this point, namely that nomads and fishermen essentially live similar life-styles, make similar use of natural resources and even exhibit similar personality traits as a consequence. To quote some of his major points:

> "Both pastoral and maritime adaptations seem to manifest a cross-cultural orientation towards their respective eco-systems of the sort generally labeled a 'commons mentality', that is, both pastures and fishing grounds are usually seen as a collective resource rather than a property...
>
> ...Both nomads and fishermen appear to exhibit cross-cultural similarities in the organization of those groups most essential to economic production, and hence survival. In both adaptations these units are characterized by their small size and fluidity in membership...

> ...Seafarers, like nomads, rely heavily on strategic movement, with all its attendant hazards...this factor may well underlie what I here suggest are similar personality types. If this is the case, nomadic and maritime peoples in the arid zone have yet one more affinity to ease the putative transition of people from one sphere to another" (1980:16, 17 and 19).

At first glance, these observations would seem to provide quite a plausible explanation for the situation in Somalia, but unfortunately, Pastner's approach is too much rooted in the old anthropological tradition where the economic determinants both on the material level and in the social relations of production are virtually ignored. Although some of the points he makes help understand how former nomads may be more receptive psychologically to a life as fishermen rather than as agriculturalists, it can hardly be used as the explanation why so many more people have left the agricultural than the fishing settlements. It should for instance be noted that after all only about 30% of the labour force in the fishing cooperatives are directly engaged in the fishing sector, and that less than half of these are actually fishermen, as pointed out in Table V-6.[14]

TABLE V-6

Labour Force in the Fishing Sector

	Baraawe	Cadale	Badey*	C. Axmed
Total active labour force	1,402	1,994	860	303
Employed in fishing sector	429	672	265	213
- Captains & fishermen	150	331	125	86
- Motorists & mechanics	30	80	16	5
- Netmenders	135	151	37	81
- Processing workers	78	110	77	29
- Storekeepers	2	Incl.	5	2
- Guards/watchmen	34	above	5	10
Employees in fishing sector as % of total labour force	30.6%	30.8%	33.7%	70.3%

*Newly arrived nomads not included in labour force figures

If we compare the structure of the two types of cooperatives, we find that they are very similar, the Beel-system being the basis of organization.[15] The most apparent difference is that of size, the largest of the agricultural settlements, for instance, was originally composed of 50,000 people. This may be a significant fact in itself, since former nomads presumably would feel more uncomfortable the more crowded their new setting proves to be. It should be pointed out, though, that the new farmers were settled into smaller units at some distance from each other within each cooperative and that in a certain sense, the largest fishing cooperatives are even more crowded since all the new housing units are built on the same spot.[16]

This being said, there are certain and probably very significant differences in how the Beel-system plays a very determinant role in the daily life of the farmers, the system seems much more flexible and of decreasing importance in the fishing cooperatives. The structure here is in practice being supplanted by the occupational division of the cooperative, to such an extent that a fisherman is much more likely to put forward a request or a complaint directly to the head of the fisheries section or even the chairman of the cooperative rather than utilize the bureaucracy of the Beel-system. The madax position on various levels has also lost much of its original status, headmen now serving more on a rotational basis rather than being elected.

Another factor is that although the system of food rationing in the two types of cooperatives is quite similar, and the minimum salary is the same, it is clear that the people in the fishing cooperatives again have a more flexible system allowing for potentially greater gains. The pay system for fishermen has already been described, and other workers in the cooperative also have the possibility to increase their monthly wages

according to work performance and dedication. The criteria involved are not very well defined, but there are five different salary brackets, ranging from SoSh 60 a month to SoSh 300, and in theory the opportunity to earn the maximum salary should be open to all.[17] Women also have the opportunity of earning extra income through embroidery and basket making after regular work hours, skills they have been taught after the resettlement.

Finally, there is one more economic factor to be considered, though its degree of importance is obviously difficult to assess: access to the black market. As mentioned above, some of the rations distributed in the fishing cooperatives seem to be sold to outsiders, and customers are easily available since the Baraawe and Cadale cooperatives are located in towns with sizeable original populations, while Ceel Axmed and Badey are within slightly more than an hour's walking distance from the villages of Goldweyn and Dawad. The agricultural settlements, on the other hand, are quite far removed from larger villages, and the occasional nomadic families that come by hardly represent a market potential.

The Role of the Fishing Settlements in Somalia's Cooperative Development

As mentioned initially, the fishing cooperatives for resettled nomads are still in their formative stage, and they are not yet considered ready to join the Union of Somali Cooperative Movements,[18] though in many ways they are more organized according to the USCM's basic concepts of a cooperative than most other cooperatives in Somalia, excepting the agricultural settlements. Nevertheless, they are, as we have seen, cooperatives only in name, since just about all decisions are made not by the resettled nomads themselves, but by the appointed officials of the Coastal Development

Project. The 'cooperatives' are also at a stage that if the Somali government through the CDP decided to leave the fishing settlements on their own, it would result in an economic and social disaster, literally within a few days.

This situation, of course, is not what the Somali authorities had hoped for when the resettlement programme first was conceived, the idea was to develop a previously neglected economic sector and integrate destitute nomads into the country's emerging socialist economy. The failure to do so, so far, must partly be explained in terms of the Somali national economy as a whole which, as pointed out in the previous chapter, is still a long way from its socialist goals, and partly in terms of the organization and development of the fishing cooperatives themselves.

It is here interesting to note that the fishing settlements are slowly moving away from their original and very strict model which seemed more based on complete collectivization under a rigid bureaucracy rather than on grassroot cooperation. Although the cooperatives are still very much under centralized state control and direction, their structure is less rigid than before, and there are even indications that private merchants are about to be allowed to take part in the marketing of the cooperatives' fish products instead of the ill-fated state agency SOMALFISH. It is precisely this kind of 'opening up' and flexibility that seems to have prevented the fishing settlements from undergoing the drastic depopulation occurring in the agricultural settlements. Ironically, the latter are much closer to the original cooperative model which was seen as the blueprint of a socialist community.

Another irony is that the newly created USCM, which may be perceived

entirely as a creation of the SRSP and thus as a representation of how the party conceives the development of socialism in Somalia, seems to continue to adhere to the notion that a truly socialist cooperative essentially amounts to a rigidly structured collective, and although the basic concept of a cooperative in the USCM is based on the laudable principle of mass participation in the control of the cooperative and representation by the cooperative members on various levels of government through elected officials, the conceived structure gives every indication of producing a large and highly parasitic strata of bureaucrats.

This point can better be illustrated by referring to some of the by-laws in the latest Law on Cooperatives (cf Som. Dem. Rep. 1979a). They state that six cooperative organizations are to make up the USCM, and each are to be structured around four different levels: Village, district, region and national. For each village, district and region, as well as on the national level, a five-man executive committee and a three-man audit and inspection committee are to be elected for each relevant cooperative sector. Since Somalia is divided up in 20 administrative regions and 70 districts in addition to countless villages, the number of people that potentially will be tied into the administration of the USCM is quite substantial. Naturally, not all cooperative organizations will be represented in each village or district; that will depend on the nature of the local economies. Still, the number of elected officials may become extremely large, and in addition one must take into consideration clerical staff on the various levels and the many appointed officials that will be occupying positions in the about 20 departments and offices on the National Committee level.

If we take the fishing sector as an example, it today compromises 23

cooperatives, including the four for resettled nomads.[19] Since the 23 cooperatives are spread along the coast in 20 districts and 9 regions, this would mean that no less than 296 fishermen would be tied up with administrative duties, most probably on a full-time basis (assuming that districts with only one fishing cooperative will not have to elect separate committees on the district level). Obviously, this loss of labour force would have detrimental effects on the fishing activity itself, something that seems to have been realized in the fishing cooperatives for resettled nomads as illustrated by the gradual abandonment of the bureaucratic Beel-system.

There are other areas as well where the USCM seems to hold the same concepts of cooperative development that were followed in the initial stages of the resettlement programme. Typical are the 'incentive awards' that cooperatives and individuals can win by

> "socialist emulation of production, hard work, patriotism, revolutionary spirit, socialism, taking part in cooperative activities, showing enthusiasm and responsibility" (Som. Dem. Rep. 1979a:A-24).

These awards include, in order of merit, USCM flags, USCM medals, and certificates of honour. Only on the bottom of the scale are awards "consisting of money, equipment, promotion, etc." (ibid.). Similarly, when the nomads first were resettled to the fishing cooperatives, it was by following the principle of "non-monetization of the communities' economic life" (Barkhadle 1976a:73), with no monetary incentives of any kind. However, less than a year after resettlement, the Ministry of Fisheries made the "important decision" of providing salary scales based on performance and giving the fishermen SoSh 0.40 per kilo caught fish as incentives (ibid:93-95). This share was subsequently doubled in 1978, suggesting that from the point of view of the Ministry of Fisheries, money is the best incentive for increased production, thus again being in

opposition to the ideals of the USCM.

Does this mean that the fishing cooperatives for resettled nomads are departing from the original goals of becoming "self-supporting socialist societies that are based on work and justice" (Barkhadle 1976a: 94)? Hardly, since the official ideals remain the same, but experience has shown that under the present circumstances a fisherman is reluctant to face the dangers of the sea without financial rewards and that a too rigid socio-economic structure can prove quite detrimental to both the cooperative as a whole and the individual members. The highly idealistic aims (cf Chapter I) and overly bureaucratic structure of the USCM must be seen in the light of the organization's limited practical experience. Very few of the appointed officials seem to have more than a superficial knowledge of any of the economic sectors that are supposed to fall under the jurisdiction of the union.

It is also from this point of view that one must assess the future of Somali cooperatives and indeed, the future of Somali 'scientific socialism' as represented in the cooperative development. It is rather obvious that the fishing cooperatives for resettled nomads, for instance, have all the potentials of becoming self-reliant in the not too distant future. Some areas, such as the average catch per boat per day are showing definite improvements, and some of the major problems, such as the lack of training, inadequate fishing techniques, poor marketing structures, etc., need relatively simple solutions.

In addition, it should be recalled that what many people, anthropologists not the least, perceived to be the greatest difficulties in sedentarizing nomads into fishing communities, have proven to be far from

unsurmountable obstacles. The 'problems of sedentarization' have mostly affected the oldest generation, while the younger men have adapted remarkably well to maritime life; the 'aversion to fish-eating', similarly, has been less of a problem than expected, and it is significant to note that in the last couple of years, partly because of soaring meat prices, but also because of a very active government campaign, Somalis in general have become much more willing to make use of fish products; and finally, the 'longing back to nomadic life' has been less wide-spread than originally feared, partly demonstrated by the fact that most people who have left the settlements have migrated mostly to the city or to higher paying jobs abroad rather than gone back to the bush.

The more serious problems are rooted in the overall organization of the cooperatives themselves and the structure of Somali society as a whole; thus the future of Somalia's 'instant' fishermen will very much be determined by the nation's political course in the coming years.

It may here be appropriate to remind of Hydén's warning that "administrative overload" and "overambitious targets" can create "serious disappointments and reactions against the government" (1970:74-75), and that "it may even be argued that a quicker way to socialism than deliberate politico-bureaucratic intervention...is to allow a further de-structuration" of cooperatives in Africa (ibid:78).

NOTES

[1]It is here interesting to note that in 1964, three state farms were also established, two for the cultivation of cotton and oil-seeds, and one for wheat growing. These state farms, however, soon proved to be failures and never provided the results the government at the time had hoped for (Som. Dem. Rep. 1974a:6; Iqbal 1980:2).

[2]This figure, which has its source in a document written by the Union of Somali Cooperative Movements, would seem to be a bit on the high side, particularly since the latest Three Year Development Plan operates with a stated goal of 68,500 ha by 1981 (cf Som. Dem. Rep. 1979d:11). Similarly, the figures in Table V-1 seem to be somewhat inflated, though not to any significant degree.

[3]This was particularly reflected in the rather resigned response given by one official at the NRA. When asked whether the NRA was willing to let the administration of the livestock cooperatives to be transferred to the USCM, he answered that the NRA would be more than willing to get rid of them though he doubted that the USCM would want to take over such an unsuccessful operation (personal notes).

[4]Burton consistently referred to the Somali nomads as "Bedouins".

[5]Recently, the Bajuun residents have been relocated to fishing cooperatives on the mainland where they continue to pursue their traditional life as fishermen using new techniques - with very good results.

[6]The other one was the meat cannery in Kisimayo.

[7]It is not entirely correct to refer to the fishing settlements as fishing cooperatives, since they are still regarded to be in their formative stage and not yet on the same level as other fishing cooperatives composed of traditional fishermen. The settlements have their own central administration in Mashruuca Horumarinta Xeebaha (Coastal Development Project) and the USCM does not yet consider them ripe enough to be part of the organization. For reasons of convenience, however, the four fishing settlements will continue to be referred to as cooperatives in this thesis, as they are for the most part referred to both by Somali authorities and foreign observers.

The distribution at the time of resettlement was as follows:

Baraawe	6,554
Cadale	4,688
Badey	3,217

[8]Sweden through her development agency SIDA granted the Somali government SoSh 22.75 million, out of which 12.87 million were made available for the Ministry of Fisheries; Italy extended a low interest loan of SoSh 7.5 million which were allocated for the establishment of cold storage facilities (never completed in the settlements); the Soviet Union allotted SoSh 208 million for the development of fisheries, out of which 72 million was a grant (cf Barkhadle 1976a:65-72).

[9]This statement brings up another factor that needs to be clarified in connection with the cooperatives in Somalia. Although the fishing cooperatives are intended primarily to be producer cooperatives, the essential marketing, at least up to September 1980, has been done through higher government levels, particularly when it comes to export where SOMALFISH has assumed all responsibility. This, however, does not alter the significance of the FAO statement; it is still in the interest of the cooperatives to maximize production, since the fishermen receive payment as a fixed sum per kilo caught fish.

[10]This point has been made by others as well. In a report prepared for the Somali Ministry of Fisheries by the White Fish Authority, for instance, the proposed 'ideal' size for an artisanal fishing cooperative would be about 2,000 people, with 300 fishermen and 60 boats (WFA 1979: 244), which may already be a high estimate (cf Haakonsen 1980a:10).

[11]Space limitations prevent a more comprehensive discussion on the fishing skills - or lack of them - in the cooperatives. For details, see Haakonsen (1980a:13-14).

[12]Although no statistics are available, oral reports indicate that it is indeed the older generation that accounts for most of the people who have left the cooperatives.

[13]For a good overall evaluation of the agricultural settlements, see Som. Dem. Rep. 1979b.

[14]The rest of the labour force is engaged in various activities such as construction, transportation, health care, administration, handicrafts, etc. The high percentage of people engaged in the fishing sector in Ceel Axmed is related to the small size of the cooperative (as pointed out above, the other three settlements are too large to be able to support themselves on artisanal fishing alone) and the availability of boats in relation to the total population.

[15]I must point out here that I only have a limited first-hand knowledge of the agricultural settlements, two days to be exact, and that necessarily affects the depth and extent of my comparison.

[16]With the exception of Ceel Axmed, where the new houses are nearly all completed, the housing projects in the other cooperatives are far from finished, as illustrated in Table V-7 below. Those families who still have not moved into permanent housing live in the traditional aqal

(nomadic hut) they brought along with them, in extremely crowded circumstances. In Baraawe, some families have built their own cariish. For details on housing, see Haakonsen (1979:19-21).

TABLE V-7

Infrastructure

	Baraawe	Cadale	Badey	C. Axmed
Housing units (total)	556	690	104	91
- Soviet-designed	376	440	104	25
- Cariish-type	180*	250#	-	66#
Schools (total)	2	2	2	1
- Elementary	1	1	1	1
- Intermediate	1	1	1	-
- Secondary	-	U.C.	-	-
Hospital	Yes	Yes	Yes	U.C.
Cooperative shop	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Processing plant	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cold storage	No	No	No	No

*Built by the settlers themselves on their own initiative
#Including those under construction
U.C. Under construction

[17] It is interesting to note in this connection that in the recent evaluation of the agricultural settlements, one of the main recommendations put forward by the State Planning Commission is to "improve the system of salaries and wages" (Som. Dem. Rep. 1979b:130).

[18] Even if the USCM considered them ready, it would be doubtful that they would be transferred from the Ministry of Fisheries. The Ministry has so far successfully resisted every attempt to take over jurisdiction and administration of any fishing cooperative.

[19] The four nomadic settlements are not included in Table V-1.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The resettlement of nearly 15,000 pastoralists into fishing cooperatives is a major event from several points of view. For one thing, the sedentarization and relocation of such a large number of people is associated with a number of practical problems, though it should be pointed out that it is not the first time an operation of this kind has been carried out. Secondly, the transition from pastoralism to fishing is an unusual occurrance and, on such a scale, actually unprecedented. Thirdly, and most interestingly for our purposes, in the Somali case the resettlement is not only regarded by the apolitical authorities as a prime example of socialist development in the country, it is also seen as representing the transition from communalism (referred to as 'tribalism') to socialism.

In order to examine this contention, we have had to go through a number of analytical steps. First of all, it has been necessary to determine the level of socio-economic integration of traditional pastoral society at the time when it was still only marginally in contact with external forces, i.e., in the pre-colonial era. In order to do so, a relatively neglected concept in marxist analysis has been applied. Partly because of the name, but also because Marx never fully developed the

concept, the Germanic mode of production has received only marginal attention in the discussion of pre-capitalist economic formations in the Third World, yet, and to a large extent due to the works of Bonte (1974 and 1978) and Rigby (1978), the Germanic transitional form of the communal mode of production has proven to be a useful methodological tool in the study of certain African pastoral societies, even when allowing for the rather fragile theoretical base upon which the concept of the Germanic mode of production was built in Marx's Grundrisse.

Since ancient Germanic society as described by Marx was primarily 'tribally' structured, i.e., along extended kinship associations and descent-lines without any state formation, the Germanic mode of production has been used to assess whether Somali society, too, was a 'tribal' society before the advent of colonialism. As argued in Chapter II, Somali pastoralists were indeed living in a stateless system based primarily on agnatic descent, where the ager publicus rather than private property was at the centre of production. Consequently, the social relations of production, despite an embryo of slavery, were not based on the exploitation of value and labour by one segment of society over another.

The next step in the analysis has been to examine to what extent Somali nomads became integrated into the capitalist economy that was introduced into the Horn of Africa as soon as the colonial powers divided the area between them. As it has been argued, colonialism had a limited impact on the majority of the Somali population: the Italians extended their influence mainly to the agricultural districts and in the towns, whereas the British tried to keep their presence to the minimum necessary required to maintain control of the coast.

It was only towards the end of the colonial era that the capitalist money economy seriously started to affect the pastoral sector following the increased demand for meat in the oil-booming Middle-East. For the first time; individual entrepreneurs started to emerge among the nomadic pastoralist population as livestock traders and barkad-owners, and although the commercialization of the pastoral economy has been gradual, it has occurred over a relatively short time-span. Nevertheless, because of the absence of a fully developed livestock trading system, the Somali authorities are not entirely unjustified in claiming that even at the time of resettlement, most nomads were still living under a 'tribal' system with a predominantly 'tribal' economy. Thus it can be argued that the resettlement of nomads indeed signified a transition from a precapitalist system.

In order to assess whether the fishing cooperatives also signify a change to a self-reliant socialist system, we have had to take into consideration the developments in Somalia since the present and self-proclaimed socialist government came to power in 1969. The ideology of the government, for the most part expressed in Siyaad Barre's speeches, is based upon the notion that there is but one socialism, 'scientific socialism', though this is also where any further explanation is provided in Somalia and the answers have had to be sought by examining the execution of the socialist ideas.

Looking at the accomplishments since the 'Revolution', it is clear that there have been a number of impressive social achievements such as the emancipation of women and the literacy campaign, to mention a few. Yet, the social reforms have not been more 'socialist' than one would find in any welfare-oriented nation. Though it is true that this government has

at times shown much more of a human concern than the ones preceding it, as for instance witnessed during the massive relief operations during the 1973-75 drought and the recent refugee influx, this still does not tell us anything substantial about socialism in the country.

The economic pattern over the last decade, on the other hand, is a better indicator of Somalia's direction which, ironically, neither suggests a socialist development nor greater self-reliance. On the contrary, there seems to be a greater dependency on the production and export of one particular commodity, namely livestock, and consequently a greater dependency on the import of most other goods. Moreover, as we have seen, the livestock trade is almost totally under the control of a small, but increasingly powerful group of private entrepreneurs.

From this point of view it may seem surprising to hear the government continue to put emphasis on developments within the state and cooperative sectors. Particularly the cooperatives have been highlighted, most recently through the establishment of the Union of Somali Cooperative Movements which seems totally devoted to the creation of self-sufficient 'socialist' cooperatives in every production sector of the economy except larger industries. While there is no evidence to indicate that the objectives and efforts of the USCM are not sincere, that the Union is just a pretention or even a smoke-screen for the forces that in reality control Somalia's economy, there is ample reason to question the USCM's ability to achieve its goals.

For one thing, the USCM has built up a complex organizational and administrative structure with a strong ideology but a very limited economic and infrastructural base, and already one can perceive many of the

'constraints' to cooperative development outlined by Hydén (1970) as being directly relevant to the USCM. Secondly, and more importantly, it is difficult to understand how the cooperative movement in Somalia can follow a socialist path of development when the principal sector of the country's economy seems more and more part of a fully developed capitalist system.

The fishing cooperatives for resettled nomads are a good example of the dilemma. It is here interesting, as a side point, to note that Somalia's 'instant' fishermen to a large extent seem to have overcome the socio-cultural barriers that many expected would have posed significant problems in the transition from nomadic pastoralism to sedentary fishing. They have, for instance, fared much better than their colleagues in the agricultural settlements, though the reasons are not, as Pastner (1980) suggests, so much attributable to a nomad's greater compatibility with sea-life as to a number of economically based factors. In the fishing cooperatives, the resettled people receive more economic incentives than in the agricultural ones, monetary incentives that some would describe as 'capitalist oriented'. Again, this reflects the basic irony in Somalia: the cooperatives that seem to function best (but by no means perfectly and far from the stated objective of achieving self-sufficiency), are the ones which have departed most from the original cooperative model which was seen as representing the future socialist society in Somalia. This, on the other hand, does not imply that a socialist economic system cannot function in Somalia, it merely shows that one particular and relatively weak production sector cannot develop independently from the rest of an economy which is following a completely different path.

This leads us back to the fundamental question once again: Is the

Somali leadership's pledge to 'scientific socialism' simply rhetoric, or are there any indications that a socialist development is indeed taking place? The opinions on this point, as we have seen, tend to vary. Most observers will probably agree that Somalia is not any closer to scientific socialism than let us say Tanzania or even Zambia, and it has been suggested that many of the country's present leaders are far from being committed socialists. However, political power in Somalia is not in the hands of those who control the economy, it is rather very much rooted in the military establishment and concentrated around certain clans and lineages. The wealthy livestock traders and plantation owners do not participate directly in Somalia's political affairs, though there seems little doubt that they are allowed to pursue their business interests without fearing any serious restraints from the government.

This situation has led Lewis (1979) to comment that in some sense, Somalia is reminiscent of the autocratic rule of Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, and that the rule of order is not socialism, but 'Siyadism', in reference to the status and power of the Somali president. Though none among the ruling elite in Somalia would subscribe to Lewis' analogy, some make little effort to hide the fact that 'scientific socialism' is not an adequate characterization of the present socio-economic system. When asked recently if the system in his country really represented socialism, a high-ranking Somali official answered that this was not really the case and that the present system could only be described as 'Somaliism' (personal notes).

Though the terms 'Siyadism' and 'Somaliism' hardly can be said to be analytical definitions of the situation in Somalia, they certainly reflect its ambiguity. The fishing cooperatives for resettled nomads seem to confirm this ambiguity: on one hand, there has been and continues to be

a sincere effort to plan and organize them towards self-reliant, socialist communities, an effort that has only partially been frustrated by technical difficulties attributable to external factors. On the other hand, this development course seems to depart significantly from that of the rest of the society. The major problem with the fishing settlements in Somalia, as with all other cooperatives, remains the disparity between their objectives and the actual developments in the country as a whole.

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Appendix A

SOMALIA: COUNTRY PROFILE

Formal name:	Somali Democratic Republic
Area:	637,657 sq. km.
Population:	3.5 million (estimated). In addition, there are approximately 1.8 million refugees from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (December 1980).
Capital:	Muqdisho (Mogadishu); population: 450,000
Official language:	Somali; Arabic, Italian and English also common
Religion:	Islam (Sunni)
GNP per capita:	US $ 131 (1979)
Currency:	Somali Shilling (SoSh); US $ 1 = SoSh 6.2 (Summer 1980)
Life expectancy:	42 years
Topography:	Mostly flat plateau surfaces and plains except for the mountainous areas of the north.
Climate:	Hot and dry throughout the year with temperatures averaging between 27 and 32 degrees Celsius; somewhat cooler in higher altitudes. Two rainy seasons bring erratic rainfall mostly in the southern regions.

Data on the Fisheries Sector:

Coast line:	3,200 km.
Shelf area (0-200m):	52,000 sq. km.
Full-time fishermen:	3-4,000, mostly artisanal
Yearly fish catches:	About 10,000 tons (1978)
Yearly exports of fish products:	1.2 ton; value: SoSh 2.6 million

Potential yearly fish catches (FAO estimates):

Coastal pelagic and semi-pelagic fish	100,000 tons
Demersal fish	80,000 tons
Sharks and Rays	30,000 tons
Crustacea	1,500 tons
Cephalopods	Unknown
Molluscs	Unknown
Total	211,500 tons

Appendix B

FISH CATCH FIGURES IN EACH OF THE SETTLEMENTS

Table B-1. Baraawe
(Catch figures in kilos)

1978	Total	Shark	Fish	% Shark	Fishing days	Boat landings	Average boats/day fishing	Average catch/boat/day
Total*	122,281	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	259	2562	10.0	48.0
1979								
Jan	14,596	2,135	12,461	14.6%	29	210	7.2	69.5
Feb	10,173	1,067	9,106	10.5%	24	81	3.8	125.6
Mar	8,141	1,391	6,750	17.1%	27	109	4.0	74.5
Apr	8,248	1,922	6,326	85.0%	24	69	2.9	119.5
May	9,020	7,211	1,809	79.9%	27	148	5.5	60.9
Jun	2,262	1,988	274	87.9%	19	49	2.6	46.1
Jul	81	69	12	85.2%	2	4	2.0	20.3
Aug	N.F.	N.F.	N.F.	-	-	-	-	-
Sep	1,119	500	619	44.7%	20#	66#	3.3#	17.0#-
Oct	19,851	9,839	10,012	49.6%	25#	108#	4.3#	183.8#
Nov	33,775	15,128	18,647	44.8%	22#	73#	3.3#	462.7#
Dec	12,782	6,586	6,196	51.5%	25	132	5.3	96.8
Total	120,048	47,836	72,212	39.8%	244	1045	4.3	114.9
1980								
Jan	5,211	3,841	1,370	73.7%	21	123	5.9	42.4
Feb	13.129	5,615	7,514	42.8%	26#	146#	6.4#	89.9#
Mar	22,557	10,768	11,789	47.7%	23#	94#	4.1#	240.0#
Apr	30,381	10,614	19,767	34.9%	29	90	3.1	337.6
May	3,749	2,262	1,487	60.3%	27	118	4.4	31.8
Jun	5,582	3,814	1,768	68.3%	25	131	5.2	42.6
Total	81,652	37,923	43,729	46.4%	151	702	4.6	116.3

* Monthly figures not available at time of visit. Figures in table taken from Murdoch & Mohamed (1980).

\# Fishing partly in Lugsanyo or Dannan where fishing days reports are not properly recorded. Figures in table partly based on averages of the rest of the year.

Table 8-2. Cadale
(Catch figures in kilos)

1978	Total	Shark	Fish	% Shark	Fishing days	Boat landings	Average boats/day fishing	Average catch/boat/day
Jan	18,780	11,440	7,340	60.9%	31	626	20.2	30.0
Feb	17,793	9,357	8,436	52.6%	25	512*	20.5	34.8
Mar	24,758	13,777	10,961	55.7%	27	579	21.4	42.7
Apr	20,694	5,929	14,765	28.7%	30	701	23.4	29.5
May	21,088	13,979	7,109	66.3%	31	777	25.1	27.1
Jun	9,126	6,392	2,734	70.0%	22	309	14.0	29.5
Jul	9,378	5,323	4,055	56.8%	24	455	19.0	20.6
Aug	10,865	2,155	8,710	19.8%	14	229	16.4	47.4
Sep	13,919	2,885	11,034	20.7%	28	436	15.6	31.9
Oct	22,035	9,979	12,046	45.3%	28	522	18.6	42.2
Nov	24,520	11,284	13,236	46.0%	27	569	21.1	43.1
Dec	22,570	8,585	13,985	38.0%	31	599	19.3	37.7
Total	215,496	101,085	114,411	46.9%	318	6314	19.9	34.1
1979								
Jan	13,175	6,143	7,032	46.6%	31	492	15.9	26.8
Feb	11,002	6,829	4,173	62.1%	27	407	15.1	27.0
Mar	13,683	6,250	7,433	45.7%	31	510	16.5	26.8
Apr	14,854	3,660	11,194	24.6%	30	561	18.7	26.5
May	13,428	7,183	6,245	53.5%	31	530	17.1	25.3
Jun	8,242	4,071	4,171	49.4%	17	172	10.1	47.9
Jul	22,611	14,798	7,813	65.4%	24	330	13,8	68.5
Aug	1,850	798	1,052	43.1%	6	43	7.2	43.0
Sep	6,987	2,486	4,501	35.6%	14	173	12.4	40.4
Oct	5,092	3,595	1,497	70.6%	20	114	5.7	44.7
Nov	25,078	7,478	17,600	29.8%	26	276	10.6	90.9
Dec	14,558	5,850	5,708	50.6%	27	224	8.3	51.6
Total	147,560	69,141	78,419	46.9%	284	3832	13.5	38.5
1980								
Jan	13,994	10,041	3,953	71.8%	29	269	9.3	52.0
Feb	21,692	14,746	6,946	68.0%	22	169	7.7	128.4
Mar	23,916	6,755	17,161	28.2%	23	225	9.8	106.3
Apr	23,285	5,204	18,081	22.3%	27	269	10.0	86.6
May	23,254	7,390	15,864	31.8%	22	221	10.0	105.2
Jun	20,786	15,620	5,166	75.1%	25	206	8.2	100.9
Total	126,927	59,756	67,171	47.1%	148	1359	9.2	93.4

* Based partly on the average of the rest of the month due to incomplete accounting.

Table 8-3. Badey
(Catch figures in kilos)

1978	Total	Shark	Fish	% Shark	Fishing days	Boat landings	Average boats/day fishing	Average catch/boat/day
Jan	N.F.	N.F.	N.F.	-	-	-	-	-
Feb	20,967	15,009	5,958	71.6%	19	83	4.4	252.6
Mar	23.991	17,055	6,936	71.1%	25	107	4.3	224.2
Apr	26,777	20,440	6,337	76.3%	25	121	4.8	221.3
May	17,710	9,496	8,214	53.6%	16	117	7.3	151.4
Jun	12,048	7,614	4,434	63.2%	24	106	7.6	113.7
Jul	6,927	4,287	2,640	61,9%	11	62	5.6	111.7
Aug	9,866	6,465	3,401	65.5%	17	41	2.4	240.6
Sep	5,775	3,450	2,325	59.7%	8	24	3.0	240.6
Oct	36,545	21,373	15,172	58.5%	17	137	811	266.8
Nov	51,597	31,843	19,754	61,7%	21	138	6.6	373.9
Dec	N.F.	N.F.	N.F.	-	-	-	-	-
Total	212,203	137,032	75,171	64.6%	173	936	5.4	226.7
1979								
Jan	N.F.	N.F.	N.F.	-	-	-	-	-
Feb	17,301	9,527	7,774	55.1%	15	69	4.6	250.7
Mar	36,758	25,473	11,285	69.3%	27	196	7.3	187.5
Apr	25,154	20,040	5.114	79.7%	25	140	5.6	179.7
May	24,329	12,816	11,513	52.7%	17	96	5.6	253.4
Jun	27,083	14,907	12,176	55.0%	27	112	4.1	241.8
Jul	21.891	14,562	7,329	66.5%	20	65	3.3	336.8
Aug	56,563	40,462	16,101	71,5%	20	63	3.2	897.8
Sep	1,552	585	967	37.7%	2	4	2.0	388.0
Oct	7,081	3,617	3,464	51.1%	4	12	3.0	590.1
Nov	15,037	9,677	5,360	64.4%	18	54	3.0	278.5
Dec	27,507	18,802	8.705	68.4%	26	119	4.6	231.2
Total	260,256	170,468	89.788	65.5%	201	930	4.6	279.8
1980								
Jan	375	206	169	54.9%	1	3	3.0	125.0
Feb	29,367	18,618	10,749	63.4%	14	115	8.2	255.4
Mar	76,044	43,171	32,873	56.8%	30	235	7.8	323.6
Apr	66,722	44,232	22,490	66.3%	30	216	7.2	308.9
May	63,958	27,931	36,027	43.7%	21	203	9.7	315.1
Jun	62,965	30,853	32,112	49.0%	26	279	10.7	225.7
Total	299,431	165,011	134,420	55.1%	122	1051	8.6	284.9

Table B-4. Ceel Axmed
(Catch figures in kilos)

1978	Total	Shark	Fish	% Shark	Fishing days	Boat landings	Average boats/day fishing	Average catch/boat/day
Jan	3,532	2,259	1,273	64.0%	16	107	6.7	33.0
Feb	5,795	2,367	3,608	39.6%	25	167	6.7	39.6
Mar	6,033	2,710	3,323	44.9%	31	236	7.6	25.6
Apr	12,836	6,522	6,314	50.8%	30	241	8.0	53.3
May	3,589	1,105	2,484	30.8%	28	168	6.0	21.3
Jun	476	348	128	73.1%	14	54	3.9	73.1
Jul	N.F.	N.F.	N.F.	-	-	-	-	-
Aug	N.F.	N.F.	N.F.	-	-	-	-	-
Sep	2,123	1,208	915	56.9%	7	56	8.0	37.9
Oct	10,600	4,828	5,772	45.5%	27	220	8.1	48.2
Nov	10,436	3,264	7,172	31.2%	28	234	8.4	44.6
Dec	12,004	4,074	4,072	33.9%	31	246	7.9	48.8
Total	67,604	28,685	38,919	42.4%	237	1729	7.3	42.4
1979								
Jan	17,370	2,063	15,307	11.9%*	30	195	6.5	89.1
Feb	7,299	1,137	6,162	15.6%*	24	203	8.5	36.0
Mar	7,261	1,300	5,961	17.9%*	31	242	7.8	30.0
Apr	6,122	1,693	4,429	27.6%*	30	227	7.6	42.2
May	3,330	1,913	1,417	57.4%	20	145	7.3	57.4
Jun	1,139	914	225	80.2%	13	25	1.9	45.6
Jul	N.F.	N.F	N.F.	-	-	-	-	-
Aug	N.F.	N.F.	N.F.	-	-	-	-	-
Sep	1,234	578	656	46.8%	18	50	2.8	24.7
Oct	4,379	2,207	2,172	50.4%	27	100	3.7	43.8
Nov	11,639	5,291	6,348	45.5%	29	227	7.8	51.3
Dec	23,890	12,082	11,808	50.6%	31	276	8.9	86.6
Total	83,663	29,178	54,485	34.9%	253	1690	6.7	49.5
1980								
Jan	17,228	8,262	8,966	48.0%	31	277	8.9	62.2
Feb	15,118	8,251	6,876	54.6%	27	265	9.8	57.0
Mar	15,735	6,606	9,129	42.0%	31	307	9.9	51.3
Apr	19,632	9,889	9,743	50.4%	30	312	10.4	62.9
May	5,724	2,826	2,898	49.4%	23	169	7.3	33.9
Jun	85#	42#	43#	49.4%	4#	-	-	-
Total	73,522	35,876	37,646	48.8%	146	1330	9.4	55.2

* Some of the boats engaged in hand-line fishing accounting for the low percentage of sharks in the total catch.

\# Beach-seine catches, not included in total averages.