

DECISIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND
POLITICAL PROCESS IN CANADA

by

George J. Szablowski

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Department of Political Science

McGill University

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ABSTRACT.

This study attempts to establish a relationship between decisional technology and political process, and to show a tendency or direction of change that takes place. Decisional technology is defined as organized knowledge used to attain a greater degree of control over decision-making in government through the application of functional specialization, procedural rigour, and systematic analysis. The empirical focus (1970-1977) is on central agencies—Prime Minister's Office, Privy Council Office, Federal-Provincial Relations Office, Treasury Board Secretariat, and the Department of Finance—and on the budgetary cycle and the policy process in Cabinet committees. The study presents an analysis of the control functions of central agencies, and an analysis of the budgetary cycle in the context of the policy process. It examines the degree to which the tendency toward greater functional specialization, procedural rigour, and increased use of systematic analysis has been established in Ottawa. Finally, in a discussion of the probable consequences and implications that technological decision-making may produce for the Canadian political process, the following future developments are considered: a further decline of political accountability of the executive-bureaucratic sector; a higher level of political control by the executive-bureaucratic sector and corresponding exclusion of outsiders from decision-making; an accelerated threat to political stability; a major change in the constitutional conventions and practices governing the political executive.

RESUME

La présente étude tente d'établir un lien entre la technologie décisionnelle et le processus politique et de montrer une tendance ou une direction du changement qui se produit. On définit l'expression technologie décisionnelle comme un ensemble de connaissances organisées lesquelles sont utilisées en vue d'atteindre un plus grand degré de contrôle sur le processus de prise de décision au niveau gouvernemental et ce, par l'application de la spécialisation fonctionnelle, d'une rigueur dans les procédures et de l'analyse systématique. La partie empirique est axée sur les agences centrales—Cabinet du Premier Ministre, Bureau du Conseil Privé, Bureau des Relations Fédérales-Provinceales, Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor et Ministère des Finances—et sur le cycle budgétaire et le processus des politiques dans les comités du Cabinet. Compte tenu des renseignements obtenus au cours de l'observation participante (1970), de sondage des ministères gouvernementaux (1973) et des interviews confidentiels avec les fonctionnaires supérieurs (1976 et 1977) aussi bien que de l'examen de certains documents, exposés et mémoranda, l'étude présente une analyse des fonctions de contrôle des agences centrales comme étant les principaux utilisateurs et disséminateurs de la technologie décisionnelle et une analyse du cycle budgétaire dans le contexte du processus des politiques à titre d'exemple de la prise de décision technologique. Il est reconnu que l'introduction formelle de la technologie décisionnelle n'est pas un équivalent à son opération réelle et une véritable emphase est donnée aux difficultés et aux contraintes qui persistent. Cependant, compte tenu des preuves examinées, l'étude démontre une nette tendance vers une plus grande spécialisation, une plus grande rigueur et une dépendance accrue de l'analyse systématique dans le gouvernement contemporain. En dernier lieu, dans le cadre d'une discussion des conséquences probables de la prise de décision qui devient de plus en plus technologique à Ottawa, l'étude présente quatre hypothèses concernant l'avenir de la responsabilité, du contrôle, de la stabilité et du changement politiques dans le système politique canadien.

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PREFACE.

The point of departure for this work goes back to the time of the first Trudeau mandate. Marc Lalonde was firmly in control of the Prime Minister's Office, while Timothy Porteous (first among executive assistants) managed the prime-ministerial work-schedule from day to day. Weekly meetings of top ministerial aides (appropriately labelled the "kitchen cabinet") were well attended and often chaired by Lalonde. In the Privy Council Office, the towering figure of Michael Pitfield began to threaten Gordon Robertson's impeccable career. Simon Reisman still ran the Department of Finance, and Al Johnson had just added Douglas Hartle and Gordon Osbaldeston to the already strong "elite corps" of the Treasury Board Secretariat.

During the snow-laden winter months of 1970 and early 1971, I spent long afternoons and evenings in the National Library. I had then just left Mr. Drury and the Treasury Board, and was ploughing through volumes, articles and papers on program budgeting, systems analysis, management science, and decision theory. Earlier, during the summer and fall, I had become more than intrigued by the infatuation of some central agency officials with "new knowledge", and by their apparent conviction that structural engineering and control of decision-making will necessarily produce lasting benefits for the Canadian polity and society as a whole.

In January 1971, Professor Thomas A. Hockin asked me to prepare a chapter for the first edition of Apex Of Power.¹ The pages which I then wrote contained my initial formulation of the questions and issues examined at length in this dissertation. They outlined my approach to the study of decisional technology and its effect on the political process. The thrust of this approach may be accurately revealed from the following three logically related questions:

- 1) Is there a theoretical prescriptive model of governmental policy-making (based on the use of decisional technology) which has emerged in recent years as a result of an increasing concern about the efficiency and the effectiveness of public policy as well as of its formulation? If so, what are its components and characteristics? What assumptions is it based on?
- 2) To what extent decisional technology has been actually introduced into the structure and processes of the federal government? What role do central agencies (PCO, PMO, TBS, Finance, FPRO) play in the policy-making process as users and disseminators of decisional technology? What kind of organizational and institutional change is taking place at the federal level under the influence of decisional technology?
- 3) Assuming that affirmative answers (or partially affirmative) answers can be given to questions number 1 and 2 above, what

logical deductions (implications) can be drawn from these answers about the impact of decisional technology on the Canadian political process?

In my examination of these questions, I seek to establish a relationship between decisional technology and political process, and to suggest a tendency or direction of change that takes place. I recognize that the formal introduction of decisional technology is not tantamount to its effective operation in government. But, I claim that if (and to the extent that) technological decision-making becomes effective, certain consequences are likely to follow. I claim further that central agencies and the budgetary cycle (in the context of the policy process) offer the best illustration of this tendency or direction of change. Accordingly, the following elements of the thesis should be considered contributions to original knowledge:

- 1) The concept of decisional technology in political analysis; (Chapter Two).
- 2) The description and analysis of the authority structure and control functions of central agencies as prime users and disseminators of decisional technology; (Chapter Three).
- 3) The description and analysis of the budgetary cycle in the context of the policy process as illustration of technological decision-making; (Chapter Four).
- 4) The hypotheses about the effects of technological decision-

making on political accountability, on political control, on political stability, and on political change; (Chapter Five). The introductory chapter entitled "The Normative Setting" contains material published in the first edition of The Apex Of Power.¹

Of course, there is no scarcity of books which examine, from one perspective or another, the impact of technology on politics and society. Since the publication of Jacques Ellul's truly seminal work La Technique ou l'Enjeu du Siècle² (1954), many more studies of this broad topic have appeared in print. The diversity of approaches adopted and conclusions drawn by the authors can be easily illustrated by naming just a few titles: Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man (1958), Galbraith's The New Industrial State (1967), Schon's Technology And Change (1967), Etzioni's The Active Society (1968), Ferkiss's Technological Man (1969), Mesthene's Technological Change: Its Impact On Man And Society (1970), Salomon's Science And Politics (1973), and Sklair's Organized Knowledge (1973). It is only fair to acknowledge these and other contributions cited in the text and their effect on the formulation of my own approach to technology as a useful and potentially significant concept in political analysis.

I must also refer to John Langford's study of the reorganization of the federal Transport portfolio. In it, Langford uses my concept of decisional technology³ "underlying the new planning and

policy-making system adopted" in Ottawa. He argues persuasively that "responsiveness, innovation, and effectiveness were the three central organizational values which served as rallying points for administrative reform throughout the federal bureaucracy between 1968 and 1972".⁴ He concludes by asking a question which directly relates to the thrust of my work:

"A larger and, in the long run, more important question is: What does the acceptance of this new decisional technology 'package' mean in the widest sense for the future development of our form of democratic government?"⁵

Finally, I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to central agency officials who granted me interviews and who also agreed to less formal exchanges of information and opinion, to staff members of the National Library and the joint Finance/Treasury Board Library in Ottawa, and to a number of individuals who, over the years, have given me valuable intellectual support, advice and encouragement. In particular, I wish to thank C.M. Drury and A.W. Johnson of Ottawa, and J.R. Mallory and M.B. Stein of McGill University, and my colleagues at York University—Colin Campbell, Thomas Hockin, David Shugarman, Donald Smiley and Michael Stevenson.

PREFACE - NOTES.

1. George J. Szablowski, "The Optimal Policy-Making System: Implications for the Canadian Political Process", in T.A. Hockin (ed.), Apex Of Power, Prentice-Hall, Scarborough, 1971; revised for the second edition, 1977.
2. Librairie Armand Colin, 1954. The English Translation by John Wilkinson was inspired by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions of the Fund for the Republic and published by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. and Random House, Inc., in 1964.
3. See Szablowski, "The Optimal Policy-Making System", (1977), op. cit., pp. 200-204.
4. John W. Langford, Transport In Transition, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and London, 1976, pp. 6, 15, and 1-22.
5. Langford, Ibid., p. 214.

CHAPTER ONE.

THE NORMATIVE SETTING.

It is apparent that we have entered into a new era in public decision-making and public administration, both at the federal and provincial levels in Canada. It promises to be a period characterized by a high degree of optimism at the elite level, a conviction that powerful analytic and technological capabilities are transforming the decision-making processes and thus vastly improving the quality and the effectiveness of the decisions themselves. For the first time in history, the optimists argue, governments have the tools to do the job. It is, therefore, their moral duty to use them to the fullest. Yehezkel Dror captures the central idea:

"Insofar as knowledge relevant to human action becomes available, it is our moral duty, as well as our best bet, to use it as much as possible. ... Put in these terms, it seems to me that careful but determined and purposeful redesigning of the public policy-making system must be our best strategy."¹

In the fall of 1970, appearing before a group of federal officials assembled in an Ottawa library auditorium, Dror repeated his belief in the moral duty of the governmental elites to strive toward the optimal model. No one had shown surprise or attempted to question him on this point.²

This normative imperative, or moral duty, is dictated by the sensing of extraordinary challenges and threats which governments are facing today. An increasing inter-dependence and complexity of events and issues are imposing progressively heavier burdens on public decision-makers and administrators. A fear that society (and in particular its bureaucratic components) may be developing an entropic condition, characterized by the "absence of form, pattern, hierarchy or differentiation" and exhibiting a general trend towards uniformity, randomness and disorder, is said to compound these burdens.³ Fundamental questions are raised about the dominance of technology, about the limits of biospheric and environmental endurance, about the alternatives to uncontrolled growth.

It is now taken for granted that if governments do not begin to anticipate and plan comprehensively, many of the desirable "possible futures" may be permanently eliminated leaving only the second-rate alternatives for our children and our children's children to pursue and experience.

"There is a continual dying of possible futures, and two mistakes are common: to be unaware of them while they are alive, and to be unaware of their death when they have been killed off by the lack of discovery."⁴

And Marion Levy warns that:

"As interdependency increases, the probability that any particular stupidity will have increased large catastrophic implications also mounts.

If the curve of knowledge falls below the curve of requisite knowledge, avoidance of catastrophe is a function of luck."⁵

Dror calls attention to a possibility that

"Although the amount of available knowledge is increasing and so is its quality, public policy-making falls further below both what it could be and what it must be."⁶

In October 1970, The Speech from the Throne, traditionally a mundane and uninspiring document, unexpectedly assumed a prophetic and highly philosophical tone:

"Because of the clash between these new values and the old, because of the quest by the young and the disillusioned for some resolution of attitudes, we live in a period of tenseness and unease. It is an age frequented by violence as desperate men seek ill-defined goals; an age of frustration as gentle men question impatiently old assumptions, it is an age in which the life support system for the biosphere may collapse unless man reverses his present course and begins again to live in harmony, rather than in competition, with his environment. It is an age in which the forces of science and technology now in motion are so massive, so swift, and so comprehensive that man may be facing his last opportunity to control his own destiny rather than be subject to it. ... Man can no longer afford the luxury of reacting to events. He must anticipate and plan."⁷

The Speech echoed the concerns expressed by many contemporary writers who see the modern period following World War II threatened by

"continued increase in the efficacy of the

technology of production which poses a growing challenge to the primacy of the values these means are supposed to serve. ... Which alternative prevails will determine whether society is to be the servant or the master of the instruments it creates."⁸

Others, however, view the same issue from a different perspective. They argue that if our social and political organizations are to escape the "entropy trap", they must develop and use "anti-entropic technology", one which will sharpen the issues and the contending solutions, concentrate (rather than diffuse) organizational and political resources, infuse a measure of organizational differentiation and inter-organizational tension, and increase the potential for energy and activity. Boulding defines entropy as "the principle of diminishing potential" and suggests that it applies to the economic and socio-political systems as well as to the physical and biological systems.

"There is (he claims) a kind of thermodynamic dismal theorem which sees the end of the universe as a uniform soup in which the absence of any differentiation and the dominance of an all-pervasive uniformity make any kind of further activity impossible. All things will be at the same temperature, all matter will be evenly distributed, and nothing more can happen."⁹

Many contend that large bureaucratic organizations exhibit analogous internal conditions which support inertia and inactivity.

In Ontario, the Cronyn Committee (Committee on Government Productivity) foresaw "revolutionary circumstances and issues

quite different from those with which any government has had to deal in the relatively evolutionary decades in the past". It recommended, inter alia, a "universal approach" to problems and suggested that government must "anticipate change rather than merely react to it", and "become bigger and involved in problems of increasing magnitude".¹⁰

The notions of abundance and growth, and therefore of a relatively unrestricted freedom to pursue divergent and conflicting social and economic goals without prior calculation and ongoing controls appear to be no longer accepted. In their place emerge the ideas of scarcity and rationality as currently dominant themes preoccupying those concerned with the future of the North American continent. "Scarcity", writes Edward Shils, "combined with rationality and efficiency imposes the notion of priority and leads to a decisional technique called the 'optimal allocation of resources among preferred objectives'".¹¹ He asserts further that:

"The notion that a whole society could be planned deliberately in a way that could shape it for a long time to come presupposes not only a pervasive knowledge of the present state of society but also the ability to foresee the subsequent behaviour of its component parts."¹²

The Economic Council of Canada devoted its entire 8th Annual Review to a "design for decision-making". In the second chapter, the Council argues that the role of government in society is increasing and that the explanation of this continuing trend

"lies within a complex decision-making process".¹³ Sylvia Ostry of the Economic Council of Canada adds:

"Clearly there is a growing public concern for improving these processes. This concern reflects many factors, including the rapid growth in the scale and scope of government activities, the spreading recognition that government decisions now have greater consequences for good or for ill than ever before, and the heightened pace of change in our complex modern society."¹⁴

Two themes appear to dominate this Review as well as almost every government or government-sponsored document dealing with public decision-making: first, a conviction that governmental decisions now have greater consequences for society; and second, a commitment that the processes of decision-making can and must be improved in order to improve the decisions themselves. And yet, barely a dozen years ago the Glassco Commission recommended major changes in the organization of government based on a new "plan for management". These reforms were expected to bring about a considerable improvement in the allocation and use of public resources, in particular money and personnel. In addition, they have led to a realignment of power within the bureaucratic establishment.¹⁵

Professor James Mallory wrote that "the impact of the Glassco Report on central administration in Canada is bound to be revolutionary".¹⁶ However, the authors of the 8th Annual Review perceive the effect of the Commission's recommendations in some-

what different terms. They compare its work with that of the Hoover Commission in the United States and claim that its principal contribution was "the creation of a climate for change".¹⁷ From today's perspective, the management philosophy adopted by the Commissioners and the organizational measures introduced by them (which were not intended to affect the Cabinet and the ministerial level of decision-making) seem rather pale in comparison with the structural and process reforms engineered between 1968 and 1972. In my view, these recent reforms go much beyond the relatively limited notions of good management and input efficiency.

"Very few political leaders, administrators, or even academics seem to grasp the fact that the planning-programming-budgeting concept introduces a fresh way of thinking about government activities. PPB introduces the business orientation of concentrating upon product as the basis for all major decisions. In so doing, it paves the way for a new era of rationalization in government management based upon an output-oriented value system."¹⁸

In addition, the emphasis on policy analysis and policy evaluation did not take root until 1969.

"Impetus to the analytical component came in 1969 when the Treasury Board eliminated the 'management improvement branch' and created instead its 'planning branch'. ... This took place in the context of greater emphasis on planning in the late 1960s as reflected in the establishment of a Cabinet committee on priorities and planning, a number of other 'functional' committees of Cabinet concerned with economic, social, external, defense, and other policy fields, and a planning staff within the Privy Council Office."¹⁹

The thrust of the innovations beginning with the Plan-

ning-Programming-Budgeting system introduced under Prime Minister Lester Pearson and the development of logical extensions of it through Cabinet and Privy Council Office reforms under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau is toward what might best be called optimal policy-making. To be sure, the optimal policy-making system in the government of Canada is still largely theoretical. Many will claim with justification that the new structures and decisional procedures introduced in recent years do not resemble a comprehensive system, and that in the reality of politics neither the processes of decision-making nor their outputs can be called optimal. While it would be difficult to disagree with such an assessment today, it is highly unrealistic to disregard the systems oriented structural groundwork which has already been laid,²⁰ the linkages which have been established and the acceptance of the normative assumptions upon which the optimal model rests.²¹ It can be expected that once a new technology—in this instance decisional technology—has been introduced and it proves to be partially successful, its application and further extension will be difficult to resist.²²

In a speech delivered on June 18th, 1970, at the conference of the Society of Industrial Accountants in Toronto, A.W. Johnson, then Secretary of the Treasury Board, talked about the roles of the Secretariat's Planning Branch, the Program Branch and the PPB "in the context of the broad strategy of government planning". He stressed that "to complete the description of roles in

PPB ... one ought to speak of the strategic role which is played in the planning process by the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office" and of "the close liaison" that the Treasury Board Secretariat maintains with these offices. "This is essential if PPB is to take account of and to reflect the broadest strategy of public policy in the planning process".²³

Decisional technology did not originate in Canada. Robert McNamara introduced one of the first techniques (Planning-Programming-Budgeting) into the United States Department of Defense in 1961. Within a few years, the optimists claim, it gave him unparalleled central control capability over the armed forces and restructured the competition for national resources traditionally carried on by the various segments of the American military establishment.²⁴

"Cynics to the contrary notwithstanding, knowledge is power"

wrote Charles Schultze, President Johnson's Director of the Bureau of the Budget.²⁵ There was no surprise, therefore, when in 1965 in a public statement, Johnson extended the application of PPB to all civilian agencies of the United States federal government, calling the new system "revolutionary".²⁶

It took only a little time and the issues were joined in a new debate.²⁷ The pluralist argued that the essence of political decision-making is "the activity by which bargains are struck and allocations negotiated",²⁸ between contending interests. On the

assumption that no group, including the government, can claim a monopoly on wisdom, public policy must emerge as a result of the process of reconciliation of divergent values and goals and the competing groups identified with them. The final shape of a decision depends on the relative power of the participating groups and on the political impact of the different arguments employed by them. The pluralist critics of the optimal model feared that the newly adopted decisional technology with its emphasis on procedural rigour and precision rather than on political bargaining, with its stress on explicit identification and examination of values and goals, and with its insistence on allocating resources to preferred objectives articulated by governmental elites would tend to ignore competing groups and interests, favour the central government executive, and force a far reaching redistribution of public resources.

It is now clear that these fears rested on shaky foundations. In June of 1971, George Shultz, Director of the Office of Management and Budget in the United States government, instructed all federal departments and agencies to discontinue submissions of

"multi-year program and financing plans, program memoranda and special analytical studies ... or schedules ... that reconcile information classified according to their program and appropriation structures."²⁹

This, however, does not mean that PPBS has been totally terminated in Washington. In March of 1972, Deputy Director of the Office of

Management and Budget insisted that it

"is still very much alive, and in use. We are making refinements and improvements to it, but we have not abandoned it."³⁰

According to Schick,

"PPB failed to penetrate because the budgeters didn't let it in and the PPB'ers didn't know how to break down the resistance."³¹

Professor Robert Presthus offers the most credible explanation:

"Perhaps the most basic problem that led to the PPB's demise was the clash of its essentially analytical nature with the entrenched, anti-analytical assumptions of existing budgetary procedures. ... In an environment such as bureaucracy (especially a budget bureaucracy) where conflict situations are avoided whenever possible and where most analytical exercises are geared toward justifying existing programs and continuing existing expenditure patterns, the inquisitive and analytical nature of PPB may easily be perceived to be a threat."³²

Typically, the PPB system slipped quietly into the Canadian scene in 1967, and was left almost unnoticed.³³ There was no high level public announcement and no theoretical debate. Canadian political scientists appeared to be largely unaware of the issues involved and yet these issues were, and still are, substantially more critical for Canada than for the United States.

Those for whom decisional technology serves as a tool of the trade show a keen awareness of the issues. While admitting that "one must not idealize the political process" with its "deep rooted institutional barriers to improving the policy and administrative

efficiency of government", Johnson cautions that the

"PPB experts should not try to force the politician to substitute the rational contemplation of objectives for the intuitive perception of the needs of the community and their solution. Rather, PPB should serve as the bridge between the intuitive perception of problems and the rational choice of programmes." And it "should not be looked on as hostile to the political process."³⁴

In spite of Johnson's pious hope, such a hostility appears to be unavoidable. It exists not only between the "inquisitive and analytical nature" of program budgeting and the traditional traits of bureaucratic behaviour, but also—and more importantly—between all the basic components of the optimal model and the political process in Canada. Decisional technologies are rooted in closely related prescriptive theories—such as budgetary theory, management theory, decision theory, systems theory, cybernetics, and policy sciences in general—and were developed in particular places in response to particular needs and pressures, and for a particular type of authoritative structure. Rand Corporation and, to a much lesser extent, Harvard Business School represent two such highly prominent places. Strategic planning for war and corporate designs for control of the markets and maximization of the profits exemplify the needs and the pressures. A unitary structure backed by a homogeneous support of interested parties and protected from open accountability by secrecy and confidentiality describes the type of authority most congruent with the prescriptions of the optimal model.³⁵ Efforts to fit and adapt notwithstanding, imported decisional technologies applied in

a specific national setting fail to take fully into account the constitutional, political and behavioural characteristics of the polity. They are in reality grafted upon the existing political institutions, either with little regard for traditional constitutional theory and the prevailing style of political (including bureaucratic) behaviour, or with the implicit intention to control and modify them.

From this perspective, the feasibility of the optimal model depends largely on the power and endurance of the constraints and impediments which distinguish the Canadian political system, and its executive/bureaucratic component. It is important to note briefly some of these constraints and impediments.

Canada lacks a strong nationally homogeneous political culture which could form a basis of support for optimally generated federal policies. This view is shared by, among others, S.J.R. Noel, John Meisel, E. Black and Alan Cairns, J.M.S. Careless, John Porter, J.C. Johnston, and Richard Simeon.³⁶ The government of Canada, however, appears to rely on a different view of Canadian political culture expressed in the following terms:

"The sense of community that exists in Canada provides the third essential reason for a federal spending power. Canadians everywhere now feel a sufficient sense of responsibility for their compatriots in other parts of the country that they are prepared to contribute to their well being."³⁷

However, the possibility should not be ruled out that political or

economic crises may play an increasingly important role in mobilizing and successively building layers of national consensus for major changes in policy direction. Such a possibility, however, should not be exaggerated. Even though it may be true that the control and guidance capacity of a government increases appreciably—even in the absence of a strong national political culture—in times of war or declared emergency because of the increase in its legal power and the crisis psychology of the public, such emergencies are still the exception not the rule in Canadian political life.³⁸

The Canadian ethno-linguistic dualism is not only rooted in history and tradition but also sanctioned territorially, institutionally and legally.³⁹ The often repeated argument that the federal Parliament represents (within its constitutional authority) the francophone population of Quebec to the same extent as l'Assemblée Nationale is constitutionally accurate but sociologically artificial. The "right" of the government of Quebec to bargain and negotiate with the government of Canada on issues of national policy is not quite like that of the other provinces. The unique position of Quebec is rooted in its overriding commitment to cultural survival as it may be defined from time to time by the provincial government. The ever present possibility of infringing this commitment constitutes a very real impediment to optimal decision-making at the federal level. All provincial governments are currently growing considerably in stature and decisional capability; they are likely to insist on a much

stronger and more comprehensive definition of the provincial interest.

Richard Simeon, describing intergovernmental diplomacy in Canada, wrote:

"The participants operate in a complex environment. They are active on many fronts at once: in the federal provincial negotiations, in trying to woo investors, in dealing with their own legislatures, and in efforts to maintain themselves in power. Goals in any one arena may conflict with those in another; a resource in one game may be a liability in another; and tactics appropriate to one set of concerns may be inappropriate to another. This means that actors must continually balance the perceived requirements of one arena with those of others."⁴⁰

Such a highly politicized environment which engulfs intergovernmental relations in Canada is not congruent with the prescriptions of the optimal model. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the inherent tendency of the optimal model towards comprehensiveness would not lead to successive intergovernmental conflicts over policy objectives and priorities and would not result in a continuous and fierce competition for scarce resources, both tangible and intangible. Canadian governing elites, both federal and provincial, prefer concessions to conflict. This traditional form of accommodation recognizes the continued strength of regional identification and the political influence of regional and provincial leaders. To the extent that consociational behaviour is institutionalized, it acts as a constraint on optimal decision-making.⁴¹

In summary, by way an overview, I have attempted to pre-

sent in this chapter a broadly drawn picture of the normative setting in Ottawa between 1968 and 1972. On the one hand, this setting had facilitated the introduction of decisional technology into the structure and processes of government. On the other hand, it brought into full light the fundamental incongruence between systematic and planned governing, and traditional and deeply rooted conventions of the Canadian political process. Let us restate the principal elements of this normative strategy:

- 1) Government perceives extraordinary challenges and threats: intensified clashes over values, extreme complexity and interdependence of issues and problems, tendency toward social entropy, over-dominance of technology, scarcity of natural resources, need for viable alternatives to uncontrolled growth.
- 2) High moral duty is invoked in order to mobilize commitment to meet these challenges and threats, and an attempt is made to harness and utilize all relevant knowledge to improve public decision-making processes and, in consequence, the decisions themselves.
- 3) This attempt focuses on the development of a prescriptive new knowledge which I call decisional technology. It is hoped that by grafting it upon the existing political and bureaucratic institutions and processes, a new machinery of government will evolve capable of meeting effectively

the perceived threats and challenges of the future.

In the next chapter, I will discuss the prescriptive theories which form the basis of decisional technology as a tool for political control.

CHAPTER ONE - NOTES.

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2. From personal experience (Ottawa, July 1970).
3. This definition of entropy is given in Webster's New International Dictionary, 1969. For a highly suggestive discussion of entropy in the biological and physical systems and analogous application of it to the economic and socio-political field, see Kenneth E. Boulding, The Meaning Of The 20th Century, Harper Colophon Books, 1965, pp. 137-156; for a contrary view claiming that social systems, unlike biological organisms, "are capable of almost indefinite arresting of the entropic process", see Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology Of Organizations, John Wiley, 1966, pp. 21-22.
4. Bertrand de Jouvenel quoted by John Wilkinson, in Futuribles, Innovation And Stability, Centre Diary, The Fund of the Republic, Santa Barbara, March/April 1967, p. 18.
5. Marion J. Levy, "Does It Matter If He Is Naked, Bawled The Child", in Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches To International Politics, Princeton, 1969, p. 90.
6. Dror, (1968), op. cit., p. 9.
7. House of Commons, Hansard, October 8, 1970.
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9. Boulding, (1965), op. cit., pp. 138-139.
10. Committee on Government Productivity, Interim Reports No. 1 (December 1970), No. 2 (March 1971), No. 3 (December 1971), Toronto, Queen's Printer.
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13. Economic Council of Canada, 8th Annual Review, September 1971, Information Canada, pp. 14-15.
14. Introduction to New Approaches To Public Decision-Making by Alice M. Rivlin, Special Study No. 18, prepared for the Economic Council of Canada, Information Canada, 1972, p. v.
15. For an excellent critical assessment of the Glassco Commission's principal recommendations and their consequences see J.R. Mallory, The Structure Of Canadian Government, Macmillan of Canada, 1971, pp. 163-175.
16. Mallory, *ibid.*, p. 170.
17. Economic Council of Canada, (1971), op. cit., p. 43.
18. David F. Parker, "Comment: The Inadequacy of Traditional Theories And The Promise Of PPB As A Systems Approach", in Frank Marini (ed.), Toward A New Public Administration, Chandler, 1971, p. 305.

19. Economic Council of Canada, (1971), op. cit., p. 44.

20. "A basic assumption of the Canadian PPB System is that systems analysis is essential to the implementation and success of the System. Departments will be encouraged to set up small staffs of analysts in close relationships to the deputy head and his program directors."

Government of Canada, Treasury Board, Planning, Programming, Budgeting Guide, (revised edition), September 1969, Queen's Printer, p. 14.

21. See G. Bruce Doern, "Mr. Trudeau, The Science Council, And PPB: Recent Changes In The Philosophy Of Policy-Making In Canada", a paper presented at the CPSA annual meeting, Winnipeg, 1970.

22. This conclusion has been already borne out by the events. The publication of the PPB Guide (revised edition) in 1969 where it was asserted that

"the adoption of an analytic approach to governmental decision-making ... is probably inevitable in a complex society" (p. 6)

has been complemented by the informal promotion by the Treasury Board Secretariat of the Management by Objectives technique (MBO), and more recently by the implementation of the Operational Performance Measurement System (OPMS). In the manual on OPMS (vol. 1) issued in January 1974, the intellectual and institutional continuity from PPBS to MBO and OPMS is fully acknowledged. See Treasury Board, Government of Canada, Operational Performance Measurement, vol. 1,

pp. 1-2. It must be noted, however, that the formal introduction of these new technologies is not tantamount to their effective operation in the context of executive/bureaucratic politics.

23. Quoted with the permission of the author from a mimeographed copy of the prepared text obtained from Mr. A.W. Johnson.
24. Allan Schick, "Systems Politics And Systems Budgeting", Public Administration Review, March/April 1969, p. 139. Virginia Held, "PPBS Comes To Washington", in F.J. Lyden and E.G. Miller, Planning, Programming, Budgeting: A Systems Approach To Management, Markham, 1968, pp. 11-26.
25. Charles Schultze, Politics And Economics Of Public Spending, Washington D.C., 1968, p. 94.
26. Held, (1968), op. cit.
27. See "A Symposium on PPBS", in Public Administration Review, December 1966; note especially Aaron Wildavsky's paper entitled "A Political Economy Of Efficiency"; see also Charles Lindblom, The Intelligence Of Democracy, The Free Press, 1965; "A Symposium On PPBS Re-examined" in Public Administration Review, March/April 1969. Two earlier works preceded the debate: Aaron Wildavsky's, The Politics Of The Budgetary Process, Little Brown, 1964; and David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom's, A Strategy Of Decision, The Free Press, 1963.
28. Schick, (1969), op. cit.

29. As cited by Allen Schick in "A Death In The Bureaucracy: The Demise Of Federal PPB", Public Administration Review, vol. 33, March/April 1973, p. 146.
30. As quoted by Presthus from Congressional Hearings, March 1, 1972, p. 27.
31. Schick, (1973), op. cit., p. 149.
32. Robert Presthus, Public Administration, sixth edition, Ronald Press, N.Y., 1975, p. 83.
33. Treasury Board Secretariat, Press Release, January 26th, 1967. Also see Doern, "Mr. Trudeau, The Science Council And PPB", (1970), op. cit., pp. 24-32.
34. Johnson, (1970), op. cit.
35. For the history of the application of systems analysis to decision-making and the roles played in it by the Rand Corporation and the U.S. Department of Defense, see Ida R. Hoos, Systems Analysis In Public Policy, University of California Press, 1972, pp. 42-67. Hoos acknowledges that

"the systems approach is a lineal descendant of, and shares a common heritage with, operations research ... (a technique which) emerged in its present form during World War II, when the British High Command sought the help of teams of physicists, biologists, mathematicians, and other specialists to devise strategy for incorporating advanced and unconventional equipment into the air defence system." (p. 42)
36. See S.J.R. Noel, "Political Parties And Elite Accommodation", C.P.S.A., Winnipeg, 1970. John Meisel, "Canadian Parties

- And Politics", in R.H. Leach (ed.), Contemporary Canada, 1968. E. Black and A. Cairns, "A Different Perspective On Canadian Federalism", in J.P. Meekison (ed.), Canadian Federalism—Myth Or Reality, Toronto, 1968. J.M.S. Careless, "Limited Identities In Canada", C.H.R., vol. L, no. 1, March 1969. John Porter, "The Canadian National Character In The Twentieth Century", in The Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Sciences, March 1967, p. 48. J.C. Johnstone, "Definitions Of Canadian Society", in Kruhlak, Schultz, Pobihushchy (eds.), Canadian Political Process, Toronto, 1970, p. 383. Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy—The Making Of Recent Policy In Canada, University of Toronto Press, 1972, pp. 22-23.
37. Government of Canada, Federal Provincial Grants And The Spending Power Of Parliament, working paper on the Constitution, Queen's Printer, 1969, p. 28.
 38. Cf. Klaus Knorr, The War Potential Among Nations, Princeton, 1955.
 39. For a definition of federalism which takes full account of these factors, see Michael Stein, "Federal Political Systems And Federal Societies", World Politics, July 1968, pp. 729 and 731.
 40. Simeon, (1972), op. cit., p. 308.
 41. For a brief critique of consociational theory as applied to

Canada, see my "Prime Minister As Symbol: A Rejoinder", C.J.P.S., September 1973, vol. VI, p. 516. Consociational theory was developed by Arend Lijphart in "Consociational Democracy", World Politics, XXI, no. 2, January 1969, p. 207. S.J.R. Noel adapted Lijphart's theory to the Canadian political process in "Political Parties And Elite Accommodation", C.P.S.A., Winnipeg 1970, mimeo. In this connection, see also Arend Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity And Theories Of Integration", C.J.P.S., IV, March 1971, pp. 1-14.

CHAPTER TWO.

THE DECISIONAL TECHNOLOGY: KNOWLEDGE FOR POLITICAL CONTROL.

It will be helpful to distinguish behavioural technology from technology in general. The latter concept has several accepted meanings, one of which is most relevant for my purpose: organized knowledge used in the execution of practical tasks or the solution of practical problems.¹ Behavioural technology is a somewhat narrower concept; it refers to that kind of organized knowledge which may be used in the undertaking of a particular type of practical task and problem, namely in the modification and control of human behaviour.² Decision-making, or more precisely, decision-making conducted by elected politicians and appointed public officials within the executive-bureaucratic institutional context, is a specific subset of human behaviour. I will thus use the term decisional technology to refer to that kind of organized knowledge which may be used for the modification and control of executive-bureaucratic decision-making in government, and more particularly in Cabinet committees, interdepartmental committees, and in central agencies of the federal government.³

Allen Schick who coined the phrase "new decisional and informational technologies" lists operations research, cost-benefit

analysis, and systems analysis as their earliest and most prominent examples.⁴ This list could now be considerably extended, and it seems reasonably safe to predict that the expansion will continue. We already have PPBS (Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System) introduced in Ottawa in 1967, which in reality combines a number of related technologies, MBO (Management-by-Objectives), and OPMS (Operational-Performance-Measurement-System) begun in the 1970s which also utilizes several technologies.⁵ It is not my intention either to describe or analyze in detail the many technologies employed today by governments, including the government of Canada. Literature on this subject is already abundant.⁶ What has been and continues to be lacking, however, is a synthesis bringing together the principal theoretical disciplines which gave birth to technological decision-making and showing the inevitable logic in the history of these developments.

Budgetary theory must be examined first. It grew out of the need and desire to control⁷ corporate investment and government spending enhanced by the continuous growth of business and personal profits, and correspondingly, government revenues. The motivation for control was the abundance of money and the new economic and political importance that had to be placed on the disposal of it. Paradoxically, scarcity is one of the fundamental assumptions of the budgetary theory. However, when used by economists

and budgetary experts, it does not mean rareness or dearth, but rather an amount not large enough to satisfy all claimants in full.

In government, the budgetary theory together with the norms of financial administration and accountability provides the executive/bureaucratic decision-makers with all the rationale and legitimation they need to carry on the desired expenditure program. Cost-efficiency and cost effectiveness measurements are intended to govern specific allocations while a scale of priorities is designed to determine the basic pattern of expenditure distribution. Although the theory recognizes the role of Parliament in reviewing and approving budgetary appropriations, in reality the norms and symbols which it expresses constitute a strong alternative reassurance directly to the public that their tax dollar is spent with probity and prudence. At the same time, the theory effectively shields from the public, and in large measure also from Parliament, the crucial and often intense bargaining over the substance of the budgetary allocations which takes place within the confines of the executive/bureaucratic system.⁸

In corporate business, budgetary theory and financial management provide the necessary normative superstructure within which conflicting pressures toward growth and diversification, toward market consolidation and control, toward accountability to the

governmental tax collector and to the shareholders can be accommodated. In addition, the desired investment policy is legitimized and justified, and long range corporate planning becomes possible. The norms and symbols expressed in reports to shareholders certified by chartered specialists, and in complex tax and information returns anointed by experts, guard against unwanted intrusion by the public and protect the autonomy of corporate control.⁹

It is not my wish or intention to ignore or minimize the practical utility of budgeting and financial management either in government or in industry. However, it is mainly through the expressive elements of relevant prescriptive theories that one can trace their common characteristics and understand the logic of technological decision-making.¹⁰

Budgetary theory makes sense only in an organizational setting; it is designed for a complex organization and serves its needs and objectives. As it is concerned with the control of only one resource, namely money (whether represented as profit, revenue, investment, expenditure, budget, or any other technical label), it remains inadequate and incomplete. The prescriptions about efficiency, effectiveness, allocation according to priority, financial probity and prudence are empty without a congruent set of norms aiming at the control of the organizational structure. These are

provided by the management theory and organization theory.¹¹

The prescriptive management theory was created in response to the perceived need to reassert control over structure in both public and private bureaucracies. The formal, manifest rules and relationships reflect only in a small way the internal life of the bureaucratic systems. The survival of these systems, their internal stability and status quo are largely protected by informal behavioural arrangements hidden behind the facade of formal structure.¹² Management theorists and designers appear not to realize that without an explicit articulation and an understanding of such behavioural arrangements, or informal structure, control over any bureaucratic organization is impossible.

"They seem to feel (writes Victor Thompson) that all latent behaviour can be made manifest and, consequently, subject to conscious human direction."¹³

The informal structure (which Thompson calls the 'natural system', as distinct from the 'artificial system') may include rules and relationships which favour strong independence and distinctiveness of the component parts in a large bureaucratic organization (i.e. departments and agencies), promote socialization against innovation and change, protect superfluous and overlapping activities and tasks, foster internal conflicts between competing units and their resolution by bargaining and coalitions. In many aspects,

then, these informal arrangements appear to be highly incongruent with the monocratic, legal-rational model of bureaucracy.¹⁴ For management theorists and designers they pose the most difficult, if not insurmountable, problem of integration between the formal and informal structure.

An illustration may help clarify my argument. Although there were no formal rules against the hiring and promotion of francophone Canadians to senior positions in the public service (on the contrary, the manifest, frequently proclaimed values were fairness and objectivity), the merit system was interpreted and applied in such a way that, in effect, relatively few francophones were being appointed and promoted.¹⁵ These informal behavioural arrangements about merit and promotion—which still are not easy to specify—served to protect the departmental bureaucracies from the perceived threat of francophone presence and potential influence in Ottawa. Today, while the official policy has deliberately challenged the protective, status quo oriented application of merit, one must expect that new informal arrangements are at work aiming to slow down, to cushion and even to circumvent the effects of intended change.

In summary, the prescriptions of the management theory seek two goals: first, an effective control over informal structure expressed in a largely hidden, latent pattern of rules and rela-

tionships and intended to protect the status quo and prevent innovation and change in governmental bureaucracies; second, an explicit integration of the informal structure with formal structure.

Thompson correctly observes that

"The natural or latent system can never be eliminated, or even diminished, although it changes in response to the artificial system."¹⁶

As soon as a new design for management is introduced, the process of internal adaptation begins, forging a set of behavioural arrangements which permit the bureaucratic system to survive and maintain itself notwithstanding. Whether a substantive change does actually occur depends on the perspective one chooses to adopt. Those who focus on the new design perceive a considerable structural and behavioural innovation; those who stress the informal bureaucratic arrangements insist that nothing has changed except tactics.

The new design, however, does serve another purpose. To the extent that management theory can claim scientific foundations and invoke the familiar norms of efficiency, effectiveness, and performance, it adds status and legitimacy to the bureaucratic institutions and purports to increase the power of their decision-making units. Aware of these potential benefits, governmental bureaucracies rarely oppose management innovations—in fact they often welcome them as opportunities for testing the strength of their adaptive capabilities.

An illustration should be helpful here. Anthony's Planning And Control Systems¹⁷ has received an unusual degree of recognition in Ottawa. It proposes a comprehensive framework for management distinguished by a high degree of conceptual consistency, precision, and apparent simplicity. Anthony's three main categories of activities—strategic planning, management control, and operational control—have been adopted with some modifications by a number of departments and agencies in Ottawa, and have been used and quoted with approval in writings and publications emanating from governmental sources. For example, recent reorganization in the Department of External Affairs has been described as follows:

"... The headquarters organization has been redesigned to encourage the closest possible relation between the discharge of operational responsibilities and the continuous development of the policy framework within which operations must be conducted. ... In order that top management (the Under-Secretary, Associate Under-Secretary and five Assistant Under-Secretaries) may be free to concentrate on policy formulation and direction, responsibility for departmental operations within established policy has been delegated to the directors-general of a number of bureaux that compose the main body of the Department. ... The new structure is meant to exploit the advantages offered by the adoption of the idea of country planning and management ..."¹⁸

As should be expected, these reforms have been engineered "in the effort to achieve greater strength and flexibility". But the real effects of these changes cannot be assessed without taking into account the pattern of informal arrangements and prac-

tices which characterize the foreign service community.

The formal and informal relationships which make up bureaucratic structure tend to coalesce along recognized sequences of events. Many of these sequences are cyclical; they recur year after year with amazing regularity. The reason is simple: all allocative processes must be linked to the annual budgetary cycle which determines the distribution of money—clearly the most important bureaucratic resource. Norms intended to control structure, whether successfully or not, cannot encompass process: a series of events over time. The dynamic, on-going nature of decision-making has led to the development of a process oriented prescriptive theory—the decision theory. Its avowed function is to control sequences of events and make sure that they bring about the desired outcomes.

Most writers on the subject agree that decision-making is the generic concept; and policy-making, allocation of resources, priority determination, and strategy are its derivatives.¹⁹

Even routine administration and implementation of existing policy are processes of decisions—of the non-cyclical variety. In short, from a dynamic, time-plus-sequence perspective, the executive/bureaucratic system looks like a complex web of intersecting streams, some cyclical and some non-cyclical, where decisions represent signposts amidst the constant flow of information. In my

discussion of prescriptive decision theory, the range of this view will be narrowed to include only those processes which are devoted to two categories of decisions: first, the formulation of substantive objectives, and second, the formulation of procedures and strategies for achieving these objectives (including all allocative processes), and for evaluating performance and unintended consequences.²⁰

More specifically, decision theory used by governmental decision-makers must provide norms or prescriptions about each of the following processes:

- 1) identification of the issue or problem to be dealt with;
- 2) discussion of the preferred states (objectives) relative to the issue or problem;
- 3) discussion of the strategies, plans or programs through the instrumentality of which the objectives are to be achieved, and when they are to be achieved;
- 4) consideration of the resources (manpower, budgets, knowledge, etc.) which are to be allocated, including the symbolic/persuasive resources (status, legitimacy, support, coalitions) which must be marshalled if the instrumental strategy is to be successful;
- 5) consideration of the organizational unit or units which are to be responsible for the implementation of the strategy, and for the efficient and effective management of the allocated

and marshalled resources in conformity with the objectives sought;

- 6) discussion of the time and the conditions when the success of the adopted strategy is to be evaluated and the degree of performance measured (including an evaluation of the unintended consequences or externalities) and communicated to the decision-makers;
- 7) consideration of the termination or modification of the strategy in the light of the communicated results and consequences.²¹

In addition, decision theory must furnish the decision-makers with guidance about the following technical sub-processes:

- 1) collection and analysis of relevant data and information;
- 2) listing of all available courses of action or alternatives;
- 3) calculation and analysis of all likely consequences that each alternative course of action may produce;
- 4) ranking of the alternatives;
- 5) choosing one course of action in the light of all constraints revealed by analysis.²²

I will discuss selected writings in normative decision theory from the perspective of two questions: the question of an agreement on values; and, the question of a generally applicable (cardinal) criterion for choice.²³

Values enter into the decision-making processes at

many points, but two of them are most crucial: the selection of an issue or problem (among all contending issues and problems) to be dealt with; and, the selection of preferred states or objectives. Because decision-making in government involves groups or collectivities of actors, some agreement on basic preferences would appear to be an essential prerequisite for further action. Decision theorists approach this question in two different ways. On one side of the spectrum are those who claim that, if values are stated clearly and categorically, an agreement is never possible (except perhaps in a crisis or emergency situation), and that consequently values must be handled implicitly and ambiguously--without rigour and precision--in order to minimize conflict and increase the chances of a workable *modus vivendi*. This position is assumed by writers supporting various approaches identified with "satisficing", "disjointed incrementalism", "mutual adjustment", and the like.²⁴

The opponents of this view are not unanimous on how values must be reconciled. They all contend, however, that without an explicit agreement in one form or another, rational decision-making is a mere pretence. Some insist on the fullest, most rigorous and unreserved scrutiny of the contending value preferences and a moral obligation to choose the best. Dror writes:

"A main implication of policy sciences for politics is that many tacit assumptions and

implicit choices are made explicit. Thus, goals of policies, underlying assumptions on the future, tacit megapolicy judgments, and patterns of handling uncertainty are all made explicit and are transformed from something to be worked out indirectly and rather unconsciously into explicit and quite clear-cut choice issues... Politics must be redesigned so as to be able to handle clear-cut alternatives, clarified values, and explicit assumptions much more than is presently the case."²⁵

With matching optimism, Harold Lasswell asserts that:

"The emerging policy scientist in our civilization is not only a professional in the sense that he combines skill with enlightened concern for the aggregate processes and consequences of decision. He belongs among the systematic contextualists who are also empirical ... the policy scientist is concerned with mastering the skills appropriate to enlightened decision in the context of public and civic order. ... He is searching for an optimum synthesis of the diverse skills that contribute to a dependable theory and practice of problem solving in the public interest."²⁶

Etzioni proposes a model that is

"less exacting than the rationalistic one but not as constricting in its perspective as the incremental approach, not as utopian as rationalism but not as conservative as incrementalism."²⁷

He calls it a mixed-scanning approach where only high-order, fundamental issues and problems (identified as such by the decision-makers from time to time) would call for a substantial degree of rigour and precision. Thus, conflict over values would arise less frequently but would have to be resolved without ambiguity in order to "set basic directions". Such periodic agreements on

fundamental values can then be 'corrected' and 'revised' by the on-going incremental processes. For "strategic occasions" (semi-encompassing reviews, overall reviews, initial reviews when an entirely new problem is considered, and the like), Etzioni prescribes a searching and repetitive scanning technique which includes the disclosure of

"normative objections ... which violate the basic values of the decision-makers, and political objections ... which violate the basic values or interests of other actors whose support seems essential for making the decision and/or implementing it."²⁸

Etzioni assumes that governmental decision-makers possess "some normative integrity" expressed in basic values and are more likely to compromise on secondary values under favourable circumstances. It must be noted that the mixed scanning approach has received considerable recognition in Ottawa and appears to be discernible in the review work of the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning.²⁹

One of the most perplexing issues in prescriptive decision theory is the problem of incommensurables. Rigour and precision demand that alternative courses of action be compared according to a generally applicable standard or a cardinal utility. The absence of such a common denominator to which all costs and all benefits could be reduced leads some theorists to the conclusion that rational choice is a fiction. For example, Thompson

argues that even

"in price system markets (where) everyone can register the intensity of his wants in a single commodity—money— ... the problem remains unsolved because we do not know how much each person values his money."³⁰

Others, however, continue to search for a meaningful answer moving either in the direction of greater precision and rigour or in the direction of a broad qualitative criterion of choice. Thus, Grauhan and Strubelt borrow an idea from Karl Deutsch and propose that decision-makers should apply "the principle of life enhancement" and evaluate the "probable real output" of each alternative in terms of its "pathological or destructive aspects" (which must be avoided) and in terms of its contribution to "life-enhancement".³¹ Michalos, in an attempt to mediate between the "maximizers and the satisficers", concludes that "an objective 'standard quality' ... is not impossible to realize" provided the decision-makers "accurately and consistently estimate(d) resulting benefits ... and resulting costs" of each proposed course of action. A tendency for one to "balance or outweigh" the other serves as a genuine "objective" criterion which

"does not require anyone to seek out the single 'best' course of action from any set of alternatives and it does not allow one merely to satisfy oneself that the value of an action is 'good enough'".³²

Hartle moves a step further on the rigour and precision continuum. He proposes a "comprehensive net worth approach" including a

"common classification system for potential effects" that each proposed course of action may produce. Such an approach

"could combine three existing concepts: the concept of net worth derived from accounting and the concepts of benefits and costs derived from economic theory. The comprehensive net worth of each individual can be defined to consist of the present value of his or her expected future benefits (assets) less the present value of his or her expected future costs (liabilities). Generally speaking accountants are only concerned with marketable assets and liabilities. But, in principle, at least some of the other non-marketable assets and liabilities can be included by imputing the values of non-dollar benefits and costs. Some of these benefits and costs can be imputed in a fairly straight-forward manner because there are market equivalents. Other benefits and costs can only be valued in the most arbitrary manner (e.g. the satisfaction derived from being a citizen of a nation that achieves a successful moon walk). While there would be little gained by having advisors impute values of such intangible benefits and costs, the comprehensive net worth framework would make it clear what is known (or objectively knowable) and what Ministerial judgments were required ... In analyzing each policy option the public servant could seek to determine for Ministers the likely changes in the elements of comprehensive net worth for groups of voters (e.g. by region, age, occupation, etc.) to the extent that estimates can be made on the basis of either market values or imputations related to market values, or simply by proxies relating to the circumstances implicit in the balance sheet entry. He could also use a framework to point out the imputations that Ministers have to make, implicitly or explicitly. This would assist Ministers in judging who would gain and who would lose under each alternative and by how much."³³

In spite of the inclusion of intangibles with imputed non-dollar

values (whatever they might be), Hartle's highly complex scheme exhibits the type of rigour and precision bias aptly expressed in the following sentence:

"The most useful common denominator is money and the exercise of ingenuity can make this measure applicable in some cases where it might seem unlikely at the first glance."³⁴

This examination of decision theory reveals that rigour and precision are the principal determinants of control. If agreed upon objectives are always defined in operational terms, if strategies for achieving them are selected from many alternatives after exhaustive comparisons, if all required resources are allocated with rigid efficiency, and if effectiveness and performance are continuously evaluated and the results fed back to the decision-makers—clearly under such circumstances the degree of control over these processes will be very high. However, the real world of decision-making continues to be dominated by conflict, struggle, threats, bargains and betrayals. Yet, optimal rationality remains a distant ideal—but not so distant that it cannot serve as a persuasive reminder of the direction in which governmental decision-making appears to develop.³⁵

The norms of rigour and precision play also another role. They conceal the serious substantive weaknesses of the decision theory, and substitute for politically and ethically difficult qualitative choices. The secrecy of most decisional processes pre-

vents the public from knowing to what extent, if any, rigorous analysis was actually responsible for specific choices. At the same time, the government can safely claim major improvements in decision-making with consequent benefits to the public. The validity of such claims can never be proved or disproved, but making them alone tends to foster reassurance and may add much needed legitimacy to the executive/bureaucratic institutions.

Systems theory, cybernetic theory, and finally the totality of normative and empirical disciplines focused on better decision-making and assembled under the heading of policy sciences, push the possibility of control to its ultimate theoretical level. Moreover, they exude a pervasive optimism about man's capacity to arrange society according to his best design. Dr. Pangloss (who taught "metaphysico-theologo-cosmolo-nigology") would have felt comfortably at home in such normative environment.

"It is demonstrated", he said, "that things cannot be otherwise, for everything being made for an end, everything is necessarily for the best end. Note that noses were made to wear spectacles, and so we have spectacles. Legs were visibly instituted to be breeched, and we have breeches. Stones were formed to be cut and to make into castles; so My Lord (the Baron) has a very handsome castle; the greatest baron in the province should be the best housed; and, pigs being made to be eaten, we eat pork all year around: consequently, those who have asserted that all is well said a foolish thing; they should have said that all is for the best."³⁶

Edward Shils wrote in 1968 about the

"notion that a whole society could be planned deliberately in a way that could shape it for a long time to come (which) presupposes not only a pervasive knowledge of the present state of society but also the ability to foresee the subsequent behaviour of its component parts."³⁷

Similar beliefs in the promises of "societal guidance", steering and enlightened control are expressed by Etzioni, Dror, Ilchman and Uphoff, Lasswell, and others.³⁸ I suspect that these beliefs have been largely generated by the persuasive power of the prescriptive models revealed by systems theory, cybernetic theory, and more recently, policy sciences.

First, I will examine three normative contributions of systems theory, namely, comprehensiveness, interrelatedness, and feedback and the manner in which they enhance the control potential over decision-making processes.³⁹

Political scientists and sociologists have used the system as an analytic framework for the study of politics and society, or any part thereof.⁴⁰ There is in my view a significant difference between such a heuristic use of this concept (which may be fruitful or not) and its application by governmental decision-makers in their search for solutions to concrete issues and problems. In the latter case alone, the identification of the systems model with real life may lead to decisions which are based on fictitious or misleading assumptions. On the other hand, it is difficult to deny the advanta-

ges which this model offers; a national health care program, for example, can be administered much more effectively if all of its activities are specified in systemic categories. Practically all computer operations, without which modern government is unthinkable, employ languages that are adaptations of systems terminology.

A system—being a theoretical construct—is comprehensive in the sense that, within its over-all purpose and boundary, it makes explicit all relationships, activities, processes and functions; nothing significant is left out. In decision-making, the norm of comprehensiveness, transplanted from the abstract model to real life, fosters repeated discoveries of new issues and problems, and eventually can create an endemic over-load of the executive/bureaucratic machine. In consequence, the need for stronger and more sophisticated methods of control increases. But although the central control agencies become more important, they can never fully cope with the magnitude of new burdens. The expanding roles of the Prime Minister's Office, Privy Council Office, and Treasury Board Secretariat since about 1968 provide good illustrations of this development.

All the elements in a theoretical system must be inter-related in such a way that a significant change in one of them affects in varying degree all the others. To maintain effective interrelatedness in an already complex organizational apparatus is a truly mammoth task which in practical terms is probably unattainable.

ble. It must, nevertheless, be attempted. The executive and the bureaucratic components of decision-making are thus formally linked together by a network of mixed, executive/bureaucratic units. New issue-areas are created cross-cutting the jurisdictions and responsibilities of the existing departments and agencies. In this structural context, an effort is made to examine and resolve social and economic problems rigorously as if they were all interrelated. But as a result, little can be accomplished without resorting to coordination on a massive scale. A euphemism for a particular mode of control, coordination fails to meet the challenge of interrelatedness, as the bureaucratic organizations respond with their own protective devices to countervail the apparent threat to their autonomies. The "crisis of coordination"⁴¹ becomes a permanent feature of governmental decision-making.

The notion of feedback, more than any other feature, links systems theory with cybernetics. It is through the instrumentality of this device that self-steering and self-adjustment may be accomplished. A truly constructive feedback must be negative—that is, the content of its message should be opposed to the main thrust of the output.⁴² In political terms, negative feedback represents the entire spectrum of activity directed against the government in power—from loyal opposition to revolution. More precisely, in public decision-making feedback consists of those elements (in policy or administration) which generate adverse consequences in society. The cumu-

lative strength of these consequences and the style in which they are communicated back to the political decision-makers should determine the scope of self-steering and adjustment. The most creative aspects of feedback are thus also the most threatening. They invite bureaucratic organizations to be their own executioners.

If the evaluation of performance in policy and administration must place particular emphasis on negative results which, in turn, will be used to "negate, oppose, or reverse ... current action"⁴³ and to modify organizational goals, what department or agency would be prepared to undertake it? Clearly, a rigorous process of self-evaluation and self-assessment, which the prescription of feedback requires, contains dangers which no governmental institution can ignore. Thus, although evaluation is said to be a component of managerial function, it is more and more subject to strict central control

"to ensure that departments have in fact introduced the performance measures and undertaken the management analyses which are seen to be desirable."⁴⁴

The acceptance of the notion of feedback as a rigorous process of self-evaluation (and a preferred norm) is made explicit in the following passage:

"What is new is the determination to embark upon formal and continuing studies of existing programs, using the sophisticated techniques of analysis which now are available for the purpose, and the decision to use such studies as a basis for decision-making, including the allocation of resources. And what is new for

the budgetary process in particular is the recognition that hard information derived from efficiency and effectiveness evaluations, whether done by departments themselves or by departments in association with the Treasury Board Secretariat, is to be preferred to the more informal judgments."⁴⁵

Again, we must expect that the internal responses of the bureaucratic organizations are not unsuccessful in combating the dangers implicit in rigorous self-evaluation and in preserving the cherished status quo.

"Communication", wrote Norbert Wiener, "is the cement that makes organizations. Communication alone enables a group to think together, to see together, and to act together".⁴⁶ Perhaps the central idea in the cybernetic approach to decision-making is expressed in the belief that messages unify rather than divide. Culture can thus be explained in terms of the frequency and intensity of particular messages. It is evident that many of the recommendations of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission directed at the federal public service were based on this belief.⁴⁷

For the executive/bureaucratic milieu, cybernetic theory prescribes a free and open exchange of information between and among the units and an erosion of the traditional system of stratified secrecy closely related to hierarchy and bounded by departmental or agency loyalty. Moreover, it attempts to overcome the "inhibiting factors", such as, constitutional restrictions on jurisdiction, ad-

ministrative rules and usages, or inadequate structural arrangements, by pushing either toward constitutional change or a major reorganization of the decision-making apparatus.⁴⁸ The norms of organizational unification and structural "togetherness" are to be adhered to through the creation, distribution and use of specialized information and knowledge relevant to decision-making. But, the "inhibiting factors" do not wither away; on the contrary, they impose a stringent control on the distribution of knowledge, information and the intellectual resources in general which grant to the executive/bureaucratic decision-makers much of their legitimacy and administrative prestige. Although the scope of the information exchanges widens and a considerably greater number of actors is included in the privileged circle, secrecy and hierarchy remain largely undisturbed while the central agencies develop new capabilities for the control of the messages and the channels through which they travel.⁴⁹

The principal aim of those who call themselves policy scientists is "to reunify knowledge for decision-making". Westin provides an apt description:

"The increasing emphasis in social science on inter-disciplinary language and behavioural research; the connections among scientists, engineers, and social scientists that are involved in efforts to apply systems-analysis and similar approaches to social problems as well as military, space, and resources areas; and the growing belief that the 'knowledge communities' will be the dynamic element (and the power-brokers?) of the 'post industrial society' all represent powerful forces moving bodies of intellectuals toward the new infor-

mation-technology, creating a new coalition elite around 'scientific' decision-making."⁵⁰

The idea of harnessing together diverse disciplines—normative, empirical, behavioural, analytical, deductive, and experimental—into one "supra-science" committed to the solution of policy problems and issues is credited to Harold Lasswell.⁵¹ However, in an article written for the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Lasswell shows that the use of knowledge, and of those who create it, by the governing elites is as old as government itself.⁵² Apart from the suggestive label, what new and unique prescriptions are offered by the policy sciences?

In the spring of 1970, a prestigious international journal was launched promising "to integrate the various disciplines into a single movement, to meld the quantitative and qualitative approaches".⁵³ Three prominent advocates of such integration presented their agendas as to how it could and should come about.

For Lasswell, the key concepts are contextuality, problem orientation, and synthesis of technique and method in the acquisition of knowledge of the policy process and its application in the process. He argues in favour of a

"distinctive identity image (for policy scientists) ... in which the role of the mediator-integrator among men of knowledge and between knowledge and action (will become) ... more explicit"

and calls for the use of

"insight procedures, such as sensitivity training, training in free association, or mood control (to mobilize) ... policymaker's potential for understanding".⁵⁴

Erich Jantsch defines policies as "normative expressions of future states of dynamic systems" and insists that policy sciences must provide the theoretical framework for

"the horizontal unfolding, as general instances of human activity, of forecasting, planning, decision-making and action at the policy level".

This cannot be accomplished unless we abandon "linear thinking" and

"learn how to regroup our values and norms in a way that will enable us to cope effectively with the problematic situations arising from the dynamics of complex social systems".

Thus, for him the central task of policy sciences is

"to bring intellectual technology into play ... in a rational and creative ... way, and to put it into a framework of thinking and action."⁵⁵

Yehezkel Dror, who in many ways has assumed the role of spiritual leader, prescribes nothing less than a scientific revolution "requiring farguing innovations in basic paradigms". In particular, the "pure" vs "applied" dichotomy must be bridged; "tacit knowledge" (or "personal knowledge")⁵⁶ must be accepted as a valid "scientific resource"; "the tight wall separating contemporary be-

havioural sciences from ethics and philosophy of values" must be broken and "an operational theory of values" must be built; emphasis must be placed on "historic developments on one hand and future dimensions on the other hand as central contexts for improved policy-making"; "a unique focus of interest" must be fixed on "meta-policies" (policies about policies) and on a moral "commitment to policy-making improvement"; and finally, "extrarational processes", such as creativity, intuition, charisma, and "irrational processes such as depth motivation", must be improved as potential sources of policy relevant knowledge.

"To bring about a radical improvement in human (policymaking) abilities consciously to direct the uses of new capacities ... to interfere with basic ecological demographic, and social processes ... —this is the main mission of policy sciences".⁵⁷

Five years later, the debate about agendas for policy sciences loses nothing of its relevancy and gains in intensity.

The new editor of Policy Sciences admits that

"very fundamental issues of concern to all who care about and identify with the policy sciences ... are not resolved, nor would one expect them to be, given their complexity".⁵⁸

Interestingly, these issues have now been narrowed down to two questions:

- a) What should be the relationship between policy scientists and policy-makers? and

- b) What should be the role of rigour and precision in policy science and in public decision-making?

James Reynolds, in a highly suggestive paper, contends that although

"policy science, far from being some problem-focused subvariety of science, is a logically and methodologically distinctive intellectual enterprise",

it does not require

"substantial alterations in our present conceptions of the methodology of science."

He shows that concept formation in policy sciences is a much more demanding and rigorous endeavour than it is in 'normal' sciences, because, in addition, it must also pass the policy relevance test. He stresses the empirical and conceptual constraints under which a policy scientist must operate and observes that

"while the knowledge attained by a policy science theory may be just what is needed to attain the objectives which led to its creation, it may also have the effect of altering the initial goals in such a way as to make itself no longer applicable."

Reynolds concludes that

"the role of the policy scientist (should) be conceived as that of an independent investigator, doing 'his own' work, most appropriately, perhaps, in an academic setting"

and not as a governmental policy analyst, and that if he is to fulfil "the promise ... (which the) early advocates claimed on ...

behalf of policy sciences", he must

"devote more energies than thus far have been expended to the methodological issues."⁵⁹

Milton Marney, in a blistering attack on Reynolds' alleged "scientific conservatism", claims that his

"central question as to the exact character of the substantive empirical knowledge which policy science would have to provide is ... abortive. ... Substantive empirical knowledge that would be both relevant and adequate is nonexistent. No holistic, natural law-like relations are there to be discovered in the social and policy science sector because complex adaptive systems do not work that way. They orchestrate stochastic, deterministic, and normative determinants of behaviour and development by way of degrees of freedom.... Analysis that is strictly limited to objective-empirical (value-free) modes of inquiry cannot provide a legitimate normative-prescriptive regimen applicable to rational control of the adaptive modifications of cognitive and cultural systems..." "In policy science" (Marney continues) "we (are) encountering demands beyond the competence of objective science: the necessities involved in dealing explicitly with purposes, goals, and values as intrinsic elements in construction of theories of optimal organization, optimal policy, optimal design, and optimal control."⁶⁰

Clearly, from Marney's perspective the role of the policy scientist is not that of a detached, academic scholar, but rather of an activist policy theoretician and designer committed to the "regulatory" and "optimizing" functions—in other words, committed to the processes of decision-making (i.e. control), but free from the

constraint of methodological rigour and precision in theory and model construction. This apparently paradoxical position is consistent with most of the writing of Yehezkel Dror. Reynolds' attempt to legitimize policy sciences (which he identifies with the tradition of Harold Lasswell rather than that of Yehezkel Dror) echoes the classical concern with which Max Weber struggled in "Politics As a Vocation" and which recently has been most eloquently articulated by Harry Eckstein⁶¹—namely, the incompatibility between the objectives and methods employed in independent scholarly study of politics (which includes the study of public decision-making) and those used for the examination and solution of policy problems and issues. Eckstein gives us an extremely useful and penetrating analysis of this subject. He also offers a conclusion worth citing in full:

"While policy-relevant political knowledge and formal channels for transmitting it to politicians have greatly increased, the cultures of politicians and political scientists have become so much more divergent and the demands of their separate roles so much more crushing that merely looking at the knowledge and the channels yields an altogether misleading picture of the actual relationships between them."⁶²

The principal aim of policy sciences—as this 'supra-discipline' is understood by Marney, Dror and many others—is to provide theoretical, normative justification for a rigorous control of public decision-making as a particular pattern of behaviour. From such a point

of view, the only "relevant and adequate" knowledge is that which services this goal; any other criteria of validity, reliability or relevance are immaterial.

I have examined in this chapter selected theoretical components of decisional technology: budgetary theory, management theory, decision theory, systems theory, cybernetics, and policy sciences. I have attempted to distil and extract from them the basic norms and prescriptions addressed to public decision-makers and to all those concerned with the processes of governmental decision-making. These norms and prescriptions converge around the imperatives of procedural rigour and precision which, in turn, lead to the introduction of a firm and pervasive control over the decision-making behaviour. The next chapter will examine the development of central agencies as users and disseminators of decisional technology and as organizations intended to coordinate and control the decision-making process in the federal government.

CHAPTER TWO - NOTES.

1. Cf. Robert S. Merrill, "The Study of Technology", International Encyclopedia Of The Social Sciences, vol. 15, p. 576, The Free Press, 1969. The Greek word technologia means systematic treatment.
2. That technologies of behaviour exist is beyond dispute—for example, psycho-therapy, drug-therapy, Skinner's 'operant conditioning', etc. The argument between Skinner and his numerous opponents centers on his radical proposal that 'operant conditioning' be applied to the population as a whole in an attempt to design a new culture. See B.G. Skinner, Beyond Freedom And Dignity, Knopf, 1971; Noam Chomsky, "The Case Against B.F. Skinner", The New York Review Of Books, vol. XVII, number 11, December 30, 1971, p. 18; John Platt, "A Revolutionary Manifesto", The Center Magazine, A Publication Of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, March/April 1972, p. 34.
3. In 1966 at the height of Washington's infatuation with Planning-Programming-Budgeting, Allen Schick wrote:

"The case for PPB rests on the assumption that the form in which information is classified and used governs the actions of budget-makers, and, conversely that alterations in form will produce desired change in behaviour."

Allen Schick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages Of Budget Reform",

in F.J. Lyden and E.G. Miller (eds.), Planning Programming Budgeting: A Systems Approach To Management, Markham, Chicago, 1971, p. 48. It is perhaps surprising that in spite of obvious ideological differences between them, Schick's view about the central purpose of decisional technology does not conflict with McDermott's statement that:

"technology ... refers fundamentally to systems of rationalized control over large groups of men ... by small groups of technically skilled men operating through organizational hierarchy."

John McDermott, "Technology: The Opiate Of The Intellectuals", The New York Review Of Books, July 31, 1969.

4. Schick, (1966), op. cit.
5. See Treasury Board, Government of Canada, Planning-Programming-Budgeting Guide, Revised edition, September 1969, Queen's Printer, Ottawa; Treasury Board, Government of Canada, Operational Performance Measurement, vol. 1, January 1974, Information Canada, Ottawa; a useful and simply written survey of available technologies may be found in Alice M. Rivlin's Systematic Thinking For Social Action, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1971; for the introduction of PPBS in Ottawa, see Szablowski, "The Optimal Policy-Making System: Implications for the Canadian Political Process", (1971), op. cit.
6. Reference may be made to three recent works: Leonard Merewitz and Stephen H. Sosnick, The Budget's New Clothes, Markham,

Chicago, 1971, which contains an excellent critique of PPB and cost-benefit analysis; Yehezkel Dror, Design For Policy Sciences, American Elsevier, New York, 1971, which attempts to deal comprehensively with decisional technologies mainly from the perspective of the United States experience; and Desmond Keeling, Management In Government, Allen & Unwin, London, 1972, which is concerned with the British experience. The Economic Council of Canada 8th Annual Review (September 1971), Design For Decision-Making, Information Canada, Ottawa, includes a good survey of the developments at the federal level in Canada.

7. Except as otherwise indicated, this term means—exert power, steer, direct and not restrain, keep in check or limit. Control over government spending has increased hand in hand with increases in the amounts spent.
8. On the development of the budgetary theory, see Merewitz and Sosnick, (1971), op. cit., pp. 1-11, and the literature referred to in notes. Much of the current budgetary theory applicable at the federal level in Ottawa may be found in the Planning-Programming-Budgeting Guide, (1969), op. cit. See also, The Royal Commission on Government Organization (Glassco), vol. 1, Part 2, Financial Management, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1962; A.W. Johnson, "The Treasury Board Of Canada And The Machinery Of Government Of The 1970s", CJPS, vol. IV, no. 3,

- September 1971, p. 346; and Donald Gow, The Progress Of Budgetary Reform In The Government of Canada, special study no. 17, Economic Council of Canada, 1973.
9. Galbraith, (1976), especially pp. 11-60; See also Glen A. Welsch, Budgeting: Profit Planning And Control, Prentice-Hall, 1964; Robert Anthony, Management Accounting, Irwin, 1964; Joel Dean, Capital Budgeting, Columbia University Press, 1951.
 10. Cf. Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses Of Politics, University of Illinois Press, 1970, pp. 22-73.
 11. 'Organization' is obviously a much broader field than 'management', although this view is not always shared by management theorists. I will restrict the discussion to management theory only which, from my perspective, consists of norms intended to govern those units in the executive/bureaucratic system directly engaged in decision-making. For one of the best critical surveys of organization theory, both normative and empirical, see Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology Of Organizations, John Wiley & Sons, 1966. An interesting and suggestive discussion of the 'artificial' and the 'natural' systems in an organization is presented in Victor A. Thompson, Organizations As Systems, General Learning Corporation, 1973. Reference should also be made to Bertram Gross, The Managing Of Organizations, Free Press, 1964.

12. Cf. Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, University of Chicago Press, 1964.
13. Thompson, (1973), op. cit., p. 15.
14. Cf. Max Weber, The Theory Of Social And Economic Organization, Free Press, 1947.
15. Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book III, The Work World, Vol. 3A, Part 2, "The Federal Administration", Queen's Printer, 1969.
16. Thompson, (1973), op. cit., p. 15.
17. Robert N. Anthony, Planning And Control Systems, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University Press, 1965.
18. Department for External Affairs, Information Division, Reference Paper No. 69 (Revised December 1971), Ottawa, mimeo, p. 6. See also Planning-Programming-Budgeting Guide, 1969, op. cit., where Anthony's work is included in its highly selected bibliography; A.W. Johnson, "P.P.B. And Decision-Making In The Government Of Canada", an address delivered on June 18, 1970, mimeo., p. 21; Douglas G. Hartle, "A Proposed System Of Program And Policy Evaluation", CPA, Vol. 16, No. 2, summer 1973, p. 243; and departmental and agency organizational charts and descriptions of formal activities contained in Organization Of The Government Of Canada, Information Canada, Ottawa, autumn 1973.

19. See, for example, Katz and Kahn, (1966), op. cit., pp. 259-260; and Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society, The Free Press, 1968, pp. 249-252. For a contrary view, see Theodore Lowi, "Decision-making vs Policy-making: Toward An Antidote For Technocracy", Public Administration Review, May/June, 1970, p. 314.
20. Cf. Katz and Kahn, (1966), op. cit., pp. 260-274. In this connection see also, Martin Patchen, "Decision Theory In The Study of National Action: Problems And A Proposal", Journal Of Conflict Resolution, June 1965, and Raymond A. Bauer and K.J. Gorgen (eds.), The Study Of Policy Formation, The Free Press, 1968, pp. 11-20.
21. Cf. Yehezkel Dror, Public Policy-Making Reexamined, Chandler, 1968; D.G. Hartle, "The Objective Of Government Objectives", Ottawa, August 1972; mimeo.; and Hartle, (1973), op. cit.
22. Cf. Etzioni, (1968), op. cit., pp. 249-281.
23. For more comprehensive critiques of decision theory, see Katz and Kahn, (1966), op. cit., chapter 10, pp. 259-299; Etzioni, (1968), op. cit., pp. 252-281; and Rolf-Richard Grauham and Wendelin Strubelt, "Political Rationality Reconsidered: Notes On An Integrated Evaluative Scheme For Policy Choices", Policy Sciences, volume 2, number 3, summer 1971, p. 249. A valuable review of the literature "from the 'administrative' viewpoint" may be found also in Joseph L. Bower, "Descriptive Deci-

sion Theory From The 'Administrative' Viewpoint", in Bauer and Gergen, (1968), op. cit., Chapter 3, pp. 104-148. Contrary to the author's contention, many of the theories he discusses contain a strong normative component. I share Thompson's opinion that, although in general

"theories range on a continuum from prescription to description, theories of decision are mostly at the prescriptive end".

Victor A. Thompson, Decision Theory, Pure And Applied, General Learning Corporation, 1971, p. 1. Recent economic literature on decision-making is examined in Economic Council of Canada, 8th Annual Review, (1971), op. cit., Chapter 3, pp. 17-34; and in Giandomenico Majone, "The Feasibility Of Social Policies", Policy Sciences, Vol. 6, Number 1, March 1975, pp. 49-69.

24. Cf. J.G. March and H.A. Simon, Organizations, John Wiley, 1958; E.C. Banfield, Political Influence, The Free Press, 1961; D. Braybrooke and C.E. Lindblom, A Strategy Of Decision, Macmillan, 1963; C.E. Lindblom, The Intelligence Of Democracy, The Free Press, New York, 1965; and Thompson, (1971), op. cit.; Aaron Wildavsky, "If Planning Is Everything, Maybe It's Nothing", Policy Sciences, Vol. 4, Number 2, June 1973, p. 127.
25. Yehezkel Dror, Design For Policy Sciences, American Elsevier, 1971, pp. 124 and 126. See also, Dror, (1968), op. cit.

26. Harold D. Lasswell, A Pre-View Of Policy Sciences, American Elsevier, 1971, pp. 12-13.
27. Etzioni, (1968), op. cit., pp. 282-283.
28. Etzioni, (1968), op. cit., pp. 286 and 287.
29. See Gordon Robertson, "The Changing Role Of The Privy Council Office", a paper delivered on September 8, 1971, mimeo., pp. 28-29; and Donald Gow, The Progress Of Budgetary Reform In The Government Of Canada, Economic Council of Canada, Special Study No. 17, 1973, pp. 43-46. Douglas Hartle, writing in the capacity of the Deputy Secretary, Planning Branch, Treasury Board Secretariat, makes it clear that the question of values is central. He insists, however, (in my view mistakenly) that only the values of elected decision-makers are relevant. Hartle, (1972), op. cit., pp. 7-21.
30. Thompson, (1971), op. cit., p. 4.
31. Grauhan and Strubelt, (1971), op. cit., pp. 245-263; and Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves Of Government, New York, 1963, pp. 169-170 and 248-249.
32. Alex C. Michalos, "Rationality Between The Maximizers And The Satisficers", University of Guelph, mimeo., 1973, pp. 15 and 17.
33. Hartle, (1972), op. cit., pp. 22-23.
34. Planning-Programming-Budgeting Guide, (1969), op. cit., pp. 33-34.

35. C.M. Drury in a recent article entitled "Quantitative Analysis And Policy-making" questions whether

"analytically oriented disciplines ... deliver(s) anything to the process of policy formation, anything of value commensurate with its costs".

Nevertheless, he concludes as follows:

"Thus, though I stand by all the skeptical qualifications that I mentioned above, I also stand by the faith that in the long run we must have more and deeper policy analysis. We in the government must learn to use it better, and I believe that we are moving, though slowly, in that direction."

Canadian Public Policy, 1:1, Winter 1975, pp. 90 and 95.

36. François Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Candide, New American Library, 1961, p. 16.
37. Edward Shils, (ed.), Criteria For Scientific Development—Public Policy And National Goals, M.I.T. Press, 1968, Introduction.
38. Etzioni, (1968), op. cit.; Dror, (1968), op. cit., and (1971), op. cit.; Warren F. Ilchman and Norman T. Uphoff, The Political Economy Of Change, University of California Press, 1971; Lasswell, (1971), op. cit.; and Harold D. Lasswell, "Policy Sciences", International Encyclopedia Of Social Sciences, Vol. 12, p. 181.
39. For an excellent critique of systems theory and its uses in policy formation, see Ida R. Hoos, Systems Analysis In Public

Policy, University of California Press, 1972. For an earlier, more general critique, see Robert Boguslaw, The New Utopians, Prentice-Hall, 1965. Of the many works on systems theory, reference should be made to the following: Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, Braziller, 1968; David O. Ellis and Fred J. Ludwig, Systems Philosophy, Prentice-Hall, 1962; C.W. Churchman, The Systems Approach, Delacorte Press, 1968; E.S. Quade and W.I. Boucher (eds.), Systems Analysis And Policy Planning, American Elsevier, 1968; and W. Buckley, Sociology And Modern Systems Theory, Prentice-Hall, 1967.

40. See, for example, David Easton, The Political System, Knopf, 1953; Morton A. Kaplan, System And Process In International Politics, Wiley, 1957; T. Parsons, The Social System, Free Press, 1951; and Katz and Kahn, (1966), op. cit.
41. Stefan Dupré has used this phrase describing the prevailing situation in Ottawa at a conference sponsored by the Science Council of Canada and held in Ottawa in March 1971. The transcript of the discussion is available from the Science Council. See also Economic Council of Canada, Design For Decision-Making, op. cit., p. 29, where interrelatedness is briefly discussed.
42. This point is stressed by Deutsch in his highly original discussion of government as a process of steering. Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves Of Government, Models of Political Commu-

- nification and Control. The Free Press, New York, 1966, pp. 88-91 and 182-199.
43. Deutsch, (1966), op. cit., p. 192.
 44. Johnson, (1971), op. cit., pp. 357-358.
 45. Johnson, (1971), op. cit., p. 357.
 46. Norbert Wiener, Communication, M.I.T., 1955, quoted by Deutsch, (1966), op. cit., p. 77. See also on this subject, Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, Wiley, New York, 1961; Norbert Wiener, The Human Use Of Human Beings, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1950.
 47. Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, (1969), op. cit.
 48. Alan Westin argues these points most persuasively in his working paper written for the Harvard University Program on Technology and Society and entitled "Information Systems And Political Decision-making", reprinted in Irene Taviss (ed.), The Computer Impact, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1970, pp. 130-144. See also, Alan Westin (ed.), Information Technology In A Democracy, Harvard University Press, 1970.
 49. A Communications unit has been established in the Plans Division of the Privy Council Office and an Information Systems Division exists since 1970 in the Administrative Policy Branch of the Treasury Board Secretariat. See the organizational charts of PCO and TBS in The Organization Of The Government

Of Canada, Information Canada, Ottawa, 1974. Reference must also be made to an important recent study of Knowledge, Power And Public Policy, by Peter Aucoin and Richard French published under the auspices of the Science Council of Canada as Background Study No. 31, November 1974.

50. Westin, (1968), op. cit., p. 133.
51. "The Policy Orientation" in Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), Policy Sciences: Recent Developments In Scope And Method, Stanford University Press, 1951, p. 3.
52. Harold D. Lasswell, "Policy Sciences", D.L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia Of The Social Sciences, The Free Press, 1969, volume 12.
53. E.S. Quade, "Why Policy Sciences?" Policy Sciences, vol. 1, no. 1, Spring 1970, p. 1.
54. Harold D. Lasswell, "The Emerging Conception Of The Policy Sciences", Policy Sciences, vol. 1, no. 1, Spring 1970, pp. 3-14.
55. Erich Jantsch, "From Forecasting And Planning To Policy Sciences", Policy Sciences, vol. 1, no. 1, Spring 1970, pp 31-47.
56. See Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, Doubleday, New York, 1966.
57. Yehezkel Dror, "Prolegomena To Policy Sciences", Policy Sciences, vol. 1, no. 1, Spring 1970, pp. 135-150.
58. Garry D. Brewer, Editorial Comment, Policy Sciences, vol. 6,

no. 1, March 1975, p. 1.

59. Policy Sciences, (March 1975), op. cit.
60. Policy Sciences, (March 1975), op. cit.
61. "Political Science And Public Policy" in Ithiel de Sola Pool, (ed.), Contemporary Political Science, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967, p. 121.
62. Ibid., p. 158-159.

CHAPTER THREE.

THE CENTRAL AGENCIES: ORGANIZATION FOR POLITICAL CONTROL.

Some eminent social scientists argue that governmental organizations emerge and develop not unlike physical organisms.¹ A correct arrangement of inducing factors and conditions will, at an appropriate time, produce a new department, an agency, a board, or a commission. The decision-makers will recognize the ripeness of the situation and give a formal "birth certificate" to the new organizational offspring, either by passing a statute, an order-in-council, or by invoking some other instrument of authority. However, it is also possible to claim that this process of creation and growth is the result of conscious human design, rather than the inevitable product of bureaucratic evolution. "Machinery of government" specialists working in Ottawa would clearly reject the view that political man is at the mercy of his own institutions. My aim in this chapter is to describe five central agencies as prime users and disseminators of decisional technology and as organizations intended to control the decision-making behaviour at the federal level. At the same time, I will indicate the direction and the extent of institutional change in these agencies resulting from their adaptation to technological imperatives.

What are central agencies? How do they differ from the

classical, hierarchic and highly disciplined bureaucracies? The latter are devoted to the service of particular program-oriented interests closely tied to clientele groups which depend upon the expected distribution of social and economic benefits. Their statutory mandates and organizational structure discourage violations of jurisdictional boundaries and demand respect for publicly defined self-interest. They see merit strictly in terms of the task performed, and resent intrusions from the outside. They claim political neutrality, ascribe policy decisions to the politicians, and reject the idea of public accountability as inconsistent with the purely professional advisory functions they say they perform. They find support for these assertions in a constitutional theory which continues to proclaim a fundamental distinction between politics and administration.

The five central agencies which I will examine exhibit very few of these characteristics. When Pierre Elliot Trudeau won the leadership of the Liberal party in 1968, two crucial elements coalesced in an extraordinary way. First, at the institutional level, the existing structure of government visibly became incongruent with the imperatives of decisional technology and things were ripe in Ottawa for a major change. Second, the philosophical approach of the new leader matched the call of the times.² During the four years of Trudeau's first mandate, the machinery of the federal

government underwent an unprecedented surgery. Cabinet was remodelled into a system of interlocking, functionally defined committees. New bureaucratic organizations were created to break down the monopolies of older departments. Task forces and inter-departmental committees sprang up bridging the traditional gap between executive and bureaucratic decision-making. Central agencies were remodelled, first as control institutions of the growing array of intragovernmental processes, and then as focal points of concentration for the key issues of national policy. All these organizational innovations received an added strength from the influx of a large number of new recruits into the public service, many of whom came from the liberal professions, the universities, and the business world, and were absorbed by the central agencies and quickly promoted to positions of responsibility and influence.

My selection of the Privy Council Office (PCO), the Department of Finance, the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), and the Federal/Provincial Relations Office (FPRO) is based on the assumption that these agencies possess, with differing degrees of intensity, certain common characteristics which set them apart from the traditional, hierarchic bureaucracies. The activities of these agencies may be conveniently grouped into five broad functions or categories, which reflect their authority structure and their principal areas of political control:

- 1) Control of strategic planning and formulation of substantive policy;
- 2) Control of integrated economic and fiscal policy;
- 3) Control of the budgetary cycle and management of governmental resources;
- 4) Management of senior personnel;
- 5) Control of federal/provincial relations.

F.G. Bailey wrote:

"Only after we understand the rules can we start evaluating the behaviour and so in the end come to a judgment on the men, if we wish to do so."³

The most fundamental set of rules spells out the central agency's authority; that is, it provides what the agency may and ought to do. The realm of authority, then, is permissive and normative. It must be distinguished from the realm of power and influence—what the agency actually does—which is empirical. I agree with Bailey that the study of rules must not be separated from the study of behaviour.

I will first describe briefly the origins of the five central agencies and their structure of authority. Subsequently, I will discuss in detail the functions of control exercised by them as the prime users and disseminators of decisional technology. Figures I and II (pp. 122 and 123) provide summaries of the central agencies' sources and structure of authority.

Let us consider first the Privy Council Office. The standard, most frequently quoted statement about its origin refers to sections 11 and 130 of the British North America Act, 1867, and to the fact that the Clerk of the Executive Council of the United Province of Canada was sworn in as Clerk of the Privy Council on July 1, 1867.⁴ In reality, this statement hides more than it reveals. Anyone can read these two sections of the British North America Act easily, but he will not be closer to a full understanding of how the PCO came to be and what are the sources of its present authority. Section 11 established the "Queen's Privy Council for Canada", but not the institution known as the Canadian Cabinet. In fact, there is no statutory or legal basis for Cabinet, and its authority derives only from constitutional convention and usage which includes (but is not limited to) the royal prerogative transferred from the United Kingdom to Canada. In Jennings' words,

"Cabinet has a life and an authority of its own. It is not concerned with prerogative powers alone; it acts whether there are already legal powers or not."⁵

I will return to this important principle of Cabinet government later in this chapter. Its political implications are significant.

Similarly then, there is no statutory basis for the Cabinet Secretariat and its authority rests as well on constitutional convention. In short, the question—"When was PCO established, and what are the present sources of its authority?"—is not easy to

answer. I propose the following answer. That part of PCO which confines its functions to the preparation, registration and distribution of orders-in-council and to the business of the Queen's Privy Council (as distinct from Cabinet) was created in 1867 pursuant to section 130 of the British North America Act, which enabled the freshly sworn Clerk to become an Officer of Canada. The current authority of this segment of the PCO derives from the formal decisions of the Governor-in-Council. The remainder of the PCO, that is, its largest and unquestionably most important part, which includes the Plans Secretariat, the Operations Secretariat, the Security, Intelligence and Emergency Planning group, and the Machinery of Government group, has evolved slowly since 1867 to its present stage under the authority of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister and is rooted in unwritten constitutional usage.⁶ The Cabinet Secretariat dates back to March 1940 when the Clerk of the Privy Council was first appointed Secretary to the Cabinet; this title became legal and mandatory only in December 1974.⁷ In addition to conventional authority delegated from Cabinet and the Prime Minister, the Privy Council Office exercises statutory authority under the British North America Act, and several other statutes.⁸

Just as the Privy Council for Canada may be considered as the successor to the Executive Council of the United Province of Canada, so the Minister of Finance (a title newly created in

1867) may be viewed as the successor to the Inspector General of Public Provincial Accounts, whose authority was set out in the Act Respecting Public Monies, Debts and Accounts of the United Provinces of Canada.⁹ Unlike PCO, however, the Department of Finance operates exclusively under the authority emanating from statute. For two years after Confederation, the newly formed Department functioned pursuant to provincial authority concerning financial administration enacted earlier. The first Department of Finance Act was assented to in June of 1869. It gave the Department

"supervision, control and direction of all matters relating to financial affairs and public accounts, revenue and expenditure of the Dominion, insofar as they are not by law or order of the Governor-in-Council assigned to any other Department."¹⁰

This provision is the direct ascendant of section 9 of the Financial Administration Act¹¹ under the authority of which the Department operates today. In comparing the authority structures of the Privy Council Office and the Department of Finance, the two oldest central agencies, it is important to note the lines of constitutional continuity which each of them is entitled to claim and rely upon. Each of the remaining agencies, Treasury Board Secretariat, Prime Minister's Office, and Federal/Provincial Relations Office, was spawned either from PCO or from Finance. The new Office of the Comptroller General, which is currently in the making, will become the first organizational offspring of TBS.

The Treasury Board Secretariat was created by Government Organization Act, 1966, following the celebrated recommendations of the Glassco Commission. Its primary and innovative effect was to institutionalize the division of financial affairs into two distinct categories: 1) intragovernmental control over the allocation of expenditure budgets and over the management of all in-house resources; and 2) national, intergovernmental and international strategy to regulate and influence the economy. The decision-makers of the day chose one instrument through which authority from Parliament was delegated to the Treasury Board and to the Department of Finance, respectively, i.e. the Financial Administration Act. Section 5 of the Act gives authority to the Treasury Board, a committee of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, to act on the latter's behalf in relation to specific matters.

The Secretariat is the organizational and operational arm of the Board. It exercises the latter's authority by delegation, and it operates as a distinct department since October 1966 pursuant to an Order-in-Council passed under the Financial Administration Act. Although the institutional distinctiveness of the Secretariat dates back only to 1966, the history of the Board itself is much longer. Treasury Board was originally established in July 1867. It was given legislative sanction by Parliament in 1869, again in 1878 and then in 1951 when the first Financial Administra-

tion Act was placed on the statute books.¹² However, during all that time prior to 1966, the Board formed an integral part of the Department of Finance and existed under the singular authority of the Minister of Finance. The "birth" of TBS as a separate institution was preceded by lengthy negotiations by senior officials of the Department of Finance held early in 1965. As internal memorandum from George Davidson (designated as the first Secretary of the Treasury Board) dated February 1, 1965 reads in part:

"We have discussed and agreed upon a plan of organization for the Treasury Board in conformity with the recommendations of the Glassco Commission, and with the duties and responsibilities which, now and in the foreseeable future are likely to be assigned to it."¹³

TBS, then, may be called a legitimate offspring of Finance, but one which has caught up with, and in some respects surpassed, the parental authority in just eleven years of organizational independence. It should be noted that in addition to the Financial Administration Act, TBS possesses delegated statutory authority emanating from the Public Service Staff Relations Act and the Official Languages Act.

From the formal legal point of view, the Prime Minister's Office is an institutional enigma. Unlike the other four central agencies, it has not been proclaimed a department under the Financial Administration Act. This means that it is not formally recognized as an independent administrative unit and its budget is hidden in the Privy Council Office's estimates. No statutory or any other

legal provision exists indicating its origin or mandate. Its chief executive officer, the Principal Secretary, lacks a legal title and his authority remains unspecified. One must add to this list of impediments the fact that it is practically impossible to state with certainty when the Prime Minister's Office became what it is today—a distinct central agency. D'Aquino claims that PMO

"did not assume a clear identity of its own ¹⁴
until Trudeau became Prime Minister in 1968".

He is probably right; and yet every prime minister since Bennett in 1935 has had a staff of his own whose mandate and orientation differed from that of the PCO officers. At what point did the shared orientations and responsibilities of the Prime Minister's staff turn the Office into a full-fledged institution? No one doubts the institutional status of Finance or TBS, even though they share adjoining floors in one office building and a number of house-keeping services, not to mention a common institutional history. PMO also shares quarters with PCO and FPRO, but the latter's institutional beginning was blessed with a statutory enactment, while PMO appears to be doomed to continue its enigmatic existence.

There are, of course, very good reasons for this state of affairs. If no authority is formally specified, discretion and flexibility are maximized. The conventional authority of the Prime Minister—which he is free to delegate to his Principal Secretary and PMO—is potentially enormous. How much authority does he dele-

gate, to whom, and with respect to which issues or problems, may be decided and changed at will. All such delegation is informal and much of it is also implied. As a result, authority may be simply assumed by an officer in the PMO on his own and exercised in the name of the Prime Minister, who, as long as he is pleased with the results, is not likely to interfere. With the complexity and size of government today, he cannot afford to interfere. The authority of PMO then defies one permanently valid definition.

The youngest central agency is the Federal/Provincial Relations Office, established in December 1974 by an Act Respecting the Office of the Secretary of the Cabinet for Federal/Provincial Relations and Respecting the Clerk of the Privy Council.¹⁵ FPRO was designated as a separate department under the Prime Minister in February 1975. In spite of its apparent statutory origin, the authority exercised by the Office is exclusively conventional and unwritten. This means that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may delegate to it any functions they deem expedient, provided they fall within the broad mandate of federal/provincial relations. Prior to 1975, the authority over the conduct of federal/provincial relations was housed in the Privy Council Office which exhibits today a similar affinity to FPRO as did Finance to TBS back in the late 1960s. Newly created institutions tend to solidify their in-

dependence over time and develop organizational objectives separate and distinct from those which they have once shared with their ascendants. There is no reason to believe that FPRO, like TBS in the past, will follow a different path.

Authority structure refers to rules which prescribe what central agencies may and ought to do. It defines the formal parameters within which executive and bureaucratic behaviour is expected to occur. The central agencies operate at the boundary which separates the top political executive--the Prime Minister and his Cabinet--from the programmatic line bureaucracies. They also provide the link and create the integrative forces which render this traditional boundary line much less distinct and sometimes downright illusory. Strict legal theories break down and make little sense in the face of modern political and institutional realities.

Pursuant to the British constitutional theory (which Canada still shares), full executive authority belongs to the Crown or, as the British North America Act states in section 9, "is vested in the Queen". Since 1947, the Governor General has assumed the role of the monarch in this respect, and if the relevant provisions of the Constitutional Amendment Bill, 1978, become law, the ultimate source of this authority will be patriated. However, by convention, the exercise of executive authority remains firmly under the control of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Jennings' observation quoted

earlier that "Cabinet has a life and authority of its own" applies equally to Canada as it does to the United Kingdom. Executive authority may be defined as the constitutional capacity to make all policy decisions intended to be accepted and followed by all those to whom they are directed or whom they may affect. Policy is a difficult term to define and few political scientists are in agreement about its meaning. I propose to borrow a definition adopted by TBS, which has the advantage of emphasizing the distinction between executive acts (policy) and bureaucratic acts (programs).

"Policy

-- A Government policy is a statement by the Government of a principle or set of principles it wishes to see followed, in pursuit of particular objectives, which may be stated in such a way as to suggest possible courses of action (programs) and as to indicate how success of the policy may be measured (criteria).

Program

-- A course of action or instrument to implement a policy (or policies), sometimes involving legislative mandates and usually, public expenditures. (A program also has objectives, which will in general be more operational than those of a policy, and be suggestive of possible criteria against which accomplishments of the objectives may be measured.)¹⁷

In general, policy decisions are not based on statutory authority, and the Cabinet has a full constitutional mandate to act as it deems fit on its own. Its acts (decisions) cannot change the existing law, nor produce direct legal consequences, but they may lead

to the initiation of the legislative process and eventual modification of statutory authority. In principle, program decisions should always be rooted in statutory authority. Invariably, programs involve the expenditure of public funds and the accountability for them to Parliament. In constitutional theory, all is well as long as Cabinet makes policy, Parliament passes laws, and bureaucracy faithfully implements programs. How and where do the central agencies and their authority fit into this neat and tidy picture?

It is possible to argue that central agencies and the role they play in the governmental process challenge certain norms of traditional constitutional theory. According to it, bureaucratic authority should be overtly expressed or explicit, specific and delegated by Parliament to a department or agency created by it. The department's accountability to Parliament—through the intermediacy of a responsible minister of the Crown—should cover all administrative acts, including budgetary expenditures. On the other hand, executive authority exercised by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet as a collectivity may be implied, general and arising from the very obligation and commitment to govern. Policy decisions are the real political results of the use of executive authority; and there is no accountability to Parliament for the making of policy, except in the broadest sense—the Ministry must always have the confidence of the House in order to govern.

Do central agencies exercise executive or bureaucratic authority? They administer no programs, and their activities are most intimately related to the formulation, analysis and evaluation of policy decisions. If they are institutional extensions of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, how far may they be permitted to specialize and grow without violating the principle of accountability? Can the government create a new breed of quasi-bureaucratic institutions, endow them with executive authority, and place them in a privileged protected milieu largely exempt from public scrutiny?

Statutory law is the usual source of bureaucratic authority. It spells out with some precision the exact scope and content of what a department or agency may and ought to do. It often contains a delegation of more specific authority to a subordinate body to make regulations, but only strictly within the scope and content of the existing statute. On the other hand, pursuant to constitutional convention, Cabinet itself is the source of executive authority. Originally, the Crown possessed very extensive prerogative powers derived from English common law. In the course of history, many of these were either replaced or modified by statutory provisions, or harnessed and modernized by constitutional convention. One may state confidently that today all authority necessary and sufficient for effective governing, whether of prerogative origin

or not, resides in the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, although they still use it officially under a variety of legal titles (such as, the Crown, the Governor General, or the Governor-General-in-Council). Since what remains of the royal prerogative is now exercised only in accordance with constitutional convention and practice, it seems superfluous and merely legalistic to single it out. I will thus use exclusively the term conventional authority and include under it all executive activities which may be performed by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, as well as those activities of central agencies which are delegated to them by the latter.¹⁸

Control of strategic planning and formulation of substantive policy.

Strategic planning refers to choices open to governmental decision-makers about issues to be resolved over a longer term. It is "planning" only in a very general sense. It is "strategic" because the decisions taken are to a large extent anticipatory and intended to place the issue and its future resolution in what is believed to be the most advantageous position. This can only be accomplished if all the critical factors in governmental decision-making are meshed together. These factors include: the annual expenditure budget; the forecast of revenues; the design of the legislative program; the consideration of other policy issues and the timing for their resolution; the evaluation of the performance of senior governmental

personnel; and the adequacy of the machinery of government.¹⁹ In other words, strategic planning is an attempt to place an issue or problem which the government intends to resolve in the future in the context of all vital circumstances which will affect its resolution—future availability of money, competent personnel, and administrative machinery, and political feasibility of future legislative action in relation to the other issues and proposals which will compete for the time and attention of the decision-makers. A policy issue or problem which receives a high priority should, in theory, be placed in a superior strategic position for its future resolution. Strategic planning represents an approach to decision-making which challenges the short term, fire-fighting type of governing, characteristic of pluralistic, liberal/democratic political systems. It also fits with the modern interventionist role of government promoted by central agencies.

The broad function of strategic planning consists of at least five elements:

- 1) priority determination for the longer term and for the annual allocation of expenditure budgets;
- 2) major reviews of specific policy areas, such as foreign and defence policies in 1969/70 and immigration in 1976/77;
- 3) security and emergency planning which has gained prominence since the October 1970 crisis;

- 4) changes and innovations in the machinery of government, that is in the organizational structure of government and in the jurisdictions of key officials and decision-makers; and finally,
- 5) legislative strategy for effective passing of bills and control of the House of Commons.

Plans Division in PCO houses analytic and advisory personnel grouped into small secretariats reflecting all of these components of strategic planning, with the exception of security and emergency planning which forms a separate unit. Thus, the Priorities and Planning Secretariat supports the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning, chaired by the Prime Minister, and is involved in the determination of priorities and broad policy objectives and the dissemination of these throughout the governmental apparatus. The Legislation and House Planning Secretariat reviews draft government bills before they are introduced in Parliament and attempts to control the legislative process. The Machinery of Government Secretariat designs new organizational models and monitors formal structural developments throughout the executive/bureaucratic establishment. It serves directly the Prime Minister, rather than the Cabinet or a Cabinet committee.

Substantive policy has been divided into five discrete sectors, each belonging to a "subject matter" standing Cabinet committee supported by a staff of analysts and advisors housed in the

Operations Division of PCO. Currently, these sectors include Economic Policy, Social Policy (health, welfare, social insurance, manpower, and housing), External Policy and Defence, Culture and Native Affairs, and Government Operations which embrace policy issues in the renewable and non-renewable categories of natural resources, as well as items which do not clearly fall within the mandate of any other sector. An interesting jurisdictional question may arise when a particular Minister supported by his departmental officials wishes to submit a policy proposal before one sectoral Cabinet committee while his competitors and rivals prefer another. For instance, a recent conflict between the domestically oriented policy assigned to the Foreign Investment Review Agency and the more traditional Canadian commitments to OECD had to be resolved at the Cabinet committee level. OECD exerted pressure, through the Department of External Affairs, in favour of a lenient and liberal foreign investment policy consistent with Canada's international position. External would have liked to have the matter discussed and resolved by the Cabinet Committee on External Policy and Defence. However, the Minister of Finance (Mr. McDonald) chose a very strong line vis-à-vis OECD and forced the referral of the issue to the Economic Policy Cabinet Committee, largely controlled by Finance, where a compromise was finally worked out between these two conflicting policy objectives.²⁰ It is fair to assume that PCO plays

a highly significant role in all difficult jurisdictional disputes between sectors, but a great majority of policy items are placed on the agenda in the normal course of business without squabbles.

Authority to embark upon strategic planning and the formulation of substantive policy originates from a constitutional convention which obligates the government to govern. The precise content and scope of this authority is unclear. DeSmith correctly observes that

"Some of the conventions about ... the working of the Cabinet system are either blurred or experimental. Codification would purchase certainty at the expense of flexibility; informal modifications to keep the constitution in touch with contemporary political thinking or needs would be inhibited ... in some contexts the rules ought not to be crystal clear. Clarification would tend to stultify one purpose of conventions--keeping the constitution up to date. ... Nevertheless, (he adds) it is unsatisfactory that the content, and indeed the very existence, of some of the most important conventions should be indeterminate."²¹

The authority delegated to PCO with respect to this broad function of strategic planning and substantive policy formulation is unquestionably predominant, but it is not absolutely exclusive. The remaining central agencies also play a role in it within their respective competences. In particular, the expected and much misunderstood contribution of PMO must be acknowledged here. Its man-

date focuses on those consequences and implications of policy decisions which have to do with:

- a) the Prime Minister's image and leadership as perceived by the public and the mass media;
- b) the overall chances for reelection;
- c) the specific national and regional interests of the party in power; and
- d) the individual preferences, objectives and ideology of the Prime Minister.

Finance has the statutory authority to determine revenue forecasts, as well as a forecast of general economic and fiscal conditions. To the extent that these become critical factors in strategic planning and substantive policy formulation, Finance possesses a strong potential leverage in this area. FPRO must evaluate the impact of strategic planning and substantive policy on provincial governments and attempt to predict and later deal with their responses. In addition, FPRO has now a special mandate to monitor events and prepare scenarios for action vis-à-vis the government of Quebec and the issue of independence and the related referendum. TBS, like Finance, has a specific statutory authority, the exercise of which may have a critical effect on strategic planning. It is charged with the determination of priorities with respect to annual and longer term expenditures and with personnel management. The

"determination of priorities" is now understood to be limited to priorities of programs as distinct from priorities of policies or proposed policies. The latter, as I have mentioned above, falls within the competence of the Priorities and Planning Cabinet Committee and the Secretariats supporting it in PCO. Similarly, the authority over "personnel management in the public service" excludes order-in-council appointments and other senior level promotions which fall within the domain of PCO's Senior Personnel Secretariat and PMO's Nominations Secretary. Nevertheless, it is important to note that in the exercise of this broad function of strategic planning and substantive policy formulation, all central agencies contribute significant authority inputs which in some instances appear to overlap and conflict, while PCO maintains its undoubted supremacy.

Control of integrated economic and fiscal policies.

The control of integrated economic, fiscal and tax policies is the second broad function of central agencies. The primary authority for its exercise derives from the Financial Administration Act, section 9, which reads as follows:

"The Minister (of Finance) has the management and direction of the Department of Finance, ... and the supervision, control and direction of all matters relating to the financial affairs of Canada not by law assigned to the Treasury Board or to any other Minister."²²

Pitfield, in a recently presented paper, called Finance a "lead department ... responsible for stabilization policy and a court of last review for economic policy."²³

He pointed out further that in order to encourage counterveillance in financial affairs, Government has created

"a number of new economic departments, such as Regional Economic Expansion, Manpower and Immigration, Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Energy, Mines and Resources, and Environment--each with its own expert skills."²⁴

How does this development affect the authority of Finance to supervise, control and direct "all matters relating to the financial affairs of Canada"? Each of the five new departments mentioned by Pitfield enjoys statutory authority, which, at least to some degree, reduces Finance's residuary authority. At the same time, however, the principle of counterveillance and the existence of at least five specialized economic orientations supported by clientele groups associated with these departments, undoubtedly, elevate Finance's authority and give it a controlling and coordinating role. Regional Economic Expansion, for instance, stands for the stimulation and growth of the economically underdeveloped parts of Canada. Its clients are industries situated in those areas seeking federal support, and labour organizations and other groups composed of local residents. Manpower and Immigration expresses and promotes a full employment philosophy, struggling at the same time with the need for growth and control of domestic manpower. Consumer and Corporate

Affairs furthers the ideas associated with controlled competition, stable price structure, and regulation of business and industry. Energy Mines and Resources, on the other hand, specializes in increased development of natural resources and further technological expansion to the north in partnership with business and industry. Environment represents interests which promote ecological protection, conservation, and limits to growth philosophy. There are, of course, other economically oriented departments of an older vintage, such as Labour and Industry, Trade and Commerce, which promote their own points of view at the decision-making table. The authority of Finance as a central agency is supposed to transcend all these special approaches and interests and exert on them an overall controlling influence in the name of economic stability and integration.

In consequence, during recent years Finance has divested itself of nearly all operational programs and has assumed a clear central agency posture. The staff of the Department (once some 6,000 strong) numbers today approximately 700. These highly skilled public servants are almost exclusively engaged in policy development and analysis confined to the four following areas which, taken together, comprise Finance's control and authority as currently defined:

- 1) tax policy; 2) economic development and government finance;
- 3) fiscal policy and economic analysis; and 4) international trade and finance.²⁵

In the area of tax policy, one unit of departmental specialists analyzes existing tax measures and new proposals from the perspective of the business community. A personal income tax unit examines proposals relating to personal taxation, deferred income plans, trusts and partnerships, and a commodity tax unit deals with all excise taxes and duties. A quantitative tax analysis unit attempts to determine the effects of taxation on the distribution of income, the long-term growth of the economy and on the behaviour of individuals and corporations. Finally, an international tax policy unit negotiates tax treaties with foreign countries and examines the effects of foreign taxation on Canadians and on the Canadian economy.

In the area of economic development and government finance, policy analysts attempt to encourage the development of Canada's natural resources in the North, including energy, oil, gas and minerals. Another unit promotes industrial development generally, including secondary industry, transportation, communications, nuclear energy, science policy and research. Government loans, investments and other financial guarantees (primarily to Crown corporations) are the concern of the last unit in this policy area.

In the area of fiscal policy and economic analysis, one departmental unit provides central economic intelligence on the overall economic conditions of the country and prepares forecasts

used in the development of national budgets. The fiscal policy responsibility includes the drawing up of annual fiscal frameworks, a forecast of financial requirements of the Government which forms the basis for the expenditure budget. This unit maintains a very close link with the Program Branch in TBS. A long range structural analysis group provides macro-economic projections using econometric models such as CANDIDE, TRACE, and RDX2, and a capital markets unit develops policy with respect to private financial institutions and management of the public debt.

Finally, in the area of international trade and finance, the Tariffs unit investigates and reports on proposals regarding the Canadian customs tariff pursuant to GATT and bilateral trade agreements. Another unit formulates recommendations on international trade policy, particularly with regard to imports; while still another group of experts maintains liaison with international financial organizations and promotes export development. The international finance division is concerned with the balance of payments and foreign exchange matters.

It is evident that the general authority delegated to Finance by statute permits the Department to spell out its precise content more or less as it pleases. This important bureaucratic discretion remains largely unchecked, and is subject only to the wishes of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, and in particular

of the Minister of Finance. For example, the conduct of federal/provincial relations belonged at one time to Finance, due to its overriding fiscal and economic implications. However, since the establishment of FPRO in 1974/75, Finance's authority in this area began to shrink; and it would not be surprising if the remainder of its control were transferred to FPRO in the near future. To be sure, Finance will retain its specialized advisory capability in federal/provincial financial arrangements; however, strategic decisions will be (and already are) taken in FPRO. This illustrates my point that conventional authority of the Prime Minister and Cabinet dominates the role of the central agencies even in the face of statute. Constitutional conflict is avoided because, conveniently, statutory authority is so general that removals and additions of particular functions are always technically possible.

The controlling and coordinating role of Finance in financial and economic matters is, of course, crucial to the effective discharge of the four other broad functions performed by central agencies. In strategic planning, Finance's contribution provides the fiscal parameters at the national level within which any major policy issue must be resolved. In the allocation and management of physical resources, expenditure budgets, and senior personnel, Finance plays a similar role at the decision-making table. The important advisory role of Finance at the intergovernmental level

in the conduct of federal/provincial relations is equally self evident. Typically, then, the predominant authority of Finance in economic and financial affairs is muted and diffused by its increased involvement in all the other broad control functions which characterize the role of central agencies.

Control of the budgetary cycle and management of governmental resources.

The allocation and management of physical resources and expenditure budgets throughout the governmental apparatus is the domain of the Treasury Board Secretariat. The statutory authority contained in section 5 of the Financial Administration Act provides:

"The Treasury Board may act for the Queen's Privy Council for Canada on all matters relating to

- a) general administrative policy in the public service of Canada;
- b) the organization of the public service or any portion thereof, and the determination and control of establishments therein;
- c) financial management, including estimates, expenditures, financial commitments, accounts, fees or charges for the provision of services or the use of facilities, rentals, licences, leases, revenues from the disposition of property, and procedures by which departments manage, record and account for revenues received or receivable from any source whatever;
- d) the review of annual and longer term expenditure plans and programs of the various departments of Government, and the deter-

- mination of priorities with respect thereto;
- e) personnel management in the public service, including the determination of terms and conditions of employment of persons employed therein; and
- f) such other matters as may be referred to it by the Governor in Council."²⁶

Money and physical resources are in great demand throughout the governmental apparatus. To be able to maximize these consistently and repeatedly over time is truly a measure of a successful bureaucratic executive. Operational departments and agencies in Ottawa are in many respects not unlike business establishments competing for markets, sales, and profits. The bureaucratic "market place", however, is confined to the competition for budgets and physical assets, which are allocated and managed centrally under the control of TBS.

Let us examine in some detail four aspects of authority delegated to TBS by statute—general administrative policy; organization of the public service; financial management; and control of expenditures and determination of program priorities.²⁷ The fifth aspect, personnel management, will be discussed under a separate heading.

A statutory definition of the concept general administrative policy does not exist. In consequence, we must rely on a bureaucratic definition provided by TBS itself. It refers to rules

based on "equity, probity, and prudence" which are to govern the acquisition, use and consumption of various kinds of property by public bureaucracies for greater "efficiency and effectiveness". These rules are developed and enforced by TBS, but the degree of enforcement varies from liberal flexibility to stubborn rigidity. They apply to such highly expensive "inputs" as computers, telecommunication systems, and office buildings, as well as to desks, rugs, and stationery. An entire Branch of TBS is engaged in the development and central direction of this policy area.

The mandate of the organization of the public service seems wide enough to encompass nearly everything in government. A formal organization means a complex group of offices or bureaus having explicit objectives, clearly stated rules, and a system of specifically defined roles, each with clearly designated rights and duties. Obviously, TBS does not prescribe all of these for the entire federal public service. But is it not within the exclusive statutory authority of TBS to do so? Here again we are facing a situation where general and undefined language of the law permits a competing central agency to assume policy responsibility in this area pursuant to conventional authority flowing from the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Machinery of Government unit in PCO is directly concerned with the organization of the governmental apparatus, the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries between

departments and agencies, and the design of new organizational units in the public service. In 1971, it was instrumental in creating the ministries of state in spite of strong opposition of some otherwise influential senior officials in TBS.²⁸ More recently, the organization division of the Plans Branch in TBS conducted special studies on the effectiveness of particular types of organizational structure, on the relationship between policy-making departments (e.g. ministries of state) and policy implementing units, and on the advantages and disadvantages of bureaucratic decentralization.²⁹ Prima facie, all these subjects fall within the statutory authority of TBS, as well as within the conventional authority of PCO. Who wins, and who loses? In all likelihood, PCO and TBS will continue to share authority in this area in the future. From the perspective of public accountability, the indeterminacy of such sharing creates serious problems, particularly when one central agency (PCO) claims an exemption from Parliamentary scrutiny.

Until recently, financial management was combined with administrative policy into one Branch called the Administrative Policy Branch. When the current reorganization of TBS is completed, the new Financial Administration Branch is likely to find itself in a new house under the Comptroller General. The term "financial management" is misleading; on the face of it, it appears to conflict with Finance's authority to direct and control the financial affairs of

Canada. To those who know better, however, "management" refers always to internal or in-house control. Moreover, "financial" in this context is restricted to those rules which promote good accounting practices recognized by professional accountants. In short, under this authority, TBS establishes control of accounts and provides for internal audits throughout the governmental apparatus.

The control of expenditures and determination of program priorities is the most crucial authority in the discharge of TBS' activities. Two branches draw upon it—one directly, and another indirectly. The Program Branch is organized along five functional groupings of government programs: a) Industry and Natural Resources; b) Transportation, Communication and Science; c) Defense, External and Cultural Affairs; d) Social and Manpower policy; and e) General Government Services. It controls the annual budgetary cycle in the course of which the departmental program forecasts are reviewed, and overall expenditure plan for the coming fiscal year is approved, and the Main Estimates and Supplementary Estimates are prepared, scrutinized and presented to Parliament. Apart from the cyclical activity, the Branch analyzes and evaluates new policy proposals from operational departments and agencies of the government. It comments on the implications of such proposals for the existing resources, and the extent to which they are likely to contribute to governmental objectives and priorities. In this respect, the Branch maintains a close relation-

ship with the Policy and Priorities Secretariat in PCO which drafts the policy guidelines for the Priorities and Planning Cabinet Committee. The guidelines set out a framework and the priorities for the annual expenditure plan. No wonder, then, that the Program Branch has become the springboard from which middle rank executives take off to high level appointments offered to them by line departments and agencies. For example, of the ten Directors in the branch in 1970, seven became ADMs by 1976; in addition, its Deputy Secretary and Assistant Secretary became DMs. The extent and rapidity of this upward mobility cannot be matched by any other governmental unit of similar size and expertise.

The activities of the Planning Branch (which was abolished in October 1978) rested on this authority as well as on the theory that the evaluation of program effectiveness and program efficiency is an essential prerequisite for a rational allocation of budgets and determination of policy and program priorities. In the words of Gordon Osbaldeston, evaluation of bureaucratic performance completes the PPB "cycle".³⁰

The Planning Branch came into its own in 1970 under the direction of Douglas Hartle, a University of Toronto economist, who left public service three years later disillusioned about the practical value of the very analytical techniques and methodologies which he had helped to introduce.³¹ His contribution, however, has had a

significant influence on the development of policy and program analysis in government. The quantitative analysis school operated by the Branch produced numerous new specialists who subsequently returned to their respective departments and agencies to man policy and program evaluation units. Although the authority under which this Branch was established originated from the Financial Administration Act, many of its activities were deeply concerned with strategic planning and the role played in it by the Priorities and Planning Cabinet Committee. Consequently, in addition to statutory authority, the Branch also acted under the conventional authority delegated to it by Cabinet. It would appear that the Office of the Comptroller General (OCG)--which in many respects is becoming the successor of the Planning Branch--will continue to rely on a similar mixture of statutory and conventional authority.

Clearly, TBS' statutory authority is more specific and better defined than that of Finance. This fact, however, does not afford TBS any greater protection against invasion from competing central agencies which rely on convention derived from Cabinet and the Prime Minister. PCO in particular has built units and expertise in areas of policy development which, to say the least, coincide with those allocated by statute to TBS. How does one distinguish "organization of the public service" from "machinery of government"? It is evident that the ultimate control in this area resides in PCO. I

suspect that the Financial Administration Act will soon be amended to reflect this new reality.

Barely six years ago, A.W. Johnson, then Secretary of the Treasury Board, put forward an interesting and apparently original theory about TBS' authority.³² He described the Board as a twofold cabinet committee responsible for: a) the management of the public service; and b) the expenditure budget. In the discharge of these two functions, the Board forms an integral part of the Cabinet committee system and acts on the strength of decisions taken in Cabinet or in one of its regular committees. For example, early in each year, the Priorities and Planning Cabinet Committee formulates a set of decisions (subsequently confirmed by full Cabinet) called Policy Guidelines which contain specific authority for the allocation of expenditure budgets. It is the task of TBS (Program Branch) to implement these policy guidelines in the course of the budgetary cycle. Thus, in addition to authority derived from statute (Financial Administration Act), TBS relies and acts upon conventional authority granted to it from time to time by Cabinet. The former is public and subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, while the latter remains secret and exempt from it. Johnson's theory permitted TBS to claim the status of a Cabinet secretariat with exclusive authority over the two areas of policy which, accordingly, are outside the competence of PCO. Moreover, the theory placed TBS closer to the "apex of power", ahead of

Finance and parallel to PMO, PCO, and FFRD.

Can we accept Johnson's theory? The answer is both yes and no. The Prime Minister and his colleagues are free to create any committees and secretariats they wish, and to endow them with conventional authority, provided the latter is not contrary to existing statutory authority. The authority contained in the policy guidelines is merely an incident of broader statutory authority to "review ... annual expenditure plans and programs". In this sense, the Board may act as a twofold Cabinet committee, and TBS may be considered a Cabinet secretariat like PCO. But, there is also another side to this coin. In law, the Treasury Board is not a cabinet committee, but is a committee of the Privy Council created by Parliament and primarily responsible to it. In this sense, neither the Board nor its Secretariat may exercise greater authority than that provided in the statute. If TBS acts as well in pursuance of authority passed to it secretly by Cabinet or a Cabinet committee, who can tell whether the latter conforms with or exceeds the provisions of the Financial Administration Act? In my view, Johnson's theory allows TBS too much discretion and reduces the possibility of Parliamentary supervision. TBS's officials are given an opportunity to claim exemption from accountability whenever they act pursuant to Cabinet authority as distinct from the authority contained in statute. This distinction, in too many instances, is either exceedingly difficult to make or

plainly illusory. If TBS forms an integral part of the Cabinet committee system which still operates according to the traditional rules of secrecy and solidarity, enjoying a privileged milieu of a protected sanctuary, it should not at the same time be, nor pretend to be, a publicly created department with full accountability to the House of Commons.

Management of senior personnel.

Highly skilled, loyal and capable men and women constitute the most precious asset of any governmental bureaucracy. Authority to recruit, train, promote, and compensate these individuals is equally precious and crucial. Since the reforms instituted in 1967, the Public Service Commission has lost its predecessor's (the Civil Service Commission) original dominance in this area. Its role is now confined to three tasks: staffing, which it shares with departments and agencies; training and development; and handling appeals on all staffing decisions.³³ The most important authority with respect to personnel management in general, namely the classification of positions and employees, and the determination of compensation rates and scales, is now in the hands of TBS. Hodgetts states unequivocally that the present distribution

"leaves little room for querying the location of ultimate repository of managerial authority over the public service".³⁴

He is right, up to a point. The Personnel Policy Branch of TBS maintains extensive and highly competent expertise engaged in collective bargaining, pensions and other non-negotiable benefits, classification and compensation of all ranks of public servants, and many related duties. However, its authority over the highest level of officials has been overshadowed by four developments:

- a) the creation of an advisory committee of private sector executives on the compensation of senior executives under the chairmanship of Allan Lambert reporting to PCO;³⁵
- b) the powerful impact of COSO (Committee on Senior Officials) composed of Gordon Robertson, Maurice LeClair, Edgar Gallant, and chaired by Michael Pitfield;
- c) the work of the Senior Personnel Secretariat in PCO under the direction of Ian Dewar and reporting to Pitfield and partly to Robertson as well;
- d) and extensive and effective use by the government of the GC category, or Governor-in-Council appointments, where, in Pitfield's own words, "lies the key to better administration and better policy development".³⁶

The SX classification is the highest a career public servant can earn. Normally, directors and directors-general merit SX-1 to SX-3; Assistant Deputy Ministers range from SX-2 to SX-4. Deputy Ministers are classified separately at the top of the ladder. Each class is related to a specific salary scale. Promotion to a new managerial posi-

may not always coincide with a higher classification. An individual may become an ADM and work as such for some time, while his/her SX classification may be held up in TBS pending a pay-related performance assessment, or the lifting of a general freeze on the SX category. Statutory authority to develop policy about the SX classification, to approve individual grants of SX category, to monitor performance assessments, and to approve compensation scales is vested in TBS. However, it must now be recognized that government attaches foremost importance to the selection of top officials. This is clearly apparent from the involvement in this process of the Priorities and Planning Cabinet Committee and the assumption of key screening and advisory responsibility by PCO.³⁷

The GC category includes appointments of all deputy ministers, members of federal boards, commissions and task forces, directors and senior executives of Crown corporations, and in general all those appointed outside the Public Service Act. Although in many instances the particular position to be filled is provided by statute, the process of selection is governed by rules developed in PCO under the conventional authority of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Senior Personnel Secretariat directed by Dewar reports now to Pitfield and, in addition, it does support work for the Lambert Committee and for COSO. COSO (Committee on Senior Officials) formulates key aspects of personnel policy for senior public servants, those in SX and GC category, and reports to the Prime Minister through Pitfield.

Its broad mandate embraces also such issues as bilingualism policy, conflict of interest in the public service, relationship between ministers and officials, post-employment regulations (i.e. restrictions on ex-public officials to engage in competitive or conflicting business activities or employment), and the work of the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability.³⁸ Dewar's Secretariat consults regularly with the Nominations Secretariat housed in PMO, which provides "political" input into the senior appointments decisions as distinct from in depth, "objective" personnel profiles prepared in PCO. Final decisions on GC appointments are taken by the Prime Minister in consultation with interested ministers, but always on the basis of the material furnished by PCO and PMO. The Lambert Committee regularly reviews executive compensations with respect to both SX and GC categories and makes recommendations to PCO and TBS. All these activities which vitally affect the lives and careers of senior officials and determine the quality and composition of the top bureaucratic elite are carried on under conventional authority, over and above the statutory authority delegated by Parliament to TBS and the Public Service Commission.

Policy on bilingualism in the public service must be viewed as an aspect of personnel management. The Official Languages Branch of TBS acts in reality as a coordinating secretariat which monitors and evaluates throughout the governmental apparatus the implementa-

tion of the Official Languages Act, the Resolution adopted by Parliament in 1973, and subsequent modifications of the policy developed by a special interdepartmental committee and sanctioned by Cabinet.³⁹ Thus, the Branch's authority is both statutory and conventional.

Control of federal/provincial relations.

This is the last of the five broad control functions exercised by central agencies and, in its breadth and scope, it is the most pervasive. It is no exaggeration to say that in Canada no policy issue or problem is exempt from intergovernmental concern. Sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act, which in law provide the basic constitutional framework for the distribution of legislative authority between Ottawa and the Provinces, have been truly left aside. These provisions as interpreted by the courts (which once used the metaphor of "water-tight compartments"⁴⁰ in a sailing ship to describe the two distinct governmental jurisdictions) present today no obstacle to the on-going development of the most intricate interdependency and easiest penetrability characteristic of any federal political system. Ontario uses policy-making authority to influence the design of the national economic budget; Quebec (even before November 1976) insists on consultations in cultural and educational aspects of foreign policy; Alberta effectively forces a

reassessment of national energy policy to suit its own interests; a number of provinces lead the way to major revisions in federal tax policy and federal/provincial fiscal arrangements; and so on.

Authority to conduct intergovernmental affairs is simply one aspect of the executive authority to govern. No federal government has paid as much attention to this activity as has that of Pierre Trudeau. Until very recently, the Prime Minister himself has chaired a separate cabinet committee on Federal/Provincial Relations, which fashioned Ottawa's over-all strategy vis-à-vis the Provinces. This committee is now merged with the committee on Priorities and Planning. Since 1975, FPRO has acted as a full-fledged second Cabinet Secretariat developing policy review capabilities in all substantive issue-areas and in all geographic regions of the country. The organization of FPRO remains flexible and responsive to changing political needs. As of April of 1978, it encompassed two deputy secretaries to the Cabinet, one for coordination and one for federal/provincial relations proper. The latter directs a section on regional analysis, a studies and research group, and a policy and program review section which is divided into four issue-areas: finance and economic matters; resources; social policy; and urban affairs and transportation. The coordination secretariat under Paul Tellier confines its activities to thorny constitutional and political problems brought to the forefront by the election of the Parti Quebecois

government in Quebec. At stake is not only the unity of the country, but also the future of the federal bureaucratic machinery, of the federal Liberal Party and the elites associated and identified with it. In a struggle of such importance, the government will muster and employ all the authority it can find.

We see then that, as is the case with the other broad functions of central agencies, federal/provincial relations falls within the domain of one institution designed and intended to control it. Yet, other central agencies are not excluded. One suspects that the theory of counterveillance applies to central agencies, at least to the same extent as it does to line bureaucracies.

Without the expertise and the knowledge generated by Finance in the area of economic, fiscal, and tax policy, no conduct of federal/provincial relations is possible. At the decision-making table (whether in cabinet committee, or intergovernmental committee), Finance presents its case and its particular point of view focused on the maintenance of economic stability in the country. Such a view may not always mesh with the more delicate and illusory requirements of political stability, nor with the short-term tactics and scenarios which FPRO may want to employ to gain a political advantage against one or more Provinces. Similarly, TBS, conscious of its own mandate to manage physical and manpower resources of the government, may and will advocate a position not necessarily consistent with the particu-

lar objectives developed by FPRO. Although both PCO and PMO are definitely closer to the thinking of FPRO officials and enjoy the benefits of very frequent and intimate consultations, their own institutional perspectives may demand similar countervailing actions. These views and positions clash at many decision-making tables, at various levels and stages of policy formulation, until they reach the ultimate forum of the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning. Marc Lalonde, Minister of State for Federal/Provincial Relations, is expected to carry the heaviest weight in this area, next only to the Prime Minister. Thus, the content of authority in the conduct of federal/provincial affairs is truly multifarious, each central agency making a significant contribution to the process from the perspective of its own policy responsibility, while FPRO maintains the primacy of authority in the field. It must be stressed that this unique flexibility in the control function is made possible by the absence of statutory authority in this field and a total reliance on constitutional convention and usage emanating from Cabinet and the Prime Minister.

A summary.

In this chapter, I have described briefly the origins of central agencies and the sources and structure of their authority; (see Figure I, Central Agencies: Sources of Authority, and Figure II,

Central Agencies: Structure of Authority and Functions of Control, pp. 122-123). Next, I have dissected their authority and organization into five broad control functions: a) control of strategic planning and substantive policy formulation, which belongs primarily to PCO but concerns the remaining agencies as well; b) control of integrated economic, fiscal and tax policies and maintenance of economic stability, which is the domain of Finance, but is subject to the countervailing forces of others; c) control of the budgetary cycle and management of governmental resources, which forms the particular mandate of TBS but cannot be divorced from the interests and influences of the other agencies; d) management of senior personnel, which is the shared concern of PCO and TBS, with the former having an edge; and e) control of federal/provincial relations, a field clearly assigned to FPRO, yet so wide and all pervasive that it cannot be managed without significant inputs from other agencies.

It is evident that the organization of central agencies and, specifically, the five broad control functions they exercise, exhibit a very strong normative reliance on decisional technology. In particular, they reflect a clear commitment to budgetary and management theories, to systems theory and cybernetics, and to decision theory and policy sciences in general. As promoters of the interventionists role of government in contemporary society, central agencies demonstrate a regular and intensive involvement in major

policy issues and a recognition that political factors and preferences cannot be excluded from their concern. As optimal budget maximizers, they demand that future allocations be increased only for those programs which show a high level of output performance established on the basis of systematic and rigorous measurement according to generally applicable criteria. They consider such measurement of governmental performance as a much more reliable and satisfactory method of control than that exercised by Parliament and parliamentary committees. They tend to voice some dissatisfaction with a constitutional theory which forces on the government the renewal of the electoral mandate every four or five years and makes consistent and comprehensive planning difficult. They maintain that they are unencumbered and free from the influence of established interest groups linked to traditional bureaucracies, and insist that their clients are all those at every level of government routinely engaged in policy formulation and implementation. Although their own jurisdictions are remarkably flexible and ill defined, and their mandates often difficult to determine with clarity and precision and largely exempt from the public eye, their activities are unmistakably devoted to the promotion of more effective, rigorous and systematic decision-making. As organizations with executive/bureaucratic, as well as hierarchic/collegial characteristics, they pave the way towards the ultimate integration of the appointed bureaucratic sector of government with the elected executive sector, and seek the required adjustments in existing constitutional

theory for that purpose. In this way, the organizational changes within central agencies (influenced by decisional technology) may lead to significant and lasting institutional change in the political system as a whole.

Central agencies use decisional technology to exert political control over bureaucratic organizations and their behaviour. This use is clearly most impressive in the course of the complex and lengthy process in which expenditure budgets are allocated to competing departments and agencies of the federal government. In the next chapter, I will examine in some detail the budgetary cycle and the instruments used in it as concrete applications of decisional technology and vehicles for central agency control. At the same time, I will attempt to place the budgetary cycle in the context of the formal policy process.

FIGURE I

CENTRAL AGENCIES: SOURCES OF AUTHORITY.

<u>PCO</u>	<u>Statutory law:</u> British North America Act Inquiries Act Governor General's Act Ministries and Ministers of State Act Statutory Instruments Act	<u>Convention from Cabinet and PM:</u> Strategic Planning, Emergency Planning, Machinery of Government, Senior Personnel (Plans Division) Substantive Policy in Discrete Sectors (Operations Division)
<u>Finance</u>	<u>Statutory law:</u> Financial Administration Act (Direction of financial affairs of Canada)	
<u>PMO</u>		<u>Convention from Prime Minister:</u> External Policy Advice Domestic Policy Advice Communications and Media Relations Legislative Advice Nominations and Appointments Correspondence
<u>TBS</u>	<u>Statutory law:</u> Financial Administrations Act (Administrative policy; Organization of the public service; Financial management; Expenditure plans and programs; Personnel management) Official Languages Act Public Service Staff Relations Act	<u>Convention from Cabinet:</u> Priorities for Annual Expenditures (Program Branch) Evaluation of Policies and Programs (Planning Branch) * Management of the Public Service
<u>FPRO</u>		<u>Convention from Cabinet and PM:</u> Political and Constitutional Strategies for Unity--Quebec (Coordination Secretariat) Conduct of Intergovernmental Relations and Coordination of Federal and Provincial Policies and Actions (Federal/Provincial Relations Secretariat)

* Since mid 1978 this role is performed by a newly created central agency: Office of the Comptroller General (OCG).

FIGURE II

CENTRAL AGENCIES: STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY AND FUNCTIONS OF CONTROL
(as of April 1978)

	STRATEGIC PLANNING AND SUB- STANTIVE POLICY	INTEGRATED ECONOMIC AND FISCAL POLICY	ALLOCATION OF BUDGETS AND MANAGE- MENT OF RESOURCES	MANAGEMENT OF SENIOR PERSONNEL	FEDERAL PROVINCIAL RELATIONS
DO	<u>Lead Agency:</u> Secretary: Pitfield Deputy Secretary: Teschke (Plans) Deputy Secretary: Marchand (Operations) Machinery of Government Secretariat Security, Intelligence and Emergency Planning Sec- retariat Plans Secretariat Operations Secretariat	<u>Key inputs:</u> Economic Policy Secretariat Economic Advisor: Stewart	<u>Key inputs:</u> Priorities and Planning Secretariat	<u>Co-lead agency:</u> Secretary: Pitfield COSO (Committee on Senior Officials) Machinery of Government Secretariat Senior Personnel Secretariat	<u>Key inputs:</u> Secretary: Pitfield Security, Intelligence and Emergency Planning Secretariat Priorities and Planning Secretariat
NANCE	<u>Key inputs:</u> Deputy Minister: Shoyama Associate Deputy Minister: Hood Fiscal Policy and Economic Analysis Branch Tax Policy and Federal/ Provincial Relations Branch	<u>Lead agency:</u> Deputy Minister: Shoyama Associate Deputy Minister: Hood Tax Policy and Federal/Provincial Relations Branch Economic Programs and Government Finance Branch Fiscal Policy and Economic Analysis Branch	<u>Key inputs:</u> Fiscal Policy and Economic Analysis Branch	<u>Key inputs:</u> none	<u>Key inputs:</u> Deputy Minister: Shoyama Tax Policy and Federal/Provincial Relations Branch Fiscal Policy and Economic Analysis Branch
DO	<u>Key inputs:</u> Principal Secretary: Coutts Designated Policy Advisors and Consultants in External and Domestic Policy Sectors	<u>Key inputs:</u> Senior Consultant: Breton Designated Policy Advisors	<u>Key inputs:</u> Designated Policy Advisors	<u>Key inputs:</u> Principal Secretary: Coutts Nominations Secretary	<u>Key inputs:</u> Principal Secretary: Coutts Designated Policy Advisors and Senior Consultants
S P	<u>Key inputs:</u> Secretary: LeClair Planning Branch* Program Branch	<u>Key inputs:</u> Secretary: LeClair Planning Branch* Program Branch	<u>Lead agency:</u> Secretary: LeClair Program Branch Planning Branch* Administrative Policy Branch	<u>Co-lead agency:</u> Secretary: LeClair Personnel Policy Branch Official Languages Branch	<u>Key inputs:</u> Official Languages Branch
RO	<u>Key inputs:</u> Secretary: Robertson Deputy Secretary: Tellier Deputy Secretary: Massé Constitutional Advisor: Carter	<u>Key inputs:</u> Policy and Program Review Secretariat	<u>Key inputs:</u> Policy and Program Review Secretariat	<u>Key inputs:</u> Secretary: Robertson	<u>Lead agency:</u> Secretary: Robertson Deputy Secretary: Tellier Deputy Secretary: Massé Constitutional Advisor: Carter Coordination Secretariat Federal/Provincial Relations Secretariat

* Abolished in October 1978

CHAPTER THREE - NOTES.

1. For example, Victor A. Thompson, Organizations As Systems, General Learning Press, 1973.
2. G. Bruce Doern, "Recent Changes In The Philosophy Of Policy-Making In Canada", Canadian Journal of Political Science, IV, No. 2, June 1971.
3. F.G. Bailey, Stratagems And Spoils, Basil Blackwell, 1970, p. xii.
4. Organization Of The Government Of Canada, Minister of Supply and Services, Ottawa, 1976, p. 6001.
5. Sir W.I. Jennings, The Law And The Constitution, 3rd edition, Cambridge University Press, 1943, p. 88.
6. For a history of these developments, see in particular: J.R. Mallory, "Cabinet Government in Canada", Political Studies, 1959, vol. 2, pp. 142-153; W.E.D. Halliday, "The Privy Council Office and Cabinet Secretariat In Relation To The Development Of Cabinet Government", Canada Year Book, 1956, pp. 62-70; M.A. Banks, "Privy Council, Cabinet and Ministry In Britain And Canada", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. 31, May 1965; R.G. Robertson, "The Canadian Parliament And Cabinet In Face Of Modern Demands", Canadian Public Administration, vol. 11, 1968, p. 272; J.R. Mallory, "Responsive And Responsible Government", Transaction of the

Royal Society of Canada, Fourth Series, 12, 1974, p. 208;
J.R. Mallory, "Mackenzie King And The Origins Of The Cabinet Secretariat", Canadian Public Administration, 19, Summer 1976, pp. 254-266.

7. An Act Respecting the Office of the Secretary to the Cabinet for Federal/Provincial Relations and Respecting the Clerk of the Privy Council, 23 Elizabeth II, chapter 16. See also J.R. Mallory, "The Two Clerks: Parliamentary Discussion Of The Role Of The Privy Council Office", Canadian Journal of Political Science, X:1, March 1977.
8. In particular, Governor General's Act (RSC 1970 c. G-14), Inquiries Act (RSC 1970 c. 1-13), Ministries and Ministers of State Act (RSC 1970 c. 14, secs. 13-34, 2nd Supp.), Parliamentary Secretaries Act (RSC 1970 c. P-1), and Statutory Instruments Act (RSC 1970-71-72 c. 38).
9. Dr. A.A. Sterns, History Of The Department Of Finance, unpublished monograph), Department of Finance, May 1965, p. 4.
10. As quoted by Sterns in History Of The Department Of Finance, *ibid.*
11. RSC 1970 c. F-10, as amended.
12. Joint Finance/TBS departmental library possesses numerous internal papers and documents containing valuable information about the history of the Treasury Board. See in particular,

Role, Functions And Responsibilities Of The Treasury Board,
2 vols., 1963 and 1971, mimeo.

13. Treasury Board Organization Manual, mimeo., Treasury Board, Ottawa, January 1967, Chapter 2, p. 1.
14. Thomas d'Aquino, "The Prime Minister's Office: Catalyst Or Cabal", Canadian Public Administration, 17, 1974, p. 57.
15. SC 1974-75 c. 16. For an interesting analysis of this legislation, see J.R. Mallory, "The Two Clerks: Parliamentary Discussion Of The Role Of The Privy Council Office", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. X, no. 1, March 1977.
16. See Letters Patent constituting the Office of the Governor General, 1947. The Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, described the effect of this delegation as follows:

"... when the letters patent come into force, it will be legally possible for the Governor General, on the advice of the Canadian ministers, to exercise any of these powers and authorities of the Crown in respect of Canada, without the necessity of a submission being made to His Majesty ..."

House Of Commons Debates, 1948, p. 1126.
17. Treasury Board, mimeo, Treasury Board Secretariat, Ottawa, November 1975, p. 5.
18. For a good discussion of the royal prerogative, see S.A. de Smith, Constitutional And Administrative Law, Penguin Books, 1971, pp. 114-29.

19. Donald Gow, The Progress Of The Budgetary Process In The Government Of Canada, Special Study No. 17, Economic Council of Canada, 1973.
20. From a confidential interview with a central agency official conducted on December 16, 1976.
21. de Smith, (1971), op. cit., pp. 54-55.
22. RSC 1970 c. F-10.
23. Michael Pitfield, "The Shape Of Government In The 1980s: Techniques And Instruments For Policy Formulation At The Federal Level", Canadian Public Administration, 19, 1976, p. 14.
24. Ibid., p. 15.
25. This Is Your Department Of Finance, Department of Finance, Ottawa, 1976.
26. RSC 1970 c. F-10.
27. This discussion is based on information obtained in the course of confidential interviews conducted with central agency officials in December 1976 and May 1977, and from internal papers and documents examined at the joint Finance/TBS departmental library in Ottawa.
28. From personal experience; for instance, Douglas Hartle strongly opposed the creation of Ministeries of State while he was Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Board.
29. From a loose-leaf internal manual entitled Functions And

Responsibilities Of The Treasury Board Secretariat, Treasury Board, Ottawa, 1974, as amended.

30. Gordon F. Osbaldeston, "Implementation Of Performance Measurement In The Federal Public Service: A Progress Report", Optimum, 7, 1976, p. 6.
31. D.F. Hartle, "Techniques And Processes Of Administration", Canadian Public Administration, 19, 1976, p. 21
32. A.W. Johnson, "The Treasury Board Of Canada And The Machinery Of Government Of The 1970s", Canadian Journal Of Political Science, IV, September 1971, p. 346.
33. J.E. Hodgetts, Canadian Public Service: A Physiology Of Government 1867-1970, University of Toronto Press, 1973, pp. 284-285.
34. Hodgetts, Ibid., p. 284.
35. Mr. Lambert, a senior executive of the Toronto-Dominion Bank, is currently Chairman of the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability.
36. Pitfield, "The Shape Of Government In The 1980s", (1976), op. cit., p. 15.
37. From confidential interviews conducted with central agency officials in December 1976; see also Gow, (1973), op. cit.
38. From confidential interviews conducted with central agency officials in December 1976. My respondents confirmed that while Pitfield plays a key role in the formulation of senior personnel policy, Robertson's influence continues to dominate

individual appointments.

39. From a confidential interview with a central agency official, December 1976.
40. Lord Atkin in Attorney General Of Canada v. Attorney General Of Ontario, (1937) A.C. 327.

CHAPTER FOUR.

THE BUDGETARY CYCLE AND POLICY PROCESS: INSTRUMENTS FOR POLITICAL CONTROL.

The budgetary cycle must be viewed as a key, controlling component of the formal policy process. One of the early and significant accomplishments of the Trudeau administration has been the synchronization of the various decisional sequences. This attempt to formalize executive and bureaucratic decision-making is depicted schematically in Figure III on page 168.¹ It shows the budgetary cycle in relation to the other decision-making sequences.

The key role of the expenditure budget in the overall policy process arises from several factors: a) its earlier and fuller development; b) its fiscal and economic significance for the country as a whole; c) its hard and tangible significance for the operation of bureaucratic organizations; and d) its unique position as a connecting link between the largely secret work of the executive and bureaucratic committees and the open public scrutiny of Parliament.

Unanticipated events of considerable magnitude may lead to crisis decision-making and thus disrupt the continuity of the formal policy process. Clearly, the latter is always dependent on at least two conditions: a) that the Prime Minister and his Cabinet

command the uninterrupted support of the House of Commons; and
b) that no major political or economic crisis occurs. When these two conditions are present, the policy process takes place in an orderly and regular manner. Priorities, policies, programs, and budget levels emerge from the decisions of numerous executive and bureaucratic committees. These committees may be described as quasi-institutional vehicles for governmental decision-making.

Normally, they share the following characteristics:

- a) They are small, usually consisting of up to 15 members, and there is often some restriction on membership and access. The members are expected to be approximately of equal rank, that is, either Cabinet ministers, Deputy Ministers, or officials below DM level.
- b) The chairmanship of each committee (and often also the vice-chairmanship) is entrusted to an individual designated by someone in higher authority; thus, the Prime Minister names the chairmen of the Cabinet committees and the committees composed of Deputy Ministers; while DMs designate the chairmen of interdepartmental and departmental committees of officials. The chairman is normally expected to continue in office throughout the mandate, unless he/she is replaced.
- c) The mandate of each committee is specific, but some flexibility is permitted; it is usually given informally, sometimes in writing, but never by way of a statutory or other legal instru-

ment. This informality of mandate distinguishes committees from task forces and commissions which are normally established by orders-in-council.

- d) The membership of a committee is expected to be representative in the sense that each major contending interest relative to the mandate should be present or given an opportunity to be heard. Thus, for example, the Social Policy Cabinet Committee consists of ministers drawn from such areas as Health and Welfare, Justice, Immigration, Urban Affairs, Citizenship, Labour, and Employment.
- e) Each committee meets regularly, but the frequency of meetings may vary considerably depending on the nature of the mandate. Some record of proceedings and decisions or recommendations is usually kept. Unlike task forces and commissions, committees work in secret and their proceedings are kept out of the public domain.

These distinguishing features are not rigid, and exceptions and modifications occur quite often in the name of flexibility or convenience.

There exists at least an implicit hierarchy among governmental committees. Departmental committees whose memberships and mandates are usually confined to one department or agency are at the bottom of the ladder. Each department and agency has an internal Management Committee chaired by the Deputy Minister (or Secretary)

and composed of all ADMs and sometimes Directors-General; its task includes the resolution of internal conflicts and issues, and the fashioning of the department's strategy or position on a particular policy issue or problem. Thus, the departmental committees constitute the first level of inputs into the formal policy process.

Since 1968, interdepartmental committees have become the principal means of communication and deliberation in the federal bureaucratic establishment. It is very difficult to determine how many of them exist and operate at any given time. Some of them have continued for two or three years or longer; others have lasted only a few months; many have spawned sub-committees which work side by side with their "parents". It is not entirely clear how these committees are created. Undoubtedly many of them have been formed on express instructions of Cabinet committees or the Prime Minister and given mandates to report back. I suspect, however, that a good number have been brought about by the departments and agencies themselves in order to resolve interdepartmental conflicts and policy differences. Central agencies show great interest in the work of interdepartmental committees, which they perceive as quasi-institutional links between Cabinet and program bureaucracies and a very important second level in the policy-making process.

Cabinet committees make up the top of the ladder; but even at this level, equality has been replaced with hierarchy and speciali-

zation. Of the nine standing committees, the Priorities and Planning takes clear precedence. It is the only standing committee chaired by the Prime Minister; its membership is rigidly restricted to designated ministers, and it alone issues guidelines (to be distinguished from mere decisions), which are expected to be taken into account by the remaining standing committees. Three "coordinating" committees come next in line--Federal/Provincial Relations,² Legislation and House Planning, and Treasury Board. Finally, there are five "subject matter" committees intended to encompass within their mandates all substantive policy areas: Economic Policy, Social Policy, External and Defence Policy, Cultural and Native Policy, and an omnibus committee called Government Operations. In addition to these standing committees, Cabinet is currently divided into special ad hoc committees on Security and Intelligence, Public Service, and Labour Relations. Other special committees may be formed at the discretion of the Prime Minister. Finally, a committee of Council meets on a regular basis to pass formal orders and regulations. The distinction between standing committees and special ad hoc committees is not always clear, but in theory the former constitute the comprehensive structural framework for top level policy formulation on an ongoing basis, while the latter take care of special issues which require resolution outside of the regular decision-making process. Thus, for example, during the prolonged postal strike in 1970, the Cabinet committee on Labour Relations met frequently and finally forced a settlement of

the dispute on terms which the Treasury Board officials did not approve.³ I must add that Cabinet itself is a committee of the Privy Council and, pursuant to constitutional principle, it assumes responsibility for all actions and decisions taken by any of its organizational sub-units.

With these three levels of committees--departmental, inter-departmental and Cabinet--the formal structure for policy-making in Ottawa is complete. It must be noted, however, that I have purposely left out the rich and equally complex intergovernmental domain and the highly significant impact of provincial governments on federal decision-making. To some extent this impact is channelled through FPRO.

Mandates and Relationships of Committees.

It is beyond the scope of this work to describe fully the mandates of bureaucratic committees. Instead I will deal in this section with only a few selected interdepartmental committees and then focus more fully on Cabinet committees, and in particular on the Priorities and Planning Committee and Treasury Board, which play crucial roles in the budgetary cycle. My purpose here is to illustrate the variety of problems and issues which have been assigned to bureaucratic committees for resolution, and the interdependence

between the interdepartmental level and the Cabinet level of decision-making--so characteristic of contemporary executive/bureaucratic behaviour. For officials in central agencies, committees have become their true life blood and they identify themselves with them almost to the same extent as they do with their own organizations. One informant from TBS put it like this:

"I perform the role of a trouble shooter or a problem solver, and I am often called upon to sit on a committee which may have been set up to solve a particular burning issue. Sometimes this issue is unrelated to my work here at TBS. For example, not long ago there was an ad hoc committee with a mandate to rationalize the government's approach to sovereignty in connection with the management of off-shore mineral rights. I was asked to chair this committee, even though most of the other members on it were either from External or Defence (DND). So, you can see, I can move in and out of a committee where TBS is not directly involved whenever the situation demands".⁴

Early in the summer of 1976, an interdepartmental committee was established to look into the possibility of integrating federal welfare expenditures with the income tax system and developing a unified welfare/tax system. Some informants from Finance and PCO who sat on this committee described its work as "the path for the future ... the most creative and intellectually challenging" of tasks.⁵ In November 1977, Monique Begin, the newly appointed Minister of National Health and Welfare, announced a partial adoption of such a new integrated approach and promised to introduce shortly the necessary legislative measure. The interdepartmental process, in other words,

was only getting off the ground more than a year after the initial discussions.

Another important aspect of interdepartmental committee work is the inevitable fact that more than one group will be working in the same general policy sector. For instance, in the area of personnel policy, three committees have recently made important contributions: COSO (Committee on Senior Officials); a committee on post-employment regulations which was brought about in reaction to the growing market for early retired senior officials in the consulting and corporate fields of endeavour; and a new committee on the ES category (economists)—a profession which, according to fellow economist Douglas Hartle, has become one of the fattest of all in the federal public service. In Hartle's view

"The annual salaries paid in Ottawa to some professional groups (not to mention overtime pay and perquisites) is nothing short of outrageous. While I hesitate to name the names, the economist-statistician group immediately comes to mind."⁶

In 1976 central agencies controlled the proceedings and deliberations of numerous interdepartmental committees. Their mandates included: the post-anti-inflation regulation strategy (the so-called DM 10 committee, which was recently reconstituted into DM 5 under the chairmanship of Deputy Minister Shoyama); Nuclear Energy; Security Panel; Commercial Policy; Demographic Policy; Native Policy;

Employment Strategy (chaired by former Deputy Minister Gotlieb); Technological Forecasting; Royal Visits; Law of the Sea; Government Organization.⁷ I underline that this list names only a few selected mandates illustrating the variety and heterogeneity of issues and problems which cross the institutional boundaries of governmental bureaucracies. If there is one single message to be drawn, it is this--today, no department in Ottawa enjoys a monopoly of mandate, no matter what may be the terms of its statutory authority. There is no doubt in anybody's mind that the big game in town is played at the interdepartmental and Cabinet committee tables.

Full Cabinet no longer serves as the principal policy-making body. Its mandate has changed, but it has not become any less significant. Cabinet must give formal approval to all decisions taken by its committees; it acts as a court of last resort whenever contending interests have failed to reach agreement at the committee level; it offers a forum for discussion and airing of highly political, controversial issues--often unrelated to the ongoing policy process--when individual ministers should feel free to "let their hair down" and reveal their innermost thoughts to each other. Since most policy issues have received more than adequate thrashing out before reaching the full Cabinet's agenda, the formal stamp of approval is the usual order of the day. In cases of disagreement on a matter of policy, a referral back to committee is much more likely than the

actual taking of a substantive decision. The "creative" role of Cabinet as a collective body for political leadership is expressed mainly in its free deliberations of various issues which fall outside of the formal policy process. "Retreat" type meetings in a Gatineau lodge fall within this category.

I have already named the standing committees of Cabinet. Their specific mandates may be briefly described as follows:

Committee on Priorities and Planning acts as the executive manage-

ment board for the Cabinet committee system. It is clearly the senior policy-making body; however, its role is kept flexible and currently it includes the following functions:

- a) articulation of broad policy objectives and priorities for the longer term and initiation of major policy reviews consistent with these priorities;
- b) formulation of priorities for the annual budgetary expenditures and policy guidelines consistent with the fiscal framework;
- c) determination of macro-economic policy;
- d) overview of personnel policy with respect to key executive appointments and promotions.

Committee on Federal/Provincial Relations⁸ establishes the federal government's strategy vis-à-vis the provincial governments on all policy and political issues and oversees the conduct of

federal/provincial relations, including the burning issue of Quebec's role in confederation.

Committee on Legislation and House Planning establishes the legislative program for the Parliamentary session and scrutinizes draft legislation to make sure that the language used truly expresses the intention of the decision-makers. It fashions the government's strategy against the opposition parties in the House of Commons and establishes priorities for the passage of government bills.

Treasury Board reviews departmental program forecasts and renders final decisions on the allocation of expenditure budgets. In addition, it hears submissions from departments and agencies with respect to specific expenditures and acquisitions and issues regulations and guidelines about the management of physical and human resources.

Substantive policy is made in the so-called subject-matter committees. In the insiders' terminology, a substantive policy field is referred to as "a sector"; the minister designated to chair the committee is called "the lead minister in the sector"; the head of the PCO Secretariat supporting the committee becomes "the sector manager".

In Figure IV at page 169, I have arranged all departments and agencies into the five policy sectors and have identified the

lead minister in each sector.⁹

Access and Membership.

It happened once that a Cabinet committee meeting was rescheduled on short notice from its usual afternoon hour to the morning of the same day. All regular members and participants were advised by telephone of the change with the exception of one Deputy Minister, who was out of town and could not be reached. He planned to return to Ottawa and attend the meeting in the afternoon, as originally scheduled. The meeting took place in the morning and an ADM substituted for the absent Deputy Minister. One item on the agenda was resolved in a manner with which the Deputy Minister strongly disagreed. When he returned and discovered what had happened, he wasted no time in dispatching a terse and unequivocal memo to the Minister who chaired the meeting. It read:

"During my absence and without my knowledge a Cabinet committee meeting was held and a decision taken against which I had no opportunity to speak. This must not happen again."¹⁰

Ongoing access to meetings of Cabinet committees is probably the most prized possession of the Ottawa officialdom. In theory, any minister may attend any committee meeting he wishes, with the exception of Priorities and Planning. In fact, most ministers cannot even find enough time to attend all the meetings of the

two or three committees to which they have been assigned. Increasingly, they choose to delegate their attendance to officials. This may be a disturbing development to those who draw a sharp line between the elected political leaders and the appointed career bureaucrats. I have found that senior officials in central agencies in particular have developed "ministerial" capabilities. They step into the shoes of ministers with ease and perform very effectively. When I probed one informant about the role senior officials play at Cabinet committee meetings, he recounted the following episode:

"A small group of ministers circulated a proposal which they wanted to present at the next regular meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Federal/Provincial Relations. I knew that my Minister (who was a member of the Committee) was opposed to the proposal, and he knew that I shared his view. He asked me to attend the meeting in his place. When we reached the item on the agenda, the Prime Minister asked one of the sponsors for a short summary of the proposal. He later turned to me and said, 'Do you have any objections?' I replied, 'No, Prime Minister, I do not have any objection; but the Minister I represent does. And if I may, I would like to speak on his behalf against the proposal.' I then meticulously and point by point destroyed the proposal and sat down. The PM looked around the table, noticing that the sponsoring ministers were disturbed and eager to get even. He asked them to elaborate further and make sure that everybody fully understood the substance of the proposal and its implications. For over half an hour, I listened to their arguments, which in reality did not contain anything new, and made no more sense then than they had before. When they finished, the PM turned to me again and said, 'Are you satisfied now? Did the additional explanation clear up the matter for you?' I replied, 'Prime Minister, I must repeat that my own satis-

faction is irrelevant. I am here only to represent my Minister; but I can say on his behalf and without any hesitation that he would not be satisfied with the explanation given for the following reasons.' And here I presented an even more formidable critique of the proposal and of its inadequate defence. I had the facts on my side and my analysis was clear, precise and again devastating. When I had finished, the PM turned to the sponsoring ministers and said simply, 'I think you should get back to the drawing board with this. Next item on the agenda.'"

The participation of officials in Cabinet committees' deliberations was introduced by Prime Minister Trudeau in 1968/69. This innovation departed then and still deviates today from the British practice. Theoretically, officials' participation in Cabinet committees increases the influence of ministers on officials and, thus, strengthens the Cabinet, the political executive, against the bureaucracy. My own analysis does not support such a diagnosis. Nine years of continued active participation has produced an official highly sensitive to political considerations. He has learned this sensitivity from his new colleagues--the ministers--in the course of hours of shared experience at the committee table, which have provided an excellent milieu for socialization and education. Given his intellect, his professional or academic training, and his knowledge of government acquired over the years of service, the access to Cabinet committees simply provides a forum in which his potential for collegiality with Ministers is fully activated. The position of a senior official is fully tenured; his status, guaranteed. Surely,

it is his influence, rather than the minister's, that has increased first and foremost.

An average and below average minister has stood to lose a great deal from the new arrangement. His intellectual shortcomings are now known to Cabinet colleagues and officials alike. His dubious standing with the Prime Minister and senior Cabinet colleagues is further undermined. He must worry about his seat in the House and cater to his constituents. As soon as he begins to understand how his department operates, he is shifted to another portfolio. Lucky for him because he could have been dropped from Cabinet altogether. His influence appears to be a function of chance. On the other hand, those few ministers who are closest to the Prime Minister, who by his choice chair and command Cabinet committees and occupy prestigious portfolios, those of the inner circle benefit considerably from the assignment of major policy responsibilities, and from the division of the Cabinet into specialized sectors over which they are allowed to exert greater influence than their colleagues. Finally, the influence of the Prime Minister has undoubtedly increased with the increase in the number of jobs he may distribute and the choice of categories, classes, and levels of responsibility he may delegate.

Gordon Robertson wrote in 1971 that the participation of ministers and officials in Cabinet committee meetings leads to

"A blending of the roles that requires

mutual confidence and a awareness of their differences."¹²

I agree. Bureaucrats have become politicized and ministers tight lipped as never before. As for differences, I think these are much greater, from the perspective of influence, between, for example, Allan MacEachen (President of the Privy Council and Government House Leader) and Norman Cafik (Minister of State for Multiculturalism), than between Jean Chretien (Minister of Finance) and Gordon Osbaldeston (Deputy Minister of Industry Trade and Commerce).

Style of Interaction in Committees.

A particular style of interaction is determined by the mandate of a Cabinet committee, as well as by the preferences and personalities of the chairman and the key participants. I will discuss in this section two strikingly different styles related to me by informants who drew from direct personal experience. However, each style can only emerge in the context of basic uniformities which apply to all Cabinet committees. A formal agenda prescribes the order of business and excludes surprises. Opposing and supporting positions adopted by the participating actors are circulated in advance to all members in secret Cabinet papers and memoranda which may include analytic work prepared in PCO or TBS. Meetings normally take place once every week, or every second week, and last three or four hours on the average. The chairman is in charge of the pro-

ceedings and responsible for the results. Decisions taken are recorded in the minutes, and reports of each decision are distributed to all Cabinet ministers, all Deputy Ministers, and to selected senior officials.

One hard-nosed official with considerable experience in government highlighted the degree to which committee styles differ by comparing the ways in which the Treasury Board and Priorities and Planning function:

"Treasury Board is a true decision-making committee. It resolves issues once and for all. In fact, it works not unlike a court of law. ... On the other hand, the Committee on Priorities and Planning is not really a decision-making body; rather it's a deliberating body. It resolves nothing."¹³

A meeting of the Priorities and Planning committee is not unlike a lengthy quasi-academic seminar with several often diverse subjects on the agenda; see Figure V at p. 171. The Prime Minister and about ten senior ministers chosen by him occupy places around the table. Next to them sit the Deputy Ministers and key departmental and agency officials. Officials from the PCO Priorities and Planning Secretariat are seated at a separate table. Mr. Pitfield, who is always present, moves freely around the Cabinet table, but most often stands by the Prime Minister. There is no vote and the decisions are arrived at by a form of consensus or compromise extracted by the Prime Minister.¹⁴

A Treasury Board meeting presents a different picture; see Figure VI at p. 172. The President and four members of the Board sit on one side of the table facing a group of TBS officials headed by the Secretary. They have previously read a submission prepared by a particular Department requesting either an approval of a substantial expenditure from the allocated budget, or an increase in the proposed budget level, which has been found to be inadequate. The Minister and the officials representing the Department are asked to join the meeting and to address the Board, if they wish. When they do, the Board members, as well as the Secretary, interrupt frequently with questions and observations. When the discussion is over, the departmental delegation (including the minister) leaves the meeting room. The Board then deliberates under the direction of its President, with the active participation of the Secretary and his staff. If unanimity does not obtain, the President may ask for a vote. Once the decision is made, it is immediately communicated to the Department, first verbally, after the Minister and his officials have been invited back into the room, and later in writing.

I must add that not all meetings of the Treasury Board follow the described pattern. In addition to its adjudicative role, the Board meets to discuss issues relating to the management of the human and physical resources of the government. In the course of such meetings, the style of interaction does not materially differ from

those pursued by the other Cabinet committees. The specific roles of the Priorities and Planning committee and the Treasury Board which they play in the budgetary cycle will be discussed below in relation to each budgetary instrument.

As I wrote earlier, the committees described above—Cabinet, interdepartmental and departmental—constitute the quasi-institutional setting within which the budgetary cycle operates. The cycle consists of a series of consecutive and closely related decisions taken over a period of some eighteen months from January of a given year to June of the following year, when the Main Estimates are finally voted by Parliament. The ultimate aim of the cycle is to allocate money (budgets) to bureaucratic organizations for the next fiscal year. The struggle which accompanies these allocative decisions exemplifies bureaucratic politics and its unique circumstances:

- 1) An assumption that bureaucratic organizations produce and distribute goods, services, and benefits in response to public demand and in the public interest, and that they provide them in greater amounts than would be possible if such goods, services and benefits were to be produced and distributed for profit by the private sector.¹⁵
- 2) A relative absence of competition among bureaucratic organizations over outputs (i.e. goods, services and benefits they produce and distribute).

- 3) A strong, often fierce competition over highly valued inputs (for example, man-years, physical assets, budgets) which bureaucratic organizations need and seek in order to maintain and increase their operations.
- 4) A system of financing of bureaucratic organizations, almost entirely confined to grants (i.e. annual budgetary allocations) which: (a) must be renewed from year to year; (b) originate from resources extracted from society largely by way of taxation and borrowing; (c) cannot be easily increased without facing political consequences.

Clearly, budgetary allocations are viewed as the most highly valued inputs, to be maximized at any cost. Some bureaucratic organizations inherit from year to year past "inequalities" in the overall distribution of budgets. The budgetary cycle offers them an opportunity for the removal or minimization of these perceived "inequalities". Those which succeed do so at the expense of their competitors, and the perceptions of "inequalities" continue to persist. Thus the struggle over scarce and preferred values (the expenditure budgets) defines the nature of bureaucratic politics.

The budgetary instruments rooted in decisional technology are intended to channel this struggle into well controlled sequences where the behaviour of competing bureaucratic organizations is forced to follow a relatively predictable and familiar pattern. These

instruments are designed and used by central agencies, and in particular by the Treasury Board Secretariat. They serve as their most effective tools for political control. Let us now examine them in detail.

The first budgetary instrument which begins the cycle is the fiscal framework.¹⁶ It is prepared by the Fiscal Policy and Economic Analysis Branch of the Department of Finance. The framework contains forecasts for the forthcoming fiscal year of three factors: (a) the general economic condition; (b) governmental revenues; and (c) governmental expenditures. As the fiscal year in question is then still some 16 months away (see Figure V at p. 171), the forecasts are necessarily based on information which will soon become dated. As new information becomes available and the economic and fiscal conditions change during the budgetary cycle, the fiscal framework is adjusted and revised accordingly. One must note, however, that these revisions may not be fully reflected in at least some decisions taken early in the cycle, which allows only a limited amount of flexibility.

Essentially, the framework is the product of one central agency, the Department of Finance; it contains specialized knowledge and analysis assembled by the Fiscal Policy Branch. Two committees of Cabinet discuss the framework. First, the Economic Policy committee examines it briefly. Subsequently, the Priorities and Plan-

ning committee devotes considerable time to it. One should note that the Treasury Board, as a committee, is largely excluded from these deliberations, in spite of its statutory authority and responsibility over the expenditure budget.¹⁷ The decisions relative to the framework or its modification are taken exclusively by the Priorities and Planning committee chaired by the Prime Minister. Using the fiscal framework as a foundation, this committee then develops a set of policy guidelines which fix the priorities for the budgetary allocations to be made for the fiscal year in question.

The policy guidelines, accordingly, are the second budgetary instrument. Unlike the fiscal framework, they are addressed and communicated to the heads of bureaucratic organizations (Deputy Ministers and Secretaries) directing them to take into account the established priorities in the preparation of their budgetary submissions. Policy guidelines are drafted by the Program Branch of TBS and then modified in the Priorities and Planning committee. The priorities they establish are most relevant for the spending of so-called "new money", which represents the difference between the total revenue forecast in the fiscal framework and the total cost at current levels of the existing programs administered by the bureaucratic organizations. Most of the "new money" originates from growing tax revenues, particularly during a period of high rate of economic growth or high inflation. At the time when the guidelines are under consi-

deration, the Priorities and Planning committee is already aware of the new policies and programs which have received approval during the past months, either by the "subject matter" Cabinet committees or by the Treasury Board. The committee is therefore clearly in a position to rank those policy and program innovations and to single out those which are to receive more favourable budgetary treatment than others. The policy guidelines are transmitted to the heads of bureaucratic organizations through the Program Branch of the Treasury Board Secretariat, which is charged with their enforcement throughout the public service. The departments and agencies are expected to use the guidelines in the preparation of their A and B Budgets.¹⁸

The third budgetary instrument is the program forecast. This document is prepared by each bureaucratic organization in accordance with the requirements set out by the Treasury Board Secretariat in a manual entitled "Program Forecast And Estimate Manual".¹⁹ The forecast is expected to include information about the following subjects:

- 1) Definitions of long range objectives of all programs;
- 2) Definitions of targets; that is, short range (annual) objectives of all programs in a form susceptible to quantification;
- 3) Courses of action which have been selected during the administration of each program from all the alternatives considered;

- 4) Outputs or immediate results of activities;
- 5) Achievement of effectiveness; that is, the degree to which the objectives and targets are being reached.

In conjunction with the program forecast, bureaucratic organizations are expected to submit a program review submission stating their total budgetary requirements for the forthcoming fiscal year covering the existing programs at present levels of cost—Budget-A. The only increases allowed in Budget-A are those defined as increases in salaries, in the prices of other inputs, or to finance changes in the volume of services required as a result of an increase in the population being served. Because no policy decisions are required respecting the existing programs, Budget-A levels can usually be agreed upon between departmental officials concerned and the Program Branch of TBS. Originally, the program forecast was intended to contain as well Budget-X, representing suggested reductions in the cost of existing programs (which were to result from efficiency studies) and suggested elimination of ineffective programs. Since departments and agencies have consistently refused to identify such reductions or eliminations, the Budget-X concept was dropped.²⁰

The next step in the budgetary cycle consists of a detailed program review by the Program Branch of TBS of Budgets-A and Budgets-B in the context of the information supplied in program forecasts. With respect to Budget-A, the review is limited to informal exchanges

between Program Branch officials and departmental officials. In the event of disagreement, a formal appeal to the Treasury Board may be made. Normally, the responsible minister will appear before the Board together with his officials and participate in the argument. The rulings of the Treasury Board on such appeals are final. With respect to Budget-B, TBS arranges a series of meetings with the ministers (and their officials) concerned. During each meeting the Deputy Secretary in charge of the Program Branch presents an analysis of the proposed new expenditure followed by a discussion in which the President of the Treasury Board, the Minister concerned and his officials play the leading roles. The main criteria used in the analysis are as follows:

- a) The priorities set out in the policy guidelines which TBS is obligated to enforce;
- b) The priorities, if any, set by the "subject matter" committee when it approved the new policy and its budgetary tag;
- c) The judgment of TBS officials about the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed policy and program.

Using these three criteria, the Treasury Board ranks all new expenditures in Budget-B according to the "marginal social benefits" that may accrue from them and allocates the budgets accordingly. The program review terminates when all targets for the forthcoming fiscal year are finalized, and all budget allocations for Budget-A and Budget-B are made. This normally occurs in August of a given year

with respect to the fiscal year to begin next April 1st; see Figure VII at page 173. For all practical purposes, the government's expenditure budget is then fixed, subject to formal approval by Cabinet. From September to January next, the budgetary decisions already taken are "translated" and incorporated into the Main Estimates. These are reviewed and approved (first by TBS and then formally by Cabinet) and laid before Parliament in February. Parliamentary review takes place between February and June when the Main Estimates are voted and passed. In addition to the Main Estimates, Parliament votes and passes each year interim supply and Supplementary Estimates.²¹

One of the aims of the budgetary cycle is to establish a sufficient degree of analytical rigor and procedural uniformity in order to subject all claims for "new money" to the same kind of scrutiny, and to weed out excesses and frills, as well as those proposed expenditures which are not likely to produce the desired result. However, the ingenuity of some bureaucratic organizations and their commitment to the imperative of budget maximization sometimes defeat these purposes. Rather than compete with numerous other worthy claimants for new expenditures from the beginning of the cycle, some departments and agencies manage to find "new money" in the "windfall revenue gains which unexpectedly surface late in the cycle". Douglas Hartle described this clever "anti-budgetary" technique as follows:

"I have no reason to attribute ulterior

motives to the Department of Finance. But the fact is that the growth in revenues has been underestimated year after year. Because the revenue estimates of February form the basis for the Estimates of the following February, which do not apply until the fiscal year beginning two to three months later, it is not surprising that in a period of rapid growth and/or inflation that the realized revenues exceed those estimated fourteen to twenty-four months earlier. The fact is, however, that departments have recognized that they are foolish to compete for additional funds for new or expanded programs at a time when their requests will be arrayed against so many alternatives. Much better to submit a cabinet memorandum during the fiscal year when the windfall revenue gains are being reluctantly revealed by Finance. Then a quickly prepared memorandum to Cabinet that shows only that funds are available to finance it for the balance of the current year, with no realistic estimates of the implication for ensuing years, will often do the trick. The real trick is, of course, ultimately played on the taxpayer. For once having been adopted, it is like practicing orthodontics on a shark to achieve modifications in the program in the future. To change the metaphor, the marshmallows of the current fiscal year become the bricks of the next fiscal year--through the A budget. And the bricks of today become the cornerstones of tomorrow as new and expanded programs are erected on this once quivering foundation."²²

The budgetary instruments discussed above, and especially the program forecast, are the direct descendants of PPBS and can be traced back to the first Treasury Board publication (September 1969) devoted to this decisional technology.²³ In it, the Treasury Board requested that each bureaucratic organization establish a unit whose

sole responsibility would be analytic work associated with program budgeting. The unit would be called the "Program Analysis Unit", and the analytic work would include:

- a) The setting of specific departmental or agency objectives;
- b) Systematic analysis to clarify the objectives and to assess alternative ways of meeting them;
- c) The framing of budgetary proposals in terms of programs directed toward the achievement of these objectives;
- d) The projection of the costs of these programs over a number of years in the future (five years for capital expenditures and three years for all other expenditures);
- e) The formulation of plans of achievement (targets) year by year for each program.

It was intended that the principal instrument for these analytic activities would be the program forecast.

In February 1973, I conducted a survey of departments and agencies of the federal government in order to ascertain the degree of compliance with this Treasury Board directive. I wanted in particular to discover whether Program Analysis Units had been in fact established and what analytic work, if any, had been completed by them. Twenty-five departments and agencies were surveyed; of which two did not respond, two refused to participate, and two gave inadequate responses. Some responses were unexpectedly generous and de-

tailed, e.g. those of the departments of National Defence, Labour, Agriculture, Veterans Affairs, and National Revenue (Customs and Excise). The survey has shown that in 1973, over three years after the issue of the TBS directive, only 12 departments had established program analysis units. However, in most of these cases, contrary to the Treasury Board recommendation, the new units were assigned additional management and planning responsibilities over and above program analysis. In general, compliance with the TBS directive has been varied and uneven. For the most part, departments and agencies have made their own decisions how to implement them, when, and by what means. Hence, little uniformity has resulted from this exercise. With respect to the completed analytic work, six departments had begun work on the definition of program objectives, one department had developed a system of performance measurement, and two departments had undertaken some program analysis in selected areas. As illustrations of the degree of resistance on the part of bureaucratic organizations to the introduction of program budgeting, I quote excerpts from letters received in response to my survey.

National Research Council: "The NRC is not unfamiliar with or unconcerned about PPB. The Council established a program, planning and analysis group over three years ago, and this unit has carefully examined the feasibility of applying PPB techniques to a variety of science based projects. These attempts to follow the Treasury Board guide lines have kept NRC aware of the need to examine programs and projects in terms of accountability and their bearing on national purposes. ... I regret that the Na-

tional Research Council is unable to respond directly to your questionnaire on program analysis. As you may know, the NRC is not a mission oriented department and has no regulatory functions. ... Consequently, our ability to apply PPB methodologies and controls has so far been limited by the nature of our responsibilities."²⁴

Consumer and Corporate Affairs: "Due to the diversity of activities and the particular organizational structure of this department, many of the aspects of PPB are the ongoing tasks of branches within the program bureaux. E.G. The major part of the cost benefit analysis carried on within the research branches, who are responsible for developing programs to meet legislative requirements. A pending major reorganization of the departmental headquarters will probably result in a change in responsibilities of the unit as now stated. The prospect for progress into various areas of the PPB system by this unit will depend on this redefinition of responsibilities."²⁵

National Health and Welfare: "The PPBS division is located organizationally with the Financial Administration Directorate. The chief of the new PPBS division will be reporting to the director, Financial Administration Directorate, who in turn reports to the Assistant Deputy Minister Administration. The one analyst presently on staff is largely concerned with a working group which is looking at the present program activity structure with a view to developing a revised structure which will enable a more flexible process of financial planning and negotiating for resources to be achieved."²⁶

Regional Economic Expansion: "Our experience suggests that a PPB system has to be tailor made to each specific department of government and the needs of that department are paramount in the system PPB designed. Therefore, we expect our detailed approach to design and analysis to be different from that of the more traditional departments.

Thus the PPB system to which you refer in your opening sentence is perhaps elusive as an all-embracing or unique system."²⁷

Solicitor General: "In the case of the other programs of this department (other than RCMP) there has been no specific unit for the purpose of program analysis to date but we are currently reorganizing the ministry secretariat and provision has been made for a separate program evaluation unit which should be functioning within the present fiscal year ending March 31st, 1974."²⁸

Energy, Mines and Resources: "The implementation of a system such as PPB is a slow process, if it is in fact ever fully introduced. The purely theoretical approach is conceptually stimulating but in practice undergoes modification and must be tailored to the system. The intellectual wave that passed through some years ago has left behind the concept of an integrated planning, analysis, and budgeting system, but the structural framework within which this is to be carried out effectively is still undeveloped, particularly in government."²⁹

Postmaster General: "I have carefully reviewed your questionnaire and find that the questions presented refer to the internal management of this department. Since it is not our policy to reveal our internal management policies, documents or techniques outside this department, I must inform you that I cannot answer your questionnaire. If it is of any value to your study, we do practice the PPB system concept, utilize recognized cost benefit analyses techniques, employ specially devised analytical techniques to meet our unique requirements, and have an adequate staff of highly skilled analysts."³⁰

Department of External Affairs: "The unit of the Department of External Affairs which is responsible for the preparation of the Department's budget and estimates is the Bureau of Finance and Administration. That Bureau is not, however, a program analysis unit in the sense which seems to be intended in your questionnaire, although it is con-

cerned with some aspects of cost benefit analysis and related activities. I am sorry that our operations do not fit your inquiry, but if there is any further information which would be of help to you please do not hesitate to get in touch with us again."³¹

Canadian International Development Agency: "The relative newness of the Policy Branch and the Program Analysis Division as a part of it make it somewhat difficult to answer your questionnaire as it is laid out. ... Some work has been done in redefining agency objectives, although as you know this is an ongoing process. Some steps are being taken now to define sub-objectives in relation to the broader ones, but this frankly is still in a very embryonic stage. At the present time we are not making use of cost benefit analysis at the macro level since CIDA's programs are really more an aggregation of projects than programs in the conventional sense. ... There has been little rigorous analytic work by the Program Analysis Division itself. The professional staff has consisted of between two and three people whose main preoccupation has been the preparation of the program forecast and after that relatively short term, day to day problems. It is expected that we shall be adding additional staff shortly at which time we should be able to move to the consideration of longer term problems and a more analytic orientation."³²

Little wonder then that Donald Gow writing in 1973 called the program forecast "largely a sham". His finding that "very few departments have conducted cost-effectiveness studies ... and relatively little such activity was reflected in the Program Forecast" correspond closely to mine.³³

These initial failures in bringing greater rigour and systematic analysis into the budgetary process are not surprising.

Many of the innovations not only appeared, but actually were, highly threatening to the traditional "probity and prudence" oriented public servants. For example, in 1969 and 1970, the specification of objectives for all departmental programs bogged down, as many departments simply refused to "stick their necks out". Eventually these resistances and inhibitions were overcome and the "objectives" exercise was successfully followed by the development of the activity structure consisting of complete classification of all major activities making up each program.³⁴

In early 1970s, the focus of technologically inspired reforms shifted towards obtaining a reliable information base which would permit the Treasury Board Secretariat and Cabinet to evaluate regularly program effectiveness and efficiency.³⁵ In July 1974, TBS issued the first Operation Performance Measurement manual, which was followed by a technical Supplement in December 1974. At the same time, the Planning Branch of TBS was engaged in a major computer simulation project called POLSIM, designed to evaluate the effectiveness of several major programs.³⁶ The other aims of this ambitious undertaking were to

"have the capacity to model government programs as comprehensively as possible ... and the ability to forecast the workings of a large number of factors, economic and demographic, that bear on the household sector and determine the distribution of income."³⁷

In March 1976, Treasury Board issued its long awaited Benefit-Cost Analysis Guide. The Preface to it, signed by G.F.

Osbaldeston, states in part as follows:

"The Treasury Board Secretariat has been actively involved in fostering the use of benefit-cost analysis by individual government departments, while also carrying out occasional in-house benefit-cost studies of major government expenditure programs. Such analysis forms an integral part of the Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) introduced by the Canadian government in 1966. PPBS differs from traditional forms of government budgeting in its concentration on the results or consequences of government activity rather than simply on resources required. It depends heavily on intensive studies of feasible alternative ways to attain defined government objectives with a view to achieving the greatest benefit for a given cost or, conversely, a given objective at minimum cost. Benefit-cost analysis is one quantitative technique that has proved to be of considerable value and usefulness within this PPB framework. ... The Treasury Board Secretariat firmly believes that more and better benefit-cost analyses will be necessary ingredients in decisions on allocating government funds. Benefit-cost analysis is, of course, in no way a substitute for judgment, but for many decisions it is a prerequisite to exercising good judgment."³⁸

A new much simplified version of performance measurement guide was put out by the Planning Branch of TBS in October 1976. In answer to the question "Why measure performance?", the guide responded:

"... because the knowledge thus derived provides essential information for planning and controlling the operations of the organization."³⁹

The concept of performance adopted in the guide includes both the measure of efficiency as well as the measure of effectiveness.

In November 1976, the President of the Treasury Board, Robert Andras, tabled in the House of Commons a Progress Report on the Measurement of Performance in the Public Service of Canada. In a brief statement, Andras announced that:

"in mid-1976, the Treasury Board Secretariat began department-by-department audits of performance measurement systems within the Public Service. Each audit will conclude with a report to the Treasury Board, and to the department or agency involved, on the latter's compliance with the TBS Circular 1976-25. These audits will be repeated periodically to ensure that adequate progress is made toward the following goals:

- that all departments and agencies have functioning performance measurement systems by 1980, for all government operations where this is feasible;
- that these systems be used, not only in support of submissions to the Treasury Board but also for management planning and control within each department and agency;
- that the quality and reliability of performance indicators be continuously improved."⁴⁰

"Performance indicators (concluded Mr. Andras) will never tell Parliament or the Government what should be the goals of our policies or programs, nor what are the most efficient and effective means of achieving these goals. But it has already been proven that performance measurement can greatly enlighten our relentless search for these elusive 'best means' of optimizing the welfare of all Canadians."⁴¹

The Report acknowledges that performance measurement is

a by-product of program budgeting and it claims that it is "essentially a neutral process". That is

"the fact that a department has taken the trouble to set up a measurement system is 'good' in the sense that it is applying sound management practice to its operations. This means that an application is 'good' in the above sense, even though operating results may show a falling trend, say, for efficiency."⁴²

I doubt whether many departmental officials would be willing to agree with this idea of neutrality.

The Report shows that considerable progress has been in fact achieved in the implementation of performance measurement, in spite of initial difficulties. For instance, in the middle of 1976, some 166,000 federal public servants, or approximately 39% of the total authorized man-years, were subject to efficiency measures. In the 1977-78 budgetary cycle, 21 departments out of a total of 44 were able to include in their program forecasts efficiency data obtained through performance measurement; (see Table I at page 174).⁴³ Furthermore, the Family Allowance and Old Age Security Program and the Excise Tax Audit Operation were singled out for their highly effective use of the performance measurement technique.⁴⁴

The use of sophisticated decisional technology by operational departments may be illustrated as well by two studies undertaken by the Policy Research and Long Range Planning Branch of the Department of Health and Welfare. The first of these, entitled

A General Framework for the Evaluation of Social Security Policies:

A Canadian Overview, was presented at a research conference held in Vienna in September 1975 devoted to the methods of evaluating the effectiveness of social security programs.⁴⁵ The second study, called Rationalization of Canadian Social Security Programs, A Summary Status Report, was prepared for a meeting of OECD working group on social aspects of income transfer policy held in Paris in December 1976.⁴⁶

Writing late in 1976, Gordon Osbaldeston referred to the evaluation of program performance as a means to "complete the PPB cycle". He added that "such measures would be useful to the Treasury Board as an aid in making resource allocation decisions".⁴⁷


Clearly, the continued and tireless use of the budgetary instruments, including fiscal framework, policy guidelines and program forecast, together with such techniques as management by objectives and operation performance measurement, has had an undeniable impact on the behaviour and expectations of departmental officials. The question is no longer whether decisional technology utilized and applied by the Treasury Board Secretariat or by operational departments will prove effective, but rather to what extent these means of political control will harness the budget maximizing attitudes of successful senior officials and ambitious ministers. It is the stated goal of the Treasury Board Secretariat to have all depart-

mental organizations in Ottawa equipped with functioning performance measurement systems by 1980 and to make sure that these are used in support of all budgetary submissions. In addition, the results obtained from performance measurement are to be used for management planning and control within each department. If this is accomplished, TBS and other central agencies will be in possession of quantified data providing clear cut evaluations of each departmental program. Technological decision-making with all its unquestionable advantages will then bear its fruit.⁴⁸

In my last chapter, I will discuss the implications and consequences which are likely to ensue from technological decision-making in the future.

FIGURE III.

INTERDEPENDENCE OF DECISION-MAKING SEQUENCES.



Source: P. S. Sunga and G. A. Duc, M.S.U.A. and the Federal Government,
an internal report, Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, Ottawa, 1975.


FIGURE IV.

POLICY SECTORS, LEAD MINISTERS, DEPARTMENTS WITHIN SECTORS.		
POLICY SECTOR	LEAD MINISTER(S) ¹ IN THE SECTOR	DEPARTMENTS WITHIN SECTOR
Economic ²	Minister of Finance	Agriculture ³ ; Consumer & Corporate Affairs; Energy, Mines & Resources; Finance; Fisheries; Industry, Trade & Commerce; National Revenue; Regional Economic Expansion; Small Business.
Social	Minister of National Health & Welfare or Minister of Justice (depending on the issue)	Employment & Immigration; Health & Welfare; Justice; Labour; Solicitor General; Urban Affairs; Veterans Affairs.
External & Defence	Secretary of State for External Affairs or Minister of National Defence (depending on the issue)	CIDA; Defence; External Affairs; Finance (IMF, GATT, OECD); Industry, Trade & Commerce (international trade); Labour (ILO).
Culture & Native Affairs	Secretary of State or Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (depending on the issue)	Fitness & Sport; Indian Affairs & Northern Development; Multiculturalism; Secretary of State.
Government Operations ⁴	Minister of Transport	Agriculture ³ ; Environment; Post Office; Public Works; Science & Technology; Supply & Services; Transport.
Source: An interview with a central agency official, November 1977.		

NOTES - FIGURE IV.

1. According to a well-placed respondent, there is no necessary relationship between "lead ministry" and membership on the Priorities and Planning Committee. However, it is an acknowledged fact that all chairmen of the "subject matter" Committees also sit on the Priorities and Planning Committee. Because the latter acts as an "executive management board" for the entire Cabinet system, membership on it implies not only ministerial seniority but also a special favour of the Prime Minister. For these reasons, PCO still continues to insist that the names of committee chairmen (and members) are confidential information.
2. Due to the importance of economic policy in recent years, the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning devotes much of its time to macro-economic issues. On those occasions it is supported by the Economic Policy Secretariat instead of the Priorities and Planning Secretariat in PCO.
3. The non-economic aspects of agricultural policy fall within the omnibus sector called Government Operations.
4. This is not a "true" policy sector but a grouping of several mandates under an omnibus heading, the largest of which is Transport.

FIGURE V.



Source: An interview with a central agency official, December 13, 1976 brought up to date in November 1977.

FIGURE VI.





FIGURE VII



Source: Treasury Board, Ottawa, November 1975.

TABLE 1.

STATUS OF DEVELOPMENT OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
IN DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES	AUTHORIZED 1976/77 MAN-YEARS	EFFICIENCY		EFFECTIVENESS (Includes quality & level of service)
		COVERAGE TO DATE (IN TERMS OF SYSTEMS DESIGNED)	SUPPLIED IN THE 1977/78 PROGRAM FORECAST	COVERAGE TO DATE (IN TERMS OF SYSTEMS DESIGNED)
		MY's	MY's	MY's
National Defence (includes military personnel)	115,321	47,303		22,771
Post Office	60,524	53,683	53,683	
Transport (excl. C.T.C.)	21,183			
R.C.M.P. (Solicitor General)	18,213	6,557	6,557	
Revenue Canada - Taxation	15,756	9,114	9,114	
U.I.C. (Manpower & Immigration)	12,079	9,542	6,437	
Revenue Canada - Customs & Excise	9,740	6,437	9,445	9,445
Manpower & Immigration - Department	12,720	5,546	5,546	5,284
Agriculture (excl. Can. Dairy Comm. & Can. Liv. St. Fd. Brd.)	11,140			
Solicitor General (excl. R.C.M.P.)	9,554			
Indian Affairs & Northern Development	12,897			
Public Works	8,966	5,442	4,740	260
Veteran's Affairs (Excl. C.P.C. & B.P.A.)	7,836	5,328	5,442	
Environment	12,210			
Supply & Services - Services	5,213	3,847	3,847	
Supply & Services - Supply & Admin.	5,288	4,019		
Statistics Canada (I.T. & C.)	6,397			
N.H. & W. - Health (excl. Med. Res. Council & Status of Women)	6,962	598	598	
Public Service Commission (Secretary of State)	4,097			
N.H. & W. - Welfare - Income Security & Social Assistance	3,341	2,506	2,500	
Consumer & Corporate Affairs - Department	2,629	1,788	1,358	
Energy, Mines & Resources - Department	3,929			
Secretary of State - Department (Translation)	3,046	1,767	1,756	2,540
Regional Economic Expansion	2,197			
External Affairs - Department	5,641			
Communications - Department	2,166	600	600	
National Capital Commission (Urban Affairs)	1,006	264	264	
Industry, Trade & Commerce - Department	2,712			
Justice	1,309			
Canadian International Development Agency (External)	963			
Public Archives (Secretary of State)	710	476	464	429
Canadian Pension Commission (D.V.A.)	498	418	334	
National Library (Secretary of State)	490	318	318	343
Finance - Financial & Economic Policies	691			
National Energy Board (ENR)	336	282		
Labour - Department	775		280	268
Treasury Board	742			
Urban Affairs - Ministry of State	280			
Bureau of Pensions Advocates (D.V.A.)	121	120	119	119
Insurance (Finance)	196			
National Museums of Canada (Secretary of State)	997			
Atomic Energy Control Board	105	55		
Commissioner of Official Languages (Privy Council)	90		8	55
Science & Technology - Ministry of State	172			
TOTAL	391,238	166,010	111,410	41,474

Source: Treasury Board, Progress Report on the Measurement of Performance in the Public Service, Ottawa, November 1976.

CHAPTER FOUR - NOTES.

1. This Figure was prepared by P.S. Sunga and G.A. Duc of the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs and included in an internal Report of the Ministry entitled "M.S.U.A. and the Federal Government", Ottawa, 1975.
2. Early in 1978, the Committee on Federal/Provincial Relations was merged with the Committee on Priorities and Planning. The newly appointed Minister of State for Federal/Provincial Relations, Marc Lalonde, chairs the newly merged committee only when the Prime Minister is absent.
3. From personal experience; September, 1970.
4. Confidential interview with a central agency official of August 17, 1976.
5. Confidential interviews with central agency officials of December 16 and 17, 1976.
6. Douglas G. Hartle, "Techniques and Processes of Administration", in Politics Canada, ed. Paul Fox, McGraw Hill, Toronto, 1977, p. 502.
7. From confidential interviews with central agency officials conducted on August 17, 1976, and December 13, 14, 16, and 17, 1976.
8. Merged recently with the Committee on Priorities and Planning.
9. The information used in this Figure was obtained during a confi-

dential interview with a central agency official in November, 1977.

10. From personal experience; September, 1970.
11. From a confidential interview with a central agency official conducted on August 17, 1976.
12. Gordon Robertson, "The Changing Role of the Privy Council Office", in Politics Canada, op. cit., p. 381.
13. From a confidential interview with a central agency official conducted on December 13, 1976.
14. Ibid.
15. This assumption is discussed, for example, by Niskanen in William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Aldine, Chicago, 1971.
16. A.W. Johnson, "The Treasury Board of Canada and the Machinery of Government of the 1970s", in Politics Canada, op. cit., pp. 487-488.
17. However, the President of the Treasury Board as well as the Secretary of the Board fully take part in these discussions as regular participants in the meetings of the Priorities and Planning committee.
18. Donald Gow, The Progress of the Budgetary Reform in the Government of Canada, Special Study No. 17, Economic Council of Canada, Ottawa, 1973, pp. 46-47.
19. Treasury Board, Program Forecast and Estimates Manual, Queen's

Printer, Ottawa, 1968. The principal guides for the preparation of budgetary instruments are the following: Treasury Board, Financial Management in Departments and Agencies of the Government of Canada, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1966; Treasury Board, Planning, Programming, Budgeting Guide, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969 (revised edition); Treasury Board, Operational Performance Measurement, vol. 1 and 2, Information Canada, Ottawa, 1974; Treasury Board, Planning Branch, Benefit Cost Analysis Guide, Information Canada, Ottawa, 1976; Treasury Board, Policy Circular No. 1976-25, Measurement of the Performance of Government Operations, Ottawa, July 31, 1976. In addition, one should mention the first study which pioneered future developments--Treasury Board, Management Improvement Branch, System of Integrated Management Planning and Control (SIMPAC), Ottawa, December 1965, mimeo.

20. This fact was confirmed to me by Gordon Osbaldeston in the course of a lecture given at York University in November 1975.
21. See Figure VII on page 173, which was prepared by the Treasury Board Secretariat and included in its mimeographed publication, dated November 5, 1975.
22. Hartle, "Techniques and Processes of Administration", op. cit., p. 503.
23. Treasury Board, Planning, Programming, Budgeting Guide, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969 (revised edition).

24. Letter, dated February 12, 1973.
25. Letter, dated February 9, 1973.
26. Letter, dated February 12, 1973.
27. Letter, dated February 23, 1973.
28. Letter, dated April 27, 1973.
29. Letter, dated May 23, 1973.
30. Letter, dated February 12, 1973.
31. Letter, dated April 19, 1973.
32. Letter, dated January 31, 1973.
33. Gow, op. cit., p. 59.
34. Treasury Board, Operational Performance Measurement, vol. 1, Ottawa, 1974, p. 2.
35. Ibid., p. 2.
36. Treasury Board Secretariat, Planning Branch, Report of the POLSIM Project, Ottawa, May 1974, Finance/Treasury Board Library, mimeo.
37. Ibid., p. 2.
38. Treasury Board Secretariat, Planning Branch, Benefit-Cost Analysis Guide, Ottawa, March 1976, Preface.
39. Treasury Board, A Manager's Guide to Performance Measurement, Ottawa, October 1976, p. 2.
40. Treasury Board, Progress Report on the Measurement of Performance in the Public Service of Canada, Ottawa, November 1976, mimeo., p. 1.

41. Ibid., p. 3.
42. Ibid., p. 3.
43. Ibid., pp. 5 and 7.
44. Ibid., p. 9.
45. Health and Welfare Canada, Policy Research and Long Range Planning Branch, A General Framework for the Evaluation of Social Security Policies: A Canadian Overview, July 1975, mimeo.
46. Health and Welfare Canada, Policy Research and Long Range Planning Branch, Rationalization of Canadian Social Security Programs: A Summary Status Report, October 1976, mimeo.
47. Gordon F. Osbaldeston, "Implementation of Performance Measurement in the Federal Public Service: A Progress Report", Optimum, vol. 7, no. 4, p. 6.
48. In the summer of 1978, the government has announced substantial cuts in programs and budgets. This announcement coincided with three important developments:
 - (a) the deliberations of the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability which promised to deliver its report before the end of the year;
 - (b) the major reorganization of the TBS seeking to sharpen its control over the budgetary cycle and to terminate its involvement in the evaluation of programs;
 - (c) the development of the Office of the Comptroller General with a much broader and clearer mandate for program evalua-

tion through the federal bureaucracy.

In a recent speech, Harry Rogers—the first Comptroller General—acknowledged the conceptual, methodological and practical constraints on effective program evaluation. He invoked practicality and realism as his guiding principles. At the same time, he declared that "managerial energy, integrity, intelligence, and judgment are not enough", and that "the art of evaluation must be pushed as far as possible". (From personal experience, October 21, 1978, Ottawa.

CHAPTER FIVE.TECHNOLOGICAL DECISION-MAKING: IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES FOR
POLITICAL PROCESS.

The study of politics nearly always comes down to the study of the distribution of power. Knowledge alone does not equal power, as Aucoin and French have ably demonstrated in their analysis of the Ministries of State.¹ Generalizations about the concentration of political power in prime ministerial hands or its diffusion among many specialized actors are incomplete unless they include as well an attempt to identify the independent variables—the factors which have contributed to either its concentration or diffusion.²

In this work, I have tried to show that a certain type of specialized knowledge called decisional technology must be taken into account in the study of power distribution in modern government, and that, everything else being equal, those who use and disseminate it have a distinct edge over others. I have also attempted to identify and describe key structural and organizational reforms instituted in the machinery of the federal government and in the decision-making processes since 1968, focusing mainly on the central agencies and the budgetary cycle. I have claimed that these reforms have been at least facilitated, if not caused, by the availability and application of decisional technology. In making these reforms, the designers in-

tended to increase the effectiveness of the policy-making process and thereby to improve the policies themselves. Unquestionably an equally important objective has been to strengthen the federal government's capability to govern in relation to the threatening acceleration of governmental competence at the provincial level.


I have attempted to show in Chapters Three and Four that some success has been achieved in reaching these objectives. More success will probably result in the future. Although I recognize that formal introduction of decisional technology is not tantamount to its effective operation, my study of central agencies, of the budgetary cycle and of the policy process establishes a clear tendency toward greater functional specialization, greater procedural rigour, and increased reliance on systematic analysis in Ottawa. Clearly, decisional technology is here to stay because no complex modern government can function without it. PPBS, MBO, and OPMS belong to the first generation of decisional technology; like the early IBM computers, they will be succeeded in the future by more ingenious and effective devices, and the political system with all its constitutional and institutional arrangements will have to adapt to them.

The final chapter of my work is devoted precisely to this process of adaptation to technological imperatives which, in my view, is under way. I will discuss here four broad issues under the general heading of "implications and probable consequences". I will argue

their importance in relation to the political process in Canada. Of necessity, it will be a speculative discussion largely confined to the realm of hypothetical analysis. I make here no claim either for certainty or for inevitability.

Figure VIII on page 184 summarizes in a systematic fashion the implications and probable consequences which will be discussed in this chapter. The four issues--political accountability, political control, political stability, and political change--are meant to define to a large extent the political process in Canada.

FIGURE VIII.



The issue of political accountability.

Political accountability means a mandatory, regular and public rendering of accounts to an external object, a body, which exercises some form of supervisory authority. In this sense, under present theory and practice, public officials are exempt from political accountability altogether. Yet, those in the senior ranks actively participate in decision-making side by side with ministers, and they--not the ministers--are primarily charged with the management of departments and programs, as well as with the spending of the budgetary appropriations.

I have shown earlier the tendency toward the structural integration of the Cabinet system with the senior levels of Bureaucracy. In a unified executive-bureaucratic world, what role will be left for the traditional theory of political accountability? Little, if any, real distinction will then exist between the functions of the elected executive and the appointed officialdom in the course of the many decision-making processes. Both "sectors" will fully and regularly take part in the increasingly complex and specialized activities of governing, and will share responsibility for the outcomes. At the top, apparent differences between policy decisions and management decisions will all but disappear. Who will be publicly accountable to whom and for what?

There is little doubt that the government is already well aware of the problem of accountability. Just over two years ago Michael Pitfield stated publicly that:

"The question of the lines and standards of accountability that should apply to senior officials in a system which also requires the interplay of ministerial and collective responsibilities in a parliamentary forum ... (creates) a technical problem of enormous practical impact upon government..."³

A year later, Gordon Osbaldeston, at that time Secretary of the Treasury Board, reviewed some technical aspects of accountability and concluded that:

"What is needed is an evaluation of the quality of judgment ... (as) the key to accountability for management performance within the Public Service organization."⁴

On November 22, 1976, the President of the Treasury Board, Robert Andras, announced the appointment of the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability under the chairmanship of Allen T. Lambert, a Toronto Dominion Bank executive whose personal success in bridging the gap between private enterprise and public service has been remarkable. In a June 1977 press release, Mr. Lambert identified a number of issues and areas of concern. He listed among them:

- "- the nature of the accountability within government of deputy ministers to ministers, the Prime Minister and the central agencies ... and their reporting relationship to Parliament; and
- the functions and responsibilities of the central agencies in the framework of accountability."⁵

The world of the political executive in which ministers and senior officials operate is a highly confidential and privileged world where ideas, positions and approaches are constantly being tested, and where the demands on individual knowledge, intellect and integrity may at times even exceed the normal levels of human tolerance. The nature of the relationship between key participants is characterized by competitive collegiality in the course of which intense absorption in one specific subject may clash with strongly held mutual interests. Decision-makers tend to be motivated by powerful peer expectations coupled with a confident capability of meeting them without fear of sanctions. "Peer" is every insider admitted into the sanctum of high level decision-making, provided he accepts the challenge of the ongoing intellectual competition. In such an intense, inward-oriented milieu, the quality of the judgments exercised by the participants can only be subject to internal criticism; real accountability toward any external object is either impossible, or at least exceedingly difficult. It poses a threat which no insider dares to face.

Clearly, the issue of accountability is likely to become more difficult and complex in the future. I have prepared a summary of possible links of accountability in existence today. It includes accountability based on constitutional convention, as well as that arising from the actual activities and relationships of ministers and

officials. This summary attempts to show the growing "internalization" and "specialization" of accountability consistent with the imperatives of decisional technology. Correspondingly, political accountability—a mandatory, regular and public rendering of accounts to an external body—continues to decline.

POSSIBLE LINKS OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNMENT: A SUMMARY.

Accountability of appointed officials.

- A. Internal: directed toward objects within the executive-bureaucratic establishment and producing, by and large, no political consequences.
- (a) Subjective: based on conscience, loyalty, commitment to the public good, fear of sanctions or desire for awards, or integration of organizational goals with private goals.
- (b) Objective: based on an existing link of dependency:
- to his hierarchic superior;
 - to his Deputy Minister and the departmental Management Committee;
 - to the responsible Minister;
 - to the Prime Minister as the nominal head of the Public Service;
 - to the Treasury Board Secretariat for compliance with

TB directives and guidelines;

- to the Privy Council Office for compliance with Cabinet directives;
- to panels of insiders charged with the evaluation of his performance and his quality of judgment.

- B. External: directed toward objects outside the executive-bureaucratic establishment and producing some political consequences:
- to Parliament arising from appearances of senior officials before House and Senate Committees;
 - to the general public arising from occasional writings, lectures, addresses, and other public statements made by officials;
 - to the general public arising from occasional resignations, leaks, and other acts motivated by a conflict between private conscience or interest and governmental or departmental interests.

Accountability of elected ministers.

- A. Internal: directed toward objects within the executive-bureaucratic establishment and may produce political consequences, which, however, are normally kept away from public knowledge.
- (a) Subjective: based on conscience, loyalty, commitment to the

public good, fear of sanctions or desire for awards, or integration of organizational goals with private goals.

(b) Objective: based on an existing link of dependency:

- to a senior Minister chairing a Cabinet committee and having a general responsibility over a policy sector;
- to the Prime Minister for the assigned portfolio or responsibility;
- to all Cabinet colleagues for solidarity and secrecy.

B. External: directed toward objects outside the executive-bureaucratic establishment and always producing political consequences:

- individually to the House of Commons for the management of the assigned portfolio or responsibility, and for the expenditure of budgetary appropriations;
- collectively with all Cabinet colleagues to the House of Commons for all decisions taken by Cabinet and its committees;
- to his constituency party and generally to his constituents before a general election;
- to the general public for his conduct as a political leader.

Technological decision-making in an integrated executive-bureaucratic milieu will favour internal accountability based on systematic and rigorous measurement of performance. This tendency, I submit, is already evident. The newly established Office of the Comptroller General appears to be largely internally oriented. Its public reporting to Parliament will be confined to the realm of "major programs", such as Defence, Agriculture, Employment, Immigration, etc., with the emphasis on high level of generality. More specific and rigorous evaluation employing "the best empirical methods to date" and likely to contain potentially explosive findings will not be released.⁶

The issue of political control.

I have argued earlier that the introduction and use of decisional technology tends to centralize the control of the decision-making processes in the executive-bureaucratic sector in general, and more specifically in the hands of the integrated political executive. The budgetary cycle offers probably the clearest example of an attempt to inject rigour, control, and systematic analysis into decision-making. It determines from year to year, and increasingly on a longer term basis, who in government will spend how much; it assigns to one central agency--the Treasury Board Secretariat--the key role in this process.

At the Cabinet level, the examples of increased rigour and control in decision-making are easily found in the major reforms brought about since 1968. In particular, they include: (1) functional specialization, which has been moved upward from budgeting at the level of the Treasury Board Secretariat to policy-making at the level of Cabinet committees; (2) division and specialization of Cabinet leadership by the appointment of regular committee chairmen as "lead ministers" in specific policy areas; (3) strict formalization of the agendas, documentation and procedure at all meetings of Cabinet and Cabinet committees; and (4) introduction of additional and more extensive hierarchy into the Cabinet committee structure.

Clearly, control of decision-making by the executive-bureaucratic sector has already reached a disturbing level. As new and more sophisticated decisional technologies are gradually adopted, the budgetary cycle and the formal policy process will become more systematic, more rigorous, and more strictly controlled. This development is likely to benefit powerful, high status interest groups whose access to governmental decision-making is defined by their functional specialization and expertise in a particular policy area. Weaker groups and individuals, perceived to possess less technological legitimacy, will be denied access. Langford's study of the Ministry of Transport appears to confirm this tendency.

"There are indications that the centralization of policy making, coordination, and control within the portfolio has facilitated the access of the industry to the process. The responsiveness

of the ministry to Cabinet decisions with respect to development in areas like northern resources and the aerospace industry has tended to lock the ministry planning and policy-making process into the activities of individual firms or consortiums of firms. This inter-relationship is often marked by the development of steering committees at the inter-departmental level which include representatives from industry. There are also indications of the development of a more routinized process of consultation between the senior Ministry Staff officials and the interest groups representing the transport industry or industrial users of transportation facilities. Research in this area might lead to disturbing conclusions concerning the comparative access of the general public and transport-oriented industrial groups to the allocative policy-making process within the ministry."⁷

What, then, are the limits of executive-bureaucratic dominance in the Canadian political process? At what point will the process break down if governmental decision-makers begin consistently to shut out weaker, less specialized private and collective interests, voluntary groups and associations from the centre of policy activity, and to deny them the opportunity to influence public policy? The budgetary cycle is a case in point. All allocative decisions are already being taken strictly within the confines of the privileged sanctum of the Treasury Board Secretariat and a half a dozen Cabinet committees supported by PCO. In addition, only senior officials and budgetary experts of the operating departments and the Department of Finance are privy to the process. No doubt, some powerful outsiders manage to get their preferences registered, but weaker non-governmental

interests are unceremoniously kept out. However, the decisions are about public moneys, and how and by whom are they going to be spent. Parliament does not begin its review of the Estimates until the executive/bureaucratic part of the cycle is completed and the shape of the expenditure budget determined. The Blue Book is presented to Parliament not unlike an ultimatum--accept the "proposed" appropriations or suffer the consequences.

In Britain, control by the political executive has reached an even higher level. According to Heclo and Wildavsky,

"Recent attempts to revive Parliamentary involvement in the expenditure process generally are trying to revive a corpse that never lived..."⁸

The authors simply dismiss the "traditional maxims concerning Parliament's power over the purse" and affirm that

"...Parliament plays little direct part in expenditure decision-making. ... The ... supply estimates are considered and approved virtually automatically. In the modern era of party discipline, any other outcome is likely to be considered for the Government as cause for resignation. So automatic has this approval become that the fiction of Supply Days for approving departmental estimates has been dropped and renamed Opposition Days to signify the set-piece partisan debates that take place between Government and Opposition on any and everything other than finances. When even the British constitution drops a fiction, it is a telling sign."⁹

It may be that in Ottawa, as in Westminster, most members

of Parliament "do not care" and "are likely to be uninterested ... in spending decisions" because

"Analysing policy and expenditure choices calls for sustained, full time attention. It meets no constituency needs, ... generates very few headlines, and scores no points for the party. ... For those facing the full-time demands for part-time legislative, constituency and party work, policy analysis can seem an expensive luxury. ... Politics (continue Heclo and Wildavsky) is, of course, about more than policy and Parliament, is, among other things, a running partisan battle between Government and Opposition. ... (It) is admirably suited for supporting or opposing, for making scenes rather than participating in policy creation."¹⁰

This interpretation suggests that there now appear to exist two separate streams of the political process: first, the closed governmental stream dominated by the political executive and dealing with the "real" business of solving allocative, distributive, and other complex socio-economic problems in society; and second, the open stream dominated by the media and including such arenas of "popular" politics as electoral campaigns, Parliamentary debates, party programs, and all other manifestations of conviction or preference where intricate and knotty issues are reduced to dichotomous simplicities for the benefit of the general public. For a month or two every four or five years, the political executive abandons the real business of policy-making and descends to the level of popular politics to win a new mandate to govern. In the course of the campaign, no Cabinet minister would consider it wise or advantageous to include in his

speeches information drawn from either fiscal framework, program forecasts or policy memoranda, even if he were exempt from the oath of secrecy.

It is crucial, I believe, that the political process in Canada should not be split too widely into these two streams. This may happen if the dominance by the integrated political executive supported by powerful, specialized interests continues to accelerate in response to technological imperatives. Most social scientists agree that there is no strong national political culture in Canada which could form the basis of public support for Ottawa and help overcome the threat of regionally or ethnically generated attitudes of defiance and cynicism.¹¹ Resort to crises and emergencies may have to play an increasingly important role in building layers of national consensus for major federal actions and policy initiatives. However, such measures must remain the exception not the rule in Canadian political life.

In short, I contend here that executive/bureaucratic dominance of the political process will grow in response to technological imperatives, and those groups and individuals in society who lack high level status based on functional specialization and expertise will find access to governmental decision-making increasingly difficult. These developments are likely to foster attitudes of defiance and cynicism in relation to the political process.

The issue of political stability.

It is now common knowledge that political stability in Canada can no longer be taken for granted. The political executive of the second largest Province is fully committed to the dismemberment of the country, or at least to a constitutional solution which is unacceptable to Ottawa and the remaining Provinces. This commitment enjoys a substantial support of the Quebec electorate, although the precise measure of such support is unclear and probably fluctuates widely from time to time. Under these circumstances, it is essential to emphasize the fragility of the present status quo which hinges upon a variety of factors. One of them, perhaps the most crucial of all, is the behaviour of elites.

Willingness to make concessions is acknowledged as a traditional trait of elite behaviour in Canada. Provincial governments look to Ottawa not for leadership but for bargaining concessions. This behaviour arises directly from the strength of regional identification and the influence of regional political elites. Arend Lijphart coined the term consociational system or

"government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy."¹²

Lijphart identified four essential elements of "consociationalism":

- a) ability of the elites to accommodate divergent interests and demands;

- b) ability of the elites to transcend cleavages and join in a common effort with the elites of the rival subcultures;
- c) commitment of the elites to the maintenance and stability of the system;
- d) understanding by the elites of the perils of political fragmentation.¹³

It is probably fair to say that most, if not all, of these elements of elite accommodation operated in Canada with reasonable effectiveness until the middle 1960s. The elites engineered the country in 1867 into existence and maintained it alive and functioning as long as they could. Commenting on the "project of Confederation", Mason Wade wrote

"The few farsighted statesmen who sponsored the measure were perfectly aware that there was not popular enthusiasm for it, and that if the scheme were to succeed under existing political conditions, it must be rushed through the legislature without the appeal to the people."¹⁴

In fact, the project won the approval of the legislature by a vote of 91 to 33, with 21 of the dissenting votes French Canadian. Ramsay Cook commented:

"This vote was the only occasion on which the plan of federation was submitted to even this limited form of popular approval."¹⁵

Initially, Lijphart hesitated to view Canada as a consociational democracy. He wrote in 1969 that, although he was "impressed

with an argument that Canada can indeed be considered a consociational system", he felt he knew "too little about Canada ... to place it with great confidence in one of the categories of (his) typology".¹⁶ S.J.R. Noel eventually adapted Lijphart's elite accommodation theory to Canada.¹⁷ His paper has been widely recognized by Canadian political scientists. It has unquestionably enriched theoretical debate about national unity, stability and the direction of political change. However, I believe it is time now for a second look at Lijphart's hesitation and to question the applicability of his model to Canada today.

If "external threats" are not perceived uniformly or with largely the same degree of intensity in various regions of the country, how salient is this factor in inducing cooperation among elites?

If one subculture within the country is concentrated territorially and its members share distinct socio-political institutions and traditions ultimately expressed in active governmental power, is it possible to speak of "a multiple balance of power among the subcultures"?

If the "total load on the decision-making apparatus" of the country is increasing and governments at all levels tend toward systematic, technological policy-making, should the newly emerging institutional forms of conflict resolution be viewed as variants of

consociational behaviour? And if not, what are they and how do they fit into the model?

If the "perils of political fragmentation" are understood and assessed differently by different regional elites and used by them to force a re-allocation of economic and political resources, what precisely is the meaning of the "elite ability to maintain cohesion" and "to transcend cleavages"?

Is it then not more appropriate to speak today of the threatening breakdown of the once paramount elite accommodation? From this perspective, what is likely to be the effect of technological decision-making on the members of the federal political executive who form a basic component of the now fragile consociational network?

I will attempt to examine here only one aspect of the leadership role--the relationship between the leader and his team of immediate colleagues and supporters. F.G. Bailey in a stimulating work entitled Strategems And Spoils¹⁸ distinguished three ideal types of relationships between the leader and his supporters--the transactional, the bureaucratic, and the moral. These relationships are undeniably relevant to Canadian political leadership at the apex. Individuals who contract out their support to the leader in return for profit or expected profit (whether money, influence, power or prestige) form

part of a transactional team. They are committed to the extent of their investments and not more, and the leader's control over them is proportionate to the relative size of each individual investment. A transactional supporter is free to withdraw some of his investment and receive a smaller dividend or to increase the investment and to demand more in return. He is also free to bargain with the leader either for himself or on behalf of others, usually his own supporters. He can retain separate loyalties and represent 'within the team' outside interests. As a member of the team, he will accept and observe any rules of conduct provided they maintain his position and make his investment secure (for example, the rules of Cabinet solidarity and Cabinet secrecy). The transactional supporters continue their commitment as long as they believe in the leader's ability to maintain team cohesion and deliver the goods. The leader thus must spare no efforts in order to perpetuate this belief. His relationship with transactional colleagues is pragmatic and businesslike and he is well aware that some of them are his potential rivals. The traditional relationship between the Canadian Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues has been transactional. It permitted the Ministers to retain regional loyalties and to represent regional interests within the Cabinet. It left them free to bargain and to consolidate their own influences while attending to the business of governing as political heads of their departments. It clearly facilitated consociational behaviour.

I suggest that, in response to technological imperatives arising from a systematic, rigorous and complex decision-making process, transactional relationships are likely to undergo a significant transformation. Through the means of the functionally structured Cabinet committee system, the Prime Minister has divided his leadership role into specialized components which he has distributed, as committee chairmanships, to some of his colleagues. For himself, he has retained the overall competency--priorities and planning. Each Cabinet committee, supported by an analytically oriented staff, acts as a socializing and educating agency providing ongoing common experiences to all regular participants. In this way, the transactional ties among Cabinet ministers become modified and new relationships emerge characterized by specialization, analytic rigour, and technological ethic. The committee system cuts across the departmental portfolio divisions and makes each chairman a "lead minister" responsible for a large policy area. An intimate, high-level, personal "bureaucracy" is thus created whose members no longer adhere to purely pragmatic, business-like attitudes toward the leader; increasingly, they become burdened with normative considerations. Most significantly, they tend to discard regional loyalties and connections, and to refrain from bargaining on behalf of regional interests. They are losing the capability and the time to play effectively the consociational roles.

In 1974, the Prime Minister set up the Federal Provincial Relations Office, a specialized Cabinet secretariat with an express mandate to develop strategies and techniques for intergovernmental conflict resolution. Today, all provincial governments possess similar analytic and advisory units. Clearly, the informal consociational network is being supplemented, if not replaced, by new executive/bureaucratic institutions.

The issue of political stability remains precariously unsettled. I have tried to show that decisional technology is not likely to contribute to its resolution; on the contrary, it will produce consequences which appear to be detrimental to it in the longer run.

The issue of political change.

The introduction of decisional technology into the structure and processes of government in Ottawa was greatly facilitated by the flexibility of the unwritten Constitution. Constitutional convention permits the political executive to be the absolute master of its own procedure and organization. This means, that the Prime Minister and Cabinet are free to adopt any organizational structure they deem fit without the knowledge or authorization of anyone, including Parliament. The reforms brought about by Mr. Trudeau in 1968

were cursorily announced in a press release issued by the Prime Minister's Office;¹⁹ their true scope, extent and particulars have been subsequently revealed from time to time in authorized public statements. Some of the reforms are still considered to be confidential information by the Privy Council Office.

Let me make it perfectly clear: conventions are an integral part of the Constitution. They are primary rules intended, for instance, to govern the behaviour of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Some conventions, in particular those applicable to the political executive and to its relationship with the legislature, are unquestionably more important than written constitutional law. Yet, paradoxically, it is often very difficult to tell with certainty whether a particular convention exists or not. This ambiguity occurs most strikingly whenever the political executive adopts a new practice regarded by those whom it affects as a binding obligation. S.A. de Smith comments on this subject as follows:

"And the tests for the ascertainment of conventions are neither universally agreed nor, when agreed, easily applied in a large number of marginal cases. Some conventions are clear-cut; some are flexible; some are so elusive that one is left wondering whether in fact the 'convention' is an ethereal will-o'-the-wisp. It is often particularly hard to say whether a political practice has crystallized into a constitutional convention and, if so, what is its scope."²⁰

Two important questions arise in this connection:

- 1) Is the political executive free to adopt practices and procedures which appear to conflict with the existing constitutional conventions?
- 2) At what point and under what circumstances will such new practices and procedures "crystallize" into new constitutional conventions, thereby effectively "amending" the unwritten Constitution?

It is my contention that the imperatives of decisional technology dictate the adoption of a particular kind of practices and procedures, i.e. those consistent with functional specialization, systematic analysis and rigorous control. For example, the following new practices and procedures have been introduced into Cabinet decision-making:

- a) division of the Cabinet into 9 or 10 permanent smaller groups (committees);
- b) regular and obligatory meetings of each group once a week or every fortnight according to a formal agenda;
- c) discussion during the meeting confined to specific topics on the agenda, and in general to the specialized mandate of the committee;
- d) regular distribution in advance to all participants of policy memoranda, analytic papers, statistical or financial information, including computer tabulations etc., pertaining to the topics under discussion;

- e) overall supervision of the proceedings by a chairman designated by the Prime Minister;
- f) decisions formally recorded and final, except when not approved by full Cabinet.

These practices adopted in 1968/69 continue to be observed to date. In my view, they affect at least one existing constitutional convention--collective ministerial responsibility for policy decisions. That is, under such highly structured conditions some ministers are unable to participate in decision-making in some areas of policy. Although memberships of committees change, the sheer volume of committee work per individual minister makes it certain that a number of ministers will be necessarily ignorant about some decisions taken by their peers.

The convention on ministerial responsibility does not require each minister to participate in every policy decision. It provides merely that, if and when a policy adopted by Cabinet is made public, every member of the Executive must stand by it and support it in the House of Commons. A minister unable to support it publicly must resign. The convention, however, does presuppose some degree of regular participation by all ministers in policy-decisions for which they are held to be responsible. Is there a conflict between the new practices and existing convention? The PCO was sufficiently concerned about this question that it invented an appeal

procedure which permits an individual minister to take any matter before full Cabinet whenever he feels that he is unable to make his case before a Cabinet committee.²¹

This, however, does not fully resolve the problem. Conventions are meant to be the "living" part of the Constitution. In the words of Ivor Jennings, they

"provide the flesh which clothe the dry bones of the law; they make the legal constitution work; they keep in touch with the growth of ideas."²²

Thus, conventions must not become formal or detached from the reality of political life. If each minister is to be fully bound by each policy decision, he should be in a position to influence it. If the new decision-making system effectively prevents such influence from being exerted in some instances, then the convention should be modified and adapted to the new reality.

The issue of political change takes on an added importance. In the future, the scope and rapidity of institutional adaptation to technological requirements are likely to grow. During the past ten years, the Cabinet process has undergone greater change than during the entire preceding period since Confederation. I have already discussed the tendency towards structural integration between the Cabinet system and Bureaucracy. New organizational and procedural devices may be needed to improve further the effectiveness and effi-

ciency of decision-making. Taken together, these innovations may very well result in a major political change. It is therefore most appropriate to question whether the Prime Minister and Cabinet should remain, under the Constitution, the sole exclusive masters of their own organization and procedure.

In this last chapter, I have discussed certain implications and consequences which decisional technology is likely to produce in Canadian political life. In particular, I have presented four principal arguments:

First, that if functional specialization in the Cabinet system increases and the latter becomes fully integrated with the structure of Bureaucracy, political accountability will decline further and be eventually replaced with purely internal measurement and evaluation.

Second, that if procedural rigour and systematic analysis continue to increase in the course of the budgetary cycle and the policy process, the control (dominance) exerted by the integrated political executive will increase as well, and the access to government will be correspondingly narrowed and limited.

Third, that if the executive actors (Cabinet ministers) give up individual consociational behaviour and increase their reliance on specialized secretariats and bureaucracies for strategies

of conflict resolution, the already existing threat to political stability will accelerate;

Fourth, that if the political executive will continue to enjoy under the Constitution exclusive authority over its own organization and procedure and over the process of decision-making, the cumulative effect of present and future structural innovations will produce a major change in the political system.

CHAPTER FIVE - NOTES.

1. Peter Aucoin and Richard French, Knowledge, Power And Public Policy, Science Council of Canada Background Study No. 31, Information Canada, Ottawa, 1974. I have purposely omitted the ministries of state from this study because it concentrates on those organizations (i.e. central agencies) which are the primary users and disseminators of decisional technology. Although the introduction of the ministry of state concept is in keeping with the broad objectives of optimal policy-making, the concept itself has failed, in my view, to take root and to produce a real structural innovation. Recent additions of such ministries as Fitness and Sport, Small Businesses, and Federal/Provincial Relations—neither of which resemble MOSST or MOSUA—have only increased the existing organizational confusion.
2. See, for instance, Denis Smith, "President and Parliament: The Transformation of Parliamentary Government in Canada", and Richard Schultz, "Prime Ministerial Government, Central Agencies, and Operating Departments: Towards a More Realistic Analysis", in Thomas A. Hockin (ed.), Apex of Power, Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1977 (second edition).
3. Michael Pitfield, "The Shape of Government in the 1980s, Techniques and Instruments for Policy Formulation at the Federal Level", a paper presented at the annual conference of the In-

stitute of Public Administration of Canada, Ottawa, August 30, 1975, mimeo, p. 22.

4. G.F. Osbaldeston, "Notes for a Speech", presented to International Personnel Management Association, Ottawa, November 19, 1976, mimeo, p. 11.
5. Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability, Press Release, June 8, 1977, p. 2. Early in 1978, the Commission has issued a progress report which sets out the parameters for its inquiry.
6. This decision was announced by the Comptroller General in his recent address to the National Conference on Methods and Forums of the Public Evaluation of Government Spending, Ottawa, October 21, 1978. It remains to be seen whether the Lambert Commission will choose to face the issue squarely and recommend: (a) a direct vehicle for public accountability of senior officials, including those working in central agencies; and (b) a remodeling of the Office of Comptroller General along the lines of the present Auditor General with direct reporting to a committee of the House of Commons.
7. John W. Langford, Transport In Transition, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and London, 1976, p. 208.
8. Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government Of Public Money, Macmillan, London, 1977, p. 243.

9. Ibid., p. 243-244.
10. Ibid., p. 261-262.
11. See for example, S.J.R. Noel, "Political Parties and Elite Accommodation", C.P.S.A. (Winnipeg, 1970); John Meisel, "Canadian Parties and Politics", in ed. R.H. Leach, Contemporary Canada, 1968; E. Black and A. Cairns, "A Different Perspective on Canadian Federalism", in J.P. Meekison (ed.), Canadian Federalism--Myth or Reality, Toronto, 1968; J.M.S. Careless, "Limited Identities in Canada", Canadian Historical Review, L, No. 1, March 1969, pp. 1-10; John Porter, "The Canadian National Character in the Twentieth Century", in The Annals Of The American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, March 1967, p. 48; J.C. Johnstone, "Definitions of Canadian Society", in Kruhlak, Schultz, Pobihushchy (eds.), Canadian Political Process, Toronto, 1970, p. 383.
12. Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy", World Politics, vol. xxi, January 1969, no. 2, p. 212.
13. Ibid., p. 216.
14. Mason Wade, The French Canadians 1760-1945, Macmillan, Toronto, 1955, p. 325.
15. Ramsay Cook, Canada. A Modern Study, Clarke, Irwin, Toronto, 1963, p. 93.
16. From private correspondence dated 29 August 1969. See also

- Arend Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Integration", Canadian Journal of Political Science, IV (March 1971), pp. 1-14.
17. S.J.R. Noel, "Political Parties and Elite Accommodation", C.P.S.A., (Winnipeg, 1970).
 18. F.G. Bailey, Strategems And Spoils, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969.
 19. Prime Minister's Office, Press Release, December 1968.
 20. S.A. de Smith, Constitutional And Administrative Law, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1971, p. 59.
 21. Gordon Robertson, "The Changing Role of the Privy Council Office", in ed. Paul W. Fox, Politics: Canada, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto, 1977, p. 375.
 22. W. Ivor Jennings, The Law And The Constitution, University of London Press, London, 1947 (third edition), p. 80-81.

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1. Participant observation as Executive Assistant to the President of the Treasury Board. June-December 1970.
2. Survey of the operating departments of the Government of Canada. January-April 1973. See Appendix A.
3. Confidential formal and informal interviews with central agency officials conducted in August and December 1976, and in May and November 1977. A structured questionnaire was used during formal interviews. I acknowledge the assistance of my colleague, Colin Campbell, in the preparation of the questionnaire. See Appendix B.
4. Written materials, including internal papers, studies and memoranda examined in the Finance-Treasury Board joint library in Ottawa. May 1977.

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FACULTY OF ARTS

4700 KEELE STREET, DOWNSVIEW, ONTARIO M3J 1P3

APPENDIX A.

January 23, 1973.

Dear Sir:

I am engaged in an independent study of the P.P.B. System and the extent to which it has been introduced into the departments and agencies of the Government of Canada since September, 1969.

The P.P.B. Guide issued by the Treasury Board in September, 1969 provides (Chapter 5, page 50) as follows:

"Each department and agency will be expected to have in its organization a unit whose sole responsibility is the analytic work associated with programme budgeting. This unit will be referred to here as the programme analysis unit."

In asking for your positive response and cooperation in this matter, I would like to emphasize that any information or documentation that I may receive from you will be used strictly in furtherance of the objectives of scholarly research and for no other purpose.

Attached herewith is a short questionnaire. Please answer each question fully and return it to me preferably before February 15th, 1973.

Your kind cooperation is greatly appreciated and will be duly acknowledged.

Sincerely yours,

George J. Szablowski

Please return to: George J. Szablowski, Department of Political
Science
Room s-640, Ross Building
York University
Downsview, Ontario, Toronto

Telephone: 416-667-2455 and 416-489-5415

Date

Department of.....

Official name of the unit.....

1. Date when the programme analysis unit was established and the basic rationale for it.
2. The specific scope of the unit's responsibility over programme analysis as determined by your Department.
3. A brief description (example only) of analytic work already completed in each of the following P.P.B. areas:
 - (a) Definition of objectives;
 - (b) Cost/benefit analysis;
 - (c) Management control in achievement of objectives.

4. Brief descriptions of the methods, techniques and procedures used in the course of analytic work.
5. References (author, title, publisher) to the main texts, manuals, and other written material used in the course of analytic work.
6. Present number of professional personnel (analysts) engaged in analytic work.
7. Open comment.

N.B. PLEASE INCLUDE ANY WRITTEN MATERIAL PREPARED BY YOUR UNIT AND ILLUSTRATING OR SUPPORTING YOUR ANSWERS TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS.

APPENDIX B.

Interview Number

Date

Office

All answers to this questionnaire are absolutely confidential.

Please tell me if you prefer not to answer a question and we will go on to the next item.

I would like to start with some questions about your present work in the PMO (PCO/TBS/Finance Department):

1. What are your responsibilities here at the PMO (PCO/TBS/Finance Department)?

2. How does what you do relate to the role of the PMO (PCO/TBS/Finance Department) as a central agency?
 - 2-a) What in your view is the role of the PMO/PCO/TBS/Finance Department in government?

 - 2-b) Is this role being adequately performed? How so?

2-c) How might the performance of your agency be improved? Please elaborate. For example?

3. How do you view accountability in your position? Do you feel that you are accountable to your superior in this agency, to your Minister, to the Cabinet, to Parliament, to the people of Canada, to your conscience, or to some combination of these?

3-a) (If R says "some combination", ask him) Specifically, to which of these do you feel accountable?

3-b) (For each to which R answers that he is accountable ask) In what sense are you accountable to

3-c) (If R listed more than one, ask him) To which of these do you feel most accountable? Why is that?

I have some questions about your usual interactions with others in government in the course of your work here at the PMO (PCO/TBS/ Finance Department).

4. With which of the following do you interact personally about some important matter during an average month?

List A for Question 4

Check off as mentioned	Frequency	Type of Contact	Type of Matter
()		The Prime Minister	
()		Your own Minister	
()		Ministers of other Departments	
()		Your own Deputy Minister/Secretary	
()		Deputy Ministers/ Secretaries of other Departments	
()		M.P.s	
()		Senators	
4-a)	How often in the average month would such interactions take place? (Register above in times/month)		
4-b)	What is the usual form of these contacts, are they by telephone, personal visits, letters, official meetings, in the hallway or restaurant, or at social occasions?		
	1. telephone 2. personal visits 3. letters 4. official meetings 5. in the hallway or restaurant 6. social occasions 7. some combination of the above (ask R to specify which combination). 8. other (specify)		
4-c)	Is the occasion for such contacts usually about an administrative governmental matter or about governmental policy?		

1. usually an administrative matter
2. usually a policy matter
3. both
4. neither (record)
5. other (record)

Please elaborate? May I have some examples?

List A

1. The Prime Minister
2. Your own Minister
3. Ministers of other Departments
4. Your own Deputy Minister/Secretary
5. Deputy Ministers/Secretaries of other Departments
6. M.P.s
7. Senators

5. Let's turn now to interdepartmental committees of officials, which of these do you regularly attend?

Committee	Meetings	Attendance	Kind of Participation	Frequency
-----------	----------	------------	--------------------------	-----------

- 5-a) Could you tell me approximately, how often each of these met in the last year? (i.e., since June, 1975)
- 5-b) What per cent of the meetings, approximately, did you actually attend?
- 5-c) How would you characterize your participation in these meetings? Are you simply an observer, do you speak only when called upon for advice, or do you actively involve yourself in the discussion?
1. simply an observer
 2. speak only when called upon for advice
 3. actively involve self in discussion
 4. some combination of these
specify
 5. Other
- 5-d) For each of these committees, could you tell me, approximately, the per cent of meetings in which you actively participate in the discussion?
- 5-e) Which of these assignments interest you the most?
- 5-f) Why is this?

6. What about Cabinet Committees, which of these do you regularly attend?

Committee	Meetings	Attendance	Kind of Participation	Frequency
-----------	----------	------------	--------------------------	-----------

- 6-a) Could you tell me, approximately, how often each of these met in the last year? (i.e., June, 1975).
- 6-b) What per cent of the meetings, approximately, did you actually attend?
- 6-c) How would you characterize your participation in these meetings? Are you simply an observer, do you speak only when called upon for advice, or do you actively involve yourself in the discussion?
1. simply an observer
 2. speak only when called upon for advice
 3. actively involve self in discussion
 4. some combination of these
specify
 5. other
- 6-d) For each of these committees, could you tell me, approximately, the per cent of meetings in which you actively participate in the discussion?
- 6-e) Which of these committees interest you the most?
- 6-f) Why is that?
7. From your experience in the policy process, who in your opinion are the key individuals who normally exert influence in major policy decisions? You may mention Ministers, fellow officials or anyone else. If you prefer you may mention titles rather than names. Try to think of ten individuals.

Name	Quality Number(s)	Specifics
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7-a) Which of the things on this list would you say contribute most to the influence that each of these men has in the policy process?

1. Hand Respondent List B.
2. Begin with the first name Respondent has given you, say:
"How about Mr. "
3. Repeat the name of each person cited and say,
"How about Mr. "

1. His formal position in government
2. His knowledge of governmental procedure and the "Rules of the Game"
3. His expertise in a policy area (BE SURE TO RECORD WHICH AREA OF EXPERTISE)
4. His experience in government
5. His personal contacts with influential people outside of government
6. His persuasiveness -- the logical force of his arguments
7. His knowledge of practical politics
8. His willingness to help his colleagues
9. His contacts in the Government Party
10. His feel for public opinion
11. His expertise on a particular area of the country
12. His decency and humanity
13. Other (specify)

List B

His formal position in government

His knowledge of governmental procedure and the "Rules of the Game"

His expertise in a policy area (PLEASE TELL INTERVIEWER WHICH AREA
OF EXPERTISE)

His experience in government

His personal contacts with influential people outside of government

His persuasiveness -- the logical force of his arguments

His knowledge of practical politics

His willingness to help his colleagues

His contacts in the Government Party

His feel for Public Opinion

His expertise on a particular area of the country

His decency and humanity

Other

I would like to ask you about your interactions with people outside government.

8-a) Which, if any, of the following do you normally consult if you want information about the publics' views on an issue. (Hand respondent list C.)

8-b) Which of these do you generally feel give you the most accurate and reliable information?

List C or Groups For Question 26.	Consults	Most reliable source of information
Editorial opinions and letters to editors (CIRCLE)	1	2
Political party leaders and workers	1	2
Business leaders	1	2
Union leaders	1	2
Farm group leaders	1	2
Public officials in local governments	1	2
MLAs and other provincial officials	1	2
Priests, ministers or other religious group officials	1	2
Ethnic group leaders	1	2
Personal friends and acquaintances	1	2
Citizens' groups which cut across economic religious and ethnic lines (specify)	1	2
Polls	1	2
Others (List)		

Depends on the issue (Elaborate?)

List C

Editorial opinions and letters to editors

Political party leaders and workers

Business leaders

Union leaders

Farm group leaders

Public officials in local governments

MLAs and other provincial officials

Priests, ministers or other religious group officials

Ethnic group leaders

Personal friends and acquaintances

Citizens' lobby groups which cut across economic,
religious and ethnic lines (please specify)

Polls

Other (please specify)

How about interaction with organized sub-groups and interests?

9. On the basis of your own experience; how significant a role do you feel sub-groups and interests generally play in helping you decide your recommendations on issues:

1. highly significant
2. moderately significant
3. insignificant

Please elaborate?

- 9-a) How often do you come into direct personal contact with representatives of organized sub-groups and interests per month?

- 9-b) In your experience, are you contacted most frequently by lobbyists who agree with you on a particular issue or by those who disagree?

1. Agree
2. Disagree

Who usually initiates contact between yourself and interest group representatives in each of the following situations?

	You	Lobbyist
Help in writing a brief	1.	2.
Getting information on a policy proposal	1.	2.
Getting the attitudes of the public	1.	2.
Massing support for a bill	1.	2.

Why is this so?

I would like to end with some questions about your own career and background.

first, regarding your career:

10. Public officials in this country and in other Western democracies have given a variety of reasons to explain why they got into government initially.

How about in your case? How did you get into government?

10-a) What year did you enter government service?

10-b) How long have you been in this agency?

10-c) How long have you held your present post?

10-d) What is your present public service category?

11. What has been your career route in government, i.e., what positions have you held at federal level?

Title	Department	Date	Level
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- 11-a) Have you held any positions outside of government, either before coming to Ottawa or in between jobs here?

Title	Date	Firm/organization
-------	------	-------------------

12. Looking at your career in government, what are the most important things you have tried to accomplish?

13. Is there a particular area of public affairs in which you feel you have become an expert?

Yes 1 No..... 2 N.A..... 9

13-a) If "yes", record areas

13-b) If "yes"

How did you acquire your expertise in the(se) area(s)?
(Record)

14. If you left government service, what would you miss about your work,

With respect to your background:

15. What year were you born?

16. What is your home town and province?

17. Could you tell me your father's major occupation?

18. Could you also tell me how much formal education your father received?

1. graduate or professional work
2. college graduate (degree obtained)
3. one to three years of college (no degree)
4. high school graduate
5. ten or eleven grades of school
6. seven through nine grades of school
7. under seven grades of school

What was the original ethnic background of your family on your

19-a) father's side?

19-b) On your mother's side?

Please don't answer Canadian(ien).

20. What is your religious preference?

Catholic

Jewish

Protestant

None

Other

21. Could you tell me how much formal education you received?

1. graduate or professional work
2. college graduate (degree obtained)
3. one to three years of college (no degree)
4. high school graduate
5. not high school graduate

22. What was your major field of study at university?

23. Do you have a graduate/professional degree? If so, in what field?

- | | |
|----------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. no | 5. public administration |
| 2. law | 6. business administration |
| 3. economics | 7. engineering |
| 4. political science | 8. other |

24. Which graduate or professional degrees have you received?

- | | |
|-----------|-------------------|
| 1. M.A. | 5. M.D. |
| 2. M.Sc. | 6. M. Bus. Admin. |
| 3. Ph.D. | 7. other |
| 4. L.L.B. | |

25. Where did you attend high school?

26. Where were your degrees taken? (graduate)
(undergraduate)

27. Please name any professional and fraternal organizations to which you belong.

28. Could you also name any social clubs to which you belong?

That's all. Many thanks for your cooperation.