

**POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND HUMAN  
INSECURITY: UNTANGLING THE SECURITY-  
DEVELOPMENT NEXUS**

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## ABSTRACT

How does assistance for social, political and economic development interact with efforts to provide security in post-conflict societies? To study this interaction, this dissertation focuses on strategies for peace operations. Influenced by the human security agenda, peace operations have adopted a multi-sectoral approach, seeking to address the many sources of insecurity facing conflict-ridden societies. In fact, there is a growing awareness that to establish sustainable peace after an event of conflict or collapsed state, not only the domestic and/or international root causes of the conflict should be identified and addressed, but the elements fueling the vicious cycle of violence should also be tackled and eliminated. I found that several policy recommendations proposed to better integrate peace operations' activities reveal a strong disagreement about the relationship between development and security. From this debate, I derived three types of peacebuilding strategies; 1) the *Security-only* strategy proposes providing order and security first and leaving developmental assistance to specialized agencies, 2) the *Sequential* strategy promotes providing security and order first, and then assuming development-related tasks as a means to avoid contradictory effects, and 3) the *Simultaneous* strategy emphasizes the relationship between underdevelopment and conflict, thus urges the implementation of both security and development related tasks simultaneously. Using logistic models corrected for temporally dependent data, I quantitatively test the effectiveness of these three strategies in establishing peace with a dataset I compile covering all civil wars from 1946 to 2006. This analysis shows that interventions designed with strategies prioritizing the establishment of security first (*Security-Only* and *Sequential* strategies) are more successful at terminating conflicts and achieving durable peace. The argument that multi-dimensionality increases the effectiveness of peacebuilding by enabling peace operations to address many sources of insecurity at once is not validated by the results of this study. Using George's method of structured, focused comparison, the quality of peace was subsequently investigated through six cases: Nicaragua, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Angola, Mozambique, and Cambodia. While the case studies agree with the quantitative results, they reveal a much more nuanced understanding of each strategy's effect on societies.

## RÉSUMÉ

Comment l'assistance apportée pour le développement social, politique et économique interagit avec les efforts pour rétablir et assurer la sécurité dans les sociétés sortant de guerre? Pour pouvoir étudier cette interaction, la thèse se concentre sur les stratégies des opérations de paix. Motivé par le souci de la sécurité humaine, les opérations de paix ont opté pour une approche multisectorielle, cherchant à identifier les diverses sources d'insécurité confrontées par les pays en question. En effet, on découvre de plus en plus que pour établir une paix durable dans un pays qui sort d'un conflit ou un pays effondré, il faut non seulement identifier et prendre en considération les causes originelles du conflit mais il faut aussi attaquer et éliminer les éléments qui causent le cercle vicieux de violence. J'ai noté que les recommandations de politiques proposées pour mieux intégrer les opérations de paix montrent des désaccords importants à propos des relations entre le développement et la sécurité. De ce débat, j'ai tiré trois types de stratégies de construction de paix: 1) la stratégie *sécurité-seulement* propose de fournir d'abord et avant tout l'ordre et la sécurité et de laisser l'assistance au développement aux services spécialisés, 2) la stratégie *séquentielle* promeut l'ordre et la sécurité avant le développement comme un moyen d'empêcher les effets contraires 3) la stratégie *simultanée* met l'accent sur la relation qui se trouve entre le sous-développement et le conflit, par conséquent propose l'implémentation des deux activités en même temps. En utilisant des modèles logistiques, j'ai testé quantitativement l'efficacité de ces trois stratégies pour rétablir la paix avec un dataset couvrant toutes les guerres civiles d'entre 1946 et 2006. Cette analyse montre que les interventions qui donnent la priorité à l'établissement de la sécurité avant tout ont obtenu un plus grand succès pour instaurer une paix durable. L'argument selon lequel pluridimensionalité augmente l'efficacité de la construction de paix par le moyen d'opérations de paix qui s'attaquent aux plusieurs sources d'insécurité ne semble pas être vérifié dans cette étude. En utilisant la méthode de George, comparaison structurée et concentrée, la qualité de la paix a été analysée à travers six cas: Nicaragua, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Angola, Mozambique, and Cambodge. Bien que les études de cas soient en accord avec les résultats quantitatifs, ils mettent en valeurs des nuances intéressantes concernant l'effet de chaque stratégie sur les sociétés.

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*“Perplexity is the beginning of knowledge.”*  
Kahlil Gibran

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*To my parents Cana and Bülent Akman  
and my husband Matthias Imboden*



## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **PEACE OPERATIONS UNDER A BROADER UNDERSTANDING OF SECURITY**

The end of the Cold War liberated security studies and international relations from a narrow interpretation of security. Freed from the constraints of the Cold War, many have ventured in exploring different conceptualizations of security. The increasing flow of people, information, goods, services and finance, already well underway during the Cold War years, urged many to address the varied forms of insecurity -ranging from physical, economical to health and environmental- present around the world became inevitable. When this got coupled with the thriving collaborative environment among major players after the end of the Cold War, the increasing awareness of our interdependence gave rise to a more receptive approach to addressing the precarious political, economic, social or humanitarian needs of others.

Indeed, human security emerged in the early 1990s out of the need to formulate a new paradigm for security. It has evolved as an effort to catalogue, to then categorize, various insecurities facing individuals around the world. The international community recognized that the traditional understanding of security could not address their new concerns. Traditional security rests upon the primacy

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of *National Security and State Survival* (Waltz 1979); where other dimensions of security (i.e. the physical, economic or political security of people) are delegated to the State itself. The State has total monopoly over its domestic realm and any outside interference is undesirable (Krasner 1999). The 1994 UN Human Development Report, in rhetoric at least<sup>1</sup>, dislocated this ‘Westphalian tradition’ by urging “that international society’s primary goal ought to be the pursuit of *human security*, which meant ‘safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression’ and ‘protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life’” (Bellamy 2004, 25).

The international community has gradually adopted this broader security understanding, which demands for a more intrusive approach that infringes upon the well-established principle of state sovereignty. One of the most visible manifestations of this shift can be observed in the mandate of UN peace operations. Since the end of the Cold War, UN peace operations have expanded their mandates from neutral, consensus-based supervisory functions to include more coercive, intrusive tasks of providing humanitarian, economic, political, developmental, and military support to local populations caught in conflict. In an effort to address varied forms of insecurity, peace operations have become complex and multifaceted. However, the results of this study show that these changes have not yet translated into better results for the UN peace operations.

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<sup>1</sup> It is important to acknowledge the duality present in international politics. As the international community forges new norms and rules about the necessity to alleviate human insecurity, international law continues to prioritize state sovereignty and territorial integrity over human security. For a more elaborate discussion on Traditional vs. Human Security see; (Liotta 2002; Bellamy 2004).



The purpose of this dissertation is to understand how the UN peace operations have performed under this broader conceptualization of security and to investigate if these newer multidimensional operations have fared better at achieving peace than the security-oriented peace operations. Many have argued that multi-dimensional peace operations have underperformed due to a lack of integration among the various activities they assume. I suggest that the call for more integrated missions is lacking a *strategy of integration*. Rearranging the institutional scheme of the UN and its peace operations, as various UN reforms prescribed, are alone not sufficient. Potentially problematic is the lack of a feasible and meaningful overarching strategy to follow on the ground. First, while integration and collaboration are desirable, without a common strategy, each component of a mission is likely and inclined to see its area of expertise as the most important aspect to tackle first. This often creates deadlocks and impedes the formulation of an integrated plan of action. As a result, each component of a mission goes ahead and implements its own programmes in an uncoordinated and chaotic manner, which often leaves some urgent issues unaddressed. Second, in order for various components of a mission to work together efficiently, the potential for contradictory effects should be taken into consideration. While multi-dimensional efforts certainly create positive externalities - generating a virtuous cycle benefiting overall peace- it is important to recognize that it often generates negative externalities as well. There is growing body of literature addressing the contradictory effects of multi-dimensionality (Berdal 1993; Willett 1995; Paris 1997; Cousens et al. 2001; Jan 2001; Uvin 2002; Paris 2004; Jarstad 2008; Sisk

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2008; Flores and Nooruddin 2009; HSU-OCHA 2009). For integration to be effective there is a need for a strategy that is informed of the potential contradictory effects of running multi-dimensional programmes. Thus, I argue that some pertinent questions regarding the strategy to follow are still to be addressed: Are there clear priorities while trying to establish peace? Should the mission first establish order and then address development-related issues? Or should developmental efforts start simultaneously with efforts at securing a stable and safe environment? Is there a sequence to follow so that some efforts do not undermine others?

My investigation of the peacebuilding and human security literatures leads me to derive two ideal policy models for integrated peace operations. I explain that these two approaches to integration are, however, in stark opposition with one another. One approach suggests the prioritization of safety and order as one dimension of human security. In fact, two strategies are derived from this literature: One strategy suggests that peace operations should assume only security-related tasks and leave development-related tasks for other specialized agencies and NGOs (*Security-only* strategy). The other strategy agrees that both security and development related tasks should be undertaken by peace operations, but in a sequential manner, where security is dealt with first (*sequential* strategy). The second approach proposes a *Simultaneous* strategy, where every dimension of security should be tackled concurrently. Juxtaposing the arguments and empirical evidences put forward by each approach, I demonstrate that both models are deductively and inductively sound. This, I argue, represents a fundamental lack of

consensus regarding which strategy to follow in order to effectively integrate peace operations. With numerous studies advocating contradictory results, there is no clear understanding of which strategy is actually more adept at delivering sustainable peace.

Results obtained using logistic analysis corrected for temporally dependent data (an equivalent to event history analysis) show that over time a *security-first* strategy fares better at establishing peace than a *multi-dimensional* one. The examination of six case studies -Nicaragua, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Angola, Mozambique, and Cambodia- agreeing with the statistical results, reveals a more nuanced understanding of the effects of peace operations' strategy. Combining the results of the quantitative analysis with the insights gained through the case studies I conclude that while it is clear that operations prioritizing security are more effective in establishing peace, there are reasons to believe that a better integration of multi-dimensional activities has the potential to yield to better results. I suggest that the relationship between theory and practice has been ignored by practitioners and scholars alike. The UN has expanded the scope of its missions "partly because of its recognition of the multiple political, social, economic and humanitarian dynamics of 'peace' via the concept of human security" (Richmond 2002, 11). Influenced by an expanding understanding of security, the UN has failed to recognize that human security is not yet theoretically and conceptually ready to inform policy. Thus, I suggest that resolving the theoretical and conceptual problems of human security should improve the performance of multi-dimensional operations.

The remainder of this introduction will proceed with my definitions of the terms ‘human security’ and ‘peace operation’ followed with a discussion of the transformations undergone by peace operations and what we should consider as peace operation’s success along with some methodological considerations. A brief overview of the dissertation will follow.

### **1. HUMAN SECURITY – A BROADER APPROACH TO SECURITY**

The favourable conditions of the early 1990s have facilitated the promotion of Human Security as a new approach to security. Let’s not forget though that efforts to expand the scope of security predate the end of the Cold War. Bajpai finds the roots of the human security approach to go back as far as the early 1970s, with the Club of Rome producing a series of volumes on ‘World Problematique’ in which the inter-connectedness of various insecurities troubling citizens of all nations was stressed (Bajpai 2000, 5). The sustainability of world development, environment, and security were called in question and presented as problems facing human society as a whole. In the 1980s, these efforts continued with several independent commissions such as the Brandt Commission<sup>2</sup>, the Palme Commission<sup>3</sup>, and the Brundtland Commission<sup>4</sup> which all aimed at

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<sup>2</sup> The commission produced two reports *North-South, a programme for survival* and *Common crisis North-South: cooperation for world recovery* (Brandt 1980, 1983).

<sup>3</sup> See report from the Independent Commission on Disarmament Security: (Palme 1982).

<sup>4</sup> Also known as *Our Common Future*: (Brundtland 1987). The report of the UN-sponsored World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). Many trace the definition of sustainable development to this report: “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.

redirecting the focus of security studies away from state security and towards security for the people (Acharya 2001). By the early 1990s, with other initiatives such as the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance and later the Commission on Global Governance<sup>5</sup>, our understanding of security expanded rapidly not only in theory but also in practice.

The first effort to officially define Human Security originates in the 1994 Human Development's Report. The broad conceptualization of human security presented in this report calls for the realization of the twin goals of 'freedom from fears' and freedom from wants', and includes seven dimensions of security. These are: 1) economic security, 2) food security, 3) health security, 4) environmental security, 5) personal security, 6) community security and 7) political security (UNDP 1994). Recognizing this conceptualization is rather broad and vague, the Human Security Commission (CHS) headed by Mrs. Sadako Ogata (former UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and Professor Amartya Sen (1998 Nobel Economics Prize Laureate) was established to formulate a workable definition of human security. In 2003, the CHS's report *Human Security Now*, defined the term as "protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people

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<sup>5</sup> See *Our global neighbourhood: The report of the commission on global governance* (Carlsson et al. 1995).

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the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity” (Ogata and Sen 2003, 9). Even though, a consensus-based legal definition of Human Security has not been formulated yet, the United Nations and its agencies are following this conceptualization of human security.

Scholars, however, have remained sceptical about the utility of such a term arguing that its broadness and vagueness decrease its analytical precision and practical use. Policy makers, on the other hand, have increasingly recognized its importance as a policy framework. Even though they define the term differently, among advocates of human security are countries, such as Canada, Japan and Norway, International Organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and its various agencies, the World Bank (WB) and many Non-Governmental Organizations. Canada, for instance, has actively promoted the human security agenda at the United Nations Security Council in 1998 as a way to widen the jurisdiction of the Council towards different dimensions of insecurity that not only concern the state but also individuals living within its borders<sup>6</sup>. More importantly in doing so Canada was seeking “to elevate humanitarian issues to the sphere of ‘high politics’” (Suhrke 1999, 266).

An all-encompassing conceptualization of human security has its benefits as it encapsulates all possible threats to human security, which, if eradicated, lead to sustainable peace. However, theoretically, this conceptualization is vague and murky as many categories overlap and its operationalization can logically become

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<sup>6</sup> It is important to mention that Canada has a slightly different definition of human security, stressing the primacy of ‘freedom from fears’ as a foundation for ‘freedom from wants’. More discussion on the Canadian conceptualization of human security can be found in Chapter two.

circular. For instance, it is possible to argue that providing personal security or health security contributes to economic development, but the contrary also holds true. Similarly, political security can increase community security and vice versa. In short, human security is successful at enumerating and classifying dimensions to security, but, as will be shown in this study, it fails at providing an executable strategy to eradicate them.

The straightforward policy prescription of the human security agenda adopted by the UN<sup>7</sup> is to address all the sources of insecurity so that ‘freedom from fears’ and ‘freedom from wants’ is attained. However, this does not inform the operations about a feasible strategy that will lead them to the desired end. Important questions are left unanswered: Should all insecurities be addressed at the same time? Or is there a sequence to follow?<sup>8</sup> I argue that answering these questions should resolve the conceptual vagueness of human security, but more importantly, should contribute to the effectiveness of peace operations<sup>9</sup>. Hence the pending question facing practitioners and scholars today is whether human security can become an analytically precise enough concept to serve as a policy guide.

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<sup>7</sup> Following the broad definition set by the *Human Security Now* Report (CHS, 2003)

<sup>8</sup> For interesting discussions on these questions see; (Khong 2001; Paris 2001; Thomas and Tow 2002; Bellamy and McDonald 2002).

<sup>9</sup> As defined below, the effectiveness of a peace operation is its ability to establish negative peace and ameliorate the quality of that peace.

## 2. MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

Moving away from a traditional understanding of security, UN missions have undergone significant transformations. Post-Cold War peace operations have aimed to achieve more than negative peace, which is merely ending the conflict and securing territorial integrity. Although the use of the term has decreased in recent years<sup>10</sup>, the incorporation of human security considerations into the UN Peacekeeping agenda started as early as 1992. In his *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros Boutros-Ghali urged that the Security Council and the General Assembly have “a special and indispensable role to play in an integrated approach to *human security*” (Boutros-Ghali 1992). In an effort to address various insecurities, peace operations have assumed more responsibilities; besides basic monitoring and interposition functions, they are now taking on tasks addressing dimensions of security other than territorial integrity and state security. These multidimensional peace operations not only aim to deal with the humanitarian issues facing local populations, but also to establish some level of political, social, and economic development that contributes to the sustainability of peace (Hurwitz and Peake 2004). As elaborated further in chapter two, a multitude of terms has proliferated in order to account for the many changes undergone by the UN operations. As the

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<sup>10</sup> Even though the Commission on Human Security (CHS), the Advisory Board on Human Security (ABHS), and the Human Security Unit (HSU) were established in 2000, 2003, and 2004 respectively in an effort to define and incorporate human security into the policies implemented by the UN, the failure to agree on a consensus based legal definition prevents various agencies from using the term. However, the UN has not given up on human security yet, on May 22<sup>nd</sup> 2008, the General Assembly (GA) convened for a one-day Informal Thematic Debate on Human Security, where member states reiterated their commitment to discuss and define the term.



primary interest of this study is to understand how different strategies fare at establishing sustainable peace, the broadest possible conceptualization of the term is desirable. In order to account for all types of ‘peacekeeping’, I use the simple and unloaded term *peace operation*. Borrowing Diehl’s broad definition, a peace operation is “any international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes”(Diehl 1993, p.4). To differentiate between the traditional missions preoccupied only with security related matters and the post-Cold War operations dealing also with development related issues, I use adjectives such as wider, broader, multi-sectoral or multidimensional interchangeably. However, the relevant distinction for this study is the strategies of the *overall peacebuilding intervention*. For this study, the unit of analysis is the overall peacebuilding intervention, which may include a series of peace operations. Rather than analysing the performance of each operation deployed to one country separately and attempting to tease out which operation actually contributed to the establishment of peace, this study considers and defines a series of successive peace operations deployed with regards to one conflict as a peacebuilding intervention.

The significant increase in the deployment of peace operations since early 1990s can be visibly observed in Figure I.1<sup>11</sup>; seven operations were active in 1989, nine in 1991 and up to 18 in 1993 and 1994. Their deployment decreased by the end of the 1990s but their number remain significantly higher compared to the

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<sup>11</sup> All figures, graphs and tables are placed at the end of each chapter.

Cold War era; since 2000 an average of seven operations are active on the ground per year. The number of non-UN operations has also increased; while one or two non-UN operations were active per year during the Cold War, the 1990s experienced a sharp increase (reaching up to ten operations) followed by an average of four active non-UN operations per year since year 2000. More relevant to this study, the mandates of peace operations have expanded rendering them multidimensional. Figure I.2 shows that until the late 1980's, the mandate of peace operations were geared to security oriented tasks. After the end of the Cold War, there is a noticeable increase in multidimensional operations, assuming both security and development related activities.

### **3. PEACE OPERATIONS' PRACTICAL CHALLENGES AND HUMAN SECURITY'S THEORETICAL CHALLENGES**

Experiences in countries such as Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s have clearly showed that the UN multidimensional peace operations have not been successful at coping with the complex settings they are deployed to. The UN personnel and many scholars have singled out, along with the need for more funds and troops, the lack of an integrated approach as the main problem facing multidimensional peace operations (PBPS 2008; UN 2000; Campbell and Kaspersen 2008; Bauer and Biermann 2004; Tschirgi 2003; Ponzio 2005). This view urges for more integration, coordination and planning among the various components of a mission. Indeed, more integration should increase efficiency as it would eliminate overlaps and redundancies often observed on the ground. However, I argue that the call for more integration as a solution for the failures of

UN wider operations is missing the same element missing in the policy prescription of the human security agenda. The call for an integrated approach lacks a clear and feasible strategy to follow on the ground.

I argue thus that untangling the relationship between different dimensions of human security framework and teasing out its policy recommendations can serve as a guideline to integrate meaningfully the different activities assumed by multidimensional peace operations. It is important to recognize that the debates surrounding human security and its operationalization are not new. The problems arising from the circular logic present among the various dimensions of human security have been researched in the past, but in isolation from each other. The well-known debates regarding the relationship between development and security<sup>12</sup>, the relationship between political and economic development<sup>13</sup> or the relationship between economic and environmental security<sup>14</sup> were all suffering from the ‘chicken and egg’ problem. While everyone acknowledged their theoretically complementary nature, unresolved discussions linger about which should come first and which policies should be followed to achieve the desired end. The novelty brought by human security is its ability to regroup these complex and intricate relationships under one common framework and to

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<sup>12</sup> For more interesting studies on the development-Security nexus see: (Uvin 2002; Tschirgi 2003; Hurwitz and Peake 2004).

<sup>13</sup> The relationship between political and economic development has been a central subject for comparative politics, especially in the literature of transition to and consolidation of democracy see: (Lipset 1959; Diamond 1992a; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski 2000) There are also studies focusing on this relationship in post-conflict settings see: (Paris 1997).

<sup>14</sup> On the relationship between economic development and the environment see: (Pearce and Warford 1993; Panayotou 1994; Nadkarni 2000; Davidson et al. 2003).

highlight their interactions, which of course multiplies the complexity of the issue at hand. Human security has been promoted by many as the way to integrate different concerns into one coherent approach; I argue, however, that this statement is rather premature. While it is undeniable that human security has advanced the debate on the scope of security, it has not formulated a coherent approach that can inform policy-making meaningfully.

### **4. WHAT CONSTITUTES OPERATION SUCCESS?**

In order to determine which strategy of integration – *Security-only*, *Sequential* or *Simultaneous* - increases the effectiveness of peace operations; I statistically test the performance of UN and non-UN peace operations in internal wars from 1946 to 2006. Many considerations led me to conclude that only internal conflicts should be included in the analysis. First, the factors affecting the probability of conflict termination and peace durability are different for internal and interstate conflicts (Fortna 2003). The ability to retreat behind a well-established border line and more importantly, the opportunity to separate warring parties are rarely present in the context of civil conflict. Second, terminating an internal conflict is harder as it not only necessitates the reintegration of former combatants into the society, but also requires significant steps of reconciliation and normalization of relations among various groups living within the same society. Third, the root causes of civil wars are often more difficult to address and eradicate than for interstate conflicts. Lack of economic opportunity, relative deprivation and poverty, lack of political representation, repression are all factors contributing to

not only the occurrence of civil conflict but also its continuation and possibly its relapses. Fourth and most importantly, according to the dataset used for this study, peace operations assuming development-related tasks are only deployed in civil conflicts. In other words, interstate conflicts always received peace operations assuming security-related tasks only. This is not surprising as the resolution of interstate conflicts does not necessitate the implementation of developmental programmes or democratization. Using the UCDP/PRIO dataset (Gleditsch 2002- Version 4-2007) as a main conflict table, I merged 56 UN peace operations and 59 non-UN peace operations into the main data<sup>15</sup>. Going through the mandate of each mission, I recorded whether operations assumed security or development related tasks or both<sup>16</sup>. As mentioned above, this study is focused on the overall strategy of peacebuilding intervention with regards to one conflict spell. Often more than one peace operations are deployed to a conflict. Therefore, rather than analyzing each operation individually, the group of operations dispatched to a conflict spell is of interest. The strategy of the overall intervention is derived from the mandates of the operations deployed and more importantly their sequence.

In order to assess the effectiveness of one strategy compared to another, it is necessary to establish what constitutes a successful operation. I argue that while the existing literature acknowledges and studies extensively the new direction

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<sup>15</sup> The main data comprises all conflicts. For the statistical analyses, interstate and extrasystemic armed conflicts were dropped from the dataset.

<sup>16</sup> You can find more information on how mandate and strategy were coded in chapter 4.

## Introduction

taken by the UN peace operations, the commonly used definitions of success fail to reflect the transformations that have taken place in the last two decades. Although there are slight variations in how operation success is defined, negative peace (absence of war) seems to be the benchmark for success (Bratt 1996; Regan 1996; Heldt 2001; Fortna 2004a; Gilligan and Sergenti 2006). Recently, this trend has been challenged by some, who defined success around different conceptualizations of positive peace (Hampson 2002; Peou 2002; Usegi 2004; Zuercher 2006; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Agreeing with this approach, I maintain that the new tasks assumed by the UN operations are designed to achieve more than negative peace. In fact, if the justification to intervene and to be more intrusive is a concern for human security, it would be more accurate to judge their effectiveness with changes in human security conditions. There are few studies (and no large-n studies) evaluating the effectiveness of these operations in terms of human security considerations (Hampson, 2002; Peou, 2002; Usegi, 2004). The only large-n statistical analysis expanding the definition of peace to account for its quality is from Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006). Their definition of 'participatory peace' not only includes termination of war, no residual violence and undivided sovereignty, but also a minimum standard of political openness.

The unavailability of data on economic, health, education or political indicators, especially for conflict-ridden developing countries, stands as a major challenge for any scholar wishing to statistically test the effect of peacebuilding on the quality of peace. While the cessation of conflict and physical violence is very important, the sustainability of peace often depends on its quality. As

explained above, there is a growing awareness that to establish sustainable peace after an event of conflict or collapsed state, not only the domestic and/or international root causes of the conflict should be identified and addressed, but the elements fueling the vicious cycle of violence should also be tackled and eliminated. Among others, lack of security, malfunctioning institutions, uneven development, poor infrastructure, scarce health and education services, and lack of political space and economic opportunity are all areas needing attention and improvement for the violence to cease and for an environment of trust to flourish.

In order to circumvent the lack of data but still account for the quality of peace two measures of peace will be tested using two different methods. Using logit analysis, the performance of operation strategy will be quantitatively tested on a negative measure of peace, defined as the cessation of conflict for 5 consecutive years. The positive measure of peace, accounting for the quality of the peace established, will be tested quantitatively through case studies. Using the seven dimensions of human security, the six cases will be studied in depth to uncover how peacebuilding strategy affect the quality of the peace established.

The statistical analysis of this study shows strong support for the Security-First approach (*Security-only* and *Sequential* strategies), which prescribes the deployment of peace operations addressing safety issues first. The *Security-only* strategy fares the best at establishing negative peace. Proponents of this strategy argue that peace operations can achieve more by providing order and basic security first, and leaving the implementation of developmental programmes to specialized agencies. This is followed by intervention following a *Sequential*

strategy. Peacebuilding interventions following a *Simultaneous* strategy are found to be the less effective in establishing peace. The qualitative analysis of six case studies agrees with the statistical results. They reveal a more nuanced understanding as to how different strategies affect the establishment of peace and what problems arise in the implementation of multidimensional mandates.


## **5. OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION**

The plan of this dissertation is as follow: Chapter two briefly describes the evolution of UN peace operations, the problems facing the new multidimensional operations and the recent efforts and proposals to remedy their lack of effectiveness. It also clarifies the definition of successful peace operation, stressing the need to move away from definitions centered on a negative understanding of peace. Chapter three explores the debates surrounding the conceptualization and operationalization of human security. Drawing from interesting theoretical arguments and empirical findings from various literatures - such as the security -development nexus, peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building– two models offering contradictory strategies for integration are derived and presented. The hypotheses arising from these models are posited to be tested statistically. Chapter four details the quantitative models followed to test the hypotheses stemming from the two opposed models. The rules followed to categorize operations' mandates and the coding scheme for the main variables are also explained and justified. Moreover, the method followed for the case study analysis is explained along with the questions used for




structured comparison. Chapter five presents the results of different logistic analyses corrected for temporally dependent data and discusses various tests done to ensure the validity of the results. Chapters six, seven and eight cover six illustrative case studies, comprising of two cases per strategy (*Security-only*, *Sequential* and *Simultaneous*). For each strategy one case ending with negative peace and one with the continuation of conflict have been selected. Chapter nine discusses the results of this study. While the six cases –Nicaragua, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Angola, Mozambique, and Cambodia- are systematically compared using Alexander George’s method of structured, focused comparison (George 1979), the results from the quantitative analysis are reinterpreted in light of the insights and new information gained through the case studies. Chapter ten follows with concluding remarks, where the policy recommendations derived from this study are highlighted along with the areas needing further research.

**Figure I.1: Number of UN and Non-UN Peace Operations from 1946 to 2006 (stacked)**



Source: Dataset compiled for this study. See chapter four for more detail

**Figure I.2: Number of Peace Operations according their mandate type from 1946 to 2006 (stacked)**<sup>17</sup>



Source: Dataset compiled and coded for this study. See chapter four for more detail

<sup>17</sup> IAPF and DOMREP were working together in Dominican Republic in 1966. It is coded as simultaneous since missions instituted elections, which goes beyond dealing with issues security-related issues only.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **TOWARDS INTEGRATED UN PEACE OPERATIONS**

UN peacekeeping underwent significant transformations in the last two decades; transformations that have stripped the term peacekeeping from its meaning. In fact, with missions deployed places where there is no peace to keep, acquiring the consent of the parties involved or retaining impartiality is now real challenge (Baker 1994). From the tasks of basic interposition and monitoring functions, the UN missions have assumed responsibilities such as election supervision, nation building, coercively enforcing peace, humanitarian assistance, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR) (Durch 1993, 2006). In short, the term peacekeeping became a misnomer not capturing the functions of the new more ambitious missions. In an effort to account for these changes, new terms have proliferated within the UN and in the relevant literature. To name a few, multi-dimensional operations, peace support operations, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, second generation peacekeeping are phrases created to differentiate the new operations from the traditional ones . As explained below, conceptual precision is desirable, but it can also lead to confusion especially if no consensus exists about the definitions and boundaries of the various terms used. The primary interest of this study is to capture the overall strategy of the intervention. That is whether security and development related activities have been implemented simultaneously or consecutively. Therefore, the broadest

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possible conceptualization of the term is desirable. In order to account for all types of ‘peacekeeping’, I use the simple and unloaded term *peace operation*. Borrowing Diehl’s broad definition, a peace operation is “*any international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes*” (Diehl 1993, 4). It is common that more than one operation is deployed to the same conflict spell. Therefore, in order to account for the strategy of the peacebuilding intervention as a whole, this study stresses the importance of the sequence of the mandates. The categorization used to classify mandates is explained in greater length in Chapter three. Even though I use adjectives such as wider, newer, multifaceted or complex interchangeably while referring to post-Cold War missions, it is important to emphasize that when the overall strategy is taken into consideration, the seemingly clear line between pre and post-Cold War operations becomes blurred.

This chapter will proceed with an overview of the evolution of UN peace operations and the efforts to remedy their lack of effectiveness with more integration. As our understanding of security expanded, the responsibilities of the missions increased accordingly, thus I argue that our definition of operation success needs to be updated to take these changes into account. Different definitions of success will be explored and the definition adopted for this study will be presented. Finally, the literature exploring the conditions contributing/inhibiting peace operations’ success will be examined. While it seems that there is a consensus about the presence of a peace operation increasing

the likelihood of peace, it is clear that there is a fundamental lack of agreement about which conditions yield to more success.

## **1. THE EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING:**

### **1.1. TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING:**

Until the end of the Cold War peacekeeping was based on the deployment of a small military force requiring the consent of all parties involved into the conflict. Their mandates were to observe, collect information, shame hostilities and atrocities in order to appease the situation. Troops could only use force as a last resort and in case of self-defense, but for the most part, it can be argued that their protection was through their vulnerability and their impartial and neutral presence (Prins 2002). It is interesting to note that the concept of peacekeeping and its functions are actually not spelled out in the UN Charter (Diehl 1988). “[The] ‘classic’ understanding of peacekeeping, and the development of techniques to control violence by means other than enforcement or counter-violence, derives largely from the experience of United Nations (UN) operations during the Cold War. Between 1948 and 1988, the 13 operations launched by the UN produced a ‘body of principles, procedures and practices’ which gradually ‘came to constitute a corpus of case law or customary practice’” (Berdal 1993, 3)<sup>1</sup>. This, of course, facilitated the eventual expansion of responsibilities experienced in the early 1990s.

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<sup>1</sup> UN envoy Ralph Bunche, who supervised the setup of the UN Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East in 1948, essentially set up the precedents for future peacekeeping operations: acquiring local consent, neutrality, and non-use of force except in self-defense (Durch and England 2009).

During the Cold War era, peacekeeping was exercised within the confines of the 'Westphalian State' system, where intervention into States' domestic or foreign affairs without their consent is unacceptable. The only interference allowed was limited to non-intrusive observers. This is not to say that exceptions did not exist. For instance, due to the conditions on the ground, ONUC (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo)<sup>2</sup> was given enforcement capabilities that were far beyond self-defence. The impartiality of the operation can also be called into question since to protect territorial integrity peacekeepers found themselves confronting warlords and mercenaries in regions that were outside government's control<sup>3</sup>. However, it is fair to argue that for the most part peace operations used to be simpler and less ambitious than what they became in the decade following the end of the Cold War.

### **1.2. POST-COLD WAR PEACE OPERATIONS:**

The rapid and drastic changes experienced by UN peacekeeping can be explained by the combination of several factors. First and foremost, freed from the Cold War geostrategic balance of power, great powers, at last, were able to work within the UN framework to solve the new challenges facing the world.

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<sup>2</sup> "Originally mandated to provide the Congolese Government with the military and technical assistance it required following the collapse of many essential services and the military intervention by Belgian troops, ONUC became embroiled by the force of circumstances in a chaotic internal situation of extreme complexity and had to assume certain responsibilities which went beyond normal peacekeeping duties." From the UNDPKO website <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucB.htm>

<sup>3</sup> "In Congo, ONUC was emplaced with the agreement of the central government which in the process lost control of certain regions. Its mandate to preserve the territorial integrity of Congo and prevent the outbreak of a civil war conflicted with the interests of the Katanga authorities that exercised effective control over their region" (Tsagourias 2006 , 475).

“This change contributed to the growing tendency on the part of the Security Council to agree on cooperative actions as crises arose” (Jablonsky and McCallum 1999, 3). This culminated in an increase use of UN peacekeeping; in fact, between 1988 and 1991, seven peace operations<sup>4</sup> were deployed around the world. Although new tasks, such as observing elections, monitoring human rights and dealing with refugees, were added to their mandates, these operations were not significantly different from traditional peacekeeping yet. The relative success of those initial missions undoubtedly contributed to the subsequent expansion of peace operations’ functions and responsibilities. Unfortunately however, many failed to recognize that their success was highly dependent on “the ripeness for settlement of superpower proxy wars” (Lipson 2007, 80). Many Cold War era protracted proxy wars were in fact coming to an end as superpowers’ declining interest resulted in decreasing military and financial aid.

The increased optimism about the effectiveness of peace operations got coupled with a drastic rise in civil wars in early 1990s. With the cooperative environment facilitating the decision to intervene, peace operations have been increasingly deployed to manage the civil wars, which inevitably required the adoption of wider mandates. In fact, in 1992 the Security Council authorized the deployment of large-scale multi-dimensional operations in Cambodia, Somalia,

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<sup>4</sup> These UN operations are: 1988–1990 United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), 1988–1991 United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), 1988–1991 United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), 1989–1990 United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), 1989–1992 United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), 1991–1995 United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), 1991–1995 United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), 1991–2003 United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).

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the former Yugoslavia and Mozambique. As intrastate conflicts (rather than interstate conflicts) became the main concern, many realized that territorial integrity was not the only source of insecurity threatening the welfare of citizens around the world. Figure II.1 illustrates the stark increase in interstate conflicts after the Cold War. The attempts to deal with severe internal conflicts or total state collapses instigated discussions on security concerns that were not military in nature. As most traditional peacekeeping operations have been deployed to monitor intrastate conflicts, a change of strategy was required. The traditional understanding of security prioritizing National Security could no longer address the many insecurities people faced every day; from food, health, political to economic or environmental threats. In fact, as discussed in chapter two, the newly-coined term ‘human security’ emerged as a commonly used framework that could encapsulate these new security concerns. The Security Council followed the conceptual broadening of security by expanding the operational meaning of the UN Charter Article 2(7), to give “authority to override domestic sovereignty when (Article 39) ‘threats to peace, breaches of peace, acts of aggression’ arose” (Doyle 2001, 221). As the focus of the international agenda shifted towards protection of civilians, peace operations’ mandates had to be adjusted accordingly, which rendered them more complex and multi-faceted.

In 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, presented his *Agenda for Peace*, where he urged the “strategy for peace [to] become more intrusive: [ranging] from preventive diplomacy to peacemaking to peacekeeping to peacebuilding to humanitarian intervention – all which aim to build human security” (Peou 2002,



54). The Secretary-General also attempted to develop the first working definition of peacekeeping<sup>5</sup>, but as Durch and England (2009) point out, “[an] Agenda for Peace missed an opportunity to bind peace operations to purposes consistent with its traditional essence and left the Council freer than it might otherwise have been to keep adding new purposes”. In fact, after 1992, most peace operations assumed a variety of tasks that rendered them very complex. Moreover, the increased involvement of specialized agencies, non-governmental agencies, private and voluntary organizations made the coordination of various activities so much more difficult (Berdal 1993, 9).

## **2. PROBLEMS AND ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY PEACE OPERATIONS**

It is clear that the expansion of UN peace operations was rushed and erratic. Deployed hastily in unknown territories of complex ongoing civil wars or state collapses, the strategies employed were not well-researched, the troops were poorly trained and the financial support often insufficient (Jablonsky and McCallum 1999). In fact, the decisions regarding where to deploy and which strategies to employ were made following the short-term lessons learned from the recently deployed missions. For instance, the reluctance to respond to the Rwandan genocide in April 1994 was related to the failure of the operation in Somalia. UN troops found themselves crossing the line between peacekeepers and combatants, which resulted in 18 US casualties. This led to a change in posture by

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<sup>5</sup> “Peacekeeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or policy personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace” (Boutros-Ghali 1992).

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the US, with President Clinton issuing Directive 25<sup>6</sup>, in which the US explicitly showed aversion to involvement in dangerous situation where no clear US interests were present. Similarly, in Bosnia, even though the UN peacekeepers were under fire and being kidnapped by the Serbs, the fear of crossing the ‘Mogadishu line’<sup>7</sup> paralyzed the UN and resulted in its inability to prevent the horrific massacre of more than 5000 Muslim civilians in Srebrenica in 1995. The sad experience of UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia demonstrated that intervention into active civil war required enforcement capabilities and adequately equipped force capable of coping with worst-case scenarios (Mockaitis 1999). As General Sir Michael Rose, formerly the commander of UNPROFOR observed “it was not possible to fight from white-painted vehicles [implying] support for the doctrine of Wider Peacekeeping” (Connaughton 2001, 50). Indeed, this was a turning point, which led towards a sharper reorientation towards enforceable human rights (Prins 1999, 124). Military force came to be authorized in order to compel the belligerents into compliance with Security Council resolutions. This necessitates that “[t]he core elements of traditional peacekeeping missions been abandoned in the context of peace enforcement: the peacekeepers’ neutral role in the conflict, non-use of force, and consent of the belligerent parties to outside involvement” (Schnabel, Thakur, 2001, 241).

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<sup>6</sup> For more information visit: <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm>

<sup>7</sup> “In referring to the ‘Mogadishu Line’, General Sir Michael Rose, formerly the commander of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, described it as ‘the line that separates peacekeeping from war fighting’” (Connaughton 2001, p.50).

As explained above, after the few immediate successes, mostly due to the ripeness for settlement and simpler mandates, it is clear that subsequent peace operations have not fared well. In order to address the many faces of insecurity, operations became responsible for a multitude of security and development related tasks, which prove difficult to coordinate. For the most part they were ill-equipped and ill-prepared to manage the complexities of ongoing conflicts and post-conflict settings. In fact, in less than three years, Boutros-Ghali sobered his optimistic *Agenda for Peace* with a more realistic *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* (1995), where he addressed the profound challenges facing UN peace operations. Reflecting failures in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, he urged action to remedy problems including the failure to distinguish between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, lack of unity of command, and lack of available troops and equipment” (Woocher 2007, 311). The Brahimi Report in 2000 was another diligent and comprehensive attempt at identifying the shortcomings of UN peace operations’ strategies. It recommended numerous reforms to make the operations more efficient and credible, such as improving operational capabilities, clearer mandates, compliance by member states with troop requirements and more resources/training. The report, also indentified a critical shortcoming that will give direction to the ensuing efforts to remedy the peace operations (Durch et al. 2003):

There is currently no integrated planning or support cell in the Secretariat that brings together those responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights,

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development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment (UN 2000, xiii).

There is now no doubt that if peace operations are to address and eradicate the various direct or indirect threats to sustainable peace, they need to adopt a multi-dimensional approach. Missions need to be equipped with military, humanitarian, developmental and political skills that would enable the management of complex ongoing or post-conflict situations. Kyoko Ono, officer of UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS), explains that the move towards multi-dimensional missions is aimed “to align the political dimension, the humanitarian dimension, the military operation and also the development partners. So that is a comprehensive approach in trying to address post-conflict situations.”<sup>8</sup> However, recognizing that the first multi-dimensional operations did not deliver the intended results, the UN in general, and the DPKO in particular, finds the problem in the lack of integration and coordination among the various components attached to the missions. From interviews conducted with people having experienced the functioning of these operations, it is clear that the missions lack a central authority able to take the lead<sup>9</sup>. Often, peace operations also assume responsibilities that overlap with other UN agencies on the ground. The lack of coordination extends to the point that the UNDPKO may be unaware that other UN agencies are working with them side by side.

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<sup>8</sup> Personal interview I conducted with Kyoko Ono on June 19<sup>th</sup>, 2008.

<sup>9</sup> From personal interview I conducted with Sakiko Fukuda Parr on June 18<sup>th</sup>, 2008 and Necla Tschirgi on June 20<sup>th</sup>, 2008.

### **3. TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH AND “*ONE UN*”**

Gathering and analysing lessons learned from the past and ongoing missions, Kyoko Ono, along with many others, acknowledges the great organizational challenges facing the UN and urges for an integrated approach. In fact the UN has sought to reform its institutional scheme since the late 1990s; it aimed at regrouping all its activities under one strategic framework. As Campbell and Kaspersen concisely summarize:

Between 1997 and 2007, the integration reforms were articulated in seminal UN reports (the Programme for Reform (1997) and the Brahimi report – Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000)); were spurred on by external evaluations (i.e. a Norwegian-based Report on Integrated Missions (2005)); were revised or developed anew in internal guidelines (i.e. the Secretary-General’s ‘Note of Guidance’ (2006), the Integrated Mission Planning Process (2006), and the Integrated DDR Standards (2006)); and were invented at the field level (e.g. consolidated peace strategies and compacts) (Campbell and Kaspersen 2008, 472).

The most recent of these reform initiatives is the Capstone Doctrine, which calls for the restructuring of the composition of operations’ senior management to integrate the military, political and development aspects into one coherent approach. The document highlights:

An integrated mission is a strategic partnership between a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation and the UNCT (United Nations Country Team), under the leadership of the SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary-General) and the DSRSG/RC/HC (Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator). The SRSG is the ‘the senior United Nations representative in

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the country' with 'overall authority over all the activities of the United Nations' and is responsible for 'ensuring that all the United Nations components in the country pursue a coordinated and coherent approach.' The DSRSG/RC/HC is responsible for the coordination of both humanitarian operations and United Nations development operations, and for maintaining links with governments and other parties, donors, and the broader humanitarian and development communities for this purpose (PBPS 2008, p.69).

The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, composed by a group of prominent advisors gathered by the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) to deal with the deficiencies of the UN, also identified lack of integration within the UN as a major problem. In response, the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission was proposed (UN, 2004). These efforts culminated in calls for the establishment of a peacebuilding architecture at the World summit of Dec. 2005, which became operational in 2006. The peacebuilding architecture consists of three parts; the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) "to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery" (Ponzio Forthcoming, 7), which is an intergovernmental body of member states, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) holds about 250 million dollars for quick catalytic disbursement of funds for projects that donors are not prepared to fund, and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) provides overall direction and guidance on programme management and monitoring, also responsible to act as a hinge between the UN system on one hand and the PBC on another (UN 2005). The five permanent SC members are on the PBC. The Commission also includes 31 member states that fall into five categories of countries; seven from the SC, seven from Economic and Social

Council (ECOSOC), seven from the GA, five from contributing countries and five representing donor countries (PBC Jan. 2008). At present, for research and examination purposes only three countries –Burundi, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau- are on the agenda of the PBC, thus it is unfortunately too early to judge its performance.

With these developments, the UN has embarked into a new direction, which calls for *One UN*. The aim is ambitious as it is to not only integrate the various components of an operation, but to bring together the many agencies attached to the UN. In fact, from the interviews I conducted in New York and Geneva, it was apparent that with different sources of funding and different donors to respond to, the various agencies working under the UN are very disconnected, to the point of becoming competitors at times<sup>10</sup>. For instance, while the DPKO has to report to the SC and is funded by the UN directly, agencies such as UNICEF or UNIFEM receives their funds from member states and donors and do not have to be mandated by the SC.

It is unquestionable that the realization of the *One UN* approach should contribute to the success of the UN in general and its peace operations in particular. In the precarious contexts of ongoing conflict and/or post-conflict reconstruction, it is imperative that UN agencies work together under a common plan. I argue, however, that the call for integrated peace operations leaves many issues unaddressed. Potentially problematic is the lack of a common plan/strategy. Even though they have decreased isolation among different parts of the UN, the

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<sup>10</sup> From personal interview conducted with Sakiko Fukuda-Parr on June 20<sup>th</sup> 2008.

reforms have not succeeded at developing an integrated approach. Ironically, it seems that various actors are devising their own plan for integration, which ultimately leads to several integration plans being implemented at once. Rearranging the institutional scheme is alone not sufficient. I argue that without a clear understanding of which strategy to follow, each operation's subunit is likely and inclined to see its area of expertise as the most important aspect worth addressing urgently.

Referring to various theoretical discussions and empirical evidences from the literature of peace operations, Chapter three presents two models/strategies for integration. Before entering the debate on strategies for success, it is imperative to define what constitute a successful operation. It is clear that with the expansion experienced by UN peace operations, the aim is not only to keep order and provide security, but also to offer a certain level of welfare (economically, socially and politically). In the following section, I review the existing definitions of success and I argue that if UN peace operations have embarked into new more ambitious missions, the definition of what constitutes a successful operation should be accordingly updated.

### **4. UPDATING THE DEFINITION OF SUCCESS**

Deciding what marks the end of a conflict period involves determining what constitutes success for a peace operation. There are however different ways of defining conflict termination, which leads to different measures of success for peace operations. The literature can be broadly divided in two camps in terms of



how operation success is defined; those who use qualitative criteria and those who prefer quantitative measures. The former group is interested in an interpretive approach to the contribution of peacekeeping to larger values such as world peace, justice and the reduction of human suffering (Johansen 1994; Druckman et al. 1997). The latter group, more relevant to this study's approach, uses quantitative criteria to measure success. Their definitions can be placed on a continuum ranging from the minimal requirement of fulfilling the mission mandate (Bratt 1996) and negative peace (Regan 1996; Heldt 2001; Fortna 2004a; Gilligan and Sergenti 2006) towards various conceptions of positive peace. In the next section, I evaluate these definitions.

#### **4.1. FROM NEGATIVE TO POSITIVE PEACE**

Starting with less demanding definitions of success and progressing towards more elaborated conceptualizations of peace that take its quality and sustainability into consideration, several definitions of peace are evaluated. First, peace operations' success can be measured with whether or not they fulfill their mandates. I argue that this definition is not effective in many regards. First, this definition of success is very limited as it cannot account for the accuracy of the mandate itself, which is an important factor in the success of an operation. If the mandate has not been appropriately designed, the operation is likely to fail. I also agree with Diehl (1993) that taking mandates as a reference for success is tricky as they are often vague and leaving lots of room for interpretation. Besides, since each mandate is specific to the conflict, it renders making generalization impossible.

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Others have preferred to use measures of negative peace to define operation success, which takes the termination of fighting as the main indicator for success. For instance, Regan defines conflict as 200 fatalities or more, thus he considers reducing the numbers of fatalities below 200 as operation success (1996, 2002). Heldt (2001) and Fortna (2004a) use a higher number of fatalities to define conflict, thus for them, an operation succeeds when the number of battle-related death goes below 1000. This of course does only take battle-related fatalities as an indicator of conflict. Clearly, it cannot account for various dimensions of security promoted by the human security agenda. Scholars using negative peace as their measure of success have defended their definition by arguing that it is unrealistic to conceive the role of peacekeepers as something more than the cessation of conflict. In response, I concur with many who argue that negative peace does not reflect what is needed for peace to be self-sustaining (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006). I also argue that the missions deployed now clearly aim at achieving more than negative peace, thus the definition of success should be redefined accordingly.

Various conceptions of positive peace have proliferated in recognition that lowering battle-related fatalities does not automatically mean peace. Moreover, it does not inform us about the quality of peace, thus its sustainability. Starting with more conservative definitions of positive peace, some define operation success as ‘deterring and preventing violent conflict and the facilitation for the resolution of the disagreements underlying the conflict’ (Diehl 1993; Druckman et al. 1997; Hillen 2000; See also: Cousens et al. 2001). Others also include criteria such as

‘limitation of casualties and suffering’ (Bratt 1996; Pushkina 2006), ‘the reestablishment of a full monopoly over the means of violence and economic and political development’ (Zuercher 2006). Alternatively, Doyle and Sambanis developed two measures of success; ‘sovereign peace’ and ‘participatory peace’ (2006). While the former is defined as termination of war, no residual violence and undivided sovereignty, the latter includes all three conditions plus a minimum standard of political openness.

#### **4.2. ADAPTING THE DEFINITION OF SUCCESS TO FIT REALITY:**

The various definitions of success essentially represent a disagreement on what peace operations are expected to provide. In fact, generating expectations of goals other than the ones stated in the mandate necessarily implies the normative formulation of preferences about what peace operations ought to deliver. It also fails to address the appropriateness and effectiveness of the mandate. In other words, if certain goals, not stated in the mandate, are expected to be accomplished, what does this tell us about the effectiveness of the mandate itself? Alternatively, if an operation fulfills all the goals stated in its mandate but there is still severe human suffering in the areas where it was deployed, can we still qualify it as a success?

In order to resolve these predicaments, I assume that UN’s broader goal in establishing peace operations is to contribute to sustainable peace. However, I argue that what constitutes sustainable peace cannot be normatively assigned or uniformly the same across cases. For example, for peace to be sustainable, one mission might need to reestablish the monopoly over violence, while in another

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some political openness might be required to ease tensions. As elaborated more in next chapter, as a conceptual tool, human security enables the formulation of a measure of success that can address these concerns. The strength of the human security framework is the ability to encapsulate a variety of security dimensions. It allows the analysis of specific issues critical to the understanding of insecurity in a particular case. Indeed, it is imperative to recognize that the path to peace will drastically differ from one case to another. For instance, as Jolly and Basu explained, both Sierra Leone and Afghanistan are faced with the challenge of rebuilding their state and society. However, given the conditions in each country, the strategy required to so will have to be adaptable to and targeted towards the resolution of the development and security problems specific to each case. They argue that “the ability to ‘securitize’ particularly relevant agendas is crucial in these cases. For instance, the need to substitute livelihoods from agriculture in place of opium production is particularly important in Afghanistan, whereas this is not a crucial threat to security in Sierra Leone. On the other hand, effective environmental control and natural resource mobilization is of far more strategic importance to Sierra Leone than Afghanistan” (Jolly and Basu 2006, 27).

In this study, while a measure of negative peace<sup>11</sup> will be used as a threshold measure for success and the quality of the peace established will also be examined. Due to the lack of available data a quantitative measure for positive peace could not be developed, thus only the negative measure of peace will be

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<sup>11</sup> For this study negative peace is defined as cessation of conflict, which is coded as less than 25 battle-related deaths.

tested quantitatively. The quality of the peace will be explored through the six case studies. Using the seven human security indicators as a framework, different dimensions of security will be investigated and the effect of different strategy on the quality of the peace will be analyzed. Where available, the level of human security indicators will be compared to regional levels and also to the levels of five years preceding the conflict. In order for peace to be sustainable, I argue that the levels of these security indicators must be restored to pre-war level or reach some regional average. Therefore, the measure of success used here accounts not only for the cessation of conflict but also the rehabilitation of other security dimensions.

## **5. CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SUCCESS**

The bulk of peace operations' literature explores two interrelated but very different questions. Some are interested in whether there is a relationship between the presence of UN peace operations and the establishment of peace. They theoretically or/and empirically investigate the positive and negative impacts of these missions on peace (however they define it). Others are interested in exploring the conditions that increase or decrease the effectiveness of peace operations.

Most of the findings in the literature seem to agree on the relationship between UN peace operations and peace; they indicate that missions have an overall positive impact on the settings they are deployed to. Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1984) compare UN involvement and non-involvement to conflict results. They found that while UN involvement seems to contribute to the

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likelihood of peace agreements in conflicts, it does not seem to help reduce tensions between warring parties (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1984, 65). In fact, according to their findings, UN involvement seemed to lengthen the duration of the crisis. Thus they conclude that while the UN may be effective at generating agreements between warring parties, it is unfortunately ineffective in producing long-lasting peace. Bratt examines 39 peacekeeping missions between 1945 and 1996 and evaluate their success in four different ways: mandate performance, facilitation of conflict resolution, conflict containment and limitation of casualties (1996). Combining all his findings, he concludes that 50% of UN missions are successful and have a positive impact. While Bratt's findings are interesting, it is important to point out that he does not compare cases where UN intervenes with cases where intervention did not happen. Without accounting for the outcomes of cases without intervention, it is actually impossible to discern whether the UN has an overall positive or negative impact.

Other studies have remedied this problem by looking at the whole universe of conflicts and by comparing cases with and without peace operations. Examining only civil conflicts and controlling for as much as possible factors that might influence the degree of difficulty of cases, Fortna found that intervention helps maintain (negative) peace (2004a). Similarly, Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild look at third party involvement, and suggest that peacekeeping in particular has increased the duration of peace (2001). Alternatively, Greig and Diehl found that while peacekeeping might be successful at monitoring a cease-fire, it is not an effective facilitator to the conflict resolution process (2005). A

recent and very in-depth study was conducted by Doyle and Sambanis, who used two measures of success; “sovereign peace” is based on the absence of large-scale violence and the reestablishment of the legitimate monopoly of violence, and “participatory peace” encompasses sovereign peace plus a minimal degree of political assent and participation. Their findings also indicate that the UN is effective at fostering peace through multidimensional peacekeeping (also referred as second generation). They found however, that peace operations have been very ineffective as a peace enforcer or war-maker (also referred as third generation) (2006, 2000).

Studies dealing with the second question – under what conditions are the UN peace operations successful? – are, by nature, more policy-oriented. They take operations as given and treat them as technical exercises in conflict management. “Many contributions to [this] literature ask the same few questions of the same few cases: Why are some peace missions more successful than others? Why do some peace agreements last while others fail? How can we improve the techniques employed in future operations?” (Paris 2000). Attempts to answer these questions produced a significantly large body of policy-relevant research, which successfully brought scholars and practitioners together. Nevertheless, an investigation of this literature reveals that there are no agreed-upon conditions for success. To show the wide array of arguments put forward in the literature, I chose some predominant studies and summarize them here.

Diehl (1993) and Johansen (1994) both argue that the likelihood of operations’ success increases under these conditions: if they are deployed to

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intrastate conflicts, if they remain neutral and acquire consent, if they are lightly armed and use weapons only in self-defense. While Durch does not make a distinction between intra and interstate conflicts, he adds ‘sufficient great power support’ to the list above (1993). Pushkina, however, finds that there is no substantial association between great powers taking a leading role and the success of the operation. Testing her propositions on 17 missions from 1945 and 1998, she finds that UN commitment, absence of external support for the belligerents, successful diplomatic efforts and low degree of mutual antagonism are the conditions necessary for success (Pushkina 2006). Others have emphasized feasibility of the mandate, adequate resources and training of the personnel as conditions for operations’ success (Urquhart 1987; see: Gray 2001; Schnabel 2001).

This brief survey of the literature reveals that peace operations seem to have had a positive effect on peace<sup>12</sup> so far. However, the findings on the conditions contributing to the likelihood of their success are contradictory and unclear. There is an apparent lack of understanding among practitioners and academics of the conditions leading operations to be more successful. I argue that this may be due to the various definitions of success used in the field. In fact, it is theoretically possible to argue that the conditions contributing to the cessation of conflict can, at the same time, impede the development of a more open political system. For instance, some have found that establishing a rigid security environment can lead to police states that can stifle organic civil movements (IPA

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<sup>12</sup> However defined.



2002; Pugh 2004; Paul 2005). Similarly, the conditions contributing to positive peace may make the cessation of battle-related deaths more difficult. For example, an often-observed phenomenon is that the promise of elections stimulates the formation of political agendas and opens space for political discussions about the future of a country. But it also significantly decreases minority groups' willingness to disarm, as these groups fear being eliminated by the winner of the elections (Paris 1997).

In order to determine the conditions contributing to operation success, I emphasize the importance of distinguishing between endogenous and exogenous variables affecting the success of peace operations. Multi-dimensional peace operations are deployed to varied settings and assume a wide array of activities. I argue that all the aspects that the UN and its members have the agency to ameliorate or modify can be categorized as endogenous variables. Some examples from the literature are: financial and logistical support (Doyle, Sambanis, 2006), commitment of troops and personnel (Connaughton 2001), clear and feasible mandate (Boutros-Ghali 1992), quality and appropriateness of training (Thakur, Schnabel, 2001), timing of deployment (Grieg, Diehl, 2005), deadline for troop withdrawal (Evans 1993), and type of missions (essentially their mandates) (Doyle, Sambanis, 2006) <sup>13</sup>. The endogenous factors can be said to relate to the overall quality of the operation. I argue the UN has the agency to examine the state of its resources and capabilities before deciding whether it is viable and/or

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<sup>13</sup> This does not constitute an exhaustive list

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desirable to dispatch a peace operation, thus I include troop commitments and funding as exogenous since they depend on member states' willingness.

Exogenous variables are related to the specificities of the conflict itself: type of conflict (intrastate or interstate), presence of ongoing militarized disputes, existence of cease-fire, type of issue under dispute (tangible or intangible) (Brams, Taylor, 1996), level of polarization (Lacina 2004) or ethnic fragmentation (Horowitz 1985; Doyle, Sambanis, 2006), severity of previous conflict, duration of conflict (Heldt 2001), number of previous mediation (Grieg, Diehl, 2005), severity of previous conflict, ripeness of the conflict (Zartman 2000), level of economic development (Doyle, Sambanis, 2006), level of democracy (non-linear relationship, where semi-democracies are most prone to civil war) (Wallenstein, Heldt, 2003), polity change, and natural resources (Lacina 2004).<sup>14</sup>


Introducing these variables into my models as controls will enable a more nuanced examination of not only what problems need to be addressed about the operations but also which settings contribute to their efficiency. Before entering an examination of the various conditions increasing or decreasing the likelihood of operation success, it is important to formulate the theory establishing my main independent variable: Strategy of integration. As I explain in the subsequent chapter, operating under a broader understanding of security – namely human security, peace operations have become multi-dimensional. However, it has been suggested that these peace operations have been rather unsuccessful due to lack of

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<sup>14</sup> This does not constitute an exhaustive list. A more nuanced discussion on control variables introduced into the quantitative and qualitative analyses follows in chapters three and four.

integration among their various components. As I explained above, while integration should contribute to the efficiency of operations, a strategy of integration is lacking. Investigating the existing literatures on human security, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building, I develop two ideal models of strategies for integration. The next chapter is a theoretical account of the expansion of our security understanding and the evolution of human security as a new approach to security. I explore the modifications it instigated in the design of peace operations and the policy prescriptions of various literatures regarding the strategy that peace operations should adopt.

**Figure II.1: Number and Types of Conflicts from 1946 to 2006 (stacked)**



Source: Gleditsch, Nils P., Peter Wallensteen, Mikale Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Havard Strand. 2002. "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (5):615-37. Version 4 - 2007.(Gleditsch et al. 2002)

## **CHAPTER III**

### **HUMAN SECURITY: STRATEGIES FOR INTEGRATED PEACE OPERATIONS**

This chapter goes over the evolution of human security, its conceptualization and the various theoretical debates surrounding its definition. It will be shown that the conceptual and theoretical debates surrounding the term human security and most importantly their policy implications are central in understanding the challenges the UN faces today. I briefly examine the United Nations' interpretation of human security and the changes that the peacekeeping department underwent since human security emerged as a new security paradigm. As explained in chapter two, influenced by the human security agenda, peace operations have become multi-dimensional, dealing with a variety of issues. While the UN has identified the lack of integration as the main shortcoming undermining peace operations' effectiveness, I argue that the type of integration sought is the more pertinent question.

#### **1. THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SECURITY**

The Human security approach was conceived to fill a significant gap present in the traditional conception of security. Traditionally, international relations has focused on the anarchic self-help state system, in which national security is imperative in order to protect state survival (Waltz 1979). Under this 'Westphalian System' (Krasner 1999), state security is the primary preoccupation

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and the security of citizens is seen as the responsibility and jurisdiction of the State itself. In fact, until the end of the Cold War, lack of political or civil rights, social injustice, extreme poverty, inequalities, hunger, and diseases were considered aspects of domestic jurisdiction (Newman 2001). More importantly, these concerns were not perceived or framed as security issues. While various IGOs, NGOs and United Nations' agencies were addressing issues related to human rights or poverty, the limited developmental and humanitarian support that could be provided was through official aid channels only. Essentially, the 'Westphalian state system' was designed to protect states from undesired interference to their sovereignty. However, as Newman argues "the citizens of states that are 'secure' according to the traditional concept of security can be perilously insecure to a degree that demands a reappraisal of the concept" (Newman 2001, 240). Indeed security, traditionally defined, does not necessarily correlate with human security. The welfare of citizens residing within the borders of a state is not necessarily guaranteed by its territorial integrity. It is interesting to note that while human security complements traditional security, it also contradicts it by infringing upon the Westphalian norms of absolute sovereignty of the state. As explained in subsequent sections, even though human security has a conceptual appeal, its application is complicated as it implies the loosening of the well-established norm of non-interference in States' domestic affairs.

Various attempts have been made to deal with the security gap present in the traditional understanding of security leading initially to the investigation of non-military sources of insecurity, such as economic, political or environmental. In the 1970s attention was given to the relationship between sustainable

development and security. Many scholars and practitioners discovered and researched the intimate relationship between underdevelopment – in forms of deprivation, inequity, instability, lack of hygiene, pollution and famine – and conflict (Murshed 2002; Stewart 2004; Collier, Hoeffler 2004; Collier 2007). Others have researched the relationship between political regime and conflict.

Democratic peace theorists have highlighted the importance of political development in the form of democratic institutions and norms<sup>1</sup>. They proposed that democratic institutions and norms not only build peaceful relations among nations (Ray 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999), but also advance peaceful relations at the domestic level (Krain and Myers 1997; Hegre et al. 2002). The importance of liberal economic policies and the interdependence created by the global economic activities have also been advanced as a factor promoting peace (Copeland 1996; Russett and Oneal 2001; Keohane and Nye 2001). In fact, this led both theorists and policymakers to promote the proliferation of democracy in the world as the surest way to achieve peace domestically and internationally (Diamond 1992b; Muravchik 1992). Others have criticized this approach stressing the reality that new democracies have demonstrated an inclination towards engagement in conflict (Smith 1996; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Moore 2008) and that domestically they have tended to be ‘illiberal’ (Zakaria 1997, 2004).

As Hampson (2002, 28) argues, “[t]hose calls for a redefinition of the meaning of security failed to come up with a new, shared definition of security.” Even though studies mentioned above broaden our understanding of security, they were applied as disconnected agenda promoted by different agencies. In fact,

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<sup>1</sup> See the structural and normative models proposed in (Russett 1993).

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“[d]uring the Cold War era, two parallel but separate sets of architecture were established to address socioeconomic development on the one hand, and peace and security on the other” (Tschirgi 2003, 1). Security and development were promoted in parallel, but disconnected, institutional and political structures (Krause and Jutersonke 2005). Arguably, the concept of human security emerging in the early 1990s, managed to connect the dual agendas of development (understood as political, social and economic) and security into one coherent approach. By reframing security concerns away from the state and instead around individuals, it is argued that human security, as a paradigm, allows for the identification of different sources of insecurity, including economic, environmental, health/food related and even political threats (the state itself). Some, however, have been more cautious or even pessimistic about the professed fortunes of the human security perspective.

In the following sections, I will examine the definitional debate surrounding the term and most importantly the policy implications of its various conceptualizations. Simply put, there are two main debates: narrow vs. broad and breadth vs. depth. I recognize that human security is an elusive and vague concept, yet I argue that the effort at narrowing its scope is a controversial endeavour, as it requires the normative prioritization of certain insecurities over others. While the policy implications of a narrower conception of human security have the advantage of being more focused and specific, it is important to note that it may fail to address pervasive insecurities. Also, as it will be explained below, the strength of human security is its ability to be all-encompassing. Therefore, I argue that restricting its scope may not be desirable. With this study, I aim to



contribute to the breadth vs. depth debate, by agreeing that a broad conception of human security can become more operationalizable if its breadth is compensated by its depth. That is, different dimensions of human security are considered insecurities only after they fall under a certain level of severity. Thus, I borrow Owen's definition, which is "the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive economic, environmental, health, food, political and personal threats" (Owen 2004b, 383).

## **2. CONCEPTUALIZING HUMAN SECURITY**

The optimism burgeoning out of the end of the Cold War gave human security the fertile ground it needed to flourish (Roberts 1996). As some middle powers, such as Canada, Japan and Norway, along with various NGOs, started to entertain the idea in the early 1990s, the UNDP took the lead and *the Human Development Report 1994* became the first significant effort to define human security and its dimensions. It called for a people-centered approach where 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' would be the universal concern. These two catchy phrases successfully captured the dual aims of security and development. The seven security dimensions identified in the Report reiterated the interdependence between these two goals: 1) economic security, 2) food security, 3) health security, 4) environmental security, 5) personal security, 6) community security and 7) political security (UNDP 1994). In this view, development and security reinforce each other in a virtuous cycle, while underdevelopment and insecurity produce a vicious cycle difficult to evade.

This initial definition sparked a heated debate about the shortcomings of a broad and elusive conceptualization of human security, the advantages of an operationalizable definition but also the pitfalls of narrowing too much the scope of the concept. In fact, there is still no agreed upon definition of human security<sup>2</sup>. From my interviews conducted with personnel of various UN agencies, it is evident that they differ in their understanding of the term. It is possible, however, to categorize the existing definitional discussion about human security in two debates: broad vs. narrow and breath vs. depth. The next section presents the different interpretations of human security from the broadest to the narrowest.

#### **2.1. BROAD VS. NARROW DEBATE:**

Along with the UNDP, Japan maintains the broadest definition of human security<sup>3</sup>, which “comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten human survival, daily life and dignity... and strengthens efforts to confront these threats” (Alkire 2002, 21). Similarly, the Commission on Human Security, an initiative launched by Japan, adopts the extensive form of the term: “protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It

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<sup>2</sup> The UNDP definition of human security has been re-discussed at the Copenhagen Social Summit in 1995 with no formal consensus reached. Although the conference declarations included a commitment to “promoting social integration by fostering societies that are stable, safe and just”, the proposed human security definition was perceived at the Summit as too broad, too idealistic, and as threatening traditional concepts of national security. The negotiations concentrated on striking a balance between national sovereignty and global action: the EU countries argued for increased leverage on national policies in the name of social development, while the G-77 countries held firmly to the importance of “territorial integrity and non-interference” which the universal and all-encompassing elements of human security appeared to undermine (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, IISD 1995) (Leaning and Arie 2000, p.8).

<sup>3</sup>See (JICA May 2008).

means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity" (Ogata and Sen 2003, 9). From this conceptualization of human security, the policies suggested and promoted by these actors are equally broad and eclectic, which I call multi-dimensional: the promotion of basic education, halting transnational organized crime, promoting environmental awareness, extending microcredit schemes, supporting conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction through economic development, social programs aimed at strengthening society etc... Japan also advocated for the establishment of a United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) to support a range of economic assistance measures.

Even though an investigation of these policy recommendations suggests that starting from developmental issues (mainly socio-economic) is the way to break into the virtuous cycle (Bajpai 2000), the UNDP Report or the Commission did not actually, as some suggest, sort out the relationship between development and security to create *one coherent human security* approach. As Suhrke argues, not only conceptually but especially in practice, the result was 'confusingly circular' (Suhrke 1999, 270), where security is seen essential for development, and development is needed to produce security. As some have pointed out, this broad and circular logic has led to the total paralysis of practitioners to prioritize. The question became: in terms of policy formulation, which dimensions of human security deserve priority, on what grounds and for what end result (Khong 2001, 233). In fact, the way one chooses to define human security has substantial

implications for the feasibility and efficiency of the policies or strategies designed by policy makers. As Alkire (2002, 23) points out, “[...] a more accurate way of interpreting the conceptual discussion might be to conclude that an adequate conception of human security must comprise not only a working definition of human security, but also an account of the *process* by which individual institutions or nations can adapt and operationalize the concept to a form that is relevant to their own institutional capabilities and cultural contexts.”

In an effort to make human security more operationalizable, some have attempted to narrow its scope by prioritizing certain dimensions of security over others<sup>4</sup>. For instance, King and Murray’s approach essentially excludes the aspect of violence and focuses on the issues associated with freedom from wants. They define human security as an individual’s “expectation of a life without experiencing the state of generalized poverty” (King and Murray 2001, 592). They proposed an index of human security that includes “only those domains of well-being that have been important enough for human beings to fight over or to put their lives or property at great risk” (King and Murray 2001, 593). These domains are identified as health, education, income, political freedom, and democracy. Similarly, Thomas’ conceptualization of human security emphasizes basic material needs, human dignity and democracy (Thomas 2001). While their focus on poverty and inequality as a source of conflict is valuable, they fail to address the freedom from fears aspects of human security (physical violence or conflict), which many argue is essential to reach freedom from wants.

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<sup>4</sup> For a lengthier discussions of efforts to narrow the term see; (Paris 2001)

Similarly, some have also criticized the UNDP, arguing that its emphasis was not incorrect, but that it ignored or undervalued the main threat to human security, violent conflict. Especially “in the mid-1990s, and in view of the egregious violations of basic human rights characteristic of much post-Cold War internal armed conflict, some concluded that the focus on development of the UNDP’s approach to security distracted attention from increasingly serious problems of basic protection of human being involved in war” (MacFarlane, Khong, 2006, 164). The Canadian approach to human security seems to address this criticism. A closer look at their definition reveals a different and narrower approach to human security:

*Human security and human development* can be understood as mutually reinforcing concepts [...] *Human security* provides an enabling environment for *human development* [...]. Conversely, [...] *human development* can also be an important strategy for furthering *human security*... For Canada, human security means freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives. [Emphasis added] (DFAIT 2000, 3).

From this passage, it is apparent that the Canadian approach sees *human security* and *human development* as two separate realms. This is in stark opposition with the UNDP or Japanese conceptualization of human security, where *human development* is a component of *human security*. In fact, Canada has chosen to advance its human security agenda by promoting safety for people by protecting them from threats of violence. They suggest that “if people lack confidence in society’s ability to protect them, they will have little incentive to invest in the future [...] Human security provides an enabling environment for human

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development” (DFAIT 1999, 7). Therefore, the Canadian’s narrowing of human security puts greater emphasis on direct violence at two levels, national/societal and international/global. “This approach [does] not ignore development questions but suggests that human security, conceived as safety from violence and abuse of rights was a prerequisite for human development” (MacFarlane, Khong, 2006).

Their policy priorities for advancing human security are:

1. *Protection of civilians*, concerned with building international will and strengthening norms and capacity to reduce the human costs of armed conflict.
2. *Peace support operations*, concerned with building UN capacities and addressing the demanding and increasingly complex requirements for deployment of skilled personnel, including Canadians, to these missions.
3. *Conflict prevention*, concerned with strengthening the capacity of the international community to prevent or resolve conflict, and building local indigenous capacity to manage conflict without violence.
4. *Governance and accountability*, concerned with fostering improved accountability of public and private sector institutions in terms of established norms of democracy and human rights.
5. *Public safety*, concerned with building international expertise, capacities and instruments to counter the growing threats posed by the rise of transnational organized crime. (DFAIT 2000, 3)

It is apparent, that in contrast to the definitions discussed earlier, the operationalization of the Canadian conceptualization of human security calls for a sequencing strategy, where physical security must be acquired first and constitutes a prerequisite to human development. The Canadian approach, in fact, seems to suggest a way to prevent the inherent paralysis of an all-encompassing approach

to human security. As elaborated below, the Canadian approach is not satisfactory for many, and the operationalization of human security remains a highly contentious issue, especially in post-conflict situations. While the broad vs. narrow debate continues and various suggestions are made about what to prioritize on the ground, others have attempted to reconcile the two camps by limiting the depth of the all-encompassing understanding of human security without narrowing its breadth. The following section expands on these rather innovative solutions.

## **2.2. DEPTH VS. BREADTH DEBATE:**

In an attempt to compensate for the breadth of human security, some have suggested to reduce its depth. That is, they have recognized that the seven dimensions proposed by the UNDP constitute a conceptual grouping of possible sources of threat to human security. However, they emphasized that these dimensions are not threats themselves, but only sources of threats (Suhrke 1999; Leaning and Arie 2000; Owen 2003, 2004b). Consequently, they argue that no dimension should and can be normatively prioritized over another. A threshold-based approach is proposed, where different dimensions of security become threats or insecurities only after they fell under a certain level of severity.

Suhrke, for instance, argues that all the dimensions of human security are equally important and relevant, especially for the identification of the insecurity inflicted in human life. However, she sees the core of human insecurity as extreme vulnerability (Suhrke 1999). Therefore, she argues that a policy inspired by human security concerns would be to protect those who are most vulnerable.

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She emphasizes three categories of extremely vulnerable persons: victims of war and internal conflict, those who live close to the subsistence level and victims of natural disasters. While it is an interesting attempt at narrowing the depth of human security, I would argue that policies suggested by Suhrke are no longer designed to attain human security but to only deal with extreme or immediate vulnerabilities.

Another attempt to limit the depth of the human security is that of Owen. While his approach is similar to Suhrke, his definition sets a higher threshold that is sensitive to regional variations. His efforts to measure and capture human security seems more nuanced than other works (Leaning and Arie 2000). Instead of being pre-chosen, Owen argues that threats should be included according to their actual severity. He clarifies: “the list of all possible threats to human security in the world is vast, the list of *relevant* harms for a particular region or country, however, is considerably more refined. Using regional relevance as the criteria for threat selection means that no serious harm will be excluded, staying true to the broad conception of human security, but also improves the chances of acquiring relevant data” (Owen 2004a, 21).

I agree that the problems associated with the operationalization of human security can be better remedied by reducing its depth rather than narrowing its scope. The normative narrowing down of human security by disregarding some of its dimensions is problematic and controversial. Therefore, in this study, I will attempt to follow Owen’s definition of human security and proposition of establishing a threshold. Although he suggested some ways for measurement, to my knowledge, he did not compile a human security dataset. In chapter three



(methodology), I elaborate on the data collection process and the measurement of thresholds I develop following Owen's suggestions. In the following section, I investigate how the UN and its various offices defined human security and incorporated into their agenda.

### **3. THE UNITED NATIONS' APPROACH TO HUMAN SECURITY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS**

#### **3.1. CHANGES WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS:**

The attempts to incorporate human security denote a significant transformation for the UN's conceptualization of security. Although Article 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 "indicate that peace is more than the absence of war", the UN Charter's conception of international security was based, until the 1990s, on a state-centered view of negative peace. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the UN has moved beyond this narrow understanding of security (Brauch 2005). This implicit in the many UN Agendas for the reform published throughout the 1990s and beyond. In fact, *Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali 1992) was followed by *An Agenda for Development* (Boutros-Ghali 1994) and *An Agenda for Democratization* (Boutros-Ghali 1996), which highlights the desire to deal with the underlying structural dynamics giving rise to conflict.

The first direct initiative address human insecurity was the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), launched by the government of Japan and the United Nations Secretariat in March 1999. The Fund, still highly active, promotes integration, that is, only multi-sectoral projects – coordinated by two or more UN agency or NGOs- are eligible for financing. It could be argued,

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however, that the establishment of the Fund was rather premature. With the lack of a clear conceptual framework, the majority of funding was only directed towards developmental concerns such as health, education, agriculture, and small scale infrastructure development and not towards security.

In January 2001, in response to Secretary-General Kofi Annan's call at the 2000 Millennium Summit for a world 'free from want' and 'free from fear', the Commission on Human Security (CHS) was established to bring some clarity to the notion of human security. The Commission consisted of twelve prominent international figures, including Mrs. Sadako Ogata (former UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and Professor Amartya Sen (1998 Nobel Economics Prize Laureate). On May 2003, the Co-Chairs presented the Commission's final report, *Human Security Now* (Ogata and Sen 2003). As explained above, the definition of human security developed by the Commission is carrying the characteristic of a broad approach, where human security is an all-encompassing concept. To carry forward the recommendations of the Commission, the Advisory Board on Human Security (ABHS) was established on May 31<sup>st</sup> 2003. Efforts to advance human security did not halt with the ABHS. The Human Security Unit (HSU) was established in September 2004 under the United Nations Secretariat at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The HSU's objective is to incorporate human security into the policies implemented by the UN.

This transformation has not been without controversies and frictions among UN member states. As explained before, human security is an individual-centered understanding of security, it necessarily clashes with the basic premises

of the Westphalian state order, upon which the current international system has been established. To repeat, the human security agenda inevitably infringes upon the state's sovereign right to rule its citizens the way it pleases: i.e. without external interference. Consequently, it is not a surprise that the full incorporation of human security into the UN system is threatening to many member states. Thus, the discussions surrounding the definition and policy implications of human security have, so far, been slow and tentative and there is no agreed upon, consensus based legal definition of human security. The only official reference to human security is in the World Summit Outcome document of 2005, paragraph 143:

We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly (United Nations 2005).

While this represents a small step, the commitment to discuss human security has been maintained. On May 22<sup>nd</sup> 2008, the General Assembly (GA) convened for a one-day Informal Thematic Debate on Human Security. While the debate did not amount to anything more than a discussion, member states recognized the value of human security and reiterated their commitment to discuss and define the term.

In practice, however, the ABSH and the HSU in particular, are in need of a working definition, as they aim to promote the incorporation of human security into the UN structure. In my interview, Kazuo Tase, Chief of the HSU<sup>5</sup> explains

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<sup>5</sup> Personal interview I conducted with Kazuo Tase on June 17<sup>th</sup>, 2008.

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that they follow the CHS's definition, as it has been approved by Secretary-General Kofi Annan. However, he acknowledges that this is a working definition and not a legal one agreed upon by member states. He also adds that his unit is open to any discussion among member states and that they keep a close relationship with member states that are interested in the notion and its realization. According to Kazuo Tase, promoting human security requires the integration of UN activities. He explains that the institutional set up of the international community has been supply-sided, where each agency, funded to advance different mandates, were in operation regardless of the specific needs of the people on the ground. The HSU calls for a demand-side approach, where the needs on the ground should take precedence over other considerations. Joined programming and integration of various UN agencies, he explains, would facilitate the demand-driven identification of the problems on the ground and the adequate deliverance of services.

#### **3.2. CHANGES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:**

The definition and policy debate surrounding the concept of human security is central to the question of intervention and especially of peace operations. A broader understanding of security can in fact legitimize a wider range of interventions. We can observe that human security considerations have also slowly seeped into the DPKO agenda. As explained in chapter one, human security was introduced as early as 1992, with Boutros Boutros-Ghali presenting his *Agenda for Peace*. Faced with an increasing number of civil conflicts and

failed states, this broader understanding of security expanded the scope and responsibilities of UN peace operations.

From my interviews conducted at the United Nations in New York, it is however clear that human security is not extensively used in the daily operation of the DPKO. While they recognize that the larger vision may be guided by human security, both the SC's mandates and the personnel at the headquarters or on the ground do not refer to the notion. While it is predictable as conflict situation are more precarious, the lack of an agreed-upon definition also contribute to its absence in practice. However, it is interesting to note that the recommendations of the Peacekeeping Best Practice Section (PBPS) are in line with the one advanced by the Commission on Human Security.

As explained above, the newer operations have not performed as well. The major problem identified by the UN has been the lack of integration. The idea of creating '*one UN*' has evolved in an effort to remedy the lack of coordination among the different branches dealing with different aspects of a conflict. While integration is essential to avoid redundancies and inefficiencies, I argue that the more pertinent question is what type of integration? The theoretical debate on human security poses an important question that speaks directly to the problems facing the UN. What is the policy application of a human security approach? For peace operations, the first step is clearly to become multidimensional. Integration, of course, is imperative but what kind of integration is the question that is left unanswered.

#### **4. SECURITY - DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: STRATEGIES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS:**

As mentioned above, the human security agenda has been promoted by many as the way to integrate development and security into one coherent approach. While it is undeniable that human security has advanced the debate on the scope of security, we need to recognize that it is a new term coined for an old debate, which is far from being resolved. As an International Peace Academy conference report written in 2004 states: “the growth of research in this area [development-security nexus] is not so much elucidating the issues as illustrating how little is actually understood of the link between security and development. The effect of an international intervention upon a host country at any stage of the conflict cycle still remains to be fully investigated. One panelist even argued that a positive correlation between development assistance and peace had yet to be proven” (Hurwitz and Peake 2004, 3). The policy recommendations proposed by various actors, whether they refer specifically to human security as an approach or not, reflect a strong disagreement about the relationship between development and security. After surveying and analyzing twenty-four governmental and intergovernmental bodies that are currently active in peacebuilding, Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell, and Sitea (2007) also conclude that the proposed approaches differed extensively. “Some programs focus on the production of stability and security in the early days of a peace agreement’s implementation, while others focus on building vibrant civil societies and furthering development, democracy, justice, and the rule of law” (Barnett et al., 2007, 36).

Below, I present two ideal models for peace operations. The ‘security-first’ model prioritizes security-related issues over developmental one. This model lead to two variant strategies for peace operations: *security-only* and *sequential* strategies. The ‘Simultaneous’ model demands for both security and development-related issues to be dealt simultaneously, yielding to a *simultaneous* strategy. It is important to note that the simultaneous strategy should not be equated with often used term ‘multi-dimensional operation’. In fact, the existing literature often differentiates between traditional versus multi-dimensional operations, but the distinction sought here is different. That is, while traditional peacekeeping is in fact employing a security-only strategy, multi-dimensional peace operations can either follow a sequential or simultaneous strategy, depending on how they execute the various tasks they assume.

By juxtaposing these two models, I aim at demonstrating the extent to which the arguments and empirical evidences put forward by each camp are in direct opposition with each other. The fact that both models emerging from this policy debate are deductively and inductively sound represents a fundamental lack of consensus regarding the design of peace operations. With numerous studies advocating contradictory results, there is so far no clear understanding of which strategy is more efficient in delivering peace. It is important to note that a consensus seems to exist within the various UN agencies that a simultaneous approach should be followed<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> I interviewed personnel from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Department (UNDPKO), United Nations Peacekeeping Practices Section (PBPS), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) – Human Security

#### 4.1. SECURITY-FIRST MODEL<sup>7</sup>:

Though the proponents of the security-first approach may agree that human security is the desirable end result, and that the fulfillment of both freedom from fears and wants is ultimately necessary, they prioritize the freedom from fears part of the definition, arguing that freedom from wants is more easily achieved once order is established. The Canadian understanding of human security discussed above falls under this ideal type. While there are variations in their policy recommendations, “adequately controlling physical violence and maintaining order, along with humanitarian activities take priority over qualitative social development such as economic and social progress” (Jeong 2005, 26). While some advocate for short peace operations, effective in providing physical security and order, others see the establishment of law and order as a long-term endeavor. However, all agree to security as a prerequisite to other developmental activities. Dobbins, for instance, gives a hierarchical order to the tasks typically assumed by operations: starting with security and continuing with humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization and development. He argues that “ while they need not be initiated sequentially and there is not a formula for the relative weight each task should be given in a particular operation, unless higher priorities such as security are adequately resourced, sustainable progress on those failing lower on the scale is likely to be elusive” (Dobbins 2008,

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Unit (HSU), United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and International Peace Institute (IPI).

<sup>7</sup> I borrow the term from: (Etzioni 2007) Also referred as the *Realist Approach* by Etzioni or *Exclusivists* by David in (David 2002).



68). Below, I attempt to collect the existing arguments and empirical evidences supporting the security-first approach under some overarching categories. It is interesting to note that there are two variations within this approach. Some suggest that peace operations should assume only security-related tasks and leave development-related tasks for other agencies and NGOs (*security-only* strategy). Others argue for the peace operations to assume both security and development related tasks, but in a sequential manner, where security comes first (*sequential* strategy).

#### ***4.1.1. FEASIBILITY / DESIRABILITY:***

It is argued that certain developmental efforts cannot be carried out in an environment of violence and disarray. Not only it is dangerous for officers on the ground, but positive results are also likely to be spoiled by belligerents. According to this view, human security dimensions other than physical violence can be addressed later and by other actors. They argue that social development is more likely to succeed once order is established (David 2002). Saul, more radically argues, that human security dilutes the energy of the SC, which was established with the limited mandate of addressing the most serious threats to world peace and security. He also adds that “contemporary research suggests that reducing violent conflict is the first and most important step in ensuring economic growth in poor countries. Under the Charter, peace and security were regarded as higher values than international justice or human rights, which cannot exist without security” (Saul 2006, 31). In line with this view, DFAIT suggests as a policy recommendation that “in situations of acute hostility and conflict, the promotion

of a certain type of governance favoring the advancement of human security may be premature, especially if the sources of direct personal threats are not eradicated” (DFAIT 2000). These views indicate that the early implementation of development-related activities is not only unfeasible, but also undesirable.

#### ***4.1.2. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES:***

Others have pointed out that even if the efforts at addressing freedom from wants can be carried out simultaneously with the containment of violence, the tasks focusing on providing development and the ones geared towards security often undermine each other, creating negative externalities. Berdal (1993, 11) explains that “[o]perations in Somalia, Angola, Bosnia and Cambodia have shown that juxtaposing military and civilian operations, although interrelated and mutually supportive, results in major command, control and coordination problems for which neither contingency planning nor doctrinal guidance presently exists.” One of the frequently cited lesson from the field is that the organization of elections reduces the willingness to disarm among minority factions (Paris 1997). Moore (2008, 2) explains “because democracy fosters political competition, the factions that have engaged in civil conflict can easily shatter the democratization process if they feel the progression is not working in their favor.” Similarly Sisk has highlighted the presence of this serious dilemma: “pursuit of democracy can undermine efforts to secure peace, and efforts to secure peace can undermine the meaning and quality of democracy. Thus, in practice, the promotion of democracy and the pursuit of peace can work at cross purposes” (Sisk 2008, 239).

In their recent analysis, Flores and Nooruddin (forthcoming) found that “post-conflict democratization retards recovery, reinforcing a growing pessimism among political scientists regarding the challenges new democracies face after civil conflicts.” In her analysis of Mozambican experience, Willet (1995) successfully highlights the contradictions in the efforts of the UN to establish peace and democracy and the macro-economic policies inspired by the Breton Woods system. Uvin (2002) also points out that in some cases, the most sincere development assistance may have had the effect of exacerbating conflict or grievance, rather than reducing it. For example, he found that “too much aid at once may, for instance, have detrimental results such as rampant corruption and wage inflation” (Uvin 2002, 11). In view of the contradictory effects of the simultaneous efforts to increase development and security, a sequencing approach to peacebuilding, where security comes first is proposed (Etzioni 2007).

Some have feared that advancing security first is likely to provide impetus for civil liberties and individual freedoms to be undermined (IPA 2002; Pugh 2004; Paul 2005). They warned about the dangers of enabling nations to become police states and authoritarian. In fact, prioritizing order and security can stifle organic civil movements that would contribute to the opening of the social, political and economic system. Etzioni, a strong advocate of the security-first approach, acknowledges these dangers but responds “one should not overlook the primacy of the right to security. Not to be killed, maimed, or tortured is the most basic of human rights. Significantly, life *precedes* both liberty and the pursuit of happiness in the Declaration of Independence’s lineup of the purposes for which government is instituted” (Etzioni 2007, 5). This resonates with the well-known

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debate on the relationship between order and liberty/justice. As Huntington argues “the primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order” (Huntington 1968, 7-8). Similarly Bull wrote “... not only is order in world politics valuable, there is also a sense in which it is prior to other goals, such as that of justice” (Bull 1977, 97).

#### ***4.1.3. RESOURCES:***

Another argument for narrowing the responsibility of peace operations is limited resources. It is argued that peacebuilding can move forward through the concentration of resources on a few sectors rather than thinly spreading the resources across a vast array of activities, which decreases the likelihood of getting satisfactory results. In fact, some have suggested that reconstruction is the least problematic task in many respects. People often welcome efforts to assist the restoration of social services. According to Kumar (1997, 15) “the international community seems to have been more effective in social rehabilitation than political reconstruction partly because of its relatively long involvement in social sectors [...] NGOs in particular, have played a critical role in rebuilding these [health, education] sectors”. Dobbins points out that the mismatch between the rising mission requirements and the declining commitment of funds and military personnel is often the reason for the failure of peacebuilding operations. He argues that ideally, with infinite manpower and money, all desired activities could be launched simultaneously, however, practically, choices must be made between competing priorities (Dobbins 2006, 32-36). Taking the lack of resources and

commitment by the member states into account, many agree that UN peace operations would be more efficient if they devoted their resources to bring law and order first. Developmental issues can be addressed later or by different actors and agencies. In fact, in his statistical analysis of 17 peace operations, Zuercher (2006, 20) found that “intrusive and non-intrusive<sup>8</sup> missions are both not very successful at facilitating absolute progress in aspects of state-hood other than security”.

#### ***4.1.4. CREDIBILITY AND FALSE HOPE:***

Related to the previous point, it has been argued that minimizing the responsibility of the missions to providing security would avoid making promises that cannot be met, which in turn, would avoid the loss of credibility of international organizations and community in general. Etzioni argues that the belief that it is possible to reengineer the regimes of other nations is at best naïve and idealistic and at worst flawed. He calls for a more realist approach to the international reality, which, in his words, “avoids squandering many thousands of lives and scarce resources in the pursuit of elusive or illusionary goals; it avoids delays in coping with conflicts that result from pursuing such goals; it avoids making promises that cannot be met, thus avoiding the loss of credibility abroad and at home. [...] and it avoids the hubris implicit in attempting to deliver more

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<sup>8</sup> Zuercher constructed a composite index from 1 to 10, by answering five questions: Did interveners enforce peace with military power; did interveners decisively shape the new constitution and / or the legal codex; did interveners assume (formally or informally) some or most of executive power, for at least 2 years; did interveners assume, (formally or informally), some or most legislative power for at least 2 years; did interveners decisively shape economic policies during the first two years; did interveners participate in executive policing. The answers were weighted, the first three, compared to the last two, had double weight. We coded an intervention as highly intrusive when the score reached 6 or higher (Zuercher 2006, 8).

than one is capable of delivering, however sincere the effort may be” (Etzioni 2007, 4).

***H-1. Security-Only:*** *If peace operations intervene to only provide physical security and establish order, they will be more likely to establish peace than if they intervene to establish security and deal with various development issues simultaneously.*

***H-2. Sequential:*** *If peace operations intervene to provide physical security and establish order first, to then assume development-related tasks, they will be more likely to establish peace than if they intervene to establish security and deal with various development issues simultaneously.*

#### **4.2. THE SIMULTANEOUS MODEL:**

Advocates of the simultaneous approach emphasize the relationship between underdevelopment and conflict. They argue that without developing/rebuilding the social, economic and political infrastructure, preventing the relapse to violence after the withdrawal of troops is impossible (Bush 1995; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006). In this view, the military and civilian (security/development) components of a mission should be on the ground working on all types of insecurity simultaneously (Tschirgi 2003; Jeong 2005). In fact, the advocates of this approach are also called “the inclusivists” (David 2002). This is in stark contrast with the view that efforts should be concentrated in one sector (i.e. security) and that tasks should be conducted in a sequential manner. They also advocate for longer and stronger missions where the “minimum requirements are (1) the capacity to address the injunction to protect civilians from violent conflict (the negative peace dimension) and (2) the capacity to address the human

security agenda (the positive peace dimension)” (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham 2005, 140). Below, I attempt to show the stark contradictions with the security-first approach by regrouping the arguments made for the simultaneous approach under the same headings used above.

#### ***4.2.1. FEASIBILITY/DESIRABILITY:***

In opposition with the argumentation developed by the security-first advocates, it is contested that it is not possible to genuinely resolve the root causes of the conflict without providing some economic, social and political infrastructures. In order to attain sustainable peace and prevent relapse to conflict, democratization, decentralization and the growth of economic opportunities are seen as important aspects that need to be addressed rather quickly (Bigombe et al. 2000). More importantly, they argue that it is not desirable for the UN or any other actors to ignore humanitarian emergencies or social and economic needs, especially if a mission is already on the ground. In fact, as some remind us, it has been a long time that the military element is no longer operating in isolation but alongside various civil organizations, NGOs and UN agencies, which often arrive before the military missions (Mackinlay and Kent 1997). Therefore, they would advocate for an integrated approach which will deal with different dimensions of human security simultaneously, this, they argue will contribute to the sustainability of peace.

#### ***4.2.2. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES:***

Advocates of the simultaneous approach also warn for the possibility of contradictory effects or negative externalities. However, in opposition to the

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security-first approach, they urge that positive results obtained in the realm of security are likely to be spoiled if social, economic and political opportunities are not created simultaneously. Jeong (2005) advocates for diffusion, explaining that peacebuilding is a complex endeavor consisting of many domains and requiring a coherent approach that can bring together multiple activities -such as security, development, social rehabilitation, political reform- in a complementary manner. He explains that “when development projects are delayed because priority is given to security sector reform, long-term security conditions may actually be jeopardized. High unemployment rate for example may produce increased violence. Prioritizing one sector over the other may not be beneficial within an organic process of peacebuilding” (Jeong 2005, 26).

The potential negative externalities pointed out by the security-first advocates are also recognized, but they are perceived as the results of a lack of integration among various peacebuilding efforts. Mackinlay and Kent argue that the response elements dealing with various aspects of complex emergencies have been (and are still to a lesser extent) working in conceptual and physical isolation. While “peacekeepers maintain order and constrain conflict; development organizations seek to integrate long-term economic and production strategies with social targets; humanitarian organizations promote survival for emergency-affected peoples and traumatized societies and governance; and human rights organizations struggle to reconcile reality with the International Charter of Human Rights” (Mackinlay and Kent 1997, 44). If these activities were integrated into one coherent approach, the various tasks undertaken would not undermine but complement each other. The statistical results presented by Doyle and Sambanis (2006) support this argument.



They found that complex, multidimensional operations<sup>9</sup> tend to be more effective than traditional peacekeeping and monitoring missions. They also emphasize the importance of social, economic and political activities alongside with security-oriented tasks.

#### ***4.2.3. CREDIBILITY/HOPES:***

Promoters of a simultaneous approach have explained that waiting for the establishment of security in the country or region in conflict, often lead to a loss of credibility in the international community's ability to address severe human suffering not related to physical violence, such as lack of food or medicine. Therefore, they advocate that if access channels to population in need of humanitarian services are available, they should be used immediately. Moreover, they urge for the importance of hope for the local population. Having access to some basic services, or witnessing the burgeoning of some participation to politics may encourage the locals to partake in the halt of violence and more importantly giving them a stake to maintain the stability that has recently been established.

In this study, I not only aim at understanding the success rate of sequential versus simultaneous missions, but I also attempt to untangle the relationship

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<sup>9</sup> According to Doyle and Sambanis (2006, 15), "multidimensional peacekeeping is aimed at capacities expansion (e.g., economic reconstruction) and institutional transformation (e.g., reform of the police, army, and judicial system, elections, civil society rebuilding). In these operations, the UN is typically involved in implementing peace agreements that go to the roots of the conflict, helping to build long-term foundations for stable, legitimate government."

between development and security. To do so, I statistically test the validity of two opposing hypotheses derived from the models presented above:

***H-3a. Simultaneous<sub>a</sub>*** *If peace operations provide security while dealing with various aspects of development simultaneously, they will be more likely to establish peace than if they would only deal with security.*

***H-3b. Simultaneous<sub>b</sub>*** *If peace operations provide security while dealing with various aspects of development simultaneously, they will be more likely to establish peace than if they would first deal with security then assume development-related tasks.*

## **5. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING OR HAMPERING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE**

While models have the advantage of being parsimonious and simple; the reality is much more complex. Evidently, the establishment of peace cannot be attributed to the presence and effectiveness of a peace operation alone. Besides, as Fortna (2003, 2004a) points out, one needs to be aware of the possibility of selection bias; are peace operations deployed to relatively easy cases or alternatively to cases where they are the most needed? The literature on conflict resolution has identified many variables facilitating peace and others inhibiting it. Introducing these variables into the model will control for the ‘degree of difficulty’ of the various cases (Fortna 2003). In order to develop a full model, it is important to account for the independent effects of these factors on the establishment of peace. While the variables will be introduced as control in the statistical testing the hypotheses, they will also be used in structured, focused comparison (George 1979) of the cases presented in Chapters six, seven and eight.

### **5.1. LEVEL OF DEMOCRATIZATION:**

Bringing a conflict to an end and ensuring that the antagonistic parties will not resort to violence again is not a self-explanatory task. Recognizing that, a group of scholars focusing on intergroup security dilemmas have maintained that partition of warring groups can effectively end the conflict and decrease the possibility of future fighting. This is particularly true for cases where the groups are territorially, ethnically and/or linguistically well-defined (Christie 1992; Byman 1997; Kaufmann 1998). They maintain that the partition solution has not been given enough attention due to the international community's mistaken bias against it. Christie (1992) explains that the aversion against separation is indicative that the powerful nationalist movements of the twentieth century are still very influential. He also urges that the ideology-driven Second World War/Cold War eras' separations (Germany, Korea, and Vietnam) are different from the post-colonial partitions based on ethnic/identity differences. The failures of the former have contributed to a false belief that partition do not lead to stable and secure outcome. Contrary to this argument, Walter found that partition results into additional wars. She argues that partition encourages 'copy-cat' movements; concession over territory encourages other groups to initiate their own demands (Walter 2004).

More appealing to the international community has been to end violence and assist conflict-ridden societies by encouraging them to transition towards democracy. This is particularly true for post-Cold War peacebuilding efforts. Originating from the vast literature that democracies are less prone to violence

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and less hostile domestically and internationally (Benoit 1996; Chan 1997; Rummel 1997; Russett and Oneal 2001), the logic for democratization has been that peace is more likely if warring parties are provided with an institutionalized set of rules under which they can advance their claims through non-violent mechanisms such as electoral or parliamentary processes. However, some have argued that the process of democratization is actually very prone to violence. While it is well established that fully institutionalized democracies are less likely to experience civil conflicts (which also holds true for highly authoritarian states), some scholars have found that the relationship between democracy and civil violence is an inverted U-shaped curve (DeNardo 1985; Muller and Weede 1990; Ellingsen and Gleditsch 1997; Hegre et al. 2001). They argue that semi-democracies are in fact prone to violence, the increase in competition and uncertainty often results in heightened sense of insecurity which can refuel the conflict (Paris 1997; Zakaria 1997; Paris 2004; Jarstad and Sisk 2008).

#### **5.2. LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:**

There is a clear correlation between underdevelopment and conflict. Many studies have shown that economic underdevelopment has led to violent conflict and especially to its reoccurrence (Collier 2007, Doyle and Sambanis 2006). From rational choice approach, conflict occurs when the costs of fighting is lower than the status quo. Therefore, it is expected that higher economic standards will increase the cost of participating into conflict, while lack of economic opportunity and mobility coupled with low income will do the opposite (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Focusing on conflict reoccurrence, Walter argues that economic factors are

also important. She maintains that “civilians are not going to transform themselves from shopkeepers back into soldiers unless the conditions that exist *at any given point in time* encourage this transformation” (Walter 2004, 374). She argues that enlistment becomes more attractive when the status quo is perceived to be worse than the possibility of death, which she calls misery. She found that higher standards of well-being, however measured, reduce the odds of additional civil wars.

### **5.3. OUTCOME OF CONFLICT:**

The durability of peace and the prevention of conflict reoccurrence are certainly affected by the way in which the conflict came to an end. Particularly for civil conflicts, many studies show that short of a decisive military victory, conflict is likely to recur as warring parties are likely to fear that the other side will not live up to the agreement (Licklider 1995; Walter 1997; Dubey 2002; Fortna 2003; Ali and Matthews 2004). Negotiated settlements followed by a peace treaty have also been found to contribute to the sustainability of peace, as the signing of a treaty indicates the existence of some political solution and to some willingness on both parties to compromise (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004b; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). While Doyle and Sambanis (2006) found no significant relationship between military victory and sustainability of peace, their finding indicates that negotiated settlements double the chance of success. Toft (2006), however, shows that negotiated settlements constitute only a small portion of civil war outcome (approximately 20%), and she presents contradictory results indicating that negotiated settlements are three times more likely to re-ignite than

the wars ended by military victory. She acknowledges however that Doyle and Sambanis findings support a different question which deals with the quality of peace rather than its absence and durability (Toft 2006, 12). Since in this study, the quality of peace is not accounted for in the statistical analysis, it is expected that military victory contributes to the establishment and durability of peace.

#### **5.4. ETHNICITY:**

The relationship between ethnicity and civil conflict (or violence in general) is a highly contested issue. Some scholars argue that ethnicity complicates the resolution of a conflict (Kaufman 1996; Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Some propose that diversity breeds conflict, thus maintaining that the more heterogeneous a country, the more likely it is to experience conflict (Gellner 1991; Nairn 1993). Economists often fall in this camp since they are interested in ethnicity as a variable affecting the ease of organization of rebellion. For instance, Sambanis (2001) proposes that ethnicity decreases the costs associated with mobilizing and recruiting a rebel force, thus concluding that ethnically divided societies are more likely to experience civil war. Conversely, an influential body of work suggests that ethnicity (identity and ideology, for that matter) cannot explain the occurrence or relapse to conflict. Ethnic identities, in this view, are too common to explain the rare event of civil conflict. Instead, poverty, relative deprivation (Gurr 1970) and structural inequality are important. This view is also known as 'greed and grievances'. Scholars giving more weight to greed rather than grievances have focused on material and organizational incentives rendering a rebellion against the government possible (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and

Hoeffler 2004). Various measures to account for the relevance of ethnicity have been used in the literature (Gurr 1993; Fearon, Laitin 2003; Cederman, Min, Wimmer 2009) several ethnicity indicators will also be introduced and tested in the models presented in Chapter five.

### **5.5. INTENSITY OF THE CONFLICT:**

In the relevant literature, the intensity of the conflict is often captured with two proxies, a count of battle-related deaths and displacement. The literature on intensity of conflict is divided in two camps. Some argue that full-scale war eventually leads to exhaustion and/or to a victor, which effectively ends the conflict. They maintain that during low intensity conflicts, the ability and willingness to continue fighting increases, which in turn decreases the prospect for resolution (Luttwak 1999; Senese and Quackenbush 2003; Rajan 2005). Others have argued that wars (especially longer ones) create more casualties, which in turn increases hostility and grievances, rendering the establishment of peace more difficult (Bigombe et al. 2000; Dubey 2002; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Barutciski and De Rouen (2007) have found that displacement alone renders the establishment of peace difficult.

### **5.6. DURATION OF CONFLICT:**

The effect of duration of war on the probability of peace is somehow related to the intensity of conflict. It is possible to postulate that longer wars increases hostility and grievances, which decreases the likelihood of peace. In opposition, it is also possible to claim that longer wars induce war fatigue and exhaustion facilitating the decision to move towards peace. As illusions of quick

### Chapter III

offensive and victory have already vanished in longer war, parties are more realistic about the probability of military victory or the parties' relative resolve. In fact, Doyle and Sambanis (2006, 99) do not control for duration in their 2006 study, arguing that deaths and displacement (intensity) and war duration should be consequences of one another. They found that the former is a better measure for their theory, and the latter is significance is rather fragile. Dubey (2002) also found no significant relationship. Collier et al. (2004), however, present some interesting results regarding the duration of war. They show that while civil wars are very likely to end during their first year, if they pass the one year duration, the probability of achieving peace decreases radically for subsequent years. Fortna (2004) and Hartzell et al. (2001) found that the longer the war the longer the peace.

#### **5.7. RIPENESS FOR SETTLEMENT:**

The notion that the timing of the intervention (or of attempts to resolve the conflict in general), has been a highly debated issue in the study of conflict mediation and resolution. Zartman, who is the pioneer for this concept, argues that "the concept of a ripe moment centers on the parties' perception of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), optimally associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe [...] the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them"(Zartman 2001, 8). Parties, therefore, perceive a negotiated settlement as the only way to de-escalate the conflict. Other scholars have attempted to improve Zartman's work by identifying a whole range of conditions to better determine



when a conflict is ripe for resolution. Haass defines ripeness with the presence of four prerequisites: desirability of a compromise; acceptable accords to all parties involved; leaders should be able to persuade their constituencies with the accepted compromise; and agreed-upon procedure to deal with their conflict (Haass 1990). Stedman attempted to refine Zartman's conceptualization by adding the complexity of a polycentric view of the actors involved (Stedman 1991). Others have added to the list of requirements but pointing the importance of an enticing opportunity, the existence of a peaceful solution to end the conflict, change of leadership or acceptable negotiation procedures (Mitchell 1995; Pruitt 1997; Lieberfeld 1999). Many variant of this theory proliferated. For instance, Stover developed the concept of societal ripeness, arguing that ripeness for leaders is not the same as ripeness for societies (Stover 2002, 511). Recently, Pruitt has presented his revised theory, which he calls 'readiness theory'. He suggests that readiness is dependent on both motivation to end the conflict and optimism about the success of negotiation (Pruitt 2005).

Despite the number of studies focusing on the subject of ripeness for conflict resolution, the concept continues to be associated with several conceptual and methodological problems. Its most obvious weaknesses are the numerous prerequisites that can be inductively generated and hence the risk of tautology. Moreover, identifying the mutually hurting stalemate becomes even more challenging for cases of internal conflict. Identifying quantitative proxies for the ripe moment is a real challenge; the possible effect of ripeness will be investigated through case studies and not in the quantitative analysis.

### **5.8. NATURAL RESOURCES:**

Little is known about the processes linking natural resources (oil, gemstones, drugs or agricultural food) to conflict (Ross 2004; Humphreys 2005). In addition, imprecise measures and missing data do not facilitate the causality problem facing this literature. It is difficult to discern whether wealth from natural resources fosters conflict by funding rebels, makes separatism more financially attractive, weakens the states, or makes it a more attractive target for rebels (see more: Ross 2004). For instance, Fearon (2005) argues that the causality shown between higher percentage of national income from commodity exports and civil war in Collier and Hoeffler's results deserve more scrutiny. With some alterations to the same data, he first shows that the variance is actually mainly caused by countries producing oil. Second, he argues that "[...] an empirically more plausible and internally consistent explanation is that oil exporters are more prone to civil war because they tend to have weaker state institutions than other countries with the same per capita income" (Fearon 2005, 487). The findings regarding the effect of various natural resources are also not robust. While many studies statistically show that oil and/or diamond is related to the onset or duration of conflict, others found no significant result. For instance, Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005) find a strong relationship between diamonds and the onset of civil war, Regan and Norton's (2005) results show the existence of these resources is associated with a decrease in civil wars (for more see; Ross 2006). The dataset used in this study contains only one variable pertinent to this discussion, oil production.

**5.9. MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN OR FORESTS:**

Some scholars have urged that the geography of conflict is worth investigating; suggesting that it can constrain or facilitate the ability to rebel and flight (Buhaug and Gates 2002). Both mountainous areas and forests can provide safe heavens for rebels. While mountains can be used as a refuge to mobilize and hide weapons, forests protect against aerial detection and attack. They also facilitate the movement of arms. Once again, there are contradictory findings about the effects of terrain related variables. Buhaug and Gates (2002) found that both mountains and forest do not have a significant effect on the scope of the conflict. Similarly, Collier & Hoeffler (2004, 587-88) found no evidence that forests or mountainous terrain advantages rebels, disagreeing with Fearon & Laitin's findings (2003, 85) that mountainous terrain is significantly related to higher rates of civil wars.

The following chapter will describe the methodology used for testing of the hypotheses posited above, the dataset and the coding of the dependent, independent and control variables.

## CHAPTER IV

### METHODOLOGY

*“Controlled comparison analysis of a small  $n$  is neither competitive with nor a substitute for quantitative analysis of a large  $N$ . Rather, the two approaches are genuinely complementary” (George 1979, 61).*

This study combines the use of both quantitative and qualitative analyses to test its hypotheses. First, the statistical analysis in chapter five tests for the effect of peace operations’ strategies on the probability of establishing negative peace using event history analysis. Negative peace is defined as five years of consecutive peace, which is characterized by 25 or lower battle-related death. Beck, Katz, and Tucker (BKT) approach to binary time-series – cross-section (BTSCS) data - or discrete time duration models- is followed (Beck et al. 1998). Second, chapters six, seven and eight analyze and compare six case studies – Nicaragua, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Angola, Mozambique, and Cambodia- using Alexander George’s method of structured, focused comparison (George 1979). The qualitative analysis complements the quantitative part in two ways. First, the effects of various independent variables that could not be quantified are analyzed. Second, the quality of the peace established can be accounted for. As explained before, due to the lack of data for many human security indicators (particularly for conflict-ridden countries), it is very challenging to reliably test for the quality of peace quantitatively. This chapter discusses the methodological considerations for

both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The first section briefly presents the dataset, defines the independent and control variables and clarifies the rules followed in their coding. Second, an overview of the method employed to analyze BTSCS data for the quantitative analysis follows. Finally, the type of case study used in the qualitative section of this study is explained, along with the criteria of case selection and the questions constituting the structured, focused comparison.

## **1. DATASET ON PEACE OPERATIONS AND ARMED CONFLICTS**

The dataset used in this study is an amalgamation of borrowed datasets merged into the data I have collected and coded specifically for testing the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. I compiled data on UN<sup>1</sup> and non-UN<sup>2</sup> peace operations, their mandates and number of troops<sup>3</sup>, which I subsequently merged with the main Armed Conflict Dataset of Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute, Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) (Gleditsch et al. 2002, v.4 - 2007). As Fortna (2004a, 269) explains, many students of peacekeeping are guilty of selection bias; “The vast majority of the literature on peacekeeping compares cases and missions, but generally examines only cases in

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<sup>1</sup> Coded using the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping (UNDPKO) website: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/overview.shtml>

<sup>2</sup> Coded using list of Non-UN operations in: Heldt, Birger, and Peter Wallensteen. 2007. "Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948-2004." In *Research Reports (Third Edition)*: Folke Bernadotte Academy Publications.(Heldt and Wallensteen 2007).

<sup>3</sup> Coded using data from: Durch, William J. 2007-2009. "Numbers of Uniformed Personnel in Peace Operations at Mid-Year, 1948-2006." In *Future of Peace Operations Program*. Washington, DC: Henri L. Stimson Center. (Durch 2007-2009).

which the international community intervenes, not cases in which belligerents are left to their own devices”. To avoid this problem, the analysis considers all conflicts, whether they receive a peace operation or not. According to UCDP/PRIO’s definition, a conflict is “*a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths*”(Harbom et al. 2007, 4). Different from the UCDP/PRIO dataset, a disaggregated sub-ID (named *idba*) has been created to identify when more than 5 years elapse between episodes of violence and/or when the constellation of rebel organizations changes completely. I relied on these sub-IDs to construct my own conflict list. As a result, I code a larger number of armed conflict onsets than the original UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset does. The full dataset covers all types of armed conflicts, but the hypotheses are tested with a reduced dataset containing only internal and internationalized internal armed conflicts. *Internal armed conflict* occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states. And an *internationalized internal armed conflict* occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides<sup>4</sup> (Harbom et al. 2007, 10).

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<sup>4</sup> There are three types of external actors rendering the conflict international: (1) typical to the Cold War pattern, the presence of a major power (or allies) acting to gain or deny strategic advantages from a rival major power; (2) neighbouring countries with their own interests in mind; (3) the neo-colonial pattern (also war on terror) where a major power intervene with troop deployment in a non-major power’s internal conflict (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005).

It is important to note that the dataset has been restructured into a time-series – cross-section data (TSCS). TSCS data offers two kinds of information: the difference between cases is captured by the cross-sectional information, and the changes within cases over time are reflected in the time-series (or within-subject) information. In this dataset, a conflict enters the dataset with its first 25 battle-related deaths and exits it when five years of consecutive peace have elapsed<sup>5</sup>. 56 UN peace operations and 59 non-UN peace operations have been merged to the main data<sup>6</sup>, along with various control variables<sup>7</sup> (explained below), which some vary across time. For this study, the main dependent variable is negative peace, defined as five consecutive years of no conflict after the end of a conflict spell<sup>8</sup>.

### 1.1. STRATEGIES FOR INTEGRATED PEACE OPERATIONS

The main independent variable is the strategy employed by the intervention as a whole (*strategy*). A taxonomy of tasks assumed by peace operations was drafted (see table IV.1), from which two categories of tasks were created: security-related and development-related (see table IV.2). The variable

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<sup>5</sup> The five years are subsequently dropped when the variable peace is created. Each conflict spell ends with peace equals one if they experienced five consecutive years of peace and 0 if they did not (right-censored cases).

<sup>6</sup> A total of 101 peace operations remain in the data when non-civil wars are dropped from the analysis.

<sup>7</sup> Control variables are borrowed from several datasets, referred below.

<sup>8</sup> If less than 5 years of peace is recorded during a conflict spell, it is counted as the continuation of the same conflict spell.

capturing the mandate type (*mantype*) of an operation and the overall strategy of the intervention (*strategy*) were coded according to this categorization. If an operation assumes security-related tasks only (*Security-only*) *mantype* was coded as 1 and if it assumes security and development related tasks simultaneously (*Multi-dimensional*), *mantype* was coded as 2. Table IV.3 presents all the peace operations considered and the mandate type they were assigned. If no operation was deployed *mantype* was coded as 0. As explained above, this study is interested in the overall strategy employed with regards to a case. It is important to recognize that often more than one operation is deployed during one conflict spell. Therefore, this study stresses the importance of the sequence of the mandates. *Strategy* is coded as *Security-Only* if operation(s) deployed were geared towards security-related tasks only, *Sequential* if a security-only operation(s) were followed by operations(s) dealing with both security and development (that is, a *Security-Only* mandate followed by a *Multi-dimensional* mandate), and *Simultaneous* if operation(s) dealt with both security and development simultaneously from the beginning of deployment. Table IV.4 lists the sequences of peace operations deployed to a conflict spell and indicate the strategy followed by the overall intervention.

When peace operations are plotted according to their mandate type (see Chapter on, Figure I.2), it is possible to observe the sharp increase in *multi-dimensional* operations after the end of the Cold War. This confirms the transformations discussed earlier in chapter II. The next figure (Figure IV.1)



illustrates the distribution of the three strategies over time. It is interesting to note that contradictory to commonly held perceptions, most post-cold war intervention are not multi-dimensional (simultaneous) in the strategy they employ. For the majority of cases where a multi-dimensional operation was deployed, a security-only operation preceded it.

## 1.2. CONTROL VARIABLES

As explained in Chapter three, scholars of conflict resolution have identified various control variables affecting the likelihood of peace<sup>9</sup>. These variables when introduced into the analysis control for the ‘degree of difficulty’ of the various cases (Fortna 2003, 2004a, 2008). The controls variables introduced into the models are: intensity of the conflict spell, incompatibility, level of autocracy-democracy, outcome of the conflict, GDP per capita, number of troops deployed, number of internally displaced people, whether ethnicity is relevant, estimate percentage of mountain terrain and oil production per capita. All variables have been lagged by one year, since it is theoretically sound to assume that some time will pass before the effect of the variable is felt.

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<sup>9</sup> Some variables (also mentioned in Chapter two) could not be considered in the statistical analysis. Some factors such as ripeness of conflict (Zartman 2001) or clarity and feasibility of the mandates (Boutros-Ghali 1992) were difficult to quantify. Data availability was also a constraint for some of the variables included into the analysis, for example percentage of discriminated population, the share of excluded population relative to the ethnopolitically relevant population.

### ***1.2.1. Intensity of the Conflict Spell***

Borrowed from UCDP/PRIO dataset, *Cumint* records the intensity of the conflict, taking into consideration the temporal dimension of the conflict. This dummy variable is coded as 0 until the conflict reached more than 1000 battle-related deaths. The coding of this variable has been extended to the years added into the dataset (the years of peace during or after a conflict spell, which are not coded in the original dataset).

### ***1.2.2. Incompatibility***

Borrowed from UCDP/PRIO dataset, *incomp* records the general incompatible position. It is coded as government, territory or both. After interstate and extra-systemic conflicts were dropped from the data, the category indicating both government and territory was left with less than 10 cases. Therefore those cases were re-coded as missing.

### ***1.2.3. Level of Democracy and Autocracy***

Two index variables *Democ* and *Autoc* were borrowed from Wejnert (2007). However, these two indexes are not easily interpretable. Therefore, I followed Jagers and Gurr's suggestion and subtracted a state's autocracy score from its democracy score to generate *Democ\_Autoc* (Jagers and Gurr 1995).

#### 1.2.4. GDP Per Capita

In order to account for the economic well-being of the country in conflict, I borrowed GDP per capita *gdpcapl* (lagged version)<sup>10</sup> from Wimmer, Cederman, and Min new dataset (Cederman et al. 2009). Other economic controls were also merged to the dataset. From Penn Tables, variables such as Purchasing Power Parity over GDP, Real GDP Chain per worker, and GDP growth levels were used but no statistical significance was found.

#### 1.2.5. Ethnicity

Several variables have been merged to the main data in order to capture the effect of ethnicity. Mainly the new *Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict* was used (Cederman et al. 2009). The variable included into the saturated model was whether ethnicity was relevant or not (along with the percentage of discriminated population and the share of excluded population relative to the ethnopolitically relevant population)<sup>11</sup>. According to their coding scheme, “[a]n ethnic category is politically relevant if at least one significant political actor claims to represent the interests of that group in the national political arena, or if members of an ethnic category are systematically and intentionally discriminated against in the domain of public politics”(Cederman et al. 2009, 325). And a group is considered as

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<sup>10</sup> Missing data represented a problem when *gdpcapl* was included in the model as important amount of data was dropped out of the model. To avoid this, the mean *gdpcapl* for each region was calculated and entered to fill the relevant missing data.

<sup>11</sup> Missing data was a problem for all the ethnicity related variables. Whether ethnicity was relevant or not is a dichotomous variable. In order to include it to the models without dropping significant amount of data, the missing data was recoded as 0.5.

discriminated if its “[...] members are subjected to active, intentional and targeted discrimination, with the intent of excluding them from both regional and national power” (Cederman et al. 2006, 8).

#### ***1.2.6. Outcome of the Conflict***

UCDP’s Conflict Termination Dataset was used to record the outcome of a conflict. The Type of termination has been coded according to six categories: “(1) ***Peace Agreement***: Agreement, *or* the first or last in a series of agreements, concerned with resolving or regulating the incompatibility – completely or a central part of – which is signed and/or accepted by all *or* the main parties active in last year of conflict. The agreement is signed either during the last year of active conflict or the first year of inactivity; (2) ***Ceasefire Agreement with conflict regulation***: Agreement between all *or* the main parties’ active in last year of conflict on the ending of military operations as well as some sort of mutual conflict regulatory steps. The agreement is signed and/or accepted either during the last year of active conflict or the first year of inactivity. In cases when a ceasefire agreement with conflict regulation is immediately followed by a more comprehensive agreement (peace agreement), the latter is considered the main cause of termination; (3) ***Ceasefire Agreement***: Agreement between all *or* the main parties’ active in last year of conflict on the ending of military operations. The agreement is signed and/or accepted either during the last year of active conflict or the first year of inactivity. In cases when a ceasefire is immediately followed by a more comprehensive agreement (peace agreement, or ceasefire with

conflict regulation), the latter is considered the main cause of termination; (4) **Victory**: One side active in the last year of conflict is either defeated or eliminated, or otherwise succumbs to the power of the other through capitulation or public announcement; (5) **No or Low Activity**: The conflict is not reported as active, i.e. does not fulfil the UCDP criteria with regards to fatalities, level of organization, or incompatibility; (6) **Other**: Any other theoretically possible outcome”(Kreutz et al. 2008, 3-4).

### 1.2.7. *Other controls*

Other control variables, which are found to be relevant in the literature of civil conflict termination and peace operations have been included into the dataset and used in the analyses. The number of troops deployed for a peace operation has been borrowed from a study guided by Durch at the Stimson center (Durch 2007-2009). The number of internally displaced persons has been merged using ‘Forcibly Displaced Populations 1964-2006’ Dataset (Marshall 2007)<sup>12</sup>. The estimated percentage of mountain terrain and the oil production per capita variables have been borrowed from the *Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict Dataset* (Cederman et al. 2009).

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<sup>12</sup> Details on its construction and use can be found from the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), *World Refugee Survey* (Annual Series). Compiled by Monty G. Marshall, Center for Systemic Peace <[www.systemicpeace.org](http://www.systemicpeace.org)>

## 2. LOGISTIC ANALYSIS CORRECTED FOR TEMPORALLY DEPENDENT DATA

Peace, the dependent variable of the hypotheses, is coded as a dichotomous variable. Therefore, as explained above, the data used for this study is time-series – cross-section with a binary dependent variable (BTSCS data). Beck, Tucker and Katz (hereafter BTK) show that while the use of BTSCS data has become more common, particularly in the study of international relations, it has often been incorrectly analyzed using ordinary logit or probit analysis<sup>13</sup> (Beck et al. 1998). BTK observe that even though many recognize that violations of the assumption of independent observations may result in overly optimistic results, BTSCS data have often been incorrectly analyzed. To resolve this, BTK suggest a simple correction to the logit specification, which renders it equivalent to an event history method for BTSCS data. They argue that this modification allowing the logit specification to handle temporally dependent data is simpler and easier to implement than attempting to master other less well-known methods. Following their recommendation, I use:

$$P(y_{it} = 1|x_{it}) = h(t|x_{it}) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(x_{it}\beta + \alpha_t - \alpha)}}$$

The solution they proposed “depends on the recognition that BTSCS data are identical to grouped duration data”(Beck et al. 1998, 1264). They explain that “annual BTSCS data are equivalent to grouped data with an observation interval of one year. The dichotomous dependent variable is one in a given year if there

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<sup>13</sup> Those techniques assume temporal independence.

was a failure (for example conflict) during that year, with the independent variables also being measured yearly”(Beck et al. 1998, 1265). Therefore, BTK argue that introducing temporal dummies in the logit analysis should account for duration dependence –the chance of a spell terminating varies with the length of that spell. They demonstrate that this corrected logit model is completely equivalent to the discrete time Cox model. “The years since the last event dummies correspond to the integral over a year of the Cox baseline hazard; since the baseline hazards are unspecified, no information is lost in treating their yearly integrals as a dummy variable” (Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, Collier 2009, 488). Also, the use of temporal dummies solves the right censoring problem; as they no longer contribute to any cases, the right censored observations will be dropped from the logit.

For a smoother baseline hazard, where the rates would not jump from one year to another but would change relatively slowly over time, BTK recommend using natural cubic splines, which “fit cubic polynomials to a predetermined number of subintervals of a variable” (Beck et al. 1998, 1270). The polynomials are joined by knots specified by the analysts, and smoothness is thus imposed by pushing the splines (and their derivatives) to agree with the preset knots. Five specifications of time will be modelled in the following chapter: a linear year count, a quadratic term ( $t$ ,  $t^2$ ), temporal dummies, natural cubic splines and splines with five knots specified at the shape of the baseline hazard derived from the temporal dummies model.

The quantitative analyses will be followed by a comparison of six case studies, the qualitative method followed is explained below.

### **3. STRUCTURED, FOCUSED COMPARISON FOR DISCIPLINED-CONFIGURATIVE CASES**

According to the typology of case study presented by George and Bennett (2005), the cases analyzed here are *Disciplined-Configurative*. These cases are often used to exemplify a theory. But they can also serve to contribute to theory testing by revealing that some cases do not fit the theory. They can even serve heuristic purposes by highlighting the need for adjustments in theory or for new theories in areas that cannot be explained (George and Bennett 2005, 75). The design and analysis of the qualitative case studies follow Alexander George's method of structured, focused comparison (1979). First, from the universe of cases presented in table IV.4, six cases have been selected according to the main independent variable considered to explain the outcomes of success and failure; that is the strategy of the intervention. The cases selected also vary in terms of their outcome. Following Alexander George's suggestions, " [...] cases of both success and failures [can be selected] in order to identify the conditions and variables that seemed to account for the difference in the outcome" (George 1979, 55). Thus, cases have been selected to represent a success and a failure case for each strategy. Success is defined as the establishment of peace for five consecutive years of peace. The success cases for Security-Only, Sequential and Simultaneous strategies are Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Mozambique,



respectively. The cases of failure are, again respectively, Burundi, Angola and Cambodia.

The method of structured, focused comparison requires that a set of questions should be formulated to systematically address the same variables across the cases and to compare them. “The disciplined-configurative study describes and analyzes the case in terms of theoretically relevant general variables” (George 1979, 51). In this study, the questions that will be investigated for controlled comparison of each case can be divided in two groups. First, questions that will qualitatively inspect the same variables introduced in the statistical analysis will be compared across cases:

1. What is the strategy of the intervention? Are there apparent tensions among the security and development related components?
2. How intense was the conflict and how did the intensity affect the desire for peace?
3. What was the country’s previous experience with democracy?
4. What was the economic situation and how did it affect the start and continuation of the conflict?
5. What was the outcome of the conflict and did it lead to peace or a relapse to conflict?
6. Was Ethnicity relevant?
7. Were there lucrative natural resources available to warring parties?
8. Was the conflict a Cold War one?

Second, as mentioned above, several aspects of conflict and its resolution are difficult to capture quantitatively. Therefore, some questions covering variables that could not be introduced in the statistical analysis will be compared across cases as well:

9. Was the international community responsive? In other words, were international actors willing and committed to invest into the resolution of the conflict?
10. Are there indications that the conflict was ripe for resolution?
11. If and once negative peace was established, what was the quality of the peace? According to data availability, the indicators to be compared are: life expectancy, level of education, poverty and inequality indicators, and prevalence of malnutrition, health indicators, competitiveness and openness of the political system, economic indicators.


The following four chapters constitute the quantitative and qualitative analysis of this study. The following chapter presents the logit analysis corrected for temporally dependent data, which as explained above, is an equivalent to event history analysis. This analysis will help determine the effect of peacebuilding strategy over time on the likelihood of establishing peace, understood in the narrow sense (termination of conflict for five consecutive years). The statistical analysis will also control for the effects of various variables identified as relevant in the literature. The three subsequent chapters present the structured, focused comparison of six cases. The quantitative analysis will reveal more nuanced explanations regarding the effect of peace operations' strategies and of other control variables that can complement or also contradict the statistical findings. A discussion chapter will follow the case studies which will carefully combine the findings and insights gained by both quantitative and qualitative analyses to address the effects of peace operation's strategy on peace in a comprehensive manner.

**Table IV.1: Taxonomies of tasks assumed by Peace operations:**

<b>Agenda for Peace 1992</b>	<b>Mackinlay and Chopra 1992</b>	<b>Berdal 1993</b>	<b>McCoubrey and White 1996</b>	<b>Diehl, Druckman, Wall 1998</b>
measures to build confidence	traditional peacekeeping		supervision	traditional peacekeeping
fact-finding, demilitarised zones	conventional observer mission	observation and verification of cease-fire, buffer zones, troop withdrawal	Observation, fact-finding	observation
Peace Enforcement units	enforcement			collective enforcement
preventive deployment	preventive peacekeeping	preventive deployment		preventive deployment
sanctions	sanctions			sanctions enforcement
	protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance	establishment of secure conditions for the delivery of humanitarian supplies		protective services
	supervising a cease-fire between irregular forces			
	assisting in the maintenance of law and order			
		electoral support	election/referendum monitoring	election supervision
		humanitarian assistance	humanitarian assistance	humanitarian assistance
		separation of forces, demobilization, collection, custody and destruction of arms		pacification
		mine clearance and training and awareness programs		
		disarming paramilitary forces, privates and irregular units	disarmament/demobilization	arms control verification
			Human rights monitoring	
				intervention in support of democracy
				state/nations building

**Table IV.2: Classification Followed for the Coding of Variable *Mantype***

Peace Operations	
Security Related Tasks	Development Related Tasks
Observation	Humanitarian assistance
Human rights monitoring	Electoral support/monitoring
Buffer-zone	Intervention in support of democracy
Preventive deployment	Support for economic liberalization
Sanctions	Governance (legislation, executive, judiciary)
Assisting in the maintenance of law and order	
Disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR)	
Enforcement	

**Figure IV.1: Number of Peace Operations according their Strategies from 1946 to 2006 (stacked)**

Source: From data compiled and coded for this study

**Table IV.3: UN and Non-UN led Peace Operations and the type of their mandates:**

<b>United Nations Peace Operations</b>	
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), May 1948 - .	Security-Only
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), January 1949 - .	Security-Only
The First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), November 1956 - June 1967.	Security-Only
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), June 1958 - December 1958.	Security-Only
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), July 1960 - June 1964.	Security-Only
United Nations Security Force (UNSF), October 1962 - April 1963.	Security-Only
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), July 1963 - September 1964.	Security-Only
United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), September 1965 - March 1966	Security-Only
Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), May 1965 - October 1966	Simultaneous
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), March 1964 - .	Security-Only
Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEFII), October 1973 - July 1979.	Security-Only
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), June 1974 - .	Security-Only
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), March 1978 - .	Security-Only
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), May 1988-March 1990.	Security-Only
United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), August 1988 - February 1991.	Security-Only
United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), January 1989 - June 1991.	Security-Only
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), April 1989 - March 1990.	Simultaneous
United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), November 1989 - January 1992.	Security-Only
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), April 1991 - October 2003.	Security-Only
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), June 1991 - February 1995	Simultaneous
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), July 1991 - April 1995	Simultaneous
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), April 1991 - .	Simultaneous
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), October 1991 - March 1992.	Simultaneous
United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR), February 1992 - December 1995.	Security-Only
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), March 1992 - September 1993.	Simultaneous
United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), April 1992 - March 1993.	Security-Only
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), December 1992 - December 1994.	Simultaneous
United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), March 1993 - March 1995.	Simultaneous
United Nation Observer Mission Uganda - Rwanda (UNOMUR), June 1993 - September 1994.	Simultaneous
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), August 1993 - .	Security-Only

United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), September 1993 - September 1994.	Simultaneous
United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), September 1993 - June 1996.	Simultaneous
United Nations Assistance mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), October 1993 - March 1996.	Simultaneous
United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG), May 1994 - June 1994.	Not in Dataset
United Nations Mission of Observer in Tajikistan (UNMOT), December 1994 - May 2000.	Simultaneous
UN Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEMIII), February 1995 - June 1997.	Simultaneous
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO), May 1995 - January 1998.	Security-Only
United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), March 1995 - February 1999.	Not in Dataset
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), December 1995 - December 2002.	Simultaneous
United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), January 1996 - January 1998.	Simultaneous
United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP), January 1996 - December 2002.	Security-Only then Simultaneous
United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), July 1996 -July 1997	Simultaneous
United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), January 1997 - May 1997.	Security-Only
United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), June 1997 - February 1999.	Simultaneous
United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), August 1997 - November 1997.	Not in Dataset
United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), December 1997 - March 2000	Not in Dataset
United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (UNCPSG), January 1998 - October 1998	Not in Dataset
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), April 1998 - February 2000.	Not in Dataset
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), July 1998 - October 1999.	Security-Only then Simultaneous
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), June 1999 - .	Simultaneous
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), October 1999 - December 2005.	Simultaneous
United Nation Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), October 1999 - May 2002.	Simultaneous
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), November 1999 - .	Security-Only then Simultaneous
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), July 2000 - .	Security-Only
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET), May 2002 - May 2005.	Simultaneous
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), September 2003 - .	Simultaneous
United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), April 2004 - .	Simultaneous
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), June 2004 - .	Simultaneous
United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), June 2004 - December 2006.	Simultaneous
United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), March 2005 - .	Simultaneous
United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), August 2006 - .	Not in Dataset

<b>Non-UN-led Peace Operations</b>	
African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), April 2003–May 2004.	Security-Only then Simultaneous
African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), June 2004–.	Security-Only then Simultaneous
Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), October/November 1976–July 1982.	Security-Only
Arab League military observers in Yemen, (ALMOYEM) October 1972.	Not in Dataset
Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission (ACOM), August. 1970.	Not in Dataset
Bamako Ceasefire Commission, (BAMCC) October 1963–April 1964.	Security-Only
Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group (PMG), May 1998–June 2003.	Security-Only
Bougainville Truce Monitoring Group (TMG), December 1997–April 1998.	Security-Only
British Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, (BPKFCY) December 1963–March 1964.	Security-Only
Chad I, March 1979–June 1979.	Security-Only
Chad II (Inter-African Force), January 1980–March 1980.	Security-Only
Chad III, November 1981–June 1982.	Security-Only
United Task Force (UNITAF), December 1992 – May 1993.	Security-Only
CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force (CPKF)/CIS Tajikistan Buffer Force, March 1993–September 2000.	Security-Only
CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia CPKF/CPFOR /Collective Peacemaking Force (CPFOR), June 1994–.	Simultaneous
Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF), December 1979–March 1980.	Security-Only
Commonwealth Multinational Police Peace Monitoring Group (CMPPMG), October 1999–January 2000.	Security-Only
The International Commission of Support and Verification of the OAS - CIAV-OAS mission in Nicaragua (1990-96)	Security-Only
Commonwealth Multinational Police Assistance Group (CMPAG), February 2000–June 2000.	Not in Dataset
Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI), February 2003–April 2004.	Security-Only
Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), August 2003–September 2003.	Simultaneous
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group – Liberia (ECOMOG–LIB Liberia), August 1990–October 1999.	Simultaneous
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group – Guinea Bissau (ECOMOG–GB Guinea Bissau), December 1998–June 1999.	Security-Only
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group – Sierra Leone (ECOMOG–SL Sierra Leone), October 1997–May 2000.	Security-Only
European Union Force (EUFOR) – ALTHEA, December 2004–.	Security-Only
European Union Force (EUFOR) – CONCORDIA, April 2003–December 2003.	Security-Only
European Union Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (ARTEMIS), June 2003–August 2003.	Security-Only
Implementation Force (IFOR), December 1995–December 1996.	Simultaneous
Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), July 1987–March 1990.	Security-Only
Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB), February 1997–April 1998.	Not in Dataset

International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS), January 1973–May 1974.	Security-Only
International Commission for Supervision and Control–Cambodia (ICC–Cambodia), August 1954–January 1970.	Not in Dataset
International Commission for Supervision and Control–Laos, I (ICC–Laos I), August 1954–July 1958.	Security-Only
International Commission for Supervision and Control–Laos, II (ICC–Laos II), May 1962–December 1975.	Security-Only
International Commission for Supervision and Control–Vietnam (ICC–Vietnam), August 1954–January 1973.	Security-Only
International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), September 1999–February 2000.	Simultaneous
International Monitoring Team (IMT), October 2004–.	Security-Only
International Peace Monitoring Team for the Solomon Islands (IPMT), November 2000–June 2002.	Not in Dataset
Joint Monitoring Mission/Joint Military Commission (JMM/JMC), April 2002–.	Security-Only
Kosovo Force (KFOR), June 1999–.	Simultaneous
Mission of Military Observers Ecuador–Peru (MOMEPE), March 1995–June 1999.	Security-Only
Moldova Joint Force/Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force, (MoldovaJF) July 1992–.	Security-Only
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), April 1982–.	Not in Dataset
Multinational Force I (MNF I), August 1982–September 1982.	Security-Only
Multinational Force II (MNF II), September 1982–March 1984.	Security-Only
Multinational Interim Force in Haiti (MIFH), February 2004–May 2004.	Simultaneous
Neutral Nations’ Supervisory Commission for Korea (NNSC), August 1953–.	Security-Only
OAS Committee of Military Experts (Advisors), OAS Hon-Nic I Military Observers Group, May 1957–June 1957.	Security-Only
OAS Committee of Military Experts (Observers), OAS-Cos-Nic January 1955–February 1955.	Not in Dataset
OAS Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), May 1965–September 1966.	Simultaneous
OAS Military Observers I, OAS Hon-ElSal I July 1969–July 1971.	Security-Only
OAS Military Observers II, OAS Hon-ElSal II, August 1976–August 1981.	Not in Dataset
OAU Military Observer Team (MOT), April 1991–September 1991.	Security-Only
OAU Neutral Military Observer Group I (NMOG I), September 1991–July 1992.	Security-Only
OAU Neutral Military Observer Group II (NMOG II), August 1992–November 1993.	Security-Only then
OAU Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB), February 1994–July 1996.	Security-Only
OAU Observer Mission in the Comoros (OMIC), November 1997–May 1999.	Security-Only
OAU Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, September 1999–November 2000.	Not in Dataset
Observer Commission from the states of Non-Aggression and Defense Aid Agreement (ANAD) and Benin, January 1986.	Security-Only
Operation Licorne, February 2003–.	Security-Only
OSCE Mission to Bosnia–Herzegovina, OSCE B-H December 1995–.	Simultaneous
OSCE Mission to Croatia, OSCE Cro June 1998–October 2000.	Simultaneous



OSCE Mission to Georgia, OSCE Geo March 1994–.	Simultaneous
OSCE Mission to Moldova, OSCE Mol, April 1993–.	Simultaneous
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), July 2003–.	Not in Dataset
Russian Abkhazia Peacekeeping Operation, (RAPKO) November/December 1993–May/June 1994.	Security-Only
Somali Military Observer Team, (SMOT Uga-Tan) October 1972–November 1972.	Not in Dataset
South Ossetia Joint Force, (SOssJF) July 1992–.	Simultaneous
Stabilisation Force (SFOR), December 1996–November 2004.	Security-Only
Symbolic (Token) Arab Security Force (ASF), June 1976–October 1976.	Security-Only
Organization of African Unity - OMIC Comoros - 1997 /1998 and 2001/2002	Security-Only
Military Observer Mission to Ecuador and Peru - MOMEF	Not in Dataset

Source: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/list.shtml> for UN peace operations. And Heldt, Birger, and Peter Wallenstein. 2007. "Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948-2004." In Research Reports (Third Edition): Folke Bernadotte Academy Publications for non-UN Peace operations.

**Table IV.4: List of interventions, their strategies and outcomes:**

Security-Only Strategy			Simultaneous Strategy			Sequential Strategy		
		Peace			Peace			Peace
UNYOM	Yemen	no	IAPF/DOMREP	Dominican Rep.	yes	MONUC		
ICC - Vietnam	Vietnam	yes	UNTAG	South Africa	no	ARTEMIS	Democratic Republic of the Congo	yes
UNOGIL			UNAMIC	Cambodia	no	AMIB	Burundi	no
ASF			UNTAC			ONUB		
ADF	Lebanon	yes	INTERFET/UNTAET			JMM/JMC		
UNIFIL			UNTAET	East Timor	no	AMIS	Sudan	no
UNIFIL/MNF I/MNF II			UNMISSET			UNMIS		
ICC - Laos I/II	Laos	yes	ONUMOZ	Mozambique	yes	ONUCA		
ONUC	Congo	yes	ECOMOG-LIB			ONUSAL	El Salvador	yes
MINUGUA	Guatemala	-	ECOMOG-LIB/UNOMIL	Liberia	no	UNAVEM I		
OMIB	Burundi	no	UNMIL/ECOMIL			UNAVEM II		
CHAD I /II/III	Chad	no	SOssJF/OSCE Geo	Georgia/South Ossetia (2004-2006)	no	UNAVEM III	Angola	no
IMT	Philippines	no				MONUA		
CMF	Zimbabwe	yes	UNMIK/KFOR	Kosovo	yes	UNOSOM I/UNITAF	Somalia	no
UNGOMAP	Afghanistan	no	MINURSO	Western Sahara/Morocco	no	UNOSOM II		
ONUCA/CIAB OAS	Nicaragua	yes	MINUSTAH/MIFH	Haiti (2004-2006)	no	NMOG I/MOT		
OAS CIAV						NMOGII/UNOMUR/UNAMIR	Rwanda	no
IPKF	Sri Lanka	no				UNAMIR/UNOMUR		
TMG	Papa New Guinea	-				UNMIH/UNSMIH	Haiti (1989-1996)	-
UNPROFOR	Croatia	yes				ECOMOG-SL		
OMIC I	Comoros	yes				ECOMOG-SL/UNOMSIL	Sierra Leone	yes
ECOMOG - GB	Guinea Bissau	yes				UNAMSIL		
EUFOR-CONCORDIA	Bosnia and Herzegovina.	-				UNPROFOR		
						OSCR B-H, UNPROFOR, IFOR, UNMIBH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	yes
						OSCE B-H, SFOR, IFOR, UNMIBH		
						UNPROFOR/UNCRO		
						UNCRO/UNMOP	Croatia	yes
						UNOMIG/RAPKO		
						UNOMIG/CPKF/CPFOR/ OSCE Geo	Georgia/South Ossetia (1992-1997)	yes
						SOssJF		
						MoldovaJF/OSCE Mol	Moldova	yes
						CPKF/CIS		
						CPKF/CIS/UNMOT	Tajikistan	yes
						UNPROFOR		
						UNTAES	Kosovo	yes
						Licorne/ECOMICI		
						Licorne/ECOMICI/UNOCI	Ivory Coast	no

If the conflict ended but five years have not elapsed yet, the status is marked as " - "

## CHAPTER V

### ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF PEACE OPERATIONS' STRATEGIES

The expansion in the responsibilities assumed by peace operations was motivated by a theoretically well-founded understanding that sustainable peace can only be achieved if the many sources of insecurities are eradicated. According to this approach, efforts at establishing order and security should be paired with development related activities, so that elements fueling the vicious cycle of violence could be addressed and eliminated. Human security, offering an eclectic conceptualization of security, has been advanced as a promising agenda to pursue in order to incorporate different facets of security into the mandates of peace operations. As elaborated in previous chapters, two approaches to peacebuilding have prevailed; a *Security-First* approach emphasizes the need to prioritize security and order, whereas a *Simultaneous* approach promotes the implementation of both security and development related efforts concurrently. Two variant strategies can be derived from the Security-First approach: according to *Security-Only* strategy, peace operations should only deal with security-oriented activities and leave the implementation of development-related activities to specialized agencies. Following a *Sequential* strategy, peace operations should

tackle security-oriented issues first to stabilize the situation and then start the implementation of development-related activities.

Up to this date, existing studies have attempted to identify peace operations' shortcomings by treating each operation separately. I maintain that the overall strategy employed by an intervention with regards to one conflict spell should be the unit of analysis. The intervention may encompass several consecutive peace operations, or a series of updated mandates for one operation. I argue that assessing peace operations individually does not capture the overall impact of an intervention. Therefore, rather than assessing the performance of each operation separately and treating them individually, the strategy of the intervention (which may include more than one operation) is examined. It is proposed that a series of operations (or a series of updated mandates for one operation) can yield three different overall strategies: *Security-Only*, *Simultaneous* and *Sequential*. Cold War era peace operations, functioning under a traditional understanding of security, are essentially following a *Security-Only* strategy. For instance, the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) sent to address the intrastate conflict in Lebanon (October/November 1976–July 1982), followed by United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978, were operations strictly dealing with monitoring peace and stabilizing the situation. The deployment of *Security-Only* operations has not stopped after the Cold War; in fact they still represent about fifty percent of the missions deployed (see Chapter one - figure I.2). The rest of post-Cold War operations are multi-dimensional, addressing both security and

development related issues simultaneously, such as the missions deployed in Mozambique, Cambodia, Haiti or Liberia. A considerable amount of multi-dimensional operations however are preceded by *Security-Only* missions, and thus are considered as following a *Sequential* strategy (see Chapter IV-Figure IV.1). For instance, the first two operations deployed in Somalia were solely geared to monitor and provide security; The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was deployed from April 1992 to March 1993 to monitor the ceasefire, then the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was deployed in December 1992 as a multinational force, organized and led by the United States and authorized by the Security Council to use ‘all necessary means’ to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. Subsequently, in March 1993, a multi-dimensional peace operation, the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), was deployed with a variety of tasks ranging from monitoring the cessation of hostilities, securing all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, to assisting the rehabilitation of political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation, and re-establishing of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country. Lastly, an example of an intervention following a *Simultaneous* strategy is the two consecutive operations deployed to Haiti Multinational Interim Force in Haiti (MIFH) and United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004. While the former four-months long operation (Feb-May 2004) had more security-

## Chapter V

oriented tasks, both missions were responsible for security and development-related responsibilities simultaneously. MIFH, along with its duty of contributing to a secure and stable environment, was mandated to support the constitutional political process under way in Haiti. Still on the ground in Haiti, MINUSTAH's mandate consists of three main responsibilities: providing a secure and stable environment, assisting political process and promoting human rights. Besides the security-related tasks of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, the mission is mandated to assist the Transitional Government in its efforts to organize, monitor, and carry out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections and to support the Transitional Government as well as Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights, particularly of women and children.

As explained in Chapter three, many argue that the addition of development-related activities to peace operations' mandate should improve overall peacebuilding effectiveness and should contribute to the establishment of peace and its sustainability. Others, however, have disagreed, maintaining that peace operations would be more effective if they were assuming only security-related activities, or security-related activities first followed by development-related activities. The statistical analysis presented below seeks at understanding which strategy is more effective at establishing peace, defined as five consecutive years of no conflict (less than 25 battle-related deaths). This chapter follows with

the presentation of some general trends regarding some characteristics of conflict and peace operation deployments. A selection of chi-square tests and analyses of variance will be analyzed to get familiarized with the data and to investigate the possibility of collinearity. Logit models corrected for time dependent data will follow, analyzing the effectiveness of peace operations' strategy along with other controls variables over time.

## 1. CIVIL WARS AND PEACE OPERATIONS

The dataset compiled for this study is made up of 225 civil conflicts occurred since 1946, out of which 175 ended in peace. In 2006 (the last year in the dataset) 32 conflicts were still active (right censored cases)<sup>1</sup>. Figure V.1 illustrates the number of new versus ongoing conflicts since 1946. Noticeable is the sharp rise of new conflicts in the post-Cold War years. While the 43 years preceding the end of the Cold War experienced on average four or five new conflicts per year, the 10 years following the end of the Cold War (1989-1999) witnessed approximately seven new conflicts per year. Also interesting is the increase of ongoing conflicts starting in the late 1960s. Even though the number of new conflicts remains roughly unchanged, there is a visible increase of conflicts in progress; the average number of ongoing conflicts was 12 for the years preceding 1960, and it steadily increased to an average of 22 in the 1960s. This number rose to 26 in the 1970s and reached a peak of 42 ongoing conflicts

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<sup>1</sup> 18 conflicts have not reached 5 years of peace yet, thus they are not considered as ongoing or as terminated.

per year on average in the 1980s. This can be explained by the protracted nature of Cold War proxy wars, which were prolonged due to superpowers' interest in supplying military and financial aid. Agreeing with this, the decline in superpower rivalry seems to have contributed to a higher number of conflict terminations. Figure V.1 shows a sharp decline in ongoing wars in the end of the 1980s. However, the uncertainty created by the end of Cold War's patron-client relationships triggered a new wave of civil conflicts in the early 1990s. On a more positive note, there is a visible decrease of new conflicts since the late 1990s and a steady decline in ongoing ones as well.

The early 1990s also experienced an increase in peace operation deployments. Figure V.2 illustrates the percentage of conflicts where peace operations were deployed compared to the percentage of conflicts where no peace operation was deployed. With almost 22% of conflicts receiving peace operations, the mid-1990s were the most active years in terms of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. While there has been a slight decrease in this trend, compared to the Cold War years there were still considerably more peace operation deployments in recent years.

As explained previously, factors other than the strategy of the intervention influence the likelihood of establishing peace and its subsequent sustainability. In addition, it is also important to address the issue to selection effect. Fortna (2003, 2004a, 2008) asks pertinent questions regarding the possibility of a selection bias when studying peace operations, that is; are peace operations deployed to



relatively easier cases - which would overestimate their success- or alternatively to more difficult ones?<sup>2</sup> Various independent and control variables are included in the main dataset to investigate this issue<sup>3</sup>. Before introducing these variables into more complex models, a selection of some simple cross-tabulations (chi-square tests) and one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) are presented below. This will not only give a sense of the relationships between peace operation deployment (their strategies) and the degree of difficulty of the cases, but it will also help identify possible multicollinearity<sup>4</sup>.

Are peace operations deployed to some regions more often than others? Regional difference can account for a certain degree of difficulty among cases in which peace operations were deployed. For instance, Africa, as a region, includes some of the most volatile countries, suffering from civil wars, failed states, ethnic violence and economic deprivation (to name a few: Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Somalia, Rwanda and Sudan). Levels of economic<sup>5</sup> and political<sup>6</sup> development also tend to vary regionally, capturing a wide array of aspects complicating the

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<sup>2</sup> For studies specifically focusing on this question see Gilligan and Stedman 2003, Fortna 2003 and 2004.

<sup>3</sup> See previous chapter 3 and 4 for a complete list of variables and how they were coded.

<sup>4</sup> Collinearity or multicollinearity can be observed when two or more explanatory variables in a multiple regression model are highly correlated. While multicollinearity does not reduce the predictive power of a model as a whole, it inflates the standard errors of the estimates, which affects the statistical significance of individual predictors. Several Chi-Square test and correlation matrices were analyzed and no collinearity was found: See supplemental material.

<sup>5</sup> A comparison of means across regions shows that both Africa and Asia have the lowest GDP per capita and Europe the highest (see supplemental material).

<sup>6</sup> A comparison of means across regions shows that Europe has the highest average Polity scores and the Middle East and Africa the lowest (see supplemental material).

establishment of peace. Table V.1 presents the distribution of years of conflict (henceforth referred as conflict-years) according to regions in which they take place and the years of intervention (henceforth referred as operation-years) they receive. With 835 conflict-years (40.5 per cent of total), Asia represents the most conflict-prone region<sup>7</sup>, followed by Africa with 608 conflict-years (29.5 per cent of total). 12.6 per cent of African conflict-years received a peace operation, representing 42 per cent of total operation-years deployed around the world. Asia is the region receiving the second most operation-years, constituting 15 per cent of total operation-years deployed to Asian conflicts. Europe is considered to be one of the more stable regions of the world, with high levels of prosperity and political openness. Europe has considerably fewer conflicts (98 conflict-years) compared to other regions, consisting mainly of a few conflicts erupting in the Balkans with the collapse of Yugoslavia. However, Europe still received a high number of operation-years; 15 per cent of the total operations-years were deployed to Europe, addressing 22 per cent of the European conflict-years. Table V.1 shows that there is a significant relationship between years of intervention and regions  $\chi^2(4, N=2063) = 54.20, p < .001$ <sup>8</sup>, but it does not indicate that peace operations are systematically deployed to one region more than others.

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<sup>7</sup> As it will be explained in more details below, this number is misleading as the UCDP/PRIO dataset codes three different conflicts in Myanmar each lasting 48 to 48 years long, skewing these results significantly. Thus Asian and African conflict-years should be much closer than depicted by this data.

<sup>8</sup> Chi-Square statistics are reported with degrees of freedom and sample size in parentheses, the Pearson chi-square value (rounded to two decimal places), and the significance level

Also interesting is to investigate the relationship between peace operation's strategies and the location of the conflict to discern if there are apparent regional variances in the strategy followed by peace operations. Table V.1a indicates that some regions are, to some extent, associated with certain types of strategies. For instance, it is interesting to note that the Middle East has only received operations following a *Security-Only* strategy. A closer look reveals that the missions deployed to address civil conflicts in the Middle East are few<sup>9</sup> and were all designed under the traditional security understanding of the Cold War era. In Europe and particularly in Africa, most interventions have followed a *Sequential* or a *Simultaneous* strategy. While it is difficult to infer any causality from these associations, it is possible to advance suggestions. The interest in providing development related programmes in both Europe and Africa can be explained by two separate phenomena. It is suggested that conflicts in Europe attracted a longer-term sustained attention from the wealthy neighbouring countries, which had a vested interest in keeping the region stable by investing in developmental programmes. In Africa, the low levels of development compared to other regions could explain the necessity for the implementation of developmental programmes to aid the establishment of durable peace.

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<sup>9</sup> All to Lebanon

Another variable capturing the degree of difficulty of a case is conflict intensity<sup>10</sup>. Table V.2 presents the distribution of peace operation-years and the strategies they followed according to the intensity of the conflict. This indicates that peace operations tend to be deployed to more intense full-scale wars rather than low intensity conflicts; compared to five per cent of low intensity conflict-years, ten per cent of full-scale war-years received a peace operation. In terms of the strategy employed, Table V.2 shows that more *Security-Only* operations tend to be deployed to full-scale wars, followed closely by the *Sequential* strategy. It is expected that the more intense a conflict, the more salient the security component of a mission will be. The number of displaced persons has also been used in the literature as an indicator for conflict severity. A one-way analysis of variance is used here between the categorical variable *strategy* and the normally distributed interval variable *internally displaced persons (IDP)* to test for differences in the means of *IDP* when it is broken down by the different categories of *strategy*. This test indicates that the mean of *IDP* differs significantly across different strategies and no operations<sup>11</sup>. To investigate this further, Table V.3 presents a comparison of the mean of *IDP* for no deployment and the three strategies. If we consider conflicts with higher numbers of displaced persons to be more difficult, these results suggest that peace operations are deployed more frequently to more

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<sup>10</sup> Intensity is captured by the number of battle-related deaths: low intensity conflicts inflict between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths and full-scale war over 1000 battle-related deaths (over the whole conflict).

<sup>11</sup> See supplemental material

challenging cases. While conflict-years with no deployment have a mean of 322,000 displaced persons, conflict-years with deployment have a mean of 681,000 displaced persons. A closer look shows that *Security-Only* operation-years are deployed to cases with lower means of displaced persons (446,000) and *Sequential* operation-years the highest (895,000 IDPs). The standard deviations of the IDPs distribution are very large, hence no claim can be made that specific strategies (or no strategy) are deployed to a given level of IDPs. Dealing with large portion of displaced population often requires more than just providing security. Therefore, it should be expected that conflicts with larger number of displaced people are associated with strategies also including a development-oriented components. Overall, no strong argument can be made that peace operations are deployed to more intense and severe conflicts in terms of numbers of battle-related deaths and displaced persons.

A large body of literature focuses on the economic causes of conflict, arguing that lower level of economic wellbeing not only breeds conflict but also decreases the chances of achieving peace. Above, both Africa and Asia, with the lowest averages of GDP per capita, have been found to be the most conflict prone regions and include the least likely cases to reach peace. Table V.4 investigates whether peace operations and certain strategies are deployed to economically disadvantaged cases. The results show that peace operations are dispatched to cases scoring three times lower in their average GDP per capita compared to cases not receiving peace operations. Across different strategies, the difference in GDP

per capita is small, but it is worth mentioning that *Simultaneous* interventions are generally deployed to the poorest cases. This may suggest that development-related activities may be deemed necessary from the beginning to aid the establishment of peace when deployed to the poorest cases. However, the large standard deviations show that there is no correlation between type of deployment and level of economic well-being.

Certain conflict outcomes have also been identified as more likely to lead to durable peace than others. As mentioned earlier, *Victories* have been found more likely to lead to peace compared to other outcomes (Licklider 1995; Walter 1997; Fortna 2003, 2004a; Ali and Matthews 2004; Toft 2006). Table V.5 shows that there is a significant relationship between peace and outcomes  $\chi^2(5, N=2065) = 77.80, p < .001$ . Agreeing with earlier studies, it also indicates that 45 per cent of the conflict reaching five consecutive years of peace ended with *Victory*. Table V.6 investigates whether there is an association between peace operation deployment (and its strategy) and how the conflict ended. Conflicts ending with formal *Peace Agreements* have received more peace operations compared to other outcomes. *Peace Agreements* are often internationally sponsored, which could explain the increased possibility that a peace operation would be a part of their implementation. Table V.6 also shows that *Ceasefires with regulations* are more associated with *Security-only* operations. It is well-known that many *Security-only* operations are established with mandates of monitoring and observing ceasefires.

To sum up, if there is a selection bias as to where peace operations are deployed, the results above suggest that peace operation may be more frequently deployed to more difficult cases<sup>12</sup>. However, large standard deviations for IDPs and GDP per capita mean that no systematic relation is present. More important to the question addressed in this study is whether there is a selection bias regarding the strategy employed by the peace operation; that is, can we discern that some strategies have been more often used towards harder or easier cases? The tables above show no noteworthy differences among the cases receiving *Security-only*, *Simultaneous* or *Sequential* strategies.

A last point needing more attention is the distribution of strategies over time. Previous graphs have shown that multi-dimensional peace operations have proliferated after the end of the Cold War. Table V.7 presents the distributions of operation-years and their strategies according to whether they were deployed during Cold War or after the end of the Cold War<sup>13</sup>. This once again confirms two trends discussed earlier. First, higher numbers of peace operations have been deployed since the end of the Cold; while only six per cent of the total Cold War conflicts-years received a peace operation, about 14 per cent of post-Cold War conflicts-years had a peace operation. Second and more problematic for the analysis that follows is that peace operations assuming development-related

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<sup>12</sup> Those results agrees with Gilligan and Stedman (2003).

<sup>13</sup> 1989 being the dividing line, which Gorbachev withdrawing troops from Eastern Europe and other significant unilateral initiatives such as withdrawing 500 tactical nuclear weapons from the territories of allies (Collins 1998).

activities, whether they follow a *Sequential* or a *Simultaneous* strategy, are almost non-existent during the Cold War era. This indicates that the predominance of *Security-only* operation-years in the Cold War era may skew the results if the analysis includes both Cold-War and post-Cold War eras. Therefore, along with models including the entire dataset, the analysis will be divided into separate models one including only Cold War years and the other only post-Cold War years<sup>14</sup>. Table V.7 also reveals that a *Sequential* strategy, prioritizing security before embarking on development-related activities, is most common in post-Cold War years. This constitutes a noteworthy piece of information that is concealed by studies evaluating each operation individually rather than a part of a larger intervention.

## 2. RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC ANALYSIS CORRECTED FOR TIME DEPENDENT DATA

A logit specification, once corrected for time dependency, can be used as an event history method for BTSCS data (Beck et al. 1998). BTK suggest that the introduction of temporal dummies in the logit analysis does account for duration dependence. They also add that, if desired, the hazard can be smoothened by introducing natural cubic splines. Others analysts have proposed to include specific transformations of time as covariates in the model. For instance, the model can be estimated with a ‘linear’ or a ‘quadratic’ time variable. One

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<sup>14</sup> I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer who provided me with insightful comments regarding the effect of Cold War (distribution of the variable strategy over time) for the article version of this chapter submitted to *International Security Quarterly* (currently R&R).



potential problem with these time specifications is that a particular functional form for the duration dependence is assumed, which may not be reflecting the reality, this will be addressed in greater length below. Table V.8 includes the linear and the quadratic time specifications (Model 1 and Model 2, respectively) and both BTK's suggestions - temporal dummies and natural cubic splines (Model 3 and Model 4, respectively), using a fully saturated model, i.e. including all the theoretically relevant variables.

Table V.8 indicates that the coefficients (or odd ratios) of these four models are not very different from each other in both their magnitude and significance. This may suggest that the coefficients are model independent when different time specifications are taken into consideration. This actually becomes more apparent when the baseline hazards of each time specification are plotted against the distribution of cases reaching peace over time. Before investigating the fit of different time specifications, let's have an initial look at the coefficients in Table V.8. Across all models, *Security-Only* as a peace operation strategy is significant and has a positive effect on peace. The adjusted odds<sup>15</sup> of establishing peace for an operation following a *Security-Only* strategy are about four times higher compared to no deployment. The coefficients for the *Sequential* strategy are also significant and the adjusted odds indicate that operations following this strategy are two to three times more likely to achieve peace compared to no

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<sup>15</sup> A more elaborated explanation follows below regarding the adjusted odds and the relative impact of each strategy on peace over time.

deployment. While the coefficients for *Simultaneous* strategy are not significant, its impact seems to be weaker than other operations but also positive compared to no deployment. The other significant coefficients are *Intensity* of conflict, certain types of conflict *outcomes* and some *regions*. First, the negative z-score recorded for the coefficient for *Intensity* indicates that more intense conflicts are less likely to achieve peace. With regards to the *Outcome* of a conflict, it seems that the odds of ending the fight for five consecutive years are higher for conflicts ending with a decisive *Victory*. The other outcomes most likely to result in peace are *Ceasefires* (and *Ceasefires with regulations*) and *Peace agreements*. Before further analysing these coefficients, it is important to remember that including all the theoretically relevant variables into a model is not necessarily desirable, as over-specifying a model introduces unwanted error terms. Below, a more detailed analysis of the results derived from a reduced model will follow. The next part investigates how different specifications of time fit the data.

Graph V.1 presents the distribution of conflicts reaching peace over time, compared to ongoing ones. This indicates that a little less than a third of conflicts ended after two years of fighting. It also shows that after two years, the number of cases reaching peace decreases with time. In fact after about 10 years of fighting, the cases reaching peace are few and scattered around the years, some reaching up to 58 years of fighting. This graph also indicates that as the duration of conflict increases, fewer conflicts remain active. In order to determine whether the time specifications included in the models are representative of the data, Graph V.2 is

generated. It presents the baseline hazards derived from model 1 to model 4 plotted against the predicted probabilities of peace, which were derived from the fully saturated models. In order to generate this plot, four models, each containing one specification of time and no covariates, were run (see table V.9). The predicted probabilities of peace based on linear time, on a quadratic term, on natural cubic splines and on temporal dummies were then generated and stored. The full model with all independent variables and a count of years was estimated to produce the predicted probabilities of peace based on all variables. These have been subsequently plotted against the four different baseline hazards. Comparing Graph V.1 and Graph V.2 demonstrates that the linear, the quadratic and the splines baseline hazards fit the data considerably well<sup>16</sup>. The baseline hazards obtained from the year-dummies are only initially a good fit, but after 25 years of conflict this is no longer the case. The initial stability of the temporal dummies baseline hazard is evidence that the specifications aimed to smoothen it are suitable. The sharp upward pull in the dummies' baseline is misleading and can be explained by the fact that there are fewer observations as the years of conflict increase. As mentioned earlier, the temporal dummies are dropped from the logit model once they do not contribute to any more cases. In fact, a closer look at Model 4 in table V.6 reveals that after year 24 most of the temporal dummies are dropped from the model except for years 30, 31, 32, 36 and 47. That is, the

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<sup>16</sup> I would like to thank Prof. Stéphane Moulin for his insightful comments and suggestions regarding the statistical portion of this study.

## Chapter V

ongoing cases, not having reached peace (i.e. the right censored cases), are dropped from the model. The remaining cases all achieve peace, which explains the upward shape of the baseline hazard. Out of the few cases remaining in the dataset after year 25, the ones establishing peace around year 30 and especially after year 47 pull the baseline hazard upward. Some examples are, Ethiopia ceasing the fight with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) in 1992 after 31 years of conflict, Guatemala ending its conflict with the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in 1996, after 32 years and Cambodia stopping the fight with the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and Khmer Rouge in 1999, after 33 years. Again, the baseline hazard is pulled upwards with two internal conflicts ending in 1995 both in Myanmar after 48 years (one against the Arakan Insurgents and Burma Communist Party, and the other against leftist organisations and All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF)). Cases reaching 58 years of conflict are Myanmar and Israel. The former has an ongoing conflict with the KNU, and the later has been fighting with various Palestinians groups over time (the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Fatah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Hamas, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), and more). To improve illustration, the graphs below will not include the cases after year 25. The above graphs and the ones to follow are included to ease interpretation, whereas the tables containing

the various logit models include all the data and provide the results used for the main analysis in this study<sup>17</sup>.

As explained in the previous chapter, the use of natural cubic splines is recommended instead of temporal dummies so that the hazard rate can be plotted smoothly. However, it is important to note that there is no theoretical justification for using this specific kind of spline. In fact, as Carter and Signorino point out, there are various kinds of splines, such as B-splines, piecewise, or quadratic splines, which could equally be of interest (Carter and Signorino 2007). While the use of splines is an attractive way to model time dependence, the fact that it cannot be theoretically specified is problematic. I argue that this weakness can be remedied to a certain extent by specifying the knots of the splines according to the fit of the temporal dummies' baseline hazard. While it will still not be based on a theoretical justification, it will at least better reflect the shape of the less smooth temporal dummies. Following the shape of the baseline hazard derived from temporal dummies, five knots have been introduced to a new spline specification: at years 2, 6, 10, 16, and 25. Graph V.3 illustrates the baseline hazard generated using this new spline specification, which is compared with the quadratic, natural cubic splines and temporal dummies' specifications. As it can be observed, this

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<sup>17</sup> To test whether these long conflicts were distorting the results, all the models presented in this chapter have been re-run by dropping these observations gradually until conflicts lasting 26 years. Dropping these cases did not significantly affect the results, thus they were kept in the dataset.

new spline specification fits the data well, though it is not significantly different than the other baseline hazards<sup>18</sup>.

As mentioned above, Table V.8 includes all the theoretically relevant variables, which can potentially lead to an over-specified model and introduce undesired error terms. As missing data entries cause cases to be dropped from the analysis –which can significantly distort the results–, fewer considered variables result in more included observations. Therefore, after running several likelihood ratio tests<sup>19</sup>, the variables not improving the fit of the model were dropped. Table V.10 presents the reduced models, which has been run, once again, with the various time specifications used above<sup>20</sup>. Model 1 includes a linear specification of time, model 2 a quadratic specification of time, model 3 introduces natural cubic splines, and model 4 includes the temporal dummies. As it can be observed

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<sup>18</sup> The outlier at year 17 showing about 40 per cent probability of peace is worth investigating more. The point represents the end of the 16 years long Lebanese civil war spell starting in 1975 and ending in 1991 (see Appendix Graph 1). Since some variables are missing for the late 1970s and early 1980s, the observations corresponding to those years drop from the model. The conflict is only picked up by the model when all variables have a value, which is near the end of the conflict. Therefore, the predicted probability of peace is inflated, as many years of conflict are not accounted by the model. Particularly because this conflict spell received an operation and ended in success, it skews the coefficient of the main independent variable. The strategy of the intervention in Lebanon is Security-only, thus it increases the strengths of its coefficient. Since, the missing data could not be found, and that the few years that are picked up affect the independent variable of interest, it was decided that it would be more reliable to drop these few observations from the dataset.

<sup>19</sup> See supplemental material

<sup>20</sup> Since fewer variables are included in the reduced model, fewer observations are dropped due to missing data. Therefore, before dropping the outlier case, the Lebanese conflict spell, mentioned earlier, the predicted probabilities of peace were one again plotted over time. As there are still variables missing for Lebanon in the late 1970s and early 1980s (mainly Democ-Autoc), this spell was dropped from the reduced model.

in Table V.10, the error terms decrease significantly when the variables not contributing to the model are dropped. In fact, while all the time related variables are insignificant in the saturated models (except for the quadratic term), the reduced models show significance for the linear specification, the quadratic and the temporal dummies. It is also interesting to note that the significance of the temporal dummies decreases as the years of conflict increase, which again confirm the earlier assessment that after year 23, the estimates are unstable. Taking the logit LR chi squared results and the fit of the baseline hazards into consideration, the Quadratic specification of time fit the data best. Similar to the results from the saturated models, the reduced models from Table V.10 indicate that *Security-Only* and *Sequential* strategies are significant and have a positive impact on peace compared to no deployment. Before further interpreting these results, it is important to verify whether the coefficients for strategy are distorted by the concentration of *Security-Only* operation-years in the Cold-War era.

Table V.7 above demonstrated that only 5 operation-years following a *Sequential* or *Simultaneous* strategy were falling into the Cold War era. This may skew the coefficient for *Security-only* and overestimate its impact on the establishment of peace. Therefore, the dataset is divided into two, one only including Cold War years and the other only the post-Cold War years, using 1989 as the dividing line. Table V.11 illustrates the reduced models for the Cold War era, once again run with different time specifications. While two peace-years falling under a *Simultaneous* strategy and two of three operation-years falling

under *Sequential* strategy are dropped when their lagged version are generated, the one year of *Sequential* strategy drops from the models as it predicts failure perfectly. Besides, even if they were kept in the model, these observations are too few to represent any significant results. The *Security-only* strategy is found to be significant and positively contributing to the establishment of peace. In fact, compared to no deployment, the presence of a *Security-only* operation in the Cold War era is about 21 times more likely to achieve peace<sup>21</sup>.

More important is to investigate if the coefficients for strategy change dramatically when the Cold War years are not included in the model. Hence table V.12 presents the same reduced models for post-Cold War years. According to these models, the coefficients for *Security-only* are less significant but still show a stronger positive effect on peace compared to no deployment. The adjusted odds of establishing peace for a *Security-only* operation are about 11 times higher than no deployment no matter the duration of the conflict. While the coefficients for *Sequential* and *Simultaneous* are not significant, their contribution to peace compared to no deployment is much weaker. Tables V.11 and V.12 demonstrate that the results for *Security-only* strategy are robust and that it performs better at establishing peace compared to the other strategies and compared to no deployment at all. The following section will present a more thorough interpretation of the effect of each independent/control variable on negative peace,

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<sup>21</sup> A more elaborated explanation of the adjusted predicted probabilities and odds ratio follows. For now, suffice to say that for this model, if the adjust command is used setting the time (duration of conflict) at different years, (for instance: adjust time=15, by (lstrategy) exp ci level (95)).



starting with peace operation strategies and using the models generated with the full dataset (Table V.10). The odd ratios from logistic models are not straightforwardly interpreted, particularly for categorical variables. Therefore, the analysis below represents a more nuanced and precise representation of the various effects of each variable over time.

## 2.1. STRATEGY OF THE PEACE OPERATION:

The logit models include three of the four dummy variables created using the main independent variable *strategy*: *Security-Only*, *Simultaneous*, *Sequential*. The fourth dummy *No peace operations* is treated as the residual category and is left out of the model<sup>22</sup>. In all reduced models of table V.10, the odd ratios of *security-only* are positive and significant. The estimates presented in Table V.10 provide us with some initial information regarding the strength and direction of the effect. However, since the variable *strategy* is a categorical variable, it is difficult to infer comparisons among its different categories. Besides, the odd ratios in Table V.10 are not insightful with regards to the marginal effect of each strategy over time. In order to render the results more interpretable, the coefficients for *strategy* are adjusted to get the exponentiated linear prediction of establishing peace and by setting time (duration of conflict) at some specific

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<sup>22</sup> If the pseudo R squared values of the reduced models in Table V.10 are compared to models including only the different time specifications and the effect of strategy (Table 1 in Appendix), it is possible to argue that strategy has an important effect in the models.

points in time for each type of strategy and for no operations<sup>23</sup>. In fact, it is important to emphasize that as the duration of the conflict increases, it should be expected that the odds of establishing peace change. Table V.13<sup>24</sup> presents the adjusted exponentiated predicted probabilities of establishing peace according to each strategy and no deployment at year two, five, ten and twenty<sup>25</sup>. Findings show that after two years of fighting, 55 per cent of conflicts receiving an operation following a *Security-Only* strategy achieve peace. This percentage is lower for other strategies and the estimates are not as robust; 28 per cent of cases receiving a *Sequential* strategy attain peace, and 31 per cent of conflicts receiving a *Simultaneous* strategy achieve peace after year two. While the probability of peace clearly decreases as the duration of conflict increases, the *Security-only* strategy continues to fare better than other strategies and also compared to no deployment (see Graph V.4)<sup>26</sup>. To compare the effect of one strategy over

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<sup>23</sup> See supplemental material.

<sup>24</sup> Using the Quadratic Specification of time - Model 2 of Table V.10.

<sup>25</sup> An alternative way of illustrating the effect of each strategy and of no operation on peace is to plot their marginal effects over time. To do so, the marginal effects of the four categories of the main independent variable (*security-only*, *simultaneous*, *sequential*, and *no operation*) are calculated, holding all the other independent variables at their means (except for time). This is then multiplied with the year-effect. For example for Security-only, the comment entered on Stata is: `gen SecOnly = _b[_cons] + _b[lstrategy2]*1 + _b[lstrategy3]*0 + _b[lstrategy4]*0 + _b[lintensity]*.742 + _b[lDemoc_Autoc]* -.654 + _b[lidp]* 362.077 + _b[loutcome1]*.145 + _b[loutcome2]*.098 + _b[loutcome3]*.043 + _b[loutcome4]*.189 + _b[loutcome5]*.353 + _b[MiddleEast]*.142 + _b[Asia]* .404 + _b[Africa]*.294 + _b[Americas]*.097 + _b[time]*time + _b[timesq]*timesq` Then the probability of peace for Security-only is calculated using:  $p = \exp(\text{SecOnly}) / (1 + \exp(\text{SecOnly}))$  – See supplemental material for more information.

<sup>26</sup> As mentioned above, the adjusted exponentiated probabilities are linear, thus the effect of time across is the same across strategies. In order to discern how duration of conflict interacts with the effectiveness of different strategies, I attempted to introduce an interaction term between the time

another, the predicted probabilities in table V.13 can simply be divided by each other to generate hazard ratios. For instance, to compare the effect of deploying a *Security-Only* operation with *No operation* at year two of conflict, the predicted probability for *Security-Only* is divided by the predicted probability for *No operation*. That is  $0.552514/0.163615 = 3.37$ . This indicates that after year two of conflict, the odds of establishing peace for a *Security-only* strategy are about three times higher than if no operation was deployed<sup>27</sup>.

These results demonstrate that over time, compared to not deploying any peace operations, a *Security-Only* strategy contributes to the establishment of peace. Both *Sequential* and *Simultaneous* strategies also have a positive effect on peace, though the results are less robust. The finding that the deployment of peace operations has, in general, a positive effect on the likelihood of attaining peace compared to no deployment is in accordance with the majority of the literature (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1984; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; De Rouen and Sobek 2004; Fortna 2008). Two arguments regarding the relationship between duration of war and probability of peace exist (see Chapter three). One posits that longer wars increase hostility and grievances, which reduces the likelihood of peace. Another line of thinking however maintains that long wars not only result in exhaustion, but also remove hopes of quick offensive and

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variable and strategy, but too many cases were dropped due to few observations to constitute meaningful results, thus these models and plots were not included into the analysis.

<sup>27</sup> I would like to thank Prof. Sandberg for the help he generously offered regarding the evaluation of the data.

victory, which all together increase the probability of peace. Graph V.4 (and also Graph V.1) shows support to the former argument that increasing level of hostility over time antagonizes and pushes the parties to keep fighting and not settle for a peace deal.

The results presented above confirm *hypothesis 1*: peace operations intervening to only provide physical security and establish order are more likely to establish peace than if they intervene to establish security and to deal with various development issues simultaneously. The findings also show support for *hypothesis 2*: peace operations intervening to provide physical security and establish order first, to then assume development-related tasks, are more likely to establish peace than if they intervene to establish security and deal with various development issues simultaneously. The results contradict *Hypotheses 3a* and *3b*, peace operations providing security while dealing with various aspects of development simultaneously, are not found to contribute more to peace than operations dealing with only security or with security first and development-related tasks later. Considering the changes that peace operations underwent and the expansion in the understanding of security in the last two decades, the interesting and potentially controversial finding is that peace operations are performing best if they assume only security-related responsibilities. Even though the focus here is the strategy of the intervention as a whole, rather than each peace operation separately, these findings also contradict some well-established studies

in the field. While Doyle and Sambanis' coding of multi-dimensional<sup>28</sup> (corresponding to *Simultaneous*), traditional and enforcement missions<sup>29</sup> (corresponding to *Security-only*) are slightly differently than in this study, their analysis (2006) shows that complex, multidimensional operations tend to be more effective than traditional peacekeeping and monitoring missions. It is important to remember that Doyle and Sambanis do not account for the sequence of peace operations. Therefore, it is possible that the contribution of a *Security-only* operation preceding a multi-dimensional operation is concealed. Figure IV.1 in Chapter four reveals that the majority of multi-dimensional operations are in fact deployed after operations mandated with only security-related responsibilities. Treating each operation individually rather than as a part of an intervention is thus

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<sup>28</sup> Doyle and Sambanis (2006) code a multidimensional mandate “if the peace operation has at least two dimensions beyond the provision of protection. These additional dimensions include: electoral assistance (e.g. registering voters, organizing and holding elections, and other activities that we describe in more detail in the book); human rights components (e.g. training military and police for the observation of human rights; investigate abuses and help build institutions for the promotion of human rights in the country); humanitarian assistance (food aid programs, refugee repatriation, etc); civilian administration and reconstruction (police training, demobilization and reintegration of troops through training and vocational programs, economic reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure).” (Supplemental Material, UN missions – Coding notes)

<sup>29</sup> Doyle and Sambanis (2006) code traditional peacekeeping mandate “if the only function of the peace operation is to provide protection, through troop interposition, use of military monitoring of ceasefires, creation of buffer zones, monitoring and facilitating the withdrawal of foreign troops, provision of security for humanitarian aid programs, and other military and civilian policing activities. The operation may, on occasion, be involved in other activities, but if these are minor, if they are only slightly different from the policing functions described above (e.g. mine-clearance and police training seminars – as opposed to creating and training a new police force) and if these activities are not described in detail in the mandate, then we code a traditional peacekeeping operation. A mission that combines security provision with humanitarian assistance would be coded as a traditional peace operation and, if force is used systematically against the parties, it would be coded as an enforcement mission.” (Supplemental Material, UN missions – Coding notes)

problematic, since the contribution to peace made by early operations becomes hard to capture<sup>30</sup>. Another important difference is their definition of peace; they used both a negative and a positive definition of peace (called sovereign peace and participatory peace). They observe that while it is harder to establish participatory peace, they find that the UN involvement is much more useful with respect to participatory peace, i.e. positive peace. Therefore, before coming to strict conclusions about the effectiveness of a *Simultaneous* approach, it is important to recognize that the quality of peace is not accounted for in the statistical analysis of this study. It will be investigated in the next chapters through qualitative case studies. It would be interesting, in further studies, to quantitatively test the effectiveness of overall strategy on a positive measure of peace. It is possible to envision that when the quality of peace is accounted for, the effectiveness of each strategy will change.

To sum up, the analysis above indicates that if termination of conflict for at least five consecutive years is the aim, peace operations dealing only with security-related issues should be deployed, as they are considerably more effective than other strategies. While this does not exclude the possibility for a *Simultaneous* strategy to fare better in establishing positive peace, it is still

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<sup>30</sup> It is also important to consider the possibility that the failure of a *Security-only* operation may be concealed when followed by successful *Simultaneous* operation. But considering that the *Security-only* operations are found to fare better than the other strategies, such cases if they exist should be few.

important to acknowledge that the cessation of conflict is a necessary step in the reconstruction of normal relations within a society.

## 2.2. INTENSITY OF THE CONFLICT:

The analysis indicates that the intensity of the conflict matters. The more intense the conflict, the more difficult it is to establish peace. More precisely, a low intensity conflict is two to three times more likely to reach peace compared to a full-scale war, regardless of how long the conflict lasted. In the literature, the intensity of conflict is often captured using two proxies, a count of battle-related deaths and number of displaced persons. As explained earlier, this study uses a count of casualties as a proxy for intensity and in addition introduces a control for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). In the analysis above, the coefficients for battle related deaths<sup>31</sup> are significant and negative, whereas the coefficients for IDPs are not significant but also negative. Even though not significant, the variable IDPs was found to improve the fit of the model, thus it remained in the analysis<sup>32</sup>. Table V.14 presents the adjusted predicted probabilities<sup>33</sup> of establishing peace for low intensity conflicts (between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths) and full-scale war (over 1000 battle-related deaths) over time. Four snapshots of the effect of intensity on peace, at year two, five, ten and twenty are

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<sup>31</sup> Named *Conflict Intensity* in the models.

<sup>32</sup> If the variable IDPs is included in the model without the count of battle-related deaths, it still does not become significant (see supplemental variable).

<sup>33</sup> Using the Quadratic Specification of time - Model 2 of Table V.10.

presented, indicating that 42 per cent of low intensity conflicts end in peace after two years of fighting compared to only 12 per cent of full-scale wars attaining peace after two years. These findings are easier interpreted when plotted. Graph V.5 illustrates the predicted probabilities of establishing peace for low intensity conflicts and full-scale war over time. Especially at the onset, low intensity conflicts are more likely to attain peace than full-scale wars. However with time, it is clear that the chance of peace diminishes for all conflicts. Graph V.6 shows the odds of establishing peace for low intensity conflicts compared to full-scale wars. As achieving peace becomes more difficult with time, the odds of peace for low intensity conflicts are higher and increases with time compared to full-scale wars. These results support the argument that greater grievances and hostility resulting from full-scale war makes the attainment of peace more challenging (Bigombe et al. 2000; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Dubey 2002). This also seems to agree with the logic of the earlier finding that heightened animosity generated by longer conflict inhibits the establishment of peace. To sum up, the results indicate that long and intense wars with high casualties are less likely to attain peace.

### **2.3. LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY AND AUTOCRACY:**

The coefficients for the level of democracy/autocracy are statistically insignificant in all models. Despite much theorizing, the statistical results for the effect of democracy on civil wars have not been very robust. As explained in Chapter three, there are contradictory theoretical expectations regarding the effect



of democracy and autocracy, and more importantly regarding the effect of different levels of democracy. Some argue that democratization should contribute to the establishment of peace as it provides warring parties with an institutionalized set of rules under which they can advance their claims through non-violent mechanisms. Others have pointed out that the different levels of democratization or authoritarianism are worth more investigation. They have suggested that an inverted-U shaped curve exist between levels of democracy/autocracy and violence, where full autocracies and full democracies experience less violence, but mild autocracies and weakly institutionalized democracies in transition are more prone to violence. In order to test whether the inverted-U shaped hypothesis holds, I created a variable with four categories (high/low autocracy and low/high democracy) but could not find any statistically significant trend with regards to the establishment of peace<sup>34</sup>.

## 2.4. OUTCOMES OF THE CONFLICT:

As shown earlier, the analysis indicates that the way in which a conflict ends affect the durability of the peace established. In table V.10, *Victory* is statistically significant across all models; its effect on peace is positive and seems to have the most impact on the durability of peace. However, as mentioned above, in order to accurately compare among categories of a nominal variable, it is more reliable to generate the adjusted predicted probabilities. Table V.15 presents the

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<sup>34</sup> See supplemental material.

predicted probabilities of peace for each outcome types at year two, five, ten and twenty. These results indicate that compared to the other outcome types, the odds of establishing peace are the highest over time for conflicts ending with a *Ceasefire*. After two years of conflict, more than 77 per cent of cases ending with a *Ceasefire* remain in peace for five consecutive years. About 35 per cent of conflicts ending with a decisive *Victory* stay in peace for five years after two years of fighting. Only 18 per cent of conflicts ending with *Peace agreements* stay in peace, which is lower than conflicts that have wind down with no substantive outcome. In fact, 22 per cent of conflicts ending with *No or low activity* remain at peace for five consecutive peace. A graph illustrating the predicted probabilities of peace over time for each outcome eases the interpretation of these findings. Graph V.7 clearly illustrates that *Ceasefires* and *Victories* are the two outcomes most likely to lead to five consecutive years of peace. While this agrees with the existing studies showing that civil war relapses are less likely if a decisive military victory ended the conflict (Toft 2006; Walter 1997; Fortna 2003), *Ceasefires* are considerably more successful at keeping peace. It is interesting to note that according to these findings, the third best outcome seems to be *No or low activities*, followed by *Peace agreements*. Though the estimates for *Ceasefires with Regulations* are weakly significant, they do not seem to contribute to the establishment of a durable peace.

## 2.5. REGION:

The region in which a conflict takes place affects the probability of establishing peace. While a region on its own does not constitute a cause for conflict or its continuation, it captures various factors that can contribute or inhibit the establishment of peace; for instance, the level of economic and social development, the availability and accessibility of arms, the rivalries among states fuelling instability in each others' domestic politics, the prevalence of wars in neighbouring countries, the effects of colonialism, the destabilizing effects of refugees' inflows from neighbouring conflicts, and even intangible cultural differences. Two of the five regional dummies are showing significant estimates; Asia and Africa. Conflicts occurring in these regions are found to be less likely to achieve peace. In fact, a simple frequency table<sup>35</sup> shows that 42 per cent of conflict-years have been recorded in *Asia*, followed by the second highest percentage of 27 per cent in *Africa*. The *Middle East* takes up of 14 per cent of the conflicts years, while the rest is shared by *Europe* and the *Americas* (6 per cent and 10 per cent respectively). Regional variance seems to be important in terms of predominance of conflicts, but also in terms of their duration. Table V.16 presents the adjusted predicted probabilities of establishing peace for each region over time. While 44 per cent of conflicts starting in *Europe* end with peace after two years of fighting, conflicts starting in the *Middle East*, *Asia* or *Americas* are only

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<sup>35</sup> See supplemental material

about 17-24 per cent likely to end in peace after two years. And 12 per cent of *African* conflicts attain peace after two years. Graph V.8 shows that this trend continues over the years, with regional differences losing its significance as conflict duration increases.

## 2.6. GDP PER CAPITA:

Lack of economic opportunity, relative deprivation and poverty have all being identified as factors increasing the likelihood of conflict and its recurrence. GDP per capita was however dropped from the model because it was insignificant and did not improve the fit of the model. It is interesting to note though that as mentioned earlier, a comparison of means across regions shows that Europe has the highest average Polity scores and the Middle East and Africa, indicating that differences in economic standing may be captured by regional variance. Thus, the same reduced models of Table V.10 were run by excluding the regional dummies and including GDP per capita instead. These models <sup>36</sup> indicate that GDP per capita is in fact statistically significant and positive, when regions are not included. This suggests that once regional dummies are introduced into the model, the individual effect of GDP per capita is soaked up by them. It is clear from the results that the odds of attaining and maintaining peace are higher in countries with higher levels of economic well-being. As explained, this effect is accounted for by the regional variables included in the models presented above.

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<sup>36</sup> See appendix Table 2


## 2.7. RELEVANCE OF ETHNICITY:

Various proxies borrowed from Wimmer, Cederman et al.'s dataset were introduced to the models above, but no significant results were found (see supplemental material). As explained earlier, competing theories exist about the effect of ethnicity on civil conflicts and the findings of this study agree with the argument that ethnic heterogeneity and the possible grievances emerging among groups are too common to explain the occurrence of civil wars and that other factors increases the salience of ethnic divisions (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

## 3. CONCLUDING REMARKS


The statistical findings show support for the hypotheses posited by the Security-First approach. Peace operations undertaking security-oriented tasks and leave development-related tasks for other specialized agencies (*Security-Only*) or address them in later stage (*Sequential*) fare better at establishing peace than *Simultaneous* operations. As mentioned earlier, the statistical analysis of this study does not account for the quality of the peace established. As peace operations' mandates have expanded to include developmental considerations, the positive aspects of peace should also be investigated. The next chapters will present six case studies. This qualitative analysis will not only shed more light on the reasons behinds multi-dimensional missions' apparent lack of success, but it will also capture aspects related to the quality of the peace established.

**Figure V.1: Number of Ongoing Conflicts and New Conflict over Years:**



Source: Gleditsch, Nils P., Peter Wallensteen, Mikale Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Havard Strand. 2002. "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (5):615-37. Version 4 - 2007.(Gleditsch et al. 2002)

**Figure V.2: Percentage of Conflicts with Peace Operations Deployed versus None**



Source: Peace operations data compiled and merged into Gleditsch, Nils P., Peter Wallensteen, Mikale Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Havard Strand. 2002. "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (5):615-37. Version 4 - 2007.(Gleditsch et al. 2002)

**Table V.1: Presence of Operation-Years across Different Regions**<sup>37</sup>

REGION	PRESENCE OF PEACE OPERATION		
	No Operation	Operation	Total
Europe	98	28	126
	77.78%	22.22%	100%
	5.21%	15.30%	6.11%
Middle East	272	21	293
	92.83%	7.17%	100%
	14.47%	11.48%	14.20%
Asia	789	46	835
	94.49%	5.51%	100%
	41.97%	25.14%	40.48%
Africa	531	77	608
	87.34%	12.66%	100%
	28.24%	42.08%	29.47%
Americas	190	11	201
	94.53%	5.47%	100%
	10.11%	6.01%	9.74%
Total	1,880	183	2,063
	91.13%	8.87%	100%
	100%	100%	100%
Pearson chi2(4) = 54.2072 Pr = 0.000			

<sup>37</sup> It is important to note that the numbers in the cells of Table V.1 represent how many years a peace operation was present and not the number of operations deployed. Refer to Table IV.3 for list of peace operations and Table IV.4 for list of interventions. It is clear that Multi-Dimensional peace operations are deployed for shorter duration than Security-Only Operations.

**Table V.1a: Cross-Tabulation of Operation-Years according to their Strategies and Region Deployed**

REGION		STRATEGY OF PEACE OPERATION			
	No Operation	Security- Only	Simultaneous	Sequential	Total
Europe	98	4	5	19	126
	77.78%	3.17%	3.97%	15.08%	100%
	5.21%	5.06%	17.86%	25%	6.11%
Middle East	272	21	0	0	293
	92.83%	7.17%	0%	0%	100%
	14.47%	26.58%	0%	0%	14.20%
Asia	789	35	4	7	835
	94.49%	4.19%	0.48%	0.84%	100%
	41.97%	44.30%	14.29%	9.21%	40.48%
Africa	531	17	17	43	608
	87.34%	2.80%	2.80%	7.07%	100%
	28.24%	21.52%	60.71%	56.58%	29.47%
Americas	190	2	2	7	201
	94.53%	1%	1%	3.48%	100%
	10.11%	2.53%	7.14%	9.21%	9.74%
Total	1,880	79	28	76	2,063
	91.13%	3.83%	1.36%	3.68%	100%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Pearson chi2(12) = 136.7232 Pr = 0.000					



**Table V.2: Cross-Tabulation of Operation-Years according to their Strategies and Conflict Intensity:**

PEACE OPERATION STRATEGY					
	No Operation	Security-Only	Simultaneous	Sequential	Total
Low intensity Conflicts	567	10	5	16	598
	94.82%	1.67%	0.84%	2.68%	100%
	30.06%	12.66%	17.86%	21.05%	28.9
Full-Scale Wars	1,319	69	23	60	1,471
	89.67%	4.69%	1.56%	4.08%	100%
	69.94%	87.34%	82.14%	78.95%	71.10%
	1,886	79	28	76	2,069
Total	91.16%	3.82%	1.35%	3.67%	100%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Pearson chi2(3) = 15.3234 Pr = 0.002					

**Table V.3: Comparison of the Mean of Internally Displaced Persons across Peace Operation-Years and their Strategies**

Internally Displaced People			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
No Operation	322.0561	642.0757	1451
Security-Only	466.73214	513.82606	56
Simultaneous	527.37037	771.68283	27
Sequential	895.06579	1272.8051	76
Total	357.58037	693.80522	1610

**Table V.4: Comparison of the Mean of GDP Per Capita across Peace Operation-Years and their Strategies**

GDP Per Capita			
Strategy	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
No Operation	3.1276556	4.17645	1797
Security-Only	1.9634178	1.2360087	65
simultaneous	1.4944089	2.0619858	27
Sequential	1.8731778	1.7301132	72
Total	3.0205187	4.0405421	1961

**Table V.5: Types of Conflict Outcome ending in Five Consecutive Years of Peace:**

Outcomes			
	No Peace	Peace	Total
Peace	276	22	298
Agreement	14.60%	12.64%	14.43%
Ceasefire w/ Regulation	184	11	195
	9.73%	6.32%	9.44%
Ceasefire	86	6	92
	4.55%	3.45%	4.46%
Victory	353	79	432
	18.67%	45.40%	20.92
No or Low Activity	670	50	720
	35.43%	28.74%	34.87%
Others	322	6	328
	17.03%	3.45%	15.88%
Total	1,891	174	2,065
	100%	100%	100%

Pearson chi2(5) = 77.8006 Pr = 0.000

**Table V.6: Cross-Tabulation of Operation-Years Strategies and Types of Conflict Outcome**

Outcomes	Strategy				
	No Operation	Security-Only	Simultaneous	Sequential	Total
Peace	227	20	16	35	298
Agreement	76.17%	6.71%	5.37%	11.74%	100%
Ceasefire w/ Regulation	174	16	3	2	195
	89.23%	8.21%	1.54%	1.03%	100%
Ceasefire	84	3	0	5	92
	91.30%	3.26%	0%	5.43%	100%
Victory	398	18	8	8	432
	91.30%	4.17%	1.85%	1.85%	100%
No or Low Activity	691	10	1	18	720
	95.97%	1.39%	0.14%	2.50%	100%
Others	308	12	0	8	328
	93.90%	3.66%	0%	2.44%	100%
Total	1,882	79	28	76	2,065
	91.14%	3.83%	1.36%	3.68%	100%

Pearson chi2(15) = 152.2131 Pr = 0.000

**Table V.7: Cross-Tabulation of Operation-Years According to their Strategies and whether they were deployed during Cold War era conflicts or Post-Cold War era Conflicts**

PEACE OPERATION STRATEGY					
	No Operation	Security-Only	Simultaneous	Sequential	Total
<b>Cold War Conflicts</b>	1,093 94.47%	59 5.10%	3 0.26%	2 0.17%	<b>1,157 100%</b>
<b>Post-Cold War Conflicts</b>	793 86.95%	20 2.19%	25 2.74%	74 8.11%	<b>912 100%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,886 91.16%</b>	<b>79 3.82%</b>	<b>28 1.35%</b>	<b>76 3.67%</b>	<b>2,069 100%</b>
Pearson chi2(3) = 125.2136 Pr = 0.000					

## Chapter V

**Table V.8: Saturated Model with Different time Specifications (Odd Ratios)**

	(1) Linear	(2) Quadratic	(3) Splines	(4) Dummies
Security Only	<b>4.809**</b>	<b>4.613*</b>	<b>4.658**</b>	<b>4.947*</b>
simultaneous	(2.63) 2.560	(2.56) 2.585	(2.58) 2.618	(2.57) 3.070
Sequential	(1.13) <b>3.357*</b>	(1.15) <b>3.428*</b>	(1.14) <b>3.462*</b>	(1.27) <b>3.764*</b>
Type of conflict	(2.07) <b>0.846</b>	(2.10) <b>0.817</b>	(2.11) <b>0.829</b>	(2.19) <b>0.793</b>
Conflict Intensity	(-0.40) <b>0.190***</b>	(-0.48) <b>0.231***</b>	(-0.45) <b>0.226***</b>	(-0.54) <b>0.225***</b>
Democracy-Autocracy	(-5.96) 1.004	(-5.18) 1.012	(-5.15) 1.012	(-4.98) 1.015
GDP per capita	(0.18) <b>0.984</b>	(0.55) <b>0.982</b>	(0.54) <b>0.983</b>	(0.64) <b>0.983</b>
Incompatibility	(-0.40) 1.021	(-0.46) 1.009	(-0.45) 1.015	(-0.43) 0.955
Oil production per capita	(0.07) <b>0.977</b>	(0.03) <b>0.983</b>	(0.05) <b>0.982</b>	(-0.15) <b>0.987</b>
Mountaineous Terrain	(-0.44) <b>0.937</b>	(-0.33) <b>0.931</b>	(-0.35) <b>0.932</b>	(-0.25) <b>0.939</b>
Relevance of Ethnicity	(-0.63) <b>0.870</b>	(-0.69) <b>0.858</b>	(-0.69) <b>0.863</b>	(-0.61) <b>0.893</b>
Internally Displaced People	(-0.27) <b>1.000</b>	(-0.30) <b>1.000</b>	(-0.29) <b>1.000</b>	(-0.22) <b>1.000</b>
Number of Troops	(-0.62) <b>1.000</b>	(-0.30) <b>1.000</b>	(-0.32) <b>1.000</b>	(-0.41) <b>1.000</b>
Coldwar conflict	(-0.51) <b>1.074</b>	(-0.52) <b>1.078</b>	(-0.55) <b>1.078</b>	(-0.38) <b>1.143</b>
Peace Agreement	(0.27) <b>4.576+</b>	(0.29) <b>5.409*</b>	(0.28) <b>5.298*</b>	(0.49) <b>5.096*</b>
Ceasefire w/ regulation	(1.94) <b>5.003+</b>	(2.12) <b>5.715*</b>	(2.10) <b>5.641*</b>	(2.04) <b>5.241+</b>
Ceasefire	(1.87) <b>8.160*</b>	(2.00) <b>8.587*</b>	(1.99) <b>8.267*</b>	(1.89) <b>8.335*</b>
Victory	(2.11) <b>11.769**</b>	(2.17) <b>13.675**</b>	(2.14) <b>13.565**</b>	(2.09) <b>13.211**</b>
No or Low Activity	(3.15) <b>3.896+</b>	(3.27) <b>4.676*</b>	(3.28) <b>4.534+</b>	(3.25) <b>4.508+</b>
Middle East	(1.77) <b>0.649</b>	(1.99) <b>0.709</b>	(1.96) <b>0.695</b>	(1.92) <b>0.761</b>
Asia	(-0.80) <b>0.228**</b>	(-0.64) <b>0.257**</b>	(-0.67) <b>0.250**</b>	(-0.50) <b>0.272*</b>
Africa	(-2.82) <b>0.264*</b>	(-2.61) <b>0.291*</b>	(-2.65) <b>0.284*</b>	(-2.43) <b>0.316*</b>
Americas	(-2.52) <b>0.616</b>	(-2.35) <b>0.670</b>	(-2.39) <b>0.660</b>	(-2.14) <b>0.707</b>
Count of years	(-0.85) <b>0.979</b>	(-0.70) <b>0.900**</b>	(-0.73) <b>1.002**</b>	(-0.60) <b>1.002**</b>
timesq	(-1.30) <b>2.71</b>	(-2.85) <b>2.71</b>		
(confyrs-k1) cubed			<b>1.004</b>	
(confyrs-k2) cubed			<b>(0.89)</b>	
(confyrs-k3) cubed			<b>0.999</b>	
			<b>(-0.54)</b>	
			<b>1.000</b>	
			<b>(-0.03)</b>	
Temporal dummy, confyrs=1				<b>0.321</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=2				<b>(-0.91)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=3				<b>0.191</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=4				<b>(-1.32)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=5				<b>0.182</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=6				<b>(-1.35)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=7				<b>0.252</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=8				<b>(-1.09)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=9				<b>0.135</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=10				<b>(-1.52)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=11				<b>0.226</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=12				<b>(-1.15)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=13				<b>0.096+</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=14				<b>(-1.66)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=15				<b>0.150</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=16				<b>(-1.41)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=17				<b>0.201</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=18				<b>(-1.19)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=19				<b>0.271</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=20				<b>(-0.99)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=21				<b>0.063+</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=22				<b>(-1.75)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=23				<b>0.127</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=24				<b>(-1.46)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=25				<b>0.155</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=26				<b>(-1.31)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=27				<b>0.132</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=28				<b>(-1.28)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=29				<b>0.195</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=30				<b>(-1.14)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=31				<b>0.117</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=32				<b>(-1.35)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=33				<b>0.328</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=34				<b>(-0.79)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=35				<b>0.168</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=36				<b>(-1.13)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=37				<b>0.192</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=38				<b>(-1.04)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=39				<b>0.438</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=40				<b>(-0.51)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=41				<b>1.508</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=42				<b>(0.28)</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=43				<b>12.374</b>
Temporal dummy, confyrs=44				<b>(1.41)</b>
LR-Chi2	<b>151.968</b>	<b>157.994</b>	<b>157.420</b>	<b>146.134</b>
Pseudo-R2	<b>.2020928</b>	<b>.2101061</b>	<b>.2093433</b>	<b>.2098842</b>
N	<b>1264</b>	<b>1264</b>	<b>1264</b>	<b>996</b>

+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001  
Significance, z-score in parenthesis under odd ratios


**Table V.9: Model Baseline Hazards of Different time Specifications (Odd Ratios)**

	(1) BHLinear	(2) BHQuadratic	(3) BHSplines	(4) BHDummies
Count of years	<b>0.937***</b> (-5.72)	<b>0.888***</b> (-5.05)	<b>1.557***</b> (3.57)	
timesq		<b>1.002**</b> (2.85)		
(confyrs-k1) cubed			<b>1.035***</b> (4.49)	
(confyrs-k2) cubed			<b>0.987***</b> (-4.28)	
(confyrs-k3) cubed			<b>1.002**</b> (3.15)	
Temporal dummy, confyrs=1				<b>6.48e+07***</b> (17.16)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=2				<b>2.30e+07***</b> (15.91)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=3				<b>2.68e+07***</b> (16.03)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=4				<b>2.29e+07***</b> (15.74)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=5				<b>8.71e+06***</b> (14.08)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=6				<b>1.79e+07***</b> (15.24)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=7				<b>4.14e+06***</b> (12.08)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=8				<b>6.65e+06***</b> (13.16)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=9				<b>2.00e+07***</b> (15.23)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=10				<b>1.09e+07***</b> (13.97)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=11				<b>2.87e+06***</b> (10.27)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=12				<b>5.96e+06***</b> (12.35)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=13				<b>6.33e+06***</b> (12.39)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=15				<b>1.44e+07***</b> (14.19)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=16				<b>1.26e+07***</b> (13.64)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=18				<b>5.17e+06***</b> (10.64)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=19				<b>1.15e+07***</b> (12.80)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=21				<b>5.96e+06***</b> (10.73)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=23				<b>6.46e+06***</b> (10.77)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=24				<b>7.38e+06***</b> (10.85)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=30				<b>1.03e+07***</b> (11.03)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=31				<b>1.19e+07</b> (.)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=32				<b>3.10e+07***</b> (13.32)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=36				<b>1.94e+07***</b> (11.31)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=47				<b>1.55e+08***</b> (13.09)
LR-Chi2	<b>45.809</b>	<b>52.035</b>	<b>75.076</b>	<b>155.194</b>
Pseudo-R2	<b>.0381976</b>	<b>.0433885</b>	<b>.062601</b>	<b>.1366535</b>
N	<b>2069</b>	<b>2069</b>	<b>2069</b>	<b>1740</b>


+ p&lt;0.10, \* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Z-score in parenthesis under odd ratios


**Graph V.1: Total number of conflicts reaching peace over time, compared with number of ongoing conflicts.**



**Graph V.2: Baseline hazards from different time specifications plotted against predicted probabilities of peace**



**Graph V.3: Baseline Hazard from 5 knots-splines compared to other baseline hazards**



## Chapter V

**Table V.10: Reduced Model with Various Specifications of time (Odd Ratios)**

	(1) Linear	(2) Quadratic	(3) Splines	(4) Dummies
Security Only	3.807* (2.43)	3.498* (2.29)	3.522* (2.30)	3.604* (2.32)
simultaneous	1.757 (0.78)	1.750 (0.77)	1.745 (0.77)	2.083 (0.96)
Sequential	2.323+ (1.78)	2.341+ (1.78)	2.331+ (1.77)	2.532+ (1.89)
Conflict Intensity	0.191*** (-6.45)	0.231*** (-5.62)	0.225*** (-5.60)	0.226*** (-5.43)
Democracy-Autocracy	1.002 (0.11)	1.010 (0.51)	1.010 (0.52)	1.010 (0.51)
Internally Displaced People	1.000 (-0.82)	1.000 (-0.48)	1.000 (-0.50)	1.000 (-0.56)
Peace Agreement	5.216* (2.14)	6.161* (2.31)	6.029* (2.30)	5.690* (2.22)
Ceasefire w/ regulation	5.079+ (1.91)	5.816* (2.04)	5.730* (2.03)	5.183+ (1.91)
Ceasefire	10.549* (2.49)	10.935* (2.54)	10.620* (2.52)	10.365* (2.42)
Victory	12.561*** (3.30)	14.538*** (3.41)	14.464*** (3.42)	13.459*** (3.35)
No or Low Activity	4.216+ (1.88)	5.003* (2.09)	4.854* (2.05)	4.668* (1.98)
Middle East	0.664 (-0.82)	0.739 (-0.60)	0.726 (-0.64)	0.777 (-0.49)
Asia	0.277** (-3.00)	0.316** (-2.67)	0.306** (-2.74)	0.321** (-2.59)
Africa	0.356* (-2.42)	0.400* (-2.14)	0.391* (-2.19)	0.409* (-2.06)
Americas	0.711 (-0.69)	0.772 (-0.52)	0.762 (-0.54)	0.776 (-0.50)
Count of years	0.976 (-1.54)	0.894** (-3.04)		
timesq		1.002** (2.83)		
(confyrs-k1) cubed			1.004 (0.98)	
(confyrs-k2) cubed			0.999 (-0.60)	
(confyrs-k3) cubed			1.000 (-0.00)	
Temporal dummy, confyrs=1				0.031* (-2.55)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=2				0.016** (-2.97)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=3				0.017** (-2.94)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=4				0.022** (-2.76)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=5				0.012** (-3.06)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=6				0.021** (-2.77)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=7				0.008** (-3.17)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=8				0.014** (-2.95)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=9				0.018** (-2.76)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=10				0.024** (-2.60)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=11				0.006** (-3.06)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=12				0.012** (-2.92)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=13				0.014** (-2.80)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=15				0.011** (-2.68)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=16				0.011** (-2.71)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=18				0.011** (-2.71)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=19				0.029* (-2.34)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=21				0.015* (-2.52)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=23				0.017* (-2.45)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=31				0.038+ (-1.94)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=32				0.126 (-1.32)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=36				0.060 (-1.62)
LR- $\chi^2$	152.581	159.087	158.283	146.430
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	.2011649	.2097424	.2086814	.2084299
N	1274	1274	1274	1005

+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Z-scores in parenthesis under odd ratios



**Table V.11: Cold War Era Reduced Model with Various Specifications of time (Odd Ratios)**

	(1) Linear	(2) Quadratic	(3) Splines	(4) Dummies
Security Only	<b>7.703*</b> (2.21)	<b>8.302*</b> (2.28)	<b>8.421*</b> (2.29)	<b>11.184*</b> (2.48)
Conflict Intensity	<b>0.146***</b> (-4.82)	<b>0.116***</b> (-4.87)	<b>0.111***</b> (-4.91)	<b>0.099***</b> (-4.87)
Democracy-Autocracy	<b>1.014</b> (0.37)	<b>1.009</b> (0.24)	<b>1.008</b> (0.23)	<b>1.006</b> (0.16)
Internally Displaced People	<b>1.000</b> (-0.51)	<b>1.000</b> (-0.77)	<b>1.000</b> (-0.83)	<b>1.000</b> (-0.64)
Peace Agreement	<b>1.580</b> (0.40)	<b>1.431</b> (0.31)	<b>1.402</b> (0.30)	<b>1.820</b> (0.49)
Ceasefire	<b>21.644*</b> (2.28)	<b>29.077*</b> (2.45)	<b>30.723*</b> (2.48)	<b>49.180*</b> (2.54)
Victory	<b>4.718</b> (1.37)	<b>4.614</b> (1.35)	<b>4.626</b> (1.35)	<b>6.727</b> (1.54)
Low or no Activity	<b>2.130</b> (0.68)	<b>2.049</b> (0.64)	<b>2.057</b> (0.64)	<b>3.117</b> (0.93)
Middle East	<b>1.524</b> (0.32)	<b>1.471</b> (0.29)	<b>1.506</b> (0.31)	<b>1.337</b> (0.21)
Asia	<b>0.913</b> (-0.08)	<b>0.835</b> (-0.15)	<b>0.832</b> (-0.15)	<b>0.706</b> (-0.28)
Africa	<b>1.281</b> (0.19)	<b>1.216</b> (0.15)	<b>1.227</b> (0.16)	<b>0.970</b> (-0.02)
Americas	<b>1.095</b> (0.07)	<b>1.091</b> (0.07)	<b>1.109</b> (0.08)	<b>0.959</b> (-0.03)
Time since last peace	<b>0.909**</b> (-2.64)	<b>1.049</b> (0.40)		
confyrssq		<b>0.994</b> (-1.15)		
(confyrs-k1) cubed			<b>0.996</b> (-0.19)	
(confyrs-k2) cubed			<b>1.001</b> (0.13)	
(confyrs-k3) cubed			<b>1.000</b> (0.10)	
Temporal dummy, confyrs=1				<b>0.958</b> (-0.03)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=2				<b>0.210</b> (-1.13)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=3				<b>0.657</b> (-0.32)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=4				<b>1.116</b> (0.09)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=5				<b>0.625</b> (-0.33)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=6				<b>0.519</b> (-0.46)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=8				<b>0.884</b> (-0.09)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=9				<b>2.287</b> (0.60)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=10				<b>1.425</b> (0.25)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=12				<b>1.274</b> (0.15)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=23				<b>0.922</b> (-0.05)
LR-Chi2	<b>89.753</b>	<b>91.687</b>	<b>91.983</b>	<b>72.446</b>
Pseudo-R2	<b>.265298</b>	<b>.2710142</b>	<b>.2718899</b>	<b>.2468863</b>
N	<b>543</b>	<b>543</b>	<b>543</b>	<b>359</b>

+ p&lt;0.10, \* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Z-scores in parenthesis under odd ratios

**Table V.12: Post-Cold War Reduced Model with Various Specifications of time (Odd Ratios)**


	(1) Linear	(2) Quadratic	(3) Splines	(4) Dummies
Security only	<b>3.085</b> (1.58)	<b>3.651+</b> (1.76)	<b>3.640+</b> (1.76)	<b>3.622+</b> (1.76)
simultaneous	<b>1.035</b> (0.04)	<b>1.031</b> (0.04)	<b>1.076</b> (0.09)	<b>1.078</b> (0.09)
Sequential	<b>2.077</b> (1.45)	<b>1.971</b> (1.35)	<b>1.995</b> (1.37)	<b>1.987</b> (1.34)
Conflict Intensity	<b>0.304***</b> (-3.49)	<b>0.288***</b> (-3.59)	<b>0.288***</b> (-3.60)	<b>0.292***</b> (-3.54)
Democracy-Autocracy	<b>1.000</b> (0.02)	<b>1.001</b> (0.04)	<b>1.002</b> (0.06)	<b>1.004</b> (0.12)
Internally Displaced People	<b>1.000</b> (-0.34)	<b>1.000</b> (-0.46)	<b>1.000</b> (-0.41)	<b>1.000</b> (-0.41)
Peace Agreement	<b>10.270*</b> (2.15)	<b>9.377*</b> (2.07)	<b>9.559*</b> (2.09)	<b>9.412*</b> (2.07)
Ceasefire w/ Regulations	<b>12.024*</b> (2.19)	<b>10.281*</b> (2.06)	<b>9.990*</b> (2.03)	<b>9.614*</b> (1.99)
Ceasefire	<b>11.060+</b> (1.90)	<b>10.913+</b> (1.89)	<b>10.617+</b> (1.87)	<b>10.559+</b> (1.86)
Victory	<b>20.316**</b> (2.77)	<b>19.043**</b> (2.73)	<b>18.209**</b> (2.69)	<b>18.551**</b> (2.70)
Low or no Activity	<b>6.962+</b> (1.81)	<b>6.149+</b> (1.70)	<b>6.212+</b> (1.70)	<b>6.305+</b> (1.71)
Middle East	<b>0.699</b> (-0.58)	<b>0.608</b> (-0.80)	<b>0.602</b> (-0.81)	<b>0.586</b> (-0.85)
Asia	<b>0.215**</b> (-3.16)	<b>0.195***</b> (-3.35)	<b>0.198***</b> (-3.32)	<b>0.194***</b> (-3.32)
Africa	<b>0.233**</b> (-2.94)	<b>0.214**</b> (-3.09)	<b>0.217**</b> (-3.06)	<b>0.210**</b> (-3.10)
Americas	<b>0.827</b> (-0.33)	<b>0.777</b> (-0.43)	<b>0.770</b> (-0.45)	<b>0.770</b> (-0.44)
Time since last peace	<b>0.947</b> (-1.08)	<b>1.312</b> (1.53)		
confyrrsq		<b>0.974+</b> (-1.82)		
(confyrrs-k1) cubed			<b>1.004</b> (0.10)	
(confyrrs-k2) cubed			<b>0.988</b> (-0.51)	
(confyrrs-k3) cubed			<b>1.013</b> (1.04)	
Temporal dummy, confyrrs=1				<b>1.336</b> (0.26)
Temporal dummy, confyrrs=2				<b>1.190</b> (0.15)
Temporal dummy, confyrrs=3				<b>0.999</b> (-0.00)
Temporal dummy, confyrrs=4				<b>2.031</b> (0.63)
Temporal dummy, confyrrs=5				<b>1.051</b> (0.04)
Temporal dummy, confyrrs=6				<b>2.131</b> (0.66)
Temporal dummy, confyrrs=7				<b>1.415</b> (0.29)
Temporal dummy, confyrrs=8				<b>2.364</b> (0.73)
Temporal dummy, confyrrs=10				<b>2.145</b> (0.63)
LR-Chi2	<b>85.607</b>	<b>89.745</b>	<b>91.317</b>	<b>72.107</b>
Pseudo-R2	<b>.2040544</b>	<b>.2139181</b>	<b>.2176668</b>	<b>.1842937</b>
N	<b>679</b>	<b>679</b>	<b>679</b>	<b>549</b>

+ p&lt;0.10, \* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Z-scores in parenthesis under odd ratios



**Table V.13: Adjusted Predicted Probabilities of establishing peace for each strategy**

	Year 2			Year 5			Year 10			Year 20		
STRATEGY	pr	lb	ub	pr	lb	ub	pr	lb	ub	pr	lb	ub
No Operation	0.16362	[.072321	.370154]	0.11706	[.062575	.218966]	0.06699	[.04596	.097637]	0.02194	[.011501	.041851]
Security-Only	0.55251	[.181319	1.68362]	0.39528	[.138181	1.13076]	0.22621	[.079882	.640603]	0.07409	[.019245	.2852]
Simultaneous	0.31877	[.069613	1.45968]	0.22806	[.053605	.970217]	0.13051	[.032424	.525327]	0.04274	[.009078	.201247]
Sequential	0.28139	[.103744	.763229]	0.20131	[.08189	.494904]	0.11521	[.049753	.266779]	0.03773	[.012211	.116588]
Pr = Probability												
[lb, ub] = [95% Confidence Interval]												

**Graph V.4: Predicted Probabilities of Establishing Peace over time According to Strategies**


**Table V.14: Adjusted Predicted Probability of Peace According to Intensity:**

	Year 2			Year 5			Year 10			Year 20		
INTENSITY	pr	lb	ub	pr	lb	ub	pr	lb	ub	pr	lb	ub
Low Intensity	.421409	[.249608	.711459]	.301488	[.207504	.438038]	.172536	[.121688	.24463]	.056506	[.022325	.143018]
Full-Scale War	.128738	[.051185	.323796]	.092103	[.04419	.191964]	.052709	[.032721	.084906]	.017262	[.009327	.031949]
pr = Probability												
[lb, ub] = [95% Confidence Interval]												

**Graph V.5: Adjusted Predicted Probabilities of Establishing Peace According to the Intensity of Conflict****Over Time****Graph V.6: Odds of Establishing Peace - Comparing Low Intensity Conflict with War**


**Table V.15: Adjusted Predicted Probabilities of Peace for Each Outcome Type:**

OUTCOME	Year 2			Year 5			Year 10			Year 20		
	pr	lb	ub	pr	lb	ub	pr	lb	ub	pr	lb	ub
<b>Peace Agreement</b>	0.184276	[.085105	.399009]	0.131836	[.070062	.248076]	0.075447	[.044536	.127813]	0.024709	[.010046	.060778]
<b>Ceasefire with Regulations</b>	0.105086	[.038664	.285616]	0.075181	[.03086	.183156]	0.043025	[.019153	.096649]	0.014091	[.004811	.041273]
<b>Ceasefire</b>	0.773933	[.12116	4.94364]	0.553693	[.102435	2.99289]	0.316868	[.07521	1.335]	0.103776	[.033381	.322617]
<b>Victory</b>	0.352326	[.185997	.667397]	0.252064	[.154322	.411711]	0.144251	[.095669	.217504]	0.047243	[.019313	.115568]
<b>No or Low Activity</b>	0.228871	[.095726	.547203]	0.16374	[.082623	.324497]	0.093705	[.060728	.144591]	0.030689	[.016247	.057968]
<b>Other</b>	0.035143	[.006247	.197701]	0.025142	[.004977	.127011]	0.014388	[.003232	.064058]	0.004712	[.001062	.020902]
pr = Probability												
[lb, ub] = [95% Confidence Interval]												

**Graph V.7: Adjusted Predicted Probabilities of Peace According to Types of Outcome over Time**

**Table V.16: Adjusted Predicted Probabilities of Peace According to Regions**

	Year 2			Year 5			Year 10			Year 20		
REGION	pr	lb	ub	pr	lb	ub	pr	lb	ub	pr	lb	ub
Europe	0.443719	[.217148	.906695]	0.317449	[.163148	.617684]	0.18167	[.087282	.378129]	0.059498	[.017471	.202622]
Middle East	0.204278	[.081548	.511718]	0.146146	[.067492	.316465]	0.083637	[.044675	.156578]	0.027391	[.011445	.065557]
Asia	0.171069	[.060175	.486321]	0.122387	[.051967	.288237]	0.07004	[.038955	.12593]	0.022938	[.012795	.041124]
Africa	0.132057	[.06436	.270964]	0.094477	[.053631	.166434]	0.054068	[.034537	.084642]	0.017707	[.007504	.041785]
Americas	0.241236	[.089724	.648595]	0.172587	[.073531	.40508]	0.098768	[.048099	.202813]	0.032347	[.012707	.08234]
pr = Probability												
[lb, ub] = [95% Confidence Interval]												

**Graph V.8: Predicted Probabilities of Peace According to Regions over Time**

## CHAPTER VI

### CASE STUDIES: SECURITY-ONLY STRATEGY IN NICARAGUA AND BURUNDI

The next three chapters will present six case studies, exemplifying two cases per strategy (*Security-only*, *Sequential* and *Simultaneous*). Following Alexander George's method for structured, focused comparison, one case ending with peace and one with the continuation of conflict have been selected for each strategy and will be analyzed and compared using the same set of questions. These cases complement the quantitative analysis by revealing the complexity of the subject matter and reminding us that there are case-specific conditions that render any generalization overly simplistic. Comparing these cases, two aspects not dealt with in the quantitative analysis are sought to be investigated. First, the specificity of each case highlights the importance of variables other than the ones identified earlier. Second, and more importantly, the quality of peace will be accounted for. As explained earlier, negative peace is one very important step towards the establishment of durable peace. However, the sustainability of peace depends on its quality. Working towards positive peace implies that peacebuilders have to play roles beyond the cessation of violence.

In the analysis of the case studies, human security is used as a framework to assess the qualitative aspects of peace since its seven dimensions points to the

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areas that need to be addressed for peace to be sustainable. As explained earlier, accounting for the positive aspects of peace quantitatively is challenging, as quantifying quality-related variables is not always possible. Even if proxies can be found, it is often impossible to gather reliable and coherent data for the majority of cases, especially since it involves war-torn societies. The analysis follows the questions developed for the focused comparison of the six cases presented in Chapter four. The first set of questions corresponds to the variables used in the quantitative analysis, that is: intensity/duration, internally displaced people, level of democracy/autocracy, economic indicators, type of outcome, and relevance of ethnicity. The second set of questions tackles variables that were not included in the statistical analysis that is: ripeness of conflict, responsiveness and commitment from international actors, aspects related to the quality of peace (depending on the availability of data, indicators on education, health, economics, politics are analyzed and compared across cases).

Below for Nicaragua and Burundi and in the following two chapters for Sierra Leone and Angola, Mozambique and Cambodia, these variables are investigated systematically for each case. As mentioned earlier, each chapter analyzes one success and one failure case per peace operation strategy and ends with a comparison between the two cases regarding the factors contributing to or inhibiting the establishment of peace. In Nicaragua, the peace operations deployed by the UN and the Organization of American States' (OAS) have contributed greatly to the establishment of peace. In Burundi, however, the operation



deployed by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) failed to bring an end to the conflict. A comparison of these two cases is presented below. In the following chapters, comparisons of cases with different strategies are mentioned where relevant, but a systematic evaluation of the six cases is left to the last chapters of discussion and conclusions, where the qualitative findings will also be interpreted along with quantitative results.

## **1. NICARAGUA: CONFLICT SPELL 1978-1989**

Two operations, both following a *Security-Only* mandate, were deployed to Nicaragua; one OAS-led and one UN-led operation. CIAV (*Comisión Internacional de Apoyo y Verificación*) was established by OAS as a Support and Verification Commission in Nicaragua in late 1989. In addition, the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), originally deployed in 1989 to verify the interstate non-intervention agreement signed among several Central American countries, was redirected to deal solely with the Nicaraguan conflict in 1990. Before examining the effect of the intervention's strategy and that of other variables on the establishment of peace and its quality, a brief history of the conflict follows.

### **1.1. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NICARAGUAN CONFLICT**

Nicaragua started the last century with an increasingly discontent indigenous population rebelling against the government. Several reforms in the countryside, mainly populated by *mestizo* peasants, had legally transformed

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communally-led indigenous farmland into purchasable territory. Only the wealthy elites aspiring to exploit the lucrative agro-export market were able to afford these new purchasable lands. These policies, disadvantaging and displacing the rural peasantry and favouring the existing elite and bureaucracy, continued after the rigged elections in 1936, in which Anastasio Somoza Gracia became the autocratic president and persisted until the Somoza family dictatorship was overthrown by the Sandinistas in 1979 (Walker 1986). The Sandinistas had become very visible in the 1960s, when they established their guerrilla organization, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, FSLN<sup>1</sup>.

The Somoza regime started to show signs of weakening during the 1970s. The regime's blatant disregard for human rights hindered U.S. ability to openly help it, as the Carter Administration had campaigned on the platform of promoting human rights internationally. Moreover, increasingly dissatisfied, Nicaraguans were joining the ranks of FSLN, especially after the assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro in early 1978, an internationally renowned journalist who actively opposed the Somocista regime. The trigger to the FSLN/Somoza conflict can be traced to this event, which precipitated a series of daring and relatively successful attacks, strikes and revolts by the FSLN against the regime. A last well-planned and bold Sandinista offensive started in June 1979 and ended with the departure of Somoza to Miami on July 17<sup>th</sup>. The new Sandinista

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<sup>1</sup> Although it is also argued to have started in the anti-Somoza students movements of 1944-48 see: Booth, 1985

government, however, would only enjoy a short period of relative calm before it found itself again in the middle of a conflict.

The revolutionary government aspired at stopping the old regime's brutality and cut the external support that aided it. They aspired to reconstruct the national economy, to reduce the class inequality and to improve the standard of living of the lower classes. However, "[d]espite its intention to make Nicaraguan society more just and peaceful, the Sandinista revolution gave rise to deep conflicts over perceived injustices. [...] Sharp ideological divisions developed rapidly after the fall of Anastasia Somoza in 1979. Marxists of every persuasion struggled both with one another and with the democratic socialists" (Wehr and Burgess 1994, 88). The revolutionary process and the FSLN government in particular, increasingly became the target of Somocista regime sympathisers, whose properties had been confiscated to fund the mass education and health programs, and organize agricultural and industrial cooperatives. It is argued however, that rather than domestic opposition, the political and economic destabilization from the outside was the major contributor to the ensuing escalation of violence, which culminated in almost a decade of fighting. "The U.S. government's policy to derail the Sandinista revolution may have been the most intensive national destabilization program in history. The Contra resistance, and to a much lesser degree the Yatama movement, were supplied and organized from the outside" (Wehr and Burgess 1994, 82).

Fearing a US-backed exile invasion or the regionalization of a U.S. occupation of El Salvador, or again, U.S. support for a Honduran or Guatemalan attack on Nicaragua, the period of 1980-88 witnessed a constant militarization, taking funds away from the social programs advertised by the revolutionary government. In fact, after the first years of optimism and euphoria, the revolutionary government had to realize that their efforts to institutionalize and consolidate their regime will be challenged by domestic resistance with foreign support, economic strangulation, and even direct CIA sabotage. Initially this resulted in a boost in the Sandinistas already wide base of grassroots support. This can be observed in the results of the first free, open, and fair elections that Nicaragua held in 1984 (Zelaya 1990)<sup>2</sup>; the Sandinista government won sixty-six percent of the vote against the six opposition parties that participated (Selbin 1999). However, counterrevolutionary (*Contra*) attacks aimed at crucial infrastructure such as bridges, oil-refining facilities, schools and health centers started as early as 1981, and intensified in the following years.

### 1.2. END OF CONFLICT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE

The US was not the only external influence on Nicaragua. In fact, the Nicaraguan revolution had been greatly aided by some other Latin American countries such as Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. These countries also helped the Sandinistas during the first years of the revolution

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<sup>2</sup> Despite the generally favourable assessments of the electoral process by independent observers, it failed to satisfy FSLN's critics in the Regan Administration, "[...]who dismissed the elections as 'farcical'"(Williams 1990, 16).

sharing the common desire to stop US intervention into Latin America. In the same vein, Colombia and three other countries – Mexico, Panama and Venezuela – started the Contadora process in 1983 (Wehr and Lederach 1991)<sup>3</sup>. This initiative did not amount to much due to the complexity of its demands and his preoccupation with security issues, but it created the base on which *Esquipulas* could be built (Oliver 1999). *Esquipulas* is the renowned series of historical efforts to resolve interstate conflicts and promote regional integration in Central America<sup>4</sup>.

The *Esquipulas* agreement set objectives and prescribed specific measures: demilitarization of conflict through cease-fires; refusal of support for and use of territory by insurgents; national reconciliation through negotiated settlements, amnesty for insurgents, and repatriation of refugees; democratization of political systems through free and open elections, ending states of emergency, and protection of human rights; and continuing regional consultation through periodic summits and a parliament. The attention of the successive *Esquipulas* summits was almost entirely on resolving Nicaraguan conflicts. (Wehr and Burgess 1994, 88)

The *Esquipulas II* accord followed, where the Nicaraguan internal opposition called for national dialogue, leading to the formation of 14 parties' coalition, the National Opposition Union (UNO). It is important to note for the analysis below that the political opposition groups forming UNO were separate

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<sup>3</sup> The Contadora negotiating process was initiated at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama on Contadora Island in the Gulf of Panama. The aim was to find use Latin American diplomatic effort to stabilize the Central American situation and harmonize relationship among these countries.

<sup>4</sup> For more details see chapter written by Oscar Arias, former President of Costa Rica, Nobel Prize laureate, architect of the Arias Peace Plan and organizer of *Esquipulas I* and *II* (Arias 1997).

entities from the Contra guerrillas fighting the FSLN (Soberg Shugart 1992). In 1989, during the San Salvador summit, President Daniel Ortega permitted opposition parties to participate in the election campaign and allowed for the upcoming elections to be monitored by the United Nations, leading to the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission for the Verification of the Elections of Nicaragua (ONUVEN). In August 1989, the Tela summit led to the signing of the Plan for the demobilization of the Contras before the end of the year and the assistance of the UN and the OAS was solicited to implement the plan (Rosende and Beltrand 1997). As explained in greater length below, ONUCA and OAS-CIAV played an important role in providing security and overseeing the peaceful demobilisation of the guerrilla forces (Child 1999). They also were active in dismantling their camps, distributing humanitarian aid, and decommissioning the weapons.

On February 25, 1990, the FSLN was taken by surprise when the opposition/coalition UNO won the elections. The Sandinistas just started to realize how much their support base had declined (Ardón and Eade 1999). A very heterogeneous alliance supported by the US government and led by Violeta Chamorro<sup>5</sup> came to rule Nicaragua. A protocol of the proceedings for the transfer of the presidency of the Republic of Nicaragua was signed after the election (27 March 1990) calling for social reconciliation and aiming to ensure an orderly and

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<sup>5</sup> The widow of the renowned journalist who had been assassinated for opposing the Somocista regime in 1979. She had been invited to join the first Sandinista junta, but resigned in 1980, not liking their socialist agenda and feeling manipulated.

peaceful transition. The war officially ended the 18<sup>th</sup> of April 1990, when a cease-fire agreement was signed.

### **1.3. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING OR INHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE**

#### ***1.3.1. THE PRESENCE OF OAS-CIAV (AUGUST 1989 -- JULY 1996) AND ONUCA (DECEMBER 1989 -- JANUARY 1992)***

The presence of OAS-CIAV and ONUCA greatly contributed to the establishment and durability of peace in Nicaragua. Their mandates were clear, straightforward, yet flexible. They effectively fulfill their roles of neutral third-party monitors and guarantors of the Esquipulas agreement. They adapted to the needs of the demobilized excombatants and provided them with the necessary means to re-integrate to their societies. The section below chronologically examines the deployments, the activities, the changes in mandates, and the contributions of these missions to the process of establishing peace.

As mentioned above, ONUCA was initially deployed to assist the implementation of Central American governments' collective agreement, Esquipulas II, which called for the establishment of a 'firm and lasting peace' in Central America. ONUCA's original mandate consisted of on-site verifications of the security undertakings contained in the agreement, which demanded "the cessation of aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements, and (b) the non-use of the territory of one State for attacks on other States... include[ing] preventing the establishment or use of facilities for radio or television transmissions for the specific purpose of directing or assisting the military

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operations of irregular forces or insurrectionist movements in any of the five countries” (UNDPKO 1992). Since it was supervising many borders, and also various armed groups in the region, teams of 10 military observers would patrol various locations by land, by air, and occasionally by river. ONUCA fits perfectly with the *Security-Only* strategy as it was to provide security while “[t]he remaining aspects of the Esquipulas II Agreement were left for other specialized international agencies to execute” (Fernandez 2004, 82).

On 12 December 1989, recognizing ONUCA’s potential in helping the peace process in Nicaragua, the five Central American Presidents requested that its mandate be expanded to Nicaragua to supervise groups willing to disarm and demobilize. It was clear that durable peace could only be established if the various irregular forces in the region demobilize and reintegrate into the normal functioning of their societies. After this request had been approved by the UN Security Council, ONUCA’s mandate was redirected to be mainly involved in the resolution of the Nicaraguan conflict. As the Contras started to show some willingness to disarm, ONUCA’s mandate was first expanded to oversee the demobilization of the Contras positioned in Honduras. The operation was authorized to deploy an infantry battalion to provide security for the demobilization centers and to supervise the disarmament of the forces in Honduras. Subsequently, further negotiations between the Contras and the new government of Nicaragua led to a second expansion of ONUCA’s mandate. The Security Council Resolution 650 in March 1990, gave ONUCA the responsibility



to create security zones in Nicaragua, within which the Contras would demobilize (Grote 1998). This proved to be a very efficient solution to regroup and prepare ex-combatants to reintegrate in to their society. 1,098 military observers and troops were deployed by May 1990, supported by international and local civilian staff.

The establishment of CIAV in August 1989, the Support and Verification Commission set up by the OAS, contributed greatly to the success of ONUCA. While ONUCA was in charge of recalling, collecting and destroying arms, CIAV's mandate "was frequently extended for short periods in order to protect the rights and security of the excombatants, including verifying and pursuing any claims that these had been violated" (Ardón and Eade 1999, 21). CIAV's mandate was mainly about the security of the excombatants, but it was also flexible at acting as a conflict-mediator between guerrilla forces and the government. As mentioned above, UNO, even though supported by many guerrilla forces, was a separate entity from the guerrillas. Therefore, the role of CIAV was vital in voicing the demands of these forces and providing them with the necessary assurances from the government so they agree to demobilize and disarm. "Among other tasks, the Tela plan entrusted the CIAV-OAS Mission with guaranteeing the practice of fundamental rights and freedoms for repatriated and demobilized people through the establishment of a Commission and observation offices, so that all those protected by the plan can report any violation of their rights and security" (Rosende and Beltrand 1997, 149). CIAV proved to be an important

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complementary to ONUCA, especially at times when the demobilization process was not unfolding as smoothly as it could. The lack of foreign assistance made government's promises of economic recovery slow in materializing. Short of the necessary resources, UNO's commitments to provide excombatants the land and services weakened significantly (Fernandez 2004). "Chamarro's UNO government ha[d] promised many things to the ex-fighters, including territory, influence over the police force, and material assistance such as schools, roads, clinics, and agricultural tools" (Conradi 1993, 437). CIAV's role was crucial at this point: by voicing the demands of the ex-combatants and holding the government accountable, it not only forced UNO to honour its promises, but it also provided hope for demobilized fighters that re-integration to society is possible. According to the Association of Retired Soldiers (AMIR), those who remobilized were the fighters who did not receive support and protection. Some former Contras regrouped to form the so-called '*recontra*', this was followed by the remobilization of some former Sandinista soldiers, under the name of '*recompas*'. However, as Grenier and Daudelin (1995) explain, the remobilization was sparked by lack of opportunity and mutual fear of each other. It is interesting to note that with ONUCA and CIAV providing security zones, and with the increasing presence of local police units, the main preoccupation quickly centered on economic demands, rather than security concerns. In fact, "many [excombatants] quickly found common ground with their former 'enemies': instead of fighting one another some decided to pressure the government into

complying with its word, and the ‘revueltos’ were born” (Grenier and Daudelin 1995, 89). The formation of *revueltos* is evidence for the fact that the insecurity present between the two groups had been successfully appeased. Child explains that “[t]he Central American peace process, and the involvement of these two international organizations [ONUCA and CIAV-OAS], introduced a series of conflict resolution approaches which previously had been little known in the area. These included the notion of creating ‘zones of peace’, and of using confidence-building measures (to include better communications between potential adversaries, and the respect for human rights) to make conflict less likely” (Child 1999, 17). It is apparent that the security oriented strategy implemented by these peace operations contributed greatly to the appeasement of hostility and the establishment of durable peace in Nicaragua.

Other responsibilities, such as dealing with the safety of the refugees, were initially given to CIAV and ONUCA. However, as their mandates quickly expanded to assume more tasks such as monitoring demobilization and securing ex-combatants, the specialized agency UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) took over the responsibility of safeguarding and protecting the rights of the refugees (Baranyi and North 1993). This enabled ONUCA and CIAV to use all their resources and efforts in securing the peace process. As mentioned before, this scheme fits the design suggested by the *Security-Only* advocates, who urge that each issue is best addressed when delegated to the relevant specialized agency.

Both ONUCA and CIAV's mandates were straightforward in that their responsibilities were limited to basic security related tasks. Even though two operations, sent by two different institutions, were on the ground, they collaborated and coordinated their activities in an efficient and productive manner. They also worked well alongside other developmental agencies, such as the UNHCR. While the later successfully resettled the displaced population, ONUCA and CIAV efficiently coordinated their efforts to demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants into their society. These missions undoubtedly contributed to the establishment of peace, it is however also important to consider other factors playing a role in the Nicaraguan peace process.

### ***1.3.2. THE INTENSITY AND DURATION OF CONFLICT***

The conflict lasted eleven years, reaching 40,000 to 55,000 battle-related deaths<sup>6</sup> between the years of 1978 and 1989 (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). The actual counts of total number of deaths (including non-combatants) are highly contested; using recent survey data, Seligson and McElhinny (1996) argued that the Nicaraguan conflict death toll was around 80,000, of which 40,000 were non-combatants. An estimated 500,000 people were internally displaced<sup>7</sup> due to the

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<sup>6</sup> Battle fatalities are defined as civilians and combatants killed in the course of combat. According to the codebook for the UCDP/PRIO dataset 'An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005)

<sup>7</sup> "Forcibly Displaced Populations 1964-2006 Dataset Compiled by Monty G. Marshall, Center for Systemic Peace <[www.systemicpeace.org](http://www.systemicpeace.org)>

conflict. These numbers show that the war in Nicaragua was intense, affecting the everyday life of many Nicaraguans.

An attempt to qualitatively capture the intensity of the conflict reveals however that some factors lessen the polarization and hostility within the Nicaraguan society. Different from a conflict about primordial identities, the political loyalties in Nicaragua were rather fluid. Even though the supporters of the revolutionaries had greatly suffered from the Somoza regime and the ensuing conflict with the Contras, they were ready to try other options. The fact that the 14 parties agreed on Doña Violeta<sup>8</sup>, the widow of Predro Joaquín Chamorro, to be the president of UNO helped mobilize a certain segment of the FSLN supporters (Pastor 1990). Another factor helping UNO's gathering votes from both camps was that it was not directly connected or composed by Contra guerrilla fighters. But it is fair to conclude that the Nicaraguan conflict did not create an enduring sense of hostility and polarization within the society that would be strong enough to jeopardize the peace process. As it will be observed in the case of Burundi, conflicts along ethnic lines seems to set off a kind of hostility and insecurity that is far more difficult to soothe, as these identities and loyalties tend to persist longer than political ones.

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<sup>8</sup> The assassination of P.J. Chamorro in 1978 had been a catalyst mobilizing Nicaragua's middle class under the Sandinistas, which ensured their military victory in 1979.

**1.3.3. LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY/AUTOCRACY**

Nicaragua's lack of experience with democracy has not prevented the smooth transition to peace through political liberalization and the holding of peaceful elections. The country had a long history of autocratic rule, with the Somoza family reigning from 1936 to 1979. The 1950s experienced some minor political openings that were quickly reversed. In 1979, Sandinista revolutionaries overthrew the dictatorial dynasty to inherit an anti-democratic, corrupt, patrimonial legacy characterized with pervasive human rights violations. Some democratization was initiated by the FSLN, but the constant fighting with the Contras was preventing deeper political liberalization (Selbin 1999). The first free and fair elections were held in 1984, with the FSLN winning by a clear majority. But it was not until the 1990 elections that the Sandinistas' commitment to democracy was proven truly genuine when President Ortega peacefully accepted defeat and was replaced by the UNO.

It is well-known that transfers of power from one warring party to another after an event of conflict are often conflictual. As some of the subsequent cases show (Burundi, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Cambodia), elections are found to increase insecurity and hostility, especially if the competing parties are armed. It is interesting to note that in Nicaragua, the elections were held before the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration process was finalized. Faced with electoral defeat, armed factions generally choose to return to fight rather than giving up or sharing power. In Nicaragua this was not the case. The Sandinistas

and the masses that supported it accepted and respected the outcome of the 1990 elections. While this may suggest that respect for democratic practices were flourishing in Nicaragua, it may also indicate the UNO was not representing a threat to the survival of FSLN. In fact, the peculiarity of the Nicaraguan case is that even though UNO was supported by the majority of armed guerrillas, it was not armed itself. FSLN trusted that UNO would not come to power and militarily destroy them. Moreover, the Sandinistas had been in control of the state apparatus and the military for more than a decade. They were confident that they would be allowed to function within the democratic institutions as the main opposition party. The overwhelming international and regional presence unquestionably also served as a guarantee that power could not be abused and that each party would be allowed to exist as long as they abide by democratic practices.

#### ***1.3.4. ECONOMIC SITUATION***

The difficulties experienced during the process of demobilization shows how much the state of the economy was an important factor in the establishment of peace. While warring parties were ready to disarm, their willingness was significantly decreased when it became apparent that the economic conditions would not allow them to resume a normal lifestyle and reintegrate into society. It is clear that once security had been provided in form of the creation of security zones and the strengthening of local police forces, the refusal to disarm (or in some case the decision to re-arm) was due to lack of economic opportunities. CIAV's role in urging the government to honour its economic promises to ex-

combatants was crucial in convincing disarmament. CIAV understood that providing security for excombatants should be paired with some guarantees permitting their reintegration to the society.

Other influential international actors often get involved in promoting their vision for peacebuilding. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and in this case, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)'s recommendations were influential in shaping Nicaragua's post-conflict economy. They advocated economic liberalization encouraged by financial support conditional to compliance with their program. In order to finance the deficit during the period of reconstruction, the Chamorro administration had to guarantee the flow of foreign finances. Therefore, quickly after assuming power, UNO signed a detailed stabilization and structural adjustment plan designed by the IMF, WB and USAID. Graph VI.1 illustrates that the overall Nicaraguan economy has grown since the early 1990s, but only to reach the average growth levels recorded for UN classified least developed countries<sup>9</sup>. Despite the flow of foreign aid, the economic policies applied did not stabilize the economy; broad sectors have been impoverished and marginalized. In fact, after analyzing the Nicaraguan experience, Paris concludes that "[...] the economic aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding in Nicaragua appear to challenge the notion that economic liberalization fosters peace in states that are just emerging from civil wars" (Paris 2002, 48). He projected that if the economic

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<sup>9</sup> Data for least Developed Countries is not available before 1981.



situation in Nicaragua does not stabilize, it could reproduce the same conditions which established the root causes of the original conflict. Even though the liberal economic policies harmed some segments of the society, the country has not relapsed to conflict.

### *1.3.5. OUTCOME OF THE CONFLICT*

The overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979 was a victory for the Sandinistas, which temporarily halted the fighting in Nicaragua. However, a quick relapse to conflict followed. This seems to go counter to the hypothesis discussed earlier positing that victory as an outcome leads to more stable peace (Walter 1997; Fortna 2003; Toft 2006). However, the relapse to conflict in Nicaragua can be explained by the extensive outside support that the Contras received. If foreign support was not readily available to the Contras, it is dubious that they would have been able to wage such a persistent war against the revolutionary government.

The peace achieved in 1989, on the other hand, has been durable and stable. It was the outcome of the Esquipulas peace agreements signed by the Central American nations. The involvement and commitment of many Central American nations contributed greatly to establishment and durability of peace in Nicaragua. The inclusion of the FSLN and the several opposing parties to the peace negotiation created an environment of trust, which facilitated peaceful elections in 1990. The involvement of several actors and international organizations also provided guarantees for both parties, and eased mutual insecurities.

**1.3.6. OTHER FACTORS**

In the case of Nicaragua, it is clear that foreign interest and the regional willingness to help the peace process were influential factors in acquiring peace. On one hand the cooperation of neighbouring countries was imperative for the successful demobilization of the Contras. On the other hand, the winding down of Cold War rivalries contributed greatly to the establishment peace. In fact, “[t]his occurred at a time when a convergence of several factors was leading the major players in the conflict to actively seek a peaceful solution” (Child 1999, 13). Also Nicaragua received a relatively generous foreign aid assistance averaging around \$130 per capita<sup>10</sup>.

Is it possible to argue that the Nicaraguan conflict was ripe for resolution? As explained in chapter three, it is difficult to clearly pin down a list of conditions that determines the ripeness of a conflict. Zartman’s conceptualization of ripeness as a ‘Mutually Hurting Stalemate’ seems to fit the situation in Nicaragua (Zartman 2000). On one hand, the Sandinista government was facing a loss of reputation and of supporters as the war against the Contras was taking scarce resources away from their social programmes. On the other hand, the Contras were becoming increasingly aware that with declining U.S. funds, a military victory against the FSLN was becoming unlikely. The existence of a peaceful

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<sup>10</sup> The World Bank Group, Quick Query selected from World Development Indicators (accessed on Aug. 14, 2009) <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/report.do?method=showReport>

solution and of an acceptable framework for negotiations was certainly very important in the resolution of the Nicaraguan conflict.

#### **1.4. INDICATORS FOR POSITIVE PEACE IN NICARAGUA**

Even though the first years of the UNO administration were rather unstable, Nicaragua did not relapse into conflict. The economic, political and social indicators suggest that the quality of peace was also slowly increasing. Data collection on inequality only starts in 1993 and shows that there are improvements in poverty levels. The percentage of population living in households with consumption or income per person below the poverty line is in decline. While it was 32.5 per cent in 1993, it decreased to 21.76 per cent in 1998 and to 19.42 per cent in 2001. The poverty gap, defined as mean distance below the poverty level as a proportion of the poverty line, is also improving dropping from 14.86 per cent in 1993 to 8.73 per cent in 1998 and 6.6 per cent in 2001<sup>11</sup>. Several indicators show that in terms of health and nutrition, Nicaragua has been within the world average and even higher since the late 1990s. While life expectancy at birth was a little under the world average in 1985, it has increased steadily to rise above average, and reached 70 years old in 2000<sup>12</sup>. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), under-nutrition was a major problem in the late

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<sup>11</sup> PovcalNet: Online Poverty Analysis Tool (Data available for countries) Accessed on August 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2009: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTPOVRES/EXTPOVCALNET/0,,menuPK:5280448~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:5280443,00.html>

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

1980s as more than 50 per cent of the population lived under the minimum level of dietary energy consumption. This improved slowly and gradually during the 1990s and it has dropped below 20 per cent by 1999<sup>13</sup>. Reliable data on education level is hard to find for the 1980s and 1990s. However, estimates show that Nicaraguan primary school completion percentage (of the relevant age group) increased from 30 per cent in the 1980 to 50 per cent in the mid-1990s and to 74 per cent in the mid-2000. These indicators show that the quality of peace in Nicaragua is on the increase, which contribute to its sustainability.

While some conditions may have been favourable for peace in Nicaragua, the contribution of ONUCA and CIAV-OAS cannot be underestimated. The operations played the role of a credible neutral third-party observer and guarantor of the Esquipulas peace agreement. More importantly, they created an environment of security and trust, in which guerrilla forces were effectively persuaded to disarm. CIAV's pressuring of the government to keep its promises and to provide the ex-combatants with the sufficient means to re-integrate into the society was essential for the successful demobilization of armed fighters. The strategy followed by the intervention to Nicaragua provides support for the argument made by the advocates of a *Security-Only* strategy. Peace operations can be more efficient at establishing peace if they follow a strategy of providing only security and order and leaving development-related issues to relevant specialised

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<sup>13</sup> FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: Database on line: Food Security Statistics.

agencies. The Burundian case, still engulfed in conflict after the deployment of a peace operation, provides a more nuanced understanding of the necessary conditions for a *Security-Only* strategy to succeed.

## **2. BURUNDI: CONFLICT SPELL 1991-2006**

The nature of the conflict in Burundi was very different from the one in Nicaragua. While ethnicity was not relevant in the latter, Burundi's post-colonial history is centered on the issue of ethnicity. The perpetual state of ethnic violence characterising the second half of the twentieth century has devastated Burundi. The OAU's efforts to halt violence by deploying a Military Observer Mission to Burundi (OMIB) in 1994 were unsuccessful. The UN attempts to gather support for the deployment of a multi-national peace enforcement operation also failed. Unlike Nicaragua, Burundi has not attracted much interest from foreign countries. In fact, the recent failures in Rwanda and Somalia were significantly decreasing major powers' willingness to get involved. Before analyzing the nature of the intervention to Burundi and the factors that inhibited the establishment of peace, a brief description of the history of the conflict follows.

### **2.1. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BURUNDIAN CONFLICT**

The country of Burundi, unlike most African states, was not artificially created by colonial rule. For centuries it was an organized kingdom, until the German (1889-1918) and the subsequent Belgian (1918-1962) colonization. Interestingly, Burundi's precolonial history reveals that relations between

ordinary Tutsi and Hutu (the two dominant ethnic groups) were on relatively equal ground. Intermarriage, for instance, was common (Reyntjens 1995). While social discontent was prevalent, it was directed to the *ganwa*, an intermediate princely class between the *mwami* (king) and the general population. “The key vectors of oppression [...] were neither Hutu or Tutsi but *ganwa*, and it was primarily against them, in their capacity as chiefs and princes, rather than against any specific socioethnic category, that the oppressed, peasants and pastoralists alike, periodically vented their anger in symbolic or other forms” (Lemarchand 1996, 41).

Ethnic tensions first surfaced during the colonial rule<sup>14</sup>, increased with the Rwandan revolution<sup>15</sup> and became sharply polarized by the introduction of some democratization after independence in the early 1960s. This political opening after independence led to a crisis of authority between the Tutsi and Hutu elements within the ruling party; the Party of National Union and Progress (UPRONA). This led to the eventual abolition of the monarchy, through a Tutsi-led coup within the army in 1966. “With the abolition of the monarchy, the most important stabilizing element in the political system was removed, and subsequent purges of Hutu officers and politicians further consolidated Tutsi supremacy” (Reyntjens 1995, 7). Ethnic violence quickly became a daily reality, culminating

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<sup>14</sup> The role of colonial rule in the ethnicization of politics in Burundi has been documented in the literature. See, among others, (Lemarchand 1970; 1996; Ntibazonkiza 1993)

<sup>15</sup> The Hutu-Tutsi problem in one country cannot be studied in isolation from the other. See (Lemarchand 1970)

in two major massacres: in 1972, following an aborted coup attempt, an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 Hutu were massacred and another 300,000 fled the country and in 1988, Tutsi-controlled army massacred another 150,000 Hutus and tens of thousands made refugees, many fleeing to neighbouring countries <sup>16</sup> (Maundi et al. 2006).

The 1988 massacre prompted domestic, regional and international pressures for the introduction of some political reforms that would ease and eventually end the vicious cycle of ethnic violence in Burundi. President Major Pierre Buyoya, was ‘encouraged’ by a great deal of external pressure to accept the introduction of multi-party democracy (Reyntjens 1995). A commission was created which formulated a Charter of National Unity and proposed a new constitution calling for the establishment of a democratic multi-party system. National referendums were held, and people overwhelmingly approved the constitution. First, free presidential elections were held on June 1<sup>st</sup>, 1993. Three parties (out of twelve) presented a candidate for presidency: the incumbent president, Major Pierre Buyoya from UPRONA; Melchoir Ndadaye, a Hutu candidate from the Burundi Democratic Front (FRODEBU); and Pierre Claver Sendegeya, also a Hutu from the monarchist and predominantly Tutsi People’s Reconciliation Party (PRP). Melchoir Ndadaye of FRODEBU won the elections,

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<sup>16</sup> The Uppsala/PRIO battle-related deaths dataset and the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset do not record these occurrences. This is due to the stricter definition used for those datasets. It requires that at least that one party involved is the government of a state (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). Most killings in Burundi happened among the civilians, where the condition of government involvement is not met.

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with sixty-five percent of the votes, Major Pierre Buyoya of UPRONA was the runner up, receiving thirty-three percent of the votes and Sendegeya of the PRP, won just over one percent. Legislative elections followed on June 29<sup>th</sup>, 1993, in which Melchoir Ndadaye won sixty-five of the eighty-one seats in the National Assembly.

Unlike in Nicaragua, the elections were not readily accepted in Burundi. The results sparked unrest among Tutsi population, who were frightened by the prospect of Hutus ruling the country. As no measures had been taken to level the military capabilities of the parties prior to the elections, the conflict reignited. Rejecting the elections' outcome, the Tutsi-dominated army assassinated President Ndadaye and four other top government officials on October 21<sup>st</sup>, 1993. As it will be elaborated further below, the fact that the parties had not been asked to demobilize and that a neutral military force was not established facilitated the return to fighting. Another even more violent episode of atrocities started after the elections. "Thousands of Tutsi were massacred by Hutu, and thousands of Hutu were massacred by the Tutsi dominated army and militia in retaliation, leaving more than 50,000 dead, 400,000 internally displaced, and 800,000 refugees-nearly a quarter of the population" (Maundi et al. 2006, 62).

### **2.2. CONTINUATION OF CONFLICT AND THE ELUSIVENESS OF PEACE**

The breakdown of law and order, the increasing violence, and the instability following the assassination of the president alerted the OAU and the United Nations. Having just approved the new *Mechanism for Conflict*



*Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR)*<sup>17</sup> in the Cairo Declaration (1993), the OAU saw Burundi as an opportunity to strengthen its efforts for peace in the region. The OAU was already involved in Rwanda and it hoped that sending a peace operation in Burundi would improve its mission performance over there as well. There was also a general expectation that OAU's determination to send a peace operation to Burundi would lead to financial contributions from foreign countries and more importantly to serve as a catalyst for Security Council action (Berman and Sams 2000).

Meanwhile, a UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Ould Abdallah, was sent to Burundi with the mandate of "facilitating contact between parties to the conflict, restoring the legal institutions, conducting an investigation of the coup and the massacre that followed, and linking up with the OAU" (Maundi et al. 2006, 66). Recognizing the immediate need for some basic security, Abdallah proposed a plan for the establishment of an international military intervention under the name of MIPROBU (International Mission of Protection and Observation for the Reestablishment of Confidence in Burundi). This proposal was immediately rejected by both the army and the Tutsi opposition (Reyntjens 1995; Berman and Sams 2000). Lacking the consensus of local parties and a justification to intervene, the UN Security Council turned down this proposal. The OAU, however, managed to deploy OMIB, by toning down the words peacekeeping force to preventive diplomacy.

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<sup>17</sup> For more information see: (Foley 2004)

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Despite the SRSG and OMIB's efforts, the situation continued to deteriorate until the end of 1995, and further during the course of 1996. Some still hoped that a recently initiated peace process, the Carter Center peace initiative, would lead to some improvement. With some major delays, this initiative did manage to bring leaders of the region to discuss the security problems using linkage politics; that is treating the Great Lakes Region as one big conflict. Two summits in Cairo and Tunis (May and June 1996) were organized, which constituted the Mwanza peace talks. The political deadlock in the peace talks and the increasing unrest effectively ended the peace process. Frustrated with the situation, Hutu militancy was on the rise within FRODEBU. In 1995, radicalized Hutus deserted the political party to join the newly created armed factions named CNDD/FDD. Very different from the situation in Nicaragua, for many Hutus and Tutsi the political option seemed increasingly ineffective in addressing their problems, which persuaded them to abandon diplomacy and join the fight.

In response, the Tutsis, led by Major Pierre Buyoya, staged a coup on July 25, 1996, which was motivated by an increasingly alarmed Tutsi army and the negotiations stalemate at the Mwanza talks. President Ntibantunganya, who had replaced the assassinated President Ndadaye, was removed from power and Buyoya was restored as president. Buyoya suspended all political parties, the National Assembly, and the 1992 Constitution, replacing it with a three-year Transitional Decree. Filled with insecurity, he was convinced that advances could only be made militarily and not at the negotiating table. Therefore, rather than

prioritizing political dialogue, he made restoring security his priority. “In his first public address, Buyoya expressed his intentions to reorganize and re-equip the security forces and the army in order to deal effectively with the country’s security problems. This military buildup resulted in a drastic enlargement of the army from 15,000 at the time of the July coup to more than 60,000 by the beginning of the 1998. The military option was accompanied by the ‘regroupment’ policy, whereby hundreds of Hutu were forced into army-protected camps after their houses had been burned down in order to isolate the militant armed groups from the population , from which they drew support” (Maundi et al. 2006). As it will be elaborated in greater length below, OMIB could do little to prevent the escalation of violence and relapse to conflict in Burundi and it left the country after the 1996 coup.

## **2.3. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING OR INHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE**

### **2.3.1. *THE PRESENCE OF OMIB (FEBRUARY 1994–AUGUST 1996)***

OMIB was mandated to act as a confidence-building mission, in which both military and civilian officers would work towards the restoration of peace and security in Burundi. The mission that was actually deployed was, however, very weak and unarmed, reached a maximum of 47 observers. The initial deployment in mid-December of 1993 was even smaller than originally envisioned and consisted only of civilian officers. The military observers did not arrive in Bujumbura until February 1994 and a considerable number of them were medical doctors (Berman and Sams 2000). The situation in Burundi was

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explosive and parties were not ready to cooperate. OMIB's mandate, the capabilities of its personnel and its funding were not sufficient to act as a credible deterrent to violence.

Despite the unfavourable conditions for peace and OMIB's weakness, it is argued that overall the intervention was not a complete failure. OMIB served as an international presence able to appease extreme shows of force by observing and reporting any critical happening. Although few in number, OMIB's observers have been reported to have served as useful intermediaries between the military authorities and the civilian leaders and to have managed to defuse numerous explosive situations (Berman and Sams 2000). In fact "[a]ll the parties in Burundi, and the international community at large, agreed that OMIB played a crucial role in preventing the situation in Burundi from sliding down the same path of ethnic genocide as neighbouring Rwanda" (De Coning 1997, 7). Some even argue that its size, the fact that its observers were unarmed and that many of its military officers were also doctors were the very reasons why the mission managed to enter Burundi at all. While OMIB did not constitute a threat to the army, "[t]heir physical presence in Burundi provided the international community with a respectable presence whose moral authority made its opinion credible" (Maundi et al. 2006, 71). The Buyoya coup of 25 July 1996 however brought an end to the peace process, which prompted the decision to withdraw OMIB in August 1996. It was no longer possible for the operation to carry out its mandate under the

fundamentally altered circumstances brought about by the coup (De Coning 1997).

As will be elaborated further below, the situation in Burundi was significantly different than in Nicaragua. First, international presence was initially not welcomed; the Tutsi minority was reluctant to allow the deployment of a stronger mission able to provide security. Second, as the peace operation was weak, important security-related tasks were not undertaken. The lack of a demobilization, disarmament and reintegration process was particularly problematic for the establishment of peace. Third, even when both parties were ready for the deployment of a stronger peace operation, key international players were not ready to invest resources and troops. Before further comparisons, other factors affecting the establishment of peace are analyzed.

### ***2.3.2. THE INTENSITY AND DURATION OF CONFLICT***

The Uppsala/PRIO dataset (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005) reports that around 10,000 battle-related deaths occurred in total in Burundi between the years of 1991 and 2003. Other sources show a more devastating count reaching 70,000 deaths (Krueger and Krueger 2007). The disparity in estimates is due to a stricter definition of battle-related death used by Uppsala/PRIO; casualties exerted by non-states actors on civilians are not counted (one side of the conflict must be the government of a state). In Burundi, the slaughter of civilians from both ethnicities, Hutu and Tutsi, were not solely conducted by the government. Hostility and mutual insecurity reached such high levels that inter-communal violence became

common, in which civilians were acquiring arms and fighting each other. The number of displaced people caused by years of conflict is also high; reaching 800,000<sup>18</sup> (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005).

Other factors not captured by numbers have heightened the intensity, suffering and hostility in Burundi. For instance, the large numbers of Burundian refugees have been additionally victimized by a change in the refugee policies in Africa. While the 1980s was characterised by a generous African ‘open door’ policy, the 1990s saw a dramatic change in the approach to refugees. Fearing harm to their own states, “African countries now prefer refugees to receive protection in ‘safe zones’ or similar areas within their country of origin” (Rutinwa 2002, 12). This trend has particularly affected the Great Lakes region. Tanzania closed its border with Burundi in 1993, not accepting any further refugees. In 1996, having received large numbers of refugees from Rwanda, Zaire also closed its doors to Burundi. Burundi’s refugees have suffered greatly from this policy shift. Another factor increasing the level of hostility, grievance and insecurity was the situation in Rwanda. Not only Burundians witnessed and heard about many tales of ethnic massacres in their own country, but they also have been greatly affected by the atrocities in Rwanda. As it will be explained below, the ethnic character of the Burundian conflict renders its resolution more challenging as the persistence of ethnic identities helps nurturing inter-ethnic hostility and mistrust.

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<sup>18</sup> Still to this day, UNHCR reports that a total population of 483,626 is of concern: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/txis/vtx/page?page=49e45c056> (accessed Aug. 14<sup>th</sup> 2009)

While in Nicaragua, a long-time FSLN supporter, seeking for better well-being, could decide to vote for the new coalition (i.e. UNO), ethnic identities did not allow for a similar loyalty switch in Burundi.

### **2.3.3. LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY/AUTOCRACY**

Burundi's experience with democracy is practically non-existent, but the attempt to liberalize the political system has not contributed to the establishment of peace. Burundi was a monarchy before its colonization and a one-party system after independence. UPRONA, representing the minority Tutsi, ruled Burundi since the mid-1960s, with its leaders undemocratically acceding to power through successive coups. With hopes of easing ethnic tensions and resolving the conflict in Burundi, the international community advocated for democratization and pressured President Buyoya to introduce multi-party elections. The prospect of elections, however, only intensified the ethnicization of politics in Burundi. FRODEBU, representing the Hutu majority, emerged as the only significant challenger. Early on, "it was clear that the contest was to be very much a two-party affair" (Reyntjens 1995, 10). The international community failed to identify the potential perils of introducing elections in this context. First of all, both ethnic groups had an active armed faction, which gave them the option to defect the diplomatic process in case of electoral defeat. Moreover, the Tutsi's were in total control of the national army. Demobilization should have been implemented before the elections and the national army should have been dissolved and reformed to include both parties. Second, the fact that the Tutsi were a clear

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minority should have been taken into consideration. With tales of Hutu massacring Tutsi in Rwanda, the minority Burundian Tutsi were frightened to give up power to their rival, who constituted an overwhelming majority. A more constructive solution could have perhaps been achieved with the introduction of a power-sharing clause guaranteeing the Tutsi minority a secure place in the government.

In this context, it is not surprising that UPRONA's defeat in both the presidential and parliamentary elections sparked demonstrations, protests and unrests among the Tutsi minority. The Tutsi were not ready to share power and were also not willing to trust a Hutu-dominant administration. Their discontent with the elections was not how fair or free it was conducted, but that the FRODEBU's victory was based on ethnic lines, that is, it was a Hutu victory. Lemarchand explains the Tutsi's perception of the elections' results: "The victory of the FRODEBU is not a democratic victory but a Hutu victory; what is now emerging is the institutionalization of the tyranny of an ethnic majority, in short, a Jacobine state under Hutu control" (Lemarchand 1996, 1982-83). As the ethnic majority was Hutu (estimated to be 80% of the total population), the Tutsi interpreted the election results as a demographic ethnic majority being translated into a political majority (Reyntjens 1995). The insecurity felt by the Tutsi culminated in renewed violence. As explained above, after successive assassinations of Hutu presidents, Buyoya re-instated himself as the president with the 1996 coup. Rather than providing a venue for the political resolution of



ethnic problems, democratization has even further polarized ethnic relations in Burundi, which precipitated a cycle of violence and polarization difficult to evade.

#### ***2.3.4. ECONOMIC SITUATION***

The economic deprivation facing Burundian population played a major role in the aggravation of ethnic relations and in the continuation of the conflict. First and foremost, during the long years of UPRONA's authoritarian rule, the limited economic wealth had been mainly directed towards the Tutsi elite minority, whether they were positioned in the civil service, the army or the party. While this practice created a sense of discrimination and resentment among the Hutu majority, more aggressive socioeconomic discrimination followed, which further uprooted the socioeconomic standing of Hutus. UPRONA introduced restrictions on the admission of Hutu children to secondary schools, which successfully kept the Hutu population away from employment opportunities in the modern sectors of the economy (Lemarchand 1996). While the lucrative jobs were increasingly occupied by Tutsis, their monopoly over the Burundian wealth was further consolidated during the 1972 and 1988 massacres. Much of the Hutu wealth was transferred to Tutsi, as they had fallen victim to the killings or had been forced to leave their land and become refugees.

The economic situation continued to be dire in Burundi, which perpetuated the cycle of insecurity and violence. The percentage of the population living in households (with consumption or income per person) earning below the poverty line remains very high; since the early 1990s more than 80% of the population

live below the poverty line<sup>19</sup>. Food shortages and hunger are growing widespread as well (Krueger and Krueger 2007). Graph VI.2 shows the years leading up to the 1993 elections witnessed a sharp decrease in GDP growth, which continued to deteriorate with the renewed conflict following the elections. There seems to be a slight growth since the end of the 1990s, but Burundi remains under the average of the least developed countries classified by the UN. The Tutsi monopolization of privileged positions within the Burundian society persists to this day. The perception of a ‘zero-sum game’ is predominant among each ethnic group. “As one may expect in an environment of economic scarcity, if Tutsi claim the lion’s share of what little wealth the country has to offer, this must be at the expense of the Hutu community” (Lemarchand 1970, 164). This evidently perpetuates the root causes of the conflict and prolongs the continuation of ethnic conflict in Burundi. The resolution of the conflict became even more elusive after the dissolution of democracy in 1993. ‘

The violence that engulfed Burundi from 1990 to 1999 has also impeded the deliverance of humanitarian assistance. In the course of this turmoil, almost all foreign economic development programs concluded their work in Burundi. As violence increased, Bujumbura was deemed too dangerous for diplomatic assignments. Numerous international relief agencies, such as the International Red Cross and Doctors without Borders, suspended their operations due to threats,

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<sup>19</sup> Millennium Development Goals Indicators, The Official United Nations site for the MDG Indicators: <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=757&crd=108> (accessed Aug. 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2009)

attacks, non-compliance and hostility from the Buyoya government (Krueger and Krueger 2007). The repressive regime has alienated many international donors; total foreign aid has dropped from approximately 48\$ per person to 15\$ per person in the 90s<sup>20</sup>.

### 2.3.5. *OUTCOME OF CONFLICT*

No agreement, ceasefire or decisive victory was achieved in Burundi. After the failed elections of 1993, leading to the assassination of newly elected Hutu President Melchoir Ndadaye, the conflict perpetuated with periods of relative calm and increased activity. In the meantime, many attempts at reconciliation and negotiation have failed to bring an end to the conflict. Even though the SRSG, Ould-Abdallah, skilfully managed to formulate an acceptable framework in which the National Assembly reopened and the constitution was amended for a new president to be elected indirectly, the political instability prevailed<sup>21</sup> (Reyntjens 1995). In addition, the increased Hutu hostility in Rwanda was fuelling fear among Burundian Tutsi, which made Ould-Abdallah's job even more challenging.

Ould-Abdallah tried to solve the conflict by bringing innovative solutions to consolidate a government able to function in the deeply polarized and ethicized

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<sup>20</sup> Source: The World Bank Group 2007, All Rights Reserved (accessed on Aug. 4<sup>th</sup> 2009): <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/report.do?method=showReport>

<sup>21</sup> In January 1994, Cyprian Ntaryamira, again Hutu, was indirectly elected as president to replace Ndadaye. Unfortunately, four months later, political uncertainty and institutional vacuum resumed, not only in Burundi, but also in Rwanda, with the plane crash in Kigali killing both the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi.

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society. Learning from the failed elections experience, he recognized the needs for guarantees for the Tutsi minority. In fact, his efforts to introduce an implicit power-sharing clause<sup>22</sup> in the Convention of Government to guarantee UPRONA some access to political power temporarily revived the stalled Carter Center peace initiative. This even resulted in a joint request from the Hutu president and the Tutsi prime minister for an international military presence to help reverse the deteriorating security situation in the country. The UN aware that political diplomacy was not sufficient and having been recently blamed for its lack of responsiveness during the genocide in Rwanda, was determined to be ready this time around. With these considerations in mind, the UN secretary-general “proposed a United Nations authorized contingency plan for the deployment of a humanitarian multinational force in Burundi” (Maundi et al. 2006, 72-73). However, while the lessons learned in Rwanda or in Somalia were pushing the UN to act, the same experiences led the U.S. and France to reject the plan. Fearing another potentially humiliating experience, the Clinton administration was reluctant to get involved. Similarly, not wanting to repeat the failure of Opération Turquoise<sup>23</sup>, France was not willing to go ahead with the plan alone. Evidently, no

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<sup>22</sup> According to the Convention: “All legislation and decrees would now require the signature of both president and prime minister (who, it was privately agreed, would be a UPRONA Tutsi); Fifty-five percent of major appointments would go to FRODEBU and its allied parties, and forty-five percent to UPRONA and its allied parties; A national Security Council was established, which had unelected members and was to be a group of *bashingantahe*, that is, ‘wise men’ to advise on governmental policy and disputes” (Krueger and Krueger 2007, 74).

<sup>23</sup> Opération Turquoise was a French military operation in Rwanda in 1994 under the mandate of the United Nations.

other country was willing to assume the responsibility of such a difficult mission without the commitment of the U.S. and in this case France. The repeated stalemates during the various peace talks and the failure to secure a UN presence all contributed to the further antagonization of relations in Burundi. As mentioned above, this culminated in Buyoya's conviction that conflict will not be resolved through political dialogue but through force. With the 1996 coup, the peace process came to an abrupt end and violence continued to ravage the country.

### **2.3.6. RELEVANCE OF ETHNICITY**

The Burundian case gives support to the result of the statistical analysis indicating that the presence of ethnic heterogeneity does not necessarily lead to conflict and that other factors increase the salience of ethnicity. However, it also indicates that once awakened, ethnic loyalties and grievances are difficult to appease. As explained earlier, ethnicity was not always a source of conflict in Burundi. Preceding its inclusion to German East Africa in 1899, the Burundian kingdom was ruled by a king and an intermediate princely class, called *ganwa*. This privileged class was standing apart from other ethnic identities, such as Hutu, Tutsi, Twa, Swahili-speaking communities all living in Burundi on relatively equal footing (Reyntjens 1995). As Lemarchand (1970, 1996) explains in great details, having experienced indirect- rule during its colonization, witnessing the ethnic tensions in Rwandan and going through the abolition of their monarchy with the introduction of some democratization in the early 1960s, the complex

socio-political hierarchies of the Burundian society have been gradually reduced to a simplified dichotomous understanding of ethnicity, that is Hutu versus Tutsi.

In essence, the conflict of Burundi is about state control, where ethnicity has been used as a tool for political and economic competition<sup>24</sup>. While colonization not only contributed to economic scarcity and created unequal forms of wealth distribution along ethnic lines, it also strengthened the Tutsi's hold on political power. With the uncertainty and vacuum of power created by the abolition of the long-existing monarchy and the introduction of multi-party elections, the competition to control the means of political and economic power greatly heightened. This led to "[...] a fierce struggle for political power and scarce economic resources between the elites of the two dominant ethnic groups, the majority Hutu and the Minority Tutsi" (Maundi et al. 2006, 58). The lack of trust, the severe hostility and the mutual insecurity felt by these groups also indicate that once ethnic loyalties became salient, the resolution of the conflict became much more challenging.

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<sup>24</sup> Interestingly however, despite the increasing salience of these two ethnicities, '[g]overnments have sponsored intensive propaganda both in the media and in academia to promote the idea that ethnicity is an artificial creation of colonial and neo-colonial imperialism, aimed at destroying the nation'(Ndikumana 1998, 33). By forbidding any debates on ethnicity on grounds of threat to national security, its existence was downplayed and denied in an attempt to hide the widespread ethnic discrimination. As ethnicity was not to be recognized, the growing ethnic inequality could not be discussed, nor the more ingrained structural mechanisms of discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin. It is not until the late 1990s that UPRONA gave in to internal and external pressures to allow debates in ethnicity. Therefore, "for many years, the nation was denied a chance to examine, through sincere dialogue, the true causes of the recurring ethnic crises."(Ndikumana 1998, 33)

### 2.3.7. *OTHER FACTORS*

The analysis above indicates that resolute international commitment to end the Burundian conflict was lacking. While several peace attempts were initiated, major international actors were not ready to invest more than acting as facilitator for negotiations. This was particularly visible when the United States and France refused to participate in the deployment of a stronger peace operations demanded by both the Hutus and the Tutsis. OMIB, the peace operation deployed in 1994, was a symbolic presence from the OAU established mainly to attract more international attention. While the mission failed to generate a bigger intervention, its presence still helped appeasing some volatile situations.

Was the Burundian conflict less ripe for resolution compared to the Nicaraguan conflict? Buyoya's acceptance to hold multi-party elections after the 1988 massacre could be interpreted as an indicator that the Mutually Hurting Stalemate was reached, but the ensuing events show the contrary. The victory of a Hutu dominant party precipitated an intense sense of uncertainty and fear among the Tutsi minority, which led to the assassination of the newly elected president and widespread civil violence. With a lot to lose, the Tutsi minority was not ready to accept a change in the status quo, which had been favouring them. Moreover, the events in Rwanda heightened a sense of insecurity in Burundi. "The genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda confirmed the worst fears of many Burundian Tutsi and strengthened them in their conviction that the control of the army was vital for their survival" (Reyntjens 1995, 20). The arrival of 200,000 Rwandan Hutu

refugees to Burundi also led to further panic within the Tutsi minority. It is possible to conclude that while a Mutually Hurting Stalemate was attained in Burundi, the uncertainty of a status quo change was too frightening to the Tutsi minority.

### **3. COMPARISONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The *Security-Only* strategy followed by the operations deployed in Nicaragua contributed to the establishment of both negative and positive peace. In Burundi, however, the small and weak mission could not provide a secure environment that could have contributed to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. In Nicaragua, ONUCA and OAS-CIAV, mandated to supervise and facilitate demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, played an important role in preventing a relapse to conflict. Financially, the missions were endowed with enough resources to carry on with proper demobilization and establish the much-needed 'security zones' for ex-combatants. Besides, they were able to provide accommodation, food and medical assistance for ex-fighters, which was critical for their reintegration into society. In Burundi, deployed after the failed (internationally sponsored) elections of 1993, OMIB was ill-suited to provide security. Compared to ONUCA and OAS-CIAV, OMIB was very small and deployed with the limited responsibilities of monitoring, observing and reporting incidences of violence. If the measure of success was fulfillment of mandate, it can be argued that OMIB was successful; indeed it was able to prevent the



escalation of violence to massive levels by symbolizing an international eye in Burundi. However, if the measure for success is peace, OMIB was doomed to fail. It was ill-mandated and under-funded to accomplish more than what it already did. OMIB was not militarily strong enough to provide security to the parties involved, or to deter them from fighting each other.

The comparison of the Nicaraguan and Burundian cases illustrates the two conditions need to be present for the deployment of a strong peace operation: the consent of the parties involved and the commitment of major international players. In the case of Nicaragua, the warring parties not only consented to the deployment of a peace operation, but a fortunate convergence of international interests also promoted a coherent international effort for peace. In Burundi, however, the Tutsis radicals along with the Tutsi dominated army initially did not want any external military presence and had rebelled against the Secretary General's suggestion to deploy a peace operation. When this got coupled with lack of international will, an unfortunate convergence of interests led to the establishment of the weak and symbolic OMIB. The establishment of a small OAU operation was a convenient solution for many as it served as a cushion for the pressures for a stronger military intervention (Maundi et al. 2006).

A related factor which evidently contributes to the efficiency of a peace operation is the mandate and the resources allocated towards it. While operations need to be endowed with sufficient resources to carry out their responsibility, their mandates need to be design to address the issues relevant to the country they are

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deployed to. OMIB witnessed the militarization of Hutu and Tutsi relations in the mid-1990s, and was neither mandated nor endowed with the resources to prevent it. The increasingly violent attitude of the Tutsi dominated army instigated militant Hutus to leave the negotiation table and join the ranks of their newly created military wing CNDD/FDD. OMIB was not prepared to stabilize relations and provide a secure environment in which productive negotiations towards peace could take place. To the contrary, as explained above the flexible mandate of OAS-CIAV enabled the mission to address rising tensions between the ex-combatants and the government.

A last aspect to consider is the presence of other international actors, agencies and NGOs. In Nicaragua, other international actors were involved in providing developmental support. These tasks were neither coordinated with nor integrated to the activities of the peace operations. However, the secure environment provided by the missions facilitated the operations of humanitarian and developmental organization. As a result, the Nicaraguan peace has been sustainable, with various dimensions of human security improving. In Burundi however, a host of problems fuelling the vicious cycle of violence could not be addressed due to the lack of security. As mentioned above, many international agencies and NGOs had to leave the country, which left crucial issues unaddressed: the high number of refugees and internally displaced persons, the deterioration in health and sanitation, undernourishment and rising poverty. In following chapters, it will be interesting to compare the effectiveness of the


security-only strategy to those interventions including development related tasks, whether sequentially or simultaneously.

**Graph VI.1: GDP Growth of Nicaragua Compared to Average of Least Developed Countries from 1960 to 2008**



Source: World Bank - World Development Indicators Database (WDI) - online. <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/GMIS/gdmis.do?siteId=2&menuId=LNAV01HOME3>

**Graph VI.2: GDP Growth of Burundi Compared to Average of Least Developed Countries from 1980 to 2008**



Source: World Bank - World Development Indicators Database (WDI) - online. <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/GMIS/gdmis.do?siteId=2&menuId=LNAV01HOME3>

## CHAPTER VII

### CASE STUDIES: SEQUENTIAL STRATEGY IN SIERRA LEONE AND ANGOLA

The civil wars of Sierra Leone and Angola have both received a series of peace operations constituting a *Sequential* strategy. That is, initial peace operations were deployed with *security-only* mandates, with subsequent missions following *multi-dimensional* mandates, assuming both security and development related tasks. Though going through a bumpy start, the intervention in Sierra Leone succeeded at terminating the conflict, whereas in Angola, the series of operations deployed were not able to establish peace. The analysis presented below answers the same questions that were posed for the cases of Nicaragua and Burundi. It addresses the differences in the implementation of the *Sequential* strategy taking into consideration the effects of others factors contributing or inhibiting the establishment of peace. While comparing the performance of the interventions across strategies is the ultimate purpose of this analysis, this chapter is mainly focusing on understanding why one *Sequential* intervention was more effective in establishing peace than the other.

#### 1. SIERRA LEONE: CONFLICT SPELL 1991-2000

The conflict in Sierra Leone started in 1991 and ended in 2000. From 1997 to this day, a series of peace operations (ECOMOG-SL, UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL,

UNIOSIL, and UNIPSIL) have been deployed to help the establishment of peace. With some initial failures, the *Sequential* strategy followed by the intervention succeeded at terminating the conflict that ravaged Sierra Leone for nine years. After a short description of the evolution of the conflict and its termination, the factors contributing and/or inhibiting the establishment of peace are analysed with an aim of better understanding the independent effect of strategy.

### **1.1. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SIERRA LEONEAN CONFLICT**

When Sierra Leone became independent from Great Britain in 1961, there were no apparent reasons that would lead one to believe that it was on the path of a destructive civil war. Politically, a multi-party democracy was established and recognized by all parties. Economically, Sierra Leone was endowed with abundant resources, dense forests and rich agriculture. And various ethnic groups were coexisting peacefully (Chawla 2000; Ducasse-Rogier 2004). In 1964, after the death of its first Prime Minister, Sir Milton Margai, from the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), the country gradually fell into mismanagement. While his brother, who replaced him, was characterized as incompetent, the major economic collapse that ensued is commonly associated with Siaka Stevens, from the All People's Congress (APC) party. Stevens ruled from 1967 to 1985 and declared Sierra Leone a one-party state in 1977. By then, the SLPP had been effectively disabled through repression, arrest, detention and exile of its members (Abdullah 2004). The economy was also stifled by an extreme centralization of power in the hands of the President and his party. As the APC successfully silenced and

suppressed opposition parties, the main opposition became the students of Sierra Leone, which would be joined by the unemployed and, disenfranchised lumpen<sup>1</sup> youth. “The students, who were immersed in the rebellious youth culture, became the most articulate group to oppose the APC. They used the platform of student politics to launch an attack on APC rule and call for radical change” (Abdullah 1998, 220-210).

As maintaining control became a real challenge, the military’s role in the government gradually increased to the point where General Joseph Momoh was chosen by President Stevens as his successor in 1985 (Olonisakin 2000). Momoh inherited an economy in ruin and a “predatory regime that was steeped in corruption, opportunism, cronyism and sycophancy” (Kandeh 1999, 352). The state’s incapacity to provide basic public services such as education or health, or to generate employment opportunities created a large pool of disenfranchised youth ready to rise up violently against the system (Bellows and Miguel 2006). It is in this economic, political and economic disarray that radical student unions leadership emerged, which were then joined by expelled/drop out students, and the unemployed youth. The revolutionary ideas were revolving around the overthrown of *De System*.

A proposal from Libya to offer military training to aid the revolution splintered the youth movement. The more radical, less educated fraction went on

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<sup>1</sup> See Abdullah Ibrahim (2004) for more on youth culture in Sierra Leone and the role played by the lumpen youth (thugs) in the opposition culminating to the establishment of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

to acquire Libyan training with no real and precise plan of action (Abdullah 1998). Returning from Libya, the difficulties of recruiting, training and launching attacks from within Sierra Leone became apparent. At this point the fate of Sierra Leone became tangled with Liberia's. Foday Sankoh, who was on his path to consolidate his leadership of what will be known as The Revolutionary United Front (RUF), struck a deal with Charles Taylor of Liberia<sup>2</sup>. Sankoh and his group agreed to help Taylor take over Liberia<sup>3</sup>, and the latter would permit them to use Liberia for launching their attacks on the APC.

From March 1991 onward, the RUF launched a series of guerrilla attacks on the Eastern towns bordering Liberia. While the government did not take these attacks seriously, the lack of a coordinated strategy and response facilitated RUF's advances towards the North and the West (Alie 2000). General Momoh, seen as incapable to deal with the insurgency, was ousted by junior military officers led by Captains Valentine Strasser and Julius Maada Bio. The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was formed, determined to end the civil war in Sierra Leone. However, in early 1995, the RUF was advancing fast towards the capital Freetown. The NPRC hired, as a last resort, a private South African

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<sup>2</sup> Charles Taylor, then head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), was fighting the government of Samuel Doe in Liberia. General Momoh's decision to allow ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group) to use the Lungi International Airport as a base and to dispatch Sierra Leone Army forces to Join other ECOMOG units in Liberia, angered Taylor. This provided the grounds for Sankoh and Taylor reaching a deal and for the Liberia conflict to spill over into Sierra Leone (Hirsch 2001).

<sup>3</sup> See (Keen 2005) for more on Charles Taylor's strategic reasons to sponsor disorder in Sierra Leone p.36-38.



mercenary organization, Executive Outcomes<sup>4</sup>, to the rescue (Keen 2005). The RUF was successfully pushed back, and elections were held even before a ceasefire was signed. As it will be elaborated further below, this proved to be detrimental to both the survival of this peace initiative and the democratization attempt. Al-haji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah from SLPP was elected president in February 1996.

## **1.2. END OF CONFLICT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE**

The Abidjan Peace Accord was signed with the RUF in November 1996<sup>5</sup>, which was followed by the quick decision by Kabbah to have the Executive Outcome leave the country. Profiting from the void of enforcement forces, discontented junior officers led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, calling themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), took power and sent Kabbah into exile (Hirsch 2001). Accusing Kabbah of failing to consolidate the peace with the RUF, the AFRC invited the RUF to join the new junta. The United Nations (UN) and The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional group of fifteen West African countries, condemned the coup and gave their support to the civilian government-in-exile. Efforts at negotiating a peace agreement proved to be futile, resulting in a military confrontation, with the AFRC relying on some segments of the national army and mainly the RUF, and

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<sup>4</sup> Executive Outcomes had been supporting the Angolan government against UNITA.

<sup>5</sup> In addition to Executive Outcomes, local groups were forming to fight back the RUF. The *Kamajor* successfully dislodge the RUF from key areas in the Southern and Eastern provinces, which forced them to sign the peace accord in November 1996 (Gberie 2004).

the government-in-exile relying on the ECOWAS Monitoring Group's (ECOMOG) forces led by Nigeria and the local Civil Defence Forces (CDF), which had been organized by local civilians to protect themselves from the RUF. Faced with a resilient and ruthless AFRC/RUF posture, ECOWAS strengthened ECOMOG's mandate to military intervention. After a fierce battle, ECOMOG, helped by domestic CDFs, succeeded at forcing AFRC/RUF out of Freetown. Kabbah was reinstated as the President in March 1998. UNOMSIL, a small observer mission was deployed in June 1998, to advise and monitor disarmament.

Violence continued in the form of atrocities; rapes, mutilations and execution of civilians, reaching a peak in January 1999. With continued military stalemate and bloodshed of civilians, Nigeria, the UK, and the US urged for negotiations, which resulted in the July 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was deployed, which proved unable to implement the agreement (Ducasse-Rogier 2004). The peace process came to an end when the RUF took 500 UN peacekeepers hostage. This was to be the last RUF treachery; the international community finally understood that the RUF could not be considered as a reliable negotiating partner. The UN, with substantial military support from the UK, successfully strengthened the government and weakened the RUF enough to compel them to disarm. Peace was achieved in 2000 and elections held in 2002.

The following section elaborates on the role played by the international community and the peace operations deployed in Sierra Leone. Various actors and

organizations have been involved in the intervention at different times, making the international involvement in Sierra Leone not as straightforward as in the cases of Nicaragua or Burundi. After chronologically mapping the course of the intervention, an analysis of its performance will conclude the next section.

### **1.3. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING OR INHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE**

#### ***1.3.1. THE PRESENCE OF ECOMOG-SL (OCTOBER 1997 - MAY 2000), UNOMSIL (JULY 1998 - OCTOBER 1999) AND UNAMSIL (OCTOBER 1999 - DECEMBER 2005)***

The United Nations became directly involved in the Sierra Leonean conflict when the NPRC, realizing the threat posed by the RUF, requested the good offices of the UN Secretary-General in 1995. The UN was to serve as a mediator between the Government and the RUF. The Special UN Envoy, Mr. Dinka, began to work in collaboration with the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS to negotiate a settlement of the conflict and a return to civilian rule (Chawla 2000). Similar to the Burundian experience, the UN initial recommendation for Sierra Leone was to hold elections. With the belief that “there can be a no lasting peace without participatory democracy and governance” (Kargbo 2006, 38), the UN was instrumental in the holding of the March 1996 elections. Like in Burundi, soon after the elections, the assumption that elections would contribute to peace in an environment of insecurity and disorder was once again proven erroneous (Squire 2006). As Kandeh (2004a) explained, neither the APC nor the NPRC were favouring democratization of the country’s political

system. But more importantly, the NPRC, joined by the RUF and their armed fractions, were threatening to attack voters in order to disrupt the elections. According to Kandeh, “it was quite a remarkable feat that elections were in fact held” (2004a, 123). As mentioned earlier, the premature holding of elections, prior to a ceasefire and demobilization, is often detrimental to the survival of the peace process and the democratization process. In fact, not respecting the outcome, the AFRC re-took power in 1997 and exiled Kabbah.

After the coup on the 8<sup>th</sup> of October 1997, unsuccessful attempts at persuading the AFRC to step down led to the Security Council’s decision to impose an oil and arms embargo. Realizing the magnitude of the instability in Sierra Leone, the Security Council demanded the operational mandate of the ECOWAS’ military arm in Liberia to be extended to Sierra Leone to prevent the total breakdown of law and order. ECOMOG-LIB had been deployed to fight against the National Patriotic Front of Liberia led by Charles Taylor in Liberia. ECOMOG-SIL was deployed to Freetown with around 3,000 Nigerian and 1,500 Guinean troops. After a few setbacks, the need for more troops became apparent (Keen 2005). ECOWAS boosted the number of ECOMOG troops to 14,000, which pressured the RUF to enter negotiations. ECOMOG was strictly providing security, playing the role of a peace enforcer, more than a peace observer. Besides to enforce the UN sanctions, ECOMOG troops were at times actively fighting the rebels.

The sanctions applied to Sierra Leone were not targeted; that is they were blanket sanctions, which were severely restricting humanitarian aid. Many have pointed out their damaging consequences for the population and have blamed them for increasing the severity of the unfolding humanitarian crisis. Others, however, have argued that the sanctions have achieved their political purpose. Keen's interviews with local aid workers revealed that the harsh conditions imposed by the West and against the junta mobilized the population to fight against the rebels (Keen 2005). This resonates with Luttwak's (1999) argument mentioned earlier regarding humanitarian aid. He maintains that humanitarian aid often gets diverted to helping the warring parties and enabling them to sustain the fight. It also prevents a decisive victory that could end the conflict. In Sierra Leone, the harsh living conditions prompted many to form or to join their local CDFs aiming at fighting and expelling the RUF from their villages and the AFRC from the government (Keen 2005). Although a harsh reality, it seems that the carpet blankets implemented in Sierra Leone have contributed to the mobilization of the local population to fight for themselves and assert their desire for a stable and peaceful government.

Faced with 14,000 ECOMOG troops and many CDFs in action, the junta understood that it had to make some concessions. An agreement was reached in Conakry, on October 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1997. Soon, however, it became clear that the AFRC/RUF junta was only entering negotiation to buy some time to stockpile weapons and resume the fighting (Keen 2005). It was agreed that ECOMOG

strength needed to be increased, thus its mandate was changed from sanction-enforcement to actual military intervention (HRW 1999). After a long battle in February 1998 AFRC/RUF was forced out of Freetown and Kabbah was reinstated as President. The Security Council terminated the sanctions and established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for an initial period of six months in July 1998. However, the RUF was not ready to give up.

UNOMSIL's mandate consisted of monitoring the military and security situation of Sierra Leone, disarming and demobilising former combatants (with the help of ECOMOG collecting and destroying arms). It was also mandated to advise the Government and local forces on police practice training and recruitment, on planning of the reform and restructuring the police force. UNOMSIL was also responsible to report violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in Sierra Leone and to assist the government in its efforts to address human rights needs<sup>6</sup>. This mission, however, was very small; only 40 military observers and three police advisers were dispatched. Compared to ECOMOG, whose strength varied between 12,000 to 15,000 troops, UNOMSIL was playing a minimal role (Malan et al. 2002). In fact, when violent fighting resumed in Freetown in December 1998, UNOMSIL's personnel was evacuated, while ECOMOG stayed to continue the fight. After the particularly bloody

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<sup>6</sup> See Security Council resolution 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998, <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomsil/UnomsilM.htm> (accessed September, 18th 2009)

January of 1999, the rebels once again entered Freetown and pushed ECOMOG away. The escalation of violence by the rebels compelled the government and the international actors to initiate a new round of negotiation in 1999, which ended with the signing of the Lomé Agreement in July 1999 (Ducasse-Rogier 2004). The Lomé signatories requested for an expanded role of UNOMSIL and the deployment of a neutral peace-keeping mission in Sierra Leone (Malan et al. 2002). Nigeria could no longer sustain its troop commitment to ECOMOG and its presence was not perceived as neutral. In October 1999, it pulled its forces out of Sierra Leone<sup>7</sup> to be replaced by a larger UN multi-dimensional mission; the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

As Funmi Olonisakin explained in her recent book *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The story of UNAMSIL* (2008), it was only after some reinforcement and reorganization that UNAMSIL was able to function effectively and contribute to the establishment of peace in Sierra Leone. UNAMSIL, initially mandated with multi-dimensional tasks, was understaffed and delayed. It was unable to compel the implementation of the agreement and carry out its various tasks. As its security component was seriously weak, the rebels were actually attacking its troops. They were preventing the operation from functioning properly, inflicting casualties and eventually taking 500 of its peacekeepers hostage. UNAMSIL's relationship with other UN agencies, funds, and programs already on the ground was also poor. The mission failed to coordinate its development-related activities

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<sup>7</sup> ECOMOG officially ended its mission and completely left Sierra Leone in May 2000.

with those agencies. UNAMSIL was perceived to be inaccessible and engulfed in the conflict. Most agencies and NGOs pursued their own independent agendas and some even “feared that their mandate would be compromised by close association with a security force” (Olonisakin 2008, 89). As it will be explained in greater detail later, in context of ongoing conflict, a mission’s development-related activities may be compromised by its security responsibilities.

UNAMSIL was thus inefficient in most of the tasks it was mandated to undertake. This effectively convinced the Security Council that if a UN mission is to be deployed, it needs to have the appropriate mandate and the necessary strength to accomplish it. “The situation clearly demanded a return to military basics, and the operational level planning process was immediately shifted into top gear. Strategic guidance was provided by UN Headquarters in New York, and this had to be translated into military objectives and tasks, accompanied by other lines of activity” (Malan et al. 2002, 11). It is interesting to note that compared to Burundi, Sierra Leone benefited from international actors’ readiness to commit and invest troops and resources towards the establishment of a militarily strong UN peace operation. Following the embarrassing capture of 500 UN troops, the mission received a dramatic increase in its number of troops, reaching a maximum of 17,500 military personnel on the ground. The mandate of UNAMSIL was also expanded under Chapter VII of the Charter. UNAMSIL’s new military leadership was determined to produce a detailed plan that would allow the mission to realistically achieve its goals. The mission statements clearly indicate that a



*Sequential* strategy was preferred for the ‘new’ UNAMSIL. In fact, four sequential phases were designed prioritizing the establishment of security and order before undertaking any other task:

**Phase 1** - Demonstrate UNAMSIL's credibility and test the RUF's commitment to the peace process.

**Phase 2** - Prove UNAMSIL's capability and choke the RUF's east/west supply route.

**Phase 3** - Deploy a strong manoeuvre force to secure the RUF's centre of gravity and seal the eastern border.

**Phase 4** - Consolidate the achievements of phases 1, 2 and 3; expand UNAMSIL's influence and support elections (Malan et al. 2002, 18).

This new plan finally brought some stability to Sierra Leone. However, the establishment of durable peace could have still not been possible without the resolute involvement of the United Kingdom. Alarmed by the instability in Sierra Leone, the UK decided to become involved militarily. The Blair Administration wanted to stabilize the situation and to establish a Sierra Leonean state able to hold its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. After helping to appease the situation by sending 7,000 British soldiers<sup>8</sup>, “Great Britain contributed some \$120 million toward the reconstruction of Sierra Leone’s security institutions and justice system” (Chege 2002, 155). In addition a UN Mine Action (UNMAS) assessment team was dispatched to investigate the extent to which land mines posed a threat to the safety and security of civilians. Landmines were found to be a limited problem for Sierra Leone<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> Separate from the 17,500 UNAMSIL troops

<sup>9</sup> Land mines had not disturbed the functioning of the peace operations, humanitarian agencies or the return of refugees. ECOMOG engineers had effectively removed some landmines when

The conflict ended in 2000 followed by a successful demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants into the society. To entice RUF's collaboration with the demobilization and the peace process in general, the Lomé Accord provided for the guaranteed inclusion of the RUF into the transitional government. In fact, Sankoh assumed the post of vice-president with some other cabinet and deputy positions allocated to the RUF. The transitional period ended with peaceful elections in May 2002. The RUF only received 1.7 of the votes and without any guaranteed position in the government after the elections, it vanished from the political scene (Jarstad 2008; Malan et al. 2002). UNAMSIL successfully completed its mandate in December 2005. The United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNOSIL) was established in August 2005 by the Security Council to help consolidate peace. After requests by the Government and the Security Council, Sierra Leone became the first country to be included in the agenda of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in June 2006. The Security Council authorized the creation of UNIPSIL in August 2008 to replace UNIOSIL. The Office works closely with the PBC in monitoring and promoting human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law, including efforts to counter transnational organized crime and drug trafficking<sup>10</sup>.

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necessary. UNMAS determined that Sierra Leone has a 'limited' problem with landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), and recommended that UNAMSIL establish a Mine Action Office to coordinate mine action in Sierra Leone "in particular with regard to mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) survey, detection and clearance, and with respect to necessary mine awareness education for the UNAMSIL peacekeepers (ICBL 2000).

<sup>10</sup> Security Council 6187<sup>th</sup> Meeting (AM)

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9740.doc.htm> visited on October, 20th 2009

The strategy of the overall intervention in Sierra Leone, though mostly adjusted and formulated in an ad hoc fashion, corresponds to the *Sequential* approach described in previous chapters. ECOMOG (and UNOMSIL to a smaller extend) were deployed to first provide security, to re-establish order and stability. UNAMSIL, originally deployed with a multi-dimensional mandate, had to be restructured to provide security first as well. Its initial mandate was ill-suited and its personnel were understaffed and unprepared to deal with the high-risk environment. In fact, the arrival of the British forces boosted the credibility of UNAMSIL, whose reputation had suffered from its weak initial deployment. “The deployment of UK troops and their commitment with regards to the training of the Sierra Leonean army clearly contributed to the changing climate prevailing in Sierra Leone, boosting confidence on the government’s side and creating anxiety as far as the rebels were concerned” (Ducasse-Rogier 2004, 9). Lessons from the Sierra Leonean experience point to the fact that providing order, demobilizing armed factions and restructuring the security institutions of a country are important steps that should come prior to any other endeavours. Attempts to hold elections, to provide development aid or reconciliation proved to be futile until some degree of security and stability was brought to Sierra Leone. In fact, Chege compares the UN and UK’s successful prioritization to reconstruct Sierra Leone’s security institution with the UN’s or multilateral agencies’ efforts, and notes:

At its peak in 2001, the UN peacekeeping force of 17,500 had a budget of \$744 million. Considering the billions of dollars in Western government and

multilateral development aid that had gone to waste in Sierra Leone over the years, partly directed toward building civil society and promoting free and fair elections as a reconciliation and peacemaking tool, noting the highly positive impact of a much smaller amount of carefully targeted military aid is important (Chege 2002, 155).

In fact, developmental activities carried out by numerous NGOs and agencies were not effective at providing relief and development as the country was actively engaged in war and plagued by insecurity. Only after security and order were established, UNAMSIL, which was designed with a multi-dimensional mandate, could start undertaking its various development activities. These included assisting in holding national elections, rebuilding the police force, contributing towards restoring the infrastructure, bringing government services to local communities, helping the Government to stop the illicit diamond trade, assisting in the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced people, monitoring the human rights conditions in the country and assisting the Government in setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Besides, working alongside with other UN agencies, UNAMSIL “launched quick-impact and income generating projects to provide jobs to thousands youths and ex-fighters and basic services to local communities. UNAMSIL troops reconstructed schools and clinics, launched and funded agricultural projects, and sponsored free medical clinics in far-flung areas”<sup>11</sup>. The unique role and functions of the Child

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<sup>11</sup> see: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/background.html> Accessed on September, 14th 2009

Protection Advisor (CPA) in UNAMSIL also deserves special mention. Very broadly, the CPA ranged “from advocacy aimed at giving priority to child rights and child protection in all aspects of the peace process, to hands-on training and sensitisation among peacekeeping troops” (Malan et al. 2002, 16). It is evident that it would have been extremely challenging for UNAMSIL to carry out these activities in an environment plagued by brute violence and instability.

### ***1.3.2. THE INTENSITY AND DURATION OF CONFLICT***

The Sierra Leonean conflict lasted ten years and left deep scars in the population. The conflict displaced an estimated two and a half million people, nearly half the population. 70,000 people died and further 20,000 citizens were maimed or mutilated (Malan et al. 2002). These numbers are considerably higher than the numbers given by the UCDP/PRIO dataset, as the rebels have targeted civilians to increase terror<sup>12</sup>. In fact, the RUF is notoriously known to attack, killed, mutilate, and rape civilians. They also have abducted an estimated 27,000 children and enlisted them as combatants. The use of alcohol and drugs was prevalent to facilitate violence and shamelessness (Keen 2005). The Sierra Leone civil war was not only fought between the Government forces and the rebels, but the civilians also joined in by creating the CDFs. Many civilians were thus directly part of the conflict. This prevalence of untrained decentralized civilian

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<sup>12</sup> UCDP/PRIO uses a stricter definition of battle-related death, requiring at least that one party involved is the government of a state. Their data recorded only 13,000 battle-related deaths (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005).

militias also led to some groups lacking discipline to abuse their power and extort other civilians (Bellows and Miguel 2006).

The establishment of CDFs by civilians, the recurring requests for international peacekeepers by the government and most importantly the 1.7 percent of votes casted for the political wing of the RUF in the 2002 elections all indicate that many Sierra Leoneans simply wanted the conflict to end. While the disenfranchised youth initially sympathized with the revolutionary ideals advanced by the RUF, their sheer brutality and their lack of a plan or ideology made them the common enemy of most civilians. Very different compared to the ethnic groups fighting one another (like in Burundi), or a politicized group fighting the government (like in Nicaragua), the aggression expressed by the RUF was aimed at almost anyone who even slightly opposed it<sup>13</sup>. In this instance, the heightened intensity of the conflict seems to have contributed to the establishment of peace by increasing civilians' willingness for peace.

### ***1.3.3. LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY/AUTOCRACY***

Sierra Leone's experience with democracy was very limited. After independence, the period from 1961 to 1973 was characterized by a short multi-party competition. Quickly, ethnicity became the easy and predominant tool to recruit supporters during elections. In short, the SLPP started to draw its support from the Mende, while the APC was supported by the Temne. The increasing

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<sup>13</sup> Keen (2005) investigates the motives and the root of this seemingly mindless and random violence (p.226-246)

ethnicization of politics was used by Stevens to legitimize his calls for a single-party system, which he argued would be 'consensual' and 'African' (Keen 2005). The 1970s and onwards were characterised by corruption, patronage and despotism, and the frequent changes of leadership by means of violence and coups. The 1990s saw the emergence of the RUF, which primarily harassed the civilian population with its banditry and horrific brutality.

In this insecure and uncertain environment is not a surprise that the premature introduction of multi-party elections in 1996 was a mistake. Similar to the 1993 elections in Burundi, rather than contributing to the establishment of peace, the prospect of elections antagonized the AFRC/RUF. The military arm of the RUF was still actively fighting, refusing to take part in the elections. In reality, none of the involved parties were ready to accept defeat. After the elections, the country returned to another six years of conflict, before the necessary conditions for holding successful elections were present. The Lomé Accord in 1999, once again called for the holding of elections in November 2001. This time, remembering the premature introduction of the 1996 elections, the decision was made to postpone them until May 2002. This proved to be a successful, as during this period the RUF finally agreed to cease violence, demobilize and abide by the ceasefire agreement. It is important to note that unlike in 1996, the international presence was much stronger and active before and after the 2002 elections, greatly contributing to its success. The Sierra Leonean experience once again demonstrates that the prospect of elections alone is not enough to persuade

warring parties that the political path to settle disputes is more favourable than force. Elections alone may antagonize the warring factions unless a credible deterrent for the use of force, trust in the fairness and openness of the political system and guarantees that the winner will allow the democratic representation of the opposition is established.

#### ***1.3.4. ECONOMIC SITUATION***

The deterioration of the economy, the decline in state extractive and allocative capacity and a growing unemployment contributed not only to the start of a civil war in Sierra Leone, but also to its continuation. Graph VII.1 shows how the annual GDP growth rates were very low (and often negative) during the 1980s, falling under the average of the UN classified least developed countries. In fact, the economic situation deteriorated to such an extent that, since the early 1980s, Sierra Leone consistently ranked as the third lowest in the world according to the Human Development list of the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Report<sup>14</sup>.

The widespread frustration and disenchantment with the state felt by the unemployed youth and students was critical in the formation of the RUF. "[The] centralisation of politics made access to resources impossible for non-members; it made membership of the party a *sine qua non* to get by exclusion literally meant death by attrition" (Abdullah 2004, 44). Not only a large segment of the population had nothing to lose in joining the fight, they actually had a lot to gain.

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<sup>14</sup> <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/>



The economic opportunity arising from failing state institutions was immense (Smillie et al. 2000). The patronage-based rule of the one-party undermined and eroded the formal institutions of the state. The state quickly became a predatory organization exploiting resources, most notably diamonds. The conflict with the RUF, and the other civilian armed groups emerging in the 1990s, was essentially a competition for access to resources (Reno 2003, 46). As elaborated more below, in this context, the presence of high-quality diamonds, very lucrative and easily smuggled, definitely contributed to the conflict by providing RUF with the ability to sustain its fight.

### ***1.3.5. OUTCOME OF THE CONFLICT***

The above description of the evolution of conflict shows that many attempts at reaching a peace agreement failed before the Lomé accord, which finally brought an end to the Sierra Leonean conflict. Like its many failed predecessors, this agreement incorporated amnesty provisions and authorized the inclusion of rebels in the government (Kandeh 2004b). However, as these ‘power sharing’ clauses are known to be perpetuating conflict in the long run, this last agreement calls for the abolishment of these provisions after the transitional period (Jarstad 2008). While the RUF may have been appeased by holding a predominant place in the transitional government, without any guarantees after the elections, it was successfully sided by popular vote in 2002.

There are still reasons to believe that the Lomé accord would not have provided a peaceful solution on its own. The presence of a strong peace enforcer

in 1999 cannot be underestimated. With the British forces and the larger number of UN troops on the ground, the RUF was increasingly convinced that victory is elusive. The restructuring of the military and police forces conducted by the UN and the UK was also a significant proof of the international community's intention to seriously commit funding and personnel to achieve long term peace in Sierra Leone.

#### ***1.3.6. OTHER FACTORS***

A factor clearly contributing to the termination of the conflict in Sierra Leone is the international attention it attracted. The ECOWAS, the OAU, the UN and its agencies, various NGOs, and most importantly the UK's commitment in providing funding and troops towards the establishment of peace in Sierra Leone is critical. UNAMSIL was the largest mission in the world in the early 2000s. Many donors and NGOs assistance also played a significant role in the reconstructing of the infrastructure, the refugees and IDPs resettlement and in the establishment of state institution. Sierra Leone's inclusion in the PBC's agenda also benefited greatly the consolidation of peace.

It is difficult to argue that the Sierra Leonean conflict was ripe for a resolution. It is difficult to find clear support for the argument that a Mutually Hurting Stalemate was present. In fact, the existence of lucrative natural resources allowed the RUF to sustain itself. The statistical analysis of this study has shown that the existence of some natural resources such as oil, gas or diamond does not increase or decrease the likelihood of establishing peace. In the Sierra Leonean

case, however, it is clear that diamonds played a significant role in perpetuating the conflict. As Bellows and Miguel argue, “[b]ecause large-scale diamond smuggling was possible only so long as the country remained in chaos, diamond profits represented an important incentive for all armed groups to continue fighting” (Bellows and Miguel 2006, 395). Faced with a collapse of state institutions, lack of services and a weak army, the RUF and the CDFs were competing with the state to exploit resources, predominantly diamonds<sup>15</sup>. It is interesting to note that once the international community took the necessary steps to stop the Liberia/Sierra Leone illicit diamond trade, the RUF’s willingness to comply with the cease-fire in 2001 increased significantly.

It is interesting to note that ethnicity did not play a central role in the Sierra Leonean conflict. Even though ethnic groups existed in Sierra Leone and became politicized after independence, the civil conflict erupting in 1991 was not an ethnic one. Ironically, Stevens’ pretext that the establishment of a one-party state would end the ethnicization of politics turned out to be accurate. Instead of ethnicity, the centralization of economic resources in the hands of a few, which was channelled to a small segment of the population through patronage links, instigated the conflict.

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<sup>15</sup> Some have suggested that the international community’s interest, mainly Nigeria’s interest to send large amount of troops to ECOMOG, was motivated with the hope to access and reap the benefits of diamond mines. Reports have been made suggesting that ECOMOG was busy mining diamonds (Keen 2005, p. 224 - footnote n.11)

#### **1.4. INDICATORS FOR POSITIVE PEACE IN SIERRA LEONE**

There was no relapse to conflict in Sierra Leone after the successful May 2002 elections. Several developments are promising with respect to the quality of the peace established in Sierra Leone. The most recent presidential and legislative elections in 2007 were hailed as free and fair by the international observers. The electoral campaigning was democratic and some 91% of eligible voters were registered (Neethling 2007). According to the World Development Indicators, the stability witnessed in Sierra Leone successfully increased the foreign direct investment flow to the country (see chart VII.2).

The living conditions however, are not improving at the same pace. According to Neethling assessment, the peace is still very fragile: “An estimated 26 per cent of the population live in extreme poverty, while 70 per cent live on less than US\$1 per day. Today, most households live in substandard shelters and only 59 per cent of the population have access to safe drinking water. This is exacerbated by high unemployment and deteriorating health conditions with a growing incidence in HIV/Aids, typhoid, malaria and tuberculosis” (Neethling 2007, 87). According to WDI, the infant mortality rate has gradually decreased and the life expectancy at birth have increased steadily with time, however, they never caught up even with the average of the Least Developed countries selected by the UN.

Some argue that if one remembers the root causes of the 1991 conflict, the slow recovery can be a danger to peace (Neethling 2007; Paris 2004; Reno 2003).

It is however important to remember that development is a slow process and it may be too early to witness the full effects of the peacebuilding programmes implemented in the past five to six years. This is particularly true for conflict-ridden societies like Sierra Leone, where the infrastructure, state institutions and services have been completely destroyed by war. Unlike the political and economic situation of 1980s and 1990s leading Sierra Leone to conflict, the country is now assisted by international NGOs, collaborating with state officials to restructure the economy, basic social services and the political apparatus. Since 2001, Sierra Leone has been receiving an average of 350 million dollars in official development assistance and official aid and about 535 million dollars in 2007 alone. Sierra Leone is receiving significant international attention, especially after its inclusion into the PBC's agenda. There are promising signs that all the peacebuilding work done in Sierra Leone will slowly but surely redress the living conditions of its population and increase the quality of peace.

## **2. ANGOLA: CONFLICT SPELL 1976-2005**

The Angolan Conflict started right after the declaration of its independence in 1975. From 1989 to 1999, Angola received four peace operations (UNAVEM I, II, III and MONUA), which constituted an intervention following a *Sequential* strategy. Unlike Sierra Leone, the series of peace operations deployed in Angola have not brought an end to the war in Angola. The section below

presents a brief history of the conflict, which is followed by an analysis of the factors inhibiting peace, including comparison with Sierra Leone.

## **2.1. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT**

The Angolan conflict started after the declaration of its independence in 1975, among three liberation movements previously organized to rebel against the Portuguese rule. The Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) was founded by left-wing urban elites, the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) was rural in character, and the União Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) was also rural-traditional, but included *assimilados*, who spoke Portuguese (Lodico 1996). These three nationalistic groups had become predominant during the last years of Portuguese colonial rule and had met in Kenya in January 1975 to agree to form a common political programme. Shortly after, the date of independence was set by the Portuguese as November 11<sup>th</sup>, 1975. Until then, a transitional government would be formed, including all three factions; FNLA, MPLA and UNITA. Before the Portuguese could transfer sovereignty, fights had already erupted among the three groups. As Portugal left, independence was declared by each party autonomously, dividing Angola into three regions.

The FNLA was the first to be defeated by the MPLA in January 1976, which left two major protagonists, the MPLA and its armed forces, the Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (FAPLA), and the UNITA and its armed forces, the Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola (FALA) (Krška

1997). Different from the Sierra Leonean experience, Angolan groups benefitted from Cold War politics, which enabled each group to find substantial outside support, financially and militarily; the MPLA was assisted by Cuban troops and UNITA was supported by South African troops, all operating within Angola. The Guerrilla fight continued throughout the 1980s, causing several major battles around the country, predominantly in the south. An unstable stalemate was reached in 1988, and with the Cold War tensions unwinding, an international diplomatic process was launched by the Portuguese, the United States and the Soviet Union. An agreement was signed in December 1988 between Angola and Cuba, where a timetable for the withdrawal of the 50,000 Cuban troops was agreed upon. A UN military observer group was requested by the parties, which led to the Security Council's decision to establish the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) in December 1988, to verify the phased and total withdrawal of the Cuban troops.

The withdrawal of Cuban troops went smoothly and by May 1991, a month before the scheduled date, the Cubans had left Angola. Meanwhile, six rounds of negotiations between UNITA and MPLA took place in Lisbon. On May 1<sup>st</sup>, 1991 the parties concluded a peace agreement, which led to a ceasefire starting at midnight on May 15<sup>th</sup>. Ratifying this agreement, the Bicesse accord was signed on 31 May 1991. Along with clauses calling for the formation of unified armed forces consisting of both FALA and FAPLA, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), and the demobilization of surplus troops, this agreement called for the holding of

multi-party elections between September and November of 1992. The accords also called for the creation of UNAVEM II, mandated to monitor the ceasefire, the demobilization and the eventual electoral process.

## **2.2. CONTINUATION OF CONFLICT AND THE ELUSIVENESS OF PEACE**

Though a cease-fire was reached before holding the elections and both parties seemed committed to the establishment of peace, the Angolan experience echoes the stories of Burundi in 1993 and Sierra Leone in 1996; both parties were still armed and the hostilities resurfaced as a result of the elections. Savimbi, UNITA's leader, was convinced of electoral fraud; a claim not substantiated by the United Nations observers (Ali et al. 2004). Even though President dos Santos had not gained the majority of the votes and a run-off election was needed, UNITA decided to return to the battle field (Tvedten 1993). It withdrew its troops from FAA, regrouped and launched a nationwide operation to occupy municipalities, resulting in high civilian casualties (Maier 1997). The government responded with counter-attacks, which engulfed Angola in an extremely destructive war. "The UN Special Representative in Angola, Dame Margaret Anstee, described this fighting as the heaviest in 17 years of civil war, and on 28 January 1993, the UN estimated that UNITA controlled 105 of the 164 municipalities" (Krška 1997, 90).

Unlike to the continuous presence of a strong peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, most of UNAVEM II troops gradually left the country with the outbreak of violence. With some adjustments to its mandate, the remaining UN



peacekeepers worked as mediators with the goal of restoring a ceasefire. At this point, UNAVEM II can be mostly compared to the small and weak mission in Burundi, OMIB. The war continued until the end of 1994, with repetitive failed attempts of negotiations on the part of the UN Special Representative for Angola.

UNITA, however, increasingly felt overstretched by having to administer the towns it had occupied. Besides, the government had restructured its military and, like in Sierra Leone, hired Executive Outcomes to bolster its strength (Vines 2004). This situation finally prompted UNITA to sit at the negotiating table. This resulted in the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November of 1994. The agreement called for the establishment of UNAVEM III, mandated to restore peace and achieve national reconciliation and democratic elections. Even though it was stronger than its two predecessors, UNAVEM III's enforcement capability cannot be compared with the powerful military force sent to Sierra Leone after 2000 (the reinforced UNAMSIL plus the British troops).

The fighting continued sporadically and demobilization was falling behind schedule. The Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN), agreed upon in the Lusaka Protocol, was finally installed in April 1997, bringing MPLA and UNITA into a coalition administration including several other smaller parties. UNAVEM III was withdrawn to be replaced by MONUA. UNITA's handover of power to the central state administration and the demobilization of its forces moved very slowly. Finally on March 6<sup>th</sup> 1998, UNITA declared full demilitarization and even though it was still delaying the handover of some

strategic locations, the government legalized its status as a political party (Vines 2004). By the end of the 1998 however, it became clear to the UN that both parties were, once again, preparing for war, importing weapons and building up troops. Unable to prevent the escalation of power, MONUA's mandate was terminated after President dos Santos called for the end to the Lusaka peace process. The war started again and continued until 2005.

### **2.3. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING OR INHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE**

#### ***2.3.1. THE PRESENCE OF UNAVEM I (DECEMBER 1988 - MAY 1991), UNAVEM II (MAY 1991 - FEBRUARY 1995), UNAVEM III (FEBRUARY 1995-DECEMBER 1996) AND MONUA (JUNE 1997 – FEBRUARY 1999)***

UNAVEM, the first mission deployed to Angola, was mandated with the clear and simple provision of verifying the phased and total withdrawal of the Cuban Troops from Angola. A realistic set of responsibilities matched with the necessary number of troops<sup>16</sup>, made UNAVEM's job relatively straightforward. Its effectiveness was also largely due to the very good cooperation between the Cuban troops and the UN observers (Krška 1997). UNAVEM II established in May 1991 replaced the first mission accomplished. UNITA and MPLA had requested a UN peace operation to observe the Bicesse Accord. This second operation was thus mandated to monitor the ceasefire and verify the arrangements

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<sup>16</sup> UNAVEM became operational on 3 January 1989 when an advance group of 18 military observers arrived in Luanda to verify the departure of the first 450 Cuban soldiers on 10 January. Thereafter, the strength rose to 70 military observers and military teams were deployed at the ports (Cabinda, Luanda, Lobito and Namibe) and the airport (Luanda), with the headquarters located at Luanda (Krška 1997).

agreed by both parties. In March 1992, its mandate was expanded to include the observation and verification of the presidential and legislative elections.

Similar to the Burundian and Sierra Leonean experience, the hasty holding of elections did not contribute to the establishment of peace in Angola. To the contrary, both parties were antagonized and the conflict reignited. In response to criticisms that the UN should have postponed the elections, the former UN Special Representative in Angola, Dame Margaret Anstee maintains that the UN did not have the authority to do so. She argues that the mission was there only to verify the implementation of the provisions agreed upon by the two parties. Thus, she urged that to prevent such failure in the future the UN “should never accept any role in the implementation of peace accords unless it has been fully involved in the negotiation of those accords and of its own mandate” (Anstee 1993, 497). Roland Paris, however, has a different interpretation of the same events. He argues that “[i]t would [...] be misleading to suggest that the [...] peacebuilding operation simply monitored the implementation of a peace agreement that the Angolan parties had themselves devised, since central components of the agreement, including the commitment to multi-party democracy, had been urged upon the parties by Western states involved in the negotiations (the United States and Portugal) and by the very international agencies that later undertook the key peacebuilding tasks (the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank)” (Paris 2004, 65). He thus maintains that the lesson to be learned is that the introduction of multi-party elections should not be pushed upon warring parties as a blanket solution for

conflict resolution. Even though both parties seemed to be committed to peace, the elections only contributed to uncertainty that awakened hostility and insecurity.

Once again, as in Burundi and Sierra Leone, if some level of security and order had been restored before the elections, at least the completion of the demobilization and disarmament process, the violence that ensued would have not been possible. In fact, all the information necessary to predict the outbreak of violence was present before the elections. It was clear that UNITA did not trust the election process and was ready to go back to fighting if it were to lose. Indeed, “UNITA had originally wanted to retain its own army until after the voting, but was finally persuaded to agree to the creation of a Joint Commission for the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces that would oversee the fusion of the rival armies into a single force of 50,000 men” (Tvedten 1993, 111). The excess soldiers of both parties, amounting to about 150,000 men, were only partially demobilized, disarmed, and reintegrated into society. It was evident to UNAVEM II’s observers that UNITA was not giving up its sophisticated arms and only demobilizing its inexperienced fighters (mostly child soldiers it had recently recruited). “By 27 September 1992 the demobilization was badly behind schedule: only 65 per cent of the MPLA and 26 per cent of UNITA forces had been processed to return to civilian life (40,000 of the original 150.000)” (Krška 1997, 88). Besides, UNVAVEM II was not strong enough to act as a deterrent. “From the time the observers (military, police, and civilians) were first deployed, until

the elections, UNAVEM personnel were subject to intimidation, and in some regions, were fired upon while in their camps” (Lodico 1996, 113). The decision to hold the elections in this context was thus a mistake<sup>17</sup>.

It is also important to note that UNAVEM II was never endowed with enough resources and personnel<sup>18</sup> to effectively monitor the Bicesse accords (Maier 1997). The mission was not only powerless to assert itself as an authoritative force, but also unable to undertake several of its mandated tasks: such as conducting humanitarian negotiations, coordinating humanitarian activities and providing them with security. The SRSG, Ms Anstee, and the mission in general, were increasingly blamed for being biased and held responsible for the return to conflict. In fact, as UNAVEM II was too close to the conflict, and could not fulfil its mandate relating to humanitarian assistance, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) had to establish a separate unit United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) in April 1993 (Richardson 2002). While UCAH still encountered difficulties in reaching

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<sup>17</sup> Maier also maintains that the “[i]nternational diplomatic observers, particularly the U.S. officials, badly misread the voters' preference. They firmly believed until the eve of the vote that UNITA would emerge victorious and that demobilization could be handled by the incoming Savimbi government. There was constant international pressure on UNAVEM to ensure that the elections took place in the belief that all other problems could be solved afterwards.” (Maier 1997, 11)

<sup>18</sup> *May 1991-January 1993 (authorized)* 350 military observers and 126 civilian police. There were also a civilian air unit and a medical unit, as well as some 87 international civilian and 155 local staff. In addition, during the polling, UNAVEM II fielded a total of 400 electoral observers (DPKO – UNAVEM II facts and figures: <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Unavem2/UnavemIIF.html> (accessed on Oct. 4th, 2010))

areas most affected by the conflict, it was at least perceived as neutral, which facilitated humanitarian workers' movement and increased their security. Overall UNAVEM II was a failure; Vines went as far as arguing that "UNAVEM II subsequently became a textbook example of the sort of peacekeeping operation that is doomed to failure. It was powerless to deal with the self-implementing nature of the Bicesse Accords when it became evident early on that both sides were failing to comply with the demobilization plan" (Vines 2004, 79).

With the collapse of the peace agreement, UNAVEM II's presence was not only becoming irrelevant, but also problematic, as its personnel were faced with increasing dangers. Most of the personnel were thus evacuated and the strength of the mission was gradually reduced to 50 military observers and 18 police observers. The Secretary-General announced that the UN would not abandon Angola and recommended the extension of the UNVAVEM II mandate to provide mediation, with the goal of restoring a ceasefire and reinstating the peace process (Krška 1997). UNAVEM III was established in 1995 after the signing of the Lusaka protocol, as a more muscular version of its predecessors. 6,500 UN peacekeeping troops were deployed to Angola with a multitude of responsibilities; among others UNVAVEM III was mandated:

to supervise, control and verify the disengagement of forces and to monitor the cease-fire; to verify the withdrawal, quartering and demobilization of UNITA forces; to supervise the collection and storage of UNITA armaments; to verify the movement of Government forces (FAA) to barracks and the completion of the formation of FAA; to verify the free circulation of persons and goods; to verify and monitor the neutrality of the

Angolan National Police, the disarming of civilians, the quartering of the rapid reaction police, and security arrangements for UNITA leaders; to coordinate, facilitate and support humanitarian activities directly linked to the peace process, to declare formally that all essential requirements for the holding of the second round of presidential elections have been fulfilled, and to support, verify and monitor the electoral process (DKPO)<sup>19</sup>.

Once again, the mission was not endowed with sufficient resources and personnel to carry out such an extensive mandate and more importantly it was not strong enough to compel UNITA's demobilization and disarmament or to protect the civilians from UNITA's attacks. In fact, increasingly "the majority of the reported ceasefire violations were attacks on civilians. These attacks were designed to control the movement of food aid in contested areas or to stop people from moving into areas controlled by the other side" (Vines, p.82). Compared to Sierra Leone, where a total of 18,500 troops<sup>20</sup> were deployed, the strength of UNAVEM III was plainly not sufficient to provide the security and order needed for the implementation of the accords. There were serious delays in the schedule and UNITA was buying time, rearming and using the peace mission as a shield against MPLA forces. Under these precarious and unstable conditions and remembering the failed elections of 1992, the decision was made to postpone the elections indefinitely or until when the UN would decide they would be feasible (Vines 2004; Maier 1997).

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<sup>19</sup> [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unavem\\_p.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unavem_p.htm) accessed on October 5th 2009.

<sup>20</sup> 11, 500 troops for UNAMSIL accompanied by 7,000 British troops.

UNAVEM III began winding down its military forces after the formation of GURN, as some stability was finally achieved in Angola. MONUA was deployed on the 30<sup>th</sup> of June 1997 to replace the latter. Its mandate was to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country<sup>21</sup> (DPKO). Shortly after its deployment, another violent episode erupted in Angola. Once again, the peace operation was not designed and endowed with enough force to deal with the hostilities. It consisted of only 1,500 rapid reaction troops, 345 civilian police and 85 military observers. The UN attempted to implement embargoes to prevent parties from rearming. However, they could not be not consistently and rigorously enforced, especially the diamond embargo (Daley 1998). Increasingly, it became obvious that the UN presence and involvement was not effective at preventing the escalation of violence. MONUA's mandate was terminated in February 1999. After several lobbying efforts from the UN for a follow-on UN operation, the Angolan accepted the establishment of a small, 30-person United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) on October 1999 (Vines 2004).

The intervention in Angola was an example of a failed *Sequential* strategy. It started with small and simple Security-Only verification mission (UNAVEM I), followed with a larger Security-Only operation (UNAVEM II until March 1992). All the following operations *were Multi-dimensional* in nature, though some of

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<sup>21</sup> <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Monua/monuam.htm> accessed on October 5th 2010.



the tasks could never be implemented due to lack of security. It is clear that compared to the military force sent to Sierra Leone, the Security-Only phase of the overall intervention in Angola was not strong and did not last long enough to provide order and security. UNAVEM I was small and its mandate was far from addressing the overall conflict. It was only tackling a certain segment of it; the withdrawal of the Cuban Troops, which was at this point an uncontroversial aspect of the conflict. UNAVEM II had only 10 months to demobilize and disarm the fractions, before it had to supervise and verify the presidential and legislative elections. As explained above, none of the operations that followed were endowed with enough military force or resources to deter and/or compel UNITA to demobilize and comply with the ceasefire.

It actually seems that UNITA became an expert at manipulating the international community. At any sign of exhaustion or risk of defeat, UNITA would agree to sit at the negotiating table, sign a ceasefire and demand the establishment of a peace operation. Once a mission deployed, UNITA would be effectively protected from MPLA's attacks and from the further weakening of its troops. Since the missions did not have the power necessary to force UNITA's compliance with the agreement, the latter would rebuild its forces, while pretending to abide by the accords. The deployment of a series of weak missions has enabled the perpetual rebuilding of UNITA's forces over the years and thus has contributed to prolonging the conflict in Angola. In an aim to include an unwilling and dishonest UNITA to the political system, the United Nations has

persistently prevented the government from achieving a decisive victory. In fact, in February 2002, three years after the departure of the last peace operation MONUA, government troops killed Savimbi, which pushed UNITA to sign a ceasefire accord ending the civil war. In contrast to the resolute international action to stop the illicit trafficking of diamonds in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the lack of enforcement regarding the implementation of the embargoes was enabling UNITA to use its diamond revenues to rebuild its forces. Some experts estimate that “the rebels, [UNITA] have earned \$3.7 billion from diamonds since 1992” (Daley 1998).

### ***2.3.2. THE INTENSITY AND DURATION OF CONFLICT***

Even though Cold-War military jargon would characterise Angola’s civil war as a low-intensity conflict, the numbers demonstrates that it was a very intensive war, especially in terms of human casualties. According to the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, by 1992 already, a total of 800,000 Angolans had died (Sogge 1992, 23-24). This number include the approximate 120,000 to 160,000 battle-related deaths on both sides and the civilians that perished due to direct violence or indirectly due to lack of food, hygiene or medical care. It is estimated that the conflict resulted in 500,000 refugees (Roque 2005, 213) In 2003, the estimated death toll had risen to a million and the number of displaced people to four million (Smith 2003).

Conflict has been permanent since the Portuguese rule, which has significantly undermined societal infrastructure. The Angolan population has

suffered not only from battle related violence, but also from the side-effects of protracted war. Similar to Sierra Leone, the country is endowed with rich and lucrative natural resources which have been only allocated to war efforts. Although the general population might have been exhausted from the war, the warring parties had enough resources to sustain themselves, lure new recruits and suppress discontent population.

### ***2.3.3. LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY/AUTOCRACY***

Similar to all the three previous cases, Angola had minimal democratic experience since its independence. The three liberation movements (UNITA, MPLA and FLNA) did not smoothly transform themselves in political parties, as some had expected. The groups were very different in terms of their socio-cultural identities and values, class distinction (urban, rural, assimilated and indigenous people), and their ethno-linguistic identity. With no institutional mechanism in place to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of one social group - which would exclude the legitimacy of others- conflict was foreseeable (Roque 2005). The system in place, facilitating the concentration of power, also translated to economic grievances; the society was characterized by unequal classes and unbalanced regional distribution of wealth in terms of income and resources.

It is interesting to note that the failed Bicesse Accords is not the first democratization attempt in Angola. The three liberation parties had tried unsuccessfully to democratize with the Alvor agreement in 1975. Very similar to 1992, they “were to combine their separate guerrilla forces into a unified army

and submit themselves to national elections to form a government which would assume power at independence in November 1975” (MacQueen 1998, 403). Democracy represented a threat to each party, which feared exclusion in case of electoral defeat, hence resulting in the long and protracted conflict. In 1992, this conflict was ironically supposed to be resolved by holding elections.

This second attempt to democratize Angola in 1992 was once again undermined by wariness. “The whole process was [...] characterized by mistrust between the MPLA and UNITA, as well as between their monitoring teams on the spot, resulting in a high degree of mutual suspicion and accusations” (Krška 1997, 88). UNITA was worried that the MPLA government was filling the ranks of the anti-riot emergency police with 10,000 of its own elite troops. This prompted UNITA to deliberately slow down the process of demobilization of its soldiers. It is also argued that UNITA only agreed to democratization because it believed that the moment was favourable for them to win the elections, there was never any indication that they would actually accept electoral defeat and relinquish power as the FSLN had done in Nicaragua. During the negotiation, UNITA was pushing for the elections to be held in only a year: “UNITA, hoping to capitalize on recent military and diplomatic successes, and drawing on strong international sentiment for speedy balloting in Africa, argued that one year had proved a sufficient preparatory period before free elections in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Nicaragua” (Tvedten 1993, 111). Only after the MPLA argued that it would not leave enough

time for the two armies to integrate, the decision was made to allow for a period of 15 to 17 months.

In Angola, like in Sierra Leone and Burundi, the lack of democratic experience, and most importantly, the lack of institutional guarantees for the opposition, made democratization an uncertain and unfavourable choice for all parties involved in the conflict. By pushing for the establishment of democracy prematurely, the international community perpetuated the mistrust towards elections. “Both accords [Alvor and Bicesse] set an unrealistically short period of preparation for elections. The winner take - all character of the polls planned at Bicesse was, like that envisaged for the 1975 process, inappropriate to the polarised nature of Angolan politics. Finally, the external supervision planned for both the 1975 and 1992 processes was wholly insufficient” (MacQueen 1998. 403). Similar to the situation in Sierra Leone, the availability of lucrative resources gave UNITA, and to some extent MPLA, a important incentive to choose the continuation of the fight in hope of winning rather than demobilizing and submitting themselves to an uncertain electoral process.

#### ***2.3.4. ECONOMIC SITUATION***

Before independence, the MPLA, mainly consisting of Angola’s urban elite, was seen as the natural successors of the Portuguese. There were not only better educated but also had been directly shaped in the Portuguese administrative culture. This facilitated the concentration of economic and political power into their hands. With the prospect of gaining power after independence, other groups

laid their claim. With MPLA's refusal to accept the legitimacy of other interests or to share power, other groups decided to fight for their access to power and resources. In fact, UNITA was quick to occupy strategic locations where it could extract diamonds to finance its fight against the MPLA. "Since 1992, UNITA have consistently controlled 60-70% of Angola's diamond production, generating US\$ 3.7 billion in revenue, enabling them to maintain their war effort" (GlobalWitness 1995). The government, while also using diamond resources, capitalized on oil revenues to finance its fight with UNITA. This is not surprising thus, that even though Angola is endowed with lucrative natural resources, the annual GDP growth since the mid-1980s has remained in the levels of the countries selected by the UN as least developed in the world (see graph VII.3). As Collier and Hoeffler (2004; 2009) would argue, the availability of resources made war an available and feasible option for both parties. This enabled them to continue to fight, rather than accept an uncertain future, in which they could be excluded from power completely.

### ***2.3.5. OUTCOME OF THE CONFLICT***

The two peace initiatives leading to the Bicesse and the Lusaka Accords have failed to provide physical, political and economic security to warring parties. The first attempt of peace was sought through holding elections, which proved to be unsuitable in a situation of mistrust and uncertainty. The second attempt, designed to avoid many of the weakness of its predecessor pledged both parties a place in the administration, i.e. a power sharing solution. In order to share power

with the MPLA, UNITA was asked to hand over the territories it occupied, contribute some of its troops to a unified army and demobilize the excess. As UNITA was reluctantly and irregularly doing so, the MPLA not only got fed up but also suspicious of its rival's intentions. Thus it launched a major offensive to recuperate the territories, which once more engulfed the country in war. Unfortunately, "[t]hese experiences provided each parties with compelling reasons for why they should not trust their adversary in a peace agreement" (Ali et al. 2004, 297). It is clear that the mistrust between these two groups made the voluntary demobilization of their troops almost impossible. Without a credible presence able to force demobilization and convince the parties that the other is disarming, it is difficult to envision why UNITA or MPLA would abide by the agreement. The fear of disarming and of losing its military capabilities to be subordinate to the other was great enough that defecting was always more appealing.

#### ***2.3.6. OTHER FACTORS***

The international community showed commitment in the resolution of the Angola conflict. It is however possible to argue that the mandates of the missions deployed were ill-suited to address the lack of trust and the insecurity present among the warring parties. International interest in the Angolan conflict did not only manifest itself in the form of peacebuilding. The conflict was perpetuated by Cold War politics, in which parties received significant outside support. The superpowers and their allies were supporting both parties financially and

militarily; MPLA was backed by the Soviet Union and aided by Cuban troops and UNITA by the United States and by South African troops. This convinced many that Angolan civil war will cease with the end of the Cold War. However, another significant source of revenue enabled the continuation of the conflict. As mentioned above, Angola is endowed with extensive oil reserves, diamonds and other minerals. “According to De Beers, some \$1.72 billion of diamonds originated from UNITA zones during the Lusaka process. The government meanwhile used funds generated from the sale of oil or loans mortgaged to future oil production to purchase millions of dollars worth of military equipment “ (Vines 2004, 102). As Kornprobst argued, not only had the Angolan parties plentiful resources to continue the war, but also much to lose in case of an electoral defeat (Kornprobst 2002, 73). This indicates clearly that a ‘Mutually Hurting Stalemate’ was not reached in Angola.

Ethnicity played some role in the conflict. Angola has eight ethnic groups; the Bakongo, the Ambundu, the Lunda-Chokwe, the Ovimbundu, the Nganguela, the Nhaneka-Humbi, the Herero and the Chindonga (Roque 2005, 214). Each party’s supporter base was linked to some ethnic loyalties; the FLNA was a Bakongo movement, the UNITA was founded by the Ovimbundu but included Bakongo, Lunda-Choke and others. MPLA’s background was Luso-African and was mainly supported by urban elites in Luanda. While ethnicity played a role in the establishment of these groups, it is not comparable with the degree of ethnic hostility found in Burundi.



Experiencing years of conflict, the quality of life quickly deteriorated in Angola. Instead of being invested in schools, hospitals and infrastructure, the oil and diamond revenues have been used to finance the war. Roque (2005) notes that 65 per cent of Angola's GDP (nearly 4bn US\$) were allocated to defence, internal security and unclassified items in 1999. She also points out that only 2.7 per cent of Angola's GDP is allocated to health and education.

### **3. COMPARISONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The similarities of the Sierra Leonean and Angolan experiences facilitate their comparisons. Both are endowed with lucrative natural resources. Both had a turbulent start after their independence. The war in Angola came sooner than in Sierra Leone, and this can be explained by two factors. First, the existence of well-established armed groups formed to rebel against the Portuguese, which quickly found themselves competing with each other as Independence became a reality. The prospect of elections in 1975 created uncertainty that led to the escalation of violence among groups. Second, the conflict became a playground for Cold War politics. In contrast, Sierra Leone enjoyed a short period of political competition from 1961 to 1973. The mismanagement of the economy and the use of ethnicity as a way to recruit supporters eroded the weak institutions in place. In short, both states became unable to guarantee the fair inclusion of the *other*, who chose to fight for their rights and access to resources and representation.


In both states, the international community attempted to resolve the conflict by introducing elections. Again in both cases, holding elections before establishing a secure order led to a relapse to conflict. As Paris argued for the case of Angola, “[t]he fighting might have been avoided if the international peacebuilding agencies had ensured that the parties were completely disarmed before the elections took place - certainly, UNITA’s military capacity gave Savimbi some flexibility in deciding whether or not to renew fighting” (Paris 2004, 69). Elections, in both instances, led to an increased sense of insecurity, which culminated in renewed fighting. In both cases, the availability of lucrative natural resources enabled parties to defect from the elections. With enough revenues, the parties involved preferred to fight in hope of achieving decisive victory, rather than accepting an uncertain election outcome and the possibility of electoral defeat. After these failed attempts at competitive politics, both countries were advised to delay future elections, and both the Lomé and Lusaka accords called for a power-sharing solution to the conflict. While Sierra Leone finally reached peace in 2000, Angola’s war continued until 2005.

The important difference between the Sierra Leonean and Angolan experiences was the international community’s willingness to show resolve and force. In Sierra Leone, after repetitive failed attempts at providing security and order, the United Nations and the United Kingdom finally sent a strong enough military force able to coerce the RUF to demobilize and disarm and to join the transitional government. The international community also took decisive steps to

stop the illegal trading of Sierra Leonean and Liberian diamonds, to finally cut the endless resources of the RUF. In the case of Angola, the maximum military strength sent by the UN was approximately 6,500 troops; in addition the mandates of these operations were ill-designed to address the insecurity present in the country.


Most relevant to the hypotheses of this study, the analysis of these missions following a *Sequential* strategy shows the futility of implementing multi-sectoral peacebuilding before the establishment of some basic security. Multi-dimensional operations sent to Angola could not effectively begin to carry out their developmental tasks, as the lack of insecurity was endangering the UN and other agencies' personnel. In fact, most of the development-related work was ineffective as the continuation of the conflict undermined these advances. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, only after the reinforced UNAMSIL and the British forces restored order and security, the developmental tasks of UNAMSIL, UNIPSIL and UNIOSIL could be carried out effectively to contribute to peace. The next chapter will analyze the performance of the *Simultaneous* strategy, which calls for the implementation of both security and development related task simultaneously. The statistical analysis and the cases analyzed so far support the hypothesis that security related tasks should be prioritized over development-related tasks, as the implementation of the latter is dependent on the presence of some stability and order.

**Graph VII.1: GDP Growth for Sierra Leone Compared to Average of Least Developed Countries from 1980 to 2008**



Source: World Bank - World Development Indicators Database (WDI) - online. <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/GMIS/gdmis.do?siteId=2&menuId=LNAV01HOME3>

**Graph VII.2: Official Development Assistance and Official Aid to Sierra Leone (current US\$) from 1960 to 2005**



Source: World Bank - World Development Indicators Database (WDI) - online. <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/GMIS/gdmis.do?siteId=2&menuId=LNAV01HOME3>

**Graph VII.3: GDP Growth for Angola Compared to Average of Least Developed Countries from 1986-2007**



Source: World Bank - World Development Indicators Database (WDI) - online. <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/GMIS/gdmis.do?siteId=2&menuId=LNAV01HOME3>

## CHAPTER VIII

### CASE STUDIES: SIMULTANEOUS STRATEGY IN MOZAMBIQUE AND CAMBODIA

The *Security-Only* and the *Sequential* strategies are two variants of the *Security-first* approach, prioritizing the establishment of security before the introduction of developmental programmes. In the cases of Nicaragua and Burundi, the operations deployed were designed to deal only with security related tasks, leaving developmental related tasks for later and to other specialized agencies. The series of operations deployed in Sierra Leone and Angola followed a *Sequential* strategy; initial operations were designed to provide security and subsequent operations were introducing development-related tasks while still providing security. This chapter explores the implementation of a *Multi-Dimensional* approach, advocating the deployment of operations assuming security and development related tasks simultaneously. In Mozambique, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), following a *Simultaneous* strategy, was successful at establishing sustainable peace. Whereas in Cambodia, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was not able to end the conflict and left after the establishment of a very precarious coalition, which led to renewed fighting a few years later. Following the same structure as the two previous chapters, after a brief description of the conflict, the factors

contributing and inhibiting the establishment of peace are investigated, and the independent effect of the peace operations strategy is examined.

## **1. MOZAMBIQUE: CONFLICT SPELL 1977-1992**

### **1.1. BRIEF HISTORY OF MOZAMBIQUE'S CONFLICT**

Mozambique, a Portuguese colony like Angola, was scheduled to become independent in 1975. Various anti-colonial movements had emerged in the 1960s<sup>1</sup>, but Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) established itself as the predominant group (Alden 2001). "Claims to have liberated large numbers of people from effective colonial control became part of Frelimo's weaponry in its campaign for international recognition as 'sole legitimate representative' of the Mozambican people at the OAU, the UN and elsewhere" (Hall and Young 1997, 32). Frelimo had also developed a rudimentary political and administrative organization, and was providing basic health and education services in the liberated zones. While this facilitated mobilization and defence, it established international recognition and support. Frelimo ended up forming the first post-independence government and openly adopted a 'Marxist-Leninist agenda'. It sought to remake the Mozambican society and economy; large industries were nationalized, agriculture was socialized, organized religion was suppressed, and education and medical care were socialized. These socialist transformations deeply disrupted the traditional leadership system and agricultural organization,

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<sup>1</sup> Such as the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO), the Mozambique African National Union (MANU) and the National Union for Mozambican Independence (UNAMI).

particularly in the rural areas (Manning 2002). Facing increased opposition, the government was quick to curtail political freedoms and made belief in its new agenda mandatory (Weinstein 2002). The discontent with the government's radical policies, coupled with the deterioration of the economy, gave rise to a general dissatisfaction among the Mozambican population.

Meanwhile, by offering safe heaven to guerrilla movements fighting against Rhodesia and South Africa, Frelimo was also angering its neighbours. In response, Rhodesia mobilized Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana), recruiting alienated, oppressed and discontented Mozambicans (Alden 2001). This marked the start of a fifteen year conflict in Mozambique. In the early 1980s, also aiming to destabilize Frelimo's government, South Africa became the main outside supporter for Renamo. Europe and the United States also assisted Renamo, seeing the opportunity to influence the formulation of its agenda towards a capitalist approach of development and towards democratization. "By late 1984, Renamo was operating in every province of Mozambique and had grown eightfold, from 2,500 to nearly 20,000 soldiers" (Weinstein 2002, 148). It is worth to note that Frelimo also received foreign support; its political agenda was attracting considerable support from the Soviet Union and its allies.

The deterioration in the economy, the winding down of Cold War politics and the advances of Renamo all contributed to a softening in Frelimo's posture. With the Nkomati Accords in 1984, Frelimo sought, unsuccessfully, to end South African's support for Renamo. Around the same time, hoping to receive international aid and regaining some control over the economy, the government



changed the course of its policies away from socialism (Manning 1998). By the late 1980s, Frelimo also conceded to multipartism, general elections, freedom of worship, and liberalized markets (Juergensen 1998).

## **1.2. END OF CONFLICT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE**

Heartened by changes in Frelimo's policies, the leadership of the Catholic Church in Mozambique attempted to bring Frelimo and Renamo to the negotiation table. These initial trials failed. However both parties were losing their much needed financial support and were increasingly urged to settle their dispute (Alden 2001). In this context, the resolute commitment from Italy to host negotiation finally succeeded and a dozen rounds of negotiations led to the signing of a ceasefire, a new Constitution (1990) and the Rome General Peace Agreement (GPA) in June 1992, which officially ended the conflict. The UN participated to the ratification of the GPA in October 1992, leading to the arrival of the newly appointed SRSG, Aldo Ajello, to the capital Maputo, who was sent to organize the establishment and deployment of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (Donini 1996). The UN made an enormous financial investment to demobilize fighters, to create a national army and to establish the conditions necessary for multi-party elections. The international community, various multinationals, and NGOS, also made extensive contributions to Mozambique post-war reconstruction. Relatively peaceful elections were held in 1994; with 87.9 per cent of the 6.1 million registered voters participating, Chissano from Frelimo was elected president with 53 per cent of the votes against Renamo's candidate Dhlakama, who gained 33 per cent of the vote.

### **1.3. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING OR INHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE**

#### ***1.3.1. THE PRESENCE OF ONUMOZ (DECEMBER 1992- DECEMBER 1994)***

The deployment of a peace operation to Mozambique was decided at the Rome General Peace Agreement (GPA), where the establishment of a 6,800-strong UN peace operation (ONUMOZ) was demanded. “ONUMOZ became the lead instrument for the UN, and was mandated with sweeping overall responsibility in four primary areas: political, military, humanitarian, and electoral affairs” (Juergensen 1998, 11). To implement its provisions, the GPA also called for the creation of a series of commissions<sup>2</sup>, staffed with Renamo and Frelimo members, various donor countries and ONUMOZ. The peace operation was mandated to demobilize and reintroduce ex-combatants into the society, to select soldiers to form the national army, to provide technical assistance to ensure that both parties (especially Renamo) were ready to compete in the elections, to organize elections, to register voters and count votes after elections (December 1992). In addition, ONUMOZ was also mandated to provide security to UN and other international activities. And finally, it was responsible to coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance operations around the country<sup>3</sup>. This last task was one of the innovations introduced by the UN to better integrate the activities

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<sup>2</sup> Peace Commissions list: Ceasefire Commission (CCF), Supervision and Control commission (SCS), Reintegration Commission (CORE), Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defense Forces (CCFADM), National Elections Commission (CNE), National Commission for Police Affairs (COMPOL), and National Information Commission (COMINFO) (Manning 2002, 29)

<sup>3</sup> DKPO website: [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/onumozM.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onumozM.htm) accessed October, 10th 2009.

of numerous agencies operating simultaneously into one unified and coordinated programme (Alden 2001).

ONUMOZ experienced a bumpy start; seriously delayed, it only became fully operational in June 1993. There were several reasons slowing down its establishment. First, administratively, it was difficult to organize such an extensive mission so quickly (the GPA had unrealistically demanded its immediate establishment) (Juergensen 1998). Second, there were serious inter-agency squabbles: “The overlap in terms of mandate fuelled inter-agency conflict over everything from the securing of lucrative contracts to implementing their provisions, while the narrowness of mandates (or at least the interpretation of those mandates) prevented agencies from fulfilling aspects of the peace process which would seem to logically fall within their purview” (Alden 2001, 51). Third, expecting a much smaller blue-helmet force, Frelimo was not pleased by the extensive mandate and was slowing down the process as well.

The deployment of an initial, simpler and security-oriented peace operation could have prevented the delays, which endangered the Mozambican peace process. The GPA’s timetable for demobilization was already short and the elections were approaching fast. In the absence of international presence, growing uncertainty and insecurity prevented parties to demobilize and to continue on track with the peace process. At this point, the Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali played a crucial role; remembering the failure of the 1992 election in Angola and witnessing the delays in demobilization in Mozambique, Boutros Ghali revised GPA’s timetable. He argued that enough time needed to be devoted

to demobilization before the elections could be held. He postponed the elections to October 1994, which effectively allow the mission enough time to be deployed and provide enough security before the elections. While the damage to the Mozambican peace process was minimized by the swift actions of the Secretary General, the Cambodian case below shows that delays in troop deployment can be detrimental in the peace process.

As a part of its military component ONUMOZ inspected violations of the ceasefire and established assembly areas for demobilizing troops. An important function of the operation, contributing greatly to the establishment of peaceful relations within the society, was its reintegration programmes intended to psychologically prepare ex-combatants to return to the normal functioning of their society. These included “[...] educational programmes such as literacy classes, recreational activities such as football matches, general information about the nature of the peace process and specifics on demobilization, to camp radio broadcasts and lectures” (Alden 2001, 41). While in terms of demobilization and reintegration ONUMOZ was performing relatively well, its mandate was vague and weak with respect to disarmament (Vines 1998). The UN failed to give clear instruction to ONUMOZ on disarmament and more importantly to provide it with the necessary financial resources to effectively tackle the issue<sup>4</sup>. The mission was

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<sup>4</sup> Chachiua and Malan (1998) argue that this was due to “[...] a prevailing philosophical wisdom that ‘war [and hence instability] is the result of political decision: the arms are the instruments of war not its cause [Ajello’s statement]’. The UN perhaps understood better (and perhaps sooner) than Dhlakama or Chissano that the armed forces of the two parties were totally fed up, and that they would not return to war — weapons or no weapons. There was therefore no perceived motive for placing a high priority on effective disarmament within the ONUMOZ mission.

not destroying or properly decommissioning the weapons it collected, nor was it effective at making sure that the weapons did not fall back into illegal hands (Chachua and Malan 1998). The presence of weapons around the country could have seriously threatened peace at times of tension, especially after the elections. While the failure in disarmament did not engender peace in Mozambique, it had more severe consequences for South Africa, where most of the weapons ended up (Vines 1998).

Politically, ONUMOZ was mandated to reintegrate the Renamo-controlled territories into the country's public administration and to promote the necessary conditions to hold democratic elections. In fact, the mission and international donors played a remarkable role at helping factions transform from armies to political parties (Reilly 2008). ONUMOZ managed a special purpose trust fund to collect large-scale international financial support for the political development of Frelimo and especially Renamo. "These resources gave the Renamo leadership a realistic chance of competing in the multiparty elections and provided its former military commanders with salaries, houses, offices, and vehicles to sweeten the deal" (Weinstein 2002, 49-50). Undoubtedly, and particularly for Renamo's members coming from lower socioeconomic strata, the assistance that both parties received and more importantly the financial incentives they were given, motivated the parties not to defect (Manning 2002).

Another innovative aspect of UNOMOZ was its mandate to integrate and coordinate the activities of humanitarian assistance agencies. The United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) was established as

the humanitarian component of ONUMOZ by the Security Council in resolution 797 (1992). “UNOHAC was designed by ONUMOZ to organize provisions for emergency distribution to critical areas of the country, to assist in the short- and long-term humanitarian needs of the demilitarization process and to mount a massive refugee repatriation programme” (Alden 2001, 42). Since there were so many areas needing attention UNOMOZ also pooled the resources and expertise of a dozen NGOs and foreign development assistance programmes already at work in Mozambique. This approach, which proved to be inefficient, was devised to eliminate duplication, to speed the delivery of the emergency commodities, maintain a comprehensive database of donor’s contribution and activities, to gather, evaluate and disseminate information on humanitarian programs, and to advise on the use of humanitarian aid with special emphasis on the reintegration of returning refugees, the internally displaced people (IDPs), demobilized soldiers and vulnerable groups (Donini 1996).

UNOMOZ is a perfect example of a multi-dimensional intervention, where security and development related tasks have been implemented simultaneously. It can be argued that ONUMOZ’s political, electoral and humanitarian relief tasks have been carried out with success. The substantial technical assistance and financial aid given to both parties undoubtedly contributed to their transformations to political parties. Also, the financial incentives and training programmes provided to ex-combatants have effectively reintegrated them into their society. For Mozambique, exhausted from the conflict and further devastated by severe drought in 1991, the humanitarian relief aid in

form of food, medical care and shelter was critical in avoiding deaths from hunger and lack of sanitation. The repatriation of refugees and IDPs was also carried out successfully with the collaboration of various NGOs and humanitarian agencies.

Three aspects of the intervention however were particularly weak; 1) the security component, 2) the demining process and 3) the assistance for long-term development. According to many accounts, demobilization was not carried out completely and, as mentioned above, since disarmament was not a clear part of the ONUMOZ mandate, lots of weapons (especially small arms) were dispersed around the country (Vines 1998). Hanlon argues that Ajello was mistaken in thinking that his main task was to cajole Renamo into accepting the deal that it had signed. While this involved important financial incentives for its leaders, "Renamo was never required [by ONUMOZ] to relinquish control of all the areas it occupied nor to hand over all its arms" (Hanlon 1996, 19). Chachua and Malan also suggest that the mission's mandate was weak in terms of its security responsibility: "[t]he short-sightedness, with which the disarmament and demobilisation of redundant soldiers were undertaken, proved a significant impediment to the post-conflict reconstruction process. The UN neglected the need for a comprehensive '*security first*' [italic added] approach to peace in Mozambique [...]" (1998, 7). The mission was not endowed with a mandate that could coerce or enforce compliance with the peace plan, thus often obedience was achieved through concessions about demobilization or disarmament and financial incentives. As many claim, if it were not for the strong will for peace of the Mozambican people, the ramifications of poor demobilization and disarmament

## Chapter VIII

could have easily led to a relapse of conflict (Kühne et al. 1995; Hanlon 1996; Synge 1997; Juergensen 1998; Chachiua and Malan 1998).

Due to a lack of coordination or leadership, the second weakness of UNOMOZ was its failure to start a comprehensive demining programme in Mozambique (Synge 1997). While there was a broad consensus in 1992 that the landmines along primary roads should be removed to protect delivery of humanitarian assistance and returning refugees, its implementation was plagued by mismanagement and inter-agency rivalry. The organization of the demining program was placed under UNOHAC. Serious delays were due to its insistence that all contracts should be approved by the Ceasefire Committee (CCF). This frustrated the agencies involved as it was seen as an unnecessary bureaucratic procedures slowing down the demining process. There were also severe rivalry between UNDP and UNOHAC, which complicated the approval of several major contracts. In fact, Synge argues that “UNOHAC and UNDP controlled the largest budgets for this work but failed to authorize programs or projects until mid-1994, leaving the bulk of the mine clearance during the UNOMOZ mandate to the actions of individual agencies” (Synge 1997, 161). A report prepared by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Mozambique to the UN notes that in 1996, there were still about 3 million landmines. According to Handicap International, an estimated 20 people step on landmines every month in



Mozambique, 60 percent of them die due to lack of access to health services<sup>5</sup>. The inability to achieve more on mine clearance in Mozambique, taking into consideration the large funds available, represents a serious missed opportunity for the mission and more importantly for the safety of many Mozambicans.

The third weakness of UNOMOZ was the inability of its humanitarian component, UNOHAC, to serve as a coordinating agency. Even though created to increase inter-agency collaboration and to integrate better the various activities taking place in the country, UNOHAC mostly slowed down development programmes by its unnecessary bureaucratic procedures. In an international workshop<sup>6</sup> evaluating ONUMOZ's performance, "strong criticism was directed at the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC). It was not necessary to place an extra layer of bureaucracy above the NGOs and UN agencies already based in Mozambique, especially not a bureaucracy which carried out its tasks inadequately" (Kühne et al. 1995, 22).

Related to the previous point, another weakness of UNOHAC was its inability to devote more resources towards long-term development plans (Barnes 1998). UNOHAC was established to replace the UN Special coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations (UNSCERO), which was already operating in

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<sup>5</sup> Referring to the mid-1990s:

<http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/banmines/schools/background.asp> (accessed on Sept. 16th, 2009)

<sup>6</sup> In March 1995, SWP Ebenhausen, together with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung office in New York, organized an international workshop on the successful conclusion of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique. Former Special Representative of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Mr Aldo Ajello from Italy, other leading members of his staff, as well as other distinguished persons in the peace process and high-level representatives of Frelimo and Renamo, took stock of ONUMOZ's successes and shortcomings.

Mozambique with the UNDP since five years (Barnes 1998). While ONUMOZ and UNOHAC benefitted extensively from the expertise of UNSCERO, many believed that terminating the latter and transferring the coordination of humanitarian assistance to a short-term peace operation was unwise. “One of the main criticisms levelled was that there was tension between the short-term demands of peacekeeping (demilitarization and reintegration of ex-combatants) and longer-term development planning” (Juergensen 1998, 11-12). Deeper social and economic issues, which had in part caused the conflict and perpetuated it, were not addressed. Donini (1996) shows that the benefits of integrating humanitarian assistance under UNOMOZ were actually smaller than its disadvantages and he argues that long-term development could have been carried out more efficiently if UNSCERO’s mandate had been expanded to work with ONUMOZ. “[T]ying UNOHAC to ONUMOZ’s short-term political mandate obfuscated the fact that the humanitarian calendar was much more long-term. This became especially evident in the winding-up phase [...]” (Donini 1996, 84). In fact, the short-lived peacekeeping mentality became even more visible when UNOHAC was asked by the DPKO to leave Mozambique one week after the elections (Barnes 1998). The major weakness emanating from the lack of mid- to long-term vision was the inability to promote national capacity and local self-reliance. Already an aid-dependent country, the overall intervention has increased rather than shaken off Mozambique’s dependence on international financial and humanitarian assistance (Synge 1997).

### ***1.3.2. THE INTENSITY AND DURATION OF CONFLICT***

According to the Uppsala/PRIO battle-related deaths data, the estimated numbers of deaths varies from 125,000 to 195,000 (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). However, as mentioned before, this does not account for violence exerted from non-state actors towards civilians. In the case of Mozambique, it is believed that nearly ninety-five percent of the victims were civilians (Donini 1996). Thus, many estimates taking civilian deaths into account and the indirect violence (famine, displacement, lack of sanitation etc...) caused by the destructive conflict show that one million died during the fifteen years of conflict (Donini 1996; Honwana 1997; Thompson 1999; Hanlon 2004).

The Mozambican war involved widespread violence against civilian population, as Renamo's strategy was to terrorize the population (raping, mutilating and killing) in order to take control of the contested areas. Besides, trying to discredit Frelimo's socialized policies, Renamo was also known to destroy schools, health centers and any social initiative established associated with the government.

A few statistics denote the overall extent of suffering: 30 per cent of the population were displaced from their villages (5 million) and 47 per cent of the primary schools became dysfunctional (some estimates give over 50 per cent of the schools). About 1 million died, of a population of 16.6 million. [...] Health care delivery, which won international awards in the early 1980s, was crippled. [...] Under 5 mortality rates were almost five times that of neighbouring Botswana and over four times of recently post-apartheid South Africa (Governo de Moambique, 1994; world comparison given by World Bank, 1994) (Thompson 1999, 194)

It is clear from many accounts that in the case of Mozambique, the intensity of conflict increased dramatically the desire for peace among Mozambicans. The population was exhausted from the war and were not taking part in the fighting other than being the victims of violent assaults.

***1.3.3. LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY/AUTOCRACY***

Until Frelimo finally accepted to democratize the political system in the late 1980s, Mozambique had not enjoyed any competitive politics. After independence, Frelimo had quickly become an oppressive single-party. The repression exercised on the population, coupled with economic hardship, undoubtedly contributed to the conflict. In fact, Rhodesia and South Africa could have not launched such a successful recruitment for Renamo, if it were not for the highly discontent population of Mozambique. Like in Sierra Leone and Angola, the prospect of demobilization before the elections worried both parties. The mistrust between Frelimo and Renamo was particularly visible, when demobilization was initially delayed by difficulties to establish ONUMOZ (Juergensen 1998). As mentioned earlier, the United Nations, in this case, was successful at reducing tensions by delaying elections and making sure that the parties were ready to compete on equal ground. However, the lack of trust between the parties persisted until weeks before the elections. Dhlakama, with claims that Frelimo was secretly training troops and maintaining arms caches, threatened to boycott the elections and withdraw his general from the National army (Manning 2002). After long negotiations with the members of the international community, guarantees and financial incentives were given to

Renamo, who finally agreed to participate in the elections. The UN and the international community in general, worked extensively to ease the possible tensions and point of mistrust: they reassured both parties that demobilization was successfully carried out for each army, they provided financial incentives and they prepared the factions to function within a new unknown democratic system. Without these extensive efforts, it is doubtful that the elections could have unfolded peacefully.

#### *1.3.4. ECONOMIC SITUATION*

Mozambique is highly dependent on primary commodity exports. Thus, Frelimo's new administration started in a difficult era, since the mid 70s experienced a worldwide recession. This resulted in a serious drop in commodity prices, which severely affected Mozambique. The prospect of independence had created popular expectation for better standards of living, thus Frelimo's bad management of the economy quickly damaged its support bases. Instead of bolstering development, the socialization of the agriculture led to a crisis in the countryside. Food shortages became common after independence; "[...] between 1981 and 1986, national production fell by thirty percent, per capita income was cut in half, and exports reduced by sixty percent" (Manning 2002, 56). The economic deterioration surely played an important role in the eruption of a conflict in Mozambique as discontent and alienated Mozambicans were easily recruited by the Renamo. The following fifteen years of conflict worsened the already weakened Mozambican economy. In the context of the Cold War, while no one was willing to intervene within a proxy war of the two superpowers,

humanitarian aid was flowing. “Mozambique became the poorest and most aid-dependent country in the world (and it may still be)” (Hanlon 1996, 16). In 1991, 78 percent of Mozambique GDP was coming from foreign aid. The country could only produce 10 per cent of its food requirement and some 60 per cent of the population were living in absolute poverty (Donini 1996, 62).

In mid-1980s, facing economic collapse, Frelimo had reluctantly solicited financial assistance from Western government and the International Monetary Fund. This forced Frelimo to give up its socialist ambitions and accept a market economy<sup>7</sup>. As Graph VIII.1 illustrates, Mozambique’s GDP grew impressively after it adopted market economy in 1984. After the 1994 elections, Mozambique’s annual GDP growth increased steadily until 1999, which subsequently dropped to levels that are average for UN classified least developed countries. However, as it will be elaborated in greater details below, post-conflict Mozambique has not been able to develop a self-sustaining and balanced economy.

### *1.3.5. OUTCOME OF THE CONFLICT*

Attempts to mediate negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo and calls for reconciliation started as early as 1986. The first official rounds of talk would only take place four years later in Rome. With several rounds of negotiations, numerous set-backs and delays, several contentious issues were finally addressed and the GPA was signed in October 1992 (Hall and Young 1997). It was agreed that the government would continue to run the country, while Renamo would start to function as a political party. Both parties agreed on a programme of

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<sup>7</sup> Mozambique became a member of the IMF and the World Bank in 1984.

demilitarization and democracy. The United Nations and the international donors were extensively involved in the implementation of the agreement. Compared to previous examples of Sierra Leone and Angola, where power-sharing clauses were introduced, the GPA was not providing guaranteed access to power to the parties; it was simply calling for multi-party elections. The involvement of the United Nations and of the international committee has played an important role in guaranteeing both sides that the elections would be fair. The Secretary-General's decision to revise the ill-devised and short timetable set by the GPA was key to the success of the peace process. In the case of Mozambique, the presence of the international community as a guarantor and mediator was critical in the signing of the GPA and, most importantly, its peaceful implementation.

#### ***1.3.6. OTHER FACTORS***

International commitment and support for the Mozambican peace process was strong and it greatly aided the establishment of a peace. As mentioned above, many also identify the Mozambican people's willingness for peace as an important factor as well. The economic collapse, the atrocities of war and popular exhaustion from the war deeply contributed to a desire for peace. Juergensen (1998) argues that the conflict was in fact ripe for peace. With no available lucrative natural resources like in Angola or Sierra Leone, the winding down of Cold War rivalries translated into a mutual state of exhaustion in Mozambique (similar to Nicaragua's experience). Without undermining the indispensable role played by the third-party intervention, some argue that a 'Mutually Hurting

stalemate' was reached between the parties (Synge 1997; Juergensen 1998), which facilitated greatly the fruitful involvement of the international community.

Though there are important ethnic near-majorities in Mozambique, ethnicity has not played a significant role in causing or prolonging the conflict. Regional differences, however, have always been an important element in Mozambique. "The distinctions with political relevance in Mozambique are regional in nature, dividing the northern provinces (Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula) and central provinces (Zambézia, Tete, Manica, Sofala) from those in the south (Inhambane, Gaza, Maputo)" (Weinstein 2002, 144). While ethnicity was not a factor in the Rhodesian instigated recruitment of Renamo, Manning (2002) explains that ethnic/regional differences in people's perceptions and attitudes towards the government influenced Frelimo's popular base. It is still fair to argue that the Mozambican conflict is not ethnic in nature.

### **1.4. INDICATORS FOR POSITIVE PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE**

After the intensive international attention enjoyed by Mozambique, it is surprising to observe that aspects related to the quality of peace are not very high. While it is expected that it takes time to witness long-term developmental effects, the limited data available shows that the positive aspects of peace are particularly slow to flourish in Mozambique. For instance, Hanlon notes that while acute malnutrition has fallen dramatically, chronic malnutrition remains high and at the same levels as during the war. He also shows that wages are falling, which he argues have led to increasing corruption and theft (Hanlon 1996, 3). According to



World Development Indicators, life expectancy slowly improved to attain 46 years in 1997 (which is still seven years under the average of the UN classified least developed countries), it has since dropped to a low of 42 years in 2007. Landmines and scarce health services have been blamed for the low life expectancy. Primary school completion rates have also dramatically fallen from 26 per cent in 1990-91 to 13 per cent in 1998, but have slowly in 2005 to 42 per cent (the same levels as during war). In 1997, 69 per cent of the population was under the national poverty line<sup>8</sup>.

One possible explanation for Mozambique's slow recovery is its overdependence on international aid. Since the early 1990s the country has been dependent on national aid and humanitarian assistance to the point that "it was cynically referred to as the 'Donor's Republic of Mozambique'" (Synge 1997). The multitude of international agencies dealing with various societal, economic and political issues may have prevented the development of local capacities vital for the long-term growth of the country. Donini goes as far as suggesting that "[...] during the years that preceded the peace accords, the extensive and deliberate use of external NGOs by donors as an alternative to government structures had greatly weakened such structures and, more generally, the indigenous capacity to cope with emergencies. Furthermore, the creation of parallel structures, many of which were temporary and ad hoc mechanisms, added

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<sup>8</sup> Life expectancy, primary school completion rate and Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population) were found using Quick Query in World Development Indicators website: <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135> (accessed on October 14<sup>th</sup> 2009).

to a level of dependency that would later complicate the difficult process of regenerating civil society and providing a social and economic environment conducive to development” (Donini 1996, 65).

The peacebuilding mission deployed in Mozambique has only perpetuated this dependence. UNOHAC, restricted by the short-term vision of UNOMOZ, was incapable of providing long-term development programmes able to take root in the normal functioning of the society. Rather than consolidating economic and societal infrastructures able to address broader local developmental problems, the mission provided short-term fixes to groups in urgent needs. The operation also used a considerable amount of its resources to appease potential spoilers by giving them financial rewards. As it is will be elaborated in greater length below, the developmental programmes and administrative structures initiated by the mission could not be sustained after its withdrawal.

Many have also maintained that the economic liberalization policies imposed on Mozambique by the International Monetary Fund have increased economic hardships by slashing social spending and civil services and have only worsened the poverty and inequality in the country (Hanlon 1996; Juergensen 1998; Saul 1999; Costy 2004; Paris 2004). Hanlon writes: “ [...] I fear that Mozambique is now locked into a downward spiral of underdevelopment, in which the International Monetary Fund, donors and Mozambique’s own leaders unwittingly act together in ways that make most Mozambicans poorer “ (1996, xv). While the international intervention has successfully contributed to the

termination of the Mozambican conflict, it did not succeed at improving the quality of the peace established.

## **2. CAMBODIA: CONFLICT SPELL 1967-1998**

Cambodia received a peace operation after 24 years of conflict. Liberated from the Cold War superpower politics, the Security Council authorized the deployment of, at the time, its largest, most ambitious and expensive mission, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), costing almost 2 billion US\$ (Findlay 1994). After a brief history of the conflict, the effectiveness of this mission will be explored, along with other factors affecting positively and negatively the establishment of peace.

### **2.1. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT**

Cambodia, colonized by France, became independent in 1955. Norodom Sihanouk, King of Cambodia, stepped down from his throne and appointed his father as king, with intentions to participate in the upcoming elections to become the democratically endorsed supreme monarch of Cambodia (Becker 1998). After effectively co-opting smaller parties and harassing his leftist opponents, he succeeded at winning the elections and ruling the country pursuing his strong belief in neutralism. With the Vietnam War exploding, Sihanouk feared a Vietnamese invasion and started to assertively repress domestic leftist groups<sup>9</sup> (among them were top leaders of Khmer rouge). In 1970, Sihanouk was overthrown by an American-supported coup (Hall MacLeod 2006). Lon Nol

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<sup>9</sup> Though, Sihanouk was himself sympathetic to the Communist abroad.

became the new ruler, quickly adopting a very authoritarian stance, renaming the Kingdom of Cambodia to the Khmer Republic. Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge was gaining strength regrouping in China and unexpectedly benefitted from the US bombardment of the Khmer countryside in 1963<sup>10</sup>, as the resentment among Cambodians resulted in a new wave of fresh recruits (Becker 1998).

Eventually, the Khmer Rouge, supported by the Chinese, succeeded at overthrowing the Lon Nol dictatorship in 1975. This new regime, renaming the country Democratic Kampuchea, was even more violent than its predecessors. In the short period of the Khmer Rouge's rule, the extreme atrocities inflicted to the Cambodians have been documented and identified as genocide (Etcheson 2005; Kiernan 1993; Hannum 1989) or what some also called autogenocide (Hall MacLeod 2006). Beside the massive killings, there was starvation, large-scale population transfers, forced labour on collective farms, and an almost complete destruction of the schooling system (De Walque 2004). In December 1978, the Cambodian Resistance fighters and allied Vietnamese military forces, tired of the Khmer Rouge provocations and border attacks, mounted a forceful attack into the Democratic Kampuchea. Vietnam successfully invaded the country and installed Heng Samrin in January 1979 as the head of the newly renamed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). This however did not destroy the Khmer Rouge, who hid under the cover of the jungle and regrouped with the support of foreign

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<sup>10</sup> US bombed Khmer countryside in an aim at disrupting the Viet Cong, a guerrilla force (National Liberation Front) in South Vietnam and Cambodia that fought the US and South Vietnam during the Vietnam War.

assistance. They regained significant strength and launched a severe guerrilla warfare against the PRK (Ciorciari 2006).

Under a Cold War understanding of security, the Cambodian atrocities received little international attention; they were considered a matter of domestic politics. It was particularly difficult for the United Nations to address the Cambodian problem as several members of the Security Council were involved in supporting opposing groups in the conflict. The Soviet Union (with Vietnam) provided economic and military support to PRK. The Chinese supported the Khmer Rouge and some other fractions fighting the PRK. The two non-communist groups, Sihanouk's United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by Son Sann were supported by the US, the European Community and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Hall MacLeod 2006).

The PKR did not get the recognition of the majority of the states in the UN General Assembly on the grounds that the Vietnamese invasion was an illegal one. This forced the FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF to uneasily establish an alliance with the Khmer Rouge so that Cambodia may be represented at the UN. On June 22<sup>nd</sup> 1982, they formed the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CDGK) to occupy the Cambodian seat at the UN (Jeldres 1993). Meanwhile, the conflict continued through the 1980s, with the Khmer Rouge not only fighting against the PRK, but also frequently killing soldiers from its two coalition partners. By the end of the 1980s, having reached a stalemate, the parties

seemed open to a settlement. A series of meetings and face-to-face talks were held between Hun Sen (who replaced Heng Samrin in 1985), the Prime Minister of the PRK, Sihanouk, the titular President of the CDGK and leader of the FUNCINPEC, leaders of KPNLF, and the Khmer Rouge in Paris (1987), at the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM I in 1988 and JIM II in 1989) and at the Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) in July-August 1989.

### **2.2. CONTINUATION OF CONFLICT AND THE ELUSIVENESS OF PEACE**

Vietnam, faced with increasing external pressure and economic difficulty, announced that it was withdrawing its forces from Cambodia. All its troops left by September 1989 before an agreement was reached among the Cambodian parties (Berdal and Leifer 1996). The parties were slow to agree on several key issues, such as the nature of the transitional governance that would precede elections, the role of the international monitors and other security and military related matters. Meanwhile, two peace initiatives were advanced; the Asian proposal, developed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), promoted the exclusion of the Khmer Rouge from future Cambodian government and a limited role for the United Nations. The UN proposal advocated the participation of the four Cambodian groups into the elections and an extensive UN role in monitoring and administering during the transition (Hall MacLeod 2006).

The exclusion of Khmer Rouge not being a viable option, the Asian proposal stalled. The permanent members of the Security Council moved forward in developing the key provisions of a Framework Document, which would lead to the establishment of a formal peace agreement. After some delays, the second

session of the PICC could take place in Paris, on the 22<sup>nd</sup> to the 23<sup>rd</sup> of October 1991. The parties finally consented on a formal agreement and a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict (Brown 1992). The agreement's main provisions were the formation of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the formation of a transitional legitimate authority under the Supreme National Council (SNC)<sup>11</sup>, UN-sponsored elections forming a constituent Assembly, disarmament and demobilization (carried out by UNTAC), law and order (ensured by UNTAC's civilian police division-CIVPOL), rehabilitation and Reconstruction, and the repatriation of refugees and IDPs (coordinated by UNHRC) (Hall MacLeod 2006). Yasushi Akashi, was named to be the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Cambodia on 9 January 1992.

It became quickly apparent that the Khmer Rouge had no intention to cooperate with the implementation of the Paris Agreement, which it has signed. Even before UNTAC could be deployed the Khmer Rouge launched effective large-scale offensives to enlarge its base areas before the UN troops arrive (Berdal and Leifer 1996). While the Khmer Rouge was not abiding by the ceasefire, it also announced that it would not take part in the demobilization phase arguing that UNTAC had not verified the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops (an unreasonable demand that all ethnic-Vietnamese should be excluded from participating in elections). As other parties began their disarmament and demobilization process, the power vacuum enabled Khmer Rouge to increase its

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<sup>11</sup> All factions were included in the SNC.

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offensive. Witnessing Khmer Rouge's military advantage, other groups decided to retain some of their military power, thus further slowing down the demobilization process. While the United Nations considered a peace enforcement mission, the permanent members, Akashi and many troops contributing countries opposed the authorization of force (Hall MacLeod 2006).

Regardless of the Khmer Rouge's non-compliance, the implementation of the Paris Agreement was continuing with the registration of political parties on August 1992. After renewed efforts at convincing the Khmer Rouge to cooperate, the latter declared that it would not participate in the elections as well. Unlike the decision to delay elections in Mozambique, the Security Council announced that it will proceed according to the plan and that the elections for a constituent assembly in Cambodia would be held no later than May 1993 (SC Res/792 – 1992 reiterated in SC Res/810 - 1993)<sup>12</sup>.

Twenty contending political parties were registered; the three main parties were the Cambodian People's Party (CPP led by the incumbent Hun Sen), the FUNCINPEC (led by Sihanouk's son Norodom Ranariddh), and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP led by Son Sann). Surprisingly, without much disruptions, 4.2 million Cambodians, 89.5 per cent of the population, casted their ballots in relatively peaceful conditions between May 23<sup>rd</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> 1993. The elections were declared free and fair by the UN (Roberts 1994). FUNCINPEC won 45 per cent of the votes (58 seats) and CPP won 38 per cent (51 seats). While no single party could secure an overall majority, the CPP claimed fraud and

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<sup>12</sup> [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/untacbackgr2.html#three](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacbackgr2.html#three) accessed on October 30<sup>th</sup> 2009,



UNTAC partiality. CPP threatened with bloodshed and secession. Sihanouk, perhaps to avoid more violence in his country, or to regain his position of ultimate ruler, proposed the formation of an Interim Joint Administration, where his son Ranariddh and Hun Sen would be the co-chairmen of a Council of Ministers and he would be the head of the country (Brown and Zasloff 1998). While this power sharing arrangement was not a part of the Paris Accord, the UN secretary-general and the Special Representative Akashi agreed to its establishment on the grounds that it provided a stabilizing mechanism for Cambodia. UNTAC's mission was declared accomplished within a week after the adoption of the new Constitution.

Unfortunately the elections, the new coalition government and the new Constitution failed to bring peace to Cambodia. Though the Khmer Rouge continued to launch attacks, it started to weaken as more of its soldiers deserted. By July 1994, the Khmer Rouge was outlawed and its members were offered amnesty, further encouraging defections (Hall MacLeod 2006). The real threat to peace came with the increasing deterioration of the relations between the CPP and the FUNCINPEC. Fighting started in the streets of Phnom Penh, which culminated to the 1997 coup by Hun Sen against Ranariddh. Cambodia's civil war ended in 1998 with the victory of one side over its enemies. "To the extent civil conflict did come to an end, it was the result of the internal disintegration of the Khmer Rouge and the ability of forces loyal to Hun Sen to dominate Cambodia's institutional life, including the state bureaucracy, judiciary, police and military" (Hall MacLeod 2006, 106).

## **2.3. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING OR INHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE**

### ***2.3.1. THE PRESENCE OF UNAMIC (OCTOBER 1991 - MARCH 1992) AND UNTAC (FEBRUARY 1992 - SEPTEMBER 1993)***

Having committed to deploy one of its first most ambitious peace operations, the UN sent a small advance mission, UNAMIC and several smaller survey missions to gather information for the establishment of UNTAC. UNAMIC was deployed on November 9<sup>th</sup>, 1991 as the first stage of the good offices mission foreseen in the draft peace agreements. It was to assist the ceasefire, to initiate mine-awareness training programme, but most importantly to provide more data for the establishment of UNTAC. It consisted of 116 military personnel (50 military liaison officers, 20 mine-awareness personnel, 40 military support personnel)<sup>13</sup>. Quickly, the large number of land-mines and sub-munitions became a problem for humanitarian relief efforts. Thus UNAMIC's mandate was enlarged in January 1992 to start the process of training Cambodians in mine-detection and clearance (SC Res/728). As is elaborated below, humanitarian efforts were already well-underway, thus the tardy introduction of these measures failed to address the severity of the problem.

This small mission was not designed to provide any security; it was there to assess the situation before the deployment of the complex operation to follow. As mentioned above, along with UNAMIC, several survey missions were also

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<sup>13</sup> DPKO - UNAMIC, facts and figures:  
[http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unamicfacts.html](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamicfacts.html) (accessed on October 12 2009).

dispatched to gather information on elections, demobilization, civil administration, civilian police and human rights to assess the needs for the establishment of UNTAC (Hall MacLeod 2006). Some argue that some of UNTAC's problems originated in UNAMIC's and the survey missions' incorrect assessment of the civilian and military strengths required, and their failure to appreciate the importance of a swift, effective deployment (Chopra 1994; Berdal and Leifer 1996; USGAO 1993).

In February 1992, having assessed the situation, the Secretary-General announced the mandate of the multi-dimensional peacebuilding mission, soon to be deployed. UNTAC's mandate was to include aspects relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of free and fair general elections, military arrangements, civil administration, the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, and the rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructure during the transitional period (SC Res/795)<sup>14</sup>. According to the Agreements, UNTAC's civil administration duties consisted of direct control over the five areas of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information, and supervision of other areas, of the existing administrative structures<sup>15</sup>.

Similar to ONUMOZ in Mozambique, UNTAC's deployment was late and patchy, and the mission didn't become operational until March 1992. Meanwhile,

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<sup>14</sup> DPKO UNTAC mandate: [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/untacmandate.html](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacmandate.html) accessed on October 12<sup>th</sup> 2009

<sup>15</sup> DPKO UNTAC Background (Full Text): [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/untacbackgr2.html#three](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacbackgr2.html#three) accessed on October 10<sup>th</sup> 2009

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serious ceasefire violations persisted in Cambodia and the situation became very volatile. Once established, UNTAC tried immediately to re-establish the ceasefire, but militarily weak and spread out among various tasks, it could not stabilize the situation. Mandated with multi-dimensional tasks, besides its efforts at providing security, UNTAC started preparations for the repatriation of the refugees and for the elections, and its police monitors established their first training programme on human rights and political freedom. The mission also started the supervision of the police and administrative structures. With all the tasks it had to carry out, UNTAC was severely lacking military and civilians monitors. In April 1992, only 3,694 troops were deployed, mainly consisting of police monitors. In Mozambique, even though the ceasefire was respected by the warring parties, more than 6,000 military troops were deployed. In Cambodia, UNTAC's lack of authority resulted in its troops becoming the target of audacious attacks. Throughout its stay UNTAC sustained 82 fatalities<sup>16</sup> and many of its personnel were taken hostage (Chopra 1994).

Disarmament and demobilization started in May 1992, as the second phase of the implementation plan. By then, it was evident that the Khmer Rouge would not readily cooperate with the demobilization and cantonment process. With late and piecemeal deployment, UNTAC was not been able to assert its authority. Even though by July 1992, 14,300 troops had finally arrived, the security situation was worsening, especially in the countryside. As Findlay points out: "A major

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<sup>16</sup> DPKO UNTAC Facts and Figures:

[http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/untacfacts.html](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacfacts.html) (accessed on October 11th 2009)

flaw of UNTAC was its late deployment, a situation which emboldened the Cambodian factions to violate the Paris Accords and jeopardized its entire mission” (Findlay 1994, 7). While Ledgerwood, who served with UNTAC’s information and education section, explains that one of the mission’s strength was its neutrality and its restraint to use force, she also acknowledges that “this strategy of restraint came at a cost, as UNTAC soldier were called cowards by the SOC government media [...]” (Ledgerwood 1994, 5). For instance, UNTAC troops were unwilling to force their way into the Khmer Rouge territory and even when some access was granted after lengthy negotiations Stedman notes that “[...] the few military observers allowed into KR territory were so limited in their activities that at times they seemed more hostages than monitors” (Stedman 1997, 27-28). Compared to Mozambique, the cost of late deployment was heavier in Cambodia. In retrospect, it is possible to argue that had the parties not being willing to cooperate in Mozambique, UNOMOZ may have faced the same problems. In fact, UNOMOZ’s security component was equally weak in its mandate and strength.

Not able to present itself as a forceful authority, UNTAC’s efforts to convince the Khmer Rouge to demobilize failed. The Secretary-General decided that demobilization should start as planned on June 13<sup>th</sup>, regardless of the Khmer Rouge’s lack of cooperation. With the Khmer Rouge not on board, the demobilization process was doomed to fail, as other Cambodian factions naturally slowed down their demobilization efforts. “When the Khmer Rouge forces refused to accept demobilization and cantonment, the other factions responded by

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limiting themselves to token compliance, often surrendering to the UN only obsolete or hopelessly damaged equipment” (Jeldres 1993, 108-109). Faced with these developments, the UN Security Council decided to abandon the disarmament and cantonment process. The Security Council imposed sanctions on the Khmer Rouge, though mostly symbolic, as the necessary Thai support was not secured (Hall MacLeod 2006). The Security Council also decided to switch the military role of UNTAC forces to protect and help prepare the elections (Findley, 1994). This further damaged the mission’s ability to act as an authority and to provide security. As Chopra points out: “[...] the limited capability of UNTAC to exercise its authority led the U.N. to perform the role of a technician in the elections, ensuring the electoral machine functioned” (Chopra 1994, 24).

The civil administration component of UNTAC proved to be more challenging than anticipated. UNTAC’s personnel were introduced in the five key ministries, in which, for pragmatic reasons, they had to work within the existing administrative structure (Um 1994). However, UNTAC quickly realized that the state structures were inseparable from the CPP’s (Peou 2000). Thus, the mission never accomplished its mandate to control and supervise the existing administrative structures of the former government. The lack of control on the police and the military apparatus allowed state-sponsored political violence (Ledgerwood 1994). In these circumstances, the SNC was complaining that it was not operating as the unique legitimate body and source of authority, but that in reality the CPP forces were in charge. In many instances, the parties involved in the SNC threatened to withdraw, but the crises were averted through negotiations.

Despite the lack of security and the Khmer Rouge's non-compliance, UNTAC was relatively effective in the preparation for multi-party elections. As UNTAC had to start from scratch, the technical assistance programs that were provided for elections were massive: "It had to draft the electoral law, regulations to govern electoral processes, and an electoral code of conduct. UNTAC also undertook to register voters, establish civil education programs, organize and conduct elections, count votes and, of course, persuade the parties to accept the outcome. Consequently, the per unit cost of each ballot cast was one of the highest for elections in recent times" (Kumar 1997, 7-8). With scant protection by UNTAC, taking great risks to visit villages, more than 400 UN volunteers organized voter registration and supervised civic education campaigns. "They trained 4,000 Cambodians to register voters and about 50,000 Cambodian polling officials" (Jennar 1994, 148). 1,529 meetings were held during the electoral campaigns, which were attended by about 800,000 Cambodians. In the UNTAC period, the Cambodian media enjoyed unaccustomed freedom and some local human rights organizations emerged (Chandler 2007). The Information and Education component of UNTAC has been seen as an important factor in these developments and in the success of the electoral process (Um 1994).

Even though the elections were surprisingly peaceful, many believed that it could have easily escalated into a renewed civil war. The decision to carry on with the elections was indeed a very risky one. Not only were the four factions still armed, the most violent one, the Khmer Rouge, was refusing to participate in elections at all. UNTAC had demonstrated plainly that its troops were ill-prepare

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to handle any upsurge of violence. In fact, “[a]fter 15 months of UNTAC mission, the territory to which the UN was prohibited access by the Khmer Rouge had more than doubled” (Jennar 1994, 146). Moreover, as the demobilization process failed, there was a strong imbalance of power between the parties. Having ruled the country since 1978, the CPP was left with a massive military and police power in relation to FUNCINPEC and the BLDP (Peou 2000). The post-election crisis highlighted the perils of having armed factions unwilling to accept electoral defeat. Had demobilization and disarmament being effectively carried out before the elections, the CCP would have not had the means to threaten bloodshed and secession. The crisis was only averted due to an unanticipated power-sharing arrangement proposed by Sihanouk, which eventually proved to be very unstable. After the departure of UNTAC, Cambodia was not a peaceful country. The Khmer Rouge was not demobilized and remained active. “The level of military activities is [was] at least as high as during the 1980s” (Jennar 1994, 155). The political stability of the coalition was precarious, which led to increased hostility resulting into the escalation of violence and the eventual 1997 coup.

One of UNTAC’s major weaknesses was the lack of integration between its military and civilian components. The activities of the survey missions sent before UNTAC were not coordinated, which from the start prevented the formulation of an integrated strategy (Berdal and Leifer 1996). According to a thorough report:

The lack of integration between the military and civilian components on UNTAC was one of its major shortcomings. The fragmentation started in the planning



phase. The military, civil administration and electoral survey missions were executed separately, in isolation from each other. The planners were not required to meet and work on a joint strategy for civilian and military components. The military therefore had no input into planning civilian activities that might require security assistance (USGAO 1993, 33).

An effective pre-deployment planning could have anticipated the difficulties that would be encountered during demobilization and revealed the inadequate and unrealistic timetable for holding the elections. The difficulties in trying to assume a quasi-administrative role in five key ministries and the challenges of working within the existing government structures in place were also unappreciated.

The military component of the mission being scarce, the lack of integrated planning made it even more difficult for humanitarian activities to receive security assistance. More importantly, the fact that security had not been prioritized proved to be extremely problematic. This can be observed when one considers the predicaments facing the process of refugees' repatriation. Following its own timetable, the process of refugees' repatriation started right away; by March 1992 convoys of refugees were ready to move. This was happening before UNTAC's military component was deployed and before its mine detection and clearance training was fully implemented. While a Malaysian battalion had to be deployed urgently to provide escort and security to the repatriation convoys (Azimi 2004), mine-clearing was not an issue that could be immediately addressed. According to the plan in place, it was not until the end of 1992 that some 5,000 Cambodians were to be trained. With refugees' repatriation well underway, the need to find

suitable mine-free land for the returnees became a real challenge. Moreover, the inability to relocate the returnees was threatening their ability to take part in the soon-coming elections. According to Berdal and Leifer, these measures should have been implemented earlier and are indicative of a severe lack of coordination. They argue that this demonstrates the inadequacy of pre-deployment planning, they add that the “UN’s failure to address this problem early on critically undermined the humanitarian relief efforts of the UNHRC, UNDP and ICRC” (Berdal and Leifer 1996, 48).

Similar to the Mozambican experience, UNTAC failed to make real advances in demining. Even though it was established early on that mine clearance was essential for peace, it was not prioritized. The Paris Agreements had limited the role of UNTAC to only training Cambodians in mine clearing and to supervise the de-mining process. While more than 2,000 Cambodians had been trained, the process of demining was extremely slow. Jennar (1994) shows that while it was urged that an initial 3,000 km<sup>2</sup> of land be de-mined as an urgent measure for security, the Cambodian Mine Action Centre, created only eight months after UNTAC’s establishment, had managed to clear some 4.9km<sup>2</sup> in the span of 40 weeks (Jennar 1994, 146). It was only after UNTAC’s departure that a real commitment to demining began. The U.N. Development Program (UNDP) and the U.N. Department for Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) jointly launched a project entitled ‘Assistance to Demining in Cambodia’, which successfully attracted significant international funding and made real advances in de-mining.

Finally, similar to ONUMOZ, UNTAC's security component was not strong enough to deter or compel factions into compliance. As the parties in Mozambique readily cooperated and committed to peace, ONUMOZ was able to devote its activities to areas other than security. However, in Cambodia, the cease-fire was not respected, violence was exerted by all factions (mainly the Khmer Rouge) and large territories were outside the mission's reach. Chopra explains that "[f]ear of escalation and a lack of military means to respond led the U.N. Force Commander (FC) to avoid armed confrontation. This eventually favoured the interests of the factions, whose acts of violence went unchecked. It directly caused the failure of phase two of the operation, the disarmament and demobilization phase, and resulted in an armed election during which the U.N. was not in control of the security conditions" (Chopra 1994, 18). Much of UNTAC's \$ US 2 billion budget unfortunately went into inflated salaries. During the UNTAC's stay, Phnom Penh grew more crowded and more prosperous, but the rural economy remained stagnant. As the mission left, the country relapsed in a series of politically motivated fights and its infrastructure was still in terrible conditions.

### ***2.3.2. THE INTENSITY AND DURATION OF CONFLICT***

A thorough study of the demographics conducted by Heuveline (1998), taking excess deaths<sup>17</sup> into consideration, shows that between 1970 and 1979 the Cambodian conflict led to a minimum of 1.17 million deaths and to a maximum

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<sup>17</sup> This accounts for deaths that are not predicted if normal trends are taken into consideration.

of 3.42 million deaths (the medium estimate is 2.52 million deaths)<sup>18</sup>. While General Lon Nol's rule was very oppressive, the massive killing of civilians mostly occurred during the Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime. There were three distinct categories of deliberate killings: waves of massacres; individual executions following imprisonment and interrogation; and arbitrary and summary executions (Hannum 1989, 89). According to the Forcibly Displaced Populations dataset, the numbers for Cambodia show that some 4 million people were displaced by 1980 (Marshall 2007). Cambodia had not been at peace since decades and the violence witnessed by its population was extreme. Like Mozambicans, Cambodians were exhausted. Their eager cooperation with and participation in UNTAC's education programs, de-mining trainings and voter registration recruitment is proof that rather than fighting civilians were ready to engage in their civil duties. The majority of Cambodians, for the first time, voted against the armed and incumbent government and were rejecting the status-quo. As Chandler observes: "What they were voting for, aside from peace, was much less clear" (Chandler 2007, 288).

The four factions, however, particularly the Khmer Rouge, were not ready to accept peace if it meant giving up power. The three factions cooperating with UNTAC opted to retain their power using the electoral system. Once the CPP was faced with electoral defeat, they chose to defect and threatened force. On the other hand, the Khmer Rouge, having committed most of the atrocities, was not ready

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<sup>18</sup> With a much narrower definition (explained in Chapter IV) the Uppsala/PRIO data on battle related deaths estimates that 230,000 to 510,000 died in Cambodia (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005).

to commit to electoral uncertainties in the first place. While Cambodians may have been ready for peace, the intensity of the conflict did not result in an increased willingness for peace for warring parties.

### ***2.3.3. LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY/AUTOCRACY***

Between 1954 and 1993, none of the leaders that ruled Cambodia came to power through a free and fair electoral process and none truly respected political rights and civil liberties (Peou 2000). As explained above, starting from scratch, UNTAC had to provide a great deal of technical assistance and coaching to establish the electoral process. The decision to hold the elections despite Khmer Rouge's lack of cooperation, and more importantly without demobilization, could have instigated the immediate relapse to conflict. In retrospect, it is clear that the escalation to violence was prevented by the obvious military superiority of CPP (it controlled the state military and police). While the CPP had the power not to accept electoral defeat, the other parties understood that not including it as an equal partner could lead to a renewed episode of fighting, which most likely the CPP would have eventually win. In fact, CPP's ability to declare an autonomous zone in the eastern provinces was enough to demonstrate that its secessionism threats were credible (Curtis 1998). Thus, in these circumstances, the holding of elections before demobilization and with one party not participating led to the establishment of an ad hoc power-sharing arrangement. However, in light of the subsequent coup, it is fair to say that the imbalance of power among the factions led to a forced coalition, which was soon overthrown to be only dominated by the CPP.

**2.3.4. ECONOMIC SITUATION**

Cambodia's economy, never particularly strong, was dependent on earnings from rice, rubber and corn exports. A demographic revolution<sup>19</sup> during the French protectorate put serious pressures on Cambodia's resources in the 1950s, that only intensified with time (Chandler 2007). Dependent on outside support, Cambodia's already weak economy suffered even further by Sihanouk's neutralism policy and rejection of US aid. His nationalization of some key industries to make up for the loss of US aid did not ameliorate the economy. The military, supported by the US and discontent of their deteriorating financial situation, ousted Sihanouk. They were however unable to ameliorate the economic situation in Cambodia.

The lack of coherent economic data on Cambodia makes it difficult to exactly know the extent of the economic hardship experienced before and during the 1970s. But it is clear that the economy severely deteriorated during the Khmer Rouge regime: "the economy was in ruins, heavy deficit spending and related hyper-inflation were endemic. The value of the Riel declined by 462% ... foodstuffs rose by 230% and non-food items by 636% [1976]. 64% of the national budget was allocated to military expenditures and 36% to civilians" (Duggan 1996, 364-5). As Graph VIII.2 shows, the economic situation somewhat improved with introduction of market economy in the early 1990s. However, the country severely suffered from the Asian financial crisis in 1997, but was able to recover

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<sup>19</sup> With improving life conditions under the French protectorate the population of Cambodia increased from less than a million to four million in early 1950s. It has now about thirteen million people (Chandler 2007).

from it relatively fast to reach the average GDP growth of the developing countries in Asia.

### ***2.3.5. OUTCOME OF THE CONFLICT***

The outcome that led to the termination of the conflict in 1998 was the victory of one side (the CPP) over its enemies (mainly FUNCINPEC and Khmer Rouge). The attempts to end the conflict with the signing of the Paris Agreement were unsuccessful. Many have blamed the agreements to be void of a post-election plan, which led to the ad-hoc establishment of an unstable coalition (Roberts 1994; Curtis 1998; Hall MacLeod 2006; Reilly 2008). In fact, the role of the opposition in the government was not addressed at all before the elections. CPP's willingness to relinquish power and FUNCINPEC ability to rule were pertinent issues that needed to be addressed. A thorough pre-election examination could have revealed that none of the parties were ready to surrender power, which would have indicated that a power sharing provision could have been a better solution than the had-hoc and unstable coalition that was eventually established after the election.

### ***2.3.6. OTHER FACTORS***

The intervention in Cambodia did not fail due to a lack of international commitment to solve the problem. Major actors supported the deployment of a strong and ambitious peace operation. It is clear from the analysis above that the mission suffered from logistical problems, such as delays in troop deployment, lack of integrated planning and coordination among its varied tasks. Similar to Mozambique, international attention to the conflict did not only come in the form

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of peace support. The involvement of external actors has played an important role in the Cambodian conflict. While the Soviet Union and Vietnam were supporting the CPP, the United States and European countries were supporting FUNCINPEC and KPNLF and China and Thailand to a lesser degree were supporting the Khmer Rouge. The end of the Cold War decreased the availability of the funds, which resulted to an increased willingness for all factions to cooperate. However, unlike Mozambique, the winding down of superpowers' support was not enough to bring an end to the conflict in Cambodia.

The existence of lucrative resources did not instigate conflict in Cambodia. However, it has helped the Khmer Rouge's ability to continue its campaign of violence despite the end of the Chinese Aid. The Khmer Rouge controlled valuable gem and timber resources along the Thai-Cambodian border. Working with Thai military and political elites, the Khmer Rouge was able to export these resources in exchange for military equipment and other supplies (Hall MacLeod 2006). As Ross explained, the presence of these resources did not cause the conflict but rather the conflict helped cause the rebel groups' dependence on gemstone sales (Ross 2004, 345). It is thus difficult to argue that a 'Mutually Hurting Stalemate' was reached among the warring parties in Cambodia.

In the long years of conflict in Cambodia, ethnicity came to play a special role during the Khmer Rouge's regime. While the fighting mainly occurred along ideological lines, among the communist, non-communist, royalist/neutral groups, the Khmer Rouge regime adopted philosophy of racial superiority and purity. The radical transformation sought by the Khmer Rouge required the racial, social,



ideological, and political purification of the Cambodian nation. This was to be achieved by the liquidation (social and physical) of a variety of ethnically, religiously and/or racially different groups<sup>20</sup> (Hannum 1989). Unlike Burundi, where ethnicity played a polarizing role engulfing civilians into violence, the ethnic violence exercised in Cambodia was only in one direction, the Khmer Rouge against the *impure* Cambodians. While Khmer Rouge's episode of ethnic violence killed millions of Cambodians, its popular base effectively dissolved, culminating in its collapse in 1994.

### 3. COMPARISONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Peace operations deployed in Mozambique and Cambodia were mandated with extensive multi-dimensional tasks. The missions were responsible for security, demobilization and reintegration, assistance to elections, economic development, humanitarian reliefs, and education. In the case of Cambodia, UNTAC was also given extensive administrative role in five ministries. In both cases, the plan envisioned was a transition from a war-ravaged and semi-collapsed state towards a peaceful democracy in the span of two short years.

Both missions were deployed with significant delays, which in the case of Cambodia, jeopardized the peace process. "UNTAC arrived too late and moved too slowly to gain the respect it needed from the Cambodian factions" (Chandler 2007, 287). Compared to security-oriented missions, the deployment of multi-

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<sup>20</sup> The major groups that Khmers considered to be distinct from themselves either racially or ethnically were the Thai, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cham. There were also smaller numbers of Lao, Burmese, Indians, Pakistanis, and indigenous hill tribes collectively called Khmer Leou (Hannum 1989, 86).

dimensional operations demands more time and coordination, and requires the involvement and collaboration of several agencies. The resources necessary to fund the many initiatives are also slow to gather and coordinate. Pressed with time concerns, UNTAC's pre-deployment planning phase was insufficient and uncoordinated. As Berdal and Leifer (1996) argue, UNTAC's pre-deployment planning failed to grasp the unfeasibility of the timetable set for holding elections, the challenge of assuming administrative task and the importance of an integrated plan between civilian and military components. The lack of integration between UNTAC's civil and military components led to critical problems in de-mining, repatriation of refugees and preparations of the elections, which all culminated in relapse to conflict. ONUMOZ's late deployment was, however, not detrimental to peace for several reasons. First of all, the parties were more obedient to the ceasefire than in Cambodia. Second, learning from previous mistakes, the GPA timetable was revised to postpone elections until the demobilization process was complete, which relieved parties from urgent insecurities about each other's relative capabilities and rate of demobilization. Overall, ONUMOZ performed better as it also benefitted from some lessons learned by its predecessors (it was deployed later than UNTAC, which was one of the first of its kind). The mission's mandate was clearer and narrower in terms of its administrative tasks, which were mostly related to elections. While the decision to postpone elections was crucial for mission success, the UN and the international donors also made sure that parties were politically ready to compete in the electoral system on an equal basis. The military and civilian components appeared to be better integrated in

ONUMOZ than in UNTAC<sup>21</sup>. Even though both UNTAC and ONUMOZ had deficiencies in their security components, ONUMOZ succeeded at establishing itself as a credible and commanding body, and was able to stabilize the situation in Mozambique. One weakness of ONUMOZ, however, was costly for Mozambicans. Even though UNOHAC was devised to increase efficiency in the coordination of humanitarian assistance, it unfortunately failed to do so. The price of this mismanagement was high for Mozambicans, who got deprived from much needed assistance.

The hypothesis regarding the *Simultaneous* strategy posits that the deployment of such an operation should be more efficient at establishing durable peace as the root causes fuelling the conflict can be eradicated early on. A closer look at the case studies reveals that deploying a peace operation to tackle short-term and long-term developmental issues along with providing security may not be the optimal option. First, as the Cambodian case demonstrates, implementing humanitarian and developmental programmes in an environment of violence and hostility often proved to be impossible. Not only acquiring consent from warring parties for safe corridors and access to civilians is difficult, but often personnel affiliated with the peace operation are not the best candidates for those negotiations. Also, as mentioned earlier, UNAVEM II in Angola could not fulfil its mandate relating to humanitarian assistance as it was too close to the conflict. Being blamed as biased and favouring sides, the mission was not the appropriate

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<sup>21</sup> It could also be argued that civil-military coordination problems may have existed but have been masked by the willingly cooperating factions.

instrument to deliver humanitarian aid. UCAH was created to provide a neutral face and it proved to be more effective in undertaking the same tasks.

Second, the short-term vision of the UN Peacekeeping Department (DKPO) may not provide the appropriate structure for launching long-term developmental programmes. In both Mozambique and Cambodia, the interventions were short-lived; they did not have the vision or the time to even tackle the developmental problems facing these nearly collapsed states. As they were mandated with several development-related tasks, the missions were endowed with expansive budgets and the international community was also pouring in a lot of funding. However, this only enabled them to quickly initiate some projects that were run inefficiently and expansively. As the UN withdrew its troops and administrators, the level of international funds could not be sustained, leaving behind unfinished projects and shaky institutions too costly for the local government to sustain. As Ottaway argues, “[t]he intervention was relatively short-lived in both cases [Mozambique and Cambodia], leaving the two countries to complete the task of state reconstruction on their own, but stuck with a model that was costly and left basic problems unsolved” (Ottaway 2002, 1009). As explained above, despite the amount of aid and developmental programmes initiated in Mozambique during ONUMOZ, the long-term the socio-economic, health and education indicators show a steady deterioration after the peace operation left. In Sierra Leone, which continues to recover and improve in its quality of peace, the DPKO seems to have avoided the downturn experienced in Mozambique by continuing to deploy small missions (UNOSIL, UNIPSIL and

UNIOSIL). Also, the experimental inclusion of Sierra Leone to the newly established Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) undoubtedly contributed greatly to continued international attention devoted to Sierra Leone.


Third, the experiences of both Mozambique and Cambodia show how difficult it is to coordinate the activities of various UN agencies and NGOs. These actors are accustomed to work independently and to be accountable only to their donors. In fact, the analyses reveal that coordination and integration within the mission's own components is already a real challenge. Organizing and planning the military, civilian/administrative, humanitarian components of a peace operation in a short amount of time and doing it so in an integrated fashion was not possible in both cases analysed above.

The six cases analysed in the qualitative portion of this study also confirm *hypotheses 1* and *2* posited in Chapter three. Providing security and order is an indispensable first step towards the establishment of durable peace. Development-related activities can only take root in a stable and secure environment. As the *Security-Only* advocates argue, once security is established, these activities can be implemented more effectively if delegated to other specialized agencies, as integrating them to short-term vision of a peace operation is difficult. Thus if an intervention is following a *Sequential* strategy, it should be prepared to stay longer and ensure that the development-related programmes take roots and translate to sustainable solutions for the local population. The analysis do not support *hypothesis 3* and it points to various reasons explaining why peace operations are not more effective at establishing peace when they follow a

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
*Simultaneous* strategy. The next chapter bring the results of the statistical analysis together with the insights gained by the case studies to highlight the conclusions and contributions of this study.

**Graph VIII.1: GDP Annual Growth in Mozambique from 1980 to 2001**



Source: World Bank - World Development Indicators Database (WDI) - online. <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/GMIS/gdmis.do?siteId=2&menuId=LNAV01HOME3>

**Graph VIII.2: Real Gross Domestic Product (annual percent change)**



Source: The World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database April 2003

## **CHAPTER IX**

### **DISCUSSION OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RESULTS**

Starting in the 1970s and accelerating after the Cold War, calls for the need to expand the narrow understanding of security have particularly influenced the design of peacebuilding. Practitioners and scholars alike have long known that the cessation of conflict is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the establishment of sustainable peace. There is a growing awareness that to establish sustainable peace after an event of conflict or collapsed state, not only the domestic and/or international root causes of the conflict should be identified and addressed, but the elements fueling the vicious cycle of violence should also be tackled and eliminated. In the early 1990s, human security emerged out of a need to fill the gap present in the traditional understanding of security, which prioritizes territorial integrity and state security. By reframing security concerns away from the state and instead around the individual, human security, as a paradigm, has allowed for the identification of different sources of insecurity, including economic, environmental, health/food related and even political threats - the state itself. As Krause and Jütersonke (2005, 457-8) eloquently put it “[t]he concept of human security – broadly and narrowly understood – shines a spotlight on the links between violence and insecurity, on the one hand, and underdevelopment and poverty, on the other. Following this expansion in the conceptualization of

security, peace operations have become multi-sectoral (or multi-dimensional), aiming to address and eradicate the many sources of insecurity facing conflict-ridden societies.

The expansion of the responsibilities assumed by peace operations has re-awakened debates regarding the relationship between security and development. Scholars and practitioners have disagreed about ways to effectively integrate security-oriented and development-related tasks into one coherent and integrated peacebuilding strategy. After investigating the various arguments made on strategies of integration, this study regroups and categorizes them under three ideal strategies: *Security-Only* and *Sequential* are two variant strategies falling under the Security-first approach and the *Simultaneous* strategy follows a multi-dimensional approach.

The quantitative analysis covering all UN and non-UN peace operations deployed to civil conflicts from 1946 to 2006 and the qualitative analysis of six cases presented in this study confirm that tensions between security and development related tasks often hamper the efforts to establish peace. The quantitative analysis, capturing a trend rather than the causal mechanisms, show that interventions designed with strategies prioritizing the establishment of security first (*Security-Only* and *Sequential* strategies), are more successful at terminating conflicts and achieving durable peace. The interventions designed to provide security and assume development related tasks simultaneously are found less likely to establish peace than missions following either a *Security-only* or *Sequential* strategies. The case studies shed light on several explanations that



complement and enrich the statistical results of this study. Instead of the simplified dichotomy between security and development related tasks developed for and used in the quantitative analysis, the case studies provide a more nuanced understanding of each strategy, particularly of the specific mechanisms making peace operations more or less successful at establishing peace. They point to various tensions arising by the simultaneous implementation of security and development related activities. Table IX.1 presents a comparison of the six cases with regards to specific aspects of the intervention and other variables found to play an important role. Below, each aspect is analyzed individually with comparisons across the six cases.

## **1. A MORE IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF PEACE OPERATIONS' STRATEGIES:**

### ***1.1. STRENGTH OF THE SECURITY COMPONENT:***

The case studies indicate that the strength of a peace operation's security component is critical. In all cases, whether the intervention follows a *Security-only*, *Sequential* or *Simultaneous* strategy, a weak military component unable to show resolve and strength could not prevent the parties from relapsing to conflict. In Burundi, Angola and Cambodia, the missions deployed were not endowed with the necessary mandate or resources to act as an authority able to deter or compel parties from spoiling the peace process. The Sierra Leonean experience demonstrated the importance of a strong military presence. If UNAMSIL had not been strengthened and if the British forces had not been deployed, it would have been difficult to establish peace in Sierra Leone. Comparing the experiences of

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Angola and Sierra Leone gives further credential to this argument. As explained earlier, while many aspects of both conflicts resemble each other, one apparent difference is the strength of the security component of the intervention; while Sierra Leone benefitted from the resolute actions of the UN and Britain, UNAVEM II in Angola was lacking the necessary military force to establish security and order. In fact, the series of weak peace operations deployed in Angola have only prolonged the conflict in Angola. The deployment of consecutive operations shielded UNITA from further MPLA's attacks, and the weakness of their security components allowed UNITA to regroup, rearm and rebuild its strength to continue with the fight.

A commanding, credible and capable security component increases the performance of a mission. It is important to note that while enforcing peace is sometimes necessary, most often an imposing and respected mission endowed with sufficient troops to show a presence is enough to increase the sense of security in conflict-ridden societies. Credibility is extremely important; reassuring previously warring parties that every groups are abiding by the agreed upon provision is key for the successful completion of DDR for instance. In future studies, it would be interested to test the significance of the security component's strength statistically, as it should be possible to quantify this variable.

### ***1.2. DEMOBILIZATION, DISARMAMENT AND REINTEGRATION:***

The analysis shows that DDR are imperative security-related steps for establishing of peace<sup>1</sup>. While DDR may not solve the root causes of a conflict, it removes the means that permit warring parties to choose fighting over negotiations. Regardless of the strategy employed, reducing the availability of guns and more importantly demobilizing and reintegrating the excombatants into the normal functioning of their society is essential for the termination of a conflict. All three cases (Burundi, Angola and Cambodia), where DDR was not conducted (or was aborted) remained at war. The experiences of Angola and Cambodia indicate that often DDR is dependent on the strength of the security component of the mission. For instance, in Angola, even though UNAVEM II was mandated to demobilize UNITA and MPLA, its lack of military force prevented the mission to act as an authority and compel parties to demobilize. Demobilization and disarmament prove to be difficult to conduct when parties do not trust that the other is honoring its commitment to the agreement. In these instances, a strong military force can reassure parties that demobilization and disarmament is the only viable option for all parties involved. The Mozambican experience brings out another aspect of DDR. It shows that if the reintegration programme is strong enough, the perils of incomplete or careless demobilization and disarmament may be avoided. In fact, ex-combatants were attracted by ONUMOZ's strong reintegration programme, in which not only financial aid, but

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<sup>1</sup> I consider the reintegration portion of DDR a security-related task and not a developmental one as I argue that the reintegration efforts entail dealing with a small group of the society and is a short-term solution to prevent combatants to return to their arms.

also the necessary training was provided for successful reintegration into society. In the case of Mozambique, the carrot seemed to have been more effective than the stick. The fact that disarmament was not a clear task of ONUMOZ still constituted an important problem, as Mozambican ex-combatants chose to sell their arms rather than giving them up, which resulted in hostilities in neighboring countries. It is clear that to foster peaceful relations within and outside a country, no peace operation should miss the opportunity to collect, decommission and/or destroy as many weapons as it can gather. Once again, as the implementation of DDR could be captured by introducing dichotomous variable, it would be interesting to include it in future statistical analysis.

### ***1.3. TIMING OF ELECTIONS:***

In all cases, the introduction of competitive elections has been advocated by the international community as a solution to conflict. Elections were mandated by internationally sponsored peace agreements, such as the Esquipulas II Agreements (Nicaragua), The Abidjan Peace and Lomé Accords (Sierra Leone), the Bicesse peace accords (Angola), the Rome General Agreement (Mozambique) and the Paris agreements (Cambodia)<sup>2</sup>. The analysis reveals that a critical point of tension between security oriented and development related tasks arises with holding elections. More specifically, the case studies indicate that the timing of the election vis-à-vis the completion of the DDR process is of particular importance. In Nicaragua (1990), Burundi (1993) and Sierra Leone (1996)

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<sup>2</sup> Except for Burundi, where President Major Pierre Buyoya was encourage holding elections by a great deal of external pressure.

elections were held void of any attempts of DDR<sup>3</sup>. In Angola (1992) and Cambodia (1993), DDR was initiated but was not completed before the elections. DDR was actually abandoned in the case of Cambodia. Finally in Mozambique (1994) and Sierra Leone (2002) DDR was completed before holding elections. With the exception of Nicaragua, all cases where DDR was not completed or abandoned relapsed to conflict. Different lessons can be drawn from the different scenarios. The cases of Burundi (1993) and Sierra Leone (1996), where DDR was not implemented before the elections, show that armed elections are doomed to fail. As competing parties are armed, they are less willing to accept electoral defeat. Not only are they more likely to choose to return to war rather than accepting an uncertain future, but elections are also known to increase the rivalries among the competing parties. The case of Nicaragua, where elections were also held before DDR, seems to not fit with this argumentation, since it did not relapse to conflict. A closer look into the specificities of the case indicates that it actually shed more light on why armed elections can lead to violence. In Nicaragua, the incumbent party, the FSLN, lost the elections and peacefully respected the electoral outcome. If one investigates why the FSLN did not use force to retain power, a main factor is that UNO, the coalition of opposition parties running against FSLN, was not armed. As mentioned earlier, it is important to remember that the Contra guerilla groups fighting the FSLN for

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<sup>3</sup> In the case of Nicaragua, some voluntary demobilization of Contra guerilla groups located in Honduras had started a few months before the elections. This is not significant enough to argue that demobilization was underway. The DDR process in Nicaragua started in March, a month after the elections.

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years and the opposition parties forming the coalition UNO were separate entities. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the incumbent party, the FSLN, was not threatened by UNO, which was perceived as a loose coalition of political actors. This contributes to the understanding that if both parties are armed, the loser will prefer going back to war rather than relinquishing its power to a strong and armed opponent. The uncertainty, the risk of being terminated, is too great for losers to accept the electoral results, and arms give them the option to opt out.

A different insight can be gained from cases, where DDR was initiated but not completed before the elections like in Angola or was abandoned completely like in Cambodia. These experiences indicate that prospects of elections worry previously fighting parties and the uncertainty felt regarding the other parties' demobilization rate and future intentions often decrease the willingness to participate to the DDR process. The premature introduction of elections heightens this sense of insecurity and pushes parties away from the peace process and the elections, especially if they are aware of their unpopularity or if they know that elections will disfavor them because they are a minority. In Burundi, even though the minority Tutsi participated in the elections, they could not accept electoral defeat fearing that an armed Hutu majority in power would lead to their extinction. For the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the prospect of elections was threatening enough for the group to withdraw from the DDR process altogether, and from the elections as well; they were unpopular, they had committed atrocities, for which they would most probably be held accountable for. In Angola, the uncertainty brought by the prospect of elections also greatly damaged

the efforts of demobilization. Both parties were suspicious of each other's honesty in demobilizing and disarming, which seriously slowed down the process. In fact, when elections were held the demobilization rate for both groups was very low, which enable UNITA to go back to conflict when faced with electoral defeat.

These cases reveal two important lessons regarding the relationship between DDR and elections. The premature holding of elections can have two interwoven effects. The prospect of elections in an environment of insecurity and mistrust decreases the parties' willingness to disarm. This in turn endangers peace as armed factions have the option to defect and to go back to war when faced with electoral defeat.

#### ***1.4. COORDINATION WITHIN THE OPERATION AND WITH OTHER ACTORS***

Peace operations are faced with two types of coordination problems. First, the various components of a mission should to be coordinated and integrated to formulate a coherent intervention and second the mission ideally could coordinate its activities with the many other actors operating alongside (UN agencies, NGOs and other multinational institutions). These represent two separate challenges and should not be confounded. First, let's consider problems encountered in efforts to coordinate the separate components of a peace operation. Evidently, the simpler the mission, the simpler the coordination and integration of its activities are. For instance, the security-only missions in Nicaragua (ONUCA and OAS-CIAV) deployed with simple and clear mandates were well-coordinated within their own command structures. They were also successful at coordinating and complementing each other activities even though they were established by two

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separate entities. However, it has been well-documented that missions with complex mandates composed of military, political, civilian and humanitarian components have been prone to experience problems in coordinating their activities.

The experience of UNTAC, in Cambodia, exemplifies the perils of an extensive and complex operation unable to coordinate the activities of its various components. As explained earlier, UNTAC was deployed with significant delays. Rushed to be dispatched, the coordination problems were already visible in its pre-deployment planning phase. The lack of integration between the military, civilian and humanitarian components, each developing and abiding by their own timetable, were severe. This generated a chain of subsequent failures in which the humanitarian assistance and the refugees on the move to be repatriated were not receiving enough protection, the relocation of the refugees was delayed due to lack of de-mining, the registration of the voters started before the repatriation process was completed, which endangered their participation to the elections. With better planning and more effective communication among peace operation's components, this lack of coordination among activities could have been avoided.

The case of ONUMOZ in Mozambique shows that complex multi-dimensional activities can be efficiently integrated and implemented in a coordinated matter. The creation of several commissions are said to have greatly aided the smooth functioning of ONUMOZ's various programmes. The Commissions operated with flexibility; they met frequently to discuss, revise and coordinated their activities. While this greatly contributed to the efficiency of the



mission and the overall success of the peace process, some tensions between security and development related tasks were still recorded. In a report, the SRSG mentioned that some tensions have arisen between the demands for security and the principles of development policy (Kühne et al. 1995, 22). It is clear that some tensions are bound to arise during the implementation of such complex missions; however, it is fair to say that the design of several committees have worked and increased coordination among ONUMOZ's components and this solution could be used as a guide for future operations.

The second type of coordination problem facing peace operations is with the various activities carried outside its mission structure by other international agencies and NGOs, which are often already operating in the country by time of the operation's deployment. There are many reasons pointing to the fact that coordinating activities with other agencies and NGOs is very challenging and thus perhaps not necessary. First of all, most of these organizations want to remain autonomous and resist any attempts to impose centralized authority (Weiss 2004). Thus, peace operations may be better off collaborating with them and seeking their expertise when needed without necessarily trying to subordinate and coordinate them. Second, as demonstrated in the case of Sierra Leone, fearing that their impartial mandates would be compromised by close association with a security force, actors like the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UNDP did not even want to be associated with UNAMSIL. Humanitarian assistance, deliverance of aid, and development programmes are all dependent on the local population collaboration and trust. Even though peace operations are

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designed to be neutral, in insecure environments plagued by war and hostility, they are often perceived as biased. For instance, UNAVEM II in Angola could not fulfil its mandate relating to humanitarian assistance as it was becoming a part of the conflict. It was blamed to be biased and favouring sides, hence the mission was clearly not the appropriate instrument for the deliverance of humanitarian aid. UCAH had to be created to provide a neutral face and was more effective in undertaking the same tasks. Development and aid organizations often not only prefer to retain their neutral stance by distancing themselves from peace operations, but also they may be more efficient at their activities if they retain their neutral stance. Third, the problems encountered by UNOHAC in Mozambique indicate the difficulties of developing a feasible system able to coordinate the various actions of international actors without stifling their programmes. The failure to implement demining programmes in Mozambique, even though large amount of donations had been collected for that purpose, perfectly exemplifies the challenge of coordinating activities under one institution. Finally, as Paris and Sisk argues, “more fundamentally, such problems [inability to coordinate] also stem from the fact that many of these agencies have different approaches to postwar statebuilding and different philosophies, objectives and conceptions of how to create the conditions for stable and lasting peace in war-torn societies”(Paris and Sisk Forthcoming).

The design of ONUMOZ shows that the lack of coordination within the various components of a mission can be and should be addressed in order to harmonize activities, maximize efficiency and minimize redundancies and

contradictory effects. However, venturing into coordinating the activities of actors outside the command structure of a peace operation seems futile. It diverts time and resources away from other pressing issues and it is doubtful that it can ever be achieved. The experience of ONUMOZ actually demonstrates that long-term developmental endeavours should not be incorporated into the structure of a peace operation. The short-term vision adopted by the United Nations Peacekeeping Department (UNPKO) is ill-suited for assuming the coordination of activities that are geared towards long-term activities. A peace operation is designed to aid the establishment of peace and to leave shortly after success, whereas agencies and NGOs addressing developmental problems are designed to stay longer term.

## **2. OTHER FACTORS CONTRIBUTING OR INHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE:**

Besides the effect of peace operations' strategies, this study investigates how several other control variables affect the establishment of peace. The statistical models presented in Chapter five identify which variables were significant and their independent effects on the probability of establishing peace. The case studies provide a more in-depth analysis of the same variables plus they reveal several new insights about how these variables affect the dynamics of conflict and peace.

### ***2.1. INTENSITY OF CONFLICT:***

The statistical models show that the longer and the more intense a conflict, the less likely it is to achieve peace. As explained earlier, in the dataset, the intensity of conflict is captured using a count of the battle-related deaths (which

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one party involved is a government), accordingly conflicts reaching 1000 deaths are full-scale war (otherwise coded as low intensity conflicts). While this doesn't capture the difference among wars barely exceeding 1000 deaths per years and the ones experiencing much higher casualties, it also doesn't account for the casualties caused by non-state actors. The estimates including civilian deaths caused by both state and non-states actors are often much higher than counts of battle-related deaths alone. Insights from case studies agree with the statistical analysis that more intense and longer wars are harder to resolve, and that increased hostility and insecurity felt among long-term opponents makes the resolution of conflict difficult. It is also possible to observe that the more intense a conflict, the more complex the mandate of the operations deployed is. While this is intuitive, it would be interesting to statistically test this inference in future studies.

### ***2.2. EFFECT OF COLD WAR POLITICS:***

Whether a conflict occurred during the Cold War or not was not found significant in the statistical analysis. This does not mean that Cold War politics has not affected the course of many conflicts; it only indicates that no systematic relationship between Cold War conflicts and the probability of establishing peace has been found. In fact, the case studies show that conflicts have been influenced by Cold War patron-client relationships. Conflicts have been fuelled by significant financial help provided to warring parties by great powers and their allies. However, agreeing with the statistical results, the end of the Cold War has not automatically translated to the termination of such conflicts. For instance, the

parties involved in the Cambodia conflicts were heavily supported by great power politics, but the winding down of the Cold War and the reduction of the support they were enjoying did not end the conflict. Similarly, in Angola, UNITA continued to be active after it lost the financial support it received from the Soviet Union. Nicaragua and Mozambique, however, seems to have benefitted from the end of the Cold War as the lack of superpower backing has increased the willingness to find a resolution to the conflict, and the international collaboration arising after the Cold War have permitted a flow of significant international aid and assistance.

### ***2.3. PRESENCE OF LUCRATIVE NATURAL RESOURCES:***

The case studies indicate that the presence of natural lucrative resources contributes to warring parties' ability to sustain the fight. However, coherent with the findings of the statistical analysis, the cases studies show that their presence does not automatically mean continuation of conflict. As the example of Sierra Leone shows, the resolute commitments to stop the illicit trafficking of diamonds effectively hindered RUF's ability to perpetuate the conflict. In contrast, in Angola and Cambodia, the lack of a resolute international action to sanction and stop the export of some lucrative minerals enabled the warring parties to sustain their guerrilla forces.

### ***2.4. ETHNICITY:***

Ethnicity, found non-significant in the statistical analysis, also seems insignificant across cases. That is, even though ethnic differences may be present, they do not necessarily become part of the conflict. Except for the case of

Burundi, where ethnicity played a central role in the conflict, the other cases show that even if ethnic groups are present, the conflict does not need to gain an ethnic dimension.

### **3. QUALITY OF PEACE**

The statistical analysis presented in Chapter five does not account for the quality of the peace established. The results indicate that strategies prioritizing security are most effective at establishing negative peace. Theoretically, it is still possible to propose that missions including development-related tasks would be performing better at increasing the quality of the peace established, compared to security-oriented missions. Contrary to these expectations, the case studies show that countries receiving interventions prioritizing the establishment of security have recovered better and faster. The short-term vision of peace operations proves to be an inappropriate framework for the implementation of long-term development assistance. In the case of ONUMOZ, even though the operation was successful at establishing and maintaining peace, the small advances achieved in the quality of peace were reversed after the operation left. First, the expansive administrative apparatus that the poor Mozambican state inherited from the peace operation quickly turned into fragile underfinanced institutions. Second, many developmental programmes were left unfinished due to lack of continued international funding. Third, many have argued that by overtaking too many administrative and civilian functions, the mission has not only started systems that

are foreign to the local population, but it has also undermined the local capacity to develop means to cope with their problems.

In Sierra Leone, where the quality of peace is now slowly increasing, UNAMSIL initiated development related programmes (on women's rights, HIV/AIDS, health and education, and child protection) only after the security situation was stabilized. But more importantly, it was followed by a series of smaller missions geared to consolidate peace. In fact, the presence of these missions seems to have enabled the developmental programmes to receive the continued international attention they need to be effective. It is important to note that Sierra Leone may be an exception with this regard. Being one of the three countries included in to the agenda of the Peacebuilding Committee as a trial case, it has received considerable amount of international attention often not devoted to other cases. Nicaragua has also recovered relatively well from its conflict and the quality of peace has been increasing at a good pace. Nicaragua received two small security-only missions, which have not been involved in any development related programmes. However, this does not mean that the international community was not implementing various humanitarian and developmental programmes in Nicaragua. In fact, the country benefitted from considerable amount of international attention, which contributed to positive peace.

This chapter drew general conclusions from the quantitative and qualitative analyses. The following chapter attempts to understand the implication of these findings for the evolution of post-conflict peacebuilding and human security.





**Table IX.1: Summary comparisons of the six illustrative cases examined**

	Security-Only Strategy		Sequential Strategy		Simultaneous Strategy	
	NICARAGUA	BURUNDI	SIERRA LEONE	ANGOLA	MOZAMBIQUE	CAMBODIA
<b>Strength of the Security Component</b>	Medium	Very weak	Weak then very strong	Weak	Medium	weak then medium
<b>Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR)</b>	DDR Completed	No DDR	DDR completed	Some weak partial demobilization	D&R partially completed, weak in disarmament	No DDR
<b>Timing of elections</b>	During Demobilization	Before Demobilization	1996 elections before DDR, 2002 elections after DDR	Before Demobilization	After Demobilization	Before Demobilization
<b>Relapse to conflict after elections</b>	No relapse	Relapse	1996 relapse, 2002 no relapse	Relapse	No Relapse	Relapse
<b>Coordination and Integration of Tasks*</b>	Good coordination	Not an issue	Some problems with coordination and integrations	Problems with coordination and integrations	Problems with coordination and integrations	Problems with coordination and integrations
<b>Intensity: Years of conflict**, Deaths and refugees</b>	11 years 80,000 deaths 500,000 refugees	3 years 70,000 deaths 800,000 refugees	6 years 70,000 deaths 500,000 refugees	12 years 800,000 deaths 500,000 refugees	15 years 1 million deaths 5 million refugees	24 years 2.2 million deaths 4 million refugees
<b>Previous experience with Democracy</b>	None	None	Very limited	Very limited	None	None
<b>Cold War Conflict</b>	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Lucrative natural resources</b>	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
<b>Relevance of Ethnicity</b>	No	Yes	Some	Some	Some	Some
<b>Negative Peace</b>	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
<b>Positive Peace</b>	Overall increase in quality of peace	No	Partial and slow increase in quality of peace	No	No	No

\* The Difference among coordination problems encountered within operations' components and with outside agencies is made in the text that follow

\*\* Years of conflict are counted from the year a conflict started to the year when a peace operation was deployed.

## **CHAPTER X**

### **CONCLUSION**

The motivation of this study was to investigate how an expanded understanding of security, namely human security, affected the effectiveness of peace operations. The argument that multi-dimensionality increases the effectiveness of peacebuilding by enabling peace operations to address many sources of insecurity at once is not validated by the results of this study. Chapter three investigated a wide range of theoretical arguments and empirical findings evaluating which strategy improves the performance of post-conflict peacebuilding. The various claims advanced by advocates of the security-first and simultaneous approaches were regrouped under overarching themes; feasibility/desirability, negative externalities, resources and credibility/false hopes. Doing so, it became apparent that many arguments developed by these two approaches are in direct contradiction with each other. The next section revisits the arguments promoted by each approach and evaluates them in the light of the results of both the quantitative and qualitative studies. Even though the results indicate that security-oriented missions fare better at establishing peace, they also reveal that the human security agenda has a lot to offer to the sustainability of peace. Therefore, the chapter will proceed with this study's implications for future peace operations and for security and peace studies in general. To conclude, some

suggestions for a human security approach to designing security-focused peace operations receptive to development related needs are proposed.

## **1. SECURITY-FIRST VS. SIMULTANEOUS APPROACH**

### **1.1. FEASIBILITY / DESIRABILITY**

Advocates for a security-first approach (*Security-only* or *Sequential* strategies) argue that the early implementation of development-related activities is unfeasible in an insecure environment. To the contrary, promoters of a simultaneous approach maintain that the root causes of a conflict cannot be solved without the early implementation of development-related activities. The results of this study show that a security-only approach can contribute to the establishment of peace and its overall quality without having to address various developmental issues directly. Many specialized agencies are designed to respond to these needs, and most often, are already on the ground assisting the population with regards to many developmental issues. Moreover, cases like in Burundi and in Sierra Leone demonstrate that most-development related activities, whether they are carried out by the peace operation or other actors, cannot be carried out in an environment plagued by violence and insecurity. Even when the peace operation is mandated to provide development-related activities, it has to stabilize the security situation first. For instance, only after security was established in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL grew in capacity and gradually started to implement the development related tasks it was mandated to assume.

It is also observed that peace operations may not always be the perfect candidates for humanitarian and development related activities. Especially in a conflictual environment, peace operations are likely to be perceived as biased by the warring parties, which compromises the missions' security and ability to secure humanitarian passage rights. As explained earlier, in Angola, a new unit had to be created by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) to carry out the humanitarian responsibilities of UNAVEM II, which had lost the trust of the warring parties. In addition, with regards to long-term development programmes, the cases of Mozambique and Cambodia have showed the inadequateness of the short-term vision inherent to peace operations. Thus, ill-suited to undertake long-term developmental activities, peace operations should leave the implementation of these programmes to specialized agencies. Agencies, NGOs and other organizations working alongside peace operations also benefit from some flexibility that the peace operation does not have. These organizations do not have a fixed timetable, they can afford waiting until they gather enough funds to undertake certain project, and in case of violence they can temporarily leave the country and come back when it is stable. Moreover, the activities of most of these organizations are often straightforward and less controversial than the undertakings of a peace operation. This provides them with a more neutral image, which facilitates their movement around the country needing assistance.

These considerations have important policy implications for the future directions of peace operations and peacebuilding in general. Human security, as a broader conceptualization of security, may rightly point to the need to address

many dimensions of security for peace to be sustainable. However, these responsibilities do not have to fall on the peace operations. They can be assumed by various actors, whose specialty is to deal with the specific issues needing attention. The conclusions drawn from this study suggest that peace operations' own specialty be confined to provide security, stability and short-term humanitarian relief.

## **1.2. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES**

Security-first advocates emphasize that without stabilizing the security situation, the advances made in the realm of development are bound to be spoiled. In addition, they warn that the early implementation of political, economical or social programmes can undermine the security-oriented tasks of a mission. On the contrary, the simultaneous approach urged that positive results obtained in the realm of security are to be spoiled if social, economic and political opportunities are not created simultaneously. This study demonstrates that the simultaneous implementations of some activities are more likely to generate contradictory effects. Moreover, the complexity of multi-dimensional peace operations can lead to lack of integration among its tasks, which further generates negative externalities. It is still however possible to argue that better coordination and integration of various tasks could prevent some negative externalities.

One recurrent practice leading to contradictory effects is the premature introduction of elections. Democratization is often promoted as a political solution to conflict and as an alternative peaceful mechanism to conflict to settling differences. All too often, however, preparations for elections in an unstable,

insecure and armed environment increase tensions among previously warring parties. Therefore, the heightened feeling of insecurity and uncertainty generated by the prospect of elections often hinders the effectiveness of security oriented activities. As explained in previous chapters, the prospect of elections can undermine the mission's demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programme. It can introduce high levels of uncertainty and competition that heighten the sense of hostility and mistrust among the warring parties. Continuing with holding elections in an armed and insecure environment most likely leads to a relapse to conflict and undermines all previous efforts to bring parties into the negotiating table.

The argument put forward by advocates for a simultaneous approach also have some value. The case studies show that the success of the demobilization process is highly dependent on a good reintegration programme. That is, if ex-combatants are not given some economic opportunities along the necessary training and rehabilitation, they become less likely to give up their weapons and abide by the demobilization process. The nature of this development-related activity is however very limited and specific to a certain segment of the society. While it is clear that a good reintegration programme should always be the part of a demobilization-related mandate, it is quite a different endeavour than large scale and long-term developmental activities often assumed by multi-dimensional operations.

Case studies reveal that developmental activities implemented before the security situation was stabilized are most often negated by continued fighting. For

instance, UNTAC in Cambodia has devoted a lot of his personnel and resources to programmes related to political, administrative and development related activities. However, operating in an environment plagued with violence, the progress achieved by these programmes was reversed by constant relapses to conflict. Similarly in Sierra Leone, billions of dollars of multilateral development aid had been invested during the mid 1990s towards building civil society and promoting free and fair elections. These programmes were implemented without the establishment of some security and order and were destroyed by the renewal of conflict after the 1996 elections. Only after 2000, when security was finally established, similar programmes have improved the quality of peace in Sierra Leone.

Some of the negative externalities can surely be avoided by better integrating the various activities undertaken by different components of a mission. A more integrated planning phase for UNTAC in Cambodia could have prevented many negative externalities generated by simple lack of coordination. The design of ONUMOZ in Mozambique, consisting of several commissions, proved that better integration can be achieved, and that it can prevent activities from undermining each other. However, it is important to remember that the simpler the peace operations, the fewer coordination problems and negative externalities there will be.

### **1.3. RESOURCES**

The security-first approach's advocates emphasize the importance of concentrating the resources of peace operation to a few security-sectors first. They

argue that development-related activities require considerable amount of resources and personnel, which spreads the mission thin, decreasing the likelihood of success. They maintain that tasks related to reconstruction, administration and development are demanding and often problematic and should be left to established agencies with prior experience. For instance, while UNTAC, in Cambodia, received large amount of funding (2 billion US\$), its resources spread thin among its various activities. Even though UNTAC, endowed with significant resources, failed at most of its assigned tasks (demining, institution building, DDR and of course lasting political agreements), it was one of the most expansive missions ever deployed by the United Nations. The British approach to solving the Sierra Leonean conflict agrees with the argumentation of the security-first approach. When deploying 7,000 soldiers to provide security in Sierra Leone, the British invested \$120 million towards the reconstruction of its security institutions and justice system. Compared to UNAMSIL, which received 2.8 billion US\$, the British intervention was much more effective at establishing peace.

#### **1.4. CREDIBILITY/FALSE HOPE**

Promoters for a security-first approach argue that by stretching the responsibilities assumed by peace operations, international organizations (mainly the UN) are making promises that they cannot meet, which results in loss of credibility. They also add that these multi-dimensional mandates also introduce false hopes among the devastated population. If and when the promises are not delivered, it often results in deeper frustration and tension. Contrary to this line of argument, supporters for a simultaneous approach explain that waiting for the



establishment of security often leads to a loss of credibility in the international community's ability to address severe human suffering. Moreover, they suggest that providing some economic opportunities and political freedom to the population encourage them to join efforts to establish peace. There are reasons to believe that missions with a weak security component can lose credibility, as the case studies reveal several instances of taking hostages, attacks and killings of peace operations' troops. As shown earlier, the deployment of successive weak operations in Angola have led UNITA to disrespect and manipulate the United Nations, and to use its missions as protection from its opponents while regaining strength for further fighting.

## **2. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS**

The statistical results of this study and the qualitative insights gained by the cases point to several policy prescriptions for future peace operations. First, providing security and order should be prioritized. This can be achieved by deploying a strong credible force able to reassure insecure parties, deter disobediences and encourage parties to comply with the terms of the agreed upon peace process. It is important to remember that in practice the decision-making process determining the composition, strength and mandate of an operation is not uniform across cases. In fact, this process is heavily influenced by the prevailing global or regional politics and the national interests of the members of the UN Security Council. The 'commitment gap' between resolutions of the Security Council and the actual resources devoted is also another critical problem (Gray

2001). While the compositions and mandates of peace operations will continue to be determined case by case, the UN could benefit from a mechanism preventing the authorization and deployment of weak, understaffed and under-equipped missions. These missions cannot accomplish much and lead to a loss of credibility in the international organizations dispatching them.

As the findings of this study points to the importance of a credible and robust security component, it is crucial to address the dangers of blurring the lines between peace enforcement and war-fighting. It is clear that drawing the line is much easier in settings where violence has ceased completely and parties are collaborating with the implementation of a peace process. However, when peace operations are deployed to conflicts that are partly pacified, the role they ought to assume should be carefully restricted to peace enforcement and not war-fighting. According to the Capstone document, the most recent document issued by the Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, peace enforcement “involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression” (PBPS 2008, 18). If the UN is to venture in more forceful missions, this definition may not be clear and precise enough to draw the line between peace enforcement and war-fighting. As Durch and England (2009, 4) stress in their recent piece on the purpose of peace operations: “although a peacekeeping force may need to undertake combat activities in certain

places and at certain times, combat is not and cannot be its baseline ‘stance’. Should combat become a routine preoccupation, then the operation has transitioned to something else, regardless of who mandated it or what that initial mandate said. That is not to say that stability operations or authorized war-fighting operations will not be needed. But peacekeeping should be kept honorably distinct”.

Second, the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration process should be treated as an important and primary security related step towards the establishment of peace. In fact, it is clear that without the completion of the DDR process it is difficult to start building peace that will last. While demobilization of the armed factions and disarmament are key, the reintegration process where ex-combatants are rehabilitated and trained to resume a normal life is equally if not more critical. This requires that the peace operations assume tasks that are not strictly security-oriented, but are limited to short-term developmental activities geared towards a small segment of the society. It is also possible to envision that these programmes could be outsourced to NGOs or other agencies if budgetary considerations constrain the mission’s capacity to undertake them.

Third, if democracy is to be promoted as a solution for conflict, the timing of elections should be carefully planned. A feasible timetable should be devised which can be revised in case of renewed hostilities. If violence is periodically erupting and the DDR process is falling behind, elections should be postponed until security is restored and DDR is completed. It is also clear that for a genuine democratic transition and consolidation to take place, providing security and order

is not sufficient. The difficulties encountered by the peace operations during the process of democratization evoke questions regarding whether promoting this particular political system is right for all post-conflict situations. Jarstad and Sisk's (2008) recent book on transitions from war to democracy is one of the few new studies exploring the conditions necessary for post-conflict democratization and its consolidation. Similar to the conclusions of this study they find that democratization presents many dilemmas for peacebuilding and that the short-term vision of peace operations does not suffice for democratization. They suggest that if peace operations are to promote transition to democracy, they ought to stay longer and address the longer-term phases of consolidating peace. The findings of this study would recommend that the implementation of long-term development/democratization assistance be left to specialized agencies. The decision-making process involving the design and deployment of a peace operation is complicated and intricate enough that expanding its scope to long-term peacebuilders may be a real challenge.

### **3. IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY STUDIES**

The promotion of internationally coordinated *Security-only* operations capable of enforcing peace if necessary is in contradiction with the well-established principle of non-interference in one another's internal affairs. This principle has guided international relations since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. As Etzioni (2007) explains, the legitimacy of the security-first approach rests on the moral principle that respect for life is essential and should be

indiscriminately applied no matter the nationality of the person/group in danger. This echoes the people-centered approach taken by the human security agenda. The legitimization for intervention on those grounds also goes hand in hand with the controversial notion 'the responsibility to protect', which gained much popularity throughout the 1990s. The 2001 report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001) has sought to promote this notion by redefining states sovereignty as the responsibility to protect their citizens. That is, rather than granting states absolute sovereignty, this new definition renders it conditional on the fulfillment of their responsibilities towards their citizens. Therefore, if a state is unwilling or unable to fulfil its responsibility for the welfare of its citizens, intervention can be considered as an option. Even though after September 11, 2001, the focus of international studies has shifted towards more pressing concerns of global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and 'rogue states', the debates on 'the responsibility to protect' and the definition of state sovereignty remain very relevant and are bound to resurface. As long as civil wars, massacres, ethnic cleansing and genocides are a reality, the Security Council will have to engage in these debates. It will also be necessary to draw limits to the notion of 'sovereignty as responsibility'. The White House, for instance, has used this definition of sovereignty to legitimize its policies towards 'rogue states'. The US has justified its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq on the grounds that these states should be stopped as they not only proliferate weapons of mass destruction and harbour terrorists, but they also "brutalize their own people and squander their natural resources for the personal

gain of their rulers” (Williams and Bellamy 2005). As Evans and Sahnoun explain a distinction should be made between the responsibility to protect and right to self-defence; they argue that “[...] what is involved in the debates about intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere is the scope and limits of countries' rights to act in self-defense - not their right, or obligation, to intervene elsewhere to protect peoples other than their own” (2002, 99-100).

As underlined by this study, the evolution and expansion of peace operations' mandates has resulted from the broadening of our conceptualization of security. Concepts such as human security have made clear that the bare cessation of conflict is not sufficient to establish sustainable peace. Especially in conflict-ridden societies, where infrastructure, economic and political institutions, education and sanitation are deficient, the establishment of sustainable peace is difficult without providing some developmental assistance. Important questions regarding the implications of a human security approach are still to be fully addressed. In fact, the expansion in the understanding of security calls for the redefinition of many activities undertaken internationally. Does a broader understanding of security imply a greater role for the international community? Can the responsibility to protect be extended to legitimize all interventions aiming to protect citizens of other countries whose lives are in danger due to lack of food, hygiene or a repressive regime? If sustainable peace can only be achieved by addressing a variety of security and developmental problems, should the international community opt for a division of labour? More relevant to the subject of this study, should most of the expanding peacebuilding responsibilities fall on

the shoulders of peace operations? And should peace operations aspire to assume the role of coordinating and integrating the various security and development related activities under their own command structure? While this study agrees that a broader understanding of security is essential for the establishment of sustainable peace, it indicates that peace operations should play a well-defined and limited role of providing order and security within the comprehensive process of peacebuilding. The attempt to integrate and coordinate all peacebuilding activities within and around short-term peace operations may not be the most optimal path to generating a sound and adequate peacebuilding strategy for post-conflict settings. Similar to Durch and England's call to keep peace operations distinct from authorized war-fighting operations, this study recommends that they are kept separate from missions undertaking longer development-related programmes. This, however, does not mean that development-related programmes are not essential for the sustainability of peace. To the contrary, case studies show that without the implementation of short- and long-term programmes aimed at redressing the economic, political, and social standing in post-conflict settings, relapse to conflict is inevitable. It is clear that a complete peacebuilding strategy must include both security and development related tasks, the challenge is to determine the right sequence and timing to avoid negative externalities and unnecessarily complicated and costly interventions. Below I explain that the difficulties encountered by the newer and broader peace operations originate in the adoption of a too broad conceptualization of human security. I propose that if

human security is rightly conceptualized it can serve as an effective checklist for the design of a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy.

#### **4. UNTANGLING HUMAN SECURITY'S DIMENSIONS: A SOLUTION TO DESIGNING MORE EFFECTIVE PEACEBUILDING?**

I suggest that the problems facing the multi-sectoral peace operations are similar to the problems encountered *conceptually and theoretically* by Human Security. Both peace operations and human security have suffered from a gap between what is theoretically sound and practically possible. In essence, I propose that the theoretical tensions encountered while conceptualizing Human Security can be observed in its practice by peace operations. While hastily expanding its peace operations, the UN ignored the relationship between theory and practice. The UN failed to recognize that human security is not theoretically ready to inform policy. With its ability to encapsulate the various direct and indirect threats to peace, human security is an appealing concept for peacebuilding. However, it is imperative to recognize that its policy recommendations have yet to be sorted out. Human security, as a concept, suffers from theoretical obstacles, which unless resolved, will not provide an efficient framework for peacebuilding.

I argued earlier that the definitional and policy debates surrounding the concept of human security are not so different from the old debate emerging in the 70s regarding the relationship between security and development. Indeed, the circularity inherent in the conceptualization of human security is not a new phenomenon. While everyone acknowledged the complementary nature between



security and development, an unsettled discussion erupted over which one comes first and which policies should be followed to attain sustainable peace. An important conclusion of this study is that the human security agenda did not successfully connect, as some argue, security and development related concerns into one coherent approach. Despite a growing understanding that human security comprises of several interdependent and overlapping security dimensions, these interactions are not yet fully understood. In fact, the dilemma facing peacebuilders is that while multi-dimensional efforts certainly could create positive externalities by generating a virtuous cycle benefiting overall peace, they often generate negative externalities as well. For instance, while the introduction of some democratization can help the resolution of the conflict and provide more political rights and freedom to civilians, the premature introduction of elections compromises efforts to demobilize, disarm and reintegrate combatants. As cases show, this can lead to a return to fighting when tensions and insecurities arise. Human Security has a lot to offer in terms of policy recommendations, particularly to peacebuilding efforts, but more research is required first.

This is not to say that human security is not a promising framework. To the contrary, untangling the relationship between different dimensions of security, and identifying the potential for positive and negative externalities should help flesh out the policy recommendations of human security. A promising study is conducted by Owen, who proposes a threshold-based conceptualization of human security which aims to improve human security's use as a policy tool without narrowing its scope. Owen proposes that instead of being pre-chosen, threats are

to be included according to their actual severity (Owen 2004a, 2004b, 2003). He clarifies: “the list of all possible threats to human security in the world is vast, the list of *relevant* harms for a particular region or country, however, is considerably more refined. Using regional relevance as the criteria for threat selection means that no serious harm will be excluded, staying true to the broad conception of human security(...)” (Owen 2004a, 21) The policy prescriptions of this conceptualization of human security could determine the short-term tasks that should urgently be assumed by peace operations, while leaving broader and long-term issues for specialized agencies. As case studies reveal, the short-term vision of the UNDPKO is not necessarily suitable for long-term development programmes and the much needed resources and personnel of the missions are better used if they addressed immediate security and relief concerns only. The threshold based conceptualization of Human Security developed by Owen could be used in further studies to investigate this possibility (Owen 2003, 2004a, 2004b).

As explained earlier, analyzing the effectiveness of the recent peacebuilding efforts around the world, practitioners and scholars alike, have indentified that integration, coordination and a common strategy are imperative for multi-dimensional peacebuilding efforts to succeed (PBPS 2008; Durch et al. 2003; de Coning 2007; Bauer and Biermann 2004; UN 2006; Ponzio 2007; UN 2000, 1997). Between 1997 and 2008, the United Nations (UN) has implemented several integration reforms to increase the efficiency of its peacebuilding. While those reforms have certainly increased performance, they have not led to a


systematic improvement in the overall efficacy of UN peacebuilding efforts. It is clear that many factors inhibiting integration are stemming from institutional barriers present within the UN system (Campbell and Kaspersen 2008). However, it is also crucial to recognize that the existing scholarship and expertise on peacebuilding has not yet produce a clear strategy for integration. Rearranging the institutional scheme of the UN, as various UN reforms prescribed, is alone, not sufficient. There is a need for a feasible and meaningful strategy to follow on the ground.

For further studies, I propose that more attention should be devoted to the positive and negative externalities generated by multi-sectoral activities. In fact, the most recent handbook published by the Human Security Unit (HSU) of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has acknowledged the importance of addressing negative externalities during the planning of multi-dimensional operations. As a solution, the HSU has tentatively developed the *Human Security Multi-Sectorality and Externalities Framework* (HSU-OCHA 2009, 18). While this scheme shows potential, it is yet too early to judge its applicability and efficiency. There is also growing body of literature addressing various different contradictory effects of multi-dimensionality (Sisk 2008; Jarstad 2008; Paris 2004, 1997; Flores and Nooruddin 2009; Willett 1995; Jan 2001; Berdal 1993; HSU-OCHA 2009; Uvin 2002; Cousens et al. 2001). These studies all emphasize the importance for a strategy able to account for the potential contradictory effects of running multi-sectoral programmes. Many, especially practitioners, have suggested the need for benchmarking not only to identify areas

falling behind but to follow progress and devise necessary next stages (IPA 2006; Freeman et al. 2007; McCandless 2008) I propose that Owen's threshold-based conceptualization of human security can help with the formulation of benchmarks for peacebuilding efforts. Benchmarking would alert the international community of the areas to prioritize and redress before further damage precipitates a cycle of insecurity and violence difficult to evade. Very different from a strict security-development sequence, benchmarks can allow for the timely introduction of programmes that contribute and/or facilitate the success of other concurrent efforts. Benchmarking will enable peacebuilders to concentrate their resources towards issues needing immediate attention, while leaving less pressing issues for later phases, all depending on the specificities of each local setting. This would lead to a much needed demand-driven approach rather than supply-driven approach we are witnessing now.

## APPENDIX: CHAPTER V

**Graph 1: Plotting the probabilities of Peace over time with Country Name Abbreviations to look for outliers**



**Table 1: Models containing only strategy and time specifications**

	(1) Linear	(2) Quadratic	(3) Splines	(4) Dummies
Security Only	1.761 (1.64)	1.935+ (1.88)	2.079* (2.05)	2.149* (2.11)
simultaneous	1.770 (0.88)	1.922 (0.99)	1.942 (1.00)	2.147 (1.12)
Sequential	1.860+ (1.70)	1.940+ (1.78)	1.872+ (1.69)	2.105+ (1.95)
Count of years	0.906*** (-7.11)	0.808*** (-8.16)		
timesq		1.003*** (6.15)		
(confyrs-k1) cubed			1.016*** (5.45)	
(confyrs-k2) cubed			0.993*** (-4.52)	
(confyrs-k3) cubed			1.001** (3.09)	
Temporal dummy, confyrs=1				3.537 (1.17)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=2				1.198 (0.17)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=3				1.422 (0.32)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=4				1.194 (0.16)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=5				0.454 (-0.68)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=6				0.930 (-0.06)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=7				0.213 (-1.20)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=8				0.346 (-0.87)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=9				1.059 (0.05)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=10				0.576 (-0.47)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=11				0.150 (-1.29)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=12				0.306 (-0.92)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=13				0.329 (-0.86)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=15				0.732 (-0.26)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=16				0.624 (-0.38)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=18				0.261 (-0.91)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=19				0.638 (-0.35)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=21				0.318 (-0.78)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=23				0.343 (-0.72)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=24				0.406 (-0.61)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=30				0.595 (-0.35)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=31				0.687 (-0.25)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=32				1.785 (0.44)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=47				8.926 (1.50)
LR-Chi2	86.748	112.316	113.209	111.816
Pseudo-R2	.0749731	.0970704	.0978421	.1031136
N	1844	1844	1844	1515

+ p&lt;0.10, \* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Z-scores in parenthesis under odd ratios

**Table 2: Models with GDP per Capita instead of regions**

	(1) Linear	(2) Quadratic	(3) Splines	(4) Dummies
Security Only	4.143** (2.68)	3.774* (2.51)	3.790* (2.52)	3.880* (2.52)
simultaneous	2.190 (1.16)	2.149 (1.11)	2.133 (1.11)	2.590 (1.33)
Sequential	2.921* (2.44)	2.873* (2.39)	2.861* (2.38)	3.098* (2.49)
Conflict Intensity	0.206*** (-6.30)	0.248*** (-5.47)	0.245*** (-5.45)	0.245*** (-5.27)
Democracy-Autocracy	0.997 (-0.14)	1.006 (0.32)	1.007 (0.34)	1.006 (0.30)
Internally Displaced People	1.000 (-1.04)	1.000 (-0.66)	1.000 (-0.63)	1.000 (-0.70)
GDP per capita	1.053+ (1.93)	1.045 (1.63)	1.046+ (1.69)	1.046 (1.63)
Peace Agreement	5.159* (2.13)	6.187* (2.33)	6.020* (2.31)	5.679* (2.23)
Ceasefire w/ regulation	4.120+ (1.72)	4.850+ (1.89)	4.731+ (1.87)	4.323+ (1.76)
Ceasefire	10.264** (2.58)	10.675** (2.63)	10.124** (2.58)	9.719* (2.46)
Victory	12.164*** (3.30)	14.271*** (3.43)	14.071*** (3.44)	13.024*** (3.35)
No or Low Activity	3.443 (1.64)	4.214+ (1.89)	4.048+ (1.85)	3.923+ (1.79)
Count of years	0.967* (-2.19)	0.882*** (-3.49)		
timesq		1.002** (3.06)		
(confyrs-k1) cubed			1.006 (1.41)	
(confyrs-k2) cubed			0.998 (-0.98)	
(confyrs-k3) cubed			1.000 (0.30)	
Temporal dummy, confyrs=1				0.042* (-2.37)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=2				0.023** (-2.79)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=3				0.022** (-2.81)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=4				0.027** (-2.67)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=5				0.015** (-2.98)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=6				0.025** (-2.68)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=7				0.009** (-3.12)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=8				0.016** (-2.87)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=9				0.022** (-2.67)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=10				0.030* (-2.50)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=11				0.007** (-2.99)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=12				0.014** (-2.83)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=13				0.017** (-2.72)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=15				0.013** (-2.62)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=16				0.012** (-2.64)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=18				0.013** (-2.64)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=19				0.033* (-2.28)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=21				0.016* (-2.49)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=23				0.019* (-2.41)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=31				0.043+ (-1.86)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=32				0.135 (-1.29)
Temporal dummy, confyrs=36				0.069 (-1.54)
Chi2	140.306	147.905	146.803	135.822
R-squared	.1848462	.1948583	.1934057	.1931363
N	1277	1277	1277	1008

+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Z-scores in parenthesis under odd ratios

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