

**Degrees of “Scapegoatability”: Assessing Spatial Variations in
Collective Violence against the Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia**

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ABSTRACT

Many instrumental expositions of collective violence have examined the role of self-interested ethnic/religious entrepreneurs in inciting riots. The concept of scapegoating is frequently used to explain how opportunistic elites attempt to deflect blame onto vulnerable ethnic minorities, particularly during times of socioeconomic and political upheaval. However, the notion of scapegoating is under-theorized in the conflict literature and the question of why elite scapegoating only sometimes leads to violence is seldom addressed. This dissertation seeks to redress the balance by interrogating spatial variations in violence against the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (a widely scapegoated group) in the late New Order period of President Suharto.

The study argues that elite-orchestrated campaigns of scapegoating succeed only if specific attributes invoked in such campaigns resonate at the local level; violence is more likely when prevailing local conditions amplify the pointed nature of the elite rhetoric. This in turn magnifies the threat perceived by the local community, provides focal point/s for mobilization against the disliked “other” and in turn makes certain Chinese communities more “scapegoatable.” Typically, scapegoating of the Chinese entails invoking entrenched stereotypes of the group as non-Moslem, non-native, economically dominant outsiders. Local mechanisms which activate these stereotypes include higher visibility of non-Moslem sites of worship, heightened ethnic competition and ostensible symbols of wealth associated with the Chinese.

The study draws on literature from political science, social psychology and ethnic demography, highlights the salience of local cleavages and stresses the

interaction between macro- and micro-foundations of violence. Existing research practice often takes the “riot episode” as a single observation. The extent of spatial variations in violence demonstrated in this dissertation cautions against such homogenization and stresses the need to disaggregate the unit of analysis in conflict studies.

The study adopts a mixed-methods approach. Three large-N datasets compiled at city, regency and neighborhood levels across Indonesia allow variations in anti-Chinese rioting to be explicated at different spatial aggregations. This is complemented by qualitative material obtained through field surveys and interviews conducted in several cities in Indonesia during six months of fieldwork in 2006 and 2007. Further, the study employs geospatial technology (GIS) to digitally map patterns of violence at various spatial units.

RÉSUMÉ

De nombreuses explications instrumentales sur la violence collective ont examiné le rôle d'entrepreneurs ethniques et religieux intéressés dans des émeutes d'incitation. Le concept de *bouc émissaire* est fréquemment employé pour expliquer comment les élites opportunistes essaient de guider le blâme sur des minorités ethniques vulnérables, en particulier pendant des périodes de bouleversement socio-économique et politique. Cependant, la notion de bouc émissaire est sous-théorisée dans la littérature de conflit, et la question : pourquoi l'élite choisit un bouc émissaire mène quelquefois à la violence? est rarement abordée.

Cette thèse cherche à redonner un équilibre en interrogeant des variations spatiales de violence contre les personnes d'origine Chinoise en Indonésie (un groupe largement considéré comme bouc émissaire) vers la fin de la 'Nouvelle Période d'Ordre' du Président Suharto. L'étude argumente que les campagnes orchestrées par élite qui choisissent un bouc émissaire réussissent seulement si les attributs spécifiques invoqués dans de telles campagnes résonnent au niveau local; la violence est plus probable quand les conditions locales amplifient la nature aiguë de la rhétorique des élites. Ceci amplifie la menace perçue par la communauté locale, fournit un ou plusieurs points focaux pour la mobilisation contre 'l'autre' peu apprécié et assure aux communautés chinoises d'être plus 'bouc émissaire-able'. Typiquement, la faire bouc émissaire du Chinois nécessite d'appeler des stéréotypes indélogeables du groupe comme non-Musulmans, étrangers économiquement dominants non-natifs. Les mécanismes locaux qui activent ces stéréotypes incluent une visibilité plus élevée des emplacements de

non-Musulmans du culte, de la concurrence ethnique intensifiée et des symboles apparents de la richesse liés au Chinois.

Inspirée par la littérature des sciences politiques, psychologie sociale et démographie, l'étude souligne la prépondérance des clivages locaux et l'interaction entre le macro et les micro-fondations de la violence. La pratique existante de recherches prend souvent l'épisode d'émeute 'comme un événement simple'. L'ampleur des variations spatiales de la violence démontrée dans cette thèse avertit contre une telle homogénéisation et souligne la nécessité de désagréger l'unité de l'analyse dans des études de conflit.

L'étude adopte une approche des méthodes mélangées. Trois grands-N ensembles de données compilés aux niveaux de la ville, de la région et du voisinage à travers l'Indonésie permettent des variations de l'émeute anti-Chinoise d'être explicitées à différentes échelles spatiales. Ceci est complimé avec les données qualitatives obtenues par des enquêtes et des entrevues de terrain dans plusieurs villes en Indonésie sur une durée de six mois de travaux sur le terrain en 2006 et 2007. De plus, l'étude utilise la technologie géospatial (IGS) pour tracer digitalement des modèles de violence à diverses échelles spatiales.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)
BCA	Bank Central Asia
BPS	Badan Pusat Statistik (Indonesian Statistics Bureau)
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DDII	Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia)
ELF	Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GOLKAR	Partai Golongan Karya (Party of Functional Groups)
HDI	Human Development Index
HMI	Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Students' Association)
HPI	Human Poverty Index
ICCF	Indonesia Christian Communication Forum
IFSL	Indonesian Family Life Survey
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTI	Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa (Indonesian Chinese Association)
KADIN	Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industries
KISDI	Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity)
KOPASSUS	Komando Pasukan Khusus (Army Special Forces Command)
KOSTRAD	Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Strategic Reserve Command of the Army)
KTP	Kartu Tanda Penduduk (National Identity Card)

MPR	People's Consultative Assembly
MUI	Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesia Religious Scholars' Council)
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia)
PMII	Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Students' Movement)
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
PODES	Potensial Desa (Village Potential Statistics)
PRD	Partai Rakyat Demokratik (People's Democratic Party)
SBKRI	Surat Bakti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia (Citizenship Certificate)
TGPF	Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta (Joint Fact Finding Team)
TRuK	Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan (Volunteers for Humanity)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WNA	Warga Negara Asing (Foreign citizens in Indonesia)
WNI	Warga Negara Indonesia (Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent)

GLOSSARY

<i>Abangan</i>	Nominal (syncretic) brand of Islam practiced mostly in Java
<i>Bhinneka Tunggal Ika</i>	The official motto of Indonesia meaning “unity in diversity”
<i>Cina</i>	Pejorative term for the Chinese
<i>Cukongs</i>	Select group of highly influential Chinese businessmen in Suharto’s Indonesia
<i>Guberniia</i>	Major administrative sub-division in imperial Russia
<i>Kabupaten</i>	Regency/rural district in Indonesia
<i>Kecamatan</i>	Sub-district in Indonesia
<i>Kelurahan</i>	Lowest level of government administration in Indonesia; similar to a large neighborhood
<i>Kotamadya</i>	City/urban district in Indonesia
<i>Kota Santri</i>	Locales renowned for devout religious (Islamic) piety
<i>Madrasah</i>	Islamic religious schools in Indonesia with graded classes and a standardized curriculum that also includes general subjects
<i>Masalah Cina</i>	term often used in official government circles to describe the “Chinese Problem”
<i>Milik Pribumi</i>	Property owned by the <i>Pribumi</i>
<i>New Order</i>	Term used to describe the regime of President Suharto from 1966-1998
<i>Non-Pribumi</i>	Non-native inhabitants of Indonesia
<i>Pancasila</i>	Official philosophical foundation/ideology of the Indonesian state

<i>Peranakan</i>	People of non-Indonesian ethnic origin who have lived in Indonesia for generations and have become thoroughly Indonesianized.
<i>Pesantren</i>	Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia
<i>Pribumi</i>	Native inhabitants of Indonesia
<i>Priyayi</i>	Traditional class of nobles in Java
<i>Reformasi</i>	Term given to describe various political reforms enacted in Indonesia in the post-Suharto era.
<i>Santri</i>	Followers of a purer, more orthodox form of Islam in contrast to the <i>Abangans</i>
<i>Totok</i>	Recent Chinese migrants in Indonesia. <i>Totoks</i> are less assimilated than the <i>Peranakan</i> and maintain closer contacts with China.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Background to the Problem

The shooting of four students at the elite Trisakti University campus in Jakarta on the 12th of May 1998 set in motion a series of tumultuous events that was to rock the very foundation of the Indonesian polity. The shooting precipitated an orgy of rioting in Jakarta and several other cities of a seldom seen magnitude and brutality and was primarily directed at the influential ethnic Chinese minority in the country.¹ The violence, which came to be known as the “May Riots of 1998,” was the culmination of nearly two years of unrest as Indonesia reeled under the weight of simultaneous socioeconomic and political crises.² Moreover, the impact of the violence was profound as it triggered the resignation of President Suharto, brought an abrupt end to his 32 year old *New*

¹ Estimates of the extent of destruction and death toll fluctuate widely, but it is believed that approximately 1,200 people lost their lives, many ethnic Chinese women were raped (possibly around 100-150) and over 4,000 shops and houses and thousands of vehicles burnt or looted from May 12-15, 1998. Jakarta and many of its suburbs bore the brunt of the violence; but there were also major riots in several other locales, notably in the towns of Solo in Central Java, Palembang (South Sumatra) and Surabaya (East Java). Medan in North Sumatra was the venue of a major anti-Chinese riot in early May, a few days before the Jakarta violence. See Siegel 1998; Wandita, 1998; articles by van Klinken and Berfield and Loveard (both in Aspinall et al., 1999); Primariantari, 1999; Zon, 2004; Purdey, 2006; Sidel, 2006 and Thufail, 2007 for more detailed accounts of the riots.

² The violence occurred in the backdrop of widespread economic and political turbulence in the country. Indonesia was particularly hard hit by the devastating impact of the Asian Financial Crisis as rising unemployment, skyrocketing cost of living and fears of chronic food shortages led to escalating social discontent. At the same time, the shackling of the main opposition candidate Megawati Sukarnoputri, the widely unpopular reelection of Suharto as president for a seventh term in March 1998 and a massive wave of well organized demonstrations by university students clamoring for far ranging reforms led to increasingly volatile political dynamics in the country. Read Aspinall et al., 1999; Schwarz, 2000; van Dijk, 2001; Challis, 2001; O’Rourke, 2002 and Aspinall, 2005 for more details of these events.

Order authoritarian regime³ and heralded the installation of a new political system in the country. The May riots also marked the climax of a sustained wave of violence against the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia that had begun with riots in a few Javanese towns in late 1996 and early 1997 before becoming much more frequent and widespread in the early months of 1998.⁴

Violence against the ethnic Chinese community has been a recurrent feature in Indonesia since the Dutch colonial period.⁵ Indeed, there have been several large “waves” or “clusters” of anti-Chinese violence⁶ across the archipelago from time to time including severe outbreaks from 1912-14, 1945-49, 1962-63 and 1965-66, apart from the aforementioned wave in the late 1990s.⁷

As one of the most prominent visible minorities in Indonesia, the ethnic Chinese have long been considered a vulnerable community in the country. Frequently associated with trade and commerce, the Chinese have earned an enviable reputation for their business acumen and entrepreneurial dexterity

³ The “*New Order*” (*Orde Baru*) is the term coined by former Indonesian President Suharto to characterize his regime from 1966-1998.

⁴ Significant incidents of anti-Chinese rioting in late 1996/early 1997 include outbreaks in the towns of Situbondo in East Java, Tasikmalaya and Rengasdengklok- both in West Java and Pekalongan in Central Java. As the disastrous impact of the financial crisis became more apparent in early 1998, there was a series of riots- popularly dubbed as the “food riots”- in many different parts of Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara. These were primarily directed at ethnic Chinese shopkeepers/ traders who were accused of hoarding food and charging exorbitant prices for basic commodities.

⁵ Anti-Chinese violence is defined in this study as any violence in which the Chinese are explicitly targeted because of their perceived ethnic and national origins; thus, the victims are attacked not in their capacities as individuals, but as representatives of their groups. Further, this definition also includes attacks on buildings, properties and institutions associated with the ethnic Chinese community. This is derived from the definition coined by Björge and Witte (1993) in explaining patterns of racist violence in Europe.

⁶ A “wave of violence” is defined as a series of attacks on a targeted community, spread over a vast geographical sphere, occurring over a short space of time and broadly galvanized by a single catalyst or several inter-related catalysts.

⁷ These earlier waves will be discussed briefly later on in this chapter. In addition, there have also been numerous sporadic and localized incidents of anti-Chinese rioting spread across the country from time to time.

(Wertheim, 1964; Bonacich, 1973; Zenner, 1991; Chirot and Reid, 1997). Such dominance in the economy has often seen the Chinese described as a privileged entrepreneurial ethnic minority (Reid, 1997)⁸ and elicited much resentment from competing groups. The visibility of the Chinese is intensified further given that most group members are racially and religiously distinctive from the majority groups in Indonesia. Hence, Arief Budiman (1999) has coined the term “triple minority” to describe Chinese Indonesians. The term is attributed to the group as they are 1) perceived to wield economic influence far disproportionate to group size;⁹ 2) non-Moslems in a country where 88% of the population is Moslem;¹⁰ and 3) considered non-*Pribumi* (non-native) in spite of being present in Indonesia for generations.¹¹ Thus, such attributes make the Chinese susceptible to aggression or likely to be scapegoated, particularly during times of socioeconomic or political turmoil (Budiman, 1999).

Indeed, much of the violence against the Chinese in Indonesia has been explained from the vantage point of scapegoating (Wertheim, 1964; Suryadinata, 1997a). Scapegoating is defined as the act of transferring blame to others

⁸ The undisputed economic influence of the Chinese has resulted in the group being described by terms such as “entrepreneurial ethnic minority,” “middleman minority” and “trading minority” amongst others. These competing terminologies and the reasoning behind using the term “entrepreneurial ethnic minority” in this dissertation will be explained later in the chapter.

⁹ In terms of economic clout, the Chinese are clearly the most powerful group in the country. It is widely believed that they control over 70% of private, corporate, domestic capital, while comprising less than 4% of Indonesia’s total population (Harymurti, 1999; Schwarz, 2000).

¹⁰ The percentage of Moslems is even higher in many of the districts in Java where much of the anti-Chinese violence has taken place. It is estimated that approximately two thirds of all Chinese are Buddhist and much of the remainder, Christians (Suryadinata, 1997a). Some Chinese have converted to Islam, but reliable figures are hard to come by and in any event their numbers are not thought to be substantial (Jacobson, 2005).

¹¹ The term *Pribumi* denotes original inhabitants of the land or “sons of the soil” and encompasses all the indigenous ethnic groups in the country. In contrast, non-*Pribumi* refers to individuals of foreign origin or descent, most notably the ethnic Chinese. Chapter four discusses in detail how this distinction between the *Pribumi* and the non-*Pribumi* was created and then reinforced through a series of discriminatory measures.

(Williams, 1947; Zawadski, 1948; Allport, 1954; Berkowitz, 1959; 1961). It is often directed at groups with “disliked characteristics” (Berkowitz and Holmes, 1959; Berkowitz and Green, 1962) and utilized as an objective strategy to “ensure survival in the face of censure” and to maintain the status quo (Douglas, 1995). Therefore, proponents of the scapegoat thesis say that it is often quite easy, during a national crisis, for opportunistic elites to pin the blame on economically privileged, politically marginalized and racially/religiously distinct minority groups like the Chinese in Indonesia.

This was certainly the case in the late 1990s as the Chinese were subjected to an active, well orchestrated and particularly virulent campaign of scapegoating by a range of economic, political, military and religious elites as Indonesia descended into chaos in the wake of the Asian financial crisis.¹² As the turmoil deepened in early 1998, it became patently clear that certain elements in the regime were deliberately trying to ferment anti-Chinese sentiment (Aspinall et al, 1999; Mietzner, 1999). The ever widening socioeconomic gap was projected as a problem created by the Chinese. Publicizing the stark dichotomy between the rich, (often) Christian Chinese and the poor Moslem *Pribumi* had all the ingredients for stirring up ethnic disharmony; yet, the approach was politically invaluable to certain regime elites as a way of deflecting attention from themselves during times of national crisis (Honna, 2001).¹³ Further, the historical construction of the ethnic Chinese as “disliked outsiders” and entrenched institutional exclusion

¹² The extent of anti-Chinese scapegoating in the late 1990s is articulated in detail in chapter five.

¹³ Fuelling anger against the Chinese enabled concerned regime elites to camouflage damaging accusations of chronic regime corruption, entrenched webs of crony capitalism and increasingly draconian measures to curb political opposition, all of which contributed decisively to the social turmoil.

based on all three aspects of the aforementioned “triple minority” status made the Chinese a logical and convenient target for elite blame mongering.¹⁴

Yet, in spite of its pervasiveness, theoretical explanations built around the concept of scapegoating do not hold up adequately to empirical scrutiny and offer at best an incomplete picture of the trajectory of anti-Chinese rioting in the late *New Order* Indonesia. It is correct to assert that elite orchestrated campaigns of scapegoating contributed to anti-Chinese outbreaks in many different locales; yet, even a cursory empirical survey reveals that the spatial distribution of violence was very uneven. For instance, in spite of the general ferocity of rioting, not every major Chinese community in the country was affected and several areas with quite substantial Chinese populations were virtually untouched from the horrors that befell their counterparts in other regions of the country.¹⁵ Moreover, even within violent locales, the extent, intensity and nature of rioting differed substantially from place to place.

It is crucial to note that almost everywhere in Indonesia, the Chinese were considered to possess ostensibly “scapegoatable” qualities, in that they were perceived as rich, non-Moslem and non-*Pribumi* outsiders. The economic crisis and the accompanying political uncertainty also impacted the whole archipelago. Hence, the broad conditions for the exploitation (scapegoating) of the Chinese

¹⁴ Chapter four engages in a detailed investigation of all three elements in the triple minority status of the Chinese. The chapter illustrates how ethnic, religious and economic differences vis-à-vis the ethnic Chinese were created, reinforced and eventually deeply embedded into the psyche of native Indonesians through a series of discriminatory rules and regulations. This process of institutionalized exclusion began during Dutch colonial rule and intensified in the post-Independence era, especially during Suharto’s time in power.

¹⁵ Several districts in the provinces of West Kalimantan, Riau, Bangka-Belitung and North Sumatra were completely spared of any violence in spite of boasting some of the largest Chinese concentrations in the country. Such spatial variations in anti-Chinese violence in the late *New Order* period will be discussed in more detail in the next section of this chapter.

were more or less uniform across Indonesia in the late 1990s. Predictably, the degree of anti-Chinese scapegoating was indeed quite extensive as elites sought earnestly to deflect blame in a volatile climate; yet, critically, such scapegoating resulted in violence only in some places and not in others. This empirical anomaly highlights the inconsistent impact of elite scapegoating and sets the stage for a more detailed articulation of the principal research puzzle driving this dissertation.

The Problem

Scapegoat theory is often very popular amongst academics and journalists alike to explain outbreaks of violence against vulnerable minority groups. However, as one recent work on scapegoating has commented, much of the attention is focused on cases where there is ready empirical support for the thesis and scholars “all too often fail to examine carefully instances where the theory fails” (Gibson and Howard, 2007). Indeed, as the above brief introduction has outlined, elite engineered campaigns of anti-Chinese scapegoating triggered riots in some locales while conspicuously failing to ignite violence in others. Such empirical inconsistencies suggest that while scapegoating may play an important role, caution needs to be exercised in attributing too much explanatory potential to the concept as it imperfectly explains spatial variations in violence. Further, the term “scapegoating” often tends to be used too loosely in the literature and in the abstract. Thus, in order to make scapegoating a more meaningful analytical category, greater attention needs to be paid to specific mechanisms through which

elite orchestrated campaigns translate into violence at the ground level. Given this, the main research question underlining this dissertation is postulated as follows:

Under what conditions do campaigns of elite scapegoating lead to violence against ethnic minorities?

At a conceptual level, the study aims to answer this question with reference to violence against entrepreneurial ethnic minorities- a widely scapegoated category of people. The dissertation makes use of spatial variations in the patterns of violence against the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in the late *New Order* period from 1996-1998 as its principal case study to understand the erratic and uneven success of elite entrepreneurs in stirring communal unrest. In chapter eight, violent riots against a number of other entrepreneurial ethnic groups are discussed as supplementary cases. Several key concepts used in this dissertation as well as the rationale for case selection are elucidated below.

Entrepreneurial Ethnic Minorities – Ripe for Scapegoating

The term “entrepreneurial ethnic minorities” broadly refers to the presence of immigrant minorities instrumental in playing a critical role in the development of trade, money management and capital accumulation in the host country (Reid, 1997: 34). Such minorities - often created through large scale movements of people across state boundaries in the last few centuries - are renowned (and resented) for superior commercial skills and frequently carry visible markers of identity that make them stand out from majority groups in the country that they reside. Archetypal entrepreneurial ethnic minority groups include the overseas

Chinese in Southeast Asia (notably, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines); Jews in different parts of Europe and Russia; Indians in East Africa, the Caribbean and parts of Asia and the Pacific; Lebanese in West African countries such as Senegal and Sierra Leone; Armenians in Turkey; and Parsis in India.

The groups listed above have also been described by a multitude of different terminologies. These include “trading diaspora” (Cohen, 1971; Curtin, 1984; Betta, 2005; Chaudhury, 2005), “trading minorities” (Wertheim, 1964), “ethno-national diaspora” (Sheffer, 2005) and “middleman minorities” (Blalock, 1967; Bonacich, 1973; Kitano, 1974; Zenner, 1991; Light and Bonacich, 1991). However, none of these terms fit accurately the empirical reality of the ethnic Chinese in modern day Indonesia or that of several of the other groups mentioned above. For instance, most definitions of diaspora allude to continuing affiliation with the homeland (Sheffer, 1986, 2003; Safran, 1991; Cohen, 1997; Brubaker, 2005). Given that a significant percentage of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia have never been to China or maintain any contact with the homeland, labelling the Chinese with terms such as “trading diaspora” or “ethno-national diaspora” would be highly problematic. Similarly, most definitions of “middleman minority”¹⁶ allude to sojourning and a fairly restrictive business sphere. Such definitions are also inaccurate given that large numbers of Chinese have stayed in Indonesia for

¹⁶ The term “middleman minority” is not precisely defined and there is no consensus on the characteristics of such a minority. Blalock (1967) defines the group as “buffers between the ruling class and the masses” either through the provision of luxuries to elites or the extraction of wealth from the masses on behalf of the elites. For Bonacich (1973), the critical element of a middleman group is the engagement of small business activity and other easily liquidated occupations. Zenner (1980) on the other hand puts emphasis on disproportionate group employment in trade and finance.

generations, shown little inclination to go back and considerably expanded and diversified their economic activities over the years. Likewise, any terminology that contains the word “trading” is also problematic as it pigeonholes the Chinese within a particular profession and provides a misleading image of their occupational breakdown. Given such limitations of competing terms, this dissertation prefers to use the nomenclature “entrepreneurial ethnic minority” as it best captures the contextual particularities of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.¹⁷

The presence of entrepreneurial ethnic minorities has often resulted in tensions over matters that range from perceived security threats to concerns about shifting balances of economic and political clout (Weiner, 1978; McLaren, 2003). They are resented for their economic dominance, lack the legitimacy of belonging to the nation as “natives”- in spite of being legally considered as citizens in many cases (Purdey, 2006: 8) - and are often tolerated only for the vital economic roles that they perform; in essence, entrepreneurial minorities are treated as “essential outsiders” (Chirot and Reid, 1997).

As Berkowitz and Green note, such disliked groups become highly vulnerable to be scapegoated when a society becomes frustrated with its inability to deal with a crisis (Berkowitz and Green, 1962). Indeed, apart from the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, several other entrepreneurial groups have also been at the receiving end of violence, especially during times of socioeconomic or political

¹⁷ The term “entrepreneurial ethnic minority” also fits well with many of the other groups under discussion here. Groups such as the Indians in South Africa have diversified their economic activities, have little connection with the homeland and would reject the notion of sojourning, as many of them have been present in South Africa for generations. The dissertation also discusses several instances of pogroms against the Jews in Germany and Russia that took place before the creation of Israel. Thus, clearly, any term that carries the word “diaspora” is not applicable to the Jews in these cases as there was no homeland to affiliate with.

upheaval. For example, a number of pogroms against the Jews in various parts of Europe and Russia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries occurred in the backdrop of acute social turmoil (Fein, 1979; Katz, 1980; Lambroza, 1987; Aronson, 1990, 1991; Judge, 1992; Brustein and King, 2004a; Gilbert, 2006); anti-Chinese riots in the Malaysian capital, Kuala Lumpur in 1969 and anti-Indian riots in Fiji in 2000 took place in the context of unexpectedly strong electoral performances by opposition groups (Slimming, 1969; Lal and Pretes, 2001; Kia Soong, 2007); and large scale violence primarily directed at the Korean community in Los Angeles in 1992 was carried out in the aftermath of the controversial acquittal of four white police officers accused of beating a black motorist (Morrison and Lowry, 1993; Bergesen and Herman, 1998).

Entrepreneurial Ethnic Minorities and Spatial Variations in Violence

It is striking that in spite of the frequency of attacks against entrepreneurial ethnic minorities, not all groups have been subjected to violent rioting. To illustrate, groups such as the Chinese in Russia, Brazilians in Paraguay and Russians in Estonia amongst others are notable for having faced little or no violence (Alexseev, 2003). Even within violent cases, significant variations exist in terms of geographic distribution, intensity, frequency and duration of hostilities; such disparities are observable both between groups and within the same group. Moreover, the experiences of most major entrepreneurial groups have differed markedly from country to country. For instance, the Indians in Trinidad and Mauritius have faced considerably less violence than their counterparts in Guyana, Fiji and Burma (Mahajani, 1960; Yegar, 1972; Stockwell 2003). Variations also

abound in terms of anti-Semitic sentiment; in a study that compared anti-Jewish pogroms in Bulgaria and Romania just before the holocaust, Brustein and King (2004b; 2004c) found that the intensity of violence was markedly lower in Bulgaria.¹⁸ The Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia provide another excellent illustration of countrywide fluctuations in ethnic violence; the Chinese in Indonesia have periodically faced the most egregious levels of violence while their counterparts have locked into an uneasy pact of accommodation in Malaysia, integrated successfully in Thailand and to a lesser degree in the Philippines and faced intermittent discrimination in Vietnam and Burma.¹⁹ Thus, these examples amply demonstrate inter-group differences in the degree of violence faced by major entrepreneurial groups.

Spatial variations in violence can also be discerned within the same group in the same country during a single large cluster of violence. Anti-Semitic violence in Russia in 1905 is a case in point where much of the violence was

¹⁸ Moreover, Helen Fein has also found considerable cross-national variation in Jewish victimization during the holocaust (Fein, 1979).

¹⁹ According to an assessment by the Minority Rights Group International (2000), the Chinese numbered in excess of 25 million people in the Southeast Asian region. With an economic influence far exceeding their numbers, they have lived in various countries of the region for many generations, especially since large scale migrations encouraged by colonial governments in the early 19th century. Yet, the extent of integration of the Chinese into the local communities has diverged sharply. The Chinese in Indonesia have faced intense discrimination, while also being subjected to high levels of outright violence from time to time. The Chinese in Malaysia, like their Indonesian counterparts, have been discriminated against intensely. But unlike in the former case, they have faced low levels of physical violence, apart from the race riots of 1969 (Slimming, 1969). The Chinese in Thailand, in contrast, have arguably enjoyed the smoothest passage amongst all Chinese communities in the region. The apparent ease of integration and assimilation of the Chinese into the very fabric of Thai society marks them out as a notable success story in inter-ethnic accommodation. The Chinese communities in the Philippines and Singapore have also been able to participate in the host society, for the most part on their own terms, infusing it with their cultural contributions and freely expressing a separate identity without fear. The Chinese in Burma, Vietnam and Brunei, however, face a more insecure future and are to varying degrees at risk of state-sponsored or officially tolerated discrimination (Minority Rights Group International, 2000). Thus, it is quite evident that the movements of Chinese people into various South-East Asian countries have resulted in very different outcomes.

concentrated in the south of the country with the province of Chernigov alone accounting for nearly 40% of the 657 pogroms recorded in that year. In contrast, eight other provinces in Russia where the Jews were also found in substantial numbers accounted for less than 15% of all pogroms in 1905 (Lambroza, 1991: 230). Similarly, during the Malaysian riots of 1969, much of the turbulence was centered in Kuala Lumpur and states such as Penang, Perak and Melaka were mostly peaceful in spite of containing similarly large Chinese populations (Comber, 1983). Anti-Indian riots in Burma in the late 1930s began in Rangoon and spread to several other cities, yet as Yegar notes, the degree of violence “varied from place to place and nor was it everywhere in direct relation to the size of the local Moslem [Indian] community” (Yegar, 1972: 37).

As noted earlier, few cases demonstrate intra-group variations during a single major cluster of violence as clearly as anti-Chinese rioting in the late *New Order* Indonesia from 1996-1998. In spite of the breadth and depth of violence, its geographic distribution was highly skewed across the vast Indonesian archipelago with some Chinese communities escaping completely unscathed while many others were caught up in an orgy of rioting. It is to a more detailed examination of the case that this chapter turns its attention next.

Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia

The Chinese are found in many parts of the country with sizable communities on the islands of Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Accurate estimates of the number of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are hard to come by. The Year 2000 Population Census of Indonesia included data on ethnicity (for the first

time since 1930) and this has facilitated attempts to quantify the Chinese in the country. Based on the 2000 Census, analysts have estimated the number of Chinese at approximately 3 million or 1.5% of Indonesia's total population (Suryadinata et al., 2003). However, given the incomplete nature of the census data²⁰ and the criterion of self-identification used as the measure of ethnicity,²¹ this figure is widely disputed as too low and most observers believe that the ethnic Chinese constitute around 3% of Indonesia's total population (Mackie, 2005).²²

There have been several major waves of prolonged and widespread violence against the ethnic Chinese and these have been interspersed with numerous sporadic attacks from time to time. The earliest sustained episode of anti-Chinese rioting occurred in 1740 in Batavia (present day Jakarta) and led to the deaths of thousands as the Dutch clamped down on an uprising by the Chinese (Coppel, 2003). Anti-Chinese sentiment became more frequent during the latter

²⁰ The collection of demographic data based on ethnic identity was a major improvement in the Year 2000 Census. The census data has been published in aggregated tabular form at the provincial level. However, these publications only include data based on ethnic affiliation for the 8 largest ethnic groups in each province. The Chinese fitted this requirement in only 11 of the 30 provinces in existence at the time (which accounted for 68% of Indonesia's total population). The Chinese are certainly present in many of the remaining 19 provinces, but given that they were not counted as one of the 8 largest groups, there is no reliable published data on the number of ethnic Chinese in these provinces. Based on assumed percentages of Chinese living in the other 19 provinces, Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta (2003) estimate the total number of Chinese living in Indonesia to be around 1.5% of the population (A more detailed explanation of the methodology used is provided in chapter three of their book).

²¹ Self-identification was used as the sole criterion in the definition of ethnic Chinese (or other ethnic groups for that matter) in the 2000 Census. Given that the census was carried out less than two years after the horrific riots of 1998, it is possible that a fairly significant number of Chinese refused to identify themselves as Chinese over fears of possible persecution (Suryadinata et al., 2003; Mackie, 2005).

²² Many discussions on the numerical aspects of the ethnic Chinese have centered on information gleaned from the 1930 population census. Projections and estimations derived from these figures often place the number of Chinese in the country at around 2.5-3% of the total population (Skinner, 1963). Taking into account birth and death rates and net migration, Mackie believes that the above estimate suggested by Suryadinata et al. is too low and that the actual number of Chinese in Indonesia is somewhere in the order of 5 to 6 million or around 3% of the total population (Mackie, 2005).

part of colonial rule, in particular in the formative period of Sarekat Islam –the first major Indonesian nationalist movement- and included countless violent skirmishes across Java from 1912 and 1914 (Bertrand, 2004) and massive rioting in Kudus in 1918 (Chandra, 2002; Purdey, 2006). The Japanese occupation of Indonesia (1942-1945) and the period of the independence struggle (1945-1949) led to a sharp escalation in the number of violent incidents including the massacres of 854 Chinese in Pontianak in October 1943 and 656 Chinese in Tangerang in May 1945 (Yang, 2003; Purdey, 2006:7).

The first protracted bout of rioting in the post-independence phase was the wave of violence that swept across many parts of Java in the early 1960s and took place in the backdrop of several discriminatory anti-Chinese regulations by the government, deteriorating economic conditions and increasing public resentment against the Chinese (Mackie, 1976). Two years later, a foiled coup attempt blamed on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) led to brutal reprisal attacks on the communists, leading to the slaughter of over 500,000 people, out of which approximately 2,000 were believed to be of Chinese origin (Bertrand, 2004). Suharto, who assumed power in the wake of the botched coup, tightened regulations against the Chinese, but there was a comparative lull in sustained anti-Chinese attacks until the massive outbreak of violence in the late 1990s.²³

²³ This is not to say that there was no anti-Chinese violence during Suharto's *New Order* regime, before the mayhem of the late 1990s. Several sporadic incidents of rioting occurred in the early part of the *New Order*, most notably in the cities of Palu in 1973 and in Surabaya, Solo and Makassar in the early 1980s. Further, there was also a large scale anti-Chinese riot in Medan in 1994.

Anti-Chinese Violence in the late New Order: Rationale for Case

Selection

The fundamental concern of this dissertation is to ascertain under what conditions campaigns of elite scapegoating lead to violence against entrepreneurial ethnic minorities. To that extent, an investigation of the patterns of anti-Chinese violence in the late 1990s is ideal for two primary reasons. First, the extent of scapegoating was pervasive as multiple Indonesian elites sought repeatedly to castigate the Chinese for the country's mounting economic and political woes. Much of the blame mongering was done by projecting the Chinese as opportunistic, rich, non-Moslem outsiders bent on furthering their own interests. Notable amongst the purveyors of anti-Chinese diatribes were military elites like Major General Prabowo Subianto, religious leaders such as Ahmad Sumargono and economic elites of the ilk of Adi Sasono.²⁴

Second, in spite of widespread efforts by elite entrepreneurs to stir up violence, their endeavors were successful only in some places and not others. Indeed, spatial variations in violence existed amongst all the major islands of the archipelago as well as at province, district (both cities and regencies)²⁵, sub-

²⁴ Major General Prabowo Subianto was renowned for his deep-seated racial hatred of the Chinese. He often branded the group as traitors and called for their expulsion. Sumargono decried what he saw as the oppression of the Moslem majority by the Chinese and spoke fervently of his dream to build an Islamic nation. Similarly, Sasono slammed the dominance of the Chinese and called for the redistribution of wealth (Scott, 1998; Schwarz, 2000).

²⁵ The highest level of local government in Indonesia is the province. Each province is further divided into districts. These are mainly of two types – rural and urban. The rural districts are known as *Kabupaten* or regencies/villages while their urban counterparts are referred to as *Kotamadya* or municipalities/cities. The principal differences between the two types of districts will be delineated later on in this chapter.

district and neighborhood level.²⁶ Moreover, as the following examples demonstrate, violent loci were not always positively correlated with the size of the local Chinese population.

Out of the principal islands, Java was by far the most conflict-prone while the distribution of violence was more scattered across Sumatra, Kalimantan (the Indonesian part of the island of Borneo) and Sulawesi. At the provincial level, Javanese provinces dominated the high violence stakes with DKI Jakarta, West Java, East Java and Central Java all experiencing major riots. In contrast, the provinces of West Kalimantan in Kalimantan, Riau and Bangka Belitung- both in Sumatra- were largely peaceful in spite of boasting sizable Chinese populations.²⁷ The pattern of rioting was also highly skewed at the district level, in both cities and regencies. The cities of Pangkal Pinang in Bangka Belitung and Pontianak in West Kalimantan were riot-free in spite of the Chinese forming more than 1/5th of the local population in each city.²⁸ Similarly, the regencies of Bengkayang, Sambas, Karimun and Kepulauan Riau (all with Chinese populations in excess of 10%) were non-violent while several regencies, mostly in Java, experienced quite severe outbreaks of rioting despite the Chinese comprising less than 1% of the population.²⁹

²⁶ Each district in Indonesia is divided into sub-districts (*Kecamatan*) and each sub-district is further divided into neighbourhoods (*Kelurahan*). The *Kelurahan* is the lowest administrative division in Indonesia.

²⁷ Based on the Year 2000 Census, the percentage of Chinese in Bangka Belitung, West Kalimantan and Riau was 11.5%, 9.5% and 4% respectively, thus, much higher than the nationwide average of 1.5% estimated by Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta (2003)

²⁸ The Chinese made up 23% of the total population in Pontianak and 21% in Pangkal Pinang.

²⁹ The percentage of ethnic Chinese in the rural districts of Bengkayang and Sambas (both in the province of West Kalimantan) was 24% and 11% respectively while the Chinese comprised more than 15% in both Karimun and Kepulauan Riau. In contrast, the ethnic Chinese were at the receiving end of hostilities in several rural districts in Java such as Kuningan, Majalengka, Jember and Bojonegoro despite comprising less than 1% of the total population.

All of the above examples highlight the fact that some locales attracted violence while many others did not. In addition, spatial variations were often found within each violent locale. This is to say that in a district/region broadly classed as violent, not every sub-district or neighborhood within that particular region was riot-prone; in other words, there were often several pockets of peace amidst the turbulence. For instance, the district of Situbondo was the locus of severe rioting in late 1996. However, a closer look at the trajectory of violence within Situbondo reveals that much of the unrest was concentrated in a handful of sub-districts. Similar patterns were evident from numerous other locales across the country.³⁰

No place illustrates variations within the riot locale better than Jakarta. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the ferocity of rioting in Jakarta was unparalleled, in terms of loss of lives and overall destruction. Yet, even in Jakarta, the trajectory of violence was far from uniform. Indeed, as chapter seven shows, out of 265 neighborhoods (*Kelurahan*) in DKI Jakarta, “only” 76 were caught up in the mayhem. Thus, in spite of its unprecedented brutality, the violence was confined to less than a third of all neighborhoods in the city. As the GIS generated maps in chapter seven reveal, violent neighborhoods were dispersed around the city and the size of the neighborhood level Chinese population seldom bore a positive correlation with rioting.³¹

³⁰ In Situbondo, much of the violence was concentrated in the sub-districts of Asembagus, Besuki, Kota Situbondo, Wonorejo and Ranurejo. Similarly uneven trajectories were found in Karawang, Banyuwangi, Tuban, Medan and of course Jakarta. Chapters seven and eight discuss these variations in more detail.

³¹ Notable examples of large and peaceful “Chinese neighborhoods” include Jelambar Baru in Grogol (Chinese population - 39.5%), Tangki in Tamansari (49.5%), Duri Utara in Tambora (41.5%) and Tanah Seral also in Tambora (37.3%). In sharp contrast, several neighborhoods with

Such stark variations in violence at various levels of disaggregation (ranging from province to neighborhood) within a single group in a single country at a particular period of time (under conditions of near uniform scapegoating) make the late *New Order* anti-Chinese riots an ideal case to examine the effectiveness of scapegoating. Further, the case subjects the scapegoat thesis to a particularly stiff examination as the Chinese in most places in Indonesia were deemed to possess attributes (perceived wealth, religious difference and perceived non-native status) that made them ripe for scapegoating during troubled times; yet, as observed, this elite rhetoric only sometimes resulted in violence.

In addition, this particular case was also chosen for more pragmatic reasons. The *New Order* under Suharto did not allow press freedom on ethno-communal issues with the government instituting its so-called SARA policy.³² As a result, the collection of systematic data and research on ethnic violence was severely curtailed during much of Suharto's reign; hence, a detailed analysis of anti-Chinese violence from 1965-66, for instance, was not possible given the dearth of information. The SARA policy was quickly disbanded after Suharto's fall and the political climate has since become far more conducive to carry out primary research on sensitive topics like anti-Chinese violence.

marginal Chinese presence experienced violent outbreaks including Pondok Labu in Cilandak (Chinese population 0.18%), Mampang Prapatan (0.2%), Jatinegara (0.11%) and Pasar Minggu (0.50 %).

³² SARA was an acronym for ethnic, religious, racial and inter-group differences and these differences were forbidden from being discussed in the public realm (Varshney, et al. 2008).

The Argument

An array of theoretical perspectives has been put forward to explain anti-Chinese outbreaks in Indonesia. These include accounts based on economic dominance of the Chinese (Wertheim, 1964; The Saiuw Giap, 1966; Somers, 1974; Chandra, 2002), elite political maneuvering (Shiraishi, 1997; Chua, 2004), military competition (Berfield and Loveard, 1998; Liong, 2002), racialized state terrorism (Heryanto, 1998), institutional change (Bertrand, 2004), uncertainty over the role of Islam (Sidel, 2006) and cultural legitimization of violence (Hüsken and Jonge, 2002). Apart from these principally mono-causal explanations, several scholars have proposed multi-dimensional arguments that have combined a number of economic, religious and racial factors (Mackie, 1976; Coppel, 2001; Purdey, 2006). Taken together, there is a rich, nuanced and sophisticated wealth of material on anti-Sinicism in Indonesia and offers much theoretical and analytical pluralism to students of the subject.

Chapter two discusses this literature in more detail, but a few brief comments are in order here. First, much of the scholarship focuses on specific incidents of violence; thus, most theoretical arguments remain empirically under-tested across a wide spectrum of cases. Second, most accounts revolve almost exclusively on the phenomenon of violence, apart from the odd cursory mention of a few notable peaceful cities during a particularly virulent period of rioting. Hence, a lack of focus on spatial variations in violence is a significant lacuna in anti-Chinese research. Third, most accounts implicitly or explicitly allude to the role of scapegoating and acknowledge its widespread prevalence. Yet, there is an almost complete absence of rigorous theorizing of the concept. Moreover, neither

the question of why scapegoating only sometimes triggers violence nor specific mechanisms through which scapegoating leads to violent outbursts is addressed adequately in the literature.

Theorizing Scapegoating

Classical theories of scapegoating rely heavily on the principle of blame displacement. Using frustration-aggression theory, scapegoat theorists posit that in times of national crisis people instinctively seek groups upon whom they assign blame and displace aggression for their misfortunes (Berkowitz, 1959).³³ Drawing on the “prior dislike hypothesis,” Berkowitz and Holmes (1959) assert that such displaced aggression is generalized to groups whose perceived characteristics result in their being disliked. In other words, the object serving as the target for aggression usually has certain “stimulus qualities” or negative attributes that attract resentment (Berkowitz and Green, 1962). Therefore, the choice of a target for displaced anger is not random and explains why certain groups are scapegoated over others.

It is evident that the scapegoating of the Chinese in Indonesia followed a similar pattern and was carried out through pointed references to disliked characteristics; in other words, by drawing attention to the three elements in Budiman’s triple minority status (economic dominance, religious difference and

³³ Frustration-aggression theory (originally formulated by Dollard in 1939) posits that aggression is essentially an outcome resulting from built-up frustration. The resulting aggression can be of two types – direct or displaced. Direct aggression implies that the source/thwarting agent of the frustration is directly attacked while in displaced aggression, frustration is taken out on outlets or substitutes in the absence of the direct source or the improbability of attacking the direct source as it may be deemed too powerful (Berkowitz and Green, 1962). It is this displaced aggression that is often invoked in theories of scapegoating.

racial distinctiveness). Decades of institutionalized discrimination by successive regimes revolved around these three elements and facilitated the characterization of the Chinese as rich, non-Moslem outsiders; this, in turn, crystallized notions of the Chinese as a “disliked minority” in Indonesia and made it easier to displace blame on the group during troubled times.

However, as already observed, theories based on displacement of aggression provide limited explanatory potential in accounting for spatial variations in violence. Indeed, I contend that much of the analytical “looseness” of conventional theories of scapegoating stems from their over reliance on the principle of displacement. Moreover, the notion of displaced aggression sits uneasily with the choice of target groups based on disliked characteristics and a priori indicates a fundamental contradiction. As Horowitz (2001: 138) observes, if aggression is directed against a group with previously disliked characteristics, it may not be entirely displaced and may involve elements of direct aggression as well. Further, pure displacement of aggression is difficult to prove and in actual practice, a great deal of ethnic aggression appears to be both direct and displaced with many instances where the source of the frustration and its outlet are linked (Horowitz, 1973).

Indeed, a quick glance at the riots of the late *New Order* reveals that in actual practice the lines between displaced and direct aggression against the Chinese were often quite blurred. Notions of pure displacement would suggest that the Chinese were not the root cause of societal discontent of the late 1990s, but were merely targeted as it was not possible to direct anger at the actual

thwarting agent.³⁴ However, such a portrayal is not accurate for three reasons: first, the pointed nature of scapegoating hinted at an element of directness. This made it easier to link the Chinese with the origins of the unrest. Indeed, in many violent locales the Chinese were viewed as being at least partially (if not wholly) responsible for Indonesia's social crises, hence deserving of retribution; second, even assuming that the Chinese were not directly responsible for the crisis, their perceived close connections with multiple regime elites made the group guilty by association; and third, given that not all Chinese were attacked equally, grounds of displacement alone are inadequate to explain variations in violence.

Therefore, it is likely that aggression against the Chinese involved a combination of direct and displaced elements; this provides a useful point of departure to understand the inconsistent impact of elite scapegoating. The principle of blame displacement was decidedly in evidence as self-interested elites sought to deflect attention from themselves by painting the Chinese as the villains of the piece. Yet, the deliberate specificity with which blame was displaced- by amplifying the triple minority complex of the Chinese- also made it possible to envision the group as bearing some direct responsibility for Indonesia's woes.

Following this, I argue that the key to unraveling the puzzle of why scapegoating only sometimes led to violence lies in understanding how the three main attributes invoked in such campaigns of scapegoating were perceived across

³⁴ For instance, such a characterization would suggest that the actual source of Indonesia's economic and political woes of the late 1990s was the regime itself. The economic chaos was due to chronic mismanagement and entrenched webs of patronage and corruption and political discontent was primarily down to Suharto's increasingly repressive measures against the opposition. However, given the state's overwhelming reach of power, it was quite improbable for societal actors to channel their aggression against the state. Instead, that anger was taken out on the Chinese who served as a convenient, vulnerable and easily accessible outlet for societal anger.

the many locales in Indonesia where the Chinese were present in non-trivial numbers. I contend that violence was more likely in areas where elite characterizations of the Chinese as rich, non-Moslem, non-*Pribumi* outsiders mirrored the respective local conditions. For example, in certain locales, the non-Moslem orientation of the Chinese could be more visible due to the presence of prominent Chinese churches. In such places, elite rhetoric castigating the Chinese as Christian conspirators plotting the downfall of Suharto and bent on illegal proselytization is likely to have a more explosive impact.

In other words, the Chinese are at their most vulnerable when local conditions “match” the elite rhetoric and make such rhetoric appear real and reasonable; thus, certain local conditions increase the “scapegoatability” of the Chinese during times of crisis. In turn, this magnifies the threat/insecurity perceived by *Pribumi* groups (Horowitz, 1985; Posen, 1993; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Figueiredo and Weingast, 1999) and provides focal point/s for mobilization against the Chinese “other” (Kaufman, 2001; Petersen, 2001). Hence, the framework being proposed here suggests that elite scapegoating will succeed and lead to violence against the ethnic Chinese if the three attributes invoked in the scapegoating process resonate at the local level in a series of context-bound ways.

Next, I briefly hypothesize specific mechanisms through which the religious, racial and economic attributes in the triple minority complex magnify the “scapegoatability” of the Chinese and consequently augment the possibility of violence in diverse settings across the Indonesian archipelago.

Activation of Ethnic Scapegoating

Several studies have shown that greater ethnic heterogeneity of society augments the likelihood of ethnic violence (Sambanis, 2001; Barron et al., 2004; Gurr et al., 2005; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). Olzak (1992) asserts that competition for economic and political resources between polarized ethnic groups can engender tensions and expounds the conditions under which this is more likely.³⁵ In an ethnically heterogeneous Indonesian context, the nature of that competition and resulting tension is likely to be two pronged; between different *Pribumi* ethnic groups (who compose the bulk of the population) and between the Chinese (who wield economic influence) and the *Pribumi*. The nature of such a two-pronged contestation and how it enhances the vulnerability of the Chinese is briefly explained below.

Local Mechanisms that Heighten Ethnic “Scapegoatability”

1) Two-pronged ethnic competition: Pribumi versus Pribumi and Pribumi versus Chinese

Much of the literature on intra-*Pribumi* ethnic tensions in the country during the *New Order* focuses on the Javanese versus non-Javanese dichotomy.³⁶ Javanese dominance in the top civilian and military echelons became increasingly stronger after independence and acquired near hegemonic status during the *New*

³⁵ Olzak (1992) and Olzak and Nagel (1982) specify a few conditions under which ethnic competition is most likely to lead to conflict; these include rapid rates of urbanization, economic crises, sudden in-migrations and expansion of the secondary and tertiary sectors of society

³⁶ The Javanese are by some distance the largest ethnic group in the country. According to the 2000 Population Census, they made up 41% of the total population in the country.

Order (Gregory, 1979).³⁷ This led to growing resentment amongst the non-Javanese.³⁸ In a regime known for its embedded neo-patrimonialism, ethnic tensions abounded as different groups sought to curry favour with the establishment (Webster, 2007).

Apart from competing with each other, *Pribumi* groups are also in constant competition with the Chinese, given the latter's economic superiority. Thus, in more ethnically divided locales, the likelihood of this two pronged ethnic competition – *Pribumi-Pribumi* and *Pribumi-Chinese* - is higher. In other words, the more fragmented a locale in terms of ethnic composition, the greater the probability of ethnically distinct *Pribumi* groups coming into contact with each other as well as with the economically dominant, *non-Pribumi* Chinese over limited resources. In turn, this augments the likelihood of violent anti-Chinese reactions as in a very polarized setting different *Pribumi* groups have to contend with the disproportionate economic clout of the Chinese.³⁹

Activation of Economic Scapegoating

The exponential expansion of the Indonesian economy in the late 1980s and the early 1990s is well documented (Firman, 1998; Hill, 2000). Given greater

³⁷ A series of factional struggles and armed rebellions mainly in the outer islands led to the ousting of many non-Javanese officers and contributed to the decreasing heterogeneity of the Indonesian army.

³⁸ The Sundanese in particular were often displeased with Javanese preponderance at all levels of governance. Suharto's rule of Indonesia as a self-proclaimed Javanese king, the extolling of Javanese culture and the misuse of Javanese symbols and traditions to maintain his hold on power also stirred dislike and apathy amongst the non-Javanese.

³⁹ The question could be posed here why there is only violence against the Chinese and not between the different *Pribumi* groups that are also in competition for resources. Multiple *Pribumi* groups might be competing for the same resources, but in the absence of historically constructed and deeply embedded hostile relationships between them and in the presence of an economically dominant Chinese community, violence between different *Pribumi* groups is unlikely. Chapter two discusses this in more detail.

access to capital and close connections with influential regime figures, Chinese business elites were particularly well placed to capitalize on this period of unprecedented economic boom. As a result, Chinese enterprises proliferated rapidly in cities and towns around the country and soon controlled many ostensible markers of economic growth such as bank outlets, department stores, shopping malls and factories (Siegel, 2000).

Given this context, it is hardly surprising that stereotyped notions of Chinese economic superiority often formed the very life-blood of much anti-Chinese elite rhetoric in the late *New Order*. Such characterizations, I argue, were likely to resonate more vividly at the local level through at least two different mechanisms.

Local Mechanisms that Heighten Economic “Scapegoatability”

1) Visible wealth of the Chinese

I argue that economic resentment against the Chinese is likely to be greater in locales where the contrast between Chinese prosperity and *Pribumi* impoverishment is brought into sharper focus. This is particularly likely to be the case in poorer urban areas.

Indonesia’s economic boom inevitably attracted a massive wave of migrants (especially into the more urban areas) in search of better opportunities. However, the fruits of economic development were unevenly distributed and many cities in particular were soon awash with a frustrated underclass –the urban poor (Firman, 1999). As the economy tumbled into freefall in 1997/98, cost of

living skyrocketed rates of urban unemployment shot up sharply and the discontent of the urban poor magnified.

Hence, locales where visible markers of Chinese prosperity (such as shopping malls and department stores) and significant levels of societal poverty coexist side by side are particularly volatile as they serve to amplify entrenched perceptions of acute group level inequalities.

2) Locales undergoing rapid development

As the Indonesian economy blossomed in the 1980s and a strategy of export-oriented industrialization took hold, large scale developmental projects were extended further into the rural hinterland. On the back of this wave of modernization, significant progress was made in education, healthcare and other human development indicators in many parts of rural Indonesia. However, modernization also led to an expansion of Chinese economic activity in many rural locales where the *Pribumi* had been long entrenched. This brought the Chinese increasingly into contact with a burgeoning rural Moslem middle class.

Thus, I argue, that Chinese communities living in the more developed rural areas were particularly vulnerable as the economic crisis escalated in 1998. In such locales, resentment against the economically dominant Chinese grew as an increasingly educated/skilled rural middle class struggled to make ends meet in the context of rising competition and soaring food prices.

Activation of Religious Scapegoating

Indonesian Islam is distinguished by its heterogeneity and scholars have put forward many different typologies to tease out variants (Geertz, 1960; Woodward, 2001; Riddell, 2002).⁴⁰ In addition, Abdurrahman Wahid, who became president of Indonesia in 1999, identified three main camps in Indonesian Islam; namely neo-modernists, exclusivists and a floating majority in the middle for whose support the other two groups compete fiercely (Wahid, 2001). Neo-modernists call for Islamic values and ethics and put emphasis on the essence of Islamic teaching. They are very inclusive and vehemently oppose efforts to use Islam as a political tool. Exclusivists fall on the opposite end of the spectrum; they complain of discrimination against Moslems and stress the urgent need to redress inequalities. Steeped in Islamic ideology, exclusivists call for Islam to occupy a more pervasive and influential role in state and society. They are well known for their withering criticism of the Chinese and the Christians for having enjoyed disproportionate economic clout and argue that these groups have been “depriving Moslems of the political dominance they feel they deserve” (Schwarz, 2000: 331). Further, the exclusivists also harbour fears (at times bordering on paranoia) over the possible “Christianization” of Indonesia.

I borrow from Wahid’s typology and argue that violence against the Chinese was more likely in locales where exclusivist elements felt more threatened by the Chinese. I hypothesize that this primarily happened in two ways.

⁴⁰ See chapter two for a more detailed discussion on these typologies.

Local Mechanisms that Heighten Religious “Scapegoatability”

1) Greater visibility of symbols of non-Moslem worship

Suharto’s wooing of Islam in the early 1990s saw Christians being gradually replaced from the core of the regime. Thus, the growing politicization of Islam in the late *New Order* increased tensions between the two religions. Exclusivist Moslem groups in particular saw Suharto’s about turn as a golden opportunity to reverse past injustices and felt empowered and gratified by the growing concessions granted to Islam by the regime (Bertrand, 2004; 90). In this context, elite rhetoric that accentuated the non-Moslem aspect of the Chinese was especially problematic in locales where religious symbols associated with the Chinese (particularly Christian Chinese) were more visible. Such visibility not only increased fears perceived by exclusivists elements (of increasing Christianization in a rapidly changing Indonesia), but also provided focal points for anti-Chinese mobilization (Siegel, 2000; Bertrand, 2004; Sidel, 2006).⁴¹

2) Sites of Islamic piety

Certain regions in Indonesia are informally referred to as *Kota Santri* (devout cities). They are typically renowned for containing dense networks of mosques and Islamic schools, high levels of Islamic associational activity and are

⁴¹ This argument assumes some degree of conflation between the Chinese and the Christians. Yet, sometimes it is analytically difficult to separate anti-Chinese violence from anti-Christian violence. As Allievi (2003) notes, it is possible that in the absence of alternative modes of association for a particular group, places of worship for that group assume added significance and consequently make them more visible to opposing groups. During the *New Order* period, the Chinese were banned from any political activity and indeed forbidden from any form of associational activity. Further, as Confucianism was banned as an officially sanctioned religion, many Chinese converted to Christianity. In this context, it is plausible that the main pole of aggregation for the Chinese was the place of worship.

often graced by charismatic religious leaders. I argue that ethnic Chinese living in such “predominantly pious Moslem communities” were more vulnerable to anti-Chinese religious diatribes that repeatedly emphasized Chinese/Christian repression of Indonesia’s religious majority (Sidel, 2006:102).

Research Design

This section outlines in brief the methodological framework used in this dissertation. The study adopts a mixed methods approach that consists of three main components: 1) quantitative data and statistical methods 2) qualitative data in the form of surveys, interviews and secondary source material and 3) geo-spatial analysis using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) technology. The benefits of methodological pluralism (or using a mixed methods approach) in social science research are well documented (Morse, 1991; Creswell, 2003; Tashakkori and Tedlie, 2003; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Such a triangulation of methods is also appropriate given the complexity of the phenomenon under investigation in this research.

Quantitative Methods

The study aims to tease out spatial variations in anti-Chinese violence in the late *New Order* Indonesia at three different units of analysis (urban district, rural district and neighborhood) through the aid of three datasets constructed at the respective spatial aggregations.

Units of Analysis

District Level –Urban and Rural

The highest level of local government in Indonesia is the province. Each province is sectioned into districts. These can broadly be divided into two main categories – urban and rural districts. Urban districts are known as cities or *Kotamadya* while their rural counterparts are referred to as regencies or *Kabupaten*. Both types of districts enjoy similar levels of administrative power with their own local government and legislative body. However, there are substantial differences between the two types. Urban districts or cities are relatively small in size, densely populated and contain economies geared towards the secondary and tertiary sectors. Rural districts or regencies in contrast are much larger in size, more sparsely populated and dominated by largely agriculture-based economies. Given such vast disparities, this research treats cities and regencies as conceptually distinct spatial aggregations.

At the city level, this study uses a dataset of 56 different cities out of which 25 cities experienced violent anti-Chinese riots in the late *New Order*. The regency level dataset on the other hand consists of 81 regencies out of which 35 were coded for violent anti-Sinicism. Both cities and regencies were chosen on the basis of a minimum threshold of Chinese and the logic used in the construction of datasets is explained in greater detail in chapter three.

Neighborhood Level: Neighborhoods in Jakarta

District level studies are useful to ascertain variations between peaceful and violent regions. However, as observed earlier, marked spatial variations in

violence existed even within broadly violent locales. The best exemplar of this is Jakarta where in spite of the sheer brutality of rioting in May 1998, less than a third of the neighborhoods in the city were affected. Thus, this study uses the neighborhood (*Kelurahan*) in Jakarta as its final unit of analysis. The analysis is based on a dataset that includes all 265 neighborhoods in the DKI Jakarta region and enables a systematic undertaking of the trajectories of violence *within* a single “violent episode.”

The use of different spatial aggregations paves the way for a more rigorous testing of the theoretical framework advanced in this dissertation and provides an opportunity to test whether critical explanatory variables retain their significance across different levels.

Definitions of key concepts, the operationalization of the main variables and the primary data sources used in the quantitative segment of the study are described in detail in chapter three.

Qualitative Methods

The quantitative study was supplemented by several sources of qualitative data. Survey questionnaires were handed out to Chinese and *Pribumi* segments of the populace and generated 77 responses in all out of which 46 were Chinese respondents while the other 31 belonged to various *Pribumi* groups. The Chinese respondents came from a random sample distributed mostly in Jakarta and in the West Javanese capital of Bandung and encompassed people from different social strata. Most *Pribumi* responses were obtained from a non-random sample of post-

graduate students at the State Islamic Universities in Jakarta and Yogyakarta.⁴² In addition, I also conducted 31 in-depth open-ended interviews in Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Semarang and Montreal with academics specializing in Chinese-Indonesian studies, journalists and several leading members of prominent Chinese-Indonesian associations.

Geo-Spatial Analysis

This study utilizes geographic information systems (GIS) technology to spatially map patterns of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia.⁴³ In essence, GIS technology is often used to capture, store, analyze and present attributes that are spatially referenced. Thus, GIS is an immensely useful tool in interpreting and visualizing data and in uncovering patterns and relationships which many not be readily apparent otherwise.

While geospatial analysis has been in use in social science for some time, most studies have been related to voting behavior (O'Loughlin, 2005). The application of GIS in conflict studies remains limited, but increasingly more and more studies have made use of GIS and assorted forms of spatial methodology (Gleditsch and Ward, 2001; Buhaug and Gates, 2002; Gleditsch, 2002; Starr, 2002; Ward and Gleditsch, 2002, O'Loughlin, 2005; Buhaug and Lujala, 2005; Raleigh

⁴² I was attached as a visiting fellow at the State Islamic University in Jakarta from February to July in 2006 and spent a further month there in August 2007. The university catered exclusively to Moslems and the respondents were drawn from the Islamic Inter-disciplinary Studies (IIS) Program.

⁴³ The GIS system used in this dissertation is ARC GIS, developed and supplied by the Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI). It is currently one of the most widespread commercial GIS systems in use globally.

and Hegre, 2005). The use of GIS in the study of conflict has also facilitated better data generation at the sub-national level (Buhaug and Lujala, 2005).

In this study, I generate separate GIS maps at the provincial and district levels in Indonesia as well as at the neighborhood level in Jakarta. GIS also has the facility where spatial data can be integrated with data on various other attributes of the phenomena under investigation. This enabled me to make my large-N datasets GIS compatible and allowed me to visually represent various relationships between key explanatory variables in both violent and peaceful locales.

Significance of Study

The significance of this research is manifold. First, the study highlights the importance of disaggregating the unit of analysis in conflict studies. Most violent events are often clustered spatially and temporally. Existing research practice often tends to take the whole cluster as a single event (King, 2004). However, as this study seeks to demonstrate, the extent of spatial variations in violence within a single group, in the same country and at a single point in time underscores the dangers of such homogenization and illustrates the importance of delving “inside” the violent episode (Kalyvas, 1999; Petersen, 2001; Beissinger, 2002; Wood, 2003; Kalyvas, 2006). Disaggregation also has the added benefit of expanding the number of cases available for comparative large-N work and facilitates a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics that lead to violence in some places and not others (King, 2004).

Second, this research highlights the salience of local cleavages, pinpoints the drawbacks of focusing solely on broader structural factors and stresses the interaction between macro and micro-foundations of violence (Das, 1990; Tambiah, 1996; Kalyvas, 2003). Further, it exposes the limitations of mono-causal explanations and emphasizes the need to develop a multi-faceted explanation for a more complete depiction of the patterns of violence. Third, the framework proposed here attempts to theorize the concept of elite scapegoating. Most studies that focus on violence against entrepreneurial minorities implicitly or explicitly acknowledge the role of scapegoating. Yet, the concept is used too loosely and the question of why scapegoating only sometimes leads to violence is seldom addressed in the literature. This study seeks to redress that balance by delineating specific mechanisms through which self-interested ethnic entrepreneurs may succeed in inciting violence at the local level.

Organization of Study

This dissertation consists of eight other chapters. Chapter two sketches the theoretical and analytical skeleton of the study and shows how it relates to the extant literature on anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia. The chapter interrogates the concept of scapegoating and delineates specific causal mechanisms that increase the “scapegoatability” of particular Chinese communities. Chapter three lays out the methodological framework used in the dissertation; the chapter surveys the multi-method approach advocated here, defines key concepts and terms and operationalizes relevant variables.

Chapter four discusses the historical construction of the Chinese in Indonesia as a “disliked minority.” Through a detailed examination of the three elements in the “triple minority” status and a primary focus on discriminatory rules and regulations, the chapter explains how ethnic, economic and religious differences vis-à-vis the ethnic Chinese were cultivated, reinforced and eventually deeply embedded over successive regimes. Chapter five is divided into two main sections and provides the immediate context for the violence of the late *New Order*. The first part of the chapter briefly outlines the multiple economic, political and social crises that engulfed Indonesia in the late 1990s. This is followed in the second part by a discussion on how self-interested Indonesian elites sought to deflect attention from themselves by embarking on a well-orchestrated and systematic campaign of scapegoating against the ethnic Chinese as Indonesia plunged deeper and deeper into turmoil.

Chapter six presents the main empirical findings at the district level- for both cities and regencies. The quantitative findings are presented first and this is followed by a deeper qualitative analysis that aims to flesh out how critical explanatory variables played out at the ground level. The chapter also tests for alternative explanations and discusses different causal dynamics in cities and regencies. Chapter seven presents the main findings at the neighborhood level in Jakarta and is primarily organized along very similar lines to chapter six.

Chapter eight tests the generalizability of the argument and seeks to apply the theoretical framework to comparable cases of violence against several other entrepreneurial ethnic minorities. Cases were chosen on the basis of the extent of scapegoating and the degree of spatial variations in violence. Chapter nine

concludes the study by briefly recapitulating the main findings and discussing the dynamics of a few notable peaceful regions and how they relate to the theoretical claims advanced here. The chapter also briefly outlines the changes in Indonesia in the Post-Suharto period and their implications for the ethnic Chinese in the country.

CHAPTER TWO

Understanding Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia: Constructing a Theoretical Framework

Chapter one provided a brief summary of the main theoretical argument advanced in this study. This chapter aims to build on it by laying out the theoretical and analytical framework in greater depth. Specifically, the framework is designed to explicate why some Chinese communities in Indonesia are more vulnerable to ethnic scapegoating than others. More broadly, the chapter also aims to provide a general theoretical lens to understand under what conditions opportunistic elite entrepreneurs are likely to succeed in triggering political violence.

The first part of the chapter surveys the extant literature on anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia and identifies the main strengths and weaknesses of the said literature. The latter part of the chapter builds on this literature, and seeks to construct a detailed theoretical framework to explain the inconsistent impact of elite scapegoating in unleashing violence against the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.

Surveying the Literature on Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia

A wide variety of competing theoretical strands have been put forward to explain the prevalence of anti-Chinese outbreaks in Indonesia. These range from economic resentment towards middlemen Chinese to elite political manipulation and from racialized state terrorism to accusations of the Chinese being a fifth column for Beijing.

Several scholars have relied on the primacy of economic factors to explain the generation of resentment and conflict against the ethnic Chinese. Wertheim (1964) for instance posits economic competition and the middleman minority¹ role of the Chinese as the single most decisive factor in causing anti-group rioting. Middlemen Chinese often act as a “buffer” between the elites and the public and are frequently victimized during times of economic and social strife –both by elites, who find it useful to scapegoat the Chinese to deflect attention from themselves and by the masses, who find a convenient outlet in these minorities to vent their frustration and anger. In a similar vein to Wertheim, Siauw Giap (1966) and Somers (1974) attribute economic competition between Chinese and Indonesian businessmen as a crucial factor in fostering violence against the group, but Somers falls short of arguing economic factors as the sole determinant of such violence and also highlights the importance of other variables.² Relative deprivation (Gurr, 1993) - in terms of significant wage inequalities between the indigenous and the Chinese- is the main causal factor for Chandra (2002) in explaining anti-Chinese violence in the early 20th century.³

By and large, economic explanations such as Wertheim’s overemphasize the centrality of economic factors and are unable to explain cases within

¹ The term “middleman minority” is not precisely defined and there is no consensus on the characteristics of such a minority with competing definitions put forward by a variety of scholars (Blalock, 1967; Bonacich, 1973; Zenner, 1980; 1991). These alternative definitions were discussed in chapter one.

² She also argues that factors such as religion, tribalism and nationalism also played a part in rousing anti-Sinicism.

³ Relative deprivation is broadly defined as the perceived difference between “value expectation” –the material conditions that an individual believes he should achieve and “value utility”- the material conditions that an individual believes he will achieve. Value expectations are conceptualized in comparison with another referent group –often a different ethnic group. Mancini (2005) analyzes horizontal inequalities (between group inequalities) at the district level in Indonesia and provides further support for the relative deprivation thesis. However, Mancini’s work is not specifically focused on the Chinese, but in general on collective violence in Indonesia.

Indonesia as well as in other countries in Southeast Asia where the economic functions of the Chinese have been similar, but levels of violence are very different and quite often much more infrequent. Moreover, Coppel (1983), Sidel (2006) and others have highlighted several instances where the trigger for anti-Chinese violence was manifestly not economic.⁴ Further, in the present context, it is debatable whether middleman minority theories are applicable to the Chinese in Indonesia as many of the Chinese have been present in the country for generations and do not see themselves as “sojourners”- which is a necessary attribute of the term as conceptualized by the likes of Bonacich (1973).

Other scholars have relied on instrumental accounts of elite political maneuvering of popular sentiment to help explain violence against the Chinese. Shiraishi (1997) observes how the Dutch elite manipulated social sentiment during the latter part of the colonial period and fostered anti-Chinese resentment with a view to diverting attention and momentum away from the burgeoning nationalist movement. Chua (2004) asserts that calculated and very deliberate anti-Chinese policies of the *New Order* regime “redefined, perpetuated and instrumentalized the Chinese problem” and depicted the entire Chinese minority as economically privileged which left them vulnerable to social backlash during times of economic decline. Themes of elite factionalism/competition (Berfield and Loveard, 1998), racialized state terrorism (Heryanto, 1998b), and elite manipulation/military involvement/government complicity (Siegel, 1998; Lindsay

⁴ Coppel for instance cites an outbreak of anti-Chinese violence in the Northern Sulawesi capital of Manado as being precipitated by an insulting remark made by a Chinese against Prophet Muhammad. He further notes that another outburst of anti-Chinese violence in Surabaya was sparked off by the execution of some Indonesian marines by the Singapore government (Coppel, 1983: 28)

2001; Collins, 2002; Liong, 2002; Panggabean and Smith, 2008) feature conspicuously in several other instrumental accounts of anti-Chinese violence.

Such instrumentalist expositions undoubtedly help to shed light on the politicized nature of anti-Chinese violence. For instance, many of the narratives of the May 98 riots in Jakarta insinuate the involvement of Prabowo Subianto and several of his fellow military cronies; yet total reliance on factors of elite manipulation leads to incomplete accounts and insufficiently explains spatial variations in the patterns of rioting within Jakarta and indeed elsewhere. Further, overt state complicity was much less in evidence in many of the “food riots” in various parts of the country in early 1998 where the degree of “spontaneity” of riots seemed greater (Mackie, 1999).

Jacques Bertrand offers an historical institutionalist explanation to account for patterns of ethnic conflict. Specifically, violence tends to occur during certain “critical junctures” of institutional change where renegotiation of national models and state institutions take place as ethnic groups contest their terms of inclusion in the Indonesian nation (Bertrand, 2004; 2006). The utility of such a broad institutional approach is that it offers a convincing argument for the temporal clustering of violence, but the account is less persuasive in its ability to explain spatial variations in violence during the course of each critical juncture.

John Sidel’s book on riots and pogroms (2006) engages the broader sociological and historical context to explain the shifting nature of religious violence in Indonesia. The first part of the book deals with violence against the Chinese and he notes that riots occur during periods of heightened ambiguity and uncertainty with regard to the position of Islam in the country vis-à-vis class

relations and access to state power. Sidel's account is nuanced and the framework presented in the book highly plausible, yet, the labeling of anti-Chinese violence as primarily religious violence overemphasizes the centrality of religion and downplays the economic and ethnic dimensions of the Chinese.

Some accounts have revolved around notions of an inherently violent culture in Indonesia that creates conducive conditions for the manifestation of conflict. Hüsken and Jonge's (2002) edited volume is notable in this respect and offers several contributions that underscore the cultural legitimization of violence in certain contexts. However, if violence has deep historical roots in Indonesia and people display an intrinsic proclivity to "run amok," conflict should be far more widespread and not localized to certain places as some empirical evidence suggests (Varshney et al., 2004).⁵

The salience of religious difference is invoked in a few analyses and Ocorandi (1998) notes that amidst the violence of the late *New Order* period, the province of Bali (with its predominantly Hindu population), Kalimantan with its Dayak (largely animist) population and the primarily Christian cities of Tapanuli and Manado were largely devoid of any anti-Chinese rioting. In a similar vein, the salience of Islam is invoked in a comparative study of Chinese and Arab middlemen traders in Java (Coppel, 2002)⁶ where the author attributes the lack of

⁵ In a large N study of collective violence in Indonesia from 1990-2003, Varshney and others suggest that conflict is very much localized and concentrated in Indonesia; they observe that more than 80% of the deaths in the period under study occurred in 15 districts where less than 7% of the total Indonesian population lived.

⁶ Similarly, Budiman (2001a) describes a survey done in the Central Java town of Tegal where *Pribumis* were asked whether they found the Arabs or the Chinese to be more patronizing or condescending in their daily interactions with the *Pribumi*. Most respondents answered "Arabs" and when subsequently asked what accounted for the lack of violence against the Arabs, confluence in religion was put forward as a central explanatory factor.

violence against the Arabs to their identification as fellow Moslems and affiliation with the strongly orthodox (*Santri*) Javanese trading class.

The theoretical approaches outlined above have all emphasized the centrality of one particular causal mechanism. Scholars such as Mackie (1976), Heryanto (1998a), Coppel (2001) and Purdey (2006) argue against the presentation of a single “master narrative” to account for anti-Chinese rioting and insist that the phenomenon under investigation is so complex and nuanced that monolithic, simplified explanations only capture a part of the dynamics in operation. Instead they argue for multi-faceted explanations for a more complete representation of violence. According to Mackie (1976), given the inadequacies of over-generalized explanations, it is more fruitful to develop a three-fold categorization of violence that identifies predisposing factors (causes of racial antagonism), restraining factors (that mitigate the overt expression of violence) and precipitating factors (immediate triggers of violence).⁷ Similarly, Coppel (2001) counts xenophobia, economic competition, class-based resentment and political/cultural factors amongst possible reasons for anti-Sinicism. Heryanto (1998) is also receptive to the possibility of multiple influences in engineering conflict and argues for the importance of placing violence in a broader political

⁷ Predisposing factors according to Mackie include racial and socio-cultural differences, aggravation of socio-cultural differences by the Dutch, ambivalent attitudes of Chinese-Indonesians towards Indonesian nationalism, common public perceptions of the Chinese as economically dominant, economic competition between Chinese and indigenous businessmen and suspicions of the Chinese being a potential fifth column for Beijing. Restraining factors include the desire of most Indonesian elites to present a non-racialized image, doctrine of legal equality as enshrined in the constitution, necessity for good inter-state relations with China and the desire to minimize economic costs as a result of harassment of the Chinese and the need to maintain a favourable business climate in order to attract FDI. Finally, precipitating factors include political instability, provocation by the Chinese government, economic and social downturns, open expressions of cultural and ethnic distinctiveness and the flaunting of wealth by the Chinese (Mackie, 1976: 129-137).

and cultural context. Along similar lines, Purdey emphasizes institutionalized racial prejudice against the Chinese, but asserts that political, economic and religious elements are also needed for a detailed explanation of the timing of violence (Purdey, 2006).

Mackie and others are essentially correct in asserting that monolithic explanations of violence are insufficient to tease out the complexities of anti-Chinese rioting; further, they note that rather than looking for broad patterns, each incident has to be evaluated meticulously on its own merit. There is some justification for this line of thinking, however, one must be cautious not to overstep the boundaries as Mackie does in enumerating a very long list of possible causal factors, which, whilst contributing to the creation of empirically rich accounts, leads to conceptual ambiguity and takes away from analytical parsimony and theoretical generalizability. To elaborate further, it is difficult to ascertain if there is a hierarchy of importance amongst Mackie's explanatory variables and indeed whether any of them is necessary or sufficient to account for violence.

Having assessed the major theoretical arguments, a few brief comments on the state of the literature are in order. Some of the scholarly material pertains to the explanation of "waves" of violence (Chandra, 2002; Mackie, 1976; Purdey, 2006) while others focus on individual case studies (Siegel, 1998). Taken together, there is a rich, nuanced and sophisticated wealth of material on anti-Sinicism in Indonesia and offers much theoretical and analytical pluralism to students of the subject.

A striking feature of the literature is that almost all analyses are of a qualitative nature and there is a dearth of quantitative studies on the topic. There is a handful of large-N studies on collective violence in Indonesia (Varshney et al., 2004; Barron et al., 2004; Mancini, 2005; Tajima, 2008), but these do not focus explicitly on violence against the Chinese. The absence of large- N studies precludes efforts to identify broader, more general trends in the patterns of anti-Chinese rioting. As much of the literature is focused on specific incidents of violence, the theoretical arguments remain empirically under-tested across a wide spectrum of cases. Hence, there is no discernible consensus amongst the policy and academic community with regard to the effectiveness of one type of explanation over others and each perspective on its own does not account for divergences satisfactorily. Thus, it is the contention of this research that in spite of potential pitfalls of missing out on contextually relevant description, the construction of a general theoretical model that can be applied in a range of different contexts is a useful endeavor.

Further, many of the accounts revolve almost exclusively around the phenomenon of violence, apart from the odd cursory mention of a few notable peaceful regions during a particularly virulent period of rioting. As noted, there is considerable spatial disparity in anti-Chinese rioting. During the turbulence of 1997/98, many cities in West Kalimantan, North Sumatra, Riau, Bangka Belitung and South Kalimantan remained essentially peaceful in spite of containing far and away some of the largest Chinese concentrations in the country. Hence, the lack of focus on spatial variations in violence is a significant lacuna in anti-Chinese research; in order to further a theoretically rigorous understanding of the general

dynamics that foster violence in some places and not in others, a systematic examination of these processes is required in violent locales as well as in non-violent ones.⁸

Third, most accounts implicitly or explicitly allude to the role of scapegoating and acknowledge its widespread prevalence. Yet, there is an almost complete absence of rigorous theorizing of the concept. Moreover, neither the question of why scapegoating only sometimes triggers violence nor specific mechanisms through which scapegoating leads to violent outbursts is addressed adequately in the literature. As Gibson and Howard (2007) observe, a fair test for scapegoat theory requires examination not only of outbreaks of violence, but also of cases where the predicted violence fails to materialize.

Alternative Framework for Understanding Anti-Chinese Violence

Based on the limitations outlined above, this section aims to construct an alternative theoretical framework to delineate causal mechanisms leading to variations in anti-Chinese violence in the late *New Order* period. The argument begins with the assertion that the ethnic Chinese, for a variety of reasons, are a vulnerable community in Indonesia. As briefly noted in chapter one, Arief Budiman (1999) has coined the term “triple minority” to describe the Chinese community. The term is attributed to the group, as they are largely non-Moslem in a country where 88% of the population is Moslem, considered *non-Pribumi* in spite of being present in Indonesia for generations and perceived to be

⁸ Varshney (2002) observes that in general most works that aim to explain variations in collective violence do so by picking a few violent cases and seeking commonalities between them and making conclusions based on those. This approach whilst useful cannot lead to a “full-blown theory of ethnic conflict” as peaceful cases were not studied alongside conflictual ones.

disproportionately wealthy. As discussed in detail in chapter four, decades of entrenched institutionalized discrimination has reinforced and perpetuated notions of the Chinese as a “disliked minority” in Indonesia. This discrimination has encompassed multiple folds, including all three elements of the “triple minority” status. The pervasiveness of the institutionalization of exclusion has helped to inculcate an image of the Chinese as a predominantly rich, non-Moslem “outsider” group into the psyche of most *Pribumi* Indonesians. This three-pronged image is especially problematized during social crises and renders the Chinese particularly vulnerable during these times. Thus, this research borrows the “triple minority” frame as its point of departure and acknowledges that anti-Sinicism stems from different roots.⁹ Further, following on from the analyses by Coppel, Purdey and Mackie, the depiction of such violence as intricate and multifaceted is deemed justifiable.

Ethnic Chinese as Scapegoats

The existence of a Chinese minority disliked on multiple facets makes it easy to portray them as “others” and transfer blame during times of strife. Hence, the concept of scapegoating is popular amongst both journalists and academics and is often invoked to explain much anti-Chinese violence. Indeed, Wertheim (1964), Suryadinata (1997) and Schwarz (2000) amongst others have noted the ease with which the Chinese are often blamed for socio-economic strife and made

⁹The skeletal framework is similar to the one used by Brustein and King (2004a) in explaining anti-Semitic violence in Europe before the Holocaust where the authors identified four different strands of anti-Semitism –economic, political, religious and racial –which frequently accompanied such violence.

convenient scapegoats. Similarly, literature detailing violence against other entrepreneurial ethnic minorities such as the Jews in Europe, the Indians in East Africa and the Lebanese in West Africa are also replete with accounts portraying such victimized groups as easy scapegoats (Fein, 1979; Katz, 1980).

Scapegoating is defined as the act of “transferring blame to others” and is often utilized as an objective strategy to “ensure survival in the face of censure” and to maintain the status quo (Douglas, 1995). The equivalent term in Bahasa Indonesia is *Kambing Hitam*, which literally means black goat and this term has often been used with reference to the Chinese (Purdey, 2006: 25).

However, much of the literature addresses scapegoating loosely and in the abstract and the actual mechanisms through which scapegoating is transformed into acts of violence against targeted groups tend to be under-specified. Further, it has to be borne in mind that Chinese in most places in Indonesia are believed to possess all three elements of the “triple minority,” in that they are perceived as rich, non-*Pribumi* and adhering to a different religion. The economic and social turmoil that triggered the violence also impacted the entire country. Hence, the broad conditions for the exploitation (scapegoating) of the Chinese were more or less uniform across Indonesia in the late 1990s; yet, scapegoating resulted in violence only in some places and not in others. Caution therefore needs to be exercised in attributing too much explanatory power to the concept as spatial disparities in rioting are inadequately explained through such a framework.¹⁰ That

¹⁰ Similarly, Gibson and Howard (2007) cast doubt on the utility of scapegoat theories in explaining violent anti-Semitism in Russia. The authors note that most accounts relying on the scapegoat theory choose cases on the dependent variable and criticize the lack of attention paid in

being said, scapegoating -though unlikely to be a sufficient condition in the fanning of violence - does serve a vital function in the explanation and it is clear that under certain circumstances scapegoating assumes enhanced salience and augments the possibility of violence. It is the task of this dissertation to enumerate the mechanisms through which certain communities become more “scapegoatable” than others.

Using frustration-aggression theory, scapegoat theorists posit that in times of national crisis people instinctively seek groups upon whom they assign blame and displace aggression for their misfortunes.¹¹ Thus, scapegoating relies on the principle of displacement which maintains “that aggressive tendencies denied expression against objects instigating the aggression tend to be directed against non-instigating objects” (Berkowitz, 1959). Drawing on the “prior dislike hypothesis,” Berkowitz and Holmes (1959) assert that such aggression is generalized to groups whose perceived characteristics result in their being disliked. This means that objects serving as the targets for aggression usually have certain “stimulus qualities” or negative attributes (Berkowitz and Green, 1962). Hence, ethnic groups most likely to be victims of displaced aggression are those groups that the frustrated people had come to regard as unpleasant (Berkowitz and Green,

the literature to cases where conditions for scapegoating were ripe, but still resulted in an absence of violence

¹¹ Frustration-aggression theory (originally formulated by Dollard in 1939) posits that the resulting aggression can be of two types – direct aggression or displaced aggression. Direct aggression implies that the source/thwarting agent for the frustration is directly attacked while in displaced aggression, frustration is taken out on outlets or substitutes in the absence of the direct source or in the improbability of attacking the direct source, as it may be too powerful (Berkowitz and Green, 1962)

1962; Storr 1968).¹² Therefore, the choice of target for displaced anger is not random and explains why certain groups are scapegoated over others. Moreover, people may be tolerated in society even though their behavior and personal characteristics are significantly different and somewhat threatening, but they do not necessarily become scapegoats until society becomes frustrated with its inability to deal with a crisis (Berkowitz and Green, 1962).

However, the notion that displaced aggression is directed against previously disliked target groups involves an element of contradiction. Horowitz (2001:138) observes that aggression against an already disliked target group may not be entirely displaced and insinuates that elements of direct aggression may also be involved. He notes that displaced aggression is hard to prove and to conclude “that one group is the sole instigator of aggression that ends up being directed on another” is a difficult task. Further, in actual practice, a great deal of ethnic aggression appears to be both direct and displaced with many instances where the thwarting agent/source and the outlet are linked (Horowitz, 1973).¹³ Also, the notion of displacement typically regards the target group as a homogenous entity and carries the assumption of uniform violence across the target population. The inconsistencies in the patterns of anti-Chinese rioting warn

¹² Individuals (attackers) may absorb negative attitudes towards a particular group from their family or culture or may have had unpleasant personal experiences with members of the target group. Williams (1947) and Douglas (1995:39) observe that scapegoats may be picked as they are visibly different and perceived as strange. Sometimes targets are also selected due to their perceived association with the actual source of the frustration.

¹³ Horowitz notes that the theoretical distinction between direct and displaced aggression might be useful; but, in actual practice, the lines are often blurred, terms are not mutually exclusive and targets may receive both forms of aggression simultaneously. To prove his point, Horowitz provides several examples of violence (mostly against entrepreneurial ethnic groups) where the said violence could have been interpreted as instances of both displaced and direct aggression (Horowitz, 1973).

against total reliance on displacement theory and indicate the presence of particular dynamics within certain spatial boundaries which consequently make more “direct” ethnic aggression against the Chinese more likely in some places than in others.

Theorizing “Scapegoatability”

Given the above context, it is plausible that the late *New Order* era violence against the Chinese resulted from both displaced and direct sources. The transference of blame to the Chinese by itself is inadequate to explain trajectories of rioting and scapegoating is likely to have merely provided the platform for violence. Hence, it is asserted here that scapegoating exists primarily as a tool for elites to incite passions against disliked groups. As events in Indonesia escalated from economic strife to a full-blown socio-political crisis, self-interested elites had ample incentives to whip up a frenzy of anti-Chinese vitriol and project the crisis as the fault of the group. Fuelling anger against the Chinese enabled concerned regime elite to camouflage damaging accusations of chronic regime corruption, entrenched webs of crony capitalism and increasingly draconian measures to curb political opposition, all of which contributed decisively to the social turmoil. It was a move bound to trigger ethnic animosity, yet invaluable for elites to “ensure survival in the face of censure” and to maintain the status quo (Douglas, 1995).

Yet, in order to explain why this frenzy of elite rhetoric led to such murderous brutality in Jakarta and Solo while Yogyakarta and Pontianak remained peaceful, one needs to move beyond the act of blame displacement and

undertake a deeper examination of particular contextual factors prevalent within each locality. To systematically explain spatial variations, it is necessary to disaggregate the “triple minority” at the local level and uncover under what conditions the ethnic, religious and economic elements of this multiple-minority framework become more threatening to the *Pribumis* within distinct spatial boundaries. For example, in certain regions, the non Moslem orientation of the Chinese might be more problematic -this could be due to the influence of militant Moslem organizations in the area or the greater presence of Islamic boarding schools or the high visibility of non-Moslem places of worship, for instance. In such places, elite rhetoric castigating the Chinese as Christian conspirators plotting the downfall of Suharto and the country is likely to have a more explosive impact. Similarly, scapegoating that focuses on the economic dominance of the Chinese could acquire greater salience in places where Chinese wealth is more conspicuous.

Following this, I argue that the key to unraveling the puzzle of why scapegoating only sometimes led to violence lies in understanding how the three main attributes invoked in such campaigns of scapegoating were perceived across the many locales in Indonesia where the Chinese were present in non-trivial numbers. I contend that violence was more likely in areas where elite characterizations of the Chinese as rich, non-Moslem, non-*Pribumi* outsiders mirrored the respective local conditions. In other words, the Chinese were at their most vulnerable when local conditions “matched” the elite rhetoric and made such rhetoric appear *real* and reasonable; thus, certain local conditions increased the “scapegoatability” of the Chinese during times of crisis. In turn, this magnified

the threat/insecurity perceived by *Pribumi* groups (Horowitz, 1985; Posen, 1993; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Figueiredo and Weingast, 1999) and provided focal point/s for mobilization against the Chinese “other” (Kaufman, 2001; Petersen, 2001).

In broad adherence to a Horowitzian framework where direct and displaced aggression manifest simultaneously, the model advanced here postulates an interaction that involves elite blame displacement with a form of direct aggression with the Chinese targeted explicitly as particular local factors make it easier to establish a direct link with the Chinese as instigators of the crisis. Such an integrated framework is best placed to evaluate variations in anti-Chinese violence- both at the district and neighborhood levels- as explanations largely focused on broader structural factors inadequately account for observed spatial disparities.

It could be pointed out that in several well documented cases the role of elites in the instigation of violence went well beyond verbal blame displacement. Indeed, as discussed in detail in chapter seven, there is strong evidence that Prabowo and his henchmen orchestrated much of the violence in Jakarta. However, it is important to note that the critical word in scapegoating is *displacement* which can encompass both blame and aggression. At certain times the role of elites was limited to verbal rhetoric while at other times it included acts of organized physical aggression as well. In either case, the actions of elites fit within the model of scapegoating advanced here; I argue that in places where organized rioting occurred - or what Heryanto (1998b) calls racialized state

terrorism - the violence was carried out precisely because the local dynamics prevalent in those areas were conducive to the activation of anti-Chinese rioting.

The approach suggested here is also significant for highlighting the interaction between broader structural factors at the national level and more micro level factors at the local level. The importance of local dynamics is alluded to in several works on collective violence. Veena Das (1990: 14) argues that “in order for diffused hostilities to translate themselves into violent conflict, contiguity has to be established between specific, concrete, and local issues on the one hand, and a master symbol on the other” and Tambiah (1996: 257) observes that a national cause can work itself out in terms of local causes, networks and interests.¹⁴ In the riot prone Indian city of Aligarh, violence occurred only in 12% of the 241 residential areas and Brass (2003: 162) acknowledges that neighborhood specific determinants may be needed to explain such variations. Kalyvas (2003) goes the furthest in emphasizing the ubiquitous nature of micro-level cleavages and stresses interaction between supra-local and local actors which leads to localized conditions aggravating master cleavages at the village level. However, for the most part, the above works provide descriptive evidence of the salience of micro-level attributes and do not generate explicit theoretical mechanisms through which specific local conditions trigger violent responses.

Having outlined the broad contours of the theoretical framework, it is now necessary to elucidate specific causal mechanisms through which each facet in the “triple minority” was activated, thereby augmenting the possibility of violence.

¹⁴ Stanley Tambiah introduces the term “parochialization,” which is defined as the “reproduction of a national issue in diverse local places, where it explodes like a cluster bomb in multiple context-bound ways” (Tambiah, 1996: 257).

Hence, the last segment of this chapter provides a series of hypotheses to explicate when the non-*Pribumi* status, disproportionate affluence and the non-Moslem affiliation of the Chinese minority triggered violent anti-Chinese reactions in diverse settings across the Indonesian archipelago.

Activation of Ethnic Scapegoating

In spite of multiple distinctions within the group, the Chinese are by and large perceived as a monolithic category in Indonesia. As extensively detailed in chapter four, there is also the tendency to treat them as non-natives (non-*Pribumi*) irrespective of most Chinese having lived in the archipelago for many decades and having acquired Indonesian citizenship.

Most explanations of anti-Chinese violence have underemphasized ethno-demographic factors. Yet, to tease out variations in violence, a scrutiny of the ethnic composition of the country is crucial. In terms of ethnicity, Indonesia has a high level of diversity and is made up of many different groups.¹⁵ The Javanese are clearly the largest group in the country and form a dominant majority in most districts in Java, except in the Sundanese populated regions of West Java and the more cosmopolitan districts of Jakarta. Regions outside of Java tend to be comparatively more heterogeneous with groups like the Batak, Minangkabau, Balinese and the Buginese being dominant in different parts. It is important to note that given nearly 90% of Indonesia's population is Moslem, much of this

¹⁵ The Javanese are by some distance the largest ethnic group in the country. According to the 2000 Population Census, they made up 41% of the total population in the country. They are followed by the Sundanese, Malay, Madurese, Batak, Minangkabau, Betawi, Buginese, Bantenese and the Banjarese as the top 10 groups in the country (Suryadinata et al., 2003).

ethnic diversity is largely likely to be in the shape of intra-Moslem (or intra-*Pribumi*) ethnic cleavages.

Several studies have shown that greater ethnic heterogeneity of society increases the possibility of ethnic violence through various mechanisms (Sambanis, 2001; Barron et al., 2004; Gurr et al., 2005; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).¹⁶ Olzak (1992) asserts that competition for economic and political resources between polarized ethnic groups can engender tensions and expounds the conditions under which this is more likely.¹⁷ In an ethnically heterogeneous Indonesian context, the nature of that competition and resulting tension is likely to be two pronged; between different *Pribumi* ethnic groups (who compose the bulk of the population) as well as between the Chinese (who wield economic influence) and the *Pribumis*. The nature of this two-sided ethnic contestation and how it enhances the vulnerability of the Chinese is discussed in detail below.

Local Mechanisms that Heighten Ethnic “Scapegoatability”

1) Two-pronged ethnic competition: Pribumi versus Pribumi and Pribumi versus Chinese

During Suharto’s reign, the regulation of *Asas Tunggal* required that all social and political organizations adopt the statist ideology of *Pancasila* as their sole ideological formulation. The *Asas Tunggal* was enacted in keeping with the SARA framework and succeeded in scuppering overt manifestation of ethnic and

¹⁶ The study by Barron et al., 2004 is the only one specifically focused on Indonesia and is based on a large scale quantitative study of local level conflict in Indonesia; they find that conflict is more likely at the local level when no single ethnic group is dominant.

¹⁷ Olzak (1992) and Olzak and Nagel (1982) specify a few conditions under which ethnic competition is most likely to lead to conflict; these include rapid rates of urbanization, economic crises, sudden in-migrations and expansion of the secondary and tertiary sectors of society

religious sentiment (Brown and Wilson, 2007).¹⁸ However, the undertones of ethnic tensions were clearly visible below the surface especially given that Suharto's *New Order* regime functioned as the epicentre of a well-oiled patron-client network where patronage was often distributed in support of ethnic affiliations and political acquiescence (Webster, 2007).

Much of the literature on intra-*Pribumi* ethnic tensions in the country during the *New Order* focuses on the Javanese versus non-Javanese dichotomy. Javanese dominance in the top civilian and military echelons became increasingly stronger after independence and acquired near hegemonic status during the *New Order* (Gregory, 1979). A series of factional struggles and armed rebellions mainly in the outer islands led to the ousting of many non-Javanese officers and contributed to the decreasing heterogeneity of the Indonesian army.¹⁹ Thus, increasing Javanization, especially in the make-up of the military, but also in the civilian sphere, often caused much resentment amongst the non-Javanese. 66% of the military leadership in the early *New Order* were Javanese while the representation of officials from the outer islands was far disproportionate to their population (Gregory, 1979).²⁰ The major military divisions were almost

¹⁸ The SARA policy enacted by the *New Order* regime dictated that matters pertaining to ethnic, racial, religious and inter-group difference should not be discussed in the public domain.

¹⁹ By the end of the 1950s, the central government was confronted with several armed rebellions in the outer islands which were fuelled by ethno-religious opposition to Javanese dominance (Berger, 1997; Brown, 2005). Many of these rebellions (especially in Aceh and South Sulawesi) were inspired by the militant Moslem movement Darul Islam. These rebellions were eventually squashed by the regime and as a result most non-Javanese officers (who were seen as actively involved in the rebellions) were expunged from service which fundamentally altered the ethnic make-up of the army (Gregory, 1979).

²⁰ A more detailed breakdown of the military shows that the Javanese occupied 68% of the top leadership positions in the army, 89% in the navy, 81% in the air force, 60% in the police and 73% in the defence ministry (Gregory, 1979). By the late 1980s, the Javanese share of the military had increased further to over 70% and the Sundanese came a distant second at less than 10% (Anderson, 1988).

monopolized by the Javanese and deeply inculcated with Javanese values and ways of thinking.²¹ Most Javanese officials were also nominal (*Abangan*) Moslems and often belonged to social circles hostile to modernist Islam which exacerbated the resentment of the Sundanese and many of the outer islanders who adhered to a more orthodox form of Islam. The Sundanese in particular were often displeased with Javanese preponderance at all levels of governance.²² Suharto's rule of Indonesia as a self-proclaimed Javanese king, the extolling of Javanese culture and the misuse of Javanese symbols and traditions to maintain hold on power also stirred dislike and apathy amongst the non-Javanese.²³

Whilst it is a simplification to understand ethnic relations in Indonesia solely through a Javanese- non-Javanese prism (Wee and Jayasuriya, 2002), the above brief description provides a general snap shot of inter-ethnic relations in the *New Order*. In a regime known for its embedded neo-patrimonialism, ethnic tensions abounded as different groups sought to curry favour with the establishment.²⁴ It is reasonable to surmise that inter-group competition was likely higher in more ethnically heterogeneous areas as multiple groups competed for finite resources.

²¹ The primary military divisions are the Siliwangi, Diponegoro and Brawijaya divisions. The Siliwangi division is based in the Sundanese dominated West Java while the other two are based in the Javanese heartland. The military elites of the Diponegoro division are all Javanese and the division is renowned for its ethnic homogeneity. The Siliwangi division in contrast is ethnically diverse and its leadership includes 9 Javanese, 7 Sundanese and 5 outer islanders (Gregory, 1979).

²² Gregory opines that the relative under-representation of the Sundanese amongst the top ranks of the military was a result of Javanese elite perceiving the Sundanese as the biggest threat to their superiority.

²³ Jakarta Post, November 6, 2002 and Jakarta Post, September 1, 2007.

²⁴ While resentment of Javanese exploitation did lead to violent secessionist movements in Aceh and Papua, ethnic tensions bubbled around the surface for the most part and were kept in check by an increasingly authoritarian regime.

Apart from competing with each other, *Pribumi* groups are also in constant competition with the Chinese, given the latter's economic superiority; tensions arising from these dynamics have been amply documented elsewhere in this dissertation and need not be rehashed here. However, what needs to be underscored is that in more ethnically divided arenas, the likelihood of this two-pronged ethnic competition – *Pribumi-Pribumi* and *Pribumi-Chinese* - is higher. In other words, the more fragmented a locale is in terms of ethnic composition, the greater the probability of ethnically distinct *Pribumi* groups coming into contact with each other as well as with the economically dominant, non-*Pribumi* Chinese over limited resources. I contend that this augments the likelihood of violent anti-Sinicism as in a very polarized setting different *Pribumi* groups have to contend with the disproportionate economic clout wielded by the Chinese.²⁵ It is true that the Chinese in most cities are numerically small (often less than 5% of the population). But, given the visibility of highly influential Chinese businessmen (*Cukongs*) and their racial distinctiveness, often the size of the group *appears* to be higher than actual figures (Zenner, 1991).²⁶

At this point, it is reasonable to query why violence is directed exclusively against the Chinese and why there is no simultaneous eruption of conflict between the various *Pribumi* groups that are also in competition with each other. As the

²⁵ A Similar explanation is put forward by Kim (1999) in a study assessing violent clashes between African-Americans and Koreans in three different cities in the US – Chicago, New York and Los Angeles. He notes that the riots in Chicago were milder and less intense compared to the others. The relative racial homogeneity of the Koreans' clientele in Chicago as opposed to more racially fragmented clientele in Los Angeles and New York emerged as a critical variable in explaining spatial and temporal variations in violence in the three cities.

²⁶ In a similar vein, Leighton (1979) notes that the number of Lebanese (another typical entrepreneurial minority group) living in Sierra Leone was often perceived as higher than was actually the case due to racial distinctiveness and economic dominance of the group.

earlier discussion on scapegoating showed, much of the empirical literature reveals that aggression is likely to be targeted at disliked and vulnerable groups during times of upheaval. Socio-economic turmoil - as the case in the late 1990s- can often increase rates of ethnic competition (Olzak, 1992; Myers, 1997) and as a historically disliked group, the Chinese are particularly vulnerable in fragmented cities (which may include distinct groups of business competitors,²⁷ clientele and labor groups) and likely to bear the brunt of *Pribumi* aggression.²⁸ Such aggression could entail both displaced and direct forms and the Chinese may also be targeted as they are viewed as “visible usurpers” of *Pribumi* rights. Brown and Wilson (2007) have observed similar dynamics in their account of ethnic violence by the Betawi against the Madura.²⁹ Further, as Bonacich (1973) notes elements in the host society (in this case different ethnic groups) may also join hands and form a temporary coalition against the “outsider” Chinese.³⁰

Locales with higher levels of ethnic divisions are likely to create tensions between various *Pribumi* groups. Thus, non-Javanese groups in such locales for

²⁷ Certain *Pribumi* ethnic groups in Indonesia have acquired a reputation for business dexterity and entrepreneurial skills. These include the Sundanese (found mostly in West Java, but also in significant percentages in all districts in Jakarta), Bataks (almost 15% of the population in Medan) and the Bugis in Makassar (more than 30% of the population). The presence of large numbers of business oriented *Pribumi* groups can augment resentment and violence against the economically privileged Chinese during periods of economic contraction.

²⁸ Horowitz (2001) in his work on deadly ethnic riots explicates conditions necessary for a deadly riot to be carried out. The first of these conditions is the necessity for a pre-existing hostile relationship between groups.

²⁹ Brown and Wilson note that in Jakarta, the Betawi, who make up 27% of the population, harbor resentment against the Javanese (35%) as the latter are perceived as responsible for the marginalization of the Betawi. Yet, Betawi anger is directed not against the Javanese but against the 1% Madurese minority. Reasons for this include instrumental calculations that view the weaker Madurese as a more pragmatic target and less likely to retaliate as well as the fact that the economically dominant Madurese are seen as the visible usurpers of Betawi rights. Brown and Wilson also note that there could be an element of displaced aggression as well as the Madura are effectively scapegoated.

³⁰ Leighton (1979) writes that entrenched perceptions of Lebanese wealth engendered resentment amongst the natives in Sierra Leone during times of economic strife and also served to unite several disparate native elite groups to put up a common front against the Lebanese.

example could resent their exploitation by the Javanese. However, for the most part, given the absence of a deeply entrenched hostile relationship between the *Pribumis* and the presence of a highly visible, convenient and politically subservient Chinese community, conflict between various *Pribumi* groups is unlikely.

2) Horizontal inequalities

In addition, ethnic resentment against the Chinese is also likely to be greater when group level differences are more visible. Frances Stewart has coined the term horizontal inequalities to define the “existence of inequalities between culturally defined groups” (Stewart, 2001). These inter-group disparities can operate in a variety of spheres including access to political opportunities, ownership of economic assets, income, employment and many others. By surveying empirical evidence from around the world, she observes further that such horizontal inequalities can be significant predictors of violence (Stewart et al., 2005).

From an Indonesian context, a study on the violence in Tasikmalaya revealed that economic inequality was a crucial factor. A similar investigation carried out by the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) on several riot venues corroborated these findings and identified group level economic disparities as the proximate cause of violence (Bertrand, 2004: 110). Mancini’s district wide study of collective violence in Indonesia found that certain horizontal inequalities were helpful in explaining spatial variations in violence (Mancini, 2005). Hence, it is hypothesized that localities where large horizontal

inequalities prevailed between the Chinese and the *Pribumi* groups were more likely candidates for the eruption of anti-Chinese violence.³¹

To sum up, the above discussion has outlined the processes through which the non-*Pribumi* status of the Chinese could be problematized at the local level. It is hypothesized that ethnically more fragmented locales display greater likelihood of anti-Chinese rioting, as the nature of the aforementioned two-sided ethnic competition is likely to be much more intense in such sites. Moreover, locales with prominent horizontal inequalities (in favor of the Chinese) are stronger candidates for anti-Chinese outbursts.

Activation of Economic Scapegoating

As the economy expanded in the 1980s and the early 1990s and a strategy of export oriented industrialization took hold, Chinese enterprises emerged rapidly in cities and towns around the country. These were referred to as *konglomerat lokal* and were propped up by collusive relationships with local military and civil officials (Siegel, 2000); thus, Chinese wealth became more and more prominent as bank outlets, department stores, shopping malls and factories- all associated with Chinese capital- mushroomed.

Given this context, it is hardly surprising that stereotyped notions of Chinese economic superiority often formed the very life-blood of much anti-Chinese elite rhetoric in the late *New Order*. Such characterizations, I argue, were

³¹ The choice of indicators for the operationalization of horizontal inequalities is discussed in the next chapter.

likely to resonate more vividly at the local level through several different mechanisms.

Local Mechanisms that Heighten Economic “Scapegoatability”

1) Visible wealth of the Chinese

Indonesia’s economic boom inevitably attracted a massive wave of migrants (especially into the more urban areas) in search of better opportunities. However, the fruits of economic development were unevenly distributed and many cities in particular were soon awash with a frustrated underclass –the urban poor (Firman, 1999). As the economy tumbled into freefall in 1997-98, cost of living skyrocketed, rates of urban unemployment shot up sharply and the discontent of the urban poor magnified.

Given this context, I argue that economic resentment against the Chinese was most likely greater in locales where the contrast between Chinese prosperity and *Pribumi* impoverishment was starker.³² Therefore, locales where visible markers of Chinese prosperity (such as shopping malls, department stores and banks) and significant levels of societal poverty coexisted side by side were particularly volatile as they served to amplify entrenched perceptions of acute group level inequalities. Poorer urban areas were particularly likely to exhibit such resentment.

³² Similarly, Brustein and King’s (2004b) comparative study of anti-Semitic violence in Bulgaria and Romania observes that the level of violence was much lower in Bulgaria as opposed to Romania. The disproportionately higher percentage of Jews in the middle class and in economically influential positions in Romania emerged as a critical variable in explaining cross-country variations in anti-Semitic violence.

Sidel and others have noted that visible signs of Chinese wealth were apparent in many riot venues. The tiny streets of many poverty stricken provincial cities were adorned with the branches of several Jakarta based Chinese owned banks. Moreover, as chapter seven demonstrates clearly, poorer neighborhoods in Jakarta with ostentatious signs of Chinese wealth were especially susceptible to be targeted by the disaffected urban poor.

2) Locales undergoing rapid development

As the Indonesian economy expanded in the 1980s, large-scale developmental projects were extended further into the rural hinterland. On the back of this wave of modernization, significant progress was made in education, healthcare and other human development indicators in many parts of rural Indonesia. However, modernization also led to an expansion of Chinese economic activity in many rural locales where the *Pribumi* had been long entrenched. This brought the Chinese increasingly into contact with a burgeoning rural Moslem middle class.

Thus, I argue that Chinese communities living in the more developed rural areas were particularly vulnerable as the economic crisis escalated in 1998. In such locales, resentment against the economically dominant Chinese grew as an increasingly educated/skilled rural middle class struggled to make ends meet in the context of rising competition and soaring food prices.

For example, in Tasikmalaya, the town's small time *Pribumi* shopkeepers faced increasing competition from Chinese based supermarkets like Matahari and Ramayana. Further aggravating tensions, the local government in Tasikmalaya

relocated the main market place (dominated by the *Pribumis*) to the fringes of the town and replaced it with a modern shopping center owned by a prominent Chinese tycoon (Sidel, 2006: 78-83).

To summarize, the above section has illustrated possible causal mechanisms through which entrenched stereotypes of Chinese economic monopolization could acquire salience in diverse local settings across Indonesia. More specifically, visible markers of Chinese wealth and increasing competition in rapidly developing areas are likely to emerge as significant predictors of anti-Chinese violence.

Activation of Religious Scapegoating

In many of the districts included in the study (both violent and peaceful), especially in Java, the Moslems form an overwhelming majority, often in excess of 90% of the population. Outside of Java, the Moslem populace is slightly lower, but still a comfortable majority in excess of 75% in many cases. The greater the Moslem population, the easier it may be to “otherize” the Chinese during times of turmoil. However, the numerical dominance of the Moslem majority does not a priori increase the likelihood of violent anti-Sinicism. Instead, it is argued here that the probability of violence will especially heighten in cities with more “exclusivist” Moslem populations.

“Exclusivist” Moslems and Violence

The literature makes it abundantly clear that the Moslems in Indonesia are not a homogenous group and many different typologies of Islamic orientation

have been put forward. Geertz (1960) in his path breaking study titled “Religion of Java” formulated a threefold classification of religious beliefs amongst Javanese Moslems –*Abangan*, *Santri* and *Priyayi*. The *Abangan* are syncretists with strong emphasis on animist beliefs; the *Santri* follow a purer form of Islam and the *Priyayi* are influenced by Hindu aristocratic culture.³³ Due to the growing *Santrification* of Indonesian society, especially in the late 1980s and the 1990s (as discussed in chapter four), much attention has focused on the *Santri*. They are often considered as more devout and orthodox Moslems and are broadly divided into two camps –traditionalists and modernists.³⁴ Other typologies of Indonesian Islam include those by Woodward (2001) and Riddell (2002).³⁵

³³ For *Abangan* Moslems, Javanese indigenous animism and Hinduism, which arrived in the archipelago long before Islam, carry tremendous weight over contemporary religious beliefs and practices. Thus, *Abangan* beliefs incorporate a series of layers of animist, Hindu and Buddhist beliefs with a top Islamic layer (Liddle, 1996; Schwarz, 2000:166). *Abangan* are very syncretic, close to Javanese cultural roots and tolerant of other faiths. *Santri* are believed to be followers of a purer Islam. Islam occupies a far more central place for the *Santri*. They are most interested in the defense of Islam as a “superior ethical code for modern man” (Geertz, 1960:127) and adhere to an unconditional belief and faith in the absolute truth of Islam. Intolerance for Javanese beliefs and other practices considered as heterodox are also common amongst the *Santri*. The *Priyayi* refers to Java’s aristocrats who formed the core of the colonial bureaucratic machine. Schwarz (2000:167) notes that the worldviews of *Priyayi* are closer to the *Abangan* than the *Santri*, but the main difference between the *Priyayi* and the other two groups is seen in class than in religious terms.

³⁴ The traditionalists continue to subscribe to the Syafi’i school of legal interpretation which is taught by charismatic ulama in boarding schools (*Pesantren*) across the country (Liddle, 2003). They hold a syncretic view of Islam, are open to incorporating some of the cultural traditions predating Islam’s arrival in the archipelago and are tolerant of different professions of the Islamic faith. Sociologically, the traditionalists are found in rural, less affluent parts of the country. Modernists favor a more direct reading or literal interpretation of the Koran and Hadith and sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad (Liddle, 2003). They often criticize the traditionalists for the latter’s tolerance of Javanese cultural practices. The modernists have a broader national base than the traditionalists, especially amongst the urban, wealthy and more formally educated segments of society.

³⁵ Woodward (2001) identifies five basic orientations within Indonesian Islam: 1) indigenized Islamists -similar to *Abangan* as in the Geertz typology 2) traditionalists 3) modernists 4) Islamists- very militant and focused on a discourse centered on Shariah law and jihad and 5) neo-modernists -call for Islamic values and ethics and are disinclined to view Islam as a political tool. Riddell’s typology is very similar and the breakdown includes neo-modernists, traditionalists, modernist reformists and Islamists.

Further, Abdurrahman Wahid, who became president of Indonesia in 1999, identified three main camps in Indonesian Islam, namely neo-modernists, sectarian/exclusivists and a floating majority in the middle for whose support the other two groups compete fiercely (Schwarz, 2000: 186; Wahid, 2001). Neo-modernists call for Islamic values and ethics and put emphasis on the essence of Islamic teaching. They are very inclusive and vehemently oppose efforts to use Islam as a political tool.³⁶ Exclusivists on the other hand complain of discrimination against Moslems and emphasize the urgent need to redress inequalities. Steeped in Islamic ideology, exclusivists call for Islam to occupy a more pervasive and influential role in state and society. They stridently disagree with the neo-modernist notion that Islam should not be used as a vehicle for political change and view political power as inseparable in the pursuit of economic and social change on behalf of the Moslems. They are well known for their withering criticism of the Chinese and the Christians for having enjoyed disproportionate economic clout and argue that these groups have been “depriving Moslems of the political dominance they feel they deserve” (Schwarz, 2000: 331).

Following on from Wahid’s conceptualization of the term, I adhere to the assumption that every community under study here contains an extremist Islamic component of some proportion.³⁷ Given their proclivity for fostering anti-Chinese

³⁶ Neo-modernists recognize the necessity of religious tolerance and the need to afford protection to the minorities and argue that institutions should be limited to the role of propagating Islamic values. Wahid considers himself as a neo-modernist and the highly respected Indonesian scholar Nurcholish Madjid also falls into this camp.

³⁷ It is certainly the case that the size of the exclusivist Moslem population varied from place to place. However, it is reasonable to assume that any society will contain people adhering to all three versions of Islam (exclusivists, neo-modernists and the floating majority), albeit in differing percentages. Wahid argues that the challenge facing all communities in Indonesia is to minimize the influence of exclusivist segments.

sentiment, this research contends that violence against the Chinese was more likely in locales where this exclusivist Moslem population felt more threatened. Further, a large exclusivist population influences the calculations of perpetrators, due to the lower cost of violence (Horowitz, 2001),³⁸ and the greater scope to use Islam as a unifying mobilization marker.³⁹ In the next section, I hypothesize that the fears of exclusivist Moslems were intensified under two broadly different local conditions.

Local Mechanisms that Heighten Religious “Scapegoatability”

1) Greater visibility of symbols of non-Moslem worship

Suharto’s wooing of Islam in the early 1990s saw Christians being gradually replaced from the core of the regime. Thus, the growing politicization of Islam in the late *New Order* increased tensions between the two religions. Exclusivist Moslem groups in particular saw Suharto’s about turn as a golden opportunity to reverse past injustices and felt empowered and gratified by the growing concessions granted to Islam by the regime (Bertrand, 2004; 90). In this context, elite rhetoric that accentuated the non-Moslem aspect of the Chinese was especially problematic in locales where religious symbols associated with the Chinese (particularly Christian Chinese) were more visible. Such visibility not only increased fears perceived by exclusivist elements (of increasing

³⁸ Horowitz in his work on deadly ethnic riots asserts that violence is more likely against a certain group if there is a lower cost of possible retaliation to potential perpetrators.

³⁹ Jonathan Fox (1999) argues that religious institutions often provide organizational resources that facilitate mobilization.

Christianization in a rapidly changing Indonesia), but also provided focal points for anti-Chinese mobilization (Siegel, 2000; Bertrand, 2004; Sidel, 2006).

For example, in the town of Situbondo, the presence of over two dozen churches for the tiny Christian population raised suspicions of surreptitious Christianization and doubts over why so many churches were needed for so few Christians in a traditional Islamic stronghold. A top official of the Council of Indonesian Religious Scholars (MUI) queried, “as a city well known for the Islamic piety of its residents, why is it that when you enter Situbondo, the most prominent building is a church and not a mosque?”(Sidel, 2006: 79).⁴⁰ In Rengasdengklok, controversies over proposed plans to build grandiose Protestant churches in the region and accusations that residents were using their homes for unauthorized religious services fuelled fears of clandestine conversions carried out by Christian/Chinese missionaries (Siegel, 2000). Similar controversies were attributed to violent anti-Chinese incidents in the town of Holis on the outskirts of Bandung (Purdey, 2006:198-203) and in Tasikmalaya and Kebumen. Thus, the high visibility of non-Moslem places of worship in a local setting causes uncertainty due to the changing urban landscape, raises fears of proselytization amongst the Moslem majority and emerges as a potential causal mechanism which could be exploited through zealous religious rhetoric.

This argument assumes some degree of conflation between the Chinese and the Christians. Yet, sometimes it is analytically difficult to separate anti-

⁴⁰ Moslem activist Adi Sasono spoke openly about the tensions created in Situbondo over the number of churches being built without permits. In an interview with the magazine Forum Keadilan, Sasono said “for example, in Situbondo from 27 churches, 3 were built during the Dutch era, four have permits and the rest have no permits. It offends people’s good manners” (cited in Purdey, 2006:51).

Chinese violence from anti-Christian violence. For instance, in the riot-plagued cities of Rengasdengklok, Situbondo and Tasikmalaya where many churches were razed, most Chinese were Christians.⁴¹ As Allievi (2003) notes, it is possible that in the absence of alternative modes of association for a particular group, places of worship for that group may assume added significance and consequently make them more visible to opposing groups.⁴²

2) Sites of Islamic piety

Certain regions in Indonesia are informally referred to as *Kota Santri* (devout cities). They are typically renowned for containing dense networks of mosques and Islamic schools, high levels of Islamic associational activity and are often graced by charismatic religious leaders. Purdey (2006:194) refers to Kebumen as one such city. The official website of Pekalongan labels the city as “*Kota Santri*.”

I argue that ethnic Chinese living in such predominantly pious Moslem communities were vulnerable to anti-Chinese religious diatribes that repeatedly emphasized Chinese/Christian repression of Indonesia’s religious majority (Sidel, 2006:102). This vulnerability was magnified further if there were perceptions of

⁴¹ The riots in Situbondo, Tasikmalaya and Rengasdengklok have often been considered by analysts as incidents of anti-Chinese violence (Bertrand, 2004; Purdey, 2006; Sidel, 2006). In Situbondo and Tasikmalaya, many churches were attacked though neither the Chinese nor the Christians were related to the triggering events. Chinese owned shops, theatres and banks were also damaged which alludes to the fact that the Chinese may have been targeted. However, a few churches belonging to the non-Chinese, such as the Batak community, were also razed. The Rengasdengklok riot was clearly more overtly anti-Chinese in nature. The immediate trigger to the violence was the intolerance of a Christian Chinese woman toward Moslem ritual practices.

⁴² During the *New Order* period, the Chinese were banned from any political activity and indeed forbidden from any form of associational activity. Further, as Confucianism was banned as an officially sanctioned religion, many Chinese converted to Christianity. In this context, it is plausible that the main pole of aggregation for the Chinese was the place of worship.

economic encroachment by ruthless and profit-driven Chinese businesses (Sidel, 2006:102).⁴³

Sidel's explanation of anti-Chinese rioting in places as diverse as Pekalongan, Makassar, Purwakarta and Tasikmalaya revolves prominently on all these being cities of high religious piety replete with a plethora of Islamic boarding schools, institutes of higher learning and deeply entrenched networks of Islamic associational activity. He notes further that such locales are particularly susceptible to violence if there are tensions between the "position of Islam and non-Muslim sources of power, prestige, and wealth" (Sidel, 2006: 68-105).

To briefly recapitulate, this section has identified two mechanisms through which the non-Moslem orientation of the Chinese is amplified, thereby increasing the "scapegoatability" of the group and in turn, the likelihood of violence. I hypothesize that violence against the Chinese is greater when the visibility of non-Moslem sites of worship is higher and in locales with dense Islamic networks

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to develop a theoretical framework to understand under what conditions elite orchestrated campaigns of scapegoating lead to violence against targeted groups. In doing so, the chapter has aimed to understand spatial variations in anti-Chinese violence in the late *New Order* Indonesia. Much of the extant literature on the subject focuses on the phenomenon of violence and devotes very little attention to uncovering spatial dissimilarities in the patterns of

⁴³ Even Siau-w Giap, who attributes primacy to economic factors in explaining anti Chinese rioting, noted the devoutly Moslem nature of the two cities that he studied– Kudus and Sukabumi- (cited in Mackie, 1976; 80-81).

rioting. Indeed, given the pervasiveness and brutality of the late *New Order* violence, the intriguing question is why the Chinese in places like Yogyakarta, Pangkal Pinang and even Bandung (to a certain extent) escaped unscathed whilst their counterparts in Jakarta, Medan, Palembang and others were unfortunately dragged into an orgy of mayhem in those chaotic months of early 1998. Hence, this chapter has attempted to redress the balance by developing an elaborate framework to address such anomalies.

Elite-orchestrated campaigns of scapegoating succeed only if specific attributes invoked in such scapegoating resonate at the local level. Typically, scapegoating was carried out by drawing attention to three specific attributes associated with the Chinese; namely, by projecting the group as rich, non-Moslem and non-*Pribumi* outsiders bent on furthering their own interests. In other words, scapegoating was executed through an exaggerated problematization of the three elements in Budiman's "triple minority" complex (Budiman, 2001).

The principal mechanisms through which these attributes assume local salience, make the Chinese more "scapegoatable" and augment the likelihood of violence can be summarized as follows. Ethnic stereotypes of the Chinese as non-*Pribumi* outsiders resonate stronger in ethnically polarized locales where the degree of competition - between different *Pribumi* groups on the one hand and between the *Pribumis* and the economically powerful Chinese on the other- is likely to be higher. Economic stereotypes of the Chinese as commercial predators are likely to have a more explosive impact when visible markers of Chinese wealth, increasing competition in rapidly developing areas and horizontal inequalities are prominent. Religious stereotypes of the group as non-Moslem

proselytizers acquire greater salience in sites where religious symbols associated with the Chinese are greater and also in locales with densely connected Islamic networks.

CHAPTER THREE

Measuring Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia: Methodological Notes

Having outlined the theoretical foundation in explaining spatial variations in anti-Chinese violence in chapter two, this chapter seeks to elucidate the methodological framework used in tracing such variations. This research primarily uses a mixed-methods approach that consists of three main components: 1) quantitative data and statistical methods 2) qualitative data in the form of surveys, interviews and secondary source material and 3) geo-spatial analysis using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) technology. The benefits of methodological pluralism were discussed in chapter one and will not be rehashed here. The first part of this chapter discusses the different spatial units of analysis considered in the study, the logic applied in their construction and the various data sources utilized (both quantitative and qualitative). The second part of the chapter engages in definitions of key terms and the operationalization of principal dependent, independent and control variables.

Units of Analysis

I explore spatial variations in anti-Chinese violence in the late *New Order* at three distinct units of analysis. The first two units are both at the district level – the urban district and the rural district. Hence, both these units focus at the sub-national level across Indonesia. The third unit of analysis is the neighborhood level in the region of Jakarta; hence, the focus here is at the sub-city level.

Districts in Indonesia –Urban and Rural

The republic of Indonesia is divided into provinces, which is the highest tier of local government. Each province is further compartmentalized into districts. These can broadly be divided into two main categories – rural and urban districts. The rural districts are known as regencies or *Kabupaten* while their urban counterparts are referred to as municipalities/cities or *Kotamadya*. Both types of districts enjoy similar levels of administrative power with their own local government and legislative body. The principle differences between the two lie in terms of population, area and the economy. By and large, cities are a lot smaller in size (area wise) than regencies, but typically contain a much higher population density. The economy of cities is much more geared towards the manufacturing and service sectors while the economic structure of regencies is dominated by a largely agriculture based primary sector. Considerable disparities also exist between the two on the basis of human development as evidenced by average district-wise scores in the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Human Poverty Index (HPI) as calculated by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).¹

Given these quite significant differences, this research conceptually distinguishes regencies (*Kabupaten*) from cities (*Kotamadya*) and aims to tease

¹ The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures average achievements in a district in three dimensions of human development: 1) life expectancy 2) literacy rate and mean years of schooling and 3) per capita expenditure. Based on the districts included in this study, the average HDI score for cities is 69 while the average score for regencies is 61 (higher the HDI score, the better). The Human Poverty Index (HPI) measures deprivations in three basic dimensions of human development: 1) ability to survive till the age of 40 2) illiteracy rate and 3) lack of decent living standards (includes access to clean water, access to health facilities and infant nourishment). The average HPI score in cities is 17 while the corresponding score for regencies is 29 (lower the HPI score, the better). The indices were obtained from UNDP's Indonesia Human Development Report-2001.

out spatial disparities in anti-Chinese violence at city and regency levels separately. It is quite plausible that the local dynamics activating violent anti-Sinicism might be quite different in the more densely populated, smaller and economically developed cities than in the larger, more sparsely populated and less developed regencies. Hence, in order to cultivate a nuanced and rigorous explanation for the spatial trajectories of violence, the conflation of regencies and cities is not advisable and it is necessary to treat them as analytically distinct entities.

The selection of districts for datasets

At the district level, two separate datasets were constructed, one containing 56 urban districts/cities (*Kotamadya*) and the other 81 rural districts/regencies (*Kabupaten*), in all spanning 23 different provinces in Indonesia. The logic employed in the construction of datasets is briefly summarized below. First, based on academic articles, online chronologies of violence and newspaper reports, a comprehensive list of districts was compiled where the ethnic Chinese population was subjected to varying levels of violence in the late *New Order* period (from 1996 to 1999). This added up to 35 regencies and 25 cities and constituted the total universe of violent cases. Second, based on BPS census data,² the percentages of Chinese living in each of these districts were compiled. Third, the lowest percentage of Chinese living in any of the violent cities/regencies was considered as a base cut-off point. Using this cut-off, a list of

² BPS stands for Badan Pusat Statistik or the Indonesian Statistics Bureau and the population census data used is from the Year 2000 Census.

“peaceful” districts was compiled where the Chinese were either found in greater or comparable numbers to the district used as a base cut-off. This process enabled the generation of peaceful districts and yielded 31 cities and 46 regencies, thus constituting the total universe of peaceful cases. The breakdown of the two district level datasets by geographic location is given below in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Anti-Chinese Violence by District

Location	City (<i>Kotamadya</i>) dataset		Regency (<i>Kabupaten</i>) dataset	
	Violent	Peaceful	Violent	Peaceful
Java	15	11	24	7
Sumatra	7	11	4	16
Bali	0	1	0	3
Kalimantan	0	5	2	7
Sulawesi	2	2	2	6
NTT/NTB	1	1	3	7
Total	25	31	35	46

Neighborhood Level in Jakarta

The neighborhood (*Kelurahan*) is the lowest level of local administration in Indonesia. The *Kelurahan* is employed as the unit of analysis in teasing out spatial variations within Jakarta, by far the most tumultuous city during the late *New Order* era rioting against the Chinese. Officially, Jakarta (also referred to as DKI Jakarta) is a province and not a city and granted special status as the capital

of Indonesia. Jakarta is divided into five urban districts (*Kotamadya*),³ which in turn account for a total of 43 sub-districts (*Kecamatan*).⁴ Each sub-district is further disaggregated into an even lower administrative division called *Kelurahan*. In total, Jakarta constitutes 265 *Kelurahan* and the dataset constructed is based on all of them. For ease of discussion, *Kelurahan* will hereafter be referred to as “neighborhoods.”

Coding neighborhoods

Out of the 265 neighborhoods in Jakarta, 76 are coded here as being sites of anti-Chinese violence during the May riots of 1998 while the remaining 189 are classified as peaceful. The coding of violence at the neighborhood level was particularly challenging for several reasons. First, in spite of the easy availability of several detailed reports on the Jakarta riots, none of them focused explicitly on disaggregating the localities of turbulence at the neighborhood level. Second, sites of violence were frequently only referred to by the street name or highway on which they occurred; for example, most chronologies identify Jalan Kyai Tapa, Jalan Gajah Mada and Jalan Hayam Wuruk amongst several others as important streets around which rioting was concentrated.⁵ This presented a coding problem

³ The five districts in Jakarta are South Jakarta (Jakarta Selatan), West Jakarta (Jakarta Barat), Central Jakarta (Jakarta Pusat), North Jakarta (Jakarta Utara) and East Jakarta (Jakarta Timur). Kepulauan Seribu was formally a sub-district in North Jakarta and included four *Kelurahan* of its own. In 2003, Kepulauan Seribu was granted new status as a separate rural district (*Kabupaten*) in Jakarta; hence the province now consists of five *Kotamadya* and one *Kabupaten*. However, as the demographic data for Jakarta is based on the Population Census of 2000, the breakdown as existed then is taken into account and consequently Kepulauan Seribu is considered as a sub-district of North Jakarta.

⁴ The breakdown of sub-districts by district is as follows: South Jakarta -10, West Jakarta – 8, Central Jakarta -8, North Jakarta -7 and East Jakarta -10.

⁵ The term “Jalan” refers to “street” in Bahasa Indonesia.

as some of the streets/highways in Jakarta cut across several neighborhoods and at times it was difficult to pinpoint which neighborhood the violence exactly occurred in. A similar challenge was presented by the identification of particular shopping malls or banks as the loci of anti-Chinese mayhem. An online Jakarta street finder directory was immensely useful in overcoming these challenges as the said directory provided complete addresses of each location searched for, including the *Kelurahan*, which greatly facilitated the coding process.⁶ In cases where only the street name was mentioned, additional research was done to unearth prominent landmarks in close proximity to the relevant streets (as noted in descriptive accounts of such rioting), which were then useful in pinpointing the exact location of violence.

Data Sources

Quantitative Data Sources

The main demographic data source was the Indonesian Statistics Bureau (BPS). While much of the data used in this study was available in the central BPS office in Jakarta, several field trips had to be undertaken to BPS offices in various provincial capitals to obtain in-depth data on certain provinces.⁷

Data on several variables was gathered from various publications of the Year 2000 Population Census. The Census was especially useful in accumulating

⁶ The website used to facilitate coding was <http://www.streetdirectory.com/indonesia/jakarta/>.

⁷ The central office of Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) is based in Jakarta. As a supplement, each province in Indonesia has its own BPS office in the provincial capital. Provincial BPS offices contain a vast reservoir of province specific data sometimes not available in the central office. Thus, a series of visits were undertaken to the BPS offices in Bandung, Semarang and Surabaya, the provincial capitals of West Java, Central Java and East Java respectively between March and June, 2006 to bolster the data collection process in those provinces.

group level data on religion and ethnic breakdown at the local level. It is correct that the census data on demographics was collected after the occurrence of violence studied here, given that the riots occurred mostly in 1998. However, it was necessary to use data from the 2000 Census, as this was the first census since 1930 where data was collected and disseminated on the basis of ethnicity. Ethno-demographic data in previous censuses was limited to religion and earlier studies on the Chinese in Indonesia had taken the percentage of Buddhists in a given locale as a proxy for the percentage of Chinese. While this measure is frequently used, it tends to underestimate the percentage of Chinese.⁸

Moreover, it would not have been possible to construct ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) indices had data from the 2000 Census not been used. Further, a comparison of the 2000 Census with the 1995 Intercensal Population Census revealed that in most cases key demographic data (such as religious composition, population density and migration) had not changed significantly between 1995 and 2000.

UNDP Indonesia's Human Development Report (2001) was another valuable source of data for HDI and HPI related indicators. The report was published in 2001, however, many of the variables used in the report were collected between 1996 and 1999 and represent values for those years. The Indonesia Village Potential Statistics (PODES) 2000 database was used for a large number of socio-economic and organizational variables and Rand Corporation's Indonesia Family Life Survey (1997) provided useful information on horizontal

⁸ Most Buddhists in Indonesia are Chinese, but only 60% or so of the Chinese are Buddhists. Therefore, using the percentage of Buddhists as a proxy tends to underestimate the number of Chinese in a given locale.

inequalities. Finally, World Bank-Indonesia's Government and Decentralization Survey of 2002 provided district level data related to several aspects of decentralization, which while not figuring in the regression analyses (as data was not available for a significant number of districts used in this research) proved useful as a complementary source in both supporting various arguments as well as testing competing ones.

The coding of the dependent variable – the presence or absence of violence and the severity of violence - had to be done from scratch. Much of the information was acquired through newspaper archives such as Lexis-Nexis and Factiva, online and academic chronologies of the riots and leading Bahasa Indonesia newspapers such as *Kompas* and *Republika*.

Qualitative Data Sources

Given the mixed-methods approach implemented in this dissertation, the quantitative component of data collection was supplemented with several sources of qualitative data. Survey questionnaires were handed out to both *Pribumi* and Chinese segments of the populace and generated 77 responses in all, which included 46 responses from the Chinese and 31 from different *Pribumi* groups.

Survey questionnaires were distributed in four different cities. Out of the 46 Chinese responses, 27 were obtained in Jakarta (but included several respondents originating from elsewhere), 10 in the West Javanese capital of Bandung, 5 in Yogyakarta and 4 in the Central Javanese capital of Semarang. The Chinese respondents included 25 men and 21 women, ranged from age 19-41 and were engaged in a range of occupations in the secondary and tertiary sectors (14

of the Chinese were engaged in trading). Moreover, for the most part, they belonged to relatively affluent families.⁹

Most *Pribumi* responses were obtained from a non-random sample of post-graduate students at the State Islamic Universities in Jakarta and Yogyakarta.¹⁰ The respondents included 18 women and 13 men, ranged from age 23-35 and mostly came from lower middle class backgrounds. Most of the respondents were Javanese, while a handful hailed from various cities in the outer islands including Makassar in South Sulawesi, Lombok in West Nusa Tenggara, Banjarmasin in South Kalimantan and Palembang in South Sumatra.

The questions posed in the survey were more or less similar for both *Pribumi* and Chinese respondents, though not identical and posed pointed queries on relative wealth, perceptions towards the other group and extent of inter-group interaction. Moreover, the Chinese were asked to provide accounts of any institutionalized or public discrimination that they or their families may have faced. The Chinese were also asked to list (in their opinion) the most significant contributory factors for the riots of the late 1990s.

In addition, I also conducted 31 in-depth open-ended interviews in Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Semarang and Montreal with academics specializing in Chinese-Indonesian studies, journalists and several leading members of prominent Chinese-Indonesian associations. The interviews were helpful in eliciting more

⁹ The Chinese respondents could be considered “wealthy” by average Indonesian standards. However, only a handful of the respondents considered themselves as hailing from rich families by Chinese Indonesian standards.

¹⁰ I was attached as a visiting fellow at the State Islamic University in Jakarta from February to July in 2006 and spent a further month there in August 2007. The university catered exclusively to Moslems and the respondents were drawn from the Islamic Inter-disciplinary Studies (IIS) Program.

detailed responses on a diverse array of aspects ranging from demographics to discrimination and these will be used to flesh out some of the statistical findings presented in chapters six and seven.

Data Sources for Geo-Spatial Analysis

This study utilizes geographic information systems (GIS) technology to spatially map patterns of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia. The GIS system used in this dissertation is ARC GIS, developed and supplied by the Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI). It is currently one of the most widespread commercial GIS systems in use globally.

Definitions of Key Terms

Anti-Chinese Violence

Anti-Chinese violence is defined in this study as any violence in which the Chinese are explicitly targeted because of their perceived ethnic and national origins; thus, the victims are attacked not in their capacities as individuals but as representatives of their groups. Further, this definition also includes attacks on buildings, properties and institutions associated with the ethnic Chinese community. This is derived from the definition coined by Björge and Witte (1993) in explaining patterns of racist violence in Europe.

Percentage of Chinese

As noted earlier, the Year 2000 Population Census contained district and sub-district level data on the percentage of Chinese. Data on ethnicity was

collected on the basis of self-identification. However, BPS only published processed data for the 8 largest ethnic groups in each province; therefore, numerical data for the Chinese was available for only 11 provinces (where the group qualified as one of the 8 largest). This meant that data on the percentage of ethnic Chinese was available for only 89 of the 137 districts included in the study.

For the remaining 48 districts, the percentage of Buddhists in each district had to be considered as a proxy variable for the size of the Chinese community. As noted earlier, this was not ideal and leads to some underestimation of the size of the Chinese given that approximately one third of all Chinese are Christians. However, in the absence of data on ethnicity, there was no choice but to use religion as a proxy for these 48 districts.

Measurement of Dependent Variables

Severity of Violence

The severity of anti-Chinese violence was used as the dependent variable at the district level, for both urban and rural districts. Gauging the severity of internal conflict/civil war is challenging and most works on the subject use the number of battle deaths to measure the concept (Lacina, 2005; Lacina and Gleditsch, 2006). Studies on state-sponsored genocide/politicide have also relied on the number of victims to contextualize the severity of such acts (Krain, 1997; Harff and Gurr, 1988).

In the context of the Chinese in Indonesia, measuring the severity of violence against the group by focusing on the number of fatalities alone is misleading and leads to a skewed depiction. Despite the widespread occurrence of

anti-Chinese rioting during the late *New Order*, many of the episodes did not involve any fatalities and much of the destruction was wrought on property and other symbols of wealth associated with the Chinese community. Indeed, even in several of the fatal incidents, the number of dead was quite low, often less than 10 (the most prominent exception to this of course is the Jakarta riots in May 1998 which claimed the lives of an estimated 1,200 people).

Thus, it is more meaningful to visualize severity of violence as a more multi-dimensional concept, of which fatalities is just one component. Based on descriptive accounts of many of the violent outbreaks, this research has developed a composite measure and identified five criteria deemed useful in the determination of severity.

1) Number of fatalities and injured

As mentioned above, many of the riots resulted in either no or few fatalities, with large scale riots in Jakarta, Solo and Medan being the exceptions. Where possible, information was collected on the number of injured and this includes both Chinese victims as well as *Pribumi* perpetrators (mainly injured in clashes with authorities as they attempted to disperse crowds).

2) Extent of property damage

Most riots included some degree of damage inflicted on shops, homes, businesses, vehicles, places of religious worship, etc. The extent of destruction ranged from the 9 shops looted in the Sarang sub-district of Rembang regency on January 27, 1998 to the razing and looting of over

1,500 buildings in the city of Makassar in mid September of 1997, resulting in damage estimated to be in excess of four million US dollars.¹¹

3) *Number of violent incidents in the district from 1996 to 1999*

While many of the districts experienced violent outbursts just once, several others were sites of recurrent bouts of anti-Chinese riots – for instance, the regency of Jember in East Java and the city of Pekalongan in Central Java.

4) *Duration of riot*

The longevity of violence varied with the more ephemeral episodes lasting a few hours to certain others continuing for 3-4 days. As an example, the disturbance in Bojonegoro on February 7, 1998 subsided in a few hours after 20 people looted a Chinese shop; in contrast, rampaging crowds went on a sustained spree of burning, stoning and looting lasting several days in Medan, Solo and of course Jakarta during the May riots.

5) *Riot participants*

The number of participants in a riot is also a useful measure to gauge its severity and spans from a few dozen in Banyuwangi to over 10,000 in Cilacap in August 1998.¹²

¹¹ For more information on the Rembang and Makassar riots, read the chronology of anti-Chinese violence compiled by Human Rights Watch at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/1998/02/18/indone1062.htm>

¹² See chronologies of violence at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/1998/02/18/indone1062.htm> and at http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Senate/9388/article/an_anatomy_of_the_recent_anti_et.htm

Based on the five criteria enumerated above, the severity of violence was coded from 0-3 with the breakdown as follows:

- 0 – No violence
- 1 – Low levels of violence
- 2 – Intermediate/medium levels of violence
- 3 – Severe violence

Districts deemed as sites of low violence typically experienced no fatalities, contained moderate property damage and entailed a single relatively short riot drawing a few hundred participants at best. Sites of inter-mediate violence sometimes involved fatalities (not always), more extensive property damage, recurrent rioting or longer episodes of rioting and attracted larger crowds than districts coded for low levels of violence. Districts at the upper end of the coding spectrum (coded as 3) included a significant number of dead and injured, large scale destruction of property (often running into the many hundreds), longer, more drawn out riots attracting thousands of participants and received widespread publicity in the media. Such riots were fortunately rare and only the cities that bore the brunt of the mayhem in May 1998 –all five districts in Jakarta, Solo, Medan and Tangerang for instance- are coded as locales of severe violence.

While emphasis was placed on all of the above indicators, the coding process involved an element of subjectivity as well. For example, the regency of Jember was caught up in a series of “mild” anti-Chinese riots in January and February of 1998. Had any of these incidents been considered in isolation, the regency would have been coded for low violence, but given recurrent anti-Chinese outbursts, Jember regency was coded as a site of intermediate levels of violence. Similarly, the regency of Rembang in Central Java also experienced a

series of low intensity riots which nonetheless necessitated coding the city as a locus of intermediate of violence.

For the neighbourhood level analysis in Jakarta, the dependent variable was simply the presence or absence of violence in each neighbourhood. Thus it was coded as a binary variable (0= non violent and 1= violent). It would have been ideal to measure the severity of violence at the neighbourhood level; however, given the dearth of data on all five of the components identified above, it was quite challenging to operationalize severity in each neighbourhood.

Measurement of Key Independent Variables

Measuring Ethnic diversity

This study uses two different indicators to measure ethnic heterogeneity at each relevant unit of analysis.

Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Index

Scholars have used a variety of indices to capture ethnic diversity. Most commonly utilized is the Ethnic Fractionalization Index (ELF) based on the standard Herfindahl Concentration Formula (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 2003; Fearon, 2003). Such an index measures the extent to which two individuals taken at random in a given locale would belong to different ethnic groups. For instance, if the fractionalization score in city A is .12, this means that there is a 12% probability that two people meeting at random in city A would be from distinct ethnic groups. ELF scores were computed for each district as well as for each neighborhood in Jakarta.

Competitive ethnic groups

In spite of being frequently used, fractionalization indices have been criticized by some (Esteban and Ray, 1994; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Fearon, 2003; Posner, 2004; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). For instance, Fearon (2003) observes that summarizing the entire ethnic landscape of a country (or at a smaller spatial unit as relevant to this research) with a single number (as fractionalization indices do) is too simplistic and may at times obscure highly salient features of ethnic diversity. Posner (2004) questions whether the Herfindahl Concentration Formula provides appropriate technology to accurately capture ethnic diversity within a given locale¹³ and notes that fractionalization indices provide no information on the depth of relations between different groups.

Given some of the above weaknesses associated with fractionalization indices, Posner (2004) has devised an alternative concept that he calls “politically relevant groups.” He argues that the inclusion of numerous small ethnic groups will skew the scores in the ELF index and represent a misleading picture of the ethnic dynamics in a given locale. Therefore, in Posner’s formulation of “politically relevant groups,” only ethnic groups that have a realistic chance of affecting political calculations are included.

Loosely based on Posner’s framework, this study uses a measure called the “number of competitive ethnic groups.” Here, only ethnic groups that constitute a minimum of 5% of the total population in the relevant unit of analysis

¹³ Posner illustrates his point with a hypothetical example. Imagine two locales; the first with two groups of equal size and the second containing three salient groups containing two-thirds, one-sixth and one-sixth of the population respectively. In both locales, the fractionalization index computed with the Herfindahl Formula would be .5; yet, the dynamics of ethnic competition would be vastly different in the two settings (Posner, 2004).

were considered. The 5% threshold is a subjective measure and approximates the threshold used by Posner.

Visible wealth of the Chinese

Rapid expansion of the Indonesian economy in the late 1980s and the early 1990s led to an explosion of Chinese enterprises around the country. These were referred to as local conglomerates (*Konglomerat Lokal*) and became ostentatious and highly visible symbols of Chinese wealth. Examples of visible wealth include banks and supermarkets/department stores under Chinese ownership. Indeed, some of the leading supermarket chains in the country such as Hero, Ramayana, Matahari and Indomart (all with outlets in most parts of the archipelago), as well as banks such as Lippo, BCA and BHS are all Chinese owned.

The PODES 2000 dataset provides data on supermarkets, shopping complexes and banks for each neighborhood in each district across the country. However, the data does not specify whether such assets are owned by the Chinese; yet, based on the literature (Sidel, 2006; Schwarz, 2000; Shari, 2000) and empirical evidence, it is reasonable to assume that many of these assets (especially supermarkets and shopping complexes) are either owned by the Chinese or controlled by Chinese wealth.¹⁴ Further, it is believed that many of the over 200 banks and major corporations in the country are “run” by the Chinese.¹⁵

¹⁴ It is believed that over 90% of supermarket chains and nearly 70% of all banks in Indonesia are either owned by the Chinese or controlled by Chinese money.

¹⁵ Michael Shari, ‘Wages of Hatred: Indonesia’s hostility to a minority costs a country dearly,’ *Businessweek Online*, October 9, 2000.

Thus, in the absence of more accurate data, PODES data is used as a proxy to capture visible wealth belonging to the Chinese.

The variables in PODES merely indicate whether such assets (supermarkets for example) are present in each neighborhood in the district and do not provide figures on the total number of supermarkets in the district. To overcome this limitation, I counted the number of neighborhoods in each district that contained supermarkets and divided that by the total number of neighborhoods in the district; the resulting score depicts the extent of supermarkets across the district.¹⁶ Hence, higher the score derived, higher the “visible wealth” of the Chinese. The same procedure was repeated for shopping complexes, banks and market places.

Chapter two argued that visible markers of Chinese wealth are likely to be particularly problematic in poorer locales. Therefore, in order to capture the extent to which Chinese wealth “sticks out,” it was necessary to create an interaction between supermarkets/banks/shopping complexes on the one hand and the total number of poor settlements/slums on the other, for each unit of analysis. The data for poor settlements also came from the PODES 2000 dataset.

Rapidly developing regencies

Chapter two hypothesized that economic resentment against the Chinese is likely to be greater in rapidly developing areas. This study uses UNDP Indonesia’s Human Development Reduction Shortfall variable to operationalize

¹⁶ For instance, if district A consists of 20 neighbourhoods and supermarkets are found in 15 of them, the score derived for district A would $15/20 = .75$. In other words, supermarkets are found across 75% of the district.

rapidly developing locales. The variable measures the extent to which the Human Development Index score (HDI) has changed from 1996 to 1999. A higher reduction shortfall indicates that the district has made progress in improving its collective HDI. As noted earlier, HDI is a composite variable made up of longevity (measured by life expectancy), level of education (measured by the mean years of schooling and adult literacy rate) and average living standards (measured by adjusted per capita expenditure).

The reduction shortfall variable is only available at the district level. Thus, in order to operationalize rapidly developing areas at the neighborhood level in Jakarta, I used healthcare trends (from the PODES dataset) as a proxy variable. This variable asks respondents to denote whether healthcare trends have improved or worsened over the last year or so. Given that PODES data was collected in 1999, the variable measures the extent of healthcare around the time many of the riots took place. Locales where healthcare trends improved would be considered as rapidly developing areas and consequently more vulnerable to violence.

Horizontal inequalities (HI)

Disparities between different ethnic groups in a variety of spheres including education, income and access to political opportunities are defined as horizontal inequalities. Precise measurement of HIs requires group level data for the relevant variables. While BPS provides detailed data on an array of socio-economic indicators, this is mostly available only for the pertinent unit of analysis as a whole and not for every group in that unit of analysis. For example, while it is possible to get overall data on the level of poverty or unemployment at the

regency, city or neighborhood level, group level data for the above variables is unavailable. Thus, measurement of HIs is compromised and is a caveat in this dataset.

This research overcomes this limitation to a certain extent by using Rand Corporation data from the 1997 Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFSL). The dataset contains a wealth of information collected at the household level across the archipelago and crucially includes a question whereby respondents are asked to identify which culture (Javanese, Sundanese, etc.) influences their daily lives the most. Using that as a proxy for ethnic affiliation, it is possible to distill group level data at the district level. Income and education were chosen (as these two indicators generated the most responses) to measure inter-group disparities at the various units of analysis. However, IFSL data is only available for a total of 97 districts (both cities and regencies) out of the 137 used in this research. Further, the sample size of respondents varies across districts and the ethnic distribution of survey participants is also uneven in some cases with most respondents belonging to a single ethnic group in certain districts.¹⁷ Given that IFSL data is only available for 97 districts, HIs were not included directly in the regression analyses (as the number of districts/observations would have shrunk considerably), but were relied upon mostly to provide descriptive statistics on the extent of group differences at the various localities. Yet, in spite of these limitations, IFSL data is useful in drawing tentative conclusions on the nature of HIs in the spheres of household income and average level of education across different spatial

¹⁷ The number of respondents in the dataset varies across districts from a high of 220 each in the regencies of Cirebon and Karawang to a low of a solitary respondent in the city of Metro in Lampung and two respondents in Indragiri Hulu, Madiun and Pasuruan.

aggregations. Further, some of the surveys that I conducted amongst both *Pribumi* and Chinese respondents also contain questions on horizontal inequalities and these were also utilized to supplement IFSL data.

Visibility of non-Moslem sites of worship

The visibility of sites of religious worship associated with the Chinese was operationalized by measuring the density of churches (both Catholic and Protestant) and Buddhist temples at regency, city and neighborhood levels. Hindu temples were not considered, as the percentage of Chinese who are Hindu is likely to be negligible. Two separate indicators were created to measure density of non-Moslem sites of worship – density by population and density by area. Density by population was obtained by dividing the total number of Catholic churches, Protestant churches and Buddhist temples by the total population in each unit of analysis while density by area was generated by dividing the total number of churches/temples by the total landmass in each unit of analysis.

Kota Santri/places of religious piety

As discussed earlier, *Kota Santri* or devout region refers to locales of high religious piety; such regions are replete with an abundance of Islamic schools, institutes of higher learning and deeply entrenched networks of Islamic associational activity. Devout regions were operationalized by measuring the combined density of Islamic schools and mosques at each unit of analysis.

The term “Islamic schools” encompasses two different kinds: *Madrasah* and *Pesantren*. *Madrasah* refers to religious schools with graded classes and a

standardized curriculum which largely includes general subjects. Most government supervised *Madrasahs* offer 30% religious classes and 70% general subjects. *Pesantrens* differ from *Madrasahs* in placing greater emphasis on religious subjects, though in recent times several *Pesantrens* have emphasized more on general subjects. In contrast to *Madrasahs*, *Pesantrens* are also considered as boarding schools where students are provided dormitory accommodation; these schools only operate at the secondary level (van Bruinessen, 2004). *Pesantrens* are mostly found in rural areas and considered as centers of rural religious life.

As with the earlier indicator, a twofold measure was employed to capture total density of Islamic schools and mosques –density by population and density by area. In density by population, the total number of *Madrasahs*, *Pesantrens* and mosques was divided by the unit level population, while density by area was generated by dividing the total number of *Madrasahs*, *Pesantrens* and mosques by unit landmass. All data on Islamic schools and places of worship were acquired from the PODES 2000 dataset.

Control Variables

In addition to the variables described above, a range of other socio-economic indicators was also used, as control variables, but also to measure competing explanations. The logic employed in the selection of some of the control variables is briefly described below.

Percentage of traders

As discussed in chapter two, several accounts of anti-Chinese violence attribute primacy to economic explanations. Wertheim (1964) for instance argues that the middleman minority role of the Chinese makes the group vulnerable to societal backlash. I test for this proposition by including data on the percentage of traders in each unit of analysis. Given the abundance of small-time Chinese shopkeepers across the country and the clear dominance of the Chinese in trading (Shari, 2000), it is assumed that locales with higher percentages of traders would make the Chinese more susceptible to rioting either by amplifying the middleman minority role of the group or due to increasing competition with other traders.

Unemployment and economic growth rates

Several explanations have attributed the Asian Financial Crisis and its disastrous impact on Indonesia as causal factors in the outbreak of violence against the Chinese. I test for this by using data on unemployment and economic growth rates in 1997. It is true that much of the violence occurred in 1998. However, given that most of the riots occurred before the end of May 1998, it makes more sense to use growth rates from 1997. Hence, locales experiencing negative growth rates would be more likely candidates for anti-Chinese rioting. Data on unemployment and growth rates were obtained from various BPS publications.

Economic growth rates were only available at the district level. Therefore, for the Jakarta level analysis, I used a variable from PODES that measured respondents' satisfaction with their economic outcomes in 1998-1999.

Availability of essential commodities

Several of the riots in early 1998 have been broadly described as “food riots” and believed to have been triggered by acute shortages of essential commodities (Mackie, 1999). I test for this by constructing a composite variable obtained from PODES 2000 that measures the availability of 9 essential commodities (rice, sugar, cooking oil, kerosene, milk, eggs, meat, maize and salt) across various spatial units.

High school dropouts

In the aftermath of the riots, many elements, especially within government circles, attempted to explain the violence as the work of the frustrated underclass or disaffected youth (Zon, 2004). I test for this proposition at the district level by using UNDP’s variable on school dropout rates for ages 16-18 and at the neighborhood level in Jakarta by looking at the PODES variable that examined junior high school dropout trends in 1998-1999.

Social gathering

Varshney (2002) argues that inter-group civic networks play a vital role in mitigating communal violence. It was not possible to directly test Varshney’s argument in this case as Chinese associations were forbidden during Suharto’s *New Order*. However, PODES 2000 contains a variable on the extent of social gatherings and I include this as a control variable to measure the impact of neighborhood level associational/mobilizational activity on anti-Chinese violence.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on methodology; it has sought to elaborate the logic behind the compilation of datasets at various spatial aggregations, describe the multiple data sources used and provide definitions of key terms and justification for the measurements used in capturing principal dependent, independent and control variables. Thus, it sets the stage for the presentation of empirical results at city, regency and neighborhood levels across the Indonesian archipelago. These results will be presented in chapters six and seven.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Institutionalization of Exclusion: The Construction of a Disliked Minority

This chapter takes a step back and examines the historical construction of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia as a “disliked community.” This dislike is predicated on three essential attributes: ethnic distinctiveness, economic dominance and religious difference. By primarily focusing on a series of discriminatory rules, regulations and unwritten behavioral norms, the chapter seeks to explain how ethnic, economic and religious differences vis-à-vis the ethnic Chinese were cultivated and reinforced by successive Indonesian regimes. The chapter serves the purpose of articulating how this historically driven process of institutionalized exclusion facilitated the creation of rigid stereotypes of the Chinese as non-*Pribumi* outsiders, economic exploiters and disloyal non-Moslems. It is these deeply entrenched images that were so readily exploited by conniving elites in the lead-up to the riots of the late *New Order*.

The chapter comprises four sections. Section one outlines why the Chinese in Indonesia continue to be treated as a homogeneous category in spite of palpable differences within the group. Section two looks at the construction of the Chinese as non-*Pribumis* and this is followed in sections three and four by an examination of the Chinese as an economically superior group and a privileged religious minority respectively.

Perceptions of Chinese Homogeneity

It is crucial to note that the Chinese are often treated as a homogenous category in Indonesia, notwithstanding numerous differences in terms of place of origin, dialect, economic conditions and so forth (Suryadinata, 1997). Before reasons for the construction of homogeneity are addressed, this section briefly elucidates some of the major differences within the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.

Ethnic Chinese started arriving in Indonesia as early as the 13th century (Chin, 2000) and there were several large Chinese settlements in different parts of Java by the 15th century (Tan, 2005), including a few well established Chinese Moslem communities along the north coast of Java (Purcell, 1965). Large scale migration first took place during the Dutch colonial period (Chin, 2000) and the development of a culture of export agriculture triggered an even larger wave of migrants in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.¹ Significant settlements in the outer islands took place from the second half of the 19th century and included gold diggers in West Kalimantan (Somers Heidhues, 2003), plantation laborers in the tobacco fields in parts of North Sumatra (Tan, 2005), tin miners on the islands of Bangka and Belitung (Somers Heidhues, 1992) and fisher communities in Bengkalis and Bagan Si Api-Api (Tan, 2005). The majority of the Chinese originated from China's southern coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian and the dominant languages of the immigrants included Hokkien, Hakka, Teochiu and Cantonese.

¹ In 1860, the Chinese population was around 221,000, swelling to more than half a million by the 1900s. Most of the migrants were petty traders, tin miners and skilled artisans. Migration dropped to insignificant levels in the 1930s against the backdrop of the Great Depression.

Thus, it is evident that considerable differences exist amongst the Chinese in terms of length of stay in Indonesia, place of settlement in the archipelago and also places of origin and linguistic affiliations. Significant variations also prevail in terms of religious denominations with most Chinese adhering to Buddhism, Confucianism and various Christian denominations. Furthermore, a small minority of the Chinese also converted to Islam (Tan, 2005). Further, Many scholars have debunked the myth of the Chinese as a uniformly powerful group in terms of the economy and have revealed strong intra-ethnic economic cleavages (Jesudason, 1997; Gomez and Hsiao, 2004).²

The Peranakan-Totok Dichotomy

The most significant distinction within the Chinese population is in terms of the socio-cultural categories *Peranakan* and *Totok*. *Peranakan* refers to people of non-Indonesian ethnic origin who have lived in Indonesia for generations and have become thoroughly Indonesianized. *Peranakan* have intermarried more frequently with Indonesians and are usually completely illiterate in Chinese languages and identify far more closely with Indonesia (and regional ethnicities) as opposed to the provinces in Southern China from where their ancestors arrived. This group has developed its own customs, dialect, *batik*, and cuisine, adapted from local culture (Chin, 2001). The *Totok*³ on the other hand are recent arrivals, primarily Buddhist or Christian, who speak Chinese, follow Chinese customs and

² In spite of widespread *Pribumi* perceptions of Chinese prosperity, only a small percentage of the Chinese can be considered as “wealthy.” Several scholars have addressed wealth inequalities within the Chinese in Indonesia and these will be addressed in more detail later in the chapter.

³ *Totok* is a colonial term originally referring to Indonesia’s immigrant Chinese who were brought in by the Dutch to work as coolies in the mines of West Kalimantan and in the plantations of North Sumatra.

show much greater affinity towards their place of origin. Further, *Totoks* dominate business enterprises in Indonesia and are noted for their high levels of cooperation with each other. However, with the end of immigration from Mainland China, the number of *Totok* has reduced drastically and their descendants have also been *Peranakanised*.

Suryadinata's (1986) analysis of the 1920 and 1930 census data⁴ shows that the *Peranakan* community was approximately 35-38% of the total Chinese community in the country at the time. However, regional differences were stark with Java being overwhelmingly *Peranakan* (almost 70%) and the outer islands being even more overwhelmingly *Totok* (close to 90%). He extends the analysis to census data of 1961 and 1971⁵ and estimates that the *Peranakan* percentage (especially in Java) increased even further during this time. The increased "*Peranakanization*" in Java is mostly attributed to pressures from the government to expedite the process of "Indonesian nation building" (Suryadinata, 1986: 96).

Social tensions and friction between the two groups have been frequently noted. The *Peranakan* have complained bitterly of the economic dominance of the *Totok*, often at the expense of the *Peranakan*. The *Totok* on the other hand pride themselves on being "pure" Chinese (Schwarz, 2000:103) and look down at the *Peranakan* for being of mixed ancestry, not being able to converse in Chinese

⁴ The respective sizes of the *Peranakan* and *Totok* communities were estimated through data on the use of language in daily speech. For example, those who spoke an Indonesian language were classified as *Peranakan* while those who spoke one of the many Chinese dialects were categorized as *Totok*.

⁵ These two censuses did not provide information on the number of ethnic Chinese in the country or on the daily language used by the Chinese. Therefore, it is rather difficult to compute the size of the *Peranakan* and *Totok* Chinese communities. Thus, the figures that Suryadinata gives are educated guesses extrapolated from the 1920 census and other sketchy information (Suryadinata, 1986: 95).

dialects and have accused the latter of being unpatriotic towards China (Suryadinata, 1986:94). The *Peranakan* and *Totok* communities formed their own political organizations in the 1930s. For instance, most *Peranakan* supported Chung Hwa Hui (CHH) - which advocated support for the Dutch and campaigned for equal status of Chinese with Europeans - and the Indonesian Chinese Party (PTI) which campaigned for full citizenship for the *Peranakan* in an independent Indonesia. *Totok* support mainly came for organizations such as the Sin Po group (Suryadinata, 1981).

The Blurring of Distinctions

Given the myriad variations amongst the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, in terms of demography, economy, religion and culture, the irrelevance of these nuances for the *Pribumi* and the perception of homogeneity of the Chinese is indeed a curious feature. A quick look at the policies of the various governments – Dutch colonial authorities, the Japanese (during the invasion) and the post-independence governments – helps to explain how the Chinese gradually began to be perceived as a more or less monolithic category.

The Dutch creation of the Chinese as a distinct socio-legal category of “Foreign Orientals” overlooked clear markers of differentiation between the long established *Peranakan* and the more recent *Totok* (Augilar, 2001). The Dutch system of a three-fold racial stratification (explained in more detail later on in the chapter) had the effect of distinguishing the Chinese from the *Pribumi* and also helped to minimize differences within the Chinese in the minds of the indigenous population.

The *Peranakan* and *Totok* distinction got blurred even further during the Japanese occupation of the country from 1942-1945. As Yang (2001) notes, the Japanese military administration took the view “once a Chinese always a Chinese” and lumped all Chinese together into the same category known as “*Kakyo*.” *Peranakan* were criticized for not being proficient in the Chinese language and compelled to make their children attend Chinese schools. The distance between the two groups was clearly reduced as a result. Consequences of the policy included increasing interactions between various Chinese groups as well as “encouraging *Pribumi* Indonesians to treat all ethnic Chinese, including *Peranakan* with several generations of residence, as outsiders” (Yang, 2001).

The various policies enacted by Sukarno and in particular the Suharto regime were conceptualized mainly in terms of a Chinese versus *Pribumi* divide and did not take into consideration socio-cultural, demographic or economic differences amongst the Chinese. If at all any internal distinction was made, it was with reference to citizenship with many of the discriminatory regulations ostensibly aimed at alien Chinese rather than Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent. However, in practice, the lines were often blurred and Chinese across the board were impacted by the regulations.⁶ For example, Suharto’s policies in 1967 to dismantle the three central pillars of Chinese culture by banning Chinese language schools, media and associational activity were all-encompassing and had the effect of minimizing differences not only between *Peranakan* and *Totok* Chinese but also between citizen and non-citizen Chinese.

⁶ Many of these regulations and their adverse effect on the Chinese community as a whole are analyzed in detail in the latter half of this chapter.

Chinese as Non-*Pribumi*: The Creation of an “Outsider” Community

This section deals with the first plank of the triple minority –the non-native or non-*Pribumi*⁷ status of the Chinese- and seeks to outline how this difference between groups was constructed and perpetuated through a series of discriminatory rules and regulations. Much of the focus centers on measures taken by the *New Order* regime of President Suharto as the ethnic Chinese increasingly began to be viewed as a serious problem for national integration. Yet, it has to be noted that the process of institutionalized exclusion predates the emergence of the *New Order* government (1966-1998) by some distance. The Chinese were already well defined, marked out and segregated as a non-indigenous group long before the *New Order* and the tradition of discrimination dates back to the Dutch colonial period (Chua, 2004). This sustained process of institutionalized exclusion has contributed to inculcating a deeply embedded image of the Chinese as a “stereotypically and inveterately alien group” (Augilar, 2001) in the minds of native Indonesians.

Dutch Policy of Racial Stratification

Articles 131 and 163 of the Netherlands Indies Constitution of 1925 divided the population of the colony into three categories –Europeans, Foreign Orientals (*Vreemde Oosterlingen*) and Natives. The term “Foreign Orientals”

⁷ The term *Pribumi* denotes a special attachment to land and reinforces the status of the indigenous as the original inhabitants of a particular land to which other groups subsequently migrated. In the Indonesian context, the term *Pribumi* refers to the myriad different indigenous ethnic groups in the country ranging from the Javanese to the Batak and from the Madurese to the Dayaks. The moniker non-*Pribumi* is conferred on citizens deemed to be of foreign origin/descent, most notably the ethnic Chinese.

included Chinese (by far the largest component), Arabs and Indians, but over time became mostly associated with the Chinese. This system of differentiation of the Chinese has continued in practice since independence and though most Chinese are legally considered citizens, they lack the same legitimacy of belonging to the nation as *Pribumis* (Purdey, 2006:8).

Under Dutch rule, the Chinese were given more privileges than the natives but less than the Europeans, as the former were relied upon to keep the colonial enterprise functioning smoothly. Thus, through a system of preferential treatment, many advantages accrued to the Chinese over a range of economic activities. These included the granting of leases over large administrative areas (at times encompassing entire villages), favorable terms for imports and the extraction of agricultural produce for export (Bertrand, 2004). Moreover, monopolies were also granted to the Chinese for the collection of road tolls, bazaar fees and opium (Bertrand, 2004). In many cases they acted as de facto tax collectors for the Dutch and powerful lending syndicates established a stranglehold over much of the banking needs of the country (Schwarz, 2000: 102).

This system of racial stratification meant that the Chinese required separate registration for births, marriages, deaths, school admissions and even separate living quarters from the native Indonesians (Ocorandi, 1998). This was in line with the colonial government's policy of segregating racial groups into *wijkenstelsel* or the neighborhood system and passes had to be obtained in order to move in and out of these residential quarters (Coppel, 1983; Tan, 2005). Legally, the Chinese often enjoyed a superior status to the natives (Schwarz, 2000:102). On criminal issues, the Chinese were subjected to similar legal codes as the

natives, but on commercial and civil matters, they were deemed to be on par with the Europeans.⁸

Emergence of Nationalist Movements

Several nationalist movements emerged at the turn of the century and largely followed group identities. Nationalist Chinese formed several organizations with the explicit aim of promoting Chinese cultural characteristics and interests. Preeminent amongst these was the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (THKK), founded in 1900, with accentuation on the revitalization of Chinese culture, Confucianism and Chinese language (Bertrand, 2004; Azra, 1994).⁹ The birth of Indonesian nationalism in the form of Sarekat Islam in 1912 –the first major Indonesian nationalist organization- is closely associated with this rise of Chinese nationalism in the early 20th century. Sarekat Islam was formed in an effort to curtail Chinese economic dominance and one of its initial activities was the organization of boycotts against Chinese entrepreneurs across Java (Azra, 1994; Shairaiishi, 1997).¹⁰ The main features of Sarekat Islam included aggressive anti-

⁸ The Regulation on Chinese Private Law- passed in 1919 –sharply differentiated the Chinese from other Foreign Orientals and stipulated that the Chinese be subjected to almost the entire European Civil and Commercial Codes (Tan, 2005).

⁹ The THKK was the first pan-Chinese organization in Java and was founded in the city of Jakarta in 1900. This was the earliest organization with nationalist overtones in Indonesia. THKK was primarily motivated with the preservation of Chinese social, cultural and religious practices. Subsequently, the THKK evolved into an educational organization and founded its own schools in several parts of the archipelago (Azra, 1994; Suryadinata, 1986). For a more detailed description of the rise of overseas Chinese nationalism in Indonesia, see Williams (1960).

¹⁰ A range of factors are attributed to the rise and growth of this organization including the articulation of economic grievances against the Chinese, increasing salience of religious cleavages in society and accusations of increasing Chinese arrogance and “haughtiness” in the wake of the Chinese revolution in 1911 (Purdey, 2006). The organization was essentially used as a tool, especially by the rural population of Java, to articulate their grievances against the government. Much of the core membership of the organization was initially made up of the lower middle class;

Chinese attitudes, exclusiveness and hostility toward outsiders and a passionate reflection of Indonesia's nationalist awakening (Kartodirdjo, 1973). The meteoric expansion of Sarekat Islam coincided with a series of riots of an explicit anti-Chinese disposition that broke out across Java from 1912-1918. It is quite evident that the growth of the movement contributed to an augmentation of anti-Chinese sentiment in this era, yet, the multi-faceted nature of the riots indicates that attributing sole causality of violence to the rise of Sarekat Islam is too simplistic.¹¹

Policies by Post-Independence Governments

1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia

The markers of differentiation between groups are enshrined in no less an instrument than the inaugural constitution of the country. Article 26 of the constitution which deals with issues of citizenship makes an unambiguous and categorical distinction between “native-born Indonesians” and “persons of other nationality,” even if it also proclaims that those of the latter group who have become citizens have the same rights as indigenous Indonesians (Coppel, 2001: 35).¹² Furthermore, Article 6 of the constitution specifies that the president of the

subsequently, membership of the movement expanded to include several other groups in society including *Santri* Moslems and large chunks of the rural population.

¹¹ Many accounts have been written about the rise of anti-Chinese violence in the early 20th century that showcase the complex, multi-faceted nature of the rioting. These include economic hostility, growing nationalist consciousness on the part of the Chinese and the natives (in other words the convergence of two streams of nationalism), ethnic prejudice and religious revivalism (Kartodirdjo, 1973; Azra, 1994). Other analyses revolve around the centrality of a particular explanation; these include Chandra's (2002) account of relative deprivation in terms of wage inequalities between the Chinese and native workers leading to conflict and Shairaishi's (1997) illuminating account of how colonial elites manipulated social sentiment to foster anti-Chinese violence to deflect attention from the burgeoning nationalist movement.

¹² Article 26 of the 1945 constitution of the Republic of Indonesia states “Citizens shall be persons who are native-born Indonesians (*orang-orang bangsa Indonesia asli*) and persons of other

country shall be a native born Indonesian (*orang Indonesia asli*) signifying that the highest seat in the country is out of bounds for citizens of “other nationalities.”¹³

Policies of the New Order Government (1966-1998)

The early *New Order* government (in the mid to late 1960s) passed a series of regulations with the explicit intention of expediting the assimilation or *pembauran* of the ethnic Chinese (Tan, 1991).¹⁴ The officially proclaimed goal was to completely absorb the Chinese in society and thus to solve the “Chinese Problem” once and for all (Schwarz, 1994: 106).

Masalah Cina -The Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem

A sequence of events in the mid 1960s prompted the Indonesian government to formulate a comprehensive solution to what was deemed as *Masalah Cina* (the Chinese problem). In the prelude to the violence of 1965, many in the army and in the Moslem community saw the ethnic Chinese as a fifth column for the government of Mao Zedong. As tension grew between the military and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), then the largest in the world outside China and the Soviet Union, suspicions about the loyalty of the Indonesian

nationality (*orang-orang bangsa lain*) who are legalized by statute as being citizens.” Article 27 stipulates that the same legal rights and obligations apply to all citizens regardless of descent. As Coppel observes, many of the discriminatory regulations subsequently enacted against Indonesian Citizens of Chinese descent- or WNI Chinese (*Warga Negara Indonesia*) - as they are popularly referred to, go against the very spirit of article 27 of the 1945 constitution.

¹³ The constitution has subsequently being amended several times in the post-Suharto period and now allows provisions for Indonesian born ethnic Chinese to become the president of the country, even if it still excludes naturalized Chinese from running for presidency.

¹⁴ Many of the regulations implemented against the ethnic Chinese are diametrically opposite to *Pancasila*, the national ideology of the country that urges all of Indonesia’s many sub-groups to be treated the same. Further, the policies also go against Indonesia’s official motto or slogan of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, which effectively means “Unity in Diversity.”

Chinese grew as well. After a botched coup attempt on October 1, 1965, which was immediately blamed on the PKI, the resultant crackdown on suspected communists led to the massacre of an estimated 500,000 people over a period of two years.¹⁵ The aftermath of the foiled coup and the resulting blood bath led to a sharp deterioration of relations with the People's Republic of China and eventually led to the severing of diplomatic ties between the two countries in 1967. The government takeover of alien Chinese schools in 1966, discriminatory measures adopted by the military commander in the province of East Java in late 1966¹⁶ and violent skirmishes in Jakarta in April 1967 between the Chinese and the *Pribumi* exacerbated a growing climate of increasing anti-Sinicism, both at an elite and mass level. Given this context, the Indonesian government moved to formulate a comprehensive plan to deal with *Masalah Cina*.

On August 16th 1967, in an Independence Day speech to the nation on the “Chinese Problem,” Suharto urged the Chinese to assimilate:

“I appeal to Indonesian citizens of foreign descent to delay no longer their integration and assimilation with the Indonesian (indigenous) community. Brothers and sisters let us be aware that brothers and sisters of (foreign descent) have already chosen voluntarily –without force– to take up Indonesian citizenship. These brothers and sisters are, as a result, not only given equal rights but are also

¹⁵ Contrary to widespread belief, the Chinese were not the primary targets in the killings. Though reliable figures are hard to come by, it is approximated that out of the 500,000 people estimated to have been slaughtered, around 2,000 were of Chinese origin. Most of those killed were suspected Javanese communists and it is believed by some that the Chinese suffered less in proportion to their total numbers than ethnic Indonesians. Many of the Chinese were killed in North Sumatra, where communist-led unions had succeeded in attracting many ethnic Chinese members to the forefront of the labour movement (Lande, 1999). Elsewhere, too, in small towns and villages, Chinese, who had been resented for their roles as petty shopkeepers and now were accused of being communist supporters, suffered in the popular fury.

¹⁶ In December 1966, the military commander for East Java, Major General Soemitro, acting independently from the central government in Jakarta issued several new decrees against the alien Chinese in the province. These included a ban on aliens engaging in wholesale trade anywhere in the province except in the provincial capital of Surabaya, imposition of a head tax on resident alien Chinese in the province, prohibition of the use of Chinese characters and language in public and so on. These measures led to economic dislocation and growing protests and demonstrations by the Chinese in several cities in East Java. For more on these measures, see Coppel (1983: 99-105).

called on to fulfill the same obligations as citizens. Integration and assimilation mean participating in all the activities of the Indonesian people with all their joy and sorrow....”¹⁷

Name changing of the Chinese

Decision of the Cabinet Presidium No. 127 of 1966 recommended that “replacing the names of Indonesians of foreign descent with names which conform to indigenous Indonesian names will assist in assimilation” (Coppel, 2002). Article 5 of Chapter 1 of Presidential Decision No. 240 of 1967 followed up by stipulating that “Indonesian citizens of foreign descent who still use Chinese names are urged to replace them with Indonesian names pursuant to current legislation.”¹⁸ It is estimated that in order to escape further harassment and discrimination, many Chinese complied with this order. By 1969, approximately 250,000 Chinese had discarded their original names in favor of more *Pribumi* sounding ones to facilitate and expedite the process of assimilation (Somers-Heidhues, 1974). Coppel (1983) cites the example of 6,662 WNI Chinese – Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent- in the town of Sukabumi in West Java who changed their names in a mass ceremony.

¹⁷ An excerpt from a speech to the nation by acting president General Suharto to the General Session of the Gotong Royong Parliament (DPRGR) on 16th August 1967, taken from Coppel, 2002. Furthermore, Article 3 of Chapter 1 of Presidential Decision N. 240 of 1967 emphasizes the need for Indonesian citizens of foreign descent (read Chinese) to undertake a process of expeditious assimilation in order to facilitate the complete eradication of racial exclusiveness

¹⁸ Moreover, in his Independence Day Speech in 1967, Suharto exhorted “...we must try to eradicate a system of social intercourse that is exclusive in the environment of a single nation, by simplifying the process of name changing (which is) one of the steps to accelerate the eradication of exclusiveness.”

Cina/Tionghoa debate – a question of terminology

Cabinet Presidium Circular SE-06/Pres-Kab/6/1967 obliged Indonesians to drop the use of the term “*Tionghoa*” (as ethnic Chinese refer to themselves) and replace it with the more pejorative term “*Cina*.” Considered as a word of contempt, the switch to “*Cina*” from the more neutral “*Tionghoa*” institutionalized a decision taken by the top brass of the Indonesian Army at a so-called ‘seminar’ held in Bandung in 1966.¹⁹ Following the Cabinet Presidium, this decision was widely implemented and applied to ethnic Chinese across the board and not just to alien Chinese. The decision not only proved morally insulting to the Chinese but also legitimated racist offences against them (Augilar, 2001).²⁰

Issue of citizenship for the Chinese

The 1946 Citizenship Act accorded dual nationality status to Indonesian born Chinese²¹ based on the principle of *jus soli* and the “passive system.”²²

¹⁹ The outcome of the gathering of high profile army leaders in Bandung was the following proclamation: “...particularly in order to remove a feeling of inferiority on the part of our own people, while on the other hand removing the feeling of superiority on the part of the group concerned within our State,... the seminar has decided to use again as the term for the People's Republic of China (*Republik Rakjat Tionghok*) and its citizens, '*Republik Rakjat Tjina*' (People's Republic of China) and '*warga negara Tjina*' (Chinese citizens)” (cited in Coppel and Suryadinata, 1978: 121-122).

²⁰ As cited in Coppel and Suryadinata (1978: 121-122), a renowned Indonesian literary figure captured the intended essence of the decree as “Use of the word '*Tjina*' might be suitable to show our anger against Peking, but the word itself is used because it is felt to embody an element insulting to the Chinese group. And use of the term '*Tjina*' cannot be limited in its application to citizens of the Chinese People's Republic alone, but it must at the very least wound the feelings of Indonesians who are of Chinese descent.”

²¹ The issue of dual nationality goes back to the very beginning of the 20th century. In 1909, the Manchu rulers issued a directive whereby every child of Chinese parentage was conferred Chinese citizenship irrespective of their place of birth. The Dutch authorities in the East Indies responded in 1910 and promulgated a citizenship act based on the principle of *jus soli* where all local born Chinese were considered as Dutch subjects; hence, the Chinese were accorded dual nationality status (Augilar, 2001).

²² The “passive system” meant that those Chinese who had been born in Indonesia and had resided there for the last five years continuously would be automatically regarded as Indonesian citizens

Furthermore, they were given a fixed period of time in which to renounce their Indonesian citizenship in favor of the Chinese.²³ As Willmott (1961) has noted, an indeed “curious feature” of the 1946 Citizenship Act was the conferring of citizenship to Chinese and others of foreign descent based on *jus soli* while for everyone else the principle of *jus sanguinis* applied.

By 1953, approximately 40% of all local-born Chinese had rejected Indonesian citizenship (Augilar, 2001). The high rejection rate is explained by fears entertained by many Chinese that on becoming Indonesian citizens they would no longer be protected by China in the eventuality of anti-Chinese violence and discrimination in the archipelago.

The acquisition of citizenship was made more arduous in the citizenship law proposed in 1954 and entailed minimum residency requirements of two generations, proof of one’s parents birth in Indonesia as well as evidence of a minimum of ten years of residence in the country (Bertrand, 2004). The draft proposed that the “passive system” from the 1946 law be changed to an “active system” whereby a declaration of acceptance of Indonesian citizenship was required. In April 1955, the foreign ministers of Indonesia and China signed a Dual Nationality Treaty. A notable feature of this treaty was that it explicitly stated that local born Chinese would have to renounce their Chinese citizenship in order to either acquire or retain Indonesian citizenship.²⁴

provided that such individuals did not reject Indonesian citizenship in favor of being the citizen of another country (Suryadinata, 1986).

²³ For more details, see Augilar (2001).

²⁴ The terms of the treaty explicitly stated that all dual nationality holders would have two years within which to choose one citizenship over the other. Persons who failed to do so within the prescribed time limit would automatically have their Indonesian citizenship rescinded. The rejection of Chinese citizenship had to be made at the District Court.

The 1958 Citizenship Act was modeled to a considerable extent on the 1954 draft and broadly followed the parameters of the 1955 Dual Nationality Treaty. The Act emphasized the need for meeting certain residency requirements for obtaining citizenship but did not revoke the status of people of foreign descent who had already acquired Indonesian citizenship.²⁵

By the early 1960s, more than two thirds of those eligible had opted for Indonesian citizenship, yet a substantial number –estimated to be more than half of all Chinese in Indonesia (Augilar, 2001)- continued to wallow in the uncertain status as “aliens.” The Dual Nationality Treaty was abrogated in 1969 following the ascent to power of Suharto, as Indonesia severed diplomatic ties with China. In 1979, the *New Order* regime instructed the compulsory re-registration of everyone of Chinese descent, whether WNI or WNA.²⁶ This was begun in the province of West Java and then spread to the rest of the archipelago (Coppel, 1983). It was estimated that approximately a million Chinese were either alien or deemed “stateless” by the 1980s. Two measures were undertaken in 1980 and the second of these “greatly streamlined” the process of naturalization for the non-citizen Chinese (Coppel, 1983: 157).²⁷

²⁵ Section 4 stipulated that Indonesian born Chinese were eligible to apply for citizenship upon turning 18 years of age if they could furnish proof of their parents’ birth and residence in Indonesia. However, section 5 was more complicated and was applicable to individuals over the age of 18 and whose parents were not born in Indonesia. Such applicants were required to fulfill residence and language requirements as well as to declare a permanent source of income (Suryadinata, 1986: 117).

²⁶ WNI (Warga Negara Indonesia) refers to Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent. WNA (Warga Negara Asing) refers to non-citizens, in this case Chinese, who are citizens of another country – usually the People’s Republic of China- or those deemed as “stateless.”

²⁷ The first of these measures, Presidential Instruction No. 2 of 1980, was applicable to WNI Chinese and was designed to clarify proof of citizenship whilst the second, Presidential Decree No. 13 of 1980, sought to expedite the process of naturalization considerably. Together, the two decisions established a set-up through which the Chinese could acquire citizenship certificates

Restrictions on Chinese cultural practices

Instruction of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, No 14 of 1967 on Chinese religion, beliefs and traditional customs state these beliefs “which focus on the country of their ancestors” and whose “manifestation can give rise to inappropriate (*kurang wajar*) psychological, mental and moral influences on Indonesian citizens and so form an obstacle to the process of assimilation, need to be regulated and their functions placed in their proper proportion.” In the guidelines issued for the implementation of Presidential Instruction No 14, it is noted that all Chinese cultural and religious practices which have characteristics and features of Chineseness (*ke-cinnan*) should only be performed within the family, namely within the boundaries of the environment of the household of the family concerned.²⁸

Toppling the three pillars of Chinese culture

Suryadinata (2004) notes that in its relentless pursuit of assimilation and determination to strip away all cultural connotations of Chineseness, the *New Order* government eliminated the three core pillars of Chinese culture –Chinese medium schools, Chinese associational activity and Chinese media. As described

(SBKRI) from the head of the regional administrative sub-district rather than going through a protracted and more cumbersome court process (Lindsay, 2005).

²⁸ The guidelines regulating Chinese cultural practices state “in the case of Chinese practices of observance which possess aspects of cultural affinity focusing on the country of their ancestors, their performance must take place internally within the family or individually.” Furthermore, it is specified that “celebrations of Chinese religious festivals and traditional customs such as the lion dance, should be done in a way which is not conspicuous (*menyolok*) in public...all such forms of activity should not be made into a public spectacle and should not take place in the streets, public buildings or other places open to the public, except within the boundaries of the environment of the household or within the boundaries of the environment of a place of worship which has been designated for the purpose.”

earlier, Chinese medium schools were shut down in July 1966 (Tan, 1991). Articles 7-9 of Presidential Instruction No 37 of 1967 determined that displaced Chinese students were to be allotted only a maximum of 40% of seats offered in national schools and also stipulated that the number of Indonesian children per class be greater than that of alien children. Presidential Decree No. B12/Pres.1/1968 permitted the establishment of schools sponsored by private groups within various Chinese communities. These schools dubbed as “Special Project National Schools” came into being in 1969 and were required to follow the national curriculum with the option of offering Chinese language classes as an added activity.²⁹

In 1966, the People’s Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia (MPR) prohibited the use of Chinese media, language and characters through Resolution No. 32 of 1966 and permitted only one Chinese language newspaper to be operated under strict supervision of the government (Tan, 1991). Chinese characters were removed from display signs in shop windows, for instance (Chua, 2004). Chinese newspapers, literature and documents were subjected to strict import restrictions. Presidential Instruction No. 49 of 1967 was issued to demand the banning of publications and advertisements using Chinese characters. Similarly, a Decree of the Minister of Trade and Cooperatives No 286 of 1978 prohibited the sale, distribution and importation of Chinese publications (Lindsay, 2005). In addition to restrictions on education and the media, all associations of

²⁹ These special project schools rapidly became popular and by 1973 had expanded to 35 in the island of Sumatra alone (Suryadinata, 1986; Tan, 1991). The government was alarmed by the rate of growth of these schools and moved to ban them in 1975 arguing that the period of transition for Chinese children was over. These schools were subsequently converted into private national schools.

the Chinese minority were dissolved, thereby depriving the group of any social coherence (Chua, 2004).

As Coppel (2002) notes the logic of the assimilation policy was for “the ethnic Chinese to lose their Chineseness and to be absorbed without trace into the wider Indonesian population.” Yet, some of the policies implemented were inconsistent or contradictory with this ideal. Rather than blurring distinctions between the groups, they helped foster a heightened sense of difference. Chua (2004) argues forcefully that this was a deliberately calculated strategy to “redefine, perpetuate and instrumentalize the Chinese problem.”³⁰ A couple of specific measures that amplified group demarcation were the special codes on the identity cards- *Kartu Tanda Penduduk* (KTP) of the ethnic Chinese and the rigid requirement for the Chinese to furnish a certificate or proof of citizenship.

Distinctive marks on ID cards

The identity cards of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia bore a distinctive code that differentiated them from the *Pribumi* population and made the identification of the Chinese very easy. It is believed that at least until the early 1990s, the serial number of the identity cards (KTP) of the Chinese in Jakarta began with the code 0 (Augilar, 2001; Lindsay, 2005). Suryadinata (1992)

³⁰ Chua (2004) sees a fine logic to the seemingly inconsistent policies of the *New Order* government with regard to the assimilation of the Chinese. He notes that complete assimilation was never the intended goal of the administration. Moreover, once the sufficient condition to marginalize the Chinese was achieved through stripping away much of their cultural distinctiveness, it became “necessary to discriminate against them in order to create some outcasts who could be used for several purposes by the state. Many regulations, some of them which still exist were there to assure that there was no complete assimilation.” The regime also cultivated a policy of projecting the Chinese as an “economically strong group” (more on this later) and attempted to pass off social and economic disparities as an ethnic problem, thus making the Chinese vulnerable to a violent backlash during times of strife.

observes that the zero tag was removed from the beginning of each serial number following a decision taken in 1990; yet, he claims in practice, the removal of the zero has been supplanted by the covert introduction of a more subtle coding system. This still enables authorities to track down the ethnic Chinese and makes them vulnerable to bribes, extortion and other types of discrimination. During field research undertaken in the West Java town of Bandung in early 2006, several of my ethnic Chinese respondents believed that the serial numbers of their ID cards were different from those of their *Pribumi* counterparts.³¹

Proof of citizenship – the SBKRI system

From the 1950s onwards, local authorities would frequently demand that *Peranakan* Chinese furnish a “certificate of citizenship” without which their Indonesian-ness would not be authenticated. A military decree was issued in June 1957 which demanded “proof of Indonesian citizenship” from the local district court (Augilar, 2001).³² Presidential Decision No. 52 of 1977 states that every Indonesian citizen who needs to prove his citizenship will have to obtain a *Surat Bakti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia* (SBKRI) from the Ministry of Justice. The aforementioned Presidential Decisions of 1980 aimed to facilitate this process by enabling the acquisition of the SBKRI through the regional sub-district

³¹ At an informal church gathering in the town of Bandung in West Java in early 2006, I had the opportunity to talk to several ethnic Chinese churchgoers. As the conversation turned to forms of discrimination inflicted on the Chinese, several respondents mentioned that their ID cards began with the digits 1050 which apparently differentiated them from the *Pribumi*. Subsequent comparison with the ID cards of several *Pribumi* citizens in Bandung revealed that that was indeed the case.

³² The acquisition of this citizenship certificate, though not synonymous with going through the process of naturalization again, was absolutely essential to determine the citizenship status of children of naturalized parents. In effect “derivative naturalization” was not presumed (Augilar, 2001).

head rather than going through the complex court system. As Lindsay (2005) notes, none of these measures specifically single out the ethnic Chinese, however, in practice these were generally interpreted by the bureaucracy and by the public at large as applying to people of Chinese descent.

Over time, the SBKRI became an absolutely pivotal document for the ethnic Chinese, as the document was needed to secure access to state educational institutions - a pre-requisite to gain entry into most state and private universities (Lindsay, 2005). It was also needed to process several documents, including passports, business licenses, credit applications³³ and so on and “necessitated the presentation of numerous documents and as well as the offering of the customary extra legal payoff” (Lindsay, 2005).

Responding to strident criticism from WNI Chinese in particular, Suharto issued Presidential Decision No. 56 of 1996 purporting to abolish all laws and regulations related to the SBKRI. But as Lindsay (2005) observes, the decision had no practical impact for many ethnic Chinese as it only applied to “persons whose husbands, fathers and mothers already possessed an SBKRI,” thus reinforcing or perpetuating the “statelessness” of the many ethnic Chinese families without the certificate. In 1999, the Habibie presidency promulgated Presidential Instruction No. 4 of 1999 as a follow up to Suharto’s Decision issued in 1996, decreeing that the SBKRI was no longer required by the ethnic Chinese. Yet, as with the Suharto Decision, the Habibie Instruction also applied only to

³³ See The Jakarta Post, ‘The Stateless Chinese dream of rights,’ 06 October 2002 for more details. Also, in 1976, the Bank of Indonesia issued a decree enunciating different conditions for the provision of credit facilities to *Pribumi* and non-*Pribumi* and the non-*Pribumi* (read Chinese Indonesians) were often required to submit documentary evidence of citizenship. (Bertrand, 2004)

those individuals whose parents or husbands were prior holders of the document, thus rendering a significantly large population of Chinese outside of its ambit. Furthermore, in spite of these reforms (albeit limited), there is evidence that the SBKRI is still being demanded by authorities in several places with the Chinese being forced to pay extortionate amounts to facilitate the processing of important documents; therefore, the certificate continues to be a lucrative source of corruption, especially for government officials at the local level.³⁴

Construction of the Chinese as the “Economically Strong” Group

The second plank of the “triple minority” status involves considering notions of the Chinese as an economically powerful group. There is a widespread belief that the Chinese, while comprising less than 4% of the population, control the levers of over 70% of the economy in Indonesia. This assertion is deeply embedded in popular literature and academic works and is constantly repeated by politicians (Chua, 2004). This section illustrates patterns and the extent of Chinese economic dominance and considers possible reasons for Chinese entrepreneurial successes. A series of steps taken by successive post-independence governments, either in the form of affirmative action programs on behalf of the *Pribumis* or through the cultivation of patron-client relations with a small class of wealthy Chinese businessmen helped to reinforce group differences

³⁴ Purdey (2005) cites an article that appeared in the Sinergi Magazine in 1999 which notes that ethnic Chinese continued having to pay extra in order to get immigration documents, passports and so on processed. Margot Cohen (1998) writing on the May 1998 riots in the town of Boyolali reported that extortion continued at government offices as victims attempted to reprocess citizenship papers and other documents that had been burnt or stolen. The Anti-Discrimination Institute of Indonesia (LADI), a non-governmental organization, claims that many Chinese have had to pay up to 500,000 rupiah in order to acquire simple documentation (The Straits Times-Singapore, February 3, 2006).

in terms of economic status and kept alive stereotypes of the Chinese as a small, economically formidable group. The second part of this section addresses several of these government policies.

Chinese Economic Dominance

The Chinese in Indonesia have long been associated with trade and commerce and described variously as a “trading minority” (Wertheim, 1964; Cohen, 1971), an “entrepreneurial ethnic minority” where they play a critical role in the development of trade, money management and capital accumulation in the host country (Reid, 1997:34) or as a “middleman minority” (Bonacich, 1973; Zenner, 1991).³⁵ Indeed, occupational distribution of population groups in Indonesia (taken from the census data of 1930) shows that nearly 37% of the Chinese were engaged in trading as opposed to less than 6% of the *Pribumi*. Almost 70% of the *Pribumi* engaged in the production of raw material (agriculture, fishing etc.) as opposed to 30% of the Chinese (Suryadinata, 1986: 78).³⁶ As Coppel (1983: 20) notes, “the image of the Chinese as trader is combined with that of wealth.” Furthermore, income tax statistics in Indonesia by population group in 1939 showed that 87% of all Chinese assessed earned an annual income in excess of 200 guilders while only 29.5% of the assessed *Pribumi* population fell within the same income range (Coppel, 1983: 20). Comprehensive economic data based on ethnicity is not readily available for the

³⁵ The introduction to this dissertation provides a more detailed explanation of the nuances and variations between each of these terms.

³⁶ In Java, where the bulk of the Indonesian population lives, the discrepancy is even wider with nearly 58% of all Chinese engaged in trading as opposed to 14% of the *Pribumi*.

post-independence era, but at the National All-Indonesian Economic Conference in 1959, KENSI, a *Pribumi* dominated economic organization reported that nearly 35% of the Indonesian national income was generated from alien Chinese traders (Suryadinata, 1986: 84).

Perceptions of wealth in the New Order

A leading business consultant firm, Data Consult, approximated in a survey conducted in 1989 that the Chinese controlled 163 of the top 200 business groups in Indonesia.³⁷ At least 80% of the companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange in the mid 1990s were owned by the Chinese (Schwarz, 2000:109). The deregulation of the economy of the late 1980s confirmed *Pribumi* suspicions that many Chinese businesses had grown exponentially under the *New Order* regime. By 1998, Chinese Indonesians owned all but one of the top ten business syndicates in Indonesia and controlled roughly 80% of the assets of the top 300 conglomerates, whilst only 13% of those groups were controlled by *Pribumi* entrepreneurs, including those connected to Suharto's family (Backman, 2001).³⁸ Of the top 15 taxpayers in the country, 13 were ethnic Chinese and the other two were Suharto family members (Purdey, 2006:22).

³⁷ On a similar note, an Indonesian consulting firm estimated in 1991 that the sales of the 200 largest conglomerates in the country was tantamount to 35% of the total GDP of the country (Schwarz, 2000).

³⁸ The two largest conglomerates, Sudono Salim's network and William Soeryadjaya's Astra Cooperation hold assets estimated to be worth Rp.6.4 trillion and Rp. 2 trillion respectively (US \$3.5 billion and US \$ 1.2 billion). Ten other Chinese conglomerates hold assets in the \$400-700 million range and over 100 companies exceed the \$100 million mark (Mackie, 1991). Several others have written extensively about the dominance of the Chinese conglomerates in the *New Order* and produce very similar statistics with only a few marginal variations. For instance, Hill (2000) observes that the top seven conglomerates in terms of turnover were all ethnic Chinese owned. Similarly Yuri Sato (1993) points out that Chinese entrepreneurs controlled 39 of the 47 largest conglomerates in the country.

By and large, there is a common perception that the Chinese in Indonesia control 70% of private, corporate, domestic capital (Harymurti, 1999; Schwarz, 2000). However, there is a wide disparity in the wealth of the Chinese and only a small percentage could be considered as “rich,” especially compared with the vast multitude of Chinese small traders and shop owners.³⁹ The extent of Chinese stranglehold on the economy is contested with Kwik Kian Gie (1997) and Sofyan Wanandi (1999) arguing that Chinese domination of the economy is way overblown given that considerable assets are owned by state banks and large state firms.⁴⁰ These claims in turn have been contested by the likes of Backman who notes “at the end of the day, the reality is that when most ordinary Indonesians come into contact with the commercial sector, it is almost invariably with a Chinese Indonesian firm.” He argues that the perception of ethnic Chinese

³⁹ Boen Setiawan (1999) notes the presence of large numbers of poor Chinese in the districts of Tangerang, Pontianak, Bangka, Medan and Singkawang. Ananta’s study of the changing ethnic composition in the Riau Archipelago reveals that the Chinese in the region were often placed at the lower end of the socio-economic and human development spectrums in terms of income, employment and education (Ananta, 2006). Further, Eddy Prabowo Witanto, a lecturer in Chinese Indonesian affairs at the Beijing Foreign University notes that the upper middle class Chinese comprise no more than 20% of the total Chinese population in the country whilst “most ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are lower to medium scale entrepreneurs in distribution and retail” (The Straits Times –Singapore, February 3, 2006).

⁴⁰ Kwik Kian Gie says that in the banking sector approximately 94% of business is carried out by state banks with private banks accounting for the remaining 6%. Further, if foreign banks are excluded from the equation, Indonesian Chinese control only a certain percentage of that 6%. Similarly, he asserts that the total volume of business carried out by giant state owned firms completely drowns out the volume of collective business carried out by thousands of ethnic Chinese companies. This view is countered by a *Pribumi* businessman named Amir (1997) who argues that much of the credit of these state banks is channeled towards established Chinese businesses. He stresses that even if one were to acknowledge that state banks carry out 94% of the banking activity, this does not mean that the money is actually controlled by *Pribumi* social groups. Thus, to establish a fairer measure of economic domination, attention has to be paid to the recipients of the largest bank loans. Wanandi (1999) rejects the myth that the Chinese control 70% of the economy. He says the Chinese undertake roughly 70% of the activities of the national private sector, which is 60% of the total private sector (remainder being foreign enterprises, joint ventures, MNCs etc). Economic activity of the private sector is at most 60% of the total economic activity. Therefore, Wanandi calculates that the Chinese are involved in 25% of all economic activities, but cautions that involvement in economic activities is not synonymous with control; given this, he speculates that Chinese control of the economy is most likely less than 25 %.

economic influence is much closer to reality than several academics and others with an interest in the field might care to admit (Backman, 2001).

In summation, it is safe to say that there is a tremendous disparity in wealth distribution within the Chinese. However, given the stunning economic successes of the small band of highly visible Chinese business elite, entrenched perceptions abound of universal wealth and prosperity of the group. The increasing tendency in government circles to treat the Chinese as synonymous with the “economically stronger group” further intensified the impression that all members of the Chinese minority were rich and powerful (Coppel, 1983:168).

Why the Chinese have flourished

Many reasons have been attributed for the success of Chinese economic enterprises. As Mackie (1991) notes, most explanations involve either cultural/ethnic accounts or structural or class interpretations. Shared Chinese culture, Chinese values and identity and Confucian ethics such as diligence, thrift, loyalty and obligations and responsibilities to clan groups have been invoked to explain the stunning commercial successes of the group (Limlingan, 1986; Haley et al., 1998; Landa, 1999;⁴¹ Wang Gungwu, 1988;⁴² Redding, 1990).⁴³

⁴¹ Janet Landa (1999) explains Chinese economic success due to the presence of an ethnically homogenous middleman group (EHMG). The theory is based on the Confucian code of ethics, importance of mutual aid/reciprocity and a closely-knit network of ethnically homogenous middlemen. She notes that the EHMG also acts as a cultural transmission unit in transmitting Confucian ethics to future generations.

⁴² Wang Gungwu (1988) observes that adherence to “values of trade” rather than a direct legacy of the Confucian past explains Chinese economic dominance.

⁴³ Explanations based solely on cultural attributes have been criticized (Mackie, 1991; Brown, 1998). According to Mackie, accounts based on Chinese values and culture alone are inadequate and to provide a richer and more detailed account attention also has to be paid to political conditions and economic policies of the concerned government. In a similar vein, Brown acknowledges that culture may have a role in business affairs but cautions that too much reliance

Another popular explanation entails the use of well established and historical patterns of business networks, often based on common place of origin, language and so on. These networks allow members “access to commercially valuable commodities such as credit, market intelligence, sources of supply and potential business partners” (Brown, 1994: 216). Political connections of entrepreneurs also lead to the success of ethnic Chinese firms (Brown, 1994; Backman, 2001). Moreover, entrenched economic patterns are sometimes caused by historical circumstances. For instance, with the enactment of the 1870 Agrarian Law in the Dutch East Indies, the Chinese were not allowed to own land. Hence, their opportunities to be actively involved in agriculture were curtailed and the group carved a niche for itself in an occupation (trading) where native Indonesians were not yet embedded (Zenner, 1980).

Having outlined the nature and extent of Chinese involvement in the Indonesian economy, the next section briefly summarizes a series of affirmative action programs and discriminatory measures undertaken by various regimes, post-independence, to bridge the gap between the economically “weak” *Pribumi* and the economically “strong” Chinese. The discussion concludes by looking at the phenomenal rise of the *Cukong* class of Chinese businessmen through patronage bestowed upon them by the *New Order* regime.

Affirmative Action Programs under the Sukarno Regime

The Benteng System

on the concept does not permit a careful examination of variations when similar cultural attributes have been present.

This was one of several affirmative action initiatives carried out by the Sukarno government to reduce economic disparities between the Chinese and the *Pribumi*. The program, which ran from 1950-1957, was a subsidized credit policy aimed at empowering the growth of an indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurial class (Suryadinata, 1986).⁴⁴ By increasing the number of import licenses and facilitating the allotment of foreign exchange credit to *Pribumis*, the Benteng System sought to curtail and loosen Chinese control of trade in Indonesia.⁴⁵ As a consequence of the program, the number of indigenous importers shot up astronomically from 250 in 1950 to at least 5,000 by 1953 (Schwarz, 2000: 117; Tjong Djinn, 2002). The percentage of government foreign exchange credit made available to beneficiaries of the program more than doubled from 37% in 1952 to 76% in 1954 (Schwarz, 2000: 117).

However, in spite of these impressive stats, the program was an unmitigated failure. The much vaunted goal of establishing a stable and viable indigenous business class never materialized as Indonesian importers simply sold their licenses to Chinese traders and many others defaulted on loans made to state banks. The incompetence and inexperience of the indigenous traders and vocal criticism from the Chinese also led to the failure of the program (Suryadinata,

⁴⁴ Djuanda, The Indonesian Minister of Prosperity (one of the masterminds behind the program along with the Minister of Trade), announced that the aim of the program would be to protect “national importers” and defined the term as “indigenous Indonesian importers or import firms where 70% of the capital came from indigenous sources” (Suryadinata, 1986: 130). These importers were given permission to import goods known as the “Benteng goods” (Tjong Djinn, 2002).

⁴⁵ Djuanda justified the measure by claiming “Indigenous Indonesian nationals as a group are included in the economically weak. Of course, a few indigenous Indonesians are economically strong, but most of them are economically weak. Nationals of this country who are not indigenous Indonesians form the economically strong group. Of course, in that group there are also economically weak persons, but these are only exceptions while most are in an economically strong position” (cited in Suryadinata, 1986: 131).

1986). It is believed that only a handful of the indigenous businessmen flourished under the Benteng program and only seven survived into the *New Order* period (Rachbini, 2001). The program also led to the emergence of an Ali Baba system where Indonesian license holders or front men collaborated behind the scenes with Chinese partners who pulled all the strings and provided the business acumen, trading networks and capital (Suryadinata, 1986; Tan, 1991; Hadiz, 1997:205). As Robison (1986) noted, what was being consolidated was not an “indigenous merchant bourgeoisie but a group of license brokers and political fixers.” The recipients were politically connected individuals with very little business aptitude who Diao and Tan (2003) aptly referred to as mere “straw men.”

Regulation of Chinese controlled rice mills

In 1954, the government headed by Sastroamidjojo issued a decree transferring the ownership of rice-mills from the ethnic Chinese to indigenous Indonesians. It was estimated that the Chinese owned the vast majority of rice mills- for instance, 138 out of 154 rice-mills in East Java- (cited in Suryadinata, 1986: 132). The regulation determined that the ownership of existing rice-mills would be redistributed amongst the indigenous whilst no new licenses would be issued to the Chinese. Amidst much ambiguity and strong protests from the Chinese, it was subsequently clarified that the regulation was applicable only to alien Chinese and not Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent. But, the surrounding uncertainty made the implementation of the regulation difficult and as a result the program was not effective and faded away by the late 1950s.

Assaat Movement

The movement was masterminded in 1956 by a politician named Assaat who was frustrated by the lack of progress of *Pribumi* entrepreneurs in the private sector and the failure of the Benteng program (Tan, 1991). He campaigned vocally for the introduction of blatant measures of preferential treatment in economic affairs for *Pribumi* Indonesians. The movement attracted the attention of some Islamic nationalists, but on the whole received lukewarm treatment from the public and soon lost political impetus (Mackie, 1976:14).

Presidential Decree No. 10 (PP No. 10)

The decree was one of most severe discriminatory regulations enacted against the Chinese during the Sukarno period and resulted in the banning of trade in all rural areas by aliens (read alien Chinese) except in the capital cities of regencies and provinces. The regulation was implemented on November 16, 1959 and aliens were required to transfer their businesses to Indonesian citizens by January 1st, 1960.⁴⁶ PP No. 10 was enforced amidst strident calls from economic nationalists for the “Indonesianization of the economy.” The decision to enforce a residence ban on aliens in rural areas as well as the trade ban was left to the discretion of regional military commanders (Mackie, 1976). Moreover, the decree instructed *Pribumis* to form rural cooperatives to accommodate Chinese businessmen (Suryadinata, 1986: 135).

⁴⁶ The principal architect of the ban was the Minister of Trade, Muljomiseno, an ardent supporter of the Assaat Movement who initially issued a regulation in May 1959 banning retail trade in rural areas and demanding that aliens hand their property over to Indonesian citizens by September 30th of 1959 (Suryadinata, 1986: 135). This was subsequently followed by the regulation proper on November 16th.

The enforcement of the ban varied regionally and was most comprehensively implemented in the province of West Java. There are fluctuating estimates for the number of people affected by the ban with some saying that up to 400,000 individuals were impacted and approximately 20-25,000 businesses affected, mostly in Java (Somers, 1964). Most analysts concur that the ban led to an exodus of over 100,000 people as the People's Republic of China actively sought to repatriate those affected (Suryadinata, 1986; Coppel, 1983; Mackie, 1976). In theory, the ban applied only to alien Chinese (WNA Chinese), but in practice, the lines were often blurred and the WNI Chinese often had to provide proof of Indonesian citizenship to escape harsh measures (Schwarz, 2000). The implementation of the residence ban was most vigorously enforced in West Java and in South Sulawesi and also in parts of South Sumatra, South Kalimantan, North Sumatra and Jambi (Mackie, 1976).⁴⁷ The regulation also led to a sharp deterioration of relations with the Chinese government who accused Indonesia of breaching the terms and conditions of the Dual Nationality Treaty of 1955 which stipulated that the Indonesian government would protect the interests of Chinese nationals.⁴⁸ Calls for the re-implementation of PP No. 10 emerged in the mid 1960s with the advent of the *New Order* government, but the enforcement of the

⁴⁷ The reasons for these regional anomalies are complex. The residence ban was more stringently enforced in West Java for instance than East Java in spite of more Chinese living in rural areas in the latter. Mackie (1976) speculates that the lower degree of acculturation of the Chinese in West Java and the stronger influence of Islam in the province may have contributed to the stricter implementation of measures.

⁴⁸ The sudden exodus of many Chinese left a huge vacuum in the Indonesian economy which in turn weakened Sukarno's hold on power and concomitantly increased the clout of the military, the majority of whom were anti-PRC. (Suryadinata, 1986:137) As a result, Sukarno moved to temporarily suspend the further implementation of PP No. 10 and the PRC toned down their displeasure for the fear of losing its alliance with Sukarno.

decree was largely uneven and was most severe in the provinces of East Java and West Kalimantan.⁴⁹

New Order Regulations on Limiting Chinese Economic Clout

Lindsay (2005) discusses a few of these measures. Presidential Instruction No. 37 of 1967 and No. 10 of 1968 for instance stipulated that the economic functions of the ethnic Chinese should be closely regulated and monitored. Furthermore, circulars and other documents drawn up by the Central Bank of Indonesia in 1973 and 1977 also established favorable economic conditions on behalf of the *Pribumis*.

Conception of the Pribumi as the “weaker” group

In a meeting with Indonesian businessmen in 1971, President Suharto impressed on the need to classify *Pribumi* Indonesians as an “economically weaker group”- *golongan ekonomi lemah*, thus reinforcing the dichotomy between the two groups and adding further impetus to the growing resentment against the non-*Pribumi* Chinese (Siddique and Suryadinata, 1981). Chua (2004) argues that in spite of a clear nexus between political elites and wealthy Chinese tycoons, Suharto attempted to “inculcate the Chinese minority in general, blurring

⁴⁹ Calls for the re-implementation of PP No 10 emerged in the early *New Order* period. During an economic conference held from May 7-10, 1966, the architect of PP No. 10, former Trade Minister Muljomiseno justified the measure and called for it to be revived (Coppel, 1983: 71). Following this, East Javanese Military commanders re-implemented the ban on alien Chinese conducting trade anywhere in the province except in the capital of Surabaya. The impact of the trade ban was not clear and according to a report from the Special Staff for Chinese Affairs (SCUT), 80 out of 105 shops in Lumajang, 75 out of 423 in Jember were either taken over or forced to shut down (Coppel, 1983:101). Purdey (2006: 20) notes that the devastating anti-Chinese violence in West Kalimantan in late 1967 was also linked with a local push to reactivate a variant of PP no. 10.

any distinctions between Chinese hawkers and tycoons, as opponents to the economic development of the Indonesian nation.” Suharto’s intention was to project the image of himself as protector and guardian of *Pribumi* rights against the “economically strong” group and had the effect of re-conceptualizing the economic gap between the rich and the poor as an ethnic gap between the *Pribumi* and the Chinese. As a result, in the 1980s, it became increasingly more common to distinguish between the “economically strong” and the “economically weak” group rather than in terms of *Pribumi* and non-*Pribumi* (Coppel, 1983).⁵⁰

Kepres

In part motivated by the construction of the dichotomy explained above, Kepres referred to a series of presidential decrees undertaken during the *New Order* –Kepres 14 of 1979 and Kepres 14A and Kepres 10 of 1980- that gave the economically weak group (i.e. indigenous businessmen) priority in obtaining government contracts. For smaller projects, only the weaker groups were allowed to bid, while for the medium sized projects, the weaker group was given a certain cushion (Schwarz, 2000: 117; Brown, 1998:185).⁵¹ For the larger projects, a group of individuals labeled as “Team 10” was given the task of deciding project allocations. Team 10 wielded tremendous influence as its control over government purchases expanded widely. When it was disbanded in 1988, Rp. 52 trillion worth of government procurements had been disbursed under its aegis

⁵⁰ However, the new distinction was merely a euphemism for the old distinction and had less overt racial connotations than the *Pribumi*-non *Pribumi* dichotomy. Hence, it was merely a “code phrase” for the continuation of the tabooed discourse of race (Schwarz, 1994: 117).

⁵¹ Several criteria were established for a group to qualify as “economically weak” including the need for at least half of the board of directors to be indigenous and at least 50% of the capital to be indigenous owned (Coppel, 1983).

(Schwarz, 2000: 118). At the time of its disbandment, Team 10 had acquired characteristics symptomatic with Suharto's style of patrimonialism. Beneficiaries were largely selected on the basis of their personal networks with influential figures in the regime.⁵²

Rise and rise of the Cukong class

During the *New Order* regime, in an effort to consolidate his personal power and wealth, Suharto handpicked a select group of Chinese businessman as his business cronies. They were mostly of *Totok* origin, came to be known as *Cukongs*⁵³ and were partners in various conglomerates belonging to regime elites. Such high level relations with members of the Suharto clan or senior military figures were restricted to a small minority of wealthy Chinese businessmen. But similar types of patron-client relations emerged at a more micro scale between small Chinese shopkeepers and persons of power at the local level (Purdey, 2006:21; Schwarz, 2000:107). In return for generating business activity and providing funds, the Chinese were given tax breaks, state bank funding, access to import and export licenses amongst other favors.

⁵² Several top *Pribumi* businessmen have backed the efforts of Team 10 strongly arguing that this was the only concrete measure adopted by the *New Order* government to extend capital forming opportunities to indigenous businessmen of the kind often showered on large Chinese businesses (Schwarz, 2000:119). A document produced by KADIN (Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industries) summarizing the results of a conference on Kepres 14A expressed staunch support for the regulation as a way of bridging glaring imbalances between Chinese and *Pribumi* economic power (KADIN, 1980). The effectiveness of such measures were however dismissed by Bratanata (1981) -a former minister of industries in the early *New Order* who subsequently became an outspoken critic of the regime- as a "political cloak" worn for the sake of convenience and to deflect attention away from the regime.

⁵³ *Cukong* is a Chinese (Hokkien) term meaning "master," but in the Indonesian context it is used to denote a skillful Chinese businessman who cooperates closely with those in power (Suryadinata, 1986: 141). Furthermore, Mackie (1992) defines *Cukongism* as a relationship between a Chinese "who knew how to raise money" and an Indonesian official (often an Army officer) who could provide protection and influence.

The benefits of the relationship were obvious. Suharto wanted new investment and the military was short of budget resources and the Chinese needed protection and powerful patrons in the wake of increasingly discriminatory regulations in the *New Order* (Schwarz, 2000:107; Chua, 2004; Purdey, 2006: 22).⁵⁴ It is believed that Suharto chose the Chinese for preferential treatment as they had a fine reputation for entrepreneurial dexterity and more importantly possessed less bargaining power than the *Pribumi* and therefore could not challenge him for political power no matter how wealthy they became (Lim and Gosling, 1997; Coppel, 1983).⁵⁵

As discussed earlier, the *Cukong* policy tremendously benefited several Chinese businessmen and resulted in the rapid growth of a vast number of conglomerates. These conglomerates began to wield disproportionate influence over many strategic sectors of the economy including automotives, wood/timber, finance, oil, paper, real estate, petrochemicals and cement (Rachbini, 1999). Some of the most successful and influential businessmen and conglomerates of the *New Order* include Liem Sioe Liong (Sudono Salim) of the Salim Group,⁵⁶ William

⁵⁴ Given the business environment and the extent of discrimination against the Chinese, collaboration with power holders was thought to be the best way to achieve economic security.

⁵⁵ Anderson finds a fine logic in this dual policy towards the Chinese: "From the point of view of the state ... it makes excellent sense, for it increases the economic resources available to the state, without any cession of political power. The more pariah the Chinese become the more dependent they become" (Anderson 1983, 491).

⁵⁶ Though several *Cukongs* profited enormously from the system, none gained as much as Liem Sioe Liong (who later changed his name to the more *Pribumi* sounding Sudono Salim) who acquired an obscene amount of wealth and rapidly became the richest person in Indonesia. An immigrant from China's Fujian Province, Salim established a relationship with Suharto when the latter was still a provincial general. The relationship flourished once Suharto became president and Salim secured monopolies, licenses and subsidies, formed alliances with foreign industrial and commercial enterprises and was generally able to cut through the labyrinth of Indonesian bureaucracy (Lim and Gosling, 1997). In return, Salim has invested heavily in several strategically pivotal sectors of the economy such as steel and participated in business ventures of the Suharto

Soeryadjaya of the Astra Group, Mochtar Riadi of the Lippo Group, Bob Hasan of the Nusamba Group, Prajogo Pangestu of the Barito Pacific Group and Eka Cipta Wijaya of the Sinar Group. Much of the success of these large conglomerates and the newly rich Chinese⁵⁷ was due to the patronage and state protection they received under the *Cukong* system (Lien and Tan, 2003).

A lasting legacy of Suharto's policy however was to exacerbate the resentment of the *Pribumi* who grew more and more frustrated with the economic monopolization of the *Cukong* elite. As a result, *Cukong* elites increasingly began to face the ire of excluded *Pribumi* groups (Robison, 1986: 138). Such resentment of *Cukong* privileges was a primary cause of the Malari riots in 1974 in Jakarta (Hadiz, 1997: 205; Coppel, 1983). Over time, especially in the 1980s, this network of conglomerates did expand to include several *Pribumi* businessmen, but *Pribumi* perceptions of *Cukong* dominance of the economy did not dissipate. Furthermore, Suharto's ties with wealthy Chinese businessmen provided scant protection for their less well-connected fellows.⁵⁸ The visibility and economic clout of the *Cukongs* helped to foster deeply embedded perceptions in the minds of the *Pribumi* about a small minority that controlled 70% of Indonesia's

clan. For more on the remarkable growth of the Salim Empire, see Schwarz, 2000: 109-115 and Robison, 1986: 296-315.

⁵⁷ Mackie (1990) discusses at length how the patronage conferred on this select band of Chinese businessmen led to the generation of a class of newly rich Chinese or in his own terminology "New Money" during the *New Order*. Also, many of the prominent *Cukongs* were *Totok* Chinese, which meant they were more recent immigrants to the country, spoke imperfect Bahasa Indonesia and invested heavily in China, often in the provinces where they hailed from; this also contributed to making the *Pribumis* question their loyalty and commitment towards Indonesia and increased the resentment towards such figures (Lim and Gosling, 1997).

⁵⁸ As many authors have mentioned, only a small percentage of the Chinese were wealthy. However, due to the visibility and political connections of the minority *Cukong* class, there was a common perception of Chinese wealth among the indigenous population and consequently their resentment and frustrations were directed towards the Chinese as whole and not just the *Cukong* class (Suryadinata, 1997b; Bertrand, 2004).

economy and also helped to reinforce ethnic differentiation between groups (Bertrand, 2004).

Chinese as Non Moslems

The third plank of the “triple minority” status of the Chinese looks at the community as non-Moslems in a country where the overwhelming majority of the people are Moslem.⁵⁹ In comparison with the first two planks, the extent of explicit government discrimination in the context of religion has been less. However, this segment of the chapter traces a few vital developments, especially towards the latter part of the *New Order* that brought into sharper focus the religious dimension of the ethnic Chinese as non-Moslems and made them more vulnerable to social backlash as the political and economic upheaval of the late 1990s beckoned.⁶⁰ These developments include the resurgence of Islam in society and its increasing political salience as Suharto actively courted several Islamic groups, the appearance of fissures and the growing Islamization of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) and the growing conflation of the Chinese with Christianity, particularly in the context of big business.

Multi-faith Chinese

⁵⁹ Overall, the Moslems make up approximately 88% of Indonesia’s total population. However, in many districts on the island of Java- where most anti-Chinese violence has occurred, the Moslems often make up more than 95% of the population. On the other hand, in certain areas of the outer islands, such as parts of Northern Sumatra, West Kalimantan and East Nusa Tenggara, the Moslem population is considerably lower.

⁶⁰ Chapter five engages in a detailed examination of how several conservative Moslem leaders, senior officers of the more Islamic “Green Faction” of the Armed Forces and extremist Islamic organizations carried out a sustained and virulent anti-Chinese campaign in the late 1990s.

It is estimated that approximately two thirds of all Chinese in Indonesia are Buddhists with most of the remainder belonging to various Christian denominations (Suryadinata, 1997).⁶¹ Some Chinese have converted to Islam, but reliable figures are hard to come by. Several Chinese Moslem communities had existed in certain coastal areas prior to European colonization (Tan, 2005) and there was a fairly large wave of Chinese conversion to Islam in the 18th century. In the present context, their numbers are not thought to be substantial and in 1983, the Chinese Moslem population was believed to be only 0.5% of the total Chinese population of the country (Jacobson, 2005).⁶² Lack of substantial conversion has also impeded inter-marriage between the Chinese and the *Pribumi*. Tan (2005) cites a Jakarta survey carried out in 1982 which revealed that out of 175 Chinese-*Pribumi* marriages only 13% were between Moslems and Christians.

Developments under the New Order

Restrictions on Confucianism

Presidential Decision No 14 of 1967 is widely understood to have effectively stopped the practice of Confucianism and Chinese customs in

⁶¹ It is possible that the number of Chinese declaring Buddhism as their religion increased substantially after the *New Order* imposed restrictions on the practice of Confucianism (Tan, 2005). All Indonesians were obliged to choose from one of Indonesia's five officially sanctioned religions in the *New Order*. Atheism, inextricably interlinked with communism in the officials' minds was banned as anti-*Pancasila* (Liddle, 1996).

⁶² Mackie (1992) discussing the lack of significant conversion to the majority religion notes "Islam seems to pose a barrier for the acculturation and assimilation of the Chinese." A range of popular theories has been thrown out for Chinese aversion to conversion including their reluctance to carry out certain physical sacrifices like circumcision and abstinence from eating pork- a favorite Chinese dish (The Siauw Giap, 1966). Further, in the colonial period, social stratification acted as a bar to conversion to Islam as many Chinese felt that converting to Islam would downgrade their social status (Jacobson, 2005)

Indonesia (Lindsay, 2005). The decree clearly articulated that Chinese religious practices which invoke close cultural affinity to the land of their ancestors and impede the process of assimilation in Indonesia should be tightly regulated and their performance should only take place within internal family circles. There is some controversy and confusion as to whether it was banned as a religion with Coppel arguing that there has never been a regulation explicitly stating that Confucianism is not recognized as a religion by the state (Coppel, 2002:238). In any event, in 1978, the Ministry of Home Affairs issued a circular recognizing only five religions and excluding Confucianism from the realm of officially sanctioned religions (Suryadinata, 2005).

Marginalization of Islam in the early New Order

Many Islamists felt that Suharto's authoritarian and nominally secular regime relegated Islam to a peripheral place (Schwarz, 2000:164). After the aborted coup attempt in 1965, several Moslem groups joined hands with the government to extract vengeance on suspected communists. Thus, after Suharto came into power, many modernist Moslem groups expected to curry favor with the regime for helping to vanquish the communists. Yet, their hopes for political clout in the new government were soon blown away as Suharto and senior army officers categorically made clear their suspicion and wariness for Islamic politics.⁶³ In the famous words of the former leader of the modernist Masyumi Party, they were treated like "cats with ringworm" (cited in Schwarz, 2000:171).

⁶³ With the eradication of the communists, only the Moslem groups possessed the requisite demographic and organizational strength to pose a viable challenge to the military government.

Initially, four Islamic parties were permitted to exist in the *New Order*, but under austere supervision and extremely controlled conditions imposed by the government (Liddle, 1996). In 1973, all Islamic parties were forced to amalgamate into the government sponsored United Development Party (PPP) which became the only officially sanctioned Islamic party; moreover, the PPP was disallowed to adopt an explicitly Islamic name (Effendy, 2003). In 1984, the government requested all political and social organizations in the country to adopt *Pancasila* as their official ideology and this dealt a further blow to the PPP as its “appeal as a specifically Moslem political vehicle” was diminished (Liddle, 1996; Schwarz, 2000:172).⁶⁴

Islamic revivalism and the wooing of Islamists in the early 1990s

From the mid 1980s, the *New Order* government responded more positively to demands of various Islamic organizations. Several factors have been attributed for this phenomenon. These include the changing social composition of the Indonesian Moslem community with the emergence of an increasingly self-confident, assertive and educated middle class; rising Islamic consciousness in the late 1980s- which saw Islam become more important as a religious and moral force; continuing resentment of perceived official favoritism towards Christians and in particular Chinese Christians; and Suharto’s calculated decision to enact a

Hence, steps were taken early on to curb any possible challenges. In December 1966, the military said that it would take stern action against any elements that violated the principles of *Pancasila* (the official state ideology) and accused the old Masyumi leaders of having violated the principles of multi-religiousness and territorial integrity of the country (Liddle, 1996, Effendy, 2003).

⁶⁴ The five principles of *Pancasila* are belief in one supreme god; justice and civility among peoples; the unity of Indonesia; democracy through deliberation and consensus; and social justice for everyone.

strategic rapprochement with Islamic parties in order to counter declining support from the military (Schwarz, 2000:175; Harymurti, 1999; Liddle 1996; van Bruinessen, 2002).

The *New Order* regime undertook several concrete policy measures in the late 1980s and early 1990s that were deemed as more favorable to Islam. The Department of Education and Culture formally disbanded the practice of forbidding female students from wearing the Islamic headscarf (*jilbab*) in state schools; steps were taken to introduce more Islamic material into the national school curriculum; the Department of Religion passed a bill in parliament regulating Islamic courts and a codification of Islamic family law; a new family law made interfaith marriages more difficult; in 1991, Suharto established Indonesia's first Islamic Bank; the Catholic editor of a popular television station received a harsh prison sentence for abusing Prophet Muhammad; the national sports lottery, contested by pious Moslems as "sanctioned gambling" was scrapped; and several Christian ministers who had been in charge of vital sectors of the economy were replaced with Moslems (Liddle, 1996; Schwarz, 2000; Van Bruinessen, 2002).

The formation of ICMI

The inception in late 1990 of the Indonesian Association of Moslem Intellectuals (ICMI) was one of the most prominent signs of the rising centrality of Islam in Indonesian public life (Liddle, 1996).⁶⁵ The organization, headed by

⁶⁵ Liddle (1996) notes that ICMI emerged in the context of a power struggle between Suharto and Christian/nationalist factions within the armed forces (ABRI). Thus, he cautions that ICMI should

the then Minister of Science and Technology, B. J. Habibie, was set up as a “sounding board” for Moslem input in public policy (Schwarz, 2000:175). ICMI championed affirmative action for Indonesia’s Moslems and this meant striving for proportional representation of Moslems in the military, political and bureaucratic fields where it was long felt that non-Moslems and the nominal *Abangan* Moslems (as opposed to the more orthodox *Santri* Moslems) had held sway (Purdey 2006: 17; Van Bruinessen, 2002).

Many modernists within ICMI were stridently and vehemently opposed to the perceived influence of prominent Chinese/Christian think tanks like the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta. The Center for Information and Development Studies and the newspaper *Republika* were set up to counter these Chinese/Christian influences. There were also some in ICMI who saw the organization as an instrument of ordinary Indonesians, the predominant majority of whom happen to be Moslem, in the struggle against the rapacious business elite (mostly Chinese) created under the *New Order*. Some members of ICMI resented the government’s economic reforms which were seen as a well-orchestrated plan to keep the “Moslems poor and the Chinese rich.” The most ardent and passionate embracer of this view was Adi Sasono, who headed ICMI’s research and publication division for several years and subsequently became the general secretary of the organization in 1995 (Liddle, 1996).

not be seen as a mass political movement, but as an instrument designed and adroitly utilized by Suharto to further his own goals and for the purpose of controlling important social groups. ICMI was led by several key officials handpicked by Suharto himself and it was allowed to flourish because it fitted in well with his strategic plans of consolidating control over the political system.

The militant embrace

Suharto's courting of Islamic groups also lured some militant movements into his camp (Schwarz, 2000:330). Militant modernist groups such as Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) and the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World (KISDI) became increasingly influential in the late *New Order* and enthusiastically supported Suharto's change of policies. Moslem militants blamed the worsening ethnic and religious relations on the Christians and the Chinese and accused the latter of placing obstacles in the path of Moslems' realizing their deserved political dominance. Given the substantial number of Chinese Christians, there was often a conflation between anti-Chinese and anti-Christian tensions. This was further accentuated by the fact that many of the large Chinese conglomerate owners were Christian, many passionately and devoutly religious (Backman, 2002).⁶⁶

Changing alignment in the Armed Forces (ABRI)

In 1993, the then armed forces commander Benny Murdani, a Catholic and a prominent target for modernist Moslem hostility was eased out of power and replaced by figures less hostile or opposed towards organized Moslem activity.⁶⁷ After overcoming Murdani's challenge, President Suharto courted the Islamists

⁶⁶Backman acknowledges that Sudono Salim, the head of the largest conglomerate in the country is a devout Buddhist, but stresses that owners of several other influential business enterprises belong to fundamentalist non-denominational churches; these include the heads of the Ometraco, Maspion, Lippo, Ciputra, and Danamon groups.

⁶⁷ Murdani was deemed as too much of a threat to Suharto's leadership, disliked for resisting demands of two of Suharto's children for extravagant military procurements and was pushed out in 1993. Murdani's removal precipitated a purge of Christians from several top level positions in the ABRI and the cabinet (Mietzner, 1999).

and tried to win back control of the Army which consequently led to a remarkable Islamization of ABRI. By the middle of the 1990s, it became increasingly evident that ABRI had split into two broad divisions- a pro-Islamic, pro-Suharto Green Faction and an anti-Islamic, anti-Suharto Red-White Faction. The Green Faction, headed by Suharto's son-in-law Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, included several officers close to modernist Moslems and became increasingly influential. The rhetoric and discourse of several very senior officers (including Prabowo) was punctuated with virulent anti-Chinese sentiment as Indonesia tumbled into freefall in the disastrous aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. The next chapter will engage with this discourse of hatred promulgated by figures in the military who saw the Chinese as a central part of a conspiracy theory to oppress *Pribumi* Moslems from securing their rightful and deserved position in the country.

Resentment against the CSIS

The Center for Strategic and International Studies is an influential think-tank based in Jakarta. It was established in the early *New Order* period and is closely linked with Christian and Chinese business interests (Schwarz, 2000). The institute worked closely with Suharto in the early *New Order* period and was often accused by elements in the Islamic community of actively striving to undermine the interests of *Pribumi* Moslems in Indonesia. Benny Murdani, the aforementioned former commander of the armed forces, was a founding member of CSIS and continued to maintain close connections with the institute even after leaving the army. By the early 1990s, CSIS was becoming increasingly vocal in its criticism of the Suharto regime and attracted the ire of elements within the

military, especially in the Green Faction, which accused the institute of masterminding the economic crisis, engineering capital flight and creating political instability in the country. On January 26, 1998, Sofyan Wanandi, a prominent ethnic Chinese businessman, a major financial backer of CSIS and also the brother of Jusuf Wanandi (the head of CSIS) was accused by the Jakarta military command of involvement in a bomb blast carried out by students associated with the outlawed People's Democracy Party on January 18, 1998.⁶⁸ Wanandi's alleged involvement in the explosion strengthened claims that the CSIS was instrumental in destabilizing the regime and led to several large demonstrations urging the CSIS to be closed down (Ocorandi, 1998).

Conclusion

This chapter has described in detail the historical construction of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia as a "disliked community." The Chinese were subjected to a highly institutionalized process of exclusion dating back to Dutch colonial rule as successive regimes sought to deal with Indonesia's "Chinese problem." The *New Order* regime in particular pursued an aggressive policy of forced assimilation vis-à-vis the Chinese. However, the implementation of this policy was inconsistent; in line with its stated goal of assimilation, some policies -such as the destruction of the three pillars of Chinese culture- managed to blur group distinctions. Yet, others -such as the promotion of the *Cukong* business class and

⁶⁸ No evidence was ever produced to support the charge and it is widely believed that the charges were trumped up. According to Wanandi himself "the police investigating me admitted that they had no evidence, but were just acting on instructions from higher up," as told in an interview with Adam Schwarz (Schwarz, 2000: 346).

distinctive marks on Chinese identity cards- served to amplify group differences rather than blur them. This partial implementation of the official policy of assimilation was particularly injurious to the Chinese as it managed to strip the group of much of its cultural consciousness while at the same time keeping the group very much in the public realm. In other words, the *New Order*'s mixed policy served to augment the precariousness of the group. The net effect of this protracted and systematic process of discrimination was to inculcate strong stereotypes of the Chinese as 1) disloyal non-natives, 2) economic exploiters and 3) non-Moslem conspirators in the minds of *Pribumi* Indonesians.

As Indonesia tumbled into political and economic turmoil in the late 1990s, such deeply embedded stereotypes came to roost as opportunistic elites sought to scapegoat the Chinese for the country's social woes. It is to these dynamics that the dissertation turns its attention in chapter five.

CHAPTER FIVE

Anatomy of a Crisis: The Hunt for Scapegoats amidst Social Chaos

This chapter seeks to contextualize the anti-Chinese violence of the late *New Order* Indonesia. The first part of the chapter briefly outlines the multiple economic, political and social crises that engulfed Indonesia in the late 1990s. This is followed in the second part by a discussion on how self-interested Indonesian elites sought to deflect attention from themselves by embarking on a well-orchestrated and systematic campaign of scapegoating against the ethnic Chinese as Indonesia plunged deeper and deeper into turmoil.

Indonesia's Multiple Social Crises

The Fallout of the Asian Financial Crisis

The Asian financial crisis was set in motion in July 1997 when Thailand floated the baht after its foreign exchange reserves were subjected to sustained attacks by currency speculators. Large scale capital flight and the collapse of the Thai baht led to sharply decreasing investor confidence around the region as the crisis rapidly escalated beyond the borders of Thailand and investors made haste to abandon long popular East and Southeast Asian financial markets.¹

¹ A detailed discussion of the causes of the Asian Financial Crisis falls outside of the scope of this dissertation. However, there is an abundance of literature on the phenomenon and myriad different explanations have been presented. These include over-reliance on short term overseas borrowing, inherent instability in global financial markets (Sachs, 1998; Wade, 2000), poorly regulated and monitored domestic financial markets (Stiglitz, 1998), crony capitalism between regime elites and business tycoons (Krugman, 1998; Pincus and Ramli, 1998; Wade, 1998a 1998b) and policy errors made by the government and the IMF in the early stages of the crisis (Feldstein, 1998).

The crisis was to hit the hardest in Indonesia, a country that had enjoyed a remarkable period of economic growth for much of the *New Order* period.² Hence, the severity of the economic crash was as unexpected as it was harsh.³ The impact of the crisis was first felt in Indonesia in late July 1997 as the rupiah dipped in value for the first time in eleven years (Evans, 1999). In response, on August 14, 1997, the Central Bank of Indonesia (Bank Indonesia) floated the rupiah. In September, the finance minister Mar'ie Muhammad unveiled a list of 15 big budget infrastructural projects that the government would temporarily place on the back burner, including several projects belonging to members of the first family. As the alarming depreciation of the rupiah continued,⁴ the government called for IMF assistance in late October 1997. The IMF, which granted Indonesia a bailout package of US\$ 43 billion, discovered an economy deeply entombed in debt and corruption. In return for the bailout, the IMF demanded fiscal tightening, reduction of subsidies for fuel and food items and the closure of non-performing banks. As Robison and Rosser (1998) noted “it soon became clear that the quid pro quo for IMF assistance would be a series of neo-liberal reforms which would strike at the heart of the politico-business and

² In the early 1990s, economic growth was around 7.5%, the rate of poverty had declined, inflation was brought under control and a series of reform measures had dismantled non tariff barriers, lowered tariffs and opened up foreign investment in hitherto unchartered areas (Schwarz, 2000).

³ Purdey (2006) estimates that in the last quarter of 1997, Indonesia's economic growth slowed to 1.4% as opposed to 7.3% in the first quarter. According to the Indonesia Human Development Report (2001), inflation in Indonesia skyrocketed from 6% to 78% between 1997 and 1998, while real wages decreased by approximately one third. As a consequence, there was an exponential increase in the rate of poverty. The report estimates that the percentage of people living below the poverty line increased from 18% to 24% from 1996 to 1999. Furthermore, the overall economic contraction in Indonesia in 1998 was 13%, which incidentally was twice as high as the decline in Malaysia or Thailand.

⁴ Hal Hill (Canberra Times, 7 June 1998) observes that the value of the rupiah to the dollar kept on depreciating from 2500 in October to 4000 in November before going into freefall in December and January. Sidel (1998) notes that the rupiah depreciated by 70% from mid July 1997 to January 1998.

conglomerate power.” On the surface, Suharto complied and agreed to rescind subsidies and to implement reforms especially in the banking sector, which subsequently led to the closure of 16 banks including several belonging to Suharto’s children. Yet, it was soon evident that these measures did not have the desired effect of stimulating reform in the industry (Evans, 1999) and the president’s children blatantly sidestepped several of the IMF stipulations, thus bringing into question Suharto’s willingness to really push for hard reforms.⁵

By October 1997, Indonesia was also experiencing its worst drought for over half a century which adversely impacted the rice harvest and exacerbated economic hardship. Over a million workers had lost their jobs by early December and modern industrial and services sectors were amongst the worst affected (Aspinall, 2005: 211). By early 1998, the flight of capital from Indonesia was approximately 10 trillion rupiah and on January 8, the rupiah fell to 10,000 to the dollar (Evans, 1999).

Suharto unveiled his budget for the coming fiscal year on January 6, 1998. The budget disregarded many of the stipulations in the IMF agreement, was perceived as wildly optimistic and expansionary (Aspinall and van Klinken, 1999) and convinced investors that Suharto had completely misinterpreted the gravity of the situation; consequently, investors rapidly pulled out their money and the

⁵ Suharto’s family bitterly complained that the measures taken were a part of an elaborate political conspiracy to topple him from power. Many conditions stipulated in the IMF agreement were disregarded (such as the dismantling of monopolies on cloves owned by Suharto’s youngest son Tommy (Aspinall, 2005; 210). Another son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, was infuriated by the decision to include his Bank Andromeda among the 16 banks targeted for liquidation and protested loudly and threatened legal action against the cabinet ministers responsible. Eventually, he fought the order in court, bought over a smaller bank and merely transferred his assets over to the smaller bank. It is believed that he received Suharto’s tacit approval (Sulaiman, 2002). For more details on the banks that were closed, see O’Rourke (2002: 47-51).

rupiah went into freefall, losing half its value in five days. As international and domestic pressure rose to a crescendo, Suharto signed another, more stringent deal with the IMF on January 15. On January 17, the rupiah fell to its nadir of 17,000 against the dollar (Purdey, 2006:80). The second IMF agreement⁶ demanded curbs on “major rent- seeking or racketeering” operations and stipulated that a host of government monopolies and cartels be scrapped and subsidies for fuel severely slashed (O’Rourke, 2002: 53). The government implemented some of the clauses in the January 15 IMF package in February, but as with the first agreement, compliance was patchy and visible improvement of the economy limited.

Chronic Food Shortages and Food Riots

As the rupiah plummeted in early January, the middle classes went into a shopping frenzy and converged on grocery stores to hoard food before prices escalated again and the specter of food shortages loomed large on the horizon (O’Rourke, 2002: 52). It is estimated that food prices increased by approximately 26% between January and February of 1998 (Evans, 1999). As the rupiah nosedived inexorably, grievances against the Chinese mounted as scores of people were laid off by Chinese controlled enterprises. Food riots broke out in many parts of the archipelago in early 1998, especially in February, after the end of the fasting month of Ramadan. Many Chinese shops were looted, partly as a

⁶ Several observers have however been critical of IMF’s handling of the crisis. According to Jeffrey Sachs, the IMF misdiagnosed the causes of Indonesia’s crisis. He censures IMF’s decision to slash public spending in the face of private sector deflation and also on the closure of the banks (cited in Schwarz, 2000: 341). Others argue that the IMF miscalculated by pushing for structural reforms in a country plagued with an acute financial crisis (Feldstein, 1998).

repercussion of rising prices and also due to the belief that the Chinese were instrumental in raising prices. Panic gradually set in as people lost confidence in the government. In early January, several political figures including former cabinet ministers called for the government to step down and for Suharto to be replaced as president. Fears and rumors that Suharto was gravely ill also aggravated concerns about complete political upheaval.

Political Storm Clouds Gather

Even before the calamitous disintegration of the Indonesian economy in late 1997, cracks had begun to appear in the political stranglehold of the *New Order*. Factionalization of the armed forces, growing popularity of the Megawati led opposition Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and strident criticism from the media saw Suharto resort to increasingly repressive measures to maintain his grip on power. In 1994, Suharto ordered that three publications –Tempo, Editor and Detik- be shut down as part of a broader campaign of clamping down on the media (Schwarz, 2000: 320). Next on the agenda was the ousting of Megawati – daughter of Sukarno –who had taken over the leadership of the PDI in late 1993. Wary of Megawati’s growing popularity and fearing that she would be nominated to run against Suharto in the 1998 presidential elections, the government declared her leadership of the PDI as illegitimate and requested the party to hold a special congress in June 1996. Megawati and her principal supporters in the executive board of the PDI were excluded from the congress. Suryadi, a dissident in the party who complied with the government order, was appointed and immediately recognized by the government as the legitimate head of the party. The blatant

maneuvering of the PDI and the usurpation of Megawati further intensified her popularity. The forcible eviction of Megawati supporters from the PDI headquarters in Jakarta in July 1996 heralded two days of violent riots which left five dead and 149 injured (Schwarz, 2000: 322).⁷ Megawati was subsequently barred from contesting the parliamentary elections of May 1997. The PDI effectively split into Megawati and Suryadi factions and was unable to mount a credible challenge to the ruling Golkar party. Predictably, Golkar comfortably won the election in an often tense campaign marred by several incidents of violence.⁸

General Session of the MPR

In the middle of the financial crisis, Indonesia held the general session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) - the highest governing body in the country- in March 1998. Amidst widespread protests, the MPR endorsed Suharto's presidency for another five year period. The new cabinet which was announced a week later was largely made up of Suharto appeasers and sycophants; the influence of Suharto's eldest daughter Tutut was clearly evident in the composition of the new cabinet where emphasis appeared to be placed on family loyalty rather than professional merit (Suryadinata, 1999; O'Rourke, 2002). The

⁷ On July 27, 1996, government backed thugs stormed into the PDI headquarters and forcibly evicted supporters of Megawati who had been camped there. Party members had occupied the building in protest of the government-orchestrated usurpation of Megawati as PDI leader at a congress in Medan. The blame for the riots was pinned on a shadowy left-wing group (PRD). For more on the ousting of Megawati and the storming of the PDI headquarters, see Eklof (2003).

⁸ With the PDI effectively hamstrung by Megawati's ousting, Golkar's principal challenge came from the Islamic United Development Party (PPP). The election campaign was marred with several violent skirmishes between rival supporters of Golkar and the PPP, notably in Pekalongan on 30 March 1997 and in Banjarmasin on 25 May 1997 (Purdey, 2006: 77).

MPR also authorized Suharto with sweeping new powers to enact extra-constitutional measures during times of emergency. The blatant political shenanigans of the Suharto “insiders” further fueled an already inflammatory situation and galvanized mass scale student protests as Indonesia staggered deeper into the abyss.

Student Protests

From early March onwards, a wave of student demonstrations swept the country as activists began to clamor loudly for change. Organized by university students with active support and encouragement from rectors and academic staff, the protests were easily the largest and best organized in modern Indonesian history and spread across the length and breadth of the country.⁹ For instance, over 25,000 students protested at the prestigious Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta on March 11, the day Suharto officially commenced his seventh term in office (Schwarz, 2000: 353).

Demonstrations called for reduction in the prices of basic commodities, the end of *korupsi* (corruption), *kolusi* (collusion) and *nepotisme* (nepotism) and also called for wide ranging *Reformasi*.¹⁰ As the main opposition leaders failed to

⁹ The student movement was triggered by a series of protests at the Depok and Salemba campuses of University of Indonesia in late February 1998. These protests received prominent media coverage and galvanized a rush of student demonstrations across the country. Before the end of the MPR session on March 11th, protests had taken place on campuses in many major cities from Bandung to Surabaya and from Padang to Manado (Aspinall, 2005).

¹⁰ For a detailed description of the student protests, see a report published by Human Rights Watch in 1998 titled “Academic Freedom in Indonesia: Dismantling Suharto-era barriers.” The report states that the major demands of the protestors often included calls for price controls on basic commodities to assist the most vulnerable groups in society, repealing the ban on independent political organization, removal of the strict regulation of recognized political parties, demilitarization of society and respect for basic human rights.

maintain a credible campaign against Suharto –which became painfully clear once the MPR had endorsed the latter’s presidency for another term- the student movement rapidly assumed the mantle as the centerpiece of resistance against the regime. The extent and scope of demonstrations widened exponentially after the MPR session even into far flung corners of the archipelago such as Jayapura in Papua and Kupang in West Timor (Aspinall, 2005: 223) as “literally hundreds of institutions, including private universities, academies, and institutes as well as leading public universities and state teacher training and Islamic institutes, participated in the movement” (Human Rights Watch, August 1998). The momentum generated by the students also galvanized several political figures into action. Amien Rais, the leader of Muhammadiyah, who was initially reluctant to mobilize his own supporters against the regime, became increasingly receptive to student protests; he toured campuses, addressed rallies and urged students to continue their protests (Aspinall, 2005:224).

At the outset, student groups and the military coexisted peacefully and most demonstrations were confined to university campuses. However, some of the confrontations turned violent and included skirmishes between the security forces and students in at least fourteen different towns in Java, Sumatra, Bali and Lombok (Aspinall, 2005: 223). Between March 11 and May 2, more than eight hundred people were reported injured in over thirty separate clashes, many with serious facial and head wounds (Human Rights Watch, August 1998). The anger and resentment of the protestors mounted as news filtered through that several of the most radical student activists had been abducted by elements of the military. For instance, several students were detained on March 19 after a clash at the

University of Lampung and it is believed that at least two dozen activists mysteriously “disappeared” over the first few months of 1998.¹¹

The Blame Game Begins: the Hunt for Scapegoats

Having outlined the contours of the economic cum socio-political crisis in Indonesia in the late 1990s, this section outlines how an already stormy climate was exacerbated by an active campaign of scapegoating against the ethnic Chinese community. As the economic and political crisis intensified in early 1998, it became patently clear that certain elements in the regime were deliberately trying to ferment anti-Chinese sentiment (Aspinall et al, 1999; Mietzner, 1999). The ever widening socioeconomic gap was projected as a problem created by the Chinese. Publicizing the stark dichotomy between the rich, (often) Christian Chinese and the poor Moslem *Pribumi* had all the ingredients for stirring up ethnic disharmony; yet, the approach was politically invaluable to certain regime elites (Honna, 2001) as a way of deflecting attention from themselves during times of turmoil. In short, a wide variety of “government statements and more concrete actions in the course of January and early February 1998 worked to create an atmosphere of public officially-sanctioned suspicion and resentment” both towards the Suharto backed Chinese conglomerates as well as the thousands

¹¹ According to a report published by the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, a number of students were arrested at the University of Lampung on March 19 after a confrontation with the security forces. It is believed that at least five students were subjected to torture during a detailed interrogation (cited in Human Rights Watch, August 1998). After a series of denials, the commander in chief of the armed forces belatedly acknowledged in late June 1998 that security forces may have been involved in some of the abductions. Also read O'Rourke, 2002 and Aspinall and Van Klinken, 1999 for more details on the student abductions.

of ethnic Chinese shop keepers scattered across the vast archipelago (Sidel, 1998).¹²

The discussion on scapegoating is divided into two sub-sections. First, attention is drawn to a series of government sanctioned and well publicized events and concrete actions where the role of the Chinese in the crisis was loudly debated. These events/actions are discussed in chronological order. The second part focuses on the more general expression of overt anti-Chinese sentiment by a range of leaders belonging to the top echelons of Indonesian political, military, economic and religious circles. Taken together, this section helps to explain the extent to which efforts were taken to transfer blame for the crisis and how the momentum generated by the ferocity of the “anti-Chinese” campaign facilitated the rapid dissemination of discontent against the Chinese across the archipelago.

Government Sanctioned Events

The failure of the “Cinta Rupiah” campaign

As the rupiah continued to depreciate, Suharto’s eldest daughter, Tutut, spearheaded the “I love the rupiah campaign” (*Gerakan Cinta Rupiah*) in early January, in an optimistic endeavor to cajole people to convert their dollar holdings into rupiah and to ostensibly demonstrate the nation’s solidarity with the

¹² These moves were taken at a time when the most severe impact of the crisis –through rising prices- was felt directly through Chinese owned shops. The economic crisis gripping Indonesia was not portrayed as the result of corruption or financial mismanagement, but passed off as a campaign financed by “hateful Chinese, Christian and pro-democracy traitors” (Hefner, 2000). Purdey remarks, “as in the past, economic and political turmoil brought an escalation of violence against the ethnic Chinese. It was easier to blame traders than the powerful economic forces giving rise to inflation” (Purdey, 2006:81).

currency.¹³ Chinese conglomerates in particular were exhorted to hold rupiah assets amidst allegations that the conglomerates' business practices and involvement in shady currency deals showed their lack of allegiance to Indonesia. The then Armed Forces Commander, General Feisal Tanjung, contacted thirteen of the most affluent ethnic Chinese tycoons in the country and demanded their active participation in the "*Cinta Rupiah*" campaign (Wibowo, 2001).¹⁴

In spite of several carefully choreographed and high profile ceremonies in which dignitaries exchanged their dollars into rupiah, the actual impact of the movement was marginal (Purdey, 2006: 84). The lack of success of the campaign was largely attributed to the antipathy and disloyalty of the Chinese with Tutut publicly blaming the group for its failure, thus further heightening resentment against the Chinese.¹⁵

Sofyan Wanandi- a convenient whipping boy

Prominent ethnic Chinese businessman Sofyan Wanandi publicly refused to join the *Cinta Rupiah* campaign (Sidel, 2006: 112). Wanandi dismissed the effort as a media gimmick and suggested that a more effective way to resuscitate the economy would be to cut down on corruption and increase transparency

¹³ On the first day of the campaign, amidst much publicity, Tutut exchanged US\$ 50,000 to Indonesian rupiah and encouraged others to take her lead by stating "we need everyone in society at large and in the government to love the rupiah" (Purdey, 2006: 84).

¹⁴ Also see Jakarta Post, January 15, 1998 and Michael Backman, Far East Economic Review, March 5, 1998 for more details on how the conglomerate leaders were pressured into contributing to the *Cinta Rupiah* movement. It was also believed in some quarters that the campaign was orchestrated by elements of the military (with the help of Tutut) to deflect public anger from "President Suharto's wealth to that of the affluent minority that has helped keep him in power" (Harsono, 1998).

¹⁵ Andreas Harsono, "Anti-Chinese Riots Ruin Indonesian Nation Building," American Reporter, 21 February 1998.

(Mellor, 1999). Government officials were furious with Wanandi's comments and a blistering propaganda campaign against him was unleashed in early 1998. After a much publicized fast-breaking ceremony on January 23, Major-General Sjafrie Syamsuddin, Jakarta's regional military commander, announced that Wanandi was being questioned in connection with a bomb blast in Jakarta earlier in the month. The explosion was attributed to the outlawed People's Democratic Party (PRD) and Wanandi was charged with providing financial assistance to the group.¹⁶ After the police interrogation of Wanandi, several radical Moslem groups demonstrated outside the CSIS –the think tank in which Wanandi was a core member- carrying inflammatory placards denouncing the CSIS as “parasites” and Sofyan Wanandi as a “traitor.”¹⁷ As Schwarz (2000:347) notes, there is evidence that these demonstrations were orchestrated by elements of the military. It is widely believed that the accusations against Wanandi were trumped up and no concrete proof has been furnished linking the Chinese businessman with the bombing. Yet, these allegations further underlined Suharto's public statements about a conspiracy behind the currency depreciation (Mietzner, 1999).

¹⁶ On January 18, 1998, a homemade crude bomb exploded in an apartment in Tanah Tinggi, in Central Jakarta. The apartment was leased by two active members of the PRD. Police recovered a laptop from the scene of the incident and it was alleged that the laptop contained emails from Sofyan Wanandi.

¹⁷ As noted in chapter four, Sofyan Wanandi, a prominent Chinese Catholic businessman, was a major financial backer of the highly influential Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) which was headed by his brother Jusuf Wanandi. The CSIS was highly trenchant in its criticism of the regime during the crisis and was accused by elements of the military in fostering political instability in the country. Wanandi in particular had further incurred the wrath of Suharto by supporting the reappointment of Try Sutrisno for another term as vice president. This was widely interpreted as an open snub to Suharto's preferred vice presidential candidate, Habibie (Suryadinata, 1999; Heryanto, 1999).

Pressure on currency speculators and hoarders

Senior military officers (and Suharto himself) denounced unnamed currency speculators as “traitors” and warned about a “conspiracy” to reduce the value of the rupiah (Sidel, 1998). The government announced in late January 1998 that currency speculation and price gouging were unpatriotic and subversive and would be liable to prosecution.¹⁸ The Chinese were frequently accused of hoarding essential commodities. State television for instance showed images of an ethnic Chinese caught hoarding cooking oil (Wibowo, 2001). Spurred on by the elite discourse, the public increasingly began to view price gougers and hoarders as ethnic Chinese (Pepinsky, 2006). During riots in the village of Patok Besi, about 50 miles east of Jakarta, looters complained that the “Chinese have put up the prices of everything too quickly” (Ocorandi, 1998); during riots in Pamunukan, one looter charged “all these economic problems are the fault of the Chinese” whilst a rioter in Losari added “we are angry because of price increases; the Chinese own the shops and they are putting up prices.”¹⁹

Breaking of the Ramadan fast –January 23, 1998

An estimated 4,000 activists from several key Islamic groups joined over 3,000 Kopassus (Special Forces) troops for a widely publicized breaking of the

¹⁸ Human Rights Watch in a report published in early 1998 charged that senior officials in the military were inciting racial tension. The report stated: “By warning over and over that the draconian anti-subversion law would be applied to hoarders of basic goods without at the same time explaining the difficulties that many shopkeepers are facing, the army has helped generate suspicions that any shop owner who refuses to sell at pre-crisis prices, or who closes his or her shop for fear of violence, is deliberately making goods scarce to keep prices high.” For more details, see Human Rights Watch, “Indonesia Alert: Economic Crisis Leads to Scapegoating of Chinese,” February 1998.

¹⁹ *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 16, 1998.

Ramadan fast (*buka puasa*) at Kopassus headquarters in Jakarta (Sidel, 2006: 113). It was hosted by the then Kopassus commander Maj. Gen. Prabowo Subianto and included leaders of hard-line Islamic groups such as DDII and KISDI who were well known for their anti-Chinese vitriol over the latter's dominance of the economy. Prabowo incited the assembled gathering by remarking that a handful of elite Chinese tycoons (including Sofyan Wanandi) were unhappy and resentful of Suharto's increasingly close relationship with the Moslem community and urged his fellow officers and Moslem leaders to "close ranks" in dealing with the challenges ahead (Schwarz, 2000: 347). Copies of Sterling Seagrave's *Lords of the Rim: the invisible empire of the overseas Chinese*, which detailed the economic dominance of the Chinese were distributed to Moslem leaders at the event.²⁰ Also distributed at the event was a booklet titled "*Konspirasi Menggoyong Suharto*" (The conspiracy to overthrow Suharto) which categorically attributed blame for the economic crisis to an "international conspiracy uniting Jews, the American CIA, the Vatican and Chinese-Indonesians" in an effort to keep Indonesia –a primarily Moslem country- down (Hefner, 2000:202). The book ended by calling for all enemies of Islam to be kicked out of Indonesia and in particular singling out the ethnic Chinese as deserving of such treatment.²¹

²⁰ *Canberra Times*, February 21, 1998.

²¹ Prabowo was widely believed to be behind the distribution of the booklet and Hefner argues that the publication originated in the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), a pro-Islamic think tank which was supported by several leading regime figures and by Suharto's children. Hefner further notes that "the booklet's anti-Chinese and anti-Christian rhetoric was the most hateful the Suharto regime had ever used" (Hefner, 2000:203).

Expression of Anti-Chinese Sentiment by Public Figures

This section describes the efforts by a vast range of Indonesian elites to pin the blame on the Chinese for Indonesia's troubles. The section is divided into four parts and discusses the articulation of anti-Chinese sentiment by political, military, economic and religious leaders respectively.

Anti-Chinese rhetoric –political figures

As early as late February 1990, Suharto had summoned the heads of the 31 largest conglomerates in Indonesia to his Tapos cattle ranch in West Java. All but two of the invitees were ethnic Chinese Indonesians. Suharto urged the assembled array of tycoons to sell 25% of their shares to *Pribumi* owned cooperatives and reminded them of their obligation to contribute toward a more equitable and egalitarian distribution of wealth.²² This meeting was widely televised across the country and Suharto brought to the attention of the entire nation that in his opinion the Chinese business fraternity was largely responsible for the widening social gap in the country (Schwarz, 2000:100).

Subsequently, in December 1997, Suharto requested that several prominent Chinese businessmen repatriate an estimated US \$ 60-80 billion allegedly parked offshore.²³ In early 1998, the president himself started using expressions like “we Moslems” which was interpreted as a snub to the Chinese.

²² The preceding two years had seen Chinese businessmen make use of the economic reforms that Suharto had implemented. The Chinese capitalized with a massive investment spree. The growing visibility of the *Cukongs* increased resentment amongst the *Pribumi*. Deregulation of the economy and public listing of companies in the Jakarta Stock Exchange made Chinese wealth far more public. The press also contributed to this with a series of extensive articles on the wealth of Indonesia's corporate elite. All this led to a wave of anti-conglomerate fervor and the meeting was Suharto's response to address this.

²³ *The Weekend Australian*, February 22, 1998.

This was crucial in the grand scheme of things, as Suharto had long championed keeping potentially divisive ethnic and religious issues out of the public and media discourse (Schwarz, 2000: 346).

In March 1998, in an interview with a Japanese newspaper, newly appointed vice president B.J. Habibie commented, “it is absurd that the ethnic Chinese, who make up 3% of the population, are controlling 90% of the economy. I would like to give the opportunity to the *Pribumi*, who make up the largest population and build them up” (Suryadinata, 1999).²⁴

Anti-Chinese rhetoric –military elites

Prabowo Subianto, son-in-law of Suharto was widely accused to have incited anti-Chinese sentiment and also suspected of involvement in the May 98’ riots. Prabowo was closely associated with several Islamic organizations “whose rhetoric revolves around an aggrieved sense of Moslem chauvinism and a deep racial hatred of Chinese Indonesians” (Scott, 1998) and was well known for his own dislike of the group. In an interview with Scott, Prabowo says “I believe in genetics, do you?...I read that book *The Bell Curve* and it is right. Intelligence depends on race.” He further nominates the “yellow people” as the dominant race. “It’s just like Jews in Europe or the Parsis in India. We resent the Chinese because

²⁴ Habibie was also slated for his comments later on in the year in the wake of the Chinese exodus following the May riots. In an interview with the Washington Post in July 1998, Habibie commented acerbically “if the Chinese community doesn’t come back because they don’t trust their own country and society, I cannot force them, and nobody can force them. Do you really think that we will then die? Their place will be taken over by others” (cited in Wibowo, 2001).

we know they outperform us” (Scott, 1998). Prabowo is also on record having said that he would like to “evict all un-nationalistic Chinese from Indonesia.”²⁵

Lieutenant General Syarwan Hamid referred to the Chinese as “rats”-who each had the potential to become a traitor- and accused the group of a lack of patriotism and of salting away the “fruits of our national development” at a time of grave crisis.²⁶ Sunarto, a senior military officer in Indonesia’s second largest city of Surabaya called on the Chinese to forgo profits to avoid becoming targets of rioting and noted that “the rich need to sacrifice a part of their wealth for the needy to minimize the threat of violence.”²⁷ An unnamed senior Indonesian army officer slammed the Chinese conglomerates for deserting the country at a time of need. “We have surrendered our economic sovereignty to the Chinese. This is a situation that must never be allowed to happen again,” he thundered.²⁸

Anti-Chinese rhetoric -religious elites

Anti-Chinese sentiments were also widely disseminated by leaders of several Islamic organizations and by conservative Moslem figures. The Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World (KISDI), a militant Islamic group, held a rally in front of the Al-Azhar Mosque in central Jakarta in mid February. The rally attracted several thousand people and berated traitors and

²⁵ Schwarz recalls a confidential interview with a Chinese businessman where the businessman was told by Prabowo that he believed the Chinese were to blame for the economic crisis and he (Prabowo) intended to drive all the Chinese out of Indonesia even if it pushed the economy back by twenty years or so (Schwarz, 2000:347). Also see Andreas Harsono, “Whither the general’s star,” *Nation*, August 26, 1998.

²⁶ Charles Coppel, “Ethnic Chinese and their skills are vital to Indonesia’s economy,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 27, 1998.

²⁷ Nikolaus Prede, “Islamic Jihad call may have stirred Indonesia’s anti-Chinese riots,” *Deutsche Presse Agentur*, February 20, 1998

²⁸ *The Weekend Australian*, February 21, 1998

liars of the ilk of Sofyan Wanandi (Sidel, 2006: 114). KISDI had close ties to Prabowo and several officials in the Green Faction in the armed forces and used political unrest in the country to launch “vicious, polemical attacks on the Chinese and Christian communities” in the country (Abuza, 2007). Its chairman Ahmad Sumargono epitomized this attitude.²⁹

At the apex of the food crisis, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) or the Indonesian Religious Scholars’ Council demanded a jihad (holy war) against “speculators” and “hoarders.”³⁰ MUI’s call for jihad was followed by a spate of violent incidents against the Chinese in parts of Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi.³¹ In mid February 1998, the head of the Islamic United Development Party’s (PPP) central leadership committee suggested that “*Pribumi* Indonesians might get negative impressions” from the actions of the Chinese led conglomerates and also argued that the economic crisis had shown to the people of the archipelago who real, loyal Indonesians were.³²

²⁹ In a meeting with Margaret Scott, Sumargono said that he blamed Chinese and Jewish speculators for the economic crisis. “A lot of our problems have been caused by the Chinese and now the IMF and the Chinese are working together to control us.” In the meeting, Sumargono also asserted confidently that Moslems should take over after Suharto and stated that his dream was to build an Islamic nation. In June 1998, Sumargono was active in trying to establish a Moslem party and promoting his brand of nationalism in which Moslems come first before the ethnic Chinese (Scott, 1998).

³⁰ John Sidel notes that these terms were “defined broadly enough to cover the thousands of mostly Chinese –shopkeepers, merchants, and businessmen scattered across the archipelago” (Sidel, 2006: 114).

³¹ Masdar Masudi, the director of the Indonesian Society for Community Development said he believed that the MUI had stirred up violence. Although the unrest had begun prior to the MUI clarion call, “more riots have occurred afterwards in a number of locations...rioters attacked alleged local hoarders of staple food –an action called for by the MUI. The MUI must be held morally responsible for the riots.” For more read, Nikolaus Prede, “Islamic Jihad call may have stirred Indonesia’s anti-Chinese riots,” *Deutsche Presse Agentur*, February 20, 1998.

³² See *Republika*, February 16, 1998 for details. Also, the head of the PPP in the municipal assembly in the city of Solo exhorted Matahari, a leading Chinese owned department store chain, to lower the prices of its primary commodities to avoid the wrath of residents (Sidel, 2006: 114)

In February 1998, Amien Rais, the leader of Muhammadiyah –one of Indonesia’s largest Islamic organizations – lashed out at Chinese tycoons for repressing Indonesia’s Moslems and slammed “Chinese parasites” close to Suharto (Clemens, 1998).³³ Lukman Harun, another prominent personality in Muhammadiyah, was also critical of Chinese economic wealth.³⁴ Moreover, countless ulama in mosques across the country called on their followers to “take back wealth that is rightfully theirs” (Purdey, 2006: 93).

Anti-Chinese rhetoric - economic elites

By the mid 1990s, more than 75% of foreign investors who had set up joint ventures in Indonesia had chosen an ethnic Chinese firm as the local partner. This influx of foreign capital further consolidated the economic stranglehold of the ethnic Chinese and exacerbated *Pribumi* resentment (Schwarz, 2000: 313). Chinese wealth also became more ostensible and conspicuous over time as several businessmen invested in extravagant shopping centers and leisure complexes (Purdey, 2006:39). In 1991, Suharto’s half brother Probosutedjo accused Chinese firms of not selling sufficient shares to cooperatives and remarked that “we still doubt their sense of nationalism”.³⁵ Achmad Tirtosudiro, a retired general turned businessman, blamed Chinese bribery and corruption for Indonesia’s woes and saw the economic crisis as an opportunity to redress the imbalance between the rich Chinese and the poor *Pribumi*. Aburizal Bakrie, chairman of the Indonesian

³³ It has to be noted though that Rais changed his attitude markedly a few months later and was one of the first Moslem figures to condemn the massive riots in May 1998.

³⁴ Lukman Harun argued in favor of resuscitating PP No. 10 of 1959 and banning retail trade in rural areas by aliens. He also called for the banning of Chinese banks in rural areas (Schwarz, 2000:123).

³⁵ Jakarta Post, June 20, 1991

Chamber of Commerce, called for a redistribution of ethnic Chinese wealth amongst the *Pribumi*.³⁶

Key Prabowo ally Fadli Zon articulated the view “if necessary, we’ll go backwards 10 or 15 years. The Moslem majority is ready to face any challenge, as long as there is economic justice. We can start to develop our country without them [Chinese].”³⁷ He further warned that it would be “payback” time if the Chinese do not return their wealth parked overseas.³⁸ Adi Sasono, cooperative minister under Habibie, shared the view that the Moslems have been unfairly denied their political dominance. “In China, we don’t see Indonesians running the government and the economy. Why should we have our majority repressed?” (Schwarz, 2000:395).

In a confidential interview with Adam Schwarz (2000: 127,) a senior economist remarked that most *Pribumi* resentment has less to do with the fact that the biggest firms are Chinese owned and more to do with the perception that Suharto had always given special facilities and preferential treatment to the Chinese.³⁹ As Schwarz notes some *Pribumi* businessmen would much rather see

³⁶ Charles Coppel, “Ethnic Chinese and their skills are vital to Indonesia’s economy,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 27, 1998.

³⁷ *Canberra Times*, February 21, 1998.

³⁸ In an interview with Schwarz in March 1998 (2000: 348), Zon remarked “if the Chinese don’t bring back their money to Indonesia, we should kick them out of the country...how can we consider them Indonesian if they take all the money they took from Indonesians and put it in Singapore? Those Chinese who want to leave can just go. They can stay here if they show a sense of nationalism by bringing back their money from overseas. But for most Chinese it is too late for them to show their nationalism.” Zon also steadfastly denied that mass scale rapes of ethnic Chinese women had taken place during the May riots (Zon, 2004).

³⁹ By the mid 1990s, it was widely perceived by the *Pribumi* that the success and wealth of ethnic Chinese businesses was primarily due to collusion with leading figures. Schwarz observes that *Pribumi* businessmen were hurt by Suharto’s preferential treatment of the *Cukongs*. As one unnamed businessman remarked “it hurts us when we hear that Suharto says *Pribumi* businessmen can’t be trusted... that ‘they don’t repay loans or work hard or are able to keep a secret...me or

Suharto's children and other family members siphoning off government wealth than see Chinese *Cukongs* benefit and this was a staggeringly stark reflection of how inflamed *Pribumi*-Chinese relations had become (Schwarz, 2000: 146).⁴⁰

Conclusion

This chapter began by briefly outlining the multiple social crises that engulfed Indonesia in the late 1990s. Such societal upheaval provided a timely opportunity for a range of self-interested elites to pin the blame on the historically disliked Chinese minority. The second half of the chapter articulated the extent of this concentrated campaign of scapegoating against the Chinese. While much of the scapegoating was composite and entailed a synthesized image of the Chinese that encompassed all three elements of the triple minority status, different elites often emphasized different aspects of "Chineseness". For instance, religious leaders like Sumargono gave greater weight to the non-Moslem dimension while *Pribumi* business leaders often emphasized the economic aspect of the Chinese.

In the backdrop of this campaign of scapegoating, anti-Chinese rioting predictably broke out in many different locales in Indonesia. However, as noted before, the impact of scapegoating was highly irregular with violence breaking out only in some places. The next two chapters form the empirical core of this dissertation and seek to explain these spatial variations in the patterns of violence across the country.

Bakrie and a number of others could be as big as Liem Sioe Liong or William Soeryadjaya if we had been given the same facilities and breaks" (Schwarz, 2000:124).

⁴⁰ Imam Tuafik, a leading *Pribumi* businessman remarked 'I'd rather see the kids grow than Liem get still more facilities. That's how bad things with the Chinese have gotten'. Professor Mubyarto, a prominent official in the National Planning Board notes 'if not for Suharto's children, all those businesses would go to the Chinese, and that would be worse' (Schwarz, 2000:146).

CHAPTER SIX

Variations in Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia at the District level

This chapter commences the empirical component of the dissertation and presents the main findings at the district level. As discussed earlier, districts in Indonesia are disaggregated into two broad types: urban districts (cities/*Kotamadya*) and rural districts (regencies/*Kabupaten*).¹ Given considerable differences in geographic size, population as well as economic development, urban districts and their rural counterparts are distinguished as conceptually and analytically different categories. Hence, the main findings in the two district types are discussed separately.

The chapter is organized as follows. The first section provides a broad overview of the patterns of district-level violence around the Indonesian archipelago. The next section, which makes up the bulk of this chapter, presents the main empirical findings. Given the mixed methods research approach utilized in this dissertation, the findings are presented in two formats. First, the results of several statistical analyses are shown in a series of tables and graphs. These results are based on datasets compiled at city and regency level. The quantitative component is supplemented next with a deeper qualitative analysis using field surveys, interviews and secondary sources. This section aims to elaborate and develop further the significance of statistical findings and also to give a sense of how the crucial explanatory variables played out at the ground level. The final

¹ Hereafter, for ease of discussion, urban districts will be referred to as cities and rural districts as regencies.

segment of the chapter addresses several alternative explanations put forward to explain violent anti-Chinese outbursts in the late *New Order* and challenges some popular (mis) conceptions about the nature of violence.

Patterns of Anti-Chinese Violence at the District Level in Indonesia

This section seeks to provide a brief descriptive overview of the main trends of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia. Figure 6.1 demonstrates that anti-Chinese violence was quite prevalent through the late *New Order* period of President Suharto as Indonesia grappled with a series of problems. Yet, at the same time, it depicts clearly the spatial disparities in the patterns of rioting across the country that motivated this dissertation. Figure 6.2 uses GIS technology to spatially plot the trajectory of violence. The red polygons depict violent districts, the yellow polygons depict peaceful districts and the districts not included in the dataset are shown in white.² Figures 6.3 and 6.4 digitally map the trajectories of violence in Java and Sumatra respectively –the two most populous islands in Indonesia and containing 95 of the 137 districts used in this research. As Figure 6.3 clearly demonstrates, much of the anti-Chinese violence was centered in Java, an island that occupies less than 8% of Indonesia’s landmass, yet is home to nearly 60% of its population and renowned as the political and economic epicenter of the country.³

² GIS stands for Geographic Information System and such technology is often utilized to present and analyze attributes that are spatially referenced. In GIS parlance, a polygon refers to a two-dimensional space that is used to capture a particular area of the earth’s surface.

³ According to the Year 2000 Population Census carried out by Badan Pusat Statistik (The Indonesian Census Bureau), the island of Java accounted for 58.83% of Indonesia’s 206 million people.

Figure 6.1: Spatial Distribution of Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia




Figure 6.2: Geospatial Mapping of Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia




Figure 6.3: Geospatial Mapping of Anti-Chinese Violence in Java





Figure 6.4: Geospatial Mapping of Anti-Chinese Violence in Sumatra



At the city level, the dataset contains 56 cities out of which 25 were coded as violent while the remaining 31 were peaceful.⁴ The cities were located in 23 different provinces and encompass all the major islands; however, a large majority of cities (44 out of 56) were scattered around the islands of Java and Sumatra. Java contained more violent cities than peaceful ones while the pattern was reversed in Sumatra. In terms of severity of violence, 9 of the 25 violent cities were coded as severe and 7 of these were found in Java.⁵ 10 cities were coded for intermediate levels of violence, while the remaining 6 cities were coded for low levels of violence.

The size of the city level Chinese population varied across the dataset. Table 6.1 reveals that the mean Chinese percentage was more or less the same across both violent and peaceful cities. Yet, there were a few notable cities with a considerable Chinese presence that were peaceful. These included the city of Pangkal Pinang in the province of Riau (20% Chinese) and Pontianak in West Kalimantan (23% Chinese). Data on the Chinese population was however available for only 37 of the 56 districts.⁶ Hence, for districts without demographic data on the Chinese, the mean Buddhist percentage was used as a proxy variable in the regression analyses in an endeavor to maximize the number of

⁴ A complete list of cities included in the dataset is provided in the appendix and contains the full breakdown of violent and peaceful cities.

⁵ The seven cities in Java coded as severely violent include all five urban districts in the province of Jakarta – West Jakarta, East Jakarta, Central Jakarta, South Jakarta and North Jakarta- Solo and Tangerang. The two cities outside of Java with high levels of violence are Medan in North Sumatra and the city of Ujung Pandang (Makassar) in South Sulawesi.

⁶ The population Census in 2000 was the first census since 1930 where data was collected based on ethnic affiliation. Self-identification was used as the sole criterion in the definition of ethnic Chinese (or other ethnic groups for that matter). The census only included quantitative data based on ethnic affiliation for the 8 largest ethnic groups in each province. The Chinese fitted this requirement in only 11 of the 30 provinces in existence at the time. Therefore, detailed provincial level data on the group is only available for these 11 provinces.

observations.⁷ Table 6.1 also shows that in general violent cities tended to be considerably larger in terms of the overall population. The population mean for violent cities is somewhat bloated by the inclusion of all five districts of Jakarta, yet, even with the exclusion of Jakarta, violent cities turned out to be almost three times as populous as their peaceful counterparts.

Table 6.1: The Distribution of Ethnic Chinese across Urban Districts

	Violent Cities	Peaceful Cities
Mean Chinese percentage	4.1 (18)	4.5 (19)
Mean Buddhist percentage	2.8 (25)	2.6 (30)
Total population in city	1,040,647 (25)	270673 (30)

Note: The number of cities is given in parentheses.

At the regency/village level, the dataset consists of 81 districts out of which 35 districts experienced anti-Chinese violence while the remaining 46 did not. The regencies were distributed across 18 different provinces and the detailed breakdown is given in Figure 6.1.⁸ As with the cities, a substantial portion of regencies were found in Java and Sumatra, but a quick look at Figure 6.1 shows markedly different and distinctive trajectories of violence in the two islands. In Java, over 75% of regencies were violent while in Sumatra, 80% of the regencies were spared anti-Chinese rioting. Most regencies on the major outlying islands

⁷ Most Buddhists in Indonesia tend to be Chinese (a pair-wise correlation of .93 between the two variables corroborates this); however, not all Chinese are Buddhists as evidenced in Table 6.1.

⁸ A complete list of regencies included in the dataset is provided in the appendix and contains the full breakdown of violent and peaceful regencies.

were peaceful apart from a few pockets of violence in the Nusa Tenggara, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. In terms of severity of violence, only the regency of Tangerang on the outskirts of Jakarta experienced the highest levels of violence. 25 regencies were coded for intermediate levels of violence and a further 9 for low intensity violence.

As Table 6.2 demonstrates, the size of the Chinese population fluctuated widely in the regencies. The average peaceful regency contained more than twice as many Chinese, even discounting outliers like the regencies of Bengkayang and Sambas both in West Kalimantan and the Sumatran regency of Bangka, which contained Chinese populations of 24%, 11% and 12% respectively. Similarly, the Buddhist percentage on average was quite a bit larger in the peaceful areas.⁹ In keeping with data from cities, the violent regencies on average were considerably more populated in contrast to their peaceful counterparts.

Table 6.2: The Distribution of Ethnic Chinese across Rural Districts

	Violent Regencies	Peaceful Regencies
Mean Chinese percentage	.96 (27)	4.1 (25)
Mean Buddhist percentage	.57 (35)	2.25 (43)
Total population in city	1,252,095 (35)	496,726 (43)

Note: The number of regencies is given in parentheses

⁹ As demographic data on the Chinese was available for only 52 regencies, the mean Buddhist percentage was substituted for the missing regencies.

Findings - Quantitative Studies

The main statistical findings of the study are presented in this segment of the chapter. Results based on urban districts are displayed first and this is followed by the presentation of regency wide results. The findings are displayed in the form of tables and graphs and are based on a series of ordered logistic regression models.¹⁰

Evidence from Cities

Three different ordered logistic models (containing a few alternate measures for independent variables) were run to measure the incidence of anti-Chinese violence in 56 different cities in Indonesia.¹¹

A quick perusal of the models in Table 6.3 amply demonstrates the multi-faceted nature of anti-Chinese violence that Siegel (1986:238), Purdey (2006: 29) and others have documented. As argued earlier, the results also hint at an interplay of a series of local level economic, religious and racial factors that combined to form a lethal mix and augmented the salience of the various attributes that were often invoked in elite-induced campaigns of anti-Chinese scapegoating.

Model 1 in Table 6.3 reveals that an increase in the visibility of non-Moslem places of worship, the extent of visible wealth of the Chinese and the number of competitive ethnic groups are all significantly and positively associated with the severity of anti-Chinese violence. Also, an increase in the availability of

¹⁰ Ordered logit models were used as the dependent variable –severity of violence- is ordinal.

¹¹ The main summary statistics of the citywide analysis is provided in Appendix D.

Table 6.3: Ordered logit Regression Models – Urban Districts

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Extent of Visible Wealth	2.60** (1.03)	2.22** (0.97)	1.89* (0.98)
Rate of Development	0.55 (0.62)	-0.56 (0.72)	-0.92 (0.76)
Competitive Ethnic Groups	0.48* (0.28)	0.54* (0.01)	
Ethnic Fractionalization			6.1** (2.43)
Density of Devout Cities (by area)		0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Density of Devout Cities (by population)	-0.02 (0.01)		
Density of non-Moslem Worship (by area)		1.40** (0.63)	1.90*** (0.73)
Density of non-Moslem Worship (by population)	0.29*** (0.09)		
Unemployment	0.02 (0.13)	0.01 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.11)
Availability of Housing Land	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)
Economic Growth in 1997	-0.24 (0.17)	-0.01 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.18)
Availability of Essential Commodities	-0.14 (0.50)	-0.17 (0.53)	-0.35 (0.54)
Chinese population	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.11)
Traders	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.18 (0.12)	-0.18 (0.13)
Social Gathering	2.06 (7.94)	2.02 (8.06)	5.42 (8.43)
High School Drop-outs	0.25* (0.12)	0.18 (0.12)	0.21 (0.13)
N	46	45	45
Pseudo R ²	0.37	0.26	0.30
Prob > Chi ²	0.000	0.01	.002

Note: Cells contain coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.


* P > .1, ** P > .05, *** P > .01

land for housing purposes serves to decrease the possibility of violence. The model controls for numerous other indicators identified as important in the literature on anti-Chinese violence.

Moslem “exclusivism” was identified in chapter two as a possible causal mechanism through which religious elements of elite instigated scapegoating might percolate and translate into violence at the local level. Model 1 clearly shows that the intolerance of exclusivist Moslems and their fears of an increasing Christianization of local communities are heightened in cities with a higher density of non-Moslem places of worship. Figure 6.5 shows the probability of violence across different densities of non-Moslem religious places while holding all other variables at their mean.¹² It is evident that there is an exponential increase in the severity of anti-Chinese rioting as the density of non-Moslem worship increases. For instance, the eventuality of severe violence is quite low (approximately 5%) for cities with an average density of churches and temples. This rises to almost 20% as the number of non-Moslem worship places is increased to its 90th percentile. Similarly, the probability of peace declines sharply from 62% at average levels of density to around 20% when density levels are at their 90th percentile. As a robustness measure, Model 2 in Table 6.3 uses an alternative measure of non-Moslem places of density where the total number of Buddhist temples and Christian churches is divided by the area of the city and the results show that this measure also significantly increases the severity of anti-Chinese violence.

¹² The figures were created using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2003) and SPost commands (Long and Freese, 2006).

Figure 6.5: The Influence of Density of non-Moslem Worship on Probability of Violence¹³



Chapter two outlined the role of visible wealth associated with the Chinese in triggering long entrenched stereotypes about Chinese economic dominance. It was also hypothesized that the impact of Chinese controlled/owned visible wealth is likely to be higher especially in the poorer cities as it further highlights group level economic discrepancies.¹⁴ Table 6.3 indicates that visible wealth is significantly and positively correlated and Figure 6.6¹⁵ makes its impact even more evident. At average levels of visible wealth, the possibility of severe violence is 3% with intermediate levels of violence around 20%. As visible wealth increases to its 90th percentile rank, intermediate violence becomes twice as high and severe violence increases dramatically by almost twenty fold. In contrast, the


¹³ The vertical line for Figures 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 denote the mean levels of the respective variables.

¹⁴ Thus, the variable “extent of visible wealth” contains an interaction term between visible wealth (total number of supermarkets and banks) and the number of poor settlements in the city.

¹⁵ Figure 6.6 measures the probability of violence across various levels of visible wealth while holding all other variables at their mean.

chances of peace become almost six times less likely as visible wealth increases from its mean to its 90th percentile.

Figure 6.6: The Influence of Visible Wealth on Probability of Violence



The theoretical framework in chapter two also outlined the role of micro-level ethnic competition in galvanizing bouts of violent anti-Sinicism, especially during times of crisis. The level of competition for scarce resources is expected to increase in more ethnically heterogeneous cities as the twofold ethnic competition (between various *Pribumi* groups and between the *Pribumi* and the Chinese) assumes greater intensity. Model 1 in Table 6.3 tests for this phenomenon by using the number of competitive ethnic groups (with each group representing at least 5% of the population) in each urban district and it is clear that the measure has a significant positive impact on violence. As Figure 6.7 shows,¹⁶ the possibility of severe and intermediate levels of violence is around 3 and 20%

¹⁶ Figure 6.7 measures the probability of violence as the number of competitive ethnic groups is increased from the mean to its 90th percentile while holding all other variables at their mean.

respectively in a city with an average number of competitive ethnic groups (3 groups). As the number of groups rises to 5 (90th percentile), the likelihood of violence (at both intermediate and severe levels) heightens; the probability of violence is higher for more intermediate levels, but the rate of change in the probability is marginally greater for severe violence as the variable is increased from its mean to its 90th percentile. Model 3 in Table 6.3 tests for ethnic heterogeneity by using the ethnic fractionalization index in lieu of the number of competitive groups and this measure is also significantly and positively associated with violence (indeed at an even greater level).

Figure 6.7: The Influence of the Number of Competitive Ethnic Groups on the Probability of Violence




Table 6.4 summarizes the impact of the three variables discussed above on the likelihood of violence.

Table 6.4: The Impact of Explanatory Variables on Anti-Chinese Violence

Variable changed while holding other variables at their mean	Change in probability of peace	Change in probability of intermediate levels of violence	Change in probability of severe violence
Density of non-Moslem Worship (from mean to 90 th percentile)	38% lower	26% higher	15% higher
Extent of Visible Wealth (from mean to 90th percentile)	55% lower	21% higher	37% higher
Number of Competitive Ethnic Groups (from mean to 90 th percentile)	22% lower	15% higher	7% higher

Evidence from Regencies

The same ordered logistic regression models outlined above were executed to measure the incidence of anti-Chinese violence across 81 regencies.¹⁷ The models in Table 6.5 indicate that regency level violence is similarly multifaceted as at the city level and encompasses several dimensions that increase the salience of ethnic/religious/economic attributes of the Chinese and consequently augment the likelihood of violent anti-Chinese outbursts.¹⁸

In all three models in Table 6.5, regencies with a high degree of religious (Moslem) piety as well as rapid levels of human development are significantly

¹⁷ The main summary statistics of the regency wide analysis is included in Appendix E.

¹⁸ As with the city level analysis, in Model 1, the density of non-Moslem worship and the density of *Kota Santri* are measured by dividing the respective indicators by the total population. In Model 2, density for the above variables is measured by dividing the respective indicators by the total landmass of the regency. Model 3 uses ethnic fractionalization as an alternative measure to capture the degree of ethnic competition.

Table 6.5: Ordered logit Regression Models –Rural Districts

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Extent of Visible Wealth	5.31 (4.27)	3.93 (4.25)	2.72 (3.53)
Rate of Development	2.32** (0.93)	1.70* (0.96)	1.88* (0.98)
Competitive Ethnic Groups	0.50 (0.33)	0.98*** (0.36)	
Ethnic Fractionalization			4.42** (1.94)
Density of Devout Cities (by area)		0.76*** (0.25)	0.65*** (0.23)
Density of non-Moslem Worship (by area)		-4.08 (6.12)	-1.82 (5.67)
Density of Devout Cities (by population)	0.01** (0.01)		
Density of non-Moslem Worship (by population)	0.02 (0.02)		
Unemployment	0.31* (0.15)	0.16 (0.17)	0.21 (0.16)
Availability of Housing Land	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)
Economic Growth in 1997	0.08 (0.12)	0.13 (0.13)	0.12 (0.12)
Availability of Essential Commodities	0.14 (0.18)	0.02 (0.19)	0.06 (0.19)
Chinese population	-0.63 (0.39)	-0.62 (0.40)	-0.41 (0.31)
Traders	0.04 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)
Social Gathering	4.73 (2.64)	2.13 (2.54)	3.37 (2.68)
High School Drop-outs	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
N	67	67	67
Pseudo R ²	0.28	0.30	0.28
Prob > Chi ²	0.001	0.001	.001

Note: Cells contain coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

* P > .1, ** P > .05, *** P > .01


and positively correlated with the incidence of violence. An increase in ethnic competition is positively associated with violence in Models 2 and 3 and the greater availability of land for housing purposes has a significant negative correlation with violence in all three models.

The models in Table 6.5 indicate that religious scapegoating is likely to appeal to exclusivist Moslems in deeply religious or devout regions that are referred to as *Kota Santri* in local jargon. As discussed in the earlier chapters, *Kota Santri* is made up of a dense network of Mosques, *Madrasahs* and *Pesantren* (two different schools of Islamic learning), Islamic institutes of higher learning, Islamic associations and an array of respected and charismatic religious leaders. Figure 6.8 shows the probability of violence across different densities of *Kota Santri* when all other variables are held at their mean. In a regency of average Moslem piety, the possibility of high levels of violence is around 22% and this increases to 38% as the level of piety is increased to its 90th percentile rank.¹⁹ In contrast, the likelihood of peace decreases from 60% to 45% as *Kota Santri* density (religious piety) changes from the mean to the 90th percentile. In Model 2 in Table 6.5, Moslem density is measured in terms of area and this measure has an even greater impact on anti-Chinese violence (for instance, as the variable is increased from its mean to its 90th percentile rank, the eventuality of high levels of violence rises by over 45%).

¹⁹ Out of the regencies, only Tangerang in the province of Banten was coded as having experienced the highest levels of violence (severity of violence =3). Therefore, Figures 8 and 9 only show trends for low and medium severities of violence and are depicted in the graphs as “Low Violence” and “High Violence” respectively.

The other measure used to capture the sentiments of exclusivist Moslems is the density of non-Moslem places of worship and as discussed earlier was strongly associated with violence in the cities. However, at the regency level, its impact was non-significant and this is somewhat surprising given that several detailed accounts of anti-Chinese rioting in regencies like Situbondo and Rengasdengklok note tensions over the increasing visibility of Christian churches (Purdey, 2006; Sidel, 2006); possible reasons for this apparent anomaly are discussed in the next section.

Figure 6.8: The Influence of *Kota Santri* on the Probability of Violence




The results of Table 6.5 show that rapidly developing regencies are more susceptible to opportunistic anti-Chinese diatribes of elites.²⁰ The attendant

²⁰ Rapidly developing regencies are captured by UNDP Indonesia's Human Development Reduction shortfall variable and measures the extent to which the Human Development Index score (HDI) has changed from 1996 to 1999. A higher reduction shortfall indicates that the district

changes of rapid development, such as the influx of commercial enterprises and the urgent need for infrastructural development, often created opportunities for the Chinese who invested heavily in these localities. Thus, during times of social turmoil, long-held economic prejudices against the Chinese were often brought to the forefront in regencies that were undergoing rapid developmental change.

Figure 6.9: The Influence of Rate of Development on the Probability of Violence



In Figure 6.9, the probability of violence is assessed across varying rates of rapid development. In regencies where the HDI score improved at an average rate, the probability of high levels of violence hovered around 25%; when HDI is increased to its 90th percentile, the likelihood of violence shot up to nearly 60%. In contrast, the prospects of peace diminished by around 35% for a similar change in the rate of development.

has made progress in improving its collective HDI. HDI is a composite variable made up of longevity (measured by life expectancy), level of education (measured by the mean years of schooling and adult literacy rate) and average living standards (measured by adjusted per capita expenditure).

The availability of housing land significantly decreases the prospects of violence across all three models. This finding is consistent with the results shown above and indicates that Chinese communities living in regencies where land competition is not as intense are less likely to incur the wrath of other groups.

Chapter two hypothesized that increased ethnic competition is likely to lead to more anti-Chinese rioting and this premise finds significant and positive support in Models 2 and 3 of Table 6.5. Model 2 uses the number of competitive ethnic groups as a measure of heterogeneity while Model 3 uses the ethnic fractionalization index. Table 6.6 summarizes the impact of the variables discussed above on the likelihood of anti-Chinese violence.

Table 6.6: The Impact of Explanatory Variables on Regency Level Violence

Variable changed while holding other variables at their mean	Change in probability of peace	Change in probability of high violence
Density of <i>Kota Santri</i> -by area (from mean to 90 th percentile)	15% lower	16% higher
Density of <i>Kota Santri</i> - by pop. (from mean to 90 th percentile)	50% lower	47% higher
Rate of Development (from mean to 90 th percentile)	35% lower	32% higher
Availability of Housing Land (from mean to 90 th percentile)	20% higher	12% lower
Number of Competitive Ethnic groups (from mean to 90 th percentile)	16% lower	13% higher

Findings- Qualitative Studies

Having outlined the main statistical findings at city and regency level, this section aims to expand on these findings through a deeper qualitative analysis

using field surveys, interviews and secondary research material. The section attempts to create a more nuanced understanding of how some of the crucial explanatory variables played out at the ground level across cities and regencies in Indonesia.

The argument advanced in this dissertation acknowledges that anti-Chinese rioting stems from multiple sources and privileges the micro-foundations of violence. Indeed, more than two thirds of the 77 survey responses used in this dissertation corroborated this assertion.²¹ Most respondents noted economic jealousy, racial prejudice, religious difference and state orchestration as having contributed to the violence and more than half said that local level attributes had to be looked at in order to account for different spatial trajectories of rioting. Almost all respondents agreed that there was a sustained campaign of anti-Chinese scapegoating leading up to and during the riots of the late 1990s. A prominent activist of Chinese-Indonesian rights summed up these sentiments well: “violence against the Chinese is very complex and can happen at any time due to the slightest provocation. The violence can involve many different aspects and it is not realistic to think of a single large factor as having caused the riots.”²²

As stated before, anti-Chinese scapegoating was primarily done by posturing the group as outsiders, hence not “loyal” Indonesians, by publicizing the economic dominance of the Chinese and by drawing attention to their non-

²¹ Of the 77 respondents, 46 were ethnic Chinese and the remaining 31 were the so-called *Pribumi*, but belonging to several different ethnic groups. Most *Pribumi* respondents noted the exclusiveness of the Chinese, their perceived economic monopolization as well as the general economic and social unrest in Indonesia at the time as critical factors in the unleashing of violence against the Chinese. Most Chinese respondents on the other hand noted economic jealousy, racial intolerance and institutional discrimination as having paved the way for the wave of violence.

²² Interview with Chinese journalist in Jakarta on April 25th, 2006.

Moslem nature; in other words by problematizing the three elements in the triple minority framework. The statistical analysis presented earlier identified a series of micro-level causal mechanisms through which these attributes assumed local salience and augmented the possibility of violence. This section attempts to bolster these findings with evidence from the ground.

Activation of Ethnic Scapegoating at the District Level

Much anti-Chinese scapegoating takes place by accentuating the ethnic differences of the Chinese; more specifically, by depicting the group as opportunistic non-native (non-*Pribumi*) outsiders. Chapter two theorized that ethnicity-oriented scapegoating is more likely to assume salience at the local level in more ethnically heterogeneous locales as the degree of competition (within different *Pribumi* groups and between the Chinese and the *Pribumi*) is likely to be greater. Indeed, the statistical analysis found clear support for this notion (both in cities and regencies) as the number of competitive ethnic groups in the district is positively and significantly correlated with anti-Chinese rioting.

Chapter two described how Suharto's *New Order* regime essentially functioned as the epicenter of a well oiled patron-client network where patronage was often distributed on the basis of ethnic affiliation. The chapter also explained that intra-*Pribumi* competition was seen at some level in terms of a Javanese versus non-Javanese dichotomy and how there was intense non-Javanese resentment at the extent of Javanese dominance. The dataset shows that violent districts in Java (where the Javanese are considered as the dominant ethnic group), on average, contained a larger percentage of non-Javanese than peaceful districts

in Java.²³ Similarly, violent districts outside of Java (where various non-Javanese ethnic groups are dominant), on average, boasted a larger Javanese population than peaceful districts outside of Java. These findings (summarized in Table 6.7) demonstrate support for the notion that intra-*Pribumi* ethnic competition was likely to have been more intense in violent localities.

Table 6.7: Percentage of Javanese and non-Javanese across Indonesia

	Mean Percentage of Javanese		Mean Percentage of Non-Javanese	
Violent Cities in Java	62.83	(13)	37.16	(13)
Peaceful Cities in Java	84.56	(8)	15.43	(8)
Violent Regencies in Java	73.4	(14)	26.59	(14)
Peaceful Regencies in Java	98.5	(7)	1.49	(7)
Violent Cities outside of Java	23.5	(10)	76.50	(10)
Peaceful Cities outside of Java	17.91	(20)	82.09	(20)
Violent Regencies outside of Java	15.75	(11)	84.24	(11)
Peaceful Regencies Outside of Java	13.2	(39)	86.8	(39)

Note: The number of districts is given in parenthesis.

Most survey respondents (both *Pribumi* and Chinese) emphatically agreed that the Chinese had a clear advantage over their *Pribumi* counterparts in trading and business. Several respondents said that the *Pribumi* could not compete on a level playing field with the Chinese given the latter's access to capital, greater

²³ The Province of Jawa Barat (West Java) was excluded from this analysis, as the Sundanese are clearly the dominant ethnic group in the province.

business acumen and stronger work ethic. 32 of the 46 Chinese respondents admitted that on average the Chinese were considered rich by Indonesian standards while all but one of the 31 *Pribumi* respondents asserted that the Chinese were rich.²⁴ Further, 26 of the 31 *Pribumi* respondents also felt that the Chinese were favored by central and local government officials and most respondents were bitter about the “preferential treatment” given to Chinese businesses. A *Pribumi* trader in Jakarta complained, “The government likes to work more with the Chinese. They get all the best contracts and deals. We [*Pribumi*] feel we can do as well as the Chinese in business, but we are not given the chance.”²⁵ Another lamented, “In my home town [Jember regency in East Java] I know at least three *Pribumi* businessmen who had to close down their shops because they could not compete with the Chinese.”²⁶

Indeed, the claim that the Chinese were driving indigenous businesses away was a common theme that echoed in several of the riot locales. In Tasikmalaya, as the economy grew rapidly in the 1990s, *Pribumi* discontent escalated as many petty traders were increasingly marginalized with the advent of Chinese based supermarket chains like Ramayana and Matahari (Sidel, 2006: 83-84). Moreover, Chinese dominated firms started gradually encroaching on traditional businesses dominated by the *Pribumi*, such as the production of batik textiles (Purdey, 2006: 61). Strong parallels with Tasikmalaya can be drawn in the town of Kebumen, the scene of an anti-Chinese riot in September 1998, as

²⁴ The question posed asked respondents to rank the extent of average Chinese richness on a scale of 1-10 (with 10 being the richest). 30 of the 46 Chinese respondents and 26 of the 31 *Pribumi* respondents ranked the Chinese as 7 or higher.

²⁵ Survey response received April 22, 2006.

²⁶ Survey response received April 29, 2006.

increasing Chinese investment in textiles, as well as the entry of supermarket chains led to the erosion of traditional markets (Purdey, 2006: 192-197). Likewise, in the Central Javanese town of Pekalongan, two Chinese owned textile factories that had attracted the ire of local residents for their role in sidelining small-scale indigenous manufacturers were set ablaze during two days of rioting in late 1996 (Sidel, 2006: 77). Similar grievances were also clearly in evidence in Surakarta (Solo), where Chinese businesses suffered extensive damage during two days of mayhem in May 1998.²⁷ Brenner provides a detailed account of how traditional batik manufactures in the Laweyan sub-district of Solo faced increasing competition from mass produced imitation batik products, many of which were bankrolled by the Chinese. In many cases, the *Pribumi* in Laweyan could not compete on a level pegging as the production of imitation batik needed a fairly substantial capital investment that they could ill afford (Brenner, 1998:89). Furthermore, the head of the Chamber of Commerce in Solo estimated that nearly 80% of shopkeepers in the city in 1998 were of ethnic Chinese origin, thus alluding to the extent of their economic dominance.²⁸

Ethnic competition was also a prominent theme in Situbondo where local entrepreneurs expressed disquiet with the rapid influx of large-scale Chinese retailers.²⁹ Moreover, Chinese owned shrimp farms in rural areas of Situbondo regency were gradually displacing indigenous owned rice farms and salt beds along the coast (Sidel, 2006:78). Grievances also ran deep in Rengasdengklok

²⁷ Solo was the worst affected city after Jakarta during the May 1998 riots. Indeed, some claimed that the extent of violence was more destructive in Solo in relative terms than in Jakarta. For a detailed account of the rioting in Solo see Purdey, 2006:124-140; Purdey in Coppel, 2006:72-89 and Thufail, 2007:65-78.

²⁸ *Kompas*, June 18, 1998.

²⁹ Ong Hock Chuan, "Retailers face restrictions in Indonesia," *Asia Times*, April 29, 1997.

where the Chinese were perceived to be in cahoots with local government officials, thereby securing special privileges (in terms of permits and so on), often to the detriment of *Pribumi* competitors (Siegel, 2000). A prominent monument erected by two Chinese tycoons at a busy intersection in Rengasdengklok further amplified *Pribumi* resentment as the monument was portrayed as an object of “gloating” and the embodiment of the superiority of the Chinese (Purdey, 2006: 69).

Pribumi resentment also figured prominently in Makassar, the capital city of South Sulawesi and one of Eastern Indonesia’s major industrial hubs, at the extent of influence exerted by Makassar’s small Chinese community (estimated to be around 40,000 out of 1.5 million residents). The Chinese had a vice like grip on several industries, retail trade and the banking sector and it was widely believed that Chinese businessmen enjoyed a privileged relationship with government officials (Hendratmoko, 1998; Sidel, 2006: 96). In a pattern reminiscent with several other cases, these concerns were clearly evident in at least two major anti-Chinese skirmishes in Makassar in September 1997 and February 1998.³⁰

Chinese owned motorized trawlers dominated the fishing industry in the coastal Central Javanese town of Cilacap. *Pribumi* fishermen who used more traditional methods of fishing found it difficult to compete with these motorized trawlers and over time more and more fishermen abandoned their boats to seek

³⁰ The riot in September 1997 lasted for nearly three days and was triggered when a mentally unstable Chinese man stabbed a nine year old girl and her nanny to death. The resultant violence led to the destruction of over 1,500 stores, homes and banks. A smaller riot erupted in February 1998 in protest of rising food prices and was a part of the wave of food riots that swept the archipelago in early 1998.

paid labor on the trawlers. A dispute over wages and work conditions on the trawlers as well as lingering resentment against Chinese dominance was at the forefront of a riot that broke out in Cilacap in August 1998 (Purdey, 2006:183-191).

The cases discussed above amply demonstrate that ethnic resentment at the privileged Chinese was often a crucial common denominator across riot locales. Further support for ethnic tensions can be gleaned from data on horizontal inequalities (HIs) collected by the RAND Corporation in the 1997 Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFSL). The limitations of the IFSL dataset and the reasons for not including HI data in the regression models were documented in chapter three.³¹ Yet, tentative conclusions can be drawn and IFSL data serves a useful function by providing further evidence on the extent of group level differences across the archipelago. The IFSL dataset contained information on 97 districts used in this study and spanned 5252 households in all. 78 of the 5252 households were Chinese and the average Chinese household income was nearly twice as high compared to non-Chinese households.³² District level patterns in group level income discrepancies can also be discerned, especially between different *Pribumi* groups.³³ These patterns are summarized below in Table 6.8.

³¹ To recap briefly, IFSL data was only available for 97 of the 137 districts covered in this study. These 97 districts in total contained data for 5252 households. However, the sample size in each district varied widely and ranged from a high of over 200 respondents in the regency of Cirebon for example to a low of just two respondents in the regency of Indragiri Hulu.

³² The 78 Chinese households for which IFSL data is available earned an average household income of close to 11 million rupiah. The Mean household income in the non-Chinese households is approximately 6.2 million rupiah.

³³ It is not possible to make district level comparisons between Chinese and *Pribumi* households given that the sample size of Chinese households is very small (or not available at all) in most districts.

It is clear that the extent of horizontal inequalities was mostly higher in the violent districts and indicates that ethnic tensions were likely to have been higher in those locales. For instance in Karawang, substantial income disparities existed between the majority Sundanese and the minority Javanese and Betawi groups with the minorities earning more. Bandung, Situbondo and Makassar –three prominent violent districts- also showed significant group level income differences. In contrast, in peaceful districts like Sibologa, Pematang Siantar and Bukitinggi, the extent of horizontal inequalities was less severe. Bucking this trend is Sukabumi city, a peaceful locality, which nonetheless showed high HI levels. However, it is possible that the impact of this group level income disparity was less problematic in Sukabumi as the disparity was in favor of the majority Sundanese community (92% of total population in the city).

Table 6.8: Horizontal Inequalities in Income in Selected Districts in Indonesia³⁴

District	Violent	Group 1		Group 2		Extent of mean HI in Income ³⁵
		Name	Mean Income	Name	Mean Income (Rupiah)	
		(Rupiah)				
Simalungun	Yes	Javanese (46)	5543222	Batak (41)	3250179	Javanese 70% higher
Deli Serdang	Yes	Javanese (36)	5077220	Batak (8)	8813167	Batak 73% higher
Sibologa	No	Batak (47)	14300000	Chinese (8)	13500000	Batak 6% higher

³⁴ Horizontal inequalities at the district level were calculated for the two largest groups in terms of sample size.

³⁵ The extent of horizontal inequalities was calculated as the difference between the mean income of the higher earning group and the mean income of the lower earning group as a percentage of the mean income of the lower earning group.

Pematang Siantar	No	Javanese (7)	5305714	Chinese (8)	5887500	Chinese 11% higher
Tebing Tinggi	Yes	Javanese (23)	3997391	Batak (23)	7219318	Batak 80% higher
Bandar Lampung	Yes	Sundanese (29)	5510897	Javanese (19)	7430000	Javanese 35% higher
Bandung City	Yes	Javanese (17)	11700000	Sundanese (82)	5254122	Javanese 122% higher
Karawang ³⁶	Yes	Javanese (39)	4901923	Sundanese (114)	3750263	Javanese 30% higher
Tanggerang	Yes	Javanese (15)	9257600	Sundanese (19)	14400000	Sundanese 55% higher
Brebes	Yes	Javanese (39)	2123692	Sundanese (34)	3651559	Sundanese 72% higher
Situbondo	Yes	Javanese (7)	13300000	Madura (34)	5079576	Javanese 161% higher
Makassar	Yes	Bugis (15)	7512600	Makassar (48)	4900750	Bugis 53% higher
Bukitinggi	No	Javanese (5)	6300000	Minang (17)	7390588	Minang 17% higher
Sukabumi City	No	Javanese (8)	3877133	Sundanese (49)	8115673	Sundanese 110% higher

Note: the number of households that group level means are based on is given underneath the group name in parenthesis.

³⁶ In Karawang regency (where Rengasdengklok is located), data was available for a third group, the Betawi. On average, the mean income of the Betawi was 66% higher (based on 29 Betawi households) than the mean income of the Sundanese, the dominant ethnic group (84% of the total population) in the regency.

Activation of Economic Scapegoating at the District Level

The economic dimension is the second main attribute invoked in the scapegoating of the Chinese; more specifically, such blame mongering was done by drawing attention to the perceived wealth and economic clout of the group. The statistical analyses showed that local level economic antipathies were more likely to come to the fore in cities where the extent of visible wealth (as identified with the Chinese) was greater. As explained before, supermarkets, banks, clubs, theaters and so forth are often identified as ostensible symbols of Chinese opulence. Further, these visible markers are potentially more explosive in poorer locales as the contrast between wealth and poverty is likely to be starker. Indeed, the city level analysis clearly showed that visible wealth is positively and significantly correlated with anti-Chinese violence, particularly in cities with large poor settlements.

With increasing deregulation in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the Indonesian economy expanded exponentially. Some have noted that national deregulation policies were inadvertently skewed in favor of the larger cities, possibly due to the availability of superior economic infrastructure (Firman, 1999). As a consequence, large metropolitan areas like Jakarta, Medan, Surabaya and others transformed beyond recognition due to an enormous influx of rural migrants who flocked to these cities in search of better opportunities.³⁷ However, as the benefits of economic development were uneven, this gave rise to an increasingly frustrated underclass- the urban poor- and the landscapes of cities

³⁷ Firman (1999) estimates that 41% of the urban population in Indonesia was concentrated in the Jabotek area (Jakarta-Tangerang-Bekasi belt), Surabaya, Medan and Bandung.

like Jakarta were increasingly littered with slums and shantytowns. As the economy tumbled into freefall in the late 1990s, cost of living skyrocketed and rates of urban unemployment shot up sharply, the discontent of the urban poor magnified. Indeed, the number of people living below the standard poverty line increased by a staggering 73% in urban areas across Indonesia from February 1996 to February 1999.³⁸ It is in this context, that the riots in several large cities like Jakarta, Medan, Surabaya and Palembang have to be viewed.

For instance, in Medan, several Chinese owned businesses such as warehouses and motorcycle dealerships were deliberately set ablaze by mostly urban poor rioters, during five days of widespread violence in early May 1998. A local resident observed that the worst affected locales in Medan were where the economic disparity was greatest.³⁹ Deliberate targeting of Chinese wealth was also abundantly clear in Jakarta as the massive May 1998 riots unfolded; many outlets of Chinese owned supermarket chains like Matahari, Hero and Ramayana, over 100 branches of the Chinese owned Bank Central Asia (BCA) and several luxury malls (either owned or controlled by the Chinese) were destroyed or looted. As Van Klinkken observes, many of the rioters were the urban poor; those who lost out in the economic boom of the 1990s, felt alienated and disaffected with the sweeping changes around them and took out their frustrations on ostensible markers of luxury that were often unattainable to them (van Klinkken in Aspinall

³⁸ UNDP (2001), *Indonesia Human Development Report, 2001: Towards a New Consensus – Democracy and Human Development in Indonesia*, Jakarta

³⁹ Jose Manuel Tesaro, “Medan’s Madness: How and why Indonesia’s third-largest city descended into chaos,” *Asiaweek*, May 22, 1998.

et al., 1999). The patterns of destruction of Chinese property in Jakarta are discussed in detail in chapter seven.

Similarly, Tangerang and Bekasi- industrial cities on the outskirts of Jakarta- benefited from the economic expansion as a multitude of labor-intensive factories and other business enterprises mushroomed in the 1990s. Thus, demand for cheap labor was rife and these cities soon became a “magnet for the urban proletariat” (van Klinkken in Aspinall et al., 1999). Indeed, as the looting and burning in May 1998 soon spread outward from Jakarta, both Bekasi and Tangerang were engulfed in violence and many banks, supermarkets and shopping malls associated with the Chinese suffered extensive damage.⁴⁰

Makassar, the economic hub of Sulawesi, was a popular destination for thousands of migrant dwellers from Eastern Indonesia in particular, as the city reaped the benefits of the late *New Order* economic boom. However, the rate of development coincided with increasing predominance of the Chinese in retail, banking and many other sectors. As outlined earlier, this led to the displacement of many traditional markets as Chinese financed modern shopping centers supplanted them (Hendratmoko, 1998). Thus, many *Pribumi* who could not afford to pay exorbitant rents to lease stalls in the new shopping complexes were driven out of business. This discontent, coupled with the increasing visibility of urban slums, as the population of Makassar kept growing, created fertile conditions for the visible wealth of the Chinese to incite resentment. This was clearly in

⁴⁰ In Tangerang for instance, all three outlets of the city’s Matahari department store were looted and burnt. Further, many branches and automatic teller machines of Bank Central Asia (BCA) were damaged in both cities. See, Ron Moreau and Maggie Ford, “The Damage Is Real,” *Asiaweek*, July 6, 1998. Also, personal interview with a *Pribumi* owner of an automobile dealership in Tangerang on May 8th, 2006.

evidence in the large riot that swept through the city in September 1997 (Sidel, 2006:96). Thus, these examples aptly demonstrate that economic scapegoating of the Chinese was more likely to assume local salience in cities where symbols of Chinese affluence were prominent and income discrepancies more pronounced.

In contrast, at the regency level, visible wealth was not statistically significant with violence (though it was positively correlated). Instead, rapid improvements in human development emerged as the most significant determinant of local level economic jealousies. The rate of human development was based on UNDP Indonesia's HDI reduction shortfall variable which measured the extent to which human development as a whole had improved from 1996 to 1999. The HDI is based on three specific dimensions –longevity, knowledge and decent standard of living- and provides a better measure of human well-being than indices based on income measures alone.⁴¹

The findings showed that regencies where overall human well-being increased sharply were more inclined to resent the economic dominance of the Chinese. In regencies with rising HDI levels, improvements in educational attainment, healthcare and living standards brought about greater expectations and enhanced the prospects of upward mobility for the mostly *Pribumi* population; the result was the emergence of an increasingly confident and more educated *Pribumi* rural middle class.

However, at the same time, the role of Chinese entrepreneurs also became crucial in these regencies. The HDI gains achieved in many rural areas were facilitated by massive improvements in economic and infrastructural development.

⁴¹ UNDP, Indonesia Human Development Report, 2001: 83.

Indeed, as the Indonesian economy opened up in the 1980s and a strategy of export-oriented industrialization took hold, large scale developmental projects were extended further into the hinterland. The Chinese often played a crucial role in this rural transformation and banks, supermarkets, shopping malls and other associated symbols of Chinese dominance rapidly emerged in regencies, albeit not to the same extent as in cities (Sidel, 1998). Thus, competition between the Chinese and the *Pribumi* became fiercer and a more assertive Moslem population, often backed up by influential religious leaders, grew ever more resentful of Chinese economic influence and clamored for a greater share of the wealth for the *Pribumis* (Schwartz, 2000; Purdey, 2006: 61).

As outlined earlier, narratives of displacement of *Pribumi* businesses by Chinese owned/controlled firms were a common feature in many violent regencies. In Tasikmalaya, where human development levels were much higher than in neighboring towns, enmity towards Chinese Indonesians increased when the town's main market (which was gutted in a fire in 1995) was replaced with a modern Chinese owned supermarket (Collins, 2002). In the regency of Tangerang, hundreds of housing development projects cropped up to tap the rising middle class in one of the leading industrial belts in the country. Chinese entrepreneurs like Mochtar Riady of the Lippo Group were quick to capitalize on this housing boom and soon built Lippo Karawaci, a model township, containing a luxurious supermall, whose grandeur and visibility caused discontent in a rapidly developing area.⁴² In Situbondo, as well as in Kebumen, many local

⁴² During the May riots of 1998, violent rioters systematically targeted Lippo Karawaci and the supermall was completely destroyed.

businesses were marginalized with the advent of large scale retailers. In Pekalongan and Jember, large Chinese owned department stores elicited much resentment.⁴³

Thus, as a wave of modernization swept across rural Indonesia in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, significant progress was made in education, healthcare, basic infrastructure and so forth. Yet, modernization also led to an expansion of Chinese economic activity in many rural locales where the *Pribumi* had been long entrenched. Thus, as the *Pribumis* struggled to compete with superior Chinese wealth, the aspirations of the burgeoning Moslem rural middle class were often stymied. As the economic crisis exacerbated in 1997/98, competition became more acute, food prices soared and an increasingly skilled/educated rural workforce toiled to make ends meet. In this context, elite scapegoating that pinned blame for the crisis on the Chinese by projecting the group as economic predators determined to deprive Moslems of their rightful place in the economy, found particular resonance in the more developed rural districts.

To sum up this section, the mechanisms through which economic scapegoating of the Chinese acquired local significance varied from cities to regencies. A phalanx of banks, malls and supermarkets associated with Chinese wealth played a central role in both district types. In cities with large poor settlements, these visible markers of wealth had explosive potential to incite violence in the context of the crisis. As the social turmoil deepened in 1998, rates of urban poverty and unemployment rose alarmingly and the urban poor who

⁴³ Sarni Ocampo, "Youths riot in protest at prices," Birmingham Post, February 16, 1998. Also, Ron Moreau, "Fury over rising prices is stirring up ethnic hatred," Newsweek, February 9, 1998.

were largely alienated from the system lashed out at symbols associated with wealth that were inaccessible to them. The dynamics at the regency level were slightly different. As the Indonesian economic miracle extended into rural areas, some regencies made notable gains in levels of human development, thus paving the way for a more educated, assertive *Pribumi* middle class. However, the development of regencies was often accompanied by an expansion of Chinese economic activity. This led to increased competition with the *Pribumi* often losing out in the process; as the social crisis escalated, the frustrations of a more educated and skilled rural workforce became increasingly focused on the allegedly opportunistic Chinese.

Activation of Religious Scapegoating at the District Level

Former Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid identified exclusivist Moslems as a significant camp in Indonesian Islam. Exclusivists complain of discrimination against Moslems and insist on the urgent need to redress inequalities and call for Islam to occupy a more pervasive role in state and society. They are also well known for their withering criticism of the Chinese for having enjoyed disproportionate economic clout. As shown earlier, exclusivist elements find it easier to translate their resentment of ethnic Chinese into violent attacks through: 1) dense Moslem networks in places referred to as *Kota Santri* and 2) in areas with a high density of non-Moslem places of worship.

Of the two mechanisms, *Kota Santri* emerged as the more significant predictor at the regency level. Chapter four documented the gradual revival of Islamic consciousness in the early 1990s, as President Suharto, for a variety of

reasons, began to actively court the Islamists. Further, as Islamic education dramatically expanded in the late *New Order* Indonesia, an ever-widening network of Islamic schools and institutes of higher learning emerged, rapidly transforming the landscape of many towns and villages.⁴⁴ Such a transformation, aided by an ever increasing number of mosques and informal prayer houses (*mushollas*), a long history of established Islamic associational activity and the presence of charismatic Moslem leaders helped several regencies to acquire or embellish their reputations as *Kota Santri*.

As Sidel and others have noted, several of the riots that engulfed Indonesia in 1996-97 took place in small provincial localities renowned for dense religious networks of the sort described above. Situbondo, where rioting broke out in October 1996, enjoyed a “nationwide reputation as a site of Islamic piety and learning” (Sidel, 2006:78; Sidel, 1998). Situbondo boasted a large number of *Pesantren* and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) - the largest Islamic organization in the country - maintained a very strong presence there (Purdey, 2006: 43).⁴⁵ Tasikmalaya, the scene of anti-Chinese and Christian rioting in December 1996, was the home to over 900 *Pesantren* (including the five largest *Pesantren* in West Java), over 60,000 registered *Santri* and had been a major center of recruitment during the Darul Islam rebellion in the 1950s (Sidel, 2006: 82; Purdey, 2006:61). Rengasdengklok, the epicenter of anti-Chinese rioting in early 1997, was yet

⁴⁴ The number of *Pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) increased exponentially from 4,195 in 1978 to nearly 9,400 by 1997. In the same time period, student enrolment in *Pesantren* increased almost three fold (Howell, 2001 citing data issued by the Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia - Ministry of Religion).

⁴⁵ Sidel notes that a *Pesantren* named Salafiyah Syafiyah was particularly well known and drew over 15,000 students on its own (Sidel, 2006: 78). Other noted traditional Islamic schools in the area included Walisongo and Mamba’ul Hikam.

another small town noted for its religious piety. Housing a population of less than 200,000 people, Rengasdengklok boasted over 100 mosques and 500 prayer houses and national level Islamic organizations such as Dewan Dakwah and Persatuan Islam were very prominent in the town (Sidel, 2006: 86).⁴⁶ With over 90 *Pesantren* and 4,500 mosques, Kebuman, a small provincial Central Javanese town at the center of an anti-Chinese riot in September 1998, was another well-established *Kota Santri* (Purdey, 2006: 193-194).⁴⁷

The triggers that precipitated these riots varied from one *Kota Santri* to another. In some cases, the triggering incident was directly related to the Chinese (as in Rengasdengklok and Kebumen), while in others, the trigger was only tangentially related (as in Situbondo) or completely unconnected with the group (Tasikmalaya).⁴⁸ Yet, as the riots spiraled out of control, many churches, Christian schools, Chinese shops, supermarkets and other symbols of wealth were set on fire and looted and the pattern of violence was broadly similar across towns regardless of the nature of the trigger.

⁴⁶ Increasing religious piety in Rengasdengklok is also evidenced by the fact that in the 1997 Parliamentary elections, support for the PPP (the only Islamist party sanctioned by the *New Order*) shot up to 17.5% from less than 4.5% in the previous election in 1992 (Luwarso, et al, 1997: 87).

⁴⁷ Furthermore, several other loci of anti-Chinese violence were also identified as sites of high levels of Moslem piety. These included the Central Javanese regencies of Rembang and Pekalongan (personal interview with Ali Munhanif, doctoral candidate in Political Science at McGill University, on May 16th, 2008) and the West Javanese town of Purwakarta (Sidel, 2006: 74-75).

⁴⁸ In Situbondo for instance, it was the perceived lenient sentence handed out to an errant Moslem youth, alleged to have committed blasphemy against the Islamic faith and who was rumored to have found refuge in a nearby Chinese Indonesian church that triggered the frenzy of burning and looting in the town (Purdey, 2006:45). In Rengasdengklok, a complaint by an ethnic Chinese woman about a noisy Moslem youth set off the riots there. In Tasikmalaya, the trigger involved the beating of an Islamic student by religious teachers who were subsequently assaulted at the local police station where the boy's father happened to be a prominent official (Sidel, 2006: 68-106). In Kebumen, a domestic spat between a Chinese- Indonesian employer and her allegedly incompetent employee escalated into a large scale riot that resulted in the burning and looting of over 80 shops, houses and other property and caused an estimated damage of over 5 billion rupiah (Purdey, 2006: 192-193).

The availability of dense Islamic networks in *Kota Santri* facilitated the dissemination of violence. Several accounts illustrate the efforts of prominent activists in Islamic associations, religious leaders and ulama in local mosques in highlighting and at times exaggerating the perceived denigration of Islam (in a number of cases, the riot trigger was portrayed as a slight on the Islamic faith), thereby igniting religious passions and helping to incite and mobilize crowds. Sidel (2006) best captures the role of these activists:

Muslim associations and institutions of learning and worship also played prominent roles in the transmission –and-interpretation- of these discursive points of reference, as well as in the process of assembly by which crowds gathered and mobilized. These were localities where “professional Muslims” –religious teachers, members of the local MUI, and branch leaders of the student associations HMI and PMII- were thick on the ground, prominent in civil society, and available for service as “fire tenders” and “conversion specialists” who could play crucial roles in stoking the fires of religious tension and providing interpretive frames for the extrapolation of local disputes into larger, interreligious issues.⁴⁹

In Tasikmalaya for instance, activists of Islamic student associations like PMII (Indonesian Islamic Students’ Movement) and HMI (Islamic Students’ Association) were visible in mobilizing/inciting crowds. These activists helped to organize a massive rally on December 26, 1996, in front of the town’s main mosque to discuss the police mistreatment of religious leaders who had disciplined a fourteen year old student of a local *Pesantren* (who happened to be the son of a prominent local police officer) for an alleged misdemeanor. At the rally, the passions of the crowd were stirred by several inflammatory speeches delivered by HMI/PMII leaders. Indeed, the heads of the Tasikmalaya PMII and HMI branches were given hefty jail sentences of nearly two years apiece for their

⁴⁹ See Sidel, 2006:102-105 for more details.

roles in the incitement of violence (Sidel, 2006:83-85). Similarly, in Situbondo, many of the rioters detained by the police after the first day of violence were believed to be *Santri* from the nearby *Pesantren* Walisongo. In Rengasdengklok, leaders of Islamic organizations such as DDII, Persatuan Islam and MUI were often active and vocal in their denunciation of the Chinese and their wealth (Luwarso, et al, 1997; Siegel, 2000; Sidel, 2006:86). Moreover, in several localities, the whipping up of anti-Chinese resentment by local Islamic preachers during Friday sermons further escalated tensions.⁵⁰ Thus, as Sidel notes, in virtually every case, particularly dense networks of Islamic learning and worship were seen “as key locations for mobilization in defense of the faith” and indeed, for exploitation by exclusivist elements and helps to explain how seemingly trivial incidents often snowballed into much larger riots.

Chapter two identified density of non-Moslem places of worship as a possible determinant through which exclusivist Moslems could set off violence against the Chinese. However, the statistical analysis did not find any significant support for this premise at the regency level. Yet, in-depth studies of rioting in localities like Situbondo and Rengasdengklok in particular have noted how local resentment and tensions over prominent churches were often at the forefront of the violence.

It is possible that this apparent statistical anomaly might be due to the unit of analysis –regency- used in the study. Density of non-Moslem worship is calculated by dividing the total number of non-Moslem worship sites by the total

⁵⁰ See Ron Moreau, “Edge of the Abyss,” *Newsweek*, February 9, 1998. Also Purdey notes that in early 1998, many ulama in local mosques called on their followers to “take back the wealth that was rightfully theirs” (Purdey, 2006:93).

landmass (or population) of the entire regency. In general, the density of churches in particular is much lower in regencies compared with cities.⁵¹ Further, in several cases, anti-Chinese rioting also afflicted only a part of the regency.⁵² For instance, the town of Rengasdengklok is a sub-district/*Kecamatan* belonging to the regency of Karawang. The wave of rioting that swept through the region in early 1997 primarily impacted only Rengasdengklok and left most of Karawang relatively unscathed. Similar spatial discrepancies were also noted within some other violent regencies.⁵³ Therefore, the use of regency level data may at times obscure the patterns of violence in small towns like Rengasdengklok.⁵⁴ Indeed, available data at the town level indicates that Rengasdengklok was three times as likely to have places of non-Moslem worship as compared to other towns in Karawang regency.⁵⁵ Similarly, in Situbondo, the sub-districts of Besuki, Situbondo,

⁵¹ As noted earlier, regencies are much larger in size than cities. On average, regencies are twenty five times larger in terms of landmass. The average regency has approximately 215 churches while an average city has nearly 70 churches. Thus, regencies only contain three times as many churches on average in spite of being much larger in size. Therefore, the visibility of churches is likely to be less in regencies.

⁵² Detailed accounts of rioting in the regencies of Situbondo, Tasikmalaya, Karawang, Bandung and others reveal spatial variations within each regency with violence concentrated in some sub-regencies (sub-districts/*Kecamatan*) and not others. Ideally, a more disaggregated dataset at the sub-district level (*Kecamatan*) or at the *Kelurahan* level –lowest formal administrative division and akin to a large neighborhood- would have been able to tease out intra-district level variations better. But, logistics dictated that the district level (city and regency) be used as the unit of analysis given the difficulty in obtaining more disaggregated data across the country. However, as noted earlier, chapter seven redresses this shortcoming by analyzing spatial disparities in violence at the *Kelurahan* (neighborhood) level in Jakarta.

⁵³ In Situbondo, much of the rioting was confined to the areas of Asembagus, Besuki, Kota Situbondo, Wonorejo and Ranurejo. In Banyuwangi, the sub-districts of Kalibaru, Glenmore, Genteng Singojuruh and Rogojampi were particularly affected. In Tuban, much of the violence was confined to the Chinese dominated areas of Bulu, Tambakboyo and Palang.

⁵⁴ Data on places of worship and sites of Islamic learning were taken from the PODES 2000 dataset. The unit of analysis in PODES is the *Kelurahan*. However, data on landmass (area) is available only for the regency as a whole and therefore it was not possible to calculate density of worship at the *Kelurahan* level across all districts.

⁵⁵ Karawang regency comprises 306 *Kelurahan*. The total number of registered churches in all of Karawang is 32. Therefore, on average, approximately one in ten *Kelurahan* is likely to have a church. The sub-district (*Kecamatan*) of Rengasdengklok consists of 17 *Kelurahan* and is home to five churches. Thus, on average, one in 3.4 *Kelurahan* in Rengasdengklok is likely to contain a

Asembagus and Wonorejo (where rioting was concentrated) were more likely to house churches than elsewhere in the regency⁵⁶ and similar trends were observed in the districts of Kadipaten and Jatiwangi in the regency of Majalengka.⁵⁷

Thus, it is reasonable to extrapolate that the visibility of non-Moslem places of worship was greater in many of the specific loci where regency level violence broke out, thereby making it easier for exclusivist Moslems to vent their frustrations. For example, Hasan Basri, chairman of the Situbondo branch of the Council of Indonesian Islamic Scholars (MUI) observed, “as a city well known for the Islamic piety of its residents, why is it that when you enter Situbondo, the most prominent building is a church, not a mosque?”⁵⁸ Other Moslem activists noted that no less than five churches, but only three mosques were located along the main public highway in Situbondo town (Sidel, 2006:79). Further, Adi Sasono, a hardline Moslem leader alleged that many of the churches in Situbondo

church. In other words, Rengasdengklok was three times as likely to contain churches as other sub-districts in Karawang.

⁵⁶ A report compiled by the Indonesia Christian Communication Forum (ICCF) titled “The Church and Human Rights in Indonesia” gives a detailed breakdown of where churches were burnt in Situbondo. Situbondo regency comprises of 136 *Kelurahan* and is home to 52 churches in total. As in Rengasdengklok, the riot prone localities carried a larger percentage of the total churches in the regency. In the sub-district of Besuki for instance, the likelihood of a church being found was twice as great. In the sub-district of Kota Situbondo where no less than 8 churches were burnt, the likelihood of a church was almost four times higher than elsewhere in the regency.

⁵⁷ Anti-Chinese riots broke out in Majalengka regency on February 13, 1998 and the sub-districts of Kadipaten and Jatiwangi were by far the worst affected with four churches in Kadipaten and three in Jatiwangi getting burnt down. Majalengka regency consists of 330 *Kelurahan* in all and the regency as a whole contained only 13 churches; thus, on average, a church per every 25 neighborhoods. However, out of those 13 churches 8 were located in Jatiwangi and Kadipaten (accounting for a total of 23 *Kelurahan*). Thus, the likelihood of a church being located was approximately eight times greater in these two sub-districts.

⁵⁸ Basri was referring to the Mount Zion Pentecostal Church, which was the first to be attacked as the rioting unfolded in Situbondo; the church was also at the center of a controversy in 1995 given its visibility, size and grandeur. After the riot, the Minister of Religion warned “Don’t build a place of worship anywhere you feel like it, that can invite conflict,” thus, alluding to the visibility of the Church (Purdey, 2006: 52). Purdey notes further “It is not difficult to imagine that ostentatious demonstrations of Christianity in a pious *Santri* town could test the limits of tolerance” (Purdey, 2006:54).

town were constructed or expanded illegally, thus adding to the controversy and “offending people’s good manners” (Purdey, 2006:51).⁵⁹ Similarly, in Rengasdengklok, where all five of the town’s churches were burnt, there was intense resentment at the illegal expansion of Christian churches (Siegel, 2000).⁶⁰ Such examples make it clear that even in regencies, local controversies over the size, prominence and legality of non-Moslem places of worship (especially churches) did play a part in inciting religious passions.

At the city level, the statistical analysis clearly identified density of non-Moslem worship as the most significant religious determinant of anti-Chinese rioting. But, in contrast with regency level findings, dense Islamic networks (*Kota Santri*) were not significantly correlated with violence in cities. As previously observed, density of churches and temples was considerably higher in cities (on average ten times greater than regencies). Further, given that cities are much smaller in size, non-Moslem sites of worship acquired far greater visibility in cities. Thus, anti-Chinese scapegoating of a religious flavor was more likely to acquire local resonance with exclusivist Moslems in cities where symbols of non-Moslem religiosity were much more prominent (on average, density of churches was nearly twice as high in violent cities as opposed to peaceful cities).

⁵⁹ Sasono believed that the vast majority of churches built in Situbondo (more than three fourths) were constructed without proper legal documentation. Under Indonesian law, permits for the construction of sites of religious worship have to be obtained from the Department of Religion and there was a widespread perception that a rising number of churches were being built and also extended without proper authorization (Purdey, 2006: 51-52).

⁶⁰ Sobarna Noor, the Secretary of the local MUI in Rengasdengklok was vocal in his complaints of the illegal expansion of Churches. He said in one case, permission was given to construct a church of 400 square meters, but the church that was eventually built was 730 square meters (Luwarso, et al., 1997: 51-55).

A *Pribumi* survey respondent noted, “In Surabaya, some radical Moslem activists were constantly worried about religious conversion. They look at churches with great suspicion.”⁶¹ A Chinese churchgoer from Bandung remarked, “In many cities churches are linked with the Chinese. For example, my church is known as ‘*gereja Cina*’ [Chinese church], even though the congregation is only 65% Chinese. They [churches] are seen as symbols of influence and of Chinese domination.”⁶² The association of churches as symbols of Chinese influence was evident in the South Kalimantan capital of Banjarmasin in May 1997, as election related violence between the ruling Golkar party and the Islamist PPP quickly descended into more general anti-Chinese and anti-Christian rioting. In the ensuing mayhem, 13 churches and one Chinese temple were burnt down.⁶³

The perceived association of churches with Chinese Indonesians is also clear from the following example. In Solo, during the May 1998 riots, a large crowd began attacking a church and the house adjacent to it in the belief that the Chinese owned it. When the owner emerged from the church and convinced the rioters that he was *Pribumi*, the crowd appeared surprised, apologized to the owner and quickly dispersed (Purdey, 2006: 126). In a pattern similar to Rengasdengklok and Situbondo, concerns over the perceived spread of Christianization and the unauthorized use of a Chinese “shophouse”⁶⁴ as a site of Christian worship, were at the heart of a riot that erupted in the Taman Rahayu

⁶¹ Survey response received April 21st, 2006; emphasis mine.

⁶² Personal interview with Chinese businessman, April 17th, 2006.

⁶³ Johannes Simbolon Loss, “Banjarasin residents clean up, bury their dead,” Jakarta Post, June 7, 1997. The article cites a local scholar from the Center for Sociocultural Research at Banjarmasin Lambung Mangkurat University who noted that several of the churches were attacked, as they were perceived to be linked to the Chinese and their wealth.

⁶⁴ Shophouse is a vernacular term often utilized in urban Southeast Asia. Typically, it refers to a building that contains a shop or series of shops and separate residential spaces.

housing estate of Holis on the outskirts of Bandung in March 1999.⁶⁵ Thus, these examples illustrate that urban localities with denser networks of churches were particularly vulnerable given the increasing likelihood of being associated with Chinese wealth and being embroiled in accusations of illegal religious practices and conversions.

The non-significance of dense Islamic networks with violence at the city level is not surprising given that the impact of traditional Islamic schools and charismatic religious leaders (the hallmarks of *Kota Santri*) is likely to be less in more urban settings.⁶⁶ Further, cities typically contain much larger non-Moslem populations than regencies and as shown earlier, are also much more likely to have a greater density of sites of non-Moslem worship, thereby diluting the impact of Islamic piety.⁶⁷

Ranking of Variables?

Elite induced campaigns of anti-Chinese scapegoating often encompass all three attributes of the triple minority complex; their non-Moslem nature, non-

⁶⁵ The actual trigger for the riot remains unclear. But, it is believed that an accident involving a car driven by a Chinese Indonesian who subsequently refused to stop and inquire about the victim may have set off the riots. Soon after the incident, the crowd that had gathered advanced towards the housing estate from where the car was assumed to have come from. The housing estate had been at the center of a local controversy over allegations that a shop-house in the estate was being used by the evangelical Christian group Ho Kim Tong as an unauthorized church without proper legal documentation from the Department of Religion (Purdey, 2006:198-203). Purdey notes further that local residents in Holis had complained several times about high noise levels generated from music and singing during “church services” (Purdey, 2006: 200).

⁶⁶ Traditional Islamic boarding schools and their teachers typically exert a stronger influence in rural districts (particularly in Java but also in many other areas).

⁶⁷ The dataset shows that the mean percentage of non-Moslems is actually higher in regencies than in cities. However, these figures are highly distorted by the inclusion of overwhelmingly non-Moslem regencies in Bali, Nusa Tenggara Timur and parts of Kalimantan. Once these outliers are excluded, the mean percentage of non-Moslems is greater in cities. Moreover, nearly 60% of all cities are likely to contain a non-Moslem population of over 10% while the corresponding figure for regencies is just 41%.

Pribumi status and economic dominance. This chapter has explicated a series of local mechanisms through which these attributes resonate at the local level and augment the likelihood of violence. Thus, as several scholars have noted (Mackie, 1976; Siegel, 1986; Purdey, 2006), this study has demonstrated the multi-faceted nature of anti-Chinese violence.

However, as with all multi-faceted explanations, questions may be posed about a possible rank order or hierarchy amongst explanatory variables. In other words, do all three attributes need to acquire local salience for anti-Chinese rioting to be unleashed? Are some attributes or local mechanisms more important in the activation of violence than others?

It is unlikely and simplistic to suggest that each attribute and its local activators are mutually exclusive with the other two. Indeed, many of the specific cases discussed above highlight the interconnected and intricate relationships between religious, ethnic and economic attributes. In Tasikmalaya for instance, high levels of development improved life prospects of the *Pribumi*. But, increasing Chinese presence in the economy led to greater ethnic competition and elicited much resentment; in turn, influential religious figures in this devoutly Moslem town found it easy to exploit these tensions. Similarly intertwined and complex narratives emerged from Situbondo, Makassar, Solo and many other riot localities.

That being said, it is certainly possible that in different districts local sensitivities were impacted more by different attributes. Thus, in some districts, religious factors may have played more of a role than ethnic or economic factors and vice versa. Table 6.4 and Table 6.6 shown earlier in the chapter simulate the

probability of violence by increasing relevant explanatory variables from the mean to the 90th percentile while holding all other variables in the model at their means. These tables enable some tentative conclusions to be drawn about the relative impact of various variables.

Table 6.4 shows that at the city level, visible wealth (economic factors) has a greater impact on the probability of violence than density of non-Moslem sites of worship or the number of competitive ethnic groups. For instance, the probability of peace declines by 55% and the probability of severe violence increases by 37% as the extent of visible wealth is increased to its 90th percentile. Increased visibility of non-Moslem places of worship (particularly churches) is also prominent in city level violence, though its impact is estimated to be less than that of visible wealth. Table 6.6 showed simulated probabilities in regencies. Here, it is clear that regencies with dense Moslem networks (*Kota Santri*) have the largest impact on the probability of violence; as the density of *Kota Santri* is increased from its mean to the 90th percentile, peace is 50% less likely and the probability of high levels of violence increases by an almost similar percentage. The rate of human development emerges as the second most significant predictor in rural areas.

Thus, in cities, symbols associated with the Chinese – both economic markers such as banks and supermarkets as well as religious symbols like Churches were crucial to activating negative stereotypes of the Chinese. In regencies, devoutly Moslem localities undergoing rapid development were most at risk of anti-Chinese outbursts.

Control Variables

The regression models presented also included several control variables in addition to the three clusters of explanatory variables. Out of the controls, availability of land was negatively and significantly correlated in Models 1 and 3 for urban districts and in all three models for rural districts. Conflicts emanating from land disputes have been frequent in Indonesia (Collins, 2003). Hence, districts where land for housing purposes was plentiful were more likely to be peaceful. This finding also provides additional support for the ethnic competition thesis in that group level competition is likely to have been less intense given the greater availability of land.

The size of the Chinese population by itself was not statistically significant with violence. As noted previously, several districts in Kalimantan, Riau and Sumatra with large Chinese populations were peaceful while several other districts where the Chinese were less than 1% of the population were at the receiving end of rioting. Some accounts reveal that the concentration of Chinese communities made them more vulnerable to attack. Indeed, as chapter seven demonstrates at the neighborhood level in Jakarta, “Chinatowns” or dense Chinese communities were more likely to be targeted. However, group concentration could not be measured at the district level due to inadequate data.

The variable “High School Dropouts” measures the percentage of youth who left school between the ages of 15-18. The city level analysis (Model 1) shows that high school dropouts are positively and significantly associated with violence. Indeed, uneducated, unemployed and frustrated young males venting their frustration were a recurrent theme in Solo, Jakarta and Medan.

Accounting for Other Explanations

This Section aims to present evidence to counter some alternative explanations that have been put forward.

Information Dissemination

As described in detail in chapter five, much of the anti-Chinese scapegoating was carried out by prominent military, religious, economic and political elites based in the capital city of Jakarta. Thus, it could be argued that whether this orchestrated campaign of blame mongering resulted in violence or not at the local level depended on the extent of exposure or publicity given to such scapegoating.⁶⁸ It is possible that Chinese communities in far-flung corners of the archipelago escaped rioting as attempts of opportunistic elites in Jakarta to pin blame on the Chinese were less well publicized.

One way of testing for this notion is to look at data on newspaper readership and the number of televisions and telephones owned at the district level. Available figures from the PODES 2000 dataset shows that telephone and television ownership was higher in violent districts. However, data for violent cities in particular is highly distorted due to the inclusion of all five districts in Jakarta and as Table 6.9 shows the difference at the city level is fairly marginal once Jakarta is excluded.⁶⁹ Similarly, television/telephone ownership as well as availability of newspaper stalls is higher in violent regencies. But, again, these

⁶⁸ Thufail (2004) argues that a process described as the “nationalization of news” can take place where statements made by prominent public figures are widely disseminated around the country through the news media.

⁶⁹ Furthermore, the gap is reduced even further when Surabaya, Bandung and Medan –the three largest cities in Indonesia after Jakarta- are excluded.

figures are inflated by the inclusion of violent regencies like Tangerang and Bekasi (located close to Jakarta) where the relevant statistics are much higher.

Table 6.9: Television/Telephone/Newspaper Usage at District Level in Indonesia

	Violent Cities	Violent Cities (without Jakarta)	Peaceful Cities	Violent Regencies	Peaceful Regencies
Number of Television Sets	2180	1298	1166	300	220
Number of Telephones	1036	502	375	38	25
Percentage of Neighborhoods with Newspaper Stalls	94.5	94	93.6	.63	.46

Note: The figures given in the first two rows denote the average number of televisions and telephones per each neighborhood in the district.

After the exclusion of significant outliers, mediums of information and communication were only slightly more prevalent on average in violent districts (that too mainly in regencies). Therefore, while it is possible that more people in violent districts heard about stories of elite scapegoating, the difference was not substantial enough to have had a significant impact on the spread of anti-Chinese violence. Further, in several peaceful regencies with large Chinese populations, television and telephone ownership was almost as high (sometimes higher) as in violent regencies.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ For example in the regency of Belitung (Chinese population 8%), each neighborhood on average contained 409 televisions and 34 telephones. In the regency of Pontianak (Chinese population 23%), 274 televisions and 27 telephones were found per neighborhood.

Was it really Anti-Chinese Violence?

Multiple interpretations of the 1998 riots have been presented. Some have questioned the alleged racially motivated nature of violence and assert that the Chinese were not deliberately targeted; they point out that a significant number of those who perished in the May riots were *Pribumi* (Zon, 2004). Heryanto on the other hand argues that the May riots are best viewed as a form of well organized “racialized state terrorism” rather than “racially motivated mass riots.”⁷¹ In a subsequent article Heryanto argued further that “ethnisation of the violence is emphasized out of proportion in the many analyses and media coverage” (Heryanto, 1999). Based on fieldwork in Solo, Purdey observed that many of the narratives that emerged from the Solo riots underemphasized the ethnic (Chinese) aspect of violence and highlighted damage inflicted on the *Pribumi* (Purdey in Coppel, 2006: 78).

However, irrespective of whether the violence was largely state orchestrated or spontaneous, there is a vast amount of evidence that demonstrates the extent to which the ethnic Chinese and their property were selectively targeted. In countless riot locales, shops owned by indigenous businessmen were spared as they had signs of “*Milik Pribumi*” (owned by the *Pribumi*) prominently daubed on their walls or shop windows. As Budianta notes “distinctions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ were made obvious during the [Jakarta] riots, as mobs let buildings bearing signs such as ‘Belonging to a Muslim’, ‘Owned by native Hajji so and so’ and

⁷¹ See Ariel Heryanto, “Flaws of Riot Media Coverage,” *Jakarta Post*, July 15, 1998. He notes that in state terrorism, the primary purpose is to induce terror or widespread fear amongst the population. This is done by targeting individuals or social groups as representatives of a larger population. He is at pains to point out that there were many victimized groups and rejects the depiction of riots as racially motivated mass violence.

‘Pure Betawian’ untouched, while unmarked buildings were burned” (Budianta, 2000). Selective targeting of Chinese property was also clearly evident in Jember in East Java,⁷² Kendari in South Sulawesi,⁷³ Tasikmalaya (Purdey, 2006: 58), Kadipaten⁷⁴ and Medan (Purdey, 2006: 114). Further, in Pamanukan, the graffiti scrawled on the walls of many of the damaged Chinese shops read, “Attack Chinese,” “Money hungry Chinese fool” or “I love Muslims” and many Moslem shops laid out a prayer mat by the door to ward looters from mistaking their property for Chinese owned property.⁷⁵ Hence, these are all examples of members of the perpetrator group taking precautions to distinguish themselves from the target group (Horowitz, 2001). Further, the survey conducted for this research showed that all but two of the 46 Chinese respondents and 21 of the 31 *Pribumi* respondents quite explicitly identified the nature of the 1998 riots as anti-Chinese.

It is true that in some places shops belonging to the *Pribumi* were also targeted (Purdey, 2006: 132; Thufail, 2007: 58), but the predominant majority of damaged shops were associated with the Chinese. Further, as Zon (2004) mentions, many of those who died in the May riots in Jakarta were indeed *Pribumi*. However, it has to be noted that a very large percentage of the *Pribumi* deaths occurred when Chinese owned supermarkets and shopping malls burnt down as hundreds of mostly *Pribumi* rioters were engaged in an orgy of looting.

⁷² Patrick Walters, “Indonesia’s scapegoats,” *The Weekend Australian*, February 21, 1998.

⁷³ Jason Tedjasukmana, “Troops on top alert as Indonesian town rocked by riots,” *AAP Newsfeed*, February 21, 1998

⁷⁴ John McBeth and Salil Tripathi, “Indonesia: Playing With Ire: The puzzling origins of anti-Chinese riots in Java raise questions about whether they’re being used to deflect pressure from the government -- and onto the IMF,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 5, 1998.

⁷⁵ Andreas Harsono, “Anti-Chinese riots ruin Indonesian Nation-building,” *American Reporter*, Vol. 4 (No. 749), February 19, 1998.

The rapes of over 100 ethnic Chinese women in Jakarta during the May riots is further evidence of the selective targeting of the Chinese (the rapes will be discussed in more detail in chapter seven).

Therefore, in spite of a few contrary examples and the interpretations of some to project the violence as motivated primarily by class based concerns or non-racial considerations, there is a substantial body of evidence that demonstrates quite unambiguously the very clear anti-Chinese element in the violent riots of the late *New Order*.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the main statistical and empirical findings with regard to anti-Chinese violence at the district level (both urban and rural) in Indonesia. The findings clearly demonstrate the complex, intertwined and multi-dimensional nature of anti-Chinese outbursts and privilege the micro-foundational aspects of violence. The religious, ethnic and economic attributes, which are often invoked in elite induced campaigns of scapegoating, resonate at the local level in a series of context- bound ways.

The chapter has made it quite clear that the local level mechanisms that trigger riots against the Chinese are quite distinct in cities and regencies. Given the quite considerable differences between cities and regencies –in terms of size, population and economic orientation- it is hardly surprising that the dynamics affecting violence in the two district types are different. In cities, visible wealth associated with the Chinese and density of non-Moslem places of worship (in

particular churches) emerge as the most significant predictors of violence. In regencies, on the other hand, devoutly Moslem localities undergoing rapid development were most at risk of anti-Chinese outbursts.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Variations in Anti-Chinese Violence at the Neighborhood Level in Jakarta

Having explained spatial variations in anti-Chinese violence at the district level in chapter six, this chapter builds on that by disaggregating the unit of analysis even further to the neighborhood level (*Kelurahan*). The chapter focuses on Jakarta - by some distance the most violent locale during the May riots of 1998 – and aims to explain why even in Jakarta, this violence was confined to certain neighborhoods and not others. Thus, this chapter addresses a seriously understudied dimension in ethnic conflict literature by stepping inside the ‘riot episode’ and examining neighborhood level variations in communal violence across a broadly violent city. In keeping with the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation, the chapter argues that the manifestation of neighborhood level violence is contingent on how the various attributes invoked in the scapegoating of the Chinese resonated across different neighborhoods.

The chapter is organized as follows. The first section provides a brief descriptive overview of the main patterns of violence in Jakarta in May 1998. The next section presents the main empirical findings. As with chapter six, the findings are presented in two parts. First, the results of several statistical models are shown in the form of tables and graphs. These results are based on a dataset comprising all 265 *Kelurahan* (neighborhoods) in Jakarta. The quantitative component is supplemented with a deeper qualitative analysis using field surveys, interviews and secondary sources. The qualitative analysis aims to delineate further the significance of statistical findings and also to give a sense of how the

various crucial explanatory variables played out at the ground level. The final section of the chapter addresses issues of suspected state complicity and orchestration of riots, the extent of selective targeting of the Chinese and mass rapes of ethnic Chinese women.

Snapshot of the Jakarta Riots

The choice of Jakarta as a city for detailed analysis is justified on several grounds. First, the city bore the brunt of the murderous riots of May 1998, which were unprecedented in terms of magnitude, brutality and sheer impact. The riots were triggered on May 12th by the shootings of four students at the elite Trisakti University campus in Grogol, West Jakarta.¹ The riots spread rapidly and soon engulfed a vast swathe of Jakarta from the north to the west to the east. Estimates of the extent of destruction and death toll fluctuate widely, but it is believed that approximately 1,200 people lost their lives,² many ethnic Chinese women were raped (possibly around 100-150)³ and over 4,000 shops and houses and thousands

¹ It is widely believed that the security forces were complicit or directly involved in the Trisakti shootings on May 12, 1998 and indeed in the subsequent riots that unfolded over the next few days. The finger of blame has been particularly pointed toward Lt. General Prabowo Subianto - Suharto's son-in-law and commander of the elite Army Strategic Reserves Unit (Kostrad) and Major General Syafrie Syamsuddin, Jakarta's military commander. For more on the incident at Trisakti, see Aspinall et al., 1999: 41-50.

² Accounts of the extent of death and destruction vary widely. A non-governmental organization called Volunteers for Humanity (Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan, TRuK) led by the well known Jesuit priest Sandyawan Sumardi published an investigative report on the riots and placed the death toll at 1,188. In contrast, the Jakarta regional government reported 288 dead; police reported 451 dead and the district military command estimated 463 fatalities. Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta (TGPF), a joint fact finding team commissioned by President Habibie in the aftermath of the riots compiled an exhaustive and "remarkable document" based on several months of research (Purdey, 2006:110). The TGPF report acknowledged and articulated the extreme difficulty in obtaining precise figures for the number of dead and stated that multiple sets of figures existed.

³ Estimates for rape victims were similarly contested with TRuK claiming that it had counted 168 victims of rape; TGPF report found 52 rapes and the state sponsored Communication Forum for National Unity (PKB) confirmed 46 rapes.

of vehicles burnt or looted.⁴ The violence also led to a rapid exodus of nearly 150,000 mostly affluent Chinese to Singapore, Australia, Canada and many other countries.⁵ The impact of the violence was tumultuous and culminated in the resignation of Suharto, the end of his 32 year old *New Order* authoritarian regime and the installation of a new political system in the country.

Figure 7.1 gives a detailed spatial breakdown of the violent neighborhoods (*Kelurahan*) across the five districts (*Kotamadya*) of Jakarta. It is clear that none of the five districts escaped unscathed, but comparatively Central Jakarta was the worst affected with over 40% of the neighborhoods engulfed in violence. Several Chinese dominated pockets in West, East and North Jakarta were also severely affected while South Jakarta, in relative terms, bore the least impact. Thus, as Figure 7.1 amply demonstrates, significant spatial variations in the patterns of rioting were observed. Indeed, in spite of its sheer intensity and rampant nature, the violence was confined to “only” 76 of the 265 neighborhoods across Jakarta (29% of all neighborhoods).

Figure 7.2 uses GIS technology to digitally map the above trends and a clear “diffusion effect” of the riot can be discerned with several violent neighborhoods (depicted in red polygons) bunched together in Central, North and West Jakarta. Further, Figure 7.2 also shows that large chunks of South and East Jakarta were mostly peaceful even as the rest of the city descended into chaos.

⁴ In terms of material damage, Gijanmar Kartasasmita, Coordinating Minister for Finance and Economy, approximated the total monetary cost of rioting at 2.5 trillion rupiah (about 250 million US dollars at prevailing rates). More specifically, 2,476 shop-houses, 1604 shops, 40 malls/plazas, 1026 houses and churches and thousands of cars, motor cycles and other vehicles were damaged (Zon, 2004:105; van Klinken in Aspinall et al., 1999: 50).

⁵ For more detailed accounts of the Jakarta riots see Siegel 1998; Wandita, 1998; articles by van Klinken and Berfield and Loveard (both in Aspinall et al., 1999), Priamariantari, 1999; Zon, 2004; Purdey, 2006; Sidel, 2006 and Thufail, 2007.

Figure 7.1: Distribution of Anti-Chinese Violence in Jakarta's Neighborhoods




Figure 7.2: Geospatial Mapping of Anti-Chinese Violence in Jakarta





Figure 7.3: Geospatial Mapping of Anti-Chinese Violence at the District Level in Jakarta



Anti Chinese Violence in Jakarta by Chinese Population

Legend

jakarta_kelurahan
jurnal CHINESE

Color	Range
Light Yellow	0.00 - 3.75
Yellow	3.75 - 19.07
Orange	19.08 - 21.08
Dark Orange	21.09 - 27.22
Dark Red	27.23 - 70.07

jakarta_kelurahan
jurnal VIOLENT

Symbol	Range
Star	0.00
Red Dot	0.00 - 1.00

0 0.000 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 (Decimal Degrees)

Map Designed by Suranjan Weeraratne

⁶ The background colors in the map depict the size of the Chinese population in each neighborhood; darker the color, greater the population of Chinese. The blue stars represent peaceful districts and the red dots depict violent ones.

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Chinese communities that were peaceful and many others that were violent in spite of the Chinese being a small fraction of the population. Notable examples include large and peaceful “Chinese neighborhoods” such as Jelambar Baru in Grogol (Chinese population 39.5%), Tangki in Tamansari (49.5%), Duri Utara in Tambora (41.5%) and Tanah Seral also in Tambora (37.3%) that were immune from the mayhem unfolding elsewhere in the city. Yet, at the same time, several neighborhoods with marginal Chinese presence such as Pondok Labu in Cilandak (Chinese population 0.18%), Mampang Prapatan (0.2%), Jatinegara (0.11%) and Pasar Minggu (0.50%) experienced outbreaks of violence.

In terms of the overall population of the neighborhood, total landmass and population density, there were no significant differences on average between violent and peaceful neighborhoods.⁸

Findings- Quantitative Studies

The main statistical findings in Jakarta are presented in this section. As with the district level analyses, three ordered logistic regression models (containing alternative independent variables) were run to measure the incidence of anti-Chinese rioting across 265 neighborhoods in Jakarta.

The main regression models are presented in Table 7.1.⁹ The models in Table 7.1 replicated the variables used in the district wide analyses as much as possible. However, a few minor adjustments had to be made due to the

⁸ The average total populations in violent and peaceful neighborhoods were 32,640 and 30,800 respectively. In terms of landmass, on average, violent neighborhoods comprised 294 hectares while peaceful areas were marginally bigger at 329 hectares.

⁹ The main summary statistics for the Jakarta-wide analysis are presented in Appendix F.

unavailability of some district-wide variables at the neighborhood level.¹⁰ A quick glance at the results in Table 7.1 reveals that the main predictors of local level anti-Chinese violence were multi-faceted and comprised a combination of economic, religious and ethnic factors, in conformity with findings from cities and regencies.

All three models in Table 7.1 demonstrate that economic scapegoating is more likely to manifest into violence in neighborhoods where visible wealth associated with Chinese entrepreneurs is prominently on display. Thus, as found in cities in general, the gap between the rich and the poor is likely to be more acute in neighborhoods with large urban slums; hence, in such neighborhoods, ostensible markers of Chinese prosperity are more likely to incite resentment.

Figure 7.5 predicts the probability of violence as visible wealth is increased from its mean value to its 90th percentile while keeping all other variables in the model at their mean.¹¹ The likelihood of violence increases from around 23% to nearly 37% as the extent of visible wealth increases; similarly, the probability of peace drops down from 78% to 62%.

¹⁰ As noted earlier, the dependent variable in Jakarta was a simple binary variable coded 0 for peace and 1 for violence. Due to insufficient information at the neighborhood level, it was difficult to code for severity of violence. The independent variables used in the Jakarta models were mostly similar to the ones used in the district-wide analyses. UNDP's HDI reduction shortfall variable that measures the rate of development over the preceding three years was not available for neighborhoods. Therefore, trends in healthcare (within the previous year) were used as a substitute to measure the extent of development within a neighborhood. In terms of control variables, there was no data at the neighborhood level for economic growth in 1997. Hence, a variable from the PODES 2000 dataset that asked respondents to rank their economic condition from low to high was used as a proxy.

¹¹ Figures 7.5 and 7.6 were created using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2003) and SPost commands (Long and Freese, 2005). In each figure, the first dotted vertical line depicts the mean value and the second line represents the value at the 90th percentile for the variable in question.


Table 7.1: Ordered logit Regression Models –Neighborhoods in Jakarta

	Model 1	Model 2	Model3
Extent of Visible Wealth	0.38** (0.18)	0.44** (0.17)	0.42** (0.18)
Competitive Ethnic Groups	0.50* (0.28)	0.58** (0.28)	
Ethnic Fractionalization			5.33 (3.53)
Density <i>Kota Santri</i> (area)		-1.01 (0.95)	-1.32 (0.99)
Density <i>Kota Santri</i> (population)	-0.12 (0.1)		
Density Non Moslem Worship (area)		4.45* (2.55)	5.38** (2.57)
Density Non Moslem Worship (population)	1.47*** (0.43)		
Chinese Concentration (Chinatowns)	1.99* (1.16)	2.46** (1.12)	2.25** (1.13)
Availability of Housing Land	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Percentage of Trading Groups	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Social Gathering	0.01 (0.27)	-0.03 (0.27)	-0.02 (0.27)
Essential Commodities	-0.11** (0.06)	-0.11** (0.05)	-0.11** (0.06)
Satisfaction with economic conditions	-0.29 (0.35)	-0.20 (0.36)	-0.13 (0.36)
Improvement in Healthcare	0.08 (0.13)	0.09 (0.13)	0.11 (0.13)
Trends in High School Attendance	-0.33* (0.18)	-0.24 (0.17)	-0.25 (0.17)
N	265	265	265
Pseudo R ²	0.14	0.11	0.10
Prob>Chi ²	0.000	0.000	0.001

Note: Cells contain coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

* P > .1, ** P > .05, *** P > .01

Figure 7.5: The Influence of Visible Wealth on Probability of Violence




Religious elements invoked in anti-Chinese scapegoating are likely to stir the passions of exclusivist Moslems and percolate into local level violence in areas where non-Moslem sites of worship are highly visible; churches and temples are often associated with the Chinese and also serve as visible markers of Chinese presence. As discussed earlier, Models 1 and 2 use different measures for density of non-Moslem worship; Model 1 calculates density by total population while Model 2 uses neighborhood landmass/area. Both measures are positively and significantly correlated with anti-Chinese violence.

Figure 7.6 estimates the probability of violence across different densities of non-Moslem worship and violence is almost 20% more likely when density is increased from the mean to its 90th percentile and the probability of peace declines by a similar percentage.¹²

¹² The predicted probability of violence shown in Figure 6 is based on density of non-Moslem worship (by total population). A simulation of predicted probabilities for density of non-Moslem worship (by area) showed very similar results.

Figure 7.6: The Influence of Density of non-Moslem Worship on Probability of Violence



The theoretical framework in chapter two hypothesized that ethnic grievances against the non-*Pribumi* Chinese are likely to be greater in locales where the degree of ethnic competition is greater. Indeed, district level findings showed strong support for this notion. Similarly, at the neighborhood level in Jakarta, ethnic competition was positively and significantly correlated with violent anti-Sinicism in Models 1 and 2 of Table 7.1. These two models measured the extent of ethnic competition by the number of competitive ethnic groups in each neighborhood. Model 3 used the ethnic fractionalization index as an alternative measure to capture ethnic competition. This was positively associated with violence but not significant.¹³ Thus, the number of competitive ethnic groups appears to be a better predictor of anti-Chinese ethnic tensions in Jakarta than a

¹³ As Posner (2004) and Fearon (2003) have noted, one of the weaknesses of the ethnic fractionalization index is that the Herfindhal Concentration Formula (based on which the index is computed) may be an inadequate technology to capture relevant dynamics of the ethnic diversity of a particular locale. Further, fractionalization scores might also be distorted by the inclusion of several small and politically irrelevant groups (Posner, 2004).

measure based on fractionalization which might on occasion be distorted by the inclusion of several very small groups.

The findings in Table 7.1 show that violence is also more likely in neighborhoods that contain densely populated Chinese communities or “Chinatown.”¹⁴ As discussed later on in the chapter, many *Pribumi* survey respondents in Jakarta complained about the exclusivity of the Chinese and noted their propensity for self-segregation. Thus, as the riots cut across Jakarta, neighborhoods where the Chinese tended to be highly concentrated were more vulnerable to attack.

Table 7.1 also reveals that the availability of essential commodities is negatively and significantly associated with anti-Chinese violence. Given that accusations of Chinese shopkeepers hoarding food and other essential items were rife, neighborhoods where basic commodities were relatively more plentiful are likely to have been affected less by food shortages.¹⁵

Table 7.2 summarizes the impact of some of the key variables on the probability of anti-Chinese violence. The probability of violence was estimated by increasing the level of each variable from its mean to its 90th percentile while keeping all other variables in the model at their mean.

¹⁴ The extent of Chinese group concentration or the presence of a “Chinatown” was measured by dividing the total Chinese population in a neighborhood (*Kelurahan*) from the total Chinese population in the sub-district (*Kecamatan*) to which the neighborhood belongs.

¹⁵ The variable “essential commodities” measured the availability of nine essential items – rice, sugar, cooking oil, kerosene, milk, eggs, meat, maize and salt.

Table 7.2: The Impact of Crucial Variables on Neighborhood Level Anti-Chinese Violence

Variable changed while holding other variables at their mean	Change in probability of peace	Change in probability of violence
Extent of Visible Wealth (from mean to 90th percentile)	16% lower	14% higher
Density of non-Moslem Worship (from mean to 90 th percentile)	16% lower	18% higher
Number of Competitive Ethnic Groups (from mean to 90 th percentile)	4% lower	3% higher
Chinese group concentration (from mean to 90 th percentile)	9% lower	12% higher

Findings-Qualitative Studies

This section aims to build on the above statistical findings through the use of field surveys, interviews and other secondary material. 45 of the 77 survey respondents were physically present in Jakarta at the time of riots, though several of them had originated from elsewhere in the country.¹⁶ Most respondents noted that it was difficult to isolate a single factor as having caused the riots. Economic jealousies, the ongoing political/economic crisis, infighting within the military and racial intolerance were frequently mentioned as contributory factors for the violence. The majority of respondents and interviewees believed that the riots in Jakarta were organized to a large extent by certain elements with vested interests who adroitly exploited local anti-Chinese sentiments.

¹⁶ Out of the 45 respondents who were in Jakarta in May 1998, 31 were Chinese and the other 14 belonged to several different *Pribumi* groups.

As stated before, anti-Chinese scapegoating was carried out by drawing attention to economic, religious and ethnic attributes of the Chinese. The statistical analysis presented earlier identified a series of micro level causal mechanisms through which these attributes assumed local salience and enhanced the possibility of violence at the neighborhood level. These mechanisms are elucidated further in the next section.

Activation of Ethnic Scapegoating in Jakarta's Neighborhoods

The statistical analysis in Table 7.1 showed that ethnic differences of the non-*Pribumi* Chinese were more likely to elicit greater resentment at the neighborhood level when the number of competitive ethnic groups was higher. Hence, the twofold ethnic competition theorized in chapter two (between different *Pribumi* groups and between the *Pribumi* and the Chinese) was likely to be fiercer in ethnically more fragmented neighborhoods in Jakarta.

Chapter two discussed how intra-*Pribumi* competition essentially boiled down to a tussle for economic and political resources between the favored Javanese and the various non-Javanese ethnic groups who resented the privileges bestowed on the Javanese by the *New Order* regime. At the neighborhood level in Jakarta, the average percentage of Javanese was more or less the same across both violent and peaceful locales.¹⁷ However, a closer look at the dataset reveals that violent neighborhoods on average contained a larger share of certain non-Javanese ethnic groups that had acquired a reputation for business and

¹⁷ On average, the percentage of Javanese in the 76 violent neighborhoods was around 34% and the mean percentage of Javanese in the 189 peaceful neighborhoods was around 32%.

entrepreneurial skills. Such groups include the Sundanese, Minangkabau, Batak and Bugis.¹⁸ For instance, the percentage of Sundanese, on average, was almost 20% higher in violent neighborhoods. Hence, the degree of intra-*Pribumi* economic competition can be expected to be higher in locales where these groups are found in larger numbers.

Evidence of intra-*Pribumi* competition in Jakarta also emerged from survey responses and interviews. A *Pribumi* businessman of Betawi origin noted that there is fierce competition in the textiles industry in Tanah Abang between traders of Minangkabau, Betawi and Javanese origins.¹⁹ Similarly, Betawi and Minangkabau traders jostle to capture the market for Moslem apparels (such as sarongs and jilbabs) in the numerous shopping complexes in the Mangga Dua area. In the transport industry, private bus companies like Kopaja and Metro Mini for example tend to be tightly controlled by ethnic Batak networks, thus eliciting resentment from other ethnic groups who find it difficult to break into such firms.²⁰ Moreover, Siegel has noted how several taxi firms in Jakarta tend to be monopolized by certain ethnic groups (Siegel, 1998).

Most survey respondents concurred that Chinese businessmen had a distinct advantage over their *Pribumi* counterparts as the former had more access to capital, obtained favorable terms from the government and benefited from well entrenched Chinese business networks. Several *Pribumi* respondents lamented that it was extremely difficult to compete with Chinese firms, especially in the

¹⁸ Personal interview with an office bearer of the Indonesian Chinese Association (INTI), May 08, 2006.

¹⁹ Survey response received May 05, 2006.

²⁰ Personal communication with Ali Munhanif, PhD Candidate in Political Science, McGill University, July 14, 2008.

retail sector and complained that Chinese businesses recruited almost exclusively from within the Chinese community.

Adi Santoso, an unemployed high school drop-out who joined looters in Tanah Abang noted that he tried to set up his own auto-supply business, but soon had to give up as he found himself “frozen out of the network because it is controlled by the Chinese” (Berfield and Tesoro, 1998). Further, the proliferation of outlets of Chinese controlled supermarkets such as Hero, Ramayana and Matahari put numerous small-scale *Pribumi* shopkeepers in Jakarta out of business. More than a year before the riots (in March 1997), Sofyan Wanandi, chairman of the Gemala Group and prominent Chinese businessman had cautioned about the expansion of supermarkets. Wanandi observed, “We cannot put supermarkets next to them [traditional markets] because people like to go to one-stop shopping centers and the traditional traders cannot compete.”²¹ Indeed, as the Matahari department store in Cengkareng was attacked, many of the looters included small-time shopkeepers from neighboring *Kampungs* whose businesses had suffered from the advent of such large retail giants.²²

These examples help to understand how scapegoating that paints Chinese entrepreneurs as money-hungry non-*Pribumi* outsiders might resonate powerfully in neighborhoods with high levels of ethnic competition.

²¹ Susan Sim, “Slow-down order on new supermarkets”, *The Straits Times* (Singapore), March 2, 1997.

²² Personal interview with Chinese Indonesian journalist, April 3, 2006.

Activation of Economic Scapegoating in Jakarta's Neighborhoods

Table 7.1 amply demonstrated that economic antipathies against the Chinese were more likely to flare up in poorer neighborhoods with ostensible markers of Chinese prosperity. Indeed, there is a considerable body of evidence to support this notion. As van Klinken observes, many of the rioters were the urban poor, those who lost out on the economic riches of the 1990s and felt alienated from a political system in which they had no representation. As the violence exploded, the urban poor unleashed their pent-up frustrations on banks, supermarkets, cars and other symbols of affluence that were inaccessible to them (van Klinken, 1998). An analyst with the Indonesian Institute of Sciences concurred: "In a riot you see anger; you see jealousy over economic inequality and economic disparity. Chinese in places like Central Jakarta are wealthy. To me it seems logical that people from lower classes target their focus on people like this."²³

In the neighborhood of Jembatan Lima in West Jakarta, where the Chinese made-up one-third of the population and where the percentage of poor households was almost 25% higher than the Jakarta average, a large crowd from the surrounding *Kampungs*²⁴ went on a rampage on May 13th and deliberately singled out Chinese property. Actively encouraged by several "rough looking men," the mob destroyed banks, many Chinese owned houses, vehicles and a food market (Berfield and Loveard, 1999).

²³ "Chinese in ordeal by fire," *Hong Kong Standard*, May 15, 1998.

²⁴ In colloquial terms, the term *Kampung* is used to refer to a small community of people (small village). Typically, each *Kelurahan* (neighborhood) consists of several *Kampungs*.

The urban poor also figured prominently in widespread looting and burning in Tanah Abang, the garment distribution district of Jakarta. As Berfield and Tesoro note, many rioters were people like Adi Santoso, an unemployed university dropout whose only source of income was irregular piecemeal jobs. As he helped himself to a laptop computer, clothes and other goods from a Chinese shop in Tanah Abang, Santoso mumbled, “I just want to take some of the fruits of development” and openly admitted that his main targets were Chinese businesses.²⁵

With a strong Chinese business community in a neighborhood littered with urban slums, the demographic profile of Angke in Tambora made it a prime target for violence.²⁶ Predictably, Angke was severely affected as Chinese property was systematically pillaged and plundered in a massive wave of rioting.²⁷ Likewise, in Cengkareng in West Jakarta, gangs of looters from nearby slums attacked several Chinese shops and houses, in one instance using a truck to batter down the doors of a shop. Residents also noted that some of the rioters chanted “let’s wipe out the Chinese” while rampaging through the neighborhood.²⁸

In the neighborhood of Pluit in North Jakarta, Pantai Indah Kapok, an upscale housing complex occupied mostly by Chinese residents was the target of rioters’ fury on May 14th. As the mob swept through the complex, 64 houses were burnt and nearly 400 others looted. Eyewitness reports indicate that many of the

²⁵ Susan Berfield and Jose Manuel Tesoro, “People Power: Unprecedented public pressure forced Suharto to say he would finally step down. But when - and at what price?” *Asiaweek*, May 29, 1998

²⁶ The Chinese in Angke comprise an estimated 25% of the total population. The number of poor households in Angke was almost 50% higher than the Jakarta average.

²⁷ Personal interview with Chinese shopkeeper in Jakarta, May 24th, 2006.

²⁸ Ian Mackenzie, “Mobs riot: 10 die in Jakarta rampage,” *The Daily Telegraph* (Sydney, Australia), May 14, 1998

looters were from the neighboring area, a part of the city crowded with slum dwellers (Siegel, 1998).

Bank Central Asia (BCA) is one of the leading banks in Indonesia. Reputed as the “most widely used by Indonesian businesses,” it is controlled by prominent Chinese entrepreneur Liem Sioe Liong and his Salim Group of Companies.²⁹ As discussed in chapter four, Liem, who also goes by his Indonesian name Sudono Salim, rose to prominence during the *New Order*. He enjoyed a privileged relationship with the Suharto administration, was the embodiment of patronage and corruption associated with the *New Order* and was widely despised by *Pribumi* entrepreneurs for the stranglehold he exerted over many strategic sectors of the economy. As the violence escalated in May 1998, BCA outlets were widely targeted and an estimated 122 branch offices and over 1,250 automatic teller machines in and around Jakarta were burnt or looted.³⁰ Further, a palatial house belonging to Liem in an exclusive Central Jakarta neighborhood was ransacked by a group of looters who proceeded to torch five of his luxury automobiles.³¹

Several other Chinese owned banks also suffered in the rioting. 16 branches of Bank Lippo, owned by Mochtar Riady, another influential Chinese tycoon, were extensively damaged. Six department stores and a major shopping center belonging to the Riady conglomerate were also set ablaze.³² Moreover,

²⁹ Michael Shari, “A Tycoon under siege,” *Business Week (International Edition)*, September 28, 1998.

³⁰ Bhimanto Suwastoyo, “IMF calls for stability in Indonesia amid run on largest private bank,” *Agence France Presse*, May 26, 1998.

³¹ Keith Richburg, “Ethnic Chinese: Indonesia’s Scapegoats,” *Washington Post*, December 23, 1998.

³² Ron Moreau and Maggie Ford, “The Damage is real,” *World Affairs*, July 6, 1998.

numerous outlets of other Chinese controlled banks such as Bank Bali, Bank Maspion and Bank Danamon were similarly targeted for looting and destruction.³³

As the economy grew rapidly in the 1990s, the number of luxurious shopping malls in Jakarta increased exponentially to cater to an ever-growing middle class (Kenichiro, 2001). These extravagant symbols of opulence were often owned by Chinese entrepreneurs, controlled by Chinese money or at the very least contained numerous Chinese shops. As the riot unfolded, such objects of undisguised prosperity were obvious targets for impoverished rioters and “ripe for plunder.” Over the course of three days, 40 shopping malls in and around Jakarta were looted or burnt (Zon, 2004: 106). These included the Citraland shopping complex in Grogol owned by Chinese tycoon Ciputra, Roxy Mall, also in Grogol, owned by fellow Chinese entrepreneur Eka Cipta Wijaya and Mochtar Riady’s Lippo Karawaci super-mall on the outskirts of Jakarta. Many other shopping malls that were destroyed such as Jatinegara Plaza in the neighborhood of Bali Mester, Yogya Plaza in Klender and Kelapa Gading Mall in Kelapa Gading contained numerous Chinese shops.³⁴ Moreover, in the mainly Chinese neighborhoods of Glodok and Pasar Baru, several shopping centers were plundered including Glodok Plaza, the largest electronic and computer center in Indonesia and Pasar Glodok, a large sprawling mall consisting of over 1,800 shops (Kusno, 2003).

Chinese entrepreneurs also control some of the leading supermarket chains in Jakarta such as Hero, Ramayana and Matahari and these were frequent targets

³³ Personal correspondence with Ali Munhanif, May 16, 1998.

³⁴ Personal interview with an office bearer of the Indonesian Chinese Association (INTI), May 08, 2006.

for mob frustration during the May riots of 1998. Hero, the largest supermarket chain in Indonesia, suffered the most with at least 30 of its 50 stores in Jakarta looted or burnt. “Retailers are highly visible, and in a riot it doesn't help to be highly visible,” said the general manager of a Hero distribution outlet.³⁵ The retail giant Matahari also suffered with 12 outlets burnt and 14 others vandalized which incurred estimated total losses in excess of 100 billion rupiah.³⁶ Further, seven outlets of Ramayana were looted including the one in Jatinegara plaza which was completely demolished by rioters.³⁷

The above examples reveal that as the riot intensified over vast swathes of Jakarta, local level economic grievances against the Chinese were most likely to spillover into violence against the group in neighborhoods where signs of Chinese wealth and economic dominance were highly visible. Further, such symbols of wealth elicited particular resentment in poorer neighborhoods crowded with slum dwellers.

Activation of Religious Scapegoating in Jakarta's Neighborhoods

The statistical analysis showed that scapegoating of a religious flavor was more likely to resonate and acquire local significance in neighborhoods where sites of non-Moslem places of worship were greater. Indeed, violent neighborhoods on average were twice as much likely to be populated with non-Moslem sites of worship (churches and Buddhist temples) than their peaceful counterparts.

³⁵ Mark Landler, “Unrest in Indonesia: A Country's Commerce is Paralyzed and a Food Shortage Looms in the Capital,” *The New York Times*, May 20, 1998.

³⁶ “Riots ruining the retail sector,” *Jakarta Post*, November 29, 1998.

³⁷ Ron Moreau and Maggie Ford, “The Damage is real,” *World Affairs*, July 6, 1998

However, it has to be noted that the extent of damage inflicted on religious symbols of the Chinese was much less than the destruction wrought on economic markers associated with the group. According to most accounts, there were only two confirmed attacks on churches within the Jakarta city limits while three other churches were burnt in Tangerang in the Greater Jakarta area (Sulaiman, 2002: 47).³⁸ Further, at least three Chinese homes, which were widely suspected as used for unauthorized prayer services, were also burnt.³⁹ Given the extent of virulent anti-Christian/anti-Chinese rhetoric as well as attacks on numerous Chinese dominated churches in many different locales in the lead up to the May riots, it is somewhat surprising that more symbols of religious worship were not attacked.

Nevertheless, the relative absence of attacks on churches or temples does not mean that religious sentiment was not a factor during the riots. Responses from field surveys and interviews clearly indicate that in several neighborhoods exclusivist Moslems were worried about the increasing visibility of Christian churches. One respondent whose family lived in the Tanah Tinggi neighborhood of Central Jakarta noted, "It is a very small area and there are at least five churches there. The Chinese are very active in at least two churches. Some Moslems in my village question the need for five churches and are concerned that they [Chinese] are trying to convert people."⁴⁰ According to another respondent,

³⁸ Sidang Jemmat Allah Church in the Pengaringan neighborhood of North Jakarta was burnt on May 13, 1998 and a large crowd stoned the Kristus Tuhan Church in Tanah Abang on the same day.

³⁹ Personal interview with Chinese Indonesian lawyer, April 13, 2006. The interviewee noted that at least two Chinese homes in the Pasar Baru area in Central Jakarta and one home in Jelambar in West Jakarta were suspected of being used for unauthorized religious congregations.

⁴⁰ Survey response received May 05, 2006.

“some churches are very large. I don’t think the permits allow them to be so big. But, the Chinese bribe local officials and get away with it.”⁴¹

Therefore, in a pattern reminiscent of several other locales (discussed in chapter six), there was concern amongst more exclusivist Moslems about the unauthorized construction and expansion of Chinese dominated churches. As noted earlier, one of the Chinese houses in Pasar Baru that was allegedly converted into a place of religious worship (and subsequently burnt in the rioting) elicited much displeasure from the local Moslem community. One respondent commented, “Pasar Baru already has several churches. So when people hear that services are carried out secretly in a house, they get very suspicious.”⁴²

Moreover, the general dominance of the Christians and the Chinese was also resented. A *Pribumi* student who was living in West Jakarta at the time of the riots observed, “I know people who attended the buka puasa⁴³ that Prabowo arranged. I attended the rally at the Al-Azhar Mosque.⁴⁴ People think that Sumargono⁴⁵ is very hardcore. But, you have to realize that Sumargono has a point when he says we have to stop Christians and Chinese from jumping (sic) all over the Moslems.”⁴⁶ In fact, more than half of all *Pribumi* survey respondents complained of the privileged position accorded to Christians/Chinese. Further, as

⁴¹ Survey response received April 19, 2006.

⁴² Personal interview with Chinese Indonesian lawyer, April 13, 2006

⁴³ The respondent was referring to the much publicized breaking of the Ramadan fast hosted by the then Kopassus commander Major General Prabowo Subianto at Kopassus headquarters in Jakarta on January 23, 1998. Over 4,000 activists from several key Islamic organizations participated in the event and booklets were distributed which condemned efforts of Christian Chinese to “keep the Moslems down” (Hefner, 2000:202).

⁴⁴ The Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World (KISDI), a militant Islamic group, held a massive rally in front of the Al-Azhar Mosque in Jakarta.

⁴⁵ Ahmad Sumargono was the Chairman of KISDI and he was reputed for his vicious attacks on Christian and Chinese communities (Abuza, 2007).

⁴⁶ Personal interview with *Pribumi* student, March 28th, 2006.

Backman notes, fears of Christian/Chinese preeminence also stem from the fact that several Chinese owners of influential business enterprises are passionately and devoutly Christian and belong to fundamentalist non-denominational churches including the heads of the Ometraco, Maspion, Lippo, Ciputra, and Danamon groups (Backman, 2001).

Thus, the problematization of the Chinese as non-Moslem conspirators keen to stop Moslems from acquiring their rightful position in society and as Christian proselytizers bent on luring impressionable Moslem youth was more likely to resonate strongly at the local level where symbols of non-Moslem worship were more conspicuous.

Ranking of Variables

This chapter has demonstrated that predictors of anti-Chinese violence at the neighborhood level in Jakarta are multi-faceted. The economic, religious and ethnic attributes invoked in anti-Chinese scapegoating acquire salience at the local level through a variety of mechanisms. The question then becomes, which attributes and which local mechanisms are more pertinent in explaining patterns of anti-Chinese violence in the neighborhoods of Jakarta.

As discussed in the district level analysis in chapter six, it is at times difficult to isolate the precise impact of each explanatory variable. In several riot locales in Jakarta, religious, ethnic and economic factors were tightly interwoven. For example, in areas such as Tanah Abang and Pasar Baru, ethnic tensions were rife as *Pribumi* competitors often failed to loosen the stranglehold exerted by Chinese traders. Further, markers of Chinese prosperity such as banks and

supermarkets as well as the presence of several grandiose churches combined to create a volatile medley of attributes highly conducive to the outbreak of anti-Chinese rioting.

That being said, it is certainly possible that in different neighborhoods local sensitivities were impacted more by different attributes. Table 7.2 shown earlier in the chapter simulated the probability of violence by increasing relevant explanatory variables from the mean to the 90th percentile while holding all other variables in the model at their means. The table allows some tentative conclusions to be drawn about the relative impact of various variables.

It is clear from Table 7.2 that visible wealth and density of non-Moslem places of worship have the greatest relative impact on the probability of violence at the neighborhood level. For instance, the likelihood of violence goes up by 14% and 18% respectively when these two variables are increased from the mean to the 90th percentile. Further, these findings are also in conformity with those at the city level (see chapter six) where visible wealth and density of non-Moslem sites of worship also emerged as the most significant predictors of anti-Chinese rioting.

Some Contentious Issues of the Jakarta Riots

Extent of State Complicity in the Riots

Most accounts of the Jakarta riots in May 1998 underscore that violence was orchestrated and planned to a large extent. Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta (TGPF), the fact finding mission appointed by the Habibie administration in June 1998 to investigate the causes of the May riots, observed that they had sufficient evidence to suspect the active engagement of high ranking members of the

military and the government in instigating the riots.⁴⁷ Ariel Heryanto stressed that it is inconceivable that any social group could have carried out violence of such magnitude and destruction in such a short space of time without active encouragement from the state.⁴⁸

The TGPF report and an investigative report compiled by a NGO called Volunteers for Humanity (Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan, TRuK)⁴⁹ noted that many of the riots in Jakarta were orchestrated by provocateurs and *preman* (criminals) who came from outside of the riot locales. Typically, the provocateurs moved in small groups, had athletic physiques, often sported crew cuts and possessed military skills.⁵⁰ Some individuals testified that they had received training under Lt. Gen. Prabowo's command;⁵¹ others admitted that they were recruited to provoke riots and military sources acknowledged that they had intercepted radio communication between groups of provocateurs and the Jakarta army headquarters (Berfield and Loveard, 1998; Purdey, 2002).

Thus, there is a vast body of evidence indicating a significant element of planning and organization in the May riots. However, it is simplistic to suggest that riots in all 76 violent neighborhoods were incited by outside elements. Indeed, the TGPF report identified three basic riot patterns: first, some riots were

⁴⁷ Joint Fact Finding Team (TGPF), *Final Report about the 13–15 May 1998 Riot*, Jakarta, October 23, 1998; and TGPF, "Executive Summary," Jakarta, October 23, 1998.

⁴⁸ Ariel Heryanto, "Flaws in riot media coverage," *Jakarta Post*, July 15, 1998.

⁴⁹ Volunteers for Humanity (TRuK), *Investigative Report on the Jakarta Riots*, May 13–17, 1998, Jakarta, May 18, 1998.

⁵⁰ TGPF, "Executive Summary."

⁵¹ Prabowo Subianto, son-in-law of Suharto was widely suspected of involvement in the May 98' riots. Prabowo was closely associated with several Islamic organizations "whose rhetoric revolves around an aggrieved sense of Moslem chauvinism and a deep racial hatred of Chinese-Indonesians" (Scott, 1998) and was well known for his own dislike of the group. He was the commander of Kopassus (The Special Forces Unit) from late 1995 to March 1998. At the time of riots, Prabowo served as the commander of the elite Army Strategic Reserves Unit (Kostrad).

localized, limited in scope and generally spontaneous; second, riots in several locales were inter-connected and had similar “operational modes” and contained elements of both spontaneity and organization; and third, riots in some places were deliberately staged, by those with clear and vested political interests.⁵²

In any event, ascertaining to what degree the riots were spontaneous and to what degree they were planned is outside of the scope of this dissertation. Irrespective of whether riots were organized or spontaneous, the salient question for this dissertation to ponder is why they occurred in some neighborhoods and not in others. Toward this end, this research argues that even in cases where riots were clearly orchestrated by outside provocateurs, such agents carefully chose specific loci for violence, keeping in mind the conduciveness of local conditions for the fanning of violence.

Indeed, as the TRuK report states, targets for destruction were deliberately chosen in advance. Information on selected locales was then disseminated through telephone calls, text messages, drivers/users of public transport and more generally through word of mouth.⁵³ In Meruya, in West Jakarta, a large crowd gathered outside a shopping complex as rumors circulated of the impending destruction of the market. Soon, two minibuses dropped a group of people off who proceeded to start a fire by throwing gasoline bombs and then quickly disappeared from view as the crowd watched the blaze (Berfield and Loveard, 1998). Advance warning was also given that Jatinegara Plaza in Bali Mester would be set ablaze. Shortly afterwards, a group of instigators gathered

⁵² TGPF, “Executive Summary.”

⁵³ TRuK, “Investigative Report on the Jakarta Riots.”

around the plaza and one set fire to a tire to attract the attention of people living in nearby urban slums. The TRuK report provides details of similar stories of careful target selection by agent provocateurs at Yogya Plaza in Klender, Bimantara car showroom in Salemba and the Citraland mall in Grogol.

An eyewitness in the Bintaro area in South Jakarta described how three instigators had arrived on motorcycles with a group of people running directly behind them. The provocateurs pointed at specific houses and yelled “burn, burn, burn” to the mob following them.⁵⁴ Further, in some cases, agitators also assigned certain marks on specific targets and actively pointed the mob towards those targets.⁵⁵ In another instance, several men boarded the KRL train near Lenteng Agung in South Jakarta. During the journey, they produced a map of Jakarta and circled certain street names, buildings and shopping center locations as possible targets for destruction.⁵⁶

Such examples demonstrate that provocateurs did not incite violence at random. Instead, riot locales were chosen strategically with particular deliberation and care. Hence, neighborhoods where specific local conditions made them particularly vulnerable to anti-Chinese violence were more likely to be targeted by riot instigators.

Was it really Anti-Chinese Violence?

⁵⁴ Michael Ocorandi, “An Analysis of the Implications of Suharto’s Resignation for Chinese Indonesians,” *Worldwide HuaRen Peace Mission*, May 28, 1998.

⁵⁵ TGPF, “Executive Summary.”

⁵⁶ TRuK, “Investigative Report on the Jakarta Riots”.

As discussed in chapter six, the riots of May 1998 have been interpreted in a multitude of ways. Some like Heryanto (1998) have claimed that the May riots are a classic example of state terrorism, a strategy used by the regime to instill widespread terror amongst the populace in an endeavor to maintain their grip on power. Others have questioned the notion that the riots were explicitly “anti-Chinese” and claim that victims included members of several other ethnic groups (Zon, 2004). They point out that a significant number of those who lost their lives in the May riots were *Pribumi*. For instance, 174 people died when Yogya Plaza in Klender was burnt down (van Klinken, 1998). The predominant majority of those were *Pribumi* looters who were inside at the time. Likewise, over 100 people perished as Jatinegara Plaza was engulfed in a ball of fire; again, most of those who died were *Pribumi*. Further, scores of charred bodies were discovered when numerous shopping centers in the Glodok area were razed.

While it is true that many of those who died in burnt out shopping malls and supermarkets were mostly poverty stricken *Pribumi* looters, it has to be borne in mind that these malls were explicitly targeted as they were deemed to symbolize the enormous wealth of the Chinese that the disaffected urban poor had come to loathe. In that context, it is disingenuous to argue that the riots were specifically not “anti-Chinese” in nature given that the victims perished while looting mostly Chinese property.

Further, there is a wealth of anecdotal evidence to signify that the Chinese in Jakarta were deliberately singled out. Both TGPF and TRuK reports mention that in several cases provocateurs yelled anti-Chinese slogans and exhorted the mob to attack Chinese property. In the main Chinese quarter of Glodok, a five-

story market for electronic goods was completely destroyed. However, adjacent to the market, on the sidewalk, were a row of small stalls operated by itinerant *Pribumi* vendors. These stalls were left untouched after the *Pribumi* merchants appealed to the mob not to destroy their livelihoods (Siegel, 1998).

In Tanah Abang, a Chinese owned motorcycle repair shop was torched by the mob, while right across the street a grocery shop remained completely unscathed. A crude sign stuck to the front of the grocery shop read, “*Toko ini milik Pribumi*” –This shop belongs to a *Pribumi* Indonesian.⁵⁷ Similarly, in several neighborhoods, properties bearing signs such as “Moslem owned” or “Pure Betawi” were largely spared while others laid out Moslem prayer mats to ward off rioters (Berfield and Loveard, 1998; Budianta, 2000). In the Ciledug area in South Jakarta, the sign BMC, which stood for “*Basmi Milik Cina*” (destroy Chinese property), was spray-painted on Chinese houses.⁵⁸

The brutal rapes of a large number of ethnic Chinese women and young girls during the May riots provide further evidence of selective targeting of the Chinese. Estimates for the number of rape victims differ with Volunteers for Humanity (TRuK) claiming 168 victims, the TGPF report finding 52 rapes and the state sponsored Communication Forum for National Unity (PKB) confirming 46 rapes. Marzuki Daruzman, the chief of TGPF acknowledged that the vast majority of rape victims were women of Chinese origin and that most were victims of gang rape.⁵⁹ According to TRuK, while rapes occurred in all five

⁵⁷ Sid Astbury, “Indonesia’s Chinese feel the heat,” *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, May 17, 1998.

⁵⁸ Andreas Harsono, “Accounts of gang rape of Chinese women emerge from Jakarta riots,” *American Reporter*, June 13, 1998.

⁵⁹ “TGPF confirms 66 rapes in riots,” *Jakarta Post*, November 4, 1998.

districts of Jakarta, most victims were found in West Jakarta where the Chinese are densely populated.⁶⁰

In one instance, four men repeatedly raped a young Chinese student in a car near the airport in Cengkareng. She spotted a green uniform in the vehicle and pleaded with her captors by saying, “if you are police, you have to save me.” One of the men responded, “No, I have to give you a lesson. You are a woman and you are beautiful and you are part of the Chinese.”⁶¹ In Jembatan Lima, a group of tough looking men wielding wooden sticks forced their way inside a city bus shouting, “where are the Chinese?” They chased away the *Pribumi* women, assaulted the male Chinese passengers and proceeded to gang rape several Chinese women inside the bus.⁶² Further, in the neighborhood of Pluit in North Jakarta, several men taunted a young Chinese girl as she was repeatedly assaulted, “you thought you were too good for us, you bitch. Now look who’s having fun.”⁶³ Moreover, Chinese women were also publicly humiliated in several cases. In one incident, a number of Chinese women were stripped naked in public, paraded around and forced to swim in a filthy pond. In another incident, a group of men broke into a bank where several female ethnic Chinese employees were taking refuge and forced the women to disrobe and ordered them to dance.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Tim Relawan untuk Kemansusiaan (TRuK), “Early Documentation No. 3: The Rapes in the series of Riots,” Jakarta, July 13, 1998.

⁶¹ Andreas Harsono, “Accounts of gang rape of Chinese women emerge from Jakarta riots,” *American Reporter*, June 13, 1998.

⁶² Muninggar Sri Saraswati and Bambang Nurbianto, “May 1998 riot victims still waiting for justice to come,” *Jakarta Post*, May 13, 2004.

⁶³ Personal interview with Chinese Indonesian journalist, April 3, 2006.

⁶⁴ Andreas Harsono, “Accounts of gang rape of Chinese women emerge from Jakarta riots,” *American Reporter*, June 13, 1998.

It is correct that the victims of the May riots were not exclusively confined to the Chinese. It is also true that *Pribumi* property was destroyed in a few cases (Thufail, 2007) while rioters actively sought targets belonging to the Suharto family.⁶⁵ Further, there is also evidence that in a number of cases ordinary *Pribumi* Indonesians actively came to the aid of ethnic Chinese victims, often placing their own lives in jeopardy. That being said, none of this detracts from the fact that there is a substantial body of evidence that demonstrates quite categorically that the Jakarta riots of May 1998 had a very clear anti-Chinese element.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented spatial variations in the patterns of anti-Chinese violence at the neighborhood level in Jakarta. As widespread riots cut across the Indonesian archipelago in mid May 1998, Jakarta was clearly the worst affected and bore the brunt of the violence. However, even in Jakarta, violence was not uniformly distributed and indeed “only” 29% of all neighborhoods in the city were engulfed in the rioting. Thus, this chapter fills an important gap in the ethnic conflict literature by assessing neighborhood level trajectories of violence within a broadly violent city. By stepping inside the “riot episode,” the chapter also redresses a common tendency in conflict studies to take the “riot episode” as a single observation. The extent of variation seen within Jakarta underscores the

⁶⁵ Thomas Fuller, “You deserve this because you are so greedy: Rioters targeted firms linked to Suharto family,” *International Herald Tribune*, May 18, 1998. Also, see Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Furious Jakarta Mobs Target Suharto’s Wealth,” *The Guardian*, May 15, 1998.

importance of neighborhood level dynamics and highlights the importance of disaggregating the unit of analysis to the lowest level possible.

The findings clearly demonstrate the complex, intertwined and multi-dimensional nature of anti-Chinese outbursts and privilege the micro-foundational aspects of violence. The religious, ethnic and economic attributes, which are often invoked in elite induced campaigns of scapegoating, resonate at the neighborhood level in a series of context- bound ways. In the neighborhoods of Jakarta, visible wealth associated with the Chinese and the visibility of non-Moslem places of worship (in particular churches) emerged as the most significant predictors of violence. Thus, as chapter six showed, these findings are also in broad conformity with the patterns of violence uncovered at the urban district (city) level.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Beyond the Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia: Patterns of Violence against Other Entrepreneurial Ethnic Minorities

The overriding question behind this dissertation has been why large-scale campaigns of elite-orchestrated scapegoating against vulnerable entrepreneurial minority groups descend into violence against some members of the target group and not others. By using spatial variations in anti-Chinese violence in the late *New Order* Indonesia as a case study, the dissertation has thus far shown under what conditions some segments of the Chinese community become more “scapegoatable,” hence, more prone to violence. The model developed contends that elite campaigns of scapegoating are more likely to lead to violence when the attributes invoked in such scapegoating resonate at the local level in a variety of context bound ways. The findings from Indonesia clearly highlight the complex and interconnected nature of anti-Chinese disturbances and privilege an explanation based on the interaction between macro-structural factors and the micro-foundations of violence.

This leads to the crucial question of whether the explanatory potential of the above theoretical framework is unique to the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia or whether it could be generalized across a spectrum of comparable cases. This chapter argues that the model built in the dissertation has the ability to “travel” beyond the shores of Indonesia. In order to prove the robustness of the model, the chapter applies it to several cases of large-scale violence against an array of other entrepreneurial minorities and attempts to establish that a similar interaction of

elite scapegoating and relevant local mechanisms help explain differences in the spatial trajectories of violence against groups as disparate as the Jews in Russia in 1881 to the Koreans in Los Angeles in 1992.

The chapter is organized as follows: The first section discusses a few prominent cases of violence against other entrepreneurial ethnic minorities. In order to facilitate a direct and meaningful comparison with the Indonesian Chinese, only instances of large-scale violence that occurred in the general backdrop of social upheaval and widespread scapegoating were considered for analysis.¹ Moreover, the section demonstrates the extent of elite scapegoating in each case and highlights the trajectories of violence, in particular spatial variations within each group. The next section of the chapter aims to explain these divergent patterns of violence by focusing on specific attributes used in the scapegoating and by underlining the mechanisms through which such attributes acquired salience at the local level.

Violence against Other Entrepreneurial Minorities

Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia in 1881

The assassination of Tsar Alexander II by revolutionary terrorists in March 1881 precipitated a serious outbreak of widespread anti-Semitic violence in several parts of southern and southwestern Russia (Aronson, 1980). The riots of 1881 happened in the context of rising anti-Jewish sentiments which frequently found loud expression in government circles and the press. The rapid growth of

¹ The cases chosen include some of the most well-known episodes of widespread rioting against entrepreneurial ethnic minorities.

chauvinistic nationalism on the part of the Russians (as well as the Ukrainians), accusations of increasing Jewish participation in the revolutionary movement against the Tsar, general economic decline in the country and the pervasiveness of institutionalized discrimination (in the form of myriad anti-Jewish regulations) all contributed to the public expression of discontent against the Jews. Further, several national and local newspapers exacerbated this discontent by publishing material that reinforced negative stereotypes against the Jews and a number of especially inflammatory articles were published in the aftermath of the assassination of Alexander II (Aronson, 1990:42; Aronson, 1991:45).

By the 1880s, in accordance with Russian law, the Jews were primarily confined to territories which came to be known as the Pale of Jewish Settlement.² Indeed, much of the violence of 1881 was concentrated around the Pale and it is believed that over 240 Jewish communities in total were affected by the pogroms, most of which took place between April and July of 1881. However, in spite of the pervasiveness of violence, not all Jewish communities in the region were targeted. As Aronson observes, pogroms occurred in only 8 of the 15 *Guberniia* (provinces) in the Pale of Settlement (Aronson, 1990: 61).³ Moreover, significant spatial variations were apparent even within broadly violent locales. For instance, the pogroms of 1881 began in the *uzed* (district) of Elizavetgrad; yet, not all towns

² Russian law dictated that most Jews were obliged to reside in the Pale of Settlement. The Pale comprised of 15 provinces in the northwestern and southwestern parts of European Russia (Belorussia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, New Russia and Bessarabia). By 1881, the Jews accounted for approximately 12.5% of the total population of the Pale (Klier, 1991: 5).

³ Aronson notes that in 1881 anti-Semitic pogroms occurred in the provinces of Kiev, Podolia, Volynia, Chernigov, Poltava, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson and Tavrida while the provinces of Grodno, Kovno, Vilna, Minsk, Mogilev, Vitebsk and Bessarabia experienced no violent outbreaks (Aronson, 1990:31).

and villages in Elizavetgrad were caught up in the violence. Similar disparities were observed in the neighboring district of Aleksandriia (Aronson, 1990: 50-59).

Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia, 1903-1906

Another major wave of violence swept through the Russian Jewry in the early years of the 20th century. The period from 1903-1906 was particularly destructive for the Jewish community as countless pogroms occurred in the backdrop of general social turmoil, punctuated by economic stagnation, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 and the anti-government revolution of 1905 (Lambroza, 1987).

In the wake of the aforementioned pogroms of 1881, anti-Jewish legislation in Russia was tightened even further as many prominent government officials paradoxically chose to pin the blame for the pogroms on the conduct of the Jews themselves. They argued that Jewish exploitation of the peasantry had sown seeds of deep-seated bitterness and resentment amongst the lower classes, which then had the explosive potential of being transformed into anti-Semitic violence during times of social turmoil (Judge, 1992: 13). Thus, a series of additional measures were imposed in the 1880s and the 1890s in an endeavor to reduce the perceived influence of the Jews. Such measures included the banning of Jewish settlement outside of towns, prohibition of Jewish ownership of property in the countryside, establishment of quotas for secondary school admissions and employment in the government sector as well as in selected professions, all of which helped to further entrench the institutionalization of discrimination against the Jews (Klier and Lambroza, 1991: 39-42).

Buoyed by such increasingly stringent measures, many officials in the administration of Tsar Nicholas II openly expressed anti-Semitic sentiments. As Lambroza observes, “The attitudes of Nicholas II and his ministers created a perception among local officials that excesses against Jews were tolerable and condoned, albeit unofficially” (Lambroza, 1987). Further, many regional and local newspapers carried numerous anti-Semitic diatribes where Jews were lashed for being economic parasites and were warned in no uncertain terms to renounce Judaism and convert to Christianity. For example, *Bessarabets*, a regional tabloid published in the province of Bessarabia was reputed for its vituperative anti-Semitic content. Although the paper never explicitly called for pogroms against the Jews, it ran several provocative pieces with sensationalist headlines such as “Death to the Jews” and “Crusade Against the Hated Race” (Lambroza, 1991: 196). In 1904, with the advent of the Russo-Japanese war, *Bessarabets* also published a series of articles where the Jews were accused of providing funds, munitions and intelligence to the Japanese (Lambroza, 1991: 214).

The extent of anti-Jewish pogroms from 1903-06 was quite astounding. There were two major riots in 1903, in the cities of Kishinev and Gomel and this was followed by at least 43 pogroms in 1904 in the wake of the Russo-Japanese war.⁴ The Russian revolution of 1905, which stemmed from years of societal disaffection at the autocratic rule of the Romanov dynasty, triggered another

⁴ As the government got bogged down in the war, it embarked on a strategy of aggressive conscription in an effort to overwhelm the enemy. However, this was an unpopular strategy and led to considerable public alienation. Such frustration was often taken out on the Jews who were perceived to bear some responsibility for the war (due in no small measure to the campaigns carried out by the anti-Semitic press). In the 45 pogroms that took place in 1903-04, 93 Jews and 13 non-Jews were killed, over 4,000 people (mostly Jews) injured and the total destruction of property was estimated in excess of 5.2 million roubles (Lambroza, 1991: 214-218).

massive wave of anti-Semitic violence.⁵ It is believed that more than 50 pogroms occurred between January and October of 1905. On October 30, 1905, Tsar Nicholas signed the so-called October Manifesto, which agreed to create a constitutional monarchy and extend the limits of civil liberties, thereby fundamentally transforming the nature of Russian autocracy. This led to a sharp escalation of anti-Jewish violence and Lambroza estimates that well over 600 pogroms, resulting in more than 3,000 deaths, were carried out in the first few months after the signing of the Manifesto (Lambroza, 1991: 226-231).⁶

Hence, it is evident that the Russian Jewry was subjected to profound and devastating acts of violence from 1903-06. Yet, as seen in the pogroms of 1881, significant spatial variations in the patterns of violence can be readily observed. As noted earlier, regional publications such as *Bessarabets* played a pivotal role in disseminating anti-Semitic propaganda of the elites. *Bessarabets* was the only daily newspaper in the province of Bessarabia and had a significant circulation (Lambroza, 1991: 196). Yet, the virulent diatribes contained in *Bessarabets* led to anti-Semitic violence only in a few cities within the province of Bessarabia (notably in Kishinev in 1903 and Bender in 1904) where the newspaper was in

⁵ The revolution united many disparate political, ethnic and national groups in Russia. Students, workers, peasants and several ethnic minorities (including the Jews) formed a loose coalition and called for immediate and substantial reforms. Many Jews participated in the revolution and several Jewish organizations (most notably the Bund -a Marxist workers' group) engaged in radical activities. In response to the revolution, many right-wing organizations professing unstinted loyalty to the values of nationalism, autocracy and orthodoxy cropped up. Several of these were militantly anti-Semitic and played a key role in many of the pogroms against the Jews (Lambroza, 1991: 219-226).

⁶ Supporters of the revolution heralded the signing of the manifesto as a major triumph against the autocracy and organized celebratory parades and demonstrations in major cities. At the same time, pro-monarchist, right wing political organizations staged counter demonstrations vowing to protect the Tsar and the crumbling foundations of autocracy. These counter demonstrations often degenerated into anti-Semitic violence.

circulation (Lambroza, 1991: 213-214; Judge, 1992: 31-33).⁷ Further, the geographic distribution of the countless pogroms of 1905-1906 was uneven and erratic. Pogroms occurred in all 15 provinces in the Pale of Settlement in the aftermath of the signing of the Manifesto. However, it is estimated that nearly 87% of the 657 pogroms recorded during this period were concentrated in seven southern provinces, while the southern province of Chernigov alone accounted for nearly 40% of all pogroms (Lambroza, 1991: 230).

Kristallnacht –The Night of Broken Glass: Anti-Jewish Pogrom in Nazi Germany, November 9-10, 1938

Kristallnacht also known as “The night of broken glass” was a well coordinated anti-Jewish pogrom that swept across many different cities of Nazi Germany on November 9-10, 1938. Within the space of one day, 91 Jews were killed, over 30,000 Jewish men (approximately a quarter of all Jewish men in Germany at the time) arrested and deported to concentration camps, more than 250 synagogues set ablaze and countless Jewish shops/homes ransacked as Germany was gripped by an orgy of anti-Semitic violence of an unprecedented magnitude (Gilbert, 2006: 15; Caron, 1985).

As Gilbert observes, Kristallnacht was the “culmination” of five years of intense institutionalized discrimination against the Jews by the Nazi government

⁷ Detailed town-wide data of readership patterns of *Bessarabets* is not available. As the only daily newspaper in the province, it is likely that *Bessarabets* was in circulation in at least the major towns/cities of Bessarabia. It is not surprising that the impact of *Bessarabets* was felt acutely in Kishinev given that the city was the capital of Bessarabia and the home of *Bessarabets*. However, *Bessarabets* was also instrumental in instigating an anti-Jewish pogrom in Bender- a small town 30 miles south of Kishinev (Lambroza, 1991: 213-214). Thus, if *Bessarabets* was widely available in Bender, it is likely that the paper was also accessible in at least the major towns of Bessarabia.

(Gilbert, 2006: 119).⁸ The pogrom was set in motion when Herschel Grynszpan, the 17 year old son a Polish Jewish family expelled from Germany took out his frustration by shooting a junior diplomat of the German embassy in Paris on November 7th. The diplomat was rushed to hospital and eventually succumbed to his injuries two days later on November 9th. The shooting was strongly denounced in the German Media which branded the Jews as killers and the government immediately imposed several punitive measures against the group on November 8th.⁹ As news of the diplomat's death filtered through on the night of the 9th, anti-Jewish demonstrations, which had already begun in several cities, rapidly intensified and degenerated into violence against the Jews.

The pogrom was widespread and affected almost every corner of Germany, yet, the intensity of violence varied from place to place. In general, pogroms were more prevalent in cities than in villages, which was expected given that most Jews lived in urban areas. However, even within cities, the extent of destruction varied significantly with the Jews in Berlin, Vienna and Frankfurt being subjected to particularly high levels of violence. Similarly, variations abounded in rural areas; the village of Hoengen with its tiny Jewish population was attacked while the villages of Warmsried, Derching and Laimering (with comparable or larger Jewish populations) were not (Read and Fisher, 1989: 68-109).

⁸ Anti-Jewish persecution began as soon as the Nazi government was installed in power. The prominence of the Jews in economic and professional activities made them objects of envy and resentment which was skilfully exploited by the Nazis. In 1933, the government enacted 42 laws that discriminated against the Jews and this was followed by a further 48 pieces of anti-Jewish legislation over the next two years (Gilbert, 2006: 120-126).

⁹ On November 8, 1938, the government imposed a set of punitive measures against the Jews. For example, all Jewish newspapers and magazines were ordered to cease publication immediately and Jewish children were banned from attending "Aryan" elementary schools (Gilbert, 2006: 25).

Anti-Indian Riots in Burma, 1938

The Indo-Burmese riots of 1938 began in late July and lasted for several days. The violence began in Rangoon and soon spread to several outlying districts. The riots caused well over 250 deaths while close to a thousand people were wounded. Further, 113 mosques (most of which belonged to Indian Moslems) were set on fire and scores of Indian shops and houses plundered (Yegar, 1972: 37). This was followed by a much smaller and less destructive wave of violence in early September of the same year.

The immediate cause of the riot was the renewed publication of a book by a Burmese Moslem called Maung Shwe Hpi which contained several derogatory references to Burmese Buddhists. The book was originally published in the early 1930s, but had gone relatively unnoticed till 1938 when its most objectionable content was given wide publicity by the Burmese vernacular press. Stirred by the publicity, several organizations of Buddhist monks staged a massive rally in Rangoon decrying the book. Riots broke out shortly afterwards and were initially directed at Burmese Moslems, but the violence was soon channeled against the Indians as the latter formed the vast majority of urban Moslems (Mahajani, 1960: 79; Yegar, 1972: 36).

Indeed, for several years before the riots, the vernacular press had whipped up a concerted campaign of hatred against the Indians. *The Sun*, a leading daily, repeatedly expressed its concern at the “menace” of Indian immigration. *The New Light of Burma*, another leading newspaper, urged its readership towards a total boycott of Indian stores (Yegar, 1972:36). Some tabloids warned Indians of a fate similar to that of the Jews in Europe while others

accused Indians of rampant propagation of Islam and clamored for the abolition of inter-marriage. The Riot Enquiry Committee, appointed by the government in the wake of the violence to ascertain its causes, firmly held these newspapers responsible for escalating communal tensions (Mahajani 1960: 83).¹⁰

However, in spite of the wide coverage given to the stigmatization of the Indians as a problematic community, the violence against the group was not uniform. As Yegar notes, the degree of violence “varied from place to place and nor was it everywhere in direct relation to the size of the local Moslem community.” For instance, serious rioting took place in the oilfield district of Yenangyaung in spite of its small Moslem population. Yegar suggests that local conditions mattered in many cases where riots were used as a pretext to “settle accounts” with certain Moslems (Yegar, 1972: 37).

Anti-Indian Riots in Durban, South Africa in 1949

Violent clashes between mostly Zulu Africans and Indians in the South African city of Durban on January 14-15, 1949 led to 137 deaths, wounded over a thousand people and caused widespread damage and destruction to over 700 stores and 1,500 houses. The riots were ignited by a minor altercation involving an African youth and an Indian shop assistant and occurred in the context of rising tensions between the two communities (Webster, 1975: 12).

¹⁰ The Riot Enquiry Committee noted that the newspapers “continuously, if intermittently, sought to use them [the issue of Indians] for the political purposes of driving a wedge of prejudice and ill-feeling between the Burmese and Indian population of Burma...but for the activities of the Burmese press in Rangoon in exploiting the disclosure of Maung Shwe Hpi’s book, we do not think the riots would ever have occurred” (cited in Mahajani, 1960: 83-84).

By the 1940s, over 80% of the total Indian population in South Africa was concentrated in the province of Natal and the vast majority of them lived in urban areas such as Durban (Ginwala, 1985). As with other entrepreneurial ethnic minorities, the Indians were well entrenched in trading and boasted an enviable reputation for economic skills. Such economic domination allied with religious and racial distinctiveness entrenched African perceptions of the Indians as “alien exploiters” (Webster, 1975: 30). The emergence of a growing African trading class intensified ethnic competition and further increased resentment of the Indians amidst suspicions that the group was accorded preferential treatment in various spheres.¹¹

Compounding this resentment was the openly hostile attitude taken by several political parties to the Indians in the general election campaign of 1948.¹² Whilst campaigning, soon to be Prime Minister Daniel Malan of the National Party branded the Indians as a “foreign and outlandish element” and deemed the group as “unassimable.” “They can never become part of the country and must, therefore, be treated as an immigrant community” he stated further and noted that repatriation had to be considered as a practical solution to the Indian question. Other speeches by government ministers such as Schoemann, Swart and Jansen also propagated hatred against the Indians. Therefore, through the portrayal of the

¹¹ Webster notes that the Indians were given preferential statutory treatment in several domains as they were perceived to be better educated and more “Westernized.” For instance, land ownership regulations for Indians were much less restrictive compared to their African counterparts and the Indians were also perceived to be preferred with regard to the issuance of trade and transport licences (Webster, 1975: 37-39).

¹² In the decade prior to the elections, there had been several Commissions of Enquiry into alleged Indian penetration of White areas. At the same time, there was also increasing tension between White and Indian trading classes. The anti-Indian tenor adopted by several parties in the campaign of 1948 has to be seen against this backdrop (Ginwala, 1985).

Indians as an undesirable element deserving of repatriation, the elites had created a framework for the Indians to be perceived as “licensed scapegoats” who could be attacked with impunity at the slightest provocation (Webster, 1975: 41-43; Bhana, 2001).

Interestingly, the violence of 1949 was confined to the city of Durban and did not spread to other urban locales in Natal where Indians were also found in fairly substantial numbers. Even within Durban, the spatial trajectory of rioting was quite uneven with much of the violence concentrated in the neighborhoods of Cato Manor and Baumanville (Webster, 1975: 23).

The Los Angeles Riots of 1992

The immediate trigger for the violence was the acquittal of four white officers of the Los Angeles Police Department on April 29, 1992 over the alleged beating of African-American motorist Rodney King. Shortly after the verdict, a large crowd gathered in South Central Los Angeles, angrily voiced its displeasure and set in motion the most serious outbreak of racial violence in the area since the Watts riot of 1965. During the course of six days of rioting, 51 people were killed, 2,383 injured, approximately 8,000 arrested and over 700 businesses set ablaze resulting in property damage estimated at over one billion dollars (Bergesen and Herman, 1998). Although there were many victims in the rioting, the Korean-American community in Los Angeles was especially hard hit with many rioters

primarily targeting retail shops owned by the Koreans (Morrison and Lowry, 1993: 26).¹³

In the months leading up to the riots, several incidents had inflamed racial tensions between the Koreans and the African Americans in Los Angeles. First, in March 1991, Latasha Harlins, a fifteen year old African American girl was fatally shot by a Korean storeowner on suspicion of shoplifting. The female storeowner was convicted of manslaughter, but only received probation and community service time instead of being sent to prison; the lenient sentence handed out invoked the outrage of many African-American leaders (Koch and Schockman, 1994: 70). The subsequent acquittal of the white officers involved in the Rodney King case (which ignited the riots) only served to aggravate the sense of injustice for the African American community who compared the King verdict with the Harlins case. Second, a hit song released shortly before the riots by popular rap star Ice Cube also exacerbated resentment towards the Koreans. The lyrics in the song “Black Korea” sent a chilling warning to Korean shopkeepers to treat African- American customers with respect or else threatening to “burn your store down to a crisp.”¹⁴ Several Korean American organizations in Southern California denounced the song and expressed concerns that the derogatory lyrics had the potential to promote racial violence against Korean storeowners (Koch and Schockman, 1994: 70).

¹³ According to some estimates, more than 75% of all damaged buildings were retail stores (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1998).

¹⁴ “Tensions Divide Blacks, Asians: Economic differences, cultural misunderstandings set 2 groups apart,” *The San Francisco Chronicle*, May 4, 1992.

As with several of the previous cases, in spite of widespread ethnic tensions, the spatial distribution of violence in Los Angeles was irregular. Serious clashes with the Koreans occurred in South Central, Pico-Union and Koreatown. However, violence against the Koreans did not always correlate with the size of the local Korean community. South Central boasted a much smaller Korean population in contrast to Koreatown and Pico-Union, yet, violence was severe and rioters targeted countless Korean stores in the area including the shop where Latasha Harlins was gunned down.¹⁵

Similar Patterns...

In addition to the cases discussed above, other serious incidents of rioting against entrepreneurial ethnic minorities include the Malay-Chinese race riots in Kuala Lumpur in 1969 (Slimming, 1969; Comber, 1983; Kia Soong, 2007), anti-Indian violence in the township of Inanda, Durban in 1985 (Hughes, 1987), violence against the ethnic Indians in Fiji (Heartfield, 2002), race riots against the Lebanese in several parts of West Africa (Winder, 1962; Boumedouha, 1990, Bierwirth, 1999), anti-Chinese riots in California and other parts of the West Coast in the 19th century (Boswell, 1986; Fong and Markham, 2002), periodic attacks against the Vietnamese in Cambodia¹⁶ (Goshal, 1993; Derks, 1996), and

¹⁵ The total Asian population in South Central was estimated at 2.9% of the total population (Bergesen and Herman, 1998). Morrison and Lowry note that the total Asian population in Koreatown was around 14% of the total population according to the census of 1990. They estimate that the Koreans comprised roughly 60% of the Asian population in Koreatown.

¹⁶ The extent of economic dominance of the Vietnamese in Cambodia is not as pervasive as that of the other entrepreneurial minorities discussed here. However, native Khmers do often perceive the ethnic Vietnamese as rich and commercially skilful with occupational specialization in a number of areas (Derks, 1996).

clashes between African-Americans and Jews in the Brooklyn neighborhood of Crown Heights in 1991 (Goldschmidt, 2006; Shapiro, 2006).

As noted earlier, much of the violence against entrepreneurial ethnic minorities occurred in the backdrop of socio-economic or political upheaval. Hence, the circumstances in which violence transpired against most groups were broadly similar to those faced by the Chinese in Indonesia. Often, it was easy for opportunistic elites or vested elements in the media to pin the blame on economically privileged, politically marginalized and ethnically/religiously distinct minority groups. The historical construction of many of these groups as “disliked outsiders” and the accompanying institutional exclusion made them ripe for scapegoating as elites sought to deflect blame from themselves in times of social strife.

Indeed, egged on by the elite rhetoric, violence did break out in many places. Yet, as the above survey of cases has amply illustrated, the potential for scapegoating was not fully realized as not all communities of the relevant entrepreneurial minority group (possessing ostensibly “scapegoatable” qualities) were subjected to ethnic violence; in fact, clear spatial variations in the patterns of rioting were ascertained even within broadly violent locales. For instance, anti-Jewish pogroms were limited to the city of Kishinev in 1903 in spite of the blatantly anti-Jewish tabloid of *Bessarabets* being available in other cities in Bessarabia; the post-election anti-Chinese riots in Malaysia in 1969 were mainly confined to Kuala Lumpur in spite of the opposition Chinese party securing noticeable gains in many other states; and the anti-Indian riots of Durban were concentrated in a few localities in 1949 and restricted to the township of Inanda in

1985. In other words, in conformity with the patterns of violence against the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, some segments of the entrepreneurial minority group were deemed to be “more scapeogatable;” hence more prone to violence than others.

As noted in chapter one, entrepreneurial ethnic minorities are vulnerable on various fronts; their economic dominance, religious difference and racial distinctiveness provide manipulative elites with several outlets for exploitation. Chapters six and seven demonstrated that violence against the Chinese in Indonesia was more likely in districts/neighborhoods where one or more of the attributes used in the scapegoating resonated at the local level in various ways. Thus, when particular local mechanisms amplified entrenched stereotypes of the group, anti-Chinese violence was more likely by increasing the threat posed to the local community and by providing focal point/s for mobilization.

Similarly, much of the scapegoating of the minorities discussed in this chapter was also multi-dimensional. For example, the Jews were slammed as economic exploiters, ethnic outsiders as well as being practitioners of ritual murder of Christian youth for religious purposes (Judge, 1992).

In line with the findings from Indonesia, the rest of this chapter argues that spatial variations in violence against various other entrepreneurial minorities are explained by how different attributes invoked in the scapegoating of such minorities played out at the local level. In other words, a similar framework to the one used in chapters six and seven is adopted to explain how ethnic, economic and religious factors often used in the blame mongering of disliked groups acquired resonance at the local level.

“Scapegoatability” at the Local Level

Activation of Ethnic Scapegoating against Other Entrepreneurial Ethnic Minorities

Many entrepreneurial groups, ranging from the Jews to the Chinese have often been projected as ethnically/religiously distinct outsiders with little allegiance to the country where they reside; their ethnic differences are accentuated and the group often portrayed as disloyal outsiders, even though in many cases, they have been present for generations. Such characterization was widely employed in many of the cases under discussion here. Chapters six and seven revealed that the image of the Chinese as non-*Pribumi* outsiders was more problematic in more ethnically heterogeneous locales where the degree of ethnic competition for finite resources was greater.

Likewise, local level ethnic competition figured prominently in many accounts of violence against other entrepreneurial ethnic minorities. During the anti-Jewish pogroms of Russia in 1881, a leading official in the town of Elizavetgad charged business and trading competitors of the Jews of being the main inciters of rioting in the town. Similarly, the governor of Poltava province suggested that business rivals from other ethnic groups triggered the pogrom in the town of Lubny on July 27, 1881. Moreover, in several other towns, Jews were accused of undesirable business practices such as dealing in stolen goods and operating liquor stores without a proper licence, which heightened ethnic resentment against the group (Aronson, 1990: 114-117).

In Odessa, the scene of a massive anti-Jewish pogrom in 1905, competition between Jewish and Gentile unskilled day labourers stoked inter-

group tensions. Competition was particularly fierce in the docksides and railway depots in Odessa where large numbers of unskilled workers grappled for limited opportunities in a constricting labour market. Many day labourers lived a precarious existence and suffered from irregular work hours and measly wages. As the pogrom swept through Odessa, non-Jewish day workers made up by far the largest component of rioters and were very active in the destruction of Jewish owned property (Weinberg, 1991: 272).

Anti Semitic violence was particularly intense in the province of Moldavia in Romania as a rapidly emerging Moldavian bourgeoisie found itself competing against a well ensconced Jewish middle class (Brustein and King, 2004a). Competition was also a sticking point amongst non-Jewish Romanian university students who vented their displeasure at disproportionate Jewish presence in elite institutes of higher education (Brustein and Ronnkvist, 2002). In contrast, in Bulgaria, while ethnic competition was present, the level of resentment generated towards the Jews was much lower as many native ethnic groups frequently outperformed the Jews in commercial and industrial endeavours (Brustein and King, 2004b).

At the time of the anti-Indian riots in Durban in 1949, an embryonic African trading class found its aspirations thwarted by firmly established Indian traders who frequently opposed applications by Africans to secure trading licences. Indians were accused of regularly bribing corrupt local officials to facilitate the registration of trade unions and the issuance (or non-issuance in the case of applications) of trading licences. Further, many Indian shopkeepers were charged with arbitrarily raising prices during a time of economic difficulty.

Competition was also growing in the transport sector as African groups attempted to break Indians' monopoly on bus transport in Durban. The Indians were estimated to control nearly 60% of all buses in Durban catering to 86% of African clientele and many African passengers seethed at what they perceived to be shabby treatment meted out to them by arrogant Indian bus conductors (Webber, 1975: 33). However, as with the trading class, the progress of an emerging African transport class was often arrested by entrenched Indian interests. Thus, competition over trading and transport meant that ethnic relations were festering as the violence erupted in 1949. Indeed, *The Leader*, a prominent Indian paper in Durban alleged that certain native trading interests organized the racial disturbances (Webber, 1975: 27). That competition was a key variable in the riots can also be seen in the fact that the government amended the Motor Carrier Transportation Act in the aftermath of the violence. This amendment granted local authorities permission to take away licences from established Indians and enable Africans to operate their own buses (Webber, 1975:13).

Bergesen and Herman's study of the Los Angeles riots of 1992 revealed that much of the violence was concentrated in locales of mixed ethnic and racial composition rather than in areas that were overwhelmingly African-American (Bergesen and Herman, 1998). Indeed, in many areas of Los Angeles County, especially in South Central, African-Americans, Hispanics and Koreans competed in the small business arena. African-Americans in particular often found it difficult to obtain bank loans to finance their business ventures. They could not compete on an even footing with the Koreans, questioned the source of Korean money and often perceived the group as receiving preferential treatment. The

senior editor of an African-American newspaper charged, “The Asians who have literally taken over certain businesses in the black community have the decided advantage because from all indications, the banks are making special dispensations in order to make loans to these newcomers to this nation.” (Cheng and Espiritu (1989). An African-American in South Central concurred, “I fought in the Jungles of Vietnam. My ancestors picked cotton for the white man. What did we get? Nothing. Now, these Orientals come in with nothing but green cards and they get everything.”¹⁷

On a related note, in a study that compared clashes between African-Americans and Koreans in Los Angeles, Chicago and New York, Kim (1999) found that the riots in Chicago were milder and less intense compared to the other two cities. The relative racial homogeneity of the Koreans’ clientele in Chicago as opposed to more racially diverse clientele in Los Angeles and New York emerged as a critical variable in explaining spatial and temporal variations of violence in the three cities (Kim, 1999).

Competition for scarce resources was also a critical factor in anti-Vietnamese violence in several fishing villages around the Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia in the 1990s. The Vietnamese were resented for having more advanced tools and skills to fish with and for alleged connivance with corrupt officials. As one irate Khmer villager noted, “Too many Vietnamese fish here and they use modern equipment. They use fishing nets which have a small mesh so they can catch even the small fish. This reduces the amount of fish in the lake. The fishing law doesn't allow fishermen to use a net which has a mesh smaller than four

¹⁷ “Ethnic lines blur as looting continues,” *Hamilton Spectator* (Ontario, Canada), May 1, 1992.

centimetres. But the Vietnamese can still use it because they give money to the fishing police” (Derks, 1996). Moreover, Derks observes that Khmer attitudes towards the Vietnamese in general tend to be more tolerant when economic relations between the groups are more complementary rather than conflictual (Derks, 1996).

The above cases clearly indicate that local level ethnic competition was a critically important factor in igniting violence against entrepreneurial ethnic minorities. Hence, elite rhetoric that accentuated the differences of “ethnic outsiders” frequently found support in regions where local grievances against such groups abounded. Many a time, local business and trading groups found themselves sidelined and unable to compete in the face of organized entrepreneurial minority networks. Such groups were often accused of being in collusion with corrupt local officials and were also resented for what were perceived as “undesirable” business practices. Hence, the pattern that emerges from riots in locales such as Durban, Odessa and Los Angeles bears striking similarities to the anti-Chinese violence that engulfed several Indonesian districts ranging from Tasikmalaya in West Java to Makassar in South Sulawesi.

Activation of Economic Scapegoating against Other Entrepreneurial Ethnic Minorities

Chapters six and seven demonstrated that projections of the Chinese as opportunistic economic exploiters were more likely to incite violence in urban locales where symbols of Chinese affluence were highly conspicuous. Moreover,

these visible markers were potentially more explosive in poorer areas where the contrast between wealth and poverty was starker.

A closer examination of some of the other cases of violence against entrepreneurial minorities reveals similar patterns. During the anti-Jewish pogroms of Russia in 1881, violence was more likely in the eight *Guberniia* (provinces) in the Pale of Settlement with the highest rates of industrial growth (Aronson, 1980). As a consequence of this industrialization, millions of rural peasants had flocked to the urban areas of these provinces in search of a better future. However, as the economy deteriorated by the 1880s, living conditions worsened in the cities and urban poverty increased as large numbers of contract workers were rendered unemployed (Aronson, 1990: 112). In a climate of economic flux, Jewish dominance as moneylenders and providers of essential commodities was increasingly resented. As Aronson notes, in many of the towns, the Jews “had become more economically visible than ever, establishing new stores, shops, mills, and factories, and buying and building new, fancy homes.” Thus, in a pattern reminiscent of anti-Chinese rioting in several Indonesian cities, the visible wealth of the Jews made them increasingly vulnerable to the wrath of the urban poor in towns such as Kiev, Odessa, Kherson and others in the summer of 1881 (Aronson, 1980).

In the Bessarabian city of Kishinev, the economic influence of the Jews was very visible at the time of the pogrom in 1903. Over 75% of factories in Kishinev were owned by the Jewish community who also controlled numerous businesses including flour mills, wineries, tobacco processing plants, trading companies and credit and loan agencies (Judge, 1992: 26). Due to rapid but

uneven economic development, Kishinev had become a city of marked social contrasts by the turn of the century with pockets of affluence interspersed with increasing poverty. Indeed, as the pogrom swept through the city, the worst affected areas were Jewish neighborhoods in the less wealthy sections of upper Kishinev and the impoverished neighborhoods of lower Kishinev (Judge, 1992: 74). Likewise, nearly identical conditions prevailed in the port city of Odessa, the locus of one of the most destructive anti-Jewish pogroms in Russia in 1905. Weinberg estimates that the Jews in Odessa controlled over 80% of the export trade in grain products and owned approximately half of the large stores and trading firms in the city. Moreover, 13 of the 18 banks in Odessa had Jewish board members and directors (Weinberg, 1991: 252).

Berlin was one of the worst affected cities during Kristallnacht in 1938. Within Berlin, the areas of Unter den Linden, Kurfürstendamm, Tauentzienstrasse and Alexanderplatz, where the glitziest and most fashionable Jewish stores were located, suffered particularly heavy damage as the mob systematically plundered Jewish stores while non-Jewish shops were deliberately left intact (Read and Fisher, 1989:70). The Israel Department Store near Alexanderplatz, one of the largest and oldest retail establishments in Europe was “raided and wrecked” whilst being watched by a large crowd (Gilbert, 2006: 50).

In a study that compares the extent of anti-Jewish pogroms in Bulgaria and Romania just before the Holocaust, the intensity of violence was found to be much greater in Romania (Brustein and King, 2004a). The authors note that popular stereotypes of the inordinate affluence of the Jews elicited less resentment in Bulgaria, as the Jews did not disproportionately dominate key sectors of the

economy. An economic survey conducted in 1939 revealed that Bulgarian Jews did not stand out as being possessors of extravagant wealth. Large-scale financiers, industrialists and merchants were rare and only a handful of Bulgarian Jews gained international economic visibility (Brustein and King, 2004b). Further, only 5% of doctors and less than 3% of lawyers were of Jewish origin (Brustein and King, 2004a).¹⁸ In contrast, in Romania, it was much easier to fuel notions of economic anti-Semitism as Jews were heavily over-represented in many key professions. Jews comprised less than 5% of the Romanian population, but according to data released in June 1937, more than 80% of engineers in textiles, 70% of journalists and over half of all doctors in the Army Medical Corps were Jewish (Brustein and King, 2004b). The dominance of Jews was even more skewed in Bucharest as the group made up nearly 80% of all bank employees and over 90% of brokers on the Bucharest Stock Exchange (Brustein and Ronnkvist, 2002). Further, Jews also served as intermediaries between landowners and peasants and as moneylenders and represented a growing middle class in Romania. Thus, given such overwhelming economic clout, Romanian anti-Semites had little difficulty in building a strong case against Jewish economic influence.

Visible wealth also played a key role in precipitating violence against entrepreneurial minorities in other parts of the world as well. In May 1969, as the Malaysian city of Kuala Lumpur was engulfed by violent rioting, markers of Chinese prosperity were frequently targeted by Malay rioters. Along Jalan Hale,

¹⁸ In the late 1930s, most Bulgarian Jews were likely to be employed as craftsmen and petty traders. Jews were concentrated in a few key economic activities, notably in the import and export of dairy products, fruit, soap and clothing. However, even in these endeavours, Jews never established the kind of dominance exhibited by their counterparts in several other European countries (Brustein and King, 2004b).

local Malays who were in debt to Chinese shopkeepers selectively destroyed many Chinese shops. In nearby Kampung Padang, a predominantly Malay area, a row of newly built shophouses was completely gutted by rioters. The row consisted of 20 shophouses of which the Chinese owned 19. The sole Malay owned property was the only one that was spared destruction (Slimming, 1969: 34-43). The following short dialogue epitomizes the extent of Malay bitterness at Chinese dominance: A prominent Chinese businessman told a Malay official, "If it weren't for the Chinese, you Malays would be sitting on the floor without tables and chairs." The official retorted, "If I knew I could get every damned Chinaman out of the country, I would willingly go back to sitting on the floor."¹⁹

The economic influence of the Koreans was much resented in South Central Los Angeles. The Koreans own over 70% of gas stations in South Central as well as a significant number of small markets and liquor stores (Cheng and Espiritu, 1989; Koch and Schockman, 1994). As the 1992 riot gathered pace, urban looters selectively targeted many Korean-American stores (Morrison and Lowry, 1993).²⁰ "They are burning the Orientals out of LA and that's the way it should be," remarked one African-American who strolled past vandalized buildings.²¹

In the anti-Indian riots of Fiji in 2000, impoverished Fijian looters actively sought symbols of Indian economic dominance. For instance, the Indian owned Foodtown Supermarket, one of the largest in downtown Suva was

¹⁹ "Preparing for a Pogrom," *Time Magazine*, July 18, 1969.

²⁰ Also see Charles Bremner, "Korean community feels the force of black resentment," *New York Times*, May 2, 1992.

²¹ "Ethnic lines blur as looting continues," *Hamilton Spectator* (Ontario, Canada), May 1, 1992.

ransacked and burnt resulting in damages estimated at over 6 million US dollars.²² Further, much rioting was also concentrated along Waimanu Road in Central Suva where several leading Indian business enterprises were set ablaze.²³

The above examples reveal that in many of the cases local level economic grievances against various entrepreneurial groups spilled over into violence in neighborhoods where signs of wealth and economic dominance of the minority group were highly visible. Further, such symbols elicited particular resentment in poorer localities where their impact was likely to be greater. Hence, it is clear that the broad patterns through which economic grievances escalate into local level violence bear strong resemblance to the findings from Indonesia.

Activation of Religious Scapegoating against Other Entrepreneurial Ethnic Minorities

Evidence from Indonesia revealed that stereotyped images of the Chinese as non-Moslem proselytizers bent on holding the Moslems back were more likely to gain purchase in locales with dense Moslem networks and in places associated with a high density of sites of non-Moslem worship. Thus, local controversies over the construction of grandiose churches in predominantly Moslem villages, allegations of unauthorized congregations and conversions reinforced deeply embedded notions of the Chinese, increased the perceived threat to local villagers and provided focal points for violent mobilization, especially during times of social turmoil.

²² Tony Wall, "Guests' of 120 years fear for their lives," *The New Zealand Herald*, May 23, 2000.

²³ Delaibatiki Nemani, "Millions lost in rioting madness," *Waikato Times* (Hamilton), May 22, 2000.

Very similar trends can be observed in several cases discussed in this chapter. In the city of Kishinev, much of the Christian religious leadership did not hide their dislike of Jews and often viewed the group as an evil force attempting to subjugate Christian Masses. At the time of the riot in 1903, tensions in Kishinev were further escalated by wild rumors of blood libel -alleged religious killing of Christian youth by Jews for ritual purposes. The murder of a Christian boy in nearby Dubossary was widely publicized as unequivocal evidence of nefarious Jewish religious practices and amplified the anger of uneducated Christian masses already given to prejudice against Jews (Judge, 1992: 39-45).²⁴ The religious element in the riot was unmistakable and Jewish properties bearing religious symbols were carefully selected for destruction. Further, many Christians chalked up large crosses or holy icons on their shop windows and doors and these were left untouched by the rampaging mob (Judge, 1992: 51).

In Russian Poland, a frequent source of tension between the Jews and the Poles centered around the issue of *eruv*s. An *eruv* refers to the legal aggregation of separate parcels of property into a single parcel under Jewish religious property law. Often, the aggregation was done by placing poles around the perimeters of the designated territory which were then connected by some sort of wire at the top. Such an enclosed space was necessary to enable Jews to circumvent religious traditions that forbade the carrying of objects between private and public domains

²⁴ In spite of widespread publicity given to the boy's murder as a case of blood libel, there was no conclusive evidence that it was carried out by Jews or as ritual practice. Indeed, an autopsy established that the boy died of multiple of stab wounds and his body bore no evidence of prick-holes from which blood could have been drained. A few leading officials in the city belatedly took steps to set the story straight and indeed published retractions in leading newspapers. However, these claims were dismissed by many locals as a mere cover-up issued under pressure from influential Jews (Judge, 1992: 45).

during religious holidays (Ochs, 1991: 172). The location of *eruvs* and alleged unauthorized changes in direction often caused friction between the Jews and their Gentile neighbours. Indeed, tensions in the district of Gostyn in 1882 and riots in the city of Plock in June 1903 were largely caused due to alleged modifications of the boundaries of an *eruv* by Jewish religious leaders without appropriate permission from relevant local authorities (Ochs, 1991: 172).

The prominence of Vietnamese religious symbols often played a vital role in violent anti-Vietnamese outbursts in Cambodia. For example, the proliferation of non-Khmer sites of religious worship was a source of acrimony in Kompong Chhnang. As one villager remarked, “When foreigners come here, they don't see the Khmer customs, they only see the Vietnamese customs. They will think this is a Vietnamese country. Not just me, but all Khmers think like I do. I want the Vietnamese to stop building pagodas. They have to follow Khmer customs” (Derks, 1996).

Religious tensions were also at the forefront of anti-Indian riots in Burma in 1938. The riots were triggered by large scale protests against the publication of a book containing sacrilegious comments about Burmese Buddhists. The violence also occurred against the backdrop of increasing Moslem immigration from India, a consequence of which was a sharp rise in intermarriage between Indian Moslem men and Burmese Buddhist women. In accordance with Moslem Personal Law, Buddhist women who married Moslem men had to convert in order to be recognized as the lawful spouse and this fostered much unease and resentment amongst Burmese Buddhist nationalists (Yegar, 1972: 33). As the violence spread from Rangoon to the outer areas, local level tensions spilled over and religious

symbols of Indian Moslems were deliberately targeted; an estimated 113 mosques around the country were vandalized or destroyed and many Buddhist monasteries served as focal points of mobilization for the mob (Yegar, 1972: 37).

The cases discussed above demonstrate that elite rhetoric that accentuated the religious distinctiveness of entrepreneurial minorities acquired particular resonance in places where local level religious tensions were prominent. For instance, in several locales, the increasing visibility of religious symbols –ranging from the construction of Jewish eruvs in Russian Poland to Vietnamese pagodas in Cambodian villages- inflamed local sensibilities and magnified the perceived threat posed by the “other.” Thus, local level dynamics aggravating the likelihood of violence were very similar to those seen in Indonesian districts like Situbondo and Rengasdengklok where there was concern amongst the more exclusivist Moslems about the illegal construction and expansion of Chinese dominated churches in pious Moslem towns.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to build on the patterns of anti-Chinese violence uncovered in chapters six and seven by extending the analysis to cases of violence against several other entrepreneurial minority groups. To facilitate a direct comparison with the late *New Order* anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia, only groups that conformed to the definition of an “entrepreneurial ethnic minority” (as established in chapter one) were considered. Moreover, the discussion was restricted to severe and widespread outbursts of rioting that occurred in the backdrop of general social and political turbulence. This provided ample openings

for opportunistic elites in the “host society” to launch virulent campaigns of scapegoating against vulnerable minority groups in an endeavour to deflect attention from themselves during times of social crisis. The nature of scapegoating was largely congruent across groups and was carried out for the most part by manipulative elites through the politicization of perceived economic dominance, religious difference and racial distinctiveness of the concerned group. Further, in each of the cases discussed, there were substantial geospatial variations in the patterns of violence within the group in spite of most group members being broadly susceptible to elite-orchestrated campaigns of scapegoating. Thus, the cases selected for analysis here followed an almost identical trajectory to the path experienced by the Chinese in Indonesia, thereby enabling a more meaningful, focused and nuanced comparison across groups.

The findings from Indonesia clearly highlighted the complex and interconnected nature of anti-Chinese disturbances and privileged an explanation based on the interaction between macro-structural factors and the micro-foundations of violence. Likewise, this chapter has clearly demonstrated the salience of intertwined local conditions in explaining differences in the spatial trajectories of violence against groups ranging from the Jews in Russia in 1881 to the Koreans in Los Angeles in 1992.

As with the Chinese in Indonesia, scapegoating magnified the possibility of violence when economic, ethnic and religious attributes invoked in such scapegoating resonated at the local level in a variety of context-bound ways. First, the projection of entrepreneurial groups as ethnically/racially distinctive non-citizens was especially problematic in areas where the degree of competition

between these “outsider” groups and dominant local groups was particularly intense. Such ethnic competition was often heightened by the increasing marginalization of local ethnic groups who could not compete effectively with the vastly superior ethnic networks of groups such as the Jews in Moldavia or the Indians in Durban. Second, the portrayal of entrepreneurial groups as avaricious economic exploiters was more likely to lead to violence in locales where ostentatious markers of prosperity associated with such groups were abundant. Third, stereotyped images that invoked religious differences of entrepreneurial groups increased the prospect of conflict in places where local level religious disputes heightened the threat perceived by dominant native groups. In several cases, such local antagonisms took the shape of increasing proliferation of religious symbols associated with the “other,” allegations of unauthorized congregations and charges of dubious religious practices.

Therefore, this chapter has patently demonstrated the generalizability the theoretical framework established in the dissertation to account for spatial variations in anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia in the late 1990s. In other words, it is evident that the framework is not unique to the Indonesian-Chinese, but can also be applied to explain geospatial disparities in violence across other entrepreneurial minority groups exhibiting similar characteristics.

CHAPTER NINE

Conclusion

This chapter comprises five sections. The first section summarizes the main arguments of the study. The second section outlines the dynamics in a few key regions in Indonesia where anti-Chinese violence did not occur and identifies potential limitations of the study. The third section briefly discusses the status of the Chinese in Indonesia in the post-Suharto era. The fourth section highlights the contribution of this study and the final section points the way to future research and identifies potential lines of enquiry.

Summary of Arguments

This dissertation has endeavored to understand under what circumstances elite induced campaigns of ethnic scapegoating lead to violence against targeted groups. At a conceptual level, the study sought to investigate this puzzle by looking at violence against entrepreneurial ethnic minorities – a widely scapegoated category of people. At an empirical level, anti-Chinese violence in the late *New Order* Indonesia was examined, given that it is a particularly prominent exemplar of the above conceptual category.

Much of the violence against ethnic entrepreneurs tends to be explained from the vantage point of scapegoating. In other words, most studies opine that during national crises, self-interested and calculating elites attempt to deflect attention from themselves by attributing blame on economically dominant, politically marginalized and racially/religiously distinctive minority groups.

However, as demonstrated throughout this study, elite orchestrated campaigns of scapegoating do not always trigger violence; even where violence erupts, significant spatial variations abound in the trajectory of rioting within the targeted group. Such empirical anomalies hint strongly at the erratic impact of ethnic scapegoating and suggest that caution needs to be exercised in using scapegoating as an overarching analytical framework. Further, it also raises an intriguing and highly salient question for students of collective violence: when are opportunistic and systematic campaigns of elite blame-mongering likely to ignite violence against selected groups?

In response to the above question, the central argument advanced in this dissertation is summarized as follows. Large-scale campaigns of ethnic scapegoating typically occur during times of great turmoil and are usually executed by drawing attention to specific attributes associated with the targeted group. For instance, much of the elite vitriol against the Chinese in Indonesia was carried out by projecting the group as 1) non-*Pribumi* outsiders disloyal to Indonesia; 2) wielders of disproportionate economic influence; and 3) non-Moslem conspirators in a predominantly Moslem country. Hence, the nature of scapegoating was highly targeted. However, whether such campaigns translated into violent outbursts against the Chinese or not depended on how the above three attributes were perceived at the local level. In other words, elite portrayals of the Chinese as opportunistic, wealthy, non-Moslem outsiders were more likely to produce violence in neighborhoods where prevailing local conditions amplified the credibility of that elite rhetoric. This in turn magnified the threat perceived by

the local community, provided focal point/s for mobilization and augmented the “scapegoatability” of certain Chinese communities.

The study identified specific mechanisms through which the ethnic, economic and religious dimensions of scapegoating became problematic in a localized context. First, elite rhetoric that focused on the racial distinctiveness of the non-*Pribumi* Chinese was especially volatile in ethnically more polarized locales as the degree of competition - between different *Pribumi* groups on the one hand and between the *Pribumis* and the economically powerful Chinese on the other- was likely to be higher. Moreover, this finding was consistent across both cities and regencies.

Second, projections of the Chinese as avaricious economic exploiters enhanced the “scapegoatability” of the Chinese through two different mechanisms. In cities, the Chinese were especially vulnerable where the contrast between Chinese prosperity and *Pribumi* impoverishment was brought into sharper focus. This was more likely to be the case in poorer urban areas adorned with ostensible markers of Chinese affluence. In contrast, at the regency level, economic resentment against the Chinese was magnified in the more developed rural areas where the benefits of modernization had led to the rise of a newly emerging and increasingly assertive *Pribumi* middle class. As the economic crisis worsened in the late 1990s, the frustrations of this rural middle class mounted as they struggled to hold their own against the economically dominant Chinese.

Third, images of the Chinese as non-Moslem proselytizers were likely to have an explosive impact when exclusivist elements amongst the local Moslem population felt more threatened. Primarily, this occurred through two broad

mechanisms: 1) in locales where sites of religious worship associated with the non-Moslem Chinese were more visible; and 2) in devoutly Moslem regions – known locally as *Kota Santri* – where dense networks of Islamic schools, mosques and associations provided ample focal points for mobilization that exclusivist Moslems were able to exploit. Of the two mechanisms, non-Moslem sites of worship emerged as the stronger predictor of violence in the urban areas (at the city level in general as well as at the neighborhood level in Jakarta) while *Kota Santri* showed greater sensitivity to violent anti-Chinese responses in the more rural areas (at the regency level). Hence, different mechanisms were at work in the activation of religiously flavored scapegoating in cities and regencies.¹

The above brief synopsis has clearly illustrated the multi-faceted and complex nature of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia; hence, the study has highlighted the limitations of “master narratives” or primarily mono-causal explanations of the phenomenon. Much like anti-Semitic resentment in Europe (Brustein and King, 2004a), the roots of anti-Sinicism are many and these multiple dimensions are frequently interwoven into elite narratives that seek to demonize the Chinese. However, this observation could prompt the following question: for scapegoating to be effective, is it necessary to invoke all three elements of the triple minority complex of the Chinese? While much of the scapegoating was composite and encompassed all three dimensions, different elites often emphasized different aspects of “Chineseness.” For instance, religious

¹ Given that the vast majority of all Chinese in Indonesia live in urban areas, it is not surprising that the visibility of non-Moslem sites of worship would be greater in cities (which are much smaller in size and more densely populated). In contrast, dense networks of traditional Islamic schools and charismatic Islamic leaders typically exert a stronger influence in the more rural areas.

leaders like Sumargono gave greater weight to the non-Moslem dimension while *Pribumi* business leaders often emphasized the economic aspect of the Chinese.² Thus, it is certainly possible that anti-Chinese violence could occur without all three elements being invoked as long as relevant local conditions are present to activate whichever attribute/s self-interested elites choose to focus on.

The assertion that most scapegoating is composite leads to a further question; if multiple local mechanisms activate the multi-dimensional nature of scapegoating in a single violent locale, are some of these more important than others in triggering riots? By simulating the probability of violence, chapter six attempted to draw some conclusions on a possible hierarchy of explanatory variables; the extent of visible wealth and greater density of non-Moslem sites of worship emerged as the two strongest predictors at the city level while devoutly Moslem locales undergoing rapid developmental change were most at risk of violence at the regency level.

Dynamics in Peaceful Regions

This dissertation has focused on establishing causal mechanisms that lead to anti-Chinese riots in some places; hence, much of the empirical evidence assembled in chapters six and seven were drawn from violent locales rather than through a detailed analysis of the “dogs that did not bark.” Here, I seek to redress that balance by looking at a few key sites where anti-Chinese violence did not occur and attempt to situate them in the context of my theoretical framework.

² See chapter five for more details.

Yogyakarta: Peace in the Heartland of Java

Yogyakarta, a bustling city of approximately half a million people, is situated in the central part of Java and renowned as a vibrant center of Javanese fine art and culture. The city also boasts an enviable reputation for its academic excellence and indeed has frequently been referred to as the “Boston of Indonesia”.³

What sets Yogyakarta apart is the almost complete absence of violence against the ethnic Chinese in the late *New Order*, in spite of the Chinese comprising approximately 5% of the city’s total population (Susanto, 2006). Aside from being the only major urban center in Java where the Chinese were untouched, Yogyakarta is a particularly intriguing case to examine for several reasons. First, as inhabitants of a well connected metropolis, Yogyakartaans were significantly exposed to anti-Chinese rhetoric from self-interested elites. Second, some of the local conditions identified in this dissertation as predictors of anti-Chinese violence were present in Yogyakarta. For instance, the density of Christian churches (both Catholic and Protestant) in the city was considerably higher than most violent cities included in the study.⁴ Further, the Chinese, as in most other places, dominated key sectors of the economy (Koning, 2007; Panggabean and Smith, 2008). Third, the absence of rioting in Yogyakarta is especially significant given that nearby Surakarta –a city that Yogyakarta has

³ Interview with an academic from the University of Gadjah Mada University, May 19th, 2006. The comparisons with Boston are drawn primarily due to the presence of several high quality universities in the city including the University of Gadjah Mada, Indonesian Institute of the Arts - Yogyakarta, Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta, Universitas Islam Indonesia and Universitas Sanata Dharma,

⁴ The density of Christian churches in Yogyakarta (by area) was approximately 2.5 times higher than the average for all violent cities and almost 3 times as high for all cities included in the dataset.

much in common with – exploded into an orgy of anti-Chinese violence lasting several days in May 1998.⁵ For these reasons, peace in Yogyakarta merits closer examination.

As noted, Yogyakarta contains numerous churches. However, in contrast with several other locales, the association of the Chinese community with sites of Christian worship is considerably less pronounced here. This is partly due to the highly visible and influential roles that some *Pribumi* elements (in particular, several Javanese businessmen) have played in church congregations.⁶ Therefore, despite the high density of Christian worship, exclusivist Moslems' deeply embedded notions of Chinese Christian dominance found less resonance here.

It is correct to assert that the Chinese had a powerful economic presence in the city; however, the extent of direct competition between the Chinese and the *Pribumi* was not as marked and clearly delineated as in some other cities given that the two groups were primarily involved in different sectors of the economy. The Chinese were mostly vehicle dealers, owners of electronics and heavy machinery and goldsmiths. In contrast, most *Pribumi* dominated public transport, restaurant and batik industries. Therefore, group relations were less fraught with tension; moreover, there was little sign of Chinese encroachment into traditionally *Pribumi* dominated industries (Susanto, 2006). Further, a significant percentage of

⁵ Similarities between Yogyakarta and Surakarta are striking. They are both located in close proximity to each other (60 kilometers away) in the Central Javanese heartland and are roughly equal in size. Further, both cities have similar demographic profiles and are renowned for rich cultural heritage, notable universities and economically dominant Chinese populations (Panggabean and Smith, 2008). While Yogyakarta managed to remain conspicuously peaceful in May 1998, Surakarta was particularly hard hit by the riots with some observers claiming that the per capita intensity of violence was even greater than in Jakarta (O'Rourke, 2002: 100; Panggabean and Smith, 2008).

⁶ Interview with Lathiful Khuluq, PhD candidate in Social Work at McGill University and native of Yogyakarta, on June 16, 2008.

the Chinese belonged to lower or middle-income categories, most of whom lived in the *Pribumi* dominated lower middle class neighborhoods; this meant that horizontal inequalities between the groups were less apparent.

The above account illustrates how potentially explosive variables were dampened by contextual factors peculiar to Yogyakarta. Moreover, traditional leadership, a variable not addressed in the dissertation, also played a role in mitigating anti-Chinese rioting in the city. Yogyakarta was accorded the status of “Special Region” in Indonesia in 1950 and is governed by the King of Yogyakarta (also referred to as the Sultan).⁷ The Sultan, as the cultural/political leader of the region is a highly venerated figure and was influential in diffusing potential violence in May 1998. Given its prominence as a university town, Yogyakarta was central to the student demonstrations that swept the country in the lead-up to Suharto’s resignation. As a massive demonstration in front of the busiest commercial sector of the city turned increasingly unruly on May 15, 1998, the Sultan appeared and addressed the masses. “I respect your struggle for reform. But you should not choose violent means. If you keep order, I’ll always be here to support your aspirations.” Captivated by the Sultan’s commanding presence and soothing demeanor, the crowd dispersed peacefully and several Chinese business enterprises were spared (Purdey, 2006; Panggabean and Smith, 2008).

⁷ In support of Indonesia’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1945, the Sultan of Yogyakarta declared his Sultanate as a part of the new republic and subsequently played a pivotal role in the ensuing national liberation struggle against the Dutch. In recognition of the Sultan’s role, Yogyakarta was granted the status of “Special Region” in 1950 and the Sultan was recognized as the governor of the region.

Large Chinese Communities in Peaceful Riau

Several districts in the province of Riau Archipelago⁸ contain significant Chinese populations. On average, the Chinese comprise approximately 10% of the total provincial population, significantly higher than the national average (Ananta, 2006).⁹ Yet, most districts such as Karimun, Batam, Riau Islands and Natuna did not experience anti-Chinese rioting at all in the late *New Order*.

Ethnographic studies have demonstrated that the socio-economic status of the Chinese in the Riau Archipelago is less dominant than elsewhere in the country. Notable trends exist in terms of education and employment. Over 43% of all Chinese in the province failed to complete primary education and only 13% completed high school education and beyond. These figures compare unfavorably with province-wide averages of 34% and 30% respectively. Similarly, 42% of the Chinese were employed in higher socio-economic strata, which compares adversely with 68% for the Batak and 58% each for the Javanese and Minang ethnic groups (Ananta, 2006, Ananta et al., 2008).¹⁰ Thus, horizontal inequalities were certainly present in Riau; but given that the Chinese were at the wrong end of these discrepancies, they posed less of a threat to the community.

It is also interesting to note that most Chinese in the Riau Archipelago are Buddhists. On average, 35% of all Chinese across Indonesia are Christians. However, this figure drops down to less than 7.5% in Riau with the Buddhists comprising 84% of all Chinese in the region (Ananta et al., 2008). At first blush,

⁸ Riau Archipelago was originally a part of the Riau Province before it was split off as a separate province in July 2004.

⁹ Data based on the Year 2000 Population Census.

¹⁰ Ananta (2006) defines employment in the formal sector as employment in the higher socio-economic strata. All group level percentages were calculated using raw data from the Year 2000 Population Census.

this suggests that Buddhist Chinese are less vulnerable than Christian Chinese to be targeted by exclusivist Moslems. While this pattern needs to be investigated further, it is certainly plausible that Buddhist Chinese present less of an existential threat to exclusivist Moslems, whose resentment against Christians was conditioned by the disproportionate influence accorded to the latter by the *New Order* regime and also by allegations of illegal conversions by Christian missionaries.

This brief discussion on key peaceful regions has underscored that they can be broadly accommodated within the theoretical framework advanced here. In both Yogyakarta and Riau, the degree of ethnic competition vis-à-vis the Chinese was not as intense and contextual factors helped to dampen the non-Moslem nature of the Chinese in both regions. Nonetheless, the discussion has also highlighted a few shortcomings of this study. While chapters six and seven showed how horizontal inequalities (especially when they are weighed in favor of the Chinese) could trigger violent outbursts, such conclusions were not based on detailed group level data at the relevant unit of analysis, unlike Ananta's study of Riau discussed above. The significance of horizontal inequalities was affirmed through evidence from fieldwork and the IFSL survey conducted by the RAND Corporation. Though these sources show unequivocal support for the harmful effect of horizontal inequalities, the study would have been strengthened further by the availability of group level data for key socio-economic indicators. For example, while I had access to data on poverty at city, regency and neighborhood

levels, the data was based for the unit of analysis as a whole and not for each ethnic group within the unit.¹¹

The central question of this study focused on when elite entrepreneurs incited violence against the Chinese; yet, the role of the Sultan in Yogyakarta revealed that influential local leaders might also have a role in diffusing tensions. Thus, traditional leadership emerged as a potentially crucial variable in Yogyakarta. While I managed to collect data on associational activity and other forms of local organizations, it was difficult to obtain systematic data on the impact of local leaders in negating tensions, given the politically sensitive nature of this research. Moreover, given the historically unique circumstances under which the Sultan of Yogyakarta gained preeminence, the generalizability of this type of leadership to other regions of the country is quite limited.

Ethnic Chinese in post-Suharto Indonesia

This section briefly discusses the status of the ethnic Chinese in the decade since the bloody riots of the late *New Order*. The political landscape of Indonesia has transformed remarkably since the fall of Suharto in May 1998. The post-Suharto era of *Reformasi* has seen Indonesia embark on a determined path towards greater democratization. This period has thus far been characterized by a more liberal political and social climate and substantial decentralization of power

¹¹ Much of the socio-economic data used in this study was obtained from various publications of the Indonesian Statistics Bureau (BPS). The unit of analysis for socio-economic data was always the administrative division. Ananta managed to overcome this problem by obtaining raw data from BPS for the Riau Archipelago. I attempted to do the same, but given that I needed group level data for 137 districts and well over 200 neighborhoods in Jakarta, it was not a feasible exercise. Further, as an individual scholar, it is difficult to obtain raw data from BPS without high level contacts.

to the regions. It has also brought about significant changes for the ethnic Chinese minority in the country.

Successive Indonesian regimes after Suharto have acknowledged flagrant injustices meted out to the Chinese in the past and stressed the need to eradicate institutionalized discrimination against the group (Suryadinata, 2001; Coppel, 2003; Freedman, 2003). In this spirit, several anti-Chinese regulations have been repealed. In late 1998, President Habibie passed Presidential Decree No. 26 forbidding the use of the terms *Pribumi* and *non-Pribumi* in all government policy formation, program planning and implementation (Turner and Allen, 2007). Abdurrahman Wahid- who followed Habibie as president in 1999- removed several cultural restrictions against the group,¹² rescinded laws prohibiting the local reproduction of Chinese characters- thereby enabling the publication of Chinese newspapers - and revoked the ban on the Chinese having to use Indonesian sounding names. In 2004, Megawati declared that the Chinese were no longer required to possess a citizenship certificate –SBKRI- to obtain government documents (Turner and Allen, 2007).

The reform period has witnessed a proliferation of Chinese political and socio-cultural activity. After the removal of the Suharto era restrictions on the formation of political parties, several ethnic Chinese based parties quickly emerged (Suryadinata, 2001).¹³ Moreover, the Chinese have also formed numerous non-party based organizations. These have engaged in a diverse array

¹² These included the restoration of Confucianism as an official minority religion, official recognition of the Chinese New Year and revival of the Chinese lion dance (Allen, 2003; Turner and Allen, 2007).

¹³ These include the Indonesian Chinese Reform Party, Indonesian Assimilation Party, Indonesian Citizen-Nation Party and Indonesian Unity in Diversity Party. See Suryadinata, 2001 for more details.

of activities that range from the promotion of educational and socio-cultural rights to the rehabilitation of victims of state violence. Some organizations have also established horizontal linkages with the overseas Chinese diaspora, both in the region and beyond (Giblin, 2003; Nagata, 2003). The emergence of an energetic new media has been another defining feature in the reform years. The increasing media freedom has inevitably led to a surge in Chinese language publications including dailies, magazines and tabloids (Allen, 2003; Pandiangan, 2003).

These changes have given Chinese Indonesians an opportunity to have greater public voice through diverse outlets. As Coppel (2003) notes, the Chinese have spoken out vocally against violence and racial discrimination and demanded the right to express their “Chineseness.” Moreover, the new media has allowed old debates, brutally silenced during the *New Order*, to resurface. Before the crackdown by the Suharto regime, different Chinese groups were involved in a heated debate on whether to assimilate or integrate into the Indonesian polity. In the *Reformasi* era, these debates have been resurrected and a vibrant discourse has taken place on what it means to be Chinese in a rapidly changing Indonesia (Pandiangan, 2003; Purdey, 2003; Turner, 2003).

It is quite evident that significant progress has been made in terms of reducing discrimination against the ethnic Chinese. However, it is prudent to interject a note of caution by stating that a lot more work still needs to be done. Some have estimated that over 50 of Indonesia’s current laws and ordinances continue to discriminate against the Chinese and other ethnic and religious minorities (Hoon, 2006; Turner and Allen, 2007). Moreover, the implementation of many of the policy changes enacted has been decidedly patchy at the ground

level. In spite of the Presidential Decree abolishing the *Pribumi-non-Pribumi* distinction, this dichotomy continues to define the way most Indonesians understand “Chineseness” (Turner and Allen, 2007). Many Chinese are still frequently required to produce the citizenship certificate (SBKRI) in order to obtain various official documents, despite Megawati’s (and earlier Habibie’s) explicit instructions to the contrary (Freedman, 2003).

These examples show that legislation alone is inadequate to alter deeply held views, opinions and “unwritten rules” about the ethnic Chinese. With relentless regularity, many old habits and attitudes, solidified through decades of entrenched institutionalized mechanisms- have continued to hold sway (Freedman, 2003; Turner and Allen, 2007). Deep-seated corruption, especially at the local level, also contributes to the soporific implementation of legislation. In many cases, people in positions of authority stand to gain through the enforcement of discriminatory laws and practices against the Chinese. For example, local government officials still routinely exhort the Chinese to fork out substantial amounts of money for the issuance of the aforementioned SBKRI (Freedman, 2003; Purdey, 2005).

Since the riots of the late 1990s, the Chinese have not faced any prolonged outbursts of violence. However, there have been quite a few sporadic attacks against the group in several places across the archipelago, most recently, in the South Sulawesi capital of Makassar in 2006. While the outlook for the Chinese in general has improved in post-Suharto Indonesia, institutional reform has not progressed far enough or fast enough to be able to predict with any degree of confidence that the Chinese will not face any large scale waves of rioting in the

future. As long as the enactment and implementation of reforms remain erratic and self-interested elites persist in having incentives to scapegoat the Chinese, the community will remain threatened, especially during turbulent times of socio-economic upheaval.

Contribution of Study

This dissertation has contributed to the literature on collective violence in several ways. First, the study has highlighted the importance of disaggregating the unit of analysis in conflict studies. Most violent events are often clustered spatially and temporally. Existing research practice often tends to take the whole cluster as a single event (King, 2004). However, by demonstrating the extent of spatial variations in violence within a single group, in the same country and at a single point in time, this study underscores the dangers of such homogenization and illustrates the importance of delving “inside” the violent episode (Kalyvas, 1999; Petersen, 2001; Beissinger, 2002; Wood, 2003; Kalyvas, 2006). For instance, this research has shown that even in a city as brutally violent as Jakarta, where over 1,100 people lost their lives in three days, the violence was concentrated in less than 30% of all neighborhoods. Indeed, the existence of peaceful neighborhoods such as Jelambar Baru and Duri Utara (each containing Chinese populations in excess of 30%) reveal that significant pockets of peace do exist side by side even *within* locales experiencing horrific outbreaks of rioting. More so than the nature of violence per se, what is truly fascinating is how some neighborhoods –situated right in the middle of the riot locale- managed to escape completely unscathed while all around them descended into outright anarchy and

lawlessness. Unless the unit of analysis under study is narrowed down to the smallest extent possible, the Duri Utaras and the Jelambar Barus of this world tend to go unnoticed amidst the overwhelming attention devoted to the riot itself. Moreover, disaggregation also has the added benefit of expanding the number of cases available for comparative large-N work and facilitates a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics that lead to violence in some places and not others (King, 2004).

Second, this research has highlighted the salience of local cleavages, pinpointed the drawbacks of focusing solely on broader structural factors and stressed the interaction between macro and micro-foundations of violence (Das, 1990; Tambiah, 1996; Kalyvas, 2003). By emphasizing that violence is more likely when there is a greater congruence between elite rhetoric and relevant local mechanisms, the study has shown how broader structural factors (often invoked in elite campaigns of scapegoating) may either mitigate or exacerbate the probability of violence, depending on how the said factors correspond with local reality. Such an interactive explanation is needed to uncover complex patterns in the riot trajectory. Further, it has exposed the limitations of mono-causal explanations and highlighted the need to develop a multi-faceted explanation for a more complete depiction of the patterns of violence.

Third, the framework employed in this dissertation has attempted to theorize the concept of elite scapegoating. Most studies that focus on violence against entrepreneurial minorities implicitly or explicitly acknowledge the role of scapegoating. Yet, the concept is used too loosely and the question of why scapegoating only sometimes leads to violence is seldom addressed in the

literature. This study has sought to redress that balance by delineating specific mechanisms through which self-interested ethnic entrepreneurs may succeed in inciting violence at the local level.

Directions for Future Research

The final section of this dissertation aims to build on this work by identifying potential lines of inquiry for future research. This study examined under what circumstances opportunistic elites succeed in triggering violence against entrepreneurial ethnic minorities and discovered that violence is more likely when there is a greater congruence between elite rhetoric and local conditions.

Inherently, there is no reason why a similar analytical framework cannot be applied to explain other forms of political violence. For instance, many instrumental expositions of religious violence illustrate how self-interested elites manipulate religion for political gain. Paul Brass argues that religious violence is orchestrated by elements with vested interests through “institutionalized riot systems” (Brass, 1996; 2003; 2004). His argument, while providing a sophisticated narrative of how religiously motivated riots are “produced,” however falls short of explaining spatial variations in violence within the riot locale.¹⁴ In other words, why is it that the “institutionalized riot system” triggers violence only in some parts of the city? The framework advanced here could offer a useful pointer towards explaining spatial variations in religious violence.

¹⁴ As Brass himself acknowledges, in the riot prone city of Aligarh, violence occurred in only 12% of the 241 residential areas in the city (Brass, 2003).

Indeed, there are at least two recent cases where the influence of agent provocateurs in fomenting religious tensions was conspicuous; namely, widespread Hindu-Moslem violence in the western Indian state of Gujarat in 2002 and the equally ferocious Moslem-Christian clashes in the eastern Indonesian province of Maluku in 1999-2000. However, in both cases, there were considerable spatial variations in the patterns of violence within the affected areas.¹⁵ Preliminary research on the two cases shows that violence was more likely in locales where the rhetoric employed by religious provocateurs found resonance with particular local conditions.¹⁶ Therefore, it is plausible that an interactive explanation that takes into account the actions of religious provocateurs on the one hand and relevant local mechanisms on the other is best placed to delineate geospatial disparities within the “riot episode.” Thus, the framework advanced in this study might be a promising tool in uncovering the micro-foundations of religious violence.

¹⁵ In Gujarat, much of the violence was concentrated in the cities of Ahmedabad, Rajkot, Vadodara, Sabarkantha and Mehsana (Jaffrelot, 2003). In Maluku, on the other hand, riots were primarily concentrated on the islands of Ambon, Seram, Buru, Tual and Manipa and in a few selected locales in North Maluku province (van Klinken, 2001; Bertrand, 2002; Wilson, 2008).

¹⁶ Typically, many anti-Moslem diatribes in Gujarat were couched in terms of Moslem “values” being a threat to the Hindutva ideology, by generating anxieties of illegal conversions and tying Moslems to rampant fears of terrorism in a post- 9/11 climate. Preliminary research reveals that several of the worst affected neighborhoods in Ahmedabad contained prominent mosques and religious schools (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

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APPENDIX A

List of Cities

Table Appendix A.1: List of Cities/*Kotamadya* included in the Urban District Level Dataset

Province	Violent Cities/ <i>Kotamadya</i>	Severity of Violence ¹	Peaceful Cities/ <i>Kotamadya</i>
Aceh			Banda Aceh
Bali			Denpasar
Bangka Belitung			Pangkal Pinang
Banten	Kota Tangerang	3	Cilegon
DKI Jakarta	Jakarta Barat (West Jakarta)	3	
	Jakarta Pusat (Central Jakarta)	3	
	Jakarta Selatan (South Jakarta)	3	
	Jakarta Timur (East Jakarta)	3	
	Jakarta Utara (North Jakarta)	3	
Jambi			Jambi
Jawa Barat (West Java)	Kota Bandung	2	Kota Bogor
	Kota Bekasi	1	Kota Cirebon
			Kota Sukabumi
Jawa Tengah (Central Java)	Kota Pekalongan	2	Kota Magelang
	Kota Semarang	2	Salatiga
	Surakarta (Solo)	3	
Jawa Timur (East Java)	Kota Malang	1	Kota Blitar
	Kota Pasuruan	2	Kota Kediri
	Kota Probolinggo	2	Kota Madiun
	Surabaya	2	Kota Mojokerto

¹ Severity of Violence is coded from 0-3: 0= No violence; 1= Low Violence; 2= Intermediate levels of Violence; 3= Severe Violence.

Kalimantan Barat (West Kalimantan)			Kota Pontianak
Kalimantan Selatan (South Kalimantan)			Banjarmasin
Kalimantan Timur (East Kalimantan)			Balikpapan Samarinda Tarakan
Lampung	Bandar Lampung	2	
	Metro	2	
Nusa Tenggara Barat (West Nusa Tenggara)			
Nusa Tenggara Timur (East Nusa Tenggara)	Kota Kupang	1	Mataram
Riau			Batam Dumai Pekan Baru
Sulawesi Selatan (South Sulawesi)	Ujung Pandang (Makassar)	3	Pare Pare
Sulawesi Tengah (Central Sulawesi)			Palu
Sulawesi Tenggara (Southeast Sulawesi)	Kota Kendari	2	
Sumatra Barat (West Sumatra)	Padang	1	Bukittinggi Payakumbuh
Sumatra Selatan (South Sumatra)	Palembang	2	
Sumatra Utara (North Sumatra)	Medan	3	Sibolga
	Tanjung Balai	1	Pematang Siantar
	Tebing Tinggi	1	Binjai
Yogyakarta			Kota Yogyakarta

APPENDIX B

List of Regencies

Table Appendix B.1: List of Regencies/*Kabupaten* included in the Rural District Level Dataset

Province	Violent Regencies/ <i>Kabupaten</i>	Severity of Violence ²	Peaceful Regencies/ <i>Kabupaten</i>
Aceh			Aceh Timur
Bali			Buleleng Jembrana Tabanan
Bangka Belitung			Bangka Belitung
Banten	Tangerang	3	
Jambi			Tanjung Jabung Barat
Jawa Barat (West Java)	Bandung	2	
	Cianjur	2	
	Cirebon	2	
	Indramayu	1	
	Karawang	2	
	Kuningan	2	
	Majalengka	2	
	Purwakarta	2	
	Subang	2	
	Tasikmalaya	2	
Jawa Tengah (Central Java)	Brebes	2	Banyumas
	Cilacap	2	Blora
	Kebumen	2	Purbalingga
	Purworejo	1	Temanggung
	Rembang	2	Wonosobo
	Tegal	2	
Jawa Timur (East Java)	Banyuwangi	2	Jombang
	Bojonegoro	1	
	Bondowoso	2	
	Jember	2	

² Severity of Violence is coded from 0-3: 0= No violence; 1= Low Violence; 2= Intermediate levels of Violence; 3= Severe Violence.

	Sidoarjo	1	
	Situbondo	2	
	Tuban	2	
Kalimantan Barat (West Kalimantan)	Pontianak	1	Bengkayang
	Sanggau	2	Kapuas Hulu
			Ketapang
			Landak
			Sambas
			Sintang
Kalimantan Timur (East Kalimantan)			Bulungan
Nusa Tenggara Barat (West Nusa Tenggara)	Bima	2	Lombok Barat
	Lombok Tengah	2	Sumbawa
Nusa Tenggara Timur (East Nusa Tenggara)	Ende	2	Flores Timur
			Manggarai
			Sikka
			Sumba Barat
			Sumba Timur
Riau	Rokan Hilir	2	Bengkalis
			Indragiri Hilir
			Indragiri Hulu
			Karimun
			Kepulauan Riau
			Natuna
			Siak
Sulawesi Selatan (South Sulawesi)	Jeneponto	1	Bone
			Gowa
			Luwu
Sulawesi Tengah (Central Sulawesi)	Donggala	1	Banggai
			Toli-Toli
Sulawesi Tenggara (Southeast Sulawesi)			Kolaka
Sumatra Utara (North Sumatra)	Deli Serdang	1	Asahan
	Simalungun	1	Karo
	Tapanuli Selatan	2	Labuhan Batu
			Langkat
			Nias
Yogyakarta			Sleman

APPENDIX C

List of Neighborhoods in Jakarta

Table Appendix C.1: List of Neighborhoods/*Kelurahan* included in the Jakarta Dataset

District/ <i>Kotamadya</i>	Sub-District/ <i>Kecamatan</i>	Violent Neighborhood/ <i>Kelurahan</i>	Peaceful Neighborhood/ <i>Kelurahan</i>
Jakarta Barat (West Jakarta)	Cengkareng	Rawa Buaya	Cengkareng Barat Cengkareng Timur Duri Kosambi Kapuk Kedaung Kali Angke
	Grogol Petamburan	Grogol Jelambar Tanjung Duren Utara Tomang	Jelambar Baru Tanjung Duren Selatan Wijaya Kesuma
	Kalideres		Kalideres Kamal Pegadungan Semanan Tegal Alur
	Kebon Jeruk	Kedoya Utara	Duri Kepa Kebon Jeruk Kedoya Selatan Kelapa Dua Sukabumi Selatan Sukabumi Utara
	Kembangan	Kembangan Selatan Meruya Utara	Joglo Kembangan Utara Meruya Selatan Srengseng
	Palmerah	Kemanggsian Palmerah	Jati Pulo Kota Bambu Selatan Kota Bambu Utara Slipi

Jakarta Pusat (Central Jakarta)	Taman Sari	Glodok Keagungan Mangga Besar Pinangsia	Krukut Maphar Taman Sari Tangki
	Tambora	Angke Jembatan Besi Jembatan Lima	Duri Selatan Duri Utara Kalianyar Kredang Pekojan Roa Malaka Tambora Tanah Seral Rawa Sari
	Cempaka Putih	Cempaka Putih Barat Cempaka Putih Timur	
	Gambir	Cideng Duri Pulo Kebon Kelapa Petojo Utara	Gambir Petojo Selatan
	Johar Baru	Galur Tanah Tinggi	Johar Baru Kampung Rawa
	Kemayoran	Cempaka Baru Gunung Sahari Sel. Kemayoran Sumur Batu	Harapan Mulya Kebon Kosong Serdang Utan Panjang
	Menteng	Menteng	Cikini Gondangdia Kebon Sirih Pegangsaan
	Sawah Besar	Mangga Dua Selatan Pasar Baru	Gunung Sahari Utara Karang Anyar Kartini
	Senen	Kenari Senen	Bungur Kramat Kwitang Paseban
	Tanah Abang	Bendungan Hilir Kampung Bali	Gelora Karet Tengsin Kebon Kacang

Jakarta Selatan (South Jakarta)	Cilandak	Pondok Labu	Kebon Melati Petamburan
			Cilandak Barat Cilandak Selatan Gandaria Selatan Lebak Bulus
	Jagakarsa		Ciganjur Cipadek Jagakarsa Lenteng Agung Srengseng Sawah Tanjung Barat
	Kebayoran Baru	Pulo	Cipete Utara Gandaria Utara Gunung Kramet Pela Melawai Petogogan Rawa Barat Selong Senayan
	Kebayoran Lama	Grogol Selatan Kebayoran Lama Ut. Pondok Pinang	Cipulir Grogol Utara Kebayoran Lama Sel.
	Mampang Prapatan	Mampang Prapatan	Bangka Kuningan Barat Pela Mampang Tegal Parang
	Pancoran	Kalibata	Cikoko Duren Tiga Pancoran Pengadegan Rawajati
	Pasar Minggu	Pasar Minggu Pejaten Barat	Cilandak Timur Jati Padang Kebagusan Pejaten Timur Ragunan

Jakarta Timur (East Jakarta)	Pesanggrahan	Bintaro	Pesanggrahan Petukangan Selatan Petukangan Utara Ulujami
	Setia Budi		Guntur Karet Karet Kuningan Karet Semanggi Kuningan Timur Menteng Atas Pasar Manggis Setia Budi
	Tebet	Manggarai	Bukit Duri Kebon Baru Manggarai Selatan Menteng Dalam Tebet Barat Tebet Timur
	Cakung	Jatinegara Rawa Terate	Cakung Barat Cakung Timur Penggilingan Pulo Gebang Ujung Menteng
	Cipayung		Bambu Apus Ceger Cilangkap Cipayung Lubang Buaya Munjul Pondok Ranggon Setu
	Ciracas		Cibubur Ciracas Kelapa Dua Wetan Rambutan Susukan
	Duren Sawit	Klender Pondok Bambu Pondok Kopi	Duren Sawit Malaka Jaya Malaka Sari Pondok Kelapa

Jakarta Utara (North Jakarta)	Jatinegara	Bali Mester Cipinang Cempedak Kampung Melayu	Bidara Cina Cipinang Besar Sel. Cipinang Besar Utara Cipinang Muara Rawa Bunga
	Kramat Jati	Cawang Cililitan Kramat Jati	Bale Kambang Batu Ampar Duku Kampung Tengah
	Makasar	Cipinang Melayu	Halim Perdana Kusuma Kebon Pala Makasar Pinang Ranti
	Matraman	Kebon Manggis Pal Meriem Utan Kayu Utara	Kayu Manis Pisangan Baru Utan Kayu Selatan
	Pasar Rebo	Pekayon	Baru Cijantung Gedong Kalisari
	Pulo Gadung	Jati Pulo Gadung Rawa Mangung	Cipinang Jatinegara Kaum Kayu Putih Pisangan Timur
	Cilincing		Cilincing Kali Baru Marunda Rorotan Semper Barat Semper Timur Suka Pura
	Kelapa Gading	Kelapa Gading Barat Pegangsaan Dua	Kelapa Gading Timur
	Kepulauan Seribu		Pulau Kelapa Pulau Panggang

		Pulau Tidung Pulau Untung Jawa
Koja		Koja Lagoa Rawabadak Selatan Rawabadak Utara Tugu Selatan Tugu Utara
Pademangan	Ancol Pademangan Barat	Pademangan Timur
Penjaringan	Kapuk Muara Pejagalan Penjaringan Pluit	Kamal Muara
Tanjung Priok	Kebon Bawang Sunter Agung	Papango Sungai Bambu Sunter Jaya Tanjung Priuk Warakas

APPENDIX D

Summary Statistics

Table Appendix D.1: Summary Statistics – Urban Districts

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev	Minimum	Maximum
Extent of Visible Wealth	56	0.76	0.57	0.07	2.4
Rate of Development	47	-2.19	.63	-2.9	0.7
Competitive Ethnic Groups	55	3.07	1.73	1	7
Density of Devout Cities (by population)	55	45.1	33.84	10.4	155.3
Density of non-Moslem Worship (by population)	55	6.46	6.9	0	35.86
Unemployment	52	11.49	3.23	3	20.3
Availability of Housing Land	56	157.48	208.56	28.78	1405
Economic Growth in 1997	49	3.92	2.55	-3	10.7
Availability of Essential Commodities	56	34.43	1.25	29.28	36
Chinese population	55	3.92	4.46	0.02	23
Traders	56	22.05	5.57	3.53	38.5
Social Gathering	56	1.95	0.07	1.63	2
High School Drop-outs	52	7.05	3.68	1.7	17.4

Table Appendix D.2: Summary Statistics- Rural Districts

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev	Minimum	Maximum
Extent of Visible Wealth	71	0.11	0.12	0.01	0.91
Rate of Development	75	-1.89	0.6	-3	1.5
Competitive Ethnic Groups	81	2.5	1.58	1	6
Density of Devout Cities (by population)	74	183.8	376.4	8.98	2909
Density of non-Moslem Worship (by population)	74	20.6	24.9	0	154
Unemployment	75	4.9	2.45	0.6	11.6
Availability of Housing Land	73	91.27	91.15	9.7	465.4
Economic Growth in 1997	75	3.4	2.67	-10.1	8.5
Availability of Essential Commodities	73	30.6	2.36	23.88	34.8
Chinese population	78	1.61	3.65	0	20.02
Traders	81	18.8	5.88	2.55	31.1
Social Gathering	73	1.8	0.19	1.13	2
High School Drop-outs	75	16.1	9.5	1.3	41.1

Table Appendix D.3: Summary statistics –Neighborhoods in Jakarta

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Extent of Visible Wealth	265	.78	.86	0	2
Competitive Ethnic Groups	265	3.75	.62	2	5
Ethnic Fractionalization	265	.72	.06	.29	.81
Density <i>Kota Santri</i> (area)	265	.22	.23	.008	1.8
Density <i>Kota Santri</i> (population)	265	3.21	1.58	.41	10.73
Density Non Moslem Worship (area)	265	.03	.06	0	.49
Density Non Moslem Worship (population)	265	.32	.34	0	1.77
Chinese Concentration (Chinatowns)	265	.16	.13	0	.73
Availability of Housing Land	265	149.64	122.6	2	695.5
Percentage of Trading Groups	265	22.33	5.33	9.2	36.8
Social Gathering	265	1.07	.58	0	2
Essential Commodities	265	25.8	2.7	12	27
Satisfaction with economic conditions	265	2.05	.45	0	4
Improvement in Healthcare	265	-.72	1.17	-2	2
Trends in High School Attendance	265	-.11	.87	-2	2

APPENDIX E

Research Ethics Certificate



Research Ethics Board Office
McGill University
845 Sherbrooke Street West
James Administration Bldg., rm 419
Montreal, QC H3A 2T5

Tel: (514) 398-6831
Fax: (514) 398-4644
Ethics website: www.mcgill.ca/research/compliance/human/

Research Ethics Board I **Certificate of Ethical Acceptability of Research Involving Humans**

REB File #: 142-0106

Project Title: The effect of socio-economics on patterns of collective violence in Indonesia

Principal Investigator: Suranjan Weeraratne **Department:** Political Science

Status: Ph.D. student

Supervisor: Dr. S. Saideman

Granting Agency and Title (if applicable): N/A

This project was reviewed on 11 January 2006 by

Expedited Review ☒

Full Review ☐

George Wenzel

George Wenzel, Ph.D.
Chair, REB I

Approval Period: January 11, 2006 to January 10, 2007

This project was reviewed and approved in accordance with the requirements of the McGill University Policy on the Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects and with the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct For Research Involving Human Subjects

*All research involving human subjects requires review on an annual basis. A Request for Renewal form should be submitted at least one month before the above expiry date.

*If a project has been completed or terminated and ethics approval is no longer required, a Final Report form must be submitted.

*Should any modification or other unanticipated development occur before the next required review, the REB must be informed and any modification can't be initiated until approval is received.

cc Dr. S. Saideman