Worlds of Protest & Worlds of Dissent:

A Comparison of West German Protest and Czechoslovak Dissent in the 1960s and 1970s.

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Contents.

Abstract (English):

This thesis explores the similarities and dissimilarities between West German protest and Czechoslovak dissent during the 1960s and 1970s. It argues that Jonathan Bolton's conception of Czechoslovak dissent, as one "world" or many different "worlds" of experiences, can be used to fruitfully examine roughly contemporaneous protest movements on the other side of the Iron Curtain during the postwar period. Appealing to Bolton's description of the "worlds of dissent" in Czechoslovakia, this thesis introduces the idea of the "worlds of protest" in West Germany. What is sought is a better understanding of the nature of protest and the nature of dissent as related but distinct forms of political and cultural phenomena. It claims that both West German protest and Czechoslovak dissent were intertwined with a concurrent "crisis of credibility" facing the political and social orders of each country. The oppositional movements, which emerged in West Germany and Czechoslovakia during the 1960s and 1970s, developed critiques of their respective regimes through reflections on the legacies of fascism and Stalinism in each country. This paper further argues that the strength of these critiques was largely derived from the extent to which the movements achieved an accurate understanding of the real nature of the regimes they criticised. While Czechoslovaks achieved a more cogent understanding of Gustáv Husák's Communist regime during the 1970s, West German's were unable to develop as rigorous an understanding of the Federal Republic due to their continued tendency to approach the Bonn regime through reflections on Germany's Nazi past. In general, this thesis contends that investigating West German protest in light of Czechoslovak dissent opens up new avenues for scholarly inquiry, which will allow us to move past the "global narratives of social unrest" that dominate much of the historical literature written on the 1960s and 1968, in particular.

Abstract (French):

Cette thèse explore les similitudes et les différences entre la protestation dans l'Allemagne de l'Ouest et de la dissidence tchécoslovaque entre les années 1960 et 1970. Il soutient que la conception de Jonathan Bolton de la dissidence tchécoslovaque comme un «monde» ou de plusieurs différents «mondes» d'expériences, peut être utilisé pour examiner dans un façon productive les mouvements de protestation plus ou moins contemporains de l'autre côté du Rideau de Fer pendant la période d'Après-Guerre. En appel à la description de Bolton des «mondes de la dissidence» en Tchécoslovaquie, cette thèse introduit l'idée des «mondes» de protestation en Allemagne de l'Ouest. Ce qui est recherché est une meilleure compréhension de la nature de la protestation et de la nature de la dissidence en tant que formes connexes, mais aussi comme deux distinctes phénomènes politiques et culturels. Ça postule que les deux protestation, Allemagne de l'Ouest et de la dissidence tchécoslovaque sont étroitement liés à une «crise de crédibilité» face aux ordres politiques et sociaux de chaque pays. Ces mouvements oppositionnels, qui ont émergés pendant des années 1960 et 1970, ont développés des critiques de leurs régimes respectifs par des réflexions sur les héritages de la fascisme et de la Stalinisme dans chaque pays De plus, il affirme que la force de ces critiques a été largement dérivée de la mesure dans laquelle les mouvements ont obtenu une compréhension exacte de la vraie nature des régimes qu'ils ont critiquer. En conclusion, on verra que les Tchécoslovaques on atteint une compréhension plus convaincante du régime communiste de Gustáv Husák au cours des années 1970, les ouest-allemands étaient incapables de développer une compréhension aussi rigoureuse de leur propre République fédérale en raison de leur tendance d'approcher le régime Bonn à travers du passé nazi de l'Allemagne. En général, cette thèse soutient que l'enquête des protestations de Allemagne de l'Ouest en vue de la dissidence tchécoslovaque ouvre de nouvelles voies pour la recherche académique qui nous permettront d'aller au-delà des «récits mondiaux de désordre sociale» qui dominent une grande partie de la littérature historique écrit sur les années 1960 et 1968 en particulier.

Acknowledgements:

No matter how solitary the writing process inevitably becomes, it cannot be sustained without the continued support, love, and criticism of one's mentors, peers and family. History is ultimately a collaborative discipline, and without the tireless guidance of professor James Krapfl, this thesis would surely consist of a series of blank pages. Over the past two years, professor Krapfl has provided me with direction as I explored the expansive fields of revolutionary thought and modern European history. The number of hours he has spent reading extracts from this thesis, pointing out logical holes and highlighting arguments that should be expanded, are evidence of his unwavering support. Professor Krapfl's input has been invaluable and, his confidence in my ideas and criticism of their early execution has helped shape not only this thesis, but all the work I have produced during my time at McGill University. One could not hope for a better advisor.

The origins of this project date back to my time as an undergraduate student at the University of Glasgow and I must thank professor Maud Bracke for the seminar class she taught on the Global 1960s (in 2008 – 2009). It was professor Bracke who first awakened my passion for studying the history of both Czechoslovakia and West Germany in the postwar period. I would also like to extend my deep gratitude to my fellow Master's student Brad DaBoll-Lavoie who not only agreed to look over the French translation of my abstract, but also consistently provided an academic sounding board for many half-baked ideas about the history of protest and dissent. Also at McGill are professors Laila Parsons, Leonard Moore, and Judith Szapor, each of whom I would like to respectively thank for playing a crucial role in my growth as a history student.

In the course of writing this thesis I have received consistent support and kindness from both friends and family. In particular I would like to thank my roommate Lenny Sharp for putting up with me when the demands of my research left me at my most insufferable, and my dear friend Natasha Chaykowski who has inspired me, kept my sanity in check, and who has, above all else, reminded me how to stay human. Finally, words cannot express the gratitude I feel towards my mother, whose love and support has sustained me throughout all my years as a student. This thesis is dedicated to her.

Preface.

There are works of history that are based upon fresh discoveries made in the archives, and there are those that explore and expand upon the existing secondary literature. This thesis has been conceived in the spirit of the second category. It is primarily concerned with drawing connections between the works of various historians who have examined the postwar experiences of Czechoslovak dissidents and West German protesters as isolated phenomena. At its heart, this work argues that more can be understood about the nature of both dissent and protest by investigating West German protest in light of Czechoslovak dissent. Unsurprisingly, however, this project began with very different research questions in mind. When I first arrived at McGill University in the fall of 2013, I planned to pursue research regarding the transformations of European Marxism during the 1960s. My interest in the history of Marxist thought—and of the 1960s in general—dates back to my time as an undergraduate student at Glasgow University, where I pursued a joint honours degree in both history and philosophy. It had long been my intention to devote myself to research that would finally combine my two academic passions. Of course, most tales grow in the telling, and it quickly became clear that my original intentions were far too ambitious. This realisation ultimately served as a blessing, and there remains much to be valued about the ideas left on the cutting room floor—they help make space for new ones.

While this thesis has taken many different forms, it has continually been compelled by the same motivations: the desire to instigate new discussions on the history of "rebellious thought," the need to move past common narratives written upon the "social unrest" of the 1960s, and the intention to examine countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain together, rather than separately. The final form of this project is indebted to the guidance of my advisor, professor James Krapfl. During the course of numerous conversations, professor Krapfl convinced me of the value of studying the intellectual history of Czechoslovakia, and he continuously encouraged my interests in the lives and thought of Jan Patočka's and Václav Havel. It also was professor Krapfl who, upon reading an early draft of my introduction, pointed out that one of the most interesting aspects of my work was my attempt to apply Jonathan Bolton's insights regarding Czechoslovak dissent to a new context, one that might even stretch beyond West German protest movements.

The historical literature written in English on West German protest movements has expanded significantly in recent years. And the monographs by Nick Thomas and Timothy Scott Brown, dedicated to the study of these protest movements have not only opened up new sets of questions regarding how to approach West European protest movements during the 1960s and 1970s, but they have also provided much of the backbone for this thesis. By highlighting potentially overlooked similarities between Czechoslovak dissent and West German protest, it is my hope that the present work contributes in some way to the new avenues of research being pursued by historians who study both countries. While my experience as both a student of history and philosophy has taught me never to consider any scholarly argument to ever truly be "complete," I have pursued a form of analysis that attempts to raise more questions than it answers—as it remains my belief that attempting to provide more fertile ground for further inquiry is what every academic should strive for.

Introduction.

§ Worlds of Protest & Worlds of Dissent.

When scholars write about the history of West German protest and Czechoslovak dissent during the 1960s and 1970s they usually tell their stories separately. The tales of intellectuals, artists, students and ordinary citizens challenging their respective central European governments remain as divided by the Iron Curtain as the countries were themselves. This division has left any comparison between the twin phenomena of Czechoslovak dissent and West German protest largely unexplored. Such an oversight is hardly surprising. Studies of Czechoslovak dissent focus on the 1970s and 1980s, examining how a variety of movements and independent cultural activity stood in opposition to Gustáv Husák's Communist regime. The historical literature written on West German protest tends to explore the emergence of the country's extra-parliamentary opposition and urban guerrilla movements in the 1960s and 1970s. While historians have made few, if any, specific comparisons of West German protest and Czechoslovak dissent as similar but distinct opposition movements, some scholars of the 1960s have contextualised the reforms of Czechoslovakia's Prague Spring alongside protest movements in Western Europe and North America within global narratives of social unrest often associated with the year 1968.[1] One of the goals of the present analysis is to move beyond these "global narratives of social unrest" and advance a framework under which West German protest and Czechoslovak dissent can be more suitably compared. This paper will argue that an investigation of Czechoslovak experiences of dissent after 1968 can be used to fruitfully examine roughly contemporaneous protest movements on the other side of the Iron Curtain—in this case West German protest in the 1960s and 1970s. The guiding framework for this approach is the application of Jonathan Bolton's conception of the "world" or "worlds of dissent" in Czechoslovakia and the use of this notion to describe West German protest. This will allow us to examine the existence of the "worlds of protest" within the Federal Republic during the 1960s and 1970s. At the centre of the present analysis is the claim that this application

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[1] See Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2003) and Robert V. Daniels, *The Year of the Heroic Guerrilla: World Revolution and Counterrevolution in 1968* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1989).

facilitates a better understanding of the nature of West German protest in particular and perhaps opposi-tional movements in general.

In his book *Worlds of Dissent*, Bolton describes Czechoslovak dissent not just as a "political stance or political theory" but as a "world" which denotes "a form of experience and behaviour...closely tied to daily life."[2] For Bolton, dissent is best conceived of as a "form of culture" and a "style of political behaviour" as well as a "set of common stories" and a "collection of practices" which had meaning "in and of themselves."[3] By extending Bolton's definition of dissent to West German protest we are able to construct several criteria for analysing and comparing dissident and protest movements. These criteria emphasise how the strength of an oppositional movement is largely derived from the movement's understanding of the regime it criticises. Therefore, the ideologies and theories found within the "worlds of protest" and the "worlds of dissent" require investigation in order to discern just how well West German protesters and Czechoslovak dissidents understood their regimes. Important for this analysis of dissent and protest is the recognition of the role played by "thought" in shaping the culture of opposition in both countries, which reinforced particular understandings of the Czechoslovak and West German political and social orders. However, considering that there are obvious geographic and temporal reasons for approaching the history of Czechoslovak dissent and West German protest separately, it is necessary to first explain why a compari-son of the two warrants specific attention.

§ Protest and Dissent in Central Europe.

There are compelling reasons why a comparison between Czechoslovakia and West Germany and their respective protest and dissident movements can be illuminating. At the very least, Czechoslovakia and West Germany were both central European countries which found themselves under competing political and social orders during the 1960s and 1970s. In a sense, they were relatively young states having been re-born after the Second World War as a Soviet-affiliated Communist republic and a western-aligned liberal

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[2] Jonathan Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent: Charter 77, The Plastic People of the Universe, and Czech Culture under Communism* (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 13.
[3] Ibid., p. 45.

democracy. Examining how each state faced substantial opposition from their citizens should open up fruitful lines of inquiry into how differing systems were challenged by dissident and protest movements. Furthermore, Czechoslovakia and West Germany also shared several characteristics that were intertwined with the emergence of these movements themselves. During the 1960s both the Federal Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia began confronting their fascist and Stalinist pasts with the legacies of both being openly debated in each country by the end of the decade. These two countries also shared a complicated relationship with their experiences of democracy during the interwar period. The failure of the Weimar Republic to defend itself against fascism cast a shadow over West Germany's fledgling democracy and in Czechoslovakia the Communist party had attempted to cleanse the nation's democratic past from its memory. As we will see, the perceived instability of West German democracy and the perceived erosion of democratic values in Czechoslovakia combined with the reflections upon each nation's fascist and Stalinist pasts during the 1960s and 1970s to create a "crisis of credibility" within the ruling political and social orders of both countries. It was in relation to such "crises" that dissident and protest movements emerged in Czechoslovakia and West Germany.

Czechoslovakia and West Germany had also once shared the same "central European" cultural and intellectual space before being divided by the Iron Curtain in the postwar period. As Wolf Tietze explains, central Europe's "core" has long been the home of two nations, "the German and the Czech, for about 2000 and 1400 years respectively."[4] The Czech philosopher Karel Kosík also highlights this relationship. He explains that in the German conception of central Europe, the close proximity of the Czech lands to Germany has been regarded as a "national connection that has lasted for centuries" and that with regard to culture, "the Czechs are a German land."[5] Kosík further describes central Europe as a "space in dispute and the space of a dispute—a dispute over what this space really is."[6] This idea can also be found in the Jacques Rupnik's examination of central Europe in 1990, when the phrase was once again in vogue. Rupnik argues that the boundaries of central Europe had been pushed eastward during the twentieth century. This began

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[4] Wolf Tietze, "What is Germany - what is Central Europe ("Mitteleuropa")?," *GeoJournal* vol 19, no. 2 (Sept. 1989), p 175.
[5] Karel Kosík, *The Crisis of Modernity: Essays and Observations From the 1968 era*, ed. James H. Satterwhite (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), p. 153.
[6] Ibid.

during the interwar period where a "new Central Europe" was conceived "not only without Germany but against it."[7] For the postwar period, Rupnik endorses the Polish historian Oscar Halecki's distinction between "West Central Europe" (which included the defeated German powers) and "East Central Europe" which comprised the lands between Germany and Russia but retained clear historical, political and cultural differences from the latter.[8] Kosík's suggestion that central Europe was a disputed space is an attractive idea. However, following Rupnik and Halecki, we might also see central Europe in the postwar period as something of a lost space, one which was divided by the Iron Curtain keeping West Germany and Czechoslovakia within separate realms of influence. What is interesting about this divide, and relevant to the present analysis, is how it affected the self-understanding of both dissidents and protesters during the 1960s and 1970s.

Ideologically, West German protest movements tended to privilege *praxis* or activity over theory in their attempts to challenge the Bonn regime. While they derived much of their self-understanding and self-justification from the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, they also looked beyond central Europe to anti-colonial movements and the western New Left in search of the best ways to transfer such theories into direct action. As we shall see, West Germans drew heavily on the work of Herbert Marcuse and Theodor H. Adorno when criticising what they perceived to be the latent fascism present in the Federal Republic. Particularly important to students' criticism of the Bonn regime was Adorno's concept of the "authoritarian personality." As Martin Klimke summarises, Adorno's theory attempted to explain "certain character features that make people prone to antidemocratic behaviour."[9] West German protesters can be seen to have relied heavily on this idea when criticising the prominence of anticommunism throughout the Federal Republic. For example, Michael Schmidke points to an argument made by Rudi Dutschke in 1968 where he claimed that the "mental basis of fascism" has not been "overcome by the defeat of the Third Reich" but

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[7] Jacques Rupnik, "Central Europe or Mitteleuropa?," *Daedalus,* vol. 119, no. 1 (Winter, 1990), p. 257.

[8] Ibid., pp. 261-262.

[9] Martin Klimke, *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties* (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 22..

lived on in the Federal Republic through anticommunism.[10] Furthermore, as Klimke explains, during the late 1960s the Socialist German Student Federation (SDS) perceived anticommunism as a "dangerous ideological tool" which "played on the same personality traits of authoritarian submission and aggression" that were characteristic of the Nazi regime.[11] In Czechoslovakia, there was greater meditation among dissidents upon their own cultural and philosophical traditions. During the Prague Spring it was primarily Czechs' and Slovaks' own conception of socialism that was used to challenge Antonín Novotný's Stalinist regime, and while dissident movements such as Charter 77 are often perceived as human rights movements they derived much of their moral critique of Husák's regime from the Czech phenomenologist and philosopher Jan Patočka. Comparing Czechoslovak dissent and West German protest provides us with something of a test case for examining how popular opposition emerged in two countries who had once shared a cultural heritage but were now politically and culturally divided.

§ The Spectre of "1968."

Comparing Czechoslovak dissent and West German protest as related phenomena also allows us to revise historical narratives that locate both West German protest and Czechoslovakia's Prague Spring within narratives of global social unrest associated with the year 1968. While there are good reasons for examining West German protest alongside similar opposition movements in France and the United States which emerged during the 1960s, some of the literature written on "1968" often forces the Prague Spring into a narrative where it does not truly belong. Transnational approaches to the various protest movements of the 1960s are themselves problematic. As Timothy Scott Brown explains, the very use of the term "1968" is wrapped up in the idea that "something of worldwide scope occurred in the late 1960s" and that the nature of "1968" as a "*global* event" therefore "organizes and confers meaning on the individual *national* events."[12] What Brown means here is that the very idea of "1968" as a global event has given birth to a way of speak-

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[10] Paraphrased in Michael Schmidke, "The German New Left and National Socialism," in *Coping with the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955—1975*, ed. Philipp Gassert and Alan E. Steinweis (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006), p. 180.
[11] Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, p. 22.
[12] Timothy Scott Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties: The Antiauthoritarian Revolt, 1962—1978* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 5.

ing and writing about the 1960s. By emphasising what was *global* about social unrest during the 1960s, scholars often downplay what was *national* or *local* about those experiences. Recognising this trend, we might instead speak of "the spectre of 1968." This is a spectre that has come to haunt the history of the 1960s with notions of global social unrest which, perhaps, ought to be exorcised. An added benefit to this approach is that it opens up fresh avenues in which to explore West German protest without seeing them through a specific, transnational lens.

The idea that the Prague Spring in particular does not fit the common narratives of "1968" is hardly a new one. It is evident in many of the edited volumes that tackle the "year that rocked the world." For instance, in his article on Czechoslovakia in *1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956-1977* Jan Pauer writes that "[d]espite contacts to student movement in the West and West German student leader Rudi Dutschke's visit to Prague, there were no comparable antiauthoritarian revolts [in Czechoslovakia] with generation-specific features as seen in Western countries."[13] Further contrasting the Czechoslovakian experience with protest in the West, Pauer continues "[t]he student movement in Czechoslovakia was also not as ideologically influenced but had a distinct national profile in Slovakia and was, in both parts of the country, integrated into society and free from violence."[14] Pauer's insights here challenge the traditional manner in which the Prague Spring has been absorbed into grander narratives of social unrest. One example of such an approach can be found in Robert V. Daniels' 1989 work *The Year of the Heroic Guerrilla: World Revolution and Counterrevolution in 1968*. Daniels focuses on the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 as the point of comparison with social unrest elsewhere. While he never explicitly equates the global protest movements of "1968" with the Czechoslovak experience, he does emphasise the citizen response to the invasion through an outpouring of grassroots protests. He writes that those protesting in August were "by and large the same kind of people—educated youth—who are in rebellion against the establishment, both in the West and in China."[15] For Daniels, the smearing of swastikas on Warsaw Pact tanks and the slogans graffitied "everywhere" recall the language of the New Left in the West: "'We

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[13] Jan Pauer, "Czechoslovakia," in *1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956-1977*, ed. Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 172.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Daniels, *The Year of the Heroic Guerrilla,* p. 191.

Condemn Soviet Fascism,' 'USSR = SS,'" and "'Make Love, Not War'," are a few of the examples he provides.[16] Such a comparison of protest symbols across the Iron Curtain is thought provoking whether or not it survives intense scrutiny, and it should be noted that Daniels describes the events in Czechoslovakia as having more in common with "the values of democracy and national independence," than with the "often exotic ideology of Western protest movements."[17] However, the focus of historians upon such vague similarities leaves the discussion of the Prague Spring to be something of an afterthought. As Daniels himself states, the Prague Spring was both "part of the worldwide Sixties Revolution" and "a side issue."[18] What is more interesting about comparing the Prague Spring with protest movements in the 1960s is that it does not sit neatly into grand narratives of global social unrests and instead stands orthogonal to them.

Despite lending its very name to another edited volume on global protest movements—*Between the Prague Spring and the French May: Opposition and Revolt in Europe, 1960—1980*—Czechoslovakia receives only a single dedicated article. Here, Zdeněk Nebřenský examines student opposition at the beginning of the 1960s in an admitted attempt to look beyond historical narratives of 1960s student opposition which are often subject to "retrospective interpretation through the events of 1968."[19] Interestingly, Nebřenský notes that many of these early dissenting youths made important contributions to the establishment in the 1970s of "social projects, a cultural avant-garde and political opposition, as represented by the *Charta 77*."[20] While Nebřenský does not develop this point, his suggestion complements Filip Pospíšil's article "Youth cultures and the discipling of Czechoslovak youth in the 1960s" which argues that the "ostracism" of particular youth subcultural groups in the late 1960s "gave rise to the 'underground' movement around the rock group Plastic People of the Universe and the activism of *Charta 77*."[21] Interestingly, Nebřenský's chapter does highlight how "transnational topics" such as a new "anthropological perspective on socialism" and

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[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid., p. 9.

[18] Ibid., p. 204.

[19] Zdeněk Nebřenský, "Early Voices of Dissent: Czechoslovak Student Opposition at the Beginning of the 1960s," in *Between the Prague Spring and the French May: Opposition and Revolt in Europe, 1960—1980*, ed. Martin Klimke, Jacco Pekelder and Joachim Scharloth (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), p. 32.

[20] Ibid., p. 44.

[21] Filip Pospíšil, "Youth cultures and the disciplining of Czechoslovak youth in the 1960s," *Social History,* vol. 37, no. 4 (Nov. 2012), p. 476.

an emphasis on the writings of "the young Marx" circulated in Czechoslovakia in the early 1960s and were appreciated by socialist students. Such developments in Marxist and socialist thought are, in fact, one of the few areas in which Czechoslovakian experiences during the 1960s can be more readily compared with those elsewhere.

One possible way to interpret the events of "1968" that serves both its Eastern and Western contexts is through Maud Bracke's idea that the period marked the "culmination point" of a set of challenges "posed to the various traditions of European Marxism."[22] Bracke's motivation for pursuing this interpretation is her belief that the Prague Spring suffered numerous "misunderstandings and strategic appropriation[s]" at the hands of the French Left—namely, the Communist Party, the student movements and the *gauchistes*.[23] According to Bracke, both the reformist and radical Left in France perceived the Prague Spring to be a "moderate movement," which has continued to inform historians' "memory of it."[24] In the trajectory of her argument, Bracke presents the Prague Spring as the Czechoslovak variant of a "European-wide phenomenon in the 1960s," where "hybrid, creative strands" of Marxism—called "heterodox" or "revisionist" Marxism by Bracke—emerged in relation to generational change in countries such as Italy, France, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.[25] She further contends that at the centre of the challenges facing European Marxism was the confrontation between the Marxist Left with "an issue it had long forgotten: liberty."[26] She then explains that from the perspective of a "longer-term historical interpretation of European Marxism," the French experiences of "1968" can too be understood as the "re-emergence of the question of liberty in relation to politics based on social justice."[27] This allows Bracke to provide insight into how the "fundamental dilemmas of Marxism" were navigated on either side of the Iron Curtain and gave rise to a "number of misinterpretations" of the Prague Spring in particular.[28] We might view the present comparison between the "worlds of dissent" in Czechoslovakia and the "worlds of protest" in West

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[22] Maud Bracke, "French Responses to the Prague Spring: Connections, (Mis)perception and Appropriation," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 60, no. 10 (Dec. 2008), p.1735.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid., p. 1736.
[27] Ibid., p. 1742.
[28] Ibid., p. 1742.

Germany as an extension of Bracke's suggestion that we should understand the "global 1960s" in light of the Czechoslovak experience rather than the other way round. Instead of retaining a narrow focus on the 1960s and transformations in European Marxism, a comparison between the "worlds of dissent" and the "worlds of protest" provides a better understanding of how the political and social orders were challenged on either side of the Iron Curtain in the postwar period. Given that the present analysis is restricted—partly in the interests of brevity—to a comparison of Czechoslovak and West German experiences of opposition, our investigation will, for the most part, focus on the 1960s and 1970s, with some discussion of the late 1950s and early 1980s being touched upon where they are relevant.

§ The Crisis of Technological Civilisation.

One way to further justify our comparison of Czechoslovak dissent and West German protest is to note the similarities between the natures of the regimes which both movements challenged. Václav Havel argued in his 1978 essay "The Power of the Powerless" that the oppressive qualities of the Communist system in Czechoslovakia—which Havel describes as "post-totalitarian," a term which will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 1—were only one aspect of the "general inability of modern humanity to be the master of its own situation."[29] Following Heidegger, Havel argued that there exists a "crisis of contemporary technological society as a whole" and that the "automatism" of the Czechoslovak Communist system was merely an extreme version of the "global automatism of technological civilisation."[30] Furthermore, he claimed that the "planetary challenge" posed by technological civilisation to the "position of human beings in the world" was also taking place in the "Western world."[31] For Havel, there exists no concrete evidence that traditional parliamentary democracy could offer any real solutions or "fundamental opposition" to the "automatism of technological civilisation and the industrial-consumer society."[32] Moreover, Havel argued

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[29] Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," in *Open Letters: Selected Prose, 1965—1990*, ed. by Paul Wilson (London: Faber & Faber, 1991, p. 207.
[30] Ibid., pp. 206-207.
[31] Ibid. p. 207.
[32] Ibid., pp. 207-208.

that in the parliamentary-democratic West, people are manipulated in ways that are "infinitely more subtle and refined" than the brutal methods used in Communist society. As he explains:

> But this static complex of rigid, conceptually sloppy, and politically pragmatic mass political parties run by professional apparatuses and releasing the citizen from all forms of concrete and personal responsibility; and those complex focuses of capital accumulation engaged in secret manipulations and expansion; the omnipresent dictatorship of consumption, production, advertising, commerce, consumer culture, and all that flood of information: all of it, so often analyzed and described, can only with great difficulty be imagined as the source of humanity's rediscovery of itself....In a democracy, human beings may enjoy many personal freedoms and securities that are unknown to us, but in the end they do them no good, for they are ultimately victims of the same automatism, and are incapable of defending their concerns about their own identity or preventing their superficialization or transcending concerns about their own personal survival to become proud and responsible members of the *polis*, making a genuine contribution to the creation of its destiny.[33]

Whether or not we agree with Havel's eloquent critique of technological civilisation and western parliamentary democracy, it must be admitted that similar critiques of capitalist democracies were advanced during the 1960s by a variety of protest movements in the western world. West German protest during the 1960s and 1970s is but one example of the variously—and roughly contemporaneous—oppositional movements that challenged regimes on either side of the Iron Curtain in the postwar period. Investigating and comparing dissident and protest cultures during the 1960s and 1970s is one avenue through which we can better understand why existing political and social orders were perceived to be oppressive by the individuals and movements that challenged them. One of the core arguments of this paper is that Czechoslovak dissent developed a more accurate understanding of the regime it opposed—particularly in the aftermath of the Prague Spring—which made its critique more powerful, and imbued a greater sense of meaning within the

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[33] Ibid., p. 208.

culture of dissent itself. It will subsequently be suggested that West German protest lacked such a rigorous understanding of the Bonn regime which in turn, made its own critique somewhat less formidable.

In the sixth of Jan Patočka's *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History* he argues that "war" is the "fundamental phenomenon" of the twentieth century.[34] He further explains that in the aftermath of the Second World War, the phenomenon of war has come to assume the form of a "half peace" within which "opponents mobilize and count on the demobilization of the other"—a clear allusion to the realities of the Cold War.[35] An important concept for Patočka's discussion of war is his emphasis on the importance of the "front line" as an importance "factor of history."[36] When speaking of the First World War, Patočka writes that the person on the front line is "gradually overcome by an overwhelming sense of meaningfulness which would be hard to put into words."[37] According to Edward F. Findlay, what Patočka means here is that the front-line experience of soldiers has a positive aspect, namely that amongst "the absurdity of war," soldiers fighting in the trenches "may come to achieve a certain clarity of insight" with regard to war's "essential meaninglessness."[38] Within this moment of realisation, those soldiers may come to feel "solidarity" towards the very enemy that they are fighting, for they too share their experience.[39] This, Findlay clarifies, is the meaning behind Patočka's conception of the "solidarity of the shaken," which refers to the phenomenon in which individuals share a "shaking of naive belief" where the meaning given to life by "ideology" is revealed to be a "false representation of reality."[40] Findlay explains that the solidarity of the shaken is an experience attainable by all those suffering through "trying times," including people living under Communism in Czechoslovakia during the 1970s.[41] Patočka argues that even the "half peace" of the postwar period has a front line and its own way of "burning, destroying persons, [and] robbing them of hope."[42] Here Patočka

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[34] Jan Patočka, *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History* (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1996), p. 120.

[35] Ibid., p. 134.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid., p. 126.

[38] Edward F. Findlay, "Classical Ethics and Postmodern Critique: Political Philosophy in Václav Havel and Jan Patočka," *The Review of Politics*, vol. 61, no, 3 (Summer, 1999) p. 434.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid. pp. 434-435.

[42] Patočka, *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History*, p. 134.

appears to allude to life in Czechoslovakia under Husák's Communist regime and his description is worth quoting in full:

> The front line is the resistance to such "demoralizing," terrorizing, and deceptive motifs of the day. It is the revelation of their real nature, it is a protest paid for in blood which does not flow but rots in jails, in obscurity in life plans and possibilities wasted—and which will flow again once the Force finds it advantageous. It is to comprehend that here is where the true drama is being acted out; freedom does not begin only "afterwards," after the struggle is concluded, but rather has its place precisely within it—that is the salient point, the highest peak from which we can gain a perspective on the battlefield. Those who are exposed to the pressure of the Force are free, far more free than those who are sitting on the sidelines, anxiously watching whether and when their turn will come.[43]

While we do not need to fully comprehend exactly what Patočka means in this passage, several of his ideas are beneficial to our analysis of protest and dissent. First, we can take his statement that the front line is "resistance" to the "deceptive motifs of the day" as a metaphor for dissent and protest and the challenge they pose to the "automatism" induced by technological civilisation and Communist and parliamentary-democratic regimes. One notion that helps elucidate this connection is Michel de Certeau's description of the 1968 French May as a "*symbolic* revolution" which opposed a "system"— meaning the very political, economic and cultural system that existed in France—and attacked the very "*credibility* of a social language."[44] Certeau believed that there was something positive about French protesters challenging the social order in France and he writes that "speech" was "taken" in 1968 the way that "the Bastille was taken" in 1789.[45] For Certeau, there is something meaningful in the very act of protest—which he describes as a "capturing of speech"—because it called "the whole system into question."[46] Patočka differs from Certeau

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[43] Ibid.

[44] Michel de Certeau, *The Capture of Speech and Other Political Writings* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp.4, 6-7.

[45] Ibid., p. 14.

[46] Ibid.

in an important respect. For Patočka, it appears necessary that those expressing resistance must understand the "real nature" of the "deceptive motifs of the day," in order to be "free." This is not to be achieved in some "afterwards," but in full understanding of the nature of the present battlefield, of the struggle taking place in the present, of the absurdity of the war which has taken the form of a half peace. For Certeau, on the other hand, the very act of calling the existing regime into question appears to hold inherent value— regardless of whether the "deceptive motifs of the day" were properly understood. Certeau describes the capturing of speech which took place during the French May as a "*positive* fact, a *style* of experience" which was "provocative and revealing" even if it was not a "moment of truth."[47] It is, however, Patočka's idea that "the deceptive motifs of the day" must be understood by those struggling against technological civilisation that provides a philosophical justification for this paper's claim that the strength of a protest or dissident movement is to be found in the degree to which protesters and dissidents recognise the real natures of the regimes they oppose. And it is through a comparison of Czechoslovak dissent and West German protest that a historical justification for this claim is further sought.

As we shall discuss below, Patočka and Havel were important figures for Czechoslovak dissent. Both served as two of the three initial spokespersons for Charter 77—a civic initiative launched in 1977 which, alongside Solidarity (*Solidarność*) in Poland, is one of the best known dissident "movements" in the eyes of western scholars—and their philosophical beliefs would play an important role in shaping the Charter movement. However, it is Havel's concluding remarks in "The Power of the Powerless" that provide the final impetus for examining West Germany's "worlds of protest" in light of Czechoslovakia's "worlds of dissent." Havel wrote that he was sceptical of political models, systematic reforms and political thought in general as pathways towards any "moral reconstruction of society" which might provide a solution to the problems caused by technological civilisation.[48] Despite this scepticism, Havel does propose the possibility of a "post-democratic" system, within which a more meaningful political structure might be found which could "provide the foundation of a better society."[49] While Havel admits that it is "hard to foresee" what

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[47] Ibid., p. 13.

[48] Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," p.209.

[49] Ibid., pp. 211-213.

shape a post-democratic system might take, he does suggest that we might see the small communities surrounding "'dissident' groups" and "independent citizens' initiatives" in Czechoslovakia as an early indication of what a post-democratic system might look like.[50] He describes these small communities as "informed, non-bureaucratic, dynamic and open communities" that comprised "the 'parallel polis'"—a term coined by Václav Benda in his 1978 essay of the same name, which discussed the importance of independent cultural activity as a dissident strategy.[51] Havel emphasises the importance of these communities being bound together by their "shared tribulations," their common belief in the "significance of what they are doing," and their general understanding that they have "no chance of direct, external success" of achieving political reforms. Each of these ideas reiterate the importance for an oppositional movement that understanding both itself and the system which it opposed as well as avoiding any direct attempt to change that regime by political means. It is in light of such criteria, regardless as to whether they could truly lead to a post-democratic system (a possibility that Havel is aware of), through which the nature of West Germany's "worlds of protest" will be examined.

§ The Meaning of "Dissent" & the Meaning of "Protest."

One immediate benefit of applying Bolton's conception of Czechoslovak dissent as one "world" or many different "worlds" of experience to West German protest is that it helps clarify the indeterminacy of meaning that exists between the use of the terms "protest" and "dissent" themselves. Historians writing in English often use these words interchangeably when writing about the global unrest of "1968."[52] Historians of Central and Eastern Europe have used the term "dissent" quite differently when discussing the Communist period. As Bolton explains, the term "dissent" has traditionally been used in reference to a "transnational pantheon" of dissident thinkers—most notably Václav Havel from Czechoslovakia, Adam Michnik from Poland, and György Konrád from Hungary—who "conducted an international conversation about

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[50] Ibid., pp. 212-213.

[51] Ibid., p. 213.

[52] See Suri, *Power and Protest*, and Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, for examples of historians use these terms synonymously when writing about "1968."

anti-politics, civil society, and living in truth."[53] However, Bolton is critical of this narrow understanding of dissent which he argues has been shaped by "the vocabulary of the Cold War" and the "selective perceptions of the West."[54] He claims that most dissidents themselves considered the very term "dissent" to be a "coinage of American and West European journalists."[55] From a Western perspective, dissidents have been portrayed with a mixture of "romanticism...and political idealism."[56] Their image is of the jailed intellectuals writing prison letters, "adventurers smuggling secret publications across barbed-wire borders," and the courageous actions of a few "rare souls" who spoke out "against the state."[57] Historians, according to Bolton, have ceased to interrogate the meaning of "dissent" and they have ignored the fact that the term itself was complicated even for so-called "dissidents."[58] In support of this point, Bolton highlights the words of Zdeněk Mlynář—a reformist Communist who was one of the architects of the Prague Spring and Charter 77—who wrote: "[t]he term 'dissident' is one of the least precise in the contemporary political vocabulary."[59] Furthermore, Bolton begins his analysis of dissent by quoting the opening lines of Václav Havel's "The Power of the Powerless," in which he wrote "A spectre is haunting Eastern Europe,...the spectre of what in the West is called 'dissent.'"[60] For Bolton, Havel's words "echo" the *Communist Manifesto* in order to intrigue and disorient the reader.[61] Havel's task is not to define dissent, but to open up questions about its very nature. While the occasional use of "dissent" and "protest" as synonyms by historians may merely indicate the limitations of language, we must recognise that "dissent" has a complicated meaning in its Central and Eastern Europe context. Understanding the meaning of "dissent" is an ongoing historical project, and one of the benefits of recognising the indeterminacy of connotation between notions of "dissent" and of "protest" is that it might reveal something historically valuable about the meanings of both.

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[53] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 3.

[54] Ibid.,, pp. 2-3.

[55] Ibid. p., 3.

[56] Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[57] Ibid., p. 3.

[58] Ibid., p. 2.

[59] Quoted in Ibid.

[60] Quoted in Ibid., p. 1.

[61] Ibid.

While it would be a fruitless endeavour to search for rigid definitions for both "protest" and "dissent," we do need some form of framework in order to draw comparisons between them. Much like "dissent," "protest" is also a problematic term, lacking a concrete meaning. This is especially true when applied to the 1960s and 1970s, where it often serves as a synecdoche for global narratives of "social unrest." Even when the term "protest" is invoked while exploring such unrest within a national context it remains difficult to define its boundaries. For example, in his discussion of West German protest movements, Nick Thomas points out the term "protest" has often been taken to mean "all forms of public demonstration of support or opposition, for or against policies, decisions or activities, by those in authority."[62] According to Thomas, this allows for a wide variety of actions to be considered as "protest," ranging from the ongoing opposition to the planned introduction of West Germany's Emergency Laws (which would limit civil liberties during times of national crisis) during the 1960s to the violent campaigns of the Red Army Faction (RAF) and the "custard bombs of *Kommune I.*"[63] Furthermore, our understanding of "protest" in West Germany has usually been intertwined with how the Federal Republic's *Außerparlamentarische Opposition* (the extra-parliamentary opposition or APO) has been defined. As Thomas explains, the APO is difficult to define because it was by no means a "central organization" but was "a collective term" used to capture a variety of campaigns and a multitude of organisations.[64] Moreover, definitions of the APO have too often been mistakenly reduced to the activities of groups tied to the Socialist German Student Federation (SDS).[65] This reduction bears a noticeable similarity to the way that Western writers have used the term "dissent" to refer to a narrow pantheon of dissident thinkers in Central and Eastern Europe. Thomas highlights the words of Karl A. Otto, who explains that the APO has been used interchangeably with "'student movement' and 'youth protest,'" which fails to express the "broad nature" of issues addressed by groups who could be considered part of the APO. Thomas settles for a middle ground when describing the APO and avoids both overly broad and excessively narrow definitions. He includes all liberal, social democratic and socialist organisa-

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[62] Nick Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany: A Social History of Dissent and Democracy* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2003), pp. 3, 7-8.
[63] Ibid. pp. 7-8.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid., p. 8.

tions that "engaged in oppositional activity outside of the parliamentary process that took a critical stance towards the parliamentary system, parliamentary parties, or government policy."[66] This is a sensible and manageable definition of the APO for Thomas's project. It does, however, discard the violent campaigns of the RAF from the APO. Still, Thomas admits that the RAF's campaigns were "undoubtedly acts of protest," but justifies their exclusion from the APO because they were "attempts to destroy a political system through violence," rather than attempts to "institute reform or to generate a revolution through political means and popular opposition."[67] While we might ponder why Thomas distinguishes between attempts to destroy a political system through violence and endeavours to generate a revolution through political means and popular opposition, it is reasonable to see (as Thomas does) the RAF as a movement which evolved from "the experiences of protesters in APO campaigns" rather than explicitly part of it.[68]

Invoking Bolton's notion of there being one "world" or many different "worlds of dissent" in Czechoslovakia, and speaking too of the "world" or "worlds of protest" in West Germany not only provides us with a suitable framework for comparing "dissent" and "protest," it also allows us to accommodate the importance of a movement such the RAF without relying on overly broad definition of "protest" itself. Introducing the idea of a "world of protest" facilitates a way to speak about both the APO and the RAF while accepting Thomas's separation of the two. We can conceive of them as separate facets of the same "world." Such a notion also helps alleviate one of Brown's major concerns, namely that the category of "protest" has been overused and is therefore often detrimental to the study of West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. Brown argues that the common usage of protest represents only "the barest fraction of what 1968 was about" which leaves us with a simple "binary of opposition between 'protest' and 'power'" that "robs the agency of the protagonists, reducing them to a defensive posture in the face of the state's initiatives."[69] Speaking of one "world" or many "worlds" of protest in West Germany should mitigate Brown's concern, while allowing us to keep the term "protest" so long as it is taken to refer to the "world" or "worlds of protest." By opening up our understanding of protest in the same way that Bolton opens up the meaning of

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[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 13.

dissent, we can begin a more robust comparison between the "worlds of protest" and the "worlds of dissent." We can examine how dissent and protest were understood and experienced on either side of the Iron Curtain and explore how the various similarities and divergences that exist between them have figured within the eyes of historians and dissidents and protesters themselves.

Chapter 1: The Crises of Credibility & the Spectres of the Past.

§ The Crisis of Credibility.

Speaking of the "worlds of protest" in West Germany and the "worlds of dissent" in Czechoslovakia provides us with a pair of analytical tools which elucidate both the nature of protest and the nature of dissent without advancing a simple binary of opposition between "protest" and "power." One way to strengthen this framework of analysis is to see protest and dissent as cultural phenomena which are tied to the credibility of the Czechoslovak and West German regimes. It was mentioned in the previous chapter that the ruling political and social orders in West Germany and Czechoslovakia experienced a "crisis of credibility" during the 1960s and 1970s which shaped each country's respective protest and dissident movements. One way to clarify the meaning of this concept is to refer Certeau's depiction of the French May as a "*symbolic*" revolution where "given social and historical *relations*" were contested and the creation of "authentic" relations was sought.[1] While we need not trouble ourselves with questions regarding what a "symbolic revolution" might constitute, it is certainly the case that many West Germans, Czechs and Slovaks challenged existing social and historical relations during the 1960s and 1970s in their pursuit of creating authentic ones. An ongoing concern for many West German protesters during this period was their belief that the Federal Republic's parliamentary democracy was unstable. As we shall see, these concerns were often expressed through reflections upon Germany's Nazi past, and the perceived threat of fascism's re-emergence. In Czechoslovakia, the 1960s were a period in which the legacies of Stalinism were confronted and a more "democratic" form of socialism was sought. While the attempts at de-Stalinisation during this period helped pave the way for the reforms of the Prague Spring, their ultimate failure resulted in a loss of confidence for many Czechoslovaks in the possibility of reforming the Communist system. It is worth noting that the credibility crises facing the West German and Czechoslovak political and social orders bears a striking similarity to what Havel described as the crisis of technological civilisation. Again, whether or not we agree with Havel that technological civilisation had created a form of "global automatism," the fact that

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[1] Certeau, The Capture of Speech and Other Political Writings, p. 5.

many West Germans, Czechs and Slovaks considered their existing political and social orders to be both oppressive and inauthentic during a roughly contemporaneous period deserves historical inquiry.

In this chapter it will be argued that the credibility of both the Communist system in Czechoslovakia and West Germany's parliamentary-democracy were challenged by significant parts of their societies, beginning sometime in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In both West Germany and Czechoslovakia an erosion of trust in the values of the establishment emerged which was informed by reflections upon the legacies of fascism and Stalinism respectively. As we shall see, such reflections on the past played an important role in the shaping of the culture of Czechoslovak dissent and the culture of West German protest. While the credibility crisis facing both regimes resulted in the birth of the protest and dissident movements in each country, it will be argued that Czechoslovaks developed a more rigorous understanding of the real nature of the Communist system in the aftermath of the Prague Spring. On the other hand, the continuing tendency for West German protesters to analyse the Bonn regime through reflections on Germany's Nazi past appears to have impeded any attempt to develop an accurate (and therefore more powerful) critique of the Federal Republic's oppressive qualities. The following sections will cover several of the most important areas in which a "crisis of credibility" can be detected in both Czechoslovakia and West Germany during the 1960s and 1970s. Specifically, it will be argued that the origins of Czechoslovak dissent can be traced to the crisis within the cultural realm which took place during the 1960s rather than the political reforms of the Prague Spring. In West Germany the credibility of democracy itself will be highlighted and the evolution of the extra-parliamentary opposition as a space of political and cultural criticism will be examined. Furthermore, following Bolton's conception of dissent as a "cultural-political movement" which was not tied to any particular "narrative about historical change" emphasis will be placed on the cultural elements of Czechoslovak dissent and West German protest in order to avoid reiterating what Brown described as a simple binary of opposition between "protest" and "power."[2]

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[2] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, pp. 44-45.

§ The Crisis in Communism: Czechoslovakia in the 1960s.

Maud Bracke's assertion that "1968" can be interpreted as the culmination of a set of challenges posed to the various traditions of European Marxism is true, to a certain extent, of both Czechoslovakia and West Germany. In the Czechoslovak case, these challenges had a specific pertinence due to the continuing rule of the Marxist-Leninist Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ). During the 1960s the central tenets of Marxist-Leninist thought—specifically the Communist Party's "leading role" and the concept of democratic centralism—came under increasing scrutiny. As James Satterwhite explains, orthodox Marxism-Leninism understood human beings to be determined by the "social and historical forces arising from the mode of production and production relations" and it was only the working class that provided the "possibility of being the agent of real change."[3] For Lenin, the Communist Party served as the vanguard of the working class in its attempt to "effect change;" the party was to be "the interpreter of historical necessity for the working class and for society at large."[4] Satterwhite emphasises that under Stalinism the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism was reduced to a set of mere "formulas" which ultimately served as a "legitimation of the party's activities, whatever they were, and thus as a legitimizing ideology for power."[5] According to H. Gordon Skilling, it was the continued imposition of the "alien system" of Stalinism upon Czechoslovakia that led to a "profound crisis" within the whole of society during the 1960s.[6] This idea is also captured by Vladimir V. Kusin in his work *The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring.* Kusin describes the existence of a historical incongruence between Communism and the Czech national disposition (it is worth noting that Kusin is either intentionally or ignorantly overlooking the Slovak national disposition here).[7] For Kusin, this manifested itself as a conflict between a "genuine striving for socialism *as a socially just form of democracy*" and the reality of Communism as a "*system of autocratic organization and, eventually, government.*"[8] As

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[3] James Satterwhite, "Marxist Critique and Czechoslovak Reform," in *The Road to Disillusion: From Critical Marxism to Postcommunism in Eastern Europe*, ed. by Raymond Taras (Armonk, New York and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1992), p. 117.

[4] Ibid., pp. 117-118.

[5] Ibid., p. 118.

[6] H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976) , p. 824.

[7] Vladimir V. Kusin, *The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring: The Development of Reformist Ideas in Czechoslovakia 1956—1967* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 1.

[8] Ibid.

Skilling points out, Czechoslovakia was a country with "vastly different circumstances and traditions."[9] The imposition of Stalinism upon Czechoslovak society had a particular impact upon the cultural realm where, as Satterwhite explains, the Stalinist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism gave the Communist party a "socially edifying role."[10] As we shall see, it the Communist Party's influence upon culture would be increasingly challenged during the 1960s: socialist realism in the arts came under fire from philosophers such as Karel Kosík and Ivan Sviták, and Ludvík Vaculík would famously denounce the leading role of the party and the government's control at the Fourth Congress of Czechoslovak Writers in June 1967.

One reason for focusing upon the transformations within Czechoslovak culture during the 1960s is that the actual reforms instituted during the Prague Spring by Alexander Dubček's regime maintained many of the core elements of Marxism-Leninism. It was the transformations in Czechoslovak culture that served as the precursor to the "worlds of dissent" that emerged during the 1970s, while the reforms instituted by the establishment during the Prague Spring can be seen as an attempt to correct an existing social order rather than oppose it. In an interview with the Hungarian journalist András Sugár (broadcast on Hungarian television in April 1989), Dubček claimed that his stance in 1967 and 1968 was that "the Party must work according to a programme."[11] He explains that he criticised the previous regime in 1967 because it had not developed any clear, meaningful programme.[12] The programme of which Dubček speaks would become "The Action Programme of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia," which was adopted at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on April 5, 1968. While the Action Programme did institute a number of important reforms, it still insisted upon retaining the Marxist-Leninist idea that the Communist Party must have a leading role in society. This idea did evolve from its Stalinist interpretation, and the Action Programme notes that such authority must be "won again and again by Party activity," and that "Party resolutions and directives must be modified if they fail to express the needs and possibilities of the whole of society."[13] However, while Dubček insists that the cre-

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[9] Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*, p. 824.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Alexander Dubček, interview with András Sugár, *Dubček Speaks* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1990), p. 33.

[12] Ibid.

[13] "The Action Program of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia," in *Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis,* ed. Robin Alison Remington (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: 1969), pp. 98-99.

ation of this programme would have required "self-criticism by the CPCZ [the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia] Central Committee," his goal seems to have been the sincere attempt to restore an existing (Communist) system which he considered to have gone astray.[14] The reforms instituted by the establishment during the Prague Spring can therefore be understood as an attempt to correct an existing social order rather than oppose it. An incident that supports this idea occured in June 1970 when Dubček was recalled from his new position as an ambassador to Turkey in order to face the results of an investigation into his actions as the first secretary. Kieran Williams explains that over the course of a series of interviews Dubček refused to renounce his reforms but did expressed deep resentment for being placed in the same "'rightist-opportist', 'anti-socialists', and anti-Soviet category [sic]" as KAN, K-231, and Ludvík Vaculík with whom, he claimed, he had "nothing in common."[15]

The importance of the cultural realm as a place of dispute during the 1960s is the main point of continuity between the critique of Czechoslovak Communism which developed during the 1960s and the emergence of dissident movements in the 1970s. It should be noted that it is problematic to look for evidence of dissent itself within Czechoslovakia during the 1960s. As Bolton explains, terms such as "dissidence" and "dissent" did not come into common usage until the second half of the 1970s.[16] The origins of the Prague Spring and its immediate aftermath are important for our present analysis because they contextualised the landscape into which the "worlds of dissent" would eventually emerge. Czechoslovak Communism experienced a steady erosion of its credibility throughout the 1960s, which began with the process of de-Stalinisation and culminating with the Prague Spring. It was the crushing of the Prague Spring, beginning with the Warsaw Pact invasion in August 1968 and concluding with the "normalization" of Czechoslovakia under Gustáv Husák, that finally destroyed the credibility of the Czechoslovak social order for the "dissidents" who would emerge in the late 1970s. As Barbara Falk explains, "normalization" refers to "the process after the Soviet-sponsored invasion whereby authoritarian communism was re-established along its

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[14] Alexander Dubček, interview with András Sugár, *Dubček Speaks*, p. 33.
[15] Kieran Williams, *The Prague Spring and its aftermath: Czechoslovak politics, 1968—1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 242.
[16] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 13.

originally rigid and Stalinist line."[17] This included a series of party purges over a period of roughly four years that Falk describes as "staggering."[18] Falk reports that around 327,000 party members were expelled and 150,000 left voluntarily, which reduced membership of the Communist party by one third.[19] Furthermore, approximately two thirds of Writers' Union members lost their jobs, 900 university teachers were fired and "21 academic institutions were closed."[20] An understanding of the transformations within Czechoslovak culture during the 1960s remains relevant to our analysis of the "worlds of dissent" because, as Bolton contends, "[u]nderstanding dissent means understanding the atmosphere of defeat, compromise, and political retreat that smothered the Prague Spring."[21] As we shall see, it was Czechoslovak culture that suffered most due to this defeat. Therefore, the "opening of speech" which took place in Czechoslovakia during the 1960s can be conceived of as precursor to the emergence of the "worlds of dissent," one which helped Czechoslovaks develop a better understanding of the true nature of the existing regime.

§ The Crisis in Culture.

Most historians would agree that the origins of the Prague Spring are tied to Czechoslovakia's delayed de-Stalinisation. As James H. Satterwhite explains, the death of Stalin in 1953 and Nikita Khruschev's denouncement of Stalinism at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 had sent a "shock wave rippling throughout Eastern Europe," which gave momentum to a trend of "disorientation and a questioning of basic assumptions."[22] While this "shock" was less immediately felt in Czechoslovakia than in Poland or Hungary, a search did begin for "new, more authentic values."[23] Furthermore, Satterwhite explains that this search began "quietly" in Czechoslovakia, as the Communist party was determined to resist de-Stalinisation as much as possible.[24] Czechoslovakia's leader during this period was

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[17] Barbara Falk, *Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe: Citizen Intellectuals and Philosopher Kings* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003), p. 80.
[18] Ibid., p. 83.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 13.
[22] Satterwhite, "Marxist Critique and Czechoslovak Reform," p. 115.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.

Antonín Novotný, a well-known Stalinist who had served as the General Secretary of the KSČ since 1953 as well as the President of Czechoslovakia from 1957. According to Skilling, Novotný made "every effort to avoid fundamental reform" but was ultimately brought down by his "intermittent concession, his inability to resort to extreme forms of coercion, and his own political ineptitude."[25] While the search for more authentic values in intellectual and authentic life met resistance during the Novotný years, Bolton points out that writers, artists and other intellectuals were able to take advantage of the "newly creative public life of the 1960s."[26] Satterwhite highlights how pressure for economic and political reform during the 1960s coincided with the waning of socialist realism's grasp on the artistic and cultural realms.[27] Culture became an important space wherein the "opening of speech" took place in the 1960s. The loosening of socialist realism in Czechoslovakia was gradual, but it began as early as 1956 and 1957 with a series of debates in the newspaper *Literární noviny* on philosophy and culture which featured contributions from Karel Kosík.[28] According to Satterwhite, these articles drew substantial public attention and were "instrumental in raising public awareness of some of the questions being asked in intellectual circles."[29] A confrontation with Czechoslovakia's Stalinist past was also important for facilitating the search for more authentic values. As Satterwhite makes sure to emphasise, it was the "revelation that the 1952 Slánský trials were not what they had been represented to be, that most undermined belief in the Communist Party and the System in Czechoslovakia."[30]

The cultural sphere was an important area in which the credibility of the Novotný regime was contested. This point has been emphasised by the famous Czech-born author Milan Kundera. In an interview with Alain Finkelkraut, Kundera claimed that the "greatness of the era of the '60's and the Prague Spring" lay not in politics but within "culture."[31] He explained that the 1960s saw "an extraordinary flowering of

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[25] Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*, p. 825-826.

[26] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent,* p. 12.

[27] James H. Satterwhite, Introduction to *The Crisis of Modernity: Essays and Observations from the 1968 era* by Karel Kosík (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Litterfield, 1995), p. 5.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Satterwhite, "Marxist Critique and Czechoslovak Reform," p. 115.

[31] Alain Finkelkraut, Interview with Milan Kundera, in *Cross Currents: A Yearbook of Central European Culture, 1982*, ed. Ladislav Matějka and Benjamin Stolz (Ann Arbor: Dept. of Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Michigan, 1982), p. 16.

Czech culture" and it was this culture which "attacked the imported political structure."[32] This point is reiterated by Roman Szporluk who writes that the "origins and greatness of the 'Prague Spring' lie in culture not politics."[33] It is worth noting at this point that the importance and influence of Slovak culture is often left out of reflections upon the Prague Spring. This trend persists into historical perceptions of dissent in the 1970s. Still, an important example of Czech cultural resurgence was the rediscovery of Franz Kafka who, according to Skilling, represented a "revival of some components of the national tradition," and had been condemned during the early Stalinist period as "bourgeois and decadent."[34] A crucial moment in Kafka's rehabilitation took place in May 1963 at the Liblice conference, where both Czech and foreign philosophers discussed Kafka's views of alienation.[35] Skilling highlights the opinions of Eduard Goldstücker, who believed the "effort to revive Kafka" deeply affected Czech intellectual life and "represented the central point in a struggle to break out of the cultural isolation into which the Czechs had been forced during the period of Stalinism."[36] As Jan Pauer explains, the conflict between artistic and cultural regeneration exemplified by the Liblice conference culminated at the Writers' Congress in June, 1967 when there was "an open clash with the party apparatus."[37] As Remington describes it, frustration with the limits of Novotný's destalinisation and the party's stranglehold on cultural activity (which had reportedly increased since 1963) became "articulate criticism of the regime."[38]

§ The Writers' Congress.

The 1967 Writers' Congress has often been considered as the opening shot in the lead-up to the Prague Spring. Remington describes it as the moment when "intellectuals" began "the revolt in Czechoslovakia."[39] The congress saw a number of liberal writers, such as Pavel Kohout, Milan Kundera, and

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[32] Ibid., p. 17.

[33] Roman Szporluk, "Defining 'Central Europe': Power, Politics, and Culture," in *Cross Currents,* ed. Matějka and Stolz, p. 33.

[34] Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*, pp. 14, 97.

[35] Ibid., p. 97.

[36] Paraphrased in Ibid., p. 97.

[37] Pauer, "Czechoslovakia," pp. 165-166.

[38] Ronald Alison Remington, *Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 3.

[39] Ibid.

Alexander Kliment criticising both domestic matters (such as renewed censorship in the recent press law) and foreign policy (particularly Czechoslovak support of Arab states in the war in the Middle East.)[40] Whether we consider such criticisms as an act of revolt, protest or dissent, they were—at the very least—an act of defiance, and they had an impact. As Skilling explains, even though the proceedings of the congress were not published and only selected speeches from supporters of the regime were mentioned in the press, "intellectual circles in Prague and elsewhere soon became aware of the explosive character of the session."[41] The most explosive moment of the congress was a speech by the novelist Ludvík Vaculík, who, in Skilling's words, "denounced the very essence of the political system in a scathing analysis of the corrupting effect of power and the failure of the regime to solve its major problems."[42]

Vaculík would become an increasingly important figure for Czechoslovak dissent. He would famously pen the provocative "Two Thousand Words Manifesto" during the Prague Spring, and he was deeply involved with the movement surrounding Charter 77, despite often clashing with other "founders" such as Václav Havel. Care must be taken when approaching Vaculík's speech at the writer's conference as a moment of early dissent or defiance. Focusing too closely on the words of one individual is one of the problems Bolton identifies within Western scholarship's portrayal of Central European dissent. There remains a danger when analysing Vaculík's words that they can be portrayed as "political idealism", or, as Bolton warns, as an example of a rare soul with "the moral courage to speak out against the state, at great personal risk."[43] At the heart of Vaculík's speech was his criticism of the Communist Party's leading role, its influence over the arts and culture, and the state of Czechoslovakia's constitution. Vaculík questioned the system of power that existed within Czechoslovak politics, asking "[w]hy don't they come out and admit that in essence a handful of people want to determine everything's right to be or not to be, what is to be done, thought, felt?"[44] He criticised the Marxist-Leninist principle of democratic centralism, describing the system of power which was in place as having entered the "dynastization phase" whereby power "has its inde-

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[40] Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*, p. 69.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Bolton, *Words of Dissent*, p. 3.
[44] Ludvík Vaculík, "Document 1: Speech by Ludvík Vaculík to the Fourth Congress of Czechoslovak Writers, June 1967" in *Winter In Prague,* ed. Remington, p. 7.

pendent position incorporated into the constitution," meaning that "[a]nything it does from that time on is constitutional."[45] Vaculík also proposed that the Union of Writers cooperate with the Union of Journalists (and other professional groups) to review the Czechoslovak Constitution and suggest any necessary changes.[46] While Vaculík also criticised the regime's continued interference in the artistic and cultural realms, his most polemical statement was his claim that "[i]t must be admitted that not one human problem has been solved in the last twenty years."[47] As Remington notes, Vaculík and his fellow speakers faced a quick rebuttal from the regime with the cultural spokesman Jiří Hendrych delivering a "violent counterattack at the Congress." [48] Vaculík and several of his fellow speakers faced criticism in the pages of *Kulturní tvorba*—the cultural weekly of the Communist Party Central Committee—which charged the writers with "demagoguery and anarchy."[49] Vaculík and a number of other writers were expelled from the Communist Party, and *Literární noviny* was taken over by the Ministry of Culture.[50]

It is important to note that Vaculík's diatribe targeted the Communist system under the Novotný regime. It did not denounce socialism. This gives reason for seeing Vaculík's speech at the Congress, and his later writings during the Prague Spring, as being tied to an "opening of speech" rather than Certeau's notion of a "capturing of speech." When Vaculík addressed the Writers' Congress, he emphasised that he was criticising Czechoslovakia's existing "power system." He stated that he did not "place the blame on socialism" because he did not "identify this power with the concept of socialism."[51] We can read this statement as falling short of Certeau's idea that the capturing of speech opposed an existing system and social language. Vaculík reiterated this stance in "Two Thousand Words," which was published during a time of waning censorship triggered by the Prague Spring. One of the significant reforms of the period was the lifting of censorship. According to Vilém Prečan, this took place in practice as early as the second half of January 1968, and was "[f]ormally" abolished in a preliminary form by the Presidium of the KSČ Central Committee in

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45 Ibid., p. 5.
46 Ibid., p. 6.
47 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
48 Remington, *Winter in Prague*, p. 4.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ludvík Vaculík, "Document 1: 'Speech by Ludvík Vaculík to the Fourth Congress of Czechoslovak Writers, June 1967,'" p. 7.

early March. [52] Bracke explains that by late March it was the Czechoslovak censors themselves who had "ceased to exercise control."[53] She further emphasises Skilling's belief that this relaxation gave way to the emergence of public opinion as a "powerful force."[54] Skilling himself argues that the situation released the mass media from the "hampering controls of strict censorship" while ultimately facilitating "an unparalleled discussion of all public issues."[55] Given that this reform began at the top of the political system, rather than from below, it remains sensible to consider it as an attempt to reform an existing system. This is, in fact, the very argument that Kieran Williams makes in *The Prague Spring and its aftermath*, as he states that despite "their many virtues" the reforms of the Prague Spring "amounted to only the liberalization of a Leninsit regime."[56] The reforms aimed at "preserving and improving" existing institutions rather than destroying them. This in turn stimulated an opening of speech, but no metaphorical "Bastille" was stormed.

"Two Thousand Words" was published on June 27, closely following the abolishment of the Central Publication Administration by the government which brought an official end to censorship by state organs.[57] In the text itself, Vaculík continued to criticise the Communist Party's relationship with power, arguing that because "the party became linked with the state it lost the advantage of keeping its distance from executive power."[58] He further states that "[w]e could not trust our representatives in any committee, and even if we did, we could not ask them to do anything because they could accomplish nothing."[59] However, Vaculík also criticised the reform process, stating that it is not "contributing any very new things."[60] As Remington notes, Vaculík proposed that the Prague Spring needed to go further, specifically with the creation of "spontaneous initiatives" at the district level, including "resolutions, demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts," in order to drive out the remaining conservatives in power.[61] In an interview with Miklós Kun,

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[52] Vilém Prečan, "Dimensions of the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1967—1970," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 60, No. 10 (Dec. 2008), p. 1665.

[53] Bracke, "French Response to the Prague Spring," p. 1737.

[54] Quoted in Ibid.

[55] Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*, p. 197.

[56] Williams, *The Prague Spring and its aftermath*, p. 3.

[57] Ibid., p. 368.

[58] Ludvík Vaculík, "Document 29: '2,000 Words to Workers, Farmers, Scientists, Artists and Everyone,'" in *Winter In Prague,* ed. Remington, pp. 196-197.

[59] Ibid., p. 197.

[60] Ibid., p. 198.

[61] Remington, *Winter In Prague*, p. 195.

some thirty years later, Vaculík reflected upon his expectations at the time of writing "Two Thousand Words." He emphasised that he did not expect the Communist Party to lose its grip on power but he did think that a "real multi-party system could evolve in Czechoslovakia."[62] Vaculík makes it clear that he was not "waiting for the coming of a Western type of *liberalism,*" instead what he hoped for was a "*reformed socialism*."[63]

Vaculík's thoughts during the Prague Spring and his reflections thirty years later were not uncommon. As Satterwhite highlights, the philosophers Karel Kosík and Ivan Sviták grew increasingly critical of the Party's "leading role" and infringement upon art, philosophy and science during the 1960s.[64] Such criticism is an example of the mounting challenges faced by Marxism-Leninism within Czechoslovakia. Kosík would write a series of articles in early 1968 for *Literární noviny*, building upon his early criticism, and in many ways mirroring Vaculík's position. Here, Kosík describes the fundamental nature of power, stating that "every ruling group endeavours to maintain itself in power and never willingly yields power."[65] For Kosík, this explains the crisis in Czechoslovakia "*in its own manner,*" and he further highlights how attempts to control the crisis are attempts to replace "old discredited and uncreative methods of rule with new, more appropriate ones."[66] This does not amount to a full endorsement of the Prague Spring's reforms, as Kosík argues that the "radical resolution" of the crisis was the replacement of the system of "a police-bureaucratic or bureaucratic dictatorship" with a system of socialist democracy."[67] While the opinions of a few writers do not reveal the mood of the entire population of Czechoslovakia, they do indicate that even the most critical members of the intelligentsia drew upon socialist values to critique the existing social order. Keeping this idea in mind, it is worth thinking about Vaculík's final reflections upon the Prague Spring. Concluding his interview with Kun, Vaculík conveyed his belief that the real significance of 1968 for Europe was that it revealed the Soviet Union for "what it was," and that it showed that "communism is *unre-*

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[62] Ludvík Vaculík, Interview with Miklós Kun in *Prague Spring—Prague Fall: Blank Spots of 1968*, ed. Miklós Kun (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1999), pp. 203, 206.

[63] Ibid., p. 206.

[64] See Satterwhite, "Marxist Critique and Czechoslovak Reform," pp. 115-122.

[65] Kosík, *The Crisis in Modernity*, p. 18.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

formable.[68] Kundera too, spoke of the events of 1968 in such a manner. Discussing the West's failure to understand what had happened to culture in Czechoslovakia before the Prague Spring, he added that the West "never understood the *massacre of Czech culture* that was the most incredible consequence of the Russian invasion in 1968."[69] Given that it was in the wake of such a "massacre of culture" that the "worlds of dissent" emerged during the 1970s, it is evident that the cultural dimension of the "crisis of credibility" of Czechoslovak Communism experienced in the 1960s fundamentally informed the nature of dissent as a political and cultural phenomenon. Furthermore, Kundera's and Vaculík's reflections upon the crushing of the Prague Spring, as well as Vaculík's and Kosík's criticism of the system itself in 1967 and 1968, suggest that the late 1960s marked something of a turning point for how leading figures in Czechoslovakia's intelligentsia perceived the Communist system itself. It would appear that they were developing a better understanding of how it was oppressive.

§ The Crisis in Democracy: West Germany in the 1960s.

During the 1960s in Czechoslovakia it was the credibility of Novotný's Communist regime that was called into question. While this challenge to the existing order had a particular cultural dimension, it can also be seen within the search for more authentic forms of socialism, which—to some degree at least—had a political manifestation in the reforms of the Prague Spring. In West Germany, it was parliamentary-democracy that faced a credibility crisis in the 1960s and 1970s. As Karrin Hanshew explains in her work *Terror and Democracy in West Germany*, "[t]he viability of German democracy remained the million dollar question" during the postwar period.[70] These were not necessarily new concerns as, according to Hanshew, debates regarding democracy's "inherent weakness" and convictions that it was "ill-suited for the German lands" date back to the early nineteenth century.[71] Hanshew is primarily interested with how the pessimism surrounding West German democracy affected the Federal Republic's confrontation with the terrorism of the Red Army Faction (RAF), culminating in the so-called "German Autumn" of 1977. At the heart of her

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[68] Ludvík Vaculík, Interview with Miklós Kun, p. 208.
[69] Alain Finkelkraut, Interview with Milan Kundera, p. 17.
[70] Karrin Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy in West Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 6.
[71] Ibid.

analysis are questions regarding political culture, which she defines as "the values, expectations, and implicit rules that express and shape collective political intentions and actions."[72] The sixties and seventies for Hanshew are therefore cast as a period of "debate" over democracy's "viability and defence."[73] Much of this debate surrounded the "ghosts" of West Germany's past. The failure of Germany's democracy experiment in the Weimar regime and the spectre of National Socialism "operated as reference points for the anarchy and authoritarianism Germans had long suspected was the inevitable result of a democratic state under siege."[74] Hanshew explains that "terrorist" and "urban guerrilla" movements such as the RAF, the 2nd of June Movement and the Red Cells (RZ) perceived the Federal Republic as a "legitimate target" because it was both a "client state of the United States" and because it was a nation which had "failed to purge itself of the remaining vestiges of German fascism."[75] Whatever we make of such groups, Hanshew appears to capture their intentions succinctly when she writes that they sought "nothing less than to liberate West Germans from a state and society that did not live up to its professed democratic ideals."[76] What such groups sought, we might say, was to force West Germans to be free.

Nick Thomas is another historian who sees the 1960s and 1970s as something of a crisis period for West German democracy. He argues that the events of the period—and protest movements in particular—were fundamental in "augmenting the foundations" of democracy in the Federal Republic.[77] According to Thomas, conflicts over the meaning of democracy stood at the heart of the 1960s protests, and protest movements as a whole were "crucial agents" in the "maturation process" for West German democracy.[78] However, it was not just German democracy that was unstable during the 60s and 70s—Marxism and socialism were also being reassessed. A crisis within the West German left began in November 1959 when the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (the Social Democractic Party of Germany or SPD) shifted away from its Marxist and Socialist roots, leaving its more ardent Leftist supporters nowhere to go except the po-

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[72] Ibid., p. 8.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid., p. 6.
[75] Ibid., p. 2.
[76] Ibid., p. 3.
[77] Thomas, *Protest Movements in West Germany*, p. 4.
[78] Ibid., p. 239.

litical and cultural space offered by the extra-parliamentary opposition. As Thomas explains, by 1959 the SPD had lost three general elections on a platform that "promoted a middle way between capitalism and communism," and it was forced to undergo a "fundamental reassessment and realignment of its political aims."[79] At Bad Godesberg in November 1959 the SPD abandoned its support for a "Marxist programme of social reform," ended its hostile position towards the Catholic Church and let go of its emphasis on "working-class struggle." In June of the following year the SPD also announced its support for NATO.[80] The SPD would move further away from its Leftist supporters when it entered into a grand coalition with the CDU/CSU in December 1966. As Hanshew notes, the "price" the SPD paid for getting into government was agreeing to pass the Emergency Laws which they had long opposed.[81] A condition of the SPD's support for these laws was that an amendment to be added to West Germany's Basic Law that guaranteed every German's "duty and right to resistance against a threat…to the free and democratic order."[82] This amendment did little to assuage the unease many West Germans felt towards the grand coalition and the Emergency Laws which, as Thomas explains, "went beyond the APO."[83] Thomas points to a survey by *Der Spiegel* in June 1967 that found 35 per cent of the general population believed the Emergency Laws were "unnecessary," 28 per cent were "outright opponents" and only 37 per cent were in favour of the laws.[84] Furthermore, the Grand Coalition marked further tensions between the SPD and the student movements. Thomas highlights this by quoting SDS member Jürgen Seifert who recalled in 1968 that the grand coalition "marked the real beginning of a student movement" because "a parliamentary democracy without a real opposition led many youth to think we were pretty close to an authoritarian state. The Emergency Laws gave people a concrete notion of what such an authoritarian state would mean."[85]

The political realignment of the SPD effectively barricaded critical voices from the parliamentary process. According to Thomas, the SPD's transformation into a party with broad appeal rendered it unable

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[79] Ibid., p. 35.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy*, p. 63.
[82] Ibid., p. 66.
[83] Thomas, *Protest Movements in West Germany*, p. 93.
[84] Ibid. p. 193.
[85] Quoted in Ibid., p. 92.

to "create and lead mass-protest campaigns that questioned the substance of the post-war settlement."[86] The West German political landscape effectively became one of "consensus politics," with the mainstream political parties aligning in "key areas."[87] The result of this convergence was that "extra-parliamentary activity based upon mass-protest movements" became one of the few spaces remaining for "public declarations of dissent."[88] Thomas suggests that there was a positive benefit to this development, considering that it opened up the possibility for "genuine public participation in politics, away from the restrictions of party political dogma."[89] Despite this glimmer of hope, it is quite clear that the SPD's turn away from its Marxist roots shaped the original contours of West Germany's "worlds of protest."

§ The Extra-Parliamentary Opposition.

When Certeau spoke of a "capturing of speech," he explained that such an experience called into question both the existing "system" and its "social language." So far as protesters capture speech, they do so against the current social order. When the SPD shifted to the right with the Bad Godesberg programme they firmly became part of the West German "social order." They joined Certeau's metaphorical "Bastille," which arguably imprisoned speech and prevented the development of authentic political and social values. Following the SPD's turn, West Germany saw the development of the extra-parliamentary opposition with formation of the *Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner* (Easter March of the Opponents of Nuclear Weapons) and the growing ideological divide between *Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund* (the German Socialist Student League or SDS) and the SPD with which it had long been associated. Thomas explains that the *Ostermarsch* emerged out of a sense of alienation towards the SPD for abandoning their campaign against nuclear rearmament.[90] The organisation was formed in Hamburg in 1960, taking its name from the Easter March organised in 1960 against a nuclear missile base at Bergen-Hohne. Thomas notes that the march "opposed 'atomic weapons of every kind and every nation'" and demanded the "unilateral disarmament of

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[86] Ibid., p. 36.
[87] Ibid., pp. 36-37.
[88] Ibid., p. 37.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid.

'both German states.'"[91] He highlights Karl A. Otto's analysis of a slogan from a 1960 *Ostermarsch* flyer stating "have trust in the power of the individual," which Otto took as evidence of the organisation's independence from "all parties, party-like groups, or trade unions."[92] Thomas further emphasises the *Ostermarsch's* nature as a pacifist organisation that had a "belief in non-violent protest at its heart" and that was by no means a "haven for revolutionary activity."[93]

The *Ostermarsch* is a core example of the developing extra-parliamentary opposition. Thomas argues that it became the leading anti-nuclear organisation and represented the beginning of a "broad and sustained extra-parliamentary campaign."[94] He points out that its regional committees expanded quickly and the number of protesters taking part in marches rose from 1,000 in the first event in 1960 to 100,000 in 1963 following the Cuban Missile Crisis.[95] Thomas concludes that the *Ostermarsch* eventually became an "umbrella organization" for extra-parliamentary "opposition," rather than an organisation that simply encouraged "extra-parliamentary protest."[96] This development was tied to the gulf between the *Ostermarsch* and the SPD, which "traditionally had a fractious relationship with other oganizations on the Left."[97] Thomas notes that the Bad Godesberg program cemented the gulf between the two, with the *Ostermarsch* later accusing the SPD in 1963 of conducting a smear campaign against them because of their support for disarmament in the West, and the SPD branding the *Ostermarsch* as Communist.[98] *Ostermarsch* went through a couple of name changes during the 1960s, adding the suffix *Kampagne für Abrüstung* (Campaign for Disarmament) in 1962 then renaming itself to solely *Kampagne für Abrüstung* (KfA) in 1963, and eventually becoming *Kampagne für Demokratie und Abrüstung* (Campaign for Democracy and Disarmament or KfDA) in 1968.[99] According to Thomas, these name changes capture the changing identity of the *Ostermarsch*: what began as an anti-nuclear organisation with global concerns became increasingly focused on

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[91] Ibid.

[92] Quoted in Ibid.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Ibid., p. 38.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Ibid., p. 39.

[97] Ibid., p. 38.

[98] Ibid., p. 38-39.

[99] Ibid.

the situation in West Germany and the policies of the Federal Republic.[100] Despite existing outside the normal political landscape, the organisation became increasingly politicised. In Thomas's words "the organisation was becoming a more definitely opposition force within German politics," and it moved from a straightforward pacifist campaign to something more critical of "German democracy in general."[101]

The SDS experienced a similar transformation to the *Ostermarsch* in the 1960s, finding itself increasingly critical of West German democracy and isolated from the normal political process. The SDS was created by socialist student groups from German universities in September 1946 and in its early years maintained a close association with the SPD. As Klimke notes, there was an ongoing interaction between the SPD and SDS in the latter's early years, during which the SPD "urged the SDS to adhere to official party lines".[102] However, ideological divides between the SDS and the SPD emerged in late 1958. At the National Convention in Mannheim on October 23rd a new leadership took the reins of the SDS. Klimke explains that many of these figures—especially Jürgen Seifert, Monika Mitscherlich, and Horst Steckel—were ideologically influenced by the critical theory of the Frankfurt School (particularly Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer) and political scientists such as Wolfgang Abendroth and Peter von Oertzen.[103] This specific form of leftist influence brought increasing prominence to issues of nuclear power and demands for negotiations between the two German states, which caused "outrage in the party council of the SPD."[104] The Bad Godesberg turn would only exacerbate these tensions. The SDS reportedly tried to maintain its association with the SPD, but it could not "conceal the growing ideological divide."[105] In the subsequent years, the SDS became increasingly influenced by the concept of the "New Left" which was introduced to the student group by Gerhard Brandt from the Frankfurt chapter in 1961.[106] Brandt understood the most important characteristics of the New Left to be its departure from orthodox Marxism, the rejection of the established party system, a critique of authoritarian and apathetic tendencies within society, the demand for

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[100] Ibid.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, p. 12.
[103] Ibid., p. 13.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.

social change, its dissatisfaction with the Cold War, and a relationship with antinuclear movements.[107] It was the growing influence of the New Left within the SDS which led to the final split with the SPD. According to Klimke, the SPD saw the SDS as a form of institutionalised "inner-party opposition," and began setting up its own student organisation in February 1960 before officially disassociating itself from the SDS on November 6th. 1961.[108] The SDS, much like the *Ostermarsch*, became an organisation detached from the existing social order in the Federal Republic. While neither organisation should be understood as constituting West Germany's burgeoning extra-parliamentary opposition *by themselves*, they stand as important examples of how the inhabitants of the "worlds of protest" began to position themselves against the political system in the early 1960s. The gulf which developed between the SPD and both the *Ostermarsch* and SDS is indicative of the waning credibility of the West German social order for the individuals and groups that would form the extra-parliamentary opposition and constitute "the world of protest" in the Federal Republic.

§ Spectres of the Past.

Protest in West Germany and dissent in Czechoslovakia were partly informed by a confrontation with each nation's fascist and Stalinist pasts. This appeal to history served as an important tool for protestors and dissidents when challenging the credibility of their regimes as well as for understanding and justifying their own rebellious movements. There was, however, an important difference between the two regarding how well this history was understood. In the 1960s and 1970s, the confrontation with the past manifested itself within the Federal Republic as a fear regarding democracy's instability. In Czechoslovakia during the 1970s, it developed into knowledge of the Communist regime's corruption. By elucidating this difference we gain clear insight into the origins of the various ideologies or *thought* which underpinned both West German protest movements and Czechoslovakian dissidence. Perceptions of the past informed protestors' and dissidents' understandings of their present, and they influenced the ways in which the present was resisted.

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[107] Ibid., pp. 13-14.
[108] Ibid., p. 14.

Regarding the social unrest in West Germany during the 1960s, Detlef Siegfried argues that the Nazi past became "a ubiquitous context for arguments about the present."[109] This was true for both newspapers that presented student demonstrators as a "new SA" (a reference to the Third Reich's storm troopers) and the students themselves who could charge any opponent with having been complicit with National Socialism in order to discredit them.[110] According to Siegfried, the Nazi past was tied to the "internal and external definitions of the generations."[111] He argues that students in particular were highly critical of the previous generation for having been "implicated in National Socialism either actively or passively"[112] This was especially true for anyone who held or had held any form of political power. Siegfried's argument evokes one of the many classical interpretations of 1960s social unrest—that of the conflict between generations. However, his claim that the Nazi past informed arguments about the present captures something important about the reality of the protest movements in the 1960s. As Brown notes, one of the SDS's "central organising motifs" was to confront the continued presence of "murders and those who facilitated them."[113] The SDS was especially critical of former Nazis within the West German judiciary and those who served in Chancellor Adenauer's postwar regime. Many of these concerns were legitimate and Brown points out that much of the higher civil service from the Nazi period remained in place during Adenauer's administration.[114] This was also true for the judiciary, and it was not until 1967 that the first Nazi judge—Hans Joachim Rehse—was convicted of any crime.[115]

Confronting the Federal Republic's fascist past was central to the "crisis of credibility" in West Germany during the 1960s and 1970s. Brown argues that history itself became "a central pillar of the anti-authoritarian revolt." It not only provided the "language, motifs and analytical tools" for core activists but also for the "extra-parliamentary opposition as a whole."[116] Charges of "fascism" were part of the West

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[109] Detleft Siefried, "'Don't Trust Anyone Older Than 30?' Voices of Conflict and Consensus between Generations in 1960s West Germany," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 40, no. 4 (Oct., 2005), p. 743.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Ibid., p. 742.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 97.

[114] Ibid., p. 93

[115] Ibid.

[116] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 81.

German protest lexicon, and they can be found in their most extreme form within the ideologies of West Germany's "urban guerrilla" groups in the 1970s. As noted above, organisations such as the RAF perceived the Federal Republic as a "legitimate target" for violent action partly because of its failure to "purge itself of the remaining vestiges of German fascism.[117] Furthermore, as Hanshew points out, when the leaders of the RAF—including Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin—found themselves imprisoned after their capture in June 1972, they reached for Germany's "Nazi past" in order to describe their own circumstances and demand "the attention of the left."[118] Hanshew points to Meinhof's description of an eight-month stay she spent within the isolation or "dead wing" of a Cologne prison between 1972 and 1973 as evidence of this strategy. Meinhof reflected upon the experience, writing: "the political concept for the dead wing, cologne, i say quite clearly, is gas. my auschwitz fantasies were…real in there [sic]."[119] The RAF issued various statements from prisons making explicit comparisons between their treatment—which included solitary confinement, around the clock surveillance and force feedings beginning in May 1973—with the victims of the Third Reich and accused the establishment of resurrecting "methods of the recent past."[120] This form of self-depiction led to the frequent portrayal of the RAF with West Germany's alternative and underground press as "objects of torture" and "prisoners of war" who were denied their legal rights.[121] While Henshew notes that the spectre of "Nazi terror" increasing competed with the image of the Bonn regime as an "Orwellian surveillance state" within the extra-parliamentary left, the ease with which RAF prisoners compared their treatment to that of the Jews during the Third Reich is "potent evidence of the postwar left's problematic memory politics."[122] Indeed, the dominant presence of "the past" as a lens through which the APO and its terrorist offshoots could criticise "the present," raises important questions for the nature of protest in the Federal Republic. Specifically, by looking backwards the "worlds of protest" arguably missed the opportunity to criticise the existing social order for what it was. If this is the case, then it stands as a point of contrast with the "worlds of dissent" in Czechoslovakia.

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[117] Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy in West Germany*, p. 2.
[118] Ibid., p. 155.
[119] Quoted in Ibid.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Ibid.
[122] Ibid., pp. 156-157.

§ Czechoslovakia's "Post-Totalitarian" Present.

Czechoslovakia did experienced a confrontation with the legacies of Stalinism in the 1960s and 1970s. However, while in West Germany references to fascism became a core part of protesters' vocabularies, Czechoslovak dissidents in the 1970s were more concerned with their "post-totalitarian" present than their Stalinist or "totalitarian" past. The open discussion of the crimes of the fifties had been a key issue within public discourse during the more lax atmosphere of the Prague Spring, which, according to Bolton, facilitated a "genuine reckoning with the past."[123] The reforms of the Dubček era allowed for the formation of K 231, which was an organisation made up of former political prisoners. Bolton highlights how the existence of K 231, and the relaxation of censorship, fostered a widespread demand for "some kind of accounting with the show trials and the people who staged them."[124] While a commission was formed to investigate the show trials, its final report was suppressed by Gustáv Husák after he replaced Dubček as first secretary of the KSČ in April 1969.[125] Reflecting on the crimes of Stalinism was a crucial part of Czechoslovakia's experience during the late 1960s, but this is not to say that the past was not important for dissidents in the seventies. As Bolton explains, the 1950s remained "one of the key themes of the 1970s."[126] They evoked memories of life under Stalinism, specifically "show trials, mass arrests, and labor camps."[127] Considering the extent of party purges which took place during the early years of the 1970s, the fear of returning to the harsh realities of the 1950s seems quite understandable. However, despite these oppressive measures Bolton argues that "invocations of the 1950s" were something of a "red herring" during the period of normalization.[128] He emphasises that the "concept of 'the 1950s'" actually provided a way of "talking about the new situation without fully understanding it."[129] Had dissidents in the 1970s continued to speak about the present by reflecting on the past, then they would share a similarity with West German protest movements

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[123] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p 78.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Ibid.

[126] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 77.

[127] Ibid.

[128] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 79.

[129] Ibid., pp. 79-80.

in the 1960s. However, as Bolton notes, for Czechoslovakia it became "more and more urgent to define and describe the forms of repression that *were* being implemented [in the present.]"[130]

Vaculík made it clear in his conversation with Kun that he believed the defeat of the Prague Spring had revealed Communism to be "*unreformable*."[131] This did not mean that Communism could not evolve or change. While the high number of party purges during the early years of normalization may have first appeared to be a return to the violence of the 1950s, it eventually became clear that the social order in Czechoslovakia had, in fact, changed. Vaculík appears to have grasped this change early on. He wrote in 1970, that he was not personally "experiencing any oppression," but he believed the Communist regime had found a "genuinely new method of terror directed at the whole nation."[132] This new method of terror was the product of Husák's conception of normalization, which Bolton defines as a vision of society in which citizens traded any meaningful public or political life for relative economic well-being."[133] Bolton highlights the analysis of Milan Šimečka in his book *The Restoration of Order*, where he developed Antonín Liehm's understanding of normalization as a "'new social contract'…[where] people would pretend to support the regime as long as they were left alone in their private lives."[134] Šimečka would go on to distinguish between the "explicit forms of violence" of the 1950s with what he called the "civilised violence" of Husák's regime.[135] It was within the context of this civilized violence that dissent developed. As Bolton summarises, "dissent arose from a system that persecuted its opponents, occasionally brutally, but rarely destroyed them."[136] To put it in Šimečka's words, "[p]eople were silenced in a dignified manner and not with a punch in the mouth."[137] This change in the Communist system in Czechoslovakia is what led Václav Havel to describe it as "post-totalitarian" in his influential 1978 essay "The Power of the Powerless." Havel employed the term in order to describe the system of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia as it existed in the late 1970s. The prefix "post-" was added in order to demonstrate that the current regime was "totalitarian in a

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[130] Ibid., p. 80.
[131] Ludvík Vaculík, Interview with Miklós Kun, p. 208.
[132] Quoted in Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 80.
[133] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 73.
[134] Ibid., p. 73.
[135] Ibid., p. 80.
[136] Ibid., p. 81.
[137] Quoted in Ibid., p. 80.

way fundamentally different from classical dictatorships," and from totalitarianism as we "usually understand it."[138]

Havel's use of the term "post-totalitarian" somewhat reflects Hannah Arendt's argument in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* that a "normalized" totalitarian regime is impossible. Arendt argued that as soon as "normalization" reaches the point where "a new way of life" could develop, a totalitarian regime would "lose its bastard qualities and take its place among the widely different and profoundly contrasting ways of life of the nations of earth."[139] Her point was that such an evolution would cause a regime to lose "its 'total' quality" and therefore cease to be totalitarian.[140] Nevertheless, many Czechoslovak dissidents (including Havel himself) continued to use the term "totalitarian" to describe the Communist regime well into the 1980s.[141] While Havel appears to have used the term "totalitarian" in the 1980s synonymously with his definition of the term "post-totalitarian" in essays such as "Stories and Totalitarianism" and "Farce, Reformability, and the Future of the World," his fellow dissidents appear to deploy the term in the same way that many scholars have—that is to say, without proper qualification. By continuing to use the term "totalitarian" to describe the Communist regime, Czechoslovak dissidents implicitly argued that essential similarities existed between Nazi, Stalinist, and post-Stalinist regimes. Considering that a core argument of this paper is its claim that Czechoslovaks had a better understanding of the real nature of the existing Communist system in the 1970s, we might see this suggestion (no matter how implicit) to be evidence to the contrary. However, considering the fact that most dissidents appear to have recognised that the Communist system had transformed from its Stalinist origins, their continued use of the term "totalitarian" has little bearing on the

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[138] Ibid., p. 131.

[139] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2nd. (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, 1964), p. 391.

[140] Ibid.

[141] For evidence of this see Václav Havel, "Stories and Totalitarianism," and "Farce, Reformability, and the Future of the World," in *Open Letters,* ed. Wilson, pp. 328-350, 355-362, and the contributions of Václav Benda, Václav Malý, Radim Palouš and Anonymous to *Civic Freedom in Central Europe: Voices from Czechoslovakia*, ed. H. Gordon Skilling and Paul Wilson (New York: St Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 42-47, 48-56, 85-86, 87-89.

overall argument of this paper. Dissidents recognised that the nature of the Communist regime had evolved despite using an arguably incorrect term to describe it. [142]

When dissident movements took form in Czechoslovakia during the 1970s they emerged with the recognition that the nature of totalitarianism had changed under normalization. A hallmark of dissident thought in the 1970s was highlighting the absurdity or hypocrisy of the political and social order. Havel explains this reality in an insightful passage in "The Power of the Powerless":

The post-totalitarian system touches people at every step, but it does so with its ideological gloves on. This is why life in the system is so thoroughly permeated with hypocrisy and lies: government by bureaucracy is called popular government; the working class is enslaved in the name of the working class; the complete degradation of the individual is presented as his ultimate liberation; depriving people of information is called making it available; the use of power to manipulate is called the public control of power, and the arbitrary abuse of power is called observing the legal code; the repression of culture is called its development; the expansion of imperial influence is presented as support for the oppressed; the lack of free expression becomes the highest form of freedom; farcical elections become the highest form of democracy; banning independent thought becomes the most scientific of world views; military occupation becomes fraternal assistance. Because the regime is captive to its own lies, it must falsify everything. It falsifies the past. It falsifies the present, and it falsifies the future. It falsifies statistics. It pretends not to possess an omnipotent and unprincipled police apparatus. It pretends to respect human rights. It pretends to persecute no one. It pretends to fear nothing. It pretends to pretend nothing.[143]

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[142] In the interests of full disclosure, it is worth noting that the present author largely agrees with Arendt's claim that a "normalized" totalitarian regime is impossible. However, this author also believes the continued use of the term "totalitarian" by dissidents to describe the Communist regime in the 1970s and 1980s is understandable (if not unproblematic). The continued attempts by Husák's regime to exert "total control" over the cultural realm bears a striking similarity to Stalinist practices.

[143] Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," pp. 135-136.

Havel's depiction of the post-totalitarian regime is not one in which the population of Czechoslovakia fears a return to the show trials and work camps of the 1950s. Instead, it is a world in which Czechs and Slovaks are forced to "live within a lie."[144] The new social contract under post-totalitarianism did not require individuals to believe the regime's hypocrisy and lies, but to behave as though they did or "tolerate them in silence."[145] However, Havel contends, it is by living within such a lie that individuals "confirm the system, fulfil the system, make the system, *are* the system."[146] Havel goes on to claim that the post-totalitarian system is something more than a "particular political line followed by a particular government," it is a "complex, profound, and long-term violation of society, or rather the self-violation of society," which cannot be opposed by establishing a "different political line and then striving for a change in government."[147]

One of the ideas for which Havel is most famous—particularly within Western understandings of dissent—is his proposal that post-totalitarianism can be opposed only by attempting to "live within the truth," which includes every activity in which "the genuine aims of life go beyond the limits placed on them by the aims of the system."[148] As Bolton explains, Havel's distinction between "living a lie" and "living in truth" is primarily distilled into his parable of a greengrocer, who places a sign saying "Workers of the World, Unite!" in his shop window, which "reinforces the reigning fictions of Communist ideology."[149] This is an example of an individual fulfilling the requirements of the system and therefore sustaining the system, sustaining the *lie*. Were the greengrocer to refuse to put out the sign then, Bolton explains, he would have taken "the first step" towards "reconciling his private convictions with his public behaviour"—he would have moved toward Havel's notion of "living in truth."[150] As it has already been mentioned, Bolton is deeply sceptical of reducing our understanding of dissent to Havel's insistence on "living in truth." He points out that Havel himself considered "dissent" to be a notion that was "largely defined by the West" which "systematically obscures much of the dissident's life and behavior at home."[151]

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144 Ibid., p. 136.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid., p. 180.
148 Ibid., p. 164.
149 Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 2.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.

Havel wrote "The Power of the Powerless" in 1978, a year after Charter 77—the most well-known "dissident movement"—had come into existence. His analysis should be perceived as an articulation of his own self-understanding of dissent. Still, when the "worlds of dissent" emerged during the 1970s, it does seem evident that the people who populated it them had a better understanding of the realities of normalization and their "post-totalitarian present." Jiřina Šiklová lends support to this hypothesis in her 1989 essay "The 'Gray Zone' and the Future of Dissent in Czechoslovakia." Here Šiklová explains how society as a whole was aware of the realities of normalization. She speaks primarily of the "gray zone" in Czechoslovakia—the "silent majority" of "diligent, qualified, professionally erudite people," who are, for the most part, "consumption oriented and politically uninterested."[152] Those who occupy the gray zone naturally encounter the establishment "on a daily basis and partake directly and indirectly in the functioning of the totalitarian regime."[153] They are also astutely aware of "the manner and degree to which people are being manipulated" and differ from dissidents only due to their "unwillingness or inability to confront power."[154] Šiklová also advances her belief that most Communists "think the same as so-called dissidents" and notes that many party officials tell "the selfsame political jokes and gripe just as much about the incompetence and corruption of our leadership."[155] Furthermore, Šiklová claims that she knows no party members who are Communist by "persuasion" or "conviction" but only for "reasons of expedience" or because they prefer to be "left alone" and lack the conviction either to leave the party or to refuse to join it when asked."[156] In general, Šiklová's reflections capture Šimečka's and Liehm's idea that normalization served as a new social contract, one which most citizens understood. Therefore, we are not without justification in accepting Havel's depiction of the realities of post-totalitarianism, and in advancing the claim that during the 1970s Czechoslovaks in general, and dissidents in particular, confronted their "post-totalitarian present" rather than their Stalinist past.

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[152] Jiřina Šiklová, "The 'Gray Zone' and the Future of Dissent in Czechoslovakia," in *Good-bye, Samizda: Twenty Years of Czechoslovak Underoung Writing*, ed. Marketa Goetz-Stankiewics (Everston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1992), p. 183.
[153] Ibid., p. 184.
[154] Ibid., p. 184.
[155] Ibid., p. 181.
[156] Ibid., p 182.

§ West German Antifascism.

Protest movements in West Germany during the 1960s and 1970s arguably lacked the sense of understanding that Czechoslovaks had for the regime which they opposed. As Karin Hanshew explains, it is now generally understood that the extra-parliamentary opposition's "antifascist vigilance" had outlived the "actual threat of fascism" in the Federal Republic.[157] She further explains that from the perspective of hindsight it has been assumed by many that the "free democratic order" of the Bonn regime was never truly at risk.[158] While antifascism was not the sole ideological trend in West German protest movements, it was an important one. At the very least, the presence of antifascism reveals how protestors navigated their present situation by invoking the Nazi past. Still, antifascism was a core tenet of the ideology that underpinned West Germany's "worlds of protest." As Hanshew argues, assessing the fidelity of West Germans' "stated fears," is much less important than understanding their influence on "people's judgement and actions."[159] She further states that the "very inability" of West Germans to correctly understand the existing conditions in the Federal Republic was a result of justifiable concerns with "democracy's viability" rather than some form of hysteria.[160] Even if Hanshew is correct in this belief, we can still perceive a fundamental difference between the nature of the "worlds of protest" in West German and the "worlds of dissent" in Czechoslovakia concerning the degree to which protesters and dissidents properly understood the regimes they opposed.

West German fears regarding their democracy's instability were by no means unreasonable. Nor was it unsurprising that these concerns manifested themselves through a confrontation with the Nazi past. As mentioned above, the continued presence of former Nazis within the civil service and the judiciary is an indisputable fact. This led to what K.H.F. Dyson describes as a "'politics of fear'…propagated by both Left and Right," which stood as a "continuing characteristic" of German "political style."[161] This fear included both the extra-parliamentary opposition's anxieties regarding the "neo-fascist potential in the political sys-

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[157] Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy in West Germany*, p. 15.

[158] Ibid.

[159] Ibid.

[160] Ibid.

[161] K. H. F. Dyson, "Leftwing Political Extremism and the Problem of Tolerance in Western Germany," *Government and Opposition*, vol. 10. no 3 (July, 1975), p. 307.

tem" and the campaign of the right-wing Springer press against the perceived "totalitarian extremists of the Left."[162] Dyson claims that such fears were not necessarily unfounded in a regime that "at its foundation was regarded as only 'provisional.'"[163] Furthermore, the Federal Republic had been under "considerable pressure since its inception" to defend itself more successfully against Communist and fascist threats than its "Weimar predecessor."[164] Hanshew emphasises how the Federal Republic had defined itself as a *wehrhafte Demokratie* in its postwar constitution; a term literally meaning "a democracy well-fortified to defend itself."[165] The perceived weakness of West German democracy led to fierce debates between its leading political parties— the Christian Union (CDU/CSU) and the SPD—during the 1950s and 1960s over how to ensure that democracy could defend itself from totalitarian and fascist threats. As Hanshew explains, these debates circulated around what it meant for democracy to be sufficiently "militant," and the CDU/CSU's belief that "executive power and the use of coercive force" were justifiable temporary responses to exceptional situations emerged as the "undisputed victor" of these debates by the end of the 1960s.[166] During this period West German democracy was haunted not only by the spectre of the Nazi past but also the failure of the Weimar Republic to resist the rise of fascism.

While the establishment debated how best to ensure democracy's protection, the student movements confronted what they perceived to be the antidemocratic tendencies remaining within the political regime and society at large. As Dyson emphasises, many young Germans continued to believe that they lived in an "excessively rigid conservative society," which defined the area of "legitimate dissent very narrowly compared to other liberal democracies."[167] These concerns remained deeply rooted in reflections upon the Nazi past. One area in which this took place was within the increasing demands for university reform during the 1960s. As Thomas explains, demands for reform quickly developed from their initial focus upon the academic courses available and student participation in university government to include a "far-left cri-

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[162] Ibid.

[163] Ibid.

[164] Ibid.

[165] Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy in West Germany* p. 35.

[166] Ibid., pp. 35-36.

[167] Ibid., p. 308.

tique" of the Federal Republic as a whole.[168] He further claims that Germany's fascist past was arguably the "key issue" behind the attitudes to reform that encouraged a "fundamental reassessment of the very nature of West German universities."[169] Thomas points out that students reproached universities for their past failure to oppose "Nazi incursions on their autonomy," as well as their long-standing emphasis on creating "an ideal of introverted personal enlightenment" instead of fostering "a critical academic community."[170] Students saw universities as being "divorced from the everyday realities and social needs of ordinary Germans."[171] There was something legitimate about such criticisms. According to Thomas, the lack of a critical academic tradition encouraging "political participation and debate" had left German universities incapable or unwilling to defend either "themselves or German democracy" when faced with the rise of fascism.[172] Furthermore, much like the civil service and the judiciary in the 1960s, West German universities continue to employ a substantial number of academics with Nazi pasts. Thomas notes that despite 4,000 Nazi academics being removed from their positions in 1945, many were reinstated in the following years.[173] Student politics and government had also remained largely conservative during the 1950s and early 1960s, with the student arm of the CDU and "rabid anti-communism" remaining dominant across West German universities and within the Free University Berlin in particular.[174] According to Thomas, the 1960s saw the arrival of a generation of students less attached to conservatism who wanted universities to live up to their "democratic rhetoric" and were receptive to "far-left critiques about the nature of post-war democracy and the role of former Nazis."[175]

However, as Brown explains, the call to resist fascism that emerged within organisations such as the SDS represented a "retroactive antifascism" and a hope to achieve what the "Weimar-era left had been unable to do."[176] To support this claim, Brown highlights the words of Peter Paul Zahl (who had served as the

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[168] Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany*, p. 51.

[169] Ibid.

[170] Ibid.

[171] Ibid., p. 52.

[172] Ibid.

[173] Ibid., p. 52.

[174] Ibid., p. 53.

[175] Ibid., p. 54.

[176] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, pp. 98-99.

editor of the underground newspaper *Agit 883*) who stated that "we didn't want it to be said about our gen-

eration that we were just as silent about [this] swinishness as our parents were about what happened in the

Third Reich."[177] However, both Brown and Dyson point to the limitations of this student antifascism.

Dyson describes much of the New Left's analysis as "manifestly distorted and potentially dangerous in its

own assertive intolerant naivety," and Brown points out that much of the protest movement's analysis of

fascism with regard to its nature, causes and meaning has fared poorly in the eyes of scholarship.[178] If

Brown and Dyson are correct in these assessments, then it would suggest that the spectre of the Nazi past

restricted West German protesters from criticising the Bonn regime for what it actually was—and such a

hypothesis would clearly differentiate West German protest from Czechoslovak dissent. The question of why

the kind of perceptiveness that characterised Czechoslovakia's "worlds of dissent" did not occur in West

Germany is one that deserves its own dedicated historical analysis. However, it is the suspicion of this au-

thor that the eventual answer may relate to Havel's belief that parliamentary-democracies are oppressive in

ways which are much more subtle that their post-totalitarian counterparts.

§ The Fine Line Between Politics and Culture in West Germany.

At first glance the "crisis of the credibility" in West German democracy may appear to be more po-

litical than cultural. However, historians such as Brown are critical of narratives that focus too narrowly on

the politics, policies and demands of the extra-parliamentary opposition and the West German student

movement in particular. Brown's understanding of "protest" is much closer to Bolton's aforementioned de-

scription of dissent as a "cultural-political movement." Approaching protest through such a lens is the very

basis of our concept of the "world" or "worlds of protest" in West Germany. It is true that extra-parliamen-

tary organisations such as the SDS and the *Ostermarsch* had political concerns which were linked to the

SPD's political transformation following Bad Godesberg. It is also the case that the university reform

movement made political demands such as their call for the creation of student *Rätedemokratie* in the late

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[177] Quoted in Ibid., p. 98.
[178] See Dyson, "Lefting Political Extremism and the Problem of Tolerance in Western Germany," p. 308, and Ibid.

1960s which would lead to universities been governed through student councils.[179] These were certainly *political* issues that were tied to the "crisis of credibility" in West German democracy. However, the "worlds of protest" was much more than a set of political demands influenced by a lack of faith in German democracy. Skilling once wrote that under a totalitarian system (or as Havel would call it, a "post-totalitarian" regime) such as Husák's Czechoslovakia, every form of "independent behaviour" becomes inherently political in the "eyes of the regime" and therefore becomes a "kind of 'political opposition.'"[180] Something of the converse took place during the 1960s and 1970s in West Germany. The nature of the capitalist democratic system, and the "crisis of credibility" in that system, led political grievances of many Germans to take on a particular cultural life. The "worlds of protest" was more than protest demands. It was also protest ideology or "thought," countercultural lifestyles, alternative communities, artistic movements, underground newspapers and even urban guerrilla movements. As mentioned above, antifascism and reflections on the Nazi Past were not simply political stances held by many protesters—they were also part of the language of protest and expressed not only protest "thought" but protest culture.

While it is is far beyond the scope of this paper to thoroughly analyse or even name the various components of the "worlds of protest," an overview of several core examples is warranted. Avant-garde artistic movements such as the Munich-based "Gruppe Spur"—which existed between 1957 and 1962—made early challenges to the social order by combining art and politics when they began publishing in their journal *Spur*. Mia Lee describes their goals as the "complete revolution of art and everyday life," and notes that they borrowed notions of alienated labour from Marxism and integrated them with the critique of leisure developed by Situationists and philosophers such as Henri Lefebvre and Jean-Paul Sartre.[181] It was within the Spur collective that Dieter Kunzelman would make his first impact on the "world of protest." As Klimke notes, Kunzelman became Spur's "leading theoretician," contributing to their journal and political pamphlets in which the group criticised "the existing culture industry and its commercialization."[182] Kun-

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[179] Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany*, pp. 60-61.

[180] H. Gordon Skilling, "Introductory Essay," in *Civic Freedom in Central Europe,* ed. Skilling and Wilson, p. 6.

[181] Mia Lee, "The Gruppe Spur: Art as a Revolutionary Medium during the Cold War," in *Between the Avant-Garde and the Everyday: Subversive Politics in Europe from 1957 to the Present*, ed. Timothy Brown and Lorena Anton (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011), pp. 12, 18.

[182] Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, p. 55.

zelman would go on to co-found another group influenced by Situationist thought, *Subversive Aktion* which sought to translate the "complex analysis of modern society based on the critical theory of the Frankfurt School...into action."[183] In 1964 *Subversive Aktion* recruited Rudi Dutschke and Bernd Rabehl who, as Klimke notes, would transform not only the organisation itself but also the SDS.[184] According to Klimke, Dutschke and Radehl had left East Berlin in order to study sociology at the Free University and were specifically interested in critically assessing "the writings of socialist and Marxist-Leninist literature."[185] What drew Specifically, Dutschke and Radehl sought apply the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School in protest activity.[186] Kunzelman and Dutschke would go on to hold prominent positions within the West German protest culture: Kunzelmann helped found the countercultural *Kommune 1* in West Berlin and, as Brown notes, Dutschke would become the leading figure in the anti-authoritarian wing of the SDS and the "*very* face" of student revolt in West Germany.[187]

In December 1964, *Subversive Aktion* played a role alongside the SDS and other student groups in organising protests against the Prime Minister of the Congo, Moïse Tshombe. Klimke reports that the group distributed flyers denouncing human rights violations committed by Tshombe at a rally in Munich on December 14th, and its Berlin branch *Anschlag Gruppe* hurled tomatoes at his car when he visited the city hall in Schöneberg some four days later.[188] The protests against Tshombe represent a moment where the "crisis of credibility" in West Germany manifested itself in its streets. As Brown explains, the protest also marked the emergence of particularly trends for West German activism. Specifically, protesters employed antifascist language against Tshombe—highlighting in leaflets the Prime Minister's use of mercenaries from the Waffen SS—to draw connections between Germany's Nazi past and "recent and current anticolonial struggles."[189] These leaflets also made explicit connections between the experiences of West Germany with those resisting the legacy of colonialism in the Third World by claiming that "[t]he oppressors of the Con-

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[183] Ibid., p. 56.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Ibid.
[186] Ibid.
[187] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 23.
[188] Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, p. 57.
[189] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 23.

golese people are also our oppressors."[190] That the self-understanding of many protestors equated their experiences with the oppression in the Third World gives weight to Brown's hypothesis that reflections on the German past became "fused" with the "global present" through the "cultural productions of the West German student movement."[191] Reflections upon the Nazi past therefore served as a "ready template for assessments of the contemporary political situation."[192] Brown points out that this model of protest would recur throughout the 1960s, with protests against visiting foreign dignitaries such as the Vice President of the United States Hubert Humphrey and the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran taking place in Berlin in April and June, 1967.[193]

The day before Humphrey arrived in Berlin members of *Kommune 1* were arrested for plotting to "bomb" his motorcade during a planned protest against the Vietnam war incited by his visit.[194] Despite reports in the Springer Press that the assassins were armed with "explosions from Peking," the communards "bomb" was revealed to made of ingredients for pudding.[195] Vietnam was, however, another issue of the "global present" which was understood by protesters through reflection on the Nazi past. As Thomas notes, *Kommune 1* was both anti-authoritarian and revolutionary in its ideology, and Vietnam and support for the North Vietnamese provided "the main focus for its political activity."[196] This was a common theme in the "worlds of protest." When Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin (who would later found the RAF) were arrested for firebombing a Frankfurt department store in 1968, Baader's lawyer defended their actions as a protest "not only against German silence on the Vietnam war, but also against an entire generation that had tolerated the crimes of the Nazi period."[197] Jeremy Varon highlights the words of Berward Vesper (Ensslin's former fiancé) who also defended the arson by claiming that "Vietnam is the Auschwitz of our generation."[198]

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[190] Quoted in Ibid.

[191] Ibid., p. 13.

[192] Ibid.

[193] Ibid., pp. 24, 56.

[194] Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany*, p. 99.

[195] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 56.

[196] Thomas, *Protest Movements in West Germany*, p. 99.

[197] Jeremy Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, The Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley, California and London, England: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 247-248.

[198] Quoted in Ibid., p. 248.

The equation of West German experiences in the present with on-going anticolonial movements and the Nazi past was a cultural characteristic of the "worlds of protest." The language of antifascism in the 1960s and 1970s went beyond the critique of the silence regarding the Nazi past and the presence of former Nazis in positions of power within the civil service, the judiciary and universities. As Thomas explains, there was also a "common fear of a conspiracy to revive Nazism" present within protests against the planned Emergency laws, the showing of racist exploitation films like *Africa Addio* (in June 1966), and the electoral successes of the neo-Nazi political party *Nationaldemokratischer Partei Duetschlands*.[199] Wilfried Mausbach explains how these sentiments would intensify following the International Vietnam Congress held in Berlin during 1968 and argues that a result of the congress was that "students began to view *themselves* as prospective victims of extermination."[200] Mausbach points to the words of a visitor to the congress who warned, "[i]f we want to understand the liberation struggle in Vietnam correctly, it means that we have to get rid of this government,…[otherwise] we will perish in a concentration camp one day"; and the reflections of Michael "Bommi" Baumann regarding his reasons to join the urban guerrilla organisation The June 2nd Movement, "[i]nstead of being deported to Auschwitz once again, I'd rather shoot—it's as simple as that."[201] Bommi had first cut his teeth in the SDS (joining at the start of '67) but was quickly drawn to *Kommune 1*. In his memoir *Wie Alles Anfing = How it all Began*, Bommi defines the *Kommune* as the "right connection of politics and counterculture." it was certainly political but it also had "a style of life, a concrete alternative, this collective living."[202] He describes the *Kommune* as presenting an alternative to the "straight" SDS. It was filled with people who "listened to the music and had long hair." It also differed from the SDS's line that "there's going to be a revolution *somtime*, but it's not going to change anything in your situation right now."[203] *Kommune 1* embodied the idea of living the revolution. Another one of its founders, Fritz

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[199] Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany,* p. 87.

[200] Wilfried Mausbach, "America's Vietnam in Germany—Germany in America's Vietnam: On the Relocation of Spaces and the Appropriation of History," in *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s*, ed. Belinda Davis et al. (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010), p. 47.

[201] Quoted in Ibid.

[202] Michael Baumann, *Wie Alles Anfing = How it all Began* (Vancouver, Canada: Pulp Press, 1977), p. 15.

[203] Ibid.

Teufel described it as "a revolution of everyday life, an abolition of private property, a breaking of the achievement principle, a proclamation of the pleasure principle."[204]

Timothy Brown has argued that the division of "culture" and "politics" into "separate domination" is no longer sustainable for scholars analysing the radical politics of the second half of the twentieth century.[205] The truth of this statement appears quite apparent in the "crisis of credibility" for West German democracy during the 1960s and 70s. Dutschke's reflection upon the protests against Tshombe provide an apt summation of this point. He wrote that "[w]ith the anti-Tshombe demonstration, we have for the first time seized the political initiative in this city. We can see it as the beginning of our cultural revolution, in which...all prior values and norms are called into question."[206] While the exact meaning of a "cultural revolution" is arguably just as unclear as Certeau's description of the French May as a *symbolic* revolution, it speaks of one of the core concerns of both this chapter and this thesis as a whole: protest had a particular cultural life As we shall see in Chapter 3, West German protesters consistenly blurred the line between culture and politics: they sought to politicise the literary realm in their struggle against the establishment and made use of symbolic imagery gleamed from revolutionary texts—such as Mao's Red Book—as parr of their own cultural identification.

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[204] Quoted in Thomas, *Protest Movements in West Germany*, p. 99.

[205] Timothy Brown, conclusion to *Between the Avant-Garde and the Everyday: Subversive Politics in Europe from 1957 to the Present*, ed. Timothy Brown and Lorena Anton (New York & Oxford: Berhahn Books, 2011), p. 219.

[206] Quoted in Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 24.

Chapter 2: Those Who Act & Suffer.

§ On Dissidents & Protesters: Those Who Act & Suffer.

In the second of Jan Patočka's *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History* he warned against deriving the meaning of historical events from the "narrative of the meaning about them."[1] He emphasised that "the meaning of a narrative about events is different from the meaning of what is narrated. The meaning of events is an achievement of those who act and suffer, while the meaning of a narrative lies in understanding the logical formations pointing to those events."[2] These words capture something at the very heart of historical analysis, even when divorced from Patočka's deeper examination of the philosophy of history. It is in the spirit of Patočka's warning that we have attempted to exorcise the spectre of "1968" from the study of West German protest and Czechoslovak dissent. Instead, dissent and protest have so far been described as cultural phenomena, as particular "worlds" in which existing political and social orders were challenged. What is sought is a historical analysis of the *meaning* of protest and dissent for those very people who "acted" and "suffered" during the 1960s and 1970s. In this respect, a historical narrative which defines the experiences of "1968" is less interesting than a historical analysis which explains why protest and dissent *felt* like a *symbolic* revolution or a "capturing of speech."

Understanding the similarities and divergences between West German protest and Czechoslovak dissent requires an examination of the individuals and organisations which populated the respective "worlds" of protest and dissent. There is some danger here in adopting too narrow a focus (particularly in the Czechoslovak case), and wandering into narratives that extoll the virtues or follies of a small group of intellectuals or student leaders While we must seek to avoid "courageous" or "martyr" narratives of resistance, the narrowing of protest and dissent to a subset of individuals and groups is an important part of the nature of both experiences. Bolton argues that in seeking to understand the "stories of dissent" we can reveal why dissent was born and fostered under a "regime of censorship," and come to learn why certain individuals and experiences "naturally acquire a larger-than-life aura, while others recede into the background

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[1] Patočka, *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History*, p. 28.
[2] Ibid.

no matter how much attention they deserve."[3] This chapter begins with a discussion of two individuals who have often fallen victim to "martyr" narratives of resistance—Jan Patočka and Rudi Dutschke. Both Patočka and Dutschke are deeply associated with the dominant ideologies often associated with Czechoslovak dissent and West German protest. In Patočka's case, his own personal conception of Charter 77 as a "moral imperative" helped shape his fellow dissidents' own understandings of dissent, especially in the wake of his death in March, 1977. Dutschke, on the other hand, was instrumental in popularising the importance of praxis and philosophy of "direct action" for West German protest. While making an explicit connection between Dutschke's beliefs and the urban guerrilla movements of the 1970s is historically contentious, the debates over violence that consumed the "worlds of protest" following the botched attempt on Dutschke's life in April 1968 often involved a radicalisation of his conception of "direct action." Highlighting the importance of these two individuals should help elucidate why certain individuals "acquire a larger-than-life aura" stories of both dissent and protest. The rest of this chapter explores Charter 77 and Czechoslovak dissent in more detail before settling into an examination of the importance of "solidarity" for both the "worlds of dissent" and the "worlds of protest." Here it will be argued that a sense of solidarity between Czechoslovak dissidents allowed for a greater degree of plurality of opinions within the "worlds of dissent" which was one of its great strengths. In West Germany, however, solidarity had a much narrower definition and for the most part served as a constraint upon protesters who were forced to lend their tacit "support" to organisations such as the RAF. This ultimately restricted the development of plurality of opinions within the "worlds of protest" and prevented West German protesters from fully confronting violence.

§ Those Who Act & Suffer: The Death of Jan Patočka.

Patočka himself played an important role in the Czechoslovak "world of dissent," and interestingly he has often been misconstrued by "martyr-narratives." His philosophical beliefs were deeply influential in the beginnings of Charter 77, and he would serve as one of the Charter's initial spokespersons. It is Patočka's death, however, that has been the subject of historical distortion. The Czech philosopher died of a

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[3] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 271.

stroke in hospital on March 13, 1977, but his death would soon develop something of a mythical status. Bolton provides an overview of how this occurred by examining a series of Western accounts of Patočka's demise. He argues that such accounts offer "a lesson in the distortions of dissident politics."[4] Bolton begins by describes Tom Stoppard's coverage from the *New York Review of Books* in the summer of 1977 as "restrained."[5] Stoppard had spoken of Patočka being "weakened by frequent and lengthy police interrogations," but emphasised that these factors were "compounded by influenza" leading to a heart attack.[6] Patočka had, in fact, been under increased scrutiny from the police, who had visited him at his apartment on March 1 and 2 before calling him in for what Bolton describes as a "daylong stay" at the police station on March 3—the day before he was taken to hospital suffering from chest pains, heart palpitations and breathing problems.[7] Bolton points out that earlier in May, Roman Jakobson had already "laid the framework for a martyr-narrative" in his obituary for Patočka in the *New Republic*.[8] Jakobson wrote that Patočka suffered health problems "after undergoing 11 hours of harsh police interrogation in two days."[9] This would be picked up by the philosopher Richard Rorty in a 1991 article for the *New Republic* which described Patočka as having "died of a brain haemorrhage while being interrogated."[10] While Bolton points out that while any implication that Patočka was beaten or tortured to death during interrogation is completely inaccurate, such fictions do "testify to the way that even critical intellectuals create dissidents in the image of their own preconceptions and yearnings."[11]

Ill-conceived myths of martyrdom—such as the one surrounding Patočka's death—do not provide an accurate understanding of the meaning of Czechoslovak dissent for those who acted and suffered at the time. However, as Bolton notes, Patočka's death did become a "sort of myth" for Czechoslovak dissidents in 1977. According to Bolton, Patočka's death provided his fellow dissidents with an "example to live up to," which highlighted the importance of their struggle and bestowed a "self-identification on a larger commu-

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[4] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 158.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Quoted in Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid
[9] Ibid.
[10] Quoted in Ibid.
[11] ibid., pp. 158-159.

nity, inspiring it to further cohesiveness and activity."[12] As we shall see, Patočka's most important contribution to the Charter movement was to define it as a commitment to a "higher authority" rather than as a "mere political calculation."[13] The charter was a "civic commitment" with no "expected consequences."[14] Bolton explains how Patočka had already emphasised themes of moral commitment and the need for the Charter to account for suffering and self-sacrifice "in its own narrative" in his essays on the Charter —"What Charter 77 Is and What It Is Not (Why right is on its side and no slander or forcible measures can shake it)" and "What Can We Expect of Charter 77" from January and March 1977 respectively.[15] These views gave Patočka's death a "deeper meaning" for his contemporaries than merely highlighting the oppressive nature of the Communist regime, and Vaculík's obituary for Patočka from March 16th captures these ideas concretely.[16] Vaculík wrote that Patočka died "from the fatal disease of civil liberty, respect for the law and statesmanlike wisdom....He died, a Czech in Europe. There can be no doubt that had he not stood up for his convictions he need not have died."[17] The sentiment within Vaculík's words can also be found in Ladislav Hejdánek's (another Czech philosopher and signatory of the Charter) statement on Patočka's death from March 24th, when he wrote "[w]e do not feel sorrow and disappointment, but it is suddenly as if we were holding a torch that has been passed on to us."[18] Vaculík and Hejdánek both provide an understanding of what Patočka's death meant for those who "acted" and "suffered." It stood as a moral appeal, one that built upon Patočka's own writings on the Charter, which speak of the important relationship between *thought* or *ideology* and the self-understanding of dissidents. As Bolton eloquently writes, "[w]ithout realising how little time he had to spare, he [Patočka] had articulated a moral framework in which his own death made sense."[19]

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[12] Ibid., p. 160.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid
[16] Ibid.
[17] Quoted in Ibid.
[18] Quoted in Ibid.
[19] Ibid.

§ Those Who Act & Suffer: The Near-Death of Rudi Dutschke.

It was noted in the previous chapter that Rudi Dutschke became something of the face of the West German student movement. Dutschke's prominence is not, however, a purely historical construction. *Kommune 1*'s Bommi Baumann reflects on Dutschke's prominence during the late 1960s. Bommi writes how Dutschke was "different" from other students; while his talks were "pretty abstract" he had "the power—you could see it right away: that man was no bookworm or rhetoric spouter, he was really on top of his thing....you knew that he wouldn't lie to you."[20] On April 11, 1968, Dutschke was wounded in an assassination attempt by Josef Bachmann. When arrested, Bachmann was found to possess a copy of the *Nationalizeitung*—a neo-fascist newspaper—which bore the headline "Stop Dutschke Now."[21] That night violent protests erupted across the Federal Republic and largely targeted the Springer Press, which the students blamed for the assassination attempt due to its "negative and often hateful portrayal of Dutschke and student protesters generally."[22] In his reflections on these so-called Easter Riots Baumanm highlights the specific importance of Dutschke himself. He writes, "[i]f it had been anyone else, someone unknown, it would of course never have been that way. He was a little like James Dean for the rock generation, an idol with symbolic value." Baumann states that he thought that these riots were the APO's "great chance" because "it was experienced in the same way by everybody, if only because it was Rudi Dutschke."[23] Baumann's words indicate Dutschke's importance within the "worlds of protest" during the 1960s, which suggests that his prominence as a leading figure of the student movement is not something that historians have simply created in hindsight.

It was not just the attempt on Dutschke's life that held meaning for West German protestors, he also made important contributions to the "language of dissent." While it was noted above that Baumann (and many others if he is to be believed) found Dutschke's talks abstract and difficult to understand, in several places he picks up on theories advanced by Dutschke. Baumann references the notion of the "propa-

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[20] Baumann, *Wie Alles Anging*, p. 25.

[21] Karin Bauer, "'From Protest to Resistance:' Ulrike Meinhof and the Transatlantic Movement of Ideas," in *Changing the World, Changing Oneself*, ed. Davis et al., pp. 177-178.

[22] Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy in West Germany*, p. 103.

[23] Baumann, *Wie Alles Anging*, p. 32.

ganda of the deed" and Dutschke's forward to the revolutionary pamphlet *Letters to Rudi D.*, in order to

discuss the experiences and problems of street protests.[24] As Hanshew explains, Dutschke and Hans-Jürgen

Krahl (who was a student of Theodor H. Adorno) had revived the idea of "propaganda of the deed"—a

strategy originally developed by anarchists in the nineteenth century—in an "organizational report" which

they presented to SDS delegates in September, 1967.[25] The concept was built upon romantic images of ur-

ban guerrillas and was employed as a complement to theories of anticolonial struggle, specifically Che Gue-

vara's "propaganda of the gun."[26] As Hanshew explains, Dutschke's and Krahl's "propaganda by deed" was

to serve the "cultural and psychological revolution in the metropoles" where "[i]ndividual actions would be

prepared in small, decentralized groups and then carried out in tandem—defying state regulation and

thereby exposing the state's vulnerability."[27] By engaging in direct challenges to the regime, the actions of

such groups would help reveal the "illegitimacy" of the existing social order to the public—by forcing it to

reveal its authoritarian tendencies—and therefore foster a potential mass movement of individuals who

would go on to "destroy the authoritarian power structure upon which it rested."[28] Baumann explicitly

refers to Dutschke's writings on this issue when he speaks of the fragmentation of the protest movement

during the Easter Riots. He argues that Dutschke was right to say that protest had to move beyond spon-

taneity, and argues that preparation, logistics and knowledge were all needed in order to avoid running into

a "void."[29] Scholars have debated the extent of Dutschke's influence on the development of the urban guer-

rilla movement.[30] Whether or not there is a direct connection to be found is less important than the fact

that Baumann appears to have made one. Baumann goes on to discuss his time in the Wieland Commune

(within which a smaller group formed the first urban guerrilla cell) and notes that *Letters to Rudi D.* was

included in the Commune's political literature along with various writings by Mao, Robert Williams' *The*

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[24] Ibid., pp. 24, 33.

[25] Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy in West Germany*, pp. 10,100.

[26] Ibid., p. 100.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Baumann, *Wie Alles Anging*, p. 33.

[30] See Ingrid Gilcher-Hotley, "Transformation by Subversion? The New Left and the Question of Violence," in *Changing the World, Changing Oneself*, ed. Davis et al., pp. 155-169.

Urban Guerrilla, Régis Debray's *Revolution in the Revolution*, and Che Guevera's "Make Two, Three, Many Vietnams.'"[31]

§ On Protesters & Dissidents: Charter 77.

The image of the Czechoslovak dissident as a courageous intellectual or philosopher is an oversimplification, but it is, perhaps, an understandable one. Figures such as Patočka, Havel and Vaculík held a place of importance within the "worlds of dissent." Much of their writings provide the best resource for assessing how dissidents understood both themselves and the nature of their movement. The dominant place of intellectuals is undoubtedly a result of what Kundera called "the massacre of culture" that began with the Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968 and continued during the period of normalization under Husák. Bolton speaks of the purging of the Communist Party during normalization—which saw 17.2 percent of the party, or 260,000 people, having their memberships cancelled and 67,000, or 4.5 percent of the party, being outright expelled—as "the soil from which dissent would grow."[32] For intellectuals, the loss of party membership effectively meant losing one's job: journalists and writers who either refused or were prevented from joining the new Writers' Union in 1971 were banned from publishing. Bolton notes that "tens of thousands" of artists and academics—alongside intellectuals who had never joined the party—were prevented from pursuing work in their chosen fields.[33] Czechs and Slovaks were required under section 203 of the country's legal code to demonstrate a source of income, which forced many individuals who had hitherto pursued work in the realms of culture to find working class jobs.[34] Bolton describes the formation of a "shadow world" of intellectual life under normalization, where writers, journalists and former Communists tried to come to terms with a "demoralized national political culture" and eventually shaped an "oppositional community," particularly through the unofficial publishing network of *samizdat*.[35] Originally, *samizdat* was a Russian word meaning "self-publish" or "self-publishing," which developed prominence in

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[31] Baumann, *Wie Alles Anging*, p. 36.
[32] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 62.
[33] Ibid., p. 88.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

Czechoslovakia in the early 1970s—most notably through the creation of its first publishing house, Edice Petlice, which was spearheaded by Vaculík.[36] Bolton notes that Edice Petlice would produce 367 titles, by a variety of Czech and Slovak novelists, poets, playwrights, philosophers, historians and personal essayists.[37] It was produced on mechanical typewriters and used carbon copies to make multiple copies which would then be circulated among the community, which makes its exact reach difficult to ascertain.[38]

The very nature of the Communist regime and the experience of normalization created the context for independent activity within which dissent would emerge. It was mentioned in the last chapter that normalization created something of a new social contract, where Czechoslovaks would "pretend to support the regime" so long as they were "left alone in their private lives."[39] As Bolton explains, accepting this contract—and surviving the party purges in particular—required making a commitment to an absurd set of beliefs that no one believed: specifically that the Prague Spring had been a "right-wing counterrevolution" and that Czechoslovakia had been saved by its "selfless allies" in the Warsaw Pact.[40] The landscape of Czechoslovakia became one where people chose to ignore the ingrained incredulity in society, or find a way to challenge it. It was within this context that the phenomenon of "independent" or "parallel" activity took root. As Skilling explains, the development of independent activity can be seen as a "universal phenomenon of dissent," which manifests itself in "ancient authoritarian systems, in modern totalitarian systems, and also in more democratic systems."[41] He notes that in Central and Eastern Europe after 1945, such independent activity fell into two categories: the "more or less ubiquitous acts of self-expression" found in family life, religion, and the black market and "rarer forms of structured or institutionalised dissent" such as human rights movements, *samizdat*, and "ecological and peace movements."[42] It was within this second, "organised" category that banned intellectuals developed a place of prominence.

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[36] Ibid., pp. 97-99.
[37] Ibid., p. 99.
[38] Ibid., pp. 99-100, 133,
[39] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent.*, p. 73.
[40] Ibid., p. 63.
[41] Skilling, "Introductory Essay," p. 3.
[42] Ibid., pp. 3-4.

The most famous form of "structured dissent" in Czechoslovakia was Charter 77—which did not actually consider itself to be an organisation and is best understood as civic initiative. As Skilling explains, the Charter described itself as a "'living community of citizens,' without organisation, structure or functionaries."[43] Charter 77 has often been understood by historians as both a human rights movement and a response to the regime's crackdown on the "music underground," most notably with the trial of the non-conformist psychedelic rock group The Plastic People of the Universe in September 1976. Recent scholarship has revealed this narrative to be a misconception, similar to the oversimplification of dissent to the stories of a few courageous intellectuals. As Bolton notes, of the four individuals placed on trial in September, only Vratislav Brabenec (a saxophonist) actually played in the Plastic People. Ivan Martin Jirous was also placed on trial but was the artistic director for the band, not a musician. The final defendants were Pavel Zajíček—actually a member of a separate band, DG 307—and Svatopluk Karásek, a Protestant minister and folksinger who belonged to neither DG 307 nor the Plastic People.[44] Bolton accepts that calling the incident "the Trial of the Plastic People" is a useful shorthand, but notes that it has displaced a more accurate description and that ultimately an "anecdote has become history."[45] What is dangerous about such shorthand is that it obscures a historical analysis of how members of the underground and dissident communities understood themselves and their movements. A similar obscurantism has overemphasised the philosophy of human rights in Charter 77's formation and the "worlds of dissent" as a whole.

The Charter was drafted by a small group of "banned intellectuals" during a series of meetings in December 1976 at the apartment of Jaroslav Kořán. Present at the initial meeting were Václav Havel, the historian Václav Vendelin Komeda, Jiří Němec, Pavel Kohout and Zdeněk Mlynář. Petr Uhl, Pavel Bergman, Jiří Hájek and Vaculík joined the small group at two subsequent meetings, and the group also consulted with others not present at the meetings themselves.[46] Human rights were a concern for these founding Chartists. Bolton reports that the Protestant philosopher Ladislav Hejdánek told Havel that their forthcoming declaration "might be based on the recently issued pacts on human rights" which was an idea

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[43] H. Gordon Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 19.
[44] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent,* p. 116.
[45] Ibid., p. 117.
[46] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 143.

that Mlynář also came up with independently.[47] The human rights pact Hejdánek referred to was the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (commonly referred to as the Helsinki Accords). Czechoslovakia had signed the Accords on August 1st, 1975 alongside thirty four other states including the United States, Canada and countries from either side of the Iron Curtain. As Bolton explains, while the Soviets welcomed the Helsinki Accords for legitimising Communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe, principle seven of the Accords—"Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion or Belief"—provided what he calls a "crucial intellectual and organizational impulse for dissident movements."[48] However, as we shall see, the discussion of human rights within original Charter declaration does not mean that the Charter movement as a whole can be reduced to concerns about human rights.

The original Charter declaration was "published" on January 6th, 1977 (the year from which the Charter derives its name). The document was seized by the Czechoslovak police after a now mythical, and likely exaggerated, car-chase during which Havel and the out-of-work actor Pavel Landovský—along with Vaculík who was receiving a lift to Wenceslas Square—attempted to mail over 240 copies of the Charter and deliver the original document to the Federal Parliament. They reportedly mailed at least one bag of letters before finally being apprehended. It did not matter: copies of the Charter were already in the hands of the Western press under the strict order not to publish it until January 7th.[49] At first glance the Charter does appear to be a human rights declaration, just as it appears to be a tool of courageous intellectual dissidents. The Charter begins by noting the publication of the Czechoslovak Collection of Laws no. 120 of 13 October 1976, which contained texts from the International Covenant on Civil Rights and of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Life that were signed on Czechoslovakia's behalf in 1968 and confirmed in the Helsinki Accords. It states that the publication of these texts serves as an "urgent reminder of the extent to which basic human rights in our country exist, regrettably, on paper only."[50]

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[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid., pp. 24-25.

[49] Ibid., pp. 148-151.

[50] "Charter 77 — Declaration, 1 January 1977," in *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia,* ed. H. Gordon Skilling (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981) p. 209.

Czechoslovakia was among the thirty-five countries that signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (commonly referred to as the Helsinki Accords) on August 1st, 1975. While the Soviet bloc welcomed the Helsinki Accords for legitimising Communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe, principle seven of the Accords—"Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion or Belief"—provided what Bolton calls a "crucial intellectual and organizational impulse for dissident movements."[51] The original Charter declaration is steeped in discussion of human rights and human rights violations but it also advances a deeper criticism of the state: it wishes to "conduct a constructive dialogue with the political and state authorities, particularly by drawing attention to various individual cases where human and civil rights are violated, by preparing documentation and suggesting solutions, by submitting other proposals of a more general character aimed at reinforcing such rights and their guarantees, and by acting as a mediator in various conflict situations which may lead to injustice and so forth."[52] As Kundera explains, the Charter was above all an attempt to "persuade the government to *talk* with them."[53] Bolton notes that the Charter's "uninspiring" legalistic language was, in a sense, "inspiring" because it revealed the Charter's own ethic of solidarity, presented in a "neutral language in which violations of international pacts could be articulated without...smuggling in any ideological commitments that might dissuade signatories."[54] The Charter drew attention to the absurdity of the new social contract under Husák. It highlighted the diminished credibility of a regime which could enshrine human rights in law and fail to abide by them. By refusing to colour the Charter with a specific ideology, the Chartists ensured that their concerns were those of all Czechoslovakians. And as Bolton points out, while the Charter denied that it was any kind of organisation *per se*, it provided dissent a name—Chartist—and it invited everyone to add their signature.[55]

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[51]Ibid., pp. 24-25.

[52] "Charter 77 — Declaration, 1 January 1977," p. 212.

[53] Finkelkraut, interview with Milan Kundera, p. 21,

[54] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 153.

[55] Ibid., p. 154.

§ Signatories & The Underground.

While Charter 77 invited all Czechoslovaks to add their names to the Charter—and the terms "Chartist" and "signatory" entered the language of dissent in Czechoslovakia—it remained for the most part centred in Prague. It is therefore understandable that the Charter movement has often been largely associated with "banned intellectuals." Furthermore, despite the Charter's refusal to be considered an organisation, it did select three spokespersons to represent the Charter when engaging with the state and other bodies whose signatures on Charter declarations would "attest to the authenticity of documents issued by the Charter."[56] The original spokesmen were Jan Patočka, Václav Havel, and Jiří Hájek, who were each in their own right well-known intellectuals with Hájek—who had held office during both Novotný's and Dubček's regimes—representing the former Communists. According to Skilling, these three spokesmen personified the "informal coalition of citizens of diverse beliefs" who were ready to "assume the risk of public activity, and were destined to suffer for this engagement."[57] Charter 77 is still easily associated with those whose names stand out most clearly among the original 240 signatories: the various "intellectuals" and reformed Communists who founded the Charter, those who published essays articulating their personal conceptions of the movement, and individuals such as Havel and Patočka who faced immediate harassment (and eventual imprisonment in Havel's case) at the hands of the regime. This association itself reveals something important about Czechoslovak dissent as a historical phenomenon—one that relates to Bolton's claim that by understanding the "stories of dissent" we can learn why certain individuals and experiences "naturally acquire a larger-than-life aura while others recede into the background no matter how much attention they deserve."[58]

However, the "population" of the "worlds of dissent" was broadened by Charter 77. Skilling notes that the overwhelming majority of signatories of the Charter were "unknown persons," most of whom were workers or professionals that had never been members of the Communist Party.[59] The Charter issued multiple declarations during 1977 indicating its growing number of public signatures, and the number reached

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[56] "Charter 77 — Declaration, 1 January 1977," p. 212.

[57] Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*, p. 19.

[58] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 271.

[59] Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*, p. 39.

over 1,000 by October 1979.[60] It is true that both Slovaks and women were underrepresented among these signatures—Bolton notes that the original number of Slovak signatures ranges between thirty and thirty-five and that among the entirety of original signatories only forty-two were female.[61] There are, however, reasons for this underrepresentation. Padraic Kenney highlights Ján Budaj's (a well-known activist in Bratislava) claim that the absence of Slovak signatures from the Charter indicates that their "political energies were directed elsewhere."[62] As Kenney explains, for Slovaks who were avant-garde artists, independent ecologists, or active in the underground church, signing the Charter might "compromise his or her primary cause."[63] As Skilling points out, there were many Czechoslovaks who were "fully in sympathy with Charter 77 and even ready to act on its behalf" but did not actually sign it.[64] He explains that the Charter published the names of only those who were willing to have their names made public, and in some cases individuals were discouraged from signing by Chartists themselves. Hejdánek, for instance, discouraged many of his students from signing the Charter fearing that their public support would lead to their dismissal from university.[65] Furthermore, Bolton argues that the underrepresentation of women was a result of many signatures standing for a "spousal unit."[66] Signing the Charter meant being blacklisted by the regime, and it made sense for one member of the household to keep their job. As Bolton points out, it was normally the men who signed but not always—Eva Kantůrková signed the Charter while her husband did not.[67] The Charter would, however, have a female spokesperson early in its existence when Marta Kubišová (a once popular pop singer and non-Communist) was chosen alongside Ladislav Hejdánek to replace the imprisoned Václav Havel and deceased Jan Patočka in September 1977.[68]

We must also remember that Charter 77 does not amount to the totality of the "worlds of dissent" during the late 1970s, despite its tendency to overshadow other aspects of dissident culture. The music un-

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[60] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[61] Ibid., pp. 171, 184.

[62] Padraic Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 81.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid., p. 42

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*, p. 29.

derground is an example of this. Its role in the narrative of dissent often reduces to the trial of the Plastic People serving as the "founding myth" for Charter 77.[69] However, the underground was itself a form of independent activity. While the "population" of the underground is difficult to gauge—Bolton estimates that the largest Plastic People concerts may have had a "few hundred people" in attendance—it was populated by a large group of nonconforming artists, musicians and working-class youths.[70] The underground also had its own theorists, most notably Ivan Martin Jirous, who was the artistic director for the Plastic People put on trial in September 1976. Jirous produced a *samizdat* manifesto in February 1975 titled "Report on the Third Czech Musical Revival," in which he described the goal of the music underground as an attempt to create a "second culture." He continued to write that this would be a culture "completely independent of the official communication channels, societal recognition, and the hierarchy of values that are controlled by the establishment. A culture that cannot have as its goal the destruction of the establishment, because it would thereby drive itself into its embrace."[71] The underground also had its own philosophy, which Bolton calls "primitivism"—a rejection of technical skill or perfection normally associated with "aesthetic canons" and a favouring for notions of authenticity and honesty.[72] Bolton highlights Jirous's reference to the nineteenth-century French proto-surrealist Lautréamont who stated "[o]ne day, everyone will make art,"[73] which is an idea that would not be out of place within the artistic countercultural movements in West Germany such as Gruppe Spur and *Subversive Aktion*. The underground was part of the "worlds of dissent" and Czech culture in its own right, but it has often been left out of narratives of dissent with the "Trial of the Plastic People" standing as a preliminary event in the lead-up to the Charter movement. Skilling, for instance, begins his work *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia* by stating that the initial stimulus for the Charter was the "trials and convictions of a group of rock musicians and their supporters for 'disturbance of the peace'."[74] While Skilling does briefly mention that the underground criticised both society

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[69] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 142.

[70] Ibid., p. 122.

[71] Quoted in Ibid., p. 128.

[72] Ibid., p. 129.

[73] Quoted in Ibid.

[74] Skilling, *Charter 77 and the Human Rights Movement in Czechoslovakia*, p. 7.

and challenged the regime's "monopoly over culture and art," he quickly moves to the reactions of intellectuals to "the trial" and its "glaring injustice."[75]

Dissident intellectuals were also guilty of simplifying the underground. Bolton explains that in Havel's account of the September trial in which Jirous and his fellow defendants were convicted—fittingly titled "The Trial"—he presented a "portrait of metaphysical anguish," which was a "convenient, and secularized, simplification."[76] Not only did Havel gloss over the importance of religion to three of the defendants, but he also presented the "'young' musicians" (only one of whom was under thirty) as having no political past or positions despite the fact that they represented "a much more diverse and complex cross section of oppositional thought."[77] Havel's reading of the underground might be seen as a form of appropriation. He oversimplified the values of the underground in order to advance his own critique of the establishment. According to Bolton, Havel understood the "Plastic People" in his "own way."[78] In the mid-1980s, after Havel had worked out his own interpretation of the Plastic People's role in the creation of Charter 77, he translated Jirous's understanding of the underground into a more "accessible language of metaphysical desperation."[79] Havel turned Jirous's primitivism into a philosophical language which could be more easily digested by "the circles of writers, journalists, political thinkers, and philosophers who were gradually coalescing into a full-scale 'dissident' movement."[80] Of course, oversimplifying the self-understanding of the entire underground to Jirous's writings would also be problematic. However, Havel's depiction of the underground is indicative of the role played by dissidents themselves in the narrowing of the "stories" of dissent to narratives of courageous or martyred intellectuals. The very phrase of "the Trial of the Plastic People" which is used to depict the underground's importance in dissent stands as a synecdoche of Havel's simplified reading of the underground which, as Bolton points out, is "precisely why the phrase caught on."[81]

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[75] See Ibid., pp. 7-15.

[76] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 138.

[77] Ibid., pp. 138-139.

[78] Ibid., p. 136.

[79] Ibid., p. 137.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid., p. 139.

§ The Solidarity of Dissent.

While Havel's own understanding of the music underground has come to shape the way many historians have characterised it, the fact remains that within Czechoslovakia's "worlds of dissent" there was space for a wide spectrum of different kinds of oppositional activity and even room for competing opinions about the nature of dissent itself. As Bolton explains, dissent was not just "*one* world of experience, but many different *worlds.*" It was a "phenomenon" which is too diverse to be "easily classified" and looked different from "country to country" and "city to city" and even from "one group of friends to another."[82] Bolton normalization."[83] This was a world composed of journalists, writers, and politicians who had suffered under normalization. Such individuals had been fired from their jobs, prevented from publishing their writings and were attempting to come to terms with "a demoralized national political culture shaped by compromise and frustration."[84] However, in Bolton's mind, Czechoslovakia's music underground of the 1960s and 1970s remained an equally important part of the "worlds of dissent," not simply because its "mythmaking techniques," had helped inspire the "new kind of oppositional community" that surrounded Charter 77, but because its very existence was a form of independent cultural activity where its own values of "authenticity" and "honest of expression" could be pursued.[85] One of the most important aspects of Czechoslovak dissent was its ability to maintain a sense of solidarity across a variety of differing political and cultural perspectives. For example, a respect for the plurality of different perspectives became inshrined in Charter 77's selection of spokepersons. As Bolton explains, the Charter developed an informal rule according to which its three spokespersons would be selected: it would usually choose one "reform Communist," one who could "represent religious currents in dissent" and a final "non-Communist" who would normally be an "intellectual or writer."[86] From a philosophical perspective, it is quite natural to see the Charter's emphasis on plurality as a real world example of Patočka's notion of the "solidarity of the shaken." Certainly Czechoslovakia's "worlds of dissent" appear to reflect Patočka's conception of the new "front line", where a sense of

[82] Ibid., pp. 13-14.
[83] Ibid., p. 14.
[84] Ibid., pp. 14-15.
[85] Ibid., pp., 14-15, 128-129.
[86] Ibid., p. 144.

"solidarity" could be achieved by all those capable of "understanding what life and death are all about."[87] The presence of plurality within the Charter movement stands as one of its greatest strengths as a form of opposition to the Communist system for, as Havel argued in "Stories and Totalitarianism," much of the power of a "totalitarian" system is derived from how successfully it manages to "limit and ultimately eliminate" political, intellectual and economic "plurality."[88] The fact that the "worlds of dissent" took shape as a movement based on plurality further supports the idea that dissidents had a particularly robust understanding of the nature of the regime which they opposed.

The connection between Czechoslovak dissent and Patočka's philosophy is not simply a historical insight made in hindsight, it is one that existed at the time. As Bolton points out, when the "founders" of Charter 77 chose a final spokesperson in December 1967—having already selected Havel and Jiří Hájek—their decision to settle on Patočka reflected Havel's conception of the Charter as a "moral initiative" rather than a political-civic one."[89] While Bolton notes that none of the Charter's "founders" could have foreseen the impact Patočka would eventually have on the Charter itself, he claims that the Czech phenomenologist was chosen because his philosophical "language of transcendence" represented the underground's emphasis on "authenticity, epiphany, and direct access to truth" from which Havel's moral interpretation of the Charter was partly derived.[90] As mentioned previously, Patočka's most important contribution to the Charter movement came in the form of two *samizdat* essays written in early 1977: "What Charter 77 Is and What It Is Not" and "What We Can Expect of Charter 77?." As Bolton explains, the former text helped articulate a clearer sense of what the Charter stood for, while the latter gave the Charter movement one of its "unofficial slogans" that "[t]here are things worth suffering for."[91]

In "What Charter 77 Is and What It Is Not," Patočka continued to emphasise that the Charter was not an "association or organisation," nor was it an act that was "political in the narrow sense" which would

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[87] Patočka, *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History*, p. 134.
[88] Havel, "Stories and Totalitarianism," p. 337.
[89] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*. p. 146.
[90] Ibid., pp. 146-147.
[91] Ibid., pp. 155-156.

compete or interfere in the "sphere of any function of political power."[92] In Patočka's mind the aim of the Charter was "the spontaneous and unbounded solidarity of all who have come to understand how significant a moral way of thinking is for a real society and its normal functioning."[93] This point not only reiterates Patočka's own understanding of the Charter as an opportunity in which the "solidarity of the shaken" could be achieved, but it also reflects Havel's musing on what a post-democratic society might look like in "The Power of the Powerless" and how an early image of it might be found in the groups and independent activity associated with Czechoslovak dissent. It is also worth noting, that Patočka considered the concept of "human rights" to be nothing more than acceptance by states and society in general that they must subject themselves to the "sovereignty of moral sentiment."[94] This further reiterates the idea that the Charter was not simply a "human rights movement," but rather used the "language" of human rights to express a deeper point. Patočka touched on several concerns regarding what the Charter might achieve in "What Can We Expect of Charter 77?." He spoke of the fear that the Charter might trigger further repression from the regime and the question of whether it could maintain the support of Czechoslovaks if it proved unable to help them by means other than "paper protests."[95] Patočka did not offer easy answers to these issues, rather by noting how people were "once again aware that there are things that are worth suffering for" and that "the things for which one might suffer," namely art, literature, and culture "are the ones that are worth living for."[96] As Bolton explains, Patočka's underlying point was not that suffering was sometimes "worth it," but that the Charter "had helped make people *aware* of this obvious truth," and that in light of this realisation this truth "might influence people's behavior once again."[97] As we have already discussed, Patočka's death helped cement these notions in the Charter community. As Bolton explains, his passing bestowed a sense of "self-identification on a large community" and inspired "further cohesiveness and activity."[98]

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[92] Jan Patočka, "What Charter 77 Is and What It Is Not (Why right is on its side and no slander or forcible measures can shake it)," in *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia,* ed. H. Gordon Skilling (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 218.

[93] Ibid. p. 219.

[94] Ibid., p. 218.

[95] Jan Patočka, "What Can We Expect of Charter 77," in *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia,* ed. H. Gordon Skilling (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 220-221.

[96] Ibid. p. 222.

[97] Bolton, *The Worlds of Dissent*, p. 159.

[98] Ibid., p. 160.

One piece of evidence which highlights Patočka's effect on the Charter movement comes from Václav Benda in his 1978 essay "The Parallel 'Polis.'" Benda addresses the "broad spectrum" of political opinion and civic attitudes brought together by the Charter and claims that the movement's focus on "moral ethical attitudes over political ones"—a sentiment which he specifically attributes to Patočka's influence—has temporally and "quite effectively" prevented any "schism" between these opinions and attitudes from taking place.[99] In 1989, Martin Palouš (another Charter signatory and later spokesperson) described Patočka's conception of the Charter as remaining, in his opinion, "'canonical' to this day."[100] However, Palouš claims that this approach to the Charter raised questions of how Chartists and the rest of society were supposed to respond to the "new situation" created by the Charter, and he points to Benda's aforementioned essay as one of the first responses to this question.[101] As Palouš explains, contrary to Patočka and Havel, Benda conceived the Charter movement as "a political act", one which had established a "parallel *polis*" which was, in fact, a "political community."[102]Benda wrote that his concern was not with "*whether* we should proceed from a moral basis" but rather "*how* to make that aspect inspiring and mobilising."[103] His proposal was to create more "[p]arallel cultural structures" such as those that existed in the realms of literature and music, and to create further parallel structures in the realms of education, economics and even in foreign policy."[104] Benda's essay might be read as an attempt to politicise both the Charter movement and the "worlds of dissent" as a whole—he writes that he is motivated by questions regarding what "specific efforts or 'positive' programme" could be developed from the Charter's moral approach for use "in the future." "makes the most sense" if it is seen as a "stage in the internal debates of the Charter," rather than as a "full-blown program of its own."[106] This is an important point because it highlights how Benda's essay represented his own self-understanding of dissent and the problems he identified within it. Benda himself admitted as much in the late 1980s describing "The Parallel 'Polis'" as both "improvised" and a result of the "need to

[99] Václav Benda, "The Parallel 'Polis,'" in *Civic Freedom in Central Europe*, ed. Skilling and Wilson, p. 35.

[100] Martin Palouš, "Jan Patočka versus Václav Benda," in *Civic Freedom in Central Europe*, ed. Skilling and Wilson, p. 123.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid. 124.

[103] Benda, "The Parallel 'Polis,'" p. 36.

[104] Ibid., pp. 37-38.

[105] Ibid., p. 36.

[106] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 213.

face up to a real crisis and real doubts."[107] Crucially, this casts Benda's attempts to politicise dissent as but one part of the very plurality found in Czechoslovakia' "worlds of dissent," and it is vital to realise that despite the influence of Patočka's interpretation of the Charter it too was part of this plurality of opinion. Patočka made this point clearly when he told the Czechoslovak police in early 1977 that he was articulating his own "'personal conception' of the Charter" in "What Charter 77 Is and What It Is Not," and was not issuing a Charter document "in his capacity as a spokesman."[108] This suggests that even for Patočka, the "moral conception" of the Charter existed within the Charter's plurality of viewpoints and not above it. This appears to have remained true for Benda who—in his explanation for his use of the term "parallel"— explains the idea that a parallel course "stresses variety, not absolute independence."[109] What this meant was that multiple parallel courses might "converge or cross each other" and possibly even open the door for a "merging" of official and parallel communities, allowing for the "peaceful dominance of the community anchored in truth over the community based on the mere manipulation of power."[110]

Within the plurality of the "worlds of dissent" (of which even the Charter was only one part) there was space for numerous opinions about the nature of dissent itself. As Bolton explains, both Vaculík and Petr Pithart produced short essays in December 1978 titled "Notes on Courage" and "The Shoulders of a Few" respectively, which highlighted "major fault lines running through the Charter community."[111] According to Bolton, in Vaculík's essay he "dared to suggest" that some Chartists were "going to prison for things that weren't worth it."[112] Bolton describes "Notes on Courage" as a "meditation on what kinds of actions were worth getting arrested for," which contained an underlying criticism of Patočka's idea that something things were worth suffering for—as, for Vaculík at least, some tribulations are not.[113] Pithart advanced a deeper criticism of the Charter, and suggested that an "active minority" within the Charter had become more concerned with "providing its own truth against power, than the common interest of the na-

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[107] See Václav Benda's contribution to *Civic Freedom in Central Europe,* ed. Skilling and Wilson, p. 48.
[108] Ibid., p. 156.
[109] Ibid. p. 50.
[110] Ibid., p. 50-51.
[111] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 231.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid., p. 232.

tion."[114] Both Vaculík and Pithart would develop these concerns into more concrete arguments over the following years, all the while facing various degrees of criticism and support from fellow dissidents.[115] Bolton points to a variety of essays made by Pithart in which he highlighted the problems facing dissent, such as "the dangers of separating off the Charter into a separate world with its own customs, rules, friendships and standards," and argued that dissent should refocus on "small-scale work" and think of dissent more in terms of "ordinary people striving to improve their communities and local environments."[116] Vaculík would go on to write *The Czech Dream Book: Dreams of the Year 1979*, a collection of daily entries which blurred daily entries about Vaculík's life, including records of meetings with fellow dissidents, with descriptions of his dreams, all presented more as literature than biography.[117] Bolton argues that within the *Dream Book* Vaculík developed an understanding of dissent as a "form of self-expression rather than political action" which continued to emphasise that such self-expression takes place in both "a public and private world."[118] According to Bolton, Vaculík was responding to dissent's struggle for a "public face" by insisting that dissent needed a more "plausible account of its own inner life," which could provide dissidents with an example of how to "free themselves from their political roles."[119] For Bolton, this new understanding of dissent represented a "serious alternative" to the "Havel-Patočka understanding" of dissent, even if it was not "equally inspiring to all the Chartists."[120]

§ The Solidarity of Protest.

Czechoslovakia's "worlds of dissent" were a place where a variety of different and often competing self-understandings could emerge. While it is true that certain conceptions of dissent (such as Havel's reading of the underground, and Patočka's conception of the Charter) often attained a degree of dominance, the plurality of opinions that constituted the spectrum of dissident thought marked its real strength even if it

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[114] Quoted in Ibid., p. 232.
[115] See Ibid., pp. 234-238, 243-251, 255-257 for a greater discussion of these debates.
[116] Ibid., pp. 237-238.
[117] Ibid., pp. 243-251.
[118] Ibid., p. 264.
[119] Ibid., p. 260.
[120] Ibid.

did create fissures among fellow dissidents. The reason plurality was a strength for dissidents was, of course, the fact that it was this very aspect of society that the Communist regime had sought to exterminate. While we must recognise that Patočka's conception of the Charter was but one element of the "worlds of dissent" we are not unjustified in thinking of the broader plurality of understandings of dissent as reflecting his notion of the "solidarity of the shaken." This idea facilitates an important point of contrast with West Germany's "worlds of protest" which arguably lacked a robust respect for a plurality within protest ideology. While protest in West Germany certainly took on a variety of different forms in which differing opinions could be expressed, its approach to "solidarity" as concept was arguably much narrower when compared to Czechoslovakia's "worlds of dissent." While the next chapter will examine this theme in greater detail by focusing on plurality in the cultural and specifically literary realms, the present section will focus on the relationship between "solidarity," direct action and eventually violence in the "worlds of protest."

When one thinks of the concept of "solidarity" in relation to West German protest, the picture that comes to mind is not Patočka's conception of the "solidarity of the shaken," where a variety of different individuals experience a shared "revelation" of the real nature of the "deceptive motifs of the day" and come together in their understanding of what "life and death are all about."[121] Instead, the term "solidarity" in the "worlds of protest" was normally used by West Germans during the 1960s to promote a sense of unity with fellow protest movements in other European and North American countries, to champion anti-colonial movements such as those in Vietnam, and even express support for the Black Panther Party. During the 1970s, the demands for "solidarity" on the Left were deeply intertwined with debates over violence as a political strategy and questions regarding how much support or condemnation should be advanced towards urban guerrilla movements such as the RAF. In each of these cases, solidarity referred less to a sense of unity across a plurality of competing opinions and courses of action than they did a demand for near blanket support for the antiauthoritarian Left's interpretation of the Bonn regime and its philosophy of pursuing direct action as a protest strategy.

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[121] Patočka, *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History*, p. 134.

As Klimke explains, the philosophy of direct action was first introduced to the extra-parliamentary opposition by German SDS member Michael Vester. Influenced by the civil rights movement in the United States and its ideas about civil disobedience, Vester produced a "widely read" article for *neue kritik* in the summer of 1965 which explored the "theoretical underpinnings of 'direct action.'"[122] At this stage, direct action was conceived of as a form of "nonviolent civil disobedience" and Vester argued that protest actions such as "teach-ins"—where students and intellectuals would come together to debate political and social problems—could pull the wider population "out of apathy and toward[s] greater democratic involvement."[123] It could provide a useful political strategy against the planned introduction of Germany's emergency laws.[124] Importantly, as Hanshew points out, Vester's philosophy "necessarily" built upon the common perception of the extra-parliamentary opposition that the Bonn regime had "authoritarian" characteristics and was a "potentially fascist state."[125] Vester conceived of direct action as the marriage of "theory and praxis, of immanence and transcendence, of democratic goals and the democratic path."[126] According to Hanshew, it was a philosophy that proposed confronting the state in such a way that it forced it to expose "its internal contradictions"—which boiled down to the State's presentation of itself as a liberal democracy despite containing authoritarian and proto-fascist characteristics.[127] While Vester only endorsed non-violent forms of direct action, it is important to note that he did so as a political strategy. Hanshew notes that the Vester's position on violence was "tactical"—he believed that violent action would "crumble in the face of a militarily and bureaucratically armed state force" and only non-violent action could confront the state "on the ground where it was weakest."[128] What Vester lacked, Hanshew claims, was any sense of non-violence as "a principled position."[129] What this suggests is that violent forms of resistance could be legitimate if the right conditions emerged.

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[122] Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, pp. 52-53.

[123] Ibid., p. 53.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy in West Germany*, p. 91.

[126] Quoted in Ibid.

[127] Ibid., pp. 91-92.

[128] Ibid., p. 91.

[129] Ibid.

Vester's philosophy of direct action also attacked "traditional leftist politics" and, as Hanshew claims, was specifically "Germanised" through the works of Herbert Marcuse.[130] Hanshew argues that Marcuse's essay "Repressive Tolerance" was particularly influential on the West German student movement because it combined "a radical critique of imperialism with an equally radical critique of advanced industrial society" and refused to renounce a strategy of "violence" against an equally "violent" oppressive state.[131] Marcuse himself was critical of parliamentary-democracy in a manner that is not totally dissimilar from Havel and Patočka's critique of technological civilisation, writing:

> In the contemporary period, the democratic argument for abstract tolerance tends to be invalidated by the invalidation of the democratic process itself. The liberating force of democracy was the chance it gave to effective dissent, on the individual as well as social scale, its openness to qualitatively different forms of government, of culture, education, work—of the human existence in general. The toleration of free discussion and the equal right of opposites was to define and clarify the different forms of dissent: their direction, content, prospect. But with the concentration of economic and political power and the integration of opposites in a society which uses technology as an instrument of domination, effective dissent is blocked where it could freely emerge: in the formation of opinion, in information and communication, in speech and assembly. Under the rule of monopolistic media—themselves the mere instruments of economic and political power—a mentality is created for which right and wrong, true and false, are predefined wherever they affect the vital interest of the society.[132]

Marcuse's critique of parliamentary-democracy sat well with West Germans' fears regarding their own democracy's viability. Furthermore, as we shall see in the next chapter, his belief that the "monopolistic media" was a facet of economic and political power was deeply influential on the extra-parliamentary opposition's criticism of the Springer Press. However, our current concern is with Marcuse's influence on the phi-

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[130] Ibid., p. 92.

[131] Ibid., p. 92.

[132] Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, by Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr. and Herbert Marcuse (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 95.

losophy of direct action for West German protesters and how this ideological belief came to stifle a sense of solidarity forming across the plurality of opinions which can be found within the "worlds of protest." In Chapter 1 we highlighted K. H. F. Dyson's claim that many young West Germans (particularly students) continued to believe that they lived in an "excessively rigid conservative society" within which the "area of legitimate dissent" was defined more narrowly than in other parliamentary-democracies.[133] If Dyson is correct in such an observation—and our exploration of West German fears regarding the oppressive nature of their state suggests that he is—then it is easy to see why West German protesters might be influenced by Marcuse. In the closing pages of "Repressive Tolerance," Marcuse argues that both the "oppressed and over-powered minorities" have a "'natural right' of resistance" to engage in "extra-legal means if the legal means have proved to be inadequate" when seeking social change.[134] It is this idea that would deeply inform Dutschke's and Krahl's conception of direct action which would come to hold a place of prominence within the ideology of the extra-parliamentary opposition.

§ Solidarity & Plurality in West Germany: "Direct Action" & Vietnam.

Considering that our analysis of Czechoslovak dissent has largely focused upon "intellectual dissidents" there may be some temptation to advance a similar designation towards those thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School—most notably Marcuse and Theodor H. Adorno—whose ideas had a particular influence upon West Germany's "worlds of protest." While such an hypothesis is worthy of study, it is beyond the confines of the present analysis to engage in a complex analysis of either the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School or the role played in protest movements by some of its leading figures. It is worth noting that unlike Czechoslovakia's "banned intellectuals," both Marcuse and Adorno were free to continue teaching, with the former based in the United States at the University of California, San Diego from 1965, and latter at Frankfurt University from 1949. Furthermore, while both Adorno and Marcuse supported many of the goals of the protest movements, Adorno grew increasingly critical of the student movement's interpretation of both praxis and fascism (a criticism which will be examined in the next chapter) a point which John

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[133] Dyson, "Left-wing Political Extremism and the Problem of Tolerance in Western Germany," p. 308.
[134] Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," p. 96.

Abromeit claims Marcuse ultimately came to agree with.[135] Instead, our concern remains focused upon the interpretation of the theories of Marcuse and Adorno by West Germans themselves and how they stifled plurality of opinions and action among the extra-parliamentary opposition.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Rudi Dutschke and Bernd Rabehl had experimented with the notion of direct action during their time in *Subervesive Aktion* with the protests against Moïse Tshombe in December 1964 being a notable example. As Klimke explains, Dutschke and Rabehl joined the Berlin SDS in January, 1965 with the specific aim of extending their strategy of pursuing "cultural revolution" through "actionist" strategies.[136] As Klimke points out, around the same time in Munich, Dieter Kunzelmann and Frank Böckelmann (a member of the Situationist group) had attempted to "utilize the local SDS branch for their own ends" by attacking the German Trade Union Association as "bureaucrats and 'apparatchiks'" which lead to the SDS President Schauer demanding their suspensions.[137] The following controversy led to Michael Vester's involvement who criticised Schauer for following a "self-complacent and bureaucratic political strategy" that remained focused on "traditional alliances."[138] Vester was concerned that the SDS President's attempt to suspend Kunzelmann and Böckelmann would suppress the "diversity of opinions within the SDS" and damage the potential benefits that might come from "action-oriented strategies" which he continued to believe were a "promising political strategy."[139]Ironically, it appears to be the philosophy of the group surrounding Dutschke that posed the greatest threat to the diversity of opinion Vester sought to protect. Klimke notes that in the aftermath of the SDS's national convention held in Frankfurt during October of 1965, the "action-oriented strategy" of the antiauthoritarian Left completely dominated the Berlin SDS (which Kunzelmann had relocated to.)[140] According to Klimke, Dutschke had spent his time in *Subversive Aktion* theorising how best to "translate" the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School into "political

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[135] For a robust analysis of both Adorno's and Marcuse's relationship with West German protest see John Abromeit, "The Limits of Praxis: The Social-Psychological Foundations of Theodor Adorno's and Herbert Marcuse's Interpretations of the 1960s Protest Movements," in *Changing the World, Changing Oneself,* ed. Belinda Davis et al., pp. 13-38.

[136] Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, p. 57.

[137] Ibid.

[138] Ibid.

[139] Ibid.

[140] Ibid., pp. 59-60.

action."[141] Ultimately, Dutschke found his solution in the philosophy of Marcuse, and not just from his arguments in "Repressive Tolerance" but also his suggestion in *One-Dimensional Man* that a potential force for social change could be found among society's "minorities and marginalized persons."[142]

By incorporating Marcuse's "minority theory" into his own conception of direct action, Dutschke created the protest ideology upon which "solidarity" with the Third World and North Vietnam would be expressed within the "worlds of protest." According to Klimke, Dutscke saw liberation movements across the Third World and Southeast Asia as part an "international class struggle," and he began to incorporate the writings of Franz Fanon and Che Guevara's "foco theory"—which, as Klimke explains, emphasised the notion of "creating" the right conditions for "revolution" on one's own—into his own theory.[143] As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the marriage of these ideas came together in Dutschke's and Krahl's philosophy of "propaganda by deed," where small decentralised groups could carry out actions against the state which would force it to reveal its authoritarian character. Klimke notes that Dutschke had already developed this idea by April 1965 and he considered the transformation of "demonstrations into 'illegal activity'"—an idea that appears to draw on Marcuse's notion of "extra-legal" means of resistance—and direct "confrontations with the state authority" as beneficial tactics for raising individual consciousness through direct action."[144] In the spring of 1966, the Berlin SDS had for the most part adopted Dutscke's philosophy of direct action and his vision of a "globally connected revolutionary movement."[145] It was within this context that the importance of expressing "solidarity" with the North Vietnamese developed a new colouring within the "worlds of protest." Klimke explains that the strength of the antiauthoritarian movement in the Berlin SDS allowed it to challenge the SDS President Schauer on a national level.[146] In May of 1966, the Berlin chapter published a war-related information flyer which decried simple calls for peace and America's retreat as a "farce" and demanded an "active identification with the Vietcong through

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[141] Ibid., p. 64.

[142] Ibid., pp. 64-65.

[143] Ibid., pp. 65-57.

[144] Ibid., p. 66.

[145] Ibid., p. 68.

[146] Ibid.

an international solidarity that connected one's individual fate to the situation in Vietnam."[147] Schauer reportedly responded to the debate triggered by the flyer within the SDS's national office by claiming that "[o]ur solidarity with Vietnam is not solidarity with the people exercising violence but with the victims who are forced by a barbarian system to answer violence with violence."[148] However, as Klimke points out, Schauer's argument that the SDS needed to "reach out to a broader community of peace activists" held little strength against the growing opposition to his position.[149] Schauer and his vice-president therefore resigned on May 23 noting their "inability to lead the organization in the face of the Berlin Chapter's obstruction policy."[150] While the two eventually rescinded their resignations, the new approach to Vietnam expressed within the Berlin flyer continued to be influential with the "worlds of protest." As mentioned in the previous Chapter, expressing solidarity with the Vietnamese became deeply intertwined with West German protesters' reflections upon their country's fascist past during the late 1960s and continued to influence the RAF during the 1970s.[151]

While not all West German protesters would have associated the struggles of the Vietnamese against the crimes of American Imperialism with the spectre of Germany's Nazi past, the growing tendency for loud voices within the "worlds of protest" to make such a connection is indicative of a prominent trend experienced during the 1960s and 1970s: the transmutation of the ongoing struggles of oppressed peoples and minority groups as a cultural symbol for protesters to rally around. As Klimke argues in *The Other Alliance*, a similar transmutation took place through the protest movements' "solidarity and identification" with the Black Panther Party and the Black Power movement in the United States.[152] According to Klimke, for many West German protesters Black Power "epitomized the liberation from imperialism and capitalism from within the First World by fulfilling both Che Guevara's foco theory…and Marcuse's minority theory."[153] Klimke explains that parts of the West German protest movement adopted the Black Panther's

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[147] Ibid.

[148] Quoted in Ibid.

[149] Ibid., p. 69.

[150] Ibid.

[151] See Mausbach, "America's Vietnam in Germany—Germany in America's Vietnam: On the Relocation of Spaces and the Appropriation of History," pp. 46-48.

[152] Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, p. 8.

[153] Ibid., p. 9.

interpretation of the black population as an "'internal colony' of the United States" which could only free itself from oppression through "the use of violence."[154] In turn, many protesters came to see the Federal Republic as an "'external colony' of the United States" which bore a degree of responsibility for "crimes committed on behalf of imperialist suppression."[155] Klimke claims that it was within such a context that "solidarity with the African American struggle" changed the way parts of the West German student movement viewed their own history and their own self-understanding.[156] However, protesters continued to see the Black Power movement (and the struggles of the North Vietnamese) as part of an international rebellion against capitalism and imperialism within which their own struggles were included. When the German SDS declared their solidarity with Black Power at the 22nd national convention in September 1967 held in Frankfurt, they not only denounced the early leaders of America's civil rights movement during the 1960s as part of a "'bourgeois' class of African Americans who have been corrupted by the co-optation attempts of the 'ruling class'" but also interpreted the aims of "black nationalism" in terms of an "international class struggle" which required "revolutionary counter violence."[157] Klimke reports that during a conversation with the German writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger in October 1967, Rudi Dutschke portrayed the situation of African Americans as an "indicator for a future revolution and radical change in society."[158] This is hardly surprising, as in 1966 Dutschke had already introduced Franz Fanon's writings on violence in colonial situations to the Berlin SDS in order to "strengthen solidarity with the Third World" and to seek at least a "partial application" of such colonial theories into "legal and illegal protest actions" in West Germany.[159]

§ Solidarity & Plurality in West Germany: Black Power & Confronting Violence.

The solidarity expressed by the West German protest movement for the Black Power movement is a further example of how West Germans turned to struggles outside of the Federal Republic in order to un-

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[154] Ibid., p. 108.
[155] Ibid. p. 109.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid., p. 112.
[158] Ibid., p. 113.
[159] Ibid. pp. 129-130.

derstand their own situation. Still, support for the Black Power movement also led to specific forms of protest strategy which embodied the concept of direct action popularised by Dutschke and Krahl. As Maria Höhn explains, at its February 1968 Vietnam Congress, the German SDS adopted a "Desertion Campaign"—a strategy whereby students would reach out to American GIs stationed in the Federal Republic and encourage them to desert their units. This strategy increasingly came to focus on developing contacts between student activists and black GIs whose experiences of racism in the military and disillusionment with the Vietnam War had left many of them radicalised.[160] Furthermore, in 1969 KD Wolf (who had been head of the German SDS from 1967 to 1968) helped found the Black Panther Solidarity Committee and the underground newspaper *Voice of the Lumpen*, which had a press run averaging 20,000 issues and addressed black GIs stationed in West Germany urging them to "read the writings of Mao, Che Guevara, Frantz Fanon and Huey Newton."[161] As Höhn explains, the Solidarity Committee hoped to create "solidarity among those groups that could 'open a second front in the metropolis of imperialism.'"[162] However, Höhn notes that the solidarity movement experienced problems from the beginning. She argues that for many black activists it seemed "deeply problematic" for German students to identify their own "repression" with that of black Americans in the United States.[163] Furthermore, as Höhn points out, students tended to overlook Germany's own racist past and present and continued to focus on "abstract debates about past and present forms of fascism" rather than engaging in a direct confrontation with German's own "racist colonial past."[164] According to Höhn, West German activists tended to see racism in German society as "emanating from the sorry 'leftovers' of Germany's Nazi past" and consistently failed to reach out to Afro-Germans (who were admittedly small in number but were often the children of African-American GIs and were stationed around US garrison towns across the Federal Republic).[165]

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[160] Maria Höhn, "The Black Panther Solidarity Committee and the Trial of the Ramstein 2," in Changing *the World, Changing Oneself*, ed. Davis et al., p. 217.

[161] Ibid., pp. 218-221.

[162] Ibid., p. 219.

[163] Ibid., p. 221.

[164] Ibid., p. 230.

[165] Ibid., pp. 229-230.

The attempts by West Germans to stand in solidarity with the Black movement is relevant to our current discussion because it is indicative of the narrowness of the very concept of "solidarity" within West Germany's "worlds of protest." As Hanshew explains, "solidarity" as a concept was central to the West German Left's "project of resistance" against a state which they saw as either "authoritarian" or "quasi-fascist."[166] This idea persisted into the 1970s where the vast majority of "extra-parliamentary actors" found themselves "unwilling or unable" to deny the fundamental principle upon which the militancy of urban guerrilla movements was based, which was "the legitimacy of counter violence as resistance."[167] Historians such as Klimke have emphasised that West Germans' solidarity and identification with the Black Power movement fostered an "increasing radicalization and greater militancy" which played a "significant part" in the emergence and self-justification of the RAF (whose theoretical writings included numerous references to the Black Panther's views on violence.)[168] Klimke's point seems to provide an explanation for Ingrid Gilcher-Hotley's argument that the militant actions of the urban guerrilla movements of the 1970s were a radicalisation of "the forms of action" pursued by protest movements rather than a direct successor to them. [169] This would reinforce the point made earlier in this chapter that drawing an explicit connection between the philosophy of direct action and the urban guerrilla campaigns of the RAF is contentious, even if individual Germans—such as Bommi Baumann—did make this connection. However, there does appear to be a direct connection between protesters' interpretation of Marcuse's "minority thesis—which was an important component of Dutschke's and Krahl's justification for direct action and provided the basis for West German identification, with the struggles of the North Vietnamese and African Americans—and what Hanshew describes as the continued depiction of the RAF as "victims of state oppression" within the pages of the alternative and underground press during the 1970s.[170]

According to Hanshew there was a wide spectrum of opinions among the extra-parliamentary Left regarding the violent actions perpetrated by the RAF. These ranged from outright celebration and silence

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[166] Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy in West Germany*, p. 72.
[167] Ibid.
[168] Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, pp. 8-9, 127-128.
[169] Ingrid Gilcher-Hotley, "Transformation by Subversion?," p. 164.
[170] Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy in West Germany*, p. 155.

(which implied complicity) to open condemnation.[171] However, despite the plurality of these opinions, the extra-parliamentary Left was united in its belief that "solidarity" was critical to "the future of progressive politics."[172] Even when members of the Left rejected the RAF's "self-stylization as revolutionaries in the fight against capitalist imperialism," they still saw its individual members as victims of "state-initiated violence."[173] Hanshew further argues that the place of privilege awarded to the notion of solidarity prevented "the majority of the radical left from effectively confronting left-wing political violence as anything but reactive counter violence."[174] We can attribute the failure of West Germany's "worlds of protest" to fully confront political violence in the 1970s to be the result of three major factors. Firstly, the general misconceptions of the Bonn regime as "quasi-fascist" which dominated the extra-parliamentary opposition in the 1960s had led to the widespread belief among the Left that the West German state was both violent and oppressive. Secondly, a large part of the protest movement understood Marcuse's "minority thesis" to apply not only to African Americans struggling against racism in the United States, and to anti-colonial movements fighting against their colonial oppressors, but also to themselves in their resistance to the Federal Republic's oppressive parliamentary-democracy. Taken together, these two factors reveal the ease in which the RAF could not only portray themselves as oppressed victims of state violence, but why a large contingent of the Left would already consider them to be so. Finally, West German protest ideology seemed to lack an attachment to nonviolence as a principled position. As mentioned earlier, when Michael Vester first popularised direct action as a form of protest he endorsed a nonviolent approach because he considered it to be a more successful political strategy. This trend appears to have persisted. As Hanshew points out during the debates over violence which consumed the extra-parliamentary opposition in 1969 following the assassination attempt on Dutschke and the subsequent Easter Riots, even those who rejected militant radicalisation were "unwilling to condemn violence altogether or to promote nonviolence as a matter of political principle."[175] Why the "worlds of protest" lacked a robust component that was committed to a form of principled

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[171] Ibid., p. 153.
[172] Ibid.
[173] Ibid. pp. 153-154.
[174] Ibid., p. 154.
[175] Ibid., p. 107.

nonviolence is a historical question to which this paper can provide only tentative suggestions. It is possible that principled nonviolence would undermine protesters' attachment to Marcuse's "minority thesis," calling into question the solidarity West German protesters expressed towards anti-colonial movements and the Black Panther movement. Furthermore, as Karin Bauer explains, Marcuse himself had argued that "pacifism and nonviolence on the side of the oppressed serve 'the cause of actual violence by weakening the protest against it.'"[176] It is worth noting, that when discussing nonviolence Marcuse notably quotes Jean-Paul Sartre's preface to Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*, in which Sartre notably wrote "if exploitation and oppression never existed on earth perhaps displays of nonviolence might relieve the conflict. But if the entire regime, even your nonviolent thoughts, is government by a thousand-year old repression, your passiveness serves no other purpose but to put you on the side of the oppressors."[177] Considering that both "Repressive Tolerance" and *The Wretched of the Earth* were popular texts for many West German protesters, and stood alongside similar works by scholars with similar opinions on nonviolence, it is likely that there was an ideological reason for lack of principled nonviolence amongst the "worlds of protest."

Whatever the reasons were for the extra-parliamentary Left's failures to confront the violence of urban guerrilla groups, the sense of solidarity that they continued to express towards organisations such as the RAF caused further divisions among the Left. Hanshew points out that both the antinuclear and women's liberation movements found their own activities increasingly "undermined by their association with violence" and began to embrace "conceptions of violence, power, and resistance" that broke from the "long-standing currents within the postwar extra-parliamentary left."[178] Hanshew claims that this "hairline fracture" would become critical to the Left's reorientation, but in the early 1970s it left the extra-parliamentary Left "simultaneously paralyzed and in flux, unable to move forward because its members grew increasingly at odds over the means to do so."[179] Hanshew points to an instance in 1972 when the sociologist Oskar Negt publicly denounced the RAF at a congress honouring Angela Davis, and claimed that if the "mecha-

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[176] Karin Bauer, "'From Protest to Resistance:' Ulrike Meinhof and the Transatlantic Movement of Ideas,", p. 181.

[177] See Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," pp. 103-104, where Marcuse quotes Sartre in French. The English versions quoted here is from Jean-Paul Sartre, preface to *Wretched of the Earth* by Frantz Fanon (New York: Grove Press, 2004), p. lviii.

[178] Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy*, p. 154.

[179] Ibid.

nism of solidarity" found within the extra-parliamentary Left was not "dismantled, he feared for socialism's future."[180] Despite the fact that Negt did not reject political violence in principle and continued to see the individual members of the RAF as "victims of structural violence," he faced heated criticism from members of the extra-parliamentary Left for his public "attack on left solidarity."[181] As Hanshew points out, solidarity "remained a privileged stance for those who hoped to preserve the possibility of critique within the FRG."[182] However, the plurality of opinions within the extra-parliamentary Left suffered because of this insistence on maintaining a united front. According to Hanshew, criticism of violent resistance such as Negt's (however restrained) continued to inspire "rabid personal attacks" by elements of the extra-parliamentary Left which continued to prevent a "substantive dialogue on violence."[183] By the Autumn of 1977 —an infamous period in West German postwar history due to the escalation of RAF violence which included the kidnapping and murder of German businessman Hans-Martin Schleyer and the hijacking of a Lufthansa airliner—extra-parliamentary Leftists began to "question resistance as they had conceived and practised it."[184] However, as Hanshew notes, just as those within the "worlds of protest" started to critique political violence as a whole, they found themselves "powerless" in the wake of the German Autumn to break through their isolation from the wider population and "unable to combat the new levels of fear and intolerance displayed by the West German state and public alike."[185] The sense of "solidarity" found in West Germany's "worlds of protest"—so distinct from its Czechoslovak counterpart—ultimately alienated protesters from the very people they were trying to reach.

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[180] Ibid., p. 161.
[181] Ibid., pp. 161-162.
[182] Ibid., p.163.
[183] Ibid., p. 206.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Ibid., p. 207.

Chapter 3: Protest & Dissent in the Literary Realm.

§ Samizdat & the Underground Press.

One point of comparison between Czechoslovak dissent and West German protest is the presence of alternative publishing networks in both countries. These networks existed as a form of independent activity that challenged the "official" culture of each country and provided a forum for the articulation and development of protest and dissident thought. In both countries this kind of activity challenged the existing social and political orders' monopolies over cultural activity and their perceived control of meaning in society. However, the *samizdat* culture that emerged in Czechoslovakia during the 1970s and the various forms of alternative publishing which developed in West Germany during the 1960s differed in several important ways. First, *samizdat* culture was largely introspective and often concerned with preserving the cultural heritage of Czechs and Slovaks as well as critiquing the exiting Communist regime. According to Paul Wilson, this "self-absorption" makes Czechoslovak *samizdat* a perfect resource for studying the very "experience of totalitarianism," but it also fostered a "lack of interest in the wider world."[1] However, as Brown points out, a characteristic of alternative publishing in West Germany was its tendency to draw the "necessary raw materials" in the struggle between protesters and the authorities from "*outside* the Federal Republic."[2] The "worlds of protest" in West Germany derived much of their language from anti-colonial movements in the Third World, Maoism, and the American and British New Left. By importing much of its key terminology from abroad, the "worlds of protest" were arguably left at a disadvantage when attempting to express an accurate critique of the Bonn regime. Second, *samizdat* culture and the alternative press further differed in their attempts to politicise the printed word and the cultural realm. The importance of praxis for West German protesters led to the literary events such as the 1968 *Frankfurter Buchmesse* (Frankfurt Book Fair) becoming sites of direct action against the cultural and political authorities which connected to the student movement's broader "revolutionary claims."[3] In Czechoslovakia, dissidents often denied that even so-called

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[1] Paul Wilson, "Living Intellects: An Introduction," in *Good--bye, Samizdat,* ed. Goetz-Stankiewicz, p. 139.

[2] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 153.

[3] Ibid., p. 121.

"political" *samizdat*—such as the material printed by Charter 77—represented any clear political pro-

gramme which directly opposed the Communist regime. Havel makes this clear in "Two Notes on Charter

77," where he argues the Charter was fundamentally a "citizens' initiative" which was "politically unde-

fined" and did not seek to implement any "political program of its own."[4] He asserts that no direct political

or ideological "expression or activity" on the part of any Charter signatory can be associated with the nature

of the Charter, and that to judge the Charter "according to the politics of particular Chartists" is as foolish

as judging it by the kind of plays that he writes.[5] Ultimately, this difference reveals how Czechoslovak

samizdat was primarily concerned with challenging the Communist regime by pursuing truth and authen-

ticity themselves, while the West German alternative press challenged the Bonn regime by advancing its

own conceptions of truth and meaning. In Czechoslovakia, truth and authenticity were sought by dissi-

dents. In West Germany, protesters often claimed that truth and authenticity had been found.

§ Samizdat Culture.

It is true, however, that the political and social orders in Czechoslovakia and West Germany held a

monopoly over meaning in the cultural realm. In 1987 Havel described the "fundamental pillar" of

Czechoslovakia's present "totalitarian" rule to be the "existence of one central agent of all truth and all pow-

er."[6] Over a decade earlier, Havel wrote an open letter to Gustav Husák charging his government with issu-

ing a "warrant against culture."[7] This warrant, Havel argued, amounted to the "a priori" suppression of all

cultural works that might contain "the spark of a slightly original thought, a perceptive insight, deeper sin-

cerity, an unusual idea, or a suggestive form."[8] According to Bolton, Havel's point was that the "purges of

cultural and intellectual life" which took place under normalization had affected "many more people than

just their direct targets."[9] Havel argued that the government's "bureaucratic control of culture" had ren-

dered the traditional role of high culture—roughly meaning literature, theatre and the arts—as the "agent

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[4] Václav Havel, "Two Notes on Charter 77," in *Open Letters*, ed. Wilson, p. 326.

[5] Ibid., p. 324.

[6] Václav Havel, "Stories and Totalitarianism," p. 333.

[7] Václav Havel, "Dear Dr. Husák " in *Open Letters,* ed. Wilson, p. 67.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 111.

of social self-awareness" completely impossible.[10] For Havel this led to an important question facing society: "[w]hat profound intellectual and moral impotence will the nation suffer tomorrow, following the castration of its culture today?"[11]

Samizdat culture was one of the main avenues in which the Czechoslovak regime's control of culture was challenged. Skilling explains that samizdat or "self-publishing" had a variety of forms and emerged in most of the Communist world and even in other countries with authoritarian regimes such as Chile and Iran.[12] According to Skilling, samizdat could serve as a means to express "one's thoughts and feelings openly and honestly," or function as a vehicle for preserving "national culture at a time when it was threatened by repression and censorship."[13] It could join similar kinds of independent activity in other artistic spheres to help protect and develop "a second or independent culture"[14] Samizdat could also express "political dissent and opposition" and provide an "important source of information at home and abroad, about the real conditions within a country."[15] In Czechoslovakia samizdat came in each of these forms. Vaculík's creation of Edice Petlice in the early 1970s marked samizdat culture's first incursions against official culture, while the official materials issued by Charter 77, the reports of individual cases of persecution and prosecution by The Committee for the Defence of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS) and the bulletins of Informace o Chartě 77 (INFOCH), serve as the best example of "political" samizdat As Skilling points out, the very nature of samizdat was seen as a "dangerous threat" to authoritarian regimes whose "control of information and culture was challenged by this competing force and whose very nature had given rise to this challenge."[16] He notes how authoritarian regimes would use every means at their disposal to crackdown on the production of samizdat such as "house searches, interrogations, detentions, imprisonment and forced exile" as well as "every provision of the criminal code." It was of course, the characterisation of Charter 77 as "illegal printed

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[10] Havel, "Dear Dr. Husák," p. 67.

[11] Ibid., p. 71.

[12] H. Gordon Skilling, *Samizdat and an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe* (Basingstoke & London: MacMillan Press, 1989) , p. 17.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., pp. 17-18.

matter" that made its distribution in print a crime under paragraph 100 of Czechoslovakia's legal code,[17] although it should be noted that the legal charges against the Charter were eventually dropped in November 1980.[18]

Skilling explains the *samizdat* was by far the most common form of "independent action" among intellectuals in Czechoslovakia.[19] Although he admits that an accurate estimation of the number of *samizdat* books and journals published is impossible, he suggests that at least 800 and perhaps more than 1000 books (including religious *samizdat*) were published in the period between 1972 and 1989 (when he published his findings).[20] He further estimates that more than 400 items of typewritten Charter material circulated in Czechoslovakia during 1977 and that by 1980 more than 1,000 individual items had been identified.[21] As with all forms of Czechoslovak dissent, the meaning of *samizdat* is a source of dispute. Bolton points out that in the West it was "invariably seen as an expression of resistance," while for writers and readers in Czechoslovakia it was also "a sign of subjugation."[22] The cultural or non-political *samizdat* which emerged in the early 1970s is best seen in the context of the "massacre of Czech culture" that Kundera asserted began with the Warsaw Pact invasion in August 1968. As Bolton explains, many writers who were banned from publishing under Husák's regime saw themselves as "carriers and preservers of Czech culture in the face of the intellectual devastation of normalization."[23] He points to Jiří Lederer's book *Czech Conversations*—which was composed of interviews with banned writers in 1975 and 1976—and notes that many of Lederer's interviewees saw *samizdat* culture as a "form of sustenance" where they could improve themselves as writers through "contact with other people's stories and with a national literary tradition."[24]

Paul Wilson has argued that Czech and Slovak *samizdat* culture was the "most introverted and the most self-reliant in Eastern Europe."[25] This enabled it to produce "a large and vigorous national literature

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17 Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 173.
18 Ibid.
19 Skilling, *Samizdat and an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe,* p. 75.
20 Ibid.
21 Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*, p. 85.
22 Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 109.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Paul Wilson, "Living Intellects: An Introduction," p. 139

that is closest in quality to the great national literatures of earlier centuries."[26] This sentiment can also be found in the reflections of banned writers themselves. For example, the Czech writer and poet Miroslav Červenka described *samizdat* as "one of the main expressions of contemporary culture" which represented "the legitimate continuance of the traditions of Czech belles-lettres whereas printed literature squanders its typographic resources and apparatuses in the production of marginal products which hang in the air without tradition."[27] Furthermore, a popular form of Czech *samizdat* was the "feuilleton," which Skilling describes as a "traditional form of Czech journalism" which were "light, somewhat humorous essays on serious subjects."[28] Vaculík had a significant hand in reviving feuilletons as a form of *samizdat* and he published an annual anthology of feuilletons by various banned writers through Edice Petlice between 1975 and 1979.[29]

The focus of Czechoslovak *samizdat* on preserving the country's cultural heritage is one of the reasons that Paul Wilson describes it as self-absorbed. According to Wilson, it was not the case that Czechs and Slovaks were not "well read or well informed" about the situations in East Central Europe or in the West.[30] Rather, they were "primarily interested" in what they had to say "about themselves."[31] Writing in 1990, Wilson argues that Czechoslovakia had a "programmatic ignorance" of modern political and economic thought.[32] While he claims that this gave Czechs and Slovaks "strength as dissidents" it has become a "serious liability" now that Czechoslovakia has become "politically free and wants to re-join the West."[33] However, there are several problems with Wilson's argument here. Leaving aside his claim that Czechoslovakia wanted to "re-join the west"—which is a massive oversimplification—what a comparison of the "worlds of dissent" and the "worlds of protest" suggests is that a dedicated engagement with the actual conditions of a country can be more beneficial for the development of dissent than one which draws most of its ideological language and theory from outside its borders. The self-inspection of Czechoslovak *samizdat* culture is indicative of a broader trend within Czechoslovak dissent. Within the "worlds of dissent," dissidents

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[26] Ibid.

[27] Quoted in Skilling, *Samizdat and an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe,* p. 77

[28] Ibid., p. 12

[29] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, pp. 39, 99.

[30] Ibid., p. 140

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

for the most part ruminated upon the specific situation in their country and drew from their own cultural past and present in order to "challenge the regime." For example, Bolton argues that the problems Havel articulated in his open letter to Husák held importance for the majority of people who later formed "the core of dissent and sign[ed] Charter 77."[34] Havel's question regarding how the warrant on culture affected society in general was particularly important. As Bolton explains, this issue led banned writers to debate whether they would enter into dissent "*as* writers," as "representatives of a suppressed national culture" or whether "some other capacity" was required considering that a concern for high culture had "necessarily elitist overtones" and might not provide the best vehicle for encouraging "broad-based and political dissent."[35] It was these very concerns that led to the creation of Charter 77 as a civic initiative, one which held no official political or ideological position and therefore would not alienate potential dissidents who held different political beliefs. The strength of dissent was that it was built upon a sense of solidarity shared by dissidents of differing political persuasions. This posed an important challenge to the "totalitarian" system which, as Havel explains, aimed at the "elimination of political plurality" and the prevention of a variety of interests, opinions, and traditions from "proclaiming their presence."[36]

§ Alternative Publishing & Direct Action in West Germany.

Alternative publishing in West Germany was similarly concerned with the control of meaning held by the country's cultural authorities. As Brown explains, the components of alternative publishing were the printed output of the student movement, the underground press and, the new "critical journalism" which emerged during the mid-to-late 1950s that focused on "exposing the claims of authority to harsh scrutiny."[37] Brown argues that these forms of writing shared a "strong internal continuity" as they each challenged "the claims of cultural authorities to absolute truth."[38] Bootleg publishers constituted a fundamental part of the underground press, reproducing various texts by authors such as Karl Marx, Leon Trotsky and

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[34] Ibid., p. 111.

[35] Ibid., pp. 112-113.

[36] Havel, "Stories and Totalitarianism," pp. 344-345.

[37] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, pp. 124-125, 127.

[38] Ibid., p. 127.

Mao Zedong as well as various works associated with the Frankfurt School.[39] According to Brown, this sort of publishing helped facilitate the creation of a "new oppositional culture from below" and he notes that *Kommune 1* was one of its "pioneers" in West Germany.[40] Underground newspapers such as the anarchist magazine *Agit 883* (published from 1969 to 1972) complemented bootleg publishers and "reflected the changing currents within the left-wing scene."[41] A typical example of critical journalism was the left-wing magazine *kronket* which, as Brown notes, is worthy of attention for launching Ulrike Meinhof as a "major journalistic voice of the extra-parliamentary opposition."[42] Brown argues that the alternative press in West Germany supplied protesters with a "shared theoretical and symbolic repertoire" which helped individuals "communicate with each other" and "perform (i.e. read, write, cite) their opposition to the system."[43] An important West German characteristic of this symbolic "performance" was the focus upon praxis and the idea of translating theory into direct action. This increasingly served to politicise the opposition to the establishment's control of the mass media and the cultural realm and was both articulated within and sustained by the alternative press.

The primary target of the alternative press—and the "worlds of protest" in general—was the near monopoly held by the Springer Press over the Federal Republic's mass media. As Thomas explains, the Springer publishing empire was created in 1946 with limited resources in the British occupation zone. By 1964 it controlled 31 percent of the daily newspaper market as well as 89 percent and 85 percent of regional and Sunday sales respectively.[44] In 1968 the major Springer tabloid *Bild-Zeitung* had a circulation of 4,094,884 per day and its Sunday paper—*Bild am Sonntag*—sold 2,319,192, making it the largest newspaper in the Federal Republic.[45] Springer's reach did not stop there: its largest broadsheet *Die Welt* sold around 225,886 copies per day which was equivalent to its non-springer rivals; weekly magazines such as *Eltern* and the women's magazine *Jasmin* sold over a million copies per week; and youth magazines such as

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[39] Ibid., p. 128.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid., p. 125.
[43] Ibid., p. 153.
[44] Thomas, *Protest Movements in West Germany*, p. 165.
[45] Ibid.

Bravo and *Twen* sold just under a million when combined.[46] According to Thomas, the Springer "colossus" stood as the "largest single publishing house for newspapers and magazines in Germany" and its domination of the press and the iron grip on editorial control held by Axel Springer himself, had "clear implications for German democracy."[47] As it was indicated earlier, the Springer press maintained a particularly "uncompromising brand of anti-communism" and a "rabid hatred of protesters" manifested across the entire line of Springer publications.[48] One of its major targets was Rudi Dutschke. whose criticisms of the Federal Republic looked "dangerously like communism" to Springer.[49] While Thomas states that it is open to debate whether such brazen anti-communism reflected or fostered "popular anti-communism and attitudes to democracy," he claims that there is "no doubt" that the anti-protester ethos of the Springer press was shared by "large sections of public opinion."[50]

As Brown explains, concerns over the Springer empire's concentration of power were felt throughout society and shared by "trade unions, liberal news journals such as *Stern* and *Spiegel*, and many writers, intellectuals, and pastors."[51] It was also a notable concern for the student movement. Brown notes that in their attempts to oppose Springer's monopoly—and alongside their general aims of ensuring "greater participatory decision-making power for authors and editors" in the literary realms—the student movement posited the notions of an 'alternative public space'" or "*Gegenöffentlichkeit*" and creating a *Gegenmilieu* which would connect the student movement with both counterculture and the arts.[52] According to Brown, the term *Gegenöffentlichkeit* came into use sometime between 1966 and 1967 during the "escalation of the conflict between the SDS and the Springer Press."[53] While its emergence was motivated by a need to "combat" the portrayal of the student movement found in Springer papers, it was also "inextricably connected" to the revolutionary concerns of the student movement, especially their belief that "narrative power" was

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[46] Ibid., p. 166.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid., p. 167.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 123.
[52] Ibid., p. 121.
[53] Ibid., p. 122.

currently sustaining existing social relations within the Federal Republic.[54] Brown further explains how the concept of *Gegenöffentlichkeit* built upon the work of the Frankfurt School's (and particularly Marcuse's) critique of mass-media manipulation and was codified in the anti-Springer campaign launched in Frankfurt in September 1967.[55] Both Rudi Dutschke and Jürgen Krahl had a hand in drafting the campaign's founding resolution which described the role of the mass media—and specifically Springer's monopoly over it—as fundamental to capitalist "domination."[56] Brown highlights the words of the resolution itself which at one point states, "[o]ur struggle against Springer is…a struggle against the late-capitalist system of rule itself."[57]

The SDS's anti-Springer campaign gained support from the new critical journalism, specifically the left-wing journal *Berliner Extra Dienst* and *kronkret* who rallied behind the catchphrase "expropriate springer" and attempted to force the Federal Cartel Office to break up the Springer empire.[58] As Thomas explains, following the attempted assassination of Dutschke on April 11th 1968, the Springer empire - with its long campaign against the student movement and Dutschke in particular - became the "most obvious target for protesters."[59] In the following days "large, sustained and violent protests" broke out in at least twenty cities with "barricades being constructed outside Springer plants and offices in Hamburg, Essen, Esslingen, Frankfurt, Cologne and Munich."[60] According to Thomas, speeches were made during a series of mass meetings at the Technical University of Berlin on April 13th which "embraced the use of violence," and at one of these meetings Ulrike Meinhof (who worked from *konkret* at the time) commented "when a Springer car burns, that is arson, when all Springer cars burn, that is a political action."[61] As a leading voice in the extra-parliamentary opposition, Meinhof would provide an important analysis of these Easter riots in the pages of *kronket* in May 1968. In a column titled "From Protest to Resistance" she wrote:

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[54] Ibid., pp. 121-122.
[55] Ibid., p. 122.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Quoted in Ibid.
[58] Thomas, *Protest Movements in West Germany*, p. 167.
[59] Ibid., p. 170.
[60] Ibid., p. 173.
[61] Ibid., p. 173.

Protest is when I say I don't like this. Resistance is when I put an end to what I don't like. Protest is when I say I refuse to go along with this any more. Resistance is when I make sure everybody else stops going along too....The protests against the Easter attack on Rudi Dutschke marked the first time that people massively crossed the boundary between verbal protest and physical resistance....The fun is over. Protest is when I say I don't like this. Resistance is when I put an end to what I don't like.[62]

It is worth noting that Meinhof admits to borrowing her opening words from a member of the American Black Power movement who spoke at Berlin's Conference on Vietnam held in February.[63] Furthermore, the phrase "From Protest to Resistance" was also the slogan of the American SDS (Students for a Democratic Society).[64] This provides some evidence of how West Germans drew from outside sources to give voice to their own critiques. According to Hanshew, Meinhof's words captured the growing mood which incited the Easter riots, namely that "the mounting conviction among protesters [was] that stronger action had to be taken."[65] Hanshew goes on to explain that the Easter riots led to a debate within the extra-parliamentary opposition over violence as a political strategy. She highlights an essay by *konkret's* Berlin Editorial Collective for its June issue, in which "words" were described as an "ineffectual" strategy for resistance because "the 'language of capitalism' was violence" and only physical force could open up "lines of communication."[66] Hanshew notes that many on the antiauthoritarian left saw "offensive actions" as part of "the radicalized course promoted by Dutschke and Krahl."[67] While Ingrid Gilcher-Hotley argues that Dutschke's and Krahl's support for direct action fell short of the kinds of violence engaged in by urban guerrilla and terrorist groups that would adopt violence as a political strategy, this did not prevent many in the extra-parliamentary opposition from making the connection.[68] For example, Bommi Baumann—who

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[62] Ulrike Meinhof, "From Protest to Resistance," in *Everybody Talks About The Weather—We Don't: The Writings of Ulrike Meinhof*, ed. Karin Bauer (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2008), pp. 239-242.
[63] Ibid., p. 239.
[64] Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy in West Germany*, p. 103.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid., p. 104.
[67] Ibid.
[68] See See Ingrid Gilcher-Hotley, "Transformation by Subversion?," pp. 155-169.

would eventually join the June 2nd Movement—cites both the Easter riots and Dutschke's opinions on the organisational problems facing the protest movement as influences for his decision to move "in the direction of terrorism."[69]

The Easter riots and the subsequent debates about violence reveal how West German concerns regarding Springer's monopoly on the mass media could spur direct action. However, control over the literary realm itself remained a site of dispute for protesters and often led to physical confrontations with the cultural authorities. For example, Brown points to the politicisation of the *Frankfurter Buchmesse* (Frankfurt Book Fair) in September 1968 as an important moment in which the idea of a *Gegenöffentlichkeit* was put into practice. He explains that the *Buchmesse* was an important symbol of West German publishing and internationalisation and the September event featured over 3,000 publishers from "some fifty-seven countries."[70] In 1967, students protested at the *Buchmesse* against the Springer empire as well as against military dictatorships in Greece and Spain and Apartheid in South Africa, which were all, as Brown puts it, "inextricably linked together" in students' minds.[71] The 1968 protests took place on a grander scale. Students organised an "Anti-Book Fair" composed of around seventy foreign and domestic publishers from the underground press as a protest against the appropriation of New Left thought by mainstream publishers such as Rowohlt, Suhkramp, and Kiepenheurer & Witsch, who each "offered well-developed lines of revolutionary history and theory that were becoming increasingly central to the left-liberal reading milieu." The *Buchmesse* was also a site of protest action which was incited by the decision of the German Publishers and Booksellers Association to award the annual Peace Prize of the German Book Trade to the poet and current President of Senegal Léopold Senghor.[72] Students were critical of Senghor due to his support for continued relations between Senegal and its former coloniser France, and his decision earlier in the year to use military troops when defusing strikes by students and workers at the University of Dakar—a decision which left one student dead, hundreds arrested and saw the university closed.[73] The protests against Senghor included a

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[69] See Baumann, *Wie Alles Anfing = How it Began*, pp. 30-32.

[70] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties,* pp. 116, 122.

[71] Ibid., pp. 118-119.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid. p. 118.

Teach-In outside the stand of his publisher on September 21st, and a planned occupation the next day which would prevent the award being presented to Senghor. While the Teach-In eventually went ahead, the occupation turned into a tense battle between 2,000 protesters and 800 police resulting in forty-two demonstrators being arrested, including the student leaders Daniel Cohn-Bendit and K.D. Wolff.[74]

For Brown, the politicisation of the *Buchmesse* was a moment in which protesters "challenged the right of cultural authorities to monopolize the terrain of meaning in society."[75] For Certeau, this would be an instance of protesters trying to "capture speech" and directly disputing the values and norms of the existing political and cultural system. The creation of the Anti-Book fair at the *Buchmesse* mirrors one of the roles of *samizdat* culture in Czechoslovakia. It was an instance of independent activity which disputed the mainstream or "official" publishers' control over the cultural realm, in this case the selling of philosophical and revolutionary treatises themselves. However, one of the obvious differences between *samizdat* and *Gegenöffentlichkeit* was that the former responded to the censorship of a Communist regime, while the latter (made manifest in the Anti-Book Fair) protested the appropriation of rebellious thought by the very social structures that many of them critiqued. The context in which the West German "worlds of protest" emerged was not one in which the capitalist system banned revolutionary texts, it was one in which the system sold them to you.

§ Praxis & Independent Activity.

Samizdat culture and Czechoslovak dissent in general did not actively try to politicise the challenges they posed to the regime. By focusing on preserving their own cultural heritage and pushing for solidarity among dissidents of differing political persuasions they posed a real threat to a Communist regime which sought total control over the cultural realm. The attempts by many West Germans to politicise the literary sphere and take direct action against the *Buchmesses* and Springer's media monopoly, do not appear to have posed an equivalent threat to the Bonn regime. Furthermore, as Hanshew points out, the debates over violence as political strategy which took hold of the extra-parliamentary opposition following the Easter riots

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[74] Ibid., pp. 119-120.
[75] Ibid., p. 121.

contributed to the "organizational suicide" of the APO and the SDS by means of "internal struggles and bickering."[76] It is worth noting that these debates did not revolve around the ethics of violence as a legitimate tactic for opposition, rather, the dispute concerned whether the militant or offensive violence proposed by antiauthoritarian leftists would be an effective political strategy.[77] It is also important to point out that SDS—which dissolved itself as a national organisation in March 1970—was not solely splintered over issues of violence, but also faced serious infighting over the role of women within the organisation.[78] A detailed analysis of the women's movement in West Germany is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of the present analysis but it is worth mentioning Thomas's assessment that the women's movement was "able to gain, from a cross-section of West German women, widespread support beyond the restrictions of revolutionary politics."[79] Thomas notes that by 1975, "20 million women in West Germany considered themselves feminists and 20,000 actively took part in feminist political activity," which makes for a thought-provoking comparison with his assessment of revolutionary politics, which "with all its sectarianism, theoretical abstraction, and frequent displays of intolerance, did not have the mass appeal necessary for a successful campaign."[80]

One of the major problems facing West Germany's "worlds of protest" appears to be the place of privilege awarded to praxis and direct action by a variety of its movements. It is important to highlight, therefore, that Theodor H. Adorno—whose work, as mentioned above, deeply influenced the student protest movement—became increasingly critical of the student movement's tendency to favour praxis and direct action over theory.[81] As John Abromeit points out, while Adorno had been an outspoken supporter of most of the student movement's "professed goals," he had expressed "concerns" regarding their focus on praxis since their beginning and eventually felt the need to distance himself from the movement after a group of students from the SDS occupied the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt University in Jan-

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[76] Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy*, p. 107.

[77] Ibid.

[78] See Thomas, *Protest Movements in West Germany*, pp. 202-203, 221-241.

[79] Ibid., p. 228.

[80] Ibid., p. 235.

[81] Abromeit, "The Limits of Praxis: The Social-Psychological Foundations of Theodor Adorno's and Herbert Marcuse's Interpretations of the 1960s Protest Movements," p. 14.

uary 1969.[82] According to Abromeit, Adorno too saw the "primary cause of Dutschke's attempted murder in the powerful anti-intellectual ideology fomented by one of the largest media concerns in Germany…the Springer Press."[83] He argued that the Springer press's negative portrayal of the student movement had "tacitly encouraged its readers to give their repressed instincts free rein in sadistic attacks upon students."[84] However, despite Adorno's claim in 1959 that he considered "the survival of National Socialism *within* democracy to be potentially more menacing than the survival of fascist tendencies *against* democracy, he disagreed with students' interpretation of fascism and praxis in several ways.[85] First, as Abromeit explains, Adorno believed that even the "formal democracy of the Federal Republic" was a "crucial step beyond, and important bulwark against, fascism" and was worth defending.[86] He therefore disagreed with students who considered it necessary to start a revolutionary movement against the Federal Republic's political institutions to prevent the "re-emergence of fascism."[87] Not only did Adorno think that such a movement was impossible within the existing social conditions, but he believed that any attempt to start such a movement could "provoke a conservative backlash" that might actually weaken West Germany's democracy and unleash "the powerful authoritarian tendencies that still existed in West German society."[88] Secondly, Adorno differed from students regarding where the threat of fascism came from in a Capitalist society. Abromeit points to a 1967 exchange between Adorno and Hans-Jürgen Krahl (who was a student of Adorno's) where the latter argued that it was a capitalist democracy's "political institutions" from which the threat of fascism emanated. Adorno, Abromeit insists, believed the threat of fascism came from "West German *society*."[89] Adorno further notes that he believes it would be "abstract and fanatical in a problematic sense, to oversee this difference, i.e. to consider it more important to take action against a democracy, which should be improved in this or that way, than against an opponent, who is already violently rumbling."[90] In Abromeit's

[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid., p. 22.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Quoted in Ibid., p. 20.
[86] Ibid. p. 26.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Quoted in Ibid., p. 27.

opinion, what Adorno means here is that the students' criticism of democracy "betrays an all-too-mechanical understanding of fascism and the conditions that could lead to its re-emergence."[91] This is an important point, especially when we consider how the credibility crisis facing German democracy during this period had helped shaped the "worlds of protest" in the first place. In Adorno's mind at least, the protest movement was built upon poor theoretical foundations. This notion leads us to the third difference between Adorno and the student movement: his belief that they misunderstood the relationship between theory and praxis. For Adorno, "thinking is a doing, theory a form of praxis," which was a point of understanding that he considered to be missing from student movements' analysis of society.[92] Abromeit points out that Adorno saw in the student movement an "unwillingness to reflect upon the object they were attempting to change with their praxis: West German society."[93] This led Adorno to charge the student movement of "refusing to reflect upon its own impotence."[94] This lack of self-reflection and self-understanding stands as a strong point of contrast to Czechoslovak dissent which—despite its self-absorption or, perhaps, because of it—did reflect upon its own inability to bring down the regime, and therefore successfully threatened Husák's regime by not trying to do so.

There were instances within the "worlds of protest" where independent activity was pursued without being burdened by the demands of praxis and direct action. Such activity can still be found within the literary realm. As Brown explains, in the aftermath of the *Buchmesse,* the calls for democratisation and "self-management" did lead to a series of initiatives which saw the formation of "authors' advisory committees" at several German publishing houses, the creation of a line of publications by Bertelsmann's authors which was run "democratically and collectively by authors and editors themselves," and the founding of the *Verlag der Autoren* (Authors' Edition) by editors at Suhrkamp which pushed for increasing self-management.[95] According to Brown, these efforts "took place alongside a wave of press-foundings" which helped establish a "vibrant and partly self-contained left-publicistic milieu with its own instrumentalities of production, dis-

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[91] Ibid.
[92] Quoted in Ibid., p. 28.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Quoted in Ibid.
[95] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties,* p. 148.

tribution, and sales" by the end of the 1960s.[96] Brown explains that these attempts to create a viable *Gegenöffentlichkeit* aimed "less at storming the commanding media heights" than on creating "access to the grassroots publications that exploded out of the antiauthoritarian revolt and took it in new and interesting directions from 1968 on."[97] This movement also saw the rise of "so-called 'info' services," which sought to unite "small local publishing initiatives" into networks with "regional, national, and international reach."[98] Brown points to Josef Wintjes's *Ulcus Molle Infodienst* (the Non-Conformist Literary Information Center) —which was established in November 1969—as one of the most important examples of these services.[99] *Ulcus Molle Infodienst* presented itself as "a mouthpiece of the alternative press" and advertised recent underground publications of "every type," including (but not limited to) international underground-newspapers, political writings and bootleg publications.[100] According to Brown, Wintjes's aim was to facilitate communication on the "widest possible basis" and help "crystallise a burgeoning underground 'literary TOTAL SCENE.'"[101] In light of this goal, Wintjes's publication featured a vast and diverse selection of over a hundred periodicals which blended "the hard-political, subcultural, and literary-bohemian left(s)."[102] We might see Wintjes's service as bearing a passing similarity to *INFOCH* in Czechoslovakia. As Bolton explains, *INFOCH* was a periodical of "situation reports" run by the husband and wife team of the "Trotskyist" Peter Uhl and his wife Anna Šabatová, which contained detailed reports about the persecution of Charter signatories, notices about *samizdat* publications, as well as open letters and other essays written by a "wide range of signatories."[103] According to Bolton, *INFOCH* was not just a source of information about the Charter (for both Czechoslovaks and historians), but was also "an institution in its one right" which helped to facilitate the Charter's transformation into a "living, breathing, debating community of its own."[104] Despite the clear differences between *Ulcus Molle Infodienst* and *INFOCH*, both existed as a form

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[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid., p. 149.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid., p. 150.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, pp. 194-197.

[104] Ibid., p. 199.

of independent activity which challenged the dominance of the West German and Czechoslovak regimes over the realms of culture without pursuing a specific political programme.

The various literary initiatives which pursued (and often achieved) greater democratisation and self-management reveal that there was an alternative to the philosophy of direct action which existed within West Germany's "worlds of protest." One of the most important characteristics of the struggle over meaning between protesters and the establishment was the role played by theoretical and political texts as symbols of opposition for protesters. As Brown explains, it was not always "necessary" for protesters to have read a particular text of importance, instead, books represented "badges of membership in one or more of the radical transnational publics that helped constitute 1968."[105] This point is also emphasised by Karel van Wolferen, who argues that across protest movements in North America and Europe authors such as Che Guevara and Herbert Marcuse helped "lubricate the machinery of radical action" and allowed protesters from "different centers of dissension" to easily communicate with each other "by referring to these authors."[106] For van Wolferen this was true despite the failure of those very same authors to provide movements with their "badly needed philosophical base."[107] Brown points to the prominence of Mao's Red Book in West Germany as an important example of this. He notes that the Red Book was first published in German by the West German Fischer Verlag and quickly sold 75,000 copies.[108] For protesters, Mao's book carried "a talismanic power far out of proportion its actual content," which further served as a "prop symbolizing revolutionary commitment."[109] According to Sebastian Gehrig, part of Mao's and Maoism's symbolic appeal was its focus on the "primacy of practice" where it became the "duty of the revolutionary to 'make the revolution' and not only talk about theory."[110] This was an idea that influenced Dutschke's notion of direct action, and

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[105] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 153.

[106] Karel van Wolferen, *Student revolutionaries of the sixties* (The Hague: International Documentation and Information Centre, 1970), p. 39.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 209.

[109] Ibid., pp. 209-210.

[110] Sebastian Gehrig, "(Re-)Confirguring Mao: Trajectories of a Culturo-Political Trend in West German," *Transcultural Studies*, no.2 (2011), p. 205.

Gehrig notes that Dutschke "frequently argued using Maoist terms" and saw in China's Cultural Revolution a "continuous social transformation, which was not guided by a great plan."[111]

If Adorno was correct to identify the privileging of praxis over theory as one of the fundamental problems within West Germany's protest movements—and the likelihood that the concept of direct action influenced the turn towards violence and terrorism in the 1970s—then the existence of a vibrant left-publicistic milieu which did not seek to politicise the literary realm suggests that another (and, perhaps, better) avenue of opposition to the establishment did exist within the "worlds of protest." Brown observes that the "literary-publicistic sphere" was a clear area in which "the assertion of the right to speak," sought by antiauthoritarians in their challenges to the cultural authorities' control of "narrative claims of authority," was achieved.[112] Furthermore, for Brown at least, the listings and commentary of *Ulcus Molle Infodienst* provide "a series of dialectic snapshots" of West Germany's antiauthoritarian opposition as it transitioned from a "narrowly defined student movement to the more complex and diffuse interplay of initiatives and voices characteristic of the fractured "alternative" culture(s) of the post-1968 period."[113] While these fractured "alternative" cultures included urban guerrilla movements who pursued violent resistance, and the broad spectrum of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist groups often bundled together under the term *K-Gruppen*, which continued the trend of politicising oppositions, they also included the anarchist Sponti scene and the flat-sharing communities known as *Wohngemeinschaften*, which numbered around 2,000 in 1971 and expanded to around 40,000 by the end of the decade."[114] Brown highlights the organisation of the TUNIX ("Do Nothing") Congress held in West Berlin in February 1978 by members of a Sponti scene as the moment where the emphasis on the "cultural production aspects of the antiauthoritarian revolt" were codified.[115] According to Brown, TUNIX attempted to escape the "either - or straightjacket" imposed by the conflict between the Bonn regime and its "terrorist opponents."[116] It brought together various alternative cultures such as Spontis, hippies, and anti-nuclear activists in an attempt to regain agency for the antiauthoritarian

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[111] Ibid., pp. 204-205.
[112] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties.*, p. 154.
[113] Ibid., p. 152.
[114] See Ibid, pp. 83-84, 265-283 for an overview of a variety of these initiatives.
[115] Ibid., p. 355.
[116] Ibid.

movement from the "stifling categories of thought and action" imposed by both the establishment and by the "all-or-nothing revolutionary logics" which had long dominated the "worlds of protest."[117] TUNIX certainly had its limitations and, like many protest movements before it, continued to marginalise the women's movement which, as Brown writes, was "notably absent" from the congress aside from a panel on "feminism ecology."[118] Its most noticeable challenge, however, came from the *K-Gruppen* and the armed left, with Dieter Kunzelmann (who, Brown notes, was now in his "Communist phase") rejecting the model of an independent culture which appeared to offer the opportunity of working "if not within the system, then at least with it."[119] According to Brown, Kunzelmann argued that "[t]alk of 'self-liberation' and the creation of 'liberated space,'...obscured the need to take sides."[120] It would seem, therefore, one of the fundamental tensions within West Germany's "worlds of protest" was the question of whether protest had to be political in order to effectively challenge the regime. This too was a question within the the Czechoslovak "worlds of dissent"—one which Benda's "The Parallel Polis" directly addressed—but it was a source of less tension between dissidents, whose emphasis on solidarity between competing viewpoints allowed for demands for greater politicisation to sit more comfortably within the culture of dissent.

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[117] Ibid., pp. 355-356.

[118] Ibid., pp. 359-360.

[119] Ibid., p. 360.

[120] Ibid.

Conclusion.

§ The Spectre of "Dissent."

It would be a reasonable criticism of this paper to suggest that despite its attempt to exorcise the spectre of "1968" from the study of West German protest and Czechoslovak dissent during the 1960s and 1970s, all that has been achieved is substitution of one spectre for another, one that could be called "the spectre of dissent." Under this new spectre, West German protest and Czechoslovak dissent can be compared as related phenomena, as "worlds" of experience in which a variety of political ideologies and independent cultural activities were deeply intertwined and posed a challenge to technological civilisation as it manifested in the Federal Republic's parliamentary democracy and Gustáv Husák's Communist regime. However, considering that one of this paper's core arguments is its claim that Czechoslovak dissidents, when compared with West German protesters, were able to develop a better understanding of the regime they opposed and therefore construct a more powerful critique, it is hard to avoid the implication that Czechoslovak dissent has been presented as somehow "better" in crucial respects to West German protest. Such a suggestion, it might be claimed, amounts to a normative argument—one that appears to support Havel's proposal in "The Power of the Powerless" that the small communities surrounding dissident groups and independent cultural activities might provide an early indication of what a "truly free" post-democratic system might look like. Many historians, most notably Hayden White, have pointed to the impossibility of engaging in historical analysis without advancing some form of moral or political argument. For example, in his book *Metahistory*, White argues that there appears to be an "irreducible ideological component in every historical account of reality" which "reflect the ethical element in the historian's assumption of a particular position on the question of historical knowledge and the implications that can be drawn from the study of past events for the understanding of present ones."[1] While it must be admitted that the present author is susceptible to both White's argument and Havel's suggestion that the small communities found within Czechoslovakia's "worlds of dissent" might provide a basis for a free and authentic society, it is not

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[1] Hayden V. White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 21-22.

the goal of this paper to advance such an argument. Rather, what has been sought is the creation of a new framework for comparing roughly contemporaneous "dissident" movements on either side of the Iron Curtain during the post war period, in order to better understand the *meaning* of protest and dissent for the various Germans, Czechs and Slovaks who "acted" and "suffered" during the 1960s and 1970s in particular. While it is possible that the approach taken by this paper—namely, its analysis of West German protest in light of Czechoslovak dissent—has resulted in the creation of yet another historical "spectre" that will eventually require an exorcist, this is a prospect that the present author is happy to live with so long as the presence of this "spectre" opens up new avenues of historical inquiry, even if they facilitate lead to its own destruction.

Pursuing a comparison of West German protest and Czechoslovak dissent by applying Bolton's conception of the "world" or "worlds of dissent" to West Germany and describing the existence of the "world" or "worlds of protest" in the Federal Republic does opens up new avenues of historical analysis. It seems plausible that this idea could successfully be advanced further and used to examine protest and dissident movements in other countries during a similar time period. Furthermore, the benefits of this framework support Brown's claim that studies of West Germany's experiences of "1968" that focus "more or less narrowly" on the student movement and its politics "represent only the barest fraction of what 1968 was about."[2] Conceiving of West German "protest" as referring to one "world" or as many different "worlds" of experience helps to rescue the term itself from Brown's suggestion that it is "overused" and Thomas's claim that it is deployed with too broad a meaning.[3] While the present discussion has largely limited itself to examining the literary realm of the "worlds of protest"—partly in the interests of brevity, but also in order to make a more fruitful comparison with Czechoslovak dissent in which *samizdat* culture played an important role—Brown's observation that West Germany's "antiauthoritarian revolt" played out across "the visual arts, film, music and personal style" and sexual politics warrant even further study than he provides himself.[4] Moreover, while this paper has often spoken of "Czechoslovak" dissent, it should be noted that the dissi-

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[2] Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 13.
[3] See Ibid., and Thomas, *Protest Movements in West Germany*, pp. 7-8.
[4] Brown *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 154, for Brown's discussion of the antiauthoritarian revolt in relation to the spheres of sound, vision, and sex see Chapters 4, 5, and 7 of the same work.

dent movements discussed were largely dominated by Czechs and for the most part centred in Prague. An analysis of the underground church movement in Slovakia (to mention but one prominent form of Slovak dissent), whose importance Kenney makes note of in *A Carnival of Revolution*, is completely absent from this paper.[5] Furthermore, Kenney points to the "isolation" of Slovakia's opposition movements with the Greens, the artists, and the Church moving in "different circles" to the "Chartist intellectuals."[6] Kenney quotes the words of Ján Budaj to support this point, with Budaj observing that "We might have coffee together if we met on the street...but that was it."[7] It would appear, therefore, that there remain many more "worlds" for historians to explore.

The isolation of Slovak dissent, not only from the contours of this paper but from the boundaries of the Prague-based "worlds of dissent" themselves, casts a shadow over the claim made in Chapter 2 that Czechoslovak dissent was more successful than West Germany's "worlds of protest" in fostering solidarity across a plurality of different self-understandings of dissent and the various forms of independent cultural activities which existed. While this shadow may also cast doubt on the plausibility of Havel's suggestion that small communities which formed around dissident groups might provide an example of the shape a "post-democratic" society might take, we should recognise that there were obvious geographic reasons for separation of dissidents in Prague from those in the rest of the country. Much of Czechoslovak dissent was sustained by word of mouth and the smuggling of *samizdat* from the apartment of one individual to the next, often under the close surveillance of the police. It is well within the realms of possibility that in somewhat different circumstance the dissidents in Prague could have had a broader reach. For, as James Krapfl has noted, part of the reason for the dissidents' isolation from "local societies" was that "potential persecution made it dangerous for community members to associate with individuals operating beyond or at the margins of the allowable."[8]A related issue for the argument of this paper is its tendency to focus on the most "well-known" protesters and dissidents in both West Germany and Czechoslovakia. It has, howev-

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[5] Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution*, pp. 11, 37.

[6] Ibid., p. 81.

[7] Quoted in Ibid.

[8] James Krapfl, "The Diffusion of 'Dissident' Political Theory in the Czechoslovak Revolution of 1989," *Slovo*, vol. 19. no. 2 (Autumn, 2007), p. 87

er, been emphasised that such a tendency was actually an important component within both the "worlds of dissent" and the "worlds of protest." As Bolton suggested, understanding the "stories" of dissent can help illuminate why certain figures developed a "larger-than-life aura" than others.[9] The influence of Jan Patočka's philosophical beliefs upon the Charter 77 movement helped foster many dissidents' conceptions of dissent as a moral imperative, while the insistence of Rudi Dutschke's (amongst others) on the importance of praxis and "direct action" appears to have ultimately prevented West German protest movements from creating a sense of solidarity across its many facets and from fully confronting its relationship with violence.

One of the core arguments of this paper has been its insistence that the strength of an oppositional movement's critique is derived from how well it understands the real nature of the regime it challenges. The fact that Czechoslovak dissidents appear to have understood how the nature of the Communist system had changed under Husák's regime does seem to have influenced the shape of Czechoslovak dissent itself. Examining West German protest in light of this element of Czechoslovak dissent further suggests that West Germans were impeded in their attempts to develop an effective critique of the Bonn regime because their continued reflections on Germany's Nazi past prevented any substantive insights into the Federal Republic's real nature. Of course, we might question whether there is any "inherent value" in an effective critique of any regime that targets its real nature. As Bolton points out, any study of Czechoslovak dissent should avoid "'triumphalist' thesis" that dissent played a role in "bringing down Communism."[10] For Bolton, it would be just as absurd to question whether the dissent of the 1970s and 1980s brought down Communism as it would be to ask "whether the French *philosophes* brought down the *Ancien Régime*, or the Romantics caused the revolutions of 1848."[11] However, Bolton also argues that dissent should be understood as "a form of culture" or a "style of political behavior" that had meaning "in and of themselves."[12] Considering that both Czechoslovak dissent and West German protest place similar emphasis on the inauthenticity of the existing values established by their respective political and social orders, any "effective" critique of a regime should have value in itself. Furthermore, as Krapfl explains, some elements of dissident thought were "revealed

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[9] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 271.
[10] Ibid., pp. 44-45.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid. p. 45

afresh in 1989."[13] In particular, Krapfl points to the invocation of Patočka's theory of the solidarity of the shaken in flyers, bulletins and speeches as "an explanation for the spontaneous coming together of Czechoslovak citizens in rejection of systemic violence."[14] Krapfl also emphasises the influence of Patočka's theory and Charter 77 upon the "original conception" of Civic Forum and Public against Violence—the two most important "citizens' initiatives which were created in November 1989—as "informal associations, not organisations."[15] Even if dissident thought played no role in bringing down Communism, it was applied in situations beyond its original context. While the West German protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s predate the emergence of Czechoslovak dissent, the more pluralist forms of protest found in parts of the literary realm and at the TUNIX congress in 1977 suggest that a form of protest resembling the "worlds of dissent" was a distinct possibility.

It is helpful to question whether Czechoslovak dissent could ever be fruitfully examined with reference to West German protest. Specifically, could "direct action" as conceived by West Germans provide a plausible form of opposition in Czechoslovakia? Such a possibility seems rather absurd. As the Soviet Union had demonstrated in 1956 in Hungary and again during 1968 in Czechoslovakia, they remained prepared to intervene in the affairs of fellow Communist countries if they perceived a threat to the Communist order—a notion that would be enshrined in the Brezhnev doctrine. If we were to go looking for examples of direct action in Czechoslovakia we might focus on Jan Palach's act of self-immolation on January 16th, 1969. However, as Bolton notes while Palach's act of sacrifice "mobilized a massive show of sympathy" it was unable to provide the "practical, political leadership of whose very absence it was an emblem."[16] Although Palach's act did inspire a march "in his memory" on January 17th, and his funeral on January 25th became a "*de facto* demonstration against the [Warsaw Pact] occupation and the retreat of reforms," Bolton points out that "no more significant or structured protest resulted."[17] Bolton continues to emphasise that the subsequent self-immolations of Jan Zajíc, Evžen Plocek, and Michal Leučík "never really entered into

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[13] James Krapfl, *Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community in Czechoslovakia, 1989—1992* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013), p. 109.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, p. 55.

[17] Ibid.

the national pantheon alongside Palach" due to media coverage of their deaths being "suppressed," which highlights how even the most "courageous deeds of moral pathos rely to some degree on successful staging as well as 'management' of their legacies"[18] Moreover, as Eva Kantůrková's 1989 essay "On the Ethics of Palach's Deed" suggests, such extreme forms of "direct action" were often engaged with in light of the moral questions they raised, rather than as a call for more explicit forms of resistance.[19] Kantůrková points to the words of the poet Jaroslav Seifert who wrote an open letter in January 1969 to other youths who might be tempted to recreate Palach's deed: "If you don't want all of us to kill ourselves, don't you kill yourselves."[20] Kantůrková argues that Palach's act should be understood as a "highly individual act" one that "broke free from what oppresses us: the impossibility of acting ethically under conditions of totality."[21] However, she continues, Palach's action "serves as sufficient for us all, and because he sacrificed himself, there is no need for anyone else to do so. Great ethical acts are always isolated."[22]

Not only are the ideals of West German protest insufficient for examining opposition movements on the other side of the Iron Curtain, they appear to have been unable to provide a lasting challenge to the Bonn regime itself. As Hanshew explains, while both Rudi Dutschke and Herbert Marcuse issued "visible and high-profile" statements in the pages of *Die Zeit* in September 1977, distancing themselves from the RAF and defining "the group's violence, not as a wrongheaded strategy, but as an illegitimate form of oppositional politics," it remained easy for the media to draw connections between the terrorism of the 1970s with the protest movements of the 1960s.[23] According to Hanshew, popular television programmes which produced "exposés on the 'torturous path to terrorism' allegedly paved by left intellectuals such as Herbert Marcuses" contributed to the "poisonous atmosphere" of "new levels of intolerance for those judged to be enemies of the 'free democratic order' which emerged after 1977's autumn terrorist crisis.[24] Regardless of whether direct action or even violence could be justified as legitimate political strategies, they appear to

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[18] Ibid.

[19] See Eva Kantůrková, "On the Ethics of Palach's Deed," in *Good-bye Samizdat*, ed. Goetz-Stankiewics, pp. 175-180.

[20] Quoted in Ibid., p. 180.

[21] Ibid., p. 179.

[22] Ibid., p. 180.

[23] Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy in West Germany*, pp. 236-239.

[24] Ibid., p. 237.

have been ill-equipped in West Germany to combat what Havel called the "infinitely more subtle and re-fined" ways in which people are manipulated under a traditional parliamentary democracy.[25]

Given that Czechoslovak dissidents never had to confront issues of violent resistance to the same extent that West German protesters did—as Krapfl notes, the nonviolent resistance to the Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968 had not been a "principled nonviolence" as the "principled motivation in 1968" remained "mixed with the practical considerations that against the combined might of the Soviet Union and its allies there could be no hope of victory by force"—we might question what could have been expected for the "worlds of protest."[26] It has been claimed that West Germans' confrontation with violence was confounded by their desire to express solidarity with anti-colonial movements in Vietnam and the struggles of the Black Panther party in the United States, which the "self-absorption" of Czechoslovak dissidents may have recused them from. However, it strikes this author that it was West German protesters' equation of their own struggles with those of others elsewhere under their own application of Marcuse's "minority thesis" that caused this problem. Furthermore, protesters could have made use of Albert Camus's claim in his 1954 work *The Rebel* that there are limits to the justifiable use of violence and that "[a]uthentic acts of rebellion will only consent to take up arms for institutions which limit violence, not for those which codify it. A revolution is not worth dying for unless it assures the immediate suppression of the death penalty; not worth going to prison for unless it refuses in advance to pass sentence without fixed terms."[27] There is no reason why West German protesters could not have continued to express solidarity to violent movements elsewhere while more thoroughly confronting whether violence was appropriate in the metropole. We should recall, however, that many West Germans did maintain a somewhat similar stance and only expressed solidarity to members of the RAF because they were perceived to be victims of state violence.

As a point of conclusion, it is worth referring back to Havel's final thoughts in "The Power of the Powerless." It has been stressed in this paper that both the "worlds of protest" and the "worlds of dissent" had meaning in themselves as both political, and perhaps more importantly, cultural phenomena. Havel

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[25] Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," p. 208.

[26] Krapfl, *Revolution with a Human Face*, p. 108.

[27] Albert Camus, *The Rebel* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1954), p. 259.

claimed that he knew from "thousands of personal experiences" how even small acts of dissent such as sign-ing Charter 77 had "immediately created a deeper and more open relationship and evoked sudden and powerful feelings of genuine community among people who were all but strangers before."[28] One of the benefits of exploring any oppositional movement through Bolton's conception of dissent as being a "world" or many "worlds" of experience, is that it helps facilitate an understanding of the meaning of protest or of dissent for the very people who acted and suffered during the historical period under analysis. Developing a better understanding of such "meaning" should be a goal for historical analysis itself. However, this goal does not preclude the importance of assessing the political ideologies and cultural trends that informed this sense of meaning. This is especially true when we recognise how West German protest was limited by its own understanding of the Bonn regime and the dominance of "direct action" and praxis upon protest thought. Havel also suggests that a sense of "genuine community" might only be the "consequence of a common threat" and it is possible that "the moment the threat ends or eases, the good it helped create will begin to dissipate as well."[29] An implication of these words is the question of whether Czechoslovak dis-sent—which was, of course, a response to a specific kind of regime, an "extreme" form of technological civilisation, Havel would say—can truly be used as a model for assessing opposition movements elsewhere, or as an example of what a freer, more authentic society might look like. It is the answer to this question, whatever it may be, that any historical analysis written under the "spectre of dissent" must be prepared to confront. Even so, this is a good question to live with. It is one that we should live with. And we can only provide an answer to it by pursuing further historical inquiry. For, as Havel insisted, "[w]e do not know the way out of the marasmus of the world, and it would be an expression of unforgivable pride were we to see the little we do as a fundamental solution, or were we to present ourselves, our community, and our solu-tions to vital problems as the only things worth doing."[30]

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[28] Havel, "The Power of the Powerless." p. 213.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

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