THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CANADIAN ARMY AS A UNILINGUAL INSTITUTION IN A BILINGUAL STATE

by

K. H. Barry Gallant

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

The Canadian Army, as it developed from a loose Sedentary Militia organization to a self-contained standing army, became a less and less congenial institution in which French-speaking Canadians could live and work. Two general influences are offered as an explanation for this development. First, French Canadians withdrew from active participation in the army when it was used for purposes of which they did not approve. Secondly, the army became increasingly efficiency oriented. These two factors combined to make the Canadian Army an English-speaking institution patterned on a British model. The army made no serious effort to adjust to the "French Fact" in Canada until growing manpower requirements forced it to draw upon the resources of the one-third of the Canadian population which speaks French as a mother tongue.

Short Title

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as a

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

This work is a study of the participation of French Canadians in the Canadian Army. The study was prompted by the fact that the Canadian Army, although the most representative of Canada's armed forces, is not ethnically representative of the Canadian population. While French Canadians form slightly less than one third of the Canadian population, they supply less than one fifth of Canada's soldiers.

It is the aim of this thesis to study the effect that the institutional aspects and characteristics of the army have had on French Canadian participation in the army. What effect has the organization, the language policy and the cultural atmosphere of the army had on the willingness of French Canadians to participate in what is one of the largest and most expensive of Canadian governmental institutions? To help answer this question, Canadian defence policies, past and present, have been taken as fixed factors. There will, therefore, be no study made in this thesis of French Canadian influence on Canadian defence policy and there will be no study of French Canadian reaction to defence policy and the roles assigned to the Canadian Army. Again, these influences and reactions are treated as fixed factors. It is the institutional development of the army, in relation to French Canadian participation in that institution, which is the focus of study for this thesis.

The method of study used is essentially an historical one. The development of the army has been divided into four chronological chapters. Within each chapter is a functional division: organization, language use and cultural milieu. The organization sections will cover administration, training, operations and recruiting. The sections on language use look at the policies and practices governing the use of French in the army and the short sections on cultural milieu attempt to give an idea of the environment in which Canadian soldiers have been required to live and work.

The study ends at the period immediately following the Korean War. The decision to choose the mid 1950's as a stopping point was based on two factors. After 1950, the operational philosophy of the army has been based upon the existence of a relatively large permanent force, in contrast to the earlier practice of relying on large reserve forces. As a result of this change in philosophy, the army's organization assumed its pre-unification geographical and functional form. At the same time, large, modern training and support facilities were developed and highly sophisticated and expensive equipment was acquired. Secondly, any study of the army after the Korean War becomes a study of the present army and thus requires a much more sophisticated method of study than the one provided in this thesis. It is here that Mr. Pierre Coulombe's study of the Canadian armed forces which he is presently completing for the Royal Commission on

Bilingualism and Biculturalism will provide essential information on the participation of French Canadians in the present armed forces. One final reason for concluding this study with the post-Korean period may be offered: a study of the Canadian Army after that time would possibly encounter serious security restrictions.

This thesis grew out of some research work I did for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism between May, 1964 and August, 1965. For permission to use the material gathered during this period, I would like to thank Professor Michael Oliver, the research director of the Commission.

Most of the material used in this thesis could not have been gathered without the whole-hearted co-operation of Mr. R. Lavergne of the Deputy Minister's Branch of the Department of National Defence. He not only provided access to the resources quoted throughout the study, but also provided working facilities at National Defence Headquarters, and for this I am most indebted.

Special thanks is also due to Mr. Harry Forbell and Mr. Pierre Coulombe of the research staff of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism who not only supplied some of the statistical information used, but who also gave many helpful suggestions.

The staff of the Canadian Army Historical Section, and in particular Colonel J. Mackay Hitsman and Captain D. W.

Morton read the original manuscript and pointed out the factual errors which, I hope, have now been corrected. Any errors remaining in the thesis and, of course, the interpretation placed upon the factual information are my own responsibility.

Final and special thanks must be given to my wife, Dorothy, who spent so many hours in proof-reading this thesis, and to my typist, Mrs. Judith Philip, whose efficiency, patience and good humour made the task much easier.

CHAPTER I

THE DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF THE MILITIA

Two broad trends affect the ethnic composition and the cultural patterns of the early Canadian Militia. The first of these trends corresponds to the period covered by the Sedentary Militia and the early years of the Volunteer Active Militia. Militia service in this period was, at least in theory, compulsory for all Canadian males of military age. Since the militia organizations existed only on paper except for limited exceptions, the militia was then ethnically representative of the Canadian population. In practice, the Militia was of little military significance. After the withdrawal of the British garrison from Canada following Confederation, a gradual shift began in the compositions and outlook of the Militia. As the Volunteer Militia and the nucleus of what was to become the "Permanent Force" grew and became professionally more competent, French-Canadian representation began to decline. Professional ties with the British Army became more complex and intimate and French-Canadians found the Canadian Militia less congenial as time passed. The South African War and the Great War accelerated this trend towards the Anglicization of the Canadian Army.

After the Treaty of Paris in 1763, two principles dominated Canadian military affairs: reliance on the Royal Navy

to maintain communications with Britain; maintenance of a relatively large British garrison in Canada.[1] The result of this reliance on British sea-power and a garrison of British troops was the nearly total absence of any Canadian participation in the military affairs of Canada. It was not until the withdrawal of British troops from Canada in 1870/71 that Canada had to give any serious thought to providing herself with a military force to meet her own requirements. Even then, because no real military threat to Canada existed, there was little impetus to establish a purely Canadian defence establishment. In the early years of this century, it also became increasingly clear that Canada would engage in large-scale military actions only as a small part of large British or other allied forces. The Canadian Army developed according to this outlook; it became militarily, if not politically, a part of a standardized imperial army.

Section One: Organization

The Sedentary Militia, 1763-1855

The Treaty of Paris marked the end of what had been almost complete self-reliance in Military affairs by the French Regime. Between the withdrawal of the Carignan-Salieres Regiment in 1668 and the despatch of 3,000 troops from France on the eve of war in 1755, there were no regular soldiers in Canada. The Canadians relied on the "Troupes de la Marine"

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[1] C. P. Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada (Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1940), pp. 54-55.

companies stationed in the country and on the excellent Canadian militia organization. "Les Compagnies franche de la Marine" were formed in 1690 by the French Department of Marine for service in the various French colonies. By 1697 Canadians were enrolled as officers and men in these marine companies[2] and this organization became in fact, if not in theory, Canada's first permanent force. After the peace treaty of 1763, the British returned the French regular troops to France, disbanded the colonial corps in Canada, but allowed their members to remain in the colony if they wished. The old Canadian militia organization was also disbanded, although some of its aspects - notably compulsory military service and the corvee - were retained. The defence of Canada became the responsibility of the British Army.

The militia was first used in a military campaign by the British when a battalion of paid volunteers was mobilized for use in the war against Pontiac. The proclamation issued by General Murray in May, 1764, appointed J. B. des Bergeres, Sieur de Rigauville, commanding officer of the French-speaking militia battalion. The other officers of the battalion were also French-Canadians with experience in the old militia or the colonial forces. Although conscription had to be threatened, the battalion was finally completed and saw service as line-of-supply troops during the uprising. The fighting was done

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[2]G. F. G. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers (Toronto, MacMillan, 1960), p. 24.

by British troops and some American provincial troops and the militia unit was disbanded as soon as the uprising was over.[3]

Canadian participation in the military actions of the American Revolution was on a small scale. The militia was first used in June, 1775 when M. de Belestre and eighty Canadians re-occupied the fort at St. Jean after the Americans, who had captured it earlier, withdrew. The siege of Quebec during the winter of 1775/76 saw some meager participation by the Canadian militia and the governor had to threaten, and finally use, compulsory service to raise militia troops during this period. Approximately five hundred Canadian militia troops took some part in the military actions during that winter, but they did not form a large contingent in the total forces used and they formed less than half the garrison at Quebec.[4] For Burgoyne's offensive the following year, Carleton could supply only a "corvee" of 105 men.[5]

The existing militia organization was not changed significantly in 1777 when the Council passed the first ordinance respecting the militia. The universal liability to

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[3]G. F. G. Stanley, "The Canadian Militia During the Colonial Period", Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research (Spring, 1946), p. 30.

[4]Ibid., p. 31.

[5]Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 121.

service of all males of military age was retained and so were most of the duties and responsibilities imposed by the old French militia laws. The first major change in the militia organization of British North America did not occur until after the passage of the Constitution Act in 1791, which created the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada. The militia laws of Upper Canada were based on the militia laws then prevailing in England, including universal liability to service for those men of military age in the colony.[6] In Lower Canada the Militia Act of 1793 was still partly based on the old French laws and differed from the English practice followed in Upper Canada in that men of military age in the colony were also subject to compulsory service for civil projects. That is, the idea of the "corvee" was still retained, although militiamen used to transport military goods were now paid for their services. The militia officers of Lower Canada also retained some of their old civil duties and functions, either formally (eg. they were also coroners) or as perquisites.[7]

During the Napoleonic Wars, many British regiments were withdrawn from the British North American colonies. To help fill the gaps left by these withdrawals, provincial corps were recruited in the colonies, but their use was restricted to the confines of North America. One of these provincial corps was the Royal Canadian Volunteer Regiment, raised in

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[6]E. J. Chambers, The Canadian Militia (Montreal, 1907), p. 33.

[7]Ibid.

Lower Canada in 1793. The corps contained two battalions: one composed of French speaking soldiers from the Quebec City region and the other made up of English speaking soldiers from the Montreal region and Glengarry in Upper Canada.[8] All officers of the French speaking battalion but three were French speaking and the unit was commanded by Lieutenant-colonel the Baron of Longueil. The second battalion also had five French speaking officers on its rolls. The corps was never renowned for its military qualities, although claims have been made that it provided useful experience for some officers and men who were to serve in the war of 1812.[9] The regiment was disbanded in 1802 and was not re-raised because of an adverse report made upon it by General Hunter in 1799.[10]

At the end of the Eighteenth Century, the militia staff of Lower Canada was overwhelmingly French speaking[11] and remained so for the first decade of the Nineteenth Century. By 1812, however, the Loyalists and past-Loyalists who had finally settled in Lower Canada began to take a renewed interest in the military affairs of British North America.

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[8] Ibid., p. 36.

[9] Benjamin Sulte, Histoire de la milice Canadienne-francaise, 1760-1897 (Montreal, 1897), p. 19.

[10] Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 142.

[11] Sulte, p. 26.

As the danger of a British war with the United States grew, the English speaking settlers of Lower Canada started to play a larger role in the militia organization of that colony. These men, many of whom had had extensive experience in Loyalist and British units during the American Revolution, were a ready source of experienced and largely willing officers and non-commissioned-officers for the militias of Upper and Lower Canada.

As the wars in Europe continued to drain away British regiments from North America, the practice of raising fencible regiments in the North American colonies was resorted to. Fencible regiments were not part of the colonial militia, but were part of the British Army. They were placed on the British Army rolls, paid by the British government, served according to British rules and regulations and were under direct British command. Fencible regiments were full-time professional corps, but they were liable for service only in North America unless they became a "regiment of the line". This distinction allowed them to be used anywhere in the world as the regiment was then a full member of the British Army. The New Brunswick Regiment was originally raised as a fencible unit, but became a regiment of the line in 1810. Altogether, five fencible regiments were raised in British North America before or during the War of 1812, including the Canadian Fencible Infantry Regiment. The men of this regiment were predominantly French speaking soldiers

from Lower Canada, but the officers were British professionals.[12] During the course of the War of 1812, some provincial corps were placed on an almost equal footing with the fencible regiments, but all were from Upper Canada with one exception.

The exception was The Voltigeurs, a militia unit raised in Lower Canada by Lt. Col. de Salaberry. De Salaberry was Canadian, but he was by profession an officer in the British regular army, retired in Canada. The Voltigeurs were regarded as an elite militia unit and eventually were on a nearly equal footing with the fencible regiments and the provincial corps of Upper Canada. The Voltigeurs were French speaking and the other militia units they were associated with at their one major battle - the Battle of Chateauguay - were also predominantly French speaking.[13]

Many militia units were raised in Lower Canada during the war,[14] but most of the action seen by militia units was in Upper Canada. Even there, the bulk of the actual fighting was done by British regular units and wherever militia units played a conspicuous part in a campaign, they were fencible regiments or long-service militia units; not ad hoc units formed of the sedentary militia. Nevertheless, the legend

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[12]Chambers, p. 32.

[13]Sulte, pp. 32-33.

[14]L. Hamfray Irving, Officers of the British Forces in Canada (Welland, Welland Tribune Print, 1908), contains detailed lists of British and Canadian officers who served in regular, provincial, fencible and militia units during the war.

grew that it was the Canadian militia - with some slight help from the British army - who won the War of 1812 and saved Canada for the Empire. While the general enthusiasm of the Canadian militia must be recognized, one must recall that it was British policy at this time to try to maintain a garrison of regular troops in Canada which was equal in size to the whole American regular army.[15] The Canadians supplied manpower for the support elements of the British forces and supplied replacements for understrength British units, but it was the British troops who bore the brunt of the fighting in Upper Canada and later carried the war to the United States.[16]

After the War of 1812, the militia system in the Canadas remained unchanged - due in no small part to the flattering picture it drew of itself and its role in the late war. It remained a useful source of manpower for *ad hoc* units that had to be formed from time to time. It played a small role in the rebellion in Lower Canada in

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[15] C. F. Hamilton, "Defence, 1812-1912", *Canada and Its Provinces*, ed. Short, A., and Doughty, A. G. (Toronto, 1914-17), vol. VII, p. 392. J. MacKay Hitsman, *The Incredible War of 1812* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 243-249, where Sir George Prevost's despatch to the Earl of Liverpool, May, 1812, outlining the military position of British North America is reproduced.

[16] C. P. Stacey, *An Introduction to the Study of Military History for Canadian Students* (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1955), p. 8. See also Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, p. 178 and Hitsman, p. 7. Irving's book has a detailed list of regular and militia units and where they served.

1837 and a larger role in the rebellion in Upper Canada, but these participants were not enrolled in militia units in the modern sense. The militiamen who took part in the rebellion in Lower Canada were almost all English speaking and served as only a minor adjunct to the British units which carried out the task of restoring order.[17]

Even with the growth of limited self-government in the 1840s and 1850s, the colonies were reluctant to change their militia organizations since any change that would make the colonial militias more efficient and self-reliant would also make them more expensive. An efficient militia system would also encourage the British government to give the colonies more responsibility for their own defence and would lead to the withdrawal of British troops from the colonies. The withdrawal of British troops would not only lead to greater colonial expenditures for defence, but would deprive the colonies of the revenues spent by the British army. Thus, the only change of any significance in the militia laws of the Canadas came in 1846, after the Act of Union. The new militia act, patterned after the old militia laws of Upper Canada, ended the distinctive civil responsibilities of the militia in Canada East.[18] The militia was still a sedentary organization that only existed on paper except for the annual muster parade. The few volunteer militia units that did

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[17]Stanley, "The Canadian Militia...", p. 38.

[18]Chambers, p. 63.

struggle into existence during this period did so through the enthusiasm of their officers and men and were "tolerated rather than encouraged by the authorities".[19] Control of the effective military forces in British North America remained in British hands not so much through the designs of the Colonial Office and the War Office as through the unwillingness of the colonies to bear any large expenditures for their own military defence.[20]

Volunteer Active Militia, 1855-1910

Apart from the few unappreciated and informal volunteer militia regiments, the ethnic structure of the militia remained proportionately balanced between English and French speaking Canadians simply because, in theory, service was universal and compulsory. This balance existed only on paper however, as did the militia itself, until 1855. The Militia Act of 1855 introduced a new factor into the militia organization of Canada East and Canada West: it established an "active" volunteer militia on top of the old sedentary militia. The Active Militia was to be a small, partially trained body of volunteers who would be uniformed, armed, trained and organized into independent companies, ready to be used in emergencies. The limit set on this volunteer part-time force was five thousand. The establishment of a volunteer militia system had an important side effect: it

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[19] Ibid., p. 64.

[20] Great Britain, House of Commons, "Report on Colonial Defence", 1859 and "Report of the House of Commons Committee, 1861" in the Canadian Militia, n.p., n.d.

marked the decline of the sedentary militia system, and with it the idea of compulsory military service,[21] although the new act still made provision for compulsory service. The system of independent militia companies was also plainly designed to provide auxiliaries to regular British units.[22] All other administrative and logistics work was left to the British regulars.

Following the "Trent Affair" and during the American Civil War, the volunteer system became increasingly popular. The enthusiasm was not universal, however, and when John A. Macdonald and George Etienne Cartier tried to have the limit on the volunteer militia raised to 50,000, a combination of Grits and French speaking government members defeated the government on this issue. The government had based its defeated proposal on the report of a special commission of enquiry into the militia. The commission, composed of Cartier, Macdonald, Galt, McNab, Tache, Lysons, Campbell and Cameron, studied the militia thoroughly and made several recommendations for its improvement, but without, apparently, making any mention of the use of the French language within the militia organization, or the use of French speaking militia units.[23] In any case, neither the report nor the bill based upon it was

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[21]Stacey, Military History, p. 13.

[22]Hamilton, p. 398.

[23]Canada, House of Commons, Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Report a Plan for the Better Organization of the Department of Adjutant General of Militia, and the Best Means of Reorganizing the Militia of this Province and to Prepare a Bill Thereon, (Quebec, Queen's Printer, 1862).

accepted by the House. The following year, the House passed a bill raising the strength of the volunteer active militia to 30,000 men and providing for the raising of "service battalions" by ballot - that is, by conscription. The latter proposal was never carried out.

The first militia act of the new Dominion government was passed in 1868 and was based on the 1855 act. It extended the volunteer system to the Maritime provinces; it divided the Dominion into nine military districts (MD), each under the command of a lieutenant Colonel who held his appointment on a full-time basis. Within the nine MDs there were twenty-two brigade districts and each of these in turn was divided into regimental districts. (This followed in rough outline the territorial organization of the British militia system.) It is interesting to note that the regimental divisions, with very few exceptions, corresponded to the federal electoral districts.[24] Georges Cartier, the first Minister of Militia and Defence, was the architect of this organization.[25] Cartier, apparently, had specifically asked for the Militia and Defence portfolio.[26] Macdonald had previously held the portfolio in the Provincial government in 1862, an indication - along with their colaboration on the abortive militia bill of that same year - of the importance

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[24]Chambers, p. 89.

[25]Sulte, p. 65.

[26]Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 254.

these two men attached to the portfolio. This interest probably helped insure that French speaking Canadians would be well represented in the department, at least on the civilian side. In fact, the post of deputy minister continued to be held by French speaking Canadians up to World War II.

For some years the British government had been becoming more and more displeased with the large military expenditures it was making throughout the Empire and had been trying to persuade the colonies to undertake a greater financial share of their own defence. In 1869, Britain had 50,025 troops stationed in the colonies, 16,185 of these in Canada and Newfoundland.[27] The settlement of the Alabama Claims finally produced the circumstances favourable to the withdrawal of these troops from Canada during the next two years, except for a small garrison at Halifax and another at Esquimalt. At one stroke, Canada not only lost her first line of defence, but far more importantly, she lost the instructors who trained her volunteer active militia units. Canada either had to make some other arrangement for training her militia, or had to be satisfied with a poorly trained and amateurish military force.

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[27]Canada, House of Commons, Letter from Mr. Secretary Cardwell to Earl Granville, The War Office, 25th. January, 1869, in Returns to the Addresses of the Senate and the House of Commons Relative to the Withdrawal of Troops from the Dominion, (Ottawa, L. B. Taylor, 1871).

To cope with the problem of providing instructors, two Canadian militia artillery batteries were placed on full-time service at Kingston and at the Citadel in Quebec in 1871. They were to train the militia units of their respective areas. This first cadre of "permanent force" instructors was increased in 1883 by the addition of one troop of cavalry, another artillery battery and three infantry companies. In 1885 a school for mounted infantry was opened at Winnipeg and the following year two more companies of infantry were added to the permanent force, raising the total strength of the force to one thousand all ranks. (This was the real beginning of the Canadian army: a small permanent force of instructors, a volunteer active militia organized into military districts, and a reserve militia on paper which was the remnant of the old sedentary militia.) The artillery battery at Quebec City, the cavalry school, and one infantry company at St. Jean formed the core of the militia organization in Quebec.

The military staff at Ottawa was ludicrously small by modern standards. It consisted of a General Officer Commanding (GOC) who was a British colonel on loan to the Canadian government and who assumed the rank of Major-General in the Canadian Militia; an Adjutant-General (AG) who was normally a Canadian militia officer; an Inspector-General (IG) of Artillery and Warlike Stores and one aide-de-camp (ADC). Before 1874, the senior officer in the Dominion

had been the Adjutant-General, also an English officer on loan. The senior military officer was responsible for the military command and discipline of the militia. All other functions were under strict civilian control within the Department of Militia and Defence. This organization almost inevitably led to conflicts over authority between the Minister and the GOC.[28]

The organization and control of the Department of Militia and Defence was not changed until after the South African War, when support and ancillary services were added to the permanent force (Medical, service, engineers, ordinance, guides and signals) to bring the established strength of the force up to five thousand all ranks. To facilitate control of the militia and the enlarged permanent force, a command structure was superimposed upon the old system of military districts. Ontario was divided into two command districts, Quebec was made a command district and the Maritime provinces were all put under one command. Already Ontario was becoming the site of most of the permanent military bases in the country.

The most important reorganization of the period following the South African War was the abolition of the post of GOC and the creation of the Militia Council by the Militia Act of 1904. The 1904 act gave the minister unquestioned control over the militia and the Militia Council (patterned

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[28]Hamilton, pp. 443-44.

after the British Army Council) acted as the advisory body to the Minister. The council was composed of the Minister, the Deputy Minister, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), the AG, the Quartermaster General (QMG) and the Master General of Ordinance (MGO). The 1904 act also abolished the stipulation that the senior military officer in the Dominion had to be a British officer not below the rank of colonel, thus opening the door for the appointment of a Canadian CGS. British officers of equal rank to Canadian officers also ceased to be given seniority over their Canadian counterparts.[29]

The permanent force, aided by the Volunteer Active Militia, took part in three military campaigns between 1870 and 1902. For the Red River Expedition of 1870, Canada supplied an infantry battalion from Ontario and one from Quebec. Enlistment for the Canadian contingent began officially on 1 May 1870 and the Canadian contribution to the force finally amounted to fifty-six officers and 700 men.[30] The Quebec Battalion, largely French speaking, was commanded by Lt. Col. Cassault, an ex-officer of the British army. When the force returned to Canada in June, 1871, Lt. Col. Cassault and eighty men remained behind as a garrison for Fort Garry.

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[29]Chambers, p. 108.

[30]Sulte, p. 74.

The first all-Canadian military operation ever undertaken was the campaign in the North West Territories in 1885. The GOC and a few staff officers were British officers on loan to the Canadian forces, but otherwise the entire expedition was composed of permanent force and Volunteer Active Militia units. Militia units were mobilized from most of the Canadian provinces and both Quebec's "city" battalions were accepted for service: the 9th Voltigeurs from Quebec City and the Carabinieres de Mont Royal from Montreal. Support for the enterprise was reasonably strong in Quebec and it was not until the campaign ended and the commanding officers of the two French speaking Quebec units were left off the GOC's honours list that antipathy was aroused against the force. The Minister of Militia and Defence - a French speaking Canadian - refused to forward the list unless these two gentlemen were included. This step drew the wrath of the English speaking supporters of the campaign[31] and helped to further aggravate the bad feelings aroused over the treatment of Riel.

The proposal to use Canadian troops to support the British in the South African War created the first marked difference of opinion on military policy between French and English speaking Canadians. Before the South African War,

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[31] D. W. Morton, The Place of French-Canadians in the Canadian Militia, 1867-1914, a submission to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1964, p. 12.

Canadian governments had followed the caution and wise policy established by Macdonald in 1885. At that time, the Colonial Office had sounded Canadian government opinion on sending Canadian troops to help in the Soudan campaign. Macdonald replied that Canadian opinion would not support such a move, but that the War Office would be welcome to recruit Canadians for service in the British army as they had done in 1858 when the 100th Foot (Prince of Wales' Royal Canadian Regiment) had been raised in Canada. The Canadian government would not, under any conditions, call out the militia under section sixty-one of the Militia Act.[32] This plan would not have cost the Canadian Taxpayer a penny[33] and would have placated both Canadian imperialists and their anti-imperialist opponents. The War Office did not avail itself of this proposal.

Fifteen years later, however, the clamour of English speaking Canadians for participation in the South African War finally caused Laurier to depart from this pragmatic policy of no official Canadian participation in imperial wars. Direct Canadian participation in the war finally amounted to 2,500 men serving in Canadian units in South Africa. A further 5,000 Canadians served in British units. Quebec City and Montreal each contributed an infantry company

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[32] C. P. Stacey, "John A. Macdonald on Raising Troops in Canada for Imperial Service", The Canadian Historical Review (December, 1957), pp. 39-40.

[33] Ibid., p. 38.

to the force. Of a total of thirty-eight officers in the first contingent, six were French speaking. The second contingent contained five French speaking officers. Paradoxically, the battery of artillery from Quebec in this contingent had no French speaking officers, while the artillery battery from Ontario had two French speaking officers.[34] The use of Canadian troops in an imperialist war in Africa was not a policy designed to increase French Canadian enthusiasm for participation in the Canadian army.

The decreasing participation of French speaking Canadians in the militia and the permanent force can be seen by tracing the organization and composition of the militia from 1870 to the first decade of the Twentieth Century. The Militia Act of 1855 provided for active militia units of company size. These volunteer companies were recruited on a local geographic basis and were small enough to allow the officers to have a direct social contact with the men of the company. Eventually, some of the independant militia companies were formed into battalions, some of which still exist. After the Militia Act of 1868 was passed, militia battalions were accepted into the Dominion militia and in 1869 a dozen Quebec battalions were added to the militia rolls.

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[34]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Supplementary Report of the Department of Militia and Defence, 1899-1900, (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1901). (Figures are compiled from this report.)

Within Quebec, militia battalions and independant companies were organized into three military Districts: MD5 comprised the English speaking militia units in the Montreal area; MD6 contained the French speaking units in the Montreal area; and MD7 contained all the units in the Quebec City area, most of which were French speaking. At first, no distinctions were made between militia units, but in 1874 military appropriations began to drop and a distinction was made between city and rural units. The city units were allowed to parade regularly and to attend summer camp once a year. The rural units, because of their dispersion, could not meet regularly during the year and after 1874 they were allowed a summer camp only every two years. This change hurt the French speaking militia units in particular, since most of them were rural units. There were only two French speaking city battalions.[35] A reorganization of the MDs in 1892 again affected the French speaking militia units in Quebec: MDs 5 and 6 were reorganized on a geographic basis which transferred many French speaking units to MD5 and a few English speaking units to MD6.

Changes in the training cadres provided by the small continuous service units stationed in Quebec also had unfortunate effects on the French speaking militia units in the province. The artillery battery stationed at the Citadel

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[35]Units were the 9th. Voltigeurs (Quebec), and the 65th. Carabinieres (Montreal).

at Quebec in 1870 had the capacity to instruct the French speaking units in their own language. Although the commanding officer of the battery was British, two of his three officers were French speaking and fifty-two of the 138 men in the battery were French speaking.[36] When the Quebec City battery was exchanged with the Kingston battery in 1880, the instructional capacity of the new battery was limited: the Kingston battery was entirely English speaking. The Cavalry School established in Quebec three years later was also entirely English speaking. The only continuous-service cadre in Quebec qualified to instruct the French speaking militia units in their own language was the infantry school at St. Jean which had only one officer who was not French speaking.[37]

Militia officers during this period received their appointments directly from the government of the day and while this practice helped to maintain a rough balance between English speaking and French speaking officers in the militia in Quebec, there was one serious weakness in the system. Officers did not receive substantive commissions in the militia (and could not join the permanent force cadres) until they had passed a course of instruction at one of the schools of military instruction operated by the permanent

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[36]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Report on the State of the Militia, 1871 (Ottawa, I. B. Taylor, 1872), p. 93.

[37]Morton, p. 4.

force, and all but one of these schools gave instruction only in English.

It is not surprising under the conditions that prevailed for the training of officers for the militia and the permanent force, that qualified French speaking officers became fewer and fewer. The failure to provide for the professional instruction of French speaking officers and NCOs was particularly depressing for the rural militia units. The officers and NCOs of rural units not only had more difficulty in attending the schools of instruction in the cities, but there was a smaller percentage of bilingual officers and NCOs in the rural units. The result was that the rural units in Quebec had a far smaller number of officers with military qualifications from the military schools of instruction.[38] The decline in the number of qualified French speaking officers can be traced in the figures provided by the Department of Militia and Defence. Before 1870 there were more officers from Quebec with certificates of qualifications than there were from Ontario and the ratio of those holding first class certificates was two to one in favour of Quebec.[39] When the militia appropriations began to fall after 1874, Quebec lost its leading position. In 1874 the number of French speaking candidates for commissions and certificates from the schools of military instruction in Quebec had been

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[38] Ibid., pp. 7-8.

[39] Chambers, op. cit., p. 89.

59 of 102 applicants. But none of the forty-one applicants who received commissions or certificates from boards of examiners in Quebec were French speaking.[40] By 1890, the proportion of officers, NCOs and soldiers with French names who received certificates of qualification from the schools of military instruction in Quebec, or from the Royal Military College, had dropped to the following figures.[41]

Cavalry School	2 of 37
Artillery School	4 of 53
Engineer School	0 of 8
Infantry School	29 of 266
RMC	1 of 6
Total	36 of 370

The Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) had opened in 1876 at Kingston with a class of eighteen cadets. Its avowed purpose was to qualify young Canadian men for commissions in the Volunteer Active Militia and the permanent force after a four year course of studies. The first commandant and his staff were all British officers. All instruction at the college was in English and the entrance requirements stressed mathematics and science. French was neither a requirement for entrance to the college nor a well-taught subject at the college. The first report on the college carried a complaint by the instructor of modern languages about the cadets' lack

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[40] Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1874, pp. 304-305; pp. 313-314.

[41] Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1890, pp. 192-198.

of proper school training in French.[42]

Originally, it was planned that each MD would send two cadets per year to the college and that after graduation these graduates would be fully qualified for service in the militia. An announcement in the Canada Gazette in 1880 noted that the first class of graduates ("The Old Eighteen") would receive commissions in the militia and that they would be regularly promoted as they became qualified by age, rank and seniority. In addition, graduates of RMC were to be appointed to fill all the permanent militia posts as they progressed in their careers.[43] The top prizes at the college, however, were four commissions in the British Army, offered annually. Twenty-four additional commissions in the British Army were offered in 1885 to RMC graduates and fourteen undergraduates of the college received commissions in that same year.[44]

By this policy, much of the value of the college as a training ground for young Canadian militia officers was lost, especially as many of the better cadets accepted commissions in the British Army. The trend of the top cadets either to join the British Army or not join the Canadian militia was further aggravated when the Canadian government showed no enthusiasm for the proposal that the top prizes at the college

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[42]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1877, p. 208.

[43]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1880, p. 270

[44]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1885, pp. 190-191.

should be civilian appointments in the Dominion government.[45] With entrance examinations stressing mathematics and science; with the highest award of the college being a career in the British Army; and with instruction given only in English, it is hardly surprising that by 1900 only ten of 255 graduates of RMC were French speaking.[46]

As the proportion of French speaking militia officers declined toward the end of the Nineteenth Century, so did the number of French speaking rank-and file militiamen. When the Volunteer Active Militia was first authorized, the problem was more one of controlling the size of the militia than in generating enthusiasm for it. By the 1870s more peaceful and less tense conditions created a decline of interest in the militia. The Deputy Adjutants General (DAG) of MD5 and MD6 found interest in the militia so low in 1871 that they recommended use of the ballot to fill vacancies in the militia units in their districts. The DAG of MD7 merely noted that the voluntary system was not supplying enough recruits to keep his units up to strength.[47] The following year, he too recommended use of the ballot.[48] The malaise was not universal in Quebec, but the few exceptions to the

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[45]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1880, p. 1.

[46]Morton, p. 5. He states that most of the ten French-Canadian cadets were from French-Canadian families who had long been active in militia affairs.

[47]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1871, p. 21, p. 27, p. 30.

[48]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1872, p. LXXXII.

general lack of interest shown to the militia in Quebec were worthy of special note in the reports of the Department of Militia and Defence.[49]

French Canadians showed no more interest in the small permanent force than they did in the volunteer militia. Except for the artillery battery at Quebec, and later the infantry school at St.-Jean, there were no units in the permanent force that were predominantly or even partially French speaking. The move of the Quebec City artillery battery to Kingston in 1880 reduced the capacity of the permanent force units to give instruction in French or to attract French speaking recruits. The move of the Quebec City artillery battery was the first instance of what was to become a continuing complaint of French speaking soldiers in Canada: service in the permanent force meant that eventually the soldier would be posted outside of Quebec - thus breaking his family ties and making him live and work in an English speaking environment. The alternative was to accept a career limited to the opportunities that could be provided by the permanent force in Quebec: a limitation that became increasingly severe as Ontario began to acquire the largest and most important military establishments after the South African War.

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[49]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1871, p. 30 (County Beauce Battalion); Annual Report, 1874, p. 25 (Shefford Field Battery), and p. 67 (The Commanding Officer transported and fed his troops at his own expense.)

Section Two: Language Use

1763-1910

The Sedentary Militia was a paper organization with no provision for administrative or training practices. It was controlled by the various provinces of British North America and what administration was required to operate the Sedentary Militia would be carried on in the administrative language of the province concerned. Fencible units were part of the British Army and thus subject to the practices of the British army. Long service militia units and militia units raised for a specific task normally operated closely with units of the British army and the language for operations - certainly above the unit level - would be English, although the language for internal communication within a militia unit would be the language of the district from which the unit was raised.[50] However, even in a battle fought largely by French speaking militia units and commanded by a French speaking Canadian, staff orders and instructions seemingly were issued in English.[51]

The creation of a volunteer active militia in 1855 meant that a small permanent staff was needed to care for the administration and day to day requirements of the militia units.

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[50] Maj. Ernest Legare, "Le Francais Dans l'Armee Canadienne", Canadian Defence Quarterly, (January, 1930), Vol. 7, p. 228.

[51] Sulte, pp. 120-121. Sulte reproduces de Salaberry's order about treatment of prisoners and his praise of the conduct of his troops. The order is in English.

The military districts of Montreal and Quebec were administered by French speaking officers. They had no staffs except during the summer training periods when they would use the services of local militia officers. While much of the actual training of the militia units was done by the British garrison, at least one training document was translated into French at this period (1863) and repeated several times.[52] However, the use of French was largely confined to the internal administration of French speaking militia units.

After the withdrawal of British forces from Canada in 1871, "B" Battery of the Canadian militia gave instruction to the Quebec militia units. Since fifty-two of the NCOs and men of this unit were French speaking[53] training was done in both languages.[54] When the battery at Kingston was exchanged for the Quebec City battery in 1880, Quebec militia units could not receive instruction in French since the entire battery was English speaking. Even within a French speaking militia artillery unit, neither the books of instruction nor the words of command were in French.[55] The only military

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[52]Legare, p. 228.

[53]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1871, p. 93.

[54]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1873/74, p. 54.

[55]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1880, p. 209, which discusses the Quebec Field Battery.

school giving instruction in French after 1880 was the infantry school at St.-Jean.[56] Staff work in the militia and the permanent force was done entirely in English, although one GOC - General Hutton - did consider that bilingual staff officers were essential for an efficient militia system. He issued an order to that effect, but difficulties with the government of the day led to his resignation before he could impliment this reform.[57]

The permanent positions in the Canadian militia structure were filled by British officers, qualified militia officers or, after 1880, by graduates of RMC. Graduates of RMC were far from being bilingual. All instruction at the college was done in English and the entrance requirements (outlined earlier) did not favour French speaking candidates from Quebec. Instruction in French was not adequate,[58] in fact, nearly twice as much time was spent learning to ride a horse properly as was spent in learning French.[59] Once commissioned into the militia or the permanent force, the young officer's further professional training was entirely

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[56]The document referred to in note 52 was an infantry training directive.

[57]Morton, p. 6.

[58]Ibid., p. 6, and Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1901, p. 63.

[59]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1911, pp. 62-63.

in English, normally at British schools of instruction and notably at the British staff colleges from 1905 onwards. A preparatory course for candidates writing the entrance tests for the British Army staff college was given at RMC, but only in English.[60] Except for the one exception of the infantry school at St.-Jean, the Canadian permanent force was a purely English speaking organization by 1910 and French was not used in the militia above unit level.

Section Three: Cultural Milieu

The Sedentary Militia 1763-1855

Following the British capture of Canada, the nature and role of the militia changed little. The old organization and the old rules were kept until 1777 when the Council passed the first ordinance respecting the militia. Except for the fencible regiments and some volunteer corps raised during the American Revolution, the Canadian militia was a paper organization. Any Canadian participation in the active military establishment of Canada was British in both form and content. The Royal Canadian Volunteer Regiment had one French speaking battalion, but was British in its uniforms, arms, training and organization.[61] The fencible regiments, the provincial corps and the ad hoc militia units created before and during the War of 1812 were similarly British in

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[60] Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1905, p. 24.

[61] Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 142.

every respect.[62] In fact, most of their commanding officers were serving or retired British regular officers, including the renowned Charles de Salaberry.[63]

A curious arrangement during the early decades of the Nineteenth Century was the distinction made between militia organizations in Quebec City. It was the practice there to distinguish "British" militia from "Canadian" militia. The distinction corresponded to English speaking and French speaking militia formations respectively until 1828, when this invidious comparison was abolished by the Lieutenant Governor. However, it was renewed in 1847[64] and remained in effect until the Militia Act of 1855 placed all militia formations in the Quebec City area into one military district.

The Volunteer Active Militia, 1855-1910

Five artillery, three armoured and four infantry units, or parts of units, of the present Canadian army can trace their origins back to the Militia Act of 1855 which created uniformed, armed, trained and paid militia units.[65] The new volunteer militia units were far from being distinctively Canadian, however. The uniforms were of British pattern, arms and equipment were British, the organization and tactics were British, and professional instruction was given by the British

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[62] Chambers, p. 40.

[63] Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, pp. 144-46; see also Encyclopedia Canadiana, "de Salaberry, Charles".

[64] Chambers, p. 56.

[65] Ibid., p. 12.

units stationed in Canada. Even the rules and regulations governing the militia after Confederation remained British: Queen's Regulations, the Mutiny Act, and the Articles of War applied to the Canadian militia when on active service. The only modification to the British rules were the restrictions placed on the use of corporal punishment.[66] The Canadian militia headquarters had no other function than to hand over to the regular British staffs a set of volunteer companies and recruits if and when needed.[67]

British regular officers continued to fill many of the permanent and more important posts in the Canadian militia organization. Up until 1904 the senior militia officer was a British officer on loan to the Canadian government. This officer, theoretically free from Canadian political ties and sympathies, was responsible for the military efficiency of the militia. The minister and the civilian officials of the Department of Militia and Defence were responsible for the provision of arms and equipment, military stores, and the provisions and maintenance of all military buildings. This division of responsibilities and interests was one of the factors contributing to the Britic.ism of the Canadian militia and the permanent force.

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[66]Maj. T. C. Scoble, The Canadian Volunteers' Handbook for Field Service (Toronto, Henry Rowsell, 1868), p. 76

[67]Hamilton, p. 398.

A British officer, charged with the task of making the Canadian militia as efficient as possible, would not unreasonably, see his task as making the Canadian militia conform as closely as possible to the British pattern. The Minister and his civilian officials were not particularly concerned about the form of the militia as long as the important function of dispersing the public moneys to the most deserving quarters was unimpaired. The most serious conflicts between the minister and his senior militia officer occurred when the demands for efficiency and military reform happened to conflict with the realities of Canadian politics. For example, a proposal to raise a French speaking militia unit and dress them in Zouave uniforms was denied as a result of objections from military people in Canada and Britain,[68] but the GOC's attempt to make the purchase of horses for the South African contingent the responsibility of an impartial army purchasing commission could not be tolerated.[69]

In one important respect, the civilian authorities overruled the military authorities on the use and organization of the Canadian militia and started what was to be a persistent Canadian demand in the two world wars of this century. The British military authorities wanted Canada to supply independent companies for the South African campaign. They intended to use these independent companies as reinforcements

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[68] Morton, pp. 8-9.

[69] Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 293.

for British units. The Canadian government, however, stipulated that the Canadian contribution remain together as a contingent and that it not be broken up as reinforcements for British units.[70] Even with this stipulation, twice as many men from Canada served in units raised in Canada for the British Army (at British expense) as served in the Canadian contingent.[71] Legally, the troops of the Canadian contingent were on the same basis as other imperial troops.[72]

In the series of Imperial and Colonial conferences held after the South African War, the British government advanced the idea of establishing an imperial army composed of contingents from all parts of the empire. This plan, first proposed at the Imperial Conference of 1902, was rejected by Canada and Australia.[73] The idea of standardization of the various military forces in the Empire was acceptable, however, and later conferences settled the details of the standardization process. An Imperial General Staff (IGS) was formed with Canadian and Australian sections and vacancies were made available to Canadian and Australian officers at the British Army Staff College at Camberley. What had been thrown

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[70] Ibid., p. 280.

[71] Stacey, Military History, p. 20, (The Canadian contingent contained 2500 men while 5000 Canadians served with British units.)

[72] Ibid., p. 20.

[73] W. L. Morton, The Kingdom of Canada, (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1963), pp. 398-99.

out the front door came in by the back door: arms, equipment, uniforms, training, organization, doctrine and outlook of the Canadian army became standardized on the British model. Standardization even extended to the exchange of officers and men and the expanding Canadian permanent force obtained the services of some British officers and NCOs[74] who not only retained their British army rank but also retained their British army seniority.[75] Arrangements were also made, in 1906, for the exchange of officers between the Canadian, Australian, and Indian armies.[76]

Although the 1904 amendment to the militia act made it quite clear that the Canadian army was only to be used to defend Canada, the permanent force and the militia was being trained and equipped to operate as an adjunct to the British army, as they had done during the South African War. The appointment of a Canadian CGS in 1908 did not alter this trend: the increasing professionalism of the Canadian permanent force was taken directly from the British pattern. While the permanent force became militarily more efficient, it lost - or rather failed to develop - a true Canadian identity.[77] If the Canadian government reserved the right to decide which military

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[74]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1905, p. 20.

[75]Chambers, p. 113.

[76]Ibid., p. 114.

[77]Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 304; and Morton, WL, p. 419.

undertakings were in Canada's interests,[78] the military authorities in Canada did not make such a fine distinction. Their attitude about the proper use of the Canadian army is probably quite accurately reflected in the 1913 report on Canadian military institutions: Canada must "think of the thousands from overseas who fight...in her behalf...and prepare herself...to do as much for them in return."[79]

The short period between the South African War and the Great War formed the cultural pattern on which the modern Canadian army was built, a pattern to which members of the army would have to conform if their careers were to prosper. While previous Canadian military tradition had been based on a volunteer militia,[80] there was now a small, balanced, permanent force of all arms and services in existence. "What were scattered units to be used as auxuliaries to British regulars in the defence of Canada have become a national army planned as a coherent whole and designed to fit a world-wide military organization. Its outlook is imperial and its task to defend Canada and the Empire."[81] The function of the Canadian army was to act in concert with the British Army in a common cause. The form of the Canadian army developed accordingly.

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[78] Morton, W. L., p. 399.

[79] Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Report on the Military Institutions of Canada by Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton, 1913 (Ottawa, Government Printing Bureau, 1913), p. 13.

[80] Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 293.

[81] Hamilton, p. 468.

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CANADIAN ARMY, 1910-1939

Introduction

The period covered in this section marks a significant change in the nature of the Canadian army. While emphasis was still placed upon the militia as the backbone of Canada's military system, a small permanent force developed and eventually became a balanced force of all arms and services. This small permanent force, both before and after the Great War, devoted most of its energies to developing a professionally competent officer corps. Lacking the resources to develop its own training institutions, the Canadian army relied heavily on British military training schools.

Canadian participation in the Great War accentuated the trend towards military standardization on the British pattern. The Canadian corps served as part of the British army in France, often under the direct command and direction of British staffs. When peace returned in 1918 and Canadian military expenditures were slashed, the Canadian army had to turn again to the British in order to maintain and develop the professional standards of Canadian officers in the permanent force or the militia. The Canadian army simply did not have the money to create its own training schools. The Canadian army reflected more and more closely the British army.

When this trend towards imitation of the British army is combined with the ill-feeling aroused over Canadian participation in the Great War, it is not surprising that French Canadian participation in the army almost disappeared. The results of this disappearance of French Canadian participation were far-reaching, because the senior officers of the army during and following World War II came largely from the inter-war officer corps of the permanent force and the militia. These officers were deeply imbued with British military traditions, doctrines and methods and it was they who molded the form of the post-World War Two Canadian army.

Section One: Organization

Militia Reorganization, 1910-1914

In 1910, the Canadian Militia was reorganized. Following the design used by the British Territorial Army, the militia was reorganized on a divisional basis. Corresponding closely to the old Military District system, each division of the militia was allotted a defined geographical area and given control of the militia units within that area. In turn, each unit was given a geographical area from which to recruit its members. Mobilization of the new militia structure would, in theory, be more rapid and efficient than the old system. The new system also had the theoretical benefit that each division would have considerable homogeneity among its members. The new system offered considerable opportunities for full and adequate representation of French speaking units and organizations

in the Canadian Army. The opportunities were never realized.

The small permanent force continued to rely on Militiamen to fill its ranks. Some officers and NCOs who had been released from the Imperial forces following the South African War did join the permanent force,[1] but the majority of officers were Canadian. The Royal Military College was by now the primary source of permanent force officers. In addition, militia officers could qualify for commissions in the permanent force by successfully completing a course at one of the military schools of instruction. There remained, however, a lack of qualified staff officers. Accordingly, British officers were borrowed to fill staff positions in the Canadian military organization and vacancies at the British Army Staff College at Camberley were allotted to Canada. Unfortunately, Canadian officers, badly prepared, could not pass the entrance tests. A short course for staff college candidates was started at RMC to prepare Canadian officers for the entrance tests. All of these routes toward a career in the permanent force required a young officer to be proficient in English. None of the courses, except for the course at the Infantry School at St.-Jean, was given in French.

In 1911 a new source of potential officers for the militia and the permanent force was opened with the establishment of a course of military instruction at McGill University.[2]

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[1]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1905, p. 20.

[2]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1911, p. 80.

No similar course was opened for students at the French speaking universities in Quebec. French speaking candidates for commissions in the permanent force had to come up through the militia, attend McGill University, or attend RMC.

French speaking candidates for admission to RMC were handicapped by the entrance examinations. The entrance examination stressed two subjects: mathematics (3000 marks) and English (1350 marks). Both subjects were obligatory. Voluntary subjects were allowed for a percentage of the total mark, but the voluntary subjects were limited to Latin, geometrical drawing and freehand drawing.[3] If a French speaking candidate passed the entrance examination (written in English), he then followed a course at the college taught only in English. French was taught as an academic subject only and received less emphasis than either gymnastics or horseback riding.[4] The following table shows the results of the pre-war officer training programmes.[5]

Rank	British Officers			Eng.spkg.Cdn.Offrs.			Fr.spkg.Cdn.Offrs.		
	1886	1899	1912	1886	1899	1912	1886	1899	1912
Maj.Gen.	1	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-
Brig.Gen.	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-
Colonel	-	1	2	1	1	9	-	-	3
Lt.Col.	2	2	3	15	14	27	5	4	3
Major	3	-	9	8	11	52	3	3	5
Captain	1	-	2	4	13	68	1	4	12
Lieut.	3	-	-	18	12	67	6	1	3
Total	10	4	17	46	51	227	15	12	27

[3] Ibid., p. 62.

[4] Ibid., pp. 62-63.

[5] Morton, D. W., p. 18.

The period covered by this table is the period of increasing professionalization of the Canadian permanent force. The table quite clearly shows that the professionalization of the permanent force - ie. the objective standards instituted for the selection and training of junior officers - did not meet the needs of the French speaking proportion of the population. French speaking Canadian officers comprised about 30% of all ranks held by Canadians in 1886. By 1912, this proportion had dropped to about 10%. This change is noticeable by 1899, especially in the junior ranks. Other factors - the unpopularity of the South African War, for instance - enter into consideration but on the whole, most of the responsibility for this change in French Canadian representation rests with the selection and training procedures of the army: in the early years of the permanent force, there was a rough proportional representation of French Canadian officers, but this proportion decreased as professional standards improved and political patronage became less important.[6]

The backbone of the Canadian military organization remained the volunteer active militia. The number of militiamen taking training with their units during the summer training periods varied from about 36,000 to 50,000 between 1904 and 1913. French speaking units in Quebec responded, on the whole, as readily as their English speaking counterparts.

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[6] Ibid., p.47-48.

The militia was also the main source of soldiers and NCOs for the small permanent force and it was here that the participation of French speaking soldiers dropped. Except for the Infantry School at St.-Jean, there were no French speaking permanent force units. Unless a soldier had an adequate command of English, the permanent force was effectively closed to him, and this despite the fact that Quebec City had the largest Permanent Force garrison outside of Halifax.[7]

The Great War, 1914-1918

Canada mobilized in August, 1914. The mobilization plans, based upon the divisional system instituted in 1910/11, were disgarded. Militia units were not mobilized. Instead, new units were recruited for the Canadian Expeditionary Force. There were, thus, no militia unit ties with the CEF. One of the consequences of this action was that there were no French speaking units in the CEF. Only after a special delegation of prominent men from Quebec had an interview with Prime Minister Borden was a French speaking battalion formed.[8]

The first draft of officers for the CEF was composed of qualified militia officers, officers of the permanent force, ex-cadets of RMC and British officers who were allowed to join

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[7]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1911, p. 13.

[8]Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 337. Rodolph Lemieux, Senator Belcourt and Sir Wilfred Laurier are named as being responsible for the formation of the 22nd Bn.

the CEF. The Canadian Officers Training Corps (COTC), established in 1913, provided an additional source of officers for the CEF.[9] Early in the war, therefore, there was no lack of junior officers and in one case, five companies of officer cadets from McGill were sent as general reinforcements to the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.[10] The flow of junior officers was maintained by the military schools in Canada, RMC and officer training camps in the UK and France which trained Canadian soldiers and NCOs who had proven themselves in battle.[11] Officer training was conducted in English.

Although the supply of junior officers for the CEF was adequate, there was a shortage of qualified Canadian officers to fill senior positions and especially staff positions. Not until 1917 was the Canadian Corps commanded by a Canadian and all large Canadian units commanded by Canadian officers. Britain supplied almost all the first grade staff officers for the CEF throughout the war.[12] Other than the

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[9] Ibid., p. 291. Laval and McGill were the first two universities with COTC companies.

[10] Canada, Department of National Defence, The Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919, (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1962), p. 228.

[11] A. F. Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-19, (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1938), p. 505.

[12] Stacey, Military History, p. 27.

Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence, there were only four French speaking generals in the CEF, and none of these officers held a senior staff position or commanded a major formation.[13]

The large majority of the officers in the CEF were Canadian born, while the majority of soldiers in the first contingent of the CEF were British subjects born outside of Canada.[14] Enlistment for the CEF generally reflected the opinion of three groups in Canadian society: British subjects living in Canada but born in Britain; Canadians of British origin; Canadians of non-British origin.[15] Because the original mobilization plan was not followed, recruits were entered directly into the CEF units. Local militia units were only used as recruiting stations. By August 18, 1914, recruiting was distributed as follows.

Recruiting by Divisional Districts, August 18, 1914[16]

	Officers	Men
1st divisional zone, Western Ont., HQ London	78	1,696
2nd divisional zone, Central Ont., HQ Toronto	281	5,618

[13]Information compiled from appendixes in The Canadian Expeditionary Force, pp. 539-543.

[14]Duguid, p. 59.

[15]C. J. Hopkins and R. J. Renison, Canada at War (Toronto, Canadian Annual Review Limited, 1919), p. 268.

[16]Duguid, p. 59.

	Officers	Men
3rd divisional zone, Eastern Ont., HQ Kingston	120	1,850
4th divisional zone, Western Que., HQ Montreal	153	3,290
5th divisional zone, Eastern Que., HQ Quebec	31	537
6th divisional zone, Maritimes, HQ Halifax	107	1,448
MD 10, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, HQ Winnepeg	254	5,332
MD 11, British Columbia, HQ Victoria	284	3,033
MD 13, Alberta, HQ Calgary	127	1,960
Other detachments		55
Total	1,435	24,819

The original strength of the CEF, set at 25,000, was quickly passed and 31,200 men actually went overseas with the first contingent.[17] By July, 1915, the strength of the CEF was set at 150,000 and three months later the authorized strength was raised to 250,000. Recruiting slowed down after the British-born manpower of the country was used up but there was still a steady stream of recruits throughout 1915. In the same year, medical requirements were lowered and special recruiting offices were established in major cities and towns.[18] Recruiting was still done on a territorial

[17] The Canadian Expeditionary Force, p. 29.

[18] Ibid., pp. 213-14.

Basis in divisional districts. An attempt to widen the basis and cross divisional boundaries led to some heated disputes and created some bad feeling between district commanders. The Minister withdrew his order[19] and recruiting continued on the divisional-territorial basis.

On the first of January, 1916, the Prime Minister told the Canadian public that the effective strength of the army was to be raised to half a million men. The decision seems to have been made by the Prime Minister alone and there is no evidence that Britain had requested an increase in the size of the Canadian forces.[20] This call - or pledge - for half a million men spurred recruiting for a few months during the winter of 1916, but by the summer of the same year enlistment began to fall.[21] Inevitably, as recruiting slowed down, the idea of voluntary enlistment began to be criticized. In August, 1916, the National Service Board was formed to make an inventory of Canada's manpower and to plan for the most economical use of that manpower. The task of National Service Board grew and became more urgent as the casualty lists for 1917 grew and began to approach the enlistment

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[19] Ibid., p. 214.

[20] Ibid., pp. 215-18.

[21] C. Hanbury-Williams, "Creating the Canadian Army", Canada in the Great World War (Toronto, United Publishers of Canada Ltd., n.d.), vol. II, p. 81. Enlistment fell from a peak of 32,705 in March, 1916 to 7,267 in August, 1916.

figures for the same year.[22] As the costly battles of 1917 took their toll of men, the emphasis switched from increasing the size of the CEF to maintaining its strength by an adequate flow of reinforcements. To provide these needed reinforcements, the government introduced its Military Service Act in the summer of 1917.

The political decisions resulting in the introduction of conscription are outside the scope of this paper. French speaking Canadians had not enlisted in great numbers prior to 1917.[23] They did not approve of conscription after 1917. French-Canadian indifference to military service turned into hostility to military service, but the effect was the same: French-Canadian withdrawal from active participation in the military affairs of the nation left the army firmly in the hands of English speaking Canadians.[24] The exclusion, or the withdrawal, of French speaking participation in the army before 1914 was reinforced by the conscription issue of 1917. Thereafter, French speaking Canadians took virtually no part in the military life of the country.

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[22] Ross Munro, "Conscription in Canada", ibid., p. 89. For the year ending 1 May 1917, 85,306 had enlisted and for the same period there had been 74,792 casualties.

[23] Ibid., p. 89. Enlistment to May, 1917 was as follows:

Ontario	173,078	Alberta	35,477
Quebec	45,277	B. C.	40,264
Maritimes	38,200	Yukon	2,327
Man. & Sask.	79,779		
		Total	414,402

[24] James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 72.

The CEF needed reinforcements. The largest untapped manpower reserve in the Dominion was in Quebec. At first, the military authorities tried to increase voluntary enlistment, but without success. The Postmaster-General, Hon. P. E. Blondin, and Major-General Lessard tried to raise a battalion in Quebec but failed to do so.[25] A Director of Recruiting was appointed for Montreal - an English speaking Protestant clergyman.[26] By the end of the war, there was still only one French speaking battalion in the army. Behind the 22e Battalion was one reserve battalion in England and a depot battalion in Quebec City and another in Montreal. The purpose of these units was to supply French speaking reinforcements for the 22e Battalion in France. Conscription did not result in any new French speaking units being formed.

In all, 129,569 men (approximately 46,000 from Quebec) were conscripted; 121,124 eventually served in the CEF;[27] 47,509 went overseas; 24,132 went to France.[28] With the exception of the Montreal district, Quebec had no worse a record of defaulters than any other part of Canada and in some cases

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[25] Ibid., pp. 92-93.

[26] The Canadian Expeditionary Force, p. 221. He was appointed after the army failed to interest a French Canadian recruiting committee in the task.

[27] Ibid., Appendix E, p. 551. These are the figures of the Department of Justice. Militia and Defence figures show 124,588 enlisted in the army.

[28] Ibid., p. 551.

had a better record.[29] The over-all participation of French Canadians in the army during the war, however, was very light.[30] Canada ended the Great War with an army that represented only part of the country's total population. This unrepresentative character of the army has never been fully removed and the army and governments have remained, until very recently, relatively unconcerned about the lack of French Canadian representation in the army.

The period of indifference: 1919-1939

After the defeat of Germany in 1918, Canada demobilized and reverted to her pre-war military organization. The Volunteer Active Militia became once more the backbone of the Canadian military organization. A small permanent force was maintained to train and instruct the militia and to provide a nucleus for any future mobilization. The strength of the permanent force was set at 10,000 men - a figure never approached in practice - and the 22e Battalion (later to become the Royal 22e Regiment) became one of the three permanent force infantry regiments. It was the only French speaking unit in the permanent force. Militia units

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[29] Hopkins and Renison, p. 295.

[30] Hanbury-Williams, p. 69. Percentages of CEF strength for 1918 are given as follows:

English Canadian	40.44%	Total Canadian born - 45%
French Canadian	4.46%	
English	33.33%	
Scotch	10.28%	Other British Empire born - 49.06%
Other (Irish, U.S. etc.)	11.49%	

perpetuated CEF units or were continuations of pre-war militia units. French speaking militia units were less active than their English speaking counterparts in Quebec, but the differences were less noticeable by 1930 and by 1935 the distinction was once again between city and rural militia units and not between French speaking and English speaking units.[31]

Militia officers were trained according to pre-war practices. To qualify for substantive commissions, militia officers had to pass courses at the various schools of military instruction which were operated by the permanent force.[32] As in the past, only the Infantry School, partly staffed by members of the Royal 22e Regiment, was capable of instructing militia members in French. Militia officers could also qualify for substantive commissions by attending the "long course" at RMC which lasted for three months during the summers. The Canadian Officers' Training Corps, established

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[31]Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1925, pp. 15-16, MD4 and MD5 were largely composed of mixed units; p. 25 - Laval now had a COTC unit; p. 41 - Quebec had the largest number of army cadets in the Dominion. And see the Annual Report for 1935, pp. 35-36 where the real distinction is once again between city and rural units.

[32]For simplicity and continuity, the term "permanent force" is used to refer to that part of the army on full-time military service. The "militia" refers to part-time reserve organizations. The proper names are "Permanent Active Militia" and "Non-Permanent Active Militia" respectively, but the names during World War II and again in the post-war period changed.

in 1913, was continued. The COTC offered an "A" Certificate which qualified the holder for a commission in the permanent force without further examination; and a "B" Certificate. The "B" Certificate qualified the holder for a commission as a captain in the militia and exempted the holder of such a certificate from writing the entrance examination to the "long course" if he later wished to qualify for a commission in the permanent force. By 1930, both Laval and the University of Montreal had active COTC contingents issuing A and B certificates. In that year, the University of Montreal contingent was increased by a full company, but the Laval contingent was disbanded.[33]

Other than obtaining a commission by the process outlined above, some permanent force officers were graduates of the four year course at RMC. Vacancies at RMC were allotted pro rata to provincial population, but some provinces, notably Quebec, were never fully represented. For example, the distribution of cadets by provinces for the 1929-1930 academic term was as follows:[34]

Ontario	100	Manitoba	4
Quebec	50	Saskatchewan	5
B.C.	16	Alberta	7
N.B.	8	Abroad	3
N.S.	7		

The curriculum followed at the college stressed the natural sciences heavily, as they did before the war, and

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[33] Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1930, p. 46.

[34] Ibid., p. 53.

French was not a required, or even a voluntary, part of the entrance examination. The "Board of Visitors" for 1930 did recommend that French become one of the subjects required on the entrance examinations.[35] No action was taken on the recommendation.

In-service training of permanent officers relied heavily on British facilities. The most important professional courses were the ones conducted by the Imperial Defence College, the British Army Staff College at Camberley and the Gunnery Staff Course. At least one of these three courses was almost a prerequisite for promotion to senior rank in the permanent force. The number of French speaking officers attending these courses was very small.

Canadian Officers Attending UK Staff Courses[36]

	English	French
1925	21	2
1930	23	1
1935	24	0
1940	31	0

Canadian permanent force officers could also receive in-job training and experience by being posted abroad to serve with British units and to serve on British staff organizations. Here again, the number of French speaking

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[35] Ibid., p. 77.

[36] These figures include all courses run in the UK and not only the ones mentioned above. The figures are compiled from the Annual Reports, Department of National Defence, for 1925, 1930, 1935 and 1940, pp. 19-20; pp. 16-17; pp. 40-41; pp. 36-37 respectively.

Canadian officers serving abroad was small.

Canadian Officers Serving Abroad[37]

	English	French
1930	11	0
1935	8	2
1940	4	1

Throughout the inter-war period, the percentage of French speaking officers in the permanent force was small. The lack of French speaking senior officers, and particularly the lack of qualified French speaking senior officers, was to result in an obvious imbalance in the command structure of the army during World War Two and the army reorganization which followed. The officers who rose to high positions during and after World War II received their training during the inter-war period in the permanent force, or in some cases, the militia.

Ethnic Origin of PAM Officers, 1925-1939[38]

	1925		1930		1939	
Rank	French	English	French	English	French	English
General	-	1	-	-	-	-
Lt. Gen.	-	2	-	-	-	-
Maj. Gen.	1	6	-	3	-	7
Colonel	3	11	5	36	2	19

[37]Figures include officers serving at the War Office, other British staffs, and exchange officers serving with British units. Compiled from the Annual Reports, Department of National Defence, 1930, 1935, 1940, pp. 16-17; pp. 40-41; pp. 36-37 respectively.

[38]Figures for 1925 exclude miscellaneous officers - eg. veterinarians. Compiled from the Militia List, Sept., 1925, pp. 1-2; List of Officers, the Defence Forces of Canada, April, 1931, p. 33; and the Defence Forces List, Nov., 1939, pp. 50-97.

Rank	1925 French	1925 English	1930 French	1930 English	1939 French	1939 English
Lt. Col.	5	14	8	55	7	53
Major	-	12	7	82	9	84
Captain	4	14	13	71	7	69
Lieut.	4	9	7	45	15	129
2 Lieut.	-	-	-	-	5	14
Total	17	69	40	292	45	375

During the inter-war period, the strength of the permanent force never approached the establishment figure of 10,000. Even in 1939 it only had approximately 4500 officers and soldiers. All permanent force units were under-strength, but the R22eR was far more under strength than the English speaking infantry units.

Strength of PAM Infantry Units, 1930-1939[39]

Unit	1930 Officers	1930 Men	1939 Officers	1939 Men
RCR	24	336	24	390
PPCLI	17	191	20	301
R22eR	14	139	14	161

French speaking representation in the militia during the inter-war period was similarly weak. For example, in 1930 there were 14 French speaking militia units in Quebec with a total trained strength of 2,292 officers and men. At the same time, Quebec contained a total of 75 militia units with a strength of 82,938 officers and men.[40] Thus,

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[39] Figures compiled from the Annual Reports, Department of National Defence, 1930, p. 44; and 1939, p. 70. The establishment for an infantry unit was 34 officers and 739 men.

[40] Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1939, p. 11. Figures only include units with French names and therefore do not include French speaking militiamen in units with English names.

by 1939, neither the permanent force nor the militia had a large number of French speaking members. When war started in 1939, there was not a large source of trained French speaking officers and men to form a nucleus around which French speaking units could be mobilized. The Canadian army entered World War II as a thoroughly English speaking organization.

Section Two: Language Use

The Great War: 1910-1918

Little can be said about language use in the army prior to and during the Great War. The army was an English speaking organization by 1910. All staff work was done in English; all training of the permanent force (except for the infantry and cavalry school at St. Jean) was done in English; all officer training was done in English, either in Canada or Britain. There was no French speaking unit in the permanent force.

During the war, the 22nd Battalion was the only French speaking unit in the CEF, apart from its reinforcement element and recruiting offices in Quebec (supervised by an English speaking clergyman). Overseas, the CEF formed part of the British army in France and thus all staff work was in English.

The Period of Indifference: 1919-1939

The army barely managed to maintain a skeleton organization during the inter-war period. It had little money, no new equipment and only marginal training establishments.

The only French speaking element in the peace-time permanent force was the R22eR.

Formal acceptance of the French language was limited to certain legal publications of the Department of Militia and Defence (later, 1922, the Department of National Defence). King's Regulations, Pay and Allowance Regulations, Cadet Services Regulations and Dress Regulations were published in French. General Orders were also published in both languages, but only because they appeared in the Canada Gazette.[41] Even this very limited use of French resulted in a type of military "Franglais": orders, decorations, and regimental names were not translated into French, although there were lapses in this respect.[42]

In general, formal acceptance and use of the French language in army publications followed the judgement given by the Judge Advocate General (JAG) in 1934. He noted that section 133 of the British North America Act required that all laws and acts of Parliament be published in both languages, but not, apparently, rules and regulations made thereunder. The JAG then went on to suggest that the circumstances and exigencies of the services should determine the use of French

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[41] Canada, Department of National Defence, Army Headquarters, File 4521-2-1, "Translation of Publications into French", memorandum, n.p., n.d., with General Order of 26 Sep., 1921 attached as Annex C. Hereafter army files referred to as Army, File No.....

[42] Ibid., memorandum from Director of Organization and Personnel Services to Director of Military Training, 27 Mar., 1934.

in army publications and not bare legal necessity.[43] The circumstances and exigencies of the service did not, apparently, require wider use of French in army publications. The publications used by the permanent force and the militia were mainly British publications and though translation had been recommended from time to time, no translations were made because they could not be made economically.[44]

Staff work in the army was entirely in English except for MD5 (Quebec). Official communications dealing with permanent force units and establishments in the district were made in English, but communications with French speaking militia units were made in French and French speaking militia officers were instructed in French at the military schools in the province.[45] The examinations for French speaking officers at these schools were also given in French.[46] During this same period, a 1926 Militia Order formulated a course of action which, if it had been rigidly enforced, would have resulted in a bilingual officer structure in the permanent force. The order stated that all permanent force lieutenants

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[43] Ibid., letter from the Chairman of the Orders Committee to Director of Organization and Personnel Services, 6 Nov., 1934.

[44] Ibid., memorandum from the Chairman of the Army Language Bureau to the Director of Infantry, 31 Mar., 1946.

[45] Legare, "Le Français Dans l'Armee Canadienne", p. 229. There were infantry schools at St. Jean, Quebec, Levis and a cavalry school at St. Jean. See also the Annual Report, 1925, p. 22 and p. 25.

[46] Ibid., p. 229.

must write a French examination before being allowed to write the lieutenant-to-captain promotion examination.[47] There is no record of how effective this order was, or of how rigidly it was enforced. The reasons for issuing the order are not clear, but there is some evidence that the order was not issued because the army authorities thought bilingualism accorded with the social structure of the country. Rather, the Chief of Staff at the time said that young officers should be bilingual so that they could read the works of French military writers.[48] A Further hint of the status accorded to the use of French in the permanent force was that officers were allowed to write French interpreters' examinations. The examinations were set and held under the regulations of the British Civil Service Commissioners and the results of the examinations were announced in the annual reports of the Department of National Defence under the heading "Foreign Languages".[49] German was accorded the same status in 1935 and Russian in 1940.

The army approached World War II as an English

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[47] Ibid., pp. 228-29. This was in contrast to the policy followed at RMC. In 1920 the Commandant had recommended that French be made part of the entrance requirements, but the recommendation was never acted upon. Annual Report of the Department of National Defence, 1920, p. 77.

[48] Ibid., p. 229.

[49] Annual Report, 1925, p. 24.

speaking organization with a small French speaking element. Where it differed from its sister services was in its mobilization plans. The army, alone of the three services, provided for the mobilization of French speaking units without requiring that the members of those units be able to speak English.[50]

Section Three: Cultural Milieu

The Great War: 1910-1918

Before 1910, Canadian military tradition - if, indeed, Canada can lay claim to any military tradition before that date - had been based upon the militia. It is true that the militia had been under the command of a British officer, but where the military duties of the commander of the militia and the political prerogatives of the government of the day clashed, the latter invariably won.[51] The establishment of the Militia Council in 1904 firmly established civilian control over the militia.[52]

The standardization agreements agreed to by Canada between 1907 and 1911 and the establishment of the Imperial General Staff in 1909, increased military efficiency at the

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[50] See Chapter Three for an outline of proposed mobilization plans.

[51] James Eayrs, "Canadian Defence Policies Since 1867", Special Studies prepared for the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Matters Relating to Defence, (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1965), p. 5; and Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 292.

[52] Eayrs, Ibid., p. 5.

expense of the Canadian militia tradition.[53] The Canadian army was British in equipment, training, doctrine, and personnel by 1914.[54] The majority of junior officers were Canadians, but senior officers and almost all first grade staff officers were British, and it was these senior officers who controlled the military development of the army. It had generally been in Canada's interest to support British power throughout the colonial period and following Confederation, but Canadian support had never approached the extent that it would assume in the Great War.

Canadian troops were placed under British command in the Great War, starting with one infantry battalion (the PPCLI) in 1914 and ending with an entire Canadian Corps in 1918. Canadian troops were not only under the supreme command of British officers, but many Canadian units and most formations were commanded by British officers until 1917.[55]

Although operational command of the Canadian field

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[53] W. L. Morton, The Kingdom of Canada, (Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 1965), p. 419; Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 304.

[54] Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 304..."the policy of standardization had but one aim, that of making the Canadian militiaman into a replica of the British Territorial Tommy in arms, training, equipment, and habits of thought."

[55] The Canadian Expeditionary Force, pp. 127-28. As early as November, 1915, Aitken, Perly, and Hughes complained about British staff officers being used in Canadian formations. This official history also says that there were some signs that the British were reluctant to surrender command of Dominion troops, but that not all the Canadian criticism was warranted.

forces remained in British hands during the war, Canada remained adamant in retaining political control of the CEF. The Minister of Militia and Defence - Sam Hughes - exercised nonoperational control over the CEF until 1916 when a Minister of Overseas Military Forces from Canada in the U.K. was appointed. This division of responsibility was opposed by Hughes and led to his enforced resignation in the same year. The overseas minister was given sole responsibility for liaison with British Headquarters in France and he was given responsibility for the organization and administration of the CEF - including the power to communicate directly with the Commander of the Canadian Corps.[56] This Canadian control of all non-operational aspects of the CEF was based upon the legal opinion of the Deputy Minister of Justice: Canadian troops serving outside Canada were Canadian militiamen on active service defending Canada abroad; therefore, they were subject to Canadian rules and regulations and were in no respect "Imperial" troops.[57]

In spite of this assertion of Canadian responsibility for the CEF, the organization and atmosphere of the CEF was British. Perhaps the image created in the eyes of French speaking Canadians is best summed up by Professor Lower:

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[56] Ibid., p. 212.

[57] Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 314-15.

Why should they wear the uniform of a British King and serve under English Protestant officers? In 1812 the enemy was at the gate; in 1914 he was unknown and thousands of miles away.[58] This conflict between English Canadian and French Canadian attitudes towards the war and the CEF, which came to a head in 1917, influenced the development of the army for years to come. French speaking Canadians withdrew from active participation in the military institutions of the country and English speaking Canadians assumed complete control of the development of the military institutions of Canada.

The Struggle for Existence: 1919-1939

The army was not abolished following the Great War, but it very nearly died a natural death. The army estimates could always be reduced, to the satisfaction of government and opposition alike, and they were reduced year by year. The residents of Canada's fire-proof house could see no need to support a fire brigade. The army had very few defenders and the army itself did not care to justify its existence publicly, nor did it dare reveal the identity of Canada's potential enemy to the politicians. For the army did have an enemy to guard against and elaborate plans were made to respond to an attack by the United States.[59]

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[58] A. R. M. Lower, Canadians in the Making, (Toronto, Longmans, Green, 1960), p. 405.

[59] James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 71 and Eayrs "Canadian Defence Policies", p. 8.

Since Canada would not support a self-contained military establishment of her own, then the officers of the small permanent force would have to reach a working agreement with some friendly army in order for them to retain and improve their professional competence. The natural choice fell upon the British Army: after all, the U. S. was a potential enemy.

The equipment, organization and doctrine of the Canadian permanent force remained British. British officers were no longer employed on Canadian staffs, but Canadian staff officers were trained in British staff colleges, used British manuals and methods of procedure and occasionally served on British staffs and in British units.[60] Perhaps this was the only realistic course the army could follow under the circumstances: the Canadian permanent force could not pay its own way and in any event, Canadian troops in large numbers would only be used as part of a larger British or allied force.[61]

The 22nd Battalion was retained as part of the permanent force following the great war and was the only French speaking unit in the army. Apart from the use of French, it was organized and run on British lines. In 1921 the regiment was granted the prefix "Royal" and formally designated the

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[60] Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 328.

[61] Ibid., p. 331; W. L. Morton, p. 474.

Royal 22nd Regiment. Six years later the name of the regiment was formally changed to the Royal 22eRegiment.[62] Following the practice of many militia and permanent force units, the R22eR became allied with a British regiment, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and went so far as to adopt the same mascot: a goat.

For all practical purposes, the Canadian army was virtually moribund until a modest rearmament policy was started in 1936. Even then, the army was given third priority behind the air force and the navy, and was confined to the role of "home defence",[63] This home defence army was singularly lacking in a truly Canadian identity and this was nowhere more apparent than at Canada's own Military College, RMC. As far back as 1920 the Commandant remarked upon the lack of a Canadian identity at the college. His proposed solution to the problem was probably typical of the pre-World War II army: he proposed that pictures of prominent Canadian military men such as Wolfe and Brock should be displayed and that the main hall should have inscribed on its walls the names of all the regiments which fought to gain and hold Canada for the British Empire![64]

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[62] Histoire du Royal 22e Regiment, p. 44.

[63] Stacey, An Introduction to Canadian Military History, p. 33.

[64] Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1920, p. 73. The Commandant at the time was the first RMC graduate to hold that post, p. 58-59.

CHAPTER III

THE BEGINNING OF THE MODERN ARMY

Introduction

On the eve of war in 1939, there was little thought on the part of the Canadian government of supplying a large expeditionary force in the event of war in Europe.[1] The role of the Canadian army was home defence.[2] On the first of September, 1939, a Canadian Active Service Force (CASF) of two divisions was authorized for home defence. Two weeks later, Canada offered to Britain an expeditionary force of one division. This division sailed for Britain in December. In January, 1940, the Canadian Prime Minister announced that a second Canadian division would be sent to join the first. By October, this second division had joined the first in the U.K. and a Canadian Corps was formed. The following year, another infantry division (3rd Infantry Division) and an armoured division (5th Armoured Division) joined the Canadian Corps. In 1942 the First Canadian Army was formed from these formations and was placed under the command of Gen. MacNaughton.

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[1] Army, G.S. Historical Section, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945, (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1948), p. 4.

[2] Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 341. Militarily, "home defence" was not a serious problem. See also Col. C.P. Stacey, Six annees de guerre, (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1957), p. 14. Politically, "home defence" was the sole purpose of Canada's modest rearmament programme.

The 1st Canadian Corps was formed in Italy in 1944 around the 1st Infantry Division and the 5th Armoured Division. This corps later joined Canadian forces which had participated in the Normandy Invasion and by April, 1945, the Canadian Army in Europe was recreated as a single organization. Starting with one infantry division in 1939, the Canadian army had grown to a full field army in Europe (an army headquarters plus army troops, two corps headquarters with corps troops, three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions, two armoured brigades and two units serving with the British army). In addition, there were as many as three divisions retained in Canada; there were Canadian garrisons in Newfoundland, the Caribbean, Gibraltar and Iceland; and there were large training and administrative establishments in each Military District.[3] Canada had mobilized for war.

Section One: Organization, 1939-1946

Unlike the process followed in the Great War, the mobilization of the CASF was based upon the mobilization of existing militia units. The concept behind mobilization in 1939 was that all regions and sections of Canada were to be represented in the CASF in proportion to their population. In Quebec's case, this was not entirely possible. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, French speaking militia units were not numerous in the province and fewer still were active

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[3] Ibid., p. 356.

during the inter-war years.[4] In the 1st Division, one brigade was to represent the west, one Ontario, and one Quebec and the Maritimes. The same was to be true of the 2nd Division.[5] The Quebec brigade of the 2nd Division was to be entirely French speaking, but these intentions were never fully realized.[6]

The R22eR, originally allotted to 5th Brigade of the 2nd Division, was transferred to the 1st Division so that the first Canadian contingent overseas would have some French-Canadian representation. An English speaking unit replaced the R22eR in the 5th Brigade. In 1940, another French speaking unit of 5th Brigade (Fusiliers de Mont Royal) were posted to Iceland and replaced by an English speaking unit.[7] A French speaking officer (Brigadier Leclerc) was appointed to command the Brigade, but he could not find enough qualified French speaking officers to make up the staff of the Brigade. He thus recommended that the project be dropped and General MacNaughton agreed. A mixed brigade was decided upon because it was thought that a mixed formation would result in a closer rapport between

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[4]Canada, Department of National Defence, Canadian Army Historical Section, Report No. 63: Manpower Problems of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, vol. 1, p. 5.

[5]Stacey, Six Années de Guerre, p. 42-43.

[6]Ibid., p. 43.

[7]Ibid., p. 44.

English speaking and French speaking soldiers.[8] In any event, the brigade was already mixed: two English speaking battalions and one French speaking battalion.

The principle of regional representation was also relaxed in the formation of the remaining divisions. The 3rd Infantry Division and the 4th and 5th Armoured Divisions had no French speaking brigades in their organizations.[9] The largest French speaking organization in the CASF was only of unit (battalion) size. French speaking technical units were non-existent[10] and French speaking units were largely limited to the infantry, artillery, and service units. Attached as Annex I to Appendix A is a list of French speaking units - or those believed to have been French speaking - which served in Canada and overseas during the war.

Regional representation in the CASF was based upon the regional activation of existing militia units. The units themselves did their own recruiting and if their recruiting drives were not successful, representation from their region in the CASF suffered. Recruiting was slow in two parts of the country: Saskatchewan and Quebec. Le Regiment de Maisonneuve mobilized to strength in 1939, but the other activated Quebec

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[8] Ibid., p. 44-45.

[9] Report No. 63, p. 33.

[10] In a letter from the Canadian Army Historical Section, 15 March 1965, p. 8, Dr. Hitsman, the author of Report No. 63, states that there was a lack of French speaking technical units because of a lack of French speaking soldiers with technical training.

militia units - the R22eR, Le Regiment de la Chaudiere and Les Fusiliers de Mont Royal - had a hard time filling their ranks. It was only when the R22eR's recruiting area was enlarged to include all of Quebec that the regiment mobilized to strength.[11] Many English speaking militia units could not recruit to strength during the "phony war" period of 1939 either, but the consequences for regional representation were not as serious as for the French speaking part of the country. The slowness of recruiting in French Canada meant that there was not proportional representation from that region in the CASF. In contrast to the Great War mobilization scheme, there was, in World War II, a sincere effort to create a regionally balanced army in 1939/40. The effort, unfortunately, failed.

Under the terms of the National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) of 1940, Canadian males of military age were subject to compulsory military service for home defence. Initially, the men were given a short training course and then they were posted to the reserve army and were free to resume their civilian occupations. In 1941 the government decided to retain a number of NRMA men in the army for an indefinite period so that a corresponding number of volunteers could be released for overseas service.[12] Gradually,

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[11] Stacey, Six annees de guerre, p. 53. See also Report No. 63, p. 11.

[12] Report No. 63, p. 38.

NRMA men were employed outside Canada, but not in a theatre of operations. As a result of a plebiscite, the NRMA had been amended in August, 1942 to allow the use of NRMA men overseas and by 1943 they became part of virtually all North America area garrisons.[13]

A manpower survey of 1941 had shown that Quebec had the largest untapped source of men of military age. Originally, the army authorities had hoped that the French speaking men who received training under the NRMA would then volunteer for service in one of the activated French speaking units of the CASF, or that new units would be composed of these "R" men.[14] Since Quebec supplied 39% of all NRMA men, and since a full 30% of NRMA men spoke French, there was no problem in finding enough men to fill French speaking home defence units.[15] As the war wore on, however, the manpower problem became not one of increasing the size of the CASF, but became a problem of finding reinforcements for units overseas.

Until 1941, recruiting had been done on an individual unit basis. When the unemployed manpower pool was used up, voluntary enlistments began to fall and in 1941 a civilian

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[13] Ibid., p. 52.

[14] Ibid., pp. 33 and 54.

[15] Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 384, shows the origin of NRMA conscripts as follows: Quebec, 39%; Ontario, 25%; Prairies, 24%; British Columbia, 6%. See also Report No. 63, p. 48, which says that 30% of all NRMA conscripts were French speaking. French Canada thus supplied its fair portion of home defence soldiers.

recruiting directorate was established within the Adjutant General's branch to remedy this situation. A French speaking associate director was appointed, principally to direct recruiting in Quebec and each military district had its own recruiting staff and civilian recruiting committee. In 1942, district recruiting companies were formed, branch recruiting offices were opened and mobile recruiting teams were formed, but none of these devices really solved the problem of falling enlistment. By 1944, the French speaking units overseas were among those most in need of reinforcements, but French speaking Canadians were not volunteering in large enough numbers to keep the overseas French speaking units up to strength.[16] There were various reasons given for the lack of enthusiasm on the part of French speaking men: the lack of French speaking militia units prior to the war; the lack of French speaking technical units; the necessity to be bilingual to get into a technical unit, and perhaps, above all, the feeling that French speaking men would only be used in the infantry.[17] This latter opinion came close to the truth for all recruits - English speaking or French speaking - in 1944 when lack of reinforcements for

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[16] Histoire du Royal 22e Regiment, pp. 343 and 349. At one point in the Italian campaign, the R22eR needed reinforcements so badly that they were sent a company of Italians who had been on the opposite side not many months before.

[17] Report No. 63, p. 44.

infantry units overseas had become general.[18] The casualties suffered by the infantry in Italy and Northwest Europe resulted in a readjustment of the Canadian army's manpower policy.

Pressure was put on NRMA men in Canada to volunteer for overseas service. The original proposal made by the army was that entire NRMA units would proceed overseas, rather than have NRMA volunteers go overseas as individual reinforcements.[19] The army hoped that the idea of going overseas as part of a unit would appeal to the NRMA men in Canada, especially to those men serving in French speaking units.[20] The plan did not work for either English speaking or French speaking NRMA units.

There were several French speaking units serving in Europe in 1944 and a determined effort was made to retain their identity,[21] but it was becoming more and more difficult to do so because of the lack of reinforcements. In October of 1944 a survey of NRMA men in Canada showed that

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[18] Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945, p. 235.

[19] Letter from the Canadian Army Historical Sectional, p. 9. The army historian says that this proposal was a gimmick to get men to volunteer and that the army authorities had no intention of keeping the units together once they reached Europe.

[20] Report No. 63, p. 132.

[21] Ibid., p. 196. English speaking units were scoured for French speaking soldiers, but many of these men were unwilling to leave their units. Finally, Generals Simonds and Crerar used English speaking companies to reinforce French speaking infantry units. (pp. 196-201).

42,000 soldiers were eligible for immediate use as infantry reinforcements and that 37% of these men were French speaking.[22] These NRMA men in home defence units refused to volunteer for overseas service, however. In November, 1944, the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence agreed that a limited use would have to be made of conscripting NRMA men for service in Europe. Originally, only 16,000 infantry reinforcements were to be sent overseas and these 16,000 reinforcements were only to be used to bring the monthly voluntary drafts up to the required strength.[23]

When the announcement about using NRMA men overseas was made, demonstrations broke out in Ottawa, Hull, Montreal, Kitchener and throughout B.C. There was also an armed mutiny in one B.C. town led by a French speaking NRMA unit.[24] The government persisted in its decision, however, and reinforcements of NRMA men began to be sent to Europe towards the end of 1944. For the most part, the reinforcement flights were disorganized, disorderly, and marked by large numbers of absentees and deserters. Of the seven NRMA units sent to Europe in the second draft, all but one were seriously understrength when they sailed.[25] The third draft went

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[22] Ibid., p. 222.

[23] Ibid., p. 237.

[24] Ibid., p. 243.

[25] Ibid., p. 250. The PEI highlanders were the only unit close to strength on embarkation. The other two English speaking units were only slightly over half strength, and the four French speaking units were under half strength.

through similar incidents and after that there was no further attempt to send NRMA men to Europe. In all, 12,908 NRMA men were sent to England and 2,463 saw service with the Canadian Army in Northwest Europe.[26] At home, there were more deserters and absentees by the middle of March, 1945 than there were NRMA men overseas. The majority of the deserters (64%) were from Eastern Ontario and Quebec.[27] In Europe itself, French speaking soldiers accounted for 50% of all Canadian deserters, although French speaking soldiers formed only 10% of the strength of the Canadian Army overseas.[28] The French speaking population of Canada had again withdrawn from an active participation in the army, even though an honest attempt had been made to create a regionally balanced army. French speaking soldiers were used as far as possible in French speaking units commanded by French speaking officers and this alone marked a considerable change from the practices of the Great War. Once French speaking units were created, an attempt was made to maintain their identity, and conscription was the ultimate method resorted to for this

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[26] Ibid., p. 262.

[27] Ibid., p. 258.

[28] Ibid., p. 276. Figures are for January, 1945. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-45, says that of the 16,000 NRMA men conscripted for overseas duty, 7,800 deserted at one time or another and that 6,300 were still missing by January, 1945. (p. 235n.)

purpose. In all, 19% of the soldiers who served in the army during World War II were French speaking, compared with the 12.6% who were French speaking during the Great War.[29]

One of the most pressing needs of the CASF in 1939 was to find enough qualified officers to command the force. The requirement for French speaking officers to command the proposed French speaking units and formations was even more pressing and, as mentioned earlier, the requirement was not met and the plan to make 5th Brigade a French speaking formation had to be abandoned because of the lack of qualified French speaking officers.[30] The early officers for the CASF came from the permanent force, the militia, RMC, the COTC and in some cases NCOs were promoted. In none of these areas was French Canadian representation large enough to supply the demands of the CASF. The need for junior officers was more easily met as they could be trained relatively quickly.

In 1941 the British practice of using selection committees to select officer candidates from the ranks was adopted. Two large selection centres were established by 1943, one at Three Rivers and one at Chilliwack. The Three Rivers centre processed both French speaking and English speaking candidates. In the same year, however, both

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[29]Canada, Department of National Defence, Army Headquarters, File No. 1435-2, "French Canadian Representation in the Canadian Army", Appendix A to memorandum from Brig. Bernatchez, 3 Aug 1950. (Hereafter, Army files will be noted as: Army, File No.....).

[30]Stacey, Six annees de guerre, p. 44.

selection centres were closed and moved to the officer training centres at Brockville, Ontario, and Gordon Head, British Columbia, which had been opened in 1941.

The actual training of officers was done at the two large training centres in Brockville and Gordon Head. A temporary school had been opened at Three Rivers in 1942, but an excess of junior officers led to its closure in September, 1943. A special school for French speaking officer candidates had been opened at St. Jerome in 1942. This school gave a preliminary course to the French speaking officer candidates who then went to the school at Brockville which had a special French speaking training section. The graduates of the French speaking section then went to French speaking units in Canada and overseas.[31]

Mr. Lapointe had originally pressed for a self-contained French speaking officer training school, but the Chief of the General Staff and the Assistant Chief of the General Staff wanted a mixed officer training school and their views prevailed.[32] The aim of the training school at Brockville was to have 30% of its graduates French speaking[33] and this was enough to maintain an adequate flow of junior officers to French speaking units. The high ranking positions in the army naturally went to pre-war permanent force

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[31] Report No. 63, pp. 44-45

[32] Ibid., p. 45n.

[33] Ibid., p. 45.

and militia officers, however, and this fact was to be reflected in the post-war army.[34] Officers trained in the officer schools established during the war as were most of the French speaking officers, and who elected to remain in the army, normally could expect to have a more limited career than more highly educated and qualified pre-war officers,[35] and post-war officers.

Section Two: Language Use, 1939-1946

The main problem of the army's mobilization plan in 1939 and of its attempt to create a regionally balanced force was the lack of non-infantry militia units in Quebec. Other arms and services of the army, and particularly the technical corps, were not representative of the population distribution in Quebec. There was an early shortage of French speaking officers and NCOs for the technical corps.[36] A unilingual French speaking officer or soldier was limited to service in the infantry, for all practical purposes.[37] All signalers in the army had to be bilingual and all French

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[34] See Appendix B, Table I.

[35] Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, draft report, Les Officiers de l'armee Canadienne, February, 1965, p. 25, tables X and XI, reproduced as Tables II and III in Appendix C; and also p. 27, Table XIII reproduced as Table IV in Appendix C. The relatively large number of unqualified majors are officers who attended World War II officer training schools with minimum education requirements.

[36] Army, File No. 1435-2, Appendix B to memorandum from Brig. Bernatchez, 15 Dec. 1950.

[37] Report No. 63, p. 44.

speaking officers - except infantry officers - had to understand English.[38]

Although limited in scope, there was a place in the army for unilingual French speaking soldiers, contrary to the assimilation practices of the other two services. The army went to some considerable effort to keep French speaking units intact once they had been formed and it was only towards the end of the war that lack of French speaking reinforcements made the army use English speaking soldiers in what had been French speaking units.[39] Soldiers, NCOs and officers could take their training in French and then serve in French speaking units.

The existence of French speaking units and training establishments created a large demand for French language training manuals and documents. Since the manuals and pamphlets used by the Canadian army were nearly all British, there existed a need for a translation bureau. In July, 1941, the Army Language Bureau was formed in the Directorate of Military training at army headquarters. The bureau published French versions of King's Regulations, extracts from the Manual of Military Law, and also Financial Regulations and Instructions.[40] The major task of the Bureau, however,

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[38] Army, File No. 1435-2, Appendix C to memorandum of 15 Dec. 1950.

[39] Report No. 63, p. 201.

[40] Army, File No. 4521-2-1, "Translation of Publications in French", memorandum from Assistant Deputy Minister to the Minister, 6 Dec. 1941.

was the translation of training pamphlets and instructions into French. By the end of the war, the bureau had translated over 500 such manuals and documents into French.[41] The Bureau even found time to translate volume one of the official history of the Great War[42] and to produce scripts for several French language films.[43]

Routine orders and General Orders continued to be published by the Translation Bureau in the Secretary of State's office until February, 1942 when the task was given to the army's translation bureau. This routine task was immediately handed back to the Secretary of State's office in April. That office was efficient enough, even with the press of wartime demands made on its services, to be able to announce in October, 1942 that the longest delay between publication of the English and French versions of the orders would be twenty-four hours and that in most cases, the orders would be published similtaneously.[44]

On the whole, the army's approach to the language problem was a pragmatic one, with emphasis placed upon

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[41] Ibid., Brief by the Director of Military Training, "French Language Editions, Training Publications", Sept. 1962, Annex A.

[42] Ibid., memorandum from MT5 to Director of Military Training, 1 Apr. 1944.

[43] Ibid., Annual Report of the Army Language Bureau, 1 Apr. 1944 to 31 Mar. 1945.

[44] Ibid., memorandum from the Head of the Translation Services (Secretary of State's Office) to Director of Military Training, 11 Sept. 1942.

solving existing language problems, rather than developing a systamatic bilingual policy. The army had to train and employ a large number of unilingual French speaking men. In contrast to the navy and air force, the army decided that the most efficient method of training these men was to train them in their own language and then - as far as possible - employ them in French speaking units. The army used French as a means to an end; it did not have a bilingual policy based upon ideological or political grounds.

1939-1946: Cultural Milieu

For the second time within twenty-five years, the Canadian army went to war in Europe as part of the British forces. But whereas in the Great War, the CEF remained part of a British army, the Canadians in World War II formed their own complete field army, under Canadian command.

Outwardly, the Canadian army remained British. Equipment, organization, and doctrines remained patterned on the British models, although many of the materials of war were produced in Canada. The laws governing the internal operations of the army also reflected their British origins, since the military enactments of Canada incorporated by reference the existing military laws of Britain.[45] The Army Act, King's Regulations, Rules of Procedure, and Customs of the Service, were incorporated into Canadian military law

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[45] Singer and Langford, Handbook of Canadian Military Law, (Toronto, Copp Clark Co. Ltd., 1941) p. 8.

under section 69(1) of the Militia Act insofar as the British laws were not inconsistent with regulations made under the Militia Act.[46]

Outward appearances of the army in World War II concealed some very real and significant changes from the CEF of twenty-five years earlier. All senior commanders of Canadian units and formations in World War II were Canadian from the beginning, as were the senior staff officers. In fact, at one point, the Canadian army reversed the historical trend and loaned officers to the British Army in the later stages of the war.[47] In World War II, the Canadians formed a complete Canadian army which operated as an army and not just another formation in the British order of battle. Canadian control of its army was complete in all respects except for operational field command where the Canadian, like its American and British allies, was subject to the operational command of the supreme allied commander.[48] If the army was, in fact, more Canadian in World War II, it was still very much an English Canadian institution.

In 1940, formal recognition was given to a fact that was partly apparent during the inter-war period. The Ogdensburg meeting between the American President and the

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[46] Ibid., p. 11.

[47] Report No. 63, p. 107.

[48] Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 360.

Canadian Prime Minster resulted in the establishment of Permanent Defence Board in August. Formal recognition was given, with the signing of this agreement, to the fact that Canada was a North American country and in the defence orbit of the United States.[49] Canada's ultimate military security no longer rested with the Royal Navy and the British Army, but with the armed forces of the United States. Perhaps this change of view is best illustrated by the fact that by war's end, and going into the post-war period, there were more Canadian officers on course in the United States than in Britain for the first time in the army's history.[50] While to all appearances the Canadian army was still imitating and attaching itself to the British Army, the factors that would create basic changes in functions and doctrine were apparent by the end of the war.

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[49]Morton, WL, p. 478.

[50]Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1947, p. 33.

CHAPTER IV

POST-WORLD WAR II: THE MODERN PERIOD

Introduction

The half dozen years following World War II saw the Canadian army assume its present (pre-integration) organization. The geographical command system was re-established consisting of Western, Prairie, Central, Quebec and Eastern Commands (Prairie Command was later absorbed by Western Command). The post-war organization of the Canadian Army (Reserve) - as the militia was renamed - tried to provide a proper proportion of French speaking reserve units for mobilization purposes,[1] but apparently no such thought was given to balancing, in a similar manner, the regular forces until late in 1946:[2] the R22eR was the only French speaking unit retained in the regular army. At the same time, the army authorities decided that the proportion of French speaking soldiers in the regular army should be 30% for the infantry and 15% for the other corps.[3] These were not limits put on French Canadian participation in the army, but were goals to aim at.

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[1] See Appendix A, Tables II and III.

[2] Canada, Department of National Defence, Canadian Army Historical Section, Report No. 81, February, 1959, p. 1.

[3] Ibid., p. 2.

Section One: Post-war Organization

Partly as a means of attracting French speaking recruits, a tentative plan was made to station one field battery of artillery, two armoured squadrons, one engineer sub-unit, and one signals sub-unit, as well as the R22eR in Quebec. These units and sub-units were, at least in theory, to be completely French speaking, since experience during the war had shown that mixed units soon became largely English speaking and that eventually almost all the officers of mixed units were English speaking.[4] When this plan was officially proposed, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) and the Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCGS) opposed it because they did not want to see regular force units decentralized.[5] In any event, the plan was not implemented immediately because of the lack of French speaking soldiers to serve in the proposed units.

In 1950 the problem of French speaking representation in the army was handed over to a "Committee for the Study of Bilingual Problems". The committee found that both the artillery and the armoured corps did not have enough French speaking soldiers to form the proposed Quebec-based units and that in particular, these corps did not have enough

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[4] Army, File No. 1435-2, Appendix A to memorandum from Brig. Bernatchez, 3 August 1950.

[5] Ibid., Appendix E of memorandum from Brig. Bernatchez, 15 Dec. 1950; see also memorandum from Vice Chief of the General Staff, 20 June 1946; and memorandum from Assistant Vice Chief of the General Staff, 9 July 1946.

French speaking NCOs to train French speaking recruits. Much of the blame for this situation was placed on the fact that the corps schools were outside Quebec and that a French speaking soldier could expect to spend a large part of his career outside his own province.[6] Part of the blame for low representation of French Canadians in corps other than the infantry was placed on three other grounds: negligible French speaking representation in non-infantry units prior to WW II; the army's reluctance to form non-infantry French speaking units because of language and technical difficulties; the language handicap suffered by French speaking soldiers.[7]

In studying methods to improve French speaking representation in the regular army, the committee started from five basic assumptions: English must remain the operational language of the army above unit level; there should be French speaking units in all corps except the signal corps; basic training for artillery, armoured corps and infantry recruits should be in French; specialist and trades training should be in French; officer training could be in French initially, although language was not a real problem with the "officer class".[8] The weakness in the

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[6] Ibid., memoranda to the Director of Artillery and Director of Armour, 31 Jul. 1950.

[7] Ibid., Bernatchez memorandum of 3 Aug. 1950.

[8] Ibid., paper number five, to the memorandum from Brig. Bernatchez, 15 Dec. 1950. See also Appendix C of this memo-

plan was that there were not enough French speaking instructors in the army to operate the proposed training programmes.

In February, 1951, the committee reached its conclusions and made its recommendations. The two basic conclusions reached by the committee were first, that English was to remain the operational language of the army above unit level; second, the character of the army must be established in peace time so that the army could absorb French speaking recruits in war time (ie. units and sub-units must be localized in Quebec).[9] The recommendations of the report revolved around these two conclusions and many of the recommendations were concerned with language training, both English and French.[10] The problem of language training was to bedevil the army for a decade.

A new mobilization plan was created to give effect to the decision to have greater French speaking participation in the army.[11] The Korean War provided the first test of the policy of creating greater French speaking participation in the army. Militia units were placed on active service,

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randum where it states that all officers must understand English and that all signallers in French speaking units must speak English.

[9] Ibid., "Conclusions and Recommendations" of the Committee for the Study of Bilingual Problems, Feb. 1951.

[10] Ibid.

[11] See Appendix A, Tables II and III.

but the units then had to find recruits to fill their ranks. That is, militia units were called out on active service, but members of the militia units were not called out; they had to volunteer. The R22eR had three battalions on active service, Le Regiment de Hull and the Three Rivers Regiment each supplied one troop of armour, the 79th Field Regiment provided one battery of artillery, and one company of the Canadian Infantry Regiment and the 205th Independent Field Battery were also French speaking.[12] All of these units reverted to the reserve list following the war, except for the three R22eR battalions and the one company of the Canadian Infantry Battalion (renamed the 3rd Canadian Guards).

Although none of the French speaking units mobilized during the Korean War was retained in the permanent force and used as a nucleus of a Quebec based, French speaking army establishment, the idea of creating a French speaking nucleus of regular army units in Quebec was not entirely abandoned. Gradually, the number of French speaking units stationed in Quebec (Camp Valcartier) increased until by 1959 there were three regular force infantry battalions, an armoured squadron, an artillery battery, an engineer works company, a signals detachment, a field ambulance and field hospital, an ordnance railhead, a field workshop and a light aid detachment, the R22eR Depot and the Canadian

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[12]Army, File No. 1435-2, memorandum from the Adjutant General to the Defence Secretary, 12 Jan. 1952.

Army Training School (CATS), all stationed in Quebec and all French speaking or bilingual.[13] The first priority of this programme was to create an adequate number of bilingual instructors at the various corps schools; 30% of the staff for the Infantry corps school and 15% for the other corps schools,[14] were to be French speaking. The corps schools then would be able to train French speaking soldiers for the growing number of Quebec based units.

One of the first steps taken to aid in forming French speaking cadres at the corps schools was the establishment of the Canadian Army Training School (CATS) in 1946. CATS had a three-fold purpose: to give basic training to French speaking recruits; to give some special corps training to French speaking recruits; to give French speaking recruits a basic knowledge of English.[15] A cut in the strength of the army in 1947 meant that CATS was established at the R22eR camp at St. Jean rather than at Camp Valcartier as originally planned. Officers and NCOs of the R22eR camp ran the school and were able to give basic training to French speaking recruits. The task of giving English language training to the French speaking recruits was more than the R22eR camp could handle, however,

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[13] Report No. 81, pp. 28-30.

[14] Ibid., memorandum from the Adjutant General to Corps Directors, 17 Sept. 1951.

[15] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

and it was not until the staff of CATS was increased in 1949-1950 that the recruits were given an adequate English course.[16]

CATS moved from St. Jean to Camp Valcartier in 1952 and was given a new role: basic training for all French speaking recruits regardless of corps; advanced training for all French speaking infantry recruits; no English language instruction was to be given during this training period. Following corps training, potential junior NCOs would return to CATS for an eight week junior leader course followed by a twenty week English language course. In addition, the school was to run a French language course for English speaking officers and NCOs.[17] In other words, emphasis had shifted from creating bilingual soldiers to creating bilingual instructors capable of training French speaking soldiers in their own language at the various corps schools. This policy was in accord with the recommendations made by the Committee for the Study of Bilingual Problems[18] and in accord with a report entitled "Training of French Speaking Recruits".[19] The French language course for

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[16] Ibid., pp. 9-11.

[17] Ibid., p. 14.

[18] See note 9 above.

[19] Army, File No. 1435-2, memorandum, "Training of French Speaking Recruits", n.d. pp. 4-8, which states that the army is interested in teaching English to NCOs and advanced trades specialists, Tradesmen in the infantry, armour and artillery corps need not know English other than the technical terms they pick up during in-job training.

English speaking officers and NCOs was in line with a decision reached by the VCGS and the AG that it would be easier to make bilingual instructors of qualified English speaking NCOs and officers than to train French speaking recruits to be instructors.[20]

The training practices followed at the various corps schools varied from school to school, but generally followed the pattern recommended by the Committee for the Study of Bilingual Problems. Classes were given in French if there were enough French speaking soldiers at the school to form a separate class; if there were not enough French speaking soldiers to warrant forming a separate class, they were given special coaching in their own language; those French speaking recruits able to absorb instruction in English were urged to do so.[21] The signal corps school was an exception to this general rule because all signallers had to know English.[22] While the capacity to instruct in French was created, it seems not to have been used consistently except for basic training. By 1962 (ten years after the programme to create a bilingual instructional capacity at corps schools started) there was no trades

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[20] Ibid., memorandum from Vice Chief of the General Staff to the Adjutant General, 10 Feb. 1951; and memorandum from Vice Adjutant General to the Adjutant General, 11 Apr. 1951.

[21] See note 9 above.

[22] See note 5 above.

training being done in French.[23] Only three corps schools had the capacity to do trades training in French, but all corps schools had at least a tutorial bilingual capability.[24]

These training policies instituted by the army had some beneficial effect, if overall percentages are compared. Between 1950 and 1958 the army nearly doubled in size. At the same time, French speaking representation in all corps, without exception, increased.[25] That French speaking representation did not increase more was due to the fact that the wastage rate of French speaking soldiers was almost 50% higher than the rate for English speaking soldiers,[26] the enlistment rate being roughly the same for both groups.[27] Another significant point is that French speaking soldiers were over-represented in the non-tradesmen category.[28] That is, French speaking soldiers did not receive advanced

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[23] Army, File No. 1001-3, "Bilingualism Generally", memorandum from Director General of Military Training to Vice Chief of the General Staff, 9 Feb., 1962, Annex C.

[24] Ibid.

[25] See Annex B, Tables II and IV.

[26] Canada, Department of National Defence, Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment (CAORE), Memorandum No. 58/12, "The Proportion of French Canadian Soldiers in the Canadian Army", (Ottawa, Oct., 1958), p. 1. The length of service for a French speaking soldier is 3.5 years compared to 5.5 years for an English speaking soldier.

[27] Ibid., p. 10. French speaking soldiers from Quebec are under represented according to population, while French speaking soldiers from outside Quebec are over represented.

[28] See Appendix B, Table II.

specialist training, or did not pass advanced specialist courses relative to their representation in the various corps. Language difficulties cannot exclusively account for this fact, since French speaking soldiers from outside Quebec who are normally bilingual, showed approximately the same wastage rates as French speaking unilingual soldiers from Quebec.[29] It is also not clear what effect the shorter length of service of French speaking soldiers has on the figures shown in Table 2 of Appendix B: do French speaking soldiers not receive advanced trades training because they do not remain in the army long enough to be sent to such courses, or do they leave the army after a short period of service because they have little chance of being sent on advanced courses? Only an extensive survey of French speaking soldiers could answer this question. But whatever the answer, it is clear that the policies introduced during the early 1950s did help to increase the representation of French speaking soldiers in the army, but that these French speaking soldiers tended to go to non-technical corps and into non-specialist jobs. French speaking soldiers also remained in the army a shorter time than their English speaking contemporaries. These two facts - low qualifications and short length of service - largely explain the decreasing representation of French speaking

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[29]CAORE Memorandum 58/12, p. 21.

soldiers in the NCO rank structure.[30]

The officer structure for the army during the post-war period shows much the same pattern as the one outlined above for soldiers and NCOs: short periods of service, low qualifications, decreasing representation as rank increases.

The officers in the army immediately following the war were almost wholly pre-war or wartime officers. By 1950, the only way to acquire a commission in the army was to attend RMC or to attend a university and gain a commission through the COTC programme.[31] In 1947 General Foulkes proposed that a French speaking wing of the services colleges (RMC and Royal Roads) be opened, but this proposal was countered by a suggestion of the minister that a military academy wing be opened at Laval University. Neither plan was adopted and the VCGS in particular was not prepared to give special consideration to French speaking officer candidates in this manner.[32]

RMC was opened as a tri-service college in 1948 and the naval college at Royal Roads in Victoria became a tri-service college in the same year, giving the first two years of a four year course (the final two years were given at RMC). The courses at both colleges were taught entirely in English

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[30]See Appendix B, Table I and Appendix C, Tables II and IV.

[31]Report No. 81, p. 17.

[32]Ibid., p. 18.

and the number of French speaking cadets at the colleges was very small, as following table of enrolments at Royal Roads indicates.[33]

Intake and Failures, Royal Roads, September, 1950

Year	Intake Total	Intake French	1st year failures French	1st year failures English	2nd year failures French	2nd year failures English
1947	60	3	0	4	0	1
1948	86	10	3	15	0	1
1949	79	2	1	4	-	
1949	79	5	-	-	-	

The idea of creating a military academy wing at Laval was again brought up, this time by Laval University. The university proposed that it establish a department of military science which would qualify French speaking students for a commission in the regular army. A special committee was established at army headquarters to study the proposal. The proposal next went to the Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee in July, 1951, where neither the navy nor the air force representative objected to the plan on principle. The VCGS did, however, object to the plan on principle and contended that more effort should be spent on raising potential French speaking officer candidates to the academic level established for English speaking candidates, rather than providing special institutions for French speaking candidates.[34] The Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee made no decision on the Laval

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[33] Army, File No. 1435-2, letter from the Commandant Royal Roads, to Adjutant General, 8 Sept. 1950.

[34] Ibid., "Extracts from the Minutes of the 17th Meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee, 16 Jul. 51".

proposal and referred the matter to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Chiefs of Staff gave the problem to an ad hoc committee under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the Defence Research Board. The Director General of Military Training (DGMT) also objected to the plan throughout this period. He preferred that the services colleges teach both French and English to the level that cadets would be bilingual by the time they graduated from RMC.[35]

The Defence Council was the fourth committee to consider the Laval proposal. The Defence Council noted that the services were generally opposed to the plan and that the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the CGS were particularly strong in their opposition. The Council also noted that this was the first instance of an important Quebec institution ever making a proposal to increase French speaking representation in the services. Still, no decision was made and the whole problem was sent back to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.[36] By this time, the lack of French speaking officers was so acute that thirteen junior English speaking officers were sent to the R22eR in Korea to make up shortages in that regiment.[37]

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[35] Ibid., Memorandum from the Director General of Military Training to Vice Chief of the General Staff, 4 July 1951.

[36] Ibid., "Extract from the Minutes of the 55th Meeting of the Defence Council, 14 Sept. 51".

[37] Ibid., letter from the Adjutant General to the Minister, 12 Jan. 1952.

Eventually, the Laval plan was rejected, but the armed services accepted the idea of a preparatory course for French speaking officer candidates to be run by the three services. The course was to be given in Quebec.[38] The course was modeled on the one being used at Royal Roads and a third preparatory year was added before the College Militaire Royal de St. Jean opened in 1952 to give French speaking cadets two or three years academic and military training in their own language. At the end of the course at CMR, the cadets then went to RMC for their final two years of training. Of the first class of 125 cadets, seventy-eight were French speaking.[39]

The Korean War increased the demand for junior officers above the number which could be supplied by the services colleges and the COTC contingents. Short service commission plans were instituted by all services in 1951/52.[40] The Officer Candidate Programme (OCP) of the army prepared highschool graduates for short service (temporary) commissions in the army. The training was done by corps at the various corps schools. The same corps schools also provided the military training for the COTC cadets and the services college cadets during the summer months. All of the corps

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[38] Report No. 81, p. 22.

[39] Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada's Defence Programme, 1953/54, (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1952), p. 17.

[40] Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada's Defence Programme, 1951/52, (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1950), pp. 18-19.

schools had some capacity to instruct officer candidates in French.[41]

Pressed by the need for more highly educated junior officers who intended to make the services a career, the services started the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) in 1953. Under the old system, neither service college cadets nor COTC cadets were obliged to join the regular army upon graduation from university and OCP cadets required only a junior matriculation education. Under the new plan, cadets would be subsidized by the government at the service colleges and civilian universities for four years. Upon graduation, cadets would then be commissioned in the regular army and would have to serve a minimum of three years.[42] French speaking cadets in the ROTP could follow a course of studies in their own language, either at CMR, Laval University or the University of Montreal.

The new policies affecting the training of French speaking officer candidates did have some beneficial result. The representation of French speaking officers in the army rose from 12.2% in 1950 to 14% in 1958 to 15.1% in 1964.[43] When the figures are broken down according to rank, however, it is clear that the percentage of French speaking officers

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[41] See Appendix A, Table I.

[42] Defence Programme, 1953/54, p. 17.

[43] See Appendix A, Table IV; Appendix B, Table I; Appendix C, Table V.

decreases as rank increases.[44] At the same time, the length of service of English speaking officers is nearly twice that of French speaking officers (21 years versus 11 years).[45] English speaking officers are also better qualified militarily (staff college and war college courses) than their French speaking contemporaries.[46] In short, the policies instituted in the early 1950s succeeded in attracting French speaking officers into the army, but the army had not succeeded in holding many of the French speaking officers. Language may have some bearing on the problem - all key professional courses in Canada and abroad are in English and except for the few French speaking units in the army, all work is done in English - but language alone does not provide the complete answer. Do French Canadian officers leave the army because they are not sent to the important professional courses; do they fail those courses and thus leave; or do they leave before they have enough seniority to be sent on such courses?[47] Not enough information exists in this field even to attempt an answer in any detail. To find an answer to these and other questions, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism instituted an extensive

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[44] See Appendix B, Table II; Appendix C, Table I.

[45] CAORE Memorandum 58/12, p. i.

[46] See Appendix B, Table III; Appendix C, Tables II, III and IV.

[47] CAORE Memorandum 58/12, p. 20.

survey of the armed forces in 1965, the results of which have not yet been published.

Language Use

1946: The Post-war Army

The plan to create a regionally balanced post-war army meant that the language problem had to be studied and a more lasting solution found for it than had been the case during the war. The problem was partially simplified by the act of declaring all Quebec units - other than English speaking infantry units - bilingual.[48] That is, Quebec units were French speaking but able to operate in English. Opposition to the bilingual unit plan soon arose. Experiences during the war had shown that bilingual units tended to become English speaking units eventually. To frustrate this tendency, proposals were made that unilingual French speaking units be created and posted to Quebec.[49] As outlined during the preceding section, the single greatest limiting factor to this proposal was the lack of French speaking instructors in non-infantry units. Before French speaking units could be created, French speaking instructors had to be trained or English speaking instructors had to be taught French. The result was the formation and reorganization of CATS, the Canadian Army Training School.

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[48] Report No. 81, p. 2.

[49] Army, File No. 1435-2, memorandum from Brig. Bernatchez to Director of Artillery and Director of Armour, 31 July 1950.

The general principle regarding language use and language training was established at this time: English was and would remain the operational language of the army.[50] A proposal was made that Laval University be asked to study the language problems of the army in the anticipation that such a study would reaffirm the principle, already established, of the dominant nature of English in the army.[51] It was also anticipated that a Laval study of the language problems of the army would result in the finding that English technical terms could not be translated into French in French training manuals.[52] Briefly, the language policy formulated by the army was that French could be used on a unit level; it could be used for basic training, trades training and specialist training; but English was to be the only acceptable language above unit level. Therefore, all officers and signallers in French speaking units had to be bilingual.[53]

English language training had always been one of the responsibilities of CATS, but before 1950 it had not been a successful programme because of the lack of qualified

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[50] Ibid., paper number five of attached background information to memorandum from Brig. Bernatchez to committee members, 15 Dec. 1950.

[51] Ibid., memorandum from Deputy Chief of the General Staff to Director of Military Training, 17 June 1950.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid., "Conclusions and Recommendations", Feb. 1951.

instructors. In 1950 the language training capability of CATS was increased, and a change in the language policy of the army began to be discussed. The first major shift in policy was the decision to teach English speaking instructors French so that they could train French speaking recruits.[54] Secondly, it was tacitly agreed that the army was really interested in teaching English only to French speaking officers, potential NCOs and senior trades specialists.[55] Non-technical, or even technical jobs at a low level, could be done by unilingual French speaking soldiers. There was thus a place for unilingual French speaking soldiers in the army, albeit, a very restricted place.

CATS was moved to Valcartier in 1952 and its training programme was changed to accord with the suggestions made in 1950. English language training was separated from military training and a French language course for English speaking officers and NCOs was started.[56] Both these changes were major innovations and were unique to the army: only the army provided for the training of recruits and tradesmen in French; and only the army ran a French language school for English speaking soldiers.

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[54] Ibid., Memorandum from Acting Adjutant General to Vice Chief of the General Staff, 25 July 1950.

[55] Ibid., memorandum, "Training of French Speaking Recruits", n.d., pp. 4-5 and pp. 7-8.

[56] Report No. 81, p. 14.

The new policy at CATS did not last many years, however. By the mid-1950s the school ceased to give basic training to all French speaking recruits and became a language school. French speaking infantry recruits were sent to the R22eR Depot for basic training and French speaking recruits from the other corps were sent to CATS for an English language course and then sent to the various corps schools where they would receive their training in English.[57] At the same time, a strong recommendation was made by CATS that those recruits who did not learn English in the required time should be transferred to the R22eR.[58] The schools continued to operate language courses for English and French speaking officers and NCOs, but in general, the language policies of the army had shifted away from the earlier plan of training and employing French speaking soldiers in French speaking training schools and units. English was now in practice mandatory for all corps except the infantry, and especially for the technical corps. The idea of providing trades training in French for all corps except the signals corps withered on the vine.

The first French language technical training course had begun at the Three Rivers Technical School in 1949.[59] French

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[57]Army, File No. 3505-3, "Language Training - French", Memorandum from Director of Military Training, 30 Jan. 1959.

[58]Ibid., Letter, Commanding Officer, CATS to AHQ, 2 Mar. 1959.

[59]Army, File No. 3686-2, "Courses - CVTS - for French

speaking-soldiers were sent to the Three Rivers School after completing basic training at CATS. The courses offered were varied and well attended: six of the technical corps of the army had soldiers taking training at the school in the first year of operation.[60] An English language training course was given to the soldiers at the same time they received their technical training, but this language training was far less effective than the technical training. Few of the graduates of the Three Rivers courses were able to take advanced courses at the corps schools which were taught only in English.[61] The effectiveness of the courses at the Three Rivers school was further damaged when English speaking soldiers were sent to the school. These soldiers received their instruction in English, but they blocked vacancies for French speaking soldiers who would have gained more benefit from the courses. At one point, all soldiers on course at the school were English speaking.[62]

In 1950, the CGS ordered that all vacancies at the Three Rivers school were to be reserved for French speaking

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Speaking Potential Tradesmen", Memorandum from Director of Military Training to Director of Personnel, 15 Nov. 1949.

[60] Ibid., Memorandum from Director of Army Personnel to Director of Military Training, 25 April 1950. The corps were: RCSigs, RCAC, RCASC, RCAMC, RCOC, and RCEME.

[61] Ibid., Assistant Director of Training, Department of Labour to Director of Military Training, 18 Aug. 1950.

[62] Ibid., GSO2 Training II to Director of Military Training, 17 July 1950.

soldiers if enough were available to make the courses worth while.[63] The plan was finally allowed to lapse because not enough French speaking soldiers were eligible to take the course to make it economical. Trades training in French at the corps schools also declined. By 1962 there was no trades training being done in French at the corps schools,[64] although the capability existed in some cases[65] and authorization for trades training in French had been given.[66] The decline in corps school courses taught in French coincided with the development of CATS as a language school. The more efficient CATS became in teaching English, the less pressing became the need to run training courses in French at the corps schools.

Paradoxically, as CATS developed as a language school, and as less and less training was being done in French, the army developed its French language programmes for English speaking officers and NCOs. The first French language programme started in 1947 when the CGS approved a

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[63] Ibid., memorandum from Chief of the General Staff to Headquarters, Quebec Command, 3 Nov. 1950.

[64] Army, File No. 1001-3, Annex C to memorandum from Director General of Military Training to Vice Chief of the General Staff, 9 Feb. 1962.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Army, File No. 3505-3, letter from Director of Ordnance Services to Commanding Officer, Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps School, 24 Sept. 1953.

plan to teach French to officers at Army Headquarters.[67] The first voluntary course started in January 1948 and classes were held after normal working hours. The following year, the plan was extended to Command, Area, and large camp headquarters. For some reason, Quebec Command and Eastern Quebec Area Headquarters were excluded from the extension and only after the GOC of Quebec command pointed out that many of his officers could not speak French were these two headquarters included in the plan.[68] The Defence Council approved the plans and funds were allotted to hire suitable French teachers.[69] The courses were so popular that by March 1948 there were 700 officers taking French courses in twenty-one centres.[70] The purpose behind the courses was two-fold: to train officers to a level where they could hold command appointments in either English or French; to train officers to a level where they could handle day to day liaison in either language.[71]

The part-time French courses were continued, although

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[67] Ibid., memorandum from Director of Military Training to Director of Personnel, 27 Nov. 1947.

[68] Ibid., letter from General Officer Commanding Quebec Command to AHQ, 12 Dec. 1947.

[69] Ibid., "Extract, Minutes of Defence Council, 23 Jan. 48".

[70] Ibid., letter from Chief of the General Staff to the Minister, 15 Mar. 1948.

[71] Ibid., Director of Military Intelligence to Director of Military Training, 19 May 1948.

they lapsed from time to time because of lack of funds,[72] but CATS assumed the major responsibility for full-time French training after discussions about French language training with the University of Montreal.[73] Nevertheless, part-time voluntary French courses continued to be approved for army officers at AHQ, beginning with a course at Carleton University in 1953[74] and later being extended to the School of Modern languages in Ottawa in 1959,[75] and the following year to the University of Ottawa.[76] All the courses were given to officers at public expense and authorization was even given for courses from private tutors.[77]

Apart from CATS, the only other source of full-time language instruction for the army was the services colleges. When RMC re-opened in 1948, stress was laid on the importance of French for young officers who are "required to deal

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[72] Ibid., telegraph to command headquarters, 20 Dec. 1952. There was no provision for French language courses in the estimates for the following year.

[73] Ibid., letter from the Chief of the General Staff to the Defence Secretary, 22 May 1952. The CGS felt that the training could best be done in an army establishment.

[74] Ibid., letter from the Chief of the General Staff to the Registrar of Carleton University, 28 Sept. 1953.

[75] Ibid., memorandum from the Director of Military Training, 18 Sept. 1959.

[76] Ibid., memorandum from the Director of Military Training, 3 Aug. 1960.

[77] Ibid.

with persons speaking both English and French".[78] French was not so important, however, that it had to be included in the entrance qualifications. Applicants had to have a junior matriculation standing in a language (preferably French) and senior matriculation standing in either history or a language.[79] French was not made a compulsory qualification until 1951.[80] The following year, CMR was opened at St. Jean, Quebec under the circumstances outlined in the preceding section.

There was a two-fold purpose behind the opening of CMR: it was meant to meet the requirements of French speaking officer candidates and it was meant to create bilingual officers for the three armed services.[81] Academic courses were given in both English and French and French was given equal standing with English for administrative and training purposes. Royal Roads and RMC remained unilingual English speaking institutions however, and all cadets from Royal Roads and CMR graduated to RMC for their final two years

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[78] Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1949, p. 11.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1953, p. 20 and p. 21. See also, Canada, House of Commons, Interim Report of the Special Committee on Defence, (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1965), p. 286. Special Committee on Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 9, (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1964), p. 286.

of academic training. The services have steadfastly refused to raise CMR to the level of RMC - ie. degree granting university level - on economic grounds.[82]

The move to give at least some professional training to French speaking soldiers and officer candidates in French created a continuing demand for training manuals and technical pamphelts in French. The large number of manuals and pamphlets translated during the war soon became obsolete and by 1950 only sixty of the 180 French language manuals available were modern enough to be of any value.[83] The change over to American equipment during the Korean War period complicated the situation[84] and the understaffed Army Language Bureau could not cope with the demand for French language translations. Instead of increasing the size of the bureau, the Department of National Defence closed it - over the protests and dire predictions of the head of the bureau.[85] All translation work then became the responsibility of the National Defence Division of the Bureau of Translations in the Department of the Secretary

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[82]Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Estimates, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 1958 (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1958) p. 138 and p. 166. See also Ibid., p. 319.

[83]Army, File No. 1435-2, Appendix D of memorandum from Brig. Bernatchez, 15 Dec. 1950.

[84]Ibid., memorandum from Brig. Bernatchez, 15 Dec. 1950.

[85]Army, File No. 4521-2-1, brief by Director of Military Training, Annex A, Sept. 1962.

of State. The demand for translations soon far outstripped the ability of the bureau to produce translations and by 1962 the number of useful French language manuals and pamphlets had dropped to twenty-eight;[86] 500 manuals and 255 precis were not translated.[87]

To help cope with the slow-down of translation, a system of priorities was established in 1954. First priority was given to translating all material needed for depot, recruit and new soldier training; second priority was given to translating all material needed by NCOs and officers for their professional advancement up to and including the rank of captain.[88] This policy was reviewed and reconfirmed in 1959[89] and expanded in 1962 to provide four categories for translation. The first priority was given to material needed for recruit training; the second priority given to material used in trades and specialty training, refresher training, NCO and officer training up to captain level; third priority went to all other (unspecified) material; and last priority was given to material used for professional advancement above captain level.[90]

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[86] Ibid. [87] Ibid.

[88] Ibid., memorandum from Director of Infantry to Director of Military Training, 28 June 1954.

[89] Ibid., memorandum from Director of Military Training to Director of Infantry, 26 Nov. 1959.

[90] Ibid., memorandum from Director of Military Training, 3 May 1962.

In the post-war period, French has gained some recognition and use in the administrative procedures of the army. French is not given parity with English, but at least all basic orders, instruction, and personnel forms are printed in both languages.[91] All correspondence between AHQ and the other headquarters, and between headquarters and units and formations is in English, as is all internal correspondence. All correspondence received in French is replied to in that language, but all French correspondence first goes through the translation bureau.[92] In French speaking units and formations, internal correspondence and communication is in the language of the units concerned.[93] The result of these procedures is that a French speaking officer or soldier can take at least part of his training in his own language, he may serve in a French speaking unit, he can study for his professional examinations in his own language and he can write those examinations in French. Beyond this point, the career of a unilingual French speaking officer is non-existent. Unless a French speaking officer has a working

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[91] Army, File No. 1001-3, Appendix E to memorandum from Director General of Military Training to Vice Chief of the General Staff, 9 Feb. 1962.

[92] Ibid., memorandum from Assistant Deputy Minister, 17 July 1956.

[93] Ibid., memorandum from Director General of Military Training to Vice Chief of the General Staff, 9 Feb. 1962.

command of English, he cannot expect to receive staff training at a Canadian or foreign staff college, and he cannot expect to be given employment on staffs or training units, or operational units outside Quebec. In short, the career of a unilingual French speaking officer is limited, whereas a unilingual English speaking officer suffers no such limitation. The career of a unilingual French speaking NCO is not so restricted, but again, he can expect no employment outside Quebec.

The Present Army: Cultural Milieu

The Canadian army retained the form of its former organization, but the substance was changed after World War II. In order to pay its dues to the collective security organizations which it had joined (the U.N., NATO and later NORAD) Canada had to retain relatively large and permanent military organizations.[94] For the first time in Canadian history, the regular army was larger than the militia.[95] New units were thus added to the regular army, and these units perpetuated British inspired traditions and forms: The Regiment of Canadian Guards, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment of Canada), 1/8 Canadian Hussars. Uniforms remained

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[94]Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1954/55, pp. 41-42. See also Defence Programme, 1951/52, p. 6.

[95]Ibid., p. 53.

patterned after the British, regimental alliances with British regiments remained, the traditions and customs of the service remained patterned on the British model and the Canadian brigade serving with NATO forces in Europe forms part of the British Army of the Rhine. The Britidism of the Canadian army has almost become a Canadian tradition concealing the real changes that occurred following World War II.

Practical working ties with the British army, so important during the inter-war years, became insignificant following World War II. The Canadian army operated its own staff college during World War II and the college was put on a permanent basis following the war.[96] In 1948 a National Defence College for the education of senior military officers was opened at Kingston.[97] Senior Commonwealth and NATO officers also attended this college. RMC was supplemented by Royal Roads and CMR and the ROTP was initiated. Corps schools gave a wide range of professional and technical training for officers and NCOs. For the first time in its existence, the Canadian army could rely on its own resources for the majority of its professional requirements. What the Canadian army could not supply from its

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[96]Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada's Defence Programme, 1947 (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1947), p. 26.

[97]Ibid., p. 26.

own resources, was supplied by the U.S. rather than Britain. Supporting the movement towards self-sufficiency in training establishments was a growing defence production industry which supplied the army either with Canadian designed and produced equipment, or with American designed equipment produced in Canada. This defence industry produced more than the Canadian armed forces required and defence spending has played no small part in the post-war prosperity of Canadian industry.[98]

The National Defence Act of 1950 consolidated the various legislative enactments affecting the armed forces into a single statute. The NDA formally ended Canadian reliance on British military laws and methods of procedure,[99] although much of the Canadian law is based on past British-inspired law and custom.

By the close of the Korean War, the Canadian army had its own laws, its own large-scale training and operational establishments and it was equipped with Canadian or American military hardware. The Canadian armed forces, and the army among them, were turning more and more to the American armed

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[98]Canada, Department of Defence Production, "Defence Expenditure and its Influence on the Canadian Economy", Special Studies for the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Defence, (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1965), p. 97.

[99]Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Bill No. 133: An Act Respecting National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 1950, (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1950), p. 11

forces for equipment, training and doctrine much as they had turned towards the British armed forces in the past. The uniforms, customs and traditions of the Canadian army remained British, but the reality behind the dress uniforms had changed by the mid-1960s. For all the changes, however, the army remained an English speaking institution with a small French speaking element. The army did not become a bilingual institution in the post-war period and there were indications by as early as 1952 that it had gone about as far as it was willing to go in this direction.[100] In one sense, the post-war Canadian army became a "bicultural" army, but perhaps the combination of British form and American substance made it more difficult than ever for the army to become a bilingual and "bicultural" (in the modern Canadian concept of the word) institution. The great unification revolution of the mid-1950s will probably make the form of Canada's armed forces less British; will it make them more Canadian?

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[100]Army, File No. 1435-2, letter from the Chief of the General Staff to the Minister, 5 March 1952.

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[100]Army, File No. 1435-2, letter from the Chief of the General Staff to the Minister, 5 March 1952.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

One major conclusion can be offered from the evidence contained in this thesis: as the Canadian army developed professionally and technically, it became less hospitable to French Canadian participation in its affairs. Before 1870, the serious business of protecting and policing the British North American colonies was done by the British army. The Canadian militia, in both its sedentary and volunteer forms, was organized and used as an auxiliary organization to the British troops based in North America. After 1855 and the beginning of the Volunteer Active Militia, the Canadian militia played a slightly more active role in the military affairs of British North America, protecting the colonies from foreign military threats (the Fenians, the scares during and following the American Civil War, the Venezuelan Crisis of 1895/96) and helping the Canadian government establish and maintain law and order in the newly expanding Dominion (the two rebellions in the North West; the Yukon field force of 1898). During this period, there is no large discrepancy between the participation of English speaking and French speaking Canadians in the militia.

After 1871, a change in the ethnic composition of the militia begins. The first of these changes is the result of a fall in militia appropriations. This fall in appropriations particularly hurts the rural militia units which are limited to one summer training period every two years while the city units can concentrate every summer for a training camp. This difference between city and rural militia units was particularly damaging to the Quebec militia organization, where most of the French speaking militia units were rural units, while most of the English speaking militia units were city units. The city-rural division reduced effective French Canadian participation in the militia organization of Canada.[1]

The next change that affected French Canadian participation in the militia after 1871 was the increasing professionalization of the militia. The small permanent force units created by the Canadian government after the final withdrawal of British garrisons were meant to act as training cadres for the militia, which was to remain the backbone of Canadian military organization. Unfortunately, after the switch of Quebec City and Kingston artillery units, except for the infantry school at St.-Jean, there was no instruction offered in French to French speaking militia officers and NCOs. This practice of offering training and professional courses only in English also extended to the

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[1]Morton, D. W., pp. 7-8.

Royal Military College. The number of professionally qualified French speaking officers and NCOs who could hold substantive rank in the militia or the small permanent force thus gradually declined after 1871.

Part of the reason for this English speaking domination of the militia organization was due to the practice of hiring a senior British officer to command the Canadian militia and the small permanent force. This officer was given responsibility for the training and organization of the militia and he would train it and organize it on the lines he knew best: the training and organization of the British territorials. To help him in this task, he would acquire the services of British instructors and staff officers. Providing that the GOC did not trespass into the area of political patronage, he was left to run the small Canadian military organization pretty much as he, as a professional career soldier in the British Army, saw fit. The only notable exception to this rule is one order issued in 1899 "suggesting" that all staff officers, instructors, and permanent force officers learn French because a large percentage of Canadian regiments are French speaking.[2] Nothing much was done about this suggestion. Interpreter's exams were started in 1899 and a language examination in

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[2]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Militia Order No. 12, Tuesday, 14 February 1899.

French was given to sergeants in 1906 that allowed them to qualify for extra pay, but neither policy seems to have been pursued actively.[3]

The other part of the reason for the continued Anglicization of the Canadian militia after 1871 is political. Canadian politicians, both French and English speaking, were more interested in how the militia was to be used than in how it was organized and trained. The first divergence between English Canadian and French Canadian opinion over the use of the Canadian militia arose the year before the second Riel rebellion, the North West Rebellion. The issue was whether or not Canadian troops should be used for British imperial purposes. The Macdonald government refused to send Canadian troops to the Soudan and this policy was adhered to until English speaking opinion in Canada forced Laurier to approve of limited Canadian participation in the South African War.[4] The actual use of Canadian troops in a British imperialist war further reduced French Canadian interest and participation in the militia and the permanent force which, by this time, was largely an English speaking organization.

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[3]Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Militia Order No. 143, Tuesday, 25 July 1899 and Militia Order No. 240, Wednesday, 17 October 1906.

[4]Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 279

The imperial standardization agreements entered into by Canada before the Great War only reinforced the Anglicization of Canadian military insitutions at the same time as they were becoming professionally proficient. The Great War, and the conscription crisis of 1917, completed the almost complete withdrawal of French Canadian participation from the Canadian Army[5] (as it could now be called).

By the end of the Great War, the Anglicization of the Canadian army was at its zenith. French Canadians did not participate in the army because they did not agree with the use to which it had been put, and those few who did wish to participate, had to do so in English. Outside the R22eR, there was no place for a unilingual French speaking soldier and there was no place at all for a unilingual French speaking officer.

In the two decades following the Great War, politicians were not interested in how the army was organized and run, but they were interested in the question of whether there should be an army at all. The result was that the army was given its annual pittance and then allowed to fend for itself as best it could. The army looked to the British army for support and succour in maintaining a degree of professional development among its officers. As a result, it never did develop a truly Canadian character

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[5]Hanbury-Williams, p. 69.

in the inter-war years. The militia fared no better than the permanent force during this period, its appropriations were cut year after year, and it depended upon the permanent force for its training - almost exclusively in English except for the training provided by the R22eR. Even with the modest rearmament programme started in the late 1930s, the army was given third priority behind the navy and air force and it was the small permanent force of the inter-war years that provided the nucleus of the Canadian army of World War II and the immediate post-World War II period.[6]

Despite definite policies to provide scope for French Canadian participation in the army in World War II by creating French Canadian units and formations, the pattern of the Great War was to a large extent duplicated: French Canada refused to participate fully in the military conduct of the war. While their participation in the "home defence" army was proportionate to their population, French Canadian participation in the Canadian army in Europe was not, although it was greater than in the Great War. The same result ensued as after the Great War: the post-war reorganization found the Canadian army an institution completely dominated by English speaking Canadians.[7]

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[6]See Chapter II, pp. 53-55 for French-English officer strength of the permanent force in 1939.

[7]See Chapter III, p. 78, and Appendix B, Table I.

There was a difference this time, however. Because of the "Cold War", Canada built and maintained the largest peace-time regular army in its history. For the first time, the regular army (as it was now called) became more important than the militia. The army was also given the funds to maintain some of the World War II training facilities and to build new training facilities. The army became, in effect, nearly self-sufficient and no longer had to depend upon the largesse of the British army. A further change had taken place that affected the ethnic composition of the Canadian army: there was no longer a serious divergence of opinion on the employment of the army between French Canadians and English Canadians. In the 1950s, Canadians, on the whole, agreed with Canadian commitments to NATO and the United Nations.[8] Now, Canadians could spend more time being interested in the organization and operation of their army and they could spend more time making it representative of Canadian society. It was during the 1950s that new French speaking army units were formed and stationed in Quebec, the College Militaire Royal de Saint Jean was opened and, in general, more interest was shown in French Canadian participation in the army.

The interest shown by the army in trying to increase effective French speaking participation in the army was

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[8]Eayrs, "Canadian Defence Policies", pp. 15-17.

caused by two facts: the army, of all the three armed services, had the largest number of French speaking servicemen in its ranks;[9] and the army was worried by the fact that although French speaking Canadians volunteered in proportion to their share of the population as a whole, they remained in the army for a shorter time than their English speaking counterparts.[10] The army tried to correct this situation and to retain the services of a larger share of its French speaking recruits by increasing opportunities to receive instruction in French and by increasing opportunities to work in at least a partially French speaking milieu.

However, the attempts to make the army a more attractive career for French speaking Canadians was hampered by the conclusion reached at headquarters that the army, above unit level, was to remain an English speaking organization for administrative purposes, and that at the operational level English was to be the only language used. Even the creation of French speaking units and sub-units was hampered by the fear of fragmentizing the army, and especially of fragmentizing the army along linguistic lines.[12] Thus,

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[9]See Table VI, Appendix C.

[10]CACRE, Memorandum No. 58/12, p. i.

[11]Army, File No. 1435-2, Memo to DCGS, 15 Dec. 1950.

[12]Ibid., Memo from VCGS, 20 Jun. 1946.

in the policies and programmes initiated in the 1950s, there was a built-in contradiction: a desire to make the army a more attractive career for French speaking soldiers versus the desire to make the army an effective and efficient military organization. This contradiction is a serious one that has not yet been solved, and perhaps it is incapable of solution unless the fundamental role of the army is changed.

As long as the major role of the army is a purely military one, that is, as long as the army is used to meet Canada's military commitments under collective security treaties, then the emphasis must remain focused on making the army an efficient fighting organization. In the eyes of the army, this means that the minimum requirement for operational and administrative efficiency is the use of one language. The only alternative to this unilingual policy is to create a truly bilingual army on the Belgian or South African model; that is, to create an army where at least all the officers and senior NCOs are capable of working in either English or French. The creation of a perfectly bilingual army must, as the Belgian experience has shown, be a very long-term programme, and one that gives no complete assurance that it will be a success.[13] There is

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[13]Jaques Brazeau, Dossier Militaire, 1965, p. 24; and Kenneth McRae, Draft Report of Interviews Held with Senior Officers at Defence Headquarters, Pretoria, South Africa, May 1965, n.d., draft reports for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

one other alternative to a unilingual English speaking army which, from a military point of view, should not even be considered: create an army divided on linguistic lines. This policy was rejected in the 1950s by both the army and the government and it has not been accepted by the new unified Canadian Defence Force.[14]

The contradiction between the demand for military efficiency and the demand for linguistic equality may be looked at from another viewpoint: change the basic role of the army. The role of the army could be changed from a purely military role, to a role that stresses service either to the country as a whole, or more realistically, service to the United Nations. It is this change of roles that has been a matter of political debate for the past several years. While the merit of changing the role of the army, or the Canadian armed forces generally, is outside the scope of this thesis, it can at least be argued here that a change from a purely military role for the army to a role that stresses service to the United Nations would make it much easier to find a solution to the problem of the use of French in the army and the employment of French speaking soldiers in a French speaking milieu. If the basic aim of the army was service, that is to act as more of an international police force and/or as a training organization and as an

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[14]Army, File No. 1435-2, letter from CGS to Minister, 5 Mar. 1952.

opportunity for civic service for young Canadians, then much less stress would have to be placed on military efficiency as such. A much wider degree of freedom could be tolerated in creating French speaking units and in using French as a working language in the army. Such an army would not be the army that Canadians now know and the creation of such an army would require a radical change in Canadian military thinking and in government military and foreign policy. In either event, whether the role of the army is maintained and an attempt made to make it into a truly bilingual army, or whether the role of the army is completely changed to meet new social and political conditions in the country, the decision is a political one. The decisions and the direction must come from the government; it is neither fair nor reasonable to expect the army (armed forces) to make any fundamental changes in its structure to meet the needs of French speaking members (or potential members) without political direction. The responsibility for changing the armed forces so that they more accurately meet the needs and aspirations of French speaking Canadians belongs to the government, not to the military leaders.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TABLE I

Survey of Corps Schools - Bilingual Instructors

School	January 1950 Officers	NCOs	September 1950 Officers	NCOs
RCAC	0	1	1	0
RCSA	1	6	1	6
RCSA (AA)	3	1	3	1
RCSA (C&AA)	2	0	2	0
RCSME	1	3	2	2
RCSofS	0	0	0	0
RCSofI	30%	0%	10	12
RCASC	2	0	2	0
RCAMC	0	1	1	1
RCDC	0	3	2	0
RCOC	1	0	0	2
RCEME	0	2	0	3
CProC	0	1	0	1
CJATC	5	13	5	13
CATS	4	12	-	-

(Source: Canada, Army, File 1435-2, "Survey of Corps School Bilingual Instructors as of Jan. 50".)

TABLE II

Percentage of RCAC, RCA and RCIC Units in Quebec Command, 1950

Mobilization Plans	Units	Quebec Units	Percentages
RCAC	19	5	28
RCA	50	10	20
RCIC	40	12	30
Reserve Force			
RCAC	23	6	26
RCA	71	14	20
RCIC	66	18	27
Active Force			
RCAC	2	-	-
RCA	4	-	-
RCIC	9	3	33

(Source: Canada, Army, File 1435-2, Memorandum 15 Dec. 50, Appendix E)

TABLE III

French Speaking Reserve Units, 1952

RCAC	Regiment de Hull Three Rivers Regiment
RCA	46th Anti-tank Regiment 27th Field Regiment 2nd Medium Regiment 51st Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment 38th Light Anti-aircraft Regiment 62nd Light Anit-aircraft Regiment 6th Field Regiment 35th Anti-tank Regiment
RCIC	Fudiliers Mont Royal Regiment de Chateauguay Regiment de Maisonneuve Regiment de Joliette Regiment de St. Hyacinthe Fusiliers de Sherbrooke Regiment de Saguenay Regiment de Levis Regiment de Montmagny Regiment de la Chaudiere Fusiliers de St. Laurent Regiment de Quebec (MG) Voltigeurs (Motorized)
Mixed Units	Canadian Infantry Battalion 258th Battery of 79th Field Regiment

(Source: Canada, Army, File 1435-2, Memorandum 12 Jan. 52)

TABLE IV

Summary of French Canadian Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1950

Corps	Percentage Officers	French OR	Canadian ALL	Bilingual Instructors Corps Schools	RMC % French	Royal Roads % French
RCAC	4.8	6.4	6.1	6.3		
RCA	7.7	6.6	6.8	11.1		
RCE	5.1	10.5	9.4	11.6		
RCSigs	6.7	8.8	8.6	3.4		
RCIC	26.1	20.2	21.1	25.0		
RCASC	9.7	13.2	12.9	6.8		
RCAMC	11.4	11.9	11.8	3.4		
RCDC	8.7	10.5	9.9	23.1		
RCOC	15.1	15.7	15.6	15.6		
RCEME	2.5	10.3	9.6	4.2		
RCAPC	17.2	14.9	15.5	--		
CProC	13.0	8.1	8.5	--		
CIntC	13.1	12.9	13.0	--		
RCAChC	31.4	--	31.4	--		
Gen List	13.5	--	13.5	--		
Average	12.2	12.3	12.3	15.5	10.8	5.3

(Source: Canada, Army, File 1435-2, Memorandum 15 Dec 50, Appendix A)

ANNEX I

List of French-speaking Units as of March 1, 1944

CANADA

12 AA Battery	RCA
17 AA Battery	
41 AA Battery	
52 AA Battery	
60 AA Battery	
61 AA Battery	
63 AA Battery	
HQ 24 AA Regiment	
HQ 26 AA Regiment	
4 AA Gun Operational Room	
3 AA Gun Operational Room	
29 AA Troop Line Signals	
59 Coast Battery	
20 Field Regiment	
15 Field Company	RCE
22 General Pioneer Company	
Fusiliers de Sherbrooke	CIC
Fusiliers de St. Laurent	
Regiment de Hull	
Regiment de Joliette	
Regiment de Montmagny	
Regiment de Quebec	
Regiment de St. Hyacinthe	
Regiment de Chateauguay	
B Company, St. John Fusiliers. (MG)	
1 Bakery Section (Mech)	RCASC
5 Company RCASC	
19 Field Ambulance	RCAMC
5 Company RCAMC	
36 Provost Company	C Pro C
46 Provost Company	
16 Company (75% French)	VG of C
12, 13, 14, and 15 Companies (50% French)	

cont.

No. 5 District Depot	Misc
25 Company Canadian Dental Corps	
5 Ordnance Depot	
105 Company CWAC	
8 Special Employment Company	
Quebec Arsenal Protection Company	
5 District Recruiting Company	
66 Military Detention Barracks	
Quebec Military Hospital	
Valcartier Military Hospital	

OVERSEAS

57 Light AA Battery	RCA
62 Anti-tank Battery	
4 Medium Regiment	
3 Battalion RCE	RCE
4 Medium Regiment Signal Section	RCCS
Fusiliers Mont Royal	CIC
Regiment de Maisonneuve	
R22eR	
Regiment de la Chaudiere	
4 Company	RCASC
Medium Regiment Platoon	
1 Convalescent Depot	RCAMC
6 Field Dressing Station	
18 Field Ambulance	
5 Field Hygiene Section	
17 General Hospital	
104 Light Aid Detachment	RCOC
9 Provost Company	C Pro C

"Note (a) All the units were formed in Canada and sent overseas as French-speaking units. They are believed to be still composed predominantly of French-speaking personnel. However, it is not known whether, with the exception of the 4 Inf. Bns. they are still French-speaking units."

(Source: Canadian Army Historical Section, Report No. 63, vol. 2, Appendix I.)

APPENDIX B

TABLE I

Percentage of French Canadian Personnel by Rank, February, 1958

Rank	Percentage French Canadian	Rank	Percentage French Canadian
Colonel & above	8	WO I	8
Lt. Col.	9	WO II	10
Major	12	Staff Sgt.	11
Captain	12	Sergeant	15
Lieutenant	15	Corporal	20
2nd Lt.	21	Private	26
Officer Cdt.	21	Apprentice	16
All Officers	14%	Other Ranks	21%

(Source: Canada, Army, CAORE Memorandum 58/12, Oct. 58)

TABLE II

French Canadian Other Ranks Among Non-Tradesmen, February, 1958

Corps	Non-tradesmen % French	Other Ranks % French
RCAC	45	21
RCA	14	16
RCE	15	14
RCSigs	15	12
RCIC	37	30
RCASC	31	23
RCOC	25	21
RCEME	19	15
CProC	26	17
CPC	40	27
RCDC	8	14
RCAMC	22	20
CIntC	0	18
RCAPC	50	24

(Source: Ibid.)

TABLE III

Officers With Staff Training, February, 1958

Category	Staff Trained	Non-Staff Trained	Total	Percentage Staff Trained
French	74	751	825	9
English	867	4250	5117	17

(Source: Ibid.)

APPENDIX C

TABLE I

Canadian Army Officers by Rank and Ethnic Origin
March, 1964

Rank	Total English	Total French	Percentage French
Lt. General	2	0	0
Maj. General	9	4	30.3
Brigadier	35	4	10.3
Colonel	94	13	12.1
Lt. Colonel	342	42	10.9
Major	1055	164	13.5
Captain	1711	290	14.5
Lieutenant	931	175	15.8
2nd Lt.	307	106	25.7
Total	4486	798	15.1

TABLE II

Staff Trained Officers: Percentages by Rank and Ethnic Origin, March, 1964

Rank	English	French
Lt. General	100.0%	-
Maj. General	100.0	100.0%
Brigadier	97.1	100.0
Colonel	83.0	69.2
Lt. Colonel	71.3	69.0
Major	45.7	26.8
Captain	29.9	26.2
Lieutenant	25.5	28.0
2nd Lt.	0.3	0.9
Percentage of All Officers	35.6%	27.1%

Note: This table includes junior officers qualified for promotion through promotion examinations, but who have not necessarily had staff training. To be promoted above major, staff training is nearly mandatory.

(Source: Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Draft Report, "Les officiers de l'armee Canadienne, Feb. 65)

TABLE III

RMC Graduates: Percentages by Rank and Ethnic Origin, March, 1964

Rank	English	French
Lt. General	50.0%	-
Maj. General	44.4	25.0%
Brigadier	31.4	25.0
Colonel	24.5	-
Lt. Colonel	14.6	9.5
Major	3.9	1.2
Captain	10.4	7.9
Lieutenant	14.4	11.4
2nd Lt.	-	-
All Officers	9.9	6.4

Note: The low percentage of Majors who are graduates of RMC is at least partially due to the fact that most of the officers of this rank are World War II officers. RMC was closed during the war.

TABLE IV

Non-qualified officers: Percentages by Group and Ethnic Origin, March, 1964

Group	English	French
Superior Officers	-	-
Intermediate Officers	26.4%	36.9%
Junior Officers	54.3	43.6
All Officers	43.9	40.7

Note: This table includes all officers without a university degree, without staff training, or those who have not graduated from RMC. The grouping system is as follows: Superior Officers - Colonel to Lt. General
Intermediate Officers - Major to Lt. Colonel
Junior Officers - 2nd Lt. to Captain

(Source: Ibid.)

TABLE V

French Canadian Officer Representation by Corps, March, 1964

Corps	French Canadian Officers
RCAC	7.0%
RCA	7.7
RCE	7.1
RCSigs	10.7
RCIC	22.9
RCASC	15.4
RCAMC	28.8
RCDC	21.3
RCOC	16.8
RCEME	8.3
RCAPC	17.4
RCPC	11.5
CProC	11.3
CIntC	17.2
All Corps	15.1%

(Source: Ibid.)

TABLE VI

French Canadian Representation in the Armed Forces, 1964

NAVY			ARMY			AIR FORCE		
Rank	Fr-Cdn	%	Rank	Fr-Cdn	%	Rank	Fr-Cdn	%
V/Adm) R/Adm) Cmdr)	1	2.9	Lt Gen) Maj Gen) Brig)	6	11.1	A/M) A/V/M) A/C)	0	0
Capt	0	0	Col	13	10.7	G/C	3	1.8
Cdr	8	3.2	Lt Col	41	10.7	W/C	13	2.9
L/Cdr	24	2.7	Maj	161	12.5	S/L	51	4.0
Lt	58	6.6	Capt	288	13.1	F/L	201	4.9
Com Offr) Sub Lt) A/Sub Lt)	41	7.0	Lt	168	14.2	F/O) P/O)		
			2/Lt	93	19.3			
Totals	132	4.9		770	13.5		495	5.8
CPO 1) CPO 2)	68	4.3	WO 1) WO 2)	162	9.0	WO 1) WO 2)	67	6.1
PO 1	120	6.4	S/Sgt	227	11.6	F/Sgt	175	9.0
PO 2	160	8.0	Sgt	816	13.8	Sgt	551	11.4
LS	223	7.9	Cpl	1221	15.6	Cpl LAC)	1340	13.7
AB	445	8.2	Pte	4658	20.6	AC 1) AC 2)	3305	15.1
OS	431	14.4						
Totals	1447	8.7		7084	17.6		5438	13.7

Note: These figures are compiled from statistics supplied by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, August, 1965.

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