

Understanding the Borderwork of the *European Union's Mainstreamed Migration Control-Development Cooperation Agenda* through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa Instrument

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Abstract

One of the many border apparatuses that migrants and refugees face include the myriad ‘cooperative’ measures between European states and perceived ‘transit’ and/or ‘origin’ states- a form of externalized borderwork- that seeks to regulate the flows of migrants perceived to be heading toward Europe. Externalizing these borders has relied on a variety of policy instruments whereby the *mainstreaming of migration priorities with development activities* abroad is emerging as a central European policy priority. This thesis explores this trend empirically through a focused case study of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF-A) instrument to deconstruct (1) how we should understand the mainstreaming of the European migration/border enforcement agenda with European development cooperation as a strategy of border externalization, and to unpack, (2) how the developmental dimension of such initiatives facilitates related borderwork. This policy instrument is analyzed using an interdisciplinary approach with an interpretive qualitative methodology based on a document analysis and discourses analysis of key EUTF-A policy documents, as well as a critical visual analysis of its “Stories from Africa” Virtual Exhibition.

Findings illustrate that the EUTF-A facilitates externalized borderwork by enabling dialogues on return/readmission and other border arrangements and by funding borderwork projects and actors on the ground. The coupling of development cooperation with migration control appears to legitimize Europe’s externalized border activities as necessary and positive practices. This thesis thereby argues that the mainstreamed migration-development agenda serves to embed migration priorities into development priorities and its developmental dimension depoliticizes border externalization and the related European migration agenda. Findings contribute to a literature that has not sufficiently engaged with the different features of migration management tools, nor sufficiently engaged with the developmental nature of the border interventions themselves.

Résumé

Parmi les nombreuses frontières auxquels les migrants et les réfugiés sont confrontés, on trouve les mesures « border externalisation » qui cherchent à contrôler les mouvements de migrants aperçus comme se dirigeant vers l'Europe. L'externalisation de ces frontières est soutenue par une variété d'instruments politiques où l'intégration des priorités migratoires dans les activités de développement à l'étranger devient de plus en plus une priorité politique central de l'Europe. Ce projet explore cette tendance à travers une étude de l'initiative « EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa » (EUTF-A) afin d'analyser : (1) la manière dont nous devrions comprendre cette intégration en tant que stratégie d'externalisation de frontières, et (2) la manière dont les stratégies et pratiques du développement international de telles initiatives facilitent la manipulation des frontières. L'EUTF-A est analysé en utilisant une approche interdisciplinaire avec une méthodologie qualitative interprétative basée sur une analyse de documents et une analyse des discours à travers une variété de documents clés de l'initiative. La méthodologie inclus aussi une analyse visuelle de l'exposition virtuelle de l'EUTF-A.

Les résultats démontrent que l'EUTF-A facilite l'externalisation des frontières en permettant des négociations d'accords sur le retour et la réadmission des migrants, ainsi qu'en finançant des projets de frontières et les personnages pertinent qui travaillent sur le terrain. Le couplage de la coopération de développement internationale avec le contrôle de migrants semble renforcer ces activités à l'étranger en tant que pratiques nécessaires et positives. Ce projet soutient donc que l'agenda migration-développement sert à incorporer les priorités de la migration dans les priorités du développement internationale et que sa dimension développementale sert à rendre moins politique l'externalisation des frontières et la politique migratoire européenne correspondante. Les résultats contribuent à une littérature qui ne s'est pas suffisamment engagée dans les différentes caractéristiques des outils de gestion de la migration, ni dans les interventions du développement international qui sont liés à la manipulation des frontières.

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My interest and understanding of border-externalization and EU's borderwork was largely developed through course papers I wrote at McGill including in: INTD 657, POLI 612, POLI 642 and POLI 619 whereby I was fortunate to receive feedback and guidance from respective course instructors and classmates. Two of these papers were presented at graduate conferences- CIPSS/CEPSI-CIPS in March 2020 at the University of Ottawa and the "Public Issues and Public Reason" Virtual Graduate Conference at Carleton University in October 2020- where attendees and discussants asked critical questions that helped push the boundaries of my queries. This project was funded by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Master's Graduate Scholarship. I was also able to receive further financial support through the 2021 Jean Monnet Award in the latter time period of my project. I am immensely grateful for the financial support received from both.

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List of Acronyms

DAC: OECD Development Assistance Committee

EDF: European Development Fund

EU: European Union

EUTF-A: European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

CEAS: Common European Asylum System

GAMM: The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility

JVAP : Joint Valetta Action Plan

ILO: International Labour Organization

IOM: The International Organization for Migration

LCG: Libyan Coast Guard

M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

ODA: Official Development Assistance

SAR: Search and Rescue Operations

SME: Small and Medium-sized Enterprise

UN: United Nations

UNHCR: The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Introduction

It has been shown that Europe's borders have been increasingly securitized since the 2014/2015 influx of refugees, particularly along the Eastern and Central Mediterranean Routes which lead to Europe's external borders (Talani, 2020). One such border apparatus includes the continuously expanding use of cooperative measures- frequently called measures of "border externalization" (see e.g. Hyndman & Mountz, 2008; Pinelli, 2017), "remote control" (see e.g. FitzGerald, 2019; Zaiotti, 2016) and/or "delocalization"(Cuttitta, 2018)- between European states and the European Union (EU) with perceived 'transit' and/or 'origin'¹ states in North Africa and the Middle East that seek to regulate the flows of migrants² and refugees perceived to be heading 'irregularly' toward Europe.

Externalizing these borders has relied on a variety of policy instruments whereby the *mainstreaming of migration management with development cooperation* abroad is emerging as a central European policy priority. For example, as stipulated in the relatively recent Partnership Framework with Third Countries under the European Agenda on Migration, "Increasing coherence between migration and development policy is important to ensure that development assistance helps partner countries manage migration more effectively, and also incentivizes them to

¹ This paper employs the use of single quotation marks around countries of 'transit' and/or 'origin' to emphasize that these are not natural categories and do not necessary reflect where most migrants come from/move through. Instead, these need to be understood as political labels which are constructed through political discourse and assumptions about various actors (Frowd, 2020).

² The term *migrant* acts as an umbrella term which "reflect[s] the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons."(IOM, 2019). I will use this as an all-encompassing term in order to account for these various reasons that drive populations to cross borders and who might be affected by Europe's externalized border activities and to reject the various distinctions and judgement calls about the legitimacy/authenticity of various migratory movements that are often associated with the various subject categorizations among border enforcement policy discourse. I use the term *refugees* as a particular category within that of migrant drawing on the official definition which is delineated under the 1951 UN convention.

effectively cooperate on readmission of irregular migrants” (European Commission, 2016, p .9). Border control is also being highlighted as a legitimate development priority (Collyer, 2020).

It is puzzling how these seemingly contradictory practices associated with care (development) and those associated with control (borders and migration management) are coupled together (Frowd, 2018b). Therefore, in the context of these policy developments, my research is motivated by the following interrelated questions: *(1) How should we understand the mainstreaming of the European migration agenda that seeks to regulate ‘irregular’ migratory movements with the development cooperation agenda as strategy of “border externalization”?* And *(2) how might the developmental dimension of such initiatives facilitate related “borderwork”?* Motivated by these questions, I explore this mainstreamed agenda empirically through a focused case study of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF-A) policy instrument which was established at the Valetta Summit in November 2015 to “address the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration and to contribute to better migration management” (European Commission, 2020b).

In line with my overarching research questions, I explore: (i) how this initiative should be understood as a border externalization instrument and its relations to the political priorities and objectives of the EU, (ii) locate how migration and development are being mainstreamed into one agenda and how this is presented and justified, (iii) highlight key development discourses, representations, practices and strategies being used, and (iv) deconstruct corresponding narratives, assumptions and representations which are produced and substantiate the instrument. This is done through an interdisciplinary approach with an interpretive qualitative methodology relying on a document analysis and a discourse analysis of relevant documents, as well as a critical visual analysis of its recent “Stories for Africa” Virtual Exhibit released in March 2021.

Findings illustrate that the EUTF-A needs to be understood as facilitating externalized borderwork by enabling dialogues on return/readmission and other border externalization arrangements, and by funding borderwork projects and actors on the ground. It further reinforces/legitimizes pre-existing violent EU migration policies that reproduce ‘irregular’³ migration movements and oft violent trajectories. The coupling of development cooperation with migration control appears to largely legitimize Europe’s externalized border activities as *necessary* and *positive* practices. These are thereby presented as *favorable* to the development and stability of cooperating African states as well as to the security and wellbeing of affected migrants and refugees assuming that their aspirations should remain contained within their countries of origin or attained through regional migration. There appears to be an attempt to *depoliticize* border externalization and the corresponding European migration agenda by utilizing pre-existing development buzzwords, discourses, and technical implementation strategies. Through this softened development and humanitarian presentation of the instrument, the EU further attempts to maintain a rights based/benevolent image while simultaneously practicing deeply violent forms of migration control through their expanding border interventions.

In order to develop these arguments, I will first summarize key elements of related research, outline key concepts and elaborate on the theoretical frame guiding my analysis. Secondly, I provide an overview of my methodology, detailing my document selection and each of the chosen

³ It should be noted that there is a consistent discursive framing of ‘irregularity’ and ‘illegality’ in EU policy documents that is focused on the method’s migrants and refugees are taking to get to get to the EU (using irregular channels such as smuggling routes) rather than their reasoning for attempting the journey (see e.g. Garelli & Tazzioli, 2018; Tazzioli, 2016). The conception that there is a distinct actor defined by particular features who can be understood as an ‘irregular migrant’ and whose characterizations can be juxtaposed with that of the ‘legal migrant’ is deeply problematic as there is no sharp line which distinguishes these (Walters, 2010). In seeking to challenge ideas of unauthorized/authorized migration, I place the use of the term ‘irregular’ in single quotation marks. Doing so helps to denaturalise the grouping as one that is performatively constructed by bordering devices (Squire, 2011).

methods. Thirdly, I will outline my case selection, key information related to the founding and mandate of the EUTF-A and the main critiques of the instrument. I will then provide an overview of my findings alongside an analysis which corresponds to my research questions and sub-questions. I finish the analysis with a conclusion which summarizes how we should understand the mainstreamed agenda as a strategy of border externalization and how we should understand its developmental dimension.

How I seek to contribute to the literature

Broadly, the accompanying analysis seeks to contribute to a complex and ever-growing body of literature on multiplying borders, border externalization, EU's various efforts to regulate 'irregular' migration movements and EU policy literature more generally. More specifically I contribute to a literature that has not sufficiently "engaged with the *developmental* nature of the border interventions themselves" where the efforts rely on the language and explanations traditionally found among development and humanitarian discourses (Frowd, 2018a, p. 1657). Based on literature reviewed, and ongoing policy developments in the EU, Europe's mainstreamed migration control/development cooperation agenda as a form of border-work warrants further exploration. Lastly, by looking at the different components of EUTF-A, I further seek to contribute to a literature that has not sufficiently engaged with externalization *instruments* and the features of migration management tools (Zardo, 2020) nor sufficiently engaged with migration governance between Europe and Africa (Zanker, 2019).

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Conceptualizing the border and situating corresponding externalization efforts to regulate migration movement

In order to understand *border externalization*, we first need to expand our understanding of the *border* and corresponding efforts to regulate migration movements. It has increasingly been noted that borders need to be understood to consist of productive reconfigurations that challenge conventional understandings of nation states territoriality and are undergoing shifts that transcend internal/external boundaries (see e.g. De Genova, 2017; Gaibazzi et al., 2017; Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013; Shachar, 2020b; Vaughan-Williams, 2015). They are further emphasized to be undergoing complex transformations (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013) which combine a multitude of dimensions⁴ that are articulated through numerous visible/invisible and formal/informal means and produce particular migrant subjects to be governed. Borders need not necessarily be understood as solid and clearly defined lines but as spaces and configurations delineated and negotiated between various actors (Casas-Cortes et al., 2015; De Genova, 2017; Gaibazzi et al., 2017).

In her recent work, Shachar (2020a, 2020b) emphasizes that we have in fact entered a new paradigm of the *shifting border* that enables states to extend their sovereign reach far outward and deep into the interior of its territory while still officially declaring their commitment to human rights. She emphasizes that the *shifting border* is a key pillar in an extensive political agenda shared by national governments to categorize and regulate mobility tactically and selectively. This focus on *selectively* regulating mobility is especially important as it shines light on a key objective and brings to the forefront the highly differentiated and unequal experiences of border crossing by different populations globally. For instance, Mau et al. (2012) specify in their work on liberal states that their border controls are designed to operate” like a “filter system” with a layered, gradated

⁴ These incorporate a variety of spatial, symbolic, temporal, discursive, legal, political, social, economic, and cultural dimensions.

series of access control mechanisms” (p. 120) in order to differentiate between “desired” forms of mobility and “undesired” populations as defined by the state authorities. Migrants suspected to be travelling ‘irregularly’ to Europe are arguably “undesired” populations and thereby subject to increased regulation of their mobility and immense scrutiny upon arrival (De Genova, 2017).

The paradigm of the *shifting border* that helps in this selective regulation is further emphasized to be characterized by a deep paradox whereby:

When it comes to controlling migration, states are willfully abandoning traditional notions of fixed and bounded territoriality, stretching their jurisdictional arm inward and outward with tremendous flexibility; but when it comes to granting rights and protections, the very same states snap back to a narrow and strict interpellation of spatiality which limits their responsibility and liability, by attaching it to the (illusionary) static notion of border control. (Shachar, 2020b, p. 9)

This paradox plays out through the EU’s various efforts to *externalize* the border. FitzGerald (2019) demonstrates how wealthy liberal democracies have set up an “architecture of repulsion” through the use of elaborate techniques of *remote control* to prevent asylum seekers and refugees from accessing the spaces to make their claims. This term was initially utilized to describe the role which visas have had on restricting movement particularly since the 1980s (Zolberg, 2003) but has since been applied by other scholars (see eg. FitzGerald, 2019; Zaiotti, 2016) to describe the myriad of strategies which governments employ to “mov[e] borders out of one’s territory and then redeploy[ing them] elsewhere” (Zaiotti, 2016, p.8).

Other concepts for this broad phenomenon with different focuses has been implemented by scholars which include that of “delocalization” (Cuttitta, 2018), “deterritorialization” (see e.g., Paoletti, 2010), and “border externalization” (see e.g., Hyndman & Mountz, 2008; Mountz, 2020) which are sometimes used interchangeably. I use the term “border externalization” in this paper to emphasize the spatial extension of the European border outward into perceived ‘transit’ and ‘sending’ states and incorporate the understanding of remote control in that conceptualization to

encompass the corresponding attempt to externalize the *selection* of migrants and refugees as well (FitzGerald, 2019; Pinelli, 2018).

Justifying the focus on Europe’s migration management and overviewing the emergence of “border externalization” in the EU

While most migratory movements from the Global South are internal (Koser, 2016), I chose to focus my project on “North-bound” migration given the continued sense of urgency attached to *undesired* migration from the Global South among wealthier nations in the Global North, the persistent use of extensive externalization approaches, the conflicting and problematic narratives attached to the implementation of these policies, and the collective implications this has for a variety of migrants (including those moving internally) that is well-developed in the literature. I chose to focus on EU’s migration management since the EU has also been a frontrunner in the Global North in experimenting with various forms of external bordering (FitzGerald, 2019) and the term ‘externalization’ was first utilized by political science scholars working on the European context (Mountz, 2020).

This external dimension in the European context can be traced back to when the EU created a unified security policy in 1985 through the Schengen Acquis, and subsequently through its development of the Dublin Convention⁵ in 1990 (Mountz, 2020)⁶. Border enforcement was then more formally shifted to the EU’s external border through the establishment of the Schengen Area in 1993 since subsequent policies came to be through the assertion that the elimination of intra-

⁵ The Dublin Convention determines which member State is responsible for examining a given asylum application (European Commission, 2016c) which normally falls onto the state of first arrival.

⁶ In her recent book, Mountz (2020) provides an extensive modern genealogy of the externalization concept globally and highlights key policy developments in the EU that were meant to externalize the border. Globally, overviewed in chapter 1 she emphasizes that modern externalization policies were introduced in the 1970s through U.S. interceptions of sea arrivals in the Caribbean, that the concept was in its early stages in the 1980s, thickened in the 1990s, diffused in the 2000s particularly in the EU and Australia, and since 2010 has been characterized by “freneticism” through the magnification of various ‘crises (Mountz, 2020). A detailed overview of this genealogy including key events is available in chapter 1 of her book. For key policy developments in the EU refer to chapter 2 of her book.

EU borders between signatory states would require stronger external border controls and policy harmonization (Mountz, 2020). This shift to Europe's external borders was accompanied by these ideas about *externalization* which have been shown to have emerged in 1991, but only incorporated formally through the external realm of the EU's immigration and asylum policy by the European Council in 1999 (Boswell, 2003, p. 621). These included separate measures to cooperate with perceived 'transit' and 'origin' states and deterrence measures targeted at prospective unwanted migrants (Boswell, 2003).

Efforts by European states and the EU to externalize its migration management have been greatly criticized for shifting migration pressures southward (Adepoju et al., 2010) and for acting as a form of "preventive refoulement" that enables European states to *circumvent* their signatory responsibilities to the 1951 Geneva Convention (Marchetti, 2010). They have further been critiqued for their violation of migrant rights and for producing/reproducing conditions of biophysical violence, such as the increased dangers migrants face on the deadly Mediterranean sea route (see e.g., Hyndman & Mountz, 2008; Squire, 2017; Stierl, 2016; Tazzioli, 2016). It is in this continuously evolving discussion on "border externalization" and the corresponding political objectives to selectively regulate migration in which I situate my work as I assume that the EUTF-A is a policy instrument that seeks to facilitate the externalization of Europe's borders. I will show *how* this may occur in my discussion.

Assumptions guiding the mainstreamed agenda of migration control/development cooperation

Many scholars discuss the mainstreamed agenda by looking at the stated relationship between migration and development and the assumptions undergirding the associated link which is being made. Scholars point to how migration-development initiatives that seek to regulate 'irregular migration' are frequently justified by the trope that they seek to address the "root causes

of migration” (see e.g., Carling & Talleraas, 2016; Castles & Van Hear, 2011; Collyer, 2020; Zaiotti, 2016; Zanker, 2017; Zardo, 2020). This policy frame emerged in European policies in the 1980s, became more prominent in the 1990s and was firmly rooted in understandings of migration and development by the early 2000s (Castles & Van Hear, 2011). This frame relies on a knowledge claim that ‘irregular’ migration and forced displacement results from economic underdevelopment and instability which *can* and *should* be addressed via technical interventions (Castles & Van Hear, 2011). This consistently re-utilized trope forms a key undergirding logic of my chosen case study.

“Root causes” approaches often incorporate an explicit assumption that *development reduces migration*, an assumption which stems from the colonial period (Castles & Van Hear, 2011; Collyer, 2020). This assumption has been shown to lack empirical basis since (economic) development has been shown to lead initially to increased emigration rather than a reduction of such (Clemens & Postel, 2018; De Haas, 2007; Flahaux & De Haas, 2016) and, any impact of development aid on reducing ‘irregular’ migration is minor and insignificant (Clist & Restelli, 2021). Giving its lacking basis in empirical evidence, the trope has been argued to be a sort of pseudo-causal narrative (Zaun & Nantermoz, 2021). It is believed that migration deterrence is largely *legitimized* through this logic, but that this ‘disingenuous development’ (Collyer, 2020). This trope has been argued to have been used to justify the objectives of the EUTF-A because it is compelling, because the frame has an established precedent through other EU external policies and to give the instrument credibility (Zaun & Nantermoz, 2021).

The *technically* focused solutions which are often suggested through these approaches are argued to perpetuate a tendency in non-critical discussions of this issue to perceive development as something natural; a specific reality which ‘exists’ and can be achieved through the correct policy initiatives (Geiger & Pécoud, 2013). How we think about ‘development’ and related

assumptions about the assumed beneficiaries of ‘development’ assistance has led to certain forms of migration being prioritized in these discussions with other forms of movement being ignored (Raghuram, 2009). Challenging such tendencies, Geiger & Pécoud (2013) emphasize that the linkages between migration and development are products of “political and scientific construction”. Thus, one should also note the *implicit* assumptions undergirding the enthusiasm around the ‘migration-development’ nexus and the worldviews which are being conveyed.

Such implicit assumptions are apparent as scholars highlight how undergirding many of these “root causes” approaches is a *sedentary bias* (Bakewell, 2008) whereby migration- especially of the poor from the Global South- to Europe is believed to be something negative that needs to be stopped (Bakewell, 2008; Carling & Talleraas, 2016; Knoll & Weijer, 2016; Landau, 2019). Relatedly, processes associated with the coupling of development aid and Europe’s borderwork (e.g. through aid conditionalities) in Africa are argued to act as strategies to produce/reproduce *containment development*, a chronotope “in which the future stability and development of both Africa and Europe demand containment” (Landau, 2019, p. 169). This chronotope relies on a discourse that codes all Africans as prospective migrants who could threaten European sovereignty and security and whose goal is to “geographically locate African’s desires and imaginations” (Landau, 2019, p. 171). Simultaneously, discourses on migration and development are grounded in an assumption that *those who do emigrate* should become ‘responsible development agents’ (Kalm, 2010). As Casas-Cortes et al., (2015) highlight, “expatriates in Europe are increasingly being scripted as engines of “development” in their role as “donors” of remittances” (p. 903).

Lastly, the narratives produced in mainstream debated are believed to be one-sided, reductionist and misleading as they often overlook the structural socio-economic factors (such as neoliberal globalization) and inequalities in which migration is embedded, ignore human rights as

central elements of effective policies as well as hide the costs of precarious forms of international migration (Delgado Wise et al., 2013). Given that these ‘root causes’ are ultimately entrenched in deep disparities of power and resources in the Global political economy, addressing these inequities would in fact necessitate a deep restructuring of the global political economy (Castles & Van Hear, 2011). Instead, these mainstreamed ‘root causes’ approaches are believed to largely reproduce existing structures (Crawley & Blitz, 2019). I am informed by these critiques and therefore seek to deconstruct key narratives, performative strategies and implicit assumptions undergirding the mainstreaming of migration-development in the EUTF-A, to bring to light the particular realities which may be obscured and how these political constructions reinforce associated agendas.

The developmental dimension as instrumental to border externalization

Multiple scholars have discussed development assistance as taking on various *instrumental* roles among Europe’s border externalization activities (see e.g., Gaibazzi et al., 2017; Lavenex & Kunz, 2008; Zaiotti, 2016). In Zaiotti’s (2016) framework of the different dimensions of ‘remote control’ measures which also includes a spatial⁷, functional⁸ and relational⁹ dimension, development aid is considered a part of the instrumental dimension of remote control measures whereby *conditions* are attached to corresponding funds that seeks to incentivize cooperation on border enforcement, largely on coercive relational terms. For example, in assessing Spain’s agreement with Mauritania in 2006, Dünnwald (2016) shows how it was mainly through the implementation of aid disbursements that cooperation on migrant control was attained but that disbursements from Spain dropped starkly in 2009 when migration through the Canary Islands

⁷ The spatial dimension consists of the movement (physically or symbolically) of the border.

⁸ the functional dimension refers to the logic and objectives intrinsic to these measures.

⁹ the relational dimension incorporates the asymmetrical interactions that occur to enforce and reinforce the measures.

decreased. For perceived ‘transit’ and/or ‘origin’ states, development aid can also be used as a *bargaining chip* given the urgency by which European states want to cooperate on border enforcement (Paoletti, 2010, 2011).¹⁰

The role of facilitating *dialogues* on migration is further elaborated by Andersson (2014) who emphasizes that the management of ‘irregular’ migration needs to be understood as part of a larger migration industry (which he terms illegality industry) that is increasingly responsible for large segments of European public expenditure. Herein, development assistance funds are used to “fight migration” and development cooperation also serves to *humanize* various migration controls including the violent deportations of ‘irregular’ migrants from European soil to their countries of ‘origin’ or so-called “safe third countries” which is facilitated by agreements resulting from these dialogues. Therefore the development activities seem to play a role in *softening* the perception of EU’s migration policies which have been critiqued for being quite violent and inhumane (Squire, 2017; Stierl, 2016a) by keeping the focus on ‘development’ over ‘migration control’ despite reinforcing the latter.

This humanizing dimension is developed more extensively in the literature on the humanitarian-security nexus. For instance, Cuttitta (2018) argues how the humanitarian rhetoric of ‘saving lives’ attached to search and rescue (SAR) operations on the Mediterranean sea has been instrumentalized to make restrictive policies more acceptable to an increasingly skeptical public opinion about Europe’s migration policies. Furthermore, humanitarianism and security have been argued to become inseparable from one another through an integral ambiguity in European border security and migration policies that simultaneously (re)produce migrants as *risks* and populations

¹⁰ This is believed to have been the case for Italian-Libyan border cooperation under Gaddafi where development funds from Italy also served to legitimize Libyan authorities and strengthened an already powerful security apparatus (Paoletti, 2010, 2011).

at risk (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 2015). This points to the ways in which labels of care (attached to development) and control (border enforcement and migration management) may have become inseparable and the need to pay attention to how these facets reinforce one another. *How* this humanization of Europe's externalized border activities may take place through the discourses and strategies of *development* however warrants further exploration.

Lastly, the fight against “irregular migration” is also productive in the fields of development and humanitarianism since it provides a “problem” that needs to be addressed and fuels the search and implementation of corresponding solutions whereby NGO projects etc. are now able to secure funding when they might have been otherwise ignored (Andersson, 2014). Relatedly, development and humanitarian actors are increasingly involved in conducting ‘border work’ and it is emphasized that we should pay attention to how migration management efforts draw on development discourses (e.g. language of capacity), and its forms of organization and technical procedures (Frowd, 2018a, 2018b).¹¹ There is also a strategic focus in contemporary borderwork to finding ‘technical’ and ‘technological’ solutions to various perceived border ‘problems’ which is subject to the rationalities of ‘improvement’ commonly found in development discourses (Frowd, 2018a). This ‘developmental’ turn in migration management has been understudied in the literature.

Theoretical Framework

I situate my query and corresponding theoretical framework in the context of these discussions, draw on the literature discussed above and place them in conversation with one another. However, some specifics about the framework I use to ground my case study analysis will be elaborated here. Firstly, Fitzgerald (2019) provides a useful framework for understanding the

¹¹ Frowd (2018b) introduces the term ‘developmental borderwork’ to label this phenomenon.

more formal and visible techniques used to control migrants remotely and to categorize the sites where these efforts are translated spatially. These include implementing forms of *caging*¹² and *virtual domes*¹³. Destination countries also use their neighbours as *buffers*, countries with maritime borders use the sea as a *moat* (e.g. the Mediterranean Sea), and *physical fortifications* have also been implemented at entrances of their territories with specific rules on who is allowed to transcend these. Flagging how the EUTF-A objectives and funded projects might incorporate these various more formal measures such as EU attempts to negotiate readmission agreements, publicity campaigns in countries of ‘origin’, efforts to cooperate on border management with ‘transit’ states and efforts to tackle flows on the Mediterranean Sea route allows me to properly categorize the EUTF-A as a border externalization instrument in my analysis.

However, as evident in the literature review, there are also active social practices, performative elements, experimentation, and ‘political constructions’ (Geiger & Pécout, 2013) which shape mobility politics. Additionally, states often use an *assemblage* of various practices, instruments, institutional arrangements, actors etc. (Bialasiewicz, 2012) to enable border externalization. To account for these active processes, I use a framework of “borderwork” to analyze my case (see e.g. Bialasiewicz, 2012; Frowd, 2018b, 2018a; Rumford, 2008). Existing as an assemblage of elements, borderwork is understood here as an order-making activity that is both constructed and performative and denotes the discourse and practical labor that is used to envision, produce, sustain and erase borders (Frowd, 2018a). The emphasis on *borderwork* is useful for our purposes as it moves us away from a static notion of border control and brings to the forefront the variegated, active, and productive processes such as the discourses and strategies of development

¹² Includes forms of coercive measures including publicity campaigns to deter migrants, “safe” third country agreements and sometimes military intervention.

¹³ Which restricts access via airspace through the global visa regime.

that help to *enable* and *maintain* the construction/reinforcement of Europe's border externalization efforts.

I subject the developmental dimension of the EUTF-A to the borderwork framework since I understand these to be critical to the bordering taking place. In order to locate emerging developmental discourses, strategies and practices in the documents I use a sub-framework that focuses on delineating associated knowledge claims, representations and the language used to describe projects. Mainstream development practice is rooted in rationalities of improvement that incorporates ways of understanding social life as a *technical* problem which is subject to rational (technical) solutions and managed by correspondingly derived experts (Escobar, 2012). Thus, a focus on locating technical language and understandings is important. I furthermore pay attention to emergent development 'buzzwords' that help to sustain the knowledge claims and worldviews perpetuated by mainstream development discourses and are used to justify various interventions within and across borders in the name of progress and care (Cornwall, 2007; Rist, 1997). These "gain their purchase and power through their vague and euphemistic qualities, their capacity to embrace a multiple of possible meanings and their normative resonance" (Cornwall, 2007, p. 472). These include, among others, key terms of "development", "capacity-building", "participation", "empowerment", "stability", "resilience", "poverty", "equality" (Cornwall, 2007; Eade, 2007; Escobar, 2009; Rist, 2007; Sachs, 2009).

Methodology

I utilized a qualitative interpretive methodology based primarily on a *document analysis* and *discourses analysis* of relevant documents to the EUTF-A as well as a *critical visual discourse analysis* of the EUTF-A's virtual exhibition to explore my research questions and corresponding sub-questions. An interpretive qualitative approach is characterized by an emergent and flexible design, a constitutive understanding of causality, bottom up in situ concept development, and a focus on contextual meaning (Creswell, 2003; Scheyvens, 2014). I utilized an abductive reasoning approach which seeks to identify the conditions by which a puzzle is less perplexing through a circular-spiral like pattern and whereby I learned more about my research inquiry whilst conducting my analysis (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). This process is interested in sense-making and assumes that there is no fixed starting point for the inquiry.

Document Selection/Data Consulted

A detailed list of the documents analyzed can be found in **Appendix A** and include: (i) documents from the Valetta Summit which were important to the establishment of the EUTF-A and for laying out its mandate, (ii) contextual EU policy documents that act as the guiding frameworks for the EUTF-A and relate to the EU's migration-related political objectives, and (iii) texts concerning the EUTF-A's activities and annual M&E Reports¹⁴. Most of the documents reviewed were selected ahead of the data coding during the research design phase according to their ability to provide important details on the guiding frameworks, mandates and context of the

¹⁴ It should be noted that while the quarterly reports were available on the website and more detailed regional reports were available as well, it was beyond the scope of my research to review these as the EUTF-A's Annual Reports provided a sufficient overview of all the projects financed and implemented including regional specificities and country level examples. Future research might want to narrow in on one of the regional windows more closely to tease out further the specific interventions planned/implemented for each regional window and how key countries and priorities are delineated.

initiative. Various platforms were consulted in order to account for different audiences that the sources were geared toward and for purposes of comprehensiveness¹⁵.

The timeframe for the analysis was based on the initial time frame of the project which began in 2015 and was originally set to continue until December 2020¹⁶ (*EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa*, n.d.). However, given my emergent research design, it should be noted that there are some exceptions to these criteria. Firstly, *key policy frameworks* which were not in my initial list were identified in the course of coding project reports and whose timeline does not correspond with that described above¹⁷. Secondly, while I was still coding my selected documents, the 2020 Annual report was published and therefore I chose to include it in order to have a complete overview of the projects funded, and perceived progress/setbacks of the initiative.

Lastly, while reviewing M&E reports it came to my attention that in an effort to maintain *transparency*, the EU had launched an EUTF-A “Stories from Africa” Virtual Exhibition¹⁸ on March 25, 2021 alongside the 2020 Annual Report which “displays the achievements of the EUTF for Africa in the fields of migration, governance, and conflict prevention, resilience, and the creation of employment and economic opportunities” (“Stories from Africa: EU Trust Fund for Africa Celebrates Five Years of Activities,” 2021). With the goal of bringing in more public-facing material to account for how the EUTF-A and distribution of its funds are being advertised to the European public, the entirety of the exhibit was coded. In total, my data analysis incorporated 48

¹⁵ For instance, prior to reviewing documents from the founding Valetta Summit and EUTF-A project specifically, I reviewed and coded their websites. As the website is the first point of contact for most trying to inquire further about the details of the projects, I assume that this material is more public facing and more emphasis is placed on perception.

¹⁶ An extension for the project was granted on September 29, 2020 until December 31, 2021.

¹⁷ These include the Strategic Orientation Document, the GAMM, The Khartoum Process, and the Rabat Process. Since the latter two are also projects and instruments of their own that were drawn on to guide the activities of the EUTF-A it went beyond the scope of the project to analyze these extensively and thus I relied on a review of their website for key contextual material.

¹⁸ Available at: <https://storiesfromafrica.eu/>

photos and descriptions, 9 contextual and foundational policy reports and frameworks, 5 Monitoring and Evaluation Reports, 5 websites, 5 Press Releases, and 2 brochures/Fact Sheets spanning the time period of 2015 until early 2021.

Document Analysis

I utilized a method of *document analysis* as a way to locate the necessary background and contextual information and in order to trace, identify, and categorize the stated objectives for the initiative and the justifications provided. It also enabled me to track the kinds of migration management and/or development projects which were being financed, track changes over time and discern on what scale the ‘successes’ of funded projects were being measured. As Bowen (2009) emphasizes, document analysis “involves skimming (superficial examination), reading (thorough examination), and interpretation” and “this iterative process combines elements of content analysis and thematic analysis” (p. 31). Whilst the former relied on my capacity to distinguish between information which was pertinent and that which was not (Bowen, 2009), through careful reading and re-reading of this pertinent information, thematic analysis enabled me to identify patterns whereby emerging themes became the categories for my analysis (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006).

Discourse Analysis

It was also crucial to look beyond what was *stated*. As the literature review illustrated, it is important to pay attention to the implicit assumptions undergirding these initiatives and the worldviews which are being conveyed (Geiger & Pécoud, 2013). As such, I further analysed the underlying meaning and representations reproduced by stipulated statements and their connections through a critical discourse analysis of respective texts. Doing so assumes that power relations can be discursive in their nature (Le & Short, 2009). Drawing on Foucault, Hall (2013) emphasizes, that “discourse entails the production of knowledge through language” and, “it defines and

produces the objects of our knowledge [and] governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about” (p. 29)

One of the key components of discourse is its capacity to *naturalize* the production of certain knowledge in the form of assumptions (Doty, 1996). Since discourses never exist in isolation, a focus on *intertextuality* was important (Hall, 2013; Rose, 2001). Conducting this discourse analysis thus required I read with great detail, immerse myself within the sources, identified key themes, examine the assumptions being made and flag the complexities and contradictions within the texts (Rose, 2001). Lastly, it also necessitated that I read for what was *not* being seen or stated. As Rose (2001) emphasizes, “absence can be as productive as explicit naming; invisibility can have just as powerful effects as visibility” (p. 158).

Coding and Interpretation of Data

I coded these documents using a grounded theory coding technique and with the help of a qualitative analysis software package: MAXQDA. I chose this software package as it has been argued to be more effective for interactive discourse analysis and interpretive approaches than NVIVO (Saillard, 2011). Key characteristics of grounded theory practices which were implemented include: concurrent data collection and analysis, memo writing, and most importantly developing analytical codes and categories from the data rather than using predetermined hypotheses and codes (Charmaz, 2006). Grounded theory coding was done in two phases whereby an initial phase consisted of naming each segment of data and the subsequent phase included “a focused, selective phase, that use[d] the most significant or frequent initial codes to sort, synthesize, integrate and organize large amounts of data” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 46).

In order to code the initial phase, I started by using a line by line coding technique and then moved to more focused coding technique as I was dealing with larger amounts of data. Memo writing was used throughout to define categories, their properties, their relations to other

categories, to highlight questions and to flag key representations which were emerging from the analysis (Charmaz, 2006). Once I had coded the entirety of my documents, I sought to find patterns and identify key overarching themes and corresponding sub-themes that became the categories for my analysis (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). I used a method of deconstruction which is conducive to discourse analysis to interpret these findings. Deconstruction brings into focus the instability of meaning and “turns attention to how language creates some meanings and suppresses other meanings”(Manning, 1992, p. 203-204). It helps to denaturalize taken for granted categories and knowledge claims perpetuated in the texts by looking at the silences and gaps, dismantling dichotomies being made and noting disruptions in the text (Feldman, 1995).

Critical Visual Discourse Analysis of Virtual Exhibition

Lastly, in order to properly analyze the Virtual Exhibit, I also utilized the above described discourse analysis and techniques with some key specifications that are important for analysis of visual materials. I utilized the critical visual methods discourse analysis technique described in Rose’s (2001) *Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials* wherein she emphasizes that there is a need to take images seriously as they are not entirely reducible to their context given that visual representations produce their own effects. Looking at images critically entails thinking about the visual medium in terms of the “cultural significance, social practices and power relations in which it is embedded, [which entails] thinking about the power relations that produce, are articulated through, and can be challenged by, ways of seeing and imagining” (p. 3).

The meaning of images argued to have been made at three sites: that of production, the image as it is it, as well as its audience. Rose (2001) urges scholars to look in detail at how images portray particular social categories, how they portray or render invisible social difference as well as think about its intended audience, including yourself is positioned in relation to the

image. In order to account for these factors, I reviewed the images and inserted my analyses into a table with three different columns. The first column entailed the details of each exhibit, including: the number I gave the image (based on the order in which I viewed it and it appeared as part of each sub-exhibit), by whom it was taken (e.g. IOM Libya), and the strategic objective it was being presented . The second column entailed the details of the photo itself - whereby I attempted to review this in isolation from the accompanying text. I proceeded to use the third column to write down observations after I had reviewed the text alongside the image. This last column was also utilized for a collective interpretation of each exhibit that was contextualized and which I also used to flag the elements of production, image, and audience. The accompanying texts were also pasted into MAXQDA where they were treated to the text methods described above.

Reflexivity, Reliability of Findings, Strengths/Limitations of Research

I came into the research with an assumption that development cooperation/assistance fulfills an *instrumental* purpose *for* migration control and externalized border enforcement. I seek to make this assumption explicit in an attempt to be reflexive about the potential biases which may have guided me in my research (Scheyvens, 2014). Rather than make the claim to be objective or neutral, I aimed to reduce these by approaching my sources with an open mind, using a methodology which was grounded in the data itself, allowing the data to take me to unexpected places, adjusting my research objectives accordingly and being explicit here about guiding assumptions.

Efforts were also made throughout the data collection, coding, analysis and writing to be trustworthy, systematic, reflexive and transparent (Creswell, 2003; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). My findings were verified by paying attention to the consistency of evidence across various sources, including documents geared towards different audiences, policy literature, and discussions in academic literature. In combination with this, I ensured that my corresponding

arguments have been developed logically (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). Where conflicting interpretations existed, I engage these critically by *contextualizing* the document, paying attention to its intended purposes, its intended audience and how these relate to the distribution and delivery of the contents.

The strengths of my data collection and analysis methods were that I consulted a variety of documents presented on different platforms which accounted for background information, incorporated documents which were presented more politically vs others more neutrally, as well as included more public facing documents to capture the *Image* which was being sold to the European public. The particular policy initiative also enabled me to keep my analysis empirically grounded, so the project is rich in examples and specificity. However, it should be noted that there are some limitations to document-focused research as documents are produced for a particular purpose that are independent from the research agenda and may not contain all details required for the research (Bowen, 2009). Furthermore, since I largely reviewed policy documents, the policy vs implementation gap must be flagged whereby what is being noted in policies does not fully reflect what is happening on the ground (Carling & Talleraas, 2016). This further applies to the M&E reports which likely do not accurately reflect the activities nor progress made on the ground since development/aid projects are beholden to donors who often require particular measurable results in order to keep funding these projects¹⁹.

¹⁹ I will always remember when I was interning at an NGO in Dakar, Senegal on a research project and the Monitoring and Evaluation Officer was producing the quarterly report and she was required to manipulate the graphs by changing the size of the bars and zooming in/out in order to “make it look as much as possible like things were improving”. Furthermore, when marketing was taking pictures for the project website, they used a group picture that contained an equal representation of female and male participants which was in line with the projects “gender empowerment” goals, but was a gross misrepresentation as most entrepreneurship/employment classes contained only 1 or 2 female participants in most cases, largely due to structural barriers which prevented their participation.

Future research might therefore consider the use of interviews to corroborate findings, or a narrowed in case study on one of the project countries involving fieldwork that seeks to locate the “on the ground” implementation/effects of funded projects. While I was careful to not assume that these documents portrayed an accurate representation of activities facilitated by the EUTF-A, using a variety of techniques of ‘reading’ and ‘seeing’ also enabled me to focus on how and why certain projects were being depicted as they are and the potential benefits of doing so.

Overview of EUTF-A Case Study

EUTF-A Case selection

It should be noted that migration-development strategies were used to varying degrees to facilitate EU externalization measures from the start with the “root causes” frame reappearing consistently during perceived periods of ‘crisis’ (Castles & Van Hear, 2011). However, it has been emphasized to have been relatively dormant idea in policy discourse until it “re-emerged in an unprecedented way with the establishment of the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa in 2015” (Carling & Talleraas, 2016, p. 6). The EUTF-A is also one of the most recent financial instruments which has been instilled by the EU in the migration policy domain and the first which directly targets migration in third countries (Zardo, 2020). It appears to be one of the first policy initiatives wherein development aid is *overtly* linked to larger EU policy interests (Castillejo, 2016). For these reasons, it is an interesting case to interrogate more closely. It also enables us to look more closely at *policy instruments* which are used for the purposes of externalization and warrant further attention (Zardo, 2020). This analysis takes a more macro scale approach, and it is beyond the scope of the project to explore details of relevant country case contexts, though examples are provided where relevant.

Overview of the foundation and mandate of the EUTF-A

The EUTF-A was formally launched at the Valetta Summit on November 12, 2015 which was the first high level summit devoted exclusively to discussions around migration (Zanker, 2017). This summit could be understood as a form of ‘networked borderwork’ that takes place through EU participation in “various dialogues, forums, communities of practice” incorporating African countries (Frowd, 2018b, p. 35). The call for this international summit is formally emphasized to have been made in April 2015 responding to the April 19th shipwreck on the Mediterranean Sea (“Opening Statement by President Donald Tusk at the Valletta Summit on

Migration,” 2015). This shipwreck involved the deaths of approximately 800 migrants who had departed from Libya, with only 28 survivors arriving at the Italian port of Catania (Bonomolo & Kirchgaessner, 2015).

Framed in response to these devastating events and the ongoing perceived migration “crisis” in Europe, as well as building on existing partnership mechanisms of the Khartoum Process²⁰, the Rabat Process²¹ and the EU-Africa Dialogue on Migration and Mobility, the Valetta summit sought to convene European and African Heads of state and Government in order to deliberate migration-related challenges and improve collaboration on migration management. Discussions and corresponding action items centered around finding “mutually beneficial solutions” to 5 priority areas which included:

- addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displacement,
- cooperation on legal migration and mobility,
- reinforcing protection of refugees and displaced populations
- tackling smuggling and trafficking of migrants and human beings, and
- improving cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration of ‘irregular’ migrants (Council of the European Union, 2015b).

The EUTF-A was designed as an *implementation tool* for these Valetta Action Plan items with an initial mandate of 5 years which was later extended for another year until December 31, 2021 (*EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa*, n.d.).

This tool was meant to complement existing EU development instruments as well as migration dialogues, and was created to fill corresponding gaps and to attract further contributions from donors to intervene in Africa (European Commission, 2015a, 2016b). The EUTF-A also plays a vital role in implementing the Partnership Framework (European Commission, 2017, 2018,

²⁰ Set up at a Ministerial conference in Rome in 2014 and is focused on tackling human trafficking and smuggling on the Eastern African migration route (European Commission, 2016b).

²¹ Set up in July 2006 at the first Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development to facilitate dialogue and cooperation on migration (European Commission, 2016b).

2019, 2020a, 2021b). It serves to implement EU led migration management and development assistance activities in 26 countries which to varying degrees, are perceived to act as ‘transit’ and/or ‘origin countries’ as well as ‘destination countries’ for varying groups of migrants, and are split according to three regional windows including Sahel and Lake Chad²², North Africa²³ and the Horn of Africa²⁴ windows (European Commission, 2021b).

The projects funded within each of these regional windows has to contribute to the overarching goals of the EUTF-A which are set out in its Constitutive Agreement²⁵. According to Article 2.1 of the agreement,

The overall objective and purpose of this Trust Fund shall be to address the crises in the regions of the Sahel and the Lake Chad, The Horn of Africa, and the North of Africa. It will support all aspects of stability and contribute to better migration management as well as addressing the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement and irregular migration, in particular by promoting resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development and addressing human rights’ abuses. (European Commission, 2015, p. 8)

These EUTF objectives are implemented according to four overarching strategic axes which were delineated by the EUTF-A Strategic Orientation Board²⁶ and include (in exact wording):

- “Objective 1: Greater economic and employment opportunities” (p.12)
- “Objective 2: Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable, as well as refugees and displaced people” (p.12)
- “Objective 3: Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination” (p.12-13), and
- “Objective 4: Improved governance and conflict prevention and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration” (European Commission, 2016a).

²² Includes the following countries in alphabetical order: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal.

²³ Includes the following countries in alphabetical order: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Egypt

²⁴ Includes the following countries in alphabetical order: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

²⁵ The Constitutive Agreement was signed on November 12, 2015 by the European Commission, 25 EU member states as well as Norway and Switzerland. It formally established the EUTF-A.

²⁶As one of the two governing bodies of the EUTF-A, The Strategic Orientation Board delineated the global strategy for the EUTF-A and met approximately once per year. It is comprised of member state representatives, other donors and chaired by the European Commission. (European Commission, 2015a).

Corresponding programs implemented need to be approved by the Operational Committees²⁷ of each regional window. The extent to which each of the strategic objectives are implemented in each of the regional windows above is variable and related to political priorities and contextual factors.

The initial funding allocation for the EUTF-A included a commitment of EUR 1.8 billion (European Commission, 2015a). However, at the time of so writing, approximately EUR 5.0 billion had been allocated in resources to this initiative with 88% of its funding coming from the EU and remainder stemming from individual member state contributions as well as other donors such as Switzerland and Norway (European Commission, 2021a). It is important to note that the largest portion of the EU funding stems from the European Development Fund (EDF), with the remainder coming from other financial instruments²⁸ (European Commission, 2021b). Beyond what has already been noted in the literature review, The EUTF-A has raised several concerns among scholars, activists and NGO's alike surrounding the political priorities/agenda it supports, its aid distribution and overall impacts. These will be mentioned here in order to better situate my analysis.

The EUTF-A as reflecting EU Priorities

Scholars and other actors note that the EUTF-A is largely *Brussels-made* and that it primarily reflects the political priorities of the EU and its member states (Castillejo, 2016;

²⁷ As one of the two governing bodies of the EUTF-A, the Operational Committee was responsible for deciding on projects to be funded/implemented on the ground with separate sessions for each of the regional windows. It is comprised of Member states and the EU commission and in order to vote member states have to have contributed at least 3 Million Euros to the Fund (European Commission, 2015a).

²⁸ These also include including the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), as well as funding from the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) and the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) (European Commission, 2015a).

CONCORD, 2018; Oxfam International, 2020; Zanker, 2017). On this note, Zanker (2017, p.2) emphasizes that the its development was “outright exclusionary” as all EU member states, and several EU agencies were invited to the discussions of the Valetta Summit but only 35 African states were invited. Furthermore, while African country representatives can participate as observers in project decisions, African partners are emphasized to lack any formal decision-making power in the EUTF-A (Castillejo, 2016). The EUTF-A has also been shown to implicate developmental/ humanitarian actors in implementing the projects. However, the great majority of these comprise European or International agencies and organizations with local actors rarely being consulted (CONCORD, 2018).

It is also believed that the EUTF-A should primarily be understood as reflecting the EU *migration* agenda (Carling & Talleraas, 2016; Castillejo, 2016; Landau, 2019; Zanker, 2017). Landau's (2019) observes that despite the ‘African’ label of this initiative the associated funds are solely allocated to those countries which feed the Central Mediterranean route. Despite the fact that southern Africa is host to millions of refugees and asylum seekers, associated countries are not included in the agreement. This is important to flag since associated migrants are much less likely to reach Europe (Landau, 2019). Zanker (2017) emphasizes that the instrument is evidently focused on the EU priority of cooperation on returns, readmission and migration management and Castillejo (2016) points to how multiple member states see the fund as way to leverage this cooperation.

Lastly, Zardo (2020) shows how the EUTF-A is a powerful *spatial practice* which divides EU-African geopolitical relations corresponding to member state donor interests. European states are able to use to fund to steer funding toward particular countries/regions of priority for them with Spain reportedly having lobbied for actions in Morocco (Oxfam International, 2020), France

pushing for the Sahel region, and Italy playing a leading role in Libya given its historical legacies (Loschi & Russo, 2020)²⁹. These priorities have led to collective concerns over coerciveness, over aid conditionalities and corresponding tying of development cooperation to migration goals which is viewed to have adverse long-term development effects.

EUTF-A as Diverting ODA to Migration Priorities

The tying of development cooperation to these migration goals is also a key focus of critique among discussions surrounding the *aid financing priorities* and *distribution* by the instrument. While the instrument includes some money from non-aid budgets, it is almost completely financed by ODA with over 80% of the budget stemming from the EDF and other development as well as humanitarian instruments (Akkerman, 2018). The largest chunk of this funding is believed to be distributed to migration and border priorities rather than priorities of economic development (Zardo, 2020; Zaun & Nantermoz, 2021). Whilst aid funding under DAC regulations should be targeted at countries where needs are highest, the EUTF-A priorities are viewed to have been highly influenced EU agenda's on migration (Carling & Talleraas, 2016).

When interviewing various officials, Castillejo (2016) shows how they articulated that EUTF-A spending is stretching the definition of ODA. OXFAM also conducted extensive studies (Kervyn & Shilhav, 2017; Oxfam International, 2020) of the different projects being funded between 2015-2019 whereby the focus of project funding on stopping irregular migration and cooperation on return/readmission has been shown to have increased overtime. While their 2017

²⁹ These relations are significant given the extensive relations, historical legacies and colonial ties which EU countries share with particular African countries. For instance, Spain has 'cooperated' extensively with Morocco in attempts to curtail movements through the Canary Islands (i.e. 2005 'root causes' approaches), and Italy has colonial ties with Libya with whom they have repeatedly signed formal and informal agreements on migration control including the infamous 2008 Italy-Libya 'friendship treaty' and more recently the controversial 2017 Memorandum of Understanding. The latter was successfully challenged by a group of human rights defenders in the Libyan supreme court, but measures such as the maintenance of LCG vessels, technical support and training continue to be implemented (United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 2018).

report found that 2/3 of the fund between 2015-2017 was actually allocated to development projects (though most approved involved the ‘root causes’ justification which OXFAM problematizes) (Kervyn & Shilhav, 2017), they emphasize that this share of development cooperation funding had reduced substantially to 48% by the end of 2019 (Oxfam International, 2020). Additionally, while official statements of the EUTF-A stipulate signaled the intent of the EU to facilitate cooperation on legal migration schemes, the 2017 OXFAM report found that only 3% of the migration management concerned efforts to facilitate migration (Kervyn & Shilhav, 2017).

This funding distribution has raised concerned that ODA is not fully complying with DAC rules, is circumventing formal procedures of traditional EU development aid schemes, and is being *diverted* toward EU security interests (Carling & Talleraas, 2016; Castillejo, 2016; CONCORD, 2018; Kervyn & Shilhav, 2017; Oxfam International, 2020). Even if the funds are perceived to have been minimal in comparison to overall EU development spending, the EUTF-A’s securitized tackling of migration is viewed to be “glimpse of things to come” (Castillejo, 2016, p. 27) with critiques that the EUTF-A is likely to lead to future aid diversion and will act as a precedent for future migration policy instruments (Castillejo, 2016; CONCORD, 2018).

Findings/Analysis

Understanding the EUTF-A as a border externalization instrument and its relation to the political priorities and objectives of the EU

In order to unpack my first research question, I start by overviewing Europe's political priorities and associated narratives. A summary of the key themes, narratives and assumptions which emerged from my study and a characterization of these priorities can be seen in **Figure 1**. A more substantial analysis of these themes follows. I also elaborate more extensively on how EU migration and development agendas are being linked and mainstreamed into one agenda. Subsequently, situated in this context, I use my theoretical framework to show how the EUTF-A needs to be understood as a border externalization instrument. Throughout my analysis, I deconstruct key narratives and assumptions as well as I flag key migration and/or development dimensions of this instrument where necessary.

Political Priorities and Key Related Themes	Key Narratives and Assumptions
Bringing order to migration flows <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUTF-A as a response mechanism • Europe needs to engage beyond its external borders • EU cannot depend on migration toolkit alone • EU seeks to embed migration priorities into development cooperation agenda 	“Crisis” narrative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sense of urgency/emergency • Unprecedented flows • Routinized • An enduring crisis (migration challenges as the new ‘normal’) • EU migrant crisis represented as a byproduct of crises in Africa
	Dual Humanitarian/security narrative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘Crises of a dual humanitarian/security nature • Humanitarianism/security as intrinsically linked • Migrants represented as ‘risks’ and ‘at risk’ • Europe’s perceived balancing act <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Restrictive closure and selective openness

	<p>“Root Causes”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undergirds the migration control/development cooperation agenda • Developmental framing of problem • Relies on a push/pull logic <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Lack of development and insecurity = push factor ○ Ineffective border management = pull factor
EU seeking to maintain its credibility and legitimacy	<p>Europe’s self-representation as a human rights leader</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Established humanitarian and development donor • Offers international protection and SAR <p>African partners lacking human rights standards/commitments</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU helping to meet these commitments • EU supporting partner countries establish rights-based border management

Figure 1. EU Political Priorities that guide the EUTF-A and corresponding themes and narratives.

Seeking to bring order to migration flows

In reviewing the documents, it was clear that controlling and bringing order to unwanted migration is a key stated political priority of the EU. This is evident in the guiding frameworks for the EUTF-A migration management activities including the GAMM wherein the European Commission (2011) stipulates that, “migration is now firmly at the top of the European Union’s political agenda” (p. 2). This priority was further emphasized across documents to be of an urgent nature with a persistent use of the ‘crisis’ narrative to describe the challenges of migration and the perceived necessity of the EUTF-A. As Lindley (2014) emphasizes, such migration “crises” that are increasingly being treated as permanent ones create a sense of panic. Associated narratives are typically produced by political actors to justify and shift the main policy agenda in a direction which they deem desirable (Lindley, 2014).

Correspondingly, migrants and refugees have consistently been framed as constituting a disaster for Europe through dehumanized representations of ‘floods’ and ‘swarms’ (Bhagat, 2020). Representing migrants and refugees as *risks* that need to be controlled has been used to justify various (largely restrictive) political agendas and reconfigured an extensive European border apparatus which seeks to regulate migratory movements. One can for instance observe these dynamics through the *emergency* labelling of the instrument. Multiple references were also made across all the documents to the “unprecedented” scale of migrants and refugees arriving in Europe in 2015/2016, stating that the capacities of the EU to process and receive these migrants and refugees were already being stretched thin, and that the EU should respond immediately.

Whilst the necessity of the EUTF-A continues to be narrated as a response mechanism to the 2015 influx, references were also made to the *enduring nature* of these migration challenges, positing that they are becoming the “new normal” (European Commission, 2016a). As stipulated in the European Agenda on Migration, “it would be an illusion to believe that this is a short-term need which will not return” (European Commission, 2015b, p. 10-11). This suggests that the various bordering mechanisms emerging to address perceived challenges of migration across the EU will continue to proliferate.

At the same time, the perilous journeys of migrants and refugees and their precarious standing in host societies have not gone unnoticed. In addition to the references made above, the crisis is also understood as a *humanitarian* one with frequent mentions across documents of the dangers of the Mediterranean Sea routes as well as the vulnerabilities of migrants that are perceived to be exploited by profit-hungry criminal smuggling networks. While the narrative of “sav[ing] lives and do[ing] everything necessary to rescue and protect the migrants whose lives are at risk” (Council of the European Union, 2015, p. 1) was consistently cited as the first priority for Europe

and its partners, this needs to be understood as inextricable from the EU's security objectives. This is due to the fact that the EU's priorities have a *dual focus* which is routinized across documents as the objectives of "securing external borders" and "saving lives" (European Commission, 2015b, p. 10).

This dual narrative also needs to be understood in correspondence with Europe's perceived *balancing act*. As emphasized in the European Agenda on Migration,

Upholding our international commitments and values while securing our borders and at the same time creating the right conditions for Europe's economic prosperity and societal cohesion is a difficult balancing act that requires coordinated action at the European level. (European Commission, 2015b, p. 2)

Thus, embedded in the routinized crises narratives, we consistently see the dynamics observed by scholars whereby humanitarianism and security have become inseparable from one another, are mutually reinforcing and whereby the 'irregular' migrant is caught in between these discourses and simultaneously (re)produced as a *risk* and a population *at risk* (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 2015). This brings to light how the politics of care and control that characterize the mainstreamed migration-development agenda, are closely linked. Furthermore, we can observe the dialectical relationship which characterizes the *shifting border*, that of restrictive closure and selective openness (Shachar, 2020, p. 9).

Linking migration-development through root causes and a delocalized understanding of the 'crisis'

It should also be noted that the understanding of this 'crisis' is represented as a by-product of the 'crisis' in Africa and the Middle East ("New Keywords Collective "Europe/Crisis: New Keywords of 'the Crisis' in and of 'Europe,'" 2016). Thus, as emphasized in the New Keywords Collective (2016), it is "insinuated[ed] that the "crisis" itself has been, in effect, inflicted upon "Europe"" and therefore, " the highest ranking figures in the EU have concurred that it is the proper

role of the states in its wider “neighborhoods” to solve the “crisis” (p. 8). This understanding forms a crucial component of *the root-cause approach* that under-grounds the migration control and development cooperation agenda.

The representation of these crises relies on a developmental framing of the ‘irregular’ migration and forced displacement problem. This dynamic is clear in our case given the main objective I cited in my case overview and the way in which the EU justifies its “root causes” approach. Through this approach Europe is argued to:

Provide support to the three regions who face the growing challenges of demographic pressure, environmental stress, extreme poverty, internal tensions, institutional weaknesses, weak social and economic infrastructures, and insufficient resilience to food crises, which have in some places led to open conflict, displacement, criminality, radicalization and violent extremism, as well as irregular migration, trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of migrants. (European Commission, 2017, p. 4)

These understandings rely on a mainstreamed push and pull logic whereby these various development problems are perceived as push factors for migration. The ‘crisis’ is also framed as result of poor governance, and lacking capacity of cooperating African states to manage their own borders, provide the necessary protections/humanitarian support to displaced persons, as well as disentangle the criminal smuggling and trafficking networks that are viewed to benefit from the disorder. Improved border management is understood as crucial for stability and security in insecure contexts (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b) and ineffective border management is viewed as a pull factor for ‘irregular’ migration (European Commission, 2016a). Through these linkages, improved migration and border management are perceived as legitimate development priorities (Collyer, 2020).

European self-representations as a human rights leader

There are important *European self-representations* and assumptions about its African partners that accompany these understandings. Consistently, documents identified the EU and its

member states as the world's largest development and humanitarian donor with an established tradition of supporting refugees and internally displaced persons, and highlighted its efforts to rescue migrants at sea, acknowledging its human rights commitments. For example, in his call for partnership/cooperation of African states to address *common challenges* related to migration, the (now) former president of the European Council Donald Tusk gave an Opening Statement at the Valletta Summit on Migration (2015) whereby he specifies that: "Europe is taking its responsibility- saving lives, welcoming refugees and those entitled to international protection, offering more organized routes for legal migration, and dismantling criminal organizations."

Substantiating this representation there also seemed to be an underlying assumption that some of its African partners were lacking in that respect. While this was not necessarily stipulated officially in the documents reviewed, it can be inferred given that some of the projects of the EUTF-A include supporting the development of "rights-based migration management" among its African partners (see e.g. European Commission, 2015a, 2016b) and efforts to support governments in adhering and complying with the 1951 Refugee convention and its 1967 Protocol.

Given that some of the states covered by the initiative are quite authoritarian and face enduring conflict there is certainly some truth to the latter assumption (Akkerman, 2018). However, for the purpose of this paper, I do not seek to verify the validity of this assumption, but rather point to the crucial self-representation of the EU that relies on developmental and humanitarian narratives. It points to an important priority whereby the European Commission may be trying to restore its legitimacy and garner support among European publics (Zaun & Nantermoz, 2021) as a human rights leader, in light of critiques of Europe's cooperation with states like Sudan and Libya (Akkerman, 2018).

Problematizing these assumptions and representations

In paying attention to silences in the texts, these assumptions and representations must be seen in a context where references to the structural conditions that shape these different perceived crises, and Europe's/EU's role in reproducing these was noticeably absent. We should be cautious that the routinized crisis “magnifies the form of transportation that refugees and migrants take while ignoring why it should be the case that people get into a boat in the first place” (Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2016, p. 319). Border controls have been argued to empower the systems which push migrants toward Europe and have solidified processes of labor segmentation. The ‘migration crisis’ trope has been argued to move our focus away from practices of European imperialism (Pradella & Cillo, 2020; Pradella & Taghdisi Rad, 2017). Relatedly, whilst concerns over the deaths along the central Mediterranean Sea route are legitimate (Deiana et al., 2020; Garelli et al., 2018), it must also be considered that it is one of the only routes available for those escaping across shores, given the lack of legal channels to get to the EU (De Genova, 2017; Garelli et al., 2018).

Representing the ‘crisis’ as a by-product of the problems in the Middle East and Africa also shifts attention away from problems *within* the EU, affecting their capacity and willingness to receive migrants. For instance, the 2014/2015 influx brought to the forefront the flaws of the CEAS (Banulescu-Bogdan & Fratzke, 2015). Additionally, the ‘refugee crisis’ has also been argued to have been more about the lack of solidarity between European states to distribute the so-called “burden” of hosting refugees rather than the scale of migrants coming in (Lavenex, 2018). Lastly, the ‘migration crisis’ trope has been argued to shift attention away from the lack of affordable housing and ongoing austerity measures in major European cities that preceded the so-called 2015 influx and which pose serious challenges for refugee reception and refugee survival upon relocation (Bhagat & Soederberg, 2019; Soederberg, 2019).

The mainstreamed EU migration/border control and development cooperation agenda

There was a clear emphasis on strengthening the EU's external migratory policies in order to facilitate the political priorities detailed above whereby founding documents stipulated the need for the EU to engage beyond its borders, tackle migration upstream by intervening in regions of origin and transit and reinforce its cooperation with third countries. In order to do so the EU could not depend solely on its migration toolkit (European Commission, 2011, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b). Embedding migration into development cooperation efforts is a key component of these interventions. There were frequent mentions across key complementary instruments that the EU is interested in a long-term reorientation and re-modelling of its development cooperation as well as mainstreaming migration, mobility, foreign policy and development into a combined framework (Council of the European Union, 2021; European Commission, 2011, 2015b, 2016a). It was also articulated that awareness among development practitioners on the significance of migration issue-areas to development needed to be increased (European Commission, 2011).

Mainstreaming migration into development cooperation involves some of the following activities: supporting partner countries and regions in the development and solidification of their migration strategies, embedding migration in sustainable development and poverty eradication approaches, encouraging and boosting “triangular cooperation between Sub-Saharan, Southern Mediterranean and European countries to foster development in regions of origin and transit”, and cooperation on analysis and of the root causes of migration and forced displacement to facilitate evidence-based policy making (Council of the European Union, 2021b, p. 3). These are all evident in the makeup of the EUTF-A and its contracted projects.

This embedding of migration priorities into development cooperation was further evident through the blended strategic objectives listed in the overview that involve a mix of humanitarian, development, security, border and migration management objectives. We can also notice this

embedding in some of the monitoring and evaluation indicators of the EUTF-A which include indicators typical of development (i.e. number of jobs created, number of youth trained on employment and income generating activities, number of people with improved access to basic services) as well as those which seem to suggest migration/border control (i.e. number of those who were reached via information campaigns, quantity of staff trained on border management) (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b).

It is furthermore evident *within* indicators such as the “number of migrants returned who received re-integration assistance” (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b) whereby we can see how a development project (for instance: through the support of income generating activities) is tied to a migration management objective of return. This points to how migration and border management might be redefining the ‘successes’ of development interventions. As Landau (2019, p. 172) flags in his overview of containment strategies, even though a number of the specific development programming tends to remain relatively unaltered (i.e. assistance for health, infrastructure, education, employment), the system of measurement utilized to assess their success is changing.

Lastly, it was emphasized that partner countries of interest needed to be made more aware of the option to “ earmark development funding for migration-related initiatives” (European Commission, 2011, p. 11). On this point, it was stressed that “European private and public resources should be mobilized for investment in third countries of origin” (European Commission, 2016a, p. 11). These examples illustrate how development funds are being used to tackle ‘irregular migration’ which raises a number of ethical dilemmas and shows how border is control is clearly becoming a complex *industry* (Andersson, 2014). The latter poses an interesting query for future

research as to how borders are financed, and which actors might benefit from various border apparatuses.

The EUTF-A as a border externalization instrument

It is in the context of these dynamics, priorities, agendas and assumptions that we need to situate the EUTF-A. I will now review the various dimensions of the EUTF-A as a border externalization instrument, complementing other policy instruments, by reviewing its *relational*, *spatial*, and *regulatory* dimensions. A summary of key elements discussed for each dimension can be viewed through **Figure 2**, after which a more substantial discussion of these elements follows.

Dimensions of the EUTF-A	Key Themes and Practices	Key Narratives and/or Assumptions
Relational	Unevenness and Coercion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Largely reflects EU political priorities • May enable the EU to exploit its colonial and other historical ties with African states 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Narratives of cooperation vs. narratives of exploitation
	Paternalism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embedded in its politics of control and the politics of care 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Notion of instrument as a “Trust Fund” • African youth as “hopeless” and “desperate” • EUTF-A helping to restore “hope” and enabling youth to meet “aspirations” in their origin countries
Spatial	Targeted locations, projects and funding delineated by key migration routes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Target’s change based on shifting migration routes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Naturalized constructions of countries of ‘origin’, ‘transit’ and ‘destination’

	<p>Targets for Countries of ‘origin’</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic development initiatives to prevent ‘irregular’ migration, and taking the form of reintegration support • Focus on dialogues of return/readmission 	<p>Main perceived challenges of countries of ‘origin’:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lacking support for local livelihoods • Lacking stability • Lacking local migration management
	<p>Targets for ‘transit countries’</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migration management • Capacity building for security forces • Information campaigns targeted at migrants 	<p>Main perceived challenges of countries of ‘transit’:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pressure to provide humanitarian services to migrants and refugees • Challenges related to smuggling/trafficking
	<p>Targets for ‘destination’ countries</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Receive bulk of ‘resilience’ funding • Building protection capacities of states • Capacity building for security forces 	<p>Main perceived challenges of ‘destination’ countries</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pressure to provide humanitarian services to migrants and refugees • Challenges related to smuggling/trafficking • Integrating refugees and forcibly displaced individuals into host communities
<p>Regulatory (using FitzGerald's (2019) framework)</p>	<p>Legal vs. ‘irregular’ migration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legal migration initiatives reserved for desirable forms of mobility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An increase in the possibilities for legal migration as dependent on reduction of ‘irregular’ migration

	<i>Buffer Strategies</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Facilitating migration-related dialogues • Facilitating and incentivizing return and readmission • Pressure to criminalize ‘irregular’ migration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Return as a pre-requisite for well- managed migration policy • Imperfect return system viewed as an incentive for ‘irregular’ migration
	<i>The Moat</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • capacity building of the LCG • equipment provision 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dual security/humanitarian focus
	<i>Caging Strategies</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Targeting development programming at prospective migrants • Outsourcing protection • Publicity deterrence campaigns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dual security/humanitarian focus • Narrative of containment • Reality vs expectation narrative

Figure 2. Dimensions of the EUTF-A as a border externalization instrument.

Relational dimension of the EUTF-A

In the guiding frameworks of the EUTF-A’s migration and border management activities it was emphasized that all tools and possibilities for leverage should be used to their fullest extent, as well as that:

The special relationships that Member States have with third countries, reflecting political, historic and cultural ties fostered through decades of contacts, should also be exploited to the full for the benefit of the EU. (European Commission, 2016a, p. 8)

This quote is particularly striking as it stands in stark contrast to the language of “solidarity”, “partnership”, “cooperation”, “shared responsibility”, “win-win partnerships” etc. which prevailed across the more public facing documents I reviewed. It also points to the highly political nature of the migration agenda and to the *relational dimension* of border externalization engagements which are often characterized by unevenness and coercion (Zaiotti, 2016). This unevenness is evident

given the conflict-ridden language of ‘exploitation’ used in the passage as well as in light of earlier concerns that the EUTF-A is “Brussels made” (Castillejo, 2016; CONCORD, 2018; Oxfam International, 2020; Zanker, 2017).

Additionally, it points to a problematic dynamic which characterizes the EUTF-A since these so-called ‘special relationships’ with different African states covered by the instrument include historical colonial ties as well as other exploitative relations bringing to light further how the depiction of ‘crisis’ may shift attention away from practices of imperialism (Pradella & Taghdisi Rad, 2017). As highlighted in the New Keywords Collective (2016) on the formation of the EUTF-A:

Through the proclamations of mutual “interdependence” between “Europe” and its African “neighbors,” therefore, Valetta exposed the extent to which the ongoing “migrant crisis” has served to authorize anew the protracted (post-)colonial struggle over dominance and power. Hence, EU-rope’s highest ambition has been to find ways to export its “crisis” to its poorer “neighbors,” and thus has sought to convert its “crisis” into a neoliberal test of post- colonial “responsibility,” whereby the ostensible legitimacy and sovereignty of African nation-states is presumed to derive from dutiful service to the mandates of re-fortifying the borders of “Europe”. (p. 9)

Such ties between specific member states and African states can be furthered through the makeup of the EUTF-A instrument since it coordinates and/or scatters the various member states interests in relation to specific regions and countries that align with their geopolitical priorities (Zardo, 2020).

On the point of relational unevenness, it should furthermore be noted that the use of the term *Trust Fund* for Africa on behalf of the EU to describe the financial instrument appears as quite a paternalistic representation, which should be understood as a key power dynamic which

characterizes the initiative.³⁰ It is embedded in its politics of control. As Frowd (2018b) emphasizes:

At its roots, the politics of border control pedagogy is paternalistic. External intervenors claiming to know better, even when attentive to the limits of their local knowledge, continue to bring their material and symbolic resources to bear in African borderlands by the millions of dollars and euros. (p. 72)

However, paternalism should also be understood as embedded with the politics of care that characterize the EUTF-A. As Barnett (2011) argues, regardless of when, humanitarian governance has always favored the perspectives, values and interests of the compassionate and the rise of expert knowledge has only aided to keep power at the top. Rooted in paternalism, the history of humanitarianism has ultimately been a history of empire (Barnett, 2011).

This dual-natured paternalism was evident throughout the documents. In the Valetta Summit political declaration it was stated that “rekindling hope, notably for the African youth, must be our paramount objective” (Council of the European Union, 2015, p. 2). This framing of African youth as “hopeless” in addition to narratives of “desperation” prevailed across documents. It was also accompanied by statements that ‘irregular’ migrants and forcibly displaced individuals were constantly at risk of being exploited by smugglers and traffickers who “prey on the desperation of those with no choice but to migrate” (European Commission, 2017, p. 33). This came with a corresponding assumption that being unable to provide these individuals with aspirations at home would help to foster radicalization and spread instability which drives ‘irregular’ migration (European Commission, 2016b). Guided by these assumptions, the EUTF-A’s activities were then narrated as addressing these problems by helping people to meet their aspirations at home (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b) and aiming “for

³⁰ It made me think of the funds wealthy parents put aside for their children and which are released to them when they reach a certain age or meet certain conditions to help them start their adult lives.

people to migrate out of aspiration in a safe way” (*EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition*, 2021).

Spatial Dimension of the EUTF-A

Given that border externalization involves a spatial extension outward beyond territorial lines (Mountz, 2020), I will now overview how the EUTF-A might seek to facilitate this. Firstly, it is worth reiterating that the countries who are eligible to receive the funds include the primary countries of origin, ‘transit’ and ‘destination’ of migration in Africa (European Commission, 2016b) who are largely delineated based on migration routes. Exceptionally, some neighboring countries can receive EUTF-A funds but this is based on migration control criteria since funds in these countries can only be contracted to “support programmes with a regional dimension in order to address regional migration flows and related cross-border challenges” (European Commission, 2018, p. 7).

The western and central Mediterranean routes held particular importance with annual reports consistently flagging quantitative statistics on migration flows and reduction or increases of arrivals along these routes. Additionally, the annual reports flagged attempts of projects to address shifts occurring along and across routes (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b). While many of the funds do target the central Mediterranean route (Landau, 2019), the most highly targeted locations seemed to shift based on which migratory routes are deemed important at particular moments in time. Thus, the EUTF-A largely illustrates Cobarrubias (2020) observation that “borders are envisioned and designed to be mobile devices and reiterated along shifting migratory routes” (p. 1).

It is also important to elaborate more on the perceived ‘transit’, ‘origin’ and ‘destination’ states which the EUTF-A’s project targets and are naturalized through associated discourse in the document. It is beyond the scope of the paper to detail them all, but a few will be elaborated with

examples. Firstly, the annual reports and strategic orientation document highlight the Sahel and Lake Chad window as comprising the primary countries of ‘origin’ for ‘irregular’ migration toward the EU with some countries also comprising key transit regions (Northern Mali and the Agadez Region in Niger) (European Commission, 2016b, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b).

Countries of ‘origin’ are perceived to face challenges of supporting its nationals livelihood and stability at home and to manage migration locally (European Commission, 2016a). The fact that the Sahel and Lake Chad is perceived to be the main region for emigration toward the EU is significant given that a substantial portion of the fund geared toward economic development initiatives (Objective 1) is concentrated in this window. Development cooperation projects are in fact primarily implemented in perceived countries of ‘origin’ and much more rarely implemented in perceived ‘transit’ countries (Kervyn & Shilhav, 2017).

Furthermore, readmission agreements are a key priority of the dialogues with countries of ‘origin’ (European Commission, 2015b) with development support acting as a key incentive for return in the shape of reintegration support. This illustrates several key components of the developmental dimension of migration-development policies including that: associated funds are used to provide leverage for cooperation on return/readmission with countries of origin, development projects are targeted at prospective ‘irregular’ migrants in their countries of origin, and, are offered as an incentive for ‘irregular’ migrants in transit or who have arrived in Europe in the form of reintegration support to return to their countries of origin voluntarily.

Migration management and assistance for security forces are the main areas of focus for projects in ‘transit countries’ (Kervyn & Shilhav, 2017). We can observe this strategic allocation of funds through the North Africa window³¹ in particular which is believed to comprise the primary

³¹Within the North Africa window it should be noted that Libya was a key country of focus for the project as a whole because it acts as a key transit hub for migrants headed to the EU via the central Mediterranean

‘transit’ countries of ‘irregular’ migration toward the EU and a ‘destination’ region for labor migrants (European Commission, 2016b). The entirety of the funds which were allocated to projects in this strategic window corresponded to improved migration management (objective 3) (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b).

Transit locations and destination countries are perceived to face the following main challenges: “acute pressure to provide humanitarian assistance and service delivery to migrants and refugees, to support the economic stability of migrants, refugees and host communities, and to target criminal networks involved in smuggling and trafficking in order to prevent irregular flows” (European Commission, 2016a, p. 6). As a result, activities in regions of transit primarily include: capacity building of security forces operating on key transit routes to combat human smuggling/trafficking and capacity building for protection and search and rescue operations (see e.g., European Commission, 2018, p. 66). Projects funded *en-route* also include information campaigns targeted at migrants on the risks of migration and voluntary return options.

‘Destination’ countries for refugees or primary sites for internal displacements seem to receive a bulk of ‘resilience’ funding (objective 2) in order to help build protection capacities for states and facilitate better service provision (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b). The Horn of Africa was highlighted as a primary site for this target. This focus on ‘destination’ countries is important for our purposes given that strategies are in place to prevent displaced peoples from becoming irregular migrants who head to the EU. There are efforts to contain displacement and outsource protection capacities to those countries who already have the

route as well as given its sensitive security situation. Significant portions of funded were invested in Libya, and it received more focus and investment over time to allow expansion of border management and migration management support (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b).

highest numbers of displaced peoples and refugees (Adepoju et al., 2010).

Regulatory Dimension of the EUTF-A

In reviewing the regulatory dimensions and practices of border control and migration management which are funded/facilitated by the instrument, I want to start by flagging the dynamics of legal vs. illegal/irregular migration. Throughout my analysis of the policy instrument, it was evident how it facilitates efforts of border systems to act as filter system for corresponding desired vs. undesired forms of mobility (Mau et al., 2012; Shachar, 2020b). Whilst one of the sub-goals of the migration management agenda of the EUTF-A was to “advance mutually-beneficial legal migration and mobility” (European Commission, 2016b, p. 29), it was clear that this was specific to *desirable* forms of mobility³².

Projects funded under this priority were solely targeted at students, researchers, and skilled forms of labor required by the European labor market. For instance, a program that was consistently brought up in the annual reports and also highlighted on the “Migration Management” portion of the Virtual Exhibit was that of the Erasmus+ program that seeks to support university student exchanges for university students from West Africa (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b). This corresponds largely to the selection criteria of migration policies outlined by De Haas et al., (2019) that are largely “based on skill, wealth, family background of migrants” and which “have been partly superimposed upon national or “racial” origin criteria that dominated earlier policy making” (p. 905).

Some of these dynamics can be observed through the example given above since the program is justified through the frame that it intends to assist in training individuals at high levels, help integrate candidates in the job market but also to “stimulate entrepreneurship and job opportunities

³² As pointed out in the overview, funds dedicated to this portion of the initiative have also been shown to be quite minimal (Kervyn & Shilhav, 2017).

in partner countries” (*EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition- Improving Migration Management*, 2021). The latter point is key as it not only brings light to a development component of the initiative (including a corresponding assumption about the development responsibilities of individuals who benefit from these programs) but importantly suggests that some of these initiatives are focused on temporary forms of legal migration.

An increase in the possibilities for legal migration was also represented in guiding frameworks as *dependent on a reduction of ‘irregular’ migration*. As emphasized in the GAMM,

Without well-functioning border controls, lower levels of irregular migration and an effective return policy, it will not be possible for the EU to offer more opportunities for legal migration and mobility. The legitimacy of any policy framework relies on this. (European Commission, 2011, p. 5)

Thus, unsurprisingly most of the migration and border management activities covered by the EUTF-A are targeted at tackling various dimensions of ‘irregular’ migration. Efforts to contain these undesirable movements were evident throughout the EUTF-A particularly in the form of buffer strategies, reinforcement of the Mediterranean sea moat and caging (FitzGerald, 2019).

Buffers include strategies on behalf of destination governments to use adjacent countries to repel undesired migrants, including asylum seekers (FitzGerald, 2019). In this regard it should first be noted that high political level dialogues are at the center of the instruments mandate (European Commission, 2016b). These dialogues are focused on embedding migration priorities into various agendas, and incentives (e.g. development funds) are provided to cooperate on stemming the flow of irregular migrants (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b). Buffer strategies also include placing pressure on transit and origin states to criminalize irregular migration (FitzGerald, 2019). This was evident given the focus of the EUTF-A to support its partners in implementing laws which criminalize all activities related to smuggling, investigating and prosecuting smugglers and traffickers, dismantling criminal networks, building

the capacity of police and security forces, security equipment provision etc. (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b).

Furthermore, a key legal tool to enable buffers include return/readmission agreements with countries of origin (FitzGerald, 2019). This is a key tool that the EUTF-A seeks to enable, as evident in the Opening Statement by (now former) President Donald Tusk at the Valletta Summit on Migration (2015) whereby he states that:

Proper return and readmission of those not entitled to international protection is essential. This is an international norm, and a responsibility of states to citizens. To keep the doors open for refugees and legal migrants, irregular migrants should be returned effectively and quickly. Voluntary return is always preferable. But when it is not possible, non-voluntary return is a prerequisite for a well-managed migration policy. And once returned, we must all work together to reintegrate these people and provide them with the means to meet their aspirations.

Herein we can see how facilitating legal migration is again narrated as dependent on managing ‘irregular’ migration.

This is in part due to the fact that EU’s imperfectly working return system is viewed as an incentive for ‘irregular’ migration with “smuggling networks often play[ing] on the fact that relatively few return decisions are enforced” (European Commission, 2015b, p. 9). It is understood that increasing return rates will help to dismantle the business of smugglers, and that migrants will in turn realize that reaching the EU is not worth the cost or the risk (European Commission, 2016a). Drawing on these assumptions, much of the key programing funded by the EUTF-A revolves around return/readmission and reintegration to incentivize return (e.g. through setting up voluntary return facilities along routes) with an increase in return/readmission acting as a key indicator of success³³ (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b).

³³ The EU-IOM joint initiative for migrant protection and reintegration funded by the EUTF-A is of particular importance in reinforcing these buffers and facilitating voluntary returns along the migration-development axis.

Reinforcing its *maritime borders* to deter undesired migrants (i.e. moat) (FitzGerald, 2019) is also a key component of border externalization supported by the EUTF-A. This dimension primarily incorporates the capacity building activities of Libyan coast guard members through the provision of training on SAR and human rights protection as well as equipment provision to prevent further loss at sea (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b). Whilst the focus appears humanitarian this must be understood in the context of the dual security-humanitarian focus discussed earlier. Coast guards are viewed to have an important role in saving lives and securing maritime borders (European Commission, 2015b).

However, support for the LCG and EU's shifting of SAR operations to the LCG has been critiqued for severely limited the capacity of humanitarian run rescue missions who have been reportedly been attacked by LCG members when operating in the Libyan nautical zone (United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 2018). Furthermore, these capacity building activities need to be understood in a context where some LCG members have been found to be 'cooperating' with the smuggling operations taking place across the Mediterranean Sea and that some migrants intercepted at sea by the LCG end up in Libya's detention centers which act as spaces of intense vulnerability for migrants depending on which groups run them (Baldwin-Edwards & Lutterbeck, 2019).

The EUTF-A also reinforces a number of *caging* activities which often mix objectives of migration regulation, humanitarian protection and other agendas (FitzGerald, 2019). This mixing is evident through the key undergirding assumption guiding these activities and borderwork narrative of the EUTF-A that include a 'sedentary bias' (Bakewell, 2008) and a form of 'containment development' (Landau, 2019). As emphasized at the Valetta Summit, "people's aspirations and needs have to be met first and foremost at home. Legal migration can offer

opportunities for some, but not for all” (“Opening Statement by President Donald Tusk at the Valletta Summit on Migration,” 2015).

These forms of containment also were evident in the programming of the EUTF-A which focused development programming of economic and job opportunities in regions which are believed to have a strong migratory potential and which are believed to help prevent individuals from migrating (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b). These economic development initiatives were justified through the frame that they would give individuals, particularly youth, “the chance to build a better future in their country rather than risking the dangers of irregular migration” (European Commission, 2019, p. 19). Thus, the development dimension itself needs to be understood as an instrument of *preventive dissuasion* that aims to discourage the intention to migrate (López-Sala, 2015). It is a form of disingenuous development (Collyer, 2020).

This borderwork of containment also needs to be understood as intrinsic to narratives surrounding forced displacement. As emphasized in the Strategic Orientation Document “most forced displacement is intra-region but a growing mixed flow of migrants has moved across the Med toward Europe” (European Commission, 2016b). Herein we can notice that forced displacement becoming north-bound migration has been problematized. Whilst there was a recognition that most displacement was intra-region (Koser, 2016), there seemed to be an implicit assumption that these movements should remain as such.

Lastly, caging also incorporates publicity deterrence campaigns which were a key component of EUTF-A funded activities (FitzGerald, 2019). Part of the programming of the EUTF-A funded EU-IOM joint initiative involves “enabling migrants to make informed decision about their migratory journeys and sensitize communities on migration” (International

Organization for Migration, 2021). Publicity deterrence campaigns also sought to inform on the dangers of irregular migration and possibilities and shared stories of returnees and victims of trafficking/smuggling through photo exhibitions, social media campaigns and information centers in countries of origin and transit (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b).

Information campaigns try to encourage patterns of self-government among prospective migrants who are expected to understand that irregular migration is a dangerous risk not worth taking (Pécoud, 2010). These campaigns promote a narrative that reality is far from expectation and that ‘irregular’ migration often “ends in deep disappointment” (European Commission, 2015b, p. 7). However, in reality information campaigns have been shown to be quite ineffective which “point[s] to one of the greatest obstacles to the control of migration, namely the refusal of migrants to accept the legitimacy of the policies aimed at stopping them” (Pécoud, 2010, p. 184). This latter statement also crucially underscores the agency of affected migrants.

Depoliticizing border externalization through development

In this sub-section, I delve more deeply into the developmental dimension related to my second research question. I explore how the language and strategies traditionally found among development and humanitarian discourses and initiatives (Frowd, 2018a) may help to enable and maintain the construction/reinforcement of Europe’s border externalization efforts. I start by discussing the technical strategies it relies on followed by a discussion as to how the EUTF-A is represented as a development in addition to a humanitarian instrument.

Relying on technical jargon, and depicting technical problems/solutions

As mentioned earlier on, mainstream development practice is rooted in rationalities of improvement that incorporates ways of understanding social life as a *technical* problem which is subject to rational (technical) solutions and managed by correspondingly derived experts (Escobar, 2012). Through these roots and technical bureaucratic practices, development projects can become

a sort of “anti-politics” machine (Ferguson & Lohman, 1994). These technical depictions and development buzzwords pervaded the EUTF-A’s descriptions of its objectives and activities. For instance, one can note how the *principles* for the EUTF-A projects were couched in very technical language and broad language. These principles included that: the process of determining funded activities was “strategic” and “efficient” and was based on discussions and “approaches adapted to specific challenges”, that it was “speedy” and “flexible” and “adaptive”, and that the activities required “a holistic, integrated, and coordinated approach with other actors for maximum impact” among others (European Commission, 2017, p. 13).

The descriptions of the border and migration control objectives/ measures also relied extensively on development buzzwords (i.e. resilience, empowerment, self-reliance, capacity-building, management etc.) As Cornwall (2007) emphasizes, “policies depend on a measure of ambiguity to secure the endorsement of diverse potential actors and audiences. Buzzwords aid this process, by providing concepts that can float free of concrete referents, to be filled with meaning by their users” (p. 474). These dynamics can be observed above as the different principles outlined are a form of technical jargon that lacks substance and leave room for multiple interpretation.

The EUTF-A was also advertised as relying on an *evidence-based approach* with an assumption that evidence collected would enable “targeted interventions” (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b). The evidence-based approach formed one of the guiding principles of the EUTF-A with a focus on improving knowledge of the drivers, dynamics, causes of migration as well as to map out responses. To gather evidence, the EUTF-A funds Research and Evidence facilities for each of the regional windows and draws on quantitative and qualitative data collected by various EU missions, IO’s, NGOs to help fill gaps in understandings. This is one of the ways in which developmental actors engage in borderwork (Frowd, 2018a) as some of the

actors funded under the project who are working on the ground like the IOM are required to collect quantitative and qualitative data on migration movements, needs and vulnerabilities (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b; International Organization for Migration, 2021) to support this evidence-base.

Evidence-based policy is founded on the principle that policy choices need to be “better informed by available evidence and should include rational analysis” (Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019, p. 2140). It is believed that when based on systematic evidence, policies produce better results (Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019). For example, we can see this evidence-based logic and technically derived knowledge in the following passage in the Strategic Orientation Document of the EUTF-A policy instrument that stipulates:

An in-depth understanding of local contexts will enable an evidence-based targeting of geographies, beneficiaries and implementing partners. This should allow greater precision in the adoption of decisions about where to make investments (areas affected by conflict or at increasing risk of conflict, forced displacement, trafficking or smuggling; areas lacking social services and opportunities or which are a source of irregular migration), who should benefit from them (e.g. at-risk-youth), and with which implementing partners (local, national, regional or international) the objectives can best be advanced in the particular context. To increase efficiency in addressing migration issues, cross-window and cross-region dimension will be considered. (European Commission, 2016b, p. 10)

The language of ‘targeting’ in the passage illustrates the perceived rationality of the EUTF-A’s interventions whereby *at-risk* areas and beneficiaries can be delineated and then particular interventions can be tailored to address those risks.

We can furthermore notice how this is done through the “root causes” programming of the EUTF-A which includes targeted technical interventions to perceived push factors by creating economic opportunities and boosting entrepreneurship as a solution to lack of opportunities in countries of origin. Another example includes its extensive focus on capacity building activities of security forces along areas delineated as carrying increased ‘risk’ along migration routes. This

targeting also points to the planning techniques which characterize development practice and which “embod[y] the belief that social change can be engineered and directed, produced at will.” (Escobar, 2009, p. 145).

The EUTF-A also appears to rely extensively on and promote its *results-based management*. As Cornwall (2007) points out, results-based management is a key component of development practice. There continues to be a large emphasis on ensuring development is quantifiable and measurable. This has also enabled the growth of an industry that measures these ‘results’. It was quite shocking to see the extensive number of methods and platforms developed to collect, monitor, report and communicate data, actions, activities and progress in each and between the three regional windows, which includes an extensive use of subcontracting to the private sphere in the form of: external evaluation firms, M&E software, mapping software’s, consulting firms etc.³⁴ (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b).

The technical practice of monitoring and evaluation typical of development practices is also being adapted to include migration system indicators. Migration control priorities are being quantified into measurable objectives with corresponding measurement indicators which are targeted, monitored, and reported in M&E reports. For instance, alongside typical development indicators of “number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities” (obj. 1.3) and “number of people receiving nutrition assistance” (obj. 2.3), some key macro-indicators of the EUTF-A include: “number of border stations supported to strengthen border control” (obj 4.1), “number of staff from governmental institutions and internal security forces trained” (obj. 4.2), and “# of migrants, or potential migrants, reached out by information campaign on migrations and risks

³⁴ The expansive opportunities of migration management M&E for consulting firms, tech platforms etc. demonstrates how the management of ‘irregular’ migration is truly becoming an ‘illegality’ industry (Andersson, 2014) and points to an interesting agenda for further research as to the significant (and somewhat hidden) dimension of the private sector.

linked to irregular migration” (obj. 3.3)” (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b). Thus, we can see how political objectives (e.g. border control, deterrence) are being couched in technical language and quantified into measurable objectives. Doing so appears to depoliticize the highly political activities of migration control.

While it goes beyond the scope of this paper to explore, unpack, and problematize the evidence-based approach and understandings of problems/solutions extensively it is worth noting a few points. Firstly, one should be critical of the *kind* of expert knowledge which drives the initiative. Expertise is often limited by what political actors shape as the realm of possibility for inquiry and the transfer of knowledge to policy is often dependent on what these political actors may deem feasible and appropriate knowledge for a given policy agenda (Escobar, 2012; Pécoud, 2015). In the case of migration policy making, though migration policy actors frequently call for an evidence-based approach, one should be cautious to how knowledge which supports policy making may have been derived from pre-determined political priorities or how “‘knowledge’ is selectively produced to accompany and legitimize migration management activities [...]” (Geiger & Pécoud, 2010, p. 10).

As we saw in the earlier section, bringing order to migration flows is a key component of the EU’s political priorities. Thus, one should also question the realm of possibility which might have been delineated for evidence-gathering by EUTF-A funded Research facilities, IO’s and NGO’s, another interesting arena for future research. Thirdly, as scholars have pointed out, despite the significance evidence which exists on the nature of migration to Europe in 2015, EU policy-making has largely been assumption-led (Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019) and despite evidence to the contrary, the ‘root causes’ narrative as it has been described has been adapted anyway, largely for political purposes (Zaun & Nantermoz, 2021).

Lastly, the reliance on expertise and empirical evidence among international migration narratives and practices has been shown to be one of the ways in which migration policies are depoliticized (Pécoud, 2015). Presenting policy choices in a way where they are only based on precise data and expertise makes them difficult to question (Geiger & Pécoud, 2010; Pécoud, 2015). The reliance on a ‘managerial’ approach also helps borderwork actors avoid political debate on policy orientations and changes (Geiger & Pécoud, 2010). These are important to note for our purposes given that it points to one of the ways in which the EUTF-A as an EU border externalization instrument and the associated EU political agenda might be obscured in the eyes of certain publics. It also reflects how its activities may be displayed as effective for the development of targeted communities.

Representing the EUTF-A as a development and humanitarian project

Despite the clear political focus of bringing order to migratory flows and the role of the EUTF-A as a border externalization instrument to enable this agenda, there has been an attempt to represent the EUTF-A as a development and humanitarian instrument. Paying close analytical attention to this presentation brings into focus the *performative* borderwork of the instrument.

Europe’s border ‘crisis’ has been described as a *spectacle* whereby depictions of Mediterranean sea crossings and EU interventions need to be understood as border spectacles that are routinized and which help to naturalize migration politics (Andersson, 2014; De Genova, 2017; Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2016; Van Reekum, 2016). Repertoires of migration governance are also in part performative because they have a symbolic dimension that seeks to satisfy various groups and to evade discontent (Geddes, 2021), and policy discourses shape not only the categories in which various audiences need to capture migration ‘realities’ but also fail to include other components which are not suitable to political priorities (Geiger & Pécoud, 2010). Looking at how the instrument is presented is important because development cooperation- in addition to

depoliticizing migration control as noted earlier- often serves to *humanize* various migration controls (Andersson, 2014).

Some of these representations of the EUTF-A can be observed through the “Stories from Africa” Virtual Exhibit. It is a useful example to review the performative dimension and humanization of the EUTF-A through development and humanitarianism as it is very public facing and has been set up for the purposes of improved *accountability* and *transparency* which were stipulated as key guiding principles for the EUTF-A’s delivery (European Commission, 2021b). It should be noted as I present subsequent themes that I do not seek to evaluate the validity of the representations which follow. Rather, I seek to analyze how we should understand development and humanitarian narratives being presented as the *main focal point* for audiences to understand the work of the EUTF-A. I argue that this is a key form of borderwork that reinforces/maintains the EU’s efforts to regulate undesired migration.

“Stories from Africa” Virtual Exhibition: Initial Impressions

Many people’s first point of contact with the exhibit might occur through the website. When one navigates the EUTF-A’s website (*EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa*, n.d.) one is first welcomed to the home page whereby at the time of writing, the first thing one sees is 4 photographs side by side under which there is an advertisement for the Virtual Exhibit with the welcoming line, “Discover the Stories”. This invites the viewer in and speaks to how the initiative is trying to represent the impact its activities are having on the lives of various project beneficiaries. As I came to learn when I reviewed the virtual exhibit later on, those four photographs were the feature exhibits, one for each strategic objective of the instrument.

It is worth pointing out however that these photographs have their own *visual effects* (Rose, 2001) on the website for which the pictures depict a *balanced* and *equitable* overview of

populations targeted as they are all profile shots including: one photograph of a young child (female), one photograph of a male, one photograph of a woman, and one photograph of a young child (male). From left to right, the young girl is surrounded by grey skies, sitting on rubble and is staring off into the distance looking tired and vulnerable, the adult male is working on a fishing boat, the woman is focused and working on some kind of artisan work, and the young boy is on a swing smiling/laughing.

What I found particularly striking was the contrast between the first photo and the last; one child is in a position of vulnerability and distress (and perhaps uncoincidentally is female) with the last photo featuring a child that is doing what children are supposed to be doing, playing and having fun. Through the linear left to right presentation of the images- an order which I revert to when viewing material- I was given the impression of improvement, a before and after. These four photographs (in that order) are also featured on the press release which was organized to announce the exhibit and for the purposes of celebrating 5 years of activities. The photographs seem to act as a form of promotional poster for the exhibit and for the project. The text on the poster reads: “Support People, Build Resilience, Promote Development #TrustFundAfrica”(“Stories from Africa: EU Trust Fund for Africa Celebrates Five Years of Activities,” 2021).

Placed in context through the Virtual Exhibit it should be pointed out that the first photo (young girl) displayed on the website corresponds to “objective 3: improved migration management” and was taken by the IOM in Djibouti. Expanded, it is actually a picture which contains a number of children and youth who appear tired, dirty and vulnerable with the corresponding description:

Every day, many people travel from Ethiopia to Djibouti, the start of a dangerous journey, looking for a better life. The IOM’S Migrant Response Centre at Obock supports the many that decided to turn back. It provides food, medical care and shelter for up to 250 people at

a time. (*EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition- Improving Migration Management*, 2021)

Here we can see the focus on the *risks of migration* which correspond closely to the key narratives outlined earlier on as well the photo that depicts vulnerability. We should also note the focus on *voluntary return*, a key component which the EUTF-a seeks to incentivize and support through the EU-IOM initiative (International Organization for Migration, 2021). It should also be flagged that this return work is presented in relation to the provision of essential humanitarian services to center in on how the EUTF-A is assisting vulnerable individuals and providing essential services.

The second feature photo (male fishing) corresponds to “Objective 1: promoting greater economic and employment opportunities”. It was taken by the ILO and seeks to highlight an employment opportunities program in Mauritania which supports the value chains of small-scale fisheries. The third feature photo (woman working on some kind of artisanal work) corresponds to the exhibit for “objective 2: strengthening resilience of communities” and was taken by the UNHCR. It is supposed to present a Malian refugee woman (who is not identified) in Burkina Faso who has received support through an initiative that supports refugee artisans access to local and global markets (*EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition- Strengthening Resilience of Communities*, 2021). It reflects one of the efforts to enhance *refugee self-reliance* whereby refugees are presented as contributing members to their African host communities.

Lastly, the photo of the child on the swing is the feature exhibit for the photo-gallery of “objective 4: Improved governance and conflict prevention” and was taken by IOM Libya to highlight the IOM Libya’s community stabilization program which restore services and rehabilitate community infrastructure (*EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition- Improved Governance and Conflict Prevention*, 2021). I found this feature exhibit particularly striking as it reminded me of the classic images one sees for development program

advertising: a child smiling and playing as a result of a development project- in this case a project focused on peace and security. The focuses on programming in Libya was also interesting, given that it is one of the partner countries for which- as I have highlighted previously- the EU has received particular critique suggesting perhaps that there is an attempt to make border measures in Libya more compelling to a skeptical public. In fact, resilience and governance projects in Libya received particular attention throughout the exhibit in contrast with other countries funded by the EUTF-A.

This overview of initial interactions with the EUTF-A Virtual Exhibit is meant to bring into sharp focus the initial impression which one might experience whilst browsing the initiative. I will now overview some key trends and representations which I observed for each of the photo galleries. I chose to expand the most on the migration management one as this is most closely connects to border control efforts. I also focus more extensively on the Improved Economic opportunities exhibit as that one most clearly illustrates the development focus.

“Stories from Africa” Virtual Exhibition: Key Themes

Firstly, The Migration Management photo gallery sought to promote the idea that the EUTF-A supports those who “migrate out of aspiration, in safe way” and highlighted its protection and SAR activities along migration routes as well as its efforts to dismantle smuggling efforts. It also flags how,

Thanks to the EUTF, in the last 5 years over 85,000 vulnerable migrants have been supported with their voluntary return to their country of origin and more than 100,000 migrants were assisted after their return under one of the EUTF’s flagship project, the EU-IOM Joint Initiative. (*EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition- Improving Migration Management*, 2021)

It is worth noting that only one of the photos highlighted the legal migration supports.

Furthermore, this exhibit in particular also appeared to have somewhat embedded in it an information campaign to deter ‘irregular’ migration and the exhibit because it persistently

emphasized the risks of migration and promoted the EU-IOM joint initiative. It also featured 4 story features of youth males who were identified by name and who returned voluntarily through the EU-IOM initiative. A common thread across these four stories was that it was a mistake to migrate, that “reality was far from expectation” and that they are now much better off back home. One of these feature stories stood out in particular as it presented a photo of a youth male sitting in between his parents on a couch with the line “Having left The Gambia without his parents’ knowledge, Ousman was assisted with return and reintegration through the EU-IOM Joint Initiative.” (*EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition- Improving Migration Management*, 2021). The notion of reuniting the individual with his family could have quite a strong humanizing effect for the audience viewing the exhibit. It also supports the assumption that youth are particularly vulnerable to be tempted by migration given a lack of opportunities and need to be supported.

Out of the 13 exhibits of this gallery, 10 promoted the EU-IOM initiative. The IOM is a key ‘developmental borderwork actor’ (Frowd, 2018a). However, as Bradley (2020) highlights, the IOM is formed by several stark tensions. For instance, while they provide some essential protection services and provide essential data on migrant trends given their significant role on the ground, at the same time the “IOM serves its European member states by helping to enable the restrictive policies that keep migrants locked in crisis conditions” (Bradley, 2020, p. 86). Such tensions bring our attention to a problem which characterizes the security-humanitarian nexus: on one hand humanitarian activities have become necessary and effective in saving lives and providing necessary services for migrants along primary migration routes. On the other hand, they can also act as technologies of surveillance and reinforce externalized border control which subject those same migrants to increased scrutiny and regulation of their mobility. The mutually

reinforcing dynamic of the humanitarian-security nexus (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 2015) makes such efforts difficult to scrutinize.

Relatedly, it was also highlighted through the work of the EU-IOM initiative that voluntary returns needed to be understood as a *protection measure* for vulnerable migrants who are ‘stranded in dire humanitarian situations’: with a particular focus on women and girls who depicted as particularly vulnerable to trafficking and sexual violence along insecure migration routes. The promotion of return as protection is particularly interesting and should be looked at critically. As Bradley (2020) stipulates about the work of the IOM in Libya, “Declaring the returns to be humanitarian – and thus, presumably, good – glosses over the difficult questions that plague repatriation efforts in such contexts. For example: Can returns be truly voluntary in the deeply coercive context of indefinite detention? [...]” (p. 88). While voluntary return may be a protection measure for some (pointing again to the challenge of scrutinizing these activities), questions such as these are important to ask, especially in contexts where voluntary return is not necessarily a safe and/or truly voluntary option, particularly for those who are fleeing violence and are in the search of international protection (Bradley, 2020).

Secondly, the photo gallery for promoting greater employment opportunities perhaps unsurprisingly featured many exhibits of individuals engaging in some kind of employment or income-generating activity (*EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition-Promoting Greater Economic and Employment Opportunities*, 2021). The exhibit sought to highlight the various technical and vocational training programs and skills development programs. It also sought to promote its support to existing SMEs and the development of SMEs through financial inclusion and improved access to markets. Results flagged included the number of jobs created through the EUTF-A and people assisted with income generating activities. This focus on

economic indicators of development corresponds largely to mainstream development understandings as we can note the focus on the provision of technical solutions to the problem of unemployment/underemployment which is in fact largely structural (Escobar, 2012).

In contrast to the documents that discussed the role of economic opportunities overviewed in my previous analysis as targeting prospective migrants, as a form of preventive dissuasion (López-Sala, 2015) or in the form of re-integration assistance, this targeting was noticeably absent in the exhibit. The economic opportunities support was largely presented solely as supporting the most vulnerable populations: those who live in remote areas and/or who live in precarious situations/circumstances: youth from vulnerable backgrounds with few skills, and women who live in precarious situation. In relation to migration priorities, exhibits only featured the support provided to refugees and IDP's through the narrative of promoting self-reliance and to enable "mutually beneficial solutions for refugees and their host communities". Diaspora members were also highlighted as development actors. These dynamics are particularly interesting because the focal point of the presentation is that of *supporting development of vulnerable communities*-distancing the initiative from migration control priorities.

A second key theme which was particularly salient through this photo gallery and also pervaded the Virtual Exhibit and the EUTF-A as a whole was that it was a *woman-focused* and *woman-friendly* initiative. This is an important representation which seems to soften the initiative. 7/12 of the photos in the employment exhibit were of women and the majority of the feature were profile shots to depict general programs. The focus on women for this objective also included the "empowerment" narrative – that women especially should be empowered through establishing SME's or supported through income-generating activities (*EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition- Promoting Greater Economic and Employment Opportunities*, 2021).

Profile shots of unidentified women were quite common throughout the imagery of the initiative, including among annual reports were 4/5 cover photos featured unidentified women wearing traditional clothing. While it goes beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the focus extensively, two related points will be made.

Firstly, throughout the documents of the EUTF-A women were depicted in the following ways: that they face more risks on the move and are particularly vulnerable to insecurities associated with ‘irregular’ migration, forced displacement, conflict and poor governance, that they lived in precarious circumstances, that they needed to be better integrated into labor markets and required increased protection measures. (*EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition*, 2021; European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2021b). Interestingly, they were also represented as peacebuilders at the societal level and key actors for the promotion of societal cohesion in unstable contexts. On these understandings of women it is relevant to point out that the depictions of women throughout photo gallery as a whole centered primarily on the following: women as entrepreneurs (including refugee women) particularly focused in the artisanal and fashion sector, women being supported with basic income generating activities, women and girls enrolled in school, receiving job training or teaching young girls, women receiving protection, and women accessing healthcare services (e.g. for maternal care) and other basic services (*EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition*, 2021).

This leads to my second point – the depiction of women in these photographs had a key visual effect namely that of producing a depiction of the African Woman or ‘third world woman’ (Mohanty, 1988). As Mohanty (1988) emphasizes, this is a homogenous notion of a group of oppressed woman and who is depicted as “lead[ing] an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender [...] and being 'third world' (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound,

religious, domesticated, family-oriented, victimized, etc.” (p. 63). This representation is usually an ‘othered’ representation that is presented as the opposite of the western woman. Highlighting this visual effect points to the importance of gendered representations in presenting migration control initiatives. It also points to future research agendas on *humanitarian borderwork* (Pallister-Wilkins, 2016) and *developmental borderwork* (Frowd, 2018b) that perhaps seeks to disentangle these gendered narratives and justifications.

Drawing on the previous discussion on gender, for the “strengthening resilience of communities” Photo Gallery, it should first be highlighted that 9/12 photos were of women and/or girls with the focus of empowerment through self-reliance activities and education initiatives, and women accessing maternity/reproductive health care and/or other services (*EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition- Strengthening Resilience of Communities*, 2021). This objective of the EUTF-A was furthermore largely presented as helping displaced individuals and those living in unstable contexts meet their essential needs (including access to food and nutrition, improved access of services) and promoting long term development of communities through improved state services, community led initiatives, and socio-economic development promotion. The theme of children and women accessing education was a key theme and the main results flagged included the number of individuals who have “improved access to basic services” though on what scale ‘improvement’ was measured was unclear.

Lastly, the gallery on improved governance and conflict prevention focused on building national capacities to prevent conflict and also promoted radicalization activities (*EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition- Improved Governance and Conflict Prevention*, 2021). It primarily promoted community rehabilitation work of damaged infrastructure and its community cohesion activities. In contrast to previous exhibits, this exhibit focused primarily on

males, youth and children. Male youth are perceived as particularly vulnerable to radicalization (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021). While capacity building of security forces and police was flagged this was done in a way that was disconnected from migration control priorities. It was further depoliticized particularly through the accompanying imagery which presented a more neutral depiction: one of the photos portrayed female police officers who were trained through a jointly funded program, another depicted the construction of a “Model” police facility and another featured distant imagery of armored vehicles driving in the desert.

In overviewing key themes which prevailed the exhibit, I sought to highlight how the representation of the EUTF-A is largely that of a humanitarianism and development initiative. The use of images helps to bring faces to an initiative which may humanize an initiative that is otherwise largely described through complicated statistics and policy frames. These representations need to be understood as performative which largely appear to legitimize the EUTF-A funded activities as *positive* practices which are favorable to the development and stability of cooperating African states as well as to the security and wellbeing of African citizen, migrants and refugees. This representation largely seems to correlate with Europe’s self-representation as a key development and humanitarian donor with an established tradition of supporting refugees and internally displaced persons. It also seems to detract from the migration-related political priorities in which the instrument is grounded.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I explored the borderwork of the EU's *mainstreamed migration-control and development cooperation agenda* through an empirical analysis of the EUTF-A policy instrument. This analysis was grounded in the following research questions: *(1) How should we understand the mainstreaming of the European Migration Agenda that seeks to regulate 'irregular' migratory movements with the development cooperation agenda as a strategy of border externalization? And (2) how might the developmental dimensions of such initiatives facilitate related "borderwork"?* These queries were motivated by recent policy developments in the EU and a research puzzle of how these seemingly disparate agendas associated with the politics of care (development and humanitarianism) and those associated with the politics of control (borders and migration management) were being coupled together (Frowd, 2018b).

Thesis Outline

In order to address these questions, I began my paper with an overview of the literature and provided conceptual and theoretical clarifications which guided my work. This section proceeded as follows: I first reviewed the literature on border externalization and how we should understand borders and corresponding efforts to regulate migration movements. Next, I justified my focus on EU's migration management. Thirdly, I reviewed the literature on assumptions guiding the linking of migration and development. Then I reviewed the literature on the instrumental roles which the developmental dimension of such initiatives take. Lastly, drawing on the literature discussed, I provided specifications on the theoretical framework I used to analyze my case. This latter subsection was focused on the different facets of border externalization I studied, my use of a borderwork framework, and my methods for locating key development discourses, strategies and practices.

The second section of my paper focused on outlining the methodology I used to analyse my case. As specified, in order to understand the various facets of the EUTF-A, I used an interdisciplinary approach with an interpretative qualitative methodology drawing on a document analysis and discourse analysis of relevant documents, as well as a critical visual analysis of the “Stories from Africa” Virtual Exhibit. To provide further details regarding this methodology and approach, I began this section by overviewing the various criteria I used to select my documents as well as specified which data I consulted. Next, I detailed my use of the document analysis method. Thirdly, I specified my use of the discourse analysis method. Fourthly, I discussed my grounded coding strategy using the MAXQDA software as well as my use of thematic analysis and the data interpretation strategy of deconstruction. Subsequently, I provided specifications regarding my critical visual analysis of the Virtual Exhibit. Lastly, I discussed issue areas of reflexivity and reliability of findings as well as the strengths/limitations of my design.

The third section of this thesis focused on providing relevant contextual information for my case study. I began by justifying my selection of the EUTF-A initiative. Secondly, I overviewed key details on the foundation and mandate of the initiative which emerged from my document analysis. Thirdly, I provided an overview of some key critiques which have been raised by scholars, NGO’s and other researchers concerning the EUTF-A regarding its political priorities A and concerns surrounding the diversion of ODA to migration priorities.

Upon overviewing my case, I proceeded to discuss my findings and analysis together through the correlating objectives of my research questions. In order to unpack my first research question, I began by exploring how the EUTF-A should be understood as a border externalization instrument and its relations to the political priorities and objectives of the EU and its member states. In order to do so, I overviewed Europe’s political priorities and associated narratives,

reviewed more closely how EU migration and development agendas are being linked and mainstreamed into one agenda, and used my theoretical frameworks to summarise how we should understand the EUTF-A as a border externalization instrument by analyzing its relational, spatial and regulatory dimensions.

After uncovering these key elements of my first research question, I delved more deeply into the developmental dimension of this initiative. I overviewed key elements which had not yet been elaborated on the developmental dimension by highlighting how the initiative draws on development discourses, practices and strategies to *represent* the initiative. This enabled me to look more closely at the performative dimension of the EUTF-A. Throughout the findings/analysis section, I deconstructed corresponding narratives, assumptions and representations which are produced and substantiate the instrument.

Argument/Summary of Findings

As should be evident from my attempt to politicize the EUTF-A's mandate, activities and narratives, the EUTF-A should largely be understood as being guided by the migration and border control agenda that seeks to bring order to migration flows. It was demonstrated that these priorities are substantiated by a 'crisis' narrative of a dual humanitarian-security nature and represented as a by-product of (developmental and border) crises in Africa which serve to justify Europe's externalized border interventions. The mainstreamed migration control-development cooperation agenda undergirded by the "root causes" narrative was shown to be central to these external bordering efforts and was thereby largely justified in its guiding political frameworks as necessary *for* the politics of migration control. Through this mainstreamed agenda, I demonstrated that migration activities have been embedded in the understandings of development and its success, and reshaped a number of development cooperation projects, objectives and indicators. My analysis also illustrated how the politics and narratives of care and control which characterize the

mainstreamed migration-development agenda evident through the EUTF-A's inception and mandate are closely interconnected and mutually reinforcing.

As an example of this mainstreamed agenda as a *strategy* of externalization in practice, I demonstrated that the EUTF-A needs to be understood as facilitating externalized borderwork by enabling dialogues on return/readmission and other border externalization assemblages, by funding borderwork projects and actors on the ground, and reinforcing/legitimizing pre-existing violent EU migration policies that reproduce 'irregular' migration movements and oft violent trajectories. I highlighted how the initiative is characterized by relational dynamics of unevenness and paternalism. I illustrated how the instruments targeted locations, projects and funding based on shifting migration routes and seeks to deliver different migration-development priorities for perceived countries of 'origin', 'transit' and 'destination'. Lastly, in unpacking its regulatory dimension, I showed how the EUTF-A filters undesirable vs. desirable forms of mobility, and facilitates buffer strategies, maritime border strategies and caging strategies.

This thesis also brought to light a number of elements connected to the developmental dimension of the initiative. I demonstrated that development funding strategies were being used in the mainstreamed agenda and that ODA is being used to fund border control. I highlighted how development aid conditionalities may be used to incentivize cooperation, may act as leverage in political dialogues and that development programming is primarily targeted at countries of origin to deter migration or implemented in the form of reintegration assistance. Furthermore, I outlined how the EUTF-A relies on a developmental framing of the problem through the root causes + stability narratives and that the initiative draws on humanitarian as well as development discourses, practices and strategies to justify its border activities.

In particular, I demonstrated that the EUTF-A relies on technical jargon, buzzwords, an evidence based approach and managerial results-based management practices typical of the development industry which I argued served to depoliticize the initiative. By overviewing its Virtual Exhibit, I articulated how the impact of the project was presented with its development and humanitarian activities as the main focal point for audiences to capture. Doing so, I argued that this performative dimensions is a key form of borderwork that reinforces/maintains the EU's efforts to regulate undesired migration.

Throughout, I showed how the coupling of development cooperation with migration control appears to legitimize Europe's externalized border activities as *necessary* and *positive* practices. These were thereby presented as *favorable* to the development and stability of cooperating African states as well as to the security and wellbeing of affected migrants and refugees which depends on containing their mobility and aspirations. This thesis thereby argued that the mainstreamed migration-development agenda serves to *embed* migration priorities into development priorities and its developmental dimension *depoliticizes* and *humanizes* border externalization and the related European migration agenda. Through this softened development and humanitarian presentation of the instrument, I showed how the EU may further attempt to maintain a rights based/benevolent image while simultaneously practicing deeply violent forms of migration control through their expanding border interventions.

Contributions and Proposed Directions for future Research

This thesis sought to highlight the importance of looking closely at the different features of border externalization instruments and attempted to contribute more generally to a complex and expanding body of literature on multiplying borders, border externalization, and EU's various efforts to regulate 'irregular' migration movements. More specifically I sought to contribute to our understanding of Europe's mainstreamed migration control-development cooperation agenda and

most crucially to our understanding of the developmental nature of border interventions (Frowd, 2018a). By looking at the EUTF-A, I further aimed to provide more insights on a relatively recent financial instrument which will likely serve as a precedent for future migration policy instruments (Castillejo, 2016). It will be interesting to see how future policy instruments draw on EUTF-A frameworks and which narratives and practices might be left behind.

I also make a methodological contribution by taking seriously various platforms through which information on border interventions is presented and disseminated, including *visual* materials. Through my focus on intertextuality, I was able to tease out key priorities and assumptions that contextualized the instrument. Forthcoming research might want to explore *visual* mediums in more depth as they are often used as tools to communicate border activities in simpler form to a wider public. As I demonstrated, they are used for the purposes of transparency and accountability suggesting that they play an important role in framing initiatives.

Future research guided by these questions may want to focus in on a smaller scale or take an inter-scalar approach which captures the structural effects of these EU level policies on the ground. By choosing to focus on the various dimensions of the EUTF-A as a border externalization instrument, I was unable to account for the variegated lived experiences of migrants and refugees whose trajectories and aspirations are shaped by such border interventions and who each have their own stories to share. Future analyses would greatly benefit from centering these stories and lived experiences.

Lastly, this thesis was largely oriented by an objective to politicize border interventions that justify themselves as humanitarian and development oriented. Contrary to these public narratives, as Stierl (2016) poignantly phrases, the border fatalities which we see occur on the Mediterranean sea need to be understood as:

The ultimate, lifeless evidence of unwantedness, [that] point to the diffuse but connected registers of death-inducing violence that underpin the contemporary border regime. These bodies, found or unfound, identified or unidentified, speak of police and border guard brutality, of mental and physical abuse experienced in detention, of push-backs at sea and forcible deportations, or abandonment and the failure to render assistance when in need, even of policies that redirect human movement or that foreclose the very ability to move and escape in the first place, rendering millions bound to local conditions of hardship. (p. 173-174)

This passage provides an important reminder to conclude this project. The politics of the border detailed extensively in this thesis produce real-lived experiences and produce oft violent trajectories for migrants affected by related interventions.

Appendix A: List of Primary EU Documents Analysed

Policy Documents :

- Council of the European Union. (2015). *Valetta Summit on Migration- Political Declaration*. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21841/political_decl_en.pdf
- Council of the European Union. (2015). *Valletta Summit on Migration - Action plan*. <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14146-2015-INIT/en/pdf>
- Council of the European Union. (2021). *Five years after the adoption of the Joint Valetta Action Plan: debate on the way forward- discussion paper*. <https://www.statewatch.org/media/1836/eu-council-migration-plan-jvap-5721-21.pdf>
- European Commission. (2011). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility*. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0743&from=en>
- European Commission. (2015). *Agreement Establishing the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa, and its Internal Rules hereinafter the “Constitutive Agreement.”* <https://www.statewatch.org/media/1836/eu-council-migration-plan-jvap-5721-21.pdf>
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- European Commission. (2016). *Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Investment Bank: on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration*. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:763f0d11-2d86-11e6-b497-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF
- European Commission. (2016). *Strategic Orientation Document: The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa*.
- European Commission. (2020). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: On a New Pact on Migration and Asylum*. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:85ff8b4f-ff13-11ea-b44f-01aa75ed71a1.0002.02/DOC_3&format=PDF

Monitoring and Evaluation Reports

- European Commission. (2017). *EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa 2016 Annual Report*. https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/default/files/eutf_2016_annual_report_final_en.pdf
- European Commission. (2018). *EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa 2017 Annual Report*.

https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/default/files/2017_annual_report_eutf_africa_final_en_compressed_0.pdf

European Commission. (2019). *EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa 2018 Annual Report*.

https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/default/files/ar_2018_en.pdf

European Commission. (2020). *EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa 2019 Annual Report*.

https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/eutf/files/eutf_report_2019_eng_digital_edition.pdf

European Commission. (2021). *EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa 2020 Annual Report*.

https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/default/files/eutf-report_2020_eng_final.pdf

Websites

EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. (n.d.). Retrieved April 30, 2021, from

https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/index_en

EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition. (2021). European Commission.

<https://storiesfromafrica.eu/>

Khartoum Process. (n.d.). Retrieved May 5, 2021, from <https://www.khartoumprocess.net/>

Rabat Process: Euro-African Dialogues on Migration Development. (n.d.). Retrieved May 5, 2021, from <https://www.rabat-process.org/en/about>

Valletta Summit on migration, 11-12 November 2015. (n.d.). Retrieved April 15, 2021, from

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/>

Press Releases

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<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23726/151109-final-valletta-background.pdf>

Opening statement by President Donald Tusk at the Valletta summit on migration. (2015,

November 11). *European Council*. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/11/tusk-opening-statement-valletta-summit/>

President Juncker launches the EU Emergency Trust Fund to tackle root causes of irregular migration in Africa. (2015, November 12). *European Commission*.

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_6055

Remarks by President Donald Tusk at the press conference of the Valletta summit on migration. (2015, November 12). *European Council*.

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/12/tusk-press-conference-valletta-summit/>

Stories from Africa: EU Trust Fund for Africa celebrates five years of activities. (2021, March

25). *European Commission*. https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/news/stories-africa-eu-trust-fund-africa-celebrates-five-years-activities_en

“Stories from Africa” Virtual Exhibition

EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition. (2021). European Commission. <https://storiesfromafrica.eu/>

Specific exhibit categories

EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition- Improved governance and conflict prevention. (2021). European Commission. <https://storiesfromafrica.eu/improved-governance-and-conflict-prevention.html>

EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition-Improving migration management. (2021). European Commission. <https://storiesfromafrica.eu/improving-migration-management.html>

EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition- Promoting greater economic and employment opportunities. (2021). European Commission. <https://storiesfromafrica.eu/promoting-greater-economic-and-employment-opportunities.html>

EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa: A Virtual Exhibition- Strengthening resilience of communities. (2021). European Commission. <https://storiesfromafrica.eu/strengthening-resilience-of-communities.html>

Other:

European Commission. (2020c). *EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa Factsheet 2020.* European Union. https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/default/files/factsheet_eutf-for-africa_january_2021_0.pdf

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