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Domestic Instability, Government Popularity and the Causes of International Conflict: A new look at Diversion Theory

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Dedicated to my Parents,

Eugenia and Lambros

Abstract

One of the most perplexing issues for students of politics is the proper role of externalization in accounting for interstate conflict. This process, which connects events at the domestic and international levels, also has been referred to as conflict linkage, conflict and cohesion, diversion and projection. The diverse terminology is fitting, because the pursuit by national elites of internal cohesion through external conflict is anything but a matter of consensus among scholars.

The present investigation will seek a more precise delineation of causes and effects. Following a review of the research program on conflict linkage, a reformulated model of externalization will be presented. Propositions will be derived from the model. Data pertaining to the experiences of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at the domestic level and in international crises during the post-World War II era will be used to evaluate the propositions. These results will be in turn compared to the more traditional explanation on the causes of international conflict; namely, theories derived from the Realist perspective. The study then concludes with some recommendations for further research on the linkage of domestic and foreign conflict.

Résumé

L'une des difficultés majeures pour les étudiants en science polititique est le role précis du processeus de "externalization" relatif aux conflicts internationaux. Ce processus, qui relie les faits aux niveaux domestiques et internationaux, est également connu sous les termes de "conflict linkage", "conflict et cohesion", "diversion" et "projection". Cette terminologie variée est appropriée, puisque le but poursuivi par les élites nationales de la stabilité domestique, à travers des conflicts extérieurs n'est rien d'autre qu'une question de consesus parmi les spécialistes.

Le présent travail cherchera à obtenir une délimitation plus précise de causes et d'effets de cette hypothèse. A la suite d'une révision du programme de recherche sur le "conflict linkage", un modèle reformulé du processus "d'externalization", sera présenté. Des propositions seront dérivées de ce modèle ainsi que des données relatives aux experiences des Etats-Unis, de la Grande Bretagne, et de la France à une niveau domestique, également en ce qui concerne les crises internationales postérieures à la deuxième Guerre Mondiale, et seront utilisées pour évaluer ces propositions. Les résultats seront comparés aux explications plus traditionelles relative aux causes des conflicts internationaux, plus précisemment, les théories dérivées de la perspective Réaliste. L'étude se conclue avec des recommandations pour la recherche future sur la relation des conflicts domestiques et étrangers.

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Chapter 1

Introduction: The Diversion of Domestic Conflict

What causes a state to pursue a violent foreign policy? Most conventional perspectives (e.g., the realist approach) place the blame for this choice of tactics squarely on the international system. In an international system that lacks a central authority, states perpetually fear for their survival. Security enhancement becomes a central concern under these circumstances (Herz 1951). Competing interests lead to disputes and, in turn, these disputes have the potential for violent escalation. No universally recognized authority exists that is capable of regulating interstate interactions and thus assure that disputes will be resolved peacefully. As Maoz (1994, 34) argues, "systemic theories rest on the premise that the structure of the international system as a whole, its major characteristics, and the key processes that take place in it, account to a large extent for the level of conflict and war in the world at any given point in time."[1]

Despite the influence of systemic perspectives, other approaches emphasize the importance of different levels of analysis in accounting for international violence. The most

obvious and widely studied alternative is that of the actor level of analysis.[2] This level attempts to link foreign policy choices -- in particular, the use of violence -- explicitly to domestic political, social and economic developments.

One type of conflict linkage -- commonly referred to as conflict and cohesion, diversion and projection -- continues to puzzle researchers. The diverse terminology is fitting, because the pursuit by national elites of internal cohesion through external conflict is anything but a matter of consensus. On the one hand, it is a time-honored notion among scholars that leaders facing domestic unrest may try to divert public attention toward a foreign threat. On the other, how that process might unfold -- along with what would constitute compelling evidence of its existence -- remain controversial matters.

Incompatible conclusions are the focus of this controversy. Quantitative evaluations of the general hypothesis have produced little or no support for the diversionary theory. This stands in sharp contrast to the multitude of case studies (some more implicit than fully explored) that suggest the existence of diversionary tactics.

Along those lines, Levy (1989, 283) concluded that "much of the explanation for the observed discrepancy between the historical (case studies) and the quantitative literature can be traced to flaws in the quantitative literature itself." He traced at least part of that inadequacy to the fact that

"little attention is given to questions of under what kinds of conditions what kinds of states resort to what kinds of external conflict in response to what kinds of threats to security of political elites." Implying that researchers have persisted in testing an overly simplistic pre-theory, Levy (1989, 283) advocated "a causal modelling perspective."

The failure to confirm a linkage is a function of mis-specified models within the quantitative literature. The goal of this dissertation, therefore, is to develop and test a reformulated model that links domestic and international conflict.

This introductory chapter will perform four major tasks. First, the actor level of analysis and how it relates to international politics is examined. System-based factors also will figure prominently in the development of the diversion model. Their role is to mediate the relationship between domestic and international conflict. Although general themes are introduced here, chapter 3 will examine more rigorously the systemic concepts and assumptions deemed essential to a valid model of diversion. Third, examples of conflict linkage are discussed. The objective is to use information derived from specific contexts to suggest potential threats to inference to the refined model. Fourth, the dissertation's intended contributions to knowledge on inter-state conflict are identified and placed in context. Finally, the research approach and key assumptions of the model are outlined.

I. The Actor Level of Analysis

The following section presents a general typology of linkages between domestic and international factors. This situates the diversionary model within the context of broader perspectives on the nature of the linkage between domestic and international politics. Some problems in the quantitative literature will also be identified. (These themes are then addressed in the third chapter, where the formal model is presented). Finally, the refined model is introduced in general terms.

a. Linkage Politics

The linkage between the respective levels of analysis can take any one of three different forms. The first can be referred to as **projection** or **externalization.** Projection implies that activities at one level of aggregation are extended to another. The diversionary theory, as reviewed and restructured in this dissertation, serves as a prime example.

A second form of linkage is **emulation** or spill-over. Emulation implies that the internal workings of a state somehow influence how that state interacts with other international actors. For example, aggressive behavior towards a domestic polity by an authoritarian government may imply an aggressive foreign policy as well. Emulation also denotes 'spill-over'. Domestic activity cannot be contained within the borders of one state and ultimately elicits intervention. A

civil war that leads to international involvement is the basic example of how domestic developments can spill-over into the international arena (Rosenau 1964; Deutsch 1964; Miller 1969).

Recent literature on the linkage between democracy and war proneness serves as an excellent example of emulation (Rummel 1983, 1985; Chan 1984; Weede 1984; Doyle 1986; Dixon 1994). This hypothesis specifies that the seemingly peaceful interaction between democratic states is a function of political regimes. Russett (1992, 1), for example, provides a rigorous specification of the proposed linkage. He outlines two different possible accounts for the observed phenomenon: (1) The normative model suggests that democracies do not fight each other because they apply the norms of compromise and cooperation that prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violence. (2) The structural model asserts that democracies require a complex political mobilization process to engage in conflict, so institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies in confrontation make violent conflict unlikely.

A third form of linkage, **diffusion**, implies the fusing of the domestic and international arenas in some manner. For example, an international economic recession with ramifications for specific domestic economies is a type of diffusion-based linkage. Along those lines, Rogowski(1989) argues that expansion or reduction of international trade affects the types of cleavage-oriented coalitions that emerge

in the domestic polity.

In general, the literature from the complex interdependence school can be characterized as being diffusion oriented. States can no longer completely control developments within their borders because of the influence of non-state actors. The linkage between the domestic and international levels of analysis is further enhanced by international currency exchange rates, cross-border trade and communication, and other types of economic and non-economic activity. In sum, the diffusion perspective points to the impact and activities that connect societies and produce a level of interaction that softens the 'hard shell' of the state (Keohane and Nye 1977; 1987, 1989; Mansbach, Ferguson and Lampert 1976).

Other political economy perspectives, such as **Dependency Theory**, can also be seen as advocating a diffusion perspective. In discussing the modernization potential of Latin American societies, Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1978, 544) argue that

> the domestic cultural and institutional features of Latin America are in themselves simply not the key variables accounting for the relative backwardness of the area... The dependency perspective assumes that the development of a national or regional unit can only be understood in connection with its historical insertion into the worldwide political-economic system...

Once again, factors outside of the control of a state are believed to be so powerful as to influence the direction and scope of a domestic economy. Dependency theory however, goes one step further by arguing that these non-state actors and forces are actually the most important determinants of a developing country's economy.

For the purposes of this dissertation, neither diffusion nor emulation linkages are included for both intellectual and practical reasons. First, diffusion usually encompasses non-military security issues. These are areas with which the dissertation project is not concerned.

Second, although emulation can include military security issues, this process has been dealt with adequately elsewhere. As noted, the extensive recent research on the hypothesis that democracies do not fight amongst themselves serves as an excellent example. Numerous journals have devoted entire issues to this subject. A second example is provided by extensive research on the spill-over effects of civil wars. (Lawson 1976; Whealey 1989; Rasler 1983; Rosenau 1964; Modelski 1961; Little 1975). Hence this investigation will focus on the one type of linkage that has yet to be addressed satisfactorily, that is, projection.

b: Projection: The Diversionary Theory

In a classic exposition on the causes of war, Wright (1965, 242) argued that "[societal] integration has often been

effected through the organization of opposition. By creating and perpetuating in the community... a fear of invasion..., obedience to a leader may be assured". Thus the leadership of a state experiencing internal conflict may have an incentive to address that problem by diverting or externalizing it. More precisely, an elite faced with social disintegration might attempt to restore order by directing the public eye toward a real -- or even manufactured -- external menace. Domestic strife then is expected to subside, because those within the group will put aside their differences in order to pursue the higher goal of national preservation.

Within the social sciences, the preceding argument retains extraordinary appeal. Indeed, for some forms of conflict, it is a widely accepted explanation. To cite an example from sociology, Dahrendorf (1964, 261) argues that "it appears to be a general law that human groups react to external pressure by increasing internal coherence." Thus, under a wide range of circumstances, the pursuit of domestic stability through foreign conflict would appear to have a presumably rational basis.

Similarly, many historical case studies have implicitly pointed to the existence of diversion tactics. Michon (1969), for example concluded that the French decision to go to war in 1792 could be traced to elite desires to erase perceived social problems. Levy and Valiki (1992) as well argue that the occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentina was internally

motivated.

Yet, surprisingly, a generation of data-based assessments have failed to produce a significant degree of support for the process of intentional diversion of domestic conflict (Rummel 1963; Tanter 1966; Wilkenfeld 1968, 1972; Phillips 1970; Onate 1974; Hazlewood 1975). As alluded to earlier, these failures are viewed as a function of mis-specified models. At least five basic problems combine to justify a new effort toward aggregate testing.

To begin, the manner in which time-lags are used represents a significant shortcoming in much of the quantitative work. The hypothesized link between internal and external conflict often is lagged for the purpose of identifying the direction of the causal linkage. However, the lags used -- frequently ranging from three months to two years -- are chosen primarily because of data constraints rather than proper theoretical articulation. Why is the lagged relationship three months and not five, or eight for that matter? More importantly, why does the time lag have to be identical for all hypothesized linkages? Is it not possible -- and even likely -- that certain types of domestic turmoil have a shorter lag time than others? Indeed, the fact that no relationship between internal and external conflict has been identified may reflect, at least to some extent, inappropriate use of time-lags.

A second area of concern neglected by the research

program is whether or not **intensity** and **type** of domestic turmoil play a significant role. Why would all instances of domestic turmoil have an effect on an elite's decision to use international violence as a diversionary tactic? For example, would it have been reasonable to expect President Bush to invade another country because of the riots that followed the verdict in the Rodney King trial? Although it seems odd to anticipate the choice of such extreme measures to rally the population in and around Los Angeles, this is not a fully inaccurate representation of event-based statistical testing.

Third, previous quantitative evaluations reflect a belief that **all** external conflicts must be a function of domestic turmoil in order for the theory to be validated. This is an unfair requirement; it assumes away the existence of genuine national security threats. A proper test of the theory must first determine what **types** of external conflict are likely to be the result of domestic instability.

Fourth and perhaps most importantly, the basic **nature** of the hypothesized linkage between internal and external conflict has been misunderstood. Although intuitively appealing, we still do not fully understand the causal sequence between an observed increase in the level of domestic turmoil and the decision to rally the public by external means. The emphasis on determining whether a **correlation** between internal and external conflict exists has resulted in a lack of understanding with respect to the **causal** mechanisms

involved.

Fifth and finally, the issue of international influences and how they affect the decision to divert domestic conflict has been ignored. Elites cannot simply externalize domestic turmoil at will. They must, at a minimum, determine whether they possess the resources necessary for such activity. The issue of the nature of the international system, and how it can constrain or facilitate the use of diversionary tactics, has not been raised within previous behavioral research.

The refined model presented in chapter 3 and operationalized in chapter 4 will address these major concerns. As will become apparent, the pursuit of a diversionary strategy by elites is a complicated procedure requiring multiple considerations.

Elites must decide if an external strategy can succeed in diverting domestic instability. This depends on both domestic and international considerations. Domestically, elites must determine if a target is available to rally public opinion. Some states that desire to divert their domestic instability may be unable to do so simply because a convenient target is not available. These states must in turn pursue a different strategy.

A further constraint on diversion, critical to the refined model, is the decision-making environment. From Rummel(1963) onward, the state invariably has been looked upon as a 'black box' in standard treatments of conflict linkage.

But the state -- regardless of the nature of its regime -- is much more than a unified actor that reacts to domestic conflict by projecting it into the international system (Allison 1971). Thus an elite contemplating the use of external conflict to divert domestic unrest could find that the decision-making process takes policy in a different, even undesired, direction. Therefore, the model will specify what type of decision-making environment is necessary for diversion to be a viable option.

Internationally, elites must consider the capability of a potential adversary. A diversionary strategy might backfire when an adversary has greater capability and/or resolve.

This implies that diversionary strategy is only one possible option available to elites for dealing with heightened levels of domestic instability. The refined model highlights available options and determines what constellation of forces lead to the choice of one strategy over another. The critical factors are whether or not **opportunity** and **willingness** for diversion are present.

The refined model also specifies a typology of domestic and international conflict. As will become apparent, only specific types of domestic instability are likely to lead to diversionary activity. Similarly, when a state is ready to divert its domestic conflict, it will choose from a limited set of external strategies.

Furthermore, because absolute levels of conflict are

likely to mask important differences between states, the model examines changes in the levels in internal and external conflict. Some states, such as Canada and the United States, experience relatively low levels of domestic instability over an extended period of time. Others, such as Lebanon, seem to constantly suffer from extremely high levels of domestic turmoil. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between these types of states' potential for diversionary activity.

Finally, the refined model presents a threshold level of tolerance for domestic instability. All states experience domestic instability. However, diversionary practices are not common because many systems at one time or another are capable of absorbing a portion of their domestic instability. The model specifies that diversionary activity is only possible when a polity can no longer absorb its internal conflict. The threshold level -- which varies cross-nationally -- isolates when diversionary tactics are most likely to take place.

II. Structural Realism: Source of Constraining Factors

Grieco (1988, 498-499), in an analysis of the logic of realism, linked foreign policy explicitly to international structure. He observed that, in a world of anarchy, states are most interested in trying to prevent others from improving relative capabilities. Grieco referred to the positional, as opposed to atomistic, character of foreign policy, with structure corresponding to the oligopolistic distribution of

power that conditions interaction. States act out of self-interest and attempt to maximize relative power within constraints imposed by a given structure. Anarchy plays an immanent role in conditioning behavior. Thus classical realpolitik is merged with systemic theory, resulting in what has become known as neorealism or structural realism.

Waltz (1979, 71) argues that a proper definition of structure must be "abstract from the characteristics of units, their behavior, and their interactions." Therefore, structure is defined in terms of how units (or states) stand in relation to one another. His definition of structure includes an *ordering principle*: Formally, each state is the equal of all the others. As such, international systems are decentralized and anarchic. His second structural characterization focuses on the *distribution of capabilities* of the system. Thus, the units of the system are distinguished primarily by their "greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks" (Waltz 1979, 92). The structure of the system changes when the distribution of capabilities is altered.

Structural realism, therefore, is a systemic theory based on principles borrowed from microeconomics and traditional realpolitik (Ripley 1990, 22). Maximization of utility is represented by the pursuit of power by each state as a self-interested, unitary actor. As in the standard analogy of a free market populated by rational actors, structure refers "only to the spontaneously formed unintended conditions of

action generated by the coactivity of separable firms" (Dessler 1989, 449). In a free enterprise system, producers and consumers strive for agreement on pricing based on the law of supply and demand. At some point an equilibrium emerges. The resulting structure, commonly known as the market, then has a life of its own.

Units in the international "market", understood to be sovereign states, are differentiated by power endowments and engage in foreign policies that reflect ongoing rivalry. Causal linkages are straightforward. Units arise and spontaneously form a structure, such as that of the Westphalian system of states from 1648 onward.[3] The organizing principle is one of competition among independent actors. Members of the international polity exist in a system of self-help, so the dispersion of capabilities will matter the most and determine the structure: "State behavior varies more with differences of power than with differences in ideology, in internal structure of property relations, or in governmental form" (Waltz 1986, 329). Given the lack of transnational authority, positional ordering among states is the crucial variable to monitor in explaining foreign policy.

The role of structural realism in the model is to identify international constraining or facilitating factors on the diversionary model. Although theories derived from structural realist assumptions often are used to explain the outbreak of international violence, the perspective advocated

here is that the structure of the system constrains and disposes behavior, but does not determine it.

"Structure explains only broad patterns and persistent regularities of conduct"(Dessler 1989, 466). In order to understand **why** states actually pursue the strategies they do, other elements must be introduced. For that reason, structural realism will be linked to the actor level of analysis. Within that level of analysis, the central question of why states pursue certain strategies can be examined.[4]

Structural realism is useful here because it identifies the externally-driven considerations that leaders must face before they choose to pursue a strategy that includes international conflict. Irrespective of why elites want international conflict -- indeed, the central thesis of this dissertation is that often, international conflict is driven by domestic necessities -- they must still consider factors such as power relative to a potential adversary and the anarchical nature of the international system.

III. Threats to Inference

Diversionary activity is only one way that the internal-external nexus can manifest itself. The critical threat to specification of any diversion-oriented model is that an observed increase in internal instability may be associated empirically with an increase in external conflict, but not as the result of scapegoating. The diversionary model developed

must be able to distinguish between genuine diversionary tactics and other types of linkages. Although this task will be carried out in full during the chapters dealing with model development and operationalization, highlighting a few case studies will reveal a basic concern.

Case study analysis is useful because it provides an empirical basis for building and revising theory. No theory in the social sciences can explain all of the empirical variance: there will always be outliers that do not fit the model being tested. These outliers thus become excellent subjects for study on a case-by-case basis. This allows for the identification of the important characteristics of the specific case that precludes its inclusion in the general model. Alternatively, a researcher can determine a method for coping with outliers and thus include them in the general model. Therefore, the following discussion serves as an example of case study analysis intended to enrich the general diversionary model.

a. The Diversionary Theory: Fantasy

International disputes that are caused by elite desires to extract resources from another state serves as the first threat to inference. Elites experiencing heightened levels of internal instability may seek to extract resources for the purpose of satisfying domestic consumption needs. As in diversionary motivation, domestic instability is followed by

international conflict, yet the basic logic behind resource extraction motivation is fundamentally different.[5]

The second threat refers to transnational ideological pressures. Transnational ideologies can be destabilizing for a state. The elites of a state experiencing these pressures often will target the perceived source of the threat.

Soviet reactions to the domestic changes that occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1968 serves as one an example. Often referred to as the 'Prague Spring', a peaceful revolution in May of 1968 ousted the hardline communist dictatorship in Czechoslovakia. Democratic reforms were implemented immediately. These changes were short lived because the Soviet Union intervened within weeks to restore a satellite communist government.

The post-Stalin transition period in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had resulted in a relaxation of oppressive domestic policies. The practical upshot of the Kremlin's policy to relax control was not only a greater level of freedom for individuals and satellite states, but also a dramatic increase in the level of political and social instability. Ardent nationalist sentiments in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland severely strained the tolerance levels of Moscow. Demands for intellectual freedom further exacerbated an already critical situation.

Domestically, the Soviet leadership had two major problems associated with the growth of dissent within its own

borders. First, a January 1968 trial of four intellectual dissidents had elicited unexpected protests around the world and in the Soviet Union itself. Second, nationalist demands for independence by Ukrainian dissidents reached a critical stage in the early months of 1968 (Dawisha 1984). As a sign of what was to come, a major editorial in **Pravda** on March 14 called for "greater vigilance against the subversive influence of bourgeois propaganda and other foreign ideologies" (cited in Dawisha 1984, 23). This return to hardline tactics would be endorsed officially at the April Central Committee meeting and substantively affected Moscow's approach towards Eastern European dissent in general and Czechoslovakia in particular (Dawisha 1984, 24).

At first glance this case may seem to be a perfect example of diversion. Heightened domestic instability in the Soviet Union was followed by an invasion of Czechoslovakia. However, the use of the diversionary theory to explain Soviet reactions to developments in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1968 is incorrect. It is unlikely that a Soviet government would have invaded Czechoslovakia in order to rally Soviet and other Eastern European dissenters behind the Communist banner. Rather, what seems more likely is that the **motivation** behind Soviet strategy was to (1) stall and reverse democratic developments in Czechoslovakia, (2) send a signal to other Soviet satellites that democratic reform would no longer be tolerated, and most importantly for the purposes of this

dissertation, (3) to prevent democratic ideals from further infiltrating the Soviet Union.

b: The Diversionary Theory: Reality

The Falklands War of 1982 between Argentina and Great Britain serves as an excellent example of diversion tactics. Most observers saw the war as an aberration. The issue of possession of the small group of islands off the southern coast of Argentina had been dormant for some time leading up to the war. Indeed, the islands offered little value other than pride to both state actors.[6] "Nations are expected to go to war over something more than a collection of islands in an inaccessible and inclement part of the of the South Atlantic"(Freedman 1985, 197).[7]

Yet Britain and Argentina went to war over these seemingly unimportant islands. On both sides of the Atlantic, "the war was driven by a sense of urgency and exaggerated pride"(Coll 1985, 7). Why did the islands suddenly become important enough to fight a war over on 2 April, 1982? Argentina and Great Britain went to war not for possession of the islands. Rather, in both countries, war was driven by the need to divert public attention away from escalating domestic turmoil.

March of 1976 ushered in a new period of dictatorial rule in Argentina. The motive behind the coup, which produced the junta, was an ungovernable society. In particular, the

deplorable economic situation contributed to the military's rise in power.

Called the **Proceso de Reorganizacion National**, the new military government saw as its self-imposed objective the reorganization of society in order to stabilize its economic social and political situation. In the words of General Jorge Rafael Videla, first president of the "Proceso",

> In March of 1976, our nation was gripped by one of the most profound crises of its existence, and, without a doubt, the gravest in its contemporary history... [a] total crisis, whose most salient point was the total breakdown of the institutional system, as power had reached a phase of disaggregation that left Argentina framed in a picture of increased feudalization and headed toward extinction (Buchanan 1987, 339).

The new government was relatively successful in controlling inflation and wage rates for three years. This semblance of economic stability, however, was bought at an excessive cost. In the name of social stability in general and economic stability more specifically, the new military regime waged what has been coined the "dirty little war". This war targeted potential leftist subversion. It started as "an antiguerrilla campaign and degenerated into the death, disappearance and torture of at least 25,000 civilians" (Buchanan 1987, 337).

The system of state sponsored terror had positive economic effects "... only to react very adversely to the global recession of 1979-1981" (Buchanan 1987, 357).

Recession brought to the forefront the many contradictions of the system established by the dictatorship. Inflation rates topped 500 per cent and real income dropped by more that 40 per cent. The "fiscal crisis... threatened to bring the productive process to a standstill" (Buchanan 1987, 375). To make things worse, political instability within the government emerged when President Videla retired in March of 1981. "That led to nine months of increasingly bitter factional infighting between the moderate and hardline sectors of the military hierarchy. Initially the moderates succeeded and installed one of their own (Eduardo Viola) as president" (Buchanan 1987, 375). However, the hardliners grew increasingly alarmed at the public displays of opposition that accompanied a more tolerant government and used the pretext of Viola's recurrent health problems to replace him with General Leopold Galtieri, a well-known hardliner.

Infighting between moderates and hardliners continued. Coupled with renewed economic and social turmoil, a severe domestic crisis resulted. By early 1982, the authoritarian government was on the verge of complete collapse.

> The need for internal reconstitution forced the military hierarchy to look for a common objective upon which both

> factions could agree and which simultaneously could divert domestic attention away from the economic crisis while justifying intensified repression against the rising opposition. By April 1982 an objective had been agreed upon and selected by the military hierarchy. This common objective lay 400 miles off the Patagonian coast (Buchanan 1987, 380).

Hindsight demonstrates that the decision to invade the Falklands Islands was a bad one. Britain reacted with unprecedented military force. Their success cost the Argentinean military its hold on power.

The British reaction was unexpected. Indeed, President Galtieri stated that, "although it was considered possible that Great Britain would react [violently], we did not believe that it was probable... In my judgement, it was scarcely possible and totally improbable. In any case, I never expected a reaction so violent. No one expected it" (quoted in Moneta 1984, 319).

Why did Britain react so violently? Once again, British behavior can be explained by a diversionary motivation. The 1979 general election in Great Britain brought in a new Conservative government under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher. The Conservatives had been elected under the promise to rebuild a crumbling economy. They did not achieve their stated goals and the situation continued to deteriorate under

Tory rule.

Unemployment increased by 23 per cent in May of 1980, a further 29 per cent increase was recorded in June and a whopping 49 per cent was registered for July. Two out of every three people thought that the country was in 'deep and serious trouble'. By 1981 riots in Great Britain were almost out of control. The cities of Brixton and Toxteth were practically war-zones as racial and economic riots dominated the public agenda.

One of the casualties of the economic and social turmoil was the Conservative Party's popularity ratings. Surveys taken at the time indicated that, if an election had been held early in 1982, not only would Thatcher's party lose the election, but it would place third. Her government needed an issue to rally the British public. The Argentinean invasion of the Falklands gave Thatcher just that opportunity.

By most accounts, the Falklands War helped increase the popularity levels of Thatcher and the Conservative party. Indeed, "in the space of three months, public opinion and party politics had been transformed" (Sanders 1992, 281). For example, Clark, et al. (1990) estimate that the Falklands War alone accounted for a 7.3 percent increase in conservative popularity. Similarly, Norpoth (1986) argues that the war led to a three-month increase in popularity of 11 percent. He concludes that the Falklands war "may have been crucial to the Conservatives' landslide victory" in 1983.

In sum, Britain waged war over territory that held no obvious geopolitical significance.[8] The war was fought at a time of great economic and social instability. Yet for three months, an overwhelming majority of British citizens decided to put aside differences to support the government in its time of need. The associated rise in popularity sustained itself long enough to bring back to power a government that only two and a half years earlier could not muster much more than 30 percent of popular support.

What are the fundamental differences between cases like Britain and Argentina in the Falklands War and the Soviet Union with respect to the Prague Spring? Although multiple linkages are used by elites as a method for coping with heightened levels of domestic instability, transnational ideological pressures differ fundamentally from diversion. In the case of the former, elites do not try to rally the public around a common external threat. Indeed, they cannot rally the portion of the public that is dissatisfied because it has common cause with the external threat. In other words, the external and internal threat are equated by elites, with the only difference being that the latter is within the boundaries of the state and the former is not.

Moreover, elites often will deal with the presence of transnational ideological pressure with the use of repression. If that strategy fails, the external source of threat is targeted. No such assumption is made (or is necessary) for

diversion to take place. Given the goal of rallying public opinion, internal repression would prove to be particularly counter-productive.

This characteristic highlights a further distinction between transnational ideological pressure and diversion: the objective for diversionary tactics is to **rally** the public in general. On the other hand, the objective for targeting the external source of threat in light of transnational ideological pressure is to **silence** the opposition.

IV. Contributions to knowledge

This dissertation constitutes an initial attempt to develop a formally derived model of diversion. Previous research on this topic will be questioned explicitly along the way, because both theory and data analysis exhibit serious problems.

This also is one of the initial attempts at formally linking multiple levels of analysis.[9] Different levels of analysis invariably have been brought in separately in international conflict, but this outlook is detrimental with respect to cumulation of knowledge. In linking formerly unconnected causal factors, cumulation in the field will be enhanced.

Lastly, much of the diversionary literature has focused almost exclusively on the experiences of the United States. Cross-national application of the refined model will

significantly enhance generalizability.

Why study the diversionary theory? Other than the fact that it stands as a plausible explanation for international violence, there are a number of theoretical considerations that make this approach particularly important. As Stohl (1980, 299) argues "students of revolutions, riots, and protests often ignore the external behavior of nation states. Likewise students of foreign policy and international relations often relegate internal events and conditions to positions of tertiary importance. If civil conflict and international conflict are systematically interrelated, these scholars' efforts are doomed to partiality."

The attempt to bridge explanatory factors from different levels of analysis is critical on its own as an objective. Research within international relations has tended to be compartementalized in that scholars tend to advocate the explanatory validity of one level at the expense of the others. The position taken here is that this approach has significantly inhibited cumulation of knowledge within international relations. As later chapters will demonstrate, the process of diversion (a state-level explanation for the causes of international conflict) can only be fully understood when other levels of analysis are considered. As a general rule, linking different levels of analysis increases the complexity of a theory. However, the result is also a theory that has enhanced explanatory power.

The model presented in the dissertation links not only different levels of analysis within International Relations, but it also brings together research from various sub-disciplines of political science such as British and American politics. As will become apparent in chapters 2 and 3, a proper understanding of the diversionary war hypothesis requires the introduction of research from comparative politics as well. Thus, the integrative nature of this research will further enhance cumulation of knowledge in political science.

V. Research Approach, Methodology, and Key Assumptions

Monthly data on domestic and international conflict will be collected for Great Britain, France and The United States for the period from 1945 to 1988. Although the model to be presented in chapter 3 is intended to be cross-national, data related constraints limit its present application to only these three states. The reasons for confining the testing to these states will be more fully explored in Chapter 4. Suffice to say at this point that given the complexity of the data collection procedure, the model could not be applied to a larger sample of states.

Data from various sources is employed, including the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, **The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators**, and **Gallup**. Probit analysis and other regression-style techniques will be

used to assess propositions derived from the model. The central dependent variable (external conflict) is operationalized with the use of Foreign Policy Crises.

Many previous evaluations of the conflict nexus define external conflict only with the use of wars. This is an unnecessary limitation. Conflicts between states often fall short of the use of violence. Yet this does not necessarily mean that they are not the result of diverted domestic conflict. The use of foreign policy crises as the dependent variable allows the consideration of both violent and non-violent international confrontations.

A Further Methodological Note

Although case study analysis is useful in many respects, quantitative large-n studies have a number of advantages over their qualitative small-n counterparts. As Bueno de Mesquita (1985, 122) argues, no theory can explain all of the empirical variance. The danger with small-n studies is that there is no way of knowing whether the single case being examined is merely an outlier or truly representative of the entire population.

Second, large-n quantitative studies have stringent demands for the operationalization of models -- much more so than qualitative approaches. Theoretical concepts must be defined as explicitly as possible in order to assure proper testing. Not only does this allow for well defined models, but

it also helps determine whether or not results obtained are truly significant and therefore a contribution to knowledge.

Researchers acknowledge that **sophisticated methodological falsification** is the most appropriate method of evaluating knowledge. The goal here is to only reject a theory or a paradigm if another paradigm is able to explain more of the phenomenon being studied. More specifically, assume two paradigms (or theories) 'A' and 'B'. If 'B' explains (1) all that 'A' does and (2) novel facts not considered or not explained by 'A', then 'B' is considered a better theory and 'A' has been falsified. The objective is to have order and structure in the study of social phenomena (and also natural). This means that however flawed, perspective 'A' should not be rejected until something better comes along.

Having said that, a central assumption of this dissertation is that the deductive method is the most appropriate method of creating falsifiable theory. Briefly, a researcher using the deductive method constructs theory first and then collects and analyses data. Those who use the inductive method collect and analyze data and then construct theory based on generalizations observed in the real world. Although a generalization often specifies a relationship between two or more variables, there is a risk that it is time and place dependent. Theory, by contrast, cannot be limited in that manner. Indeed, as will become apparent in chapter 2, a central reason why much of the previous evaluations of the

diversionary theory are faulty is because of the inductive nature of the theory building.

Not only must a theory be deductively derived in order to assure that it is truly falsifiable, but the number of examined cases is important as well. Although analysis of a few cases can help draw out important peculiarities of specific cases, analysis of single or few cases is not very useful in terms of falsifiability. Falsifiability necessarily is a function of the number of cases examined. Why is this so?

As pointed out earlier, there will undoubtedly always be some amount of error when attempting to isolate a causal relationship. In other words, there is no guarantee that the way in which a researcher analyses a particular case will be correct(Bueno de Mesquita 1985). Because this level of error is unknown and often impossible to know, generalizing from one case or a few cases might distort reality. On the other hand, probability theory tells us that if these errors are random, they will eventually cancel out each other. Thus, the greater amount of cases being analyzed, the greater the confidence in the generalizable results.

It goes without saying that the model to be presented in chapter 3 is probabilistic. In other words, it is not expected to accurately predict *all* instances of international conflict. Identification of exceptions to individual elements of the model is possible. However, this is not a genuine or fair test of the refined model's ability to predict conflict behavior.

What is critically important is the capacity to perform well when *all* the elements of the model are taken together.

VI. Description of Chapters

Chapter 2 presents a literature review which discusses the intellectual origins of the diversionary theory and other material relevant to this topic. Emphasis is placed on demonstrating the need for a revised model of conflict linkage. A further objective is to outline those elements of structural realism relevant for this project. As will become evident, structural realism can be synthesized with other approaches to provide a better understanding of international conflict. This sets the stage for the development of the model and attendant expectations in chapter 3. Chapter 4 operationalizes the model and presents the data. Chapter 5 tests the model. Finally, chapter 6 examines the practical implications of the findings.

Endnotes

1. Numerous treatments explain the outbreak of violence from a systemic perspective, the most prominent of which is structural realism. Parity and preponderance (Diehl and Wayman 1994; Vasquez 1980); alliances (Levy 1981; Oren 1990; Ray 1990; Singer and Small 1966; Wayman 1990); polarity configurations (Singer and Small 1973; Waltz 1979; Brecher and James 1985; Bueno de Mesquita 1978) are some of the most important system-oriented explanations for war, all of which focus in some way on the distribution of capabilities.

2. Singer (1961) distinguishes between two levels of analysis. The first is referred to as international. The focus here is on the interaction of states, viewed as unitary actors. Differences between states are discounted or downplayed. It is assumed that the international system itself influences the behavior of individual units. On the other hand, the actor level of analysis emphasizes closer examination of individual units and their behavior. Waltz (1959) identifies a third level of analysis, that of the individual. Here the focus is on individual decision makers and how they can influence international politics.

3. Regardless of the specific date selected, there is agreement that anarchy among sovereign states distinguishes the modern world from its predecessor.

4. Maoz (1994) also argues that structural characteristics provide only the opportunity for war and that the motivation for conflict resides elsewhere.

5. Resource extraction will be dealt with more explicitly in chapter 4.

6. For Argentina it was a question of sovereignty and the fact that these islands, so close to its territory, were possessed by a colonial power. For Great Britain, the islands were a throwback to a bygone era of colonial possessions. Indeed, the islands were considered more of a burden than a blessing.

7. One observer has argued that, "the war over the Falkland Islands was one of the truly unexpected events of the post-war period. No one in... the British... government conceived that the Argentine government would move to seize the islands, yet that is what they did. And no one in the Argentine government imagined that Britain would go to war over a territory... described... as 'a bleak and gloomy solitude, an island thrown aside from human use, stormy in winter and barren in summer." (Kirkpatrick 1989, 12).

8. Alternatively, it can be argued that Britain's reputation mattered for other possible confrontations, such as Gibraltar or Hong Kong.

9. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) attempt to formally link different levels of analysis. Their International Interaction Game links a **realpolitik** explanation for the outbreak of war to domestic politics. In their model, domestic politics constrains states that desire to pursue an international strategy. Theoretically, the model presented in this dissertation reverses the causal linkage and makes **realpolitik** the constraining factor.

Chapter 2

Rally Events, Domestic Instability, and the Conflict Nexus: A Review of Previous Findings

Quantitative research on the linkage between internal and external conflict began in the early 1960's. Most studies concluded that internal and external conflict were not related in any obvious fashion. However, as will become apparent, most previous evaluations of the hypcthesis contain serious theoretical shortcomings. As such, confidence in the findings and conclusions is lacking.

The chapter unfolds in three stages. First, standard treatments of the diversionary theory will be examined. The focus is on outlining how and why the event count-based studies have been unable to isolate a relationship in light of the fact that case studies have found numerous examples of the conflict nexus. Second, a discussion of related literature from other sub-fields of political science will highlight the need for proper theoretical articulation. Finally, as discussed in Chapter 1, structural realism plays a central role in the eventual research design. Therefore, the chapter also examines the central assumptions of this important paradigm in the study of international politics. The focus is on determining what elements of structure are important with respect to the diversion of domestic conflict.

I. Diversion Theory

Rummel's (1963, 71) initial assessment of conflict linkage was based on data for over 80 states during the years 1955 through 1957. A factor analysis of domestic and foreign conflict, such as riots, assassinations, and strikes, along with mobilizations and wars, failed to produce linkages across the levels of interaction. Rummel reached the conclusion that "foreign conflict behaviour is generally completely unrelated to domestic conflict behaviour."

The importance of this initial study on the content of future research was significant. As Stohl(1980, 300) argues, "subsequent studies dealing with the linkage... relied on [Rummel's] data, methodology or both." Indicators used by subsequent studies were primarily event-oriented.[1] Moreover, the statistical tools employed were exclusively factor and regression analysis.

As far as cumulation is concerned, the study had negative consequences. Rummel's work was essentially a pilot study containing little theory. His objective was simply to correlate indicators of domestic and international instability. Little emphasis was placed on determining the causal relationship between various concepts. Future research projects based on this initial study replicated the inductive nature of Rummel's work. No one questioned whether or not the entire premise was faulty from the beginning. Therefore, it is

no surprise that subsequent research merely confirmed Rummel's initial findings.

The first post-Rummel study was conducted by Tanter (1966). He built in a time lag between internal and external strife for the years 1958 through 1960 and found a slight connection that increased with incorporation of the delay. However, the model could only explain about 11.7 percent of the variance. He inferred that "there may be no 'simple' relationship between domestic and foreign conflict behaviour." Tanter concluded that there could exist a "causal relationship which is being obscured by other phenomena. That is, the relationship may be mediated by a third variable. . . ."

Hypothesizing that the standard approaches toward data aggregation could be masking important effects, Wilkenfeld (1968, 262) advocated a role for intervening variables. He argued that the type of government -- with the proposed categories being authoritarian (centrist), democratic (polyarchic) and personalist dictatorship -- might affect the conflict nexus. For authoritarian (centrist) regimes, Wilkenfeld found a limited, positive relationship between war and "revolutionary" activity. His results also linked war to "domestic turmoil" in democratic states. These findings suggest that the conclusions of Rummel and Tanter do not rule out a more elaborate connection involving internal and external conflict. Certain factors excluded from those earlier designs, such as regime type, appeared to be important to the

process. Wilkenfeld's results, however, still did not support the hypothesis that external and internal conflict are connected directly.

Aggregate research in the next decade substantiated these initial findings. Phillips (1970), for example, found that "[u]nder conditions of domestic strife, modernizing states which had experienced political instability tended to 'overreact'." These regimes responded "in a more extreme fashion to foreign hostility than otherwise would be expected." However, like Rummel and Tanter, Phillips discovered only a marginal relationship. As James (1987a) points out, Phillips' results did not constitute evidence that warfare or other serious types of conflict would be initiated by a state in response to internal disruption.

Hazlewood (1975) put forward a more complicated line of reasoning. He argued that, to a certain degree, internal dissension could be diverted outward. However, as threats to the elite become more severe, "the utility of conflict management through diversion slowly decreases. Ultimately, the elites and their factions become so divided that the use of diversion mechanisms is no longer feasible." Once such a threshold is surpassed, elite instability and foreign conflict are likely to vary inversely. Hazlewood used variables such as economic expansion and population diversity at the causal level, with technological capacity as one example of an intervening factor and external conflict within a specific

environment as the dependent variable. For the latter, he borrowed Tanter's three types of foreign strife: (1) diplomatic conflict, which encompasses negative sanctions, protests, expulsions of ambassadors, etc.; (2) war, including preparations; and (3) belligerency, such as anti-foreign demonstrations. Hazlewood's results, however, offered little support to the notion of a threshold or breakpoint for conflict linkage.

Other studies focused on the nexus of internal and external conflict in specific locations. By concentrating on an individual state or geographic region over an extended period of time, this branch of the research program attempted to overcome problems related to both the validity and reliability of evidence. With a smaller sample size, the domain would be considerably more homogeneous. Thus previously hidden patterns might be discerned more readily, presumably avoiding the problems associated with all-encompassing, cross-national analysis.

Onate (1974), for example, examined the foreign and domestic conflict of the People's Republic of China. The change to a state-specific focus, however, still did not produce a compelling case for externalization. Data on an annual basis over the period from 1950 to 1970 revealed a weak relationship between foreign and domestic conflict. After introducing essentially arbitrary time-lags, Onate found a closer statistical connection when internal conflict was the

dependent variable.

Using the same research strategy as Rummel and Tanter, Collins (1973) investigated the relationship between internal and external conflict in Africa during the period 1963-1965. Collins' (1973, 233) analysis "demonstrated a strong basis of concomitant variation between the domestic and foreign domains." However, the size of the correlation led him to believe that foreign conflict was the product of other factors as well. There was no support for the "further hypothesis that official military hostility and violence were a product of domestic disorder in the preceding year." (Collins 1973, 237)

Wilkenfeld et al. (1972) monitored conflict in the Middle East as a whole for the period 1949 to 1967. This research team found that for Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, domestic conflict played only a minor role in the explanation of foreign conflict levels. Furthermore, for Israel, government instability seemed to produce a reduction in foreign conflict. At the cross-national level, action and reaction had the greatest explanatory power. For each state, the best predictors of foreign conflict behaviour are "the conflict behaviours diverted toward it by other states."

Burrowes and Spector (1973) analyzed Syria between 1961 and 1967. Using Rummel's events data and basic research strategy, they did not find a relationship between internal and external conflict. However, unlike Tanter's study, a time lag did not improve the relationship at all.

Activity on this subject waned after the mid-1970s. Having repeatedly tested the hypothesis and found no relationship, scholars essentially agreed that the proposed linkage between domestic and international conflict was a myth. Indeed, "seldom has so much common sense in theory found so little support in practice" (James 1987a, 22).

Levy (1989, 263) described the gap between theory and evidence as disturbing, because numerous historical cases suggest that "decisions for war are frequently influenced by the domestic political interests of political elites facing internal challenges to their political authority." Levy was correctly pointing out that the conflict-nexus hypothesis was being employed as an explanation of conflict long before it was tested statistically.

Michon (1969), for example, concluded that the French decision to go to war in 1792 could be traced to elite desires to erase perceived social problems: "War would give the government dictatorial powers and would allow it to eliminate its detested enemies. For these groups, war was a grand manoeuvre of domestic politics" (in Blanning 1986, 71).

Similarly, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 has been described -- at least with respect to Russian motivation -- as an effort to "stem the tide of revolution" (White 1964, 38). Confident in Russia's ability to crush the Japanese after the latter's surprise attack at Port Arthur, the Russian minister of the interior stated that "what this country needs is a

short victorious war" (White 1964, 38).

Japan's attack was not wholly unexpected. It had been preceded by negotiations in which the Japanese had shown their willingness to reach a peaceful solution to the 'Far East' question. Russia's expansionistic policy in the Far East was perceived by the Japanese to be a direct threat to their interests. This coupled with Russian intransigence lead Japanese policy makers to the decision that war was the only solution to an increasingly uncomfortable situation (Paul 1994). Russia welcomed the war not only because of the potential domestic payoff, but also because of a mistaken belief that a great European power could not possibly succumb to an Asiatic state. (Gilbert 1984)

More recently, Levy and Valiki (1992a, 125) argue that Argentina's military regime was motivated primarily by domestic imperatives in its decision to invade the Falkland Islands in 1982. They argue that "threats to the stability of a regime, and therefore conditions conducive to scapegoating, most often stem initially from conflicts within the regime and not directly from domestic pressures."

In Argentina's case, the existence of economic and social instability was not the direct cause of scapegoating. Rather, social instability lead to "sharpened internal conflicts within an increasingly strained military regime" (Levy and Valiki 1992a, 129). The Argentinean ruling coalition was split between those that advocated greater economic liberalization,

and those that feared openness and its potential for revolutionary activity. What better way to bring the two military coalitions together could there be than creating an external target to divert attention? For Levy and Valiki therefore, the Falklands war served as a means to unify the competing military factions and thus stabilize the military junta.

It has also been suggested that British motivation for involvement in the Falklands War was also the result of diversion. Although the studies that deal with Britain's scapegoating activity will be dealt with shortly, suffice to say that domestic turmoil in Britain prior to the Falklands War was reaching crisis levels. Unemployment was at its highest post-war level. Moreover, racial tension had led to serious disturbances.

In a more general sense, Mayer (1977) argued that the primary motives for war are internal to the state. Foreign policy is a function of domestic politics, as opposed to traditional notions of the balance of power. Mayer reached that conclusion through a comparative historical study of the period since 1870, which suggests that, for self-interested governments, international politics will tend to play a role secondary to that of stabilizing civil society.

In a review of the conflict linkage research program, Levy (1989, 283) concludes that "much of the explanation for the observed discrepancy between the historical (case studies)

and the quantitative literature can be traced to flaws in the quantitative literature itself." He traced at least part of that inadequacy to the fact that "little attention is given to questions of under what kinds of conditions what kinds of states resort to what kinds of external conflict in response to what kinds of threats to security of political elites." Implying that researchers have persisted in testing an overly simplistic pre-theory, Levy (1989, 283) advocated "a causal modelling perspective".[2]

It is clear that the causal mechanism connecting foreign and domestic conflict requires further specification. The inductive approach -- which characterizes most of the quantitative evaluations thus far -- has undermined the goal of a proper understanding of the causal linkages involved. Researchers have ignored the issue of why internal conflict **should** be related to external conflict in the first place. We do not know **how** internal and external conflict are related because we do not have a theory to guide analysis.

A case in point is the use of time lags by Tanter and others. First, why employ a time lag of three months and not five, for example? Second, why must the time lag be identical for all types of linkages and states? Is it not possible that certain types of domestic conflict have a shorter lag time than others? Researchers have not considered the possibility that the lack of a statistical relationship is the result of the inappropriate use of essentially arbitrary time lags.

More importantly, why would state elites consider a 'rally'-oriented strategy in the first place? Rally strategies are pursued when government elites perceive that their hold on power is not assured. In democracies, this could mean that popularity ratings have fallen below some threshold. In other words, domestic instability is important only to the extent that it threatens government elites and triggers a desire to create some kind of target to rally public opinion. A proper theoretical discussion must specify what types of domestic instability are critical to an elite's hold in power.

This points to the likelihood that some of the event count-based indicators used by Rummel and others are inappropriate for the purposes of a proper test of the conflict linkage hypothesis. Presumably, an event like "number of anti-government demonstrations" is much more salient for the linkage than something like "number of riots". Riots do not necessarily target the government but anti-government demonstrations **do**. To treat them as equally important, like Rummel and others who are engaged in events count-data analysis do, may be unwarranted. The point of the preceding comparison is to suggest the possibility that certain types of domestic instability are best dealt with by domestic means.

Similarly, one might hypothesize that the "number of purges" will have a negative rather than positive effect on external conflict. Purges imply that elite employ a domestic strategy in dealing with domestic instability. Why would

elites purge potential challengers and then try to rally their support by external means? The answer of course, is that they would not.[3]

Assuming that anti-government demonstrations appropriately operationalize salient domestic instability, what kind of external conflict strategy can elites be expected to pursue? Would the number of anti-foreign demonstrations be appropriate? That depends on whether or not one is willing to accept the argument that anti-foreign demonstrations cancel out the effect of anti-government demonstrations. Although this hypothesis is implausible on theoretical grounds, Rummel and others in fact test for it. They then would have us believe that the absence of a **statistical** association between anti-government and anti-foreign demonstrations provides evidence for the notion that internal and external conflict are not linked in a causal way.

As will be discussed below, what is particularly problematic about the events data analyses of the internal-external nexus is that the findings of related research projects from outside of International Relations have largely been ignored. These projects are important because, when taken together, they point to the existence of a linkage between internal and external conflict.

IIa. Rally Events and Government Popularity

Focusing exclusively on the experiences of the United

States and Great Britain, a related literature examines the connection between the domestic popularity of government elite and external conflict. This line of research has been more successful in uncovering a relationship between the actor and system levels of analysis.

Taking first the experiences of the United States, Mueller(1973, 209), for example hypothesizes that certain types of international conflicts are likely to increase the levels of popularity experienced by an American President. He argues that "intense international events generate a rally effect which tends to give a boost to the president's popularity rating." More specifically, Mueller argues that, for a rally in popularity to take place, the event must be (1) international, (2) involve the participation of the President directly, and (3) 'be specific, dramatic and sharply focused'.[4] This last requirement is critical in that events that "transpire gradually, no matter how important, are excluded from consideration because their impact on public attitudes is likely to be diffused."[5]

Mueller suggests five types of international events that are likely candidates for rally events. First are sudden military interventions in another state, such as in Korea (1950) and in Lebanon (1958). Second are major military developments in an ongoing war, like the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. Major diplomatic developments -- such as the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) -- form Mueller's third category. The

fourth category -- dramatic technological events such as the first Soviet atomic test -- also are likely to become rally events. Lastly, summit meetings between the president and the head of the Soviet Union also are expected to affect a president's popularity ratings.

Mueller found that rally events were associated with an approximately five to six percent increase in popularity for American presidents.[6] However, he admits that the rally variable is not designed to stand on its own. Rather, the rally variable helps account for sporadic upturns in a general downward trend explained primarily by the 'coalition-of-minorities' variable.

This variable predicts that "a president's popularity would show an overall downward trend as he is forced on a variety of issues to act and thus to create intense, unforgiving opponents of former supporters." (Mueller 1973, 205) In other words, by virtue of the fact that presidents make decisions, they necessarily alienate potential voters. The greater the number of actions, the greater the level of alienation and ultimately the greater the loss of support. The variable itself is measured by time; the longer in office, the lower the popularity of a president.

Building on Mueller, Lee (1977) finds a positive rally following a major international event, regardless of the success or failure of U.S. policy. For each event that meets Lee's criteria for a possible rally event, presidential

popularity ratings are taken before and after the event. He then measures the duration of the rally event by the number of months it takes presidential popularity to return to pre-event levels. For Lee, the above-noted results are probably a function of the fact that the "president becomes the focus of national attention in times of crisis... symbolizing national unity and power... The average man's reaction will include a feeling of patriotism in supporting presidential action, a desire not to hurt a President's chance of success" (Lee 1977, 253).

Brody (1991) takes a similar point of view when he argues that international crises are 'special moments' in public opinion. Brody adds a qualification to Mueller's list of rally prerequisites. He argues that an international crisis is likely to lead to an increase in popularity when "events are breaking at an unusually rapid pace, when the administration has a virtual monopoly of information about the situation, opposition political leaders tend to refrain from comment or to make cautiously supportive statements. Opposition spokespersons are motivated to alter their normal stance by an unknown mix of patriotism and outrage at the threat to the country" (Brody 1991, 63-64). In other words, successful rally events are associated with bipartisan support for the president's actions and are so presented on media. Using a case study methodology, Brody finds strong support for the hypothesized relationship.

Focusing on Great Britain, a further group of studies examine the effect that the Falklands War of 1982 had on the popularity ratings of the Thatcher government. Crewe (1985), for example, observes that between the time of the Argentinean invasion on March 31, 1982 and the British victory of June 14, Conservative support in the opinion polls increased by some 15 percentage points. He concludes that "in the space of three months, public opinion and party politics had been transformed."

Dunleavy and Husbands(1985) also concur that the Falklands war substantially increased government popularity. Their model -- which contains only two independent variables, unemployment and a Falklands dummy variable -- accounts for 87 per cent of the variance in government popularity between September 1979 and April 1983. Dunleavy and Husbands also agree that the Falklands lead to about a 15 percent increase in popularity for Thatcher's Conservatives.

In a similar study, Norpoth(1986) finds that unemployment and the Falklands war were the two most important predictor variables for British government popularity during the early 1980s. Norpoth's estimates however, are slightly more conservative that those of Dunleavy and Husbands'. Norpoth finds that the "Falklands effect" had an eleven point positive influence on government popularity between May and June of 1982. This increase was sustained long enough to help the Conservatives win the next election.

Although not explicitly concerned with the diversionary theory of war, these "rally" studies demonstrate the existence of a linkage between the different levels of analysis. Popularity ratings do in fact seem to be affected by the existence of external conflictual phenomenon. What is important to point out however, is that popularity in these studies is the dependent variable. Intense crises lead to gains in popularity. To make the inferential leap that low popularity leads to international crises is inappropriate.

Given this limitation, why are these studies important for a proper understanding of the diversionary theory of war? If the findings of these studies are correct, and only certain types of external conflict are associated with increased levels of government popularity, the attempt to link domestic instability to all types of foreign conflict -- as is common practice in the diversionary theory of war literature -- is simply inappropriate. Therefore, a distinction between types of cases must be made. The objective in doing this, of course, would be to determine what types of international conflict are the result of domestic instability.

IIb. Economic Instability and Government Popularity

What remains unexplored by the rally-based studies is the question of what causes a collapse in government popularity in the first place. A preliminary consensus has emerged around the notion that economic indicators are the best predictors of

government popularity.

Writing about the experiences of the United States, Hibbs(1982) finds that macroeconomic performance indicators -- such as unemployment and income growth rates -- have a "sizable impact" on presidential evaluations in the long - term. With respect to the most salient of macroeconomic indicators, Hibbs finds that, overall "the public is about twice as inflation as unemployment-averse when sustained policy effects are considered." Perhaps the reasons for this have to do with the fact that inflation has the potential to affect more people than unemployment. An increase in unemployment hurts only those with no jobs. However, high inflation has ramifications for all segments of society.

Similarly, Brody(1991, 91) argues that "because the president is the nation's chief policy-maker, it would be reasonable and just if the state of the economy figured prominently in the public's evaluation of presidential job performance." Brody proposes two models for explaining how government popularity is affected by economic indicators. The first model, referred to as 'direct effects', hypothesizes that the "more the individual is affected by the performance of the economy, the more closely tied will his or her evaluation of presidential job handling be on the performance of the economy" (Brody 1991, 96). In other words, Brody proposes that we are sensitive to economic performance and judge the president -- as chief economic policy-maker --

according to how we are personally affected.

The second approach -- referred to as the spectator model -- proposes that the economy is not a unique area of policy. It is like others, in which direct personal experience is much less widespread. Under this construction, the central hypothesis follows these lines: "Irrespective of personal circumstances and experiences, a failing economy will be reflected in negative presidential job ratings, a succeeding economy in positive ratings" (Brody 1991, 91).

Using bivariate regression for the period between 1949 and 1985, Brody finds different effects for democratic and republican presidents. Republican presidents' popularity seem to be more affected by inflation, and democrats', by unemployment. However, Brody notes that economic indicators account for only **part** of the variance in government popularity.[7]

This odd finding may be the result of differences in the electoral base of each type of president. Democratic presidents generally receive greater support from the poorer segments of American Society. Unemployment is a serious problem for these groups, therefore, Democratic presidents loose comparatively greater support when it increases. These groups are unlikely to support a Republic president even when unemployment is under control.

Alternatively, the wealthier segments of society generally vote for Republican presidents. An increase in

unemployment is less likely to affect this cohort and thus a Republican president's popularity. Comparatively speaking, the wealthier elements of society will be more affected by inflation. Thus, when inflation increases, Republican President's popularity will suffer.

MacKuen(1983) as well acknowledges that economic indicators explain only part of presidential popularity. Examining the years 1963-1980, he finds that political and military events, such as demonstrations, political speeches and wars, also influence levels of presidential popularity. MacKuen (1983, 187) concludes by arguing that "a president cannot, and need not, rely on economic success to maintain his political support."

Kernell incorporates economic indicators in his model on determinants of presidential popularity. However, instead of looking at absolute levels of macroeconomic indicators, Kernell speculates that the American voter has a fleeting political memory and therefore only short-term changes in performance are important. Kernell's results are inconclusive. Although economic indicators seem salient, none of his coefficients are particularly large nor significant.

More promising results have been uncovered by studies that focus on economic indicators and voting behaviour. Erikson(1989) conducts a time series analysis of the post war U.S. elections incorporating campaign oriented indicators as well as economic variables. His economic variable is defined

as the "cumulative weighted average of annual percentage change in per capita disposable income over the previous four years." His campaign oriented variable is an aggregate of respondents likes and dislikes about the presidential candidates' personal characteristics.

Taken together, the two independent variables account for 90 per cent of the variance in the voting of the incumbents share of the vote. More importantly, the *beta* of the economic variable was 20% higher than the campaign oriented independent variable (0.63 vs. 0.52).

A second study conducted by Markus(1992) on eight presidential elections (1956-1984) confirmed initial results. Using per capita income as the central economic independent variable, Markus found that "each 1 per cent real increase in per capita disposable personal income raises the vote for the incumbent by 1.9 percentage points" (s.e. = 0.2).

In their seminal piece on government popularity and economic performance for the United Kingdom, Goodhart and Bhansali(1970) find statistically significant affects for inflation and unemployment. However, the unemployment and inflation variables are in virtually every instance dwarfed by the lagged endogenous term (i.e., the previous months' party rating); and also frequently exceeded by the 'honeymoon' effect, electoral cycle, and pre-election effects.

Husbands(1986) examines the effects of unemployment on government popularity in Britain for the years 1966-1983.

Modelling different governments separately, Husbands finds that unemployment on its own cost the Labour government from 1966 to 1970 6 points of popularity, the subsequent conservative government from 1970 to 1973 4 points, and the conservative government from 1979 to 1983 2 points. The 1974-1979 Labour government was not affected by unemployment rates in any meaningful manner.

A subsequent study by Miller and Mackie(1973) found that none of the economic performance variables add much to the ability to predict government popularity ratings. They conclude by stating that the "evidence is against a simple view of politics in which the electorate chooses between competing teams of economic managers, base their choice on only two economic variables."[8]

At least one observer has noted that "taken together the studies present a somewhat muddled picture of the politico-economic nexus that has been an assumption of political observers. The best indicator of the weak nature of the studied link is the repeated finding that the previous month's popularity rating is a much stronger 'predictor' of this month's score than the combined effects of any economic measures."

Part of the problem is that the nature of the economic indicators employed may be inappropriate. As suggested by Brody, objective macroeconomic performance indicators may affect the individual voter less that subjective judgements

about individual economic prospects for the future. Beginning from that assumption, Sanders et al.(1987a) hypothesized that economic **expectations** are likely to be the best predictors of government popularity. They argue that "other things being equal, the more optimistic people are about the future... the more likely they are to support the incumbent government in order to sustain the very status quo that produced their optimism in the first place." (Sanders et al. 1987a, 286)

Testing their hypothesis on U.K. Gallup poll questions concerned with whether or not respondents believe that, (a), the general economic situation and, (b), their own household's financial situation' will improve over the next twelve months, they find significant support for their hypothesis. With only four independent variables -- one that directly measures personal expectations and three that indirectly measure the general state of the economy -- they were able to account for 87% of the variance in government popularity.

In a different paper, Sanders(1987b) models both macro-economic data and personal economic expectations as predictors of government popularity. His model includes inflation and unemployment rates as well as interest and exchange rates as objective macro-economic indicators. His fifth independent variable, of course, is *personal economic expectations*. All independent effects have coefficients in the expected direction, but the two best predictors of popularity for the period 1987-1990 are personal expectations and interest rates.

Sanders implies that interests rates can also be treated as being subjective in nature because of the high proportion of variable interest borrowers in Great Britain. Any increases in the interests rates have a direct affect on people's disposable income.

Sanders goes one step further and attempts to determine the causes for a public's changing expectations. He finds that for the 1987-1990, inflation rates were the best predictor of changing economic expectations. This implies that with a proper lag structure, macro-economic indicators can once again be seen as the most salient determinants of government popularity.

In sum, Economic factors, whether one is speaking of inflation, unemployment, cost of living, or economic prospects for the future, do seem to have an important role in predicting the popularity ratings of government elites. The findings of these economic studies have important implications are far as the diversionary theory are concerned. They demonstrate that only certain types of domestic indicators are likely to affect government approval ratings. The attempt by the diversionary theory literature to link all types of domestic conflict to international conflict may be questioned on these grounds.

Taking the rally and economic instability literatures together, a more precise picture of the linkage between domestic and international conflict unfolds. The related

literature demonstrates that the causal linkage between domestic and international conflict is more complicated than presented by standard treatments of the conflict nexus hypothesis.

Not all conflict linkage studies have fallen victim to the above noted pitfalls. One study has incorporated a number of the theoretical developments already discussed. More specifically, Morgan and Bickers (1992, 12) refer to their reformulated diversionary model as "more limited and precise than previous arguments." They argue that it is important to distinguish between loss of presidential support from within the ruling coalition and from outside groups. "If support among members of the ruling coalition is eroding, we can expect the leader to attempt to mollify them or to use an external threat to rally their support. On the other hand, when the loss of support comes from members of society who are not needed for the leader to maintain control, it will at best be ignored and at worst dealt with harshly" (Morgan and Bickers 1992, 11). Thus, only those challenges which directly threaten the leadership of elites are deemed important.

Their results are promising. Applying the model to the United States for the period 1953-1976 and using partisan Gallup data as independent and data from the **Militarized Interstate Dispute** (MID) dataset as dependent variables respectively, they find strong support for their reformulation. The probability of an external incident was

significantly greater when the level of partisan approval in the previous quarter was low, and less likely following quarters when partisan approval was high (Morgan and Bickers 1992, 18). Moreover, they also found that aggregate support for the president is **not** a determinant of foreign conflict behaviour.[9]

Although a step in the right direction, Morgan and Bickers study has an important limitation. The ability to apply the model cross-nationally is limited. This is true of the rally literature in general. Indeed, much of the promising research on linking domestic and international conflict has focused almost exclusively on the United States or the United Kingdom. As such, we lack a theory applicable to all types of states, regardless of their regime type or geographic location.

III. Structural Realism

Improper theoretical specification is the central reason why the quantitative literature has failed to produce an association between domestic and international conflict, but it is not the only one. The conflict nexus literature has assumed that constraints are not operative on elites once they decide to divert attention away from domestic problems. This perspective is too simple. The decision to divert must be re-examined in the light of anticipated systemic considerations. Elites may want to externalize, yet be unable to do so given

potential international reactions.

Therefore, a primary assumption for any reformulated approach should be that a synthesis of factors at different levels of aggregation are required for a more complete understanding of why states use violence in international disputes. Although the independent variables will come from the actor-level, structural imperatives figure prominently in the model as well. Structural realism, with its emphasis on the anarchical international system, is the most appropriate system-level approach for the purposes of the eventual research design.

From two standard sources, including one classic and one modern, Keohane (1989, 38-39) derives three fundamental assumptions of structural realism. The first concerns the units of the system:

1. The most important actors in world politics are territorially organized entities (city-states and modern states).

Economic theory provides the basis for a second assumption about political processes at the international level:

2. State behaviour can be explained rationally.

Similar to firms in a market, states optimize. This expectation, however, is not intended to hold true at all times and all places. As Dessler(1989) argues,

> The rationality assumption implies that states are units carefully calculating the costs of alternative courses of action and seeking to maximize their expected utility. Rationality makes survival possible. In particular, rational responses to structural constraints enhance the prospects for survival.

Therefore, although irrational behaviour in international politics is possible, it is unlikely to be rewarded. In reference to this, Dessler (1989, 466) argues that "in an office building, we do not find people attempting to walk through walls, crawl through air-conditioning ducts, or leave via upper-story windows. Rationality dictates the use of hallways, staircases and elevators, and ground-floor exits; those who are not rational will be 'selected out' of the system (they will lose either their jobs for travelling from one office to another through air-conditioning ducts or their lives for exiting from top-floor windows).

Third, structural realism emphasizes the role played by the lack of a central government in explaining state behaviour in the modern world. Thus,

3. The international system is characterized by anarchy.

In his description of the basic propositions of realism, Grieco (1988, 488) mentions anarchy as the "principal force shaping the motives and actions of states." Each state will be concerned with its position in the hierarchy. The capabilities possessed by other individual system members and coalitions (hostile or friendly) will be monitored. It almost goes without saying that changes in the distribution of power make up an especially important part of the environment. In the most extreme instance, a state might enter or exit the system, thereby altering the balance of power in a qualitative manner.[10]

Interests pursued by states are conveyed by a fourth additional axiom:

4. States seek power and calculate their interests in terms of power, relative to the nature of the international system that they face.

This last axiom emphasizes the competitive nature of international relations. Cooperation among states is rare, and when it does occur it is often sovereignty based. Even if two states can gain in an absolute sense, cooperation still might

not develop because of concerns about relative standing. Mutually beneficial cooperation (in absolute terms) regarding security, economic or other issues will be eschewed if the gains accruing to another state are deemed too high, because a future clash with that actor cannot be ruled out. Realists can cite centuries of confrontation and warfare as evidence for the omnipresent pursuit of power by states. Thus, *states focus on maximizing their chances for survival in a hostile international system by manoeuvring to weaken dangerous opponents*.

The proposition is particularly important because it is directly challenged by this dissertation project. The diversionary theory -- as to be presented in the next chapter -- specifies that some instances of international conflict are motivated by domestic consumption needs, not genuine national security threats as suggested by structural realism.

The inability to account for non-systemic motivations for international conflict is perhaps one of the most serious shortcomings of structural realism. Along those lines, James and Hristoulas (1994) find that realpolitik type variables are useful in accounting for U.S. crisis involvement. Yet realpolitik provides only an incomplete picture for crisis activity. Domestic political processes are also found to have an important influence. Presidential success, presidential approval rating, and the timing of elections are a few of the concerns that affect U.S. actions beyond national security

concerns.

Goertz and Diehl (1994) similarly are able to predict the use of military force by colonial powers in cases of decolonization through a model that includes both realpolitik and non-realpolitik factors. Their results indicate that the power status of the colonial power is a significant influence on its decision to resist decolonization with military force. They note that these results are consistent with the expectations of the realist model. However, they also identify an "international norm of decolonization that calls for the peaceful relinquishment of colonial territory." This norm exhibits a inhibiting influence on state decisions to use military force. Indeed, it exercises a greater influence than the realpolitik factors and helps explain why colonial powers have been willing to give up territory without a fight, even when self-interest would suggest otherwise.

Both studies are embedded within the realist tradition in that anarchy and the distribution of power are central to the understanding of international politics. However, they acknowledge that paradigmatic evolution is necessary.

A similar position is taken here as well. The present endeavour only seeks to refine a subset of the specified axioms by incorporating other levels of analysis. First, the assumptions of anarchy (# 3) and state dominance (# 1) are not dependent on treating domestic political activity as a constant. Second, the rationality assumption (# 2) complicates

the task at hand only to the extent that states must consider systemic and domestic imperatives when deciding whether to pursue hostile foreign strategies. In other words, an elite must decide if a strategy is rational both domestically and internationally.

Third, there is nothing inconsistent between diversionary motivation and the structural realist claim that states are concerned with relative power (# 4). Mastanduno et al. (1989, 464-65) argue that "while the survival of the state in the international arena requires the defense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation-state, domestically it demands that the state meet and overcome challenges from, and maintain the support of, societal groups and coalitions." In other words, a state cannot guarantee its security by enhancing relative power unless its elite have the support of domestic groups.

Where structural realists may be incorrect however, is the question of the *origin* of a threat. As noted, structural realism discounts the possibility that a threat may emerge from within the state itself. It is precisely here where the most salient changes to structural realism are required. Given this, "realist theory should be modified to indicate that when security needs are paramount, states will act in a manner predicted by realpolitik models; correspondingly, other motives may be dominant or coequal depending on the issue area or stakes in a conflict" (Wayman and Diehl 1994).

Therefore, a distinction must be made between types of international conflict. One subset would include those cases that can be explained by realpolitik type variables. Alternatively, another subset would focus on cases that are explained by other types of motivations, such as diversion. This task will be fully explored in the next chapter, which explicitly deals with the development of the refined diversion model.

Having said that, the elements of structure deemed relevant for this project refer to the *distribution of capabilities* in the system and the *balance of power*. The balance of power and the number of great powers in an international system is of paramount importance to structural realists. This is because the structure of the international system is defined as the distribution of capabilities or power among the units in the system. Most structural realists measure the distribution of power by simply counting the number of particularly powerful states relative to the remaining states in the system" (Mansfield 1993, 107). Systems with two major competing states are bipolar. Alternatively, multipolar systems are composed of more than two competing great powers.[11]

An international system's number of poles is argued to have important implications with respect to the propensity for war. Some content that multipolar systems are more stable and thus less war prone (Deutsch and Singer 1973). The argument in

favour of multipolar systems is relatively straight forward. A larger number of major states allows for a greater number of opportunities for cross-cutting interaction. The by-product of this type of interaction is that it becomes increasingly difficult to view any one state as an ally or enemy. As Wayman (1985, 116) argues, "an enemy on one issue becomes an ally on another." Moreover, the greater the number of poles, the less attention any single major power receives. This divided attention makes escalating arms races less likely. By contrast, in a system with two competing powers, each action by one state is more likely to be viewed as a direct threat to the other. In sum, it is argued that the possibility for global war is enhanced by the zero-sum nature of bipolar systems.

Alternatively, Waltz (1964), Gaddis (1986) and others counter that bipolarity is in fact more stable than multipolarity. With only two leading powers, the system is said to be easier to manage. Well defined spheres of influence imply that conflicts will be easier to control. Finally, the preponderant resources of the two leading states should encourage them to act as system managers. Adventurism by clients is likely to be restrained.

Although empirical evidence supports both points of view, a consensus seems to have emerged over the notion that, in general, bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity. Indeed, James(1994, 12) argues that "several studies have produced

evidence that a system with two central powers is less prone to damage from warfare with no study resulted in uniform support for multipolarity."

For example, Levy(1985), testing the polarity hypothesis on data collected on Great Power wars going back to 1495 found that on average, bipolar systems were more stable than multipolar systems.[12] Levy operationalizes stability using various indicators. These include the frequency, or the number of wars in a given period; magnitude, referring to the total nation-years of war; and, severity, measured by the number of battle fatalities. With the exception of frequency of wars, bipolar systems scored the most stable on all indicators.

Haas (1970) applies the polarity debate to 21 geographic subsystems from the eighteenth century onward. Although he does not conclusively uncover that bipolar systems are more stable, he does find that if "a state or group of states is willing to accept longer wars... bipolarity provides escape from the more war-prone character of historical multipolar subsystems. Hopf (1991) as well, finds that bipolarity is less warlike.

Brecher, James and Wilkenfeld (1990) argue that bipolar systems are the most stable. Employing two measures of polarity, they test their model on data collected on international crises since 1918. They found that crises occurring in multipolar systems were more likely to involve military hostilities and pose a higher threat to state values.

Previous research on externalization has almost completely ignored the potential influence that the structure of the international system has on the ability to divert domestic instability. Although the nature of the linkage between the structure of the international system and diversion of domestic conflict will be dealt with explicitly in the next chapter, suffice to say at this point in time that systemic considerations may have a powerful affect on the propensity to divert domestic instability.

Further concerns with the Rationality Assumption

Rationality is central to the diversion model. An extended discussion of this assumption is necessary given the fact that it has been heavily challenged in the international relations literature.

First, scholars who look at the **nature** of a state's internal organization argue that foreign policy is not the result of calculations by one (or a few) individual. Instead, it is a product of compromise, consensus, bargaining, and domestic opinion, none of which is conducive either to deciding rationally or in accord with the national security interests of the state (Allison 1971; Halperin and Kanter 1985; Art 1985).

Second, the political psychology school provides an array of anecdotal evidence that further challenges the rational actor assumption. Political psychologists point to cognitive

and motivated biases that hinder rational decision making (Jervis 1976; Holsti and George 1975; Lebow 1981; Bronfenbrenner 1960; Stein 1992; Janis and Mann 1977; Lebow and Stein 1989; Steinberg 1989). Despite differences, both the 'cognitive' and 'motivational' models maintain that leaders are plagued by a number of decisional pathologies. Specifically, in times of crisis, leaders rely on past experience to define present realities, engage in post-decisional rationalizations, remain insensitive to information that challenges previous commitments and use inappropriate historical analogies, just to cite a few of the recognized problems.

There are various methodological reasons why many of the criticisms levelled by political psychology do not pose a serious challenge to this research endeavour. First, there is a tendency within this literature to focus on policy failures; case selection is not random. Although the insights of political psychology remain relevant, non-random case selection is inappropriate for the purpose of falsifying theory. Indeed, Lakatos is critical of this form of falsification: "Simple tests of a given theory against the empirical record at a given point in time" constitute "naive falsification". While an approach based on political psychology may be superior for the descriptive purposes, it is not as useful when the goal is generalization.[13]

Along different lines, Nicholson(1992) argues that

politicians are accustomed to dealing with higher-than-average levels of stress. He asserts that "if [politicians] are not able to act effectively under stress, they will not get very far in the profession... thus there is some form of indirect selection of effective crisis decision makers". Clearly, one can safely assert that the stress associated with the duties of a national decision-maker is so high that only a handful of individuals can cope with it. Alternatively, the quest for public office may serve as a natural selection process whereby only those individuals with higher than normal tolerances for stress can survive.

In reference to the effects of stress on decision making, a range of case studies also seem to favour an interpretation based on rational behaviour. From a review of the results of five case studies conducted by the International Crisis Behaviour (ICB) Project, Richardson (1988, 313-314) concludes that "stress may have positive effects on crisis decision-making." He describes the central finding of the ICB Project's investigations as follows: "crisis-induced stress did not have the pervasive, adverse consequences for coping which one of the most prominent theories of crisis decision-making [i.e., psychological modelling] would lead one to expect." Information processing and judgment, in other words, are better in crisis situations than might have been anticipated by students of political psychology, who tend to emphasize the roles played by misperception and error.

In summarizing the results of several studies dealing with international crises, Oneal (1988, 605) observed that, with a smaller number of [internal] actors involved, "fewer quasi-independent interests will have to be accommodated." Senior officials also tend to be "generalists", with a lower inclination toward bargaining intended to protect "narrow bureaucratic interests." Furthermore, "centralization of authority, decline in partisan politics, and greater acceptance of the leader's responsibility that typically occur during crises create an opportunity for leadership and innovation." In fact, even some critical interpretations of rational choice seem to emphasize that intense conflicts are the situations most conducive to that perspective on decision making about foreign policy (Singer 1989, 12).

Achen (1989, 11) extended the argument in favour of rational choice beyond the crisis domain, arguing that outcomes within the state are "representable as those of a unitary rational actor whose preferences are an average of the participants' preferences, as weighted by their power to influence the central decision-maker." Thus descriptions of bureaucratic politics "do not contradict the unitary rational actor assumption"; instead, "they actually imply it." An intense international conflict would constitute a limiting case, with only a few interests to be aggregated. In sum, with real or potential military hostilities at hand, there are sound reasons to expect rational choice by national leaders;

even under routine conditions, coherence may be commonplace in the realm of security, at least at the level of output.

Part of the inconsistency in the findings between political psychology and advocates of rational choice may have to do with the nature of the evidence used by political psychology. Most of the studies use the classic experimental research design.[14] Although this type of design tends to be very strong in demonstrating causal inference between independent and dependent variables, it is artificial and thus weak on **external** validity.

Experimental designs lack external validity because their is no way to guarantee that the observations made during the experiment also occur outside of the laboratory. Briefly, this is because the test subjects are often not chosen randomly and the method of controlled introduction of stimuli is artificial in nature.[15]

A similar critique can be levied against **prospect theory** (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Prospect theory, as a theory of choice or decision-making, predicts risky behaviour in order to avoid losses and risk aversion in the domain of gains.[16] However, there are a number of conceptual and methodological problems with the theory. First and foremost, many of the rigorous tests of prospect theory have relied on the classic experimental design for evidence. Once again, external validity becomes a serious concern.

Prospect theory is dependent on a "reference point" to

distinguish between gains and losses in choice. This reference point also has been referred to as the 'status quo' in the general prospect theory literature. Although this may be controlled easily in the classic experimental design setting, the location of such a reference point in international relations may be problematic or, at best, difficult to isolate. Furthermore, outside of the controlled environment of the classic experimental design, choices often depend on those of an adversary. Moreover, such choices are often framed in the context of future gains and losses.

Levy(1992, 294-295) argues that

> few of the conditions are satisfied in the highly unstructured choice problems which foreign policy decision-makers typically face... [moreover] it is difficult to evaluate and compare prospects, and to rule out the alternative explanation that one prospect is chosen over another not because of framing.

The 1990 Gulf War highlights the above-noted concerns. Was Iraq's decision not to evacuate Kuwait following U.N. Security Council resolutions and U.S. threats a function of the fact that they perceived such a move to be a loss? Probably not - Kuwait had been invaded only days before the Western threats were mounted. Even if reputation guided Saddam Hussein after the occupation, the argument that withdrawal

from Kuwait would be considered a loss for Iraq broadens the definition of that concept too greatly. If, on the other hand, the occupation of Kuwait is considered a gain for Iraq, then prospect theory would predict a more conciliatory attitude on the part of Iraq. This simply did not occur. The purpose of this illustration is to demonstrate that it may be prohibitively difficult to determine when a situation is considered a loss or a gain.

Since rational choice theory can be derived "from a small set of assumptions which are normatively appealing" it is more parsimonious than prospect theory (Levy 1992b, 296). It also does not require the difficult assessment of a reference point. In order for prospect theory to **replace** rational choice, it must demonstrate (1) the existence of framing; and (2) loss aversion. As Levy(1992b) acknowledges, the burden of proof is on prospect theory to demonstrate that it is superior to rational choice, most notably, expected utility theory.

In sum, Bueno de Mesquita (1981), James (1988), Spanier and Uslaner (1989, 265) and Rourke (1990, 135) have noted that rational, unitary choice by governments is most accurate in describing <u>crisis</u> situations. Time constraints effectively remove many of the informal channels of communication that operate in non-crisis situations and sometimes produce effects unintended by those at the top.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined a number of problems associated with the standard treatments of the conflict linkage hypothesis. First, domestic instability is often believed to be associated with international conflict in a linear fashion. In fact, if one probes the specified relationship more carefully, this belief generally is incorrect. As implied by Brody, Morgan and others, domestic instability itself cannot lead to international conflict. Rather, the relationship is mediated by an intervening variable: Domestic instability has the **potential** to cause international conflict only if it threatens the position of governing elites. This is so, because as Morgan and Bickers (1992, 7) argue, political leaders are "more sensitive to the support they receive from key segments of society that allow them to remain in power rather than the overall level of societal support".

Second, previous treatments have sought to explain all types of external conflict. This is an unnecessary limitation. Not all types of foreign conflict have the potential to increase elite popularity. For example, Reagan's Central American foreign policy -- especially with respect to the funding of the Contras in Nicaragua -- was not popular. Most polls taken at the time indicate that there was a two to one margin against funding the Contras (Sobel 1992). Moreover, contrary to what might be expected given the diversionary theory, Vietnam did not increase the popularity of American presidents.[17] Some activity -- such as US involvement in

World War II -- results from genuine national security threats. These types of conflicts are unlikely to be related to domestic instability as anticipated by the diversionary theory.

It seems clear that domestic instability leads to a drop in government popularity. Collapses in popularity are not simply a question of time as Mueller proposes with his coalition-of-minorities variable. Rather, concrete issues and how a leader deals with them are important with respect to how he will be viewed by the public. Moreover, there seems to be some agreement that economic instability is the most salient type of domestic turmoil with respect to the issue of elite popularity.

The evidence with respect to whether or not international events affect popularity is much more convincing. Depending on the type of international event, elite popularity can increase dramatically. The missing element for the purposes of this dissertation is whether or not decreases in elite popularity (caused by domestic instability) lead governments to search out international conflict in order to divert public attention.

The task of the next chapter is to synthesize these theoretical developments into a general model of diversionary conflict activity. Findings from outside the standard treatments of the conflict nexus warrant a reexamination of this intuitively appealing, yet complicated frame of

reference.

Endnotes

1. Most of the studies used some combination of the following indicators: (1) domestic conflict behaviour: number of assassinations; number of general strikes; presence of guerrilla warfare; number of government crises; number of purges; number of riots; number of revolutions; number of anti-government demonstrations; and number of people killed due to domestic violence; (2) external conflict behaviour: number of anti-foreign demonstrations; number of negative sanctions; number of protests; number of countries with which diplomatic relations were severed; number of ambassadors expelled or recalled; number of threats; presence of military action; number of wars; number of troop movements; number of mobilizations; number of accusations; and, number of people killed in all forms of foreign conflict behaviour.

2. Along the same lines, Mack (1975, 617) observed that scholars in the research program had become "so totally immersed in the technical 'puzzles' posed by the use of different statistical techniques that the fact that there is no established paradigm has escaped their [the researchers'] attention". As a means toward a fully specified model, see Putnam (1988).

3. One might suggest that Saddam Hussein did exactly this in the months prior to the Iran-Iraq war. Although this war can be seen as a conflict nexus case, it is not consistent with the scapegoat

hypothesis. This special case, and others similar to it, are dealt with explicitly in chapter 4.

4. Building on Mueller, Kernell (1987, 513) adds to this the stipulation that the potential rally event must "make the front page for at least five consecutive days... to guarantee widespread public awareness". Although the choice of five days is essentially arbitrary, this requirement is useful in that it provides simple operational criteria for identifying international incidents that are likely to have a strong domestic impact.

5. Thus sudden changes in the bombing levels in Vietnam would be expected to elicit a reaction, while a gradual increase of American troops would not be anticipated to have such impact.

6. Actually, Mueller found that a president could expect a five to six percent drop in popularity in a given year if he did not have a rally event.

7. Both Brody and Mueller acknowledge, however, that objective economic indicators such as inflation and unemployment are not as strong predictors of government popularity as other variables. In particular, Mueller's "coalition of minorities" swamps any economic effects presented in his model.

8. Subsequent studies on both the United States and the United Kingdom have found a weak relationship between economic performance and government popularity. Generally all of these studies have found lagged-endogenous and electoral cycle affects to be much stronger predictors of government popularity.

9. Along similar lines, Lindsay, Sayrs and Steger (1992, 21) speculate that one possible reason for the weak relationship between foreign policy behaviour and presidential approval "... may be that presidents are less concerned with the public at large than with what is happening on Capitol Hill".

10. Metaphysically, the assumption of anarchy might be restated as follows: The only guarantee of survival for an individual unit in a closed system is assertion of sovereignty in whatever way that becomes necessary. Thus it is assumed that human nature will produce an anarchical outcome in such an environment. This inference, to be more exact, effectively links Waltz's (1959) first image to structural realism as a theory from the third image.

11. "Poles" of power have been defined in terms of coalitions of states rather than individual states. See for example, Singer and Small, 1968; Haas, 1970; Wallace, 1973; Bueno de Mesquita, 1975; and Stoll and Champion, 1985.

12. For Levy, two periods since 1495 are characterized as having bipolar structures. The first is 1495-1556 and the second, 1945-.

13. Ultimately, this distinction is best brought out by the difference between idiographic and nomothetic research designs. The idiographic model aims at explanation through the examination of unique considerations of a given action or event. Alternatively, nomothetic models are designed to discover those factors that are most important in explaining classes of actions or events (Babbie 1993, 71).

14. The classic experimental design includes two groups of subjects. Both groups are matched according to criteria spelled out by the researcher. Pre-tests are performed on both groups and then an independent effect is introduced to only one. Subsequent changes are measured in a post-test. Any variance in scores between the pre- and post-test is a function of the introduction of the independent variable. (see Kinder and Palfrey, 1993).

15. See Babbie (1993); Manheim and Rich (1991); Bernstein (1992); Kinder and Palfrey (1993); and, Agnew (1994) for discussions on the problems associated with classic experimental research design.

16. McDermott (1992), for example, applies prospect theory to the failed American attempt at rescuing the hostages in Iran in 1980.

Similarly, McInerney (1992) looks at Soviet policy toward Syria leading up the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

17. As a further example, Bush was hesitant to pursue a military solution to the 1990 Gulf war because he feared that a protracted military conflict with Iraq might significantly hurt his standing.

Chapter 3

A Revised Cross-National Model of the Internal-External Conflict Nexus

Development of the revised model unfolds in five stages. First, the core of the model, referring to assumptions and logical relations, is presented. Emphasis is placed on demonstrating why **change** in level of domestic instability is important. Second, a state typology with attendant expectations is developed. Third, the **absorption** of domestic instability is introduced as a central concept in the process of externalization. The fourth stage consists of a discussion of how and why elites choose a foreign over domestic strategy when dealing with internal instability. Fifth, because external constraints on diversion are important, structural realism's role as a guide to these constraints will be presented. Finally, the model specifies why diversionary activity is associated with only a **particular** type of external conflict. The central elements of the model then are summarized using a flow-chart diagram. This highlights the multitude of factors that an elite must consider before an effective strategy of externalization can be pursued.

I. The Importance of Changing Levels of Domestic Instability

Much of the previous research on diversion has tested for a **linear** relationship. In other words, a state's foreign strife is expected to correlate with its level of domestic conflict. However, this kind of direct connection between internal and external conflict is likely to be rare. Numerous factors -- both domestic and external -- constrain the ability of elites to divert their internal instability. It therefore is inappropriate to expect internal conflict to be a **singular** cause of all types of external conflict.

In attempting to reduce levels of internal conflict, a state's elite may follow either a domestic or foreign strategy. The domestic strategy is usually more attractive, not only due to relative ease of execution, but also because of associated costs. Simply put, the number of factors that must be taken into consideration is reduced if a state adopts a domestic strategy.

By contrast, when leaders decide to externalize internal instability, they must consider not only the domestic costs and benefits of such a strategy, but international factors as well. The elite must first and foremost create the domestic and international atmosphere whereby it is justified in pursuing conflict with another state. It also must consider the likelihood of winning any confrontation that results. Furthermore, even if the elite wins, it must take into account a potential international backlash.

Domestic Constraints

Among the domestic constraints on diversion, the decision-making environment potentially is very important. The state invariably has been looked upon as a 'black box' in standard treatments of conflict linkage. But the state -- regardless of the nature of its regime -- is much more than a unified actor that reacts to domestic conflict by projecting it into the international system. Thus an elite contemplating the use of external conflict to divert domestic unrest could find that the decision-making process itself takes policy in a different, even undesired, direction.

More specifically, the complexity of a political system may lead to unintended delays in the implementation of policy. Complex political systems with large, multi-layered bureaucracies usually are associated with a significant amount of specialization.[1] In particular, the formulation and implementation of public policy in large industrialized societies increasingly involves different government levels and agencies (Hanf 1978, 1).[2] A heightened level of division of labour requires greater management and coordination. To maintain consistency and uniformity, standard operating procedures (SOP's) characterize the execution of day-to-day policy. This naturally leads to slower implementation.[3]

Consider the situation faced by the elite of a hypothetical state X as described by Figure 3.1. The figure reveals the evolution

(Figure 3.1 here)

of internal conflict for x. From T_k to T_{k+1} in Figure 3.1, the situation deteriorates for the central elite of State X, with an increase in internal conflict from I_{x0} to I_{x1}. In attempting to restore order, the elite could choose either a domestic or foreign strategy at T_{k+1}. Each would entail certain costs and benefits.

Let the expected costs of these strategies at T_{k+1} be represented, respectively, by C_d and C_f. The expenses of a domestic strategy might include monetary payoffs to interest groups, increased activity by security forces, devotion of resources to propaganda, or some combination of rewards and punishments directed at the domestic polity. The foreign strategy could entail verbal threats, mobilization of military forces or even more extreme actions aimed at a rival state.

Benefits, domestically speaking, would be the same for each strategy: a reduction in internal conflict corresponding to I_{x2} at T_{k+2}. The foreign strategy, however, might offer further, external benefits, such as changes in the policies of one or more states. Consider the potential difference in expected utility: If $E(U_{f,k+1}) > E(U_{d,k+1})$, where the former represents the choice of a domestic strategy and the latter a foreign strategy at T_{k+1}, then diversion is the preferred choice at T_{k+1}.

Unfortunately for the leaders of State X, however, the

Figure 3.1
Internal Conflict and the
Timing of Externalization for State X



foreign option may not be available: What if the state is not ready, in practical terms, to implement the foreign strategy at T_{k+1}? The administrative machinery may not be prepared either to conduct or effectively threaten operations against an external target. Thus a rational elite is expected to choose the domestic strategy at T_{k+1}, or to do nothing at all. By T_{k+2}, hypothetically the point in Figure 3.1 at which the more attractive foreign strategy could be implemented, the perceived need for action already has imposed a domestic solution.

As suggested, SOP-type incremental decision-making could inhibit a relationship between internal and external conflict by introducing delay. Under what conditions, then, would such a time-lag not be expected to occur? It could be argued that the organizational constraints outlined earlier cannot be applied so readily to situations that are perilous to the governing elite. An intense state of affairs tends to result in a shift from incremental to ad hoc decision-making. In an ad hoc forum, such as that of an international crisis, policies are made and implemented quickly, at least in relation to normal circumstances. From this point onward, the type of situation at issue is one in which decisions are made by upper-level, government elites.

What level of internal conflict would be required in order to generate an ad hoc forum to deal with policy? Let it be assumed that, in the example conveyed by Figure 3.1, the

shift in internal strife faced by State X was not extreme, at least in relation to what would be considered normal for the state (i.e., I_{xn}). Normal level of internal conflict is simply the level of domestic instability **ordinarily** experienced by a state on a day-to-day basis. Even the most stable of political systems will experience some base line level of domestic instability that is considered normal by the political elite.

In the above situation then, the elite would not think it necessary to make that problem the focus of all available energy and an accelerated timetable for decisions. Indeed, they may simply choose to ignore the problem hoping that it will go away on its own. This limited approach would carry over to any consideration of a foreign venture designed to divert the public eye from internal difficulties.

When the level of internal conflict is high enough, however, the danger posed to the elite will dominate the agenda. As a result, the central decision makers should perceive the need to deal immediately with the gathering storm.

Figure 3.2 shows such an example, pertaining to a

(Figure 3.2 here)

hypothetical State Y. At T_k, internal conflict is approximately at a normal level for State Y, I_{yn}. By T_{k+1}, however, I_{y1} units of internal conflict are present,

Figure 3.2
Internal Conflict and the
Timing of Externalization for State Y



representing a dramatic upward shift. The state in this scenario, which experiences a high increase in domestic conflict, is expected to react much more quickly than State X from Figure 3.1. Since $I_{y1} - I_{yn}$ is much greater than $I_{x1} - I_{xn}$, that is only natural. Ad hoc decision making means that, by T_{k+2}, the foreign strategy is available. If $E(U_{fk+2}) > E(U_{dk+1})$ for State Y, it will wait a short period of time and implement the foreign strategy, with internal conflict declining to I_{y3} by T_{k+3}. Even if $I_{y2} < I_{y1}$, as depicted by figure 3.2, it still may be worthwhile to choose the foreign strategy at that time.[4]

To sum up, given a situation of highly escalated internal conflict, reaction time is expected to become significantly shorter, resulting in the greater availability of a policy of projection. All other things being equal, a high level of internal conflict will result in an almost immediate reaction, because the state has shifted from incremental to ad hoc decision making. Since ad hoc decision making allows for almost immediate reaction to domestic turmoil -- or, for that matter, anything else -- it is feasible to act at T_{k+2}. On the basis of the preceding argument, it is expected that when such a connection is observed, the time-lag between internal conflict and external conflict will be relatively short. The gap should correspond to the time it takes a state to respond to a salient threat. Put differently, a state either will externalize quickly or probably not at all.

As argued in chapter 1, the hypothesized link between internal and external conflict is lagged for the purpose of identifying its causal direction. Time-lags range between three months and two years. The preceding discussion demonstrates that these time-lags have been essentially arbitrary; Levy's (1989, 262) observation that "there is no solid theoretical basis for discriminating among essentially arbitrary time lags" seems more relevant that ever.

Larger and more complex states will require an extremely high change in the level of domestic instability in order to trigger **ad hoc** decision making. Alternatively, states with a lower level of internal complexity focus decision making at the elite level. In other words, more decisions are made on an ad hoc basis by top political elites. SOPs are not common because of the lack of specialization. These states require smaller changes in order to trigger **ad hoc** decision making. Therefore, the ability to implement a diversionary policy will vary from state to state based on the amount of decision-making complexity.[5]

Why would an elite react externally (or domestically for that matter) to an increase in domestic instability at time T_{k+2} (figure 3.2), knowing that domestic instability will returned to normal levels by T_{k+3}? The answer, of course, is that it would not. Figure 3.3 depicts two distinct ways in

(figure 3.3 here)

Figure 3.3
The Choice of Strategies for State X



which domestic instability can evolve over time. From T_{k+1} to T_{k+2} state X experiences an increase in the level of instability to level I_{xb} from I_{xa}. Instability will either continue to increase (curve 1), or it will return to normal levels by T_{k+3} (curve 2).

Assume for the moment, that the associated change in instability from I_{xa} to I_{xb} is minor. Elites unilaterally will pursue a **passive** strategy in dealing with the problem. First, if instability eventually is expected to return to normal levels, elite will simply ignore the problem and do nothing. It is not in their interests to pursue a strategy that will alleviate increases in the level of instability when the problem will go away within a reasonable amount of time. Moreover, because of organizational constraints, their options are extremely limited. Similarly, a passive strategy will be pursued even if elites expect instability to increase by time T_{k+3}. Being unable to react in a timely fashion because of organizational constraints, the elite will pursue a "wait and see" strategy. Elites might be expected to make political speeches and/or public appearances as forms of 'damage control' in the interim.

By contrast, **active** strategies (either domestic or external) will be pursued if the associated change from I_a to I_b is substantial. First, if instability is expected to increase by time T_{k+3}, then it is in the elite's interest to react before the situation deteriorates even further.

Moreover, because organizational constraints are not present, the elite can react in a timely fashion. Second, even if the elite expects instability eventually to return to normal levels, it will pursue an active strategy because the instability at time T_{k+3} is threatening. Elites cannot predict how long it will take for a more stable environment to return. Moreover, unlike the situation described above where a "wait and see" strategy is pursued, the threat is salient at T_{k+2}, irrespective of what the future holds.

Table 3.1 presents a typology of available options.

(table 3.1 here)

Depending on forecasts of future tendencies, low change will unilaterally lead to a "do nothing" or a "wait and see" strategy. Empirically, the "do nothing" and the "wait and see" strategy are identical. In both instances, no substantial strategy is pursued, although in the case of "wait and see" elites may pursue some kind of interim policy such as public appearances and/or political speeches. High change will lead to an active strategy, even when domestic instability is expected to subside on its own. The combined effect of salient threat and opportunity is simply too strong to be ignored by the elite.

The Dynamics of Internal Conflict

Table 3.1

Domestic Instability and Expected Reactions

Anticipated Future Prospects

Change in the level of domestic instability	Unknown/Domestic Instability will increase	Domestic Instability will subside on its own
High	Active Reaction immediate: Domestic or international strategy	Active Reaction immediate: Domestic or international strategy
Low	Passive Reaction: wait and see strategy	Passive Reaction: Do nothing

Figures 3.4a and 3.4b provide illustrations of two

(Figures 3.4a and 3.4b here)

states, A and B, each faced with an escalated level of internal conflict (I_1) at the same time, T_k. To conclude, however, that each is experiencing a high level of internal conflict would be inaccurate. In Figure 3.4a the evolution of State A from T_k to T_{k+1} entails a relatively small change in internal conflict ($I_{a1} - I_{a0}$) even in comparison to the normal level, i.e., $I_{a1} - I_{an}$ (where I_{an} and I_{bn} represent historical averages for States A and B, respectively). By contrast, the change from I_{b0} to I_{b1} is quite dramatic in Figure 3.4b. If State B pursued a foreign strategy and A did not, that might present a misleading picture. Given such mixed results, the mistaken conclusion would be that, in general, states do not externalize.[6] The point of the preceding comparison is that changes in internal conflict should not be neglected in anticipating responses.

Under the conditions depicted by Figure 3.4a, State A would not be expected to externalize. Although State A experiences a high level of internal conflict, I_{a1} represents only a minimal change from the norm. For B, I_{b1} means something different.

II. A Typology of States

FIGURE 3.4a: State A's Internal Conflict over Time



Figure 3.4b: State B's
Internal Conflict over Time



Based on differences in the usual or normal levels of internal conflict, prospects for diversion are expected to vary from one state to the next. The normal level of internal conflict can be defined as an average based on the history of internal conflict for state X since its last period of systemic disequilibrium.[7] The latter would correspond to either a revolution or participation in a war. Thus 'n' represents the number of time intervals since the last polity-wide disruption for X. For states that have not experienced war or revolution, 'n' would correspond to the elapsed time from independence.

Operationally, the normal level of internal conflict is an average of the level of internal conflict over an extended period of time (n). However, since recent experiences are likely to be more relevant than those of the distant past, the averaging procedure should reflect that property. Given that requirement, the normal level of internal conflict can be presented as follows:

(1) I_{xn} = Average $\{G(T_j)I_j\}$

where,

I_{xn} = estimated normal level of internal conflict for State X at T_j $(j = 1,\ldots,n)$.

$G(T_j)$ = a monotonically decreasing function of the time since the last incidence of polity-wide

disequilibrium.

I_j = internal conflict for State X at T_j.

Thus the normal level of internal conflict is adjusted continuously, with observations weighted less heavily as they recede in time. Changes in the level of internal conflict below this benchmark are unimportant. It is only when internal conflict surpasses the normal level that the possibility for diversion is present.

Three types of states will be described, with the categories based on the respective past records of internal conflict. Type I is a state in which very little internal conflict can be detected over an extended period of time. The state has a stable leadership and the overwhelming majority of its citizens accept and even promote the national system. Examples of such a regime are Holland and Sweden.[8] It is assumed that members of Type I are most capable of absorbing domestic conflict, so these states are considered unlikely to externalize.

Type II is a state with a history of moderate internal conflict, but without that strife threatening its existence. An example of such a state would be Pakistan. A Type II state is most likely to externalize, because the normal level of internal conflict is at the point where it cannot be absorbed easily by domestic mechanisms. The cost/benefit analysis in this situation is more favourable to projection, since the

state still has the capacity to pursue external conflict in order to achieve cohesion.

Type III is a state with a history of a very high level of internal conflict which, at least at some times, has threatened its existence. Examples of such states would be Lebanon and Afghanistan. The regimes in these states are considered **least** likely to externalize. Given the high normal level of internal conflict, it is assumed that the state's apparatus is overwhelmed with the quelling -- by force if necessary -- of internal conflict. Domestic instability is very high, yet the cost/benefit analysis does not favour dealing with that problem by external means.[9]

Although this expectation seems to stand in sharp contrast to what was argued earlier about changes in domestic strife, that is not the case. A higher level of internal conflict ordinarily does increase the likelihood of diversion. However, diversion is unlikely to take place when an **extremely** high level of internal conflict is considered normal. Coser's (1956, 272) classic exposition on the sociology of conflict and cohesion anticipates that argument:

> [the] relation between outer conflict and inner cohesion does not hold true where internal cohesion before the outbreak of the conflict is so low that the group members have ceased to regard preservation of the group as worthwhile, or actually see the outside threat to concern

"them" rather than "us". In such cases disintegration of the group, rather than increase in cohesion, will be the result of outside conflict.

Anticipating the likely result of an attempt to externalize, rational elites will think twice.

III. Absorption Levels

None of the preceding arguments are intended to imply that only states of Type 2 can (or will) externalize. To explain further, a discussion of the concept of absorption is necessary. Consider two states, A (Type I) and B (Type II), with levels of internal conflict measured at regular intervals. The evolution of internal conflict is represented by the identical curves Y_A and Y_B, in Figures 3.5a and 3.5b, respectively.

(Figures 3.5a and 3.5b here)

The normal levels of internal conflict over an extended period of time for these two states are represented by I_{an} and I_{bn} respectively, where $I_{an} > I_{bn}$. The absorption levels, corresponding to the point above which a state will externalize, are I_{al} and I_{bl}, respectively. Even though both states have identical recent histories of internal conflict from T_k through T_{k+2}, State B will have the potential to

Figure 3.5a: State A's
Internal Conflict over Time



Figure 3.5b: State B's Internal Conflict and Time



Figure 3.6: A Model of Externalization



*Triggers 'ad hoc' decision-making

externalize twice (at T_k and T_{k+1}) and State A only once, at T_k. This is true because, the closer the normal level of internal conflict is to the absorption level, the greater the likelihood that a state will externalize. Thus, the diversion of internal conflict is only likely to take place when there is an objectively large change in the level of internal instability that approaches, reaches, or surpasses the absorption or threshold level.

To recapitulate, absorption and normal levels (I_1 and I_n) are constants. Every state has some level of internal conflict that is looked upon by elites as normal and not posing a serious threat. A state's observed level of domestic conflict will oscillate around I_n and, most of the time, changes will be seen as insignificant by elite. A state is said to absorb this conflict because the elite makes no overt attempt to deal with it. Relating back to table 3.1, this state has simply decided to pursue a passive strategy.

When the level of internal conflict increases enough to place it at the forefront of the policy agenda -- that is, when it approaches the absorption level -- a shift from incremental to ad hoc decision-making takes place. The problem then may be dealt with almost immediately through externalization or some internal strategy.

The threshold level of internal conflict is not simply a higher normal level of domestic instability. The two are different concepts. The normal level of internal conflict

reflects an aggregation of civil, political, and, economic instability. Threshold, on the other hand, signifies the point at which change in the level of domestic instability triggers **ad hoc** decision-making. In other words, threshold implies that the system can no longer absorb the domestic instability and that it is time for the elite to deal explicitly with the problem.

What would occur if a state experienced only a minor change in the level of domestic instability (figure 3.1), but that change reached the absorption threshold? The model would necessarily predict no diversionary activity. A polity that experiences a minor change from what is considered normal, yet the change is high enough to bring it close to the threshold level, is a Type III state by definition. In other words, it is a state that has a heightened normal level of domestic instability and is therefore least likely to divert its domestic instability.

A comparison of normal and threshold levels will determine whether a state is classified as either Type I, II, or III. Although the normal level of domestic conflict will vary from state to state, the threshold will remain relatively constant. States where normal and threshold levels are close to one another are classified as type III. Alternatively, those where the distance is great are type I. Finally, type II states maintain a midway point between normal and threshold levels.[10]

IV. Dealing with Domestic Instability: Domestic and External Strategies

The choice between a domestic or foreign strategy depends on whether the source of instability originates with the elite's governing coalition. Even in non-democracies, political elites come to power by fomenting a coalition of social elements.[11] Therefore, the elite are dependent on these elements for maintaining power.[12] The elite may be more likely to follow a domestic strategy if the source of the domestic threat is outside this coalition. They are not dependent on these outside groups and will not risk the costs associated with a foreign strategy. Foreign strategies potentially entail larger costs and will therefore be reserved until they are absolutely needed. Non-salient domestic instability -- that is, when the source of the domestic instability is outside the elites political coalition -- can be dealt with harshly as is often done in non-democracies or it can simply be ignored.[13]

Alternatively, elites are threatened when the source of domestic instability is from within the coalition. Here a domestic strategy of repression could have serious implications. The effect would be to further alienate the coalition.[14] The only viable options are to address their concerns in a substantial manner or to pursue a diversionary strategy. Often, a domestic strategy aimed at satisfying the concerns of a political coalition is unavailable. Economic

demands for example, such as a reduction in unemployment, may be impossible to satisfy. Indeed, it may be easier to pursue a hostile external strategy against a weaker opponent than to reduce unemployment substantially.

External Constraints

An elite must find a state to be the target of its attempted diversion. A history of conflict with another actor is the most salient facilitating factor. It obviously would be very difficult for an elite to explain why it had targeted a state with which it historically had friendly, or at least neutral, relations. If a traditional enemy exists, the state attempting to externalize will be less constrained. Alternatively, if there is no such target, an important constraint is in operation.

Other external constraints operate on the specified diversion model. By virtue of their nature, they warrant separate treatment. With its emphasis on relative power calculations and the anarchical nature of the international system, structural realism best encapsulates the external conditions that an elite must take into account in deciding to externalize internal conflict.

V. The Structure of the International System and constraints on externalization.

Systemic constraints will vary depending on whether a

state operates within a bipolar or multipolar system. They will also vary depending on whether or not the state is a great or minor power. As implied in chapter two, great powers in bipolar systems are unlikely to pursue foreign ventures that threaten the equilibrium and stability of the system in order to divert domestic instability. This does not mean that Great Powers are cautious all the time.[15] It only implies that they are cautious when attempting to divert domestic instability. Put differently, it is not in the interests of the power to threaten the equilibrium of the system merely for domestic consumption needs. As such, when major powers desire an external scapegoat they will most likely target a state that is not a member of the other pole's coalition.

As Paul (1994, 31) argues, "there is a clear advantage in striking when the opponent has few alliance partners as it will have less retaliatory power whereas the weaker state's alliance partnership with a great power assures it support in terms of both tangible material assistance and a defensive shield..." It goes without saying that it will not target the centre of the other pole either. This is not to imply that crises and wars between poles are not possible. Rather, the contention here is that they are less likely in the context of diverting domestic instability. Minor powers that are part of one of the two power centres are expected to behave in the exact manner as their notable counterparts. In other words, they will seek out states that are not part of either

coalition. However, given potential support by an alliance partner, they are not necessarily limited to targeting weaker states. Given the expectation that they will receive material support from the alliance leader, they can *potentially* target a more powerful state (Paul 1994).

Due to the decentralized nature of multipolar systems, Great Powers here are expected to behave differently than their bipolar counterparts. Great powers in multipolar systems are more free to target a wider range of states in their pursuit of a scapegoat because of shifting coalitions. The only constraint, of course, is that they will search for a target that is significantly weaker. Minor powers are also less constrained in multipolar systems.

Finally, in their search for a scapegoat, non-aligned states in bipolar and multipolar systems will only search out other non-aligned states. These states uniformly fear potential involvement by Great Powers.

In sum, diversion of domestic instability is more likely in multipolar systems. The constraints operative on a state under this type of system are lower than in bipolar systems. In particular, Great Powers in bipolar systems are likely to view themselves as system managers and therefore be extremely prudent in their choice of scapegoat targets. Great powers in multipolar systems are less likely to view themselves as system managers and therefore they will target a wider range of states.

Although the introduction of actor-level explanations into a structural realist environment may appear paradoxical, there is nothing inherent within structural realism that precludes this innovation (Diehl and Wayman 1994; James 1993). None of the critical assumptions noted in chapter 2 are violated by the introduction of actor-level considerations. The assumptions of **anarchical interaction** and **state dominance** in international politics are not dependent on treating domestic political activity as a constant. Similarly, **rationality** as an assumption complicates the task at hand only to the extent that states must consider systemic **and** domestic imperatives when deciding whether to pursue hostile foreign strategies. Elites decide if externalization is a rational domestic **and** external strategy.[16]

Lastly, states calculating their interests directly in terms of power relates to at least one of the conditioning factors specified in the model. Relative strength is potentially important enough to hinder the proposed relationship between domestic and international conflict.

IV. The Nature of External Conflict

Other considerations beyond the structure of system can affect a state's desire and ability to externalize internal conflict. The structure of the international system limits the **type** of international actor available for a target. Beyond that, only certain types of foreign conflict are likely to

result from externalized domestic conflict.

Elites will choose a foreign strategy that will minimize external costs and maximize domestic impact. This is because the objective is to increase domestic popularity and not achieve some foreign policy goal. As such, the elite will attempt to minimise two factors: duration and battle deaths. All other things being equal, long, drawn out conflicts are less popular than short decisive victories. The public will eventually view the conflict as unnecessary and excessively costly. Second, the higher the amount of battle deaths incurred, the greater will be the demands to end the conflict. This does not mean that violence in the form of war is ruled out. However, it does imply that if the elite choose a militarily hostile strategy to divert public attention, it must be sure that they will win decisively and quickly. Indeed, a quick military victory may be the best type of diversionary tactic because elites can boast about the superior training and hardware possessed by the state.

VII. The steps towards externalization

A synthesis of the above arguments leads to a clearer picture of the process of externalization. Figure 3.6 illustrates its complexity.

(Figure 3.6 here)

The first requirement is the existence of internal conflict that approaches the absorption level relatively quickly.[17] **Ad hoc** decision making becomes the norm. The elite then must determine if the source of the instability threatens its power. If not, a domestic strategy will be pursued. If so, the foreign strategy is still available.

If the source of instability is critical to the elite, a target for diverted internal conflict must be found. If a target is not available then elite will revert to a domestic strategy. Finally, other international factors play a role as well. If international conditions are favourable, diversion will take place. If not, the domestic strategy will be pursued.

This decision-tree implies that the process of externalization is much more complicated than ordinarily depicted. Therefore, it in no surprise that much of the quantitative evaluations have failed to produce a linkage between internal and external conflict.

(Figure 3.7 here)

Figure 3.7 depicts state X's domestic and external conflict levels over an extended period of time. The I's represent all the instances of external conflict that state X has experienced (i.e., $I_1 \ldots I_{12}$). However, to expect that all of these instances follow some change in the level of domestic

Figure 3.7
The Prospects for Diversionary Activity



instability is incorrect. This is because there are only three possible points in time where externalization is a viable option. These are at times T_k, T_{k+1}, and T_{k+2}.[1]

A linear model would find no association between domestic and international conflict in the example provided by figure 3.7. However, the revised model would find a **perfect** association because every instance where internal conflict can be externalized (i.e., where it surpasses the threshold level I_{nx}) is followed by external conflict (I_3 at time T_k, I_6 at time T_{k+1}, and, I_9 at time T_{k+1}). Other upward spikes in the level of domestic instability do not reach the threshold and are therefore not expected to lead to diversionary activity. Similarly, other instances of external conflict exist that are not related in any way to internal conflict. As such, the revised model of diversionary activity does not seek to explain **all** instances of international conflict. Previous evaluations of the model have assumed that domestic instability is a **necessary and sufficient** condition for international conflict. The present evaluation only assumes that domestic instability is a **sufficient** condition for international conflict.

Final Comments

This chapter has addressed the concerns identified in

[1] Assume that an available target is present and that the other international conditions are favourable.

chapter 1 and 2 in one form or another. First, with respect to time lags, the model specifies that the delay between internal and external conflict will be extremely short. Only significantly upward changes in the level of domestic instability are relevant to the elite. The elite then make dealing with domestic instability the focus of their attention. Reaction time is reduced because the constraints normally operative are no longer present in these domestic crisis situations.

Second, the nature of the linkage is now clear. Domestic instability leads to external conflict because domestic instability threatens the elite. Elite in turn attempt to regain domestic control by creating a foreign menace that rallies important segments of society. Instability that has no potential to harm the standing of the elite is more likely to be dealt with by internal means.

Third, only certain types of external conflict have the potential to rally domestic opinion, namely, those that minimize external costs and maximize impact. More specifically, the attempt to link domestic conflict to all types of international conflict is indicative of a faulty research design: it assumes away the existence of genuine national security threats.

Finally, international environmental factors have the potential to constrain diversionary activity. Elites may want to divert domestic conflict externally, but may be unable to

do so given anticipated international reactions. In other words, the international system itself plays a central role in the calculus of elites contemplating diversionary activity.

Endnotes

1. Hanf's (1978, 1) definition of specialization is appropriate in the context of the present discussion. He writes that, "[t]erritorial and functional differentiation has produced decision systems in which the problem solving capacity of governments is desegregated into a collection of sub-systems with limited tasks, competence and resources, where the relatively independent participants possess different bits of information, represent different interests, and pursue separate, potentially conflicting courses of action."

2. As was noted in chapter 2, this view is not necessarily inconsistent with the structural realist argument that the international system constrains foreign policy choices. The two critical assumptions of anarchy and state dominance are not dependent on treating domestic political activity as a constant.

3. Along the same lines, Rose (1984, 57) argues that specialization "creates agencies that have narrowly defined interests, and political resources to advance these interests. The resulting boundary disputes may be resolved, but the lengthy process of inter-organizational bargaining can reduce the effectiveness of existing programmes, and increase the difficulties of implementing new programmes". (emphasis added) See also Pressman and Wildavsky

(1973).

4. If $I_{y2} > I_{y1}$, the foreign strategy is more viable than ever.

5. Although both highly developed democracies, it could be argued that the United States and Great Britain have different thresholds for triggering ad hoc decision making. Whereas the separation of powers in the United States often limits the authority and strength of the President, the same cannot be said with respect to the U.K.'s parliamentary system. Given the existence of party loyalty and discipline, cabinet policy is unlikely to be blocked by parliament. The Prime Minister then, appears to have greater freedom of action when compared to the U.S. President.

6. The baseline for comparison is the normal levels of internal conflict for both states.

7. For an explanation of this terminology in the context of systemic analysis, consult Brecher and Ben Yehuda (1985).

8. Operational criteria for the typology will appear in Chapter 4.

9. Although regime type may also have an impact in the propensity to divert domestic conflict (see Wilkenfeld, 1968), the objective in this dissertation is to develop a general cross-national model. The incorporation of regime type will compromise the more important

objective of developing a theory that is not time and place dependent.

10. Operationalization of the distinction between 'large' and 'small' differences between normal and threshold levels will be presented in chapter 4.

11. This necessarily implies that a state is comprised of a multitude of elite groups. Depending on the type of regime, a state can include an economic elite, a military elite, etc. These groups have the capacity to influence foreign and domestic policy. However, the contention here is that as far as foreign policy decisions are concerned, the central decision unit is focus of a n a l y s i s .

12. In democracies this may simply mean that a majority of the electorate support the political elite. Alternatively, in non-democracies, a coalition of the military and business interests may be enough to maintain the power of the political elites.

13. For example, Levy and Valiki (1989) note that the Argentinian junta's attempt to use the conflict for domestic political purposes was aimed at the members of the ruling elite whose support was necessary to maintain the junta's authority, not the general populace. Alternatively, pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing in 1989 were repressed by the Chinese authorities, not rallied. The

contention here is that repression was employed because the demonstrating students were not viewed as a threat that had to be appeased. This domestic strategy of repression could not be employed by the Argentine junta: a policy of repressing the elements of the ruling coalition would have undoubtedly backfired on Galtieri.

14. One can point to Saddam Hussein's domestic activity prior to attacking Iran and Kuwait as examples where a domestic policy was followed by an international one. However, as will be demonstrated in chapter 4, these two cases do not serve as proper examples of diversion tactics.

15. In fact, 23% of all Foreign Policy crises coded by the International Crisis Behaviour Project (89 of 390) directly involve either or both superpowers.

16. Along similar lines, Putnam(1988) develops a domestic-international interactions model. Of crucial importance to this model is the notion that decisions made at one level of analysis cannot conflict or contradict those at the other.

17. This concept also will be operationalized in Chapter 4.

Chapter 4

New Directions for testing: Operationalization and Data Collection

Taking into account the literature review presented in chapter 2 and the model developed in chapter 3, the discussion will now outline new directions for testing the externalization hypothesis. It also describes the coding procedures and selection criteria for testing the refined model.

The chapter unfolds in five general stages. First, the two dependent variables are described. Emphasis is placed on determining when and why states will pursue the international strategy over the domestic one in dealing with internal turmoil. Second, the independent variables are operationalized. Attendant propositions are then specified. Fourth, the crucial **secondary** elements of the model are operationalized. Finally, the model is summarized graphically.

Before proceeding on to the task at hand however, an important qualification with respect to the generalizability of the model should be noted. Although the refined *theoretical* diversion model is intended to be completely generalizable, its *operationalization* on a state-by-state basis is not. For example, in theory, all states have a threshold level of domestic instability. However, threshold will vary depending

on whether a state is a democracy or not. For the purposes of the present investigation therefore, the operationalization of the model is intended to apply to only the three states under consideration.

I. The Dependent Variables: Choosing strategies

One of the more serious shortcomings of previous linkage treatments is that they do not control for the possibility of domestic strategies in dealing with internal turmoil. As argued in chapter 3, domestic strategies are always possible and must therefore be employed in a proper test of the diversionary theory. Therefore, the following section will outline, in operational terms, the two available strategies.

a. The Diversionary Theory: External Strategy

International conflict is operationalized with the use of foreign policy crises as defined by the **International Crisis Behaviour Project** (ICB). For a given state, a foreign policy crisis arises when its central decision makers perceive three interrelated conditions: (1) **a threat to basic values**, with a simultaneous or subsequent awareness of (2) **finite time for response**, and the (3) **high probability of involvement in military hostilities** (Wilkenfeld and Brecher et al. 1988, 2).

Many previous evaluations of the conflict nexus define external conflict as the use of violence against another state. This is an unnecessary limitation. Conflicts between

states often fall short of the use of violence. Yet this does not necessarily mean that they are not the result of diverted domestic conflict. The use of foreign policy crises as the dependent variable allows the consideration of both violent and non-violent international confrontations.[1]

Cross-National Evaluation

The revised diversionary theory will be tested on the experiences of three leading members of the international community for the years 1948-1982.[2] The states in the analysis include the United States, Great Britain, and France. Although useful, one central limitation of many of the studies presented in chapter 2 is that they examined the experiences of only one state. Put simply, a cross-national application allows for greater generalizability.[3]

Data was collected on a monthly basis for a total of 408 months (or cases). Months where a foreign policy crisis began for each of the three states were assigned a score of '1'. All other months were coded 0. This was done even though many of the crises last beyond the initial trigger month. This coding scheme reflects an interest in how activity begins, as opposed to how it might be sustained.

Although the model can be applied to any number of states[4], the present evaluation focuses on the United States, Great Britain, and France for purely data-related reasons. States were excluded from the analysis for falling into one of

two broad categories. First, states such as the Soviet Union were excluded because of a lack of data for certain crucial independent variables (domestic instability). Second, states such as Canada and Belgium were excluded because they have not been involved in enough international crises to warrant aggregate testing.[5] The combination of these limitations significantly narrowed the candidates for testing. Access to the **Militarized Interstate Disputes** dataset would have allowed application of the model on a larger number of states. For example, Canada and Germany would have been included in the analysis because the frequency of their **disputes** is much greater than the frequency of their **foreign policy crises.**

A central concern of the model is the notion that only certain types of external conflict are likely to be the result of diverted domestic instability. As argued in chapter 3, the attempt to link domestic instability to **all** types of external conflict excludes the possible existence of genuine national security threats. Elites who divert their domestic instability externally have, by definition, a **domestic** motive for **international** conflict. They therefore will try to minimize external cost. Cost can be defined as (1) casualties in the event of military hostilities and, (2) duration of conflict.[6]

First, as the number of coffins returning home increases, the greater the likelihood that the public will abandon support for the government's foreign policy. Second, public opinion generally favours swift solutions to perceived

problems. The ability to act quickly and decisively not only minimizes potential losses, but it also demonstrates diplomatic and military strength. Bush's popularity during the Gulf war was not only enhanced by the fact that the United States suffered less than 200 battle deaths, but also by the fact that American military technology was proved to be superior.

Because the true objective is the rallying of public opinion, elites must have the ability to control international events as they develop. Targeting a significantly weaker opponent allows for greater control, thus, the focus can be on the true objective of rallying domestic opinion.

For the above reasons, the instances of international conflict experienced by the three states in the analysis were categorized based on two criteria. The first criterion is the length of the crisis. Crises that lasted longer than four months were coded as **long duration** cases. Similarly, cases where the UK, US and France were involved in crises with a state that is significantly weaker were coded as **power imbalance** cases.

(Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 here)

Type I crises involve the targeting of significantly weaker states and last for a short period of time. It is hypothesized that the relationship between domestic and

Table 4.3: France
Foreign Policy Crises

	crisis name	Trigger Date	Termination Date	French Status
Type 1 Conflicts				
	Invasion of Laos	24-Mar-53		crisis actor
	Dien Bien Phu	13-Mar-54	21-Jul-54	crisis actor
	Suez nationalization	26-Jul-56	06-Nov-56	crisis actor
	Suez-Sinai Campaign	05-Nov-56	06-Nov-56	crisis actor
	Tunisia-France I	31-May-57	27-Jun-57	crisis actor
	Tunisia-France II	08-Feb-58	17-Feb-58	crisis actor
	Bizerta	17-Jul-61	29-Sep-61	crisis actor
	French Hostages	25-Oct-77	23-Dec-77	crisis actor
	Chad-Libya III	15-Apr-78	28-Jul-78	crisis actor
	Shaba II	14-May-78	25-May-78	crisis actor
	Raid on Gafsa	28-Jan-80	27-Feb-80	crisis actor
	Chad-Libya VII	10-Feb-86	30-May-86	crisis actor
Type 2 Conflicts				
	Berlin Wall	13-Aug-61	17-Oct-61	crisis actor
Type 3 Conflicts				
	Chad-Libya IV	25-Jun-79	10-Nov-79	crisis actor
	Chad-Libya V	06-Jan-81	16-Nov-81	crisis actor
	Chad-Libya VI	31-Jul-83	11-Dec-84	crisis actor
Type 4 Conflicts				
	Berlin Blockade	24-Jun-48	12-May-49	crisis actor
	Berlin Deadline	27-Nov-58	15-Sep-59	crisis actor

Table 4.2: United Kingdom Foreign Policy Crises

	Crisis Name	Trigger Date	Termination Date	UK Status
Type 1 Conflicts				
	Sinai Incursion	25-Dec-48	10-Jan-49	crisis actor
	Suez Canal	08-Oct-51	30-Jan-52	crisis actor
	Dien Bien Phu	11-Apr-54	27-Apr-54	crisis actor
	Suez Nationalization	26-Jul-56	06-Nov-56	crisis actor
	Suez-Sinai Campaign	05-Nov-56	06-Nov-56	crisis actor
	Lebanon-Iraq Upheaval	14-Jul-58	31-Oct-58	crisis actor
	Kuwaiti Independence	30-Jun-61	13-Jul-61	crisis actor
	E. African Rebellions	19-Jan-64	30-Jan-64	crisis actor
	Cod War	19-May-73	13-Nov-73	crisis actor
	Belize I	01-Nov-75	30-Nov-75	crisis actor
	Cod War II	23-Nov-75	01-Jun-76	crisis actor
	Belize II	25-Jun-77	28-Jul-77	crisis actor
	Falklands War	31-Mar-82	14-Jun-82	crisis actor
Type 4 Conflicts				
	Berlin Blockade	24-Jun-48	12-May-49	crisis actor
	Berlin Deadline	27-Nov-58	15-Sep-59	crisis actor
	Berlin Wall	13-Aug-61	17-Oct-61	crisis actor

Table 4.1: United States Foreign Policy Crises

	Crisis Name	Trigger Date	Termination Date	US Status
Type 1 Conflicts				
	Dominican Republic	24-Apr-65	31-Aug-65	crisis actor
	EC 121 Spyplane	15-Apr-69	26-Apr-69	crisis actor
	Black September	15-sep-70	29-sep-70	crisis actor
	Pleiku	7-Feb-65	2-Mar-65	crisis actor
	Pathet Lao Offensive II	6-May-62	12-May-62	crisis actor
	Panama Canal	10-Jan-64	12-Jan-64	crisis actor
	Gulf of Tonkin	2-Aug-64	7-Aug-64	crisis actor
	Omduran	18-Mar-84		trigger
	Gulf of Syrte II	5-Apr-86	16-Apr-86	crisis actor
	Sandinista Border Cros.	16-Mar-88	28-May-88	trigger
	Invasion of Grenada	19-oct-83	28-oct-83	crisis actor
	Mayaguez	12-May-75	14-May-75	crisis actor
	Gulf of Syrte I	12-Aug-81	1-sep-81	trigger
	Threat To Sudan	12-Feb-83	22-Feb-83	trigger
	Lebanon/Iraq Upheaval	14-Jul-58	14-oct-58	crisis actor
	Syria/Turkey Border	18-Aug-57	29-oct-57	crisis actor
	Aborted Coup	21-Feb-58	20-May-58	Trigger
	Dien Bien Phu	20-Mar-54	7-May-54	crisis actor
	Suez Crisis	5-Nov-56	8-Nov-56	crisis actor
	Bay of Pigs	15-Apr-61	24-Apr-61	crisis actor
	Pathet Lao Offensive I	9-Mar-61	16-May-61	crisis actor
Type 2 Conflicts				
	Nicaraguan Mig-21's	6-Nov-84	9-Nov-84	crisis actor
	Korean War I	25-jun-50	29-sep-50	crisis actor
	War In angola	1-sep-95	12-Dec-75	crisis actor
	Shaba II	14-May-78	22-May-78	crisis actor
	Korean War III	15-Apr-53	27-Aug-53	crisis actor
	Taiwan Straights II	23-Aug-58	14-sep-58	crisis actor
	Cuban Missile Crisis	16-oct-62	20-Nov-62	crisis actor
	Congo II	26-sep-64	29-Nov-64	crisis actor
	Six Day War	6-jun-67	11-jun-67	crisis actor
	China Civil War	30-sep-48	26-oct-48	crisis actor
Type 3 Conflicts				
	Guatemala	10-Feb-54	29-jun-54	crisis acror
	Pueblo	22-Jan-68	23-Dec-68	crisis actor
	US Hostages	4-Nov-79	20-Jan-81	crisis actor
Type 4 Conflicts				
	Korean War II	31-oct-50	10-Aug-51	crisis actor
	Yom Kippur War	12-oct-73	31-May-74	crisis actor
	Berlin Deadline	27-Nov-58	15-sep-59	crisis actor
	Berlin Wall	4-jun-61	17-oct-61	crisis actor
	Taiwan Straights I	3-sep-54	2-Dec-54	crisis actor

international conflict will be strongest here. An example of such a case is the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in April of 1965. Military intervention by the U.S. was motivated by a perception that a Castro-type revolution was immanent in the Dominican Republic. They invaded with a 23,000 strong marine force on the pretext to protect Americans in the strife-torn capital. Their ultimate objective was to support the unpopular Cabral junta.

Type II crises involve short conflicts where the target has comparable power and therefore serves as a serious threat. It is assumed that these cases are examples of genuine national security threats. The Six Day War in 1967 serves as an example. This is because the likelihood of serious military hostilities were enhanced by potential Soviet involvement. Type III cases include conflicts with relatively weak powers that last longer than four months. These cases do not fit the criterion of being short, so they are not considered possible candidates for externalization. The series of crises between France and Chad beginning in 1979 serve as example of a strong and weak power involved in conflict which lasts a long time. Finally, Type IV crises involve strong states where the crisis duration is extended. Once again, these cases are considered examples of genuine national security threats. The Berlin Blockade crisis serves as an example of two relatively equal sides involved in a protracted conflict.

Further Concerns with the Dependent Variable

As noted in chapter 1, a potential problem exists with respect to linkages between domestic and international conflict that are **not** the result of externalization. These operationally similar linkages fall into two broad categories. The first is referred to as **transnational ideological pressure** cases, and the second, **resource extraction** cases.

Iraq's motivation for invading Kuwait in August of 1990 often is cited as an instance of the resource extraction process (Chaudhry 1991; Workman 1994; Lawson 1976). The post Iran-Iraq war period posed a significant challenge to the stability of the Iraqi regime. The eight year war had significantly depleted the country's resources. By some estimates, the war cost Iraq over 200 billion U.S. dollars. This combined with a death toll of about one million soldiers and civilians meant that Iraq indeed paid a high price for the war with Iran (Baram 1993).

By the end of 1988, Iraq owed 80 billion dollars (US) to Arab and non-Arab creditors. Servicing this debt cost eight billion a year (Baram 1993). As a result of the cash flow problem (triggered by the mounting debt and the drop in oil prices), Iraq entered a period of deep recession. Salaries declined, but the cost of foodstuffs rose between 25% to 40% annually. Thus, the living standards of the average Iraqi fell to a level even lower than that which was present during the war with Iran (Baram 1993).

In the two-year interim period between the Iran-Iraq war and the Kuwaiti invasion, "Iraq brought up a series of issues that together created the crisis." They were the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border dispute; disputes over oil prices and production quotas; and Iraqi demands for debt forgiveness and financial aid from the Gulf Arabs. All three issues were designed to deal with the growing levels of domestic turmoil caused by a crippled domestic economy. Indeed, "Baghdad [came] to see such an invasion as the solution for all its problems" (Baram 1993, 9).

Although Iraq's territorial claims had little to do with the resource extraction perspective being outlined here, they did serve as the trigger to the pre-crisis period.[7] These claims heightened the threat perceived by all Arab states, and Kuwait in particular. This issue alone, however, was not enough to drive Saddam Hussein to the conclusion that the solution to the Iraqi resource and economic dilemma was war with Kuwait.

A further issue of contention for Iraq came to the forefront in Arab Summit held in Baghdad in May 1990. Referring to the overproduction of oil which was bringing prices as low as seven dollars a barrel, Hussein stated that "[Iraq has] reached a point when we can no longer withstand pressure" (Baram 1993, 16). Finally, Hussein felt that the war debts incurred during the eight year war with Iran should be forgiven because Iraq had fought the war not only for itself,

but for then entire gulf region. In essence, Saddam Hussein's policy following the Baghdad Summit was to blame the suffering of the Iraqis on the rich Arabs who were unwilling to provide compensation to Iraq for its victory over Iran.

The stage was thus set for the invasion of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein had convinced himself -- and up to a point, the Iraqi masses -- that the oil rich Gulf states were conspiring against him and his country. He quickly came to believe that the only way to alleviate the major economic misery in his country was by invading, occupying, and, looting Kuwait.

This is not to say that Saddam Hussein's only reason for invading and occupying Kuwait was to extract its resources. Indeed, other reasons for the invasion included a desire for hegemonic control of the region. However, the above discussion illustrates that a central reason was the desire to gain control of Kuwaiti oil fields, thus strengthening his economic position.

The problem that this type of case poses for the present investigation is that there is no compelling way to distinguish scapegoating from resource extraction as motivations for external conflict. In both instances, external conflict is preceded by heightened levels of internal conflict.

The Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 provides an example of transnational ideological pressures. After the revolution of 1979, Iran appeared intent on undermining the Gulf states,

monarchical or republican, "rejecting them as secular, oppressive and corrupt, and determined to bring its version of a radical universal Islam into the forefront of Middle East politics" (Chubi 1989, 1).

Several factors made Iraq the primary target for the export of the Iranian revolution. First, because of its proximity and power, Iraq posed the greatest single threat to Iran's revolutionary regime. By eliminating this primary threat, the rest of the Gulf states would be expected to succumb with much greater ease. Indeed, once the war had already began, Khomeini himself stated that

> If the war continues and if in the war Iran defeats Iraq, Iraq will be annexed to Iran; that is, the nation of Iraq... will link [itself] with the Iranian nation. They will set up their own government according to their wishes -- an Islamic one. If Iran and Iraq can merge and be amalgamated, all the diminutive nations of the region will join them (quoted in Chubin, 164).

Geopolitically therefore, Iraq had to be eliminated in order for the revolution to have any significant chance of taking hold in the rest of the Gulf.

Second, "with Shi'ites accounting for about 60 per cent of Iraq's total population, the revolutionary regime in Teheran could, and certainly did, entertain hopes that this

community, which had always viewed itself as a deprived group, would emulate the Iranian example and rise against their 'oppressors'" (Karsch 1987, 29). Iranian expectations were further fuelled by the secular Ba'th regime in Iraq which vehemently opposed to the notion of an Islamic political order.

Beginning in June of 1979, the regime in Teheran began to publicly urge the Iraqi population to rise up and overthrow the Ba'th regime. A few months later, Iran escalated the situation by providing material support to Shi'ite underground movements in Iraq, and by initiating terrorist attacks against prominent Iraqi officials, the most significant of which being the failed attempt on the life of the Iraqi Deputy Premier, Tariq Aziz, on April 1, 1980. "Faced with the growing amount of evidence that the Iranian regime was set upon destabilizing the Ba'th, and fully aware of Iraq's fundamental inferiority to Iran, the Iraqi leaders had serious doubts whether the Iraqi system could sustain a prolonged, exhausted [political] confrontation with Iran" (Karsch 1987, 30). Accordingly, Saddam Hussein ordered a preemptive attack on Iran on September 22, 1980, thus triggering the longest and most brutal war involving two third world states.

Once again, heightened levels of domestic instability and turmoil were followed by a war. Iraq was experiencing tremendous domestic difficulties as a result of the Iranian instigation. After attempting to resolve the problem with

internal measures, which included the rounding up and imprisoning of thousands of suspected Iranian sympathizers, the execution of some of their leaders, and mass expulsions of Iranian citizens, Saddam Hussein quickly realized that he had to go to the source of the problem.

However, to refer to this set of developments as an example of the diversionary theory is incorrect. Saddam Hussein's objective in attacking Iran was **not** to rally his domestic Shi'ite critics on the side of the Ba'thist regime. Rather, his goal was simply to silence them. Unlike externalization, whereby elites pursue foreign strategies in order to rally important segments of society, regime support from these groups was not seen as being critical for Saddam Hussein's continued authority. The problem posed by this case is, of course, the fact that it cannot be empirically distinguished from those examples of theoretically relevant externalization.

The distinction between rally phenomena and resource extraction centres around the idea that in the former, no concerted attempt is made to deal with the source of discontent. For example, Britain did not fight over the Falklands with the hope that it would end economic stagnation and racial tension. The Falklands were used as a **device** to **distract** the people from real problems at home. Alternatively, resource extraction is a motivation for war that has the potential to be a long-term **solution** to the domestic problems

that have caused internal instability.[8]

In the transnational and resource extraction examples, the linkage between domestic and international conflict is overt. Foreign conflict is pursued **because** of domestic instability and it is often specified as such by elites. Saddam Hussein publicly declared in 1980 that Iran was the cause of Iraqi domestic turmoil. Similarly, immediately before the 1990 Gulf War, Hussein declared that the other Gulf states were harming Iraq economically.

One would not expect this to be the case when diversionary tactics are involved. It would not make sense for elites to indicate that they were pursuing a hostile policy with another state purely in order to rally public opinion. In sum, the fundamental difference between the diversionary theory of war and other empirically similar linkages is that, in the case of the former, there is no obvious connection to the domestic situation of the triggering state.

The most appropriate method to deal with these types of cases is to identify and remove them from the general analysis. It might be argued that type 1 conflicts involving the attempt by the United States to remove potential 'communist' governments from Latin America and Asia (such as the Dominican Republic intervention) are transnational ideological cases. This is not the case, because the threat perceived by the United States is to its national security vis-a-vis the international environment, not its domestic

stability. Similarly, small scale operations such as Bay of Pigs and the Invasion of Grenada cannot be viewed as attempts by the United States to extract resources.

On the other hand, two of Great Britain's cases did qualify as being motivated by resource extraction. Both "Cod Wars" of 1972-73 and 1975 with Iceland are removed from the final analysis because they involved states that went to war over natural resource entitlement. The first crisis was triggered in 1972 when Iceland unilaterally declared that it would extend its fishery limits to 93 kilometres (55 miles). Iceland's position was justified "on the basis of its heavy dependence on fisheries and on the right of coastal states to protect their offshore natural resources" (Hart 1976, 6). Indeed, almost eighty percent of Iceland's export revenue came from fish products.

Both parties initially attempted to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the dispute. However, by May of 1973, the dispute escalated to the point where Icelandic gunboats fired on British trawlers. Eventually, even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became involved when Iceland threatened to limit allied access to the Keflavik naval base.

Iceland triggered a second crises for the United Kingdom in 1975 when it extended its fishing limits to 370 kilometres (200 miles). The affect was to further limit U.K. catches and was accordingly perceived to be a serious threat by the British government. Unsuccessful negotiation, as well as

multiple hostile high-seas encounters led Iceland to sever diplomatic relations with Great Britain in February of 1976. The crisis ended four months later when Iceland agreed to allow a limited number of British fishing vessels to enter Icelandic waters.

The United Kingdom perceived the successive extensions of Icelandic fishing limits as serious threats because they would limit access to an important natural resource. Iceland's 1972 decision alone would have decreased total British catches by 20-25 percent and distant-water catches by 40-60 percent (Hart 1976). British decision-makers openly admitted that Iceland's actions would have a serious domestic impact for the United Kingdom. Therefore, given the requirement that there be no overt connection between domestic politics and international conflict, these cases must be excluded from the final analysis.

b. Domestic Strategy: Political Sanctions

As argued, crisis activity is not the only option available to an elite facing popular disaffection. As Russett (1990b, 128) has observed, "if a government is engaged in large-scale suppression of domestic political upheaval, it may actually be less likely to provoke a foreign conflict." Most of the previous quantitative evaluations have assumed that the only way to deal with heightened levels of domestic instability is diversion. As demonstrated in chapter 3, there

are some important practical reasons which preclude the use of diversionary tactics all the time. As the discussion of lags indicated, timing is extremely important. Elites may want to divert but may be unable to do so because of the administrative apparatus. Second, an external target may not be available. Under these types of circumstances, elites are more likely to use a domestic strategy.

Data on one variable, **political sanctions,** collected from the **Handbook of Political and Social Indicators** (Taylor and Jodice 1983) serves to measure the potential for a domestic strategy in the pursuit of domestic stability. Sanctions are defined as actions "taken by the authorities [or subnational governmental units] to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate a perceived threat to the security of the government, the regime, or the state itself." (Taylor and Jodice 1983, 62). As in the case of foreign policy crises, the raw number of Political Sanctions were recorded for each state on a monthly basis.[9]

II. Independent Variables: Economic and Non-Economic

The analysis distinguishes between two general types of independent variables: economic and non-economic. Data for five non-economic variables was collected from the **Handbook of Political and Social Indicators** for the years 1948-1982. (Taylor and Jodice 1983) As the level of conflict manifested through domestic behaviour increases, crisis activity -- or

alternatively, political sanctions -- is considered more likely. Thus, crisis activity or political sanctions become more probable with an increase in

b_1: **riots**, defined as, "a demonstration or disturbance that becomes violent. If destruction of property is an essential component of the observed behaviour, the event is not a demonstration." (Taylor and Jodice 1983, 29)

b_2: **protest demonstrations** defined as "a nonviolent gathering of people organized for the announced purpose of protesting against a regime or government or one or more of its leaders; or against its ideology, policy, intended policy, or lack of policy; or against its previous action or intended action". (Taylor and Jodice 1983, 19)

b_3: **political strikes** defined as, "a work stoppage by a body of industrial or service workers or a stoppage of normal academic life by students to protest a regime and its leaders' policies or actions."(Taylor and Jodice 1983, 21).

b_4: **armed attacks** defined as, "an act of violent political conflict carried out by (or on behalf of) an organized group with the object of weakening or

destroying the power exercised by another organized group." (Taylor and Jodice 1983, 37)

b_5: **deaths from domestic group violence** defined as measure or indicator of the magnitude of internal war. (Taylor and Jodice 1983, 44)

It is hypothesized that riots will predict political sanctions better than foreign policy crises. As illustrated in chapter 1, no inherent reason existed to expect President Bush to react externally to riots in Los Angeles. In fact, it is much more likely that a government will treat riots as criminal in nature and therefore deal with them by internal means.

No further expectations are derived with respect to the other non-economic independent variables. The only requirement is that the other indicators cannot simultaneously affect the prospects for **both** the domestic and international strategies. This is because the domestic and international strategies are mutually exclusive. The decision to pursue an international strategy is necessarily the result of the fact that a domestic strategy is not available. Elites do not generally choose between two equally useful strategies. The model specifies a number of conditions, the satisfaction (or non-satisfaction) or which determines which strategy will be pursued. These include high change in the level of domestic instability,

availability of target, etc. The most important condition however, is the nature of the threat and whether or not elite consider it salient. Given the mutually exclusive nature of the domestic and international strategies therefore, the remaining non-economic will be dealt with either with a domestic or international strategy, but not both.

Collectively speaking, these propositions complement prior testing efforts which, in the appraisal of internal conflict, stressed explicit actions by members of the domestic polity (Rummel 1963; Tanter 1966; Wilkenfeld 1968, 1972; Phillips 1970; Onate 1974; and, Hazlewood 1975). The only difference, of course, is the emphasis placed on distinguishing between whether or not the indicator in question results in a domestic or external strategy.

Data on two economic variables was collected with the use of **Economic Indicators** (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 1989). **Unemployment rates** and **Cost of living increases** were coded for each state on a monthly basis for the years 1955 to 1988. As specified by the model in chapter 3, it is hypothesized that these variables will be consistently the best predictors of the external strategy.

The model specifies the importance of a third economic variable; that of **people's evaluation of future economic prospects**. Data for this indicator could not be located for the years prior to 1976. Moreover, **Gallup** only started collecting systematic data on this variable after 1989. For

the years 1976 to 1989, the question "would you say that you are financially better off now than you were a year ago, or are you financially worse off now?" was asked only once a year. This is the case for all three states under consideration. A separate analysis on a reduced number of years from 1990 to 1995 could not be conducted because **The International Crisis Behaviour Project** codes data only up to 1988.

Given the importance of economic indicators on government popularity (and therefore international conflict), it is hypothesized that **unemployment** rates and **cost of living** are likely to be the best predictors of crisis involvement for the three states under consideration. Alternatively, these two indicators are hypothesized to be the least effective predictors of the domestic strategy. This alternate expectation is based on the earlier prediction that a specific type of domestic instability cannot simultaneously explain a domestic and international strategy.

One ordinarily would predict unemployment rates to have only a minor impact on how a polity views a government. After all, even 'worst case' scenarios, such as the US' peak in unemployment of 10.7% in 1982, affected only about 11% of the population directly. However, as Goodhart and Bhansali (1970) point out, changes in unemployment have produced changes in voting intention among a far larger group than those personally affected. Indeed, Butler and Stokes (1974, 292)

maintain that unemployment rates affect an entire societies perception of their government because "it boils down to a question of competence in achieving a goal that is all but universally seen as desirable." In sum, as unemployment increases, those who are unemployed are obviously not satisfied. Further, those who already have employment begin to question whether or not they can maintain their positions.

Second, cost of living increases directly affect the economic position of all segments of society. A sudden increase in the cost of living can have a dramatic impact on the purchasing power of consumers. Moreover, severe cost of living increases also suggest a lack of governmental competence with respect to the management of the economy.

III. Secondary Hypotheses

The purpose of the following section is to outline and operationalize the secondary elements of the model. Secondary does not necessarily mean less important. Indeed, these secondary factors and hypotheses are crucial to the understanding of what kind of constraints and conditions operate on elites when they decide to deal with domestic instability. They are referred to as secondary because they do not **directly** allude to the linkage between domestic and international conflict.

a. Popularity

For the United States and the United Kingdom, data on the popularity of leaders was collected from **Gallup** (1976, 1981). Data for this variable could not be located for France prior to 1980. The purpose of including popularity in the analysis is two fold. First, crisis involvement is expected to affect popularity. In other words, conflict involvement will become the independent variable. Although not crucial for the analysis -- in that a lack of relationship between the occurrence of international conflict and popularity in no way affects the possible relationship between internal and external instability -- the existence of such a relationship and how long it endures will highlight the effectiveness of external strategies in the pursuit of domestic popularity. In keeping with the model, it is assumed that Type I conflicts are likely to produce to the greatest return in terms of popularity.

The second purpose for including popularity in the analysis is much more crucial. The indicators used to explain crisis involvement also will be used to explain increases or decreases in popularity. It is assumed that the indicators that best predict crises also will be the best predictors of change in popularity.

More specifically, the model developed in chapter three specifies that certain types of domestic instability are more likely than others to affect the likelihood of external involvement because they affect popularity as well. Domestic

instability that does not affect popularity is not considered salient by the elite and therefore is more likely to be dealt with by the use of political sanctions.

Alternatively, domestic instability that is salient to elites, namely, instability that threatens popularity, is most likely to affect crisis involvement. It is hypothesized that economic indicators will be the best predictors of crisis involvement and therefore, by definition, the best predictors of change in popularity.

b. Threshold and Absorption

Popularity levels also are employed in the definition of the threshold or absorption level. To reiterate, the absorption level is the point at which elites perceive a significant domestic threat and thus implement an *ad hoc* decision making forum in order to quickly deal with the gathering storm.

In the case of democracies, the political elite is likely to perceive the need to implement such a strategy when their popularity levels fall below what would be necessary to win an election. Thus, for the United States, the operational threshold is approximately the 50% approval rating. Below that, a president is expected to do what is necessary to increase his standing. Instead of using the 50% threshold, the present investigation assumes that presidents prefer a buffer zone between victory and loss. Therefore, a 55% threshold will

be employed.

For the United Kingdom, the definition of a popularity threshold is slightly more complicated. Popularity ratings of above 50% are extremely rare. In fact, from the data collected here, only 107 of 408 months are associated with popularity above 50% compared to 202 for the United States. Moreover, an approval rating of greater than 50% is not necessary in order to assure victory in a "first-past-the-post" type electoral system. Therefore, a threshold level of 45% will be employed when dealing with the United Kingdom.

c. Typology of State

Due to the limited cross-national application of the model, it will not be necessary or possible to fully distinguish states based on the presented typology. In other words, it is not possible to determine if the states experience low, medium, or, high, levels of domestic instability over time. However, one can present a preliminary ranking of the states in the analysis in terms of their potential for externalization.

Using an aggregation function for the independent variables in the analysis, an estimate of overall normal levels of instability can be made. For this purpose, each independent variable was standardized. The seven standardized independent variables then were summated. This provided an aggregate score of the level of domestic instability for each

month. Taking the mean for the entire period in the analysis for each state reveals that the United States had the highest normal level of conflict (mean=0.40) with the United kingdom second (mean=0.23) and France, third (mean=-0.06).[10] Although this ranking does not indicate whether these states experience high, medium or low normal levels of domestic instability, it can aid in predicting which of the states is likely to divert most often.[11]

Clearly, because the highest score is associated with the United States, the model is likely to work the best here. France on the other hand, with the lowest score, is not expected to divert as often. Finally, Great Britain's experiences will be somewhere in between the other two actors.[12]

d. Systemic and Structural Factors

Due to the limited amount of cases of external conflict available for analysis, the introduction of further conditioning factors is not possible. Moreover, bipolarity characterized the entire period under consideration (1948-1988). As such, there is no "variance" in the international system. Given this, the operational implications of structural and systemic factors will be more fully explored in chapter 6 using a qualitative approach.

For now, what can be said about the structural conditions

introduced in chapter 2 and 3 is that all three states in the present analysis are, at a minimum, great powers with an interest in maintaining the international system. As such, they are not expected to target important world actors in their pursuit of domestic stability.

This does not mean that the United States, Great Britain, and France will not be involved in crises with states such as the Soviet Union and its important allies. Rather, it is assumed that this is an unlikely scenario for the purposes of enhancing domestic stability and popularity ratings.

IV. Operationalizing the Model: hypothesized Linkages

Figure 4.1 presents the hypothesized relationships among indicators in the operationalized model. The two economic indicators at time T-2 are expected to affect popularity ratings at time T-1 and crisis involvement at time T. Alternatively, Riots at time T-1 are expected to affect the prospects for political sanctions and nothing else. As noted, no expectations are derived with respect to the other four behavioural variables. Because the strategies are mutually exclusive, these variables are anticipated to affect either crisis involvement or political sanctions, but not both. Hence a dotted line is used to depict the relationships between these independent variables and popularity, crisis involvement, and political sanctions.

Two other important relationships should be emphasized.

First, as far as the diversionary theory is concerned, popularity serves as an intervening variable. Therefore, time order is crucial. Although the independent variables and popularity are all expected to be precede crisis involvement, these indicators affect international crisis involvement **through** popularity. This explains the necessity of specifying that the independent variables are measured at time T-2 and popularity at time T-1.

Second, By virtue of the fact that a state pursues a domestic strategy (political sanctions) an external strategy becomes less likely. Thus a negative sign is used to depict the relationship between crisis involvement and political sanctions.

Finally, crisis involvement is expected to positively affect popularity ratings at time T+1. If elites choose external strategies in order to divert public attention away from domestic instability, they then should expect a return in the form of increased popularity.

The operational model portrayed in figure 4.1 is viewed as an important improvement over previous operationalized versions of the conflict-nexus hypothesis. The task at hand now is to determine how well the model stands up to aggregate testing.

Endnotes

1. Both Brody (1991) and Mueller (1973) argue that conflict with other states is not the only available external strategy. For example, they find that summit meetings between heads of state can also have a rally effect. Although this type of process may also exist, this dissertation is only concerned with the explanation of foreign conflict behaviour.

2. Although some of the variables are coded well into the 1990s (such as popularity for the United States), most of the domestic instability indicators are available for only up to 1982.

3. Future cross-national applications of the model will include a wider range of states. This will include non-great powers as well as non-democracies.

4. The only difference in applying the model to great powers and minor powers is, of course, that the systemic constraints on diversion are slightly different. As noted, weaker powers always have the option to become involved in conflict with stronger states.

5. According to the ICB Project, Canada and Belgium experienced 2 and 7 foreign policy crises respectively in the post-war period.

6. Morgan and Bickers (1990, 12) argue that "the use of aggressiveness to divert attention from domestic troubles should occur at relatively low levels of internal conflict and should usually involve relatively low levels of foreign conflict behaviour." This is an unnecessary limitation. Violent conflict is not the problem. As long as the elite can minimize external costs, diversionary activity should be related to a wider range of external conflictual behaviour, which can include violent military intervention. (Mueller 1973; Kernell 1978; Cotton 1986).

7. Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1988) divide a crisis into four distinct phases. The first is the pre-crisis period where actors perceive a higher than normal threat. Acute threat, time pressure and war likelihood all characterize the second crisis period. Third, the deescalation period is characterized by declining threat, time pressure and war likelihood. The final period, referred to as *impact*, is characterized as a period of no threat, time and war pressure. For a further explanation of this terminology, see Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1988) and Brecher (1993).

8. Levy(1992) as well argues that, although theoretically distinct, resource extraction and diversionary motivation have a common empirical basis. The latter often reinforces the former. However, he does acknowledge that diversionary tactics can occur in the absence of motivation for resource extraction.

9. Examples of political sanctions include censorship of individuals or institutions; restrictions on political activity; declaring martial law; setting curfews; and, banning a political party. During the period under consideration (1948-1982), the United States, Great Britain and France each experienced at least 636 incidents of political sanctions (Taylor and Jodice 1983, 1988).

10. Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum scores for each state are as follows:

	Standard Deviation	Minimum Value	Maximum Value
United States	3.31	-3.75	19.67
United Kingdom	3.15	-2.32	24.90
France	2.87	-4.42	15.41

The standard deviations of each of the scores for normal levels of domestic instability indicate that the values obtained are not particularly reliable and should be

interpreted with extreme caution.

11. Risse-Kappen (1991) similarly treats domestic structures as the intervening variable between public opinion and policy decisions. He develops a model where differences in political institutions, policy networks, and societal structures account for differences in foreign policy outcomes among France, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. These domestic structures determine how elites respond to societal demands and in turn formulate external policy.

12. The model predicts that states with the highest normal levels of domestic instability are the least likely to externalize their domestic instability. Common sense dictates that none of the three states in the analysis can be characterized as such. The three states in the analysis are variants of either low or moderate levels of normal internal instability.

Future applications of the model will include a much larger sample of states. The state typology will be determined using *difference of means* tests. This technique will help determine whether or not the observed differences in normal levels of domestic instability between states are statistically significant.

Chapter 5

Testing the Refined Model: United States, Great Britain and France in the Cold War Era.

Regression analysis will be used to examine the relationships among interval independent and dependent variables. Probit analysis is employed where the dependent variable is dichotomous.

Preliminary Concerns

Internal validation is required before the model's elements can be fully tested. Each of the explanatory variables must be sufficiently independent of each other to assure proper testing. Correlation matrices for the seven independent variables for each of the states will determine if any two or more variables are related to each other too strongly on the basis of Pearson's R. Generally speaking, correlations above 0.80 are considered strong enough to question whether the variables are truly independent of each other (Levin and Fox 1994, 338-339).

For the United States, only one bivariate relationship -- that of riots and deaths from domestic group violence -- has

a strong correlation (0.60, $p<0.001$). Although high, it still does not reach the specified threshold of 0.80. None of the other correlations is strong enough to cause any concern. In fact, the next strongest correlation is 0.21 ($p<0.001$), between protests and riots.

With respect to the United Kingdom, political strikes and protests produce a Pearson's correlation coefficient of 0.69 ($p<0.001$). Although high, it still does not approach the threshold of 0.80. The second highest correlation is 0.33 ($P<0.001$) for riots and protests. All other Pearson's are below the 0.20 level.

Finally, France's highest correlation of 0.48 ($p<0.001$) belongs to the relationship between riots and political strikes. The second highest is 0.35 ($p<0.001$) for the relationship between riots and protests. Therefore, none of the correlations indicate that the explanatory variables are overly associated with one another.

A further preliminary concern is the time-oriented nature of the data. Time series data often violates some of the assumptions of least-squares regression analysis. One of the assumptions made is that the residuals or errors from the regression are uncorrelated. The most common cause of correlated errors (or autocorrelation) is failure to include in the model specification an important variable which itself is autocorrelated. For example, popularity ratings of elites measured at some specific time interval is extremely

susceptible to autocorrelation. This means that the best predictor of popularity at time T is likely to be popularity at time T-1.

Taking first the experiences of the United States, three variables show signs of extreme autocorrelation. Appendix A depicts the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions for the three offending variables: popularity, unemployment, and, cost of living.[1] The autocorrelation function (ACF) simply gives the autocorrelations calculated at lags of 1 through 16 months. The partial autocorrelation function (PACF) gives the corresponding partial autocorrelations, controlling for autocorrelations at intervening lags. The autocorrelation functions for popularity, unemployment and cost of living show extreme autocorrelation. The partials for the three variables show strong positive "spikes" at the first lag, with a few marginally important correlations beyond the initial lag.

As is, these variables cannot be used in regression analysis. The time series must be first "corrected" to eliminate the problem. The most common technique employed to correct a series is ARIMA or **Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average** (Box and Jenkins 1976). ARIMA models combine three types of processes in order to correct a time series -- autoregression (AR); differencing (I); and moving averages (MA).

The most common and easiest method used to correct a time

series is the *differencing function*. This is because a time series often reflects the cumulative affect of some process. Before employing ARIMA in its entirety, it might be useful to look at only the differenced versions of popularity, unemployment, and cost of living. After all, the model itself specifies that only *changes* in the levels of the variables are important, not the absolute values themselves.

The autocorrelation and the partial autocorrelation functions of the differenced versions of the variables indicate a significant reduction in the level of autocorrelation for unemployment, cost of living and popularity. Therefore, no further transformation is deemed necessary with respect to the United States.

Differencing proved to be not sufficient with respect to the United Kingdom. Therefore, ARIMA must be employed in order to correct the time series. Once again, the only three variables that show signs of autocorrelation are unemployment, cost of living, and popularity. The most common ARIMA model to employ is ARIMA (1,1,1). Specifying each element on its own, AR(1) calls for a first-order autoregressive process; I(1) performs one difference; and $MA(1)^2$ calculates a first-order moving average process.

Standard diagnosis includes a visual analysis of the ACF and PACF of the errors produced by ARIMA. The ACF and PACF of the error series should not be significantly different from 0. However, two or three high-order correlations may exceed the

95% confidence level by chance. Moreover, the residuals should be without pattern. In other words, they should be *white noise*. As a measure of this phenomenon, the Box-Ljung Q statistic should not be significant at any lag.

A first order ARIMA transformation (ARIMA(1,1,1)) was sufficient in correcting all three time series variables for the United Kingdom.[3] None of the Box-Ljung Q coefficients is statistically significant and the ACF and PACF plots demonstrate low autocorrelation amongst the errors of the transformed series. As far as France is concerned, further transformation beyond simple differencing was required as well. The ARIMA model (1,1,1) proved sufficient for this state.[4] None of the Box-Ljung Q coefficients is significant and the ACF and PACF plots show no pattern among the errors.

Specifying Propositions

In keeping with the constraints imposed by the model, both the economic and non-economic indicators are differenced in order to measure **changes** in the level of domestic instability. Moreover, squaring each of the variables emphasized the importance of **large** changes.[5]

As argued in chapter 4, the economic variables are expected to be associated only with crisis involvement. Thus, crisis involvement is expected to be positively related to the

e_1 = squared differenced level of unemployment,

and,

e_2 = squared differenced level of cost of living.[6]

No expectations were developed with respect to the non-economic internal instability variables other than for riots. In other words, it is hypothesized that the remaining variables are equally likely to affect the prospects for crisis involvement and political sanctions. The only specification developed in chapter 4 was that those variables that most strongly predict the external strategy will be the worst predictors of the domestic strategy and vice-versa. In other words, if protests predict political sanctions well, this variable will not be effective in predicting the crisis involvement. Thus, the domestic or international strategy becomes more likely when there is an increase in the

n_1 = squared differenced level of armed attacks,

n_2 = squared differenced level of deaths from group violence,

n_3 = squared differenced level of political strikes,

n_4 = squared differenced level of riots,

and,

n_5 = squared differenced level of political strikes.

The Domestic Strategy: Political Sanctions

Multiple linear regression is employed to test the relationship between the independent variables and political sanctions. Multiple linear regression is the standard technique employed in order to determine the relationship between two or more interval level independent variables and one interval level dependent variable. For the purposes of this analysis, the focus will be on the b coefficient (slope), standard error and beta. Significance tests will not be considered due to the fact that the entire population of cases is being examined.[7]

Results from testing the linkage between domestic instability and political sanctions supports the notion that certain types of domestic instability are more likely to be dealt with by domestic means. Looking first at the United Kingdom with a one month lag, almost all of the independent variables behave in the manner predicted. In particular, the two worst predictors of political sanctions are changes in the levels of unemployment and cost of living with b coefficients of 0.23 for both and a standard error of 0.23 for cost of living and 0.18 for unemployment. Although both unemployment and cost of living have positive coefficients, the respective standard errors are very large. Generally speaking, the standard error of the estimate must not be greater than half of the b coefficient (approximately a T of 1.96). In both instances, the standard errors are almost as large as the coefficients themselves. Moreover, the beta's for both

unemployment and cost of living -- which measure a variable's contribution to explained variance -- are extremely low.

(Table 5.1 here)

As can be seen in Table 5.1, deaths, riots, and protests predict an increase in political sanctions quite well. Therefore, as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, these variables are not expected to be effective predictors of crisis involvement because the strategies are considered mutually exclusive. All three have strong b coefficients in relation to their standard errors. Similarly, these variables have the strongest beta's. The negative coefficient for political strikes (-0.64, s.e. 0.19, Beta -0.24) indicates that an increase in political strikes leads to a decrease in political sanctions. In other words, political strikes are likely to lead to a decreased use of political sanctions.

(Table 5.2 here)

The experiences of the United States also are consistent with the model's predictions. As table 5.2 indicates, the only two variables that have acceptable coefficients in relation to their standard errors are protests and riots. Therefore, these variables are not expected to affect crisis involvement. The other variables in the analysis have minimal influence in

Table 5.1

Explaining Political Sanctions in the UK: 1 month lag

Variable	B	Se B	Beta	T
Cost of Living	0.23	0.23	0.04	1.02
Unemployment	0.23	0.18	0.05	1.30
Deaths	0.12	0.01	0.36	10.30
Political Strikes	-0.64	0.19	-0.24	-3.31
Protests	0.91	0.09	0.78	10.40
Riots	0.33	0.08	0.14	3.90
Armed Attacks	0.07	0.05	0.07	1.06
Constant	0.13	0.72		0.19

Table 5.2

Explaining Political Sanctions in the US: 1 month lag

Variable	B	Se B	Beta	T
Cost of Living	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.45
Unemployment	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.19
Deaths	0.06	0.05	0.06	1.19
Political Strikes	0.07	0.06	0.05	1.10
Protests	0.10	0.01	0.31	7.34
Riots	0.34	0.04	0.49	9.36
Armed Attacks	0.08	0.05	0.06	1.50
Constant	4.73	10.88		0.44

terms of predicting political sanctions.[8] As expected, cost of living and unemployment do not contribute very much to predictability.

France's experiences are similar to those of the other states. Unemployment and cost of living do not effectively explain political sanctions (see Table 5.3).

(Table 5.3 here)

The strongest predictors of political sanctions for France are protests with a coefficient of 0.43 and a standard error of 0.08 (beta=0.29) and deaths with a coefficient of 0.42 and a standard error of 0.06 (beta 0.40).[9] Therefore, these variables are not expected to affect crisis involvement.

Taking the results of the three states together, the economic indicators were completely ineffective in the prediction of political sanctions. Protests were consistently the best predictor of political sanctions for all three states, while riots and deaths were effective for two of the three states. The different effect between the economic and non-economic indicators makes sense. Because economic indicators were argued to be the best predictors of crisis involvement, the corollary expectation is that they will be completely ineffective as far as political sanctions are concerned.

Table 5.3

Explaining Political Sanctions in France: 1 month lag

Variable	B	Se B	Beta	T
Cost of Living	-0.43	0.55	0.00	0.04
Unemployment	-0.01	0.01	-0.05	-1.03
Deaths	0.42	0.06	0.40	7.43
Political Strikes	-0.03	0.22	-0.01	-0.15
Protests	0.43	0.08	0.29	5.05
Riots	0.07	0.13	0.03	0.54
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03
Constant	46.36	55.03		0.40

The External Strategy: Foreign Policy Crisis Involvement

As in the case of the domestic strategy, the experiences of each state will be examined separately. Probit analysis is the appropriate regression-style technique to implement, given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. (Aldrich and Nelson 1984)

a. Traditional Models of Externalization

Tables 5.4 through 5.6 reproduce the testing procedures commonly employed by other evaluations of the conflict-nexus hypothesis. In other words, the independent variables are not differenced and squared to measure intensity and change. Moreover, no distinction between **types** of international conflict are made. Finally, because previous evaluations do not ordinarily incorporate economic indicators of instability, unemployment and cost of living are excluded from this preliminary test. This testing procedure is referred to as **traditional** because it summarizes the nature of data analysis conducted by the classic quantitative applications of the conflict-nexus.

Results are predictably inconclusive when examining the effect of the independent variables at six different lags. Using a threshold of 1.96 for the ratio of the maximum likelihood estimate to standard error (analogous to a t-test at the $p < 0.05$ significance level), very few of variables in Table 5.4 (United Kingdom), Table 5.5 (United States) and

Table 5.6 (France) are statistically significant at the tested time lags.

For the United States, only one variable -- deaths from domestic group violence -- approaches significance at the two month lag with an M.L.E./S.E. of 1.75. Given the large number of variables modelled at seven lags (5 x 7 = 35), one can safely assume that this relatively high coefficient is simply a statistical artifact. At a lower threshold of 1.5, protests at a one month lag and political strikes at the four month lag have M.L.E./S.E.'s of -1.47 and 1.47 respectively.

(table 5.4 here)

Results from the testing of the *traditional* untransformed model on the experiences of the United Kingdom are similar to those of the United States (see table 5.5). Only one variable achieves an acceptable M.L.E./S.E. score, that of deaths from domestic group violence at a lag of five and six months (M.L.E./S.E. = 1.95 and 2.06 respectively). Moreover, only one other variable approaches the lower threshold of 1.5, that of protests with a M.L.E./S.E. of -1.44.

(table 5.5 here)

Finally, with respect to France, deaths from domestic

Table 5.4: United States: Traditional Model

No Lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.01	0.01	0.80
Deaths	-0.01	0.02	-0.88
Political Strikes	-0.03	0.04	-0.67
Protests	-0.01	0.01	-1.30
Riots	-0.00	0.01	-0.17
constant	-2.15	4.75	-0.45

One month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.01	0.20
Deaths	-0.00	0.01	-0.16
Political Strikes	-0.03	0.02	-0.54
Protests	-0.01	0.00	-1.47
Riots	-0.00	0.01	-0.37
constant	-2.57	9.35	-0.27

Two month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.02	0.01	0.19
Deaths	0.01	0.01	0.69
Political Strikes	-0.07	0.12	-0.64
Protests	-0.00	0.00	-0.84
Riots	-0.00	0.01	-0.35
constant	-2.90	0.82	-3.54

Three month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.01	0.01	0.88
Deaths	0.01	0.01	0.53
Political Strikes	-0.18	0.15	-1.21
Protests	0.00	0.00	0.16
Riots	-0.00	0.01	-0.41
constant	-2.52	7.30	-0.31

Table 5.4 (con't): United States: Traditional Model

Four month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.02	0.01	1.05
Deaths	0.01	0.01	1.09
Political Strikes	-0.24	0.16	-1.47
Protests	0.00	0.00	1.32
Riots	-0.00	0.01	-0.42
constant	-2.22	0.80	-2.76

Five month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.01	0.01	0.67
Deaths	0.01	0.01	1.31
Political Strikes	-0.09	0.11	-0.84
Protests	0.00	0.00	1.42
Riots	-0.01	0.01	-0.61
constant	-2.37	0.80	-2.95

Six month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.01	0.35
Deaths	0.02	0.01	1.75
Political Strikes	-0.02	0.07	-0.37
Protests	0.00	0.00	1.35
Riots	-0.01	0.01	-0.89
constant	-2.38	8.92	-0.27

Table 5.5: United Kingdom: Traditional Model

No Lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.00	0.20
Deaths	-0.00	0.00	-0.25
Political Strikes	-0.04	0.09	-0.51
Protests	-0.02	0.02	-1.44
Riots	-0.00	0.04	-0.17
constant	-2.00	0.16	-12.52

One month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.00	0.19
Deaths	-0.00	0.00	-0.26
Political Strikes	0.04	0.09	-0.45
Protests	-0.02	0.02	-1.48
Riots	0.01	0.03	0.37
constant	-1.98	0.16	-12.65

Two month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	-0.00	0.00	-0.19
Deaths	-0.00	0.00	-0.07
Political Strikes	0.01	0.10	0.06
Protests	-0.01	0.02	-0.39
Riots	0.02	0.03	0.98
constant	-2.09	0.18	-11.57

Three month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	-0.00	0.00	-0.18
Deaths	-0.00	0.00	-0.16
Political Strikes	0.02	0.10	0.16
Protests	-0.01	0.02	-0.40
Riots	-0.00	0.01	-0.41
constant	-2.04	0.17	-12.30

Table 5.5 (con't): United Kingdom: Traditional Model

Four month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	-0.00	0.00	-0.18
Deaths	-0.11	0.14	-0.80
Political Strikes	0.01	0.09	0.15
Protests	-0.01	0.02	-0.28
Riots	-0.02	0.03	-0.78
constant	-2.00	0.16	-12.64

Five month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	-0.00	0.00	-0.17
Deaths	0.00	0.00	1.95
Political Strikes	-0.03	0.10	-0.26
Protests	0.00	0.02	0.21
Riots	-0.03	0.03	-1.11
constant	-2.00	0.16	-12.60

Six month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	-0.00	0.00	-0.18
Deaths	0.00	0.00	2.06
Political Strikes	-0.03	0.10	-0.35
Protests	0.00	0.02	-1.07
Riots	-0.03	0.03	-1.07
constant	-2.02	0.17	-12.21

group violence is the only variable that surpasses the specified threshold at lags of five and six months. (see table 5.6)

(table 5.6 here)

These results seemingly replicate the findings of earlier studies in that an extremely weak to non-existent relationship between internal and external instability is identified. This finding of course, was not unexpected given the relatively simple nature of the testing procedure.

b. Refined Externalization Model

What are the implications of transforming the independent variables as specified by the model (squaring and differencing) and selecting to conduct the analysis on only type 1 foreign policy crises? Taking first the United States, only one M.L.E./S.E. is high enough at a 0 lag to warrant attention. Popularity has a positive coefficient which indicates that as Type 1 crises occur, popularity increases. This is consistent with the model in that foreign policy crises are expected to be associated with a positive return in popularity. The fact that popularity and type 1 crise are positively associated at the same time lag implies that the return is immediate (see table 5.7).

Table 5.6: France: Traditional Model

No Lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.00	0.89
Deaths	-0.03	0.06	0.05
Political Strikes	0.11	0.20	0.55
Protests	-0.12	0.08	-1.49
Riots	-0.01	0.01	-0.93
constant	-3.13	25.00	-0.93

One month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.00	0.72
Deaths	-0.02	0.06	-0.41
Political Strikes	0.03	0.20	0.15
Protests	-0.10	0.08	-1.34
Riots	-0.01	0.13	-0.10
constant	-5.31	25.79	-0.21

Two month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	-0.00	0.00	-0.96
Deaths	-0.03	0.06	-0.53
Political Strikes	0.09	0.18	0.48
Protests	-0.07	0.08	-0.94
Riots	0.04	0.11	0.40
constant	-8.74	22.61	-0.39

Three month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	-0.00	0.00	-1.16
Deaths	-0.03	0.07	-0.52
Political Strikes	0.11	0.19	0.60
Protests	-0.07	0.08	-0.84
Riots	0.06	0.11	0.51
constant	-6.38	24.23	-0.26

Table 5.6 (con't): France: Traditional Model

Four month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	-0.00	0.00	-0.80
Deaths	0.07	0.04	1.62
Political Strikes	0.03	0.20	0.17
Protests	-0.10	0.08	-1.25
Riots	-0.01	0.12	-0.11
constant	-2.22	25.50	-0.09

Five month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	-0.00	0.00	-0.14
Deaths	0.12	0.04	2.70
Political Strikes	-0.06	0.20	-0.31
Protests	-0.03	0.08	-0.35
Riots	-0.10	0.11	-0.90
constant	-0.32	27.24	-0.01

Six month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	-0.00	0.00	1.04
Deaths	0.12	0.04	2.70
Political Strikes	-0.08	0.20	-0.42
Protests	-0.04	0.08	-0.51
Riots	-0.08	0.12	-0.69
constant	-5.68	23.97	-0.24

(table 5.7 here)

The first signs of strong M.L.E./S.E. scores are at the two month lag. Increases in armed attacks and unemployment are strongly associated with crisis involvement for the United States. Armed attacks continue to have a positive influence on crisis involvement until a lag of five months. The only other independent variable with a strong performance is deaths from domestic group violence which approaches significance at the fourth month lag and maintains a M.L.E./S.E. above 2.00 for the fifth and sixth lags. Unemployment stays above the 1.96 threshold only once, at a lag of 2 months.

Protests and riots are not effective predictors of crisis involvement. This is consistent with the expectations of the model given that these variables predicted political sanctions quite well. However, the model also predicted that political strikes and cost of living would be related to crisis involvement. The results for the United States do not support this notion at all. The M.L.E./S.E. for cost of living and political strikes's did not even come close to the lower of the two thresholds (i.e., 1.5). Moreover, their coefficients often are negative, implying that an increase in political strikes or cost of living actually leads to a reduction in crisis involvement. However, this conclusion should be tempered by the fact that the associated standard errors are extremely high.

Table 5.7: United States: Refined Model

No Lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.01	0.02	0.86
Deaths	0.00	0.02	0.20
Political Strikes	-0.01	0.04	-0.24
Protests	-0.00	0.00	-0.48
Riots	-0.00	0.01	0.33
Popularity	0.05	0.02	2.70
Unemployment	0.17	0.12	1.42
Cost of Living	-0.00	0.01	-0.44
constant	-5.83	1.47	-3.97

One month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.02	0.02	1.26
Deaths	0.00	0.02	0.14
Political Strikes	-0.01	0.05	-0.26
Protests	-0.00	0.00	-0.33
Riots	-0.00	0.02	-0.16
Popularity	0.03	0.02	1.60
Unemployment	0.23	0.12	1.08
Cost of Living	-0.00	0.01	-0.55
constant	-6.01	1.51	-3.97

Two month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.03	0.01	2.25
Deaths	0.01	0.01	0.88
Political Strikes	-0.03	0.10	-0.34
Protests	0.00	0.00	0.19
Riots	-0.01	0.02	-0.58
Popularity	-0.06	0.02	-3.09
Unemployment	0.29	0.13	2.20
Cost of Living	-0.01	0.01	0.88
constant	-7.07	1.73	-4.08

Three month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.03	0.01	2.59
Deaths	0.01	0.01	0.91
Political Strikes	-0.09	0.15	-0.62
Protests	0.00	0.00	0.83
Riots	-0.01	0.02	-0.58
Popularity	-0.04	0.02	-2.30
Unemployment	0.19	0.13	1.49
Cost of Living	-0.01	0.01	-0.69
constant	-5.43	1.57	-3.47

Table 5.7 (con't): United States: Refined Model

Four month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.04	0.01	2.71
Deaths	0.02	0.01	1.75
Political Strikes	-0.16	0.17	-0.93
Protests	0.00	0.00	1.10
Riots	-0.01	0.13	-0.41
Popularity	-0.04	0.02	-2.22
Unemployment	0.17	0.13	1.33
Cost of Living	-0.01	0.01	-0.88
constant	-5.26	1.59	-3.30

Five month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.03	0.01	2.35
Deaths	0.02	0.01	2.09
Political Strikes	-0.03	0.07	-0.35
Protests	0.00	0.00	0.72
Riots	-0.00	0.13	-0.29
Popularity	-0.04	0.02	-2.32
Unemployment	0.20	0.13	1.53
Cost of Living	-0.01	0.01	-0.67
constant	-5.52	1.55	-3.56

Six month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.02	0.01	1.25
Deaths	0.03	0.01	2.35
Political Strikes	-0.00	0.04	-0.12
Protests	0.00	0.00	0.34
Riots	-0.07	0.12	-1.46
Popularity	-0.04	0.02	-2.22
Unemployment	0.17	0.12	1.46
Cost of Living	-0.00	0.01	-0.11
constant	-5.15	1.42	-3.64

In order for popularity to be considered an intervening variable, it must show a strong M.L.E./S.E. score at a lag before any of the independent variables. The data support this notion. None of the independent variables have an effect on crisis involvement before popularity. Popularity begins to have a strong negative coefficient at the two month lag that continues for the remaining lags.

Taking all the lags together, the refined model leads to 13 strong relationships out of a theoretically possible 36 (M.L.E./S.E better that 1.96).[10] This stands in sharp contrast to the unrefined U.S. model where **none** of the variables achieves an M.L.E./S.E. of 1.96 or better. There is, therefore, relatively strong support for the elements of the refined diversion model as far as the United States is concerned.

Why did the refined model perform better than its traditional counterpart? Was it the effect of the transformed independent variables, or alternatively, proper case selection as far as the dependent variable is concerned?

Testing the transformed independent variables on all conflict cases results in six variables with M.L.E./S.E.'s of 1.96 or better. Alternatively, testing the untransformed variables on only type 1 cases results in 9 M.L.E./S.E's above the 1.96 threshold. It seems as though the combined effect of transformation and proper case selection is the cause of the improved performance of the model. However, proper case

selection on its own seems to have a slightly stronger influence.

Given the discussion of the absorption level in chapter 3, and its operationalization in chapter 4, the refined externalization model is expected to perform almost equally well on the experiences of the United Kingdom.[11] This is in fact the case. As indicated in table 5.8, there is little activity amongst the independent variables until the fifth month lag. The only exception is cost of living which has a strong M.L.E./S.E. from the second lag onwards. At the fifth lag, almost all of the relevant independent variables surpass the 1.96 threshold. The only exception is political strikes with an M.L.E./S.E. of 1.64. Also important to the model is the fact that riots and protests do not reach the specified threshold at any time lag. Once again, this is expected given the fact that these two variables predicted political sanctions quite well. However, inconsistent with the expectations of the model is the high coefficient for deaths at the fifth month lag. This variable predicted political sanctions quite well, thus it was not expected to be related to crisis involvement at all.

The only real anomalous finding is the consistently low and positive coefficients for popularity at all seven time lags. This outcome falsifies an important element of the model; that is, that popularity acts as an intervening variable. There are two possible explanations for this

finding. The first is simply improper theoretical articulation. In other words, there may in fact be no threshold level of tolerance in the first place. The second, more plausible explanation is improper operationalization.

Most other research projects that examine popularity in Great Britain choose to focus on the difference in popularity between the governing party and the opposition. It may be more useful to employ this strategy because the threat in parliamentary systems is not low popularity ratings themselves, but low ratings in relation to the official opposition.

(Table 5.8 here)

Taking the lags together, the refined model produces 9 strong relationships out of a theoretically possible 36 (M.L.E./S.E better that 1.96) six of which are purely economic. Again, this stands in sharp contrast to the unrefined model where none of the variables achieve an M.L.E./S.E. of 1.96 or better. There is therefore, relatively strong support for the elements of the refined diversionary theory of war model as far as the United Kingdom is concerned.

It was earlier determined that France's threshold level is the lowest of all three states in the analysis. Therefore the model is not expected to perform as well with respect to the experiences of this state. Testing bears this out.

Table 5.8: United Kingdom: Refined Model

No Lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.00	0.62
Deaths	-0.08	0.13	-0.43
Political Strikes	-0.15	0.14	-1.07
Protests	-0.01	0.00	-1.56
Riots	-0.05	0.07	-0.65
Popularity	0.01	0.01	0.64
Unemployment	0.00	0.00	-0.65
Cost of Living	0.00	0.00	-0.74
constant	-1.40	0.12	-11.72

One month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.00	0.98
Deaths	-0.00	0.00	-0.55
Political Strikes	-0.00	0.01	-0.03
Protests	-0.01	0.01	-1.69
Riots	0.00	0.00	0.58
Popularity	0.01	0.01	0.70
Unemployment	0.14	0.10	1.40
Cost of Living	0.00	0.00	1.78
constant	-1.45	0.14	-10.26

Two month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.00	0.30
Deaths	0.00	0.00	0.20
Political Strikes	0.01	0.03	0.39
Protests	-0.00	0.00	-0.33
Riots	0.00	0.01	0.67
Popularity	0.01	0.01	0.88
Unemployment	0.17	0.12	1.51
Cost of Living	0.00	0.00	1.96
constant	-1.45	0.14	-10.26

Three month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	-0.01	0.01	-0.74
Deaths	0.00	0.00	1.04
Political Strikes	0.01	0.01	0.76
Protests	-0.00	0.00	-0.89
Riots	-0.00	0.00	-0.36
Popularity	0.01	0.01	1.21
Unemployment	0.19	0.10	1.83
Cost of Living	0.00	0.00	3.02
constant	-1.16	0.12	-9.66

Table 5.8 (con't): United Kingdom: Refined Model

Four month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	-0.00	0.00	-0.46
Deaths	0.00	0.00	1.11
Political Strikes	-0.01	0.01	-0.90
Protests	0.00	0.00	0.95
Riots	0.01	0.01	0.85
Popularity	0.01	0.01	1.18
Unemployment	0.18	0.11	1.62
Cost of Living	0.00	0.00	2.30
constant	-1.31	0.14	-9.36

Five month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.00	2.97
Deaths	0.00	0.00	2.73
Political Strikes	0.02	0.01	1.64
Protests	-0.00	0.00	-1.64
Riots	0.01	0.00	1.30
Popularity	0.02	0.01	1.40
Unemployment	0.35	0.10	3.66
Cost of Living	0.00	0.00	2.37
constant	-1.50	0.14	-10.71

Six month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.00	3.48
Deaths	0.06	0.04	1.59
Political Strikes	-0.44	0.29	-1.50
Protests	-0.13	0.11	-1.20
Riots	-0.26	0.27	-0.97
Popularity	0.02	0.01	1.44
Unemployment	0.01	0.01	1.99
Cost of Living	-0.10	0.01	-1.33
constant	-1.21	0.13	-9.63

No connection between domestic instability and international crisis involvement is visible until the fourth month lag where unemployment surpasses the 1.96 threshold with a strong M.L.E./S.E. of 3.26 (see Table 5.9). The fifth month lag proves to be the most crucial as far as France is concerned where armed attacks, deaths, and unemployment all have M.L.E./S.E. scores above 2.00. As in the case of the United States however, cost of living and political strikes do not perform well at any lag.

(table 5.9 here)

It was hypothesized that protests and deaths would not be effective predictors of crisis involvement because these variables help to account for the domestic strategy. Protests behaved as predicted by the model, however, deaths proved to be an effective predictor of crisis involvement as well as political sanctions.

In sum, the refined model does not perform as well on France. Only five of 26 possible associations have M.L.E./S.E. scores greater than 1.96. This however, is still an improvement over the traditional model for France where only two associations are above the 1.96 threshold.

How well does the refined diversionary model perform when looking at all three countries together? In all three cases, the refined model was able to increase the likelihood of a

Table 5.9: France: Refined Model

No Lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.00	0.00
Deaths	-0.00	0.00	-0.19
Political Strikes	0.02	0.08	0.32
Protests	-0.02	0.02	-1.21
Riots	-0.01	0.03	-0.41
Unemployment	0.44	0.31	1.41
Cost of Living	0.01	0.12	0.50
constant	-1.81	0.14	-13.23

One month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.00	0.01
Deaths	-0.00	0.00	-0.31
Political Strikes	0.04	0.08	0.49
Protests	-0.02	0.01	-1.51
Riots	0.01	0.03	0.37
Unemployment	0.38	1.29	0.30
Cost of Living	-0.01	0.12	-0.04
constant	-1.79	0.13	-13.40

Two month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	-0.00	0.00	-0.29
Deaths	-0.00	0.00	-0.16
Political Strikes	0.02	0.08	0.26
Protests	-0.01	0.02	-0.50
Riots	0.03	0.03	1.21
Unemployment	2.14	1.50	1.43
Cost of Living	0.20	0.13	1.51
constant	-1.93	0.16	-12.05

Three month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	-0.00	0.00	-0.25
Deaths	-0.00	0.00	-0.34
Political Strikes	0.04	0.08	0.51
Protests	-0.01	0.02	-0.74
Riots	0.03	0.03	0.91
Unemployment	0.10	0.29	0.33
Cost of Living	0.13	0.12	1.11
constant	-1.84	0.14	-13.09

Table 5.9 (con't): France: Refined Model

Four month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	-0.00	0.00	-0.22
Deaths	0.00	0.00	1.48
Political Strikes	0.01	0.08	0.18
Protests	-0.01	0.02	0.40
Riots	-0.02	0.03	-0.72
Unemployment	2.51	0.77	3.25
Cost of Living	0.16	0.13	1.26
constant	-1.86	0.14	-13.09

Five month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.00	3.26
Deaths	0.01	0.00	2.79
Political Strikes	-0.02	0.09	-0.26
Protests	0.00	0.02	0.13
Riots	-0.03	0.03	-0.98
Unemployment	2.74	1.19	2.30
Cost of Living	-0.04	0.14	-0.28
constant	-1.84	0.14	-13.22

Six month lag	M.L.E.	S.E.	M.L.E./S.E.
Armed Attacks	0.00	0.00	0.08
Deaths	0.01	0.00	2.85
Political Strikes	-0.02	0.09	-0.22
Protests	0.00	0.02	0.07
Riots	-0.03	0.03	-0.93
Unemployment	0.05	0.32	0.17
Cost of Living	0.15	0.13	1.10
constant	-1.86	0.14	-12.98

strong association between domestic instability and international crises. Second, the notion of popularity acting as an intervening variable is strongly supported for the United States. As noted, popularity ratings for the United Kingdom were not significant predictors of crisis involvement.

An interesting finding has to do with what can be termed the critical lags for each of the three countries in the analysis. For the United States, the strong M.L.E./S.E. scores seem to cluster around the two to four month lags. For the United Kingdom and France, the critical lag is slightly later at about the fifth month lag. This supports the notion that it is incorrect to treat all states the same by expecting internal and external instability to be related in exactly the same manner.

The single most elusive variable in the analysis for all the states under consideration is political strikes. This variable was not a particularly good predictor of neither the domestic nor the international strategy. This, of course, was not expected. Second, the behaviour of deaths from domestic group violence is not consistent with the model. Oddly enough, this variable performed too well because it predicted both the domestic and international strategies.

As specified in chapter 4, this was not expected because the domestic and international strategies were hypothesized to be mutually exclusive. The evidence from deaths from domestic group violence implies that a domestic and international

strategy may be employed simultaneously. This obviously has serious theoretical implications as far as the revised diversion model is concerned. Future theoretical development will require the identification of independent variables that affect both the domestic and international strategies simultaneously.

Explaining Popularity: The United States

The model specifies that not all measures of domestic instability are likely to affect government popularity equally. First and foremost, almost all of the variables have the anticipated negative sign, indicating than an increase in the independent variable (domestic conflict) leads to a decrease in the dependent variable (popularity). Of the non-economic variables expected to affect popularity however, only armed attacks has a high enough coefficient in relation to its standard error to be considered important.

The model specifies that economic indicators are expected to be the strongest predictors of government popularity. The data support this notion. At a one month lag, the strongest predictor of changes in the level of government popularity is unemployment with a coefficient of -2.11 (s.e. of b=0.46). Results are similar for the two month lags as well. (see table 5.10). Cost of living on the other hand, has an extremely weak influence on government popularity. This finding is not

consistent with the predictions of the model.

(table 5.10 here)

As far as the United States is concerned, the model would expect protests and riots to not be effective predictors of popularity because they help account for political sanctions.[12] The data analysis supports this notion. Although both riots and protests have negative coefficients -- indicating that an increase in these variables leads to a drop in popularity -- the coefficients are extremely small and the standard errors are comparatively large. Therefore, as far as the United States is concerned, four of the seven variables behave in the manner predicted by the model.

Explaining Popularity: The United Kingdom

Results are similar with respect to the United Kingdom. All the variables have the expected negative sign at both time lags, with armed attacks, deaths, cost of living and, unemployment all having strong coefficients in relation to their standard errors. As anticipated, economic indicators prove to be the most powerful predictors of government popularity. (see table 5.11) Unlike the Unites States, cost of living increases have a measurable affect on government popularity. Consistent with the model, riots and protests do not affect popularity in any measurable fashion.

Figure 5.10
Explaining Popularity: The United States

Dependent: Popularity lagged 1 month forward

	B	Se B	Beta	T
Armed attacks	-0.19	0.08	0.13	-2.40
Deaths	-0.02	0.08	-0.02	-0.26
Political Strikes	-0.12	0.10	-0.06	-1.18
Cost of Living	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.74
Unemployment	-2.11	0.46	-0.26	-4.59
Protests	-0.03	0.02	-0.07	-1.25
Riots	-0.23	0.21	-0.06	-1.12
constant	64.20	2.98		21.71

Dependent: Popularity lagged 2 months forward

	B	Se B	Beta	T
Armed attacks	-0.23	0.08	0.15	-2.79
Deaths	-0.03	0.08	-0.03	-0.42
Political Strikes	-0.11	0.10	-0.06	-1.10
Cost of Living	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.74
Unemployment	-2.12	0.46	-0.26	-4.63
Protests	-0.03	0.02	-0.08	-1.40
Riots	-0.20	0.21	-0.26	-0.95
constant	64.20	2.95		21.76

(Table 5.11 here)

The model predicts that political strikes are supposed to affect government popularity as well. The analysis does not support this notion. Finally, deaths are not supposed to affect popularity ratings because they affect political sanctions. However, as Table 5.11 indicates, deaths are strong predictors of popularity at both tested time lags. Once again, deaths performed too well. In sum, five of the seven variables for the United Kingdom behave in the manner predicted by the model.

International Crises and Popularity

Turning the coin on its head, do foreign policy crises lead to increases in popularity? Looking at the United States, the answer is clearly a "yes". Using Type 1 conflicts as the independent variable, there is a measurable and significant increase in the popularity of presidents in the months following a crisis. The coefficient for a 1 month lag is 8.12. This implies that when a crisis is short and involves a significantly weaker state, a U.S. president should expect on average about an 8% increase in popularity.[13]

The increase drops as popularity is lagged further. At the end of the second month, the expected return is 7.45%. After three months, the expected return in popularity is only about 5%. Finally, after four months, the return has dropped

Table 5.11
Explaining Popularity: The United Kingdom

Dependent: Popularity lagged 1 month forward

	B	Se B	Beta	T
Armed attacks	-0.21	0.08	-0.24	-2.63
Deaths	-0.04	0.01	-0.15	-2.96
Political Strikes	-0.09	0.18	-0.05	-0.51
Cost of Living	-0.03	0.00	-0.38	-6.92
Unemployment	-1.59	0.38	-0.25	-4.17
Protests	-0.07	0.10	-0.07	-0.69
Riots	-0.42	0.43	-0.24	-0.98
constant	60.41	1.38		43.62

Dependent: Popularity lagged 2 months forward

	B	Se B	Beta	T
Armed attacks	-0.22	0.07	-0.25	-3.14
Deaths	-0.04	0.01	-0.16	-3.21
Political Strikes	-0.02	0.18	-0.01	-0.09
Cost of Living	-0.03	0.00	-0.37	-6.77
Unemployment	-1.74	0.38	-0.27	-4.60
Protests	-0.05	0.10	-0.06	-0.54
Riots	-0.43	0.43	-0.27	-1.00
constant	64.94	1.39		44.53

to about 3.8%. The influence of a crisis on popularity diminishes to almost 0% by about the sixth month.

What is particularly striking about these findings is that when no distinction in crisis type is employed, the expected return in popularity is significantly lower. After one month, the expected return is about 5.2. After two months, about 4.7. In the third month, the popularity return is only 3%. This finding strongly supports the notion that only certain types of external conflict are likely to lead to gains in popularity.

Results are not as clear with respect to the United Kingdom. Taking the one month lag on popularity, a prime minister can only expect about a 1.5% increase in the popularity. This figure does not change significantly for the other time lags. In fact, the highest return is 1.80% at the three month time lag. In all instances however, the corresponding standard errors are higher than the coefficients themselves, indicating that the findings are not particularly reliable. As such, only extremely weak support can be attributed to this element of the model as far as the United Kingdom is concerned.[14]

Absorption Levels

The model specifies that states are most likely to divert their domestic instability after they have surpassed their threshold or absorption level. Chapter 4 operationalized

threshold as the critical level of popularity necessary for electoral victory. The threshold was specified to be about 55% for the United States and 45% for the United Kingdom.[15] A cross-tabulation of type of conflict and dichotomised popularity reveals moderate support for the threshold level hypothesis.[16]

(table 5.12 here)

There is fairly strong evidence that the United States was more likely to be involved in a type 1 conflict when presidential popularity was less than 55%. Type 1 crises were about 20 percent more likely to follow low levels of popularity (i.e < 55%). Alternatively, 53% of all the other types of crises (type 2 through 4) followed higher levels of popularity.

(Table 5.13 here)

Results are significantly weaker with respect to the United Kingdom. Comparatively speaking, type 1 conflicts were associated with approximately a 15% greater likelihood of being associated with low levels of popularity. This conclusion however, should be tempered by the fact that type 1 conflicts are almost evenly split between those that are associated with low and high levels of popularity. These

Table 5.12

Conflict Type by Popularity Level: The United States

Conflict Type	Popularity Level < 55%	Popularity Level > 55.1%	
Type 1	11 - 65%	8 - 47%	19
All others	9 - 35%	9 - 53%	18
	17 100%	20 100%	37

Table 5.13

Conflict Type by Popularity Level: The United Kingdom

Conflict Type	Popularity Level < 45%	Popularity Level > 45.1%	
Type 1	6 - 86%	5 - 71%	11
All others	9 - 14%	9 - 29%	3
	7 100%	7 100%	14

results further emphasize the problematic nature of popularity as operationalized for the United Kingdom.

Comparing Strategies

The final element of the model to be tested concerns whether or not there is a trade-off between the domestic and international strategies. In other words, are states less likely to employ political sanctions when involved in international crises and vice-versa? Data from all three countries support this notion to varying degrees. First, with respect to the United States, a probit analysis between political sanctions and type 1 crisis involvement reveals an M.L.E./S.E. score of -2.39. This indicates that political sanctions become less likely when the United States is involved in type 1 international crises.[17] Results are similar with respect to the United Kingdom with a M.L.E./S.E. of -1.98.[18] The relationship between political sanctions and international crises is predictably negative with respect to France, but not as strong (M.L.E. = -1.27).[19]

Summary Evaluation

Figures 5.1 through 5.3 are reproductions of the components of the operational model presented in chapter 4 (Figure 4.1). Figure 5.1 presents the elements of the hypothesis that are supported for the United States. As noted,

all hypothesized relationships receive some level of verification. Political strikes and cost of living have been set aside from the main figure because they were the only variables that did not perform as expected. Alternatively, unemployment, deaths, armed attacks, riots, protests, and, popularity, behaved exactly as predicted by the theoretical and operational model. It is clear therefore, that the experiences of the United States fit the model's expectations quite well.

(Figure 5.1 here)

Figure 5.2 depicts the observed relationships for the United Kingdom. The economic variables behaved exactly as predicted with respect to the hypothesized relationships with popularity and crisis involvement. riots and protests as well, demonstrated a strong relationship with political sanctions. Armed attacks predicted popularity well, but not crisis involvement, therefore a dotted line connects armed attacks and crisis involvement. A dotted line is also employed to demonstrate the lack of relationship between crisis involvement and popularity. Finally, as predicted, the trade-off between crisis involvement and political sanctions is supported.

Deaths has been removed from the list of variables that demonstrate verified linkages. This is the case even thought

Figure 5.1

Observed relationships among Indicators:

The United States



deaths were associated with both political sanctions and crisis involvement. This is done in order to emphasize the that the independent variables were expected to affect either crisis involvement or political sanctions, but not both.

(Figure 5.2 here)

Figure 5.3 depicts the observed relationships for the last state in the analysis, that of France. As can be seen, the overall performance of the model is weakest with respect to this state. Four of the variables are removed from the figure because they did not behave as predicted by the model. Once again, deaths is included in the list of failed variables because it affected both crisis involvement and political sanctions. A **dashed** line is employed to indicate that the specified relationship was not tested due to a lack of data.

(figure 5.3 here)

Concluding Comments

As is the case with any endeavour of this type, some of the elements of the model developed in chapter 3 and operationalized in chapter 4 were supported, but not all. However, what can be stated with some level of confidence is that the testing of the refined model has resulted in a number of important confirmed relationships. Most relevant for this

Figure 5.2

Observed relationships among Indicators:
The United Kingdom



Figure 5.3

Observed relationships among Indicators: France



dissertation, diversion of domestic conflict does seem occur with respect to the three states in the present analysis.

A number of secondary hypotheses are supported as well. First and foremost, states are not limited to one strategy in dealing with domestic instability. As the data analysis demonstrates, a domestic solution is often available. Second, popularity does seem to play a role in the diversion of domestic conflict, at least with respect to the United States. Finally, elites can expect some kind of return when they pursue foreign policy ventures in the form of increased popularity.

What are the implications of these findings with respect to the traditional literature on externalization theory. Clearly, something went wrong twenty years ago when this hypothesis was first tested. The task for the sixth and final chapter is to examine why mistakes were made. An equally important question to be addressed is how this research project affects the study of international politics specifically, and political science in general.

Endnotes

1. Plots are presented only for the United States. Results for France and Great Britain were comparable.

2. MA(1) specifies the use of 1 previous observation along with the current one to calculate the moving average.

3. For unemployment, AR(1) ϕ=0.93 and MA(1) ϕ=0.86. For Cost of living AR(1) ϕ=0.22 and MA(1) ϕ=0.94. Finally for Popularity, AR(1) ϕ=0.51 and MA(1) ϕ=-0.17.

4. For unemployment, AR(1) ϕ=0.87 and MA(1) ϕ=0.38. For Cost of living AR(1) ϕ=0.57 and MA(1) ϕ=0.57. As noted, data for popularity is not available.

5. The observations were actually multiplied by their absolute value. This assured that negative values remained so after the transformation.

6. For France and United Kingdom, the transformed values are employed in the analysis.

7. Significance tests are based on a comparison of a computed statistic with a sample distribution. Since the data set contains the entire population of cases, there is no sampling

error. The standard error will nonetheless be employed as a indicator of the comparative strength of the coefficient.

8. Results for the two month time lag is even more striking:

Dependent: Political Sanctions lagged 2 months

Variable	B	Se B	Beta	T
Cost of Living	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.19
Unemployment	1.92	12.36	0.01	0.16
Deaths	0.06	0.06	0.07	1.16
Political Strikes	0.23	0.07	0.02	0.32
Protests	0.08	0.02	0.27	5.60
Riots	0.25	0.04	0.37	6.17
Armed Attacks	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.56
Constant	6.37	12.42		0.51

9. Once again, results for the two month time are consistent with the one month lag:

Variable	B	Se B	Beta	T
Cost of Living	-0.00	0.00	-0.03	-0.54
Unemployment	-0.02	0.01	-0.10	-2.09
Deaths	0.44	0.06	0.43	7.72
Political Strikes	-0.34	0.23	-0.10	-1.49
Protests	0.46	0.09	0.32	5.33
Riots	-0.12	0.13	-0.05	-0.89
Armed Attacks	-0.00	0.00	-0.03	-0.54
Constant	28.15	55.81		0.50

10. Empirically, the number is 13 out of 48. For theoretical validation however, riots and protests at the 7 lags are removed from consideration because it was argued that they are not likely to be strong predictors of crisis involvement in

the first place. In other words, it would be unfair to consider these relationships as empirically relevant when the deductive model has previously specified that a relationship is not expected.

11. No distinction between types of cases will be made with respect to the United Kingdom and France. The reason for this decision is data-related. These two states do not have as many conflict experiences as the United States. Therefore, to categorize the cases for Great Britain and France and execute separate analyses for two types of conflict will render the statistical analysis unreliable.

12. Recall that popularity ratings and crisis involvement are theoretically linked. If a variable predicts one, it is also expected to predict the other. Therefore, because protests and riots do not account for crises in a meaningful manner, they should be ineffective as far as popularity is concerned as well.

13. The coefficients of the model are not compromised by the skewed nature of the conflict variable. The assumption of normality only affects the validity of the T statistic in a regression analysis.

14. However, as was argued earlier, there may be serious operational problems with popularity as it was defined with respect to Great Britain.

15. Note that these scores are also the mean popularity levels for both states for the entire series.

16. For both the United States and the United Kingdom, conflict type was cross-tabulated with a dichotomised popularity variable lagged 1 month forward. Other lag structures, such as two or three months provided similar results.

17. M.L.E. = -0.04, S.E.= 0.01.

18. M.L.E. = -0.08, S.E.= 0.04.

19. M.L.E. = -0.03, S.E. = 0.03.

Chapter 6

Directions for Future Testing and Practical Implications

When Samuel addressed the people, he told them plainly, that God had raised up enemies against them to keep them humble, and to try, prove, and punish them. These considerations serve to show how wrong are those who say that the sole end of war is peace...(Jean Bodin 1955)

Having established a theoretical and empirical relationship between domestic and international conflict for the three states under consideration, the sixth and final chapter will first outline areas for further improvement of the model. Second, the chapter will consider how the diversionary theory can be used to aid cumulation of knowledge in International Relations and the study of crisis, conflict and war. Finally, the policy-level implications will be addressed. Emphasis will be placed on illustrating how the refined diversion theory can explain state behaviour in Eastern Europe in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

I. Directions for future testing

The present investigation was motivated by a discrepancy in conflict analysis. Quantitative inquiries had produced

little or no support for the diversionary theory of war. This stood in sharp contrast to the multitude of case studies that suggested the existence of diversionary tactics. The position taken in this dissertation is that this discrepancy can be traced to flaws in the quantitative literature itself. At least five basic problems combined to justify a new effort toward aggregate testing.

To begin, the manner in which time-lags were used represented a significant shortcoming in much of the quantitative work in this area. It was demonstrated that the lags employed were chosen primarily because of data constraints rather than proper theoretical articulation. The fact that no relationship between internal and external conflict was identified may have reflected, at least to some extent, inappropriate use of time-lags. Data analysis revealed that the lags are not constant: they vary based on the type of domestic conflict and the state under consideration.

A second area of concern neglected by the research program had been whether intensity and type of domestic turmoil play a significant role. Why should all instances of domestic turmoil have an effect on an elite's decision to use international violence as a diversionary tactic? Data analysis in this study revealed that certain types of domestic instability are more likely to be associated with international conflict. Namely, economic indicators were found to be the strongest predictors of international conflict

because these types of factors most directly impact an elite's popularity.

Third, previous quantitative evaluations reflected a belief that all external conflict must be a function of domestic turmoil. This was an unfair requirement because it assumed away the existence of genuine national security threats or wars fought for other reasons. Testing of the refined model demonstrated that diversion was most likely to work in instances where the target was significantly weaker in relative military capability. Alternatively, as predicted, the model was not effective in predicting crisis between equally matched states.

Fourth and perhaps most importantly, the basic nature of the hypothesized linkage between internal and external conflict had not been properly understood. The conflict-nexus was found to be mediated by an important intervening variable, that of *threshold* (operationalized as popularity for the three states under consideration). More importantly, proper theoretical articulation revealed that external strategies are not the only available options for dealing with domestic instability. Depending on the *type* and *nature* of internal instability, the data analysis in this study revealed that a domestic strategy is always available and is sometimes preferred.

Finally, international factors and how they affect the decision to divert domestic conflict had been ignored. The

elite cannot simply externalize domestic turmoil at will. In particular, the nature of the international system, and how it can constrain or facilitate the use of diversionary tactics, had not been raised within previous behavioral research.

The refined model demonstrates that the elite must, first and foremost, decide if an external strategy can succeed in diverting domestic instability. This is shown to depend on both domestic and international considerations. Some states that desire to divert their domestic instability may be unable to do so simply because a convenient target is not available. These states must in turn pursue a different strategy.

A further constraint on diversion critical to the model was identified to be the decision-making environment. From Rummel(1963) onward, the state invariably has been looked upon as a 'black box' in standard treatments of conflict linkage. But the state -- regardless of the nature of its regime -- is much more than a unified actor that reacts to domestic conflict by projecting it into the international system (Allison 1971). Thus an elite contemplating the use of external conflict to divert domestic unrest could find that the decision-making process takes policy in a different direction. Given this, the model specified what type of decision-making environment is necessary for diversion to be a viable option.

Internationally, the refined model emphasized that elites must consider the capability of a potential adversary. A

diversionary strategy might backfire when an adversary has greater capability and/or resolve. This implies that a diversion strategy is only one possible option for dealing with heightened levels of domestic instability. The model highlighted available options and also determined what constellation of forces lead to the choice of one over another. The critical factors were identified to be whether or not **opportunity** and **willingness** for diversion are present.

Finally, the model presented a threshold level of tolerance for domestic instability. All states experience domestic instability. However, diversionary practices are not common because most systems are capable of absorbing a portion of their domestic instability. The model specified that diversionary activity is only possible when a polity can no longer absorb its internal conflict. The threshold level -- which varies cross-nationally -- isolated when diversionary tactics are most likely to be employed.

Chapters four and five operationalized and tested the model for the experiences of three Great Power democracies in the Post World War II era. The findings from this limited cross-national application of the refined model suggest that externalization does in fact take place, at least with respect to the three states considered. The findings were strongest for the United States. With the exception of two indicators, the independent, intervening, and dependent variables performed exactly as predicted. Given the importance of

presidential popularity, it seems as though electoral politics play a role in determining foreign policy in the United States.[1]

In some respects, the model performed even better for the United Kingdom. As anticipated, economic indicators proved to be the most salient predictors of international crisis involvement. The only anomalous finding was the inability of popularity to operate as specified by the model. Finally, the model did not perform as well with respect to France. This was expected given that the operationalization of normal conflict in chapter four ranked the United States first, Great Britain second, and France third in their externalization potential.

As is the case with any endeavour of this type, a number of problems have been encountered in the testing of the model. First, with respect to data collection, popularity ratings for France could not be located. This was a serious problem given the importance of this concept for the model. Moreover, data on what was argued to be the most important independent variable was not available for any of the states in the analysis. *'Subjective economic prospects for the future'* was argued to be extremely important because it directly measured the level of polity wide economic satisfaction. Therefore, it must be incorporated in future tests of the model.

A number of reasons combine to warrant a re-operationalization of the external dependent variable as well. Due to the comparatively limited number of foreign policy

crises experienced by states in general, a larger cross-national evaluation could not be performed. The limited number of cases also meant that the crucial structural constraints could not be tested. Availability of the **Militarized Interstate Disputes** (MID) dataset would have alleviated these interrelated problems.[2] This is because militarized interstate disputes occur more frequently than foreign policy crises.

On its own however, the inclusion of the MID data would not resolve all problems. A longer time frame -- possible going back to the beginning of the twentieth century -- would allow for enough variation in the structure of the international system necessary for more complete testing.

The limited number of cases also meant that differentiation between **types** of foreign policy crises was not possible. In order to allow for a sufficient number of cases per category (or value) of the dependent variable, only a distinction between whether or crisis occurred in any given month was possible. Once again, availability of the MID data will alleviate this problem.

The focus of this dissertation has been on military conflict. Future applications of the model may benefit from the inclusion of economic disputes as the dependent variable. Given the potential for military disputes to escalate uncontrollably, states may prefer the less costly option of economic conflict. This type of dependent variable may also be particularly useful when dealing with states that do not have

obvious targets for military conflict. For example, Canada would be hardpressed to **independently** pursue a militarily hostile foreign policy.[3] Therefore, the only option for states in Canada's position may be economic disputes.

A proper cross-national application would also include the experiences of non-democracies. However, in order to broaden the application of the model, data must be located on a number of variables that are not readily available: Many non-democracies do not openly admit to the existence of unemployment and riots.

A more serious *theoretical* issue is the operationalization of **threshold** for non-democracies. This was relatively easy to do for democracies: popularity ratings were shown to be critically important to the theoretical linkage between domestic and international conflict. Alternatively, for non-democracies, popularity ratings cannot be used as a measure of threshold.

As suggested by Levy and Valiki (1992), a dictatorship's 'threshold' is a function of the stability of the ruling coalition. By definition, the more stable the coalition, the less threatened the elite feel. As such, the operationalization of threshold for non-democracies should include indicators intended to measure coalition or elite instability.

Along those lines, Taylor and Jodice (1983) provide a number of useful indicators. First, '*unsuccessful irregular*

executive transfers' measures the impact of organizations or groups attempting to remove and replace the incumbent national executive outside the conventional procedures for transferring power. Similarly, '*executive adjustments*' assesses the scope and magnitude of power adjustments or 'purges'. These two indicators, used in combination, may prove to be an adequate operationalization of non-democratic threshold.

A final area of concern refers to transformation of the independent variables. Given the requirements of the model, an emphasis was placed on operationalizing the independent variables in order to measure the impact of sudden and large changes in domestic instability. It is these types of changes that are most likely to trigger **ad hoc** decision making and thus increase the likelihood of diversionary activity. Therefore, the model assumes elites react only to short term trends in the level of domestic instability.

The nature of salient domestic instability may however, take on a different form. Gordon (1974), for example, argues that diversionary tactics can explain Germany's motivation for involvement in the First World War. However, salient domestic instability for Gordon differs fundamentally from the process identified in this project. Whereas sudden large changes in instability are important here, Gordon identifies the German rate of industrialization after unification as well as the nature of the political system as being critical to the diversion process. He argues that between 1871 and 1914

Germany "was an inherently unstable nation-state, which was faced from the outset with an insoluble dilemma: trying to industrialize as fast as possible, but also trying to offset the social changes of industrialization and their inevitable impact on politics." The political system was founded during a non-industrialized period. "Rapid [modernization], however, threatened to blow this [union] to smithereens" (Gordon 1974, 218).

Therefore, Germany's social problems did not begin immediately prior to its involvement in World War I as would be predicted by the refined model. A transformation of the independent variables would have to account for this type of process. Taking unemployment as an example, salient domestic instability would not be the change between one time period to the next. Rather, emphasis would be placed on examining long term trends.

Finally, although least squares regression and probit analysis were employed as statistical tools, future applications of the model may benefit from the application of *Linear Structural Equation Model for Latent Variables* (LISREL). LISREL allows for the determination of coefficients of simultaneous linear equations relating the dependent to independent variables. In other words, the impact of the variables presented in figure 4.1 can be tested simultaneously using LISREL, as opposed to segregating the model into constituent parts as was done in chapter five.

II. Implications for Cumulation of knowledge in International Relations and the study of Crisis, Conflict and war.

Although some operational and data related problems persist, the method employed in developing the model in this dissertation has important implications with respect to the study of international relations. First and foremost, it is relatively clear that cumulation within International Relations will be aided significantly by a recognition that the different levels of analysis are not mutually exclusive.

This recognition will have a particularly strong impact on one of the most prominent approaches to the study of international politics; that of structural realism. In chapter two, a number of assumptions for structural realism were outlined. They included that (1) states are the key actors; (2) the state system is anarchic; (3) states are rational, and, (4) states seek power and calculate interests in terms of power. As noted, this last point is of particular interest for this dissertation. Structural realists believe that the goal of each state is to maximize relative power and the chances for survival in a hostile international system. In operational terms, this means that states manoeuvre to weaken dangerous opponents.

What is relatively clear from the testing of the refined diversionary theory is that states do not only pursue these kinds of objectives. Some external conflict is motivated by domestic imperatives. Given this, "realist theory should be

modified to indicate that when security needs are paramount, states will act in a manner predicted by realpolitik models; correspondingly, other motives may be dominant or coequal depending on the issue area or stakes in a conflict" (Wayman and Diehl, 1994). In other words, depending on the type and nature of a threat, Structural Realism only has conditional validity.

As discussed in chapter two, Goertz and Diehl (1994), and, James and Hristoulas (1994) serve as examples of attempts to isolate non-realist motives for international conflict. However, each acknowledges the inherent importance of structural realism. The optimal solution is not necessarily to 'throw the baby out with the bath water' but to revise structural realism to account for these types of processes. Therefore, a central conclusion of this dissertation is that the structure of the system is important, but that we have to begin looking at it in a different manner. Other levels of analysis must be included in a refined version of structural realism. The result would be a more complex and less parsimonious theory or paradigm but at the same time a more useful way of looking at international relations and international conflict (James 1994).

An example from this project will help illustrate the advantage of linking seemingly inconsistent approaches. As noted in chapter five, the predictive power of the revised conflict-nexus model was enhanced by virtue of the inclusion

of a systemic cost/benefit constraint. Although the model performed well without its inclusion, the requirement that states will target a significantly weaker state in their pursuit of a scape-goat enhanced the predictive power of the model greatly. This factor had not been included in previous tests of the conflict-nexus.

Political Science as a field will benefit greatly from cross sub-discipline communication as well. Indeed, the critical elements of what types of domestic instability are important to elites are essentially borrowed from the sub-fields of American and British politics. The diversionary literature on its own had not considered this question salient enough to examine systematically. The result, of course, was the inability to properly understand the causal relationship between domestic and international instability. Therefore, the diversionary theory serves as a promising first step in the direction of elaborating structural realism in order to account for other types of motivations for conflict behaviour.

The findings presented here also suggest that Balance of Power theorists are correct in their belief that equality in capability has a constraining effect on the propensity for international violence. Briefly, Balance of Power theories rest on the notion "that an equal distribution of power makes victory in war too uncertain to warrant risking the initiation of war" (Bueno de Mesquita 1980, 370; Haas 1953; Gulick 1955; Morgenthau 1985; Kaplan 1957; Zinnes, North, and Koch 1961).

The refined diversionary theory operates in the same fashion. States may want to divert their domestic conflict externally, but may be unable to do so because a potential adversary is stronger.

The diversion theory however, has a greater range of implications when considering nation-level determinants of crisis, conflict, and war. For example, expected-utility theory suggests a decision-based set of incentives for conflict initiation. The typical expected-utility calculus of initiation points to realpolitik type considerations such as the potential impact of alliances. However, it generally neglects the importance of domestic determinants war. The diversion theory points to the necessity of modelling domestic costs and benefits from international conflict involvement.

Of critical importance is the 'risk' and 'uncertainty' associated with the decision to initiate international conflict (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 33). Briefly, 'risk taking' "refers to the probability of success that a decision maker demands before pursuing a course of action. "Uncertainty," on the other hand, refers to the degree to which the probability of success of a course of action is unknown." Given the necessity of being in control of the external situation, diversion theory would suggest that elites have a low tolerance for uncertainty and risk when deciding to divert. This is because the elite cannot afford to have the external

situation spiral out of control: The domestic impact could be serious. This suggests that diversion is probably a rare phenomenon.

The data analysis presented in chapter five supports this view. Although the model performed relatively well on the experiences of the United States, Great Britain, and France, this was only the case after proper isolation of potential diversion cases. For example, about half of United States crises were deemed not to be likely candidates for diversion (type II, III, and IV) precisely because of the risks and uncertainties associated with such strategies.

Further, the diversionary theory is intrinsic to theories of conflict and heightened nationalism. Levy (1989, 90) argues that "peoples in both democratic and non-democratic states are often highly enthusiastic at the beginning of wars". This has much to do with the fact that nationalism creates a common interest in the nation, a concept of the national interest as the highest value, and an intense commitment to the well-being of the state. Nationalism therefore, can have a strong impact on the propensity for international conflict. Not only can elites be driven to war by nationalism[4] but more importantly, elites can use nationalism for this purpose as well.

Nationalism explains why diversion works in the first place: diversion rallies public opinion and heightens nationalistic feelings. This suggests that diversion will only

be employed in states where there is some minimal level of nationalist feeling. Future applications of the refined diversion model might benefit the inclusion of a further conditioning variable: that of the level of latent nationalism. Countries like Germany in the post-world war II era would obviously have a relatively low level of latent nationalism. This is fundamentally because of the embarrassment associated with its participation and activities in World War II. Germany, therefore, would not be expected to divert as often as states that are associated with much higher levels of nationalism.

Others have noted the linkage between heightened nationalism, diversion theory, and international conflict. Referring to the ethnic and culture nationalism is the Balkans, Gagnon(1995, 131) argues that ethnic hatreds are not the essential cause of the Yugoslavia conflict, but rather a function of "the purposive actions of political actors who actively create violent conflict, selectively drawing on history in order to portray it as historically inevitable." Moreover, he argues that "the external (ethnic) conflict, although justified and described in terms of relations with other groups and taking place within that context, has its main goal within the state, among members of the same ethnicity" (Gagnon 1995, 134).

Gagnon implies that elites in the Balkans employed ethnic nationalism as a means of diverting attention away from

potential domestic threats. He argues that the external threats were manufactured to suit elite needs. As evidence of this, he points to the fact that intermarriages were quite high in those ethnically-mixed regions that saw the worst violence; and sociological polling as late as 1989-90 showed high levels of tolerance, *especially* in those mixed regions now engulfed in war.[5]

In sum, the diversionary theory has important and positive implications with respect to both the study of international relations in general, and the study of crisis, conflict and war more specifically: Standard approaches to the study of international relations will be improved by the inclusion of state level explanations.

III. Practical Implications

The implications of the findings as far as the control of international conflict is concerned are not so promising. Mayer (1969, 297) argues that

> whereas wars whose motivation and intent are primarily diplomatic and external retain their political purposes..., those whose mainsprings are essentially political and internal fail to acquire a well-defined project. At the outset even the minimal external objectives of wars that are sparked internally have a tendency to be singularly ill defined.

Indeed, there is a possibility that the elite attempting to divert has not properly considered the objectives and consequences of its actions.

Unclear or misleading external objective imply unclear or misleading negotiating positions. The practical upshot is that these types of conflict become increasingly difficult to resolve. Mediation and other types of conflict management are limited in that they can only deal with disputes that arise from a genuine national security threat. They cannot effectively resolve conflicts that result from an attempt to cope with domestic turmoil. There is very little an organization like the U.N. can do when at least one of the parties involved in a dispute fabricates an issue in order to satisfy domestic consumption needs. As Gagnon (1995, 165) argues, if violence is... caused by internal conflict, then negotiations over interests outside the domestic arena will be without effect, since the goal of the conflict is not in the international environment, *vis-a-vis* another state, but rather at home."

A case in point is the tremendous instability associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact. Violence has erupted in Russia and the former Yugoslavia with the prospects of conflict spreading to other Eastern European states, such as Albania and Bulgaria, being relatively high. Moreover, mediation efforts by the U.N., the European Community, and NATO have been less than effective, especially

in the case of the war in the former Yugoslavia. The diversionary theory not only provides an explanation for why these conflicts have arisen, but also for why they have become almost impossible to resolve, at least in the short term.

The developments in Eastern Europe stand in sharp contrast to the multitude of studies that examine the effects of the process of democratization on the propensity for international violence.[6] The political transformations in this region serve as examples where democratization has actually lead to an **increase** in international instability and conflict.[7] In fact, there is preliminary evidence to support this view. Mansfield and Snyder (1995) for example, find that newly democratized states are about 80% more likely than their autocratic counterpart to be involved in an violent international conflict. These staggering results suggest that democratic states are not peaceful, at least in the early days of their development.

Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 86) argue that newly democratized states are war prone because of heightened nationalism. Referring to post-Soviet Russia, They state that "voters disgruntled by economic distress [and] backed by belligerent nationalists like Zhironovsky, contributed to the climate that led to war in Chechnya." Yeltsin felt it necessary to show that he could act decisively in the light of increased political polarization. Substantively, of course, these developments fall within the explanatory rubric of the

diversionary theory.

Democratization creates a wider spectrum of politically significant groups with diverse and incompatible interests. The collision between newly enfranchised political groups and 'old guard' interests leads to extremely heightened levels of domestic political and social instability. Unable to settle differences, the quickest solution to a growing problem is diversionary tactics. Indeed, "one of the simplest but riskiest strategies for a hard-pressed regime in a democratizing country is to shore up its prestige at home by seeking victories abroad" (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 93).

Does the model developed in chapter 3 help explain the evolution of domestic and international conflict in parts of Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War period? The model specifies that the first requirement is an increase in the level of domestic instability that surpasses the threshold level.

The period following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was clearly characterized by a heightened level of domestic social and political instability. Of central importance however, was economic instability triggered by the collapse of the communist distribution system. Although a common problem in all of the Warsaw Pact countries, the disruption of the distribution system was particularly acute in Russia. Not only did it create rapid inflation but high unemployment rates as well. Some estimate that the

disintegrating economy plunged Russia into a depression more severe than the West experienced in the 1930s (McWilliams 1995, 470).

To cushion the shock of higher prices caused by shortages, Yeltsin in 1991-1992 printed great sums of money. The result was an inflation rate that reached 2,000 percent for 1992 and a government budget deficit of 25 percent. By the winter of 1991-1992, 90 percent of Russians lived below the *official* subsistence level. Public opinion polls conducted at the time indicate that a high percentage of former Soviet citizens viewed the market economy transition with considerable pessimism.

McWilliams (1995, 471) argues that the transition created "an impoverished, humiliated, and increasingly embittered mass of people who could not understand how their great nation had reached this juncture in history. ... [T]he mood in Moscow became reminiscent of Germany in the aftermath of its defeat in World War I." Russia was not alone in its plight. Yugoslavia, for example, experienced a whopping 6,000 percent increase in inflation in the period leading up the break-up of the country. Clearly then, the level of domestic instability was extremely acute.

The model specifies that for externalization to occur, the source of the instability also must be critical to the elite. This is the case as far as Eastern Europe and Russia are concerned. The coup that ousted Gorbachev and almost

reinstated a authoritarian regime is evidence of this. The economic instability was (and obviously still is) particularly threatening to the governing elite in Eastern Europe because it has led to a polarization of society. The resulting instability caused by the political and economic changes resulted in the centrist position of Gorbachev becoming increasingly untenable. "Briefly seen by conservatives as insurance against popular rebellion and by radicals as the main obstacle to a conservative coup, the reformist center quickly [became] the object of scorn and distrust from both sides" (Bova 1991, 125).

Indeed, with respect to the six Eastern European states, Rose and Mishler (1994) found that, on average, 25% of the population preferred returning to the old communist system and the associated economic stability. Although not a majority, it certainly suggests that a strong anti-transition element is present in Eastern Europe.

The Croatian Example

The recent Croatian counter-attacks designed to reclaim territory lost to Serbian rebels in 1991-1992 highlight how political, social, and economic instability can influence the decision to become involved in international conflict. Both the primary (i.e. threat to viability of the government) and secondary (i.e. structure of the system) elements of the model are supported by this case.

The Croatian secession from Serb-led Yugoslavia in June of 1991 resulted in open warfare with the Belgrade supported Serb rebels. Outgunned and outmanned, the new Croatian state lost one third of its territory and suffered 10,000 casualties. Fighting between Croatian government forces and Serb rebels officially ended in January of 1992 under the auspices of the United Nations and the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

In the meantime, the domestic political, social, and economic situation in Croatia was growing increasingly troublesome for the newly elected Tudjman government. During the Croatian presidential and parliamentary elections in August of 1992, both Franjo Tudjman and his ruling party, the Croatian Democratic Union, won convincing victories (Kearns 1993). However, the government's high popularity was short lived.

First, by September of 1992, the government was accused of limiting and interfering with the operations of several magazines and newspapers (Kearns 1993). Second, and most importantly, the government was criticized in its handling of privatization. All applications for privatization had to be handled by the Agency for Reconstruction and Development. Of the approximately 3,500 enterprises, around 1,000 had applied to have their ownership transferred. Out of these, the agency approved only 119 applications (Kearns 1993). The rest of the companies remained in government hands. This gave rise to the

suspicion that the government would use this ownership to ensure that its own political supporters secured for themselves the greatest benefits from any future sales. By early of 1993, opinion polls showed a sharp decline in support for both the President and party (*Globus*, 8 January 1993).

Croatia's economy has been in a deplorable state. During the 1991 war, 40% of the country's economic capacity was destroyed. To make matters worse, Croatia became host to around 700,000 refugees. Inflation leading up to the August 1995 offensive was at about 250% per year and the real average salary had declined by around 60 per cent since the beginning of 1991. Official statistics placed the unemployment rate at about 20 per cent (Kearns 1993).

Such was the background leading up to the August 1995 Croatian offensives to reclaim lost territory. Politically, Tudjman knew his days were numbered unless he did something quickly to turn his prospects around for the upcoming election. Reclaiming lost territory would not only alleviate some of the economic pressure on the state (resource extraction), but would also give Tudjman the 'heroic' status necessary to win the election.

Other factors consistent with the model may have lead Tudjman to believe an offensive against the Serbs was the best way to assure victory in the next general election. The model emphasizes that elites generally target weaker opponents in their attempt to divert domestic instability. Along those

lines, the Croatian army had been completely refurbished after the losses to the rebels in 1991. By August of 1995, they were clearly the superior military force. This coupled with the possibility that Tudjman had worked out a deal with Belgrade that would allow him to retake the lost territory, assured victory for Croatia.[8]

As the model would predict, the overall great power response to the Croatian assault was "at best ambiguous and at worst contradictory" (Heritage 1995). On the one hand, Russia and Great Britain strongly condemned the Croatian offensive, while the United States and Germany seemed to have given the Croats their tacit support. Other than verbal condemnations, the great powers have not taken any formal action against Croatia to date.[9]

In sum, the combination of heightened domestic instability, an upcoming election and low government popularity necessitated a response by Tudjman. Predicting a swift victory and a muted response by the great powers, Croatia's offensive against the Serbs can be seen as an example of diverted domestic conflict.[10]

The refined diversion model also helps explain why some East European states did not divert. First, although Poland and Czechoslovakia both experienced heightened levels of domestic instability after the fall of the Soviet Union, that level did not reach crisis proportions. In fact, many observers point to Poland and Czechoslovakia as models of

political and economic transition (Rosenberger 1992; Winiecki 1994; Bookman 1994). Further, even if the Polish government did, at some point relish external conflict, it is unclear what type of target would have been available. Targeting Germany, for example, would not have made any sense. This is not only because Germany is clearly a stronger state, but also because Germany is viewed as an important source of much needed foreign capital.

East Germany, of course, did not have any time to divert any domestic instability because it was quickly united with the Federal Republic in October of 1991. Alternatively, Russia could not choose to target the Baltic states in its search for a 'scapegoat' because it would have been an extremely risky strategy. The Baltic states were quickly recognized as independent entities by the West. Any attempt by Russia to target these new states would have been met by extreme criticism. Russia needed western capital and was not about to jeopardize this by targeting the Baltic states.

The Structure of the System

As suggested by the model, the international system itself can potentially have a significant impact on a states willingness and ability to divert domestic conflict externally. It is at this crucially important level where elites perform a true cost-benefit analysis with respect to the utility and feasibility of externalization.

Most International Relations research suggests that the international system is moving towards a multipolar structure. (Layne 1993; Wagner 1993; Kennedy 1993; Mersheimer 1990; Kegley and Raymond 1994). Given the arguments presented in chapters two and three, this change may prove to be particularly problematic when it comes to attempts at controlling diversionary motivations for war. The bipolarity of the cold war constrained the activities of states in their pursuits of diversionary targets. Its end may have removed a powerful constraint from international politics.

The states most likely to be viewed as economic and military great powers challengers in a new multipolar system are Japan, Germany (and the EC), China, and Russia.[11] Some argue that these great powers will not pose a serious challenge to the United States because they are only concerned with economic development. Indeed, Nye (1990, 169) has argued that "Japan seems likely to remain a one-dimensional great power rather than a new hegemonic challenger of the United States."

Although Japan and Germany seem to be more concerned with economic development, there is no guarantee that these non-militaristic policies will continue to be pursued in the future. Nye's comment on the uni-dimensional nature of Japan's aspirations neglects the fact that it is now third in military expenditures, seventh in military capabilities, and maintains the largest navy in the Pacific (Schelsinger 1992, 12).

Although a strong Yen explains military expenditures, the same is not true with respect to military capabilities and size of the navy.

On a more substantive level, "Japanese security planners did not even consider the possibility of a rupture in the U.S. - Japanese security relationship. Now they do" (Mahbuban 1992, 127). This has led to Japanese requests for membership in the Security Council of the United Nations. These developments are not consistent with the view that Japan's interests are only economic.

Similar developments have taken place in Germany. Although there is no clear evidence of attempts at remilitarization, Germans have begun to take a much more active role in international affairs. They have, for example, taken on primary responsibility for economic assistance to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. They are also upgrading military systems which includes the acquisition of long-range transport aircraft necessary for distant military operations. Finally, they too have requested permanent membership on the Security Council of the U.N.

Although it is difficult to imagine the conditions that would lead to Japan and Germany becoming military competitors, the preceding discussion only serves to highlight its potential. One likely scenario however, is that there will be increased pressure on Japan and Germany to follow independent military policies.[12] This will result from a reduced American

commitment already in progress on the European continent and in Asia. As Kissinger (1994, 809) has argued, the "economic powers will become political and military powers commensurate with their economic strength. They will be obliged to do so because, in the post-cold war world, others will not perceive threats in the same way and so will not be willing to run risks for them." Once this occurs, there is no guarantee that the military and economic interests of Japan, Germany and the United States will continue to coincide.

Although the United States, Japan and Germany still cooperate on many ventures, the same cannot be assumed for Russia and China. It is these two countries that are most likely to cause systemic instability in the foreseeable future. China's economic development since the early 1980's has been phenomenal. Indeed, over the last few years, China has had the world's fastest growing economy at about 10-15% per year (**Economist** 7 July 1995). Moreover, if China maintains economic reforms towards a market economy, it is likely to pass Russia by 2010 (Chace 1992, 108). Indeed, Barnathan et al. (1993) go one step further and argue that China will emerge as 'the economic powerhouse of the 21st century.'

China's phenomenal economic development has not come about at the expense of its military. Indeed, its economic growth has been paralleled by an equal expansion of militaristic aspirations. The present dispute with Taiwan is just one example.[13] As well, it is presently involved in an

impressive array of international disputes with no less than ten international actors.

To say the least therefore, China serves as a huge source of international instability. It has the least commitment to the status quo of any of the important powers. Indicative of this is the fact that China has hinted that it is not particularly comfortable with the extent of U.S. power. Its leaders have argued that former U.S. president Bush's 'New World Order' is merely a "ruse for extending U.S. hegemony throughout the globe" (Layne 1993, 8).

One observed has noted that "the present crisis over Taiwan may blow over, but look ten or 20 years ahead and it is easy to see grounds for anxiety" (**Economist** 7 July 1995). To make matters worse, instability after the death of Deng Xiaping may heighten Chinese assertiveness.

Although the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union brought conciliatory behaviour on the part of Russia towards the West, this seemingly cooperative behaviour is not assured for the future. Issues may arise which will bring to the forefront a renewed wave of hostility. This may already be taking place given the seemingly divergent policies with respect to the former Yugoslavia.[14] It is relatively clear then, the "Russian leadership increasingly finds itself at odds with U.S. foreign Policy, interests and values" (Doughty 1995).

Russia is becoming uncomfortable with the U.S. acting as

the only superpower, and is looking for counterweights such as a new relationship with China. It is also beginning to rebuild bridges with anti-west Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea (Doughty 1995). Moreover, they would like to rearm Serbia and have hinted that they may be willing to unilaterally forgo the arms embargo for this purpose. One senior Yeltsin aid has gone as far as to say that "the time when we allowed 'well-wishers' from Washington to lecture our own affairs is over" (Simes 1995).

Therefore, the likelihood of a competitive multipolar system emerging in the 21st century should not be ruled out. As much of the literature suggests, such a multipolar system will be associated with shifting alliance patterns and increased insecurity and instability.

It is precisely here where the likelihood of diversionary activity increases. In a future multipolar world, states will feel less constrained and thus more likely to pursue diversionary actions. States contemplating the use of external conflict to divert domestic instability will find that the international system will not be able to impose the types of constraints on behaviour available during the cold war period.[15] In Eastern Europe for example, "virulently ethnic hatreds long contained by the threat of great-power intervention have reappeared and are wreaking havoc" (Kegley and Raymond 1994, 167). As Mersheimer argues (1990), the collapse of bipolarity was the "crucial permissive condition

that allowed these particular causes to operate."

Why should a possible future multipolar system fall victim to the same types of problems associated with previous multipolar configurations? After all, as Mueller (1989) argues, Great Power behaviour is fundamentally different today, and this change is believed to have much to do with the stabilizing effect of international institutions.[16] Keohane (1993, 53), for example, argues that "avoiding military conflict in Europe after the Cold War depends greatly on whether the next decade is characterized by a continuous pattern of institutionalized cooperation." This stems from the argument that "institutions can alter state preferences and therefore change state behaviour" (Mersheimer 1995, 7).

How can institutions alter the cost-benefit analysis performed by states and thus affect the propensity for international conflict? Institutional theory assumes that states would prefer not be involved in conflict. However, conflict (military or otherwise) emerges because states find it extremely difficult to cooperate. It is precisely here where institutions come in. In theory, institutions are supposed to alter the cost-benefit analysis performed by states (Axelrod 1984). Cooperation becomes possible because of long-term institutionalized interaction. States will think twice about not cooperating when they know they will have to deal with the state they 'cheated' sometime in the future.

The research assumes that institutions will help resolve

military-security issues because they have been effective in economic disputes. This theoretical extension can be criticized for a number of reasons.

First, institutional theory rests on the assumption that the costs associated with being 'suckered' by another state are manageable. Although this may be the case with economic issues, getting 'suckered' in the security realm may mean swift destruction. In other words, the long term time horizon necessary for cooperative behaviour is often absent in the military-security realm (Parks 1985).

A further problem is identified by Mersheimer(1995, 15). He argues that the theory is "of little relevance in situations where states' interests are fundamentally conflictual and neither side thinks it has much to gain from cooperation. In these circumstances, states aim to gain advantage over each other", not resolve a dispute peacefully.

Evans and Wilson (1992) acknowledge that states sometimes employ institutions in their dealings with other states. However, they go on to argue that institutions merely reflect the interests of great powers. In other words, institutions are merely "arenas for acting out power relationships". A case in point is the United Nations. It is no accident that the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China are all permanent members of the most important body of the organization. Moreover, the fact that each of the permanent members of the Security Council have veto power is further

consistent with Evans and Wilson's arguments.

Recent developments in the former Yugoslavia point to the ineffectiveness of international institutions in the security realm. The U.N. UNPROFOR peacekeepers' mandate in Yugoslavia included four elements: They were to (1) consolidate the ceasefire between the Croat and Serb forces, (2) Establish a demilitarized zone between Croatia and the rebel held territories, (3) protect the population against the threat or use of force (i.e. "ethnic cleansing") and (4), assist displaced persons who wished to return to their homes. (A. James 1993, 93). The ultimate overarching objective for UNPROFOR was "to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis" (U.N. Document S/23280 1991).

As noted by A. James (1993, 93), the U.N. scheme was a "non-starter". Although the U.N. forces had some impact at the local level in terms of policing and security, their failures far outweighed their achievements. Multiple ceasefire violations, as well as the inability to consistently protect the local populations from "ethnic cleansing" highlight two important mandate related deficiencies. Moreover, "virtually no progress was made with that part of UNPROFOR's mandate which refers to the return to their homes of displaced persons" (A. James 1994). Finally and most importantly the U.N. did little to create the conditions necessary for a final peace settlement.

Conclusion

In sum, the constellation of forces seem to point an increased likelihood in the use of diversionary tactics to stabilize domestic polities in Eastern Europe. The combination of extreme economic instability and the collapse of the bipolar system may imply that these states will capitalize on the fluidity of the international system and seek a 'quick fix' to domestic turmoil.

Because the root of the problem is internal to each state, the only truly long term solution is sustained economic development supported by the more developed nations of the world. Although economic problems are admittedly only part of the problem, loans and other types of economic transfers will probably go a long way in stabilizing the domestic polities of each Eastern European state. The alternatively is too politically risky in an age of systemic fluidity.

Bova (1991) suggests that the fundamental difference between the Eastern European transitions to democracy and those that occurred in Greece, Portugal, and Spain in the mid-70's is that in the latter, economic transformation came before institutional transformation. This allowed for smooth overall changes to occur. The objective of economic transfers would be to help speed up the economic transformation process. The effect will be to reduce the level of political polarization and thus enhance the domestic standing of Eastern European governing elite.

Although this type of policy is likely to have a minimal impact in areas already involved in conflict (e.g., the former Yugoslavia) it may help stabilize 'risky' states such as Russia. A presidential election is scheduled for Russia next year and the worst possible scenario for the West would be the victory of a hyper-nationalist that appeals to disgruntled and impoverished voters.

For those areas already engulfed in conflict, a more assertive and consistent stance by the great powers will likely alter the cost-benefit calculus of leaders such as Tudjman and Milosovic. Tudjman was able to launch his offensive partly because of the inconsistent behaviour of Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States.

The great powers must demonstrate that the costs of continued fighting outweigh the potential benefits. In other words, they must impose systemic constraints on the involved actors.

The fly in the ointment however, is Russia and their support of Belgrade and the Serb rebels. Any negotiated settlement would therefore have to directly involve Russia. The United States was able to influence the Russian decision to transfer nuclear technology to other states. Similar types of pressures can be used on Moscow to convince the government that cooperative behaviour is in its best long-term economic and political interests.

The preceding discussion emphasizes the need to

fundamentally rethink the nature and origin of international conflict. Resolving international disputes in the future will involve more than a few thousand well placed United Nations peacekeepers. Diversionary motivation points to the necessity of looking not only to the international system for potential options and solutions, but to the domestic political situation as well. The linkage between the various levels of analysis seems more prominent than ever.

Endnotes

1. Studies that directly examine the connection between foreign policy and electoral politics include Abramowitz (1985); Arnold (1990); Asher and Weisenberg (1978); Chappell and Keech (1985); Davis (1988); Edwards (1990); Graber (1982); Hinckley (1986, 1988); Hughs (1978); Levering (1978); Marra, Ostromb and Simon (1990); Miller (1967); Miller and Stokes (1963); and, Page and Shapiro (1992).

2. Significant problems were encountered in the attempt to locate the MID dataset. Although an older limited version of the dataset was available, this was not employed because it only includes cases up to 1975. Wider distribution of revised version of the dataset -- coded up to 1985 -- is not yet permitted.

3. Of course, this does not preclude joint military operations such as the Gulf War of 1991 and U.N. or N.A.T.O peacekeeping operations.

4. Jeremy Bentham(1955) argued that because of domestic politics and nationalism, President William McKinley "led his country unhesitantly toward a war which he did not want for a cause in which he did not believe".

5. For example, throughout the 1980s. 29 percent of Serbs living in Croatia married Croat spouses (Gagnon 1995, 134).

6. For example, see Rummel (1983, 1985); Chan (1984); Weede (1984); Doyle (1986); and, most recently, Dixon (1994).

7. It would be stretching the definition of democracy to argue that all of these states have achieved this goal in 1995. Indeed, many of the transition governments have been accused for non-democratic practices. Tudjman's government in Croatia stands as a good example. Although he was democratically elected in 1992, he has been accused of repeatedly attempting to control the media (Kearns 1995).

8. No assault was made on Serb-held land bordering Serbia, fuelling speculations that Tudjman had a deal with Serb president Slobodan Milosevic (Kuzmanovic 1995).

9. Tudjman may have been assured of the hollow great power reaction because of an earlier offensive to seize a piece of western Slovenia in May of 1995. Although the area was designated as U.N. protected, Croatia only had to suffer minimal criticism from abroad.

10. The discussion of this case should not be taken to necessarily imply that Eastern Europe will soon be engulfed in conflict

resulting from domestic instability. The model developed in chapter three is probabilistic in that the greater the number of conditions satisfied, the greater the likelihood of diversion. This brief discussion on Eastern Europe only suggests that policy makers should keep a cautious eye on developments inside each state.

11. Two states, Germany and Japan, are obviously already economic great powers. The two other, China and Russia have tremendous military capability.

12. Alternatively, "an upward spiral of conflict could erode the current liberal international economic regime and destroy the defense ties that were carefully nurtured after the second world war" (Kegley and Raymond 1994, 204).

13. In an extremely bold move, China has been testing surface-to-surface missiles just 140 miles off the coast of Taiwan. These tests are intended to pressure the Taiwanese government to not pursue further claims for international recognition. China has even hinted that it may be willing to invade Taiwan.

14. While Russia has historical, cultural, and religious ties to the Serbs, U.S. foreign policy has at least implicitly taken a hostile attitude towards Belgrade and the Serb rebels. The most recent example of this is the welcomed response to the Croatian assault on Serb strongholds by Germany and the United States.

15. Mueller (1989, 218-219) argues that nuclear weapons had much to do with enhancing peaceful superpower relations in the Cold War period. By extension, one can argue that possession of such weapons by all the great powers in a future multipolar system will have similar consequences (Mersheimer 1990). This perspective is faulty for a number of reasons. First, there is no substantive evidence that nuclear weapons made any difference to begin with. Second and more importantly, the assumption that nuclear weapons will contribute to stability in a future multipolar system is dependent on the assumption that there will be little on no horizontal proliferation. As the technology to build such weapons becomes increasingly available, minor anti-status quo states will be able to legitimately threaten greater powers. This type of scenario certainly will not lead to enhanced systemic stability in a future multipolar world.

16. Keohane (1988, 386) defines international institutions as "persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations." Mersheimer (1995) argues that this definition is too broad and may encompass "every regularized pattern of activity between states." Accordingly, he adds the stipulation that the 'rules' are "formalized in international agreements, and are usually embodied in organizations with their own personnel and budgets."

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Appendix A

Untransformed Popularity: US

Autocorrelations



Untransformed Popularity

Partial Autocorrelations



Untransformed Unemployment: US

Autocorrelations



Untransformed Unemployment: US

Partial Autocorrelations



Cost of Living: US

Autocorrelations



Cost of Living: US

Partial Autocorrelations



Transformed Unemployment: US

Autocorrelations



Lag Number

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Transformed Unemployment: US

Partial Autocorrelations



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Tranformed Popularity: US

Autocorrelations



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Transformed Popularity: US

Partial Autocorrelations



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Transformed Cost of Living: US

Autocorrelations



Transformed Cost of Living: US

Partial Autocorrelations