Emerging social exclusions in a new master-planned Indonesian provincial capital

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Abstract

This thesis examines Dompak, Indonesia's first master-planned city, which was established in 2007 as the new provincial capital of the recently formed Riau Islands Province. According to official rhetoric about Dompak, it was created as an 'eco-city' that would replace the Dutch-created city of Tanjung Pinang as the provincial capital. While builders of Dompak claim it is inclusive, my research demonstrates that the creation of Dompak exacerbates socio-economic, racial, and religious divides amongst its residents. This thesis makes three main contributions. First, I contextualize Dompak within the global new city trend and examine both the provincial administration's motives and rationale for constructing a new city and how Dompak is used to legitimize political agendas through discourses of pro-poor planning, economic liberalization, green urbanism, and cultural heritage preservation. Second, through the case study of Dompak, I illustrate how urban planning and design can function as tools to sustain power hierarchies, as well as to justify the displacement of unwanted marginal populations. Using Oren Yiftachel's 'dark side of planning' framework, I investigate the regressive aspects of urban planning and the discrepancies between rhetoric and reality, particularly relating to land expropriation, environmental degradation, and social exclusions. Third, I investigate the socio-economic and political consequences that Dompak's creation has had on the lives of local residents.

Résumé

Ce mémoire examine Dompak, la première ville planifiée d'Indonésie, qui a été créée en 2007 en tant que nouvelle capitale provinciale de la province des îles Riau, récemment formée. Selon la rhétorique officielle, Dompak a été conçue comme une "éco-cité" qui remplacerait la ville de Tanjung Pinang, créée par les Hollandais, en tant que capitale provinciale. Alors que les bâtisseurs de Dompak affirment qu'il s'agit d'une ville inclusive, mes recherches démontrent que la création de Dompak exacerbe les divisions socio-économiques, raciales et religieuses entre ses résidents. Ce mémoire présente trois contributions principales. Premièrement, je contextualise Dompak dans la tendance mondiale de création de villes nouvelles et j'examine à la fois les motifs et la logique du gouvernement provincial qui soutiennent la construction d'une nouvelle. J'analyse la façon dont Dompak est utilisée pour légitimer des agendas politiques à travers des discours sur planification urbaine en faveur des pauvres, la libéralisation économique, l'urbanisme vert et la préservation du patrimoine culturel. Deuxièmement, à travers l'étude de cas de Dompak, j'illustre comment la planification et le design urbains peuvent servir d'outils pour maintenir les hiérarchies de pouvoir, ainsi que pour justifier l'expulsion de populations marginales non désirées. En utilisant le concept du « côté obscur de la planification urbaine » d'Oren Yiftachel, j'étudie les aspects régressifs de l'urbanisme et les divergences entre la rhétorique et la réalité, en particulier en ce qui concerne l'expropriation des terres, la dégradation de l'environnement et les exclusions sociales. Enfin, j'étudie les conséquences socio-économiques et politiques que la création de Dompak a engendrées sur la vie des résidents locaux.

Abstrak

Tesis ini mempelajari Dompak, sebuah perencanaan kota baru yang pertama di Indonesia, terbentuk pada tahun 2007 sebagai ibu kota provinsi baru dari Provinsi Kepulauan Riau yang baru didirikan. Kota ini dinyatakan secara resmi sebagai 'kota ramah lingkungan' yang akan menggantikan ibu kota Tanjung Pinang yang dibentuk oleh Pemerintah kolonial Belanda. Meskipun perencanaan Dompak pada awalnya dinyatakan sebagai kota yang inklusif, namun penelitian ini menunjukan bahwa terbentuknya Dompak telah mempertontonkan kesenjangan sosial-ekonomi, ras, dan agama diantara penduduknya. Tesis ini memperlihatkan tiga kontribusi utama antara lain. Pertama, penelitian ini memperlihatkan hubungan antara Dompak dengan kecenderungan kota-kota baru di dunia dan mempelajari motif dan justifikasi dibentuknya sebuah kota baru. Selain itu, tesis ini menganalisa bagaimana pembangunan Dompak dipergunakan untuk melegitimasi agenda politik melalui tata kota inklusif, liberalisasi ekonomi, 'green urbanism', dan pelestarian warisan budaya. Kedua, melalui studi kasus Dompak, tesis ini menggambarkan bagaimana perencanaan dan perancangan kota dapat berfungsi sebagai alat untuk mempertahankan hierarki tingkat kekuasaan, dan juga untuk menjustifikasi pemindahan kelompok marginal. Menggunakan kerangka kerja 'dark side of planning' oleh Oren Yiftachel, tesis ini menyelidiki aspek regresif perencanaan kota dan diskrepansi antara rencana dan kenyataan, terutama yang berkaitan dengan kelayakan penggunaan tanah, perusakan lingkungan, dan pengucilan secara sosial. Ketiga, tesis ini menyelidiki dampak sosio-ekonomi dan politik yang ditimbulkan oleh pembangunan Dompak terhadap kehidupan warga setempat.

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

APBD	*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah* (Regional Budget)
APBN	*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara* (National Budget)
BAPPEDA	*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah* (Regional Development Planning Agency)
BAPPENAS	*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional* (National Development Planning Agency)
BPN	*Badan Pertahanan National* (National Land Agency)
BPS	*Badan Pusat Statistik* (Central Bureau of Statistics)
DESPOS	*Departemen Sosial* (Department of Social Affairs)
DI	*Daerah Istimewa* (Special region)
HGB	*Hak Guna Bangunan* (Building rights)
KEPRI	*Kepulauan Riau* (Riau Islands)
KESBANGPOL	*(Badan) Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik* (Office of Nation and Politics)
KPK	*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi* (Anti-Corruption Agency)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
POSYANDU	*Pos Pelayanan Terpadu* (Integrated Healthcare Centre)
PUSKESMAS	*Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat* (Community Health Clinic)
PU	*Pekerjaan Umum* (Public Works)
REPELITA	*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun* (Five-Year Development Plan)
RI	*Republik Indonesia*
RP	*Rupiah*
RPJMD	*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menegah Daerah* (Regional Medium Term Development Plan)
RPJMN	*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menegah Nasional* (National Medium Term Development Plan)
RPJPD	*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Daerah* (Regional Long Term Development Plan)
RPJPN	*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional* (Regional Long Term Development Plan)
RS	*Rumah Sakit* (Hospital)
SIJORI	Singapore-Johor-Riau (Growth Triangle)

Glossary of Indonesian words and terms

Adat	customary law especially of Islamic-Malay tradition
Bank Syariah	Sharia-compliant Islamic banking
Bapak (Pak)	Sir / Mr.
Daerah	Area / region
Daratan	Mainland
Gotong Royong	Cooperation between community members to reach a goal
Gubernur	Governor
Hak Milik	Land ownership
Hak Pakai	'Right of use' over state or private land
Hukum Otonomi Daerah	Regional Autonomy Law (referencing Law 22/1999 of Indonesia's decentralization program which allocates more decision-making power to provinces and regencies)
Ibu	Madame / Ms.
Kabupaten	Regency
Kampung	Village
Kebun	Garden
Kelurahan	Village office
Kecamatan	District office
Krismon	Contraction of *Krisis Monitor*, monetary crisis (referencing the 1997 Asian financial crisis)
Masjid Raya	Main Mosque
Masyarakat	Public
Melayu Murni	Pure Malay
Musholla	Prayer room
Omong kosong	Small talk / chit chat
Orang laut	Nomadic sea peoples
Orde Baru	New Order (references the period of President Suharto's regime from 1966 to 1998)
Pasrah	Surrender and acceptance
Pemimpin visioner	Visionary leader
Pesantren	Islamic boarding school
Propinsi	Province
Pulau	Island
Rumah Panggung	Multi-tiered wooden/bamboo housing built on stilts
Salam	Greeting (referencing a specific Indonesian greeting etiquette that includes holding out both hands, slightly bowing and touching your chest lightly with your hands)
Sejarah Melayu	History of the Malay World
Serumpun	Solidarity
Surat izin	Permission letter / research license
Transmigrasi	Transmigration (referencing a program devised by colonial and post-colonial leaders in Indonesia to move peoples from densely population regions to less populous outer regions)
Zona	Zone

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1: Setting the stage

In the last three decades, more than 150 new-master planned cities have been built in over 40 cities around the world (Moser, 2020; Moser and Côté-Roy, 2021). Located primarily in the Global South and in emerging economies, these new cities are built from scratch and are 'generally intended to be administratively and geographically distinct from existing cities' (Moser, 2020: 125). New city projects are being built by both the private and public sectors, ranging from new seats of political power to privately owned gated enclaves. Particularly for former colonies in the Global South, state-led new city construction is a way to symbolically cut ties with their colonial past (King, 2008; Moser, 2012) and a part of nation-building strategies associated with fostering 'progress', 'modernity', 'catching up with the West', and transitioning to 'first world' economies (Watson, 2009b; Moser *et al*., 2015; Datta and Shaban, 2016). Often intended to rebrand and communicate state ideology, new cities are also ways for nations and their political elites to convey to the world (and investors) that they are international, modern, and open for business (Moser, 2019). Moreover, new cities are also constructed as direct responses and solutions to the many challenges of rapid urbanization and development, including overcrowding, housing shortages, infrastructure problems, congestion, pollution, and environmental degradation. As such, they are often framed by their builders as a utopian 'quick fix' to the urban problems that plague cities in the Global South. Indeed, despite widespread criticism leveled against new cities, as this thesis demonstrates, the promise of providing solutions to myriad urban challenges continues to captivate and motivate state officials, private developers, urban planners, and other actors involved in city building.

This optimism about building cities from scratch is seen in the current Indonesian administration, led by President Joko Widodo (commonly known as *Jokowi*), and its embrace of new cities as an economic development strategy and a way to address the nation's rising inequality and a variety of its urban challenges (Lyons, 2019). At present, approximately half of Indonesia's population lives in cities or towns, and it is projected that by 2045, the centenary of Indonesia's independence, this number will rise to more than 70 percent (Roberts et al, 2019). As one of the fastest urbanizing countries in the world, Indonesia is grappling with a variety of challenges relating to urban livability: a lack of adequate affordable housing, high traffic

congestion and pollution rates, increasing urban poverty and crime, and a lack of quality basic services such as education, healthcare, proper sanitation systems, electricity, and access to clean and potable water. The dangers and risks of global warming add more urgency to urban challenges and the Indonesian government has stated that these problems need to be addressed in the years to come (Roberts et al, 2019).

While Indonesia is a relative newcomer to building new cities from scratch, the state's latest medium-term national development plan includes several recently announced new urban mega-developments. The ambitious new city project is to move the national capital from Jakarta to a brand-new 'smart and green' master-planned city, Nusantara, that is to be built 1300 kilometers away in the province of Kalimantan at an estimated cost of USD $35 billion (Jacob, 2023). Nusantara is scheduled to be inaugurated as early as August 2024 and is to be completed by 2045 and is designed to more evenly distribute economic opportunities across the nation as well as deconcentrate the population of the Jakarta region while alleviating many of its urban pressures (Beech, 2023). Although construction only started in 2022, the project is already fraught with controversy ranging from land conflicts with indigenous communities (Chia et al., 2021) to environmental damage resulting from large scale deforestation (the project plans to clear 200,000 hectares of forest), leading to pressures on existing habitats and changes to peatland that threatens existing carbon reserves (McCann, 2023). Even greater in ambition is the now defunct Jakarta 'Great Garuda' Seawall Project, an Indonesian-Dutch public-private collaboration that proposed a new waterfront megacity built on reclaimed land as a solution to the effects of rising sea levels and a sinking Jakarta. While advocates of the project claim it may be the only solution to save Jakarta from massive floods, critics question the imposed mass evictions and relocations of villages needed to make way for the project (Sherwell, 2016) and the feasibility of such a large-scale project to be completed and to fulfill its objectives (Calven, 2017; Wade, 2019). Another example that demonstrates the Indonesian state's growing enthusiasm for building urban mega-developments from scratch is the long-term federal plan to diversify the national economy, deconcentrate the population, and provide housing through building 10 new cities from scratch in Indonesia's outer regions (i.e., beyond the economic and population center of Java) (BAPPENAS, 2019). These cities, most of them branded as 'smart', are to serve both as a way to alleviate the urban density of Java and as a nation-building strategy. The latter was clearly articulated by Jokowi in his lamentation that 'since independence, our

nation has yet to build its own city by the Indonesian government. Our cities are all inherited and colonially built' (Ariyanti, 2015). While these projects are still in the planning stages, they demonstrate the Indonesian state's recent embrace of building new cities from scratch as a development strategy. Less is known about the regional efforts to build new cities such as Dompak, as they are not national-level strategies promoted by the state.

While Indonesia's new national capital project and the 'Great Garuda' Sea Wall have received international attention from the media and scholars, another seat of political power is underway that has received little scholarly or international media attention to date and remains largely unknown outside of its local context. In 2004, the regional government of Riau Islands Province, just south of the Malay Peninsula, began building Indonesia's first master-planned provincial capital more than ten years before the central government embraced the idea of creating new cities as an economic development strategy. The decision to build a new capital was made possible by the events that followed the fall of the authoritarian regime of President Suharto in 1998, which included sweeping decentralization policies and the 'Regional Autonomy Law', which split Riau Province into two, forming the Riau Islands Province (*Propinsi Kepulauan Riau,* commonly referred to as *Kepri*), with the other half of the former province on Sumatra and retaining the name Riau Province. Having long resented the lack of autonomy over their economy and politics, particularly with the discovery of oil in the 1980s, Riau Islander elites were eager to gain more control over their economy, develop their own political institutions, and promote what they perceived to be their regional cultural distinctiveness (Fee, 2001; Chou, 2006, Long, 2010).

While the state has engaged in a number of nation-building activities since its formation in 2002, the most ambitious was the decision to replace its existing capital, Tanjung Pinang, with a new master-planned city built from scratch on the rural island of Dompak, located along the south-west coast of Bintan (Figure 1.1). Dompak is approximately 25 minutes by car from Tanjung Pinang with a landmass of approximately 1000 hectares. Before construction began on the new city project, the island had minimal public amenities: a school, a few small prayer rooms, and local shops and food stalls. It was home to around 3,400 residents, the majority of whom lived below the poverty line and depended on fishing and other maritime activities as their main livelihood. The villages comprised mostly of *rumah panggung* – traditional wooden houses built on stilts along the coast. The construction of Dompak began in 2007 with the creation of a

bridge to connect the island with Bintan. Today, the city functions as the province's administrative center and has two bridges, a few paved roads, provincial government buildings, a Malay cultural center, an Islamic center and mosque, a ferry terminal and two housing resettlement zones.

Figure 1.1 – Geographical location of Dompak, Riau Islands, Indonesia (Source: Author)

Capitalizing on the intensifying identity politics in the region, state officials imagined the new capital to be a modern and spacious *Malay* eco-city, reflecting 'authentic' Malay and Islamic culture, in contrast to the multicultural, multireligious, and chaotic city of Tanjung Pinang (Moser and Wilbur, 2017). Furthermore, inspired by Putrajaya, Malaysia's new capital, the Kepri government hoped that Dompak would not only be an engine for regional economic

growth and development, but would also put Kepri on the map, and demonstrate to the international community (and future investors) that the Riau Islands was not just a regional backwater, but an emerging province 'capable of creating a new city that is grand and impressive' (Interview with Kepri's former governor and pioneer of the Dompak project, Abdullah, October 7, 2016).

I first travelled to Dompak in the summer of 2014, seven years after construction of the new city had begun. Sarah Moser, a scholar on new cities who would become my thesis supervisor, first told me about this project during my research assistantship with her at the end of my undergraduate degree. Toward the end of her doctoral research, carried out in Kepri, she had heard that the provincial government was building a new capital city from scratch. Having grown up in the megacity of Jakarta, I was no stranger to the complexities of Southeast Asian urbanism and therefore was intrigued to learn more about the project and eager to see the first state-designed master-planned city in Indonesia with my own eyes.

A few days into my first visit, it quickly became evident that the project was fraught with problems, challenges, and controversies. There were a few things that stood out to me. First, it seemed odd that most Kepri locals, let alone other Indonesians with whom I spoke were unaware of the new city. In fact, most locals knew the island only for its corruption scandals involving illegal bauxite mining. Second, although Dompak was promoted as an 'eco city,' I saw no evidence of 'eco' attributes apart from a few untouched trees and solar streetlights. On the contrary, the urban landscape was filled with large open pits from the bauxite mining, construction debris, and deforested areas. Third, the architectural style of the grand mosque, one of the first buildings constructed, made me feel like I had just travelled to the Middle East. Instead of the vernacular mosques with tiered pagoda-style roofs found in the villages of Kepri and throughout the region, the grand mosque had a domed roof and tall minarets that according to one of the planners, was inspired from the architectural styles of the ancient and holy Masjib Nabawi in Medina, Saudi Arabia, built by the Islamic Prophet Muhammad in 623 CE (Moser and Wilbur, 2017). Finally, it was strange to me that the new housing complex, a series of identical cement boxes, was built miles away from the ocean even though most local residents are fisherfolk.

When I returned to Dompak in 2016 to conduct fieldwork for my Master's degree, having made it the focus of my graduate studies and this thesis, the controversies surrounding the new

capital city had intensified, with locals protesting forced relocation, more allegations of corruption, mysterious disappearances of state funding, as well as severe malaria and dengue fever outbreaks on the island, resulting from mass deforestation, open-pit mining, and construction. Moreover, with a new government in power, the project itself had morphed into something else, reflected in the new and more entrepreneurial-focused masterplan that now included investor-friendly (planned but unbuilt) landscapes such as a waterfront marina, a museum, a shopping and business district, a resort, a sports complex, and a stadium. I was particularly interested in how this project was interpreted by local residents who did not seem to be part of the urban decision-making process.

In 2022, I revisited Dompak to conduct a brief follow up on my research[1], only to discover that there had been minimal progress in the development of the new city since my previous visit. In fact, the Dompak project appeared to be entangled in even more complex issues. Throughout the project's history, there has been a distinct lack of accountability and transparency, with many of the projects outlined in the 2015 masterplan failing to materialize, despite the distribution of funds. The lack of maintenance towards the new government buildings, the untouched open mine pits, and the various construction projects abandoned midway, contributed to the overall sense of stagnation and neglect. Furthermore, tensions between the city builders and local residents were palpable, underscoring the ongoing struggles within the community. Nevertheless, despite the hardships imposed by forced relocation and the loss of livelihoods, the community came together to create a sense of normalcy in their new environment. For instance, they rebuilt community gardens in the new housing resettlements, and residents appeared accepting and adaptable in the face of adversity. This prevailing sense of unity and resilience among the residents speaks to the Indonesian tradition of *gotong royong* - the sharing of burdens and working together cooperatively to reach a common goal.

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[1] In early 2018, I was forced to take an unexpected leave of absence from my research due to unforeseen circumstances.

Figure 1.2 – Rendering of the main entrance into Dompak, the new provincial capital of the Riau Islands, Indonesia (Source: Dompak 2015 Master Plan - Riau Islands Regional Development Planning Agency)

Figure 1.3 – Government office building in Dompak, July 2022 (Source: Author)

1.2: Research aim and objectives

This thesis is an exploration of the complexities and controversies I encountered in Dompak. It is an investigation into the politics, policies, and power dynamics between city builders, elites, and local residents that shape the Dompak project. It is also a reflection on how Dompak itself fits into broader trends in urban planning and constructing new cities in the Global South. More specifically, my research questions how and why political elites designed and constructed Dompak and its impact on residents. Together, the chapters of this thesis seek to illustrate geographies of exclusion that are created and exacerbated through a new master-planned provincial capital and how these social exclusions are linked to persistent cleavages between class, race, and religion in the region. My thesis also offers insight into a contemporary urban mega-development in Indonesia and how it is shaped by local political, racial, and religious forces.

My key research objectives, along with their guiding questions, are as follows:

1. Position Dompak within the broader global trend of new city building.
   Who are the actors / stakeholders involved in the making of Dompak and what are their motives? Where do Dompak builders draw inspiration from and what has influenced its urban policies, plans, and aesthetics?

2. Examine the motives and policies behind Dompak's creation.
   What is Dompak's stated vision? What discourses have builders of Dompak adopted to legitimize these visions and form policies? What are the processes behind the implementation of its urban policies? How have urban policies and plans been instrumentalized by planners of Dompak to further their political and ideological agendas? What are the policy-to-implementation gaps in the making of Dompak?

3. Critically analyze the socio-economic and political impacts of Dompak on residents.
   Who has been involved in the decision-making processes of creating Dompak? What are the power dynamics at play in the creation of Dompak, and how does the project sustain or exacerbate entrenched power hierarchies in the region? How do local residents challenge, resist, or reinterpret the master plan?

4. Investigate the role of Dompak's built environment in reshaping/reinventing the Riau Islands' provincial identity.

Which identities are embodied in Dompak's aesthetics and design? Which identities are markedly excluded in the making of this new capital? In what ways has Kepri's quest for cultural 'authenticity' been projected onto Dompak's urban environment? How do builders of Dompak engage with Islam in the project? How have architecture and urban space been politicized in Dompak by the ruling elite and the planners they employ?

1.3: Thesis structure

This first chapter, *Introduction*, has presented a general background about my field site, research aims, and objectives. In this section, I outline the remaining chapters of this thesis by providing a general overview of each chapter, including the main points and contributions.

Chapter 2, *Contextualizing the Riau Islands and the province's desire for a new capital,* provides the historical context necessary to understand the processes that led to the construction of Dompak as the new master-planned capital of Riau Islands Province. The chapter is divided chronologically into four parts. First, beginning with the arrival of Arab merchants and missionaries in the 13th century, I trace the emergence and spread of Islam in the religiously and ethnically diverse Malay world. Second, I examine the colonial period that was initiated with the arrival of Dutch colonists in the 17th century and the resulting remapping of geopolitical territories in the region and migration into the Malay peninsula of different ethnic groups. Third, I highlight the most important consequences of the highly centralized central administration on the political and economic landscape of the Riau Islands. Finally, I discuss how democratization and decentralization after the fall of Suharto in 1998 as well as rise of ethno-nationalism across the region led to the creation of the autonomous province of Kepri and following this, the construction of Dompak.

Chapter 3, *Literature Review,* explores the three bodies of scholarship upon which the empirical chapters, 5 and 6, draw and build upon. The chapter is divided into three sections. First, I broadly examine the scholarship on new master-planned cities in the Global South. I focus on research that analyzes the motives and consequences of these new cities. I note that my ethnographic study of vulnerable rural populations within the context of a new city-in-the-making fills an important gap in the scholarship on the current wave of new city projects.

Second, I turn to what Oren Yiftachel calls the 'dark side' of urban planning. Here, I explore the literature that brings together power, politics, planning, and social exclusions, with a particular focus on the context of new city projects. I also demonstrate how the framework of 'the dark side of planning', which Yiftachel developed to critique Israel's use of planning as a way to subjugate and exclude Palestinians, can be productively used to analyze social exclusionary practices in the context of a new city project in Indonesia. In the final section, I examine the scholarship on cultural politics, national identity formation, and the built environment. Specifically, I discuss scholarship that analyzes how power and ideology are expressed through architecture and the aesthetics of the built environment. I highlight studies that show how the built landscape is a way for elites to forge a sense of unity among the dominant population while physically and symbolically excluding racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. In this chapter, I explain how my research contributes to the scholarship on new master-planned cities and postcolonial urbanism in the Global South.

Chapter 4, *Overview of Methods and Methodology*, describes my process of data collection. It is divided into four sections. First, I critically examine my positionality and its effects on my fieldwork and the data collection process. As a Muslim Arab-Indonesian woman and a researcher from a Western academic setting, I argue that I inhabited an 'in-between' position – not quite insider yet not an outsider. Notably, my fluency in Indonesian and knowledge of Muslim and Indonesian culture enabled me not only to gain a more nuanced understanding of the political and religious dynamics at play in Dompak, but also the trust of interviewees. Second, I describe the ethics and logistics involved in my fieldwork and data collection and safety in the field. Third, I summarize my methods of data collection which include gathering and analyzing textual documentary sources as well as ethnographic methods. Finally, I describe how I analyzed the empirical data collected, which consists of textual documentary sources, audio recordings of interviews, my own hand-written notes, and photographs taken in the field. It is the patterns and themes that emerged in this analytical process that inform the main arguments in the two empirical chapters of this thesis.

Chapter 5, *The dark side of planning: Engineering social exclusions in the creation of a new provincial capital in Indonesia*, critically examines how the Dompak project sustains and perpetuates socio-economic, racial, and religious divides and exclusions in the Riau Islands Province. Despite the regional government's rhetoric of 'improvement,' I argue that the design

of Dompak politically, physically, and symbolically prioritizes Malay Muslims over ethnic and religious minorities. More specifically, grounded in the empirical data collected and analyzed through my field work, the chapter draws from Oren Yiftachel's conceptual framework on the 'dark side of planning,' adapting his four dimensions of analysis to the case of Dompak: territorial, procedural, socio-economic, and cultural.

Chapter 6, *Dompak, Indonesia – Religio-nationalism and the (re)assertion of Muslim dominance through the construction of a provincial capital*, broadly explores how nation-building, growing religio-nationalism, and new urban developments have come together in the creation of Dompak. Building and expanding on the insights in the cultural dimension of Chapter 5, and grounded in the empirical data collected and analyzed through my field work, it critically examines the expression of a particular Muslim identity embodied in the design of Dompak and its built environment and asks why, in the context of a multi-religious, multi-ethnic province, Dompak has been designed in an overtly Arabized Muslim idiom. I argue that the reason is twofold: first, for Muslim elites to perpetuate and normalize existing social power hierarchies in which they maintain hegemony; and second, to rally otherwise disparate Muslim groups in the province under the banner of Islam, while displacing and marginalizing non-Muslim minorities, particularly Chinese Indonesians, who are increasingly positioned as economic rivals and as less 'authentic' citizens with an accordingly weaker claim to the land.

Chapter 7, *Discussion and Conclusion*, begins by reviewing the main themes explored in each of the preceding chapters. This retrospective analysis serves to reinforce the connections between the main arguments in this thesis and the initial research objectives set forth in Chapter 1. It is then followed by a discussion of the key contributions this thesis has made and some directions for future research.

Chapter 2: Contextualizing the Riau Islands and the provinces' desire for a new capital city

2.1: Introduction

The Riau Islands (known locally as *Kepulauan Riau or 'Kepri'*) consist of approximately 3,200 islands in the South China Sea, situated between Singapore and the east coast of Sumatra and act as the southern entry way into the Malay Peninsula. In this chapter, I explore how the unique geographical positioning of the Riau Islands has played a significant role in the formation of the province's heterogeneous cultural heritage and identities. Moreover, I provide an overview of the region's socio-political history leading up to the creation of Dompak, Kepri's new master-planned capital that provided officials and elites with a way to showcase the province's new identity. First, I provide an overview of the Sultanate reign in the Riau Islands during the pre-colonial era and the peaceful spread of Islam to the region. Second, I highlight the remapping of the region's geo-political territories during the colonial era, as well as the migration of different ethnic groups into the Malay Peninsula. Third, I examine the effects of the administrations of the two main post-independent presidents, Sukarno and Suharto, on the region's political and economic landscape. Finally, I discuss how decentralization and regional autonomy after the fall of Suharto (1998) coupled with a wave of ethno-nationalism led to the formation of Kepri, and subsequently, to the creation of Dompak.

2.2: Religio-ethnic diversity in the Riau Islands' precolonial era

The early records of the Malay world[2] reveal that coastal settlements along the Strait of Malacca, due to the nature of trade winds, acted as a resting place for sailors travelling across the Indian Ocean between the first and sixth centuries. By the seventh century, many of these cities had become major trading ports for Chinese, Indian, and Arab merchants (Matheson, 1971). Historical evidence suggests that these merchants were often guided to the coasts by local nomadic sea peoples (*orang laut)*[3] of the archipelago (Andaya, 1997; Chou, 1997). According to

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[2] What was known as the 'Malay world' or *Dunia Melayu* today comprises of peninsular Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei as well as Sumatra, Borneo, and the Riau Archipelago in Indonesia.

[3] The Malay term 'Orang Laut' translates to sea peoples. According to several historical texts, the tribe of sea people in the Riau-Lingga Archipelagos acted as 'pilots' to merchants as they guaranteed safe passageway. Moreover, the *orang laut* of the South China Sea often had close relations with Sultanates as they acted as envoys and took on specialized trades such as making weapons (Andaya, 1997).

The Malay Annals (*Sejarah Melayu*) – a compilation of Malay language literary work written in the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries that provides a history of the Malay maritime empire – reigning Hindu-Buddhist empires (i.e. Srivijaya and Majapahit) as well as Sultanates (i.e. Malacca, Pahang, Siak) of the Malay World over the centuries were influenced by these foreign merchants, who in addition to acquiring spices and carrying out their trade, also spread their religions -- Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam – throughout the region.

Toward the thirteenth century, the dominance of particularly Arab merchants (who were often accompanied by missionaries) resulted in the rapid spread of Islam in the region. The development of Islamic kingdoms hereafter became instrumental in the spread of Islam to the rest of the Indonesian archipelago (see DasGupta, 1962; Alfian et al, 1997; Hasan, 2009). The most significant example of this is the Pasai kingdom (1267 – 1517) of northern Sumatra (located in the present-day semi-autonomous province of Aceh), which was Southeast Asia's first officially declared Islamic kingdom (Fatimi, 1963). Although Islam quickly became the prominent religion across the kingdoms of the Riau Archipelago, many scholars have argued that Hindu and Buddhist traditions and practices remained integrated in the cultural mosaic, causing distinct versions of Islam across the region (Abdullah, 2012; Ishak, 2012).

2.3: European colonialism and the remapping of geo-political territories in the Riau Islands

With the advent of European colonialism, control over this resource-rich region began shifting from local sultanates to foreign powers and companies, which led to an expansion of trade from regional to global markets. This is represented by the Portuguese burning down the city of Melaka in 1511, resulting in the dissolution of the powerful Melaka Sultanate (1400-1511). The Riau Islands fell under the control of the Johor Sultanate (1528-1855) and later the Riau-Lingga Sultanate (1824-1911), which made the city of Tanjung Pinang their center of trade and the Island of Penyengat (*Pulau Penyengat*) their base for Islamic studies and the royal family[4] (Long, 2009).

The British and the Dutch gradually became the dominant powers in the region, first as traders, and then as colonizers. Following the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, the Dutch and British

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[4] Over centuries, Penyengat Island became notorious for being a 'pure Malay' historical center whereby local and Arabic scholars united and disseminated Islamic ideologies.

divided Southeast Asia into respective spheres of colonial power, formalizing British control over the mainland territories of the Malay Peninsula, Borneo and Singapore, and Dutch control over the Indonesian archipelago. Soon after, to consolidate their political power, Dutch expansionists turned the Riau archipelago into a vassal state (Andaya, 1997). By the early 1900s, however, influenced by members of the 'Roesidijah Riouw,'[5] Sultan Abdul Rahman II of Riau-Lingga showed resistance to Dutch rule. In 1911, the Dutch annexed the Riau-Lingga Sultanate, built a military base in Tanjung Pinang and directly controlled the region until the Japanese occupation (1942-1945).

Throughout the colonial period, the expansion of maritime trade coupled with military conquests and civil wars in other parts of the Indonesian archipelago prompted the migration of a variety of ethnic groups to the Malay Peninsula, such as the Chinese, Bugis, Batak, Minangkabau, Palembang, and Javanese peoples[6] (Matheson, 1986; Andaya, 1997). However, despite centuries of ethnic heterogeneity in the Riau Islands, those referred to today as 'pure Malays', or *Melayu Murni,* particularly in elite political discourses, are those associated through kin affiliation with Malay sultanates (Al-Azhar, 1997; Barnard, 2004; Fee, 2001; Henley and Davidson, 2007; Long, 2008).

2.4: Independence in Indonesia and its effects on regional identity in the Riau Islands

In the years following independence in 1945, the uncertainty as to how the Riau Archipelago would be governed gave rise to tensions between royalist Malays and non-Malay migrants (primarily Minangkabau and Chinese). Likewise, this 'raised questions regarding the degree to which boundaries of provinces and military districts should coincide with those of ethnicity' (Andaya, 1997: 502). Subsequently, by the late 1950s, President Sukarno's central administration in Jakarta decided to redraw the Riau Archipelago's boundaries (Faucher, 2007). Seen as having more economic importance, Jakarta focused on the development of mainland

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[5] The Roesidijah (Club) Riouw was an Islamic literary group based on Penyengat Island. The club was founded by Malay intellects, many of whom studied Islam in Mecca in the late 1800s, who wanted to spread Islamic literature to the Malay World. Later, it was known to also be an anti-colonial resistance organization, and many of its members (e.g. Raja Ali Haji, Haji Ja'far bin Encik Abu Bakar) ended up as national heroes in Indonesia (Dunia Melayu Se-Dunia, n.d). In the early 20th century, after many residents of Pulau Penyengat fled to Singapore after the Dutch colonized the area in 1911, many of the groups' members reestablished the club in Singapore and the publishing house was renamed Al-Ahmadiah Press.

[6] Additionally, the connections these ethnic groups were strengthened by intermarriages between Riau royal families and elites from elsewhere in the region.

Riau and consequently moved the capital of Tanjung Pinang to Pekanbaru in 1959. As noted by Andaya, 'as far as Jakarta was concerned, the *kepulauan's* [islands'] historical claims to leadership had been superseded, and the future of Riau should be in the economically dominant *daratan* [mainland]' (1997: 503). Similar to the colonial era, the boundaries of the Riau Archipelago were once again arbitrarily redrawn to fit into an outsider's political agenda. This evoked a sense of 'eroding regional identity' amongst (Malay) Riau Islanders, leaving them feeling disempowered and excluded (Wee, 2002; Moser and Wilbur, 2017).

When President Suharto gained to power in a military coup and established the 'New Order' (O*rde Baru)* regime in 1965, it marked a considerable change of trajectory for the Riau Islands. This new regime, guided by neoliberal policies, further centralized the power of the central government, which was characterized by intensive resource extraction from Indonesia's outer islands as a method for economic expansion and consolidating power (Erb et al, 2005). When oil was discovered in the Riau Archipelago in the late nineteenth century, the region became highly profitable for the nation and played a significant role in Indonesia's success as an oil exporter from 1974 to 1981 (Wie, 2012). However, in the 1980s, drastic declines in the global price of oil (oil and gas accounted for 82% of all exports and 73% of government revenue at this time) caused the Suharto Administration to reform its financial policies by deregulating the financial system and further opening up Indonesia's markets to foreign investments (Sikroski, 1998).

Singapore took this as an opportunity to form a trilateral partnership with Johor and the Riau Archipelago and formed the 'SIJORI Growth Triangle' (Singapore-Johor-Riau), a trade zone aimed at utilizing the expertise and investment capital of Singaporean firms and the cheap labour, resources, and land of Indonesia and Malaysia (Faucher, 2007). As a result, two Singaporean-run industrial parks were launched in the Riau Islands, Batamindo in Batam and Bintan Industrial Park in Bintan, which significantly increased the influx of migrant workers to the region[7]. Consequently, local Malays in the Riau Islands were pressured to sell their land (and in some cases were forcibly evicted), and often lost employment opportunities because businesses centered in Jakarta mostly relied on Javanese migrant workers (Fee, 2001). Thus, although Suharto's 1986 deregulation package did result in higher GDP growth, the benefits

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[7] By the end of the 1980s, over 1.4 million residents from Java and Madura had emigrated to Riau and an estimated 400,000 of these transmigrants resided in the Riau Islands.

were inequitably distributed among the nation's peripheral regions, and the oil revenues generated from the Riau Islands largely went to Jakarta. As a result, the Riau Malays 'had real fears of economic and eventual political marginalization' (Fee, 2001: 875).

2.5: Regional autonomy and the creation of a new state capital

By the late 1990s, Indonesia's economy was mired in corruption and cronyism[8], which led to an economic crisis known locally as *Krismon 1998* (short for *krisis moneter* or monetary crisis). *Krismon* ultimately forced Suharto to step down and intensified resentment of Indonesia's outer regions against the central administration, who were perceived widely as draining resources and funneling them into Jakarta and into the pockets of the Suharto family (Moser, 2008). As a way to address regional inequality, Suharto's successor, President Habibie, launched a decentralization program under a new Regional Autonomy Law (*Hukum Otonomi Daerah)* in 1999 aimed to 'allocate more power to make decisions to the area *(daerah),* in this case the regency (*kabupaten),* and legislated fiscal balance, where rights over profit from resources would be more fairly allocated to the various regions from which they originated' (Erb et al, 2005: 2). Primarily led by local aristocrats and elites, resource-rich provinces (namely Papua, East Kalimantan and Riau) jumped at the opportunity to break away from Indonesia's administrative center. More specifically, the district head of the Riau Islands (2001-2003), Huzrid Hood, motivated by a surge in ethno-nationalism among local elites, advocated for a separate Malay province in the Riau Islands that excluded mainland Riau and that would allow 'native' Malays to regain political control from their 'internal colonizers' (Faucher, 2005; Davidson and Henley, 2007; Long, 2010). Accordingly, after centuries of colonialism and decades of political and economic subordination to Jakarta, the Regional Autonomy law came into effect in the Riau Islands in September 2002, in which it seceded from its mainland and became one of Indonesia's 32 provinces (Choi, 2011).

To showcase the formation of the new province, in July 2004 appointed governor H. Ismeth Abdullah (2004-2010), announced the creation of Dompak, a master-planned island city that would function as the new provincial administrative capital of the Riau Islands. This new

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[8] The New Order regime prompted and facilitated the wealth accumulation of numerous crony capitalists, majority of whom were part of the Suharto family. The regime also turned to the Chinese for their business acumen, leading them to dominate as heads of conglomerates in a variety of industries. This prompted and facilitated the wealth accumulation of numerous Chinese crony capitalists who tended to profit the most. As a consequence, anti-Chinese resentment (re)emerged amongst indigenous Indonesians (Suryadinata, 2008).

city's vision was to shift government functions away from the ethnically mixed Dutch-developed city of Tanjung Pinang to a 925-hectare city designed to reference the pre-colonial era of Malay dominance. Moreover, as this thesis explores, Dompak became an opportunity for the province's administration, composed largely of Malay elites, to reassess and reassert their cultural identity and broadcast who belongs in this highly symbolic urban project and who does not.

Chapter 3: Literature Review

3.1: Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the relevant scholarship I use in my empirical chapters on Dompak, the new master-planned capital of Riau Islands Province, Indonesia. In this chapter I situate my research within three bodies of scholarship, each of which constitutes a section in this chapter: (1) new master-planned cities in the Global South, (2) power, planning, and social exclusions, (3) cultural politics, identity, and the built environment. These sections provide insight into the scholarship that informs Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis and explain how I am building on and expanding this scholarship. In this chapter, I also demonstrate how my research addresses gaps in the scholarship and contributes to the study of new master-planned cities and postcolonial urbanism in the Global South.

In the first section, I provide a broad outline of contemporary scholarship that investigates urban mega-developments branded as new 'cities'. I begin by examining the literature that investigates the motives and rationales behind and the consequences of the building of new cities. Often promoted by their builders as responses to urban challenges, scholars demonstrate how state-driven new city projects are rationalized as being economic development and modernization strategies and a way to forge and fortify national identities. As recent scholarship demonstrates, however, many of these cities fall short of the idealistic rhetoric of their builders, and instead result in economic disparity, environmental degradation, and social exclusions, among others. Finally, I highlight the need for more multidisciplinary approaches to examining the local political context within new city projects and demonstrate how my research on Dompak responds to the call for new empirical and ethnographic studies of vulnerable populations (Watson, 2009; Moser & Côté-Roy, 2022).

In the second section, I examine scholarship that explores what Israeli scholar Oren Yiftachel terms the 'dark side' of urban planning and the links between power and urban planning. As much of this scholarship argues, instead of being a progressive force for good, urban planning is often highly politicized and can create or sustain socio-economic, cultural, and political inequalities and exclusions. An important strand within this literature includes critiques of neoliberal ideological influences on urban planning and how the branding of projects characterized by rhetoric about creating spaces that are modern, inclusive, and progressive

disguises the pro-business agendas of ruling elites. While much of this scholarship focuses on urban planning broadly, I also highlight important recent studies on how social exclusions are engineered in the context of new cities being built from scratch. Finally, I demonstrate how Oren Yiftachel's framework of the 'dark side' of planning, developed to understand the context of how Israeli urban planning intentionally excludes and marginalizes Palestinians, can be productively used to analyze and understand how urban planning is used in the context of a Muslim majority province in Indonesia to exclude ethnic and religious minorities, and particularly non-Muslims.

In the third and final section, I analyze scholarship that examines the roles of cultural politics and nation building in urban planning. I provide an overview of the literature that investigates how architectural styles, and the aesthetics of the built environment are embedded with power and ideology that appropriate and project certain cultural identities while silencing others. In the context of postcolonial states, the built landscape is infused with cultural meaning and is a medium through which ruling elites and planners forge and fortify national unity based on idealized and highly selective versions of the past. Responding to recent calls to analyze these processes from the vantage point of local residents of the cities, my research discusses the interplay between the instrumentalization of an 'imagined' past that is embedded in the built environment in Dompak and the interpretations and responses to this by residents of the Riau Islands.

3.2: New master-planned cities of the Global South: Motives and critiques

Over the last three decades, over 150 new master-planned cities have been announced in over 40 countries (Moser, 2015). These new cities, located primarily in the Global South, are built from scratch and are 'generally intended to be administratively and geographically distinct from existing cities' (Moser, 2020: 125). In most cases, their builders rationalize the projects as being a response to urgent urban challenges including rapid urbanization, overcrowding, housing shortages, infrastructure problems, congestion, pollution, and environmental degradation (Moser and Côté-Roy, 2021).

Much of the recent scholarship on contemporary new cities critically examines their touted motives. These motives are frequently framed by city builders around the rhetoric of 'improvement' (Li, 2007) or a 'right to development' (Côté-Roy and Moser, 2019). Builders of new cities often seek to elevate their nation's global ranking (Bagaeen, 2007; Koch, 2010;

Moser, 2015, Datta, 2015), to transition to 'first world status' (Watson, 2014) and to foster economic growth and capital accumulation (Goldman, 2011; Keeton, 2011; Bogaert, 2015; Datta, 2015; Moser et al, 2015), notably by adopting entrepreneurial forms of urban governance (Moser, 2015; Datta, 2016; Shin, 2016) and creating special economic zones (Easterling, 2014; Moser, 2015). Moreover, builders of new seats of political power often aim to use the construction of a new city as a way to break away from their colonial past (Vale, 1992; 2008; Moser, 2015; 2019; Koch, 2014) and project a (re)imagined new state identity (Seekins, 2009; Moser, 2012; Koch and Valiyev, 2017; Moser and Wilbur, 2017). Only after understanding the underlying motives of projects, as well as how they are interpreted, disseminated, and actualized in local contexts, can scholars begin to critically assess successes and failures in each context. Accordingly, my research investigates the provincial administrations' motives for constructing a new capital through interviews with government officials and textual analyses of Dompak's masterplan. In both empirical chapters (5 and 6), I examine how these motives are rationalized, disseminated, interpreted, and instrumentalized by builders of Dompak to further their agendas, as well as how the realization of their plans has exacerbated existing social hierarchies and exclusions.

While planners insist that a 'more democratic socially just, and sustainable form of urbanization is possible' (Brenner, 2009: 198), recent scholarship demonstrates how new city projects fall short from these ideals. New city builders are often criticized for overemphasizing neoliberal policies (Parnell and Robinson, 2012) and prioritizing private-led urban development (Hogan et al., 2012; Murray, 2016; Shatkin, 2011; 2019; Fält, 2019; Côté-Roy and Moser, 2022) which often results in exhibiting elitism and perpetuating socio-economic inequalities (Watson, 2014; Datta 2015; Moser, 2020; Moser and Côté-Roy, 2021). In similar vein, new city development has been frequently marred by a reputation for expropriating original residents from their land and livelihood (Watson, 2009; Goldman, 2011; Moser and Wilbur, 2017; Moser, 2018) as well as fostering social exclusivity. This exclusionary nature is underscored by the development of enclaves based on religion and ethnicity (Watson, 2009; Moser, 2012; 2013; Moser and Wilbur, 2017; Moser et al, in press) alongside the symbolic exclusion of residents through urban design and aesthetics in the built environment (Seekins, 2009; Moser, 2012; Moser and Wilbur, 2017). Finally, the new city building trend is widely recognized by scholars

for furthering environmental degradation (Bagaeen, 2007; Datta, 2012; Cugurullo, 2016; Ajibade, 2017; Moser and Avery, 2021).

In addition to exploring the common motives behind the urban policies of new master-planned cities as well as their intentional and unintentional consequences, recent scholarship also examines the origins of these policies and the assemblage of global actors that enable them (Bunnell and Das, 2010; Robinson, 2011). An example of this are critiques of universality in urban theory by postcolonial post-colonial scholars who argue that colonially inherited urban planning frameworks prove to be incapable of addressing the challenges of cities in the Global South (Roy, 2009; Bunnell and Das, 2010; McCann and Ward, 2012; Robinson, 2013 Pow, 2014). In this light, Roy (2009) calls for 'new geographies of theory' that are more applicable to the multiple realities of Asian cities (Bunnell and Maringanti, 2010; Robinson, 2011). Developing this idea, Bunnell *et al.*'s (2012) notion of 'global urban frontiers' highlights the diversity and scale that Asia has to offer in understanding and influencing contemporary urban policies in a global context. With the burgeoning of new master-planned developments across Asia, it is therefore pertinent for scholars to critically examine the connections between their models and urbanization practices, or as Roy and Ong (2011) call it, their 'worlding.' As one of Southeast Asia's new master-planned developments, my research in Dompak not only responds to this call, but also provides insights into an 'off the map' Asian city (Robinson, 2013) and contributes to a broader 'global urban knowledge production' that analyzes urban policies and their effects (Bunnell *et al.*, 2012).

An integral part of policy mobilities scholarship examines the actors involved in urban policy design and the mechanics of how 'urban policies, norms and aesthetics circulate' (Moser, 2019: 2). In an attempt to conceptualize the mobilization of policy knowledge, Pow (2014) turns to Singapore's status as a model city in the Global South and builds upon the framework of 'assemblages' to 'frame the movement of policy knowledge' (289). He argues that the production of knowledge related to urban policies are often used as marketing tools; in this case, idealized versions of models become 'assembled and exported' by an array of 'policy actors' or 'transfer agents' to sustain and reinforce an image of success (Pow, 2014: 290). Through the case study of Kuala Lumpur as a model for Hyberabad, Bunnell and Das (2010) trace the long chain of actors and processes behind policy transfers. These actors - political figures, government officials, local elites, and global consultancies - argue, in an attempt to sell 'versions of

modernity', tend to operate in a seductive manner; a notion they refer to as 'serial seduction' (Bunnell and Das, 2010). Drawing on this, Côté-Roy and Moser (2019: 56) critically examine the seductive narratives that elite stakeholders use to promote African new cities, which, they argue, 'depoliticizes conversations on Africa's urban development and mode of urbanisation'. Moreover, Moser (2019) explores the role of global elite conferences in the circulation of policies behind, specifically, new city-building. Through an ethnographic study of the 'Cityquest KAEC forum', an annual international non-academic meeting of technocrats and urban 'experts' held in Saudi Arabia, Moser shows how the lack of dissenting voices normalizes problematic neoliberal assumptions of urban development. Specifically, in Chapter 5, I delve into the strategic actions taken by Dompak builders and local elites as they draw inspiration from Putrajaya, Malaysia's new capital. These actions involve the emulation of policies and plans from Putrajaya which not only augments existing power structures but also intensifies the development of ethno-religious enclaves within Kepri. This analysis aligns with the perspective of Phelps et al (2014), who contend that certain policy reforms are characterized by aspirations that extend beyond the realm of neoliberalism. In the case of Dompak, these reforms are imbued with a deeper cultural dimension, influencing the deliberate creation of ethnic enclaves alongside economic objectives.

Another trend in contemporary policy mobilities scholarship analyzes the problems that arise from the adoption of urban models solely based on their 'global best practices', international recognition and ease of implementation (Hoffman, 2011; Bunnell and Das, 2010; Phelps et al, 2014). Undeniably, by ignoring the local political context, these urban models 'do not reflect the spatial complexities of the places in which they are 'applied' and are often seen to fail' (Watson, 2009: 172). My research in Dompak shows that by emulating urban policies of 'model cities' (Bunnell and Das, 2010), such that of Putrajaya, it is just as likely that similar consequences will be replicated. In Chapter 6, I discuss the dangers of 'borrowing' ideas (Watson, 2009) and I demonstrate how these consequences, namely various forms of exclusions, play out in the local context.

3.3: Exploring the dark(er) sides: Power, planning and exclusions in new master-planned cities

Urban planning is often assumed to be an inherently beneficial discipline that strives to improve living conditions for residents of towns and cities. However, as Allmendinger and

Gunder (2005: 88) demonstrate, 'there is now a long tradition which argues that planning is not a universal and progressive force for good', ranging from Marxist and neo-Marxist critiques to Foucauldian postmodern and post-structuralist perspectives. Building on a variety of these perspectives, Yiftachel (1994; 1995; 1998; 2000) is one of the most influential scholars that examine the 'dark side' of urban planning. While acknowledging that there are progressive elements inherent in urban planning, such as infrastructural advancements, Yiftachel explores how it is also used for more sinister purposes. Drawing on his research on Israel/Palestine, he argues that urban planning can be used as a tool to further social division and exacerbate inequalities, arguing that 'social control is embedded in the very emergence, institutionalization and practice of urban and regional planning' (1998: 400), and that 'planning is structurally devised to exert control and oppression' (1998: 403) over marginalized groups, particularly ethnic and religious minorities, and the urban poor. Specific to the Israeli/Palestinian context, Israeli urban and regional planners have been criticized for implementing policies that limit Palestinians access to land, resources and public services. These include expropriating land (the construction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank which has resulted in the mass displacement of Palestinian communities), restricting building permits (making it challenging for Palestinians to obtain legal paperwork), allocating resources unequally (favoring resource allocation such as water and electricity to Israeli settlements), creating separation barriers (physically barring Palestinian communities from access to essential services), and restricting movement (through checkpoints, roadblocks and permit systems) among others (Yiftachel, 2006; Alexander, 2010; Jabareen, 2010).

Many scholars have built upon the framework of the dark side of urban planning and examined the intersection of planning, power relations (governmentality), and social exclusions in a variety of contexts. As Allmendinger (2002: 96) argues, while theorists tend to discuss a more simplified and abstract view of the world in order to gain insight into the 'concrete actuality' of cities, it is important to focus on the 'messy world of power and oppression'. An example of this is in a study that unearths the powerful interests driving urban planning in Denmark and demonstrates how abuses of power are legitimized by discourses of rationality (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Similar studies examine the use of urban planning in sustaining and entrenching racial inequalities in New York through the design of housing policies cemented in redlining (i.e., the discriminatory practice of denying services to specific communities)

(Marcuse, 1997; Tajbakshs, 2001), while Oranje (1996) demonstrates the complicity of planning in the maintenance of apartheid in pre-democratic South Africa. This body of research shares a common desire to question the assumption of the benevolence of urban planning and that it is not just a rational and technical tool for the betterment of society, but a process that is embedded in power relations and the ideological and cultural hegemony of society. I contribute to this literature by responding to Yiftachel's (1998: 403) call for planning theorists to bridge the critical gap between theory and practice and 'seriously explore its [urban and regional planning] dark side'. In Chapter 5, I demonstrate how Yiftachel's (1989) conceptual framework, which investigates planning mechanisms that impose social control through four dimensions – territorial, procedural, socio-economic, and cultural – can be productively applied to the context of Dompak.

Furthermore, although no studies to date have specifically used the dark side framework in analyzing a new city project, a number of scholars have demonstrated how new city master-planning has been and continues to be used to maintain privilege for dominant or elite groups as well as perpetuate social exclusions (Watson, 2009; Datta, 2016; Moser, 2020). Often seen as providing governments or ruling elites with a *tabula rasa*, a clean slate on which to build cities of the future, new cities can be seen as an embodiment of the tension inherent in planning between progress and inclusion, on the one hand, and oppression and exclusion, on the other.

A common way that these processes are masked and legitimized by city builders are through a variety of neoliberal approaches, which scholars have theorized as entrepreneurial urbanism and governance (Harvey, 1989; Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Datta, 2016) or 'speculative urbanism' (Goldman, 2011), for which economic growth and capital accumulation are made to be the primary goals of new city creation. While often relying on inclusive rhetoric, such as 'the right to the city' (Lefebvre, 1996; Harvey, 2008; Parnell and Robinson, 2012), 'participatory planning' (Purcell, 2002), 'civic governmentality' (Roy, 2009) or 'pro-poor urbanism' (Watson, 2009) as well as promises of progress, city builders who adopt entrepreneurial forms of urban governance have instead become 'oriented to the provision of a 'good business climate' and to the construction of all sorts of lures to bring capital into town' (Harvey, 1989: 11). As many scholars have demonstrated, both in the context of new cities and in established cities, entrepreneurial forms of urbanism are fundamentally intertwined with the creation and perpetuation of social exclusion and inequality, and the process of capital accumulation is often

accompanied by the exploitation and removal of already marginalized groups (the urban poor, women, religious and ethnic minorities, etc.) (Harvey, 2008; Sassen, 2009; Goldman, 2011; T.R Samara et al, 2013; Datta, 2016; Moser, 2015; 2020), or what Watson (2009) refers to as the 'unwanted' and 'ungovernable'.

Through empirical case studies, a number of scholars have illustrated how these neoliberal policies have been strategically used to promote capital accumulation in new cities, often to the detriment and physical exclusion of the nation's urban poor. Builders of new cities often use city branding as a tool to rationalize their developments that cater exclusively to the upper classes. Research on India's 100 smart cities scheme (Datta, 2015) and Songdo, South Korea's new smart city (Shin, 2016), demonstrates how new techno-utopias that rely on state-led investment cater primarily to the needs of investors and the rich, creating enclaves for the nation's emerging upper middle class. Examining Tianjin, a new eco-city in China, Caprotti (2014: 16) discusses the social inequalities embedded in the master plan and highlights the incongruity of having low-income migrant workers build 'eco-cities in which they will likely never be able to afford to live themselves'. Cugurullo (2013; 2016) discusses how Abu Dhabi's new eco-city, Masdar, practices urban environmentalism exclusively in economic terms. Despite the promise that 20% of the project will be reserved for low-income workers, Cugurullo contends that it is unclear how that will be implemented in Masdar. Moser (2018) scrutinizes Forest City, a new Chinese-developed private eco-city built along the coast of Malaysia, where thousands of nearby villagers were displaced in the building process. Fält (2019) explores the marketing of Appolonia, a new private city in Ghana and contends that the strong emphasis on 'formality' will likely exclude the majority Ghanaians who depend primarily on the informal economy and its informal land use. Likewise, in an attempt to broaden their economic diversification strategy, Moser *et al*. (2015) suggest that as a private city listed on the Saudi stock exchange, King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC) in Saudi Arabia could potentially cater more to shareholders of the development company than to residents themselves. While it is common for scholars to demonstrate how the adoption of neoliberal policies in the creation of new city projects often lead to exclusionary consequences (built or anticipated) fewer studies have explored the *role* that urban planning plays in exacerbating them. In response to this, in Chapter 5, I question the motives behind Dompak's creation and importantly, I scrutinize the ways in

which Dompak planners have used new city planning as a technical tool to maintain social hierarchies, further social divisions, and depoliticize entrenched socio-economic problems.

3.4: Symbols of power: Cultural politics and identity in new master-planned cities

For over four decades, scholars have examined how cultural politics are part of nationalism and nation building. As Hobsbawn and Ranger (1983) argue in their seminal work, *The Invention of Tradition*, ruling elites in nation-states often rely on 'invented traditions' – cultural practices, understood broadly, that appear to date back to a primordial time of the nation in question, but are in fact newly constructed, often intentionally for the purpose of forging national and cultural unity – to consolidate power and legitimacy. Similarly, in Anderson's (2006) analysis of nationalism, nations are conceptualized primarily as social and political constructs, or 'imagined communities,' which national groups imagine themselves to be part of, a process that is facilitated by the state, the media, and other actors. Building upon these frameworks, critical research on contemporary urbanism in the postcolonial Global South explore how landscape, architecture, and monuments operate to project 'invented traditions' and fortify 'imagined communities' in the service of nation building (Vale, 1992; 2008; King, 1996; 2004; Colombijn and Lindblad 2002; Bunnell, 2004; Hasan, 2009; Harvey, 2008; Kusno, 2000; 2010; Moser, 2010; 2012; 2013). While a significant part of this scholarship is centered around the ways in which power and ideology is embedded in the built environment through its design, numerous scholars have called for further empirical research into 'how citizens accept, reject, reinterpret or ignore these efforts or how citizens in turn can constitute the landscape' (Moser, 2008: 29). Developing on the work of researchers who examine the manifestation and interpretation of national ideology in the built environment, in Chapter 6, I investigate the ways in which an 'imagined' or 'invented' cultural heritage (i.e. 'Malayness', rooted in an Arab/Islamic past) is manifested in Dompak's built environment and instrumentalized by the ruling elite as a tool for hegemony, as well as how it is interpreted by the ethnically and religiously diverse population of the Riau Islands.

In the context of postcolonial urbanism, the politics of independence often acts as a central framework through which scholars analyze the symbolic power embedded in the built environment. For instance, in his book on post-colonial new capitals, Vale (1992) examines how architecture functions as an expressive tool for national identity. He explores the ways in which state leaders in post-independence nations have strategically manipulated the built environment

in order to establish their regimes' credibility and maintain particular social hierarchies. Capital cities are a key focus for ruling elites' efforts at consolidating national unity and cultivating national identity among multiple competing groups (Vale, 1992: 44). Many legacies of colonialism continue to be experienced in newly independent nations, which then replicate similar modes of exclusion in their post-independent built environment (King, 1996; 2004; 2008; 2012). Likewise, Kusno (2000; 2010), one of Indonesia's foremost contemporary urban scholars, explores the 'political memories' embedded within urban spaces of Indonesia. He argues that the colonial past has and continues to play a major role in the formation of political consciousness throughout Indonesia's urban history, demonstrating how symbols of memory and power serve as ways to evoke authority, particularly in moments of regime transfers and changes.

While a number of scholars analyze the varied forms of urban initiatives that result from the transformation of regimes on a national level (Colombijn, 2002; Ong, 2000; Kusno, 2001; 2010), little attention has been paid to the process of manipulating the built environment in regional settings where the transfer of decision making from central to local authorities has led to the adoption of modeling practices that accentuates distinct and exclusive identities of the region (although see Hoffman, 2011; Moser, 2012b; Moser and Wilbur, 2017). Debates about architecture and urbanity tend to focus on main urban centers, implicitly assuming that it applies to all regions (Hasan, 2009). To expand these debates, my research in Dompak sheds light on the rarely discussed transformation of an urban environment at the provincial/regional level, or the 'unspectacular "nationalized" spaces' (Moser, 2008: 29).

Only a handful empirical studies have explored the role of architecture and aesthetics in the built environment of, specifically, new cities built from scratch and how design can act be used as both a nation-building strategy as well as an instrument of power and identity formation. In the second edition of *Architecture, Power and National Identity,* Vale (2008; 2014) explores the architecture and urban design of post-World War II state-sponsored capital cities, such as Brasilia, Chandigarh, Islamabad, and Abuja, which he contends are designed to 'gain legitimacy not just in the eyes of a new national citizenry, but in the eyes – and wallets – of a larger international system of other powerful nation-states' (2014: 32). Importantly, he investigates the links between nation-building and city-building by teasing apart the concepts of 'national identity' and 'capital architecture' and concludes that architecture and urban design often act as essential tools in the quest for nation-states to retain political legitimacy and gain self-assurance.

In the context of Myanmar, Seekins (2009) argues that the building of Naypyidaw, the new capital, was part of the ruling military regime's plan to project a new ethno-racial 'Myanmar identity' as well as assert the state's power against growing political unrest with which the former capital had become associated. Similarly, Putrajaya, the new administrative capital of Malaysia, showcases a generic Middle Eastern architectural style that borrows from the 'great' Islamic civilizations considered to be located at the center of Islam rather than from vernacular architecture found in Malaysia, considered to be the 'periphery' of Islam (Moser, 2012a; 2012b). The adoption of this architectural form reflects a desire on the part of Malay Muslim elites to situate Malaysia as a part a transnational pan-Islamic world as well as a 'homegrown effort at nation-building' that promotes an imagined community of (exclusively) Muslim Malays while intentionally excluding ethnic and religious minorities, primarily Malaysia's ethnic Chinese minority (Moser, 2012: 2921). Drawing on this research, Moser and Wilbur (2017) examine the cultural heritage revival and appropriation of 'Malayness' in state architectural projects in the Riau Islands Province. Notably, they argue that the new built environment of Dompak is manipulated to project an 'authentic' past that simultaneously consolidates the power of Malay elites, symbolically connects them to the broader Islamic world, while producing various forms of ethno-religious exclusions (namely, the non-Muslim, non-Malay minority).

     As Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis will demonstrate, through the case study of Dompak, I weave together these three strands of scholarship to highlight the social exclusions entrenched in the design of a new city built from scratch. Unique to the Dompak project, the provincial administration's desire for economic development, prestige, and modernization also fuses with their nostalgic longing for a pre-colonial cultural past, resulting in both the socio-economic as well as ethno-religious exclusion of the province's minorities.

Chapter 4: Overview of Methods and Methodology

4.1: Introduction

This chapter examines the methods and methodology that my research has employed. I conducted my fieldwork from August to October 2016 in Tanjung Pinang, the previous capital of Riau Islands Province, and Dompak, the current provincial capital since 2007. I then returned in the Summer of 2022 to conduct a few follow up interviews. Since its announcement as a new master-planned capital, Dompak has received limited scholarly attention (see Moser, 2014; Moser and Wilbur, 2017; 2018), and thus, my fieldwork sought to gain insight to the rationale behind the new city, its vision and mission, its urban policies and their implementation, and the responses to these schemes by residents. I investigate the provincial administrations' motives for constructing a new capital through the types of discourses that local planners instrumentalize to further their agendas, and I critically analyze the socio-economic and political consequences of this master-planned city, including the ways in which it has both exacerbated existing social hierarchies and exclusions and created new ones. More specifically, my first manuscript (Chapter 5), which explores the layers of dissonance between Dompak planners' stated visions, the discourses they have adopted to legitimize these visions and form policies, the implementation of said urban policies, and finally, its consequences on local residents, relies on an analysis of policy and planning documents, interviews with government officials and local residents, participant observation, as well as a textual analyses of media sources (namely newspaper clippings and online blogs). My second manuscript (Chapter 6) examines the ways in which growing religio-nationalism in the Riau Islands is manifested in Dompak's built environment and relies on analyses of historical documentary sources, interviews with government officials and local residents, and the oral histories of long-term residents. Importantly, through my fieldwork, I deepened my understanding of the differing sentiments of the stakeholders involved in Dompak's creation.

In this chapter, I first reflect upon my positionality, or how I am positioned vis-à-vis various power structures within my field context. Second, I discuss the ethics as well as the logistics of my field study. Third, I provide an overview of the multi-varied data collection approaches and participant selection techniques I used in the field. Finally, I describe the data analysis methods I used to write this thesis.

4.2: Positionality as a female Arab-Indonesian researcher in the Riau Islands

A large body of scholarship has examined how the positionality of researchers affects their empirical data and conclusions (Hartsock, 1987; Harding, 1987; Hastrup, 1992; England, 1994; Serrant-Green, 2002). Others have emphasized that it is crucial for researchers to reflect upon their identities and consider how notions of 'insiderness' and 'outsiderness' affect their qualitative research process and its outcomes (see Asselin, 2003; Hellawell, 2006, Arthur, 2010, Thomson and Gunter, 2010; McNess et al, 2013). In this section, I discuss my position as an 'in-betweener' in the field (Milligan, 2016). Importantly, I explore how my racial background and cultural / religious identity, gender, past professional experiences, as well as my personality have primed me for the intense social experience of carrying out fieldwork in Indonesia and I examine how these factors have played a role in influencing my data collection and analyses.

First, my fluent Indonesian language skills and intrinsic familiarity with values and cultures found in the region made me well positioned to conduct research in Dompak. I was raised in Jakarta by an Arab-Indonesian mother and American father and received my education from an international school (notably, although I am bilingual, I do speak Indonesian with a slight American accent). My upbringing as a Muslim Arab-Indonesian allowed me to better understand the variegated, Arab-influences in Kepri culture, which for other researchers may have required an interpreter. More specifically, as a Muslim having grown up in Indonesia within a minority Arab-Indonesian community, I have a nuanced understanding of the role of religion in Indonesian culture, which prompted many of my research participants to gain initial trust in me (Mercer, 2007). For example, I often used Islamic terms in my speech, wore modest clothing[9], and greeted locals with a bowed *salam*[10]. Upon meeting my interviewees, I was often asked about my racial background, marital status, age, and religious beliefs[11]. In these encounters, I would strategically emphasize my Acehnese roots and Muslim background through which the geographic and cultural proximity of my identity to my research participants' identities created a

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[9] Specifically, I always brought along a scarf with me, which I would wear as a headscarf when entering villages in Dompak.

[10] The word *salam* translates to 'greeting' in Indonesian (derived from the Arabic greeting 'As-salamu alaykum' meaning 'peace be upon you'). A common and polite greeting etiquette among Indonesian-Muslims is to hold out both hands, slightly bow and to touch your chest lightly with your hands.

[11] It is quite common in Indonesian village culture to ask what people in the Global North might deem to be private/personal questions. Having been raised in Indonesia, I was aware of this prior to entering the field and was able to negotiate such chit chat in a way that gained my participants' trust.

sense of familiarity. By linking my own identity to my research participants' identities, a shared bond was created. I believe that subtle yet mindful acts like these encouraged my research participants to feel at ease with my approach and open up (Bryman, 2004). Indeed, sharing a similar cultural background with my research participants positioned me at an advantage as an 'insider' (Asselin, 2003; Tembo, 2003; O'Connor, 2004), for which I was accepted as an Indonesian 'local' despite having a racially ambiguous appearance[12] and a foreign-inflected Indonesian accent. This is not to say that all of my research participants viewed me this way. To some, I may have been viewed simply as an 'outsider' (Horowitz, 1983; Collet, 2008; Chagnon, 2003) or an outsider that had 'insider knowledge' (Ochieng, 2010; McNess et al., 2013) as my socio-economic status was visibly different from that of most of my interviewees, I come from a western academic setting, and grew up in Jakarta[13]. Therefore, although I shared an Indonesian and Muslim identity with most of my participants, positioning me as a trusted 'insider', my middle-upper class and metropolitan upbringing also fostered a sense of 'otherness'. Hence, these identities positioned me as an 'in-betweener' in the field.

As a young female researcher, I experienced both advantages and disadvantages in the field that mostly correlated with the demographic of my research participants themselves. Most of the government officials I interviewed were men, who all seemed intrigued by the fact that I was a solo female researcher. In addition to acting as a conversation starter, this usually led to a willingness to share their time and materials. I generally felt safe, even though I would often be the only female in the room, as most interviews were conducted in open-door office spaces, and I was typically treated with respect as an honorary male (see Figure 4.1). Occasionally, an exchange of our contact information at the end of an interview led to instances where flirtatious government officials would proceed to message me on multiple of my social media platforms for weeks after our meeting, and they would pass my information on to their friends. Following my time at the field, I made sure to strengthen the privacy settings on my social media accounts. At no point during our *actual* interactions however did I feel unsafe.

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[12] The question of my racial background often came up during my initial meeting with interviewees, and in many cases, acted as a conversation starter. A few locals detected that I had Acehnese-Arabic roots, however almost always recognized that I was *blasteran* (mixed-race), in which case they would question whether or not my father had converted to Islam. I sensed that answering, 'yes, my father was a convert, and I was raised by my Muslim grandparents' gave me credibility among Kepri locals.

[13] As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Jakarta epitomized the central administration to which many locals have long felt a sense of resentment.

Amongst the locals I interviewed, I found that female participants did not feel threatened by me and were at ease inviting me into their homes, which led to many rich, in-depth interviews (see Figure 4.2). The local men, on the other hand, would often be wary of inviting a young female into their space, resulting in our interactions to feel more formal and occasionally rushed. This, however, no longer became an issue when I began to travel to sites with my male research assistant and/or Dompak's village head, as I discuss further below.

Figure 4.1 – Author conducting a structured interview with the Director of Public Works at the Dompak Public Works office.
(Source: Author)

Figure 4.2 – Author conducting a semi-structured interview at the front porch of a local resident's house from Tanjung Siambang, Dompak
(Source: Author)

My educational background in urban geography, past fieldwork-based internships in India and Barbados and my current job in the municipal sector in Montreal, gave me a nuanced understanding of the complexities of governance structures and city planning. This, in turn, allowed me to better navigate the Riau Islands bureaucratic systems and better understand the power structures embedded among government departments and agencies in Dompak. Having worked as a part-time GIS analyst and environment coordinator for the Town of Montreal West, I was able to relate my past work experiences to that of many of my research participants, particularly to employees in Dompak's Public Works and Planning departments. This aspect of my positionality opened up doors as it allowed for interactive conversations. For example, when collecting data and requesting specific plans, I used technical planning terms, prompting most of my research participants to ask questions about my professional background and this resulted in

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rich discussions about urbanism and planning. After my first few interviews with government officials, it became clear that they were happy to share their experiences in city government after I, considered a peer to a certain extent, would open up and discuss the hurdles I have faced working in Canada's municipal sector. It was an advantage therefore that I entered the field having had work experience in government as it allowed me to better navigate the system and relate with my participants.

Finally, in addition to my cultural and professional background, which positioned me as an 'in-betweener' in the field, my social personality and my ability to 'embrace the personal' (Moser, 2008) also heavily influenced local perceptions of me as a researcher. Having been raised in Indonesia, I have a deep knowledge of widely held cultural and social expectations. I made sure to develop many informal relationships and partake enthusiastically in informal social activities as a fieldwork strategy. For instance, particularly amongst lower socio-economic demographics, it can be perceived as pretentious or arrogant not to sit for long periods chatting, sharing stories, or engaging in *omong kosong,* or small talk. Also, I understood the importance of accepting invitations to social events such as house visits, meals, weddings, and so on, in order to gain trust and make participants feel at ease. Thus, my openness to answer questions about my personal life, my willingness to attend social events in the community, my readiness to eat whatever was provided on the table for me, and more generally, my adaptive social skills, gave me a strong advantage in the field and helped me gain the trust of the community. In sum, my positionality (cultural background, gender, academic and professional experience) coupled with my personality, prepared me to adapt quickly to new and unpredictable environments, which played a pivotal role in the success of my fieldwork.

4.3: Field logistics and ethics

Although my data collection was based primarily in Dompak, I resided in Tanjung Pinang, the neighboring city and previous capital of Kepri, since Dompak was still under construction, had no available temporary housing in the existing villages, and was overall less safe. I had previously travelled to Dompak for a brief visit in 2014 that allowed me to gain a sense of the project and its level of progress (or lack thereof). During this trip, it was clear that I needed to gather data in an extremely mindful way, as I discovered through conversations with locals that Kepri officials involved in Dompak's construction were commonly known to be

corrupt and involved with the regional mafia. Therefore, for precautionary purposes, I chose to live a short but easily commutable distance from my research participants.

I resided in Tanjung Pinang with a local family I met during my search for an apartment rental. Although his rental space was occupied, Pak Rusli[14] (short for *Bapak* Rusli or Mr. Rusli*)* and his family welcomed me to stay in their private home. During my stay, I shared a room with their ten-year-old daughter to whom I taught introductory English as a way to show my appreciation for their hospitality.

Pak Rusli was initially helpful during my fieldwork, yet it was difficult to navigate our relationship when it came to my research since he occasionally overstepped his role. Pak Rusli works for the Kepri government and provided me with introductions to members of the Dompak city planning community. He also assisted me by personally accompanying me to the Kepri Office of Nation and Politics (or *Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik,* KESBANGPOL*)*, where, through his personal connections, he helped expedite my Kepri research license (*surat izin)* that granted me approval to conduct research on the island. Additionally, when I initially contacted Kepri officials, Pak Rusli often gave a follow up call and claimed that I was his niece, as familial ties go a long way in Indonesia. In many ways, Pak Rusli played the role of the 'gatekeeper' in the snowball sampling technique (Valentine, 2005), and I found that his guidance and connections opened doors for me, which rapidly expanded my network of connections. However, during introductions with government officials, Pak Rusli would often try to speak on my behalf and explain my research agenda for me, despite my fluency in Indonesian, which may have given my research participants the idea that I was unable to speak for myself, or that my research was influenced by local officials. Therefore, after a few instances of Pak Rusli's disruptions, I respectfully declined meeting research participants with him in attendance.

Although I was able to speak the language of my research participants, I hired Pak Rusli's son, Aji[15], to be my research assistant on the field, primarily to drive me to my interview appointments and various field sites using a rented car. Aji played a pivotal role in my data collection process primarily during focus groups, as he would often care for and play with the children during my interviews with mothers who otherwise would have been distracted. I found that having an assistant who was both a Kepri local and a male influenced the data I collected.

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[14] I have received consent from Rusli to refer to him using his first name in this thesis.

[15] I have received consent from Aji to refer to him using his first name in this thesis.

For example, it was clear that local fisher folk in the villages were more comfortable inviting me to tour their homes and fishing sites when Aji accompanied me. Additionally, since he was visibly younger than me[16], I did not get the sense that my research participants assumed we were romantically involved, which likely would have colored their perception of me and thereby been a distracting factor. Had I been accompanied by an older male whose relationship to me would have been less obvious, I believe I would not likely have received the same respect.

I was granted permission to conduct my field study by the Research Ethics Board I (Certificate of Ethical Acceptability of Research Involving Humans) of McGill University on August 2016[17]. All participants in my study were granted confidentiality and anonymity (unless they explicitly consented otherwise) and provided oral consent for their responses to be used in this thesis. Moreover, as mentioned above, I was granted approval by the Kepri Office of Nation and Politics (*Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik* or KESBANGPOL*)* to carry out my field research on site in: (1) the Dompak Public Works office (*Dinas Pekerjaan Umum Propinsi Kepri or PU Dompak),* (2) the Dompak Regional Development Planning Agency office *(Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah or BAPPEDA),* (3) the District office of Bukit Bestari *(Kecamatan Bukit Bestari)*, and (4) the Dompak Village Head office (*Kelurahan Dompak).* Additionally, the Dompak Village Head granted me permission to conduct research in all six villages on the island.

4.4: Data collection

During my fieldwork, I used a mixed methods approach to collect data that involved both textual analysis of documentary sources and ethnography. The two primary collection methods I used were gathering and analyzing textual documentary sources, including media reports and official documents, and ethnographic methods. The latter consisted of in-depth interviews (structured and semi-structured), focus groups, oral history, and participant observation. To address my research objectives of critically examining the official discourse that rationalizes the Dompak project as well as the interpretation and reaction to this project by locals, I interviewed both government officials and local residents.

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[16] Aji was 20 years old and appeared young as well.
[17] Due to unforeseen health-related circumstances, I was forced to withdraw from McGill University in 2018. At the time, I had completed my courses, fieldwork, and analysis, and was in the final writing stages of my thesis. I was fortunate enough to continue my studies in 2022.

Prior to arriving in the field, I had gathered online sources from local Kepri websites, including press releases, news reports, and blogs. These media sources provided me with an introductory understanding of the locals' perception of the new city project as well as insight into which government agencies were relevant for me to approach in the field. I had also been in contact with a number of government officials working in the national planning agency (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunanan Nasional* or BAPPENAS*)* of Jakarta, which is responsible for approving nation-wide urban projects and their budgets. From BAPPENAS*,* I collected government documents such as 5-year plans and social development policy briefs in the Kepri region. Upon arriving in the field, I visited the Tanjung Pinang regional archival office (*Badan Pusat Statistik or BPS Kepri)* to collect census data and strategic assessment reports (2010-2016) in the district of Bukit Bestari, which has jurisdiction over Dompak. Likewise, I was given the *Buku Monografi*, a government document highlighting demographic information of Kepri cities, from the Bukit Bestari district office. I received the most textual documentary sources from Dompak's Public Works office, which provided me with the Dompak 2007 and 2015 Master Plan and Report, CAD files, construction quotes, building elevation models, and zoning maps.

During fieldwork, I carried out in-depth interviews (structured, semi-structured, focus groups, and oral history), and conducted participant observation in villages across Dompak to further engage with my research community. My main techniques of data logging during my fieldwork include audio recording, note taking, keeping a field diary, and photography.

I conducted interviews with a total of 52 participants who differ in socio-economic backgrounds, ages, and gender. I divided my research participants into three main categories: (1) government officials (high ranking politicians, urban planners, and state employees), (2) local residents of Dompak, (3) residents of Tanjung Pinang (in order to get a broader sense of Kepri local's perception on Dompak's creation). When conducting my fieldwork, I grouped my interviews according to these categories because of both geographical reasons (i.e., a car was required to travel from the government office complex to the villages) and to accommodate the snowball sampling technique. The following sections delve into the details of my qualitative approach, in accordance with my data collection method.

Interviewees	Male	Female	Total
Government officials (urban planners, public works employees, district officers, etc.)	13	3	16
Local residents of Dompak	15	11	26
Local residents of Tanjung Pinang (previous capital of Kepri)	5	5	10
			52

Table 4.1 – Number of interviews conducted by participant group.

4.4.1: Interviews with government officials

I conducted 16 structured interviews with government officials of Dompak (13 male and 3 female), primarily to better understand the motives and constraints behind the city' rationale, vision, and design. I created a structured interview guide (in Indonesian) prior to arriving in the field (see Appendix I for a translated version of the guide), and my methods of data logging were audio recording and note taking (pen and paper). I found that interviews with government employees worked best in the early mornings on Monday to Thursday, particularly because there was seemingly less structure in the Friday workday due to Friday prayers among Muslims, who constituted the vast majority of government employees.

In order to compare findings across employees directly and indirectly involved with Dompak's creation, I selected participants using purposive criterion sampling, which entails choosing participants based on a predetermined criterion of significance (Patton, 2001), which in my case, was to align with my research objectives. My interviewees ranged from higher ranked officials in Kepri's BAPPEDA and PU as well as civil servants in the district and village offices (*Kecamatan Bukit Bestari* and *Kelurahan Dompak).* Importantly, the way in which I framed my research when introducing myself to this specific category of participants played a vital role in how I was viewed as a researcher. Specific to this participant group, I emphasized that my research aimed at better understanding the nuances of this new city project that was not widely known. To provide additional credibility to my research agenda, I often referred to the research that my supervisor, Sarah Moser, carried out in a new capital city in Malaysia, Putrajaya. Also, I would mention that my research in Dompak will eventually be featured in a 'New Cities Atlas' project, tied to McGill University. The realization that my research could potentially place Dompak on the global map made some officials take me more seriously and seemed to encourage them to share their knowledge of the project.

Amongst the government officials I interviewed, I found discrepancies in the discourse between the varying levels of government bureaucrats. Notably, planners from BAPPEDA, who were directly involved in the design of Dompak's masterplan, were more inclined to glorify the project and discuss only its successes, whereas PU employees, who dealt with the daily operations of project seemed less attached to the projects' outcome and thus were more open to discuss its challenges. I also found that because of the difference in professional status (i.e. white versus blue collar), there was a visible lack of communication between the departments I interviewed. Correspondingly, it was clear through the results of my interviews that employees of BAPPEDA were either unaware of the challenges brought up by PU workers or that they had strategically chosen to ignore or address them. Moreover, government employees who were not involved in the making of the city, namely those who worked for the *Kecamatan* and *Kelurahan,* tended to be more outwardly critical, likely because they felt no accountability or commitment to the project.

A significant figure among my research participants was the first Governor of Kepri, Ismeth Abdullah (2004-2010)[18], the pioneer of the Dompak project, who I discovered during my preparation for fieldwork turned out to be a distant relative of mine. In the first week, during my first three pilot interviews, I mentioned my relation to Abdullah (who locals referred to as 'Mr. Ismeth' or *Pak Ismeth*), which, as mentioned above, may have caused respondents to feel as though I was an insider. However, at times this also could have skewed their responses as I sensed that they feared providing an honest and perhaps critical response. As a result, I stopped mentioning my relation to Pak Ismeth after my first week.

4.4.2: Interviews with local residents

As discussed above, developing informal relationships and partaking in social activities was a key strategy during my fieldwork. This was particularly the case when engaging with local residents of Dompak, most of whom are of a lower socio-economic demographic. Thereby, with this group of participants, I would take my time to introduce myself and engage in small talk in order to gain initial trust. I also always accepted invitations to enter their homes for meals, to have tours of their village, or even to attend local cultural ceremonies. Because of the informality embedded within the local cultural milieu, I chose to carry out less structured interviews (see

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[18] I have received consent from Ismeth Abdullah to refer to him using his full name in this thesis.

Appendix II for the translated version of the semi-structured interview guide) which allowed for flexibility to further explore themes that individual participants were more knowledgeable or passionate about (Valentine, 2005). I used a combination of semi-structured interviews and focus group interviews to grasp local sentiments and their experience with the city's construction. Although it was not in my initial fieldwork plan, I also adopted the method of oral history during my time spent in local villages as I found that my interviewees would often initiate discussions surrounding the history of their land. Oral history is commonly used in ethnographic research to 'uncover people's experiences of the built environment and to trace the narratives of their geographical engagements there' (George and Stratford, 2010: 142).

I interviewed a total of 26 residents of Dompak. 14 were individual interviews and were semi-structured (9 men and 5 women) and 10 were through focus groups (divided into 2 groups). Moreover, to provide a representative sample, I made sure that the participants selected came from an array of circumstances: (1) 8 residents who had been relocated to a new home in the housing resettlement zone, (2) 6 residents who have long been promised a new house, but have yet to be relocated, (3) 10 residents who have refused to relocate and thus continue to live in their traditional homes. Dompak consists of six main territories (*wilayah*): Tanjung Setemu, Tanjung Siambang, Tanjung Basur, Tanjung Mandor, Tanjung Semesu, and Tanjung Duku. In order to compare and contrast findings, I conducted interviews in 3 of the most populated of these villages (Setemu, Siambang, and Duku). These interviewees came from different ethnic backgrounds (Among 26 locals: 15 Malay, 5 Chinese, 4 Javanese, 2 Other) yet had similar socio-economic conditions. After several preliminary visits to the villages, I found that interviews were most conducive for women between 9-11am when they were home and less busy with chores, and either at their place of work (in most cases, fishing areas) during working hours, or in the late afternoon for men, between 4-6pm, when they had arrived home from work.

In order to understand the firsthand experiences of residents who have had to endure major changes in their environment, I used the method of oral history. Specifically, I adopted this approach if I had noticed that in their interview the participant mentioned a historical element to their space that had been altered or destroyed by the city building process. During one visit to a local village, a group of local fisherfolk who sensed my eagerness to learn about their land's history, brought me to a hidden bunker built by the Dutch in the early 1800s. I later found out from the village head that most locals had kept these sites hidden from Dompak planners.

Furthermore, I conducted focus group interviews with residents who had refused to relocate to the new housing resettlement zones, particularly since there was already a unified sense of community in the village and activities were generally done together (see Figure 4.3). Because focus groups facilitate open-ended questions and informal discussions, it was an ideal setting for families and neighbors to collectively share and express their thoughts about the Dompak project and their ways of adapting their livelihood strategies to their changing circumstances. A challenge I found in interviewing Dompak residents was that I had to continuously convince and remind them that I was not affiliated with state authority or the media. Having been a quiet and rather remote island, Dompak residents seemed particularly wary of media presence. It seemed as though most locals had the impression that the media was linked to government bureaucrats, and therefore saying the wrong thing might affect their rights to their land or any potential compensation that they were eligible to receive. To be sensitive to this, I mainly relied on taking notes by hand to help put interviewees at ease, and only used my audio-recorder during focus groups[19]. Indeed, this became less of an issue when I met with and interviewed the Dompak village head, Pak Eko[20], who subsequently played a major role in influencing the data of my semi-structured and focus group interviews. Upon meeting with Pak Eko, in the middle of my second week on the field, he accompanied me to the villages and introduced me to many local residents. This broadened my participant sample size significantly as residents were put at ease in sharing their experience around their village head representative, who is a very personable man and well respected among Dompak residents. While Pak Eko is technically a state employee and could have deterred some participants from speaking critically of a state-run project, I sensed that villagers felt relaxed around him and free to open up.

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[19] I would only use the audio-recorder after consent of the use of the device.

[20] I have received consent from Eko to refer to him using his first name in this thesis.

Figure 4.3 – Author conducting an informal focus group with local residents of village Tanjung Sekatap, Dompak. (Source: Author)

Finally, to get a sense of Kepri's residents' view of the high profile new city project in which they suddenly found themselves living in, I carried out 10 (5 male and 5 female) semi-structured interviews with local residents of Tanjung Pinang (see Appendix III for a translated version of the interview guide). I selected residents using the snowball sampling technique, and the interviews were audio recorded.

4.4.3: Other fieldwork methods used

I used the 'deep hanging out' method to identify the lived experiences of local residents adapting to the major changes in their built environment. Although I did not reside in the villages, I was able to develop a strong understanding of life in the villages (particularly the struggling fisherfolk) as I met with the locals on a daily basis and formed strong connections. According to Geertz (1998), deep hanging out, which involves immersing oneself deeply in the culture, social context and daily lives of participants, allows the ethnographer to move beyond the superficial observations and capture the complexities of the culture being studied. To fully identify the ways that locals were adjusting to the challenges of relocation, I also maintained a detailed field journal in which I noted the daily struggles of community members, which ranged

from a breakdown of family structures, since many members were relocated to different resettlement zones, to major changes in livelihood strategies due to the loss of biodiversity. Finally, in addition to taking photographs, I maintained a photo journal (Chaplin, 2011) of interactions among locals in their shared spaces of Dompak villages, including community gardens, fishing docks, forests, and so on.

4.5: Data analysis

Analyzing my field data was a three-step process as I had primary data (transcribed interviews) as well as secondary data (textual documentary sources collected from media sources and government offices) to examine. My main technique for both involved reviewing my data repeatedly to finalize research themes and noting key labels to perform analytic coding (Basit, 2003; Meyer and Avery, 2009; James, 2013). First, I transcribed over 38 hours of interviews (in Indonesian), which I then coded thematically (Boyatzis, 1998) in order to find patterns. I did this by going over my transcriptions and manually organizing applicable statements by theme. I then translated said chosen statements into English. Second, I compiled my textual sources and highlighted pertinent facts that matched my 'labels', which I then interpreted in order to draw meaning from them (Stake, 1995). Finally, since my primary and secondary data came from an array of sources, I carried out cross-case analysis (Stake, 1995) to compare and contrast my findings and refine my key research themes.

Preamble to Chapter 5

As I elaborated upon in Chapter 3: *Literature Review*, a wide array of scholarship has examined the regressive elements within urban planning. Importantly, scholars have drawn attention to how planning can be used as a means of oppression and actively contribute to the perpetuation of social exclusions within a society. This following empirical chapter responds to Oren Yiftachel's (1998) call for scholars to bridge the gap between theory and practice and explore the 'darker sides of urban planning.' More specifically, it adopts Yiftachel's 'dark side of planning' conceptual framework to critically analyze the social exclusions produced by the making of Dompak, the Riau Islands' new master-planned provincial capital. Using the framework's four dimensions of analysis – territorial, procedural, socio-economic and cultural – this chapter presents the Dompak project as a case study to illustrate how planning practices can be harnessed as a tool for social control. Moreover, through an examination of the socio-economic and political consequences that Dompak's creation has had on the lives of local residents, this chapter underscores the significant role that local political, racial and religious dynamics play in new city construction. While this framework has been applied in several empirical contexts, this chapter provides a unique contribution to the field through its novel application of it in the context of establishing a new city.

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Alyssa Wilbur *(lead author)***:** Contribution of original research material; writing of original draft; conceptualization of argument, theoretical frameworks, and structure; data analysis; review and editing of draft versions.

Sarah Moser *(co-author):* Direction and guidance of argument, analysis and structure; review and editing of draft versions of the manuscript.

Chapter 5: The dark side of planning a new city: Engineering social exclusions in the creation of a new provincial capital in Indonesia

Abstract

The creation of dozens of new cities from scratch around the world over the past decade is rationalized as a proactive response to an assortment of urgent urban challenges. Advocates of new cities claim that they provide ordered places for urban populations to expand that are free from the pollution, congestion, and other problems plaguing rapidly growing cities, particularly in the Global South. This article critically examines how a new city project in Indonesia sustains and exacerbates broader socio-economic, racial, and religious divides, demonstrated through the case study of Dompak, the new capital of Riau Islands Province. We investigate how the design of Dompak physically and symbolically prioritizes Malay Muslims over ethnic and religious minorities, drawing on Oren Yiftachel's framework that characterizes the 'dark side of planning' through four categories of analysis: territorial, procedural, socio-economic, and cultural. Despite the state's rhetoric of 'improvement', we demonstrate how the creation of Dompak has left local communities more divided. This paper aims to shed light on how new cities, despite claims that they are important solutions to urgent urban problems, can be tools deployed to advance ethno- and religio-nationalism.

Key words: new cities, dark side of planning, social exclusions, urban governance, power in planning, marginalization

5.1: Introduction

Since the mid-1990s, new city projects built from scratch have proliferated in over 40 countries almost exclusively across the Global South. The construction of these new master-planned cities is rationalized by ruling elites and the planners they employ as both an economic development strategy as well as a means to address growing urban challenges such as housing shortages, congestion, pollution, and environmental degradation. Across the Global South, particularly in former colonies, new city construction has been associated with 'progress', 'modernity', and 'catching up with the West' and has thus been attractive to governments who wish to break away from their colonial past and transition to 'first-world' economies (Datta and Shaban 2015; Wakeman 2016; Watson 2009b). Along with advancing neoliberal agendas, new city planning has, in many cases, been strategically manipulated as a vehicle to increase state power, perpetuate power hierarchies, and further marginalize and render invisible the unwanted or 'ungovernable' (Watson 2014).

New cities are being constructed at an astonishing rate and for a variety of purposes: to promote economic growth and accumulate capital (Datta 2015; Goldman 2011; Keeton 2011;

Moser 2015), elevate their nation's status on the global stage (Côté-Roy 2021; King 2008; Koch 2010), and/or strategically project a re-imagined national identity (Moser 2012a; 2012b; Moser and Wilbur 2017; Rossman 2017; Seekins 2009; Vale 2008). Indonesia has joined this 'world of new cities' (Moser, Swain, and Alkhabbaz 2015), in the recently announced new capital to replace Jakarta. But a lesser-known master-planned city in Indonesia was started over 15 years ago, when the Riau Islands Province (Propinsi Kepulauan Riau, also known as 'Kepri'*)* announced the creation of Dompak, the country's first state-designed master-planned city established as the province's new capital.

Dompak, an island of approximately 1000 hectares and home to around 3,400 residents, is located in the Riau archipelago between the eastern coast of Sumatra and Singapore. Prior to the construction of the new capital, Dompak was a remote rural island covered in mangroves and jungle with no infrastructure connection to Bintan, the nearest major island. Residents of Dompak are spread across six coastal villages and until the recent creation of two bridges to Bintan, used small fishing boats to get to the nearest port town and interim capital of Kepri, Tanjung Pinang. Most residents have traditionally depended on fishing and other maritime activities as their main source of livelihood, and they live below the poverty line. Until the announcement of the new capital, improving conditions on Dompak and raising residents' standard of living had never been a priority of the state and the limited infrastructure on the island has been maintained almost entirely by residents themselves. The island has never had extensive public amenities; it has one elementary school, a few small prayer rooms (*mushollas)*, community gardens, and several small locally owned corner shops and food stalls.

In 2002, the Riau archipelago broke away from Riau Province to form a new province: Riau Islands Province. Governor Abdullah (2004-2010) announced the plan to create a new capital city in 2004 as a way to establish a distinct identity for the new province. Just as (Indian) Punjab lost its capital of Lahore as a result of Partition, Pekanbaru, the capital of the now-divided Riau Province, continued to serve as capital of the newly-split province of Riau, leaving Riau Islands Province without a capital. Tanjung Pinang, by far the largest city in the province, was rejected as the new capital as state officials of Kepri favoured the idea of a new city built from scratch modeled after Malaysia's new capital of Putrajaya (Moser and Wilbur 2017). The construction of Dompak started in 2007, and it was initially supposed to be completed by 2010. However, the project faced myriad problems that prompted multiple revisions to the master plan

and resulted in significant delays, including accusations of illegal land acquisition by the state, unforeseen budget cuts, underestimated costs, shoddy construction, resistance from local residents, allegations of corruption, and sudden changes in the Kepri administration.

To analyze the social exclusions produced in this new master-planned capital, we adopt a framework developed by Oren Yiftachel (1998) that theorizes how Israel uses planning to dominate and control Palestinians. Yiftachel examines four characteristics of what he calls the 'dark side of planning': territorial, procedural, socio-economic, and cultural. While Yiftachel developed his framework in the context of a Jewish ethnocracy[21] (Yiftachel 2006), we argue that it is productive in thinking through the ethnicization of space in a new master-planned city in Indonesia. Rather than a Jewish majority exerting power over a Muslim minority, Riau Islands Province has a Muslim majority whose political leaders have employed a variety of methods, including urban planning, to control and marginalize ethnic Chinese residents and sustain elite Malay power. In the context of Dompak, Yiftachel's four dimensions are a useful framework to critically analyze the politics of planning and how state actors have deployed particular planning practices to maintain Malay Muslim dominance and marginalize ethnic and religious minorities and the rural poor. First, the territorial dimension interrogates controversies surrounding land acquisition and the new city's resettlement zone and exemplifies how Dompak planners have strategically deployed territorial policies to exclude and marginalize particular groups. Second, the procedural dimension discusses the communicative infrastructure adopted to plan Dompak and highlights the significant gap between government officials' inclusive/pro-poor and participatory narratives and the reality. Third, the socio-economic dimension investigates the policy-to-implementation gaps in the new city and the impacts they have had on the local residents of Dompak, including environmental degradation, changes to livelihood, community structures, health, safety, and accessibility. Finally, the cultural dimension examines how the city's Arabized Malay aesthetic and various amenities and institutions have been built exclusively for Muslims in order to broadcast publicly the dominance of Malays in the province, while delegitimizing and marginalizing ethnic and religious minorities, both physically and symbolically. Parallels are evident between the Israel/Palestine context and our research in the

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[21] Yiftachel developed this term to describe a political regime that facilitates the control and 'expansion of the dominant group in contested territory and its domination of power structures while maintaining a democratic facade' (2006: 3; see also 1997, 1999, 2004).

Riau Islands Province, in that by controlling the production of space, state officials are able to facilitate capital accumulation while strengthening collective ethno- and religio-national identities. As Yiftachel argues, urban and regional planners' function, at least in part, 'as "spatial police", structurally embedded in the ever present reality of oppression experienced by marginal social groups' (Yiftachel, 1998: 398).

This article argues that particular ethno- and religio-nationalist development narratives and planning practices have been instrumentalized by Dompak planners to justify the displacement of the poor and the marginalization of non-Muslim Malay minorities. We suggest that the new city-building agenda in Kepri, framed around the rhetoric of *pembangunan* (development / improvement) (see Li, 2007), functions as a technical solution for advancing the province's neoliberal policies from which officials draw power and legitimize their own agendas. This, in turn, depoliticizes socio-economic issues and normalizes a particular neoliberal approach to economic development. By adopting Yiftachel's framework to interrogate the narratives, discrepancies, and consequences of new city planning in Kepri, this paper sheds light on some of the regressive aspects of state planning, including false and empty promises, land expropriation, social exclusion, and ethnic marginalization.

Field research for this article was conducted from Fall 2016 to Winter 2019, in Tanjung Pinang and Dompak and later via online follow-up interviews. Our findings are based on 52 interviews with various government officials, including planners, public works employees, and district representatives, as well as with residents of villages on Dompak and Tanjung Pinang from a variety of socio-economic, racial, and ethnic backgrounds. We carried out structured and semi-structured interviews and conducted three focus groups with residents of Dompak. Our research also involved textual analysis of government material including master plans of Dompak, policy documents and reports, speeches by Kepri governors, official cost estimates for construction, census data, maps, news articles, and blogs.

This article begins by situating Dompak within the broader context of state-driven urban mega-developments and master planning, and how they reflect the 'dark side of planning' (1998). Next, we critically analyze the ways in which the planning of Dompak subjugates and marginalizes non-Malays and Kepri's poor through the Yiftachel's four categories of analysis: territorial, procedural, socio-economic, and cultural. We suggest that despite the optimistic rhetoric of state officials and planners, Dompak represents a troubling trend of rising ethno- and

religio-nationalism embedded in massive state urban developments that exacerbate and entrench cultural as well as socio-economic divides. Our research is part of a robust field of critical scholarship that examines how planning as a discipline is often complicit in normalizing rather than challenging social hierarchies (Bhan 2014; Huxley and Winchester 1991; Porter 2010; Sandercock 2002; Watson 2009a). While the vast majority of this scholarship examines planning as a tool for segregation or oppression in established cities, our research provides insight into a new city being built from scratch, that as a provincial capital, holds particular symbolic power.

5.2: Investigating the dark side of urban planning

The emergence of urban planning as a discipline during the colonial era was driven by the understanding that cities were places plagued with problems, but problems that could be solved through rational and scientific spatial planning (Hall 2014). A great deal of scholarship has sought to evaluate the successes and challenges of planning and the policy-to-implementation gap (Allmendinger and Gunder 2005), yet the focus on the *results* can frequently overlook the exclusionary *intentions* of urban planning, and how planners often mask and normalize regressive aspects of planning through scientific and rational-sounding language. Over the past two decades, an expansive body of scholarship demonstrates that 'planning is not a universal and progressive force for good' (Allmendinger & Gunder, 2005: 89) by examining the perpetuation of inequalities in settler colonial societies (Porter 2010; Sandercock 2002; Ugarte 2014); the role of planning in racial and religious chauvinism, particularly in the context of Israel and Malaysia (Avni, Alfasi, and Bornstein 2016; Moser 2012a; 2020a; 2020b; Moser and Wilbur 2017; Wilbur 2021; Yiftachel 1999; 2000); and its role in discriminating based on gender (Beebeejaun 2017) and socio-economic status (Bhan 2009; Watson 2009a). While state planners are often assumed to be altruistic and naïvely idealistic people, in reality, they frequently seek to further their own interests or maintain the status quo.

Our research draws on a vibrant and eclectic body of scholarship that examines how planning is used by the state as a tool for repression that enables the dominant group to control, oppress, and marginalize minorities. Yiftachel is one of the key scholars at the forefront of examining planning's 'dark side' in the context of an ethnocracy. Through the complex context of Israel and Palestine, he demonstrates how planning, under the guise of being a neutral scientific discipline, can normalize inequality, exacerbate social problems, and reproduce social hierarchies (Yiftachel 1995; 1998; 2000).

There is just a small body of scholarship to date that examines how recent new city projects are intentionally master-planned to exclude some while privileging others. Many new city projects are grandiose statements of nation building and an opportunity for the state to project its power and ideology to a broad audience (Vale 2008). Putrajaya, the new capital of Malaysia, makes an unambiguous declaration about Malay Muslim ascendancy over other ethnic and religious minorities in the country by allowing very little symbolic or physical space for ethnic and religious minorities, who constitute over 40% of the population (King 2008; Moser 2012a). Naypyidaw, the new capital of Myanmar, is similar in its adoption of overtly Buddhist symbolism and its clear prioritization of Buddhism as the 'authentic' national identity. As mentioned, the ways in which planning has been deployed by Israel to control and exert dominance over Palestinian land and bodies have received abundant scholarly analysis. Other recent studies draw attention to how new city projects are being designed to exclude the poor, particularly private, gated cities, where employment and wealth are conditions for residency (Moser 2020a). For example, Forest City is a gated private city built by a Chinese developer on artificial islands off the coast of Malaysia. It is designed for ethnic Chinese, as is clear from its promotional material and showroom, and lacks infrastructure (schools, religious institutions, language) for other ethnic and religious groups (Moser 2018). Because the vast majority of these new city projects are in their early stages of construction, in many cases it is unclear if or how the planning will target particular groups for exclusion.

While scholars have carried out important studies on regressive forms of state planning in a variety of established geographical settings, the use of urban planning as a tool of social control in the context of new cities being built from scratch has received scant attention. Our research responds to Yiftachel's call for more empirical analysis into planning's 'dark side', and employs his framework in an Indonesian context for the first time in order to think through a new city project that has received little scholarly attention to date.

5.3: Territorial dimension: Land control through the creation of a new city

Territorialisation, or the production of controlled spaces to achieve certain effects is a significant way in which states have controlled populations and resources (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Peluso and Lund, 2011; Liu et al, 2015; Liang et al, 2018). Modern states have the power to govern territories and manipulate spatial relations in order to prioritize particular groups over others, with territorial policies deployed as powerful tools to control weaker groups

and minorities (Yiftachel 1998). Analyzing the effects of territorialisation constitutes the first dimension of Yiftachel's (1998) conceptual framework in which he calls for the examination of how land is controlled through zoning laws, land ownership, location of settlements, and expansion.

Territorialisation and its effects are particularly pertinent when looking at new cities as 'no space, person, or social configuration is a tabula rasa, a clean slate waiting to happen' (Li, 2007: 279). In the case of the Dompak project, planners and policy makers have strategically altered zoning laws, capitalised on the lack of formalised land ownership, and pushed resettlement locations for the local poor to the periphery in order to accumulate capital and redefine space for government officials and local and international elites. Dompak illustrates how 'more affluent interest groups seek to create and cordon off their cosmopolitan enclaves as much as possible from the disorder around them' (Samara *et al.*, 2013: 7).

In 2005, Dompak residents were informed via written notices that vast tracts of land on the island were to be cleared to make way for the new city and zoning laws were to be altered to accommodate the project. The 2007 master plan stated that Dompak's government complex and tourism zones would enclose 467 hectares of land, mandating that all six villages, all located on coastal land, be relocated further inland into two new resettlement zones totalling 15.7 hectares. Local landowners were promised adequate compensation as well as ownership of ready-built housing units in the new housing resettlement zone. Governor Abdullah's administration had assured residents that they would be guaranteed ownership certification for their existing land; that their land would be compensated at a price of approximately Rp. 20,000 (USD $1.40) per meter square; and that each household would be given both 'right to use' *(hak pakai)* certificates to a 15 by 20-meter squared plot of land in the new resettlement zone, as well as a brand new, clean, and safe home built and designed by the government (Interview, 2016).

However, despite promises of land rights and adequate compensation, territorialisation in Dompak has been plagued with problems, including land registration processes that are disorganized, mismanaged, and corrupt. For instance, ongoing land disputes with corporations[22]

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[22] In the early 1990s, much of Dompak's land was allegedly leased to Suban Hartono, a real estate mogul and owner of several companies in Kepri. Although there are no records of lease payments made to Dompak landlords, property owners whose land is mapped within the boundaries of the leased land must obtain a signed approval letter from Hartono in order to legally certify their land ownership (which they require in order to receive their compensation package).

have meant that a number of property owners deemed to have improper certifications have yet to receive compensation. As one Dompak local and landowner laments,

> I don't understand why they're making it so complicated for us… We've been living here for generations. My ancestors' graves are right here. How can they claim I have no land rights? (Interview, 13/08/2016)

Through its needlessly complex land registration process, the National Land Agency (*Badan Pertahanan National or BPN)* has prioritized the rights of elites over local property owners. many of whom have yet to receive their ownership certificate and compensation packages. Additionally, due to alleged budget cuts from the central government, Dompak locals who had agreed to sell their land to the state were compensated only Rp. 3,000- 5,000 (approximately USD $0.20-0.35) per meter squared, a significantly smaller amount than they were initially promised (*TanjungPinangPos*, 2011). The lack of a formal negotiation process has left many residents feeling 'cheated' or 'tricked' into agreeing with the relocation program. A disempowered Dompak landowner sums up his frustration:

> We were forced to sell our land. We had around 1 hectare of land that was only compensated Rp. 3,000 per meter… [The] government … had promised that they would build houses for Dompak residents. In reality, there aren't enough houses built, and the existing houses are falling apart. Now, the price of land per meter here has reached hundreds of thousands of rupiah, so then why were we compensated only Rp. 3,000? (TanjungPinangPos, 2011)

Similarly, regardless of the state's aim of 'improving the housing and general livability of local residents' (Interview, 12/08/2016), the territorialization process has marginalized locals by pushing them into substandard housing far from the coast and traditional maritime livelihoods and far from the new urban center. Notably, although the 2007 masterplan shows that 300 coastal units of traditional Malay-style homes (*rumah panggung)* designed on stilts were to be constructed, only 159 inland units of identical cement box-shaped buildings topped with roofs that feature a small design detail intended to convey 'Malayness' were actually built by the time of relocation in 2014[23]. Locals criticize these houses for being built on infertile land, for their lack of vegetation (for shade), and for their stark contrast to Dompak's seaside villages with lush greenery, fruit trees, and community gardens. Many residents are also frustrated by the inland

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[23] This number remained the same when I conducted research in 2016 and in 2022. Officials from Dompak's Public Works Department claim that costs had been underestimated and they were told to stop construction in the resettlement zones in 2013.

location and relatively far distance from the new city center. For local fisherfolk, this has meant that they must commute to the source of their livelihood: 'When we finally move to the new housing zone, I must walk at least 2-3 kilometers to the sea. Who will watch my *sampan* (fishing boat)? What if it gets stolen?' (Interview, 2016).

Territorialisation in Dompak has been marked by several important discrepancies between stated territorial policy goals and the built reality and exemplifies how planning legislation has 'been used (opportunistically) time and time again across the globe as a justification for evictions and land grabs' (Watson, 2009b: 177). Altering land use and zoning policies in the name of planning a new capital has caused the local poor to be pushed to the new city's periphery, causing further distrust and tension between local residents and the Kepri administration and exacerbating socio-economic differences.

5.4: Procedural dimension: Narratives employed, state-civil relations, and policy-to-implementation gaps in the planning of Dompak

It is crucial to look at not only the goals, but also at the decision-making *process* behind the formulation and implementation of plans and policies: how goals are achieved, how they are justified and legitimized, and which actors and stakeholders are involved in this process. This approach constitutes the second dimension in Yiftachel's (1998: 401) framework, the 'procedural dimension,' and helps shed light on how 'planning processes also exclude various segments and groups from meaningful participation in decision-making and thereby contribute to the marginalization and repression of these groups.' This form of control 'can be applied explicitly from above or implicitly through sophisticated methods of information distribution and meaningless forms of public consultation' (Yiftachel, 1998: 402). In Dompak it is important to analyze the narratives that, on the one hand, planners use to justify and legitimize official policies, and on the other hand, serve to obscure both the policies laid out in the master plan and the consequences for affected communities.

In the case of Dompak, two related narratives have been adopted by the state to rationalize and legitimize the new city-building process as a vehicle for *pembangunan*: inclusive planning and participatory planning. Planners of Dompak have been influenced by the widespread recognition in recent decades that successful planning must challenge conventional top-down approaches to planning and prioritize 'civic governmentality', which focuses on empowering, mobilizing, and properly compensating their urban subjects (Roy, 2009; Ellis,

2012). Kepri planners have embraced this approach, and initially laid out a decision-making process that included local residents through public town council meetings to be held twice a week, recurring in-person 'check-ins' with local residents, and agreed-upon compensation for land and other losses incurred during and after the city's construction (Interviews, August-October 2016). As the regional secretary of Kepri states, 'we must act upon the aspirations of local residents, [we won't] allow Dompak island to have many fancy buildings, when the housing of local residents are not taken care of; therefore, we need to pay attention to the needs of the local community to solve all issues [local disputes]' (Sitompul, 2018).

However, there are deep discrepancies between the participatory and inclusive rhetoric of planners and the actual process. Despite the Kepri administration's claim to 'prioritize the rights of the people', interviews with local residents demonstrate the opposite. Residents reported that they are upset that they had not been able to participate at all in the decision-making process. In interviews, they often used phrases such as '…if they had asked for my opinion – I would have told them that …' (Interviews, August – October 2016). Residents felt that many of the current problems related to the city's development, including land-rights and environmental issues, could have been avoided if only locals had been involved and had been part of the *pembangunan* process. Angry sentiments from residents have only intensified in recent years. One community representative conveyed his sense of helplessness during a demonstration in 2018: 'since Dompak became the new capital, we villagers here have felt further disempowered by the Kepri government. We feel as though we are simply spectators here' (*KoranKomunitas*, 2018). Dompak is one of many contemporary urban development projects in the Global South in which 'over time the managerialist and technocratic dimensions of policy-making and planning have come to dominate, and participation remains only rhetorically important' (Watson, 2009b: 179).

Similarly, government officials have adopted a narrative of inclusive and pro-poor planning that assumes all residents, regardless of their socio-economic status or race, have a clear 'right to the city' (Lefebvre, 1996). As stated by a Kepri planner from the regional planning and development agency (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Dareah or BAPPEDA*): 'this project will open up many doors to existing residents of Dompak. We will give residents a new and much better life. After all, it is a city for the people' (Interview, 08/09/2016). This 'will to improve' is common among officials and regional elites in neo-colonial regimes who view less powerful people as backward and in need of systematic improvements (see Li, 2007).

Despite the high-minded rhetoric, Dompak's most recent plans position it primarily as a vehicle for capital accumulation that will cater to middle- and upper-class Indonesians, tourists, and foreign investors. As such, Dompak is an 'entrepreneurial city', whose builders aspire to build 'mega projects and spectacular landmark buildings' and 'investor-friendly landscapes' (Shin, 2017: 85). This is particularly evident in Dompak's most recent masterplan from 2015, which features a free trade zone with an industrial complex and central business district, as well as an international ferry terminal, a resort zone, a waterfront city and marina, a science techno-park, a museum, a modern shopping complex, a sports complex and stadium, a botanical garden, a zoo, a mangrove forest park and cable cars (Dompak Masterplan, 2015). While it also includes some infrastructural improvements for local residents such as paved roads, highways, and bridges that connect to the mainland[24], its focus is on placeless mega-developments and spectacular landmark buildings that will be of little benefit to local residents. The master plan mostly prioritizes the provision of a 'good business climate' and the construction of other 'lures to bring capital into town' (Harvey, 1989: 11). The narratives of participation and inclusivity have been proliferated by Dompak planners to justify a variety of planning decisions that support the interests of ruling elites rather than the local community, who are marginalized by these entrepreneurial schemes.

5.5: Socio-economic dimension: The impact of environmental degradation, poorly built infrastructure, and forced livelihood changes on the lives of Dompak residents

The longer-term socio-economic consequences of planning constitute the third dimension of Yiftachel's framework. Drawing on this dimension, this section examines how top-down spatial policy making in Dompak, coupled with environmental damage caused by the construction process itself, has resulted in major changes to the lives of local residents and how the project has been contested by the community. Through the field research, we found that the main ways that locals were negatively impacted were employment and educational opportunities, housing conditions, public health and safety, and social support networks.

The Kepri administration has adopted a narrative of green urbanism for Dompak and promotes it as an 'eco city'. However, similar to the narratives of participatory and inclusive

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[24] Although there is an absence of essential public services on the island (i.e. most young local residents must commute to Tanjung Pinang to attend secondary school) there have been no mention in the 2015 masterplan for the improvement or creation of public schools and clinics in existing villages or new resettlement zones.

planning discussed above, the rhetoric has not matched the reality on the ground. The construction of Dompak has led to significant environmental damage with important negative socio-economic consequences for local residents. The use of heavy machinery and extensive logging and land excavation for construction and open pit mining[25] has resulted in significant soil erosion, coastal pollution, and a loss of biodiversity. Between 2007 and 2009, when much of Dompak's forested area was cleared and construction began, there was a severe malaria and dengue fever outbreak that caused several deaths and infected around 1,000 residents and construction workers[26]. The destruction of the jungle and mangroves and the subsequent erosion dramatically altered Dompak's biodiversity and caused a steep decline in fish and other marine life that thrive in mangrove ecosystems. This has negatively impacted the livelihood of local fisherfolk, whose income declined dramatically soon after the land was cleared and construction began. In the words of one resident:

> I mainly catch *ketam* [crab] or *gonggong* [a local shellfish], and although they were once so prevalent in this area, it's been months seen I've caught any. The debris [from the construction and past mining operations] all falls directly into our ocean... As you can see, the water is no longer clear. Our environment has been spoiled. (Interview, 15/09/2016)

While a handful of residents have benefited economically from the new city, particularly local food stall owners, whose customer base now includes government employees, the changes in nearby marine life has meant that most residents have been suddenly forced to turn to other sectors for employment. Consequently, dozens of local residents have applied to the Kepri administration's temporary public service employee program (*Pegawai Tidak Tetap or PTT*) in the hope of finding job opportunities in the new capital. This program was primarily intended to bolster employment opportunities for Kepri's youth, yet not a single resident from Dompak has been hired for this program. Their exclusion has left residents feeling further neglected and disempowered and has fueled local popular resistance toward the Kepri administration and the Dompak project (*Antara Kepri*, 04/07/2012). During a demonstration in April 2018, a community representative argued,

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[25] The island of Dompak has rich deposits of bauxite that had been exploited by illegal miners for decades. Despite hope that the new city's construction would immediately halt these illegal activities, a rampant increase in open pit mines were seen from 2007 to 2013 (Republika, 2013).

[26] This was responsible for one of the major delays to the project (Interview, 26/09/2016).

> The Kepri government should at least employ Dompak's youth to help them increase their dignity. By employing them, they can maybe afford to go to university… It would make a difference even if they were hired as *tukang sapu* (sweepers/janitors). The important thing is that they can get work here and continue their education. (*Koran Komunitas*, 17/04/2018)

Despite the Kepri administration's promise of better employment opportunities in the new city, most Dompak residents today have no choice but to commute to Tanjung Pinang or to other islands in Kepri for work.

Similarly, promises to provide improved housing conditions remain unfulfilled, as can be seen in the current state of Dompak's resident resettlement zone. Relocated residents expressed disappointment and frustration about the significant discrepancy between what was initially promised to them and the actual state of their new homes. For example, the new state-built houses had not been serviced with running water or electricity, leaving residents with poor sanitation and unsafe living conditions. During interviews, words such as 'leaky', 'peeling', and 'collapsing' were used by several residents to describe the homes provided to them by the state, and comparisons were made to animal cages to describe their new 'unlivable' houses. A concerned housewife shared her worries:

> I moved up here [to the resettlement zone] because my husband said it would be better and we would be safe. They promised to give us basic amenities, but there is still no access to water and I don't understand why there are electricity poles around as we have no functioning street lights. Even our old village had electricity. Here, I worry for my child's [9-year-old son] safety because it is so dark at night and he rides a motorbike. (Interview, 15/08/2016)

Today, most relocated families have had to invest in shared diesel generators and install temporary plumbing. Moreover, several residents have reported break-ins since moving in, which they attribute to the lack of public lighting in the resettlement zone. Safety concerns also extend beyond the resettlement zone as several women and children have fallen into large sinkholes caused by construction. A disgruntled resident explained,

> They keep promising to fill these holes caused by the construction trucks with asphalt. An official told me that the budget for the 'small' issues has been taken to finish the larger infrastructure projects such as building the new ferry terminal. What about us? My pregnant wife has fallen twice now travelling to the mobile clinic. (Interview, 15/08/2016)

The resettlement zones have significantly damaged social support networks that had developed over time in the community-oriented villages. While most residents of Dompak's villages live in

multi-generational homes, all of the houses in the resettlement zones are for nuclear families. The new houses not only split apart multi-generational families, some families from the same village have been assigned to live in different resettlement zones that are kilometers apart, disrupting neighbourhood ties and kinship networks in the community.

5.6: Cultural dimension: Religio-ethnic exclusion through Dompak's built environment

The 'cultural dimension' constitutes the fourth and final component in Yiftachel's framework for analyzing the 'dark side' of planning and examines how aspects of culture are marshalled by planners to sustain and entrench the power of the dominant group. As Yiftachel points out, one of the ways that dominant groups maintain political and social power while excluding and marginalizing undesirables is through strategically appropriating particular aspects of ethno-cultural and religious heritage in architecture and planning. Often under the guise of reviving 'authentic' and 'traditional' cultural forms that mask contentious politics and alternative narratives, the built environment is used as a tool to showcase and normalize the dominant ethno-culture's claim on power (Yiftachel, 2004, 2006; Anderson, 2006; Kusno, 2010). Dompak illustrates how a new city can be designed to accommodate and support Malay Muslims, while broadcasting their ascendancy over non-Muslims and other ethnic groups, who are physically and symbolically marginalized. By engineering a desired cultural landscape, Dompak planners have used the master-planning of a new city as a tool to 'delegitimize peripheral ethnic cultures and identities' (Yiftachel, 1998: 403).

Decentralization and regional autonomy in Kepri provided the local ruling elite, who had long felt a sense of neglect by the central state, with a chance to assert a Malay cultural identity on the new province despite its diverse demographics and history (Fee, 2001; Wee, 2002; Chou, 2006; Long, 2010; Moser and Wilbur, 2017). The cultural politics of Dompak and its intentional projection of a Malay Muslim identity to the exclusion of all other ethnic and religious groups is particularly significant in the context of the Riau Archipelago, which is one of Indonesia's most ethnically and religiously diverse regions. There are three dominant religions in Kepri, Islam (77.51%); Protestant Christianity (12.22%); and Buddhism, (7.57%), and seven main ethnic groups, Malay (25.6%); Javanese (18.2%); Chinese (14.3%); Minangkabau (9.3%); Batak (8.1%); Bugis (2.2%); and Banjarese (0.7%) (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2017).

Despite the diverse population, or perhaps because of it, the newly-formed Kepri administration, comprised predominantly of Malay-Muslim elites, has sought to prioritize Malay

culture and project a 'pure Malay' identity in public projects (Moser and Wilbur, 2017). The 'Malayization' of Kepri has been further reinforced across the province through various nation-building programs. This is especially apparent today in the spheres of sports and recreation, education, as well as performing arts, architecture and the built environment. And despite the problems associated with considering 'Malayness' as a static and homogeneous category (Wee, 2002; Barnard, 2004), Kepri's regional long-term development plan emphasizes that the province's broad vision is to 'promote the Riau Islands as the heartland of Malay culture in an honorable eco-friendly manner' and to 'develop a Malay culture that could act as an umbrella for other cultures in society' (RPJMD Kepri, 2015). Along the same lines, Dompak's masterplan repeatedly states that it is imperative that the urban environment of the province's new capital reflect, above all else, a 'Malay cultural nuance' (Dompak Masterplan, 2015). For the Malay ruling elites and the planners and architects they employ, this has meant not only projecting a generic version of Malay cultural identity, which broadcasts publicly the prioritization of Malays and flaunts the lack of separation between government, religion, and ethnicity.

All buildings in Dompak are required to incorporate 'authentically Malay' designs in their exteriors, although this is not clearly defined in the masterplan. While all structures in Dompak to date have been built by the state, an employee from Dompak's development team stated that 'these design by-laws will be strictly enforced for all future investors and developers' (Interview, 18/09/2016). Today, the new capital's skyline features an eclectic combination of *limas*-style[27] roofs made of concrete, and Arab-style domes, which sit atop government offices and are imported architectural features, that are arguably not 'authentically Malay'. Numerous government buildings have Malay floral patterns painted on their exteriors and Islamic-style arches framing the windows. This amalgam of cultural aesthetics is also exemplified in the designs for Dompak's main gates, shaped as ogee-style arches and supported by tall minarets and feature both Malay floral patterns and Arab-looking *mashrabiya*[28] screens (Dompak Masterplan, 2015). There is no engagement with local vernacular architecture and aesthetics, such as *rumah panggung* (modest coastal vernacular wooden houses built on stilts) or patterns from Malay woodcarvings that are found specifically in the Riau Islands.

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[27] Traditional homes along the Strait of Malacca that are built of wood, raised on stilts, and have a distinct three-tiered roof.

[28] Latticework screens found predominantly in Arab regions.

While over 20% of Kepri's population is non-Muslim, a portion of the province's regional budget is earmarked for specifically Islamic structures on Dompak, such as the Grand Mosque (*Masjid Raya Dompak or Masjid Raya Nur Ilahi Provinsi Kepulauan Riau),* an Islamic cultural center, and an Islamic library. Although the Grand Mosque has attracted some local Malay tourists to Dompak and is widely used during Friday prayers by government employees working in Dompak during the week, residents of Dompak continue to use local prayer spaces in their villages[29]. Several residents question where the Kepri government's priorities lie, including a fisher in his 50s:

> We have seen no effort from the government to improve our villages' existing infrastructure. Over the years, we have had to put in a lot of our private funds and efforts to maintain our *mushollas,* and I suspect, even with all these new facilities/improvements on Dompak, we will continue to have to do so. Some of us do not have motorbikes, so it is simply too far to make it up the hill to the new Masjid Raya. I've only been there once. (Interview, 07/09/2016)

Many residents feel that they would rather see funds from the province's regional budget be directed to improving their daily lives instead of the creation of various new Islamic amenities they have little use for, as is clear from their continued use of privately maintained village prayer spaces. Thus, beyond the obvious exclusion of non-Muslims by investing in an overtly Malay and Islamic infrastructure and aesthetics, Kepri officials have also continued to disregard priorities of many poor Malay and Chinese villagers in Dompak. For all the attention and resources directed to providing infrastructure for Muslims and projecting a strong Muslim identity in the new capital, it is significant that no amenities have been provided for non-Muslims, who are wholly absent from Dompak's planning documents. Churches and temples have no place in Dompak and no cultural motifs of other ethnic groups are present or permitted.

5.7: Conclusion

Our research demonstrates how Riau Islands Province share some similar dynamics with Israel / Palestine and highlights the usefulness of Yiftachel's framework in analyzing a completely different geographical, political, and religious context. Similar to Israeli state planners, officials in Kepri have used state policies surrounding land control to physically and

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[29] There are three *mushollas* (Islamic prayer rooms) and one small mosque in the villages on Dompak that pre-date the plans for the capital. These feature vernacular architecture such as tiered wooden roofs rather than domes, which is an architectural feature with no presence in Southeast Asia until the colonial era.

symbolically exclude the poor under the guise of 'improvement', as illustrated through controversies surrounding land acquisition, compensation packages, and the implementation of the resettlement zones that are far below stated standards, with little to no accountability. We highlight the discrepancies between the rhetoric of 'participatory planning' and 'pro poor' narratives used in the planning processes and the reality, in which built infrastructure caters to elites and (potential) tourists and is being created with the intention of attracting capital and foreign investors. Virtually all stages in planning and decision-making in Dompak have been top-down with little to no resident involvement. Spatial policymaking has caused environmental damage, and partly as a result, the livelihoods of residents have been negatively affected. Furthermore, poorly built infrastructure in resettlement zones has resulted in unsafe living conditions despite governmental promises for improvement. Finally, we argue that by enforcing exclusively Malay designs and displaying only Islamic aesthetics, Kepri planners actively exclude and disregard the province's cultural and religious minorities. These practices serve to reinforce the domination of Malays over others and sends a message about the priorities of the ruling elites who run the new province.

The programs and policies of improvement, framed around the narratives of participation and pro-poor planning, have exacerbated the distrust local communities feel towards provincial government, despite Dompak's official goal of 'creating a capital for the people'. We suggest that through the design and implementation of Dompak, Kepri officials have replicated the centralized modes of governing such as top-down decision-making processes and poor distribution of wealth that they had historically criticized in the national government, and which were part of the impetus for the creation of a new province. Officials blame poor local residents for the failures of the project through colonial narratives that Malays are inherently lazy (Alatas, 1977), for being backwards and unable to take care of houses provided to them by the government, and for stealing construction materials (Interview, 25/09/2016). Yet it is government intransigence and widespread corruption coupled with delays resulting from continuous changes in government leadership that have plagued the project[30].

By empirically examining a state led new master-planned capital, our research demonstrates how the national, scientific, and inclusive language of planning can exacerbate

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[30] The two Kepri governors involved in pioneering and establishing the Dompak project, Abdullah and Basirun, have both been imprisoned for corruption.

social divisions. Yiftachel's framework is useful in thinking through the 'dark side of planning' a new city from scratch in a complex religious and multi-ethnic context and demonstrates how local residents are being impacted. Moreover, we contribute to the growing body of literature that illustrates new geographies of exclusion emerging in new master-planned cities based on race, socio-economic class, and religion.

Dompak is one new city project among many underway in Indonesia. There are at least a dozen new city projects being planned across the archipelago, including a new national capital that will see the center of political power shift from Jakarta to Borneo. While there are lessons to be learned from Dompak's missteps, a lot will depend on whether these emerging new cities aspire to be inclusive and multicultural, or if they, like Dompak, are intended as grand statements of ethno- and religio-nationalism.

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Preamble to Chapter 6

The previous chapter positioned Dompak within the broader new city trend by exploring the provincial administration's motives and vision for constructing a new city. Building upon this, it highlighted the 'darker sides' of its planning practices by exploring the discrepancies between the administration's stated vision, the narratives they have employed to legitimize these visions and form policies, the implementation of said urban policies and significantly, its socio-economic and political consequences on local residents.

The following chapter, also grounded in the empirical data collected and analyzed through my field work, builds upon the fourth dimension of Yiftachel's framework: the cultural dimension. It explores the cultural politics behind Dompak's creation and provides insight into how new city design and aesthetics can be leveraged by planners as a tool to normalize the dominant ethno-cultural claim on power. Specifically, it examines the distinct expression of Malay and Muslim identity in Dompak's built environment, despite being the new provincial capital of a racially and religiously diverse province. Expanding on the previous chapter's exploration of emerging social exclusions, this chapter demonstrates the ways in which non-Malay/non-Muslim minorities are physically and symbolically excluded from the new city. As such, this chapter reflects the emerging religio-nationalism in Indonesia and how a provincially created new master-planned city can be steeped in complex cultural and religious politics as a key arena for the expression of power.

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Chapter 6: Dompak, Indonesia - Religio-nationalism and the (re)assertion of Muslim dominance through the construction of a provincial capital

Abstract

Dompak is a lavish state-led new city project built as the new capital city of a recently formed Indonesian province. The design of Dompak reflects a growing sense of religio-nationalism in the Riau Islands and in Indonesia more broadly. Residents of the province are 77% Muslim, with the other 23% Buddhist, Hindu, and various denominations of Christian. However, the design of Dompak consciously projects an 'authentic' Muslim identity and provides religious infrastructure for Muslims only, serving to physically and symbolically exclude non-Muslims from the provincial seat of power. This chapter examines the cultural politics of Dompak, the adoption of 'authentic' Arab and Malay idioms in the design of its government buildings, and the new narratives of Riau Island identity and Muslim / Malay dominance that are produced in the project. This chapter also investigates some of the social exclusions produced by this urban mega-development.

6.1: Introduction

Indonesia is the world's third largest democracy and home to over 225 million Muslims, making it the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. Although Indonesia does not consider itself an Islamic state, Islam, in its many local manifestations, has played and continues to play a central role in civic planning, politics, and nation-building. The interplay between changing practices and interpretations of Islam and local cultures has resulted in a variety of Muslim identities and practices across Indonesia's over 2,000 inhabited islands, resulting in ongoing tensions between conservative Muslims and those who follow more liberal or even syncretic interpretations of Islam. In Indonesia, Islam is intertwined with a variety of political ideologies and ways of governing, which play out in diverse ways across the archipelago, and Islam is frequently used by the state as a justification for various policies. The role of Islam in Indonesian governance has been a source of contention since becoming a republic in 1945 and continues to be a source of tension and debate (see Effendy 2003; Sukma 2003; Hefner 2011).

In the decades before gaining independence, conservative and orthodox religious leaders began to form Muslim organizations to counteract what they feared were the corrosive and dangerous effects of secularization (and Westernization) on Islam and Muslim practices in the archipelago (Hefner and Horvatich 1997). These Muslim organizations developed mutually

beneficial relationships with newly formed political parties. Muslim organizations relied on the parties for access to political power, and, in turn, political leaders gained the support of the religious segments of the population through the endorsement of these religious authorities. After gaining independence from the Dutch, Sukarno, Indonesia's first president, consulted with Muslim leaders while drafting Pancasila, Indonesia's official philosophical foundation (Feillard 1997). In the decades since independence, the state continued to consult with Muslim leaders and attempt a balance between secularism and inclusivity of minority religions and satisfying conservative Muslim practices. President Suharto (1967-1998) sought to 'harness the growing political clout of the Muslim middle class', while strategically refraining from actions that would antagonize Indonesia's Western donors (Fealy 2004: 165). Toward the end of Suharto's regime, concurrent with the increase in Islamist activism, an unprecedented number of Muslim leaders were elected and given senior government positions.

Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, conservative Muslim practices have been increasingly manifested in various facets of political and social life, including the expansion of Islamism, sharia, and the Arabization and Islamicization of cultural practices (Ghoshal 2010; Porter 2013; Saat 2018; van Bruinessen 2015). The end of Suharto's regime and the subsequent decentralization of power has seen more than 440 sharia-inspired ordinances adopted at the district level (Hodge and Rayda, 2018). Elected leaders across the archipelago continue to leverage the power of Islam and the prestige gained from identifying with Arabized and conservative interpretations of Islam for political purposes, while embracing various economic liberalization policies and courting foreign investment. There has been a documented growth in religious intolerance in Indonesia in politics and society more broadly in recent years (Feillard et al. 2011; Bourchier 2014; Kersten 2015). This is exemplified in the 2017 gubernatorial election, in which the Chinese Christian governor, Basuki Tjahaha Purnama, popularly known as Ahok, was prosecuted on trumped-up charges for insulting Islam (Lamb 2017). The surge of conservative Islam in Indonesia can also be seen in the growing popularity of Arabized Muslim dress among both men and women, the proliferation of new mosques (often imitating Arab mosques, rather than vernacular styles), increased travel to the Middle East, and growing links to Islamic banking and Middle Eastern economies (Venardos 2010; Burhanuddin and van Dijk 2013; Salim 2015). This surge is also evident in the sphere of new urban development, wherein state officials instrumentalize Islam to consolidate their power through Islamic urban spectacles,

which serve to privilege Muslims while physically and symbolically marginalizing non-Muslims, resulting in an intensification of religious and social polarization (Moser and Wilbur 2017).

This chapter broadly explores how Islam, nation-building, growing religio-nationalism, and new urban developments have come together in a state urban mega-project called Dompak, a new city under construction to serve as capital of a recently-formed province in Indonesia, Propinsi Kepulauan Riau (Riau Islands Province, or Kepri). More specifically, this chapter critically examines the expression of a particular Muslim identity embodied in the design of Dompak and examines why, in the context of a multi-religious, multi-ethnic province, Dompak has been designed in an overtly Arabized Muslim idiom. I argue that the adoption of these overtly Muslim identities seeks to achieve two primary aims: first, to perpetuate and normalize existing social power hierarchies in which Muslim elites maintain their hegemony; second, to consolidate traditionally disparate groups of Muslims in the province under the banner of Islam, while displacing and marginalizing non-Muslim minorities, particularly Chinese Indonesians, who are increasingly positioned as economic rivals and as less 'authentic' citizens who have a weak claim to the land.

One of the key motivations underlying the creation of any new capital city is for ruling elites to 'consolidate national unity and cultivate national identity in the face of multiple contending groups' (Vale 2008: 48). By choosing to adopt an Arabized 'Islamic' aesthetic in an ethnically and religiously diverse province with its own design traditions, the Kepri administration in Dompak makes a bold statement about which citizens belong in the new capital city and deserve representation, and which do not. In order to understand the decision to create Dompak and analyze its engagement with Islam, I first outline the formation of the Riau Islands Province and the forces – both historical and contemporary – that have motivated this new Arabized identity. Second, I discuss the making of Dompak and its underlying politics. Third, I analyze how the province's existential search for an 'authentic' identity is manifested in Dompak, the social exclusions it produces, and how Dompak connects with Malaysia's recent experimentation with its own Islamicized new capital city project. Dompak reflects changing engagements with Islam in Indonesia, emerging religio-nationalism, and new tensions between racial and religious groups, and underscores how a state-created new capital city is a key arena for the expression of power and are steeped in complex cultural and religious politics.

6.2: Islam and the formation of Riau Islands Province

The creation of Dompak as a new seat of power embodies complex tensions relating to Islam and race, and power struggles over identity. To understand how Dompak came into existence and took the form of an 'Islamic' city, it is necessary to examine the history of the Riau Islands, its strategic geographic location, its ethnic and religious diversity, the changing significance of Islam, and the fetishization of Arab culture in the region. The Riau Islands is comprised of approximately 3,200 islands situated in the Strait of Melaka between Singapore and the east coast of Sumatra. The Strait of Melaka has long been an important part of the maritime trade route between China, India, and the Arab world. Muslim Arab and Indian merchants trading in the region were often accompanied by Muslim missionaries, and Islam spread steadily across the Malay Peninsula and what is now Indonesia (Matheson, 1986). By the early 1600s, Islam had become the dominant religion across the Malay Peninsula and much of what is now Indonesia (Azra 2006).

Europeans entered the region in the sixteenth century, although the Dutch took over the Riau Islands only in 1824, following the Anglo-Dutch treaty that divided the Malay world between the British and the Dutch. With the presence of a strong sultanate during the colonial period, trade expanded in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and a variety of ethnic and religious groups migrated to the region, including Bugis[31], Minangkabau, Banjarese, and Batak peoples as well as a further influx of Chinese migrants (Matheson, 1986, Andaya, 1977). The Riau Islands was the home of the Riau-Lingga Sultanate, based on Penyengat Island. The royal mosque on Penyengat Island functioned as a center for Islamic studies and a base from which to disseminate Islamic teachings in the region. Today, several political and cultural figures from the Riau Islands are considered founding fathers of Malay culture in Indonesia, although with the abdication of the sultan in 1911 and the takeover of the Dutch, the region lost its role as a cultural and religious hub[32] (Long 2013).

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[31] Bugis elites were known to assume intellectual leadership in Malay society (by promoting Islam) and in the late 1800s, many allied with the Dutch to bring down Sultanates that they believed behaved in ways they considered un-Islamic (Fee 2001).

[32] In the early 1900s, Sultan Abdul Rahman II of Riau-Lingga, a beloved sultan by indigenous Malays, resisted Dutch rule. Rather than acknowledging Dutch authority, he fled with his retinue to Singapore in 1911. The Dutch then built a military base in Tanjung Pinang and continued to govern the Riau Archipelago until the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) (Matheson 1986).

After independence, the Riau Islands archipelago was a peripheral region that was considered economically and politically insignificant to ruling elites in Jakarta. The provincial boundaries of Riau were redrawn several times and the capital was moved from Tanjung Pinang to Pekanbaru in 1959 (Faucher 2005). Because the region was remapped 'at will without consulting local populations or recognizing the region's historical and cultural heritages', Riau Islanders were left feeling 'dispossessed and marginalized' (Riau Roundtable Report 2007: 13). During President Suharto's regime (1965-1998), the Riau Islands increasingly became a source of income for the state through the extraction of resources. The Riau Islands also became a key destination for poor Javanese who were forced to migrate under the national transmigration scheme, a program designed to relieve overpopulation in Java (Faucher 2005). The massive influx of Javanese transmigrants[33] meant that many Riau Malays were pressured to sell their land or were often forcibly evicted, and there was a significant decline in employment opportunities for local residents (Fee 2001). This fostered resentment among many local Malays in the Riau Islands, and an aversion toward the 'foreigners', as they felt that their 'historical claims to leadership had been superseded' (Andaya 1977: 503). In addition to a sense of eroded identity, Riau Malays feared 'economic and eventual political marginalization' by these newcomers (Fee 2001: 875).

After the fall of President Suharto in 1998, resentment continued to fester among Riau Islanders, whose resources were being drained and whose lands were taken under Suharto's centralized and autocratic approach to governing, economics, and national planning. To appease the more peripheral regionals that resented centralization, Suharto's successor, President Habibie (1998-1999), initiated sweeping nation-wide decentralization policies in 1999. In 2002, under the 'Regional Autonomy Law' (*Hukum Otonomi Daerah*)[34], the province of Riau split into two; the portion on Sumatra remained 'Riau' and the Riau Islands archipelago became the province of Kepulauan Riau, or Kepri.

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[33] By the end of the 1980s, over 1.4 million residents from Java and Madura were forced to emigrate to Riau Province and an estimated 400,000 of these trans-migrants settled in the Riau Islands.

[34] The 'Regional Autonomy Law' (Law 22 of 1999) was designed to provide greater political, cultural, and economic power to local governments. Since the enactment of the law, eight provinces have been created in Indonesia.

6.3: The making of a new capital

The effects of the Regional Autonomy Law were particularly evident in Kepri, which, as a new province, sought to immediately assert its regional identity (Fee 2001; Chou 2006; Long 2010). After the formation of the province, the state engaged energetically in nation-building activities to foster a new provincial identity in a variety of spheres including education (Moser 2016), sports and recreation (Moser 2010), performing arts events, and architecture and the built environment (Moser and Wilbur, 2017). In 2005, Kepri's first elected governor, well-known businessman Ismeth Abdullah[35] (2004-2010), signed a memorandum of understanding with the local parliament to create a new capital city on a rural island off the west coast of Bintan to replace Tanjung Pinang, a multi-cultural and multi-religious port town of 200,000. The new capital would not be burdened with the colonial history of Tanjung Pinang, would be a 'modern' and spacious Malay city that would contrast with Tanjung Pinang's dense chaos and cultural cacophony, and 'promote a deeper sense of Kepri distinctiveness' (Interview with former governor, Abdullah, October 7, 2016). Although he was born and raised in West Java and is not a Kepri local, Abdullah, who is of Arab descent, was held in high esteem by Kepri residents, and many Riau Islanders referred to him in the early 2000s as a *pemimpin visioner* or 'visionary leader'. Abdullah's electoral victory can be partly credited to the support garnered from his choice of vice governor, Muhammad Sani, who was 'immensely popular amongst the indigenous Malays', and in the context of the intensifying identity politics after the formation of the province, he exemplified 'authentic' indigenous Malay culture (Fionna 2017: 18). Abdullah and his administration believed that constructing a new capital would elevate the province's status and put Kepri on the map: 'we needed to prove to the international community that we [Riau Islanders] are capable of creating a new city that is grand and impressive' (Interview with former governor, Abdullah, October 7, 2016).

After provincial government officials conducted several feasibility studies, Dompak, a quiet island with six coastal villages, or *kampung*, and a landmass of approximately 1000 hectares, was selected as the location for a new provincial capital city. Administratively, the new city lies within the jurisdiction of the greater Tanjung Pinang area. The island of Dompak itself is

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[35] Abdullah was well known by the Kepri public as he was the chair of the Batam Industrial Development Authority, an industrial complex that transformed the island of Batam into Kepri's largest and most prosperous economy (Faucher 2007).

home to around 3,400 residents, who have lived for centuries on the periphery of the island in seaside villages. Many households have been pressured to relocate to new housing resettlement zones created by the government, located inland on neighbouring Bintan Island and Dompak, far from the coast and their livelihoods, which depend primarily on fishing and other maritime activities.

The construction of Dompak began in 2007, and was set to be developed in multiple phases, with the project's completion planned for 2010 (concurrent with the end of Abdullah's term in office). Initially, Dompak was to house all Kepri government employees in a new residential zone on the island. The plans were to include a government office complex, a central business district, a tourism and recreational zone, a trade and services zone, and a religious (i.e. Islamic) zone, all of which were to be funded through the provincial budget. However, the project has been riddled with problems and obstacles, including entrenched corruption related to missing funds and the procurement of contracts, illegal (yet state-sanctioned) bauxite mining, environmental damage that has impacted fisheries, angry residents who refuse to give up their land, legal challenges surrounding land acquisition, budget overruns, and unforeseen budget cuts (Moser 2014; Moser and Wilbur 2017).

Today, Dompak functions as the provincial capital. The 'city' consists of an administrative government complex of 18 buildings, a small university, a provincial mosque, a ferry terminal, three bridges connecting Dompak to neighbouring Bintan Island (the province's largest island), and two modest neighborhoods with a total of 140 houses for resettled villagers. Currently, the 'city' is populated by public service employees and city officials who commute daily from their homes in Tanjung Pinang, as well as several thousand local residents who live in either the new neighbourhoods or in the remaining villages. Although the new neighborhoods were created to house all residents in the surrounding coastal villages, many families have refused to relocate and/or sell their land as they do not wish to live far from their boats and livelihoods. Furthermore, the state has offered them a below-market rate and the new houses lack basic amenities such as electricity and running water (Moser and Wilbur 2017). In response to villagers' resistance to relocation, the revamped 2015 master plan designates a 'Malay Kampung' zone, an area where local families can remain in place on the condition that they operate 'traditional' homestays from their homes to host tourists and transform the villages into cultural tourism destinations. Despite the obstacles and delays in Dompak's construction over the

last ten years, feasibility studies are now underway for major development projects such as a sports complex, a golf course, factories, a waterfront mangrove promenade, a waterpark, a museum, and a cable car system.

6.4: The existential search for 'authenticity'

Many Riau Islanders have long felt a sense of disenfranchisement and loss due to the abdication of their sultan to the Dutch in 1911, decades of territorial boundaries being redrawn, general neglect by the central government, and the exploitative system of state centralization in which profits from the archipelago's oil and other resources flowed to Jakarta. Various movements have sought to change the political status of the Riau Islands, by either reinstalling the sultanate or forming an independent state (Faucher 2005; Kimura 2012). Decentralization provided Riau Islands with provincial status and greater autonomy over its economy and resources, which has generally appeased separatists and diffused much of their anger. The Kepri government has sought to highlight the province's 'authentic' identity to foster loyalty and a sense of solidarity in a geographically sprawling and diverse province and as a way to legitimize its policy agenda. A provincial 'brand' consisting of a unique ethnic dance, architectural style, and other apolitical aspects of material culture are also demanded by the national conceptualization of diversity in Indonesia (Errington 1997). This existential search for 'authentic' culture has resulted in a variety of competing versions of what constitutes provincial identity (Moser and Wilbur 2017).

To evoke a sense of local authenticity in a new province, local elites have turned to various sources, including Islam, the region's royal heritage, and pre-colonial Malay culture (Moser and Wilbur 2017). For the Malay ruling elites that formed the new Kepri administration, the province's new identity needed to first and foremost create a sense of 'trans-national Malay solidarity, or "*serumpun*"' (Faucher 2007: 447). Since Islam is viewed as a fundamental part of 'Malayness', political rhetoric in Kepri often highlights the historical connectivity between the Riau region and Arab World. For example, Malay elites who are able to claim Arab roots, and/or have embarked upon the Hajj, are automatically bestowed with respectability and social prestige[36] (Moser and Wilbur 2017). Likewise, there is a tendency among Muslims in Indonesia

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[36] It is important to note that since the pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia is extremely costly, elites are better able to afford to make the Hajj and therefore gain its associated social prestige, thus perpetuating inequalities and socio-economic power hierarchies.

to 'view the Middle East as the heartland and source of all things "authentic" in Islam' (Liow 2015: 16). At the same time, many Kepri elites imagine a pre-colonial Malay world free of Chinese and other minorities, a 'pristine civilization which combined the best elements of *adat* [customs] and Islam' (Fee 2001: 876). The Kepri administration seeks to recreate this world in part through framing Kepri as the 'heartland of Malay culture', a status that implies an ethnic Malay but primarily a Muslim claim to the land, while denying the contributions and legitimacy of non-Malays[37] and non-Muslims in the province. Many of Kepri's inhabitants are excluded from state-imposed narratives about 'authenticity' and belonging. Of the seven main ethnic groups, Malays are the largest but do not constitute even half of the population: Malays, 35.6%; Javanese, 18.2%; Chinese, 14.3%; Minangkabau, 9.3%; Batak, 8.1%; Bugis, 2.2%; and Banjarese, 0.7% (Badan Pusat Statistik 2017). The sections below demonstrate how and why Islam is strategically manifested in Dompak's urban identity, and who is excluded in the process.

6.5: Circulating 'Islamic' city models and new social exclusions

Islam has played a central role in the political, social, and economic landscape of the Malay world since its arrival in Southeast Asia and has been shaped by local cultural identities in the region over the centuries. Like many parts of Indonesia, in Kepri today, Islam plays a growing role in politics at the local level and is increasingly perceived as a 'viable alternative for justice, welfare and collectivism' (Riau Roundtable Report 2007: 14). Moreover, Kepri's recent embrace of conservative Islam in public life, like elsewhere in Indonesia, is evident in the increasing popularity of overtly Muslim styles of dress, Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren)*, Islamic banking (*Bank Syariah*), and Islamic-oriented businesses. It is also notable that state rhetoric often characterizes Kepri as an 'inherently Islamic province', despite 22% of its residents being non-Muslim, and centuries of Chinese migrants settling in and developing the region. Many local government officials wish to re-establish the Riau Islands as a center for Islamic teaching, as it was during the Riau-Lingga sultanate. For example, Governor Nurdin

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[37] It is possible, however, for non-Malay Muslims from other parts of Indonesia such as Java to be absorbed into or marry into Malay culture. For non-Muslims, there is no such opportunity except conversion to Islam and intermarriage with Malays.

Basirun (2016-2019[38]), aspires for Kepri to become a 'society that produces Quranic experts that are able to memorize the Al-Quran and its interpretations' (*Humas Kepri* 2018).

This heightened use of Islam in official capacities is highly visible in the design, aesthetics, and institutions of Dompak. For Kepri officials and planners of Dompak, Putrajaya, Malaysia's new capital, is a successful urban model, a city that is modern, orderly, and 'global' yet is rooted firmly in Islam (Moser 2012a). In 2005, Abdullah organized Dompak's planners, members of the local parliament, and district heads to take a study tour of Putrajaya to examine the city, including the urban landscape, master plan, and architectural aesthetics of Malaysia's new capital. To members of the study tour, Putrajaya was exactly what they hoped to create in Dompak: a clean, organized, modern 'Islamic' capital that was the mirror opposite of Tanjung Pinang. Dompak planners sought to imitate Putrajaya's grandiose government complex, zoning and building laws, large open green spaces, 'eco' buildings, and wide boulevards (Fig 6.1). Dompak's emulation of Putrajaya illustrates an emerging trend in which ideas, policies, and visions of 'model cities' are circulated transnationally among countries in the Global South, rather than initiating in and flowing from the Global North (Bunnell and Das 2010; Côté-Roy and Moser 2019).

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[38] Although Basirun had another two and a half years in his term, he was arrested by the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission in July 2019 for allegedly accepting bribes in exchange for granting a land reclamation permit to a businessman seeking to build a resort on a protected zone in Batam (*The Straight Times*, 12/07/2019).

Figure 6.1 The model of Dompak conveys the main priorities of the city design: 'green', formal, ostentatious, and 'Islamic'. Source: Author.

The study tour from Kepri was particularly inspired by Putrajaya's unique 'Islamic' image. Rather than aspiring to be simply a modern global city, Putrajaya was designed to project a Muslim identity, and to support and represent Muslim residents through architecture, urban design, zoning, and religious amenities. Dompak also imitated Putrajaya's adoption of a *particular* Muslim identity inspired by the classic 'great civilizations' of the Middle East (Moser 2012b). Like Putrajaya, Dompak's government buildings feature a distinctly Arab architectural idiom. Also like Putrajaya, builders of Dompak have looked to foreign cultures for the city's most symbolic architecture. Dompak's Grand Mosque (*Masjid Raya Dompak* or *Masjid Raya Nur Ilahi Propinsi Kepulauan Riau)* is a direct (albeit modest) copy of the Nabawi Mosque, or 'Prophet's Mosque' in Medina, one of the most significant mosques in Islam, established and first built by the prophet Mohammed (Figure 6.2). The mosque's exterior has arched doors and windows, a large domed roof, and a tall minaret and its interior is filled with crystal chandeliers, mirrors, arches, and golden Arabic wall inscriptions – all of which present a sharp contrast to the

tiered wood vernacular mosques found in the Riau region[39]. Located on the island's peak, the Grand Mosque, which accommodates approximately 5,000 people, occupies a highly visible and symbolic location and is the first structure seen when arriving at the provincial capital. According to Governor Basirun, in addition to functioning as a place of worship, the Grand Mosque will contribute to the economy as it is intended to attract (Muslim) cultural and religious tourists (*Batam Pos* 2018). Dompak takes Putrajaya's piousness even further in the creation of a religious district that is meant to support Muslim practices and activities.

Figure 6.2 The exterior and interior of the Masjid Raya Dompak, or Grand Mosque of Dompak, patterned after the Nabawi Mosque in Saudi Arabia. Source: Author.

Unlike Putrajaya, Dompak's initial design included the creation of a '*kawasan ibadah, sosial, dan pendidikan*'[40], or religious, social, and educational zone, which is referred to colloquially as the *zona ibadah*, or religious / worship zone. It will consist solely of Islamic structures: the Grand Mosque, an Islamic cultural center, an Islamic library, and a university, called *Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji* (The Maritime University of Raja Ali Haji), or UMRAH for short. 'Umrah' commonly refers to one of the pilgrimages Muslims take to Mecca.

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[39] Vernacular mosques in the Riau region tend to be made of wood with a tiered pagoda shape. Domes are not part of vernacular architecture and were introduced to Southeast Asia only in the 1800s.

[40] Although in the 2015 revised masterplan, this zone is referenced as the 'public service zone' (*zona pelayanan umum),* all government officials that I interviewed still colloquially refer to it as *zona ibadah* (religious/ worship zone), which was what it was known as in the 2007 masterplan.

According to government officials, the Islamic cultural centre in Dompak is meant to re-establish the Riau Islands as a place of Islamic learning and worship. The Kepri government announced that Dompak's Islamic center would be functional by mid-2018 and is to become a hub for 'Hafidz Al-Qur'an', an international conservative Islamic organization based in Turkey that is rapidly gaining popularity across Indonesia. Their mission is to 'help create a cohesive community that implements the teachings of the Qur'an in everyday life'[41] (*Tanjung Pinang Pos* 2017). With the creation of this religious zone and these Islamic structures in place, Governor Basirun, a key proponent of the development of the Islamic center, hopes that Dompak will become a city that produces future generations of devoutly religious [Muslim] Riau Islanders, which he believes will restore the region to the glory years of the sultanate, when it was a hub for Islamic teaching (Limahekin 2018). In addition to building Islamic structures, in mid-2018, the Kepri government announced that together with the local Free Trade Zone agency[42], the master plan will once again be revised, this time to allocate 100 hectares of Dompak to the development of a 'halal industry'. The head of the Free Trade Zone agency is convinced that Dompak's planned infrastructure, coupled with its strategic location close to Singapore and Malaysia, means that the project will have no problem finding investors from the Middle East who want to produce halal commodities in Southeast Asia. Several investors from Dubai have expressed interest and Governor Basirun has announced that the halal industrial complex will become an official part of Dompak's plan before the end of 2018 (*Antara Kepri* 2018).While many locals feel proud of the Islamicized capital as representing an important part of their identity, it has prompted criticism from others who feel the Arabized aesthetic is inauthentic and exclusionary, or feel the entire project is a waste of resources when Tanjung Pinang lacks adequate infrastructure.

In constructing an 'authentic' identity through a recuperated Arabized Islam, city builders ignore the cultural heterogeneity found in local populations in favour of a universal, homogeneous aesthetic (Hasan 2009) that is simplistic, exclusionary, and is an example of anachronistic 'instant culture' (Budihardjo 1997). In addition to the Arab-styled Grand Mosque and the Arab- and Malay-influenced government zone, this form of 'instant culture' can also be

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[41] The organization called Hafidz Al-Quran, otherwise known as 'Lembaga Tahfidz Quran', has funded many young Indonesians to study Islam in Turkey.

[42] Badan Pengusahaan Kawasan Perdagangan Bebas dan Pelabuhan Bebas Tanjungpinang, Kepulauan Riau (BPKPB).

seen in Dompak's housing resettlement zone for those relocated from seaside villages. Homes in the resettlement zone have roofs inspired by vernacular Malay homes found throughout the region, placed atop uniform concrete box-shaped buildings (Figure 6.3). The new state-designed houses contrast with the vernacular housing styles found in Dompak's fishing villages, which are made of wood and built on stilts over the sea (Fig 6.4). A local resident who has refused to give up her land critiques both the claims to authenticity and the practicality of the state housing:

> Our old homes that they are destroying are the ones that carry Kepri history. These new houses belong somewhere like Batam or Jakarta. Also, they are located too far away from the ocean, and there is no space for my husband to store his *sampan* [wooden fishing boat]. (Interview, September 14, 2016)

Figure 6.3 New housing settlement on Dompak with 'Malay' roofs atop concrete blocks. Source: Author.

Figure 6.4 Seaside village on Dompak built from wood on stilts over the ocean. Source: Author.

Instead of encouraging vernacular architectural forms, builders of Dompak embrace highly selective 'authentic' elements drawn from an interpretation of Arab culture combined with particular aspects of local culture. As such, Dompak publicly announces Muslim / Malay supremacy over the land and implicitly states who belongs and does not belong. Dompak has been designed not as a celebration of Kepri's multiculturalism or religious diversity, nor is it an attempt to sustain local livelihoods and help improve the lives of the poor. It is a spectacle of Muslim / Malay supremacy that perpetuates existing power hierarchies within the province and creates new geographies of social exclusion (Moser and Wilbur 01/02/2018).

In both Dompak and Putrajaya (Chapter 2), a shared sense of connectedness to global Islam both reflects and strategically capitalizes on the growing global pan-Islamic movement. As such, builders of Dompak have incorporated governance strategies that ensure the new city remains exclusively Malay / Muslim. No non-Muslim religious buildings are part of the masterplan, a great deal of the project's resources are allocated to the religious zone, and all buildings must incorporate some form of Malay design on their exterior. Despite the diverse

population of the province, the toponomy of its streets and buildings are all named for Muslim-Malay aristocrats and Arabs. Builders of Dompak have created an 'authentic' 'instant culture' as a political maneuver to maintain power, assert their claim to the land, while courting Arab investment.

6.6: A new capital as a vehicle for Muslim hegemony

This chapter highlights how a particular type of Islam is engaged strategically in Kepri through the construction of its new master-planned capital city. As a new capital, Dompak represents state efforts to construct a unique identity for a recently formed peripheral province from which elements of an idealized version of particular cultures and histories are strategically recalled, while strategically overlooking others. In a fledgling new province, Dompak is the product of an existential search for an identity that sets the province apart from Indonesia's other provinces. At the same time, it reflects current ethnic and religious tensions and the rise of religio-nationalism and Islamism in the region. As with many new seats of political power, Dompak also represents an attempt to consolidate and showcase cultural identity, while cultivating a sense of belonging among a particular favoured subset of the population.

Dompak can be understood as an expression of Malay dominance over non-Muslims. Through the case of Dompak, this chapter demonstrates how the Kepri administration, driven largely by the interests and priorities of Malay elites, have seized on Islam as a symbol of the region's pre-colonial and pre-Chinese roots. This quest for cultural 'authenticity' reflects rising religio-nationalism and an attempt to unify a wide variety of Muslims (Malays, Javanese, Bugis, etc.) while rendering non-Muslims invisible in official expressions of provincial identity. In contrast to Putrajaya, the adoption of an Arab architectural idiom in Dompak is rationalized as an acknowledgment of the historical Arab connections with the region. Hence, an Islamic identity functions as a means for Malay elites to retain their hegemony in a modernizing and ethnically and religiously heterogeneous region.

Dompak's master plan, urban toponomy, and its architectural borrowings from the Arab-influenced Putrajaya, and the Middle East more generally, reflects growing conservatism, the expansion of Islamism, as well as the Kepri administration's prioritization of transforming Dompak into a purely 'Islamic' space. After the fall of the Suharto regime, and particularly since the global 'War on Terror,' there has been a resurgence of Islamic conservatism throughout Indonesia, which has resulted, for many Muslims across the nation, in the forging of 'a greater

sense of solidarity and identification with their religious counterparts in other parts of the world' (Liow 2015: 4). Dompak, particularly its religious zone, embodies a growing Islamic orthodoxy and the expansion of political Islam, as well as the growing desire among many Muslims to connect with the wider Muslim world. The influence of a Turkish Islamic organization over part of Dompak's religious zone as well as the replica of an iconic Saudi mosque demonstrate that even in a minor provincial capital, Dompak is connected to distant countries considered by Kepri officials to be deeply 'Islamic' countries.

This chapter demonstrates that the construction of Dompak perpetuates and exacerbates religious and class divisions and will likely result in religious clustering on an unprecedented scale (Moser 2020). Although rejecting what they perceived as the exclusionary policies of both the colonial and post-colonial governments, officials in the Kepri administration have reproduced similar exclusionary ways of governing. Notably, by excluding non-Islamic religious, educational, and cultural structures in its plan, despite the province's diverse demography and history, the Kepri administration has ignored Kepri's non-Muslim residents and excluded their histories from the official narrative projected in Dompak. In this way, Dompak planners have strategically removed the representation, as well as the ability of ethnic Chinese and other minorities to access the province's new center of power, potentially diminishing their social, economic, and political mobility. Hence, the Kepri administration sustains the marginalization and discrimination that the ethnic Chinese face throughout Indonesia (Lindsey and Pausacker 2005; Hoon 2006; Suryadinata 2008). The willful exclusions produced in Dompak illustrate the 'dark side of planning' (Yiftachel 1998) and the consequences of state urban planners who make decisions for 'reasons of political, ethnic or of racial domination and exclusion, rather than in the interests of good planning' (Watson 2009: 172).

In an era of expanding religious presence in the public sphere in Indonesia, it is important to examine the interplay between religion, cultural identity, and power structures, and how these social phenomena are manifested in urban planning. Dompak demonstrates how policies and cultural identities circulate within the Global South and how they are reproduced and manipulated by ruling elites for political purposes. Despite the many highly publicized problems in Dompak related to corruption and incompetency (Moser 2014; Moser and Wilbur 2017), several local mayors from Java have travelled to Dompak on urban study tours as part of Indonesia's national plan to construct 10 new cities. While Kepri is one of the country's

peripheral provinces and the urban development in the province has been largely overlooked by scholars, further studies of Dompak will help shed light on the growing engagement between Islam, Islamism, and state planning in Indonesia and the social exclusions that result.

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Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion

7.1: Chapter overview

This thesis has explored the complex dynamics surrounding the creation of Dompak, Indonesia's new master-planned provincial capital and the cultural politics underpinning its design. I have examined the motives, policies and aesthetics, and power dynamics behind its creation as well as its impact on local residents. Specifically, my research sought to analyze the rhetoric and discourses used to legitimize Dompak's vision and policies, demonstrating how urban policies have been instrumentalized to further political and ideological agendas. Moreover, I examined the role of Dompak's built environment in reshaping the provincial identity of Kepri and highlighted the ways in which architecture and design have been employed to maintain and further entrench existing power hierarchies. This thesis has unpacked the geographies of exclusion that have been created and exacerbated within the context of master-planning the new capital and highlighted how social exclusions are intricately linked to divisions based on class, race, and religion in the region. By offering a critical lens into the forces at play, this thesis has provided insight into how Dompak aligns within the broader trends in new city planning in the Global South, and how Dompak is shaped by unique local political, racial, and religious dynamics. In this concluding chapter, I reiterate my key arguments, summarize my chapters and its findings, discuss some reflections and key contributions of this thesis within the broader context and finally, explore some directions for future research.

In Chapter 1, *Introduction,* I began by providing an overview of the global new city building trend, emphasizing Indonesia's recent embrace of it through ambitious plans of creating a new administrative capital city and several other smart cities across the nation. While they are aimed at distributing economic opportunities and alleviating urban pressures, these projects have been accompanied by controversies related to land conflicts, environmental concerns, and social displacements. I then introduced Dompak, Indonesia's first, albeit largely unheard of, master-planned city. In the context of providing a timeline and highlighting the Dompak project's complex and continual challenges and controversies, I summarized my field visits to Kepri that spanned over eight years. Following this, I presented the research aims and objectives of this thesis that questions the complex dynamics between city builders, political elites, and local residents that shape Dompak's development and its broader implications, as well as the role of

Dompak's built environment in shaping Kepri's provincial identity. I concluded by outlining my thesis structure that summarizes the subsequent chapters to come.

In Chapter 2, *Contextualizing the Riau Islands and the province's desire for a new capital*, I examined the historical processes that eventually lead to the creation of Dompak. First, I explored how the heterogeneous cultural heritage and identities found today in the Riau Islands resulted from its unique geographical positioning and continuous intermingling of cultures, religions, and peoples. Indeed, while Islam became the dominant religion in the region soon after its introduction in the 13th century, other religious practices and traditions remained important and were integrated alongside Islam into the diverse cultural mosaic of the Malay world. Second, I examined how the advent of Dutch colonialism beginning in the 17th century significantly altered the geo-political and cultural landscape of the region, leading to increased interregional trade and migration as well as periodic wars and instability. Third, I argued that post-colonialism and national independence in Indonesia were contested in the Riau Islands, and that Jakarta's policies were perceived as yet another attempt by outsiders (this time from Java) to dictate the future of Riau Islanders. Finally, I discussed how democratization and decentralization after the fall of Suharto in 1998 as well as rise of ethno-nationalism across the region led to the creation of the autonomous province of Kepri and eventually to the construction of Dompak.

In Chapter 3, *Literature Review,* I explored three bodies of scholarship that lay the theoretical groundwork for the empirical chapters of this thesis. The first constitutes scholarship on new master-planned cities in the Global South. Within this context, I explored literature that discussed the motives propelling the construction of these cities and their ensuing consequences. Often conceptualized as responses to urban challenges, scholars have uncovered a spectrum of driving forces behind these cities, spanning from economic development and modernization to forging and fortifying national identities. The second body of scholarship centers around what Oren Yiftachel has termed the 'dark side' of urban planning. Exploring the literature on the intersections and interrelatedness of power politics, planning, and social exclusion, I demonstrated how the framework of 'the dark side of planning' can serve as a valuable tool for dissecting social exclusionary practices in new cities built from scratch. The third facet encompasses the discourse on cultural politics, national identity formation, and their manifestation in the built environment. Within this domain, I reviewed scholarship that analyzes how power and ideology are expressed in architectural styles and the aesthetic attributes of the

built environment. My specific focus here rested on the examination of how the built landscape can be wielded by elites and city builders to establish and bolster national unity and cultural homogeneity, often at the cost of physically and symbolically excluding racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.

In Chapter 4, *Overview of Methods and Methodology*, I discussed the process of collecting and analyzing the empirical data used for Chapters 5 and 6. First, I critically examined how my positionality as a Muslim Arab-Indonesian woman and a researcher from a Western academic setting, inhabiting an 'in-between' position, enabled me not only to gain a nuanced understanding of the political and religious dynamics at play in Dompak, but also the trust of many participants. Second, I described the ethics and logistical considerations involved during my field work. Third, I discussed the primary collection methods used during the data collection process: 1) gathering and analyzing textual documentary sources, including media reports and official documents, and 2) ethnographic methods, consisting of in-depth interviews (structured and semi-structured), focus groups, oral history, and 'deep hanging out'. Finally, I described how I analyzed the empirical data collected, showing that the patterns and themes that emerged in this process inform the main arguments in the two empirical chapters.

In Chapter 5, *The dark side of planning: Engineering social exclusions in the creation of a new provincial capital in Indonesia*, I argued that the Dompak project sustains and perpetuates socio-economic, racial, and religious divides and exclusions in the Riau Islands Province. Adopting Oren Yiftachel's conceptual framework on the 'dark side of planning,' and grounded in the empirical data gathered during my fieldwork, this chapter shed light on the stark contrast between the rhetoric of 'participatory planning' and 'pro poor' narratives used in the planning processes and the political realities on the ground. Rather than fulfilling its proclaimed mission of 'creating a capital for the people', I contended that Kepri officials replicated the very centralized governance mechanisms they had historically criticized the national government for, inadvertently perpetuating top-down decision-making and unequal wealth distribution. Paradoxically, these practices were among the driving factors behind the establishment of the new province itself. Further, I demonstrated how spatial policymaking led to environmental degradation and threatened the livelihoods of local residents. The substandard infrastructure in resettlement zones resulted in unsafe living conditions, despite promises of improvement from the government. Finally, I argued that by exclusively promoting Malay designs and Islamic

aesthetics, Kepri planners symbolically and physically excluded and marginalized the province's cultural and religious minorities, reinforcing Malay dominance and signaling the priorities of Kepri's ruling elite.

In Chapter 6, *Dompak, Indonesia - Religio-nationalism and the (re)assertion of Muslim dominance through the construction of a provincial capital*, I broadly explored how nation-building, growing religio-nationalism, and new urban developments have come together in the creation of Dompak. Grounded in the empirical data collected during my fieldwork and building on the insights gained in Chapter 5 about cultural exclusion, this chapter showed how Dompak, as a new capital, represents state efforts to construct a unique identity, a product of an existential search for an identity that sets the province apart from Indonesia's other provinces. At the same time, it reflects current ethnic and religious tensions and the rise of religio-nationalism and Islamism in the region. More specifically, it provided a critical examination of the expression of a particular Muslim identity embodied in the design of Dompak and its built environment and asked why, in the context of a multi-religious, multi-ethnic province, Dompak has been designed in an overtly Arabized Muslim idiom. The reason, I argued, is twofold: first, it serves as a means for Muslim elites to perpetuate and normalize their existing social power hierarchies, ensuring their continued dominance; and second, it acts as a unifying force for various Muslim groups within the province, rallying them under the banner of Islam. Simultaneously, it results in the displacement and marginalization of non-Muslim minorities, notably Chinese Indonesians, who are increasingly framed as economic competitors and deemed less 'authentic' citizens with weaker land claims and limited access to the province's new center of power. This, in turn, diminishes their social, economic, and political mobility. In this way, although the creation of Dompak was partly a response to the perceived exclusionary policies of both the colonial and post-colonial governments, officials in the Kepri administration have reproduced a similar pattern of exclusionary governance. Finally, this chapter contextualized the creation of Dompak by looking at the circulation of 'Islamic' city models in the Global South, and, in particular, how Malaysia's recent experimentation with its own Islamicized new capital city project inspired Dompak planners.

7.2: Key contributions and my research within a broader context

This thesis contributes to the growing body of scholarship on emerging new cities in the Global South in a variety of ways. First and foremost, what sets this research apart is its

empirical analysis, firmly rooted in on-the-ground data collected in Dompak, over the span of eight years and in various stages of the new city's development. With research on new cities still relatively in its infancy, and many such projects at initial development stages, this thesis provides a distinctive perspective on the *actual* outcomes and ramifications of a newly established provincial capital and its consequences for all the stakeholders involved. Despite the optimistic 'inclusive' and 'eco' narratives surrounding the Dompak project, through in-depth interviews with local residents, I have illustrated in both Chapters 5 and 6, how it, instead, perpetuates existing power hierarchies, reinforces geographies of exclusion based on socio-economic class, race, and religion and significantly degrades the environment.

Moreover, this thesis contributes to the scholarship concerning the darker sides of planning and postcolonial urbanism. It has responded to Oren Yiftachel's call for planning theorists to bridge the critical gap between theory and practice (Yiftachel, 1998: 403), and is the first to use Yiftachel's 'dark side of planning' framework developed to study Israeli to analyze a new city project in a Muslim context, supported by empirical contributions based on fieldwork. Indeed, in Chapter 5, I demonstrate how this framework can be productively used to understand the intricacies of urban policy and governance in the context of a new city project. By shedding light on the layers of dissonance between narratives, policy, and implementation in the making of Dompak, using the framework's four categories of analysis (i.e., territorial, procedural, socio-economic, cultural), I demonstrate that with little to no forms of monitoring practices of good governance, new city builders can seamlessly use planning as a tool to depoliticize existing socio-economic and environmental issues. In this vein, this thesis demonstrates the necessity for all new city projects to integrate and leverage mechanisms that uphold practices of good governance and promote sustainability (e.g., transparency and accountability evaluations, data-driven decision making, stakeholder engagement).

Furthermore, through an analysis of Dompak's design and aesthetics, this thesis sheds light on the role that a new city's built environment can have in shaping and reinventing cultural identity. In Chapter 6, I show how the regional government's search for a unique provincial identity, through the making of Dompak, serves as a way for certain elites to consolidate their power, simultaneously by participating in and capitalizing on the rise of global pan-Islamic sentiment. This empirical chapter highlights how designs and urban aesthetics of new cities can therefore act as a projection of an idealized identity that can have grave consequences for the

communities' religious, cultural, and racial minorities. Furthermore, by analyzing the role that Putrajaya plays in the shaping of Dompak, I offer a critical perspective on new patterns of transnational urban policy circulation, tracing how both policies and cultural identities circulate and how they are reproduced and manipulated by ruling elites for specific political purposes.

Finally, although Dompak is Indonesia's first post-colonial new master-planned capital, it has received almost no scholarly attention. This thesis therefore offers insights into trends in Indonesia's urban development that are influenced by an interplay of local, regional, national, and transnational political, racial, and religious forces; the reproduction of normative and city-centric assumptions of modernity and development in a relatively peripheral province in Indonesia; corruption at various levels of government and private sectors that profit from the creation of new cities. Given the Indonesian government's ambitious plan to build a dozen more new cities from scratch, it is imperative for planners and scholars to critically examine and better understand the socio-economic, political, and environmental impacts of these projects. While there has been considerable discussion in the last three years since the unveiling of Nusantara, Indonesia's new federal capital city project, relatively scant attention has been directed toward the numerous smaller cities featured in Indonesia's ambitious new city building agenda. Like Dompak, many of these provincially led emerging cities remain largely unacknowledged, even though they hold the potential to significantly impact the lives of countless residents and their environment. It is crucial to recognize that through their planning, governance, and design, these urban developments have the potential to perpetuate and reinforce existing power hierarchies, redefine provincial identities, and socially exclude minority or unwanted populations. The Dompak project therefore stands as a compelling illustration of this broader phenomenon and underscores the importance of focusing on these smaller-scale province-led urban projects, as together, they form an integral part of a larger trend and deserve scholarly attention.

7.3: Directions for future research

In considering directions for future research, several avenues emerge as pivotal for a more comprehensive understanding of Dompak's urban development and its broader impact. First, there is a compelling need for a sustained longer-term empirical study to elucidate what Dompak will look like in the coming decades, thereby shedding light on Dompak's urban trajectory and its impacts as well as signs of community resilience. As discussed, my research spanned eight years and three site visits, yet minimal progress has been made, which contrasts

with the ambitious promises outlined in the master plans. While the built environment had not changed much over the years, there was a notable shift in the attitude of Dompak residents during my most recent visit in 2022. This marked a significant change from 2016 when demonstrations and opposition to the project were at their peak. Today, many residents display a sense of *'pasrah'* (surrender or acceptance). Further research involving extensive surveys and interviews with displaced local residents who have now been living in the new resettlement zones for a decade (and many of whom were forced to undergo livelihood changes) would provide insights into how local resistance plays out, signs of community unity and resilience in the relocated population, the ongoing challenges of the unrelocated villagers, and how Dompak residents view the project over time.

Second, investigations into the relationship between shifting political regimes and urban planning policies, with a particular attention to the persistent policy-to-implementation gap, would provide insights into the differences between rhetoric and reality. Since the construction of the Dompak project started in 2014, there have been five changes in the political leadership of Kepri, and with that, numerous alterations to the master plan's vision, goals, and timeline. Therefore, with further scrutiny, the Dompak project could act as a fruitful case study that illustrates the effects of political change in a master-planned city project.

Third, while the socio-economic dimensions examined Chapter 5 briefly analyzed the dissonance between Dompak's 'eco' narrative and the reality on the ground, further research into Dompak's environmental sphere would shed light on the ecological impacts of the project. Further in-depth studies on this topic could explore the traditional ecological knowledge of local residents who have witnessed the environmental changes firsthand, to quantitative studies that calculate Dompak's energy costs. Likewise, although this thesis mentions the steep decline of fish and other marine life that thrive in mangrove ecosystems, it was beyond the scope of the project to delve into the impact that the Dompak projects has had on its local biodiversity.

Fourth, as the first provincially led project of its kind, it could be fascinating to explore how the Dompak project relates to other new city projects across the archipelago. During interviews with Dompak's lead planners, a clear sense of optimism emerged as they envisioned Dompak serving as an inspiration for other new city projects in Indonesia, similarly to how Putrajaya had served them. Significantly, while a few local mayors from regions in Java had

visited Dompak on policy study tours, it was apparent that the Dompak project remained unfamiliar to planners in Jakarta, despite these high hopes.

Finally, conducting comparative studies between Dompak and other urban mega-projects of similar scale and ambition would yield fascinating information about how different projects are conceived, how they are executed and financed, the actors involved from the public and private sectors, and how different economic, political, and contexts shape each project. Future research could make fruitful comparisons between Dompak and other recent master-planned cities designed to serve as seats of political power (both provincial and national) such as Amaravati in India, Sejong in Korea, Ramciel in South Sudan, Naypyidaw in Myanmar, and Arkadag in Turkmenistan.

7.4: Final comments

The landscape of new city development has undergone significant transformation since I embarked on my research almost eight years ago. The number of new cities planned in both the public and private sector is only set to rise as the challenges of urbanization continue to increase and, as I discussed in Chapter 3, this emerging trend of building cities from scratch continues to be prioritized by public and private actors, particularly in the Global South. Despite the considerable criticism this approach has received, state actors persist in viewing new cities built from scratch as viable solutions to urban crises, as a means to shape national identities, and as a way of fostering economic growth and modernization.

This is particularly evident in the context of Indonesia, a relative latecomer to the new city movement. While attending the UN Habitat III conference with my lab in 2016, I had the opportunity to talk to a group of Indonesian urban scholars and planners. It was evident from my discussions with them that the concept of new city development had only recently gained traction in the country. Fast forward to the present, and Indonesia has attracted substantial global attention, primarily from the ambitious Nusantara and Jakarta Seawall projects, which I outlined in the first chapter of this thesis. The vision and narratives of these new urban mega-developments echo those offered to legitimize and promote the Dompak project. Considering how these narratives were misused by Dompak builders, it is difficult to avoid feeling skeptical about the other new city projects announced. Will there be as many gaps between rhetoric and reality? Will these new cities reproduce similar exclusionary policies and designs with similar socio-economic and political consequences? Despite these reservations, there is a glimmer of

hope. For instance, Nusantara aims to be the first new capital built using a 'Voluntary Local Review (VLR)', a UN-supported mechanism designed for local and regional governments to assess their progress of implementation and ensure that Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are pursued in earnest (Siddique et al, 2023). Indeed, the nation's recent emphasis on promoting good governance in new city planning is encouraging. The value of these transparency and accountability tracking tools will inevitably depend, however, on how effectively these mechanisms are adopted and employed. While it is unknown how this will unfold, it is my hope that this thesis and its critical examination of the darker sides of new city planning in an Indonesian context will shed light on the necessity of various accountability measures. The outcomes of Indonesia's ambitious upcoming new city projects will significantly influence the future trajectory of Indonesia's urban development as well as how the country will be perceived on the global stage, and importantly, could have tremendous impacts on the environment and the livelihoods of the citizenry.

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Appendices

Appendix I – Guide for structured interviews with state officials of Kepri (group 1)

Below is the tentative guide I used when interviewing my research participants. These questions, translated from Indonesian, were altered regularly throughout my fieldwork when new information came to light.

Introduction and context / General information:
1. What is your current occupation? What is your role in relation to Dompak's construction?
2. Where are you from? If you are from the Riau Islands Provinces', which district are you from?
3. Do you currently reside in Dompak? If so, when did you move to this new city?
4. Gender
5. Age

Motivations:
6. What are the main interests of the actors involved in Dompak's creation?
7. In your opinion, is the city's mission and vision widely recognized and accepted by the general public?
8. Do you see the 'new city building agenda' as a solution to the current urbanization challenges in Indonesia?
9. What are the underlying reasons for choosing to make Dompak Indonesia's first eco-city?
10. Do you know which urban models Dompak is based on? (i.e. Putrajaya, Singapore)
11. Do you believe Dompak can be/ will be a model for other new cities in Indonesia and internationally?

General questions about the city:
12. What types of residents do you envision that Dompak will attract?
13. What mechanisms have been used to market the new city?
14. What methods were used to attract investors?
15. In your opinion, what are some of the successes/ challenges/ failures of the city?
16. How do you feel about the chosen aesthetics of this new built environment? In your opinion, does it evoke a specific sense of heritage/pastness? If so, does this heritage
17. What are your opinions on the green city model? Do you think Dompak can become one of the pioneers of sustainable city innovations in the Global South?
18. Do you identify with this new city? If so, in what ways?
19. How is the city different from how you expect it to be? Is it fulfilling your expectations?
20. In your opinion, how does this new city compare to other cities in the Riau Islands Province?
21. What recommendations would you make to the city?

Appendix II – Guide for unstructured interviews with displaced local residents of Dompak (group 2)

Below is the tentative guide I used when interviewing my research participants. These questions, translated from Indonesian, were altered regularly throughout my fieldwork when new information came to light.

Introduction and context / General information:
1. What is your current occupation?
2. How long have you lived on this island? Have you always been a resident of Dompak (or the previously known, Pulau Manillei)? Were you born here? (If not – which district are you from?)
3. Have you been relocated to the government subsidized housing resettlement zone?
4. Gender
5. Age
6. How many people live in your household?
7. Married/children?
8. Ethnicity?
9. What do you do in your spare time?

[If possible – observe/take notes on the condition of their new homes: number of rooms, appliances, bathroom amenities, access to running water, overall security, etc]
General questions about the city:
10. What are your general opinions on this new city? What do you like/dislike about it?
11. Do you still feel 'at home'?
12. What are your thoughts on the housing resettlement zone?
13. How do you feel about the chosen aesthetics of this new built environment? In your opinion, does it evoke a specific sense of heritage/pastness? If so, do you identify with the chosen 'new built heritage'?
14. What types of residents do you envision that Dompak will attract? Have you/ do you think you will foster a sense of connection with the city's newcomers?
15. How did the lengthy construction process of this new city affect your daily activities? Have your daily activities changed since the grand opening? If so, in what ways?
16. What is the distance from your place of residence to your place of work? Has it changed since your relocation/ Dompaks construction?
17. Do you feel as if Dompak officials have included you in the city building process? Is there a system for pioneering residents to provide feedback to city officials? If not, would you like there to be a way to communicate with officials? How?
18. How is the city different from how you expect it to be? Is it fulfilling your expectations?
19. What recommendations would you make to the city?

Appendix III – Guide for semi-structured interviews with Kepri citizens (group 3)

Below is the tentative guide I used when interviewing my research participants. These questions, translated from Indonesian, were altered regularly throughout my fieldwork when new information came to light.

Introduction and context / General information:
1. What is your current occupation?
2. Where do you currently reside?
3. Gender
4. Age
5. How many people live in your household?
6. Married/children?
7. Ethnicity?
8. What do you do in your spare time?
9. Do you have plans to relocate to Dompak? (i.e. for better job prospects)

General questions about the city:
1. Have you visited Dompak?
2. What are your general opinions on Dompak? What do you like/dislike about it? (If you have not visited, this can be based on how the new city has been promoted/marketed)
3. What types of residents do you envision that Dompak will attract?
4. Are you aware of the amenities/city facilities that Dompak has to offer? (i.e. mosques, Islamic university, Islamic center) Do you feel as though there is an appropriate amount of diversity in the facilities offered? (i.e. would the city be well suited for you and members of your family?)
5. How do you feel about the chosen aesthetics of Dompak? In your opinion, does it evoke a specific sense of heritage/pastness? If so, do you identify with the chosen 'new built heritage'? Do you think that the chosen aesthetics of Dompak represents the Riau Islands Province's demographic?
6. Do you feel as if Dompak officials have included you (as a resident of the Riau Islands Province) in the city building process? Is there a system for pioneering residents to provide feedback to city officials? If not, would you like there to be a way to communicate with officials? How?
7. Do you think that there are job opportunities for you in this new power center?
8. What recommendations would you make to the city?