DOCTRINE OF THE WILL AS CONSENT

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by

HENRY MARTYN ESTALL.

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FOREWORD.

A word of explanation may be appropriate regarding the title chosen for this thesis. Its selection was made prior to the investigations which are embodied in the text, and was taken chiefly because it expressed a point of view regarding human motivation which seemed to hold possibilities of fruitful exploration. Much has been written about the will, in theology and moral philosophy, so that it seemed idle to add more words on a subject about which past controversy has chiefly succeeded in hanging a thick fog, unless some new way of piercing the gloom lay open. Such a clue seemed to offer in the method of correlating the writings of philosophers on the subject with their actual lives. If there were a freedom making human life potentially so splendid a thing as some have said, then surely the secret of it lay in the lives of those who had attained to it. Might it not be possible to know how they attained ?

But that did not mean accepting necessarily their account of the matter. That would have to be restated in such fashion as to carry meaning in this day. It would have to brave the light (or pierce the darkness) of up-to-the-minute psychology, and not survive merely as a curious relic of other days,- charmingly naive, but passé. And because Prof. Hocking has sought to wrestle with the problem of the will and its education, - and not in vain,- acutely conscious all the while of the findings of modern psychology, yet also intimately sensitive to the finer experience of men, I thought to try how far his theory of consent would light up the lives and work of certain great philosophers. The title chosen reflects the enthusiasm which was mine on reading "Human Nature and Its Remaking".

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION .

The approach to philosophical literature adopted in the pages which follow is, in its intention, psychological. The attempt is made to examine the significance of the concept of 'Will' for Augustine, Descartes, Pascal, Malebranche, Rousseau. But it was felt not to be enough to trace the varying fortunes of the mere word, as it entered into the vocabulary of different men. For words, like clothes, go out of fashion. They become drab, colourless, uninteresting; they no longer attract attention; and so, lest their wearer be carried with them into oblivion, they must perforce be discarded. But although I seem to ransack old cupboards, mine is no antiquarian's search for curious relics. Admittedly, 'will' has become old-fashioned, at least in psychology; it belongs with other discarded and discredited 'faculties of the mind'. And even in general discourse it keeps none too pleasant company. Shades of John Knox and Jean Calvin, and all the sombre company of theologians, with their inter--minable disquisitions on the freedom of the will. Let's be behaviourists and free of the problem.

But if the meaning of a term have genuine significance it refuses to be thus easily dismissed. It accepts discomfiture unabashed, sloughs off its unwelcome

disguise, and, freed of unfortunate associations, returns to take its rightful place in the experience of men. So that, to follow the fortunes of a concept, as distinguished from a term, one musts needs beware the limitations of literal-mindedness. For ideas are more elusive than words, and more potent. Both are long-lived, so that the same word may in its long history have been the hiding-place of more than one idea. But ideas,while they have not the same stolidity that words have, do, to some extent, retain the impress of their dwelling-place; their later career is influenced by the company they keep. So that it becomes essential to trace with some care the tradition within which they belong. The great tradition of Greek philosophy became merged with the religious movement called Christianity. And many, many, years later, from that flowing together there emerges modern western philosophy. This absorption of philosophy by a religious institution,- is it of any significance ? I shall hold that the meaning of the term 'will', im Malebranche for instance, cannot be grasped apart from appreciating the place of honour which it came to hold in the doctrines of the Catholic Church. I shall even suggest that the concept itself would scarcely have been used by him, had he not been so completely and devotedly a son of the church. This is to suggest that there can be a literal-mindedness in the usage of ideas as well as of words, a quite stultifying adherence to traditional modes of thought as well as to

forms of expression.

Yet, because tradition can be so dominating a factor in literature and in life, it may not lightly be ignored. For this reason the attempt is made to relate the writings of Descartes, Pascal, and Malebranche to those of Augustine, who, more than any other, established that reconciliation between Platonism and Christian dogma with which their thought was familiar. During the period in which these three men lived and wrote there occured a considerable emancipation from the lines of the Catholic tradition, so that it becomes more difficult to search out the sources for the ideology of writers influenced by, or the product of, that emancipation. To a considerable extent the Catholic tradition lessens the importance of providing an accurate historical context for those writers who remained faithful to that tradition, or rather it constitutes a special historical context of unique stability. In considering the work of such a man as Hobbes it would be far more important to place him within the flux of changing social and political conditions.

But although it be dangerous to assume either a constancy in the usage of words or an abiding quality of ideas, there is a standard for evaluating the significance of a man's philosophy to be found in the immediate insight into human nature which is common to us all. Even though it be held that this too is changing, the rate of change is so very much slower as to make the passage of a few

thousand years negligible for our appreciation of character. This then is to be the crucial test, that, after having brought to the task of understanding a man's writings our knowledge, often inadequate, of the cultural tradition within which his work was done, we should put the questions: Has his description been true to his own personal experience; and, What is the root of that experience ? This is what is meant by saying that the approach here adopted is psychological or biographical. It is the kind of psychology that is advocated in the opening essay of a volume by Mr. J. Middleton Murry, entitled "Things to Come".

II

I have asked what significance is to be found in the merging of Greek thought with Christianity. Murry says of this confluence that it brought together two different definitions of the essential nature of man,- the Greek: Man is an animal endowed with reason, and the Christian: Man is an animal with an eternal soul. There are reservations to this general statement to be considered later. But Murry passes on to formulate a method for determining what truth there is in these two definitions. "Take all the heroes of humanity; choose from among them those who have made the deepest and most permanent appeal to men; try to discover what those men really were; if you can discover it, that is what man <u>is</u>."[1]

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1. J. Middleton Murry - "Things to Come", p.25.

It may seem inordinately presumptuous to accept such a commission. It is presumptuous. The task is hazardous, and the chances of failure great. Injustice will probably be done. So be it. The error can damage none but myself. And no other way lies open. "We have to approach the heroes fearlessly and try to wrest their secret from them. We have to regard them as real beings, in the firm persuasion that what man has done, man can do again."(1)

It is true that a far less ambitious undertaking might well have equally, if not more, significant results. To have wrested the secret from just one 'hero' might serve abundantly to teach one how to live, which from the time of Socrates has been the real goal of philosophy. This is true, and indeed is the course which originally furnished the incentive to the present study. It explains why the concept 'will' is specifically examined in the writings of the 'heroes' selected for study. It is assumed that where this term enters into the record of their experience and the formulation of their systems there is betrayed their distinctive indebtedness to the Christian tradition. The reasons for this assumption are given below. But there is added certainty furnished, in these days when numbers carry to such an extent the force of proof, if one's investigations tend to exhibit something in the nature of a psychological law underlying the seeming confusion of separate individual descriptions. "Let us suppose", says

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1. Ibid. p.27.

Middleton Murry, " that as we wrestle with our heroes for their secret, one after another, we begin to discern that they all are shaped after the same pattern; that they all pass through strange experiences which they describe, each in his own language, but in such a way that we cannot fail to be aware that what they are describing is fundamentally the same experience.... then, I think, we can fairly claim to have proved something that is of importance to men." (1)

Such a conclusion would, of course, be immeasurably strengthened were the 'test cases', so to speak, chosen from widely different contexts, thereby ensuring a considerable measure of independence. But to such a task one would have to bring a vast wealth of intimate appreciation for many cultures. It is properly, in fact, the entire task of comparative religion. Seen against the background of so tremendous a project, this essay can only appear as a very small beginning. So it is. And here it may be said, in passing, that considerations of cultural heritage contributed largely to the selection of 'heroes'. Nothing, for instance, would have been quite so satisfying as to have studied the life of Spinoza here,- but that must be left for some future time.

It could not be known in advance what would be found of real significance in the lives of the 'heroes' chosen, so that these choices had to be made somewhat at random. But even superficial acquaintance had in some cases

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1. Ibid. pp.27-8.

already suggested possibilities of fruitful research. In the lives of Augustine and Pascal there occurred, - it is common knowledge - a re-orientation, resulting in a quality of life rarely attractive and markedly different from their earlier experience. In Descartes there was an amazing enthusiasm for a new method in philosophy which he claimed to have discovered and which yielded him a rich sense of certainty in his thinking. These were among the clues which guided choice. Neither was the attempt made to fit all results into the same mould. Available biographical material is sometimes scanty; perhaps the search has not been promulgated with adequate steadfastness. But, however that may be, it is hoped that previously-desired conclusions do not appear to have prejudiced the study of the original textual material, thereby doing it violence and transgressing the canons of sound criticism. It is clear, for instance, that Malebranche, though his disciple, differs fundamentally from Descartes, and no attempt has been made to gloss over this difference.

III

Two statements made above must now be examined: Middleton Murry's formulation of the Greek and Christian definitions of man's nature, and the assumption that the concept of 'will' owes its place in western philosophical thought primarily to Christianity.

It is quite beyond the scope of this paper to

criticize the first statement adequately. To begin with, the earliest biographical records of Jesus which we now possess are written in Greek. To imagine Jesus, as Murry does, augmenting the Greek definition: Man is an animal endowed with reason, by saying to Plato: "Man is an animal endowed with reason; but he is something more; he is a creature who has it in him to become an eternal soul",[1] is to imagine a Jew using language already familiar to the Greek seer. It is, further, to leap the gap of four or five hundred years which divides the life of Plato from the editing, in Greek, of the earliest extant records of the life and teaching of Jesus,- a period during which much must have happened to the meanings conveyed by Greek words. It is also to assume that the original Aramaic of Jesus is faithfully translated into the Greek of the Gospels. And it is to feel fairly confident that in this present day we can pierce through the long ages of western thought in order to listen with understanding to the words both of Plato and of Jesus,- and then to listen with an imaginitive insight which we incline to refuse to the Galilean peasants, to Paul, and to the judges both of Socrates and of Jesus.

These are difficulties. For many they constitute insurmountable difficulties. Chiefly they lead to doubt as to the historicity of Jesus and of Socrates. At all events they make the attempt at historical reconstruction seem of doubtful worth. Such an attitude would probably be

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1. Ibid. p.18.

inevitable were we, in fact, adrift on a sea where words and their meanings resembled nothing so much as wind-tossed waves. But we have accepted a standard of much greater permanence,- that the constitution of the human spirit, its deepest nature, its real potentialities, remain essentially unchanged within the brief period of recorded history. This is why it is possible to say that Plato would have had "more than an inkling" of what Jesus meant.

John Burnet has an essay on "The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul", in which he puts forward the thesis that the supremely original work of Socrates, in virtue of which he is truly called the founder of philosophy, was to imbue the Greek word 'psyche' with profoundly new meaning. Socrates' mission was 'the cure of souls', his message "that there is something in us which is capable of attaining wisdom, and that this same thing is capable of attaining goodness and righteousness."(1) This identification of the 'psyche' with all the noblest potentialities of the human spirit was, says Burnet, quite new to the Greeks of Socrates' day. A careful search through the literature of fifth-century Athens reveals a variety of meanings for 'psyche'. It was a thing apart, its origin and its destiny other than the body's. It may sometimes be translated 'life', but then always in connection with death

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1. John Burnet. -Essays and Addresses, p.140.

or swooning; to love one's 'psyche' was to shrink from death. It was active in dreams, when it escaped for a brief period from the body, its prison. Its seat was the heart or the blood, and thus it was the source of the sentiment of kinship, 'la voix du sang'. It explained all wayward moods and appetites, all alien and unorthodox desires, all transient fancies and strange memories,- a suggestion of the modern 'subliminal self'. "On the whole neither religion nor philosophy in the fifth century B.C. knew anything of the Soul. What they called by that name was something extrinsic and dissociated from the normal personality, which was altogether dependent on the body." Burnet discovers only two references which really foreshadow Socrates' idea of the 'psyche'. These are both from the "Philoctetes" of Sophocles. "Odysseus tells Neoptolemus that he is to 'entrap the psyche of Philoctetes with words', which seems to imply that it is the seat of knowledge, and Philoctetes speaks of 'the mean soul of Odysseus peering through crannies', which seems to imply that it is the seat of character."

Whereas hitherto the one thing you could not do with your 'psyche' was to live by it, Socrates "denied that the soul was any sort of mysterious second self, and identified it frankly with our ordinary consciousness." This was to bridge the gap between natural science and popular religion by means of a unification, as simple as it was profound, of the nature of man. Knowledge of the natural world, passion for the moral life, the quest for

personal contentment, these were not incompatible goals witnessing to an inherent discord in human nature. "The one thing needful for the soul was that it should strive after wisdom and goodness."[1] These were but two aspects of the self-same goal, for, according to the Socratic dictum, 'Virtue is knowledge',- a dictum amounting to"a denial that there is any ultimate distinction between theory and practice."[2]

Such a study as this of Burnet's brings Greek thought, in its larger outreach, infinitely closer to the teaching of Jesus than does the definition:Man is an animal endowed with reason. One cannot interpret Greek philosophy in a narrowly intellectualist sense, simply in order to point to clear-cut deficiencies, unsuspected until the impact of the Christian religion. When Socrates urges his fellow-citizens to 'care for their souls' he is using the same language as Jesus, though admittedly his under--standing as to how that is best to be done may be vastly different. But that is not here a matter of inquiry.

Jesus believed that all men really wanted to do just one thing,- to 'save their souls alive'. In his own day and land men characterized the object of their longing as 'the Kingdom of God',- a religio-political state where the deepest instincts of man would be satisfied, where they would be freed from foreign domination, rendered

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1.Ibid. p. 159.
2.Ibid. p. 160.

competent to observe the sacred laws without a sense of constraint or bondage, eager and able to worship in 'fear' and with rejoicing, attended by prosperity and fortified against disaster, holding up their heads with dignity among the nations of earth,- a favoured and a righteous people. More than one conception was current as to the method by which this national hope was to be realized. For some the way led through political revolution. Others held that it could come only as the reward of strict ad--herence to the laws and traditions of the Jewish race; while in either case it was exclusively an affair of the Jewish people. While the ideal had its tremendous appeal for Jesus, to neither of these programmes could he adhere. Rather, he joined himself, whole-heartedly and without reserve, to a movement initiated by John the Baptizer, whose unhesitating and uncompromising message was that entrance to the kingdom could only be won by strict personal righteousness,- a righteousness that was no mere formal adherence to a legal code, but a rigorous self-examination amounting to a complete change of heart. John called on men to repent, and then to wait; for even with John, as with other schools of thought, the kingdom, which was imminent, would only come by divine initiation, a sudden and a terrible event. Jesus joined this move--ment of John's, and in the joining realized, with insight dazzlingly clear, that John had missed the supremely

important thing, the true nature of the kingdom he sought to enter. It was not to come. It was, and he, Jesus, was now in it. There was no awaiting a catastrophic judgment, no divine apocalypse. To give oneself utterly and unreservedly to the good was to enter at once into the kingdom, to find life, to become free, to "save one's soul alive".

ὃς ἐὰν ζητήσῃ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ περιποιήσασθαι, ἀπολέσει αὐτήν, καὶ ὃς ἐὰν ἀπολέσῃ, ζωογονήσει αὐτήν. (1)

There can be no commentary on this saying, documentarily the best authenticated in the whole record concerning Jesus, comparable to his own life. He spoke of 'doing the will of God', 'loving God with one's whole being', and of 'selling all that one had', 'losing one's life',- these phrases are not self-evident, clear, or simple in meaning, and it is scarcely profitable to discuss them out of their context. But in them is con-tained the condition for becoming fully alive. And they are not mere cryptic sayings, not clever paradoxes, not platitudes. Their truth is lived by Jesus. For him, the essential, ultimate, condition for the finding of life was a surrender of personal will to the will of God,- an elimination of the factors of personal desire and prejudice in order to become aware of and participant in the realities of life, its true purposes, its undistorted meanings.

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1. Luke, Ch.17,v.33.

The documents in which fragments of this teaching were recorded came to hold the place of highest honour in the libraries of the church. They were edited, added to, and commented upon, until it was impossible for their readers to know what was the original teaching and what later interpretation. It became imperative to introduce some measure of uniformity, and this was done through conciliar agreements relative to the sacred canon. Even in the time of Augustine complete uniformity of usage had not been secured, though the acceptance of Jerome's Latin translation and compilation marked the achievement of practical uniformity.(1) Unfortunately this action also had results quite other than those desired; it authorized a heterogeneous mass of documents, and it gave them the prestige attaching to 'revealed truth', which meant they might no longer be read with intelligent discrimination. The attitude which Augustine adopts toward the Scriptures illustrates the point,- an attitude still held by Malebranche, as indicated in the distinction which he draws between the doctrines of the church and the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Yet although this care for the sacred writings deprived them of their vital power by attaching to them an authority other than that of self-evident truth, they were preserved to influence profoundly the course of Christian thought. From them is derived the doctrine of the will as found in Augustine. In them is contained the paradox of the will as in some way the

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1. Jerome was contemporary with Augustine. His dates are 340-420.

source both of good and of evil.

CHAPTER II.

THE MEANING OF WILL FOR ST. AUGUSTINE.

"In the 'Confessions' of St. Augustine we have the first autobiography in all literature, and the first great classic of Christian experience outside the New Testament."[1] Augustine, Bishop of Hippo in North Africa, was born in the year 354 A.D. His mother, Monica, was a Christian, and Augustine's tributes to her character and her devotion to his own good are passionately, poignantly, reiterated. His father evidently consented to join the church sometime during Augustine's boyhood, for, recording the events of his sixteenth year, which he spent at home, - "a season of idleness interposed through the narrowness of my parents' fortunes" - Augustine mentions that his father had only recently become a catechumen. Both parents were eager to give their son the best possible education, and so he was sent at the age of sixteen from Thagaste, the home town, to Carthage. "The expenses for a further journey to Carthage were provided for me; and that, rather by the resolution than the means of my father, who was but a poor freeman of Thagaste."[2]

Here the reading of Cicero enthralled him, so that he "longed with an incredibly burning desire for an immortality of wisdom."[3] Evidently the brilliance of his mind was soon recognized, and he took part eagerly in the discussions among teachers and students which characterized the schooling of his day. Especially did

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1. R.E.Welsh - Classics of the Soul's Quest. p.28.
2. Augustine - Confessions. p.23. 3. Ibid. p.36.

their freedom from superstition, and their ideal of establishing the truth by the appeal to reason rather than faith, attract Augustine to the learning of the Manichaeans. That he was honoured and respected for his skill in debate and his mastery of rhetoric is clear. Later on he became himself a teacher of rhetoric.

Evidently, too, he won many friends among his wealthier fellow-students, and with them he entered into the sports and amusements of the day. Carthage was a prosperous and fashionable city, and, looking back ffom later years, Augustine speaks with bitterest self-reproach of his early life there,- of his association with a boisterous, fast-living 'gang', of 'stage-plays', circuses, and public games. Most merciless of all, and this is a note which echoes throughout the 'Confessions', is his self-accusation in the matter of relations with women. One gets clearly the sense that moral conditions as they exist today along this torrid African shore were not very different in Augustine's day; greater splendour then, no doubt; more open , natural, abandon; frankly pagan practices, innocent of any effort to legitimize them on any other grounds than those of natural morality, - an easy-going life against which the young church resolutely set its face, holding out an ascetic ideal to its most faithful followers, and urging that the inviolable sanctity of marriage be recognized among all

the membership. The laxity of the standards held by those among whom he moved, as against the rigour of the Pauline ideal,- this disparity set Augustine a personal moral problem which recurs again and again in the 'Confessions'. Custom made the satisfaction of personal desire very easy. He seems to have been very happy with a mistress, who bore him a son when he was only eighteen, and with whom he lived for twelve years or more. This, however, was not recognized as marriage by the church, and did not preclude the possibility of an honourable marriage being arranged. This, in fact, was the case with Augustine, his betrothal breaking off the relationship which had lasted so long. In the end mistress and bride alike were sacrificed to the monastic ideal, which Augustine derived from Paul's letters.

Throughout the 'Confessions' runs the thread of a passionate search for Truth. The record of this search is qualified, it is true, by the reminiscent mood in which the whole is written,- possibly, also, as some critics have urged, by a didactic intention, since it is written for his fellow-Christians. Augustine is telling the story of his soul's journey, telling it with a relent--less determination to portray the whole truth, but it is a 'Confession', not a diary. Looking backwards he sees his early interests and allegiances in the light of later experience. The freshness of the original enthusiasm for

Cicero or for Plato is therefore lost to some extent, because their significance for his thinking is reckoned against a standard accepted very much later. Even so, that first glimpse of the ideal of wisdom which was his as he read Cicero's Hortensius; his absorption in the teaching of the Manichaeans, eliciting the cry: "O Truth, Truth, how inwardly did even then the marrow of my soul pant after Thee, when they often and diversely, and in many and huge books, echoed of Thee to me..?";[1] the disillusionment that came with his detection of the sophistry of Faustus; his discrediting of astrology; the baffling riddle of evil for which so desperately he sought a solution; his appreciation of the teaching of Ambrose; the sheer delight which followed his introduction to Neo-Platonist teaching; - these scattered notices bear eloquent witness at once to the quality of Augustine's mind, and to an intellectual honesty which not all his harsh self-criticism can wholly hide. The vision of Truth transcends at last the language of truth: "And I entered and beheld with the eye of my soul... the Light Unchangeable.... He that knows the Truth knows what that Light is; and he that knows it, knows eternity. Love knoweth it. O Truth Who art Eternity, and Love Who art Truth, and Eternity Who art Love."[2]

Following his disillusionment with

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1. Ibid. p.38.
2. Ibid. pp.133-4

Manichaeism, brought to a head by the teaching of Faustus, Augustine went to Rome, and later became a teacher of rhetoric at Milan. Thither two intimate friends, Nebridius and Alypius, followed him. Here he came under the influence of St. Ambrose, and through him entered much more sympathetically into a study of Christian documents. Others of the fathers of the church are mentioned with reverence and affection, as personal advisers or as heroic examples,- Simplicianus, Victorinus, St. Antony. He read with new insight the letters of St. Paul, letters revealing an inward struggle of the same order as his own. For the crucial conflict in his life is fought out on the plane of the will, and Paul's account of the struggle between flesh and spirit seems painfully true of his own life. Convinced by the eloquence of Ambrose, and by the writings of the Platonists, with their doctrine of the Logos, as to the reasonableness of Christianity, urged to accept the rule of the church by the example of his mother and the attractiveness of its austere moral code, - Augustine is torn between two allegiances.

The story is told in Book VIII of the Confessions. The habits of his past life hang desperately close and will not be set aside. Yet no bitterness is here. "It was through me that custom had obtained this power of warring against me, because I had come willingly whither I willed not.... That new will which had begun to

be in me, freely to serve Thee,.. was not yet able to overcome my former wilfulness, strengthened by age."[1] The issue is evaded, decision postponed. "Anon,anon... presently...leave me but a little.... Give me chastity and continency, only not yet."[2] No half-measures will do. The struggle continues until excuses fail, their sheer inadequacy made plain before the unconditional demands of the new life. 'To will' is not 'to be able' until he wills 'thoroughly'. "Whence this monstrousness ? and to what end ? (The mind) commands itself to will, and would not command, unless it willed, and what it commands is not done. But it willeth not entirely; therefore doth it not command entirely."[3] This is the heart of the matter. "By truth up-borne, borne down by custom" - so is the self, a dual creature, its habits opposed to its new purpose. The step which decides the issue involves no new element. It is taken the moment the will for God, for the new life, becomes entire..... At once the struggle is won. Release from tension is marked by a swift flow of tears. Simply Alypius is told, and Monica his mother. He resigns his chair of rhetoric in Milan, retires to the country, and within the year is baptized into the church.

Hazardous is the attempt to add to Augustine's own record of what happened in that secluded

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1. Ibid. p.157.
2. Ibid. pp.158,163.
3. Ibid. p.165.

Milan garden. The contrast between the ascetic ideal of the church and his own life of self-indulgence is drawn wholly in terms of sex-relationships. One can say that it is the experience of one whose sex-life is quite unbalanced. What morbid dwelling on his own immorality is here. Even the new life of chastity is made to seem attractive by being identified with a vision of "the chaste dignity of Continency, serene, yet not relaxedly gay, honestly alluring me to come, and doubt not; and stretching forth to receive and embrace me, her holy hands full of multitudes of good examples."(1) What is this but the sublimation of desire ? Shall we not lay all this desperate inner warfare to the charge of an exaggerated mother-complex, cruelly distorting his whole outlook on life ?

It may be, though, that this type of ex--planation, common enough in modern psychologies of religion, is not notably clearer than Augustine's own account. It may be that we can offer from the outside a description of the factors at work in Augustine's life. But the important approach to an understanding of the philosophy which he afterwards wrote is that which sees clearly the inner aspects of his experience. He wanted to align himself with the church, the movement wherein he now saw truth, in thought and conduct, to be most fully revealed. This desire was for him incompatible with his present manner of life. Therefore he had to be

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1.Ibid. p.169.

willing to make that life over in conformity with the requirements of the society which he longed to join. More than forty times in the space of four pages he uses the word 'will', making it unmistakeably clear that the decision to become a Christian is hampered, not by doubts as to the wisdom of the course, but by the interference of life-long habits directed to other and incompatible ends.

II

In a letter to Aurelius, Bishop of Carthage, Augustine says of his 'De Trinitate' : "I began as a very young man, and have published in my old age, some books concerning the Trinity, who is the Supreme and true God."[1] Of his purpose in writing he says: "The following dissertation concerning the Trinity has been written in order to guard against the sophistries of those who disdain to begin with faith, and are deceived by a crude and perverse love of reason." Augustine goes on to list three types of sophist : "Those who frame their thoughts of God according to things corporeal,... those who do so according to the spiritual creature, such as is the soul, and... those who neither regard the body nor the spiritual creature, and yet think falsely about God; and are indeed so much the further from the truth, that nothing can be found answering to their conceptions, either in the body, or in the made or created spirit, or in the Creator Himself."[2]

1. Aurelius Augustine - "On the Trinity", Translator's Preface.
2. Ibid. Bk.I. Chap.I. Sect.1.

It is evident from this introduction that the attitude of mind which Augustine is going to extol is that which he here calls faith. Yet the thesis which he seeks to prove concerns the doctrine of the Trinity. Faith is evidently belief in God; but far more than an intellectual assent, it is a fundamental direction involving the whole personality, a term approximating closely in meaning to 'will', though carrying with it a more specific emphasis on its objective reference.

In expounding the doctrine of the Trinity, which is God, apprehended only by faith, Augustine makes use of certain analogies drawn from the life of man. The first of these is found in Book IX: "The mind itself, and the love of it, and the knowledge of it, are three things, and these three are one."[1] It is important to discover just what Augustine meant by love in his trinity of mind, love, and knowledge. Of course it is not an accident that he chooses to use this word, because he wants to use his analogy in order to define the Holy Spirit in terms of love. In the twelfth chapter of the same book he discusses a 'faculty' of the knowing mind which is really prior to knowing. It is the desire to know, a restless seeking after something which is yet unknown and unnamed. "We have come to be able to call it wish", he says, since "every one who seeks wishes to find", or, in the case of knowledge, to know. Then follows the process

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1. Ibid. Bk.IX.Ch.IV.Sect.4.

of 'finding', studying, coming to know, after a description of which there occurs this significant sentence: "And the same desire which led us to long for the knowing of the thing becomes the love of the thing when known."[1]

A second analogy is presented in BookX,- the trinity of memory, understanding, and will. One has to turn to Book XI for the content of the first and third terms in this analogy. Here one finds the truly empirical conclusion that there can be nothing in memory, (or in imagination either) which has not already been given in experience. As to will, that is also a term in "the trinity of the outer man". The problem considered in this, the third analogy from the life of man, concerns visual perception, although a similar analysis might be made of "hearing, smelling, tasting, touching."[2] Here again Augustine isolates three terms: the object seen, the act of seeing, and "that which keeps the sense of the eye in the object seen, so long as it is seen, viz. the attention of the mind."[3] Later Augustine calls this 'attention of the mind' the will of the mind, and this seems to be the 'faculty' responsible for the joining together of the 'body which is seen' and 'the image of it, i.e. vision.' This will is "so vehement that it can be called love, or desire, or lust."[4]

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1. Ibid. Bk.IX. Ch. XII. Sect.18
2. Ibid. Bk.XI. Ch. I. Sect. 1
3. Ibid. Bk.XI. Ch. II. Sect. 2
4. Ibid. Bk.XI. Ch. II. Sect. 5

There follows a disparagement of 'bodily sense' in comparison with the life of the spirit; yet the will, "which moves to and fro, hither and thither, the eye that is to be informed, and unites it when formed",[1] - although its field of operation has, as it were, been transferred to the inward life of the soul,-fulfils a comparable function in 'the trinity of the mind'. It is thus operative in relation to both body and mind, and does not rest content until its object becomes the vision of God, a conclusion comparable to the better known sentence in the opening section of the Confessions; "For Thou madest us for thyself, and our heart is restless until it repose in Thee."[2]

It is not an accident that the one 'Person' common to all these 'trinities' should be described in similar terms: in the problem of perception, the focussing of attention on a specific object, or rather in a given direction prior to the perception of the object qua object; in the processes of retention and recall, the selection, by virtue of their emotional contexts whether of desire or fear, of those images of greatest clarity; in the striving and the seeking which is prior to the securing of any knowledge, and which is transformed into "the love of the

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1. Ibid. Bk.XI. Ch. IV. Sect.7
2. Confessions - Bk.I. Sect. 1

thing when known"; - the significance of this restless, inquiring, directive, process which is variously called attention, desire, preference, will, love, is very real for Augustine. Even in the 'trinity of the outer man' it is 'more spiritual' than either the thing discerned or 'the vision in the sense'; even here it "begins to intimate, as it were, the person of the Spirit".[1] Directed ultimately to the goal of 'living blessedly', it serves to guide men in the right direction, which is for Augustine that of belief in the doctrines of the church, and particularly that of the Trinity.

In view of the avowed purpose of the treatise, one may question whether Augustine's psycho-logical observations have any real scientific value. He is definitely and deliberately looking for analogies to serve the purpose of his argument. The comclusions do not emerge naturally from disinterested observations. They are dogmatic, incontrovertible, independent of any empirical evidence adduced in their support. Yet, while deploring the restrictive influence of a corpus of 'revealed truth' which could not be tampered with, but with which all genuine empirical knowledge must somehow be reconciled, one may surely recognize the brilliance of Augustine's mind, and note with some care, for its influence on the later history of thought, his conception of how that mind functioned,- that in which he discerned

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1. Ibid. Bk.XI. Chap.V. Sect.9

a trinity which was in very truth 'an image of God'. It is to be noted too, though the validity of Augustine's theological conclusions is not here a matter of inquiry, that in his hands the doctrine of the Trinity itself becomes, as it were, the symbol of that trinity which is man. "God, although incomprehensible, is ever to be sought". Herein is symbolized the difficulty of explaining how it is that man seeks to know that which he does not yet know, though the very seeking would itself seem to presuppose the knowing. The function of knowing, the object known, and the desire to know, are all involved in the total event. Unfortunate, perhaps, this predilection for the number '3', conditioning as it does the extent to which Augustine's analyses will be carried. Fortunate, though, that, by the same token, all three terms must co-exist, 'one and indivisible'. In spite of the initial assumption of infallibility, by virtue of its supposed scriptural authority, in spite of the tedium of continual confirmation by appeal to scripture, this Doctrine, in the hands of a brilliant student, is made to serve the purpose of a tremendous hypothesis,- one that sends him searching into problems of perception, memory, imagination, emotion, seeking a rationale of human life itself,- one that leads him to profound conclusions: for, strangely enough, theological though its title sounds, the conclusion of the treatise announces a discovery regarding the attainment of

human happiness:

> "The human mind, then, is so constituted that at no time does it not remember, and understand, and love itself. He therefore who knows how to love himself loves God... But when the mind loves God, and by consequence, as has been said, remembers and understands him, then it is rightly enjoined also to love its neighbour as itself; for it has now come to love itself rightly and not perversely when it loves God, by partaking of whom that image not only exists but is also renewed, so as to be no longer old, and restored so as to be no longer defaced, and beatified so as to be no longer unhappy."(1)

In this treatise, as in the Confessions, there is revealed Augustine's remarkably acute and delicate introspective power. Consider, for instance, the subtle and searching psychological discussion in Book X, where the attempt is made to discover how it is that there can arise an interest (or love) in self-knowledge. How can striving, seeking for knowledge, precede knowledge ? Quite evidently, for Augustine, the mind must from the first know itself, "for it knows itself as seeking, and as not knowing itself."(2) In parenthesis, as it were, he deals shrewdly with the problem of the 'substance' of the soul or mind, pointing out the fallacy in the reasoning of those who, because they cannot conceive of substance independently of extension, define mind in terms of matter, or body. But to revert to the problem of self-knowledge. How is it possible to obey the precept: "Know thyself" ? By the very understanding of the precept, says Augustine, by the very possibility of its formulation,

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1. Ibid. Bk.XIV. Ch.XIV. Sect.18.
2. Ibid. Bk. X. Ch.III. Sect. 5.

it is evident that it can be obeyed.

> "Yet whoever doubts that he himself lives, and remembers, and understands, and wills, and thinks, and knows, and judges ? Seeing that even if he doubts, he lives; if he doubts, he remembers why he doubts; if he doubts, he understands that he doubts; if he doubts, he wishes to be certain; if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows that he does not know; if he doubts, he judges that he ought not to assent rashly; Whosoever therefore doubts about anything else, ought not to doubt of all these things; which, if they were not, he would not be able to doubt of anything."(1)

In the Confessions his looking within is intensely personal ; it brings to light a mass of desires and inclinations so little according with sainthood that official piety has hastened to point out that they are either grossly exaggerated or deliberately fictitious; fortunately we do not now need to discredit the conviction, which grows with the reading, that Augustine intended to lay bare the simple truth about himself, more particularly since we get here the clues to his influence and doctrine. One wonders, indeed, whether an intimate personal journal, from which this record was later taken, may not have been written earlier as part of the process of facing all the facts about himself.(2)

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1. Ibid. Bk. X. . Ch. X. Sect. 14.
2. Compare this analysis of memory in Book X of the Confessions: "For the eyes say,'if those images were coloured, we reported of them. The ears say 'if they sound,we gave knowledge of them'. The nostrils say,'if they smell, they passed by us. The taste says, 'unless they have a savour, ask me not'. The touch says,'if it have not size,I handled it not; if I handled it not, I gave no notice of it."

III.

Acceptance of the authority of the church simplified life enormously for Augustine, yet one needs to remember why: not because intellectual effort might now be relaxed, but because an inner personal conflict had been resolved. One needs to remember that at this time the actual doctrines of the church were still in a relatively plastic state; it was the period of great church councils, of heresy the more formidable because it was not yet certain just what constituted heresy, there being no settled and assured dogmatic tradition. The church was still young and vigorous; belief had not hardened into sacrosanct creedal statements, teaching into dogma. The opposition between faith and reason,- an issue whereon Augustine and Thomas Aquinas are often held to differ fundamentally,- is not to be understood, as in the days of Descartes, as an opposition between 'revealed truth' -'the faith once delivered to the saints',- and unfettered inquiry.

One of the problems agitating mediaeval philosophy was as to the primacy of knowledge or will. It is a problem which we should prefer to avoid, as being couched in terms which lead rather to confusion than to fruitful discussion. Since, however, opposition to Thomist philosophy was made on the basis of an appeal to Augustinianism, brief note must be taken of the lines of the argument.

We have seen that Augustine's use of 'will' occurs in the analysis of complex mental processes,- e.g. in perception will is used as meaning 'attention'- and that in general it fulfilled the function of converting thought into action, or of setting thought in process. Such a concept was necessary, since he held that cognition could not of itself issue in action. In so far therefore as Augustine can fairly be said to have held to a doctrine of the primacy of the will, such a doctrine must mean that he was primarily concerned with moral philosophy,- with conduct. In religious belief the counterpart of such an attitude is found in the exaltation of faith over reason; indeed the controversy as to the relative importance of these two 'qualities' is really the same issue. Faith is a practical attitude; it is 'loving God'. It is very close in meaning to the Kantian 'good will'. But, as we shall have cause to repeat later, attitudes are 'vector' in character, they are attitudes <u>towards</u> some thing or some person. This objective reference, even though it be ideal only, tends to become incorporated in the definition of the attitude. An ideal, expressed in the thought-forms of the day, is thus illicitly given a permanent status which obscures the original emphasis on attitude, and transforms 'faith' into 'the faith'. Thus the opposition between faith and reason arises, faith being held to include acceptance of certain beliefs, the contents of which are beyond the validation or invalidation of Reason.

Various kinds of special authority are attached to them - of Scripture, or special revelation - and so the issue between Faith and Reason becomes an issue as to the different ways in which truth may be apprehended. The mystics, for instance, may hold to a doctrine of the inner light, a special, non-empirical, source of knowledge. Thus the argument reduces to a purely intellectual one as to the possible sources of knowledge; as such it appears to be irrevelant to our inquiry into the nature of the will.

CHAPTER III.

THE WILL IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY FRENCH PHILOSOPHY:

DESCARTES, PASCAL, MALEBRANCHE.

In his Fourth Meditation, "Of the True and the False", Descartes face the problem of error. "Error", he says, "is not a real thing depending on God, but simply a defect.... I fall into error from the fact that the power given me by God for the purpose of distinguishing truth from error is not infinite."(1) Human life is thrown precariously somewhere 'between God and nought', between the Supreme Being and non-being, and error in a man's thinking is the mark of this dual orientation. "For error is not a pure negation, but it is a lack of some knowledge which it seems that I ought to possess." It is characterized as error in contrast to the positive possibilities of knowledge. Yet the limitations of human knowledge, its inadequate and fragmentary character,- these are not what we mean by error. Error is something other than ignorance. It is "a combination of two causes... of the understanding and at the same time of the will."(2)

Descartes' theory of truth is not here in discussion, but these quotations are given because of their introduction of the will. The will is a power, a power to choose freely, it constitutes the human being in some sense a free agent, an efficient cause of his own actions. To be thus free is to partake of the nature of God, "indeed it is for the most part this will that causes me to know that in some manner I bear the image and similitude

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1. R. Descartes - Selections (Scribner's) p.128.
2. Ibid. p.130.

of God."[1]

The will and the understanding are thus separate human faculties, which yet are complementary to each other. A choice, where the possibilities are not clearly defined, where the knowledge of them is not clear, is a matter of indifference. It constitutes the "lowest grade of liberty". But the will is naturally inclined in the direction of that which is known to be good and true. In this sense it is determined; yet the determination is not an externally imposed constraint but an internal inclination. "If I always recognized clearly what was true and good, I should never have trouble in deliberating as to what judgement or choice I should make, and then I should be entirely free without ever being indifferent."[2]

"If I always recognized clearly". This is Descartes' criterion of the certainty of ideas, that they shall be clear and distinct: the measure of their clarity is the measure of their certainty. Judgments made on the basis of clear and distinct ideas are necessarily true. Unfortunately, knowledge is far from perfect, and many of our ideas are confused and indistinct. Error consists in judgments made on the basis of just such confused and indistinct ideas. The act of judging involves, as well as these ideas, a determination of the will, and this may be either an affirmation or a denial. The scope of the

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1. Ibid. p.131.
2. Ibid. p.132.

will is very much wider than that of the understanding; it is not bound down to those judgments only which have for their terms clear and distinct ideas; hence the possibility of error, due to judgments taken in advance of clear knowledge. Descartes therefore proceeds to the eminently rationalistic resolution "never to give judgements on matters whose truth is not clearly known to me,"(1) a resolution which will serve to keep him from error.

The indications which this Fourth Meditation furnish as to Descartes' conception of the will limit it almost entirely to the process of intellectual judgment. The choices which are here considered scarcely affect conduct. They have to do primarily with knowledge. Descartes' own synopsis confirms this interpretation and indicates a limitation deliberately imposed. "I do not intend to speak of matters pertaining to the Faith or the conduct of life, but only of those which concern speculative truths, and which may be known by the sole aid of the light of nature."(2) The resolution to withhold judgment until all the facts are clearly established is further described as a restraint imposed on the will. This resolution is not a natural one, because, although clear knowledge lures the will to decision, and frees it from indifference, yet the existence of error is adequate proof that such a resolution is not always taken by men. Clearly the resolution is

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1. 1.Ibid. p.136.
2. Ibid. p. 87.

moral in character, and this restraint of the will seems to indicate something more fundamental than will itself, yet of the same character. What is it that can thus commit the will only and always to the truth ?

In Part III of the Discourse on Method Descartes lays down a provisional code of morals consisting of four maxims, "in order that I might not remain irresolute in my actions, while reason obliged me to be so in my judgements, and that I might not omit to carry on my life as happily as I could."[1] In the second of these maxims, "That of being as firm and resolute in my actions as I could be",[2] it is clearly recognized that the exigencies and emergencies of life do not always permit that delay which is necessary to clear knowledge. Situations arise which call imperatively for immediate action, and here Descartes decides to act according to such knowledge as he has, and to adhere consistently to a decision once made. Such decisions are possible because the range of the will is much greater than that of the understanding. It seems paradoxical that this discrepancy which in 'matters speculative' is the source of error, should in practical life be accepted without serious concern. Here it is the resoluteness of the will in decisions once taken which is commended. There is an irrevocable character about such decisions which precludes the consideration of further evidence. Even though a decision is taken on the basis of

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1. Ibid. p.20
2. Ibid. p.22

'probable' truth only, its finality is urged as necessary to one's peace of mind, in contrast to the vacillation and indecision of those who are never finally sure whether their conduct is right or wrong.

The attitude of suspended judgment so commendable in scientific and metaphysical investigation is felt to be intolerable in the ethical and practical spheres of life. The explanation is, I think, two-fold. Descartes was disposed to accept the authority of church and state in all matters, even in those wherein freedom was to him so dear,- freedom to doubt, and think, of matters speculative, i.e. primarily physical and mathematical science. But there is a further explanation, which has to do both with his conception of the source of error and with the irrevocability of decisions.

Error is not attributable to God, but is explained by the free will of man. In this it has been thought that Descartes was merely being thoroughly orthodox. I think not. The certainty with which he speaks of the control of the will, the irrevocability of moral decisions, the unmistakeable clarity of his two basic ideas,- of himself and of God,- and his conviction that 'God could not deceive him',- these are not mere orthodoxy. They bear the marks of genuineness. Hoffding speaks of the mystical side of Descartes' philosophy,[1] and this is well

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1. H. Höffding - History of Modern Philosophy, p.241.

enough, except that the term 'mystical' is not very precise. What I take this to mean is that Descartes fulfilled the conditions for the discerning of truth,- the laying aside of all preconceptions and prejudices, the rigidly honest analysis of himself, which discovers the sources both of error and of discontent not in external circumstance but in his own attitudes; the giving of himself "entirely to the search after Truth."(1) One cannot read the Discourse on Method", with its ingenuous biographical detail, without sensing the author's unfaltering enthusiasm for a discovery which is to lead him from doubt and confusion and ennui into genuine certainty. The record of those early years of prolific reading and wide study which yet failed to satisfy his enquiring mind, the later years of travel and adventure, widening his experience without rooting it in any abiding conviction which should bring him peace,- these things are profoundly true to human experience. In realistic detail they lack the utter abandon of Augustine's Confessions, but they have a ring of undoubted sincerity.

In 1619 all this is changed, and changed in a fashion comparable to the conversion of Augustine. The change is recorded as a tremendous discovery. "The 10th. November 1619, when filled with enthusiasm, I discovered the foundations of a wonderful science".(2) It is

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1. Descartes - Selections. p.27-8.
2. Quoted by H.Hoffding - History of Modern Philosophy, p.213.

not enough, surely, to regard this as recording the discovery of analytical geometry. It is the secret of a new and unbounded ambition,- to create, by means of a special method, a whole system of philosophy, not building uncertainly on the obscure writings of the schoolmen, but getting at the heart of truth. And fundamental to the system are two irreducible ideas,- thought and extension; himself as a thinking substance, his body, all body, as extended substance,- both cohering in the being of God.

Descartes does not plunge immediately into the task of publishing his findings. Nine more years he spends, "reading the book of the world", "practising myself in the solution of mathematical problems according to the Method, or in the solution of other problems which though pertaining to other sciences, I was able to make almost similar to those of mathematics, by detaching them from all principles of other sciences which I found to be not sufficiently secure."(1) A long discipline intervenes between the original insight of 1619 and the writings which it prompted,- there is no haste, no impulsive acting on momentary 'enthusiasm'. Eventually, Descartes is content to lead the secluded life of thought. He concerns himself scarcely at all with the ecclesiastical controversies of his day, so that his aloofness has been construed as fear and undue caution for his own personal safety. It may be

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1. Descartes - Selections. p.27.

so, but it may also be that he felt himself to have achieved such a measure of genuine insight into the way in which truth is revealed as to make him content to state his findings as precisely as might be. His insights carry him beyond the short enthusiasms of a reformer. They possess a timelessness which renders trivial the contemporary strictures of the church. They have a scope so sweeping that they make the seer very humble, so that he speaks of wonder as the fundamental passion of the soul. They make him content to wait,- indeed they lift him out of himself, so that he does not really matter. Inconsistencies there are, of course, within the writings which he submits to the authority of the church, and between them and the dogmas of the church, but they are not such as may not one day be corrected by "the judgement of the more sage", and ultimately, Descartes was convinced, they were in harmony with the deepest meanings and purposes of the church, which was the symbol and the shrine of real religion.

Here then is the answer to the question; What is it that can commit the will, which in itself is liable to error, always and only to the truth ? Commitment to the truth is a fundamental attitude, the very price of knowing truth. It does not await the full vision of the truth, for that has about it a character of revelation.

Descartes, standing at the beginning of the 'modern' period, profoundly influenced subsequent philosophical thought. For the purposes of this study he has been discussed, not in respect of those contributions which are generally regarded as most significant for later thought, but in a manner which links him with the mediaeval world. This link is provided by the Catholic Church, to which he remained always devoutly faithful. But it is not merely as conservatively orthodox that he retains connection with this past. Rather do his personal notes bear witness to a profound inner experience which moulds his after life, and which at once makes him fellow to Augustine and to the long line of saints and sages who cherished alive the twin traditions of thought and mysticism.

There are two points of view to be found in Descartes which seem strikingly at variance. The one, which links him intimately with Augustine, may be indicated by his statement concerning the will, that it "causes me to know that in some manner I bear the image and similitude of God." The other is his distinct and clear idea of God's existence. Descartes himself sought to account for the duality of 'will' and 'reason' in his analysis of the Passions. The reconciliation of this dualism is rendered the more difficult by his definition of body as mere extension, functioning according to mechanical principles, while thought, or thinking substance, is utterly different. Neither substance

can be reduced to the other, yet both in fact cohere in the nature of man, and are supported in the unity of God.

That which these definitions preclude observation insists on allowing. Mind does act on body, apparently, and body on mind. How is this possible ? In the "Passions of the Soul" Descartes saw effects produced in the soul which had bodily movements as their cause. The transmission of these movements to and from the pineal gland, 'the seat of the soul', was effected by 'the animal spirits', which were 'bodies of extreme minuteness' present in the organism and described as the most volatile constituents of the blood. These passed to and fro in the neural pathways of the body, causing movements in one part to initiate corresponding movements in another. This is a corpuscular theory of the transmission of psychic energy, though Descartes also has a suggestion of a wave theory. ("...just as when one draws one end of a cord the other end is made to move.")[1]

A passion, then, is an effect in the soul of a bodily action. Many of these bodily changes, indeed all those which are also found to occur in animals, take place quite independently of the soul. Here is first foreshadowed the concept of the reflex arc in psychology. These changes are peripherally initiated, the power to set up the action being located in the outside world, while the muscular

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1.R. Descartes - "The Passions of the Soul". Art. XII.

response comes as a mechanical effect, following the transition of 'animal spirits' from the organ stimulated along the nerve 'filaments' to the brain, and thence through other nerves to the muscles. These changes thus begin in the body as 'passions', i.e. with the body as 'patient', though in so far as appropriate response is called forth the body is also 'agent'. Similarly the functions of the soul are of two kinds,- desires, which are active, being originated in the soul itself, and perception or knowledge in the reception of which the soul is passive. The double role of agent and patient is thus played by both body and soul, and played for the most part alternately. "What in the soul is a passion is in the body commonly speaking an action."(1)

Let us see what these different states are, in body and mind, and the relation between them. Movements of external objects may affect our bodies, setting the animal spirits in motion, This may result in certain changes in the brain, followed by muscular response, the animal spirits acting throughout as agents of transmission. Those changes in the brain may have had the further effect of setting up a state of 'passion' in the soul. All perception, including perception of bodily changes, is in a sense 'passion' for the soul,i.e. it is a passive reception of representations of extended things. The soul, as patient, is "united to all the portions of the body conjointly", but particularly

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1. Ibid. Art. II

to the small central area known as the pineal gland; this selection being made by Descartes on the ground that, unlike most bodily structures, the pineal gland was unitary and asymmetrical and so could conceivably join together dual sensory reports into unified representations of objects. But the soul is an 'agent' also. Not all perceptions are representations caused by bodily substance. We have direct perception of our desires, which owe their origin to the soul as agent. The soul acts independently of body in desire, yet its desire may be directed towards bodily ends, in which case the body is the 'patient' of the soul. Some of our perceptions we relate to objects in the external world, others to our own body, and still others to our soul. It is these latter which Descartes proposes to call the 'passions of the soul'. In so far as a thing is perceived at all, its perception is a passion of the soul, but Descartes proposes to use the term in a special sense to refer to "feelings of joy, anger, and other such sensations".[1] These indeed may be excited through the same bodily processes as underlie other forms of perception. Their peculiar quality is seen to lie in the force of their excitation,- "there are no others which so powerfully agitate and disturb it (the soul)."[2] Hence Descartes suggests an alternative name,- "emotions of the soul". But in the very next Article he also calls desires, which

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1. Ibid. Art. XXV.
2. Ibid. Art. XXVIII.

he holds to be actions initiated by the soul itself, 'emotions of the soul'; the distinction between passion (in the narrow sense) and desire - both of which are also 'feelings' - being drawn primarily in terms of their causes. Passions are caused by 'extended substance', desires by the soul or 'thinking substance'. Descartes is here committed to an interaction theory of the relation between mind and body, a position explicitly recognized in Article XXXIV entitled "How the soul and the body act on one another". This conclusion denies the incompatibility of thought and extension. The relation between body and mind is intimate and continuous. Properly speaking, then, neither one nor the other is pure 'substance', in the sense of being always a subject and never a predicate.

In the first Article on the Passions there is vaguely suggested a point of view which might have saved Descartes from this predicament. It is that passion and action are in reality dual aspects of one and the same process, the fundamental characteristic of which is movement. Movement as received is passion, movement as imparted is action. This position is compatible with the apparently loose way in which he speaks of 'emotion' as both passion (in the narrow sense) and desire; desire would then be the active, moving, aspect of emotion, and passion the passive aspect, the condition of the person 'moved'. But Descartes is committed further to the position that

all things must have a cause. Therefore passion is an effect, action a cause; and since these are states both of the body and of the soul, and states moreover which are mutually dependent, some principle of interaction between mind and body must be postulated.

The necessity for such a principle is made clearer when it is seen that not even desires are really caused by the soul quite independently of the body. Passions, i.e. states in the soul caused by violent agitations of the body, have as their principal effect the stimulation of desire,- "they incite and dispose their soul to desire those things for which they prepare their body, so that the feeling of fear incites it to desire to fly, that of courage to desire to fight, and so on."(1) The attempt to schematize the admitted causal relations illustrates conclusively the assumption of interaction. Here is a system of bodily changes which may go on quite independently of mind, wherein my body and its environment function both as cause and effect. Some, or all, of these changes may however be perceived by my mind, the environmental and bodily changes alike. There is then a causal relation between them and my perception of them. My perceptions may further incite desires, and the desires may result in bodily changes, and hence changes in the environment. Sometimes, though, my desires need not be thus

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1. Ibid. Art. XL.

dependent on perception, and need not have bodily effects. Also I can perceive my desires in the same way as I perceive objects; and perception of objects may, in cases of imagination and illusion, have no real objective cause. In such cases perception depends on an act of the will.[1] Small wonder that Malebranche sought to introduce some order into this tangled mass of causal relations by insisting that there could only be one 'vera causa', namely God. More discerning still was Hume's probing into the very nature of our idea of cause. Why must a cause always be necessary, since the assumption leads us into such confusion ?

Descartes' own way out of the confusion was to appeal to his own experience. Whatever may be the cause of emotions,(and this is a word which may stand for passions, whose "ultimate and proximate cause" is material, or for desires, whose proximate cause is mental or perceptual) he finds them subject to the control of the <u>will</u>. At first sight the introduction of will seems to be only an added complication. But it serves to remind us of the fact that beyond the mass of conflicting motives and alternating desires which characterize the momentary state of this body-mind complex there is the general direction of a person's life. There is memory, too, from which records of other similar situations may be brought, though not necessarily to provide a check to particular desires, since

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1. Ibid. Art. XX.

we remember chiefly those things which we desire to remember. Reason intervenes, introducing consideration of the kind of results that are likely to follow if we yield to the desire incited by some one emotional state. Reason cannot perhaps supplant passion, but it can restrain the accompanying desire until the moment of excitement has passed. We have seen that in the intellectual life the path of wisdom was for the will to formulate judgments based on clear and distinct ideas, since such judgments must certainly be valid. So here is laid down a regulative principle in respect to passion and desire,- that the will adhere to "the firm and determinate judgments respecting the knowledge of good and evil, in pursuance of which it has resolved to conduct the actions of its life."[1] This sense of direction, consistently and resolutely held, will, in course of time, result in the formation of habits which support it; the kind of passions which result from the bodily action will be such as conduce to one's general life-purpose. The conflict between divergent desires, with its trail of slavery and unhappiness, will be eliminated eventually by the formation of thought-habits all of which are subsidiary to this one general life-purpose.

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1. Ibid, Art. XLVIII.

II.

There was a young man in Descartes' own country whose life accentuates the diversity of the points of view that merge in Descartes' system. Blaise Pascal was a worthy successor to Descartes in mathematical genius. The story of his childhood's curiosity over geometry and his discovery, all untaught, of some of Euclid's propositions, develops into a record of outstanding mathematical achievement. But this mathematical brilliance is far from forming the basis, either of a philosophical system, or of his belief in God. "If there be a God, he is infinitely incomprehensible", says Pascal. The language is comparable to that of Descartes, but it is only the opening sentence of the celebrated 'wager' as to God's existence, a belief for which there is no proof. Pascal uses his findings in regard to probability theory in much the same way as Augustine had used his psychological observations, to strengthen his faith, not to give it a rational basis.

Descartes' philosophical system required a God to resolve its difficulties, hence the importance of the ontological argument for his existence. It is a God who may be defined as "a substance that is infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself and everything else, if anything else does exist, have been created."[1] God is

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1. Descartes - Selections, p.118.

introduced into Descartes' scheme as a logical necessity, relating together the otherwise isolated substances of thought and extension. But this God who is a logical necessity is not the God of religious experience. It is the God of Aquinas, rather than of Augustine. Prof. C.C.J.Webb, in his study of Pascal puts the matter rather well:

> "It is a profoundly important distinction between the philosophy of the seventeenth century and that of today that, while the former was content, taking the idea of God from the religious tradition of the civilization out of which it sprang, to employ it in scientific and philosophical speculation as though it were intelligible quite apart from any specifically religious experience, the latter recognizes that the conception of the Absolute to which our general reflection on the world, as known apart from religious experience, may conduct us cannot be as a matter of course interpreted by the religious associations of the word <u>God</u>; but that the notion of God is, strictly speaking, one only reached through that specific experience which we call religious; so that only as an inference from our acceptance of this as a genuine experience of reality are we at liberty to use that notion in explicating the nature of the Absolute of philosophy."(1)

It is an important distinction to which attention is here drawn, and it is one of which Pascal would have been acutely aware.

The comparison of Descartes with Pascal proves fruitful chiefly because there were elements in Pascal's experience which made him both a disciple of, and antagonistic to, Descartes. He is close to Descartes in that both of them exhibit an original mathematical genius, Pascal at a precociously early age. Descartes' enthusiasm for his mathematical discoveries, the fascination which they had for him, and the allegiance to scientific truth so loyally

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1.C.C.J.Webb - Pascal's Philosophy of Religion, p.21.

given,- into these attitudes Pascal could enter with an equal zest. But here the similarity ceases. Descartes receives the inspiration to devise a system of philosophy based upon a new general analytic method, but it is a system which quite repels Pascal. Pascal leaves us a volume of "Pensées" in hap-hazard order and the sketchiest form. They contain a profound distrust of 'the philosopher's God', a contempt for rationalistic arguments for his existence, an appeal to 'les raisons du coeur.' Unmistakeably the explanation of this striking divergence is to be sought in Pascal's own religious experience.

Descartes' own language in the Discourse on Method is also evidence of a distrust of philosophy amounting to a preference for participation in practical affairs, the life of the world, rather than the abstruse and unconvincing ratiocination of the schools. Yet he becomes the father of modern philosophy; and one is rather safe in attributing the comprehensive system which he produced to the discovery of a new method which held a criterion of certainty lifting his thinking out of the morass of scholastic discourse. That, at least; is what Descartes himself says. He is committed unwaveringly to this method, and it enlarges his vision until he feels himself capable of presenting a reasoned, clear, coherent, account of God, of nature, and of human life. Henceforward his life is controlled by this vision of the true.

Pascal's allegiance is given to something very different. It is given to 'les raisons du coeur.' His whole criticism of Descartes might well be contained in one line from the 'Pensées': "The knowledge of God is very far from the love of him."[1] Pascal is here emlarging the whole scope of Cartesian philosophy, and , by implication, challenging some of its most basic assumptions. For the fundamental fact about knowledge is not, as Descartes supposed, a clear idea, whether of oneself or of God or of extended bodies. It is an attitude, a feeling, 'une raison du coeur', an instinct. "We know truth, not only by the reason, but also by the heart, and it is from this last that we know first principles; and reason, which has nothing to do with it, tries in vain to combat them."[2]

C.C.J.Webb has sought to discover just what Pascal meant by 'les raisons du coeur', and his conclusion is that the phrase covered two distinct processes, which Pascal does not clearly distinguish,- 'instinctive belief', and 'intuitive knowledge'. By instinctive belief is meant attitudes comparable to those discoverable in the behaviour of animals lacking the discursive intellect of man. Indeed, 'Reason' is chiefly used in 'rationalizing' behaviour which has been initiated and dictated by considerations of self-interest and self-

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1. The Thoughts of Blaise Pascal - C.Kegan Paul, p.252
2. Ibid. p.102.

preservation without being clearly thought about at all. This analysis of the tendency to rationalize behaviour may be indicated by the following quotation from the 'Pensees':

> "M. de Roannez said: 'Reasons come afterwards, but at first a thing pleases or shocks me, without my knowing the reason, and yet it displeased me for the reason which I only discover later.' But I believe, not that he was displeased for those reasons which he afterwards discovered, but that those reasons were only discovered because the thing was displeasing."[1]

That William James read Pascal's Pensees is clear from his reference in the essay entitled "The Will to Believe". One wonders whether there is not here more than a chance suggestion of thepoint of view incorporated in the James-Lange theory of emotion.

'Intuitive knowledge', immediate apprehension of first principles is also included among 'les raisons du coeur'. The first principles of knowledge are given, not deduced through reasoning. "For our knowledge of first principles, as space, time, motion, number, is as distinct as any principle derived from reason. And reason must lean necessarily on this instinctive knowledge of the heart, and must found on it every process. We know instinctively that there are three dimensions in space, and that numbers are infinite, and reason then shows that there are no two square numbers one of which

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1. Ibid. p.309.

is double of the other. We feel principles, we infer propositions, both with certainty, though by different ways. It is as useless and absurd for reason to demand from the heart proofs of first principles before it will admit them, as it would be for the heart to ask from reason a feeling of all the propositions demonstrated before accepting them." (1)

Pascal's empiricism is thus very different from Sensationalism. "Two things instruct man about his whole nature, instinct and experience."(2) Not only is our knowledge of the external world built up from data given to us through sensation, as it is for Locke, but the very principles which our reason follows in systematizing its materials, are themselves products of infra-rational processes. This disparagement of reason is probably directed partly against the rationalism of Descartes, whom Pascal calls "useless and uncertain".(3) In his discrediting of rationalistic proofs for the existence of God, however, Pascal indicates his close affinity with the Augustinian tradition, as opposed to the large place given in the Thomist system to the rationalistic vindication of religious experience and dogma.

"Dieu sensible au coeur". There was an immediate, face-to-face knowledge for Pascal, which made

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1. Ibid. p.102.
2. Ibid. p.26.
3. Ibid. p.304.

elaborate proofs for his existence irrelevant and distasteful. God was a being to be loved, rather than a necessary hypothesis. One is here in the presence of the centrally significant experience in Pascal's life, comparable to Augustine's conversion, comparable perhaps to the crisis at Neuburg in Descartes' life. It is not, I think, necessary to enter into great detail. In 1654 there occurred an experience which Pascal himself dates exactly, and describes in fragments of ecstatic language. This was followed by his enthusiastic identification with the Port Royalist movement, a group with which he had for some time previously been in contact, and of which his sister Jacqueline was already a member. The 'solitaries' of the Abbey of Port Royal were followers of Cornelius Jansénius, a Flemish theologian whose doctrines, based on the teaching of Augustine, were condemned by Pope Innocent X in 1653. Two years later Arnauld, also a Jansenist, was denounced by the Sorbonne as a heretic. It was as a defence against these charges of heresy that Pascal wrote the'Lettres Provinciales', acting on behalf of the members of Port Royal. Whatever the merits of the theology they professed,there can be no doubt that they sought to effect such reforms in the Catholic Church as should reconcile its authority with authentic personal religious experience. It was thus a Protestant movement in the sense that Luther and Calvin were Protestants, yet unwilling to revoke its allegiance to the church.

It is in the light of this experience and the identification with the Port Royalist movement that the section of Pascal's Pensees entitled "Of the True Righteous Man and of the True Christian" needs to be read. It is the language seemingly of an ascetic, urging the depravity of the will, and the need for hatred of self. "Self-will never will be satisfied, though it should have power for all it would."(1) This is almost the language of Hobbes, but for Pascal it indicates quite clearly the depravity of a will directed towards the aggrandisement of the self, a condition as natural and inescapable as it is vicious and self-defeating. Then follows this paragraph:

> "To hate self, and to seek a truly lovable being to love, is therefore the true and only virtue, for we are hateful because of lust. But as we cannot love what is outside us, we must love a being which is in us, yet not ourselves, and that is true of each and all men. Now the universal Being is alone such. The Kingdom of God is within us; the universal good is within us, is our very selves, yet not ourselves."(2)

It is not important that Pascal's theology found a place for doctrines of original sin and salvation by grace. What is significant is this paradoxical language about the self. The self is seen as a 'member' of an infinitely larger whole, on the analogy of the body and its members, the part finding its true nature only in the whole. The analogy is extended to civil government, in words which suggest a theory of the general will. "We should look to

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1. Ibid. p.240.
2. Ibid. p.240.

the general advantage, and the inclination to self is the beginning of all disorder, in war, in politics, in economy, and in man's own body."[1] The explanation of Pascal's 'hatred of self' is found in this sense of the futility of a self wrecking its own happiness by being untrue to its own deepest nature, which is not that it shall remain an isolated, independent entity, but that by its own consent it shall become a significant, willing, obedient, member of the whole. This consent to be ruled by the good constitutes the essence of the re-orientation of his life. He proceeds to identify himself whole-heartedly with that movement in France, which as it seemed to him stood for a purified and simplified religious life. The certainty of his writing in the Lettres Provinciales is vastly different from the vacillating, undecided, state of mind portrayed in "The Weakness, Unrest, and Defects of Man", the chapter in the Pensees which completes the tale of "The Misery of the Man without God."

Let us now see wherein Pascal differed from Descartes. Descartes builds his philosophical system on an irreducibly clear knowledge of himself. His correspondingly clear idea of God is obtained by way of the ontological argument. Pascal thinks of the self as being caught up in the larger whole, the universal good. Its

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1. Ibid. p.239.

identity is retained, in fact it is only thus completely realized. Sainte Beuve's remark, that Pascal's was "l'esprit le moins panthéistique qu'on puisse concevoir", together with the evidence of his ascetic tendencies, make it clear that the universal good was not to be equated with the whole of the natural world as experienced by the natural self. It was a condition, a manner of life, entered upon as a result both of effort and of 'grace'. The relationship of the self with God is one of faith, not knowledge; it is "Dieu sensible au coeur". It is a relationship where the 'term' God is infinitely incomprehensible, where the human 'term' alone is susceptible of rigorous analysis and revision. "Labour then to convince yourself, not by increase of the proofs of God, but by the diminution of your passions."[1]

Both Descartes and Pascal thought of the will as different from the intellect. For Descartes it went astray unless it were kept rigorously subordinate to the processes of reason. For Pascal it was likewise evil, but the solution of this predicament lay not with reason, which more often than not only succeeded in rationalizing past conduct, whether good or evil. It lay rather in the subjection of the will to something of its own nature, as it were, i.e. to the will of God. Pascal is unable to start with clear ideas of anything,

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1. Ibid. p.99.

least of all of the self. The subjection of the will to reason, which for Descartes is the price to be paid for clarity and certainty of knowledge, is a resolution which Pascal is quite unable to carry out by himself. He is helpless because he finds in fact his reason acting as the accomplice of his will, complacently validating and justifying his own prejudices, which are founded, not on clear knowledge, but on desire. The way out of the egocentric predicament, which yields nothing but dissatisfaction, lies for him through obedience and allegiance to that which is other than himself. To be true to Pascal one must add that what happens is that he escapes by being rescued. God makes himself known, not to the reason but to the heart, and saves him from himself. This is the doctrine of grace.

Certain conclusions emerge from this comparison of Descartes and Pascal. In spite of the language of the first meditation, and Descartes' profession of universal doubt, Pascal's was the more devastating scepticism. Descartes' doubt concerns only the field of 'speculative truths'. He is content to abide by the customs of his country and the religion of his fathers, for the sake of peace and freedom to pursue his metaphysical and scientific investigations. Historians have not been slow in pointing out that this attitude lands him in a quandary, because his own writings,

accepting as they do the Copernican hypothesis, would, if published, have brought him into conflict with the church. This is clear from Descartes' own letters to Mersenne. Descartes wished to avoid such controversy, and it is possible to interpret this reticence as an earnest and humble effort not to sacrifice truth to the pettiness of shallow dispute. Such a course was not open to Pascal. His doubt swept the whole field of human speculation, and then, turning inwards, proceeded to demolish the fabric of his own reliance on himself. Webb speaks of a certain "lack of confidence in his moral intuitions"; it becomes uncertain whether what he calls justice is really justice. "After many changes of judgement concerning true justice, I recognized that our nature was a continual change, and I have not changed since; were I to change I should but strengthen my opinion." In his searching self-criticism there is literally nothing left secure, nothing of himself, nothing,- except his certainty of God.

Perhaps it is presumptuous to venture any interpretation of Pascal's mystical experience. We know something of the early man,- the changed man arouses our admiration. And between the two there occurs an experience of which Pascal gives a rather incoherent introspective account,- the account of a miracle. We are faced with a peculiar difficulty here, because the descriptions by all the mystics of the supreme experience in which God reveals

himself to them vary considerably one from another. Many of them are masses of confused,detail, most of them in highly metaphorical language. Moreover, there is generally a crisis, dramatically sudden, which becomes isolated in the person's experience with peculiar vividness. It is precisely dated perhaps, the exact spot is remembered, the liberating words recalled, the sense of the divine presence acutely keen.

Treating such experiences briefly, and trying to discover in them indications of general psychological laws, one may perhaps be allowed one or two observations;
1. That there is always the sense of an objective presence, other than the person to whom the experience occurs.
2. That there is often an apparent loss of temporal perspective. The sense of dramatic change foreshortens the past and focusses attention on one vivid experience. Careful examination of the evidence often reveals a much more gradual process (e.g.Pascal's familiarity with the Port Royalists.)
3. That two general types of such experience occur: a. of an emotional nature: There is intense personal satisfaction of desire; the experience is likely to be recurrent. It is this type which is usually dealt with as evidencing various kinds of emotional repression. b. of a moral nature: the experience is demanding of the person. It requires the fulfilment of certain conditions,- self-analysis, acknowledgement of sin, surrender of personal desires. It carries a sense of release. It is not so spectacular, and is not recurrent.

It may be that the distinction between these two types is just that the second is more thorough-going than the first; but it is a fundamental distinction. The exaltation of emotion has obvious shortcomings. It points so often to a pathological condition, as witness Voltaire's remark about Pascal, that this was the writing of a sick man. This does not mean that the second type is devoid of an emotional content, but if one apply a pragmatic test to the lives of those whose later accomplishments are beyond question great there is more to reckon with than perverted methods of emotional satisfaction. There is control of emotion, rather than giving it right of way; there is the introduction, as in Augustine, of the language of the will, which marks, not a disorganized, but a thoroughly organized person. In the final chapter we shall try to express the meaning of such a person's inner experience of consent to be ruled by that which is not himself. This is the idealistic aspect of this thesis. But from the point of view of psychology it seems clear that the mystics' sense of 'anéantissement' is very different from any form of 'dissociated personality' or dominant emotional complex. It is the experience of a person who thenceforward lives a life of rare freedom, devoid of fear, unharassed by conflict.

III.

The attempt must now be made to point out the diverging methods by which readers of Descartes sought to reconcile the dualism inherent in his system. Pascal's solution is to deny the relevance of Reason at the deepest levels of human experience. It is a false absolutization of Reason which presents the opposition between will and intellect as insoluble. The scope of Reason being very limited, this opposition cannot be regarded as depriving man of all hope of certainty. Pascal's own personal experience leads him to deny the premisses which he attributes to Descartes. The inherent rationality of man, his ability to subjugate his will and his passions to his reason, are quite illusory ideals. Even his moral standards are precariously relative to his own changing desires, and have no absolute certainty. Escape from complete scepticism is only effected by his being willing to forsake the inadequacy and futility of a life speciously lived according to Reason, and to find release in complete obedience to the will of God. This is a non-rational experience, which is facilitated by the honesty of his own recognition of helplessness, but which ultimately comes to him by the sheer grace of God.

It is significant that the sketches of Pascal's philosophical system should have remained as we

now have them, luminous flashes of insight, couched in rarely beautiful language. By the very nature of his approach to reality, Pascal is committed to a life characterized by moral enthusiasm, rather than to the serene, unhurried, resolution of metaphysical problems. It may be doubted whether his early death is sufficient explanation of the fragmentary character of his writings. Indeed, Pascal illustrates the validity of a conclusion which emerges from a study of the relationship of the Church to philosophical thought,- that there is a genuine disparity between religion and philosophy,- a disparity which is glossed over to the dis-service of both by their joint usage of the term God. This is indicated rather clearly also in the case of Malebranche.

Nicholas Malebranche was born in 1638, some forty years later than Descartes, and after a sickly childhood necessitating private tuition, entered the Oratory of Jesus in Paris at the age of twenty-one. Like the Jansenist Movement, of which the Abbey of Port Royal had become the centre in France, with Arnauld and Pascal as its outstanding scholars, the Oratory of Jesus had, in its effort to strengthen and deepen the inner life of the Catholic Church, revived the study of Augustine. Here Malebranche studied theology and philosophy, yet deriving from his study a dissatisfaction comparable to that which

drove Descartes to forsake his books and go forth into the life of the world. Because of his physical weakness and ill-health this course was never open to Malebranche, and fortunately it was not necessary. At the age of twenty-six he was introduced, accidentally, to the writings of Descartes, and found in them the clarity of expression, the honest facing of fundamental problems, of which he was in search. He devoted himself whole-heartedly to the study of Descartes, and his own writings constitute a development and a criticism of that system. Like Descartes he also pursued the study of mathematics and experimental science, being particularly attracted to the study of insect life.

Malebranche accepts the radical independence of Descartes' two types of substance, thought and extension, and faces the logical problem which such a dualism involves. There is no possibility of relationship, of causing, willing, or knowing, between mind and body. Hence the mind can only have a knowledge of bodies in so far as it has ideas of them; ideas, however, belong to the category of 'thinking substance', not to extension. This is Descartes' doctrine of representative perception, and the ground for such representations' being true is found, not in any ability of the mind to compare them with their originals, for the mind cannot know matter directly, but

in the possibility of "seeing all things in God."[1]

Probably Malebranche's most distinctive contribution to philosophy is his discussion as to the nature of cause. Causality is defined as "puissance d'agir"; causes produce their effects "by the force of their own nature". This means, in the physical world, that causes have the power to initiate motion. But the initiation of motion cannot be attributed originally to matter, but only to God. Matter, defined as extension, is by its own nature inert and passive and ineffective. In so far, then, as any description of physical events in terms of cause and effect is legitimate, physical causes must be regarded as 'occasions' only for their subsequent effects. It is God who really causes physical changes, using antecedent conditions as 'occasional causes'.[2]

To apply this doctrine to the problem of the relation between mind and body, the objects and events in the physical world occasion, but do not cause, our ideas of them. They are merely the occasions of our having certain ideas. Evidently this functioning of 'occasioning' did not constitute a real relationship between mind and body for Malebranche, and so the independence of the two substances was maintained. Malebranche distinguishes carefully between the physiological processes which are theoretically correlated with thinking, and the perceptions,

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1. Malebranche - Recherche de la Vérité. Livre III, Part.II.Ch.6.
2. Ibid. Livre VI. Part.II. Chap.3.

sensations, ideas, and thoughts themselves. The action of matter on mind being inconceivable, what Malebranche calls 'traces' in the brain can only be occasional causes for these thought processes.(1) By the same reasoning, mind cannot act on matter, so that the problem as to the existence and the explanation of the freedom of the will must be solved.

Besides being furnished with ideas, which are occasioned by natural causes, the mind has 'natural inclinations'. These are directed towards various goods. First of all, there is the characteristic of restless seeking after truth and happiness. This we have found to be basic in Augustine's treatment of the will, and also to find its place in Descartes' system, where he speaks of the fundamental worth of wonder or curiosity. This seeking has as its natural goal the vision of God. But there are also inclinations directed towards our own preservation and well-being. A third type of inclination is directed naturally towards the good of others, and is based on sympathy. Such inclinations, subsidiary to the general inclination towards the good, and having to do with specific, particular, goods, bear an intimate relationship to the passions, which have for their occasional causes certain far-reaching bodily changes indicative of

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1. Ibid. Livre II. Part I. Ch. 5. Sect 1.

unusual tension on the part of the organism. Malebranche has a detailed analysis of the elements included in emotion or passion, together with their physiological correlates. Pleasure and pain are involved, as indices of good and evil. Pleasure is a sign of the good; it indicates what kind of action will be in conformity with our inclination for self-preservation. The passions put us in touch with the conditions of life, they suggest the direction of our inclinations towards personal and social good. 'Admiration', or wonder, does not however in the same way lead us to the general good, namely to God.

These natural inclinations are what we speak of as will. Our will is most distinctively given us by God. It is an 'impression' of God, and as such it is naturally inclined towards the Good. This is in close agreement with Descartes, but, like Descartes, Malebranche has to account for error and evil. This is achieved by thinking of the will as inclined towards particular goods as well as towards the general or universal Good, that is, towards God Himself. The general direction of the will towards good is comparable to the general laws of nature. God, the true and only cause, acts in created nature through general laws which are the immutable expressions of his will. Occasional causes constitute the particular operation of these general laws. A specific example of what is meant by such a general expression of will is to be found in the

relation between body and mind. It is the will of God which joins together the disparate substances of thought and extension, providing sensory and nervous mechanisms as occasional causes for the translation of thought into action involving the body. Now the general direction of the will towards the good constitutes its 'invincible determination'. It is naturally inclined towards the good. Recognition of this is, however, obscured, in particular situations because of the variety of possible alternatives, the conflict of desires, insufficiency of knowledge, and the tendency towards impulsive action. Hence arises a kind of freedom, the freedom of uncertainty. In this sense the will is free in respect of particular goods, simply because they are particular. There are always alternatives.

> "L'esprit ne peut pas ne pas choisir le motif qui, à ce moment, lui parait le meilleur, mais il peut toujours ne pas choisir, suspendre son consentement. Comme les biens particuliers, qui sont souvent de faux biens, ne déterminent pas l'esprit invinciblement, nous pouvons, en raison du mouvement vers Dieu qui est le fond de notre volonté, réserver notre consentement jusqu'à ce que des biens plus certains nous apparaissent."(1)

The only case in which the will is invincibly determined, where there is no hesitation as to what constitutes the good, is when it is directed in worship towards God. This lack of hesitation, this certainty in respect of the general good, breeds a kind of freedom immeasurably superior to that existing in particular situations, indeed it is only as this general good is pursued, consented to,

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1.V. Delbos - La Philosophie Française, Ch.IV.Part.II,p.129.

chosen, that any criterion becomes available for removing the uncertainty attaching to specific situations. Malebranche holds this general direction towards the good to be the essential characteristic of will,- in this is found its freedom. "Nos inclinations ne peuvent être réglées que lorsque nous aimons Dieu de toutes nos forces, et toutes choses pour Dieu, par le choix libre de notre volonté."(1) Such a significantly central free choice may be incompatible with Malebranche's doctrine of occasional causes. Nevertheless it is his own language, and it demonstrates his sense of personal, willing allegiance to God,- rather than an unwitting, imposed dependence which would deprive him of any will at all.

The explanation both of freedom and of evil is found, then, in the action of the will. The one purely free act is the free choice to 'love God'. Thence is derived the possibility of 'seeing all things in God', i.e. seeing all things in the light of the general good, and so possessing a criterion for action in particular situations. The freedom of uncertainty consists in the possibility of either giving or with-holding consent in respect of inclinations directed towards particular ends. Error arises because of this type of freedom, since there is at this level no infallible criterion which will insure our choices being right in any particular case. The discovery of error and its correction is only possible because there is this fundamental orientation of the will towards the Good.

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1. Malebranche - Recherche de la Vérité, Book IV.CH.I. Sect.IV.

Malebranche prefaces Book V of his "De la Recherche de la Vérité", that on the Passions, with the warning that his psychological analyses abstract from the fundamental unity of man:

> "Enfin les sens et l'imagination ne diffèrent pas davantage de l'entendement pur que les passions diffèrent des inclinations... L'homme est un, quoiqu'il soit composé de plusieurs parties; et l'union de ces parties est si étroite, qu'on ne peut le toucher en un endroit qu'on ne le remue tout entier. Toutes ses facultés se tiennent et sont tellement subordonnées, qu'il est impossible d'en bien expliquer quelqu'une sans dire quelque chose des autres." (1)

The divisions into which the whole work is arranged are explained to be merely for the sake of clarity and to avoid confusion and repetition. This fundamental unity, or integration, holds not only as between inclination and passion, but also between reason and will. Such a position is implied, for instance, in the first Book. concerning the Senses: "On pourrait assez conclure que l'entendement ne juge jamais, puisqu'il ne fait qu' apercevoir.... que c'est la volonté seule qui juge véritablement en acquiesçant à ce que l'entendement lui représente et en s'y reposant volontairement, et qu'ainsi c'est elle seule qui nous jette dans l'erreur." (2)

The point of view from which this paper is written regards such statements as these from Malebranche as being extremely significant. Because there is usually some one problem which a particular philosopher discusses

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1. Ibid. Book V. Ch. I.
2. Ibid. Book I. Ch. II. Sect.1.

with unique acuity, some specific aspect in which his speculation is richly original, the history of philosophy tends to become the selection of these most valuable contributions. But in the writing of any great philosopher there is an attempt at reaching adequacy of system, coherence of parts. Whitehead lays down two requirements for a system of philosophy,- logical coherence and adequacy.[1] There is a danger that the adequacy of a man's philosophy for himself will be overlooked in the criticism of inconsistencies which appear to other minds. It is easy to point to such inconsistencies, for instance, in Malebranche. The mind-body problem is not solved by denying interaction in the only case where it is directly felt, only to affirm it in such transcendental fashion that verification is quite impossible.

It is fascinating to see how the detection of inconsistency in a predecessor may set the really vital problem to a later thinker, wrestling with which he works out his own scheme. The dependence of Malebranche on Descartes, and the divergence of Pascal from Descartes, are illustrations; yet the emphasis on differences should not totally obscure a deeper-lying agreement.

One of the most valid corrections of casual appreciation of a man's philosophy comes by comparison with his own personal life, in so far as that is known.

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1. A.N.Whitehead - Process and Reality, p.4.

The study of more intimate documents often reveals that a man's writings reflect personal experiences apart from which they can be but imperfectly understood. Augustine's psychological observations illumine his theological treatises, while his personal Confessions bear witness to the depth and delicacy of his introspective analysis. In the account of his own early life and of the period of crisis, culminating in his conversion to Christianity, is to be found that restless seeking which is given so important a place in his later doctrinal exposition. Inevitably, therefore, his writings could only really be understood by men within whose own experience there had been wrought out a drama of comparable intensity, for that which is true in Augustine has been experimentally established in his own case, and so stands open to verification. To condemn as heresy or commend as competently authoritative are equally irrelevant attitudes towards writings grounded in genuine experience. Not until they are regarded as human documents descriptive of life can they be examined with any measure of sound appreciation. Changing cultural backgrounds, language forms, social conditions, may render these documents obsolete. Thus there can be no final literary form, no absolutely standard philosophical expression. Imaginative insight is essential alike for a sound evaluation of the old as for contemporary restatement. Thus Descartes marks the beginning of a new era in philosophy because

he rejects an arbitrarily imposed method of thought and appeals directly to his own experience, formulating a system wrought out in the full cognizance of the scientific investigations of his day. Yet in the direct appeal to his own inner experience Descartes uses language so astonishingly reminiscent of Augustine that commentators have uniformly discredited his disavowal of indebtedness. Whatever be the truth of the matter, it is certain that the freshness and directness of appeal to their own experience of life link Augustine and Descartes closely together. It is quite otherwise with the detailed content of their writings, and naturally so, for they stand in different eras of history.

Again, as between Descartes and Pascal, the differences of expression are obvious, differences accentuated by their strained personal relations. Yet if one turn from the demands of logical consistency to see how far each o f them achieved adequacy in his thinking, one will discover a surprisingly close bond of agreement. It is Kuno Fischer who concludes that ultimately 'will' is the foundation of Descartes' philosophy:

> "What lay at the foundation of doubt was the will, which sought to break through self-delusion, and penetrate to certainty. Certainty consisted in the clear and distinct knowledge of self and of God: from thence followed the clear and distinct knowledge of things without us, In the light of reason we saw the absolute opposition of soul and body. Our passions now prove the union of the two, for only in such a union could they have their source: they deny what clear knowledge affirms, Thus arises a contradiction

> "between the perceptions of our free reason, and the involuntary affections of our mind. The problem contained in this contradiction is solved when we understand the passions, see through the imaginary worth of their objects, and destroy their power. That opposition of soul and body does not prevent their union in human nature, and this union does not prevent the opposition of the two... If the will, by virtue of doubt, could break through self-delusion, and by the help of thought could attain to clear and distinct knowledge, it can by clear and distinct knowledge also master the power of the passions... the will, enlightened by knowledge, gains the victory over the passions also."(1)

Pascal did not so understand Descartes, and since the latter's attempt to reconcile the will with the reason seemed to him quite unconvincing, he proposes to reject "the reason of the philosophers". It is not worth an hour's study. This rejection is made, emphatically not 'in praise of folly', but is dictated by the necessity of being true to his own deepest experience. Even then Pascal is far from launching a romantic, sentimental, even mystical appeal to emotion. The grounds for belief are still 'les raisons du coeur'. The argument made to the sceptic for belief in God is still, in his eyes, mathematically legitimate. The will to believe is deeper than reason, but not antagonistic. "Nothing is so much in harmony with reason as a denial of reason in questions of belief. And nothing is more contradictory to reason than the denial of the same in questions which are not of belief. Not to admit that there is any such thing as reason, or not to admit anything but reason, are two equally dangerous errors." Pascal's protest against Reason is a demand for adequacy in philosophy. His condemnation is reserved for a system

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1. Kuno Fischer - Descartes and his School, p.436.

which gives no clue to the search for truth, which silently ignores the real springs of morality in the life of man, which fails to indicate to him the conditions of his own lasting happiness.

We have said that Malebranche is open to grave charges of inconsistency. It was inevitable that the Spinozistic identification of God with the world should follow Malebranche's "Vision of all things in God." The contrast between mind and matter had been drawn by Descartes. The contrast between man and God as drawn by Malebranche is comparably vivid. In ascribing the source of all our volitional acts to God, Malebranche subtracts from the term 'will' so much of its normal human content that he renders his analogous use of it as constitutive of the nature of God quite devoid of its original validity. Actually, it is clear, Malebranche is surreptitiously admitting, as genuine aspects of human experience, elements implied in the connotation of his terms which his piety then leads him to attribute exclusively to God. Spinoza's correction is apposite: "The intellect which would constitute the essence of God must differ toto coelo from our will and intellect, nor can they agree in anything save in name, nor any more than the Dog as a celestial constellation and the dog as a barking animal agree."(1)

It was also evident, when the discussion of causation had landed the participants in the predicament

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1. Spinoza - Ethics. Pt. I. prop. 17, Scholium. (Quoted by M. Ginsberg.)

of Malebranche, with real causes removed from the functioning both of matter and of mind and attributed to the activity of an incomprehensible God, that the time was ripe for a searching criticism of the very concept of causation. This was the task of Hume.

In Malebranche we find the term God transferred from the language of religion to the language of philosophy, and used there as a convenient solvent of metaphysical difficulties. That Malebranche was sincere in doing this may well be admitted, just as Berkeley's polemic against materialism was sincere, but one gains the impression that this combination of philosophy with religion is, in Malebranche's case, an attempt to combine incompatibles. One breathes the atmosphere of the cloister with Malebranche, and senses an unquestioning allegiance to the Church as guardian of an honourable and authoritative tradition. Quite other than this is his attitude to Platonic thought, in which he was also steeped. Malebranche himself points the contrast: " Matters of faith are only learned through tradition, and Reason cannot reveal them... Where theology is concerned, one ought to love antiquity because one loves the truth, and the truth is to be found in antiquity. Here all curiosity should cease, when once the truth has been reached. But in matters of philosophy it is novelty that should rather be prized, for the same reason, that the truth is always to be loved, that it must needs be sought after,

and that an unfailing curiosity must be exercised towards it. If Aristotle and Plato might be regarded as infallible, it would only be necessary, perhaps, to read them carefully, in order to understand them; but Reason does not validate such an attitude. Reason, in fact, demands that they be judged more ignorant than modern philosophers..."(1) The Faith is accepted on authority, enriched with the glamour of antiquity. The frank, honest, imaginative, appreciation of Plato and Aristotle gives place to a pious, unreflective acceptance of the doctrines of the Church.

Superficially, this attitude towards the church appears to be the same as was Descartes', but on closer examination its justification is far more difficult. Malebranche was an apologist for the church, Descartes found within it a warmth and beauty which he was loath to lose. In the attempt to reconcile the work of Descartes with the doctrines of the church, Malebranche is led to undermine the foundations of all human endeavour in thought and conduct. Man is deprived of real responsibility for his own ideas, his own actions, his own desires. The will of man is only a thin ghost of will; it does not motivate his conduct, but only creates an illusion of motivation. The real reason why our bodies do the things we want them to do is that the good God chooses to will effectively what we helplessly desire. Only in the worship of God can we be sure that our action is good, and that for the doubtful reason that it ministers to God's own boundless

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1. Malebranche - Recherche de la Vérité, Bk.II.Part.II. Ch.5.

conceit.

Malebranche's warning that 'l'homme est un' is difficult, then, to reconcile with the disorganizing effects of his own speculation, for the real conclusion of his thinking is that God is One, a paternal benevolence whose Will is law. The unity of man is in no sense a moral achievement, but is only sustained by the continuous action of God, making his ideas true and his volitions effective. It is a philosophy which could only have flourished within the sheltered atmosphere of a powerful and kindly institution, indulgently disposed towards the children it protected and cherished.

For Malebranche himself it would seem as though his doctrine of occasional causes left room for a fundamental freedom of man, which lay in the recognition that the world exhibited a system of law and order, to which man might conform his conduct and so find happiness. But the general effect of his writing was not to draw attention to this matter of personal orientation, but to make of him a thorough-going 'occasionalist', and hence a rather helpless person who spoke much of the will, but failed to breathe into it any genuine creative power.

CHAPTER IV.

LATER DEVELOPMENTS OF THE IDEA OF WILL IN MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

I.

We have seen how Malebranche's attempt to retain as many as possible of the elements in Descartes' system, and yet to be faithful to the logical implications of the disjunction between thought and things, leads to an unconvincing nominalistic theory of the will. In England, too, the concept tends to lose much of the meaning which it had once held; or perhaps it is that in a period when constitutions were being remade, freedom of conscience and of speech vigorously upheld, and the traditionally authoritative rulers of church and state restrained and controlled in the exercise of power, men knew so intimately and indubitably that they had wills of their own that even philosophers forbore to discuss so obvious a fact. The period that followed Descartes was predominantly rationalistic, both in England and on the Continent, a period in which problems of perception dominate the interest of the philosophers, relegating the study of emotion to comparative obscurity. Whitehead's criticism, that "Experience has been explained in a thoroughly topsy-turvy fashion, the wrong end first", refers specifically to this dominant interest of the British empiricists in what they called 'ideas' and what he prefers to define as "prehensions in the mode of presentational immediacy."[1]

This tendency is already evident in Descartes,

1.A.N.Whitehead - Process and Reality,Part.II.Ch.VII. Sect.II.

and it is accentuated in Locke and Berkeley. Locke's "Essay on the Human Understanding" is primarily an analysis of 'ideas', his discussion of the will occurring in a chapter on "The Idea of Power", following a very brief chapter "On Modes of Pleasure and Pain", in which the 'passions' are only mentioned by way of illustrating that "the ideas of them are derived from sensation and reflection".[1] According to Locke, the will supplies us with our "clearest idea of active power". This is a conclusion which Hume criticises severely. It is therefore considered in the light of that criticism, rather than in connection with Locke's own writing. It should be noted though that Locke enters a timely caveat against the too facile explanation of human behaviour in terms of 'faculties' of the mind. "It is the <u>man</u> that does the action, it is the agent that has power, or is able to do."[2] The force of this emphasis on the consistent, unified, action of the whole man, an emphasis which we have sought to bring out in our study of the actual lives of Augustine, Descartes, and Pascal, is however lessened in Locke by his willingness to acquiesce, for purposes of discussion, in the use of the terminology of 'faculty psychology'.

Berkeley is chiefly concerned to vindicate his belief in God, and it is this which leads him to his radical criticism of the doctrine of matter. In this day

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1. J.Locke - "An Essay on the Human Understanding", Book II. Ch.XX. Sect.18.
2. Ibid. Book II.Ch.XXI. Sect.19.

one may perhaps incline to the opinion that Berkeley's substitution of 'ideas' for 'matter' is not after all so very revolutionary, that "unthinking objects of the mind... entirely passive... whose existence consists only in being perceived" are not so very different after all from "inert matter". Berkeley himself says: "All the difference is that, according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances or spirits which act and think and perceive them; whereas philosophers vulgarly hold the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving substance which they call matter."[1] One could wish that the polemic against matter had not been so necessary, and that Berkeley had gone on to describe the operations of spirit. As it is, there is just enough, towards the end of the Principles, in his treatment of our knowledge of other minds and in his study of natural process as revealing God, to indicate that spirit acting on 'ideas' is that which he regards as truly significant. Unfortunately, before he can discuss Virtue or Duty he must furnish them with a background of 'ideas', not matter, and this task occupies his whole attention. Into the distinctions of perceiving, imagining, thinking, willing, he scarcely enters. With the elimination of matter his task is done,- the rest seemingly is easy. He is content with a simple definition, with which

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1. G. Berkeley - Principles of Human Knowledge, Sect.XCI.

Descartes would have agreed: "A Spirit is one simple, undivided, active being - as it perceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the will."[1] Concerning our 'notions' of these processes Berkeley has almost nothing to say.

Hume is led to a consideration of the will in his search for the source of our "idea of necessary connexion". Clearest of all in the record of a man's knowledge of life stand out two facts: that he is sometimes the victim of circumstances, and sometimes the master of them. Some things happen to him; others happen because he initiates them. At least, whatever the ultimate truth of the matter may prove to be, that is how it seems to him. And his language bears witness to this dual role of actor and sufferer. Hence words for fate, necessity, and all passive forms of verbs, and impersonal expressions; and on the other hand words like freedom, will, wish, desire, attempt, action, intention, purpose, and all active constructions with persons as subjects.

Of course the simplest explanation of the things that just 'happen', the vast area of life over which man exercises no control, is in terms of a cosmic controller. This explanation, which has its beginnings in primitive animism, is clearly an analogy from human experience, and appeals to man's'consciousness of power', the sense of active agency which he calls his will. Natural science

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1. Ibid. Sect.XXVII.

replaces such an explanation by the conception of an assumed relation of cause and effect between otherwise discrete material entities. It is the 'idea of necessary connexion' among objects (or even among 'ideas', as in Berkeley) that falls under Hume's scrutiny. How does it arise ?

> "It may be said, that we are every moment conscious of internal power; while we feel that, by the simple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our mind. An act of volition produces motion in our limbs, or raises a new idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we know by consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy; and are certain that we ourselves and all other intelligent beings are possessed of power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflection, since it arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and on the command which is exercised by will, both over the organs of the body and faculties of the soul."(1)

Hume does not accept the explanation in terms of 'internal power'. It does not occur to him that part of the pre-scientific explanation of natural process may yet remain in the concept of causality. Truly the will initiates action; "but the power or energy by which this is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable."

Moreover, the action of the will upon the body is most curious. Not all bodily processes are subject to voluntary control, nor the same processes under varying conditions. The initiation of action is indirect. It is willed to perform a specific task, but the method is that of appropriate innervation and muscular movement. Are these

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1. D. Hume - Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sect.VII, Part 1.'Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion.

means also willed ? Evidently not; how then can we say that the power we seek to isolate is found in 'willing' ? The same restrictions apply with regard to mental processes as to those of the body. Not all of them are equally subject to 'the command of the will', and "this self-command is very different at different times". So that Hume reiterates a conclusion arrived at in his preliminary investigation of physical causation: "the power or energy of the will (is) equally unknown and incomprehensible." "Volition", says Hume, "is surely an act of the mind",(1) but it is not the act whence is derived our idea of power. Instead he traces this idea to the fact of the repeated occurrence of events in the same order, and concludes that "the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist."(2) This is Hume's position, that although no evidence of necessary connection is discoverable in nature herself, it is yet our inveterate habit always to think of nature as though such evidence were really there. Here is suggested to Kant his doctrine of the categories of mind.

1. Ibid. Sect.VII. Part 1.
2. Ibid. Sect.VII. Part 2.

II.

We seem to have reached a period in the history of philosophy where interest in the problems of epistemology absorbs the attention of the philosophers to the exclusion of the problem of Socrates. Let us pause to review our findings: Socrates urging men to care for their souls; Augustine never at peace with himself until in all honesty his life is committed to the rule of the good; Descartes, disillusioned with mere book-learning, restlessly enlarging his experience of men and things, until a new method of fearless inquiry grips him with its tremendous possibilities, then writing simply in the vulgar tongue that all men, not professional philosophers only, may see how to rise above the thraldom of their own petty, uncertain desires and pursuits to follow after truth, freed alike from superstition and scholastic obscurantism; Pascal, submitting to the rule of Port Royal, and later becoming its brilliant, fearless defender,- a passionate nature, at times almost morbid in the manner of his expression, yet reiterating the message of Socrates in language that bears witness to his amazement at the incredible stupidity of men whose world is bounded by the trivial private affairs of a selfish life; Malebranche caught by the vision of all things in God, consenting freely to be governed by natural law, finding his true destiny in the worship of a God whose will was

precisely of such a nature that it lay revealed through the accurate unbiassed methods of science: these are the men we have studied. Doubtless such brief statements abstract from the context of their lives. But we have done our best to see what manner of men they were in their inner experience. We had to appraise the quality of their mature lives against their younger days, and then see what it was that moved them to write philosophy. We are not surprised that they made mistakes in working out their conceptions of the world and of man; but we should reject them as incompetent guides if we detected any faltering accent in their fundamental attitudes to life. If we found them vacillating between right and wrong, subscribing deliberately, even for the sake of expediency, to what they knew to be false, going back on the insight which first set them on the track of real discovery,- then we should be sadly disillusioned indeed. It is because just such charges have been levelled against Descartes that it was necessary to examine them in detail. It is because there are traces of utter scepticism in Pascal that his distinction between Reason and 'les raisons du coeur' had to be grasped, and his further conviction that after all the genuine solution of doubt had about it a character of revelation.

The problems in epistemology which Locke, Berkeley, and Hume discuss tinge philosophy with the

possibility of a radical scepticism not to be contemplated with equanimity. To pass at once to the man who saw most clearly the barren conclusions to which the limitations of our knowledge lead, provided we have no assurance that we are in touch with anything more enduringly real than our own transient ideas,- Kant, having demonstrated the phenomenological character of a rationally categorized world of sense perception, is forced to supplement this world by definite statements about the 'noumenal' world. Within the brief compass of this essay it is not possible to enter into a proper study of Kant, but the significance of the Metaphysic of Morality must at least be noted. If the entire range of scientific enquiry, the range of natural knowledge, is limited to a world which can confidently be asserted to be no more than a world of appearance, then immediately the search for the reality that lies back of the appearance is forced upon us. And for Kant it is the Will, the Practical Reason, that puts man in touch with this reality. Prevented by the limitations imposed upon his intellect from knowing anything about this noumenal world, he is yet confident of its reality. Nor is it just blindly felt. Its existence is attested by the moral nature of man, as well as being required to support the world of appearance.

If Hume's analysis of the concept of causality awakened Kant from his 'dogmatic slumber' and

led to his formulation of mental categories under which all experience is inevitably given, the Critique of Practical Reason also has its sources in the work of other men, notably Rousseau. The following attempt to elucidate the ideas which were in the air, and which were proving their potency in the political arena, and bringing to birth a new era in literature, is quite unhistorical in form. Its justification must be that it is easier to understand the moving force of new ideas after their implications have been clearly seen.

Hobbes, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, James, Bergson, supplement classical psychology by pointing to tha amazingly potent 'drives' which characterize all organic behaviour, and which are prompted ever to new forms of expression by a sort of relentless discontent or maladjustment which is never completely removed. The connecting of man with the long history of organic evolution is pre-eminently the work of the nineteenth century. It invalidates Descartes' clear-cut distinction between animals and men, and proceeds to recognize in sub-human life primitive principles of motivation which long antedate consciousness. It is no longer possible, therefore, to begin an account of experience with the data of impressions or sensations and their derivative ideas. There are no sensations apart from a sensitive organism, - there is just a meaningless flux of events, unrelated,

unarranged, unrecognized, the merest drift of existential stuff. Sensitivity emerges as the property of an organism, an entity differentiated from the flux, cohering and continuing as a unit. It becomes a point of reference; it encounters and opposes the flux. Born along by the flux, "as rain blown along earth's fields", it yet succeeds in retaining and developing its own identity. Pre-eminent in this process is the effort towards survival, but matched with this effort, indeed functioning as an index of achievement, is a 'subjective intensity of satisfaction'. Ultimately, this intensity of satisfaction, beginning perhaps as the merest subjective aspect of cutaneous irritability, becomes the stupendous novelty of 'consciousness'. Long before this, indeed all through its phylogenetic history, it has lived by the laws of cause and effect; it has survived in virtue of its 'prehensions in the mode of causal efficacy'[1]; by trial and error it has 'learned' what things belong to its salvation. Instinct, we say, has been its guide. It has lived <u>as if</u> it knew.

But this description is over-simple. For it is not one organism that has survived these many

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1, The phrase,'prehensions of causak erficacy' is coined by A.N.Whitehead in Process and Reality. Such prehensions are held to be more primitive than 'prehensions of presentational immediacy'. The differentiation required above may perhaps suggest how the second type arose from the first. Indeed it may turn out that this second type of prehension is almost as primitive as the first. As soon as an organism responds appropriately to different environmental factors,e.g.to light and to physical contact in different ways, there occurs the barest suggestion of separate objective reference, which I take to be involved in 'prehensions of presentational immediacy'.

vicissitudes, accumulating wisdom with the years. It is many, and the transition from individual survival to racial survival is no simple transfer of experience. The very inclusion of sex among the most fundamental drives of the organism should warn us that it is idle to confine our description of 'the state of nature', as Hobbes did, to the lone individual. We have to introduce, therefore, into this picture of the organism functioning through its prehensions of causal efficacy the hypothesis of such differentiation among these prehensions as shall make possible specifically appropriate responses to different factors in the environment, and one general kind of response will be towards others of its own kind, responses which involve the contributory functioning of other organisms.

To take now a giant stride through time into the midst of human society, Rousseau posits a will for the general good among men which is quite as inseparably a part of their 'nature' as is narrow self-interest. Long before Darwin metaphors derived from the living world of plants and animals were used to suggest the true nature of society. The early conception of a contract entered into by individual men acting deliberately and rationally, compromising their freedom from external restraint in order to better their material condition, and passing thus from a 'state of nature' into an

organized community or state with a duly constituted sovereign,- this anachronistic conception gives place in Diderot, for instance, to the notion of an earlier natural community in which each individual was bound to his fellow by innate feelings of sympathy and companionship.

This is the beginning of a romantic reaction against a rationalism which exalted man's reason as a 'substance' utterly different from anything else in nature, making of him an isolated individual whose conduct might be directed entirely by a will acting on the basis of clear and distinct ideas. Such a reaction is suggested by Pascal when he points out how subtly and ingeniously rationalisation of desire can take place. Romanticism is an escape from the loneliness and the coldness of 'private sense worlds'. It is a vindication of the natural, and therefore good, origin of "expansive instinct and emotion".[1] So far is it from believing that impulsive action is almost certain to lead to error, or that the will acting in advance of clear knowledge is evil, that it jubilantly acclaims spontaneity and unconventionality, and tends to look askance on action "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought."

Rousseau is not a radical romanticist. For him the will of the people is exercised according to reason. "No-one will dispute that the General Will is in

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1. Cf. Irving Babbitt - "Rousseau and Romanticism".

each individual a pure act of the understanding, which reasons while the passions are silent on what a man may demand of his neighbour and on what his neighbour has a right to demand of him."[1] Nevertheless, in other writings, especially the early prize essay on "The Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences", there is a very definite attack on the over-sophistication of civilized life, a criticism of the arts and sciences as having contributed to the degeneration of a will naturally good.

The idea of the General Will may perhaps serve as an indication of what was currently meant by will itself. The term, while it lays a much-needed emphasis on the social nature of man, is an analogy from earlier conceptions of his nature. Its choice indicates that in earlier psychology the will had been construed as integrating, in action, the various 'faculties' and 'powers' with which man was thought to be endowed. In seeking to correct rationalism Rousseau thus makes use of a conception which was already familiar to earlier philosophers. Only he seeks to free it from its exclusive dependence on intellect, and to introduce instinct and emotion as equally accredited factors in the life of man. The General Will is held to mark a genuinely novel integration which is more than the sum of the private wills of all the citizens. Indeed the General Will, once it

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1. Quoted from the original draft of the Social Contract by G.D.H.Cole in his Introduction to the Everyman Edition.

appears, has a salutary effect on the members of the society. It strengthens and ennobles their own wills. It thus proves to be not only a solving conception for the problems of the origin and development of civil life, but, retroactively as it were, to reaffirm the dependence of morality on a good will. This is the significance of the conception for Kant.

The General Will is a will generalized, i.e. universalized as to its object, a will for the general good. When this is understood it is seen that such a conception is already advanced in Malebranche; the fundamental natural inclination of the will is towards God. What one has to grasp in Rousseau, indeed in the eighteenth century generally, is an ideology, not of the church, but of the state. Malebranche had held that the supreme end of man is the worship of God. But this end is ceasing to have the vivid intimate meaning which it once had. Already in Descartes we have seen the scientist whose supreme end was loyalty to truth, a goal more meaningful to modern readers than the mystic's love of God. In Rousseau we find the summum bonum defined as the social good. This transvaluation is clear if we consider the kind of religion which Rousseau advocates,- a religion admittedly devised as a bulwark of the state, not as a good-in-itself. But before there can be any achievement of social good there must be the will for its realization,

a will that is so committed to the idea of the general good that it can afford to risk danger to private personal interests. This is something other than the compromise among conflicting interests which Hobbes envisaged. The general good of all must be an ideal held by the individual, an ideal for which he is willing to sacrifice his own immediate good. Rousseau believed this to be possible, indeed to be the natural condition of men uncontaminated by civilization. His confidence assumed further that in a community where all men were equal this will for the general good could find expression in democratic procedure, where those whose wills were biassed by concern for personal ends would cancel out each other's votes, leaving a true indication of the general will.

There are indications in Rousseau that the general good was ultimately a much vaster thing than the national state. He envisaged a European Federation, as witness his sympathetic editing of the Abbe de St.Pierre's "Project for Lasting Peace". He believed that the Christian ideal of brotherhood, and its other-worldly emphasis, cut across allegiance to particular states. Is it in all seriousness, then, that he rejects Christianity, after making so pointed a distinction between the religion of the Gospels and the theology of the churches ? May the concluding chapter of the Social Contract on Civil Religion not be in fact the sheer irony of an intense individualist ?

III.

Whatever be the reply to the questions in respect Of Rousseau himself, it is certain that Kant's conception of the good will is intensely individual. It is my will, autonomous and free. And it is good only because its scope is completely universal, not bounded in its reference by national frontiers, but legislating in terms of universal validity. Morality is not adherence to custom or tradition. It is rational, not instinctive, behaviour. It can only exist among rational beings, who act, not merely in conformity to law - all action necessarily conforms to law - but in obedience to the idea of law. "Duty is the obligation to act from reverence for law." Morality is defined in the subordination of an external 'must' to an internal 'ought'. It is really the fact that man is endowed with reason that makes moral conduct possible, that initiates the tragic splendour of the knowledge of good and evil, that yields the meaning of freedom. Henceforth the quest of happiness is mightily more poignant. No hedonistic calculus can now measure its results,- no social norms, no indices of success, suffice. Results are irrevelant. Morality concerns motives. And yet the idea of law is not enough. When Kant called the will the Practical Reason he doubtless meant to assert the primacy of intellect over 'natural inclination', a phrase which seems in his mind to have stood for the satisfaction of personal feeling and desire. But in calling the will

practical he is even more emphatically asserting that something must be done about the 'idea of law'. Man, capable of the idea, owes allegiance to it. In the acceptance of this obligation lies the fulfilment of duty.

Superficially, the unsatisfactory and unconvincing aspect of Kant's metaphysic of morality lies in the complete separation between the 'intelligible' world and the world of nature. In the intelligible world, the world of purely rational beings, all action is free, that is to say, it is action in conformity with laws laid down by the autonomous will. Unfortunately, in the world of human experience, such a freedom can never be demonstrated to exist, for man is subject to the laws of nature, which are heteronomously imposed. Kant knew this and saw no escape. Man is not free in this world of nature, and only wishful thinking can breed the illusion that he is. "As a natural scientist, a student of Newton, an original explorer of the stellar universe, proposer of a nebular hypothesis, he (Kant) finds no God in the world of physical law, no room there for freedom, no sign of immortality."(1)

But the concept of freedom remains. Its insistent voice it is which leads Kant into the intelligible world, the kingdom of ends, where rational beings, including men, are free and respect each other's freedom. Man is a creature of both worlds, immortal and free in the one, mortal in the other and subject to the laws of nature.

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1. W.E.Hocking, in"Immanuel Kant 1724-1924", p.38.

Modern physics begins now to suggest possibilities of freedom in a world where Kant, following Newtonian physics, found none. Whether the principle of indeterminacy holds the key to a reconciliation between Kant's two worlds is a question awaiting an answer. Strange witness to the monistic urge, though, is our incautious exploitation of such a possibility in preference to the more difficult belief in immortality.

Kant endorses the close alliance between will and reason which we found to be Descartes' ideal, although both terms have now been so exhaustively scrutinized as to deserve new names. That which Kant has rejected, in Malebranche and in Rousseau, is the wholesomeness of 'natural inclination', indicating that he conceived this to be in opposition, or at least irrelevant, to Reason. "Duty.... which proudly rejects all kindred with the inclinations." The nineteenth century does not support this exaltation of Reason. It tends instead to undermine the belief in man as an end in himself, and to make of him a stage only in the process of evolution. What may lie beyond man in the ultimate record of the total cosmic process remains for us inscrutably hidden, but meanwhile we are disposed to look with greater favour, and with more humility, to the possibilities of securing happiness through conformity to the requirements of natural law, than to assert the autonomy of our wills in a world which is alien to our immediate

experience. Yet Kant's emphasis on personal morality serves as a correction to the idea that the universal scope of the will is given in the social ideal alone. Such an end does not, as Kant himself pointed out, contain any clue by which to determine what are a man's 'duties to himself'. It simply is not adequate for the whole of life. Indeed it would seem as though the mediaeval will which had God for its supreme object,- even though one add paradoxically with Augustine and Pascal that God is incomprehensible,- is more nearly what is meant by the good will.

CHAPTER V.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE WILL.

The title of the present thesis, "The Doctrine of the Will as Consent", was suggested by two books written by W.E.Hocking,- "Human Nature and its Remaking", and "The Self, its Body and Freedom". The conception of 'Consent' is defined most clearly in that section of the second book, entitled "Why the Mind Needs a Body". Hocking traces schematically the order of the development of an emotion, using this as "simply a special case of all our mental dealings with the outer world."[1] That order is described as follows:

> " 1. The exciting idea in the mind;
>
> 2. Beginnings of disturbance in skeletal muscles and viscera, with increased adrenal flow;
>
> 3. The mind becomes aware of these changes (an incipient James-Lange effect);
>
> 4. The mind consents, or does not consent, to the further development of these expressive changes in the muscles under its control. Then, if consent is given;
>
> 5. Increased muscular activity and increased adrenal secretion;
>
> 6. Mental awareness of these changes (full James-Lange effect);
>
> 7. Development and exhaustion of the emotion. "[2]

The critical stage in this development, and the one ignored by the James-Lange theory of emotion, is Number 4, which Hocking proposes to call "the threshold of consent". He

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1.W.E.Hocking - The Self,its Body and Freedom, p. 68.
2. Ibid. p.64.

adduces in support the experimental work of Cannon and Britton on directly induced emotional states, and the work of Dr.G.Maranon of Madrid, who produced pseudo-emotional states in his patients by the artificial injection of adrenin. The significance for Hocking of this experimental evidence lies in the fact that where the emotional state in its mental, or subjective, aspect was fully aroused, the characteristic bodily changes were also present,- increased adrenal secretion and extensive visceral adjustments,- while where the physiological changes were artificially induced the resultant mental state was described by the patient in the terms of emotional experience, but using these terms expressly as a metaphor. It was "as if I was afraid". From this distinction Hocking draws the conclusion that the bodily changes are not sufficient of themselves to initiate the psychic state which must then run its normal course, but that an added constituent is essential for the emotional state to be fully constituted,- namely, the consent of the self.

Cannon found that the bodily changes which accompany emotions are not sufficiently differentiated to provide any satisfactory classification of emotions; indeed he sees good reason why these changes should be alike in cases, for example, of fear and rage, since "the bodily needs in either response are precisely the same." The specific subjective quality of an emotional state, though unreal apart from certain visceral changes, is not explicable by reference to these factors, since they are more or less uniform in

character for all varieties of emotion. Cannon concludes that "the bodily conditions which have been assumed, by some psychologists, to distinguish emotions from one another must be sought for elsewhere than in the viscera." This does not prove that there are no specific bodily conditions which differentiate one emotion from another, but it does urge the reasonableness of Hocking's argument that there is a phase in the development of an emotional state where its specific character is still undetermined, and hence open to control. This indeed is precisely the kind of implication which Cannon himself develops in his concluding chapter, entitled "Alternative Satisfactions for the Fighting Emotions."

Cannon would not agree that all forms of emotional behaviour are alike subject to cortical control. His findings indicate that " central control for the expressions of these emotions (fear, joy, grief) like that for rage, lies subcortically and, specifically, in the thalamic region."[1] Yet he uses, in connection with emotion, such phrases as 'cortical government', 'cortical dominance', 'superior control', 'inhibitory check', 'when the optic thalamus is freed from cortical control'. These phrases and their context suggest that the optic thalamus, as an area of central control for the expression of emotion, is itself, in organisms where higher centres have been evolved, subject to a certain amount of control, exercised by the cortical neurones, whose functioning is correlated with 'cognitive

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1. W.B.Cannon - Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage, p.280.

consciousness'. This type of control is only effective with respect to "those bodily activities which are normally under voluntary control... the neural mechanisms for the primitive emotions operate in a region outside the range of such consciousness."[1] If I understand Cannon aright, fear, joy, grief, rage, indeed all those emotional states which possess markedly different and 'cognized' subjective quality, are to be included under the category of those which are "normally under voluntary control". Since Hocking in his analysis of an emotion assumes that it shall be such as to be subjectively recognized for what it is, presumably he is only analysing states which Cannon would admit to be open to cortical control. Interestingly enough, Cannon refers voluntary control to the 'cognitive consciousness'. This is in agreement with Hocking's position.

Let it be remarked again that Hocking's analysis of emotion is intended to serve "simply as a special case of all our mental dealings with the outer world." His conclusion is that the emotional life of man cannot be conceived as having a history independent of the larger interests and purposes of the whole man. "The threshold of consent" stands for the level where possible kinds of behaviour are considered in reference to these larger interests. This assertion, that all the responses of man to his environment can, prior to their becoming overt and actual, be brought to 'the bar of the self' for certification,

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1. Cannon - "Neural Organization for Emotional Expression", in The Wittenberg Symposium on Feelings and Emotions. Chap. 22. p.263.

finds considerable support in recent psychology. Not that there is a self separable from its total activity. But it is impossible to describe the nature of the self in terms of a 'bundle of sensations', or by any other metaphor which first particularizes kinds of behaviour and only afterwards suggests that there is something which binds them together.

In neurology the outstanding work of Sherrington yields the evidence that the activity of the nervous system is integrative in character. The body acts as a whole. Differentiation of function, specificity of structure, are only possible within an organic unity. The story of biological evolution passes from simple undifferentiated structures to highly complex organisms, but the complexity must, to achieve survival, always be compatible with 'integrative action'.[1] It is true that well-established types of action, for which specific physiological mechanisms are responsible, seem to attain a status of relative independence. They are not subject to any control ab extra. Such is the general type of reflex action. Similarly, we say that instincts are comparatively fixed and unchangeable forms of behaviour. Yet, without positing consciousness at the level of their inception, it can be said that we have evidence as to the method of their establishment in the analogous formation of habit. Habits become comparable to instincts in the manner of their functioning. But they have not arisen ready-made. They were formed, learned, acquired, and only after

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1.C.S.Sherrington - The Integrative Action of the Nervous System.

long practise have they become relatively automatic and ineradicable. It is possible to conceive that their particular form might have been other than it is. Indeed the infinite variety of biological species affirms the fact of alternative types of response. There is always more than one way of meeting an emergency. But the occasion, or the emergency, is one which involves the entire organism, just as the denouement colours indelibly its later history.

This general description has to be qualified, however, by pointing to the importance attaching to the distinction between intelligence and instinct. This is, biologically, a distinction between nicely adapted and generally adaptable forms of behaviour, a distinction resting on the degree of centralization in the nervous system. Those forms of response which involve the innervation of lower neural centres only, acquire a degree of precision far greater than do those involving extensive ramifications in the higher centres,- but they become commensurately invariable.

The physiological basis of intelligence is precisely this central mass of neural tissue focussing in one general area the conduction paths from sensory end-organs and to muscles and glands. The brain, we say, is the seat of intelligence. And one, at least, of the features of intelligence is that the irrevocable character of overt

'trial and error' response is superseded. Alternatives lose their disjunctive force, where incipient, anticipatory, movements replace the blind discharge of energy.

Investigation of the physiological mechanisms involved in mental processes does not carry us very far towards an understanding of the mental processes themselves. At best it can serve as a useful check to purely psychological theory, since, granting the assumption of the mind-body connection, psychological theory ought to be compatible with physiological data. Such a check Hocking has sought to impose upon his writing, and it survives the test. His working hypothesis is that the instinctive nature of man can be unified in a fashion which makes it subject to real control. The fact of this unification is indicated by Schopenhauer's phrase,"the will to live"; indeed unification is an unfortunate term since it suggests a prior 'state of war' among separate instincts. The emphasis is laid on "a primordial undifferentiated capacity to strive",(1) only this capacity does not remain primordial in the sense of ever being outgrown. Differentiation of function is always subordinate to a central unity; dissociation is a mark of abnormality, but is not to be explained as atavism. It follows that "if these several instincts (eg. those for food-getting, fear, sex) are differentiations of some fundamental impulse, there will be among them a certain vicarious possibility of satisfaction." This is Hocking's solution to the problems of repression and perversion, and is his answer to the question: What happens to the energy of an incipient emotional state to

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1. W. McDougall - Outline of Psychology, p.113.

which consent is not given ? The consent is given or withheld prior to the attainment by the emotional state of a momentum such as to necessitate repression; neither is the initial flow of energy annulled, it is drained into other channels with resultant vicarious satisfaction.(1)

Physiology fails, at the moment, to provide undisputed data as to the brain mechanisms correlated with the higher thought processes where choices occur and decisions are rendered in the light of past experience. In particular, the extent to which functional occurs within the cortex is a matter of some uncertainty. But enough has been said to indicate that Hocking's 'threshold of consent' is by no means fanciful even on the available physiological evidence, as a theory emphasizing the dependence of particular patterns of behaviour on the general disposition of the individual.

William James uses language very suggestive of Hocking's. The chapters in the Principles of Psychology on Attention and Will are intimately related, indeed volition, for James, "is nothing but attention".(2) With a caution which yet reveals how the conception attracts him James asks "what the effort to attend would effect if it were an original force ?"

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1. K.S.Lashley, in Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence, comes to conclusions indicating that intelligence is a single dynamic function of the nervous system. His findings are completely against all theories as the localization of functions in the brain. The analogy is not pressed because experiments in maze-learning with injured rats provide but slender foundation for a theory as to the nature of intelligence.

2. Wm. James - Principles of Psychology, Vol 1. p.447.

The reply is worth quoting at length:

> "It would deepen and prolong the stay in consciousness of innumerable ideas which else would fade more quickly away. The delay thus gained might not be more than a second in duration, but that second might be critical; for in the constant rising and falling of considerations in the mind, where two associated systems of them are nearly in equilibrium it is often a matter of but a second or less of attention at the outset, whether one system shall gain force to occupy the field and develop itself, and exclude the other, or be excluded itself by the other... We shall see that the whole drama of the voluntary life hinges on the amount of attention, slightly more or slightly less, which rival motor ideas may receive. But the whole feeling of reality, the whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life, depends on our sense that in it things are <u>really being decided</u> from one moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago. This appearance, which makes life and history tingle with such a tragic zest, <u>may</u> not be an illusion." (1)

II.

Hocking approves of Nietzsche's phrase 'the will to power' as describing this nucleus of instinct, with its urge towards action: "We shall accordingly adopt this phrase, the will to power, as a working name for the instinctive centre of the human will." (2) There is, however, the suggestion of a circular definition in the last sentence which needs to be removed. Two further quotations help to elucidate Hocking's definition: 1. "Will exists, when, and in so far as, any instinctive impulse has first to obtain the consent of a ruling policy before pursuing its course." (3) This 'consent of a ruling policy' implies that the will is more complex a thing than the totality of instinctive impulses.

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1. Ibid. p.453.
2. W.E.Hocking - Human Nature and its Remaking, p.98.
3. Ibid. p.93.

2. "Will, in the last analysis, is thought assuming control of reality",[1] that is to say, will is 'the practical reason! It is perhaps unfortunate that Hocking should have referred to instincts as 'obtaining the consent of a ruling policy', a metaphor taken from organized human life. Roback prefers a physical metaphor in his "Interference of the Will Impulses:" a choice is made by following the neural path where least resistance is offered. But he fails to explain how it happens that neural resistance should be thus differentiated. Moreover it is doubtful whether nervous mechanisms can be satisfactorily described in terms of physics. "The doctrines of nervous energy, as derived by analogy with forms of physical energy, seem precluded by what we know of the nature of nerve conduction." If, as seems probable from studies of the refractory period of nerve, the response of the neuron is momentary and is followed by a quick return to the resting state after every excitation, there can be no general fund of nervous energy capable of accumulation and diversion into various activities."[2]

In affirming the primacy of 'will-thought' Hocking is adopting the position of Kant. And the agreement is significant, because Hocking is not unaware of the course of psychological thought in the two hundred years that separate him from Kant.

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1. Ibid. p.105.
2. K.S.Lashley - Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence, p.166.

"The Doctrine of the Will as Consent" includes both a definition and an ideal. It states that the will is defined in the subordination of all the possible responses of the individual to 'the consent of a ruling policy'. It affirms this to be a definition of fact, the kind of fact popularly expressed by saying that a man does what he wants to do. Such a definition implies teleology; the question is whether it need involve consciousness. The most primitive type of biological behaviour is adapted to secure satisfaction for the organism, but since we have no direct knowledge of what such a subjective state can possibly be like in lowly organisms, - indeed have no proof of its existence,- it may seem preferable to speak objectively and historically of behaviour having high survival value. Survival would then be 'the ruling policy', not in the sense that the organism deliberately sets about the business of becoming the oldest inhabitant or the proudest father in its own native shovelful of the primordial slime, but in the sense that whatever behaviour does not contribute to the furtherance of such a super-imposed 'policy' incurs for the organism in question the inevitable punishment of extinction. The limitation of such a behaviouristic position is that it consists entirely of description by an outside observer, and the 'ruling policy' is here natural law, external necessity. It is inconceivable how this type of behaviour, unless it had a subjective aspect of 'satisfaction', could ever come to be continuous

with intelligent behaviour. Radical acceptance of evolution theory therefore implies either thorough-going behaviourism, with a denial that there is any such thing as awareness, or else the ascription of real subjective aspects,- feeling, let us say,- to all organic unities. The second course is probably not any more difficult than to admit the existence of other minds like our own. Behaviourism is, after all, a form of solipsism. Awareness then, - posit its emergence at what stage we will,- is necessary for a 'ruling policy' to be consented to. Instinct, attitude, emotion, will, are all terms which presuppose some degree of subjective retention and intention. The behaviourist is therefore quite consistent in rejecting them.

An ideal certainly does imply consciousness, and the ideal for which the 'will as consent' stands can concern only a 'ruling policy' consciously held. It concerns what Kant called 'rational beings' in whom thought has assumed control. It is that thought owes its allegiance to that which is beyond thought. In saying that consent is to that which is beyond we are not making a preposterous statement. All our reactions have been reactions <u>to</u>; only so have things acquired their particular 'thinghood'. In the progressively fine discrimination of our organs of perception, the facilities of our symbolism, the method of extensive abstraction,- in these ways the size of our world grows so vast that we want a name for it all. It sounds a trifle

ridiculous to speak of reacting to the universe as a whole,- yet that in fact is not an absurdity. The growth of science even in Kant's time was such that a universal scope for thought was not unthinkable. Think of the ideal objects which men have held to - they are always beyond: the ashes of the fathers; the Muses; the voice of the Lord, the still,small, voice; fate, the will of Allah; patriotism, liberty, humanity, justice; the categorical imperative; goodness, truth, beauty; duty. Man's vision grows, and his language changes; but in the presence of the ideal there is but one attitude which yields an inner freedom; it is that complete acceptance of its rule which we have called consent.

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