BUDDHISM AND POLITICS IN CEYLON

McGILL UNIVERSITY

Faculty of Graduate Studies

BUDDHISM AND POLITICS IN CEYLON

by

MARY E. MARCHADIER

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the role of the Saṅgha in the political development of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) from its Independence in 1948 to the promulgation of the 1972 Constitution.

The Saṅgha strove during these years to regain its traditional position of political influence. As a consequence, it became increasingly involved in partisan politics and enmeshed in a diversity of problems quite foreign to its traditional role. This new role of the Saṅgha as a modern political pressure group resulted in a constant weakening of its traditional prestige among the politicians and the people.

Nonetheless, the Saṅgha did provide, during this same period, a crucial link between the traditional and modern components of Ceylon's political development. Its influence is evidenced in the 1972 Constitution which recognizes Theravāda Buddhism as the state religion and Sinhala as the official language of the newly-named Republic of Sri Lanka.

ABRÉGÉ

La présente thèse examine le rôle que joue le Sangha dans le développement politique de Ceylan (Sri Lanka) depuis son indépendance en 1948 jusqu'à la promulgation de sa Constitution de 1972.

Au cours de cette période, le Sangha s'est efforcé de retrouver sa position traditionnelle et son influence politique. En conséquence, il s'est trouvé de plus en plus impliqué dans la politique des partis et a dû faire face à des problèmes qui n'avaient pour ainsi dire rien à voir avec son rôle traditionnel. Ce nouveau rôle du Sangha en tant que groupe de pression a eu pour résultat un affaiblissement constant de son prestige traditionnel parmi les hommes politiques et le public.

Pourtant, au cours de cette même période, le Sangha a été un pont d'une importance considérable entre l'élément traditionnel et l'élément moderne du développement politique de Ceylan. Son influence est évidente dans la Constitution de 1972 qui reconnaît le Petit Véhicule comme la religion d'État et le cinghalais comme la langue officielle d'un état rebaptisé du nom de République de Sri Lanka.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Baldev Raj Nayar, who supervised my thesis, for his wise advice and pertinent comments which have been of tremendous value in writing this study. His infinite patience in unearthing sources of information for me about which I was quite unaware and in rereading the many rewritings was well beyond the call of duty.

I am also very grateful to Professor Gopal Krishna, of Oxford University, for suggesting the subject of the Sinhalese Sangha and its influence on the Ceylonese through the centuries. It was indeed a rewarding and compelling topic.

MAP 1

CEYLON PROVINCIAL DISTRICTS*

Western Province
1. Colombo
2. Kalutara

Southern Province
3. Galle
4. Matara
5. Hambantota

Sabaragamuwa Province
6. Ratnapura
7. Kegalla

Central Province
8. Kandy
9. Matale
10. Nuwara Eliya

Uva Province
11. Badulla
12. Monaragala

North-Western Province
13. Kurunegala
14. Puttalam

North-Central Province
15. Anuradhapura
16. Polonnaruwa

Northern Province
17. Jaffna
18. Mannar
19. Vavuniya

Eastern Province
20. Batticaloa
21. Amparai
22. Trincomalee



Derived from: The Times Atlas of the World, 5th edition (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), plate 26.

*See Appendix V, Table 1, p. 229.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since 1945, one of the most significant changes in global politics has been the emergence of many new independent nations which had formerly been under colonial rule. The efforts of these nations to include in their political system the means whereby they can both retain their traditional uniqueness and at the same time cope with the demands and challenges of modernization has focused world attention upon their political development.

During the transitional period when a country evolves from a traditional society to a modern one, its political system must try to accommodate two different groups of people. The first includes the majority of the population which has continued to carry on its daily life much as its forefathers did, despite the presence of the alien power. The people live in rural areas and villages where there exists a group of influential persons who, because of their ancestors or their affiliation with a highly-revered traditional fraternity, are regarded as the wise men of the area. It is to such men that the villagers look for leadership and advice. These influential leaders are the focal point of rural life.

The modern, centralized institutional network which the colonial rulers superimposed upon the traditional communities had a minimal but still irritating influence. For instance, certain centuries-old traditional practices such as landlordism may have been eradicated, resulting in loss of secure employment for the peasants. Taxes may have been levied, reduc-

ing the affluence and hence the prestige of local notables. The young may have been lured away from the countryside, where they are needed to replace their elders, by the promises of a bright future in an alien milieu.

Largely due to the impact of colonial rule, there came into existence a second distinct group of people. They lived in the same geographical areas as the outsiders. Frequently, these people grew up and were educated in schools with a westernized curriculum in the language of the aliens. Such people were exposed to modern ideas, mingled with the outsiders and adopted consciously or unconsciously, through personal and environmental association, many western attitudes and aspirations. Consequently, they were assigned to responsible positions in various branches of the administration which the colonial power had established. Despite such apparent assimilation, however, these natives never enjoyed the same societal or work status as did their European confrères. They remained "local people," subservient to the outsiders.

Despite the differences between the indigenous traditional and modern sectors of society under colonial rule, they were united in their efforts to rid their country of the intruders. They held the same dream of a society in which, as in centuries past, their own elite were the rulers of the people's destiny. Religious leaders, for their part, dreamt of once again holding the predominant position of influence, the older peasants dreamt of returning to a life where ancient kinship regulations ensured that the strong and young remained in the villages to take their places and tend to their needs in their old age. The young peasants dreamt of having no further worries about providing for the daily needs of their families. They would once again be assured of an adequate living under a feudal system

administered by a benevolent religious body and the responsibilities of young children could, at least, be shared if not completely taken over, by the elderly. The rich dreamt of retaining all their wealth and accumulating more land and therefore greater prestige and influence, as in centuries past.

The westernized natives also dreamt of a rosy future. Since they felt they would be the elite of the new country, they would replace the alien rulers; they would dictate rather than be dictated to. They would be highly respected by the people who would come to them for advice and direction just as was the case for the educated before the aliens arrived. For their part, the government workers thought that, with the modern institutions which the colonial power had created, all people would be able to participate in making their wishes known to the elite. All people would be able to have the same kind of education so that all, not only a select number of males, would be able to help the government govern through the communications network the aliens had established, such as printing presses and a year-round road system.

Everyone, whether he belonged to a traditional or to a modern group, saw the future through rosy eyeglasses but the scenarios of their dreams were thoroughly different. What did they have in common? They had a common longing to get rid of alien rule so they could fulfill their dreams. All the people were united in their common dislike of the colonial rulers and in their determination to be rid of them, but not much else.

However, once the country has gained its independence and a democratic constitution has been introduced, how then does it handle its future? It now possesses the physical and constitutional means to permit the differ-

ent sectors of the citizenry to pursue their particular dreams, through, for instance, interest groups, election campaigns, assemblies, propaganda and demonstrations. Is it possible to fulfill dreams set in a traditional world by using modern institutions and methods? Can all these different dreams be attained without struggles that often lead to civil disturbances and even violence in the normally most peaceful of societies?[1]

Such were the questions which the Ceylonese set out to resolve in 1948 when Ceylon[2] was granted its independence.[3] The Sinhalese[4] Buddhist peasants dreamt their traditional dreams, the traditional Siam nikāya [fraternity] of the Saṅgha [Buddhist monastic order] viewed the future as a return to life as it existed centuries ago.[5] Its modernized counterparts, the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas, saw their return to the societal pre-eminence enjoyed by the Saṅgha in ancient times. The westernized Sinhalese Buddhists viewed their future as that of revered leaders who, with modern tools and knowledge, could help guide the destiny of all Ceylonese toward previously unfulfilled glories. The westernized minorities in the urban areas expected their future to continue moving along the same path they were following at the time of Ceylon's Independence. Of all these sectors, however, only the Saṅgha contained both modern and traditional elements to which all Sinhalese could relate. As a result, the Saṅgha, as the principal political interest group of Ceylon, became the bridge between the two worlds of tradition and modernity.

It will be the purpose of this study to examine the political activities of the Sinhalese Saṅgha as a political interest group[6] and its influence upon the United National Party[7] and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party[8] between 1948 and the promulgation of the new constitution in 1972. In doing

this, the study will try to shed some light on the difficulties that face new states and on the ways that important interest groups and political parties adopt to resolve the dilemmas faced during the transition from tradition to modernity while still maintaining a democratic government.

Specifically the study will investigate the following questions:

(a) How did the Saṅgha use its organization, that had evolved through the centuries, to try to regain its historic role in society? What effect did its internal diversity have upon its capacity as a political interest group?

(b) What political strategies were adopted by the tradition-bound Siam nikāya as opposed to those of the western-oriented Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas?

(c) What policies did the tradition-based Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the westernized United National Party adopt to gain the endorsement of the Saṅgha and its supporters?

(d) How successful was the Saṅgha during this twenty-five year period in re-establishing its historic leadership role on a permanent basis?

Considerations of these questions will be undertaken for each of the first three significant periods in the political life of Ceylon since Independence. They are:

(1) the immediate post-Independence phase, from 1948 to 1956, when the Saṅgha was rapidly gaining political power among the Sinhalese;

(2) the following nine years (1956-1965), when the Saṅgha seemed to have largely reasserted its traditional influence over the Sinhalese people through its inherently strong rural support, on the one hand, and its modernized political approach, on the other;

(3) the years, 1965-1972, leading to the promulgation of the 1972 Constitution, when the Sangha's pressure for, and achievement of, communal education and Sinhalese language policies appeared not sufficiently pertinent to Ceylonese society to withstand displacement by current economic matters.

Notes

1. The political capacity and capability of the system must first mature. Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review 553 (1961):498.

2. Ceylon was renamed the Republic of Sri Lanka in the 1972 Constitution.

3. The Ceylon Independence Act of 1947 was not enacted by the British Parliament until February 1948.

4. The Sinhalese are the descendents of colonists from northern India who arrived in Ceylon about the fifth century B.C. Their Indo-Aryan language is now known as Sinhala. By 1973, they constituted 71 percent of the Ceylonese population. Approximately 75 percent of the Sinhalese are Buddhists. Robert N. Kearney, Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 143, 156.

5. See Appendix 1, p. 193.

6. Interest groups are defined by Gabriel A. Almond, Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970), p. 116, as "specialized structures of interest articulation--trade unions, organizations of businessmen or industrialists, ethnic associations, associations organized by religious denominations, civic groups and the like. Their particular characteristics are explicit representation of the interests of a particular group, orderly procedures for the formulation of interests and demands, and transmission of these demands to other political structures such as political parties, legislatures, bureaucracies."

7. See Appendix II, pp.216-217.

8. See Appendix II, pp.211-212.

CHAPTER II

THE SANGHA AND THE STATE IN PRE-INDEPENDENCE CEYLON

Buddhism: The Link Between the Sangha and the Laity

Buddhism originated in India during the sixth century B.C. and was derived from Hinduism by Gautama. Still regarded today by his followers as the most recent Buddha, Gautama decried the veneration shown toward the Brahmanical ritual and the priestly caste, since neither could influence a man's karma. Instead of relying on others for guidance in the search for nirvana,[1] it was, he felt, the responsibility of each individual to seek the truth for himself. Indeed, the Buddha advised his followers not to accept uncritically even his own viewpoint concerning the meaning of life. Nevertheless, to this day, Buddhists revere him as the divine manifestation of the Dharma;[2] the faithful still accept in principle tenets postulated over twenty-five centuries ago.

Very briefly, Buddhism holds that life is inevitably filled with evil, suffering and sadness,[3] and afflictions, all of which are the direct results of man's passions. As well, it is a person's behavior and attitude to life in his current existence that will determine his societal position in the next.[4] This is the thesis of karma. Nor can an individual's spiritual progress be enhanced through the mediation of any supernatural eminences. Oblations to nats,[5] for instance, can at best only stave off cer-

tain problems of the present life. The Buddhist must strive to disassociate himself from the tentacles of worldly matters through self-discipline and meditation. It is generally accepted that an almost infinite number of rebirths is inevitable, so that a Buddhist's time perspective deals in terms of eons rather than centuries. Therefore, the importance of upheavals, altercations and other societal aberrations, which have either public or private significance, matter little in theory when placed in such an enormous span of time.[6]

For the layman, one of the principal means by which he can increase his prospects for a better life in the next rebirth is through the practice of merit, that is, right action[7] sincerely undertaken to help others. As the degree of merit credited to the donor is directly related to the sanctity of the recipient, members of the Sangha are regarded by the Sinhalese as the most auspicious individuals to whom they can do or provide good.[8] For the bhikkhu is looked upon by the laity as a Buddhist who has advanced considerably further along the elusive and arduous road to nirvana than they themselves have. No longer is he supposedly involved with the mundane affairs of the day, but rather he is engrossed in other-worldly contemplation. The Sangha can, therefore, look to the laity for its material needs such as food, robes and often shelter [Dāna], in addition to their labor for the maintenance of the vihāra [monastery]. Hence, merit provides different but reciprocal benefits for the secular and the sacred Sinhalese groups in society, and encourages a close association and interdependence between the two often divergent bodies. As well, because of this interdependence, the Sangha has been most influential in determining the direction of the laics' thinking, both philosophically and politically.[9] This became

increasingly evident as the Sangha evolved from its initial establishment in Ceylon in 253 B.C., to the present day.

Sangha: The Evolution of the Primary Sinhalese Buddhist Institution

The Sangha, the Dharma and the Buddha make up the Tiratana,[10] upon which Theravāda Buddhism[11] is based. This trilogy is inseparably linked, for the Sangha is considered the custodian and teacher of the Dharma proclaimed by the Buddha.[12] As a result of these responsibilities, the Sangha is also expected to provide a suitable environment for the spiritual advancement of its members, the bhikkhus.[13]

Originally, the devotees of the Buddha were solitary wandering mendicants who spent their lives in continuous meditation. To this day, the tenet is still endorsed that only through self-discipline is mental and physical disassociation from mundane activities achieved. Furthermore, only by attaining such a spiritual state can the journey to nirvana be shortened. The Buddha also advised that interaction between the bhikkhus either as individuals or groups should be founded on the equality of all since the spiritual search for the millenium must be an individual endeavor. Consequently, the Sangha has continued to stress that Buddhism cannot be imposed on others since the fundamental precepts of self-reliance and self-perception would then be compromised. Its sole responsibility to the laity therefore is to provide them with examples of true devotion and meditation to emulate. The bhikkhus may speak to laymen about various current problems that are directly related to human destiny but in no way are the monks expected to carry out priestly functions.[14] As a result, the bhikkhu still remains the layman's ego-ideal whose vast wisdom emanates from an other-

worldly orientation.[15]

The focus on individuality has meant that there remains an inherent flexibility in Buddhist concepts which has provided a positive milieu for the changes that have evolved within the Saṅgha through the centuries. Settled monastic communities, known as vihāras, that supported a hierarchy among their individual members, came into being. The Vinaya Code had originally been formulated as merely a set of simple guidelines to help the bhikkhu regulate his behavior and activities.[16] But through the years it has become a complicated code of strictures that orders the collective life of the Saṅgha and its various nikāyas and vihāras.[17] The Code's directives have become so involved that the original individualism upon which Buddhism was pivoted has given way to the demands of group organization.[18] A modified structure has evolved through the centuries. The ancient organization prescribed by the Vinaya has been altered through time to meet the needs of the Sinhalese Buddhists. Consequently, the altered Vinaya is a compendium of guidelines dealing with new tasks that have been added to the duties of the Mahā Saṅgha.[19] These have involved the responsibility of educating male youths as well as being the chief agency for the preservation of Sinhalese culture and literature.

However, group organization in the Saṅgha has never resulted in a central authority, nor does there exist an overall organizational plan specifically setting out a number of leading positions and procedures for filling them. Moreover, despite implicit acceptance of the Vinaya by the religious, there still exists a sufficient degree of personal freedom to enable a bhikkhu to act on an individual basis if he is particularly averse to certain group majority decisions.[20] As well, this allowance for some

differentiation within the Saṅgha[21] has meant that groups of bhikkhus have organized themselves into separate fraternities or nikāyas. It is this lack of conformity among these "sects" that has contributed to the emergence of "political bhikkhus"[22] and led to antagonism between the Siam nikāya and the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas.

Other fundamental alterations in the Saṅgha have been the direct result of popular adherence to the concept of merit. In the precolonial era, the King of Kandy traditionally supported this tenet by donating, for instance, extensive tracts of land to the local Saṅgha from which, in later years, would emanate the rich Siam nikāya. Emulating traditional leaders, the Buddhist laymen still give material goods such as food, robes and shelter to the religious in return for an improved karma. One result of such beneficence has been the emergence of a very wealthy Saṅgha, in particular the Siam fraternity, that controls a considerable amount of community property. Despite British efforts to reduce the size of vihāra properties,[23] the Siam nikāya, in addition to its traditional influence as a religious order, remained an important economic power whose wishes had to be carefully considered in policy-making by Ceylonese politicians.[24]

On the other hand, the bhikkhus of the relatively poor Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas, who were totally dependent on the material support provided by the laity, could freely concentrate on their particular interest: to make Theravāda Buddhism and certain of its adjuncts, such as the Sinhalese language [Sinhala], the prime motivating force in Ceylonese politics and Sinhalese society.[25]

Ceylon has one particular distinction that is non-existent in other Theravāda Buddhist states. Its social structure, including the nikāyas, is

based on caste. Buddhist theory views such stratification as a matter of convenience and therefore it is deemed to have no greater ethical implication than wealth or beauty.[26] That is, caste is not explicitly condemned, but is rather de-emphasized.[27] Although the secular portion of Ceylonese society has traditionally exhibited a vertical hierarchy, its rigidity has been continuously dissipated in recent years under the impact of social mobilization.[28]

However, a similar de-emphasis of caste has not been as marked within the Sangha which is still divided by elitism.[29] For instance, the inauguration of nikāyas was a direct result of the Siam sect's adherence to caste principles. Isolated for an extra three centuries from foreign influence compared to other areas of Ceylon, Kandy in the central province[30] provided a haven of traditionalism. Indeed, it was that part of the Sangha situated here in the highlands that provided a refuge for beleaguered Buddhists from other regions of Ceylon during the religiously oppressive Portuguese occupation. However, the Kandyan Sangha accepted as members only those persons that were part of the erudite Goyigama caste.[31] Such elitism, reinforced by material wealth, gave the Siam nikāya a very special position of authority and prestige within Sinhalese society.[32] To ensure the continuation of this status, the Siam nikāya was formally established in the eighteenth century. By this action this nikāya consolidated its superiority by refusing to include in its midst persons from other castes.[33] As a direct reaction to this elitism, the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas were formed during the nineteenth century. From their inception, these sects have continuously differed from their older counterpart: for instance, caste is not a criterion for the inclusion of new members.[34]

Caste, however, has played only a minor role in the layman's consideration of the Saṅgha.[35] Instead, the institution has represented for villagers through the centuries a unit that is separate from worldly concerns whether they be of a governmental nature or socially based.

By choice, the Siam nikāya has retained a large measure of independence from the mainstream of Sinhalese Buddhist life. Such has not been the case for the Amarapura and Rāmaṇya nikāyas, whose members are mainly of coastal origin. Having been, as a result, in close and frequent contact with Europeans for over four centuries, they, like their lay counterparts, have adapted and even adopted many once-alien practices and orientations. For instance, the fact that the Mahā Saṅgha has become a very influential pressure group in the political system of Ceylon is largely attributable to such exposure.[36] Like the Siam sect, the new nikāyas also regard themselves as the guardians of Buddhism, and indeed they consider the Saṅgha itself as both a symbol and living example of Sinhalese culture. Consequently, active political participation on the part of Amarapura and Rāmaṇya bhikkhus became an inherent duty in order that foreign invasions into the traditional prerogatives of the Saṅgha be abolished and its historical primacy restored.[37]

Whatever the individual nikāyas and bhikkhus may view as the model for their behavior, it has been as the guardian of Sinhalese Buddhism that the Saṅgha has become so influential in the Ceylonese political system since Independence.

Ceylon: The Role of the Saṅgha Before 1948

Theravāda Buddhism has continued to play an important part in Sinhalese life ever since 253 B.C., when the King in Kandy and his subjects first embraced it, until the present time.

It was the Indian Emperor Aśoka who sent bhikkhus to neighboring states, including Ceylon, to spread the Theravāda Buddhist philosophy. For then not only could the new followers benefit from its tenets, but Aśoka himself could enhance his karma through such meritorious acts. Flattered by such attention from the illustrious Emperor, the Sinhalese King eagerly adopted Buddhism and set about establishing a relationship between the Monarchy and the Saṅgha that reflected the principles of authority practiced by Aśoka in his association with the bhikkhus. Although changes in society through the centuries inevitably resulted in certain adjustments in both Sinhalese-Buddhism and the State-Saṅgha linkage, the fundamental precepts have continued to be believed by the Sinhalese Buddhists. Consequently, when modernization continued to threaten the primacy of Sinhalese Buddhism even after Independence, the three nikāyas worked through the political system to ensure that Ceylon would be a truly Sinhalese Buddhist state.

Buddhists assume unquestioningly that the State is the guardian of the Saṅgha. And it is only by demonstrating their willingness to assure such guardianship that Ceylonese politicians have been able to secure the important Sinhalese Buddhist votes. This means that a current or future government must provide tangible evidence of its intention to ensure not only the continuation of the Saṅgha but its pre-eminent place in the Island's society. Moreover, the Buddhists, whether laics or bhikkhus, have also expected politicians, irrespective of party affiliations, to seek and also heed the advice proffered by the sagacious religious concerning matters of state.[38] On the other hand, the traditional intervention by the lay governing body into the affairs of various vihāras has not been tolerated in modern times, at least by the wealthy Siam nikāya.

The relations between the State and the Saṅgha were initially based on a reciprocal alliance. The Saṅgha had depended upon the King not only to ensure its continuing spiritual prosperity and societal pre-eminence, but also to offer advice concerning the selection of clerical hierarchy.[39] With time there was an even greater monarchical involvement when it became the practice to include the Regent in the Saṅghadhikaran [Council of the Saṅgha] that was composed of the Saṅgharāja[40] and twelve bhikkhus. This body discussed weighty administration policies of the Saṅgha, and decided on disciplinary measures for wayward bhikkhus.[41] Nevertheless, it still remained for the Council alone to be the final court of appeal in all ecclesiastical matters.[42]

For its part, the Saṅgha was so deeply revered by the laity that it was able to ensure both the loyalty and obedience of the people to the King, even when unpopular but just policies were implemented.[43] This shared relationship of the Sovereign with the Saṅgha in sacred and secular matters resulted in the belief by many Sinhalese that their King was a probable future Buddha.[44]

However, this close association between the Saṅgha and the State did irreparably compromise the original status of the bhikkhus as a group of mendicants, engrossed in spiritual matters. Earlier, the bhikkhus were felt to be so far removed from worldly concerns that the Buddhist laity provided for their daily needs. This belief coalesced with the practice of merit that enhanced a person's karma in direct relation to the sanctity of the recipient. Quite predictably, the Sinhalese, including their King, showered material goods upon the Saṅgha. It was due to the monarch's largesse that the various vihāras amassed great tracts of land.[45] Indeed, the

munificence of the laymen was so abundant that it finally became imperative that a member of each vihāra in Kandy, the nāyaka [head of the vihāra], be appointed guardian and administrator for each monastery. To ensure the continuation of this duty, a form of inheritance, pupillary succession, became an established practice of the future Siam nikāya.[46] And inevitably, such administrative tasks led to future thero [senior bhikkhu] involvement with matters of a purely secular nature, such as governmental land policies.[47] This concern with secular affairs resulted in the Sinhalese Buddhist population looking to the Saṅgha, not only for spiritual guidance, but also for leadership in purely worldly matters.

By the sixteenth century, when the first European traders settled on the coast of Ceylon, Kandy was a quite distinctive community: geographically isolated in the highlands of Ceylon and co-administered by a Sinhalese Buddhist monarchy and Saṅgha.[48] Indeed, these two institutions were so closely linked that the prosperity or misfortune of one affected the other in a similar way,[49] with the result that the Kandyan population's fortunes followed those of the leadership.

The latent cleavages between the hill people and the lowlanders, a majority of whom were Tamils, only deepened with the arrival of the Portuguese in 1505, followed by the Dutch in 1658.[50] Since neither of these invaders succeeded in subjugating Kandy,[51] they had little effect upon the highlanders. However, their influence upon the littoral peoples proved, in the long run, to be traumatic. The Portuguese embarked on a fervent crusade to convert to Christianity all the people who were geographically accessible. They forbade the public practice of Buddhism and Hinduism, and harshly punished any persons who attempted to do so. The result of such vigorous

proselytizing was that the faithful fled to the Kingdom of Kandy and Buddhism ceased to exist as a popular religion and way of life in the lowlands.[52] In their turn, the Dutch concentrated on the establishment of schools parallel in curriculum to their own (i.e., of a practical bent), but taught in the Indo-Dravidian vernacular. And so, the vistas of westernization for these lowland people were further broadened while the Kingdom of Kandy had, in essence, become an enclave of traditional society on the Island. The variance in social outlook which was engendered by these different orientations resulted in bitter animosity among the Ceylonese after Independence.[53]

The Saṅgha in Kandy continued to be the prime source of education, which was of a traditional and classical nature, for three centuries after the arrival of the Westerners on the coast of Ceylon.[54] As a result, the Saṅgha was able to maintain its own predominant position in Sinhalese society and sustain the traditionally pivotal place of Buddhism in Kandy life.[55] Since instruction was in Sinhala and the curriculum centered around the Faith's precepts, the partnership between the sacred and the secular groups in Kandy remained undisturbed until the arrival of the British in 1796. By then, the Saṅgha had become a formalized institution with each vihāra supporting a hierarchy of persons that regulated the members' lives and, as well, administered the considerable wealth of the particular monastery.

It was into this tightly knit, self-sufficient community that the British entered in 1815. Unlike their European predecessors, they successfully initiated many irreversible changes within Kandy society. In certain aspects, the innovations were traumatic. For instance, 1815 saw the eradication of the Kandy monarchy and the installation of the British as the protectors of the Saṅgha.[56] However, fifteen years later, the colonialists

withdrew their formal patronage of the bhikkhus and set about demolishing the last remnants of the traditional system in which the Sangha had thrived for centuries.[57]

With the British Temporalities Act, the amount of land controlled until then by the Sangha was halved. Since wealth in land had, for centuries, largely delineated people's status in Ceylonese society, this redistribution was viewed by the Sinhalese people and by the Sangha as a deliberate attempt to disparage the institution's importance.[58] The takeover of education by the foreigners further eroded the traditional influence of the bhikkhus. In the lowlands the people, who were already familiar with European ways, quickly adapted to the new British pedagogical system. With the English language as an intrinsic part of the essentially pragmatic curriculum, the students of these schools were the ones who could qualify for the much-desired government positions. The people of Kandy, however, did not accept British intervention into their schools as readily. Indeed, it was only with persistent determination that a parallel school system was organized under colonial auspices in the highlands.[59] Again, the antipathy that this unpopular innovation engendered was further exacerbated when the bhikkhus were replaced by Christian missionaries as instructors.[60]

The pragmatic, career-oriented school curriculum introduced by the British helped to foster the growth of a Ceylonese middle class. This particular stratum of society that is so symbolic of modern life had been largely non-existent until the 1800's.[61] Furthermore, the arrival of the British marked the onset of a trend among the rural Ceylonese, which has continued to the present day, to move into the cities where again modern expectations increasingly challenged age-old values.[62] Such factors as

popular participation in politics by all sectors of society, the emergence of the nuclear family and the material orientation of the industrial workers, all contributed to changes in traditional institutions in the urban areas. The chasm deepened between the rural and urban people as their needs became, for the time being, increasingly disparate.

In the predominantly rural area of Kandy, the venerable Siam nikāya retained its historical influence and traditional views of the relationship between the people and the Saṅgha.[63] In the urban areas, however, there was a growing number of bhikkhus, members of the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas, who were working in tandem with Buddhist laymen to reassert the traditional primacy of Sinhalese Buddhism in all sectors of society including that of government. Such persons began to adeptly combine the hitherto alien practices of Saṅgha-related political militancy with traditional labels and symbols.[64] The appearance of bhikkhus, clad in their saffron-colored robes, making public appeals ensured them an audience, be it supportive or antagonistic, ready to listen to them. The insistence that the word "Buddhist" be included in both mastheads and group names, and the ultimately successful efforts to have Sinhala--already closely linked to the Buddhist population--recognized as the official language of Ceylon, were all part of the political bhikkhus' campaign to reassert the traditional primary status of the Saṅgha. Later, after Independence, there would be a successful Buddhist effort to have the government of Ceylon publicly support Sinhalese Buddhism by underwriting the huge cost of the dazzling Buddha Jayanti. Such policies helped link the alien practices of westernization with the traditional connotations of Sinhalese Buddhism.[65]

The effectiveness of the Buddhist middle class was strengthened by

the interaction between the laity and the Saṅgha.[66] The innately separate spheres of the sacred and the secular were linked through such cooperative interaction. An instance of this weakening of the demarcation line between the sacred and the secular was apparent in the activities of the British Theosophical Society. Brought to Ceylon in the latter part of the nineteenth century, its main goal was the total restoration of government supported pansalas [Buddhist schools] that were to be staffed exclusively by bhikkhus.[67] One of its members, Anagarika Dharmapala, gained recognition by the Sinhalese for his views on subjects which had, until then, been the sole prerogative of the Saṅgha to decide. For instance, Dharmapala worked toward the return to a pre-colonial Sinhalese society. This, he maintained, would provide a milieu in which new levels of insight into the meaning and interpretation of Buddhist precepts would be found not only by the bhikkhus, but equally well by the laity.[68]

There still existed, however, a very noticeable hesitancy on the part of many Buddhists,[69] including the Siam nikāya, to endorse the Mahā Saṅgha as political activists.[70] At the same time, there was active displeasure over colonial policies, and a determination to restore Sinhalese Buddhism to its traditional place in society and to ultimately achieve state endorsement of its predominant position among the Ceylonese. It was such tangible facts as the colonial policy that eroded monastic education and the colonialists' deliberate eradication of the Kandyan monarch, that united the Buddhists in concerted protests.[71]

It was from the Young Men's Buddhist Association Movement that the first formal Buddhist political group, the All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC), was established in 1918. Its primary goal was to achieve rapid

political independence for Ceylon. Like most movements at this time, the participating bhikkhus were usually affiliated with the westernized Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas. The life of the recluse--physically and spiritually removed from this world's materialism that the Siam sect espoused--was not for them.[72] Instead, they directed their organizational talents to halt the rapid weakening of Buddhist influence among the people.[73]

With its members supporting such a viewpoint, it was normal that, once the ACBC had seen the departure of the colonialists, it then would work toward achieving its next priority: the recognition of the primacy of Buddhism in the political and social system of Ceylon. From its inception, it had welcomed other Buddhist groups until it had become the umbrella organization for three hundred lay and religious Buddhist groups.[74] Early in its career, it organized a program of regular conferences whose theme remained the search for avenues that would lead to the inclusion of Sinhalese Buddhists in state policy formation. It pointed out the positive results that would evolve for society as a whole when state leaders once again sought and followed the wise directions of the Saṅgha which still remained impervious to the pressures and influences of an ego-based twentieth century.[75]

And this remained the goal of the Saṅgha and its Sinhalese supporters during the years after Independence. It mattered little whether the methods of the fundamentalists differed from those of the liberals, both groups directed their attention to the political system as the best means to make Sinhalese Buddhism the hallmark of the Ceylonese nation state.

Notes

1. Nirvana: The extinction of the individual self and of its corollary of suffering and reincarnation. The attainment of being, instead, in harmony with the universe and part of it.

2. Dharma: The sum total of the rules of behavior for all aspects of life. It is one of the Three Jewels, the other two being the Buddha and the Sangha. Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970), p. 35.

3. Ediriweera R. Sarachandra, "Traditional Values and the Modernization of a Buddhist Society," in Religion and Progress in Modern Asia, ed. Robert N. Bellah (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 113.

4. Needless to say, the tenets cited here are those that are generally accepted as the ideal rather than, as this study will partially show, the practice. Melford E. Spiro, Buddhism and Society (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), provides an insight into the various interpretations of Theravāda Buddhism as its adherents give it. For a more generalized exposition of societal action and reaction to religious beliefs, Peter L. Berger, Sacred Canopy (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), is very helpful.

5. Nats are the beings involved in the practice of magical-animism in Ceylon. While Buddhism is concerned with sin, rebirth and the fate of the soul, magical-animism is solely involved with the well-being of the present life. Michael Ames, "Ideological and Social Change in Ceylon," Human Organization 22 (1963):46.

6. Spiro, Buddhism and Society, p. 120.

7. This is found along the Eightfold Path, which comprises the Right View, the Right Aims, the Right Speech, the Right Acts, the Right Livelihood, the Right Effort, the Right Concentration, and the Right Meditation, which leads to full Enlightenment and Nirvana.

8. Spiro, Buddhism and Society, p. 115.

9. Richard F. Nyrop et al, Area Handbook for Ceylon (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 206-207.

10. Also known as the Three Refuges and the Three Jewels.

11. "Way of the Elders." It is one of the survivors of eighteen schools of non-Mahāyāna Buddhism. This philosophy of life has no saints or saviors. It counsels a spirit of compromise and mutual adjustment.

12. Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 186.

13. Hans-Dieter Evers, "The Buddhist Sangha in Ceylon and Thailand," Sociologus 18 (1968):22.

14. Sarachandra, "Traditional Values and the Modernization of a Buddhist Society," p. 115.

15. Bryce Ryan, Sinhalese Village (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1958), p. 38.

16. The Vinaya Code was already a well-developed set of rules by the first century B.C. Nancy Ann Nayar, "The Societal Foundations of the Early Buddhist Sangha," (Part I) Prabuddha Bharta 81 (January 1976):24.

17. Richard F. Gombrich, Precept and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 315; Ames, "Ideological and Social Change," pp. 45-46.

18. Heinz Bechert, "Theravada Buddhist Sangha," Journal of Asian Studies 24 (August 1970):773.

19. Term used to describe the Buddhist clergy collectively as opposed to the Sangha which usually denotes the Buddhist organizational structure.

20. Marshall R. Singer, The Emerging Elite (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964), p. 138; C. D. S. Siriwardane, "Buddhist Reorganization in Ceylon," in South Asian Politics and Religion, ed. Donald Eugene Smith (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 535.

21. Evers, "The Buddhist Sangha," pp. 32, 34.

22. Those bhikkhus who actively participate in fashioning Ceylon's political system.

23. Although the first register of temple land was completed in 1821, it was found to be incorrect. A new registration was started in 1831, but never completed. Hans-Dieter Evers, "Buddhism and British Colonial Policy in Ceylon," Asian Studies 2 (December 1964):327-328. An accurate figure has never been compiled. Evers estimates that the Sangha controlled about 135,000 acres in Kandy in 1956. Declared annual income from 24 monasteries and vihāras was over 717 thousand rupees in 1962-1963. This income did not necessarily include offerings which were considerable. Hans-Dieter Evers, "Monastic Landlordism in Ceylon," Journal of Asian Studies 28 (1967):687-689.

24. Spiro, Buddhism and Society, p. 391.

25. S. J. Tambiah, "Buddhism and This-Worldly Activity," Modern Asian Studies 7 (1973):7.

26. Gombrich, Precept and Practice, p. 269.

27. Ryan, Sinhalese Village, p. 37.

28. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, pp. 6-7.

29. Gombrich, Precept and Practice, p. 307.

30. See Map 1 facing p. 1 of this thesis.

31. Goyigama Caste: The Cultivator Caste that to this day remains the most dominant and prestigious group in the country as a whole. There is no priestly caste in Sinhalese society.

32. Nyrop, Area Handbook for Ceylon, p. 194.

33. Ryan, Sinhalese Village, p. 40.

34. Ibid., p. 39. The Rāmanya nikāya, for instance, was founded by reformist members of the Siam sect.

35. Gananath Obeyesekere, "Theodicy, Sin and Salvation in a Sociology of Buddhism," in Dialectic in Practical Religion, ed. E. R. Leach (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 35.

36. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 26.

37. Jerrold Schecter, The New Face of Buddha (New York: Coward-McCann, 1967), p. 276; W. Howard Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 194.

38. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1973 (London: Macmillan Press, 1974), p. 127.

39. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 22.

40. Chief bhikkhu of the Saṅgha.

41. Trevor Ling, The Buddha (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973) p. 188.

42. A modified version of such an association was suggested in 1959-1960. This Buddha Sāsana Mandalaya was to be comprised of government and Saṅgha appointed laics and bhikkhus. Siriwardane, "Buddhist Reorganization," pp. 544-545. The Siam nikāya vetoed it as a new infringement on Saṅgha prerogatives.

43. S. Arasaratnam, Ceylon (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 80.

44. Spiro, Buddhism and Society, p. 379; S. J. Tambiah, "The Politics of Language in India and Ceylon," Modern Asian Studies 1 (1967):222.

45. By the eleventh century, the largest landowners were the vihāras.

Trevor Ling, Buddha, Marx and God (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), p. 194.

46. For further information concerning Monastic Landlordism, see Appendix I, p. 193.

47. Heinz Bechert, "Contradictions in Sinhalese Buddhism," translated by Dr. W. Richard Cantwell, Contributions to Asian Studies 4 (1974):2.

48. Desmond Crowley, "Ceylon: Communities and Politics," Current Affairs Bulletin 36 (July 1965):52.

49. E. F. C. Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 9.

50. See Appendix V, Table 1, p. 229 for demographic and geographic distribution of the Ceylonese population.

51. Bryce Ryan, "Status, Achievement and Election in Ceylon," Journal of Asian Studies 20 (August 1961):467.

52. Arasaratnam, Ceylon, p. 136.

53. Bechert notes that it was this convergence of the sacred and the secular through education that led to the extensive identification of the Sangha with the special interests of the Sinhalese and to the bhikkhus' nationalistic stance in later years. Bechert, "Contradictions in Sinhalese Buddhism," p. 13.

54. Kandy was not subjugated until the unification of the entire Island in the 1800's by the British. Ames, "Ideological and Social Change," p. 46.

55. Gananath Obeyesekere, "The Great and the Little in the Perspective of Sinhalese Buddhism," Journal of Asian Studies 22 (1963): 139-154, points out that there exist in Ceylon both Theravāda Buddhism, which the people in principle follow, and Sinhalese Buddhism that transcends and denigrates much of the formal dogma.

56. These included the support of religious rights, the appointment of highly placed bhikkhus and the supervision of the management of vihāra land. Evers, "Buddhism and British Policy," p. 329.

57. Evers marks this policy change as the beginning of the continuous conflict, still present, between the Sangha and the government. Ibid., p. 333.

58. Bryce Ryan, "Status, Achievement and Education," p. 463.

59. Ibid., pp. 470-473.

60. Ling, Buddha, Marx and God, p. 230.

61. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 26.

62. Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 221.

63. Reginald Stephen Copleston, Buddhism: Primitive and Present in Magada and Ceylon (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1908), p. 14.

64. G. C. Mendis from "The Revolution of 1956," quoted in Donald Eugene Smith, Politics and Social Change in the Third World (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 146. Eisenstadt points to such a weakening of religious institutions as the Sangha as a major characteristic of the modernization process. S. N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change and Modernity (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 24.

65. In Rustow's opinion, it is those very people who have directly taken part in the institutions and life of such aliens and then turned back to their native milieu who are the most effective modernizers. Rustow, A World of Nations, p. 162.

66. In Tambiah's view, this was the beginning of a new Buddhist era with the urban bourgeoisie as its strongest supporters. "Buddhism and This-Worldly Activity," p. 6.

67. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 41.

68. Balkrishna Govind Gokhale, "Anagarika Dharmapala: Toward Modernity Through Tradition in Ceylon," Contributions to Asian Studies 4 (1974):39.

69. The peasants in particular were distressed by such involvement. To them the bhikkhu was the ideal person, dispassionate and wise, who had proven his ability to withstand the magnetism of transitory matters. Spiro, Buddhism and Society, p. 408.

70. Donald Eugene Smith, "The Politics of Buddhism," Worldview 16 (January 1973):14.

71. Ling, Buddha, Marx and God, p. 216.

72. The reluctance on the part of the Siam nikāya follows Eisenstadt's theory that persons with strong ties to tradition lack the desire to interact with other groups. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change and Modernity, p. 54.

73. Berger observes that with modernization of religious institutions a market situation exists in which such groups must either accommodate the new political milieu and "sell their commodity," as did the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas, or resist the changing society and withdraw

from such participation, as the Siam nikāya tried to do but with only partial success. Berger, The Sacred Canopy, pp. 151, 155.

74. Donald K. Swearer, Buddhism in Transition (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1970), p. 55.

75. Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970), p. 132.

MAP 2

CEYLON (SRI LANKA)

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS OF MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS



Derived from: Bryce Ryan, "Socio-Cultural Regions of Ceylon," Rural Sociology 15 (March 1950):6-7.

CHAPTER III

THE BUDDHIST STRUGGLE FOR A RETURN TO TRADITIONAL WAYS

Cracks in the Fragile Euphoria of Independence

The Ceylon Independence Act was passed on December 10, 1947. After years of laboring to attain self-government, the Sinhalese Buddhists and their mentor, the Sangha, as well as the Tamils and the Christians--indeed all Ceylonese--were ecstatic with their success. In order to insure a smooth transition from colonial to independent status which was to come into effect on February 4, 1948, a general election was held prior to the change-over. All Ceylonese citizens were invited to participate.

Although no group emerged from the contest with a clear parliamentary majority, the United National Party (UNP), led by the highly respected and popular Sinhalese Buddhist, D. S. Senanayake, gained the greatest number of seats.[1] A stable, majority government was assured when most of the successful independent candidates agreed to work with the UNP. Such a concession on their part was sensible since the UNP takeover of the governmental reins seemed to meet with the approval of the various ethnic and religious groups.[2] At the time, the ominous communal tensions that would emerge within the next few years and become increasingly fractious were not apparent. There was no obvious indication that such groups as the Sangha, the Sinhalese, and the Tamils would stridently make uncompromising demands upon the UNP. Nor was it manifest in February 1948 that religious strife would immobilize the

political system by severely crippling its social and financial capabilities.[3] For instance, the new Constitution, which the Ceylonese as a whole had endorsed, accorded no special status to any specific sector of society. Furthermore, its articles outlined the structure of a purely secular state.[4] On their part, the Sangha and the Sinhalese Buddhist laity remained confident, nonetheless, that Independence would automatically mean a return to the pre-colonial society which by tradition and history accorded them superior status.

Certainly, the future of Ceylon in early 1948 appeared to be most auspicious for its people, including the Sinhalese Buddhists. For example, in the economic sector, its per capita income was second only to that of Japan in the whole of Asia.[5] Moreover, such prosperity seemed likely to continue since the political leadership was comprised of well-to-do, experienced businessmen.[6] Many of the incumbents, such as the Prime Minister, D. S. Senanayake, and the House Leader, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike,[7] had held responsible positions in the colonial government for more than two decades prior to the assumption of their current positions.[8] In the cultural and religious context, the Sinhalese were content with the government. For although many of the current Cabinet Ministers, such as Bandaranaike, had initially embraced the Christian faith and received their education in such prestigious western institutions as Oxford University, they had become converts to Theravāda Buddhism when universal suffrage was granted to the Ceylonese colony by the British in 1931.[9] As well, with D. S. Senanayake, a stalwart Buddhist from birth, at the helm of state, the Sinhalese and the Sangha remained confident that their concept of a Ceylonese state would immediately be made a reality.

Such a nation, in Buddhist eyes, would once again venerate the bhikkhus as personages of great righteousness and sagacity. For this reason, the Saṅgha would be consulted on matters of importance to the country and its people, and its suggestions would be followed by the leadership. Its good offices would also be needed once more to provide a constructive liaison between the rulers and the ruled if friction should hamper the relationship between the two sectors. The Buddhists also took for granted that the state would underwrite all the financial obligations relating to the Saṅgha. Not only did they expect Sinhala to be officially recognized as the state language but, as a matter of course, the pansalas would be the principal educational institutions of Ceylon.

Such was the type of nation which the general Sinhalese Buddhist population, and, more particularly, the peasant sector envisaged when Independence became a reality.[10] For in the social context of the Buddhist village, the Mahā Saṅgha had continued in its traditional role as the epitome of goodness and wisdom, to be emulated by its followers. Not only did the rural bhikkhu elicit the utmost respect from the people, but he frequently --and voluntarily--acted as administrative adviser in political matters pertaining to the town itself. Consequently, the Saṅgha held great potential power,[11] if it chose to use it, since the Sinhalese peasantry made up seventy percent of the total Ceylonese population.

Such optimism, however, proved to be totally unwarranted. The new government remained virtually identical to that which had existed prior to 1948. Independence had merely brought about a change in name, not in character, for the leadership nurtured the perpetuation and predominance of western culture to the exclusion of all other available options. The European

system remained an intrinsic part of the state political institutions, its school organization, and urban life in general.[12]

In fact, this alien life style became even more pervasive in 1951, when the Education Act endorsed the UNP's uninterrupted policy of maintaining a distinct separation between church and state. The Act rescinded the automatic grants to private schools and instead gave their administrations a choice between two options. The first option allowed the schools to remain totally independent from governmental supervision and dictates, but this meant that such schools would be ineligible for any state grants. Instead, their financial support would have to come from individuals in the form of fees levied by the schools themselves and from private contributions. The alternative option was that the schools amalgamate with the nationally supervised pedagogical system. This system was non-sectarian, state supported and provided with such facilities as well-equipped laboratories and libraries attuned to meet the demands of a modern, scientifically oriented world for potential job-holders.

The Sinhalese schools, administered by the Sangha, unequivocally refused to integrate, but the majority of other schools with mainly Tamil and Christian student populations accepted amalgamation. Consequently, the schools normally located in highly populated areas, with mostly non-Sinhalese Buddhist students, became the sole beneficiaries of governmental munificence.[13] Furthermore, the young person from such an institution was far better prepared upon leaving school than his Sinhalese counterpart, and consequently could attain the more important positions in Ceylonese society. These positions were mainly to be found within the governmental sphere where English was the predominant means of communication and modernity the by-

word.[14] In contrast, students of the less materially oriented, classical Buddhist institutions--even those in urban areas--could not comply with Ceylonese job requirements in the large population centers. The result of the Education Act seemed to be that the elite of the new Ceylonese nation remained an English-speaking, non-Sinhalese group.[15]

The societal division between the Sinhalese Buddhist peasant and his urban counterpart became increasingly obvious and more difficult to bridge. The Mahā Saṅgha continued to be recognized among the peasants as the traditional custodian of Sinhalese literature and scholarship. Consequently, education in the Kandyan rural areas remained static as the bhikkhus continued in the pedagogical tradition of combining Buddhist principles with all facets of education. The result of this policy was that Theravāda Buddhism with all its ethnically nationalistic implications, such as the exclusive use of Sinhala, became an integral part of each peasant's life.[16] Westernization was to be reviled: it was an anathema, for the Mahāvāmsa stated that it was the traditional practices of Buddhist Ceylon which were to direct the nation's destiny through all time so as to set an example for the rest of the world to follow. And so, shared antipathy to westernization gave added strength to an already traditional tie which in essence unified the peasants and the Saṅgha in rural society.[17] As a result, the highland villages became virtual enclaves walled in by a traditional lifestyle and value system which had endured for more than two thousand years. Not only was there little, if any, rapport with the littoral population, but also the general ways and politics of the urban lowlanders elicited no interest among the Sinhalese ruralites.

Nevertheless, this chasm of ignorance and indifference that had

grown particularly through the last four centuries between the two groups and which was seemingly being reinforced since Independence, abruptly ended in the early 1950's. As the political system settled itself into an alien cultural pattern, a number of bhikkhus began to take an active interest in altering the political and societal direction which their country appeared to be taking.[18] This Saṅgha involvement in national affairs initially did not have as great an impact on the urban Sinhalese whose interests were not exclusively anchored to Buddhism and its religious, as it had upon their rural compatriots. In the latter case, politically incensed bhikkhus now frequently led to an increased interest in politics by the peasants since Saṅgha and village society were so closely linked.

It took a greater length of time for the urban-based Sinhalese to become equally involved in political-religious matters. They were not as accessible to the bhikkhus nor were they as emotionally involved with the Saṅgha. Even though the religious were incensed over certain issues, their anger did not result in an almost automatic endorsement by the urbanites. In fact, there were many Sinhalese Buddhists who remained averse to political involvement of any kind by the Mahā Saṅgha. In other cases, the Sinhalese in the large centers only gradually came to realize that by their endorsement of the bhikkhus' call for a Sinhalese state they would personally benefit--for example by greatly enhancing the likelihood that they would obtain better jobs--for they would enjoy greater prestige and consequently would attain a more affluent lifestyle.[19] Therefore, enthusiastic joint urban and rural support for a Sinhalese oriented nation-state only came to fruition as the UNP continued to ignore petitions that the government restore the traditional pre-eminence of Buddhism and Siṃhala in the affairs of the state.

The politician who would incorporate these divergent Sinhalese urban and rural clusters into a unified, pulsating ethnic nationalist movement was S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike. In 1951 he resigned as House Leader and left the UNP. This action came as the culmination of years of frustration during which he had been publicly working to achieve special state recognition for the Sinhalese Buddhists in acknowledgement of their historical place in Ceylonese society. Among the concessions which Bandaranaike maintained were the minimum due to the Buddhists were the public financing of their school system and the recognition of their language with at least the same status as that given to English.

When the UNP Cabinet maintained its refusal to endorse such ideas, Bandaranaike returned to his original political base, the Sinhala Mahā Sabhā (SMS) group, which he had founded in 1934. Even as early as then, he and his SMS colleagues had taken up the task of promoting Sinhalese Buddhist interests. Now, in 1951, using the SMS as a nucleus, Bandaranaike officially established his own political party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP).[20] Although it was too new a group to consolidate sufficient support to win the 1952 election, it went about preparing itself to win the one that would be held in 1956.

As a result, during its initial years, the SLFP bent its efforts to achieving a consolidation and unity of purpose between the three predominant Sinhalese groups: the Sangha, the peasants and the urbanites. The common interests of all these groups was the linkage with Buddhist religion. Symbolic of this core element was Sinhala and the pansalas which passed the Theravāda Buddhist legacy from generation to generation.

The central message of the SLFP, like the SMS before it, was the

recognition by all Ceylonese of the importance of the Sinhalese Buddhist tradition and, as a result, the enhancement of its standing within the whole Ceylonese community. The necessity of achieving such a goal was the focal point of SLFP political campaign platforms; later in 1956, when the SLFP formed a major part of the government, it was the achievement of this end toward which governmental policies were directed.

From its inception, the SLFP continually asserted that only through an amalgam of tradition and modernity could Ceylon attain its ancient prosperity and cohesiveness. The name of the party reflected this belief since it combined the ancient Sanskrit name for Ceylon, "Sri Lanka," with the English, "Freedom Party."[21] To further emphasize the historical and traditional aspects of the party, Bandaranaike himself adopted the traditional mode of dress.

Starting in 1951, the Ceylonese people were inundated with the SLFP's fervent appeals that the Saṅgha and the Sinhalese people by virtue of their historical and traditional standing in Ceylonese society must, at all costs, be given their due by state support and encouragement of their religious, linguistic and educational aspirations. Moreover, the Mahā Saṅgha, with its infinite wisdom, must be recognized as the regulator of society by both the rulers and the ruled, since its proverbial sagacity had remained untrammeled through the years.

Bandaranaike and his SLFP had not been alone in the decision to take concrete action that could alleviate what they perceived as the insidiously rapid encroachment of westernization upon Ceylon. For as early as 1950 and 1951, many Buddhist laymen and certain members of the Saṅgha[22] were busy organizing groups to actively combat what seemed an increasingly alien

social environment. However, although many Sinhalese agreed that Europeanization was a pernicious desecration of their homeland, they could not agree upon the means whereby they could act collectively in order to rectify the matter. Some members of these newly organized bodies advocated a policy of making their demands known, and the injustices perpetrated upon them corrected, through patient, albeit lengthy, persuasion.

A contrary approach was that of many young bhikkhus, largely affiliated with the Amarapura and Rāmaṇya nikāyas, who decried the idea of pursuing a path of quiet, but persistent, persuasion. In their view, more radical methods were called for. Consequently, during the next few years, militant activities were increasingly organized and led by bhikkhus, so that their protest demonstrations became a frequent sight in the various Ceylonese cities.[23] However, as time passed and no UNP governmental change of policy was in sight, frustration grew and the ominous specter of violence, engendered by the futility of more peaceful methods, became a reality in the years following the 1952 election.

Of course, any popular involvement that led to aggressiveness on the part of the Saṅgha was abhorrent to many of the Buddhist laity. Moreover, such overt action brought to public attention the heretofore latent antipathy between the conservative, almost recluse--but rich--Siam nikāya and its less affluent counterparts, the Amarapura and Rāmanya groups. The bitter divergence in viewpoint between the two groups came to the fore in the 1952 election campaign. Many of the bhikkhus from the two latter nikāyas threw their wholehearted support behind the SLFP through active participation in marches against UNP policies and vigorous campaigning in dispersed areas of Ceylon.[24] The Siam nikāya, for its part, countered such support by publicly

endorsing the UNP's policy of maintaining an unqualified separation between church and state. In essence, such a policy meant that the Saṅgha remained in complete control of all its affairs, including financial matters.[25] On the other hand, many bhikkhus from other less affluent vihāras enthusiastically promoted the policy of establishing a strong bond between secular and sacred affairs and therefore endorsed the SLFP policy to this effect. This particular dissension between the Siam nikāya and the other nikāyas concerning the involvement of the laity in the affairs of the Saṅgha was to continue unabated in public for more than a decade. It was such acrimony arising among holy men over purely material and worldly matters that would ultimately weaken the potential viability of the Saṅgha in its traditional role as a disinterested mediator between the government and the people.[26]

The anomaly of "political bhikkhus" was only one facet of Ceylonese life, however. There were, by the time of the 1952 election, distressing signs of a general decline in Ceylonese civic life that neither the government nor the Saṅgha was able to counter in the following years.[27] Demonstrations were becoming an increasingly popular method of showing public dissatisfaction. Such marches led by bhikkhus became a more and more frequent sight. However, this militancy often had little to do directly with religious problems, but instead was linked to economic matters, such as the steadily rising unemployment rate coupled with steep rises in the cost of living index and a parallel drop in per capita income.[28]

Although the programs of the SLFP in conjunction with the enthusiastic support of a number of bhikkhus had a great political potential, the SLFP did not constitute a real threat to the UNP predominance in the 1952 election. Since the SLFP was only one year old and therefore still in its

formative stages, it had had little time to establish an efficient organization. Furthermore, the continuing debate within the Mahā Saṅgha as well as among its lay counterparts, concerning the propriety of direct political involvement by bhikkhus, weakened the party's effectiveness. Moreover, many areas of Ceylon, particularly the cities, were not easily accessible on a person to person basis, as were the rural areas, where the political bhikkhus and the villagers were generally in harmony with each other's views.[29] In rural areas a political party endorsed by the religious was apt to be upheld by the peasantry. Added peasant support was forthcoming when the SLFP promised to restore the Saṅgha to its traditional place at the apex of Ceylonese society and to make Sinhala Ceylon's official language. Despite such promises and the endorsement of the SLFP by the bhikkhus, the party was not a particularly dynamic force at the time of the 1952 election and aroused little political interest. Consequently, the turnout at this time was not as extensive as it would be in 1956, when the peasants had become more aware of the importance that politics could have in their lives.[30]

With the SLFP still in its infancy and the peasants still ill-at-ease in the world of political campaigns, the UNP was not unexpectedly returned to office with a clear majority in the 1952 election. Nonetheless, the SLFP campaign could be regarded as preparatory work to cultivate the fallow but fertile soil of Buddhist support. The seeds sown in 1952 still had to germinate. The 1952 campaign did demonstrate, however, that political issues--such as the place of the church in state affairs, the importance of tradition in the educational system, and the significance of a growing use of a western language as opposed to the universal use of a traditional tongue--were sharpening the focus of the electorate on specific party poli-

cies in contrast with the more personal appeals of Independent candidates during the 1947 election.[31]

Having campaigned on the issue of maintaining its current policies and then having received a clear mandate to govern, the UNP saw little need to alter its stand on the contentious issue of state involvement in religious matters. This adamant refusal to meddle in the affairs of the Saṅgha was not necessarily engendered by any hostility to that sector of society. For example, in 1953, the government provided extensive financial aid for major renovations to be made to the Sri Daladā Māligāva [Temple of the Sacred Tooth of Buddha]. As well, it subsidized the Vidyālankāra Pirivana's program of revising the Dharma, the compilation of an encyclopedia of Buddhism and, on a long range basis, its translation from Sinhala into English.

Such largesse on the part of the state was particularly noteworthy since the lagging financial position of Ceylon was an increasing cause for concern within the administration. Indeed, so alarming were the results of numerous financial statements issued by the Central Bank that in 1953 Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake[32] discontinued food subsidies. This was a drastic decision for the support program had been in effect for over ten years. Over this period of time, the people had gradually regarded it as part of their normal income. Now, with its sudden abolition, at the very time when unemployment and steep rises in the cost of living index were sharply reducing their real income, the citizenry was ripe for participation in any demonstration against the government. With bhikkhus among the principal organizers and participants in a series of protest marches and satyāgrahas,[33] the government quickly capitulated. Food subsidies were partially restored, even though the economic situation continued to worsen.[34]

The success of the various demonstrations on the food subsidy issue paved the way for a whole new series of civil protests against all kinds of unpopular governmental decisions. The more militant displays of displeasure were those led by younger members of the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas. By 1954, these Saṅgha members were enthusiastically involved in an energetic campaign to reinstate Buddhism as the national religion and Sinhala as Ceylon's official language.[35]

Still, the government remained adamant. Even though delegations of prominent Buddhist laymen and bhikkhus pleaded that a governmental commission be set up to examine the questions of religion and language, the Prime Minister, Sir John Kotelawala, who had replaced Dudley Senanayake upon the latter's resignation, endorsed his predecessor's negative view in this regard. Determined that something positive must be done in the matter, the Buddhist leadership searched for other means whereby a Committee could be established.

The Buddhist Committee of Inquiry: 1954-1956

Within the Buddhist community itself, there was a growing consensus that the slow but constant erosion of their culture through simple neglect on the part of the government must cease. The urbanites, for example, realized that normal opportunities theoretically available to the whole citizenry, such as better incomes, job promotions and respect for them as Sinhalese Buddhists by their fellow countrymen, did not in practice exist in their case. Such rights would be theirs only if governmental policy was radically changed. This would mean a reassertion of their traditional predominance through a state-financed educational system in which Sinhala would

be the primary language of instruction. Furthermore, responsible jobs would only be available to them when Sinhala was recognized as the official language.

At the same time, the rural communities, including both bhikkhus and peasants, were highly indignant that their religion, language and culture were ultimately destined for virtual annihilation if governmental policies did not change.

The young bhikkhus, who had so ardently supported Bandaranaike and his SLFP in his initial efforts in 1952 to restore Sinhalese Buddhism to its rightful position of predominance in Ceylonese society, continued to enthusiastically promote such a cause. Other bhikkhus, inspired by their political brethren, had formed small groups that would also promote the Sinhalese Buddhist movement. Before long such Saṅgha Sabhās amalgamated into two large organizations, the ACBC and the Sri Lanka Mahā Saṅgha Sabhā. The Buddhists felt that a few large groups might well prove to be more potent persuaders than many smaller ones.

This generalized determination to quickly eradicate the existing intolerable position in which the Sinhalese found themselves was strengthened even more as the time for the Buddha Jayanti celebrations drew near. Even though the year-long festivities would commence only on 23 May 1956,[36] plans concerning it were already under way in 1953.

The Buddha Jayanti was considered by all the faithful as a highly significant landmark in the progression of Buddhism since it marked the midpoint of twenty-five hundred years in its evolution.[37] But for the Sinhalese it had an added importance since it also commemorated the twenty-five hundredth anniversary of their arrival on the ancient Island of Sri Lanka.

This immigration was the result of the Sinhalese being charged by Gautama himself to carry on the elucidation of Buddhist philosophy.[38] And so, in order to commemorate this anniversary appropriately many associations had already been organized by 1953 to help in the preparations for the Jayanti.

The incongruity that existed in the early 1950's, between the traditional importance of the Sangha and its Sinhalese followers and the current disparagement of their philosophy, language and general culture, seemed even more humiliating as the Jayanti drew near. Equally insulting for many was the obvious disinterest shown by the UNP government in seeking advice from the Sangha.[39] The debasement of the Sinhalese was further underlined for them by the glaring disparity that currently existed between the Sinhalese and the Tamils who occupied an elite position in all sectors of society, largely because the latter had succumbed to a westernized educational system rather than their own.[40] The Sinhalese were also usually viewed by the other Ceylonese groups as a source of cheap labor.[41] Equally infuriating to the Sinhalese was the apparently total negligence on the part of the UNP government to rectify the intolerable position to which the Sangha and its supporters had been relegated within Ceylonese society.

The UNP government, however, continued to demonstrate its past policy ambivalence in relation to decisions concerning Sinhalese Buddhist requests. In 1954, Prime Minister Kotelawala, with the approval of his full Cabinet, formally appointed the Lankā Bauddha Mandalaya [Buddhist Council of Ceylon] (LBM) to be responsible for the overall organization and administration of what would turn out to be a dazzling Buddha Jayanti celebration. In conjunction with this involvement with the festivities, the state pledged to allocate a substantial sum of money to help defray the enormous ex-

penses that such an undertaking would entail. The state donations, when totaled, exceeded 5,000,000 rupees, or 1,060,000 dollars.[42] Such largesse was particularly noteworthy in the light of the serious financial problems that continued to plague the country. However, these various governmental endorsements of Buddhism in relation to the Buddha Jayanti still did not extend to countenancing state aid for the Sangha-administered schools. Furthermore, the UNP continued to categorically refuse any support whatsoever for a Buddhist Committee of Inquiry.

This continued refusal on the part of the administration elicited two rather different responses from the Buddhist community. On the one hand, those Sinhalese, including bhikkhus of a more forceful nature, staged a series of demonstrations, ranging from "sit-downs" to marches, through the principal streets of such centers as Colombo and Galle. The reaction of the more conservative Sinhalese, on the other hand, was a grim determination to immediately organize a comprehensive analysis of the Sinhalese Buddhist position and then to publicly air its findings and recommendations. This, they felt, should be completed before the commencement of the 1956 celebrations.[43] Consequently, in 1954, the same year that the government's LBM was inaugurated, the highly respected ACBC[44] initiated and formally endorsed the establishment of the Buddhist Committee of Inquiry. Seven distinguished bhikkhus and seven prominent Buddhist laymen formed the Committee.

The terms of reference given to the Committee included: firstly, a detailed study of the current status of the Sangha as a recognized authoritative body, and secondly, an analysis of why certain Sinhalese Buddhist projects received state support, while others that were of equal importance to the community were given no governmental consideration. As well, the Com-

mittee was to ferret out what factors were involved that led to the non-recognition of pōya days as religious holidays while full observance of Christian holidays was officially recognized. In examining these matters, the Committee was to use as a basis of comparison Theravāda Buddhism's traditional, historical pre-eminence prior to the colonial era, and, in particular, in the time preceding British settlement. Once it had gathered the necessary information, the Committee of Inquiry was charged with the task of making recommendations of a practical nature such that the injustices and bias that Sinhalese Buddhists faced could be immediately and permanently eradicated.

The Committee was expected to complete the Inquiry and to file a final public report by the beginning of 1956, that is, prior to the commencement of the Buddha Jayanti celebrations. By presenting its findings at this particularly crucial time, the ACBC felt that added pressure would be brought to bear upon the UNP government to rectify the situation in which the Sinhalese Buddhist community found itself.[45]

Extensive efforts were made by the Committee of Inquiry to contact Sinhalese Buddhists throughout Ceylon. In certain instances, questionnaires were sent. More than 1700 completed forms were received by the Committee in response. As well, hearings were set up in 37 widely dispersed areas of Ceylon, and these elicited suggestions from more than 1800 laymen and 700 bhikkhus.

The Committee's activities were given wide publicity and support by many Sinhalese newspapers, among which were the widely read Lankadipa and the Riviresa. The whole news media closely followed the progress of the Inquiry and, as well, gave advance publicity on future locations where hear-

ings would take place.[46] Ancient religious ceremonies were frequently held on the same days that Committee hearings took place. The result was that large crowds of Buddhists attended both activities. Information meetings proliferated, these were chaired by representatives of the Committee in order to impress upon the people the need for their enthusiastic support and participation in all Buddhist-related activities. Such involvement would increase the probability that the state would once again have to acknowledge the primacy of their community within Ceylonese society.[47]

Even during the Committee's hearings, efforts continued to be made to persuade the government to deal more fairly with the Sinhalese people. These petitions were made circumspectly, and the delegations involved consisted of eminent personages. For instance, a select body that included representatives from the All-Ceylon Ayurvedic Congress,[48] the All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress, the All-Ceylon Literary Association, as well as the two National Front Councils, the Lankā Jathika Guru Sangama and the Sinhalese Jathika Sangama (SJS), formally met with Sir John Kotelawala. This time they urged the Prime Minister to inaugurate policies that would permit the hiring of Sinhalese Buddhists for civil service positions in numbers commensurate with their ratio in Ceylonese society. As well, they emphasized that Sinhala still continued to be the language of the majority and, accordingly, it was imperative that it be recognized as the principal means of communication throughout the civil service, rather than English, which was spoken by only a small proportion of the population. Once again, such pleas were dismissed by government. English continued to be the official language of the House of Representatives and was automatically used in all official government transactions. The only linguistic concession accorded the Sinha-

lese was that they--as well as the Tamils--could use their native tongue when corresponding with public offices.[49]

Feelings regarding government policy were exacerbated when it became unofficially known that the UNP was planning to call an election that would take place in April 1956, immediately preceding the Buddha Jayanti celebrations. It had been hoped that the festival would promote cohesiveness among all sectors of the population. However, since the two events would closely follow each other, the divisive nature of an election almost ensured that there would be little likelihood of general amity among the citizens at the onset of the Jayanti. The resentment of the Buddhists rose to new heights at this decision since, according to the Constitution, an election did not need to be held before May 1957.

In light of this new development, the Committee of Inquiry increased its efforts to complete its work before the impending election could be held.[50] It was successful in these efforts. On 4 February 1956, the Committee made its findings and recommendations public, in a report provocatively entitled, "The Betrayal of Buddhism."

"The Betrayal of Buddhism" chronicled 450 years of humiliation for the Sinhalese Buddhist community. This degradation had been principally perpetrated by the various European powers which came to Ceylon. The report graphically recounted the erosion of the position of Buddhism through the contemptuous disregard that these alien powers had for Island tradition and for the majority of the indigenous population. The report went on to emphasize that there had been no surcease from the indignities heaped upon the Sangha and the Sinhalese people even after Ceylon had become an independent nation-state. Colonial policies, antithetical to all that tradition implied,

were not only perpetuated but were still being augmented as the government maneuvered to strengthen its dominance. Government policy was transforming the ancient Sri Lanka into a bastion of westernization, epitomized by the decree that English be accepted as the official language of Ceylon.

Furthermore, the Committee pointed out that, in keeping with such an edict, preference was blatantly accorded to those educational institutions which promoted the usage of English and cast aside centuries of classical instruction that was pertinent to all stages of man's existence. In addition, science had been made the focal point of the curriculum. As well, state funds wholly supported institutions inimical to Buddhism while such time-proven schools that took a traditional Buddhist approach to pedagogy were left to find their own means of support. Again, discrimination reared its ugly head, the Committee asserted, when students from the pansalas were denied important positions in favor of westernized Ceylonese.[51] To emphasize the incongruity of such practices, the Committee noted that Christians comprised only 9 percent of the total population as against the Sinhalese Buddhists' 64 percent and that the bulk of financial support to maintain alien institutions in Ceylon came from the Sinhalese through taxation.[52]

The report concluded with the assertion that the precipitous decline in Ceylon's overall economic and social well-being was due to the radical departure from the traditional political, religious and cultural customs that had prevailed when Ceylon was prosperous.[53] Although the culprits responsible for the current deplorable situation were not specifically named, the report made it perfectly clear that the blame lay squarely on the shoulders of the UNP government.[54] The administration was roundly condemned for its blatant disregard of the provisions contained in Section 29(2) of the Con-

stitution. This paragraph had specifically prohibited legislative discrimination against any person on religious or racial grounds.

However, not only were the politicians criticized by the Committee but the Saṅgha was also chided. The Committee decried the continuation of pupillary succession which in essence had resulted in hereditary acquisitions of Saṅgha properties by a thero's kinsmen. On the other hand, the Siam nikāya curtly dismissed the admonition as an example of laymen's interference in matters of a purely sacred nature.[55]

Numerous recommendations were contained in the "Betrayal of Buddhism." It strongly advised that admissions to universities reflect the religious and racial composition of the population. As well, it suggested that all teachers' training institutes and denominational schools be incorporated into the state system. In this way, public funds would underwrite all educational expenses of most schools. Only in the case of those institutions which restricted entrance to those children of a single specific religion would the state be absolved from taking over their expenses. On the other hand, if more than 51 percent of the pupils in a school shared the same religion, the administration of that institution should be under the sole jurisdiction of persons sharing that same faith. But since such schools were open to children of other beliefs, the government would be wholly responsible for their financing.[56]

In the realm of politics, the "Betrayal of Buddhism" advised that a constitutional amendment be enacted that would specifically state that only Sinhalese Buddhists could hold the positions of Head of State, Prime Minister, and Executive Head of the most important State Departments. The same criterion should also apply for the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Also

included in the report was the counsel that a specific Department of Religious Affairs be inaugurated so that all relevant matters could be handled by a specially appointed Cabinet Minister.

The report concluded by once again declaring that it was urgent for the good of the nation that Ceylon revert to the mode of life that had existed during the Kandyan monarchy in Sinhalese Buddhist society.[57] Alien cultures must be eradicated. The Christian religious holidays to which the current administration adhered must be discarded, and in their stead the Buddhist poya days be recognized. To achieve such a reversion to a truly Sinhalese Buddhist mode of life, the Committee warned that there must be close cooperation--and consensus--among all the nikāyas. For it would be these bodies that must set the example for Ceylonese society to follow. The Sinhalese Buddhists, the report went on, should try to emulate the Buddha Sāsana Council of Burma, which had effectively integrated the secular and sacred interests in much the same manner as in ancient times when the Saṅgha and monarchy had cooperated.[58] To ensure greater unity in the Saṅgha as a whole, as opposed to a specific nikāya loyalty, it suggested that central training centers be established to school those persons who wished to become bhikkhus.[59]

Essentially, the "Betrayal of Buddhism" reflected the grim determination of the Sinhalese Buddhist population, whether members of the Saṅgha or laity, to reinstate their traditional culture at all costs.[60] Since the report exemplified a unity of purpose felt by those people, it mattered little whether they were urbanites or peasants, domiciled in the highlands or along the littoral, rich or poor; they were all Sinhalese Buddhists and therefore had a common goal: the restitution of what they felt was their birthright.[61]

The Buddhists were soon given the opportunity to demonstrate their

cohesiveness and turn their dreams into reality. The election dates of April 5, 7 and 10 had been officially announced. Such a contest, immediately preceding the Buddha Jayanti, provided the community with an opportunity to grasp the reins of government and inaugurate the ideal society which they yearned for.[62]

Summary and Conclusions

The initial optimism of the Ceylonese concerning their newly independent nation gave way to communal dissatisfaction less than a year after its establishment. The Tamils and other minorities expected a continuation of western ways. The Mahā Saṅgha expected a reassertion of the primacy of the Saṅgha throughout Ceylonese society, and immediate governmental recognition of Sinhalese Buddhism as the sole culture of Ceylon. The same expectations were held by the Sinhalese peasants and city dwellers. The hitherto disparate Sinhalese Buddhist community was unified by a single purpose: the reassertion of the pre-eminence of the traditional culture throughout Ceylon. As in past centuries, the laity looked to the Saṅgha for leadership and the Saṅgha to rectify the current situation through influencing the state's political leadership.

However, during these early years of state development, the UNP was loathe to direct Ceylon solely along ancient societal paths. Nonetheless, it was not averse to giving Sinhalese Buddhism certain privileges. But such munificence as providing money for the Jayanti was not sufficient. The party refused to endorse practical measures to reassert the ancient culture by establishing a Buddhist Committee of Inquiry.

An alternative to the UNP appeared in 1951 when the SLFP was estab-

lished by such men as Bandaranaike who had been working for the restoration of Sinhalese Buddhism since the 1930's. Meanwhile, modern elements could not be wholly eradicated even from the efforts to restore traditional ways. The Amarapura and Rāmanya bhikkhus had been influenced by the colonial impact in both their schooling and their daily activities. Bandaranaike himself had been educated in a British university and had, for a while, embraced the Christian faith. Similarly, the middle-class urban laity had spent much of their lives among the colonialists. Consequently, there was an inevitable mixture of traditionalists, such as the Siam nikāya and the peasants, and westernized Sinhalese Buddhists.

Still, unity of purpose among the Sinhalese did exist from 1953 until after the 1956 election and was further cemented by the Buddha Jayanti celebrations. The Jayanti underlined the many centuries of common history shared by all Sinhalese Buddhists. Perhaps, it was this affinity that compelled the conservative Siam nikāya and peasants to endorse the SLFP during the election campaign in 1956 and in the period immediately afterwards in spite of the SLFP's coalition with the Marxist, but nevertheless strongly Sinhalese nationalist party, the Viplavakāri Lankā Sama Samaja Party [Revolutionary Ceylon Equal Society] (VLSSP).[63]

Notes

1. See Appendix V, Table 4, p. 232.

2. See Appendix V, Tables 2 and 3, pp. 230, 231.

3. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 47; Robert N. Kearney, "Sinhalese Nationalism and Social Conflict in Ceylon," Pacific Affairs 37 (Summer 1964):135. Kearney warns that societies which move smoothly from colonial to independent status without societal disruptions are likely to incur civil unrest after independence. A struggle for priority between the proponents of colonial tenets and those of the indigenous culture is almost inevitable.

4. The 1947 Constitution, Section 29(2) provided that no law enacted by the Parliament of Ceylon shall:

(a) prohibit or restrict the free exercise of any religion,

(b) make persons of any community or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of other communities or religions are not made liable,

(c) confer on persons of any community or religion any privilege or advantages not conferred on persons of other communities and religions,

(d) alter the Constitution of any religious body except with the consent of the governing authority of that body, provided that in any case where a religious body is incorporated by law, no such alteration shall be made except at the request of the governing authority of that body.

5. W. Howard Wriggins, "Impediments to Unity in New Nations: The Case of Ceylon," in The Dynamics of Modernization and Social Change, ed. George S. Masannat (Pacific Palisades, Cal.: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1973), p. 185.

6. From 1948 until 1977 the premiership was held by the members of either the Senanayake or Bandaranaike families; both of whom were part of the elite Sinhalese Buddhist Goyigama caste. Despite the leadership's sophistication in worldly matters and close attachment to the Sinhalese Buddhists, neither they nor their families that succeeded them through the years, could prevent the ever-increasing civil unrest or maintain the nation's original prosperity.

7. See Appendix V, Table 5, p. 233.

8. The Donoughmore Constitution of 1931 incorporated a program and the opportunity for certain Ceylonese to actively participate in governing the colony.

9. As Singer points out, it is a moot point whether these conversions occurred as a result of true philosophical convictions or whether political expediency was the primary motive. Singer, The Emerging Elite, p. 61. Such conversions from Christianity to Buddhism and vice versa were not uncommon among the Goyigamas. Nur Yalman, Under the Bo Tree (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 87, 233-234.

10. Robert N. Kearney, Communalism and Language in Politics of Ceylon (Durham, N.C.; Duke University Press, 1967), p. 62.

11. This power was only potential for, until the Sangha campaigned in 1956 among the rural residents, their interest in politics was, at best, minimal. Tarzie Vittachi, Emergency '58 (London: André Deutsch, 1958), p. 19.

12. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 27.

13. Between 1948 and 1956, annual government grants, for example to Christian schools, amounted to Rs. 45 million, as against Rs. 300,000 for the pansalas. Christian collegiate schools numbered 205 while there were only 55 Buddhist ones. In university administrative bodies, the ratio of Christians to Buddhists was three to one. I. D. S. Weerawardana, Ceylon General Election 1956 (Colombo, Sri Lanka: M. D. Gunasera & Co., 1960), p. 147.

14. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, passim.

15. The language of government and business was English despite the fact that 91 percent of the Ceylonese could neither read nor write it. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 449.

16. Christmas Humphreys, Buddhism (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 137.

17. Spiro, Buddhism and Society, p. 364.

18. Donald Eugene Smith, Religion, Politics and Social Change, p. 147. Also see Appendix V, Table 6, p. 234, indicating the increased voter turnout when the political bhikkhus emerged.

19. W. Howard Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 210.

20. See Appendix IV, Chart I, p. 226.

21. Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon, pp. 226-227.

22. Spiro accounts for such contrary behavior in relations to orthodox Buddhism by dividing its adherents into two groups. First there are those bhikkhus who strictly practice the teachings of the Dharma, and shed all worldly interests in their adherence to nirvanic Buddhism; and secondly the others, such as the political bhikkhus, who follow karmatic Buddhism whereby salvation is obtained by meritorious actions, and the focus is therefore on the enhancement of one's status within Samsāra. Spiro, Buddhism and Society, pp. 66-70, 91, 426.

23. Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon, p. 241.

24. The antipathy between the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas and the Siam nikāya had existed since the very founding of the Amarapura nikāya. In fact, so great was the continuing hostility between the Amarapura and Siam fraternities that the latter proclaimed it impossible for the Amarapura members to even attain nirvana. Each termed the other "Priests without sanctity [duk-silayas]." Spiro, Buddhism and Society p. 319 n.

25. Self-interest on the part of the Siam nikāya was a significant factor

for its support of the UNP. The importance which this sect attached to controlling its vast wealth and the power that went with it became obvious when a 1959 Sāsana Commission recommended by a large majority the joint administration of such riches by a committee made up of government representatives, Buddhist laymen and the whole Mahā Sangha. See pp. 98-99 of this thesis.

26. Robert N. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, pp. 121-122.

27. Rustow points out that frequently colonial rule was of sufficient duration to thoroughly disrupt traditional patterns of authority, but not really long enough to firmly establish new ones. This seems to have been the case with the British settlement of Ceylon. Rustow, A World of Nations, p. 77.

28. See Appendix V, Table 10, p. 236.

29. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics, p. 126.

30. Robert N. Kearney, "The New Political Crises of Ceylon," Asian Survey 2 (June 1962):20.

31. See Appendix V, Table 4, p. 232.

32. See Appendix V, Table 5, p. 233, for a listing of incumbent Prime Ministers and their parties.

33. Arasaratnam, Ceylon, p. 24.

34. Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon, pp. 232-233. The balance of trade was to continue to decrease in the next decade and a half, as Ceylon's main exports--raw materials such as tea, rubber and coconut--decreased in value on world markets. Marshal R. Singer, "Group Perception and Social Change in Ceylon," International Journal of Comparative Sociology 7 (March 1966):221.

35. André Bareau, La vie et l'organisation des communautés bouddhiques modernes de Ceylan (Pondichery, Institut Français d'Indologie, 1957), p. 81.

36. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 170.

37. It is believed that ultimately Buddhism will itself disappear. There are three modes by which this will come to pass: (a) the increasing loss of sanctity among its adherents; (b) the waning of observance of its precepts; and (c) the final lack of any overt evidences of Buddhism. The cyclical evolution of Buddhism until its immersion into nothingness is expected to occur over five stages approximately one thousand years apart. These are: (1) more and more of the faithful will be in-

capable of achieving the necessary advanced degrees of growth in their sanctity to reach a millenium; (2) minor prohibitions will be ignored; (3) the impiety of leaders, followed by their supporters, will result in droughts and famine; these will in turn cause the death of the bhikkhus; (4) the wearing of the monastic robe and other observances of the symbols of the faithful will be increasingly neglected; and (5) the disappearance of the relics of the Buddha that will signal the end of the Philosophy. The Buddha Jayanti marked the mid-point in this evolutionary cycle. George Coedès, "The Twenty-Five Hundredth Anniversary of the Buddha," Diogenes 15 (July 1956):107.

38. The basis for this belief rests on the writing contained in the Mahāvāmsa which synchronizes the death of the Buddha with the founding of the Sinhalese race. To the deity Vishnu was given the task of overseeing the chosen race. Today he is venerated by the Sinhalese Buddhists as the protector of the Faith, the Race and the Land. Donald Eugene Smith, Religion, Politics and Social Change, pp. 103-104.

39. Kearney, Communalism and Language, pp. 78-79.

40. The Tamils held approximately 70 percent of the government posts, the large majority of mercantile jobs and the greatest proportion of professional occupations; all of which required English as a first language. The incongruity lay in the fact that 59 percent of the population spoke only Sinhalese, with only 10 percent of the Ceylonese fluent in English. D. K. Rangnekar, "The Nationalist Revolution in Ceylon," Pacific Affairs 33 (December 1960):366.

41. Singer, The Emerging Elite, p. 71.

42. As Smith points out, such governmental affirmation as well as the promised monetary contribution was a landmark in modern Ceylonese times for it established the precedent for massive state intervention in Buddhist affairs. Donald Eugene Smith, "The Sinhalese Buddhist Revolution," in South Asian Politics and Religion, ed. Donald Eugene Smith (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 459-460.

43. Eisenstadt has pointed out that unless the government of a new state can aggregate the demands made by various interest groups into a generalized policy, no constructive political system can be maintained. Such a vacuum is likely to lead to civil disruptions and a split within the central institutions of the nation itself. Such has been the case in Ceylon since 1952, whether the incumbent party be the UNP or the SLFP. Civil unrest throughout the country remained unassuaged. Sinhalese Buddhist expectations, Tamil demands, a constantly worsening economy and the growth of various militant socialist movements have simultaneously rent the Ceylonese political system for more than two decades. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change and Modernity, pp. 82, 92-93.

44. It was founded in 1918 under the appellation, The All-Ceylon Congress of Young Men's Buddhist Association; in 1940, it adopted its present

name. Through these various designations it still retained its primary purpose of promoting the interests of Buddhism and the Buddhists. Donald Eugene Smith, "The Sinhalese Buddhist Revolution," p. 460.

45. Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon, p. 242.

46. There were, at this time alone, nine daily Sinhalese newspapers with a total circulation of approximately 976,000. Their detailed reportage of the Committee's activities gave their readers the opportunity to closely follow its progress and involve themselves in the Inquiry when feasible. B. H. Farmer et al., "Sri Lanka," The Far East and Australasia, 1974 (London: Europa Publications, 1974), p. 337.

47. Weerawardana, Ceylon General Election 1956, p. 110.

48. The Ayurvedic physicians were those persons who practiced medicine by using traditional means that had evolved through the centuries.

49. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 24.

50. Arasaratnam, Ceylon, p. 28.

51. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 170.

52. Donald Eugene Smith, "The Sinhalese Buddhist Revolution," p. 481.

53. This assertion is somewhat misleading since there had been periods of severe decline earlier in the fortunes of Sinhalese civilization. For instance, between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries, power-hungry monarchs squandered resources on fighting battles, and domestic needs were forgotten. It was at such times that food was scarce, diseases such as malaria rampant and the administration itself corrupt. Arasaratnam, Ceylon, pp. 93-97.

54. Donald Eugene Smith, Religion, Politics and Social Change, pp. 142-143; Weerawardana, Ceylon General Election 1956, pp. 113-114.

55. Evers, "Monastic Landlordism," p. 692.

56. At the time of the report, about 40 percent of the students attending Catholic schools were Buddhists. Donald Eugene Smith, "The Sinhalese Buddhist Revolution," p. 481.

57. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 22; Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, pp. 196-197.

58. Donald Eugene Smith, "The Sinhalese Buddhist Revolution," p. 465-466. However, as later events would show, the Buddha Sāsana Council which was formed four years later was totally ineffective. The wealthy Siam nikāya was the principal cause of its failure, since it categorically refused to permit any other nikāya or the laity to involve themselves

in its affairs. A case in point was its refusal to permit a committee of bhikkhus and laymen to handle Saṅgha financial affairs.

59. Smith has commented that the report generally reflected the modern world-view of the English-educated Buddhist layman. Its chief deficiency, in his opinion, lay in its tendency to solve complex problems of policy by simplistic solutions. Donald Eugene Smith, "The Sinhalese Buddhist Revolution," p. 463.

60. Kearney, Communalism and Language, p. 79; Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon, p. 242.

61. In light of the promises made by the SLFP in the 1956 campaign, it should be noted, as Tambiah observes, that the report did not specifically demand that Buddhism be made the State Religion or that the traditional prerogatives and privileges accorded to the Saṅgha by the ancient Sinhalese monarch should be reinstated. Tambiah, "Buddhism and This-Worldly Activity," p. 7.

62. As Ludowyk notes, the events which led to the 1956 General Election and those which followed can be considered the prelude to a social revolution, and then its consummation. Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon, p. 237.

63. See Appendix II, p. 218.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL PRE-EMINENCE OF THE SANGHA: THE 1956 ELECTION

Major Party Contestants

The 1956 election campaign proved to be a landmark in the evolution of Ceylonese politics. It was, in fact, the first political contest which appeared to offer clear-cut alternatives on whether Ceylon would return to a traditional pattern of life or become an increasingly westernized industrial state. This campaign set the pattern for many subsequent election campaigns. Since the matters at issue continued to be so fundamental to the future conduct of daily life for each voter and his family, a high electoral turnout became the norm for all elections through the years.[1] The choices the parties offered the electorate were seemingly clear-cut. Did the electorate support traditionalism and the SLFP[2] or westernization and the UNP?[3] Ceylonese elections have been, in essence, two-party contests. Communalism has become so uncompromising that campaign issues, reflecting this acute ethnic awareness, have been in fact "either/or" policy propositions. No compromising alternatives between the two poles were countenanced by either politicians or the populace.

The catalyst that molded the 1956 election was undoubtedly the "Betrayal of Buddhism" Report. The eagerness with which it was endorsed by many of the Sinhalese and their impatience to see its recommendations implemented in full permitted no room for accommodation of other groups' aspira-

tions. To the Buddhists it highlighted the insulting negligence of the government in its treatment of the majority. Such a negative leadership attitude was forcefully underlined by the approaching Buddha Jayanti celebrations which, in contrast, extolled the virtues of both Buddhism and its designated leaders, the Sinhalese. The fact that huge sums of public money had been used to enhance the sumptuousness of the festivities did not offset the antipathy created by the UNP's refusal to promote the primacy of Sinhalese Buddhism in other matters. In several other spheres, the UNP was regarded as equally remiss. The initial abolition of rice subsidies had the greatest impact on the peasants, the urban poor and the workers--not the elite. When this seemingly discriminatory policy was only partially rectified, the Sinhalese were not appeased. The continuing apparent injustice of the lack of financial support for Sangha-administered schools, while their secular westernized English counterparts were amply provided for through governmental beneficence, continued to rankle the Sinhalese Buddhists. All in all, both the Sangha and the Buddhist laics were exceedingly affronted by the obvious UNP subservience to westernized Ceylonese demands while the Sinhalese remained mere "hewers of wood and drawers of water."

With such emotional issues at stake the two major political groups in the campaign, the Mahajama Eksath Peramuna [People's United Front] (MEP) comprising the SLFP and the VLSSP,[4] and the UNP, found themselves chained to political platforms which left little room for compromise or even negotiation between the contestants. The populace unhesitatingly associated themselves with either the Sinhalese demands that were enunciated by the MEP, or with the incumbent UNP, which could apparently be relied upon to repulse the impractical claims of their adversaries. Other matters, such as the increasing

influence of socialist and Marxist tenets and the steadily declining economic viability of the nation, were only of secondary interest. However, subsequent elections were to be marked by the increasing importance of these issues in influencing the direction that the political system would follow.[5] Nonetheless, these same matters would again be judged in terms consonant with communalism.

The 1956 contest, however, seemed to revolve around the narrow debate on the needed or needless recognition of one particular religion and language to the exclusion of all others.[6] The distribution of the limited monetary resources was important only insofar as it could further the aspirations of one group to the detriment of all others.

Principal Issues

The issues in the 1956 campaign reflected the controversies that had become increasingly acrimonious among the Ceylonese since 1948 after having simmered for many years prior to Independence.

Religion

The role of religion in modern Ceylon was presented to the people as having only two alternatives:

1. Should governmental policy in Ceylon continue to be based upon a clearly defined separation of church and state?

2. Or rather, should Theravāda Buddhism be formally recognized as the official state religion?

If the latter course were chosen, then national policies would be formulated to conform with its precepts.[7] Also, Sangha schools would automatically be totally financed through public funds. Furthermore, Buddhist

holy days, such as the pōya days, would be officially recognized, replacing the Christian holidays which had been imposed until then.

Language

Again, there seemed to be but two choices:

1. In the first case, the government would formally recognize English as the primary language of Ceylon. At the same time, it would give limited recognition to Sinhala and Tamil, since these were the ancestral tongues of the two principal ethnic groups.

2. The other option was the official recognition of Sinhala as the language of communication to be used throughout the Island.

The second choice between the religious and linguistic alternatives meant that the culture of the Sinhalese Buddhists must be reasserted at all costs. Even the possibility that agitation by other groups forced to conform to Sinhalese precepts would ensue seemed to be of little importance.[8] In essence, the focal point of these policies to the Sangha and its supporters, was the complete implementation of the Committee of Inquiry report.[9] And it would be through the astute campaigning of the SLFP and MEP leader, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, that this goal would be automatically equated in the electorate's mind with an MEP election victory.[10]

Economy

Even this seemingly less important issue appeared to pivot upon only two contrasting alternatives:

1. Should the nation continue along its present course that permitted non-Ceylonese companies or individuals to retain such lucrative holdings as the tea plantations?[11] Furthermore, was it not financially prudent to

once again abolish rice subsidies, or at least, not increase them in the face of a declining economy?

2. Or would a democratic socialist society[12] be a better alternative for a new nation such as Ceylon?

Under the second alternative, important Ceylonese industries so frequently controlled by foreign investors would be nationalized. The earnings that the State would derive from such firms would enable the government to immensely broaden the scope of social services. The less affluent sector of society (at this time, the Sinhalese) would benefit immeasurably from such munificence. And, of course, rice subsidies could be raised to their former levels or even further extended.

This second choice had the added benefit for the party which advocated it--the SLFP--that communist groups such as the VLSSP could overtly or tacitly support such a party without irreparably damaging their credibility among their own supporters.

The various religious, linguistic, and even economic alternatives which the Sinhalese Buddhists endorsed would radically change the very fabric of the Ceylonese nation. By their nature, the religious and linguistic policies would undoubtedly identify certain minorities as antagonists of the Sinhalese Buddhists. For such groups would be compelled, as Ceylonese citizens, to adhere to alien Buddhist principles, since governmental policy would be guided by them. In contrast, their own religious beliefs would likely not be given protection against such overwhelming Buddhist predominance. Furthermore, the position of the westernized groups in Ceylonese society would be seriously jeopardized. They would be compelled to immediately learn a language totally unrelated in origin to either English or

Tamil to be able to obtain suitable employment and be a viable part of Ceylonese society.

Such election issues as these consequently involved matters that the extremists could exploit to the full since they were assured of support by whichever groups endorsed their particular stand. The seeds of ethnic hatred could rapidly grow to gigantic proportions in an atmosphere which made religious and linguistic priorities the focal points of an already divisive election campaign.[13]

Party Positions on the Issues

The election was essentially a struggle between the incumbent UNP and the MEP coalition. The leader of the latter was the experienced S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, who had committed his own party, the SLFP, before the 1952 election, to work toward furthering Sinhalese Buddhist interests. The catalyst of the MEP was the Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna [United Bhikkhu Front] (EBP) interest group, whose members, the bhikkhus, fully exploited their continuing influence among the Buddhists to gain endorsement for the party whose goals paralleled their own. The Sinhala Bhasa Peramuna [Sinhala Language Front] (SBP) also threw its support behind the MEP coalition since one of its principal campaign promises was to ensure that Sinhala immediately became the working language throughout Ceylon.

Fully realizing the impact that the current resurgence of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism would have upon the life of the nation, the Marxist party, the VLSSP, became a partner in the MEP coalition. Its leader, Philip Gunawardena,[14] argued that there were many similarities between Buddhism and communism, and he assured the recalcitrant of both groups that the two philos-

ophies meshed, since they so obviously complemented each other, one enhancing the material position of the people and the other helping care for their spiritual well-being. The initially superficial comparison of Buddhism and communism became increasingly complex through the years as the faithful of each group sought to justify their position for or against a close political working relationship between the two parties.

On a less organized basis, but nonetheless providing ardent support for the MEP, were the rural middle class groups such as the lay Buddhist teachers and the Ayurvedic physicians. The livelihood of both these groups was increasingly jeopardized by the steady incursion into the highlands of westernized professionals whom the UNP supported. Only with the installation of an MEP government could this growing menace be halted.

To further its electoral chances even more, a nolo contendere agreement was worked out by the MEP with such leftist groups as the Communist Party (CP),[15] and the Lankā Sama Samaja Party [Ceylon Equal Society Party] (LSSP).[16] Through this pact, the parties agreed to field no candidates in constituencies where the other already had a representative running. Unlike the socialist parties, the MEP had candidates placed in all electoral districts.

Having prepared a solid foundation through coalitions and pacts, the SLFP and other member parties were only faced with presenting a cogent program which would appeal to the majority of the Ceylonese electorate consisting, of course, of the Sinhalese Buddhists.

The Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP)

The MEP styled itself the "party of the common man" and based its campaign primarily on the recommendation included in the "Betrayal of Bud-

dhism" Report.[17] Sinhala would be immediately proclaimed the official language and Theravāda Buddhism inaugurated as the religion of the state. The coalition assured the Sinhalese Buddhists that their currently humiliating position in Ceylonese society would no longer be countenanced. Job requirements, for instance in the public service, would reflect the cultural essence of Ceylon and, as a result, Sinhalese Buddhists rather than English speaking westernized persons would be selected. Ceylon would once again become a region marked by peace and prosperity, as it had been many centuries past. It would be an example for the rest of the world to emulate. Parents could rest assured that their children would be educated in Sinhalese schools which based their curriculum on Buddhist philosophy. The Mahā Saṅgha would be urged to take over the administration of the state educational system.

The MEP platform was couched in such terms that it appealed equally to Sinhalese Buddhists who were concerned about their material well-being and employment opportunities. Such persons had shown a marked interest and enthusiasm for certain programs which had been put forth at various times by leftist groups.[18] Bandaranaike commiserated with them and pointed out that, even at the present time, the UNP made sure that the middle class was largely comprised of English-speaking aliens, that is, the westernized Ceylonese.[19] However, with the changes in priorities promised by the MEP, the Sinhalese would become the dominant group in this stratum of society. At last, the prestige which was their due and was commensurate with increased buying power would finally be theirs. Although the composition of the urban middle class would be radically changed, their rural counterpart, which principally included Buddhist teachers and traditional medicine men, were assured by Bandaranaike of their continuing predominance in village life.[20]

The MEP also proved its magnetic appeal by gathering the Sinhalese labor movement to its side. Bandaranaike himself promised that all foreign control of Ceylon's major commercial enterprises would be returned to their rightful owners, the Ceylonese. Consequently, the aliens who had held lucrative and powerful administrative positions in these industries, and the westernized Ceylonese who had enjoyed comparable positions in the labor movement, would be replaced by Sinhalese.[21]

Initially, Bandaranaike had said that, although Sinhala would be the principal language of Ceylon, this would not preclude the Tamils from making reasonable use of their own native language, that is within their own localities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.[22] Such a concession, he stated, had little likelihood of weakening the dominant position of Sinhala, since the Tamils, like the majority of ethnic groups in Ceylon, lived in virtually secluded clusters comprised of their own people.[23] However, the Sangha and other Sinhalese supporters were so angered by this concession that the MEP leader made no further mention of permitting such linguistic freedom.[24]

Symbolically, Bandaranaike reinforced his promise to ensure an unassailable position for Sinhalese Buddhism in Ceylon by permanently divesting himself of all western clothing despite the fact that this was the common dress of most urban Ceylonese civilians. Instead, he appeared, starting early in the campaign, clad in the "cloth and banian" of the traditional Sinhalese countryman.[25]

With a platform which promised a Sinhalese millenium in Ceylon as soon as his party came to power, he contrasted this positive future with the negative present that had been caused by UNP policies. The evils visited upon the nation, the unwarranted and discriminatory concessions made to the

westernized Ceylonese, and the corruption of the Island's traditional mode of life were the sole responsibility of these colonialist puppets. The UNP had devoted all its attention to westernizing Ceylon and basing its administrative decisions solely on urban interests, he charged.[26] It had totally neglected the majority of the population who lived in rural areas and were in fact the mainstay of the nation.

By vowing full restoration of Sinhalese Buddhist traditional life, the MEP appealed to the innermost yearnings of the peasants in particular. And with the promise of a type of democratic socialism, which would mean the expansion of social services and more equalized earnings, the coalition also drew into its orbit the unionized urban workers.[27]

The Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna (EBP)

Certainly, the political dexterity with which Bandaranaike and other MEP candidates handled their part of the 1956 campaign was remarkable. Yet, undoubtedly, it was the vigor displayed by the EBP members in taking full advantage of their organizational talents and in wielding their considerable influence among the Sinhalese Buddhist laity that provided the momentum for the ultimate success of the MEP campaign.

It was under the direction of the illustrious Mapitigama Buddharakhita[28] that a confederation of bhikkhus, the Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna (EBP) was established. Although the EBP quickly evolved into a militant group,[29] ready to take any action that would swiftly make Sinhalese Buddhism the guiding light throughout Ceylon, its initial purpose was to provide support for the MEP campaign. The attachment to the MEP emanated from its initial endorsement of the SLFP and its leader's unflagging efforts since the inception

of the party in 1952 to ensure the rapid restoration of Sinhalese Buddhism.

The EBP was formally inaugurated on the 4 February 1956, the eighth anniversary of Independence. Its potential power among the Sinhalese laity was quite awesome, for it consisted of a tightly knit coalition of seventy-five regional bodies, Vihāra Sāsanarakshaka, which had a membership of more than twelve thousand bhikkhus.[30] It immediately undertook the task of making certain that all Sinhalese Buddhists, whether peasants or urbanites, fully realized that it was imperative that they vote for the MEP. Only with this coalition in power, the religious emphasized, could there be a complete restoration of the people's traditional birthrights. Since the EBP membership came from a network of vihāras, which virtually reached into every village of Ceylon,[31] the bhikkhus had little difficulty in making contact with all the Sinhalese peasants on a personal basis.

Like Buddharakhita, who had supported the SLFP program in 1952, many of the religious had never ceased working in various ways to bring about the restoration of the Sinhalese Buddhist ethos to the modern state of Ceylon. They now undertook this new political task as the dedicated enthusiasts that they had proved themselves to be in the past. As had always been the case, the greatest proportion of these "political bhikkhus" were formally associated with the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas.[32] Through the years, despite the increased diversity of their activities, such bhikkhus continued to enjoy the same close relationship with the people of the town in which their vihāra was located. This empathy was intensified during the election campaign, for both the bhikkhu and the villagers worked as a team on a local basis to do their utmost to ensure that Sinhala and Buddhism would once again be the officially predominant characteristics of the Ceylonese nation

before the formal beginning of the Buddha Jayanti celebrations.[33]

In spite of indisputable evidence that a great number of Sinhalese people were sympathetic toward EBP objectives and, moreover, that these bhikkhus were virtually ensuring an election victory for the MEP, their activities were still strongly criticized by many Buddhists. The conservative sector of the laity continued to assert that membership in the Saṅgha, by its very nature meant complete withdrawal from worldly activities.[34] Furthermore, the bhikkhus' insistence in wearing the distinctive saffron robes of the Sinhalese religious while traveling around on their political circuits was a blatant contradiction, their critics continued, of what the Mahā Saṅgha was assumed to represent. It was felt that bhikkhus who participated in worldly activities, such as electioneering, weakened the authority of the Saṅgha by mixing important sacred duties with trivial secular matters. As a result, their actions also undermined Theravāda Buddhism itself since the Saṅgha was one of the Tiratana [Three Jewels].[35] Therefore, any good that might directly result from such political activism would be more than offset by the harm caused to the very bedrock upon which Theravāda Buddhism rested.[36]

Among the most vociferous critics of political activity by bhikkhus was the Siam nikāya. Like their laic brethren, they unhesitatingly endorsed the principle that traditional Sinhalese Buddhism must be restored to its rightful place in the society. But such irreligious manifestations as political involvement, they maintained, would only result in the most dissolute examples of impiety.[37]

The animosity among the Buddhists, and within the Mahā Saṅgha in particular, became so virulent that a meeting to which all members of the

Sangha were invited was called. Its purpose was to try to resolve the acrimonious dispute and heal the pronounced fissure that so obviously was widening among the nikāyas.[38] Although it was the highly respected Venerable Weliwitiye Sorato Thero, principal of the prestigious Vidyodaya Pirivena, who chaired the gathering, the dissension among the religious could not be quieted. The differences that existed appeared to be too great to settle in a matter of hours.

Arguments from both sides in the dispute were heard. Members of the Siam fraternity contended that Kotelawala's government was very obviously demonstrating its support of Buddhism through its firm insistence, despite strong criticism, that secular and sacred matters should exist, as far as governmental affairs were concerned, as separate entities. Because of this prudent policy, Sinhalese Buddhists were given every freedom to pursue their particular philosophy as they saw fit. Other Siam supporters pointed out that, even if some merit could be found in the EBP's philosophical position, it was most illogical to expect that the effects of four hundred years of colonial rule could be eradicated in less than a decade.[39]

The contention of EBP members, on the other hand, was that, by assuring the election of a political coalition so devoted to the Buddhist cause as the MEP, the Sangha could resume its ancient, prescribed duty as the guardian of Theravāda Buddhism. Such a pious government could then be expected to consult with the religious on a regular basis concerning all social, economic and political matters that affected the people. This had been the much lauded tradition in ancient Sri Lanka under the monarchy. Consequently, continuous guidance would ensure that Ceylon was once more a truly meritorious example of a Theravāda Buddhist state as it was destined to be according to

the Mahāvāmsa.

Neither this gathering nor others which were held in the same vein were able to resolve the dispute. Consequently, during the whole 1956 election, as in all ensuing political, societal and economic events which affected the Sangha, the nikāyas remained divided.

The United National Party (UNP)

The election platform of the UNP was couched in such terms that its policies attracted that sector of Ceylonese society which was anxious to maintain the overall status quo in the political system.

Like the first party leader, D. S. Senanayake, his son Dudley and his cousin, Sir John Kotelawala, were Sinhalese Buddhists. They contended that the UNP had pursued a firm policy of separation between church and state not because of some nefarious scheme to demean Theravāda Buddhism but because it was a necessity in a multi-ethnic society such as Ceylon. And this policy, the UNP candidates went on to point out, had not been applied with blind rigidity. For instance, the state had been most generous to the Sinhalese Buddhists. It had provided some of its very limited public funds to help defray the expense of translating Pāli texts, to aid in the compilation of a Buddhist encyclopedia, and to assist in the massive restoration of the Sri Daladā Māligāva. At the very time of the campaign, the UNP politicians noted, the government was providing large donations to help current preparations for the Buddha Jayanti celebrations. Indeed, it had been the UNP administration, with the full approval of the Sinhalese Buddhists, which had initially established the Lankā Bauddha Mandalaya, charged with supervising the overall arrangements for the Jayanti. Such an expenditure of time and money to ensure that the festivities would be a success certainly was not characteristic

of a government which was impervious to the occasional need by the religious bodies for some subsidiary governmental support.

However commendable these expenditures might have been, this governmental munificence to the Buddhist community had seemed to be an example of blatant favoritism in the eyes of a previous UNP supporter, the Roman Catholic Church. Consequently, unlike its 1952 public endorsement of the UNP, the church remained silent in 1956 when no change of government policy was evident regarding donations to the Jayanti. As a result, throughout the campaign the church did not take sides, except to strongly advise parishioners that they should not support a Marxist party.[40]

The UNP election platform also made it clear that, for purely pragmatic reasons, it would continue with the same linguistic and educational policies. It was pointed out that the British had left Ceylon with a modern educational system which took into consideration the demands of industrialization. Although Ceylon was still a predominantly agricultural society, world prices for raw materials were continuing their downward trend and would not likely rise in the near future. Consequently, to restore the previously buoyant economy of the state, the export of processed and manufactured goods was a necessity. Since education that prepared a working force with adequate knowledge to cope with such requirements was far more expensive than the traditional classical scholasticism, such as that of the Sinhalese Buddhist classes, a single government-supported pedagogical program seemed the most practical means to enhance industrial opportunities in a nation with limited funds. It would be not only uneconomical and debilitating to the national good, but unfair to single out one ethnic body for preferential treatment when it involved public funds. Such a disbursement would have no advantages

for other groups, unlike the Buddha Jayanti which involved the whole Ceylonese nation. Nevertheless, ethnic organizations that wished to provide, at their own expense, auxiliary instruction which focused upon Sinhalese and Theravāda Buddhism would not be hindered by the government.[41]

Again, the UNP candidates claimed, the choice of English as the language of instruction had a two-fold purpose. English was becoming the most commonly used language in business in the urban centers. Although the rural sector of the society was numerically larger, it was generally divided along ethnic lines. For these reasons, selection of a language such as Sinhala or Tamil as the national lingua franca would be far more discriminatory in the long run, even for the peasants, than the choice of a "neutral" tongue. Furthermore, from a practical point of view, the necessary textbooks normally required in modern education were readily available in English. Therefore, the cost of translation and the time needed to carry through such a linguistic conversion into a Ceylonese ethnic tongue could be avoided. For these reasons, the UNP candidates stated that their party would continue with the English language and a neutral public educational system.

In the sphere of economics, the UNP again pointed to the deflated export prices for raw materials. This external situation, over which Ceylon had little control at that time, was the fundamental cause for its declining Gross National Product, the UNP contended.[42] Therefore, rapid industrialization, which could only be attained through encouraging foreign investment, was an economic priority in the party's platform. Only then would the peasants enjoy prosperity as processing plants located in Ceylon, to which they could sell their produce at profitable prices, became increasingly available. Only then would there be jobs for the unemployed and an increased wage scale

for all workers. Until a fiscal rejuvenation did occur, social aids such as rice subsidies had to be restricted or even abolished. Such abolition of public assistance had been strongly urged by the Bank of Ceylon many times since 1952, the UNP reminded the citizenry.

Despite the UNP appeal for a viable, united Ceylonese nation, and the reasons for its past--and hopefully future--governmental policies, most Sinhalese Buddhists, with the possible exception of the Siam nikāya, remained unimpressed. Furthermore, the incumbent party had lost a number of its previous supporters who would have endorsed its current stand. These were the Indian Tamils who worked on the tea plantations in Kandy and had enjoyed voting rights in the 1947 election. Later, when they were disenfranchised in 1949, the UNP had still received the majority of votes from the plantation workers, although these were preponderantly Sinhalese. However, Bandaranaike had been carefully nurturing these particular workers' support himself through promises of a revival of Sinhalese Buddhist primacy in the nation as a whole. This painstaking cultivation of loyalty for the MEP in conjunction with the worsening economic conditions drastically undermined the UNP's initial pocket of strength among plantation workers.[43]

Moreover, the UNP was about to lose a sizeable portion of the long-time party faithful, the Ceylonese Tamils, who had heartily endorsed it at the onset of the 1956 campaign. Just two months prior to the April election, Kotelawala's party reversed its language policy. Suddenly, it agreed to make Sinhala the official language of Ceylon, while at the same time explicitly stating that the government would take into consideration the fact that minority languages were still used in part of the state. However, the UNP did not make a parallel reversal in its religious policy: the sacred and the

secular, as far as the party was concerned, would continue to operate in separate domains.[44] The consequences of these decisions drastically diminished the UNP's chances for re-election. The Tamils were so enraged at the new language policy that, for the first time since 1947, they set about reorganizing the semi-dormant Tamil Congress (TC)[45] and the Federal Party (FP).[46] The first task of these parties, immediately before the April election, was to publicly and vehemently decry the new UNP language policy and the incumbents' betrayal of all non-Sinhalese citizens' interests. But the Sinhalese were not lured into supporting the UNP either. Theravāda Buddhism, Kotelawala had asserted, was not under any circumstances going to be restored to the societal position it had held centuries ago in Kandy. Therefore, the MEP remained the party for Sinhalese endorsement.

Election Results

Unlike the two previous campaigns, there were in 1956 two explicitly identifiable political parties of comparable strength. Each had, initially at least, recommended specific alternative paths which the Ceylonese political system could follow.

The Sinhalese voters, whether they were primarily religiously, linguistically and/or socialistically oriented, continued with EBP encouragement to be a mainly cohesive bloc of MEP supporters. This constancy was principally due to the astute selection by Bandaranaike of policy issues and the energetic and wide-range campaign forays undertaken by the EBP.[47] In this election, the peasants were drawn into the electioneering as were many of the bhikkhus. Both groups shared similar interests and both had become acutely aware that their mode of living and very value system were in real peril of being lost forever. A vote for the MEP, in their eyes, was a vote

for the retention of these treasures.[48] Bandaranaike reinforced this sentiment by asserting that an MEP government would provide undreamt of spiritual and material opportunities for the present Buddhist faithful, as well as for future generations of Sinhalese.[49]

In its overall campaigning, the MEP leadership ignored four centuries of western rule: the inference being that these years were of no importance in the evolutionary cycle of Sinhalese Buddhist life. Such a perspective was reassuring to all the MEP supporters, for it reaffirmed the feasibility of reverting to that which could be then justifiably considered not lost but merely mislaid momentarily.[50]

For his part, Kotelawala appealed to the Ceylonese population as a whole and not to particular groups. His campaign travels epitomized this unified outlook for he only visited a representative group of localities and spoke during a limited number of UNP political get-togethers for potential supporters.

Bandaranaike, on the other hand, painstakingly went to every constituency of Ceylon, and made a particular effort to meet as many individuals as the three-month campaign time permitted.[51] The Opposition Leader constantly reiterated his party's need for full Sangha support. He maintained that there was only one issue at stake in the 1956 election: the future place of the Sinhalese Buddhists in Ceylonese society. He asserted that the Sangha must be given the foremost position. It was imperative, Bandaranaike never failed to declare, that Ceylon must regain its ancient peace and prosperity. Only proper recognition and reverence, by the leadership and the people, for the Sangha and the Philosophy which it watched over, could restore this millenium.[52]

Such unceasing emphasis on communalism by the MEP was reinforced by the press. The journalists, from the start of the campaign, had made this topic, both in their editorials and in their election coverage, the focal point of the contest. They paid little heed to secular issues despite the UNP's initial attempt to base its platform on subjects relating to a non-sectarian nation.[53]

The continuing unpleasantness which existed among the Buddhists concerning the propriety of political participation by the Saṅgha did not seem to seriously undermine popular support for the MEP. The peasantry which comprised the largest number of the already numerically superior Sinhalese,[54] did turn out massively to vote in this election. The rural people's overall empathy with individual bhikkhus, many of whom had by then become politically involved through the EBP, reinforced the laity's support of the MEP.

The final results of the 1956 election gave the MEP a clear majority. It obtained 51 of a possible 95 seats and 40.7 percent of the popular vote. In contrast, the UNP won 8 seats and 27.3 percent of the popular vote.[55] This victory clearly demonstrated the receptiveness of the Sinhalese to calls for a return to communal life and to an officially recognized predominance of the Saṅgha in the political system. The new Prime Minister was fully aware of the important part that the Mahā Saṅgha could play in the ensuing years in the implementation of campaign policies and the continuing need for its subsequent endorsement of the new MEP government and its leader. Consequently, Bandaranaike made a point of publicly acknowledging that his party's electoral triumph was directly attributable to the energetic support of the bhikkhus.[56] The Prime Minister's recognition of the Saṅgha as the current primary source of power and influence in the political system seemingly implied a possible

return to the customs of past centuries when the bhikkhus were the accepted leaders of the society.

Summary and Conclusions

However, the debate over the Saṅgha's role in the political system continued and underscored the patent difficulty in returning to a wholly traditional society. On one side of the argument was the conservative wing of the Mahā Saṅgha, such as the Siam nikāya, which advocated that the Saṅgha not involve itself directly in political matters. Instead, its role should be that of chief adviser to the administration which, in turn, would follow the Saṅgha's suggestions. However, these conservative bhikkhus did not seem to realize the impossibility of such a scheme in the current situation. The political system of Ceylon was a democratic one, which required, unlike an imperial monarchy, that a party to gain and retain power must first heed the wishes of the majority of the electorate.

On the other side of the debate were many bhikkhus associated with the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas, who were more familiar with the concepts that guided a modern state such as Ceylon. They insisted that the Saṅgha could most effectively influence political policies by first seeking support from the electorate. Only as long as the majority of voters agreed with the demands of the Saṅgha would the politicians faithfully follow the bhikkhus' advice. Such was the case in the 1956 election when the Saṅgha and the majority of the electorate agreed that the principal priority was to formally recognize the primary status of the Saṅgha and Theravāda Buddhism as well as Sinhala in Ceylonese society.

The Buddhist Committee of Inquiry had provided an excellent example

of how such sacred and secular cohesion could influence the policies of a political party. Through its program of hearings and questionnaires that involved rural and urban dwellers, bhikkhus and laity, it had brought about a consensus among the Sinhalese. The SLFP endorsed the findings of the Inquiry and won the election despite its political association with such communist parties as the VLSSP, LSSP and CP.

However, at the same time, there was a weakening of the hold on tradition and religion and this trend would continue through the following years as social mobilization resulted in expanding the needs and expectations of the people. Education raised job and economic expectations and provided an impetus for young people to leave the traditional milieu and seek the "better life" in the cities. Consequently, the less complex aspirations of a traditional society did not satisfy a modern people. Other interest groups, such as trade unions, competed with the Sangha for popular and political support. Such modern organizations involved not only broader issues but a greater spectrum of people that included not only Sinhalese but Tamils and other minority groups.

The Ceylonese political system was unable to adequately cope with such developments during the tenure of the MEP. It could not absorb the diversified demands of the electorate through compromise, nor were people such as the bhikkhus, Sinhalese laity or minorities, ready to accept such a solution. Nevertheless, these years were to prove a training period for a better capacity to cooperate on the part of both the politicians and the electorate and as a result the development of a political system better able to handle the diverse requirements of a modern state.

Notes

1. Geertz argues that when modern political consciousness is thrust upon relatively new nations, the citizens' interest in government can easily reach fever-pitch. Popular involvement in the modern corporate state is stimulated since each ethnic group strives to retain its communalism by achieving political dominance in the new country. This observation is borne out in the case of Ceylon where the struggle for such primacy was to characterize all elections until the new 1972 Constitution that acknowledged Sri Lanka as a Sinhalese Buddhist nation. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Old Societies and New States, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 121.

2. See Appendix II, pp. 211-212.

3. See Appendix II, pp. 216-217.

4. See Appendix IV, Chart I, p. 226.

5. Wilson has pointed out that the viability of Ceylonese society is dependent on its economic as well as its social progress, which in turn determines the current relevance of the Constitution and the effectiveness of the government. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 2.

6. Singer, The Emerging Elite, p. 107.

7. Wells and Pardue both attribute the unfailing pertinence of Theravāda Buddhism to its facility in incorporating cultural changes into its philosophy. Allan Wells, Social Institutions (New York: Basic Books, 1971), pp. 230, 269; Peter A. Pardue, Buddhism (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968), p. 147.

8. Pieris notes that although the original value basis of a culture is irreversibly altered, it can still remain normatively meaningful to the people involved. This results from the self-generating momentum of the value system itself. Nevertheless, in dynamic societies there is always a discrepancy between operational and latent values. The social order can maintain an equilibrium as long as opposition groups are permitted to function in a controlled manner. However, when such bodies are suppressed, the check and countercheck balance of the system also ceases and disequilibrium results. Ralph Pieris, "Ideological Momentum and Social Equilibrium," American Journal of Sociology 57 (January 1952), pp. 339, 342-343.

9. Donald Eugene Smith, "The Sinhalese Buddhist Revolution," pp. 470, 474.

10. Indeed, the MEP defined itself as "the evolution of resentment against the UNP." Calvin A. Woodward, "Sri Lanka's Electoral Experience: From Personal to Party Politics," Pacific Affairs 47 (Winter 1974-75):468.

11. Bryce Ryan, "Socio-Cultural Regions of Ceylon," Rural Sociology 15 (March 1950):16.

12. This included such things as subsidizing Ayurvedic medicine, nationalizing the bus company and raising the workers' wages "across the board." Crowley, "Ceylon: Communities and Politics," pp. 61-62.

13. Arasaratnam, Ceylon, p. 28.

14. See Appendix III, p. 221.

15. See Appendix II, pp. 198-199.

16. See Appendix II, pp. 207-208.

17. Singer, The Emerging Elite, p. 144.

18. Calvin A. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1969), p. 117; Robert N. Kearney, "The Marxist Parties," in Radical Politics in South Asia, eds. Paul R. Brass and Marcus F. Franda (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1973), p. 404.

19. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 47.

20. B. H. Farmer, "The Social Basis of Nationalism," in Journal of Asian Studies 24 (May 1965):435-436; Kearney, "Sinhalese Nationalism and Social Conflict," p. 127.

21. Rangnakar, "The Nationalist Revolution." p. 365.

22. W. Howard Wriggins, "Ceylon's Time of Troubles, 1956-58," Far Eastern Survey 28 (March 1959):35. See Map I opposite p. 1 of this paper.

23. The electoral map of Ceylon had been so set up at the time of Independence, that many of the constituencies were virtual enclaves since the majority of each contained mainly one ethnic group. Ryan, "Socio-Cultural Regions," p. 4. See Map 2, opposite p. 28 of this paper and Appendix V, Table I, p. 229.

24. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 142.

25. Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," p. 122. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, pp. 92-94, also emphasizes the tremendous manipulative value that symbols can have in shaping people's perception.

26. Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, p. 123.

27. Crowley, "Ceylon: Communities and Politics," p. 61.

28. It would be this same thero who, frustrated by the cautious implementation of MEP campaign promises by Bandaranaike related to Sinhalese Buddhist goals, would engineer the leader's assassination in 1959. Donald Eugene Smith, "The Political Monks and Monastic Reform," in South Asian Politics and Religion, ed. Donald Eugene Smith (Princeton, N.J.: Prince-

ton University Press, 1966), p. 499.

29. Fred Halliday, "The Ceylonese Insurrection," Explosion in a Sub-Continent, ed. Robin Blackburn (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 168-169.

30. Weerawardana, Ceylon General Election 1956, p. 144.

31. Donald Eugene Smith, "The Political Monks and Monastic Reform," p. 490.

32. Ibid., p. 492.

33. Kearney, "Sinhalese Nationalism and Social Conflict," p. 26.

34. Two opposing views of Saṅgha involvement in mundane matters will exemplify this apparently insoluble problem:

Humphreys unequivocally states that the most rapid way for bhikkhus to alienate the affection of the people is "to dabble in worldly politics." Humphreys, Buddhism, p. 139.

Spiro argues, on the contrary, that the religious and laity are well aware of all the implications involved in the traditional other-worldly role of the bhikkhu. Similarly, they cherish the inspiration that such deportment provides for the lay Buddhist. Nevertheless, they also realize the great benefit that the Mahā Saṅgha can be to Buddhists when their Faith is in jeopardy. Faced by a common threat the laity and the Saṅgha readily coordinate their activities to ward off the danger. Spiro, Buddhism and Society, p. 473.

35. See page 9 of this study.

36. Myron Weiner, "The Politics of South Asia," in The Politics of the Developing Nations, eds. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 205.

37. Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, p. 207.

38. The animosity between the Siam and Amarapura nikāyas is still noteworthy in village life. The two sects, for instance, found in the same locality, would refuse to jointly celebrate Buddhist rites, even though the ceremonies were identical. Separate vihāras are maintained and there is no interaction between the two, although the villagers themselves freely intermingle. Nur Yalman, "Dual Organization in Central Ceylon," Journal of Asian Studies 24 (May 1965):447. As Malalgoda observes, animosity within a single nikāya such as the Siam fraternity was evident as early as 1750, when the group was riven by dissension over the exact boundary line of each of its properties. After its establishment, the Amarapura nikāya was fragmented by jealousies between the vihāras and their numerous patrons emanating from the increasingly acrimonious rivalry involved in obtaining more and more temporal holdings. The Rāymana nikāya was relatively small and under close central supervision. Its radical spirit has, as well, provided it with a strong cohesiveness. Kitsui Malalgoda,

Buddhism in Sinhalese Society 1750-1900 (Los Angeles; University of California Press, 1976), pp. 125, 145, 167.

39. Weerawardana, Ceylon General Election 1956, p. 149.

40. As Smith has pointed out, since the Marxists were part of the MEP coalition, this dictum also nullified any possible endorsement of the SLFP. Donald Eugene Smith, "The Sinhalese Buddhist Revolution," p. 471.

41. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, pp. 22, 25-26.

42. See Appendix V, Table 10, p. 236.

43. Woodward, The Growth of the Party System, p. 117.

44. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 133.

45. See Appendix II, p. 215.

46. See Appendix II, pp. 202-203.

47. Weerawardana, Ceylon General Election, p. 145; Arasaratnam, Ceylon, p. 23.

48. Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon, p. 241.

49. Kearney, Polities of Ceylon, p. 34.

50. Smith and Rustow have both emphasized the facility with which such religions as Buddhism, which entertain an elaborate worldview, can blend or compete with such political doctrines as nationalism, democracy and socialism. As a result, these religious philosophies can readily legitimize new social, economic and political structures. In so doing, they can help "an elite maintain its political leadership solely on the basis of secular ideas still foreign to the masses." Donald Eugene Smith, Religion, Politics and Social Change, p. 3; Rustow, A World of Nations, p. 222.

51. Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative, p. 209.

52. Schecter, The New Face of Buddha, p. 137.

53. Donald Eugene Smith, "The Sinhalese Buddhist Revolution," p. 472.

54. See Appendix V, Table 3, p. 231.

55. See Appendix V, Table 4, p. 232.

56. Donald Eugene Smith, "The Political Monks and Monastic Reform," p. 495.

CHAPTER V

ACTION AND REACTION: THE SAṄGHA AND THE MEP

Anticipation and Disillusionment

The pace of change from a colonial dependency to a modern nation quickened after the 1956 election of the MEP coalition government. For the first time since Independence, the number of parliamentary seats held by Sinhalese Buddhists reflected their numerical proportion in Ceylonese society as a whole.[1] However, in order to retain their political primacy, in fact as well as theory, Prime Minister Bandaranaike and his Cabinet were dependent upon continuing support from their principal mentors, the Saṅgha and the EBP in particular.

Such support was readily given to the government during its first few months in office by the Mahā Saṅgha and the Sinhalese population as a whole. The latter were gratified at the thought that finally they would be able to reassert their historical primacy and eradicate the effects of their recent displacement by the Europeans and such minority groups as the Ceylonese Tamils. This optimism was reinforced by the initial actions of the new government. Sinhalese Buddhist symbols dominated the investiture rites of the MEP. In accordance with the wishes of the EBP, the Prime Minister and his Cabinet were clad in traditional Sinhalese dress for the swearing-in ceremony and only Sinhalese music was played. On prior occasions, it had been western cultural practices which had been dominant. Within a few days of his assumption of office, Bandaranaike announced that Sinhala, not English, would be

the principal language of parliamentary debate. This announced change in linguistic priorities was manifest when the Speech from the Throne was delivered first in Sinhala, then in Tamil, and lastly in English.

However, the first piece of legislation, the Language Bill, signaled the beginning of an increasingly vituperative debate within the Cabinet. The struggle revolved around policy priorities and centered on a conflict between the right-wing Sinhalese nationalists and the left-wing Sinhalese socialists. Immediate measures to promote the traditional culture of Ceylon were demanded by the L. H. Mettananda groups, while equally emphatic calls for economic stimulation through nationalization of foreign-owned businesses were made by the socialist N. M. Perera and his supporters. The mediator between the two factions was Bandaranaike, who would become increasingly absorbed in the task of seeking Cabinet unity for the next five years.[2]

Despite his continuous efforts to attain satisfactory compromises over the varying demands of the Ceylonese, the Prime Minister remained largely unsuccessful. The language issue was a case in point. During the election campaign, Bandaranaike had promised that if the MEP formed the new government it would immediately implement legislation giving formal recognition to Sinhala as the official language of Ceylon. At the same time, he had also stated, "this will not involve the suppression of such a minority language as Tamil, whose reasonable use will receive due recognition."[3] However, when an article was included in the original Bill which allowed a limited use of Tamil, it was greeted with vigorous expostulations from the Sinhalese nationalists. Political bhikkhus, in conjunction with the EBP executive, organized and led a series of demonstrations protesting the intrusion of Tamil into a fundamentally Sinhalese milieu. The Cabinet's response to these pressure

group activities was to rediscuss the Bill.[4] However, for the first time since Independence there was no Tamil representative in the Cabinet. And perhaps because of this minority absence, further deliberations resulted in the announcement that a majority of the ministers had decided in favor of deleting the contentious article. Consequently, the Language Law was passed in July 1956 with no specific provision for the official use of Tamil. The only overt governmental response to the massive satyāgraha immediately launched by the western-educated Tamils was an amendment to the Bill which stated that if the government deemed an evolutionary approach to the linguistic change-over advisable, the legislation would not be fully implemented until 31 December 1960.[5]

Although the government had apparently tried to placate the feelings of both factions, it was to no avail. The formal passage of the Bill was heralded by the first of many communal riots between the Sinhalese Buddhists and the Tamils.[6] The Ceylonese newspapers also became involved in the language issue and provided, for the next decade, a powerful public forum for diverse opinions. The press had always mirrored the divisiveness of the Ceylonese people and the communal agitation further strengthened the already existing editorial heterogeneity. The English language papers, which normally devoted much of their content to finance and external affairs, were categorically opposed to the new legislation. On the other hand, the Sinhalese press, which continued to be community oriented, heartily endorsed its passage and called for the immediate imposition of a Sinhalese Buddhist lifestyle throughout Ceylon.[7] The Tamil journals, which devoted the bulk of their space to Indian matters, maintained a conciliatory tone and pressed for parity in the usage of both Sinhala and Tamil.[8]

At hand, however, to effectively counter any tendency on the part of the Cabinet to delay legislation favoring the Sinhalese community were the SLFP members of the House. Unlike their more urbanized political counterparts of other parties, they were villagers themselves, newly elected to the legislature and culturally linked to rural life in Buddhist communities.[9] Their influence over government policy proved to be greater than that of the VLSSP politicians and conservative Buddhists who recommended that the state not interfere in religious affairs, but instead follow a secular policy and provide a good, efficient and liberal administration. The rural SLFP members' political importance was due to the fact that they enjoyed the backing of not only the greater proportion of MEP supporters, but also that of the powerful Sangha and the EBP.[10]

Because of SLFP insistence that the MEP fulfill its campaign promises, the government announced the appointment in February 1957 of a Buddha Sāsana Commission. It consisted of ten bhikkhus and five Buddhist laymen, five of whom had sat on the earlier Committee. The EBP, which had provided the momentum for its predecessor, strongly criticized this new body. It charged that its establishment was merely an excuse for the government to further procrastinate in fulfilling past promises. When the Siam nikāya was asked by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs to nominate additional bhikkhu members to the Commission, it refused. The Siam fraternity then accused the MEP of unwarranted interference in purely religious matters. Despite such opposition, Bandaranaike and his Cabinet set up the Commission to investigate the various means through which the historical restoration of Sinhalese Buddhism could be expedited. The members were also asked to suggest ways in which the Sangha's current tri-partite structure could be unified in order to better facilitate

its capacity to respond to the needs of a modern Sinhalese Buddhist society. Although the Siam nikāya's vehement opposition to the latter task was readily apparent, the government did not rescind the objectionable guideline.[11] Rather, it continued to emphasize that the Buddha Sāsana Commission must investigate any aspect of Ceylonese society that would help in "according Buddhism its rightful place in Ceylon."[12]

However, the appointment of the Commission did not suspend governmental activity in furthering the pre-eminence of Sinhalese Buddhism. A Ministry of Culture under N. Q. Dias was instituted to specifically inaugurate new programs and promote existing ones that would foster a rapid growth in national Buddhist activities. Its principal adviser was to be the Saṅgha. The Ministry's budget was augmented to enable it to increase grants and subsidies to four thousand Vihāra Sāsanarakshaka Societies. These groups, in turn, were requested to provide from among their membership persons who would sit on the eighty-eight newly-inaugurated Regional Boards. The Boards were requested, as well, to appoint representatives from among their supporters to an advisory body to the government which would involve both bhikkhus and Buddhist Elders. It would be these persons who could best help the government accomplish its campaign promises, Dias declared.[13] Their wisdom, talent and experience added to the efforts of the administration would indeed facilitate the re-establishment of a wholly Sinhalese Buddhist state.[14] Despite this statement, the Saṅgha assumed that, in fact, it alone would wield the most influence in formulating government policy. Such a belief did not take into consideration, however, the growing influence of other pressure groups with different priorities. This incorrect assumption on the part of the bhikkhus largely contributed a few years later to the Saṅgha's disenchantment with the SLFP.[15]

At the same time, the Education Ministry was also working to further the cause of Sinhalese Buddhist culture. It announced the elevation of two secondary schools, closely affiliated with the Vidyodaya and Vidyālankāra pirivenas, to university status. Legislation provided that the Saṅgha would have complete jurisdiction over selection of faculty, administration, and curriculum content. Sinhala was to be the sole language of instruction, while Sinhalese culture was to be the focal point of most courses offered.

Despite these innovations, the EBP and many of its supporters decried the length of time involved in reasserting the historical prerogatives of the Sinhalese.[16] Bhikkhus publicly denounced the continuing use of English as the medium of instruction in some Sinhalese and Tamil schools. They denounced the government's retention of Christian holidays rather than Buddhist festivals. Although such vocal dissatisfaction was limited to a relatively small number of persons,[17] their influence over their countrymen was extensive. They represented a tightly-knit group which espoused the tenets of the 1947 Kalaniya Declaration.[18] This document maintained that it was only through continuing political action on the part of the Mahā Saṅgha that Sinhalese Buddhism could achieve its intended dominance in modern Ceylon. The same group vigorously endorsed Vijayavardhana's well-known book, Revolt in the Temple, which unequivocally declared that it was the duty of the Saṅgha to ensure the pre-eminence of Sinhalese traditions throughout Ceylonese society. Furthermore, the book argued, the intrusion of alien ways, which had demeaned the inherited importance of Ceylon as the leader of Buddhist nations, was solely due to the Saṅgha's lack of influence over civil affairs.[19]

Although it had been such members of the Mahā Saṅgha who had been largely instrumental in the SLFP's 1956 victory, the conservative Buddhists

continued to voice their doubts that the Sangha could retain its spiritual integrity if it continued to be politicized. No longer, they maintained, would it be the stabilizing force to which the Sinhalese could turn for an example of tranquility exhibited by its members because they realized the triviality of daily mundane affairs.[20] The conservative sector of the Sangha also asserted that, although most bhikkhus carried out their political activities to assist their countrymen, they unwittingly helped a few unscrupulous bhikkhus to further their own selfish goals. This argument seemed to gain validity since such persons as the Reverend Mapitigama Buddharakhita Thero grew increasingly affluent as bhikkhus' political involvement increased.[21]

The constant dissension among the various Ceylonese interest groups helped to erode the government's capacity to govern effectively. Whatever it set out to do was greeted with accusations of betrayal by some sector of Ceylonese society.[22] Such denunciations were invariably followed by demonstrations which, in turn, frequently resulted in violence between adherents of antagonistic groups. With the passage of time, civil unrest became more and more a part of Ceylonese life. Since much of the acrimony centered upon government policies, the Prime Minister and the MEP became ever more a source of disunity, rather than a center of unity.

Moreover, the Cabinet was unable to function as a collective entity since serious rifts over policy priorities existed. The Sinhalese nationalists, such as L. H. Mettananda, refused to sanction any Cabinet policies until the bhikkhus had been consulted. Such demands carried weight, for they enjoyed the full public approval of the EBP and the Sangha.[23] The VLSSP Cabinet members, such as the Minister of Agriculture, Philip Gunawardena, just as forcefully repudiated such a political-religious linkage and instead called

for a close alliance between the government and the workers that would restore the economy. Such a partnership could then work effectively and efficiently to nationalize all foreign-owned industry including the lucrative tea plantations.[24] It had been due to such VLSSP emphasis on economic matters, rather than linguistic and religious concerns during the 1956 election, which had led some Tamils to support the MEP coalition.[25] Indeed, the VLSSP's message throughout the campaign had been the need for full Ceylonese-worker control of the economy which would inevitably result in the flourishing of indigenous cultures.[26] The VLSSP had continued to endorse this viewpoint after becoming part of the government and remained unmoved by the arguments of their Sinhalese counterparts.

The B-C Pact, 1957

With the effectiveness of the Cabinet virtually paralyzed because of these quarrels, and because violence was becoming a prevalent characteristic of every facet of Ceylonese life, Bandaranaike announced that there was to be an immediate series of meetings between him and the Federal Party leader, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam. Their object was to examine means whereby a *modus vivendi* could be achieved that would end rioting and reduce the level of tension among the people. After a number of lengthy discussions between the two men, the Prime Minister reported on 26 July 1957 that a compromise solution had been reached. Popularly known as the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact (B-C Pact), the agreement stated that legislation would be introduced to permit the use of Tamil between the government and the minority in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Ceylon, where few Sinhalese resided. As well, secondary and post-secondary schools in those areas would be allowed to teach in

Tamil if the student population continued to be mainly from the minority group.

This announcement triggered a new series of protests on the part of the Sinhalese and the Sangha. Public denunciations declaiming Bandaranaike's perfidy were commonly heard from such nationalist leaders as Mettananda. He called upon the Sinhalese to keep faith with their forefathers, who for two thousand years had struggled against religious and linguistic suppression by intruders.[27] Sinhalese laborers, for their part, organized action committees that forcibly occupied the homes and lands of the Tamils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The victorious invaders declared that Bandaranaike and the Ministry of Lands would not evict them if they were sincere in the public pronouncements that Ceylon was the homeland of the Sinhalese.[28] No official response was forthcoming to this challenge.

Amid the growing denunciations of the MEP and Bandaranaike by its former supporters, the UNP began to emerge as a possibly viable opponent to any infringement on Sinhalese dominance, after it had denounced the B-C Pact and called for its immediate abrogation. In October 1957 it successfully organized and led, with the help of the bhikkhus, a protest march whose path from Kandy to Colombo was marked with recurring incidents of violence. Despite this appearance of solidarity between the UNP and Sinhalese Buddhists, the latter continued to voice skepticism concerning the UNP's long term sincerity. The Ceylonese still vividly remembered its sudden about-face from an ardent advocate of equal rights for all Ceylonese during the 1956 election campaign to an equally enthusiastic supporter of Sinhalese nationalism.[29]

However, the Sinhalese Buddhists themselves appeared divided over their vision of what Ceylonese national life should incorporate. For instance, in

the same month as the UNP protest march was held, the government announced the formation of a committee to examine ways in which the study of English could be improved at the secondary school level. This official action was a direct response to an onslaught of protest from Sinhalese parents over the rapid deterioration of English-language teaching in the Sinhalese schools.[30] Mindful of a possible backlash from the EBP and the Saṅgha, the MEP publicly warned the committee members that more competent English instruction must not in any way weaken the overriding importance of Sinhala. The only tangible result emmanating from the committee was the inclusion of a course for English-language instructors the following year at the non-Buddhist Mahāragama College.

Among the Buddhists, the government's efforts to please all sectors of the electorate only contributed to its growing image of ineffectiveness. Consequently, it was to the more radical bhikkhus that the Sinhalese now turned for leadership. The Mahā Saṅgha's thesis had remained unchanged; the government's duty was to restore to the historical founders of Ceylon the quality of life and cultural pre-eminence which had been neglected for centuries. The fulfillment of this obligation, it asserted, also required that those westernized Ceylonese who had little knowledge of either the nation's language or principal culture must be removed from the schools, the civil service and the armed forces, and be replaced by Sinhalese.[31] Such demands as these, underscored by marches, demonstrations and sporadic communal fighting, however, elicited no official response from Bandaranaike or the Cabinet.

The 1958 Riots and Their Aftermath

It was only in the spring of 1958 that the MEP leadership publicly recognized the growing insistence of the Buddhist claims. An April 9, two hun-

dred bhikkhus and three hundred laymen staged a demonstration in front of the Prime Minister's official residence. Led by the prominent EBP executive and SLFP co-founder, the Reverend Buddharakhita, the crowd with the help of loud-speakers decried the government's perfidy. Bandaranaike was reminded that he had never stated his preference for a gradualist approach to the restoration of the Sangha's traditional rights. Nor, the protesters pointed out, had there been any suggestion that he could collaborate with their opponents by endorsing such an agreement as the B-C Pact. But since he had, the demonstrators shouted, they were forced to adopt militant actions to achieve what was rightfully theirs.[32]

Despite the many earlier militant actions on the part of both the Buddhists and the Tamils, it was this particular gathering which again resulted in government action. After a hastily-called Cabinet meeting, which further widened the division between the Mettananda and Gunawardena factions,[33] Bandaranaike announced that the administration recognized the validity of the protestors' arguments. Since the Tamils had not, as agreed, ceased their provocative activities, the B-C Pact was no longer valid. Hence the government could continue its drive to restore Sinhalese rights unhindered by such commitments to the minority.

Although this announcement terminated the current demonstration, it did not herald a return to the pre-1957 rapport between Bandaranaike and the Sangha.[34] There remained an increasingly unbridgeable chasm between the religious nationalism of the Mahā Sangha, and EBP in particular, and the growing Ceylonese nationalism of the government. At this time, even the more moderate Sinhalese Buddhists in the EBP no longer gave the Prime Minister and the SLFP their unqualified support. There had been a growing division in the

EBP since the 1956 election. The more moderate members had viewed with growing skepticism, the claims of the EBP radicals led by Buddharakhita that a Sinhalese state could only be viable if jointly administered by the EBP and the SLFP. The moderates insisted that the role of the EBP must simply be that of a co-ordinator for Sinhalese Buddhist groups. Despite efforts on the part of Bandaranaike to keep the EBP unified, the moderates in 1957 stated that neither the Buddharakhita organization nor the government seemed able to refashion Ceylon into a Sinhalese Buddhist state. Consequently, they would establish a new independent body, the Lankā Sangha Sabhā (LSS), which would seek the support of other Ceylonese groups to peacefully mold a unique Asian nation.[35]

However, such associations as the LSS were not able to halt the communal conflict that continued to be fought on an intellectual as well as a physical level. Instead, other Sinhalese groups such as the Jathika Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP-2)[36] came to the fore. Shedding its underground existence in the spring of 1958, it joined the EBP in calling for the immediate cultural metamorphosis of Ceylon.[37] Under its leader, the former SLFP Cabinet Minister, K. M. P. Rajaratna, the JVP(2) worked closely with Sinhalese trade unions to promote job opportunities for their members. The claim that fluency in Sinhala should be a fundamental prerequisite to obtaining work was rapidly being voiced more and more as the Ceylonese economy continued to weaken.[38] The fulfillment of such a condition was becoming increasingly important as the number of Sinhalese Buddhists, including bhikkhus, entered the labor market.[39] Still their demands were not met by the MEP.

By May 1958, civil violence had become so generalized that an Island-wide State of Emergency was declared. Civil freedoms were restricted, public

gatherings were forbidden and the leadars of the JVP(2) and FP were put under house arrest and not released until the following March when martial law was lifted. During this year, 1958, of imposed calm the government, with Bandaranaike at the helm, made a concerted but vain effort to find a compromise in regard to the communal problems that would satisfy the EBP, the politicians, and the minority Ceylonese groups. However, there appeared to be little room for consensus. The Sangha continued to press for a Sinhalese state at the meetings which it held now on vihāra property.[40] The Tamils remained equally adamant in their position. And division in the MEP Cabinet went on. Because of the continuing impasse, the legislature passed a Bill in early March 1959 banning political meetings in sacred places as well as political discussion at any religious gathering. The Bill also included a provision that the B-C Pact would take effect in 1965. Martial law was then revoked, although there was still no apparent inclination on the part of the Sangha or the EBP to work toward co-operation rather than confrontation.

Once more, the Sangha denounced government hesitance in making Ceylon a truly Sinhalese Buddhist state, and young people joined their elders in decrying the lack of available jobs and their declining buying power. Again, such dissatisfaction was reflected in Cabinet divisiveness.[41] Nevertheless, Bandaranaike continued his efforts to find a middle path acceptable to all groups. However, the result of his efforts seemed to mean that he had become the common foe of every warring faction,[42] At the same time, the Cabinet Ministers had become so preoccupied with their particular nationalistic and economic goals that they could no longer function effectively. Since the right wing continued to enjoy the support of the Sangha and the EBP, the Prime Minister ended the impasse by demanding that the left wing Ministers either com-

ply with the majority or resign.[43] Two VLSSP Department Ministers and their parliamentary sympathizers left the MEP coalition and established a Marxist political party of the same name, the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna.[44]

With these resignations, the Sangha publicly assured the Sinhalese that the long-awaited Buddhist state would rapidly come to fruition. Despite such expectations, the pace of cultural change continued to be as slow as before. However, no longer were there multiple targets on which nationalist antipathies could focus. The socialists had left the coalition and only Bandaranaike remained responsible for government action. On 25 September 1959, Sinhalese frustration with the inability of Bandaranaike and his MEP to fulfill the Buddhists' expectations reached its apex. The Prime Minister was assassinated by Talduwe Somarama Thero. The ensuing investigation into the shooting confirmed that both Somarama and the influential Buddharakhita had been members of a small group of bhikkhus who had planned the slaying.

Cries for the banishment of all members of the Mahā Sangha from every lay activity followed. For the first time in recorded history, bhikkhus were stoned by the Sinhalese. Martial law was imposed, censorship of the press invoked; and in accordance with public demand, the religious were formally prohibited from participating in any type of political movement.[45] Within days of the assassination, the Cabinet announced the appointment of the former Minister of Education, W. Dahanayake,[46] as head of the MEP coalition government.

The Buddha Sāsana Report, 1959

Less than two months after the Governor-General had confirmed his position as Prime Minister, Dahanayake tabled the report of the Buddha Sāsana Com-

mission that had been established by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike in 1957. While endorsing the recommendations of the earlier Buddhist Committee of Inquiry,[47] the Commission also advocated the establishment of a bicameral Buddha Sāsana Mandalaya that could take over the many secular matters with which the Saṅgha was increasingly burdened. The Commission suggested that one chamber of the Mandalaya be composed of an equal number of bhikkhus from each nikāya. They would be the only voting members of the chamber, although lay Elders could act in an advisory capacity if requested. As in ancient times, it would handle all purely sacred matters just as the Venerable Mahā Saṅghadhikarana [Chief Ecclesiastical Tribunal] had. Consequently, such problems as vihāra succession disputes over the position of Saṅgharāja, the removal of incompetent bhikkhus from positions of authority and the veracity of a person's claim that he was a member of the Mahā Saṅgha, would all fall within its purview. One of its first tasks, the Report continued, should be to draw up and then administer a detailed set of guidelines to which all bhikkhus would be required to adhere, regardless of their nikāya affiliation. Such a unified code of conduct would help, the Commission felt, to promote cohesiveness among the Mahā Saṅgha that had increasingly weakened during the past two centuries.

The Commission envisaged the second chamber of the Mandalaya as a representative body of bhikkhus and laymen who would handle the more secular aspects of Saṅgha activities. Cited as an example was the administration of vihāra landholdings that would be placed under the supervision of a Commissioner of Temple Lands. Furthermore, this body would be the ultimate authority in deciding on the advisability of permitting bhikkhus to be paid for services which they rendered to such institutions as schools, hospitals and

prisons. By centralizing the flow of requests for remuneration by bhikkhus, the chamber could better ensure that payments to the religious did not become the norm in Ceylon. Instead, it could ensure that a clear division remained between services rendered by the Mahā Saṅgha and those provided by the laity.[48]

The Buddha Sāsana Commission concluded its Report with the recommendation that the increasingly popular practice of direct involvement by political pundits and the religious in each other's affairs must cease. Partisan politics should be left to the politicians. Similarly, journalists, particularly those affiliated with the westernized Lakehouse Press, had no right whatsoever to ridicule the Saṅgha for its insistence that only the past could provide adequate guidelines for modern Sinhalese life.[49] Such matters, beyond the scope of newspapermen, the Report stated, and must be left to the discretion of the bhikkhus.[50]

The forceful endorsement of this suggestion was quickly evidenced when the Siam nikāya contended, in response to the Sāsana's findings, that the laity in any guise was by its very nature incapable of making prudent decisions concerning the internal affairs of the Saṅgha. This argument provided the basis for the Siam's categorical refusal to countenance any external interference, including that of the proposed Mahā Saṅghadikaran. Neither laymen--however devoted they might be--nor bhikkhus affiliated with other nikāyas would be permitted to meddle in its affairs. The fraternity also pointed out that there were already two authentic Buddha Sāsana Mandalayas which had been established many years ago by the Malwatta[51] and Asgiriya vihāras. The Siam nikāya concluded its censure by asserting that such novice groups as the Amarapura and Rāmanya could not presume to make decisions which would tamper with the affairs of the ancient Siam nikāya.

The already apparent division within the Mahā Saṅgha grew as the two littoral nikāyas refused to endorse the Siam's total condemnation of any new Māndalaya. At the older group's continuing insistence, the Amarapura finally agreed to support the Commission Report on procedural grounds only. The Rāmanya, however, never veered from giving the recommendations of the Sāsana full corroboration.

So strong was the Siam nikāya's opposition to the Commission Report that Prime Minister Dahanayake made a point of visiting the Mandalaya of the Malwatta Temple in Kandy to discuss the Report's recommendations. Upon his return he announced that the government would not endorse the formation of a new Buddha Sāsana Mandalaya. This statement met with approval from the Sāsanarakshaka Buddha Mandalaya, all of whose members were devout laymen. Their satisfaction stemmed from the conviction that such an organization as that suggested by the 1959 Sāsana Report would have led to the involvement of bhikkhus in temporal affairs to an unseemly degree. Countering this viewpoint was the ACBC which represented the moderate element of the Mahā Saṅgha. The ACBC insisted that one of the duties of the Saṅgha was to ensure that at least some of its members would be available to constructively aid the government and the people in running the affairs of the nation. It contended that to erect a barrier between the religious and the politicians would prove to be detrimental to the spiritual welfare of all Ceylonese.[52] There was no way, the organization asserted, that a truly Sinhalese Buddhist state incorporating traditional customs could be built without the continued assistance of the Saṅgha which was, by its very nature, an embodiment of both the past and the present.[53]

Seemingly, neither the shock following the assassination of Bandara-

naike nor the hard work of the Buddha Sāsana Commission had brought about a more constructive approach to national difficulties within Ceylon. The nation remained inert before the hurdle of communalism: the Sangha divided over its prerogatives and its obligations, the Cabinet immobilized over legislative priorities, the Ceylonese alienated from each other by their cultural differences, and all sectors increasingly debilitated by the faltering economy. So serious had the national situation become that, in December 1959, Dahanayake tendered his resignation as party leader. Parliament was dissolved and the country went to the polls on 19 March 1960.[54]

The March 1960 Election

Under the new leadership of C. P. de Silva,[55] the SLFP vied for voter support against Senanayake's UNP, and the smaller MEP and LSSP. All Sinhalese parties affirmed their total commitment to enhancing the growth and importance of Sinhalese Buddhism throughout Ceylon. Similarly, each group including the UNP espoused support for trade unionism and a more collectivist approach to decision-making in places of work.

In fact, the UNP was merely continuing the policy, stated during its 1958 reorganization meeting, to fully endorse Democratic Socialism. As evidence of its continuing empathy with the urban worker, Senanayake pointed to the party's support of the Lankā Jathika Estate Workers' Union, which it had helped organize in 1958.[56] Mindful of the importance of the Sinhalese vote, the UNP promised full funding of religious schools as well as the immediate proclamation of Sinhala as the principal language of Ceylon. However, such assertions did not prevent the UNP from pointing out that this did not necessarily preclude English and Tamil instruction in Ceylonese schools.

For the first time in its twenty-five year history as a political party, the Trotskyite LSSP made an independent bid for power. It called for the complete cessation of all state involvement in the realm of religious schooling. Furthermore, while agreeing that Sinhala was indisputably the language of the majority, it advocated the unrestricted use of Tamil in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Adhering to its fundamental belief in economic sovereignty for Ceylon, it maintained that only by first achieving this goal would the people fully realize their cultural aspirations. Hence, the LSSP candidates promised that their party's first action as government would be to nationalize all foreign-owned enterprises.

The newest of the existing political parties, the MEP, advocated explicit recognition of Ceylon as a purely Sinhalese Buddhist state. Full implementation of the complete roster of recommendations made by the Buddha Sāsana Commission would be its first goal. Not only would the controversial Mandalaya be established, but the MEP promised that as government it would shoulder the responsibility of carrying out the duties which had been those of the monarchs in ancient times. Consequently, in keeping with this role, it would assume the task of administering all land linked to the various vihāras. Concomitant with this return to the past was the MEP's stated belief that more bhikkhus should hold a more influential position in the everyday life of the people. This could be partially achieved, the party maintained, by using the vihāras not only as places for meditation but as centers where the people could gather to participate in a wide range of activities organized jointly by the Saṅgha and the laity to promote Sinhalese culture.

Like the UNP, the SLFP was without the active support of the Saṅgha. Nonetheless, its current platform remained consistent with 1956 party policy.

It endorsed the promotion of Sinhalese culture and acknowledged the Saṅgha as the embodiment of the people's philosophical aspirations. Striving to please all elements of the fractious majority, the SLFP pledged to promote the recommendations of the Buddha-Sāsana Commission "in accordance with Buddhist principles."[57]

The results of the March 1960 election were inconclusive; no party received a clear majority, and even the leading UNP managed to obtain only four more seats than the runner-up SLFP.[58] The general restlessness characteristic of Ceylon during the previous four years continued in the following month of April. Despite similar communal policies, the Sinhalese peasants, who still comprised the majority of the electorate, continued, on the whole, to support the SLFP in preference to the UNP. The memory of the older party's abrupt change in language policy at the end of the 1956 campaign still lingered.[59] On the other hand, the Sinhalese, including those in the rural areas, were also great admirers of the LSSP Leader, N. M. Perera, whose insistence on justice for all had gained their respect. It was he who had played the principal role in bringing Bandaranaike's assassins to trial; and it was he who, during his term as Minister of Finance, insisted that the Official Opposition's parliamentary rights be meticulously observed by the government. However, his party did not enjoy the same popularity. It was deemed anti-religious by the Buddhists, highly revolutionary by the middle class businessmen, and an urban-oriented Marxist devotee by the peasants.[60]

Within a month of its formation, the UNP government was defeated by an Opposition motion of non-confidence. Once again, the country geared itself for a general election; a political contest, however, in which the contending parties demonstrated that they had not only reassessed their priori-

ties, but also their leadership. On 7 May 1960, the SLFP elected Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the widow of the assassinated Prime Minister, as its leader. The party, like its competitors, now took cognizance not only of cummunal issues, but of economic ones as well. Henceforth, the Sangha would have to vie with other pressure groups for political attention. The demands emanating from growing urban centers, rising unemployment and a faltering economy would increasingly absorb the attention of not only the socialist-oriented parties, but of the traditional UNP and SLFP as well. The role of the Sangha as a Ceylonese institution would be re-examined by the politicians, the Sinhalese Buddhists and the bhikkhus themselves. Could it best serve its members and the laity as an integral part of modern life? Or should it function as an example of serenity, aloof from the transitory problems of the day, to which the Ceylonese could turn to regain a better balanced perspective of current life? During the next decade, the Sangha, the politicians and the people were to continue their search for an optimum role for the Sangha to play in modern Ceylon.

Summary and Conclusions

The years between 1956 and 1960 had proved crucial in the continuing transition of Ceylon from a traditional society to that of a modern state. Because of the 1956 campaign, Bandaranaike and the MEP had found they had little flexibility in either policy-making or negotiation with the different sectors of society if they were to maintain the crucial support of the Sangha and the Sinhalese voters.[61]

The political priorities had already been set for the MEP's term of office by its promise to implement the recommendations of the Buddhist Com-

mittee of Inquiry which represented the sentiments of many bhikkhus and laity who were SLFP supporters. Together with a government led by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, an ardent Sinhalese, whose chief advisor was the Sangha, the longing for a wholly Sinhalese Buddhist state seemed to be on the threshold of realization.

However, it was dedication to a single goal which resulted in Bandaranaike's inability to create a viable nation.[62] Consequently, his efforts to even partially satisfy Tamil requests to use their mother-tongue in the schools, courts and administration of their own villages had to be refused for the time being. The demands by certain Cabinet Ministers that immediate steps be taken to stop the precipitous decline of the economy had to be deferred. And still, the expectations of the Sangha and Sinhalese remained unrealized.

The assassination of Bandaranaike could be regarded as the end of single-issue oriented politics. The 1960 election campaign and the short-lived UNP administration exemplified this new trend. The restoration of Sinhalese Buddhism was still of paramount importance in March 1960 but the problems of the minorities were officially recognized by the parties and even the role of the Sangha had become an issue open to debate among many Sinhalese Buddhists.

The Buddha Sāsana Report had marked a further modification of earlier sentiments over bhikkhu prerogatives. Although the Report fully endorsed the earlier Inquiry's recommendations, it also suggested that mutual assistance between the religious and the laity might well be the answer to many problems plaguing both groups. No longer was it taken for granted that advice should flow only one way from the Sangha to the people and to the politicians.

As the following years were to demonstrate, formidable problems lay ahead for all sectors of Ceylonese society. But the future was to also mark a gradual receptivity on the part of the politicians, people and many bhikkhus to consider a more diversified political system rather than one chained solely to the precepts of a traditional society.

Notes

1. Singer, The Emerging Elite, p. 61.
2. Guenther Lewy, Religion and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 492.
3. Ibid., p. 481.
4. Kearney, Communalism and Language, p. 116.
5. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 26.
6. Nyrop, Area Handbook of Ceylon, p. 449.
7. Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Political Development, p. 130.
8. Singer, The Emerging Elite, p. 112.
9. Wriggins deems this change in the locus of power as the most significant aspect of the 1956 election, for the incumbent government had better channels of communications to the masses than its predecessors. Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, p. 366.
10. Arasaratnam, Ceylon, p. 31.
11. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Electoral Politics in an Emergent State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 23-24.
12. Donald Eugene Smith, "Emerging Patterns of Religion and Politics," in South Asian Politics and Religion, ed. Donald Eugene Smith (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 31.
13. When Dias had been Government Agent for the district of Ratnapura, he initiated a Government Buddhist Society in 1952. Its members were moderate Sinhalese civil servants whose goal was to safeguard their material as well as spiritual interests. In 1954, Dias and the Reverend Henepitigedera Gnanaseeha Thero launched the first Vihāra Sāsanarakshaka Societies. Soon, they numbered over three thousand and provided an organized visiting itinerary for the 1954 Buddhist Committee of Inquiry.

Urmila Phadnis, Religion and Politics in Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Monohar Book Service, 1976), pp. 175-178.

14. Lucy M. Jacob, Sri Lanka (Delhi: National Publishing House, 1973), p. 156.

15. Robert C. Lester, Theravada Buddhism in Southeast Asia (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1973), p. 160.

16. Even though these political bhikkhus were widely criticized, they nevertheless are the people who provide the symbolic linkage between tradition and modernity. As a result, they are able to ultimately provide a stabilizing influence upon a traditional society which is contending with the challenges of social mobilization. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," p. 499.

17. It is estimated that between 15 and 20 percent of the Sangha actively supported Bandaranaike and the MEP during the 1956 election campaign. Lewy, Religion and Revolution, p. 479.

18. This thesis was first incorporated into the "Declaration of the Vidyālankāra Pirivena" issued on 13 February 1946. It was entitled "Monks and Politics." Ibid., p. 466.

19. Benz, Buddhism or Communism?, p. 101.

20. Berger maintains that this is a fundamental problem for all religious institutions during major societal changes. As the different patterns alter the definition of reality in terms of people's lifestyles and have a spillover effect upon their sacred institutions and the role of the religion in the changing precepts of the laity who follow its tenets. Berger, The Sacred Canopy, p. 155.

21. Buddharakhita was not only a founding member and secretary of the EBP, but also Vice-President of the SLFP. Largely due to his influence, the EBP continued to urge the government to implement all the recommendations of the "Betrayal of Buddhism" report immediately and without compromises to any of the Ceylonese minorities. Buddharakhita personally oversaw the MEP activities even when he was not in the capital city. He had a direct phone link to Colombo in his air-conditioned apartment located behind the vihāra in Kelaniya, Kandy. It was due to his intransigence that there was an open split in the Cabinet in 1959. Furthermore, the investigation into the assassination of Bandaranaike in 1959 revealed that he was directly involved in its planning. Lewy, Religion and Revolution, pp. 482-488.

22. Arasaratnam, Ceylon, p. 31.

23. Lewy, Religion and Revolution, p. 480.

24. In October 1958 there existed 593 totally foreign-owned tea estates covering almost half of the total acreage in Ceylon. Jacob, Sri Lanka, p. 100.

25. Wriggins, "Ceylon's Time of Troubles," p. 36.

26. Lewy, Religion and Revolution, p. 481.

27. Ibid.

28. Vittachi, Emergency '58, p. 34.

29. Kearney, Communalism and Language, p. 117.

30. Jacob, Sri Lanka, p. 157.

31. Singer, The Emerging Elite, p. 146.

32. Zeylanicus, Ceylon (London: Elek Books, 1970), p. 231.

33. Vittachi, Emergency '58, p. 28.

34. Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Political Development, p. 146.

35. Phadnis, Religion and Politics in Sri Lanka, pp. 252-254.

36. Jathika Vimukthi Peramuna. Number (2) used to distinguish the party from the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna. See Appendix II, p. 205.

37. Lewy, Religion and Revolution, p. 484.

38. D. K. Rangnekar, "Racialism and National Integration in Ceylon," United Asia 10 (October 1958):396.

39. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics, p. 169.

40. Lewy, Religion and Revolution, p. 487.

41. K. K. Gormé, "Ceylon's Dilemma," United Asia 20 (March-April 1968):78.

42. S. A. Pakeman, Ceylon (London: Ernest Benn, 1964), p. 197.

43. Dhirendra Mohan Prasad, Ceylon's Foreign Policy Under the Bandaranaike's, 1956-65 (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1973), p. 413.

44. See Appendix II, p. 210.

45. Singer, The Emerging Elite, p. 139.

46. See Appendix III, p. 219.

47. See pp. 46-49 of this thesis.

48. Lewy, Religion and Revolution, pp. 493-494.

49. Ames, "Ideological and Social Change in Ceylon," p. 47.

50. Benz, Buddhism or Communism?, p. 68.

51. The Siam nikāya's Malwatta Chapter is the oldest vihāra, with the largest membership. Since it was also the wealthiest entity in Ceylon in terms of landholdings, the Nāyaka and his Council wielded considerable power over the Sinhalese, and consequently, in the political sphere as well. Hans-Dieter Evers, "Kinship and Property Rights in a Buddhist Monastery in Central Ceylon," American Anthropologist 69 (1967):704-705.

52. Nyrop, Area Handbook for Ceylon, p. 259.

53. Sarachandra, "Traditional Values and Modernization," p. 259.

54. Arasaratnam, Ceylon, p. 35.

55. See Appendix III, p. 220.

56. Woodward, The Growth of the Party System, p. 188.

57. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, "Buddhism in Ceylon Politics," in South Asian Politics and Religion, ed. Donald Eugene Smith (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 512.

58. See Appendix V, Table 4, p. 232.

59. Arasaratnam, Ceylon, p. 35.

60. Wilson, "Buddhism in Ceylon Politics," p. 517.

61. Swearer, "Buddhism in Transition," p. 32.

62. Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative, p. 73.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONTINUING INFLUENCE OF THE SANGHA

The July 1960 Election: Growth in Diversity of Issues

The 1960's increasingly challenged the capacity of the Ceylonese political system to meet the daily needs of the nation and to help the people adjust to the expectations and problems intrinsic to social mobilization. The Sinhalese Buddhists continued to press for national linguistic and religious primacy in every-day life as well as the formal embodiment of their culture's priority in the constitution. The Sinhalese who formed the majority of the labor force were preponderantly young and well-educated. They wanted jobs and wages befitting their schooling and ability. Furthermore, they expected the language of work to be Sinhala. The Tamils also entertained the same job expectations but called for the lingua franca to be Tamil in areas where they formed a majority. The population as a whole looked more and more to the government to provide social services such as food subsidies and care for the sick and elderly.

The politicians' cognizance of this growing diversity of popular expectations was reflected in the various party platforms presented during the July 1960 election. The means whereby Sinhalese Buddhist aspirations would be fully attained continued to be the key feature of both the SLFP and UNP platforms. This time, however, the Sangha played no direct role in the electioneering, as it had during the 1956 campaign. Such notables as the Nāyaka

of the Malwatta vihāra publicly cautioned members prior to the onset of the election not to become involved in it. The administrations of both the Vidyodaya and Vidyālankāra pirivenas also strongly advised bhikkhu faculty and students to disassociate themselves from any political activities.

Despite this physical absence of the Mahā Saṅgha, Mrs. Bandaranaike, leader of the SLFP, remained attentive to the aspirations of the Saṅgha and pledged to continue her late husband's efforts to make Ceylon a genuinely Sinhalese Buddhist state. To achieve this goal, the SLFP promised to implement every recommendation in the Buddha Sāsana Commission Report. A non-sectarian public education system would be established, incorporating all schools with the exception of those under the jurisdiction of the Saṅgha. Instruction would be free for all students at the primary and secondary levels. Further efforts to make Ceylon a more egalitarian society would take the form of increased food subsidies and greater state aid for the sick and elderly. As well, long-term, low-interest loans would be made available to peasants. Nationalization of important foreign-owned industries would also be seriously considered.

The reaction of the Saṅgha and its sympathizers to the proposed measures for greater state intervention was mixed. The Sri Lankā Eksath Bhikkhu Bala Mandalaya (SLEBBM) endorsed them as positive socialist measures. The principal beneficiaries, it pointed out, would be the Sinhalese Buddhists who had been the most frequent victims of past alien domination, and indeed were still suffering from its effects. With the necessities of life assured they could devote more attention to the spiritual aspects of life. On the other hand, such arguments for greater state intervention were decried by both the EBP and the UNP. The SLFP reply to its opponents was to accuse them

of endorsing a totally free enterprise system as a means whereby the few could continue to exploit the many.[1]

Sinhalese relations with the Tamil community became a strong source of acrimony between the SLFP and the UNP throughout the campaign. Each continued to accuse the other of seeking clandestine agreements with the Federal Party in order to garner its support.[2] Sirimavo Bandaranaike maintained that her party's intentions concerning the minority were very clear. It would examine the terms of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact to determine the merits of implementing it fully, partially, or not at all. The SLFP's ultimate decision according to her would be based on which course of action would best enhance the general well-being of the nation. In response to this statement the EBP, though not directly involved in the electioneering, voiced its skepticism that a party which even contemplated endorsing such a document could provide a government compatible with a Sinhalese Buddhist state. It maintained that the incapacity of an SLFP administration to lead the nation had been evident ever since the SLFP had linked itself with the LSSP and the Communist Party.

The alliance alluded to by the EBP was a current no-contest pact agreed to by the SLFP, LSSP and CP. Although obvious policy differences did exist between the SLFP and the Marxist groups, they did share the common aspiration of achieving a more egalitarian Ceylonese society through greater state intervention. A further impetus to such an alliance was, in the case of the SLFP, the fact that its electoral support was largely based in the rural areas, while that of the Marxist parties was principally found in the cities and among trade unionists. Such urban backing was becoming increasingly important as more and more young people left the country-side. The

no-contest pact between the SLFP and the Marxists therefore meant that votes would be split only two ways between the UNP, on the one hand, and the SLFP or the LSSP or the CP, on the other, rather than a possible four way division.

The Marxist parties, and the LSSP in particular,[3] had enjoyed close ties over many years with the trade unions. These groups often provided the new urbanites, deprived as they were of nearby kinship support, with an association whose members shared similar aspirations. Often the workers within one union set aside the traditional barriers of communal differences, since their immediate goals were the common ones of steady employment, increased wages and fringe benefits. Leaders of the unions, such as Bala Tampoe,[4] were frequently members of both a union and a political party and, therefore, could more easily influence party policies in favor of labor than non-union leaders. Since its inception, the LSSP had received the bulk of its support from such groups as the Central Council of Ceylon Trade Unions(CCCTU), which included both Sinhalese and Tamil workers, for the LSSP had always taken a neutral position on communal matters. With such a non-commited communal attitude, the Marxist parties had campaigned in the Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern Provinces,[5] as well as in the Sinhalese areas in prior elections. They had, as a result, become known throughout Ceylon for their non-communal stance, unlike the UNP and SLFP which had never fielded candidates in Tamil constituencies.

The views of the LSSP and the Communist Party on communal matters in the July 1960 campaign were consistent with their past assertions. They took the position that there should be freedom of religion throughout Ceylon and all parents should have the right to decide what religious instruction, if any, their children should receive. On the subject of language, the Marxist

parties maintained that Sinhala, Tamil and English must all be official languages. They emphasized that the language of administration used in a particular locality must be the same as that of the majority of residents. This contention echoed the main theme of the B-C Pact.[6] The LSSP and CP clearly stated their commitment to nationalization. They once more assured the voters that Ceylonese citizens would enjoy their cultural uniqueness after the workers directly controlled industry and fully reaped all its benefits.

Consequently, although the LSSP, CP and SLFP all endorsed nationalization, the two former parties were firmly committed to it, while the SLFP was willing to compromise with business and merely take over certain sectors. Similarly, the SLFP continued in its drive to make Ceylon a solely Sinhalese Buddhist state: Only after this was accomplished would it consider the restricted use of Tamil in government and education. Its Marxist allies, on the other hand, envisioned Ceylon as a country that should reflect equally the culture of its principal ethnic groups.

The UNP, like the SLFP, acknowledged Sinhalese Buddhist aspirations as the most important matter with which the state had to deal. Given a clear mandate, it too promised to implement the recommendations of the Buddha Sāsana Commission. The party also promised to make Buddhism the state religion and to ensure that Sinhala would be recognized as the official language of Ceylon. UNP candidates seldom failed to mention that, unlike the SLFP, their party had not compromised itself by signing a B-C Pact. Moreover, the UNP promised a special fund to further beautify Buddhist holy places and to finance projects which the Sangha felt would enhance Sinhalese culture.

The UNP asserted that its form of Democratic Socialism was not tainted with Marxism. State subsidies would be provided for those persons who were

unable to fully care for themselves and would be available for public projects that would ultimately better the citizens' standard of living. However, at the same time, a UNP government would ensure that funds were available for capital investment by Ceylonese entrepreneurs. Such economic measures, the party asserted, would vastly improve the state's financial position.

In the 1956 election, the UNP had created voter cynicism by its apparently ambivalent linguistic policies. This time it was its economic views that the critics found inconsistent. The opposition parties had urged the Senanayake government not to dissolve Parliament since Ceylon's weak economy could not afford the expense of two elections within a six-month period. Nonetheless, the July 1960 election was called. The Prime Minister maintained that, as a minority administration, his party did not have sufficient power to implement its economic plans. Now, the UNP opponents pointed to the apparent discrepancy between the party's promised economic policies and past action. A number of uncommitted voters were swayed by such accusations and voted for the SLFP or its allies.[7]

The July 1960 election results gave the SLFP an absolute majority for they won 75 seats out of a total of 151. Nonetheless, they only received 33.6 percent of the popular vote as opposed to the UNP's 37.6 percent.[8] With the Bandaranaike name to help, the SLFP had retained its traditional image of a party eager to enhance the position of the Sinhalese Buddhists throughout Ceylon. This conclusion was borne out by the continuing strong voter support in the Sinhalese-dominated rural areas of Kandy and Matale.[9] Still, long-time SLFP advocates such as the Ayurvedic physicians, village teachers and young adults were not hesitant in voicing strong criticism of the party's apparently growing attachment to communism. However, urban votes were scattered among

the various parties. Sympathies appeared to be torn between undivided loyalty to Buddhism and a desire, however small, to be freed from the material worries which resulted from the housing shortage, inflation, low wages and unemployment.[10]

Efforts to Satisfy Traditional and Modern Demands

Throughout the five-year tenure of the SLFP, from 1960 to 1965, there was a growing popular expectation that the government should solve an ever-increasing variety of problems. As well, Sirimavo Bandaranaike's administration was to become more and more divided over whether communal, fiscal or social difficulties should have precedence. The needs of the urban and rural areas continued to remain relatively different.[11] Such divided expectations resulted, once again, in a lack of party cohesiveness. Although nine parties were represented in the House, each group included numerous independently-minded members. Even the two largest social groupings, the Sinhalese and Tamil, were divided into four with the growth of city populations and a continuing hard core peasantry. Assimilation in the urban areas among the ethnic groups remained very low. Party leaders still represented the different interests and aspirations of their constituents despite party labels. As the number of city electoral districts grew, so did the importance of urban representatives' opinions. The result often was an unbridgeable difference of viewpoint within a party caucus.[12] This type of divisiveness between urban and rural interests was also apparent among the bhikkhus. Many, particularly those of the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas moved to central locations to obtain a higher education, to fill a position in a branch of the social service, or to work among the Sinhalese urbanites.[13] The Bandaranaike government

tried to overcome these growing differences in orientation by appealing to the people's common identity as Ceylonese or, more often, Sinhalese Buddhists.

This policy was readily evident at the beginning of the SLFP's term of office, when the attainment of Sinhalese Buddhist goals once again dominated the speech from the throne. The document stated, among other items, that Sinhala would become the official language of Ceylon and its usage would be mandatory throughout the educational system and public service. Economic policies, such as selective nationalization and government subsidies, would be introduced to permit Ceylonese peasants and workers to share more equitably in the fiscal fruits of the nation. In conformity with past practice, namely in 1956 and March 1960, a Buddhist ceremonial reception, attended by bhikkhus and government officials clad in traditional dress, was held following the speech from the throne.

By the end of December 1960, Sinhala had been formally recognized as the official legislative language. However, provision was also made to provide translations in Tamil and English if they were requested. Sinhala was also made the sole language of instruction throughout the newly established school system. The government took over nearly all private schools, while it was negligent in providing prompt compensation. This unilateral expropriation so infuriated the Christians that they occupied over 700 schools in protest over the non-payment. At the same time, they also voiced their anger over compelling their children to be taught in Sinhala. The Christians, 85 percent of whom were Roman Catholic, did not end their sit-in until the government announced that troops would be brought in to forcibly eject them if they did not leave voluntarily.[14] The parents complied but the ever-growing tension between the non-Buddhists and the administration was not alleviated.

Still, public criticism grew over the lagging pace of the government in reasserting Ceylon's traditional culture despite its campaign promises. Nor did the recriminations abate when Mrs. Bandaranaike announced that two new committees dealing with Sinhalese Buddhism were to be formed. The first was an advisory committee to the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, to help it implement the Buddha Sāsana Commission Report. Its chairman was P. M. Kalukundayawe Thero, a former leader of the Bauddha Jathika Balavegaya (BJB). He had worked closely with L. H. Mettananda since Independence to have Sinhalese Buddhism restored to its traditional importance. His prestige was to prove of little practical value, however, in the following years when the committee tried to reorganize the Sangha in conformity with the Commission's recommendations.

The second committee was in operation by March 1961 and handed in its findings a few months later. Labeled the National Education Committee, it was expected to examine the capacity of the new school system to ensure the primacy of Sinhalese Buddhism in all facets of education and employment throughout Ceylon. The Committee's report found that the initial efforts of the government in the field of education were praiseworthy. However, it advised that a quota system based on religion should be used to regulate university admissions and job placements in the civil service and the armed forces.

These suggestions were highly applauded by such groups as the BJB and ACBC. Their members were preponderantly young bhikkhus and laymen who came from middle-class, coastal families. Although they had received most of their education in Christian schools or Sinhalese institutions modeled on them, they now demanded that Sinhala be the only recognized language of work and that Sinhalese Buddhists who had the proper job qualification be

given priority over other applicants.[15] These groups now increased their campaign for Sinhalese job priority by publishing reports that substantiated their claim that Sinhalese Buddhists were underrepresented in the public sector relative to their total numbers. The government's response to the Education Committee's report and its supporters was the announcement that it would immediately begin to retire all public servants who had not successfully passed the language tests.

The accessibility to jobs was only one of the economic measures needed to restore the Sinhalese Buddhist nation, according to Felix Dias Bandaranaike, Minister of Finance. The wealth of the nation, he maintained, was largely dependent on the productivity of the peasants, particularly the Sinhalese Buddhists in the central regions. Nevertheless, it was this sector of society, Bandaranaike pointed out, that was the most economically deprived. Consequently, extensive loans with low interest rates would be made available to individual farmers. They would repay them from the profits which they derived from new investments. Furthermore, subsidies would immediately be given to sick and elderly Ceylonese who were increasingly dependent upon the state, as their younger and more able relatives moved away to find more economically fruitful employment. These policies were enthusiastically endorsed by the Sinhalese who, henceforth, called them and all future positive efforts to improve their financial viability, Dompé Socialism. This was in honor of the Finance Minister whose home-riding was Dompé.[16]

No approval for government policies in any field was forthcoming, however, from the linguistic and religious minority groups. Their dissatisfaction reached new heights with the passage of the 1961 Language of the Courts Act. Sinhala, rather than English, now became the language of the judiciary

regardless of the locality in which the court was held. Led by the Federal Party, a one-day strike was held throughout Ceylon by the non-Buddhists. This was followed by a series of demonstrations in Jaffna. Sirimavo Bandaranaike responded to this dissidence by proclaiming the inauguration of regional councils throughout the state whose members would be elected locally. These units would be responsible for local civil administration and the promotion of a regional majority's culture. This announcement resulted in even greater outcries of rage from the Sinhalese than had marked those of the minorities. Led by K. M. P. Rajaratna of the JVP(2) and L. H. Mettananda of the BJB, the demonstrations and violence became so wide-spread and unruly that martial law was brought into effect in April 1961. However, fighting between Sinhalese and Tamils did not wane until the Federal Party executive had, as in 1958, been imprisoned.

Nevertheless, deep dissatisfaction with the government continued. This manifested itself in an unsuccessful coup d'état undertaken by a group of senior Christian police and army officers in January 1962. These officers were arrested. Rumors spread that the conspirators had intended to install Governor General Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, a Christian, as Head of State, although Sir Oliver himself had been unaware of the coup. At the same time, despite government denials, such groups as the EBP maintained that the plot had not been limited to a few notables, but had included many non-Buddhists. Such blanket culpability was angrily denied by the minorities. Still, such a coup was understandable, they asserted, considering the discriminatory policies of the government. The Lakehouse newspapers supported such contentions and sharply criticized Mrs. Bandaranaike and the SLFP for their undue haste in pressing forward with pro-Sinhalese Buddhist legislation that would directly

affect all Ceylonese. When the societal tensions over who was responsible for the coup threatened to degenerate into civil war, a Commission of Inquiry was given the task of verifying the accusations that were being made over the matter.[17] Except for those originally charged, the Inquiry's findings absolved all persons including the Governor General. Nevertheless, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke resigned.

He was replaced by William Gopallawa, a staunch Buddhist and relative of Mrs. Bandaranaike. The new Governor General, clad in national Sinhalese dress and accompanied by bhikkhus, was sworn into office during the ancient Buddhist ceremony used for the installation of Kandy dignitaries. Although never officially incorporated into state protocol, such traditional Buddhist rites had become an integral part of all important state functions.[18] Specific responsibility for their implementation had devolved, since 1956, upon the Minister of Cultural Affairs.

However, not all the activities of the Department of Cultural Affairs were popular with the Sangha or Sinhalese Buddhists. Early in 1962, Marthripala Senanayake,[19] Minister of Home and Cultural Affairs, announced that in conformity with the Buddha Sāsana Commission proposals, the government would immediately embark on a program to reorganize the internal structure of the Sangha. The goal was to ensure that the bhikkhus were no longer disturbed by secular responsibilities, and as a result would be able to follow their traditional vocation of contemplation. In keeping with this objective, members of the Sangha would no longer be permitted to accept remuneration for the services they provided to the laity. Nor would the government condone the religious involving themselves in such secular activities as politics. If some bhikkhus should continue to engage in such activities despite this stricture,

it would then be the duty of the Minister to ensure their departure from the Saṅgha. Such reform measures, M. Senanayake declared, would assist in restoring the Saṅgha to its traditional lofty status to which all Ceylonese could look for inspiration.[20] However good the intentions of the SLFP may have been, the public outcry against such governmental reforms was so great that they were all rescinded by the end of the same year, 1962.[21]

Despite this reversal, the SLFP continued to involve itself in Saṅgha related matters. At the beginning of 1963, the Prime Minister declared that henceforth all income derived by vihāras in excess of basic living expenses would be taxed. This decision brought a flood of protests particularly from the Siam nikāya in Kandy which was still the only group of bhikkhus that controlled lucrative tracts of land. Notables such as Talpavila Seelawamsa Thero, a former member of the SLFP and EBP executive and now Dean of Buddhism at Vidyālankāra University, and his counterpart at Vidyodaya University, Bambarende Siriseevali Thero, announced their intention to return immediately to the political arena. Their sole purpose, they asserted, was to abolish all present and future governmental efforts to interfere in the affairs of the Saṅgha.

At the same time, the ACBC demanded the resignation of the SLFP Ministry in order to install the UNP as government. They called for the implementation of the recently published policy paper of the United National Party entitled "What We Believe In." The paper asserted that, as the visible representative of the state religion, the Saṅgha must be the government's most important adviser. Furthermore, only if the bhikkhus were absolutely unfettered by state regulations could they resume their traditional role. The UNP paper marked the first time that the party had officially endorsed the res-

toration of the Saṅgha to its historical status.[22] Its appearance gave the Mahā Saṅgha a viable political alternative to the Bandaranaike party that had in past years seemed to be its closest ally. Still, the cries for the SLFP resignation had no tangible effect until Diyavadananilame, Head of the Sri Daladā Māligāvà, announced that the Siam nikāya would immediately close the Daladā Māligāva if the government interfered in any way. In response, all state plans to reorganize the Saṅgha were dropped, and the Saṅgha was publicly and privately assured by Mrs. Bandaranaike that its revenues would remain untaxed.[23] This policy reversal demonstrated the SLFP's belief that its political viability still depended more upon support from the traditionalists than upon the more modern sector of society.

The Growing Importance of Trade Unionism

The financial malaise of Ceylon was becoming an increasingly important problem. Declining export trade, protective tariffs in compliance with demands from small business, and the nationalization of the petroleum and insurance sectors had all contributed to a sharp decline in foreign currency reserves.[24] Moreover, increased welfare and social services, together with a high birth rate[25] and free education at the primary and secondary levels, had further impeded the fiscal vitality of the state. Consequently, there was little money to stimulate potential labor-intensive sectors that might otherwise have helped to counter the growing number of unemployed, the majority of whom were young. Even those among the educated who did find positions were frequently embittered because their jobs were not commensurate with either their academic qualifications or job expectations. Exacerbating the bleak financial picture was the soaring cost of living,[26] which particularly affect-

ed young families who had earlier migrated from such rural areas as Kandy.

Although the Sinhalese Buddhists had been among the most ardent supporters of the SLFP in 1960, they became increasingly cynical about the government's ability to alleviate their plight.[27] More and more, they were joining trade unions where there was a growing interaction between organized labor and the political parties.[28] However, this linkage was, at the same time, becoming increasingly strained for government, for through its nationalization measures, it was also the employer of a growing number of Ceylonese. Despite their awareness that the economy was in difficulty, workers' expectations continued to far exceed the state's capacity to grant wage increases.

The first major confrontation between labor and government began in 1961 when the budget was brought down. The budget called for wages to be frozen at their current levels and food subsidies, including those for rice, to be decreased. Immediately, W. D. de Silva, the SLFP trade union organizer, and a stalwart Sinhalese Buddhist, resigned from the party. He then publicly denounced the government for its anti-labor policies. Similarly, the LSSP and Communist Party cut their ties with the administration in protest over the budget. A deluge of strikes in 1962 and 1963 reflected the ever-growing worker disenchantment with the SLFP. The Samastha Lankā Rajaya Lipikaru Sangamaya [All-Ceylon Government Clerks Union] (SLRLS) became more and more vocal in its insistence that only those persons who spoke Sinhala fluently be given positions in the civil service. Even the LSSP and Communist Party by 1963 were, for the first time, echoing these demands.[29] The two parties asserted that it was no longer necessary to use people with an alien education to assist the government,[30] since there was an over-abundance of Sinhalese-speaking applicants.[31]

With little visible evidence of any government effort to heed labor's demands, the LSSP, MEP and CP, for the first time, jointly sponsored the 1963 May Day Rally. This was followed in August by the announcement of a formal coalition among the three parties called the United Left Front (ULF). Its stated primary purpose was to compel the SLFP to abolish English in every department of the public sector throughout Ceylon. Even though the ULF fought for Sinhala to be recognized as the sole language of work, it continued to endorse the principle that, in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, Tamil should be spoken instead. To strengthen labor's overall position, the ULF announced that all unions affiliated with the three parties would form a federation, the Joint Committee of Trade Union Organizations (JCTUO). In conjunction with any other unions which wished to join it, the JCTUO would draw up a comprehensive list of worker demands. These would be formally presented to employers and government alike with a series of protests to follow if they were not immediately granted.

Once again, the divisions among the people were mirrored in the Cabinet. That body was divided over whether nationalist or fiscal affairs should be their paramount concern. Unable to reach a consensus, Parliament was adjourned between 9 April 1963 and 17 July 1963 so that a comprehensive policy could be drawn up. At the end of the recess, the Prime Minister made Cabinet changes which gave portfolios directly linked with economic matters to ministers deemed labor sympathizers. She also declared that labor grievances would more than ever play a major role in government decision-making. Nonetheless, labor restiveness did not abate, for no concrete concessions were forthcoming from the SLFP.[32]

By the end of 1963, Mrs. Bandaranaike had begun talks to form an al-

liance with the ULF. Such overtures had become necessary despite the relatively small size of the industrial sector. For not only did it include such influential persons as Philip Gunawardena and J. R. Jayawardene, but it also involved many former Sinhalese Buddhist supporters and young bhikkhu teachers. Furthermore, labor militancy had become so pronounced that it was disrupting Ceylonese life as well as weakening the credibility of the SLFP administration.[33]

Despite SLFP overtures, labor distrust of it was not easy to dispel. The JCTUO, as it had earlier planned, presented its paper, "The Twenty-One Demands," to both government and private business during March 1964. The document maintained that neither had made any tangible effort to improve the living standards of the workers. In the following weeks, Philip Gunawardena asserted that his party, the MEP, would never ally itself with an elitist group such as the Bandaranaike administration. Nonetheless, talks between the other two ULF parties and the government continued. On 11 June 1964, Sirimavo Bandaranaike and N. M. Perera announced the formation of an SLFP-LSSP coalition government. Three portfolios in the new Cabinet, including that of Finance Minister, were to be held by LSSP members. The Communist Party refused to join the coalition and only promised general support for the new government if it would immediately implement fourteen of the "Twenty-One Demands" that dealt specifically with working conditions and wage increases.[34] Also, on 11 June, the MEP and the CCCTU whose members were linked to the Sinhalese Buddhist, Tamil and western educated communities, severed all connections with the ULF.

Once again, the SLFP had to choose between retaining the support of the traditionalists or allying itself with such modern elements as the LSSP

and the trade unions. For the sake of anticipated political gain it chose the latter course. However, the decision did not give the SLFP the backing it needed to govern effectively. Instead, its change in direction seemed only to indicate the party's incapacity to take a firm position on whether to work for the restoration of a traditional state or the establishment of a modern nation.

A National-Socialist Administration Fails: June 1964-December 1964

Accusations were made by both Sinhalese Buddhist and Marxist activists that their former allies by forming a coalition had betrayed them. Both parties categorically denied this. As proof of her party's steadfastness, Sirimavo Bandaranaike announced that the government would immediately introduce legislation proclaiming Sinhalese Buddhism to be the predominant religion of Ceylon. The Bill, she added, would also permit freedom of religion in keeping with the democratic nature of Buddism and its emphasis on indivdualism.[35] On its side, the LSSP asserted that the alliance did not indicate any compromise in its ideological commitments. Perera argued that the People's Revolution had taken place in 1948 when the Ceylonese took over the administration from the colonialists. Since then, he went on, the people had directed the society along those paths which mirrored their cultural inheritance. Evidence of this citizens' takeover of their country lay in such agreements as the B-C Pact. This concord was proof that Sinhala and Tamil, the languages of the people, had unequivocally replaced English, the tongue of the elitists.[36]

The acceptance of such arguments by the party faithful was mixed. In the case of the SLFP, advocates of the coalition such as the All-Ceylon

Bhikkhu Mandalay (ACBM) sponsored a mass meeting that involved over one thousand bhikkhus. The assembly passed a resolution urging the new government to invite "progressive forces" regardless of party affiliation to join it so that all could work in unison to overcome Ceylon's serious economic problems.[37] However, no such support was forthcoming from either the ACBC or the Siam nikāya. Both rejected the continuing popular argument of SLFP adherents that only after economic woes were alleviated could true spiritual insight be experienced. The ACBC declared that Marxism with its doctrines of revolution and denial of spiritual values could not possibly be linked to Buddhism with its tenets of non-violence, rebirth and nirvana.[38]

Support for this denunciation of Buddhist-Marxist association was so great among some SLFP representatives that they withdrew from the party to establish the Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist Party (SLFSP)[39] under the leadership of an SLFP past-president, C. P. de Silva. The SLFSP asserted that it was a genuine socialist, not Marxist body. Its efforts would be directed toward promoting the cultural and financial status of the Sinhalese Buddhist peasants who were the traditional state's true heirs.[40]

A similar party split occurred within the LSSP. Edmund Samarakkody and Bala Tampoe, leaders of the ultra-leftist Ceylon Mercantile Union (CMU), left the party. Repudiating the thesis that a class revolution had already taken place, they established the LSSP (Revolutionary),[41] whose goal was to overthrow the elitists who had always governed Ceylon and replace them by a workers' administration.[42]

The antagonism toward the coalition only increased as it sought to both alleviate economic woes and increase its popularity among the ethnic groups, particularly the Sinhalese Buddhists. N. M. Perera, the new Finance

Minister, announced that legislation would be introduced during the fall session of the House of Representatives to increase government revenue through a new tax on toddy. This statement elicited immediate protests from the Sinhalese Buddhist community. Since Buddhists refrained from imbibing alcoholic beverages, toddy was a highly popular drink as it contained no stimulants. The religious and laity in concert established action committees, held protest demonstrations and conducted public prayer meetings. The participants insisted that the toddy tax was a plot directed by the government and western-oriented newspapers to eradicate Buddhism. Accusations of journalistic complicity were principally directed toward the Lakehouse newspapers which had, in the past, been particularly critical of the Bandaranaikes and the SLFP.[43] Now, they endorsed the toddy tax as one effective means to help counter the decrease in government revenue due to the continued weakening of the tea export market.

This media endorsement did not, however, alter government plans to control newspaper content more stringently. For years, the Lakehouse group, in particular, had incurred the administration's wrath with its vigorous opposition to all forms of nationalization and its castigation of all efforts to promote one particular culture to the detriment of others. Citing such criticism as an attempt to prolong western elitism, a Press Commission was set up in the early summer of 1964, chaired by K. D. de Silva, a noted Buddhist activist[44] and retired Supreme Court Judge. The Commission's provisional report noted that the testimony of the Mahā Sangha was highly critical of journalists who impeded efforts to make Ceylonese life reflective of its historical traditions. It observed that, as the four largest newspaper chains were privately owned, they held a virtual monopoly on news, providing a biased pic-

ture of events. Holding their particularistic interests paramount, the newspapers had, the Commission charged, consistently supported the UNP which advocated laissez-faire economic policies, while indiscriminately opposing all SLFP efforts to enhance Sinhalese Buddhist living standards and job opportunities through government takeovers. This interim report and its final version both favored the establishment of a central Press Council with regional Press Tribunals to monitor the media, a recommendation that was in concert with the views expressed by the Mahā Saṅgha at the hearings.

In the throne speech delivered on 20 November 1964, the government declared its intent to establish Press Monitoring Agencies to ensure that the primacy and promotion of Sinhalese Buddhism were the dominant themes of all newspapers. A second major proposal was the introduction of a Bill giving formal recognition to Theravāda Buddhism as the state religion. The third principal item was the continued intention of the administration to impose a toddy tax.

The Sinhalese Buddhists greeted the government's new legislative program with derision, and the Saṅgha denounced all aspects of the speech.[45] Bhikkhus and newsmen together condemned the proposed Press Council as a subtle form of nationalization. It was, they averred, a nefarious means contrived by the Marxists to subvert democracy and thereby ultimately eradicate Sinhalese Buddhism through censorship of the press.

Numerous protest demonstrations, speeches, editorials and meetings culminated in a gigantic mass rally held on 28 November 1964. The rally demonstrated an unprecedented display of unity among the Saṅgha, the press, the ACBC, the Buddhist Theosophical Society, the UNP, the JVP(2), and the MEP. The leaders of the three political parties profusely thanked the religious

for their untiring vigilance in protecting the traditional rights of the people despite the threat from the potentially debilitating machinations of alien elements and irresponsible SLFP aspirations.[46] Laudatory, widespread press coverage was given to the mass meeting and to the colorful parades linked with it. These processions involved hundreds of bhikkhus in their robes, carrying Ceylon's gold and red flag, and flanked by dancers and drummers.[47]

A tangible result of the rally was the government's withdrawal of the Toddy Tax Bill. Nevertheless, the criticism of the SLFP-LSSP government continued. On 3 December 1964, the JVP(2) under Rajaratna and the MEP jointly sponsored an amendment to the throne speech. It stipulated that legislation be immediately introduced requiring that the offices of Governor General, Prime Minister, Cabinet Minister, Department Head, military and school executives be filled only by Sinhalese Buddhists. The vote on the motion saw C. P. de Silva's SLFSP join forces with the JVP and MEP to defeat the SLFP-LSSP government by a count of 74 to 73. Parliament was dissolved on 17 December 1964 and the date of the next general election was set for 22 March 1965.

Summary and Conclusions

Despite the fall of the government, the SLFP had augmented its originally narrow communal perspective. The years from 1960 to 1965 had presented a growing challenge to the SLFP to alter it particularistic, traditional orientation for one that encompassed more diversified interests. With increasing mobility, fewer close family ties and the promises by politicians since Independence of a growth in individual prosperity, the population more and more relied on the government to supply their material needs and security. Such expectations required a more broadly based endorsement than the Sangha could

provide. Consequently, successful overtures were made by the SLFP to such "mass" parties as the LSSP, much to the chagrin of the more conservative sector of the Sangha. Furthermore, as Tambiah notes, the coalition tried to meet expectations for the sake of political expediency but did so at the expense of not setting continuing economic goals.[48] Nonetheless, the search for economic viability did result in a greater political scope on the part of the SLFP that involved non-Sinhalese who were linked with the LSSP and its unions. Through such a coalition, a common goal had been set which could encompass Sinhalese and Tamils, in both urban and rural areas.[49]

The negative aspect of this stride away from traditionalism by the SLFP was its loss of support of many influential members of the Sangha and Sinhalese Buddhist community. Although the withdrawal of bhikkhu endorsement did not lessen their credibility among many other Ceylonese, it did weaken the viability of Mrs. Bandaranaike and her SLFP as a government for, as Rustow observes, the dependency of the politicians upon their traditional supporters is noticeable greater than theirs is upon the politicians.[50] The positive aspect of the government's defeat, however, was that the SLFP had expanded its political horizons. In Kearney's view, continuous disregard of other strong interest groups in the economic and social sectors had been a fundamental flaw in the SLFP from its inception.[51] It had now started to correct this weakness through close alliances with non-communal groups.

The next seven years were to be a continuation of this effort on the part of both the SLFP and UNP to become mass parties. But they continued to be dependent on the Sinhalese Buddhist majority for political viability, and, consequently, their growth as popular parties was slow. Only as the cultural demands of the Sangha diminished and the economic expectations of the populace

increased did the politicians' dependence on traditional support lessen. However, such changes, as Eisenstadt would have indicated, were not rapid or free from set-backs as the ensuing years were to demonstrate.[52]

Notes

1. Robert E. Bellah, "Epilogue," in Religion and Progress in Modern Asia, ed. Robert E. Bellah (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 220.

2. Woodward, "Sri Lanka's Electoral Experience," p. 471.

3. One of its leaders, Philip Gunawardena, was Secretary of the CCCTU, while the other, Colvin R. de Silva, had organized the first Marxist trade union in 1932.

4. See Appendix III, p. 224 and Appendix II, p. 209.

5. See Map I opposite page 1 and Appendix V, Table I, p. 229.

6. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System, p. 278.

7. Ibid., p. 149.

8. See Appendix V, Table 4, p. 232

9. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System, p. 207.

10. Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon, p. 256. Some writers such as Kitagawa, question the feasibility of convinced Buddhists to either lead or be led along the material paths of Marxism. He contends that the impetus needed to create and continue a welfare state is incongruous with the triviality of current events in a dedicated Buddhist's mind. Joseph M. Kitagawa, "Buddhism and Asian Politics," Asian Survey 2 (1962):10.

11. Nyrop, Area Handbook for Ceylon, p. 256.

12. Woodward, The Growth of the Party System, p. 269.

13. Singer, The Emerging Elite, p. 144.

14. Robert N. Kearney, "Sinhalese Nationalism and Social Conflict in Ceylon," Pacific Affairs 37 (Summer 1964):131.

15. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 173.

16. Kearney, "The New Political Crises," pp. 20-21.

17. Lewy, Religion and Revolution, p. 498.

18. The revival and use of such traditional ceremonies and symbols reinforces a people's nationalistic feelings and, hence, eases their way along the path of modernization. Rustow, A World of Nations, p. 117.

19. See Appendix III, p. 223.

20. Benz, Buddhism or Communism?, p. 69.

21. Lewy, Religion and Revolution, p. 497.

22. Phadnis, Religion and Politics, p. 130.

23. Ibid., p. 244. Phadnis attributes this SLFP compliance to the demands of the Sangha and to political expediency. Economic problems were rapidly increasing while communal issues were gradually being settled. The Sri Daladā Māligāva was not only a Sinhalese Buddhist shrine and therefore of great import to the people, but it was also a popular tourist attraction. The threats of the bhikkhus not only meant a possible loss of foreign currency but the return of fractious politics if bhikkhus reverted to their militancy of the late 1950's.

24. Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative, p. 218.

25. See Appendix V, Table 9, p. 235.

26. See Appendix V, Table 10, p. 236.

27. Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon, p. 262.

28. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics, pp. 47, 71.

29. Ibid., p. 127.

30. The capacity of a people to take full charge of its own administration and join such non-traditional pressure groups as trade unions demonstrates that the state has largely displaced traditionalism in favor of modernity. Rustow, A World of Nations, pp. 72, 91.

31. In 1963 alone, there were 2700 applications for 70 available openings in the upper strata of the public service. Nyrop, Area Handbook for Ceylon, p. 236.

32. Woodward, The Growth of the Party System, p. 163.

33. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics, pp. 65, 152.

34. Zeylanicus, Ceylon, pp. 234-235.

35. Wilson, "Buddhism in Ceylon Politics," p. 530.

36. Kearney, "The Marxist Parties," p. 432.

37. Donald Eugene Smith, Religion, Politics and Social Change, p. 149.

38. Ibid., p. 226.

39. See Appendix II, p. 213.

40. The establishment of the SLFSP and its policy commitments drew many of Sirimavo Bandaranaike's former peasant supporters to it and, as a result, weakened the SLFP. These consequences were evident when the National Government won the 1965 election. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 154.

41. See Appendix II, p. 209.

42. The LSSP also lost a considerable number of 1965 votes. Much of the prior support which urban workers had given the party had been obtained through Bala Tampoe's efforts. Their support went with him when he left the LSSP. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics, pp. 69, 113.

43. The Lakehouse Group was composed of several English language newspapers, including the prominent Ceylon Daily News. Its coverage was largely devoted to those events and opinions which reflected the interests of the urban, westernized and affluent Ceylonese. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 240.

44. Wilson, "Buddhism in Ceylon Politics," p. 524.

45. Lewy, Religion and Revolution, p. 499.

46. Ibid., p. 501.

47. Schecter, The New Face of Buddha, p. 140.

48. Tambiah, "Buddhism and This-Worldly Activity," p. 19.

49. Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," American Political Science Review 64 (1970):1123.

50. Rustow, A World of Nations, p. 168.

51. Kearney, "The New Political Crises," p. 127.

52. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change and Modernity, pp. 327, 354.

CHAPTER VII

THE SANGHA DIVIDED

The 1965 Election: Communal Priorities and Economic Difficulties

Although thirteen parties contested the March 1965 election,[1] the important contenders remained the UNP and the SLFP. The principal issues also mirrored past contests: communal particularities and economic difficulties. The partisan alliances and divisions that had appeared during the period of the recent SLFP-LSSP governmental coalition continued throughout the campaign. Once more, bhikkhus actively participated in electioneering, and representatives from the various groups to which they belonged were frequent speakers at the numerous meetings organized by the UNP or SLFP. The Sangha explained its return to campaigning by asserting that Sinhalese Buddhism was again being threatened. Depending on which of the two principal antagonists they supported, the religious claimed it must be protected from a takeover by either Marxism or westernization.

The contention that the recent coalition government had posed a very real threat to Sinhalese Buddhism and the democratic traditions of Ceylon provided a number of groups with a common theme. These included the UNP, JVP(2), MEP, and SLFP, as well as the Lakehouse Newspaper Group. The SLFP, LSSP and Communist Party all repudiated such an accusation, claiming that the danger lay in the incipient incursion of western culture, not Sinhalese socialism. The Bandaranaike group pointed to the Lakehouse chain's anti-SLFP bias as evidence to support their contention.

Threatened with nationalization if the SLFP won the election, the Lakehouse papers made no effort to hide their antipathy toward the Bandaranaike party. During the campaign, they intensified their criticism of the SLFP. This was the party, they declared, that was making Ceylon into a communist state, and eradicating centuries of democracy and Sinhalese Buddhist life. The newspapers urged the Ceylonese to unite under the banner of the party that had led the way to Independence, the UNP. The Lakehouse Company provided concrete support to the Senanayake party by printing and distributing all UNP campaign material free of charge.[2] Other dailies, such as the Times newspapers, also unequivocally endorsed the UNP. Although they published in English and had middle and lower-middle class readership they had, prior to 1965, given only qualified support to the UNP. Now, however, they questioned the overall intentions of the SLFP and called upon voters to cast their ballots for United National Party candidates.[3]

Still, it was not only the past efforts of the coalition to impose press censorship that helped the UNP cause, but also its altered image. Since the publication of its 1958 policy paper, the UNP's apparent neutrality concerning culture had been replaced by a strong endorsement of Sinhalese Buddhism.[4] Now, in the 1965 campaign, it used this paper as evidence of its continued intention to ensure that Sinhalese Buddhism alone occupied the most important place in Ceylonese society rather than sharing it as a co-partner of Marxism. As a result of such assertions, the UNP enjoyed the support of the Mahā Saṅgha Peramuna [Sri Lanka Bhikkhu Front], the Tri Nikāya Bhikkhu Mahā Bala Mandalaya [Three Saṅgha Bhikkhu Organization] and groups of religious associated with Vidyālankāra University. Ardent bhikkhu allies of the SLFP in past years now endorsed the UNP, maintaining that their goals had not

changed. Instead, these former supporters insisted, it was the Freedom Party that had altered its direction away from Sinhalese Buddhist interests and toward communism. The two philosophies were irreconcilable, they declared; while Buddhism looks for the solution to spiritual matters through ignoring every-day affairs, Marxism focuses on mundane activities to merely satisfy material desires.[5]

Many members of the Siam nikāya also repudiated the SLFP because of its Marxist connections. The Mahā Nāyake Thero of the Malwatta vihāra, the Venerable Amunugama Siri Mahā Vipassi Thero, for instance, publicly voiced his skepticism that the SLFP could ever again be trusted to secure the proper place for Sinhalese Buddhism after its alliance with the LSSP.[6] Bhikkhus from the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas countered such statements by contending that such UNP endorsement from members of the Siam fraternity principally emanated from the desire to retain their landholdings.[7]

The UNP, in turn, blamed the defection of the SLFP to Marxist thinking in its refusal to rely on the Sangha as its main adviser. This would not be the case for his party, Senanayake asserted: a UNP government would be in continuous consultation with the religious. As a result, the traditional democratic life of the Ceylonese would be assured. Consultation would also be the means, the UNP leader promised, whereby ethnic groups could reach a consensus concerning cultural priorities. Round table conferences would be held that involved the representatives of the various communities and from these meetings would evolve amicable arrangements that would promote the best interests of a united Ceylon.

With growing support among the bhikkhus for the UNP, the SLFP continued its bid for Sinhalese Buddhist endorsement on the basis of particularistic

aspirations. The party once again promised to implement all the recommendations of the 1959 Buddha Sāsana Commission. As well, it announced plans to establish, in the ancient capital city of Anuradhapura,[8] a university to be used exclusively as a bhikkhu training center. Like the UNP, the Freedom Party promised to observe Buddhist pōya days as holidays, rather than Christian Sundays. It reminded the electorate that it was the only political party that had, since its inception, continued to hold, as its most important goal, the re-establishment of Sinhalese Buddhism to its traditional status. SLFP candidates noted that even in the 1965 campaign, the UNP were still equivocating on the issue. Proof of this lay in the support which the Senanayake party was enjoying from the Christian churches, they argued. With such allies, a UNP government would promote western culture to the detriment of Sinhalese Buddhism, the SLFP asserted.[9]

Rather than permit a new wave of westernization to alter their society, the SLFP instead proposed that a new constitution be drawn up by the people to replace the current one that had been written with the help of the British. A uniquely Ceylonese constitution could see a Republic supplant the present Dominion, Buddhism recognized as the state religion and Sinhala as the sole official language. Furthermore, Mrs. Bandaranaike suggested, once a truly Sinhalese Buddhist state was ensured it would be feasible to implement the 1958 Tamil Language Act "in a manner acceptable to both communities and thereby enhance cooperation and understanding between the majority and minority groups."[10]

Although these policies drew support from such groups as the Sri Lanka Eksath Bhikkhu Bala Mandalaya and many faculty and students of Vidyodaya University, this endorsement did not counterbalance the opposition of conservative

bhikkhus and of the Siam nikāya in particular. Moreover, weakened rural support of the SLFP was evident even before election day as peasants at village meetings voiced their profound distrust of a party that was willing to ally itself with Marxist groups.[11] Sinhalese backing was further dissipated by the government's prior withdrawal of rice subsidies, the proposed tax on toddy, the rising cost of living and growing unemployment.[12]

Despite these opponents, the SLFP appealed to a wider range of interests than it had in any prior contest. Through its coalition with the pro-union LSSP its image as a purely traditional group of elitists was being slowly altered to one that had a potential appeal for all sectors of Ceylonese society.[13]

Like the UNP and SLFP, the LSSP adopted a more flexible policy position during the current campaign. Aware that it must deal first with daily concerns rather than ideological ones in order to gain greater voter support, it changed its neutral stance on the communal issue.[14] The party campaigned for formal recognition of Sinhala as the principal language of Ceylon and Tamil as the language of the people in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. It justified this position by reminding the Tamils that one of their own leaders, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, had endorsed the B-C Pact. He had, in essence, Perera maintained, formally acknowledged the national priority of Sinhala throughout Ceylon while relegating Tamil to a merely administrative tongue in circumscribed regions. Instead of this, the LSSP candidates pointed out, their party was demanding the official use of Tamil in all sectors within the two provinces. Despite this argument the Tamils' anger at the LSSP was not assuaged.[15]

Another cause of voter disenchantment with the Sama Samajists was its earlier alliance with the SLFP when nine of the ULF's "Twenty-One Demands" had

still been outstanding. Throughout the campaign, Bala Tampoe and his LSSP(R) lost no opportunity to remind the workers of this defection. Through the LSSP's exploitive and opportunistic actions, Tampoe pointed out, there still did not exist any job protection for the Tamil, Burgher and Christian white collar workers who formed a majority in the private commercial sector of industry.[16]

The votes which the LSSP lost did not, however, lead to a majority victory for either the UNP or SLFP for the UNP won 66 seats and the SLFP only 41 out of a total of 151.[17] The political division within the Sangha seemed to be reflected in voter response even though the turnout was greater than ever before.[18] Although it was the UNP which had the greatest plurality in the 1965 election, the voting patterns of the Ceylonese remained relatively rigid. With rural areas still virtually communal enclaves,[19] a local party victory continued to reflect the ethnic character of the constituency. Hence Tamils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces were apt to endorse a Federal Party or Tamil Congress candidate, while the Sinhalese localities generally returned UNP or SLFP contestants. In certain cases the personal popularity of a candidate was particularly important. For instance, S. A. Wickremasinghe (CP), Philip Gunawardena (LSSP), Sirimavo Bandaranaike (SLFP), and Dudley Senanayake (UNP) had personal followings which invariably led to their re-election.[20]

Expansion of the Political Spectrum

However, it was such people as the Bandaranaikes and Senanayakes who, with the passage of years, had cause to more and more readily mobilize support across both the traditional and modern sectors. They had become increasingly

identified with issues that were important not only to the Sinhalese Buddhist peasant and conservative bhikkhu, but as well to the trade unionists and to the more liberal sector of the Saṅgha. This growing ability of the political elite to attract support from both the traditional and modern sectors of society meant that they, in conjunction with the Mahā Saṅgha, were increasingly capable of providing for the Ceylonese a bridge which linked the traditional cultural order to a modern, industrial nation.[21] It also indicated that basic differences between the UNP and SLFP policies were ever more difficult to detect. However, these same expanding perspectives of the two parties also made it simpler for them to form coalitions.

This was the case for the UNP in 1965 when it received a plurality. A National Government was set up that included not only the MEP and SLFSP but the two Tamil parties, the FP and TC. Its leader was Dudley Senanayake.[22] The inclusion of the two Tamil parties in the government was due to a private arrangement made between Senanayake and the leaders of the FP and TC, Chelvanayakam and Ponnambalam, concerning the status of Ceylonese Tamils. Senanayake promised UNP support for the implementation of the B-C Pact and for the establishment of a decentralized administration that would permit the inauguration of independent District Councils to handle regional affairs. Such bodies could, in time, provide the basis for a Federal State, which was the espoused goal of both the FP and TC. The three parties to the arrangement also agreed to press for the inclusion of Indian as well as Ceylonese Tamils in the reallocation of the lucrative tea estates which the UNP intended to nationalize. Two other main items of the pact were the revision of the Language of the Courts Act to permit Tamil to be used in the courts of the Northern and Eastern provinces, and the transfer, not dismissal, of Tamil civil servants who

had not passed the language exams. Although the details of the agreement only gradually became public knowledge, the conciliatory attitude of Senanayake was obvious when he named his first Cabinet.[23] For the first time since 1956, a Ceylon Tamil was appointed.[24]

Despite these concessions to the minority group the National Government principally reflected the Sinhalese Buddhist majority in its actions and policies. Dudley Senanayake and J. R. Jayawardene took their oaths as Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister during an ancient Buddhist ceremony especially chosen for the occasion. Immediately following his installation, the new Prime Minister, as S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and his wife had done earlier, publicly thanked the Sangha for its support during the campaign. He attributed the election victory of the UNP to the positive influence which the Sangha had used on the party's behalf.[25]

The post-election optimism did not long continue, however. Immediately after taking office, the National Government passed a bill recognizing pōya days as the sole national holidays. The Christians quickly voiced their disapproval. Nor did the legislation assuage growing Sinhalese Buddhist disenchantment with the new government. No sooner was the National Government installed than the Education Department suspended 239 teachers and fired 140 others for illegally participating in the 1965 campaign. All the guilty were members of the Sri Lanka Jathika Guru Sangamaya [Ceylon National Teachers Union] and had vigorously opposed the UNP during the election, contending that it would never serve the Sinhalese Buddhist cause conscientiously. Their outcry over such treatment was joined by that of the SLFP, LSSP and CP. The three parties promised that when they formed the next government, this law would be rescinded and all offenders would be pardoned and reinstated.

A united stand was not so evident among the SLFP and the two Marxist parties when reports concerning the UNP-Tamil agreement came to light in the early winter of 1965. Senanayake and his party executive were bitterly criticized for their allegedly traitorous actions.[26] Among their accusers were members of the LSSP-affiliated Government Clerical Service Union and the CP-linked Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions. However, neither of the unions was able to obtain a united stand among its members against the UNP-Tamil agreement. One reason for this was that prior to 1956 their workers had been recruited on the basis of fluency in English and consequently included English, Sinhala and Tamil speaking members. Many of the older members were the very people who were directly affected by the Language Bill provisions and would be among the first to be dismissed for their inability to speak Sinhala. At the same time, however, such dismissals would leave room for younger Sinhalese members. Despite this conflict of interest, the incipient split over union policy on the matter between the older and the more numerous younger members was averted, even though both unions and the LSSP and CP officially protested the language concessions in January 1966. They defended their position with the statement that the National Government's policy was "motivated by capitalism and imperialistic considerations and bureaucratic tendencies."[27]

Another incipient union split was not so felicitously concluded. The All Ceylon Government Clerks Union, comprised of Sinhala-speaking civil servants, was one of the most vehement critics of the UNP-Tamil agreement. Although it was unified in its opposition to the agreement, it was decidedly split over the advisability of joining forces with the communists to fight it. The Marxist sympathizers won out over the more conservative incumbent executive, ousted it and joined forces with the rejuvenated Joint Committee of

Trade Union Organizations. This most radical element that included a number of the religious vowed to protect Sinhala from the proposed government policies.[28]

On 5 January 1966, between eight and ten thousand demonstrators who included bhikkhus, unionists and SLFP, LSSP and CP members began a nation-wide strike. Once again, the strikers declared, the rights of Sinhalese Buddhists were in jeopardy. Despite its diverse support, this protest did not enjoy as widespread worker support as had the 1962 ULF demonstration. Both the LSSP-linked Ceylon Trade Union Federation and the CP-linked Ceylon Mercantile Union refused to participate.[29]

Nonetheless, rioting broke out and the army had to be called in. The violence ceased only after one bhikkhu had been killed, 91 persons injured and extensive damage to property. A State of Emergency was declared, and all public processions and assemblies related to communal matters were banned. Only with express government permission could they be held. Press censorship was imposed once more. This time curtailment of news seemed to be particularly stringent for the Davasa newspapers.[30] Always a stalwart proponent of Sinhalese Buddhist predominance, the support of the Davasa group for the UNP in the 1965 election had already changed to angry criticism. This Sinhalese newspaper chain had vigorously decried the inclusion of the Federal Party in the coalition and had continued to assert that such an alliance demonstrated an implicit bias on the part of the National Government for a federal structure.

Despite a visible drop in public support for the UNP,[31] the Senanayake government went ahead with its original plans. The Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of 1958 came into force on 8 January 1966. The

Bill specifically included the provision that Tamil would be the language of administration in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The government insisted that such a concession posed no danger to Sinhalese primacy. It pointed out that Sinhalese Buddhism had already been strengthened and stimulated through the past combined efforts of the Sangha and the administration and that both institutions would continue this practice.[32]

The State of Emergency declaration did not end the immediate repercussions stemming from the government's support of Tamil rights. In the spring, the government announced that a coup d'état had been planned to take place in February 1966 and the perpetrators had been caught and were awaiting trial. The accused were all members of an ultra-nationalist group, the Buddhist National Force, and included Hempitigedara Gnanaseeha Thero, a long-time advocate of unitary rule for Ceylon, and the Commander of the Army, Major General Richard Udugama. Although the trial for all those involved in the coup began that spring, it did not end until January 1970. The trial proceedings, as they dragged on, weakened public support for the government. The trial finally culminated in the acquittal of all the accused by a unanimous verdict of the jury.[33]

The flimsy evidence produced by the administration against the accused damaged the credibility of the National Government and made it simpler for such groups as the Samastha Lankā Rajaya Lipikaru Sangamaya [All Ceylon Government Clerks Union] to pursue their goals by undermining government policies. In October 1966 the union sponsored a conference to examine means whereby Sinhala could once more be immediately accepted as the sole administrative language throughout Ceylon. The Conference sent a formal demand to the National Government to have the civil service officially declared unilingual so that

the jobless rate among the Sinhalese could diminish. When no response was forthcoming from the administration, the SLRLS appealed directly to the public and got support particularly from the Saṅgha and Sinhalese Buddhist community. As a result, Senanayake announced that talks between the Finance Minister and union executives would be immediately scheduled. The talks began in 1967 but meanwhile there was no decline in unemployment among the Sinhalese in any sector of the society. The tea export market continued to decline[34] and despite the clearly capitalist bent of the National Government, foreign investors were not responsive to its invitations to participate in job creation programs.[35] As a result disenchantment among all groups of Ceylonese with the administration continued to grow.

The SLFP took advantage of this apparent lack of success in promoting the growth of private enterprise to put forth its own program of Democratic Socialism. It held a series of conferences after its 1965 electoral defeat to re-examine its program. Particularly prominent at these meetings were members of the Mahā Saṅgha, as well as the LSSP, who endorsed the view that the enhancement of Sinhalese Buddhism would best be achieved through a continued evolution of a socialist society. The nation's vitality would directly depend on mass enthusiasm and participation. With such cooperation, Bandaranaike and Perera declared, the interests of both the Sinhalese Buddhist peasants and the workers would be optimally served.[36]

Such joint statements ultimately led to a formal alliance of the SLFP, LSSP and CP and the formation of the United Front [Samagi Peramuna] (UF) in March 1968. It was made clear that the UF was not to be merely an electoral arrangement, but rather it was a new people's party headed by Sirimavo Bandaranaike.[37] The UF pledged to implement a new twenty-five point Common Program,

which included the following items: democratic rights of workers in factory and office would be formally incorporated into a Workers' Charter of Rights; public employees would be permitted to participate in politics; people would again receive the same rice subsidy they had been allocated under the SLFP-LSSP coalition, current social benefits program would be adapted and expanded to serve the needs of the people more adequately.

The Common Program also took into consideration the cultural aspects of Ceylon. It promised a new constitution that would formally acknowledge Sinhalese Buddhism as the principal religion of Ceylon, and guarantee its primacy. The Tamil Regulations would be rescinded and legislation pertaining to minority rights would be introduced only after a mutual agreement between the Sinhalese and other ethnic groups had been reached. All religions would definitely be guaranteed their "due rights."[38]

The Common Program was enthusiastically hailed by a large number of Ceylonese who called for the immediate institution of a United Front government. Although their demand was not complied with at the time by the National Government, it would, nevertheless, be the UF with its broad-based Common Program that would appeal to large sections of the population and win the 1970 election by a wide margin.[39]

At the same time that the UF was proclaiming its Common Program, the National Government was introducing legislation to provide for the establishment of district councils. The backlash from the Sinhalese Buddhist community was so great, however, that Senanayake withdrew the Bill in July 1968. This action in turn led to the formal resignation of the FP and TC from the National Government. Despite losing his Tamil coalition partners, Senanayake continued to govern for he had retained the tenuous support of the majority of the

voters. The people of Ceylon, like those in other developing countries, expected that if there was a conflict between local and national interests, their particular representative would promote the constituency's viewpoint rather than that of the party. When the legislators were not apparently following this course in 1968, the Sinhalese people themselves took to the streets to demonstrate their displeasure and, at the same time, threatened to withdraw their support. Once again, the people were victorious and the law of the land was, in essence, made in the streets rather than in the House of Representatives.

However, Government acquiescence in the demands of the majority community did not stop the growing criticism of the Senanayake administration by the Sinhalese and the Tamils. To these groups were added former Christian supporters of the UNP. They continued to demand that Sundays be nationally recognized holidays, but to no avail. At the same time, they increased their calls for financial reimbursement for the schools taken over earlier by the state. Even though such repayment had been promised them by the UNP during the 1965 campaign, no money from the administration was forthcoming.

Although the Sinhalese Buddhists, Tamils and Christians nursed many divisive communal grievances, they nevertheless shared common economic problems. Consequently, strikes that involved workers from the various communal groups became ever more prevalent. All were demanding higher wages, better fringe benefits and more job opportunities. Strikes by members of the Joint Committee of Trade Union Organizations were accompanied by demonstrations that saw the United Front and the Mahā Saṅgha as active participants.

Just as the workers and peasants were increasingly disenchanted with the National Government, so also was the Saṅgha. The administration had

dealt no more effectively with the challenge of the Buddha Sāsana report recommendations than it had with other problems. All suggestions pertaining to the report had been ignored with the exception of that which concerned the establishment of a Saṅghadhikaran.[40] The government asked the executive committees of the Malwatta and Asgiriya vihāras to examine the feasibility of setting up a similar body to specifically deal with Saṅgha-related problems. The bhikkhus' conclusions, sent to the Minister of Justice A. P. Sikemanne in 1968, were that such a judicial body, by its very nature, had to include representatives from each nikāya. Since each fraternity was independent of the others, neither the delegates nor their groups could be bound by the decisions of the Saṅghadhikaran. This negative conclusion only underlined the intrinsic division within the Saṅgha that resulted in a lack of unified thought and action in all affairs, including politics. The National Government made no public comment concerning the report nor did it suggest further innovations.[41]

Still, by the late 1960's, there was growing concern among the bhikkhus over such a lack of consensus. This became evident at the annual conference of the ACBC in 1969 during which its leaders pointed out that such internal dissidence could ultimately result in a Ceylonese nation that no longer epitomized a Sinhalese Buddhist ethos. If this should ever occur, they warned, Theravāda Buddhism, unlike Hinduism, Islam or Christianity, would be lost to the world.[42] Such admonitions were to be reiterated throughout the impending 1970 election campaign but to little avail.

The 1970 Election: A Divided Saṅgha

Immediately following the announcement that a general election would take place on 27 May 1970, the ACBC published a policy paper whose theme was

Saṅghá unity. It was endorsed by such personages as the Nāyaka of the Malwatta vihāra. The statement urged bhikkhus to set aside their differences and work in concert to ensure that an administration which really had the interests of the Sinhalese Buddhists at heart was elected. This should be, the paper emphasized, the sole criterion for electing a party, be it the UNP, the SLFP or a coalition of the two. The new government must not be the sort that would countenance the continuation of the Tamil Regulations Act. The ACBC again warned that the 1970 election could prove calamitous to Theravāda Buddhism if persons sympathetic to Tamil demands, modernization and foreign domination governed Ceylon.[43]

To help decide which political body should be supported the ACBC paper declared that certain policies must be an intrinsic part of the successful party's goals. These should minimally include the promise to establish a constituent assembly that would in turn draw up a new constitution which truly reflected the aspirations of a Sinhalese Buddhist nation. The future government must also promise to permanently abolish all Christian private schools. As well, it must be ready to ensure that no bhikkhus would be involved in politics; for only through such abstention could the traditional dignity of the Saṅgha prevail.[44]

In spite of such advice the bhikkhus, who now numbered about eighteen thousand,[45] remained divided. Long public and private discussions were unable to resolve their differences. Instead, the Saṅgha, during the 1970 election, continued to undermine its potential influence over the Sinhalese Buddhists by its internal differences.[46] During the campaign, the bhikkhus were divided into three loose groups. There were those politically left-of-center who supported the UF, versus those endorsing the UNP and

its right-of-center stance.[47] Thirdly, there were the bhikkhus who abjured all political involvement.

The powerful Sri Lankā Eksath Bhikkhu Bala Mandalaya (SLEBBM) favored the SLFP unequivocally.[48] These bhikkhus assisted the party through an intensive house-to-house campaign in conjunction with giving talks to small local gatherings. Also to be found in the same political camp was the Sri Lanka Bhikkhu Front (SLBF), whose principal campaign efforts involved speaking at mass meetings. Both Buddhist groups criticized the UNP for promoting policies antithetical to communal harmony and asserted that the continuation of such a government could only lead to an irreparable dismemberment of Ceylon. Neither the SLEBBM nor the SLBF involved themselves in the question of the SLFP's credibility over its alliance with the LSSP and CP. Their speeches centered solely on the theme that a vote for the SLFP was a step towards ensuring the primacy of Sinhalese Buddhism.[49]

A number of notables who had formally worked for the UNP cause in 1965 now favored the UF. One was the former Chief Justice Hema Basnayake.[50] Another, who had sharply criticized the SLFP pacts with communist parties in past years, now ignored such hurdles in the name of communal interests. The Venerable Mahā Nāyake Thero, leader of the Malwatta vihāra, declared his support for the Freedom Party in newspaper articles. He endorsed the "socialism"[51] of the UF under Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the "mother of us all" in preference to the "conservative politics" of Dudley Senanayake.[52]

The manifesto issued by the UF in April 1970 was mainly a reiteration of its 1968 Common Program. Its principal declared policy was Sinhalese Buddhist primacy in practice as well as theory. Only after this goal was fully realized, the UF candidates declared, would there be nation-wide discussions on how best to facilitate restricted use of Tamil and freedom of religion

which could possibly involve state grants to Christian schools as well.

Despite such promises, there appeared to be a growing desire on the part of the electorate, and hence on the part of such parties as the SLFP and later the United Front, to consider other problems not directly related to communal interests.[53] For instance, this was the first campaign since the establishment of the SLFP that it ran candidates in Tamil-dominated constituencies. Too, a major part of its platform included promises to inaugurate a comprehensive social insurance program and to organize numerous job-creation projects particularly geared to provide work for Ceylonese youth. Such goals seemingly appealed to a greater number of Ceylonese than had previously been the case. This was notable particularly in the election results, when the SLFP far outdistanced the ultra-Sinhalese nationalist Sinhala Mahajana Peramuna [Sinhalese People's Front] (SMP).[54]

Despite the inclusion of these former peripheral issues into central programs, Buddhist aspirations and support were important. Both Bandaranaike and Dudley Senanayake visited, at least once, each constituency that their parties were contesting. In ridings in which there was a significant minority, the SLFP and UNP sent spokesmen of the same ethnic, religious or caste group to campaign on behalf of the party.[55] Communal aggressiveness was still apparent although it was not as bellicose as it had been in the days of the Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna and the 1956 election.[56] For instance, the Venerable Dhammaratana Thero had announced at a UF rally that both pōya days and Christian sabbaths would, as the LSSP had earlier promised, be recognized as national holidays. The ACBC immediately responded by holding a large protest demonstration in Colombo, decrying such communal perfidy. However, this was the sole manifestation of the ACBC's opposition to the announcement.

Such incidents demonstrated that not all Sinhalese Buddhists were willing to accept or ignore the SLFP's leftist allies and policies. As in 1965, many bhikkhus issued stern warnings to the Sinhalese that a vote for the UNP was a vote for the continuation of their culture while one for the UF was an endorsement of Marxism and the annihilation of Sinhalese Buddhism.

The UNP worked hard to cultivate and enhance its image as a guardian of traditional tenets. The back cover of the official UNP election pamphlet had a series of photographs showing Dudley Senanayake participating in various Buddhist ceremonies. Inside the brochure was a series of pictures accompanied by a list of UNP accomplishments during its recent program of restoration and reconstruction of ancient Buddhist shrines. UNP candidates carried on this theme of promoting Theravāda Buddhism by emphasizing the party's intention to continue such projects and initiate others that would be suggested by the Saṅgha.

Bhikkhu organizations such as the Mahā Saṅgha Peramuna championed the efforts of the United National Party to reassert Ceylon's traditions. Like its opponents, the UNP also enjoyed electoral support from eminent bhikkhus. One such person was the Veñerable Rambukwelle Sri Sobhita Thero, who frequently addressed campaign meetings on behalf of like-minded bhikkhus linked to the Malwatta vihāra. Unlike the Venerable Mahā Nāyake Thero, he insisted that there was only one single party in Ceylon that could fulfill Sinhalese aspirations and, at the same time, permanently restore racial and religious peace. That was Dudley Senanayake's party, the UNP.[57]

The UNP continued in its belief that private investment and private enterprise were the only means whereby Ceylon could achieve long-term prosperity. Foreign investment and technology would be attracted, it maintained,

through capitalist policies, the economy would flourish and positions demanding the skills of educated Ceylonese would be abundant.

Job creation seemed to be a predominant item in the platforms of both the UNP and UF. Since both parties made similar promises to protect Sinhala and recognize Theravāda Buddhism as the state religion, the concrete difference between their platforms rested mainly on economic issues.[58] With the UNP as the most recent government, it had to bear the brunt of the blame for the economic situation that saw high unemployment particularly among the young.[59] This aspect was very important for it was the first time that eighteen-year olds had been permitted to vote.[60] Consequently, the sluggish economy together with the party's pro-Tamil stance appeared to weaken voter support. The turnout for the election reached an unprecedented high of 85 percent.[61] The SLFP won 91 seats out of a total of 151 while its partners, the LSSP and CP won 19 and 6 respectively. The UNP was victorious in only 17 constituencies. However, the Senanayake Party received 37.9 percent of the popular vote while the SLFP received only 36.9, the LSSP 8.7 and the CP 3.4.[62] The simple-plurality electoral system of Ceylon did not enable the wishes of the electorate to be accurately reflected. The disproportion between seats won by a party and its popular vote omened a difficult time ahead for the UF if it did not heed the wishes of the populace. Law might well once again be made in the streets rather than in the legislature.

Many of the electorate, particularly those under 21 years of age, candidly stated that their pro-UF vote was more anti-UNP than an endorsement of the United Front.[63] Still, in popular vote the UNP retained its nucleus of support from the middle class and urban minorities. Similarly, SLFP strength remained relatively stable in the more traditionally oriented and rural areas

of the North-Central and Uva Provinces.[64]

The major change in political support during the election seemed to reflect the increasing sub-division within the Sangha itself. As the political issues had diversified, the Sangha had become less and less politically effective. It was, in the political arena, a pressure group whose sole state purpose was the promotion of Theravāda Buddhism. As its members became increasingly involved in other interest groups, the Sangha's political influence decreased. Problems of modernization were rapidly replacing those of traditional times.

1970-1972: Formal Realization of Sangha Aspirations

Following the 1970 election, many of the UF's previous opponents became its advocates. Although the Lakehouse newspapers had tempered their endorsement of the UNP during the campaign, they had still supported the Senanayake party. Nonetheless, when the UF took over the government, the Lakehouse chain declared that not all aspects of the UF program were negative unless Marxist doctrines were to undermine them. The Davasa group also gave the new government qualified support. Like its competitors, it made no secret of the fact that it still distrusted the SLFP's Marxist allies and their potential capacity to destroy Sinhalese Buddhist culture.[65] Notwithstanding this new-found journalistic support, the UF still declared its intention to nationalize the press.

At the same time, the UF did demonstrate a desire to involve groups with diversified interests in governing through the selection for the Cabinet. Included in it were such persons as C. Kumarasurier, a Ceylon Tamil, as Minister of Posts and Communications; Baduiddeen Mohamed, President of the Islamic Socialist Front, as Minister of Education; N. M. Perera, Leader of

the LSSP as Minister of Finance; and Colvin R. de Silva, architect of the first Marxist trade union, as both Minister of Plantation Industry and Chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike also became the creator and director of a new department dealing solely with unemployment. Despite efforts to include the Tamil United Front (TUF)[66] in the government, Mrs. Bandaranaike remained partially unsuccessful. G. G. Ponnambalam, leader of the TC, and two of his parliamentary confrères refused to formally support the UF. This was due to the UF's refusal to work for a bilingual federation. These TC members announced their continued intention to achieve such a political system and, therefore, would only give the UF limited support.[67]

The Minister of Cultural Affairs, S. S. Kulatilake, a Sinhalese Buddhist, announced immediately after the Cabinet appointments were made public that the theme throughout the UF administration would be "Ceylon: Land of Buddhism."[68] At the same time the UF inaugurated a program that would see the establishment of party branches in each constituency throughout Ceylon. These local bodies were expected to enable a continuous communication linkage to be maintained between the government and the people, including the various ethnic groups.

During its initial fiscal efforts the UF received some unexpected support from the UNP to bolster Ceylon's economy. Immediately following the publication of the election results, Dudley Senanayake resigned as the party's head. The leadership devolved upon his Deputy, J. R. Jayawardene. Despite the dismay of the party's right wing, Jayawardene immediately declared that the UNP would be willing to work in tandem with the UF to facilitate a return to national prosperity.[69] Such teamwork, he stated, would also include ap-

proval of socialist policies to hasten the achievement of this goal. The sole stipulation to such cooperation was that the UNP would not countenance any actions that might violate existing democratic freedoms. Jayawardene asserted at the time, however, that the UNP remained convinced that there was no congruity between Buddhist and Marxist philosophies. Marxism, he pointed out, was anchored to material affairs while Buddhism was based on spiritual matters.[70]

At the outset of the UF government's tenure, the majority of the bhikkhus, Ceylonese populace and politicians seemed ready to work together for the good of their nation. On 21 July 1970 with the unanimous consent of the legislature, a Constituent Assembly was established. All Ceylonese communities and political parties were to have representatives on this body. Its specific task was to present a tentative constitution to the House of Representatives that would establish a Sinhalese Buddhist state based on democratic socialist tenets. It was hoped that the new constitution would be promulgated within two years.

In the interim, the UF continued efforts to modernize Ceylon and at the same time retain its Sinhalese Buddhist character. Once more the education system was revamped. During its first six months in office, all remaining missionary and private schools except for the pansalas and pirivenas, were brought under the direct jurisdiction of the Education Ministry. Even though the SLFP had harshly criticized the National Government for permitting more and more English language instruction in state schools, the UF continued with the same policy. It even went one step further and introduced modern language learning facilities in the schools.[71] The need for fluency in English was growing as the number of technical and commercial courses increased and

students were urged to take them. Although conservative bhikkhus and laity deplored the decision, English became a compulsory subject in 1972 for all levels above grade five. Nonetheless, the greatest emphasis was still placed on fluency in Sinhala and bhikkhus still continued to fill a large percentage of paid teaching positions.

Despite the continuing movement of the population to the urban areas, the majority of people continued to live in rural regions.[72] In traditionally Sinhalese Buddhist districts, such as Kandy, the ancient social structure remained largely unchanged. Bhikkhus continued to provide classical Sinhala instruction. The influence of the Saṅgha, and the Siam nikāya in particular, retained its age-old importance in the villages.[73] The Malwatta vihāra in Kandy, for instance, continued its centuries-old practice of monastic landlordism, largely unimpeded by civil authorities.[74] Even when land reform legislation was introduced in 1972, such vihāras were exempted from the 50 acre restriction on private holdings; so also were foreign-owned tea estates and corporations. On the other hand, the Saṅgha continued to be regulated by the Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance and petitions for tax concessions went unheeded.

The estrangement between the conservative Siam nikāya and the more liberal Amarapura and Rāmanya fraternities had continued to grow through the years.[75] Efforts by the UF to close the gap were evident when the Minister of Cultural Affairs announced the establishment of a committee involving representatives from the three nikāyas. This group was asked to coordinate ideas and suggestions from bhikkhus on the type of advisory role the Saṅgha should play in order to enhance the growth of Sinhalese Buddhism. The committee was then to draw up a policy paper based on its findings. Although the com-

mittee examined the national holiday question and gave its support to the reinstitution of Sunday holidays in addition to the continued observance of pōya days, it was unable to provide any concrete suggestions for coordinated action of the Sangha concerning state matters.

This was not the only effort in which the UF failed to resolve long-standing problems. The economy remained in a precarious state. The chemical and pesticide industries had been nationalized, as had banking services. A trade policy of positive non-alignment was introduced which, it was hoped, would create more jobs and expand the public sector. Still unemployment continued to soar. However, even though the administration had been unable to restore the second phase of the rice subsidy, welfare services were extended. There now existed, for instance, employment exchanges, social insurance, unemployment assistance, and one rice subsidy. Indeed, so involved had the state become in social services that it had largely eliminated the need for a continuance of traditional family obligations.[76] This change of dependence on kin to that on the state was becoming increasingly important as young people became more mobile, leaving their elders to fend for themselves.

As the young people moved to various regions of the country seeking jobs commensurate with their skills, they grew ever more critical of the government's apparent impotence to correct the growing economic problems.[77] One of the most militant groups was the Deshapremi Bhikkhu Peramuna (DBP), based at Vidyodaya University. Its members were student bhikkhus between the ages of 16 and 25, who came from rural Sinhalese Buddhist families.[78] Early in 1971 the DBP called for all members to break all previous ties with the UF and, instead, form guerrilla groups that would overthrow the government. Its call for mobilization was quickly endorsed by the extremist JVP(1)

which promised that together the two groups could permanently eradicate both the UF and the UNP. This would be followed by the establishment of a council manned by members of the DBP and JVP(1), which would reorganize affairs so that a comprehensive program of social welfare and employment would be available for all.[79]

Led by the JVP, the two groups initiated their plan by attacking the American Embassy in Colombo on 6 March 1971. Several deaths resulted. On 7 March, the armed forces were brought in and this action was followed by the Declaration of a State of Emergency on 16 March. Still the rebellion continued. After numerous police stations in the provinces had been besieged, strict censorship and an island-wide curfew were imposed on 5 April. The UF requested armaments from outside nations and such countries as India, the Soviet Union and the United States responded. It was only in May, after approximately 14,000 insurgents had surrendered or been captured that fighting ceased.[80]

Support from other Ceylonese groups for the JVP and its followers had been negligible. The trade unions had declared their intention to co-operate with the government in suppressing the revolt. The LSSP and CP publicly disassociated themselves from the rebels describing their program as a mixture of guerrilla-type leftism and anti-Indian racism.[81] Despite such widespread castigation of the insurgents, there was, nonetheless, general agreement among the country's various leaders that a greater effort must be made to improve the economic situation.

With this in mind, the government announced a Five Year Development Plan at the end of 1971 to ease what the administration described as the worst economic crisis in Ceylon's history.[82] Perera inaugurated, as part of

the Plan, Land Development Cooperatives that would employ groups of people to cultivate areas that had been developed over the years for large scale operations. It was hoped that these would provide an alternative to the public services as a source of mass employment. They might also check the movement of the peasants to the cities, Perera pointed out, and give work to the rural labor force, 75 percent of whom were unemployed. Furthermore, the resultant increase in food would help to counter domestic shortages and provide goods for export.[83]

Other efforts to ease the unemployment situation included the establishment of the Sinhala Sanwardena Sanvidānaya by a group of bhikkhus and laymen. Its specific purpose was to work closely with the government to alleviate unemployment, through encouraging young Sinhalese Buddhists to stay in school longer and learn more about their own culture.

However, the harmony exhibited among the various groups over enhancing the economy was not evident in the Constituent Assembly during 1971 and part of 1972. Special interest groups representing specific ethnic groups and regions were formed. One was the Sinhala Democratic Union which vowed to guard the interests of the Kandyan Sinhalese. Another group was the Vihāra and Dēvāle Trustee Association, headed by the Diyawadananilame [lay custodian] of the Sri Daladā Māligāva [Sacred Tooth Relic of the Buddha]. Its efforts lay in making sure that Buddhism and the Saṅgha[84] were accorded their rightful position in the new constitution.

The Federal Party was also doing its utmost to serve the interests of the Tamil community. Although all Ceylonese agreed that there was need for a new constitution, there was no consensus over the type of political system it should provide. The Sinhalese parties and their allies favored a

unitary republic while the Tamils steadfastly demanded a federation. The Federal Party declared that the constitution must minimally embody specific provisions for the active protection of Tamil culture. However, the majority of the Assembly continued to reject the motion of recognizing two official languages. Instead, they adopted a resolution stating that the new National Assembly "may" provide for the use of a language other than Sinhala in the courts and the administration of the Northern and Eastern Provinces.[85] The Tamils denounced this lack of precision and when the majority of Assembly members refused to permit these two provinces to be officially recognized as bilingual regions, the Federal Party officially resigned from the Constituent Assembly in June 1971. Despite continued pleas by the Assembly's Chairman, Stanley Tillekeratne, its withdrawal remained permanent. And even though the provisions of the B-C Pact were never abrogated, the Tamils' demand for constitutional protection for their culture was never endorsed. Consequently, the Federal Party announced that a day of mourning for all Ceylonese minorities would be held when the new constitution was proclaimed.

The new Constitution of the Republic of Sri Lanka was ushered in on 22 May 1972 with a simple Buddhist ceremony. In a separate chapter (Number III, Section 6) entitled "Buddhism," it declares that "the Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster Buddhism while assuring to all freedom of religious belief and practice."[86] The Constitution also gives priority to Sinhala and designates it the official language of Sri Lanka. Although the official text of all legislation must be in Sinhala, it is specified that the Tamil language can be formally permitted in the administrative and judicial spheres if so requested. As well, in Section 19, the minorities

are expressly protected against religious discrimination when applying for jobs in the public sector.

Apart from the pre-announced day of mourning, there were no civil disturbances when the new constitution was promulgated. The Sinhalese Buddhists did not demonstrate as they had in past years when certain concessions were made to the minorities. In turn; there were no acts of violence on the part of the Tamils or Christians over their grievance that their cultural status had not been given more formal recognition. In Eisenstadt's opinion, this non-combative reaction by all parties to such a vital document that did not fully meet the demands of any group was indicative of the political system's growing capacity to mitigate popular displeasure.[87]

Summary and Conclusions

The 1972 Constitution was tangible evidence that the Saṅgha and its supporters had achieved what they had actively sought for 25 years: a Sinhalese Buddhist state. Buddhism had finally been declared the state religion and, as the acknowledged guardian of Theravāda Buddhism, the Saṅgha was indisputably the primary traditional institution of Ceylon. Governments would come and go, and political aspirations may change to meet the demands of modernization, but the Saṅgha would retain its position. Moreover, as a result of the persistence of the bhikkhus, Sinhala was the sole official language and there now existed a single publicly supported school system and many bhikkhu instructors within it to ensure that it remained the principal tongue for all Ceylonese.

Bellah points out that if modernization is to be successful, traditional religions must either participate in the transition or retreat from major spheres where secular tenets have taken over.[88] By May 1972, the di-

vided Sangha had followed both criteria. The Siam nikāya and conservative bhikkhus had successfully countered many political actions that could threaten their regained status and priorities. They had, to a large extent, turned their attention to affairs directly related to the Sangha and Theravāda Buddhism. For their part, the more liberal bhikkhus had become involved, as salaried workers, in such modern concerns as trade unionism and socialist activities. Such involvement in the public sector, Smith warns, can only be tenuous at best in the long run, since Buddhism is fundamentally a monastic philosophy.[89] In traditional times the interests of the religious and the people were the same: in modern times they have become increasingly diverse in many aspects despite efforts of integration by both parties.[90] Consequently, the integrity of the Sangha is easily compromised by such close interaction between the laity and the religious.

Nonetheless, the younger members of the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas have been able to provide a bridge between tradition and modernity for the Ceylonese political system. No doubt, the achievement of a truly modern orientation on the part of the two Sinhalese parties, the UNP and SLFP, is still to be attained. Although they have moved from the elitist traditional bodies of 1947 they have not yet become parties that readily appeal to a broad range of interests. The National Government was divided when the UNP acceded to the wishes of the Sinhalese communalists that regional councils not be established and consequently diversity among the Ceylonese not be encouraged. The UF remained united as long as all parties agreed on the priorities stated by the Sangha and embodied in the 1972 Constitution. Later, in 1974, dissension came to the fore within the UF concerning fiscal policies that could limit vihāra incomes and increase state coffers. Once again the conservatives won

the battle and vihāra funds remained untouched by the state. It is just such reluctance on the part of traditional elements to relinquish their societal role, Eisenstadt points out, that inhibits the growth of the modern state.[91]

Notwithstanding such setbacks, the UNP and SLFP were gradually adopting more policies that reflected the global concerns of the population. The Ceylonese in turn were broadening their perspectives to include economic aspirations, as well as communal needs. The divided Sangha provided both a propellant and restraint that permitted a more measured movement towards modernization. It could well be that this dualism was largely responsible for the acceptance by all people of the 1972 Constitution. The traditional features, language and religion, became an intrinsic part of a modern state. The agreement of the Sangha to a constitution that described Ceylon as a democratic socialist state also demonstrated, at least a tacit acceptance, that modern as well as traditional tenets would characterize the political system of the Republic of Sri Lanka.

Notes

1. See Appendix IV, Chart 2, p. 227.
2. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 153.
3. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 177.
4. Woodward views the campaign program of the UNP in 1965 as a prime example of what pressure groups can accomplish. No longer was the UNP an amorphous body. It now had specific policies that, as the years passed, would increasingly evolve to reflect the aspirations of more and more voters. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System, p. 172.
5. Benz, Buddhism or Communism?, pp. 227-228.
6. J. R. Jayawardene in Buddhism and Marxism and Other Buddhist Essays (London: East and West Ltd., 1957), p. 6, has stated, "Buddhism seeks to make men good not after the environment that surrounds them is changed, but to make them good irrespective of the environment which surrounds them and

through their goodness changes their environment." Quoted in Schecter, The New Face of Buddha, p. 34.

7. Since 1961, the UNP has always charged that government supervision over vihāra lands as instituted in the Temporalities Regulations was a major insult to the Sangha. Senanayake argued that such matters were solely under the jurisdiction of the religious and that, consequently, the 1961 Law was a virtual SLFP government takeover of Sangha properties in line with communist tenets. Ibid., p. 142.

8. See Map I opposite p. 1 of this thesis.

9. Wilson, Electoral Politics in an Emergent State, p. 28.

10. Kearney, Communalism and Language, p. 123.

11. Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon, p. 267.

12. See Appendix V, Table 10, p. 236.

13. Woodward cites the 1965 election as the SLFP's best organized and coordinated campaign it had so far contested. Woodward, The Growth of the Party System, p. 166.

14. In Nyrop's opinion, policy-making for the LSSP was always geared more to expediency than strict adherence to doctrinal considerations. Nyrop, Area Handbook for Ceylon, p. 305.

15. Kearney, Communalism and Language, p. 127.

16. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics, p. 116.

17. See Appendix V, Table 4, p. 232.

18. See Appendix V, Table 6, p. 234.

19. See Appendix V, Table 1, p. 229.

20. Woodward, The Growth of the Party System, pp. 228, 245.

21. Singer, "Group Perception and Social Change," p. 224.

22. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 451.

23. W. A. Wiswa Warnapala, "The Formation of the Cabinet in Sri Lanka," Political Science Review 12 (Jan.-June 1965):130.

24. See Appendix V, Table 8, p. 235.

25. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 177.

26. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 23.

27. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics, pp. 24, 104.

28. Ibid., p. 132.

29. Ibid., p. 150.

30. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 177.

31. Wilson, Electoral Politics in an Emergent State, p. 131.

32. Unlike 1947, when some Sinhalese spoke only English, by 1966 all Sinhalese spoke at least some Sinhala. Singer, "Group Perception and Social Change," pp. 214-215. The number of active Buddhists had also increased marginally (2.4%) between 1946 and 1971. See Appendix V, Table 2, p. 230.

33. Schecter, The New Face of Buddha, pp. 142-143.

34. Lewy, Religion and Revolution, p. 502.

35. Jacob, Sri Lanka, p. 180.

36. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System, pp. 210, 278. Woodward points out that through the combined activities of the SLFP, an elitist group, and the LSSP, a mass-oriented body, there existed the potential to bridge the gap between the people and government institutions. Such a linkage had been impossible when the SLFP and LSSP had both functioned as totally separate entities.

37. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 147.

38. Ibid., p. 148.

39. Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative, p. 58.

40. Phadnis, Religion and Politics, p. 229.

41. Ibid.

42. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 173.

43. Wilson, Electoral Politics, p. 104.

44. Nyrop, Area Handbook for Ceylon, p. 259.

45. Ibid., pp. 206-207.

46. Phadnis, Religion and Politics, pp. 274-275, 313.

47. See Appendix IV, Chart 2, p. 227.

48. The founders of the Sri Lankā Eksath Bhikkhu Bala Mandalaya were former members of the Lankā Saṅgha Sabhā (LSS). By 1969 it had evolved into the SLEBBM, whose stated objective was to establish a UF government headed by Mrs. Bandaranaike. Only this government, it asserted, would revive the traditional Sinhalese Buddhist nation through a socialist program. Phadnis, Religion and Politics, p. 196.

49. Wilson, Electoral Politics, p. 89.

50. He had encouraged the Saṅgha to involve itself in projects that would enhance the life of the lay Sinhalese Buddhist community. One of his biggest projects was the formation of the Tri Nikāya Saṅgha Sabhā (TNSS) which acted as an advisor on vihāra affairs and lay matters. Under his aegis, the TNSS undertook a program to improve the living conditions of the peasant. It was geared to encouraging a coordination of lay and Saṅgha activities. Swearer, Buddhism in Transition, pp. 53-55.

51. Ceylonese socialism in Ludowyk's view was not a political creed nor a stereotyped economic program. Rather, it denoted the state's commitment to financial development in a country where foreign investment was high and savings small. Socialism, he observes, was an emotional demand that fitted with the traditional notion of patronage from above. Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon, p. 247.

52. Wilson, Electoral Politics, p. 105. Wilson feels that such a statement demonstrates that the SLFP was still an elitist party with a charismatic leader. Hence, the UF had the potential to provide an amalgam group that had both a charismatic and a mass appeal.

53. Nyrop, Area Handbook for Ceylon, p. 246.

54. Appendix II; p. 214. It fielded 51 candidates all of whom forfeited their deposits with the exception of the leader, R. G. Senanayake. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 174.

55. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 149.

56. Ibid., p. 178.

57. Wilson, Electoral Politics, p. 89.

58. In Rustow's opinion, modernization results in an interdependence among all aspects of society. Consequently, economic viability and a common working language become equally important to people in a twentieth century state. Rustow, A World of Nations, p. 41.

59. 45 percent of the 14-25 year age group were out of school and without gainful employment in 1969. Janice Jiggins, "Dedigamā 1973: A Profile of a By-Election in Sri Lanka," Asian Survey 14 (November 1974):1003.

60. There were 900,000 new voters in this newly enfranchised age group.

Sadham Mukherjee, Ceylon: Island That Changed (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1971), pp. 32-33.

61. See Appendix V, Table 6, p. 234.

62. See Appendix V, Table 4, p. 232.

63. Mukherjee, Ceylon: Island That Changed, pp. 32-33.

64. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 105.

65. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 177.

66. This was a coalition of the FP and TC set up prior to the 1970 election. See Appendix IV, Chart I, p. 226.

67. Urmila Phadnis, "Trends in Ceylonese Politics," India Quarterly 27 (April-June 1971):123.

68. Nyrop, Area Handbook of Ceylon, p. 304.

69. The right-wing turned to Senanayake for leadership after this announcement. Although Senanayake did not again head the party, the bitter dispute between the two factions was not resolved until after Senanayake's death in 1973. Only then did all members accept Jayawardene as leader. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, pp. 138-139.

70. Phadnis, Religion and Politics, p. 171.

71. Jacob, Sri Lanka, p. 179.

72. Approximately 81 percent of the population was still rural-based. John Paxton, ed. The Statesman's Year Book 1975/1976 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), p. 483.

73. Nyrop, Area Handbook for Ceylon, p. 98.

74. Tambiah, "Buddhism and This-Worldly Activity," pp. 8-9.

75. Smith notes that politicization leads to secularization which, in turn, results in the weakening influence of the Sangha upon society. Donald Eugene Smith, Religion, Politics and Social Change, p. 4.

76. Ralph Pieris, Social Development and Planning in Asia (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1976), p. 300.

77. Kearney cites the ever-increasing number of unemployed young people who insisted on waiting for job openings in the modern business sectors as an indication that social mobilization was too rapid to permit proper adaptation to modern demands. The growth of unemployment among such youth could easily result, Kearney continues, in a violent overthrow of

the government. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 224.

78. Kearney, "The Marxist Parties," p. 435.

79. By 1969-1970, overall unemployment had risen from 10.5 percent of the labor force to 13.9 percent. Robert N. Kearney, "Educational Expansion and Volatility in Sri Lanka. The 1971 Insurrection," Asian Survey 15 (September 1975):735.

80. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 201.

81. W. A. Wiswa Warnapala, "The Marxist Parties of Sri Lanka and the 1971 Insurrection," Asian Survey 15 (September 1975):747-748.

82. As Kearney observes, even if the Plan fulfilled its goal of creating 810,000 new jobs, that would still leave 290,000 persons unemployed at the end of 1977. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 214.

83. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 63.

84. The Department of Cultural Affairs took the first census of Buddhist Institutions and Clergy of Ceylon in 1971. There were 18,670 bhikkhus and 152 Buddhist hermitages with 548 bhikkhus. Ibid., p. 183.

85. Ibid., p. 240.

86. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, pp. 174-175.

87. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change and Modernity, pp. 26-27.

88. Bellah, "Epilogue," p. 203.

89. Donald Eugene Smith, "The Political Monks," pp. 408-409.

90. Donald Eugene Smith, Religion, Politics and Social Change, p. 7.

91. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change and Modernity, pp. 354, 357.

CHAPTER VIII

A QUARTER CENTURY OF POLITICAL CHOICES

This study began with the description of a newly independent nation-state, Ceylon, that appeared in 1948 to have all the attributes necessary for a bright future. It had gained its independence through peaceful measures. It had one of the highest standards of living among the countries of Asia, the people were well-fed and seemingly content with their daily lives. Twenty-five years later the situation had drastically changed. Ceylon had been torn by riots, martial law had been imposed three times and political leaders jailed, part of the Saṅgha discredited and the economy in a perpetual state of crisis. Who was responsible? How could this debilitation have been prevented? This chapter will briefly examine the role and policies of the UNP, the SLFP, the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas, and the Siam nikāya, and their influence upon the Ceylonese political system.

The UNP

The party which first took over the reins of government was the UNP under the leadership of a Sinhalese Buddhist, D. S. Senanayake. He had been a member of the colonial administration that was directed from above and permitted the local people a certain degree of self-government within prescribed limits. And this is exactly how Senanayake and his immediate UNP successors ran the new government. The UNP leaders really did not consider the nationalistic aspirations of the Sinhalese Buddhists of prime importance. Nor did they realize how certain the Sinhalese and the Saṅgha had been that Indepen-

dent Ceylon would once again be a flourishing Sinhalese Buddhist state administered by a government whose senior adviser would be the Sangha. Instead, the UNP leadership persisted in its contention that church and state must remain separate entities.

When a Sinhalese Buddhist delegation approached first Dudley Senanayake and later Sir John Kotelawala, asking them to establish a government commission that would investigate the best means to facilitate the establishment of a traditional Sinhalese Buddhist state and the restoration of the Sangha to its primary societal status, the UNP leaders had several options to choose from.

For instance, they could have agreed to set up such a commission. It is probable that they would then have also been ready to implement its findings. Such a sequence of events would doubtless have ensured in 1956 an election victory for the UNP, supported whole-heartedly by the Sangha and the Sinhalese. The re-elected government would then have tried to implement the commission's proposals. However, following Tamil protests, the UNP would then have encountered much the same sequence of events which the SLFP later met.

In actual fact, the UNP refused to involve itself in religious affairs. Consequently, even before the 1956 election, it incurred the wrath of the Sinhalese Buddhists although it kept its credibility with the minority groups. Had it continued this policy, it would probably, all things being equal, have retained the support of the minority groups. It would have remained the Opposition Party, then, for the next fifteen years, influential but unable to win an election.

But the UNP did not follow such a road. Only weeks before election

day in 1956, Kotelawala's party suddenly altered its policy concerning language. It recognized Sinhala as the official language of Ceylon. This reversal resulted in the withdrawal of minority support and the loss of confidence among its Sinhalese Buddhist followers. This about-face had yet another effect. The Tamils, with no political party to support them, revitalized their own dormant Federal Party and Tamil Congress.

With its 1956 defeat, the UNP had to reassess its position. It had lost credibility with the ethnic communities. What other groups existed that needed a political party to further their aspirations? There was the growing industrial sector with increased trade union membership that included both Sinhalese and Tamils. Although the LSSP was closely linked to the workers and their organizations, many Ceylonese were disinterested in joining bodies linked to the Sama Samajists who were self-proclaimed communists. The UNP had the working sector in mind, therefore, when it published its 1958 policy paper. In this document, the United Party termed itself a Democratic Socialist organization whose goal was to promote the interests of all Ceylonese workers without resorting to Marxism. In its opinion, the best way to promote the prosperity of the people was through government encouragement of private enterprise and investment. The UNP set about sponsoring its own trade unions to broaden its base of support by including both rural and urban interests. And so it began to wend its way back to majority power.

The UNP took over the government after a plurality victory in the 1965 election. However, without a majority, the Senanayake party was forced to choose between running a government that was perpetually faced with defeat in the legislature or form alliances with other parties that, combined, would give it majority status.

Had it decided to remain unaligned, it would have undoubtedly fallen before its term was completed. The divisive communal problems and union factiousness were too deep-rooted to permit the survival of a minority government. Unlike the 1956 election, when the overall political cohesion of the Sangha and its supporters assured a victory for the SLFP, the 1965 election saw Sinhalese Buddhists dividing their political backing between the UNP and the SLFP. Consequently, the UNP had to seek the endorsement of other groups.

The UNP then formed an alliance with the Tamil parties. But to achieve this it had to support many of their goals. However, the UNP did not publicize the specific issues which it had agreed to promote. If it had, Sinhalese demonstrations, riots and general chaos throughout the country would have followed. Instead, the concessions to the Tamils were gradually introduced. The National Government completed its term of office but lost the next election because of these concessions.

On the whole, the UNP did not make policy errors that irreparably damaged it or the Ceylonese society. Its decision to change its position concerning language priorities in 1956, because it seemed to be politically expedient to do so, undoubtedly hurt its credibility among the electorate for a number of years to come. However, its support of Sinhalese demands for linguistic and religious priority, its appeal to the workers and its determination to include in its policy considerations all Ceylonese, rather than select groups, helped to unite the country as a whole.

The SLFP

From its inception, the SLFP took advantage of political opportunities as they presented themselves. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike saw the poten-

tial political influence of the Saṅgha and the opportunity that by promoting its interests a party could quickly gain power. Consequently, he molded the SLFP so that it conformed to an image which the Saṅgha and the Sinhalese Buddhists could identify with and support. His return to traditional clothing, his close association with the bhikkhus, and his wholesale endorsement of the Committee of Inquiry's recommendations ensured a 1956 election victory. The path ahead looked bright with success. What happened?

A crisis situation developed when Bandaranaike announced the signing of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact. Had such an agreement been necessary? Immediately following his investiture a legislative program had to be presented. Although Bandaranaike was committed to enhancing the status of Sinhalese Buddhism, he did not have much choice in legislative priorities. He may, for instance, have realized that if the Tamils suddenly lost all their acquired rights, particularly those pertaining to language, they would create trouble for the government. He had already stated in his campaign platform that the Tamil language would not be suppressed but rather it would have the status of a minority language. Let us suppose that Bandaranaike's first piece of legislation had been a Bill proclaiming Theravāda Buddhism as the official religion of Ceylon and Sinhala as the official language with Tamil and English as minority tongues, there would have been wholesale demonstrations by the Sinhalese and loss of their support. Even though he had publicly supported minority language rights in his campaign, the civil disturbances that followed the announcement that there would be a B-C Pact were evidence that by passing such a Bill, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for him to continue governing. Since the principal issue at this time was ethnic priority, and the Sinhalese formed the majority of the

electorate, Bandaranaike could not afford to lose their endorsement.

Could Bandaranaike have completed his term of office peacefully? Not likely, for unemployment was growing, particularly among the young Sinhalese Buddhists. English-speaking Tamils held the most prestigious and well-paying jobs. Disputes and riots could well have erupted over this issue.

When Bandaranaike took office, he had another choice concerning the Tamil language. He could have ignored the minority's protests and steadfastly continued his policy of making Ceylon a Sinhalese Buddhist state. The Tamils would have demonstrated and perhaps rioted. The results might have even led to jailings, and Bandaranaike certainly did not wish to have the first riots in Ceylon's modern history occur during his term of office. Nonetheless, they still occurred after Bandaranaike signed the B-C Pact. If he had made Ceylon a Sinhalese Buddhist state, it seems doubtful that he would have been assassinated.

Furthermore, it is likely that Bandaranaike would have been re-elected in 1960. He would then have been faced with major economic problems and divisions over the merits and demerits of socialism. Could he have coped any better with this problem than he did in 1958 when a Cabinet split occurred? Could he have promoted a compromise between Marxists and non-Marxists? It is questionable. Bandaranaike seemed unable to encourage consensus among disparate elements. Seemingly, his political downfall would have occurred during 1963-1964 because of acute economic problems and the advisability of employing Marxism to rectify matters.

However, Bandaranaike made neither of these choices. Instead, he personally signed a pact with the leader of the very group which the Sinhalese viewed as their archenemy. Perhaps he did this in the belief that the

Sinhalese would accept the idea of making a minor concession to the Tamils now that the government had already begun its program of molding administrative and educational institutions to reflect the pre-eminence of Sinhalese Buddhist culture. Bandaranaike never regained his credibility with his former mentors and lost the endorsement of the minority groups with his refusal to immediately implement the terms of the Pact. Radical elements in the population came to the fore and he was assassinated.

When Sirimavo Bandaranaike took her place at the helm of the SLFP and the government, the Sinhalese Buddhists once more anticipated a rosy future. However, now both communal and economic problems were predominant. Consequently, the demands of another increasingly influential pressure group had to be taken into consideration as well as those of the Saṅgha; it was the workers. Mrs. Bandaranaike was faced with the formidable combined opposition of the communist parties and labor unions. How could she gain their support?

One choice she had was to continue her administration alone, unhindered by coalition commitments. She would have retained the endorsement of many powerful conservative bhikkhus and Sinhalese laity. She might even have kept the qualified support of those religious who sympathized with the workers. However, without cooperation from the trade unions, the economy would have been immobilized and the financial resources of the nation severely curtailed. At the same time, the populace would have still expected to receive their subsidies, loans and other benefits. The wealthy Siam nikāya had shown no desire to help the economy and, indeed, had continued to successfully resist all efforts to tax its properties and income. So there appeared to be no financial help forthcoming from that body.

Consequently, Mrs. Bandaranaike had little choice but to form a pact

with the Marxist parties who could best help her government remain, at least partially, viable. But in forming the 1964 coalition, she antagonized her powerful conservative Sinhalese Buddhist allies who viewed the coalition as a pact with the archenemies of Buddhism. At the same time, the LSSP antagonized the workers, for the alliance with the SLFP was instituted even though the Sama Samajists had promised to fight for the fulfillment of labor's aspirations. The coalition harmed itself further when it decided to impose a tax on toddy. Politically, this was an unwise move but financial conditions dictated that some immediate, relatively lucrative, source of revenue be found and in a poor country with very few financial resources there seemed no other alternative. The government fell in 1964.

Like the UNP earlier, Mrs. Bandaranaike and her party spent the years as Opposition Party taking stock of their past political mistakes and the current ones of the UNP. Mrs. Bandaranaike formally and publicly allied the SLFP with the LSSP and CP that enjoyed the support of labor. Together, they presented a formal "Twenty-Five Point" program which they promised would be implemented in full when they took over the next government. The use of the number, "Twenty-Five" was a clever political move. The workers had been angered when the SLFP-LSSP coalition had not fulfilled labor's Twenty-One Point Common Program. Now, three years later, they were being promised a similar but apparently more comprehensive one. It contained benefits for the Sinhalese Buddhists and trade unionists alike. The United Front won the next election in 1970 because of its twenty-five points and the UNP-Tamil imbroglio. Indeed, rather than ignoring its opponent's alliance, the SLFP took full advantage of it. Having formally allied itself with the LSSP, which had always campaigned in Tamil areas, and now having the precedent of the other Sinhalese

party's coalition with the Tamils, SLFP members under the banner of the UF could, and did, campaign in Tamil constituencies without losing credibility.

Once in power, Mrs. Bandaranaike did not repeat her husband's initial error. She immediately set up a Constituent Assembly and made sure that by the end of the two year deadline Ceylon had a new constitution enshrining Sinhalese Buddhism as the primary religion. She reinforced Sinhalese Buddhist support for the SLFP when the country was given back its ancient name of Sri Lanka. She had forestalled any large-scale Tamil protests to the contents of the new constitution by specifically including Tamils as formal members of the Constituent Assembly. Later, after the Tamils decided to boycott the Assembly, both Mrs. Bandaranaike and its Chairman, Colvin R. de Silva, never ceased in their efforts to persuade the Tamils to return. Consequently, any violent demonstrations by the Tamils would only have weakened their own cause.

With the new constitution in effect, Mrs. Bandaranaike's big problem in 1972 seemed to be labor, the economy and communal demands which groups could use as levers to gain economic concessions. It would have taken astute handling of these problems and her political partners to survive the SLFP's mandate intact and win the next election.

The SLFP ran into several problems during the two decades under study. The signing of the B-C Pact, for instance, created serious troubles. A tactical error was made in setting up a formal alliance in 1964 with the LSSP. Perhaps an informal agreement would have been wiser since another election was close at hand. Unfortunately, in 1972 the SLFP was still the "Bandaranaike Party" and it was the LSSP and CP which appealed to the masses. It seems questionable whether the SLFP could have retained the support of the general population for any length of time if it had to fend for itself alone

politically. It appears highly likely that it would have been simply a traditional nationalist party out of tune with the times. The actions of the SLFP did show the growth of Ceylon at certain periods of time, but what damage it did cause was frequently because of its great reliance on the Sangha for support.

The Amarapura and Rāmanya Nikāyas

The Sangha was highly visible in the political arena during the first quarter century of Ceylon's Independence, working to ensure that it did become a truly Sinhalese Buddhist state. But in doing so the public image of such nikāyas as the Amarapura and Rāmanya was badly tarnished. Did the actions of the political bhikkhus harm Ceylon? Did they choose wisely when they had to decide on alternative courses of action?

By the time S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike made his decision to establish the SLFP, many bhikkhus in the coastal regions had already started to gather support to help the Sangha restore Ceylon to its former status of a Sinhalese Buddhist state. When the SLFP announced that its goal was the same as that of the bhikkhus, the religious could have decided to withdraw from the scene and let the SLFP take over. If they had done so, Bandaranaike would presumably have won the 1956 election, but with a much smaller majority. Furthermore, with the outcome of the election not so evident the UNP would not have been apt to endorse Sinhala as an official language.

However, Bandaranaike had a tendency to endorse the opinions of the pressure group which was, for the moment, the most forceful. Both the Sinhalese majority and the Tamils were intent in 1956 on ensuring their cultural prerogatives. But the Sinhalese were divided over the advisability of link-

ing church and state. Buffetted by three strong pressure groups, the SLFP with only a small majority might have made a formal alliance with the Marxists to stabilize its position. The issue of a truly Sinhalese Buddhist state might well have degenerated into futile communal squabbling for years to come. The problems for the state were inevitably to become more complicated with modernization, the pressure groups would have become more diversified and the formal recognition of a Sinhalese Buddhist state perhaps never achieved.

However, the political bhikkhus did continue in their efforts to promote Sinhalese Buddhism through an alliance with the SLFP. They enthusiastically participated in the 1956 campaign and through their untiring efforts the SLFP won the election with a comfortable majority. Like the monarch and Sangha in Kandy the religious envisioned a similar linkage between the MEP and the Sangha. Together, the political bhikkhus thought, they would immediately fashion a truly traditional Sinhalese Buddhist state.

Events did move in a positive direction until Bandaranaike announced the signing of the B-C Pact. The bhikkhus had a choice of action at this point. They could have accepted the agreement as merely a concession to a minority group by a self-confident Sinhalese nation which was well on the way to permanently fashioning a state that would fully reflect its unique culture. Relegated to a specific region, the Tamil districts could have become virtual enclaves. Ceylon would then have been a society in which Sinhalese Buddhists and Sinhala dominated in all parts of the Island with the minor exception of the self-administered Tamil districts.

Instead, the political bhikkhus entered whole-heartedly into protest actions. They demanded that such a Pact be immediately nullified and they

would consider nothing less. Perhaps one principal reason for this rigidity was that they had totally committed themselves loudly and clearly throughout Ceylon during the 1956 election campaign to immediately change the whole country into a purely Sinhalese Buddhist state. They had left themselves no room to yield gracefully to compromises. Unlike Bandaranaike, they had dismissed any suggestion of permitting the intrusion of alien cultures in the new state. Statements to that effect had, furthermore, received widespread coverage in the Ceylonese media. The western-oriented newspapers questioned the feasibility of such an objective, but the Sinhalese journals commended such aspirations. Publicly and personally committed to the restoration of a traditional state, the bhikkhus' credibility was already weakened at the time the B-C Pact was signed because of their past political agressivity. Change seemed slow and sporadic, and the achievement of the bhikkhus' goal even open to question. Despite the fact that they had tarnished the image of the Saṅgha through their militancy, it seemed imperative for the maintenance of their leadership among the people and the momentum of their cause that they pursue their goal unswervingly.

However, the bhikkhus of the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas did have another opportunity to bow out of public life after the assassination of Bandaranaike. Bhikkhus were specifically prohibited from participating in politics. This was a chance for the religious to return to their vihāras permanently. And perhaps they were very tempted to do this, for they fully endorsed the findings of the Buddha Sāsana Report. If the additional recommendations had been implemented, the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas with their Siam counterpart would have reappeared in the ancient setting of a Mahā Saṅghādhikaran, part of a two-chamber Mandalaya. Each nikāya would have been

equally represented in this prestigious body of wise men that was far removed from the turbulence of politics. All in all, the tarnished image of the political bhikkhus would have been immeasurably cleansed by their affiliation with such a body. But the Siam nikāya refused to join such a group.

Even if the Mahā Saṅghadhikaran had been set up, the political bhikkhus would have been faced with another hurdle if they removed themselves from the everyday life of Ceylon. They needed money to support their needs. The vihāras attached to the Amarapura and Rāmanya nikāyas enjoyed the same tax exemptions as did those in Kandy. However, these nikāyas had not amassed large fortunes upon which they could live indefinitely. Nor did they possess large tracts of fertile land which could provide them with a livelihood. Even the size of donations given to the vihāras was limited and could well become even less plentiful as the urban areas around them grew and traditional practices waned.

The Amarapura and Rāmanya bhikkhus could not return to Kandy and share the Siam nikāya's wealth, for the acrimony that had existed when they left was still very much alive. Furthermore, in practical terms the westernized nikāyas would have found it very difficult or impossible to return to a highly traditional life. The same held true for a return to living the fundamentalist life of wandering menditants.

For a time, however, it had seemed that there might be another source of income which would enable them to live in their own vihāras relatively removed from public life. The Sāsana Commission had proposed a second Chamber in the new Mandalaya. This body would have pooled all Saṅgha material resources and provided the bhikkhus with money for their daily needs. Once again the Siam nikāya categorically refused to consider such a proposal and

the government endorsed its veto.

Consequently, the political bhikkhus continued in public life. During the early 1960's they were not as bellicose as before; but not for long. They had the opportunity to modify their public image as radicals by quietly pursuing their salaried jobs in the social sector. But perhaps their very way of life, that is as urban workers, encouraged them to return to the public view. Soon they were following their stated goal of forcing the government to give Sinhalese workers job priority and to enforce the law that made Sinhala the language of work in the public sector. But the political bhikkhus had lost a great deal of their impact and their own groups did not have as great an influence by the mid-1960's as did the trade unions. They had tarnished their traditional image as wise men removed from the mundane cares of daily life and had, instead, become co-workers very much involved in the problems of everyday living.

So they joined trade unions. They marched in the front line of protest demonstrations and argued over the compatibility of Theravāda Buddhism and Marxism. By 1972, when the new constitution was proclaimed, the political bhikkhus had lost much of their traditional identity as members of the Saṅgha.

The political bhikkhus had also sacrificed their unique and privileged position to a very great extent. They perpetrated dissonance among the populace, often unnecessarily. Nonetheless, their principal contribution to Ceylon was that they provided a very necessary link between tradition and modernity. Furthermore, with their persistence, they did ensure that Ceylon became a wholly Sinhalese Buddhist state, untrammelled by the official recognition of any alien cultures.

The Siam Nikāya

During the twenty-five years following Independence, the Siam nikāya followed a very different route from the Amarapura and Rāmanya fraternities. Although there were individual bhikkhus affiliated with the Siam nikāya who pursued their own convictions, the Siam brotherhood as an entity appeared to follow one fundamental principle: to maintain its independence from any intruders, be they politicians or bhikkhus affiliated with other nikāyas.

The Buddhist Committee of Inquiry had suggested that the Siam nikāya dispense with pupillary succession. If the Siam nikāya had agreed, it then would have lost control over what persons were given the responsibility as guardians of the vihāras and their riches. Its wealth ensured its independence from intruders. It ensured that the nikāya would retain its dignity and remain impervious to the vicissitudes of everyday life that harried the laity. It could thus remain a bastion of stability and a fortress of tradition, a reminder to the Sinhalese of how transitory were the cares and joys of daily life. It was therefore not unexpected that the Siam nikāya curtly dismissed the suggestion made by the Buddhist Committee of Inquiry.

The nikāya was asked numerous times to participate in the 1956 campaign to ensure the survival of Sinhalese Buddhism and to become the senior adviser to the government. It declined, stating that taking sides in partisan politics was not the same as giving advice to the ruler of a country. To have entered into the fray could have led the Siam nikāya down the same road as that of its coastal counterparts.

When the Buddha Sāsana Commission recommended the establishment of a bi-cameral Mandalaya, the nikāya had two options. It could agree to participate in the Saṅghadhikaran with the other nikāyas. If it had done so, it

would have lost a certain amount of the laity's respect, just as the two other nikāyas would have gained some. Indeed, such institutions as the Sanghadhikaran were exactly like those that had helped lead to the earlier defection of the predecessors of the political bhikkhus to form new fraternities. Now in the 1960's there were three nikāyas, each one independent of the others. Consequently, any decision reached by the higher Chamber would not be binding upon the fraternities or the bhikkhus. By joining such an ineffective body, the Sangha would have lost even greater credibility and influence within the Sinhalese community.

In 1964, the Siam nikāya was again faced with a major problem when the SLFP-LSSP coalition was formed. The Bandaranaike party had already announced its decision to nationalize the press. This latest takeover would have been only one of a series. Furthermore, the SLFP had made a formal coalition with the LSSP which had never indicated any particular support for the declaration of Theravāda Buddhism as the state religion. As well, it had been the LSSP leader, Finance Minister Perera, who had proposed the tax on toddy whose principal consumers were the Buddhists. Since it was a communist party, the LSSP espoused the concept of community of property and the SLFP had already announced its desire to put all vihāra material possessions under the care of a lay administrator appointed by the government so that bhikkhus could follow, unhindered, their vocation of meditation. It was but a short step from these ideas to advocating the notion that the religious need no property, for their ancient predecessors were adequately taken care of by the community at large. The Siam nikāya was faced with a dilemma. Should it follow its previous policy and remain aloof from the political scene, depending on others to prevent the coalition from turning Ceylon into a com-

munist state?

Certainly there was considerable opposition among the laity to the coalition and to its intended program. On the other hand, there was potentially considerable support for the SLFP-LSSP. The government had promised that Theravāda Buddhism was to be formally recognized as the state religion. The administration was also making sure that positions in the civil service were increasingly filled by Sinhalese. Consequently, many Sinhalese Buddhists could well support the coalition. At the same time, the economic situation was worsening, money in short supply, and the demands and needs for government subsidies great. There was only one very wealthy entity in Ceylon with great tracts of fertile land and that was the Siam nikāya. In earlier centuries the peasants had worked the land and received remuneration from the landlord, the Siam nikāya. With such a precedent and a communist dominated government, vihāra land and produce could rapidly become state property. This was totally unacceptable to the Siam nikāya.

Consequently, there appeared to be much at stake in the decision that the Nayākas of the Malwatta and Asgiriya vihāras should jointly call a meeting in support of the UNP. The government fell shortly after, and was replaced by the non-communist coalition of the National Government. Although the meeting called by the nikāyas was highly successful, the Siam fraternity's influence did not seem great enough to assure a majority victory for the UNP.

Within five years, the Siam nikāya was once more voicing its opinion over the matter of partisan politics. The 1970 election appeared to offer two alternatives from the standpoint of the nikāya: a Sinhalese Buddhist government or a communist government. The issues at stake were the same as they had been in 1965, but the danger seemed more imminent. The political

bhikkhus were publicly divided and quarreling and their influence seemed very limited. The economy was only growing worse. If the Siam nikāya remained aloof from the political arena it took the risk that a communist government would be elected. If it entered into the fray, its integrity would be further damaged.

There was a divided response by the Siam nikāya. A great number of the bhikkhus did not participate. However, the Mahā Nayāke endorsed a paper drawn up by the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress calling upon the Sangha as a whole and the two Sinhalese parties, the UNP and SLFP, to unite to fight the communist menace. However, the bhikkhus did not join together nor did the parties. The SLFP instead continued to promote its alliance with the LSSP. The Mahā Nayāke came out in favor of the United Front while other bhikkhus supported the UNP.

It would seem that the decision to enter the political arena in 1970 was an error on the part of the Siam bhikkhus. A socialist government came to power and the Siam nikāya lost a bit more of its prestige and influence.

If the Siam bhikkhus should be tempted to involve themselves in ensuing elections, it would appear very possible that they too, like their Amarapurā and Rāmanya brethren, will ultimately deprive Ceylon of its unique feature, the Sangha, guardian of Theravāda Buddhism and one of the Three Jewels/Refuges of the philosophy. By actively participating in future political campaigns, the Sangha will soon be seen by the Ceylonese as only another pressure group working to promote its immediate particularistic interests rather than as a body of sages who, because of their inner serenity, can advise the common man on the consequences of his actions in centuries to come.

Sri Lanka

Ceylon, on Independence Day, seemed to have all the attributes of a modern state. To the casual observer, modernity was evident everywhere; Ceylonese cities were modern, European in style, with office buildings and a modern form of government. English was spoken everywhere.

Unknown to the uninitiated, however, tradition still held the whole island and modernity was but a veneer which Independence was soon to prove all too thin and fragile.

For twenty-five years, the traditional forces battled the forces of modernity, and it seemed as if tradition won all the battles and modernity lost them all. Bhikkhus, rural Sinhalese and urban Sinhalese never abandoned the contest against the entrenched, westernized politicians and Tamils until all their original demands had been met. Thus apparently were the forces of modernity fully routed and annihilated. A comparison of the constitution of 1947 and that of 1972 could convince us that Ceylon is to-day a backward country steeped in tradition, parochial religion and a single language unknown to the rest of the world. Nothing could be further from the truth.

At the end of every encounter, modernity had lost a little but tradition, too, had lost a little. For every inch of the battleground gained by the bhikkhus, an inch was lost. And the battle itself was the greatest loss for tradition, for it was fought with the very weapons of modernization: democracy, propaganda, strikes, the rights of man, the importance of the present, all of these concepts alien to Sinhalese tradition. So when the bhikkhus came out of their solitude and contemplation to join in the melée, modernization had won the war and Buddhism could never regain its traditional role. Paradoxically, every time tradition won a battle, Ceylon

was becoming a more modern nation, and the very struggle against modernization made Ceylon a less traditional nation.

However, modernization does not mean an absence of problems. The difficulties which the State faces today have not been the fault of any particular group of leaders. As we have seen all have made mistakes. Still Ceylon remains, to this day, a modern political system with a freely elected democratic government. The traditional sector of the society, including the Sangha, has been the principal loser in the process of modernization. The Sangha has become more divided with the passage of time and a less unique feature of Ceylonese society. It has not been able to reassert its historical influence and is not likely to ever regain it. Nonetheless, it is principally due to the Sangha and its role as a link between tradition and modernity that there exists today the Republic of Sri Lanka, the Country of Sinhalese Buddhism.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

MONASTIC LANDLORDISM

The common link between the traditional and conservative Siam nikāya and the secular leaders has been the material wealth--particularly in land-holdings--of the Saṅgha in Kandy. For instance, by the nineteenth century the various vihāras of the highlands possessed one third of all paddylands there, large tracts of adjacent forests and numerous villages [vihāragam]. As well, they had effective secular control over a large portion of the peasants who serviced the vihāra estates. Such laic labor was regarded as an informal payment for the use of vihāra land plots and a means of enhancing a layman's karma.[1]

As there never was a central Saṅgha authority,[2] it became the responsibility of each vihāra to manage its own real estate. With time, the effective administration of these tracts of land was more and more considered the responsibility of the nāyaka [chief bhikkhu of a vihāra]. Originally, this had been an elected office of limited duration, which subsequently became an entrenched position of lifetime tenure, enhanced ever more by the nāyaka's complete control over the burgeoning wealth of the vihāra. Commensurate with such responsilities was the power and prestige of each nāyaka among the religious and laity of Kandy.

These lands acquired through merit were always deemed in theory to be the possession of a particular vihāra, but the nāyaka was so closely associated with its administration that it became the accepted practice for

the nāyaka to designate his successor. However, this duty created problems insofar as the ordained bhikkhus were committed to celibacy as long as they remained members of the Saṅgha. As a result, the practice of pupillary succession came into being whereby the senior pupil in the vihāra, who had been personally chosen by the nāyaka and had been under his guidance, was also the accepted legatee of the chief bhikkhu and all his administrative responsibilities. Furthermore, there usually existed a kinship tie between the two bhikkhus. Indeed, the greater the amount of vihāra property at stake, the closer the consanguinity between tutor and pupil.[3]

Consequently, by the time the British arrived in Ceylon in 1796, the inheritance of vihāra lands and pupillary succession had combined to make monastic landlordism a major institution of the Siam nikāya.[4] At first, the British, in compliance with the advice of the Colebrooke Report (1831-1832), which had been established to examine Island administration, did not interfere with the burgeoning wealth of the Kandy Saṅgha.[5] Nor did they interfere with the traditional obligations of the peasants who serviced vihāra property.

Nonetheless, a new set of recommendations, handed down by the British Temple Land Commission in the mid-1850's, noted that all vihāra property was non-taxable.[6] At the same time, however, there were no records which delineated specific land-holdings. Consequently, levying duties on all potentially taxable lands was impossible. As a result, in 1856 the colonial regime required the registration of all property throughout Ceylon. The effect of this action was that vihāra lands were reduced by fifty percent[7] and monetary values were attached to all services performed by the laity in relation to the Saṅgha. However, these very policies that had so drastically reduced the material power of the Saṅgha also formalized monastic ownership, giving

a new societal rather than religious prominence to the vihāra and its members as wealthy and influential landowners. There now existed an explicit linkage, which increased greatly in importance after 1947, between the Sangha and Ceylon's political bodies. Both had a desire to control these Buddhist landholdings and thereby enhance their status as policy-makers in Ceylonese society and politics.

However, it was the theros of the Siam vihāras, which had remained affluent,[6] who were able to wield discreet but effective influence over elected public officials. Indeed, their power over the policy-making of the various incumbent Ceylonese governments seemed to increase at a greater rate than the size of their material possessions and inherent religious prestige would seem to warrant.[7] As its response to proposed governmental reforms in the 1950's and 1960's was to demonstrate, the reputedly conservative Siam nikāya became as deeply involved in politics as did the recognized political bhikkhus of the Amarapura and Rāmanya fraternities. Different methods and goals might separate the conservative and liberal sectors of the Sangha, but the extent of their political involvement would be equally great.

Notes

1. Hans-Dieter Evers, "Buddhism and British Colonial Policy in Ceylon, 1815-1875," Asian Studies 2 (December 1964):324.

2. This is, as Siriwardane points out, one reason for the importance of the monarchy in the operation of the Sangha--its centralizing authority, C. D. S. Siriwardane, "Buddhist Reorganization in Ceylon," in South Asian Politics and Religion, ed. Donald Eugene Smith (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 543.

3. Hans-Dieter Evers, "Kinship and Property Rights in a Buddhist Monastery in Central Ceylon," American Anthropologist 69 (1967):703-710; Bryce Ryan, Sinhalese Village (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1958), p. 41.

4. Evers, "Kinship and Property Rights," p. 709.

5. Hans-Dieter Evers, "Monastic Landlordism in Ceylon; A Traditional System in a Modern Setting," Journal of Asian Studies 28 (1967):685-692.

6. These include the Malwatta vihāra and the Sri Daladā Māligāva [Temple of the Tooth].

7. Evers, "Monastic Landlordism," p. 689.

APPENDIX II

RESUMES OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES

WHICH INFLUENCED SINHALESE BUDDHIST POLITICAL SUPPORT

(1935-1972)

CP(M)--COMMUNIST PARTY (MOSCOW)

Political Bent: One of the two major Marxist parties[1] (the other is the LSSP).

Always implacably opposed to the UNP.[2]

Leaders: President: Dr. S. A. Wickremasinghe (until 1972).

Secretary General: Pieter Keuneman (until 1972).
Dr. S. A. Wickremasinghe (since 1972).

Also: M. G. Mendis (President of the Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions).

Major Supporters: Membership includes professionals, intellectuals, and white-collar workers.[3] Tries to attract both Sinhalese Buddhist and Tamil voters.

Founded in: 1943.

by: Dr. S. A. Wickremasinghe and Pieter Keuneman. They had first split from the LSSP in 1940 to form the USP--United Socialist Party, which became, in 1943, the CP--Communist Party.

Elections: 1947--Campaigned alone.

1952--Campaigned with the VLSSP.

1956--No contest pact with the MEP coalition.

1960(M)--No contest pact with the SLFP.

1960(J)--No contest pact with the SLFP.

1965--SLFP + LSSP + CP(M). Allied in 1965 with SLFP, LSSP and CP(M). In 1966, the CP(M) became recognized member of the coalition.[4]

1970--SLFP + LSSP + CP(M) = UF.

Changes: 1963--CP → CP(M) + CP(P).

Labor Coalition: August 1963--LSSP + MEP + CP = ULF--United Left Front.

Remarks: While it has had little strength in Parliament, the CP controls the largest trade unions of any party in Ceylon, except the Ceylon Democratic Congress (formerly the Ceylon Indian Congress),[5] and consequently controls the political support of many urban Ceylonese.

Notes

1. Robert N. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon (Berkely; University of California Press, 1971), p. 60.

2. Charles S. Blackton, "Sri Lanka's Marxists," Problems of Communism (January-February 1973), p. 29.

3. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics, p. 72.

4. Ibid., p. 59.

5. Calvin R. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1969), p. 293.

CP(P)--COMMUNIST PARTY (PEKING)

Political Bent:	Maoist. Has tried to remain aloof from religious issues.
Leaders:	1970--N. S. Shanmugathasan and Premala Kumarasiri.
	1972--N. S. Shanmugathasan and Watson Fernando.
Major Supporters:	Youth.
Founded in:	1963, as a splinter group of the CP.
by:	N. S. Shanmugathasan.
Elections:	1965--Campaigned alone.
	1970--Did not field any candidates.
Changes:	1960's--CP(P) + CP(P) + JVP(2).

DSP--DHARMA SAMAJA PARTY [SOCIAL JUSTICE PARTY]

Political Bent: Militant Sinhalese Socialist.

Supporter of Buddhist rights.

Leader: L. H. Mettananda, former President of the Buddhist School of Colombo, Founder of the Bauddha Jathika Balavegaya [National Front for the Protection of Buddhism], co-leader of the VLSSP before 1960, Founder of the BSP--Bolshevik Samasamaja Party [Bolshevik Equal Society Party] after the July 1960 election.

Founded in: March 1960.

by: L. H. Mettananda.

Elections: 1960(M)--Campaigned alone.

1960(J)--Became part of the MEP in March.

Changes: DSP + VLSSP → MEP.

Remarks: L. H. Mettananda--Leader of the Sinhala Jathika Sangamaya, a Sinhalese extremist group.[1]

The DSP ceased to function after the July 1960 election and many of its members joined the LSSP.

Note

1. Calvin R. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1969), p. 141.

FP--FEDERAL PARTY [ILANKA TAMIL ARASU KADCHI]

Political Bent: Conservative.[1]

Principal Tamil party in 1972.

Essentially a communal party. Opposed the SLFP suggestions for officially recognizing the Tamils as a minority in a Sinhalese Buddhist nation-state.

Leader: 1972--S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, a Christian.

Major Supporters: Since 1956, the FP has been the most successful Tamil party in Ceylon.[2]

Founded in: 1949, as a splinter group of the Tamil Congress, over the disenfranchisement of the Indian Tamils.

by: S. J. V. Chelvanayakam.

Elections: 1952--Supported the UNP.

1956--Withdrew support from the UNP, "Went it alone."

1960(M)--Won almost all Tamil votes, thus gaining ascendency over rival TC. Campaigned alone.

1960(J)--Campaigned alone.

1965--UNP + FP + TC + MEP + SLFSP + JVP(2) = National Government

1970--Supported UF.

Changes: 1970--FP + TC → TUF (Tamil United Front).

Remarks: Entrance of the FP into trade union field illustrates a party attempting to use a labor organization explicitly to create a link with a segment of the population not readily accessible through other forms of party activity.[3]

The FP worked to unite Tamil people of the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Ceylon, in order to provide a viable opposition to the Sinhalese Buddhist majority.

The FP has been committed to a federal-type of constitution, with broad powers for the constituent elements.

The FP has generally followed a centralist position and con-

sequently has been able to bargain with both the UNP and the SLFP.

In 1968, the FP withdrew formally from the National Government over the pro-Sinhalese Buddhist policies, but continued to lend the government qualified support.

1965-1968 was the only time when the FP participated in a coalition government.

The FP held one portfolio from 1965 to 1968 in the National Government, but was unable to alter the government's strong support for the Sinhalese Buddhists.

Notes

1. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1973 (London: Macmillan Press, 1974), p. 165.

2. Calvin R. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1969), p. 293.

3. Robert N. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 67.

4. Ibid., p. 59.

JVP--JANATHA VIMUKTHI PERAMUNA [PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT]

Political Bent: Uses China, Cuba, and Albania as political examples to follow.[1]

Advocates violence to attain Maoist goals.[2]

Leaders: Rohana Wijeweera (c. 1972).

Mahinda Wijeweera, Second-in-Command.

Major Supporters: Militant Sinhalese Buddhist youth.[3] (Many students at the University of Ceylon and at Vidyodaya University).[4]

Also has hard core support from jobless middle and lower middle class youth, mainly from rural areas.[5]

Founded in: the early 1960's, as an underground movement.

by: Rohana Wijeweera, when he and his supporters were expelled from the CP(P).

Elections: 1960(M)--Did not field any candidates.

1960(J)--Did not field any candidates.

1965--Supported the Sinhalese Buddhist cause.

1970--Campaigned for the UF.

Remarks: The JVP was proscribed in 1971 for leading the April 1971 insurrection.

Notes

1. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1973 (London: Macmillan Press, 1974), p. 162.
2. Ibid., p. 163.
3. Ibid., p. 162.
4. Charles S. Blackton, "Sri Lanka's Marxists," Problems of Communism (January-February, 1973), p. 29.
5. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 162.

* Number (1) added to distinguish the party from the Jathika Vimukthi Peramuna.

JVP--JATHIKA VIMUKTHI PERAMUNA [NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT]

Political Bent: Nationalistic (Sinhalese-Buddhist) extremist.[1]

Leaders: K. M. P. Rajaratna and F. R. Jayasuriya.

Major Supporters: Sinhalese language extremists, rather than religious extremists, comprised its membership.[2]

Founded in: the late 1950's.[3]

by: K. M. P. Rajaratna and F. R. Jayasuriya.

Elections: 1960(M)--Did not field any candidates.

1960(J)--Campaigned for the SLFP in Kandy.[4]

1965--UNP + JVP + FP + TC + MEP + SLFSP = National Government.

1970--Did not field any candidates.

Remarks: The JVP was defunct by 1970.

K. M. P. Rajaratna's party was unrelated to the JVP(1).[5]

The JVP emerged from the Sinhala Basha Peramuna, a Sinhalese extremist group led by K. M. P. Rajaratna and F. R. Jayasuriya.[6]

Notes

1. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, "Buddhism in Ceylon Politics," in South Asian Politics and Religion, ed. Donald Eugene Smith (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 529.
2. Calvin R. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1969), p. 141.
3. Robert N. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 103.
4. Wilson, "Buddhism in Ceylon Politics," p. 520.
5. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 103.
6. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System, p. 141.

* Number (2) added to distinguish the party from the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna.

LPP--LANKA PRAJATHAN TRAVADA PAKSHAYA [CEYLON DEMOCRATIC PARTY]

Political Bent: More conservative in the fields of religion and language than most affiliates of the SLFP.[1]

Opposed to state takeover of denominational schools.

Opposed to interference with Buddhist organizations.

Leader: W. Dahanayake.

Founded in: 1960 (January 4).

by: W. Dahanayake, when he broke with the SLFP in December 1959 after being interim Prime Minister.

Elections: 1960(M)--Campaigned alone.

1960(J)--Campaigned alone.

1965--Campaigned alone.

1970--Did not field any candidates.

Changes: The LPP merged with the SLFSP after the 1960 elections.

Note

1. Robert N. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 115.

LSSP--LANKA SAMA SAMAJA PARTY [CEYLON EQUAL SOCIETY PARTY]

(The members are called "Sama Samajists")

Political Bent: Marxist-Trotskyite party.

The LSSP is the oldest and strongest of the several Marxist parties in Ceylon.[1]

The LSSP has always opposed the UNP.[2] Since 1956, it has increasingly sought support from the Sinhalese Buddhist population.

Leaders: N. M. Perera, Trotskyite, moderate socialist (1947-1972).

Colvin R. de Silva, the architect of the 1972 Sri Lanka Constitution. Leader in 1965, Deputy Leader in 1970.

Major Supporters: The power base of the LSSP is urban.[3]

The LSSP includes professionals, intellectuals and white collar workers as members.

Founded in: 1935.

by: Philip Gunawardena, N. M. Perera, Colvin R. de Silva.

Elections: 1947--Largest single party in opposition to governing UNP at the time of Independence.

1952--Campaigned alone.

1956--No contest pact with the MEP coalition.

1960(M)--Campaigned alone.

1960(J)--No contest pact with the SLFP.

1965--SLFP + LSSP = Coalition Government.

1970--SLFP + LSSP + CP(M) = UF.

Changes: 1940--LSSP → LSSP + USP--United Socialist Party

1945--LSSP → LSSP + BLP--Bolshevist Leninist Party under Colvin R. de Silva.

1963 (August)--LSSP + MEP + CP → ULF.

1964--LSSP → LSSP + LSSP(R): this split was caused by the labor coalition with the MEP and CP in 1963.

Remarks: The LSSP opposed radical communalism in 1972.

The LSSP remains the strongest Marxist party in Ceylon.[4]

The LSSP has not sought to create a mass party. It sets rigorous conditions for membership and requires members to participate regularly in party activities. (1960-1970 membership increased from 2,000 to 4,000).

In 1935, the LSSP stood for: equal status for Sinhalese and Tamils; it strongly opposed communalism, and strongly supported state nationalization. It was supported by young graduates of westernized Ceylonese universities, and was the first Marxist party (Fabian Socialism). In 1972, it continued its post-1956 stance which took into consideration the political importance of the Sinhalese Buddhist community, but remained unalterably opposed to radical communal demands for more power.

Notes

1. Calvin R. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1969), p. 293.
2. Robert N. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 60.
3. Charles S. Blackton, "Sri Lanka's Marxists," Problems of Communism (January-February 1973), p. 33.
4. Ibid.

LSSP(R)--LANKA SAMA SAMAJA PARTY (REVOLUTIONARY)

Political Bent: Pro-Peking, i.e., left of the LSSP.

Leaders: Bala Tampoe (c. 1973).

Prins Rajasooriya.

Major Supporters: Sinhalese Buddhists opposed to socialism and to the UNP.

Founded in: 1964, as a splinter group of the LSSP.

by: Edmund Samarakkody and Bala Tampoe when it split from the LSSP over the ULF labor coalition and SLFP-LSSP political coalition. It was formed by the radical members of the LSSP.[1]

Elections: 1965--Campaigned alone.

1970--Opposed both the UNP and the UF.
LSSP(R) + JVP(1).

Changes: 1968--LSSP(R) → LSSP(R) + RSSP.

Union Affiliates: Since 1964, Ceylon Mercantile Union (General Secretary: Bala Tampoe).

Remarks: The LSSP(R) has not been really viable since its poor showing in the 1965 election.

Note

1. Calvin R. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1969), p. 294.

MEP--MAHAJANA EKSATH PERAMUNA [PEOPLE'S UNITED FRONT]

Political Bent: Marxist-Trotskyite.

Leaders. Philip Gunawardena and L. H. Mettananda.

Major Supporters: The MEP is really the party of Philip Gunawardena and his personal retinue.

Founded in. 1959, as a splinter group of the MEP coalition.

by: Philip Gunawardena.

Elections: 1960(M)--Campaigned alone.

1960(J)--Campaigned alone.

1965--UNP + MEP + FP + TC + SLFSP + JVP(2) = National Government.

1970--Informally allied with the UNP.

Changes: 1960--MEP + DSP = MEP.

1963--LSSP + CP + MEP → ULF.

1970--MEP → VLSSP + SMP.

Union-Affiliates: Central Council of Ceylon Trade Unions. (Secretary: Philip Gunawardena).

Philip Gunawardena controlled a considerable number of the more important trade unions.

Remarks: The MEP was the only party to serve in coalition governments with both the SLFP and the UNP.

The MEP was reduced to one seat in the 1965 election.

Philip Gunawardena was a Cabinet Minister in the 1956 MEP coalition.

The MEP was founded in 1959-1960 by Philip Gunawardena and a group of loyal followers within the VLSSP and DSP.

The MEP has tried to adapt Marxism to the peasant economy and culture, but it has no mass peasant base.

SLFP--SRI LANKA FREEDOM PARTY

Political Bent: Sinhalese nationalist.

The SLFP has developed from a moderate to a more radical socialist party.[1]

Leaders: S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike (1951-1959).

W. Dahanayake (September 1959-December 1959).

C. P. de Silva (December 1959-May 1960).

Sirimavo Bandaranaike (May 1960-...).

Major Supporters: Sinhalese Buddhists who are tolerant of, or directly support moderate socialist policies.

Founded in: October 1951.

by: S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, when he left the UNP Cabinet and resurrected and re-formed the 1934 Sinhala Mahā Sabhā.

Elections: 1952--Campaigned alone.

1956--SLFP + VLSSP = MEP coalition. No contest pact LSSP + CP.

1960(M)--Campaigned alone.

1960(J)--Supported by LSSP + CP until labor unrest in 1961.

1965--Supported by LSSP + CP(M).

1970--SLFP + LSSP + CP(M) = UF.

Changes: At the end of 1959, W. Dahanayake broke with the SLFP and formed the LPP.

1964--SLFP → SLFP + SLFSP.

1964--SLFP-LSSP coalition.

Formed Government: March 1956-March 1960.

July 1960-March 1965.

May 1970-July 1977.

Important Aspects of Cabinets It Formed: 1956-1959--Philip Gunawardena (VLSSP-MEP), was Minister of Agriculture and Food. Two other Marxists were in the Cabinet including P. H. William de Silva, Minister of Industries and Fisheries. N. Q. Dias was Minister of Cultural Affairs.

SLFP

1960--C. P. de Silva became President of the SLFP in early 1960 and headed the party in the March 1960 election. He was Deputy Leader of the Government and Minister of Land, Irrigation and Power. He and his supporters left the party in 1964 to form the SLFSP.

3 LSSP Ministers + 12 SLFP Ministers.
N. M. Perera (LSSP) was appointed Minister of Finance.

1970--3 LSSP Ministers + 1 CP Minister + 17 SLFP Ministers + 1 LSSP Minister + 1 CP Deputy Minister + 1 Tamil.

14 Buddhists (including 2 Marxists) + 2 Christians + 1 Hindu + 1 Muslim + 2 Marxists of Christian background.[2]

LSSP members: N. M. Perera, LSSP Minister of Finance; Colvin R. de Silva, LSSP Minister of Plantation Industries; Leslie Goonewardene, LSSP Minister of Communications.

The 1970 Cabinet included 9 Kandy Sinhalese and 9 Low Country Sinhalese.

By September 1970, Tamils had been appointed as Permanent Secretaries in the key Departments of Finance, Defence and External Affairs, Home, Local Self-Government, and Public Administration.[3]

1971--Marthripala Senanayake, Deputy Leader.

Union Affiliates: The SLFP did not enter into the labor field until after it came to power in 1956.

Trade unions did not have a significant role in recruiting new SLFP members until 1970.[4]

1970--Sri Lankā Jathika Guru Sangamaya [Ceylon National Teachers Union] (SLJRS).
--Joint Committee of Trade Union Organizations (JCTUO).

Press Affiliates: UF affiliate--Lakehouse group.
SLFP and UF affiliate--Davasa group.

Notes

1. Calvin R. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1969), p. 294.

2. Robert N. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 62-63.

3. Urmila Phadnis, "Trends in Ceylonese Politics," India Quarterly 27 (April-June 1971), p. 128.

4. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics, p. 73.

SLFSP--SRI LANKA FREEDOM SOCIALIST PARTY

Political Bent: Right of the SLFP. When C. P. de Silva broke away from the SLFP, this gave many ex-Marxists the opportunity to obtain party posts.[1]

The SLFSP endorses policies to help the rural poor, but it is anti-Marxist.[2]

Leader: C. P. de Silva (Not to be confused with LSSP leader, Colvin R. de Silva).

Major Supporters: Sinhalese Buddhist rural middle class.

Founded in. 1964.

by: C. P. de Silva, when his group broke away from the SLFP over the coalition with the LSSP.

Elections: 1965--UNP + TC + FP + MEP + SLFSP + JVP(2) = National Government.

1970--Did not field any candidates.

Changes: By 1970, the SLFSP had been absorbed by the UNP.[3]

Notes

1. Robert N. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 116.
2. E. F. C. Ludowyk, The Modern History of Ceylon (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 266.
3. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon, p. 107.

SMP--SINHALA MAHAJANA PERAMUNA [SINHALESE PEOPLE'S FRONT]

Political Bent: Militant.

Stood for Buddhist rights, supported demands by Sinhalese Buddhist public and private sector employees.

Leader: R. G. Senanayake, who had run through the 1960's as an independent and successfully won each election.[1]

Major Supporters: The SMP failed to make an impact on the voters.[2]

Founded in: 1968, as a splinter group of the MEP.

by: R. G. Senanayake.

Elections: 1970--Campaigned alone, but none of its candidates were elected.

Remarks: The SMP espoused Sinhalese Buddhist nationalization of industry.[3]

Notes

1. Calvin R. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1969), p. 237.

2. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1973 (London: Macmillan Press, 1974), p. 174.

3. Robert N. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 106.

TC--TAMIL CONGRESS

Political Bent: Very conservative and unlikely to find a basis for agreement with the left-oriented SLFP, although they share many common views with conservative SLFP members.[1]

Leader: G. G. Ponnambalam.

Major Supporters: Rural Tamils in the northern and eastern parts of Ceylon. Jaffna-oriented.[2]

Founded in: 1944.

by: G. G. Ponnambalam.

Elections:
1947--Campaigned alone.
1952--UNP + TC + Labour Party.
1956--Campaigned alone. Very weak.
1960(M)--Campaigned alone. Very weak.
1960(J)--Campaigned alone. Very weak.
1965--UNP + FP + TC + SLFSP (+ JVP(2)) = National Government.
1970--Campaigned alone.

Changes:
1949--TC → TC + FP.
1970--TC + FP → TUF (Tamil United Front).

Remarks: Leading party among the Tamils until 1956 when the FP took the dominant position.

Its association with the UNP from 1947 to 1956 caused the party to lose favor with the Tamils when communal discord erupted in Ceylon after 1956.[3]

Essentially a communal party.

Notes

1. Robert N. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 60.
2. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1973 (London: Macmillan Press, 1974), p. 164.
3. Calvin R. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1969), p. 294.

UNP--UNITED NATIONAL PARTY

Political Bent: 1946-1956--Neutralist position concerning religion and language.

1956 and after--Increasingly pro-Sinhalese Buddhist.

1972--Endorsed state support of Buddhist educational institutions, and Sinhalese as the official language.

Originally a pro-Western, conservative party; after 1956, the UNP sought to attain a more popular image by adopting "democratic socialism" as its ideology, and by promising to implement "progressive" (i.e., socialist) measures if it became the government.[1]

Leaders: D. S. Senanayake (1946-1952).

Dudley Senanayake (1952-1953; 1958-1970).

Sir John Kotelawala (1953-1958).

J. R. Jayawardene (1970-...).

Major Supporters: The UNP has included among its supporters members of the Ceylon National Congress, the Sinhalese Mahā Sabhā, the All-Ceylon Muslim League and the Moors' Associations.

Founded in: 1946.

by: D. S. Senanayake, to contest pre-Independence election. The UNP was a conservative socialist party formed by prominent people throughout Ceylon, most of whom had been active in pre-Independence politics and in the movement for Independence.

Elections: 1947--UNP (coalition of Ceylon National Congress, Muslim League and Sinhala Mahā Sabhā formed the UNP).

1952--UNP + TC + Labour Party.

1956--Campaigned alone.

1960(M)--Campaigned alone.

1960(J)--Campaigned alone.

1965--UNP + FP + TC + MEP + SLFSP + JVP(2) = National Government.

1970--Campaigned alone. Had some Tamil support.

Formed Government: February 1948-March 1952.

March 1952-March 1956.

March 1960-July 1960.

March 1965-May 1970.

Important Aspects of Cabinets It Formed:

1947--S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike--Vice-President of the UNP and leader of the House.

4 SMS + 4 CNC + 1 Muslim League + 2 Tamil Independents.

Sir John Kotelawala--spokesman in Cabinet for UNP right wing.

1965--J. R. Jayawardene--Deputy Prime Minister. Had considerable influence in the trade union movement.[2] Was President of the Lanka Jathika Estate Workers Union.

Philip Gunawardena, MEP Cabinet Minister, very influential in the trade union movement.[3]

3 SLFSP Ministers + 1 FP Minister (Minister of Local Government) + 1 MEP Minister + 12 UNP Ministers.

15 Buddhists + 1 Muslim + 1 Hindu + 1 Christian (after 1967) + 1 Tamil Hindu (until 1968).

Union Affiliates:

UNP concern with the labor movement emerged from an effort to reform and revitalize the party after the 1956 defeat. At the time, it was considered anti-labor by many trade unionists.[4] Nevertheless, supported by a number of political bhikkhus, it entered the rapidly expanding trade union movement, and provided a non-Marxist alternative.

Despite this position, the UNP continued to stress that trade unions should not be used for partisan purposes and has particularly denounced political strikes. Consequently, pro-UNP trade unions refused on principle to join in the general strike of January 1962, since the UNP maintained it was a political strike.

Press Affiliates:

Lakehouse group.

Times group.

Notes

1. Calvin R. Woodward, The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1969), p. 294.

2. Robert N. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 47.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 66.

VLSSP--VIPLAVAKARI LANKA SAMA SAMAJA PARTY

[REVOLUTIONARY CEYLON EQUAL SOCIETY PARTY]

Political Bent:	Marxist.
Leader:	Philip Gunawardena (d. 1972).
Major Supporters:	Urban labor, both Sinhalese and Tamil.
Founded in:	1950, as a splinter group of the LSSP.
by:	Philip Gunawardena.
Elections:	1952--Campaigned with the CP. 1956--VLSSP + SLFP = MEP. Did not field any candidates after 1956.
Changes:	Coalesced with the DSP, the party of L. H. Mettananda (former leader of the VLSSP) in 1959.

APPENDIX III

LIST OF PROMINENT CEYLONESE LEADERS WITH SHORT BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES (1949-1972)

BANDARANAIKE, Felix Dias

Cabinet Minister in the SLFP government from 1960 to 1964. Minister of Finance in the UF government. Nephew of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike.

BANDARANAIKE, Sirimavo

Leader of the SLFP. Prime Minister of Ceylon from 1960 to 1965, and from 1970 to 1977. Widow of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike.

BANDARANAIKE, S. W. R. D.

A leading member and Vice-President (1947) of the UNP and Cabinet Minister from 1947 to 1951. Founder of the Sinhala Mahā Sabhā in 1934, and of the SLFP in 1951. Prime Minister of Ceylon from 1956 until his assassination in September 1959.

BUDDHARAKHITA, Rev. Mapitigama

Member of the SLFP Executive Committee, influential member of the Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna. Reputed to be a co-conspirator in the S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike assassination in September 1959.

CHELVANAYAKAM, S. J. V.

Founder and leading member of the Federal Party. He is a Christian.

DAHANAYAKE, W.

Cabinet Minister in the MEP government from 1956 to 1959. Prime Minister of Ceylon from the assassination of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike in

September 1959 until December 1959, and Cabinet Minister in the National Government formed in 1965. Leader of the Bauddha Bhasa Peramuna (BBP). Leader of the Lankā Prajathanthrawadi Pakshaya (LPP) which he founded in 1960 after his resignation from the SLFP.

DE SILVA, C. P.

Cabinet Minister in the MEP and SLFP governments of 1956-1960 and 1960-1964. Became President of the SLFP in January 1960 and headed the party in the March 1960 election. Deputy Leader of the SLFP government and Minister of Land, Irrigation and Power. Founder of the Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist Party after his resignation from the SLFP in 1964. Cabinet Minister in the National Government.

DE SILVA, Colvin R.

The Chairman of the Constituent Assembly (1970-1972). A founder and co-leader of the LSSP. Ceylon Federation of Labor official. Organized the first Marxist trade union in Ceylon in 1932. Leader of the LSSP in 1965. Deputy Leader and Minister of Plantation Industries in the United Front government.

GNANISSARA, Rev. Malevana.

President of the anti-Marxist Tri Nikāya Bhikkhu Mahā Bala Mandalaya. He led the bhikkhus' campaigns for the UNP in 1965 and 1970.

GOONETILLEKE, Sir Oliver

First native Ceylonese to be Governor-General (1954-1962). Co-founder of the Ceylon National Congress in 1919 which was at the forefront of the Independence movement.

GOPALLAWA, William

First Sinhalese Buddhist to be Governor-General (1962-1970). President

of the Republic of Sri Lanka (1972-...).

GUNARATNE, Rev. Meetiyagoda

Head of the socialist Sri Lankā Eksath Bhikkhu Bala Mandalaya, a nationalist organization. Leader of the Mahā Sangha Peramuna which supported the United Front in 1970.

GUNAWARDENA, Philip

A founder and member of the LSSP. Founder and leader of the Viplavakāri Lankā Sama Samaja Party (VLSSP) from 1950 to 1959. Minister of Food and Agriculture in the MEP coalition. Founder and leader of the MEP party. Cabinet Minister in the 1965 National Government. He has been Secretary of the Central Council of Ceylon Trade Unions.

JAYASURIYA, F. R.

Co-Leader of the Sinhalese Language Group and co-founder of the JVP(2).

JAYAWARDENE, J. R.

Prominent UNP official and leader (1970-...). Prime Minister of Sri Lanka (1977-...), Finance Minister (1947). Deputy Prime Minister (1965). President of the National Employees Union and the Lankā Jathika Estate Workers Union.

KALUKUNDAYAWE, Rev. Pannasekera

Chairman of the advisory committee to the Minister of Cultural Affairs on implementation of the Buddha Sāsana Commission Report (1961).

KEUNEMAN, Pieter

Founding member (1943) and Secretary of the Communist Party (originally the United Socialist Party), which he founded in 1940 with S. A. Wickremasinghe. Secretary General of the Communist Party until 1972. A leader of the Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions. Has been a member

of the legislature since its inception.

KOTELAWALA, Sir John

Leader of the UNP and Prime Minister (1953-1956). Spokesman for the UNP right wing.

MENDIS, M. G.

President of the Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions. A leader of the Communist Party.

METTANANDA, L. H.

Founder of the Bauddha Jathika Balavegaya (BJB). Before 1960, co-leader of the Viplavakari Lankā Sama Samaja Party. Leader of the Sinhala Jathika Sangamaya (SJS). Co-leader of the MEP Party. Tried to establish a radical Sinhalese Buddhist Party, the Dharma Samaja Party. However, the DSP was never a viable Sinhalese Buddhist group in the political arena.

PERERA, N. M.

Moderate socialist leader (Trotskyite). Founding member and co-leader of the LSSP. Leader of the Opposition (1949-1952) and Finance Minister in the SLFP-LSSP government. Finance Minister in the United Front government. Leader of the Ceylon Federation of Labor.

PONNAMBALAM, G. G.

Founder of the Tamil Congress. Cabinet Minister from 1948 to 1954 in the UNP and Cabinet Minister in the National Government.

RAJARATNA, K. M. P.

Co-founder of the JVP(2).

RAJASOORIYA, Prins

A leader of the LSSP(R).

SAMARAKKODY, Edmund

A founder and leader of the LSSP until 1964, when he organized the LSSP(R). He later left it and founded the Revolutionary Sama Samaja Party in 1968.

SEELAWAMSA, Rev. Talpavila

Dean of the Faculty of Buddhism at Vidyālankāra University and a member of the SLFP executive prior to 1960, as well as of the Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna. He was foremost among the bhikkhus in voicing his strong opposition to the implementation of the 1959 Sāsana Commission Report.

SENANAYAKE, D. S.

A founder of the Ceylon National Congress in 1919 which was at the forefront of the Independence movement. Founder and leader (1948-1952) of the UNP. Prime Minister from 1947 until his death in 1952.

SENANAYAKE, Dudley

Leader of the UNP. Prime Minister from 1952 to 1953 and from 1965 to 1970. Son of D. S. Senanayake. Died in 1973.

SENANAYAKE, Marthripala

Minister of Industries, Home and Cultural Affairs in 1962. Deputy Leader of the SLFP in 1971. Had been a member of the UNP until he left in 1952. Has been a member of the legislature since its inception.

SENANAYAKE, R. G.

Minister of Commerce and leader of the UNP's left wing (1952-1956). He became an independent associate of the MEP coalition in 1956 and was once more Minister of Commerce and Trade. Organized the Sinhala Mahā Sabhā in 1968.

SHANMUGATHASAN, N. S.

Founder and co-leader of the CP(P). Executive of the Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions.

SIRISEEVALI, Rev. Bambarende

Dean of the Faculty of Buddhist Affairs at Vidyodaya University. He publicly protested his unalterable opposition to the terms of the Buddha Sāsana Commission Report and maintained that the Sangha was an adviser to the Sinhalese laity.

TAMPOE, Bala

General Secretary of the Ceylon Mercantile Union. Was an influential member of the LSSP until 1964 when he resigned. Helped found the LSSP(R).

WICKREMASINGHE, S. A.

Founding member and president of the Communist Party until 1972. Since then, he has been its Secretary General. Originally a member of the LSSP until the Communist Party was formed in 1943.

WIJEWEERA, Mahinda

Second-in-Command of the JVP(1).

WIJEWEERA, Rohana

Founded the JVP(1) when he and his supporters were expelled from the CP(P).

APPENDIX IV

CHARTS

CHART 1

SPLITS AND COALITIONS IN THE PRINCIPAL CEYLONESE PARTIES



⟶⟶⟶ Intermediate step in assuming current party label.

----- Each party retained its own identity, however.

[1]Both factions campaigned as the legitimate LSSP(R).

CHART 2

PARTY RELATIONSHIPS DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

(Boxed parties are in coalition; *indicates no contest pact; Dates refer to post election changes)

	CP	CP(P)	DSP	FP	JVP(1)	LPP	LSSP	LSSP(R)	MEP	SJS	SLFP	SMP	TC	UNP	
1947	CP						LSSP						TC	UNP	1947
1952	CP *VLSSP						LSSP				SLFP			UNP + TC *FP	1952
1956				FP							SLFP + VLSSP = MEP *CP *LSSP		TC	UNP	1956
MARCH 1960			DSP	FP		LPP	LSSP		MEP *DSP	SJS	SLFP *CP		TC	UNP	MARCH 1960
JULY 1960				FP		LPP			MEP		SLFP *CP *LSSP *JVP(2) (*FP 1961)		TC	UNP	JULY 1960
1965		CP(P)		FP (1968)	JVP(1)	LPP		LSSP(R)			SLFP + LSSP (=CP(M) 1966)			UNP + TC + FP + MEP + SLFSP = National Government *JVP(2)	1965
1970				FP (post 1970 election)				LSSP(R) + JVP(1)			SLFP + LSSP + CP(M)=UF *FP (post 1970 election)	SMP	TC	UNP *MEP	1970

APPENDIX V

TABLES

TABLE 1

ETHNIC COMMUNITIES BY DISTRICT

	% of District Population				
	Sinhalese	Ceylon Tamils	Indian Tamils	Ceylon Moors	Others
WESTERN PROVINCE					
Colombo	83	6	3	5	4
Kalutara	87	1	6	6	--
SOUTHERN PROVINCE					
Galle	94	1	2	3	--
Matara	94	1	2	3	--
Hambantota	97	--	--	1	1
SABARAGAMUWA PROVINCE					
Ratnapura	78	1	19	1	1
Kegalla	83	1	19	1	1
CENTRAL PROVINCE					
Kandy	60	3	28	7	1
Matale	72	4	17	6	1
Nuwara Eliya	38	3	57	1	1
UVA PROVINCE					
Badulla	55	3	38	3	1
Monaragala	87	1	9	2	1
NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCE					
Kurunegala	93	1	1	4	1
Puttalam	80	7	2	9	1
NORTH-CENTRAL PROVINCE					
Anuradhapura	89	2	1	7	1
Polonnaruwa	87	2	1	7	1
NORTHERN PROVINCE					
Jaffna	1	95	2	1	--
Mannar	18	63	11	7	1
Vavuniya	18	63	11	7	1
EASTERN PROVINCE					
Batticaloa	3	71	1	23	1
Amparai	29	23	1	46	1
Trincomalee	29	37	2	29	2

SOURCE: Robert N. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 158.

TABLE 2

RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTION

	1946[1]	1953[2]	1963[3]	1971[4]
Buddhist	65.0%	64.4%	66.2%	67.4%
Hindu	20.0	19.9	18.5	17.6
Christian	8.9	8.8	8.4	7.7
Moslem	6.0	6.7	6.8	7.1
Others[5]	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2

[1]Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," in Political Development and Social Change, ed. Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (New York: John & Sons, 1971), p. 158

[2]S. Namasivayam, The Legislatures of Ceylon, vol. 5 (London; Faber & Faber, 1951), p. 4.

[3]Robert N. Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1971), p. 169.

[4]A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1973 (London: Macmillan Press, 1974), p. 15.

[5]Includes Zoroastrians, Free Thinkers, Agnostics.

TABLE 3

ETHNIC AND GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION OF POPULATION

	1946[1]	1953[2]	1956[3]	1963[4]	1971[5]
Sinhalese--Low Country	43.8%[6]	42.6%	46.1%	42.2%	42.8%
Kandy	25.8[6]	26.7	24.0	28.8	29.1
TOTAL	69.6	69.3	70.1	71.0	71.9
Tamils--Ceylonese	12.4	11.2	11.2	11.0	11.1
Indian	10.2	12.2	10.8	10.6	9.4
TOTAL	22.6	23.4	22.0	21.6	20.5
Moors--Ceylonese	6.0	5.8	6.8	5.9	6.4
Indian	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.2
TOTAL	6.1	5.9	6.9	6.4	6.6
Others[7]	2.7[6]	1.4	1.0	1.0	1.0

[1]S. Namasivayam, The Legislatures of Ceylon, vol. 5 (London: Faber & Faber, 1951), p. 3.

[2]Nur Yalman, Under the Bo Tree (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1971), p. 13.

[3]S. Namasivayam, Parliamentary Government in Ceylon, 1948-1958 (Colombo: K. V. G. de Silva & Sons, 1959), pp. 10, 93.

[4]Robert N. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 4.

[5]A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1973 (London: Macmillan Press, 1974), p. 15.

[6]Bryce Ryan, "Socio-Cultural Regions of Ceylon," Rural Sociology 15 (March 1950), p. 4.

[7]Includes Burghers, Eurasians, Euro-Ceylonese, Europeans, Malays, Pakistanis, Veddahs.

TABLE 4

PARTY PERFORMANCE IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: 1947-1970

PARTY	1947		1952		1956		1960(M)		1960(J)		1965		1970	
	% Pop. Vote	No. Seats Won	% Pop. Vote	No. Seats Won	% Pop. Vote	No. Seats Won	% Pop. Vote	No. Seats Won	% Pop. Vote	No. Seats Won	% Pop. Vote	No. Seats Won	% Pop. Vote	No. Seats Won
UNP.....	39.9	42	44.1	54	27.3	8	29.4	50	37.6	30	39.3	66	37.9	17
SLFP.....	--	--	15.5	9	40.7	51	20.9	46	33.6	75	30.2	41	36.9	91
LSSP.....	16.9	15	13.1	9	10.2	14	10.5	10	7.4	12	7.5	10	8.7	19
CP.....	3.7	3	5.7	4	4.5	3	4.8	3	3.0	4	2.7	4	3.4	6
FP.....	--	--	1.9	2	5.4	10	5.8	15	7.0	16	5.4	14	4.9	13
TC.....	4.4	7	2.8	4	0.3	1	1.2	1	1.5	1	2.4	3	2.3	3
Other Parties	6.2	7	2.9	2	0.6	--	18.3	19	5.3	7	6.7	7	1.3	--
Independents.	28.9	21	14.0	11	11.0	8	9.1	7	4.6	6	5.8	6	4.6	2
TOTAL.....	100.0%	95	100.0%	95	100.0%	95	100.0%	151	100.0%	151	100.0%	151	100.0%	151

SOURCE: Robert N. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 92-93.

TABLE 5

PRIME MINISTERS

	PARTY	TERM OF OFFICE
D. S. Senanayake	UNP	October 1947 - March 1952
Dudley Senanayake	UNP	March 1952 - October 1953
Sir John Kotelawala	UNP	October 1953 - April 1956
S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike	MEP[1]	April 1956 - September 1959
W. Dahanayake	MEP	September 1959 - March 1960
Dudley Senanayake	UNP	March 1960 - July 1960
Sirimavo Bandaranaike	SLFP	July 1960 - March 1965
Dudley Senanayake	UNP	March 1965 - May 1970
Sirimavo Bandaranaike	UF[2]	May 1970 - July 1977

[1]MEP = SLFP + VLSSP; see Chart 1; p. 226 and Chart 2, p. 227.

[2]UF = SLFP + LSSP + CP(M); see Chart 2, p. 227.

TABLE 6

PARTICIPATION IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS; 1947-1970

	Electorate	Voters	Percentage of Electorate Voting
1947	3,048,145	1,701,150	55.8
1952	2,990,912	2,114,615	70.7
1956	3,464,159	2,391,538	69.0
1960(M)	3,724,507	2,889,282	77.6
1960(J)	3,724,507	2,827,075	75.9
1965	4,710,887	3,821,918	81.1
1970	5,505,028	4,672,656	84.9

SOURCE: Robert N. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 143.

TABLE 7

PERCENTAGE OF INDEPENDENTS IN RELATION TO TOTAL MP'S ELECTED

1947	22.1%
1952	12.6
1956	8.4
1960(M)	4.6
1960(J)	3.9
1965	3.9
1970	1.3

TABLE 8

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF CABINETS: 1960-1970

	Number of Ministers Appointed in;					
	March 1960	July 1960	June 1964	March 1964	September 1968	May 1970
Sinhalese	7	10	14	15	18	18
Ceylon Tamils	0	0	0	1	0	1
Moors	1	1	1	1	1	1
Burghers	0	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	8	11	15	17	19	21

SOURCE: Robert N. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 62.

TABLE 9

POPULATION INCREASE: 1946-1971

	Total Population	Increase Over Preceding Period: (%)
1946[1]	6,600,000	--
1953[2]	8,100,000	18.5
1956[3]	8,900,000	9.0
1963[3]	10,600,000	16.0
1971[4]	12,700,000	16.5

[1]S. Namasivayam, The Legislatures of Ceylon, vol. 5 (London: Faber & Faber, 1951), p. 4.

[2]S. Namasivayam, Parliamentary Government in Ceylon, 1948-1958 (Colombo, Sri Lanka: K. V. G. de Silva & Sons, 1959), pp. 10, 93-94.

[3]Robert N. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 4.

[4]B. H. Farmer et al., "Sri Lanka," The Far East and Australasia, 1974 (London: Europa Publications, 1974), p. 324.

TABLE 10

ECONOMIC TRENDS: 1949-1971

	GNP		Per Capita GNP		
	Million Rupees	% Increase Over Preceding Year	Rupees	% Increase Over Preceding Year	Cost of Living Index for Colombo 1952 = 100
1949	2,272	n/a	344	n/a	319.0[1]
1955	5,048	16.7	567[2]	n/a	n/a
1960	6,289	n/a	635	n/a	103.5
1962	6,710	4.4	643	1.7	106.3
1964	7,363	6.7	675	4.2	112.2
1965	7,551	2.6	676	0.1	112.5
1968	8,862	7.9	739	5.3	121.5
1970	9,695	4.1	773	1.8	138.2
1971	9,782	0.9	781[3]	1.0	n/a

SOURCE: Robert N. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 211.

[1]Between 1937 and 1951 the cost of living index rose from 100 to 319. William F. Christians, "Ceylon--Economic and Financial Factors," The Encyclopedia Americana, 1957 ed. (Montreal: Americana Corporation of Canada, 1957), p. 238.

[2]Donald A. Redmond, "Ceylon," Colliers Year Book 1958 (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1958), pp. 119-122.

[3]Gale Research Company, Countries of the World and Their Leaders, 3rd ed., s.v., "Ceylon," (Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1977), p. 897.

APPENDIX VI

GLOSSARY

AMARAPURA NIKĀYA--Sect or organization of bhikkhus, the name of which (Amarapura) is derived from the capital of the Burmese Empire. This ordination was established in Ceylon in 1864.

BHIKKHU-- Buddhist monk. Should not be seen as fulfilling the same role as the priest in western Catholicism. Yet he is not simply a monk quietly engaged in study and meditation within the monastery. Insofar as the word "priest" conveys the sense of mediator or go-between, or even "one who sanctifies," there is a profound sense in which the bhikkhu is a priest. In many contexts, the bhikkhu passively radiates, mediates, the Buddha-power to the lay society in which he lives.[1]

BUDDHA--"Enlightened one." A professed agnostic, he expounded his teachings based on personal experience, taught that life is full of suffering, and invited his followers not to accept his teachings on his authority; but to experiment with them and come to their own conclusions.

BUDDHA JAYANTI (May 1956-May 1957)--The 2500th anniversary of the Buddha, marking the apogee of Buddhism. According to Buddhist belief, the Buddha's way, philosophy or religion was to grow and develop for 2500 years. 1956 was the year of public commemoration of this great Buddhist milestone.

BUDDHA SĀSANA COMMISSION--A commission appointed by the government of Ceylon in 1957 to deal with a wide range of problems concerning the internal discipline of the Sangha.

BUDDHA SĀSANA MANDALAYA--A deliberative body consisting of two chambers, one of which included the laity and bhikkhus; the other, only the religious (Saṅghādhikaraṇ).

BUDDHISM--Theory of human existence with a philosophy not dependent in any way on theistic belief or theistic sanctions. It does not have any divine revelation as its starting point.[2] Pali texts relate that the message of the Buddha is based on suffering and the release from suffering.

DĀNA--An act of giving whereby the donor acquires merit.

DHARMA (Sanskrit) or DHAMMA (Pali)--One of the Tiratana [Three Jewels or Three Refuges], the other two being Buddha and Saṅgha. It is a teaching or a law, an austere doctrine which illuminates the path to ultimate salvation yet leaves the layman without divine help to face his earthly trials.

GOYIGAMA--The Highest (Cultivator) caste in Ceylon. The Siam nikāya is composed mainly of Goyigama bhikkhus.

KARMA (Sanskrit) or KAMMA (Pali)--Refers to the volitional action of which, morally viewed, there are two types: good and bad. Good karma produces merit for which there is favorable or unpleasant retribution. Karma is to merit/demerit as cause is to effect.[3] The law of karma operates inexorably to ensure that the Buddhist's rebirth will be the moral consequence of actions and thoughts in the past life.

MAHĀ NĀYAKE--Chief bhikkhu of a nikāya.

MAHĀ SAṄGHA--Term used to describe bhikkhus collectively.

MAHĀVĀMSA--A body of historical literature composed about the end of the fifth century A.D. by a bhikkhu. It deals with the lineage of kings from the semi-legendary beginnings of Sinhalese history up to the middle of the fourth century A.D.

MERIT--Action that conforms to Buddhist precepts. By practice of Right Action, the Buddhist ensures pleasant consequences for his deed.

MIDDLE WAY-- Since in the present life, man cannot escape from existence, he should regulate his mode of living in such a way that its inevitable conflicts and sorrows minimally influence him. That is, follow the Middle Way which provides a peaceful compromise to the vicissitudes of life.

NAT--Since Buddhism does not deal with crisis situations but rather with remote things and final ends, this lacuna is filled with nats and nat worship. This group of supernatural beings can, however, inflict evil as well as good upon a person.

NĀYAKA--Chief bhikkhu of a vihāra.

NIKĀYA--Buddhist "sect" or ordination. The three principal Ceylonese nikāyas are the Amarapura, the Rāmanya and the Siam. Though usually referred to as sects or fraternities, nikāyas are closely related to Christian religious orders with many of the same basic beliefs but quite different organizational parameters.

NIRVANA (Sanskrit) or NIBBANA (Pali)--Release from the cycle of constant reincarnation through the extinction of the individual self and its replacement by the integration with the totality of the whole universe.

PĀLI--The language of the Buddhist Canon.

PANSALA--Sangha school.

PIRIVENA--Sangha institution of higher learning.

POLITICAL BHIKKHU--A member of the Sangha who actively participates in fashioning the general political system of Ceylon.

PŌYA DAYS--Buddhist Sabbath days that coincide with the waxing and the waning of the moon.

RĀMAÑYA NIKĀYA--The "Rangoon" ordination or sect of Buddhist bhikkhus, introduced into Ceylon in 1815.

RELIGIOUS--A member of a religious order or a nikāya, such as a bhikkhu.

SAṄGHA--Literally "gathering," Saṅgha may refer to the entire following of the Buddha, both lay and monastic but it is most frequently employed with reference to the gathered body of bhikkhus. It is only in this latter sense that it has been used in this study.

SAṄGHADHĪKARAN--Ancient ecclesiastical court attached to the Saṅgha.

SAṄGHARĀJA--The highest ecclesiastical office in Ceylon.

SAṄGHA SABHĀ--Small groups or councils of bhikkhus whose purpose is to enhance the status of Sinhalese Buddhism.

SĀSANA--Refers to religious matters relating to Buddhism.

SATYĀGRAHA--Passive resistance by groups of persons to demonstrate their opposition to policies implemented by governing bodies.

SIAM NIKĀYA--The Siamese sect or ordination of bhikkhus, established in Kandy, Ceylon around the middle of the nineteenth century.

SRI DALADĀ MĀLIGĀVA--Temple of the Tooth.

THERAVĀDA BUDDHISM--"Way of the Elders." This philosophy of life has no saints or saviors, and only a few simple rituals. It propounds a spirit of compromise and mutual adjustment as taught by the Buddha. Theravāda Buddhism is one of the survivors of eighteen schools of non-Mahāyāna Buddhism. The Ceylonese, with rare exceptions speak only of Theravāda.[4]

THERO--A bhikkhu who has been a member of his order within a particular nikāya for more than ten years.[5]

TIRATANA--(Three Jewels or Three Refuges)--"I take refuge in the Buddha; I take refuge in the Dharma; I take refuge in the Saṅgha." These tenets

are inseparable, for the Sangha is custodian and teacher of the Dharma proclaimed by the Buddha.

VIHĀRA--A retreat or monastery of the Sangha. A Temple of the Buddha.

VIHĀRA SĀSANARAKSHAKA SOCIETIES--Temple associations for the promotion of Buddhism.

VIHĀRAGAM--Villages given by the monarchs to vihāras.

VINAYA--The elaborate code of monastic discipline, or code of regulations governing the Sangha, that has evolved through the centuries.

Notes

1. Robert C. Lester, Theravada Buddhism in Southeast Asia (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1973), p. 109.
2. Trevor Ling, The Buddha (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), p. 241.
3. Melford E. Spiro, Buddhism and Society (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 115.
4. Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Area Handbook for Ceylon (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 505.
5. Kitsiri Malalgoda, Buddhism in Sinhalese Society--1750-1900 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976), p. 55n.

APPENDIX VII

LIST OF OFTEN-USED CEYLONESE ABBREVIATIONS

ACBC — All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress. Set up the Buddhist Commission of Inquiry in 1954.

ACBM — All-Ceylon Bhikkhu Mandalaya. Supported the UF during the 1970 election.

BBP — Bauddha Bhasa Peramuna [Buddhist Language Front]. Communal organization. Leader: W. Dahanayake (Appendix III, p. 219). Supported the SLFP during the 1956 election.

BJB — Bauddha Jathika Balavegaya [National Front for the Protection of Buddhism]. Militant lay Sinhalese Buddhist Organization. President: L. H. Mettananda (Appendix III, p. 222).

CCCTU — Central Council of Ceylon Trade Unions. Allied with the MEP coalition until 1959. It then supported the VLSSP. Secretary: Philip Gunawardena (Appendix III, p. 221.

CFL — Ceylon Federation of Labor. Allied with the LSSP. Leader: N. M. Perera (Appendix III, p. 222).

CFTU — Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions. Allied with the CP. President: M. G. Mendis (Appendix III, p. 222). Co-leader: Pieter Keuneman (Appendix III, p. 221).

CMU — Ceylon Mercantile Union. Allied with the LSSP until 1964. Since then, it has supported the LSSP(R). General Secretary: Bala Tampoe (Appendix III, p. 224).

CP — Communist Party. Known before 1943 as the USP. In 1963, it split into the CP(M) and the CP(P), (Appendix II, pp. 198, 199, and Appendix IV, Chart 1, p. 226).

CP(M) Communist Party (Moscow), (Appendix II, pp. 198-199 and Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226, 227. Leaders: S. A. Wickremasinghe (Appendix III, p. 224), and Pieter Keuneman (Appendix III, p. 221).

CP(P) Communist Party (Peking), (Appendix II, p. 200 and Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226, 227). Leader: N. S. Shanmugathasan (Appendix III, p. 224).

CTUF Ceylon Trade Union Federation. Allied first with the CP and then with the CP(P). Leader N. S. Shanmugathasan (Appendix III, p. 224).

DSP Dharma Samaja Party [Social Justic Party] (Appendix II, p. 201 and Appendix IV, Chart 2, p. 227).

EBP Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna. Political front of bhikkhus whose goal was to have Sinhala recognized as the sole official language of Ceylon. Supported the SLFP in the 1956 campaign.

FP Federal Party [Ilanka Tamil Arasu Kadchi] (Appendix II, pp. 202-203 and Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226, 227). Leader: S. J. V. Chelvanayakam (Appendix III, p. 219).

GCSU Government Clerical Service Union. Allied with the LSSP. Oldest and most prominent public servants' union.

JCTUO Joint Committee of Trade Union Organizations. A federation of all unions allied with the CP(M), LSSP, and MEP. Campaigned for the UF in 1970.

JVP(1) Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna [People's Liberation Front] (Appendix II, p. 204 and Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226, 227).

JVP(2) Jathika Vimukthi Peramuna [National Liberation Front] (Appendix II, p. 205 and Appendix IV, Chart 2, p. 227).

LBM Lankā Bauddha Mandalaya [Buddhist Council of Ceylon]. Appointed by UNP to organize the Buddha Jayanti celebrations.

LPP Lankā Prajathan Travada Pakshaya [Ceylon Democratic Party] (Appendix II, p. 206 and Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226, 227).

LSS Lankā Sangha Sabhā. Formed after the May 1958 riots. Composed of moderate bhikkhus who left the EBP at that time.

LSSP — Lańkā Samā Samaja Party [Ceylon Equal Society Party]. (Appendix II, pp. 207, 208 and Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226, 227). Leader: N. M. Perera (Appendix III, p. 222).

LJEWU — Lankā Jathika Estate Workers' Union. Founded by the UNP in 1961. President: J. R. Jayawardene (Appendix III, p. 221).

LSSP(R) — Lankā Sama Samaja Party (Revolutionary), (Appendix II, p. 209 and Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226, 227).

MEP — (Mahajana Eksath Peramuna) [People's United Front]. Initially it was a coalition government (1956-1960). Subsequently, it became a single party (Appendix II, p. 210 and Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226 and 227).

ML — Muslim League. United with the UNP in the 1947 election (Appendix IV, Chart 1, p. 226).

MSP — Mahā Sangha Peramuna. Supported the UF during the 1970 campaign. Leader. Rev. Meetiyagoda Gunaratne (Appendix III, p. 221).

RSSP — Revolutionary Sama Samaja Party. A faction of the LSSP(R). (Appendix IV, Chart 1, p. 226). President: E. Samarakkody (Appendix III, p. 223).

SBP — Sinhala Bhasa Peramuna [Sinhalese Language Front]. Campaigned for the MEP coalition in 1956. Leader: F. R. Jayasuriya (Appendix III, p. 221).

SJS — Sinhala Jathika Sangamaya [National Ceylon Union]. Radical Sinhalese Buddhist organization with a composite membership of bhikkhus and laics. Campaigned from its inception in 1954 for a unilingual civil service. Leader: L. H. Mettananda (Appendix III, p. 222).

SLBF — Sri Lanka Bhikkhu Front. Supported the UF in the 1970 election campaign.

SLEBBM — Sri Lankā Eksath Bhikkhu Bala Mandalaya [Sri Lanka United Bhikkhus Organization]. Socialist oriented. Allied with the UF government in 1970. President: Rev. Meetiyagoda Gunaratne (Appendix III, p. 221).

SLFP — Sri Lanka Freedom Party (Appendix II, pp. 211-212, and Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226, 227).

SLFSP — Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist Party (Appendix II, p. 213 and Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226, 227). Leader: C. P. de Silva (Appendix III, p. 220).

SLJGS — Sri Lankā Jathika Guru Sangamaya [Ceylon National Teachers' Union]. Allied with the SLFP. Campaigned for the UF in 1970.

SLRLS — Samastha Lankā Rajaya Lipikaru Sangamaya [All-Ceylon Government Clerks' Union]. Campaigned from 1962 to 1965 for a unilingual civil service.

SMP — Sinhala Mahajana Peramuna [Sinhalese People's Front]. (Appendix II, p. 214, and Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226, 227).

SMS — Sinhala Mahā Sabhā. Founded in 1934 by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike (Appendix III, p. 219). United with the UNP in 1946 (Appendix IV, Chart 1, p. 226).

TC — Tamil Congress (Appendix II, p. 215, and Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226, 227). Leader: G. G. Ponnambalam (Appendix III, p. 222).

TNBMBM — Tri Nikāya Bhikkhu Mahā Bala Mandalaya [Three Sangha Bhikkhu Organization]. Anti-Marxist. Supported the UNP during the 1965 campaign. President. Rev. Malevena Gnanissara (Appendix III, p. 220).

TUF — Tamil United Front. Coalition of the FP and the TC (Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226, 227).

UF — United Front [Samagi Peramuna]. Coalition of the SLFP, LSSP and CP(M) (Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226, 227).

ULF — United Left Front; CP, LSSP, and MEP, 1963-1964 (Appendix IV, Chart 2, p. 227).

UNP — United National Party (Appendix II, pp. 216-217, and Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226, 227).

USP — United Socialist Party. Formed as a splinter group of the LSSP and later, in 1943 became the CP (Appendix IV, Chart 1, p. 226).

VLSSP Viplavakarı Lankā Sama Samaja Party [Revolutionary Ceylon Equal Society Party] (Appendix II, p. 218 and Appendix IV, Charts 1 and 2, pp. 226, 227). Founded by Philip Gunawardena (Appendix III, p. 221).

YSF Young Socialist Front: a faction of the JVP(1).

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Akzin, Benjamin. State and Nation. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1964.

Allen, Richard. A Short Introduction to the History and Politics of Southeast Asia. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Almond, Gabriel A. Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970.

The American University. Area Handbook for Ceylon. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.

Anderson, Charles W., Fred R. van der Mehden, and Crawford Young. Issues of Political Development. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967.

Arasaratnam, S. Ceylon. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

Ashby, Philip H. The Conflict of Religions. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965.

Ashford, Douglas E. Ideology and Participation. Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1972.

Banks, Arthur, ed. Political Handbook of the World: 1977. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977.

Bareau, André. La vie et l'organisation des communautés bouddhiques modernes de Ceylan. Pondichery: Institut Français d'Indologie, 1957.

Baron, Salo Wittmayer. Modern Nationalism and Religion. New York: Meridian Books, 1960.

Benz, Ernst. Buddhism or Communism? New York: Doubleday & Co., 1965.

Berger, Peter L. The Sacred Canopy. New York: Anchor Books, 1967.

Bliss, Kathleen. The Future of Religion. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1972.

Butwell, Richard. Southeast Asia Today--and Tomorrow. New York: Praeger, 1969.

Cady, John F. Southeast Asia. New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1964.

Chavan, R. S. Nationalism in Asia. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt., 1973.

Conze, Edward. Buddhism, Its Essence and Development. New York: Harper Torch Books, 1959.

Copleston, Reginald Stephen. Buddhism: Primitive and Present in Magadha and in Ceylon. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1908.

De Silva, K. M., ed. The "Rebellion" of 1848. Kandy: K. V. G. de Silva & Sons, 1965.

Eisenstadt, S. N. Tradition, Change and Modernity. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973.

Emerson, Rupert. From Empire to Nation. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960.

Evers, Hans-Dieter. Monks, Priests and Peasants. Leiden, Netherlands: E. G. Brill, 1972.

Farmer, B. H. Ceylon: A Divided Nation. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Fisher, Charles A. South-East Asia. London: Methuen & Co., 1964.

Gale Research Company. Countries of the World and Their Leaders. 3rd ed., s.v. "Ceylon." Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1977.

Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973.

Geiger, Wilhelm, and Heinz Bechert. Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1960.

Gombrich, Richard F. Precept and Practice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

Goonetileke, H. A. I. A Bibliography of Ceylon. 2 volumes. Zug, Switzerland: Inter-Documentation, 1970.

Gutmann, James, ed. Philosophy A to Z. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1963.

Humphreys, Christmas. Buddhism. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1962.

Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Jacob, Lucy M. Sri Lanka. Delhi: National Publishing House, 1973.

Jeffries, Sir Charles. Ceylon: The Path to Independence. London: Pall Mall Press, 1962.

Jennings, Sir Ivor. The Constitution of Ceylon. London: Oxford University Press, 1953.

_____, and H. W. Tambiah. The Dominion of Ceylon. London: Stevens & Sons, 1952.

Johnson, Chalmers. Revolutionary Change. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966.

Joshi, L. M., ed. Buddhism. Patiala, India: Punjabi University, 1969.

Kalupahana, David J. Buddhist Philosophy. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976.

Kearney, Robert N. Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967.

_____. The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka). Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973.

_____. Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

Kunstadter, Peter. South East Asian Tribes, Minorities and Nations. Vol. 1. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Leifer, Michael. Nationalism, Revolution and Evolution in South-East Asia. Bug, Switzerland: Inter-Documentation Company A.G., 1970.

Lester, Robert C. Theravada Buddhism in Southeast Asia. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1973.

Levy, Marion J., Jr. Modernization and the Structure of Societies. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Lewy, Guenter, Religion and Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Ling, Trevor. The Buddha. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973.

_____. Buddha, Marx, and God. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966.

Ludowyk, E. F. C. The Modern History of Ceylon. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.

Malalgoda, Kitsiri. Buddhism in Sinhalese Society--1750-1900. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976.

Mendis, G. C., ed. The Colebrooke-Cameron Papers, Volumes 1 and 2. London: Oxford University Press, 1956.

Mukherjee, Sadhan. Ceylon: Island That Changed. New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1971.

Namasivayam, S. Parliamentary Government in Ceylon, 1948-1958. Colombo: K. V. G. de Silva & Sons, 1959.

_____. The Legislatures of Ceylon, Vol. 5. London: Faber & Faber, 1951.

Nayar, Baldev Raj. Minority Politics in the Punjab. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966.

_____. National Communication and Language Policy in India. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.

Nyrop, Richard F., ed. Area Handbook for Ceylon. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.

O'Dea, Thomas F. The Sociology of Religion. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

Pakeman, S. A. Ceylon. London: Ernest Benn, 1964.

Pardue, Peter A. Buddhism. New York: Macmillan Co., 1968.

Paxton, John, ed. The Statesman's Year Book, 1975/1976. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975.

Phadnis, Urmila. Religion and Politics in Sri Lanka. New Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1976.

Pieris, Ralph. Social Development and Planning in Asia. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1976.

Prasad, Dhirendra Mohan. Ceylon's Foreign Policy Under the Bandaranaike's (1956-65). New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1973.

Pye, Lucian W. Politics, Personality and Nation Building. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.

Ross, Floyd H., and Tynette Hills. The Great Religions. Greenwich, Conn.: Beacon Press, 1956.

Rudolph, Lloyd I., and Susanne H. Rudolph. The Modernity of Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.

Rustow, Dankwart A. A World of Nations. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967.

Ryan, Bryce. Caste in Modern Ceylon. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953.

Ryan, Bryce. Sinhalese Village. Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1958.

Schecter, Jerrold. The New Face of Buddha. New York: Coward-McCann, 1967.

Schermerhorn, R. A. Comparative Ethnic Relations. New York: Random House, 1970.

Schmitt, David E. Dynamics of the Third World. Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1974.

Singer, Marshall R. The Emerging Elite. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964.

Smith, Anthony D. Theories of Nationalism. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.

Smith, Donald Eugene. Religion and Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970.

_____. Religion and Politics in Burma. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965.

_____. Religion, Politics and Social Change in the Third World. New York: Free Press, 1971.

Spencer, J. E., and William L. Thomas. Asia, East by South. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971.

Spiro, Melford E. Buddhism and Society. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

Steinberg, David Joel, ed. In Search of Southeast Asia. New York: Praeger, 1971.

Swearer, Donald K. Buddhism in Transition. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1970.

Thomson, Ian. Changing Patterns in South Asia. London: Barrie & Rockcliff, 1961.

Vittachi, Tarzie. Emergency '58. London: André Deutsch, 1958.

Von der Mehden, Fred R. Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963.

Weber, Max. The Religion of India, translated and edited by Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale. New York: Free Press, 1958.

_____. The Sociology of Religion. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963.

Weerawardana, I. D. S. Ceylon General Election 1956. Colombo, Sri Lanka: M. D. Gunasera & Co., 1960.

Wells, Alan. Social Institutions. New York: Basic Books, 1971.

Wertheim, W. F. East-West Parallels. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964.

Wijesekera, N. D. The People of Ceylon. Colombo: M. D. Gunasera & Co., 1965.

Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam. Electoral Politics in an Emergent State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

_____. Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1973. London: Macmillan Press, 1974.

Woodward, Calvin A. The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon. Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1969.

Wriggins, W. Howard. Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960.

_____. The Ruler's Imperative. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.

Yalman, Nur. Under the Bo Tree. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1971.

Yinger, J. Milton. Religion, Society and the Individual. New York: Macmillan Co., 1967.

_____. The Scientific Study of Religion. Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Co., 1970.

Zeylanicus. Ceylon. London: Elek Books, 1970.

Articles

Abeyagunawardena, D. S. "The Buddhist Art of Ceylon." In Hemisphere. Edited by R. J. Maguire. Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1964.

Adam, Werner. "Political Crisis in Sri Lanka." Swiss Review of World Affairs 13 (November 1973): 2-3.

_____. "Sri Lanka's Uncertain Future." Swiss Review of World Affairs 14 (August 1974): 25-26.

Almond, Gabriel A. "Approaches to Development Causation." In Crisis, Choice and Change. Edited by Gabriel A. Almond and Scott C. Flanagan. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1973.

Ames, Michael M. "Ideological and Social Change in Ceylon." Human Organization 22 (1963): 45-53.

Arasaratnam, S. "Nationalism, Communalism and National Unity in Ceylon." In India and Ceylon. Edited by Philip Mason. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Balakrishnan, N. "Sri Lanka in 1974, Battle for Economic Survival." Asian Survey 15 (February 1975): 102-110.

_____. "Sri Lanka in 1975: Political Crisis and Split in the Coalition." Asian Survey 16 (February 1976): 130-140.

Bechert, Heinz. "Contradictions in Sinhalese Buddhism," translated by Dr. W. Richard Cantwell. Contributions to Asian Studies 4 (1974): 7-17.

_____. "Theravada Buddhist Sangha." Journal of Asian Studies 29 (August 1970).

Bellah, Robert N. "Epilogue." In Religion and Progress in Modern Asia. Edited by Robert N. Bellah. New York: Free Press, 1965.

Benz, Ernst. "On Understanding Non-Christian Religions." In The History of Religions. Edited by Mircea Eliade and Joseph M. Kitigawa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.

B. H. "A People's Government--Social and Political Trends in Ceylon." The World Today 22 (1956): 281-291.

Bharati, Agehananda. "Monastic and Lay Buddhism in the 1971 Sri Lanka Insurgency." Journal of Asian and African Studies 11 (January and April 1976): 102-112.

Bhattacharya, Dr. Debesh. "Violence in Sri Lanka." Current Affairs Bulletin 49 (November 1972): 184-190.

Blackton, Charles S. "Sri Lanka's Marxists." Problems of Communism (January-February 1973): 28-43.

Coedès, George. "The Twenty-Five Hundredth Anniversary of the Buddha." Diogenes 15 (July 1956): 95-111.

Crowley, Desmond. "Ceylon: Communities and Politics." Current Affairs Bulletin 36 (July 1965): 51-64.

Deutsch, Karl W. "Social Mobilization and Political Development." American Political Science Review 553 (1961): 493-514.

Easton, David. "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems." World Politics 9 (April 1957): 383-400.

Evers, Hans-Dieter. "Buddha and the Seven Gods." Journal of Asian Studies 27 (1968): 541-550.

_____. "Buddhism and British Colonial Policy in Ceylon." Asian Studies 2 (December 1964): 323-333.

_____. "The Buddhist Sangha in Ceylon and Thailand." Sociologus 18 (1968): 20-35.

_____. "Kinship and Property Rights in a Buddhist Monastery in Central Ceylon." American Anthropologist 69 (1967): 703-710.

_____. "Monastic Landlordism in Ceylon: A Traditional System in a Modern Setting." Journal of Asian Studies 28 (1967): 685-692.

Farmer, B. H. 'The Social Basis of Nationalism in Ceylon." Journal of Asian Studies 24 (May 1965): 431-439.

_____. "Sri Lanka." The Far East and Australasia, 1974. London: Europa Publications, 1974: 341-346.

Fernando, Tissa. "Elite Politics in the New States: The Case of Post-Independence Sri Lanka." Pacific Affairs 46 (Fall 1973): 361-383.

_____. "The Western-Educated Elite and Buddhism in British Ceylon." Contributions to Asian Studies 4 (1974): 18-29.

Flanagan, Scott C. "Models and Methods of Analysis." In Crisis, Choice and Change. Edited by Gabriel A. Almond and Scott C. Flanagan. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1973.

Geertz, Clifford. "The Integrative Revolution." In Old Societies and New States. Edited by Clifford Geertz. New York: Free Press, 1963.

Godkumbara, C. E. "Archaeology in Ceylon." In Hemisphere. Edited by R. J. Maguire. Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1964.

Gokhale, Balkrishna Govind. "Anagarika Dharmapala: Toward Modernity Through Tradition in Ceylon." Contributions to Asian Studies 4 (1974). 30-39.

Gombrich, Richard F. "The Consecration of a Buddhist Image." Journal of Asian Studies 26 (November 1966): 23-36.

_____. "'Merit Transference' in Sinhalese Buddhism: A Case Study of the Interaction Between Doctrine and Practice." History of Religions 2 (November 1971): 203-219.

_____. "Reviews, Buddhism and Society." Modern Asian Studies 6 (1972): 483-496.

Gormé, K. K. "Ceylon's Dilemma." United Asia 20 (March-April 1968): 77-86.

Halliday, Fred. "The Ceylonese Insurrection." In Explosion in a Subcontinent. Edited by Robin Blackburn. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1975.

Jayasekera, P. V. J. "Sri Lanka in 1976: Changing Strategies and Confrontation." Asian Survey 17 (February 1977): 208-217.

Jennings, Sir Ivor. "Politics in Ceylon Since 1952." Pacific Affairs 27 (December 1954): 338-353.

Jiggins, Janice. "Dedigama 1973: A Profile of a By-Election in Sri Lanka." Asian Survey 14 (November 1974): 1000-1014.

Kearney, Robert N. "Educational Expansion and Volatility in Sri Lanka: The 1971 Insurrection." Asian Survey 15 (September 1975): 727-745.

_____. "The New Political Crises of Ceylon." Asian Survey 2 (June 1962). 19-27.

_____. "The Marxist Parties of Ceylon." In Radical Politics in South Asia. Edited by Paul R. Brass and Marcus F. Franda. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1973.

_____. "Sinhalese Nationalism and Social Conflict in Ceylon." Pacific Affairs 37 (Summer 1964): 125-136.

Kitagawa, Joseph M. "The Asian Mind Today." Worldview 16 (January 1973): 8-11.

_____. "Buddhism and Asian Politics." Asian Survey 2 (1962): 1-11.

LaPalombara, Joseph. "Penetration: A Crisis of Governmental Capacity." In Crises and Sequences in Political Development. Edited by Leonard Binder et al. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Leach, E. R. "What the Rioting in Ceylon Means." The Listener 59 (June 5, 1958): 926.

Lerski, George J. "The Twilight of Ceylonese Trotskyism." Pacific Affairs 43 (Fall 1975): 384-393.

Madras, Fr. Thomas Joseph. "Repatriates From Ceylon to India." ICMC Migration News 2 (1955): 8-12.

Malalasekera, Gunapala Rujasena. "Some Aspects of Reality as Taught by Theravada Buddhism." In The Indian Mind. Edited by Charles A. Moore, with the assistance of Aldyth V. Morris. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967.

Marriott, McKim. "Cultural Policy in the New States." In Old Societies and New States. Edited by Clifford Geertz. New York: Free Press, 1963.

Melson, Robert, and Howard Wolpe. "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective." American Political Science Review 64 (1970): 1112-1130.

Miller, Robert J. "Background to Buddhist Resurgence." In Studies in Asia 1966. Edited by Robert K. Sahai. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966.

Nayar, Nancy Ann. "The Societal Foundation of the Early Buddhist Sangha." (Part I and Part II). Prabuddha Bharta 81 (January 1976): 24-30, and 83 (March 1976): 111-119.

Niehoff, Arthur. "Theravada Buddhism. A Vehicle for Technical Change." Human Organization 23 (1964): 108-112.

Obeyesekere, Gananath. "The Buddhist Pantheon in Ceylon and Its Extensions." In Anthropological Studies in Theravada Buddhism. Edited by Manning Nash et al. Yale: Yale University Press, 1966.

_____. "The Great and the Little in the Perspective of Sinhalese Buddhism." Journal of Asian Studies 22 (1963): 139-154.

_____. "Theodicy, Sin and Salvation in a Sociology of Buddhism." In Dialectic in Practical Religion. Edited by E. R. Leach. London: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

Obeysekara, Jayasumana. "Revolutionary Movements in Ceylon." In Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia. Edited by Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973.

Packenheim, Robert A. "Approaches to the Study of Political Development." In The Dynamics of Modernization and Social Change. Edited by George S. Masannat. Pacific Palisades, Cal.: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1973.

Phadnis, Urmila. "Trends in Ceylonese Politics." India Quarterly 27 (April-June 1971): 122-139.

_____. "The UF Government in Ceylon." World Today 27 (June 1971): 267-276.

Pieris, Ralph. "Ideological Momentum and Social Equilibrium." American Journal of Sociology 57 (January 1952): 339-346.

Rangnakar, D. K. "The Nationalist Revolution in Ceylon." Pacific Affairs 33 (December 1960): 361-374.

_____. "Racialism and National Independence in Ceylon." United Asia 10 (October 1958): 391-397.

Reynolds, Frank E. "Tradition and Change in Theravada Buddhism." Contributions to Asian Studies 4 (1974): 94-105.

Ryan, Bryce. "The Ceylonese Village and the New Value System." Rural Sociology 17 (March 1952): 9-28.

_____. "Socio-Cultural Regions of Ceylon." Rural Sociology 15 (March 1950): 3-19.

_____. "Status, Achievement and Education in Ceylon." Journal of Asian Studies 20 (August 1961): 463-476.

Sarachandra, Ediriweera R. "Traditional Values and the Modernization of a Buddhist Society." In Religion and Progress in Modern Asia. Edited by Robert N. Bellah. New York: Free Press, 1965.

Sarkisyanz, Emanuel. "The Social Ethics of Buddhism and the Socio-Economic Development of Southeast Asia." Asian and African Studies 6 (1970): 7-26.

Seneviratne, H. L. "Aristocrats and Rituals in Contemporary Ceylon." Journal of Asian and African Studies 11 (January and April 1976) 97-101.

Singer, Marshall R. "Group Perception and Social Change in Ceylon." International Journal of Comparative Sociology 7 (March 1966). 209-226.

Siriwardane, C. D. S. "Buddhist Reorganization in Ceylon." In South Asian Politics and Religion. Edited by Donald Eugene Smith. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Smith, Bardwell L. "Religion, Social Conflict and the Problem of Identity in South Asia." Journal of Asian and African Studies 11 (January and April 1976): 1-12.

Smith, Donald Eugene. "Emerging Patterns of Religion and Politics." In South Asian Politics and Religion. Edited by Donald Eugene Smith. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966.

_____. "The Political Monks and Monastic Reform." In South Asian Politics and Religion. Edited by Donald Eugene Smith. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966.

_____. "The Politics of Buddhism." Worldview 16 (January 1973): 12-26.

_____. "The Sinhalese Buddhist Revolution." In South Asian Politics and Religion. Edited by Donald Eugene Smith. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Soedjatmoko. "Memorandum on Scope and Purpose of Seminar." In Religion and Progress in Modern Asia. Edited by Robert N. Bellah. New York: Free Press, 1965.

_____. "Cultural Motivations to Progress: The 'Exterior' and the 'Interior' Views." In Religion and Progress in Modern Asia. Edited by Robert N. Bellah. New York: Free Press, 1965.

Spencer, Robert F. "Religion in Asian Society." In Religion and Change in Contemporary Asia. Edited by Robert F. Spencer. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971.

Tambiah, S. J. "Buddhism and This-Worldly Activity." Modern Asian Studies 7 (1973): 1-20.

_____. "The Politics of Language in India and Ceylon." Modern Asian Studies 1 (1967): 215-240.

Warnapala, W. A. Wiswa. "The Formation of the Cabinet in Sri Lanka." Political Science Review 12 (January-June 1973): 121-133.

_____. "The Marxist Parties of Sri Lanka and the 1971 Insurrection." Asian Survey 15 (September 1975): 745-758.

_____. "Sri Lanka in 1973: A Test for Both Rulers and Ruled." Asian Survey 14 (February 1974): 148-157.

Weiner, Myron. "Political Integration and Political Development." In Political Development and Social Change. Edited by Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971.

_____. "The Politics of South Asia." In The Politics of the Developing Nations. Edited by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam. "Buddhism in Ceylon Politics." In South Asian Politics and Religion. Edited by Donald Eugene Smith. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Wilson, J. L. J., ed. "Ceylon." Current Affairs Bulletin 12 (August 1953). 115-128.

Wood, Arthur L. "Political Radicalism in Changing Sinhalese Villages." Human Organization 23 (Summer 1964): 99-107.

Woodward, Calvin A. "Sri Lanka's Electoral Experience: From Personal to Party Politics." Pacific Affairs 47 (Winter 1974-1975): 455-471.

Wriggins, W. Howard. "Ceylon's Time of Troubles, 1956-58." Far Eastern Survey 28 (March 1959): 33-39.

_____. "Gandhi, Bhutto and Bandaranaike Running Hard But..." Worldview 17 (May 1974): 14-20.

_____. "Impediments to Unity in New Nations: The Case of Ceylon." In The Dynamics of Modernization and Social Change. Edited by George S. Masannat. Pacific Palisades, Cal.: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1973.

Yalman, Nur. "The Ascetic Buddhist Monks of Ceylon." Ethnology 1 (1962): 315-328.

_____. "Dual Organization in Central Ceylon." Journal of Asian Studies 24 (May 1965): 441-457.