

# ‘Tunajenga taifa letu’(We are building our nation): The emergence and evolution of new city building in post-socialist Tanzania

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## **Abstract**

In Tanzania, at least 12 new urban mega-developments branded as ‘cities’ have been planned since 2008, largely by government ministries and enduring socialist-era parastatals. These projects join a rising tide of new master-planned cities spreading throughout the Global South, as governments seek not only to respond to the needs of growing urban populations, but also to claim a place on the global stage. This thesis explores the emergence and evolution of new city building in Tanzania and positions it within broader global urban trends. Paying particular attention to Tanzania’s transition from socialism to market capitalism, I argue that institutional legacies from the socialist era have allowed the state to retain a central role in urban development. One of these legacies is the restructured state-owned developers responsible for most of the new city projects underway, whose hybrid configuration blurs the divide between the public and private sectors. I explore how state power is exercised through these hybrid entities and new city projects in order to regain control of informal urban spaces, expand government revenue sources, and legitimize state authority. I also draw on policy mobilities literature to explore how urban visions are circulated internationally, imported, locally re-assembled, and how they are ultimately transforming Tanzania’s urban landscape. Focusing on the role of planning and government networks, urban study tours, and diasporic communities as agents of policy circulation, I map out the geographically diverse sources of urban policy influence in Tanzania’s new city projects. Throughout this thesis, I highlight how entrenched socialist institutions and profit-driven urban development practices produce new city projects that are increasingly unresponsive to low- and middle-income needs and consolidate the benefits of urban development in the hands of a wealthy few.

## **Résumé**

En Tanzanie, 12 nouvelles villes au moins ont été planifiées depuis 2008, en grande partie par l’État et par des entreprises para étatiques datant de l’ère socialiste. Ces projets s’inscrivent au sein d’une vague de construction de villes nouvelles réparties dans le Sud Global. Cette thèse s’intéresse à l’émergence et l’évolution de villes nouvelles en Tanzanie. En accordant une attention particulière à la transition de la Tanzanie socialiste vers le capitalisme, je soutiens que les héritages institutionnels de l’ère socialiste ont permis à l’État de conserver un rôle central dans le développement urbain. J’explore notamment la reconfiguration du rôle des promoteurs immobiliers de l’État qui sont responsables de la plupart des nouveaux projets de villes en cours, et dont la configuration hybride brouille la séparation entre les secteurs public et privé. J’explore la manière dont le pouvoir étatique s’immisce à travers ces entités hybrides et les projets de villes nouvelles, dans le but de reprendre le contrôle d’espaces informels, d’accroître les sources de revenus gouvernementales et de légitimer l’autorité de l’État. J’emploie également la littérature sur la circulation des modèles et politiques urbaines afin d’explorer la manière dont les visions urbaines sont diffusées à l’échelle internationale, importées et réassemblées localement, transformant ainsi le paysage urbain de la Tanzanie. En m’attardant au rôle des réseaux gouvernementaux et de planificateurs urbains, des voyages d’études urbaines, et des communautés diasporiques en tant qu’agents de diffusion, je cartographie la provenance des diverses politiques urbaines qui influencent les projets de villes nouvelles en Tanzanie. À travers cette thèse, je démontre comment les institutions socialistes établies et les pratiques de développement urbain axées sur le profit produisent des villes nouvelles qui ignorent les besoins des populations au revenu faible ou moyen, consolidant les retombées de ces opérations de construction entre les mains de l’élite économique.

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### **List of acronyms**

|   |   |
|---|---|
| AVIC– Aviation Industry Corporation of China      | MIPM– Marché International des Professionnels de l’immobilier               |
| BRI– Belt and Road Initiative                     | MKURABITA– Mpango wa Kurasimisha  |
| BRIC– Brazil Russia India China                   | Rasilimali na Biashara za Wanyonge  |
| CAHF– Center for Affordable Housing Finance       | MLHHSD– Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development        |
| CBD– Central Business District                    | NGO– Non–Governmental Organization  |
| CCD– Capital City District                        | NHC– National Housing Corporation   |
| CCM– Chama Cha Mapinduzi                          | NSSF– National Social Security Fund   |
| CDA– Capital Development Authority                | OECD– Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development                |
| CEO– Chief Executive Officer                      | OPEC– Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries                     |
| CHADEMA– Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo        | PSSSF– Public Service Social Security Fund                                  |
| CMG– China Merchant Group                         | REIT– Real Estate Investment Trust  |
| CMHI– China Merchant Holdings International       | SASAC– China’s State–owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission |
| COO– Chief Operating Officer                      | SEZ– Special Economic Zone  |
| COSTECH– Commission for Science and Technology    | SME– Small and Medium Enterprise  |
| CPS– Customized Property Solutions                | SOE– State Owned Enterprise   |
| DB– Doing Business                                | SWOT– Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats                            |
| EPZA– Export Processing Zone Authority            | TANESCO– Tanzania Electric Supply Company                                   |
| FDI– Foreign Direct Investment                    | TANU– Tanganyika African National Union                                     |
| FEZ– Free Economic Zone                           | TBA– Tanzania Buildings Agency  |
| GCC– Gulf Cooperation Countries                   | TMRC– Tanzania Mortgage Refinancing Company                                 |
| GDP– Gross Domestic Product                       | TPA– Tanzania Ports Authority   |
| GIC– Global Intelligence Corps                    | UAE– United Arab Emirates   |
| ICT– Information Communication Technology         | UNIDO– United Nations Industrial Development Organization                   |
| IMF– International Monetary Fund                  | VAT– Value Added Tax  |
| JV– Joint Venture                                 | WHC– Watumishi Housing Company  |
| KAEC– King Abdullah Economic City                 |   |
| KDA– Kigamboni Development Authority              |   |
| KSP– Knowledge Sharing Program                    |   |
| LAPSSET– Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia–Transport |   |
| LH– Korea Land and Housing Corporation            |   |



## Chapter 1: Introduction

### 1.1 Background

In recent years, ambitious urban mega-developments have emerged on the periphery of Africa's rapidly expanding cities. Taking the form of entirely new districts or cities built from scratch, these greenfield developments stand to reconfigure the built environment of urban Africa. The official rationale put forth by urban authorities is that these urban mega-developments are planned in response to the steep rise in demand for housing, infrastructure, and public services that have accompanied unprecedented rates of urbanization. According to UN projections, Africa's urban population is expected to triple between 2018 and 2050, totaling 1.5 billion urban dwellers by 2050, which will account for 22% of the world's urban population (UN-DESA, 2019: 24).

While new city builders promise these developments will address the urgent needs of growing populations, the luxurious and modern cityscapes featured in their master plans stand in stark contrast to the existing realities of extremely poor urban dwellers. As comprehensively planned mega-projects, they depart from previous more incremental approaches to urban renewal and show little to no evidence of participatory or democratic processes in their planning (Watson, 2014). Often designed by international planners, several of these mega-projects are inspired by global city icons such as Singapore or Dubai and feature utopian designs of modern glass towers and manicured landscapes. The prevailing discourse is that building these 'world-class' cities will enable emerging economies to attract investment and leapfrog from primary export industries to knowledge economies.

In looking to master-planned cities as a panacea for addressing development challenges, African governments join a broader global trend that has been spreading across the Global South since the turn of the century. Often in collaboration with the private sector, governments in Asia, the Middle East, and South America have enthusiastically embraced new cities as part of their national development strategies. Developers and public authorities are attracted by the notion of building from a *tabula rasa* because it allows them to bypass the problems that plague existing cities, and seamlessly deliver high quality infrastructure, services, and lifestyles to their residents. Imagined as multifunctional and autonomous, new cities are symbolically detached any dependence on the 'old' and dilapidating urban centers from which they seek to distance themselves. Disassociated from 'failed' urban spaces (Murray, 2016), new cities are used as a

way for a country to strategically re-brand and project a curated ‘modern’ identity to the world (Koch & Valiyev, 2015; Moser, 2013; Seekins, 2009). For some, spectacular architecture and state-of-the-art facilities are used to communicate to an international audience that a city is ‘open for business’ (Moser, 2019), while for others, motivated by nation-building prospects, for example, new cities are used to communicate state ideology to the citizenry (Koch, 2014; Koch & Valiyev, 2015; Moser, 2013).

New city projects are informed by globally circulating urban ideals, packaged as urban ‘best practices’ by the local elites of so-called model cities, seeking to boost their local interests. A host of traveling technocrats including planners, consultants, and state actors work to circulate urban models around the globe in a bid to seduce state, municipal, and planning authorities into adopting their pre-packaged version of modernity (Bunnell & Das, 2010; Rapoport, 2015a). International conferences and study tours to model cities help sustain these shared policy networks, bringing together new city actors and connecting seemingly disparate places (González, 2011; Moser, 2019). While previous research on the proliferation of global and world city ideals has tended to focus on urban models emanating from the Global North, less is known about the growing number of urban policy transfers between countries of the Global South. Cities in emerging economies that were not previously considered to be centers of innovation have emerged as models for developing countries in search of alternative success stories, and often ones that eschew Western democratic norms (Bhan, 2014; Pow, 2014).

Although this trend has been underway since the 1990s in Asia and the Middle East, scholars argue that this particular wave of new city building took root in Africa around 2010, in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, when loose international capital was in search of new and untapped markets (Keeton & Provoost, 2019; Watson, 2014). African cities have increasingly been seen by international investors as places that can yield massive profits. Reports of a growing middle class, and high economic growth rates have contributed to an increasingly popular narrative that Africa is ‘on the rise’ (Côté-Roy & Moser, 2019; Pitcher, 2012). This seductive discourse has been internalized by local governments, which deflect criticism that there is a mismatch between the new city plans and local needs, with the argument that they have the ‘right to development’ (Côté-Roy & Moser, 2019: 10). Large-scale interventions are justified as being ‘urgent’ and ‘inevitable’, and have the effect of normalizing land speculation, expropriations, and displacements as ‘necessary evils’ in the struggle for improved urban

conditions (van Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 2018). While many projects are still in nascent stages of implementation, critics have raised concerns over their long-term impacts. Scholars have speculated broadly about what consequences private financing will have on the future governance of new cities (Fält, 2019; van Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 2018); how these enclaves of wealth risk exacerbating already-existing divisions (Datta, 2015; Murray, 2016); and whether they are likely to distract government resources and financing away from more pressing needs and towards investments that will only benefit a wealthy few (Moser, 2020; Watson, 2014).

Given the novelty of this trend in Africa and the pressing challenges that accompany fast rates of urbanization, more empirical research is needed on new city projects emerging across the continent. In addition, more academic attention is needed on the factors that enable and promote the emergence of new cities, including how they are informed by emerging urban models in the Global South. While several planned projects have yet to break ground, gathering empirical evidence in these early stage is critical, given the profound impacts these mega-project are likely to have on future urban conditions (Fält, 2019; van Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 2018).

## **1.2 Objectives and research questions**

My research explores the emergence and evolution of new city projects in Tanzania. Since 2008-2010, enduring socialist-era parastatals, public pension funds, government ministries, and private developers have separately planned and implemented 12 new city projects, making it one of the most prolific countries engaged in new city building in the region. While these projects are at varying stages of implementation, they are largely planned as multifunctional satellite developments on the outskirts of major cities including Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Dodoma, and Zanzibar Town. However, one exception is an ambitious plan to revive and permanently move all government functions to the socialist-era capital of Dodoma, a transition that had for almost 50 years remained incomplete.

To date, Tanzania's new city projects have received little scholarly attention both individually and as a group. Tanzania presents as a unique case study in the region as the country pursued one of the most comprehensive experiments in African socialism from the late 1960s to the mid 1980s. It is also one of the few countries in the region to have taken part in new city building in the post-independence period, with the planning and partial construction of Dodoma. These historical factors provide fertile ground for examining the role of legacies and continuities

from this era and their impact on contemporary urban transformations. Furthermore, Tanzania's commercial capital, Dar es Salaam is projected to reach 13.4 million by 2035 (UN-DESA, 2018), breaching the threshold of 10 million inhabitants that characterizes a megacity. How authorities are choosing to respond to this unprecedented spike in urban population will be crucial in the years to come.

Having identified Tanzania as a fruitful case for new cities research, my objectives for this thesis are threefold. First, I aim to critically examine the drivers and rationales behind the emergence of new master-planned city projects in Tanzania. Second, I seek to explore how these new city projects have been influenced by internationally circulating urban models. Third, I intend to examine what impact the post-independence socialist period has had on the local urban context and the new city projects developing within it. In investigating these three different aspects of my case study, I aim to situate Tanzania's experience within the broader global trend of new city building.

### **Research Questions:**

Given Tanzania's avid participation in new city building, and the need for more conceptual clarity and empirical evidence for how this trend is developing in Africa, I have used the following three sets of research questions to guide my thesis research.

#### **(1) Rationales and motivations**

What are the local and transnational drivers behind Tanzania's new city projects? How do new city projects fit into the national political, economic, and social development agenda? What are the official and unofficial rationales for building these new cities? How have new city projects and their drivers shifted over time and how have they been impacted by leadership transitions?

#### **(2) Urban visions and global influences**

What are the prevailing new city visions among Tanzania's new city projects and what regional and global models are they informed by? How are global urban visions circulated and imported into Tanzania? Who are the local and international actors involved in visioning, translating, and implementing new city projects in Tanzania? How are imported visions contested and localized? How are broader global urban trends reflected in the Tanzania's new city projects?

#### **(3) Socialist legacies and public-private configurations**

How does Tanzania's socialist past influence the local urban context and the actors involved in planning and implementing new cities? What is the role of the state and to what extent is the

private sector involved in the planning, financing, and implementation of new city projects? Does the socialist-era, master-planned city of Dodoma set a precedent for Tanzania's new master-planned cities or does the government seek to emulate other more contemporary international or regional models?

Using these three broad sets of questions to guide my investigation and analysis of new city projects in Tanzania, I seek to contribute to a better understanding of why and how 'new cities' have been embraced with such enthusiasm.

### **1.3 Structure of thesis**

This thesis is structured into seven chapters, starting with this introduction. **Chapter Two** provides historical context, which I present chronologically, first briefly recounting the pre-colonial and colonial eras, then examining two important political and economic transitions, the socialist transition that followed independence in the 1960s, and the neoliberal transition of the late 1980s. Focusing on institutional legacies from both of these periods, I examine how these have influenced new city actors and the urban agenda today. **Chapter Three** presents my research approach and the qualitative methods I used to collect and analyse my data. I also include a discussion section, where I reflect on the challenges of carrying out research in a rapidly changing political context. **Chapter Four** presents the three main strands of literature in which I have chosen to anchor my research, starting with the literature on new cities in Africa, followed by policy mobilities literature, and finishing with scholarship on entrepreneurial governance. Throughout, I highlight areas that deserve more scholarly attention and the ways in which my research seeks to fill various gaps in the scholarship. **Chapter Five** is the first of two empirical chapters and provides an overview and map of all the new city projects I was able to identify in Tanzania, the actors involved, and how urban redevelopment approaches have changed over time. **Chapter Six** is the second empirical chapter and explores Tanzania's new city projects through a policy mobilities framework, examining some of the key actors and modes through which urban policies, norms, and forms are circulated into Tanzania. **Chapter Seven** concludes my thesis, reiterates the main contributions I have made, and suggests avenues for further research.

## **Chapter 2: Historical context**

### **2.1 Introduction**

In this chapter I introduce the political and economic transitions that shaped Tanzania throughout the pre- and post-colonial eras and how they continue to impact contemporary urban development. The first section provides an overview of the pre-colonial and colonial periods, which lays the foundation for later chapters about diasporic movements between Oman and Zanzibar, as well as the relocation of the country's capital from Dar es Salaam to the inland city of Dodoma. First, I briefly describe coastal Tanzania's pre-colonial prominence as an ancient trading post with strong ties to the Persian Gulf and urban centers that predate European colonialism. I then delve into the country's colonial experience, first as part of German East Africa, and then as a British protectorate. Moving on to the two periods that are most critical to my research, I explore: (1) the post-independence period under Julius Nyerere, architect of Tanzania's 20-year experiment with African socialism; and (2) the post-socialist period, defined by market-oriented reforms and structural adjustment policies imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. I focus on the ways in which these two periods of radical reform attempted to resolve the shortcomings of previous periods and how they have come to influence urban development in Tanzania today. Finally, I conclude with an overview of the current urban and political context under President Magufuli who was elected in 2015. I highlight the current regime's protectionist policies and the revival of a selection of socialist-era plans and examine how these have impacted the trajectories of several new city projects.

### **2.2 Pre-colonial and colonial beginnings**

#### **2.2.1 Pre-colonial period**

The Swahili coast stretches from modern-day Somalia to Northern Mozambique and has for centuries been a place of 'intense global interconnectivity' (Myers, 2011: 167). As far back as the eighth century, caravans transporting gold, sugarcane, cloves, ivory, and slaves from the continental interior would congregate in the port cities that lined the coast, loading ships bound for Persia, India, and China (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2005). This cultural confluence contributed to the evolution of a distinct Swahili culture and language that blended African Bantu with loan words from Arabic and Hindi. A short distance from the continental coast, the two islands that make up Zanzibar offered a protected harbor from which transoceanic trade between the Swahili

Coast and the rest of the world flourished. From 1690 to 1861, Zanzibar was an Omani Sultanate, eventually becoming the center of the empire when Sultan Seyyid Said moved his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar Town in 1832 in order to elude British pressures to end the slave trade (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2005). After gaining independence from Oman, the Sultan of Zanzibar went on to establish the port city of Dar es Salaam in 1862, adding to the many coastal trade cities along the Swahili Coast that predate European colonization (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2005; Hayuma, 1980). Although it came under British colonial rule in 1890 as European powers chipped away at the continent and undermined and usurped the power of local rulers, Omani influence endured under the Sultan of Zanzibar<sup>1</sup>, who remained a constitutional monarch throughout the British colonial occupation (Ingrams, 1967).

### **2.2.2 Colonial period**

For a brief period (1890-1919), mainland Tanzania, along with Burundi and Rwanda, constituted Germany's East African colonies. After Britain and France, Germany had amassed the third largest colonial empire in Africa, acquiring most of its overseas territories during the Berlin Conference of 1884, where European powers famously partitioned the African continent among themselves (Emel, Huber, & Makene, 2011). In a bid to open up the territory for exploitation, the German colonial state quickly established railway and road communication lines into the landlocked interior, linking them back to the port in Dar es Salaam (Hayuma, 1980). Railroad lines were used largely to transport commodities such as coffee, sisal, and cotton, although the colonial regime was also interested in mining gold early on and encouraged private companies to exploit minerals (Emel et al., 2011). The German colonial administration used violence in order to control the population and employed systems of forced labor to carry out most construction and agriculture. Resistance to these oppressive tactics culminated in the violent Maji Maji Uprising of 1905, which lasted two years and spread over a considerable part of Southern Tanganyika (Beverton, 2009). The insurgency eventually led to the adoption of a more liberal administration by the colonial authorities and inspired later 20<sup>th</sup> century freedom fighters in their struggle against European occupation (Ingham & Chiteji, 2020).

Following the German defeat at the end of the First World War, the League of Nations mandate divided and ceded Germany's overseas territories to the allied powers (Callahan, 1993). Tanganyika<sup>2</sup> became (and would remain) a British protectorate until its independence in 1961.

Unlike neighbouring Kenya, where British settlers were encouraged through land grants and technical assistance (Mueller, 1981), the British colonial administration never promoted Tanganyika as a settler colony. This limited colonial investments to the two port cities of Tanga and Dar es Salaam, both of which were linked to the railway networks reaching into the hinterlands (Sawers, 1989). Dar es Salaam's prominence grew relative to other Tanzanian cities thanks to its status as both the capital city and the best harbor in the country (Sawers, 1989). By independence in 1961, Dar es Salaam's population had grown to four times the size of the second largest city, Tanga (Sawers, 1989). Throughout both colonial regimes, the heavy death toll among settlers in the coastal capital of Dar es Salaam prompted the authorities to consider relocating the capital to the highlands, where the climate was more temperate and free from malaria (Hayuma, 1980). While several inquiries into moving the capital were conducted, imperial interests prevailed over settler health, and the capital remained as Dar es Salaam so that colonial authorities could continue to exploit its natural harbor.

## **2.3 Post-independence experiment with socialism**

### **2.3.1 Independence and the Arusha Declaration**

By the 1950s the League of Nations mandate that had brought Tanganyika under British control was converted into a UN 'trusteeship', whose ultimate goal was to ease non-self-governing territories into independence (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2020). Julius Nyerere, founder of the Tanganyika African Union party (TANU) and an outspoken nationalist, became the lead negotiator in the emancipation process, which culminated in his election as prime minister<sup>3</sup> of an independent Tanganyika in December 1961. The nation-wide enthusiasm that accompanied independence was short lived, and the years that followed were characterized by economic and political instability both on the mainland as well as on Zanzibar, which at the time was still in the process of becoming independent. By the time Zanzibar gained independence from Britain in 1963, centuries of Omani occupation, slavery, and colonial-imposed racial subjugation had privileged Zanzibaris of Arab and Asian descent (here meaning of Omani, Yemeni, or Indian descent) both economically and politically (Myers, 2011). In a series of pre-independence elections, the Arab-Zanzibar Nationalist Party and the Pemba People's Party had retained a parliamentary majority, despite only representing a minority of the population. Unsatisfied with their lack of representation, the mainly African Afro-Shirazi Party allied with the left-wing Umma Party and mounted an insurrection in January of 1964 (Mathews, 2018). The revolt



quickly devolved into sectarian violence as insurgents raided police barracks, and once in possession of weapons, proceeded to overthrow the Sultan and brutally kill some 5,000 Arab and Asian Zanzibaris (Mathews, 2018). Those who survived the onslaught fled principally to the UK or the Gulf States, with many ending up in Oman, and eventually becoming naturalized (Myers, 2011). In the months following the coup, Zanzibar's new government, led by the Afro-Shirazi and Umma Parties, coordinated with TANU to unify Tanganyika and Zanzibar, forming the United Republic of Tanzania<sup>4</sup> in April 1964.

Taking stock of the progress made since independence and the continued economic difficulties that wracked the nation, Nyerere argued that basing development on capitalist systems had failed (Cooper, 2002). In 1967, Nyerere produced the Arusha Declaration, in which he outlined his particular brand of African Socialism, *Ujamaa*, Swahili for 'familyhood' (Cooper, 2002), and laid out a national development strategy promoting self-reliance. Based on his exposure to post-war Fabian Socialism<sup>5</sup> during his time at Edinburgh University in the early 1950s, Nyerere developed a distinct anti-market philosophy, which he fused with his belief that particular aspects of village life functioned well and could be scaled up to yield broader benefits. Moreover, his doctrine denounced elitism and focused on the creation of a single Tanzanian identity rooted in egalitarian principles (Hyden & Karlstrom, 1993). This ideology earned him support from communist China and the Soviet Union, both of which provided assistance in the form of financial aid and infrastructure projects<sup>6</sup> (Hyden & Karlstrom, 1993). Nyerere was far from the only African leader to adopt socialist ideals; in fact 35 African countries out of 53 declared themselves socialist following independence (Anne Pitcher & Askew, 2006). Socialism's revolutionary and anti-imperial doctrine appealed to post-colonial leaders, who wanted to break free from the Western capitalist markets in which African states were trapped exporting cheap primary resources to Europe (Thomson, 2018). During the 1960s, socialism had proven to be a successful alternative to Western capitalism—after all, the Soviet Union had developed from an agrarian-based economy to a major superpower in less than 30 years. Post-colonial leaders who embraced socialism hoped that by centralizing the planning of their economies they could develop their own industrial capacity and become modern and competitive states (Thomson, 2016). Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, Guinea's Sekou Toure, and Senegal's Léopold Senghor all devoted themselves to rebuilding the cultural identities of their nascent nations by espousing some version of socialism (Pitcher and Askew, 2006; Cooper, 2002). Yet

what set Nyerere's Tanzania apart from the socialist endeavors of other African independence leaders were the two state-led interventions at the heart of *Ujamaa*: (1) the relocation of the administrative capital to the master-planned city of Dodoma (Hayuma, 1980; Scott, 1998; Vale, 2008), and (2) the widespread forced resettlement of 'unorganized' populations into the state-planned *vijiji vya Ujamaa*, or communal agricultural villages (Cooper, 2002; Hydén, 1980; Pratt, 1999). These large-scale attempts to use place-based policies to spur rural economic development have influenced the current urban development context and set precedents for the most recent wave of new city projects.

### **2.3.2 Socialist restructuring**

In the years that followed the Arusha Declaration, socialist reform aimed to centralize the state's power over the economy and redistribute resources to rural underdeveloped areas where most Tanzanians were living (Sawers, 1989). Spatial redistribution policies would provide a counterpoint to the deeply unjust land ownership patterns implemented during the colonial era, in which urban zoning practices disenfranchised the African majority. High building standards and taxes kept poorer African households from accessing better-serviced areas and effectively promoted racially segregated neighborhoods. Europeans and Asians were able to settle in low-density neighborhoods and Africans were relegated to high-density areas (Alexander, 1983). Inequality was further maintained through laws that permitted the regular demolition of so called 'slum housing' disproportionately occupied by African migrants, in the name of sanitation (Alexander, 1983; Owens, 2014). To correct this disparity, institutions were created and legislation and policies were drafted that would allow the state to acquire national assets and private enterprise (Cooper, 2002). The 1967 Land Acquisition Act granted the central government ownership and powers of expropriation over all national territory. The Act made the private purchase, sale, and rent of land illegal, stripping all land of commercial value (Land Acquisition Act, 1967; Owens, 2014). As a result, claims to land were reduced to a mere right of occupancy and the state became the sole proprietor of land. These spatial policies both abolished existing formal capitalist land markets that had been established during the colonial-era and expanded state power over urban development (Owens, 2014).

At the same time, one of the primary concerns of the post-independence government was to support the delivery of affordable and high-quality housing for all citizens (Kironde, 1992).

Providing secure housing would correct the poor housing conditions of African households that were intensified during the colonial era and lay the foundation for a 'stable and contented population' (Kironde, 1992: 314). In 1962, the National Housing Corporation was established with the ambitious mandate to provide universal housing to all Tanzanians. Their slogan, *Tunajenga taifa letu*, 'we are building our nation', attests to the central role the NHC was expected to play in the newly independent nation. As a public housing agency under the Ministry of Lands<sup>7</sup>, the NHC was expected to produce 2,000 residential units per year, or 25% of total demand at the time (Komu, 2011). To achieve these ambitious targets, the NHC was vested with the state's authority. In 1971, the Buildings Acquisition Act granted the NHC the power to acquire any building that was either of 'high value or did not serve as a primary residence' (Acquisition of Buildings Act, 1971; Owens, 2014: 43). The Act enabled the NHC to amass a large portfolio of well-located properties throughout the country, the majority of which were rented out rather than sold (Komu, 2011; Owens, 2014). As demand outstripped the NHC's capacity to provide housing, and without access to alternative formal developers, many Tanzanians resorted to building their homes through informal arrangements (Owens, 2014).

Urban policy reforms under Nyerere were primarily concerned with the redistribution of wealth, aimed at overcoming the unequal development between Dar es Salaam and the rural interior that had been exacerbated by the German and British colonial regimes (Sawers, 1989). A second Five Year Development Plan was released in 1969, which highlighted the government's fear of unequal development between urban and rural areas:

The danger is that 'development' in Tanzania could be exclusively concentrated in one or two areas, leaving the other areas stagnant or even in decline. (Sawers, 1989: 844; URT, 1969: 176)

In order to address the potential for unequal development, a growth pole program was established the same year that would build new manufacturing facilities in nine towns in rural areas, with the intention of diverting growth from Dar es Salaam and boosting economic activity in the regions surrounding the poles (Sawers, 1989). In addition, several other anti-primacy policies were adopted, including directing social welfare spending to less developed regions and transferring the capital from coastal Dar es Salaam to Dodoma, located near the geographical center of the country. While these re-distribution policies helped promote the growth of industrial employment in centers outside of Dar es Salaam (Sawers, 1989), they also marked the

beginning of an extended period of urban deterioration as fiscal and municipal resources were steadily diverted from cities into rural areas.

### 2.3.3 Dodoma: The nonmonumental capital

In 1973, Nyerere set out to build the ‘first nonmonumental capital city’ (Vale, 2008: 179), a physical manifestation of the *Ujamaa* values of equality, self-reliance, and hard work (Vale, 2008). Located close to the country’s geographic center, the new capital of Dodoma was intended to help further Nyerere’s nation-building efforts by turning fiscal and economic resources to the rural and impoverished hinterlands. Capital relocation was not uncommon in the post-colonial era; five other newly independent African countries, including Congo, Malawi, Botswana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Mauritania<sup>8</sup> also went on to build new capitals to consolidate national identity and break with former colonial strongholds<sup>9</sup> (P. Hall, 2006; Myers, 2011).

Produced in 1976 by Toronto-based Project Planning Associates Ltd., the master plan for Dodoma drew inspiration from Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City (Beeckmans, 2018; Project Planning Associates Ltd., 1967), the modernist movement, and from local rural communities in Tanzania. Organized around communal ten-house cells (Figure 2.1), the residential layout was intended to ‘represent the village way of life’ (Project Planning Associates Ltd., 1967: 15).





Figure 2.1: TANU cells consisted of a neighborhood layout of 10 houses, headed by a voluntary leader who acted as representative on behalf of the TANU political party. As the most basic unit of party organization, the TANU cell allowed for the extended reach of the party and the government at the grass-roots level (O’Barr, 1972). Source: (Project Planning Associates Ltd., 1967).

In plans for Dodoma, long, low-rise buildings that referenced the vernacular *Tembe* house were married with modernist designs (Project Planning Associates Ltd., 1967). The Capital Center designed by Conklin Rossant, depicted an undulating pedestrian walkway flanked by the National Library, the High Court, museums, and public gathering spaces, all ‘articulated to human scale’ and surrounded by verdant gardens (Vale, 2008).



Figures 2.2 and 2.3: The capital center walkway designed by Conklin Rossant, featuring (right) an abstracted Acacia tree at the center of the Ujamaa Square. Source: (Project Planning Associates Ltd., 1967)

At the southern end of the walkway, in the city’s Ujamaa Square, stood a large, abstracted Acacia tree to symbolize a traditional gathering place of Tanzanian villagers (Vale, 2008; Myers, 2011). Rejecting the strict geometrical forms that characterized other modernist capitals of the twentieth century like Chandigarh and Brasilia, Dodoma’s planners allowed the built environment to curve around the existing hilly topography, while making sure to keep buildings off arable land that would be cultivated by future residents (Vale, 2008). Replete with references to rural Tanzanian life, the plans for the new capital echoed the villagization program underway (Myers, 2011; Project Planning Associates Ltd., 1967) and served as a mediating point between urban and rural populations (Vale, 2008).

In the eyes of its creators, Dodoma would become a ‘powerful postcolonial symbol’ of Tanzania’s new egalitarian order (Myers, 2011: 43). A faltering economy and compounding external shocks, including the OPEC oil crises of 1973 and 1979, derailed the construction and transfer of the new capital. Only one third of the master plan was ever built, and although parliament officially relocated to Dodoma in the 1990s, it remained a ‘lonely legislative outpost’

(Vale, 2008: 188). Intentions to finalize the move re-emerged intermittently over the years, but none of them came to fruition (Myers, 2011). As a result, Dar es Salaam remained both the center of commercial activity and continued to house several government ministries, with government staff only traveling to Dodoma when parliament convened (Myers, 2011). In 2016, newly-elected president John Magufuli promised to complete the nearly 50-year-long transition by the end of his five-year term in 2020. As of February 2019, all ministries have been relocated to Dodoma, and foreign embassies have been granted plots in the center of what is now the new and permanent seat of the Tanzanian government.

As the first master-planned city project in Tanzania, Dodoma sets an important local precedent for the current wave of new city building, as planners and developers (in particular, those working to expand Dodoma) draw lessons from its planning and implementation. Several employees from the Ministry of Lands who witnessed the development of the initial 1976 plan attribute the city's failure to poor economic conditions and continue to draw inspiration from the original master plan. Another less obvious legacy is the impact Dodoma's construction had on Dar es Salaam and other urban centers in Tanzania. Construction and ongoing efforts to relocate the capital progressively drained financial and human resources from Dar es Salaam, further reducing capacity for urban management and redevelopment in what was and still remains the country's main urban center (Owens, 2014; Sawers, 1989).

#### **2.3.4 *Ujamaa* villagization: Forced relocation and communal agriculture**

Central to Nyerere's socialist experiment was the creation of *Ujamaa* villages, a resettlement scheme that sought to resolve Tanzania's problems of rural poverty by promoting the collaborative nature of African agrarian society (Hydén, 1980). This would be accomplished by moving scattered rural populations into centralized village units, which would be 'equipped with schools, clinics and party offices' (Cooper, 2002: 178). The pragmatic and administrative logic behind the scheme was that it would improve agricultural productivity and public service provision in a country with low population density. Unsurprisingly, peasants preferred to work their own individual plots and when requested by the state to join *Ujamaa* Villages, resolved to 'escape' to new plots of abundantly available land to continue small-scale subsistence agriculture (Hydén, 1980). Nevertheless, government forces persisted, becoming coercive and violent at times. On several occasions, houses were burned to prevent those who had been forcibly moved

from returning to their villages (Scott, 1998). By 1976, 91% of the population had been settled into *Ujamaa* Villages (Cooper, 2002: 178). As resources continued to be diverted to the newly occupied villages, urban management was 'starved of fiscal resources, well-trained technocrats, and land development potential' (Owens, 2014: 40). Naturally urban populations continued to grow, but a lack of resources placed immense pressure on the shrunken municipal governments and existing infrastructure (Owens, 2014). Although carried out by a benign and arguably well-intentioned state, the villagization scheme was the 'largest forced resettlement scheme [carried out to date] in independent Africa' (Scott, 1998: 223). Several scholars point to the similarities this scheme shared with the agricultural settlement programs of the colonial era (Myers, 2011; Scott, 1998; Vale, 2008). These feats of social engineering carried out under the banner of development have undoubtedly set precedents for large-scale, top-down planning schemes such as new master-planned cities. The new city projects emerging today are tied both to plans and philosophical ideals from the socialist era as well as new and developing global forces.

## **2.4 Neoliberal reform**

In evaluating the legacy of *Ujamaa*, regardless of how it was carried out, several advances were made in terms of social welfare. *Ujamaa* villages became important centers for the provision of health care and education (Ibhawoh & Dibia, 2003). By 1985, Tanzania had the highest primary school enrollment of any Sub-Saharan country (96%); the maternal mortality rate dropped by more than half between 1961 and 1973 (James, 2014); 60% of villages had easy access to potable water, a health care center, and dispensary (Ibhawoh & Dibia, 2003: 71). Beyond material economic and development indicators, Nyerere's endeavors to establish greater social equality created a harmony between different ethnic groups that few other African nations have been able to achieve (Ibhawoh & Dibia, 2003).

Despite these successes, a period of steep economic deterioration ensued. In the years that followed the implementation of villagization, agricultural production plummeted; drought and transportation disruptions led the way to famine, which, coupled with the international oil crises of 1973 and 1979, combined to make Tanzania one of the 'biggest per-capita consumers of foreign aid' in the world (Cooper, 2002: 179). Matters only worsened in 1978 and 1979 when Tanzania was dragged into a war with Ugandan dictator Idi Amin (Cooper, 2002). An upsurge in international interest rates triggered by the global debt crisis of the early 1980s, compounded Tanzania's debt burden and dealt a final blow to the Tanzanian economy (Hyden & Karlstrom,

1993). Urban populations suffered most, as they could not retreat into subsistence agriculture like their rural counterparts (Cooper, 2002). In an effort to pressure Tanzania into adjusting its economic policies, the international donor community set conditions for future loans. Nyerere resisted these demands and viewed them not only as a threat to *Ujamaa* but to the nation's sovereignty (Hyden & Karlstrom, 1993). As the economy continued to deteriorate, local opposition to Nyerere intensified and led to the eventual abandonment of the socialist project. Nyerere resigned as president in November of 1985, and upon delivering his farewell speech at the Diamond Jubilee Hall in Dar es Salaam, he conceded that he failed to fulfil his development objectives (Nyerere, 1985).

#### **2.4.1 Structural adjustment policies and the dismantling of the welfare state**

Tanzania's transition from socialism to free-market capitalism marked the beginning of an era of regional economic divergence. In 1986, newly appointed President Ali Hassan Mwinyi announced that Tanzania was abandoning socialism in order to access loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The loans were conditional on the adoption of free market capitalism and trade liberalization (Cooper, 2002; Hyden, 1980; Pratt, 1999). Macro-economic reform required the state to apply policies of deregulation, privatization, and liberalization, which included cutting food and housing subsidies, lifting import restrictions, and privatizing and or liquidating 'wasteful parastatals' (Green, 2009: 12).

The impacts of economic liberalization were mixed. While per capita income and agricultural production increased, government spending cutbacks progressively dismantled the welfare state that had been established under the Arusha Declaration. As state-owned firms and resources were gradually privatized, the process of neoliberalization became a vehicle for elites to capture state resources, spreading corruption throughout the public sector (Barkan, 1994; Owens, 2014). Mwinyi's role in the liberalization reforms earned him the nickname of 'Bwana Ruksa' or Mr. Permission; his administration was characterized by an 'anything goes' attitude that captured the zeitgeist of Tanzania in the 1990s (Briggs & Mwamfupe, 2000). Controls on imports and exports were loosened, which encouraged a consumer boom, particularly in Dar es Salaam, where 'windfall cash' from liberalization gains was reinvested in peri-urban real estate (Briggs and Mwamfupe 2000: 806). Since cities function as strategic places of contemporary capitalism and centers of production, consumption, and agglomeration (Brenner & Theodore,



2002; Krätke, 2014; Storper, 2011), urban centers in Tanzania once again became the focal point of economic development. While the socialist period represented an era of regional convergence, as place-based redistribution policies closed the divide between urban and rural, the neoliberal transition of the 1980s and 1990s resulted in regional economic divergence.

#### **2.4.2 Difficult transitions: The persistence of socialist-era institutions**

The current urban development context is the result of an uneven transition from socialism to capitalism, where parastatals and legislation established in the socialist period remained in place after neoliberal reforms. Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, the NHC, along with more than 400 other public sector institutions, was privatized (Komu, 2011: 144). The 1990 NHC Act reoriented the agency's role from a public housing provider to a hybrid public-private real estate developer, making it financially independent from the state, with the expectation that operating on 'sound commercial principles', would enable the agency to perform more efficiently (National Housing Corporation Act, 1990; Owens, 2014). Despite becoming a commercial private sector entity, the NHC continued to operate under the Ministry of Lands, and new stipulations required the corporation pay dividends to the central government. In the decade that followed, the NHC struggled financially. This persisted until the 2005 Miscellaneous Act made it possible for the NHC to 'determine market rents, acquire land and compete in any sector of the housing market' (2005 Miscellaneous Act, 2005; Owens, 2014: 50). This amendment enabled the NHC to pursue high-end real estate projects and emboldened the agency to become a leading real estate developer.

Although nation-wide privatization efforts should have introduced new competition to the real estate development market, persistent socialist-era agencies and 'institutional infrastructure' pervaded the reform period (Hyden and Karlstom, 1993: 1400) and maintained the NHC's monopoly over urban development. Throughout the socialist era, the Buildings Acquisition Act (1971), had allowed the NHC to acquire high-value buildings. This Act remained in place until 1990, five years after the abandonment of the socialist agenda and Nyerere's resignation as head of state (Komu, 2011; Owens, 2014). The persistence of the 1971 Act created a powerful disincentive for private property developers who feared the expropriation risk associated with formal transparent urban development. Informal housing production that had characterized the socialist era continued as people opted to build their homes outside the regulatory framework.

The complex systems of ownership and limited documentation that characterizes informal development further obscured transactions (Owens, 2014). According to the Urban Dwellers Survey, by 2015 62.5% of Tanzania's urban population lived in informal settlements, versus 37.5% in planned areas (The Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development, 2016).

## **2.5 Tanzania today under Magufuli 'The Bulldozer'**

### **2.5.1 Shifting political tides**

In November of 2015, President John Pombe Magufuli was sworn in as Tanzania's fifth president after winning 58% of the votes in the most contentious election in political history (BBC News, 2015b). His party, *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM), 'the party of the revolution', has maintained power since independence despite Tanzania's transition to a multiparty democracy in 1992 (Anyimadu, 2016). No opposition party had managed to rally sufficient political support until presumed front-runner Edward Lowassa defected from CCM after losing the presidential candidate nomination, joined the opposition party *Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo* (CHADEMA), 'the party of democracy and development', and mounted a coalition with three other political parties (BBC News, 2015a). This election exposed fractures within the CCM and attested to waning voter support for the ruling party (Anyimadu, 2016). In the years leading up to the election, CHADEMA had gained popularity through a vocal anti-corruption campaign that was largely targeted at exposing members of the CCM and drawing attention to large-scale land deals (Owens, 2014) and mineral exploitation by foreign investors (Jacob & Pedersen, 2018).

Presenting himself as a populist leader committed to these very same values, and virtually appropriating the opposition's manifesto, Magufuli vowed to purge the public and private sector of corruption and reinstate the country's sovereignty over its own resources. Once in office, his administration sacked and suspended the senior executives of several state-owned enterprises, notably those of the National Housing Corporation and National Social Security Fund (Domasa, 2018). With these agencies being among the most prominent real estate developers in the country, several new city projects have been disrupted. In addition to Magufuli's crusade on corruption, the administration has taken up several protectionist measures that have raised questions about the emergence of resource nationalism in the region (Lange & Kinyondo, 2016). In an effort to consolidate ownership of natural resources and raise government revenue

collection, the administration has introduced legislature to increase taxes, royalties, and domestic processing requirements (Collord, 2019). Ownership contracts have been renegotiated in order to establish the state as a majority shareholder in several extractive multinational operations. Acacia Mining Plc, a London-based subsidiary of the Canadian mining giant Barrick Gold, was caught in a nearly two year-long dispute with the Tanzanian government over a ban on mineral export concentrates and \$190 billion in outstanding taxes (Shabalala & Saminather, 2019). Often punctuated by state-sovereignty rhetoric, resource nationalism has regained momentum more recently in resource-rich African countries (Andreasson, 2015; Lange & Kinyondo, 2016).

Jacob and Pedersen (2018) argue that tougher fiscal policies (especially towards extractive multinationals) and the growing presence of the state in the economy were underway well before Magufuli assumed office, as part of a broader shift in the ruling party's strategy to retain political support after competitive elections in 2010. Magufuli adds to this a populist style and authoritarian leanings. Attention has been drawn to Magufuli's crackdown on freedom of speech and local media by international media and advocacy groups such as Amnesty International (2019) and Human Rights Watch (2019). Heavy policing of the internet and social media has resulted in the arrest of several citizens and the disappearance of journalists who had criticized the regime (Collord, 2019). More worrisome to the international community is the ban on any anti-government protests and the multiple arrests and assassination attempts on opposition party leaders (Al Jazeera, 2017; Ng'wanakilala, 2018). These measures have created a constrained and insecure environment in which many are afraid to speak out. Critics have voiced concerns that this regime could upset decades of otherwise peaceful democracy (Ahearne, 2017; Peralta, 2018).

### **2.5.2 Reviving *Ujamaa* and its long-awaited capital city**

Magufuli's populist regime engages with politics of memory in order to gain support and consolidate power. Throughout his campaign and into his presidency, President Magufuli has frequently made references to Nyerere and more generally to *Ujamaa*-era principles. While CCM has always strategically tied its identity closely to the memory of founding father, Julius Nyerere, Magufuli's allusions to Nyerere are far more explicit than previous presidents. Echoes of socialist discourse can be found in Magufuli's campaign slogan *Hapa Kazi Tu* 'we are just here to work', a clear nod to the principles of 'hard work' put forth by Nyerere. Other similarities

include his promotion of the industrial sector as a way for Tanzania to achieve ‘self-reliance’—yet another tenet of the Arusha Declaration. With his stern stance on corruption and humble beginnings as a school teacher, several observers have called Magufuli a ‘young Nyerere’ (Ahearne, 2017). However, his most evident revival of Nyerere-era politics is his ambitious plan to complete the relocation of the capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma. Although plans to relocate the capital also re-emerged under both President Benjamin Mkapa (1995-2005) and president Jakaya Kikwete (2005-2015) (Myers, 2011), Magufuli is the only president to have made any substantial commitments to the capital transition. Despite opposition from government staff, many of whom are reluctant to make the move from bustling, coastal Dar es Salaam to the small and isolated capital city, Magufuli has pushed on and according to one journalist reportedly threatened that ‘anyone left behind after he had made the move himself would be dismissed’ (Interview, August 2018). What started out as a way to rally support throughout the campaign trail has evolved into a key instrument of control, wielding the memory of the nation’s founding father as a tool to legitimize the regime.

## **2.6 Conclusion**

The two comprehensive reform programs that defined Tanzania’s post-independence period have undoubtedly had lasting impacts on urban development. Socialist restructuring centralized state control over land management by abolishing land markets and vesting formal housing production in the NHC. Redistributive policies that spread resources to rural areas drained financial and managerial capacity from existing urban centers, in particular Dar es Salaam (Owens, 2014; Sawers, 1989). The neoliberal transition that followed also transformed the urban landscape by reorienting the mandates of state-owned agencies like the NHC, whose role shifted from that of a welfare agency that provided public housing, to a for-profit real estate developer (Komu, 2011; Owens, 2014). Today, formal urban development is dominated by a few long-standing hybrid public-private agencies, whose control over the market can be attributed to lingering socialist legislature that once vested them with the powers of the centralized state.

Reflecting on this tumultuous time in Tanzania’s history, it is evident that each of these nation-wide reforms was a way to address the shortcomings of the previous period. Socialist restructuring was embraced to correct the inequalities and disenfranchisement of local populations introduced by the colonial administration, and later liberalization was adopted to

address the economic recession that followed the implementation of *Ujamaa* policies. What makes Tanzania's post-independence experience unique among African states is that Nyerere actualized what for many independence leaders was only a philosophical ideal.

The socialist legacies from this defining period have primed the country for urban mega-developments in several ways. First, even though they failed to achieve their intended development goals, the large-scale spatial interventions carried out by the state, namely the *Ujamaa* villagization program and the relocation of the capital to Dodoma, set precedents for similarly large state-led interventions today. Second, decades of anti-primacy policies, which diverted financing and managerial capacity from urban centers, have left municipalities without the tools to manage population growth and carry out urban redevelopment. Under these conditions, the prospect of building new cities from scratch are undoubtedly more attractive to government authorities looking for quick solutions. Third, reformed state-owned agencies that benefited from decades of expropriation powers and have thus come to dominate urban development, are now more entrepreneurial and have the capacity to take on city-scale projects. Liberalization reforms have further facilitated the emergence of new cities by opening the Tanzanian economy to global flows of foreign capital, investment, and ideas. Against a backdrop of past state-led mega-projects, and with municipal governments finding themselves unable to cope with the pressures of fast-paced urbanization, new city projects are multiplying across Tanzania.

## **Chapter 3: Research approach and methodology**

### **3.1 Research design**

This chapter provides a detailed account of my research process and methods. My research was driven by two overarching objectives: first, to critically examine how and why new city projects are emerging in Tanzania, and second, to understand how transnational urban policies circulate through and inform Tanzania's proliferation of new city projects. While this thesis is largely concerned with how this trend is being interpreted in Tanzania, my research builds on scholarly studies of new cities elsewhere in the Global South. Alternating between the specificities of the Tanzanian context and the shared experience of urban transformation in the Global South, I aim to shed light on the different yet parallel trajectories of new cities emerging in Tanzania and elsewhere in the Global South. I applied an abductive strategy, moving between empirical data that I collected through qualitative techniques, and theory drawn from the supporting literature to develop my arguments. Qualitative methods, which 'emphasize quality, depth, richness and understanding', while providing flexibility throughout the research process, lent themselves well to my study of this complex phenomenon (Valentine, 2001: 43).

While several scholars of new cities in Africa have examined individual cases (Fält, 2019; Murray, 2015b; Smith, 2017; van Noorloos, Avianto, & Opiyo, 2019) or published research on broader regional trends (Carmody & Owusu, 2016; Côté-Roy & Moser, 2019; Keeton & Provoost, 2019; van Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 2018), few have approached the study of new cities at the national level. I chose to undertake a national-scale approach for my research after making two important observations early in my research process. First, most of Tanzania's new city projects are still in nascent stages of construction, and several have yet to break ground. Second, nine of the 12 new city projects I had identified were being developed by state entities, suggesting there was a broader national agenda at play. Looking at multiple new city projects in Tanzania allowed me to achieve a more general understanding of contemporary urban transformation in Tanzania and the variety of public and private actors involved. At the expense of a more detailed exploration of individual projects, this thesis presents the first comprehensive overview of all new city projects planned and underway in Tanzania.

Taking into consideration local cultural factors, I scheduled my fieldwork session after Ramadan. Given that much of Dar es Salaam's population is Muslim, this allowed me to avoid a period in which many respondents might have been unavailable or more tired due to fasting

between sunrise and sunset (Binns, 2006). My fieldwork took place over a period of approximately 10 weeks, between June 14th, 2018 and August 21st, 2018. During this time, I was primarily based in Dar es Salaam, but made several trips to Arusha, Dodoma, and Zanzibar in order to visit city sites, meet with participants, and even attend the opening ceremony of a new city. While Dodoma is the capital of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam continues to be the commercial capital of the country, where most businesses are headquartered as well as several government offices (at the time of fieldwork). During my time in the field, the country was, and continues to be, in the midst of a significant transition as government functions are permanently relocated from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma.

My research approach combined data collected in the field with thorough and ongoing desk research, which spanned more than two and a half years (September, 2017 - March, 2020). In the following subsections, I describe the qualitative data collection methods I used in my research, including semi-structured interviews, document collection, and site visits. This is followed by a reflection on the peculiarities and challenges of conducting fieldwork in Tanzania at the time. Finally, I conclude with a reflexive statement on my own positionality during fieldwork.

## **3.2 Data collection**

### **3.2.1 Participant selection and recruitment**

The public nature of large-scale infrastructure projects is such that key figures are identified in local news and on developer websites, which allowed me to apply purposive sampling to identify stakeholders involved in the new city projects. While I made preliminary attempts to contact key actors through LinkedIn and email, I found that the response rates via these communication mediums were extremely low. Consequently, I relied almost exclusively on phone calls or WhatsApp messaging to reach out and follow up with participants. Since most potential interviewees did not make their phone numbers public online, I relied predominantly on snowball sampling to recruit participants. This recruitment technique involves using one contact to gain access to another, who in turn can introduce you to others— ‘recruiting gains momentum, or snowballs as the researcher gains contacts’ (Valentine, 2005: 117). The strength of this technique is that the researcher does away with one of the more challenging aspects of recruitment, that of building trust with a complete stranger (Valentine, 2005). I started my

recruitment process at two local universities, the University of Dar es Salaam and Ardhi University, where teaching staff put me in touch with industry and government employees. When I ran out of interview leads, I would reach out to local journalists who had interviewed key stakeholders or written about new city projects, allowing me to collect more contact information as well as verify my own understanding of the local context through our conversations. Certain public events, such as the Fumba Town opening ceremony, allowed me to recognize a person of interest and reach out to them in person.

### **3.2.2 Semi-structured interviews**

Data gathered during my fieldwork consisted primarily of elite interviews. In total, I held 36 semi-structured interviews with government officials, public and private developers, planners, third sector organizations, and a host of other stakeholders involved in new city projects (see Appendix A), discussed in more detail below. According to Longhurst (2010) and Ayres (2008), the free form of the semi-structured interview allows participants to focus on issues they feel are important, such that the resulting discussion is a collaboration between researcher and participant. I also supplemented my research with more informal conversations with small business owners, local residents, and expatriates. These less formal, unstructured conversations helped deepen my understanding of the local political climate and the evolution of the new city projects.

I began my round of fieldwork by speaking with professors and lecturers at two prominent Dar es Salaam Universities, Ardhi University and the University of Dar es Salaam. These first interactions allowed me to ask questions more freely, confirm my initial understandings, and learn more about the urban context. Since Ardhi University is dedicated to the study of land-related subjects and spatial planning, their teaching staff are often subcontracted to work on municipal planning projects. Some teaching staff and faculty are engaged as consultants on the Bagamoyo SEZ project, others are members of the committee in charge of planning New Dodoma, and others worked with the NHC on a variety of smaller-scale projects. Faculty members were instrumental gatekeepers (Valentine, 2005), referring me to participants both at various government-owned firms and the Ministry of Lands.

Having realized early in my research that the NHC was extensively involved in new city building, I concentrated my recruitment efforts on this agency. I also interviewed key actors in



other state agencies involved in housing and infrastructure development such as Watumishi Housing, a real estate investment trust that focuses on government housing, and the National Social Security Fund, one of East Africa's largest public social security funds. Beyond gathering information on the drivers, financing, and the challenges of new city building, these interviews were crucial in determining the extent of the state's involvement in urban redevelopment. The government officials with whom I spoke worked under the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development. Interviews with officials helped shed light on the national development agenda and clarified the state's relationship with hybrid agencies like the NHC. While there are very few large-scale private developers in Tanzania, I carried out interviews with employees belonging to three private firms, including the German developer CPS Live Ltd., Chinese government-owned developer AVIC International, and a Tanzanian marketing firm contracted to promote one of the privately-built new cities.

Many of my interviews with developers and government officials inevitably converged around the issue of housing affordability in these new mega-developments. Questions like which market segment developers were targeting and how they planned to improve affordability in a housing market limited by high interest rates led me to investigate the nascent mortgage industry in Tanzania. I interviewed the directors of local banks and the senior employees at the Tanzania Mortgage Refinancing Corporation, a liquidity fund established by the World Bank to help supply local banks' mortgage portfolios with long-term capital. I also interviewed members of a few third sector organizations that had done advocacy work on behalf of populations that would be affected by new city projects, including Haki Ardhi and the Foundation for Social Studies Tanzania. Having defended the rights of local residents, these organizations provided a social justice and legal perspective on the new city projects.

Finally, as part of my objective to study the role of urban policy transfer in the making of Tanzania's new cities, I also interviewed international planning consultants. These included three consultants who had worked on the master plan for Safari City, one project manager who had submitted a prospective plan for Kawe Satellite City, and a planner who worked for LH, the Korean, state-owned developer responsible for the planning of Kigamboni New City. These interviews were carried out remotely over Whatsapp video or audio-only calls, since interviewees were based in New York, Istanbul, Stuttgart, and Seoul. According to Temenos and McCann (2013), policy mobilities research is particularly challenging because it requires the

researcher to figuratively and sometimes literally ‘follow’ policies and policy actors, as well as explore the multiple contexts and histories through which policies move. It was particularly challenging to identify the specific international consultants that had worked on new city projects, not only because most master plans had been completed several years ago, but also because the Tanzanian collaborators they had worked with at the NHC or the Ministry of Lands no longer held those same positions. Tracking down international planners required me to be resourceful. I relied on online sources, recovered archives of consulting websites, compared photos of planning sessions with staff websites, and reached out to those I had identified on LinkedIn. In addition, I also had to inform myself on the local context these planners were coming from. For example, Turkish and South Korean planning firms were both brought to Tanzania through international aid and export promotion programs, which required additional research on local institutional arrangements and diplomatic policies.

The majority of my in-person interviews were held in offices, usually in a private office or conference room, although some interviews took place in an office with an open floor plan. This was done at the request of interviewees, who thought it would be more convenient to meet in their place of work and did not show any hesitation in doing so. Other interviews were either held at a cafe or on the construction sites of the new city projects. Reflecting on the interview process, I found that individuals in corporate positions were remarkably easy to reach out to, while those working in government were more difficult to access. In addition, government officials were also more difficult to interview, as they were more likely to be interrupted by phone calls, sometimes up to five phone calls during a single 30-45-minute interview. I go into more depth on the challenges of interviewing elites in a later subsection on positionality and reflexivity. Another challenge I discovered while interviewing was that due to how slow implementation has been for some of these projects, I observed that even individuals in managerial positions were sometimes unclear about key features of the projects. Some struggled to answer basic technical questions about the projects, such as what the original land use of the project site was, while in other cases, there seemed to be no shared collective understanding of the original vision of the project. In addition, follow-up interviews were difficult to plan once I had left Tanzania as participants rarely replied to emails.

### 3.2.3 Supporting documents and web content

The nascent nature of many new city projects means that information about them is frequently unavailable and requires persistence and creativity that involves thoroughly combing through developer websites and online news for any information that might be useful. I have collected and reviewed all the documents I could access for the multiple new city projects I investigated. These include planning documents, developer websites, company reports, national development plans, legislature and policy documents, NGO and aid agency reports, social media, and local and international news sites, forums, and blogs. These documents supplemented my interview data, and in some cases were the only source of information on some projects.

In certain cases, developers and the Ministry of Lands were unwilling to share planning documents, either because they were reluctant to share future plans that had not yet been implemented, or because they were simply not open to the public. Some resources were guarded by a wall of bureaucratic procedures and required letters of intent, and, in some cases, the presence of my local sponsor. On one occasion, I visited the University of Dar es Salaam's East Africana Archives, where I was able to access the original 1976 master plan documents for Dodoma, newspaper articles from the same period, and research by local scholars on the Ujamaa era. Accessing the archive required a slew of documentation and that I bring my local supervisor from Ardhi University in person, who, only after negotiating on my behalf, was able to grant me access. Thankfully, this was not always the case. Visiting regional offices and new city project sites was an opportunity to meet with sales agents as well as collect information pamphlets and other promotional materials. Any documents or information I could not access or collect from my in-person visits, I looked for online on developer websites, document sharing sites, or informal forums like Skyscrapercity.com and Jammi Forums<sup>10</sup>. However, the challenge with relying on web content was that it was often only available temporarily. The NHC's website was frequently down, and other developer sites were constantly being modified or taken down as projects shifted in priority and operations either progressed or stalled. I used digital archives, such as Internet Archive's 'Wayback Machine', which crawls the web, taking snapshots of webpages, providing access to websites at different moments in time, but these were not available for all websites.

### **3.2.4 Site visits and events**

In addition to conducting interviews and collecting relevant documents, site visits were an important component of my fieldwork. I visited and toured several new city project sites including Fumba Uptown Living, Fumba Town, Kawe Satellite City, Iyumbu, Safari City, and AVIC Town. I also toured the proposed locations of projects which had yet to break ground, which was the case for Kigamboni New City and New Dodoma. There were a few large housing and mixed-use projects I was unable to access but was able to view from outside the gates: Dege-Eco Village, Gezaulole Watumishi Housing Estate, and Morocco Square and Victoria Place (both mixed-commercial and residential towers). In addition, I also stayed in and visited the existing cities around which these satellite developments are being built: Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Arusha, and Zanzibar Town. I supplemented these site observations by examining land-use plans (when I was able to access them), as well as satellite imagery from Google Earth Pro, using the ‘time slider’ feature to confirm construction timelines. In-person site visits were crucial to giving me a better sense of the location and surrounding areas in which these new projects are being built, particularly because it can be difficult to gather this from developer websites that are largely catered to investors.

I also had the opportunity to visit Fumba Town during their two-day opening ceremony. In order to boost attendance and heighten the spectacle of the event, developers organized a talent show and hosted the opening ceremony of the Zanzibar Film festival. New homeowners posed for local media and event photographers as they received their keys in front of their newly purchased houses, their doors adorned with big red bows. Partner organizations set up merchandise and information stations under white tents, and the German pre-fabrication firm responsible for building most of the houses in Fumba opened the doors to their workshop. This was a unique opportunity to experience a version of the city that was expertly curated by the developers to project their urban vision, effectively transforming the entire city into a showroom. I not only had open access to the city’s physical spaces, but also to key stakeholders and partner organizations, who were more willing and prepared to answer questions about the project.

### **3.3 Coding and analysis**

I logged my fieldwork data through audio recordings and notes, kept a field journal, and took photographs of the new city sites and surrounding areas. Since most interviewees agreed to be

recorded, my first step in analyzing my data was to transcribe my interviews. Following the recommendations of qualitative research scholars (Cameron, 2005; Longhurst, 2010; Valentine, 2005), I transcribed my first few interviews in the field as part of a reflective process to improve on later ones. I finished transcribing the remaining interviews after returning from the field with the help of a transcription pedal. Some preliminary content analysis took place during the transcription process itself, as I took note of clear patterns (e.g. real estate conferences, study tours to model cities, admiration of foreign urban models) (Dunn, 2005/2016)). I did this by coding soft copies of my data manually in Microsoft Word, using different colors of highlighters to group similar concepts. Later, I applied 'latent' or thematic analysis, which involved sorting relevant quotes into a table organized by theme (e.g. policy tourism, policy mobilities, boosterism) (Cope & Kurtz, 2016; Dunn, 2005/2016). I reviewed my transcripts and other sources multiple times over to identify emergent themes that were relevant to my previously established research questions and to the scholarship to which I was planning to contribute (Dunn, 2005).

Beyond corroborating the data gathered in interviews, the documents I collected throughout my research provided background, context, and in some cases, were the primary source of information on certain new city projects (Bowen, 2009). Coffey (2014), along with other scholars who have addressed qualitative document analysis, emphasize the need for documents to be considered as 'social facts' rather than objective truths (Bowen, 2009; Hodgetts & Chamberlain, 2014; Jacobsson, 2016). As such, a document should be examined as a reflection of the particular socio-political context it was made in, as a version of reality. Coffey (2014) emphasizes the importance of considering the entire lifecycle of the document, from the time it was authored and produced, to when it was used and consumed. These reflective practices are particularly relevant when analyzing planning documents, which Innes (1995: 184) suggests are the product of an 'interactive and communicative activity'. When I analysed planning documents, I made an effort to 'situate' the document's production (Coffey, 2014; Jacobsson, 2016) and consider who was involved in the planning process, who the clients were, and the what the socio-political situation was when the plan was commissioned. I then considered the multiple possible uses of, say, a master plan, beyond its use as a blueprint for future construction. While document analysis is efficient and cost effective compared to other qualitative data collection methods, it is important to consider that all documents carry biases and how we select

and choose to interpret these documents adds subjectivity to the knowledge that we draw from them.

### **3.4 Reflections on the research context and representation**

In order to carry out research in Tanzania, I had to acquire a research permit from the state-controlled Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH). The application required the endorsement of a local advisor or contact, something I found very challenging to organize while I was still in Canada, due to the low email response rates I experienced when reaching out to potential local contacts. A little over a week after my arrival, I met with a lecturer at Ardhi University, who agreed to be my advisor. He was indispensable in helping me acquire my COSTECH permit, meeting with my first participants, and accessing several other resources, including the University of Dar es Salaam's East Africana Archives and planning documents for Kigamboni New City. We met periodically throughout my fieldwork to discuss my progress and so he could factcheck the information I had collected (without breaching participant confidentiality). This advisor played an important role in helping me navigate the complex bureaucracy that besets most official channels in Tanzania.

While difficulties associated with maneuvering large bureaucracies are common in many developing contexts, I felt these challenges were particularly acute in Tanzania, where the regime's low tolerance to critique has scared many bureaucrats into stiff compliance with procedure. My interactions with lower-level government staff were often met with a slew of demands for paperwork and supporting letters from multiple parties. I would return several times to the same office only to be turned around for additional documentation. I suspect that lower-level staff were taking precautions to ensure that more senior employees would be made responsible in the event that anything controversial emerged from my and others' research activities. I spoke with several other academics who had recently carried out research in Tanzania, who confirmed this observation.

Although I had read news condemning the Tanzanian president's intolerance to freedom of the press, I was unaware of the full extent of state censorship until I arrived in Tanzania. Since President Magufuli came into power in 2015, several laws limiting freedom of expression have been passed, undermining the independence of the media, civil society, and political opposition groups (Human Rights Watch, 2019). The political situation continued to evolve throughout my time there and in subsequent months. One particular event that increased tension around research

activities took place during my fieldwork. In July of 2018, Twaweza, a research organization promoting citizen engagement in politics and based in Dar es Salaam, faced intimidation by COSTECH after publishing an opinion poll that revealed a drop in the President's public approval ratings. In the wake of the scandal, amendments were made to the 2015 Statistics Act to criminalize the publication of statistics that had not been approved by the state (i.e., the National Bureau of Statistics, or a new five-person Statistics Technical Committee) (Amnesty International, 2019; Human Rights Watch, 2019). This served to encourage government interference in information sharing and further intimidate civil society and the media.

These developments complicated several aspects of my research, beyond the previously mentioned bureaucratic barriers. Participants became less forthcoming about their views on the political situation. During interviews, I was often given the party line and had to instead look for meaning in silences and what was not being said (Koch, 2013; Turner, 2013). One interviewee commented that Tanzania had become a 'whispering state', while others mentioned they were suspicious of people working as 'spies for the government' (Interviews, August 2018). My own local academic advisor confided in me that if anything 'bad' were to come from my research that it would be traced back to him, given that he had signed off on my research permit. A few key actors that I had planned on interviewing had recently been discharged in a wave of corruption-related dismissals instigated by the President and declined my interview requests. I was not able to visit Dege Eco-Village or speak to executives involved in the new city project because the project was caught up in a corruption scandal that had led to the dismissal of most of the board members of the National Social Security Fund, one of the lead developers of the project. Meanwhile, new regulations were put in place, making it increasingly difficult for foreign workers to acquire work permits in Tanzania. While this did not directly affect me, it did increase the precarity of foreigners' legal status in the country and led to more permit checks. On several occasions I was approached in public by security guards or police and told I could not take photographs of my surroundings. Some instances included the University of Dodoma's campus and areas near the Dar es Salaam port and CBD coastline. Authorities threatened to confiscate my camera and attempted to bring me to the nearest police station. Although areas marked 'off limits' for photography in Tanzania do exist, such as the ferry boats in Kigamboni and outside parliament gates in Dodoma, these interactions took place in locations that did not have signage prohibiting photographs. Although these threats did not amount to anything and

may have been an attempt to extort a bribe, they are also indicative of a broader climate of scrutiny and heightened state control.

While several participants provided oral consent to be identified in my thesis, in light of current political conditions I have taken steps to protect the identity of my research participants in order to ensure their safety. During my research process, I did not share the identity and comments of interviewees with other participants (Valentine, 2005). In some cases, if I was explicitly asked, or felt a referee would be made uncomfortable or put at risk, I did not divulge their identity to the participant they had referred me to. All my interviews were stored in password protected devices and I did not travel with my laptop. I chose not to mention any participant names when representing interview data in my thesis. Participants are referred to by their position, which is further obscured if the quote contains potentially sensitive information. In several quotes, I chose to redact details that might give away the identity of the interviewee.

### **3.5 Positionality and reflexivity**

A large body of social science scholarship examines how the positionality of researchers, or how they are positioned vis-à-vis various social hierarchies, and various aspects of themselves including class, education, age, gender, ethnicity, and even personality, actively shape the research process and its outcomes (Dowling, 2016; Harding, 1987; Moser, 2008; Rose, 1997; Valentine, 2005). The process of acknowledging one's positionality and constantly reflecting on the impact that it has on one's research is known as 'reflexivity' (Dowling, 2016). This practice allows scholars to openly acknowledge the subjectivity of the knowledge that is being produced, given that 'there are no neutral observers and no research is completely unbiased' (Moser, 2008: 384). Since my inquiry into Tanzania's new cities is concerned with the perceptions of different actors, interpretation is central to my research approach. Hence, my identity and previously held biases placed within this foreign and power-laden social context have played an important role in the ideas elaborated in this thesis.

I am a young, white, middle-class, educated female pursuing research on behalf of a large university based in Canada perceived widely as 'prestigious'. Due to my father's humanitarian line of work, my family moved often while I was growing up to different countries in the Global South. I spent nine years living in Nairobi, Kenya both as a child, and later as a young adult working for a startup. Therefore, I already had a great deal of familiarity with the East African



context. I had visited Tanzania prior to my fieldwork and have some basic language skills in Swahili. I believe my prior experience in East Africa helped me to navigate both the physical and social environment while in Tanzania. However, even with years of experience in these contexts, there were many situations in which being a white woman made me the target of unwanted attention and attempts at extortion.

When walking alone in public young men would constantly approach me and offer to guide me around. They were insistent and would continue to walk with me regardless of how explicitly I dismissed them, later demanding *chai*—a fee for their ‘services’. Among other expatriate women, we often joked about the advantages of having a ‘travel husband’, walking with a male friend was a sure way to keep men from accosting us in public. Even trying to do simple enough tasks like buying ferry tickets to go to Zanzibar from Dar es Salaam, my taxi driver communicated with two men on the street, who then accompanied me to a side room a few meters away from the official ticket booth and forcefully tried to sell me tickets for twice the standard price. The security guard at the housing complex I was staying in continually made romantic advances towards me, hoping I would buy him a motorcycle or help him immigrate to Canada. In contrast, local women did not act opportunistically towards me and often helped me get around. After having traveled 10 hours by bus to Dodoma, I arrived in a dark unlit bus lot on the edge of town and taxi drivers and motorcyclists quickly crowded around me trying to claim me as their client. I felt vulnerable and unsafe, but luckily a young woman named Heaven, who I had met on the journey, shooed them away, found me a taxi, and bargained the price down on my behalf. Despite this unwanted attention, I still felt more prepared than the average foreigner. I was able to diffuse some of these more tense situations with humor and Swahili references. It was easier for me than for my other expatriate friends to bargain for transport and other services and negotiate my way around urban and rural research sites. In some cases, I used my Shwaili language skills to put interviewees at ease, and they were often pleasantly surprised or amused.

Moser (2008) highlights that some personality types or social skills are better suited to certain types of research. Using snowball sampling, which is akin to networking, as my main means of recruiting participants, meant that I had to be very social. I had to build enough rapport with my participants for them to feel comfortable enough to share the contact information of their friends or colleagues. I also made several cold calls a day, in which I had to convince people to meet within a short time. Although I did not have to build the kind of friendships with

participants that are conducive to long-term ethnographic fieldwork, positive interactions with participants had many benefits, whether it was being given a private tour of a new city site or engaging in more candid conversations. I believe my extroversion, sense of ease within the cultural context, and genuine interest were key in facilitating successful interactions with participants.

I did not hire a translator or interpreter during my research since I was primarily interviewing elite stakeholders, almost all of whom could communicate in English with varying levels of proficiency. Although this allowed me to be in full control of my interviews, there were moments when having an interpreter would have been helpful with people who did not speak English as well<sup>11</sup>, or in deciphering Swahili media content. I worked around this by using Google Translate for local news documents and relied on my regular check-ins with my local advisor, journalists, and scholars to cross-check my understanding. Despite having some personal advantages, I was well aware of my status as an outsider and acknowledge that my understanding of the local context is limited to what I learned from my participants and collaborators.

While literature on qualitative methodology is largely concerned with minimizing the power gap between a more powerful researcher and a less powerful participant (Bosco & Herman, 2010; Dunn, 2005/2016; Rose, 1997; Valentine, 2005), my interviews with elites reversed this dynamic. I was keenly aware of my disadvantaged position in the presence of new city CEOs, high ranking executives, directors of state-owned agencies, and officials at the Ministry of Lands. Moreover, planning and urban development in Tanzania (and globally) is male dominated. Of my 36 interviewees, only seven were women (see Appendix A). Other scholars have explored the advantages and disadvantages of performing research as a woman in a predominantly masculine environment (Herod, 1993; McDowell, 1998; Turner, 2013). I found that being a woman helped in some situations, since I was considered ‘non-threatening’ or ‘harmless’ (Turner, 2013), male interviewees were more open to sharing information. Howard (1994) argues that researchers who are considered outsiders can be positioned outside gender norms. My status as a white anglophone may have helped me access individuals in higher positions. However, I sometimes felt I was not taken seriously, particularly among more senior government officials, who were more likely to try and lead the interview or behave in a pedantic manner towards me due to my age and gender.

To negotiate these unequal power relations, I stretched what Rice (2010) calls the ‘elasticity’ of my positionality, downplaying or amplifying certain aspects of my identity or research depending on the situation. I dressed professionally and printed a set of business cards featuring my university’s name in large red letters. When I felt I should be taken more seriously, I name dropped prominent actors involved in local urban development or brought up recent news, to show I was well informed. Other times I felt it was to my benefit to downplay my knowledge of a particular project and ‘play dumb’ (McDowell, 1998).

In retrospect, it has become clear to me that my interviews were affected by external constraints and this may have impacted standard power relations. Due to the nature of the ‘closed context’ and recent wave of dismissals across state-owned agencies, even individuals in high-level positions may have felt vulnerable about being interviewed. It has been challenging to maintain a positive relationship with participants and collaborators in Tanzania now that I am back in Canada and in particular as my research is critical of the new city projects I examined, a situation that is only further complicated by the repressive political conditions in the country and the need for me to ensure the safety of my participants.

## **Chapter 4: Literature review**

### **4.1 Introduction**

This literature review provides background on my research topic, explains the theoretical concepts I use to analyze my empirical findings, and also helps to position the contributions my research makes to urban geography scholarship. The objective of my research is to study the emergence and evolution of new city projects in Tanzania, which involves creating a database of new city projects that are being created by different public and private actors, examining the local and transnational drivers of new city projects, understanding how projects are incorporated into local development agendas, and exploring how they are informed by internationally circulating models. I have organized the supporting literature into three strands: (1) new master-planned cities, (2) policy mobilities, and (3) entrepreneurial governance. Together, these three bodies of scholarship can help explain the emergence and evolution of new cities in Tanzania and frame the Tanzanian case as part of a broader trend of new city building in the Global South.

The first section provides an overview of the growing and vibrant scholarship on new-master-planned cities. This section sets the foundation for my research subject by introducing the new cities trend. I begin by exploring some of the ways that new cities have been framed as both products of neoliberal globalization and as tools for achieving political objectives. I examine some of the arguments that new cities scholars have put forth about how these new developments respond to broader desires for defining identity and consolidating power within the context of non-democratic states. I then focus on research about new city projects in Africa, where the new cities trend accelerated dramatically after 2008. Here I highlight some concerns scholars have raised about how appropriate, accessible, and exclusive ‘fantasy plans’ for new cities are. Finally, I briefly outline what has been published on new cities in Tanzania and highlight the need for a more comprehensive study of the new city projects underway at the national level.

The second section introduces the ‘urban policy mobilities’ literature, which is helpful for thinking through how new cities in Tanzania are influenced by internationally circulating urban models and ideas. Here, I lay out the basic assumptions that underpin the policy mobilities approach to conceptualizing policy circulation. I then explore how booster practices and study tours to model cities have created a market for ‘best practices’ that is supported by planners, consultants, and other actors who circulate policies around the world. Finally, I comment on the

direction of urban policy flows and emphasize the need for more policy mobilities research to study increasingly prominent south to south flows.

My third and final section examines ‘entrepreneurial governance’ and the advent of more entrepreneurial forms of urbanism, where the city is conceptualized as a business model by investor states. This scholarship introduces states as ‘market players’ who use private sector instruments to achieve economic and political agendas. In doing so, these scholars provide a more nuanced interpretation of the role of public and private actors in the making of new cities, and counter claims that privatized urbanism has resulted in a ‘hollowing-out’ of the state.

## **4.2 New master-planned cities**

### **4.2.1 Defining new master planned cities and their drivers**

While there is now a robust body of literature on new cities, the scholarship has yet to converge around specific terminology or a definition for what constitutes a ‘new city’ (Moser & Côté-Roy, in-press). In this thesis I draw on a definition proposed by Moser and Côté-Roy (in-press) who conceptualize new cities as: ‘urban mega-developments built from scratch on a *tabula rasa* that are designed to be both geographically and administratively separate from established cities, while projecting a distinct brand, architectural identity, and vision of the future, a sort of “mirror opposite” (Murray, 2015a) of nearby cities’.

One of the ways in which the emergence of new cities has been framed is as a product of globalization and increasingly neoliberal economic regimes. Facilitated by the financialization of real estate markets (Goodfellow, 2017), and the liberalization of economies in the Global South, new cities are conceived as platforms for global capital accumulation. The assumption shared by the governments of developing countries is that being perceived as a ‘world class’ city will attract investors, whose activities and capital investments will help boost local economic development (Datta, 2016; Goldman, 2011b; van Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 2018). Moser et al. (2015) examine the case of King Abdullah Economic City, in Saudi Arabia, which was built as part of a broader national strategy to attract investment into Saudi Arabia and diversify the economy beyond the oil industry. In an attempt to produce the ideal business environment and ‘sweeten the pot’ for investors, some new cities are conceived as ‘states of exception’, where certain domestic laws are suspended (Easterling, 2014), which is particularly the case with new cities developed within special economic zones (SEZs). Easterling (2014) examines how the

‘frictionless realm’ of the SEZ, defined by legal and economic exemptions, has been extrapolated to several new cities including King Abdullah Economic City, Songdo City in South Korea, Cyberjaya in Malaysia, and HITEC City in Hyderabad. A subset of studies have further explored the branding strategies used to market and distinguish new cities from their competitors. Herbert and Murray (2015: 487), examine how the builders of Waterfall City and Lanseria Airport City/Cradle City in South Africa have drawn attention to their developments by projecting images of ‘convenience, leisure and relaxation’ and ‘invoking the language of sustainability’. Other scholars have drawn attention to how increasingly pervasive ‘smart city’ and ‘eco city’ rhetoric has been deployed both as a way to market and legitimize new cities (Cugurullo, 2013; Datta, 2015; Koch, 2014; Rebentisch, Thompson, Côté-Roy, & Moser, 2020; Watson, 2014).

Parnell and Robinson (2012) criticize the overemphasis on neoliberalism as a driver of contemporary urban transformation and argue that other drivers need to be considered. In support of this, van Noorloos and Kloosterboer (2018) acknowledge that even though neoliberalism may play some role in the emergence of new cities across the African continent, it is not the only factor at play, and that given the variety of governance contexts from which new cities have emerged, the goals of new city builders are varied. In some cases, new cities emerge as vehicles for state ideology. They are intended to fulfill some political agenda, such as to support nation-building efforts (Koch, 2014; Moser, 2012a, 2012b), break with the past (Goodfellow & Smith, 2013; Seekins, 2009), legitimate the ruling regime (Koch, 2010, 2014; Koch & Valiyev, 2015), foster religious and cultural communities (Moser, 2013), or alternatively suppress religious extremism (Moser & Côté-Roy, in-press).

Approaches to the study of new city projects that incorporate political and cultural factors are particularly useful in understanding mechanisms of urban redevelopment in non-democratic settings, where configurations of state power differ and there is a ‘selective engagement with market capitalism’ (Koch & Valiyev, 2015: 576). Natalie Koch has written widely about the nationalist drivers of new city building in Central Asia, where she argues that new cities and the rhetoric used to promote them have been used both as a tool for nation-building and regime legitimization. In Kazakhstan’s new capital city, Astana (now known as Nur Sultan), ‘spectacular urbanism’ is used to promote the image of a ‘benevolent state’ (Koch & Valiyev, 2015). Extravagant centralized projects are ‘dressed up in nationalist and populist language’, to make it

seem as though they are ‘for the people’ and that the general public will somehow benefit from them, albeit indirectly (Koch & Valiyev, 2015: 579).

Other scholars have focused on how new cities, and new capitals in particular have been used to re-define national identity and consolidate state control through reference to a curated and idealized past. Seekins (2009) explores how transferring the capital of Burma to the new city of Naypyidaw has allowed the ruling military regime to move from a landscape that had become associated with resistance to the state, to one that harkens back to the time of Burmese conqueror-kings and their absolute control over citizens. Likewise, Moser (2013) highlights how the ‘fantasy Islam’ architecture of Malaysia’s new administrative capital, Putrajaya, makes reference to historical Middle Eastern models rather than traditional local Malaysian styles in order to position itself as one of the grand Islamic civilizations, and as a reflection of growing ethno- and religio-nationalism, while both physically and symbolically excluding non-Muslim minorities (Moser, 2010, 2012a, 2018). More research is needed on the ways in which new cities are used to consolidate popular support and legitimize authoritarian regimes in other geographical regions and this is a theme I explore in Chapter 5, ‘Tanzania’s new master-planned cities: Socialist legacies in a neoliberalizing landscape’.

#### **4.2.2 New master-planned cities in Africa**

With over 40 new city projects that have broken ground across Africa, the continent is becoming an increasingly relevant region of study for global urban studies (Côté-Roy & Moser, 2019). Most academic attention thus far has focused on the mega-projects planned in regional hubs such as Konza Technopolis and Tatu City in Kenya (Smith, 2017), Hope City and King City in Ghana (Fält, 2019), and resource-rich countries such as Eko Atlantic in Nigeria (Murray, 2016), Kilamba in Angola (Cain, 2014), and Modderfontein (Ballard et al., 2017) and Waterfall City (Murray, 2015b) in South Africa, leaving many projects unexamined.

Watson (2014) and Keeton (2019) argue that this particular wave of new city building took root in Africa around 2010, in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, when loose international capital was in search of new and untapped markets. References to Africa as the ‘last development frontier’ and the popularization of an ‘Africa rising’ narrative, fed by promising projections of economic growth and the expansion of the middle class, have also attracted investors and supported the proliferation of new cities on the continent (Côté-Roy & Moser,

2019). This marks a substantial shift in the political attitudes of African governments that had until recently espoused an anti-urban bias, and whose policies prioritized anti-migration and rural development interventions (Pieterse, 2019). Governments that had once perceived rural to urban migration as a threat to economic and social welfare, are now looking to urbanization as an opportunity for national development.

Driven by a desire to connect to the global economy (Carmody & Owusu, 2016), and anxieties of being ‘left behind’ (Côté-Roy & Moser, 2019), these new cities have been criticized for being more responsive to external and international forces than to local needs (Murray, 2016; van Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 2018). In trying to project an ideal image of urbanity that can serve as a landing platform for global capital, many of Africa’s new city plans feature modern corporate skylines, whose gleaming glass buildings reflect the ‘mirror opposite’ of local realities of extreme poverty and overburdened infrastructure (Murray, 2015a, 2016; Watson, 2014). These imaginaries are so far removed from local contexts that when recounting perceptions of Nigeria’s Eko Atlantic City, Murray’s interviewees can only find the words to describe the new city in terms of an ambitious ‘elsewhere’—as ‘the future Hong Kong [or] Dubai of Africa’ (Murray, 2015a: 100).

Due to the limited fiscal resources of most African states, an increasing number of cities are financed through public-private partnerships (Herbert & Murray, 2015; Murray, 2015b; Pitcher, 2012; van Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 2018). As more of these developments fall under some form of private management, scholars have raised concerns that the private sphere is encroaching on public space and threatening democratic modes of urban governance (Fält, 2019; van Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 2018). Supported by liberal rationales that the private sector is superior to the state in addressing urban development, several African states have made regulatory reforms to encourage the privatization of municipal responsibilities (Fält, 2019; van Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 2018). Scholars have raised concerns that these ‘private cities’ run the risk of catering to a wealthy minority at the expense of the needs of the poor majority. Fält’s (2019) recent paper on Appolonia New City in Ghana, exposes how developers exploit vague definitions of what constitutes ‘affordability’ to market housing to local buyers and be perceived as inclusive, when in fact these so called ‘affordable’ houses are far too expensive for most Ghanaians. As high-end, luxury compounds price out the majority of local residents, Pitcher (2012) describes the retreat of the elite into enclaves of wealth, and the simultaneous



abandonment of the public city. Imposed on the existing metropolitan fabric, these ‘bubbles of wealth’ (Murray, 2013) physically fragment urban landscapes, lead to ‘urban splintering’ (Graham & Marvin, 2002), and exacerbate the urban divide that already characterizes many African cities. Beyond ‘bypassing’ the problems that plague existing cities (Grant, 2015; Murray, 2015a), these exclusionary projects actually divert state funding further away from the needs of the poor majority. Even in cases where new cities are privately financed, the state may have to step in to subsidize the final product. Cain (2014) and Watson (2014) both examine Kilamba, a new city in Angola, where the state’s entire national housing budget was used to subsidize apartments for the middle and upper class. While concerns over the elitist and exclusionary character of new cities are not unique to Africa, these issues are likely to become increasingly salient on the continent given the growing interest of investors in Africa and fast-growing urban populations. Moreover, Côté-Roy and Moser (2019: 10) explain that African authorities have deflected criticism that there is a mismatch between the new city plans and local needs, by arguing that after a long period of colonization, they now have a ‘right to development’.

#### **4.2.3 New master-planned cities in Tanzania**

To date, Tanzania’s new city projects have received little scholarly attention both individually and as a group, with the exception of Tanzania’s first and arguably most ambitious city project, Kigamboni New City. It is the subject of a working paper published by scholars from the Nordic Africa Institute (Lindell, Norström, & Byerley, 2016) that describes resident responses to the compensation and relocation scheme in the early stages of project implementation. *Governing Urban Africa* (Silva, 2016), a collection of essays by urban scholars writing from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, features a chapter by Maria Pastore that considers the impact of Kigamboni New City on the existing water and sanitation infrastructure in Dar es Salaam. A working paper by Møldrup Wolff, Kuch, and Chipman (2018) considers the impact of speculative investments in Kigamboni New City and land price spikes in the surrounding area. Kigamboni New City is again briefly mentioned by van Noorloos and Kloosterboer (2018), as well as Watson (2014), and Keeton and Provoost (2019) as one of many examples of African new city projects. A recent paper by Kanai and Schindler (2019) provides a novel comparative study of Iranduba University City in the Brazilian Amazon and Bagamoyo Special Economic Zone in Tanzania, which they frame as being part of global infrastructure scramble. Finally, a

doctoral dissertation (Owens, 2014) on urban redevelopment in and around Dar es Salaam, Arusha, and Mwanza examines the evolution of state-owned developers and the Usa River and Kigamboni New City projects, but fieldwork for this study pre-dates several of Tanzania's more recent new city projects. My thesis begins to fill gaps in this subset of the scholarship by cataloging and analyzing several underexamined new city projects and actors in Tanzania and situating them within a broader global trend of new city building.

### **4.3 Urban policy mobilities**

This section examines urban policy circulation as a global phenomenon, characterized by networks of shared knowledges. I use the term 'urban policy' broadly to mean anything from actual policy recommendations to ideas about urban form or financing. Moving beyond a simple 'transfer-diffusion' understanding of policy circulation, in which policies are produced in one center, packaged, and disseminated outwards, the policy mobilities approach offers a more nuanced understanding of the movements, channels, and actors involved in policy circulation (Jacobs, 2012). Peck and Theodore (2010) provide a clear overview of how the mobilities framework improves upon previous conceptions of policy transfer. First, they acknowledge that the actors who circulate policies are driven by their own interests, and yet are constrained by the politically charged institutional contexts in which they work. Second, they highlight that policies 'travel in bits and pieces—as elective discourses, inchoate ideas, and synthesized models' (2010: 170). Third, they emphasize that policies are constantly 'in-transformation', and morph and mutate as they are interpreted and re-interpreted by the various actors that transmit them. A mobilities approach also considers urban processes at different scales, at once examining cities as 'key sociospatial nodes within global circuits of policy knowledge', and also, as deeply embedded in local institutional and political contexts (McCann, 2011: 111). This provides a useful framework for examining new city projects, which are affected by both international and local forces.

#### **4.3.1 The business of exporting 'best practices'**

The driving assumption behind urban policy circulation is that the success of model cities like Barcelona, Singapore, or Dubai, is replicable. Consequently, scholars find that policies are implemented based on perceived successes in other contexts, rather than a particular local

political ideology (González, 2011: 1399; McCann, 2011). A large subset of the literature is therefore focused on the ‘supply side’ of policy circuits (McCann, 2011: 109), where best practices are synthesized and exported world-wide. Temenos and McCann (2013) argue there is nothing ‘natural’ or ‘evident’ about what is considered a ‘best practice’; rather, it is consciously constructed and managed by various actors such as the host organizations who actively ‘rescript’ Barcelona and Bilbao by endorsing some policies and sites, while obscuring others (González, 2011). This type of knowledge management is part of a wider set of promotion practices cities engage in, collectively referred to as ‘policy boosterism’ (McCann, 2013). Actors who engage in boosterism include municipal and state-level actors seeking to access international markets (McCann, 2013) and ‘extrospective elites’ wanting to promote their geographically situated interests (Peck & Tickell, 2002).

#### **4.3.2 Agents of policy circulation**

The work involved in creating the highly visible physical infrastructure of cities is supported by largely ‘invisible networks’ (Murray, 2015a: 97) of both human and non-human actors (Moser, 2019). Policy models do not exist as independent and discrete courses of action, available to policy makers as if *à-la-carte* items on a menu. A slew of ‘traveling technocrats’, including international architects, planners, and development agencies participate in ‘pushing policy’ along its various phases of transport (Larner & Laurie, 2010; Moser, 2019; Rapoport, 2015a).

Prominent international consulting firms feature frequently in the literature on new cities as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ whose 3D renderings of futuristic new cities, graphs, and tables serve to ‘seduce’ country officials into adopting their pre-packaged version of urban modernity (Bunnell & Das, 2010; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Peck, 2011; Pitcher, 2012). However, other less obvious actors also contribute to policy networks, such as think tanks, media, NGOs, and advocacy groups (Peck, 2011). While some scholars examine a more diverse set of actors, such as Larner and Laurie (2010), who study the work of mid-level technocrats, the vast majority of policy mobilities scholarship focuses on the role of a few elite professionals commonly referred to as the ‘Global Intelligence Corps’ (Olds, 2002; Rapoport, 2015a; Rimmer, 1991). What of the actors who do not fit into the narrow category of ‘globalizing bureaucrats’ (González, 2011)? There is a dearth of scholarship in the literature on actors who unconsciously participate in networked learning and knowledge transmission. Diasporic communities, such as those studied

by Myers (2011) and Grant (2009), are engaged in actively re-shaping the landscapes they travel between, often without realizing it. Chapter 6, 'Borrowed Skylines: Urban policy transfer in Tanzania's new city projects', begins to address this gap by explicitly including diaspora as key actors in urban policy circulation.

#### **4.3.3 Modes of policy transmission**

In response to calls for more research on the actual process of policy transmission (Peck, 2011), some scholars have carried out empirical research on 'mobility events' such as urban study tours to model cities and international conferences, through which they offer insight on the micro-level interactions that take place between agents that circulate urban policy. Gonzalez (2011: 1398) interprets the 'short fact-finding trips' policy makers take to other cities to learn about their transformation as a form of 'policy tourism'. Examining urban study tours in Barcelona and Bilbao, Gonzalez argues that there are several parallels between recreational tourism and 'policy tourism' that make it a useful analogy for explaining the behaviors of both hosts and visitors during policy-oriented excursions. Recreational tourists and policy tourists alike have a tendency to turn places into 'objects of desire' where sites are taken out of context and 'orientalised' (Gonzalez, 2011: 1400). Urban transformation stories are often dramatized, but like tourists seeking to confirm their preconceived image of a place, policy tourists do not often challenge the narratives they are served.

González (2011) and Moser (2019) draw back the curtains on some of these more exclusive interactions in the meeting rooms of Barcelona's local host organizations, or the conference halls of the Cityquest KAEC forum, where some of the most prominent players in new city building meet annually (Moser, 2019). González (2011) explains that interactions between hosts and visitors are underlined by global power relations that determine what information is shared, as well as how it is shared. Meanwhile, Moser (2019) details how conference organizers establish mentor-mentee relationships between new city CEOs to facilitate discussions about financing, managing political pressures, and how to handle citizen-led resistance to projects. While these studies help develop a fuller picture of the 'work' (Jacobs, 2012) involved in moving policy around, little has been written on what policy-importers take away from these interactions and excursions. Chapter 6 seeks to address this gap, through

interviews with Tanzanian officials and developers who have taken part in these policy excursions.

#### **4.3.4 Following urban policies on the move in emerging South-to-South channels**

Scholars generally recognize that policy transmission is unidirectional, moving from ‘sites of innovation’ to ‘zones of policy emulation’ (Peck & Theodore, 2010:170; González, 2011) along channels that continue to be ‘deeply structured by enduring power relations’ (Peck & Theodore, 2010: 169). Until recent years, policy mobilities research has tended to focus on North to South policy movements, where ‘sites of innovation’ are predominantly cities in Europe and North America (Peck & Theodore, 2010: 170; Robinson, 2002; Roy, 2009). The burgeoning scholarship on new master-planned cities in particular challenges Western-centric urbanism by looking at the increasingly prevalent flows between countries of the Global South (Bunnell & Das, 2010; Moser, 2019; Pow, 2014). These authors expand the geography of policy networks and consider the rise of new model cities that had not previously been considered centers of urban innovation.

As the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf, BRIC countries, and Asian Tiger economies have become powerful economic actors and donors, they join urban policy markets with transformation stories that are more relatable to the governments of developing nations. Pow (2014), explains how the Singapore model was readily taken up by less ‘up-to-date’ cities like Kigali, Lagos, and Hanoi, because it leveraged the ‘third world’ city profile. This is accompanied by the increasingly global reach of Asian and Middle Eastern planning consultants (Rapoport, 2015a) and developers, eager to bid for high-profile contracts in developing countries, where authorities are in search of urban solutions that offer fast results and more importantly, that ‘eschew Western-style democracy’ (Pow, 2014: 300). Urban mega-developments and new city projects such as Cyberjaya (Bunnell & Das, 2010) and KAEC have gained global visibility through the actions of charismatic leaders, and exclusive elite conferences like the Cityquest KAEC Forum (Moser, 2019). More research is needed on South-to-South policy networks, what new city-building giants have emerged in the Global South, and how they have gone about distinguishing themselves as experts. These are topics I address in Chapter 6: ‘Borrowed skylines: Urban policy transfer in Tanzania’s new city projects’.

It is equally important to consider how these globally circulating urban models are ‘consumed’. A few scholars have considered how urban policy assemblages moving through policy circuits between countries of the Global South are ‘territorialized’ or ‘localized’ once they are inserted into different contexts. Pow (2014: 301) for example, examines how the Singapore’s public housing model has been ‘lost in translation’ and morphed into ‘privileged forms of private real estate development’ after landing in India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Watson (2015: 39) considers how ‘smart-city’ rhetoric and ambitions have been widely circulated both in India and across the African continent and argues that in many cases the technologically advanced features depicted in the master plan graphics are rarely implemented, and final construction is limited to ‘a few iconic buildings and some upmarket housing’. The unintended consequences and actual outcomes of these traveling policy stories deserve more scholarly attention. I seek to address several of these concepts in my research by focusing on the role of Tanzania as an importer of foreign urban policies and examining the South-to-South policy networks through which Tanzanian authorities bring in urban ‘best practices’ from elsewhere. In the interest of addressing both the mobile and territorial aspects of policy, my research will also examine how imported policies become ‘localized’ by the Tanzanian host context, how political transitions affect imported policies, and how ‘coherent and convincing’ (Jacobs, 2012: 418) certain imported models have remained over time.

#### **4.4 Entrepreneurial governance**

This section examines how various groups of scholars have engaged with the concept of entrepreneurial urbanism and how this transformation in urban governance prompts discussions around the entangled interests of public and private actors in the production of urban space. David Harvey’s (1989) seminal work on the entrepreneurial city explores the reorientation in Western forms of urban governance following the decline of the Keynesian Welfare State in the 1970s. Harvey claims that there has been a shift in modes of urban governance from managerialism, typical of the 1960s, where cities served as sites to provide services, facilities, and benefits to citizens, to entrepreneurialism, where the focus for city officials is on creating a ‘business friendly’ environment for investment. While Hall and Hubbard (1996) argue it is difficult to assess whether entrepreneurial governance truly represents a break from older forms of managerial governance, they concede that there has been a fundamental transition from an urban politics of income redistribution to a politics of growth. In this new configuration, cities

are perceived as ‘growth machines’ for the national economy, whose management, within an increasingly competitive open market, is speculative rather than bureaucratic (T. Hall & Hubbard, 1996: 153). As globalization processes intensify, city-authorities engage in civic boosterism as they seek to distinguish their cities from others and lure now-mobile transnational firms, workers, and investors. Municipal governments adopt behaviors that had previously been restricted to the private sector such as ‘risk taking, inventiveness, promotion and profit motivation’ (T. Hall & Hubbard, 1996: 153; Harvey, 1989). Importantly, scholars argue that state powers are being eroded (Brenner, 1999) and that capital flows have now re-organized around cities as ‘control and command’ centers of the global economy (Sassen, 2005).

While this transformation in approaches to urbanization and urban management has been experienced globally, Datta (2016) argues that Western conceptions of the entrepreneurial city cannot fully capture the complexities of entrepreneurial urbanism in the Global South. Scholarship on entrepreneurial urbanism in the Global South diverges from Harvey’s entrepreneurial city in a number of ways, the most significant of which is that scholars studying emerging regions tend to discuss urban entrepreneurialism at the state-level rather than the municipal-level (Datta, 2016). Some examples include Shin (2016) who examines the making of Songdo City as a speculative investment driven by the developmental South Korean state, or Wu (2003) who demonstrates how the re-development of Shanghai is a territorial manifestation of state power in China’s post-socialist transition. Similarly, but at the regional-scale, Datta (2015) explores how ambitions for the semi-autonomous Indian state of Gujarat to become a national model and center for international investment have materialized in the planning of Dholera Smart City. These articles center on the ways in which states use urban re-development not only to spur economic growth but also as a ‘tool for asserting the material and symbolic power of the state’ (Datta, 2016: 15).

Contrary to the idea that the neoliberal transition has resulted in weak states ‘beholden’ to an increasingly prominent private sector, scholars argue that state power has been ‘redeployed’ (Hibou, 1998) into ‘new institutional arrangements’ (Bogaert, 2012: 258). While structural adjustment programs led to the restructuring and privatization of state-owned agencies throughout the Global South, in many cases (especially in post-socialist states) these entities continued to operate under the direction of or in partnership with the state (Pitcher, 2018). While these reformed agencies operate on ‘corporate governance principles’ and aim to maximize

profits, they also ‘constitute part of the state’s investment portfolio’ and are therefore ‘expected to generate revenue for the treasury’ (Pitcher, 2018: 53). While Pitcher speaks broadly about ‘African investor states’ that are vested in a variety of potentially profitable industries, Goldman (2011b) and Bogaert (2012) both discuss these reformed state agencies in the contexts of world-city making and state-driven place-based investments. Goldman (2011b: 562) explains that what separates these now-reformed parastatals from ‘historically weak government agencies’ is the former’s dependence on external financing. Because most of the infrastructure projects these reformed parastatals undertake are financed through bank loans or external investors, they are only directly accountable to the lenders and the ministries under which they are housed (Goldman, 2011a, 2011b). Newly privatized agencies therefore operate in a sector onto themselves, straddling the private and public spheres as they benefit simultaneously from public support and the flexibility of the private sector (Bogaert, 2012), making them less accountable to the public and yet not entirely autonomous of the state.

Even when real estate developers are private entities with no prior institutional ties to government, Mouton and Shatkin (2019: 2) explain that their activities are still strongly tied to the ‘state-sponsored vision of change’. They argue that the real estate sector is a direct product of the application of state power, manifested through regulatory changes, political reforms, and strategic partnerships (2019: 4). The real estate sector and its multiple stakeholders represent an important global-local interface, where international forces come face-to-face with varying local contexts (Goldman, 2011b; Mouton & Shatkin, 2019: 3; Pitcher, 2017). Mouton and Shatkin (2019: 3) explain that developers are ‘informed and constrained both by the global circulation of finance and models of urbanism, and by a myriad of local institutions’. If scholarly approaches to urban studies are divided—on one end by political economy theorists, who tend to privilege the role of universal structures of power and international capital flows, and on the other end, by proponents of postcolonial urban theory, concerned with the specificities of each urban context—then Mouton and Shatkin (2018) call for more mid-level or conjunctural approaches to urban analysis. Understanding the relational role that real estate developers play can help produce a more informed and holistic picture of this new and evolving phenomenon of new city building, one which adopts a more ‘networked’ (Lindell, 2008) understanding of urban governance where there are various forces at play, at multiple scales. Chapter 5, ‘Tanzania’s new master planned cities: Socialist legacies in a neoliberalizing state’, contributes to emerging



research on the ‘relational’ role of real estate developers. More specifically, it will contribute to evolving literature on state-owned developers that now function as ‘public-investment vehicles’ (Pitcher, 2017: 45) for increasingly entrepreneurial states in the Global South.

## **Chapter 5: Tanzania's new master-planned cities: Socialist legacies in a neoliberalizing landscape**

### **5.1 Introduction**

Widespread liberalization and integration of the world economy has opened up global markets and brought new players into African economies. This increased foreign direct investment is not only being directed to natural resource extraction, but also into new developing industries such as telecommunications, consumer goods, and real estate (Pitcher, 2018). Breaking from previous tropes of a poverty-stricken continent, influential reports published by both international financial institutions and consulting firms tout Africa's untapped investment potential (Côté-Roy & Moser, 2019; Pitcher, 2012). These favorable accounts of a 'rising' Africa have piqued the interest of international property developers, who are directing their attention to the continent's growing middle class, leading to a boom of speculative infrastructure investments (Côté-Roy & Moser, 2019). This sudden inflow of foreign direct investment has induced interregional competition as African states vie for the status of regional hub through the redevelopment of port infrastructure, the establishment of free economic zones, or the construction of state-of-the-art conference centers and luxury hotels. Fueled by this promising investment climate and encouraging projections of Africa's growing middle class, public and private actors have launched ambitious new city projects in Tanzania.

Africa's inclusion in global real estate markets was made possible through the structural adjustment programs imposed on developing nations in return for loans from the World Bank and IMF in the late 1980s. The neoliberal transition and wave of privatization that ensued created fertile ground for the new city-building trend, which is in part driven by private capital (Moser, 2015; Watson, 2014). Scholars have suggested that privatization, particularly of municipal assets and of the urban redevelopment process, has cast doubt on what role the state will have in governing and developing the urban sphere (Fält, 2019; Murray, 2016; van Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 2018). I argue that rather than receding from the urban sphere, the Tanzanian state has used new cities and other mega-infrastructure projects to regain control of informal urban spaces, expand its revenue sources, and legitimize its authority.

This chapter provides an overview of Tanzania's 12 new city projects and the drivers and actors behind their planning and execution. I identify and analyze the stated and unstated drivers of new city projects over a period of more than a decade that guide this particular type of urban

development effort. I present these chronologically in order to demonstrate how builders of new city projects have responded to different drivers as political priorities have shifted over time. Prior to 2008, urban development efforts were characterized by incremental and participatory donor-driven projects. These types of interventions were gradually superseded by a number of city-scale projects between 2008 and 2015 whose goal was to attract foreign direct investment. Following elections in 2015, political interests shifted, and new city projects have since been driven by a populist and nationalist urban agenda. Using evidence from the 12 new city projects to support my arguments, I demonstrate how the urban agenda has shifted over the years in response to the changing priorities of the ruling party. Throughout, I emphasize the influence of the post-independence socialist period and of the neoliberal transition championed by the international financial institutions and argue that these two periods have left behind significant institutional legacies, which make Tanzania a unique case in the broader global context of new city building.

## **5.2 New city projects and actors**

Of the 12 new city projects planned for construction in Tanzania since 2008, six are led and developed by commercial public sector entities<sup>12</sup>. These are reformed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that operate on commercial, for-profit principles and which, for the most part, finance their operations independently through bank loans rather than through government funding. Tanzania's reformed SOEs are a product of the wave of privatization that accompanied the neoliberal transition beginning in the late 1980s, when several parastatals were either liquidated or privatized. Despite operating on commercial principles, all of the SOEs I will be examining are entirely owned by the state through their respective ministries (Controller and Auditor General, 2017).

While there are private actors involved in formal urban redevelopment, city-scale projects have almost exclusively been driven by the state, either through ministries or indirectly by SOEs that function as hybrid public-private entities. The most prominent SOE involved in Tanzanian real estate and new city building is the National Housing Corporation (NHC). The small number of private sector developers can largely be attributed to the persistence of socialist-era legislation that has allowed state agencies and SOEs, in particular the NHC, to repossess high value properties (Buildings Acquisition Act, 1971), thereby deterring the establishment of private

developers (Owens, 2014). The current urban development context is characterized by the far-reaching and centralized control of the state. This is both a legacy of the socialist era under Nyerere, as well as a legacy of the colonial governance structures that preceded it. The lack of formal private developers has resulted in a limited supply of formal housing and consequently led to the spread of informal settlements in the unplanned and underserved periphery of most Tanzanian cities. In an effort to address urban sprawl and regain control of the urban landscape, the state has, through various programs, ministries, and state-owned enterprises, launched several city-scale urban development projects. A few private sector developers have emerged alongside these efforts, offering more high-end real estate developments that promise, through several construction phases, to grow into equally autonomous and multifunctional cities.

Figure 5.1 depicts the 12 new city projects underway in Tanzania since 2008. These projects have largely been planned as multifunctional satellite cities on the outskirts of major cities including Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Dodoma, and Zanzibar Town. Half of these new city projects cluster around Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital and primate city (Wenban-Smith, 2014). Population targets for the new cities vary between 50,000 and 500,000, the area of project sites range from 0.60km<sup>2</sup> to 90km<sup>2</sup>, and no project is more than 50km from a major city center or airport (Table 5.1).




Figure 5.1: Map of 12 new city projects underway in Tanzania. Source: (Joanna Ondrusek-Roy)

|                       | Kigamboni New City  | Safari City  | Jyumbu  | Usa River   | Salama Creek  | Kawe  | Fumba Town   | Fumba Uptown Living  | AVIC Town   | Dege Eco-Village  | New Dodoma (Government City*)   | Bagamoyo SEZ  |
|-----------------------|---|--|---|---|---|---|--|--|---|---|---|---|
| Developer             | MLHSD   | NHC  | NHC   | NHC   | NHC   | NHC   | CPS Live Ltd.  | AZAM Group (Bakhesa)   | AVIC  | Hriad Builders Limited (Joint venture between Azimio Housing Estate and NSSF)     | MLHSD, Dodoma Municipal Council   | EPZA, IPA   |
| Inception date        | 2008  | 2011   | 2016  | 2013  | 2014  | 2013  | 2015   | 2015   | 2014  | 2014  | 2016  | 2013  |
| Location              | 10 km from Dar es Salaam  | 15 km from Arusha  | 12 km from Dodoma   | 15 km from Arusha   | 16 km from Dar es Salaam  | 10 km from Dar es Salaam  | 5 km from Zanzibar International Airport, 10 km from ferry port  | 5 km from Zanzibar International Airport, 10 km from ferry port  | 40 km from Dar es Salaam  | 30 km from Dar es Salaam  | 17 km from Dodoma*  | 12 km from Bagamoyo Town, 50 km from Dar es Salaam  |
| Area (acres)          | 16,061  | 568  | 578   | 300   | 199   | 5.84 (current); 241 (projected)   | 150  | 255  | 583   | 19,700  | 1,543*  | 22,440  |
| Estimated cost (US\$) | 6.7 billion   | 2.5 billion  | 5.5 million (phase one)   | 1 billion   | 1 billion   | 2.2 billion   | 120 million  |  |   | 653 million   | 4.8 billion*  | 10 billion  |
| Main function         | Extension of central business district; international business hub; port; gateway to Africa; tourism hub            | Reduce urbanization pressure on Arusha; tourism hub; low mid, and high-end housing | Mid-low income housing for government workers moving from Dar es Salaam | Reduce urbanization pressure on Arusha; mid to high-end housing | Reduce urbanization pressure on Dar es Salaam; mid to high-end housing        | Urban expansion along northern coast line; reduce urbanization pressure on Dar es Salaam; high-end housing; gateway to Tanzania | Proof of concept for urban development experimenting with sustainable technologies and permaculture principles; targeting Zanzibari diaspora | Legacy project for Bakhesa; high-end housing   | Experimenting with gated community model in Tanzania; built in anticipation of Kigamboni new city | Satellite center to Dar es Salaam; high-end and middle income housing             | New government buildings and housing; support capital transition from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma       | Multifunctional special economic zone; import/export processing; port; residential; tourism hub |
| Planner               | LH Consortium: Korea Land & Housing Corporation, Heerim Architects, Planners Co., Ltd., Archplan International Ltd. | Mobility in Chain; iki Design; Drees& Sommer; Kommsult; Strateji                   | NHC   | PHLS International  | IDEA (Integrated design engineering advisory); Kenyan planning firm (unknown) | PHLS International  | CPS Live Ltd.  | PHLS International   | AVIC International  | Y&P Architects Ltd., Muluhan Construction Industry Co Ltd., Arova Consult Co. Ltd | Saman Corporation (2010); New Dodoma planning committee (MLHSD, DMC, Ardi University, UDSM, ex-CDA) | Ardhi University, COWI  |
| Implementation status | Project discontinued  | Serviced plots for sale, 10 sample units built                                     | Phase one complete; 300 units built; plot for phase two underway        | Planned   | Planned   | 8 high-rise apartment blocks built; construction is stalled   | First phase complete; opening ceremony and owner hand-off in June 2018; 500 units sold and 100 residents moved in as of May 2020             | Several units, seawalk, roads, and other supporting infrastructure built; recreational area and seafont walkway are open to public and especially active on weekends | Phase one completed in 2017; plans to extend the development are stalled                          | Project discontinued; 4,200 apartment units built                                 | Several administrative buildings built; launch ceremony took place on April 2019*                   | Project stalled; construction and financing terms under negotiation                             |

Table 5.1: Table with basic features and information on 12 new city projects underway in Tanzania. Source: (Joanna Ondrusek-Roy)

Acknowledging that there are challenges in defining what constitutes a new city, I have broadly based my selection of new city projects on three main conditions. I first considered whether the developer chose to market and identify a project as a ‘city’, and explicitly differentiate it from other projects that they merely considered to be ‘residential housing projects’. One higher-level manager at the NHC described what he considered to be the defining characteristics of a city project:

A satellite city is a big project, which has a huge chunk of land, more than 100 acres and is mixed use. It incorporates all kinds of facilities, commercial, offices, industrial, social... everything. In addition to facilities like churches, schools, hospitals. They are on a much bigger scale, but Kibada for example, is just a residential housing project, with only 200 units, it doesn’t qualify as a satellite city. (Interview, July 2018)

Second, I looked for projects that demonstrated some ambition to become somewhat autonomous from existing cities through the inclusion of features like office spaces, schools, hospitals, conference centers, among others. While some projects appear to be smaller scale gated real estate developments, these are often the initial residential zones of projects that developers intended to expand through additional phases of construction. One NHC manager emphasized that their city projects were not intended to be mere bedroom communities.

What we want to do is have new cities where we have offices, markets, hospitals everything, so that some of these people don’t need to go back to the existing city center, they can work from here, live here, shop here. (Interview, July 2018)

Third, I considered whether developers intended for their project to be governed independently. Several developers mentioned having a broad administrative plan, in which they would manage the new city for a preliminary period of 10 years, for example, and later hand over governance to an appointed administrative body. While these factors helped inform my selection, projects did not have to meet all these conditions to be included in my analysis. While some of these projects may not fit the conventional profile of new cities discussed elsewhere in the literature, it is still valuable to study why and how new city builders have used the city narrative in planning and marketing.

### **5.2.1 The Tanzanian state**

The Tanzanian state is directly involved in urban redevelopment efforts both in revising plans for existing cities and generating plans for new satellite cities. Although the state is involved in urban planning efforts at various levels, in particular through centralized processes of land

governance, this section focuses on the new city projects that state entities, like the Ministry of Lands, municipal councils, and state authorities, have initiated and led.

Antecedents of new city projects, including plans to redevelop parts of Dar es Salaam and even earlier intentions to establish satellite cities, have re-emerged intermittently since 1968 (Armstrong, 1987). In 2006, the Ministry of Lands together with the Dar es Salaam City council, launched an initiative called the ‘Satellite Urban Centers Project’ (Pastore, 2018). The initiative involved the construction of five new satellite cities along the trunk roads radiating from the city center, the purpose of which was to decongest Dar es Salaam and provide basic services to the urban periphery. Although these satellite centers lacked the world-city aspirations of the new cities intended to captivate international investors today, they set a precedent for the current wave of new city projects.

Growing aspirations to redevelop Tanzania as a gateway for international investment into Africa by projecting an image of a Tanzania that was ‘open for business’ materialized with the conception of Kigamboni New City between 2008-2010. Spearheaded by the Ministry of Lands, then under ex-UN-HABITAT director, Dr. Anna Tibaijuka, the new city was planned as an extension of the country’s commercial capital. Two suspension bridges and an underwater tunnel would link Dar es Salaam’s central business district (CBD) with the mirroring Kigamboni Peninsula, allowing Dar es Salaam to spill over onto the sparsely developed urban periphery. Featuring a prominent international business zone, landmark skyscrapers, and large tracts of coastal land reserved for hotels and conference centers, Kigamboni New City, was intended to ‘propel Tanzania into the global ranks of “world cities”’ (Lindell et al., 2016: 7). Planned and designed by Korean state-owned developers, Korea Land & Housing Corporation (LH), 3D renderings of the new city bear a striking resemblance to the skyline of Songdo Smart City in South Korea (see 6.2.2.1). A separate entity, the Kigamboni Development Authority (KDA), was established under the Ministry of Lands to oversee land acquisition, compensation, and resettlement of the area’s more than 90,000 residents. In order to prevent further inconvenient developments on the city’s planned site, the Ministry of Lands proclaimed a ‘stop-order’ on construction in Kigamboni from 2008-2010 (Haki Ardhi, 2012), that brought local small-scale development to a standstill and generated local opposition, which continued to build as a lack of funding delayed compensation and resettlement processes (Lindell et al., 2016). The project was

eventually abandoned when the Ministry of Lands came under new leadership in 2015 (see 6.3.1).

In 2013, the state's plans to develop a special economic zone outside Tanzania's colonial-era capital, Bagamoyo, were assembled as part of a national initiative to establish 14 special economic zones throughout Tanzania. The master plan for the Bagamoyo Special Economic Zone (SEZ) centers on an international port that promises to rival other regional ports, as well as alleviate sea traffic coming through the Dar es Salaam harbor (COWI, 2013). Planned in a collaboration between Ardhi University professors and a Danish consulting group, COWI, the master plan includes several features beyond the standard import/export facilities that constitute traditional SEZs. The project is mixed use and includes industrial, commercial (ICT park and SME park), tourism facilities, conservation areas, and a residential zone (COWI, 2013), which reflect a desire to be autonomous from nearby urban centers. Although the project is primarily directed by Tanzania's Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), under the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing, several other state entities have been involved in the planning process, including the Tanzanian Port Authority (TPA), the Ministry of Lands, and the Tanzanian Investment Center (COWI, 2013). Construction of the US\$10 billion project was awarded to China Merchant Holding International<sup>13</sup> and will be financed through the Omani State Government Reserve Fund. While the SEZ received plenty of support under the previous administration, the project has been stalled since 2016, and negotiations over the terms of the contract are ongoing (see 6.3.1).

Nearly 50 years after it was first envisioned by Nyerere, the post-independence socialist capital of Dodoma is being realized anew by Magufuli as the flagship project of his presidency. While the vision for 'New Dodoma'<sup>14</sup> consciously incorporates several elements from the original 1976 plans, it also seeks to make new and significant expansions to the existing city. At the time of fieldwork (July, 2018), the planning commission for New Dodoma consisted of 23 members, including planners from the Dodoma Municipal Council, professors from Ardhi University and the University of Dar es Salaam, as well as ex-members of the now-defunct Capital Development Authority (CDA), which had been tasked with the implementation of the original 1976 master plan. Interviews with three members of the planning commission revealed that they intended to base the new plan on a 2010 revision of the master plan produced by a South Korean engineering firm, Saman Corporation. The 2010 revision featured the addition of



five functions that would influence the development of the Capital City District (CCD). The New Dodoma would be: a government city housing all administrative buildings and functions; a higher education city centered around the University of Dodoma; an airport city serving as a travel hub for East Africa; a technology city featuring a high-tech industrial zone; and a tourist city that might incentivize tourists to stop in Dodoma on their way to popular national parks in the north (Saman Corporation, 2012). Given Magufuli’s goal to permanently relocate all government functions to Dodoma, the construction of a distinct zone known as Government City has been prioritized. In order to fast-track construction and avoid compensating and relocating residents, Government City is being built on land that was, until recently, part of the Tanzania People’s Defense Force compound, 17 kilometers east of central Dodoma. This area will include government ministries, embassies, residential space for government employees and officials, parliament, the High Court, as well as commercial areas and public services. 3D renderings and promotional videos of Government City depict large avenues, contemporary architecture, impeccable landscaping, and wide open park spaces (Dodoma City TV, 2018), all of which stand in contrast to the existing arid landscape (Figure 5.3).



Figure 5.2: Members of the planning commission for New Dodoma point towards Dodoma from the site of the Government City, 17.5 kilometers away from Dodoma’s city center. Source: (URT, 2018)

### 5.2.2 State-owned enterprises

Several Tanzanian SOEs have become involved in housing production and new city building in the last 12 years. These include the National Housing Corporation (NHC), the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), and the Watumishi Housing Company (WHC). The most prolific of these is the NHC, which has initiated five new city projects since 2012, all of which are located on the outskirts of existing cities: Kawe Satellite City (Dar es Salaam), Salama Creek (Dar es Salaam), Safari City (Arusha), Usa River (Arusha), and Iyumbu Satellite City (Dodoma) (Figure 5.1).

These projects take the form of largely middle- to upper-class housing and commercial developments, although the NHC claims to accommodate low, middle, and high-income households. Most of these projects (Salama Creek, Kawe, Usa River, Safari City) were planned by international planning consultants with design sensibilities that reproduce Western suburban lifestyles and consist of low-density, low-rise neighborhoods, requiring a car to get around. The NHC's satellite cities are similar in form and composition to other projects on the continent such as Appolonia, City of Light in Ghana (Fält, 2019), Kilamba in Angola (Cain, 2014; Watson, 2014; Buire, 2014), and Tatu City in Kenya (Adewunmi, 2011). Although they are currently largely residential, as part of their intention to be self-sufficient satellite centers the plans also include commercial zones, office space, and occasionally light industry. The multifunctionality of these centres is embodied in the 'work, live, play' motto frequently found in new city marketing and promotion materials. Pedestrian-friendly environments and an abundance of parks and recreational facilities seek to deliver the 'liveability' (Fält, 2019) that existing African cities have been criticized for lacking.



Figure 5.3: 3D renderings of Salama Creek (left) and Safari City (right), depicting scenic views of modern town-houses, wide tree-lined streets, and clear blue skies. Sources: (NHC, 2015b; NHC Tanzania, 2016)

Over the last decade, the NHC has gradually evolved from a primarily managerial role, with limited property development and building mainly single-storey bungalow-style houses, towards the more enterprising endeavor of building entirely new cities with a diversity of housing types, including high-rise apartments, multi-story town houses, and luxury villas. The NHC's shift towards taking on more ambitious city-scale projects is rationalized as part of a growth strategy to transition from a property management role to the role of a developer (NHC, 2015a). This shift, explored in Chapter 2, has been underway for the past three decades, starting with the legal restructuring of the company through the 1990 NHC Act that enabled the NHC to operate commercially (National Housing Corporation Act, 1990), and followed by an

amendment made in 2005 that gave the NHC more autonomy with regard to the types of projects it could pursue (Miscellaneous Amendment Act, 2005). While legislative reforms have changed the financing mechanisms and allowed the NHC to invest in more profitable real estate ventures, the corporation continues to be state-owned. The chairman of the corporation is appointed by the president, while the director general and other members of the board are selected by the Minister of Lands. While the NHC's operations are no longer funded by the state, the corporation continues to pay dividends in addition to corporate taxes to the state as its only shareholder, all of which are paid into the Government Consolidated Fund. As such, the NHC, along with other SOEs, represent an important source of government revenue, especially given the country's weak tax base. The reformed mandate and financing structure of the NHC allows the state to continue addressing housing provision, but through private capital and what it perceives to be more efficient market mechanisms.

As a holdover from the socialist era, the NHC is expected to produce affordable housing alternatives and maintain a presence in every region of the country, which makes it particularly challenging to earn profit (NHC, 2015a). In line with these expectations, the corporation has continued to advertise itself as a developer for all segments of the population, with stated targets to build 12,000 affordable houses (39%), 16,700 mid- to higher-end houses (55%), 1,800 commercial units (6%) by 2025 (NHC, 2015a). While the NHC undertakes a variety of projects at different scales (including mixed-use high-rises and smaller housing estates), their city-scale projects have tended to target middle- to high-income households. Interviews with upper management at the NHC reveal that Salama Creek and Usa River only offer middle- to high-end residential units (Interview, July 2018) and prices for a 3-4 bedroom apartment in Kawe Satellite City development sell for US\$128,000-290,000, which is well out of range for the average Tanzanian, where median annual household incomes as of 2013 were US\$2,154 (Gallup, 2013). Interviewees explain that profits generated from higher-end sales are then used to finance the construction of affordable housing. Following demands from the state, the NHC has provided more affordable options for US\$24,000-36,000 in their newest city project, Iyumbu, and one of their small-scale residential projects, Kibada Estates (~200 units) sold out within 48 hours since units were priced at US\$20,000 (Interview, July 2018).

Beyond their housing estates and satellite city projects, the NHC has also recently developed several lucrative projects in central Dar es Salaam. These smaller-scale projects take

the form of mixed-use commercial and residential towers, which, due to their prime location in downtown Dar es Salaam target a high-income clientele. Golden Premier Residences, Eco Residence, Victoria Place, and Morocco Square buildings offer 2-4 bedroom apartments that range from US\$98,812-398,315. Since new management was appointed in 2010, the company has eagerly sought out projects with higher grossing margins, and a Strategic Plan produced in 2015 suggests their ambitions may have outgrown the national market. The plan states that the NHC's vision is 'to become a leading real estate development and management firm in Africa' by 2025 (NHC, 2015a: 25). According to the Center for Affordable Housing Finance, the NHC had US\$400 million worth of ongoing projects in real estate in December 2015, and US\$800 million by 2020 (CAHF, 2020).

While pension funds are generally used to finance urban redevelopment and real estate projects, the NSSF<sup>15</sup> has taken on the role of primary developer in two major infrastructure projects. The first is East Africa's longest suspension bridge, the Nyerere Bridge, which now links Dar es Salaam to the Kigamboni Peninsula. The second is Dege Eco Village, a US\$544.5 million urban mega-development, located in Somangira district, Kigamboni Peninsula, whose construction by Turkish contractors, Mutluhan Construction Industry Co. Ltd. started in 2014. The project is a joint venture between the NSSF and local real estate developer Azimio Housing Estate Limited<sup>16</sup>. The developers' intention was to produce a 'modern, well planned, eco-friendly city, with all the amenities you could possibly ever need' (DEGE Eco Village, 2014). The eco rhetoric used in the name and marketing of this project is a feature that has since the early 2000s become increasingly mainstream in new city projects and urban policy-making around the world (Joss, 2011). The COO of the parent company of Azimio revealed that eco-claims of the project were intended to qualify Dege Eco Village for international sources of climate-related financing and to potentially earn carbon credits over the lifetime of the project ("Asif Bucha," 2015). While construction has been on hold since 2016, the 4,200 concrete<sup>17</sup> apartment units that have been built show no attempt to integrate any principles of sustainability.

Another SOE involved in large-scale housing schemes is Watumishi Housing, a property developer and licensed fund manager for the Watumishi real estate investment trust (REIT). The trust's founding investors are all SOEs, including the Public Service Social Security Fund (PSSSF), National Social Security Fund (NSSF), National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF), and the National Housing Corporation (NHC). REITs allow investors to buy shares in commercial


real estate portfolios and access dividend-based income from real estate ventures carried out by the fund manager. Established in 2013, Watumishi Housing is the main implementer of the Tanzania Public Servant Housing Scheme whose goal is to build 50,000 houses in five phases starting in 2014. Watumishi Housing focuses exclusively on building housing for civil servants and their projects are limited in scale; they do not include commercial and office spaces or other facilities that might allow them to function independently from established cities, in contrast to the NHC and NSSF projects. While I have not included Watumishi Housing projects in my list of new city projects in Tanzania, the multiple housing developments they are producing demonstrate the extent to which the state is invested in real estate and the multiple institutional arrangements used to carry out these investments.

### **5.2.3 Private developers**

A late transition from socialism to capitalism and institutional legacies from the socialist era have made it difficult for private developers to establish themselves in Tanzania. The Buildings Acquisition Act (1971), that allowed the NHC to acquire high-value buildings during the socialist era, remained in place until 1990, five years after the abandonment of the socialist agenda (Komu, 2011; Owens, 2014). The persistence of the 1971 Act created a powerful disincentive for local private property developers who feared the expropriation risk associated with formal transparent urban development (Owens, 2014). Likewise, foreign developers have been slow to launch projects in Tanzania given a lack of local skilled labor and materials, a large infrastructure gap, and restrictive local property rights. As a result, there are only three large-scale private developers building new city projects in Tanzania.

On the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar, two new cities are currently under construction in a free economic zone. Located 25 kilometers from Zanzibar Town, Fumba Uptown Living is a luxury city development that is being built and financed by one of Africa's richest men, Said Salim Bakhresa. He is the founder of the Bakhresa Group, a conglomerate of companies that operates throughout Africa and is involved in a wide variety of industries including milling, bottled water, media, petroleum products, inland container depots, and the marine ferries that connect Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar Town. The company's products are so ubiquitous that one interviewee joked that it was 'difficult to spend even one day in Tanzania without giving your money to Bakhresa' (Interview, July 2018). Originally from Zanzibar,

Bakhresa has close ties with Zanzibar's president, Ali Mohamed Shein. Although Bakhresa had originally established a milk-processing plant in the Fumba Free Economic Zone (FEZ), the now 71 year-old multi-millionaire, inspired by both a need to leave behind a physical legacy and a desire to 'take better advantage of the scenic location', decided to invest in the construction of this city development (Interview, July 2018). Planned by Dubai-based PHILS International, construction is underway on 500 luxury villas, a picturesque seawalk reminiscent of Beirut's corniche, and a man-made beach achieved through dredging sand from the ocean floor (Figures 5.4a and 5.4b).



Figures 5.4a and b: Left (10-2016), right (02-2020). Satellite images of Fumba Uptown Living, showing progress in the construction of the mega-development as well as the artificial beach created through dredging. Source: (Google Earth Pro)

Bakhresa allegedly drew inspiration from properties he owns in Muscat, Dubai, and Johannesburg when envisioning the luxurious lifestyle of Fumba Uptown Living (Interview, July, 2018). The architecture and interior decor reference a generic Arab style with geometric inlays and arched doorways, and reflects contemporary luxury tastes in the region. According to an interview with a senior consultant, plans to make the satellite development 'seamless' include placing electric polls and gas lines underground, establishing a desalination plant, and having potable water on tap in every home, 'just like in Europe' (Interview, July 2018). While the first phase of implementation, which started in 2016, has focused on building residential units, the second phase of construction is set to include commercial facilities, international schools, conference centers, and hotels. These additional amenities showcase the developer's ambition to build a self-sufficient urban center and alternative to Zanzibar Town.

The builders of Fumba Uptown Living see the new city project as a starting point for Zanzibar's metamorphosis, claiming that if the government and local pension funds were to capitalize on Zanzibar's location and invest in port infrastructure, the sleepy island could become the 'Singapore of East Africa' (Interview, July 2018). Like Nigeria's Eko Atlantic being



compared to the ‘future Hong Kong [or] Dubai of Africa’ (Murray, 2015a: 100) or Kenya’s Konza City dubbed the ‘Silicon Savannah’ (Smith, 2017: 32), Fumba Uptown Living is conceptualized as an international exception to its surroundings, its vision only describable in reference to an ambitious elsewhere.



Figure 5.5: Fumba Uptown Living, a luxury city development built by one of Africa’s richest men, Said Salim Bakhresa. (Source: Joanna Ondrusek-Roy, 2018)

A second satellite city project is being planned and implemented within the same FEZ by German property consultants, CPS Live Ltd. (Customized Property Solutions), a family-operated company led by brothers Sebastian and Tobias Dietzold. The Dietzold brothers came to Tanzania in their teens with their missionary parents, who settled the family in Moshi in northern Tanzania. They first ventured into real estate by flipping bankrupt property portfolios in Germany and selling them to American hedge funds. Wanting to return to Tanzania, the brothers set up a simple backpacker hostel on the Northern coast of Zanzibar and later pursued a number of bigger business ideas, one of which was a digital marketplace or Tanzanian equivalent to Amazon called *Tupomoja*, meaning ‘we are one’ in Swahili. Eventually, they settled on property consulting, and while their original portfolio contained a handful of small hotels, through personal ties with Zanzibari government, they were approached and asked by officials to build a satellite town in Zanzibar (Interviews, July and August 2018).

Fumba Town seeks to become a successful experiment in sustainable new city building in Africa. Of the 500 units that have already been built, several have been assembled using prefabricated housing techniques, which developers boast reduces the negative environmental footprint of cement, while community gardens and eco-entrepreneurship training programs promote local involvement in the city’s environment. One of the town’s main selling points is

that the landscaping is based on permaculture principles or a ‘whole systems’ approach to design. Sloping roofs and gutters collect grey water, which is then used to water community gardens and front lawns, in which native fruits and vegetables are planted; these are either consumed by residents or sold at the local town market. Finally, the leftover organic waste is composted and used to fertilize the gardens and build topsoil<sup>18</sup>. Combining technical sustainability solutions with community building initiatives, the designers of Fumba Town see themselves as changemakers rather than mere real estate developers and plan to scale up and replicate this model throughout Tanzania and to other parts of Africa. Located on the south-east part of the island, some 30 minutes from the urban center and port of Zanzibar Town, both Fumba FEZ projects are only separated by a 15-minute drive and yet their urban visions could not be further apart. Both projects, however, remain out of reach for the average Tanzanian. The villas in Bahkresa’s Fumba Uptown Living are priced at US\$400,000 and up. While CPS had originally planned to target middle class Tanzanians and aimed to price a 2-bedroom house for US\$35,000, additional infrastructure costs have pushed prices up. Studio apartments start at US\$17,900, a 2-bedroom townhouse sells for US\$55,000 and a 5-bedroom seafront property costs around US\$300,000 (CPS, 2018). Regardless of how inaccessible these developments are to locals, the new city developers benefit from building in a free economic zone, which allows foreigners to purchase houses on a 99-year lease, guaranteed by the local investment authority. Fumba Town is the furthest along of the new city projects in Tanzania, and by May 2020, 500 units had been sold and nearly 100 residents had moved in (CPS, 2020).

Back on the mainland near the site of the long-awaited Kigamboni New City, AVIC Town is a new city project built and managed by AVIC International, a subsidiary of the Chinese state-owned aerospace and defense conglomerate, Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC)<sup>19</sup>. AVIC International participates in a variety of industries worldwide, including aviation, trade and logistics, retail and high-end consumer goods, real estate and hotel management, and electronics. Some notable projects they have undertaken in Africa include the Two Rivers Development, a mixed-use mega-development that is part of Kenya’s 2030 Vision, as well as Freetown Aviation City in Sierra Leone. At first glance, AVIC Town appears to be a luxury gated compound, with 130 villas, a swimming pool and gym facilities, but an additional five phases of construction are planned, which will expand the development to include shopping centers, office space, and educational facilities that would eventually make the town relatively



self-sufficient. The first phase of development was completed in 2017 and is meticulously landscaped, with palm trees lining the roads and ornate gates that surround each villa. Prices range between US\$150,000 and US\$500,000 (TMRC, 2017) and are therefore out of reach for the average Tanzanian. The design of the town seems to fuse Western suburban ideals with Chinese sensibilities. The houses are painted yellow with red roofs, both auspicious colors in Chinese color symbolism; yellow is an imperial color and represents power and prosperity, while red is associated with good fortune, happiness, and celebration (Yu, 2014).

A one and a half-hour drive along a dirt road from the Dar es Salaam CBD, the large gated compound stands in stark contrast to its surroundings of sparsely occupied coastal plots and informal cinder block-baking operations. Foreigners can purchase land in Tanzania for the purpose of investment and obtain a certificate of occupation through the Tanzanian Investment Center. Although the land was supposedly designated for investment purposes, the acquisition process for the AVIC Town property was fraught with problems. Incumbent residents were misled into believing they were being relocated to make way for a development that would house retired members of the Tanzanian People's Defense Force (Liganga, 2015). Several ex-residents complained they had not been sufficiently compensated and members of the surrounding community worried that an underground river that runs underneath the development and was a key source of water for the community during times of drought would be diverted to create the artificial lake seen in the town renderings (Liganga, 2015) (Figure 5.6).



Figure 5.6: Digital rendering of AVIC Town. Source: (AVIC Town, 2015)

According to the marketing managers and sales agents interviewed, over 50% of units have been sold, although there is no way of verifying whether these numbers are inflated or false. The development remains largely vacant, aside from a few heavily armed guards patrolling the premises and one sales agent working out of a furnished model home.

Along with AVIC Town and Dege Eco-Village, the NHC and Watumishi Housing have also initiated several medium-sized real estate projects in Kigamboni. The wave of speculative real estate investments that has washed over the peninsula in the last decade can be attributed to recent regulatory reforms and anticipation for the infrastructure upgrades and connections that Kigamboni New City promised to bring to the area. A working paper by Stina Møldrup Wolff, Amelia Kuch and Joshua Chipman (2018) claims real estate market reforms including the Unit Titles Act (2008), which allows for the division of ownership titles in three dimensional space (i.e. condos and apartments), and the Mortgage Financing Act (2008), which enabled more households to access mortgage financing, have both played an important role in supporting the real estate sector. More recently, a large backlog in land surveying has prompted the Minister of Lands, William Lukuvi, to encourage private sector surveying and planning in the area (Møldrup Wolff et al., 2018). Although land use planning and large-scale urban developments have until now been monopolized by state actors, this shift in attitude towards private sector involvement in land management may attract more small-scale private real estate investors and developers in the years to come. The remainder of this chapter will analyze the drivers and evolution of state-led projects (here meaning projects led by state-financed entities and hybrid state-owned developers) as they continue to produce the majority of new city projects in Tanzania.

### **5.3 Stated drivers of new city building: Urban crisis and the formalization agenda**

Many new city projects have been touted as a means of addressing housing shortages, urban sprawl, and the congestion that cripples the Global South's rapidly urbanizing cities. Dar es Salaam is currently Africa's fifth most populous city, and is projected to grow from six million today to 13.4 million by 2035 (UN-DESA, 2018). While urban Tanzanians experience better living conditions than their rural counterparts (Rosen & Sobecki, 2019), residents of Dar es Salaam complain of congestion, stating that it can take 'three to four hours to get into town, just in the morning, and then another two to three hours in the evening to get back home because of traffic jams' (Interview, July 2018). The creation of new cities offers a quick solution to the urban crisis underway. The NHC's new city projects are all rationalized as a means of providing mass housing to local Tanzanians. The corporation's own statistics report that Tanzania's housing deficit is estimated at nearly 3 million units and is increasing by 200,000 units per year

(NHC, 2015a). According to one realtor, ‘In Dar alone, there is a housing shortage of 400,000 units’ (Interview, July 2018).

Another stated driver supporting Tanzania’s new cities is the state’s national formalization agenda. In line with the liberalizing policies promoted by the World Bank and IMF around the turn of the millennium, many African states took up the task of formalizing landholdings (Briggs, 2011). These policy recommendations were largely based on Hernando De Soto’s (2001) conception of ‘dead capital’<sup>20</sup>. Because acquiring formal or statutory land rights requires a significant amount of time and capital<sup>21</sup>, most Tanzanians resort to acquiring customary land rights through local authorities (Møldrup Wolff et al., 2018). According to De Soto’s approach, although customary land rights are recognized by formal institutions, they are considered less secure and therefore prevent occupants from investing in and realizing the full value of the land they occupy. Along with providing tenure security, formal land titles can serve as collateral for accessing loans, therefore ‘unlocking’ otherwise ‘dead’ capital for development (Briggs, 2011:132). Since 2005, the Tanzanian government has embraced De Soto’s philosophy and implemented a formalization program titled the *Property and Business Formalisation Programme* (more commonly referred to by the Swahili acronym, MKURABITA – Mpango wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na Biashara za Wanyonge). Briggs (2011: 132) points out that as the title of the program suggests, the government of Tanzania perceives a strong link between property and business, which underscores the government’s ‘desire to liberate funds from legal property rights to finance business expansion’. While the various satellite cities that have been planned since 2008 are not officially included in the formalization program, several state-owned developers as well as officials of the Ministry of Lands mention formalization as one of the principle drivers of the new city projects.

Beyond the recommendations of international financial institutions, formalization is also intended in large part to curb the spread of informal settlements, which by 2010 were home to nearly 80% of Dar es Salaam’s population (Møldrup Wolff et al., 2018; Sheuya & Burra, 2016: 447). This is made clear in a statement by one of the NHC’s higher level managers:

There has been a lack of planning of cities for some time and although it was the mandate of the government to plan cities, it was not happening. That’s why there are slums everywhere. So we thought we should develop cities which are planned, well planned, so we could complement the government to provide these services instead of waiting for the government to plan them. We initiated these programs both to support the government to

provide well planned cities, and so as to limit the spread of slums and unplanned settlements. (Interview, July 2018)

Some scholars consider growing informality to be a main driver of new city building, as governments build new cities to reclaim control over urban spaces that have grown out of their grasp (Murray, 2015a; Watson, 2009, 2014). Both the formalization program and the new city projects are meant to bring the large and growing informal sector into the control of the state. The Tanzanian government's current efforts to expand the tax base and also manage and regulate 'unplanned' slum populations through the creation of new cities are not unlike earlier attempts by Nyerere to capture the scattered peasantry and bring them into the formal economy through the villagization program. While contemporary efforts are perhaps less coercive, there are continuities between the Ujamaa villages and new cities as both are top-down spatial interventions aimed at capturing informal domestic capital, limiting sprawl, and providing centralized services. These new developments attest to the extended reach and continued control of the state over land governance and the urban agenda.

#### **5.4 Unstated drivers of new city building and their evolution over time**

Prior to 2008, urban development efforts were characterized by incremental and participatory donor-driven projects. However, these types of interventions gave way to an entrepreneurial wave of urban interventions under the Kikwete administration, which while they were officially, touted as a means of addressing the urban congestion and housing shortages, were largely driven by the prospect of attracting foreign direct investment and achieving economic growth. During this time, state-owned enterprises pursued increasingly profitable real estate and new city ventures, which were anticipated to help fill government coffers. Following a contentious election in 2015, the ruling party's interests shifted inwards and marked another turn in the urban agenda, characterized by efforts to consolidate voter support through more affordable housing schemes and investments into the interior through the capital transition to socialist-era Dodoma.

##### **5.4.1 Competing for the gateway to Africa: Economic drivers of new city building (2008-2015)**

From 2008 to 2015, under Kikwete, *Mzee wa Maisha Bora* (Mr. Good Life), Tanzania's new city projects were largely motivated by the prospect of improving the economy by opening up and courting foreign investors. Mega-infrastructure projects launched in this period include

waterfront and city redevelopments, commercial and industrial complexes including special economic zones and port infrastructure, as well as entirely new satellite city developments. These projects were rationalized as investments in the modernization of the country and promised not only to attract foreign direct investment but also to spur tourism and make Tanzania a major player in East African and global markets. Emboldened by influential reports of a growing middle class and optimistic economic growth projections, the state and hybrid state-owned developers ramped up the scale and number of new city projects.

Liquid natural gas was discovered offshore near Lindi in Southern Tanzania in 2010. Prospecting petroleum companies estimate there are 57 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves, which would potentially make Tanzania the third largest producer in sub-Saharan Africa, after Nigeria and Mozambique (Ford, 2016). Around the same time, uranium deposits were also discovered and Russian mining operators mobilized to begin mining by 2012 (Basov, 2013). Following these discoveries, the Tanzanian government as well as local and international investors had high prospects for national development, believing that the revenue from the gas exports alone would help ‘turn Tanzania into a middle-income country within 10 years’ (Ford, 2016). In addition to a relatively stable political climate compared to neighboring countries, and steady GDP growth rates above 7%, Tanzania was poised for a flood of foreign investment (Nordea, 2020; World Bank, 2019). The architectural form and features of the new city projects launched between 2008 and 2015 attests to this economic optimism. Characterized by corporate architecture, striking skylines, and state-of-the-art facilities to accommodate the anticipated business class and tourists, most of these projects were clustered around Dar es Salaam, the country’s commercial capital.

Arguably Tanzania’s most ambitious new city project, Kigamboni New City, aspired to be an ‘ultra-modern urban centre with facilities competing with those in places like Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Hong Kong, and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia’ (“Tanzania Needs to Develop More Modern Satellite Cities,” 2013; Watson, 2014: 222). The promotional video and master plan showcase a prominent international business zone, conference centers, and international schools to accommodate the anticipated international workforce (LH, 2010a). Similar ambitions to create an ideal business environment are reflected in the plan for the Bagamoyo SEZ, conceived in 2013. The multifunctional SEZ would bypass the bureaucratic inefficiencies and poor infrastructure that make Tanzania a difficult country in which to conduct

business<sup>22</sup>. Operating independently from domestic laws and regulations, SEZs provide a ‘space of exception’ along with several additional incentives, including tax exemptions, cheap labor, streamlined customs procedures, and state-of-the-art infrastructure (Easterling, 2014), thereby providing foreign businesses with ideal conditions for entering the host country’s regional market. Bagamoyo SEZ was conceived as the first of several SEZs planned as part of an economic development programme titled ‘The Mini-Tiger Plan 2020’ (COWI, 2013). Modeled on the success of the Asian Tiger economies (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), the program involved establishing 14 SEZs in the hopes of attracting foreign direct investment and boosting exports. The report produced in collaboration with the Japan Development Institute predicted that the program would fast track economic growth much like it had in the Asian ‘miracle economies’, from 5-6% to an ambitious 8-10% (URT, 2004). The success of the SEZs was substantiated by what the authors referred to as the ‘Ponds and Birds Theory’ in which SEZs located in promising areas and focusing on strategic sectors represented ‘ponds’ that would attract foreign direct investment or ‘migrating birds’ (URT, 2004). Bagamoyo would serve as the first of the 14 SEZs and therefore provide proof of concept for the zones that followed.

With tourism constituting nearly 17% of the country’s GDP in 2014 (Tanzania Tourist Board, 2014), Kigamboni New City, Safari City, and the Bagamoyo SEZ are also geared towards enhancing Tanzania’s allure to international and regional tourists. Distributing new cities across different regions offers a means to spread touristic attractions throughout the country, the benefits of which have largely concentrated in the north around the Serengeti, Ngorongoro, and Tarangire National Parks, and Africa’s tallest peak, Mount Kilimanjaro.

New cities planned for construction around the coast are also motivated by a desire to participate in the ongoing regional port competition to supply the landlocked countries of the Great Lakes Region. Once built, Bagamoyo SEZ is expected to become ‘East Africa’s preferred coastal logistics and manufacturing hub’ (COWI, 2013: 22) (Figure 5.7). Kigamboni New City’s planners envisioned the future city as a ‘global port’ and ‘transportation and industrial hub connecting Africa to the Indian Ocean’ (LH, 2010a: 169). Similarly, the NHC’s Kawe Satellite City is promoted as a ‘gateway to Tanzania’ (NHC, n.d.). While port competition between Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia is not a new phenomenon (Hoyle & Charlier, 1995), liberalized trade has prompted massive investments in port redevelopments in recent years (Enns, 2018). The Kenyan government announced in 2012 the redevelopment of the Lamu port in the north as

part of a larger transport corridor linking Lamu with South Sudan and Ethiopia. The US\$23 billion project, which is included in Kenya's Vision 2030 (Kenya Ports Authority, n.d.), will also be accompanied by the redevelopment of the southern port of Mombasa. In February of 2019, the Ethiopian Prime Minister met with the UAE's Minister of Foreign Affairs and agreed to cooperate on a project to turn the Berbera Port in Somaliland into a 'major trading hub' (Ayieko, 2020; Mooney, 2017). In addition to promoting the establishment of new cities on the coast, port competition has spurred other major infrastructure developments in Tanzania, including the construction of a new standard gauge railway intended to improve supply chain connections with Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Wiig & Silver, 2019) (Figure 5.8).

Figure 5.7: The designated site for the Bagamoyo SEZ, envisioned as part of an economic corridor between Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam. Source: (COWI, 2013)

Figure 5.8: Existing and proposed railway lines in East Africa. Plans to rehabilitate the railway linking Dar es Salaam to the landlocked countries of the Great Lakes Region are underway. Source: (BBC News, 2016)

government-owned (Kweka, 2019). They cluster around major national industries such as electricity, water, transportation, tourism, ICT, land, gas and minerals, housing, and banking. Like the NHC, several of these SOEs have been restructured to operate like private enterprises and straddle the divide between the public and private sectors. About 60% of government investment is held in only 10 SOEs, of which, two are involved in new city projects: the Tanzania Port Authority and the NHC (Kweka, 2019).

The NHC operates on commercial principles, and finances projects through loans from local banks, allowing the corporation to leverage the tools of the private sector while simultaneously benefiting from its status as a state-owned enterprise. As a government entity the corporation is able to access government guaranteed loans, acquire land, and inspire customer trust. One of the reasons the NHC is able to finance their projects through pre-sales is that prospective home buyers are confident that ‘the government will deliver’ (Interview, June 2018). This hybrid public-private configuration can be examined through Pitcher’s (2018) research on entrepreneurial governance in Africa in which she argues that across the African continent, reformed state-owned enterprises are used by entrepreneurial states as ‘public investment vehicles’ from which the state can draw revenue. Using this concept, the new cities built by the NHC can be interpreted as investments made by an entrepreneurial state looking to participate alongside the private sector, in speculative real estate ventures. As one of the main vehicles for state investments, the NHC operates much like any other competitive private developer. It carries out SWOT analyses (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) of the local real estate market in order to better position itself among competitors, and presentations highlight that they expect a minimum of 25% return on investments for new city projects such as Safari City, Kawe Satellite City, and Usa River in addition to ambitious revenue growth targets. According to their 10-year strategic plan published in 2015, the NHC aspires to increase the company’s revenues from TSh64.7 billion in 2013 to TSh500 billion in 2025 (NHC, 2015a). Whereas parastatals were considered to be barriers to growth during the neoliberal transition, the hybrid status many of them have gradually acquired since then, has shifted attitudes and reformed state-owned enterprises are now consciously leveraged to turn profits and achieve development outcomes.



#### 5.4.2 Turning inwards: The political drivers of new city building (2015-2019)

Following a competitive election in 2015, there has been a concerted effort by the CCM to reaffirm the ruling party's voter support (Jacob & Pedersen, 2018). Development rhetoric and policies have shifted inwards towards Dodoma and the predominantly rural and poor interior, where the CCM's voter base is strongest (Morse, 2018). Accordingly, this has been reflected in the urban agenda, and the central government appears to be more interested in deploying new city projects as a means to extend the ruling party's reach, consolidate voter support, and reinforce the new regime's legitimacy.

According to one regional director of the NHC, 'when the government needs a new district, they ask the NHC to build a new satellite city, sometimes in the middle of nowhere!' (Interview, August 2018). The government uses its influence over state-owned developers to build new cities as a way to establish new administrative districts and extend the ruling party's reach. While Tanzania has been involved in a decentralization program since the late 1990s (Kessy & McCourt, 2010), Goodfellow and Smith (2013), who examine Rwanda's urban development agenda, explain that there is still a strong tendency to continually defer to executive authority even when new administrative levels are created. This appears to also be the case in Tanzania, where a study by Fjeldstad *et al.* (2010) found that local priorities were largely set by the central government. According to Owens (2014), partial decentralization reforms in Tanzania have created overlapping governance regimes which confound institutional roles. As a result, the central government has retained defacto control over regional and local governance structures (Kessy & McCourt, 2010). A new district therefore becomes an arm of the central state and the regime's reach is extended and strengthened.

Magufuli has been widely described as a populist, occasionally referred to by the local media as *Rais mtetezi wa wanyonge* (defender of the down-trodden or the people's champion) (Sabinus, 2020). He has demonstrated his commitment to the common Tanzanian in part through his anti-corruption agenda but also by slashing 'wasteful' government expenditures through grand public gestures such as cancelling Independence Day celebrations and parliament parties (BBC News, 2015c) or placing restrictions on the international travel of government officials (Mtulya, 2019). In one statement he pledged 'to bring a new Tanzania that is fighting for the most vulnerable people so that they can participate in development' (BBC News Swahili, 2018).

In line with his populist image, he has placed particular emphasis on the provision of affordable housing.

Croese and Pitcher (2019) argue that housing distribution is used by authoritarian governments as a way to buy loyalty and co-opt support, particularly when they deliberately target lower-level government employees and civil servants. With the state controlling the preeminent players in real estate and urban development, housing distribution has become a tool for the government to curry favor and broaden the state's presence throughout the country. While Watumishi Housing has always specialized in delivering housing to government workers, the NHC has also been directed to contribute to the government housing stock, resulting in the construction of their most recent project, Iyumbu Satellite City, which is exclusively reserved for government staff making the move to Dodoma. Increasing the housing stock around Dodoma is also intended to support the President's agenda to complete the long-awaited capital transition.

Throughout his campaign and into his presidency, Magufuli has continually adopted socialist-era rhetoric, frequently quoting Julius Nyerere in his speeches and referencing the *Ujamaa* principles of hard work and self-sufficiency. His most important gesture to Nyerere's legacy is his promise to finish the nearly 50-year-long capital transition to Dodoma. Despite never being completed, Tanzania's post-independence capital and Nyerere's long-time dream, remains a powerful post-colonial symbol in the minds of the Tanzanian people (Myers, 2011). As was Nyerere's original intention, the administrative transition promises to bring a much-needed economic boost to the underdeveloped central region, while also cementing Magufuli's image as a populist and champion of the poor. In addition, the move to Dodoma would consolidate voter support in the interior, where CCM support is strongest (Morse, 2018). While Magufuli has taken on several large infrastructure projects since his inauguration, including a standard-gauge railway connecting Dar es Salaam to Kigali and the Rufiji hydroelectric dam, the redevelopment of the capital is the flagship project of his presidency.

Scholars such as Seekins (2009) and Moser (2013) have highlighted how the new capitals of Myanmar and Malaysia, Naypidaw and Putrajaya respectively, were built in reference to some idealized version of the past in order to legitimize the ruling party and re-define national identity. Moser (2013: 39) explains that cities are 'powerful vehicles for expressing ideology due to their highly visible and symbolic nature'. The completion of Dodoma can also be interpreted as a highly symbolic intervention that makes use of national memory. Although Nyerere's socialist

policy initiatives ultimately failed, Pratt (1999: 138) argues that there is a persistent national fondness for Nyerere: ‘Tanzanians have no doubt that for over forty years they had in their midst a leader of unquestionable integrity, who, whatever his policy errors, was profoundly committed to their welfare’. The resurrection of the socialist-era capital allows Magufuli to capture this positive public sentiment and associate it to his own image.

As was discussed earlier in section 5.2.3, the master plan of ‘New Dodoma’ is an adaptation of the 2010 master plan revision prepared by South Korean engineering firm, Saman Corporation. The 2010 master plan itself preserved several elements from the 1976 plan, noting that ‘the philosophy and approach used in 1976 is still valid and should be enhanced’ (Saman Corporation, 2012: 40). One key holdover is the distinct residential layout, characterized by communities consisting of a cluster of four neighborhoods arranged around a commercial center with shared facilities. In addition, Saman Corporation planners also set aside 70% of the capital city district for open green spaces (Saman Corporation, 2012: 42). The combination of interconnected and self-sufficient communities set within wide open rural areas draws directly from the Garden City inspirations of the original plan. In interviews, members of the New Dodoma planning commission continually praised the ‘richness’ of the 1976 plan and their desire to retain certain elements, such as incorporating the vernacular *tembe* longhouses into the design of the Government City’s new buildings.

The first phase of implementation of New Dodoma involves the construction of a Government City to house all administrative buildings and functions. When explaining the design of the new Government City, one of the commission’s planners described a central avenue lined with columns, culminating in a semi-circle around a statue of Julius Nyerere (Interview, August 2018). While these design elements seem to blatantly disregard Nyerere’s vision of a nonmonumental city (Myers, 2011), this appears to be done less out of reverence to the original plan, and more so to make the association to Nyerere explicit. At the opening ceremony of the Government City on April 13<sup>th</sup> 2019, Magufuli concretized his references to Nyerere, stating: ‘I am the happiest today. We are fulfilling the dream of our founding President Nyerere that he made 46 years ago’ (“Tanzanian president inaugurates new gov’t satellite city in Dodoma,” 2019).

In resurrecting this nostalgic image of Nyerere, Magufuli is also appealing to a time of almost absolute state control. The one-party state under Nyerere was highly centralized, and state

institutions controlled everything from the economy to where citizens lived. Magufuli seeks to vest power in his presidency, justifying authoritarian action as a means to achieve development in much the same way that Nyerere once justified the forced resettlement of rural populations into *Ujamaa* villages. His anti-liberal and interventionist policies also mirror socialist-era policies. In order to ensure Dodoma does not become a commuter city, Magufuli has directed all state-owned enterprises involved in real estate, namely the Tanzania Building Agency (TBA), Watumishi Housing, and the National Housing Corporation, to focus their resources on Dodoma and discontinue ongoing projects around Dar es Salaam. As such, Magufuli is using state-owned enterprises and their monopoly over the supply of formal housing to achieve his political objective to transition the capital. The capital transition has been underway since June of 2018, despite the lack of infrastructure to support it. Some ministries have temporarily moved into commercial buildings or spare space at the University of Dodoma. At the time of fieldwork, the interim office for the Ministry of Lands was located in one of the city's few existing high-rises, crammed onto two floors. Back in Dar es Salaam, private sector actors fear a return to the not-so-distant socialist era: 'We may be experiencing a recurrence of *Ujamaa* with Magufuli as president. I fear we will suffer the same outcomes, if we don't learn from those lessons we will face them again. After *Ujamaa*, we were down on our knees' (Interview, July 2018).

## **5.5 Risks and challenges**

A number of risks and challenges relating to the real estate market and the shifting political climate threaten to disrupt several new city projects. While developers have pursued ambitious high-end projects emboldened by promises of a growing middle class, these investments reflect a desire for predictable profits from a market that will exist in the future, rather than a response to existing local demand. In their 10-year strategic plan, the NHC emphasizes the importance of capitalizing on the growth of the middle class, stating that the corporation will:

Plan for housing designs and locations that will attract the growing middle class. They tend to reside in urban areas and prefer houses with modern amenities. A rising middle class will increase demand for middle income housing and bigger houses. (NHC, 2015: xvi)

Scholars have cautioned that investment analysts may be overestimating the size of the middle class in Africa (Pitcher, 2012; Watson, 2014), not least, because there is no consensus for what constitutes the middle class. Benchmarks vary from measures of discretionary income (\$2-

20/day) (AfDB, 2011), to quality of life indicators (having a secondary school education, piped water, electricity, and participating in non-farm labor) (Thurlow, Resnick, & Ubogu, 2015), and national statistics do not consider informal income, making statistical projections on the growing middle class largely unreliable. Even considering the aforementioned criteria, Watson (2014) argues that it is difficult to imagine how a household with US\$2-20 a day of discretionary income could purchase a residence in any one of these urban ‘fantasy plans’. Excluding the new city projects that are established in SEZs, property ownership in Tanzania remains limited to citizens, narrowing the pool of potential buyers to the domestic market. A study carried out in 2019 revealed that only 2.25% of Tanzania’s urban households could afford a US\$16,380 house (Esipisu, 2019). While attempts to make housing more affordable have been made by both developers and mortgage financiers, mortgage interest rates remain prohibitively high. Even NHC employees claimed they themselves could not afford to buy a house in any of the NHC’s new developments:

Most of us, if you look at my salary, I can’t qualify for a mortgage, the interest rate is about 18-21%, so we can’t afford it as someone who is in the middle class. Maybe managers or people higher up (Interview, June 2018).

Without a large enough market to purchase the thousands of units being produced through these new city ventures, the state may have to intervene and provide financial support, much like in the case of Angola, where the bulk of the national housing budget was used to subsidize apartments in the US\$3.5 billion New City of Kilamba (Cain, 2014; van Noorloos & Kloosterboer).

Furthermore, according to Pitcher (2018: 61), property investments in nascent African real estate markets are problematic because, with the exception of South Africa, ‘assessing the value of property is still in its infancy’ throughout the continent. With few investment alternatives in less diversified economies and smaller markets, state assets tend to concentrate in real estate projects (Pitcher, 2018). This is the case in Tanzania where so many state-owned entities are involved in real estate development (NHC, NSSF, TPA, EPZA, TBA), in addition to also being invested into other real estate portfolios like the Watumishi Real Estate Investment Trust. Overexposure to real estate markets puts the Tanzanian state and multiple state-owned developers at risk should market volatility occur. This was already exemplified in the summer of 2018, when government ministries and state-owned enterprises moved out of commercial towers in the Dar es Salaam CBD to new offices in Dodoma, leaving many of Dar es Salaam’s biggest

skyscrapers vacant (Interview, June 2018). While the market slump mostly affected commercial rather than residential real estate, one NHC executive explained that soon the residential market would also be hit as government employees begin to move more permanently to Dodoma (Interview, July 2018).

Since elections in 2015, state support for several new city projects has been undermined as political interests have shifted. Nicknamed ‘the bulldozer’ from his time as Minister of Works, Transport and Communication, the moniker has since become associated with Magufuli’s staunch stance on corruption. Since coming into office, the president has embarked on a campaign to publicly weed out and dismiss corrupt government officials. Several SOEs involved in real estate have been implicated, which corresponds with a wider pattern of corruption in land administration and related industries (Transparency International, 2013).

Having uncovered ‘rot’ in the National Housing Corporation, Magufuli dismissed the director general and several other board members, leaving the agency without leadership for more than nine months (“Magufuli revokes appointment of NHC chairperson,” 2018). Likewise, 13 high-level NSSF executives have been dismissed in relation to the supposed embezzlement of TSh179 billion (US\$80 million) intended to finance the land acquisition and planning services for Dege Eco Village (The Citizen, 2017). Implementation of the new city was halted in 2016 after the report from the controller and auditor general revealed gross irregularities (Controller Auditor General, 2015). The project has remained idle for four years now, leaving the concrete skeletons of the would-be ‘eco’ city development to be picked over by opportunistic locals in search of cheap building materials (Figure 5.9).



Figure 5.9: Fieldwork photograph of Dege Eco Village. Source: (Joanna Ondrusek-Roy, July 2018)

To gain the support of its constituents and bolster its populist identity, Magufuli's regime has placed additional pressure on the NHC to produce affordable housing. However, these directives are more reflective of the NHC's original mandate to provide universal housing to the Tanzanian people than they are of the corporation's current status as a commercial, for-profit developer. Mounting pressure from the central government has led to friction between the NHC and other SOEs as they struggle to establish services and affordable housing options in infrastructure poor areas.

The utility companies don't want to play their fair share of the game. For example, when we build a house, TANESCO, the [state-owned] electricity company is supposed to ensure they get electricity from wherever it is, up to the house, but they don't, so we bear that cost. The water utility companies, same thing, they just don't want to. So we have to bear this cost on their behalf sometimes we have to build the access roads. At the end of the day, this affects the final price of the house because we are doing a part that should be done by other people. (Interview, July 2018)

Rather than being financed by the state, the costs of building basic urban infrastructure are passed on to the consumer, pushing back affordability targets. Multiple attempts to appeal to the central government for tax cuts have gone unheard and there is a general sentiment of frustration across the corporation. One of the NHC's regional managers expressed his concern: 'this government is less supportive of the NHC than the last. Magufuli wants to merge the NHC, Watumishi Housing, and TBA because, to a certain extent, we have all become competitors and have failed to provide affordable housing' (Interview, August 2018). Friction between different state-owned enterprises and the more recent corruption-related dismissals have led to prolonged project interruptions. Given the populist turn and pressing demands for affordability, the NHC also appears to have lost support for more upscale city projects on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam, which had been initiated during the Kikwete administration. This is not only a challenge for new city builders in Tanzania, as state-supported mega-projects worldwide find themselves at the mercy of shifting political tides.

## **5.6 Conclusion**

This chapter provides an overview of Tanzania's new city projects, the actors involved in their planning and implementation, and their stated and unstated drivers. It is a first attempt at identifying the international and domestic circumstances under which the new cities trend has emerged and evolved in Tanzania. With 12 new city projects planned between 2008 and 2018,

Tanzania represents one of the most prolific cases of new city building in Africa, and sheds light onto the political and economic dynamics that are aligning to support the creation of new cities. This chapter makes three main contributions.

First, my analysis of the Tanzanian case exemplifies the continued and central role of the state in new city building, manifested by the large number of state-led projects and centralized urban land governance practices. I attribute this to socialist legacies that have enabled hybrid state-owned enterprises to monopolise formal urban development. Despite being restructured during the neoliberal transition to operate commercially, these hybrid entities continue to be state-owned and therefore exemplify the complex public-private configurations that characterize new city actors. As recent regulatory reforms continue to incentivize real estate development, SOEs may find themselves competing alongside private sector developers for development opportunities and a limited pool of potential home buyers.

Second, this chapter demonstrates how drivers of new cities have shifted following a regime transition from a more outwardly-oriented entrepreneurial agenda aimed at attracting foreign direct investment and increasing government revenue, towards a more politically motivated urban agenda, in which new cities are leveraged to rally populist support and legitimize the regime. This shift attests to the limitations of using neoliberalism as an explanatory tool for new cities, by demonstrating that local forces, like party politics, also play an important role in the emergence of new cities.

Third, I raise concerns that have already been flagged by many scholars of new cities, about how affordable the new city projects are and how likely they are to succeed in meeting the needs they claim to address. I highlight how optimistic projections of a growing middle class are inherently unreliable, given that definitions of what constitutes the middle class are so varied. I also point out the risks involved with having so many state-owned enterprises invested in a potentially volatile real estate market. Lastly, I examine the contradictions that arise from the dual roles that the NHC is now expected to assume—both as a government entity, and as privately financed developer—and illustrate how these contradictions result in a failure to achieve affordable housing targets.



## **Chapter 6: Borrowed skylines: Urban policy transfer in Tanzania's new city projects**

### **6.1 Introduction**

With the exception of Iyumbu Satellite City and New Dodoma, which are Tanzanian state endeavors, Tanzania's new city projects are a product of international collaborations, supported by various networks of urban practitioners, consultants, policy makers, and diasporic communities. Drawing from seemingly disparate cities such as Putrajaya (Malaysia), Songdo (South Korea), Istanbul, and Milan among others, hypermobile international actors help circulate urban models, aesthetics, and ideas about how to achieve modernity and development through the built environment. The current urban policy making environment is informed by the perceived success of model cities, the builders of which consciously construct narratives around their urban success stories, and the city authorities and roving planning consultants who single out some of these policies as 'best-practices'. City marketing and branding efforts work to promote these 'best practices', creating a market around urban solutions, where global cities form key sites of attraction for policy tourists looking for quick fixes. This chapter provides an understanding of how ideas and policies relating to new city projects circulate globally and are adopted in Tanzania. Through interviews with local Tanzanian developers and international planning consultants, I trace the circulation of urban policies and provide insight into the diversity of influences that are shaping Tanzania's new city projects.

As policy circuits continue to be shaped by 'enduring power relations' (Peck & Theodore, 2010: 169), actors 'adopt different power positions depending on their perceived status in the global urban hierarchy' (Gonzalez, 2011: 1410). Different cities take on different roles, as 'givers' and 'receivers' (González, 2011) of urban policy, or 'teachers' and 'learners' (Rapoport, 2015b). In recent years, Tanzania has been a receiver of foreign urban policy and ideas, particularly in the realm of new city building. However, as this chapter demonstrates, builders and stakeholders of new cities in Tanzania are not passive recipients of urban policy, but actively shape imported policy models according to their own political agendas and interests.

Like in neighbouring Rwanda (Behuria, 2018) and Kenya (van Noorloos et al., 2019), builders of new cities in Tanzania import urban policies from a variety of different countries and cities. Significantly, most of these precedents are located in the Global South. Major contributors include Asian countries, such as South Korea, China, and Malaysia, as well as countries in the

Middle East and North Africa, such as Morocco, UAE, Lebanon, and Turkey. This marks a sharp contrast from the years following independence when urban models were imported from the Global North. Notably, the socialist-era new capital of Dodoma was planned by a team of Canadian planners and American architects, who drew from Ebenezer Howard's Garden City (Beeckmans, 2018). Several European investors and planning firms continue to have a minor presence in shaping Tanzania's urban landscape. There is also a small but growing network emerging regionally between African states including Kenya, Rwanda, and South Africa that circulate urban ideas among them.

Interviews with new city developers and international planning consultants reveal that policies imported into Tanzania include anything from urban form (different architecture styles or development types, such as gated compounds) to financing methods (public-private-partnerships or affordable housing schemes), to sustainable urban practices (waste management systems and permaculture principles). More recently, in their efforts to shift the government bureaucracy from Dar es Salaam to the legislative capital of Dodoma, Tanzanian officials have looked to other countries to learn from their experiences with capital relocation, such as the administrative relocation of the Malaysian capital from Kuala Lumpur to Putrajaya.

This chapter is divided into two sections and addresses the transnational movement of policies and the mutation of foreign policies once they have landed. The first section examines the types of ideas and urban policies being introduced into Tanzania as well as the agents engaged in policy circulation. I explore how policy transfer is dependent on and facilitated by a range of international professional, government, and kinship networks. Manoeuvring between state-based, macro-level forces and community-level, micro-interactions, I examine the institutional landscapes through which policies move and are transformed. In the second section I investigate the role of political transitions and local customs in Tanzania, and how these mutate 'landed' policies. I conclude by reviewing the implications of my findings and highlighting the empirical contributions this chapter makes to scholarship at the nexus of policy mobilities and new cities research.

## **6.2 Agents and modes of policy circulation**

There are a variety of actors and mechanisms through which urban policies are circulated and imported into Tanzania. Scholars of global urban studies have written extensively about the

growing global reach of international architects, planners, and consultants, although most have focused on the well-known firms established in the Global North, such as Kohn Pedersen Fox, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, Foster and Partners, and McKinsey (Bunnell & Das, 2010; Faulconbridge, 2010; McNeill, 2009; Rapoport, 2015a; Rimmer, 1991). By examining the diverse teams of consultants collaborating to plan Tanzania's new cities, I contribute to a growing literature on South-to-South urban policy transfers. I demonstrate how the national agendas of Korea, Turkey, and China have created institutional infrastructure that enables the circulation of urban policies into Tanzania. I then critically analyse the policy tourism experiences of Tanzanian state officials and new city developers. Finally, I delve into how new cities in Zanzibar are being marketed and re-made to attract diasporic communities now established in Oman.

### **6.2.1 Corporate urban planning networks**

As early as 2008, the Tanzanian state has sought out the expertise of foreign planning and engineering firms in order to support their urban redevelopment ambitions. Lacking local expertise and motivated by a desire to incorporate 'proven solutions' and 'best practices' into their urban transformation plans, the Ministry of Lands and the NHC invited foreign firms to bid for the master plans of multiple new city projects. International planning, architecture, and consulting firms, referred to by scholars as the 'Global Intelligence Corps' (GIC) (Olds, 2002; Rapoport, 2015a; Rimmer, 1991), are key agents that circulate urban policy globally. Due to their international presence, these agents are able to 'authoritatively frame urban problems and harness a diverse but carefully curated range of "local" lessons as solutions' (Temenos, Baker, & Cook, 2019: 13). Local authorities and developers who actively seek out GIC firms believe that a 'global approach' is superior, and that foreign professionals will introduce new concepts and ideas from which local practitioners can learn (Rapoport, 2015).

Interviews with international consultants working in Tanzania reveal that there is a personal, networked element to the way GIC firms are hired. In many cases, tender invitations for planning contracts have been extended to firms that Ministry or NHC officials had met and networked with in the past. Annual international conferences function as 'mobility events' and are opportune places for new city actors to cultivate business connections (Clarke, 2012). Several international planners who ended up working on new city projects in Tanzania mentioned first

meeting with NHC executives at MIPM (Le marché international des professionnels de l'immobilier), a four-day real estate exhibition, conference, and networking event gathering some 30,000 industry professionals every year in Cannes. Other meetings were more explicitly geared toward hiring external consultants, such as when NHC board members presented Tanzanian urban planning and investment opportunities at an international conference for the export of technical consultancy services in Ankara in April of 2011 (ATCEA, 2011).

One of the NHC's first city-scale projects was planned and designed by an international consortium of GIC firms. A senior business development officer at the NHC explained that since Safari City was one of their first city-scale projects, they felt they lacked the skills and capacity to produce the plan in-house (Interview, July 2018). As a result, the master plan contract for Safari City was awarded to SIGN JV, a joint venture between two Turkish property-consulting firms, Sigma and Intaya, in 2011. One of the partners had previously been involved in the planning of a luxury community development in Tanga on the north coast of Tanzania, through which they developed a relationship with Tanzanian government authorities (Interview, December 2019). SIGN JV later subcontracted sections of the Safari City plan to several international architecture and engineering firms. While global engineering and architecture firms are becoming more multidisciplinary, city-scale master planning continues to require a wide range of expertise (Rapoport, 2015), which, coupled with limited timelines, often results in multiple firms working together on one project.

In the case of Safari City, iki Design Group from Turkey produced the urban plan and designed the architecture, Drees & Sommer from Germany planned infrastructure logistics, Mobility In Chain based in Italy produced the transportation plan, Kentsel Strateji, also from Turkey, supported land-use planning efforts and developed a socio-economic framework for the city, and Kommsult from Lebanon carried out a market study and drafted an investment strategy for financing the implementation phase (Interview, December 2019). This international consortium (Figure 6.1) was formed based on working relationships established during past collaborations, thereby reinforcing and expanding existing international planning networks.



Figure 6.1: The Safari City planning consortium celebrating the completion of the master plan for the new city. The Consortium brought together GIC firms from Turkey, Lebanon, Italy, Germany, together with local Tanzanian planners. Source: (iki design group, 2013)

Despite recent advances in technology that might enable this international team to work remotely, planning collaborations continue to prioritize face-to-face interactions (Temenos et al., 2019). The team met in Istanbul, Milan, and Cannes (during MIPM), in addition to Dar es Salaam and multiple meetings in Arusha near the project site. This presented the opportunity for NHC staff to visit various foreign cities and come away with first-hand experiences of other urban contexts. NHC employees were particularly impressed during their trip to Istanbul and returned with a desire to replicate recent Turkish urban success stories in Tanzania.

There are several drivers motivating GIC firms to bid for planning contracts abroad: shrinking local markets, lucrative and prestigious commissions to design the next iconic skyline, and loose local regulations in much of the world, which provide a kind of ‘playground for architects’ who are eager to try out new innovative designs that would not pass policy requirements back home (Rapoport, 2015a: 112). The master plan for Safari City, designed by iki design, based in Istanbul, is laid out in the shape of an eye, a gimmicky choice that may not be appreciated by municipal authorities everywhere, but that intrigued NHC executives. In other cases, GIC firms may be attracted to projects that are not necessarily lucrative, but that can enhance their reputation in a certain type of urban expertise, notably eco-city or smart-city branded projects (Rapoport, 2015a). The Korea Land and Housing Corporation, which is responsible for planning Kigamboni New City, has worked on several eco and smart-city projects since 2008 in a bid to both ‘enhance their global profile’ and stand out as leaders in these increasingly popular urban trends (LH, 2019a). As the planning industry has become increasingly international, a diverse and international portfolio is now considered a prerequisite for securing high-profile mega-projects (Faulconbridge, 2009; Aoun & Teller, 2016).

Confirming this, one of the Safari City planners from Germany stated that city developers worldwide ‘want to see these [international project] references so they know you can do it’ (Interview, December 2019). From a practical standpoint, it has become easier for planning firms to work abroad as the neoliberal turn of the late 1990s and the evolution of communication technology have greatly facilitated GIC firms’ access to international markets (Aoun & Teller, 2016).

Several scholars have criticized GIC firms for producing plans that prioritize global ‘best practices’ to the detriment of locally sourced solutions (Bunnell & Das, 2010; Rapoport, 2015b). Critics argue that as GIC firms ‘recycle’ the same urban models in their various international projects, they contribute to a kind of homogenized urbanism (Bunnell & Das, 2010; Murray, 2015; Watson, 2014; Gonzalez, 2011). This becomes problematic when the application of ‘global best practices’ produce master plans that are ‘divorced from social reality’ (Bunnell & Das, 2010: 19; Murray 2015; Watson 2014; Watson 2009). For example, one GIC planner admitted having drafted the transport plan for a new city in Tanzania for right-hand traffic, when in Tanzania, like in several other former British colonies, drivers keep to the left side of the road (Interview, December 2019).

International planners face a number of constraints when attempting to produce an urban plan that is well adapted to the local context. Interviews with the Safari City consortium revealed that despite intentions to adapt the plan to the local context, the team was limited by time and budgetary constraints. One transport engineer mentioned that they had considered carrying out a study on the movement of the informal *daladala* buses, which are the primary mode of transport in Tanzania, given the country’s low car ownership rates<sup>23</sup>. Tracking and mapping the bus routes would not only have informed the planning of the new city, but also would have allowed the planners to advise local municipal authorities in Arusha on how to better manage congestion around the existing bus stops. Unfortunately, the international consultants were only on site for three to four days at a time, while simultaneously working on other international projects, and did not have the resources or time to invest into such a study. Interviews also confirmed scholarly critiques on the poor quality of preliminary studies of local contexts (Aoun & Teller, 2016), which are often the product of a quick desk survey. Acknowledging this, several consultants also complained that it was more difficult to work in contexts where there was a lack of reliable data.

My technical expertise and planning skill set is dependent on reliable data. In Tanzania, or Ghana, for example, I don't think there is reliable data, which means I can't do an input, output analysis, to determine how many jobs will be created or what economic impact the [new city] project will have. (Interview, December 2019)

Rapaport (2015a) argues that the conception that GIC professionals are somehow imposing urban ideals on passive and vulnerable local authorities needs to be modified. She suggests that the clients who commission GIC firms are active participants in the planning process and ultimately decide what gets implemented. While this is true to a certain extent, this argument runs the risk of overstating the agency that clients have in the planning process. State officials often 'lack the knowledge and expertise required for a level discussion' (Rebentisch et al., 2020: 4), making them highly suggestible to plans proposed by international consultants. For the most part, clients like the NHC and the Ministry of Lands, are enticed by the solutions rhetoric that is presented at industry conferences and by GIC professionals. For example, the master plan for Kigamboni makes several grandiose claims about how the new city will improve current conditions:

Kigamboni City should complement the function of Dar es Salaam in that its growth as a tourist destination, a center for global business and a comfortable living environment will boost Tanzania's economy internationally to become one of the leading developed nations in East Africa and Africa as a whole. (LH, 2010a: 44)

If the City's vision and overall goal are achieved through the implementation of the ICT plan, New Kigamboni City will be positioned as the world's best city [due to benefits from integrated ICT]. (LH, 2010a: 167)

One GIC planner from South Korea expressed his frustration about the planning process, and the promises he felt he had made to clients:

Do you know what a charlatan is? A doctor who prescribes a pill, and if you take this pill everything is OK. Of course there is no such pill. But because I work for a state-owned enterprise, if the government asks me to do something I have to do it. Sometimes the government or the multilateral development banks just want to do something, even if it's not a working solution for a better country. However, I feel conflicted in my mind. (Interview, December 2019)

While this shows an awareness on the part of some planners concerning the potential benefit of the plans they produce, it also prompts a more critical examination of the role of master plans beyond their use as a guide for urban development. Interviews reveal that GIC professionals are sometimes asked to pitch the master plan and design of new city projects to potential investors.

Once the master plan for Safari City was completed, the consortium of GIC firms involved presented at a conference in Dubai.

After we did the study, they wanted to gain investors for this project. They organized a big conference in Dubai where the NHC and the other consultants they hired gave some presentations on their satellite city projects, and we were one of them, so we presented as well. All the typical names, Nakheel, Emaar, and other big developers of Dubai were there. (Interview, December 2019)

Foreign planning and architecture firms with global reputations lend legitimacy and stability to projects in otherwise risky business environments. More than a blueprint for the project, a visually striking master plan plays an important role as a marketing tool to entice financiers and make the city project a reality.

### **6.2.2 Government networks**

Despite the increasingly private character of new city projects, state actors and public institutions continue to be important agents of policy circulation (Bunnell & Das, 2010; Moser, 2019). In the following section, I provide an overview of the macro-level drivers and state-actor networks involved in circulating urban policy reflected in Tanzania's new city projects. In particular, I examine the influence of three emerging superpowers, South Korea, Turkey, and China, and how their broader national agendas and their various state corporations have become instrumental in circulating particular urban models into Tanzania.

#### **6.2.2.1 Korea's Knowledge Sharing Program**

In 2008, the state-owned Korea Land and Housing Corporation (LH), started exporting 'Korean-type new towns', later re-branding to specialize in the export of 'Korean-style Smart Cities' (LH, 2019b). Housed under the Korean Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, LH is responsible for the construction of 15% of housing in South Korea, including several new cities and free economic zones<sup>24</sup>, and is one of the leading developers of urban space in Korea (LH, 2017). According to their website, the state company began to export Korean-type new towns to overseas markets in order to 'boost Korea's international competitiveness' and 'enhance [the firm's] global profile' (LH, 2019b). By 2009, LH had won the tendering competition to plan and design Kigamboni New City, Tanzania's first new city project since the socialist-era capital of Dodoma.



Spearheaded by Tanzania's Ministry of Land, Kigamboni New City was intended to provide a satellite extension to the overcrowded Dar es Salaam CBD and become a hub for international business and trade. The master plan produced by LH featured an ambitious vision for Kigamboni New City modeled on Korean new towns such as Songdo (located in the Incheon Free Economic Zone) and based on 'Korean new city standards' (LH, 2010a). Drawing inspiration from the Incheon FEZ<sup>25</sup>, which LH refers to as a 'gateway to Northeast Asia' (LH, 2010b: 102), planners sought to position Kigamboni New City as a 'gateway to the East African Corridor' (LH, 2010a: 39). In line with this vision for the port city, the master plan promotes five key dimensions: international trade, seafront tourism, high-tech industries, higher education campuses, and livability— all packaged as a 'pentaport'. Aligning with a growing movement in more environmentally sustainable urbanism (Rapoport, 2015a) and LH's own sustainable brand, the plan for Kigamboni New City includes features that have become part of a rather standard eco-city package, including high thermal efficiency building envelopes, renewable energy technologies, and 'eco parks' and bicycle lanes (LH, 2010a). The most notable Korean urban concept included in Kigamboni New City's master plan is the 'ubiquitous information technology' or 'smart systems' approach to infrastructure planning reflected in the new city's ICT program. Designed by LG CNS, Korea's leading IT firm, the ICT plan features broad access to wireless internet and an intelligent surveillance system that can be monitored remotely to enhance transportation, security, and urban governance (LH, 2010a).

This project comes on the heels of years of South Korean tech-centered national policies, starting with E-Korea (2002-2004), targeted at growing internet connectivity, and followed by U-Korea (2004-2008). The 'U' here stands for 'ubiquitous', in that policy makers sought to integrate virtual urban components like ICT with physical infrastructure in order to create 'ubiquitous' computing environments in new and existing Korean cities (Lee et al., 2008). The vehicle that helped propel these policies abroad in the form of smart city designs is the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP), a bilateral development assistance program developed by the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance in 2004. As a newly enrolled member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)<sup>26</sup>, the KSP has enabled the South Korean state to differentiate their development assistance approach from other donor countries (Doucette & Müller, 2016). The program seeks to 'modularize' Korea's development experience and apply Korean technical and development expertise to particular socio-economic

issues in consultation with the governments of low and middle-income countries (Aboubcar, 2013). Through lectures and site visits, KSP aims to develop the knowledge and expertise needed for overseas government officials to foster growth in their own countries. Eager to share actionable development packages based on their own successful past policy experiences, and to cement their transition from aid recipient to aid donor, Korean authorities promote the KSP through several international channels including Korean embassies, as well as multilateral aid agencies and development banks (Interview, December 2019). Locally, the KSP relies on the expertise and contributions of several state institutions including LH. Since it started participating in the KSP in 2006, LH has helped plan and design several new city projects and industrial complexes abroad as part of KSP consultations, these include Kigamboni New City, and more recently South Saad Al-Abdullah, a smart eco-city in Kuwait.

#### **6.2.2.2 Exporting ‘Turquality’**

Relations with Turkey have evolved as a growing number of Turkish firms have been contracted to plan or build large infrastructure projects in Tanzania. The master plan for Safari City was coordinated by a joint venture between two Turkish property consulting firms, Intaya and Sigma, who then hired another Turkish firm, iki design, to plan and design the new city. Another Turkish firm, Mutluhan Construction Industry co. Ltd, was hired as the main contractor for Dege Eco Village, the NSSF’s satellite city project, which has been in limbo since corruption allegations were made in 2016. Yapi Merkezi, a construction and engineering firm, was commissioned to build 202 kilometers of standard-gauge rail from Dar es Salaam to Morogoro (Yapi Merkezi, n.d.). This stretch of railway constitutes the first segment of the ‘central corridor’, a transport network connecting the port in Dar es Salaam to markets in landlocked Uganda, Rwanda, and Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In 2011, PY International, a Turkish project management consulting firm produced a feasibility study and master plan proposal for the NHC’s Kawe Satellite City project. Interviews reveal that the work carried out by the Turkish consultants was financed through Turkish government incentives with the support of the Turkish Ministry of Trade, as part of a national program to boost the presence of Turkish technical consulting firms operating internationally (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development, 2014a; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Trade, 2020). As part of this incentive program, the Turkish Commerce & Trade Minister’s Board

visited Tanzania together with PY International, which ultimately won the competition<sup>27</sup> (Interview, December 2019). Although it is unclear how many other Turkish planning and construction firms have received government support to carry out urban projects in Tanzania and in Africa more broadly, in looking to secure contracts abroad and improve the visibility of Turkish firms, state programs promote the transfer of urban models, norms, and ideas from Turkey into countries such as Tanzania.

The international reach of Turkish planning firms is likely to continue to expand in coming years in response to a push from the Ministry of Trade to shift away from labour-intensive exports that have dominated Turkish trade<sup>28</sup>, towards more information-intensive exports like planning and engineering consulting (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development, 2014b). In another attempt to elevate Turkish exports, the Ministry of Trade deployed a national marketing strategy in 2004 under the label ‘Turquality’, a portmanteau of ‘Turkey’ and ‘quality’. While this national brand-building strategy started out supporting mostly textile and apparel brands, the label has now been awarded to particular service and technical industry brands (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Trade, n.d.).

According to Turkey’s 10th Development Plan, published in 2014, one of the government’s goals for the republic is to become a leader in the global market for infrastructure in least-developed and developing countries (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development, 2014b). Africa is set to be a key target market for Turkish firms in this industry due to the continent’s large infrastructure gap (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). Turkish-Africa relations have gained momentum since initiating an ‘Open to Africa’ foreign policy stance in 1998<sup>29</sup>. President Erdogan’s foreign policy agenda has been characterized as ‘neo-Ottoman’ in wanting to expand Turkish engagement to countries that were formerly part of the Ottoman Empire (Langan, 2017). Media sources highlight the government’s interest in ‘reactivating the Turkish memory chip’ about the Turks’ historical presence in Africa (Kenyon, 2018).

As several rising powers, including China and Oman, seek to expand their presence in African markets, investments are increasingly couched in a rhetoric of historical ties. Colonial legacies have left African politicians sensitive to potential foreign exploitation as is evidenced by the recent rise in resource nationalism across the continent (Jacob & Pedersen, 2018), and a common historical experience can be used as a discursive tool to deflect any neocolonial

perceptions held by more nationalist governments. Legitimized by ‘heritage diplomacy’ (Winter, 2020), national-scale efforts to extend Turkish soft power and boost the Turkish brand become vehicles for the circulation and export of urban models and policies.

### **6.2.2.3 China’s Belt and Road Initiative**

On October 16th, 2015, in the presence of several Omani dignitaries and executives of China Merchants Holding International, then-Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete lay the foundation stone for the Bagamoyo Special Economic Zone (SEZ). The Omani State Government Reserve Fund would finance the US\$10 billion project, while construction would be carried out by China Merchants Holding International (CMHI), whose parent company, China Merchants Group, is a leading state-owned conglomerate under China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)<sup>30</sup> (CMG, n.d.). Bagamoyo SEZ is the first of 14 special economic zones planned for construction in Tanzania as part of an economic program developed in collaboration with the Japanese Development Institute and the Asian Development Bank. ‘The Mini-Tiger Plan 2020’, named in reference to the Asian Tiger economies, sought to replicate the ‘Asian miracle’, whereby Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan became industrialized nations in part through the creation of SEZs that promoted technology and knowledge transfers (URT, 2004)<sup>31</sup>.

While SEZs have been endorsed as a development model for years, including by United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) (Easterling, 2014), they are now being promoted more systematically by Chinese state-owned companies participating in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (World Bank Group, 2019). Previously referred to as *One Belt, One Road*, the transregional infrastructure development strategy adopted by the Chinese government in 2013 is intended to form a modern-day Silk Road, where ‘Belt’, overland infrastructure projects such as high-speed rail, connect to ‘Road’, or maritime shipping routes and port infrastructures (Demissie, 2018). SEZs that are part of ports function as key nodes in the BRI, connecting the local economy to global production chains and transportation routes (Bach, 2011). As ‘spaces of exception’, where customs and regulations relating to tax and labour are suspended, SEZs create ‘stepping stones’ for Chinese companies to access African markets<sup>32</sup> (Demissie, 2018). BRI mobilizes the necessary finance, expertise, and skilled labor to implement plans for SEZs and other connective infrastructure projects. In search of solutions to local infrastructure deficits and

motivated by the promise of enhanced connectivity, African state actors are increasingly orienting local development agendas towards BRI-type projects. Beyond the perceived benefits associated with massive infrastructure investments, BRI projects are promoted as an avenue for African states to integrate into global markets. In addition, BRI countries are also prioritized as trade partners and foreign aid recipients (Bräutigam & Xiaoyang, 2011; Demissie, 2018).

The coast of East Africa, Tanzania, along with neighboring Kenya and Mozambique<sup>33</sup> are projected to host important hubs for the expansion of the BRI (Demissie, 2018). In recent years, there has been a proliferation of connective infrastructure projects in the region, particularly in the form of development corridors. The Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor Project underway will establish crude oil pipelines, road, and rail connections from Lamu Port in Northern Kenya to Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. The first phase of the US\$25.5 billion project has been contracted to a consortium of firms led by China Communications, a subsidiary of the China Road and Bridge Corporation (Enns, 2018). In Tanzania, the National Five-Year Development Plan 2016/17-2020/21, proposes to establish rail and road networks, port infrastructures, logistics hubs, and SEZs along three development corridors. Each of these corridors will connect ports and SEZs on Tanzania's coast to surrounding East African economies including Rwanda, Uganda, Malawi, and Mozambique (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development, 2014a).

Beyond developing a physical infrastructure network, the BRI also helps foster a policy network, promoting fast policy transfers between China and other regions, and between the cities and ports that act as nodes along a modern-day Silk Road. In 2014, a number of high ranking Tanzanian delegates, including the Director General of Tanzania's Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), visited the Duqm SEZ on the central-eastern coast of Oman (Duqm Special Economic Zone Authority, 2014), which has also become incorporated into the BRI since the involvement of Chinese government-owned conglomerate, Oman Wafang<sup>34</sup>. Duqm<sup>35</sup> is to be the largest SEZ in the Middle East and North Africa region and comprises eight zones, including a port, dry dock, oil refinery complex, industrial complex, tourism center, logistics center, residential and business areas, and Duqm airport (The Duqm Special Economic Zone Authority, 2020). The project has clear links to Bagamoyo SEZ, which also contains many of the same features (COWI, 2013).

Bach (2011) and Easterling (2012) have written extensively on this recent shift in the composition of SEZs, describing how the special economic zone has evolved and expanded from a pragmatic space for processing imports and exports, to a more multifunctional and self-sustaining urban form that includes residential, commercial, and tourism areas. Easterling (2012) explains that rather than dissolve into the city, SEZs have tended to absorb urban features and have become a new urban paradigm. As the BRI continues to promote connective infrastructure projects and hybrid-SEZ-cities such as Duqm and Bagamoyo, which are designed to function as key nodes within this global network, they are likely to become an increasingly popular model for new cities.

### **6.2.3 Urban Study Tours**

Mayors have been visiting ‘sister cities’ in municipal exchanges to share best practice and build diplomatic ties for decades, while some intercity trade networks date back to antiquity. In recent decades, interactions between cities have increased dramatically with the rise of global cities like Tokyo, London, and New York bypassing nation states as international actors, and contributing to a growing sense of municipal internationalism (Sassen, 2013). Municipal officials now take part in systematized urban tours of ‘model cities’, in which host organizations prepare itineraries and guide visitors through highly curated urban landscapes. González (2011) provides a detailed description of this growing practice, which she calls ‘policy tourism’. She argues that conceptualising these ‘short fact-finding trips by urban and planning professionals to other cities to learn about their transformation’ as a form of tourism sheds new insights on the process of urban policy circulation (González, 2011: 1398). In policy tourism, much like recreational tourism, destinations are turned into ‘objects of desire’, orientalist, and removed from their broader context. Urban transformation stories are dramatized and rescripted based on their audience. As a result, policy tourists often take away simplified and de-localized narratives about how to achieve urban transformation. While seeking to confirm the previous image they had of a place, policy tourists often leave without discussing challenges or questioning the narratives they have been given (González, 2011; Moser, 2019). In this section, I apply the lens of policy tourism to the Tanzanian case, after having discovered that several Tanzanian planning officials have been on urban study tours. I divide my analysis by organization, examining policy tourism

among employees and officials at the NHC, the Ministry of Lands, and the committee in charge of planning New Dodoma, and discuss key takeaways and intentions.

#### **6.2.3.1 The National Housing Corporation**

As Tanzania's largest real estate player, the NHC, is the most internationally active local real estate developer, contracting some of their planning needs to foreign planning firms but also sending employees in their business development branch to international conferences and on urban study tours. During the planning of Salama Creek, a satellite city on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam planned by a Kenyan firm, 'a number of national housing staff were taken to Nairobi to look at some of the cities Kenyans are working on' such as Tatu City (Interview, July 2018). As mentioned earlier, working with international consulting firms for the planning of Safari City also presented an opportunity for NHC staff to visit Istanbul, Milan, and Cannes. Interviews with staff who had been on these excursions reveal that takeaways from the visit to Turkey, which were made with the planning of Safari City in mind, were later applied to the 2018 revision of the Dar es Salaam master plan, demonstrating the broad impact of policy trips.

According to one business development manager at the NHC, conference travel as well as personal travel are often used as opportunities to visit other new city projects or model cities: 'whenever we travel outside the country we usually reserve one day to visit projects' (Interview, July 2018). Conferences government officials have attended include the annual meeting of the African Union for Housing Finance, the African Real Estate Society's Annual General Meeting, and Shelter Afrique, which was hosted in Nairobi in 2018, in Victoria Falls in 2017, and in Abuja in 2016. As one NHC employee points out, 'whenever we go to these meetings, we do visit projects so that we learn what other African countries are doing' (Interview, July 2018). Because the organization's main purpose is to improve housing affordability in Africa, Shelter Afrique's annual conference features a competition to design a US\$5,000 house. As a result, these regional conferences become an important setting for planning professionals to discuss challenges around affordability and to collaborate on innovative urban designs. In 2017, Shelter Afrique hosted a general meeting in Rabat, allowing NHC staff to visit projects in Morocco, where more than 15 new cities are planned for construction under the *Villes Nouvelles* (New Cities) initiative (Côté-Roy & Moser, 2019). One NHC employee expressed his admiration for new city projects in Morocco. He particularly praised a tax-based program the Moroccan state

had established to help fund affordable housing projects. Since 2002, Morocco's Solidarity Fund for Housing and Urban Integration has been using taxes on construction materials (cement, iron, sand) to reduce the burden of direct government financing for affordable housing schemes (Lam & Feather, 2016). NHC employees who took part in this particular visit repeatedly brought up this takeaway, stating that they wanted to 'copy it, because the biggest challenge we face is funding' (Interview, July 2018). These findings suggest that regional conferences provide an important avenue for urban policy tourism throughout Africa. In addition to the examples listed above, a business planning manager at the NHC mentioned that the organization's employees had also visited the United Arab Emirates, China, Germany, South Africa, and Botswana, 'to get a feel of what new building technologies there are, especially with regards to affordable housing' (Interview, July 2018).

#### **6.2.3.2 The Ministry of Lands**

As part of the planning process for Kigamboni New City, delegates of Tanzania's Ministry of Lands traveled to South Korea and were hosted and escorted around by the firm they had contracted to plan the new city, the state-owned Korea Land and Housing Corporation (LH). The week-long trip itinerary included in the master plan report is remarkably packed. Guided tours to key urban sites like free economic zones, new city projects, and the Incheon International Urban Festival, are punctuated by meetings with executives from LH and the South Korean Ministry of Lands and Maritime Affairs. Time was also set aside for cultural and leisure activities like a visit to the aquarium, a tour of the Korean Folk Village and Suwon Castle, as well as a shopping excursion to the Yongsan Electronics Market (LH, 2010a).

Some of the sites on the tour showcase infrastructure elements that are included in the plan for Kigamboni New City, such as the under-river tunnel or the Incheon Grand Bridge. This urban emulation is exemplified in the visit to Songdo's North East Asia Trade Tower, which bears a striking resemblance to the landmark skyscraper planned for Kigamboni New City designed by the same architecture firm, Heerim Architects (Figure 6.2).





Figure 6.2: Songdo Smart City skyline (left), a 3D rendering of Kigamboni New City (right). Sources: (George Mason University, n.d.; LH, 2010a)

Photographs of the study tour are included in the Kigamboni New City master plan report, along with captions written by the consultants whose choice of words illustrates the message these study tours are meant to impart: ‘walking through the central park [of Dongtan New City], it was possible to experience the cutting edge future life’ or ‘experiencing ubiquitous technology’ at the Incheon Global Fair (LH, 2010a: 304). The focus on ubiquitous technology is intended to firmly establish South Korea as an expert and leader in smart city markets. In fact, LH has planned or is in discussions to work on around a dozen smart city projects around the world, with one of their more prominent contracts being to design a new smart and eco-city in Kuwait<sup>36</sup>.

### 6.2.3.3 The planning committee for New Dodoma

In May of 2017, President Magufuli dissolved the Capital Development Authority (CDA), which had been in charge of overseeing the capital transition from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma since its inception in 1976 (“JPM dissolves CDA, says its existence no longer ‘justified,’” 2017). The CDA’s duties were handed over to the Dodoma Municipal Council, while several members of the CDA were absorbed into a planning committee for New Dodoma, a task force housed within the Ministry of Lands, and charged with drafting and implementing the newest iteration of the Dodoma master plan (Interview, August 2018). Prior to this institutional reconfiguration, several members of the CDA and current New Dodoma planning committee took part in urban study tours. Members reported having visited Beijing, Putrajaya (Malaysia), Lilongwe (Malawi), Abuja (Nigeria), Brasilia (Brazil), and Canberra (Australia). One senior-level official explained that these trips were intended to increase the team’s exposure to new capitals in order to ‘widen their design conceptualizations of what national capitals should look like’ (Interview, August

2018). Another one of the committee's planners who had visited Beijing in 2016, explained that the idea to pipe water from Lake Victoria over 700 kilometers to semi-arid Dodoma came from witnessing water being piped into Beijing from the Yangtze River, located some 1,400 kilometers away. In 2012, members of the committee visited Malaysia's new capital, Putrajaya, for one week.

We were looking at capital cities that are not that large, like in the US and the like. A modest size but well planned, with elements of sustainability and all these other urban design concepts. So we thought Putrajaya would be one of these cases. (Interview, August 2018)

The visiting team had three objectives: (1) to see how a modern city such as Putrajaya has been planned, developed, and was being managed; (2) to see how they managed the transfer of government functions from the old capital city, Kuala Lumpur to the new capital city, Putrajaya; and (3) to see how they could use Malaysian expertise and advice back in Tanzania (Interview, August 2018). Tanzanian officials aspired to replicate Putrajaya's public-private partnership financing model, to finance the expansion of Dodoma, acknowledging that the Tanzanian Government's internal budget would be insufficient for funding such a large-scale project. Those who visited Putrajaya commented on how impressed they were by the road system, the grand avenues, and the lack of traffic. Tanzanian envoys also returned with the idea that large avenues and boulevards could be used to encourage civic life:

We want to build a large boulevard where people can march if they want to protest. In the larger park we will have a promenade where people can actually walk for two kilometers, giving people some space for a political arena, but also social activities. (Interview August, 2018)

These comments demonstrate the selective adoption of aspects of Putrajaya by the Tanzanian delegates, who chose to interpret the wide avenues of the Malaysian capital as a space to foster civic engagement rather than as a symbol of authoritarian top-down planning.

Tanzanian planning officials proved to have a surprisingly wide range of experience with urban policy tourism and exposure to many urban contexts. Beyond providing insight on the actual process of policy tourism, interviews reveal which takeaways were retained by visitors months or even years after the tour. Investigating these takeaways can shed light on how policy tourism translates to policy learning. Overall, there seemed to be some understanding that the purpose of these trips was not only to collect policies for replication, but rather to learn and

broaden urban conceptions: ‘exposure gives you a lot of learning and therefore you can internalize some of the concepts which were adopted somewhere’ (Interview, August 2018). Interviewees emphasized the importance of face-to-face interactions with planners and developers, and how they learned directly from their experience with urban transformation:

You visit the city and then you see for yourself what has been implemented. What you see in the physical sense is the design and the product, but you also get to learn exactly how the implementation was done. (Interview, August 2018)

However, interviews also revealed flaws and shortcomings in the practice of urban policy tourism. Given that policy tours are first and foremost designed by host countries as elaborate publicity campaigns, I found there was little discussion around challenges and little to no follow-up. For example, while a visit to Morocco in 2017 excited NHC planners about the prospect of taxing building materials to finance affordable housing, as early as 2016, Moroccan news reported that this financing scheme had failed (El Asrawi, 2016). The taxes on building materials that supplied Morocco’s Solidarity Fund for Housing and Urban Integration had caused an 18% inflation in the price of cement, which translated directly into higher housing prices (El Asrawi, 2016). It stands to reason that visiting NHC staff were not informed of this fact if by 2018 they were still considering implementing this financing scheme. A focus on policy solutions obscures much-needed conversations about the challenges of implementation. In addition, I found little to no evidence of any follow-ups on the long-term success of the urban models that are promoted during these visits. This case illustrates the ‘performative’ aspect of policy tourism, described by González (2011), where guests and hosts adhere to a set of unspoken rules about what can and cannot be discussed.

Participants are not always clear on what the host institutions intended, and this can be attributed to several factors. First, itineraries are very packed and therefore visitors do not have much agency during their time abroad. In most cases, visitors admitted to ‘just following’ their hosts, who whisk them from one curated landscape to another. Most Tanzanian officials who had been on these trips had difficulty recalling what their takeaways were, let alone the names of the cities they had visited. Regardless of how curated or controlled these tours may be, hosts cannot always control the way visitors interpret the urban transformation narratives they are given.

Second, while policy boosters may promote the idea that policies are interchangeable, in reality, most circulating policy models are often largely unworkable in other contexts. Being

aware of their own context's constraints, policymakers may only take away a small and seemingly insignificant part of a model. Interviews reveal that although Tanzanian planning officials are enthusiastic about the potential for the 'urban solutions' to which they are introduced during these study trips, there is also, particularly among the more senior officials, a sense of realism about how applicable they are to the local context. One senior official on the New Dodoma planning committee stated: 'But of course contexts vary, we have our own context here, so you cannot transfer everything' (Interview, August 2018). There is the feeling that despite limitations, they need to be able to talk about their takeaways, so they remember one or two details, no matter how irrelevant or inconsequential they may be. For example, NHC staff visited Fumba Town, the German-built 'sustainable' private new city project on the island of Zanzibar. This project is promoted by its developers as one of the most innovative new city projects in Tanzania, largely because the project presents a holistic sustainability package, combining new building technologies, such as prefabricated houses with permaculture principles and the promotion of community interactions around sustainable waste management. Presumably NHC officials would have been impressed by this sustainable eco-city package, since they later subcontracted the development of phase II of their new Iyumbu development in Dodoma to CPS Live Ltd. However, when asked why they had chosen to outsource to the German developer, one NHC official remarked that he 'liked the interior finishings in their homes' (Interview, July 2018). This demonstrates how local political context is key in determining what actors take away and how these learnings are used. In the end, the outcome of policy tourism may not necessarily be to return with a replicable solution, but something else entirely.

#### **6.2.4 Diaspora and urban development in Zanzibar**

Having discussed the more formal agents of urban policy circulation, in this section I focus specifically on the role of the Zanzibari diaspora as a key actor of urban policy circulation. Understanding what constitutes the Zanzibari diaspora requires some historical context, which is explored in detail in Chapter 2. Zanzibar has long been a deeply cosmopolitan place at the center of ancient maritime trade. As a result, a scattering of diasporic communities have gradually settled all around the shorelines of the Indian Ocean (Myers, 2011). Members of this diaspora are linked to the exodus that followed the turbulent 1964 Revolution. Social tensions harbored over 200 years of Omani rule, slavery, and colonially imposed racial hierarchies were brought to a

climax when the post-independence elections resulted in an Arab-dominated coalition government (Pettersson, 2002). Frustrations over years of rule by a minority-elite led to an insurrection that toppled the newly elected government and culminated in ethnic violence targeting Zanzibaris of Arab and Asian descent. Those who survived the genocide fled primarily to the UK and Gulf States, with several choosing to settle in Oman and become naturalized citizens (Myers, 2011). Now, more than 50 years later, two new cities are being built in a free economic zone on Zanzibar's main island, Unguja. The Omani-Zanzibari diaspora, had until now been unable to return to their ancestral homeland given restrictive property rights, which are limited to local Zanzibaris. Thanks to their location within a free economic zone, which suspends local regulations that restrict property rights, these newly constructed developments present the first opportunity for those dispossessed by the revolution to return and buy property in Zanzibar.

Fumba Uptown Living is a luxury city development that is being built and financed by one of Africa's richest men, Said Salim Bakhresa, the founder of the Bakhresa Group, a conglomerate of companies that operates throughout Africa. The spacious villas that line the coastal development feature architectural elements that emphasize Zanzibar's historical Middle Eastern connection in order to cater to the expectations of Oman-based property buyers. Elaborate, interlacing geometric patterns line the railing of the rooftop terraces, and pointed horseshoe arches inside the homes lead to large living room spaces furnished with long, typically Middle Eastern couches that can accommodate the whole extended family. In addition, PHILS International, which was contracted to plan Fumba Uptown Living, is owned and operated by Zanzibari diaspora based out of Dubai.

Just 15 minutes down the main road in the same FEZ is Fumba Town, developed by German property consultants CPS Live Ltd., whose goal is to establish one of the first sustainable city initiatives in Africa. Having invested in the new town as a means to test new sustainable building technologies and practices in an African context, the developers were taken by surprise when buyers from Oman showed significant interest in the project. CPS CEO, Sebastian Dietzold, described one of his investment pitches in Muscat: 'I didn't even have the Omani market in my mind, I was just going there to have a look and meet two or three people. I was sitting in the reception at the Hyatt and hundreds of people came, hundreds!' (Interview, August 2018). CPS responded by quickly establishing a sales office in Muscat and participating in several Gulf-based real estate trade shows including CityScape (2016) and Arabian Travel

Market (2016), both hosted in Dubai, and the Oman Real Estate Exhibition (2019) hosted in Muscat. They have also organized several private exhibitions to promote the project to investors in Oman, one of which was hosted at the Hyatt in Muscat in 2015. Their marketing efforts are tailored in a way that suggests the project has become attuned to the preferences of an extremely responsive Oman-based diaspora. One promotional video for a prestigious and upmarket neighborhood in Fumba appeals to Zanzibari-Omanis both through the use of Arab actors portraying a resident family, apparent by their clothing (the man wearing an Omani-style robe and the woman wearing a niqab), and by using the phrase ‘you deserve to fly and come home’ (CPS Live Ltd., n.d.) in reference to Zanzibar as a homeland for the diaspora. While promotional materials highlight a diversity of ethnicities typical of cosmopolitan Zanzibar, a number of 3D renderings explicitly portray Zanzibari-Omanis (Figure 6.3).




Figure 6.3: A rendering of a private villa in the Bustani neighbourhood of Fumba Town in which inhabitants are depicted wearing traditional Omani clothing, a signal to encourage Omani-Zanzibari diaspora buyers. Source: (CPS Live Ltd., n.d.)

Furthermore, the developers have explicitly emphasized the project’s focus on security, both in terms of physical security and tenure security. The development is gated and guarded by around-the-clock security staff. Tenure security is guaranteed for foreign buyers under a 99-year lease that is ensured by the Zanzibar Investment Promotion and Protection Authority. Both of these features are likely to appeal to a community whose identity has been defined by violence against them and the traumatic dispossession of their property.

Through their investments in both Fumba FEZ developments, and their movements between Oman and Zanzibar, the diaspora are reviving ties between Zanzibar and Oman, as well



as the broader Gulf region. Evidence of a growing Omani presence is also visible on the Tanzanian mainland, where Oman's biggest wealth fund, the State General Reserve Fund, recently pledged to finance the US\$10 billion Bagamoyo Port and SEZ project (Servant, 2019). CPS has taken advantage of this opportunity to promote sales, strategically marketing Fumba Town as part of a transportation hub between Bagamoyo SEZ and the Dar es Salaam port (Figure 6.4).



Figure 6.4: Facebook post featuring pictures from the Bagamoyo SEZ cornerstone laying ceremony on the Fumba Town page as a way to promote their new city as part of a transportation corridor between Zanzibar, Bagamoyo SEZ, and the Dar es Salaam Port. Source: (Fumba Town, 2015)

The desire of the diaspora to return promotes the import of urban ideals and norms from Oman. As multiple world powers vie for influence in the region, diasporic communities are likely to play an increasingly important role in bridging seemingly disparate places. Meanwhile, continued Omani investment in Tanzanian urban developments reinforces ties to countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), where new city projects are popular, and may lead to more luxury mega-urban developments and more influence from the GCC in Tanzania in the years to come.

### **6.3 Policy mutation in Tanzania**

Having analysed the different modes of policy circulation and the networks of actors that support urban policy transfer, this section discusses the ways in which circulating policy models are ‘localized’ by the Tanzanian context. Rather than being static, Tanzania’s new cities are ‘lived projects’ (Ward, 2019), with each city an assemblage of policies in motion, constantly being reconfigured to fit the agendas of the multiple stakeholders involved in its development. First, I explore the ways in which political regime transitions have impacted Tanzania’s new cities, demonstrating how state actors are not only agents of circulation but also determine policy import and implementation. I then consider the role of local customs and market factors in reshaping the new city plans and designs produced by GIC firms.

#### **6.3.1 Government as a gatekeeper**

The Kikwete administration, which lasted two terms between 2005 and 2015, was a golden age for the conceptualization of new cities and urban mega-developments in Tanzania. Between 2008 and 2015, 10 new city projects were initiated, most of which were clustered around Dar es Salaam and were planned and designed by consortia of international planning and engineering firms. The plans featured corporate skylines, international business zones, high-end homes, beachfront hotels, and conference centers, all global design features that promised to attract international business and distinguish Tanzania as the ‘gateway’ to Africa (COWI, 2013; LH, 2010a). Kikwete’s development policies were in line with previous administrations which, since the introduction of the liberalization agenda in the mid-1980s, sought to attract FDI as their primary strategy for achieving economic growth (Jacob & Pedersen, 2018).

Since President Magufuli took office in 2015, three of the 10 new city projects launched during Kikwete’s administration have either been placed on hold or abandoned, while five remain idle<sup>37</sup>. In addition to more common causes of project delay such as a lack of financing and land disputes, regime transition has played a critical role in disrupting the implementation of new city plans in Tanzania. Magufuli came into office promising to combat corruption, end exploitation by foreign investors, and industrialize Tanzania (Collord, 2019). His hard stance on these issues allowed him to gain popularity with an electorate that had grown wary of the excessive corruption among top ranking state officials (Kiyabo & Mnjama, 2012) and Kikwete’s supposed lack of policy direction (Collord, 2019). Magufuli’s first years in office were marked



by cuts in public spending and stringent policies targeting the private sector (Andreoni, 2017; Collord, 2019). The president's agenda appears to be in line with a broader shift occurring within the CCM as confidence in market liberalization among party officials has dissolved and been replaced instead by a renewed appreciation for state intervention and state-owned enterprises (Andreoni, 2017; Collord, 2019; Jacob & Pedersen, 2018). This ideological shift has deprioritized the development of the Kikwete-era new city projects. Consequently, most of the imported policies assembled into urban master plans are no longer being implemented. These plans have largely been replaced with a more inward-looking approach to development and it is currently unclear the extent to which imported urban ideas, policies, and aesthetics continue to circulate among civil servants, and the extent to which they have been purged or abandoned.

The following four policy priorities pursued by the current administration have indirectly and directly disrupted the implementation of new city projects: (1) reducing high-level corruption, (2) cutting wasteful government spending, (3) addressing 'foreign exploitation', and (4) completing the capital transition to Dodoma. In line with the anti-corruption agenda that defined his electoral campaign, Magufuli publicly dismissed several allegedly corrupt NHC and NSSF officials. Without leadership for more than nine months, several NHC projects that lacked direction and financing were stalled, notably Kawe Satellite City. Planned by Dubai-based PHILS International, the beachfront satellite development is one of the few new city projects developed by the NHC that had made significant progress in its construction, with eight high-rise apartment buildings already built. Requests made by the NHC to receive government guarantees<sup>38</sup> for additional loans to support the completion of the project were repeatedly denied by the Treasury, with Magufuli commenting that 'the current government does not give out loans when there is still doubt as to how its money will be spent' (Mwanainchi, 2017).

In September 2017, in line with fiscal cuts designed to limit 'wasteful spending', Magufuli's government dissolved the Kigamboni New City Development Authority (KDA) (Møldrup Wolff et al., 2018), the administrative body responsible for implementing the Kigamboni New City master plan (LH, 2010a). The task of implementing the new city plan was then handed off to the newly created Kigamboni Municipal Council. Local tensions had developed around the project both at the residential and parliamentary levels. High-profile land disputes galvanized local community groups, which banded together to protest the relocation of the area's 97,000 residents and the potential return of a stop order that had previously paralyzed

construction in Kigamboni from 2008 to 2010 (Lindell et al., 2016). Replacing Kigamboni New City champion Anna Tibaijuka as Minister of Lands, William Lukuvi terminated both the relocation scheme and regulations hindering new construction, stating that the residents of Kigamboni ‘should not be denied their land tenure rights and will not be denied construction permits’ (URT, 2017). The effective abandonment of the Kigamboni New City project allowed the populist regime to relieve tensions in the Dar es Salaam periphery as well as gain public support (Interview, May 2020). While these spending cuts have impacted flows of urban policy at later stages, other measures administered under Magufuli have interrupted policy flows in earlier phases of policy circulation. During his first week in office Magufuli declared that state officials would be restricted from foreign travel, setting a precedent by limiting his own travel to East Africa (Mtulya, 2019). This marks a sharp contrast from the previous administration, where Kikwete undertook regular diplomatic trips, several with the intention of seeking investors and partners for new city projects including trips to Oman (2012, 2013), China (2008, 2013, 2014), and Singapore (2013) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, 2013; Ndugulile, 2013; Ng’wanakilala, 2018; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014; Times of Oman, 2012). Travel restrictions are likely to drastically reduce the importation of urban policy, as Tanzanian officials stop attending the international conferences and urban study tours that once provided opportunities to renew or establish connections with urban authorities, GIC firms, and investors.

Magufuli has publicly denounced what he believes are unfair investment deals and the foreign exploitation of Tanzanian resources, a position consistent with a rise in resource nationalism emerging across the continent (Jacob & Pedersen, 2018). While foreign mining companies have borne the brunt of Magufuli’s crackdown, multinationals operating in telecommunications and infrastructure sectors have also been hit with tax hikes, import and export restrictions, and demands from the Tanzanian state to renegotiate their contracts (Collord, 2019; Jacob & Pedersen, 2018). These measures have had a resounding impact on the local business environment, as FDI has precipitously dropped in 2016 to US\$864 million from US\$1.56 billion in 2015 (UNCTAD, n.d.), further reducing avenues for policy circulation.

The President’s hard stance on foreign investors appears to have been extended to the financiers and developers of the Bagamoyo SEZ as his administration suspended the project in January 2016. The President and Tanzania Port Authority officials characterized the terms

agreed to by predecessor, Jakaya Kikwete, as 'commercially unviable', with 'conditions that could only be accepted by mad people' (Mwangasha, 2019; Ng'wanakilala, 2019). Pushback against BRI-related projects has intensified in the last few years<sup>39</sup>, triggered by fears of debt-trap diplomacy<sup>40</sup>, and Magufuli himself complained that investors wanted to 'take the land as their own' (Mwangasha, 2019). Since then, state officials have clarified that negotiations are still underway (Kanai & Schindler, 2019). The state's willingness to renegotiate the terms of the project may be more indicative of this administration's growing reliance on China, which in contrast to many Western donors, is still willing to provide aid and financing even in the face of human rights violations<sup>41</sup>. Given that sources of development financing are now more limited and that Magufuli has repeatedly praised China's unconditional support (Dahir, 2018), it appears that his nationalist political stance has been tempered by the realities of Tanzania's pressing infrastructure deficit.

The most significant disruption to the new cities planned under Kikwete has come from Magufuli's determination to finalize the transition of the national capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma. Concentrating development efforts away from the coast and towards the geographic center of the country is reflective of this administration's increasingly inward-looking development agenda. In order to achieve the capital transition, Magufuli has directed all state-owned developers, including the TBA, WHC, and NHC to focus their efforts and resources towards developing housing around Dodoma (Interview, August 2018). The NHC has moved forward with the Iyumbu Satellite City project, which is intended to house newly transferred bureaucrats on the outskirts of Dodoma. As a result, the agency's resources and managerial capacity have been drawn away from other previously planned and already-initiated NHC projects, like Safari City, Kawe, Usa River, and Salama Creek. In contrast to the aforementioned NHC projects, which were all planned by international planning consultants, Iyumbu was planned in-house by NHC planners (Interview, August 2018). Local planners are also being directed to work on Magufuli's vision for New Dodoma. In line with this regime's nationalist sentiment, a team of all-Tanzanian planners have been tasked with adapting a revision of the Dodoma master plan produced by the Korean planning firm Saman Corporation in 2010.

The state's monopoly over urban development in Tanzania has made new city projects particularly susceptible to shifting political tides. Recent nationalistic interventions have heavily curtailed flows of urban policy into Tanzania and deprioritized several FDI-driven and foreign-

planned new city projects. This underscores the important role of state actors in policy circuits, not only as agents of circulation but also as gatekeepers whose policy priorities can promote or impede policy mobility.

### **6.3.2 Forces of localization**

Having analyzed the ways in which policy mobility and implementation was impacted by the most recent political transition, I now turn to examine how global policies are localized. More specifically, I examine how several local pressure factors, including local housing customs and the nascent mortgage market, have forced imported policies to mutate and adapt to the Tanzanian context. The majority of housing in Tanzania is self-built outside of formal state regulations (Esipisu, 2019). The pervasiveness of informal housing development can be seen as resulting from inefficient formal land and housing delivery systems, but also as an intentional strategy that provides self-builders with flexibility, more affordable options, and the ability to avoid costly regularization processes (Andreasen, McGranahan, Kyessi, & Kombe, 2020; Owens, 2014). Those seeking to own a home hire day laborers and collect building materials gradually when finances allow for it, building incrementally, sometimes one room at a time over several years. For many Tanzanians, regardless of income, building one's own home 'from scratch' is a point of pride. When asking one of the NHCs planners if he would consider living or investing in one of the NHC's projects, he replied: 'I prefer building my own house rather than living in somebody else's ideas. I want to live in my own ideas' (Interview, July 2018). This opinion was echoed by other participants who insisted that NHC homes, which generally only have two or three bedrooms, did not fit their needs, as they could not host large extended families. Another interviewee remarked that there are certain cultural preferences among different ethnic groups that are also not reflected in the designs proposed by developers. For example, 'in the Sukuma culture men and women do not share spaces like bathrooms and bedrooms' (Interview, August 2018), making the smaller, one-bathroom homes the NHC is offering unappealing to many potential buyers.

In a bid to convince the Tanzanian public to buy 'ready-made' houses, the NHC has produced a televised program called *Maisha ni Nyumba* (life is a home). In the program, the host tours viewers around units in the NHC's new city developments and housing estates, while emphasizing the benefits of buying a home in one of their developments. For projects that have

yet to break ground, video flyovers of the new city renderings are voiced over by an energetic narrator encouraging prospective homeowners to *wekeza sasa!* (invest now!). In addition to providing advertising for the NHC, the program tries to deliver a logical argument for investing in ready-made homes, explaining that they come with up-to-date infrastructure and utilities like water and electricity, often not available in the rural areas where land is inexpensive and therefore where many opt to build homes.

Developers are also confronted with additional barriers posed by local customs. One manager at a local investment bank remarked that the residential units in several new city projects such as Kigamboni, Kawe, and Dege Eco Village are primarily mid- and high-rise apartments, whereas most Tanzanians are used to living in single detached homes. Ties to land are important and many engage in some level of subsistence agriculture, even in peri-urban areas. This particular divergence in priorities became evident in the early stages of the Kigamboni New City resettlement scheme. Soon after plans were announced, a committee of residents organized a protest to ensure that the peninsula's 97,000 residents would be relocated to individual land plots rather than the 1.6 km<sup>2</sup> block of apartments intended in the original plan (Lindell et al., 2016). This reluctance to shift into high-rise housing is not limited to Tanzania. GIC consultants planning new cities in Kuwait and Mongolia, where nomadic roots have created a strong attachment to land, also reported that locals prefer traditional detached homes (Interview, December 2019).

A local preference for concrete among Tanzanians also limits the types of building materials local developers can use. Interviews with new city builders reveal that introducing new building styles and technologies has been a challenge as skeptical home buyers look for a house they 'know will last' (Interview, August 2018). Not all new city developers have conceded to local expectations. The makers of Fumba Town actively challenge local norms by continuing to construct apartment buildings and prefabricated houses, which are primarily made of particleboard. Having successfully sold the model to Zanzibari-Omanis in Fumba Town, with almost 500 units sold as of August 2019, CPS hopes to replicate their success in Dodoma, where the NHC has subcontracted them to run a pilot project incorporating their singular prefabricated house designs. If successful, CPS would be in charge of building phase II of Iyumbu, the NHC's satellite city development intended to house newly transferred government staff.

Real estate markets represent an important global-local interface, where international forces are confronted by distinct local contexts (Mouton & Shatkin, 2019). As ‘middlemen’ who engage both with internationally circulating urban models and local institutional and cultural constraints, developers play an important role in translating foreign urban policy into something workable in the local context. While they are sometimes pressured to ‘localize’ foreign urban models to cater to the preferences and needs of the local market, they also actively push new concepts and technologies forward, reforming local tastes along with the urban landscape.

Beyond the constraints imposed by local customs and preferences, the most limiting factor in the realization of utopian new city visions is financing. Lack of easily accessible financing creates both supply-side and demand-side bottlenecks. While private developers like CPS, Bahkresa, and AVIC International are able to self-fund through parent companies or foreign capital investments, the NHC finances its projects entirely through loans from local banks. Although the agency’s loans are guaranteed by the government treasury, the NHC does not receive any additional preferential loan terms or subsidies and has to shoulder the full cost of local lending rates (currently at 17%) (Esipisu, 2019).

For prospective homeowners hoping to buy into one of the NHC’s new city developments, the barriers to acquiring a mortgage are high. Mortgage interest rates range from 15 to 19% (TMRC, 2017) and are only accessible to individuals who are formally employed with monthly salaries of more than US\$2,000 (Owens, 2014), or alternatively, who own high-value property that they can use as collateral. The latter is only an option for about 3% of Tanzanians who have a title deed (CAHF, 2018: 255). That is not to say that conditions have not improved for borrowers over the last few years, as interest rates were much higher a decade ago (22-24% in 2010) (TMRC, 2017). The creation of the Tanzania Mortgage Refinancing Company (TMRC) in 2010, has allowed local banks to access long-term funding necessary for financing 15-30-year mortgages. Prior to 2010, Tanzanian banks did not have enough long-term capital to finance a mortgage market. A senior TMRC employee, argues that TMRC has played a key role in enabling local developers to take on large-scale projects in the last 5-7 years (Interview, July 2018). Nevertheless, access to housing finance continues to be limited to a small and privileged segment of the population. According to the 2020 World Bank Doing Business Report, Tanzania ranked 67th in ease of getting credit while neighbouring Kenya ranked 4th<sup>42</sup> (World Bank,

2020). Tanzania's mortgage market remains among the smallest in East Africa, with a ratio of outstanding mortgage debt to GDP of 0.33% (CAHF, 2018).

These market bottlenecks limit the NHC's potential customer base and constrain the implementation of new city plans. As a result, only a few residential units are built and key infrastructure including roads, electricity, and water connections are delayed. In August of 2017, the NHC completed 10 (affordable) sample houses at the Safari City site in the hopes of boosting pre-sales to finance ongoing construction efforts. Several of these units were purchased and a few residents had moved in by August 2018, yet none of the site's roads had been paved and residents complained of frequent water cuts. One resident had stacked full water barrels on one side of her kitchen from floor to ceiling in preparation for the inevitable shortage. When asked why the roads had not yet been paved, one employee of the NHC's Arusha branch explained that they feared the new roads would be damaged by trucks during the construction of the rest of the city's infrastructure. Although all of the NHC's city projects are still in early phases of construction, what has been built looks very different from the intentions laid out in the initial master plan. All that can be seen today of the ambitious plan laid out by Safari City's international planning consortium in 2013 is a cluster of bungalows (Figure 6.5).



Figure 6.5: On the left, 3D rendering produced by the international consortium of firms who planned Safari City; on the right, a photograph of the Safari City site today, with only 10 one-story houses built and no tarmacked roads. Sources: (iki design group, 2014; Fieldwork, August 2018)

## 6.4 Conclusion

This chapter explores Tanzania's new city projects through a policy mobilities framework and examines their diverse international urban influences. In doing so, it contributes empirically to scholarship at the nexus of policy mobilities and new cities research and can provide insight into how policy networks facilitate the proliferation of new cities throughout the Global South. This

chapter makes three key contributions. First, I demonstrate how Tanzanian new city builders actively seek out the expertise of foreign planners and consultants in order to address a lack of local expertise and to incorporate ‘global best practices’ into their new city designs. In search of this expertise, Tanzanian city builders and government officials participate in urban study tours throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, in addition to attending a wide range of international conferences through which they cultivate the personal networks that sustain policy transfer. Second, I illustrate the variety of actors involved in circulating urban policy into Tanzania. Agents who circulate urban policy include planning professionals, NHC employees, government delegates, employees working at the Ministry of Lands, and also diasporic communities, who are unexpectedly facilitating policy networks between Tanzania and the Gulf States through enduring ties to their ancestral homeland. Moreover, I demonstrate the continued importance of state actors by examining the roles of three emerging urban innovators, South Korea, Turkey, and China, who promote their national and international interests by boosting and exporting their urban expertise. These examples provide new empirical insights into the increasingly prevalent policy flows taking place between emerging economies and actors that have not historically been international exporters of urban policy. Third, one advantage of taking a long time frame into account for this study is that I was able to observe the mutation of policies that were imported and assembled into new city plans over a period of several years and through two different presidential regimes. This allowed me to observe the multiple possible ‘destinies’ of mobile policies (Jacobs, 2012). By using foreign-inspired examples of new city projects like Kigamboni New City and Safari City, I demonstrate how shifting government agendas, local building customs, and market bottlenecks all serve to ‘localize’ imported urban policies such that the end product is often far removed from initial plans.



## **Chapter 7: Conclusion**

The central focus of my research has been to examine the emergence of new cities in Tanzania as part of a broader global trend of new city building. I have explored this subject through three main focal points: (1) drivers and rationales of new city projects and the main actors involved in building new cities, (2) the transnational circulation of urban policy and the main agents of policy mobility, and (3) institutional legacies from the socialist era and the impacts of political change on new city projects. My empirical findings demonstrate first that new cities are adopted by the state to achieve a variety of development and political outcomes, making these projects susceptible to changing political interests. Second, I argue that several of Tanzania's new cities are the product of complex assemblages of internationally circulating models that are translated and localized through their exposure to local customs and market conditions. Third, I illustrate how enduring socialist legacies have enabled the Tanzanian state to play a central role in urban development. This final chapter is organized into three sections that summarise the key arguments and main ideas explored throughout the thesis as a whole. First, I review the main empirical findings of each of the previous chapters. Second, I identify what contributions this research makes to urban geography scholarship. Finally, I conclude by suggesting avenues for future research.

### **7.1 Chapter overviews**

In Chapter 1, 'Introduction', I broadly outline the rapidly urbanizing context from which new cities are emerging, and the use of new cities as solutions to the urgent urban problems that governments in the Global South are facing. I identify common characteristics between new city projects world-wide, including the increasingly prominent role played by private actors, the corporate and global aesthetic reflected in renderings of new city projects, the business-friendly regulations, and the shared policy networks that appear to both inform and connect these seemingly disparate projects. I then present my aim and research questions: to critically examine Tanzania's 12 new city projects through their drivers and rationales, the actors involved in their creation, their international urban policy influences, and the socialist-era legacies that have impacted the local urban context. I then reflect on the importance and timeliness of this research and end this chapter with a brief outline of the rest of the thesis.

In Chapter 2, ‘Historical context’, I provide some historical background to the urban trends underway today in Tanzania. Here I chronologically explore the pre-colonial era, highlighting Tanzania’s longstanding historical ties to Oman. I briefly recount Tanzania’s colonial experience, first as part of German East Africa and then as a British protectorate, highlighting the unequal development of urban areas over rural areas that would later prompt Nyerere to focus development efforts on resource redistribution. Then I dissect the post-independence years under Nyerere, the process of socialist restructuring, and examine two of the most substantial spatial interventions carried out as part of Nyerere’s Ujamaa philosophy: Ujamaa villagization, and the planning of the new capital, Dodoma. I make the argument that these two top-down projects have primed Tanzania for the emergence of similarly large-scale, state-driven projects like new master-planned cities and other urban mega-developments. I then turn to examine the neoliberal transition that spanned the 1990s and early 2000s, and describe how some socialist-era legislation and institutions were maintained in Tanzania’s transition to a market economy, and how they have allowed state-owned enterprises to monopolize formal urban development. Finally, I introduce the current political context under president Magufuli’s populist and nationalist regime and outline his plans for a new Dodoma.

Chapter 3, ‘Research approach and methodology’, provides a justification and practical explanation of the research design and qualitative methods I opted to use in my exploration of new cities in Tanzania. Here I explain why I chose to undertake a national-scale analysis rather than focus on a particular new city case study. I then discuss the three research techniques I applied to collect data, including semi-structured interviews, document and web content analysis, and site visits. After discussing how I analyzed the interview recordings and documents I collected, I reflect on some of the challenges of conducting fieldwork in Tanzania at the time and contemplate how my positionality, as a young, white, educated female has affected the process and outcomes of this research.

In Chapter 4, ‘Literature review’, I review the three strands of literature I chose to anchor my research in, and to which this thesis contributes: (1) new master-planned cities; (2) urban policy mobilities; and (3) entrepreneurial governance. Drawing from the emerging and vibrant body of scholarship on new cities, I use this opportunity to define what constitutes a ‘new city’. Throughout, I highlight the key concepts that I used to guide my research and support my arguments in later empirical chapters. These include the diverging neoliberal and cultural-

political drivers of new city building; the multiple agents and modes of urban policy circulation contributing to the design conceptions of new cities; and finally, the often entangled interests of private and public sector entities involved in real estate and urban development. Throughout, I highlight gaps in the literature and opportunities for my own research to make important empirical contributions.

Chapter 5, ‘Tanzania’s new master-planned cities: Socialist legacies in a neoliberalizing state’, is the first of two empirical chapters and provides a comprehensive overview of the 12 new city projects planned in Tanzania since 2008. This chapter outlines the features of the new city projects and the main actors involved in planning, financing, and implementing them. The rest of this chapter explores the official and unofficial drivers of new city building and elaborates on how the unofficial drivers have shifted following the political transition in 2015. My empirical analysis demonstrates that these projects have been officially rationalized as means of addressing urban congestion, a 3 million-unit housing deficit (Esipisu, 2019) and informal sprawl. The majority (9 of the 12 new city projects), are spearheaded by the state or hybrid state-owned developers. The prominent role of the state can be attributed to prevailing socialist institutions, which have enabled the state to retain control of urban development through reformed parastatals and centralized land governance protocols. From 2008 to 2015 new city projects appeared to be responding to a neoliberal pull, and sought to attract foreign investment through a modern, corporate aesthetic, in the hopes of positioning Tanzania as an international business hub. However, since the general election in 2015 led to a regime transition, the urban agenda has turned inwards both physically and in terms of development policies. Urban development efforts are now strategically aimed at completing the capital transition to the long-awaited socialist-era capital of Dodoma in an effort to associate a positive collective memory of Nyerere to the current regime. The more externally-oriented new city projects conceived during the previous administration have been abandoned or left idle, and developer efforts are now concentrated around the capital city, claiming to offer more affordable housing options in an effort to legitimize the new regime and consolidate support for the ruling party. This chapter contributes to literature on the neoliberal and political drivers of new cities, as well as scholarship on entrepreneurial governance by demonstrating how new cities are deployed by the state to achieve a variety of economic, development, and political outcomes. In doing so, this

chapter provides empirical evidence that new city projects remain a highly politicized state-end endeavor, despite the radical transformations that followed the neoliberal transition of the 1990s.

In my second empirical chapter, Chapter 6, ‘Borrowed skylines: Urban policy transfer in Tanzania’s new city projects’, I explore the new city projects through an urban policy mobilities framework. This chapter is organized into two main sections, the first examines the actors and modes of policy circulation and demonstrates how international urban policy models are imported and translated into Tanzania’s new city plans. The second section investigates policy ‘mutation’ and explores the local factors that either impede the implementation of or ‘localize’ imported policies, leading to outcomes that look very different from original plans. My principal findings in this chapter are that Tanzania’s new city builders are primarily looking to urban models in the Global South and in emerging economies such as South Korea, Turkey, and China, where government actors play an important role in policy boosterism. Beyond examining the roles of policy circulators that have already been identified in the scholarship such as government actors and planning consultants, I introduce a new agent of policy circulation: the diaspora. I demonstrate how diasporic communities with historical ties to Oman play an important role in promoting policy circulation between Gulf States and new cities emerging in Zanzibar. I also explore how policy networks are built, renewed, and strengthened through ‘mobility events’ including study tours and conferences. Based on interviews carried out with well-traveled Tanzanian officials, I critically examine their takeaways from these policy excursions. In my second section, which focuses on policy ‘mutation’, I demonstrate that the state plays an important role as a gatekeeper for urban policy, either facilitating or impeding the import and implementation of urban policies. I then consider how policy assemblages that have already been incorporated into new city plans are impacted by the local context. I explore how developers are constrained by local building material preferences, cultural norms of building your own home, and a reluctance to transition to apartment living. I also demonstrate how a nascent mortgage industry has reduced the potential market of home buyers and pushed developers to reduce the scope of what is implemented from the master plan. These empirical findings reinforce one of the central pillars of policy mobilities scholarship, which is that policy circulation is not a smooth process. Policy journeys are multi-scalar, highly dependent on the actors that carry them through multiple sites of transmission, and they are interpreted and

reinterpreted, contested, and re-made according to the interests of the political elite, developers, and customers that consume them.

## **7.2 Contributions and findings**

Overall, this thesis explores the emergence and evolution of new cities in Tanzania, which had until now, received little scholarly attention both individually and as a group. With 12 new cities planned since 2008, Tanzania offers a fruitful case study for research on new cities and conclusions drawn from this research can offer insights into broader new city-building activities both regionally within Africa and globally. Furthermore, these findings are particularly relevant to countries with a historically centralized state, or in more authoritarian political contexts where the state continues to play an important role in urban development. In addition to presenting the first comprehensive study of Tanzania's new city projects planned since 2008, four key empirical contributions have emerged from the two empirical chapters in this thesis.

First, while scholars of new cities have voiced concerns over the encroachment of the private sector on otherwise public municipal spaces, my analysis of the Tanzanian case demonstrates a need to reconsider the public-private dichotomy when examining new cities. The emergence of hybrid developers like the NHC (National Housing Corporation), which fulfil dual roles as state-owned entities and as profit-driven real estate developers, blur the divide between the public and private spheres. This finding is consistent with the findings of other urban studies scholars in the context of India (Goldman, 2011), the Philippines (Mouton & Shatkin, 2019), and Angola (Cain, 2014; Pitcher, 2017), all places in which the state is 'deeply entangled' with real estate markets and developers. Mobilizing literature on entrepreneurial governance, I have demonstrated that the Tanzanian state is able to deploy market instruments through state-owned developers and benefit financially from large-scale real estate ventures like the NHC's new city projects. Framing the Tanzanian state as market player that is engaged in making strategic investments alongside the private sector goes against the notion that the neoliberal transition has led to a 'hollowing-out' of the state (Rhodes, 1994). This suggests there is a need to consider more complex configurations of state power, particularly when seeking to understand how and why new city agendas are deployed in less democratic settings.

Second, by analysing the evolution of new city projects in Tanzania, I demonstrate how urban mega-projects are subject to shifting political interests and therefore respond to more than

just neoliberal economic motives. While new city projects under President Kikwete appeared to be externally and economically oriented, following Magufuli's election, urban development has been focused on the interior, in particular on supporting the transition of the capital to New Dodoma. This shift is reflective of the ruling party's desire to consolidate voter support after competitive elections in 2015. New satellite cities built around Dodoma and the revival of the socialist-era city associate the positive national memory Tanzanians have of founding father Nyerere with the current president and serve to legitimize his more statist approach to development. This provides empirical evidence for how new city projects are used to mobilize nationalist ideals and attract popular support. As such, this research contributes to scholarship that considers the cultural and political drivers of new city building.

Third, this research sheds light on the increasingly prominent Asia to Africa flows of urban policy circulation. My analysis reveals that Tanzania's new city builders have primarily looked to urban models in Asia. Emerging economies like South Korea, Turkey and China, strategically position themselves as having more relatable and realistic development experiences, with which other developing countries, like Tanzania, can more easily identify. In addition, my original study of two new cities on the island of Zanzibar demonstrates how diasporic communities act as catalysts and agents of policy circulation, by reinforcing networks between Zanzibar and the Gulf states. These empirical contributions highlight the 'multi-centered' (Bunnell and Das, 2010) and relational nature of the new cities trend. Furthermore, this research responds to the call to unsettle Western-centric urban theory production (Parnell & Robinson, 2012; Roy, 2009) by examining new urban centers of innovation in the Global South and emerging economies.

Fourth, this research contributes to scholarship at the nexus of policy mobilities and new cities research by examining how mobile urban policies are assembled into new city plans and later mutate through pressures from the local Tanzanian context. As discussed previously, while Tanzanian new city actors actively import urban policies from a variety of locations, these policies are not always implemented, and if they are, they are not necessarily recognizable from their intentions. I highlight the role of the state as a gatekeeper, which through policies and regulations can either enable or inhibit policy import and implementation. I also demonstrate more generally how local pressure factors like housing finance bottlenecks and local customs

and preferences can lead to construction outcomes that look very different from the intended forms laid out in the master plan.

### **7.3 Avenues for further research**

Through the process of carrying out this research a number of avenues for future research have emerged that I was unable to pursue given the time limitations and scope of this research. First, in researching the Bagamoyo SEZ and new city projects in the Fumba FEZ, I recognized that Tanzania falls into a broader pattern of building new cities within SEZs (Moser & Côté-Roy, *in press*). This type of urban development has the potential to become increasingly popular as regulatory exemptions and tax incentives offer an ideal environment for global capital to touch down. Moreover, the SEZ allows developers to bypass the inconveniences present in existing contexts by creating a space of exception. Private developers in Fumba have already shown how the SEZ can be used as a loophole for side-stepping laws that restrict property rights to nationals, in order to open local real estate markets to the global economy. As SEZs continue to be promoted as a development solution by multilateral agencies and facilitated through the financing and expertise of Chinese state-owned enterprises contributing to the Belt and Road Initiative, I anticipate that the zone as an urban and economic development paradigm will likely continue to proliferate throughout Africa in the coming years. This offers fertile ground for exploring how these exceptional urban spaces will be governed, and whether public-private developers will play a role in their development. In this theme, it will be fascinating to explore what impacts they have on the landscapes into which they are inserted, whether they will help address infrastructure gaps, and if they will turn into exclusive enclaves that further fragment urban landscapes and entrench socio-economic differences.

Second, this research has only begun to explore the rise of new urban models in emerging economies and position them as sources of urban policy innovation. More research is needed on the ways in which new city developers, particularly those sponsored by the state such as the South Korean state-owned Land and Housing Corporation or the Chinese state-owned AVIC International have expanded their presence globally and positioned themselves as new city experts. While LH appears to be branding itself as an expert in smart and eco-city design, with new city projects in Kuwait and Brazil, AVIC International is actively engaged in the planning and construction of aerotropolises world-wide, with projects in Sierra Leone, Zambia, and

Kuwait. This presents fertile ground for comparative studies of how mega-projects carried out by these state-developers have unfolded differently in different countries and political settings.

Third and most topical, would be to explore how the new cities trend as a whole is affected by the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic. While it is still too soon to tell what the effects of the pandemic will be, it is clear that rethinking urban landscapes will be at the forefront of many national agendas. With cities presenting as hotspots for disease transmission, it seems likely that the pandemic will prompt planners and municipal authorities to rethink urban best practices. Reconsidering urban form and assessing the benefits and drawbacks of density, we may see more new city plans with lower density layouts that address health and sanitation concerns by encouraging car-oriented transport, or perhaps through a resurgence of Corbusian architectural features that prioritize air and light. There is also the potential for smart city components to be reframed around health management, as contact tracing apps are integrated with smart-city sensors and surveillance tech to track and minimize outbreaks. The contraction of the global economy ensuing from the months-long shutdown of the world's major economies, interruptions to supply chains, and plummeting oil prices, will all undoubtedly have knock-on effects for the corporate financiers and investors that have backed the construction of new city projects. Related to the inevitable contraction of global trade, China's Belt and Road Initiative is likely to be scaled back as resources are channeled towards more pressing domestic concerns. And while the labor force in developed countries has adopted a 'work from home' model as the new normal, this is not the case for the majority of urban populations in the Global South who rely predominantly on the informal sector for income generation and also live in informal settlements, where it is more difficult to access proper sanitation and keep social distance. Given the circumstances, we may see states double down on formalization efforts as informal spaces are increasingly perceived as zones of contagion (Lall & Wahba, 2020). More concerning, however, is the potential for the temporary and exceptional powers that states have acquired in order to enforce lockdowns and intervene in the economy, to become normalized and more permanent. More centralized or authoritarian state configurations are conducive to top-down projects like new cities and given the current circumstances, citizens may be more amenable to large-scale statist interventions in the urban landscape.



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## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> The Sultanate of Zanzibar became independent from the Omani Empire in 1861, after the death of Sultan Seyyid Said whose will divided the empire among his three sons: Majid claimed Zanzibar, Thwain, Muscat, and Turki, Sohar (Ingrams, 2007). At the time, the Sultanate of Zanzibar spanned the Kenyan and Tanzanian coasts (Swahili Coast) and included the islands of Pemba and Unguja (the two islands that make up Zanzibar today).

<sup>2</sup> The territory now known as Tanzania has had several names over the years. First, it was part of German East Africa along with Burundi and Rwanda (1890-1919); then it was referred to as Tanganyika during its time as a British protectorate and into the first years of independence (1919-1964); and finally it has been known as Tanzania since Tanganyika and Zanzibar's unification in 1964.

<sup>3</sup> Nyerere resigned from this position for one month to write about his views on government and African Unity, which would yield one of his most important papers 'Ujamaa—The Basis for African Socialism'. This text would later serve as the basis for the Arusha Declaration (1967). He was elected as President in 1962 when Tanganyika became a republic (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020).

<sup>4</sup> The name Tanzania is a portmanteau of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

<sup>5</sup> Fabian socialism was championed by a number of 19th century British intellectuals who believed the ideals of socialism could be gradually achieved through parliamentary processes rather than through revolution and armed struggle, as was advocated by Marxist socialists.

<sup>6</sup> From 1970 to 1975, the Chinese Railway Engineering Corporation built the TAZARA railway, which extends from Dar es Salaam to Zambia. Financed by interest-free loans from the Chinese State, this was the largest overseas aid project China had undertaken at the time.

<sup>7</sup> The Ministry responsible for land administration has changed names multiple times before becoming known as the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development, from here on referred to as the Ministry of Lands.

<sup>8</sup> Congo (Kinshasa), Malawi (Lilongwe), Botswana (Gaborone), Nigeria (Abuja), Ivory Coast (Yamoussoukro), and Mauritania (Nouakchott).

<sup>9</sup> Libya and Liberia also planned to establish new capitals but have not implemented plans (Hall, 2006).

<sup>10</sup> Jammi Forums, an informal forum based in Tanzania that is 'part whistle-blowing platform and part citizen journalism outlet', has been the target of government intimidation both under President Kikwete and President Magufuli's regimes (Dahir, 2017).

<sup>11</sup> Unlike in neighboring Kenya, English is not as widely spoken in Tanzania, because there were fewer colonial settlers and Nyerere declared Swahili to be the main language of instruction after independence.

<sup>12</sup> This terminology is used in the Tanzanian controller auditor general reports, but for the sake of clarity I have chosen to use the term 'state-owned enterprise' which is used frequently in the scholarship.

<sup>13</sup> A leading state-owned conglomerate under China's State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission.

<sup>14</sup> While efforts to revitalize the capital have not officially referred to Dodoma under a new name, I have chosen to use the nomenclature of 'New Dodoma' for the sake of clarity. I also use this title to make the argument that the urban transformation of Dodoma is so significant that it constitutes an entirely new city.

<sup>15</sup> The NSSF provides pensions for those not included in government pension plans.

<sup>16</sup> Owned by local business tycoon, Mohammad Iqbal. Local private real estate developers in Tanzania appear to be owned and run by a handful of wealthy business magnates. Interviewees repeatedly referred to the companies by their CEOs names rather than using the company names.

<sup>17</sup> The cement industry is a major contributor to carbon emissions.

<sup>18</sup> The landmass of Zanzibar is made of coral limestone and therefore has a very thin layer of topsoil. This not only makes for poor agricultural conditions, but also means there are few trees that could be used as building materials. The builders of Fumba Town have struggled with sourcing building materials and have largely been dependent on imports, which has resulted in construction delays. The particle board used in the prefabricated homes is imported from Romania because of the lack of a specialized local timber industry both on Zanzibar and the mainland (Interview, July 2018).

<sup>19</sup> AVIC is a fortune 500 company, with more than 100 subsidiaries, and 500,000 employees (AVIC, n.d.)

<sup>20</sup> 'Dead capital' refers to property that is informally held and therefore not fungible, meaning it cannot be used to generate funds other than when it is sold (Briggs, 2011; De Soto, 2001).

<sup>21</sup> Before MKURABITA, the formal land registration process took 68 bureaucratic steps, over an average of 8 years at a cost of US\$2,250 (Briggs, 2011).

<sup>22</sup> Tanzania ranked 145 out of 190 countries in ease of doing business in 2013. This ranking ranges from 0-190, a low numerical value indicates a better business environment while a high numerical value indicates a difficult business environment ("Ease of Doing Business in Tanzania: 2008-2019 Data," n.d.).

<sup>23</sup> Motor vehicles (per 1,000 people) in Tanzania was reported at 7 in 2007, according to the World Bank Data Bank (World Bank, 2007).

<sup>24</sup> Bundang, Ilsan, Pyeongchon, Jungdong, Pangyo, Dongtan, Kimpo; Sejong City and Innovation City (9 of ten innovative cities, currently under development with a total area of 44.2 km<sup>2</sup>) (LH, 2019b).

<sup>25</sup> LH was involved in the development of several zones within Incheon including Cheongna International City, Yeongjong Haneul City, and Incheon Hi-Tech Park (Incheon Free Economic Zone authority, 2018; LH, 2017).

<sup>26</sup> Korea joined the OECD in 1996. Members of the OECD are expected to allocate 0.7% of their GDP to overseas development assistance.

<sup>27</sup> Unable to guarantee treasury financing for the project or find suitable developers, the NHC ultimately opted to implement a more feasible plan produced by Dubai-based planning firm, PHILS International.

<sup>28</sup> Construction constituted 20% of Turkish exports in 2014 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development, 2014a).

<sup>29</sup> Relations were reinforced in 2003 when a strategy for the ‘Development of the Economic Relations with African Countries’ was prepared by Turkey’s Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade.

<sup>30</sup> SASAC has almost 100 state-owned enterprises overseas and as it is under the direct supervision of the State Council, it is a key instrument in the re-centralization of Chinese SOEs.

<sup>31</sup> See thesis section 5.4.2 for more information.

<sup>32</sup> This aligns with China’s internationalization strategy, which began in 1978 with the ‘Reform and Opening Up’ policy and was followed by the ‘Going Out’ policy of the 1990s, which incited Chinese companies to establish themselves abroad.

<sup>33</sup> Several transport infrastructure projects are planned in Mozambique including the construction of the new Techobanine port and the expansion of the Beira port (World Bank Group, 2019), in addition to plans to upgrade the three rail corridors of Nacala, Beira, and Maputo.

<sup>34</sup> Oman Wanfang is owned by Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in China and pledged US\$10 billion to develop an industrial park within Duqm.

<sup>35</sup> A special economic zone established under the Tanfeedh plans for economic diversification, planned in preparation for a post-oil future.

<sup>36</sup> South Saad Al-Abdullah New City, is part of Kuwait’s Vision 2035 to transform the country into an international financial and trade hub (Euronews, 2019).

<sup>37</sup> Some projects like Dege Eco Village and Kigamboni New City have been abandoned, Bagamoyo SEZ is on hold, while other ‘idle’ projects are still technically being pursued only with limited progress such as Salama Creek, Safari City, Usa River, and Kawe Satellite City.

<sup>38</sup> A commitment from the Treasury to pay back loans in the event that the borrower defaults.

<sup>39</sup> The government of Sierra Leone canceled a deal to build a US\$400 million airport with China Railway International Group, financed by China’s Exim bank. Similarly Mahathir, former prime minister of Malaysia, canceled US\$22 billion worth of Chinese-backed projects, and other projects have also been scaled back in Myanmar and Pakistan (Chandran, 2019).

<sup>40</sup> One recent example of debt-trap diplomacy is Hambantota port, which was leased to China Merchants Port Holdings for 99 years in 2017, after the Sri Lankan government failed to repay debts accrued during the construction of the port (Abi-Habib, 2018).

<sup>41</sup> Magufuli’s regime has put in place policies and taken steps to: expel pregnant girls from school, persecute the LGBT community, censor media, ban the publication of data without government approval, and intimidate journalists and political opposition leaders (The Economist, 2018, 2019).

<sup>42</sup> Lower ranking values denote easier access to credit.

## Appendix

### Appendix A: List of interviewees

|    | <b>Organization</b>                         | <b>Role</b>                    | <b>Gender</b> | <b>Location</b>      |
|----|---|--------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|
| 1  | Community advocacy group                    | Land rights consultant         | Female        | Dar es Salaam        |
| 2  | Government ministry                         | Director                       | Female        | Dar es Salaam        |
| 3  | Government ministry                         | Assistant director             | Male          | Dar es Salaam        |
| 4  | Government ministry                         | Urban planner                  | Male          | Dodoma               |
| 5  | Government ministry                         | Director                       | Male          | Dodoma               |
| 6  | Housing finance organization                | CEO                            | Male          | Dar es Salaam        |
| 7  | Tourism industry                            | Tenant in new city             | Male          | Arusha               |
| 8  | International planning and development firm | Urban planner                  | Male          | Virtual- Seoul       |
| 9  | International planning firm                 | Urban planner                  | Male          | Virtual- Stuttgart   |
| 10 | International planning firm                 | Urban planner                  | Male          | Virtual- New York    |
| 11 | International planning firm                 | CEO                            | Male          | Virtual- Istanbul    |
| 12 | International planning firm                 | CEO                            | Male          | Virtual- Istanbul    |
| 13 | International university                    | Academic                       | Female        | Virtual- Oxfordshire |
| 14 | International university                    | Academic                       | Female        | Virtual- Aarhus      |
| 15 | Local bank                                  | Operations manager             | Male          | Dar es Salaam        |
| 16 | Local university                            | Professor, planning consultant | Female        | Dar es Salaam        |
| 17 | Local university                            | Professor, planning consultant | Male          | Dodoma               |
| 18 | Local university                            | Professor                      | Male          | Dar es Salaam        |
| 19 | Marketing firm                              | Marketing manager              | Male          | Dar es Salaam        |

|    |                               |                              |        |               |
|----|-------------------------------|------------------------------|--------|---------------|
| 20 | Multilateral development bank | Country Manager              | Male   | Montreal      |
| 21 | Private developer             | Sales supervisor             | Male   | Dar es Salaam |
| 22 | Private developer             | Operations manager           | Male   | Zanzibar      |
| 23 | Private developer             | Project coordinator          | Male   | Zanzibar      |
| 24 | Private developer             | CEO                          | Male   | Dar es Salaam |
| 25 | Regional newspaper            | Journalist                   | Male   | Dar es Salaam |
| 26 | Social security fund          | Site engineer                | Male   | Dar es Salaam |
| 27 | Social security fund          | Prospective home buyer       | Female | Dar es Salaam |
| 28 | State-owned developer         | CEO                          | Male   | Dar es Salaam |
| 29 | State-owned developer         | Corporate affairs manager    | Male   | Dar es Salaam |
| 30 | State-owned developer         | Business development officer | Female | Dar es Salaam |
| 31 | State-owned developer         | Business development manager | Male   | Dar es Salaam |
| 32 | State-owned developer         | Business planning manager    | Male   | Dar es Salaam |
| 33 | State-owned developer         | Regional manager             | Male   | Dodoma        |
| 34 | State-owned developer         | Regional manager             | Male   | Arusha        |
| 35 | State-owned developer         | Sales officer                | Male   | Arusha        |
| 36 | State-owned developer         | Urban planner                | Male   | Dar es Salaam |