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SHAYKH AḤMAD SIRHINDI

AN OUTLINE OF HIS THOUGHT AND A STUDY OF HIS IMAGE
IN THE EYES OF POSTERITY

by

YOHANAN FRIEDMANN

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Institute of Islamic Studies,
McGill University,
Montreal.  

June 1966.
FOREWORD

A student of the history of Islām in India is soon confronted with the name of Shaykh ʿAlīmad Sirhindī (1563/4-1624). He was a contemporary of the emperors Akbar and Jahāngīr, was given by his disciples the honorific title of the Renewer of the Second Millennium (mujaddid-i alf-i thānī) and is the author of a celebrated collection of letters that came to be known as Maktūbāt-i ʿImām-i ʿRabbānī. It has been a near consensus of modern historians that Sirhindī brought about major changes in the development of Islām in India. He is said to have reversed the heretical trends of the period of Akbar, restored the pristine purity of Islām and inspired the orthodox reforms of Awrangzāb. The purpose of this thesis has been to re-examine the evidence for this assessment. During the process of research a considerable amount of hitherto unknown material bearing on the reception of Sirhindī's ideas by his contemporaries and by posterity has been uncovered. It has also become clear that Sirhindī's known works have been used in a tendentious manner in modern historical works. Modern historians have laid great emphasis on Sirhindī's demand for the strict implementation of the sharīʿa by the state.
and for the purification of Islām from late accretions, to the virtual exclusion of other subjects which are not less important in Sirhindī's thought and constitute the bulk of his writings. For Sirhindī was primarily a ṣūfī. He was not a thinker concerned mainly with the question of religion and state and was not regarded as such by his contemporaries.

The present writer has tried to present a more balanced picture of Sirhindī's thought. An effort has been made to concentrate upon those aspects that have hitherto been neglected. The work does not claim to be exhaustive and much more research will be necessary before a final assessment of Sirhindī's place in the history of ṭaṣawwuf can be made. The present writer is convinced that further studies of Sirhindī will have to be made against the background of Ibn al-‘Arabī and ‘Alā‘ al-Dawla al-Simnānī rather than that of Akbar and Jahāngīr.

It is a pleasant duty to express my gratitude to those who assisted me in the preparation of this work. Professor C. J. Adams, Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University, has read the whole thesis and offered valuable criticism and suggestions. Professor Adams was also of great help in arranging my trip to India in the fall of 1964. Many difficult aspects of Sirhindī's thought have been clarified in my
discussions with Professor H. Landolt. Sincere gratitude is due to Professor Khalīq Ahmad Niẓāmi of Aligarh Muslim University, whose scholarship and hospitality I had the privilege to enjoy while visiting Aligarh in the academic year 1964-65. I am also grateful to my friend R. Nettler, but for whose help the English style of the thesis would have been worse than it is.

My studies at McGill University in the years 1962-63, 1963-64 and 1965-66, as well as my trip to India in 1964-65, would have been impossible without the generous financial help of the Canadian Friends of the Hebrew University in Montreal. I should like to offer thanks mainly to Dr. S. Cass, National Chairman, Academic Awards Committee, and to Mr. S. Risk, National Honorary Secretary, for their continued interest in my work.
A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The following system of transliteration of Arabic characters has been used:

- (except when initial)
- b
- t
- th
- j
- h
- kh
- d
- dh
- r
- s
- sh
- s
- d in Arabic; z in Persian and Urdū
- t
- a; at (construct state)

Long vowels: /ā / ū / ẓ, ū
Short vowels: 'a / 'u / i
Diphtongs: /aw / ay
- iy (final form IDTH)
- uww (final form ū)
Persian and Urdū additions to the Arabic alphabet:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Persian} & : & \text{Urdū} \\
\text{p} & : & \text{t} \\
\text{c} & : & \text{d} \\
\text{z} & : & \text{r} \\
\text{g} & : & \text{n} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Additional Urdū vowels:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Urdū} & : & \text{Urdū} \\
\text{e} & : & \text{o} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Urdū aspirated consonants have been marked by the addition of \( h \).
CHAPTER 1

THE SOURCES

The main source materials for the present study are the following:

1) Epistles and other works by Sirhindī.
2) Polemical works by Sirhindī's opponents and his supporters' replies.
3) Hagiographies.
4) Modern analyses and evaluations of Sirhindī's thought and significance.  

1) The most important work in the first group is Sirhindī's letters which came to be known as Maktūbāt-i Imam-i Rabbānī. Though many manuscripts of this work are available in various libraries and the Maktūbāt have been lithographed several times, as well as translated into Turkish, Arabic and Urdu, we do not have the benefit of a scholarly edition of the text or a part of it. This is somewhat surprising and disappointing as these letters have been repeatedly hailed as a landmark in the development of Islām in India; one must not forget, however, that the preparation of a scholarly edition of this difficult work, comprising nearly 900 pages, would be a stupendous task requiring a team of scholars working
over a prolonged period of time. Thus the student is frequently treading on uncertain ground when analysing various details of Sirhindī's thought.

The Maktūbāt are divided into three volumes which were completed, according to their chronograms, in 1025/1616-17, 1028/1618-9 and 1031/1621-2 and contain 313, 99 and 122 epistles respectively. The first volume was started after 1008/1599-1600, the year in which Sirhindī became associated with Muḥammad al-Baqī bi-ʿllāh. It is important to point out that the letters were arranged in the present order in Sirhindī's lifetime and that this order is chronological. This assertion is based not only on the nearly contemporary tradition according to which Sirhindī himself decided upon the ordering of the letters and appointed the editors, but also on conclusive internal evidence. This not only enhances our confidence in the authenticity of the material, but also enables us to follow the development of Sirhindī's thought and to detect possible changes in his fields of interest and attitudes throughout his life.

The 534 letters of the three volumes are addressed to nearly 200 persons. Most of these are șūfīs and the letters deal with a variety of subjects connected with șūfī thought. Only a small number of recipients
belong to the Mughul officialdom and not more than seventy letters have been addressed to them. The significance of this for the over-all evaluation of Sirhindī's place in the history of Islām in India will be discussed in due course; for the time being let us only state that the letters addressed to the Mughul officials have received attention out of proportion with their actual weight in the collection as a whole.

Each of the three volumes was assembled by one of Sirhindī's disciples who also undertook minor editorial tasks, such as providing each letter with a brief introduction, stating the identity of the addressee and the nature of the subject or subjects dealt with in the letter. In many cases Sirhindī himself acknowledges the receipt of the letter in reply to which he is writing and summarizes it. These summaries are very helpful in understanding the background of the letters, especially in view of the fact that, barring insignificant exceptions, we do not have at our disposal the full text of the letters received by Sirhindī. Occasionally, due to lack of time, Sirhindī found it difficult to answer all the questions addressed to him; in such cases he would refer his disciples to earlier letters in which their questions had been discussed. We can learn from this fact that Sirhindī's letters were
available not only to their original recipients, but also to other persons interested in the subjects discussed in them. In fact, in at least one instance Sirhindī instructed one of his disciples residing in the Dakhan to prepare several copies of his letters,14 apparently for possible circulation in the future. It can therefore be assumed that the letters were "open" to some extent and that they were fairly well known in the ṣūfī circles of the time. This notwithstanding, the letters are very repetitious and many of the subjects are discussed in them over and over again.

Not all of Sirhindī's letters were prepared in response to questions. Some were written on his own initiative or at the request of people who wanted their case to be recommended to a government official upon whom Sirhindī was believed to have wielded some influence. We shall discuss these letters later in our study; one point concerning them must, however, be made now: just as we do not have at our disposal the text of the questions sent to Sirhindī by his disciples, we do not have the replies he received from people whom he had approached upon his own initiative. To gauge their response we must glean our evidence from scattered details in Sirhindī's letters. This method cannot be
expected to furnish us with fully satisfactory answers concerning the extent to which Sirhindī was influential with these people. This deficiency is particularly severe when we come to deal with Sirhindī's influence on high officials of the Mughul court. We lack the very material which would presumably supply us with the answer to the all-important question of whether Sirhindī's influence on the nobles of the court and on Jahāngīr himself was as decisive as many writers have believed it to be.

Another difficulty in dealing with the Maktūbāt lies in the fact that only a small number of the nearly 200 addressees can be properly identified with the help of the sources presently available to us. The virtual anonymity of most of them is a great hindrance in our endeavour to evaluate the significance of each letter. It comes to the fore especially when we try to explain the apparent differences and contradictions in Sirhindī's views as expressed in different places. We tend to think that many of these contradictions stem from Sirhindī's belief that esoteric doctrines should be revealed only to those who are adequately prepared and capable of rightly understanding them. He therefore withholds certain "secrets" from one disciple, but does
not hesitate to reveal them to another one. Considering Sirhindī's strong views on the necessary distinction between 'awāmm and khawāss,\textsuperscript{15} this seems to be the most plausible explanation of these contradictions; however, we cannot yet furnish a conclusive proof for it.

However serious these difficulties may be, the Maktūbāt still remain the basic and indispensable material for the analysis of Sirhindī's thought. Sirhindī's other works are shorter, but have the advantage of being comprehensive expositions of a subject. They are interesting in more than one way. The Epistle on the Refutation of the Shi’a (Risāla dar Radd-i Rawāfiż), which has been published as an appendix to the lithographic editions of the Maktūbāt,\textsuperscript{16} is apparently Sirhindī's earliest work. It was compiled during Akbar's reign, before Sirhindī's initiation into the Naqshbandī order in 1008/1599-1600,\textsuperscript{17} and can be considered the first manifestation of his sunnī fervour.

Ithbāt al-Nubuwwa is Sirhindī's only work written entirely in Arabic, though Arabic passages are abundant in the Maktūbāt and in the other works. Its date cannot be established exactly, but it was also written before 1008/1599-1600. It presents the familiar arguments to prove the necessity of Prophecy in general and the Prophecy of Muḥammad in particular. Parts of it
are identical with chapters in al-Ghazālī's al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl; it draws heavily upon other classical kalām works proving the necessity of Prophecy, and it does not break any new ground. It is interesting solely because Sirhindī expresses in it his views on the situation of Islām in India during the reign of Akbar and reproduces in its preface a debate on the subject of Prophecy which he claims to have held with Abu 'l-Faḍl. Though Abu 'l-Faḍl is not mentioned explicitly, it is clear that Sirhindī is alluding to him when he says: "I debated with a man who studied the science of falsafa, learned from the books of the infidels, claimed for himself a l-faḍīla wa a l-faḍ l, led people astray and went astray himself in the investigation of Prophecy and its occurrence to a certain man ... ."

(nāẓartu ba’d man qara’a ‘ilm al-falsafa wa akhadha min kutub al-kafara ḥaẓẓan wa idda’ā al-faḍīla wa al-faḍl wa aḍalla al-nās wa ḍalla fī taḥṣīl al-nubuwwa wa thubūṭihā li-shakhṣ mu‘ayyan). The book's connection with Abu 'l-Faḍl and its non-ṣūfī character are our reasons for suggesting that it was written before 1008/1599-1600.

Mabda’ o Ma‘ād is already decidedly ṣūfī in character. It was written between 1008/1599-1600 and 1019/1610 and Sirhindī refers to it several times in the first volume of the Maktūbāt. Both Zubdat al-Maqāmāt
and Ḥaẓarat al-Quds quote it extensively. It consists of 54 short chapters dealing with a variety of ṣūfī subjects. It is very different in form and content from the two earlier works and is indicative of the tremendous change which Sirhindi underwent as a result of his association with Muhammad al-Baqī bi-‘llāh. Mabda’ o Ma‘ād is an esoteric work. In several places in it Sirhindi says that none before him had been given the mystical insights included in this book. In view of the extensive quotations in the contemporary material, Mabda’ o Ma‘ād seems to have been a very popular book in the seventeenth century, very much unlike its position in modern research which has virtually ignored it.

Ma‘ārif Laduniyya is also a ṣūfī work, very much similar in structure and content to Mabda’ o Ma‘ād. It is not dated and one can say with certainty only that it was written after Sirhindi had joined the Naqshbandī order.

In addition to the works described above, Sirhindi’s biographers mention: al-Risāla al-Tahlīliyya, Risālat al-Mukāshafāt al-Chaybiyya, Risālat Ādāb al-Murīdīn, Ta‘līqāt al-‘Awārif, Sharḥ al-Rubā’iyyāt li-‘l-Khwāja ‘Abd al-Baqī. The first three of these works do not seem to be extant. At least part of the Ta‘līqāt al-‘Awārif, which was a partial Arabic commentary
on ‘Awārif al-Ma‘ārif of Suhrawardī, 27 may be preserved in letters 117, 118 and 119 of the third volume of the Maktūbāt. 28 Sharḥ al-Rubā‘iyyāt is mentioned by Storey, 29 but was not available to us.

Thus, on the basis of philological analysis of the sources, Sirhindī’s creative life is divisible into two periods. In the first period, which can be characterized as pre-ṣūfī and which lasted till 1008/1599-1600, Sirhindī wrote the Radd-i Rawāfiţ and the Ithbāt al-Nubuwwa. In the second or ṣūfī period, from that year and on, he wrote all his other works. It is important to point out that the ṣūfī period cannot be further divided on the basis of our literary evidence. No literary evidence is extant from the period of "intoxication" (ṣukr) through which Sirhindī claims to have passed. 30 Sirhindī claims to have written to his preceptor Muḥammad al-Bāqī bi-‘llāh highly "intoxicated" verses in which he denied the existence of any difference between Islām and infidelity; 31 however, we do not find these verses in Sirhindī’s letters to al-Bāqī bi-‘llāh, which constitute the first part of the first volume of the Maktūbāt. On the other hand, the Maktūbāt contain much material that can be considered "intoxicated" by any standards, even in letters which Sirhindī wrote very late in his life. 32 Hence literary evidence does not
corroborate the view that Sirhindī started as an "intoxicated" Sūfī and developed into a "sober" one. We shall discuss the significance of this later.

2) It is indicative of the direction which the research on Ahmad Sirhindī has taken that hardly any of the numerous works dedicated to the refutation of Sirhindī's views has been published. On the other hand, several of his supporters' replies have appeared in print. Perhaps the most important polemical work against Sirhindī is included in the unique manuscript Mukhtasār Ma’ārij al-Wilāya fī Madārij al-Hidāya wa Ma’ārij al-Awliyyā fī Madārij al-Āṣfiyyā’. The author is ‘Abd Allāh Khweshgī Qusūrī who completed the book in Awrangābād on Rajab 24, 1094/July 24, 1683.33 It is a book containing Sūfī biographies of considerable importance.34 Two of them include material relevant to our subject. The first is the biography of the well-known Shaykh ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq Muḥaddith Dīlawī (1551-1642). Most of it consists of a long epistle in which ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq expresses his strong disapproval of Sirhindī's views.35 The second is the biography of Sirhindī himself.36 It includes quotations from Sirhindī's letters that aroused opposition of his contemporaries and from polemical works written in refutation of Sirhindī's views, especially Kāsir al-Mukhālifīn.37 Also included
is the text of an important decree concerning Sirhindī, which was issued upon the instructions of Awrangzēb. It will be discussed in detail later in this work.

Other anti-Sirhindī polemical works originated in al-Ḥijāz and were written in response to an istiftā from India that reached al-Ḥijāz in Jumādā II, 1093/June-July 1682.38 We have two works by Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Rasūl al-Barzanjī, a Shafiʿī ʿālim of al-Madīna. The first of them, Qadḥ al-Zand wa Qadḥ al-Rand fi Radd Jahālāt Ahl al-Sirhind,39 is an Arabic work completed on Rajab 15, 1093/July 19, 1682.40 It seems that it was also translated into Persian under the name Gardan Shikan,41 probably for circulation in India. Another work by the same author is al-Nāshira al-Nājira li-ʿl-Firqa al-Fājira,42 completed on Muḥarram 7, 1095/December 26, 1683.43 It was apparently written to counter the pro-Sirhindī campaign launched in al-Ḥijāz at that time by Muḥammad Bēg al-Ūzbakī whom we shall discuss later. It is the last of the ten books which al-Barzanjī claims to have written in refutation of Sirhindī and his followers.44 Among these ten works were, in addition to the two extant ones, al-Ighāra al-Musbiḥa, Idāʿat al-Nibrās45 and a Persian work called Khayl Allāh bar Sar-i Khayr Allāh.46

Another work of the same period and of very
similar character is al-‘Aṣab al-Hindī li-‘ṣīqāl
Kufriyyāt Aḥmad al-Sirhindī by Ḥasan b. ‘Alī, a Ḥanafī
ʿAlīm of Makka.47 It is not dated, but was also written
in response to the istiftā’ of 1093.48

Many more works of the same kind seem to have
been written at that time. A list of authors containing
16 names is given in al-Nāshira al-Nājira.49 The most
prominent among them seems to have been al-Barzanjī’s
teacher, Ibrāhīm al-Kurdī al-Kūrinī.50

The outstanding supporter of Sirhindī in the
controversy of 1093-1095 was Muḥammad Bēg al-Uzbakī.
He came to al-Ḥijāz from India51 and wrote ‘Aṭiyyat al-
Wahhāb al-Fāṣila baynā al-Khaṭa’ wa al-Ṣawāb.52 The
book was finished on Rabī’ I 2, 1094/March 31, 1683,53
between al-Barzanjī’s Qadḥ al-Zand and his al-Nāshira
al-Nājira. It was intended to undermine the charges
levelled against Sirhindī by trying to show that the
Arabic translation of the Maktūbāt, prepared for the
Ḥijāzī ‘ulamā’, were misleading. It is important be-
cause of extensive quotations from the istiftā’ of the
Indian ‘ulamā’, which does not seem to be extant else-
where.54

The importance of the above-mentioned polemical
works should not be underestimated. Not only do they
dispel the widely accepted view that Sirhindī was
unanimously accepted as "orthodox" in India and elsewhere; they also give us a valuable insight into the image of Sirhindī that was prevalent in the seventeenth century. From a broader historical view-point, we learn from them about the prestige enjoyed by the ‘ulamā’ of al-Ḥijāz among their Indian counterparts, and about the connections between the ‘ulamā’ of the two countries.

The vehemence of the polemics surrounding Sirhindī abated in the eighteenth century and it is only with hesitation that we include some of Shāh Waḥīd Allāh’s works in this category. Apart from the well-known Fayṣala-yi Waḥdat al-Wujūd wa al-Shuhūd which has been published and widely commented upon, Shāh Waḥīd Allāh wrote two epistles relevant to our discussion which are still in manuscript. One is Shawāhid al-Tajdīd which gives us valuable insight into the understanding of the concept of tajdīd in the eighteenth century. The other one, which has no title, deals with the concept of khilla and explains in this connection Sirhindī’s role at the beginning of the second millennium. Other eighteenth century works concerned with the question of waḥdat al-wujūd versus waḥdat al-shuhūd have been described elsewhere. In addition to these we have the short but highly interesting statement by ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Dihlawī, who states that Sirhindī’s
A contribution to the Sufi thought was the introduction of the concept of khilla.58

In the late nineteenth century Sirhindī found a vigorous defender in the person of Wakīl Ahmad Sikandarpūrī.59 Prompted by a feeling that people again show interest in al-Barzanjī's works, Sikandarpūrī wrote in 1308/1890-1891 al-Kalām al-Munjī bi-Radd Irādāt al-Barzanjī.60 It is written in florid Arabic and contains a detailed refutation of Qadḥ al-Zand. Sikandarpūrī wrote also two other works in defense of Sirhindī. His Hadiyya Mujaddidiyya61 deals with ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq's epistle, while Anwār Ahmadiyya was written to refute Mukāshif al-Asrār by an otherwise unknown Gujarātī.62

Sikandarpūrī's works seem to be the last written according to the pattern common in mediaeval Muslim polemics. Works written in the twentieth century, whether attacking Sirhindī or defending him, are decidedly different in form, content and intent and will be discussed separately.

3) Hagiographies of Sirhindī are numerous and no attempt has been made to exhaust material of this sort. It is full of legendary material such as miracle stories, traditions according to which Sirhindī was predicted, description of cosmic events accompanying his
birth and death and the like. There are also a number of stories describing Sirhindī's miraculous impact on political events. These are perhaps the most interesting aspect of the hagiographies as they contain adumbrations of Sirhindī's image in the 20th century.

We have utilized two works from this category written by Sirhindī's contemporaries. Ḥazarāt al-Quds by Badr al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Sirhindī63 contains chapters on Sirhindī's life, his spiritual experiences, miracles, daily routine and tries to refute the views of his critics. It also deals with his sons and disciples. Zubdat al-Maqāmāt by Muḥammad al-Hāshim b. Muḥammad al-Qāsim al-Babaghānī al-Badakhshānī64 contains biographies of Muḥammad al-Bāqī bi-ʿllāh, of Sirhindī and of his disciples and copious quotations from the Maktūbāt and the other sources.

4) The description of modern works dealing with Sirhindī's thought and significance is intimately connected with the analysis of his image in the 20th century. As we consider this analysis an essential part of our study, we shall deal with it in detail in a special chapter. We would therefore prefer not to describe the 20th century sources in this introductory section, but rather to combine the bibliographical survey with the analysis of the modern works in Chapter IX.
One remark remains to be made here. The reader who is familiar with the crucial historical role which Sirhindī is frequently said to have performed in the seventeenth century India might wonder why no historical sources have been mentioned in our present survey. The situation is that except for Jahāngīr's memoirs we have virtually no strictly historical material concerning Sirhindī at our disposal. Practically all our sources are ṣūfī and theological. The significance of this fact for the over-all assessment of Sirhindī's role in the history of Islām in India can hardly be overestimated.
CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF TAJDĪD AND THE MILLENNIUM

The ideas of religious renewal (tajdīd) and revival of the prophetic usage (ihyāʿ al-sunna) developed at a very early stage of Islamic history. The concept of ihyāʿ al-sunna, which is frequently used in the early Islamic literature, stemmed from the conviction that the period of the Prophet had been the ideal which ought to be recaptured. Revival of the prophetic usage has therefore always been one of the most meritorious actions that could be performed by a Muslim.¹ The famous saying of the Prophet that "the best of my community is the generation in which I was sent, then those who follow them, then those who follow them . . ." (khayr ummatī al-qarn alladhī buʿithtu fīhi thumma alladhīna yalūnahum thumma alladhīna yalūnahum) is only one of the numerous traditions idealizing the earliest period of Islamic history.²

On the other hand, the concept of tajdīd, which in later times appears to have become almost indistinguishable from that of ihyāʿ al-sunna, was much less frequent and originated in material of a different
kind. The hadīth "God will send to this community on
the eve of every century a man who will renew its dīn"
(inna allāh yab’ath li-hādhihi al-umma ‘alā ra’s kull
mi’a sana man yujaddid lahā dīnahā) is offered by Abū
dā’ūd at the beginning of Kitāb al-Malāḥim.3 This part
of the Sunan deals with events expected to take place
immediately before the Hour (al-sā‘a). The material
dealing with this subject in the various collections of
hadīth includes some traditions indicating that the
Hour was imminent;4 others enumerate various miraculous
events the occurrence of which is necessary before the
Hour can take place (ashrāṭ al-sā‘a).5 These later
traditions seem to mitigate the air of imminence
surrounding the earlier ones. It is, of course, difficult
to determine the context in which the mujaddid tradition
originated. In a way it is similar to the traditions
predicting the advent of the mahdī and seems to be a
product of messianic expectations. It may also have
been intended to offer a reason for the continued ex-
istence of the world despite the traditions asserting
the imminence of the Hour and to allay the apprehensions
aroused by them.6 It is noteworthy that the concept of
tajdīd was originally unrelated to the revival of sharī‘a;
this idea seems to be of much later origin.

Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī was given the title of
Renewer of the Second Millennium (mujaddid-i alf-i thānī) and the above mentioned tradition concerning tajdīd was standardly quoted as the legitimization of this title. While this tradition clearly is the formal source from which the title was taken, in Sirhindī's thought the concept of tajdīd is much more intimately connected with his awareness of the Millennium and its impact on the spiritual conditions of the world.

The most succinct description of the millennial changes on the cosmological level is given in the Mabda-o Ma'ād. Sirhindī deals with the hierarchy of the "realities" (ḥaqā'iq) and maintains that, contrary to views held by earlier ṣūfīs, ḥaqīqat-i ka'ba is the highest ḥaqīqa. It is beyond the stage of attributes and defies any description. One stage lower is ḥaqīqat-i qur'ānī, still lower ḥaqīqat-i muḥammadi. This structure undergoes a fundamental transformation with the advent of the Millennium. Sirhindī says: "I am about to say a wondrous thing that nobody has ever heard . . . God acquainted and inspired me with it through his grace and generosity. A thousand odd years after the death of the Prophet a time is coming in which ḥaqīqat-i muḥammadi will ascend from its position and unite with the position of ḥaqīqat-i ka'ba. At this time ḥaqīqat-i muḥammadi receives the name ḥaqīqat-i ahmadi and becomes
the Manifestation of the Essence of God (mazhar-i dhāt-i aḥad jalla sultānuhu). Both blessed names (i.e., Muḥammad and Aḥmad) unite with their meaning (mussammā) (?). The former position of ḥaqīqat-i muḥammadī will remain vacant till ‘Īsā descends and enacts the sharī‘a of Muḥammad. At that time ḥaqīqat-i ‘Īsawī will ascend from its position and establish itself in the position of ḥaqīqat-i muḥammadī that had remained vacant.10

This cosmological development is reflected also on a lower level. Here it concerns the relationship between the Prophet Muḥammad and his community. Muḥammad had in the beginning two individuations (ta-‘ayyun): the bodily-human and the spiritual-angelic. These two individuations were symbolized by the loops of the two mīms of his name. Since his death the human individuation has been gradually weakening while the spiritual one has been steadily gaining strength. Within a thousand years the human individuation disappeared altogether. Its symbol, the first mīm of Muḥammad, disappeared along with it and was replaced by an alif standing for divinity (ulūhiyyat). Muḥammad came to be Aḥmad. The disappearance of his human attributes facilitated his ascent, enabled him to reach the highest possible stage and to free himself from mundane attractions (kashākash-i ghayr o ghayriyyat); it had,
however, an adverse impact on his community,\textsuperscript{11} which
lost the lights of prophetic guidance emanating from
Muḥammad's human aspect. This is the reason why in-
fidelity and innovation (\textit{bid'a}) have gained the upper
hand, while the lights of Islām and \textit{sunna} have grown
dim. Woe to the people, says Sirhindī, whose king does
not tend to them, but rather focuses his entire
attention on his beloved.\textsuperscript{12}

Sirhindī is thus in agreement with the view
that the ideal period of Islamic history was the life-
time of the Prophet. He also agrees that it has been
followed by a gradual decline. He does not, however,
subscribe to the view that this decline is irreversible.
As soon as it reached its lowest point with the complete
disappearance of the human attributes of the Prophet and
the absolute severance of his ties with his community,
the trend was reversed and a new development set in.

To justify his views on the reversal of the
downward trend of Islamic history, Sirhindī makes use of
a tradition originally associated with eschatological
expectations. This tradition predicts the eventual
return of Islām to its original condition. The Prophet
is reported to have said: "Islām began as a stranger and
it will return to what it was. How blessed are the
strangers!" (\textit{al-islām bada'a gharītan wa ya'ūd kamā}
This tradition is found in several canonical collections of hadīth. It describes there the times prior to the Hour, when Islām will grow weak and its followers become few. Sirhindī sees the situation of his own times in similar terms. Islām has become a rarity (islām ... ghurbat paydā karda ast) and Muslims are strangers (gharīb) in an alien environment, in which no godly person (allāh gū) will soon remain. Happy is the man who manages to revive an abandoned sunna in these days. There are indications that the Day of Judgment (qiyaṣma), which was always expected to come at a time when people are wicked (taqūm al-sā'a 'alā shirār al-nās), is imminent. The mahdī has been heralded by the appearance of a comet. In these days one has a special duty to promote the sunna and to extirpate even the "good innovation" (bid'ā ḥasana), which might have been considered harmless in the more fortunate periods of Islamic history.

When compared with the ancient eschatological traditions, this passage makes it abundantly clear that eschatological speculations are in the background of Sirhindī's views of his times. His eschatology, however, does not expect the ultimate end of the world, but rather the arrest of the process of decline at its nadir by means of tajdīd.
Tajdid is mentioned in the Maktubat for the first time in a letter to SirhindI's son, Muhammad Sadiq. SirhindI vaguely refers in it to his times as being "full of darkness" and says that at such times during the pre-Islamic period a steadfast Prophet (payghambar-i ulu al-'azm)20 was sent to the ancient communities (umam-i sabilqa) in order to establish a new shari'a.21 However, in the Islamic community, which is the best of all and whose Prophet is the seal of the Prophets, this is not possible. The Muslim 'ulamā' have therefore been awarded the same rank that had previously been given to the Prophets of Israel.22 A mujaddid is chosen from them on the eve of every century, not to bring a new shari'a, but to revive the existing one. This is especially necessary after the passage of a thousand years: this is a time in which a steadfast Prophet was sent during the pre-Islamic period, as an "ordinary Prophet" could not have performed the task. When a period such as this occurs during the Islamic era, the situation requires a man of perfect knowledge (alimi 'arifi tamam al-marifat), who is capable of fulfilling the task of the steadfast Prophet. SirhindI sums up the discussion with a verse frequently quoted in the Maktubat: "If the bountiful Holy Spirit will help again, others will also (be able to) do things
that Jesus had done" (fayż-i rūḥul quds ar bāz madad farmāyad digarān ham bi-kunand ān čih masīhā mi-kard). 23

The eschatological substratum of the concept of tajdid, and especially of tajdid-i alf, is evident also from the fact that Sirhindī considers the Millennium as the beginning of the "last" stage of Islamic history. The idea of the existence of such a last "stage" is derived from a tradition according to which the Prophet said: "My community is like the rain: it is not known whether the beginning of it is better or the end" (mathal ummatī ka-mathal al-maṭar lā yudrā awwaluhu khayr aw ākhiruhu). 24 The comparison between the period of the Prophet and his companions and the Millennium is so close, that it is doubtful who is superior to whom. 25 The perfections (kamālāt) of Prophecy, which have been gradually disappearing since the death of Muhammad, will re-appear in persons who deserve this blessing because they are the Prophet's heirs and followers. 26 The person who possesses these perfections is the mujaddid of the Millennium. His knowledge is derived from the lights of Prophecy which have regained their splendour. It is far beyond the knowledge of the jurists and the gnosis of the Sūfīs. Whatever blessing the community receives during this period, it is through his mediation. 27
It would thus seem evident that with the transformation of the Prophet into a purely spiritual being at the advent of the Millennium, the mujaddid is called upon to fulfil some of the Prophet's tasks with regard to his community. Though this is nowhere explicitly stated, his haqīqa occupies in a sense the position of haqīqat-i muḥammadī, which was left vacant between the Millennium and the eschatological advent of 'Īsā.

We have seen earlier that the ties of Muḥammad with his community were completely severed with the advent of the Millennium. The cessation of his function as a guide of his people was accompanied also by profound changes in his spirituality. These were facilitated by the millennial mission of a "common believer" (fard-i ummat, fard az afrād-i ummat), whose function we shall presently describe.

The task of this "common believer" is connected according to Sirhindī with the spiritual relationship between Ibrāhīm and Muḥammad and with the ṣūfī concept of friendship (khilla). This friendship, which is the highest manifestation of love (ḥubb), is the principal force responsible for the creation of the world and its continued existence. Originally it belonged to Ibrāhīm, the Friend of Allāh (khalīl allāh). Having
reached this exalted stage, Ibrāhīm was made the imām of all, and even Muḥammad was ordered to follow him. The Qurʿān says: "Follow the creed of Ibrāhīm, a man of pure faith." (ittabi' millat ibrāhīm ḥanīfan). And since it is not possible to reach the Essence of God (ḥaẓrat-i dhāt ta'ālā) without the mediation of wilāyat-i ibrāhīmi, the Prophet prayed: "O Lord, pray for Muḥammad as you have prayed for Ibrāhīm" (allahumma ṣallī 'alā muḥammad kamā ṣallayta 'alā ibrāhīm). 

The "common believer"'s task is to facilitate the fulfilment of this supplication. To explain the way in which this is done, Sirhindī describes the relationship between the wilāya of Ibrāhīm and that of Muḥammad. He portrays the wilāyat-i ibrāhīmi, - which is identical with the wilāyat-i khillat, - as a circle whose centre and noblest part is the wilāyat-i muḥammadi. This being so, one cannot reach the wilāyat-i muḥammadi without crossing the periphery of the circle and passing through all the stages of the wilāyat-i ibrāhīmi. This is the reason why Muḥammad was ordered to "follow the milla of Ibrāhīm"; only through his mediation can be reach the centre of the circle which is the essence of his own wilāya and at the same time acquire all the perfections of the wilāyat-i ibrāhīmi. However, since Muḥammad's wilāya is essentially part of the centre of
the circle, it cannot enter its periphery without a mediator (mutawassit), who is related to both the centre and the periphery. This mediator is a member of his own community. With the advent of the Millennium he performs his task of mediation; Muḥammad then returns him to the world to guard and preserve the community, while he himself holds tête-à-tête with the Beloved in the House of Celestial Seclusion (ān sarwar . . . ān fard-rā az bi-rāyi ḥirāsat o muḥāfazat-i ummat az ān-maqām bi-‘ālam bāz gardānīda khwud dar khalwat-khāna-yi ghayb al-ghayb bā maḥbūb khalwat dāshtā). The question whether the "common believer" and the mujaddid are identical clearly arises from our discussion so far. Both of them appear at the same time and have somewhat similar tasks in maintaining the link between the community and its source of inspiration. However, nowhere in the Maktūbāt are the two personalities treated as one or even mentioned together. Sirhindī formulated his ideas regarding them at different times. He deals with the concept of tajdīd for the last time at the beginning of the second volume of the Maktūbāt. The "common believer" is
explicitly mentioned for the first time only towards the end of the third volume, though the idea was adumbrated earlier. This fact is significant for our evaluation of the development of Sirhindī's thought with regard to "orthodoxy": though the concept of tajdīd-i alf is apparently Sirhindī's innovation, there is sound classical basis for the concept of tajdīd itself. Sirhindī can find no such basis for his later idea of the "common believer" and the severance of the link between Muḥammad and his community. We, therefore, conclude that in questions related to the millennial changes Sirhindī does not move towards "orthodoxy" but rather away from it. It should be also pointed out that Sirhindī dealt with the ideas discussed here only in letters addressed to his sons and successors, Muḥammad Saʿīd and Muḥammad Maʿṣūm, and to one of his closest disciples, Muḥammad Ḥāshim Kishmī. He was fully aware of the explosive nature of these ideas and was apprehensive of the opposition which they would arouse. As we shall see later, his apprehension proved to be fully justified.
CHAPTER III

THE SELF-IMAGE OF AHMAD SIRHINDI

We have seen that some of Sirhindī's disciples considered their master as the Renewer of the Second Millennium. We have also described Sirhindī's view of the Millennium as a crucial period in the spiritual history of the world. It is our intention now to study those parts of Sirhindī's writings from which we can gain insight into Sirhindī's own view of his role in shaping the spiritual profile of his times. In particular, it would be instructive to know whether he considered himself as the mujaddid or as the "common believer" whose functions have been described in the previous chapter.

Sirhindī describes his spiritual achievements in various places and has also a distinct view of his spiritual development. He gives an outline of this development in one of the earliest letters of the Maktūbāt. He wrote it after he heard that some people had been discussing his denial of the Unity of Being (waḥdat al-wujūd, tawhīd), in order to prevent the spread of any incorrect idea regarding his views. Since his very childhood, says Sirhindī, he believed in
the Unity of Being. Since this was also the belief of his father, he was able to gain intimate awareness of this world-view and enjoyed it immensely. Later he became associated with Muḥammad al-Bāqī bi-ʿllāh who taught him the Naqshbandī path (ṣawāq) and showed great interest in him. His awareness of the Unity of Being grew in intensity, and no subtlety of this theory remained unknown to him. He understood properly the minutest details of Ibn al-ʿArabī's mystical insights, even those which are given—in Ibn al-ʿArabī's view—to the Seal of the Saints (khātam al-wilāya) only. His ecstasy and intoxication were so intense that in a letter to his teacher he wrote the following verses:

Alas! this sharīʿa is the religion of the blind,
Unbelief and belief are the locks and face of that beautiful fairy,
Our religion is unbelief and the religion of the Christians,
Unbelief and belief are the same in our path.

This condition persisted for months and years. Then, suddenly, God caused his earlier insights which were based on the belief in the Unity of Being to disappear, and Sirhindī learned that God can never be united with anything. His way parted with that of Ibn al-ʿArabī, and he came to see the correctness of the views of the People of the Sunna.
This view of Sirhindī's spiritual development has been rather uncritically accepted by most modern writers. We have seen, however, that no literary evidence exists to corroborate Sirhindī's claim that he had passed through a period in which he did not see any difference between Islam and infidelity. The first volume of the Maktūbat contains twenty letters addressed to al-Bāqī bi-'llāh, but the ecstatic verses which Sirhindī claims to have written to him do not appear in them. On the contrary, in these letters Sirhindī vigorously affirms the complete compatibility of his mystical insights with the sharī'a. Already in this early period he considers the outward meaning (zāhīr) of the sharī'a as the touchstone for the correctness of his ṣūfī experience and finds himself in agreement with 'Alāʾ al-Dawla al-Simnānī who was one of the earliest ṣūfī critics of Ibn al-ʿArabī's theory of the Unity of Being. Sirhindī did not write any works supporting this theory before his meeting with al-Bāqī bi-'llāh in 1008/1599-1600. Between this date and al-Bāqī bi-'llāh's death in 1012/1603 - the period in which his letters to al-Bāqī bi-'llāh must have been written - he was already convinced that the sharī'a ought to be the touchstone of ṣūfī experience. It would thus seem evident that Sirhindī did not support the theory of the Unity of
Being, as he interprets it here, for any substantial length of time, though he might have had moments in which this theory appealed to him. It is even less likely that he ever wrote the verses about the identity of Islam and infidelity at a time when he actually believed them to be true. It is probable that Sirhindī wrote these verses only as a description of what he claimed to be his spiritual past. The editors of the Maktūbāt would have had no reason to exclude these verses from their original context if they did not find it necessary to expunge them from a later letter. Discovery of additional literary works by Sirhindī might correct this point, but, as the source material stands now, Sirhindī's claim to have passed through a stage of "intoxication" (sukr) seems to be intended to lend more authority to his "sobriety" (sāhw). Pure sobriety is, according to him, the stage of "the common people who are like cattle" (awāmm ka-‘l-an‘ām); authoritative sobriety can be achieved only through its mingling with intoxication.10

Like many ṣūfīs before him, Sirhindī was deeply convinced that God had favoured him with spiritual insights that had not been previously given to anyone else. Mabda’ o Ma‘ād is particularly rich with assertions to this effect. Sirhindī feels that he has
been given special understanding of the nature of the 
šūfī descent (nuzūl) to the world which was improperly 
understood before. In a vision of a celestial tawāf 
he outstrips his fellow pilgrims who turn out to be 
angels. In a dream the Prophet gives him the rank of 
mujtahid in speculative theology (kalām) and writes 
for him an ijāza as a shaykh does for his khalīfa. 
Sirhindī claims that no one has described the hierarchy 
of the ḩaqāʾiq the way he did, and that no one has 
spoken about the transformation of this hierarchy with 
the advent of the Millennium. Finally, God told him: 
"I have forgiven you and those who are related to you, 
with mediation or without it, till the Day of Judgment."
(ghafartu laka wa li-man tawassala bika bi-wāsiṭa aw bi- 
ghayr wāsiṭa ilā yawm al-qiyāma). 

As the years passed, Sirhindī's conviction 
that he had been given an extraordinary spiritual standing 
grew stronger and stronger. His increasing popularity 
among some of his disciples might have been one of the 
reasons for this development which reached its highest 
expression towards the end of the third volume of the 
Maktūbāt. Sirhindī reached the conviction that several 
spiritual forces, combined in his personality, were 
responsible for his extraordinary spiritual achieve-
ments. His "intimacy" (wilāya) is a combination of the
wilāyat-i muḥammadī and wilāyat-i mūsawī. From this unique combination a new "reality" (ḥaqīqa) came into being. It resulted in magnificent, but secret, spiritual achievements; if he ventured to disclose any of them, or even hint at them, "the throat would be slit and the gullet severed" (*qūṭī‘a al-bulʿūm wa dhubiḥa al-ḥulqūm*).

At about the same time Sirhindī wrote a letter to a certain Şāliḥ Kūlabī, who seems to have been one of his more trusted disciples. This letter contains the most eloquent, poetic and forceful expression of Sirhindī's claim to spiritual eminence and it is not surprising that it made him highly vulnerable to attacks by his opponents. It deserves to be translated in full:

"I am both the disciple of God (murīd allāh) and His desire (murād allāh). The chain of my discipleship is connected with God without any mediation. My hand is a substitute for the hand of God. I am a disciple of Muḥammad, connected with him through many intermediaries: in the Naqshbandī order there are twenty one intermediaries in between; in the Qādirī - twenty five and in the Čishtī - twenty seven; but my relationship with God as a disciple is not subject to any mediation, as has already been related. Hence I am both the disciple of Muḥammad the Messenger of God and
his co-disciple (ham-pîra, i.e., we are both disciples of the same master: God). Though I am a parasite at the table of this wealth, sitting near the Prophet, yet I have not come uninvited; though I am a follower (tābi'), I am not without a share of genuineness (aṣāla); though I am a common believer (ummat), I am sharing in the wealth. This is not a sharing from which a claim of equality would arise; this would be infidelity (kufr). It is a sharing of a servant with the master. Until he called, I did not come to the table of this wealth and until he expressed his wish, I did not stretch my arm to partake in it. Though I am an Uwaysî,20 I have an Omnipresent and All-Seeing Instructor (murabbi-yi ḫāzîr o nāẓîr). Though in the Naqshbandî order my instructor is 'Abd al-Baqî, yet the One who has undertaken my instruction is the Everlasting One (al-bâqî). His glory is great and His munificence all-pervading. I have received my instruction through (His) grace and I have gone the way of the elect. My chain (of mystical instruction; silsila) is that of the Merciful (raḥmânî), because I am a servant of the Merciful (‘abd al-raḥmân). My Lord is the Merciful One - great is His glory and all-pervading His munificence - and my instructor is the Most Compassionate (arḥam al-rāhimîn). My path is the path of subhānî. I have gone the way of tanzîh;
through Name and Attribute I am not seeking anything but the Essence. This subḥānī is not the subḥānī which was the creed of (Abū Yazīd) Bistāmī. The two do not have anything in common. That one (i.e., Bistāmī's) has not gone out of the circle of the souls; this one (i.e., mine) is beyond the souls and the horizons.21

That one is tashbīh cloaked in tanzīh; this one is tanzīh untouched by even a grain of tashbīh. The Most Compassionate did not use in my case anything but muʿaddat22 as means of instruction; His grace was the only active factor in it. His great generosity, care and zeal for me prevented Him from allowing anyone else to take part in my instruction, but I have approached someone else in this matter. I am a divine disciple (murabbā-yi ilāhī) - great is His glory - and an elect of His boundless grace and generosity.23

This was the self-image at which Sirhindī arrived at the end of his literary career. He was fully aware of the possibility that such statements, expressing ideas which were novel in his opinion, would arouse the opposition of his contemporaries. He expresses his apprehension particularly in connection with his views on the spiritual status of Ibrāhīm and his relationship with Muhammad. After a detailed discussion of the subject,24 Sirhindī says that although
he did not arrive at these views by himself but rather through divine inspiration, people would resent them. The concepts which he uses, such as the "first individuation" (ta'ayyun-i awwal) were not known among the early Muslims (mutaqaddimin), while the later generations (muta'akhkhirin) expressed different views regarding them. If anybody expresses nowadays an unusual idea, says Sirhindī, he will be cursed and humiliated by his contemporaries. In this particular case, Sirhindī expects to be accused of preferring Ibrāhīm to Muḥammad. Though he gave satisfactory answers to all the objections, he is not certain whether his opponents will be placated. There is no cure for stupidity, stubbornness and bigotry save divine intervention.25

Regardless of whether Sirhindī's claim to originality in this field can be accepted, his views as summarized here will come as a surprise to anyone familiar with Sirhindī's image in modern literature. Sirhindī consciously advocates ideas which were, according to his own admission, unknown to the early generations of Muslims. He even chastises his contemporaries for their bigotry and traditionalism. We shall see later that with regard to the sunna Sirhindī expresses different ideas and vigorously objects to any
innovation. It is therefore significant that in esoteric matters, expressed in letters to his trusted disciples, Sirhindī considers himself as a thinker expounding ideas novel in Islamic thought.

We have still to answer the question whether Sirhindī considered himself as one of the persons invested with special spiritual powers in connection with the Millennium. Nowhere in the Maktūbāt does he identify himself explicitly with either the mujaddid or the "common believer". We have, however, a letter addressed to Muḥammad Maṣūm in which Sirhindī describes his spiritual role in terms identical with those used later for the "common believer". He was created in order that wilāyat-i muḥammadi acquire the tinge of wilāyat-i ibrahīmī and the millennium-old desire of Muḥammad be fulfilled. But even more important things were entrusted to him. He says: "I have not been brought (into this world) for the sake of ṣūfī instruction (pīrī) or discipleship (murīdī). I was not created in order to perfect and guide the people. (My) work is different and so is (my) workshop. Whoever has the proper attitude in this matter will receive the divine bounty; others will not receive it. The work of perfecting and guidance (of the people) is, in comparison with that work (of mine), like a thing lying rejected on
the road (ka'1-ma'trūh fī al-tarīq). The call (da'wa) of the Prophets is also of the same (low) standing when compared with their esoteric mission (mu'āmalat-i bātiniyya). Though the office of Prophecy came to an end, yet the perfect followers of the Prophets have a share in the perfections of Prophecy through (their) following and inheritance.27

The tasks which Sirhindī sees here as his own correspond with those of the "common believer", but they also go beyond them. The "common believer" was sent to guard and preserve the community; Sirhindī here regards work of this kind with contempt. Similarly, he is contemptuous of the public activity of the Prophets which is worthless when compared with their much more important esoteric task. An exhaustive comparison of Sirhindī's views on this matter with those of other thinkers is beyond the scope of the present study. One is, however, tempted to remark that Sirhindī's description of himself - or of the "common believer" - is reminiscent of Ibn al-‘Arabī's theory of the Seal of the Saints (khātam al-awliyā'), who follows Muḥammad as far as the shari'ā is concerned, is his heir in this respect, but has also direct access to the genuine source of inspiration (al-wārith al-akhīdha 'an al-asl).28 Sirhindī's views on Prophecy as expressed here will be commented
upon elsewhere; we ought, however, to point out that these striking views are expressed in a letter to Sirhindī's son and successor Muḥammad Maʿṣūm. Thus, we have another instance in which Sirhindī deals with potentially explosive ideas only in letters to his closest associates.

Taking all this into consideration, we cannot accept the view according to which Sirhindī started his ṣūfī career with a period of intense intoxication which was in turn replaced by pure sobriety. We would be closer to the truth if we assumed that both elements were always present and that Sirhindī determined the subject matter and the style of each letter according to the degree of preparation of each recipient. Sirhindī's self-image is also noteworthy for what it does not include: in his ecstatic utterances about himself Sirhindī does not mention the promotion of the sharīʿa as one of his tasks. One development is clearly discernible in the matter under discussion: Sirhindī's preoccupation with his own spiritual role in the world increased gradually and reached its highest point towards the end of his life.
CHAPTER IV

PROPHECY AND SAINTHOOD

In our analysis of the concept of tajdid-i alf we have already seen the importance of Prophecy (nubuwwa) in Sirhindī's thought. It is our intention now to study the concept of Prophecy more systematically. It is fruitful to consider it together with Sainthood (wilāya), which had long been its sister concept in ṣūfī thought.

As we have seen earlier, Sirhindī wrote his first work on Prophecy at the time of his association with Abu 'l-Faḍl, during the reign of Akbar. According to the mujaddidī tradition, Sirhindī was invited to Abu 'l-Faḍl's court to assist him in his literary work. The two men were on friendly terms at that time, and Abu 'l-Faḍl had nothing but high praise for Sirhindī. During one of their discussions, however, Abu 'l-Faḍl assailed the 'ulamā' and their concept of Prophecy and spoke disrespectfully of al-Ghazālī; Sirhindī could not tolerate this, left the court in anger and did not return there until Abu 'l-Faḍl apologized to him. Sirhindī's discussions with Abu 'l-Faḍl in general and the above
mentioned incident in particular apparently prompted Sirhindī to compile his *Ithbāt al-Nubuwwa*. The contents of this book have been very important for those modern historians, who regard Sirhindī as a champion of Islamic orthodoxy.

The book starts with a very gloomy description of Islam in India during the reign of Akbar. Sirhindī says in the preface that the people's belief in Prophecy is on the wane, and so is their compliance with the *shari‘a*. "One of the tyrants of our age" (ba‘d mutaghallība zamāninā) - presumably Akbar himself - has tortured many *‘ulamā‘* because of their strict compliance with the *shari‘a* and their unflinching obedience to the Prophets. The situation is so bad that the name of Muḥammad is not being mentioned at the royal court, and persons bearing it have adopted another name. The tyrant has forbidden the sacrifice of the cow, which is one of the most important symbols of Islam in India (*min ajall sha‘ā‘ir al-islām fī al-hind*). He has demolished mosques and has honoured pagan temples; the customs of the infidels have been disseminated and their laws translated into Persian with the aim of the obliteration of Islam in view. Sirhindī began to investigate the reasons behind this situation and came to the conclusion that it had been brought about by "the remoteness of the prophetic
period, the study of the science of philosophy and the
books of the Indian sages" (bu'd al-‘ahd min al-nubuwwa
wa al-khawāfī ‘ilm al-falsafa wa kutub ḥukamā‘ al-
hind).6 He further mentions a debate with a person who
was influenced by this material - presumably Abu 'l-
Fazl7 - and who maintained that Prophecy was designed
to promote public welfare (maṣlaḥa) and to restrain the
common people from indulging in vice and strife, but had
no connection with ultimate salvation (al-naṣāt al-
ukhrawiyya). Abu 'l-Fazl found support for his position
in the structure of al-Ghazālī's Ḥiyā‘ Ulūm al-Dīn:
the fact that "Things Leading to Salvation" (munājāt)
constitute a separate book and are not a part of the
book on "Acts of Worship" (‘ibādāt) indicates that al-
Ghazālī supported the Philosophers in thinking that
Acts of Worship do not lead to salvation. Sirhindī
rejects this argument by saying that the aim of
Prophecy, indeed, is ultimate salvation. Al-Ghazālī
explicitly says that Acts of Worship do have saving
power, and the structure of the Ḥiyā‘ is a result only
of the author's desire to deal separately with the out-
ward (ẓāhir) and inward (bātin) aspects of religious
observance. Sirhindī also rejects Abu 'l-Fazl's
contention that belief in the Prophet is not incumbent
upon people living in the post-prophetic period because
they have not seen his miracles and have not been convinced of the validity of his prophetic claim. The Qur'an and the Traditions are sufficiently convincing in this respect.\(^8\)

The rest of *Ithbāt al-Nubuwwa* is hardly of any interest, being, as we have seen,\(^9\) a reproduction of the classical ideas on Prophecy and its necessity, on the nature of the prophetic miracle (*mu'jiza*) and the Prophecy of Muḥammad, and on the inability of the intellect to arrive at certain truths without prophetic help. The book bears precious little relationship to the main body of Sirhindī's views on the subject, which will be our present concern.

The frame of reference in which Prophecy is discussed in the *Maktūbāt* is a ṣūfī one. While in *Ithbāt al-Nubuwwa* the Prophet is a man to whom God said "I am sending to a certain people" or "... to all people" and who does not need any additional qualifications to fulfil his task,\(^10\) in the *Maktūbāt* Prophecy is viewed as an advanced stage (*maqām*) in the spiritual journey of the ṣūfī towards perfection. The approach of the *mutakallimūn* to the question of Prophecy, fully adopted by Sirhindī in *Ithbāt al-Nubuwwa*, has all but disappeared in the *Maktūbāt*. Its place has been taken by discussions about the spiritual nature of the prophetic experience,
its connection with wilāya and its relationship with God (haqq) and men (khalq) respectively. The transformation of Sirhindī's views on Prophecy between Ithbāt al-Nubuwwa, which had been written before he joined the Naqshbandiyya, and the Maktūbāt, which were written afterwards, is only one sign of the deep change in religious outlook which Sirhindī underwent as a result of his initiation into the Naqshbandī order. He no longer simply reiterates the views of the mutakallimūn on Prophecy; he approaches it from a characteristically sūfī view-point.

During his sūfī period, Sirhindī describes the spiritual achievements of Prophecy and Sainthood in different ways. Two types of relationship between them are discernible in the Maktūbāt. Prophecy and Saint-hood are sometimes described as two parallel ways leading to different degrees of divine awareness. In other cases Prophecy appears to be the culmination of the spiritual journey of the Saint.

In descriptions of the first type, the way of Prophecy leads directly and without any mediation to the genuine Source (āsl al-āsl). This was originally the way of the Prophets and of their companions; very few of their followers in the post-prophetic period are allowed to embark upon it. The way of Sainthood, on the other
hand, is the way of eminent ṣūfīs, such as the aqṭāb, awtād, budalā' and nujabā' and of the common believers. This way does involve mediation (tawassut, ḥaylūla) between the ṣūfī and his God. The leader of those using this way is 'Alī. He had held this position even in his pre-existence, before he came into this world at the time of Muḥammad. Every participant in the journey through the way of Sainthood receives the divine blessing (fayz) through 'Alī's mediation. After his death, the task of mediation was given to Ḥasan and Ḥusayn and, later, to the twelve imāms and to 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jilāni.¹¹

Let us turn now to descriptions of the second type.

The spiritual journey culminating in the acquisition of prophetic perfections consists, in Sirhindī's experience, of four stages. In the first stage, called fanā' and "Journey towards God" (sayr ilā allāh), the ṣūfī abandons the realm of the possible (mumkināt) and reaches the knowledge of God in the realm of the necessary (wājib). The second stage, called baqā' and "Journey in God" (sayr fī allāh), brings the ṣūfī to spiritual heights that defy any verbal description. During the third stage, "Journey towards God through God" (sayr ilā allāh bi-'llāh), the
šūfī begins to descend from the pinnacle of his experience into the realm of the possible. The fourth stage is the "Journey in Things" (sayr dar ashyā'), during which the šūfī acquires again the knowledge of the concrete world which escaped him during his ascent. The first two stages of the journey are connected with Sainthood; the third and the fourth enable the šūfī to reach the "Stage of the Call" (maqām-i da'wat), which properly belongs to the Prophets, but can be shared also by their perfect followers. Not every šūfī reaches the stage of the prophetic descent, but there is a close affinity between the Prophets and the šūfīs whose spiritual achievements are sufficient to permit it. Prophecy is thus better (afdal) than Sainthood, but it also is, paradoxically, the result of descent from the summit of spiritual achievement.

In other descriptions of the spiritual "stages" (maqāmāt), Prophecy ranks above wilāya, shahāda and šiddiqiya. It is interesting to note that Sirhindī here reduces the difference between the Prophet and the šiddīq to a minimum. He affirms that there is no difference between the kinds of knowledge (ʿilm) possessed by these two persons. The only differences between them lies in the way in which they communicate with the source of knowledge. The šiddīq receives his
knowledge through inspiration (ilhām) which is prone to error, while the Prophet receives the same knowledge through revelation brought down by an infallible angel (wāby). Thus, though the Prophet receives his revelation in an error-proof way, there is no difference between himself and the siddīq in so far as the substance of the knowledge is concerned.\textsuperscript{13}

These descriptions of the relationship between Prophecy and Sainthood differ from each other, but they demonstrate the close affinity of the two concepts in Sirhindī's view. Both the Prophets and the most successful ṣūfīs are allowed direct access to the ultimate source of religious inspiration. There are, however, also differences between them. The Prophet is marked by his sobriety (ṣahw); the Saint by his intoxication (ṣukr).\textsuperscript{14} The Saint and the Prophet do not always have the same ability to focus their attention upon the objective of their journey. The difference between them comes to the fore especially during the stage of descent. The Prophet, who has fully experienced the Ultimate Reality (ḥaqq) at the peak of his ascent, can now concentrate entirely upon his mission to the people (daʿwat-i khalq). On the other hand, the Saint, whose ascent failed to give him the ultimate experience of Reality, tries to compensate himself for this failure
during the descent. He directs only his outward (zähir) attention towards the people, while his inner (batin) self makes abortive attempts to catch another glimpse of the Ultimate Reality. His energies are thus dissipated, and his experience cannot be completely satisfactory.\(^{15}\)

In Mabda’ o Ma’ād Sirhindī considers his understanding of the perfect, single-minded spiritual descent (nuzūl) as one of his original contributions to šūfī thought. His predecessors held, according to him, that the perfect descent is that during which the šūfī is mindful of both haqq and khalq;\(^{16}\) their view was basically different from his own conception of the single-minded descent. In a later letter in the Maktūbāt, however, Sirhindī describes the prophetic descent in a way that renders meaningless any distinction between the two views regarding it. After describing the single-minded concentration of the descending Prophet on his mission to the people he says: "... the true understanding of this stage is that turning towards the people is the same as turning towards God. 'Wherever you turn - there is the face of God.'\(^{17}\) This does not mean, however, that the possible is identical with the necessary ..." (wa tāhqīq-i in maqām ān ast kih tawajjuh bi-khalq 'ayn-i tawajjuh bi-ḥaqq ast fa-aynamā tuwallū fa-thamma wajh allāh nah bi-īn ma‘nā)
This apparent change in Sirhindi's views on the matter has also a wider significance which will be considered later.\textsuperscript{19}

It is on the basis of the above description that Sirhindi reaches his conclusions concerning the superiority of Prophecy to Sainthood. Those who preferred Sainthood to Prophecy, says Sirhindi, based their view on the faulty assumption that Prophecy is concerned exclusively with people (khalq), and therefore cannot be of the same value as Sainthood, which aspires to experience the Ultimate Reality (\textit{haqq}). Such people believe Sainthood to be inherently connected with the ascent (\textit{\textasciitilde{ur}\texttt{u}j}), while Prophecy comes into the picture only during the descent (nuzul). Once it is understood, however, that both Prophecy and Sainthood participate in both phases of the spiritual journey, and that the achievements of Prophecy in both are superior to those of Sainthood, there can be no doubt as to the over-all superiority of Prophecy.\textsuperscript{20} It is possible, however, that in some partial aspect a Saint may be superior to a Prophet. His position would then be somewhat similar to that of the martyrs in the holy wars of Islam (shuhad\textasciitilde{a}) who, in some sense, rank higher than the Prophets. Since this partial superiority is a result of the Saint's scrupulous observance of the prophetic
commands, it entails no disrespect towards the Prophet. On the contrary, the reward for the Saint's spiritual achievements reverts to the Prophet, in accordance with the ḥadīth: "Whoever institutes a praiseworthy sunna, will receive his own reward and the reward of those who follow it" (man sanna sunna ḥasana fa-laahu ajruhā wa ajr man ‘amila bihā). Sirhindī therefore sees no harm in the words of Ibn al-‘Arabī who said that "the Seal of the Prophets learns from the Seal of Sainthood". The commentators of Fusūs al-Hikam, says Sirhindī, needlessly felt compelled to explain his words artificially by saying: "The Seal of the Saints is the treasurer (khazīna dār) of the Seal of Prophecy. If the king takes something from his treasury, there is no harm."22

To what extent can persons living in the post-prophetic period hope to acquire the spiritual blessings of Prophecy?

It is one of the frequently recurrent themes in the Maktūbāt that the accomplished followers of the Prophets can acquire a share in the prophetic perfections "through following and inheritance" (bi-tabā‘iyyat o wirāthat), though Prophecy as such came to an end with the completion of Muḥammad's mission. Even in the post-prophetic period there are persons, though extremely few in number, who are allowed to approach God by way of
Prophecy. All those who traverse the prophetic way reach their objective directly; none of them has to serve as a mediator for the others. These are neither the People of the Left (ašhāb al-shimal), who are covered by the veils of darkness, nor the People of the Right (ašhāb al-yamīn), who are covered by the veils of light; these are the First-comers (sābigān) who have freed themselves from all veils. Though no person can reach the rank of a Prophet any longer, these people have been given all the prophetic perfections. "In reality", says Sirhindī, "I myself am a member of the group of the Companions and I share the perfections of the Prophets" (wa fī al-baqīqa īn shakhs nīz az zumra-yi ašhāb ast wa mulḥaq bi-kamālāt-i anbiya').

Thus, though Sirhindī vigorously upholds the Islamic doctrine according to which Muḥammad was the last of the Prophets, Prophecy is, in a sense, a continuing reality. The prophetic perfections, which are said to be continuously present in the chosen few followers of the Prophets, emanate from Prophecy the conception of which is deeply influenced by ṣūfī ideas. We have seen that in the Maktūbāt Sirhindī has all but abandoned the approach of the mutakallimūn to the question of Prophecy. The persons endowed with prophetic qualities discussed in the Maktūbāt are not Prophets who
have been formally sent by God to warn a community or to bring a new sharī'a. They do not perform miracles in order to convince the people to whom they have been sent of the validity of their claim to Prophecy. They cannot even be called Prophets in the proper sense of the word. Yet they do retain the cardinal spiritual privilege enjoyed by the Prophets of old: they are allowed direct access to the divine source of inspiration and are in no need of prophetic mediation like ordinary believers. We have seen that Sirhindī himself claimed to have attained this special status.25 We have also seen that the lights of Prophecy and the Prophetic perfections have regained their splendour with the advent of the Millennium. The accomplished followers of the Prophets, who live in the millennial period and possess the prophetic perfections "through following and inheritance", are barely distinguishable from their predecessors of the prophetic period in whom these perfections were originally (bi-‘l- āṣāla) invested.26

The frequency with which Sirhindī speaks of persons possessing the prophetic perfections is indicative of the importance that he attaches to the matter. The problem, indeed, is important: in what way does the Muslim community maintain its contact with the Divine after Prophecy has come to an end? Many Muslim thinkers
have been confronted with this religiously crucial question, and various answers have been given. Probably the most "orthodox" answer to the question has been given in the saying which states that the 'ulamā' are the heirs of the Prophets (al-'ulamā warathat al-anbiya'). The most elaborate answer has been given by the Shi'Is, whose imāma and wilāya continue to perform those prophetic functions which are the most important in shi'I thinking. Sirhindī's own answer to the question faithfully reflects his sunni patterns of thought. Instead of the imāms of the Shi'Is he speaks of the Companions of the Prophets (asbāb) and their Followers (tābi'ūn), who were given a share of the prophetic qualities of their leader. These qualities were latter transferred to those who faithfully follow the sunna of the Prophets. It seems to us that in Sirhindī's thought the concept of Companionship is being extended in time and that, in a sense, every age has its own Companions and Followers. This is the background against which Sirhindī can claim to be "a member of the group of the Companions" and against which he can repeatedly assert that persons possessing prophetic perfections never cease to exist. Thus the Muslim community is able to retain its contact with the Divine, despite the fact that Prophecy as such came to an end with the completion of Muḥammad's mission.
CHAPTER V

SIRHINDI'S VIEW OF THE ISLAMIC TRADITION: I

It is our intention to study in the two following chapters Sirhindī's views with regard to the various components of the Islamic tradition. We shall analyse his views on major Islamic concepts, movements and personalities. The analysis will demonstrate that his views on virtually all matters are deeply influenced by his comprehensive ṣūfī outlook.

1. Sunna, Sharī‘a and Ṭariqa.

Modern writers have repeatedly stressed that in Sirhindī's view sunna and sharī‘a are the most important components of Islamic culture. In a sense this is true, and there are many statements to this effect in the Maktūbāt, in Mabda‘ o Ma‘ād and in the various accounts of Sirhindī's thought written by his disciples. On the Day of Resurrection, says Sirhindī, people will be questioned about their adherence to the sharī‘a, not about taṣawwuf (fardā-yi qiyāmat az sharī‘at khwāhand pursīd az taṣawwuf na-khwāhand pursīd). He urges his disciples to read books on fiqh and affirms that ṣūfī experience is inferior to the
sharī'ā and not vice versa, because sharī'ā is based on incontrovertible proof, while ṣūfī experience is a result of fallible speculation only (ḥawāl tābi‘-i sharī'at ast na sharī'at tābi‘-i ḥawāl kih sharī'at qat‘ī ast wa ḥawāl gannī). 2 One of his disciples recalls that when he was overwhelmed by ḥāl, Sirhindī used to tell him: "Go to study your lesson, because an ignorant ṣūfī is the fool of Satan!" (sabag bi-khwān kih ṣūfī-yi ḍāhil maskhara-yi shayṭān ast). 3 Any ṣūfī experience that is rejected by the sharī’ā is heresy (kull ḥaqīqa raddathu [sic] al-sharī’ā fa-huwa zandaqa wa ilḥād), 4 says Sirhindī, and the Maktūbat contain countless exhortations to follow the sunna and comply with the sharī’ā.

These and many other statements in a similar vein are sufficient to show that in Sirhindī's view compliance with the sharī’ā is essential. However, in order fully to understand the significance of this view, we must elucidate the concept of sharī’ā in Sirhindī's thought. Only in this way shall we be able to see Sirhindī's statements regarding it in the proper perspective. It is not sufficient simply to state that Sirhindī upheld the sharī’ā, as his modern interpreters have asserted; one must describe Sirhindī's view of the sharī’ā in order that such a statement be meaningful.

Sirhindī deals with the concept of sharī’ā in
two different contexts. Occasionally he considers it from the point of view of a jurist and gives his opinion on certain points of law. In the vast majority of cases, however, he discusses the shari'a in terms of ṣūfī thought, analyses its outward (qāhir) and inner (bāṭin) aspects and describes its relationship with such concepts as ṭarīqa and ḫaqīqa.

Discussions of juridical problems are extremely rare in the Maktūbāt and in the other works by Sirhindī. It is noteworthy that while Sirhindī never wearies of describing the minutest details of ṣūfī experience, his exhortations to comply with the shari'a remain general to an extreme. We rarely find in the Maktūbāt a warning against a concrete infraction of Islamic law common in Sirhindī's time or a reference to a specific legal question. Let us deal briefly with these rare cases before turning to the main body of Sirhindī's thought relative to the question of shari'a.

Epistle 191 of the first volume of the Maktūbāt is addressed to ‘Abd al-Raḥīm Khān-i Khānān, a high official of the Mughul court. Its purpose is to convince the recipient that Islamic law does not impose difficult duties on the believer. The shari'a is easy to comply with. For instance, only seventeen daily rak'as were prescribed, and these can be performed in
less than an hour. If a Muslim finds rukū' and sujūd to be difficult, he can comply with the law by performing them symbolically. If he cannot perform the ablution with water, he can do so with sand. Only one fortieth of property was fixed as zakāt, and even then not all kinds of property are taxable. Pilgrimage (hajj) has to be performed only once in a lifetime and only if transportation and supplies are available and roads are safe. Generally speaking, God has widened the sphere of the permitted actions (mubāḥāt). He has permitted every man to wed four wives and to have an unlimited number of concubines; moreover, He has provided for exchanging wives at will by permitting divorce (cāhār zan bi-ni-kāḥ wa az sarārī har qadr kih bi-khwāhad mubāḥ farmūdah wa ṭālāqrā wasīla-yi tabdīl-i nisā' gardānīdah).

Sirhindī continues in the same vein while dealing with matters such as clothing and food and concludes, saying that if anyone finds the sharī‘a onerous, he doubtlessly suffers from an affliction of the heart (maṣā‘-i qalbī). These views on legal matters, and especially those concerning divorce, are reminiscent of the legal stratagems (hiyal) evolved by some fuqaha in order to circumvent certain legal precepts. It should be kept in mind that this letter is addressed to a government official, with whom Sirhindī corresponded over a lengthy
period of time in an attempt to influence his thinking. 7
The emphasis on the permissive nature of the *shari'a*,
which is not the usual attitude adopted by Sirhindī, 8
is designed to make 'Abd al-Raḥīm more receptive to
Sirhindī's ideas on the necessity of complying with the
law as fully as possible.

Sirhindī's approach to the question of
innovation (*bid'a*) is also relevant to the description
of the non-ṣūfī portions of his views on Islamic law.
Here again we are faced with scarcity of specific
material on the subject, though general exhortations to
follow *sunna* and avoid innovation are abundant.
Sirhindī very rarely speaks of innovations which are
peculiar to the Muslims of India as a result of their
life in the midst of a Hindū people. 9 In most cases he
deals with the problem on the theoretical level, adducing
random examples only to prove a general point. In
several places in the *Maktūbāt* he launches vigorous
attacks against the distinction between good innovation
(*bid'a hasana*) and bad innovation (*bid'a sayyi'a*), 10
asserting that either of them is certain to do away
with a *sunna* and should, therefore, be scrupulously
avoided. The innovations which Sirhindī condemns in
this context are rather trivial and none of them arises
from Hindū influence. It has been said, for example,
that the use of the turban as a part of the shroud is a good innovation; it is clear, however, that this contravenes the sunna by using an additional piece of cloth beyond the three prescribed ones. To place the turban-sash on the left side has also been considered as a good innovation, though it is evidently inconsistent with the sunna, which demands that the sash be allowed to hang between the shoulders. The opinion of those 'ulama who maintain that it is laudable to express the prayer-intention (niyyat-i namaz) aloud, though the Prophet and his companions never did it in this manner, is also unacceptable. In case this recommendation is followed, most people are satisfied with the words and are not concerned with the intention of the heart (irada-yi qalb); a sunna is thus abrogated. Therefore, all innovations are bad and ought to be shunned. The Qur'an says: "Today I have perfected your religion for you and bestowed upon you all my favour, and I have approved Islâm as your religion." Islâm is thus perfect and does not require any modifications or additions.

Such is Sirhindî's approach to the question when he is writing on his own initiative and can freely choose the examples to support his unequivocal rejection of any innovation. But not always is he given this freedom of choice. In the Maktubat there are a few
cases in which Sirhindī is asked about specific matters relating to the question of innovations. One of his closest disciples, Muhammad Hāshim, pointedly inquires whether the Prophet and his companions knew about sulūk and jadhba which are frequently mentioned in Sirhindī's works; if they did, what expressions did they use to describe them? if not, can these concepts be considered as good innovations? The question is clearly rhetorical, and after trying to explain it away by saying that the companions were in no need of jadhba and sulūk because of their proximity to the Prophet, Sirhindī is compelled to admit that "the expressions fanā', baqā', jadhba and sulūk were not used in the time of the Prophet and were invented by the šūfīs" (pas 'ibārat-i fanā' o baqā' o jadhba o sulūk muḥdath bāshad wa az mukhtara'āt-i mashāyikh). 13

In another case, one of the disciples asks Sirhindī why he disallows the performance of dhikr aloud (dhikr-i jahr) while condoning other customs unknown at the time of the Prophet, such as the wearing of farjī, shāl and sarāwil. 14 Sirhindī's reply is that the Prophet's actions are of two kinds: those connected with worship ('ibāda) and those based on custom ('urf o 'āda). If something is found to be inconsistent with the Prophet's actions of the latter
kind, it must not be considered a "blameworthy innovation" (bid‘at-i munkar), because it "has no connection with religion" (bidin ta‘alluq na-dārad). It is only a matter of custom that may change with time and place. It may also be pointed out here that Sirhindī himself occasionally engaged in practices questionable from the point of view of "pure" Islām, such as "giving alms to the spirits of the dead" (tasadduq bi-arwāh-i mawtā). He describes in details the manner in which this should be done and demands that whenever alms are given to the spirit of a deceased a separate gift be given to the Prophet.

The main part of Sirhindī's thought relating to the question of shari‘a is deeply influenced by his ṣūfī outlook. Sirhindī is not interested in the details of the shari‘a, but rather strives to incorporate it, as a major Islamic concept, in his comprehensive ṣūfī world-view. It is therefore to be expected that he speaks of the shari‘a in a characteristically ṣūfī way. Shari‘a consists, in his view, of two parts: form (ṣūra) and essence (ḥaqīqa). In other words, it has an outward (zāhir) aspect and an inner (bātin) aspect. The outward form of the shari‘a involves compliance with the Qur'ānic commandments despite the struggle which one has to wage at this stage with his evil-bidding soul (nafs-i ammāra). It is only God's mercy that enables persons who do not transcend this rather low stage to enter Paradise. Paradise and its pleasures, how-
ever, also have form and essence; those who in this world reach the stage of formal belief (ṣūrat-i ʿImān) only, will not enjoy Paradise in the same way as the people of the essence (arbāb-i ḥaqīqa). The essence of shariʿa (ḥaqīqat-i shariʿat) can be arrived at by properly understanding the ambiguous verses of the Qurʾān (mutashābihāt). This understanding can bring about the perfections of Prophecy (kamālāt-i nubuwwat), while the form of shariʿa is capable of producing the perfections of Sainthood (kamālāt-i wilāyat) only. 16

Sirhindī deals with the two aspects of the shariʿa also in connection with the spiritual ascent of the ṣūfī. Its form is capable of rising only within the sphere of the possible (silsilayi mumkināt); during the spiritual ascent through the stages of the necessary (marāṭib-i wujūb) it must combine with the essence. If there is further ascent above this sphere, the form and the essence separate again, and the ṣūfī can reach the Water of Life (Āb-i Ḥayāt). This is a stage which has no connection whatsoever with the world. The ṣūfī finds himself here outside the circle of the shariʿa. He is, however, "protected" from sin (mahfūẓ) 17 and does not neglect any part of the shariʿa. Those who are allowed to reach this supreme stage are very few. Many more ṣūfīs reach only its shadow, imagine that they have gone outside the circle of the shariʿa and end up with heresy. Only the perfect ones are capable of main-
taining the shari'a in its entirety at this stage.18

Every member of the community, even the ṣūfī who is allowed to reach the highest stage of spiritual progress, is thus obliged to comply with the shari'a.19 The proper, "essential" (ḥaqiq) compliance depends upon the spiritual advancement of the believer; only those who have subjugated their evil-bidding souls are capable of achieving it. Though God is merciful enough to accept formal belief and practice as sufficient for the attainment of "formal" salvation, ṣūfī discipline is necessary in order to achieve a higher stage. This discipline, called in the Ḥakṭūbāt mostly ṭarīqa and sulūk, confirms the shari'a and makes its knowledge more detailed and more certain. Shari'a and ṭarīqa are, on the one hand, two expressions of the same reality;20 on the other hand, ṭarīqa is a servant of the shari'a whose service is essential for making the shari'a complete.21 The relationship between shari'a and ṭarīqa is parallel to that between Prophecy and Sainthood: shari'a is superior to ṭarīqa in the same way as Prophecy is superior to Sainthood. At the same time, shari'a can no more dispense with ṭarīqa, than Prophecy with Sainthood.22

Sirhindī's peculiar approach to the question of shari'a is evident also from other statements scattered in the Ḥakṭūbāt and in the Ḥabda· o Ḥa‘ād. For instance,
he defines *sulük* as being "compliance with the *sharī'a*: repentance, asceticism and the like" (*sulük kih 'ibārat az ityān-i sharī'at ast az tawba wa zuhd wa ghayruhumā*). 23 His uncompromising insistence on compliance with the *sharī'a* and his intransigent hatred for those who oppose it are explained also in *ṣūfī* terms: an ardent lover can brook no compromise with his rivals (*dar maḥabbat mudāhanat gunjāvish nadārad muḥibb dīwāna-vi maḥbūb ast tāb-i mukhālafat nadārad bi-mukhlīfān-i maḥbūb bi-hī jō wajh āshī namī-nūmāyad*). 24 Another way of placing the *sharī'a* squarely within the *ṣūfī* world-view is to say that one cannot reach his real objective without "annihilating himself" entirely in the *sharī'a* (*tā tamām-i khwud-rā dar sharī'at gum na-sāzad wa bi-imtīthāl-i awāmir o intihā'-i nawāḥī mutāhālāi na-gardad būy az In dawlat bi-mashāmā-i jān-i ū na-rasad*). 25 The Persian khwud-rā gum sākhtan is a translation of the Arabic *ṣūfī* term *fānā*, and Sirhindī thus speaks of *al-fānā* fi *al-sharī'a*. Perhaps the most striking example of the impact of *ṣūfī* ideas on Sirhindī's views of the *sharī'a* is contained in his few remarks concerning the Islamic schools of law (*madhāhib*). In most legal matters in which differences of opinion exist between the Shāfi‘ī and the Ḥanafī schools, says Sirhindī, the outward and formal aspect is according to the Shāfi‘ī school, while the
inner, "essential" aspect is in accordance with the Ḥanafī school (wa ʾakṭhar-i maṣaʿīl-i khilāfī miyān-i shāfī'),26 az ʾin qābīl ast kih gāhir o ʿūrāt murājjiʿī bī-jānīb-i shāfī', ast wa bāṭin o ṣaḥīḥat muʿāyyid-i madhhab-i Ḥanafī).27 In another context the perfections of Sainthood are said to correspond to the Shāfīʿī law, while those of Prophecy are considered related to the Ḥanafī law ( . . . kamālāt-i wilaʿyat-rā muwāfaqat bī-fīqh-i shāfī', ast wa kamālāt-i nubūwata-rā munāsabat bī-fīqh-i Ḥanafī).28 The tradition according to which Abū Ḥanīfa laid particular stress on the idea of sunna and used scriptural rather than rational proofs29 is apparently behind Sirhindī's preference of the Ḥanafī school. The preponderance of this school in Transoxania where the Naqshbandī order came into being is another probable reason for his view. Questions of legal practice, however, hardly play any role in Sirhindī's adoption of the Ḥanafī school.

What are Sirhindī's views regarding the guardians of the sharīʿa, the ṣulṭānī,30

The classification of the ṣulṭānī offered by Sirhindī faithfully reflects his views of the sharīʿa as described above. The form of the sharīʿa, which according to Sirhindī is contained in the unequivocal verses of the Qurʾān (muḥkamāt),31 is the domain of the
"superficial" 'ulamā' (‘ulamā’-i zawāhir). They are captivated by the form, deny the existence of any essence in it, and are guided solely by books on fiqh, such as the Hidāya and Bīzūdī (?). The essence of the sharī'a, on the other hand, is dealt with by the profound 'ulamā' (‘ulamā’-i rāsikhān). It is found in the ambiguous verses of the Qur'ān (mutashābihāt), which are the kernel and heart of the Book. The unequivocal verses, though called ummahāt-i kitāb, are nothing but means to reach the substance (natā'ij) contained in the ambiguous ones. The profound 'ulamā' understand the dual nature of the sharī'a, insist on attaining both its form and essence, but concede that the form is sufficient for a person to be a Muslim. Between the two groups of the 'ulamā' are the Saints (awliyā'-'i khudā). They are captivated by the essence, but do not consider it the essence of the sharī'a. In their view the sharī'a is a mere husk without a kernel; still, they do not refrain from observing it scrupulously.

We may say in conclusion, that in his discussion of the sharī'a, Sirhindī clearly values its inner, "essential" aspects above its outward and formal ones. This preference results in according the highest status to the ambiguous verses of the Qur'ān in which the essence is thought to be contained. Sirhindī maintains
this view despite the fact that according to the Qur‘ān itself only "those in whose hearts there is a deviation follow the ambiguous (verses) desiring dissension ..."34

At the same time he maintains, that the outward form of the sharī‘a cannot be dispensed with, since, philosophically speaking, the form can never be separated from the essence, and nobody can reach the essence while disregarding the form. The concept of sharī‘a is thus fully incorporated into the ṣūfī world-view. The characteristic ṣūfī dichotomy of form and essence is thoroughly applied to it. Those whose compliance with the sharī‘a is merely formal are rather condescendingly accepted into the Muslim community; their inferiority to those who reach the essence is, however, made abundantly clear. That the ‘ulamā‘ who reached the highest stage of inner understanding are called ‘ulamā‘-i rāsikhān is also noteworthy: Sirhindī here seems to use the term that is most acceptable in the sunnī world-view in order to express a ṣūfī, or even a shī‘ī, notion.

2. The concepts of Islām and infidelity (kufr).

As in the case with numerous other subjects, Sirhindī deals with the concepts of Islām and infidelity on two different levels. On the one hand, he puts forward his views regarding the status of infidels in a Muslim society and, specifically, the treatment that ought to
be meted out to the Hindū inhabitants of the Mughul empire. He makes his views on this subject clear mainly in letters to officials of the Mughul government, and we shall discuss them in due course. On the other hand, he discusses infidelity and related concepts in a ṣūfī frame of reference. This part of Sirhindī's views on the matter will be our present concern.

Islam and infidelity are normally determined by sharī'ī criteria. But at the same time, says Sirhindī, there are also Islam and infidelity which constitute stages in the spiritual progress of the ṣūfī along the Path (ṭarīqa). The ṣūfī infidelity (kufr-i ṭarīqat) comes into being in the stage of unity (maqām-i jam'). The ṣūfī does not at this stage see anything except the beauty of the Beloved. The common distinctions between good and bad, truth and falsehood, are meaningless to him; he considers them only as shadows of the all-embracing unity. He, therefore, can be at peace with everyone and affirm that all are following the straight path. Occasionally he even affirms the identity of God (ḥaqiq) and the creation (khalq). This was the spiritual stage of al-Ḥallāj when he said: "I have denied the religion of God; infidelity is incumbent upon me, but is repulsive to the Muslims" (kafartu bi-dīni 'llāhi wa 'l-kufru wājibun / ladayya wa 'inda 'l-muslimīna qabīhu).
The infidel of the ṭarīqa, unlike the infidel of the sharī‘a, does not deserve punishment. He has reached the stage of infidelity as a result of being overwhelmed by the love of God that has caused him to forget everything else. The touchstone of his sincerity is his compliance with the sharī‘a. Al-Ḥallāj every night performed 500 rak‘as in his prison and refused to eat the food given to him by his captors for fear that it might have been procured in an unlawful manner. The infidel of the sharī‘a is, on the other hand, dominated by ignorance (jahl), rebels against God, and will not be spared his punishment.

Islam in the sharī‘ sense is, of course, a higher stage than sharī‘ infidelity. The same applies to the ṣūfī Islam (islām-i ṭarīqat), which is higher than the ṣūfī infidelity and is attained at the stage of separation following unity (farq ba‘d al-jam‘). The distinctions between good and bad, truth and falsehood, regain their validity at this stage. The two kinds of Islām are related to each other; moreover, when Islām in the sharī‘ sense reaches its perfection and attains the essence of the sharī‘a, it unites with the ṣūfī Islam. Sirhindī summarizes his analysis so far by an assessment of the relative value of the spiritual stages discussed here: "The stage of the ṣūfī infidelity is higher than
the Islām of the form of the sharī‘a, though it is lower and baser than the Islām of the essence of the sharī‘a” (martaba-yi kufr-i ṭarīqat az islām-i şūrat-i sharī‘at buland-tar ast har ānd nisbat bi-islām-i ṭaqlīqat-i sharī‘at past o adwan ast).38

Sirhindī's distinction between the various kinds of Islām is related to the distinction he makes between the various parts of the Muslim community. In his view there is a fundamental difference between the common people (‘awāmm), whose Islām is merely formal and never reaches beyond the simple observance of the sharī‘a, and the spiritual élite (khawās), whose true, real Islām emerges after the necessary experience of the şūfī infidelity (. . . ğunān-čih islām kīh pīsh az kufr-i ṭarīqat ast islām-i ‘awāmm-i ahl-i islām ast wa islāmī kīh ba‘d az kufr-i ṭarīqat ast islām-i akhāes. al-khawās).39 Sirhindī strongly adheres to the classical şūfī distinction between the common people and the élite,40 and frequently speaks of the common people with undisguised contempt. He uses for them expressions such as "common people who are like cattle" (‘awāmm ka-‘l-an‘ām) or "bovine creatures" (bahā‘im şifatān). Anything that might lead the ignorant masses astray must in his view be kept secret and even advanced disciples cannot be trusted with all the şūfī insights.41
His contempt is a clear reflection of the idea, that the Islam of the common people, uninitiated into the mysteries of taṣawwuf, is far from being the objective towards which men should strive. That God in His boundless mercy made this kind of Islam sufficient for salvation in the crude, formal sense, does not mitigate Sirhindī's contempt for those who fail to transcend it.

3. Shi'a.

Aside from isolated references to the Khawārij, the Shi'a are the only Islamic sect to which Sirhindī pays attention in his works. An attempt to refute the shi'I doctrines was the subject of Sirhindī's first literary endeavour. As we have seen earlier, his Epistle on the Refutation of the Shi'is was written in the pre-šūfī period of his life. It is marked by an exceptionally vigorous denunciation of the Shi'a and their role in Islamic religious history. In the beginning of the Epistle Sirhindī explains that his decision to write a refutation of the shi'I doctrine was prompted by the prophetic tradition demanding that the learned refute heretical ideas whenever they appear. He decided to fulfill this duty when he observed that "some of the followers of the Shi'a who frequented these regions boasted and were proud of these fundamental principles (of the shi'I faith) (mugaddimāt), and spread
these fallacies in the councils of the princes and the kings". 43

Aside from this brief introduction, the Epistle consists of three parts. In the first part 44 Sirhindī describes the various shīʿī sects. Only in minor details are his descriptions different from those found in other heresiographies. In the second part 45 Sirhindī describes the shīʿī takfīr of the Companions of the Prophet and then launches his bitter attack upon the doctrines of the Shīʿa. Their adoration of 'Alī, says Sirhindī, is similar in its excesses to the Christian attitude to Jesus. 46 The shīʿī books are unreliable and must be regarded to be as corrupted (muharrafa) as the Tawrāt and the Injīl. 47 The Shīʿa do not refrain from adding spurious passages to the Qurʿān while accusing 'Uthmān of concealing Qurʿānic verses which had allegedly been revealed in praise of the Prophet's family. 48 The shīʿī claim that 'Alī was nominated to succeed the Prophet is baseless, 49 and the consensus that elected Abū Bakr was full and included 'Alī himself. 50 The most important passages of the Epistle are those in which Sirhindī declares that the Shīʿa must be considered infidels and approvingly quotes legal opinions to this effect. We shall quote only a few of his most outspoken statements: "To say of a
believer that he is an infidel is a cause of infidelity. A sound tradition runs as follows: 'Whoever accuses a man of infidelity and says (to him): 'Enemy of God'; and it is not true - if it is as he said (then all right); if not, it (i.e., the curse) will come back upon him.' 51 Now we know certainly that Abū Bakr and 'Umar are faithful, are not enemies of God, and have been promised Paradise. Their takfīr therefore comes back upon those who pronounced it. According to this tradition, the Shi‘ā must be pronounced infidels." 52 Sirhindī also quotes with approval a legal opinion issued by a group of Transoxanian 'ulamā who ruled: "Since the Shi‘a permit cursing Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān and one of the chaste wives (of the Prophet), which in itself constitutes infidelity, it is incumbent upon the Muslim ruler, nay upon all people, in compliance with the command of the Omniscient King, to kill them and to oppress them in order to elevate the true religion. It is permissible to destroy their buildings and to seize their property and belongings." 53

The third and last part of the Epistle 54 contains traditions praising the members of the Prophet's family (ahl al-bayt). These traditions are intended to demonstrate the contrast between their virtues and the alleged moral depravity of the Shi‘a and to prove that
the Shi'a are unworthy of being heirs of those whose spiritual heritage they claim to preserve.

Such are the opinions regarding the Shi'a which Sirhindí expressed early in his life. We shall now look into the question whether he modified these opinions later, and if so, to what extent.

Sirhindí's attitude towards the Shi'a in the Maktúbát is less hostile. He still maintains that their view of early Islamic history and their hatred for the three first khulafā' are misguided, but in most cases he refrains from declaring them infidels. Only in early letters to Mughul officials, written in order to persuade the recipients not to enter into any relationship with the Shi'a at their courts, are there passages in which the Shi'a are considered infidels.55 In other letters Sirhindí applies the term kufr to Shi'i doctrines only very rarely.56 In comparison with the attitude of the Epistle, Sirhindí's approach to the Shi'a in the Maktúbát is rather mild. He continues to uphold the validity of the three first khulafā', but, on the other hand, stresses in several places that in the disputes which ravaged the Muslim community during 'Ali's term of office, 'Ali was in the right. The wrong stand taken by 'Ali's opponents was a result of a mistaken ijtihād made in good faith and cannot, therefore, be a reason
for their exclusion from the Muslim community. Sirhindī points out that the Sunnīs, contrary to the Khawārij, hold the members of the Prophet's family in high esteem.\textsuperscript{57} It is significant that these statements, which seem to suggest a more conciliatory attitude towards the Shī'ā, appear in works written during Sirhindī's ṣūfī period, while being conspicuously absent from the Epistle. The progressive mitigation of Sirhindī's hostility towards the Shī'ā can be seen also from the fact that towards the end of his life Sirhindī concedes to 'Alī and the twelve a'imma a special spiritual task. The a'imma are said to be the leaders of those who approach God by the way of Sainthood and the transmitters of divine blessings to them.\textsuperscript{58} Though the way of Sainthood is in Sirhindī's view inferior to the way of Prophecy, and though there is no indication of any change in his opposition to any public manifestation of Shī'ī influence at the imperial court or elsewhere, the passage referred to seems to indicate that even a fervent sunnī ṣūfī like Sirhindī is not able altogether to sever the manifold connections linking ṭasawwuf with Shī'ī thought.

4. \textit{Falsafa}.

In his criticism of the philosophers (\textit{al-falāsifa}) Sirhindī quotes al-Ghazālī as his main source.
The underlying idea of his reasoning is that human intellect is incapable of understanding properly the nature of God without prophetic assistance. The ancient Greek philosophers did not become aware of the existence of the Creator despite their intelligence and attributed the existence of things to dahr. It was only when the prophetic call became gradually stronger that the later philosophers rejected the view of their ancient predecessors and affirmed the existence of the Creator. They would not have been able to become aware of His existence without prophetic help. Yet their concept of the Creator remains wrong. They deny His knowledge of the particulars (juz'iyvāt), consider him denuded of attributes (mu'attal) and without a function in the world (bi-kār). The only thing that originated with Him in their view is the "active intellect" (aql-i fa‘āl). This entity, says Sirhindī does not exist save in the philosophers' imagination; yet they persist in tracing to it the origin of the events that take place in the world instead of recognizing God as the only force behind them. Some of them deny Prophecy, and even those who accept it reject the content of essential parts of the Qur'ān, such as the bodily resurrection and the events connected with it. Their denial of God's knowledge of the particulars leads them
to the rejection of divine laws. Consequently, they are stubborn and ignorant people and must be regarded as infidels.63

The harsh judgment passed by Sirhindī on the philosophers' metaphysics leads him to an equally indignant rejection of their natural sciences. Their geometry, astronomy, logic and mathematics are useless as far as the hereafter is concerned and fall therefore within the category of the "inconsequential things" (mā lā ya‘nī). They must not be dealt with except in cases in which they are indispensable for the strengthening of a shari‘ī science. These cases are extremely rare; and if a person is concerned with the sciences of the philosophers, it is a sign that God has withdrawn His favour from him (‘alāmat i‘rādihi ta‘ālā ‘an al-‘abd ishtighāluhu bi-mā lā ya‘nīhi). Quoting al-Ghazālī's al-Mungidh min al-‘alāl as his authority, Sirhindī asserts that the best sciences of the philosophers, namely ethics (tahdhīb al-akhlāq) and medicine (ṭibb) have been stolen from the books of the Prophets.64 So great is Sirhindī's abhorrence of any non-religious occupation, that he admonishes against even the study of Sa‘dī's popular Rūstān and Gulistān,65 though elsewhere he himself quotes from these books verses that illustrate his point.66
In the material summarized above Sirhindī claims several times that he bases his rejection of the philosophers on the works of al-Ghazālī. It must be pointed out, however, that while there are basic similarities between the two thinkers, such as the rejection of the philosophers' metaphysics and the belief in the fundamental inadequacy of the human intellect to arrive at certain religious truths, their views regarding the philosophers are far from identical. This is especially true of their respective approaches to the natural sciences. Unlike al-Ghazālī, Sirhindī does not discuss separately the merits or otherwise of each science; he lumps together all the philosophers and all their sciences and rejects them in toto. While al-Ghazālī approaches the question with a well-balanced argument and uses relatively moderate language, Sirhindī's approach is emotionally charged and his language largely vituperative.67 These differences notwithstanding, there can be no doubt about the basic dependence of Sirhindī on al-Ghazālī in this field. This dependence is brought into relief also by the fact that Sirhindī does not take cognizance of the philosophical developments after al-Ghazālī, and the only philosophers mentioned in his works are al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā.
5. **Theology (kalām).**

When compared with his views of the philosophers, Sirhindī's attitude to the theologians (mutakallimūn) seems to be sympathetic, though they, like the "superficial" 'ulamā', also cannot reach the highest stage of divine awareness. Both the șūfīs and the theologians strive to attain the knowledge of God (ma‘rifat-i khudā), but each group understands this term in its own peculiar way. The șūfīs, who maintain that the way to attain the objective is the suppression of the evil-bidding soul (riyāzat-i nafs) and the purification of the inner self (tasfiya-yi bāţīn), understand knowledge as "expanded ecstatic perception" (daryāft-i basīt-i wijdānī). The theologians, whose way is that of demonstrative reasoning (nazar o istidlāl), understand it as "formal affirmation and belief" (şūrat-i taşdīqī o İmānī). The knowledge of the șūfīs, expressed by the verbs shinākhtan and yāftan, is a result of their awareness of the divine presence ('ilm-i huṣūrī); in their case, says Sirhindī, "the known is not outside the essence of the knower" (yāft dar birūn-i dhāt-i yābandah namī-bāshad). On the other hand, the knowledge of the theologians, expressed by the verb dānistan, is acquired ('ilm-i huṣūlī) by an intellectual process and comes from outside. The knowledge of the theologians
is therefore of a different kind and of a lesser value
than that of the süfis.

Sirhindī maintains that the rational arguments
of the theologians, though intended to strengthen the
faith, are liable to have the opposite effect. This
weakening is caused by the fact that human reason is not
capable of providing rational proof for certain articles
of faith, such as the vision of God in the hereafter or
the doctrine of God creating the acts of men by creating
in men the power to perform each act (al-istiṭāˈa maˈa
al-fiˈl). Both these tenets are correct, but the
rational arguments adduced by the theologians to support
them are deficient. The deficiency of the supporting
argumentation creates doubts regarding the tenets them­
selves. Sirhindī therefore supports the Māturīdī school
of theology, which in his view kept aloof from
"philosophical subtleties" (tadqīqāt-i falsāfiyya). On
the other hand, he opposes al-Ashʿarī, who introduced
the method of demonstrative reasoning (naẓar o istidlāl)
among the sunnī ʿulamāʾ. Al-Ashʿarī's intentions were
commendable: he wanted to strengthen the faith by the
use of reason. This task is, however, difficult. 70
Sirhindī therefore maintains that articles of faith
must not be subjected to the test of reason, which is
ill-equipped to demonstrate their validity.
To investigate Sirhindī's claim that the Māturīdiyya remained aloof from what he calls "philosophical subtleties" is beyond the scope of this work. Goldziher thinks that the Māturīdiyya occupy a middle position between the Mu'tazila and the Ashʿariyya; if this is the case, Sirhindī's statement is rather difficult to understand. It is likely that Sirhindī's preference of the Māturīdiyya is caused mainly by factors other than al-Māturīdi's peculiar views on theology, which, in any case, do not play an important role in Sirhindī's thought. His preference is probably related to the connection between the Māturīdi school of theology and the Ḥanafī school of law, which Sirhindī supported for reasons that have already been explained.

As for specific theological questions, Sirhindī deals with them on two different levels. At one level, he reiterates the position taken by the classical theologians on subjects such as free will and acquisition (kasb), the hereafter, the pillars of Islām (arkān), the vision of God (ru'ya) and the like. Sirhindī deals with the theological issues in this manner mostly in letters to government officials or to ūfīs who are beginning their training. Usually these letters do not deal with one specific subject, but are rather long and comprehensive statements outlining the
proper beliefs that ought to be held and the proper practices that ought to be followed. They seem to be a sort of manual of belief and practice given to persons who join the order or whom Sirhindī wishes to bring within his sphere of influence. On the other level, some of these theological subjects are discussed also in connection with Sirhindī's appraisal of Ibn al-‘Arabī's world-view. Especially such subjects as the relationship between the divine essence and its attributes and the vision of God are of importance for his stand toward Ibn al-‘Arabī. It is appropriate therefore to consider these traditional theological subjects in our analysis of Sirhindī's approach to Ibn al-‘Arabī, which will follow in due course.
CHAPTER VI

SIRHINDI'S VIEW OF THE ISLAMIC TRADITION: II

1. The early ṣūfīs.

Sirhindī's view of the early ṣūfīs is very instructive with regard to his understanding of the ṣūfī experience. Acting upon the principle that "the words of the intoxicated have to be interpreted (allegorically) and turned away from (their) outward meaning" (fa-inna kalām al-sakārā yuḥmal wa yuṣraf ‘an al-zāhir), Sirhindī can regard even the most ecstatic ṣūfī statements as a legitimate expression of a certain stage in the development in the Muslim consciousness of the Divine. To achieve this end Sirhindī occasionally adduces explanations which are all but unacceptable on linguistic grounds, but which are well integrated within the comprehensive framework of his thought.

Sirhindī's attitude towards al-Ḥallāj is a case in point. We have already seen the interpretation given by him to the verse in which al-Ḥallāj declared that he had "denied the religion of God". Elsewhere Sirhindī deals with the famous ana al-haqq, and it is in connection with this utterance that he makes his major effort to "justify" and "excuse" al-Ḥallāj.
Sirhindī's interpretation of *āna al-ḥaqiq is related to the distinction he makes between the theories of the Unity of Being (*waḥdat al-wujūd, tumāhíd-i wujūdī*) and the Unity of Appearance (*waḥdat al-shuhūd, tumāhíd-i shuhūdī*). Unity of Appearance means "to see One, namely nothing but One is seen by the ṣūfī" (*tumāhíd-i shuhūdī yakī dīdan ast ya‘nī shuhūd-i sālik juz bar yakī na-bāshad*). Unity of Being, on the other hand, means "to consider Existence as One, to regard everything else as non-existent and to consider the manifestations of that (One) as one, despite their non-existence" (*tumāhíd-i wujūdī yak wujūd danistan wa ghayr-i ā-rā ma‘dūm angāshtan wa bā wujūd-i ‘adamīyyat majālī o mazāhir-i ān yakī pindāshtan*). Sirhindī exemplifies this distinction by describing two views which a person can take of a natural phenomenon. The wujūdī would deny the existence of the stars while looking at the sun because he is overwhelmed by the spectacle and cannot see anything except the sun itself. His view is patently wrong. The shuhūdī, on the other hand, knows that the stars do exist, though he also sees only the sun. His consciousness is in the stage of *‘ayn al-yaqīn*, while that of the wujūdī remains at the lower stage of *ilm al-yaqīn*. The highest stage of consciousness, that of ḥaqiq al-yaqīn, can be reached when the
sight of the onlooker is sharpened to an extent that enables him to see the stars and the sun simultaneously.\(^4\)

The controversial utterances of the süfis, says Sirhindī, have to be understood in terms of Unity of Appearance, which is not inconsistent with proper Islamic belief. These utterances, such as *ana al-ḥaqiq* and *subḥānahu*, were made when ecstasy prevented the süfis from seeing anything except God. They, therefore, do not affirm the existence of anything except Him. "*Ana al-ḥaqiq* means 'God exists, not I' - he (i.e. al-Ḥallāj) does not see himself and therefore does not affirm (his own existence); it does not mean that he sees himself and considers himself God" (wa ma'ni-yi *ana al-ḥaqiq* ān ast kih ḥaqiq ast na\(^5\) man čūn khwudrā namī-binad ithbāt namī-kunad na ān kih khwud-rā mī-binad wa ān-rā ḥaqiq mī-gūyad). Lack of affirmation, says Sirhindī, is not tantamount to denial.\(^6\) In another passage, he approvingly quotes his mentor al-Baqī bi-‘llah who said that *ana al-ḥaqiq* does not mean "I am God" (*man ḥaqqam*), but "I do not exist, what exists is God" (*man nīstam wa mawjūd ḥaqiq ast subḥānahu*).\(^7\)

The obvious linguistic difficulties involved in this exegesis bring Sirhindī's determined effort to retain al-Ḥallāj within the fold of Islam into sharp relief. A similar effort is discernible in his inter-
pretation of subhānī. This utterance aims in Sirhindī's view at the tanzīh of God, not of Abū Yazīd. Both these explanations have to be read in conjunction with Sirhindī's theory of the perfect man (al-insān al-kāmil), who has attained "subsistence in the Essence" (bāqā-yī dhātī) and therefore never uses the word "I" (āna) for himself. They are also comparable to the explanation of Suhrawardī, who thought that al-Ḥallāj had said āna al-ḥaqūq "by way of narrative", speaking not for himself, but in the name of God (‘alā ma‘nā al-ḥikāya ‘an allāh ta‘ālā). This explanation is approvingly quoted by Sirhindī. In adopting it, Sirhindī continues a long standing tradition of the ǧūfīs, most of whom refused to identify themselves with al-Ḥallāj's detractors.

Sirhindī's views of the ecstatic utterances of the early ǧūfīs should be understood also in the light of his description of the various degrees of religious consciousness, with which we have dealt earlier. The utterances are to be seen as expressions of the stage of "ḥūfī infidelity" (kufr-i ṭarīqat), legitimate in themselves, but not insurpassable. It is, therefore, not surprising that Sirhindī envisages a stage beyond that arrived at by these intoxicated ǧūfīs. The way in which their spiritual achievements can be improved upon is explained in Sirhindī's discussion of Rābiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya
in Mabda’ o Ma‘ād. This passage is characteristic of
the interplay of sunni and šūfī ideas in Sirhindī’s
thought and exemplifies his theoretical preference for
sobriety over intoxication. It deserves to be translated
in full: "Once upon a time a group of šūfīs were sitting
together. I spoke of my love for the companions
(ghulāmān !) of the Prophet in the following words:
'I have been overwhelmed by the love of the Prophet to
such an extent that I love God (only) because He is the
Master of Muḥammad.' Those present were amazed at this
talk, but they could not express their opposition. This
statement (of mine) is contrary to that of Rābi‘a who
said: 'I told the Prophet in a dream: "I have been over­
whelmed by the love of God to such an extent that there
remains no room for loving you."' Both statements
indicate (that they have been made in the stage of)
intoxication, but my statement has genuineness (aṣāla);
she spoke in the very midst of intoxication; I spoke at
the beginning of sobriety. She spoke (while being) at
the stage of Attributes; I spoke after returning from
the stage of the Essence. At the stage of the Essence
there is no room for this kind of love. No relation­
ship can reach this stage; everything there is either
bewilderment (hayra) or ignorance (jahl). Moreover,
(the šūfī) by his dhawq denies love at this stage and
does not consider himself deserving to love God in any way. Love and gnosis exist at the stage of Attributes only. The love of the Essence (mahabbat-i dhati) about which they (i.e. the sufis) spoke - its meaning is not the Essence of Oneness (dhat-i ahadiyya), but the Essence with several of its Attributes. Thus the love of Rabia is at the stage of Attributes. God inspires the truth."

Thus, Sirhindī refrains from censuring the early sufis for their ecstatic utterances, though he is convinced of their deficiency. His guiding principle is to refrain from creating dissension in the community. This attitude is significantly different from Sirhindī's views in the days before he joined the Naqshbandī order and when he wrote such violent denunciations of dissenters as the Epistle on the Refutation of the Shi'a. His rather catholic attitude towards the sufis reaches its fullest expression when he has to defend himself against critics who resented his own ecstatic statements. At the end of letter 121 of the third volume, which is a reply to 'Abd al-Haq Dihlawī's criticism of Sirhindī's claim to spiritual eminence, Sirhindī says that utterances divulging secrets have always been made by the sufis. He continues: "Thus, what is all this commotion? If a statement has been made whose outward meaning does not
conform to the shar‘Ī sciences, it should be turned away from its outward meaning and made to conform (with them) out of consideration (with him who uttered it). One must not level accusations against a Muslim. To expose a whore or a sinner is always forbidden and blameworthy according to the sharī‘a; how can then a Muslim be put to shame on the basis of mere ambiguity? What kind of religiosity is it to spread (unfounded rumours about him) from town to town? The way of Islām and kindness is first to find out who made the utterance whose outward meaning contradicts the shar‘Ī sciences. If he is an heretic, it should be refuted and no effort should be made to correct him. (But) if he who made the utterance is a Muslim and believes in God and the Prophet, an effort must be made to emend his words, to give them correct explanation or to ask for an explanation from him. If he is unable to furnish a correct explanation, one must give him good advice. It is desirable to enjoin good and forbid evil in a gentle way, because this is likely to bring about repentance. If the objective of repentance is not reached and it is required to expose the matter, this is another thing."16

2. Ibn al-‘Arabī.

Sirhindī's attitude to Ibn al-‘Arabī is one of the most intricate and difficult questions which we
must discuss. Modern writers have stressed Sirhindî's role in controverting Ibn al-‘Arabî's theory of wahdat al-wujûd, which was in their opinion un-Islamic and prejudicial to the survival of the Muslims of India as a distinct religious community. It is not our intention to enter here into a detailed description of wahdat al-wujûd and wahdat al-shuhûd. We have referred to these two theories briefly in the preceding section, and a full description of them can be found in B. A. Faruqi's The Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid. We should like rather to concentrate on Sirhindî's view of Ibn al-‘Arabî as a thinker and on the reasons given for the differences with Ibn al-‘Arabî.

We have seen in the preceding section that Sirhindî does not dissociate himself from the early šûfîs whose ecstatic utterances made them suspect in the eyes of the 'ulamā' and occasionally even brought about their execution. He maintains that these utterances, if properly understood and interpreted, constitute a legitimate expression of Muslim religious experience. It seems to us that his attitude towards Ibn al-‘Arabî is not essentially different. Sirhindî is critical of certain aspects of Ibn al-‘Arabî's teaching, but this criticism does not prevent him from appreciating Ibn al-‘Arabî's contribution to taṣawwuf as a whole.
Let us first discuss some of the differences between the two thinkers. Sirhindī criticizes Ibn al-‘Arabī for saying that the Vision of God in the hereafter will be "in symbolic form" (bi-ṣūrat-i mithāliyya). Since God (ḥaqq) does not have any form, Ibn al-‘Arabī’s view is, according to Sirhindī, tantamount to a virtual rejection of the Vision and resembles the views of the Philosophers and the Mu‘tazila. Sirhindī opposes Ibn al-‘Arabī’s view of the Attributes by asserting that the "essential" ones (ṣifāt-i ḥaqīqiyya) exist independently of and in addition to the Essence. He also disagrees with Ibn al-‘Arabī on the nature of the divine presence in the world. Perhaps the most important area in which Sirhindī departs from the theory of Ibn al-‘Arabī as he understood it is the nature of the existence of the phenomenal world. It is Sirhindī’s understanding that Ibn al-‘Arabī denied any independent existence of the world and thought that it existed only in the imagination of the common people. Sirhindī agrees that the world, indeed, is mere imagination (wahm), but adds that it has been given a measure of stability and permanence (thubūt o thabāt) by divine volition. It is not imaginary in the sense that it appears only in the people’s imagination, but in the sense that God created it to be such. It therefore has a kind of independent
existence, though not comparable with the Existence of God. This independent existence is important, because it allows for the Muslim idea of reward and punishment. In this exposition Sirhindī sees himself as adopting a position intermediate between the 'ulamā' who maintain that the world "really" exists and Ibn al-‘Arabī and his followers who deny that the world has any existence at all.22

Nevertheless, Sirhindī recommends the study of Ibn al-‘Arabī's works and considers them indispensable for the proper appreciation of his own spiritual insights.23 Frequently he quotes Ibn al-‘Arabī's works approvingly.24 Those of Ibn al-‘Arabī's opinions which are unacceptable should be viewed benevolently; they are similar to bona fide errors of a mujtahid, and Ibn al-‘Arabī should not be blamed for holding them.25 Occasionally Sirhindī even seems to be uneasy when he expresses opinions which are at variance with those maintained by Ibn al-‘Arabī. In one of the letters included in the third volume of the Maktūbāt, Sirhindī criticizes the views of Ibn al-‘Arabī regarding the Vision of God (ru'ya). As if he were astonished at his own courage to criticize the great master, he continues: "Oh God! What can I do in this battle-field? It is the Shaykh (i.e., Ibn al-‘Arabī) with whom I sometimes fight and sometimes
agree. It is he who laid down the foundations of the theory of gnosis (sukhan-i ma‘rifat o ‘irfān) and elaborated on it. It is he who spoke in details about Unity (tawḥīd) and Union (of the Creator and the creature) (ittiḥād) and who explained the emergence of Multiplicity (ta‘addud o takaththur). It is he who attributed Existence solely to God (ḥaqq) and asserted that the world was imaginary (mawḥūm o mutakhayyal). It is he who established the stages (tanazzulāt) of Existence and distinguished between the qualities of each stage. It is he who considered the world to be essentially identical with God (‘Ālam-rā ‘ayni-i ḥaqq dānista ast) and who said 'All is He' (hama ʿust); this notwithstanding, he found the stage of His transcendence (tanzīh) beyond the world and considered Him too remote and too pure (munazzah o mubarra‘) to be seen or known. The ṣūfīs who preceded him, - if they spoke about these matters at all, - only hinted at them and did not elaborate. Most of those who came after him chose to follow in his footsteps and used his terms. We latecomers (mā pas māndagān) have also benefited from the blessings of that great man and learned a great deal from his mystical insights. May God give him for this the best reward."26

It should be kept in mind that the above-quoted
passage was written late in Sirhindī's life. It is clear that even in this period Sirhindī maintains a very respectful attitude towards Ibn al-‘Arabī. He does not condemn him for his opinions, but rather attempts to interpret his controversial statements in a way that would render them compatible with what he considers to be the proper Islamic belief. It is not surprising that the crux of the matter is the interpretation to be given to the famous "All is He" (hama ʿūst). Although in an early letter Sirhindī seems to understand this expression as indicating phenomenological unity between God and the world, he later explains that it does not imply that God dwells in the material world (ḥulūl) or is united with it (ittiḥād). It means only that beings are manifestations of the one Divine Essence. The Essence does not dwell in them, is not united with them and not influenced, coloured or augmented by them. Another explanation given by Sirhindī to hama ʿūst is analogous to his understanding of ana al-ḥaqq. The latter sentence is taken to mean "I do not exist, what exists is God"; in parallel fashion, hama ʿūst would mean "All does not exist, what exists is He" (hama nīṣand mawjūd ʿūst). This interpretation is likewise devoid of any implications of phenomenological unity between God and the world. In other words, "All is He"
should be understood "All is from Him" (hama az ġūst); according to Sirhindī this is the meaning in which the wujūdī ṣūfīs intended it to be understood. The two phrases are therefore not contradictory, but rather two expressions of the same truth.

Despite the extensive treatment of this matter and the detailed exposition of questions related to it by Ibn al-‘Arabī, some of the ṣūfīs failed to understand him properly and condemned him on account of his views. The truth of the matter is, says Sirhindī, that "in most assertions about reality (taḥqīqāt) the Shaykh is in the right and his detractors far from the truth. From the investigation of this matter one ought to learn about the greatness and the profound wisdom of the Shaykh, not to refute and condemn him. The more (the discussion of) this question continues, . . . the more remote become any suspicions of a doctrine of indwelling (ḥulūl) and unity (between God and the world) (ittiḥād) . . . ."31

What are the conclusions which Sirhindī draws from this analysis of the relationship between the respective world-views of the ṣūfīs and the ‘ulamā’?

Both the ṣūfīs and the ‘ulamā’ are willing to accept "All is from Him", though they do not understand it in the same way. The ‘ulamā’ maintain only that the
world has its origin in God; the ṣūfīs accept this view, but maintain also that the world is a shadow of the divine perfections. Though this latter point is not understood by the ‘ulamā’, for which reason they are unable to reach the spiritual heights attained by the ṣūfīs, the gap between the two groups is bridged as far as essentials are concerned. Sirhindī is, therefore, able to demonstrate that the differences between the wujūdī ṣūfīs and the ‘ulamā’ are unessential and result only from varying modes of verbal expression. By adopting this view Sirhindī can take up the cause of Ibn al-‘Arabī and his followers without unduly antagonizing their opponents among the ranks of the ‘ulamā’. In other passages, however, he clearly dissociates himself from the attitude of the latter. To ascribe real existence to the world, as the ‘ulamā’ do, is in his opinion a kind of polytheism: it amounts to an assertion that God has partners in the most exclusive of his attributes, namely Existence.

It is not easy to arrive at a meaningful evaluation of the differences between Sirhindī and Ibn al-‘Arabī. In the Maktūbāt we are faced with many seeming contradictions, which do not easily lend themselves to an acceptable interpretation. We have seen that Sirhindī understands the famous hama ʿūst in two different ways.
In an earlier chapter we have referred to his description of the prophetic descent (nuzul) in which he implies that at this stage any distinction between haqq and khalq is meaningless. Such a doctrine seems to be in glaring contradiction to many passages in which heavy emphasis is laid upon the absolute separateness of haqq and khalq. It is also significant to note that while in a letter included in the first volume of the Maktubat Sirhindī accepts the view of those who maintain that the world exists independently due to divine creation (‘alam bi-‘iijd-i haqq subhanahu dar kharij mawjud ast), he later stresses that its existence is imaginary (mawhum), though with a degree of permanence.

The material at our disposal is too equivocal to enable us to state categorically that Sirhindī's view of Ibn al-‘Arabī developed in any particular direction with the passage of time. Likewise, the lack of sufficient biographical material about the addressees of the letters included in the Maktubat prevents us from substantiating our assumption, that at least some of the contradictory statements made in the various letters are due to differences in the spiritual capacities of the recipients, as Sirhindī saw them. On the other hand, there is no evidence to support the prevalent view according to which Sirhindī had been in the beginning a
follower of Ibn al-‘Arabī, and only later came to realize the deficiencies of Ibn al-‘Arabī's world-view. We assert this despite the fact that this view is based on Sirhindī's own description of his spiritual development in a letter included in the first volume of the Maktūbah. Sirhindī's self-image, as expressed in the early period of his life and even later, does not tally with the content of the Maktūbah as a whole. Most of the letters in which Sirhindī gives sympathetic interpretation to Ibn al-‘Arabī's views and criticizes those who failed to understand the true meaning of the great master's works, were written late in Sirhindī's life. Thus, if there was a development in Sirhindī's views on this matter, it is likely that he moved towards a sympathetic appreciation of Ibn al-‘Arabī rather than away from it.

It also seems to us that Sirhindī's criticism of the wahdat al-wujūd theory is a result not only of his disagreement with some of its constituent ideas. It springs also from his fear that the theory might lead common, uninitiated people to heresy and neglect of the shari‘a. Sirhindī fears such result even though he stresses that the accomplished adherents of wahdat al-wujūd "have reached perfection" (in țā‘īfa wāṣil o kāmil and) and are not to be blamed. The criticism
of Ibn al-ʿArabī is thus due at least partly to Sirhindī's conviction that certain ṣūfī "secrets" have to be withheld from the public because of their potentially harmful effect upon the uninitiated.

It is, therefore, our conclusion that Sirhindī's rejection of Ibn al-ʿArabī is far from being as complete and unequivocal as is generally believed. His criticism of Ibn al-ʿArabī is widely different from that of the ʿulamāʾ, not only in the way in which it is arrived at, but also in its essential features. In view of all this, and with due allowance for the complexities involved, we suggest that Sirhindī should not be regarded as a thinker who rejected hama ʿust and replaced it with hama az ʿust, but rather as one who interpreted the former expression by the latter, for the sake of clarity and because of the danger of misinterpretation by the uninitiated.

3. The Naqshbandī order.

As we have seen earlier, Sirhindī was initiated into the Naqshbandī order by Khwāja al-Bāqī bi-ʿllāh in 1008/1599-1600. This initiation was an event of major importance in his life. His religious outlook was transformed; and he became convinced that the Naqshbandī discipline was the shortest, fastest and only way to the pinnacle of spiritual achievement. The Naqshbandīs, says
Sirhindī, begin their spiritual journey where the other ṣūfīs end theirs. This "inclusion of the end in the beginning" (indīraj al-nihāya fī al-bidāya) is the Leitmotiv in Sirhindī's descriptions of Naqshbandī superiority. Sirhindī explains, however, that this does not imply equality between a beginner in the Naqshbandī order and an advanced disciple in another one; it merely means that the Naqshbandī shaykh shares his advanced stage with his beginning disciple. This early sharing has in turn a salutory effect on the final achievements of the Naqshbandīs. The way of the Naqshbandīs is absolutely identical with that of the Companions, and they have the same rank. One step in their way is better than seven in any other one; this is the way leading to the perfections of Prophecy, while the other ways have to be content with the attainment of Sainthood. Though certain innovations have crept even into the Naqshbandiyya, this order is still superior to the others which are guilty of many reprehensible customs, such as listening to music (samā'). This custom is unable to induce any real spiritual achievement and is characteristic of people suffering from spiritual instability (tagallub-i ahwāl). Practices associated with it, such as dancing (raqs), singing
(naghma) and ecstatic sessions (wajd, tawājud) are also objectionable. Prayer can perform their function much better.
CHAPTER VII

THE INDIAN ENVIRONMENT

The subjects with which we have been dealing so far have no particular connection with India. It is time now to consider Sirhindī in the context of his Indian environment.

Sirhindī has been credited with a major role in the development of Islām in India. It is therefore rather surprising that India, its history, its people and the conditions prevailing there in Sirhindī's time do not occupy a much more central position in his thought. Sirhindī does not regard the contribution of the Indian Muslims of Islamic culture very highly, is conscious of their great indebtedness to the ‘ulamā’ of Transoxania and speaks of India as the "lower country" (diyār-i suflā) as against Transoxania which he designates as "upper". An overwhelming majority of his work deals with problems that are of no more concern to the Muslims of India than to their co-religionists in other countries. Denunciations of Hinduism and attacks on the Hindūs, which have become one of the main themes in modern analyses of Sirhindī's historical significance, actually play only a peripheral role in his thought.
Even subjects that could have specific relevance to the conditions prevailing in India in the 16th and 17th centuries are frequently presented without any reference to these conditions. Sirhindī's Epistle on the Refutation of the Shī'ā is a case in point. Sirhindī might have been prompted to compile it by the growing influence of the Shī'a in the Mughul court. Yet, except for a brief reference to shī'ī propaganda in "these regions" at the beginning of the Epistle, he does not pay any attention to the circumstances which enabled shī'ī Islām to gain a foot-hold in India. He discusses at considerable length the events that led to the elevation of Abū Bakr to the khilāfa in 632, but does not mention at all the Safawī neighbours of the Mughuls, some of whom were instrumental in the introduction of shī'ī Islām into the subcontinent. Sirhindī is interested in the problem within its classical frame of reference and entirely ignores the form in which it manifested itself in 16th and 17th century India. This is another indication of the fact, that Sirhindī is primarily a ṣūfī and a theologian, and not a person pre-occupied with problems of a particular historical period. All this notwithstanding, our description of Sirhindī's works would not be complete without considering those few elements in his thought that clearly are the product
of his Indian environment.

We have seen earlier that Sirhindī vigorously objects to the introduction of innovations (bida', sg. bid'ā) into Islamic culture. However, his exhortations to this effect are general, and he rarely attacks specific deviations from what he considers to be the proper form of Islamic practice. The few examples adduced to illustrate his views on the matter are random and do not constitute a systematic attack on the (un)-Islamic practices current in his time and place. Only in a single letter does he deal with innovations peculiar to the Muslims of India. This letter (volume 3, letter 41) is addressed to an anonymous šūfī lady (yakī az šāliḥāt) and deals mainly with the "pledge of women" (bay'at al-nisā') at the time of Muḥammad. Sirhindī expresses his conviction that women are more prone to blameworthy actions than men and then proceeds to describe the innovations common among Indian Muslims, chiefly women, in his time. Because of their utter stupidity women pray to stones and idols and ask for their help. This practice is common, especially when small-pox strikes, and there is hardly a woman who is not involved in this polytheistic practice. Women participate in the holidays of Hindūs and Jews. They celebrate the festival of Diwālī and send to their sisters and daughters presents
similar to those exchanged by the infidels. They
sacrifice animals at the tombs of Ṣūfī saints, even
though this custom has been branded as polytheistic
in the books of Islamic law. They observe fasts in
honour of saints, though God alone is entitled to this
homage. Having finished the fast, they commit various
sins. All this, as well as other sinful practices, is
in violation of the conditions upon which the Prophet
accepted the "pledge of the women".7

Despite the fact that Sirhindī's Islamic
consciousness is barely qualified in any way by his
being Indian, Sirhindī is confronted with the questions
of India's status from the theological point of view and
of the attitude which Muslims should have towards its
Hindū inhabitants. To give an answer to these questions
is for him a rather difficult task. A Muslim can learn
from his classical sources what attitude he should adopt
towards the Jews and the Christians and what is their
position in the spiritual history of mankind. He cannot
do the same with regard to the Hindūs. The first question
which Sirhindī has to answer in order to clarify their
status is whether Prophets have been sent to their
country or not. Sirhindī's reply is that Prophets were
sent to India, but all were rejected, and none had more
than three followers. They were not successful in
founding a community, and we, therefore, do not have any reliable information concerning them; who would have transmitted the information and who would have been there to receive it? Moreover, the Indian language did not have the necessary words to transmit information about the Prophets. Hence, there is no verbal tradition about the prophetic missions to India, but there are some gruesome reminders of them. Probably having in mind the Qur'ānic traditions about the extinct communities of 'Ād and Thamūd, Sirhindī says that the ruins scattered all over India are those of towns and villages which rejected the Prophets and which were consequently destroyed by the divine wrath. 8

Yet these Prophets did exercise some influence upon the spiritual life of India. Whatever the "leaders of Indian infidelity" (ru'asā'i ḫufr-i hind) know about the necessary existence of God, they learned from these unsuccessful apostles, very much like the Philosophers. 9 Going back to the classical notion that reason alone is not sufficient to bring about awareness of God, Sirhindī says that the lame and blind intellects of the Brahmins could never have reached the good fortune of this awareness without prophetic guidance. Yet despite their indebtedness, the Brahmins misuse the knowledge communicated to them, falsify the message by claiming
that the Divine is dwelling (हालो सारी) in them and induce people to bestow divine worship upon their own persons. 10

The above is one way in which Sirhindī attempts to disparage the spiritual achievements of the Hindūs. He tries to achieve the same objective also by evolving a theory concerning the respective merits of religious duties (फाराइद), works of supererogation (नवाफिल) and acts of mortification (रियाद, मुजहदात). The subjugation of the carnal soul, which ought to be man's highest aim in this world, can be effected solely through the performance of works prescribed by the shari'a. Works of supererogation are of any value only when supplementing the religious duties. The fulfilment of one commandment brings man nearer to his purpose than a thousand years of mortification independent of the shari'a. A penny given as zakāt is better than thousands of dinārs spent on charity without reference to the Qur'ānic commandment. Acts of self-denial performed independently of divine precepts may even be a source of strength for the carnal soul. Thus the Hindū Yōgīs and the Greek Philosophers, who lose no opportunity of self-denial, are actually engaged in an exercise in futility. 11

The preference of the prescribed religious duties over the supererogatory works is of such fundamental
importance to Sirhindī that he deems it necessary to incorporate it even in his cosmology: the supererogatory works belong to the "World of the Command" (ālam-i-amr) and enable the worshipper to approach merely the shadow of the Ultimate Reality (gurb-i-zillā), while the religious duties are part of the "World of Creation" (ālam-i-khalq) and lead the believer to the proximity of the Essence (gurb-i-aṣlā). 12

Sirhindī's critique of Hinduism is given in the most succinct form in a letter addressed to one Hirday Rām. This letter is the only one in the Maktūbāt which was sent to a Hindū and also the only one in which Sirhindī expresses his views on a few details of the Hindū tradition. Significantly, the letter begins and ends without any benedictory formulae, so copiously used by Sirhindī in the rest of his correspondence. It constitutes a reply to two letters which Sirhindī received from Hirday Rām. From Sirhindī's description of these two letters 13 and from his reaction to their content, it seems likely that Hirday Rām expressed in them his desire to join the Naqshbandī order without first accepting Islām; he probably based his request on the belief that all religions are essentially identical and that formal conversion would thus be meaningless and superfluous. It is not surprising that
such a request and the ideas accompanying it were abhorrent to Sirhindī. His reply is devoted in its entirety to a devastating and scornful attack on Hinduism, on the human characteristics of the Hindū deities and on the idea that Rām and Raḥmān are one and the same. It is noteworthy that Sirhindī does not formally urge his correspondent to accept Islām, though he says that "one should use farsighted intelligence and refrain from following them" (i.e. the Hindū deities). This omission is significant, for it faithfully reflects Sirhindī's general disinterestedness in questions of conversion. His concern is limited to the Muslim community only. Sirhindī's disciples and followers claim that Sirhindī was engaged in widespread missionary activity, but there is no sound historical evidence to substantiate this claim.

Sirhindī follows up his utter rejection of the beliefs and practices of Hinduism by an equally outspoken attitude regarding the position of the Hindūs in the Mughul empire. The honour of Islām demands the humiliation of the infidels and of their false religion. To achieve this objective, jizya should be mercilessly levied upon them, and they should be treated like dogs. Cows should be slaughtered to demonstrate the supremacy of Islām. The performance of this rite is, in India,
the most important symbol of Islamic domination. One
should refrain from dealing with the infidels unless
absolutely necessary, and even then treat them with
contempt. Islām and infidelity are two irreconcilable
opposites. One thrives upon the degradation of the
other. Sirhindī’s deep-seated hatred of the non-
Muslims can be best illustrated by his rejoicing at the
execution in 1606 of Arjun, the fifth guru of the Sikhs.
In a letter to Shaykh Farīd Būkārī Sirhindī says:
"These days the accursed infidel of Goindwāl was very
fortunately killed. It is a cause of great defeat for
the reprobate Hindūs. With whatever intention and pur-
pose they are killed - the humiliation of infidels is
for the Muslims life itself . . ." (dar īn waqt kushtan-i
kāfir-i la‘īn-i goindwāl bīsyr khūb wāqi‘ shud wa bā’ith-i
shikast-i ‘agīm bar hunūd-i mardūd gasht bi-har niyyat kih
kushtah bāshand wa bi-har gharaţ halāk kardah khwārī-yi
kuffār khwud naqtd-i waqt-i ahl-i islām ast). Else-
where he says: "Whenever a Jew is killed, it is for the
benefit of Islām" (juhūd bar kih shawad kushtah sūd-i
islām ast).18

Shaykh Muḥammad Ikrām has suggested that
Sirhindī softened his attitude towards the Hindūs at the
end of his life. He quotes letter 22 of the third
volume as evidence for this thesis. In the letter
Sirhindī discusses the question whether contacts between Muslims and infidels are permissible. He refers to the tradition according to which the Prophet had a meal with a Jew and quotes the Qur'ānic verse which declares the food of the People of the Book lawful for Muslims. He maintains that the impurity of the polytheists is not "essential" (najas-i 'ayn); the verse saying that "the polytheists are impure" (innamā al-mushrikūn najas) indicates impurity of belief (khubth-i i'tiqād) only. Sirhindī thus reaches the conclusion that contacts with the polytheists have never been forbidden and in the conditions of India are even inevitable.

Ikrām's contention that this letter reflects a more moderate attitude towards the Hindūs, adopted by Sirhindī at the end of his life, may be correct. The interpretation of 'Āzīz Aḥmad, who maintains that the letter was written to distinguish Sirhindī's "religio-social separatism from Hindū caste-system" also deserves careful consideration. However, another factor must not be lost sight of during our discussion of this apparent modification of Sirhindī's attitude towards the Hindūs. All the violent expressions of hostility against them in the first volume of the Maktūbāt are included in letters addressed to nobles of the Mughul court. Sirhindī's intention in these letters is to
undermine the position of the Hindūs in the Mughul administration, rather than to fight their contacts with Muslims in other areas of life. This intention is evident when due consideration is given to the identity of the recipients of these letters. \(^{25}\) The absence of direct anti-Hindū material in the last two volumes of the *Maktūbāt* might, therefore, be due to the sharp decline in Sirhindī's correspondence with the ruling circles after the completion of the first volume. The letter on which Ikram bases his contention is addressed to a šūfī, Maqṣūd 'Alī Tibrīzī, \(^{26}\) and views the question of polytheism and infidelity in an entirely different perspective. It seeks to assure the recipient that Muslims are not rendered impure by their inevitable contacts with the Hindūs, rather than to make a conciliatory move towards the latter community. Although the letter seems to imply that Hindūs may be considered as People of the Book, it does not indicate a change in Sirhindī's views on their participation in the Mughul administration.

To sum up: letters containing overt references to India and its Hindū inhabitants constitute only a tiny portion of the *Maktūbāt*. Most of them are addressed to officials of the Mughul court. It seems to us that Sirhindī's view of the Hindūs - in the few cases when it
is expressed - is determined not by the development of his ideas on the matter, but rather by the context in which it is expressed. Sirhindī objected to Hindū participation in the government; he therefore expresses his hostility towards Hindūs in letters to government officials who presumably had the power to purge the administration of Hindū influence. On the other hand, the few references to Hindūs in letters addressed to his fellow śūfīs are relatively mild.
CHAPTER VIII

SIRHINDI AND THE MUGHUL COURT

Whether Muslim spiritual leaders should become involved in the administration of the state has been an issue since the earliest days of Islam. India has not been an exception in this respect. Professor Nizāmī has shown in his numerous articles on the subject that the ṣūfī orders active in India differed from each other in their respective attitudes to the rulers of the day. He maintains that "the Naqshbandī silsilah alone considered it not only permissible but imperative to establish contact with the rulers, and to attempt to influence their thought and policies". It has been a near consensus of modern Muslim historiography that Sirhindī's revivalist activities, directed at the Mughul nobility and carried out in accordance with the general outlook of the Naqshbandī order, effected an important change in the direction of the Islamic developments in India. Sirhindī is said to have been unanimously accepted as the mujaddid who "had restored the pristine purity of the doctrine of Islam" and paved the way for the gradual shift in the religious policy of the Mughul
empire from the rank heresy of Akbar to the strict orthodoxy of Awrangzēb. He was able to achieve this result by exercising his influence on the ruling circles, not excluding the emperor Jahāngīr himself. We shall presently examine this opinion in view of the evidence available.

We must again stress at the outset that the relationship between religion and state is not one of the central themes in Sirhindī's thought, and we have relatively few references to it in the Maktūbāt. As in other areas in this field, Sirhindī makes also statements that are seemingly contradictory. He objects when a ṣūfī decides to join the services of the state; such an occupation Sirhindī considers worldly and therefore base. He himself, however, maintains correspondence with the ruling circles and demands that they seek the advice of the 'ulamā'. This notwithstanding, he himself is not always enthusiastic about joining the court. It seems to us that in the beginning he preferred to exercise his influence by way of correspondence and that only later events, connected with his imprisonment, served to modify his attitude.

Historians who have dealt with Sirhindī's attitude to the state have completely neglected those passages in the Maktūbāt in which Sirhindī sternly
warns his correspondents against any connection with the rulers and their institutions. In the first volume we have a letter in which Sirhindī strongly advises one Bahā’ al-Dīn against any association with the rulers. Faithful to the classical ṣūfī aversion to worldly affairs, he asserts that this world and the next are two irreconcilable opposites; one can be enjoyed only at the expense of the other. Speaking in the same vein, he quotes the following classical warning concerning the rulers: "Flee from their company more than you would flee from a lion; he causes (only) worldly death which might (even) be beneficial in the hereafter, while association with the kings necessarily brings about eternal perdition . . . Beware of their company, beware of their food, beware of their love, beware of their sight . . ." (firra min ṣuhbatihim akthar mimma tafirr min al-aṣad fa-innahu yūjib al-mawt al-dunyawi wa-huwa qad yufīd fī al-ākhira wa-khtilāṭ al-mulūk yūjib al-halāk al-abadī wa al-khasāra /sic/ al-sarmadī fa-iyyāka wa-ṣuḥbatahum wa-iyyāka wa luqmatahum wa-iyyāka wa-maḥabbatahum wa-iyyāka wa-ru’vatuhum). Occasionally Sirhindī is even more specific. In a series of letters to Muḥammad Ṣiddīq Badakhshi, Sirhindī expresses his bitter disappointment that this promising disciple should have established contacts with the rich and
finally joined the army, though he was in no material need.8 Mamrêz Khân Afghân, who also abandoned the ṣūfī way of life in order to join the armed services, deserves in Sirhindī's view only scorn and contempt; even if he reaches the rank of panj-hazârî or haft-hazârî, he had traded the ephemeral benefits of this world for the everlasting bliss of the hereafter.9 As for the possibility that he himself might serve at the court, Sirhindī expresses different opinions. In a letter to Shaykh Farîd Bukhârî10 he indicates his willingness to assist Jahâṅgîr in strengthening Islâm;11 in a later letter to the same addressee, however, Sirhindī seems to be apprehensive that he may be asked to serve at Jahâṅgîr's court in an advisory capacity. He expresses his apprehension in connection with the emperor's decision to invite four 'ulamā' to serve as sharî advisors at the court.12 Sirhindī is very pleased with this decision, though he would prefer that only one "ālim of the hereafter" (az 'ulamā'-i ākhirat) be invited, to prevent wrangling. It is his hope, however, that he himself will not be asked to fill the post.13

This material notwithstanding, Sirhindī maintained contact with various dignitaries of the Mughul empire and even received material support for his khângâh from them.14 We shall presently analyse
the part of the Maktūbāt containing this correspondence, while constantly keeping in mind that these letters constitute only a small portion of the collection as a whole. Not more than seventy letters out of the total 534 are addressed to persons who can be identified as servants of the emperor. Most of them are found in the first volume; of those only few deal with subjects that can be classified under the heading of religion and state.

We shall begin our discussion of Sirhindī's relations with the Wughul nobles and other influential people by an examination of a little known aspect of the subject. A few of Sirhindī's letters contain personal recommendations of various kinds. Some of the letters seem to have been written solely for this purpose, and the brief discourse on religious matters included in them serves only as a polite introduction to the main part of the letter. A few examples will illustrate the nature of the personal matters in which Sirhindī tries to intervene. In a letter to Khwāja Jahān, Sirhindī requests him to release a prisoner who approached Sirhindī in this matter. Elsewhere he recommends two persons to the service of Jabārī Khān. In other letters he requests that a certain learned man be given a governmental post or tries to obtain a
stipend for the father of a large family who had to join the army because of his destitution.\textsuperscript{18} In a letter to Shaykh Farīd Bukhārī, Sirhindī expresses the hope that a certain Shaykh Zakariyya will again be included in the dīwān, apparently as a recipient of a stipend.\textsuperscript{19} In two letters sent to his teacher al-Bāqī bi-llāh he seems to perform the function of a public notary in Sirhind. He certifies that certain persons eligible for government pensions are alive and asks that the sums be given to the bearers of the letters.\textsuperscript{20}

In none of these instances do we know whether Sirhindī's recommendations were heeded or not. There is, however, a partial answer to this question in another case. In a letter to Shaykh Farīd Bukhārī Sirhindī complains that the city of Sirhind does not have a qādī and people are therefore compelled to act unlawfully in certain cases. This situation would not arise if the vacancy were filled.\textsuperscript{21} That this request of Sirhindī was not promptly complied with is clear from a letter written later on to Šadr-i Jahān. In it, Sirhindī speaks of the necessity to appoint judges in Islamic cities, complains that the city of Sirhind has not had a qādī for several years, and requests that a protégé of his be appointed to the post.\textsuperscript{22} Thus it seems that Sirhindī was ignored here in a relatively
important matter.

These letters of recommendation must have been prepared for the persons concerned at their own request and were to be delivered by them to the prospective benefactors. The fact that Sirhindī was asked to write these letters indicates that he was believed to wield some influence upon the ruling circles of the capital, at least in questions of a minor, personal nature. However, more material will have to be discovered and analysed before it can be determined to what extent this belief was justified.

The most important documents for the evaluation of Sirhindī's historical role have been those few letters to the Mughul officials, in which he expresses his views on the situation of Islām in India during the reign of Akbar and Jahāngīr. His view of the decline of Islām during Akbar's period and his rejoicing at the accession of Jahāngīr are too well known to need any detailed description. He bemoans the ascendancy of infidelity during the reign of Akbar and demands that Jahāngīr be prevailed upon by his ministers to forbid the heretical customs that have established themselves at the court. He lays much of the blame at the door of the wicked, worldly 'ulamā' ('ulamā'-i sū, 'ulamā'-i dunyā) and demands that the "'ulamā' of the hereafter" ('ulamā'-i
akhirat) assist the emperor in strengthening Islām. It is evident from the existence of these letters, that Sirhindī tried to impress his view of Islām upon some of the top officials of the Mughul empire. Unfortunately, we do not have at our disposal the answers given to Sirhindī by these officials. We therefore cannot know to what extent his efforts were successful. His sweeping recommendations concerning the Hindūs were clearly not carried out by Jahāngīr, but this does not mean that his views failed to gain favour among some of the officials whom he contacted. That the question of Sirhindī's influence upon the thinking of Shaykh Farīd Bukhārī or 'Abd al-Raḥīm Khān-i Khānān should have become a matter of controversy among the students of his works is regrettable; any opinion concerning the matter cannot escape from the realm of speculation till hitherto unknown material - hopefully the letters of these officials to Sirhindī - is brought to light and analysed. As the source material stands now, we cannot go beyond saying that Sirhindī tried, with unknown results, to propagate his ideas among the top echelons of Mughul officialdom.

Let us turn now to a discussion of Sirhindī's relations with Jahāngīr, which have also been a controversial issue among the students of the period. The
view which asserts that "Sirhindī . . . did play some role in the accession of Jahāṅgīr" and that Jahāṅgīr, under the influence of Shaykh Farīd Bukhārī and Sirhindī, gave at the time of his elevation to the throne a pledge to defend Islām has been called seriously into question recently by the works of Ḥabīb and Rīvī. It is true that Sirhindī expressed satisfaction at the accession of Jahāṅgīr, but later he was disappointed with the new emperor. His description of the situation of Islām during the reign of Jahāṅgīr, written between 1025/1616-7 and 1028/1618-9, is as gloomy as his descriptions of the period of Akbar. In a letter to Mīr Muḥammad Nuʿmān, Sirhindī says: "In your letter you spoke about the good character and piety of the present Sulṭān and indicated that justice prevails and that the ordinances of the sharīʿa are being compiled with. Perusal of this letter was for me a cause of great joy and pleasure. May God grant victory and grandeur to the sharīʿa of Muḥammad and his community, just as he made the world resplendent with the brilliance of the present king's justice and equity! Dear friend! The spread of the illustrious sharīʿa depends, according to (the maxim) "the sharīʿa is under the sword" (al-sharīʿa taḥt al-sayf), upon the assistance and care of the great Sulṭāns. This (assistance) has slackened recently and
Islam has necessarily become weak. The Indian infidels fearlessly destroy mosques and erect temples in their place. In Tānēsar (sc. Thānēsar), in the pool of Kurukhēt (sc. Kurukshetra),32 there was a mosque and a tomb of a saint. They destroyed these and erected a big idol-temple in their stead. The infidels publicly observe the customs of infidelity, while Muslims are unable to comply with most Islamic ordinances. On the day of Ekādashi33 of the Hindūs, when they refrain from eating and drinking, they insist that no Muslim bake and sell bread - in the country of Islām!; on the other hand, during the blessed month of Ramaqān they cook and sell food publicly. Due to the weakness of Islām nobody can restrain them from doing this. Alas, a thousand times alas! The present king is one of us, and we, the ṣūfīs (mā faqīrān) are in this kind of weakness and misery!34

This passage makes it abundantly clear, that even if Jahāngīr gave his alleged pledge to defend Islām, he did not honour it to Sirhindī's satisfaction.

In 1619, not a long time after he wrote the letter which we have just discussed, Sirhindī was summoned to Jahāngīr’s presence. His audience with the emperor and his subsequent imprisonment have been subject to numerous interpretations. The sources on which
these interpretations are based can be divided into two distinct groups. One includes the memoirs of Jahāṅgīr and the Maktūbāt; the other consists of later Naqshbandī literature. While the former group is by virtue of its contemporaneity and authenticity historically far more important, it has been the latter one which contributed most of the material to the prevalent image of Sirhindī as the man who brought the Mughul dynasty back into the fold of Islām. We shall discuss this latter group of sources while dealing with the development of Sirhindī's image in Indian Muslim literature.

Jahāṅgīr's memoirs contain three references to Sirhindī. In the first, Jahāṅgīr describes Sirhindī as an arrogant impostor, who is sending his disciples to every town and city to deceive the people. Out of the idle tales that he wrote for his followers he compiled a book called the Maktūbāt, which contains many useless theories and leads people to heresy. Among other things Sirhindī wrote that he had transcended the spiritual stage of the khulafā’-i rāshidūn.35 Jahāṅgīr therefore summoned Sirhindī to the imperial court. Sirhindī behaved there in an arrogant manner, yet was not able to give any satisfactory explanations for his theories. Jahāṅgīr continues: "I came to see that the best thing for him would be to be imprisoned for some time, so that
his disturbed disposition and confused mind calm down a little and the agitation of the masses subside. He was taken into custody by Ani Rai Singh Dalan, to be kept imprisoned in the fort of Gawāliyār." About one year later Jahāngīr released him, gave him a robe of honour, and a present of one thousand rupees. He was given the choice of staying at the court or leaving it. He recognized that the punishment imposed upon him was an appropriate one. In a subsequent passage Jahāngīr mentions that he gave Sirhindī a gift of two thousand rupees at his annual weighing ceremony. Nowhere does Jahāngīr acknowledge that Sirhindī exercised any influence upon him.

Sirhindī refers to his imprisonment and his subsequent stay in the emperor's camp several times. It is clear that some letters in the first part of the third volume were written while Sirhindī was in Gawāliyār. He tends to see the episode in characteristically ṣūfī terms. The imprisonment is in his eyes a manifestation of God's awe (jalāl), as distinguished from His beauty (jamāl). Sirhindī feels that he has made great strides in his spiritual progress by experiencing both aspects of the Divine. He chastises one of his disciples who wrote that his own spiritual progress was adversely affected by Sirhindī's imprisonment. His
suffering, and the contempt consequently shown to his disciples by the masses, should have an opposite effect: "the cruelty of the Beloved gives more pleasure than His fidelity" (jafā-yi maḥbūb az wafā-yi ū bīshtar ladh-dhat bakhsh ast). Sirhindī does not see his imprisonment as a part of a struggle against the emperor or his policies. He sees it entirely in terms of ṣūfī experience.

As for his stay at the royal camp, Sirhindī seems to have enjoyed it; however, while describing the end of his stay there he says that he "was freed by divine providence from accompanying the army".

As the source material stands now, it is difficult to establish satisfactorily the reasons behind Sirhindī's imprisonment. Jahāngīr himself speaks of Sirhindī's arrogant claims to spiritual eminence and mentions, very vaguely, an "agitation of the masses" which he wants to stop by Sirhindī's detention. Though there is no compelling reason to doubt Jahāngīr's explanation of the action he took against Sirhindī, some writers tend to think that it is not satisfactory. Nūr Jahān's irritation at Sirhindī's attacks against the Shi‘ah and his failure to perform prostration in the emperor's presence were cited as the real reasons for his imprisonment. This may be so; but since neither of
these elements can be satisfactorily established by sound historical method, we prefer to treat them as a part of Sirhindī's image as it developed in Indian Muslim literature.\(^43\) We shall refer to them again in due course.

After his release from prison, Sirhindī wrote one letter to Jahāngīr. He wishes success to the imperial armies and then proceeds to apply the ṣūfī dichotomy of form (ṣūra) and essence (ḥaqīqa) to military affairs. He makes a distinction between "formal victory" (ṣūrat-i fath), which can be achieved by the "army of war" (lashkar-i ghazā) and "real victory" (ḥaqīqat-i fath) which can be achieved by "the army of prayer" (lashkar-i du‘ā'). He has no doubt in his mind that the army of prayer is the stronger one, because prayer, not the sword, is the only way to avert the divine decree.\(^44\)

In another letter, addressed to his sons, Sirhindī describes a meeting which he had with the emperor. He explained to the emperor the basic principles of Islām, did not make any compromise and used the same language he employed in the ṣūfī gatherings. The emperor is said to have listened attentively, without any sign of disapproval.\(^45\) The emperor's apparent agreement with Sirhindī's discourse is, however, less significant than
it seems to be, because Sirhindī apparently did not ex-
pound his controversial views on this occasion. He
spoke about "the mission of the Prophets, the in-
sufficiency of reason, the belief in the hereafter,
reward and punishment, the affirmation of the Vision,
the finality of Muḥammad's prophecy, the centennial
mujaddids, emulation of the khulafā'-i rāshidūn, the
sunna of the tarāwīḥ (prayers), the falsity of the trans-
migration of souls, the conditions of the jinn and their
reward and punishment and so on". Sirhindī did not
offer to the emperor any advice as to the proper conduct
of political affairs, and least of all did he urge him
to purge the administration of Hindū influence or to
impose jizya on his Hindū subjects. It is clear that in
the primary sources from which we have to draw our
information about Sirhindī's relationship with Jahāngīr,
there is little material to substantiate the thesis
that Sirhindī succeeded in converting the emperor to his
view of Islām.
CHAPTER IX

THE JUDGMENT OF POSTERITY

In the preceding chapters we have outlined the thought of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī. It is time now to discuss the view taken of him by his contemporaries and by subsequent generations. The opinion that Sirhindī was recognized by the ijmāʿ of Islam in India as the Renewer of the Second Millennium has been widely accepted by Muslim historiography and followed by some western scholars. Sirhindī's admirers were able to sustain it by ignoring or explaining away a whole body of material reflecting a different point of view. It is our contention that the consensus of the Muslims of the subcontinent concerning Sirhindī's historical role is of late origin and is now showing signs of breaking down. The purpose of this chapter is to trace the changing image of Ahmad Sirhindī in Indian Muslim literature from the seventeenth century to the present day. Clearly not all the relevant works could be discussed here and we do not claim to have exhausted the subject. Especially the nineteenth century literature is inadequately represented. Nevertheless, a reasonably clear development of Sirhindī's image will be discernible in our discussion.
The image of Sirhindī in the eyes of his contemporaries could be best ascertained on the basis of letters which he received from his correspondents. These were undoubtedly numerous. Sirhindī's replies and the editors' brief introductions to them occasionally contain references to the reactions aroused by Sirhindī's views. Apparently he was questioned several times in connection with letter 11 of the first volume, in which he described his spiritual ascent and seemed to imply his superiority to Abū Bakr. Elsewhere he states that some of his disciples did not abandon practices of which he disapproved or even left the ṭarīqa. This material is, however, patently insufficient to assess the reception of Sirhindī's ideas among his contemporaries. An adequate assessment could be made only by studying the full texts of letters received by Sirhindī. Only two such letters have come to light thus far. The more important of them is by the famous writer 'Abd al-Haqq Muḥaddith Dihlawī and was discovered by Professor Niẓāmī. The other is a hitherto unknown letter by 'Abd al-Jalīl Siddīqī preserved in the Khudā Bakhsh Library in Patna. These letters, and especially the former, set the tone for the discussion of Sirhindī's views in later literature.
'Abd al-Ḥaqq opens his letter very respectfully. He points out that for years on end he has been anxious to ask Sīrhindī to explain some of the statements made in the Maktūbāt. Among the statements that have made people uneasy and puzzled he mentions Sīrhindī's view that Abū Yazīd al-Bīstāmī and al-Junayd remained "captivated by the shadow" (giriftār-i ẓill) and never reached the essence (aṣl). Sīrhindī's claim that he was the first to receive certain spiritual insights and his discourtesy towards his teacher al-Bāqī bi-illāh and other great ūfīs were also found objectionable. Furthermore, Sīrhindī claimed that the perfections of Muḥammad and Ibrāhīm combined in his personality, that he had been created from the remnants of the clay used in the creation of Muḥammad, and that all the perfections which were originally (bi-‘l-asāla) invested in the Prophet were eventually given to him as Muḥammad's follower (bi-tatabbu‘ wa ṭufayl /sic/). 'Abd al-Ḥaqq was willing to overlook all these. However, when Sīrhindī wrote letter 87 of the third volume, 'Abd al-Ḥaqq was unable longer to restrain himself. He quotes the controversial letter in full, then censures the arrogance implicit in it and castigates Sīrhindī for want of humility which is the essence of the ūfī ideal (darwīshī). Sīrhindī's attitude is in 'Abd al-
Haqq's view unprecedented; indeed, there were arrogant 
Sufis in the past, but they were careful to exclude the 
Prophet from their claim to superiority. Commenting on 
Sirhindī's statement that he is "sharing in the wealth" 
(ṣarīk-i dawlatam), Abd al-Haqq rejects 
Sirhindī's distinction between the sharing of equals 
and sharing which does not imply equality: sharing 
(shirka) and equality (ham-sari) are in his view 
identical, and there can be no sharing between servant 
and master. Sirhindī thus makes a false claim of equality 
with the Prophet. Abd al-Haqq compares Sirhindī's 
attitude with that of some Madāwīs: they claim that 
Sayyid Muḥammad Jawnpūrī acquired all the perfections 
of the Prophet by faithfully following him; this is exactly 
the attitude adopted by Sirhindī regarding himself. 
Sirhindī's doctrine is also analogous to the attitudes 
of the Shiʿīa who claim that the twelve aʿīmma are the 
Prophet's disciples who reached the rank of their 
master. Sirhindī's statements are, in Abd al-Haqq's 
view, self-contradictory: it is meaningless to say that 
"I am a parasite, yet have not come uninvited"; a 
parasite is precisely the man who comes to a feast un-
invited. It is similarly meaningless to state that 
"though I am a follower, I am not without a share of 
genuineness", or that "I am both the disciple of God
(murīd allāh) and His desire (murād allāh)". The proper belief is that all are the disciples of Muḥammad, and he alone is the disciple of God who receives from Him the blessings and transmits them to the community. A Muslim bristles with horror at statements of the kind that Sirhindī made.\(^1\)

The rest of the epistle is devoted to a detailed refutation of Sirhindī's views as expressed in the letter under consideration. Sirhindī's claim that there is no mediation between himself and God comes in for the severest criticism. Illustrating his view by the verse "be ecstatic with God, but sober with Muḥammad" (bā khudā dīwānā bāsh o bā muḥammad hūshyār), ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq maintains that this claim entails gross discourtesy towards the Prophet. He stresses that his appreciation of Sirhindī and of his way in tahāwuf is still very high, but he could not remain silent in view of Sirhindī's statements regarding the Prophet. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq indicates that he has taken this critical stand only after the most careful consideration of the matter. At the end of the epistle he prays, asking God to show him the right way if his criticism is unjustified, and to guide Sirhindī to the right path if it is he who is in error.\(^1\)

The disagreement between Sirhindī and ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq has been a source of embarrassment for the Naqshbandīs,
who have tried to demonstrate the unanimous acceptance of Sirhindī by his contemporaries. Several traditions, intended to minimize or explain away the disagreement between the two thinkers, have come into being. According to some of them, ‘Abd al-Ḥaqqa wrote his critique on the basis of spurious letters circulated with malicious intent by an enemy of Sirhindī, Ḥasan Khān Afghān. The conspiracy was discovered when Sirhindī sent to ‘Abd al-Ḥaque the genuine version of his letters, whereupon ‘Abd al-Ḥaque apologized to Sirhindī for his attack. This tradition is, however, baseless. The genuineness of the letter which aroused ‘Abd al-Ḥaque’s criticism is beyond question, since Sirhindī himself, in his reply to ‘Abd al-Ḥaque, accepts the responsibility for writing it and attempts to explain it in a way not incompatible with proper Islamic belief. Some Mujaddidīs tried to minimize the importance of ‘Abd al-Ḥaque’s opposition to Sirhindī by saying that he was a bigot, belonged to the "superficial" ‘ulamā‘ (‘ulama‘-i ẓawāhir), and spoke on the basis of unfounded rumours. In their view no importance ought to be attached to disputes between contemporaries which are presumably based on personal rivalry. In any case, ‘Abd al-Ḥaque is said to have eventually retracted his criticism in a letter to Ḥusām al-Dīn Aḥmad. The letter is given at the end of an
account of Sirhindī's teaching which constitutes an appendix to the printed editions of 'Abd al-Ḥaqq's Akhbār al-Akhyār. Its authenticity is, however, open to question. The entire appendix does not appear in the oldest manuscripts of the book and seems to have originated in late Mujaddidī circles.

Whether 'Abd al-Ḥaqq eventually retracted completely his criticism of Sirhindī or not, the two thinkers retained their mutual respect despite their disagreement. While 'Abd al-Ḥaqq certainly criticized some of the fundamental aspects of Sirhindī's teaching, his criticism has nothing of the acrimony that is characteristic of the polemical works written against Sirhindī in the late 17th century.

'Abd al-Jalīl Siddiqī criticizes Sirhindī from a different angle. While 'Abd al-Ḥaqq accused him of transgressing the limits of propriety in his remarks about the Prophet, 'Abd al-Jalīl implies that Sirhindī's understanding of the nature of God and the world is not sufficient and that he is merely one of the "superficial" 'ulamā'. 'Abd al-Jalīl's short letter is apparently a reply to letter 112 of the first volume of the Maktūbāt. Sirhindī stresses in this letter the paramount importance of the beliefs of ahl al-sunna wa al-jamā'a. If one has acquired these beliefs, says Sirhindī, he can dispense with any ṣūfī experience; on the other hand, ṣūfī
experience that is incompatible with them is nothing but satanic temptation (istikdrāj). He also contrasts the infallibility of Prophecy with the fallibility of ṣūfī experience.  

'Abd al-Jalīl opens his reply by saying that whoever understands properly the meaning of lā ilāh illā 'lāh is relieved from the distinction between reward and punishment which depend upon duality (dū'ī); once the duality is removed, reward and punishment disappear along with it. The only thing that remains then is the Beauty of Unity (jamāl-i tawḥīd), as indicated in the Qur'ānic verse: "He is God, the One". The Knowers of Truth ('ulama'-i haqiqat) consider existence as one. It is only the superficial 'ulama' ('ulama'-i zawāhir) who dwell upon Custom (sunna) and Community (jamā'a); the Knowers of Truth have made Union (jam'īyya) the center of their lives. There can be no Community there is only Prophecy. The Prophet said: "A shaykh in his group is like a Prophet in his community" (al-shaykh fī qawmihi ka'-l-nabi fī ummatihi). But Prophecy brings with it only uncertainty (taraddud), while Sainthood results in serenity (ārām). We should not lapse from serenity to uncertainty because it will not make any change in the House of Divinity. One hundred and twenty four thousand Prophets have been sent to the world, but none of them has made any change there. The
situation remains the same to this day (al-ān kamā kān ast). Since the death of Muḥammad, Sainthood has been superior to Prophecy.24

The two letters analysed here are obviously insufficient to allow a comprehensive assessment of the contemporary reaction to Sirhindī's views. They may, however, be indicative of two groups of persons who were dissatisfied with the contents of the Maktūbāt. ‘Abd al-Ḥāqq represents those who resented Sirhindī's extravagance, his excessive self-esteem and his allegedly derogatory remarks about the Prophet. They saw in all this a deviation from the accepted sunna of the community. ‘Abd al-Jalīl, on the other hand, speaks for those who had little use for religious observance and regarded the personal experience of Union as the highest spiritual achievement. They saw in Sirhindī's stress on custom (sunna) and community (jamā'ā) an indication that he had failed to transcend the formal aspects of religion and was unable to reach the ultimate religious truth.

Sirhindī seems to have antagonized both groups. On the basis of the material now available, it is impossible to assess the importance of these two groups in the community as a whole. More material will have to be brought to light before the degree to which Sirhindī's views made an impact on his contemporaries can be reliably determined.
Sirhindī's widespread correspondence would indicate, however, that many people sought to learn from him the science of tasawwuf, despite the opposition that he encountered from the 'ulamā' and some ṣūfīs.

2. The hagiographic literature.

The hagiographic literature is concerned primarily with the miracles Sirhindī was believed to have performed. Although Sirhindī stresses several times in the Maktūbat that miracles are not a necessary part of ṣūfī activity, among his followers the legend of an all-powerful miracle worker soon came into being. The hagiographies contain traditions according to which the coming of Sirhindī was predicted by such eminent ṣūfīs as Aḥmad-i Jām. They credited Sirhindī with the miraculous ability of healing the sick, preventing disasters, rescuing people who had lost their way in the desert, discovering people's hidden thoughts and practices or being able to appear in different places at the same time. Sirhindī's prayer at a funeral is capable of bringing forgiveness to the deceased and of abrogating the punishment of the grave. A distinct group of stories deals with Sirhindī's violent treatment of persons who slighted him or honoured those who had fallen out of grace with him. Of particular interest is a miracle story connected with the destruction of a
Hindū temple. A group of Sirhindī's disciples was engaged in the destruction of a temple in the Dakhan in accordance with their master's teaching. When they were surprised by a large number of infidels, Sirhindī miraculously brought a Muslim force to their rescue.35 This story is a faint indication that Sirhindī's views on the Hindūs began to filter down to the popular level. One should, however, keep in mind that this is the only story of its kind in the hagiographies which we have examined. Sirhindī's image in the eyes of his disciples was by no means that of a fanatic iconoclast, but rather that of a saint endowed with diverse miraculous powers. The significance of the above-mentioned story should not be exaggerated.36

The hagiographic literature is also the main source for material relating to Sirhindī's alleged influence on Jahāṅgīr and for the Naqshbandī version of the events leading to Sirhindī's imprisonment. Sirhindī is credited with miraculously preventing the Sulṭān from wreaking his vengeance on delinquent officials of the court and with bringing about the dismissal of an unjust governor.37 He also predicts that Shaykh Farīd Bukhārī will be unsuccessful in his attempt to conquer the Hindū fortress of Kāṅgra.38 Rather unwillingly he later gives his blessing to Bikramājīt, the Hindū
commander of the new and successful expedition against the fort. 39

Sirhindī's imprisonment according to the hagiographic literature was the result of a shīʿī conspiracy against him. Sirhindī was summoned to the court and asked about his alleged claim to have surpassed the spiritual achievements of Abū Bakr. He replied to the charges. The reply satisfied the emperor, and Sirhindī was excused. However, when the shīʿī conspirators saw that their plot was failing, they drew the emperor's attention to the fact that Sirhindī had failed to perform the sajdah. He was recalled and ordered to prostrate. He refused to do so and was sent to prison where he spent his time studying the Qur'ān and converting his fellow prisoners to Islām. 40 Prince Khurram, whose ultimate victory in the struggle for the throne was predicted by Sirhindī, 41 sent two fuqahāʾ to Sirhindī in order to persuade him that prostration before a ruler is permissible. He should perform it and forego further punishment. Sirhindī refused. In his view prostration before anyone except God was unlawful. 42 The emperor finally repented, released Sirhindī, honoured him and never again parted company with him. Shāh Jahān, Awrangzēb and all their 'ulamāʾ and wuzūrāʾ became members of the Mujaddidī order. 43 Sirhindī's unyielding
attitude and defiance in the face of un-Islamic practices have subsequently become a major component of his modern image.

3. The controversy over Sirhindī during the reign of Awrangzēb.

The polemics over Sirhindī's views, touched off by the letter of Shaykh 'Abd al-Ḥaqq, seems to have subsided after Sirhindī's death in 1624. Sirhindī replied to 'Abd al-Ḥaqq shortly before that date, and 'Abd al-Ḥaqq was unable for that reason to resume the debate even if he did not find Sirhindī's explanations satisfactory. The decades immediately following Sirhindī's death were characterized, as far as literature regarding him is concerned, by hagiographies written by Sirhindī's immediate disciples. As could be expected, these depicted Sirhindī in a very favourable light. Polemics came into prominence again during the reign of Awrangzēb.

On Shawwāl 27, 1090/December 1, 1679 the shaykh al-islām, acting upon the instructions of the emperor, issued a decree of considerable importance for the evaluation of Sirhindī's historical role. The decree was sent to the qāḍī of Awrangābād whose name was Hidāyat Allāh. Its main part reads as follows: "It has reached this august and holy location that some passages in the
Maktūbāt of Shaykh ʿAḥmad Sirhindī are apparently opposed to the views of ahl al-sunna wa al-jamāʿa. The followers of the above-mentioned shaykh, who have established their residence in the happy city of Awrangābād and are very active in spreading and teaching these (Maktūbāt), maintain that the false ideas mentioned above are true. Therefore the following exalted order has found the honour of being issued: this servant of the shariʿa (i.e., the shaykh al-islām) writes to the refuge of the shariʿa (i.e., the qādī of Awrangābād) to curb them from teaching this. Should it become known that anybody believes in the above-mentioned false ideas, let him be punished by the shariʿa punishment.¹⁴

As for the authenticity of this document, there is no reason to doubt it. Maʿārij al-Wilāya, the work in which it is included, was completed only four years after the date of the decree under consideration and was written in the city of Awrangābād.¹⁵ The reliability of the decree as an historically authentic document is greatly enhanced by the fact that it appears in a contemporary work written in the same city to which the decree was originally dispatched. The existence of the decree is mentioned in two additional contemporary works.¹⁶ Moreover, the supporters of Sirhindī in the controversy that ensued never denied its existence and
never declared it to be a forgery.

Quṣūrī, the author of Maʿārij al-Wilāya, says in the beginning of the chapter devoted to Sirhindī that he is favourably inclined to the ṣūfīs. As an indication of his impartiality, he promises to quote Sirhindī's ecstatic statements (ṣâḥiyyāt) before reproducing the hostile fatāwā of his opponents.47 His quotations are by and large accurate.48 After quoting a large number of fatāwā declaring Sirhindī an infidel,49 he says that these are valid only if Sirhindī wrote his ecstatic discourses with their external (zāhir) meaning in mind; if he intended them to be understood in the internal (bāṭīn) sense, he is not to blame, though he should not have made statements disrespectful of the Prophet.50 Thus, there is no reason to fear that Quṣūrī would have introduced into his book a spurious document because of personal hostility to Sirhindī. It is true that he does not offer detailed argument in defense of Sirhindī, but this in itself is a powerful indication of the view prevailing in the late seventeenth century. We can safely assume that few people then alive were surprised when the decree proscribing the Maktūbāt was published.

Quṣūrī maintains that the ‘ulamāʾ were hostile to Sirhindī mainly because of the letters dealing with
the Millennium and with the relationship between Muḥammad and Ibrāhīm.51 He then gives extensive quotations from a book called Kasir al-Mukhālifīn. The author of this book, whose name is not given by Qusūrī, objects to Sirhindī on similar grounds. Sirhindī’s views on the Millennium in the author’s opinion imply that both Ibrāhīm and the "common believer" are superior to Muḥammad.52 Sirhindī had said that Muḥammad had not reached the highest stage of spiritual development before the advent of the Millennium; this view is contrary to the Qurʾān, the sunna and the ijmāʿ.53 Sirhindī is in this author’s view a self-conceited (khwud-ra'y), opiniated (khwud-pasand), arrogant (khwud-bīn) and ignorant (nā dānishmand) person who doubtlessly considers himself the "common believer" with a crucial spiritual task.54 It is a consensus of the community that haqīqat-i muḥammadī is the highest haqīqa; it is superior to all other haqāʾiq and called therefore haqīqat al-haqāʾiq. Sirhindī’s theory that haqīqat-i kaʿba is higher than haqīqat-i muḥammadī and his description of the changes that take place in the respective positions of the various haqāʾiq with the advent of the Millennium must therefore be rejected.55 Kasir al-Mukhālifīn then criticizes Sirhindī’s pretenses in the controversial letter 11 of the first volume,56 censures Sirhindī for divulging
the secrets of his mystical experiences, and flatly accuses him of claiming to be a Prophet. Quṣūrī then quotes several fatāwā declaring Sirhindī an infidel. These fatāwā were the background against which the decree proscribing the Maktūbāt was issued.

The controversy over Sirhindī did not subside with the issuance of Awrangzēb's decree. The decree was apparently unsuccessful in curbing the teaching of the Maktūbāt to the satisfaction of Sirhindī's opponents. They continued in their efforts to strengthen their position and approached the prestigious 'ulama' of al-Ḥijāz with a request for an opinion on the matter. The original text of the īstiftā', which reached al-Ḥijāz in Jumādā II, 1093/June-July 1682, has not yet been brought to light, and the identity of its authors remains uncertain; however, it is mentioned several times in the contemporary literature and extensively quoted in Ḥāfiẓat al-Wahhāb by Muḥammad Bāq al-Uzbakī. The charges made in the īstiftā' are similar to those made in Kāsir al-Mukhālifīn. The Ḥijāzī 'ulamā' are requested to state their opinion with respect to the following main points: the superiority of ḥaqīqat-i ka'ba to ḥaqīqat-i muḥammadī; the special status of the "common believer"; letter 87 of the third volume; Sirhindī's alleged claim to have been created from the remnants of
the clay used in the creation of Muḥammad;\textsuperscript{64} his claim that his \textit{wilāya} is compounded from the \textit{wilāyāt} of Mūsā and Ibrāhīm;\textsuperscript{65} the disappearance of Muḥammad's bodily aspects and the reappearance of the prophetic perfections with the advent of the Millennium;\textsuperscript{66} letter \textsuperscript{11} of the first volume.\textsuperscript{67} According to Muḥammad Bēg's account, the \textit{istiftā'\textsuperscript{11}} contained, in all, questions on 32 points in Sirhindī's teaching. It was written in Arabic.

The response of the Ḥijāzī \textit{ulamā} was swift. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Rasūl al-Barzanjī completed his \textit{Qadh al-Zand} not more than a month after the \textit{istiftā'\textsuperscript{11}} had been received. At about the same time Ḥasan b. 'Alī wrote his \textit{al-‘Aṣab al-Hindī}.\textsuperscript{68} Sa‘īd b. Barakāt, the \textit{sharīf} of Makka, sent both books, together with other material of similar nature, to the "qādī of India" (qādī al-hind). Accompanying the books was a letter of his own, in which he states that the \textit{ulamā} of al-Ḥijāz had unanimously decided that Sirhindī was an infidel. Any other opinion should be discarded.\textsuperscript{69}

Al-Barzanjī begins his \textit{Qadh al-Zand} with a reference to the above-mentioned decree of Awrangzēb.\textsuperscript{70} He then gives a lengthy exposition of his views of the Prophet. Muḥammad is the best of creatures and did not leave this world without first realizing in himself all
possible perfections. Sirhindī is, therefore, patently wrong when he says that the Ka'ba is superior to the Prophet. Similarly, it is indefensible and preposterous to maintain that the Prophet reached perfection only a thousand years after his death. Al-Barzanjī is the first critic to say explicitly that Sirhindī's theory of the ḥaqīqat-i muḥammadi changing to ḥaqīqat-i aḥmadī is a thinly veiled hint at his own person. Like the author of Kāsir al-Mukhālifīn, he flatly accuses Sirhindī of claiming to be a Prophet. The desire to uphold this claim is the reason that Sirhindī called himself the Renewer of the Second Millennium and said that the Prophet Muḥammad disappeared while he himself was sent to guard and preserve the community. With caustic sarcasm al-Barzanjī says: "I wish I knew who is guarding the community after his death! He has been dead for more than sixty years; not even his name left India, let alone his guardianship and preservation!" (wa layta shi‘rī man yahris al-umma ba‘da mawtihi fa-qad māta mundhu sittīna sana wa lam yakhruj dhihrūhu ‘an ard al-hind faḍlan ‘an ḥirāsatīhi wa ḥifzīhi). The bodies of the Prophets never decay or disintegrate; it is therefore manifest infidelity (kufr ṣarāḥ) to maintain that the body of Muḥammad disappeared a thousand years after his death. Al-Barzanjī then assails the very
concept of the Second Millennium by stating that it will not be allowed to run its course: "What is the meaning of the Renewer of the Second Millennium? Does a second millennium remain from the time allotted to this community so that he can be its Renewer? Did the 'ulamā' not agree unanimously and did al-ḥāfiẓ al-Suyūṭī not say in his epistle (called) al-Kashf that not even five hundred years will elapse after the Millennium and that the Day of Resurrection will take place four hundred odd years after it? (mā ma‘nā mujaddid al-alf al-thānī wa hal baqiya min muddat hādhihi al-umma alf thānī /sic/ ṣattā yakūn mujaddidahu a laysa qad ajma‘a al-‘ulamā’ wa dhakarahu al-ḥāfiẓ al-suyūṭī fī risālatihi al-kashf anna mā ba‘da al-alf lā yablugh khams mi‘a sana wa anna al-qiyāma taqūm fī arba‘a mi‘a wa shay‘). 78 Millennial renewal, unlike its centennial counterpart, has not been mentioned in the classical sources. Furthermore, it implies the abolition of Muḥammad's prophecy and of his law. 79 The next point assailed by al-Barzanjī is Sirhindī's claim to have direct relationship with God without prophetic mediation. 80 Sirhindī's claim to have been created from the remnants of the clay used in the creation of Muḥammad also comes in for criticism. 81 The millennial revival of prophetic perfections and Sirhindī's claim of superiority to Abū Bakr are
sharply attacked. Sirhindī cannot claim, says al-Barzanjī, that he spoke on the spur of the moment while being in the state of intoxication; he deliberately committed his ideas to writing and did not withdraw them even when cautioned and reprimanded by such eminent persons as `Abd al-Ḥaq Muḥaddith Dihlawī. No consideration can be shown to a person whose infidelity manifests itself in his disrespect for the Prophet. 84

Neither Qadḥ al-Zand nor the very similar al-‘Aṣab al-Hindī remained unchallenged for long. In fact, the letter of Saʿīd b. Barakāt which we have mentioned earlier contains strong indications that some of the Ḥijāzī `ulamā’ did not agree with the condemnation of Sirhindī in the first place. After stating that the decision to declare Sirhindī an infidel was unanimous, Saʿīd b. Barakāt says that those who expressed a different opinion were persons with insufficient knowledge although they occupy high positions. They should not be relied upon. 85 We can safely conclude from this statement that some highly placed `ulamā’ of al-Ḥijāz disagreed with al-Barzanjī and Ḥasan b. `Alī. But the major challenge to Sirhindī's detractors came from Muḥammad Bēg al-Uzbakī who came to al-Ḥijāz from India after al-Baranjī wrote Qadḥ al-Zand. Shortly after his arrival Muḥammad Bēg wrote ‘Aṭīyyat al-Wabbāb al-Fāṣila bayna al-Khaṭa’ wa al-
The main purpose of this book was to show that the fatāwā issued against Sirhindī were based on a faulty translation of his Waktuštāt into Arabic and on wilful misrepresentation of his views. Several examples will demonstrate the method used by Muḥammad Bēg in his defense of Sirhindī. In letter 87 of the third volume Sirhindī says: "The chain of my discipleship is connected with God without mediation" (irādat-i man bi tawassūt bi-illāh muttasīl ast). The Arabic translation by Sirhindī's rivals read: irādatī muttasīla bi'illāh min ghayr tawassūt aḥad. Muḥammad Bēg translates: irādatī muttasīla ilā allāh ta'ālā bi-lā wāṣīta. To this he adds: "meaning, without mediation except that of the Prophet" (ay bi-lā wāṣīta ghayr al-nabī). This interpretation can hardly be justified if one keeps the original Persian text in mind. With regard to Sirhindī's saying that "my path is the path of subhānī" (tarīqa-yi man tarīqa-yi subhānī ast), Muḥammad Bēg maintains that the yā of subhānī is the adjectival yā, not the yā denoting the first person. The Arabic translation of this phrase should therefore read: tarīqi al-tarīqu al-subhānīyyu (and not tarīqi tarīqu subhānī). According to this interpretation, Sirhindī does not glorify himself by this expression, but rather says that his way is the way of those who say subhān allāh. In
many cases Muḥammad Bēg simply denies that Sirhindī said the things attributed to him by his opponents. Elsewhere he disputes the interpretations given to Sirhindī's letters. For instance, he argues that one cannot conclude from letter 11 of the first volume that Sirhindī reached the high stages of spiritual achievement only in his capacity as a servant and because of his following of the Prophet.90

Although most of Muḥammad Bēg's translations and interpretations seem to be rather strained linguistically, he apparently succeeded in obtaining opinions favourable to Sirhindī from several 'ulamā'. He was assisted in his efforts by another šūfi from India, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Saṭḥī, and by Muḥammad Farrukh Shāh, probably a grandson of Sirhindī.91 In addition to the preparation of a new Arabic version of Sirhindī's controversial letters, Muḥammad Bēg defended Sirhindī in debates with the Ḥijāzī 'ulamā'. These debates are mentioned by al-Barzanjī in his al-Nāshira al-Nājira li-ʾl-Firqa al-Fājira,92 which was written with the intention to counter to pro-Sirhindī campaign launched by Muḥammad Bēg and to refute Sirhindī's views once again. Al-Barzanjī speaks of Muḥammad Bēg with scorn and contempt, accuses him of gross ignorance of both Arabic and Persian, and considers him incompetent to engage in
religious debates with the learned 'ulamā' of al-Ḥijāz. It seems to us, however, that the considerable attention given to Muḥammad Bēg's activities by al-Barzanjī would indicate that Muḥammad Bēg's campaign was making some headway.

4. Sirhindī's image in the seventeenth century.

The prevalent image of Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī among the seventeenth century ‘ulamā' was that of an extravagant ṣūfī, suffering from illusions of grandeur and highly disrespectful of the Prophet. It was this image that prompted Awrangzēb to order the issuing of the decree proscribing the Maktūbāt and characterizing their contents as opposed to the views of ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a. Thus, the view according to which Awrangzēb's religious reforms were inspired by the works of Aḥmad Sirhindī is no longer tenable, though Sirhindī had, indeed, recommended some of the measures eventually implemented by Awrangzēb. The letters in which Sirhindī demanded the implementation of the sharī‘a by the state are not mentioned at all in the seventeenth century sources used in the preparation of this work. Such an omission is not surprising when made by Sirhindī's critics; it is amazing, on the other hand, that Sirhindī's supporters, who barely held their ground against the vehement and well-documented attacks of
their rivals, did not use these letters to bolster the image of Sirhindî as a pious sunní Muslim. The crusading zeal permeating some of Sirhindî's letters to the Mughul officials might have had an enormous impact upon the Hijâzî 'ulamâ. Yet no use was made of this material by such a man as Muḥammad Bēg, who exerted a considerable effort to clear Sirhindî of the charges levelled against him. The fact that Sirhindî's letters to the Mughul officials and his demands for the strict observance of the sharî'a were virtually forgotten in the seventeenth century can be explained by several factors. It is likely that only a few complete collections of the Maktūbāt were available at the time. Individual letters were probably transmitted by the original recipients to their fellow ṣūfîs, and it was in this way that the letters gained most of their publicity.94 Sirhindî's demand for the strict implementation of the sharî'a by the state was voiced exclusively in letters to Mughul officials which could not be spread in the way described above, and were therefore known only to their original recipients and to those few who possessed a complete collection of the Maktûbát. As for the general exhortations to follow the sharî'a, which are so common in Sirhindî's works, these were considered too commonplace to be of much value and are barely referred to by
Muḥammad Bēg. Sirhindī was primarily a ṣūfī and had to be defended within a ṣūfī frame of reference. Muḥammad Bēg had to show that Sirhindī's spiritual experiences, as described in the Maktūbāt and the other works, were not incompatible with the basic principles of Islam. Sirhindī's personal observance of the ṣharī'a and his demand that others do likewise were irrelevant in the controversies of the seventeenth century.

Unlike the 'ulamā', the historians of the period do not seem to have devoted much attention to Sirhindī. The Tabaqāt-i Shāhjahanī by Muḥammad Ṣādiq, a major collection of biographies written in mid-seventeenth century, has only a short note on Sirhindī and says that "he was one of the successors of the renewer of the Naqshbandī order (?), Khwāja Muḥammad Bāqī Naqshbandī Uwaysī . . . He was knowledgeable and observant, a sea of divine secrets. He is the author of valuable books. His books and letters contain many curiosities and strange things which (even) the intellects of the wise people are unable to comprehend. He died at the end of Ṣafar of the year 1034 and was survived by knowledgeable, observant and talented sons." (az khulafā’-i mujaddid-i tarīqa-yi naqshbandiyya khwāja muḥammad bāqī naqshbandī uwaysī ast quddisa sirruhu ‘ālim o ‘āmil wa babr-i asrār-i ilāhī būd wa šāhīb-i taṣānīf-i ‘āliya
It is evident that Muḥammad Ṣādiq is not conscious of any special historical role performed by Sirhindī. On the basis of the material now available, we tend to conclude that Sirhindī was not considered in the seventeenth century as an important thinker except by his disciples and by the ‘ulamāʾ involved in the controversies surrounding him.

5. The eighteenth century.

The interest in Sirhindī seems to have diminished after the controversy of the late seventeenth century subsided. The section on Sirhindī in Subḥat al-Marjān min Ṭhār Hindūstān by Ṣād Bilgrāmī is devoted almost exclusively to the various possible interpretations of the controversial letter 11 of the first volume. There is only a brief reference to Sirhindī's imprisonment and his stay in the imperial camp. Bilgrāmī does not attach any special significance to these events. Neither does he consider Sirhindī a man engaged in a struggle against the heresies of Akbar.

Shāh Wali Allāh deals with the thought of Ḍīmad Sirhindī in several works. Fāyṣala-yi Waḥdat al-
Wujūd wa al-Shuhūd, in which he demonstrated the essential identity between Ibn al-‘Arabī and Sirhindī, has received considerable attention. The debate touched off by this book has also been already described. Another relevant work by Shāh Wāli Allāh, the Shawāhid al-Tajdīd, is still in manuscript, and an account of it seems necessary.

The Shawāhid al-Tajdīd begins with an analysis of the famous ḥadīth about the centennial mujaddidūn. Shāh Wāli Allāh maintains that this ḥadīth refers to a person endowed with all the perfections and capable of taking the place of the Prophet in his own age. Sirhindī is, in his view, the mujaddid who was sent at the beginning of the eleventh century. He then enumerates eleven "witnesses of renewal" (shawāhid al-tajdīd) to prove that Sirhindī indeed was the mujaddid. The "witnesses" are the following:

1) he spread religious knowledge and ṣūfī "secrets" far and wide
2) he performed innumerable miracles
3) he was accepted as the mujaddid by the greatest ‘ulamā’ of his age, such as ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm Siyālkōtī
4) he explained the Naqshbandī discipline in an unprecedented manner
5) God chose for him thousands of excellent associates who assisted him in his work

6) God enabled him to understand the mysterious letters at the beginning of some Qur'anic suwar (al-muqatta'at al-furqaniyya) and the ambiguous verses of the Qur'an (al-mutasbihat al-quraniyya)

7) he was subject to the cruelty of the Sultan but persisted in proclaiming the truth

8) God opened for him the doors of "inner knowledge" (ilm-i batin) in an unprecedented manner

9) a large number of infidels accepted Islam and thousands of Muslims repented their sins - all due to his influence

10)103

11) God enabled him to give an account of wilāya, nubuwwa and risāla; of the perfections of the steadfast Prophets; of the stages of khilla and mahabba and of the special qualities of Muhammad.

It is therefore clear that he was the mujaddid of the eleventh century.104

It is noteworthy that Shāh Wali Allāh recognizes Sirhindī in this work as the Renewer of the eleventh century, not of the Second Millennium. This seems to be an implicit criticism of Sirhindī's theory of millennial renewal. However, in another epistle included in the
same collection Wali Allah recognizes Sirhindi as a sign (irhās) of a new period starting with the Millennium. Whether this indicates a change in Wali Allah's view of Sirhindi would have to be determined on the basis of further research in Wali Allah's works.

Shāh Wali Allah's son, Shāh 'Abd al-'Azīz Dihlawī maintains that the original contribution of Sirhindi to tasawwuf is the development of the concept of khilla. The ṣūfīs before Sirhindi started their spiritual journey at the stage of loving (muḥībbiyya) and were later able to reach the stage of being loved (maḥbūbiyya). Both relationships were one-sided. It was only with Sirhindi that the stage of khilla was reached. This is the stage when God and the ṣūfī long for each other and the relationship is mutual. This view of 'Abd al-'Azīz stems from Sirhindi's own description of the spiritual changes taking place with the advent of the Millennium, which we have described earlier.

Sirhindi's image in the eighteenth century was still that of a ṣūfī teacher, engaged in the exploration of divine mysteries. It is, however, interesting to note that Shāh Wali Allah includes among his eleven "witnesses of renewal" the fact that Sirhindi was cruelly treated by the Sulṭān, yet persisted in
proclaiming the truth. Shāh Wali Allāh sees in this behaviour a sign of Sirhindī's personal steadfastness as a deeply religious man and does not attach any political or social significance to it. It appears, however, that the theme of Sirhindī's defiant attitude to the Sultan, which originated in Naqshbandī hagiographies and has become a major component of Sirhindī's image in the modern period, was gaining strength in the eighteenth century.

6. Wakīl Ahmad Sikandarpūrī.

The interest in Sirhindī does not seem to have been great in the nineteenth century. Towards its end, however, Sirhindī found a vigorous defender in the person of Wakīl Ahmad Sikandarpūrī who wrote three books in his defense.108 Sikandarpūrī was a member of the Mujaddidi branch of the Naqshbandī order109 and wrote his books out of the desire to exonerate Sirhindī from the charges levelled against him in the seventeenth century, rather than because of any particular development in his own time. Sikandarpūrī's books are similar in nature and scope to the pro-Sirhindī works written during the time of Awrangzēb. He reiterates Muḥammad Bēg's claim that al-Barzanjī wrote Qadī al-Zand on the basis of wilfully distorted translations of Sirhindī's letters. He also charges that al-Barzanjī accepted a bribe from Sirhindī's
enemies for writing the book. Drawing his information from *Atiyyat al-Wahhāb*, he speaks extensively of persons who responded favourably to Muḥammad Bēg's activities in al-Ḥijāz and issued *fatāwā* in support of Sirhindī. He then compares Sirhindī with other great Ṣūfīs who were attacked by their contemporaries, quotes traditions urging that no Ṣūfī be harmed or declared an infidel, and attempts to undermine al-Barzanjī's argument that the concept of millennial renewal is meaningless and heretical because the second millennium will not be allowed to run its course.

We have already referred to some of the material from *Hadiyya Mujaddidiyya*, which was written in order to refute Shaykh 'Abd al-Ḥaqq's arguments against Sirhindī. It is also in this book that Sikandarpūrī indicates the reasons for which he holds Sirhindī in such a high esteem. They are the following:

1) Sirhindī spread religious knowledge and Ṣūfī "secrets"

2) he understood the mysterious letters at the beginning of some Qur'ānic *suwar* and the ambiguous verses of the Qur'ān.

3) he knew the names of the Indian Prophets and of their followers
4) he was able to give an account of wilāya, nubuwwa, risāla, khilla, and maḥabba and of the special qualities of the Prophet. 117

It will be recalled that three of these four points were mentioned by Wālī Allāh in his Shawāhid al-Tajdid. Sikandarpūri's appreciation of Sirhindī does not differ from that of Sirhindī's supporters in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

7. The modern period.

The mediaeval approach to Sirhindī, of which Wākīl Ahmad Sikandarpūri seems to be the last representative, is characterized by exclusive attention to Sirhindī's thought and ṣūfī experiences. Both Sirhindī's supporters and his critics discuss his views in the abstract and try to determine whether they are compatible with what the critics consider to be the immutable principles of Islam. They do not see, and are not interested in, any connection between his approach to ṭaquwāf and the context in which it crystallized. They are not concerned with those letters in which Sirhindī expresses his opinions on the situation of Islam in India during the reigns of Akbar and Jahāngīr or those in which he demands that reforms be introduced into the administration of the Mughul empire.

A fundamental change in the approach to
Sirhindī occurred with the publication in 1919 of the Tadhkira by Abu 'l-Kalām Āzād. It appears that the Tadhkira is the first work in which Sirhindī is described as the person who reacted single-handedly to the religious corruption that spread in India during the reign of Akbar. According to Āzād the country was at that time glutted with 'ulamā' and șūfīs who were all bemoaning the prevalent sad situation without making any attempt to remedy it. The biggest disaster of India was that tasawwuf, corrupted by innovation and ignorance, was reigning supreme. Religious license (ibābat) was euphemistically called the "esoteric way" (tarīq-i bātin). The whole country was ignorant of the sharī sciences.

During the reign of Akbar innovations were spread by the government itself, with active assistance of the wicked 'ulamā' and the worldly (dunyā parast) șūfīs. Ahmad Sirhindī, says Āzād, was the only person who had the courage and stamina to embark single-handedly upon a campaign of reform and renewal (islāḥ o tajdīd) and to stand up to the emperor himself. The rest of the 'ulamā' continued to teach in their religious schools and to write insignificant commentaries and super-commentaries; in some cases they even issued fatāwā declaring Sirhindī an infidel. Sirhindī's mission was not limited in Āzād's view to the repudiation of religious innovations and the
introduction of *tawḥīd-i shuhūdī*. His activities had a much wider scope; he transcended *tasawwuf* and was fulfilling the tasks of the Prophets of old. 118

The image of Sirhindī in the *Tadhkira* is radically different from that reflected in the earlier literature. Sirhindī is seen here as a rebel against the government in power. He is a reformer in the field of religion as well as in other fields which remain unspecified by Āzād. He comes at a time when the lives of the Muslims of India are dominated by *tasawwuf* and combats this situation. The new image of Sirhindī faithfully reflects the new situation of the Muslim community in India and the political attitudes of Āzād, who wrote the *Tadhkira* while he was detained because of his anti-British activities. He considers *tasawwuf* as the cause of the torpor that had paralysed the Muslim community in the past and discards it in favour of direct political action against the government in power. The past and its personalities are viewed by him through the mirror of the present. The image of Sirhindī is no longer that of a man of religion interested solely in the exploration of the mysteries of God and His creation; he is a religiously minded rebel against the conditions surrounding him.

The *Tadhkira* of Abu ‘l-Kalām Āzād set the
tone for the treatment of Sirhindī in subsequent works. Sirhindī has since been considered as the leader of a religio-political movement which set out to nullify the consequences of Akbar's policies. He is seen as a religious thinker who rejected the idea that Islam and Hinduism can be reconciled by eliminating the unessential elements in both and who reaffirmed the distinctiveness and unique character of Islam. By his stand and activity he "checked the process of Indian Islam's disintegration into syncretic heresies".119

Characteristic of the new approach is the Urdu work by Muḥammad Miyān, The Glorious Past of the 'Ulama' of India. It is noteworthy that a book bearing such a general title should start with a description of Sirhindī's life and achievements without paying any attention to those 'ulama' who lived and worked in India previously. After a description of Akbar's heretical views and policies, Muḥammad Miyān turns to Sirhindī's plan of reform. According to the author, Sirhindī set out to reform the ruling circles of the empire. The author maintains that Sirhindī's success was complete and "it appears that all the important sunnī ministers and officials of the courts of Akbar and Jahāngīr were important members of the movement of the Mujaddid" (ma‘lūm hōtā hay kih dawlat-i akbarī o jahāngīrī kā
Muhammad Miyān is concerned with Sirhindī's political activity to such an extent that he devotes a whole chapter of his book to the question why Sirhindī, with all the power and influence that he had acquired, did not attempt an actual rebellion against the government whose policies he opposed (mu'addid sāhib ne baghawat kyūn nahin ki). His answer is that Sirhindī's movement was not strong enough during the reign of Akbar and there was also the possibility that the emperor might eventually repent. Muhammad Miyān also maintains that, according to the Islamic tradition, Muslims should not rebel against a ruler unless his infidelity is beyond doubt. Such was not the case with Akbar. As for the time of Jahāngīr, Sirhindī had to consider the possibility that the Hindus would seize the reins of government entirely as a result of internal strife among the Muslims and that the Shi'ī kingdom of Persia would intervene on behalf of Jahāngīr's shī'ī wife, Nūr Jahān. The only way of action open to Sirhindī therefore was to influence the ruling circles by peaceful means. In an obvious reference to the methods used in India during the khilafat movement, Muhammad Miyān characterizes Sirhindī's approach to the Sultan as "passive resistance" (muḥāwamat bi-ʾl-ṣabr,
167

‘adam-i tashaddud ki jang) which was, in his view, also
the method used by the Prophet Muhammad in Mekka.121
Sirhindī’s efforts were crowned with success. Jahāṅgīr
listened to his preaching and made an important Islamic
gesture by sacrificing a cow at the vanquished Hindu
fortress of Kāngra. Sirhindī’s activities created the
atmosphere which eventually enabled Awrangzīb to rule
according to the principles of orthodox Islam.122

A similar approach is adopted by Fārūqī in
The Mujaddid’s Conception of Tawhīd. He affirms rather
uncritically the historicity of Jahāṅgīr’s complete
conversion to Sirhindī’s view of Islām on the basis of
the Naqshbandī hagiographies.123 In the main part of
his book he has described the differences between
waḥdat al-wujūd and waḥdat al-shuhūd clearly and
succinctly. He tries, however, to present Sirhindī as
a thinker who controverted Ibn al-‘Arabī’s un-Islamic
waḥdat al-wujūd and replaced it with waḥdat al-shuhūd
which is the true expression of Islām.124 It is, of
course, legitimate to maintain that Ibn al-‘Arabī was a
heretic; however, in a book concerned mainly with
Sirhindī one would expect the author to point out that
Sirhindī himself did not see Ibn al-‘Arabī in this light.
Sirhindī did not consider his criticism of waḥdat al-
wujiud as a fight against heresy. Fārūqī completely disregards those passages in the ṭablāt in which Sirhindī explained and defended Ibn al-ʿArabi rather than refuted him. 125 The presentation of Sirhindī's attitude towards Ibn al-ʿArabi is, therefore, distorted. Fārūqī's concluding statement that "there can hardly be any doubt that the call of the Mujaddid to all Musalmans and Islamic mystics is

Away from Plotinus and his host

and

BACK TO MUḤAMMAD. 126

as well as many other passages in the book, gives an unpleasant ideological flavour to an otherwise valuable presentation of an intricate problem in taṣawwuf. Fārūqī's approach has had a considerable impact on subsequent research and was fully adopted by Qurayshī. 127

More moderate is the appraisal of Muḥammad Ikrām in Rūd-i Kawthar. Ikrām questions the prevalent interpretation according to which Sirhindī put an end to the heresy of Akbar. He rightly observes that this view was first expressed by Ṭażāṭād and that earlier sources do not see Sirhindī in this light. Ikrām maintains that Akbar's heresy had been eliminated before Sirhindī's letters were written and views Sirhindī's contribution to the development of Islām in India in a different
manner. According to him, the importance of Sirhindī lies in the fact that he succeeded in propagating one ṣūfī order over all India, thus giving to the country some measure of spiritual unity. By introducing the theory of wahdat al-shuhūd he resolved the differences between the ʿulamāʾ and the ṣūfīs. He also devoted great energy to combatting religious innovations and shīʿī influences. Assuming the historicity of the Naqshbandī account of Sirhindī's meeting with Jahāngīr, Ikrām has warm words of appreciation for the courage displayed by Sirhindī when he preferred to be jailed rather than to prostrate before the Sultan. People were heartened by this example, and the tide of unlawful practices was stemmed. 128

A completely new approach to Sirhindī has recently been adopted by two Indian Muslim writers, Ḥabīb and Rizvī. In a short article on The Political Role of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindī and Shah Waliullah, Ḥabīb stresses Sirhindī's fanatical hatred of the Hindūs and presents a considerable amount of evidence to prove that Sirhindī's political role is nothing but a pious legend, invented by his disciples and perpetuated by their credulous followers. 129 Ḥabīb maintains that "their (i.e., of Sirhindī and Wali Allāh) glorification is only a part of the modern separatist tradition which seeks solace and inspiration from those who were but shadows when
compared to the real makers and motive-forces of our history." \(^{130}\) In order to prove his point, Habīb grossly exaggerates the importance of Sirhindī’s anti-Hindū pronouncements which were, as we have seen, an unimportant part of Sirhindī’s thought.

A much more detailed argument is presented by Rizví in *Muslim Revivalist Movements in Northern India in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. The main thesis of this book is that the Indian Muslims have always rejected Muslim communalism and tried to evolve a culture capable of developing in the Hindū environment of India. While discussing Sirhindī, Rizví also stresses, with strong disapproval, his hatred of the Hindūs\(^ {131}\) and maintains that neither he nor any of his disciples had any success in propagating their ideas. The cause of their failure was the deep attachment of the Muslims of India to the pantheistic philosophy of Ibn al-‘Arabī and their rejection of the bigotry of Sirhindī and his followers. The world-view of Ibn al-‘Arabī is seen by Rizví as the ideology of communal harmony, while Sirhindī is depicted as a narrow-minded representative of a tiny Muslim minority, unsuccessfully trying to disrupt the peaceful co-existence of Hindūs and Muslims.\(^ {132}\)

Rizví’s description of the response to Sirhindī’s teaching is questionable in several respects.
Firstly, his evidence for the failure of Sirhindī to influence the population of the various provinces is tenuous. There is sufficient evidence to support the view that Sirhindī failed to evoke favourable response from the 'ulamā'; as for the reaction of the common people among whom Sirhindī's disciples were working, their response is largely unknown. But the fact remains that a large number of people corresponded with Sirhindī and sought to learn the science of taṣawwuf from him. Sirhindī's occasional complaints about the performance of his disciples, which are given disproportionate attention in Rizvi's work, cannot nullify the overwhelming evidence that Sirhindī, indeed, was a šūfī teacher who gained considerable acceptance. Secondly, Rizvi assumes that Sirhindī's disciples were fomenting anti-Hindū sentiments wherever they went. This assumption is entirely baseless. We have seen that the question of the Hindūs is a peripheral one in Sirhindī's thought and that he deals with it almost exclusively in letters to Mughul officials. When Sirhindī's disciples went to the various cities of India to propagate their order, they were teaching the Naqshbandī spiritual discipline rather than fomenting communal discord. To assume that Sirhindī and his followers encountered some organized popular opposition and to identify it with
anti-communalism is gratuitous.

Thus, the peripheral elements in Sirhindī's thought have become the core of his modern image. Indian and Pakistani historians, living in a society in which an ever increasing number of people is concerned with political matters and in which the question of religion and state plays such an important role, turn almost instinctively to those parts of Sirhindī's teaching that can be interpreted as relevant to their modern problems. In contrast, Sirhindī's taṣawwuf, which is the core of his thought but which is irrelevant and even undesirable in the eyes of many modern Muslims, has been largely ignored. Moreover, Sirhindī's views on the question of religion and state have become the criterion according to which his contribution to the development of Islām in India is being assessed. Those who maintain that Islām should play a prominent role in the conduct of state have seen in Sirhindī their precursor. On the other hand, those affected by the modern theory of secularism consider Sirhindī's approach an unwarranted interference of religion in matters of state. Both groups have unfortunately based their judgment on a peripheral element in Sirhindī's thought. For Sirhindī was primarily a ṣūfī and must be assessed as such.
CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

The thought of Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī, as expressed in the works written after he joined the Naqshbandī order, is characteristically ṣūfī. The ṣūfī categories of outward (ẓāhir) and inward (bātin), form (ṣūra) and essence (ḥaṣīqa) are thoroughly applied to the various topics under consideration. It is because of the systematic application of these categories that the major Islamic concepts are discussed in Sirhindī's works on two different levels. Indeed, Islām itself can be, in Sirhindī's view, of two kinds. The common people, uninitiated into the mysteries of ṭaḡawūf, are content with "formal" Islām. In contrast, the ṣūfī élite is able to reach the high stage of "essential" Islām. Likewise, Sirhindī speaks of the "formal" and "essential" aspects of Paradise, of infidelity and of the sharī'a. Even the differences among the various schools of law (madhāhib) are regarded by him as differences between form and essence, and this is perhaps the most striking example of the total immersion of the concept of sharī'a into the ṣūfī worldview. Since the dichotomy of form and essence is
common to both *tasawwuf* and *tashayyu*; Sirhindī occasionally expresses ideas with a distinct shīʿī colouring, despite his vociferous denunciation of the Shīʿa in the more esoteric works. The most striking of these ideas is the distinction between the public "call" of the Prophets (*daʿwa*) and their esoteric mission (*muʿāmalat-i bāṭiniyya*) and the preference given by Sirhindī to the latter. The fact that Sirhindī assigned to 'Alī and the twelve *aʿimma* a special spiritual task in the realm of *tasawwuf* also indicates that even Sirhindī, an assiduous sunnī ṣūfī, is not completely free from shīʿī elements in his thought.

In view of all this, the prevalent assessment of Sirhindī as a person whose main objective was the restoration of the *shariʿa* in India must be considerably modified. This assessment is oversimplified and does not take into account the peculiar ṣūfī attitude to the *shariʿa* adopted by Sirhindī. It is, of course, true that Sirhindī always stresses the indispensability of the *shariʿa*, but he also applies to it the ṣūfī dichotomy of form and essence and maintains that it is the inner, essential aspect of the *shariʿa* that a Muslim should strive to attain. That Sirhindī does not consider the formal, outward aspect of the *shariʿa* as a Muslim's ultimate goal is clear also from the fact that, barring
insignificant exceptions, Sirhindī never discusses problems of fiqh. Had Sirhindī's primary objective been the restoration of orthodoxy in Indian Muslim society, one would expect at least some interest in concrete legal questions on his part. Sirhindī displays no such interest and clearly is not afaqīh. His lack of concern for legal details is in glaring contrast to the detailed descriptions of his spiritual experiences and analyses of śūfī concepts. Sirhindī was first and foremost a śūfī and must be seen primarily in this light. One cannot assess him properly by considering only the few letters to Mughul officials in which he demanded the strict implementation of the shari‘a by the state. The overwhelming majority of Sirhindī's letters and other works deals with questions of tagāwwuf. His main endeavour in them is to integrate his śūfī ideas into a sunnī frame of reference, without depriving them of their peculiar śūfī flavour. This endeavour manifests itself in the clearest fashion in Sirhindī's descriptions of the supreme spiritual achievements of a śūfī. Sirhindī calls these achievements the "perfections of Prophecy" and maintains that they can be arrived at only by assiduously following the Prophet and his companions. As we have seen earlier, the meaning of Prophecy in this context is fundamentally different from
its meaning in the works of the mutakallimün. Sirhindi chose to use the concept of Prophecy for the description of the highest šūfī achievements because of the high standing of this concept in the sunnī world-view.  

Further research must be done before the place of Sirhindi in the development of tasawwuf can be properly assessed. Not much is known as yet about the eighteenth century Naqshbandiyya, and works such as the Bashārat-i Naẓhariyya by Mirzā Maẓhar Jān-i Jānān are still in manuscript. Yet it is in works of this kind that we are likely to find the clue for the proper assessment of Sirhindi's significance in the history of tasawwuf. Sirhindi's present significance for Indian and Pakistani Muslims is a result of his image as the restorer of orthodoxy and reviver of "pure" Islām. This image, which developed in modern historical writing since the Tadhkira of Abu 'l-Kalām Āzād, reflects twentieth century developments in the Indian subcontinent rather than the seventeenth century thought of Aḥmad Sirhindi himself, who was primarily a šūfī and not a thinker interested in the relationship between religion and state and between Muslims and Hindūs. The latter questions constitute only a peripheral element in his thought.
Appendix A

Bankipore MS, vol. 17, no. 1586, fols. 188b-1919

کترب سی دھنغم از جانب نقیر عبد اللہ بابا سے احمد که مزونم است بیتی یکی گن در ديوان نلیست

س کے ایک اسی بند سے عزیزمن ترمیمی را کہ مقصود لا اہال اللہ معلیم است از

تفریتی عذاب وتراب فانگ است از اولہ عذاب وتراب در دوئی

است بجوں دوق برخائست عذاب وتراب نیز بر نجات نقص

وہتی دی جمال تحقید مگر دادہ قل هواللہ اهلا ان آئھر

جری میں مسیر است سلسلہ را کہ ان بھینڈ نقدی

بیست کید اموال عبودیت را دم بجنر دوسیت اشا کیان

بیہد دبنند که ان لیک ذات اموالہ با جمار برخائسند

اگرہ نامعلوم علماء علماء دادیں اند

فاما علماء عقیقت 1896/ہیئت بزر ہواہد وعود دیکر نبیانشہ

اند کہ مہبعہ هیت وہاہد وہوست بمر ہواہد وہوئی دیکر

Qur'v 37:112،1

(2) تہیر
اذن عند مومود نحب عنانية في عを利用して عليه></p>
ظاهر و باطن هایل کنیم (ویژه) داسی ظاهر به که از فواد گنگ ها گنگ هوای باتن به که هر طالبی که نهیدار آن رفته به هم دهون رفت و اکنون که توله تقال وانا بیان کرده نه می‌دانم درست این نقلر دعا و سلام به که مطالعه کتابی بان چراکر

۹۳-۱۴
Appendix B.

 quelle al-Wilaya, p. 708

... وإلى قاضي وريدة أبا ابوبكر نقل أورانج قاضي قضاء

بجانب قاضي وريدة أبا سيد ك نقل أو إبني است

قرار بتاريخ بيس رفعت شهر عوال سنة يلي هزار د

نود هبى أخى خريحت بناه نفقات وكمالات دستها ناقوته

انتباه قاضى قضاء الله بعانيت باحده

درين دير مهى ندك نفس مرشدك ببعض مواقع

كتونات شيخ أحمد سهنى ظاهر في رأي الاعتقاد الول

سيت وجماعت اسم وضع قانون شخص مذكور حر دير بلده

أورانج أباد نجحت بينود مكونات دارند وتحويط آن بيشتر

وتنديس مينايد اعتقال (3) حقيقت اعتقاد باطله مذكوره دارند
همگان را از مصرف عدود به آن‌انت که این فاقد شرارت با خیانت
به‌نهایت به آن‌نها از رشد و در سپرایان بی‌بیند
کی‌که معلوم شود که معتقد عقاید باطله مذکوره است
اقدا بزرگی خوی سایتم لرها نارانست حد باید که
به‌لمه و جم مطاع دایم از اتباع بعمل آورد و همیشه
بر گارند

(۷) اعتقادا ۴۷۸۸
Appendix C

al-Barzawī, Qadh al-Zand, fol. 48 11-26

اما بعد فقد ورد البينا عام ثلاثة وثمانين وألف وأوفر بمحمد الثانية
من علماء الهند استفتاء عن بعض الكفات عرقة من اسم البلد الجهنمي
في مكتبه، فتسعت عامة تلك الديار على كتب مقتديها، وإمر لم Thiết
السلطان الصاغ أوردو زيب سهاب استفتاءه وتبَّرده ومراعيه
المستمدتين من المرويين قرآين الله بن الناكد، داعين تلك المكتبة
فانتما اوامره ال [كل ١] تمر من يلدها داهو كلبحر ست من قضاته
وياقته دانندها واطمطبا من علماء الكرم عامة الكتبة على
الاستفتاء الهذير با عبر من ديننا معلوم ومشهور، ماظور لما
كل البهو، ومن هذا الفقيه داعي علما العلامة كتبة قرآانه نور
الدنيا إبراهيم ألودي الکوران فاعل كتابية تردب بإردا الشرفية
من الآيات القرآنية والحادية النبوية والدعا ذاك تأكيدا
ليسفنا نوربا علينا ابيبة طلبتهم من رعاية السادة
والتقرب عن الفضير والاصطاد عن الله الكلان وبه المستبان

omitted in the text (1)
اما عبد بيله ... اشه رجب هندي مابل حافي في العلم الذي دار
رض عين كرمن العبادات غير عارف بالعراب نفخر عن دقيوم
العلم ليس له بصيرة بإعظامه التصف حيث وقع بينه
دبئته مكتابات نظرت في عبارته وذا هي تبنى عن عجبه
وحبه دوبره الانتام عن نهر الكلام الغريب والنازك وذك بئنت
بضع هنواته نسالة له قدر كراييس فانامت عن أريمن
نعولت دوارت عدماً إذا كان هذا حاله في سدوار كراييس
صلة أكثر من ذلك وهو بلين جداً لا يفرم مثل الكلام دعنه
دعا كبيرة ومع ذلك فهو من اتباع امجد الأردنى متخصص
له مما يود يؤمن ببنيته فهو من الألفاء واختتم إذا تزعم لا
تقبل تمكنته وهذا الرجل قد اعقمته في الترجمة (9) دقة مر أنه
جمينا واياه بليس ملوك بفاعلا ما وراء النهر وظلمتها الذيهم
اذل اللغة الفارسية فيذكر امجد الأردنى ونقارةه وقد تزمر
كاتبنه فلم يختلف فيهم اثنان اخوكر وضعع وافتراو أن عبان
الهند قد دفع من الجماعه ذلك الكاتب واستناد اتباعه وأورده
نسبة ويلودوا من تلك اللعبات ...

\[\text{النحيدة، البازنجي، ناشينو، يلفز، 383-7}\]
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1 Not all the sources used have been described in this chapter, nor do all of them fit the suggested classification. Our intention here is to describe the principal sources, to assess their contribution to the work as a whole and to draw attention to the problems arising from their use. A full list of sources will be found in the bibliography.

2 All our references are to the Lucknow 1889 edition, unless stated otherwise.

3 By Mustaqīm Zāda Sulaymān Sa‘d al-Dīn. Istanbul 1277.


5 By Qādī ‘Alīm al-Dīn, Lahore 1913. See EI², s.v. Aḥmad Sirhindī. This work has not been available to us.


7 The last letter of volume 3 bears the number 123, but letter 39 is missing from the editions available to us.
It was intended that each volume contain letters in number having some significance in the Islamic tradition. The 313 letters of the first volume correspond with the number of the prophets and of the *shuhadā* who fell in the battle of Badr; the 99 letters of the second volume correspond with the 99 Beautiful Names (*al-asma al-husnā*). The third volume was intended to contain 114 letters to correspond with the number of the chapters of the Qur'ān; however, Sirhindī died soon after the completion of the 114 letters of the third volume and the material that was to become the beginning of a prospective fourth volume was included in the third one. See *Maktūbāt*, vol. 2, p. 215-23; *Zubdat al-Maqāmāt*, pp. 240-241; *Haẓarat al-Quds*, fol. 44b-5. These additional letters are not mentioned in the preface to the third volume, which mentions 114 letters only. See *ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 215-18; vol. 3, p. 1618. These letters are not mentioned in the preface to the third volume, which mentions 114 letters only. See *ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 215-18; vol. 3, p. 1618.

Thus the earliest letters, addressed to Sirhindī's preceptor al-Bāqī bi-llāh, are found at the beginning of the first volume. We read about Sirhindī's plans to undertake a trip to Delhi and Agra in an earlier letter (*ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 789-10) and about his return in a later one (*ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 999-21). Sirhindī defends himself against accusations levelled against him
in connection with letter 87 of the third volume in letter 121 of the same. The controversial letter 11 of the first volume is mentioned by its number in letter 192 of the same volume (ibid., vol. 1, p. 191\textsuperscript{10}-12); this means that the letters were arranged in their present order and known by their numbers even before the volume was completed. Many of them are also mentioned by their present numbers in the polemical literature of the 17th century (e.g., ḫadh al-Ẓand, fols. 15a\textsuperscript{17-18}; 18a\textsuperscript{8-9}; 19a\textsuperscript{21-22} and elsewhere).

\textsuperscript{10}Volume 1: Yār Muḥammad al-Jādīd al-Badakhshī al-Ṭālaqānī (Maktūbāt, vol. 1, p. 2\textsuperscript{13-15}).

Volume 2: ‘Abd al-Ḥayy Ṣākar Ḥiṣārī (ibid., vol. 2, p. 2\textsuperscript{18-23}).

Volume 3: Muḥammad Nu‘mān b. Shams al-Dīn Yahyā (ibid., vol. 3, p. 4\textsuperscript{7-12}).

\textsuperscript{11}A letter by ‘Abd al-Jālīl Siddīqī to Sirhindī is preserved in Bankipore MS. XVII, no. 1586, fols. 188b\textsuperscript{10}-189a\textsuperscript{19}. See infra, pp. 136-138. For another letter addressed to Sirhindī, see note 35 to the present chapter. We also have three "petitions" (farāz dāsht) sent to Sirhindī by his son Muḥammad Sādiq, describing the progress of his disciples and his own ǧūfī experience. These are published at the end of the first volume of the Maktūbāt (pp. 458\textsuperscript{11}-460\textsuperscript{13}).
It is therefore difficult to agree with 'Irfān Ḥabīb's suggestion that the letters were not known before they were "ready for public circulation" upon the completion of the first volume. See The Political Role of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindī and Shah Waliullah in Enquiry 5 (New Delhi 1961), pp. 43-44.

A modern Turkish translation is now available in Esseyyid Zeynelabidin Işık, Aleyîye Nasihat. "Redd-i Revâfiz tercümesi". Istanbul 1964. I have not been able to trace the Arabic translation by Shāh Wali Allāh, mentioned by Inayatullah (EI^2, s.v. Ahmad Sirhindī). Brief excerpts from it are given in Nuʿmānī, ed., Tadhkira-yi ʿImām-i Rabbānī, Lucknow 1960, pp. 299-306.

See also al-Kalām al-Munjī, p. 3^6-7 from bottom, according to which Sirhindī composed this work at the age of 17.

Shaykh Inayatullah is mistaken when he says that the epistle in refutation of the shīʿī views is entitled tahlīliyya (EI^2, s.v. Ahmad Sirhindī). Risāla Tahlīliyya is mentioned in several sources as a work
different from the anti-shī`ī tract. It does not seem to be extant. See Tadhkira-yi `Ulama’-i Hind, p. 12; Subhat al-Marjān, p. 526-8; Hadiyya Mujaddidiyya, p. 983-10; al-Kalām al-Munī, p. 66-9.


20 See Mabda’ o Ma’ād, ed. Delhi, n.d., p. 81-9, where Sirhindī mentions his initiation into the Naqshbandī order.

21 Ithbāt al-Nubuwwa, p. 6814-16.


23 Zubdat al-Maqāmāt, pp. 17010-17418; pp. 14120-14414; Ḥazarāt al-Quds, fol. 27b1-3 and elsewhere.

24 Mabda’ o Ma’ād, p. 6012-15; p. 6417; p. 6711-12.

25 We have used the manuscript preserved in Riza Library, Rāmpūr, India, under number Sulūk 936. It was transcribed by Ḥusayn Shāh Bukhārī Qādirī Rāmpūrī in 1255. The printed edition of Lahore 1351/
1933 was not available to us. Cf. Storey, Persian Literature, p. 989, note.


29 Persian Literature, volume 1, part 2, p. 989. The book is also mentioned in Shāh Wali Allāh's Kashf al-Ghayn fī Sharḥ al-Rubā‘iyyatayn, Delhi 1310, p. 2. In Shāh Wali Allāh's view, Sirhindī's commentary on the Rubā‘iyyāt only added to the difficulty of understanding them.


31 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 4114-16.

32 Such as letter 87 of the third volume which aroused much opposition. Sirhindī defends his statements in this letter in letter 121 of the same volume. The esoteric nature of many letters in the third volume was recognized by the 19th century writer Wakīl Ahmad Sikandarpūrī. See Hadiyya Mujaddidiyya, pp. 14³-15³.
The manuscript is part of the private collection of Professor Khalīq Ahmad Niẓāmī of Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, India. I am grateful to Professor Niẓāmī for allowing me to use it.


Ma‘ārij al-Wilāya, fols. 621v-665r. It has been published as an appendix to Niẓāmī, op. cit., pp. 312-344.


No information about the author of this work is available.

Al-Nāshira al-Nājira, fol. 1b12-14; al-ʿAsab al-Hindi, fol. 14-5; Qadḥ al-Zand, fol. 46v-17.

Manuscript in ʿAṣafiyya State Public Library, Hyderabad, India (Kalām 224). It was copied at Awrangābād on Rajab 1, 1157/August 11, 1744 by Zayn al-ʿAbīdīn Muḥammad b. Ḥasan b. ‘Abd al-Karīm b. Muḥammad al-Barzanjī. The copyist was a descendant of the author. For al-Barzanjī himself, see Brockelmann, GAL, G II, pp. 388-389; S I, pp. 529-530.

Qadḥ al-Zand, fol. 33b3-6 from bottom.

ibid., fol. 3b2-3.

ʿAṣafiyya Manuscript, Kalām 223.

Al-Nāshira al-Nājira, fol. 26a16-20.
44ibid., fol. 2a7-9.

45Qadh al-Zand, fol. 11b19-20; fol. 15a14-16.

46ibid., fol. 3a22ff.

47Aṣafiyya Manuscript, Kalām 224. See also Bankipore Catalogue, vol. 10, no. 579. Al-Ṣārim al-Hindi seems to be the same work.


49Al-Nāshira al-Nājira, fol. 1b16-2a7. See also Qadh al-Zand, fol. 3a15ff; fol. 79a1-4.

50Al-Nāshira al-Nājira, fol. 2a3-4; al-ʿAṣab al-Hindi, fol. 17-10; Qadh al-Zand, fol. 3a15-16.

51Al-Nāshira al-Nājira, fol. 3b3-4.

52Printed in Muʿarrab al-Maktūbāt, vol. 3, margin.

53ibid., vol. 3, p. 184, margin.


55Rasāʾil-i Ḥaẓrat-i Shāh Wali Allāh. Ḥabīb
Ganj Collection 24/8, fols. 133a-137b. Preserved in Mawlānā Azād Library, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, India. The manuscript is corrupt and illegible in many places.

56 *ibid.*, fols. 47a-50a.


58 The name of this work is not mentioned and it may be part of a larger work. It is quoted in *Wakīl Ahmād Sikandarpūrī*, *Hadiyya Mujaḍḍidīyya*, Delhi, n.d., pp. 94-96. An Arabic translation of it is given in *Muʿarrab al-Maktūbāt*, vol. 1, pp. 173-177, margin.


60 Delhi 1312. See p. 408 for the date of composition. Brockelmann’s reference to the author of this work as Ahmād b. ‘Abd al-‘Aḥad al-Sirhindī al-Sikandarpūrī (*GAL*, S II, p. 530) is erroneous.

61 Delhi, n.d.

62 Delhi 1309. See pp. 31-45 where Sikandarpūrī describes how Gujarātī came to write this book.

63 India Office MS. D.P. 630. The Urdu translation of this work by Ahmad Ḥusayn Khān, published in Lahore 1922, was not available to us. See EI², s.v. Ahmad Sirhindī.

64 Kānpūr 1380.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II


5. See, for instance, *Sunan Abī Dā'ūd*, vol. 2, pp. 429ff, and similar chapters in other collections.

6. The same intention is evident also in another tradition included in the *Kitāb al-Malāḥim*. (*Sunan Abī Dā'ūd*, vol. 2, p. 439, bāb qiyām al-sāʾa). One night,
near the end of his life, the Prophet was leading the community in prayer. When it was finished he said:

"Have I seen you to night? - because a hundred years from how none will remain on the face of the earth" (a ra'aytukum laylatakum hadhihi fa-inna 'alā ra's mi'a sana minhā lā yabqā mimman huwa 'alā zahr al-ard 'ahad).

Commenting on this version Ibn 'Umar says that it is erroneous; the Prophet said according to him: "... none will remain of those who are to day on the face of the earth - meaning that the generation will come to an end" (lā yabqā mimman huwa al-yawm 'alā zahr al-ard - yurid an yankharim dhālika al-qarn). The corrected version is hardly acceptable, but it is indicative of the desire to circumvent the predictions about the imminence of the Hour. Cf. P. Casanova, *Mohammed et la fin du monde*, Paris 1911, pp. 17-18.

7 'Abd al-'Hakīm Siyākūtī was according to the mujaddidī tradition the first man to call Sirhindī by this title. See Khazīnat al-Asfīyā', p. 614.13

8 *ibid.*, p. 6189-16; Tadhkira-yi Ulamā'-i Hind, p. 129-15.

9 The benedictory formulae following the name of God, the Prophet and other persons have been omitted in all translation appearing in this work.


15 Cf. *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, vol. 1, p. 131 (kitāb al-ʿImān, no. 234): "When 'Allāh Allāh' is not said on earth, only then will the Hour take place" (lā taqūm al-sāʿa ʿāttā yuqūl fī al-ard allāh allāh).

"Worship during the (last) cataclysm is like fleeing towards me" (al-‘ibāda fī al-haraj ka-‘l-hijra ilayy). See also Maktūbāt, vol. 2, pp. 1374-12.

17 Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 2255, 2268 (kitāb al-fītān wa ashrāt al-sā‘a, nos. 110, 131); Sunan Ibn Māja, vol. 2, pp. 1340-1341 (no. 4039).

18 Maktūbāt, vol. 2, pp. 13517 - 1383. This letter is partly devoted to the description of a comet seen in India in 1028/1617-1618. It may be of some interest to astronomers.

19 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 38612-3913.


21 The text of the Maktūbāt is iḥyā‘-i sharī‘at-i jadīda (vol. 1, p. 25516). The passage is reproduced in Zubdat al-Maqāmāt, p. 1756-14; the text here is binā-yi sharī‘at-i jadīda, which seems to be preferable.


24 It was felt already in the early period of Islamic history that this tradition is not compatible with the sayings indicating that the ideal period of
the Prophet was followed by an irreversible decline.

25Maktubat, vol. 1, pp. 304-305; 305-11;
Zubdat al-Magâmat, p. 190-11.

26Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 299-300; 434-8. The appearance of prophetic qualities in persons living in the post-prophetic era through "following and inheritance" (bi taba'iyyat o wirâthat) is one of the frequently recurring themes in the Maktubat.

27Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 14-15. See also vol. 3, p. 248-18, where Sirhindî speaks of the mujaddid as the "representative" of 'Abd al-Qâdir al-Jîlânî.

28See infra, p. 159.

29Qur'ân, 4, 125.

30Qur'ân 2, 124.

31Qur'ân 16, 123.


33Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 166-169; 150-151; 165-14.

34See supra, note 27. The brief reference to the mujaddid at the very end of the third volume of the Maktubat (pp. 248-13-249) does not invalidate this statement. Sirhindî only responds there to the possible criticism of the contradictions between his concept of
tajdīd and his later ideas about the mystical role of 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī. He does not add anything new to his understanding of tajdīd.

35See supra, note 33 to the present chapter.


37He is the author of Zubdat al-Maqāmāt.

Thirteen letters have been sent to him; this is the third largest number sent to any single correspondent, with the exceptions of Sirhindī's sons Muḥammad Saʿīd and Muḥammad Maʿṣūm. See Sirhindī's praise for him in Maktūbāt, vol. 3, pp. 14116-20.

38Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 15121-15215.
NOTES TO CHAPTER III


2 Qureshi (The Muslim Community in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent (610-1947), The Hague 1962, p. 151) says that it was Sirhindī's "spiritual guide who corrected his exuberance by keeping him within the necessary discipline"; Sirhindī stresses, however, that the correction came to him through divine inspiration. See Maktūbāt, vol. 1, p. 41^17 ff.

3 ibid., vol. 1, pp. 41^2-42^8.


6 ibid., vol. 1, pp. 10^22-11^3.

7 ibid., vol. 1, p. 165-6.

8 See F. Meier, 'Alā‘ al-Dawla al-Simnānī, in EI.


10 It is interesting to note that 'Alā‘ al-Dawla al-Simnānī, who seems to have influenced Sirhindī's
thinking considerably, also says that his erstwhile adherence to the theory of the Unity of Being helped him to see its falsity later. See Jāmī, Nafahāt al-Ums, Lucknow 1334, pp. 429-440, especially p. 439ff. I am indebted for this reference to Professor H. Landolt.

11Mabda o Ma‘ād, pp. 104-111.
12ibid., pp. 3317-345.
13ibid., p. 395-8.
15Mabda o Ma‘ād, pp. 6012-611.
16ibid., pp. 810-91.
18Letters to Šāliḥ Kūlābī are included in all three volumes of the Maktūbāt (vol. 1, letters 161, 182, 244, 306; vol. 2, letter 33; vol. 3, letters 87, 95); this seems to be an indication of the prolonged association between him and Sirhindī. Kūlābī also had access to the letters which Sirhindī sent to his sons (Maktūbāt, vol. 1, p. 26318-19). In one of the letters Sirhindī wrote to him about the death of his sons Muḥammad Sādiq, Muḥammad Farrukh and Muḥammad ‘Isā (ibid., vol. 1, pp. 44110-4428); this may also be seen as an indication of the degree of intimacy between the two men. Cf. Zubdat al-Maqāmāt, pp. 37014-3729; according to this
source Kûlabî was one of Sirhindî's first associates.

19 The Lucknow 1889 edition of the Maktûbât (vol. 3, p. 145\(^{10}\)) reads here mutaṣʿammīn, which is difficult to accept. We have translated according to the Delhi 1290 edition which has muttaṣīl (vol. 3, p. 149\(^{10}\))

20 i.e., a ṣūfī who does not need an instructor.

See 'Aṭṭār, Tadhkirat al-Awliyā', ed. Nicholson, vol. 1, p. 24\(^7\)-12: "Know that there is a group of people called Uwaysīs. They do not need a ṭīr, because the Prophet, in his own heart, gives them instruction without the mediation of anyone, in the same way as he gave it to Uways. Though he did not meet the Prophet in person, he received instruction from him. In reality, he was (the Prophet's) intimate companion. This is a very high stage . . ." Cf. Nicholson, Mathnawī, commentary on 4/1926.

21 An allusion to Qur'ān 41, 53.

22 This is a very difficult and rare expression. If the text is correct, it may mean "things designed (especially for me (?)� births.

23 Maktûbât, vol. 3, pp. 145\(^{10}\)-146\(^{7}\). See partial translation of this letter in Rizvi, op. cit., p. 268, n. 2.

24 Maktûbât, vol. 3, pp. 146\(^9\)-151\(^{21}\).

25 ibid., vol. 3, pp. 151\(^{21}\)-152\(^{15}\).
26 The letter which we analysed here is addressed to Sirhindī's son and successor, Muḥammad Saʿīd.

27 ibid., vol. 2, pp. 162-177.

28 Ibn al-ʿArabī, Ḥujūṭ al-Ḥikam, ed. ʿAfīfī, Cairo 1946, p. 64.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1 Cf. supra, p. 23.
2 Cf. supra, pp. 6-7.
4 ibid., pp. 131 14-1325.
6 Ithbāt al-Nubuwā, pp. 515-614. The investigation of the validity of these charges, which are similar to those levelled by ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Badā‘ūnī in his Muntakhab al-Tawārikh and have been a subject of controversy for a long period of time, is beyond the scope of the present study. For different views regarding them see, for instance, Sharma, op. cit., pp. 23-25, 35-49; Sa‘īd Ahmad, Musalmānōn kā ‘urūj o zawāl, Delhi 1963, pp. 306-307; B. A. Faruqi, The Mujaddid’s Conception of Tawhīd, Lahore 1940, pp. 16-22; Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, Oxford 1964, pp. 167-181. See also Omar S. Pound, The Emperor Akbar as a Religious Man: six interpretations. Unpublished M.A. thesis in the library of the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal.
7 See supra, pp. 6-7.
8 Ithbāt al-Nubuwwa, pp. 6\textsuperscript{14}-9\textsuperscript{18}. Cf. al-Ghazālī, al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl, ed. Cairo 1952, p. 43.
9 See supra, pp. 6-7.
10 Ithbāt al-Nubuwwa, p. 10.
11 Maktūbāt, vol. 3, pp. 247\textsuperscript{4}-248\textsuperscript{12}.
12 Maktūbāt, vol. 1, pp. 150\textsuperscript{23}-151\textsuperscript{14}. Cf. ibid., vol. 1, p. 153\textsuperscript{6-8}.
13 ibid., vol. 1, pp. 55\textsuperscript{17}-56\textsuperscript{2}, 24\textsuperscript{11-15}.
14 ibid., vol. 1, p. 30\textsuperscript{21-22}.
15 ibid., vol. 1, p. 291\textsuperscript{15-23}, vol. 2, p. 92\textsuperscript{8-22}.
16 Nabda o Ma'ād, pp. 10\textsuperscript{4}-11\textsuperscript{1}.
17 Qur'ān, 2, 115.
18 Maktūbāt, vol. 2, p. 92\textsuperscript{8-22}.
19 See infra, pp. 98-99.
20 Maktūbāt, vol. 1, pp. 291\textsuperscript{15-23}, 337\textsuperscript{10}-338\textsuperscript{7}, 433\textsuperscript{8}, 434\textsuperscript{13-19}; vol. 2, pp. 89\textsuperscript{23}-90\textsuperscript{16}; Nabda o Ma'ād, pp. 66\textsuperscript{18}-67\textsuperscript{4}; Ḥazarāt al-Quds, fol. 33\textsuperscript{1-2}; Zubdat al-Maqāmāt, pp. 175\textsuperscript{19-21}, 210\textsuperscript{20-21}.
21 Maktūbāt, vol. 1, p. 191\textsuperscript{12-23}.
22 Nabda o Ma'ād, p. 66\textsuperscript{6-17}.
23 Maktūbāt, vol. 3, p. 247\textsuperscript{5-10}. The expression gurb-i thubūt (p. 247\textsuperscript{6}) is an obvious corruption of gurb-i nubuwwat. Cf. the Delhi 1290 edition, vol. 3, p. 251\textsuperscript{6}. 

25 See supra, pp. 34-36.

26 See supra, p. 24.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

2 ibid., vol. 1, p. 1857-12; Ḥaẓarat al-Quds, fol. 37b7-10, 61b1-2; Zubdat al-Maqāmāt, p. 21010-17.
3 Ḥaẓarat al-Quds, fol. 37b7-10.
5 See Nurul Hasan, ‘Abd al-Rahīm Khān, in EI2, s.v.
8 See e.g., Zubdat al-Maqāmāt, pp. 2094-9, 1979-19, and infra, note 11 to the present chapter.
9 See infra, pp. 105-106.
10 For the classical background of this distinction see J. Robson, Bid‘a, in EI2, s.v.
For a description of these garments see Dozy, *Dictionnaire Détaillé des Noms des Vêtements chez les Arabes*, Amsterdam 1845, pp. 327-334 (*farjiyya*, pl. *farājī*), pp. 203-209 (*sirwāl*, *sārāwīl*) and p. 244 (*shāl*).

It should of course be understood that the alms are actually given to poor people, in the name of the deceased. For a description of this custom among the Muslims in India, see Jaffur Shurreef and G. A. Herklots (translator), *Wannoon-e-Islam* or the *Customs of the Muslims of India*, London 1832, pp. 417, 422-425. Cf. also *Maktūbât*, vol. 3, p. 19722-23, where Sirhindī ordered that "various victuals be brought to the spirituality of the Prophet" in gratitude for the *ijāza* which the Prophet had written for Sirhindī in his dream.

19 *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 108*12*-110*12*.

20 *ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 25*3*-9, 409-18, 59*12*-14,

21 *ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 50*8*-13, 55*1*.

22 *ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 296*2*-3.

23 *ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 224*22*; *Hazārat al-Quds*, fols. 52b*20*-53a*3*.

24 *ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 168*21*-169*3*.

25 *ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 100*3*-6.

26 The text seems to be corrupt here: o hanafi or a similar expression must have been omitted.

27 *Ma'bad o Ma'ād*, pp. 38*17*-39*2*.

28 *Maktūbat*, vol. 1, p. 365*13*-15. Cf. *Hazārat al-Quds*, fols. 39a*11*-39b*5*, where Badr al-Dīn describes a vision in which Sirhindī was visited by Abū Ḥanīfa, al-Shāfiʿī and their disciples. In this vision the lights of Abū Ḥanīfa entered Sirhindī; the same happened later with the lights of al-Shāfiʿī. Badr al-Dīn says that Sirhindī can therefore be called "hanafi shafiʿī". The transformation of the two jurists into mystical figures is characteristic of the way in which Sirhindī deals with the sharīʿa and its leading personalities.

In this chapter we shall discuss the ‘ulamā’ only as far as their spiritual achievements are concerned. Sirhindī's views on their role in society will be discussed later. See infra, pp. 115-121.

See Qur'ān, 3, 6 which is the background for the whole discussion that follows.

Of al-Marghinānī. See Brockelmann, GAL, G I, p. 376.


It would be perhaps instructive to refer here to another place in which Sirhindī speaks of this Qur'ānic verse. In the Radd-i Rawāfiţ (p. 116-7), written before Sirhindī joined the Naqshbandī order, he quotes this verse in support of his refutation of the shī‘ī views. In this period Sirhindī saw the "ambiguous verses" as a source of dissensions in the community; in his şūfi period they became the source of the profoundest religious knowledge. This change reflects the essential transformation of Sirhindī's religious outlook as a result of his affiliation with the Naqshbandī order.
35 For the classical background of this concept and its sister-concept farq or tafriqa see Kalābādī, al-Ta‘arruf li-Madhhab Ahl al-Taṣawwuf, Cairo 1960, pp. 119-121.


37 See supra, note 35 to this chapter.


41 Maktūbāt, vol. 1, pp. 259-12, 336-13, 45310-21; cf. ibid., vol. 2, p. 12914-23. Of particular interest is also a passage in Nabda· o Maʿād (p. 336-8) in which Sirhindī says: "It remains to be said that Seeing God (ruʿya) in the hereafter is a reality (haqq) in which we believe and are not concerned with its manner (kayfiyya). The reason for this is that the common people are not able to understand it, not that the élite cannot understand it; they (i.e., the élite) (even) have a share in it in this world, though it is not called Seeing." Cf. Maktūbāt, vol. 2, pp. 1821-193; vol. 3, pp. 24412-24519; Nabda· o Maʿād, p. 4311-13, and supra, chapter 3, note 17.

42 See supra, p. 6.

43 Radd-i Rawāfiḍ, p. 18-10.

44 ibid., pp. 21-59.

45 ibid., pp. 59-233.

46 ibid., p. 512-16.

47 ibid., p. 113.

48 ibid., pp. 1019-111.

49 ibid., p. 1312-13.

50 ibid., p. 1717-22.
This tradition is based on the ancient Arab belief about the magic ability of the curse to find out whether it was pronounced justly or not and to afflict the man who pronounced it in the latter case ($rujū' al-la'na$). See Goldziher, *Über die Vorgeschichte der Hīgha-Poesie*, in *Abhandlungen zur Arabischen Philologie*, Leiden 1896, vol. 1, pp. 39, 118. The importance of the curse, which is so prominent in the sunnī-shī‘ī polemics, can be properly understood only against this background.


55. *Maktūbāt*, vol. 1, pp. 71$^{16-72^8}$, 104$^{13-16}$.

See also Sirhindī's letter to the people of Sāmāna advising them not to overlook the failure of a local khaṭīb to mention the names of all the four khulafā‘ in his khutba (*ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 28$^4$-29$^{14}$).


59. The text, zīrakī hālī (?), seems to be corrupt. See Maktūbat, vol. 1, p. 282\textsuperscript{20}, and cf. the Delhi 1290 edition, vol. 1, p. 282\textsuperscript{19} which has zīrakīhāy.

60. See Goldziher - Goichon, Dahriyya, in EI\textsuperscript{2}, s.v.; al-Ghazālī, al-Mungidh min al-Dalāl, p. 17\textsuperscript{7}-10; idem., Tahāfut al-Falāsifa, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā, Cairo, n.d. (Dhakhā'ir al-`Arab 15), p. 153\textsuperscript{4}-5.

61. Maktūbat, vol. 1, pp. 282\textsuperscript{16}-283\textsuperscript{3}; vol. 3, p. 38\textsuperscript{14} ff.

62. In this connection Sirhindī brings several times a curious anachronistic story about Jesus and Plato. When Jesus' prophetic call was brought to Plato's attention, he said: "We are rightly guided people and are in no need of anyone to guide us (nahnu gawm muhtadūn lā ḥāja la nā ilā man yahdīnā)." Sirhindī then attacks what he considers to be Plato's stubbornness and stupidity in the strongest possible terms. See Maktūbat, vol. 1, p. 316\textsuperscript{8}-13; vol. 3, pp. 41\textsuperscript{5}-8, 226\textsuperscript{14}-227.

63. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 315\textsuperscript{5}-316\textsuperscript{8}; vol. 3, pp. 23\textsuperscript{4}-12, 38\textsuperscript{14}-43\textsuperscript{2}, 94\textsuperscript{5}-95\textsuperscript{19} (especially 94\textsuperscript{16}-19), 193\textsuperscript{1}-12; Mabda' o Ma'ād, pp. 47\textsuperscript{11}-48\textsuperscript{5}.

64. Maktūbat, vol. 1, pp. 90\textsuperscript{2}-17, 315\textsuperscript{23}-316\textsuperscript{4}.

The attribution of this statement to al-Ghazālī's al-Mungidh min al-Dalāl is inaccurate. Al-Ghazālī
maintains in al-Munqīdhat that medicine cannot be learned save by divine inspiration and that the physicians learn about the healing properties of some drugs from the Prophets (pp. 42-12, 45-1-7; see also p. 23-6-8, where al-Ghazālī speaks of the connection between the political scientists and the Prophets). Nowhere in al-Munqīdhat does he say that the physicians "stole" their science from the Prophets. Al-Ghazālī's intention is to demonstrate the insufficiency of the human intellect in certain fields, not to revile the physicians whose function in society he regards as essential. See also infra, note 67 to this chapter.


67Sirhindī follows al-Ghazālī's well-known view that the philosophers ought to be considered infidels on account of their views regarding the eternity of the world, their rejection of bodily resurrection and their denial of God's knowledge of the particulars (Tahāfūt al-Falāsīfa, pp. 305-307; al-Munqīdhat min al-Dalāl, pp. 22-9-23-1). The two thinkers differ, however, on other points. While Sirhindī maintains that the philosophers could have never reached the knowledge of the Creator without prophetic help,
al-Ghazzālī holds that the naturalists (al-ṭabī‘īyyūn) indeed reached it through their observation of the wonders of nature. (Al-Mungidh min al-Dalāl, pp. 171-186). The main difference between Sirhindī and al-Ghazzālī lies in their respective views of the natural sciences while in Sirhindī’s view the study of these is in practically all cases a sheer waste of time, al-Ghazzālī maintains that it is a collective duty of the Muslims (fard kifāya) to study medicine, arithmetic and geometry in sufficient measure to safeguard the welfare of the community. Physics, astronomy and magic, on the other hand, are useless and ought to be avoided (Iḥyā‘ Ulūm al-Dīn, Cairo 1939, vol. 1, pp. 231-16, 293-15, 4514-18; Al-Mungidh min al-Dalāl, p. 195-8). Al-Ghazzālī’s chapter “On the Intellect, its Nobility, its Essence and its Parts” (Iḥyā‘, vol. 1, pp. 88-95) is also indicative of the difference between the two thinkers in this respect.

68 For the classical background of the term bast see Hujwīrī, op. cit., pp. 48816-49012 (translation pp. 374-376). For the connection between the Arabic wajada and the Persian yāftan in the vocabulary of the ṣūfīs, see ibid., pp. 53813-54117 (translation pp. 413-416).

69 Ma‘ārif Laduniyya, fols. 10a4-10b14.


72 See Abū 'Udhba, op. cit., pp. 4 13-14 (the text seems to be defective here). The author frequently quotes the views of Abū Ḥanīfa instead of those of Māturīdī when discussing the differences between the two schools of theology. See e.g., p. 32 5-8 and passim. On the question of the relationship between schools of law and schools of theology with reference to the Shāfiʿīs and the Ashʿarīs see G. Makdisi, Ashʿarī and the Ashʿarītes in Islamic Religious History, in Studia Islamica 17 (1962), pp. 37-80 and 18 (1963), pp. 19-40.

73 See supra, p. 66.

74 See, e.g., letter 67 in the second volume (pp. 125 2-135 17) which is the first of two letters sent by Sirhindī to Khān-i Jahān. Of similar content is letter 17 in the third volume (pp. 20 14-33 17) addressed to an anonymous ṣūfī woman (ṣāliha az ahl-i irādat). Cf. also ibid., vol. 1, pp. 89 13-94 15.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

2 Supra, pp. 69-70.
3 Both our editions have here khadamiyyat which seems to be meaningless in this context.
5 The Lucknow edition (vol. 1, p. 564) reads here haqq ast o man which seems to be meaningless. We accepted the version of the Delhi 1290 edition (vol. 1, p. 584).
13 Supra, chapter V, section 2.
14. Emending mahabbat-i ò ma'rifat dar sifat
ast o bas of the text (Mabda' o Ma'ad, p. 47\textsuperscript{8-9}) to
mahabbat o ma'rifat etc. according to Zubdat al-Maqamât,
p. 205\textsuperscript{15-16}.

15 Mabda' o Ma'ad, pp. 46\textsuperscript{15}-47\textsuperscript{11}. Cf. 
Maktubat, vol. 1, pp. 155\textsuperscript{1}-156\textsuperscript{2}, where SirhindI says
that the preference of the love of God to that of the
Prophet is characteristic of Sainthood, while the
opposite attitude is characteristic of Prophecy, and
ibid., vol. 3, p. 224\textsuperscript{14-18}. For Rabi'a, see also ibid.,
vol. 1, p. 228\textsuperscript{2-6}. For the dream to which SirhindI
refers here see 'At'tar, Tadhkirat al-Awliyā', ed.
Nicholson, vol. 1, p. 67\textsuperscript{5-9}.

16 Maktubat, vol. 3, p. 230\textsuperscript{11-22}.

17 E.g., Qureshi, op. cit., p. 156; Faruqi,

18 Maktubat, vol. 3, pp. 135\textsuperscript{21}-136\textsuperscript{23}, 159\textsuperscript{9-18}.

19 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 191\textsuperscript{2-16}. Cf. ibid.,
vol. 1, p. 314\textsuperscript{18-23}, 374\textsuperscript{4-12}; vol. 2, p. 86\textsuperscript{14-20};
Ma'rif Laduniyya, fol. 15b\textsuperscript{7-15}; Faruqi, op. cit.,

20 Maktubat, vol. 1, p. 42\textsuperscript{1-4}.

21 We say "as he understood it" advisedly. An
investigation on our part whether SirhindI's understanding
is correct and duly takes into account all the
complexities of Ibn al-`Arabi's world-view would be beyond the limits set for this study.


27 ibid., vol. 2, pp. 512-65 (especially 519-20).


BM. MS, Ethé 645, fol. 436a4-5.


35 Supra, p. 95.

36 Supra, pp. 49-50.


38 Supra, note 22 to the present chapter.


40 See notes 24, 26, 28, 29, 30 to the present chapter.


44 ibid., vol. 1, pp. 743-11, 3991-6; vol. 2, pp. 4023-4117.

45 ibid., vol. 1, p. 36411-18.


NOTES TO CHAPTER VII


2 See infra, pp. 170-171.

3 Radd-i Rawāfīz, p. 1-10.


5 Cf. supra, pp. 59-62.

6 On the question of the historicity of this occasion see W. M. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, Oxford 1956, p. 230.

7 Maktūbāt, vol. 3, pp. 68-75, especially pp. 69-71. The letter has been partially translated by Rizvi, op. cit., pp. 252-254.


9 Cf. supra, p. 77.


The "World of Creation" is in a sense superior to the "World of Command" in Sirhindī's thought. See *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 3311-3420, 1438-1445, 14713-1484, 15810-22 and L. Gardet, "Ālam (section 2) in *EI* 2, s.v.

In the beginning of the letter under consideration Sirhindī says: "Your two letters have been received. We have understood from them that you love the šūfīs and seek refuge in this lofty group (i.e. the Naqshbandiyya). What favour it is when one is given this good fortune! Secondly: 'I am telling you that what is necessary for the message / it is up to you whether you will take my advice or be bored by it'."

(\textit{do kitāb-i shumā rasīd az har do maḥabbat-i fudārā' wa iltijā' bi-īn tā'īfa-yi 'aliyya mafhum gasht cih ni'mat ast kih kast-rā bi-īn dawlat bi-nawāzand thāniyan: man ān-cih shart-i balāgh ast bā tū mi-gūyam / tū khwāh az sukhanam pand gīr wa khwāh malāl}). The meaning of "What a favour it is . . ." is not quite clear; Sirhindī may be saying that to be initiated into the Naqshbandī order is a great favour, which is not bestowed upon everybody, particularly not upon a Hindū (*Maktūbāt*, vol. 1, p. 17014-16). See also the editor's introduction to this letter, *ibid.*, p. 17012-14.

*ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 17012-17116. The letter
has been partly translated by Rizvi, op. cit., p. 254.
Some excerpts are given also in Aziz Ahmad, op. cit.,
pp. 186-187.

16 Ḥaẓarāt al-Quds, fol. 63a9-11, 87b2-8;
Ghulām Sarwar, Khazīnat al-ʿAsfīyāʾ, Kānpūr 1898,
p. 61310-14; Muḥammad Miyan, Ulamāʾ-i Hind kā Shandār
London 1913, p. 412.

17 Maktūbāt, vol. 1, pp. 1067-15, 1493-11,
1657-1671, 16914-21, 19311-20, 3392-6.
18 ibid., vol. 1, p. 19311-13. Quoted in
Rizvi, op. cit., pp. 249-250. For the description of
the execution and its background see Khushwant Singh,
A History of the Sikhs, London and Bombay 1963, vol. 1,
pp. 56-62. This author's statement concerning
Sirhindī's role in inciting Jahāngīr against Arjun
(p. 59, note 25) is inaccurate. Sirhindī did not write
"in strong terms to Jehangir against the Guru"; he
wrote to Shaykh Farīd Bukhārī after the execution had
already taken place. It is also not true that Sirhindī
"claimed to be the second prophet of Islam after
Mohammed". Sirhindī's birth date, given here as 1546,
is an apparent misprint for 1564. There are some other
inaccuracies also in this note.
in various aspects of the relationship between Islam and infidelity. In addition to the letter discussed here, see Maktūbāt, vol. 2, pp. 166-168 and vol. 3, p. 595-16.
Early traditions on this question are assembled in al-Ghazālī, Ḩiyā' Ulūm al-Dīn, Cairo 1939, vol. 2, pp. 140-154: "On the permissible and forbidden intercourse with the oppressive Sulṭāns . . ." (fī-mā yuḥall min mukhālaṭat al-salāṭīn al-ẓalama wa yuḥram . . .).


4Ureshi, op. cit., pp. 152, 158-159.

5The Lucknow 1889 edition has here the meaningless min al-īstīghātha. See the correct version in the Delhi 1290 edition, vol. 1, p. 148.17.


8Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 145.7-21, 145.21-146.7, 146.7-11 and especially p. 147.8-18.


Rizvi (op. cit., pp. 225-226) implies that the 'ulamā‘ were invited to the court in order to amuse the emperor by their religious debates, not in order to advise him on matters of the sharī‘a. Sirhindī's letter, which is the only source from which we know about the matter, does not lend itself to this interpretation. Unless new material relevant to the question is brought to light, Rizvi's interpretation remains highly questionable.


Ibid., vol. 1, p. 67¹⁷-20.


Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 72¹⁹-73².

Ibid., vol. 1, p. 56¹⁵-17.

Ibid., vol. 1, p. 68²-6.


Ibid., vol. 1, p. 195¹⁸-22.

24 Sirhindî praises, for instance, 'Abd al-Rahîm Khân-i Khânân for his faithfulness to the Naqshbandi silsila (Maktûbât, vol. 2, p. 121-10). In letters addressed to him there are several passages from which the relationship of Sirhindî with Khân-i Khânân seems to be that of pîr and murîd (ibid., vol. 1, pp. 85-15, 86-12). We can see no reason for Rizvi's statement (op. cit., p. 240) that "the letters written by Mujaddid to Khan-i Khânân exhibit the constant struggle which Mujaddid had to wage to convince him of the correctness of his approach to Islam".

25 For his career see Nurul Hasan, in EI², s.v.
Irfan Habib maintains (The Political Role of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindì and Shah Waliullah, in Enquiry 5 (New Delhi 1961), p. 42) that "there is no proof that he (i.e. Shaykh Farīd Bükhārī) received them (i.e. Sirhindī's letters) at all ..." and that it seems very difficult to believe that such a high official of the Empire would have dared to entertain letters which spoke in abusive terms of the reigning king's father". This view is questionable. Shaykh Farīd Bükhārī wrote to Sirhindī at least three times (Maktūbāt, vol. 1, pp. 60^{8}, 66^{13-14}, 68^{19-21}) and it is clear that the correspondence was not unilateral. That he was not fearful to maintain contact with Sirhindī is clear also from his material support for Sirhindī's khāngāh (ibid., vol. 1, p. 61^{17-20}). The same is true of 'Abd al-Rahīm Khān-i Khānān who also wrote to Sirhindī several times (ibid., vol. 1, pp. 31^{3}, 85^{11-15}, 86^{9-11}, 197^{11}) and of his son Dārāb Khān (ibid., vol. 1, p. 219^{17}).

Nizāmī, in Islamic Culture 39 (1965), p. 47.

Yasin, op. cit., p. 151.

Habib, op. cit., pp. 41-43.

Rizvi, op. cit., pp. 219-223.

These are the dates between which the second volume of the Maktūbāt, from which the following quotation
has been taken, was written. See supra, p. 2.

32 For this place see V. A. Smith, The Oxford History of India, Oxford 1961, p. 56.


34 *Maktūbāt*, vol. 2, pp. 161-162. Cf. Habib, op. cit., p. 43; Ikram, op. cit., p. 202. The view of Professor Nizāmī, who maintains (Islamic Culture 39 (1963), p. 47) that nothing is known about Sirhindī's views of the emperor between the latter's accession and Sirhindī's imprisonment, must thus be modified. Sirhindī was clearly dissatisfied with the fact that Jahāngīr did not introduce stronger measures for the "defense of Islām". Fārūqī (op. cit., pp. 21-22) is wrong when he uses this letter to describe the situation of Islām under Akbar.

35 Jahāngīr refers here to letter 11 of the first volume.


37 Ibid., p. 3087-10.
Aziz Ahmad rejects the idea according to which Sirhindī's imprisonment was caused by a Shi'ī conspiracy. (Religious and Political Ideas of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindī. Rivista degli Studi Orientali 36 (1961), p. 261, note 7).
NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1Maktūbāt, vol. 1, pp. 206\textsuperscript{13}-208\textsuperscript{2}, 191\textsuperscript{9-23}.

Cf. Ḥaḍrat al-Quds, fols. 77a\textsuperscript{9}-77b\textsuperscript{16}.

2ibid., vol. 1, pp. 352\textsuperscript{3-6}, 364\textsuperscript{18-21}.

3ibid., vol. 1, pp. 201\textsuperscript{13}-202\textsuperscript{20}, 240\textsuperscript{1-2}.

4See Muhammad Shafi, 'Abd al-Haqq b. Sayf al-Dīn in EI\textsuperscript{2}, s.v., and Khāliq Ahmad Ṣīmānī, Ḥayāt-i Shaykh 'Abd al-Haqq Muḥaddith Dihlawī, Delhi 1964. For the letter itself, see supra, chapter I, note 35.

5See supra, chapter I, note 11.

6Ṣīmānī, Ḥayāt-i Shaykh 'Abd al-Haqq, pp. 312\textsuperscript{19}-313\textsuperscript{10}.

7Maktūbāt, vol. 3, pp. 190\textsuperscript{17}-191\textsuperscript{2}.

8Ṣīmānī, Ḥayāt-i Shaykh 'Abd al-Haqq, pp. 313\textsuperscript{10}-315\textsuperscript{1}.

9ibid., pp. 315\textsuperscript{1}-316\textsuperscript{1}. 'Abd al-Haqq's text corresponds fairly accurately to Sirhindī's original. One remark may be useful. On p. 315\textsuperscript{6} Ṣīmānī's text reads: 

\textit{man ham murīd-i rasūl allāh am wa ham ham-rah.}

The manuscript, (Ṣuṣūfī, op. cit., fol. 624\textsuperscript{13}) actually has the correct ham-pīra instead of ham-rah. Cf. Maktūbāt, vol. 3, p. 145\textsuperscript{14}, and supra, pp. 34-36.

10Maktūbāt, vol. 3, p. 145\textsuperscript{16}, and supra, p. 35.
11. Nizāmī, Ḥayāt-i Shaykh ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq, pp. 316\(^1\)–318\(^2\), 318\(^1\)–319\(^3\).

12. ibid., pp. 318\(^2\)–9.

13. ibid., pp. 319\(^3\)–20.


16. Maktūbāt, vol. 3, pp. 223\(^1\)–231\(^5\). The name of the addressee is not given in our edition of the Maktūbāt, but it is evident from the content that this letter in fact is Sirhindī's reply to ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq.

17. Hadiyya Mujaddidiyya, pp. 101\(^5\)–103\(^4\).


19. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq, Akhbar al-Ākhyār, Delhi 1332, pp. 323\(^2\)–326\(^6\).

20. The following manuscripts have been examined:

a) Bodleian 363 (copied in 1095)

b) India Office D. P. 572 (copied in 1107 from a manuscript corrected by the author)

c) Êthē 640 (no date)

d) Aligarh Muslim University, ‘Abd al-Salām collection 931/26 (copied in 1138)
e) British Museum Or. 221 (copied in 1218)

f) Suleymaniya, Istanbul, Esad Ef. 1311
(copied in 1244)


24. See reference in chapter I, note 11, and Appendix A.

25. See supra, chapter I, section 3.


28. Ḥazarāt al-Quds, fols. 32b°14-16, 67b°15-68°6, 70b°-71a°1, 71a°13-21, 72°12-20, 73°10-18, 74°2-11, 81b°14-82a°3; Zubdat al-Maṣāmī‘at, pp. 264°12-265°4, 270°4-274°21; Majma‘ al-Awliyā‘, fol. 442b°6-10.
29 Hazarāt al-Quds, fol. 72a1-72b5.
30 *ibid.* , fols. 73b10-74a2; Majmaʿ al-Awliyā', fol. 441-9.
31 Hazarāt al-Quds, fols. 81b5-14, 86a6-86b1.
32 *ibid.* , fol. 79a1-79b13.
33 *ibid.* , fol. 39b11-12; Zubdat al-Magāmāt, pp. 179-1801.
34 Hazarāt al-Quds, fols. 66b16-67b10; Zubdat al-Magāmāt, pp. 264-12, 26712-26816; Majmaʿ al-Awliyā', fols. 441a9-17, 443b3-444a5.
35 Hazarāt al-Quds, fol. 6811-18; Zubdat al-Magāmāt, pp. 26210-26316.
36 As has been done, in our view, by Rizvi, *op. cit.* , pp. 311-313.
37 Hazarāt al-Quds, fols. 70a12-70b5, 71b1-13, 76b16-77a2; Zubdat al-Magāmāt, pp. 26910-27014, 2776-20.
38 Hazarāt al-Quds, fol. 74a11-19; Majmaʿ al-Awliyā', fol. 442b10-17.
41 Zubdat al-Magāmāt, pp. 28110-2825.
42 Hazarāt al-Quds, fol. 46a6-10.

44. *Maʿārij al-Wilāya*, p. 708. See full text in Appendix B.

45. *ibid.*, p. 840.*infra.*

46. *Qadh al-Zand*, fol. 4b-11-18; *al-Nāshira al-Nājira*, fol. 3b-15-17. See Appendix C. The 19th century Naqshbandī writer Wakīl Aḥmad Sikandarpūrī, who learned about the decree from al-Barzanjī's *Qadh al-Zand* only, rejects the authenticity of the decree and considers it a forgery. For him it is inconceivable that Awrangzēb would have issued such a decree after he had been the disciple of Sirhindī's son, Muḥammad Maʿṣūm (al-Kalām al-Munifi, p. 2716-19). The truth about the relationship between Awrangzēb and Muḥammad Maʿṣūm is a matter of controversy (for opposing views see Yasin, *op. cit.*, p. 168; Niẓāmī in Islamic Culture 39 (1965), pp. 49-50 and Habib, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50) and is beyond the limits of this study. In any case, Muḥammad Maʿṣūm had been dead for eleven years when the decree under consideration was issued.


52. ibid., pp. 669-673.
53. ibid., pp. 673-675.
54. ibid., pp. 675-677.
55. ibid., pp. 683-687; cf. supra, pp. 19-20.
56. ibid., pp. 687-690.
57. ibid., pp. 690-691.
58. ibid., pp. 691-692.
59. ibid., pp. 696-708.
60. See supra, chapter I, notes 52, 53.
63. ibid., vol. 3, pp. 48-52; cf. supra, pp. 34-36.
67. ibid., vol. 3, pp. 155-158.
68. See supra, chapter I, note 47 and pp. 11-12.
69. Qadh al-Zand, fols. 3b-4a. The "qadi" of India" is styled in the letter itself as qadi al-quadat bi-l-diyar al-hindiyya (ibid., fol. 3b-11-12) and is
probably the same person referred to in the decree as shaykh al-islām. Since the replies are being sent to him, it can be assumed that he made the decision to send the istiftā‘ to al-Ḥijāz. The introduction to Qadh al-Zand even says that "the Sultān of India requested that the 'ulamā‘ of Makka and of al-Madīna, such as Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī, Muḥammad al-Barzanjī and others, express their view with regard to the Maktūbāt of Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī" (wa al-sabab al-bā‘īth li-ṭaṣnīf ḥādhihi al-rasā‘īl huwa anna sultān al-hind ‘ālam gīr /sic/ istaftā ‘ulamā‘ al-ḥaramayn kā-‘l-shaykh ibrāhīm al-kūrānī wa al-sayyid muḥammad al-barzanjī wa ghayrahuma ‘an maktūbāt al-shaykh aḥmad al-sirhindī) (ibid., fol. 3b3-6), but this does not have to be taken literally, and probably means only that the mustaftī acted upon the instructions of the emperor. In Qadh al-Zand itself, the istiftā‘ is described as coming from the "‘ulamā‘ of India" (ibid., fol. 4b10-11).

70 See Appendix C.
71 Qadh al-Zand, fols. 5a3-9a26.
72 ibid., fol. 11b15-20.
73 ibid., fols. 14a2-18, 25a21-25b2; cf. supra, p. 27.
74 ibid., fol. 31b14-16.
75 ibid., fols. 9a26-11a5.
76 **Ibid.**, fols. 13b²⁸-14a², 26a²⁸-26b³⁰.

78 **Yadḥ al-Zand**, fols. 14a²⁸-14b¹.
79 **Ibid.**, fols. 14b²⁷-15a⁸.
80 **Ibid.**, fols. 17b²¹-18b¹⁷.
81 **Ibid.**, fol. 18b¹⁸-29.
82 **Ibid.**, fols. 18b²⁹-19a¹⁵.
83 **Ibid.**, fols. 27b²⁷-28a¹⁵.
84 **Ibid.**, fols. 32b²²-33b³⁰.
85 **Ibid.**, fols. 3b³⁰-4a⁹.
86 See supra, p. 12.
88 **Ibid.**, vol. 3, pp. 49-50, margin.
89 **Ibid.**, vol. 3, pp. 52-55.
90 **Ibid.**, vol. 3, pp. 152-158.
91 **Ibid.**, vol. 1, pp. 148-169. Cf. al-Nāshira al-Nājira, fol. 2b¹⁶-17. See also *Muʿarrab al-Maktūbāt*, vol. 1, pp. 77-148, margin, where opinions favourable to Sirhindī are extensively quoted.
92 See supra, p. 11.
93 Al-Nāshira al-Nājira, fols. 2b¹⁴-15, 3b³⁻⁴a³, 10a¹⁵-10b². Cf. Appendix C.
94 Supra, chapter I, notes 13, 14.


96 Muhammad Sadiq, Tabaqat-i Shabjahani, Aqafiyya Manuscript, fol. 351a10-351b2.

97 Subhat al-Marjân, pp. 4710-528.


99 Faruqi, op. cit., pp. 149-170.

100 See supra, chapter I, note 55.

101 Wali Allâh, Rasâ'il (Shawâhid al-Tajdid), fol. 133a1-133b3.

102 Cf. supra, pp. 110.

103 The text here is corrupt and unintelligible: 
لاض احذاء عليه عليه وصل ان امر بويبلا ثم المخال

104 Wali Allâh, Rasâ'il, fol. 133b3-134a9.

105 Ibid., fol. 49a10-50a4. For the meaning of irhâs see Ibn Manzûr, Lisân al-'Arab, s.v. r-h-s.

106 Hadiyya bujaddidiyya, pp. 941 from bottom-968.

107 Supra, pp. 25-27.

This claim is not borne out by Sirhindī's works.

Hadiyya Kujaddidiyya, p. 97-7.


Aziz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 189.

Muhammad Miyān, 'Ulamā'-i Hind kā Shāndār Māzī, p. 212.

ibid., pp. 212-215.

characterizes the historical outlook of this school of Muslim historiography in the following words: "There is little enthusiasm or interest in pre-Muslim India, and Aurangzeb is the national hero, Akbar and Dara Shikoh, traitors to the cause of Islam. Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindi, an orthodox divine of Jahangir's reign who opposed Akbar and Abul Fazal's (sic) liberalism, is the true intellectual leader of the Muslims who, together with Aurangzeb, and also with Syed Ahmad Breivi and Shah Ismail - the nineteenth century Wahabi leader - visualized the Muslim state which is now Pakistan." See A. B. M. Habibullah, Historical Writing in Urdu: A Survey of Tendencies, in C. H. Philips, ed., Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon. London 1961, pp. 494-495.

124Ibid., pp. 186-187 and passim.
125See supra, chapter VI, section 2.
127 Qureshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-158.
129 Haoib, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-50.
130 *ibid.*, p. 55.
133 *ibid.*, pp. 271-284.
NOTES TO CHAPTER X

1 Supra, pp. 46-53.
2 Supra, pp. 28-29.
3 Supra, p. 56.
4 Supra, pp. 33-40.
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