State-Formation and Patronage Networks: A comparative analysis of Berber-State relations in Morocco and Algeria

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ABSTRACT

This article seeks to account for the different relationships between the central government and Berber populations in Morocco and Algeria—The first case being largely integrative and the other frequently conflictual. Through a comparative historical analysis, it highlights the dual importance of the legacies of French colonial rule on one hand, and post-colonial configurations of political power on the other. Both variables were essential in shaping the extent and the composition of power networks in Morocco and Algeria, which defined the relationship Berber communities had with the central authority.

EXTRAIT

Cet article vise à interroger les relations entre populations berbères et gouvernement central marocain d'une part et gouvernement central algérien d'autre part. Si dans le cas du Maroc, la stratégie employée se montre portée sur l'intégration, l'approche algérienne se révèle beaucoup plus conflictuelle. Cette analyse historique comparative a pour objectif de mettre en lumière l'importance de l'héritage colonial français, tout comme celle de l'architecture du pouvoir politique contemporain. Ces deux variables ont déterminé la portée et la composition des réseaux de pouvoir au Maroc et en Algérie, ce qui a eu pour effet de façonner les relations des communautés berbères avec le gouvernement.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANP	Algerian People's National Army
BP	Political Bureau
DRS	Department of Intelligence and Security
ENA	North African Star
IRCAM	Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture
FIS	Islamic Salvation Front
FFS	Socialist Forces Front
HCA	High Commission for Amazighity
MAK	Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia
MNA	National Algerian Movement
MP	Popular Movement
MTLD	Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties
PDAM	Moroccan Amazigh Democratic Party
PDI	Democratic Independence Party
PPA	Algerian People’s Party
RCD	Rally for Culture and Democracy
RPK	Rally for Kabylia
UDMA	Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto
GPRA	Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The Berbers were the first recorded inhabitants of Northern Africa and the Sahara. They came under the influence of the Phoenicians for seven centuries, the Romans for six centuries, the Romanized Byzantines for a century, the Islamo-Arabs for four centuries, the Turks for three centuries and the French for more than a century (Benrabah, 2013: 22). The Arab conquest of the Maghreb under the first Caliphate resulted in the Arabization of the peninsula. The Arab invasion introduced a new political system, the Arabic language and Islam to North Africa (Ennaji and Sadiqi, 2008), which was later followed by a long period of French colonization.

The Berbers are one of the largest ethnic groups in North Africa. They are not an entirely homogeneous group and are composed of different sub-groups. In Morocco, there are three primary Berber dialects, rooted in three distinct regions: Tashelhit in the south, spoken by approximately 8 million persons, Tamazight in the southeast and Tarrifit (Zenatiya) in the north, both respectively spoken by 3 million persons. Algeria has two primary dialects and several smaller ones: Taqbaylit in the Kabylie region spoken by 5 million persons; Chaoui in the Aures region, spoken by roughly 2 million persons; Tachenaouit in the Chenoua and Zaccar mountains in the west of Algiers, spoken by 100,000 persons; the dialects of the Berbers of the oases, spoken by approximately 350,000 person inside the country; and Tamasheq, in the south at the border of Mali and Niger, spoken by 100,000 Touaregs (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011: 2). All these dialects (including those spoken in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt) are variants of one single language. In Morocco it is difficult to estimate the share of the population that identifies as Berber since this identity marker is not necessarily asserted. The estimates vary between forty percent and sixty percent of the Moroccan population, while in Algeria the Berbers represent about thirty five percent of the population (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011)[1].

[1] World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, [Online] http://minorityrights.org/minorities/berber/



Figure 1. Map of Berber-speaking regions (Source: Yves Jardin, Le Monde Diplomatique 1994)

In Morocco, Berber identity has not been a major component of political mobilization. The question of "Arab" versus "Berber" identity is one that rarely surfaces in Moroccan politics. Despite the preponderance of Arabic in state institutions, Morocco has a history of multilingualism due to its culturally diverse background which includes Arabic, Tamazight, French, Spanish and English, making the country very cosmopolitan. Since independence there have been no significant clashes between the government authorities and the Berber population, who were effectively integrated into the (monarchical, authoritarian) political system. Among

the reforms undertaken by the state during the Arab spring, was the recognition of Tamazight (Berber language) as an official language in the Constitution.

In Algeria, the relationship between the Berbers and the state has been much more conflictual. Berber grievances have led to protests as well as other forms of Berber political mobilization, such as the formation of political parties appealing to the Berber minority. Clashes between the government authorities and the Berber populations have become a regular occurrence since the independence, notably during the "Berber Spring" of the early 1980s, the "Black Spring" of 2001, and the conflicts in 2015 in the city of Ghardaia.

This thesis will seek to account for these two very different relationships between the central government and the Berber population—one largely integrative, the other frequently conflictual—in these two neighbouring North African states.

In doing so, this chapter will first offer a brief review of the relevant scholarly literature. From this it will develop an explanatory framework, one which emphasizes the dual importance of the legacies of French colonial rule on one hand, and post-colonial configurations of political power on the other. The chapter will also discuss the methodology adopted in the thesis.

Chapters Two and Three will address the colonial and post-colonial era, respectively in keeping with the analytical framework developed in Chapter One. Each will show how critical junctures shapes future trajectories of Berber-state relations. Finally, Chapter 4 will summarize the key findings of the thesis, draw out their implications, and—based on this—offer some thoughts on how the issue is likely to play out in these two countries in the future.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Given the very large scholarly literature relevant to this topic—on ethnicity, nation and state-building, colonial and post-colonial politics, contentious politics—it is not possible to offer a comprehensive review of everything in a thesis of this length. Hence, for the purpose of this analysis, the focus will be on four key clusters of scholarship regarding the nature of nation and identity; ethnic conflict; political institutions and legitimation. All four clusters of these, as we will see, have interesting insight to offer into the Berber case.

Identity, Nationalism and Nation-Building

Early primordialist theories of ethnicity—which view ethnic identity as an objective and relatively fixed characteristic—are clearly unhelpful in the Berber case, where the extent and character of Berber (self) identity varies greatly in the two neighbouring countries of Morocco and Algeria. Instead, it is more useful to look to approaches which highlight the impact of change and hence the dynamic nature of identity mobilization.

Modernists like Ernest Gellner, link identity formation to modernity. One of the first important research on Berbers was realized by Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud in their work *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa* (1973). Modernists identify factors associated with modernization to explain the emergence of nationalism. According to Gellner, nationalism changed with the rise of industrialism. Mass transportation, social mobility, division of labour and standardized public education took down the barriers between communities, thus favoring the emergence of self-identification to specific communities.

In a similar modernist approach, Benedict Anderson argues that a nation is a "socially constructed community, imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group" (Anderson, 1983). Individuals of a national group share common beliefs, ideals and aspire to a common future. The members of a national community will never know all their fellow-

members, yet they have a sense of belonging. The community is “imagined”, and so is the national affiliation. This perspective shifts the focus from identity to identification which emphasizes the importance of perception instead of the categorization of identity (Brubaker, 1996). There is no fixed definition of Berber (or Arab) identity and although the content of ethnic identities is perceived as ‘primordial’ by the community, it is constantly evolving (Aslan, 2015: 33).

While primordialist scholars from the colonial era perceived Berber identity as fixed and immutable, today’s scholars see ethnicity as a dynamic component of North-African societies, they are constantly being reshaped by forces within and outside the group (Hoffman and Miller, 2010). Ethnic belonging is therefore embedded in intersubjectivity. This idea understands Berber ethnicity through its relationship with others. Otherness can include other ethnic groups, as well as the state and the identity it seeks to promote.

Despite the constructed aspect of identity, it is necessary to stress the importance of continuity in the ***“****imaginaire national”*. A group will need to refer to its old characteristics, culture and traditions in order to give legitimacy to its claims and define itself as a distinct nation. Amazigh activists appeal to primordial, essential and enduring characteristics of group membership. In Anthony D. Smith’s view, “collective cultural identity refers not to a uniformity of elements over generations but to a sense of continuity on the part of successive generations of a given cultural unit of population, to shared memories of earlier events and periods in the history of that unit and to notions entertained by each generation about the collective destiny of that unit and its culture” (Smith, 1991: 25). In this approach, nations have been around for a long time, but have taken different shapes at different points in history.

Discussing the case of Morocco, Mordechai Nisan argues that since the most important factor shaping Berber identity is language, because of the absence of a unified spoken and

written language among Berbers, they couldn't resist cooptation. Although language practices are enmeshed in social systems of domination and subordination of groups, Nisan's argument is reductive as it limits the identity of the Berber population to its spoken language and does not provide enough explanation as to why there was a recognition of an official and unified Amazigh language in Morocco in 2011.

Michael Willis advances that the relationship between the Berbers and the state of Morocco was shaped by the monarchy's use of political pluralism to coopt the Amazigh movement. A long-term strategy whose purpose was to exclude the nationalist party – the Istiqlal – from the central power after the independence. By forging alliances with local chiefs, the King maintained his supremacy on the political power and managed to tame the nationalist opposition. He further argues that the geographic isolation of the Amazigh populations, especially in the Atlas Mountains in the North of Morocco, hindered the strength of the political movement (Willis, 2014).

Lisa Anderson explains that nation-building and the level of political inclusion within a state depends on its political institutions. She argues that republics seek social homogeneity, while monarchies are more compatible with social diversity. This variation comes from the different conception of legitimacy within both political systems. Monarchies rest on ideas of kinship, inequality, and social hierarchy – the monarch is presented as the uniting symbol of a nation in which he is the mediator. While republics rely on ideas of popular sovereignty which require equality – whether real or discursive – among the citizens of the nation (Anderson, 2000). Lisa Anderson's argument provides considerable insights on the variation in the nation-building strategies of our two cases. The Moroccan monarchy's nation-building process has been accommodating towards the different communities that made up Morocco, including the Berbers. The regime did not need to rely on social and cultural homogenization to safeguard its legitimacy. The Algerian republic on the other hand, promoted a strong nationalist ideology

after the independence. The regime sought to homogenize the society around an exclusively 'Arab' nation which did not include the Berber identity.

It is important to note that nationalism can take conflictual dimensions. For Horowitz, 'identification' is based on the intersubjective recognition of members within a specific group. Therefore, categorization can be an important vector of ethnic conflicts as it underlines the differences between 'us' and the 'others' and thus raises the risk of contentions. However, there are many cases were different groups coexist within a state without major conflicts. That is why several scholars pointed out that there is no clear link between ethnic diversity and conflict.

Ethnic Conflict

Although ethnic diversity is a variable difficult to measure, Fearon and Laitin (2003: 82) found that there is no significant correlation between ethnic or religious diversity and civil conflict. They find instead that the primary determinants of ethnic insurgency are per capita income, the size of the population, and whether the state was recently formed. What are often labelled as ethnic conflicts are in fact 'internal insurgencies that occur when the population is poor, and the government is weak'. These findings suggest that differences in the relative size of the Berber minority – between forty and sixty percent of the population in Morocco, compared to around one-third in Algeria – is not a key variable shaping the likelihood of violence in this case.

Using a historical and institutional approach, Kapferer (1988) and Malkki (1995) have discussed the link between colonial history and ethnic conflicts. Through colonial policies, the settlers structured the post-colonial interactions between the state and the society. By categorizing people into different exclusive ethnic groups, the colonial regimes have been encouraging the creation of antagonistic and hierarchal classification. "Such constructions of identities, along with favorable treatment of one group over the other, [politicized] ethnic

differences and [created] the potential for conflict" (Aslan, 2015: 12). In Algeria, the French colonial policies drew a legal distinction between Kabyles and Arabs. Because of an orientalist perception of what North African societies were at the time, but also because it made it easier to control the population if it was divided – to prevent them from uniting against the colonial authority.

Wimmer's theory on the origins of ethno-nationalist conflicts seeks to include different variables in a dynamic process model, where he analyses the different paths nationalism can take (Wimmer, 2012). He suggests that national affiliation is the decisive basis for the integration and exclusion of people. By determining who is part of the nation-state, in whose name the state is ruled, and who has access to the rights provided by the state, the formation of nation-states can lead to social exclusion (Wimmer, 2002). Wimmer highlights the lack of legitimacy of states who exclude large segments of the population on the basis of ethnicity, because they contradict the principle of ethnic self-rule, which is at the basis of nation-states. During the first twenty years that followed Algerian independence, the Arabization policies pursued by the government excluded Berber populations from nation-building, however, the Berber conflict in Algeria goes beyond a mere opposition between 'Arabs' and 'Berbers'. Indeed, grievances in Kabylia often reflect national issues that are common to the rest of the country (ICG, 2003) and that can be better understood through the concept of *hagra*. Hugh Roberts describes it as "a fundamental premise of the way in which the state-society relationship is managed, or rather mismanaged, by the authorities in contemporary Algeria" (Robert, 2002: 22). This concept is specific to the Maghreb and refers to a form of oppression, contempt and impunity from the political authorities towards the people, which creates a deep feeling of injustice among the population. The *hagra* has been particularly manifest in Berber regions (ICG, 2003), where in addition to repression, the state shows little concern for their

development. That is why, when discussing ethnic contentions in Algeria, we must keep in mind that ethnicity is not the primary reason for conflict.

Institutions and Legitimation Strategies

Now shifting to the solutions provided by governments to deal with such contentions within their borders, Mylonas finds three possible variations: assimilation, accommodation and exclusion. The 'exclusionary' policies refer to the physical removal of a minority – in the form of mass killing, deportation, genocide or segregation. They don't apply to our cases since the Berbers were not treated as such by Morocco nor Algeria. Nevertheless, during the decades following the independence, the Algerian state has adopted coercive assimilationist policies towards Berbers (Willis, 2014), meaning the denial of Berber heritage in Algeria.

> "The goal of assimilationist policies is to secure the loyalty of an individual or a community by "conquering" their belief system and ensuring their obedience to the national state. An implicit normative assumption of such policies is that the core group's culture is superior to the non-core group's culture. States use assimilationist policies to create co-nationals" (Mylonas, 2012: 22).

In the 1970s, these policies involved for example the prohibition to give Kabyle names to children, to distribute Tamazight literature in Algeria and the cancellation of Kabyle radio channels (Amazighworld, NA). Those bans were part of the Arabization policies implemented by the president Houari Boumediène between 1965 to 1978.

Morocco on the other hand, has gone from a relative accommodation of Berber rights to increased multiculturalism in the past decades. In such a political landscape, the community,

> "is allowed to have certain separate institutions such as schools, churches, cultural associations, and so forth. This "minority" status does not mean that the host state is indifferent toward the loyalty of the non-core group's members. The state requires political loyalty to central state institutions and obedience to general laws. [Nevertheless], the fact that "difference" is accepted and perpetuated does not necessarily mean that the non-core group does not still face discrimination both by state institutions and by individual members of the core group." (Mylonas, 2012: 23).

The Moroccan state never viewed the Berber movement as an actual threat for the integrity of the regime. Therefore, accommodative policies were possible. The Palace provided just enough recognition to the Amazigh populations to quell discontent, but he also resorted to cooptation as an essential strategy to maintain its stability.

Gerschewsk defines cooptation as a way for a regime to tie the important and influential actors to the regime elite (2013: 19). Cooptation seeks to create cohesion within the central power, and at the same time prevents actors from becoming too powerful to counter the regime's authority. In the immediate post-independence period, the king of Morocco coopted the different groups to maintain his position. For Mounira Charrad, this process involved the integration and manipulation of strong patrimonial networks across the country (Charrad, 2011: 51). "Patrimonialism was initially used to refer to a form of traditional authority and a source of legitimacy, where there is a blurring between the public and private spheres of the state. In other words, the ruled accept the authority of the ruler, not because of a system of laws and rules, as in a legal-rational society, but because of a personal connection between the two" (Duthie, 2015: 111).

Eisenstadt's explains that neopatrimonial states differ from patrimonial states by their resemblance to modern states. Both – modern and neopatrimonial – systems are composed of a large administrative apparatus, with a legal bureaucracy, and political parties (1973: 11). However, in neopatrimonial states, the parliament and the political parties act as a space of competition for the control of political and material resources of the state (Eisenstadt 1978, 277). The elites use the resources for their group, their personal interest or as a reward for loyalty. Hence, the stability of a neopatrimonial regime largely depends on its ability to expand its patronage network, by integrating new elites within the close circle of the central power and avoid competition (Eisenstadt 1973: 51; Aslan, 2015: 24). In Morocco, the neopatrimonial system is based on the strategic alliances forged by the King, through which he managed to

weaken the opposition's discursive and institutional strategies by coopting or shutting down all the potential competitors to his hegemony. In this system, connection to the Palace is itself a resource – that the Berber elites have managed to obtain. In Algeria, on the other hand the neopatrimonial system mostly relies on a different resource: oil rent. However, the hydrocarbon revenues are managed in the utmost opacity and only benefit a small group close to the political power. When both Algeria and Morocco faced increasing political demands from the Berber movement, the Moroccan political system has been more efficient – or perhaps more willing – than that of Algeria in integrating Berber elites into the central power of the state to receive their support, avoid political rivalries and alleviate protests.

This leads us to issues of political legitimation, since "even very coercive regimes cannot survive without some support" (Geddes, 1999: 125). Indeed, if the rulers are unable to legitimize their position in the eyes of the population, the elite and the opposition (Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2017: 288), due to 'budget constraints' or a decline of their 'power resources', the stability of the regime is threatened (Gerschewski, 2013: 25). Von Soest advances that legitimation "can be both instrumental manipulations to safeguard political power or genuinely held beliefs among the political elite. They are thus of strategic value and may also express elite members' true convictions about their perceived entitlement to rule." (Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2017: 288). In Von Soest's typology, there are six different 'claims to legitimacy' used by authoritarian regimes to secure their rule – the first three ones involve 'identity-based' claims:

- (1) The 'Foundational Myth', built on the history of the country and often used as a legitimation narrative by parties that emerged through national liberation struggles.
- (2) The 'Ideology', which celebrate the 'righteousness of a given political order' and a belief system promoted by the elites (Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2017: 290).
- (3) 'Personalism', which focuses on the ruler's 'legitimacy' to govern the country.

- (4) The 'Procedures', which relies on 'attempts to create procedural legitimacy" - through democratic mechanisms, with elections for example, or through "hereditary power transfer" (Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2017: 290).
- (5) The 'Performance', which lies on the capacity of a political and economic system to satisfy citizens' needs.
- (6) The 'International Engagement', for regimes who refer to their international role to legitimate their rule within their country[2].

These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and can be combined to preserve the institutions of an authoritarian state. When focusing on our two cases, it seems that the legitimation mechanisms adopted by the Moroccan regime are more compatible with the integration of the Berbers in the political system and in the national narrative. Indeed, in Morocco, the 'identity-based' legitimation strategies are inclusive, as shown by the multicultural nationalist ideology on one side and the King presented as the father of the Moroccan people – regardless of religious or ethnic origins – on the other. The political procedures also leave room for plurality. Indeed, the party landscape in the parliament of Morocco is one of the most dynamic in the Arab world (Liddell, 2010). Even if the parliament is completely tamed by the Palace through co-optation, the electoral victories of Moroccan political parties are not one-sided landslide victories unlike other authoritarian regimes, like Algeria, where the rulers are elected with substantial margins. Finally, because the hereditary succession in a Monarchy is expected, it leaves less room for rivalry and uncertainty.

The legitimation strategies of the Algerian regime are more excluding and favour division. Firstly, because the revolutionary ideological foundation of the Algerian regime, which dates back to the end of the war of independence of 1962, is becoming increasingly

[2] For a more detailed outline of the six legitimation strategies, refer to pages 289-291 of Von Soest and Grauvogel's article 'Identity, procedures and performance: how authoritarian regimes legitimize their rule" (2017).

obsolete. Indeed, the median age in Algeria is twenty-eight years old (World Factbook, 2018), which means that half of the population did not experience that war. Regarding ideology, the 'Arab' nationalism promoted after the independence did not embrace Berber identity, thus leaving a large segment of the population excluded from the national narrative. As for the political 'procedures', they are blurred by the opacity of the government. It is difficult to identify the decision-makers in Algeria and to know who holds the power. The last legitimation strategy involves the economic performances of the government, which have long been supported by oil revenues. However, the Algerian regime faces increasing difficulties in satisfying popular expectations despite the oil rent. Not only because the collective resources are diverted to the benefit of the rulers, but also because the drop of oil prices in 2014 make government spending more and more challenging (IGC, 2018).

It is important to remember that we are not discussing the actual legitimacy of both regimes, but rather the legitimation mechanisms of the rulers. In both Morocco and Algeria, the legitimation strategies of the governments are becoming increasingly outdated. Indeed, even if legitimacy is a variable difficult to measure, ongoing protests in both countries are a strong indicator of popular discontent. The uprisings during the 'Arab Spring' in 2011, and the nation-wide protests that started in February 2019 in Algeria – during which the population massively opposed to a fifth presidential mandate of Abdelaziz Bouteflika – show the fragility of both systems. However, in Morocco, this disconnection between the government's claims to legitimacy and the population, did not take the form of "ethnic contentions" like in Algeria.

The following section introduces the independent variables through an overview of the next chapters.

Chapter two will explain how the colonial era and the political paths taken at independence have shaped contemporary Berber-state relations. During the colonial period, the

French pursued divisive policies in Morocco but they kept the institutions of the Sultanate intact. It later enabled the incorporation of Berber rural elites in the political system – to extend the authority of the monarch, and to offset the growing popularity of the Istiqlal. At the time of the independence, the King was a symbol of national unity across Morocco; combined with the multicultural legacy of the country, it allowed for an inclusive nationalism to emerge. In Algeria, on the other hand, the French dismantled the local institutions and engaged in aggressive policies of cultural change – which involved the promotion of artificial ethnic boundaries. At independence, the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) emerged as national leader, but the party was afflicted by major internal rivalries, and the power struggles within the FLN led to an increasing exclusion of Berber actors. The boundaries established under colonialism remained important elements of contentions as assertive Arabism was implemented in reaction to French policies. The nation-building strategy that followed involved molding society under a homogeneous 'Arab' nation which did not include the Berbers.

Chapter three will discuss the contemporary configuration of political power in Morocco and Algeria. Specifically, it will be suggested that the integrative nature of the institutions of the Moroccan monarchy are compatible with social diversity and allowed for a formal inclusion of Berbers into the political system, which gave them the ability to shape public policies. The monarchical authority's reach across the country enabled the power networks to include both Arab and Berber population. The cooptation strategies developed by the King, allowed his authority to be accepted by the Berbers without major conflicts, while at the same time gaining the support of Berber elites. On the opposite, the political institutions in Algeria led to conflictual relationships between the Berbers and the state by excluding them from the power networks. The single party rule and the opacity of the political power, which the Algerians refer to as "*le pouvoir*" – the opaque layer of military and party leaders that enjoy

political power but whose rivalries, alliances, and political machinations are both constant and unclear – resulted in the marginalization of Berber populations and generated important disparities across the country. Such political structures led to grievances within the disadvantaged group who didn't have access to the formal or informal institutions of the state. Combined with a repressive political authority, the state failed to legitimize its authority in the eyes of Berber populations and kept the Berber elites excluded from the power networks and decision-making. Hence, the system generated fragmentation along ethnic lines and paved the way for conflict.

Chapter four concludes the paper and presents its implications.



METHODOLOGY

This paper undertakes a comparative historical analysis of the relationship between the Berbers and the state in Morocco and Algeria using process tracing in order to understand the variation in the causal patterns. Process tracing is an important tool of causal inference in qualitative and case study research (George and Bennett 2005). It is particularly relevant for analyses in which

the explanatory variables and the outcome variables are separated by long periods of time (Mahoney, 2003). Since the analysis goes back to the institutions of the colonial period in order to understand a contemporary political phenomenon, it is relevant for this thesis use process tracing.

This research is seeking case-specific mechanisms that explains solely our cases, not necessarily generalizable mechanisms. Explaining them requires an understanding of how "causal forces are transmitted through a series of interlocking parts of a causal mechanism to produce an outcome" (Beach and Brun Pedersen, 2016: 35). To do so, it is essential to clearly link the explanatory variable with the outcome variable (Mahoney, 2003: 363). Mahoney suggests that careful description is necessary in this case, as it allows us to better understand the trajectories of change. In this paper, *conflict* and *non-conflict* are the outcome variables. The causal mechanisms are drawn from the two following variables: *colonial rule* and the *configuration of political power*.

The goal will be to link the different temporal sequences (Collier, 2011) that characterize the states' relation with the Berbers to understand effects of our dependent variables. The timeline of the analysis focuses on three sequences, namely colonization; the transition to independence; and the post-independence period.

As primary sources, I am using newspaper articles, from newspapers such a as *Aljazeera, Jeune Afrique, Le Monde Diplomatique* and *Algeria Watch,* but also from Amazigh newspapers and websites, such as *Tamazgha* and *Amazigh World*. I am also using the data in the *International Crisis Group* reports, the press releases of NGOs such as the *National Federation of Amazigh Associations* in Morocco and the *Congrès Mondial Amazigh.* And finally, the publications of the official state institutions in charge of promoting Berber culture that are accessible online: the *Haut Commissariat de l'Amazighité* in Algeria and the *Institut*

Royal de la Culture Amazigh (IRCAM) in Morocco. Fortunately, the primary sources outlined above are available in English and/or French since Berber groups and associations tend to translate a significant amount of their publications.

CHAPTER TWO:

FROM COLONIALISM TO INDEPENDENCE

1. ALGERIA

Before the arrival of the European settlers, the Regency of Algiers had been a vassal state of the Ottoman empire since 1520 (Gouëset, 2002). Since the Ottomans could not govern such a vast and diverse territory through direct rule, the political system was organized in local governments (Temlali, 2015: 67). The territory was divided in four regions, namely Algiers, Constantine, Oran and Tittery. All four governed by *Deys* (local governors), who were appointed by the Ottoman sultan and who enjoyed a large amount of autonomy (Belmessous, 2013: 120). Because of Algeria's geographical location on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, the population was ethnically and religiously diverse, with Jews, Christians, Muslims, Kabyles, Turks and Arabs. The Millet system of the Ottoman empire applied different rules to the different religious communities. The only rule to which everyone was subject was the tax paid to the Sultan (Stora, 2004: 17).

After the decline and fall of the Ottoman Regency, the French Kingdom under Louis Philippe 1st, took over the region for one hundred and thirty-two years. The arrival of French settlers in 1830, was followed by important resistance from the *Deys* and the populations. In response to revolts against European territorial expansion, the French military carried out a repression campaign in the countryside (Wyrtzen, 2017). The intensity of the conflicts forced the French General Robert Bugeaud and the Emir Abdelkadir[3] to find a common ground to put

[3] The Emir Abdelkadir was a political and spiritual Algerian leader, who fought the French during the first years of colonization, but who surrendered in 1847 to the French army (Moresi, 2019). He was exiled in Damascus, where he became a national hero for saving Maronite Christian populations during revolts in 1860, for which he earned several military and symbolic decorations - In both France and Middle East (Murner, 2018).

an end to the revolts. In 1837, both parties signed the Treaty of Tafna which divided the Algerian territory between the Emir and France – Abdelkadir would keep a third of the territory (in the Northern area) and the French would have the remaining areas. France however, disregarded the Treaty and continued its territorial expansion (Stora, 2004 :16-18). In 1848, the entire Algerian territory was declared French, but Kabylia was only conquered at the end of the 1850s – as it was more difficult to pacify the tribes in mountainous areas (Belmessous, 2013: 123). William Gallois describes the first two decades of the Algerian conquest as particularly violent (Gallois, 2013), involving massacres, expropriation, districting and population transfers (Owen, 2004: 172).

Since the Algerian territory was completely annexed by France and not simply colonized, its laws were different than in other African and Asian colonies. While Morocco was under the rule of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algeria had its own ministry. France's administrative grip on Algeria was stronger than in Morocco, which resulted in the dismantling of traditional social organizations. The length of Algerian colonization also played a role in the depth of the administrative grip of the country, as colonial institutions had more time to be established.

1.1. Implementation of Divisive Policies

Divisive measures were implemented throughout the whole colonial period. The French administration redefined the legal organization of the communities through top-down legislations. Reforms favored antagonisms between the French and the colonial population on the one hand, but also within the colonial population, through a hierarchical categorization of groups – which included Berbers, Muslims, Europeans and Jews. Each community was subject to very different rules.

The *Senatus-consulte* of 1865, created under the rule of Napoleon III, was the first important legal measure to separate the French citizens from the Algerians (referred to as '*Musulmans'* in official documents) (Gosnell, 2002: 23-25).:

> "Article premier.
>
> L'Indigène musulman est français ; néanmoins il continuera à être régi par la loi musulmane.
> Il peut être admis à servir dans les armées de terre et de mer. Il peut être appelé à des fonctions et emplois civils en Algérie.
> Il peut, sur sa demande, être admis à jouir des droits de citoyen francais ; dans ce cas il est régi par les lois civiles et politiques de la France" (Article Premier, Senatus-consulte, 1865).

Algerians became 'French nationals' but without enjoying the rights associated with French citizenship, such as the right to vote. They remained governed by *shari'a* law, while still having duties towards France. To fully become French citizens, Algerians had to foresake Islam[4] (Maamri, 2016: 34) – This separation of citizenship and religion by French jurisdictions aimed at removing the political dimension of Islam.

The *Senatus-consulte* was the first colonial measure to create second-class citizens, but it later laid the foundations for a new and more important set of laws: The *Code de l'indigénat*. It was introduced in 1881 in Algeria and progressively implemented in other French colonies, but not in protectorates such as Morocco. The code consolidated the judicial and administrative difference between 'colonial subjects' on the one hand and 'French citizens' on the other. Algerian natives became 'colonial subjects' while Europeans were granted the right to citizenship. Algerians maintained their personal status, usually associated with their religion or ethnic community, while being subject to important civil restrictions. The code granted French officials the right to arbitrarily arrest natives, and to extend individual sentences to entire tribes

[4] Jewish populations of Algeria were also treated as 'colonial subjects' until 1870, when they were naturalized by the *Décret Crémieux*. (Gosnell, 2002)

or villages if deemed necessary by the administration[5]. 'Colonial subjects' were also imposed curfews, travel limitations, and special taxes called the *Impôts arabes* (Confer, 1966: 22). The code removed traditional law from the administrative organization of the communities to replace them with French ones (Bozzo, 2006: 33).

The third important divisive measure was the 'Kabyle Myth', developed between 1840 and 1857, during the conquest of Kabylia by the French military (Ouerdane, 2003). It was based on the idea that there was an essential difference between the civilized Berbers on one side and the barbarian Arabs on the other (Meynier, 2014). Yet, instead of seeing the Berbers as simply different from the Arabs, they were perceived as superior to the Arabs (Lorcin, 2005: 12). The settlers believed that Berbers shared more similarities with the French – Their physical characteristics were more similar to that of Europeans since they had a lighter skin – and saw them as the descendants of the "original Christian inhabitants" of the territory (Hill, 2009: 32). Since Arabs were nomads, they granted less value to territorial attachment, while sedentary Berbers did. The colonial administration believed that the latter had more potential to become a nation like the ones in Europe (Carette, 1848). France considered that "civilized people were organized into nation-states, not tribes" (Hill, 2009: 33). In 1841, the French General Duvivier wrote : "*Il est de toute évidence que la fixité Kabaïle et l'amour de cette race pour le travail devront être les plus forts pivots de notre politique pour nous établir en Afrique*" (Ageron, 1960 : 314). France saw in Kabyle communities, potential allies in North Africa.

Patricia Lorcin explains that although no official legislation effectively granted Berbers a superiority over the Arabs, this representation was unofficially integrated in the political and social structures promoted by the French administration (2005: 13). Reforms were conducted

[5] Collective sentences included offenses such as "not moving when called upon to fight a forest fire or a plague of grasshoppers, attending unauthorized meetings, delay in payment of taxes, and acts against reforestation" (Confer, 1966: 24)

in Berber land, where Muslim law was removed from the traditional institutions (Ageron, 1960). The civil registry imposed an alien system of patronyms to distinguish 'Berbers and 'Arabs'[6] (Benrabah, 2013: 30). Through this categorization, the colonial administration created artificial social boundaries, that were used to favor 'Berbers' over 'Arabs' (Lazreg, 1983) in an attempt at dividing the population to better control it.

Education policies in Kabylia also sought to spread French ideals in the region. The new schools built at the end of the 19th century (Ageron, 1960) promoted French language and secular republican values instead of Islam and Arabic language (Hawkings, 2011: 14). A new historiographic narrative was constructed, in which Arabs were presented as the invaders of Berbers lands, the latter being described as the descendants of Christians and Romans. In this narrative, French colonialism in North Africa became necessary to save these population from barbarism and restore the "lost Western civilization it once had" (Wyrtzen, 2017: 222).

The reforms implemented in Kabylia, and in Algeria in general, highlight the paradox of French occupation. Despite the willingness to assimilate the colonized population, the administration created divisive structures and completely disrupted traditional institutions. Not only because of a true ignorance of local cultures, but also to divide the population in order to avoid uprisings[7]. By the beginning of the 20th century, Algeria's political institutions were completely changed.

As explained by Todd Shepard, "applied assimilationist theory – which worked to eliminate group 'particularisms' in order to create individuals who could be French citizens – had pushed most Algerian 'Muslims' farther away from other French people, not closer"

[6] Using the first name followed by the Berber/Arab particle 'son of' and connected to the previous ancestor's name.

[7] In 1935, the Council of State went as far as making Arabic a foreign language in Algeria to prohibit the printing of Arabic newspapers and thus limit the possibilities of organized opposition (Temlali, 2015: 85).

(Shepard, 2006: 47). With the rise of Algerian nationalism in the 1920s, this social restructuration gradually evolved into rivalries between the political actors.

1.2. Rise of Algerian Nationalism and Fragmentation

J.N.C Hill suggests that Algerian nationalism emerged with the exposure to European nationalist ideas during WWI (Hill, 2009: 14). One hundred and seventy-three thousand Algerians (Arabs and Berbers) had fought side by side with French soldiers in Europe (Dufoix, 2005). The French government had failed to give them social or political recognition. This feeling of injustice and the constant denial of political rights led to an increasing politicization of Algerian demands in the mid-1920s (Lawrence, 2013: 115).

The *Étoile Nord Africaine* (ENA) was founded in 1926, by Messali Hadj, a Kabyle intellectual, who had close ties with the *Parti Communiste Français*. It was the first nationalist organization to raise the issue of Algerian independence, but it was a small underground association composed approximately of three thousand people. It was easily dissolved by the French government three years after its creation (Stora, 2014). The former members of the ENA tried to give the movement a second chance in 1937 by founding the *Parti du Peuple Algérien* (PPA), but the constant destabilization of the PPA by the French authorities, with the repression and incarceration of its members, led to the dissolution of the party in 1945 (Ruscio, 2012).

In 1946, in the immediate aftermath of WWII, the socialist government of Felix Gouin carried out important social reforms to rebuild the country after the war, among which was the abolition of the *Code de l'Indigénat*. Citizenship was granted to Algerian nationals and the French parliament passed a law that allowed the *Indigènes* to have fifteen seats in parliament (Ageron, 1994). Two new political parties were created. Messali Hadj's *Mouvement pour le*

Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), and Ferhat Abbas' *Union démocratique du manifeste algérien* (UDMA). Both parties were founded by former leaders of the PPA, their claims and social composition were very similar – Members were young and educated men, who advocated for independence. The fragmentation of the movement into two parties severely hindered its development.

In 1949 occurred one of the first major identity crisis in the movement, when Rachid Ali Yahia, a Kabyle member of the MTLD, presented a motion during a party's Assembly to replace "Arab Algeria" by "Algerian Algeria" in official documents (Aïtel, 2014: 54-55). The purpose of the motion, which was to introduce the plural, and thus Berber identity in the nationalist struggle, triggered an internal crisis. Some of the members viewed the motion as colonial interference in the movement to divide Algerians nationalists along ethnic lines (Aitel, 2014: 55; Ouerdane, 1987). This crisis led to the partition of the MTLD. Members who wanted to use "Algerian Algeria" were excluded from the party; most of whom were Berbers (Tamazgha, 2008).

In the early 1950s, the constant disagreements within the newly formed nationalist movement opened a window of opportunity for the FLN to emerge as the new leader of the struggle. In 1954, the party was composed of six leaders: Mohamed Boudiaf, Ben Boulaïd, Didouche Mourad, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, Krim Belkacem and Rabah Bitat, all of them advocating for an armed struggle against the colonial power. Some members of the MTLD had left the party to join the FLN, as did several Berber officials from Kabylia (Harbi, 1980: 115).

Because of its more radical strategies, the FLN eventually crushed its national opponents and became the only actor in the struggle for independence – even though its violent methods did not receive unanimous support from the Algerian population.

After the dissolution of the MTLD, Messali Hadj created the *Mouvement National Algérien* (MNA), who was the main rival of the FLN. Although the MNA had the same goals as the FLN, it advocated for a less radical strategy, claiming a compromise with France was to be found through pacifist means and progressive negotiations.

Because of their different aspirations, the opposition between the FLN and the MNA erupted into a violent confrontation described as a fratricidal war by Malika Rahal (2014). At the beginning of the conflict, confrontations between both groups mainly took place in Kabylia, MNA's stronghold and gradually reached other key territories like Algiers (Stora, 1983: 53-54). The FLN believed it had to establish itself as the sole leader of the nationalist struggle, and to do so, it had to eliminate all its opponents. Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour explain that the more fragmented is a self-determination movement, the more likely it is to use violence against the state and against its co-nationals as well. Indeed, the groups are not only fighting against the state they wish to free themselves from, they are also engaged in a "struggle over political relevance" with their co-nationals (Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour, 2012).

This FLN's political strategy was concretized during the Soummam conference of 1956, during which the party adopted the following resolutions:

> "1) Reconnaissance de la Nation Algérienne indivisible.
> 2) Reconnaissance de l'indépendance de l'Algérie et de sa souveraineté dans tous les domaines, jusque et y compris la défense nationale et la diplomatie.
> 3) Libération de tous les Algériens et Algériennes emprisonnés, internés ou exilés en raison de leur activité patriotique avant et après l'insurrection nationale du 1er novembre 1954.
> 4) Reconnaissance du FLN comme une seule organisation représentant le peuple algérien et seule habilitée en vue de toute négociation. En contre-partie, le FLN est garant et responsable du cessez-le-feu au nom du peuple algérien. "
> (Plate-form Soummam, 1965; Retrieved from: El-Watan, 2018).

The Soummam Platform announced the exclusivity of the FLN in the nationalist struggle. It laid the foundations for the populist ideology endorsed by the FLN. The party claimed to be

the sole representative of the social aspirations of a united nation (Addi, 1990). From now on, all divergent opinions to the ones asserted by the FLN would be discarded, and that included the recognition of plurality within Algerian identity.

1.3. Independence

The war for independence broke out in rural areas, when the FLN attacked French military posts in the Aurès region in November 1954. The guerilla warfare techniques of the FLN and France's military responses led to substantial civilian casualties in addition to military casualties (World Peace Foundation, 2015). Between 1954 and 1957, the General government of Algeria recorded 16,382 attacks against civilians and 9,134 against French military (Stora, 1983: 17).

In 1961, France held a referendum on Algerian independence, to which 75% of the population voted 'yes'. A year later, the Evian Accords were signed between the *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne* (GPRA) and the French government. The Treaty declared a ceasefire between the two parties, thus putting an end to the war and to one hundred and thirty-two years of French colonization[8]. Violence nevertheless continued in Algeria, in the immediate aftermath of independence with the massive killing of *harkis*[9], who were accused of treachery, because of their collaboration with France during the war.

[8] For a more extensive analysis of the Algerian war for independence, refer to *La guerre d'indépendance des Algériens 1954-1962*, by Raphaël Branche dir. (2009), and for a larger perspective, Matthew Connelly (2003) explains the importance of the international stage in the outcome of the war - He analyzes the diplomatic strategies of the FLN, who reached out to international actors like Egypt or the UN to gain support against France.

[9] Harkis are Algerians who were enrolled in the French army between 1954 and 1962 - They were recruited to serve as auxiliaries in Algeria during the war.

1.4. Rivalries and Exclusion within the FLN

The political landscape in the early 1960s was characterized by important rivalries within the independence movement. Competition between the leaders led to an internal crisis within the FLN in 1962. This historical period acted as a critical juncture in the construction of the Algerian state and its national discourse. Power struggle and the use of violence to overcome political disagreements left an unsteady base for state-building. It also fostered a political tradition of marginalization of actors who opposed the FLN's orientations; Berber elites most often found themselves to be marginalized by the newly formed government.

Ferhat Abbas, who was president of the *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne* (GPRA) in 1962 was removed from office. A political compromise within the party propelled Benyoucef Ben Khedda head of the government – Ben Khedda was a member of the FLN who had participated in the negotiations of the Evian Accords with France, but he enjoyed little support from other members of the party and the army (ENS/Mohand Amer, 2006). Alliances started consolidating within the party as leaders were preparing for potential future political positions. Ahmed Ben Bella, then Prime Minister of the GPRA, allied with Houari Boumediene, Chief of General Staff (*État-major Général*). In July 1962 they opposed to the GPRA, even though Ben Bella was still vice-president of the institution, and created the *Bureau Politique* (BP), which he declared to be the new executive branch of the FLN.

With both the BP and the GPRA claiming to represent the legitimate political authority of Algeria, the situation evolved into an internal crisis (Algeria Watch, 10.07.2011). The FLN experienced severe division that Amar Mohand Amer (2014) sees as the concretization of past disagreements within the party. Ben Bella and Boumediene's political coup led to violent confrontations in Constantine and in Kabylia between supporter of the BP on one side and of the GPRA on the other (Algeria Watch, 10.07.2011).

On the GPRA's side, Krim Belkacem, Interior Minister of the GPRA, and Mohamed Boudiaf, State Minister of the GPRA, called for an opposition to Ben Bella and the BP. They moved to Tizi-Ouzou, in Kabylia to organize an opposition to Ben Bella's 'dictatorship' (Stora, 2004). The *Wilaya*[10] of Kabylia brought its support to the GPRA and Krim Belkacem. Ben Bella and Boumediene accused the leaders of the *Wilaya* of perpetuating colonialism by dividing Algeria between the 'Arabs' and the 'Berbers' (Mohand Amer, 2014).

Hocine Aït Ahmed, Minister of the GPRA – other Kabyle member of the FLN with Belkacem – resigned from the government and left the FLN. He accused the party of extremism and excessive military control (The Guardian, 2016). In July 1962 he declared :

> *"Je profite d'une escale à Paris pour rendre publique ma démission de tous les organismes dirigeants de la révolution. […]. Il n'y aura pas de guerre civile, il n'y aura pas de conflit racial. […] La solution doit résider dans un verdict du recours du peuple*"[11]. (Aït Ahmed, Retrieved from: Institut Nationale de l'Audiovisuel, 27.07.1962).

In 1963, Aït Ahmed founded the *Front des Forces Socialistes* (FFS) – first opposition party of Algeria (Harbi, 1980: 362). The FFS advocated for socialist and secular values that appealed to Kabylia's population. The party was prohibited by the BP in the name of popular unity, and Hocine Aït Ahmed was sentenced to death – accused of trying to divide the nation. This political decision, triggered riots against the BP in Kabylia, who were severely repressed by the Boumediene's army (Stora, 2004). Hocine Aït Ahmed's sentence was reduced to life incarceration instead (Watanabe, 2013: 168), but he later went into exile in Switzerland.

Also opposing Ben Bella's authority, Mohamed Boudiaf created the *Parti de la Revolution Socialiste* (PRS) but was arrested for conspiring against the state as well. In 1964

[10] Name of the different administrative divisions of Algeria (there were six Wilayas in 1962).
[11] Personal transcription of the speech

he went into exile in Morocco (Stora, 2004) – Krim Belkacem was not arrested, but he was gradually marginalized from the Algerian political arena.

Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumedienne feared that any substantial change in the political institutions that were not under their control would undermine their authority. In September 1962, Ben Bella formed a government composed exclusively of his supporters. The BP eventually managed to marginalize the GPRA from the political arena to impose its authority (Harbi, 1980). Ben Bella remained head of state for three more years, but he failed to build stable alliances and to establish himself as a strong leader. The economic situation in Algeria kept deteriorating, leading to important economic migrations to France under his presidency (Stora, 2004). The BP failed to come up with solutions for the economic and social problems Algeria was facing, to focus solely on state-building (and the consolidation of the FLN's authority). A military coup led by Boumediene overthrew Ben Bella in 1965 (Harbi, 1980).

Parallel to the political competitions, the ideological values embraced by the BP reinforced Berber social exclusion. When Ahmed Ben Bella was freed in 1962, he declared : "*Nous sommes des Arabes, des Arabes, dix millions d'Arabes. […] il n'y a d'avenir pour ce pays que dans l'arabisme"* (Zenati, 2008). This speech gives an insight of the conception of identity embraced by the state after the departure of France. Fazia Aïtel considers that "the need for such a passionate declaration indicates that there [was] no unanimity on the subject of Algerian identity" (Aïtel, 2014: 29). The FLN wanted to get rid of everything that was French, to build a nation solely on an Arab identity – inspired by Nasser's pan-Arabism[12] (Ben Tahar and El-Shikh, 2012). The promotion of 'Arabism' resulted in an exclusion of Berber identity.

[12] During the war, Egypt brought its support to the FLN, and Ahmed Ben Bella had close ties with Gamal Abdel Nasser.

The first constitution of Algeria was crafted in this unitary perspective (Watanabe, 2013: 159):

> "L'Islam et la langue arabe ont été des forces de résistances efficaces contre la tentative de dépersonnalisation des Algériens menée par le régime colonial. […] L'Algérie se doit d'affirmer que la langue arabe est la langue nationale et officielle et qu'elle tient sa force spirituelle essentielle de l'Islam" (Préambule, Constitution du 10 septembre 1963).

The constitution of 1963 portrayed the colonial period as a parenthesis in Algerian history, thus requiring the reestablishment of past Arab and Islamic values that presumably predated colonialism. This attempt at social homogenization was a way for the newly formed Algerian Republic to create a new nationalist discourse. National cohesion had to be engineered in a short time span and in a context of political conflict, which led to the exclusion of those who deviated from the Arab national ideal, namely the Berbers.

When the colonial state collapsed in 1962, it gave way to power struggles, clientelist practices and an accelerated attempt at social homogenization. Unlike in Morocco, there was no genuine leadership capable of mobilizing the Algerians under a shared purpose after 1962. The constant rivalries between the members of the FLN made it almost impossible for a strong leader (or group of leaders) to gain massive popular support. The BP's government was fragmented, but so was the opposition. None of the leaders who were opposed to the BP managed to massively rally the population either.

Opposition to the established authority of the FLN was perceived as deviation from the 'only acceptable political path'. In this perspective, pluralism–through any form of divergence, whether on political orientations or "ethnicity"–was in contradiction with social cohesion and thus the political unity of the nation (Chouikha and Gobe, 2015: 15). Hence, the political transition from colonialism to independence in Algeria, resulted in important political

exclusions that marginalized the Berber actors from state-formation and led to important grievances.

2. MOROCCO

In the pre-colonial era, the Moroccan political system was organized around the *makhzen*. The *makhzen* represents the institutions of the 'state' of Morocco, and include the religious, political and military apparatuses, which rely on the authority of the Alawite dynasty, established in 1631. To extend its authority in the region, the dynasty would collect taxes across the Moroccan territory – '*makhzen*' literally means 'storeroom' in Arabic (Daadaoui, 2011). To establish himself as the legitimate religious and political authority of the region, the Sultan relied on repression (El Mansour, 1992), patronage, and strategic alliance with tribal leaders.

Since Morocco was never part of the Ottoman Empire, due to its geographical remoteness far West in North Africa, the region had never been part of a larger bureaucratic system (Cantat, 2018). Tribal communities were rather autonomous, and tribal leaders enjoyed important political legitimacy among their respective populations. The power relations in the rural areas were defined by a separation between the *bled al makhzen* and the *bled al siba.* The first was the area of influence of the *makhzen,* characterized by the presence of the ruling class of the Palace. The second was the area of dissidence and of 'anarchy' in the remote regions. The latter were not subject to the central authority of the royal family (Wyrtzen, 2011).

When the Sultan was unable to integrate the areas of dissidence to the *bled al makhzen,* he would provide weapons and/or material resources to the tribal leaders to secure loyalty indirectly (Berdouzi, 1981). Berber populations were predominantly inhabitants of the *bled al siba,* making them potential 'dissidents' (Wyrtzen, 2011). Local chiefs served as bridges

between the sultan and the population. Co-optation was already a common strategy in the Moroccan pre-colonial system.

The French first arrived in Morocco in 1907 (Gellner, 2003: 32) but the Protectorate was only officially established on March 30th, 1912, with the Treaty of Fez, signed between the French emissary Eugene Renault, and the Moroccan Sultan Moulay Abd al-Hafid (Terrasse, 1952: 169). The city of Tangier remained an international zone, while the northern strip of Morocco and the territories of Tarfaya and Rio de Oro (in Western Sahara) were under Spanish control. The rest of the country remained under French influence.

2.1. Pacification and the Berber Policy

Immediately after arriving in Morocco, the French military engaged in a 'pacification campaign'. A succession of military operations was undertaken throughout the country from 1912 to 1933. In doing so, France sought to reinforce the *makhzen*'s grip in rural areas, hoping that it would also help France's expansion across Morocco[13].

> "[The] pacification radically altered the power relationship between the *makhzen* and the *siba*, dramatically expanding what Scott has described as "state space," the landscape and social groups "legible" to the state that can be feasibly censused, taxed, conscripted, and administered. It systematically eliminated "nonstate space," forcing tribal groups previously wielding a degree of autonomy from the *makhzen* to submit completely to the state" (Wyrtzen, 2011: 230).

The pacification campaign ensured that the religious institutions were maintained, since the French were not willing to completely destabilize the *makhzen* by imposing a brand-new political system. Unlike in Algeria, the purpose was more to manipulate the pre-existing political institutions and make sure that Moroccan officials maintained a role in the administration of the *makhzen* (Bidwell, 1973). Although France oversaw all the main political

[13] For a detailed overview of the military operations undertaken during the Pacification campaign, refer to "*La Pacification du Maroc*" by General Henri Simon (1934).

activities, the Sultan nevertheless, remained the religious representative of the Moroccan people. The Protectorate Agreement thus officially preserved the symbolic and religious integrity of the Sultan, as shown by the Article 1 of the Treaty of Fez:

> "Article premier.
>
> Le Gouvernement de la République française et Sa Majesté le sultan sont d'accord pour instituer au Maroc un nouveau régime comportant les réformes administratives, judiciaires, scolaires, économiques, financières et militaires que le Gouvernement français jugera utile d'introduire sur le territoire marocain.
>
> Ce régime sauvegardera la situation religieuse, le respect et le prestige traditionnel du Sultan, l'exercice de la religion musulmane et des institutions religieuses, notamment celles des habous. Il comportera l'organisation d'un Maghzen chérifien réformé. […]" (Treaty of Fez, 1912).

Pacification was undertaken throughout the whole territory, but when the French military officers reached the tribes in the Middle and High Atlas Mountains, they were confronted with important Berber resistance, especially in the North (Wyrtzen, 2011: 231). In the Riffian region, Abdelkrim Al Khattabi and his troops vigorously opposed French (and Spanish) occupation. The French eventually managed to pacify the area in 1926. The capital city was moved from Fez to Rabat out of fear of new uprisings. At the end of pacification, communications between major cities had increased, and the new road network allowed for better connections in rural areas (Simon, 1934). It also enabled the French officials to have a greater influence throughout the territory and laid the foundations of a strong bureaucratic apparatus which was later very useful for the King of Morocco to stretch out his own area of influence after independence.

The important resistance encountered in Berber regions during pacification led the French to believe that Berbers were hostile to the Islamic law promoted by the *makhzen* and

that they wanted to keep practicing their own traditions and customary law (*urf*)[14] instead of the *shari'a* law (Wyrtzen, 2011: 231).

A preliminary decree recognizing Amazigh customary law had already been issued on September 11th, 1914, to preserve the judicial autonomy of Berber tribes. The document allowed the *makhzen* to designate tribes that would be governed by *urf* and those that would be governed by *shari'a* law (Halstead, 1967:32). This measure was based on the same logic that led to the establishment of the Kabyle Myth in Algeria–Meaning that Arabs and Berbers were seen as different communities that had to be legally distinguished. Except that in Morocco, unlike in Algeria, the King served as an intermediary between the tribes and the French administration, since he oversaw the designation of tribes that were subject to the decree. France's political oversight on tribal organizations thus remained limited.

In 1930, French authorities decided to revise the 1914 document by creating a new legislation: the "Berber Decree" (*Le Dahir Berbère*). The first article of the decree laid the foundation of a clear-cut categorization between the Arabs and the Berbers.

> "Article 1.
>
> Dans les tribus de Notre Empire reconnues comme étant de coutume berbère, la répression des infractions commises par les sujets marocains qui serait de la compétence des Caïds dans les autres parties de l'Empire, est de la compétence des chefs de tribus. " (Article 1, Dahir Berber, 1930).

The purpose of this new law was not to give the Berbers an actual autonomy, but rather to reinforce the distinction between Arabs and the Berbers through legal means, by allocating different jurisdictions to each group. Criminal acts were to be judged differently depending on the 'religious affiliation' of the citizens. Through this decree, the French also standardized the

[14] The *urf* law was an aggregation of all the situations that could potentially occur within the tribe. They were usually passed down orally from generation to generation, and sometimes written down by a pupil. The *urf* had two important characteristics. First, it made sure that the material properties of the group remained within the tribes, and secondly, traditional procedures gave prominence to the oaths upon the religious commander in order to avoid retaliations (Bidwell, 1973: 271).

political and administrative organization of the Berbers under one unique legislation (Wyrtzen, 2011: 228). Like in Algeria, the French saw in Berber communities, a greater similarity with the Europeans, and thus an opportunity to better assimilate them (Bidwell, 1973: 54).

Because Morocco was a Protectorate and not a colony like Algeria, Moroccans were not subject to the *Code de l'Indigénat*. The social hierarchies within the population were therefore different, as the only significant legal separation among Moroccans was the Berber Decree and not a distinction between subjects and citizens.

Another important aspect of France's Berber policy in Morocco was the introduction of French-Berber schools for rural elites, such as the Collège Azrou in the Middle Atlas. The colonial administration pursued a francization campaign in the rural areas, hoping that it would build support for France among Berber communities. The programs in these schools were based on a French curriculum instead of Islamic ones (Benhlal, 2005). It provided an institution to train future Moroccan executives, and this Berber rural elite came to be useful for the King to consolidate his rule and build alliances in the aftermath of independence (Clark, 2018: 66).

Institutional restructuration was therefore limited in Morocco compared to Algeria. French intervention on Moroccan social and political organizations resulted in the consolidation of the *makhzen*'s grip in Morocco, rather than its marginalization from political power.

2.2. The Rise of Moroccan Nationalism

In 1930, the introduction of the Berber Decree and the embodiment of an ethnic separation through legal means sparked discontent among the Arab elites, who feared seeing the Berbers assimilated and converted to Christianism by the French (Vermeren, 2006). Arab elites were hostile to the decree claiming it was a direct attack on Islam, since it was based on the presumed Islamic or non-Islamic customs of the citizens (Lawrence, 2013: 56). Article 6 of the Berber

Dahir stipulated that criminal cases in Berber lands be tried under French law instead of Islamic law (Hoffman, 2010: 855):

> "Article 6.
>
> Les juridictions françaises statuant en matière pénale suivant les règles qui leur sont propres, sont compétentes pour la répression des crimes commis en pays berbère quelle que soit la condition de l'auteur du crime. Dans ces cas est applicable le dahir du 12 août 1913 (9 ramadan 1331) sur la procédure criminelle. " (Article 6, Berber Dahir, 1930).

The Arab elites accused France of manipulating ethnic particularism to divide the country to isolate the Berbers from the rest of the Moroccan nation. Following its implementation, demonstrations erupted in large cities. The *latif* prayer, chanted in times of disaster or calamity, was recited in the mosques (Lawrence, 2012: 477): "*Oh Allah, the Benevolent, we ask of You benevolence in whatever fate brings, and do not separate us from our brothers, the Berbers*" (quoted in Wyrtzen, 2015). Since the French did not have the right to enter mosques, it provided the Moroccans with an exclusive gathering space. Indeed, at the beginning of the settlement, the colonial administrator General Lyautey, had prohibited the access to mosques to all non-Muslims (Wyrtzen, 2015: 145). According to Wyrtzen, it reinforced the feeling of a collective Moroccan identity since "this space fuses the religious and the political, as prayers are said in the name of the ruler of the community" (Wyrtzen, 2015: 145).

The French authorities tried to quell the protests (Lawrence, 2012: 477), by removing Article 6 from the Berber decree. In 1934, a group of urban Arab activists founded the *Comité d'Action Marocaine*, the first nationalist political party. They drafted a document compiling the political demands of the Moroccan people: The *Plan de Réformes Marocaines*. The claims were submitted to the French authorities and the sultan. They asked for a reorganization of the political, social, financial and judiciary systems, to put the Moroccan people back at the center of the decision-making process through greater sovereignty; the last section of the document also asked for the withdrawal of the Berber policy. The manifesto did not however, call for the

end of the Protectorate Agreement (Plan de Réformes Marocaines, 1934). The demands were ignored by the colonial authorities, the *Comité d'Action Marocaine* was dissolved in 1937 and its members were arrested.

During WW2, the Moroccans' views on France changed as the country was weakened and occupied by Germany. It became increasingly difficult to appear as a dominant political power (Wyrtzen, 2015: 171). Moreover, the important internal political divisions under the Vichy[15] rule undermined the government's credibility. The establishment of the new regime in France altered the relations that the Sultan had with the colonial authorities (Ginio, 2006). France gave more freedom to the Sultan. He started making more frequent visits to the rural areas, especially in the Middle Atlas, where he would meet Berber tribal chiefs. It later helped him consolidate his political position as leader of the Moroccan nation (Wyrtzen, 2015: 253-254).

In 1943, the Istiqlal party was created on the same Arab nationalist bases as the *Comité d'Action Marocaine,* except that now the Sultan agreed to collaborate with the party. The Istiqlal wrote the *Manifeste pour l'Indépendance* (Lahnite, 2011: 205), which called for the end of the Protectorate Agreement and the withdrawal of the settlers in order to build a constitutional monarchy in Morocco. The manifesto was signed and approved by the sultan before its release, and it clearly placed him (*Sa Majesté*) at the center of the claims and national aspirations:

"A - En ce qui concerne la politique générale :

[15] Between 1940 and 1944, France was under German occupation. The country was governed by the Marshall Philippe Pétain, who collaborated with the Nazis. He established an anti-semitic and anti-bolshevik regime in the country. The regime was named after the new administrative capital city, moved from Paris to Vichy. For a more extensive overview of this historical period, refer to Debbie Lackerstein's book *National Regeneration in Vichy France: Ideas and Policy 1930-1944* (2013).

> De demander l'indépendance du Maroc dans son intégrité territoriale sous l'égide de Sa Majesté Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef, que Dieu le glorifie ;
>
> […]
>
> B - En ce qui concerne la politique intérieure :
>
> De solliciter de Sa Majesté de prendre sous Sa Haute direction le Mouvement de réformes qui s'impose pour assurer la bonne marche du pays, de laisser à Sa Majesté le soin d'établir un régime démocratique comparable au régime de gouvernement adopté par les pays musulmans d'Orient, garantissant les droits de tous les éléments et de toutes les classes de la société marocaine et définissant les devoirs de chacun." (Manifeste pour l'Indépendance du Maroc, 11 janvier 1944).

The manifesto was perceived as a direct attack by the French authorities, who arrested its signatories; Sultan Mohamed V was sent into exile in Madagascar and replaced by his cousin Mohammed Ben Arafa. While the Sultan was away, Morocco faced important uprisings, sometimes violent, in Casablanca and Rabat, because of the unpopularity of the new Sultan and the growing resentment towards France (Wyrtzen, 2015: 269). As the population asked for the return of the Sultan Mohamed V, it became increasingly difficult for France to maintain its grip on Morocco – especially since the situation in neighboring colonies was also deteriorating in the 1950s. France was economically weakened by the war, and it attached greater importance in keeping French Algeria than the Moroccan Protectorate.

The Sultan returned to Rabat in 1955 after two years in exile, to negotiate with France. The Sultan later benefited from the fact that the colonial authority had negotiated the end of the treaty with him instead of the Istiqlal, he thus appeared as the leader of the colonial struggle (Jowiya, NA). In 1956 he changed his title to King Mohamed V and declared the country's independence. Although Morocco experienced episodes of sporadic violence in the last years of the Protectorate, when compared to Algeria, the self-determination process was more the result of a political struggle and negotiations than of a violent transition.

2.3. State-Formation and Berber Inclusion

France's administrative centralization and the expansion of the King's control over remote areas during the colonial period, provided the *makhzen* with strong state institutions and a large administrative apparatus (Clark, 2018: 58).

Although the Istiqlal and the King fought together against the French, their respective political aspirations for the future of Morocco the aftermath of independence were divergent. The party's position towards the monarchy was ambivalent. The Istiqlal recognized that the King had been essential in the nationalist struggle, but the party wanted to maintain a position of power (Sater, 2016). The King sought a return to the traditional pre-colonial *makhzen* in which he was the main political actor, while the Istiqlal on the other hand defended a constitutional monarchy in which the King's influence would only be symbolic (Clark, 2018: 63).

There was also a third important actor in the political landscape at independence, which enjoyed important political legitimacy, namely, the Berber notables in rural areas, who were not hostile to the *makhzen* (Aslan, 2015: 85). Seeing an opportunity to counter the political expansion of the Istiqlal, the King instrumentalized the rural-based Berber elites, thus developing the *makhzen's* network of influence (Liddell, 2010: 316). Berber elites who were trained in French Berber schools like the Collège Azrou were propelled to positions of responsibility. Many took executive positions left by the French in local administrations.

The first government formed by Mohamed V in 1956 was eager to be inclusive, and representative of the confessional and ethnic diversity of the Moroccan society. It was chaired by a Berber, M'Barek Bekkai, former officer in the French army (Amazigh 24, 2017). The government counted nine ministers of the Istiqlal, six of the Democratic Independence Party (PDI) and independents (Lahnite, 2011: 213), among which a Jew and a Berber, Lahcen Lyoussi, the Minister of Interior.

The composition of the government also encouraged the division of the political landscape, to prevent the formation of a large and unified opposition against the King's authority (Aslan, 2015: 97). The purpose was mainly to weaken the Istiqlal's opportunities at developing stronger alliances with opponents. The first constitution of Morocco clearly stated that a single-party system was forbidden:

> "Article 3.
> Les partis politiques contribuent à l'organisation et à la représentation des citoyens.
> Il ne peut y avoir de parti unique au Maroc." (Maroc, Constitution du 7 décembre 1962).

The King later encouraged the creation of a rural political party composed essentially of Berber elites: The *Mouvement Populaire* (MP). The MP was created in 1957 by Berber notables who sought to organize a resistance against the Istiqlal's growing influence in the rural areas (Willis, 2014: 44). Indeed, after independence, the Ministry of Justice, led by an official of the Istiqlal, had carried out important Arabization measures to re-establish Islamic Law across Morocco. Customary law had been abolished in tribal areas and new judges had been appointed in Berber land (Ashford, 1961: 114-115). The Istiqlal was quite critical of Berber particularism. The party advocated for an Arab nation and the promotion of Islam, it rejected communitarianism. When the Ministry of Justice began to implement its policies in Berber areas, government officials were confronted to uprisings in the Rif and the region of Tafilalt because of the disagreements between rural notables and the Istiqlal. The political reforms were perceived as an intrusion on their territory by the tribal chiefs (Hart, 2000). The monarch's response to the dispute was quite representative of his arbitration strategy. He decided to pursue the Arabization policies, but at the same time he officially recognized the tribes as a component of the Moroccan citizenship. Tribal affiliation was added to identity cards and recorded in the civil registry booklets – which also increased the *makhzen*'s oversight of rural population (Hoffman, 2000). The King prevented the Istiqlal from dissolving the MP by officially recognizing the party in 1959

(Willis, 2014: 212). In doing so, he prevented Arab nationalists from establishing a leadership that would have undermined the *makhzen*. He weakened the party's influence in the political arena by keeping the parliament fragmented into multiple parties (Clark, 2018: 76).

Arabization policies were not perceived as hostile and assertive by Berber communities since the nationalism promoted by the King was inclusive – it did not impose identity choices on the different groups. Moreover, Arab nationalists' influence in politics remained limited as long as the King controlled the *makhzen*. The King was quite tolerant of Berber particularism, allowing tribal chiefs to maintain their traditional local communities. The King did not oppose Berbers claims as long as they didn't have a hard-lined political stance (Willis, 2014: 212). By giving Berber leaders the ability to manage their own society, he gained their trust and loyalty. Decentralization could have had important consequences on the *makhzen*'s authority, decreasing state-control in the rural areas, but instead it helped the state maintain its influence over the territory by using rural notable as intermediaries of his authority.

The multicultural legacy of Morocco and the preexisting institutions were important factors in shaping a rather inclusive political system. Disagreements between Berber claims and other actors were not salient enough to become decisive political issues in the years following Independence[16]. The allegiance to the monarch was presented as a common rallying point of the different communities of the country, whether Arab, Jewish or Berber – as suggested by the country's national motto "*God, the Nation, the King*". This identity trait left quite a large flexibility for the Berber communities to adapt these values to their own tribe

[16]The North East of Morocco did experience important uprisings in the 1960s, because of the political and economic marginalization of the area. The region kept getting poorer with the outbreak of the war in Algeria as the population was mostly living out of the cultivation of vines in the region of Oran in French Algeria. The response of the King Hassan II was particularly brutal, resulting in 3 000 civilian casualties (Mamfakinch, 2012). The region was excluded from Hassan II's political priorities (Cantat, 2018). The claims in the Riffian region were not only cultural, they showed that the public opinion was not in full agreement with the political decisions of the *makhzen*. Although the region is composed of a Berber population, the claims revolved around economic exclusion before everything else, making the ethnic dimension secondary – but still present - in the protests.

(Aslan, 2015). Unlike in Algeria, where the FLN endorsed an assertive Arabism as the defining trait of the nation. The 1962 Constitution of Morocco consolidated the Monarch's superior status by recognizing him as the Commander of the Faithful ("*Amir Al-Muminim"*):

> "Article 19.
>
> Le Roi, Commandeur des croyants, symbole de l'unité de la nation, garant de la pérennité et de la continuité de l'état, veille au respect de la nation, garant de la pérennité et de la continuité de l'état, veille au respect de l'Islam et de la Constitution. Il est le protecteur des droits et libertés des citoyens, groupes sociaux et collectivités.
>
> Il garantit l'indépendance de la nation et l'intégrité territoriale du royaume dans ses frontières authentiques. " (Maroc, Constitution du 7 décembre 1962).

In the constitution, the King is presented as the protector of the nation. His responsibilities and prerogatives go beyond the political sphere and all the other political actors remain secondary.

3. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Although the modern Moroccan state did not exist in a Weberian conception before independence, the fact that a Moroccan entity pre-dated colonization made it easier for the post-colonial *makhzen* to build stable institutions and a unified nation. The new regime did not have to start from scratch (and in a short time span) like in Algeria, where the local institutions had been completely disrupted to introduce French ones. The *Deys* of the Regency of Algiers did not enjoy the notoriety of the Sultan of Morocco – since they were subordinates of the Ottoman Sultan. The Moroccan sultanate on the other hand, was a rather solid structure that was reinforced by the Protectorate. Its political institutions could therefore survive if they managed to adapt to new environments[17]. To legitimize its rule, the regime stressed its continuity from the pre-colonial period, and in doing so, it expressed a form of durability.

[17] It seems necessary however, to mention that the regime survived two coup attempts - in 1971 and 1972. We

Traditional networks in rural Morocco were consolidated rather than erased in the process of state-modernization, while the dissolution of local structures in Algeria paved the way for fragmented networks and weak social capital (Henry, 2013). This variation in the History of both countries, constitutes the backdrop upon which an inclusive political power was configured in Morocco in opposition to a fragmented one in Algeria – as we'll discuss in the following chapter.

The struggle for independence of Algeria was characterized by a constant fragmentation of the movement because of disagreements and competition between the actors. When the FLN arrived in power, it was still fragmented. It led to the exclusion of Berber actors from the construction of the state in the years that followed independence. Thus, increasing Berber grievances in the early post-independence era, and paving the way for conflictual relationships between Berbers and the central authority. The King of Morocco on the other hand, developed a large network of influence, which included Berber notables as he sought to decrease the Arab nationalists' influence in rural areas.

Finally, Algeria built its national identity essentially on Arab traits, which left little room for Berber singularity, while Morocco had a rather inclusive conception of its national identity, thus reducing the potential for conflict.

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can't know whether the monarchical regime would have lasted if one of the coups had worked.

CHAPTER THREE:
CONFIGURATION OF POLITICAL POWER
AND BERBER-STATE RELATIONS

1. ALGERIA

1.1. "*Le Pouvoir*"

Following independence, Algeria adopted a political system based on a presidential republic – The President is the Head of Sate, and the Prime Minister is the Head of Government. Presidential elections are held every five years through direct universal suffrage in a two-round system. However, the institutions only act as a façade for a regime that is configured like a black box, and in which it is difficult to truly know who holds the political power.

The regime is highly centralised, and the President holds important executive power, however, the fact that Abdelaziz Bouteflika ruled for twenty years, despite his stroke in 2013 and his rare appearances in public (France 24, 26.02.2019) suggests that he was not the sole power holder. The three important pillars of the state are: the *Armée Nationale Populaire* (ANP), the *Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité* (DRS) and the Presidency – affiliated to the FLN (Belkaid and Benchiba, 2019). Algerians often speak of the central authority as "*Le pouvoir*": this opaque layer of military elite and party leaders who govern Algeria, experience important and constant rivalries, but nevertheless share a common interest, that is the preservation of the status quo and the "long-term survival of the regime" (Brynen and al., 2012: 32).

> *"Le pouvoir* in Algerian colloquial use carried multiple meanings. It could signify persons, institutions and 'the state as such', as well as a specific system of domination, i.e. the specific nature of the regime. […] The term *le pouvoir* thus also referred to a system of domination in which political decisions 'somehow happened' outside formal political institutions, and not just in an informal but also

> in an unintelligible way even for politically relevant actors" (Werenfels, 2007: 131-132).

The elite benefit from the opacity of the political institutions, as it allows them to "deflect responsibility from themselves" and blame "mysterious" actors for the political decisions (Werenfels, 2007: 133).

The regime is characterized by the interweaving of the army and politics. Even though the army doesn't exercise direct power over Algeria, the military has a prominent role in shaping the strategic orientations of the state, whether economic or political. Lahouari Addi explains that "the president's legitimacy comes from the army, which uses the FLN and elections as façades" (Addi, 2017: 408). Since the military hierarchy is unaccountable to the Algerian population, it uses the FLN's administration as a political tool to govern (Addi, 2017: 410).

The history of Algeria also consolidated the use of military force to solve political problems. Not only with the armed struggle for independence against France, but also with the riots of 1988 and the civil war of the 1990s. Indeed, while Algeria was relatively stable until the mid-1980s, the collapse of oil prices – with the barrel dropping from 30 dollars in 1982 to 12 dollars in 1988 (Addi, 1995: 3), plunged the country into an important economic crisis. Riots broke out in major cities in October 1988. They were violently repressed by the military (Ait Benali, 2009), which completely ended the historical legitimacy of the FLN. Popular protests compelled the President Chadli Bendjedid to reform the political system. A new constitution was introduced in 1989, putting an end to the single party system. The first multiparty elections took place in 1991.

The military had hoped that the democratization of the political system would have improved the economic situation while allowing the regime to maintain power (Addi, 2017: 408), but the elections paved the way for the rise of the Islamic party the *Front Islamique du*

Salut (FIS) (Rahal, 2017). The FIS won the first round of the legislative elections with forty-eight percent of the votes, while the FLN only got twenty-four percent of the votes. Seeing that the FLN would lose, a state of emergency was declared by the government, and the second round of the elections was cancelled by the military. The president was removed from office and the army took control of the government. The FIS was banned, and its leaders were arrested. The use of military repression to counter democratically held elections led the country into a civil war that lasted almost a decade between the Islamist factions on one side, and the FLN trying to safeguard its power on the other. The war was of extreme violence, "the total death toll of the conflict to this day remains a controversial issue" (World Peace Foundation, 2015). According to Algeria-Watch, a total of 200 000 people was killed between 1992 and 1998, and 8 000 disappeared (Algeria-Watch, 2009). This decade in the history of Algeria further consolidated the grip of the army on national politics.

When Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected in 1999 with the backing of the military (Arieff, 2013: 2), the national reconciliation plan carried out by the government gradually put an end to the conflict (Moussaoui, 2007). Multi-partyism was maintained after the civil war, but the FLN nevertheless remained in power.

Lahouari Addi explains that the political opposition in the Algerian parliament doesn't really threaten the regime, and on the opposite, serve its interest by giving an illusion of plurality and social representation in the Assembly – Forty-four parties took part in the legislative elections of 2012 (Joshua, 2017). The opposition, however, lacks real political and social foothold (Addi, 2006:6), and the trust in political institutions remains low among Algerians, "14 percent trust political parties and 17 percent trust the parliament a great deal or quite a lot" (Arab Barometer, 2017: 8). Power has remained in the hands of the same opaque elite instead of the elected body. Thus, voter turnout rates are low in the Algeria, and especially in Kabylia – The region often boycotts elections. In 2014, the national voter turnout for the

presidential elections was of fifty two percent, while it only reached twenty five percent in Kabylia (Crétois, 2017). Even the *Front des Forces Socialistes* (FFS), which previously embodied the role of the opposition, lost its Kabyle electorate during the 2012 parliamentary elections, as the party shifted away from its role of political opponent to preserve its place within the system.

Algerians have, for a long time, felt rejected by the political system, as they had no say in their country's public affairs. The protests of 2019, that led to the resignation of Abdelaziz Bouteflika (after twenty years of authoritarian rule) are a major turning point in Algerian history. For the first time since 1962, the country has experienced nation-wide unified popular protests and the street managed to obtain concessions from the authorities (IGC, 26.04.2019). The regime nevertheless abandoned Bouteflika and other members of the Presidential clan as an attempt to remain in power and control the political transition. That is why the population calls for a complete break with the past and a removal of the political system. Berber populations actively participated in the pacifist protests that have been taking place every Friday in since February 2019, and Amazigh flags are waved by demonstrators alongside Algerian flags. In June 2019, however, forty-one protesters were arrested by the authorities for carrying the Amazigh flag during the protests. They were accused of "harming the integrity" of Algeria (Amnesty International, 05.09.2019). Mayors of Kabylia have again called for the boycott of the presidential elections of July 2019, with the support of other actors such as magistrates–who also play an important role in the organization of the elections (africanews, 15.04.2019).

It is important to recall that Algeria is a rentier state with important hydrocarbon resources. Indeed, oil and gas account fort 60 per cent of budget revenue, 30 per cent of GDP,

and 95 per cent of the country's total exports (World Factbook, 2018). The opacity of the regime combined with oil wealth has strengthened clientelist practices and corruption. State resources have mainly served the interest of the "*pouvoir"*, at the expense of the Algerian population. The Transparency international corruption perception index ranked Algeria 105 out of 180 countries, with a score of 35 out of 100 (Transparency International, 2018).

Since the nationalization of oil companies by President Houari Boumediene in 1971, hydrocarbon wealth goes directly into government treasury (Brynen and al., 2012: 195). It favored what Hazem Beblawi (1987) described as rentier mentality: when income is seen as the result of rent distribution rather than productive work. The hydrocarbon sector was thus developed at the expense of other economies (Omeje, 2017), and the political institutions were forged in a way that made the "*pouvoir*" the main beneficiary of this system (Cook, 2007: 15).

The ruling elite sees state resources as their own, and for that reason, boundaries between the public and private sector remain blurry in Algeria. In 1993, soon after the beginning of the civil war, Algeria was facing an important economic crisis. The military regime turned to the IMF for loans, in exchange for Structural Adjustment Programmes[18] (Omeje, 2017: 167), but the "the state's corruption enabled the elites to profit rapaciously from the economic liberalization process" (Omeje, 2017: 164), while the population was experiencing the consequences of the economic and political crisis of the war. It resulted in the marginalization of the private sector (Henry, 2004), and the development of an economic apparatus in which the "state contracts are awarded based on personal connections rather than merit or efficiency" (IGC, 2018: 2).

[18] Structural Adjustment Programs involve a set of liberal economic policies that must be adopted by states who borrow money to the IMF (including privatization, market deregulation and opening to globalization).

As compensation, the government increased social spending to reduce popular discontent. Rentier states have this capacity to provide welfare with low taxes (Joshua, 2017). After the national reconciliation in 2000 for example, the government largely increased subsidized spending to build houses (Lust, 2017), as the country was facing housing shortage because of the important population displacements of the 1990s (Algeria-Watch, 13.12.2009). Social programs also involve subsidies for staple commodities such as water, milk and electricity; but also spending in retirement, teachers' salaries and allowances for the unemployed (Gouëset, 2014). For instance, when the inflation of sugar and cooking oil prices triggered large protests in January 2011, the government responded by giving important subsidies on both commodities as an attempt to prevent further mobilizations (Joshua, 2017). Algeria's economic policies thus favored consumption at the expense of development policies. The latter would have required a diversification of the economy, but it would have created competitors to the ruling elite's monopoly (Yousfi, 12.02.2019).

Rather than providing the society with means to create revenues, the government thus relies on wealth distribution, which he sees as a favor to its citizens (Belbawi, 1987). The problem is that patronage networks excludes the population from political decision-making processes and wealth management. The Open Budget Initiative index, which evaluates public budget transparency, gave a score of 3/100 to Algeria (International Budget Partnership, 2017), the distribution of resources and the government budget are administered in the utmost opacity, and the population has no say in the allocation of resources. It allows the ruling elite to use hydrocarbon wealth to maintain patronage networks and distribute resources and benefits to members of their clan as preferential treatment. Since the ruling elite has a grip on both the political and the economic systems, it shows little interest in the diversification of the economy despite the instability of state finances – due to their link to the fluctuation of oil prices (IGC, 2018). Rent also gives the government the ability to keep taxes very low, thus breaking the link

with political representation. This mechanism further encouraged opacity in Algeria, as the government doesn't see itself has accountable to the citizens. It generates a feeling of injustice and contempt among Algerians, known as *hagra,* which was particularly strong in Kabylia.

The next section will discuss the effects of the political system presented above on Berber exclusion and grievances. Berber populations have been excluded from power networks, which favored economic isolation. Combined with political repression it resulted in conflictual relationships with the central power.

1.2. Contemporary Berber Exclusion

Less than twenty years after independence, the FLN was facing growing criticism, due to its incapacity to keep its development promises. Kabylia became the cradle of popular protest, as the first large-scale demonstrations against the regime broke out in the region, in April 1980, after the authorities cancelled a conference by Mouloud Mammeri on Berber poetry at Tizi-Ouzou University. The population not only blamed the regime for the extent of the Arabization policies, but also for the incapacity of the government to fulfill its development promises after 1962.

The demonstrations were repressed, and the University evacuated. The government was suspicious of Berber particularism, fearing an external instrumentalization of ethnic divisions in Algeria (Maddy-Weitzman, 2019). The protests however, managed to carry the claims for the recognition of Berber identity outside of university circles (Mahé, 2001).

Caught in between the repression of the regime on one side, and the rejection of Berber particularism by the Islamists on the other, Kabylia ended up being politically marginalized during the war. Supporters of the FIS defended the establishment of an Islamic state in Algeria,

in which Arab identity and religious conservatism would prevail. It was not compatible with the distinct identity claimed by Kabylia.

Between September 1994 and April 1995, student strikes broke out in schools of Kabylia (Tamazgha, 14.09.2003); with 700 000 students demanding the recognition of Amazigh identity in the constitution, and the teaching of Tamazight in schools (Maddy-Weitzman, 2019).

In May 1995, several weeks after the strikes, the *Haut Commissariat à l'Amazighité* (HCA) was created by presidential decree (Decree n°95-147, 1995). The HCA was an attempt at taming turmoil by granting some recognition to Berber populations, while at the same time maintaining control over the evolution of Berber linguistic claims. The purpose of the HCA was to assist the government with the introduction of Tamazight in primary and secondary schools (Abrous, 2013). The institute can be seen as an attempt at co-optation of the Berber movement, but with the ongoing civil war, the creation of the HCA did not have the desired effect.

In April 2001, the death of 18-year-old student Massinissa Guermah, who was shot by the Gendarmerie while he was in custody, triggered riots in Kabylia. The police forces replied with disproportionate brutality, by firing at rioters. The confrontations resulted in one hundred twenty-five civilian casualties, thousands injured (ESISC, 2010) and incarcerations without trial (UNPO, 2018). The use of military repression to quell the 2001 protests was traumatic for the population (Maddy-Weitzman, 2019: 317). If a regime starts losing legitimacy and uses repression, it further undermines its legitimacy (Gerschewski: 2013: 28), but it can be an effective intimidation strategy. This event, known as the Black Spring, left a legacy of defiance and resentment towards the regime; especially since it happened in the early postwar period. The officer who shot Massinissa Guermah was only sentenced to two years of incarceration, which reinforced the feeling of *hagra* (IGC, 2003: 29-30).

In response to the Black Spring, the Arouch Movement was created in June 2001. Representing seven regions of of Kabylia (Tizi-Ouzou, Bejaia, Bouira, Alger, Sétif, Boumerdes and Bordj Bou Arreridj), the organization wrote the *Plateforme El-Kseur.*[19] The document expressed Kabyle grievances and gathered fifteen demands for the government to take responsibility for its action during the Black Spring. They included the departure of the police forces from Kabylia, the end of the state-repression, the recognition of Tamazight as a national language, and an economic emergency plan for Kabylia (Tamazgha, 14.09.2003). The President Bouteflika asked his Prime Minister Ali Benflis to negotiate with the movement and find a compromise, but the *Platform El-Kseur* had two claims that the government rejected:

- N°2: "*le jugement par les tribunaux civils de tous les auteurs, ordonnateurs et commanditaires des crimes et leur radiation des corps de sécurité et des fonctions publiques* ".
- N°11: "*la mise sous l'autorité effective des instances démocratiquement élues de toutes les fonctions exécutives de l'État ainsi que des corps constitués* ".

Those two claims explicitly challenged state authority by speaking out against the presence of police forces and the security services in Kabylia. The government failed to provide alternative solutions despite the demonstrations. The platform was eventually rejected and declared unnegotiable by the central authority (l'Humanité, 2002). The government did however recognized Tamazight as a national language (but not official language) in 2002, but the population felt that is was a cosmetic change to quell dissent (IGC, 2003).

The failure of the regime to effectively respond to Kabyles grievances led to the creation of the *Mouvement pour l'Autonomie de la Kabylie* (MAK) in 2001, a pro-independence organization created by activist Ferhat Mehenni, who formed a government in exile. The MAK sees the regime as an extension of the French colonial power. Because of their criticism of the FLN, MAK demonstrators are often arbitrarily arrested during protests (El-Watan, 2017). The

[19] A French version of the platform is available online on *Tamazgha*: http://www.tamazgha.fr/La-Plate-forme-d-El-Kseur,207.html

government never really sought dialogue with the MAK or its elites. Unlike the Moroccan *makhzen*, who integrated Berber elites into the formal networks of the monarchy, the Algerian regime never integrated the MAK's elites into the formal networks of power.

The MAK recently lost its popularity, a new organization: the *Rassemblement pour la Kabylie* (RPK) was created in 2017. It advocates for greater autonomy within the Algerian state but rejects independence (Jeune Afrique, 28.02.2017).

1.2.1. Political representation

State-repression in Kabylia severely hindered the region's support for the regime during the legislative elections that followed the Black Spring, in 2002 (Hachemaoui, 2013). Kabylia was still experiencing important violence in the early 2000, with riots frequently breaking out in Tizi-Ouzou and Bejaia (IGC, 2002: 2). The feeling that election results were rigged resulted in the rejection of the regime false representative democracy by population (IGC, 2002). Voter turnout rates were very low, reaching approximately two percent in Kabylia in 2002. Polling stations were vandalized, and their access was blocked by protestors - for the few who wanted to vote. The authorities decided to respond by closing 1160 of Kabylia's polling stations – out of 1368 – for "security reasons" (RFI, 2002), thus increasing the feeling of political exclusion. While violence slightly decreased over the years, the region's concern for national elections remained low. Boycott is still a major political strategy. Participation in legislative elections reached less than fifteen percent in 2007, twenty percent in 2012 and twenty-one percent in 2017 (Le Point, 2012; Libération, 2012; Marianne, 2017). Electoral participation is low in Algeria in general – reaching for example fifty-one percent during the presidential elections of 2014 (Le Monde, 2014) and thirty four percent during the legislative elections of 2017 (Jeune Afrique, 2017).

The few Kabyle votes are given to The *Front des Forces Socialistes* (FFS), the first opposition party, founded in 1963 by Hocine Ait Ahmed, and the *Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie* (RCD). Created in 1989, the latter is historically associated with the Berber struggle. It's an extension of the *Mouvement Culturel Berbère*[20] (Ilikoud, 2006: 18). While the instrumentalization of Berber identity gave them a small electoral base in Kabylia it also limited their national expansion (Ilikoud, 2006). Rivalry and competition between the two for influence in region also restrained the possibilities of a unified movement, to the benefit of the FLN. Neither of the parties had a leader popular enough (after Hocine Ait Ahmed) to carry Berber claims into the formal institutions. Berber populations therefore had little capacities to participate in national political affairs through formal institutions.

Using Von Soest's typology – on the 'claims to legitimacy' used by authoritarian regimes to legitimize their rule (Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2017: 290) – Algerian electoral procedures, have thus been ineffective strategies to legitimize the regime in the eyes of Kabyle populations. Elections, and other procedural mechanisms do not encourage political representation and are limited because of the opacity of the political system. It generates exclusion and makes electoral participation superficial. In addition to the regime's failure to dialogue with the Kabyle population, the FFS and the RCD also failed to represent the population and meet Berber political expectations (IGC, 2003). The few Kabyles who managed to access central positions in Parliament also fear losing their standing if they oppose too much to the status quo (UNPO, 2018). Hence, since Kabylia has had little representation within central institution, the region had little access to state wealth. As explained by Cécile Jolly, access to central positions of power allows for the redistribution of resources all the way down the social ladder, which can benefit certain regions over others – That is why Boumediene

[20] A social movement born in the 1980s which advocated for the officialization of Tamazight and the recognition of Berber cultural rights.

favored Eastern Algeria during his presidency, while Bouteflika's access to power benefitted Western Algeria, as they were both respectively from these areas (Jolly, 2001: 116). The lack of support for the FLN in Kabylia, resulted in the neglect of the region by the regime, who never managed to create a strong electoral base in the area.

1.2.2. Economic marginalization

While the state had invested in Kabylia until 1986 (IGC, 2003), economic isolation later became a real issue and public services are weak despite important state revenues. Even if large cities like Bejaia, Tizi-Ouzou or Boumerdes receive slightly better state support, remote areas are left behind. For example, the sidewalks that had been destroyed, during the Black October riots of 2001, had not been repaired until 2009 (Libération, 07.04.2009). Some villages in Kabylia have trouble satisfying their gas needs, even though Algeria has important gas resources. It can have drastic consequences when the region experiences important snowfalls like the ones of 2012 (Plantade, 15.02.2012)

Some of the rural municipalities of Kabylia coped with the lack of citizens services with their own resources. The population developed informal networks and an economy of solidarity to overcome the lack of state funding. Projects are financed by the communities, with sometimes the help of European NGOs and the diaspora in Western countries. Projects range from the construction of cultural centers or fountains, to citizens services networks like pipelines of drinkable water (Courrier International, 2016). The cities of Taourirt, Iguersafene and Zouvga are examples (among many other) who created autonomous waste-management services. The population of Iguersafene, located on high mountains, also built its own water-supply system, with community funding (Jeune Afrique, 17.07.2017). To meet the needs of the village, the inhabitants of Zouvga gathered five million dinars (fifty-five thousand dollars) to build a water pipeline on seven kilometers in the mountains. The same village uses the

community's fund to pay the salaries of the childcare employees, nurses, and waste collections services. In 2008 was also implemented a renovation project for the historical heritage of the city of Djebla to develop tourism in the area. It was funded by the association *ONG II* and the local community (Zoreli, 2017).

Solidarity-based economy nevertheless created tensions with the central authorities, who see village committees as rivals who interfere in their political field (Pérret, 2014), yet they fail to provide the necessary infrastructure for the region. The lack of territorial integration generated important grievances among the population and further encouraged distrust in government institutions. The presence of security forces in Kabylia, as part of the fight against terrorism also reinforced the feeling of insecurity (UNPO, 2018).

In addition to the marginalization, is the problem of youth unemployment and the absence of economic opportunities – This is in fact a country-wide problem, not just in Kabylia. However, it's difficult to precisely know unemployment rates in Algeria, as official rates are not accurate.

In 2013, the MAK had published a list of business activities that could be further developed in the region (MAK, 2013). It included activities such has mining, fish production (Kabylia covers twenty five percent of Algeria's coasts), agriculture, tourism or traditional crafts (leather and textile) (Akerkar, 2015: 53). The Mountains of Kabylia and the coast of the Mediterranean Sea are indeed valuable assets for the development of the region. It would, however, require political will to diversify the economy (outside of hydrocarbon sectors), as private initiatives are not enough to sustain local economy. Akli Akerkar explains that "Algerian industrial development sacrificed regional characteristics to respond to centralized planification requirements"[21] in the decades after independence (Akerkar, 2015: 80), which left entire regions such as Kabylia excluded from economic development priorities.

[21] Free translation

While Kabylia is the "traditional bastion of opposition to the Algerian state" (Maddy-Weitzman, 2019: 321), waves of contestation also broke out in Southern Berber province of Ghardaia in the M'zab valley in 2013 and until 2015. Clashes between Mozabites (Berber) and Chaambas (Arab) communities resulted in twenty-two casualties a many left injured (Al Jazeera, 10.07.2015). Spurious comparison between both Northern and Southern Berber areas must be avoided[22], nevertheless, Kabylia and Ghardaia have in common that they put forward their Berber identity as a reason for their political marginalization. Unlike Kabylia, repression in Ghardaia was not state led, as violence broke out between Mozabites and Chaambas communities. Nevertheless, the M'zab is also characterized by high unemployment despite the important gas resources in the region, which creates social frustration, as the population doesn't benefit from resources extracted on their land. Government inaction in the face of inter-community violence has also reinforced grievances and distrust in central institutions (IGC, 2016).

The Algerian government tried to instrumentalize the location of protests in Kabylia to present them as an isolated conflict – and prevent joint national uprisings (Mediapart, 2016), but there are issues common to many regions. The events of early 2019 in Algeria, with nation-wide demonstrations against the "*pouvoir*" have showed that dissatisfaction is widespread.

1.3. Legitimation

The regime failed to legitimize its rule in the eyes of Berber populations. Material legitimation, with subsidized spending provided with hydrocarbon rent, were not effective with Berbers.

[22] Kabylia is closer to Algiers than Ghardaia, it also largely francophone and more politicized – several parties were born in Kabylia. Its population is also larger, with six million Kabyles, for three hundred thousand Mozabites. Traditional Berber political parties have showed little concern for Southern Berbers. Kabyles have secular values while Southern Berbers practice Islam, and finally Ghardaia is closer to the Libyan border, which increased insecurity in the area since the fall of the Muammar Ghaddafi in 2011 (Diploweb, 2015).

Indeed, “legitimation strategies often don’t target the whole population, but seek the support of specific groups” (Joshua, 2017: 304), and Berbers were not considered in the legitimation strategies of the regime, which resulted in exclusion and grievances. Moreover, the Black Spring of 2001 left legacy of resentment towards “*le pouvoir*”.

The central power did make improvements regarding Berber rights since 1980. The Institute for Amazigh Studies was created in 1990, and the *Haut Commissariat pour l’Amazighité* in 1995. As part of the national reconciliation, the government also recognized Tamazight as a national language in 2001 (IGC, 2003), and later as an official language alongside Arabic in 2016. In 2018, Yennayer, the Berber New Year celebration, became a national holiday (El Watan, 09.01.2018). Nevertheless, Berbers still face economic insecurity. Cuts in the HCA budget in 2018 for example, caused the anger of students in Kabylia, who accused the central power of recognizing Tamazight language and then reducing the resources allocated for its teaching - while refusing to disclose government budget (Liberté-Algerie, 2018).

Patronage networks in Algeria are excluding, and groups outside the ruling elite can hardly shape public decision-making. In Morocco on the other hand, the integration of specific actors within the *makhzen*’s patronage networks, gave them the ability to influence public decision-making (Sater, 2014: 152), while nevertheless remaining within an authoritarian system controlled by the *makhzen*.

The Algerian regime failed to present formal institutions as an effective channel to meet Berber demands. The Algerian government did not provide appropriate solutions for Berber claims, while Moroccan formal institutions were relatively responsive to cultural and linguistic claims. The “*pouvoir*” has been focused on the immediate (and reactionary) safeguarding of its power when confronted to political crises – whether with Berbers of other groups. The systematic repression of Amazigh populations, combined with economic marginalization, has

reinforced the feeling of regional belonging in Kabylia, instead of quelling discontent and encouraging assimilation.

2. MOROCCO

2.1. The *Makhzen*

The *makhzen* of the post-colonial era is a combination of traditional and modern institutions, at the center of which is the monarchical power (Daadoui, 2011). Morocco has known three Kings since independence: Mohamed V until 1961, followed by his son Hassan II who ruled for 38 years, and Mohamed VI since 1999 (Mednicoff, 2017: 113). Morocco is a constitutional monarchy in which the King exercises control over all the important spheres of the political apparatus. The constitutional changes of 2011 slightly increased the power of the Prime Minister, by granting him the title of 'Head of the Government', and instead of being appointed by the King, he is selected within the party who won the elections. Nevertheless, the monarch remains above all political institutions and he is not accountable to anyone:

> "Article 42.
>
> Le Roi Chef de l'Etat, Son Représentant Suprême, Symbole de l'unité de la Nation, Garant de la pérennité et de la continuité de l'Etat et Arbitre Suprême entre ses institutions, veille au respect de la Constitution, au bon fonctionnement des institutions constitutionnelles, à la protection du choix démocratique et des droits et libertés des citoyennes et des citoyens, et des collectivités, et au respect des engagements internationaux du Royaume.
>
> Il est le Garant de l'indépendance du pays et de l'intégrité territoriale du Royaume dans ses frontières authentiques. Le Roi exerce ces missions par dahirs en vertu des pouvoirs qui Lui sont expressément dévolus par la présente Constitution" (Article 42 of the Constitution of Morocco, 2011).

There are almost no constraints to the Monarch's prerogatives. He is allowed to rule by decree, and he is can dissolve the government or the parliament by decree as well. He chairs the Council of Ministers, but also the Superior Council of Justice, whose purpose is to guarantee the independence of the Judiciary. The King can dismiss members of the parliament or of the government without prior consultation, and his status of "Chef suprême des Forces Armées

Royales", gives him power over the military apparatus, and thus the coercive power of the state (Constitution of Morocco, 2011).

The *makhzen*'s power also involves the administrative control of the territory. Which was used to foster the loyalty of tribal leaders after independence. The country had 13 provinces in 1956, 40 in 1989 (Claisse, 1992) and 62 in 2015 (Lamlili, 2015). The division of the territory not only increased the number of administrative officers working for the *makhzen*, it also brought the state closer to the population to prevent potential rural uprisings against the monarchy (Claisse, 1992). By giving tribal leaders some autonomy and the ability to oversee administrative territories, the state maintained both modern and traditional administrative institutions. It was important for the King to preserve tribal affiliation in rural areas, while integrating them into a centralized bureaucracy (Charrad, 2011), even if local committees only have a consultative status (Bouabid and Iraki, 2015: 51-52).

Despite the modernization of state institutions, the King managed to maintain aspects of its traditional symbolic foundations (Wegner, 2011). Although the contemporary traditional components of the monarchy have changed significantly from ancient royal families, the Alawite dynasty nevertheless relied heavily on history and religion to legitimize its rule. The King is considered to be a descendant of the Prophet Mohamed and has of status of 'Commander of the Faithful' - which he recalls once a year during the Ceremony of Allegiance (*bay'a*) despite the growing popular criticism of this ritual (Almirat/Globalvoices, 2012). Hassan II made greater use of the "*repertoire symbolique*" of the *makhzen* than Mohamed VI. By claiming he was above electoral and political considerations and that he worked for the true national interest rather than political considerations, he portrayed himself as the only one able resolve national grievances (Denoeux and Maghraoui, 1998).

Because the King is at the center of the political arena and enjoys a significant amount of authority, the power networks revolve around the *makhzen*. Relations to the King, through personal affiliation or lineage are themselves valued commodities in Morocco. The *makhzen* managed to forge strong patronage networks across the country that include both rural and urban populations. The development and the maintenance of these networks, essentially through cooptation, have been essential in the monarchy's strategies to remain in power and avoid contentions with the opposition. It does not mean however that the *makhzen* did not also rely on repression to quell the opposition. The "years of lead" (1960s-1980s) under Hassan II, were a time during which the regime largely used violence, torture and arbitrary arrests against specific actors to quell dissent[23] (Garçon, 2005).

The *makhzen*'s strategy consisted in keeping the right balance between marginalization of the opposition on the one hand and its integration through cooptation on the other (Charrad, 2011). Cooptation seeks to integrate influential groups and individual into the regime's network (Gerschewsk, 2013: 19). In Morocco, cooptation has taken different forms since the 1950s. The first decades of state-building focused on the political and/or economic inclusion of the elites into the political system to foster loyalty. With, for example, the integration of Berber rural notables and members of the Istiqlal party into the close circle of the *makhzen* as explained in the previous chapter. The purpose was to bring at the center of state, networks and actors who were previously in remote areas (Charrad, 2011: 51), but also leaders of political parties (Clark, 2018). The King selected the parties that were allowed to participate in elections and excluded those that were a threat to his authority. Janine Clark explains that the institutionalization of parties helped the *makhzen* control the political arena as the opposition was within the political

[23] Against advocates of the independence of Western Sahara, in the Riffian region, and against members of Mehdi Ben Barka's left wing party, the repression was particularly brutal.

system, and the integration of the elites into the system reduced their criticism of the state (Clark, 2018):

> "The parliament offered legitimate social standing, revenue, and visibility to opposition leaders. The king did not neglect to consult them, give them rewarding missions, offer them presents, or grant them favors that indicated that they belonged to his circle, to the *makhzen*, and to court society" (Leveau, 2000: 127).

The political system thus favored apathy and the status quo, by absorbing party elites into the patronage networks of the *makhzen*. For that reason, parties have very little reform capacities and are hardly seen as agents of change who carry popular will (Liddell, 2010: 327). Only "25 percent of Moroccans trust the parliament, compared to 67 percent who do not" (Arab Barometer, 2017: 6) and "10 percent of Moroccans trust political parties, compared to 86 percent who trust them either not much or not at all" (Arab Barometer, 2017: 6). The left-wing opposition party, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) is an example of the effects of the monarchy's influences networks in parliament. When the spokesman of the USFP was appointed minister in 2010, the party tempered its criticism of the institutions. The USFP then became more conservative and lost an important part of it support base (Monjib, 2010).

The political opposition thus developed alternative means of expression, carried by actors emerging from the civil society, outside of traditional political parties, with for example human rights activists, women's' rights associations or Berber cultural associations (Denoeux and Maghraoui, 1998). This was possible because of the democratization and liberalization policies pursued by the state in the 1990s. They paved the way for increased popular expression – 8 out of 10 associations in Morocco were created between 1997 and 2007 (HCP, 2014). The *makhzen* therefore adapted its cooptation strategies and broadened its patronage networks to reach out to leaders of associations, social movements and NGO's (Buehler, 2015: 367; Clarke, 2018). "Inclusion of opposition activists in positions of potential influence within formal politics [drains] civil society of the resources it needs to be effective, leaving the government

ultimately unchecked, harder to challenge, and more dominant" (Weiss, 2006: 50). That way, the regime's supports, like the opposition remain tamed by the Palace (Wegner, 2011).

Unlike in Algeria, patronage networks in Morocco allows political groups to be integrated within the political system and shape public decision-making – while nevertheless remaining within a political framework defined by the *makhzen*. The integrative nature of the Moroccan monarchy gives it institutional flexibility (Anderson, 2000), which, according to James Sater, created patronage networks that are a "source of sociopolitical cohesion" (Sater, 2017: 152) rather than exclusion. This flexibility provided fertile ground for social diversity since various political groups could be included in the networks of the *makhzen* – Human rights associations and women's rights activists have already been mentioned, but other examples include Islamists parties and Sufi organizations. Since Morocco doesn't have important resources, the *makhzen* gives communities the ability to participate (under monarchical control) in the political life.

The King has the ability to adapt to changing political contexts without severely hindering his political authority. He can bring limited about democratic reforms without losing its grip on the Moroccan society (Lawrence, 2014). Hence, the scope of the monarchy's patronage network and its integrative capacity allowed the King to stay at the center of the political power with less conflict than in Algeria.

Since the King is not accountable to any institution, he manages state resources as he pleases to sustain his patronage networks – despite popular criticism regarding the lack of transparency of the Monarchy. Resources such as land, public goods, positions in parliament, in government or in prestigious institutions, are allocated according to the proximity to the circle of the *makhzen*. The difference with Algeria, however, is that the Monarchy developed broader and more integrative patronage networks than its neighbor. Indeed, political inclusion

and loyalty to the King was never a matter of political identity. For that reason, it was possible for Berber elites to be integrated in patronage networks and benefit from state resources. The next section will explain how the configuration of the *makhzen*'s political power encouraged diversity and allowed for the integration of Berber elites into power networks.

2.2. The Monarchy and Berber Integration

Distribution of states resources after independence, was carried out in a way that would foster the support of the monarchy among specific groups. The land retrieved by the *makhzen* after the departure of the French was redistributed by the state in the early 1970s (Charrad, 2011: 59). This policy was part of the agricultural reform of 1972, which involved a collaboration of the monarchy with the tribes. Three hundred thousand hectares of land were given to twenty-five thousand rural families between 1971 and 1973 (Chiadmi, 1974). The redistribution was regulated by two decrees issued in December 1972.

As part of the new modernization measures, the first decree established agricultural cooperatives, that were supervised by the Ministry of Agriculture (Dahir establishing act n°1-72-278, December 29, 1972). The second one laid out the rules of land allocation and exploitation across the country. Article 22 specified that farmers had to "work the land themselves with the help of their relatives living under the same roof and without wage labor" (Doumou, 1987: 75). Non-compliance with the law could result in sanctions or land withdrawal:

"Article 22.

[…]. Il est tenu notamment:

1. Pour les lots individuels, d'exploiter personnellement et de façon effective et permanente, avec l'aide des membres de sa famille. Habitant sous son toit et en dehors de toute association, location ou utilisation d'une main-d'œuvre salariée permanente.

Pour les lots collectifs, de participer personnellement et de façon effective et permanente à leur exploitation.

2. De s'abstenir d'exercer toute activité salariée, sauf à titre, occasionnel." (Dahir establishing act n° 1-72-277, December 29, 1972).

By implementing those decrees, the *makhzen* sought to preserve tribal affiliation in rural areas (Charrad, 2011: 59) and reinforce his popularity. Indeed, the Agrarian reform was implemented not long after the coups against Hassan II – in July 1971 and August 1972. Since agriculture represented a significant part of the Moroccan economy– as the country did not have resources comparable to that of Algeria to sustain the growing population's needs, control over rural land became a source of power (Chiadmi, 1974). Since Berber populations were the main inhabitants of rural areas, they largely benefitted from the agricultural reform. It allowed the King to consolidate its clientele network and prevent a rural mobilization against the monarchy (Chiadmi, 1974) at a time when he needed political support to counter the Istiqlal.

The King also fostered the support of Berber elites in parliament, where Berber claims were given room for expression as long as they did not criticize the central power or the supremacy of the King. In 1976, the parliament voted for the creation of the Berber Studies Institute. Although it was never created, it allowed Berber politicians and activists to publicly evoke the question of Berber identity within formal institutions (Aslan, 2015). The journal *Amazigh* however, was banned in 1982 after the publication of an article that questioned the official history of Morocco. The author, Ali Azaykou, was arrested and imprisoned for a year (Aslan, 2015: 170). Therefore, if Berber particularism became to critical of the institutions, it was tamed by the authorities before being given the chance to grow.

Another example is the political party *Parti Démocratique Amazighe Marocain* (PDAM), created in 2005. It was banned from parliamentary elections of 2007 and dissolved the next year by the authorities. The Ministry of Interior accused the PDAM of dividing the country on the basis on ethnocentrism. A few Berber intellectuals condemned the decision

(Racelma, 2008), but since the PDAM was still a young party which had little support, it could be banned without sparking major protests.

Supporters of the Berber cause nevertheless connected with other parties, such as the *Mouvement Populaire* (MP), a conservative party, composed essentially of Berber rural elites, who had the support of the monarchy after independence. Although the MP never claimed an exclusive Berber identity, the party "works closely with Amazigh activists and has mobilized support for the Amazigh movement across the country, advocating for recognition of Amazigh cultural practices and the protection of Imazighen's rights" (Chtatou, 2019). The MP is a party of notables, whose elected officials are "clients" of the *makhzen* (Bennani-Chraibi, 2013: 8). To develop a network across Morocco, and to have candidates in municipalities, the MP could seek the help of rural elites and Berber landowners who had been given land in the 1970s. Loyalty to the regime allowed the party to secure "patronage opportunities" (Buehler, 2015: 368). They won 27 seats out of 395 in the parliamentary elections of 2016 – and 33 seats in 2011 (Medias 24, 02.11.2016). Members of the MP benefitted from the prestige and the distribution of resources associated with government positions. Mohand Laenser for example, the secretary general of the MP, was Minister of Posts Telecommunications in 1983, he then became Minister of Agriculture, Rural Development and Maritime Fishing in 2002. He was also appointed Minister of Interior from 2012 to 2013, and then became Minister of Urban Planning in 2015 (Jeune Afrique, 16.03.2018).

When Morocco experienced an increasing politicization of Berber claims in the 1990s, with the release of the Agadir Charter[24] and the creation of several Berber associations who advocated for the recognition of Berber language and culture in Morocco. Hassan II effectively

[24] The Agadir Charter of 1991 presented seven recommendations to the Moroccan government, which included the recognition of Tamazight as a national language, its integration in school curricula, in the media and in cultural programs (Aït Mous, 2011).

used his position to respond to grievances without causing contentions. During the annual Throne Day speech on August 20, 1994, he announced that the government would consider introducing Tamazight dialects in primary schools, but that Arabic would nevertheless remain the national language (Denoeux and Maghraoui, 1998). Although the reform was not implemented until 2001 (Abrous, 2017: 3), the King recognized the political dimension of the demands and presented the institutional channel as an effective means to solve national issues. In doing so, he encouraged Berber activists to address their requests directly to the *makhzen* rather than through alternative means (Aslan, 2015: 178), that could have been more violent and more challenging for the monarchy. Hassan II defined the boundaries within which Berber claims could be formulated and be heard. He showed that the monarchy could make political concessions as long as its authority was not challenged (Denoeux and Maghraoui, 1998). Moreover, since the King's speech emphasized the primacy Arabic language, Arab nationalists didn't have any reason to oppose to the teaching of Berber dialects in schools (Donnet, 1995).

Hassan II feared for the stability of the monarchy in the 1990s. With the destabilization of Iraq in 1991, and the ongoing civil war in Algeria, the King wanted to prevent the rise of an Islamic challenge in Morocco (Aslan, 2015). It encouraged the government to satisfy some of the social demands to avoid an escalation of popular discontent and ensure a smooth monarchical transition from Hassan II to his son.

When Hassan II died in 1999, after thirty-eight years of rule, his son, Mohamed VI, followed the cooptation and political integration strategies of his father, but in a context of political liberalization. Mohamed VI recognized the human rights abuses of his father, and freed political prisoners who had been arrested under Hassan II. He sought to break with his father's repressive legacy (Brynen and al, 2012: 35). The government opened a dialogue with the civil society, improved women's rights through a reform of Family Law, and further recognized Berber cultural rights (Canergie Endowment, 2010).

The *Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe* (IRCAM) was created in 2001 by Royal decree. It was built in a developing neighborhood and has a very modern architecture (Aslan, 2015: 165). Its purpose is to provide a consultative expertise to the government to improve Berber cultural rights and promote Tamazight language (IRCAM, 2019). When IRCAM was created, Berber activist and intellectual, Mohamed Chafik, was appointed first Director of the institute. Mohamed Chafik was close to the King. He was a member of the Royal Cabinet in 1968, and a member of the Royal College in 1976. His popularity among the Berber movement had allowed him to serve as a bridge between the population and state officials in the 1990s (Aslan, 2015: 167). The integration of Berber civil society elites like Mohamed Chafik, into patronage networks in the early 2000s was also a strategy to prevent an escalation of conflict similar to the Black Spring of 2001 in Algeria.

Since the democratization of Morocco went hand in hand with modernization, Mohamed VI faced the decline of the *makhzen*'s traditional legitimacy. In the early 2000s, the King was still quite popular because of the contrast with his father's repressive legacy. However, in 2011, the *makhzen* was confronted to important social grievances. Indeed, protests for more political accountability, social justice and economic redistribution broke out across Middle East and North Africa and reached Morocco. The February 20 Movement demanded more rights, economic opportunities and political transparency. Berber populations actively participated in the movement. They had Amazigh-specific claims that included the official recognition of their language.

The King responded to the uprisings by announcing reforms of the constitutions a few months after the protests (in June 2011), to take the momentum away from the uprisings. The amendments did not affect the hegemony of the King whatsoever, but the Prime minister was now to be selected from the largest party in Parliament, and he was granted the right to dissolve the Assembly. Tamazight was also recognized as an official language

alongside Arabic (Desrues, 2012), and IRCAM became an essential consultative body in the implementation of the measure. The multicultural heritage of Morocco now appears clearly in the 2011 Constitution as it puts forward a rather inclusive definition of the nation – which doesn't force identity choices:

> "État musulman souverain, attaché à son unité nationale et à son intégrité territoriale, le Royaume du Maroc entend préserver, dans sa plénitude et sa diversité, son identité nationale une et indivisible. Son unité, forgée par la convergence de ses composantes arabo-islamique, amazighe et saharo-hassanie, s'est nourrie et enrichie de ses affluents africain, andalou, hébraïque et méditerranéen.
>
> La prééminence accordée à la religion musulmane dans ce référentiel national va de pair avec l'attachement du peuple marocain aux valeurs d'ouverture, de modération, de tolérance et de dialogue pour la compréhension mutuelle entre toutes les cultures et les civilisations du monde." (Preamble of the Constitution of Morocco, 2011).

By showing that the *makhzen* is willing to respond to selective claims, the King still tries to encourage activists to use the institutional channel to convey their demands. It was rather effective with Berber cultural rights, however, the economic situation in Morocco, with high unemployment, massive corruption and the neglect of rural regions perpetuate social grievances, including in Berber areas

2.3. Legitimation

The *makhzen* managed to legitimize itself in the eyes of Berber elites. The monarchy's strategy of extending and consolidating its influence across Morocco, and especially in rural areas, was rather effective to secure the loyalty of Berber notables.

Traditional legitimacy further reinforced patronage networks, especially under Mohamed V and Hassan II's reigns. The monarch portrayed himself as the father of the nation, regardless of identity – the King "espoused an ideology of patriarchal patrimonialism"

(Charrad and Adams, 2011: 12). It gave him the ability to go beyond the contractual logic of clientelism, by using monarchical symbols. Unlike "*le pouvoir*" in Algeria, who remained in an exclusively contractual relation with its population which it sees as "clients" – subsidies distributed with hydrocarbon rent are the most glaring example of that contractual logic.

When Berber elites were integrated into the *makhzen*'s network, they became less critical of the political system, as power was granted in exchange for political allegiance to the *makhzen*. Nevertheless, Morocco still experiences an important economic and social divide, which has not spared Berber regions. In 2016, riots broke out in Northern Berber city of Al-Hoceima, after a fishmonger was brutally killed by the authorities. The population protested against corruption, lack of public services and economic marginalization (Al Jazeera, 20.07.2017). In Spring 2018, a consumer boycott on specific brands of water, milk and fuel[25] took place throughout Morocco, to oppose an "economy dominated by large groups linked to a business and political elite, or foreign brands". (Al Jazeera, 14.11.2018). The population demanded better economic integration, and lower commodities prices. Hence, signs of widespread popular discontent as still present in Morocco, and the *makhzen* can't solely rely on the integration of elites to bypass popular grievances.

3. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Algeria is an opaque authoritarian state, in which clientelist networks are sustained with hydrocarbon rent by a fragmented ruling elite who controls both the economic and political apparatus. Berber populations were excluded from power networks. Hence, they could not shape state orientations. It resulted in important economic marginalization, as they did not benefit from state resources. The regime failed to legitimize itself in the eyes of the Berber

[25] The boycott specifically targeted *Sidi Ali* water, *Danone* dairy products and *Afriquia* gas stations.

populations. It created important grievances, that paved the way for a conflictual relationship with the central power.

Kabylia, unlike other regions (or groups) that have also been marginalized by the Algerian regime, had a distinctive "ethnic identity". In order to discredit Kabylia and its claims, the regime instrumentalized its 'ethnicity' to distinguish it from other regions, nevertheless, some of the political and economic grievances in Kabylia are common to the rest of the Algerian population.

Morocco's authoritarian rule on the other hand, is compatible with social diversity. The monarchy was not hostile to Berber culture, and quite responsive to Berber claims. Morocco did not face important Berber-specific uprisings like in Algeria, nor did it have a sovereigntist Berber movement. The "Berber question" raised fewer contentions than in Algeria. The country has a history of social plurality, that was instrumentalized by the King to integrate Berber elites into the *makhzen*'s patronage network. It provided those elites with political and economic benefits, that fostered loyalty towards the King. The Monarch was not only willing to include in the *makhzen*'s network actors who did not challenge his hegemony, he also sought the integration of groups that could become an obstacle to his authority. Therefore, the integrative nature of the *makhzen* prevented conflictual relationships between Berbers and the state. It also allowed Berber actors to participate in formal politics and shape public policies. Nevertheless, popular discontent due to lack of economic opportunities, poor social justice and corruption remain widespread in Morocco, including in Berber regions.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION

This paper showed that power structures defined during the colonial era, and institutional legacies in North Africa are enduring. In Morocco, the nationalist movement was compatible with social diversity, since Moroccan identity prevailed over Berber identity. The Moroccan Monarchy has a multicultural history and inclusive institutions that forged national cohesion. The recognition of the country's social pluralism by the *makhzen*, through accommodative policies towards Berbers, created less incentives for identity-related conflicts than in Algeria. Moreover, since colonial occupation in Morocco preserved most of the traditional networks and local structures (including tribal communities), modern state-formation allowed for the consolidation of pre-existing networks. While in Algeria, colonial occupation resulted in the dissolution of traditional structures. It created fragmented political networks with a weak social base, which evolved into political competition that marginalized Berber actors.

The third chapter showed that the Algerian government has been reactionary in his responses to the Berber movement (with both violence and concessions) while the Moroccan government better anticipated Berber claims. Despite being an authoritarian regime, the Moroccan monarchy could "democratize" without losing its political authority. Integrative power networks gave Berber communities the ability to express popular grievances through formal institutions, by providing them with a space to shape public decisions. In doing so, the Monarch could decrease social conflict. Plurality, however, did not bring equality, since only the elites close to the *makhzen* were given the opportunity to participate in public affairs, not the population—Such power structures perpetuate the social divide between the elites and the rest of the Moroccan population. The introduction of Tamazight language in the constitution in 2011 for example, was a real step-forward for Berber rights. Yet, since Moroccan schools are still struggling to find a balance between teaching in French or in Arabic, the official recognition of Tamazight does not mean its institutionalization is effective. Indeed, in April

2019, the King of Morocco announced the reintroduction of French language for the teaching of scientific subjects in Moroccan schools, after forty years of Arabization (Brouksy, 07.05.2019)—Such measures could increase inequality and discrimination in education, since French language is essentially spoken by the elites.

It is very unlikely that Morocco will experience a fragmentation along "ethnic lines" in the future. The Berber issue is not salient enough to become a matter of political contentions. However, the social fragmentation, with growing unemployment rates —especially among the youth, reaching 26,5 percent in 2018 (Le Point, 11.02.2018)—could fuel social unrest across Morocco in the near future. There are little chances, however, that the King himself will be overthrown. Indeed, if national uprisings were to occur, the Monarch always has the option of stepping down from the central power, while keeping his symbolic national authority (Lawrence, 2014)—as it is the case in European monarchies.

Chapter three also showed that the fragmentation of the Algerian political power and the opacity of its institutions resulted in exclusion of non-members of "*le pouvoir*" from decision-making. It led to important political and economic marginalization, as Berber actors did not have a say in the distribution of state resources nor did they have access to it. This paved the way for conflictual relationships between the central power and Berber populations.

Distrust in government institutions is still strong in Kabylia, despite the increased recognition of Amazigh rights. The 'Berber question' will remain a salient national issue in the upcoming years —as showed by the presence of more than one million people at Hocine Ait Ahmed's funeral in Kabylia in 2016 (Akef, 04.01.2016). However, it will probably be less conflictual.

As explained in this thesis, Berber grievances are often similar to that of the rest of Algeria. It shows that when resentment becomes too important, legitimation is harder to buy

solely with material goods and subsidies (Joshua, 2017: 307). In fact, the Algerian regime has failed to effectively "buy" social peace, since the country has been experiencing constant fragmented social protests—until 2019, when they evolved into nationwide demonstrations. Authoritarianism persisted in Algeria, but the legitimation strategies of the regime were not renewed (Joshua, 2017) and the feeling of *hagra* remains widespread.

Algeria is currently at a critical juncture of its history, and on the long run, the unity of the protest movement could bring democratic changes to the country. The fact that Kabylia actively participated in the demonstrations shows that the divide is really between Berbers and the regime, and not between Berber and Arab populations of Algeria. It is very likely however, that the military will try to safeguard its power—Both Algerian and Moroccan power holders have difficulties imagining an alternative political order, in which they grant more power to the civil society.

It seems that the focus of the upcoming years in both countries should be to further encourage the political participation of the population, but also to address the issue of youth unemployment in order to avoid unrest. Algeria should engage in a diversification of its economy as well, and invest in the development of Kabylia, since economic integration is necessary to overcome social marginalization.

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