

SYN

SYSTEMATIZED UNREASON AND SCIENCE:
A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF
MAGIC, MYSTICISM, RELIGION, AND SCIENCE

by

Percy Black

Submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Science in
the Department of Psychology,
McGill University, April 1946.

PROGRESS

New occasions teach new duties; Time
 makes ancient good uncouth;
They must upward still, and onward
 who would keep abreast of Truth;
Lo, before us gleam her camp-fires; we
 ourselves must pilgrims be,
Launch our Mayflower, and steer boldly
 through the desperate winter sea,
Nor attempt the Future's portals with
 the
Past's blood-rusted key.

- James Russell Lowell.

PREFACE

The most disturbing paradox in the world today is war. All men desire to live, yet every so often large sections of mankind strive to destroy each other in deadly combat. Although the causes for this unfortunate dilemma are manifold, and stem from various directions, I believe that among the most preponderant causes are those pertaining to irrational elements in man's thinking and acting.

In this thesis I have not ventured to consider any absolute criteria of what is rational and what is irrational, but have rather relied upon a comparison of certain relative merits of two systems of human adherence. These two systems are, respectively, magic, mysticism, and religion on the one hand, and science on the other. The former are here designated collectively as systematized unreason, while the latter is examined in its various aspects as the "scientific system."

The thesis is divided into three Parts. In Part I, certain common as well as distinctive elements in magic, mysticism, and religion are traced. For this purpose, especially in Chapter I, the literature of anthropology and sociology, as well as that of psychology, served as the main source of our information. In Chapter II, some of the various threads in magic, mysticism, and religion, are woven

together and conceptualized as systematized unreason, while in Chapter III the latter is examined in contrast to the scientific system.

Part II deals with certain thought processes and personality characteristics in systematized unreason. These characteristics along with certain historical and other social factors together are intended to make for a broader understanding of the reasons for its persistence. A questionnaire was specially constructed to aid in the accumulation of data in this direction but was found to be wanting in many ways, as is explained in the Appendix. For this reason, rather than drawing certain statistical inferences from the results which themselves may have been faulty, recourse was made also to a widely scattered field of literature including economics, history, and philosophy. Nevertheless, the results of the questionnaire were helpful in many ways and are used in the text to advantage.

In Part III certain broad conclusions are made based on the work as a whole, and are intended to indicate some general prerequisites which are involved in the transfer of man from the level of systematized unreason to the more rational level of the scientific system.

Perhaps a word is necessary at this point concerning the bias of the writer. As Cottrell and Gallagher point out, "The admission of bias is no longer an admission of incompetence

for social research; in fact, an explicit statement of social, personal, scientific and doctrinal frames of reference is increasingly held to be the only way of delimiting the context within which research is meaningful."¹ It is in this light then that I say that my faith in science and the scientific method has been for many years the greatest faith I have had, not only in its efficiency in the laboratory, but also in its ability to conquer the ills of human society more efficiently than any other means yet invented by man. Ever since my under-graduate days as a student of chemistry and general science, I have been keenly aware of the fact that almost everywhere that the scientific attitude and the scientific method have found their way into a given problem, both living and non-living, natural and social, there did the darkness of ignorance recede and the light of knowledge take form. Viewing civilization as a struggle to get things done in the easiest ways possible with the least misery engendered to all concerned, I have therefore placed my faith in science, since it has accomplished most in this direction.

It is a privilege at this point to acknowledge my debt and gratitude to those who helped in the research and preparation of the thesis. Ever since the research for this thesis began in the summer 1945, and even long before then,

¹ From L.S. Cottrell, Jr., and Ruth Gallagher, "Developments in Social Psychology 1930-1940," p. 8.

Professor Chester E. Kellogg with his unusually keen scientific insight and gift of direction, has served as my perennial guide. His spirit of humility combined with his sympathetic understanding of the young research student, was of inestimable value to the furtherance of this project. Many thanks are due to my good friend Zvi Garfinkle, who, with his wealth of information on economic matters read the entire manuscript and made many pointed criticisms and constructive suggestions which are now incorporated in the thesis. I am grateful to Professor Forrest La Violette, who, though not directly concerned with my work, was ever-ready even in the midst of his diverse activities to offer helpful suggestions and advice. I want also to make special recognition of the help and encouragement given me by the distinguished British geographer and anthropologist, Prof. H. J. Fleure, F.R.S., who, though taken up with many duties during his short stay in Montreal last October, granted me a lengthy interview concerning this thesis, and admonished me "to carry through, unafraid and unflinchingly, and true to your conscience."

To Miss Beth Senecal many thanks are due for her help in the translation of the questionnaire into French. Special thanks are due also to the librarians of Redpath Library and Divinity Hall, respectively, for their ever-willing assistance in the gathering of pertinent sources of information. For assistance in the arrangement and drawing of several illustrations in the text, as well as for helpful hints concerning the Medieval History of the Catholic Church,

I am deeply indebted to my brother, Perry. Finally, but not leastly, a special word of thanks is due to Miss Sophie Michas whose wise grammatical counselling and diligent care transformed a scrawled manuscript into the neat piece of typing which it is.

Montreal, P.Q.
April 23, 1946.

Percy Black

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	v
INTRODUCTION	1

PART I

IN SEARCH OF COMMON TRENDS IN MAGIC, MYSTICISM, AND RELIGION and a COMPARISON OF THEM WITH SCIENCE

CHAPTER

I	THREE APPROACHES TO MAGIC, MYSTICISM, AND RELIGION	18
	Section 1. Magic	20
	2. Mysticism	28
	3. Religion	52
II	SYSTEMATIZED UNREASON: AN INTERPRE- TATION	70
III	THE SCIENTIFIC SYSTEM	80
	Section 1. Scientific Attitude	81
	2. Scientific Method	86
	3. Social Aims of Science	89
	4. Science and Systematized Unreason	100
	Summary of Part I	109

PART II

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SYSTEMATIZED UNREASON

IV	EXPLORATION OF SOME AVENUES OF THOUGHT IN SYSTEMATIZED UNREASON, AND AN INTER- PRETATION OF THEM IN RELATION TO INTEL- LECTUAL EVOLUTION	110
----	---	-----

	PAGE
Section 1. Adult Perpetuation of Childhood Logic	112
2. The Power of Words	120
3. The "Naturalness" of Systematized Unreason	125
4. The Melange of Science and Systematized Unreason	133
V SOME PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS	141
Section 1. Mass Dereism	143
2. This Believing World	148
3. Gregariousness	152
VI PERSISTENCE OF SYSTEMATIZED UNREASON	156
Section 1. Ignorance, Its Maintenance and Enforcement	158
2. Unquestioning Submission Elevated to a Position of Virtue	167
3. Symbolism and Ritual as Means of Motivation and Control	174
4. Incorporation of Cultural Patterns Under the Self- regarding Sentiment	178
5. A Battle of Words Between Psychology and Sociology-- Who's Right?	184
6. Summary and Application	191
Conclusion of Part II	196
PART III	
CONCLUSIONS: FROM A SOCIAL ENGINEERING STANDPOINT	
VII IN THE SERVICE OF SOCIAL CHANGE	197
Section 1. Security, a Prerequisite to Man's Abandonment of System- atized Unreason	199
2. Social Security Through Social Science	202
3. Education to Reality	208
Conclusion of Part III	213
Appendix. Method and Procedure of the Research	214
Questionnaire	
References	220

INTRODUCTION

ad maiorem scientiae gloriam

There is no animal with as much intelligence as man yet none that makes so little use of what it has as he. Man, the king of animals, is everywhere the servant of his own beliefs and practices, bound and chained to an irrational past, beset on every side by conflicting emotions, and inadequately striving to free himself from these chains.

Much has been written concerning the early beginnings of man and where that may have taken place. Today we are confronted by more urgent problems. In this world of endless wars and human misery, it is not so much a question of where civilization began but rather, when will it begin?

Certainly no one would deny that our western world has the technological means to create a Garden of Eden for the great majority of human beings, here and now (50, 90, 133). Why then does it not happen? What is the cause not only of this slowness, but also of the recurrent wars and endless misery?

The answers to these queries are manifold and come from many disciplines. There are economic theories, sociological theories, religious theories, psychological

theories, and others to explain these problems. Malthusians clamour that there are too many of us while some religionists shout that we need more. Capitalists blame the Communists, while the latter are equally as vehement on their side. Sociologists say that we hate the other fellow, having likes only for our own, while psychologists claim that we like the novel and get tired of sameness. Some psychiatrists say that too much absolute morality is the cause of our ills, while others reply that it is not enough morality which is causing us so much grief. Then there are the theories which claim that wars and misery are inevitable because of certain inherent faults in human nature. Then there is the old "answer-all" used by so many for so long, that God visits these ills upon us for transgressions of His will. Lastly, but not leastly, there are those who claim that in order to achieve a more sensible, more permanent form of civilization, one which will help right the unfortunate dilemmas into which man invariably gets himself into, it will first be necessary to learn how to remove non-rational beliefs and practices.

The above claims are common, and may all have elements of right as well as wrong. Nevertheless, I, along with many others, regard the latter as being the more important. It is then, in an endeavour to better

understand certain factors of collective irrational beliefs and practices, that this paper is written. Moreover, we must endeavour to develop "a profound theoretical knowledge of the factors which produce, modify, and remove non-rational beliefs" (13, pp. 664-665). In the hope of contributing to this important task, I have chosen to make a study of magic, mysticism, and religion, and the term "Systematized Unreason" was coined to designate them collectively.

Now, the removal of non-rational beliefs and practices immediately implies their replacement with rational beliefs and practices. The question almost inevitably arises then, "Is it possible to expect that man is mentally capable of thinking and acting more rationally than he is?" As I see it, this question can be answered in the affirmative from at least three different directions.

1. Evolution of Rationality: The comparative study of different societies and civilizations, especially from an historical point of view, points most assuredly to the fact that man has progressed, ^{however}beit in trial and error fashion. This is to say, that he has been able to put to ever greater use his intelligence in the understanding and control of the physical universe about him. Would anyone deny that it is because of the greater understanding and control of the physical and

natural environment that man has been able to multiply and spread over the whole planet? Now, greater understanding and more efficient control is the equivalent of saying that there has been a progressive evolution of rationality. We can say then, that man today, though physically and probably mentally alike that of his forebears since the time when the Cro-magnon man appeared, has definitely become more rational. Moreover, it is unlikely that this progressive evolutionary trend towards ever greater rationality has stopped. Thus we can say with a fair amount of assurance that this trend will also continue in the future.

2. Normal Curve Hypothesis: The statistical concept of normality assumes that for a given measurement or trait, the majority of cases will assume characteristics very closely akin to one another. This tendency for the majority of cases to cluster about a given point or characteristic is referred to as the "central tendency" and may be shown graphically as a "normal curve."

Now, it is fairly well accepted among psychometricians that with respect to intelligence, most of the people of the world have a comparable degree of it, and this is referred to as "normal." Moreover, it is likely that this degree of normality has not

increased appreciably, say, since ancient times.¹

Nevertheless, since there has evidently been an increase in rationality since then, both from the point of view of (a) man's greater understanding and control of the physical world, and (b) his greater understanding of his individual and societal makeup, then we may assume that there is enough intelligence in man to make it possible for him to become even still more rational. That is, since the degree of innate intelligence, i.e. the ability to learn and to act accordingly remains approximately constant, and rationality increases with time, then we can expect the latter to continue to increase in the future. (See Fig. 1)

3. Tools of thought and action: Since the beginnings of the scientific era over 300 years ago, some of the most imponderable puzzles have been solved(9). As has been implied above, it is to this ability to solve perplexing enigmas most adequately that we attach the criterion of rationality. Having solved more perplexing problems in the relatively short span of 300 years than any other system was able

1

This statement is based on the assumption that the genetic theory of the continuation of traits through the germ plasm is correct in the majority of cases. From which we may infer that there has been no profound or widespread change in effects such as intelligence, which are dependent upon the germ plasm, since ancient times.

to solve in the whole period before then, there can be no wonder then that we attach so much importance to the scientific system.¹

The great majority of people, however, know only of this system as a mysterious word in which are enveloped all sorts of amazing wonders. The majority of people probably cannot be scientists, i.e. have not sufficient intelligence to use the scientific system in order to make great discoveries. But it is quite likely that they can incorporate into their mental makeup one of the most important parts of this system--the scientific attitude.¹ It is this basis, this important "tool" which has been ancillary to scientific progress in the past. It is this very important tool of thought which most people can be taught to adhere to. We claim with Stuart Chase that "people are not 'dumb' because they lack mental equipment; they are dumb because they lack an adequate method for the use of that equipment" (25, p. 569). Given the 'method'--tools, if you will--men will in time learn to reject their former tools which were not so adequate to meet life's problems, and will learn to use the new ones as if they had always possessed them. An "outlook" or tool of thought leading to a particular type of action can be taught in childhood. Stress any particular one in childhood, and it tends to remain in adulthood (20). Given the tools,

¹ See Chapter III where this system is briefly discussed.

such as a scientific frame of reference, man will go forward to greater and greater rationality.

Thus, we have shown that man is capable of thinking and acting in a more rational manner than he is. In (1), it was shown that it is inevitable even in trial and error fashion, that man will become increasingly more rational. In (2), the assumption was that man has enough innate intelligence to absorb more rationality. In (3), it was pointed out that it is not a lack of intelligence which delays progress towards greater rationality, but inadequate tools of thought, and that, given more adequate tools man will surely progress.

"But," someone may ask, "if rationality inevitably increases with the ages, why should we worry; why should we bother writing about it?" The reason is that we are still overburdened with the deadweight of irrationality of the past, and which makes this evolutionary process needlessly slower than it can be. Therefore, we should find it important to study this deadweight in order to be able to deal more adequately with it in a shorter span of time than would otherwise be required. In this paper, for instance, an attempt is made to gain an understanding of some of these obstructive impedimenta in order to postulate ways and means to eject them with the least

delay and with the least harm to society.

Our orientation is always towards a greater use of the scientific system in society. The objection is often raised, however, that too much science and too little systematized unreason (the special form of which depending upon the objector's bias), would cause a breakdown of morals and all civilized decency. Muret, for instance expresses a common view when he writes that science is but an instrument of destruction. "Peut-être dans deux ou trois siècles d'ici, alors que la science, aujourd'hui surtout theorique, sera devenue pratiquement experimentale, pourra-t-on édifier une société en vertu des principes édictés par elle. Mais l'heure de ce progrès n'a pas encore sonné. Pour l'instant, la science n'est guère qu'un instrument de destruction." (110,p. 313).

That such a view is incompatible with everything that stands for progress and human betterment will be more evident as the discussion develops. Meanwhile, however, it is interesting to note a view opposite to the one above, from the pen of so eminent a scholar as the late Sir James G. Frazer. In a characteristic passage in "The Golden Bough" he writes: "The abundance, the solidity, and the splendour of the results already achieved by science are well fitted to inspire us with a cheerful confidence in the soundness

of its method. Here at last, after groping around in the dark for countless ages, man has hit upon a clue to the labyrinth, a golden key that opens many locks in the treasury of nature. It is probably not too much to say that the hope of progress--moral and intellectual as well as material--in the future is bound up with the fortunes of science, and that every obstacle placed in the way of scientific discovery is a wrong to humanity " (42,p. 712).

The objections against too much science exist on false premises. The belief that science in being objective, of necessity loses all vestige of moral responsibility shows an unforgivable ignorance of the overall aim of science. And that aim is, to implement and further those moral ideals which aim at human betterment and well-being. Science is not amoral or evil. A great deal of evil exists because of the ill-use that mystifiers and obscurantists make of scientific achievement. Evil, or social degradation, spreads because of the purposeful shielding of scientific methods and progress from the masses by powerful obscurantists everywhere to whose advantage of self-aggrandisement, blinders are clamped on the masses(131-132). Moreover, as McCabe, in his "The Story of the World's Oldest Profession" (98) has shown, debauchery and immorality have been greatest where magic, mysticism,

and religion, respectively, were strongest.¹

Again, it is sometimes claimed that men cannot be creative in their arts if they are shorn, say, of mysticism. The word mysticism has a number of meanings, but the one that is probably thought of in objecting to too much science, is the one which implies a certain feeling of awe and wonderment at the beautiful scenes and sounds in nature, that sometimes come over certain sensitive individuals, and which helps them create beautiful paintings or music. With such an objection, probably no scientist has any opposition, except that it might be said that a scientific invention may also represent a great deal of artistic creativeness, and that awe or inspiration are not especially required. For instance, Thomas Edison, in answer to a query, once said that his inventiveness was "99% perspiration and 1% inspiration."

But it is sometimes claimed that religious mysticism is essential in the production of great paintings, music, and sculpture etc., and that too much science is obstructive to such art. Now it may

¹ Cf. also A.W. Ward, (ed), "Cambridge Modern History," p. 672). Joseph McCabe, (99,100), has again shown that lack of science does not make for greater art, but for less art and more misery. Compare also, the general unhappiness that can be caused by abundant mysticism and religion in John Davidson's "A Ballad of a Nun, and other Poems."

be that too much science may be obstructive to religious mysticism, but it is difficult to see how the former is obstructive to art. As will be shown in Chapter III, the main scientific aim is in part "to make this world a better place" (127) and as such cannot be obstructive to art.

Besides the objections raised against too much science from outside its ranks, there is a very potent one coming from within the ranks of science itself. It is the objection that, since science disrupts the intellectual bases of mysterious religious beliefs and practices, there remains a gaping emotional emptiness in many men's hearts, which, try as they would, cannot be compensated for by a truth-seeking, realistic, and unemotional science.¹ It is therefore suggested that a new religion--a religion based on a psychological theory--be substituted in the place of the former abortive religions. This psychological principle or theory is the "Group Mind," which, after due recognition and sanctification, is elevated to the position of a deity, with the name "Theopsyche." Such a view has been articulately outlined by Prof. R. B. Cattell in his "Psychology and the Religious Quest" (24), although there have been many allusions to such

¹ See Chapter IV, Section 4, where some of the implications of this social phenomenon are briefly discussed.

a doctrine long before. For instance, Hegel's concept of the State as Super-individual, and more latterly, William McDougall's theory, so well expressed in his "The Group Mind"(102).

Cattell's "Theopsyche," is essentially a religion of the Group Mind--a search for immortality through material and intellectual service to the group... Whatever be the objections raised against such a view, from a psychological viewpoint, is irrevelent at this point in our discussion. What matters is, that here we have at last a means of advancing science for the benefit of man, plus a method for tiding man over his difficult period of emotional readjustment, without, at the same time hindering the upward struggle of science. It is a means for making man's lot bearable in the face of inexorable hardships. It is a religion in the service of man rather than of man in the service of the unseen and mysterious. In so far that such a religion stands in the service of science for the benefit of all, it gains our whole-hearted support, it being our purpose here to study those forces which have always resisted and hindered science.

Now, verbal objections to too much science can be solved easily enough. The crucial problem is, "Do we have enough science, especially science of society, in order to secure the greatest possibilities

for social and intellectual development?"

In answer to this question, it would be folly to state with full assurance that we already have enough knowledge of society in order to thoroughly meet the ideal which this problem demands. Doubtless, however, there is enough knowledge from the various fields of the social sciences to enable mankind to make for a wider extension of rationality or efficiency than now obtains. But it is the desire, or rather the lack of it, to apply the findings and conclusions that constitutes in part, the drawback towards an ever expanding rationality of man.

On my part, however, in attempting to discover some of the characteristics of systematized unreason, I am not merely trying to reproduce encyclopaedically what I have found in the literature, and through the questionnaire¹ and general observation. In social psychology, like anthropology and sociology, and other sciences, we have not only the task of observing and recording, but we must infer from these studies certain conclusions in order to gain greater insight and broader understanding of man. In geology, for instance, men had known for a very long time that there are different strata of rocks as we descend

¹ See the appendix.

through the earth's crust towards the core. But this simple observation was almost useless until it was inferred by Lyell, and Smith, that the rocks found nearest the core were formed earlier than those near the surface, and that fossils found in the former represent a form of life more ancient than the latter. The further implications inherent in these deductions are too well known to need elaboration here. In similar fashion then, an attempt is here made to infer, wherever possible certain conclusions which may have further effect upon our thinking and acting. Emile Durkheim writes in a like connection, thusly: "La Sociologie se pose d'autres problèmes que l'histoire ou que l'ethnographie. Elle ne cherche pas à connaître les formes périmées de la civilisation dans le seul but de les connaître et de les reconstituer. Mais, comme toute science positive, elle, a, avant tout, pour objet d'expliquer une réalité actuelle, proche de nous, capable, par suite, d'affecter nos idées et nos actes..."(39,p. 1-2).

Thus, our overall purpose becomes a purpose with an ethic; for it is an attempt to more fully understand certain mental and social processes of the obscure and mysterious in order to put forth means for their replacement with scientific modes of thought and action. This purpose has been divided into five parts, towards which it has been the aim of the writer to strive.

1. To explore some avenues of thought among persons holding unscientific beliefs, and in so doing to contrast these ways with scientific modes of thought.
2. To investigate the degree and manner in which scientific thought is admixed, absorbed by, or assimilated with unscientific thought and belief .
3. To investigate some acquired personality characteristics of persons adhering to certain forms of thought and practice.
4. To study how, in the face of scientific evidence to the contrary, certain irrational beliefs and practices continue to persevere.
5. To attempt to infer some factors which might "produce, modify, and remove non-rational beliefs."¹

Much more work remains to be done in the study of systematized unreason, say, of even one form, such as the mental processes involved in magic. For, in and from the inner and darker recesses of the mind,

1

C. D. Broad, loc. cit., ibid. See our Appendix, where the method used in investigating these aims is outlined.

as in the magical processes, it might be shown that they have profound effects upon our more sophisticated and erudite undertakings, e.g. science in general. It is the task of psychology to probe these processes, individually and socially, and thereby to contribute to the other disciplines means for further study and improvement(78).

Indeed, Psychology may be looked upon as the correlating science of the sciences(141). True, it has not as yet given us the answers to many urgent questions, but in this respect we, qua psychologists, have nothing to be ashamed of, for in the true scientific spirit we claim simply and honestly our ignorance: "Ignoramus ignorabimus".

"Knowledge and Wisdom, far from being one,
oftimes have no connection; knowledge dwells
in heads replete with thoughts of other men;
Wisdom in minds attentive to their own.
Knowledge is proud that he's learned so much;
Wisdom is humble that he knows no more."

How true, indeed, are Cowper's lines. Nevertheless, even with the possibility of being tendencious, I am firmly convinced that there lies within the limits of psychological discipline, the seminal possibilities of laying the noetic groundwork upon which all science, all empirical observation rests.

Meanwhile, we, as social scientists, must get more facts,----facts about ourselves, about society

about our relations to one another and to our society. We must get facts, and we must present them and our conclusions fearlessly. We are almost discouragingly behind the advances of the natural and physical sciences(9). But the latter too, did not have their way paved by a bed of roses---they too, met up with social obstacles of a most malignant nature(50). But from this alone we can find courage and faith that our task is not hopeless. We need a renewed and fervent application to the task at hand; we need to rededicate ourselves almost religiously to that faith in man, which first inspired the fathers of the social sciences in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Only in such an outlook can we hope to go forward; all others have failed.

The next two chapters are concerned with a study of magic, mysticism, and religion, and certain interpretations which follow thereon. ChapterIII will deal with the scientific system and a contrast between it and systematized unreason. It is also intended to indicate more fully the orientation of this thesis. These chapters together will form Part I, and it is hoped they will serve as a theoretical anchor upon which we will enlarge and elaborate our thesis as the discussion in general develops.

PART I

IN SEARCH OF COMMON TRENDS IN
MAGIC, MYSTICISM, AND RELIGION
and a
COMPARISON OF THEM WITH SCIENCE

CHAPTER I

THREE APPROACHES TO MAGIC, MYSTICISM, AND RELIGION

Present scientific knowledge about magic, mysticism, and religion and related fields have been built up mainly through three channels of endeavour:

1. Anthropologists, perhaps more than any other group of professionals, have extensively investigated the modes of thought and interaction among primitive races of men.
2. Sociologists have endeavoured to conceptualize the various modes of thinking and acting under a few headings, which could be universally applied. Thus, such terms as folkways, mores, institutional ways, have come to us, partly via the efforts of the anthropologists collecting new facts and partly through the efforts of the sociologists who systematized and conceptualized these facts.
3. Psychologists, working with the material of the anthropologists and sociologists, as well as making many investigations on their own, have studied the manner in which the various systems of thought and interaction have affected the individual living under given conditions.

Actually, when one channel has been used in studying the present three fields of human adherence, i.e. magic, mysticism, and religion, the other two channels have also been employed to a greater or lesser degree.

For it is impossible to study any field of human interest to the complete exclusion of related sciences. Science is like that; it permits of arbitrary or temporary separation, but never of absolute or permanent separation; it is pandemic and unitary. This is especially marked in the three sciences, anthropology, sociology, and psychology, which overlap in many directions. In our attempt, then, to further conceptualize magic, mysticism, and religion, and to perceive therein a similar thread, though often a hidden one, we will have recourse to the above three channels, as much as we can.

There is probably one more professional school which also studies the related problems of magic, mysticism, religion, etc., and that is the History of Philosophy and Religion. It is likely that most theological colleges give courses bearing this title. Moreover, some universities, e.g. Oxford and Harvard, grant degrees in History of Philosophy and Religion.

This school of learning, however, has not been specially treated here, for it is felt that it does not offer any basically new approach to the problem. It is felt that this school is rather a combination of the three channels referred to above, using the one or the other

to a greater or lesser degree, depending upon the writer's specialized background or tastes. It will be readily noticed, that in some measure, the approach of this paper is along similar lines as the latter, except perhaps, that the historical and philosophical approaches are here largely absent, and are replaced to some extent by the socio-psychological content and interpretation.

1.

Magic

Ever since man became man, lost his fur, and gained his mind, he has been the victim of two inexorable forces: an outer reality, cold, harsh, and indifferent, and his consciousness, which has caused him to perceive this reality, and driven him to seek to allay and control it. Sometimes his consciousness served him well in his struggle, sometimes it drove him into worse disaster than he had ever been as a sub-human. For, when he became a super animal, he found himself surrounded by other super animals, no longer content to live as other animals in tranquil search for food and shelter; no longer finding it necessary to exploit the physical environment only, but also to control and manipulate other homines sapientes who lived in the environs. ~~Such was the early consciousness of man~~

It is from these basic differences between man and animal--the ability to perceive, imagine, plan ahead, and act upon the plan (103, 105),¹--that various attempts to control and exist both in his physical and with his social environments, have been made. One of these attempts comes under the general term of magic.

According to an analysis by Sir James G. Frazer's "The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion," magic may be conceived of as being divided into two branches, both under the general name of "Sympathetic Magic." This classification is meant to imply that both branches of magic "assume that things act on each other at a distance through a secret sympathy, the impulse being transmitted from one to the other by means of what we may conceive as a kind of invisible ether ..." (42, p. 12). The two branches are "Homeopathic Magic" and "Contagious Magic." The one assumes that any effect may be produced by imitating it (Homeopathic or Imitative Magic); the other, that whatever is done by the magician to a material object "will affect equally the person with whom the object was once in contact whether it formed part of his body or not" (42, p.11).

¹ Cf. especially McDougall's discussion of an imaginary original man ("Mowgli") in his "Outline".

Sir James gives numerous examples of both branches of magic, but a general understanding of the principle involved will suffice for our purpose here. Of Homeopathic or Imitative Magic, he writes:

"Perhaps the most familiar application of the principle that like produces like is the attempt which has been made by many peoples in many ages to injure or destroy an enemy by injuring or destroying an image of him, in the belief that, just as the image suffers, so does the man, and that when it perishes he must die" (p. 12).

Of Contagious Magic, Sir James writes:

"The most familiar example of Contagious Magic is the magical sympathy which is supposed to exist between a man and any severed portion of his person, as his hair or nails; so that whoever gets possession of human hair or nails may work his will, at any distance, upon the person from whom they were cut. This superstition is world wide..." (p. 38).

It hardly needs pointing out that to a large extent, such magical practices, at least the principles involved, are omnipresent today in our so-called highest cultures. For instance, candles are still lighted in many a 'civilized' home in order to ward off lightning; and pictures of the Virgin are hung in many places in order to ward off evil (79).

The principles of magic, as developed by Frazer in his attempt to differentiate between magic and religion, serve to show that in their pristine form there is no reference to supplication of spirits or supernatural powers in order to gain their favour. Rather, Frazer shows that in magic there is prevalent a mistaken notion of the laws of causality. "The fatal flaw of magic lies not in its general assumption of a sequence of events determined by law, but in a total misconception of the nature of the particular laws which govern the sequence." For instance, both contagious magic and imitative magic are based on "mistaken applications of one or other of two great fundamental laws of thought, namely, the association of ideas by similarity and the association of ideas by contiguity in space or time. A mistaken association of similar ideas produces homeopathic or imitative magic: a mistaken association of contiguous ideas produces contagious magic" (42, p. 49).¹

Whether Frazer's analysis is valid or not, need not deter us here. What concerns us, is that in the overall picture of magic we are able to discern the workings of the

¹ Cf. however, the criticism of this explanation by Leuba, "The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion" (pp. 55-58).

human mind, howbeit inadequately in the struggle for existence in a dual environment--the physical and the social.

But magic is not a discrete entity of the mind as one might be led to believe after a cursory examination of "The Golden Bough." It merges with other elements, and it is only an arbitrary distinction that is often created for the sake of finer analysis.

Frazer was perhaps overzealous in his attempt to demarcate magic and religion into two discrete categories. Though he recognized that many religious practices are adulterated with magic, he did not stress this mixture, but rather laid emphasis upon the individualistic character of magic as distinct from the more socialized aspects of religion. Moreover, he further distinguished magic from religion, in that, the former lacks supplication, while the latter is characterized by it. Others, such as Durkheim and the French school, were not willing to divorce the two so fully. Durkheim writes:

"La magie, elle aussi, est faite de croyances et de rites. Elle a, comme la religion, ses mythes et ses dogmes; ils sont seulement plus rudimentaires, sans doute parce que, poursuivant des fins techniques et utilitaires, elle ne perd pas son temps en pures spéculations. Elle a également ses cérémonies, ses sacrifices, ses lutrations, ses prières,

ses chants et ses danses. Les êtres qu'invoque le magicien, les forces qu'il met en oeuvre ne sont pas seulement de même nature que les forces et les êtres auxquels s'adresse la religion; très souvent, ce sont identiquement les mêmes. Ainsi, dès les sociétés les plus inférieures, les âmes des morts sont choses essentiellement sacrées et elles sont l'objet des rites religieux. Mais en même temps, elles ont joué dans la magie un rôle considerable" (39, p. 58).

Anthropologists have spilled much ink on the question of the primacy of magic, animism, and religion: some arguing that one came before the other, while others claiming that they evolved together, the one predominating over the others at given stages of individual and social development. Whatever came first, or whether they evolved together is a secondary question, as far as we are concerned. What is important though, is to recognize that magic, or the tendency towards it, is so strong a drug of the human mind, that it has not yet completely worn off, from great sections of present society. Lewis Browne, in his book, "This Believing World," writes:

"...to this day no historical religion is without its adulterations of magic. In all of them there survive at least the relics of old coercive rites; and in all of them there exist originally persuasive prayers that have since

taken on the character of coercive spells. The belief, for instance, that the whole substance of a bit of bread and a cup of wine must change into the body and blood of Christ--that belief is quite flagrantly the relic of an old magic rite. Or the belief that any prayer is only efficacious if uttered in a certain place at a certain time in a certain tongue by a certain person, or is particularly efficacious if concluded with the words 'We ask it in Jesus' name' or some similar formula--such a belief reveals quite obviously the degeneration of a one-time religious petition into a mere magic spell" (15, p. 44).

Primitive magic is concerned with utilitarian ends. How to obtain and maintain a sufficient food supply and how to ward off disease and remain healthy occupies a large part of the time and energies of the primitive mind. Magic is concerned with the physical not the metaphysical.¹ As Calverton puts it: "It (magic) is not a palliative for minds tormented by the meaning of the universe, but a practical technique for men to control the world in which they live. The

¹ Cf. W. J. Perry, "The Origin of Magic and Religion," where, according to V. F. Calverton (18), it is shown that primitive magic served economic ends to a great extent.

inadequacy and invalidity of the technique does not alter the nature of its direction. The motivation behind it is the same" (18, p. 33).

This motivation is interestingly noted by Spencer and Gillen in their book, "Across Australia."

"Almost every action in the life of a Central Australian savage from the day of his birth to the day of his death is associated, in some way or another, with magic. No sooner is the Arunta child born than a black line is painted over his eyebrow in order to ward off sickness. How or why it should do so does not in the least trouble the parents. They have been told by the men that it will and that is enough for them. The idea of putting any of their beliefs to the test of experiment never enters their heads. If the young child avoids sickness then, of course, it is the result of the black line--if the desired result does not follow then it means that some other person has worked evil by counter magic, and the savage goes on his way perfectly content with this simple explanation" (142, p. 342).

Magic in our western society is also extremely interested in such ends as is the magic of savages, except that we do not like to refer to ourselves as working magic or being magicians. Moreover, our magic goes one step further. Whereas the Arunta, for instance, do not question why or how their magic works, we



ABOVE are pictures of religious stamps made to be eaten. These are St. Joseph stamps printed in French from Quebec, Canada, but St. Anthony stamps printed in English can be bought in New York from the Franciscan Fathers. They are printed on rice paper so that they can be ground up and placed in food. They are recommended for various purposes, especially as a remedy for all kinds of stomach ailments. Some Catholics insert them in the food of Protestants and of "heretics and infidels" whose conversion to Roman Catholicism is desired. If St. Joseph stamps, like those above, are not found to be effective, other brands—St. Francis, St. Dominic, Little Flower—can be tried.

Fig. 2.

sometimes do. Our magic seeks to attain these ends not merely through a primitive devotion to tellurian forces through false applications of the laws of thought,¹ but through a sanctification of this devotion in harmony with metaphysical ideas historically developed by the group. Contemporary magic is primitive magic reconciled and synthesized with the cultural ideas of gods, spirits, and immortality.²

2.

Mysticism

"They reckon ill who leave me out;
When me they fly, I am the wings;
I am the doubter and the doubt,
And I the hymn the Brahmin sings."-Emerson.

"God equals everything, everything
equals God." - Spinoza.

"The characteristic attitude of the mystic is one almost of antagonism to any rational or intellectual process. His appeal in the last resort is to his own feeling or intuition, and he needs nothing more." - W.B. Selbie, "The Psychology of Religion," p. 53.

This section is divided into three parts:

(a) will serve as an introduction to the other two, and will indicate the purpose of the study of mysticism and some of the conflicting implications which arise

¹ Cf. J. G. Frazer, op. cit., above.

² Cf. Lewis Browne, op. cit., above. See also, Fig. 2.

therefrom; (b) and (c) both deal with the content of mysticism, but have been dealt with separately here, for as is expressed later, we have noted a distinction between "primitive mysticism" and "civilized mysticism." This differentiation is not clearly distinguished in the literature and it is hoped that it will help clear the situation somewhat.

(a) In Search of Categories and Logical Principles.

Ever since Auguste Comte,¹ in his "Cours de Philosophie positive" (1852), first pointed out the importance of the comparative method in studying society and the higher mental functions, there have been a great number of researches made along those lines. Thus, for instance, Levy-Bruhl in his "Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Societes Inferieures," in attempting to determine certain laws governing "collective representations,"² uses the comparative method in order to throw "some light upon the genesis of our (present day) categories and our logical principles" (86, p. 14).

Comte, however, failed to see the importance of discerning and classifying facts concerning institutions, customs, languages, and group-ideas of so-called

¹ Auguste Comte (1798-1857), claims for himself the honour of being the founder of the science of sociology. He urged the application of the scientific method to the solution of social problems, a cry which was heeded and valiantly carried forward by Emile Durkheim, founder of "L'Annee Sociologique" and consequently of the French School of sociologists.

² This term, among others will be further discussed in

savage or primitive races. The beginning of such investigations, as Lévy-Bruhl tells us in his "L'Ame Primitive" (87), had its roots among the anthropologists and ethnologists, especially of the English school. Led by E.B.Tylor and his "Primitive Culture" (1871), a host of worthy followers and collaborators, such as J.G.Frazer, Sydney Hartland, and Andrew Lang, soon appeared. In France, Germany, and Holland, work of a similar nature also took form under able hands. Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, in France; Speiser, Neuhauss and Pechuel-Loesche, in Germany; and Kruijt and other Dutch scientists, in Holland. And in the United States, the Ethnological Bureau of the Smithsonian Institute gathered valuable information concerning the Indian tribes of North America.

With the gradual collection and organization of the host of information gathered from the four corners of the earth, it became clear that there was a great amount of similarity to be found in the thinking and acting of primitive peoples widely separated from one another, both in space and time. The findings of these numerous researches were interpreted in different ways by different schools, two of which will be briefly mentioned here.

The English school supposed that, since there

is so much similarity in institutions, beliefs, and practices among widely separated peoples, this is of sufficient evidence for the theory of a sameness of structure of the human mind. This sameness resolves itself about the laws governing the association of ideas and the natural and ubiquitous recognition of cause and effect, all of which are supposed to have originated in a general animistic attitude, and found among all peoples (even our own) to a greater or lesser degree.

The French school too, recognizes that there must be a great similarity in the mental processes among the various peoples of mankind, since there is such a great resemblance among their ideas. But, they do not agree that the facts which bear out the resemblances, are "equally valid when it is a case of proving that these ideas have a common origin in the belief in animism, in a spontaneous 'natural philosophy' which would be the earliest reaction of the human mind to the appeal of experience" (86,p.21).

The French school argues that animism cannot adequately explain collective representations, and implies that the English school argues as if individual minds can function over and above the group mind. Though this is not the place for contending pro and

con either side, it might however, be pointed out, that this French school was probably influenced by Tarde's "Les Lois de l'Imitation" (147), in which the force, "imitation," is believed to align the individuals in a group through some vague compulsion characteristic of men. Also, by G. LeBon's ideas that the crowd is not a mere sum or average of its component individuals, but a different entity--a collective mind (81).

These theories are more or less disregarded nowadays by most social psychologists (14, 76). Thus, Brown writes: "Humans imitate when this type of behavior enables them to arrive at certain goals in the psychological field. The underlying dynamic situation creates the imitation, rather than a force called imitation creating these goals" (14, p. 92).

However, the two opposing views have never, as far as this writer is aware, been fully resolved, and we will return to a brief discussion of them again in Chapter VI.

(b) Some Results of the Search. A study of the literature reveals two types of mysticism. One recognizes every event to be attributable to supernatural or spiritual powers, this type being properly called animism; the other, in which the individual recognizes natural events as distinct from supernatural events and supernatural entities, feels that he is

" as One" with these supernatural phenomena at certain times; this type is the mysticism with which our western civilization is more acquainted. In this section we will deal mainly with the former type, and take up the latter type in section (c). Some writers use the two terms interchangeably with qualifying remarks to denote which particular type they are referring to. The reader will do well to bear this in mind especially since we will often be referring to Lévy-Bruhl, who uses the term "mystique" in both senses.

In "L'Ame primitive" (87), Lévy-Bruhl illustrates with many examples the vague conceptions--- "pre-notions"---that primitives in various Pacific islands and in Africa, have of the homogeneity of living and non-living forms. They seem to have a notion of an underlying spiritual force ("force mystique") which pervades everything, including such inert matter as rocks. This force is interpreted in various ways by various groups of "pre-civilized" men, but the recognition of the immanence of this force is possessed by all of them. Various names such as "imunu," "mana," are given by the natives to "this mystic reality which permeates everywhere and which is felt rather than represented..." (87,p.17).

Men and animals, being a part of this all-enveloping mystical "imunu," represent in their art such strange creatures as the body of an animal with the head of a man or vice versa. Lévy-Bruhl explains that such anthropozoöomorphic activity is a natural outgrowth from the savage's thought processes, which are qualitatively different from ours. The savage "feels" that imunu is part of everything, so that joining a head of a man to the body of an animal, is, from his point of view, not at all a strange thing to do. "If primitives," writes Lévy-Bruhl, "frequently endeavour to reproduce beings who are half human and half animal, they are but interpreting the mystic coexistence of the human and animal forms in the beings who are the revered objects of their thought" (87, p. 55).

The savage always feels himself enveloped by these forces. His every action, or the action of his neighbour is attributed to them. If he trips over a stone, then a mystical force desired that he trip over that particular stone. If an arrow hits or misses him, then a mystical element either guided it to or away from him.

The primitive, either conciliates or coerces the various mystical forces, by various practices,

in the attempt to please them or make them do his bidding. Conciliation or coercion is used, depending upon whether he is religiously or magically inclined, or he may use both methods. Whatever the method, it is with the same motive as we noted in the section on magic, i.e. the motive of self-preservation and welfare. Lévy-Bruhl, in his "La Mentalité Primitive" notes:

"Le primitif se sent toujours entouré d'une multitude innombrable de puissances et d'influences surnaturelles, invisibles, plus ou moins vaguement définies, de qui dépend à chaque instant son bonheur ou son malheur. Quoi qu'il arrive, il se demande d'abord laquelle d'entre elles a fait sentir son action, et il cherche avant tout à se concilier, ou à l'apaiser si elle est irritée. Pour caractériser cette disposition constante de la mentalité primitive, on l'a appelée mystique. Non pas par allusion au mysticisme religieux de nos sociétés, mais dans le sens étroitement défini où 'mystique' se dit de la croyance à des forces, à des influences, à des actions imperceptibles aux sens et cependant réelles" (88,p.16).

One might be led to think from the above paragraph, as from other writings of Lévy-Bruhl, that he creates the impression that the mind of the savage is qualitatively different than that of the 'civilized'

man in society. However, in answering many of the criticisms levelled against this view, he modified it somewhat in speaking before a gathering of his most vehement critics, the "English school" of anthropologists, in London, 1931. He said: "Il existe une 'mentalité primitive', caractérisée par son orientation mystique, par un certain nombre d'habitudes mentales, et spécialement par la loi de participation, qui y coexiste avec les principes logiques.....Elle se distingue nettement de la nôtre, mais elle n'en est pas séparée par une sorte de fossé. Au contraire, dans les sociétés les plus 'civilisées', on en aperçoit sans peine des traces et plus que des traces. Dans nos campagnes, et jusque dans nos grandes villes, on n'aurait pas à chercher loin pour reconstruire les gens qui pensent, sentent, et même agissent comme des primitifs" (88,p.26). (Underlining mine).

In an earlier work, "How Natives Think" Lévy-Bruhl noted a certain psychological characteristic of primitives, which was later found to be similar to that possessed by children, in researches made by Piaget (118,119,120). Lévy-Bruhl notes the inability of primitives to disassociate themselves from their environment. This was already implied above, when we noted that the savage "feels" a certain immanent

"imunu" which pervades everything. This phenomenon, Levy-Bruhl has called the "Law of Participation". Thus he says:"... the primitive's mentality does not recognize two distinct worlds in contact with each other, and more or less interpenetrating. To him there is but one. Every reality, like every influence is mystic, and consequently every perception is also mystic" (86,p.68).

In a series of researches among French and Swiss children, (118,119, 120), Jean Piaget has shown certain psychological characteristics of children's conceptions to be akin to some of Levy-Bruhl's writings about primitive conceptions. Though Piaget does not attempt to link his findings with those of Levy-Bruhl's, it is clear that the conclusions arrived at, are to a large extent similar in both cases.

Piaget has shown that the child does not comprehend the distinction between the "I" and external reality, that is, his subjective experiences and the events in the external world. "... in stating that the child proceeds from realism to objectivity, all we are saying is that originally the child puts the whole content of consciousness on the same plane and draws no distinction between the "I" and the external world. Above all we mean that the

constitution of the idea of reality presupposes a progressive splitting up of this protoplasmic consciousness into two complementary universes--- the objective universe and the subjective"(120,p.242).¹

Furthermore, Piaget posits his conviction that children's minds, that is, their psychological structural differences with respect to adults are almost as great as their anatomical differences (118). In other words, the child behaves in what he calls an "undifferentiated absolute" composed of self and environment, from which gradually the two become segregated and more or less distinct entities.

Herein lies both the similarity and the dissimilarity between Piaget's children and Levy-Bruhl's primitives. Whereas Piaget's children behave in an "undifferentiated absolute" which is akin to Levy-Bruhl's "Law of Participation," the former, however, evolve with age from this characteristic

¹ Cf. however, a later research by Dorothea McCarthy (101), who has shown that the "egocentricity" or non-socialized, non-reciprocal forms of thought and speech among children, are not nearly so marked as Piaget's conclusions would indicate. Also differing from Piaget, is a study by Johnson and Josey(72), who, concerning the children in their investigation, state in part, that "instead of finding them egocentric we found them socially minded, willing and able to assume the position of another and even that of an hypothesis." It may well be that these wide differences are due to different cultural patterns i.e. between Europe and the U.S.A., rather than experimental flaws.

into an adult personality, able to distinguish "self" from environment; while the primitive tends to hold onto this seemingly childish mentality.

Now, it seems strange that adult human beings---and that includes primitives---should continue to persist in types of thought and practice , which obviously have no reference to objective reality, and more important, have no visible utilitarian purpose. However, the primitives live on, generation after generation with these systems of beliefs and practices, which do them no immediate harm, but which keep them bound to the obscurities of the past and purblind to ~~keep them where they are, whereas they could be on~~ the realities of the present.

Now, mysticism is one type of systematized unreason, and this is a particular type that we have been considering, i.e. animism. In the ensuing section we will consider a type of mysticism, more readily recognizable as existing in our society.

(c) 'Civilized' Mysticism. In this section we will examine some of the claims of and for Western mystics, past and present, and then analyze and interpret these claims.

First, mysticism seems to be inextricably bound up with the orthodox religions, especially of the Catholic and Oriental varieties. In a recent

book dedicated to the furtherance of mysticism, "The Soul Afire: Revelations of the Mystics," H.A. Reinhold writes: "Correct theology is...the basis of orthodox mysticism, and a mystic whose life is a contradiction to the law of the church (i.e. the Catholic Church,B.) will be regarded as a fraud... dogmas form an essential part of mysticism" (124,p.xix). Thus religious orthodoxy is recognized as a necessary adjunct of mysticism.

Later Reinhold writes: "Mysticism... is something which defies words. All mystics have groped in the dark in their effort to describe what they experienced when they felt God. At best they took refuge in symbols, allegories and analogies taken, as in poetry, from natural and visible things... these are the analogical terms which are common coin to all lovers of God once they have admitted to communion of being which is so strong that it bursts through the rational approaches to God."

The editor of this collection of mystical writings then refers to Evelyn Underhill, who distinguishes mysticism from magic, thusly: "Magical are all forms of self-seeking transcendentalism." Reinhold further enlarges upon this definition by saying "that all magical pseudomysticism is based on an assumption that God, angels, superior powers and demons,

can be forced, by repetition of formulas and weird irrational practices, by sheer human effort to rise above itself through a kind of self-intensification, to do whatever one wants them to do...Mystics have nothing in common with such irrational and evil or silly doings.... This book will show that the greatest of all mystics are those who rise to union with God and leave behind that aspect of mysticism which intrigues the world....The mystics are people who--while their personality not only suffers no diminution, but is expanded to an exhilarating richness--become so perfectly passive to Him, humbly allowing Him to do what He wills them in the outpouring of His love....In a word, orthodox mysticism is nothing but the experience intensely lived of the mystery of grace and freedom....The God who revealed himself to Abraham, Moses and Isaias (sic) is the very God of the mystics" (124, p. xix).

Let us now analyze these authoritative statements concerning mysticism and magic, so that we may later more adequately understand and interpret them.

- (1) Mysticism defies words.
- (2) There seem to be bars to admission "to a communion of being."

- (3) Mystics do not try to change the course of events by appealing to certain powers, but rather are passive agents carrying out the will of the power with whom they are in a "communion of being."
- (4) In being passive agents their "personality is expanded to an exhilarating richness."
- (5) Grace and freedom are regarded as mysteries, that is, they are secrets and objects of awe.
- (6) The God who revealed himself to Abraham, Moses and Isaias is the One with whom the mystics want to be in "a communion of being."

With regard to magic there seems to be one main distinction, thus: that though those people who believe in magic desire the same "communion of being" as do the mystics, the former, however, want to have some say; they want to speed up the process of the "outpouring of His love", rather than act as passive agents in that partnership. In other words, since they are in "a communion of being" they feel they should have at least some of the power properly and usually possessed by a partner in any venture. We shall soon see that the mystics themselves are not as far removed from magicians as they

would like us to believe.

In the interpretation of the 6-point analysis which follows, it will be seen that mysticism is synonymous with obscurantism shrouded in meaningless verbiage. It will be seen too, that the difference put forth by mystics distinguishing themselves from those professing magic is very vague and in fact, so attenuated and umbrageous that the two practically, if not theoretically, are almost one and the same.

Interpretation of analysis of mysticism and magic.

(1) Not only does mysticism defy words, but it uses solemn strange sounds to represent itself. This is probably used, as Russell says, "to override patent facts by means of an emotion felt to be desirable "(130,p.vi). In fact, Reinhold implies that these strange sounds may be used as an inducement to others desiring to represent their own experiences of mysticism.

" The Canticle of Canticles with its Oriental lushness of imagery, its surface sensuality, its chaste candor, has served as an inspiration to one group writing of their experiences. Others again have taken refuge in an allegorical explanation of Holy Writ. Others again, continuing along a line established by Plato, Plotinus, and the Prophets, drown us in a 'glossalalic' flood of stammering words of awe, reverence and darkness." In a footnote, " glossolalic " and " glossolaly " are described as follows: " Speaking in tongues, described by St. Paul, repeatedly, especially in I Cor. 14. Although the phenomenon here described is not decidedly identified as the same which made the early Christian pronounce strange sounds, both seem to witness things that are unutterable."

To be sure, even William James, in his "The Varieties of Religious Experience," proposes "four marks which, when an experience has them, may justify us in calling it mystical," and which include an element of experience which is 'unutterable', thus: 1. Ineffability; 2. Noetic quality; 3. Transiency; 4. Passivity (70, pp. 380-381). Though James cites numerous biographical examples to illustrate mystical experience even among well-known leaders and intellectuals of the 19th century and earlier, he fails to convince us that there is a noetic quality involved i.e. a quality which would tend to give the experiencer sudden insight into the most complex problems and meanings of life. This writer's own experience may clarify the present stand.

According to the examples given by James, this writer can safely say that he too, has at times been 'possessed' of experiences similar to some of the mystics cited by him. Introspectively, however, or rather, retrospectively, this writer can acknowledge such mystical experience as a child and adolescent, but it seems, upon reflection, that these

mental states were always, or nearly always, brought on either when there was a "necessity" to escape reality due to hardships, etc., or when in a most satisfied state. Thus the two extremes, from the unpleasant to the pleasant, both tended to induce the mystical phenomenon. Again, upon retrospection, the younger the writer was, the more did such states tend to become associated with the idea of the 'Will of God' or hyper mundane forces, and there was a concomitant lessening of tension in "unenviable" situations, or a feeling of being above everything or "lightness" as James too, cites in his biographies. Especially marked thus was early adolescence. In no case, however, does this writer profess to have greater insight into the problems of the universe other than that which he has actually been taught, or which he has studied or imagined.

Moreover, one should grow up---physically, emotionally, and mentally. If adults be physically and mentally mature, but emotionally immature, it seems that it might be possible for them to make an adjustment, though with mediocrity. However, when their mature mental powers (intelligence) begin to create words about how deeply they were able to probe into otherwise undeniable secrets of nature and the universe, while in a mystical trance, it seems very much like a "cover-up" for an emotional abnormality which they do not understand or cannot control. They 'rationalize' if you will.

(2) The bars to admission to a "communion of being" erected

by the mystics has an air of professional jealousy. We suspect that this hostility is very much akin to that displayed in ancient times by the priest with respect to the magician, as suggested by Frazer. "He (the priest) professed to be the proper medium, the true intercessor between God and man, and no doubt his interests as well as his feelings were often injured by a rival practitioner (i.e. the magician), who preached a surer and smoother road to fortune than the rugged and slippery path of divine favour" (42, p.52). Later (pp.101-102), Frazer writes of the advantages of mystics who deceived the populace during the Middle Ages, as well as themselves.

"In the thirteenth century there arose a sect called the Bretheren and Sisters of the Free Spirit, who held that by long and assiduous contemplation any man might be united to the deity in an ineffable manner and become one with the source and parent of all things, and that he who had thus ascended to God and been absorbed in his beatific essence, actually formed part of the godhead, was the Son of God in the same sense and manner with Christ himself, and enjoyed thereby a glorious immunity from the trammels of all laws human and divine. Inwardly transported by this blissful persuasion, though outwardly presenting in their aspect and manners a shocking air of lunacy and distraction, the sectaries roamed from place to place, attired in the most fantastic apparel and begging their bread with wild shouts and clamour, spurning indignantly every kind of earnest labour and industry as an obstacle to divine contemplation and to the ascent of the soul towards the Father of Spirits." Sic per obscurantum ad astra est.

(3) That mystics are passive agents of divine will may seem to be a real distinction from that of magicians, who wish to "squeeze" that will for all it is worth to gain their own ends. But this is only a distinction put forth by mystics when they are

deliberately inventing one. For, the following passages from the compilation of mystical verse and writings in "The Soul Afire," shows itself to be a direct contradiction to what Reinhold points out in his preface to the book. The passage is referred to as "Saint Thomas Aquinas as related by Peter Calo, "and reads as follows:

"After the death of the Doctor, Brother Reginald returned to Naples and resumed his lectures, exclaimed with many tears: 'My brothers, while he was still in life, my Master forbade me disclose the admirable things concerning him whereof I have been witness. One of these things was that he had acquired his science not by human industry, but by merit of prayer, for whenever he wishes to study, discuss, read, write, or dictate, he first had recourse to prayer in private, and poured forth his soul with tears in order to discover the divine secrets, and by the merits of this prayer his doubts were removed and he issued therefrom fully instructed." (Underlining mine)

The underlined parts of the above passage clearly show that though Brother Reginald was a mystic, he nevertheless used his "communion of being" for practical mundane purposes. In other words, the self-seeking transcendentalism characteristic of the magician is also inextricably woven into the fabric of the mystic's personality. The magician may use different charms or rituals to attain his ends, but the purpose in both cases is the same: to change or modify the course of events, or to get insight into mundane problems--through recourse to supernatural powers. Thus, what is distinctive on paper of mystics as regards magicians, becomes in practice indistinguishable.

(4) The exhilarating characteristics of some mystics have attracted some attention. It has often been noticed that there is a great deal of eroticism in the mystic trance (41, 56). Especially is this apparent among those who forcefully or voluntarily accept sexual deprivation, to wit, cloistered nuns. Of the latter, David Forsyth writes with pertinent conclusiveness:

"The religious mystic in this endeavour to apprehend God, passes through a succession of psychological states, the final one of which is referred to by the devout as the stage of the 'ecstatic vision'. This is marked by intense emotional excitement, loss of self-control, and insensibility to external impressions; and it finds frequent verbal expression in references to a divine lover, betrothals, and heavenly or spiritual marriage.

"The parallels between this and sexual excitement are impossible to miss--the intense emotion, the loss of control, the insensibility to external impressions, and the amorous speech. It is eroticism that seeks communion with one another; and during the sexual orgasm the distinction between object and subject is indeed obliterated, and 'all is resolved into oneness'...We may conclude, therefore, that sexual feeling makes a substantial contribution to mysticism, which is itself another instance of misplaced and unsatisfied sexual desire. In view of this, it is instructive that mystics attach great importance to a period of sexual abstinence as a preliminary and aid to getting themselves into the mystic state" (41, pp. 137-138).

(5) Why should "grace and freedom" be regarded as mysteries?

The writer is unaware of any valid reason why an individual must be a mystic in order to appreciate balance, rhythm, symmetry, proportion, concinnity, etc. in

nature as well as in man-made art of all kinds. It is unnecessary to subscribe to an obscurantum per obscuranturium in order to appreciate grace. As for freedom, How can a mystic enjoy it, since he is not free but a passive agent carrying out divine will? These two inconsistencies are left unanswered by the mystics, and are hocus pocus to the objective, free-thinking mind.

(6) As for the God with whom the mystics want to be in communion it is to be wondered whether the mystics among the Hindus, Mohammedans or Tibetans share the view of Catholic mystics. Whether they strive after the same God or not, however, probably makes no difference, in the long run. We're all striving to keep healthy and 'happy', and, whether we choose to be in communion with the Great Brahmin, Allah, or Jahveh, to achieve these ends does not matter. The end result is the same. It is a deterrent to the actual achievement of these ends by surer paths, one of which, is science, in all its ramifications.

Since, to a certain extent magic resembles mysticism as reluctantly or unconsciously intimated even by the pro-mystics, Reinhold and Underhill, and since the main distinction on paper is vitiated in practice (see interpretation (3), above), then it is clear that the two systems of human thinking and acting are far more alike than would seem. At most, mysticism is magic elevated and solemnized by humbugging verbiage which becloud and blind the masses for the ends of a few who are 'fortunate' enough to gain admittance to a "communion of being" (130,131).

In general, mysticism as it is usually comprehended, is almost invariably associated with a strong religious emotionalism. The mystic seeks to "save himself" through an egoistic attempt at union with the ultimate. His "knowledge" does not spring from ordinary sense perception, ideation, or intellectual cerebration. Rather, it is intuitional in source yet socially incommunicable in character.

There is no doubt that the mystic experiences some emotion, but because of its abnormal character, both from the viewpoint of the nature of the emotion and its extreme atypicalness to the majority of people, especially in the advanced stages of the trance, it is consequently unverifiable in content. In other words, science cannot accept the reality of the "union of being", since the extreme emotion is so rarely found among the populace. Where and when it is found, it is so subjective and often so inconsistent and illogical in content, that it becomes unverifiable, besides being unprofitable for social benefit.¹

However, since mysticism is so closely connected with religion and religious groups, it becomes a powerful force in the favour of these groups. For, in it, the latter have a means of exhorting their following to attain greater religious heights and consequently greater priestly recognition, by urging that all may hope some day to achieve union with the divine, i.e. unattainable.

¹ Cf. however, James' "Varieties" (pp.427 ff.) where the opposite position is taken.

Moreover, there can be no doubt, as has been intimated throughout this short study of mysticism, that it is a product of man's infantile thoughts and emotions.¹ As such it is included in our collective term, systematized unreason. The great wonder is that great sections of mankind have not yet disassociated themselves from these dampers of the mind and barriers to efficient social action. This enigma needs further research, further probing into the mind and behaviour of man. An indication, however, as to why mysticism, or systematized unreason in general continues to persist, will be attempted in Chapter VI .

¹ See Chapter IV where this is more fully treated.

Religion

"Religion is the struggle for existence beyond the grave." - J. Lippert.

"Religion is an attempt to get control of the sensory world, in which we are placed, by means of the wish-world, which we have developed inside us as the result of biological and psychological necessities."

- Sigmund Freud, "New Introductory Lectures," p. 215.

"The only theory of religion which today seems to have value as a scientific working hypothesis is the theory that religion has its origin and its support in dissatisfaction with life, resulting from reflection on the failure of life to satisfy the primary desires of man."

- Knight Dunlap, "Civilized Life," p. 196.

It is almost needless to posit that there are not many words about which there are so many different meanings, interpretations, and arguments, as in the case of religion. Commoners, theologians, and scientists,--all have their views on this controversial issue. Most people, however, excepting in large measure anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists, do not examine religion from the point of view of its gradual evolution through a long history of human interaction within the frame of men's attempts to satisfy their instinctual urges which arise naturally, and those which arise in communally created situations. In other words, most people examine religion in the light of what it is to them, i.e. how a particular religion affects them, and therefore lose themselves in a mass of highly subjective and consequently coloured thinking.

On the other hand, social scientists endeavour to gain a larger understanding of modern religions by studying primitive

ones, such as still exist in various parts of the world, as in the far-flung regions of the Pacific. The method used in such attempts, is to observe the customs, rites, and other behaviour of people in primitive societies,¹ and from these to infer what the origin of the various behaviourisms may have been.² Armed with such knowledge, these men consider themselves advanced one rung in the knowledge of the evolutionary ladder of man's behaviour and processes of thought.

To know the latter forms just as an important part of their researches as it is for the chemist in his attempt to understand the structure of a chemical compound and the relation to one another of its various radicals or groups of atoms, as in stereo-chemistry. The chemist desires to know these characteristics of chemical compounds so that he may better understand their function and thus utilize their properties to advantage. Likewise, the sociologist, the social anthropologist, the social psychologist, the speculative philosopher, etc., in dealing with origins, as of religions and religious thinking, attempts to delve into the basic makeup of man's fundamental strivings and the primordial thoughts used by him to gain his ends.

¹ By the terms "primitive men" or "primitive society", scientists are agreed that it connotes "members of the most elementary social aggregates with which we are acquainted" (86,p.13).

² This is not to say that all sociologists and all social anthropologists necessarily go out on the expeditions to study primitive societies, but rather that many do, and that the others try to gather the results from the literature in order to conceptualize them into well-ordered and meaningful data.

It is in such attempts that one realizes immediately the pressing need for a communion of effort by all the various divisions of social science; for, without benefit of these interrelated fields of investigation, not only is it impossible to gain perspective but a synthesis of the various findings and a final conclusion--the last word--cannot be made. Social science is one field composed of many plots, each being in some measure helpful to the understanding of the whole. In attempting to understand man all plots must be used to advantage. Dichotomies do not exist 'naturally'; they are arbitrarily invented to help in the common study, man, and to this end they must be integrated and synthesized.

In the present study, with respect to religion, it was found that the theories concerning its origin and nature, seem, in general, to resolve themselves about (a) those of the anthropologists and sociologists, and (b) those of the psychologists: the former tending to propound theories around the control- and stability-producing factors in the group, while the latter concerning themselves mainly with the ceaseless dynamic causes and effects, which characterizes so aptly the human animal in his struggle for existence.

In general we may say that there is a great deal of agreement among anthropologists and sociologists, especially those of Continental Europe, that religion is pre-eminently a collective venture which has grown up in society to help preserve common goals and common practices within the group. Thus it is conceived of as a great stabilizer or "fixer" of society. For this point of view of which there are many proponents, Durkheim summarizes most adequately thus:

"Une religion est un système solidaire de croyances et de pratiques relatives à des choses sacrées, c'est-à-dire séparées, interdites, croyances et pratiques qui unissent en une même communauté morale, appelée Eglise, tous ceux qui y adhèrent" (39,p.65).

These "Eglises" are another way of saying "institutions" i.e. collective ventures of a group, whether it be in matters magical, mystical, or religious. This unification into a moral community of certain practices to which are attached a certain amount of sacredness and taboo, have also been referred to as "collective representations" by Levy-Bruhl, as "cultural compulsives" by Calverton, and many other designations, to denote a particular characteristic of these institutions, and that is, the ready-made systems of thought and practice into which the child is born, and by which he is conditioned to the extent of feeling it as part of his own mental makeup.

The psychologists too, recognize that these ready-made practices etc., have a great effect upon the child and adult. But they are not, in general, prepared to conclude that the

individual has not a more important part to play in the inception and growth of religion. Whereas the sociologists tend to emphasize the group in the study of man, as is revealed in Comte's famous dictum: "Humanity is not to be defined through man, but on the contrary, man through humanity", the psychologists on the other hand, tend to take the opposite approach. Among the latter, the emphasis is mainly on the individual and his 'natural' likes and dislikes, his inner strivings and the results of their solution or frustration.

The psychological study of religion received its first great impetus from the contributions of Wilhelm Wundt's study of early mythological and religious ideas in his work, "Volkerpsychologie" (1913). But, it is the Americans who were the real pioneers in the systematic investigation of religious phenomena. Following after Stanley Hall, who first wrote on this subject in 1891, in connection with the psychology of adolescence, is a brilliant succession of writers, chief among whom may be mentioned, Starbuck, William James, Leuba, Ames, Coe, Stratton, Barnes, Pratt, and Cronbach. The method chiefly used by them was to arrange and make order out of a vast array of phenomena dealing with religious experience, derived mainly from biographies, introspection, and the questionnaire technique.

Other countries, too, have their share in the development of the psychology of religion. German writers, such as Troeltsch, Mandel, Stahlin, followed Wundt, especially

studying the subject from a genetic and anthropological point of view. In France, the sociological study of religion is the fashion, being largely originated by Durkheim and his co-workers in connection with the "Annee Sociologique," as was noted above. However, a school of religious psychology may be said to have been inaugurated by the contributions and influence of Henri Bois and his pupils at Montauban. England has not been very productive in this regard, but has made notable contributions in the persons of R. H. Thouless, T. W. Pym, W.B. Selbie,¹ and J. A. Hadfield. To a great extent, English psychologists of religion have been influenced by the psychoanalytic school, and have made notable contributions in the persons of Drs. A. G. Tansley, Henry Maudsley, and David Forsyth, who have followed closely on the theories of Freud and Jung in this connection.

One of the first lessons that one can draw from even the most casual perusal of the literature on the psychology of religion, is firstly, that there is not one or even a few factors to which we can attribute the cause and development of religion and religious experience, and secondly, that there is by no means agreement between psychologists as to what these underlying factors may be. The attempt to generalize from one factor or to attribute the beginnings and growth of religion

¹ I am greatly indebted to Rev. Prof. W. B. Selbie's book "The Psychology of Religion" (136), for the brief historical sketch of religious psychology, here presented.

to one or a few factors, such as the gregarious and sex instincts, fear, awe, curiosity, etc., is probably a very natural tendency in mankind, i.e. a tendency to oversimplify, and psychologists do not necessarily escape this distinction. To a great extent, this tendency is probably due to a lingering susceptibility among not a few writers to incur an approach akin to the old faculty psychology in dealing with complex matters even though always being consciously against any attempts to revive such tendencies in others.

Disagreement being the rule, rather than the exception, we can only hope to set forth briefly some of the various views and to interpret them where possible in the light of recent psychology, and the bias of our personal attitude.

Rev. W. B. Selbie, in his book, "The Psychology of Religion," which is widely used by theological students, claims that both anthropological and psychological studies point to one important conclusion, and that is, that man is by nature religious and, this being the case is not the province of psychology to improve it, but only to make an adequate description of it, so that students of philosophy and theology can use these tools for an evaluation of religion in the service of man.¹ "The point we are concerned with is that man is so constituted that he acts in such and such a way. In other words he cannot help being

¹ A similar view is presented by the Wiemans' "Normative Psychology of Religion" (156), to whom we will refer again in connection with science and its aims.

religious, and the whole vast terrifying business which we call religion is rooted in a nature which works in this way and can do no other. As we study its various ramifications and forms of expression we may obtain further light on the how and wherefore of it all, but meanwhile, the important thing is the mentality which must express itself thus and thus. We may, if we will, take it for granted that the process, as natural, is also rational. That it not only makes for man's well-being and for the preservation of his kind, but also represents something in the nature of reality. The proof of this, however, has to be sought elsewhere than in psychology (that is to say, in theology, B.) which is only concerned with investigation the mental processes out of which it all springs" (136,p.31).

Now it may be that religion is natural to man. However, it seems strange that a student of psychology should claim that that which is 'natural is also rational'. Is it rational, for instance, for the deluded lunatic or paranoiac to think and act as he does, merely because it is natural for him to do so and can do no other? Is it rational for a small child to reach out for a dangerous snake or other dangerous objects, just because it is natural for a child not to fear such objects? Are wars rational because they are universal i.e. natural? We must firmly answer all of these negatively, and religion too, might be viewed likewise, or at least not as firmly positively as Selbie does. That which is natural may or may not be rational or necessarily conducive to man's well-being and for the preservation of his kind.

Moreover, contrary to what Selbie claims, we hold that psychology and affiliated studies are more ably equipped to answer these questions adequately, than either philosophy or theology. An attempt to prove this stand will be made under the section dealing with the aims of science, as well as being implied throughout this thesis.

Since the advent of Freudianism¹ there is probably no aspect of human activity that has not been ascribed to the workings of the sexual instinct, by someone or other. And even devotedness to religion and/ or to science has been conceived as a sublimation of the sexual energies. These conceptions, though very likely guilty of oversimplification of objective reality, can neither be proved nor disproved conclusively by the present writer. In any case, no rigorous attempt will be made.

However, where the processes of thought are inordinately ascribed to the sex force, then this thesis must differ with such a viewpoint. That is, where the relational comprehension of the physical and non-physical world, of the animate and the inanimate, etc. are unduly represented as being influenced by the sexual component in the human struggle for existence, we take issue with such a theory.

¹ Freud's "Totem and Taboo" (44) was the forerunner to a great deal of polemics based on sex as the motivating source of religion and religious practices. However, the first thoroughly psycho-analytic interpretation of religion is that recently by Géza Roheim, "Animism, Magic, and the Divine King" (126).

J. B. Hannay in his "Sex Symbolism in Religion" (56) attempts to show how religion had its inception through fear, around which grew up a host of dogmas through the use of phallic symbolism. These dogmas were then purposely propagated by priests and others, through deceit, which the minds of the magic-thinking men in ages past were unable to discern. A quotation from Julian S. Huxley in a paper on the theory of Sex, and with which Hannay agrees, shows this viewpoint clearly.- "...primitive instincts such as those of Fear and Sex wind themselves round the roots of all mental life, become sublimated by the acquisition of new objects and are parts of the indispensable subterranean driving force of legend and doctrine. Once the attention of the human mind has become entangled with the problem, unsatisfied wonder and curiosity are begotten, and in their turn beget a varied progeny of myth and taboo, legend and doctrine" (56,p.11).

Now, there can be no doubt that both the instincts of fear and sex have coloured and do still colour a great part of our intellection. But this does not lead straightaway to the notion that all our religious practices are fear-and sex-based, as Hannay purports to show. Fear and Sex do not necessarily show themselves in the prayer "please give", or the savage dance for rain, or the civilized feasts of 'thanksgiving', etc. There are many faucets from which flow the religious kind; to name any one or two as the original fountain head seems to be somewhat far-fetched.

Sir George Birdwood, in his Appreciation to J. B. Hannay's book, above, goes even still further than either Hannay or Huxley in this regard. "...I am inclined," he writes, "to go further than the Author, and, seeing that the generative organ is the most considerable thing about us, and to primitive man must, from the moment he began to think, have been a perpetual miracle, I hold that early races identified the thing with Deity-- not a symbol of Deity, but the actual Deity" (56,p.5). Why the generative organ 'must...have been a perpetual miracle' is not shown, but seems to be taken for granted. Tot homines tot sententiae.

Strangely enough, Freud did not lay too much emphasis upon the sexual prepotencies in man, as a direct causal explanation of the generation of religion. Rather, he recognized that the eternal struggle to keep alive, to stay well and content is the primary job of 'all us mortals', and that the job is not an easy one being fraught with dangers, frustrations, and disillusionments at every turn. It was then, his hypothesis that religion consists in the projection by the human mind of its hopes and aspirations on the outer world which is indifferent to them. It is in his "Totem and Taboo" (41) that he traces the gradual development of vague wish-fulfilling projections of the human personality upon the outer world, to the ultimate projection of a father complex in the 'person' of God. God, then becomes the idealized father to whom the individual comes for succour in times of need, or thanksgiving. In a later work, "Future of an

Illusion"(45), and still later, in "Civilization and Its Discontents"(46), he shows that these projections are illusory in that they do not concern themselves with outer reality. Thus he says, "... we call a belief an illusion when wish-fulfillment is a prominent factor in its motivation, while disregarding its relations to reality, just as the illusion itself does"(45,p.56). It is for these reasons that he endeavours to show that religion is an illusion.

It was not long after Freud's "Future of an Illusion" that the British psychiatrist, David Forsyth published his iconoclastic book "Psychology of Religion"(41), which follows pretty closely along the lines laid down by Freud.¹

The Dean of St. Paul's (Walter Robert Matthews), was not to be outdone, however. Arguing versus the psychoanalytic view that religion is an illusion, he posits his claim that if this were correct, our conceptions of nature would likewise be untrue, and that science, which attempts to study the latter, would itself be an illusion, and that all life would therefore be an illusion. Comprehending the obvious impracticality of such a view, he then argues that religion like science must also be in contact with reality. The difference being that the former serves an Ultimate Reality, while the former is in contact only

¹ A more extended discussion of these views by Freud and Forsyth, and others, will be found in the section on personality characteristics below.

with immediate reality. The dean's argument reads in part thus:

"There is a fundamental fallacy in every argument which seeks to prove from psychological data that the object of experience is illusory....It can be shown that the concept of nature is, in a sense, a projection of the mind, but it would never occur to anyone to argue on this ground that therefore there is no such thing as an objective world or an order of nature. Why, then, is it assumed that the same kind of argument is valid in the case of the object of religious experience? On what principle are we to differentiate the logical character of these two bases of reasoning? I venture to assert that there is no distinction, and that the employment of this type of argument against the reality of God by those who would certainly refuse to admit its cogency when applied to nature is an elementary logical mistake. At least, if the sceptical conclusion is admitted in the sphere of religion, let it be admitted in the sphere of nature."...The object which science studies would have turned out to be illusory, and with it science itself. Now, Psychology is a science, and dependent, like every other science, on the conception of an order of nature. Psychology would, then, be infected by the illusory character which pertains, on this hypothesis to all sciences, and thus the very instrument by which we thought we had proved religion to be illusory turns out itself to be illusion. I apprehend that there could scarcely be a more perfect example of a self-destructive argument"(96,pp.221-223).

If the Dean's arguments be correct then all sorts of logical inconsistencies follow therefrom. His premise is reasonable, but his conclusion is a non sequitur. For, in effect, what his argument consists of is to show the implausibility of the argument from the particular to the many, and thereby arriving at the conclusion that the argument of the particular must be invalid. Stated syllogistically his argument runs something like this:

some A exists in B;
C is A;
∴ all B is A, which is absurd:
∴ C is not A.

where,

A = illusion

B = mind

C = religion

Stated in words, the argument would run something like this:
Illusion in any sphere of life, when it exists, exists in the
mind;

Religion is an illusion;

Everything in the mind is an illusion, which is absurd:

Religion is not an illusion.

The trend throughout the argument is to prove that material reality exists, and, once proved, to show that a "Beyond Material Reality" must needs also exist. How the one necessarily follows from the other is not shown, but taken to be a sine qua non. This is a common subtle error, and is particularly stressed here, since, at a superficial reading of the argument it seems to bear weight. But on closer examination of the logic involved, as well as recourse to the actual facts obtained through psychology and psychiatry, the argument becomes veritably bare.

In a later edition of his book "Psychology of Religion" (1936), already mentioned above, the late Dr. Forsyth answered the many abuses thrown both at his views and his person, by various denominational church periodicals. Especially interesting is his reply to Dean Matthews, whose contrary arguments we have

just considered. The latter's argument, as far as Dr. Forsyth was able to envision, boils down to the single question, 'What is reality?' and his answer, briefly is this:

There are two kinds of reality, psychic and objective. The psychic is the more primitive, being present in the fantasies and imaginations of children, and grown-ups, who have not totally outgrown their mental characteristics of childhood. The objective reality is that part of our makeup which receives sense impressions through the sense organs, and by trial and error, certain cause and effect relationships are established, which in turn may be testified to by numerous independent researches. In arriving at conceptions which "hold", the scientist puts to the test that which he derives from his imagination and his fantasies, i.e. from his psychic reality. But he does not rely on the psychic reality alone, as the religionist does, for he is aware that it is all too often misleading i.e. illusory. In a characteristic passage, Dr. Forsyth states:

"Whereas the scientist thinks and tries, the religionist only thinks. His claim to a supernatural or divine quality, or authority in his particular kind of pleasure-thinking is denied by modern psychology, which has failed to detect any reason for supposing anything of the sort. The religionist instead of resting content to accept his fantasies as only psychically true, insists that they are also objectively true, and proceeds to state his speculations about the world and the universe, as though they had passed the test of objective reality. Here he is falling into the identical error that is characteristically made with no less confident assurance by neurotics and the insane. With the gradual extension of scientific knowledge, one religious explanation after another has been supplanted by a scientific explanation, until now psychology has proved the illusory nature of the entire religious interpretation of life"(41,pp.214-215).

Though this writer is not prepared to state conclusively that 'psychology has proved the illusory nature of the entire religious interpretation of life', and that religion has been all vox et praeterea nihil, it does seem however, that Forsyth's psychoanalytic argument holds the field, theoretically at least. Now, whether we start with the sociological viewpoint or the psychological viewpoint, the conclusion seems in both cases to point to the irrationality of religion: sociology pointing to the deterrent effects it has had upon social evolution, while psychology pointing to the irrational mental characteristics from which it stems in the individual. Bearing this in mind will help the reader understand more readily the brief interpretation of systematized unreason which follows in the next section. But first let us examine one more view.

We have seen that there has been a great deal of oversimplification among psychologists and others, in trying to understand and explain religion and religious experience. There have been 'natural' theories, sex, fear, spirit, and ghost theories, direct revelations of an actual god or gods, magic, animistic, and mystical theories, etc. etc., concerning the origin and nature of religion. Because of the great diversity of theories accounting for the great diversity of religious thought and practice, there has grown up a view, which is not too dissimilar from that of the psychoanalysts as presented above, but which more readily takes into account the psychological concept of "individual differences". Briefly it is thus:

This view recognizes that man can never be totally satisfied with his lot. However, because of his intellectual capacities, he endeavours to resolve this unending frustration which is his. Some resolve it in one way, and some in others, while some do not resolve it in any way and continue to be all the more frustrated. Strange as it may seem, this resolution on the part of the individual, or the group, this mental orientation tends to put the individual or group at rest with himself or itself. It is not a material object, such as food, clothing, or housing, but without it the mind is dissatisfied, shelterless. The mind must needs catch on and cling to something, else it be torn asunder by conflict. The human is like that (79).

This view does not stem from any one writer, but is a gradual outgrowth of both psychological and philosophical speculation, and both direct and indirect allusions to it are made in numerous books. However, since this hypothesis is based on man's thinking and resolving of life's dissatisfactions, the question at once suggests itself, as to why man continues to hold on to past 'resolutions' even when new and better ones present themselves for mental reorientation.

There seem to be two possible answers to this question: (1) that the new resolutions, the new thinking, is not necessarily better than the old, and (2) that there are characteristics which grow up about the 'old' type of thinking which act as insulators of the old and repellants of the new. These questions, are not pertinent only with respect to religion, but also with respect

to all systematized unreason. Our chapter on science will discuss the first question, while in Part II we will take up answer (2).

But first we must turn to a brief discussion of systematized unreason in general.

CHAPTER II

Systematized Unreason: An Interpretation.

"...the dogmatic affirmations of religion and magic are brought near to us simply as standardized natural reactions of the human organism under conditions of conflict. The essence of much religious belief is the affirmation of man's dependence on Providence, that is, on some powerful, partly benevolent partly dangerous principle pervading the universe. The other equally important source of religious attitudes is the affirmation of human immortality. Magic is, in its substance, the re-interpretation of the secondary causation in terms of good as against bad omens. It is thus the ritual production of favorable antecedents of luck and success."---Bronislaw Malinowski, "The Scientific Approach to the Study of Man," p. 232.

Now that we have made a brief review of various theories and definitions of magic, mysticism, and religion, it remains for us here to endeavour to collect some of the major trends inherent in these three systems of human achievement. We say "achievement" because notwithstanding their crying impracticality in dealing with everyday affairs, they are nevertheless systems of thought and practice which have served and continue to serve many human beings in the struggle to keep alive. They are systems of thought and practice which have gradually evolved in the long process of human social and individual evolution, and which distinguish man from his lower forbears.

But what is the common trend, the vinculum, by which we can discern in them what we have called Systematized Unreason? Bearing in mind the presentation of magic, mysticism

and religion in Chapter I, we have been able to make the following six marks of distinction or stages in their development: (1) Conflict or Dissatisfaction; (2) Partial Resolution of Dissatisfaction through Intellectual Symbolization; (3) Contented Insufficiency; (4) Social Interiorization; (5) Social Encrustation; (6) Continuity. These marks of systematized unreason have been implied, implicitly or explicitly, in various parts of the foregoing discussion, but will be further clarified here.

1. Conflict or Dissatisfaction. Man has always needed and continues to need means of controlling nature, of protecting himself from ill-fortune, in short, a means to cope with the necessity of staying alive. In this need, he has not worked alone as an individual, but has gathered together with others like himself to achieve this common goal. But this very aggregation of human beings striving together for the same ends has imposed on man the secondary problem of coping with the desires and frustrations of their respective lot. These dual necessities which have always, and do still confront man, have driven him to literally invent, or improvise, often makeshift attempts to cope with them. Some of these attempts we have discussed, and to some extent, have shown their makeshift, or inadequate character. As the discussion proceeds we will have occasion to show even more strikingly this inadequacy of systematized unreason, but for the moment it is important to see that they are all man-made attempts to find a way out from




Fig. 3 . Diagrammatic representation of common attributes of magic, mysticism, and religion. Note how the various aspects of this concept cut through one another, and are thus interrelated. Note also the element common to each of them, represented by the circle in the centre.

(See also Fig. 5 , p.108)

the everpresent dual necessities which confront him. This communality is shown diagrammatically in Fig. 2.

2. Partial Resolution of Dissatisfaction through Intellectual Symbolization. By intellectual symbolization we do not refer only to those erudite undertakings, such as mathematics, music, or logical explanations. Rather, these undertakings are merely advanced stages of what human beings have always been doing, and that is, thinking of, thinking about, imagining, memorizing, forming the great host of various cognitive capacities of man, and which are carried out symbolically. In fact, at least one writer has shown that this symbolizing activity of man, is a basic need. "...I believe," writes Prof. Susanne Langer in "Philosophy in a New Key," "I believe there is a primary need in man, which other creatures probably do not have, and which actuates all his apparently unzoological aims, his wishful fancies, his consciousness of value, his utterly impractical enthusiasms, and his awareness of a 'Beyond' filled with holiness. "This basic need which certainly is obvious only in man is the need of symbolization. This symbol-making function is one of man's primary activities, like eating, looking, or moving about. It is the fundamental process of his mind and goes on all the time" (79, pp.38-39).

This symbolization process, which is a pressing or driving force itself as distinguished from the various other 'zoological aims', has developed ideas and systems of thought about which man has tended to move. Unless he build a 'system'-- whether it be logical or not does not matter---unless he develops his thoughts in a given direction, he cannot be satisfied. It is in this process that systematization of whatever brand he has chosen or hit upon to tide him over "this vale of tears,"

forms. If it be magic, mysticism, religion, science, or whatnot, which is his particular brand, he must have a system ^{move.} towards and around which he will ~~move~~. The various systems are merely steps in the intellectual evolution of man's striving to understand and control external nature and himself, and to gain a perspective of his relation to the universe. They are means to resolve, theoretically at least his failures and the continual frustrations with which he meets.

Thus the word 'systematized' in our term "systematized unreason"...

3. Contented Insufficiency. The means used and the system adopted are not tested in the sense in which we think of testing an experiment or hypothesis in the laboratory. They are rather casual attempts to solve existing enigmas. Once rationalized and systematized, new means are not vigorously sought or attempted to cope with new situations or new conditions. This contentedness with insufficiency or inadequacy forms the 'unreason' part of "systematized unreason."

4. Social Interiorization. As time goes by, the group absorbs the various unreasoned thoughts and activities, enlarges, modifies, and makes into a more coherent body, the facts and theories, which it or some of its members, has developed. Once established and entrenched in a given culture, systematized unreason may be looked upon as acting^{as}/inhibitive or obstructive elements to a free and unhampered play of intelligence. Moreover, these inhibitory ~~penetrations~~ inroads into the ever-ready natural curiosity of the "natural man"¹ do not of necessity recede and diminish in the mind of the otherwise intelligent scientist or scholar. These dampers of the mind find their way into the makeup even of the best of us(111) and we will briefly allude to their psychological basis in the section on Personality.

5. Social Encrustation. Once totally ingrained into the thinking and acting of the individuals of the group, the inner system concomitantly develops a cortex of ideas and attitudes, which act both as a compelling force to keep alive the system, and as a repellent against any infiltration of incompatible ideas and attitudes. The reader will recall the mutual non-complementary attitudes between the magician and the priest of religion. The same attitude on the part of the priest toward a later development, science, and scientists, is almost too well-known to have to repeat. There is no need to enlarge further upon this theme,

¹ "Natural Man" in the sense that McDougall uses it(103, chpt.VI).

which can be illustrated with innumerable examples both from primitive and modern times.

6. Continuity. Evenⁱⁿ the most rigid systems of thought and practice there is everpresent the seeds of change. The change may be for something entirely untried before and may be for the better, or may be a retrogression and may be for the worse. In general, the changes, in a Darwinian sense, have been for the newer and better.

But even with change for the new there is not a total throwing off of all that went before. Even as man, in many respects, mirrors his animal ancestry, so too, do his newest social systems harbour vestiges of those of the past. Frazer goes so far as to claim that even though the Catholic Church has a strong hold over its adherents, ~~that~~ the latter still hold on to more magic than to the religion which they openly profess (42,pp.56-59).

Magic, mysticism, and religion are so intertwined, it is almost impossible to distinguish one from the other discretely. The likelihood is that where one is found, there too, will be found the other two. For, the mind is not blocked off into compartments. What exists in one sphere tends to become the common property of all the others to a greater or lesser extent (111). So that in evolving from magic, through religion

through mysticism, to science,¹ as Frazer (42) tells us, there are always large appendages left over from the system that went before. In short, the past shows a great deal of continuity with the present.

aspects

Now that some of the ~~majortrends~~ in systematized unreason have been reviewed, there is an important question which can be raised with regard to mark (1) above. It was noted that various means are adopted by man in order to cope with environmental necessity. The means we had in mind, of course, were magic, mysticism and religion. The question now arises, How, briefly, can the three means be distinguished one from the other? We have seen some of the common trends, What now, are the distinguishing marks between them?

Magic, mysticism, and religion, all have an air of mystery surrounding them. They each claim, explicitly or implicitly, to be able to do things which are impossible by any other secular means. And also, magicians may be religious and mystics at the same time. Similarly there is no reason, theoretical or practical, why a man who professes religiousness may not be a mystic and concomitantly or separately practice magic. It seems that where one system is found present in an individual,

¹ Science itself is not entirely free from mystical elements. Dr. F.G. Crookshank, in a supplement to Ogden and Richard's "Meaning of meaning" (115, pp. 337-355), has shown how there are still mystical elements in modern medicine and medical thought, while Charles Carlé, "Mysticism in Modern Psychology," (158) performs a debunking fete in pointing out some of the unscientific and mystical flaws inherent in Psychoanalysis and Psychodiagnostics.

the probability is that the other two will also be found to a greater or lesser degree respectively, whether the individual professes such a plurality of beliefs and practices or not (42).

Now besides these characteristics common in their means the following is a summarized presentation of what we believe to be the main distinguishing marks:

1. Magic endeavours to stay or move the functions of the animate or inanimate, in order to gain some mundane end.
2. (a) Primitive mysticism feels itself to be at one with a fundamental all-pervading spiritual world, and hopes to be able to please it for the best interests of the group and its individual members.
2. (b) Civilized or religious mysticism endeavours to be stayed or be moved by the supernatural animate (God) in order to gain some mundane end.
3. Religion endeavours to stay or move the functions of the supernatural animate (God or gods) in order to gain some mundane and/or post-mundane end.

Thus the means may be distinguished with reference to the ends they seek, which are, in effect, variations upon the same theme. The end sought in each case or in the combination of the three is, in the final analysis a means of adjusting to the physical and social environment. The three systems may be found operating in the same individual at the same or different times as a "magico-religio-mystical" combination, as was noted above.

From the point of view of mental hygiene, the means employed may be healthy or unhealthy, but from the point of view of scientific progress, they are definitely detrimental (13,14, 35,50,97,etc.). This will be more fully brought out in the following chapter in the section dealing with science and systematized unreason.

CHAPTER III

THE SCIENTIFIC SYSTEM

"La critique est la vie de la science."
- Cousin.

"Keep your mouth shut and your pen dry till you know the facts. Use your intelligence and integrity with all diligence to get the facts. Then, but only then, can we speak with some measure of enduring wisdom as we walk humbly among our fellowmen." - The Scientist's Credo. (A.J. Carlson, Science, February 25, 1944).

In this chapter we will consider what we believe to be the three main distinctions of the scientific system:

(a) scientific attitude; (b) scientific method; and (c) social aims of science. These will be followed by a section contrasting science and systematized unreason.

The reasons for including these sections in this thesis are three-fold:

(a) The necessity for emphasizing that science is yet another system developed by man to cope with the same problems that have always confronted the magician, the mystic, and the man of religion. This will be implied throughout the four sections which follow.

(b) To show by way of the three distinctions named above, how this one of man's endeavours deals with the age-long problems of mankind.

(c) To illumine and emphasize the inherent incompatibilities between systematized unreason and science. This will be treated in section 4.

This chapter is not intended to be an exhaustive account of science in all or even in some of its theoretical ramifications. Rather, it is hoped it will serve as an integral part of the direction of this thesis, and that it will give the reader further understanding of the direction of our approach. Further, it is hoped that it will help him to appreciate and interpret the conclusions more fully.

1.

Scientific Attitude

Science is always ready and courageously resigned to 'change'. By the manner that scientists adjust and orientate toward change, one recognizes what can be called the "scientific attitude."

Attitudes are the way we usually think of certain problems in our environment, and which predispose us to certain ways of acting towards these problems. Given attitudes are not inherent in our make-up, but are built into us by systems of explicit or implicit social sanctions (2, 140). More exactly, we may say with Prof. G. W. Allport that "An attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related" (2, p. 180).

The attitude of the true scientist can be likened

to that of a famous student of physics, who, when confronted with a problem which seems to be beyond his powers of solution, does not "pass the buck" to some supermundane force or power, but readily admits his ignorance: "Ignoramus ignorabimus." Science has no need to explain the workings of the universe by reference to unnatural entities. When LaPlace, the great French scientist, had finished his famous work on Astronomy, "Mecanique celeste," he is said to have presented a copy of the book to the king. Upon examination, the king found no mention of God, and, calling this omission to the attention of the scientist, the latter replied: "Sire, I had no need for that hypothesis."

What is true of Astronomy is true of all the sciences. What was universally thought to be attributable to preternatural agencies is more and more being shown to be explainable by natural causes, as the boundaries of ignorance recede and new frontiers of knowledge are set up. This is not to say that the attitude of the scientist is like that of the proverbial 'know-all.' Rather, it is the reliance upon his search for newer, better methods, upon which he hopes to accomplish ever more. In the words of Dr. A. J. Carlson: "Much happens in nature and in man for which science has yet no complete analysis of the causal chain. We recognize the unknown but not the unknowable" (21, p.221).

The true scientist is one who is a "lover of the whole of wisdom" and a lover of "the vision of truth."¹

¹ The phrases in quotations in this sentence are taken from Plato's ideas of the ideal philosopher in the "Republic," but well to the ideal scientist as well.

His goal is accuracy of observation, accuracy of description, and honesty of inference, and should be uncoloured as much as possible by his likes and dislikes." As Alexander Bain cautions: "He must not have any strong emotional likings, of the nature of preference; having to give an account of everything that exists, because it exists, his main delight should be to attain impartiality and exhaustive completeness....."¹
(6, p. 110).

Religious Faith and Scientific Faith

"Knowledge consists in understanding the evidence that establishes the fact, not in the belief that it is the fact." - Chas. T. Sprading.

It is sometimes contended that in the last resort, science, like religion, rests in faith, the idea being that scientists have a great deal of confidence that the laws postulated and universally acknowledged by them, will always bear themselves out under the conditions regulating the specific law. This confidence often borders on complete certainty or faith that a given set of phenomena will always occur under a given set of conditions.

However, this faith is of a different kind than is manifested by religionists. The faith of the scientist is a faith based on laws which can be tested and verified or rejected, at any time and at any place, under the conditions of

¹ We shall claim, however, in section 3, under "Aims," that although the scientist should strive to be accurate, honest, and impartial in the report of what he observes, he should, however, be partial to one thing, and that is, to strive to achieve by his findings and otherwise, the 'greatest good for the greatest number'.

the specific law. The faith of the religionist on the other hand, is a faith in something that does not happen always or everywhere, but in the hope that it will happen. The former is based on objective evidence, the latter on subjective desire.

The faith of the scientist is always open to further question and further proof. Not so, however, in religion, as in most other forms of systematized unreason. Since religion is based on supernaturalism, the faith here must be held without question, since there can be no evidence for its validity. "The most serious aspect of the supernatural," writes A. J. Carlson, "is not the revelations per se, the miracles, the myths and the guesses, but the injunction that all this must be taken on faith, that inquiry and doubt is taboo--that is, sin" (21, p. 220). Moreover, in religion, faith in a given direction is unchanging even if the particular orientation is shown to be inadequate or even harmful time after time (50). On the other hand, in science, faith in a given direction is changed readily, or at least, more readily than in religion, when this faith is shown to be inadequate or opposite to newly discovered facts. Newtonian physics, for example, was held unquestioningly for centuries. But since the advent of Bohr's and Planck's development of the quantum mechanics and the wave theory of matter, and Einstein's work on a unified field theory concerning the laws of gravitation and electro-magnetism, some of the older theories gave way to

the more effective new ones. This is the scientific faith. A faith bounded and determined by the scientific attitude.

The most obvious thing about the scientific attitude is the readiness to change. This should not be interpreted to mean vacillation of motive or instability of personality. Rather, it is the recognition, as the old Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, long ago saw, that the 'only constant thing is change', and that an acquiescence of this fact is the only sensible attitude. Of course, today we subscribe to a more modified form of the idea of change, and we call it "evolution." But the basic conception is "changing order, orderly change, and this is everywhere--in nature, organic and inorganic, in individual and in social life..." (148, p. ix).

A resignation toward change, and a desire to recognize and adjust to it whenever and wherever it may manifest itself, is, in essence, the scientific attitude. For, no progress of a relentless and socially useful nature can take place without the recognition that this attitude is the corner stone, the passport to a 'braver, newer world'.

2.

Scientific Method

"Until consciousness of the necessity of controls in all endeavours to ascertain new truths or in evaluating current theories, dogmas or practices, until the consciousness has become a compelling factor in society, man remains essentially unscientific no matter how much detailed scientific facts he may remember and how much scientific pattern he may have absorbed." - A. J. Carlson.

There have been many definitions of science, but most, if not all, have included the idea of the "necessity of controls." It is probably for this reason that many people think of science only from the point of view of its specialized techniques.

Stressing this aspect, Hampden C. Shaw, after reviewing a number of definitions of science, posits his own widely-inclusive definition thus: "...Science is that method of attack in the investigation of phenomena which firstly, bases its conclusions on the accurate observation of facts and their recording, under abstracted and controlled conditions, or conditions as near this as can be managed, with allowance made for uncontrolled factors, the whole experiment being capable of repetition under similar circumstances; secondly, classifies and simplifies the data, endeavouring to arrive at some general law or formulas which may be used as a basis of prediction. All this being done with an extreme cautiousness of statement, nothing being based on insufficient evidence" (141, p. 21).

Going still further, Dr. M. M. Offner in his introduction to a recent text, "Fundamentals of Chemistry," enumerates the various steps involved in the scientific method. "When the scientific attitude," writes Dr. Offner, "is put into practice in the observation and study of a particular problem, the procedure is in accordance with scientific method, which is the surest and most efficient system for accomplishing desired results. Scientific method consists of the following steps:

1. Recognition of a problem to be solved or a need to be met.
2. Formulation of working hypotheses (the tentative suppositions) so that pertinent data bearing on the problem may be intelligently sought.
3. Unprejudiced examination of the data found.
4. Testing of the hypotheses by experiment.
5. Formulation or statement of the solution reached (that is, the answer to the problem).
6. Application of the solution to the original problem and to similar questions, situations or needs" (114, p. 7).

The scientifically inclined mind is an inquisitive one. Its possessor cannot be content to speculate widely from the ease of the armchair, on merely a few facts. The true scientist is constantly gathering more facts to corroborate or check his hypotheses. This is the difference between a speculative conclusion and a scientific one (70). It is the difference between theories built up in systematized unreason

and those in science. It is the difference between acting on faith and acting on evidence.

C. E. Ayres, in "Science the False Messiah" (5), though recognizing the great benefits that the scientific method can bring, feels constrained, however, to allow science to be the main guiding wheel for civilization. He realizes that it is wiser to act on evidence than on speculation based on a minimum of evidence. Nevertheless, among the central themes of his thesis, is the view that, given the main control of society's steering column, scientists might become even more dogmatic, more intolerant to opposing tendencies than the worst Inquisition ever was.

What he, and others like him, forget, is that the attitudes of scientists built up through the centuries preclude such tendencies on the part of the majority of them. Secondly, their past actions vindicate the latter, for the future, at least as much as any other professionally trained group of people. If scientists should ever become the intolerant "priests of science" as Ayres puts it, it is more than likely that some unforeseen virus of systematized unreason shall have crept in and polluted the purity of their three-fold system.¹ Against such a virus, scientists must constantly be on watch, both with respect to their own persons, and that of their fellow-scientists.

¹
That is, the scientific attitude, scientific method, and the aims of science.

3.

Social Aims of Science

"The noblest motive is the common good."
- Vergil.

"The ought = the socially successful."
- Emile Durkheim.

"Science inculcates veracity of thought and action, without which there can be no alleviation to the suffering of mankind."
- Thomas Huxley.

"The cultivation of science in its highest expression is perhaps more necessary to the moral condition than to the material prosperity of a nation." - Louis Pasteur.

"Without the impersonal guidance and the efficient control provided by science, civilization will either stagnate or collapse, and human nature cannot make progress toward realizing its possible evolutionary destiny."
- Julian Huxley.

The endeavour to carry out the scientific method and the resolve to hold to the scientific attitude may be looked upon as being a very important part of the aims of scientists. For, in making use of them, much valuable information has thereby been gained, and scientists still wish to use them for further information, in various fields of endeavour. These are the classic aims or ideals of scientists. They form the sine qua non of scientific progress during the past three centuries, and are still absolutely essential today.

But today, more and more scientists are realizing

that such aims as above are not enough. For they see that unless the products of this scientific progress be marshalled properly, universal chaos will result. They realize that the offspring of their intelligence can, if not handled properly, turn against them and society as well. For instance, socio-psychological principles, such as those concerned with propaganda techniques, may be used indiscriminately by certain individuals and groups for selfish, i.e. for anti-social ends. Chemical explosives and energy of all kinds, potentially beneficial to mankind, are coming into the hands of persons resolved to use them for selfish purposes, as opposed to the higher purposes of man as a whole. Even medicine, bacteriology, and biochemistry are sometimes used against man by certain people well versed in the classical aims of science,¹ such as noted above. Certain scientists, such as J. B. Bernal (9), J.B.S. Haldane (53), Julian Huxley (64, 65, 66), Harold D. Lasswell (80), Karl Pearson (111), and others, see this situation expanding dangerously, and they therefore feel that they must awaken from their classical lethargy.

What is this new orientation? What is it striving to attain?

Actually it is an old orientation in a new key.

¹ The bestiality displayed by some German scientists before and during the recent war of the nations, are too well impressed on all, to need further elaboration here.

It is the age-old fight for a life abundant streamlined in the garb of unbridled intelligence. The new orientation is a struggle by certain scientists to show the more reluctant scientists and others, that the struggle for existence can be turned into the pleasure of living. The new orientation is the recognition that modern living cannot be based on the methods of the past; that the scientific method and attitude must be applied to social problems, if their solution is ever to be adequately reached. In short, it is a search for efficient social action, by which is meant the search for means to get the most done in the least time, in which there is a minimum of effort exerted, and which satisfies the majority of biological needs and psychological desires of the majority of people everywhere. *Propaganda*

But immediately as scientists or any other body, examine social problems, they of necessity come into contact with social values. Now social values are those attitudes and practices thought to have survival value that is they are thought to be conducive to the continued existence of the group and its customs. Since these socially minded scientists seek after greater rationality in society i.e. after greater social efficiency, they must, of necessity, accept certain values of the group, such as, for instance, the value of human survival and some of the morals which have grown up alongside and ancillary to this highest of values. Once accepted, these values become the focal point

of their social aims.

Around this foundation of major social values may be built up a system of ethics compatible with modern living and relentless change. There are no absolutes in this system, except man himself. For, if man is to survive and live as rationally as possible, all our thoughts, all our energies must always be directed in serving this end. "The circumstances of social life," says J. Huxley, (are) "of first importance, and no 'higher' values than these can be admitted. The simple aim is to promote and extend the investigation of the conditions which affect human life and welfare" (65, p.361). Huxley recognizes, and rightly so, that the scientific system is incomplete without an incorporation of social aims towards which the various scientific techniques may be employed. For, there can be no higher goal than the attainment of the greatest abundance of life and welfare of mankind.

The objection is sometimes raised that such a system of ethics stresses the material needs of man too inordinately, and that his spiritual needs (whatever they may be) are too neglected. We can only say that man has as yet never adequately satisfied his material needs, such as sufficient food, shelter, and bodily fitness. The satisfaction of these basic necessities will probably raise the level of man's feelings of security. When these things are accomplished, which, as was pointed out in the Introduction,

there is no valid reason that they cannot be, then at that time, the objections to a lack of spiritual emphasis in a scientifically based system of ethics can be considered, if they still exist. But as in most ventures, first things come first, and, as most people will concede, we still have not achieved an adequate solution to our basic material needs to be talking and wasting our energies about doubtful spiritual ones (65).

Now, the acceptance of values into the scientific system at once raises the question as to whether such practice could be considered scientific. Would this not be going against the outlook of traditional science?

The answer is both yes and no. Yes, because it is a divergence from that of the ways and thinking of many scientists. No, because it is merely a re-interpretation of the function of science and scientists in society. When we contemplate the passage of time from an historical point of view, we are struck by the continual reinterpretation of outlook and means used to cope with harsh reality. For instance, animism, magic, religion, and mysticism, are but different philosophies or outlooks upon life which lead to somewhat different means in coping with life's problems. Science, likewise, is but the latest addition to these various philosophies and methods. In this sense, then, science was born like all other systems i.e., was born through necessity and trial and error groping for an ever-

increasing abundance of life.¹ As Bernal puts it: "If the contemplation of the universe for its own sake were the function of science, then science as we know today would never have existed, for the most elementary reading of the history of science shows that both the drive which led to scientific discoveries and the means by which those discoveries were made were material needs and material instruments" (9, pp. 5-6, underlining mine). Thus, in recognizing that science is concerned with material needs, we are merely reinterpreting what has always existed.

Once the need for an incorporation of social aims into the scientific system is recognized, then the next step is to formulate a system of values. As was pointed out above, the focal point of these values is the search for means to promote an ever expanding abundance of life for man. The values which must of necessity grow up alongside of and ancillary to this highest of values can, in general, probably be built up through a reliance upon the scientific attitude and method, at least more so, than through any other means.

True scientists subdue to a minimum their likes and

¹ True, pure science does not necessarily claim to be searching for the immediate means of satisfying basic individual or social needs. But then again, most scientists are not pure scientists. Moreover, as Calverton (19) and Bernal (9) have so eloquently shown, there can be no scientist, however "pure" he professes to be, who is not at the same time contaminated and tarnished by the thinking and acting of his social milieu.

dislikes, in studying any given problem. It is likely that German scientists imbued with Nazi doctrines could study likewise during the Hitler regime, except that they probably stopped to subdue their emotions in an experiment which interfered with Nazi doctrines and ideologies. The Nazi "Kultur" became for them a cultural compulsive which they could not readily overcome. Likewise, the social aims of scientists, in general, could be such as to subdue their prejudices to the utmost, except at that point where a given experiment involved a reversal of their basic value, i.e. a love for the whole of mankind, and a zeal to promote its welfare. That would be the great difference between scientists imbued with nationalistic doctrines, and those imbued with the zeal to achieve the highest social efficiency for mankind as a whole. Besides, as Huxley states and rightly so, scientists cannot completely disassociate themselves from considerations of value:

"....the emancipation of natural science from considerations of value is a fiction, approximated by the possibility of temporarily and artificially isolating scientific activity from the other activities of man."

...."The essential differences between natural and social science boils down to this--that the phenomena with which social science deals are less readily isolated, and that as an activity it is more closely entangled with human values" (66, p. 278).

With the bias of scientists constantly geared to the welfare of man as the prime social aim and value, combined with the scientific attitude and method, scientists

and like-minded people could together develop a scientifically based system of ethics, which would constitute the social aims of science.

Wieman and Wieman, throughout their book, "Normative, Psychology of Religion," appear to favour the further development of science, but are opposed to the application of scientific accuracy in the formulation of norms, i.e. standards of values. "Scientific accuracy," they say, "can never take the place of critical evaluation; and evaluation is impossible without norms, either explicitly stated or implied in the appraisals" (156, p. vii).

It would seem that the Wieman's divorce "scientific accuracy" from "critical evaluation," and imply that since this is the case, science can never boast of a system of norms. The obvious criticism of such a view, is that critical evaluation is implied in scientific accuracy. As Cousin wrote a long time ago, "la critique est la vie de la science." Experimentation is the life-blood of science, and in every experiment, as every scientist can attest, there is a good deal of critical evaluation: 'Should he use this method or that? Is the inclusion of a particular technique better than another?' etc. Shown the inadequacy of the view as presented by the Wiemans, it follows at once, that since scientific accuracy implies critical evaluation, therefore there can be built a system of norms surpassing any heretofore.¹

¹ In all cases where we talk of the building of a system of norms etc., we have in mind of course a cooperative venture in which scientists from all over the world would enter. Like all science, the social aims too, must be based on mutual cooperation, ~~i.e. a mutual~~ meeting of minds.

Well do we appreciate the difficulties which could be encountered in the building of such a system, but we are confident that it can be done. As Haldane, in his essay, "Science and Ethics," well appreciates, "Today we are very far from any such blessed condition. Yet we can begin... to apply scientific method both to individual moral problems and to the problem of morality itself....it represents the unification of human effort, the marriage of the mind and the heart, the moralization of science and the rationalization of ethics" (53, p. 119, underlining mine).

The crucial problem is to recognize that unless we build our values around man and aim for them through science, we remain probably the greatest social paradox of all time. For, having the best method yet invented in the long struggle for social efficiency, we fail to apply it fully to our greatest problem--the problem of living rationally and efficiently in society.¹ Only an incorporation of a system of values in science (which remains to be thrashed out as yet), can reverse this unfortunate paradox into a deliberate attempt to create a more expansive social rationality and efficiency.

This is not to say that all those values which already exist in society are useless. On the contrary, there are probably enough existing ones to make it unnecessary for

¹ "Rationality" and "social efficiency" are defined explicitly in a number of places above, as well as their meaning being implied throughout the thesis.

a scientifically based system of values to create new ones. What we need, however, is to salvage all those which are socially practical and consequently good, and incorporate them into the social aims of science, bearing in mind always that none is absolute but the continued social efficiency of man.

Once this is accomplished, they can be taught to the children, not in the form of dogmatic truths, but as the best means yet devised by man in order to live sociably and rationally side by side with his fellow-man. As the teaching, being scientific, would not be dogmatic, it would therefore not be fixed and consequently open to change with change.

Taught the aims of science from infancy, no human being, let alone scientists, could display the barbarism which some German scientists reputedly displayed during the Nazi regime. That is why, in part, it is imperative that scientists not only learn the scientific method and attitude in their separate fields, but also incorporate the scientific aims, i.e. a certain system of morals and values into their outlook.

Except as scientists realize this and act accordingly, there can be no hope of permanent peace or abundant life, but endless slaughter leading to ever bigger and better slaughters of mankind every 15 - 20 years.¹

¹ The latest expression of a similar view, is that by Brig.-Gen. George B. Chisholm, Deputy-Minister of Health in P.M., Nov. 18, 1945.

Selected References

The classical work concerning the attitudes and methods of science is Karl Pearson's "The Grammar of Science" in which he expounds the thesis that as men learn dispassionateness in one field of study, and as they apply this to the study of society for the greater benefit of man, then they will be making the greatest contribution to humanity. A. E. Wiggam's "The New Decalogue of Science" stresses the need for more power in the hands of an international body of scientists, rather than allow power to remain in the hands of pompous mugwumps. This book was written soon after the inauguration of the late League of Nations, so that its tone can be judged accordingly. A less drastic approach is that of Howard Selsam's "Socialism and Ethics," in which is expounded the view that the methods of social science are more amenable to working out a system of ethics than any other branch of human endeavour, such as philosophy and religion. See especially his chapter, "Science and Ethics." Probably the most consistent proponent of a view which is similar to ours is that by Julian Huxley, to whom references have been made several times in the text. J. D. Bernal's "The Social Function of Science" is another case in point.

Interesting symposia from which the aims of science may be inferred, and in which there are also certain theses opposed to social aims in science, may be found in R. N. Anshen (ed.), "Science and Man," also, E. H. Cotton (ed.), "Has Science Discovered God?"

4.

Science and Systematized Unreason

"The history of Science is not a mere record of isolated discoveries; it is a narrative of the conflict of two contending powers, the expansive force of the human intellect on one side, and the compression arising from traditional faith and human interests on the other....faith is in its nature unchangeable, stationary; science is in its nature progressive; and eventually a divergence between them, impossible to conceal, must take place." - J. W. Draper, "History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science."

We have now briefly reviewed some of the major characteristics of both systematized unreason and the scientific system, respectively. Following is a summary list showing the inherent differences between the two systems.

<u>Systematized Unreason</u>	<u>Scientific System</u>
1. S.-U. ¹ is the easy or pristine way of dealing with life's problems.	Science is indurated by long study and hard work.
2. S.-U. is fixed and unchanging.	Science is ever moving, ever groping for newer, better heights to conquer.
3. S.-U. rests on the sanctity and omniscience of the dead. "It is essentially a Cult of the Dead and the Past" (41).	Science rests on data obtained by the dead or living, but always verifiable by the living. "It is a Cult of the Living and the Future" (41).
4. S.-U. acts ² on faith in unknown entities.	Science acts ² on proved theories and laws.
5. S.-U. is wish-fulfilling and therefore largely delusory (45).	Science faces reality objectively--whether that reality be pleasant or unpleasant.

¹ Abgd. from Systematized Unreason.

² By "acts" we mean the readiness to accept or reject anything as being true or false. In both S.-U. and science, as we pointed out in section one of this chapter, there is a great deal of action performed based on pre-existing attitudes. But whereas the pre-existing attitude in S.-U. is fixed, in science it can "change with change."

- | | |
|---|---|
| 6. S.-U. believes and acts on "revealed knowledge." | Science acts only on knowledge derived from the critical and objective powers of man. |
|---|---|

These lists overlap to a certain extent. Thus numbers 4, and 6, resp., imply one another, but are not necessarily identical. For instance, one can act on faith in unknown entities without necessarily acting on knowledge supposedly revealed in a dream or vision. Likewise, science might be of such a kind as to act, only on the proved theories of the past, and remain static evermore.

Religion via Science. Notwithstanding the differences which exist between systematized unreason and science, there are some who are wont to justify their special brand of systematized unreason by linking it with science, or by making it seem as if their particular brand transcends science. This tendency is sometimes evident in both the literature of religion and science, with certain eminent men of science often taking a leading role in this direction.

The reasons for this defensive or apologetic attitude among religionists, or among those who are not religious in the traditional sense, but who are nonetheless in favour of a certain kind of religion as distinct from science, are not hard to find. As science progressed, religion receded to the background as far as influencing men's lives was concerned. It is probably not too much to say that the advance of science was inversely proportional to the amount of influence that religion

had over men's lives at a particular period. That this is still true today, though not to the same extent as it was formerly, may be inferred from the fact that generally, those countries where religion has lost its potency to a great extent, are, however, more advanced scientifically. Since the tactics of intimidating scientists have largely failed, there is gradually emerging an attitude among many religionists to "get on the good side" of science. At the same time, there are many scientists, especially those in the physical sciences,¹ who, though not usually in favour of a return to orthodox forms of religion, feel that there are valid reasons for a continuation of it in a modified form.

The great physicist, the late Sir Oliver Lodge (90), felt that scientists and others can profit from the 'seers, prophets and poets' of the past and present, in that the latter are receptive to the "whisperings which seem to come to them--...reverberations and intensifications of sounds too faint for the unaided ear...." He agreed that science is not the only way of arriving at truth, so that, to shut out the truths obtainable by these non-scientists would be very unscientific on the part of scientists.

Knight Dunlap (37,p.205) claims that since religion is concerned with the other world, science cannot subject these postulations to tests. While A. N. Whitehead (155) thinks that religion is an ever-present reality always beyond reach and

1

See Chapter VI.

ever-waiting to be realized by mortal man. The following quotation from Whitehead's "Science and the Modern World" is a beautiful combination of literary paradoxes which strive at something unknown and gain nothing. "Religion is the vision of something," writes Whitehead, "which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realized; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something which is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest."

Such literary style from the pen of so eminent a philosopher has no doubt a great appeal to most people, and rightly so. However, when one stops to consider the great damage¹ that this "vision" has caused to countless generations in the past, and its continued persistence in the present, one wonders whether it is an ideal worth striving for with the methods of the past. Dunlap (37) says that science cannot legally investigate 'religions' or 'visions', and what they are concerned with. We say: 'What does it matter whether science can or cannot investigate these vague visions of something beyond? Let us get on with the job of making this a better world, not because we have 'visions of a beyond' but because we see that the only way we can get along best is to strive for ways and means to do so. Science is the

¹ We have already referred to several historical and other sources where this "damage" is clearly expostulated.

best system invented yet to cope with those problems, Why not use it to the utmost?'

The controversies among the two opposing factions of scientists, materialists and vitalists, respectively, are of long standing, and are as yet not resolved. The former holding that all phenomena are natural i.e. part of this universe, and can therefore be explained by the laws, already perceived or unrealized as yet, while the latter holding that certain phenomena, especially those concerned with living creatures, cannot be explained and are unexplainable by such means.

With respect to religion, the materialists tend to disregard it as an inept attempt by man to adjust to life's difficulties through a projection of certain desires, consciously or unconsciously generated, upon the external world. The vitalists oppose this by referring to certain facts of biology and psychology. They claim that from the point of view of evolution, in the Darwinian sense, there is a noticeable tendency towards a progressive and therefore purposive evolvment in the genealogical trees of life, plant and animal alike. Not only do they think this vital force to be part of, or directing the overall picture of evolution, but also manifesting itself in the every action of each living form. One of the staunchest and most consistent proponents of this view was William McDougall.¹ And, though he and many others like him have explicitly stated in various writings, their

1

Though this view runs through most of his writings, it is particularly stressed in his "Religion and the Sciences of

non-affiliation with any of the organized religions, they claim to be awe-struck by the wonders of the cosmos and the oneness of life; this reverential or mystical air, is their religion.

There is a great difference between this type of religion and all others. This "vitalistic" religion is a theory to which no prayers are offered, and no concessions asked, while all others purport to be ultimate veracity surrounded by holiness, in which prayers are offered and concessions asked.

There is, however, at least one group of organized religionists who claim to derive their knowledge through a new form of science. They claim, moreover, that their religion-science has produced greater causal efficacy in certain respects than ordinary science has. This is "Christian Science" or "New Thought." One of its most prominent leaders and teachers, Dr. H. W. Dresser, describes the essential difference between his science and the empirical inductive-deductive sciences with which our universities and schools, for the most part, are associated, thus: "What is the Christ or universal wisdom taught by the Master in the Gospels, and how does it differ from other sciences? It is a higher science pertaining to the inner life of man as part of the whole mission of Jesus in making known the Kingdom of God on earth. It does not start with the discovery and observation of external facts, then work up to knowledge of natural laws through inference and criticism, as we proceed when fostering such a science as physics or biology; it begins with a certain

appeal to the heart of man in behalf of an invisible realm of being in which he has his real existence. The test of its power or truth is not in its mere law or rational consistency, in the ability of man to think it out to the end and defend it against all objections; but in its applications to human needs, through the works accomplished by it" (36, p. 41).

If by "accomplished" Dr. Dresser means attraction of a large number of followers who claim that this "higher science of the inner life of man" is truth and has worked miracles, then there can be no doubt, that this is correct. (See Fig. 4) However, in every form of systematized unreason, there are always those who claim that it is "truth" itself, and has high causal efficacy. The magicians in Central Australia believe in the supremacy of their art; so too, do the Mohammedans believe theirs to be the true faith; these can be multiplied to include almost all the religions past and present. So we see, on this count, Dr. Dresser's claim to supremacy because his special system includes the word "Science," does not differentiate him very much, if at all, from other systems of unreason. If, on the other hand, by "accomplished" is meant that Christian Science has discovered some new techniques for studying either natural or social phenomena, then this writer has yet to see any reference to it in the literature. On both counts, Christian Science or New Thought, is neither science nor new thought, but is an attempt to draw gullible customers into their ranks. Its

"appeal to the heart" is but another way of saying that it is "wishfulfilling" as we have seen to be so prominent a feature of religion in general, above.

This attempt to try to adjust and "to get on the good side" of science, is not found only in Christian Science. Other religious denominations have also attempted to do the same thing, though in a more apologetic manner.¹

Most of the attempts to arrive at religion by way of science, as we have seen, fail because they either evade the inherent incompatibilities between them, or postulate theories of religion which are not akin to what is commonly known as religion but are merely speculative or scientific theories. There are, however, as has been intimated several times above, two sources which link both science and

systematized unreason. One of these links is Man, and the other is his inevitable Struggle for Existence. Man, in his struggle for existence over the long torturous past, has tried many ways, to some of which, by force of his psychological makeup and other considerations, such as economic, geographical, and sociological factors, he has blindly adhered in the face of more efficient ways.² For the most part he has tried and stuck to various forms of systematized unreason;

¹ For instance, the writings of the Catholic apologist, Hilaire Belloc, are too well known to need reference. For a book written by a Protestant clergyman, in this vein, see especially Lloyd C. Douglass, "Those Disturbing Miracles."

² See above for our meaning of "efficiency."

only lately in this age-long history have some men begun to employ a new system, science. But, whatever be the system, the sources are always the same: man and his struggle.

(See Fig. 5)




Fig. 5. - Man and his Struggle for Existence

SUMMARY OF PART I

In Chapter I, were described certain aspects of magic, mysticism, and religion, while an interpretation of them was made in Chapter II. The implication throughout being that they are products of man's psychological makeup interacting with the societal and physical environment. The implication was further intended to show how inadequate these various products are to cope with man's inevitable problems of living. This inadequacy was then outlined against the comparatively more efficient and rational system of science, in Chapter III. In the latter chapter, an attempt was also made to indicate the necessity for the scientific system to incorporate certain broad social aims.

PART II

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SYSTEMATIZED UNREASON

CHAPTER IV

EXPLORATION OF SOME AVENUES OF THOUGHT IN SYSTEMATIZED UNREASON, AND AN INTERPRETATION OF THEM IN REIATION TO INTELLECTUAL EVOLUTION

"I have a perhaps unreasonable
amount of belief, not in a millenium,
but in the world on the whole blunder-
ing rather forwards than backwards."

- Leslie Stephens.

In Part I we endeavoured to trace an underlying and essential substratum in such social and psychological phenomena as magic, mysticism, and religion, etc., which were collectively designated as "systematized unreason." Their inclusion was designed to serve as a general background to the rest of this work. A chapter on Science was also included to contrast the basic differences between its attitudes and those of systematized unreason, the purpose being to further illuminate the general aspects of the latter, as we see them, and also to give further orientation to the work.

In this section we will consider further some of the details which were of necessity excluded in the general theoretical discussion above. Though our questionnaire dealt only with French-Canadian people of the Roman Catholic faith in and around Montreal, a deliberate attempt was made here to generalize whenever possible in order to be able to illumine the widest range of forms of systematized unreason. Moreover, reference was made to the works of other writers,

so as to corroborate our generalizations as much as possible. Nevertheless, this generalizing technique over such a wide range of phenomena sets a definite limitation upon the conclusions in general in this and following chapters. But to have made the contents more specific to the Roman Catholic Church would have entailed a research project of much wider scope than was here possible, as was pointed out in the Appendix. Again, this writer has no bone to pick with the Roman Catholic Church as such, in particular, or with any other faith for that matter, so that, to specify the former with particular emphasis would not have been in keeping with our outlook, nor our interests.

Section 1

Adult Perpetuation of Childhood Logic

"Doomed....to remain insoluble so long as mankind, cherishing the monstrous belief that the Universe was created and works for their benefits, and endeavour to construe it in terms of their very partial feelings and thoughts, which can have no intelligible relation with a whole Universe. To think otherwise is nothing else than to wake the human relative to the absolute." - Hen. Maudsley - "Religion and Realities," p. 92.

"....the practice of prayer necessarily militates against self-reliance and personal independence, and in varying degrees unfits the devotee for the practical duties of life, and thus becomes, so far as it is consistently acted upon, a further obstacle in the path of progress." - Chas. T. Gorham, "Religion as a Bar to Progress," p. 3.

In studying the thought processes, the psychologist is not particularly interested in attaining or creating paragons of formal logical constructions. Rather, he is concerned with the "ordinary thinking of concrete individual minds." As James Sully put it: "The psychologist....is concerned not with the question 'How can we think correctly?' but with the question 'How do we ordinarily think?' Hence he has to make a more careful analysis of the actual processes of thinking." (146, pp. 339ff.).

However, the psychologist also aims to make man's

thinking always more effective, more efficient, more able to get things done and to think things out in a manner congruous with objective reality. As McDougall says, "The essential task of psychology is to render his (man's) thinking and his striving more successful, to give them greater causal efficacy" (105, p. 12). It is then with these principles in mind that we turn now to a brief description of some forms of thought among children and adults.

We have seen how similar were Levy-Bruhl's descriptions of the primitive mentality as compared with those of Piaget's findings with children's conceptions. Both the child or the primitive cannot or does not completely dis-¹associate himself from his surroundings. He is part of it, and it is part of him. Similarly, Frazer's description of Sympathetic Magic, where there seems to be an invisible bond or relationship between individual and removed object or other individual, bears a striking relationship to those of Levy-Bruhl's and Piaget's findings.²

In our society, however, we are apt to disregard the similarities of our, qua adult, thought processes and those of our children as well as those of adult primitives, and to concentrate on the qualitative dissimilarities. But are we fully warranted in assuming thus? Let us see.....

¹ According to Henle and Hubbell (59), even with respect to "egocentric speech," adults are not too qualitatively different from children. They found approximately the same percentage of egocentric speech in adult women students as Piaget found in his researches with children (i.e. approximately 40%).

² See Chapter I, where these findings are more fully discussed.

The great majority of us spend a goodly part of our time trying to achieve what we have not, or trying to overcome or allay the handicaps or sufferings with which we are continually faced. We are still "the old savage in the new civilization." One's needs and wants are about the same as those of primitive man's. The latter tries to get what he is after in two ways: (1) by making an attempt to cope with his difficulty, whatever it may be, in a manner as closely congruous with objective reality as he knows how, and (2) he makes special prayers, incantations, or works magic, to help materialize his needs. Our children too, usually use such techniques as the latter, which are quite natural to them, except that they have not yet learned some of the more lucrative means of coping with real problems, means which even the primitives have learned through their long history of trial and error. The infant bawls and he is catered to; later he learns to verbalize his needs, which are soon granted; very soon, as a child and then as an adolescent and adult, he has already become partial to this habit, which, however, is now called prayer or supplication.

In essence, the principle of bawling as a child, or praying as an adult, is the same. Both bawling and praying are similar elements, the one being natural to the young, while the latter being an adult perseveration of bawling in a modified and socially acceptable form. As Jersild says:

"The idea of praying to a higher power is usually accepted quite readily by children, who, in their experiences, frequently have occasion to be reminded of their own limitations and unfulfilled desires. The desires

that lie back of the child's "I wish" or "if only I had" and which he realizes vicariously his own make-believe can readily be translated into the petition: "Please give." It is considerably easier, it appears, to lead a child to petition that his passing desires be granted than to petition that he be helped to have desires and aspirations of the kind that should be granted and the determination to carry out these aspirations. The same, to be sure, holds true also of adults" (71, pp. 418-419).

This "please give" attitude so characteristic of childhood, apparently stays put as the maturing child grows into adolescence and adulthood. It gives the individual an illusion of power, actual or potential, and it is easy to see why, when once possessed of such an illusion, the individual readily succumbs to its false logic. For, Does it not hold out promises of endless variety to the individual struggling to meet life's reality? Does it not hold out the hope to him that the world will eventually work out in his favour and that everything will be all right? This tendency is well exemplified by the following response to question 7b in part IV, of our questionnaire.

Q. "Si vos prières ne sont pas exaucées, quelles sont les raisons de ce refus, d'après vous?"

R. "La prière peut être exaucée dans une autre façon... on ne prie pas Dieu en vain."

Though this attitude was expressed by a graduate student in psychology, the replies elicited by all on this question were identical, though not necessarily similarly expressed. However, there was a tendency among less educated

persons to be more emphatic thus: "on est toujours recompensé par ses prières dans un autre côté."

It is these illusory or wishfulfilling mechanisms of thought that persist in later life. It is the pre-logic, called "La Loi de Participation" by Levy-Bruhl (87), in which the individual has a vague notion of being ultimately extended with the cosmos. This notion flows on from childhood through adulthood, and becomes intellectually rationalized by means of the greater intelligence and wider knowledge in the latter stage. It is precisely for these reasons that Forsyth wrote that "adult savage and civilized adult alike are on a mental level at which the real world, and the world of the imagination are not yet discriminated"(41, p. 131). And R. B. Cattell expresses the same idea when he says that "the connection of the great religious consolations of prayer and immortality with animistic and magical levels of thinking is too great to require demonstration" (24, p. 36).

The psychoanalysts recognized this relapse into pre-realistic infantile thinking with respect to the characteristic mental state of the insanity, "compulsion neuroses." Discussing the thoughts and feelings with one of the intelligent patients whom he had cured of the latter disease, Dr. Sigmund Freud relates in his "Totem and Taboo : Resemblances Between The Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics," that his former patient felt the thought at a given moment could be so strong as to be overpowering. The patient dubbed this phenomenon, "Omnipotence of Thought." After discussing the principles

of magic, animistic, and religious thought processes, Freud was able to discern the same principle in them as in the compulsion neuroses. He further differentiates between them and the scientific attitude, which, as the reader will recognize, fits in with our own distinctions above, thus:

"In the animistic stage man ascribes omnipotence to himself; in the religious he has ceded it to the gods, but without seriously giving it up, for he reserves the right to control the gods by influencing them in some way or other in the interests of his wishes. In the scientific attitude towards life there is no longer any room for man's omnipotence, he has acknowledged his smallness and has submitted to death as to all other natural necessities in a spirit of resignation" (44, p. 147).

But all who are scientists are not necessarily disassociated from these infantile or primitive thought processes. The relapse into those early, uncorrected ways of regarding the real world is a very tempting one ever ready to take possession of even the best of us, especially in trying situations (12, Chapter VIII). It is quite probable that those scientists who have not fully outgrown their pristine attitudes, and who continue to face life with their minds partly bound to the past, must have had their outlook mentally chained at a very tender age (24, pp. 34ff.).

As far as I am aware, there have been no studies made to find out why some scientists manage to extricate themselves from the infantile cobwebs which are both natural to them and imposed by parental or social authority, while others continue to hold fast to much of their early

illusory mechanisms and often defending them with a great host of self-justificatory verbal explanations. However, Piaget's work with childhood forms of thought might serve as an indication as to how to undertake at least certain parts of such a research. A longitudinal approach would have to be used, spread over at least forty or fifty years. It would be necessary to begin with those children whose chances of getting a scientific education in later life, would be high. It would also be necessary to work with those children whose imposed membership in certain forms of systematized unreason, such as in certain extremely orthodox religious or similar groups, could be reasonably well assured. Such children would most likely be found among the scientifically educated middle-class families in our society.

Once an index of the degree of pre-logical¹ forms of thought could be ascertained for any particular child, it would then be necessary to follow this up with further tests of pre-logical interiorization within the individual, as he grows from childhood into adulthood and even into old age. Such studies would require an integrated system of research planned and directed from a central authority of a group of social scientists subsidized with large sums of money over a long period of time.²

¹ The methods used could be similar to those adopted by Piaget in his various researches (118, 119, 120).

² For a similar view, but in a different connection, see Ernest W. Burgess and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., "Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage" (17, pp. 371-374).

The results if energetically pursued would be worth far more than the energy and money expended, for it would help solve many existing enigmas. It would show us just where and how the individual becomes entangled in a myriad delusions and false concepts, which make it impossible for him to differentiate between the real world and the world of the imagination. It would show us more clearly how and why we are all more or less easily swayed towards anthropomorphic forms of thought. It would show us how to overcome the needless and tormenting problem of our myopic and conceited desires to think of the universe as an extension of ourselves. Indeed, there might well develop a new form of scientific logic and practice. As Piaget puts it, "it may very well be that psychological laws arrived at by means of our restricted method can be extended into epistemological laws arrived at by the analysis of the history of the sciences: the elimination of realism, of substantialism, of dynamism, the growth of relativism, etc., all these are evolutionary laws which appear to be common both to the development of the child and to that of scientific thought" (120, p. 240).

But meanwhile, in answer to the question we first posed, 'Are we really much different from primitives or children with respect to certain important thought processes?' we must, as we have shown, reply in the negative.

Section 2

The Power of Words

"Le mot, qu'on le sache, est un etre vivant....le mot est le verbe, et le verbe est Dieu." - Victor Hugo.

"All life comes back to the question of our speech--the medium by which we communicate." - Henry James.

From the earliest times man has invested certain words or symbols with powers, usually attaching to them anthropomorphic or wishfulfilling characteristics, clothed them in mystery, held them in awe, religiously passed them on intact generation after generation, to be used ulteriorly by tyrants and rulers, and solemnly proclaimed as "truth" by the masses in their ignorance and subservience. In no other field do words disturb the emotions, elicit sentiments of awe and subservience, and block clear thinking to such an extent as in religion (115). This is to be expected, since the primitive linguistic outlook, that is, the infantile outlook, is most markedly distinguished by an attachment to words as if they possessed some mysterious entity in se (70).

Frazer (42, Chapter XXII) traces the development of tabooed words in magic and religion, while Ogden and Richards (115) claim that the investing of words with powers or thinking of them as entities in themselves is a phenomenon

like. One respondent, a Ph.D. student of Philosophy replied: "Ubique," meaning that God is everywhere. Pointing out to him, after the questionnaire was fully answered, that such a conception is contrary to Catholic doctrine and is akin to the pantheism of Spinoza, he replied by saying that "God is everywhere as Cause of everything." Questioning him still further, as to whether God might be inside the bronze statue which stood beside us, the respondent replied that "God is the cause of the bronze materials, but not necessarily in the statue." Later, upon asking him whether God, since He causes everything, might not be the cause of wars, the respondent replied that all "bad things are caused by ourselves, and that God, being revealed to us as righteous cannot have anything to do with such matters, and besides, we must have faith in Him."

The writer suspects that the respondent, who seemed to be rather intelligent, realized the obvious inconsistencies of his replies and that he finally wound up with the extreme rationalization of 'the necessity of faith in revealed knowledge and doctrine'. Without mentioning William James, on our part, the respondent at this time referred to the position taken by him as pointed out above, and said that it is all nonsense. The respondent disclaimed James' notion that philosophers and others attach any importance to words as such, but rather to the experiences of which the words serve as signs.

How difficult it must be, however, as the respondent himself gradually came round to seeing, for a grown-up to get rid of the verbal fallacies into which he is born. They tend to become part of us and exert a blinding influence throughout life. "This attitude," writes Malinowski (94, p. 308), "in which the word is regarded as a real entity, containing its meaning as a Soul-box contains the spiritual part of person or thing, is shown to be derived from the primitive, magical uses of language and to reach right into the most important and influential systems of metaphysics.... The misuse of words, based always on a false analysis of their semantic function, leads to all the ontological morass in philosophy, where truth is found by spinning out meaning from the word, its assumed receptacle."

The above is but one example of what occurred time and time again, especially among the more educated classes, who seemed to be more alive to inconsistencies in their replies, though they could not readily explain them away. The less educated classes tended to reply to our questions in a more dogmatic, unswerving manner, their attitude being that the interviewer should either "take it or leave it."

There can be no doubt that words are not only signs or symbols for our thoughts and experiences, but also have a propelling force of their own, and which vitiate a good deal of our thinking (25, 115). "Only those whose studies have led them to investigate the subject are aware of the

depth to which the ground beneath our feet is thus, as it were, honeycombed by unseen forces."¹ There can be no doubt that systematized unreason thrives on these forces. Moreover, ~~because~~, as Malinowski puts it, "the various structural peculiarities of a modern, civilized language carry...an enormous dead weight of archaic use, of magical superstition and of mystical vagueness" (94, p. 328). More work is urgently needed to bring this "dead weight" to the surface, so that all may see and be cleansed, as it were, of the impurity.

¹ J. G. Frazer, "Psyche's Task," p. 169, quoted by Ogden and Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

Section 3

The "Naturalness" of Systematized Unreason

"There is no expedient to which man will not resort to avoid the real labor of thinking."
- Sir Joshua Reynolds.

"Systematic thinking is apparently a comparatively late development in human experience; it has not played any great part in human life until within the last 3,000 years, and even today those who really control and order their thoughts are but a small minority of mankind. Most of the world still lives by imagination and passion."
- H. G. Wells.

Left to the 'natural' thinking of which even uncivilized man is capable, man does not readily develop systems of scientific methods or social codes as we know them. When free from the built-up systems of observation and interpretation which have accrued throughout the long evolution of human thinking and interacting, man does not straightaway show signs of being radically different from those of his children. This may be evidenced by reference to the systems of prevalent animistic and magical thought which are supposed by many anthropologists and psychologists to have been among the first types of thinking (42, 83, 86), and, as may be clearly inferred from the researches of Jean Piaget,¹ children naturally develop these primitive thought processes too. Piaget (121), in a recent essay, even considers it very possible to arrive at a

1

Operes citates, ut supra.

psychological theory of the development of understanding and the creation of an experimental epistemology, by an analysis of the intellectual evolution of the child. All of which would tend to show, that 'natural' man thinks, but on a plane not far removed from that of the ordinary child.

But notwithstanding the natural abhorrence to think higher than that to which he is inherently accustomed, man has experienced leaps of the intelligence, leaps which have gradually pulled him out of the slough of magic and animism to the somewhat greater heights of religion. And even now the climb is slowly being made towards ^a higher ledge yet, science. These leaps are usually occasioned by prolonged hardships, continued inability to cope adequately with basic problems, or sudden jolts, such as wars and revolutions.¹

Frazer (42, Chapter IV) believes that the adoption of one mode of thought over another is a gradual process, where the newer or more efficient² mode of thought in time universally comes to be recognized as such by the force of its superiority. This slow though progressive movement towards ever greater efficiency, is marked by ups and downs, similar to the genetic evolvment of the psycho-physical "counterbalancing fluctuations" in the growth from childhood to adulthood.

¹ This view has been expressed by so many writers, as to obviate the necessity of reference. However, none has shown this more clearly than V. F. Calverton, "The Passing of the Gods," q.v.

² See pp. 91 ff. for our signification of the term "efficiency."

As we move up the scale through the various forms of systematized unreason which we have discussed, to science, the systems become more and more associated with thinking and reflection on the reality level.¹ Thus, we assume, in a Darwinian sense, that that which went before presents a lower level than the one following. This assumption is generally used both in Biology to account for animal and vegetable evolution, and in Geology to give an account of the chronological differences in rock strata, the topmost layers being considered to have been formed the most recently. In a similar manner, we assume that religion is higher than magic, but that the system of science is yet higher than religion, as a social system born of the necessity to cope with hardship and dissatisfaction which all men everywhere invariably meet. And, though it is much easier to fall in line with the various forms of systematized unreason, because it does not require anything outside the 'easy' or 'natural' thinking to which man readily succumbs, men will eventually have to learn to think and act scientifically if we are going to have any thinking at all in the future.

As Prof. Langer puts it:

"People who discover the obvious discrepancy between fantasy and fact deny that myths are true; those who recognize the truth of myths claim that they register facts. There is the silly conflict of religion and science, in which science must triumph, not because what it says about religion is just, but because religion rests on a very young and provisional form of thought, to which philosophy of nature--proudly called 'science', or 'knowledge'--must succeed if thinking is to go on" (79, p.202).

¹ See page 66, where the "reality principle" was discussed.

There are, however, some psychologists who, after an analysis of religion, usually from the basis of individual experience, arrive at the conclusion that the highest point in culture is that enveloped by religion. They do not as a rule¹ mention what religion they have in mind or whether it is all religion in general. Runze, for instance, says:

"...(die) Religion....wenn einmal zur Wirklichkeit geworden, die eine und selbige in allen Menschen ist--und bleiben muss, weil in ihr das Zentralerlebnis und der Höhepunkt des Menschseins erreicht ist."²

"Obwohl viele Menschen scheinbar religionslos leben, so ist doch die Anlage zur Religion allen gemeinsam, und diese ist ein spezifisches Kennzeichen des Menschseins auf allen Stufen der Entwicklung vom Tiermenschen zum Idealmenschen" (128, p. 160).

It appears likely from the context of the rest of Runze's thesis, that he would attribute the "Höhepunkt des Menschseins" to the moral influence of religion upon man's natural egoistic proclivity. If this assumption is correct, then it is difficult to see that anything spectacular in the way of "Idealmenschen" has been produced because of this supposed restraining influence, unless one paralogize on the assumption of post hoc ergo propter hoc. For, one need not be a learned historian or a particularly acute

¹ The Wiemans' book, already referred to several times above, is an exception to this rule. The tendency in the latter book is towards an apotheosis of the Protestant religion, especially of the Baptist denomination.

² The reader will recall that Prof. Selbie also claimed that religion is 'natural' to man and then he arrived at the conclusion that it is therefore rational. But he did not venture to posit that it is the highest point reached by mankind, as Runze does. (see pp. 59 & 60 above).

observer to perceive that there has probably been at least as much intrigue, intolerance, inquisitions, persecutions and ignorance in the ranks of religion as in any other system of man's making.¹

Moreover, from our analysis of some of the main principles involved in religion in Part I, it would appear that the various forms of religion are but variations upon the same theme, and that is, to influence the supernatural for mundane or post-mundane purposes. If one variation is chosen over and above the others, who is to be the chooser, and on what grounds is he going to make the choice? If he choose purely from subjective bias, his choice is very likely to be counteracted and opposed by others with equally as strong subjective biases. On the other hand, there is not as yet a sufficiently good criterion to make the choice on a more objective plane. However, at least one could be suggested, and that is, our criterion of "social efficiency" which was referred to above. The difficulty of course with this criterion is its inability to measure whether a particular social system satisfies more needs of the majority of people than some other system. Nevertheless, it is presented here as a possible alternative to subjective choice.

¹ See in this connection William McCarthy's exegesis of the Old and New Testaments, called "Bible, Church and God" (159), where it is implied that our Judaeo-Christian society cannot be otherwise, as it is based on a flagrantly inconsistent collection of books, variously called the "Word of God," the "Holy Book" or the "Bible." Cf. also, Karl Kautzky's "Foundations of Christianity" (75) for an analysis of the Judaeo-Christian religion from an economic standpoint.

Religion has also been represented by many as the highest goal that one may seek and which creates a sort of inner quietude in the individual, and which has "meaning-value" for him. Eduard Spranger's "Types of Men" (Chapter 6) is probably the best expression of such a view. "The mere feeling of happiness," Spranger says, "or the longing for happiness, is in itself religious, at least from the point of view of a psychology of religion." Later he writes: "We see then from these definitions that nothing is outside the realm of religion, although, according to its importance in the total mental life of a person, it may be significant in different degrees" (160, p. 211).

It seems to be stretching the meaning of religion too far, to attribute almost everything to it. Thus, if a man set up for himself certain goals towards which his every effort is concentrated, then that becomes for him his religion, according to Spranger's view. But, it is doubtful whether Spranger would be prepared to admit that the strong desire of the scientist—philosopher to probe the secrets and meanings of the universe necessarily makes the latter more religious than one whose main interests are devoted to making more money, or killing more people, or shooting down more enemy planes, or discovering new factors of the mind. If psychology is ever to make more progress, it is necessary that terms be used to explain more specific situations or phenomena, lest it remain forever tied down with obscure verbalisms. Instead of heading toward greater clarity, i.e.

towards a goal where a word can be most readily identified with its referent, Spranger seems to be heading towards the exact opposite goal. The meaning of religion not only loses its meaning when everything towards which we strive can be attributed as being religious, but the means towards 'salvation' and 'inner revelation' in Spranger's terms, become rather obscure. Thus he writes:

"The meaning of the world is not cognized or proved but comes to us in this unique experience. Its mediations may be purely psychical or may come through extra-psychical regions, as for instance religiously experienced nature or history. But the decisive factor is the 'how' of experience. This unique condition which is favorable to revelation and leads to salvation, results from a characteristic method of soul culture" (160, p. 216).

The criticism of Runze's views above, must also be levelled at Spranger's views. Moreover, unless psychologists can find it in their way to secede from the type of obscure verbiage, inherited from long centuries of philosophical and religious patter, then it will be an inordinately long climb upwards to a more scientific psychology. This is not to say that there can be no use for speculation, or for abstract generalizations. But rather, the urgent need for emancipation from the jejune outbursts of pedantry is herein indicated.

Summary

Since magic and religion appear in children earlier than science, we inferred that the former are more primitive, i.e. 'natural', while we implied science to be a relatively new development. Likewise since systematized unreason precedes science in the historical evolution of civilization, we claimed that science, as the more efficacious, is a more advanced state of the process of civilization. We then proceeded to show the inadequacy of certain views, such as the one that religion is the highest point yet reached by man, or the one which claims that the highest goal set by each man can be represented as religion.

Section 4

The Melange of Science and Systematized Unreason

"One would suppose that every man of science must necessarily be a Rationalist....Alas, not so! Men of science have the failings of ordinary men; they are Jekylls and Hydes, and move from Dr. Jekyll, the man of science, to Mr. Hyde, the Spiritualist, with the utmost ease." - Sir Arthur Keith.

"The towering genius of the great scientist often lapses into childish babblings as he turns to problems in which his personal desires give structure to his thought."
- Prof. Gardner Murphy.

It had been originally planned to investigate the degree and manner in which science has become absorbed among the general populace adhering to various forms of systematized unreason,¹ such as the adherents of the Catholic Church, for instance. Part III of the questionnaire was expressly designed for the purpose of getting suggestions for this matter. However, the latter was found to be inadequate, in that there are too few questions, and that the replies to those that were asked were on the whole stereotyped replies. That is to say, that the respondents replied in a way which they felt would be expected of a "Good Catholic," and of course, this did not indicate to us what their inner feelings and thoughts on the matter might actually be.

¹ See Introduction, p. 15 . By the absorption of science, is here meant the degree to which people have interiorized the scientific attitude, and the extent to which they are willing to follow scientific findings, as opposed to the fixity of thought and practice into which most people are born and accept at an early age.

But our work in this direction was not altogether in vain. For, during the course of research in the literature of psychology and allied fields, it was found that it might be profitable to note how scientists themselves have interiorized the findings of science, and the scientific attitude in general.

And, it was considered likely that if an indication of how science has fared among scientists could be attained, then it might be possible to infer in what direction it may be expected to move among the masses in general. In this indirect manner, then, we may attempt to note in general what it was our purpose in the beginning to note more precisely.

A poll conducted by Leuba (84) in 1914 and again in 1933, showed that the percentages among scientists who believed in a God to "whom one may pray in the expectation of receiving an answer more than the natural subjective, psychological effect of prayer," were as given in Table 1. The tendency is obviously away from the basic belief of religion, i.e. the belief that it is possible to move or stay the functions of a supernatural entity in order to gain some mundane end.¹ This same trend, was evident among the scientists questioned as to whether they believed in the "continuation of the person after death in another world." (See Table 2).

1

See pp. 52 ff., and p. 78.

TABLE 1

Scientists classified by specialty	Lesser Scientists		Greater Scientists	
	1914	1933	1914	1933
Physicists	50	43	34	17
Biologists	39	31	17	12
Sociologists	29	30	19	13
Psychologists	32	13	13	12

TABLE 2

Scientists classified by specialty	Lesser Scientists		Greater Scientists	
	1914	1933	1914	1933
Physicists	57	46	40	20
Biologists	40	32	25	15
Sociologists	52	31	27	10
Psychologists	27	12	9	2

There are many interesting questions which might be raised regarding Leuba's results. For instance, Why do the scientists, such as the physicists and biologists, dealing with physical and natural relationships, tend to believe the basic affirmations of religion, at least more so, than those dealing with social and individual phenomena, such as the sociologists and psychologists? Why was there such a marked decrease in belief among all the scientists questioned in the short span of 19 years, i.e. 1914 to 1933? Why is there a lower percentage among "greater" scientists as compared to lesser ones, with regard to belief in the matters asked by Leuba? These are all very

interesting and important, but we must content ourselves here, for reasons of space and time, to point out the fact that among scientists in general, there is a definite swing away from the basic dogmas of religion.

The reasons for this shift may be explained by virtue of the fact that religion and science are in their essence incompatible, as was shown above. Nevertheless, the two can apparently co-exist in some scientists of the first rank, as is shown in Tables 1 and 2. This is indeed a perplexing problem, but can be resolved when we remember that man is rarely "consistently consistent." This inconsistency is perhaps not so inherent in the human makeup as it is forced upon many an individual by virtue of the society into which he is born. That is to say, that the systems of beliefs and practices in the various forms of systematized unreason have a numbing effect on the freedom of intellection, though it be hardly recognized by even the mature scientist. It is probably more difficult to outgrow an "ingrowth" in childhood, than it is to interiorize a verity in adulthood. Thus, the scientist who was brought up with strong attachments to religious dogma, for instance, might find it impossible to "let go" of his earlier attachment, even though it be shown him to be incompatible with his more erudite outlook. As A. J. Carlson says: "We can be conditioned to science or justice just as to the supernatural, but the latter usually gets there first. The conditioned emotions usually outlive one's intellectual metamorphosis." Later he says: "Our social heritage, good, bad, and indifferent, clings

to us like the hand and appendix of organic inheritance" (21). Thus, even the scientist of the first rank, may cling to the childish faith which accepts the incredulous, and may forfeit his independence of judgment.

The following episode poignantly illustrates the uncompromising hold that early and adult religious training can have upon even the best of scientists. A certain well-known psychiatrist, who is also a member of an order of Catholic monks, was called in for consultation regarding a certain case in a large mental hospital. The patient was obviously depressed with feelings of guilt and remorse, due to an illegal sexual experience which she had had. After the examination, this psychiatrist felt that 'there was nothing that could be done, as she had committed sin, and she would have to suffer her punishment'.¹

This is but one small case, which does not affect society in general. But one need not strain the imagination overmuch to realize how prejudices and biases, especially those gained through the inculcation of systematized unreason during childhood, can predispose the masses of its adherents to accept blindly its various assertions in later life, and to stand solid or unmoved by various advances in scientific ideas and methods.

1

This anecdote was related to the writer by a friend who works in that institution, the sincerity of whom the writer has no reason to doubt.

What now, can we infer has happened and is likely to happen, as far as the absorption of the scientific attitude, etc., is concerned, among the general populace? In proposing an answer to this question, let us first summarize the tendencies we found existing among the scientists.

1. There is a general shift away from dogmas basic to religion.
2. There is a tendency among many scientists, to cling to these dogmas while at the same time adhering to the scientific system.

In Part I, it was implicitly shown that man has tended to replace one system of thought and practice by another as he gradually moved up the scale of social evolution. Thus the animistic and magical stages came to be more and more replaced by the religious and mystical stages, until finally a totally new way of thinking and dealing with problems,--the scientific system--came upon the scene. At each new stage there wasn't a total shedding of the former stage like the shedding of the carapace by a crustacean. Likewise we find that the scientific system has not fully occupied the stage upon which it has already made its entrance. However, if our assumption is correct, that is, if a new system comes in time to take over the social stage from the one occupying it formerly, then the scientific system too, will come in time to entrench itself firmly upon the stage. The general shift away from the old phase in favour of the more recent, i.e. the scientific system, among scientists, is as good an

indication as any that a similar shifting has taken place among the masses of mankind in general. It would be folly to expect, however, that the latter have shed their outmoded 'carapace' to the same degree as have the scientists, but it would be over-cautious indeed, to hold that man has not moved towards greater rationality at all. From animism, magic, religion, mysticism, to science has been a long path indurated by man's stupidity and ignorance; but the path is steadily upward, steadily toward the more efficient,¹ the many back-slidings, notwithstanding.

But what inference can we draw from the second conclusion regarding the absorption by scientists themselves regarding the scientific system, as we have conceived it? This has already been partly answered above when we pointed out that it seems to be an established principle in the history of social evolution, that there is never a total shedding of the old in favour of the new. Thus there arises very often the paradox of the acceptance in part or in whole of the 'ways' of mutually exclusive systems and principles. As with many scientists, so too, among the masses in general, there is, in some quarters, at any rate, the tendency to try to hold on to both the old and the new, in varying degrees.

This period of transition is often marked by many dangers, which we have already alluded to in connection with

1

See page 91.

Prof. R. B. Cattell's theory of the "Theopsyche."¹ It can be added here that not only do theoretical systems arise with the object of tiding men over the "moving-over" or "casting-off" phase, but also, new cults spring up to cater to this difficult period in men's lives (62, pp. 302-303). People are not completely satisfied with the old, and are not sufficiently adjusted to the new, so that they become susceptible to other obscurities which hold them for a while.²

What now can we summarily conclude?

1. Science is gradually being absorbed by the masses, and can be expected to make ever wider intrusions into the thinking and acting of the masses.
2. This gradual absorption by the masses is causing a great deal of mental anxiety and instability due to the transition.
3. Cults, quacks, and obscurantists are taking advantage of this situation to an almost alarming degree, but in time can be expected to recede. ~~There is no doubt that the~~
~~quackery, the superstitions, the~~
~~obscurantism, the~~.

¹ See p. 12.

2 See Cantril's chapter on the Father Divine movement in his book, "Psychology of Social Movements." See also Lee Steiner's little book, "Where do People Take Their Troubles," where it is shown how quacks of all kinds prey on the gullibility of the mentally insecure.

CHAPTER V

SOME PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS

In this chapter, as in the last, we have tried to bring our discussion to as great a degree of abstraction as possible. However, to have generalized in all cases would have placed undue strain on the limits of some of the statements, so that in a number of instances, reference is made directly to religion, this case being that of the Roman Catholic Church.

Again here, as in other sections of this work, our questionnaire proved to be very inadequate in pointing to any significant data, though it did help in giving the writer a certain orientation towards the work as a whole, as well as to indicate factors which might be pursued further. These indications were helpful in the selection of pertinent material in the literature. In no way, however, is this chapter intended to serve as a thorough outline of the major personality characteristics of people who are adherents of a particular type of systematized unreason. The accumulation of such data would need a great deal of further research. Rather, the discussion in this chapter is meant to indicate some of the factors of human behaviour, an outline of which may make for a better understanding of the reasons for the persistence of systematized unreason.

The following chapter will deal mainly with some of the social factors which help maintain systematized unreason. Thus, the two chapters are interrelated--the one being a description of some of the behaviour which is, to some extent, an outgrowth of systematized unreason, the other with the factors making for a persistence of this behaviour. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind throughout, that no strict dichotomy is here attempted, and probably if it were, could not adequately disassociate one from the other. Systematized unreason is developed necessarily through man and his psychological make-up, but at the same time, this make-up is molded to a great extent by the means of ^{its} production. It is with this consideration then, i.e., with some of the factors of these 'molded' or acquired characteristics to which we turn for brief discussion.

1.

Mass Dereism

As has been pointed out in Chapter II, systematized unreason in its various forms, has been developed by man as a means of adjusting to the environment. The latter, physically and naturally, may often be harsh, bringing in its course pain, suffering and anxiety. These anxiety feelings, seek an outlet in order to mitigate the deflected energies of frustration, and they may light upon the path of least resistance.

Devotion and Suggestibility.

One such path is the retreat to prayer. Many studies on the psychology of prayer have been made which point in general to its characteristic tendency of auto-suggestion. This may be helpful to the improvement of the personality and the maintenance of personal or group morale, but it may be harmful by increasing the individual's general suggestibility (24, p. 37). David Forsyth (41), as also Sigmund Freud (45,46), R. B. Cattell (24), and others, believe that the auto-suggestive tendencies in worship are characterized by the same psychological mechanisms as in other auto-suggested practices. Traditionally it is believed that the essence of worship is that the worshipper is drawn out of himself, and wholly given to the object of worship. Forsyth, however, believes that "psychology would describe the condition as the exact opposite, that the

worshipper withdraws into himself, shuts out his sensory perceptions, and gives himself over to rumination in an auto-suggestive manner. The frequent indulgence of auto-suggestion for whatever purpose tends to increase suggestibility; and as this is another feature of the child temperament, to foster it in an adult is likely to be harmful" (41, p. 130).

William McDougall, on the other hand, was constrained to ascribe worship merely to auto-suggestion. He felt that worship was a natural expression of reverence, and that even animals shared this proclivity with man, though in a rudimentary degree. This tendency, furthermore, is not envisioned by him as being "in any exceptional or peculiar relation to the rest of man's nature" (104, p. 149 f.).

Whatever the explanation be with respect to prayer, its manifestation is an indication of man struggling ineptly to keep a semblance of success in the face of failure, by creating phantasmagoria in the mind. This elusive or blind escape from reality in a group, is fostered and utilized to advantage in religion. As Cattell well appreciates, it is for this reason that religion is so attractive to "the sick, the inferior, the maladjusted, the fearful, the poor, and those scorned and rejected by love, power, life, and society" (24, p. 39).

Probably the most poignant illustration of how people readily succumb to the suggestive tactics of an ideology

or a leader, is that of the conversion of great sections of Germans in the early thirties, to the derealistic propaganda showered upon them by the Nazi machine. The Germans had been thoroughly beaten in 1918, and now they were existing as the dregs of Europe and humanity. But with the advent of the ideology which told of them of their actual superiority in blood and brains over the rest of mankind, and, as other people in similar circumstances, they succumbed to these wishfulfilling, though untruthful suggestions. People, especially disheartened and frustrated people, can be whipped into any shape or form, for they are not ^{wholly} ~~rational~~ homines sapientes, but are ^{also} governed by emotion, instinct, preference, and a tendency to suggestibility.

Hitler well appreciated this frailty when he wrote in "Mein Kampf," "What people desire determines their hope and belief," and so well did he practise this idea, that "he made it a point of telling his audience exactly what it wanted to hear, regardless of scruples" (161, p. 204). The journalist, Edgar Mowrer, shows that not only were the dregs of society thus deluded, but also professors and university students were similarly taken in (161).¹

¹ In contradistinction to this view, Konrad Heiden in "Der Fuehrer" (58) reports that it was mostly "the uprooted and disinherited" classes, e.g. especially the jobless war veterans, who were so deceived, and not so much the learned classes. Since Heiden, as a student in Munich, was himself engaged in many student fights against the Nazis, it is understandable that he should have overlooked the great many students in other parts of Germany who were not so opposed to the Nazis as he.

According to Dr. A. A. Roback, the psychoanalyst, Carl Jung explained this social phenomenon by saying that the Germans succumbed to Hitler, "because he was the mirror of every German's unconscious into which they projected their own selves" (125, pp. 67ff.). Which, after all, is the same thing as Hitler recognized i.e. "What people desire determines their hope and belief," and which has been known in different terms for a very long time, as William James so aptly expressed in his "The Will to Believe" (68).

The parallel between the mass dereism of the Germans who vainly hung on to a deceptive ideology and leader in the hope of hiding to themselves what were their failures and their frustrations,--the parallel between this and the mass dereism found more especially in orthodox religions is not hard to draw. Stunned by frustration, swayed by subtle authoritarian coercion, unbalanced by wishfulfilling desires, and driven by the need for self-satisfaction, men succumb to the suggestive techniques of these religions, and are both bewildered and satisfied by its ideas and practices. Prayers prescribed by a theology, or adoration of a social system defined by a demagogue, are thus products, in part, of the suggestibility in man, which are often utilized to his own disadvantage.

Neuroses and Autisms.

It was noted above in connection with certain thought processes¹ that Sigmund Freud noticed the similarity between the relapse to infantile thought patterns in certain types of neuroses and those of religion. The resemblance between these and other details of obsessional cases to religious thought processes and practices, further suggested to him that the obsessional neurosis was a private religious system and religion a universal obsessional neurosis. By falling in line with the mass, the individual is thus spared the trouble of being neurotic alone (44, 45, 46).

Approaching the subject of mass delusion from a slightly different angle, Gardner Murphy arrived at similar conclusions to those of Freud's. Defining personalistic autism as an often unconscious "movement of cognitive processes in the direction of need-satisfaction" (111, p. 9) he strikes out at socially shared autisms as being even more numbing to clear thinking. Moreover, he points out that it is especially evident in the latter that the individual escapes atypicality in the conscious or unconscious guise of the collective autisms. In this way the individual is spared the surprises and ego injuries which might arise by being in contact with reality. But, as Murphy rightly appreciates, "by and large, more

¹ ut supra, pp. 116-117.

cognitive distortion is achieved through (these) socially shared autisms than through psychotic processes within the individual" (111, p. 9).

Summing up the position taken here, we may say with Prof. R. B. Cattell "that religious expression can be regarded as a pitiful accumulation of escapes and self-deceptions centering upon one major illusion. That major illusion is a reflection of childish attitudes, and persists through the continued emotional immaturity of most adult minds" (24, p. 40).

2.

This Believing World.¹

Besides the great sameness of biological make-up in man, there is probably no other pattern so universally held the world over as the belief in God or gods. The myth-making tendencies in man i.e. his need for symbolization, as was noted in Chapter II, is so prevalent that it is no wonder that we have so many different twists or guesses in the manufacture of these beliefs. Nevertheless, as Browne

¹ This heading is from the title of Lewis Browne's book by the same name.

tells us, there is a certain trend common to many parts of the world--"blind guesses"--concerning the complex idea of a slain and resurrected God. "It was one of these guesses," Browne writes, "one of those blindly hopeful snatches after security, which a race drowning in insecurity instinctively felt forced to make, no matter where it dwelt" (15, p. 96).

Now, besides the widespread belief in a God or gods, there are many philosophical arguments to prove the validity of such a belief. With these we are not concerned here. What we are concerned with is to get some insight into the reason why the god-idea was invented in the first place, and why it continues to be so popular.

We have already implied by reference to Browne, above, that the human race being beset by innumerable difficulties ventures guesses about the unsolved riddle of existence and hits upon a god or gods.¹ There is, however, a more profound theory as to the origin of the idea of God, formulated by Freud and the psychoanalysts, to whom we shall briefly turn now.

Recognizing the inevitable difficulties with which mankind is confronted, this school has drawn a parallel between the manner in which children react when faced with difficulties and that in which adult man reacts in similar circumstances.

¹ John Dewey has expressed a similar view, except that the 'blind element' does not enter into it so strongly as in Browne's view. Thus he says: "One chief reason for the appeal to something beyond experience was the fact that experience is always in such flux that men had to seek stability and peace outside of it" (32, p. 25).

Children "run to Mamma" for love, but look to father for support in tough situations. The father is idealized or envisioned as a mighty man, capable of granting favours or meting out punishment. The child, moreover, as Piaget and others have shown,¹ is incapable of disassociating himself completely from the cosmos about him. His fantasies and his images assume eidetic proportions, and may even approach hallucinatory expression. The adult, on the other hand, has somewhat outgrown these infantile behaviours, but apparently has not completely detached himself from his infantile past. The past merges and grows into the present while the present emerges sending its roots into the past. And so, bewildered and disheartened, struggling man turns to the easy dreams of his childhood and imagines a "Father," cruel in his anger, but loving and merciful when pleased. Thus, like a child, the adult has created the illusion of an all powerful, all merciful, yet potentially cruel father who needs to be constantly appeased lest his wrath be cast upon an unheeding child.

The creation of such an illusion is all the more understandable when we recall that man is by nature inclined to think in animistic or anthropomorphic terms.¹ So that

1

See Part I.

the apotheosis of a surrogate father in the adult, and the concomitant aura of wonder and mystery is merely an extension and elaboration of the infantile thought mechanism in order to meet the emotional and physical strains of life. As an added attraction to a "race drowning in insecurity," the idea of a mother of God or of the gods, has also been wishfully projected into the outside world, again without realizing this infantile error. Frazer's "The Golden Bough" has many allusions to goddesses as well as gods in ancient civilizations. And, whereas today such twofold illusions do not exist officially in the major religions, the Catholic Church, however, as Forsyth points out (41, p. 125), continues to provide wishfulfilling substitutes for both father and mother in God, the Father, and ⁱⁿ Mary, the Mother of God.

This believing tendency in man (68) thus is one of the strong natural roots upon which systematized unreason feeds. The pitfalls of living being universal, and the emotional and ideational adjustments of man likewise presenting common trends, together they form a large part of the groundwork from which magic, mysticism, and religion find continued nutriment.

3.

Gregariousness

"Personne ne va au spectacle pour le plaisir du spectacle, mais pour voir l'assemblée, pour en être vu, pour ramasser de quoi fourner au coquet après la pièce; et l'on ne songe à ce qu'on voit pour savoir qu'on en dira." - J. J. Rousseau, "Julie ou la Nouvelle Héloïse," deuxième partie, lettre 17.

"Men are interested in what each other believe. That is the magnet that draws and holds them together." Free Mind, Nov. 1944.

There has been a great deal written for and against, in and out of the literature of psychology concerning the instinct of gregariousness or the "herd instinct" as it is sometimes called. We do not wish here to take up the cudgels for either side in these polemics; we want merely to show that the tendency among people is to share their fears and their hopes, to long for the approval of their community, to be curious about what the other fellow is wearing, doing, saying, etc.--to show that these common tendencies are naturally beneficial to any undertaking or system which provides a special time and a special place where they may be expressed. Systematized unreason provides just such facilities and is accordingly benefitted by them. For instance, concerning the means by which primitive religious and magical groups continue to hold together, Radcliffe-Browne in "Taboo," writes as follows:

"Actually in our fears or anxieties as well as in our hopes we are conditioned...by the community in which we live. And it is largely by the sharing of hopes and fears, by what I have called common concern in events or eventualities, that human beings are linked together in temporary or permanent association" (123, p.40).

In his book "Mind: Perception and Thought in their Constructive Aspects," the late Dr. Paul Schilder expresses some reasons why people have a common concern in one another. From clinical experience he felt that we observe ourselves as others see us especially as our parents have looked upon us as children. Thus he reasons that "self-observation and self-consciousness are therefore acts of a social nature and are the expression of the fact that human beings are basically social....I think that the human mind, and especially the function of consciousness, is the expression of the essential social quality of human existence.... I insist that in even the most primitive experience psychic acts are socialized" (133, pp. 335-6).

If even the most primitive experiences were entirely tainted by our socialized patterns of thinking and acting, then it is conceivable that no progress of any kind could ever have been made, for man would be irrevocably bound to a status quo ante. In such a state, there could be no leap of the imagination into unexplored worlds of thought, never anything new or different from that which went before.

I do not think that our acts are bound exclusively to our social patterns. That is to say, there is always some room

for individual acts and thoughts outside of the common socialized ones to which we become accustomed at an early age. The tragedy, however, is that Dr. Schilder's description of these acts and their accompanying thoughts, are so overwhelmingly socialized and fixed, as almost to make it seem impossible for man to get himself out of the difficult ruts in which he continually finds himself. The high degree of socialization to which we are all subjected since birth becomes habit forming. It begins to exert an influence upon our thoughts and actions in the direction of desiring continued socialization in the manner to which we have early become accustomed.

Thus, for instance, in answer to the question 'whether life would be worthwhile if there would be no heaven,' such answers as these were elicited from some of our respondents: "I never thought of that before...besides I have been brought up with a heaven, so I can't imagine what it would be like otherwise"; "It might be worthwhile just the same."

Not only do our ideas and acts largely stem from our social milieu, but we tend to become positively conditioned to our surroundings, especially those of our childhood. Our childhood playmates, the friends we have become accustomed to meet at our church, or our lodge, or our school, hold out a special charm to us and draws us closer to one another. There are, of course, varying degrees of this "drawingness" or attraction, such as one's family, country, friends, clubs, etc.

The point we are making here is that this tendency in man exists and forever seeks expression. This gregarious tendency is not specific to systematized unreason, but can find expression therein, and thus becomes another personality characteristic associated with it. Moreover, it is a strong factor in welding the group together, such as in a church, and thus lends itself to the life of the latter.

CHAPTER VI

PERSISTENCE OF SYSTEMATIZED UNREASON

"Misguided by authoritarian dogma, bound by exclusive faith, stunted by inculcated loyalty, torn by frantic heresy, be-deviled by insistent schism, drugged by ecstatic experience, bewildered by invented mystery, and loaded down by its own original premises, the unfortunate human race struggles along under its ghastly self-imposed burden." - Maj.-Gen. G. B. Chisholm.

The basic assumption implied throughout this thesis is that with regard to systematized unreason, there is a decidedly low degree of social efficiency as compared, say, with the potentialities of the scientific system.¹ If this hypothesis is correct, then the question arises as to why or how systematized unreason continues to persist in the face of a more socially efficient system. Given two means of getting things done, the one more socially efficient than the other, Why is the less efficient one not readily supplanted by the other? With this question we will mainly concern ourselves in this chapter, incorporating at the same time a section on the theoretical problem of the relative effects upon the individual by the group, and those of the group upon the individual, in Section 5.

¹ We have already made several references throughout the text to authors who have actually shown this to be the case, especially in regard to magic and religion as contrasted with science.

The reader may be puzzled by the sameness, at least in part, of the direction of approach in this section, as compared to the previous one. The division into two separate chapters is, however, an arbitrary one, but one which it is felt will make for greater clarity of presentation and comprehension of the problem. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, the persistence of systematized unreason is mainly due to two interrelated factors, the personalities of its adherents and the more or less impersonal controls used to mold the adherents into a desired shape. It is toward the latter of these factors that we will now turn our attention to in this chapter, bearing in mind always that the one factor cannot ever be completely divorced from the other.

1.

Ignorance, Its Maintenance and Enforcement

"By identifying the new learning with heresy you are making orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance." - Erasmus.

"There is no darkness but ignorance."
- Shakespeare.

"The most mortal enemy of knowledge, the greatest executioner of truth is the adhesion unto authority, and especially our beliefs upon the dictates of antiquities. For present ages do so superstitiously look upon ages past that the authorities of one smother the reasons of the other."
- Sir Thomas Browne.

As a form of systematized unreason, the Roman Catholic Church in its early beginnings was for the most part beneficial to its adherents, at least more so than the decaying social systems from which it sprang. Men had lost faith in their leaders, in their flagrantly paradoxical religions and laws, and the temper of society in general, was ripe for the growth of this new theocracy. The early Christian church had a more advanced social theory than any other in existence at the time: the Greek Empire had collapsed; the Roman Empire was about to collapse, and everything in general was in a state of confusion. As Kautsky tells us in his "Foundations of Christianity":

"The picture...is not a pleasant one: general decay in every quarter, economic, political, and also scientific and moral....as society sank deeper into bondage, submission became the supreme virtue, and from it were derived all the noble qualities to which we have devoted our attention: aversion

to the common weal and concentration on individual interests, cowardice and lack of self-confidence, longing for redemption by an emperor or a God, not by one's own strength or the strength of one's class; self-debasement before the powerful priestly impudence toward inferiors; blasé indifference and disgust with life, yielding to a yearning for sensations, for marvels...hypocrisy, lying and forgery" (75, pp. 147-8).

Springing from the ruins of the Roman Empire, the Roman Catholic Church, armed with the noble doctrine of the Brotherhood of Man, and simultaneously filled with a desire to spread its power and its faith, soon developed the decadent blossoms of the seeds of decay which it had inherited. As Thomas Hobbes in his "Leviathan" long ago recognized, the Papacy was in no small way an extension of the domain of the Roman imperial era.

The first taste of power led to a hunger for more and more power. Expediency became the watchword and expansion its goal. Hallam, in his "History of Europe during the Middle Ages," shows that the Church spread on fraud and deceit. In a characteristic passage he writes concerning the conversion of heathens:

"Many of the peculiar and prominent characteristics in the faith and discipline of those ages appear to have been either introduced or sedulously promoted for the purposes of sordid fraud. To those purposes conspired the veneration for relics, the worship of images, the idolatry of saints and martyrs, the religious inviolability of sanctuaries, the consecration of cemeteries, but above all, the doctrine of purgatory and masses for the relief of the dead--a creed thus contrived caused a torrent of opulence to be poured into the Church" (54, p. 141).

If we consider that the Church and its doctrines offered almost the only means to which a man could unburden his heavy heart; that deception and fraud were commonplace among the clergy at the expense of a submissive feudal populace; that secular centres of learning were almost unknown and those which did exist were thoroughly bound to doctrine i.e. to changeless tenets of a superstitious age; that the scientific spirit of inquiry was yet unborn;--if we consider these things, then we see that it was almost impossible for any other social system to have taken root for so many hundreds of years.

The puzzle arises when we realize that the ancient forms of this Church continue to function side by side with more socially efficient modes of thought and behaviour developed in the modern era. One would readily suppose, as Thomas Inman pointed out long ago in his "Ancient Pagan and Modern Christian Symbolism," that certain beliefs and practices would have become extinct when "once a given set of archaeological or other scientific evidence would deny the verity of their content." That this supposition is not borne out by actuality is commonplace. One of the main reasons why this is so, is briefly alluded to by Inman in a different connection: "No matter what the creed (i.e. magical or religious, B.) whether Ancient or Modern, the main object of its exponents and supporters is to gain over the minds of the populace. This has never yet been done, and probably never will be attempted, by educating the mind of the multitude to think" (67, p. xxxvi).

Whereas conditions were such in Medieval times and earlier, as to allow the ferment of a rigid, upper-class benefitting, ecclesiastico-social system to be unchallenged by unlearned, submissive vassals, times are somewhat different today. The Reformation in the sixteenth century changed this easy imposition by the Catholic Hierarchy upon an unsuspecting European populace. Learning awakened and went to war upon the old socially inefficient orthodoxy. The germ of unrelenting inquiry began to stir, and with it the foundations of the Catholic Church. The latter has never been the same since then, but yet remains unshaken.

Intellectually outstripped by the new advances in philosophy and science, the Catholic Church made its own Reformation--a Counter Reformation--which had two aspects, positive and negative. The positive aspects were designed to inculcate into its adherents the belief in the divine nature of its doctrines and its methods, and to teach the falsity of all other "knowledge" which the Church did not approve. The negative aspects were characterized by a militant drive to inhibit by physical force and subtle social coercion, any opposing trends. Both of these aspects were undertaken by the Jesuits with the sanction of a hard-pressed Papacy.¹

Today, with the tremendous growth of systems of communication, such as radio, press, movies, and travel

¹ See articles on "Jesuits" and "Ignatius de Loyola" in "Encyclopaedia Britannica" 17th ed., for further details on the Counter Reformation.



**POPE PIUS XII, 'PONTIFEX MAXIMUS'
OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH,
WEARING HIS BEJEWELLED TIARA,
OR TRIPLE CROWN, SYMBOLIZING
HIS CLAIM TO BE**

**"THE FATHER OF PRINCES AND
KINGS, RULER OF THE WORLD AND
VICAR OF JESUS CHRIST."**

**This is the official pronouncement used at
the coronation of every pope.**


**Fig. 6 - From Converted Catholic Magazine,
Feb. 1946, p. 41.**

established by Leo XIII, that it is Our right and Our duty to deal authoritatively with social and economic problems."¹

Thus, armed with the self-elevating principle of authority both in religious and temporal matters, the Church has never left the idea of the Counter Reformation. Every effort is made to re-enforce those lands already strongly under its control. The newspaper P.M., for instance, reported from Paris (Sept. 25, 1945) that "no Spanish citizen can get employment unless he produces a certificate that he attends church," and that "the Catholic Church in Spain supports Franco's reign of terror." The magazine "Christian Century" (Aug. 29, 1945), reported atrocities by Catholics, goaded and directed by their priest against the Protestant minority in a village called San Andres Timilpran. "The Witness" (Oct. 4, 1945), reported similar outbreaks in El Paso, Texas. Again, French Protestant Ministers in Canada know that they must always be watchful lest their churches be damaged or their congregation molested.² In the United States there is very little disturbance of this nature, but there is a good deal of egoistic Catholic literature published in this direction. The teaching that the Catholic Church has the right to put to death heretics, was boldly reasserted in the "Tablet," official newspaper

¹ From Father Joseph Husslein, "The Christian Social Manifesto" p. 294, as quoted by converted Catholic Magazine, vol.6, October, 1945, p. 206.

² As reported to the writer in discussions with the Rev. Dr. Paul Villard, Minister in the United Church of Canada, and Rev. J. A. Giguere, of the French Canadian Mission, in Montreal.



**THE CROSS AND THE SWORD—SYM-
BOL OF THE INQUISITION AGAINST
HERETICS.**

"Veritas"—Catholic "Truth"—which must be accepted under pain of death, is engraved on the sword surmounted by the cross, behind which is the sun-god communion wafer. This is an emblem of the Dominican Order, the heresy-hunters of Inquisition times, and signifies that Roman Catholic belief and social discipline must be enforced even at the point of the sword.

**Fig. 7 - From Converted Catholic Magazine,
January 1946, p. 13.**

1 From Father Joseph Hunsbain, "The Christian Social Mani-
fest" p. 294, as quoted by converted Catholic Magazine, vol. 8,
October, 1945, p. 208.

2 As reported to the writer in discussions with the
Rev. Dr. Paul Villard, Minister in the United Church of Canada,
and Rev. J. A. Giguere, of the French Canadian Mission, in
Montreal.

of the Roman Catholic diocese of Brooklyn, in its issue of Nov. 5, 1938, as follows:

"Heresy is an awful crime...and those who start a heresy are more guilty than they who are traitors to the civil government. If the State has the right to punish treason with death, the principle is the same that concedes to the spiritual authority the power of capital punishment over the arch-traitor to truth and Divine revelation.... A perfect society has the right to its existence...and the power of capital punishment is acknowledged for a perfect society.... Now, the Catholic Church is a perfect society, and as such has the right and power to take means to safeguard its existence." ¹

Thus with the proud motto, "Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus," as the sure credential of its own infallibility, the Roman Church feels uninhibited about what it may do. "The means justifies the ends" becomes in itself the mast behind which it rigidly sails in stern contrast to the reality-yielding system of science.

As in the early Counter Reformation, but even more so, today, education has become a vital concern of the Catholic Church. In order to hold a semblance of all-powerful ability which supposedly should be in accordance with its far-reaching and ambitious aims for society, it is reluctantly incorporating the new learning. In the face of more efficient modes of learning, both in content and in results, it would seem that the Jesuits, at least in the United States, are finding it difficult to communicate their orthodox system, as may be evidenced from the following quotation in the book,

¹ Quoted in Converted Catholic Magazine, Dec. 1945.

"The Jesuits and Education," by Jesuit Father William McGucken:

"We must bring it home every day more and more, to those we have to teach that religious education, Catholic education, as distinct from any other, non-Catholic or non-religious, really does mean something. Somehow or other, they must be made to feel that they are better men for being Catholics, and for having been educated at a Catholic school" (107, p. 152).

Later he writes:

"Jesuit education...is only a means to form the individual for the Church, not for himself....The objective, envisioned by Jesuit pedagogy, is the triumph of the Catholic Church; hence, its first characteristic. It is an ecclesiastical pedagogy rather than religious; indeed what it attempts to stir up and foster is not so much a religious spirit in general as full and entire submission to the authority of the Roman Church, the acceptance of the dogmatic truth she teaches, the fulfillment of the practices she has instituted.... From the intellectual, religious, and moral viewpoint, the youth is to become a subject of this Church, the guardian and font of truth. Jesuit educators in general do not aim at proselytism, at recruiting subjects for the Society of Jesus; what they desire is to establish their influence in particular over the higher classes of society (i.e. scholars and scientists, B.) for the triumph of the Church" (170, p. 158).

Thus the Church marches forward reluctantly with the new learning. It thrives on the learning and dogmas of the past, but it readily uses the means of the present to perpetuate them. The Church cannot exist by releasing the controls upon the fettered minds of its adherents; it must preach the status quo ante, even if it be in the garb of the

new technology. The aim is world dominion, the method is suppression of truth (131). With a body of adherents, second only to that of the Confucianists in numbers, the Roman Catholic Church has undoubtedly gone a long way in realizing this aim.

2.

Unquestioning Submission Elevated to a
Position of Virtue

"My opinion is that there would never have been an infidel, if there had never been a priest. The artificial structure they have built on the purest of all moral systems for the purpose of deriving from it pence and power, revolt those who think for themselves and who read in that system only what is there."
- John Adams, (from a letter written to Thomas Jefferson, dated Aug. 9, 1816).

"All the authority in the world is as nothing and the traditions of a thousand years sound like the mere hearsay of yesterday."
- Thomas Huxley.

"The summary of seven hundred years of Christian expansion in northern Europe is that the work was mainly done by the sword in the interests of kings and tyrants who supported it, against the resistance of their subjects who saw in the Church an instrument for their subjection." - J.M. Robertson, "A Short History of Christianity".

Class-conscious economists, historians, and others, have long recognized that in every age it has benefitted one class of society to hold in check, for economic reasons, the struggle for more than mere existence¹ of all other classes (9, 14, 18). This "one class" is known as the "upper class" and no age past or present, has been without it, except perhaps in some very restricted area.

¹ By "more than mere existence" we mean more than the basic necessities to sustain life. Even the lowliest serf or peasant needs envy the lavish comforts of his master or lord, unless constrained by some physical or psychological force.

In order to hold in check the unbridled desires of natural man, it is necessary for this upper class to be in control of the physical means to do so or it must make provision for the early training of the lower classes in the virtues of submission. The latter is the easier and the more efficient. For, once an attitude of submission is engendered in large sections of society, it tends to perseverate itself, and thus obviates the necessity of constant physical vigilation.

Economic superiority of the upper classes is not the only motive in society which requires submission of the masses in order to realize their aims. There are also motives of power which some individuals or groups of individuals almost inevitably desire. That is to say, there is an inordinately strong psychological component in the mentality of certain men, which strives after superiority and control of others. To achieve this requires submission on the part of the masses of the people, and as with the upper class above, it is easier to achieve it by psychological rather than by physical means.

In both cases, i.e. both in the zeal for economic superiority and authoritarian social control, these interests are well served by systematized unreason. Whether it be through the priest or the shaman of animism, magic, or religion, the mass of the people have always been made to fear the

consequences of opposition to their prevalent ideas.¹ Mention has already been made of the opposition to the priest of religion by the priest of magic, as explained by Frazer (42, Chap. IV). Likewise the priest of religion, with his dogmatic suppositions and rules, is opposed to the infiltration of any opposing tendencies into the minds of the faithful. A moral theology which exults subservience and docility of mind, and condemns the free use of intelligence, thus becomes a welcome ally to those who seek superiority over the masses in one form or another. When one party of this alliance is threatened, the other is automatically threatened, and as a corollary, when one is strengthened the interests of the other is likewise secured.

Submission to the authority of the Church in religious matters is gradually extended until it reaches almost every act of the human personality (24, p. 39). Men are taught to tolerate deprivation and suffering. The passivity engendered in the less fortunate classes becomes the rock upon which is maintained the advantages of the more fortunate (37, Chap. VII). It is for this reason that religion is sometimes referred to as the great social opiate.

The Papacy, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie, have long recognized the disadvantages, from a Machiavellian point of view, of an unquestioning, credulous populace, and have accordingly fostered such standards of judgment in them.

¹ Cf. in this connection J.J. Murphy's article, "Catholicism's Moral Code" in the Converted Catholic Magazine, (April 1946) where he shows how the confessional and casuistry in the Roman Catholic Church has tended to subdue even its more intelligent elements.

Speaking of the false "Donation of Constantine" and of papal fraud in general, the historian, Edward Gibbon wrote in his celebrated work, "Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire" thusly: "The Popes themselves have indulged a smile at the credulity of the vulgar (common people); but a false and obsolete title still sanctifies their reign, and by the same fortune which has attended the Decretals and the Sibylline Oracles, the edifice has subsisted after the foundations have been undermined" (48, p. 740).¹ Thus, in the following quotation from an encyclical, "Divini Redemptoris," Pope Pius XI, in talking to the poor mentions the rich, but makes the conditions of opulence seem more tragic than those of poverty.

"Let them (the poor) remember that the world will never be able to rid itself of misery, sorrow and tribulation, which are the portion even of those who seem most prosperous. Patience, therefore, is the need of all, that Christian patience which comforts the heart with divine assurance of eternal happiness....Indeed, how many of the poor in anticipation of the Kingdom of Heaven, find in these words a happiness which so many of the wealthy, uneasy with their riches and ever thirsting for more, look for in vain!" (122, p. 19).

¹ For further treatment of the history of papal fraud and intolerance, see James Bryce, "The Holy Roman Empire" (16). Especially interesting in this connection is the treatment of the dual standard where the populace is given one standard by which to act and think, while the clergy themselves do not abide by it.

The apotheosis of submission in Christianity, especially in Roman Catholicism, has led the British psychiatrist, David Forsyth, to the conclusion that there is an important element of masochism therein. He has also concluded that it is because of this masochistic element, there are more active women church members than men, since masochism tends to be more related to women than to men (41). Conversely, since the Islamic religions are characterized by a more intractable road to salvation, and since men are its mainstay, he attributes sadistic tendencies to it.

However, Forsyth does not exclude sadistic tendencies entirely from Christianity. Rather, he feels that there are also maso-sadistic tendencies, especially in Roman Catholicism. He maintains that the masochistic elements are found mainly among the submissive followers, whereas the sadistic elements are found among the oft-times ruthless leaders who take advantage of this psychological characteristic of their flock. Thus, in pointing to the maso-sadistic tendencies in Christianity he concludes it to be the main factor of its persistence:

"We can hardly doubt," he says, "that the early spread of Christianity is to be explained chiefly because the religion suited the rulers themselves. For the same reason it has survived all these centuries, and in every state where it has been subordinated to the secular power, it has become as a political force which helps the few to rule the many" (41, p. 155).

Now, it is quite likely that there are sadistic and masochistic elements both in the various theologies and moralities of Christianity as well as in its adherents. Similarly, there may be sadistic elements in the Islamic religions. Both masochism and sadism, however, are individual sexual abnormalities, whose exact aetiology is not definitely known, but whose symptoms may arise under any ideological system or clime. So that, to attribute certain social behavioural patterns in Roman Catholicism as characteristic of maso-sadism, seems to be a malapropism. At the least, such appropriation of these terms attenuates their meaning needlessly.

As we see it, the existence of these subservient patterns of behaviour in Roman Catholicism are merely socially learned patterns, and as such, serve to perpetuate this religious institution. Attitudes, or mental sets, are most easily learned during childhood. It is during these formative years of life that the old established patterns of culture become entrenched. It is thus during these early years that we interiorize our predilections, our ideas of right and wrong, good and bad, our religious or magical bend, in short, during childhood we become what we think and say and do later in life. These standards of judgment serve as the building materials with which we form our frames of reference, our attitudes for, against, or indifference to any person, group, ideological system, or institution (20). Once entrenched, a given frame of reference is as difficult to dislodge as it is easy to instil. And so, an unquestioning and submissive

frame of reference toward one's religious affiliation is a socially engendered process, one which may blind even the otherwise open-minded and analytical individual, to its shortcomings. This blinding effect of our childhood patterns of thought and behaviour, serves, more than any other cause, to perpetuate even the most pernicious tendencies in society, both in and out of systematized unreason.

In this section we have pointed out the general tendency toward submissiveness to authority which pervades systematized unreason, with special reference to Roman Catholicism. In the following section, we shall consider some of the factors which are attendant upon the submissive frame of reference, such as the deference before symbolism and ritualism.

3.

Symbolism and Ritual as Means of
Motivation and Control

"Assure a man that he has a soul and then frighten him with old wives' tales as to what is to become of it afterwards, and you have a hooked fish, a mental slave!" - Theodore Dreiser.

"...we are worshippers of archaic patterns of thought. We have erected temples of the mind and enthroned on their altars certain handed-down ideas which we are as afraid to displace as any African tribesman his equally home-made and static wooden gods....rationalized they continue to determine our attitudes and our actions toward our fellowmen..." - Rev. Frank S. PersonsII.

It has long been recognized by social scientists that associated with magic and religion are many ceremonials of an irrational, non-reflective nature (74). People everywhere are not capable or are not given to understand the various rationalizations and philosophies of their group. This is left to their leaders or functionaries, who, however, are capable of transforming these verbal rationalizations into a language which all can understand and to which they all become emotionally attached. This language is Ritual.

Strange as it may seem to the investigator of ritualistic behaviour, man, the supposed pinnacle of wisdom among the animals, derives a great deal of satisfaction from

performing all sorts of acts which have no causal effect upon the external world. He may dance when he wants rain; he may swallow a biscuit on bended knee in the hope of living forever; he may make the sign of a cross for the various purposes of chasing away evil spirits, inviting good-fortune for the new-born, immunizing himself from sickness, and insuring long life, etc.; and he may follow the directions of ignorance robed in colour and surrounded in ceremony.

The emotional satisfaction through ritualistic performance is a strong element in the complex of perseverative forces in systematized unreason. With regard to the Roman Catholic Church, this was found to be an especially appealing device to its adherents. The majority of our respondents in answer to the question regarding the religious ceremonies which they liked best,¹ showed their appreciation first of Christmas, and secondly of Easter.² The reasons given for the preference of the Midnight Mass of Christmas was best expressed by a middle-aged housewife thus: "Quand nous chantons--ça nous arrache nos entrailles," which, translated literally means, "when we sing our insides are turned inside out."

Such emotional fervor was intimated by most of our respondents except in more prosaic terms, some alluding to the "holiday spirit" of the church and the gaiety of the people,

¹ See Part I, ques. 6, of the questionnaire, in the Appendix.

² There were a few, however, who gave as their first choice, such various responses as the "Baptism of Children," "Mass for the Dead," and "Holy Week."

while one labourer, surprisingly enough, felt that the only reason 'he likes the big religious holidays is that they are also holidays from work'.

Though ritual is "standardized overt behavior of a non-logical sort" (74, p. 68), it serves a useful function, however, in the sense that it satisfies the overflow of emotions in certain situations. The pageants and gala festivals lend colour to the drab, workaday life of the ordinary man. They give him a glimpse of colour in a colourless world; they stir within him emotions of pleasure and joy which he sorely lacks; they lift him for a moment from the deadly routine of his humdrum life into the warming clasp of group participation, childish fantasy and delight. It is no wonder that he looks forward eagerly to those ceremonies which carry him away in a gust of emancipation from his cares and toils which are ever the lot of struggling man.

But these emotional satisfactions become emotional attachments to the rituals and to the functionaries who serve to bring them to the common man. This transfer of emotions from one group of phenomena to a related group is a well-known psychological characteristic, and was long ago ably expressed by Alexander Bain. In remarking upon the spread of emotions over collateral and indifferent objects, he notes a pertinent factor in the persistence of authoritarian religion, thus:

"This is carried to the utmost in religion. Holy places, symbols, rites, formalities, language, reflect and magnify the feelings toward the main object of worship...

"Human authority avails itself of such associations, in order to extend its influence. Official robes and symbols, a ceremonial of obeisance and deference, solemnities in the investiture to office, forms observed in degrading and punishing, have the effect of diffusing the respect for authority in ... society" (6, pp. 104-5).

Rituals are the overt acts revolving about and inspired by recognized symbols of the group. Inculcated at an early age, these symbols may serve as "triggers" in the hands of the functionaries to set off a mass of feeling and emotion for, against or indifference to anything. Verbal symbols, such as purgatory, hell, heaven, God, angels, and non-verbal symbols, such as pictures and statues representing more fully the imaginations surrounding the former, are the stepping-stones in the transfer of the pleasant emotions from the lifeless to the living.

The deference engendered by symbol and ritual has been and still is an undying force in keeping magic, mysticism, and religion as ever active ingredients in our social interaction. Symbols arouse and rituals satisfy, while all manner of social inefficiency becomes socially condoned by way of this purblind emotionalism.

In the following section we will discuss the manner in which the thinking and acting of the group becomes fixed in the thinking and acting of the individual.

4.

Incorporation of Cultural Patterns
Under the Self-regarding Sentiment

"Both the somnambulist and the social man are possessed by the illusion that their ideas, all of which have been suggested to them, are spontaneous." - Gabriel Tarde, "The Laws of Imitation," p. 77.

There is hardly a man who does not think well of his "self," of his beliefs, of the rationality of his behaviour and his thinking. Organized and integrated with his affects and impulses, these ideas of himself and others, form a hierarchy of sentiments of which the "self-regarding sentiment" is the dominating force (103).

Now, the ideas, emotions, and purposes that a man has, are to a large extent determined by his social milieu (20). So that when the ways of thinking and acting of a given culture are absorbed by the individual and become part of him, he tends to regard them as products of his own innate being. If he thinks something, which is and has for a long time been accepted by his culture, he thinks that it is the only way--the only right way--of thinking. If he acts in a socially accepted manner, it is the "normal" way of acting, and 'he himself' would have acted likewise had he been left to his own devices, say, on some far-off isle'--so he believes.

The child at the zoo, for instance, upon seeing the monkey take a piece of unbuttered bread to his mouth exclaims

in a tone of astonished superiority and joviality, "Mommy, look he's not even eating it with butter!" Again, last Christmas, this writer overheard a woman remarking in astonishment to her Chinese laundryman: "What! you people don't have a Christmas...?" What these examples purport to show is that, once attuned to given ways of thought and action, the individual attains an emotional attachment thereto, in which images, ideas, beliefs, and feelings form an important component under the self-regarding sentiment. The 'different', on the other hand, becomes the strange, the untrue, and accordingly to be avoided.

The self-estimate is, in a narrow sense, only that which the individual judges himself to be, but in a larger sense, this also includes the "not-me" part of the "self-other" patterns. If systematized unreason plays a strong and ubiquitous role in the "not-me" behaviour, then it too, becomes incorporated under the self-regarding sentiment at an early age. Thus, the dominating self-regarding sentiment in the individual helps hold him to his old established ways, and serves as a check upon radical departures which he might be tempted to make.

The effects of this cultural sentiment in the individual serve a good purpose, in a sense, in that they make for stability in the group. If systematized unreason be one part of the hierarchy of sentiments under the self-regarding sentiment, then it too, serves to strengthen this stability.¹

¹ That is, of course, if systematized unreason is the prevailing order of society.

If all men in a society were to think and act absolutely uniquely, without incorporating into their respective self-regarding sentiments the community of ideas and actions characteristic of the group, there would be no semblance of uniformity at all, and hence chaos would be the order of the day. "It would seem probable, McDougall writes, "that apart from the influence of society in moulding the character of its members, the behaviour of all men would be as crude, as ruthlessly self-seeking, as unrestrained by any moral considerations, as the behaviour of most other mammals" (105, p. 112).

As the child grows into adolescence and adulthood, he gradually incorporates into his system of thinking, feeling, and acting, the products of his own being as well as those of other beings in his environment. There is an internalization of the "self-other" patterns of being, which come under and become part of, the self-regarding sentiment. Not only does the individual imbibe the self-other patterns, but in so doing, there is built up within his "self" the mechanism of identification with the group. Walter Lippmann, in his book, "Public Opinion" notes a similar mechanism in the socialization of the individual, but speaks in somewhat different terms. Thus he writes:

"We are told about the world before we see it. We imagine most things before we experience them. And those pre-conceptions, unless education has made us acutely aware, govern

deeply the whole process of perception. They mark out certain objects as familiar or strange, emphasizing the difference, so that the slightly familiar is seen as very familiar and the somewhat strange as sharply alien. They are aroused by small signs, which may vary from a true index to a vague analogy. Aroused, they flood fresh vision with older images, and project into the world what has been resurrected in memory" (89, p. 90).¹

These 'resurrected pre-conceptions' are similar to our reference to the incorporation of self-other patterns under the self-regarding sentiment. They help identify the individual with his group. And this identification with the group creates one more emotional link in the chain of complex emotional attachments which exist in the individual towards his group, its ideas, its beliefs, its behavioural patterns, and in fact, its very persons.

The gradual formation of the self-regarding sentiment from childhood to adulthood tends to become crystallized about a given cultural nucleus. Once formed, the individual strives to conform to this culture, for it is part of his 'self'. To dissent is to go against his 'self' and would be like committing bodily suicide. To conform, then, to his self-regarding sentiment becomes a primary goal of the individual.

¹ The reader will recall that Levy-Bruhl presents an almost identical picture, in his conception of "pre-logical notions" in the mind of the primitive. See p. 34 above.

Interestingly enough, certain goals may continue to exist even after they have been reached, and furthermore, continue to hold a persistent influence over the individual. In his "Dynamic Psychology" R. S. Woodworth emphasizes the point that mechanisms once aroused tend to become drives in themselves. While G. W. Allport treats the subject of motives in a similar vein, pointing out that they tend to become "autonomous" and act upon the behaviour of the individual as a dynamic directing force (1). Similarly, Kurt Goldstein believes that there is one overall drive, that of "self-actualization," which may, under certain conditions, be so strong as to govern the organism accordingly (49).¹

Actually there is yet no theory that can explain for us which goals or motives become drives, and which goals gradually fade and die out. But, with respect to systematized unreason, there can be no doubt that its incorporation into the self-regarding sentiment of the individuals in a given culture, tends to have a persistent dynamic influence upon their thought and behaviour. It becomes habitual not only within the frame of a given individual but within the frame of a given culture. In fact it becomes culture itself.²

1

In contradistinction to these views there have been several experiments which have shown that the acquisition of certain behavioural patterns need not necessarily become perseverative. Wm. McDougall sums this view up by saying that the striving process towards a goal "terminates as our attention passes to other matters" (105, p. 112).

2 The term "culture" is used here in the sense that Bronislaw Malinowski defines it. He says: "Culture begins when the transition between habit and custom is made. We can define custom as habit made public by communication from one individual to others, and transferable, that is, capable of being ingrained by one generation on to the next" (95, p. 224).

Systematized unreason in whatever form, when part of the self-regarding sentiment of the majority of the people of any given society and culture, becomes then, an inevitable part of that culture, and as such is transferable from one generation to the next. It becomes "habit" in William James' meaning of the term, in that it is society's most precious conservative agent (69). For, as we explained above, its very nature is inhibitive to rationality, to an ever increasing social efficiency, and synonymous with a glorification of antiquity and the status quo ante.

Thus we see that the self-regarding sentiment of the individual can be interpreted as being also one of the psychological mechanisms involved in the incorporation and persistence of a given culture.

5.

A Battle of Words Between Psychology
and Sociology--Who's Right?

The question as to whether there are certain entities in society which have an impelling force upon the individuals in it, or whether these entities are mere creations of men and exist only in the minds of men, has for a long time occupied an imposing position in certain intellectual circles. This question has deployed the intellectuals mainly into two warring factions, the one contending that there are no superorganic forces other than the mind of the individual (the psychological camp), and the other that such forces exist and play a very important role in shaping the thought and action of the individual (the sociological camp). As an example, the reader will recall that in the introductory remarks to the section dealing with mysticism in Chapter I, the English school of anthropologists claimed that there is a universal sameness of structure of the human mind, while the French school argued that there are certain collective representations of the group as a whole which affect the function of the individual mind in a certain way. The former school thus argues from the psychological camp, while the latter argues from the sociological camp.

Now, the brief discussion concerning these two camps

is incidental to our overall purpose in this chapter, which is an investigation into the main causes for the persistence of systematized unreason. However, because it is felt that a contribution might be made to the understanding of this incidental problem by way of our interpretation of the self-regarding sentiment in the last section, it is therefore included.

The two schools have respectively adopted various terminologies to signify their outlook. The following list of terms and their proponents are but a few of the better known ones:

Sociological Terms

Folkways, Mores, and Institutions--W.G. Sumner.

Collective Representations
--Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl.

Collective Mind--G. LeBon.

Group Mind--Wm. McDougall.

Psychological Terms

Conscience--lay and theologic term.

Categorical Imperative
--Immanuel Kant.

Super Ego--Sigmund Freud.

Standard of Judgment--Hadley
Coutril.

Though there have been many polemics written on the sociological side since the time of Comte who said "Humanity is not to be defined through man, but on the contrary, man through humanity," it will, however, serve our purpose here merely to quote V. F. Calverton, who sums up this outlook thusly:

"When modern psychology makes judgments or conclusions it makesthem from the point of view of the individual and not of society. It envisages the world through the eyes of the individual instead of the community, and yet it is only through the community that the individual has intellectual consciousness. Remove the community and the individual would be helpless. He would be without language, culture, tradition. The individual, consequently, is not a product of himself but of the language, culture, and tradition of his age. He is not a separate entity but part of the collective whole. Since that collective changes with the constant alterations that take place in civilization, the individual can be studied only in terms of the whole of which he is a part and in terms of the changes which that whole experiences" (18, p. 4).

Conversely, on the psychological side there have also been many polemics written with the emphasis here on the individual, such as the extreme stand taken by F. H. Allport who writes that "There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals (1, p. 10); but again, for our purpose, it will suffice to quote a more moderate view, that of Jean Piaget, thus:

"It has seemed to us that amongst the very numerous and complex characteristics of magic described by sociologists, the belief in efficacy at a distance was the hardest to explain psychologically by studying it in relation to social life instead of isolated by itself. We have, therefore, assumed, solely as a working hypothesis, that there was continuity between the purely individual idea of efficacy and the idea implied in the social beliefs of a magical type. This does not in the least suggest that the social beliefs have not--precisely because they are social--an infinitely greater power of coercion and crystallization. It means that they are made possible by an individual psychological substratum" (119, p.392, underlining mine).

It would seem, from an analysis of these respective quotations, that the sociological view heralds special powers in the group over the individual, an emphasis which is also accepted in the psychological camp. However, in the process of emphasizing this tendency of the group versus the individual, the sociological camp tends to overlook the facts that: (1) unless there are individuals, each with psychological mechanism able to coerce; and (2) unless the respective individuals each has the psychological mechanism to act as the recipient of this coercion,--unless there are these essentials in the first place, it is of no use talking of some super organic compelling force. In other words, individuals are both the "coercers" and the "coerced."

If there be some super organic compelling force, as the sociological theories would indicate, is it not likely that it would affect a herd of cattle or a single cow, in the same way that it is supposed to affect humanity and the individual human being? The fact, however, is that only an individual trained to accept the thinking and acting of his culture as the only thinking and acting which is permissible and morally right, will accept it as such, and it will have a compelling force over him.

This is where our interpretation of the self-regarding sentiment might be of some help in the understanding of this problem. The reader will recall that William McDougall proposed the view that our sentiments are built up into

hierarchies, with the self-regarding sentiment as the dominating one. This view was implicitly accepted in the last section, and it was further expostulated that as the child grows up, it incorporates into its self-regarding sentiment the cultural patterns of the environment. Further, we hypothesized that the self-regarding sentiment acts as a goal or as a guide to the individual, towards which he steers and from which he dare not secede, lest he harm his "self" or "ego." This becomes habitual to the degree that it is hard to distinguish what is the individual psychological mechanism and what is the cultural element with which it is almost a homogeneous melange. In this melange the self-regarding sentiment is the culture to a large extent, and as a corollary, the culture forms a large part of the self-regarding sentiment. It is, in short, a "self-culture sentiment."

Now, it is precisely at this point that the sociological views seem to veer from the facts. That is, in realizing that the individual in a group does things in accordance with the culture in which he lives, and in a manner that is compelling to him, the sociological view supposes that this compelling force acts on the individual from the outside, when all along the force is actually his own psychological make-up. For, his ego-ideal is part of the "self-culture sentiment," which, as we have explained, is both his goal and his drive, and comes from within.

Nevertheless, the sociological camp, in this regard,

has done a great service in pointing out that individuals do not act necessarily in accordance with their "natural" or pristine psychological make-up. That, on the contrary, individuals act in accordance with the cultural patterns into which they are born, and that their differences in cultural patterns makes largely for the differences in their thinking and acting.

There is really no controversy between the two points of view if impartially examined. Both agree that there is no group brain out of which we could possibly expect a group mind in the same respect as an individual mind (88). Both agree that no individual, if left to his own devices in some far-off deserted isle could develop any stage of civilization in the commonly accepted sense of the word. Therefore, it seems that the issue is one of a misunderstanding of phraseologies which lead to differences of interpretation of the facts. In this light then, it would seem wise to discard certain phraseologies which lead to equivocation. Such decisions, as well as others, might be arrived at, at international conferences of social scientists.¹

No one need overlook the strength that the group carries over the individual's thinking and acting. Thus it

¹ Such conferences have been held in other fields with great success, and there is no good reason as far as I can see, that similar conferences may not be held in the field of the social sciences.

seems possible to accept both the sociological and psychological points of view, with a rider providing that certain wordings be altered or discarded. Terms, such as "Group Mind," "Conscience" and others, carry an inevitable aura of mystery and equivocation. Unless we qua social scientists can delineate and co-relate these terms to their referents, then they will continue to block needlessly the upward struggle toward a more scientific science of society.

6.

Summary and Application

When we ask someone, "Why do you subscribe or conform to this or that form of systematized unreason?" the most probable reply is: "It helps me or satisfies me in such or another way." And the respondent is right. He is right because he "feels" he is right, and there can be no doubt that there is a great deal in what he says or feels. From this we are led to infer that systematized unreason to a great extent is dependent for its existence upon the function it serves its adherents. "La fonction fait l'organe."

A way of life, even an unscientific one, is better than no way, for "no way" must needs lead to anarchy and chaos. Even the most uncivilized peoples have a way of life. They have systems of sanctions and controls which are transmitted from generation to generation, a lex non scripta, and which keeps their society in some order at any rate. Primitive men live together because it is easier than living alone. Similarly, more highly civilized societies live in groups because it is easier than struggling for an existence by oneself.

In systematized unreason, as that exemplified by the Catholic Church, the basic purpose presumably is to satisfy human needs arising out of the struggle with the elements, universal biological needs, and needs engendered through social interaction. Built on this keel, though with widely different

superstructures of thought and action, may be found all the various systems of socialized behaviour in diverse forms of systematized unreason, as we have alluded to in Chapter I.

Through the long history of the Catholic Church, which in turn was based largely upon the past experience of large sections of the human race (15, 54, 75), there have evolved certain socially beneficent systems and institutions in the greater framework of the parent body. Side by side with the irrational practices and beliefs, which have been treated here to some extent, have grown up institutions of healing, and of philanthropy of various kinds, in short, a way of life, which is very pleasing to some, and the only means of subsistence for others.

The richer and more educated classes of French Canadian Roman Catholics could probably get along well enough without recourse to the church. But, as one of my respondents explained, they were born into it and do not feel harmed by it, thus remaining even willingly. On the other hand, the lower classes, especially those who find it difficult to find employment, or those who cannot "stand on their own feet" in times of distress, find the Church as the sole Mother to whom they may turn for consolation-relief from life's travails. This gives them a temporary, though unrealistic, feeling of control over their particular misfortune. Thus there are two types of Catholics, the richer erudite class, and the poor and unlearned class, the latter of which makes

up the mass of the adherents of the church.¹

The erudite class, of which a substantial section of the clergy form a part, conceals scientific advances and other ideas which may be contradictory and embarrassing to the Church.² One of my informants expressed the rightness of this concealment along these lines: "Take "Das Kapital" by Karl Marx, for instance. We who are more educated than the ordinary butcher, baker, or candlestick maker, know that he was a sincere man with many great ideas. But, if the unlearned mass of the people were to read such literature, do you think they could understand it or interpret it wisely? Of course not! They might be led to make rash decisions, for, due to their lower intelligence, and lack of appropriate learning and powers of restraint, they might readily lose their balance, and God knows what would be if such were allowed to occur. So you see, that is why we must have systems of controls, in the same way, that we have red and green traffic lights. Thus, rather than mislead the people, we are actually protecting them from themselves."

Since it was the writer's business at the time of this investigation to get information, no categorical reply was made to the above statement in order not to antagonize the respondent. Needless to say, however, the learned respondent overlooked certain important facts. For instance,

¹ The above observations and conclusions were reached by the writer and two French Canadian acquaintances of the Roman Catholic faith, one of whom holds a doctorate degree in psychology.

² The "index expurgatorius," for instance, is an example of what the Church does to "pull the wool" over the people's eyes.

many other religious faiths do not have an "index" or other methods of concealment of knowledge, and still they manage to get along in a more or less non-chaotic manner. Again, whereas traffic lights are meant to control all, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, alike, the index and other controls in the Catholic Church set up artificial strictures among the people, creating un-natural classes and almost rigid stratification of these groups.

Nevertheless, the Catholic Church has built up around it a way of life which is most probably satisfying to the majority of its adherents. Because of this reason, among the others cited in this thesis,¹ it perseveres, and moreover, presents a veneer of dignity and satisfaction both to its adherents and outsiders alike. In a similar manner, too, as the reader will recall, our discussion in Chapter I referred to several instances among primitive adherents of magic and mysticism (animism), where their way of life was satisfying enough to them to blind them to more socially efficient ways of life. They too, felt theirs to be the best of all systems and beliefs.

A way of life may thus be the greatest of all good or the greatest of all evil. By inference, we must conclude that that way of life which is open change with change is good,

¹ It has been emphasized several times throughout the text, that the discussion here is not meant to portray a total picture of the reasons for the continued persistence of systematized unreason, but merely to contribute some ideas and facts which may lend themselves to such a venture.

and that which gets stuck in a quagmire of antiquity is bad. The one leads to a life in accordance with changing reality, the other leads to ever greater irrationality and paradox.

Conclusion of Part II

In this section we have enlarged and elaborated on some of the factors of systematized unreason, with special emphasis on religion in general. Where specific factors have been treated they have been mainly with regard to the Roman Catholic Church. Such details as the processes of thought were investigated, shown to be infantile and similar to that of primitives in many ways. An hypothesis regarding the probable evolution of thinking and acting towards an ever greater use of the scientific system in dealing with life's problems, was posited. Later, by showing some of the psychological characteristics common to all men, and some of the impersonal coercive characteristics of systematized unreason such as in the Roman Catholic Church, we were able to record some of the possible reasons for its persistence.

In Part III, we will endeavour to point to some of the possible means necessary in order to precipitate social evolution from systematized unreason towards ever greater social efficiency. In this task, it will be necessary to draw heavily from the conclusions above, in order to help us in our inferences in accordance with the original purpose.

PART III

CONCLUSIONS:

FROM A SOCIAL ENGINEERING STANDPOINT

CHAPTER VII

In the Service of Social Change

"...If we once start thinking, no one can guarantee where we shall come out, except that many objects, ends and institutions are doomed. Every thinker puts some portion of an apparently stable world in peril, and no one can wholly predict what will emerge in its place." - John Dewey.

"Every step forward in the progress of Mankind is the result of someone challenging the existing order and proposing a change."
- C. G. Patterson, ed. Free Mind, May 1945.

In Part I, we dealt with the common trends in magic, mysticism, and religion, under the collective term, "systematized unreason," and compared it with the scientific system. This served as a background to the subject matter of Part II, where certain social and psychological characteristics of religion were investigated. In an endeavour to bring the past two sections to their logical conclusion, we will briefly indicate here some of the changes required in society in order to make for greater social efficiency.¹ For, the social engineer who is interested in the social amelioration of mankind must try not only to indicate the causes for a particular maladjustment in society but must

1

See p. 91, where this term is defined.

also undertake to prescribe certain changes which may eliminate the causes (74, Chapter XVI). This attempt is made in accordance with the social aims of science which we have outlined in Chapter III above, and should therefore be interpreted only in that light.

1.

Security, a Prerequisite to Man's
Abandonment of Systematized Unreason

"The Golden Age of humanity is not behind us; it is yet to come, and will be found in the perfection of the social order." - Saint Simon.

"...security will smash superstition, where education, prohibition, sermons, satire, and science have miserably failed."
- Brenton Berry.

Man has come a long way since the time when he left the trees, stood up, shook off his fur, and enlarged his brain. He has fought through the tempest and the storm of a 'nature red in tooth and claw'; he has tamed the elements and subdued the beast; he has explored the oceans and the skies, and has peered at objects too small for his eyes. He has done all that and much more.

In the infancy of the race he also invented magic and animism, and later religion and mysticism. They were all born of necessity--born to cuddle man in his fear and his wants. They were the offspring of a species wallowing in the darkness of ignorance and the torment of insecurity. And, sad to say, insecurity and ignorance, the twin evils of mankind are still with us in the never-ending struggle for existence.

'What will the morrow bring?' is still on every lip as it must have been on the mind of the cave-man.

'Will my neighbour make a newer and better arrow to kill me with the more easily? Will he discover my hunting grounds and wish to crowd me out? Will his clan invade mine and make us their slaves?' Today the problems are still quite similar. Instead of "arrow" read "bomb"; instead of "hunting" read "trade and commerce"; and instead of "clan" read "nation"; and you have the insecurity and hardships of our own day.

What can we conclude from all this? It is this: That unless man can be made to feel secure, both from economic¹ and from psychological points of view, then the upward struggle towards greater social efficiency must of necessity be an infinitely long one. There must be individual and social security. There must be a society where the one is in some measure secure from the inclinations of the many, and where the many are in some measure secure from the

1

We agree with the Marxists that economics is a large determining factor in the shaping of history. However, this factor has not been too highly stressed in this thesis, because we feel that even economic factors are functions of the human beings who largely create them. Cf. in this regard Prof. Henri Sée's "The Economic Interpretation of History" (135), where it is shown that economic factors in historical and present-day evolvement are not the only determinants, as some writers would indicate. There are chance factors and personality factors, which also play commanding roles in shaping men's thinking and institutions, etc. See also, Olaf Stapledon's "Philosophy and Living" (143), whose chapter on "Social Change" is a similar critique of the Marxist school of thought.

idiosyncracies of the one.

This writer does not pretend to know how this security is to be brought about. In the ensuing sections, however, will be indicated certain conclusions which, if adopted, may be ancillary to such a condition in society.

2.

Social Security Through Social Science

"When wisdom rules man will be at peace with himself." - Plato, "The Republic."

"The hand that follows intellect can achieve." - Michelangelo.

"The time has come when scientific truth must cease to be the property of the few-- when it must be woven into the common life of the world." - Louis Agassiz.

"On the continued progress of science depends not only the realization of the conquest of poverty and disease but all the means of significant change in human society." - J.D. Bernal, F.R.S.

"Fear and faith have ruled much of man's past, but the millenium is still far away. Now let us try what may be accomplished by understanding. Give science a chance." - A.J. Carlson.

It has been indicated several times above that the process of change from the lowly and socially inefficient to the complex and socially efficient is not an easy one. The ascent from the childish to the adult, from the superstitious to the scientific, from the wishful to the realistic, may be marked by much hardship and suffering. For, in the process, old ideas are overthrown, obsolete methods are abandoned and new and more capable ones are put in their place.

This social transition has its counterpart in the transition period from childhood to adulthood. This period of growing up,--adolescence--can be a pleasant interlude only if the individual is mentally prepared for it, i.e. resigned and expectant of the change that unceasingly is about to alter his total make-up. If the individual is not prepared for the change, adolescence can be the exact opposite of that which poets and bards are often wont to sing about and yearn after. For it can be marked by general unrest and upheaval.

Similarly, the shock of social adolescence could be cushioned if proper precautions be taken. Society must be counselled and guided during the difficult passage across. Wise counselling to the average adolescent can only be based on scientifically proved facts. Likewise, wise counselling to the group, if ever it is to grow up from its childish lethargy of systematized unreason, must be based on scientifically corroborated knowledge. For, the chances seem greatest that wise social engineering can come from those quarters which have made a scientific study of society their life-work. The ills of the body are most wisely treated by the medically trained practitioner; so, likewise the ills of society must be treated by those trained in the ills of society.¹ No sensible person nowadays runs to the

¹ There is an important difference, however, between these two professional groups. Whereas, one or more individuals will entrust their bodies or their minds into the hands of one medical practitioner, society is not likely (and rightly so), to entrust itself in the hands of any one social scientist. Only an international body of social scientists should be entrusted with such a tremendous task.

medicine man or witch doctor when he is sick or when he is trying to prevent sickness, and likewise, a wise society, which is merely a collective term for the aggregate of individuals comprising it, should not allow itself to be cared for by those not adequately equipped to do the job.

But, old ideas and old ways die hard. Society is change-resistant and loaded down with the incubus of the past. Only a deliberate attempt on the part of scientists to clear away the rubble of antiquity and to teach and show above all, that the scientific system¹ in the hands of trained social specialists, each with different contributions to make to the welfare of society, may cut through the hideous confusion of today. Only intellect freed from the bounds of an unchanging past, working in harmony with other intellects similarly freed, may seek out the way. This position is admirably stated in a "Political and Economic Planning" broadsheet:

"A large element in the population, educated and uneducated, has yet to recognize that the same technique which has produced electricity, wireless, aircraft, fertilizers, and new breeds of plants and animals, can, if suitably adapted, produce on just as lavish a scale, the social, political, and economic inventions of which we are so desperately in need." ²

¹ See Chapter III where this system is outlined..

² Quoted in part from J. D. Bernal, "The Social Function of Science" (9, pp. 90-91).

Until social systems base their premises and practices on strictly scientific grounds, it remains for socially-minded scientists and other like-minded people to show the way. No opportunity should be lost by them in an effort to bring such to pass. No opportunity should be lost in taking science to the people, since the people are often restrained from coming to science. In contradistinction to some who believe that only by going backwards can we reach these goals, we can only decry such preachments as the last blasts of a superstitious age quickly coming to its doom. For instance, Fulton Oursler, senior editor of Reader's Digest suggests that scientists stop criticizing myths and superstitions and accept them instead:

"Scientists today are saying, 'repent.'... Scientists once believed that it was possible to keep the ethics of Christianity while dismissing the 'myths' and 'superstitutions' upon which religion is founded. Now they see their mistake. They see a great danger and they are frightened."¹

Scientists are not 'repenting' and they are not 'frightened'. If they are repenting, it is only because science is not more fully entrenched in the minds of men blindly groping about in the search for security. If scientists are frightened, it is only because the products of science may fall into the hands of those incapable of using them properly for social benefit. We find the latest manifestation of such a view among many scientific circles with regard to scientifically discovered machines of war,

¹ As reported in The Montreal Daily Star, Feb. 4, 1946.

and this outlook is expressed by Dr. F. W. Hanley writing recently in The Canadian Scientist, thus:

"Scientific knowledge, scientific method, applied to the problems of human society can be the means of ensuring freedom from want and fear. Nothing less should be the goal of scientists today. Science, one of the most fruitful products of the human mind, must never again be used by irresponsible groups for destruction or prevented from making its fullest contribution to society" (55, p. 2).

If scientists desire these things: if they desire to remove the irrational thinking and acting in society, and the misery which inevitably goes with it, then they must be willing to make themselves heard on these matters. They cannot afford to wait for millenium, they must work for it. They must apply themselves not only in the study of the causes of irrationality in our civilization, but they must also apply their logical conclusions to it. If social scientists choose to serve merely as observers of social phenomena and refrain from drawing conclusions which might be of value to mankind, then indeed, they are merely 'useless academicians', as many physicists and other scientists are sometimes wont to think (9).

But not all social scientists are thus inclined, and, even for the sake of prestige alone, we, qua social scientists, must constantly push to the fore those among us who are willing and daring enough to go before the public with the studied conclusions of the group as a whole. We will not always be correct in our conclusions; we must, because we are

human beings, make many mistakes. But then again, the doctors of our bodies and our minds likewise make many mistakes--Who would dare oppose the studied conclusions of the medical profession with regard to matters of prevention and cure of disease? Similarly, social scientists working as a body in the interests of society, can help give society the security it sorely needs. But first, social scientists must be willing.

In section 1, the question of individual and social security was indicated as a necessity in the attempt to produce, modify and remove non-rational beliefs and practices. In this section, it was implied that unless social scientists, who, more than any other professionals, study these social phenomena,--unless they were willing to apply their efforts towards that end, then security will be a much longer time in coming than is necessary. In the following section will be indicated some of the tasks which social psychologists and other scientists might set for themselves in order to expedite this aim.

3.

Education to Reality

"Although for many years to come weaker minds lacerated by fear may yearn to live in a world of make-believe instead of in one that is, the strong and the fearless, the yea-sayers, the fuglemen of the race, flourishing aloft the torch bequeathed them by Epicurus and Lucretius, will struggle to wipe out the darkness of superstition and make men into gods instead of gods into men."
- V.F. Calverton, "The Passing of the Gods."

"The most direct and effective way to foster freedom is through the scientific method, which engenders open-mindedness, well-trained emotions, and a healthy skepticism."
- The Commission on the Relation of School and College.

We have seen that systematized unreason is incompatible with science. We have seen too, that systematized unreason makes for delusion and unrealistic thinking. It follows then, that in order to eliminate these hinderances to science, which are consequently, hinderances to greater social efficiency, it is necessary to undo the hold that systematized unreason has over the minds of men. Once scientists recognize the need for greater participation in this struggle to free the human mind from the bondage of individual and social autisms, it is incumbent on them to wedge their way into the omnipresent incubus of an obsolete past.

In accordance with the aims of this thesis as presented in the Introduction, I believe therefore, that the major conclusion that can be drawn from the work at this point, is that there is a pressing need for societal education to reality. It is the need for man to stand on his own feet and confess his helplessness and his ignorance when confronted with overpowering burdens. It is the need to grow from social infancy to social adulthood, from the childish illusion of the 'self' extended with a providential cosmos,¹ to the clear-sighted realization that both 'good' and 'bad' are wrought on earth by man himself. It is the need for men to think freely and uninhibited by the autisms of his group. For, when men will learn to think freely, uninhibited and unafraid, untied from their passions and shorn from the irrational attachments to antiquated authority, then might this world be free from war, from hate, from oppression, from intellect chained and bound.

But how might such a condition come about? There have been numerous ways suggested by various authors, pointing in the main to the need for an early training of children in the principle of the scientific attitude and method. Such training, along with an interiorization of the social aims of science, would probably go a long way in obviating

¹ See p. 38, where Piaget's term "undifferentiated absolute" and Levy-Bruhl's term "Loi de Participation" are discussed.

much of the mental suffering and mental conflict which is becoming ever more prevalent in our society.¹ Such training would instil in the individual an outlook of independence of thought and action, and yet enhance in him a desire to co-operate and strive for the benefit of his group.

A universal training in the outlook of the scientific system would probably do much to overcome the inadequacies of childhood training in many a home. It is being increasingly realized by psychiatrists and psychologists that much of the mental conflict which arises in adult life in our society, is due to faulty childhood training. Many of our neurotics and psychotics are often grown babies who have never learned to face the world realistically (85). They had been taught to "run to Mamma" and encouraged, or at least not hindered from using such dereistic mechanisms as fantasy and day-dreaming in facing life's problems. These adult babies or civilized primitives are the human materials through whose wishfulfilling outlook many a scheming demagogue is enabled to tread upon those not so unrealistically inclined.

Social psychologists and other social scientists can do much to overcome this situation by availing themselves of some of the various techniques used in propaganda.²

¹ We suggested above that one of the reasons for this high incidence of neuroticism is the conflict of the modes of acting and thinking of the past with the ever-changing modes of the present. An attitude of resignation toward change would thus be desirable.

² See for instance L. Doob's "Propaganda, Its Psychology and Technique" (33), where many of the principles described therein might be used to advantage in such a venture.

By these means they might more easily reach large sections of the population in this scientifically orientated drive to remove systematized unreason and other forms of social inefficiency from the social and individual life of man.

There are some writers who point out that a transition from one system of thinking and acting based on the authority of sacredness and tradition, to another system based on secular arguments, may have little chance of survival. Prof. Robert Faris, for instance warns that "traditional knowledge and morality must rest on authority of some sort, but when the sacredness of old ways disappears, a transition to new standards which are to be justified and maintained on the basis of secular arguments can not always be maintained" (40, p. 13).

Indeed, 'traditional knowledge and morality must rest on authority of some sort', but in a societal set-up where reality is faced with a realistic spirit, men have no need to rely on authority overmuch. Such traditional knowledge would be found only in ancient books and read only by specialists for historical purposes, and by the layman for a pastime. If it is a knowledge which is always useful then it is not traditional but is living knowledge capable of enhancing social efficiency. In a societal set-up where the scientific spirit is triumphant and the spirit of servility before obsolete folk knowledge or tradition is secondary, it does not follow that 'a transition to new standards...on the

basis of secular arguments can not always be maintained'. For, rather than an easy reliance upon recurrent and inept fixity, people in such a set-up must needs be expectant of and happily resigned to change.

The realization that all civilizations, past and present, have been plagued with the autisms of mass escape from reality in one form or another, can lead only to one major conclusion. And that is, that those who are aware of this harmful deadweight in our midst must turn their energies in a concerted effort to get at the causes for it, and concomitantly to seek ways and means of eliminating the causes. There seems to be no other way.

Conclusion of Part III

In section 1, the lack of security in the struggle for existence was pointed out as being the main ground from which systematized unreason reaps its harvest. It was then suggested that social scientists aided by the findings in all fields, might best utilize them by applying them to meet social needs. Finally, in section 3, the need for an education to reality in society was indicated, and the suggestion put forth that more study be made on the causes and cure of unrealistic thinking.

APPENDIX

Method and Procedure of the Research

In accordance with the purpose of the thesis, as explained in the Introduction, a questionnaire relating to the various sections, was drawn up. The aim, as the reader will recall, was to probe a number of characteristics related to systematized unreason. Such an undertaking, however, could not be done thoroughly with respect to magic, mysticism, and religion. It was therefore decided to draw up a list of questions with the purpose of presenting them to adherents of a religious group, and from the results obtained, to generalize where possible upon the characteristics of systematized unreason as a whole.

French Canadians in the Montreal district of the Roman Catholic faith were arbitrarily chosen to be the respondents to the questionnaire, and the latter was accordingly drawn up to be as closely congruous with their belief as possible. However, such questions which were very openly Catholic, especially those which tended to bring into relief private beliefs,¹ feelings, and attitudes, were considerably disguised, in order not to antagonize the respondents. Thus, in order to offset the likelihood of a poor batch of responses, some of the questions bearing directly on religion were worded

¹ Cf. P. E. Vernon, "Questionnaires, Attitude Tests" (149), where the distinction between 'private' and 'public' attitudes, is more fully elaborated.

in such a manner as to admit of the possibility of their being answered by non-Catholics. Further, in order to make our respondents feel that they were not being singled out for investigation, a number of questions having no bearing on the present study were purposely included. See for example, questions 3 and 4 of Part I. Moreover, many of the questions were re-worded several times in order to make for the greatest clarity of meaning as well as to make for the least emotional resistance and inhibition on the part of the respondents. Finally, all these precautions were taken for the highly practical reason that to antagonize the members of any one religious institution might run the risk of retaliation both upon the University and on the present investigator. Such a risk was felt to be undesirable, so that, as much as possible, the questions were "toned down" to a large extent whenever this necessity was brought to our attention.¹

The order of the questions was divided into four parts, according to the purpose they were designed to serve, as follows:

Part I - Means of persistence of Systematized Unreason.

Part II- Personality characteristics

Part III - Degree and manner of scientific admixture with

¹ Investigators concerned mainly with college students as respondents, need not necessarily be so wary about the potential ill-feeling that their study might evoke. See for instance, D. Katz and F.H. Allport's "Students' Attitudes," especially chapters XV - XVII.

Systematized Unreason.

Part IV - Thought processes.

This order of presentation was necessary, as it was felt that in this way the questions were on an increasing scale of emotionally involved elements. Furthermore, this probably had the effect of allaying any fears or suspicions that the respondents might have had, and to draw them on to the completion of the questionnaire. On the whole, it was found that respondents were distrustful at first, but more and more talkative as the questioning proceeded.

Most studies on religion have been made with the aid of College students as the respondents. As a result, age groups, socio-economic levels, intellectual and intelligence levels, and other important data, such as family background and certain personality traits, could be readily ascertained (61, 114). In the present case, however, such information could not be ascertained as such an investigation would have entailed a staff of trained interviewers and other personnel, a requisite which this study did not possess.

A total of 39 questionnaires were completed, the present investigator acting as interviewer in all cases. Many more than this small number might have been completed, had we distributed the questionnaire to hundreds of prospective respondents for self-completion. However, it was felt that for the sake of expediency, bearing in mind the nature of the data sought, it was wiser not to allow the questionnaires to

fall into the hands of certain people who might be offended by them.

In all instances, the respondents were selected at random without regard to socio-economic level, in various French Canadian areas of Montreal. They were all over the age of twenty-one, and there were slightly more than half women as compared to men. All the interviews were carried out in loco, that is, at the place where the respondent was contacted, whether at home, in the factory, in a monastery or at school, and were conducted in French. The attitude of the investigator was such as to make for the greatest amount of amicability between the respondent and himself, and at all times, it was endeavoured to have no one else around but the interviewer and the respondent. For, as Wallin well knows, "the role of the investigator should be one which does not stimulate the anxiety or insecurity feelings of the subject" (150, p. 201).¹ As a result of this approach, the respondent may sometimes give the interviewer more valuable information than is called for by the questions themselves.

Limitations of the Questionnaire. Apart from the fact that questionnaires in general have fallen into disrepute of late among certain writers (163), there are several factors which

¹ In general, the instructions given in Wallin's paper, "The Case Study," were followed as closely as possible in the interviewing. Moreover, the experience gained as an interviewer during the summer of 1945 for an industrial research company, was invaluable to the writer.

cause the present questionnaire to be especially conspicuous in this regard. There are two main difficulties with it, as follows:

1. The questions do not elicit what is called for, and in this way, they may be regarded as invalid. That is, the replies received were largely such which the respondent felt were required of him as a Roman Catholic in good standing with his Church. Thus time after time, catechetical replies were elicited, rather than the innermost thoughts and feelings of the respondent. They are, in other words, what Allport has called "institutional" replies (1). However, as Vernon points out "the investigator (should) admit the likelihood of such distortions, and follow them up by comparing his results with data obtained from other sources e.g. ...from direct observation. Even if he has only been able to collect records of people's 'public attitudes', and has failed to penetrate to their privately held opinions, his results may still be of social psychological interest" (149, p. 208). It is only in this way, then, that the present questionnaire was of some value.

2. Since there were no statistical or other checks on the validity of the questionnaire, the results were necessarily interpreted with many reservations. Thus, in order to avoid the ever-present tendency of subjective interpretation, very few of the results were actually incorporated within the body of the text. The answers were regarded as suggestive of the actual nature of what was sought rather

than representative of the true nature, ipso facto. For these reasons, it was largely necessary to make recourse to other writers who have written on related topics.

APERÇU D'OPINION GENERALE

Ce travail est entrepris afin d'obtenir un aperçu des idées et opinions générales sur des questions diverses, entretenues par des personnes dans toutes les classes de la société. Et, comme plusieurs de ces questions concernent la religion, vous pouvez vous imaginer que ceci est un projet très important. Vous pouvez aider à cette oeuvre importante, en remplissant le questionnaire aussi franchement et aussi soigneusement que possible.

Ceci n'est pas une épreuve d'intelligence ni une épreuve d'aucune sorte. Il n'est pas question que vos réponses soient exactes ou inexactes: votre opinion vaut autant que celle de n'importe qui. De plus, on ne vous demande aucune marque d'identification; donc, nous vous demandons de répondre en toute liberté et avec absolue sincérité, car vos réponses seront traitées de façon absolument confidentielle.

Si, après avoir rempli le questionnaire, vous aimiez discuter quelques aspects en particulier, veuillez écrire vos nom, adresse, et numéro de téléphone sur la dernière page, afin que nous de l'Université, puissions vous atteindre. Vous pouvez être assuré que vos opinions resteront tout-à-fait confidentielles.

S. V. P., essayez de répondre à chaque question. De plus, n'hésitez pas à écrire dans les marges, si vous le trouvez nécessaire, afin d'expliquer plus complètement certaines de vos réponses.

Percy Black, étudiant,
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research,
McGill University, Montreal.

Sexe: _____ Age: _____ Occupation: _____
Education: primaire, secondaire, université (rayez ceux qui ne s'appliquent pas)
Classe Economique: supérieure, bourgeoise, pauvre (rayez ceux qui ne s'appliquent pas)

- I
1. Si vous étiez pauvre, et étiez sans travail, pensez-vous qu'il serait mieux de mourir de faim que de voler?
Oui _____ Non _____ Je ne sais pas _____
 2. (La question suivante est seulement pour des personnes de la religion protestante; les autres n'ont pas besoin de répondre.) Pensez-vous que votre secte particulière est meilleure que n'importe quelle autre?
Oui _____ Non _____ Je ne sais pas _____
Remarques (s'il y a lieu):
 3. (La question suivante est seulement pour des personnes de la foi catholique; les autres peuvent se dispenser de répondre.) Pensez-vous que le Pape est inspiré par Dieu, et par conséquent ne peut se tromper?
Oui _____ Non _____ Je ne sais pas _____
Remarques (s'il y a lieu) :

4. (Les questions suivantes sont pour des personnes de n'importe quel groupe religieux.)

- (a) Pensez-vous que ce serait une bonne chose si tout le monde était de la même foi? Oui _____ Non _____ Je ne sais pas _____
- (b) Si votre réponse était "oui", veuillez s. v. p., noter quelle religion serait la plus convenable.....
Si votre réponse était "non", veuillez indiquer brièvement vos raisons.

5. Concernant les pouvoirs politiques, croyez-vous que votre Eglise devrait en avoir: (a) plus ____; (b) moins ____; (c) autant qu'à présent _____
Je ne sais pas _____

6. (a) Lesquelles des cérémonies religieuses de toute l'année préférez-vous?

(b) Quelle partie de ces cérémonies vous plaît le mieux?

7. Est-ce que vous aimez ordinairement les membres de votre propre groupe religieux mieux que les autres?

II

1. Veuillez dire en vos propres mots ce que vous désirez le plus dans la vie?

2. Lesquelles sont vos craintes les plus graves? (s. v. p. essayez d'être aussi franc que possible.)

3. Lesquelles des choses suivantes occupent le plus souvent vos pensées? (Exemple: Si vous pensez à "l'âme" le plus souvent, mettez le numéro "1" au-dessus du mot "âme"; si "purgatoire" se trouve le suivant dans vos pensées, mettez le numéro "2" dessus du mot purgatoire, etc.)
la confession, le diable, des choses sexuelles, le ciel, la politique, Trinité, Communion, purgatoire, Dieu, la mort, âme, religion.

4. De ceux que vous avez choisis comme les trois premiers, s. v. p., dites pourquoi ils occupent vos pensées le plus.

5. Avez-vous jamais eu des visions?..... Si oui, à quel sujet?

6. Avez-vous jamais eu des rêves concernant la Sainte Famille ou les Saints?..... Si oui, s. v. p., décrivez brièvement ces rêves.

7. Avez-vous jamais eu le sentiment d'une puissance inexplicable qui vous entourait, vous enveloppait, pour ainsi dire?.....
Si oui, expliquez votre sentiment, s. v. p.

8. S'il n'y avait pas de ciel, pensez-vous que la vie vaudrait la peine?

9. Si vous portez un crucifix ou médaillon, dans quel but le portez-vous?

10. (a) Sentez-vous plus libre de "parler à coeur ouvert" sur des sujets qui vous troublent, au Bon Dieu qu'à quelqu'un autre? Pourquoi?

(b) Vous sentez-vous soulagé après avoir communiqué vos sentiments à Dieu?
Vous sentez-vous proche de lui en de pareilles occasions?.....
Expliquez, s. v. p.

11. Priez-vous souvent?..... Si oui, comment vous sentez-vous si vous y manquez quelques fois? (Si vous ne vous rappelez pas d'avoir jamais manqué, essayez, s. v. p. , de vous imaginer dans une telle situation.

III

1. Certains gens pensent que si nous pouvons augmenter nos connaissances au radio, il serait possible de communiquer avec d'autres mondes, comme le Ciel, par exemple. Qu'est-ce que vous pensez à ce sujet?

2. Les hommes de science font des expériences répétées avant d'accepter quelque chose comme vrai. Pensez-vous que c'est une bonne méthode et que l'on ferait bien de la suivre dans la vie quotidienne?
Expliquez, s. v. p.

3. Pensez-vous qu'une foi profonde et la prière sincère, peuvent guérir des maladies?..... Si vous connaissez des cas de ce genre, veuillez donner quelques détails.

4. Pensez-vous que l'Homme est un descendant d'êtres moins perfectionnés? Oui _____ Non _____ Je ne sais pas _____ Expliquez votre réponse, s. v. p.

5. Pensez-vous que les hommes de science devraient faire des recherches sur la religion et autres matières religieuses?
Oui _____ Non _____ Je ne sais pas _____
Remarques (s'il y a lieu) _____

6. Pensez-vous que le diable puisse causer la maladie, la folie, les malheurs? Oui _____ Non _____ Je ne sais pas _____
Remarques (s'il y a lieu) _____

7. Avez-vous jamais eu des doutes concernant (a) Dieu.....
(b) Trinité.....
(Répondez par "oui" ou "non", selon les (c) Communion.....
circonstances) (d) Ciel.....
(e) Purgatoire.....

IV

1. (a) Croyez-vous au destin? Oui _____ Non _____ Je ne sais pas _____
(b) Qu'entendez-vous par le mot "destin"?

2. Dites, s. v. p. où vous pensez que sont les suivants, et ce qu'ils
Peuvent être: (a) Ciel
(b) Purgatoire
(c) Dieu
(d) Les Saint-Esprits
(e) Ame
(f) Diable

3. (a) Quand pensez-vous que nous recevons nos âmes?

(b) Qu'est-ce que vous pensez qu'elles deviennent avec nos âmes
quand nous mourrons?

4. Qu'est-ce que vous pensez que le Frère André possédait qui lui
permettait de guérir les malades et les infirmes?

5. Si vous désirez ardemment quelque chose, et priez beaucoup pour
l'obtenir, vos prières sont-elles ordinairement exaucées?

Oui _____ Non _____ Je ne sais pas _____

Remarques (s'il y a lieu) _____

6. Que demandez-vous en général, quand vous priez? (nommez, s. v. p.,
des choses pour lesquelles vous avez prié dans le passé.)

7. (a) D'après vous, que se passe-t-il pendant le temps qui s'écoule
entre votre prière, et le temps où votre demande est accordée?

(b) Si vos prières ne sont pas exaucées, quelles sont les raisons
de ce refus, d'après vous?

8. Pensez-vous que l'eau bénite ait des effets bienfaisants?

Oui _____ Non _____ Je ne sais pas _____

Expliquez-vous, brièvement, s. v. p.

9. Comment, en votre opinion, serait-il possible de se débarrasser
du diable?

- I. 1. Si les médecins arrivaient à ressusciter des personnes après la mort, est-ce que cela affecterait vos croyances actuelles à ce sujet? Oui _____ Non _____ Je ne sais pas _____
S. V. P., expliquer brièvement.
- II. 1. Pouvez-vous décrire vos sentiments pendant la communion?
2. Décrivez, s. v. p., vos sentiments les plus intimes, quand vous péchez.
- III. 1. Certains chimistes ont essayé de prouver que le pain et le vin subissent aucune transformation pendant la communion. Quelle est votre opinion à ce sujet?
2. Indiquez dans le carré approprié votre opinion au sujet de l'affirmation suivante: La Religion devrait rester comme elle est pour toujours. Oui _____ Non _____ Je ne sais pas _____
Expliquez votre réponse, si possible.
- IV. 1. Puisque la Sainte-Trinité est partout, croyez-vous qu'elle ne fait qu'Un? Oui _____ Non _____ Je ne sais pas _____
Remarques (s'il y a lieu).
2. Pensez-vous que le baptême efface le péché originel d'un nouveau-né? Oui _____ Non _____ Je ne sais pas _____
Expliquez brièvement, votre réponse, s. v. p.

REFERENCES

1. Allport, F.H. Social Psychology. Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1924.
2. Allport, G.W. "Attitudes." A Handbook of Social Psychology. Edited by C. Murchison. Worcester, Mass.: Clark Univ. Press, 1935, Chapter 17.
3. Allport, G.W. Personality, a Psychological Interpretation. New York: Henry Holt, 1938.
4. Allport, G.W. "The Ego in Contemporary Psychology." Reprinted from Psychological Review, 1943, 50:5.
5. Ayres, C.E. Science the False Messiah. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1927.
6. Bain, Alexander. Mental and Moral Science. London: Longmans, Green, 1884.
7. Becker, Carl L. "The Function of the Social Sciences." Science and Man. Edited by R. N. Anshen. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942.
8. Bernal, J.D. The World, The Flesh, and The Devil. London: Kegan Paul, French, Trubner, 1929.
9. Bernal, J.D. The Social Function of Science. London: George Routledge, 1939.
10. Berry, Brenton. You and Your Superstitutions. Columbia, Mo.: Lucas Bros. 1940.
11. Bertocci, P.A. "The Psychological Self, The Ego, and Personality." Psychological Review, 1945, 52:91-
12. Britt, S.H. Social Psychology of Modern Life. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944, Chapter 25.
13. Broad, C. D. The Mind and Its Place in Nature. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925.
14. Brown, J. F. Psychology and the Social Order. New York: McGraw Hill, 1936.
15. Browne, Lewis. This Believing World. New York: Macmillan, 1926.

16. Bryce, James. The Holy Roman Empire. London: Macmillan, 1930.
17. Burgess, Ernest W. and Cottrell, Leonard S., Jr. Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939.
18. Calverton, V.F. The Passing of the Gods. New York: Scribner's, 1934.
19. Calverton, V.F. (ed.). The Making of Man. New York: Modern Library, 1931, Introduction.
20. Cantril, Hadley. Psychology of Social Movements. New York: John Wiley, 1941.
21. Carlson, A. J. "Science and the Supernatural." Science, 1931, 73:1887, pp. 217-225.
22. Carlson, H. B. "Attitudes of Undergraduate Students." J. of Soc. Psychol., 5, 1934.
23. Cattell, J. McKeen. "Psychology in Retrospect." Exploring Your Mind. Edited by A.E. Wiggam. New York: Blue Ribbon Books, 1928.
24. Cattell, R.B. Psychology and the Religious Quest. New York: Thomas Nelson, 1938.
25. Chase, Stuart. "The Tyranny of Words." Harper's Magazine, 1937, 175: 561-569.
26. Compton, Arthur H. "The Purpose of Science." Science and Man. Edited by R.N. Anshen. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942.
27. Conklin, Edwin Grant. "Science and Ethics." Science and Man. Edited by R.N. Anshen. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942.
28. Cotton, Edward H. (ed.). Has Science Discovered God? New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1931, Introduction.
29. Cottrell, Leonard S. Jr., and Gallagher, Ruth. Developments in Social Psychology. New York: Beacon House, 1941.
30. Cunningham, G. Watts. Problems of Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt, 1935.

31. Davidson, John. A Ballad of a Nun and other Poems. Girard, Kansas: Haldeman-Julius, 1925.
32. Dewey, John. Living Philosophies. New York: The World Publishing Co., 1941.
33. Doob, L. Propaganda, Its Psychology and Technique. New York: Henry Holt, 1935.
34. Douglass, Lloyd C. Those Disturbing Miracles. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1927.
35. Draper, J.W. History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science. New York: D. Appleton, 1875.
36. Dresser, Horatio W. Spiritual Health and Healing. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1922.
37. Dunlap, Knight. Civilized Life. Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Company, 1934, Chapter VII.
38. Durkheim, Emile. The Rules of Sociological Method. Trans. by Sarah A. Solvay and John H. Mueller. Edited by George E. G. Catlin. Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1938.
39. Durkheim, Emile. Les Formes Elementaires de la Vie Religieuse. Paris: Libraire Felix Alcan, 1912.
40. Faris, Robt. E.L. Continuity of Generations and the Behavior of Children. Unpublished paper, Syracuse University (no date).
41. Forsyth, David. Psychology and Religion. London: Watts & Co. 1936, (2nd. ed.).
42. Frazer, James G. The Golden Bough. New York: Macmillan. 1944 (1 vol. abgd. ed.).
43. Free Mind, official organ of the Institute of Human Fellowship, Portland, Oregon.
44. Freud, Sigmund. Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics. Trans. by A. A. Brill. London: George Routledge, 1919.
45. Freud, Sigmund. The Future of an Illusion. Trans. by W. D. Robson-Scott. Edinburgh: Horace Liveright and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1928.
46. Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and Its Discontents. Trans. by Joan Riviere. New York: Jonathan Cape & Harrison Smith, 1930.

47. Gauvin, Marshall J. "God and the War." The Truth Seeker,
Nov. 1945, 72:11.
48. Gibbon, Edward. Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire. London:
Everyman's Library, 1919, vol. I.
49. Goldstein, Kurt. Human Nature in the Light of Psychopatho-
logy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press,
1940.
50. Gorham, Charles T. Religion as a Bar to Progress. Girard,
Kansas: Haldeman-Julius, 1944.
51. Gould, K.M. Windows on the World. New York: Stackpole, 1938.
52. Gregory, R.A. and Ferguson, Allan. "Obituary Notice of Sir
Oliver Lodge." Obituary Notices of the Fellows
of The Royal Society. London: Morrison and
Gibb, 1941.
53. Haldane, J.B.S. "Science and Ethics," in The Inequality of
Man. Harmondsworth Middlesex, England:
Penguin Books, 1938.
54. Hallam, Henry. History of Europe During the Middle Ages.
New York.
55. Hanley, F.W., editorial in The Canadian Scientist. Oct. 1945,
1:1.
56. Hannay, J.B. Sex Symbolism in Religion. London: The
Religious Evolution Research Society, 1922
(privately printed).
57. Hart, Hornell. "Religion." Am. J. of Sociol., 1942, 47:896.
58. Heiden, Konrad. Der Fuehrer. Trans. by Ralph Manheim.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1944.
59. Henle, M. and Hubbell, M.B. "'Egocentricity' in Adult
Conversation." J. of Soc. Psychol., 1938,
9, 227-234.
60. Hepner, H.W. Human Relations in Changing Industry. New
York: Prentice-Hall, 1934.
61. Horne, E.P. and Stender, W.H. "Student Attitudes toward
Religious Practices." J. of Soc. Psychol.,
1945, 22:215-217.

62. Hughes, E.C. "Institutions." Principles of Sociology.
Edited by R.E. Park. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1943.
63. Huxley, Julian S. "Religion: Its Persistence and Human Character." Has Science Discovered God?
Edited by E. H. Cotton. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1931.
64. Huxley, Julian S. Science and Social Needs. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1935.
65. Huxley, Julian S. The Uniqueness of Man. London: Chatto & Windus, 1941.
66. Huxley, Julian S. "Science, Natural and Social." Science and Man. Edited by R.N. Anshen. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942.
67. Inman, Thomas. Ancient Pagan and Modern Christian Symbolism.
New York: Peter Eckler Publishing Company, 1922 (4th ed.).
68. James, William. The Will To Believe. New York: Longmans Greene. 1899.
69. James, William. The Principles of Psychology. New York: Henry Holt, 1910. vol. I.
70. James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience.
London and New York: Longmans Greene, 1922.
70. Jean, F.C., Harrah, E.C. and Herman, F.L. Man and His Physical Universe. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1943.
71. Jersild, Arthur T. Child Psychology. New York: Prentice-Hall. 1944.
72. Johnson, E.C. and Josey, C.C. "A Note on the Development of the Thought Forms of Children as Described by Piaget. J. of Abnormal and Soc. Psychol., 1931, 26:338-339.
73. Katz, Daniel, and Allport, F.H. Students' Attitudes.
Syracuse, New York: The Craftsman Press, 1931.
74. Katz, Daniel, and Schanck, Richard L. Social Psychology.
New York: John Wiley, 1938.
75. Kautzky, Karl. Foundations of Christianity. New York: International Publishers, 1925.

76. Klineberg, Otto. Social Psychology. New York: Henry Holt, 1940.
77. Knight, Frank H. "Fact and Value in Social Science." Science and Man. Edited by R.N. Anshen. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942.
78. Koffka, K. "The Psychologist Among the Scientists." Science and Man. Edited by R.N. Anshen. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942.
79. Langer, Susanne K. Philosophy in a New Key. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942.
80. Lasswell, Harold D. "The Commonwealth of Science." Science and Man. Edited by R.N. Anshen. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942.
81. LeBon G. The Psychology of Crowds. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1899.
82. Lenin, V.I. "Sources and Constituent Parts of Marxism," (1913), in Capital and Other Writings, by Karl Marx. Edited by Max Eastman, New York: Modern Library, 1932.
83. Leuba, James H. The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion. London: Archibald Constable, 1909.
84. Leuba, James H. "Religious Beliefs of American Scientists." Harper's. 1934, CLXIX:297.
85. Levy, D.M. Maternal Overprotection. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1943.
86. Levy-Bruhl, L. Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Societes Inferieures. Trans. as How Natives Think, by L. A. Clare. London: J. Allen and Unwin, 1926.
87. Levy-Bruhl, L. L'Ame Primitive. Trans. as The 'Soul' of the Primitive, by L. A. Clare. New York: Macmillan, 1928, Introduction, pp. 15-55.
88. Levy-Bruhl, L. La Mentalite Primitive. Oxford: At The Clarendon Press, 1931.
89. Lippmann, W. Public Opinion. New York: Macmillan, 1930.
90. Lodge, Oliver Sir. Reason and Belief. London: Methuen, 1910.

91. Lubin, Issidore. "Report on Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power." Temporary National Economic Committee, 1938, Pt. I.
92. Lynd, R.S. and Lynd, H.M. Middletown. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929.
93. Maier, N.R.F. and Schneirla, T.C. Principles of Animal Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill, 19
94. Malinowski, Bronislaw. "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages." Meaning of Meaning, by Ogden and Richards, q.v., Supplement I.
95. Malinowski, Bronislaw, "The Scientific Approach to the Study of Man." Science and Man. Edited by R. N. Anshen. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942.
96. Matthews, Walter Robert. "Psychology and the Future of Religion." Psychology and Modern Problems. Edited by J. A. Hadfield. London: University of London Press, 1935.
97. Maudsley, Henry. Religion and Realities. London: John Bale, Sons & Danielson, 1918.
98. McCabe, Joseph. The Story of the World's Oldest Profession. Girard, Kansas: Haldeman-Julius, 1932.
99. McCabe, Joseph. The Gay Chronicle of the Monks and Nuns. Girard, Kansas: Haldeman-Julius (no date).
100. McCabe, Joseph. My Twelve Years in a Monastery. Girard, Kansas: Haldeman-Julius (no date).
101. McCarthy, Dorothea A. The Language Development of the Pre-school Child. Institute of Child Welfare Monograph Series. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1930, No. 4.
102. McDougall, William. The Group Mind. New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1920.
103. McDougall, William. Outline of Psychology. London: Methuen, 1930.
104. McDougall, William. "Psychology and the Thought of God." Has Science Discovered God? Edited by E.H. Cotton. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1931.
105. McDougall, William. The Energies of Man. London: Methuen, 1932.

106. McDougall, William. Religion and the Sciences of Life. London: Methuen, 1934.
107. McGucken, William J. The Jesuits and Education. New York: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1932.
108. Millikan, Robert A. "Christianity and Science." Has Science Discovered God? Edited by E.H. Cotton. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1931.
109. Moore, G. and Garrison, K.C. "A Comparative Study of Social and Political Attitudes of College Students." J. of Abnormal and Soc. Psychol., 27, 1932-1933, 195-208.
110. Muret, Maurice. L'Esprit juif, Essai de Psychologie Ethnique. Paris: Perrin et Cie., 1901.
111. Murphy, Gardner. "The Freeing of Intelligence." Psychological Bulletin, 1945, 45:1.
112. Murphy, J.J. "Behind the Graeco-Roman Conflict." Converted Catholic Magazine, May, 1945.
113. Nelson, E. "Student Attitudes Toward Religion." Genet. Psychol. Monog., 1940, 22:323-423.
114. Offner, Monroe M. Fundamentals of Chemistry. Philadelphia: New Home Library, 1944.
115. Ogden, C.K. and Richards, I.A. The Meaning of Meaning. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1944, (6th ed.).
116. Patrick, G.T.W. "Idealistic Confessions of a Behaviorist." Has Science Discovered God? Edited by E.H. Cotton. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1931.
117. Pearson, Karl. The Grammar of Science. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1900.
118. Piaget, Jean. Judgment and Reasoning in the Child. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1928.
119. Piaget, Jean. The Child's Conception of the World. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929.
120. Piaget, Jean. The Child's Conception of Physical Causality. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930.
121. Piaget, Jean. "Intellectual Evolution." Science and Man. Edited by R.N. Anshen. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942.

122. Pius XI. Divini Redemptoris on Atheistic Communism, an Encyclical. New York: The Paulist Press, 1937.
123. Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. Taboo. Cambridge: At The University Press, 1939.
124. Reinhold, H.A. (ed.). The Soul Afire: Revelations of the Mystics. New York: Pantheon Books, 1945.
125. Roback, A.A. Psychorama. Cambridge, Mass.: Sci-Art Publishers, 1942.
126. Roheim, Geza. Animism, Magic, and the Divine King. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1930.
127. Ruch, F.L. Psychology and Life. Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1941.
128. Runze, Georg. "Psychologie der Religion." Handbuck der Vergleichenden Psychologie. Edited by Gustav Kafka. Munchen: Ernst Reinhardt, 1922, Band II.
129. Russell, Bertrand. What I Believe. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1925.
130. Russell, Bertrand. Mysticism and Logic. New York: Norton. 1929.
131. Russell, Bertrand. "An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish." The American Freeman, Girard, Kansas, June 1943.
132. Russell, Bertrand. "The Value of Free Thought." The American Freeman, Girard, Kansas, Aug. 1944.
133. Schilder, Paul. Mind Perception and Thought in their Constructive Aspects. New York: Columbia University Press. 1942.
134. Scott, H. "Technology Smashes the Price System." Harper's Magazine, 1933, 166:129-142.
135. See, Henri. The Economic Interpretation of History. Trans. by Melvin H. Knight. New York: Adelphi Company, 1929.
136. Selbie, W.B. The Psychology of Religion. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1924.
137. Selsom, Howard. Socialism and Ethics. Toronto: Progress Books, (no date).
138. Sencourt, R.E. "The Pope as Head of a Church Government." Current History, Oct. 1928, 29:69-75.
139. Shaffer, L.F. "The Psychology of Adjustment. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1936.

140. Sherif, Muzafer, and Cantril, Hadley. "The Psychology of 'Attitudes'." Psychological Review, Nov. 1945, 52:Part I.
141. Shaw, Hampden C. The Correlation of the Sciences with Reference to Psychology. Unpublished Master's thesis, McGill University, 1935.
142. Spencer, Baldwin, and Gillen, F.J. Across Australia. London: Macmillan, 1912, (vol. I).
143. Stapledon, Olaf. Philosophy and Living. Harmondsworth Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1939, Vol.II.
144. Starbuck, E.D. The Psychology of Religion. New York: Scribner's & Sons, 1900.
145. Steiner, Lee R. Where do People Take Their Troubles? Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1945.
146. Sully, James. Outlines of Psychology. London: Longmans Greene, 1884.
147. Tarde, Gabriel. Les Lois de l'Imitation. Trans. as The Laws of Imitation, by E. C. Parsons. New York: Henry Holt, 1903.
148. Thomson, J.A. and Geddes, P. Evolution. London: Home Univ. Library.
149. Vernon, P.E. "Questionnaires, Attitude Tests." The Study of Society. Edited by F.C. Bartlett, et al. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1939.
150. Wallin, Paul. "The Case Study." The Prediction of Personal Adjustment. Edited by Paul Horst, et al. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1941.
151. Ward, A.W. et al., (ed.). (First arranged by Lord Acton). Cambridge Modern History. Cambridge: The University Press, 1930 (vol. I).
152. Webb, Clement C.J. Group Theories of Religion and the Individual. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1916.
153. Wells, H.G. The Pocket History of the World. New York: Pocket Books Inc. 1941.
154. Whitehead, A.N. Religion in the Making. New York: Macmillan, 1926.
155. Whitehead, A.N. Science and the Modern World. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1938.

156. Wieman, H.N., and R.W. Normative Psychology of Religion.
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1935.
157. Wiggam, Albert Edward. The New Decalogue of Science.
Garden City, New York: Garden City Publishing
Co. 1922.
158. Carle, Charles. Mysticism in Modern Psychology. New York:
Psycho-sociological Press, 1943.
159. McCarthy, William. Bible, Church and God. New York:
Truth Seeker Co. 1945.
160. Spranger, Eduard. Types of Men. Halle (Saale): Max
Niemeyer Verlag, 1928.
161. Mowrer, Edgar A. Germany Puts The Clock Back. Harmondsworth
Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1938.
162. Woodworth, R.S. Dynamic Psychology. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1918.
163. Fritz, Martin F. Collection and Presentation of Statistical
Data in Psychology and Education. New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1939.

