

Received Truths: Problems of the Music-Text Relationship and
Bertolt Brecht.}

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February 1987.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and
Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts.

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ISBN 0-315-38271-6

Abstract

This thesis examines the theoretical foundations of previous investigations of the music-text relationship in the works of Bertolt Brecht and his composers. Using several representative interpretations of the song, Lob des Kommunismus, as a model, it reveals that it is Brecht's dramatic theory, rather than an elaborated theory of musical meaning, which informs the previous investigations. The lack of a theory of musical meaning undermines the translation of a key concept of epic theatre, i.e. estrangement, into musical terms. A historical analysis then demonstrates the ambiguous nature of the concept of *gestus*, which is integral both to Brecht's theory and to previous critical literature on music-text relationships and Brecht. As a result, Brecht's theory is not an adequate theoretical foundation for such an investigation; it cannot be treated as a "received truth", but must be critically historicized in order to ensure progress in the investigation of music-text relationships and Brecht's works.

Résumé

Cette thèse se propose d'étudier les fondements théoriques des recherches ayant déjà été faites sur les rapports musicaux-textuels dans l'oeuvre de Brecht et de ses compositeurs. A partir de quelques interprétations caractéristiques du lied, Lob des Kommunismus, le corpus nous révèle que c'est la théorie dramaturgique brechtienne même, et non pas une théorie élaborée de la signification musicale, qui forme les recherches antérieures. Cette absence d'une théorie de la signification musicale mine la transposition d'un concept clé (la distanciation) du théâtre épique brechtien dans le champ musical. Une analyse historique démontre ensuite la nature ambiguë du concept de gestus, qui fait partie intégrante à la fois, de la théorie dramaturgique brechtienne et, de la critique littéraire sur les rapports musicaux-textuels. Il en résulte que la théorie de Brecht ne peut servir à un fondement théorique adéquat pour une telle investigation. Il faut donc la considérer dans une perspective d'historicité critique afin d'assurer le progrès dans l'étude des rapports musicaux-textuels de l'oeuvre brechtienne, plutôt que de la percevoir comme une idée reçue.

Acknowledgements

I would like first of all to thank my supervisor Dr. T-E. Goldsmith-Reber for her encouragement and criticism throughout the preparation of this thesis. I would also like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for the financial assistance which made this project possible. I am also indebted to Mr. Hans-Walter Frischkopf for his timely and constructive criticism. And finally, I would like to thank Ruth Epp, whose support and encouragement contributed in no small way to the successful completion of this work.

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Preface

All translations which do not refer in the notes to translated works in the Bibliography are the author's. With respect to translations of material from Brecht's works, John Willett's translations were consulted, but some differences of opinion prevented a complete reliance upon his work. The case of gestus is an example. Willett generally uses the term gest for Brecht's term Gestus, but in one place he uses the term gest both for Gestus and Gestik, which, in my opinion, is a conflation of two differentiated ideas. (1) Also, because of the possibility of an unfortunate association of Willett's term gest with the word jest, I have followed Patrice Pavis in retaining Gestus in English, although without capitalization, change in the form for the plural, or underlining. (2) I have not been able to follow Pavis when he uses the terms gestuality and gestural, because they seem to me too closely related to gesture, from which the term gestus seeks to distinguish itself. Instead, I use the terms gesticality and gestic. (I have often wondered if it would not be appropriate, however, to restore the confusion that the reader of the original experiences by consistently using the terms gesture and gestural.)

As for the term Volkstumlichkeit; North American

cultural history in the last quarter century makes the use of words like folk, folklike and folksiness in combination with Brecht's composers impossible if we are to avoid visions of Appalachian Eislars and Dessaus dancing through our heads. For this reason I have reluctantly resolved to use the less familiar, if ugly, "folkishness".

And lastly, the edition of Brecht's works used for this thesis is the Gesammelte Werke in 20 Banden published by Suhrkamp in 1967. It is always referred to by giving the volume number first and the page number last, with the two separated by a colon. It is the only work referred to in this way in this thesis. Thus the reference, G.W. 15:389, refers to page 389 of volume 15 of the Gesammelte Werke.

Introduction

The original task of this thesis was the description of how music fulfilled a critical and independent role in epic theatre by estranging the text in the songs from Brecht's and Eisler's dramatic collaborations, Die Mutter and Schweyk im Zweiten Weltkrieg. As a trained musician, I have long found the question of interaction between text and music interesting, but had never had the opportunity to investigate it before now. Fritz Hennenberg's Dessau-Brecht. Musikalische Arbeiten was to provide the theoretical foundation, since it was (and is) the only sustained effort at translating two key concepts from Brecht's epic theatre (i.e. *gestus* and *estrangement*) into musical terms. The thesis was, in other words, to be an interdisciplinary investigation of the interaction of two media, literature and music, in epic theatre. During the course of my research, however, which not only consisted of an investigation of the theoretical works of Brecht and his composers, but also the examination and comparison of analyses in the critical literature on this topic, it became necessary to admit that there were serious obstacles confronting such an inquiry. Firstly, it became apparent that the critics' reception of Brecht's theoretical categories hindered a scientific investigation of the theme, i.e. Brecht's theory was an obstacle to understanding Brecht's work. Second, it became clear that many analyses

did not provide connections between their formal analyses and their metaphorical interpretations.

These two realizations, which are inextricably intertwined, necessitated both a reexamination of Brecht's theory (and its reception by the critics) as well as an investigation into the possibilities of music being a language or sign system. Both investigations revealed further problems. Aspects of Brecht's theory proved in some ways to be less stable than expected when it was subjected to a historical analysis. And the reception of this theory by critics generally showed no recognition of this fact (i.e. by admitting that their use of Brecht's "theory" was in fact a heuristic reduction). The question of musical meaning, for its part, as has already been indicated, showed that the notion of musical meaning remains problematic. For example, although some critics acknowledged the importance of convention for establishing music as a sign system, none took it upon themselves to prove the conventions that presumably underlie the symbolic meanings attributed to various musical formulae.

The investigation of only one of these problems would require a detailed analysis of all the critical works available, one which examined their different premisses, in order to do justice to each one. However, such an approach would exceed the parameters of this thesis. Therefore, this thesis will first present in Chapter 1 three analyses of Hanns Eisler's Lob des Kommunismus, showing that there is not

sufficient information given in these analyses in order to judge their adequacy. It will then be suggested that the source of this problem is the unreflected acceptance of Brecht's theoretical statements about the role of music in epic theatre. In Chapter 2 Brecht's concept of gestus will be examined. As it is a central category to Brecht's theory, and since it is used by him in connection with music, it is appropriate to examine the concept in some detail. The difficulties and contradictions inherent in this concept will be demonstrated by a historical examination of Brecht's concept. It will be seen that these difficulties leave their trace in the statements about gestus by the composers who worked with Brecht. These same problems are also expressed by the use that the critics make of the concept, by duplicating on the one hand Brecht's confusion between private and social gesture, and on the other hand, by using descriptions of gestus that rely on an as yet unelaborated theory of musical meaning. This thesis, then, offers a model which suggests that Brecht's theory may not be the best tool for achieving an understanding of his work; and this model will need further elaboration and testing to determine its validity.

A word of caution is in order before proceeding.

Throughout the course of this thesis the question of musical meaning is raised repeatedly, generally by observing that this or that critic has asserted the meaning of a certain musical structure without offering proof of its validity. It

may be expected, then, that musical meaning itself will be thematized and elaborated in this work. That is not possible in this thesis because of the sheer immensity of the task. Though every remark that musical meaning remains unproven must eventually demand that the problem be thematized, it is mentioned in this thesis only to refer to the fact that the particular critic is going to great lengths to prove the adequacy of Brecht's prescriptions for music, when he or she can or does not lay a theoretical foundation for such an interpretation.

It may be objected that one reason for not offering proof for a statement is that it is self-evident. It is self-evident, for example, that natural language "means" something, i.e. that it has referents. But it is by no means self-evident that music "means" something, in the sense of expressing something other than its formal being (or semiotically, in the sense that it refers as a sign to another concept distinct from its formal being). (1) Stravinsky was of the opinion that music could not "express" anything at all:

For I consider that music is, by its very nature, essentially powerless to express anything at all, whether a feeling, an attitude of mind, a psychological mood, a phenomenon of music, etc. Expression has never been an inherent property of music... If, as is nearly always the case, music appears to express something, this is only an illusion and not a reality ... (2)

Now, to hold this opinion and not be a crank must mean that between Stravinsky's position and, say, that of Georg Knepler, who holds that music can even express concepts, there exists an uncertainty about music's ability to express concepts, emotions etc. (3) So it is possible for Faltin to say that music is a sign system whose components refer only, to themselves (i.e. not to extra-musical realities like emotions or concepts); and this is of course, related to the self-reflexivity of the aesthetic message as it is understood by Umberto Eco. (4)

The above positions are generally not favourable to the Brecht scholarship on the subject of music-text relations, since, as will be seen in Chapter 1, Brecht's theory of music's role in epic theatre depends on the existence of musical meaning. For that reason one usually finds positions similar to those of Susanne Langer who, in Philosophy in a New Key, considered music to be a system of symbols (although she held that the emotions symbolized could not be translated) (5); or, like Nattiez, they believe that music refers in some vague way to the world (6); or, like Leonard Meyer, they hold music to be able to express content iconically, i.e. to express an extra-musical reality because of some similarity between the music (form) and the extra-musical reality (content). (7) Georg Knepler, in his book, Geschichte als Weg zum Musikverständnis (1982), goes so far as to say that music can semanticize concepts because of the common origins of music and language. (8)

These various tendencies show that musical meaning is not self-evident. For that reason, any postulation of musical meaning requires the explicit statement of the interpreter's assumptions concerning musical meaning as well as a demonstration of the adequacy of this postulation against others. An adequate analysis of a song in one of Brecht's plays would have to include a detailed analysis of both text and music, with their relationship to one another established such that it was clear what elements were relevant to the analysis and why. Musical meaning would have to be explicitly thematicized, if the analysis were to have any scientific value. Further, the analysis would have to be grounded in an understanding of the context of the song. Context means not only the song's relationship to the rest of the drama, nor its place within the oeuvre of the poet and the composer. Context means both of these as well as its context in literary and musical, i.e. cultural, history, which then should be expanded to include the work's social and historical moment. Of course, partial analyses are also acceptable. But an analysis which asserts that a particular musical formula has a particular meaning without both giving the critic's textual interpretation and his or her methodology of determining musical meaning is not a partial analysis. Rather, it is an interpretive assertion which does not contribute to the attempt to understand the object under investigation.

Precisely because such a detailed analysis requires

the collection of material not yet brought together for such a purpose, it is not possible in this thesis to offer an example. The purpose of this thesis must, therefore, remain critical, pointing to problems which hinder research on this topic of music-text relationships in Brecht's works and offering a strategy which may lead to more useful results. With this in mind, we will now move on to a discussion of Eisler's Lob des Kommunismus.

Chapter One

Text and Music in Epic Theatre

1. Text and Music. Three Interpretations of 'Lob des Kommunismus'.

This Chapter proposes to examine three interpretations of Lob des Kommunismus, written in 1930 by Hanns Eisler for Brecht's play, Die Mutter, and subsequently undergoing revisions for performances in 1935, 1949 and 1951.(1) The reader will remark that the term interpretation has been substituted for the term analysis, which was used in the Introduction. This is to signal that the interpretations, although they must result from analysis, do not in our examples reveal the steps of the analysis, and so are missing a major component. The interpretations are those of Albrecht Dümmling, Georg Knepler and Karl Schonewolf. They have been chosen because they are representative of the major types of interpretation of songs in Brecht scholarship, and because they deal with the same work. The song itself was chosen, not only because it is dealt with by several critics, but also because Brecht devoted some small attention to the work, and this allows for a fruitful comparison with the critics. At this point we will examine an analysis from the most recent extended work on the theme, Brecht and music, and which

appeared in 1985, namely Albrecht Dümmling's 'Lasst euch nicht verführen'. Brecht und die Musik.

This monumental work of over 700 pages is a historical investigation of the theme, Brecht and music. Its great achievement consists in the bringing together of a vast amount of material on Brecht's collaboration with musicians, situating it within a chronological account of Brecht's life and career as well as those of his musicians. Dümmling has provided a sorely missed overview of the role of music within the history of Brecht and his composers. But his interest is not only historical; he does not only refer to interpretations by other critics, but also offers his own. In that case, however, one would expect that he would demonstrate his presuppositions and proofs. Unfortunately, Dümmling indulges in interpretation without explicit methodological foundation. For example, his book is strewn liberally with statements about the symbolic meaning of various musical formulae, but there is no statement about how music can "mean" something. (2) At one point, when discussing the opera Mahagonny, he notes that Brecht's "thesis about the irrationality of opera is disputable if one conceives of music as a separate language", but he does not say whether he considers music to be a language. (3) The closest he gets to indicating his opinion is when he notes in the discussion of Massnahme that Eisler's "style is stamped by music's speech-like character", a statement which cannot indicate clearly whether this is Dümmling's position or not. (4)

In this, Dumling's interpretations are representative of those of Brecht scholarship. At this point we will turn to Dumling's interpretation of Eisler's Lob des Kommunismus. (5) Dumling gives some of the historical context along with anecdotal material at the beginning of his discussion. He makes an important point when he refers to Die Mutter as an "aestheticization" of the Agitprop productions. (6) He also gives one aspect of the work's artistic context through comparison with Die Massnahme :


the disciplinary function of the rhythm [as in Die Massnahme] retreats [in Die Mutter] before a more melodic, a more friendly gestus [Gestus]. Instead of the moderately-sized, aggressive-seeming movements with brass instruments, Eisler uses a smaller, more soloistic instrumentation in Die Mutter: trumpet, trombone, percussion, and piano. In later revisions [Ergänzungen] and adaptations he intensified this tendency towards friendliness and the chamber music-like. (7)

After observing that a "quieter tone" prevails, one apparently associated with the "gentle tone of friendliness" and "musical friendliness" (8), he continues:

In Lob des Kommunismus Pelegea Wlassowa answers the question of some women, as to whether communism is criminal: "That's not true. Communism is good for us... it's rational, everyone understands it; it's easy." She ends with the famous sentence: "It's

the simple thing, that's hard to do."

The musical setting has all the characteristics of artistic simplicity. Thus the melody is based on the interval of a minor third (once based on the tone f', once on c'), while the chordal accompaniment forms a regular, forward-moving 3/4 meter in andante tempo, only occasionally interrupted by changes in meter. The character of simplicity, friendliness and easiness is not only accomplished by the simple melodic and harmonic disposition, through the delicate piano-dynamic and simple three-part song form, but also by the bouncy syncopated entry of the voice.

In addition to clarinet chords, the voice is accompanied by elegant figures taken over from baroque music (recognized by the mordents). While the main section of the composition starts playing the praise of communism in a friendly, completely undramatic way and so characterizes it as "easy" -- in contradiction to the deterring warnings of the bourgeois press; the instrumental coda (admittedly composed in 1949) refers to the difficulties which still stand in the way of its realization. This [is effected] by the complicated fugal technique, but also through the anapest rhythm () which moves into the foreground. The anapest, which drives the ending into an impetuous acceleration,

stands since Die Massnahme as a symbol for "class struggle".(9)

This example is a cameo of the problems which are fundamental to the Brecht scholarship on the text-music interrelationship. There is, for example, the keyword "gestus". This is an enormously important concept for Brecht and Brecht scholarship (and is dealt with in detail in Chapter 2). Dumling at one point considers gestus to be the attitude which is demanded of the singer by a song.(10) This idea is close to the 1977 Grosse Duden's definition of Gestus as "manner" or "expression". A "friendly gestus", then, could be an attitude of candidness etc. expressed by the singer. But Dumling also speaks of "melodic gestus" and observes how Bach's as well as Mozart's music were examples of "gestic music".(11) It is obvious from this that we are not dealing merely with an actor's representation of an attitude. The implications of this are considered in the next Chapter; here I only want to show that we are dealing with a problematic notion that is not recognized as such.

The next problem has to do with musical meaning. The music apparently expresses a "friendly gestus" through its formal elements (melody, harmony, dynamic, instrumentation etc.). It seems the quality "friendly" is associated with a combination of simplicity, quietness, moderate tempo, and absence of drama. The question is, how is this so? It is just as likely that these characteristics would be associated with resignation, and since the piece seems to have a minor

"flavour", what is to prevent the traditional association of "melancholy" ? (12) To answer this, we must consult the text. Steve Gooch's translation of this song is given below:

It's quite straightforward, you'll understand it.

It's not hard.

Because you're not an exploiter, you'll quickly grasp it.

It's good for you, so find out all about it.

They're fools who describe it as foolish, and foul who describe it as foulness.

It's against all that's foul and against all that's foolish.

The exploiters will tell you that it's criminal

But we know better:

It puts an end to all that's criminal.

It isn't madness, but puts

An end to madness.

It doesn't mean chaos

It just means order.

It's just the simple thing

That's hard, so hard to do. (13)

The text describes communism as something good and refutes or at least derides its detractors. In that it recommends finding out all about something "good for you" it can be considered to be concerned for one's welfare and so friendly. And this is further supported if one considers the fact that the scene takes place in a kitchen, a sign of


friendly, proletarian sociability.(14) Brecht seemed to think this at any rate, as his Keuner Geschichte showed:

Herr Keuner preferred city B to city A: "In city A," he said, "they love me; but in city B they're friendly to me. In city A they made themselves useful to me [were helpful to me]; but in city B they needed me. In city A they invited me to their table, but in city B they invited me into the kitchen." (15)

The above has shown how the textual context and foundation of this song supports the idea of friendliness. (Note that Dumling did not do so.) But this still does not tell us what in the music supports this concept or why it does so. The above statement would only imply that the music receives its meaning by association with the text. Dumling does not accept this statement completely, for he also considers that music can contradict the text. He maintains, for example, that the constant rhythmic motion and the broad melody of the Lied vom Wasserad from Die Rundkopfe und die Spitzkopfe contradict the resigned mood of the text. (16)

Perhaps the problem of musical meaning is made clearer when we look at the other musical signs. Why, for example, does fugal treatment represent difficulty? Calling it complicated is only a rhetorical device to prepare the reader for the acceptance of this idea: it is not proof. Dumling may be relying on musicians' memories of countless hours before their counterpoint homework or some other such association.

The association of fugue with difficulty is not established.

An even more problematic symbol is the association of the anapest with class struggle. Manfred Grabs is held by Hennenberg and implicitly by Dumling to have demonstrated that the anapest is associated often with the concept of class struggle in Die Massnahme, and so this rhythm becomes "semanticized". (17) But semanticized for who and from which perspective? If it is considered from the production end to be idiosyncratic to Eisler, then this could tell us something about Eisler's "style" but not necessarily about "meaning", which, as Mukarovsky points out, is not a purely individual affair. (18) But if we must look at Brecht and Eisler's work from the point of view of intended effect as Hennenberg maintains we must (19), then we must ask how this effect could be created when it could not be guaranteed that the same audiences would attend Die Massnahme and Die Mutter, and in that order. This symbol becomes even more problematic if Dietrich Stern is correct when he states that the diminution of the same rhythm () , which appears in Weill's Seeräuber-Jenny and in Eisler's song Von Angebot und Nachfrage, is "a very common cliché from entertainment music" which "carries the association of the indifferent, the corrupt". (20) It would have to be explained why this rhythm could be successfully "resemanticized" in Lob des Kommunismus and how it could maintain this new meaning against all the weight of the entertainment industry.

Dumling, then, demonstrates several attitudes which

are peculiar to Brecht scholarship on this subject: he does not seem to receive a key Brechtian category (*gestus*) reflectively; he does not establish the relation between the text and music; he does not offer a methodological basis for his notions of musical meaning; he deals with musical meaning in an assertoric not problematic fashion.

To this might be added a more curious problem, namely a disregard of history when dealing with his interpretation. I refer to the fact that the interpretation starts out with the 1930 version of the song and ends with the 1949 version. Now, Dumling's historical narrative is at this point concerned with the period of production of Die Mutter, i.e. 1932. It is not too much to assume, if we accept Dumling's implied notions of musical meaning, that the versions which exist from the years 1932, 1935, 1949, and 1951, being different, also "mean" something different. (21) What, for example, is the significance of the silence on the question of future difficulties in the 1932 version, since there is no "difficult" fugato? And if one accepts the idea that the *anapest* means or calls up the idea of class struggle, what is its significance when it occurs, not in the face of intensified struggle between left and right in Germany in the thirties, but in 1949 in Vienna and in 1951 in the DDR? This type of combination of interpretations does not acknowledge the specificity of the art work's historical moment.

At this point it may be instructive to turn to Georg Knepler's analysis of Lob des Kommunismus as it appears in

1982 in his book, Geschichte als Weg zum Musikverständnis.

One of his main concerns is to show how music can express concepts through 'semanticization', that is, through repeated association of a musical formula in some manner (as in association with a text) which eventually invests that musical formula with the meaning previously carried by its associate. (22) The general recognition of the meaning of a musical formula (or musical sign) is referred to as its "stabilization" (Konstantisierung). (23) Knepler is trying to subject music, therefore, to a "semiosis" in order to provide musical meaning with a scientific foundation. Because of its interest it is quoted at length:

One can study two different degrees of "stabilization" [Konstantisierung] in one and the same musical structure: Hanns Eisler's Lob des Kommunismus (the stage version of the music for Die Mutter). A short motif [F-G-Ab-G-F] which determines the melodic events, underlies this short piece. The investment [Konstantisierung] of the phonetic form (which appears in several variations) with the meaning "serious reflection" is brought off by its connection with the words, by appropriate chordal accompaniment, by a corresponding manner of performance, and through a few other elements. In the middle of this motif a sub-motif is found, a traditional, much more stabilized [konstantisierte] element, namely the downward step

of a minor second [Ab-G]. Within a certain geographic area the downward step of a minor second has become, for several centuries, a [musical sign] which means "difficulty" or "pain", "anxiety", as well as "trouble", "sadness", or "tears". It can encode information of the type: "there is something difficult" or "here is something painful" or "[this] has to do (or had or will have to do) with trouble", as well as "O Woe!". It is characteristic of the nature of the [musical sign] that even this relatively well "stabilized" [sign] must first be subjected to certain procedures in order to receive its meaning. For the downward step of a minor second can be contained in a practically endless number of musical formulae without in any way carrying the meaning "difficult", "pain", and the like. In order to do that, the downward step of a minor second must be brought out [herausgearbeitet] in a specific way. This can happen in the most various of ways. In the present case the minor second occurs 29 times, and always as a well-marked [ausgezeichnet] interval; usually it makes up the highest tone of a phrase, is always on a strong beat [gutem Taktteil]; moreover, it is always connected to meaningful, stressed words; [and] once the first of the two tones is held by a fermata. Now, while the motif can be subjected to

a process of variation without changing its meaning, a single variation experienced by the sub-motif is semantically of the greatest importance. It concerns the following: the word-drama of Brecht's poem consists in naming the simple, the rational, the easily-executed, which characterizes communism, [only] in order to unexpectedly reveal in the last two lines that it is "difficult to do". The music proceeds oppositely and adds to the poet's text a kind of musical-conceptual counterpoint. It accompanies the listing of the easy [things] with many representations of the "difficult". When the latter is then called by name, the music and text run parallel for three short beats. Then comes the coda. At this point (the text is already finished) Eisler, for the first and only time [makes] a major out of the minor second. This dissolving of the familiar and well-semanticized motif ([familiar] both within this work and in general) from minor into major, a step suggesting C-major, [a step] which never in the entire work appeared as a resolution to the major (allowing itself to be conceived of as a dominant or tonic); the fact that the tone e', reached in this way, never occurred before this point; the simultaneous shift to a quicker tempo; added to that the brevity and

slenderness of the structure [of this section] ...
 -- all this makes it clear [that] the musical code
 refers conceptually to the body of the poem,
 answering at the same time the last line's
 "difficult to do" with the reference to the "easy
 to do" which was implied (but never articulated)
 earlier in the text. (24)

Now, Knepler is concerned primarily with showing how
 an already semanticized musical formula realizes its meaning
 in a particular composition. (Oddly enough it is also the
 most extended analysis of this song.) This will reduce the
 importance of apparent omissions (such as the vague
 references to appropriate accompaniment, words, etc.).
 Though it should be remarked that all of these elements must
 effect or hinder the realization of the formula's meaning;
 and so, in the end, Knepler would have to demonstrate their
 interaction with the minor second interval, especially since
 he notes that the motif must be "brought out in a specific
 way". More important to us is the presupposition that the
 interval of a minor second has the particular meaning Knepler
 associates with it. Not only does he not offer proof for
 this point, but he neglects the question of historical
 context. There is, for example, some indication that this
 interval has such a meaning within the process of homophonic
 music's development, but this is in the context of a nascent
 system of tonality. (25) Eisler's music was written in the
 aftermath of the Vienna School's "revolution" and does not

show signs of association with tonality in any simple way. Knepler does not demonstrate how this alleged meaning is retained in this context and so runs the risk of ahistoricism.

Our problem becomes even more difficult when Knepler's analysis is compared with Dumling's. Dumling maintains that the musical elements emphasize the textual message: simple music illustrates or emphasizes the idea of the "easy to do" (communism); and he stresses that the ending refers to the difficulties ahead. Knepler, on the other hand, maintains that the music is melodically stressing the concept of "difficulty", while the text speaks of the "easy to do"; and he further notes that the coda is a reference to the "easy", contrasting with the last words: "It's the easy thing, that's hard to do". We have conflicting interpretations here: Dumling maintains that the music illustrates the text; Knepler maintains that it contradicts the text. How is one to choose between the two? Or should we agree with an earlier analysis by Knepler that holds that music can, because of its simultaneous voices, express opposed ideas? (26) But if these analyses are mutually exclusive, what is the source of their difference? One conclusion is that this is an example of the plurality of musical meaning resulting from its ultimate indeterminacy -- but then one must ask what the point is of interpretation in the first place.

The question of musical meaning is not the only common ground between these two critics. Their very handling of the

theme disguises a "subterranean rumbling" that informs their approach; and these rumblings are Brecht's own comments about the music for this song. His comments consist of a single sentence from Über die Verwendung von Musik für ein episches Theater:

In the small piece in which the accusation that communism is criminal is contradicted, the music provides a hearing for the voice of reason through its friendly, advising gestus [Gestus] so to speak.

(27)

Brecht thus sets up the notion that the music expresses a friendly gestus, introducing both the problem of musical meaning and gestus. Dumling's analysis and that of Knepler take this up as a programme to be proved (and do so with contradictory results).

It is appropriate to bring in one more analysis of Lob des Kommunismus which mediates between Brecht's statement and those of our critics, and which was almost certainly known to them, namely Kurt Schonewolf's notes on the music for Die Mutter which appeared originally in the Theaterarbeit in 1952. Schonewolf's description is a modest elaboration of Brecht's statement:

A polished, three-part song with a narrative [erzählend] melody in a warm, sincere tone. After the introductory spoken recitative with the question about communism comes the mother's answer. Calmly moving chords of the continuo (piano and

bass), like those of an Air by Bach, on top of that the narrative [sprechend] melody which itself sounds like "the simple thing that's difficult to do", which it [the music] talks about with the clarity of one who has become knowledgeable [wissend Geworden]. (28)

Once again we meet the idea of music which "speaks", which expresses warmth and sincerity, which may be taken as the equivalent of Brecht's (and Dumling's) "friendliness". Again we meet the idea that the music somehow embodies the textual meaning; for now the melody sounds like the "easy thing that's hard to do". Schonewolf, then, considers the music to express both easiness and difficulty, while Dumling and Knepler decide for one or the other (although Schonewolf does not tell us whether these ideas are expressed simultaneously or consecutively).

Looking at these three interpretations, it seems that our critics have not questioned the adequacy of Brecht's statements, but instead have taken them for propositions only requiring demonstration. Brecht has stated implicitly that music has a certain meaning, and the critics set out to demonstrate its legitimacy. It is not meant that Brecht provides the sole foundation for this idea of musical meaning; rather, Brecht's statements find an echo in his critics because of similar cultural experiences and expectations concerning music. Sharing similar presuppositions, the critics take up Brecht's statements

unreflectively. This becomes more obvious if we look at two key aspects of Brecht's dramatic theory : the role of music in epic theatre and estrangement.

2. The Role of Music in Epic Theatre.

Brecht's main statement about the role of music in epic theatre is found in his much quoted scheme of oppositions from the Anmerkungen zur Oper 'Aufstieg und Fall der Stadt Mahagonny'. (29) Brecht first discusses the "separation of the elements", noting that "music, text and visual image must retain more independence". (30) He then sketches out the scheme of oppositions which, he emphasizes, are not mutually exclusive; he wants to show a "shift in accent" from the function of music in "dramatic opera" to that of "epic opera" as they are reproduced below:

Dramatic Opera

Epic Opera

music serves the text.....	music mediates the text
music intensifies the text.....	music interprets the text
music asserts the text.....	music presumes the text
music illustrates.....	[music] criticizes
paints the psychological	
situation	shows behaviour (31)

These functions are not limited to epic opera, but extend to epic theatre as a whole, as paragraph 71 from the Kleines Organon für das Theater demonstrates:

The musical addresses to the public (in the songs)

emphasize the general gestus of showing, which always accompanies the particular [gestus] demonstrated. For that reason the actor should not move [smoothly] into song, but should set it clearly off from all else, which is best supported by several theatrical measures such as the change of lighting or use of titles. For its part, the music must resist the conformation which it is usually [subjected to] and which devalues it to the level of a mindless servant. Music does not accompany, if not with commentary. It does not satisfy itself with "expressing itself" by simply emptying itself of the mood it finds in the events... Thus can music completely establish its independence and criticize the themes on its own, also, however, occasionally taking care only of the change in [the type] of entertainment. (32)

Brecht has set up here a series of oppositions: serve/mediate, intensify/interpret, assert/presume, illustrate/ criticize, accompany/comment, psychology/behaviour. Preference is given to the second term, but there is no exclusion of the first term in our sets, since Brecht is only talking about a shift in accent. In the last analysis this scheme means that preference is given to independence (i.e. not merely serving), to criticism and to material existence (behaviour). By the latter I mean to say that the pair, psychology/behaviour, is equivalent to

the other oppositional pair introduced earlier in the same article, namely "thought determines being/ social being determines thought". (33)

Brecht's scheme has informed a great deal of the Brecht scholarship dealing with music-text relationships. Hennenberg repeats Brecht's prescription, but with a difference:

Music must not, like a narcotic intoxicating opiate, prevent the listener from thinking, but much rather, it must demand it. This had been furthered by the independence which [music] had once again achieved as a result of the separation of the arts which had been welded together in the "total art work" [Gesamtkunstwerk]. The word-tone relationship was altered so [that] the [musical] tone did not duplicate the word, but rather critically interpreted it. Music should not "serve" but "mediate"; it should not "intensify" or "assert" the text but "interpret" it, and "take it [the text's message] for granted"; it should not "illustrate" but "comment on" the text; it should not paint the "psychological situation" but "present behaviour". (34)

Like Brecht, Hennenberg seems to be offering a series of maxims or prescriptions. But in the middle Hennenberg notes that the music-text relationship was altered so that the "tone did not duplicate ... but ... critically

interpreted" the word. This indicates that the goals of music in epic theatre are not problematic for the critic, but are realized and only need demonstration. At the very least it reveals an ambiguity concerning the prescriptions (are they fulfilled or only recommended?). Admittedly, Brecht himself considers his conditions met, as his discussion of Eisler's music for Die Mutter shows. (35) But when critical works simply take authorial opinion as propositions to be demonstrated instead of critically tested, this can only lead to dogma, especially when the foundations of the interpretation of musical meaning are as insecure as our Introduction suggests.

Hennenberg is not the first representative of such an attitude; Ernst Schumacher also relies on Brecht when he observes in his book, Die dramatischen Versuche Bertolt Brechts 1918-1933 (1955), that Eisler's music⁷⁰ for Die Mutter

has nothing to do with naturalistic motivation or accompaniment [Untermalung], rather it must achieve an independent contribution to the demonstration of the gestic-social character of the drama. With that it goes beyond the music which is only a servant to an illustrative and expressive gesture... (36)

And John Willett says much the same thing when he remarks in his discussion of Mahagonny that

music here becomes a kind of punctuation, an underlining of the words, a well aimed comment

giving the gist of the action or the text. And this remains its prime function in all of Brecht's plays. (37)

Nor is Hennenberg the last to exhibit this attitude. Bernward Thole, for example, also has occasion to remark the function of music in Die Mutter:

Appearing beside ~~verbal~~ verbal language, the specific language of music shows [the text's] background, [its] inner doubt [and] outer power, and so awakens feelings of distance, i.e. a distanced attitude of apprehension in the spectator. With that we already have the estranging effect of music through the musical expression, that is, characterized with the help of the language of tones ...for music has not primarily to do, [in Brecht's theatre] with illustrations or the raising of illusions, but rather with the illumination of the meaning, with the uncovering of socially relevant causes. (38)

One year earlier than Thole, in 1972, Albrecht Betz, in his biography of Eisler notes, again in connection with Die Mutter, that Eisler's

music goes against the text. It expounds it, displays it objectively, and guards its authentic identity against metaphors and 'mood'. Instead of illustrating it, it takes up a position of contrast to the text: or, more precisely, to the conventional response the latter might awaken. (39)

Incidentally, against which mood does this music guard itself? The "mood" of the text in its scenic context has been seen to be one of friendliness. But if the music protects its authentic identity against mood, is it friendliness against which the music struggles? Again, if the music goes against the text, this must put Dumling's interpretation in question, or at least reveal that it is problematic.

So far, it will be noticed that these comments all have in common the fact that they refer to the opera Mahagonny or the play Die Mutter. It comes as no surprise, since Brecht's most extensive treatments of musical function are occasioned by these very works. But this does not mean, even in the works of critics cited, that such functions are limited to these plays. Willett's remarks have already shown the tendency to generalization when he notes that the function of music he has outlined is the same for "all of Brecht's plays". (40) What Willett does in 1959, Knopf repeats in 1980:

Music does not "accompany" [untermalen] in order to serve the word or the action ... nor does it suppress the word... Music should be independent, it should not subordinate itself to the word, but rather lend it a certain attitude ... make its meaning clear or comment on or relativize it. (41)

The close relationship between Brecht's remarks and those of the critics quoted above is obvious. These quotes

do not only demonstrate the unreflective acceptance of Brecht's prescriptions, but also a tendency to generalize these statements to all of Brecht's work. (A tendency which is supported by the already quoted paragraph 71 from Kleines Organon.) Not all of the scholarship in this area is so explicit about their dependency on Brecht's theory; a large number of studies carry it as a hidden assumption. It manifests itself primarily in analyses which demonstrate or assert that the music illustrates, interprets, underlines the text etc. It is the motivating force, for example, for Mainka's statement about the musical elements of Eisler's lied, Deutschland, which he holds to form a "contradiction to the --albeit verbally fixed, attitude" of the text. (42) A similar intent informs Stern's remark that Eisler's Kampflied, Roter Wedding, has its "bloody-minded [textual] effect" diminished by the music. (43) We find it again in Michael Gilbert's remarks about Eisler's music for the end of the film, Hangmen also Die, where he observes that "the effect intended ... is that of alienation, with the music commenting on the scene by distancing itself from it". (44) Dümling has numerous such interpretations scattered throughout 'Lasst euch nicht verführen': Eisler's music for Kuhle Wampe "articulates the protest against the represented relations"; the rhythmic pattern of the Wasserrad-song, also by Eisler and used in Die Rundköpfe und die Spitzköpfe, contradicts the resignation expressed by the text; Dessau's music is commentary through association of specific musics

with specific social groups. (45)

The above examples refer to one term of the equation set up by Brecht, namely commentary or criticism. But there are equally numerous examples of interpretations which demonstrate illustration or underlining. Dümling shows how Eisler's music for Gesang der Reiskahnschlepper from Die Massnahme, "through alternation of two tempos, clearly represented (auskomponieren) two contradictory attitudes" a slower tempo represents the heavily-laden coolies, the quicker the overseer's desire to increase the work tempo. (46) Hennenberg observes that Dessau's music for Der gute Mensch von Sezuan is "cold and hard" where "the inhumanity of man to man is denounced". (47) Knopf shows how Dessau's music for the song, Das Lied von Sankt Nimmerleinstag (from Der gute Mensch von Sezuan) is illustrative:

[it] represents [textually] a depopulated heaven, a disappointed hereafter, [it] is realized musically as a schmalzy operetta interlude: the bourgeois [nature] of the music corresponds to the petit bourgeois hopes and illusions. (48)

This discussion not only demonstrates a remarkable dependency on the part of critics on Brecht's theoretical statements about music's function in epic theatre; it also indicates a shared attitude between Brecht and the critics about music's ability to convey meaning. If it were as obvious that music was a carrier of meaning as it is that natural language is, there would be nothing to

problematicize. But the rise of an aestheticizing school of musicians emphasizing music as a purely formal and meaningless play of tones, coupled with the difficulties faced by a nascent semiotics of music, suggests that the question of musical meaning is indeed problematic. (49) (The discussion of Lob des Kommunismus also demonstrated this problematic nature.) At this point we will examine a concept essential to Brecht's theatre, which also depends on an adequate formulation of the problem of musical meaning: estrangement.

3. Estrangement and Musical Meaning.

Estrangement or Verfremdung is a concept peculiar to Brecht's epic theatre meaning "to make strange". (50) There has been a great deal of speculation on the relationship between estrangement (Verfremdung) and alienation (Entfremdung) and its origins in the philosophies of Hegel, Marx, Korsch etc. (51) It has also been connected with the concept of making strange (priem ostranenie) associated with the Russian Formalists (52), and from there expanded to a concept fundamental to literature. (53) Any investigation of estrangement, including the musical variety, will have to eventually take account of these ideas. For our investigation it is not immediately necessary, and so we will move simply to a definition of estrangement and its translation into musical terms.

Estrangement consists primarily of two related ideas: "making strange" and the offending of norms. Its goal is to reveal underlying overlooked realities about the object of estrangement by highlighting relationships not previously apparent, and this in such a way that the object seems "strange". (54) The goal, which cannot be ignored in Brecht's case, is to stimulate a critical attitude in the spectator that will lead to a critique of the spectator's own social reality. (55) As Hennenberg notes, this critique has at its foundations a historical materialist concept of class antagonism and a critique of the capitalist mode of production. (56) He is quite right to stress this, for it restores to Brecht's theory and practice the revolutionary nature of his criticism, and it is just this which is lost when one overhastily identifies Brecht's concept of estrangement with a notion of "making strange" which is purportedly at the heart of all art. (57)

The most familiar estrangement techniques are those which attack the norms of naturalistic theatre as represented by Stanislavsky, Hauptmann, Chekhov, Ibsen etc. Naturalistic theatre subordinates all of its techniques to one goal: effacing the difference between art and lived reality. (58) The actors must not act out the roles, they must appear to actually be the characters. (59) The stagecraft is directed towards creating the illusion that the spectator is eavesdropping on a piece of lived reality (60); and finally, the text is written to give the impression of reality through

a seamless plot, realistic dialogue etc. Brecht attacked just this type of organic wholeness. He breaks up the plot into fragments, scenes are broken up by musical interludes, the illusion is destroyed. Visible stage machinery, visible musicians attest to the artificiality of the stage event.

(61) The actors are asked to give up the aim of "being" their characters, they must act such that the audience is aware that the performer is self-consciously demonstrating a fictitious character. (62)

In this case music's estranging role is obvious: as a medium distinct from language it serves to break up the course of events, to stand as an implied criticism of the illusion of naturalistic theatre. But it may not be immediately clear how music can estrange in its relation with the text. To elaborate on this point it will be helpful to turn to Grimm's Bertolt Brecht: Die Struktur seines Werkes.

Grimm points out that estrangement techniques are to be found in the poetic language itself. (63) By this he means that language, as the container of social values and norms, is estranged when certain norms or expectations are "offended" by the use of unexpected ideas. In this way surprise can be considered a linguistic estrangement technique, since an expected word may be replaced with another which frustrates the reader's expectations and leads to "new" connections, to surprising understandings about an aspect of the reader's social reality. (64)

In fact, the offending of expectations is the

underlying motif of Grimm's other techniques, such as the "unheard of self-evident [statement]", the "disappointed expectation", "disturbed familiar associations", "distortions of established [vorgepragt] verbal forms", "apparently faulty logic", "justification of the wrong thing", "discrepancy between word and action". (65) All of these imply the contradiction of norms. Naturally, this understanding of estrangement is of enormous importance for music, which is a system of norms, or rather consists of various systems of norms.

Hennenberg's treatment of musical estrangement shows how important the above concept of estrangement is for music. It is not intended to imply that Hennenberg takes over Grimm's ideas --that is of no importance here. For Brecht has already provided the theoretical justification for such a translation by attributing to music the ability to comment on and criticize texts --thus establishing the idea of contrast. (66) In this way, contrast comes to mean the same thing as estrangement. (67)

Hennenberg's classic example of musical estrangement is the offending of the norm of structural harmony by the combination of that system with that of twelve-tone composition. In the opera that Dessau made out of the play, Herr Puntila und sein Knecht Matti, twelve-tone harmonies are combined with diatonic folk-melodies. Such a combination of distinct structural systems is held by Hennenberg to be contradiction and from that he concludes that these

"contradictions in compositional structure refer to social contradictions". (68) Thus, when in this opera the folk song Lied von der Roine is sung by Puntila on Hatelma "mountain", the dodecaphonic accompaniment is a criticism of Puntila's "folkishness" (Volkstumlichkeit). (69) Hennenberg gives a general idea of the role of this type of musical estrangement:

The landowner Puntila seems human when in a drunken state. But this humanity can be more dangerous to those who trust it than the open brutality shown by the sober Puntila. If, therefore, the music of the drunken Puntila reflects tipsy elation, it is not allowed to forget the social gestus of the landowner. The joviality must be internally broken up, [müst] appear questionable. That is accomplished in that the music does indeed make use of a folklike idiom, at the same time distorting it by combining it with harmonic or thematic forms based on the constituting twelve-tone row. (70)

He maintains that this is also true for the Puntila-lied, which Brecht wrote for the 1949 Berlin performance. (71) The lied is not, however, sung by Puntila himself; it is sung by his cook Laina and forms what Dumling refers to as a criticism of the plot from the "kitchen-perspective", the kitchen being the "typical proletarian space". (72) Hennenberg discusses the role played by the Puntila-lied:

The estrangement of the structure in the Puntila-lied means to say: the practical jokes which are recounted were not pure fun. Puntila, indeed, is not harmless, but rather, underhanded. The shadow of his brutality always falls across his boisterous merriness. The folkish intonation of the Puntila-lied is not allowed to deceive the listener in that regard; his [critical faculties] are not allowed to lie still-- therefore the folkishness (Volkstumlichkeit) is estranged. (73)

This example shows just how problematic Hennenberg's interpretation is. For it assumes that the dodecaphonic method is used for "social criticism". (74) Further it assumes that the twelve-tone method is distorting; it does not co-exist with the folklike idiom but distorts it, and hints at brutality. Now, if dodecaphony calls Puntila's humanity into question, one would expect that tonality must mean "humanity", as it does when associated with the witnesses in the opera Die Verurteilung von Lukullus. (75) But even the women of Kurgela in Puntila (who, according to Hennenberg, represent the "wit and wisdom of the people") have their "folkishness" distorted by the harmony based on a twelve-tone row. (76) Hennenberg maintains that,

with Puntila the harmony expresses his true essence, while the melody does so with the women [of Kurgela]. But the poetry which streams from them [the women] is always overshadowed by harsh

reality. (77)

This is apparently true for the hired hands as well.

(78) Now, it may be that an interpolation of dissonance into a largely consonant work may call attention to itself and demand some reckoning with its appearance, some postulating of a meaning for the intrusion. But if the whole of the work is based on the combination of diatonic and twelve-tone systems, how is the meaning to be established? One must wonder why the humanity of the women of Kurgela is not called into question as it is in Puntila's case. And if the association of the women of Kurgela with humanity is established in the text, then it must be asked how the music can mean just this type of criticism. It must be shown why the folklike melody is not itself a criticism of naiveté, and the twelve-tone harmonies are not instead representative of a more advanced social situation.

Behind interpretations like those of Hennenberg lie presuppositions which must be explained and made explicit. It must be explained how the two systems used by Dessau have acquired the meanings Hennenberg attributes to them. It must be shown how dissonance can retain certain meanings associated with unpleasantness; how such meanings of dissonance can be associated with the twelve-tone method; and how use of such dissonance implies criticism (in this case of folkishness). It is all the more necessary to do this, since we are dealing with a period some 25 years after the "birth" of the twelve-tone method. And further it must be

demonstrated whether such associations are group-specific, and if so, to which groups. If these questions are not raised, then the meaning becomes absolute by implication, and the assumptions underlying them become a kind of ideology in the sense of false consciousness. (79)

What is to be questioned, then, is not the existence of norms, nor their antagonistic struggle with emergent or residual systems (80); rather, it is the meaning of these norms which must be questioned. Gottfried Wagner, for example, notes that the estrangement of dance rhythms is an example of criticism. (81) But what is the meaning of this criticism -- or is the implication that the offending of norms is implicit criticism of those norms? In this case one must still establish the meaning of the offended norm.

We have seen how the estrangement techniques of Brecht's theatre offended the norms of naturalistic theatre, and there is no lack of documentation outlining the norms of naturalistic theatre and their "meaning". Turning to music, however, one must ask how the meanings of the norms have been stabilized -- for meaning implies relative stability. What is there in simplicity that implies friendliness in music (82); how has the waltz come to symbolize social decay (83); how and for whom have the major and minor tonalities retained associations of light and darkness? (84) There are many such associations to be found in Brecht scholarship on this subject, but, until the question of musical meaning is itself thematicized, these must remain assumptions -- however

much our own experience may cause us to agree unreflectively with these very associations.

This chapter has shown how three interpretations of Lob des Kommunismus assert various types of meaning to Eisler's music without making explicit connection to the text. This has the tendency to attribute to music a meaning independent of the text, which is problematic as our Introduction suggested. Since musical meaning is problematic, critics must demonstrate not only (as Knepler does) that semanticization is possible, but the semanticized formula must be placed in its historical context to test its validity. Our critics do not do this.

It was then seen how Brecht's somewhat incidental remark about Lob des Kommunismus is taken up by Schonewolf and Dumling and used as a foundation for their interpretations. It was suggested that this procedure has at its heart the legitimation of Brecht's programme for music in epic theatre. A brief excursion into the field of musical estrangement reinforced the idea that it is really Brecht's legitimation that is at stake, because this concept, too, depends on an adequate theory of musical meaning for its elaboration. So long as musical meaning remains problematic, it is likely that the attribution of meaning to music in Brecht's theatre is in reality the symptom of a desire to assert the adequacy of his theory rather than to examine it

critically.

It is now appropriate to turn to a key concept of Brecht's theatre, namely *gestus*, in order to test its adequacy both in Brecht's theoretical statements and in its translation into musical terms.

Chapter Two

Brecht's Concept of Gestus and Music

1. The Concept of Gestus.

To begin a discussion of Brecht's concept of gestus it is probably best to first mention that, in German, the word Gestus was synonymous with the word Geste, which means gesture. Looking at the entry for Gestus in the 1977 edition of the Grosse Duden, we are referred to Gestik, which is the totality of gestures, i.e. gesticulation. Gestus itself is defined as "expression, manner (Habitus)"; and Geste (gesture) is "the involuntary or conscious movement of the hands or arms that accompanies or replaces someone's word (and expresses an inner attitude)". In both cases we find the term "expression", which implies the outward manifestation of an inner, or at least not yet evident, condition. Both definitions also include concepts which could imply syntheses or combinations of more than one manifestation of expression, namely manner and attitude.

There is no doubt that Brecht used the term Gestus in the above sense in his earlier critical writing. In a review from November 1920, he notes how the "gesture (Gestus) and word" of a particular actor "came to a strong, rhythmical unity". (1) Again, in October of the same year, we find the

synonym of Gestus, namely Geste in another review; " this performer must proceed entirely from the gesture (Geste) and overcome the routine of the word". (2) Brecht also uses the collective noun Gestik in yet another review from 1920, in which he refers to the "good moments in the gesticulation".

(3)

However, most discussions of Brecht's use of gestus refer to a meaning peculiar to his theory, and which at least one critic has dated from 1932. (4) This new concept creates certain difficulties; first, Brecht uses a term whose conventional meaning resists the new one he wishes to assign. Secondly, Brecht is not consistent in his use of the term, so that there is an ambiguity as to which of the two meanings applies when no definition is supplied. Thirdly, this confusion is almost unavoidable since, as this Chapter argues, the term represents a battleground for two general ways of interpreting the world; and so the use of an old term for Brecht's concept is a kind of polemic in itself. Fourthly, the ambiguity of Brecht's usage of the term is emblematic for a conflict in the author's own position, a conflict which could be characterized as one between class roots and class affiliations. In other words, it symbolizes the conflict between ideologies representing Brecht's bourgeois class roots and his desire to affiliate as a left-wing intellectual with the workers' movement. (5) I will elaborate upon these difficulties, which are directly connected with the theme of this thesis, during the course of

a chronological survey of Brecht's statements on gestus.

It must first be admitted that a truly chronological study of Brecht's theoretical statements that would allow for more powerful hypotheses regarding the reasons for some of his apparent inconsistencies, remains a project for the future. Hecht has given a clear representation of the difficulties regarding the dating of the Brecht papers, and this must be kept in mind throughout the following analysis. (6)

The first really extensive statement by Brecht on gestus is found in his essay from 1935 entitled Über die Verwendung von Musik für ein episches Theater. The Marxist or historical materialist context of these comments is evident when he writes that

The interest of the epic theatre is eminently practical. Human behaviour is shown to be alterable, man [is shown to be] dependent on certain economic [and] political relationships and at the same time capable of changing them ... In brief, the spectator is given the opportunity to criticize human behaviour from a social standpoint, and the scene is therefore played as historical.

(7)

For this reason

the actor's gestus becomes especially important. For art it has to do here with a cultivation of the gestus -- naturally it has to do with socially meaningful gesticulation, not illustrative or

expressive gesticulation. (8)

In this passage it is possible to isolate all four of the problem areas mentioned above. The first problem is that it seems we are talking about gesture, but also that we are not talking about gesture. According to Brecht we need a gesture which will "express" social behaviour with regard to its political and economic determination, but this gesture can neither be illustrative nor expressive. But what is gesture if it is not expressive or illustrative? Clearly Brecht wants to avoid expression and illustration in the sense that these are motivated by a sovereign human psyche independent of the material world; for he has already told us that behaviour is determined by political economy. However, a gesture which demonstrates economically determined social relationships is obviously illustrating this thesis. And, if social relations are determined by the political economy, is it not likely that gestus, which is bodily communication mediating materially determined social relations, is also so determined? This would mean that there is no gesture which is only illustrative or expressive, and conversely that every gesture illustrates the thesis that social relations are materially determined. But Brecht evidently thinks that gesture can be so divided. The first and third problems are related then, since the new type of gesture, which I indicate by using the term gestus, cannot be clearly established, its definition being its own negation as illustration or expression. Brecht seems to accept, therefore, that there is some

kind of private gesture which can be separated from social gesture. He is caught, so to speak, between the horns of the bourgeois concept of a private life separate from the public, and the Marxist concept that no material manifestation of human life can be divorced from the social. (9) For this reason Brecht cannot give another term to represent his concept, for each is expressed materially as bodily communication, i.e. gesture. The real difference is that we are dealing with gesture viewed from two distinct viewpoints; from that of the bourgeois individualist and that of the Marxist materialist. To go back to the second problem, namely that Brecht is inconsistent in his use of the two terms, we see that, with this problem at the centre of his theory, he can not possibly be consistent, rather this inconsistency is constitutive of his theory. And then to look at the fourth problem, I would suggest that this inconsistency arises from the struggle within this author between two ideologies. But to investigate this latter problem would require a separate study, and it cannot be further developed here.

With the above taken into consideration, I think it is possible in earlier writings to recognize the beginnings of this new concept of Gestus as an organizing principle which holds the individual gesture as the manifestation of the general, i.e. the politico-economic determination of social life, in the particular, that is, in gesture. This change is marked by the new term of "gestic (or gestural) content".

(10) When speaking in 1929 of his work with Piscator on

Julius Caesar Brecht says,

We had always tried to bring out of these works,
which we used as pure sources of raw material, that
which we called the gestic/gestural content
[gestischen Gehalt]. (11)

This term is also brought into use in 1930 in a way
that demonstrates that the gestic or gestural is involved,
not with the creation of new gestures, but with a new inter-
pretive strategy, as was indicated in the discussion of the
previous article. In an essay about the development of epic
theatre, Brecht says,

Only the gestic/gestural content [der gestische
Gehalt] of existing theatre could be regarded as
concrete. It was not so much a matter of the
invention of new gestures [Gesten], but rather of
bringing out the gestic/gestural; not so much of
creating new material, but rather, of organizing
that material. (12)

Already in 1931 we find the use of a term which has to
do with a further synthesis of gestic material, a further
generalization, namely the fundamental gestus (Grundgestus).
This occurs in notes on the play Mann ist Mann where Brecht
remarks that, in the second part of the drama,

once again, over and beyond the meaning of the
individual sentence, a quite particular fundamental
gestus was brought out, whose perception it's true
could not do without the meaning of the individual

statements, but which really requires this very meaning only as a means to an end. (13)

These examples are only indications of new tendencies in Brecht's thinking. However, they cannot be read in only one way, and there is much to be said for this insistence on the material reality of the gestural being connected with the positivistic psychology of behaviourism, as Rosenbauer argues. (14) But this is only so if we realize that this connection represents the privileging of the material reality as against the romantic concept of the "spirit". (15) For Knopf has demonstrated how the equation, materialism = behaviourism, is inadequate. (16)

Our next example comes from the period 1935-41 and has not yet been dated more exactly. Brecht states that

under a gestus [Gestus] one understands a complex of gestures, facial expressions, and, usually, statements, which one or more persons direct at one or more persons. (17)

With this statement it is clear that we are dealing, not with gesture, but with a synthesis of body and facial movements and language. This may or may not go beyond the definition of Gestus as manner, depending on whether or not one admits language to the constitution of a habitual disposition. More important here is the explicitly social nature of gestus since all of its constituents must be directed at other people. However, Brecht is not referring to gestus as an expression of an inner condition abstracted from its

social context, as his examples demonstrate:

A man selling a fish, shows, among others, the gestus of selling. A man writing his will, a woman luring a man, a policeman beating a man, a man counting out ten men -- in all these there is a social gestus. A man appealing to his God only shows a gestus, according to this definition, when, this occurs in relation to others, or in such a situation where relations of people to other people arise (e.g. the praying king in Hamlet). (18)

First let us examine the question of gestus being directed at other people. It may seem that gestus must demonstrate a direct communication between two or more people. The examples of the fishmonger, the temptress, and the policeman certainly reinforce this impression. This is all undermined by the example of a man writing his will. Now, it is possible that this could be a social occasion at which the dying man dictates his will before witnesses who have varying prospects regarding the final testament. Or it could be a dictation before some legal authority which would demonstrate some relation between the individual and the state. But it is also entirely possible, since Brecht has used the word "write" as opposed to "dictate", that we are talking about an action which is directed at other people only in terms of its social import. The example of the praying man also supports this interpretation.

How far one can abstract from Brecht's statement is

not certain. He introduces a further distinction of gestus, i.e. the social gestus, which is used at least three times in theoretical statements of the period 1935-41. (19) Two of these will be dealt with separately (15:483,346), while the third (17:1083) is not defined by Brecht. As our example above demonstrates, what makes the gestus social is not direct communication between participants on stage nor even the possibility of supposed off-stage communication, such as the possibility that the will's beneficiaries learn of their gains through action represented only indirectly on stage. Rather, what makes gestus social is the social import of the gestus, conveyed to the audience through a complex of gestures and language. This could mean that the gestus is social, not because of its demonstrated or inferred communication between stage characters, but because it is, as our previous example indicated, "socially meaningful", i.e. it allows "conclusions to be drawn about social conditions". (20) A social gestus, then, is a gestus which conveys to the spectator information about social relationships through their expression in the characters' manner, which is in turn determined by economic and political factors.

Moving to Brecht's essay, Über gestische Musik one sees a further differentiation. (21) This should not be taken for a further development in time, however, because this essay, written around 1938, cannot be accurately related in time to the previous example. I am speaking, rather, of a logical development, in the sense of differentiation being a

logical progression. Again Brecht tries to show that gestus does not simply mean a series of gestures when he states that

One should not understand gestus as gesticulation; it does not concern emphatic or explanatory hand movements, it has to do with general attitudes. A language is gestic when it is based on gestus, demonstrating particular attitudes of the speaker, which he adopts towards other people. (22)

Gestus, then, has to do with "general" or "particular" attitudes of one person towards others. In this formulation there is really nothing that tells us what the relationship of gestus is to social context, and, abstracting this statement from its context, it could simply express attitudes of some abstract subject, attitudes such as anger, fear etc. But Brecht develops the concept further when he asks what the nature of a social gestus is. According to him

not every gestus is a social gestus. The defensive attitude towards a fly is not at first a social gestus; the defensive attitude towards a dog can be one, when, for example it expresses the struggle which an ill-clad man has to carry out against a watch-dog ... The work gestus is without doubt a social gestus, because the human activity directed towards the control of nature is an affair of society, an affair between people. On the other hand, the gestus of pain, so long as it remains so abstract and general that it does not go beyond the

domain of the animal, is not yet a social gestus. But it is in that direction, towards the de-socialization of gestus, that art often leans. The artist does not give up until he has the "look of a hunted dog". The person is then only "the person" [as abstraction]; his gestus is stripped of every kind of social particularity, it is empty, which means it is no matter or measure of particular people among people. The "look of a hunted dog" can become a social gestus when it is shown how, through particular machinations of people, the individual person is pushed down to the level of the animalistic. The social gestus is the gestus relevant to society, the gestus which permits conclusions about social conditions. (23)

It seems that that type of gestus which was being implied in our first example, namely the gestus which is the manifestation of socially or economically determined gestures and language, has now clearly been sundered from the accidental or personal gesture or gestus. For Brecht has stated "not every gestus is a social gestus". A social gestus is one which articulates a social affair between people; and one which does not do this remains limited to the individual, empty and abstract, such as the gestus of pain. But as there is no gestus which occurs outside of a social context, there is no gestus which is not social. It is rather a question of the perception of gestus as being in a social context, which

can only come about through its demonstration.

By this I mean to remind the reader that we are not speaking of gesture in the real world, but of gesture as it is used in the theatre. In the theatre, as the Prague semi-otician Bogatyrev pointed out, a gesture is not so much a sign as it is a "sign of a sign". (24) As an illustration let us take Courage biting a gold coin to test its authenticity. (25) In the real world this may be a sign representing distrust; but on stage the actor is not demonstrating distrust of another actor. Rather, the actor is demonstrating the sign of distrust as a fictive character who stands in a fictive relationship of distrust to another character; this is a sign of the sign of mistrust. As such, it can be presented as abstract or empty, that is, as mistrust simply as an accidental quality of human nature. Or it can be presented as a social gestus by demonstrating this gesture as a determined product of economic and political human relations, and, in our example, Brecht supports the latter choice.

From the above remarks it may seem that the assertion that there is no gestus devoid of social context is a contradiction. For gestus, being a stage presentation of the thesis of the social context of gesture, has no "social context" strictly speaking. But I mean to say that there is no gesture on stage which does not "permit conclusions about social conditions". Brecht is mistaken in that case when he says that not every gestus is a social gestus, because every play demonstrates a social thesis, even if that thesis is that

there is no social thesis. If, however, he means that a gestus is only a social gestus when it demonstrates the thesis of economically, politically determined behaviour, then he is correct, for he is drawing in that case the distinction between his theatre and other theatre, e.g. "naturalistic", expressionistic etc. The important conclusion which can be drawn from these remarks is that it is not the individual gesture alone which is to demonstrate this concept of gestus, although it can draw attention to itself through stylization or other estrangement techniques. Rather it is the total context of the play, as indicated by the dramatist, which creates a gestus from gesture. (26) It follows then, that any ambiguity of context will affect the successful formulation of a gestus.

The next example, dating from 1940, is the Kurze Beschreibung einer neuen Technik der Schauspielkunst, die einen Verfremdungseffekt hervorbringt. (27) Its chief importance is its apparent separation of the social gestus from that which Brecht just called gestus in the previous example. This separation is effected by using the word gestus (Gestus) only with social gestus, while the more accidental or individual concept is named gesture (Geste). The traditional theatre would not have any problems with Brecht's statement that

everything emotional must be externalized, that is, developed into gesture [Geste]. The actor must find a sensual, external expression for the emotion

of his character, if possible an action which betrays his inner processes. The emotion concerned must step outside, emancipate itself so that it can be dealt with in large. A special elegance, strength and grace of gesture results in the estrangement effect. (28)

His definition of social gestus contains the concepts with which we are already familiar: social context and historicization. He means by social gestus "the mimetic and gestural expression of social relationships, which people of a particular historical period have to one another". (29)

Such a tidy distribution of terminology is not maintained, as a glance at some other notes show. By way of example I will only refer to one instance, which Hecht gives the title Hervorbringen des V-Effekts, written around 1939. Here Gestus and Geste seem both to mean gesture. Under the sub-heading Style and Naturalness, Brecht says that

the naturalness of the gestures [Gesten] and intonation should not be lost in their choice. It concerns stylization here. With stylization gesture [Geste] and intonation "mean something" (fear, pride, pity, and so on). A gesture [Gestus] which arises from such stylization reduces the flux of reactions and actions of the characters to a series of rigid symbols ... (30)

Brecht's next extensive discussion is found in the . Kleines Organon für das Theater, which appeared in 1948. Up

to this point we have seen gestus used as gesture and as gestus, i.e. economically determined gesture as representative of social relations; and we have also seen the latter form further qualified as social gestus. From the statements we have examined, social gestus has shown itself to be a gestus or gesture which, because of its demonstrated social context, reveals social relations in a particular historical moment. Paragraph 61 of the Kleines Organon undermines this idea to some degree. Brecht writes:

The realm of attitudes which the characters adopt towards one another is called the gestic realm. Bodily disposition/attitudes, intonation, and facial expression are determined by a social gestus: the characters mock, compliment, and instruct one another, and so on. To these attitudes, adopted by people towards other people, belong even the apparently entirely private ones such as expression of physical pain in sickness, or religious [ones]. (31)

What is new here is the idea that the physical expression of the characters is determined by the social gestus. Previously, in the Kurze Beschreibung, social gestus was the physical sign of materially determined social relations, and a gestus was gesture deprived of this context. (32) Now, however, it seems that the social gestus is precisely that system of relations which before was the precondition of social gestus. Social gestus becomes, if we combine the two

statements, its own precondition, which is logically impossible if we are to avoid theology. But what this passage represents, besides a warning to those who would define Brecht's terminology by combining temporally disparate statements, is a further application of the implication of social or material determinacy of behaviour. For social gestus, here defined as the system of social relations, now determines even that which before was considered non-social, as our examples have shown. Paragraph 63 is an elaboration of this theme using the opening section of Leben des Galilei by way of example. (33)

The rest of the Organon, when it mentions gestus, deals with the fundamental gestus (Grundgestus), which is the summary of the story (Fabel) or theme of a particular scene, as it is represented by a particular action (34); or gestus is discussed with regard to estrangement, i.e. with stressing the artificiality of the stage event, such as the gestus of demonstration or of "supplying finished material". (35) As these are of no immediate importance to our theme, we will not pursue them here.

There remains one last extensive discussion of gestus by Brecht, given the title, by Hecht presumably, of Gestik. (36) I will quote it at some length:

...We will deal with the gesticulation [Gestik] which occurs in daily life, and which receives its refinement in the drama.

Next there are single gestures [Gesten] such as are

made in place of statements and whose comprehension is effected by tradition, such as the, for us, affirmative nod of the head; gestures [Gesten] of illustration such as those which describe the size of a cucumber or the curve of a racing car. Then [there is] the multiplicity of gestures [Gesten] which demonstrate spiritual/mental attitudes: contempt, tension, helplessness, and so on. Further, we speak of a gestus [Gestus], under which is understood a whole complex of individual gestures [Gesten] of the most various kinds, together with statements, which underlie isolatable events among people, and which concerns the general attitude [Gesamthaltung] of all those concerned with the event (e.g. the condemnation of a person by other people, a discussion, a struggle, and so on); or a complex of gestures [Gesten] and statements, which, occurring with a single person, trigger certain events (e.g. the hesitant manner of Hamlet, the conviction of Galilei, and so on); or also simply a basic attitude [Grundhaltung] of a person such as that of satisfaction or of waiting. A gestus [Gestus] portrays the relations of people to one another. The carrying out of a piece of work, for example, is no gestus [Gestus] if it does not contain a social relationship such as exploitation or cooperation. (37)

Just as he did over a decade earlier, Brecht distinguishes between gesture and gestus, and he demonstrates explanatory, illustrative and expressive gesture. (38) There is, however, a curious omission here; social gestus has gone missing. In its place stands gestus, understood now as the representation of social relations. It seems, in fact, as if gestus and social gestus have been replaced by gesture and gestus respectively. This is of little consequence, however, since the fundamental problem of Brecht's dealings with gestus continues to haunt his writing, namely what actually distinguishes the two from each other. Under the heading of gesture Brecht has given the "expressive" gestures of contempt and helplessness. But this does not help us understand how these differ in kind or quality from the gestus which express, as basic attitude, satisfaction or waiting. Both can be social, expressing relations of people to one another: contempt for someone, helplessness before someone, satisfaction with someone, etc. Even seemingly more abstract gestures are social. To refer to the nod of the head; in its abstraction this may be a "simple" sign of affirmation, but on stage in the context of an expensive restaurant, the nod of a maître d's head upon the entrance of a wealthy patron could convey the social relation between social "unequals", it could convey the affirmation of the patron's status as well as the demonstration of the maître d's subordinate position. Again, no illustrative gesture is devoid of a social context and Brecht's examples of the

cucumber and racing car are interesting, since they undermine his thesis. Show the size of a cucumber to whom, for what purpose? Illustrate the curve of a racing car to whom and why? To show through the elegance of its curve its fine design? But this also means money, status, and even historical moment -- after all, not every society had such an object to describe.

Moving to his examples of gestus, we can ask why the general attitudes of the participants in an event need to be subsumed under the concept of gestus. If one did not accept the view that human nature is materially and historically determined, this scenario could be played simply as the reaction of sovereign individuals to an accidental occurrence. This interpretation could obviously be even more easily adopted in regard to the example of the gestus of the single person.

Once again we are faced with the fact that Brecht is trying to distinguish between two ways of understanding the world, and not between two "things". Part of the confusion arises because, on the stage, these interpretations are indeed represented by "things", i.e. signs. This is not what Brecht seems to think, though; and the constant confusion on this point throughout his elaboration of the theme of gestus is a witness to this basic problem.

First and foremost, this discussion of gestus has demonstrated Brecht's terminological inconsistency. This is partially explained by the fact that most of Brecht's theo-

retical statements are fragments. Brecht pretended to no ambition to fully elaborate a systematic theory of theatre, and the number of extensive statements are relatively few. One must also consider that the majority of Brecht's theoretical writings arise out of an ongoing polemic, which would also preclude a systematic exposition, if that, indeed, was ever a possibility for Brecht. (39)

Our discussion has concentrated on shifts in terminology and meaning within works that offered definitions. But the uncertainty of the meaning of the word *gestus* is intensified if one looks at statements whose context does not indicate a definition. The fragment on Athletic Training, from 1935-41, for example, is one of these latter types. There Brecht notes that

training in the athletic arts (dancing, fencing, wrestling) is certainly important for the actor, because he must be able to master his body.

However, it is even more important that he learn to communicate the *gestus* [Gestus] to his entire body, which needs training in the sensual. (40)

Again, in a note on a poem honouring Lenin by the rug-weavers of Kujan-Bulak, which also is from the period 1935-41, he remarks that this poem

shows one of the many great [and] new *gestus*/gestures [Gesten] of the Russian proletariat freed by the revolution. (41)

A fragment from the period 1949-55 offers the same

difficulty. Brecht remarks that,

when rehearsing, one should avoid loud speaking as one hears oneself badly. Loudness also brings certainty with it, and, when rehearsing, one should, with honest uncertainty, search for the intonation according to the gestus/gesture [Gestus]

(42)

* Given the unstable nature of Brecht's terminology as well as the special place which gestus occupies in it, one would be foolhardy to attempt to determine the precise meaning of Gestus or Gesten in these examples, which could be easily multiplied. By extension, trying to define various terms such as social gestus, as though we are dealing with stable terms which have a secure place in a systematic theory of drama, must fail, if that approach seeks to identify its results with Brecht.

But it has also been the purpose of the foregoing investigation of gestus to show that there is an underlying unifying idea throughout Brecht's wrestling with this terminology. That idea has to do with the determination of consciousness by social being. Further, it is Brecht's intention to demonstrate this thesis through drama, as the representation of social reality. (43)

Now, there can be no doubt that the question of social determination of consciousness was central to Brecht's thinking from at least 1930 onwards. In his notes to the opera Mahagonny he states explicitly that the purpose of epic opera

is to show that "social being determines thinking" as opposed to the thesis that "thinking determines being". (44) And eighteen years later, in 1948 in the Kleines Organon, he says much the same thing when he writes that

This method [dialectical materialism], in order to hit on the mobility of society, treats social conditions as processes and pursues them in their contradictory nature. For [this method] everything only exists in that it changes, and therefore is not identical with itself. This is also so for emotions, opinions and attitudes of people, in which the contemporary manner of social life expresses itself. (45)

In other words, Brecht is concerned with a question central to a Marxist elaboration of a theory of culture, namely, how does social reality relate to consciousness and so to cultural products? This is not the place for an exposition of the key ideas; the reader is referred to the excellent discussions of this topic by Raymond Williams in Marxism and Literature and Fredric Jameson in The Political Unconscious, which demonstrate the central position of this question to Marxist cultural theory. (46) It is my intention here only to indicate that this question, which occupied Brecht during an extended period of his career, cannot be separated from his Marxist standpoint.

In my opinion it is precisely the recognition of this underlying singleness of purpose which motivates various

critics' attempts at presenting a unified Brechtian dramatic theory. In the case of *gestus*, it is the reason for Hennenberg's rather facile definition of *gestus* and 'social *gestus*' (47); and it is also the reason for Peter Wagner's claim that *gestus* was always social for Brecht. (48) It is also the root of Knopf's generalization of *gestus*, which he discusses under the heading of gesticulation (Gestik), as well as for Pavis' attempt to deal with the problem by referring to a "constant enlargement of the notion of social Gestus". (49) But all such syntheses, if they are true to the object of their study, must come up against the fact that Brecht is ambiguous as to the extent of the relation between the social and the individual, as was demonstrated above. By this I mean that, for Brecht, there seems to still be a concept of a personal gesture which, by implication through its contrast with social *gestus*, is not socially determined.

Willett notes this ambiguity when explaining the notion of *gestus*, remarking that *gestus* "is at once gesture and gist, attitude and point [of the story]". (50) Hennenberg does the same when he introduces a term that does not occur in Brecht's writings, namely "social gesticulation (Gestik)". (51) Hecht also tries to separate *gestus* and gesticulation in order to accurately represent Brecht, but I take it as indicative of the recognition of the logical problem involved when he refers to the "so-called social *gestus*". (52)

Pavis' problems are also to be located in his accurate

representation of Brecht's ideas. Noting that gestus "remains very vaguely and contradictorily defined" (53), he goes on to emphasize that the "social dimension" is common to all definitions, and that gestus "is distinguished from gestuality", that it "has nothing to do with conventional gestures" or "illustrative gesture". (54) Further, referring to the "constant enlargement of the notion of social Gestus", he says that gestus "may be a simple bodily movement of the actor", or "a particular way of behaving", or "a physical relationship between two characters", or "the common behaviour of the group". (55) But Pavis cannot tell us how gesture and gestus can be concretely distinguished from one another, admitting that

In practice, it is often very difficult to observe the dialectical mobility of Gestus, between a way of behaving and a gestuality which are fixed, on the one hand, and a spontaneous and creative activity on the other. (56)

In fact, Pavis unwittingly puts his finger on the source of this difficulty when he notes that "the distinction between an individual gesture and a socially encoded one is also quite irrelevant to Gestus". (57) He continues:

For Brecht, gesture is not the free and individual part of man in opposition to the collective domination of language and ideology ... [man] does not own it personally; it belongs and refers to a group, a class, a milieu. (58)

These statements are examples of the desire to unify Brecht's theory by logical extrapolation from the notion of socially determined consciousness. But it would be rash to apply this to gestus, since it would ignore Brecht's own ambivalence. For if the distinction between individual gesture and a socially encoded one is irrelevant to gestus, as Pavis claims, then there is no explanation for Brecht's persistence in the distinction, as the last article examined showed, as well as in Über gestische Musik. (59) This ambiguity with Brecht as to the limits of the applicability of the notion of social determination of consciousness has direct influence upon the question of gestus and music; and so, this investigation will turn to Brecht to see what he and the critics have to say about gestus and music.

2. Gestus and Music.

Brecht's first use of the term gestic (gestisch) with music occurs in a fragment dating from around 1930. In it Brecht states that, "if the music is gestic, then those who make music act". (60) First of all, "music" here refers to the music as a unit set into the action (i.e. a song) and not to the formal elements of the music itself. Secondly, the adjective gestic would in this case best be rendered as gestural since it deals with the physical activity of the musicians on the stage. In this case Brecht is referring to the estrangement technique of visible musicians whose stage

presence emphasizes the artificiality of the stage event, and which is important throughout his writings. (61)

In the second instance, around 1939, Brecht refers to the gestic in reference to jazz in his notes on Die Massnahme. Here it is not altogether clear what he means when he says that jazz

shows possibilities of aiming at a new union of the freedom of the individual with the discipline of a larger body (e.g. improvisation with a sure goal), of emphasizing the gestic, of subordinating the manner of music making to its function, that is, changing styles without transition when there is a change in function, and so on. (62)

But earlier on in the same article he says that the music for part 5 ("What is a person really?") is an imitation of a music which reflects the basic attitude of the merchant: jazz. The brutality, stupidity, sovereignty and self-contempt of this type could not be "formed" in any other musical form. (63)

If gestus has to do with "general attitudes" (64), then brutality, stupidity etc. are the attributes and constituents of the merchant's gestus or "basic attitude". This means that music "reflects" the gestus of its subject; and in our case it would mean that jazz somehow reflects brutality, stupidity etc. And Brecht reaffirms this idea four years later in Über die Verwendung von Musik für ein episches

Theater, when he refers to the drama Die Mutter:

In the piece in which the accusation that communism creates chaos is contradicted, the music obtains through its friendly, advisory gestus a hearing, so to speak, for the voice of reason. The music gives to the piece Praise of Learning, which connects with the question of learning a heroic and yet naturally cheerful gestus. (65)

The Grosse Duden also refers to music when it defines Gestus as "expression" or "manner". There it refers to the "dramatic manner [Gestus] of Verdi's music". It is possible that Brecht refers to this kind of definition only; but, given the special role of the term gestus in his theory, and given the fact that he refers to this role earlier on in the same article, it would not be unreasonable to deduce that Brecht is talking about musical gestus as the reflection of a character's gestus, as socially determined consciousness, which is manifest in gesture. After noting, for example, that gestus is "socially meaningful" gestus and not "expressive or illustrative gesticulation" (66), he goes on to say that

the character of this music as a gestic music, so to speak, can hardly be otherwise explained except by elaborations which work out the social purpose of innovations. Practically, gestic music is music which enables the actor to present certain

fundamental gestus [Grundgestus]. (67)

For the moment let's overlook the fact that the fundamental gestus, which here seems to fulfill the same function that social gestus and gestus also played at various times, is later, in the Kleines Organon, considered to be the summary of a scene. (68) Important here is that this quotation indicates that we are not restricted to the Duden definition of gestus in Brecht's discussion of Die Mutter. However, this quote also introduces a new difficulty; for, if Brecht stated earlier that music reflected a gestus, he is now saying that music simply enables the actor to present a gestus. Naturally, it is possible that music enables the presentation of a gestus by reflecting it; but there is nothing to indicate precisely what is meant.

Our last example comes from the already discussed Über gestische Musik from 1938. There, one will recall, Brecht distinguishes gesture or gesticulation from gestus (69), and then, he further distinguishes gestus from social gestus, the latter being gestus which is "relevant for society", which "allows conclusions about social conditions". (70) The concept of gestus seems to have several applications regarding music; first, Brecht seems to be talking about rhetorical effectiveness, and that music should be an aid to this end. For he prefaces his remarks about music with the well-known example of a gestic language:

a language is gestic when it is founded upon
gestus, when it points out particular attitudes
which the speaker adopts towards other people. The

sentence, "Pluck the eye that offend thee out" is gestically poorer than the sentence "If thine eye offend thee, pluck it out". In the latter, the eye is first introduced, for the first clause contains the clear gestus of assuming something, and then comes the second clause like a surprise, a liberating piece of advice. (71)

There are several things to be observed in this statement. This translation, for example, like Willett's, gives a special character to the word Gestus by translating it as gestus -- Willett uses "gest". (72) This is misleading, as a reexamination of the beginning of the article shows, because Brecht only wishes to state that, for him, gesture (Gestus), does not only consist in hand movements; rather, he considers gesture as all physical manifestations of "general attitudes". (73) Again, this is clearly meant when he shows that Gestus is abstract gesture, while social gestus is gesture in its social context, that context being understood in Marxist terms. (74) Our example, then, demonstrates language which is gestural and consequently abstracted from its social context; it demonstrates rhetorically effective language. Perhaps it is for this reason that Brecht then says that it is "for the musician... an artistic principle, and, as such, none too interesting". (75)

But this concept of gestus, given the problem of the identical adjectival forms of the two meanings in German, does indeed have an application for the composer: "It may

help him set his texts in an especially lively and easily accessible [manner]". (76) The composer is not confined, however, to this understanding of gestus:

On the other hand, it is important that this principle of observance of the gestus can enable him to musically adopt a political attitude. For that it is necessary that he give form to a social gestus. (77)

The composer must give form (gestalten) to a social gestus in order to "musically adopt a political attitude". Whether this means that the composer must "set" a social gestus as one sets a text to music, as Willett's translation suggests (78); or whether the composer can actually "give form" to a gestus is not clear. What is clear is that the composer must adopt a political stance with his music. Brecht pursues this question in the subsection, How can the composer reflect his attitude to the class struggle in his attitude towards the text?:

Suppose that the musician should represent his attitude in the class-struggle in a cantata on Lenin's death. The report of Lenin's death can be [shown] very differently, as far as the gestus is concerned. A certain ceremonial manner says little, as this can also be regarded as fitting for an enemy in case of death. Anger about the "blindness of fate" which tears away the best of a community would be no communist gestus, nor would

wise submission before the "workings of fate"; the gestus of a communistic mourning of a Communist is a very particular gestus. The behaviour of the musician to the text ... indicates the degree of his political and therefore, of his human maturity. (79)

Here the gestus is defined negatively; it is not a certain type of anger or submission. But this implies that music can express emotions (anger) or attitudes (submission); and it must be noted that the emotion and attitude are given a social context, for it is anger about the "blindness of fate" and submission before the "workings of fate". Qualified in this way they express an attitude towards the world which could further be identified with particular social groups in particular historical moments; in other words, they express ideologies. (80) It is this which makes the musical gestus a social gestus. But, to return to the beginning of the article, it seems that gestic music also refers to a rhetorical effectiveness based on gesture. If this is true, we see that once again Brecht is admitting an abstract form of gestus to his "system". This must also conflict with the logic of the idea that social being determines consciousness, since this would mean that the very question of rhetorical effectiveness, or "gesticality," must be socially determined. Both versions of the "If thine eye offend thee"-sentence contain the same lexical and social meaning. If there is a stress on rhetoric, then this must be socially determined if

the thesis of socially determined consciousness is to have any meaning. There would be, then, no abstract gestus. Brecht's inconsistency concerning the extent of the applicability of this thesis makes it difficult to know what musical gestus is.

Returning to the Über die Verwendung von Musik, we can see to what difficulties this will lead. Brecht refers to the "friendly", "advising", "cheerful", "heroic", "delicate", and "rational" gestus. (81) But he does not give a context in which these "empty" gestus relate, and by implication this leaves the door open for music being able to express just such empty gestus. Here I want to focus briefly on one aspect which reveals in nuce the problems which arise: the confusion between gestus and the affections.

In Brecht's Über gestische Musik, the social context of emotions is stressed, and the logical application of a historicizing approach such as this would lead to the conclusion that all emotions have particular historical, social contexts. Rulicke-Weiler is of this opinion when she says in Die Dramaturgie Brechts that gestus,

as Brecht understands it, has nothing to do with theatrical gestures, such as the lover putting his hand to his heart ... rather [he] struggles against their noncommittal nature. Therefore, Brecht's actor does not show "anger" per se, but rather a very particular anger, brought about by particular causes and defined by certain conditions. (82)

Five years earlier, Hennenberg says much the same thing when he points out that Brecht

demands that the artist expressing "pain" should not do so abstractly and generally, never leaving the "realm of the purely animalistic". Pain, and every other affection, must be connected to the social conditions which call it forth. (83)

And yet, he maintains that the "boundaries between gestus and affect are fluid"! (84) For someone who supports the idea that social being determines consciousness, this is a fatal error. For the affections, or passions, are abstract emotions, they are emotions ahistorically conceived; and to admit that there is a type of consciousness which is not determined by social being, which is ahistorical, is to defeat the thesis completely. (85) It also should not escape the reader's attention that the word affect (Affekte), in the hands of a trained musician, like Hennenberg, has a further connotation, namely that of the Doctrine of Affections from the eighteenth century.

The Doctrine of Affections has its origin in the late baroque period and consists of the notion that human affections such as rage, sorrow etc. can be adequately expressed in music according to well-defined formulas. (86) At no point, however, are the affections historicized or given social context. (87) One cannot conflate the affections with gestus if one allows that the concept of gestus consists in the social determination of consciousness, and, therefore, of

gesture and attitude. However, this is just what both Michael Gilbert and Kim Kowalke do. Kowalke refers to gestus as the "twentieth-century analogue to Affekt", and as the "modern reflection of affection". (88) Gilbert writes that,

the radically different socio-historical contexts notwithstanding, it is worth noting in this instance that more than a subtle affinity exists between the seventeenth and eighteenth century [sic] concept of Affektenlehre (as exemplified by Bach) and the Brechtian notion of Gestus as an aesthetic device or principle designed to elicit and direct a certain response on the part of the listener. (89)

Gilbert's comparison is absurd for it is precisely the "radically different socio-historical contexts" which constitute the concepts of gestus and affection. One cannot think these contexts away without destroying the concepts. It is ~~this~~ very abstraction that would remove gestus' constituting elements that Brecht would characterize as empty. And no one who adopts a historicizing approach can consider such constituents as accidental qualities attendant on a more fundamental, a more "real" centre. The physical manifestations of anger, for example, may appear to be similar in different cultures or between temporally distant ones; but an emotion is not identical to these physical states. It is inseparable from its cause, expression and resolution, all of which are socially determined.

3. Gestus and Music. Its Reception by Brecht's Composers and the Critics.

It is natural to turn to Brecht's composers for clarification of the relations between music and gestus; one might expect that those who are held to have realized these theoretical goals could explain how they were realized. However, that is not the case. Dessau, for example, takes up the term gestus as part of the Brechtian "system" he adopted and uses it in a way that adds nothing to our discussion of the term. Nor does he explicitly define the term. So, for example, he informs us that the gestus of two songs (Lied von der grossen Kapitulation and Lied vom Fraternisieren) have the same gestus. (90) Again, he remarks that the fifth variation of the Puntilla-lied has a "tragi-comic" musical gestus. (91) And in 1953 he says that the music for Die heilige Johanna der Schlachthofe

does not need to be ashamed any longer, to 'serve' the word ... it receives the 'gestic', the content-directed meaning when it appears independently. (92)

Kurt Weill dealt with the question of music and gestus in 1929 in the essay Über den gestischen Charakter der Musik. (93) Although he states that his interest lies in the setting of the "fundamental tone, the fundamental gestus of an

event", where the event is apparently one "between people", he seems to think that the gestic music concerns "the rhythmic fixing of the text", the setting of long and short syllables etc. (94) No doubt rhythm must play some role in musical gestus, but to assign it the main role indicates that Weill is referring to something other than the gestus which we have been referring to in this Chapter. Puzzling out the actual meaning here is not necessarily useful, since, as Gottfried Wagner points out, Weill has involved himself in a serious contradiction in this article. (95) Within two sentences he denies music's ability to characterize, and at the same time notes that music can "represent the gestus illustrating the stage event". (96) Wagner objects:

Where is the difference between a psychological-characterizing ability and one which can illustrate the stage event? Is not the latter also a characterizing ability? (97)

Nor does Eisler shed light on the concept of gestus. A footnote in his collaborative work with Adorno, Komposition für den Film, informs us that

Brecht uses concepts like gesticulation [Gestik] and estrangement [Verfremdung] and, as a contrast, empathy [Einfühlen] in his dramaturgical theories. Thus he expressly demands for his 'epic theatre' a 'gestic music'. It should proceed more from behaviour [Benahmen und Verhaltensweisen] than from mood. (98)

Note here the use of the word Gestik where one would expect to see Gestus, since he is, of course, referring to an essential concept of Brecht's theatre (which is the same one that has occupied us). Note also that Brecht never used the word Gestik in such a manner. This would already indicate that the difference between Gestus and Gestik is not apparent to Eisler. And, in his interview with Hans Bunge in 1958, one can not overlook his embarrassment about this concept of gestus:

You know, with Brecht the theory of gestic music goes back to his youth. The 'gestic' is really a brilliant discovery of Brecht's. He discovered it just the way Einstein discovered the famous formula, for example...The great literature from Homer to Shakespeare and beyond: where literature is great, the language is gestic. Where music is great (for example with Bach), it is gestic. With that Brecht simply meant that music co-produces [mitproduzieren] the behaviour of the singer and of the listener ...

I can't tell you enough about the concept of gestus in music in such a conversation. It has to be practically demonstrated. For example -- I played again and again for Brecht -- at his request-- the recitative of the Evangelist from the St. John Passion (Eisler sings): "Jesus went with his disciples across the Kidron valley, where there was

a garden, which he and his disciples entered." So here the Bible is recounted. Moreover, the tenor is set so high ... expression is impossible and so, therefore, is bombast and emotional exuberance. It is commented on. That means the demonstration of the reader is also represented [mitgemacht].

(Eisler sings): "Jesus went with his disciples across the valley of Kidron." So, the location of the valley is shown exactly. Brecht considered it a model of gestic music. And so it is. (99)

Gestus, then, has some connection with greatness and the cooperation in producing a behaviour of performer and spectator. Whether the behaviour of the performer is the attitude of the fictive character demonstrated or that of the actor towards the audience or towards the role is not clear. Apparently there is also something gestic in the example from the St. John Passion. But whether it is the fact that the tenor's tessitura prevents emotive interpretation, or whether it has to do with the reader's gestus (and what this is, is also not clear), or whether it is gestic because it is "great" (i.e. by Bach), remains a mystery.

It is not surprising, given Brecht's own inconsistencies as regards gestus and given the uninformative remarks of his composers about the concept, that the critical literature on Brecht and music should exhibit a profusion of examples of musical gestus without explanations concerning its possibility. And the descriptions of musical gestus generally follow

the lines already established for music's role in epic theatre. There are those who assign music an independent and critical role: it criticizes the gestus, creates the gestus (100); lends the text a gestus (101), and even determines the gestus. (102) On the other hand there are those who give music a more dependent role: it underlines gesturally (103), emphasizes the gestus (104), transfers the gestus to music (105), and translates the gestus. (106) Then again it appears that the music demands a gestus from the performer (107), or reveals the composer's gestus (108) or the composer's attitude towards the public. (109)

There is nothing logically preventing music from doing all of these things, if it is given that it can indeed communicate. But this variety of ways of approaching gestus is duplicated by the types of gestus expressed by music. Music can apparently express the following gestus: anger (110), sadness (111), strictness (111), struggle (112), the brutal-erotic (113), a challenging gestus (114) etc. Then there are other "gestus" such as the melodic (115) and the rhythmic (116). Added to that is the more unusual gestus of being-a-commodity. (117)

This chapter suggests that one cannot rely on Brecht's theory to provide an adequate foundation (at least in the case of gestus) for the investigation of music-text relationships. He shows considerable ambivalence concerning the possibilities of private gestus, which we have suggested is

contradictory to the thesis of social determination of consciousness. This contradiction on Brecht's part is duplicated in his discussion of music and gestus and so shows that his theory cannot be relied on to legitimize the notion of musical gestus, i.e. the musical expression or demonstration of socially determined consciousness or behaviour.

The questionable nature of gestus as a concept received from Brecht is further demonstrated by its reception by the composers with whom he worked. The uninformative remarks of Dessau, Weill's contradictions and Eisler's confusion attest to the difficulty of adopting this concept as a tool for understanding Brecht's products involving music.

The assertions of the critics reveal that, with gestus, we are faced with a similar problem discovered in Chapter 1: firstly, it seems that gestus in music relies on a theory of musical meaning (otherwise it could not express anger, lordliness, etc.). When this meaning is uncertain, the interpretations, giving no explanations as to the nature of musical meaning, become mere assertions whose purpose seems to be more the justification of Brecht's theory than the investigation of music in his theatre. Second, gestus, like the question of the role of music in epic theatre, becomes a concept which is not critically received, rather, the critics seem to make it their task once again to demonstrate the concept's realization without asking whether or not it can be realized. (Why, for example, is it so difficult to perceive gestus in practice? (118))

The results from these modest investigations in the last two chapters would indicate that a different approach must be taken if there is to be any meaningful progress in the research on music-text relationships in Brecht's theatre. It is just such an approach that will be considered briefly in the concluding section of this thesis.

Conclusion

The recurring motif of this thesis has been the uncritical reception of Brecht's theory by Brecht scholarship dealing with the music-text relationship. The necessary conclusion of this thesis, then, is the call for a critical reexamination of Brecht's theory, making of it an object of study of the same nature as his other products, instead of considering it the adequate theoretical foundation and reflection of his other works. This idea, though not actually carried out, is not new; Peter Burger presents a similar programme when he observes in 1974 in Theory of the Avant-Garde that the theories of Adorno and Lukács are incapable of understanding Brecht:

In this situation, a way out seems to offer itself, and that would be to make the theory of this materialist writer the yardstick of judgment. But this solution has a considerable drawback: it does not permit an understanding of Brecht's work. For Brecht cannot become the horizon of judgment and simultaneously be understood in his distinctiveness. If one makes Brecht the yardstick for what literature can accomplish today, Brecht himself can no longer be judged and the question whether the

solution he found for certain problems is tied to the period of its creation or not can no longer be asked. In other words: it is precisely when one attempts to grasp Brecht's epochal significance that his theory must not be made the framework of the investigation. (1)

The most fruitful approach to our problem would be to take up Jameson's recommendation to always historicize, that is, to think dialectically. (2) This means not only that the specificity of Brecht's theory must be determined in a chronological narrative of its development, but also that his categories themselves must be placed in their historical moment. (This also holds true for the theories of his critics.) (3) Instead of using an unadmitted heuristic reduction of his concept of *gestus* as a framework for investigations of gesture in Brecht's theatre, its contradictions should be restored to it and these thematicized as well. In this case, one question might be what the nature of these contradictions is as regards cultural and social history as it is crystallized in the individual known as Bertolt Brecht. One would ask why these contradictions appear and whether they have pendants in his other works. (At the same time, I do not deny the usefulness of consciously adopting heuristic reductions for research methods. By consistently referring to *gestus* as socially determined consciousness, for example, it was possible to reveal Brecht's ambivalence on this point.)

Turning to Brecht's concept of music's role in epic

theatre, it must be asked why Brecht demands a music which "means" something, when so much of the avant-garde represented formalistic concepts of art. Eggebrecht's essay, Zur Methode der musikalischen Analyse (1972), can help to formulate the approach needed. He maintains that music's meaning and content are contained in its structure (4), and that this meaning is not conceptual. (5) The content, however,

is not only all that registers itself in music in its formation concerning [authorial] intention, historical situation and social reality, but also that which develops during the course of its receptions and [which] sediments into [the music] (6)

One type of content, then, would be the question of attributing meaning to music. As Eggebrecht points out, it is not whether this meaning is perceivable that is important (as in the musical symbolism from the baroque), but rather, what is important is that it is postulated. (7) In our case, then, it is not necessarily important that music express "friendliness" etc., rather, it is important that particular composers and writers found it necessary to posit a music that carried meaning. What this means, would in turn demand a detailed investigation of Brecht's relation to other artistic movements in their historical and social context.

Historicizing, however, does not mean simply the detailed description of a historical background, it means demonstrating how the historical moment constitutes the

cultural object. (8) One must be wary, then, of studies which adopt the concept of historicization, like that of Joost et al. in Bertolt Brecht. Epoche- Werke- Wirkung (9) only to once again deliver historical background in the guise of historicization.

As to the question of gestus, it could be suggested, that a more relational way of thinking is necessary. By that I mean that one should not try to isolate a gestus from its context in the play, but instead understand that it is the whole context of a play which determines whether gesture on stage becomes private or socially determined gesture. If a gestus still remains difficult to see after adopting this attitude, it may have one of the following causes: either the production of the play has altered the text so that its thesis of socially determined gesture is destroyed, or there may be an ambivalence in the text itself as regards gestus.

By finally removing Brecht's theory from its privileged position in Brecht scholarship, by subjecting it and Brecht's works to a consistent historicization, and by adopting a dialectical, relational approach -- through all these approaches which would abandon the desire to prove the adequacy of Brecht's theory and practice, it may be possible to finally produce interesting and informative results concerning the question of Brecht and music.

Appendix 1Occurrences of words based on the root "Gest" in Brecht's theoretical works

One of the by-products of my research is this chart which also refers to the Gesammelte Werke. By date I simply mean the date given in the Werkausgabe.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Vol.</u>	<u>Page</u>
21.8.20	15	50
15.9.20	18	10
13.10.20	15	20
23.10.20	"	22
23.11.20	"	29
1920	"	47
1921	"	58
1.2.29	"	185
1929	"	187
""""	"	181
""""	"	182
1930	"	204
""""	"	209
""""	18	79
""""	"	87
12.30	"	78
8.3.31	17	983-84
1931	15	216-17
""""	"	223
""""	17	997
""""	"	1031
""""	18	181
1932	18	129
1934	3	1070
1935	15	238
""""	"	474-79
1936	17	1050
""""	"	1053
""""	"	1070
""""	"	1083
""""	"	1086
'35-'41	15	394-96
""""	"	401
""""	"	408

''''''	''	409
''''''	''	419
''''''	''	421-22
''''''	''	424
''''''	''	425-28
''''''	18	374
''''''	''	423
''''''	15	452
''''''	''	460
1938	''	482-85
''''''	17	1097
1939	15	289
''''''	''	303
''''''	18	395
''''''	''	398-99
'39-'40	15	321-22
''''''	16	522
''''''	''	562
''''''	''	565-66
''''''	''	572-73
''''''	''	602-603
''''''	''	606
''''''	''	620
''''''	''	624
''''''	''	626
''''''	18	417
1940	15	335
''''''	''	341-42
''''''	''	343
''''''	''	344
''''''	''	345-46
''''''	''	351
''''''	''	353
''''''	''	369-70
''''''	''	370
'40-'47	''	487
1941	18	420
''''''	4	1838
1947	17	1119
''''''	''	1120
''''''	''	1122
''''''	''	1125
1948	16	683
''''''	''	684
''''''	''	689-90
''''''	''	690-94
''''''	''	697
''''''	''	698\
''''''	''	699
''''''	17	1214
'48-'50	17	1174
1949	16	713
''''''	''	715

1953	""	802
""	""	804
'49-'55	""	751
""	""	752-54

Appendix 2

Hanns Eisler's 'Lob des Kommunismus'

This is the version for the 1932 performance. (Taken from Hanns Eisler's Neun Balladen aus 'Die Mutter' (Leipzig: VEB, 1977) 11-14.)

Ruhige ♩ (♩ = 108)
(ossia ♩ = 96-104)

(con sord)

Trp B *pp*

Pos *pp*

Schlg *pp*

Ges (gesprochen) Was spricht gegen den Kommunismus? (gesungen) Er ist ver-nunft-ig, je-der ver-steht ihn. Er ist leicht.

Ruhige ♩ (♩ = 108)
(ossia ♩ = 96-104)

Klav *pp*

Trp B *pp*

Pos.

Schlg

Ges Du bist doch kein Aus-beuter, du kannst ihn be - greifen. Er ist gut für dich, er -

Klav

Hanns Eisler's 'Lob des Kommunismus'

9

Trp B

Pbs

Schlg

Ges

Klar

Pauke

pp

p

kun-di ge dich hach ihm Die Dumm köp-fe nen-nen ihn dumm und die



12

Trp B

Pbs

Schlg

Ges

Klar

p

Schmut-zi gen nen-nen ihn schmut-zig Er ist ge-gen den Schmutz und ge-gen die Dumm-heit. Die



Hanns Eisler's 'Lob des Kommunismus'

15

pp

Trp B

Pos

Schlagw

Ges

Klar

Aus-beu-ter nen-nen ihn ein Ver-bre-chen, a-ber wir wis-sen Er ist das En-de ihrer Ver-

16

pp

ppp

Trp B

Pos

Schlagw

Ges

Klar

bre-chen Er ist kei-ne Toll-heit, son-dern das En-de der

Hanns Eisler's 'Lob des Kommunismus'

21

Trp. B

Pbs.

Schlag.

Ges.

Toll-heit Er ist nicht das Cha-os, son-der-n die Ord-nung. Er ist das

Klar.

22

Trp. B

Pbs.

Schlag.

Ges.

Ein-fa - che, das schwer zu ma-chen ist!

Klar.

Gang -

pp

Notes

Preface.

(1) John Willett, trans., Brecht on Theatre. The Development of an Aesthetik (New York: Hill and Wang, 1964) 86.

(2) Patrice Pavis, "On Brecht's Notion of Gestus," Semiotics of Drama and Theatre. New Perspectives in the Theory of Drama and Theatre, trans. Susan Melrose. eds. Herta Schmidt and Aloysius van Kesteren, (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1984 (1978)) 304.

Introduction

(1) See Oswald Ducrot and Tzvetan Todorov, Dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences du langage (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972) 131-38.

(2) Igor Stravinsky, An Autobiography (1936; New York: W.W. Norton, 1962) 53-54.

(3) Georg Knepler, Geschichte als Weg zum Musikverständnis. Zur Theorie, Methode und Geschichte der Musikgeschichte, 2nd.ed. (Leipzig: Philipp Reclam, 1982) 132.

(4) Reinhard Schneider, Semiotik der Musik. Darstellung und Kritik, (Munchen: Wilhelm Fink, 1980) 91; Umberto

Eco, Einführung in die Semiotik ed. Jürgen Trabant (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1972). 145.

(5) Schneider, Semiotik 159-62.

(6) Schneider, Semiotik 233.

(7) Leonard B. Meyer, Music, the Arts, and Ideas. Patterns and Predictions in Twentieth-Century Culture, (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1967) 6; see also Schneider, Semiotik 146.

(8) Knepler, Geschichte 69ff. and 160ff.

Chapter One.

(1) Albrecht Dumling, 'Lasst euch nicht verführen'. Brecht und die Musik, (München:Kindler, 1985) 342-43,

(2) Dumling, Lasst 246, 247, 337, 462.

(3) Dumling, Lasst 217.

(4) Dumling, Lasst 300.

(5) Dumling, Lasst 340-46.

(6) Dumling, Lasst 343.

(7) Dumling, Lasst 341.

(8) Dumling, Lasst 344.

(9) Dumling, Lasst 345-46.

(10) Dumling, Lasst 453, 475.

(11) Dumling, Lasst 293, 533.

(12) Hermann L.F. Helmholtz, On the Sensations of Tone as a Psychological Basis for the Theory of Music. trans. Alexander J. Ellis, (1887; New York: Dover, 1954). This

work was translated in 1885. The translator has supplied us with a list of presumed characters of keys. Although he has given us the character of each major and minor key going up by semitones, I have reduced the list from page 551 of this work to major and minor alone. Note the differences between them. Major keys have the following characteristics: pure, certain, decisive, innocence, resolve, many earnestness, deeply religious, majesty, grandeur, pomp, triumph, festivity, stateliness, serious, solemn, courage, determination, brilliant, firm, dignified, joy, magnificence, splendour, brightness, brilliance, peace, passing regret, etc. Minor keys have the following characteristics: softness, longing, sadness, earnestness, passionate intensity, melancholy, grief, anxiety, solemnity, darkness, mournfulness, restlessness, tender womanly feeling, gloomy, etc.

I do not subscribe to these interpretations, but if an interpretation insists on choosing one character or another, then the choice must be shown to be appropriate.

(13) Bertolt Brecht, The Mother, trans. Steve Gopch (London: Eyre Methuen, 1978) 28.

(14) Dumling, Lasst 560.

(15) Bertolt Brecht, Gesammelte Werke in 20 Banden (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1967) 12:389 ; further references to this work are given such that the above would appear as G.W. 12:389.; Schumacher makes a connection between this story and Brecht's choice between East and West Berlin, see Ernst

Schumacher, Leben Brechts (Leipzig: Philipp Reclam jun., 1984) 259.

(16) Dumling, Lasst 383.

(17) Fritz Hennenberg, Brecht-Liederbuch (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984) 417; Dumling, Lasst 301.

(18) Jan Mukarovsky, "Art as Semiotic Fact," Semiotics of Art. Prague School Contributions. eds. Ladislav Matejka and Irwin R. Titunik (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976) 3.

(19) Fritz Hennenberg, Dessau-Brecht. Musikalische Arbeiten, (Berlin: Henschel, 1963) 7.

(20) Dietrich Stern, "Hanns Eislers Balladen für Gesang und kleines Orchester," Studia musicologica. 18.1-4 (1976): 178.

(21) Dumling, Lasst 342-43.

(22) Knepler, Geschichte 585.

(23) Knepler, Geschichte 581.

(24) Knepler, Geschichte 160-62.

(25) See note 13.

(26) Georg Knepler, "Was des Eislers ist..." Beiträge zur Musikwissenschaft, 15. 1/2 (1973): 35-36.

(27) G.W. 15:479.

(28) Werner Hecht. ed. Materialien zur 'Mutter', (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969) 117.

(29) G.W. 17:1004-16.

(30) G.W. 17:1010-11.

(31) G.W. 17:1011; see also Willet, Brecht on Theatre. p.38. Willet also translates psychisch as psychological.

It must always be kept in mind that psychological here does not mean a behaviouristic psychology, since the psychological here stands as the opposition to behaviour. It means the psychological in the sense of the idealistic notion of a sovereign thinking subject; it is, therefore, the word expressing "spirit" or the "spiritual".

(32) G.W. 16:697.

(33) G.W. 17:1010.

(34) Hennenberg, Dessau 18. See also Note 31 above.

(35) G.W. 15:479.

(36) Ernst Schumacher, Die dramatischen Versuche Bertolt Brechts. 1918-1933 (Berlin: Verlag das europäische buch, 1955) 202.

(37) John Willett, The Theatre of Bertolt Brecht: A Study from Eight Aspects (1959; New York: New Directions, 1968) 132.

(38) Bernward Thole, Die Gesänge in den Stücken Bertolt Brechts. Zur Geschichte und Ästhetik des Liedes im Drama, (Göppingen: Alfred Kummerle, 1973) 243.

(39) Albrecht Betz, Hanns Eisler: Political Musician trans. Bill Hopkins, (1976; Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982) 107-108.

(40) Willett, Aspects 132.

(41) Jan Knopf, Brecht-Handbuch. Theater. Eine Ästhetik der Widersprüche (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1980) 391.

(42) J. Mainka, "Musikalische Betroffenheit -- Zum Begriff des Gestischen," Beiträge zur Musikwissenschaft

15.1/2 (1973): 71.

(43) Dietrich Stern, "Zur Theorie des musikalischen Materials bei Adorno und Eisler," Argument Sonderband Hanns Eisler, ed. Wolfgang Fritz Haug (Karlsruhe: Das Argument, 1975) 165.

(44) Michael Gilbert, Bertolt Brecht and Music: A Comprehensive Survey, Diss. U of Wisconsin-Madison (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1985) 275.

(45) Dumling, Lasst 319, 383, 568.

(46) Dumling, Lasst 301-302.

(47) Hennenberg, Dessau 119.

(48) Knopf, Theater 212.

(49) Stravinsky is an example of this as we saw on Page 6 of this thesis. ; see also Schneider's Semiotik der Musik for a detailed discussion of the problems of a semiotics of music.

(50) See Fredric Jameson, Prison House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1972) 58.

(51) Knopf, Theater 378-83.

(52) Reiner Steinweg, Das Lehrstück: Brechts Theorie einer politisch-ästhetischen Erziehung (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1972) 159.

(53) Reinhold Grimm, Bertolt Brecht: Die Struktur seines Werkes, 5th ed. (Nürnberg: Hans Carl, 1968) 9.

(54) G.W. 15:301,355; 16:680.

(55) G.W. 15:302,303,486; 16:683.

- (56) Hennenberg, Dessau 196, 209.
- (57) Grimm, Struktur 9.
- (58) G.W. 15:341.
- (59) G.W. 15:343.
- (60) G.W. 15:341.
- (61) G.W. 16:657-58.
- (62) G.W. 15:343.
- (63) Grimm, Struktur 26.
- (64) Grimm, Struktur 26; Hennenberg, Dessau 194.
- (65) Grimm, Struktur 27-40.
- (66) G.W. 17:1011.
- (67) Hennenberg, Dessau 209-13.
- (68) Hennenberg, Dessau 233.
- (69) Hennenberg, Dessau 288.
- (70) Hennenberg, Dessau 284.
- (71) Dümpling, Lasst 560.
- (72) Dümpling, Lasst 560.
- (73) Hennenberg, Dessau 291.
- (74) Hennenberg, Dessau 64.
- (75) Hennenberg, Dessau 277.
- (76) Hennenberg, Dessau 292-93.
- (77) Hennenberg, Dessau 294.
- (78) Hennenberg, Dessau 299.
- (79) Peter Burger, Theory of the Avant-Garde trans. Michael Shaw (1974; Minneapolis: U of Minneapolis, 1984) 6.
- (80) Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977) 121-27.

(81) Gottfried Wagner, Weill und Brecht: Das musikalische Zeittheater (Munchen: Kindler, 1977) 135, 248, 270.

(82) Dumling, Lasst 346.

(83) Wagner, Weill 137.

(84) Hennenberg, Dessau 189.

Chapter Two.

(1) G.W. 15:29.

(2) G.W. 15:22.

(3) G.W. 15:20.

(4) Pavis 291.

(5) Thole 57.

(6) Werner Hecht, Aufsätze über Brecht (Berlin: Henschel, 1970) 170-74, 181-82.

(7) G.W. 15:474-75.

(8) G.W. 15:475.

(9) Williams 18-20.

(10) In order to emphasize the ambiguous nature of the earlier writings, I will use the form, gestus/gestural.

(11) G.W. 15:181.

(12) G.W. 15:209.

(13) G.W. 17:983-84.

(14) Knopf, Theater 416.

(15) Williams 19.

(16) Knopf, Theater 416.

(17) G.W. 15:409.

(18) G.W. 15:409.

(19) G.W. 17:1083, 15:483,346.

(20) G.W. 15:484.

(21) G.W. 15:482-85.

(22) G.W. 15:482.

(23) G.W. 15:483-84.

(24) Petr Bogatyrev, "Semiotics in the Folk Theatre,"

trans. Bruce Kochis, Semiotics of Art. Prague School

Contributions eds. Ladislav Matejka and Irwin R. Titunik

(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976) 33.

(25) Pavis 293.

(26) Brecht recognizes this when, in Kleines Organon,

he notes in Paragraph 63 that we need to know the end of the

Leben des Galilei in order to understand the beginning. See

16:690-92.

(27) G.W. 15:341-57.

(28) G.W. 15:345.

(29) G.W. 15:346.

(30) G.W. 15:370.

(31) G.W. 16:689-90.

(32) G.W. 15:483-84.

(33) G.W. 16:690-92.

(34) G.W. 16:693-94; Pavis 294.

(35) G.W. 16:699.

(36) G.W. 16:752.

(37) G.W. 16:752-53.

(38) G.W. 15:482.

(39) Werner Hecht, Sieben Studien über Brecht

(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972) 26..

(40) G.W. 15:424.

(41) G.W. 18:423.

(42) G.W. 16:751.

(43) G.W. 16:704.

(44) G.W. 17:1010.

(45) G.W. 16:682.

—(46) Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious:

Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca, New York:

Cornell UP, 1981) 22-58 ; Williams 75-141.

(47) Hennenberg, Dessau 261-62.

(48) Peter Wagner, "Das Verhältnis von Fabel und Grundgestus in Bertolt Brechts Theorie des epischen Theaters," Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie 89 (1970): 608.

(49) Knopf, Theater 392; Pavis 293.

(50) Willett, Aspects 173.

(51) Hennenberg, Dessau 302.

(52) Hecht, Sieben 57.

(53) Pavis 291.

(54) Pavis 293.

(55) Pavis 293.

(56) Pavis 296.

(57) Pavis 297.

(58) Pavis 297.

- (59) G.W. 16:752-53, 15:482.
- (60) G.W. 18:87.
- (61) G.W. 17:1207, 1136, 1000, 1096, 15:473.
- (62) G.W. 17:1031.
- (63) G.W. 17:1031.
- (64) G.W. 15:482.
- (65) G.W. 15:479.
- (66) G.W. 15:475.
- (67) G.W. 15:476.
- (68) G.W. 16: 693-94.
- (69) G.W. 15:482.
- (70) G.W. 15:484.
- (71) G.W. 15:482.
- (72) Willett, Brecht on Theatre 104.
- (73) G.W. 15:482.
- (74) G.W. 15:483-84.
- (75) G.W. 15:483.
- (76) G.W. 15:483.
- (77) G.W. 15:483.
- (78) Willett, Brecht on Theatre 104.
- (79) G.W. 15:484.
- (80) Ideology being in this case "a system of beliefs characteristic of a particular class or group", Williams 55.
- (81) G.W. 15:479.
- (82) Kathe Rulicke-Weiler, Die Dramaturgie Brechts (Berlin: Henschel, 1968) 265.
- (83) Hennenberg, Dessau 309.

- (84) Hennenberg, Dessau 309.
- (85) See note 87.
- (86) Harvard Dictionary of Music Ed. Willi Apel 2nd. ed.. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1974) 16.
- (87) "During the Baroque period the composer was obliged... to arouse in the listener idealized emotional states -- sadness, hate, love, joy, anger, doubt and so on..." New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians Ed. Stanley Sadie, (London: MacMillan, 1980) 800.
- (88) Kim Kowalke, Kurt Weill in Europe (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1979) 116-17.
- (89) Gilbert 435.
- (90) Paul Dessau, Notizen zu Noten (Leipzig: Philipp Reclam, 1974) 57.
- (91) Dessau, Notizen 63.
- (92) Dessau, Notizen 36.
- (93) Kurt Weill, Ausgewahlte Schriften ed. David Drew, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975) 40-45.
- (94) Weill 42.
- (95) Wagner, Weill 80.
- (96) Weill 42.
- (97) Wagner, Weill 80.
- (98) Theodor W. Adorno and Hanns Eisler, ed. Eberhardt Klemm. Komposition fur den Film (Leipzig: VEB, 1977) 120.
- (99) Hans Bunge, Gesprache mit Hans Bunge. Fragen Sie mehr uber Brecht (Leipzig: VEB, 1975) 67.
- (100) Hennenberg, Dessau 303, 55.

- (101) Knopf, Theater 391.
- (102) Hennenberg, Dessau 46.
- (103) Dümpling, Lasst 234.
- (104) Hennenberg, Dessau 61.
- (105) Ingeborg Allihn, "Die Musik ist der wichtigste Beitrag zum Thema. Zusammenarbeit Hanns Eislers mit dem Dichter," Musik und Gesellschaft 28 (1978): 71.
- (106) Knopf, Theater 182.
- (107) Dümpling, Lasst 453.
- (108) Ingeborg Allihn, "In Wirklichkeit soll gezeigt werden politisches Verhalten -- Die Musik Hanns Eislers im Brecht-Theater," Musik und Gesellschaft 28 (1978): 395.
- (109) Betz, Political Musician 101.
- (110) Hecht, Materialien 118.
- (111) Hennenberg, Dessau 311; 186.
- (112) Fred Fischbach, "Pour une nouvelle lecture des pièces de Brecht à la lumière de la musique de scène de Hanns Eisler," Recherches germaniques 13 (1983): 152.
- (113) Kowalke 119.
- (114) Dümpling, Lasst 514.
- (115) Dümpling, Lasst 323.
- (116) Wagner, Weill 80.
- (117) Hennenberg, Dessau 63.
- (118) Pavis 296.

Conclusion

- (1) Bürger 88.
- (2) Jameson, Political 9, 47, 56.
- (3) Burger 15-20.
- (4) Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht, "Zur Methode der musikalischen Analyse," Erich Doflein: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag (Mainz: Schott, 1972) 68.
- (5) Eggebrecht 75.
- (6) Eggebrecht 76.
- (7) Eggebrecht 79.
- (8) Jameson, Political 31ff.
- (9) See Jörg-Wilhelm Joost, Klaus-Detlef Müller and Michael Voges, Bertolt Brecht: Epoche-Werk-Wirkung Ed. Klaus-Detlef Müller (München: C.H.Beck, 1985).

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