

Two Ottoman Intellectuals on the Issue of God's Knowledge: Khojazāda and ʿAlā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī

Lambertus Willem Cornelis van Lit

Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal

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Abstract – English

Through the study of three chapters dealing with a philosophical discussion of God's knowledge (especially of particulars as opposed to universals) from two Ottoman studies on Ghazālī's (Algazel, d. 1111) *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* ('The Incoherence of the Philosophers'), this thesis offers two simultaneous analyses. On the one hand, justice is done to the commentary tradition of the *Tahāfut*, which in general has been assumed to exist solely in the reply by Ibn Rushd (Averroës, d. 1198). It is shown that a commentary tradition flourished in the Ottoman Empire from the second half of the 15th century on, spurred on by the invitation of Sultan Mehmed II to two distinguished scholars of the time – Khojazāda (d. 1488) and 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1482) – to participate in an 'intellectual contest' on Ghazālī's *Tahāfut*. A full list of commentaries and glosses is provided, together with biographies of the two antagonists and a description of the 'intellectual contest' in which they participated.

In addition, light is cast on the development of the issue of God's knowledge in late-medieval Islamic philosophy. The two Ottoman studies are analyzed and compared with earlier texts, chiefly Ghazālī's original text. It is shown that most of the material included in the Ottoman texts stems from earlier theological texts such as *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* ('Commentary on The Stations'), a commentary by Jurjānī (d. 1413) on a theological compendium by Ījī (d. 1355). The importance of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209) for the later development of Islamic theology is confirmed; while it is shown that Ibn Rushd's commentary on the *Tahāfut* was not used by the Ottoman scholars.

Résumé – Français

Durant l'étude de trois chapitres tirés d'ouvrages traitant de discussions philosophiques du savoir de Dieu (des particuliers aux universels) dont deux études Ottomans à propos de Ghazālī (Algazel, mort en 1111) *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* (l'incohérence des philosophes), la présente thèse présente deux analyses simultanées. D'un côté, est rendu justice à la tradition de commentaires de *Tahāfut* qui en général a été étudiée seulement par la réplique de Ibn Rushd (Averroès, mort en 1198). Il a été prouvé qu'une tradition de commentaires s'est développée dans l'Empire Ottoman depuis la deuxième moitié du 15^e siècle suite à l'invitation du Sultan Mehmed II de deux érudits renommés de l'époque – Khojazāda (mort en 1488) et 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (mort en 1482) - afin de participer à un «concours intellectuel» à propos du *Tahāfut* de Ghazālī. Une liste complète de commentaires et de gloses est fournie accompagnée de biographies de deux antagonistes et d'une description du «concours intellectuel» dans lequel ils ont participé.

De plus, le développement de la question du savoir de Dieu dans la philosophie islamique de la fin du Moyen-Age est mise en relief. Les deux études Ottoman sont analysées et comparées avec des textes plus anciens, principalement ceux de Ghazālī. Il a été démontré que le matériel inclus dans les textes Ottomans vient de textes théologiques plus anciens tel que *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* (commentaire sur les stations), un commentaire de Jurjānī (mort en 1413) sur un compendium théologique écrit par Ījī (mort en 1355). L'apport de Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (mort en 1209) s'est prouvée déterminante dans le développement ultérieur de la théologie islamique tandis qu'il a été prouvé que le commentaire d'Ibn Rushd sur le *Tahāfut* n'a pas été utilisé par les érudits Ottoman.

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The Islamic Studies Library has been close to a second home for me and I owe many thanks to the librarians (Anaïs, Charles, Salwa, Shawn and Steven) for welcoming me each day, ever so helpful in tracking down yet another impossible reference. I especially think back fondly at the arrangement allowing me to come in half an hour earlier (thank you Shawn!); they were the best half hours of the day.

Introduction

Let it be known that ‘Zayd is sitting’. Then when Zayd stands up, two things can happen. Either the knowledge that Zayd is sitting changes into knowledge that ‘Zayd is standing’, or it does not. If the knowledge does not change, it clearly cannot be called knowledge anymore but instead becomes ignorance. And if the knowledge that ‘Zayd is sitting’ changes into the knowledge that ‘Zayd is standing’, a change is required in the knower: from one who knows that Zayd is sitting, to one who knows that Zayd is standing. This presents a theological problem: because ignorance (the first alternative) nor change (the second alternative) should characterize God, it therefore appears impossible for God to know that Zayd is either sitting or standing.

This and related issues form the crux of a major discussion of how knowledge is attributable to God. It has been a heated debate, with many sides, throughout much of Antiquity and Medieval times, but interestingly enough it is still subject of many a discussion.¹ In the Christian tradition it is usually referred to as the issue of divine omniscience, in particular in relation to future contingents. Here the central question is how the future can remain contingent, with free will for human beings being upheld, while at the same time known to God, with His omniscience being upheld.² In the Islamic tradition however, the focus has been more on the concept of knowledge itself and its application to God. It therefore is usually referred to as the discussion of God’s knowledge, and especially God’s knowledge of particulars. Since the provocative article of Marmura in 1962,³ modern scholars of Islamic philosophy have devoted more attention to the issue, especially to Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine that God knows particulars ‘in a universal way’ (*‘alā naḥw kullī*). Studies offering an overview are few,⁴ but usually they are concerned with the views

¹ Much of the modern interest came out of an article by Kretzmann in 1966; Kretzmann, N., “Omniscience and Immutability”, *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 63 No. 14 (1966) pp. 409-421; it is for example taken up by Kenny, A., *The God of the Philosophers*. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1979); and later by Wierenga, E. R. *The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1989) A modern introduction concerned with the logics of the discussion is: Weingartner, P., *Omniscience: From a Logical Point of View*. Philosophische Analyse Band 23. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag (2008).

² See e.g. Craig, W. L., *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez*, Leiden: Brill (1988); future contingents are also the main concern of the articles in Rudavsky, T. (ed.). *Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing (1985).

³ Marmura, M. “Some aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 82 (1962): pp. 299-312.

⁴ An exception is Rosenthal, F., *Knowledge Triumphant: the concept of knowledge in medieval Islam*, Leiden: Brill (2007), pp. 108-129.

of particular philosophers such as Fārābī,⁵ Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd,⁶ Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī,⁷ and Iqbal.⁸ Although this thesis approaches the subject similarly, focusing on the views of Khojazāda and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s al-Ṭūsī (both Ottoman intellectuals from the second half of the 15th century), much attention has also been devoted to establishing relationships with earlier texts. In general, the works cited here are from after the time of Ibn Sīnā, and thereby this thesis provides some broader observations pertaining to the philosophical discussion in later medieval times.

The choice of Khojazāda and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī is not coincidental. To assess their views, only their books on Ghazālī’s *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* (‘The Incoherence of the Philosophers’) have been used. By choosing these two relatively unknown texts, the commentary tradition on Ghazālī’s text is placed in the foreground. By and large, modern scholarship has only devoted attention to Ibn Rushd’s famous commentary of Ghazālī’s *Tahāfut* called *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (‘The Incoherence of the Incoherence’), while neglecting the Ottoman commentary tradition, which sprouted in the 15th century with the two before mentioned studies, and blossomed throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, with the last known commentator passing away in the first half of the 18th century. My hope is that this thesis will spur further examination of not only the history of the reception of Ghazālī’s book, but also the larger history of a continuing philosophical tradition within the Islamic world after Ibn Rushd.

This thesis is therefore double-bladed; on the one hand the Ottoman commentary tradition and in particular the first two Ottoman commentaries are described, on the other hand the philosophical discussion of God’s knowledge in later medieval Islamic philosophy is discussed through the lens of the two Ottoman intellectuals.

Structure of the thesis

The thesis opens with a chapter devoted to three loosely connected topics. The first is an overview of all commentaries on Ghazālī’s *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*. The second is the historical background of the first two commentaries from the Ottoman Empire, since these provided the

⁵ Terkan, Fehrullah. “Does Zayd Have the Power Not to Travel Tomorrow? A Preliminary Analysis of al-Fārābī’s Discussion on God’s Knowledge of Future Human Acts”, *The Muslim World* 94 (2004): pp. 45-64; Marmura, M. “Divine Omniscience and Future Contingents in Alfarabi and Avicenna”, in: Rudavsky, T. (ed.), *Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence...*, pp. 81-94.

⁶ Manser, G., “Die göttliche Erkenntnis der Einzeldinge und die Vorsehung bei Averroës”, *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie*, 23 (1909), pp. 1-29; Belo, C., “Averroës on God’s knowledge of particulars”, *Journal of Islamic Studies* 17:2 (2006): pp. 177-199.

⁷ Abrahamov, B., “Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on God’s knowledge of the particulars”, *Oriens* 33 (1992): pp. 133-155; Ceylan, Y., *Theology and tafsīr in the major works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī*, Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (1996), pp. 111-122.

⁸ Fāzli, A. H., “Iqbal’s View of Omniscience and Human Freedom”, *The Muslim World* 95 (2005): pp. 125-145.

basis for later commentaries and are the central topic of this thesis. The third is the reception of Ghazālī's book and its commentaries (especially the two under investigation in this thesis) in modern scholarship. The second chapter then gives more information about the authors (Khojazāda and 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī) of these two commentaries. The third chapter provides some background on the philosophical issue central to this thesis: divine omniscience. It will refresh the mind of the specialist, as well as provide a referential framework for new students of the issue. Its primary objective is to trace the philosophical discussion from Aristotle up to and including Ibn Sīnā. When dealing with Ancient and late-antique philosophy, the focus is therefore on the texts that are likely to have been available to medieval Islamic philosophers. When dealing with texts from the Islamic World, the chapter only provides material from philosophical texts. Early Muslim theological debates of, for example, how to predicate the attribute (*ṣifah*) of knowledge (*'ilm*) to God, are therefore completely untouched: to investigate their content and relation to the philosophical and late-medieval theological discourse properly would require a Master's thesis in itself.⁹

The fourth chapter offers an overview of the two Ottoman treatises, by describing the chapter headings and the introductions of the works. The fifth chapter is the first of a three-part close reading. It discusses proofs to establish that God knows things other than Himself. The sixth chapter then discusses God's self-knowledge, and the seventh chapter goes into the issue of God's knowledge of particulars. After the conclusion and bibliography, the appendix provides a list of all the Islamic thinkers who are discussed in this thesis. The appendix also provides an edited text of the three relevant chapters from Khojazāda's text.

Advice to the reader

There are some conventions used in this thesis which the reader should be aware of. First and most importantly, the name Khojazāda is used where 'Khawājah Zādah' would have been a more correct transliteration of his name. As the name appears frequently in the thesis, a shortened version, which reflects the pronunciation, has been adapted. This is also in line with the choice made by the 'International Symposium on Khojazāda', which will also adopt this form in their conference proceedings. All historical persons are referred to by their agnomen. In case of simple names, the definite article which usually precedes a name is excluded (e.g. Ghazālī

⁹ Interested readers are referred to e.g. Ījī, *ʿAḍud al-Dīn, Kitāb al-Mawāqif*, 3 vol., Bayrūt: Dār al-Jīl (1997), v. 3, pp. 93-100; Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn, *Kitāb al-Arbāʿīn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn*, Ḥaydarābād: Maṭbaʿat Majlis Dāʿirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmānīyah (1354/1934-35), pp. 133-136; and especially Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Fiṣal fī al-Milal wa-al-Ahwāʾ wa-al-Niḥal*, 5 vol., Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah (1986), v. 2, pp. 293-308.

instead of al-Ghazālī), though it has been retained in compound names (e.g. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī instead of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Ṭūsī). Also, no dates are given. The full name and dates of birth and death can be found in the ‘List of Persons’, appended to this thesis. Whenever an English equivalent exists of Arabic words such as places, titles, and religious terms (e.g. Istanbul, Sultan, Quran), this equivalent is used without mention of the original term. In translating technical terms, an attempt has been made to use this translation consistently. In some cases the specific Arabic term (between brackets, in italics) has been supplied. Especially in those cases, one must note that the translations given of such terms were not primarily intended to represent the ultimate rendering of the Arabic term, but rather supply an English word that is closest in meaning given the context (this is also why consistency in the use of translated terms is not always maintained). In citations, texts between round brackets are part of the original texts, while texts between square brackets are interpolations or comments. Whenever the Arabic text uses the third person singular pronoun (*huwa*, *-hu*) followed by *ta‘ālā* (‘may He be exalted’) to refer to God, ‘He’ with capital H is used.

The three chapters in the second part of the thesis discuss the issue of God’s knowledge as laid out in Ghazālī’s 11th, 12th, and 13th chapters (corresponding to Khojazāda’s 13th, 14th, and 15th chapters). For ease of citation however, references will be made to ‘first chapter’, ‘second chapter’, and ‘third chapter’. To lessen distraction, when referring to Ghazālī’s, Khojazāda’s, or ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s text, precise annotation will usually be missing. As the general location is always mentioned, one should be able to find the correct passage without much trouble. We will work our way through the chapters by paraphrase and study, combined with comparative analyses of texts by other Muslim thinkers wherever necessary. It should be pointed out that Khojazāda and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn wrote their commentaries on Ghazālī’s text in a very loose way. That is to say, their texts do not follow Ghazālī’s text line for line and then comment on it, but rather they take the ideas Ghazālī presents and discuss them completely on their own terms. Indeed, Ghazālī’s original text seems at some points one of the least concerns the two Ottoman scholars had. Overall, Khojazāda’s and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s texts run very similar. However, they diverge in composition in some instances, and we are therefore forced to postpone or bring forward some passages by either philosopher. In the introduction of each chapter such will be indicated and an account which corresponds to the actual contents of the chapter will be provided.

The passages can be found in the following sources:

- **Ghazālī's text:** Ghazālī, transl. by M. Marmura, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers: tahāfut al-falāsifa*, Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press (1997), pp. 125-143 [= Ch. 11-13].
- **‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s text:** Ṭūsī, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn (ed. by Riḍā al-Sa‘ādah), *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, Beirut: al-Dār al-‘Ālamīyah (1981), pp. 255-274 [= Ch. 11-13]. This edition is reprinted but with different pagination by: Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī (1990), p. 239-258, but note that all references in this thesis apply to the 1981 print. An older print edition is: Ṭūsī, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, *Kitāb al-Dhakhīrah*, Hyderabad: Maṭba‘ah Dā’irah al-Ma‘ārif (1899), pp. 163-179.
- **Khojzāda’s text:** printed in: Khojzāda, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, al-Maṭba‘ah Al-‘Īlāmiyya: Egypt (1302-1303/1884-1886), pp. 74-86 [= “faṣl” [sic], “faṣl 13”, and “faṣl 14”], and in: Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd, Khojzāda, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 2 vol., “printed at the expense of Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī and his brothers in Egypt” (1321/1903), vol. 2, pp. 31-51 [= “faṣl” [sic], “faṣl 13”, and “faṣl 14”]. Nevertheless, the reader may want to turn to the edited passage appended to this thesis.

In the thesis, samples of Arabic texts are used to demonstrate textual correspondences between the two Ottoman texts and earlier theological or philosophical texts. The presentation of these samples is as follows: on the left, the earlier is text cited, on the right one, (or both) of the Ottoman texts is cited. If ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s text is discussed, the title ‘al-Dhakhīrah’ is used to distinguish it from Khojzāda’s text which will be referred to as ‘Tahāfut al-Falāsifah’. Text placed in **bold** is an exact correspondence. Underlined text is present in two texts when a comparison between three texts is made. Dashed text has strong resemblance to one of the other texts (or both) but is not exactly the same. Stars (*) indicate that although the passage is continuous, the other text has words at the position of the star (it indicates that in comparison to the other text, words are ‘missing’).

The Background

The *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* and its commentary tradition

In this first chapter, we will trace the legacy of Ghazālī's 'The Incoherence of the Philosophers' (*Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*). The book itself was presumably written during his stay in Baghdad (1091-1095)¹ and must have circulated fairly rapidly as Ibn Rushd (living in faraway Andalusia) wrote his famous counter-commentary only about a hundred years later. Although the *Tahāfut* is nowadays held to be one of the most important products of medieval Islamic philosophy, few explicit responses to this text are widely known, at least in the Islamic world, so the scope of its direct influence has the appearance of being limited.² The refutation by Ibn Rushd under the appealing title *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* ('The Incoherence of the Incoherence') has received much scholarly attention among modern Western scholars. Yet, the importance and influence of Ibn Rushd's book lies within the Latin Scholastic tradition, not within the subsequent development of Islamic philosophy. To get a better sense of the commentary tradition on Ghazālī's *Tahāfut*, we will first list all the commentaries that have been mentioned in the bio-bibliographical works that I have examined. As its commentary tradition in the Ottoman Empire is little known, I will then discuss the history of it. Finally, I will note the reception of the *Tahāfut* and its commentaries by modern scholars.

Commentaries on the *Tahāfut*

It is worthwhile showing those commentaries that we do know of, either by title alone or also by one or more manuscripts. The list presented here draws mainly from Ḥibshī,³ but it is cross-checked with the information found in the *Kashf al-Zunūn* by Hajjī Khalīfah, as well as supplemented by manuscript evidence.⁴ All persons mentioned here can also be found in the appendix. A question mark indicates that its existence is doubtful or that no manuscript of the work may have survived.

¹ Ghazālī, transl. by M. Marmura, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers: tahāfut al-falāsifa*, Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press (1997), p. xvii. This is contested though. Griffel for example argues for a longer period (beginning before Ghazālī came to Baghdad). See Griffel, F., *Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 35ff.

² The subject is in need of a rigorous study and all I can refer to here is Mas'ūdī's use of Ghazālī's *Tahāfut* in his commentary on Ibn Sīnā's *Ishārāt*, which at least proves it was read and used in the kalām/falsafah discourse after Ghazālī's death, cf. Shihadeh, A., "From al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī: 6th/12th century developments in muslim philosophical theology", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 15 (2005), p. 155.

³ Ḥibshī, 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad, *Jāmi' al-shurūḥ wa-al-ḥawāshī*, 2 vol., Abu Dhabi: al-Majma' al-Thaqāfi (2004), Vol. I, p. 682.

⁴ Hajjī Khalīfah, *Kashf al-Zunūn*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah (1992) (Henceforth: *Kashf*).

◆ **Al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah***

- Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*
 - Agostino Nifo (d. 1545), *Destructiones destructionum Averroys cum Augustini Niphi de Suessa expositione*⁵
- ‘Alā’ Al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 887/1482), *al-Dhakhīrah / Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*
- Khojzāda (d. 893/1488), *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*
 - Ḥakīm Shāh al-Qazwīnī (d. 928/1521), *Ḥāshiyah ‘alā al-Tahāfut*⁶
 - ? al-Ījī (d. 906/1501), *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*⁷
 - Ibn Kamāl Pāshā (d. 940/1534), *Ta‘līqah ‘alā al-Tahāfut*⁸
 - ? Mu’ayyad Zādah (d. 970/1562), *Sharḥ Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*⁹
 - ? Nūṯ al-Rūmī (d. 1007/1598), *Ḥāshiyah ‘alā al-Tahāfut*¹⁰
 - al-Qarābāghī (d. 1073/1662), *Tahāfut al-Ḥukamā*¹¹
 - ? Al-Kūrānī (d. 1078/1667), *Ḥāshiyah ‘alā al-Tahāfut*¹²
 - al-Uskudārī (d. 1149/1736), *Talkhīs al-Tahāfut*¹³

There is also mention of a book *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* by al-Rāwandī (d. 573/1177). Rāwandī's book is attested by Ismā‘īl Pāshā in his *Hadīyat al-‘Ārifīn* as well by Āghā Buzurg who refers to a

⁵ Not in Ḥibshī's list, Nifo, A., *Destructiones destructionum Averroys cum Augustini Niphi de Suessa expositione*, Venice: Octavianus Scotus (1497), cf. Mahoney, E., “Nifo, Agostino (c.1470-1538)” in: *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, London: Routledge (1998), ed. Edward Craig.

⁶ This gloss is not mentioned in the *Kashf* under this name, there is a mention of a “*Tahāfut Ḥakīm Shāh*” (Vol. 1., p. 513). It is identified as a gloss in: Fāni, E.S., “*Hakīm Şah el-Kazvîni*”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, XV, pp. 194-195.

⁷ In the *Kashf*, the book title “*Tahāfut Mu‘īn al-Dīn*” is mentioned (Vol. 1, p. 513), but in *Hadīyat al-‘Ārifīn* it is mentioned as “*Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*” (*Kashf*, Vol. 6, p. 223).

⁸ *Kashf*, Vol. 1, p. 513. GAL makes mention of it. It has been translated into Turkish: Paşa-Zāde, K., *Tehāfut Hāşiyesi (Hāşiya ‘alā Tahāfut al-falāsifa)*, transl. by Ahmet Arslan, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı (1987).

⁹ *Kashf*, Vol. 5, p. 642, also: Muḥibbī, M., *Khulāṣah al-Athar*, 4 vol., Beirut: Maktabah Khayyāt (1966), Vol. 6, p. 223.

¹⁰ Confirmed in *Kashf*, Vol. 6, p. 531, and in: Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣah al-Athar*, Vol. 4, p. 475.

¹¹ Not in Ḥibshī's list, nor mentioned in *Kashf*, Vol. 5, p. 423, nor mentioned in *Shaqā‘iq*, p. 272 (entry on Qarābāghī). But see e.g. MS Hasan Hüsnü Paşa 787, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (Istanbul). Edition (not seen): Karabağî, Muhyiddīn Muhammed b. Ali el-Hanefī er-Rūmī, ed. by A. Güzel, *Karabağî ve Tehāfut-ü*, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları (1991).

¹² *Kashf*, Vol. 6, p. 291.

¹³ Not in Ḥibshī's list, but see *Kashf*, Vol. 6, p. 323. It is mentioned by Bouyges (under the name Muḥammad Amīn). Cf. Ibn Rushd, ed. by M. Bouyges, *Tahāfut at-Tahāfut*, Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique (1930), p. xx. For an edition see Gökdağ, K., *Mehmed Emin el-Üsküdârî ve Telhîsu Tehāfutî'l-Hukemâ Adlı Eseri*, Unpublished PhD thesis, Marmara University (2008).

library catalogue (of *al-Khizānah al-Riḍawīyah*).¹⁴ However, Āghā Buzurg lists it under a separate item and since no mention is made of it in the main entry on Ghazālī's *Tahāfut* in the *Kashf al-Zunūn*, it seems to be that the names merely coincide. Another book which is not included in this list is a *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. Āghā Buzurg names it, referring to several libraries.¹⁵ It is also mentioned in Van Dijck's *Iktifā' al-Qunūc*, where (under the entry title 'Naṣīr al-Dīn 'Alī al-Ṭūsī') we read: "to him also belongs *Kitāb Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* (not printed), which is the fourth book of the same title." Van Dijck then relates it back to Ghazālī's book.¹⁶ Still, considering the likely mix-up with 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī together with the fact that such a book is not accounted for by other bibliographical reference works, it seems justified to leave this title out of the list until examinations of manuscripts can shed more light on the issue. Further, if we consider all later authors as part of the same tradition, it is very likely that al-Ījī's and Mu'ayyad Zādah's books are in fact glosses on Khojazāda's (or 'Alā' al-Dīn's) book, instead of being a separate investigation of Ghazālī's *Tahāfut*, and they are therefore listed as glosses (although again manuscript study should be conducted to gather conclusive evidence).

From this list it becomes clear that with the staging of this debate by Sultan Mehmed II, a commentary tradition until at least the end of the 16th century ensued. As will be pointed out in the overview of Khojazāda's life, this influence also stretches beyond the Ottoman Empire for it is attested that his book was in the possession of the Iranian scholar Dawānī.

The debate between the two Ottoman scholars

Ḥajjī Khalīfah relates:

"Sulṭān Muḥammad Khān al-'Uthmānī al-Fātiḥ ordered al-Mawlā [...] Khojazāda [...] and al-Mawlā 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī [...] to both write a book on their judgment of the discussion between the *Tahāfut* of the Imām [al-Ghazālī] and the philosophers. Khojazāda wrote it in four months and Mawlā al-Ṭūsī wrote it in six months. They chose Khojazāda's book above al-Ṭūsī's one. Both received 10.000 dirhams from the Sulṭān, but Khojazāda was also given a precious robe. That was the reason for the departure of Mawlā al-Ṭūsī to Persia."¹⁷

¹⁴ Not in Ḥibshī's list, but see *Kashf*, Vol. 5, p. 392 and Āghā Buzurg, *al-Dharī'ah ilā Taṣānīf al-Shī'ah*, Beirut: Dār al-Aḍwā' (1983), #2254, Vol. 4, p. 502.

¹⁵ Āghā Buzurg, #2255, Vol. 4, p. 502.

¹⁶ Dijck, E.C. van, *Biblāwī*, M.A., *Iktifā' al-Qunūc*, Cairo: Maṭba'ah al-Hilāl (1897), p. 197.

¹⁷ *Kashf*, Vol. 1, p. 513; Tāsh Kubrī Zādah, *Shaqā'iq al-Nu'mānīyah fī 'Ulamā' al-Dawlah al-'Uthmānīyah*, Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabīy (1975), p. 61.

It is hard to tell the exact role of the Sultan in ordering the debate and deciding on a winner. At the very least it seems to be the case that the Sultan was personally involved in formulating the challenge and the decision of a winner. This story also wants to tell us that even though the prize money was lavish, the honour of winning was so important as to instill a grave disappointment in ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. Needless to say, the announcement of Khojazāda’s text as the winner explains why all subsequent glosses were on his text. But even in the time of the debate itself it seems to have gained quite some importance. Tāsh Kubrī Zādah writes about the impression Khojazāda’s work had on Dawānī:

“It is mentioned that Ibn Mu’ayyad, when he came to be in the service of Mawlā Dawānī, was asked: ‘what gift did you bring to us?’ He said: ‘*Kitāb al-Tahāfut* by Khojazāda’ [...] So Dawānī studied it for a while and said: ‘May God be pleased with you and with the author of the book! I had the intention of writing a book on this subject, and had I written it before I had seen this book, it would have seen the light (*law katabtu qabl an arā hādhā al-kitāb la-ftaḥat*).’¹⁸

This is an important account as Dawānī would prove to be one of the most influential philosophers of the 15th/16th century and indeed an important figure for Islamic philosophy at large. The list of glosses (four of which are sure to exist as we still hold manuscript evidence, four others which are good possibilities) shows that Khojazāda’s text was quite popular for at least a hundred years. In the 17th century we still witness some glosses, but in the early 18th century the tradition stops and we only know of a summary by Uskudārī.

Modern scholarship

Modern interest in the *Tahāfut* begins about 150 years after the time the glosses stop to be produced, with Ernest Renan’s *Averroès et l’Averroïsme* in 1852.¹⁹ This, however, also immediately marked the interest of most scholars from then until now in the connection between Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd, leaving the Ottoman connection out of the picture. Specific to the topic of this thesis, God’s knowledge, it is interesting to note that Renan incorrectly accused Ibn Rushd of holding the view that God does not know particulars. “Dieu, par conséquent, ne connaît que les lois générales de l’univers; il s’occupe de l’espèce et non de l’individu”,²⁰ as Renan explains Ibn

¹⁸ *Shaḡā’iq*, pp. 83–84; Slightly different in *Kashf*, Vol. 1, p. 513. At least for the issue of God’s knowledge do we have an extensive discussion by Dawānī in his commentary on Ījī’s *al-‘Aqā’id al-‘Aḡudīyah*. Cf. ‘Abduh, M., ed. S. Dunyā, *al-Shaykh Muḡammad ‘Abduh*, 2 vol., Cairo: Dār Iḡyā’ al-Kutub al-‘Arabīyah (1958), v. 2, pp. 339–454.

¹⁹ Renan, E., *Averroès et l’Averroïsme*, Paris: Calmann Lévy (4th ed. 1882 [1852]).

²⁰ Renan, p. 114.

Rushd's point of view. Tjitze de Boer picks up the topic in his 1894 study²¹ which paraphrases and explains the whole *Tahāfut* but does not point out the error of Renan. His succinct remarks on Ibn Rushd are correct, but it is only Gallus Manser (in 1909) who explicitly corrects Renan's view.²²

In 1302/1884, a print edition of Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, together with Ibn Rushd's *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, and also Khojazāda's *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* was published in Cairo.²³ It was quickly followed by two subsequent printings (of the same editions) in 1319/1901 and 1321/1903.²⁴ D.B. Macdonald notes (in 1899) that the edition was put together "apparently from an earlier Constantinople edition",²⁵ and although Bouyges notes that this was confirmed to him by "plusieurs cheikhs de Constantinople",²⁶ it seems that no one is able to provide evidence for it. The influence the publication had on scholarship can hardly be underestimated. The above-mentioned study by De Boer was conducted using it. He in fact opens his book by acknowledging this ("Im jahre 1302 d.H. (1884/5 D) erschienen in Cairo zwei schriften zusammengedruckt..."), and closes his book by suggesting more than 60 corrections to the edition. A few years, in 1913, a partial German translation appeared by Max Horten.²⁷ From here on, more and more scholarly works start to appear, of which one of the highlights is most probably Van den Bergh's English translation of the complete *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*.²⁸ The familiarity of Ghazālī's book and Ibn Rushd's response among scholars of Islamic philosophy

²¹ Boer, Tj. de, *Die Widersprüche der Philosophie nach al-Ġazzālī und ihr Ausgleich durch Ibn Rošd*, Strassburg: Verlag von Karl J. Trübner (1894), pp. 62-63.

²² Manser, G., "Die göttliche Erkenntnis der Einzeldinge und die Vorsehung bei Averroës", *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie*, 23 (1909), pp. 1-29.

²³ At the end of the book 1303 is printed as the year of publication. Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd, Khojazāda, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿah al-ʿilāmiyya (1302-1303/1884-1886).

²⁴ The 1321 publication has Khojazāda's text on the margins, not as a standalone text. It further specifies that it was "printed at the expense of Muṣṭafá al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī and his brothers in Egypt." All three are mentioned by Bouyges in: Bouyges, M., "Notes sur les philosophes arabes connus des Latins au Moyen Age. V. Inventaire des textes arabes d'Averroës", *Mélanges de l'Université St.-Joseph*, 8 (1922), p. 25. Bouyges gives further information in: Ibn Rushd, ed. by M. Bouyges, *Tahafot at-Tahafot*, Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique (1930), p. xix.

²⁵ Macdonald, D.B., "The Life of al-Ghazzālī, with Especial Reference to His Religious Experiences and Opinions", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 20 (1899), p. 124, fn. 1.

²⁶ Bouyges, M., "Inventaire des Textes Arabes d'Averroës (suite) Additions et Corrections a la Note V", *Mélanges d'Université St.-Joseph*, 9 (1923), p. 45.

²⁷ Horten, M., *Die Hauptlehren des Averroës: Nach Seiner Schrift: Die Widerlegung des Gazali*, Bonn: A. Marcus und E. Webers Verlag (1913).

²⁸ Ibn Rushd, transl. by S van den Bergh, *Averroës' Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)*, 2 vol., London: Luzac & Co. (1954).

was thereby firmly established, to the point that it received generous attention in introductory books on the history of Islamic philosophy.²⁹

All the while though, as we noticed, only passing mention of Khojazāda’s book (let alone ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s book) was made. Most of the places where it did receive attention were quite possibly too obscure to reach to a large audience. One of the earliest sources making mention of Khojazāda’s (and ‘Alā’ al-dīn’s) book was Flügel, in his catalogue of manuscripts of the Vienna Courtlibrary (Hofbibliothek). He lists an MS of Khojazāda’s work as “*Tahāfut li-Kwājah Zādah*.”³⁰ Citing the *Kashf*, he gives an accurate (albeit short) description of the debate between Khojazāda (“Chodschazāda”) and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, and further comments that Khojazāda’s goal was to take and expand Ghazālī’s critique on the philosophers. He also refers to Ibn Kamāl Pāshā’s commentary, which is included in an MS containing several works of Ibn Kamāl Pāshā. He lists this commentary under the title “*Risālah fī al-jawāb ‘ammā katabahu Khojazāda fī Tahāfut al-Ḥukamā’*.”³¹ A couple of years later Steinschneider refers to this in an entry on Ghazālī’s *Tahāfut*.³² The authoritative Brockelmann, in his *GAL*, called Khojazāda’s book “chiefly a critique on Ghazālī and the philosophers.”³³ Unfortunately, he listed ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s book as “*Kitāb al-Dhakhīrah (Dhukhr) fī al-Muḥākama bayna al-Ghazālī wa-Ibn Rushd (Tahāfut ‘alā al-Tahāfut)*”, some years later repeated in Laknawī’s *Fawā'id al-Bahīyah* and many years later repeated by Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī in his *al-‘Alām* and in Kaḥḥālah’s *Mu‘jam al-Mu‘allifīn*.³⁴ Add to that Horten’s statement in the introduction of his *Hauptlehren* that Khojazāda and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī were asked to write a study to decide between Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd.³⁵

Bouyges, writing a couple of years later, got the story of the two Ottoman scholars right. In the introduction to his edition of Ibn Rushd’s *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* he discusses the possibility of Khojazāda’s and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s texts as sources for establishing a correct version of Ibn Rushd’s text. He however notices that no such possibility exists, as both texts are commentaries on Ghazālī’s text, not Ibn Rushd’s text. “Cette opinion, qui dramatise l’histoire, n’est pas

²⁹ For example, the widely read book by Leaman makes abundant use of Ghazālī’s and Ibn Rushd’s texts; Leaman, O., *An Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy*, Cambridge: CUP (2nd ed. 2002).

³⁰ Flügel, G., *Die arabischen, persischen, türkischen Handschriften der K.U.K. Hofbibliothek zu Wien*, 3 Volumes, New York, Hildesheim: Olms (Reprinted 1977, Original: 1867), #1520; Vol. II, p. 597.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 218.

³² Steinschneider, M., *Die hebraeischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher*, Berlin: Kommissionsverlag des Bibliographischen Bureaus (1893), pp. 326-327.

³³ *GAL*, II, p. 298.

³⁴ *GAL*, SII, p. 279; Laknawī, M., *al-Fawā'id al-bahīyah fī tarājim al-Ḥanafīyah*, Miṣr: Maṭba‘ah al-Sa‘ādah (1906), p. 145, n. 1; Ziriklī, *al-‘Alām*, Beirut: Dār al-‘Ilm al-Milaliyīn (1980), vol. 5, p. 9; Kaḥḥālah, ‘U., *Mu‘jam al-Mu‘allifīn*, 15 vol., Damascus: al-Maktabah al-‘Arabīyah (1957-1961), vol. 7, p. 185.

³⁵ Horten, p. iii.

suffisamment fondée en ce qui concerne Averroès”,³⁶ as Bouyges notes. He also notes that the glosses on Khojazāda’s work equally are without any reference to Ibn Rushd. However, recourse to the earlier (wrong) story is made by Louis Gardet. He wrote in his entry on “*‘Ilm al-Kalām*” in the *EI* that “the work of the Turk Khojazāde (9th/15th century) [...] sought to refute the *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* of Ibn Rushd.”³⁷ Besides this, no mention is made in the *EI* of the events in the Ottoman Empire on Ghazālī’s *Tahāfut*. Daiber points to a PhD thesis (1972) which supposedly contains an edition and introduction of Khojazāda’s text, but just as the Constantinople edition it has made no impact beyond the inferences that such a text exists.³⁸ With a distorted comment in an encyclopaedia as important as the *EI*, the complete story about the debate between ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Khojazāda and the subsequent commentary tradition was more or less forgotten in modern scholarship and the work of Khojazāda was only known to be an attempt to refute Ibn Rushd. For example, the topic briefly resurfaces again in an article by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu where he writes that “Mehmed II encouraged the scholars of his time to produce works in their special fields; for the comparison of the works both entitled *al-Tahāfut* by al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd, he ordered two scholars of his time, Hocaẓāde and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī each to write a work on the same subjects.”³⁹ Although the background story, and the role of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, have been done justice in this remark, an accurate description of the content of the books is again lacking. A similar assessment of the commentaries on Ghazālī’s *Tahāfut* was made by Qarībullāh, who writes in his *The influence of al-Ghāzālī [sic] upon Islamic jurisprudence and philosophy*:

“Almost three centuries after Ibn-Rushd, khawājā zāda (d. 893/1458 [sic]) wrote his book *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, in which he stated his views, as an arbitrator, in respect of the two previous works [i.e. Ghazālī’s *Tahāfut* and Ibn Rushd’s *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*]. However,

³⁶ Ibn Rushd, ed. by M. Bouyges, *Tahafot at-Tahafot*, p. xix.

³⁷ Louis Gardet, “*‘Ilm al-Kalām*”, *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., Vol. III, p. 1149a. Gardet must have written the article between 1967 (latest year of a publication he refers to) and 1971 (publication date of Volume III of the *EI*).

³⁸ Hans Daiber lists the French PhD (Hassen Jarrai, 1972), supposedly containing a critical edition, but despite an intensive search I cannot confirm its existence. Cf. #4855 in Daiber, H., *Bibliography of Islamic philosophy*, Leiden: Brill (1999). Also in: Association française des Arabisants, *Dix ans de recherche universitaire française sur le monde arabe et islamique de 1968-69 à 1979*, Paris: Editions Recherche sur les Civilisations (1982), #589, p. 47 (it mentions the research was conducted under R. Arnaldez and gives the title: “*Tahafut al-Falasifa*’ par Khwadja Zade. Edition, introduction, analyse et notes.”).

³⁹ Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, “Ottoman Science in the Classical Period and Early Contacts with European Science and Technology”, pp. 1-48, in: *Transfer of Modern Science & Technology to the Muslim World*, ed. By Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Istanbul: IRCICA (1992), p. 18.

apart from the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* of khawāja zāda, and *Tahāfut at-tahāfut* of Ibn-Rushd, no other books written specifically about al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut* have been found."⁴⁰

Modern scholars of the history of Islamic philosophy have thus by and large left out the Ottoman commentary tradition on Ghazālī's *Tahāfut*. Where Khojazāda's commentary is mentioned, the prevailing opinion has been that it was primarily a comparative study of the *Tahāfut* and Ibn Rushd's commentary.

‘Alā’ al-Dīn's text was (we can assume for the first time) printed in Hyderabad in 1899.⁴¹ Riḍā Sa‘ādah showed that this edition is based on one manuscript and defective in some ways,⁴² therefore publishing his own critical edition in 1981.⁴³ Another publisher published in 1990 the same edition, though with a different pagination.⁴⁴ Next to his edition, Sa‘ādah also published a comparative analysis.⁴⁵ This book mainly deals with the conclusions (and not so much the argumentation) to the various problems discussed in the *Tahāfut*, and primarily discusses Ghazālī and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn. Sa‘ādah also includes Ibn Rushd's views, which he favours himself. Other books in non-European languages concerning the topic of this thesis, God's knowledge, do not discuss Khojazāda's text and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn's text. For example, Jalāl Sharf's book *Allāh, al-‘Ālam, wa-al-Insān* discusses exactly the issues raised in Ghazālī's *Tahāfut*, but only briefly mentions Khojazāda on one topic.⁴⁶ Qumayr, in his introductory book on Ghazālī's and Ibn Rushd's *Tahāfut*, likewise makes no mention of the later commentary tradition.⁴⁷ In Turkish, the body of scholarship on Ottoman intellectual history has been growing and there is likewise more and more available on Khojazāda and the Ottoman *Tahāfut* tradition. Most of the newer material came out of the 1987 study of Prof. Arslan on one of the glosses on Khojazāda's text, to the exception of Türker's PhD thesis of 1956.⁴⁸ Among the new PhD theses, we may name three of them. First there is Duran's study of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn's text. It is a critical edition plus Turkish

⁴⁰ Qarībullāh, H. M. al-F., *The influence of al-Ghazālī [sic] upon Islamic jurisprudence and philosophy*, Beirut: Dar-el-Jil (1993), p. 36.

⁴¹ Al-Ṭūsī, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, *Kitāb al-Dhakhīrah*, Hyderabad: Maṭba‘ah Dā‘irah al-Ma‘ārif (1899).

⁴² ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, pp. 27-29.

⁴³ Al-Ṭūsī, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, ed. by Riḍā al-Sa‘ādah, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, Beirut: al-Dār al-‘Ālamīyah (1981).

⁴⁴ Al-Ṭūsī, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, ed. by Riḍā al-Sa‘ādah, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī (1990). The discrepancy between the page numbers is due to a difference in blank pages and is therefore irregular.

⁴⁵ Sa‘ādah, R., *Mushkilah al-Şirā‘ bayn al-Falsafah wa-al-Dīn*, Beirut: Dār al-‘Ālamīyah (1981).

⁴⁶ Jalāl Sharf, M., *Allāh, wa-al-‘Ālam wa-al-Insān fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, Beirut: Dār al-Nahḍah al-‘Arabīyah (1980).

⁴⁷ Qumayr, Y., *Ibn Rushd wa-al-Ghazālī: al-Tahāfutāni*, Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq (1986).

⁴⁸ Pâşâ-Zâde, K., transl. by A. Arslan, *Tehâfüt Hâşiyesi (Hâşiya ‘alā Tahāfut al-falāsifa)*, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı (1987); Türker, M., *Üç Tehâfüt Bakımından Felsefe ve Din Münasebeti*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi (1956). The latter compares Khojazāda's text with Ghazālī's and Ibn Rushd's.

translation plus study (total of 872 pages).⁴⁹ There is furthermore a comparative analysis of Khojazāda's and 'Alā' al-Dīn's text by Deniz (266 pages).⁵⁰ Lastly, an edition, translation and study of Uskudari's summary of Khojazāda's text (351 pages) may be mentioned.⁵¹

As a final remark of this survey, the symposium dedicated to Khojazāda may be mentioned. Under the title *Uluslararası Hocazâde Sempozyumu* ('International Symposium on Khojazāda'), the theology faculty of Uludağ University (Bursa) and the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality organized on 22 to 24 October 2010 a symposium which attracted some twenty scholars. A pamphlet on Khojazāda's life and work was published (in Turkish) in support of the symposium,⁵² and a conference proceedings is at the moment of writing forthcoming.⁵³ An impression of the conference can be gained from the conference report in *Ilahiyat Studies*.⁵⁴ This symposium will possibly spur on scholars to pursue more investigations in the *Tahāfut* tradition, and will hopefully at the very least make the history of the Ottoman reception of Ghazālī's *Tahāfut* readily available to interested students.

⁴⁹ Duran, Recep, *Alaaddin Ali al-Tûsî: Kitâb al-Zuhr*, Unpublished PhD thesis, Ankara University (1989).

⁵⁰ Deniz, Gürbüz, *Hocazâde ve Ali Tûsî'nin Tehâfütlerinin Mukayesesi*, Unpublished PhD thesis, Ankara University (1999).

⁵¹ Gökdağ, K., *Mehmed Emin el-Üsküdârî ve Telhîsu Tehâfütî'l-Hukemâ Adlı Eseri*, Unpublished PhD thesis, Marmara University (2008).

⁵² It has 76 pages and contains a wealth of references (mostly to Turkish sources) and a rudimentary survey of manuscripts. Yücedoğru, T., *Arap, Acem ve Rum Diyarında Emsalsiz Biri Hocazâde Muslihuddîn Mustafa*, Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi (2010).

⁵³ Yücedoğru, T., Koloğlu, O., Kılavuz, M., Gömbeyaz, K. (eds.), *International Symposium on Khojazada (22-24 October 2010 Bursa): Proceedings*. Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi (2011).

⁵⁴ Lit, L.W.C. van, "Conference Report: International Symposium on Khojazāda", *Ilahiyat Studies* (2011).

Khojazāda and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī: bio-bibliographical accounts

After having introduced the *tahāfut* tradition, we will now give an account of the lives of the two intellectuals under discussion. It will allow us to understand the context of their textual debate better, as well as give an insight into how intellectuals in general were faring in the Ottoman empire of the 15th century. Furthermore, as was mentioned before, there is very little material available on the subject, so it would be beneficial to expand on their biographies in order to be as comprehensive as possible. We will first discuss the life of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. Afterwards we will consider the life of Khojazāda.

‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī

Let us begin with ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. As mentioned before, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s take on the *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* has been edited and published in 1981 by Riḍā al-Sa‘ādah. In his edition, he has provided an excellent short biography of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn.¹ This account follows al-Sa‘ādah but will give references to the *Shaqā’iq al-Nu‘mānīyah* of Tāsh Kubrī Zādah and other primary sources. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s full name is ‘Alā’ al-Dīn b. Muḥammad al-Batārikānī² al-Ṭūsī al-Ḥanafī³ and he was also known as Mawlā ‘Irrān⁴ and the “Abundance of Knowledge and the Highly Knowledgeable One in the Sciences” (*Ghazārah al-‘ilm wa-Sa‘ah al-Bā‘ fi al-Funūn*⁵). He died in Samarqand, in 887/1482,⁶ and since it is mentioned that he was 70 years old when he died⁷ it is likely that he was born around the year 817/1413 (if we assume this age refers to solar years). Originally from Persia, he took on several positions as a scholar in the Ottoman Empire. He seems to have written primarily commentaries and glosses on theological works but he of course also wrote a study on al-Ghazālī’s *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*. He later let go of his worldly possessions and took on the Sufi garb, moving back to Samarqand.

¹ Al-Ṭūsī, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, ed. by Riḍā al-Sa‘ādah, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, Beirut: al-Dār al-‘Ālamīyah (1981), pp. 13-19. His account mainly draws from the entry on ‘Alā’ al-Dīn in: Tāsh Kubrī Zādah, *Shaqā’iq al-Nu‘mānīyah fi ‘Ulamā’ al-Dawlah al-‘Uthmānīyah*, Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabīyah (1975), pp. 60-62.

² Al-Sa‘ādah follows al-Ziriklī, *al-‘Alām*, Beirut: Dār al-‘Ilm al-Milaliyīn (1980), vol. 5, p. 9. For example Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī gives “al-Bayādakānī”, cf. Suyūṭī, transl. by Philip Khuri Hitti, *Nazm al-‘iqyān fi a’yān al-‘yān: Al-Suyūṭī’s Who’s Who in the Fifteenth Century*. New York: Syrian-American Press (1927), #118, p. 132.

³ This full name is given by Suyūṭī. Tāsh Kubrī Zādah gives just “‘Alā’ al-Dīn ‘Alī al-Ṭūsī”.

⁴ al-Laknawī, M., *al-Fawā'id al-bahīyah*, p. 145.

⁵ Suyūṭī, *Nazm al-‘iqyān*, p. 132.

⁶ Most sources confirm this, except three. Ziriklī and Kaḥḥālah states he died in 877. Cf. Kaḥḥālah, ‘U., *Mu‘jam al-Mu‘allifīn*, 15 vol., Damascus: al-Maktabah al-‘Arabīyah (1957-1961), vol. 7, p. 185. Ziriklī bases himself on Ibn Iyās, *Badā’i‘ al-Zuhūr*, 5 vol., Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif (1951), Vol. 3, p. 88. Sarkīs claims he died in 885, in Khorasān or Tabrīz. Cf.: Sarkīs, Y., *Mu‘jam al-Maṭbū‘āt al-‘Arabīyah wa-al-Mu‘arrabah*. Maṭba‘at Sarkīs: Miṣr (1931), Vol. 2, pp. 1248-1249. As the *Shaqā’iq* is the oldest source, it should be given the benefit of the doubt (maybe these other dates are copyist or typographical errors).

⁷ Only claimed by Suyūṭī.

Youth

He grew up in Ṭābirān and Nawqān or Nūqān, in the district of Ṭūs. In Persia, he learned from both the Islamic and scientific tradition and apparently made the same progress in both. He became well versed in the sciences of *tafsīr*, *ḥadīth* and argumentation (*al-khilāf*).⁸ One source suggests he came to the Ottoman Empire when he was 29 (corresponding to the year 1441 if one accepts 1412 as his birth year),⁹ which is coherent with other sources which state he arrived when Murad II was still the sultan which places his arrival at least before 1451.¹⁰

In the Ottoman Empire

At first he was offered a position in Bursa,¹¹ but his career took a definitive turn when he came in contact with Sultan Mehmed II. Sultan Mehmed II gave him a position at one of the eight churches which were transformed into madrasas after the conquest of Constantinople. This madrasa later became known as *Jāmi‘ Zayrak* and Tāsh Kubrī Zādah reports that the sultan paid ‘Alā’ al-Dīn 100 dirham a day.¹² The sultan visited his madrasa and took together with his vizier Maḥmūd Bāshā lessons on Jurjānī’s *ḥāshiyah* on the *Sharḥ al-‘Aḍud*.¹³ The Sultan was so pleased with him that he supposedly gave him afterwards 10,000 dirham and a precious robe of honour. He also gave each participant 500 dirham.

Tāsh Kubrī Zādah sees him, together with Mawlā ‘Abd al-Karīm and Khojazāda, as one of the more important scholars of his time, as he specifically tells us that ‘Alā’ al-Dīn was given a madrasa in Constantinople “just as ‘Abd al-Karīm and Khojazāda were given one, and thereby all the other greatest scholars of the time (*fuḍalā’ min al-dahr*) had gotten a madrasa too.”¹⁴

⁸ Laknawī, *al-Fawā'id al-Bahiyya*, p. 145.

⁹ Ibid., p. 146.

¹⁰ The Sultan Murad II thought he could ‘retire’ from his position as Sultan in 1444 but when his son (Mehmed II, only 12 years old at the time) did not perform very well he took over again in 1446. He passed away in 1451 and Mehmed II became once again the Sultan. Cf. Colin Heywood, “Mehmed II”, *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Alan Masters, New York: Facts on File (2009), pp. 364-368.

¹¹ Bursa was the capital of the Ottoman Empire in the 14th and early 15th century. Afterwards, Edirne became the capital (and in 1453 Constantinople took over) but Bursa remained a very important city with a lot of scholarly activity. See: Inalcik, H., “Bursa”, *El²*, I, 1333b-1336a.

¹² Named after Mawlā Zayrak who also held a position at this madrasa. It is possible that they held their position at the same time but as Mawlā Zayrak supposedly received 50 dirham per day (*Shaqā'iq*, p. 74, [= entry on Mawlā Zayrak]), ‘Alā’ al-Dīn could be seen as the head-teacher.

¹³ ‘Sharḥ al-‘Aḍud’ is a reference to Ījī’s commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājjib’s *Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahá fi al-Uṣūl* (a summary of his own *muntahá al-sūl wa-al-amal fi ‘ilmay al-uṣūl wa-al-jadal*, a book on principles of Malikite law). See: Ījī, Ibn al-Ḥājjib, Taftāzānī, Jurjānī, and Ḥasan Hiriwī, *Ḥāshiyat al-‘Allāmah Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī ... wa-ḥāshiyat al-Muḥaqqiq al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī ... ‘alá sharḥ al-Qāḍī ‘Aḍud al-illah wa-al-Dīn ... li- Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahá al-uṣūlī*. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyah (1983). Brockelmann makes mention that this *ḥāshiyah* of Jurjānī is also known as ‘*al-Sharīfiyah*’, cf. GAL, I, p. 306.

¹⁴ Tāsh Kubrī Zādah, *Shaqā'iq al-Nu‘māniyah*, p. 60.

Similarly, after he tells us about the Sultan’s visit to ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s madrasa, he relates that ‘Alā’ al-Dīn went with the Sultan to the madrasas of ‘Abd al-Karīm and Khojazāda (the former whom the Sultan disapproved of, the latter whom he liked, as the report goes). The sultan later gave ‘Alā’ al-Dīn the madrasa of Edirne and paid him 100 dirhams per day.

Back to Persia

Particularly after Khojazāda won the debate on the *Tahāfut*, he began to refrain from earthly affairs and devoted himself to the affairs of the afterlife. He first went to Tabriz and met ‘Abd Allāh al-Ilāhī, who was a former student of his. Afterwards he went to the Naqshbandī ‘Ubayd Allāh al-Samarqandī in Samarqand. He acquired an important place among al-Samarqandī’s circle and stayed there until his death in 887/1482.

His works

What I give here is meant to be the most comprehensive list possible, considering the sources available. Not all of the works listed here are cited in each source and some of them may have taken on a different title between different sources and are thus cited double in this list. As all but the *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* have been left unedited, it is not clear which texts are still extant. A rigorous search and verification of available manuscripts remains to be done.

What is at least clear is that al-Ṭūsī’s attention was mainly focused on the classical theological works, that is, by scholars such as al-Ījī, al-Jurjānī and al-Taftāzānī. As such, his *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* stands out and already for this reason deserves attention.

Muḥākamah

- *Al-Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, al-Dhakhīrah, al-Dhukhr, al-Dhakhīrah fī al-muḥākamah bayna al-Ghazālī wa Ibn Rushd, al-Bidāyah fī al-muḥākamah bayn al-ḥukamā’.* The last title is misleading. It is given by GAL and also indicated by Ziriklī. Although Brockelmann gives references to manuscripts, it is unlikely that he saw this title on one of them.¹⁵

Sharḥ

- *Sharḥ* (in Persian) on *Maṭāli‘ al-Anwār* by al-Iṣfahānī, which is in Persian.¹⁶

¹⁵ GAL, Ziriklī, *Hadīyah, Shaqā’iq, Fawā’id, Mu‘jam al-Mu’allifīn*.

¹⁶ *Hadīyah*.

Hāshiyah

- *Hāshiyah* on *al-Talwīḥ* which is itself a *Sharḥ* by al-Taftāzānī on *Tanqīḥ al-Uṣūl* by Ibn Mas‘ūd al-Maḥbūbī.¹⁷
- *Hāshiyah* on the *Sharḥ* of al-Jurjānī on *al-‘Aqā’id al-‘Aḍudīyah*, by ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī.¹⁸
- *Hāshiyah* on the *Sharḥ* of al-Ījī on *Mukhtaṣir al-Muntahá* by Ibn al-Ḥājjib.¹⁹
- *Hāshiyah* (properly speaking: *Ta‘līqah*) on the *Hāshiyah* of al-Jurjānī on the *Sharḥ* of al-Ījī on the *Mukhtaṣir al-Muntahá* of Ibn al- Ḥājjib.²⁰
- *Hāshiyah* on the *Sharḥ* of al-Jurjānī on *al-Mawāqif* by al-Ījī.²¹
- *Hāshiyah* on *Lawāmi‘ al-Asrār*, which is Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s *Maṭāli‘ al-Anwār*.²²
- *Hāshiyah* (properly speaking: *Ta‘līqah*) on the *Hāshiyah* of al-Jurjānī (?) on the *Sharḥ al-Maṭāli‘*, being a commentary by al-Urmawī on the *Maṭāli‘ al-Anwār fī al-Ḥikmah wa-al-Mantiq* by al-Taḥṭānī.²³
- *Hāshiyah* on the *Hāshiyah* of Jurjānī on *al-Kashshāf* by al-Zamakhsharī, a famous Quran commentary mainly dealing with linguistic issues.²⁴

Mukhtaṣir

- *Mukhtaṣar* on the *Sharḥ* of al-Jurjānī on *al-Mawāqif* by al-Ījī.²⁵

Other texts

- *Al-Bidāyah fī al-Muḥākamah bayn al-Ḥukamā’*²⁶
- Brockelmann makes mention of “ein Gedicht in einer anon. Anthologie”²⁷

¹⁷ This work is mentioned in: GAL, Ziriklī, *Hadīyah*, *Shaqā’iq*, *Mu‘jam al-Mu’allifīn*.

¹⁸ GAL, *Fawā’id*.

¹⁹ *Hadīyah*.

²⁰ *Shaqā’iq*.

²¹ GAL, Ziriklī, *Hadīyah*, *Shaqā’iq*, *Fawā’id*, *Mu‘jam al-Mu’allifīn*.

²² GAL, *Hadīyah*.

²³ *Shaqā’iq*, *Fawā’id*.

²⁴ *Hadīyah*, *Shaqā’iq*, *Fawā’id*.

²⁵ *Kashf*, v. 2, p. 1892.

²⁶ Mentioned by *Hadīyah*, possibly the same as the study on the *Tahāfut*.

²⁷ GAL.

Khojazāda

Khojazāda (lit. Khwājah Zādah, but also referred to as Hocasāde²⁸, Khōdjazāde²⁹, Hāğazāde³⁰, etc.) can be seen as one of the most important ‘ulamā’ of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century. This not only becomes clear from the positions he held in the Ottoman Empire, but also from his extensive list of writings, the fact that later intellectuals commented on his works, and the wide attention he received from biographers, being mentioned in more sources and with a bigger entry than most other scholars from the same period.

His full name is usually given as Muşliḥ al-Dīn Muşṭafā b. Yūsuf b. Şāliḥ al-Brūsawī (or ending in: al-Bursawī al-Ḥanafī³¹ or al-Brūsawī al-Rūmī al-Ḥanafī³²). We don’t know when exactly he was born, but it is presumably around the same time as ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī or shortly after. Living his whole life in the Ottoman lands, he became a well known scholar in his own lifetime and remained well-known as the various glosses on his books testify. He held positions as a Mudarris and Qāḍī in various places, and maintained strong connections throughout his life with all three Sultans he served under. He died in Bursa in 893/1488. The account below follows in the main Tāsh Kubrī Zādah’s entry in his *Shaqā’iq al-Nu‘mānīyah*,³³ leaving out some of the more flowery anecdotes on him and adding material found in other sources.

Youth

Khojazāda was born and raised in Bursa, Anatolia, and enjoyed a good life, as his father was a rich businessman. The disappointment of his father in his desire to pursue study and acquire knowledge – rather than following him in becoming a businessman – is depicted by Tāsh Kubrī Zādah in a story on how the sufi shaykh Walī Shams al-Dīn al-Bukhārī meets Khojazāda’s father. Looking at Khojazāda and his brothers, the shaykh sees all of them dressed in expensive robes except for Khojazāda, who was wearing only bad clothes. “Why is he in such a bad state?” the shaykh asks. “I have rejected him because he does not want to follow my footsteps”, the father

²⁸ Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, “Ottoman Science in the Classical Period and Early Contacts with European Science and Technology”, 1-48, in: *Transfer of Modern Science & Technology to the Muslim World*, ed. By Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Istanbul: IRCICA (1992), p. 18.

²⁹ EI², Vol. III, p. 1149a.

³⁰ GAL, II, p. 230.

³¹ Ibn al-‘Imād, ‘A., *Shadharāt al-Dhahab fī Akhbār man Dhahab*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīyah (1998), Vol. 8, p. 15.

³² Shawkānī, M., b. ‘A., *al-Badr al-Ṭālī‘ bi-Maḥāsin man ba‘da al-Qarn al-Şābi‘*, Damascus: Dār al-Fikr (1998), #549, p. 823, cf. Ismā‘īl Pāshā Baghdādī, *Ḥadīyat al-‘Ārifīn*, Istanbul: Wikālat al-Ma‘ārif (1955), Vol. 2, p. 433 [Repr. as vol. 5/6 in *Kashf al-Zunūn*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīyah (1992)]. In *Al-Badr* the beginning part of his name (Muşliḥ al-Dīn) is dropped, also in: al-Laknawī, *Fawā'id al-Bahīyah fī Tarājīm al-Ḥanafīyah*, Cairo: Maṭba‘ah al-Sa‘ādah (1324/1906), pp. 214-215.

³³ *Shaqā’iq*, pp. 76-84 [= entry on Khojazāda].

replies. When they finished their talk, the shaykh asked Khojazāda to come close to him and he said: “You seem not to be moved by your bad state. This means that the correct way is your way and a great thing will befall you, God willing, and your brothers will be like servants to you.”³⁴

But this ‘great thing’ had to wait first. In these first years with little or no support from his father, Khojazāda possessed only one shirt and had to copy for himself every book he wanted to read.³⁵ After he had studied for some time, he went to the service of Mawlā Ibn Qāḍī Ayāthalūgh.³⁶ In the madrasah Aghrās Khojazāda studied Arabic,³⁷ principles of law and religion,³⁸ and the linguistic sciences of meanings and metaphors with Ayāthalūgh.³⁹ Then he went to the service of Khiḍr Bak Ibn Jalāl (Ḥiḍrbeg⁴⁰). Khiḍr Bak was one of the other most important scholars of the 15th century. It seems he spent most of his career as a *mudarris* in the royal madrasah of Bursa, and taught not only Khojazāda, but most of the important scholars of the 15th century too.⁴¹ As a sign of Khojazāda’s progress, Tāsh Kubrī Zādah reports that Hiḍr Bak used to say: “Whenever a problem is difficult for me, let it be presented to the Flawless Intellect (*al-‘aql al-salīm*)”, by which he meant Khojazāda. Flattering as the nickname may be, it cannot be found in other sources and thus seems not have stuck to him.

His mature life

His career took off when Khiḍr Bak sent him to Sultan Murād Khān to show his teaching capabilities. The Sultan first made him Qāḍī of Kestel⁴² and then gave him the madrasa al-Asdīyah in Bursa and paid him 20 dirhams⁴³ per day. Khojazāda stayed there for 6 years, and learned by heart the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* by Jurjānī.

³⁴ Later in the story Tāsh Kubrī Zādah adds that when Khojazāda became a Qāḍī, his father and brothers visited him. As everyone there sat down according to their status, it turned out that Khojazāda was sitting at the best place while his brothers had to sit down with the servants. Khojazāda appropriately said at this event to his father: “Were you to have given me possessions, I would not have reached this rank.”

³⁵ To make matters worse, he could only afford to copy them on leaves of bad quality (*awraq ḍa‘īfah li-rukḥsihā*). Without doubt a deplorable state.

³⁶ *Shaqā’iq*, p. 60 (entry on Ayāthalūgh).

³⁷ Mentioned in *Al-Badr al-Ṭālī*, #549.

³⁸ Referred to as *al-‘uṣūlayn*.

³⁹ Referred to as *al-ma‘āni wa-al-bayān*, together with *‘ilm albadī* they form Arab literary theory (*‘ilm al-balāghah*). As to the two referred here: “both are concerned with the relation of thought to expression and with the different ways to express the ‘same’ idea”, Schaade, A., von Grunebaum, G.E., “Balāgha”, *El*, I, 981b-983a.

⁴⁰ *GAL*, II, p. 229.

⁴¹ See each of their respective entries in the *al-Shaqā’iq al-Nu‘māniyah*, e.g. Al-Khayālī, al-Qaṣṭalānī, and Ibn al-Khaṭīb, to name the most important ones.

⁴² A town close to Bursa.

⁴³ *Al-Badr al-Ṭālī*, #549, reports 10 dirhams.

Even though he received a regular stipend, it seems he was still living under poor conditions. When the Sultan passed away (in 1451), he was succeeded by Sultan Muḥammad Khān (Mehmed II). As Tāsh Kubrī Zādah relates, when this Sultan requested the learned men to come to him so that he could select a private teacher, Khojazāda had to borrow 800 dirhams to buy horses for him and his servant. He made the journey to the Sultan who had moved from Constantinople to Edirne (Adrianopol⁴⁴), and it is on this occasion that Khojazāda would first establish his reputation. The Sultan’s teaching position was decided on the basis of the participants’ performances in a debate, in which Khojazāda defeated two other participants; Mawlá Zayrak (after whom the madrasa in which ‘Alā’ al-Dīn taught was named) and Mawlá Sayyidī ‘Alī (a less important scholar of that time). As prize money Khojazāda received 10,000 dirhams. He also became the Sultan’s teacher and read with him *al-‘Izzī fī al-Taṣrīf* by al-Zanjānī, and wrote a commentary on it.

From this position, he then accepted, with some reluctance, the post of Qādī of the army.⁴⁵ This transfer was apparently arranged by the vizier Maḥmūd Bāshā, who was jealous about Khojazāda’s close relationship with the Sultan. Regardless, as this was one of the highest positions in the Ottoman Empire at the time, right below the leading authority called the *Shaykh al-Islām*, it confirmed Khojazāda as one of the leading scholars of the empire.

After this position, the Sultan gave him the right to teach in Bursa and paid him 50 dirhams per day. Tāsh Kubrī Zādah states that Khojazāda said:

“At the time I was given the right to teach in Bursa, I was 33 years old and loved nothing more than knowledge itself. I preferred the position in Bursa above the Qādīship for the army and the teaching of the Sultan. At that time I had 100,000 dirhams.”

While in Bursa, he attracted a lot of students,⁴⁶ and seems to have become well off in all regards. He did not, however, intend to stay in Bursa and went back to Constantinople where he was invited by the Sultan to a court debate with Mawlá Zayrak (whom he had encountered earlier when he applied to become the sultan’s teacher). This debate was held at the palace of the Sultan, in the presence of the Sultan (and presumably many others) and was concerned with the proof for divine unity (*tawḥīd*). Ḥajjī Khalīfah describes it as an event in which

⁴⁴ GAL, II, p. 230. Note that this implies that Constantinople was already conquered, placing this story after 1454.

⁴⁵ There are two armies in the Ottoman Empire, one for the East and one for the West. It is not known which army Khojazāda was assigned to.

⁴⁶ Shawkānī, *Al-Badr al-Ṭālī*. #549, p. 823.

“Between them arose great discussions and it lasted for seven days [all the while] in the presence of the Sultan Muḥammad Khān. The arbiter between them was Mawlá Khusraw but he could not make a clear decision [who had the upper hand] so the Sultan ordered on the sixth day that they would exchange their writings and study them. Then on the seventh day the superiority of Mawlá Khojazāda became obvious to the Sultan and Mawlá Khusraw agreed with him.”⁴⁷

As a reward, Khojazāda was given a position at a madrasa in Constantinople. Tāsh Kubrī Zādah relates that it was in this madrasa that he wrote his commentary on the *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*. This book was therefore written at a high point in his career, most probably around 865/1460 (making him around 40 years old).

Afterwards he became a Qāḍī again, first in Edirne and later in Constantinople, the latter being again one of the highest positions available in the empire. At the court, the Sultan appointed Muḥammad Bāshā al-Qarāmanī as his vizier, who was a student of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. Because of this relation and the victory of Khojazāda over ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, Qarāmanī was agitated against Khojazāda and apparently told the Sultan that Khojazāda was complaining about the weather in Constantinople while praising the weather in Iznīq, and that he had forgotten what he once had learned. Subsequently, Khojazāda was transferred to Iznīq where he served as a Qāḍī and teacher. He later resigned his judgeship but remained a teacher until the death of Sultan Mehmed II.

The last period of his life and his death

When Bāyazīd Khān became Sultan (he reigned from 1481 until 1512⁴⁸), Khojazāda accepted a position at the sultanic madrasa in Bursa, and received 100 dirhams per day. When he also received the right to issue fatwas, he lost the use of his feet and his right hand, leaving him to write with his left hand. When the Sultan Bāyazīd Khān ordered him to write a gloss on the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* (by Jurjānī on Ījī), he tried to excuse himself by saying:

“My notes on the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* were taken by Mawlá Ḥasan Jalabī and he included them in his *Ḥāshiyah*. [But] I also made a draft of the *Talwīḥ*, so if the Sultan wants to, I can make a clean copy.”

⁴⁷ *Kashf*, Vol. 1, p. 221, “*Baḥṭh al-Mawlá Zayrak wa-Khojazāda*”. Cf. *Shaqā’iq*, p. 75 (in the entry on Mawlá Zayrak).

⁴⁸ Ágoston, G., “Bayezid II”, *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Alan Masters, New York: Facts on File (2009), pp. 82-84.

It seems that this did not work, as the Sultan requested that he write a gloss on the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*. Tāsh Kubrī Zādah writes that they placed the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* on top of Khojazāda’s pillow and he could not look at another book until he finished it. He continued working on it until his death in 893/1488, having finished the gloss up to the second discussion on ‘existence’. Mawlānā Bahā’ al-Dīn – one of his students – made a clean copy of the draft. When he finished the clean copy, he too passed away.

Khojazāda was buried in Bursa, in the cemetery of the Emir Sultan Mosque (close to al-Bukhārī as Tāsh Kubrī Zādah mentions). Despite several earthquakes that damaged the mosque (in, for example, 1210/1795-96 and 1272/1855⁴⁹) the grave of Khojazāda remains intact until today.

Two important sons may be mentioned. One is Shaykh Muḥammad. He became a teacher and a judge already while Khojazāda was still alive. He later stepped out of public life to become a mystic. He died in Persia in 902 or 903 (1496 – 1498). The other is ‘Abd Allāh who died at a young age. He wrote witty and provocative remarks, in an eloquent manner.⁵⁰

Debates with other scholars

While in Constantinople and at the court of the Sultan, Khojazāda engaged in some debates that were staged by the Sultan. Some of them are recorded by Ḥajjī Khalīfah in the *Kashf al-Zunūn*, which appear to have been recorded, or were at least famous. We already came across one of them, namely the discussion with Mawlā Zayrak. Another was the debate between Khojazāda and Afḍal Zādah, on the mistakes made by al-Sayyid al-Sharīf Jurjānī, which arose during the session with the Vizier Muḥammad Bāshā al-Qarāmanī. Afḍal Zādah said that he could not raise an objection against Jurjānī, simply out of respect. Mawlā Khayr al-Dīn, the teacher of the Sultan, followed him but Mawlā Khojazāda said: “he is a man who is capable of making mistakes; however, his mistakes are small so they ignored them.” He showed the mistakes and he defeated them both.⁵¹ But Khojazāda did not always win. For example in the discussion with Mawlā al-Khayālī, Khayālī defeated him and Ḥajjī Khalīfah reports in his *Kashf al-Zunūn* that because of this “Khojazāda did not sleep on a bed until the death of al-Khayālī.” This was presumably a poetic way of expressing that Khojazāda was from then steered clear from Khayālī.⁵²

⁴⁹ Gabriel, A., *Une Capitale Turque Brousse Bursa*, 2 vol., Paris: E. De Boccard (1985), vol. 1, p. 131.

⁵⁰ Cf. Ibn al-‘Imād, *Shadharāt al-Dhahab*, Vol. 8, p. 16.

⁵¹ *Kashf*, Vol. 1, p. 221, “*Baḥṭh al-Mawlā Khojazāda wa-Afḍal Zādah*”.

⁵² *Kashf*, Vol. 1, p. 221, “*Baḥṭh al-Mawlā al-Khayālī wa-Kwājah Zādah*”. Cf. *Shaqā’iq*, p. 86, in the entry on Khayālī.

Finally, another important discussion is the discussion of ‘Alī Qūshjī and Khojazāda on several subjects. This discussion arose on the ship when Mawlā ‘Alī Qūshjī was arriving in Constantinople (coming from Samarqand⁵³) and Khojazāda went ahead to meet him when he was a Qāḍī. The first of them is on ebb and flood, the tides of the sea. The second was on what is related to the magnitudes of the position from the view from sea (i.e. the Bosphorus) from the mosques of Constantinople. The third was on objections to the definition of “the signification of a word” (*al-dalālah al-lafzīyah*).⁵⁴

His works

As with ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, we see a lot of glosses on the classical texts of theology. We also have a note on one of them in the *Kashf al-Zunūn* giving us some insight into how these glosses came to be. This note is on the gloss on the commentary on *Hidāyat al-Ḥikmah*. It is related that Khojazāda did not intend to write it, but that one of his students edited the comments and notes he made during the study sessions on the book and that this is how the gloss came to be. If we accept this note to be exemplary, it is safe to conclude that the large number of glosses (*hawāshin*) produced in the Ottoman Empire is mainly due to the fact that the commentaries on which they are glosses were taught at the madrasas and subsequently came to exist from the passing remarks made in the study sessions. Besides those kinds of glosses, some studies were requested by the Sultan, such as the gloss on the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*. Next to glosses, the Sultan also ordered specific studies of which the studies on the *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* by ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Khojazāda are a prime example.

In contrast with ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, Khojazāda wrote also other types of text than glosses. Although it is doubtful that the ‘debates’ which the *Kashf al-Zunūn* lists as books were actually written down (let alone survived), other writings like the “Essay on the essence of *bā’ al-basmalah*” could very well be existing texts. Except for the *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, all treatises have been provided with a reference to a manuscript whenever possible. This is not meant as an extensive survey of all available manuscripts, but merely to show that the majority of the works ascribed to Khojazāda have survived.⁵⁵

⁵³ See Fazlıoğlu, İhsan, "The Samarqand Mathematical-Astronomical School: A Basis for Ottoman Philosophy and Science." *Journal for the History of Arabic Science*, 14 (2008): pp. 3-68.

⁵⁴ *Kashf*, Vol. 1, p. 223, “*Baḥṭh al-Mawlā ‘Alī Qūshjī wa-Khojazāda*”. Cf. *Shaqā’iq*, p. 99, in the entry on ‘Alī Qūshjī.

⁵⁵ These MSS are from the pamphlet described in the previous chapter; Yücedoğru, pp. 45-57.

Muḥākamah

- *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, Kitāb al-Tahāfut, on Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* by Ghazālī⁵⁶

Sharḥ

- *sharḥ* of Khojazāda (draft) on *Ṭawālīʿ al-Anwār* by Bayḍāwī⁵⁷
- *sharḥ* of Khojazāda on *Mawāqif al-Kalām* by Ījī⁵⁸
- *sharḥ* on *al-ʿIzzī fī al-Taṣrīf* by ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Zanjānī⁵⁹
- *sharḥ al-rīḥānah*⁶⁰

Hāshiyah

- *Hāshiyah* of Khojazāda called *Ḥall al-Hidāyah* on the commentary of Mīr Ḥusayn b. Muʿīn al-Dīn al-Maybadī on *Hidāyah al-Ḥikmah* by Abharī⁶¹
- *Hāshiyah* of Khojazāda on the commentary of Jurjānī on *Mawāqif al-Kalām* by Ījī⁶²
- *Hāshiyah* of Khojazāda on *al-Talwīḥ fī Kashf Ḥaqāʾiq al-Tanqīḥ*, a commentary by Taftāzānī on *Tanqīḥ al-Uṣūl* by ʿUbayd Allah ibn Masʿūd al-Maḥbūbī⁶³
- *Hāshiyah* on the *ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafī* by Nasafī
- *Hāshiyah* on the commentary of Iṣfahānī on *Ṭawālīʿ al-Anwār* by Bayḍāwī⁶⁴
- *Hāshiyah* on the commentary of Taftāzānī on Qazwīnī’s summary (called *Talkhīs al-Miftāḥ*) of *Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm* by Sirāj al-Dīn al-Sakākī (d. 626/1229)

⁵⁶ GAL, Shaqāʾiq, Hadiyyat, Fawāʾid, Ziriklī, al-Badr, Shadharāt, Kashf (v. 1, pp. 509-513). An autograph appears to have survived: MS Şehid Ali Paşa 1583, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (Istanbul).

⁵⁷ Shaqāʾiq, Hadiyyat (which adds “*li-Iṣbahānī*”, a possible indication that Ismāʿīl Pāshā thinks it is on Iṣfahānī’s famous commentary entitled *Maṭālīʿ al-Anzār*, see the *ḥāshiyah* section), al-Badr, Shadharāt, Kashf (v. 2, pp. 1116-7).

⁵⁸ Only mentioned in Hadiyyat.

⁵⁹ Hadiyyat, Fawāʾid, Shadharāt, See e.g. Antalya-Tekelioğlu 628, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (Istanbul).

⁶⁰ al-Badr.

⁶¹ Shaqāʾiq (doesn’t name al-Maybadī but Mawlānā Zādah, also in Shadharāt and Fawāʾid), Hadiyyat, Fawāʾid, al-Badr, Shadharāt, Kashf (v. 2, pp. 2028-9). See e.g. Ayasofya 4847, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (Istanbul).

⁶² GAL, Shaqāʾiq, Hadiyyat, Fawāʾid, Ziriklī, al-Badr, Shadharāt, Kashf (v. 2, pp. 1891-1892, it notes that Ḥasan Chalabī b. Muḥammad Shāh al-Fanārī supposedly borrowed notes from Khojazāda which were full with new ideas of him (*mamlūh bi-abkār afkārīhi*). He divided this among his students, copied all of it in one night, and returned it the next day. Fanārī’s *ḥāshiyah* therefore consists of Khojazāda’s notes). See e.g. Bağdatlı Vehbi 826, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (Istanbul).

⁶³ Shaqāʾiq, Hadiyyat, al-Badr, Shadharāt, Kashf (v. 1, pp. 497-498).

⁶⁴ Possibly the same as the previously mentioned *sharḥ*. See MS Şehid Ali Paşa 1597, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (Istanbul).

Discussions, other texts

- *Baḥth al-Mawlā Khojazāda wa-Afḍal Zādah*⁶⁵
- *Baḥth al-Mawlā Zayrak wa-Khojazāda*⁶⁶
- *Baḥth al-Mawlā ‘Alī Qūshjī wa-Khojazāda*⁶⁷
- *Risālah fī Kawn Bā’ al-Basmalah li-l-Mulābasah fī Ḥadīthihā*⁶⁸
- *Muqaddimāt Sab‘ fī Ma‘rifah Qaws Quzaḥ*⁶⁹
- *Ḥall al-Mughliṭa al-Musammāt bi-l-Jadr al-Aṣamm*⁷⁰
- *Risālah fī al-Ḥarakah*⁷¹
- *Risālah fī I‘tirāz ‘alā dalīl ithbāt wujūdīyah al-Bārī*⁷²
- *Risālah fī Tawḥīd*⁷³
- *Risālah fī Baḥth al-‘illah wa-al-Ma‘lūl*⁷⁴
- *Risālah fī anna Kalām Allāh Qadīm*⁷⁵

⁶⁵ Kashf (v. 1, p. 221).

⁶⁶ Kashf (v. 1, p. 221).

⁶⁷ Kashf (v. 1, p. 223).

⁶⁸ Only mentioned in Hadiyyat. This hadith runs approximately as follows: “All the holy mysteries – God’s words addressed to men in the one hundred tablets of early scripture, the Psalms of David, the Torah and the Gospels – are contained within the Qur’an. The whole of the Holy Qur’an is contained within the Surah al-Fatihah, the opening chapter, [...] the whole of the Fatihah is contained in the beginning line, In the Name of God, the Beneficent, the Compassionate, and the essence of everything is contained in the beginning of the beginning, the first letter, the ‘B’, [...] The essence of the essence is in the dot under the letter ‘B’ (↔).” See for example, al-Suhrawardī, Shihāb al-Dīn, Bayrak, Tosun (transl.), *The Shape of Light: Hayakal al-Nur*, Louisville: Fons Vitae (1998), pp. 39-40.

⁶⁹ Mentioned in GAL as *Bayān Qaws Quzaḥ*. See e.g. Kılıç Ali Paşa 1040, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (Istanbul).

⁷⁰ Mentioned in GAL, See e.g. MS Veliyyüddin 2122, Beyazıt Devlet Kütüphanesi (Istanbul).

⁷¹ Mentioned in GAL.

⁷² See e.g. MS Ayasofya 2350, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (Istanbul).

⁷³ See e.g. MS Ayasofya 2206, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (Istanbul).

⁷⁴ See e.g. MS Esad Efendi 1161/6, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (Istanbul).

⁷⁵ See e.g. MS Esad Efendi 3782/10, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (Istanbul).

Some notes on divine omniscience from Aristotle to Ibn Sīnā

This chapter will describe some of the philosophical discussions from Greek and early Islamic sources which form the foundation on which the discussion on divine omniscience in the two Ottoman treatises is based. It will remain brief and will only pick up bits and pieces of the history of this discussion; nonetheless it will provide enough historical background to illuminate the evolution of the discussion, as well as expose the structure of the philosophical arguments. We can roughly divide this chapter in three parts: one on Aristotle and his commentators, one on the continuation of the discussion among Plotinus and his Arabic heirs, and finally a concise exposition of Ibn Sīnā's ideas on the subject. All sources mentioned here were available to medieval philosophers from the Islamic world.

Aristotle and his commentators

Interpretations of Aristotle's view of divine omniscience (which is for him a discussion about the intellectual activity of the Unmoved Mover) vary greatly, and the variations will show us some of the basic strategies one can adopt in discussing God's knowledge, strategies we will encounter in the Ottoman texts. One of the most well-known interpretations is that God only knows Himself. It is held by most modern scholars (such as Ross¹). However, it was already challenged by Brentano in the 19th century.² We will come back to the challenge of Brentano, but let us for now elaborate on the mainstream interpretation. For the most part it relies on passages from Aristotle's *Metaphysica*. Leading up to the idea that the Unmoved Mover is 'thought thinking itself', Aristotle argues in Chapter 7 of *Metaphysica* XII: "And thought in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thought in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense."³ Aristotle continues to explore this idea in Chapter 9. There, certain ways to predicate knowledge of the Unmoved Mover are discussed. The absence of knowledge is dismissed, "For if it thinks nothing, what is there here of dignity? It is just like one who sleeps."⁴ Aristotle moves on to state that "it thinks that which is most divine and precious, and it does not change; for change would be change for the worse, and this would be already a movement."⁵ Aristotle then ends the argument with: "Therefore it must be itself that thought

¹ E.g. Ross, D., *Aristotle*, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd (5th ed., 1949), p. 182, but repeated throughout his work on Aristotle.

² Brentano, F., *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (1967 [1867]), pp. 189-195.

³ 1072b14-1072b31, p. 1695.

⁴ 1074b15-1074b34, p. 1698.

⁵ 1074b15-1074b34, p. 1698.

thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking.”⁶ The mainstream interpretation that Aristotle’s God only knows Himself seems therefore solidly grounded in Aristotle’s own words. As we may notice here, the basic argument (used on several occasions) is that God (or, the Unmoved Mover) is perfect and therefore deserves nothing but the best. This argument from nobility both ensures that He knows, as well as restricts the objects of His knowledge to the one most perfect thing: Himself.

Brentano (and following him E. Caird and R. George, to take two examples) proposes that Aristotle in fact has a second strategy in mind. This argument depends on God’s causal behaviour. The key passage here is *Metaphysica* XII, 4.⁷ George’s conclusion shed’s light on this interpretation. He says: “I suggest that [...] the first of all things contains within itself the formal principle of what it brings forth, as do medical art, architecture, and man. The first mover moves all things. Therefore, in analogy to the first three cases it IS all things...”⁸ The idea put forward here is thus that this argument from causality is not in conflict with the argument from nobility. As Brentano puts it: “Und so erkennt den das, was das Princip von Allem ist, Alles, indem est sich selbst erkennt...”⁹ God therefore knows indeed only Himself (in line with the argument from nobility), but because as cause of all things, He contains an aspect of those things, He knows all other things by knowing Himself. To make this interpretation sound, one must assume that there is a connection between causation and knowledge. Though Aristotle may not have made this explicit, we can find an Arabic translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ *de Providentia* argue:

“At any rate the view according to which god does not know what is generated through him is absurd. Thus it is necessary that the gods know better than anyone else that their specific nature makes good things. But if they know that, they must also know what depends on such a nature.”¹⁰

⁶ 1074b15-1074b34, p. 1698, reaffirmed in his *Ethica Eudemia* (VII.12), 1245b14-19, p. 1974.

⁷ Brentano, p. 189-195. Also argued for in: Caird, E., *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, 2 vol., Glasgow: MacLehose, Jackson and Co. (1923), vol. 2, p. 22; and George, R., “An Argument for Divine Omniscience in Aristotle”, *Apeiron*, 22:1 (1989) pp. 61-74.

⁸ George, p. 66.

⁹ Brentano, p. 191.

¹⁰ Mignucci, M., “Logic and Omniscience: Alexander of Aphrodisias and Proclus”, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, III (1985), p. 228. Mignucci (translating from German) cites Ruland, H.-J., *Die arabische Fassungen von zwei Schriften des Alexander von Aphrodisias: Über die Vorsehung und Über das liberum arbitrium* (Saarbrücken, 1976). Unfortunately, I have no access to this book.

It is thus obvious that Alexander did not believe that God only knows Himself.¹¹ However, as Mignucci points out, there is another Arabic source (Ibn Rushd's 'Epitome of Metaphysics' [*Talkhīṣ Mā Ba'd al-Ṭabī'ah*]) which ascribes a refinement of this idea to Alexander. Freudenthal, translating Ibn Rushd's text, states:

“Alexander says that the worst mistake is made by those people who maintain that providence concerns all individuals, as the men of the tent do. Providence could flow from the celestial powers only if they possessed knowledge, as has been said before. But how is it possible that they have a knowledge of individuals which is always renewed and besides which is infinite?”¹²

In contrast, in the Arabic translation of Themistius' commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* XII we can read:

“He [i.e. God] intellectually apprehends the intelligibles which are existent in Him. Not in a transitory sense, but He intellects all in one sudden instance [...] He intellects all of the existents not as external to His nature, nor as acts extraneous to Him, but as He is producing them and originates them, and they are He.”¹³

Here we stumble upon one of the biggest challenges in the discussion of divine omniscience. Brentano's interpretation seem to argue for knowledge of all things, universals and particulars, which seems to be in line with Themistius. Alexander though is here on the record saying that knowledge of particulars would be impossible as in this case God would have a knowledge that

¹¹ This is not an uncontested assertion. Slomo Pines and Paul Moraux (the latter being one of the most prominent scholars of the 20th century to have worked on Alexander) argue that Alexander restricts God's knowledge to Himself alone. Of course for our purposes we are not looking for the 'real' opinion of Alexander, so this does not affect the validity of our assertions here. It must be stressed though that Alexander's *De Anima* describes a similar self-knowledge (i.e., knowing that one knows something else means one knows a proposition which includes the self ['I know x'], which therefore entails self-knowledge). Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, transl. by A. P. Fotinis, *The De Anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias*, Washington: University Press of America (1979), pp. 112-113; Pines, S., "Themistius' Commentary on Book Lambda", *Aristoteles Werk und Wirkung*, ed. J. Wiesner, 2 vol., Berlin: De Gruyter (1987), vol. 2, pp. 179-180; Moraux, P., *Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Exégète de la noétique d'Aristote*, Bibliothèque de la Faculté de philosophie et lettres de l'Université de Liège, fasc. 99, Paris: E. Droz (1942), p. 125.

¹² Mignucci, p. 228 discusses this passage extensively. Cf. Freudenthal, J., *Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles untersucht und übersetzt*, Berlin: Verlag der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1885) p. 113.

¹³ Badawī, A., *Aristū 'ind al-ʿArab*, Kuwait: Wakālah al-Maṭbūʿāt (2nd ed., 1978 [1947]), pp. 17-18, similar passages appear at pp. 20-21. This argument may have been conceived of for the first time by Themistius, cf. Pines, p. 202; Sharples, R.W., "Alexander of Aphrodisias and the End of Aristotelian Theology", *Metaphysik und Religion*, ed. by T. Kobusch, M. Erler, München: K. G. Saur Verlag (2002), p. 9. The view of Themistius is agreed upon by Ibn Sīnā in the latter's commentary on the same passage of Aristotle. Cf. Pines, p. 191ff; Badawī, pp. 22-33.

constantly changes (and it would be infinite but this is for our purposes less important).¹⁴ Looking into the *Analytica Posteriora*, one notices that knowledge of particulars seems to be excluded. The force of the argument in the *Analytica Posteriora* is that knowledge is properly speaking a demonstration, constituting an intelligible.¹⁵ Knowledge is knowledge of the reasoned fact (Ar. *burhān limmīy*, literally ‘demonstration of why x is y’), that is, it must contain information about the causes of the object of knowledge. However, it must also be based on universals, as another of Aristotle’s criteria of knowledge is that it always holds. In comparison with particulars, Aristotle explains:

“If the propositions on which the deduction depends are universal, it is necessary for the conclusion of such a demonstration and of a demonstration *simpliciter* to be eternal too. There is therefore no demonstration of perishable things, nor understanding of them *simpliciter* but only accidentally, because it does not hold of it universally, but at some time and in some way.”¹⁶

The *Analytica Posteriora* continues to describe the difference between knowledge of the fact and knowledge of the reasoned fact. The two differ in several regards, one being that if two sciences are closely related (e.g. mathematical and nautical astronomy) “it is for the empirical scientists to know the fact and for the mathematical to know the reason why; for the latter have the demonstration of the explanations, and often they do not know the fact, just as those who consider the universal often do not know some of the particulars through lack of observation.”¹⁷ From here it seems that if someone is only able to possess knowledge of universals, that person lacks some knowledge, namely knowledge of particulars. However, later on Aristotle states that “one who has the universal demonstration knows the particular fact too”¹⁸ which seems to contradict this. The solution Aristotle proposes, in line with the aforementioned idea that knowledge proper is only concerned with universals, is that sense

¹⁴ The relationship between knowledge and reality is further discussed in Aristotle’s example of the sea battle that will or will not happen tomorrow, which many later philosophers further discussed. Cf. Adamson, P., “The Arabic Sea Battle: al-Fārābī on the Problem of Future Contingents”, *Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie* 88:2 (2006): pp. 163-188.

¹⁵ In the *Ethica Nichomachea* Aristotle sums this up as: “Knowledge is belief about things that are universal and necessary”; 1140b31-1141a8, p. 1801.

¹⁶ 75b22-65b25, p. 122. This line of thought is investigated and linked to the Arabic discussions of God’s knowledge most profoundly by P. Adamson. See: Adamson, P., “Knowledge of Universals and Particulars in the Baghdad School,” *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 18 (2007): pp. 141-64, and: Adamson, P., “On Knowledge of Particulars”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 105:1 (2005): pp. 257–278.

¹⁷ 78b34-79a6, p. 128.

¹⁸ 86a4-86a10, p. 140.

perception (that is, grasping particulars) is not knowledge at all. “One necessarily perceives an individual at a place and at a time, and it is impossible to perceive what is universal and holds in every case,”¹⁹ Aristotle argues. This also explains Themistius use of ‘existents’ and ‘intelligibles’ in the citation above. While knowledge is undoubtedly about existing things, it is only about them insofar as they are intelligibles. All non-intelligible aspects about a thing are not part of its being intelligible and are therefore not intellectually apprehended.

The interpretation that God only knows universals (i.e., intelligibles), is supported by some other passages from Aristotle. In the *Metaphysica* an ambiguous statement about knowledge of all universals is made by Aristotle in answer to a question about whether the Unmoved Mover’s knowledge is composite (i.e. consisting of many parts). He says: “We answer that everything which has not matter is indivisible.”²⁰ If we interpret this from the perspective of the *De Anima*, we see that Aristotle there says:

“When thought has become each thing in the way in which a man who actually knows is said to do so (this happens when he is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative), its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery; and thought is then able to think of itself.”²¹

We can notice here that this mode is called potential in a special sense. This is probably due to its being potential in thinking the object, but actual in thinking itself. Moreover, where the thinker becomes identical with the object of thought, in this second sense of self-knowledge it is already identical. Third, this second sense is self-sufficient, as it only depends on something internal to the thinker.²² Norman uses the *De Anima* to interpret the *Metaphysica* and thereby concludes that “When Aristotle describes the Prime Mover as “thinking itself”, he is not referring to any activity that could be called “self-contemplation”; he is simply describing the same activity that human minds perform when they engage in abstract thought.”²³ By no means is this merely a modern, idiosyncratic interpretation. In the *De Intellectu* by Alexander of

¹⁹ 87b29-87b33, p. 144.

²⁰ 1075a05-1075a10, p. 1699.

²¹ 429b6-429b9 p. 682.

²² Norman, R., “Aristotle’s Philosopher-God”, *Phronesis* 14:1 (1969), p. 65.

²³ Norman, p. 67, H. Seidl also stresses the similarity between the mode of knowledge of the Unmoved Mover and humans, cf. Seidl, H., “Aristoteles’ Lehre von der νόησις νοήσεως des Ersten, Göttlichen Vernunftwesens und Ihre Darstellung bei Plotin”, *Aristoteles Werk und Wirkung*, ed. J. Wiesner, 2 vol., Berlin: De Gruyter (1987), vol. 2, p. 160.

Aphrodisias,²⁴ we can read a description of the Active Intellect which fits the description Norman gave. First Alexander argues that an immaterial being can only be an intellect.²⁵ Then he argues that:

“The intellect that is in a state of possessing [thoughts] can, when active, think itself, not in so far as it is intellect (for then thinking and being thought will exist for it simultaneously and in the same respect), but in fact just in so far as the actual intellect is identical with the actual objects of thought.”²⁶

It seems that (pseudo-)Alexander is arguing for exactly the kind of self-knowledge that Norman argued for. It also entails the view that God knows all intelligibles, though it must be said that the text at this point does not explicitly equate this concept of the Active Intellect with the concept of God.²⁷

From Plotinus to Fārābī

Plotinus is important to our investigation, since he had an effect on the subsequent development of the debate on God’s knowledge, though in a rather oblique way. Plotinus was keen on criticizing Aristotle’s theory of God’s knowing only Himself (although we saw this may not be the most compelling interpretation of Aristotle’s ideas, it is the interpretation Plotinus takes). Where Aristotle used the argument from nobility to argue for God’s self-knowledge, it is exactly this same argument that Plotinus uses to eradicate God’s self-knowledge, explaining that ‘the One is beyond knowledge’.²⁸ In direct opposition to Aristotle’s notion, Plotinus asks rhetorically “what will it learn by thinking itself?”²⁹ And a bit later he adds, “For at what is it to aim, as if it was missing something?”³⁰ It seems therefore that Plotinus’ idea on the applicability

²⁴ Note that the attribution to Alexander is a precarious one. It was however held to be by Alexander in the Islamic world, which is our primary concern. Cf. (pseudo-)Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, transl. by F. M. Schroeder, R. B. Todd, *Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect*, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies (1990), pp. 1-22.

²⁵ (pseudo-)Alexander of Aphrodisias, p. 48 (107.34), see also p. 50 (109.17).

²⁶ Ibid., p. 50 (109.4).

²⁷ But Alexander does equate God with the Active Intellect in his *De Anima*, cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima*, p. 118; Sharples, p. 3.

²⁸ A paraphrase of Enn. V.3.12.48-49, Plotinus, transl. by Armstrong, A.H., *Enneads*, Loeb Classical Library, 7 volumes, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press (1966-1988), vol. V, p. 117.

²⁹ Enn. V.3.10.48, Plotinus, *Enneads*, vol. V, p. 109.

³⁰ Enn. V.3.12.37, Plotinus, *Enneads*, vol. V, p. 115. Cf. Enn. V.3.13.10, Plotinus, *Enneads*, vol. V, p. 119. A similar passage, explicitly against ‘the Peripatetics’, can be found at Enn.VI.7.37, Plotinus, *Enneads*, vol. VII, p. 201ff. Also, Seidl’s previously cited article contains a comprehensive analysis of the issue. An analysis that connects Plotinus with Proclus and Aquinas can be found in: Wallis, R.T., “Divine Omniscience in Plotinus, Proclus, and Aquinas”, in: *Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought*, ed. by H.J. Blumenthal and R.A. Markus, London: Variorum (1981), pp. 223-235.

of knowledge to God is fairly straightforward: The One is beyond knowing. This does, however, not mean that Plotinus himself does not talk about knowledge and godlike entities. In one passage we can read:

“But Zeus who sets all things in order and administers and directs them for ever [...] how could he not have memory when all this is going on? In his devising and comparing and calculating how many cycles and of what kind there have been, and how thereafter they may come to be, he would have the best memory of all, just as he is the wisest craftsman.”³¹

Here we see the argument from causality coming into play again. The reference to the ‘calculation of cycles’ is interesting here, as Aristotle used the orbit of the planets as an example of a piece of knowledge, and (as we will see) Ibn Sīnā also makes use of it (and in much the same way as Plotinus does here). What this knowledge of ‘calculations of cycles’ means is later explained by the qualification that this knowledge is “a kind of static universal intelligence, manifold and varied, and yet at the same time simple.”³² It may be tempting to use ‘unique’ instead of ‘simple’ in this passage, but that does not seem to be the force of the argument here. We would then have Plotinus on the record arguing that this godlike entity has one single thought (as against multiple thoughts), though this thought is complex of its own, that is, consists itself of many parts. It seems rather that Plotinus intended this statement to be somewhat paradoxical: a simple thought which nevertheless informs the knower of many things. Though not explicitly further developed by Plotinus,³³ it might indicate the idea that if one cause has many effects, all these effects are, by inclusion, known through knowing the one cause.

The influence of Plotinus can be found in the Arabic translation of most parts of Enneads IV, V, and VI under the title ‘The Theology of Aristotle’ (*Uthūlūjiyā Aristāṭālīs*).³⁴ As C. D’Ancona has aptly demonstrated, in some of the key instances of the original text of Plotinus concerning the

³¹ Enn. IV.4.9.1-9, Plotinus, *Enneads*, vol. IV, p. 159. Armstrong notes that Zeus could either be the Divine Intellect or the Soul of the Universe.

³² Enn. IV.4.11.25, Plotinus, *Enneads*, vol. IV, p. 165.

³³ A similar idea can be found in Kindī’s ‘On First Philosophy’ (*fi al-falsafah al-ūlā*), where he relates that “The universals are therefore multiple, as we have stated previously, and consequently the intellect is multiple. It may be thought that the intellect is the beginning of that which is multiple, and that it is united in a certain way, since it is a whole, as we stated previously, and unity is predicated of the whole.” Ivry, A.L., *Al-Kindī’s Metaphysics*, Albany: SUNY Press (1974), p. 106-107. For French translation and Arabic edition: Rashed, R., Jolivet, J., *Oeuvres Philosophiques et Scientifiques d’Al-Kindī: Volume II Métaphysique et Cosmologie*, Leiden: Brill (1998), pp. 86-87.

³⁴ Adamson, P., *The Arabic Plotinus*, London: Duckworth (2002), p. 6.

issue of God’s knowledge, the Arabic translation ascribes self-knowledge to God. For example where Plotinus’ Greek text translates into English as “that which is altogether simple and self-sufficient needs nothing”,³⁵ the Arabic version adds a qualification that changes the force of the argument. It translates into “The simple, the self-sufficient, does not need anything, knowing itself (*yaʿlamu dhātahu*).”³⁶ By adding Aristotle’s idea, it trumps Plotinus’ own theory.³⁷

There are also many passages in ‘The Theology of Aristotle’ which do not correspond directly to passages in the Greek text, but are digressions to give further explanation of Plotinus’ text (though not indicated as such). In a passage that deviates from Plotinus’ original text, we can read:

“The intellect is ignorant of the things that are under it, as we have said before, because it does not need knowledge (*maʿrifah*) of them, because they are in it, and it is their cause.”³⁸

From this passage it thus becomes clear that if one knows oneself (as intellects do), one also knows what one will produce. Knowledge of the cause implies knowledge of the effect, but without having to rely on this effect. Knowledge relying on the effect means cognition, a word which could be translated into Arabic as *maʿrifah* (which therefore fits the passage well). In another part of ‘The Theology of Aristotle’ the text (again deviating from Plotinus’ text) explains this in greater detail. Here it is said that God has no knowledge “because thought has first principles (*awāʿil*), and the creator – may He be exalted – has no first principles.”³⁹ As Adamson remarks, it seems that the text wants to argue that God does not have discursive knowledge (which would involve deliberation from premises (Ar. *awāʿil*) to conclusions) but may have knowledge in the way Plotinus argues for knowledge of the intellect.⁴⁰ This also seems to be the argument put forward by Fārābī in his ‘Letter Concerning the Intellect’ (*Risālah fī al-ʿAql*). Here we read:

³⁵ Enn. V.3.13.17, Plotinus, *Enneads*, p. 119.

³⁶ Translated by D’Ancona. D’Ancona, C., “Divine and Human Knowledge in the Plotiniana Arabica”, in: *The Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism*, ed. by J. J. Cleary, Leuven: Leuven University Press (1997), p. 429. Cf. Badawī, *Aflūṭīn ʿind al-ʿArab*, p. 176.

³⁷ Kindī, though, seems to hold on to Plotinus’ own views, arguing for a strict unitary view of the concept of God. He does not go into the question whether this rules out ascribing knowledge to God, though this seems to be the obvious conclusion from his writings, especially in ‘On First Philosophy’, cf. Ivry, p. 112; Rashed, Jolivet, pp. 94-95.

³⁸ Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus*, p. 89, cf. Badawī, A., *Aflūṭīn ʿind al-ʿArab* (= *Plotinus apud Arabes*), Cairo: Maktabah al-Nahḍah al-Miṣrīyah (1955), p. 37.

³⁹ Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus*, p. 150, cf. Badawī, *Aflūṭīn ʿind al-ʿArab*, p. 66.

⁴⁰ Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus*, p. 152.

“But if there exist things which are forms which have no matter, it is not at all necessary that this essence [the intellect in potentiality] abstracts them from matters, but it encounters them as abstracted and thinks them just as it encounters itself [or: its essence], insofar as it is an intellect in actuality.”⁴¹

The simile of self-knowledge appears to indicate that this is an event that instantly happens, and the reason for this is that there is no obstruction to intellectually apprehend it (the impediment being matter) according to Fārābī. In regards to God, Fārābī ends his epistle by saying that “the principle through which the first heaven becomes a substance [...] is the intellect which Aristotle mentioned in letter Lam [book Lambda] of the *Metaphysics*.”⁴² Most importantly, we see here that Fārābī is claiming that God is an intellect, and it is for this reason that arguments applicable to intellects may be applied to God. With this reference, we are right back where we started, i.e., with Aristotle’s *Metaphysica*. Having seen how the philosophical discussion developed and came to be received in the Islamic world, we must now turn our attention to Ibn Sīnā, whose solution to the issue became the main opinion which later philosophers either started out from or tried to refute.⁴³

Ibn Sīnā: knowledge of particulars in a universal way

All three places where Ibn Sīnā discusses God’s knowledge extensively begin with a discussion of self-knowledge. Adhering closely to Aristotle’s ideas, Ibn Sīnā explains that immaterial entities (which are by definition not obscure to themselves) are both knowing and known. Because God is an immaterial entity Ibn Sīnā is led to conclude that “It is a knower known to Itself. Indeed, It is knowledge (*‘ilm*) Itself.”⁴⁴ In ‘the Healing’ (*al-Shifā’*) Ibn Sīnā uses the more appropriate terms intellect, intellectual apprehender and intelligible (*‘aql*, *‘āqil* and *ma’qūl*). He summarizes the reason for God being all three by writing:

“That is because He is an intellect by reason of being an immaterial entity. By considering that an immaterial entity is ascribed to Him, He is an intelligible Himself.

⁴¹ Fārābī, transl. by A. Hyman, “The Letter Concerning the Intellect”, *Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, A. Hyman, J.J Walsh, New York: Harper & Row (1967), p.217; Fārābī, ed. by M. Bouyges, *Risalat fi’l-‘Aql*, Beirut: Dar el-Machreq Sarl (2nd ed., 1983), p. 20.

⁴² Fārābī, Hyman, p. 221; Fārābī, Bouyges, pp. 35-36.

⁴³ Some angles to Ibn Sīnā’s discussion will not be discussed here but raised in the second part of this thesis, whenever the need thereof occurs.

⁴⁴ Ibn Sīnā, transl. by P. Morewedge, *The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn Sīnā)*, London: Routledge (1973), p. 61 [= ‘Book of Knowledge’ (*Dānish Nāma-i ‘Alā’ī*), ch. 29]. Note that I follow Morewedge’s translation of the title here. Another often used translation is ‘Philosophy for ‘Alā’ al-Dawlah’.

And by considering that an immaterial entity is available to Him, He is an intellectual apprehender Himself.”⁴⁵

And in the last of the three major works where Ibn Sīnā discusses the issue we read:

“The First is a self-subsistent intelligible essence, and therefore He is Everlasting (*qayyūm*), and free from relations, weaknesses, reliance, or other things which make an added state to the essence. It is known that what is judged to be like that, is an intellectual apprehender of itself, being intelligible to itself.”⁴⁶

It therefore is obvious that Ibn Sīnā insists on God’s self-knowledge because He is immaterial. The argument from nobility is not explicitly used here, but it could be conceived of as an argument that lies behind the argument from being immaterial, in the sense that being immaterial could be said to be prior and better than being enmattered.⁴⁷

To argue for God’s knowledge of other things, Ibn Sīnā first notes that part of what makes God Himself is that he is “the existentiator (*hastī dah*) of things according to the order in which they exist.”⁴⁸ Knowing Himself, God therefore also must have knowledge of His being this ‘existentiator’. Knowledge of what is existentiated must then be included, for otherwise He would not know what He is an existentiator of. Put another way, “He intellects what follows from Him in as much as He is a cause of what follows Him and owes its existence to Him,” as Ibn Sīnā says in the *Ishārāt*.⁴⁹ Ibn Sīnā reiterates in this argument the difference between how we acquire knowledge and how God does this; God’s knowledge is not dependent on the different things he existentiates, “on the contrary,” as Ibn Sīnā puts it in the ‘Book of Scientific Knowledge’, “Its knowledge is the cause of the existence of all things.”⁵⁰ In the *Shifā’* he expands this argument and explains that this dependence means that “either His essence would be constituted by what He intellectually apprehends [...] or it would accidentally occur to Him to

⁴⁵ Ibn Sīnā, transl. by M. Marmura, *The Metaphysics of The Healing*, Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press (2005), p. 285 [Bk. 8, Ch. 6, Pr. 8] Note that this translation is mine.

⁴⁶ Ibn Sīnā, ed. by Sulaymān Dunyā, *al-Ishārāt wa-al-tanbīhāt*. Dhakhā’ir al-‘Arab, 22, 4 vol., Miṣr: Dār al-Ma‘ārif (1957), vol. 3-4, p. 481 [= namaṭ 4, faṣl 28].

⁴⁷ Ibn Sīnā makes use of the argument from nobility to contrast God’s way of knowing with the way other entities know in the *Ishārāt*, Ibn Sīnā, Dunyā, *al-Ishārāt*, vol. 3-4, pp. 710-711 [= namaṭ 7, faṣl 16].

⁴⁸ Ibn Sīnā, Morewedge, *Dānish Nāma-i ‘Alā’ī*, p. 61 [= Ch. 29].

⁴⁹ Ibn Sīnā, Dunyā, *al-Ishārāt*, vol. 3-4, p. 709 [= namaṭ 7, faṣl 15].

⁵⁰ Ibn Sīnā, Morewedge, *Dānish Nāma-i ‘Alā’ī*, p. 61 [= Ch. 29].

intellectually apprehend.”⁵¹ Either option is impossible, even more so for Ibn Sīnā who makes God’s necessity (as the necessary of existence [*wājib al-wujūd*]) a central tenet of his thought.

As we noted, in earlier discussions of God’s knowledge issues arose such as whether the multiplicity of the objects of knowledge makes the knower multiple, or whether the changeability of an object of knowledge changes the knower. The major part of Ibn Sīnā’s discussion of God’s knowledge is devoted to tackling those issues.

Knowing contingent beings

Chapter 31 of the ‘Book of Scientific Knowledge’ deals with the problem of whether or not God’s knowledge of other things extends beyond Himself, to contingent beings. Ibn Sīnā proposes that because these beings are contingent in themselves, and therefore admit of existence or non-existence, they can only be known as contingent and not as existent or non-existent. His argument for this is by contradiction: “If it could be known that the contingent being existed while it was possible for it not to exist, at the time it was not in existence, knowledge would be falsehood.”⁵² From this it seems that knowledge of contingent beings is denied. Ibn Sīnā proposes a solution that involves reflecting on what makes a contingent being necessary. Ibn Sīnā classifies all beings as either necessarily existing in itself (this class only includes God), or necessarily existing through something else (this class holds all other existing beings), also called contingently existing in itself.⁵³ Thus, Ibn Sīnā changes the question from how one can know contingent beings that are contingent in themselves, to how one can know necessarily existing beings that are necessary through something else. The answer is obvious; one should know what exactly necessitates the thing under discussion, that is, by knowing its cause. Knowledge of the cause implies knowledge of the effect, the contingent being.⁵⁴ Ibn Sīnā concludes his discussion in the ‘Book of Knowledge’ with the remark that while we may possess only partial knowledge of the cause of something, and thus we may not possess complete knowledge of it, God can and does possess a complete knowledge of the cause of everything. This is because He Himself is the ultimate cause of all of those things, and given His self-knowledge, He therefore possesses a complete knowledge of everything.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Ibn Sīnā, Marmura, *al-Shifā’*, p. 287 [Bk. 8, Ch. 6, Pr. 13], translation adapted.

⁵² Ibn Sīnā, Morewedge, *Dānish Nāma-i ‘Alā’ī*, p. 63 [= Ch. 31].

⁵³ Ibn Sīnā, Marmura, *al-Shifā’*, p. 29-30 [= Bk.1, Ch. 6].

⁵⁴ Ibn Sīnā, Morewedge, *Dānish Nāma-i ‘Alā’ī*, p. 63 [= Ch. 31]; Ibn Sīnā, Dunyā, *al-Ishārāt*, vol. 3-4, p. 709 [= namaṭ 7, faṣl 15]; Ibn Sīnā, Marmura, *al-Shifā’*, p. 287 [Bk. 8, Ch. 6, Pr. 13]; Ibn Sīnā, Badawī, *al-Ta’līqāt*, p. 60.

⁵⁵ Ibn Sīnā, Morewedge, *Dānish Nāma-i ‘Alā’ī*, p. 63-64 [= Ch. 31].

Of these three books, it is in the *Shifā'* where we find knowledge of universals and knowledge of particulars most strictly distinguished. For example, he says:

“He is the principle of the existents that are perfect in their concrete individual existence and of the generable and corruptible existents – first in [terms of] their species and, through the mediation of these, in [terms of] their individual instances.”⁵⁶

What this ‘mediation’ means becomes clearer when he says about particular, contingent things:

“When corruptibles are intellectually apprehended (*‘uqilat*) in terms of the quiddity denuded [of matter] and the things that attach to it that are not individualized, they are not intellectually apprehended inasmuch as they are corruptible. If apprehended (*udrikat*) inasmuch as they are connected with matter and the accidents of matter, with a [particular] time and individuation, they would not be intellectually apprehended but would be sensed or imagined.”⁵⁷

Between brackets are the verbs Ibn Sīnā used to indicate cognition. It shows a sharp distinction between what knowledge is and what sensation or imagination is. Knowledge is strictly speaking that which can be intellectually apprehended (using the root *‘-q-l*), requiring an (immaterial) intellect, intellectual apprehender and an intelligible. In all other cases we should speak of perception (using the root *d-r-k*), requiring a (material) organ, apprehender and apprehended thing. The former is strictly non-material and not able to change for it is already fully actualized, the latter strictly sensible, i.e., material and able change, for it still contains potentiality. ‘Knowing contingent things’ is in Ibn Sīnā’s view therefore a contradiction in terms; we could however speak of ‘apprehending contingent things’.⁵⁸

From this Ibn Sīnā argues that it is more suitable to say that God knows *about* contingent things, rather than saying that God knows contingent things. ‘Knowing about contingent things’ means knowing them “inasmuch as they are universal, [...] inasmuch as they have attributes”,⁵⁹ Ibn Sīnā argues. He states that such attributes may come to form a description (*rasm*), which is a logical term closely related to the term ‘definition’. It therefore seems to be the case that we

⁵⁶ Ibn Sīnā, Marmura, *al-Shifā'*, p. 287 [Bk. 8, Ch. 6, Pr. 13]; But see also Ibn Sīnā, Dunyā, *al-Ishārāt*, vol. 3-4, p. 709 [= namaṭ 7, faṣl 15] in which knowledge ‘vertically’ (*tawl^m*) and ‘horizontally’ (*‘ard^m*) seems to allude to a difference between universals and particulars, or put differently, as species that have a unique entity and species that have many entities.

⁵⁷ Ibn Sīnā, Marmura, *al-Shifā'*, p. 287 [Bk. 8, Ch. 6, Pr. 15].

⁵⁸ As may be obvious, all of this was in one sense or another already present from Aristotle on, see p. 35.

⁵⁹ Ibn Sīnā, Marmura, *al-Shifā'*, p. 288 [Bk. 8, Ch. 6, Pr. 16].

should interpret ‘attributes’ as meaning all necessary and accidental predicates of a subject.⁶⁰ We could argue that as long as we make this description long enough (“he is a man, he is a philosopher, he drank a chalice containing poison, ...”) we can be sure that this description defines a unique particular thing (“Socrates”) and therefore everything can be known in this way. But this is not exactly what Ibn Sīnā wants to argue for.⁶¹ He continues by saying:

“If that individual is one of the things that are for the intellect also an individual, then the intellect would have access [for apprehending] the thing described. This is the individual which is the only one of its species and has no similar – as, for example, the sphere of the sun or Jupiter.”⁶²

It therefore seems right to conclude that according to Ibn Sīnā, God only has a direct knowledge of beings which are unique in their species.⁶³ Knowledge of sublunary beings, which are multiple in a given species, is only available to Him by way of the attributes that attach to them as universals. What he means by this last statement is discussed in the next section.

Knowing changeable things

The next problem discussed by Ibn Sīnā is whether God can know changeable things while still remaining unchanged Himself. The connection with the previous problem (knowing contingent beings) could be said to be that we could conceive the change of things as a change in what is

⁶⁰ This is dealt with in for example the part on logic in the ‘Remarks and Admonitions’, book 1, chapters 9-13 and book 2, chapter 9, See S. C. Inati [transl.], *Remarks and Admonitions*, Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies (1984), pp. 53-57 and pp. 72-73.

⁶¹ Marmura has also analyzed the relation between universal and particular in the part on Logic from Ibn Sīnā’s *al-Shifā’*. Marmura, M., “Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals in the *Isagoge* of his *Shifā’*”, *Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge*, ed. by A. T. Welch, P. Cachia, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (1979), p. 38 and pp. 51-52.

⁶² Ibn Sīnā, Marmura, *al-Shifā’*, p. 288 [Bk. 8, Ch. 6, Pr. 17].

⁶³ This is the interpretation of Marmura; Marmura, M. “Some aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 82 (1962): pp. 299-312. Although his interpretation is speculative, it gained widespread acceptance. E.g. see Kogan, B., “Some reflections on the problem of future contingency in Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes”, *Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives*, ed. by T. Rudavsky. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing (1985): pp. 95-101. Another example: Terkan, F., *Recurrence of the perennial encounter? Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd on God’s knowledge*, unpublished PhD Thesis, Chicago: University of Chicago (2004), vol. 1, pp. 71ff. And even in an introductory book the view is uncritically accepted: O. Leaman, *An Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy*, Cambridge: CUP (2nd ed., 2002), pp. 135ff. Though it fits this context (i.e. the *Shifā’*) well, it is not representative of the whole corpus of Ibn Sīnā where the knowledge of all things is emphatically ascribed to God. Cf. “It is necessary that He is knowing all things”, Ibn Sīnā, Dunyā, *al-Ishārāt*, vol. 3-4, p. 728 [= namaṭ 7, faṣl 21]; “Consequently, all things are known by It”, Ibn Sīnā, Morewedge, *Dānīsh Nāma-i ‘Alā’ī*, p. 64 [= Ch. 31]. Other scholars have tried to challenge Marmura’s interpretation, see e.g. Adamson, P., “On Knowledge of Particulars”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 105:1 (2005): 257-278; Belo, C. “Averroes on God’s Knowledge of Particulars”, *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 17:2 (2006): pp. 177-199 (the first 11 pages are an exposition of Ibn Sīnā’s theory).

attributed to them. For example, a problem seems to occur if we consider a thing which before time t_1 does not exist, from t_1 to t_2 it exists, and after t_2 it does not exist anymore (here the attribution of ‘existence’ to a thing is changed). If we say that God knows that “the thing does not exist but will in the future”, we are right to say so before t_1 . But it becomes problematic at some point in between t_1 and t_2 . If we still hold that God knows that “the thing does not exist but will in the future” we are now arguing that God’s knowledge is false, which is clearly impossible. Ibn Sīnā argues that if we instead say that God has changed His mind and now knows that “the thing exists but will not in the future”, we must come to the conclusion that God has changed in that case, while Ibn Sīnā argued before that God is unchangeable.⁶⁴

This is solved by Ibn Sīnā by arguing for a kind of knowledge of changeable particulars that does not change. God can have knowledge of particulars, but only “in a universal way” (*alā nahw kullīy*).⁶⁵ This of course fits in neatly with the solution Ibn Sīnā proposed in the previous problem, where Ibn Sīnā argued that God only knows *about* contingent things, which means that God only knows the things inasmuch as they can be described by universals

To explain his ideas on the problem, Ibn Sīnā provides an example. This example illustrates how knowing a contingent being inasmuch as it has attributes applies to a solar eclipse, in particular under the aspect of change over time.⁶⁶ First, Ibn Sīnā describes a manner of knowing the solar eclipse that is not appropriate for God, for here the astronomer is said to know “that a star is first situated at one particular place to which it will later return, and that it will be in conjunction with another star after several hours.”⁶⁷ In this way, the knowledge of the astronomer of what is now the case, at the moment of consideration, will change over time. It might as well be thought of as the difference between apprehending (by sense perception or imagination) and knowing (by intellecting), as it is obvious that an astronomer can only know that a celestial object is at a certain place at a certain time when he sees it at that place, that is to say, when he perceives it.

⁶⁴ Ibn Sīnā, Morewedge, *Dānish Nāma-i ‘Alāī*, p. 65 [= Ch. 32]; Ibn Sīnā, Marmura, *al-Shifā’*, p. 290 [Bk. 8, Ch. 6, Pr. 21].

⁶⁵ Ibn Sīnā, Marmura, *al-Shifā’*, p. 288 [Bk. 8, Ch. 6, Pr. 15].

⁶⁶ Although the use of the example of the solar eclipse can be traced back to Aristotle (*Analytica Posteriora*, 75b33-75b36, p. 123), Marmura sees in Ibn Sīnā’s use of it a further argument for his interpretation that Ibn Sīnā excludes knowledge of sub lunar beings to God. Cf. Marmura, “Some Aspects...”, p. 311.

⁶⁷ Ibn Sīnā, Morewedge, *Dānish Nāma-i ‘Alāī*, p. 65 [= Ch. 32]; Ibn Sīnā, Marmura, *al-Shifā’*, p. 289 [Bk. 8, Ch. 6, Pr. 18]; Ibn Sīnā, Dunyā, *al-Ishārāt*, vol. 3-4, p. 718 [= namaṭ 7, faṣl 18].

Ibn Sīnā emphasizes that “the astronomer possesses scientific knowledge of astronomy without knowledge of the present (*aknūn*) particular condition.”⁶⁸ A notable difference is the adjective ‘scientific’, which seems to hold the same meaning as ‘universal’ as used by Ibn Sīnā in the expression ‘knowledge in a universal way’. This is implied in the sentence which immediately follows the previous sentence and which states that “If [...] he possessed *universal* knowledge, his knowledge would not be subjected to change at any time”.⁶⁹ Therefore, to talk about ‘knowledge in a universal way’ is to emphasize its relation with intellection, removing it from perception and imagination.

So far we have noticed that ‘universal knowledge’ must be unchanging over time, always being true. Ibn Sīnā clarifies what this means in the context of the example. “He would know that after being at a certain place the star would move to another place, and after making a certain motion it would make another motion,” Ibn Sīnā says in the *Dānish Nāma-i ‘Alā’ī*.⁷⁰ In the *Shifā’*, he uses the same example and commits himself to the same view, albeit in a more elaborate fashion. As a kind of conclusion he ends the example there saying that “this intellectual act on your part would be true before that eclipse, during it, and after it.”⁷¹ Therefore, what makes it different from before is that it loses its dependence on the present time. In other words, it does not say anything about what is happening ‘right now’, or ‘in a few hours from now’. This kind of knowledge can still be dependent on time, but only in respect to itself. That is, it is dependent only on relative moments in time which are related to the system of knowledge-items it described. No static, absolute moment in time is needed as a condition for this system. This may be likened to a differential equation which in itself does not define a curve. It is only after one particular solution (perhaps equal to God’s self-knowledge in this simile) is given that the whole curve becomes known and fixed. As Ibn Sīnā concludes in the *Ishārāt*:

“The Necessary of Existence necessitates that His knowledge of particulars is not a temporal knowledge such that the ‘now’, the ‘past’ and the ‘future’ enters into it, with the result that His essence is characterized by an attribute that changes. Rather, it necessitates that His knowledge of particulars is in a holy way, elevated from the temporal and time. It is necessary that He knows all things, because His omnipotence – which consists in the detailed unfolding of His initial decree – extents to every

⁶⁸ Ibn Sīnā, Morewedge, *Dānish Nāma-i ‘Alā’ī*, p. 65 [= Ch. 32].

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, emphasis mine.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Ibn Sīnā, Marmura, *al-Shifā’*, p. 290 [Bk. 8, Ch. 6, Pr. 20].

individual thing that is entailed, through an intermediary or without an intermediary; because what is not necessary does not exist, as you know.”⁷²

Indeed, this is very similar to the conclusion of the *Shifā’*. “The First, through His essence, knows all things,” Ibn Sīnā writes, “this is because He is the principle of all things.”⁷³

⁷² Ibn Sīnā, *Dunyā, al-Ishārāt*, vol. 3-4, pp. 726-728 [= namaṭ 7, faṣl 21].

⁷³ Ibn Sīnā, *Marmura, al-Shifā’*, p. 290 [Bk. 8, Ch. 6, Pr. 22]. This conclusion is not made explicit in the *Dānish Nāma-i ‘Alā’ī*.

The Discussion

Comparative overview of the two books

We now have the historical analysis proper behind us, and we will use this chapter as a bridge between the historical part of this thesis and the philosophical part. As announced in the introduction, the philosophical part of the thesis will consist of a discussion of God’s knowledge as it is presented in Khojazāda’s and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s text. Before this, it will be useful to review the two Ottoman texts as a whole. This way, we will be able to point out some features of composition, as well as come to know the intention of the authors. We will finish this chapter with some remarks on how the subsequent three chapters are set up.

Chapter headings of the books

In order to familiarize ourselves with both books, it is useful to look at their chapter headings as they give a good idea of the overall structure of the book. Comparing them, we can see immediate differences between the three *Tahāfuts* (see *Table 1*).

If we compare ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s chapter headings and Ghazālī’s chapter headings, we notice that ‘Alā’ al-Dīn stays close to the subjects Ghazālī chooses. However, he does take the liberty to reword them in a more positive way. While Ghazālī makes frequent use of words like ‘invalidation’ (*ibṭāl*) and ‘inability’ (*taʿjīz*), ‘Alā’ al-Dīn does not follow this. Either he uses ‘establishment’ (*ithbāt*) instead (as in 4) or, more frequently, he uses a sentence structure such as ‘on the proof of whether or not x is y ’ (*fī bayān anna ... am lā*). Sometimes his wording is more precise, as in chapter 7, where Ghazālī raises the question whether God can be divided into genus and differentia. Here ‘Alā’ al-Dīn labels the discussion whether or not God can be composed of ‘intellectual parts’ (*ajzā’ aqliyah*). The most interesting difference is in chapter 10. In Ghazālī’s text it is a very short chapter, merely summarizing or concluding what has been discussed in the previous chapters. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn takes this opportunity to stray from Ghazālī’s topic and discuss the concept of knowledge, as a prelude to the next three chapters on God’s knowledge.

Comparing Khojazāda’s chapter headings with Ghazālī’s, we notice an even closer resemblance than that between ‘Alā’ al-Dīn and Ghazālī. The wording, including the use of *ibṭāl* and *taʿjīz*, stays close to Ghazālī’s original. The only real difference is a rearrangement and addition of some chapters. This is already apparent with the first chapter, which, although dealing with a

problem that is connected with the next chapters, is not attested as such in Ghazālī's book. Furthermore, Khojazāda expanded chapters 3 and 5 of Ghazālī's text (in Khojazāda's list chapters 4 and 7), with an additional chapter to further clarify the issues at stake. His additions, therefore, do not appear to introduce new material but instead offer a different systematization. Last, just as 'Alā' al-Dīn deviated from Ghazālī in chapter 10, Khojazāda also deviates from him but in a more radical way. He simply does away with the chapter altogether and proceeds directly to chapter 11 (in his count chapter 13). Khojazāda therefore added 3 chapters and did away with one, leaving him with 2 extra chapters in total.¹

¹ The assertion in the *Kashf al-Zunūn* that Khojazāda's study contains two more chapters than Ghazālī's original is therefore not the whole story. Cf. *Kashf*, Vol. 1, p. 513. This formulation is taken over by Sa'ādah: Sa'ādah, R., *Mushkilah al-Şirā' bayn al-Falsafah wa-al-Dīn*, p. 20.

	Khojzāda	Ghazālī	‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī	
1	في إبطال قولهم المبداء الأول موجب بالذات لا فاعل بالاختيار			
2	في إبطال قولهم بقدّم العالم	في إبطال قولهم بقدّم العالم	في حدوث العالم وقدمه	1
3	في إبطال قولهم في أبدية العالم	في إبطال قولهم في أبدية العالم والزمان والحركة	في أبدية العالم	2
4	في إبطال قولهم الواحد لا يصدر عنه إلا الواحد	في بيان تلبّيسهم بقولهم إنّ الله فاعل العالم وصانعه وإنّ العالم صنعه وفعله وبيان أنّ ذلك مجاز عندهم وليس بحقيقة	في بيان أنّ قولنا الله تعالى فاعل العالم وصانعه هل هو بطريق الحقيقة أم لا	3
5	في إبطال قولهم في كيفية صدور العالم المركّب من المختلفات عن المبداء الواحد			
6	في تعجيزهم عن الاستدلال على وجود الصانع للعالم	في بيان عجزهم عن الاستدلال على وجود الصانع للعالم	إثبات الصانع للعالم	4
7	في بيان تعجيزهم عن إقامة الدليل على وحدانية الواجب	في بيان عجزهم عن إقامة الدليل على أنّ الله واحد وأنّه لا يجوز فرض إثنيين واجبي الوجود كلّ واحد منهما لا علّة له	توحيد الله جلّ وعلا أي نفي الكثرة عنه	5
8	في إبطال قولهم إنّ الواحد لا يكونه قابلاً وفاعلاً بشيء واحد			
9	في إبطال قولهم في نفي الصفات	في إبطال مذهبهم في نفي الصفات ²	أنّصاف الله تعالى بالصفات	6
10	في تعجيزهم عن إثبات قولهم إنّ ذات الأول لا ينقسم بالجنس والفصل	في إبطال قولهم إنّ الأول لا يجوز أن يشارك غيره في جنس ويفارقه بفصل وإنّه لا يتطرق إليه انقسام في حقّ العقل بالجنس والفصل	أنّه تعالى هل يجوز أن يكون له تركيب من أجزاء عقلية أو لا	7
11	في تعجيزهم عن إثبات قولهم إنّ وجود الأول عين ماهيته	في إبطال قولهم إنّ وجود الأول بسيط أي هو وجود محض ولا ماهية ولا حقيقة يضاف الوجود إليها بل الوجود الواجب له كالماهية لغيره	أنّه تعالى هل له ماهية غير الوجود أم لا	8
12	في تعجيزهم عن إثبات أنّ الأول ليس بجسم	في تعجيزهم عن إقامة الدليل على ان الأول ليس بجسم	أنّ الله تعالى ليس بجسم	9
		في تعجيزهم عن إقامة الدليل على	الكلام في حقيقة العلم	10

² No chapter heading in the text, but this is what is given in Ghazālī’s introduction.

		أَنَّ لِلْعَالَمِ صَانِعاً وَعَلَّةً	
13	في تعجيزهم عن القول بأنَّ الأول يعلم غيره	في تعجيز من يرى منهم أنَّ الأول يعلم غيره ويعلم الأنواع والأجناس بنوع كَلِّي	11 أنه تعالى عالم بغيره من الأشياء
14	في تعجيزهم عن القول بأنَّ الأول يعلم ذاته	في تعجيزهم عن إقامة الدليل على أنه يعرف ذاته أيضاً	12 أنه تعالى يعلم ذاته
15	في إبطال قولهم إنَّ الأول لا يعلم الجزئيات	في إبطال قولهم إن الله تعالى عن قولهم لا يعلم الجزئيات المنقسمة بانقسام الزمان إلى الكائن وما كان وما يكون	13 أنه تعالى ليس عالماً بالجزئيات المتغيرة
16	في إبطال قولهم السماء متحركة بالإرادة	في تعجيزهم عن إقامة الدليل على أنَّ السماء حيوان مطيع لله تعالى بحركته الدورية	14 أنه هل للفلك نفس ناطقة متحركة له بالإرادة أم لا
17	في إبطال ما ذكره من الغرض المحرك (للسماء)	في إبطال ما ذكره من الغرض المحرك للسماء	15 بيان الغرض الأصلي من حركة الفلك
18	في إبطال قولهم إنَّ نفوس السموات مطلقة على جميع الجزئيات الحادثة في هذا العالم	في إبطال قولهم إنَّ نفوس السموات تعلم جميع الجزئيات ³	16 بيان علم نفوس السموات بأحوال الكائنات
19	في إبطال قولهم بوجوب الاقتران وامتناع الانفكاك بين الأسباب العادية والمسببات	في إبطال قولهم باستحالة خرق العادات ⁴	17 بيان أن ترتب الموجودات بعضها على بعض هل هو لعلاقة عقلية وعالية حقيقية بينها أم لا
20	في تعجيزهم عن إثبات أن نفس الإنسان جوهر مجرد قائم بذاته	في إبطال قولهم إنَّ نفس الإنسان جوهر قائم بنفسه ليس بجسم ولا عرض ⁵	18 بيان أن النفس الإنسانية هل هي مجردة أم لا
21	في إبطال قولهم باستحالة الفناء على النفوس البشرية	في قولهم باستحالة الفناء على النفوس البشرية ⁶	19 بيان أن النفس الإنسانية قديمة أو حادثة وأنها هل هي باقية بعد موت البدن وخرابه أم لا
22	في إبطال قولهم بنفي البعث وحشر الأجسام	في إبطال إنكارهم لبعث الأجساد مع التلذذ والتألم في الجنة والنار باللذات	20 بيان أنَّ حشر الأجساد وردَّ الأرواح إلى الأبدان هل هو

³ The chapter heading in the text is very long; this is what is stated in Ghazālī's introduction.

⁴ There is no chapter heading in the text; this is what is stated in Ghazālī's introduction.

⁵ The chapter heading in the text is very long; this is what is stated in Ghazālī's introduction.

⁶ The chapter heading in the text is very long; this is what is stated in Ghazālī's introduction.

		والآلام الجسمانية ⁷	ممکن وواقع أم لا
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Table 1: Table of Contents of the three *Tahāfut*s. The numbers on the left indicate Khojazāda’s chapter numbering. The numbers on the right indicate Ghazālī’s chapter numbering. Introductions and conclusions are left out of this table.

Aim of the books according to the introduction of the authors

The introductions that the two intellectuals offer supply us with information concerning their intention and methodology. Both introductions will be treated separately and a brief comparison will follow.

‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s introduction

‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s introduction is divided into two parts: a preface (*tamhīd*) and an introduction (*muqaddimah*). He discusses the happiness (*sa‘ādah*) of humanity’s knowledge of God and His perfections, and how this can be achieved by reflection on His creations (*al-tafakkur fi maṣnū‘ātihī*). He then discusses the role of the philosophers in this, and how some of what they do can be good, while some of it falls short. He then explains the reason why he wrote the treatise: he received an order from the Sultan to study the *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, and to write what he thought of the two methods (i.e. Ghazālī’s method versus the method of the philosophers) “by way of expanding and favouring (*min jihāt al-taḍ‘īf wa-al-tarjīh*), and objecting and correcting.”⁸ ‘Alā’ al-Dīn explains that he will not be ‘blindly’ following (*bi-ṭarīq al-taqlīd*) Ghazālī, although he will adopt Ghazālī’s outline and method. He concludes the preface by promising only to put forward what he deems correct and understandable, followed by an invocation to God to help him with this. His final words in the preface concern the book as a whole. He affirms it is written in 20 chapters, “like the original”. As can be seen from the previous table, this is true in terms of the chapter count, but it is slightly misleading with regard to chapter 10. However, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn does not bring this issue up here.

In the introduction, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn explains the aim of his book by giving a primer on the conflict between reason and revelation. The very fact that we have different faculties is something we should be thankful for, but at the same time remain aware that they have their limits. In ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s words, “they fail to reach their fulfilment, for we cannot see everything there is to see,

⁷ The chapter heading in the text is very long; this is what is stated in Ghazālī’s introduction.

⁸ ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, *Tahāfut*, p. 61.

nor can we hear everything there is to hear... [etc.]”⁹ This is the same for all other faculties, including the intellect; there will always be a bit of doubt left, no matter how deeply we think about an issue.

For ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, this is precisely what the philosophers fail to appreciate. To illustrate his point he treats the well known issue of what constitutes a body. Most philosophers agree on the form/matter distinction. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn puts forward that Plato argues for a composition of the four elements, while Democritus argues for the idea that indivisible parts together constitute a body. The example is to show that even on the most basic questions philosophers, relying solely on their intellect, can differ greatly in their conclusions.

‘Alā’ al-Dīn states that “there is no solution [to these intellectual conflicts] except by returning to that firm devotion, and there is no equivalent to that method.”¹⁰ Adding to it that “whoever plunges in the vast ocean without a boat, will surely be a drowned man.”¹¹ Still, he acknowledges the rational sciences as valid, and in fact recognizes the attainment of happiness by use of the intellect and sees the intellect as a gift from God. His biggest criticism is that instead of being thankful for this great gift, the philosophers made it harmful to themselves. The function of religion is thus to humble people and make them aware they do not and will not know everything there is to know.

After establishing these ideas, he goes on to connect this with the content of the book. In his view, the difference between philosophy and religion is threefold.

1. The application of certain concepts to God, such as ‘substance’ (*jawhar*), when it is taken to mean ‘that which is self-sufficient’ (*qā’im bi-nafsihi*), for this concept is only properly applied to possible existents.¹² This difference is merely of a terminological type, and does not constitute a real difference in meaning (*ma‘ná*). ‘Alā’ al-Dīn will therefore not discuss it.
2. The philosophical judgments that are built upon decisive evidence and which go against the manifest sense (*ẓawāhir*) of the Religious Law. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn gives as an example astronomy, in which religious conceptions about the sphericity of the heavens

⁹ Ibid., p. 65.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 67.

¹¹ It is reminiscent of Ghazālī’s *Al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl*: “... the diversity of men in religions and creeds, plus the disagreement of the Community of Islam about doctrines, given the multiplicity of sects and the divergency of methods, is a deep sea in which most men founder and from which few only are saved.” Ghazālī, transl. R. McCarthy, *Deliverance from Error*, Louisville: Fons Vitae (1999), p. 54.

¹² As opposed to God who is the ‘Necessary of Existence’ (*wājib al-wujūd*).

and the earth, the composition of the heavenly bodies, their motions etc., go against scientific judgments. While it is clear that these scientific judgments are based upon mathematics and observations, it would be absurd to suggest that two contradictory judgments are both backed up by decisive evidence. The solution ‘Alā’ al-Dīn proposes is that “the gate of interpretation of the manifest senses is open.”¹³ In this way, a true contradiction does not arise and therefore it will also not be the topic of discussion in ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s book.

3. Last, there are philosophical judgments that are not backed up by decisive evidence. This will be the subject of the ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s *Tahāfut*. These are divided into two:
 - a. The philosophical judgments that go against judgments that are in accordance with Religious Law and for which there is decisive evidence (i.e. in favour of the Religious Law). These will make the one who maintains such a philosophical argument an unbeliever. Examples are the eternity of the world, and the rejection of bodily resurrection.¹⁴
 - b. The philosophical judgments that go against judgments that are in accordance with Religious Law and for which there is no decisive evidence (i.e. the Religious Law leaves the question open). These will not make the one who maintains such a philosophical argument an unbeliever. An example of this is denying attributes of God, in favour of an absolute adherence to the idea of *tawḥīd*. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn adds that on such an issue, even some Mawlās agree with the philosophers.

‘Alā’ al-Dīn concludes his introduction saying that although the intention of the book is of course to warn the philosophers of the falsity of arguments that they imagine to be strong, and to free them from error, he does not want to be restricted to merely proving their error. “Rather,” he says, “we will import some of what they have erred in, in the evidence, and if the claim is true, to prove those from numerous aspects.”¹⁵ This is because some of the claims of the philosophers are true, though they may not have argued for them correctly. He concludes this by saying that “this exaggeration in their viewpoints is purely because of blind following (*mujarrad taqlīd*), not because of correct proof.”¹⁶ In short, it is his mission to sort out opinion

¹³ Ibid., p. 70.

¹⁴ As discussed earlier, Ghazālī gives three points on which philosophers are to be called unbelieving: the two mentioned here by ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, and as a third the rejection of philosophers of God’s knowledge of changeable particulars.

¹⁵ ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, *Tahāfut*, p. 81.

¹⁶ Ibid.

from truth, showing that whenever reason and revelation seem to go against each other, at least one of two is in fact merely an opinion. Where the philosophers have merely followed earlier philosophers blindly and did not give a correct proof for an idea that is in itself correct, he will show the correct proof.

Khojazāda's introduction

Khojazāda's introduction is more concise than 'Alā' al-Dīn's. It also does not contain an explicit division between a preface and an introduction. Khojazāda begins his text by saying that reason ('aql) and revelation (naql) are congruous, and that searching for knowledge is commendable. He chooses to illustrate this by citing 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, who allegedly said:

رحم الله امرأ عرف نفسه واستعدّ لمسه وعلم من أين وفي أين وإلى أين

Meaning:

“God has mercy on a man who knows himself and stands prepared by his tomb. Who knows from where [we come from], where [we are] at, and to where [we are going].”

Khojazāda then argues that unfortunately, some of the philosophers may depart from the truth and thus corrupt science. He explains that it is Ghazālī who has corrected this error. At this point Khojazāda explains that his own text was commissioned by the Sultan on order to explain Ghazālī's point of view and to show how and why the philosophers erred.

Khojazāda goes on to explain how the sciences are divided up. He follows a fairly standard approach, which is close to Ibn Sīnā's division;¹⁷ there is practical and theoretical knowledge and theoretical knowledge can further be divided into three subdivisions. The highest one is Metaphysics, the middle one is the Mathematical sciences and the lowest one is Physics. Following Ghazālī, he states that the errors are only to be found in Metaphysics and Physics, while Mathematics is free of error.¹⁸ To further back up this claim he reminds the reader of the use of mathematics in religious affairs such as in calculating prayer times.

He makes it very clear that his intention is first to state what the philosophers think and what Ghazālī's reply is, and then to refute them (*ubṭiluhā*). He ends his introduction by supplying all chapter headings.

¹⁷ Ibn Sīnā, “Risālah fī Aqsām al-‘Ulūm al-‘Aqlīyah”, *Tis‘ Rasā’il fī al-Ḥikmah wa-al-Ṭabī‘iyāt*, Beirut: Dār Qābis (1986), pp. 83-94, cf. Anawati, G.C., “Les Divisions des Sciences Intellectuelles d’Avicenne”, *MIDEO*, 13 (1977), pp. 323-335.

¹⁸ Ghazālī, transl. Marmura, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, pp. 5-7, but even more explicit in: Ghazālī, transl. McCarthy, *Deliverance from Error*, pp. 65-66.

Comparing the introductions

If we compare both introductions, some striking similarities emerge, especially with regard to structure:

ḥamdallah - statement about the happiness of knowledge - statement about the exaggeration of the philosophers which led them astray – Ghazālī's correction – request of the Sultan, including an appraisal of the Sultan – why the philosophers erred – the intention of the book.

They diverge on several points. First and foremost is the size of their introductions. Khojazāda tried to give a compact introduction, merely giving an idea how and why the book was composed, and what the rest of the book will be about. 'Alā' al-Dīn does this too, but goes beyond it by providing a more precise idea of how he thinks reason and revelation complement each other. We could say he provides a philosophy of religion in his introduction.

This is the source of the second major difference. While 'Alā' al-Dīn proposes from this philosophy of religion an idea of which topics should be discussed and to what extent they should be refuted, Khojazāda does not come up with such a sophisticated idea. He uses an older idea, in fact an idea already proposed by Ghazālī, that while the Mathematical sciences are true without doubt, the Physical sciences already raise questions and the Metaphysical sciences are to be refuted in several instances. In this way, Khojazāda stays closer to the original text of Ghazālī, but it comes at the cost of having to take a much firmer stance against philosophy than 'Alā' al-Dīn had done. There is no question that Khojazāda's intention is to refute the philosophers rather than harmonize their opinion with the opinion of religious scholars.

First discussion: on God's knowledge

Introduction

As discussed above, the problem of God's knowledge is treated according to one of a three-chapter structure. This first chapter lays the basis for the other chapters by proposing three different proofs for God's knowledge. We will first briefly treat the introductions of this chapter and then discuss the proofs one by one.

Ghazālī

To connect his three chapters on God's knowledge with the previous ten chapters of the *Tahāfut*, Ghazālī first proposes a proof for God's knowledge which he ascribes to 'the Muslims' (thereby implying that 'the philosophers' are not part of the Muslim community, or at the very least deserve to be suspected of having departed from it). The earlier chapters dealt with the origination of the universe. Since Ghazālī claims that the Muslims hold that God created the universe through an act of will, God's knowledge of this act is implied. This is because one cannot will something into being without knowing the object of the action.¹ Since all things are the willed effect of God's creative power, He knows all things.

He then continues to point out that since the crucial factor in this – God's creative power – is denied by philosophers (at least, as far as Ghazālī is concerned), knowledge and self-knowledge do not automatically follow. He proposes to put forward two proofs the philosophers came up with to fix this defect. In reality though, it turns out that he treats three distinctly different proofs, subsuming the proof from nobility under the proof from being a cause.

The two Ottoman intellectuals

Khojzāda and 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī do not concern themselves much with Ghazālī's text. Khojzāda is extremely concise. He dubs his chapter "on their [i.e. the philosophers'] incapacity concerning the statement that the First knows something other than Himself in a universal way" and further adds that "They have different methods for this." After this, he simply moves on with the first proof.

'Alā' al-Dīn includes an actual introduction. Mainly drawing from Jurjānī's commentary on Ījī's *al-Mawāqif*, he begins by giving a basic proof for God's knowledge which is close to the one Ghazālī provided. Textual reliance can be established if we look at the following texts:

¹ Intention and consequence of an action may not seem to be completely the same at all times, and this will be further discussed at page 76ff.

Sharḥ al-Mawāqif

(المسلک الثاني إنه تعالى قادر لما مرّ وكلّ قادر فهو عالم)
 لأنّ القادر هو الذي يفعل بالقصد والاختيار ولا يتصور
 ذلك إلّا مع العلم (لا يقال) كون كلّ قادر عالماً ممنوع إذ
 قد يصدر عن النائم والغافل) مع كونهما قادرين عند
 المعتزلة وكثير من الأشاعرة (فعل قليل) متقن (اتفاقاً)²

al-Dhakhīrah

فلأنّ فاعل لجميع ما عداه بالاختيار والفاعل بالاختيار لا
 بدّ أن يكون عالماً بمفعوله لأنّه يفعل به بإرادته ولا يتصور
 إرادة الشيء بدون تصوّره والعلم به وما يقال من أنّه قد
 يصدر من النائم والغافل فعل قليل بالاختيار من غير
 شعور به³

Although there are not many exact correspondences, the few parts that do correspond show that ‘Alā’ al-Dīn probably had this text in mind while writing. As we will see, compared to Khojazāda his text reveals very few concrete textual reliances on other texts although it is of course clear that most of the material that ‘Alā’ al-Dīn includes in his text is coming from the same or similar sources as the ones Khojazāda is drawing from.

After this proof, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn gives a division into four classes of how philosophers have thought about God’s knowledge (denial of both self-knowledge and knowledge of others, denial of the former but affirmation of the latter, affirmation of the former but denial of the latter, and affirmation of self-knowledge and affirmation of knowledge of all others except for changing particulars).⁴ He proposes the topics of the chapters: the first chapter deals with “His knowledge of things other than Him, namely, universals and unchanging particulars.” The second chapter deals with “His knowledge of Himself.” And the third chapter is about “the absence of His knowledge about changing particulars.”

Structure of the chapters

Both Khojazāda and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn apply a very strict structure to this chapter, as well as in the chapters to come. First an argument as ‘the philosophers’ would present it is given. They do this first in summary, then in full. Then they systematically discuss (usually going line by line) problems that arise in the argument. If counter-arguments to these objections are well-known, they are given and are themselves subject to discussion. Usually, they do not provide a concrete

² Ījī, *Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, v. 3, p. 102.

³ ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, *Tahāfut*, p. 255.

⁴ Divisions of the different positions on this issue vary. For example, in the *Kitāb al-Arba‘īn* Rāzī gives 6 groups: 1) God has no self-knowledge 2) God only knows other things 3) God has knowledge of universals 4) God knows everything in a conditioned way 5) God does not know infinite things 6) God does not know all things. Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn, *Kitāb al-Arba‘īn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn*, Ḥaydarābād: Maṭba‘at Majlis Dā‘irat al-Ma‘ārif al-‘Uthmānīyah (1354/1934-35), pp. 136-145.

conclusion, but either leave it to the reader to decide which side of the argument is more convincing, or they create such a context in which one side is clearly favoured over the other.

The main structure of this first chapter differs between the two Ottoman intellectuals. 'Alā' al-Dīn in particular makes some major structural changes. While Khojazāda presents all three main proofs for God's knowledge, and discusses their argumentation as a whole, 'Alā' al-Dīn postpones the first part of the second proof (as this is an argument for God's self-knowledge, and is therefore properly discussed in Chapter 2) and omits the third proof (again postponed until Chapter 2). Also, and importantly, Khojazāda includes a large section dealing specifically with Ghazālī's text. 'Alā' al-Dīn's text has no such section.

Khojazāda's decision to discuss every proof in full in the first chapter seems odd, as it leaves little material for the second chapter. However, it does provide a better structure as Chapters 2 and 3 are built upon the first chapter. The first chapter therefore lays out the structure of the philosophical discussion, on which more specific investigations (such as self-knowledge and knowledge of particulars) can be conducted. In this respect 'Alā' al-Dīn leaves the reader to guess how exactly all three chapters are connected to one another. Although the argumentation scheme below does reflect the actual content of the chapters of Khojazāda and 'Alā' al-Dīn, we will follow 'Alā' al-Dīn in postponing the argument for God's self-knowledge of the second proof, and we will follow Khojazāda in including the third proof (from nobility) in this chapter.

First proof: From being abstract

The argument

Ghazālī

Ghazālī's exposition of the first proof of God's knowledge of other things stands in contrast with the elaborate argumentation of the two Ottoman intellectuals. He states that God is devoid of matter and therefore a pure intellect. As such, it has all intelligibles laid bare to it, for all intelligibles are devoid of matter so there is no impediment to intellectually apprehending them. Beyond this point Ghazālī does not elaborate and only points out that angels are intellects and human beings also after their death (which is in this context nothing more than the doing away of material relations).

The two Ottoman scholars

As mentioned earlier, both Ottoman intellectuals first give a very short version of the argument before they go into the argument in detail. The summary of the first argument already shows a great divide between Ghazālī's text and the texts of the two Ottoman intellectuals. Their proof, together with the critical discussion of it, shows a greater depth as well as technical knowledge of the philosophical discourse. In argumentation the scholars hardly differ. They argue that because God is immaterial, He is therefore intelligible. And because He is self-subsistent, He is therefore also an intellectual apprehender. He therefore knows all intelligibles. Ghazālī did not specify his proof to such an extent, but the Ottoman scholars go even further. They also want to tie together these statements, and want to propose an argumentation that is as watertight as possible. In order to understand how these statements connect to each other, we need to occupy ourselves with a step by step look at their explanation.

How they explain the argument

As for the first proposition – that God is immaterial –, both scholars simply state that this has already been proven.⁵ From this point on, the argument is set up as being applicable to any immaterial thing, with God taking no special place among these entities. What the proof argues for is therefore the knowledge that any immaterial, self-subsisting thing has of all immaterial things.

The second statement – that all immaterial things are intelligibles – is argued for by pointing out that the impediment to intellection is matter and its concomitants. Immaterial things are by definition unrelated to matter and its concomitants and there is therefore no other option than to be an intelligible. As Khojazāda aptly puts it, “it is intellectually apprehended without the need of any action (*amal*) in order to become an intelligible. So if it is not intellectually apprehended, this is due to some aspect of the intellectual apprehender.”⁶

That an immaterial, self-subsisting thing intellectually apprehends all other intelligibles requires an argumentation of its own. The first step towards the conclusion is to argue for the intellectual apprehension that an immaterial, self-subsisting thing has of one (any) intelligible.⁷ To argue for this special case they use a definition of intellection as “a relation of that

⁵ This is explained in a previous chapter entitled “on the fact that God is without a body” (Ghazālī and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s chapter 9, Khojazāda’s chapter 12).

⁶ Taftāzānī adds: “not due to some aspect of [the intelligible]” (*lā min jihatihī*), see section on ‘origins of the argument’ for full textual comparison. Cf. Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid*, v. 4, p. 114. Also note that such a comment is missing from ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s text.

⁷ Again both authors follow the same train of thought.

[intelligible] to the immaterial, self-subsisting existing thing, being a relation of something inhering to a locus (*muqāranat al-ḥāll li-l-maḥall*),” as Khojazāda puts it. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s comment on it may also be helpful. He adds that “one cannot imagine such a relation except by the production (*ḥuṣūl*) of that quiddity [i.e. of the intelligible] in the immaterial thing.”⁸ This means that the desired conclusion - that an immaterial, self-subsisting thing intellectually apprehends some intelligible - is equivalent to saying that the relation of an intelligible to an immaterial, self-subsisting thing as a relation between something inhering and locus.⁹

To argue for this, the case of two intelligibles is first considered. This is because an immaterial, self-subsisting thing belongs obviously to the more general group of immaterial things, which is equal to the group of intelligibles. This argument therefore assumes an intensional identity between the group of immaterial thing and the group of intelligible things, which is to say that to be immaterial means nothing more or less than to be intelligible, and vice versa. Immaterial, self-subsisting things are therefore, due to their immaterialness, intelligibles. As such, the more general case of the relation between two intelligibles is first concerned to make matters less complicated. The special case in which at least one of the intelligibles is self-subsisting is only considered afterwards. In this general case, it is first argued by both Ottoman scholars that two intelligibles can be intellectually apprehended simultaneously (*maʿan*). As Khojazāda puts it, “a judgment of one thing by another thing requires conceiving them together.” Or in ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s words, “a judgment between two things is only possible after intellectually apprehending them together.” This is proven by examples such as the judgment of anything with existence, unity (examples of Khojazāda) or necessity, possibility (examples of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn). Note that intellection is here considered as a propositional judgment, that is, of the form ‘x is y’ or ‘x is not y’. In this sense judging ‘together’ means judging them within one proposition. As such, it is clear that not only some intelligibles can be judged together, but in fact all intelligibles can be judged together.

From judging together it is only one small step to say that two intelligibles can have a connection (*muqāranah*), albeit a connection in the intellect that intellectually apprehends them both. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn does not argue for this very aptly, merely stating that “if they are conveyed together, then we connected them in the intellect.” Khojazāda brings more convincing arguments to the table. “If something is an intelligible together with something

⁸ Cf. e.g. Jurjānī, *Taʿrīfāt*, p. 63 [= #481]; “conceptualization is the production of the Form of a thing in the intellect” (*taṣawwur ḥuṣūl ṣūrat al-shayʿ fī al-ʿaql*).

⁹ If one compares the sources one will notice that this part is in fact placed at the end of the reasoning, not at the beginning. However, the argument becomes clearer when this part is placed at the beginning.

else," he says, "they are both states in the intellective faculty. So the connection they have is a connection from one state to the other."

At this point it might be appropriate to point out the two different relationships the Ottoman intellectuals use. On the one hand they make use of a subject-predicate relationship, which is the one between two intelligibles if they are thought of together by an intellectual apprehender. For example 'horseness' and 'justice' could be related in a subject-predicate relationship if an intellectual apprehender thinks of the proposition 'horseness is not justice'. However, at the same time as an intellectual apprehender thinks this proposition, another relationship also exists, namely a relationship between something that inheres (*ḥāll*) and the locus (*maḥall*). This is the relationship between the intelligible and the intellectual apprehender. It is by playing around with these two relationships that Khojazāda and 'Alā' al-Dīn construct this first argument, for they wish to show that the two relationships can occur simultaneously if one of the two intelligibles is self-subsistent.

If we continue the argumentation of the two Ottoman philosophers, we should remember that we so far have the possibility of a connection between two intelligibles if they are in an intellect. From this, the Ottoman scholars argue that therefore this connection must be possible on its own. It is argued that the specific depends on the more general, and so the possibility of a connection in the intellect depends the possibility of a connection in general.

At this point we can return to the specific case if one of the two intelligibles is self-subsisting. If this is so, it means it cannot be something inhering (*ḥāll*) within an intellect. The connection it has to the other intelligible can therefore neither be a connection from one state to another, nor a connection from something inhering to a locus. The third option, a connection from a locus to something inhering, is the only remaining option. It is therefore the case that the connection that is possible between two intelligibles of which one is self-subsistent, is a connection between the self-subsistent intelligible as locus and the non-self-subsistent intelligible as something inhering (in the locus). We started by arguing that such a relation is exactly the same as saying that the self-subsistent thing intellectually apprehends the other intelligible. Therefore, an intelligible, self-subsistent thing is able to intellectually apprehend all other intelligibles.

To complete the argument, Khojazāda adds that "if it is permissible that it is intellectually apprehending the other, its intellection is in fact occurring, for change and temporal occurrence are of the consequences of matter, as you know." This argument is to ensure that

God, an immaterial selfsubsistent thing, is always intellectually apprehending all intelligibles. The reason why then our intellect is not always intellectually apprehending all other intelligibles is not treated. One reason could be that it is because it is not completely selfsubsistent, at least not before death, as it is partly associated with our material body.

Origins of the argument

As we will see throughout these chapters, Khojazāda and 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī make abundant use of earlier works. Especially Khojazāda is prone to cite earlier texts, but without mention of the source.¹⁰ As Khojazāda's and 'Alā' al-Dīn's text are very close in content to each other, we may take any textual evidence of a source in Khojazāda's text also to be potentially applicable to 'Alā' al-Dīn's text. In general, we can say that although the Ottoman scholars follow the structure of Ghazālī's text, the content is primarily based on the commentary by al-Sayyid al-Sharīf Jurjānī on Ījī's *al-Mawāqif fī 'ilm al-Kalām*. As this text was not very old at the time of Khojazāda and 'Alā' al-Dīn, they may have perceived it as the most cutting-edge text available in the field of Kalām. However, they did not always use the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*. For instance, in the case of this first argument, the first two pages of Khojazāda's text is almost entirely a citation from Iṣfahānī's commentary called *Maṭālī' al-Anzār* on Bayḍāwī's *Ṭawālī' al-Anwār*.¹¹ In the few lines where Khojazāda is not following Iṣfahānī, he cites Rāzī's commentary on Ibn Sīnā's *al-Ishārāt wa-al-Tanbīhāt*.¹² As the citation taken from Iṣfahānī is too long, we will not compare the two fragments in full here but we will rather restrict ourselves to the most remarkable passage. If one compares the following paragraphs, a striking resemblance catches the eye:

Ibn Sīnā	Iṣfahānī	Taftāzānī	Jurjānī/Ījī	Khojazāda
وأما ما هو في ذاته بريء	كل مجرد قائم بذاته يصح	المجرد بريء عن	(إذ كل مجرد) كذلك	وأما أن كل مجرد كذلك يصح
عن الشوائب المادية	أن يعقل لأن كل مجرد	الشوائب المادية	(يمكن أن يعقل) لأن	أن يكون معقولاً فلأن ذاته
واللواحق الغريبة التي لا	قائم بالذات يكون منزهاً	واللواحق الغريبة وكل	ذاته منزّه عن العلائق	منزّهة عن العوارض الجزئية
تلزم ماهيته عن ماهيته فهو	عن الشوب المادية مفسداً	ما هو كذلك	الغريبة عن ماهيته	اللاحقة للشيء بسبب المادة في
معقول لذاته	عن العلائق الغريبة التي لا		والشوائب المادية المانعة	الوجود الخارجي المقتضية
	تلزم ماهيته عن ماهيته		عن التعقل	للاقسام إلى الأجزاء المتباينة

¹⁰ This may have been common practice in his time. For a similar practice from a contemporary, cf. Heer, N., *The Precious Pearl*, Albany: SUNY Press (1979) (= translation of 'Abd al-Rahmān Jāmī's *al-Durrah al-Fākirah*).

¹¹ Iṣfahānī, Maḥmūd ibn 'Abd al-Rahmān, *Maṭālī' al-Anzār 'alā Ṭawālī' al-Anwār*, Istanbul: (1305/1887-88), p. 355-357; cf. Pollock, J.W., Calverley, E.E., *Nature, man and God in medieval Islam: 'Abd Allah Baydawi's text, Tawālī' al-anwar min matalī' al-anzar, along with Mahmud Isfahani's commentary, Matalī' al-anzar, sharh Tawālī' al-anwar*, 2 vol., Leiden: Brill (2002), v. 2, pp. 833-837.

¹² Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v. 2, p. 299 [= namaṭ 3, faṣl 19].

	وكل ما هو كذلك فمن شأن ماهيته أن تصير معقولة لذاتها لأنها		في الوضع وهي المانعة من التعقل فإذا كان مجرداً عنها لم يكن فيه مانع من كونه معقولاً بل يكون في نفسه صالحاً
ليس يحتاج إلى عمل يعمل به يعدّه لأن يعقله ما من شأنه أن يعقله ¹³	لا يحتاج إلى عمل نعمل بها حتى تصير معقولة فإن لم تعقل كان ذلك من جهة العاقل الذي من شأنه أن يعقلها ¹⁴	لا يحتاج إلى عمل يعمل به حتى يصير معقولاً فإن لم يعقل كان كذلك من جهة القوة العاقل ¹⁵	فماهيته لا تحتاج إلى عمل يعمل بها حتى تصير معقولة فإن لم تعقل كان ذلك من جهة العاقل ¹⁶
			لأن يعقل من غير احتياج إلى عمل يعمل به حتى يصير معقولاً فإن لم يعقل كان ذلك من جهة العاقل

Roughly 450 years divides Ibn Sīnā and Khojazāda, yet this argument survived almost to the letter. It is textual evidence of the continuity (or, perhaps, reiteration) of the philosophical discourse within the Islamic civilization in the later medieval period, and the impact the corpus of Ibn Sīnā had on Kalām. We may also note that Bayḍāwī's and Iṣfahānī's text had a formative influence on later theologians, and that Taftāzānī's text on the other hand seems to be informed by Ibn Sīnā's original text.

Much of the rest of the argument, and also parts of the objections, also relies on Ibn Sīnā's *Ishārāt*, together with Rāzī's commentary on it (the other famous commentary, by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, seems to have played no role for the two Ottoman scholars). In the third chapter (on the soul), we find remark 19 stating many of the same arguments that we can find in the two Ottoman texts. First Ibn Sīnā argues that every intellectual apprehender must also intellectually apprehend himself, and is therefore an intelligible. Then, because of the possibility that two intelligibles can be intellectually apprehended together, an intelligible can be an intellectual apprehender if it has self-subsistent existence. If we compare 'Alā' al-Dīn's text with Rāzī's commentary, then it seems that 'Alā' al-Dīn relied on Rāzī's text. Two small excerpts will suffice to show this:

<i>Sharḥ al-Ishārāt</i>	<i>al-Dhakhīrah</i>
اما أن يتوقف على حصولها في الجوهر العاقل أو لا يتوقف	اما أن يكون مشروطاً بحصول المحرّد في العقل أو لا يكون

¹³ Ibn Sīnā, *Dunyā, Ishārāt*, v. 2, p. 346-347 [= namaṭ 3, faṣl 8].

¹⁴ Iṣfahānī, Maḥmūd ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān, *Maṭālī' al-Anzār 'alā Ṭawālī' al-Anwār*, Istanbul: (1305/1887-88), pp. 355-356.

¹⁵ Taftāzānī, Sa'd al-Dīn, *Sharḥ al-Maqāsid*, 5 vol., Bayrūt: 'Ālam al-Kutub (1989), v. 4, p. 114.

¹⁶ Ījī, Jurjānī, *Kitāb al-Mawāqif*, 3 vol., Bayrūt: Dār al-Jīl (1997), v. 2, p. 695.

...	...
وَحَقِيقَةُ الْبَارِي تَعَالَى غَيْرَ مَعْقُولَةٍ لِلْبَشَرِ وَكَذَلِكَ حَقَائِقُ المفارقات وحقائق القوى البسيطة الفعالة والمنفعلة غير مَعْقُولَةٍ لَنَا ¹⁷	لا يمكن للبشر معرفة حقيقة الباري عزّ شأنه مع أنّها مجردة وكذا حقيقة العقول والنفوس وسائر القوى * الفعالة والمنفعلة كما اعترفوا به عندهم غير معقولة

In the first sentence, we notice that ‘Alā’ al-Dīn changed *yatawaqqafa* into *yakūna mashrūṭ^{an} bi-*, and this conveys the same meaning. The same is the case when Rāzī writes *al-jawhar al-‘āqil* while ‘Alā’ al-Dīn writes simply *al-‘aql*. In the second sentence we notice the same happening. Sometimes ‘Alā’ al-Dīn expands on Rāzī’s text, sometimes he contracts it, sometimes he shuffles the word order; in the end his reliance on Rāzī is undeniable.

Objections to the argument

Throughout these three chapters, the standard format for our Ottoman scholars is first to present the philosophical argument as faithfully as possible and then to propose a critique of it in a systematic way. Although many different points of critique can be distinguished (both authors propose seven objections, though not all the same as the other and not argued for in exactly the same way), we can categorize them into four issues.

Matter as an impediment

The first is concerned with the part which reasons that an immaterial object is an intelligible. The argument assumed an intensional identity, but Khojazāda and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, following Ghazālī, argue that it is not obvious that this is the case. They propose that it is not clear why there is no other impediment than matter, and further note that the philosophers did not propose an argument to back up their claim that matter is the only impediment for a thing to be an intelligible. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn backs this claim up by an example. For even though God and the intellects are immaterial, His essence (*ḥaqīqah*) is unknown to us, which would seem to imply that God’s essence is not an intelligible. This example shows that not all immaterial things are intelligibles. As we saw before, he took this example from Rāzī.

Two intelligibles apprehended together

Next, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn argues that not every intelligible can be intellectually apprehended together with another. This is an objection that Khojazāda does not include in his treatise. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn admits that ‘with another’ (*ma‘a ghayrihi*) can be interpreted in two ways; either it can mean ‘with every other thing’ (*jamī‘ mā ‘adāhu*), or it can mean ‘one of many’ (*al-ghayr fī al-jumlah*).

¹⁷ Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v. 2, pp. 299-300.

The last case is admittedly true, as 'Alā' al-Dīn already pointed out some examples of intelligibles which can be intellectually apprehended together with another intelligible. However this is not the objective of the argument. The objective is the establishment of God's knowledge of all things, not just some of them, and for this one needs to prove that such a connection between any two intelligibles is possible. For this argument tries to identify the propositional subject-predicate relationship with a quasi-substantive locus-adherent relationship, so if not all intelligibles can be related propositionally, then they cannot all be related quasi-substantively if one of them is self-subsistent. 'Alā' al-Dīn's objection boils down to the counter-argument that such a general possibility is not proven from merely some examples. It could be that some intelligibles are incompatible (*tanāf*) with one another and can therefore not be intellectually apprehended together. This one can only find out by going through all the possibilities, something that has not been done.

Connection in general and connection in the external world

Being the major premise of the first proof, the argument that if a connection is possible in the mind, it must be possible in general and therefore also possible in the external world, is the argument that receives the most attention from the Ottoman scholars. 'Alā' al-Dīn argues that the argument that a connection in the intellect implies that such a connection can be possible in general is not valid. He thereby tries to criticize the first part of the argument, the step from possibility in the mind to possibility in general. Khojazāda argues that from the lack of dependence of 'a connection taken absolutely' on 'a connection in an intellect' it does not follow that a connection will occur if one of them has external existence. For its mental existence is a condition for the suitability of the connection, and mental and external existence differ. He thereby emphasizes the second part of the argument, the step from possibility in general to possibility in the external world.

For 'Alā' al-Dīn, saying that a connection in the intellect implies that such a connection can be possible in general is turning everything around by saying that something is only due to a condition 'possible', while it would be 'necessary' or 'impossible' if considered in itself.¹⁸ A normal way of speaking would argue that something is 'possible' in itself, only becoming 'necessary' or 'impossible' by a condition. The argumentation is dense here, and the meaning obfuscated. It seems that 'Alā' al-Dīn is saying that the connection between two intelligibles

¹⁸ 'Alā' al-Dīn uses 'possibility' (*imkān*) here whereas Khojazāda uses 'correctness' (*ṣiḥḥah*). 'Alā' al-Dīn therefore can make use of the technical sense of *imkān* as one of the three categories of being. He indeed uses 'necessary' (*wājib*) and 'impossible' (*mumtani'*). Khojazāda does not use these terms in this passage.

cannot be conditionally possible - being necessary or impossible in itself – but has to be possible in itself, only conditionally necessary.

Although this may seem to be an objection to the argument under discussion, it is in fact not convincing. For according to the way 'Alā' al-Dīn reasons, one is still committed to say that the connection is possible in general, becoming necessary under the condition of both intelligibles being in the intellect. At this point of the argumentation, it is not essential to establish that the connection is in general necessary; a sufficient result is that the connection is in general possible.

The argument has more force when 'Alā' al-Dīn continues to describe the different types of connection (drawing from Rāzī's *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*), something which Khojāzāda does too. Here it is argued that a connection can either be:

1. Between two states, both in the same locus
2. Between a locus and something inhering in it
3. Between something inhering and the locus in which it is in

The original argument was that if a connection is possible in the mind, it must be possible in general. But now with the classification of connections, we can see that this possibility 'in general' does not have a clear meaning. It is something beyond the classification, comprising all three of them. It is as though there are three different modes of connection: in itself (which consists of all three types of connection),¹⁹ in mental existence (which is the first type), and in external existence (the second and third type). If one accepts such a tripartite division, it immediately follows that if a connection is possible in itself, necessary in mental existence, this does not imply anything at all for its external existence. Therefore, the objection the Ottoman scholars raise here is that each type of connection is distinctly different from the others, and is therefore able to serve as a condition for the other. No circular argument has to occur if we make the first type a condition for the second or third type of connection, that is to say, the connection between two intelligibles can be conditioned on the intelligibles having mental existence.

As Khojāzāda puts it, that mental existence of the intelligibles is a condition for the connection between them cannot be understood as a condition for all immaterial things in relation to an

¹⁹ A technical term for this would be *nafs al-amr*. Khojāzāda does not use this term here, but does use it in an objection to the second proof of the first chapter. A similar term is *ḥadd dhātihi*. This term is not used by Khojāzāda, but is frequently employed by 'Alā' al-Dīn.

immaterial, self-subsisting thing. Rather, the meaning is that the connection taken absolutely – between two intelligibles in an intellect – is conditioned on the mental existence of both of them in the intellect. So in considering the connection between two intelligibles in an intellect, there is no argument for a connection between an intelligible and the intellectual apprehender. Here it is also the difference between external and mental existence that is at stake. Khojazāda's explanation of the division between mental and external existence is that external (*khārīj^{an}*) existence, also called 'individual/concrete' (*'aynī^{an}*) or 'foundational' (*aṣīl^{an}*), is that mode of existence which includes effects (*āthār*) and of which one can make evaluations (*aḥkām*). The mode of existence which does not have such effects and of which one cannot make such evaluations is called mental (*dhihnī^{an}*), 'obscure' (*zillī^{an}*) or 'non-foundational' (*ghayr aṣīl^{an}*). These modes are not congruous, that is, if something is necessarily happening in the one, it does not have to happen in the other. A simple example of this is fire: in the external world it burns everything it touches, but if we think about fire, it does not set our mind on fire. In the case of this passage it is the other way around. A connection that happens in our mind does not mean it has to happen in the external world.

Khojazāda also proposes an absurd effect if the argumentation of the initial proof is accepted, to substantiate his claim. It would in that case follow that a substance (i.e. self-subsistent thing) would become an accident (i.e. a non-self-subsistent thing). This is because if we think the quiddity of a substance, we know this means its quiddity is acquired in the intellect. So the mental existence of this thing is dependent on the mind, as it is in it as something inhering is in a locus. Now if we say (following the opponents' reasoning) that it cannot be the case that its mental existence is a condition for its existence in the intellect (because its mental existence is exactly its existence in the intellect), then one would have to agree that the quiddity itself (*muṭlaq^{an}*) is acquired in the intellect, which would mean that the externally existing substance is imprinted (as something inhering) in a locus. This means, while it first was self-subsistent, it now depends on the locus (i.e. the intellect) and would therefore be changed from substantial to accidental.

As a closing remark on this objection, Khojazāda comments on the relation between 'a permissibility of a connection in general' and 'a permissibility of a connection in the intellect'. Even if the latter is not held to be a condition for the former, one can still consider them to be equally happening. As an analogy Khojazāda reminds the reader of the relation between cause and effect; even though the former is not dependent on the latter, if the former is present, so is

the latter. Their presence is simultaneous, and likewise are the possibilities for a connection (in general or in the intellect) simultaneous.

A solution from Ibn Sīnā

Khojazāda offers a solution to the aforementioned objection, which he relates back to Ibn Sīnā.²⁰ This is to consider when the disposition (*isti'dād*) of the connection to another intelligible occurs to an intelligible. If this disposition is inherent in the quiddity of an intelligible, there is no issue at all and a connection may occur at all times. But if we say that this disposition is only there when the quiddity occurs in an intellectual apprehender, that is, if it has to rely on mental existence, three scenarios may occur. The disposition could be *with* the connection, that is, occurring to the intelligible at the same time as that intelligible is connected to another intelligible. This is obviously impossible, since the disposition of an event always has to be prior to the happening of that event. The disposition could also be *after* the connection, but this is again impossible for the same reason. A last possibility is of course that the disposition is *before* the connection. As it turns out, it then has to occur always to that intelligible, since an immaterial thing is not subject to change. Any intelligible is therefore always disposed to connect to another intelligible, regardless whether it has mental existence or not.

Khojazāda offers two objections to this solution. First, he argues that an immaterial thing is not completely devoid of predications, for mental existence is predicated to it. So this mental existence can still serve as a condition for the disposition of the connection. Second, and more importantly, this argument relies on the definition of knowledge as the occurrence (*ḥuṣūl*) of the form in the intellectual apprehender. This definition is refuted by most philosophers except for Ibn Sīnā, Khojazāda claims. This last claim is repeated by 'Alā' al-Dīn (though he does not explicitly relate it to Ibn Sīnā). He argues that there is no reason to assume that the occurrence is reason enough to admit intellection to the immaterial self-subsisting thing. The connection could also be merely one of the conditions, and the act of intellection could still be absent if the other conditions (whatever they may be) are not fulfilled.

²⁰ He refers to him as *al-shaykh*, but from Khojazāda's later remark that he read this in *Kitāb al-Ishārāt* it is obvious that he has Ibn Sīnā in mind.

Second proof: from being a cause

The argument

The second proof for God's knowledge is established within the same discourse as the first proof. That is, it again relies on the notion of knowledge as intellection and the notions of intellect, intellectual apprehender and intelligible (ʿaql, ʿāqil, maʿqūl). However, it is in stark contrast with the first proof in terms of the argumentation the two Ottoman scholars give, which is in this case only very brief. Khojazāda's initial argument is based on God's self-knowledge,²¹ and from there continues to argue that "His essence is a cause for everything else, and knowledge of the cause implies knowledge of the effect. So He knows other things which are effects [of Him]." ʿAlā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī states the argument in a very compact way: "Were God to know of Himself, He would know all others as we have mentioned. But He is knowing of Himself, so He is knowing of what we have mentioned."

How they explain the argument

This proof is a good example how Khojazāda and ʿAlā' al-Dīn differ. Whereas Khojazāda emphasizes on the philosophical correctness of the argument, going in great detail to explain the argument (although not so much in his own words as we will see shortly), ʿAlā' al-Dīn devotes more effort to the composition of the argument. In the introducing argumentation ʿAlā' al-Dīn only wants to put the simplest form of the syllogism. Only afterwards does he explain its components with two remarks. The first remark simply states that God is the cause for all other things and knowledge of the cause makes knowledge of the effect necessary (explaining the second part of the argument). The second is that the explanation of God's self-knowledge is under investigation in the next chapter.

In both cases Khojazāda makes more effort to explain the matter. He first of all decides to include the explanation of God's self-knowledge in this chapter, instead of postponing it to the next chapter (although we will postpone its full discussion until the next chapter). For the other part of the argument he proposes a slightly different wording than ʿAlā' al-Dīn. As just mentioned, ʿAlā' al-Dīn merely states that 'God is the cause'. Khojazāda however points out that it is the 'essence' (*dhāt*) of God that is the cause. He clarifies this by arguing that because God knows Himself, He knows that His essence is a principle (*mabda'*) of other things. But this in

²¹ Because ʿAlā' al-Dīn postponed the argument and its discussion to the next chapter, we will do likewise with Khojazāda. We will there also follow a nuance in the definition of knowledge which sets this argumentation in stark contrast with the previous one. Here we will focus on the part of the argument that discusses God's knowledge of other things.

turn must imply knowledge of the effect, as one cannot know that something is a principle if one does not know what it is the principle of (a thing cannot only be a 'mabda' but is always a 'mabda' li'). Being a principle entails a relation with what it is a principle of, and knowledge about it requires knowledge of both related things. Because everything is causally related to Him, He knows everything, not just the first effect.

Furthermore, where 'Alā' al-Dīn uses the verb *yastalzimu* to indicate the relation between knowledge of the cause and knowledge of the effect, Khojazāda uses *yūjibu*.²² As we will see in the paragraph on the objections, Khojazāda makes a conceptual difference between *yastalzimu* and *yūjibu*. In this light 'Alā' al-Dīn's choice is unfortunate, as he probably meant by it that knowledge of the cause *necessitates* knowledge of the effect, while from the usage of this verb it seems like it says that knowledge of the cause *requires* knowledge of the effect.

Origins of the argument

Ibn Sīnā

As with the previous argument, we can find this argument in the *Ishārāt* of Ibn Sīnā, and the commentary tradition on it. Chapter 7, remark 15 runs:

“The Necessary of Existence must intellectually apprehend Himself by reason of His essence, as has already been established. He intellectually apprehends what is after Him inasmuch as He is a cause of what comes after Him, [and] owes its existence to Him. He intellectually apprehends all the other things in as much as they are necessitated in the chain of the descending arrangement from Him, [both] vertically (*ṭawl^{an}*) and horizontally (*‘arḍ^{an}*).”²³

As reflected in the translation, this remark consists of three parts. First, God knows Himself, which is something we will discuss in the next chapter. The next point Ibn Sīnā makes is a very compact argument for God's knowledge of other things. All Ibn Sīnā says is that God knows them in as much as He is a cause of them. The second part of this sentence is obscure in Arabic as it reads “... من حيث هو علّة لما بعده منه وجوده” The *-hu* affixed to the *min* refers here to God while the *-hu* affixed to *wujūd* refers here to the effect (of which God is a cause).

²² He follows Ījī and Jurjānī here, see the next paragraph on the origins of this argumentation. Rāzī, Ṭūsī, Iṣfahānī and Quṭb al-Dīn use *yaqtaḍī*. Cf. Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v. 2, p. 535; Ibn Sīnā, *Dunyā, Ishārāt*, v. 3, p. 709; Rāzī, Quṭb al-Dīn, *al-Ilāhīyāt min al-Muḥākamāt*, p. 392.

²³ Ibn Sīnā, *Dunyā, Ishārāt*, v. 3, p. 709 [= namaṭ 7, faṣl 15].

The third comment made in this remark puts the whole line of reasoning under pressure. Here Ibn Sīnā is talking about “all the other things” (*sā'ir al-ashyā'*), but it is not clear how this is supposed to be understood. It could refer to all things except for God (taking ‘other’ to refer to God), or it could refer to all things other than the ones described in the second comment (taking ‘other’ to refer to the effects alluded to in the second comment). Rāzī and Ṭūsī (in their commentaries on the *Ishārāt*) are clear about it; the second comment only refers to one effect. This is the First Effect, for in the supralunar world there is the rule of “one only bestows one.”²⁴ The “all the other things” are everything what comes after this first effect.

Note the difference in argumentation between comment two and three. In two, Ibn Sīnā argued for a relation between cause and effect in terms of existence; in three, however, we see that the argument proceeds along the same line although the words ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ are not mentioned. Instead, the necessity of the things (*wujūbuhā*) instead of their existence is at stake, which Ibn Sīnā relates to God by a chain (*silsilah*). This is something Ibn Sīnā discusses in his ontological part in Chapter 4, where in remarks 11 to 15 he discusses the necessity of a self-subsistent cause outside the chain of events.

Lastly, we may note the terms ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’. They seem to play a role as technical terms and even though later philosophers picked it up and incorporated it in their explanation,²⁵ it is completely missing in the treatises of our two Ottoman scholars.²⁶

Ījī and Jurjānī

As noted before, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī is less revealing in terms of his sources than Khojazāda is. But as his treatment is close to Khojazāda’s, we can be quite sure that whatever applies to Khojazāda, will probably apply to Ṭūsī. For this second proof of God’s knowledge, Khojazāda seems to have made explicit use of the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* by al-Sayyid al-Sharīf (and, by extension, Ījī) and the *Muḥākamāt bayna sharḥay al-Ishārāt* by Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī. This dependence becomes clear when one compares the texts.

²⁴ Compare for example remark 11 from chapter 5 (that one cause can only originate one effect) with remark 39 from chapter 6 (its application to God, the One Necessary of Existence). Ibn Sīnā, *Dunyā, Ishārāt*, v. 3, pp. 527-531 and v. 3, pp. 645-657.

²⁵ E.g. the three commentators Rāzī, Ṭūsī and Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī, but also e.g. Āmidī, Mahdī, *Abkār al-Afkār*, v. 1, p. 325.

²⁶ It is also missing in e.g. Ījī’s *Mawāqif* and Taftazānī’s *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid*.

Sharḥ al-Mawāqif

(المسلك الثاني إنه تعالى يعقل ذاته وإذا عقل ذاته عقل ما
 عداه أما الأول فلأن التعقل * حضور الماهية المجردة) عن
 العلائق المادية (للشيء المجرد) القائم بذاته (وهو حاصل في
 شأنه) لأن ذاته مجردة غير غائبة عن ذاته فيكون عالماً
 بذاته (وأما الثاني فلأن مبدأ لما سواه) أي لجميعه إما
 بواسطة أو بدونها (والعلم بالعلّة يوجب العلم بالمعلول)
 فيكون عالماً بذاته وجميع معلولاته²⁷

Tahāfut al-Falāsifah

المسلك الثاني أنه تعالى مجرد قائم بذاته لما سبق وكل مجرد
 قائم بذاته فإن ذاته المجردة القائمة بذاته حاضرة له غير
 غائبة عنه وكل ما كان ذاته المجردة القائمة بذاته حاضرة له
 لا بد أن يعقل ذاته لأن التعقل ليس إلا حضور الماهية
 المجردة للأمر المجرد القائم بذاته فثبت أنه تعالى لا بد أن
 يعقل ذاته وذاته علّة لما عداه والعلم بالعلّة يوجب العلم
 بالمعلول فيكون عالماً بغيره من المعلولات

It is obvious that all Khojazāda did was change the order of the argumentation as to be more complete at first, instead of giving the small argumentation first and then expanding on its components as Ījī and Jurjānī do (this last style is similar to ‘Alā’ al-Dīn). Besides this rearrangement Khojazāda did not change that much. Instead of saying ‘*aql*’ he uses *mujarrad bi-dhātihi*, and instead of *shay’* he uses *amr*: both are synonymous in this context. Both texts remind us of a very similar passage in Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī (ten years younger than Ījī) which may also have been a source (as some of the overlap between Khojazāda and Quṭb al-Dīn cannot be found in Ījī and Jurjānī). Here we find the argument (correspondence with Khojazāda’s text in bold):

muḥākamāt bayna sharḥay al-ishārāt

الله تعالى عالم بذاته وذاته علّة لجميع الأشياء والعلّة يوجب العلم بالمعلول فيكون الله تعالى عالم بجميع الأشياء²⁸

The parts that are not bold are still quite close to Khojazāda’s text. Instead of ‘*ālim bi-dhātihi*’ Khojazāda uses *lā budda an ya’qila dhātahu*; instead of *li-jamī’ al-ashyā’* he uses *li-mā ‘adāhu*; and (again) instead of *bi-jamī’ al-ashyā’* he uses *bi-ghayrihi min al-ma’lūlāt*. All of these changes do not change the meaning of the sentence.

Āmidī

On the question whether Sayf al-Dīn Āmidī was read by our two Ottoman scholars we must conclude that this is unlikely. No arguments unique to Āmidī’s treatment of the topic are presented by the two Ottoman scholars, and it is only in this place of the treatises that textual

²⁷ Ījī/Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, v. 3, p. 102.

²⁸ Rāzī, Quṭb al-Dīn, *al-Ilāhīyāt min al-Muḥākamāt*, p. 392.

correspondence can be established. This correspondence is in the presentation of Khojazāda's alternative argument.

<i>abkār al-afkār</i>	<i>Tahāfut al-Falāsifah</i>
إذا علم ذاته وذاته مبدأ لما وجوده بوجوده بالذات	إذا علم ذاته وذاته مبدأ لغيره فلا بدّ وأن يعلم أنّ ذاته
فيجب أن يكون عالماً بأنّ ذاته مبدأ لغيره ومتى علم أنّ	مبدأ لغيره ومتى علم أنّ ذاته مبدأ لغيره فلا بدّ وأن يعلم
ذاته مبدأ لغيره فلا بدّ وأن يكون عالماً بذلك الغير لأنّ	غيره لأنّ العلم بإضافة أمر إلى آخر يستلزم العلم بكلّ
العلم بكونه مبدأ لذلك الغير علم بمعنى إضافي بين ذاته وما	واحد من المضافين
وجب عنه ولا تحقّق لذلك دون العلم بالمضافين ²⁹	

The first group of words where Khojazāda deviates is a simplification of Āmidī's "His essence is a principle for what receives essentially its existence from His existence"³⁰ into "His essence is a principle for what is other than Him". The second group of words that is different is again a simplification. Āmidī first explains that the type of knowledge under discussion is a kind of relationship and specifies the related items. Khojazāda simply assumes the reader knows that a relationship is implied and only offers the well-known principle that knowing the two related items is implied in knowing the relationship. Textual correspondence between these two authors can therefore not be denied. But since Āmidī's text does not reappear in others parts of Khojazāda's or 'Alā' al-Dīn's text, it could very well point to a mediate source which drew from Āmidī on which Khojazāda in turn drew this passage.

An argument not used

An example of a passage in Āmidī's text which, by any expectations, should have appeared in the Ottoman treatises is a citation and paraphrase of the position Ibn Sīnā takes in his *Shifā'*.³¹ A translation and treatment of it was already done previously,³² and so we will not go over it again. What is noteworthy is that it is undoubtedly one of the most pristine passages of Ibn Sīnā on the subject. That Khojazāda and 'Alā' al-Dīn do not use it goes to show that they most likely did not read Ibn Sīnā's *Shifā'* and it reaffirms our previous assertion that they did not read Āmidī's *Abkār al-Afkār*.³³

²⁹ Āmidī, Mahdī, *Abkār al-Afkār*, v. 1, p. 325.

³⁰ Āmidī is possibly referring back to Ibn Sīnā's phrase "inasmuch as He is a cause of what comes after Him, [and] owes its existence to Him", see above.

³¹ Compare Āmidī, Mahdī, *Abkār al-Afkār*, v. 1, p. 325; Ibn Sīnā, Marmura, *Shifā'*, p. 285 [Bk. 8, Ch. 6, Pr. 7-8]

³² See page 39 of this thesis.

³³ Besides this, Āmidī's text includes a lot of the older debate (referred to in p. 7, fn. 9) and is therefore more properly part of a discourse together with for example Shahrastānī's *Nihāyah al-Iqdām fī 'ilm al-*

Objections to the argument

Khojazāda

Khojazāda gives three main objections of which the first two are concerned with God's self-knowledge (which we do not deal with here and which are therefore postponed to the next chapter, second proof). The third objection deals with the statement that knowledge of the cause necessitates knowledge of the effect. He distinguishes three interpretations of this statement, all of which are insufficient to validate it.

The first interpretation is given as follows:

“If it means that the knowledge of the cause (under the aspect as a specified essence (*dhātahā al-makhṣūṣah*) necessitates (*yūjibu*) the knowledge of the effect – as is obvious [i.e. used] in the first proof – : [we do not accept this, for] no proof for it has been provided.”³⁴

The second interpretation is:

“If it means that the knowledge of the cause (under the aspect of being a principle (*mabda'*) and cause (*'illah*) for the effect), is a necessitator (*mūjib*) of knowledge of the effect: [we do not accept this, for] that is without doubt invalid. Because knowledge of its being a principle of the effect is dependent (*mawqūf*) on the knowledge of the effect ([because of the] necessity of the dependency of the comprehension of the relation on the comprehension of the two related terms), so it is impossible that it [i.e. knowledge of being a principle] is a necessitator of it [i.e. knowledge of the effect].”³⁵

The third interpretation and subsequent invalidation is:

“If it means that the knowledge of the cause (under the aspect that it is a cause for the effect) is a requirement (*mustalzim*) for knowledge of the effect, while not being a necessitator of it – like it is used in the second proof – : [we can say] against the opponent that the thing that is the principle cannot know itself under the aspect of being a cause of the effect. For if principality and causality are a relational affair, and if

Kalām. In comparison with later texts (e.g. Ījī's *Mawāqif*) there is definitely an evolution from a 'theological' discussion to a 'philosophical' discussion.

³⁴ This can be found almost verbatim in Rāzī, *Quṭb al-Dīn, al-Ilāhīyāt min al-Muḥākamāt*, 392 and Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v. 2, p. 535; a textual comparison will not be given here, but the textual correspondence is similar to passages which are compared in full in this chapter.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

there is no doubt that it is different from the specific essence itself, then why do you say that undoubtedly its intellection of that relational affair is such that it implies that it is intellectually apprehending the other thing of the effect? Undoubtedly, they³⁶ need to provide proof for that.”

He relates and tries to discard a possible objection his philosophical opponents could raise. This contention consists of two points. First, it points to the correlation between knowledge of a thing and the reality of a thing. In this sense, if we know that a specific thing causes another specific thing, and we also know that the specific thing that is the cause is realized in the external world, we must also know the effect. Causality is thus conceived of as something that must hold equally between the knowledge and the reality of a specific thing. Second, it argues that for something to be intelligible means to be present (*hādir*) to the intellectual apprehender. If so, ‘being a principle’ must be present to God, as He is attributed with it. Piecing the two points made together, by knowing that He is a principle of other things, God knows these other things.

Khojazāda argues against both points. The first point is denied with the straightforward remark that such a correlation need not to exist. Although the causality between the individual external cause (*‘ayn al-‘illah al-khārijīyah*) and the individual external effect is not denied, there is no decisive proof for applying this causal relation to the forms of these two individual things. This of course depends on the difference between the modes of external and mental existence.

The second point is countered by pointing out that all real attributes of God are present to Him, but ‘being a principal’ is merely a conceptual attribute. “The attribution of an attribute to something does not constitute the attribute, neither externally nor mentally.³⁷ So it does not follow that it [i.e. the attributed attribute] is intelligible for Him,” Khojazāda argues.

‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī

‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s objections have little to do with Khojazāda’s objections. He lists two main objections, the second of which he expands into a discussion. The first objection relates to the third chapter, where we will find similar arguments. However, it is useful to see ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s mentioning it here. His objection is a perceived inconsistency between the objects which would have to be included in the knowledge of God if one accepts this argument from causation,

³⁶ It would have more sense if Khojazāda had used ‘you’ (*la-kum*) but instead he uses ‘they’ (*la-hum*).

³⁷ ‘Externally’ relates to the real attributes, ‘mentally’ relates to other things which are conceived by acquiring their form in the intellect. Khojazāda excludes both options for a conceptual attribution.

and the objects which are commonly excluded from God's knowledge. It may be known that it is particular things that are commonly excluded from God's knowledge (further discussed in the third discussion), but the argument makes use of the effects of God's causality, and the chain of causality is made up of particulars. In the same spirit it is usual to attribute universal objects to God's knowledge, but universals "do not have external existence such that they are an effect", 'Alā' al-Dīn explains. The argument from causation thus would mean that God would have knowledge of all particulars, but without any knowledge of universals. This is in contrast with what is usually argued for: God has knowledge of all universals and does not have knowledge of particulars (argued for by use of the first proof).

Interestingly, Ījī and Jurjānī discuss a similar point but they do think that the philosophers argue for universal knowledge in this proof. They argue that since an essence is a universal, it will not produce any particulars (*taqyīd al-kullīy bi-al-kullīy lā yufīdu al-juz'īyah*)³⁸ and therefore the knowledge of God only applies to universals. 'Alā' al-Dīn therefore did not take this from the *Mawāqif*. It could be that he is mixing up the argumentation of the theologians with the philosophers, as the theologians have a very similar argument. The difference is that the theologians make use of God being *qādir mukhtār*³⁹ ('powerful and choosing') which the philosophers do not accept for it would for example imply the temporality of the universe.

His second objection goes into an issue which was also under attack by Khojazāda. This is the use in the proof of the argument that 'knowledge of the cause implies knowledge of the effect'. But in contrast to Khojazāda, 'Alā' al-Dīn does not take issue with the validity of the claim but with its consequences. For according to him, the assertion that 'knowledge of the cause implies knowledge of the effect' would imply that from the knowledge of one thing, one would know all its effects and by extension all effects of those effects and so forth, which goes against the normal usage of the concept of knowledge.

This objection might have been inspired by Ghazālī's text, though textual evidence is lacking. We could at least see 'Alā' al-Dīn's argument as a formalization of Ghazālī's example of the stone rolled off the hill. Ghazālī explains that although a stone can be rolled from the top of a

³⁸ Ījī, Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, v. 3, p. 104.

³⁹ E.g. mentioned by 'Alā' al-Dīn in the introduction to this (11th) chapter. Also in e.g. Ījī, Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, v. 3, pp. 101-102. The particular term was apparently not in use in the time of Ghazālī who settles on the simpler 'volition' (*irādah*), Ghazālī, Marmura, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, p. 125. Perhaps the confusion was instigated by earlier theologians, e.g. Rāzī who uses the highly ambiguous *fā'il* ('actor') as already implying knowledge of particulars (the discussion is of course exactly what it means to be an 'actor', for a stone will naturally fall to the ground but clearly does not know about his own behaviour), Rāzī, *Ma'ālim fī Uṣūl al-Dīn*, p. 34.

hill (i.e. the effect) by someone (i.e. the cause) with full consciousness and knowledge (that is, having knowledge of the effect), the effects of the rolling stone (e.g. crashing into another stone and thereby breaking it) cannot reasonably be foreseen.⁴⁰

Continuing with 'Alā' al-Dīn's text, he relates that it could be replied that what is at stake here is not knowledge in its normal usage, but complete knowledge (*al-ilm al-tāmm*) of the cause, which necessitates⁴¹ knowledge of the effect. This 'complete knowledge' means knowledge of the essence of the cause together with all of his attributes which together form the causality.⁴² From here one can use the argument from relationship again, which states that knowledge of a relationship needs knowledge of both related terms. So if one needs to have knowledge of causality, it needs knowledge of both the cause and caused.

To this 'Alā' al-Dīn observes that knowledge of a relationship such as causality also relies on knowledge of the cause, which in the case of God entails self-knowledge. He relates that it is not self-evident why God's knowledge of Himself should be complete. As this is properly discussed in the second chapter, he closes the discussion of the second proof. For him, this also means the coming to a close of the first chapter, so this last remark on God's self-knowledge also works to open the way to the proper discussion of God's self-knowledge.

Third proof: from nobility

The third proof uses an argument from nobility. It is important to note that 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī does not use it in this chapter. However, he does use it in the second and third chapter. Even though the application of the argument in the second chapter is explicitly towards God's self-knowledge, 'Alā' al-Dīn himself admits that it is likewise an argument for knowledge of other things. Khojazāda does explain and discusses it in this first chapter (but leaves it out in the second chapter, only to reappear in the third chapter). The difference between the two Ottoman scholars may be partly due to Ghazālī's ambivalence in his *Tahāfut*. In chapter 11 (the first chapter on God's knowledge) he first states that there are two proofs for God's knowledge (namely the two arguments we previously discussed) but then adds this third argument from nobility at the end of the chapter. As Ghazālī comes back to this argument in both of the other two chapters, it is clear that this proof is in fact an important part of the discussion and cannot

⁴⁰ Ghazālī, *Tahāfut*, p. 129.

⁴¹ Here 'Alā' al-Dīn does use *yūjibu*, in contrast to his earlier *yastalzimu*.

⁴² A similar view was held by Ghazālī, which is refuted by Khojazāda who claims it is not the perfect knowledge of the cause, but knowledge of the complete cause (*al-illah al-tāmmah*). He thereby seems to relate it to the four causes, claiming that in the case of Ghazālī (and here, 'Alā' al-Dīn) only the effective cause is taken into account. See page 83 of this thesis.

be discarded out of hand.⁴³ Because the three proofs together form the basis on which the second and third chapters are written, and also because the proof from nobility does not pertain explicitly to God's self-knowledge, it is important to discuss it here. Therefore, 'Alā' al-Dīn's explanation and discussion of the argument in the second chapter will be discussed here (and left out in the following chapter).

The argument

Ghazālī

Ghazālī discusses the argument in an informal way. His argument *ad absurdum* comes out of his discussion of the second proof, which argued that because of God's self-knowledge, He knows all other things. Considering the number of things God should know, and considering that God only truly knows Himself, Ghazālī raises the objection that in that case other things would be nobler than God, since there would be things that know both themselves and other things. Drawing from an Aristotelian principle that the passive cannot be a cause of the active,⁴⁴ Ghazālī asks "how can the effect be nobler than the cause?" An answer he imagines is that one could say that knowledge is only needed by things in order to acquire perfection. As God does not need to acquire perfection but is already perfect in and of Himself, He does not need this knowledge, for otherwise His perfection would rely and depend on it (and indeed a similar argument is commonly used by philosophers when applied to other divine attributes such as sight and hearing). Ghazālī draws the (patently absurd) conclusion that by this reasoning God would not need to have any knowledge, neither of particulars nor of universals.

The two Ottoman scholars

Khojazāda and 'Alā' al-Dīn construct the argument differently. They first offer a proper proof in favour of God's knowledge using the argument from nobility, and subsequently discuss some issues with it. The argument consists of two parts. First it is argued that knowledge is an absolute perfection (*kamāl muṭlaq*) for existing things. Second it is argued that God already possesses all absolute perfections. The conclusion is that therefore God must have knowledge (in the case of Khojazāda, God has knowledge of things in general, for 'Alā' al-Dīn, God has knowledge of Himself and knowledge of others).

⁴³ From its structure one gets the impression that the discussion of the argument from nobility ought to be seen as part of the second proof.

⁴⁴ See e.g. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. 9, 1050b6 ff.

How they explain the argument

For the first part Khojazāda explains that an absolute perfection for existing things (inasmuch as they are existing things) means that it is not perfect in some regard and imperfect in some other regard, but that it is rather perfect in all regards. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn argues from a different angle, stating that “absence of knowledge is ignorance, and ignorance is a shortcoming (*naqīṣah*).” It thus seems that in this argument Khojazāda discusses the application of knowledge, while ‘Alā’ al-Dīn discusses the removal of knowledge. In other words, Khojazāda poses the question what knowledge or the attribution of knowledge is (in terms of nobility) for something or someone if we assume first that that thing or person does not have knowledge, while ‘Alā’ al-Dīn poses the question what knowledge or the absence of knowledge is (in terms of nobility) for something or someone if we assume first that that thing or person has knowledge.

This different conceptualization pours over in the second part of the argument. For Khojazāda, the argument made is that absolute perfection cannot constitute a cause for imperfection. Because of this, it is not impossible to have absolute perfection applied to God. To complete his case, he also adds that everything that is not impossible must be necessary when applied to God:

“For it is either necessary or possible by a specific possibility (*bi-l-ḥikmah al-khāṣṣah*⁴⁵). There is no means (*lā sabīl*) for the second option for were a thing possible for Him by a specific possibility, there would be an aspect of possibility in Him, necessitating multiplicity which is impossible for God's essence.”

‘Alā’ al-Dīn does not make this move, but merely states that a shortcoming “is impossible for God.” Apparently, for him this makes the argument already sufficient. His alternative argument is in the same line and might help to understand his first *ad absurdum* argument better. He states:

“Also, knowledge is a nobility and perfection and [therefore] knowing is nobler and more perfect than not knowing. For were God not knowing of Himself, while others than Him do know themselves, it would follow that some of His created beings are nobler and more perfect than Him; exalted be God from that!”

⁴⁵ See page 89 of this thesis.

Origins of the argument

As a concrete discussion of this argument is missing in Ījī's *Mawāqif* and in Ibn Sīnā's *Ishārāt*, and the texts of both Ottoman scholars show for this argument no citations of other texts, we must assume that much of what the scholars wrote on this topic relates directly back to Ghazālī.⁴⁶ To be sure, 'Alā' al-Dīn's exposition is close to Rāzī's treatment of it in, for example, his *Muḥaṣṣal*. Here we read that according to Rāzī "knowledge is a perfect attribute and ignorance is a defect (*nuqṣān*) and may God be elevated from a defect!"⁴⁷

Though Ibn Rushd is probably not a source for the Ottoman scholars, we may cite here his explanation of the argument from nobility as he puts it clearly, arguing for it from a Peripatetic point of view. Ibn Rushd explains:

"Since there is nothing superior to knowledge, it is not possible that that which does not possess knowledge should be superior to that which does, be it a principle or not. For since some of the principles possess knowledge, others not, it is not permissible that those which do not know should be superior to those that do, just as little as this is possible in regard to effects which do and do not possess knowledge. And the nobility of being a principle cannot surpass the nobility of knowledge, unless the nobility of a principle that does not possess knowledge could surpass the nobility of a principle that does. And the excellence of being a principle cannot surpass the excellence of knowledge. And therefore it is necessary that the principle which has the utmost nobility should possess the utmost excellence, which is knowledge."⁴⁸

Objections to the argument

Khojāzāda

As we have seen before, Khojāzāda raises points of discussion on this argumentation in a systematic, phrase-by-phrase fashion. His first issue is about what it means to say that 'knowledge is an absolute perfection for an existing thing' (*al-ʿilm kamāl muṭlaq li-l-mawjūd*). In the argument, he used 'absolute perfection' in the sense that it therefore cannot be perfect in one sense and imperfect in another. Here he takes issue with such a definition, claiming that

⁴⁶ Though the argument discussed here has of course a long history, see the chapter 'Some notes on omniscience'.

⁴⁷ Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn, *Kitāb muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-al-muta'akhhirīn min al-ʿulamā wa-al-hukamā' wa-al-mutakallimīn*, Cairo: al-Maṭba'ah al-Ḥusaynīyah al-Miṣrīyah (1323/1905), p. 120. This is repeated in e.g. his *Ma'ālim*, Rāzī, *Kitāb Muḥaṣṣal* (on the margins), p. 41; Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn, *Ma'ālim Uṣūl al-Dīn*, Cairo: Maṭābi' Āmūn (2000), p. 34; See also Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn, *Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn*, Ḥaydarābād: Maṭba'at Majlis Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif al-'Uthmānīyah (1354/1934-35), p. 136.

⁴⁸ Ibn Rushd, transl. S. van den Bergh, *Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut*, v. 1, p. 274.

'absolute', if used with 'perfection', must mean that 'perfection' should not be defined by using any reference to any aspect of the thing it is predicated of.

His two other objections pertain to the second part of the argument. On the one hand, he does not see how there cannot be an aspect of possibility to God, as long as this pertains to his accidents, not "in view of His existence itself." On the other hand, by extension, Khojazāda refuses to accept that a multiplicity would itself constitute an impossibility for God. If this multiplicity is conceptual, it is possible; it is only impossible with regard to God's actual essence. Similar argumentation can of course already be detected among philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā, who – as we saw earlier – on the one hand stresses the oneness of God, but on the other hand argues that God can be conceptually divided into intellect, intellectual apprehender, and intelligible.

‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī

‘Alā’ al-Dīn raises slightly different objections, due to his different presentation of the argument. Just like Khojazāda, he also takes issue with the definition of knowledge as a perfection. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn argues that absence of knowledge need not be ignorance, for absence of knowing something can itself constitute just as good an item of knowledge. He then compares the two modes of knowledge, by presence and by acquisition. He explains that with knowledge by presence (*al-‘ilm al-ḥuḍūrī*) one is not able to imagine the absence of knowledge of itself.⁴⁹ He does not, unfortunately, go further into detail about this point, but instead he merely states that if another type of knowledge would be accepted, the burden of proof does not lie with him, but is on his opponent (lit. 'you', 2nd pers. plur.) to prove that under such a concept of knowledge, absence of self-knowledge would constitute ignorance.

This is his response to the first argument that he cites. For the alternative argument, he considers the notions of 'nobility' and 'perfection' and proposes an argument *ad absurdum*. Here he remains very close to Ghazālī's text and puts forward the argument that were these notions to be taken on their own – that is, were God's knowledge noble in itself –, then God's perfection and nobility would rely on this aspect of 'having knowledge'. Just as attributes such as hearing and sight are held by philosophers to be inapplicable to God (because they would make His perfection dependent on them), so a similar argument must hold of knowledge. If one compares this with the description of Ghazālī's argument, one can see that both style and content are

⁴⁹ Although the argumentation is set out in the chapter on God's self-knowledge, I take the two *-hi's* in '*‘ilmīhi bi-dhātīhi*' to be referring to a more general knower, applicable to all things that are able to know under consideration of this concept of knowledge. Cf. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, p. 265, l. 12.

very similar. Perhaps surprisingly though, not a bit of textual correspondence can be found if one compares 'Alā' al-Dīn's and Ghazālī's texts. Even in cases where one might expect a similarity, such as the use of the same root and stem to convey certain meanings differs. For example, though both use the root *k-m-l* to convey a sense of 'achieving perfection', Ghazālī opts to use stem I while 'Alā' al-Dīn uses stem X. It also seems that where Ghazālī uses several synonyms, 'Alā' al-Dīn tends to stick with one term. An example of this is Ghazālī's use of *nuqṣān*, *nāqīṣah*, *muzlamah*, and *qāṣir*, (all meaning 'deficiency' or 'deficient') where 'Alā' al-Dīn only uses *nuqṣān*.

Khojzādā's critique of Ghazālī

After Khojzādā has concluded that the last two methods are proofs for God's knowledge of all things while the first proof does not prove this (but only proves knowledge of universals), he does not continue with the next chapter straight away, but includes an extensive analysis of Ghazālī's text. This is quite different from 'Alā' al-Dīn's text, in which we can only find implicit traces of Ghazālī's text, let alone an explicit assessment of it. As a detailed textual correspondence would be quite laborious (and with little value) to show in each case, the following table (together with a qualitative description) will suffice for those who want to compare the two texts. The table should be read as follows: in the left column are page and line numbers referring to the text appended to this thesis. In the middle column are page and line numbers referring to Marmura's edition and translation of Ghazālī's text. In the right column is indicated in bold whether it is an exact (or near exact) citation or whether it is a paraphrase. Also note that rows printed in italics are shorter citations referring back to Khojzādā's own text (he takes up small bits to criticize them).

Khojzādā	Ghazālī	Style; Subject of passage
10.5-9	126.1-8	Citation ; Explanation of first proof
10.10-11	126.13-14	Paraphrase ; one interpretation of 'aql
10.11-12	126.14-18	Paraphrase ; another interpretation of 'aql
10.13-14	126.19-20	Paraphrase ; matter as the only impediment
11.1	10.10	<i>Refers back to Khojzādā's previous citation</i>
11.1-2	10.10-11	<i>Refers back to Khojzādā's previous citation</i>
11.4	10.12 & 10.6	<i>Refers back to Khojzādā's previous citation</i>
11.7-8	10.7-8	<i>Refers back to Khojzādā's previous citation</i>
12.3-4	127.15-19	Paraphrase ; explanation of second proof
12.5	127.20	Citation ; There are two objections
12.6-7	128.1-5	Citation ; First objection, two types of causality
12.8-9	128.21-129.1	Citation ; Second objection, there is only one effect to God
12.9-12	129.2-7	Citation ; Example of the rock falling from the hill

13.3	12.7	<i>Refers back to Khojazāda's previous citation</i>
13.4	12.7	<i>Refers back to Khojazāda's previous citation</i>
13.9-10	12.8-10	Paraphrase; <i>Refers back to Khojazāda's previous citation</i>
13.13-14	12.10-11	<i>Refers back to Khojazāda's previous citation</i>

Cross-reference index of Khojazāda's passage on Ghazālī's chapter on God's knowledge

As can be read from the table, Khojazāda first renders the argumentation Ghazālī gives of the first proof (from 10.10 to 11.2). He then extracts some passages which he thinks are particularly open to criticism (from 11.3 to 12.7), and explains why he thinks they are problematic. Only then does he render the second proof as Ghazālī offers it (from 12.8 to 12.17), this time choosing to stay closer to Ghazālī's text than he did with the first proof. He then treats problematic passages one by one (from 13.1 to 14.5).

Critique of Ghazālī's discussion of the first proof

One of Ghazālī's objections is that if what is meant by 'intellect' is that it intellectually apprehends all things, than it becomes problematic to say that all immaterial things are intellects, for this would be the desired conclusion, and can therefore not be used as a premise. This objection relies on Ghazālī's comment that it is not clear why matter should be the only impediment to intellection. If it is indeed the only impediment, the argument holds true, but otherwise one cannot simply claim that all immaterial, self-subsisting things are intellects and therefore intellectually apprehend everything.⁵⁰

Khojazāda objects that this proposition is universal, while the desired result is particular, so an inconsistent relationship between the two statements would not be necessary for they work on different levels. Furthermore, both of the interpretations Ghazālī gives of 'aql' are not accepted by Khojazāda, who thinks that being an intellect is related to being an intelligible (namely, being a self-subsistent intelligible).

Next, Khojazāda criticizes Ghazālī's line that "whatever is a pure intellect has all intelligibles laid bare to it." Khojazāda says that the philosophers do not use this as a premise. They do not prove His knowledge of all things, but only His knowledge of something else (that is, at least one of all other things).

The third and final objection he makes to Ghazālī's discussion of the first proof is the notion put forward by Ghazālī that the philosophers argue that the human soul is devoid of knowledge of

⁵⁰ Khojazāda does not use Ibn Rushd's basic attack against Ghazālī's reasoning which is that "he [i.e. Ghazālī] regards the premises he mentions as first principles, whereas for the philosophers they are conclusions from many premises.", Ibn Rushd, Van den Bergh, *Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut*, v. 1, p. 260.

intelligibles because of its connection to a body. Ghazālī argued that “once [the human's] preoccupation [with the body] ceases with death, [the individual,] not having been tarnished by bodily appetites and base qualities that come to him from natural things, has the realities of all the intelligibles unveiled to him.”⁵¹ Possibly, Ghazālī got this idea from Ibn Sīnā's eschatology (*ma'ād*). For example, in the final chapters of his *Ishārāt*, remark fourteen of part eight reads:

“If the knowers and those who are above imperfection shed of themselves the pollution of the relation to the body and are released from preoccupation with the body, they will reach the world of saintliness and happiness, and the highest perfection will be engraved in them. They will achieve the highest pleasure about which you have already learned.”⁵²

From passages like this Ghazālī could very well have concluded that the general position of the philosophers is that the connection to a body stands in the way of a full comprehension of the intelligibles. In his response, Khojazāda argues that the philosophers do not think the body stands in the way of achieving perfections. In fact, the philosophers argue that:

“The soul acquires perfections by mediation of the body, which is a tool for it in its actions. So if the body is removed from the soul before it acquired the perfections, the perfections remain absent.”

Khojazāda here implicitly connects the issue Ghazālī raised (the human process of acquiring knowledge) with the achievement of human perfection. This becomes clear when he names both knowledge⁵³ and perfections in the explanation of why a body is needed:

“According to them, the preparedness of the soul for knowledge and perfections is an insufficient (*qāṣir*) preparedness; [the soul] is in need of perfecting its preparedness by the mediation of the bodily tools (i.e. organs) until the moment that what completes the soul's preparedness for it (i.e. the knowledge or perfection) emanates from the separate principles.”

⁵¹ Ghazālī, *Tahāfut*, p. 126 (Marmura's translation).

⁵² Ibn Sīnā, transl. by S. C. Inati, *Ibn Sīnā and mysticism: Remarks and admonitions : part four*, London: Kegan Paul International (1996), p. 77.

⁵³ Khojazāda uses here *'ulūm*, i.e. a plural of the singular 'knowledge' (*'ilm*). This both to relate it on an equal level with perfections (*kamālāt*), but also because knowledge is always about something. Therefore, knowledge in the plural indicates knowledge of any given amount of things.

It seems that this argument has the standard account of for example Ibn Sīnā in mind about the acquisition of knowledge. Where the passage from the *Ishārāt* just cited may seem to imply a renouncement of bodies as a useful tool for the acquisition of perfections, we have seen him explicitly affirming the use of bodily organs in earlier passages of the same *Ishārāt* in for example the part on the soul.⁵⁴ For Ibn Sīnā too, bodies and bodily organs are useful as they enable one to 'prepare' for the acquisition of intelligibles. It is of course when this preparation has been undergone that bodies lose their value; they have no value in and of themselves.

Critique on Ghazālī's text on the second proof

As Ghazālī's rendering of the second proof is quite different from how the two Ottoman scholars presented it, Khojazāda is quick to point out that the way Ghazālī has put it is not in agreement with the view of the philosophers. The reason for Ghazālī's inaccurate rendering is explained by Khojazāda by saying:

“I think that he wants to accept the second proof which we provided [...] by omitting some premises, such as His knowing the cause, and that knowledge of the cause necessitates knowledge of the effect, and the absence in the argumentation of sole causality.”

Subsequently, he takes issues with three specific aspects of Ghazālī's discussion. The first is that the philosophers did not claim that God's causality is natural and compulsory, as Ghazālī claims they did. Khojazāda explains that

“Instead they argue that God is powerful (*qādir*) in the sense that if He wishes to, He does so, and if He does not wish to, He does not do so. But the wish (*mashī'ah*) of the action is inherent (*lāzim*) in His essence and the absence of the wish is impossible.”

It is unclear whether Ghazālī or Khojazāda is right here, as this may be primarily a difference of interpretation between them.⁵⁵ For example, when Ibn Sīnā discusses human will (*irādah*) in his 'Notes' (*al-Ta'līqāt*), he explains that our will always needs to be activated by an outside cause. Only because of extrinsic reasons do we undertake actions. He then briefly turns his attention

⁵⁴ Ibn Sīnā, *Dunyā, al-Ishārāt*, v. 2, pp. 363ff. [= namat 3, faṣl 10].

⁵⁵ Though it may interest the reader to mention that Ibn Rushd makes a very similar objection against Ghazālī in his *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*. There we can read: “The philosophers only attribute a will to God in the sense that the acts which proceed from Him proceed through knowledge, and everything which proceeds through knowledge and wisdom proceeds through the will of the agent, not, however, necessarily and naturally, since the nature of knowledge does not imply (as he [i.e. Ghazālī] falsely affirms of the philosophers) the proceeding of the act.”, Ibn Rushd, transl. by S. van den Bergh, *Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)*, 2 vol., London: Luzac & Co. (1954), v. 1, p. 264.

to God's will. He first notes that God's will is quite unlike our will as it is not dependent on other things. He then describes God's will as follows:

يكون السبب في إرادته ذاته ولا يكون فيه إمكان إرادة أو إمكان مشيئة⁵⁶

Ghazālī would most likely see this statement as being in agreement with his statement. He would read that the cause of God's will is His essence. Therefore, His will is fixed and does not admit of a possibility for volition: His behaviour is merely following the dictates of His nature. Khojazāda, though, could read his aforementioned idea in Ibn Sīnā's sentence. Just because there is no possibility (*imkān*) of a wish for an action, does not mean there is no wish for an action at all.⁵⁷

Khojazāda's second criticism is that Ghazālī, when discussing what knowledge of the cause means, focuses on knowledge of the efficient cause (*al-illah al-fā'ilīyah*). This is only part of a complete causal account of the effect, what should be considered is the complete cause (*al-illah al-tāmmah*). Although he remains silent of what the complete cause exactly means, it seems that he is thinking about how the four Aristotelian causes (material, formal, efficient, and final) operate in tandem on the effect. The 'complete cause' would then refer to an account that takes all four into consideration, or as Jurjānī puts it in his *Tarīfāt*: "the complete cause is the totality of what the existence of a thing is dependent on."⁵⁸

The third and last point Khojazāda makes is an extension on the previous objection. Taking the previous point in mind, the example Ghazālī gives of the stone rolling down the hill would not be accepted by the philosophers, as Khojazāda claims. This is because the complete cause is not known in this example, only the action of pushing the stone of the hill is known. If one were to take all aspects into account (such as the slope of the hill or the amount of force with which the stone was pushed) one would be able to know that the stone was to hit another stone and break it (if the argumentation of the philosophers would be accepted).

⁵⁶ Ibn Sīnā, *Talīqāt*, p. 22.

⁵⁷ Unfortunately, we cannot go deeper into the matter here as this would lead us into the discussion of God's omnipotence, while God's omniscience is under discussion in this thesis.

⁵⁸ Jurjānī, *Tarīfāt*, p. 157 [= #1243].

Second discussion: on God's knowledge of Himself

Introduction

The second chapter, after having discussed the basic mechanics of the discussion of God's knowledge in the previous chapter, deals with God's knowledge of Himself (in other words, God's self-knowledge). Obviously, as the second proof from the first chapter uses God's self-knowledge to arrive at His knowledge of His effects, it is an important topic that deserves special attention. It can also be seen as a bridge to the major issues that arise in working out the philosophical arguments for God's knowledge of particulars, which is the topic of the next chapter.

Ghazālī

In this chapter, Ghazālī presents three arguments to refute the philosophers' position that God knows Himself. The first argument is that if will is disallowed for God, knowledge cannot be allowed either. If His activity is compelled, like the sun's emitting light, self-knowledge is not entailed. Second, he adds that being an immaterial thing does not guarantee its being an intelligible, so its self-knowledge is not self-evident. Lastly, an argument from nobility does not demonstrate God's self-knowledge either. As a counter-example Ghazālī gives the distinction between 'seeing' and 'blind'. Clearly, 'seeing' is nobler, but because the philosophers insist that God does not see, Ghazālī argues that philosophers cannot use the argument from nobility in the case of knowledge and ignorance.

These three counterarguments are styled according to the three methods for arguing that God knows from the first chapter. The first counterargument Ghazālī uses here relies on the second method from the previous chapter. The second counterargument relies on the first method, and the third counterargument relies on the third method.

The two Ottoman intellectuals

Khojazāda and 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī show not even the faintest trace of Ghazālī's discussion. Instead of providing similar counterarguments, or at least styling their own arguments according to these three counterarguments, they opt instead for presenting two methods of proving that God knows Himself, and they subsequently discuss these methods. The reason for this may suggest itself by making two notes. First, both intellectuals show textual influences of Jurjānī's commentary on Ījī's *Mawāqif*. Second, the treatment of God's self-knowledge in the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* is exactly according to this format (i.e. presenting two methods together with

a critical discussion of them). It therefore seems that the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* provided a kind of template for our two Ottoman intellectuals.

Structure of the chapters

Khojazāda is very brief in this chapter. This is because he has treated most of the proofs (and their critical discussions) in the previous chapter (but, as mentioned before, we will treat his proofs and discussions here in order to compare them with those of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn). He also does not treat the argument from nobility, nor does he critically assess Ghazālī's text.

ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's chapter is more involved. As he explicitly withheld the second proof (and discussion of it) in the first chapter, he here gives a full account of it. After an excursus on the difference between 'knowledge by acquisition' (*ʿilm ḥuṣūlī*) and knowledge by presence (*ʿilm ḥudūrī*), he also goes into quite some detail into an argument from nobility.

First proof: from knowledge of others

The argument

The first proof of this chapter relies on the first proof of the previous chapter. Khojazāda argues that because God knows other things, "He [i.e. God] is possible, due to a 'general possibility' (*al-ḥikmān al-ʿāmm*), to intellectually apprehend that He is intellectually apprehending that other thing." Otherwise, and here Khojazāda uses Jurjānī and Ījī explicitly,¹ one would be able to have knowledge of the most difficult books (examples given are the *Almagest* of Ptolemy [*al-majisṭī*] and the *Conics* of Apollonius [*al-makhrūṭāt*]) without it being necessary that you know that you know this, which is clearly absurd. This knowledge includes (*yataḍammanu*) knowledge of His essence, and therefore God knows Himself.

ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn argues for a proof that is basically the same, but slightly different in the details. The first difference is that ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn uses 'proximate possibility' (*ḥikmān qarīb*) instead of 'general possibility'. He explains that when one knows that one knows something, "it could be said that knowledge of a thing and knowledge of that knowledge are one." What he means by this is not entirely clear and it does not seem to have had a precedent in an earlier text. One interpretation could be that knowledge of knowledge of something is not only entailed, but included in the definition of knowledge of something.

Another difference is that he does not use the verb *yataḍammanu*. Instead he elaborates on it, stating: "so He knows that He knows something else and this knowledge is only possible after

¹ Ījī, Jurjānī, p. 106 [= mawqif 5, marṣad 4, maqṣad 3, baḥṭh 2, 2nd].

knowledge of His essence, as it [i.e. knowledge of His essence] is one of the known parts of that knowledge.” We can understand this as in a propositional sense. The knower now not only possesses “knowledge of something”, but also knowledge that “I have knowledge of something”. As the term ‘I’ is part of this proposition, it must be understood first before the proposition as a whole can be said to be understood.

Origins of the argument

The terms *al-ḥikm al-ʿāmm* and *ḥikm al-qarīb* stick out and seem to be used in a technical sense. To understand their meaning, we first may make note of Jurjānī's definition of *al-ḥikm al-ʿāmm* in his *Taʿrīfāt*:

General possibility: it is the negation of the necessity of one of the two opposites. Like we say that heat is necessarily related to fire, but its absence is not necessary for otherwise the proprium would be more general in an absolute sense.²

Admittedly, his definition is opaque but some insight might be gained by contrasting it with the definition of ‘specific possibility’ (*al-ḥikm al-khāṣṣ*):

Specific possibility: it is the negation of the necessity of both opposites. Just as all humans can write. For the ability to write is not necessary for him, nor is the absence of the ability to write.³

What the ‘specific possibility’ means is clear. It refers to a proprium, such as in the case of human beings the ability to write (the ability to laugh (Ar. *ḍāḥik*) is a more common example in Aristotelian philosophy). From here we can interpret ‘general possibility’ as meaning that, following the example, although wherever fire is, there is heat, if there is no heat, we cannot infer that there is no fire. Attributing heat to fire, even though it is an essential accident, makes it more specific than fire in general.

A lot more can be gained by looking into the origins of the proof. It was said earlier that this argument seems to be connected with the first proof of the previous chapter, and if we look at its origins this is affirmed. Just as the first proof from the previous chapter relied in part on Ibn Sīnā's 19th remark from his *Ishārāt*, so is also this proof related to that remark, albeit a different

² Jurjānī, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf, *al-Taʿrīfāt*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyah (2000), p. 40 [= #275], which reads:

الإمكان العام: هو سلب الضرورة عن أحد الطرفين، كقولنا: كل نار حارة، فإن الحرارة ضرورية بالنسبة إلى النار، وعدمها ليس بضروري، وإلا لكان الخاص أعم مطلقاً

³ Jurjānī, *Taʿrīfāt*, p. 40 [= #274].

part of it. The remark deals with the relation between intellect (^c*aql*), intellectual apprehender (^c*āqil*), and intelligible (*ma^cqūl*), and here we are concerned with the implication of the relation between intellectual apprehender and intelligible. In fact, this is what Ibn Sīnā begins his remark with, only afterwards arguing how an immaterial, self-subsisting entity can be both intelligible and intellectual apprehender. He begins by saying:

“You know that everything that intellectually apprehends something, it intellectually apprehends even more possibly so the act that it is intellectually apprehending it [i.e. the intelligible thing]. That [thing] has [therefore] intellectually apprehended itself because of it [i.e. the act of knowing that it knows]. So everything that intellectually apprehends something, intellectually apprehends itself...”⁴

Al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt

إشارة: إنك تعلم أن كل شيء يعقل شيئاً فإنه يعقل بالقوة القريبة من الفعل أنه يعقله. وذلك عقل منه لذاته. فكل ما يعقل شيئاً فله أن يعقل ذاته.

First sentence of Ibn Sīnā's argument

As for the first sentence, the translation *bi-l-quwwah al-qarībah min al-fi'l* by ‘even more possibly so the act’ is debatable. It does seem to be how Ṭūsī (and following him, Goichon) interprets it, proposing a tripartite division. According to him, *al-quwwah al-ba^cīdah* is the material intellect (*al-^caql al-hayūlá*), *al-quwwah al-mutawassiṭah* is the habitual intellect (*al-^caql bi-l-malakah*, ‘intellectus in habitu’⁵), and *al-quwwah al-qarībah* is the actual intellect (*al-^caql bi-l-fi'l*).⁶ However, Rāzī (writing before Ṭūsī) interpreted it differently. His interpretation will also reveal a connection with the texts of Khojazāda and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. He reads the text as saying ‘by a possibility close to actuality’, and so taking *al-qarībah min al-fi'l* as one unit, connected to *bi-l-quwwah*. This allows him to examine *quwwah* on its own and he criticizes its use. For even if this *quwwah* is ‘close to actuality’, it is still connected with non-existence. That is, “the word *quwwah*

⁴ As the Arabic text is ambiguous to say the least I’ve provided Ibn Sīnā’s text too. Cf. Avicenna, Goichon, *Livre des directives et remarques*, p. 337. Its application to God is explicit in chapter 4, remark 28 which reads: “The First is a self-subsistent intelligible essence, and therefore He is Everlasting (qayyūm). Free from relations, weaknesses, reliance, or other things which make an added state to the essence. It is known that what is judged to be like that, is an intellect of itself, being intelligible of itself.”, Ibn Sīnā, *Dunyā*, v. 3, p. 481. The relation between the two remarks is pointed out by Ṭūsī; Ibn Sīnā, *Dunyā*, *Ishārāt*, v. 3, p. 482.

⁵ Avicenna, Rahman, *Avicenna’s Psychology*, p. 34.

⁶ Ibn Sīnā, *Dunyā*, *Ishārāt*, vol. 2, p. 390 [= namaṭ 3, faṣl 17] Note that due a miscount in *Dunyā* edition (after faṣl 14 he starts counting again from 13) faṣl 17 in *Dunyā*’s edition is in fact faṣl 19. I give *Dunyā*’s count to accommodate the student.

is a synonym for 'a possibility connected with non-existence'" as Rāzī claims.⁷ This is unacceptable, as it in this sense cannot apply to God or any other abstract things for they are purely active and do not admit of any possibility of non-existence. Rāzī proposes the following sentence as an improvement of Ibn Sīnā's first sentence:

“Everything that has intellectually apprehended something can (has the potential to) intellectually apprehend that it intellectually apprehends that thing.”

And continues to explain:

“The meaning of this potential is a ‘general possibility’ (*al-ḥikmān al-‘āmm*) such that this intellection obtains in that whose essence is necessary to occur, like God, and who is not like this, but rather has a potentiality close to actuality, like in our case.”⁸

Ṭūsī criticizes Rāzī for this, giving a definition of ‘general possibility’ which is very close to Jurjānī's definition (“‘general possibility’ applies to improbable possibilities, such that as long as they are non-existent, they are not necessary”). As this is far from what Ibn Sīnā is trying to say, Ṭūsī opts to retain Ibn Sīnā's original wording. All of this is not present in for example the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* by Ījī and Jurjānī. It therefore seems that both Ottoman authors had read the *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt* (by Rāzī, not necessarily the one by Ṭūsī). Khojazāda embraced Rāzī's interpretation wholesale, but ‘Alā’ al-Dīn seemed to have made a compromise between Ibn Sīnā and Rāzī by using Rāzī's *ḥikmān* mixed with Ibn Sīnā's *qarīb*. This could be motivated by Ṭūsī's commentary, although at least the exact phrasing seems to belong to ‘Alā’ al-Dīn himself.

Second sentence of Ibn Sīnā's argument

The second sentence may be even more opaque. The translation presented here has already made use of the notes Rāzī supplies. It is noteworthy to point out that Rāzī warns that it is not the case that the intellectual apprehension of intellectually apprehending something is the same as the intellectual apprehension of the essence of the intellectual apprehender himself. Rather, the intellectual apprehension of intellectually apprehending something entails knowledge of the relation between knower and object of knowledge. In general, what is argued for is that knowledge of the relation stands in need of knowledge of both related terms. It is only after one knows both terms that one can understand the relationship that connects them. Thus, the knower is only one part of this knowledge (the other part being the object of

⁷ Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v. 2, p. 305 [= namaṭ 3, faṣl 19].

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibn Sīnā, *Dunyā, Ishārāt*, vol. 2, p. 391 [= namaṭ 3, faṣl 17].

knowledge), and thus knowledge of the knower is included (Rāzī uses *yataḍammanu*) in knowledge of the relation.

If we compare this with Khojazāda's and 'Alā' al-Dīn's texts we notice, just as with the previous point, that Khojazāda relies more on other texts and adheres to those texts' technical terminology, while 'Alā' al-Dīn proposes the argument in his own wording but in doing so sacrifices the use of precise technical terms.

Objections to the argument

The objections raised in this chapter are very few. Khojazāda and 'Alā' al-Dīn principally refer the readers back to the objections to the first proof from the previous chapter. Khojazāda does however add that it is not obvious why one who intellectually apprehends something should be able to intellectually apprehend this intellectual apprehension. Analogous to this is that "what a human thinks (lit. finds, *yajiduhu*) of itself does not bring about a true, universal judgment." This argument may be understood in the light of what Rāzī says about it. He reminds the reader about the distinction between particulars and universals, and how particulars are perceived by bodily organs and universals by the soul. Therefore the judgments that 'Zayd has humanity' and 'Zayd is a human, not a horse' are not produced by one judging faculty. Likewise, Rāzī thinks, it could be possible that a man knows that he knows something, without knowing himself.¹⁰ The underlying assumption seems to be that in the proposition 'I know something', the 'I' taken on the level of intellectual apprehension is merely a universal notion, and does not refer specifically to the self of the knower of this proposition. The self as a particular may only be perceived by bodily organs.

Second proof: from being abstract

The argument

The second proof is tied up with the second proof from the previous chapter. It is in fact such an integral part of it that Khojazāda decided to treat its exposition and objections in the first chapter and only briefly reminds the readers in the second chapter of its existence. However, as 'Alā' al-Dīn does the opposite (only mentions it in passing in the first chapter, treating it more properly in this second chapter), and it seems to make more sense to treat the argument for God's self-knowledge in this chapter, we will here present Khojazāda's argument from the first chapter on God's self-knowledge. Khojazāda argues:

¹⁰ Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v. 2, p. 300.

“God is an immaterial, self-subsisting thing, as has been established before. There occurs for every immaterial, self-subsisting thing its immaterial self-subsisting essence, without obscurity about it. Everything for which its immaterial, self-subsisting essence occurs to, doubtlessly intellectually apprehends its essence, for intellection is nothing but the occurrence of the immaterial essence to the immaterial, self-subsisting thing. Therefore it is established without doubt that God intellectually apprehends Himself.”

‘Alā’ al-Dīn proposes a nearly similar reasoning, but reverses the sentence order:

“The meaning of God’s knowledge is intellection. Intellection consists of the presence of the essence, devoid of extraneous concealments (*al-ghawāshī al-gharībah*) and concomitants with matter. This is the case of God’s essence in relation to Himself (*ilā dhātihi*), because His essence is devoid of the defect of matter (*shā’ibah al-māddah*) and not obscure to Himself (*‘an nafsīhi*). Likewise is each immaterial thing in relation to itself. So He knows His essence, and likewise does each immaterial thing.”

Origins of the argument

Ījī and Jurjānī

As we saw in the previous chapter, Khojazāda’s exposition relies textually on the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* and on the *Muḥākamāt bayna Sharḥay al-Ishārāt* (by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī). Although ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s text usually does not show textual evidence of influence, here we are able to track down a citation (albeit short) from Jurjānī’s *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*.

<i>Sharḥ al-Mawāqif</i>	<i>al-Dhakhīrah</i>
<p>أَنَّهَا عَاقِلَةٌ لِذَوَاتِهَا إِذِ التَّعَقُّلُ * حَضُورُ الْمَاهِيَةِ الْمَجْرَدَةِ عَنِ الْغَوَاشِيِ الْغَرِيبَةِ * (عِنْدَ الشَّيْءِ) الْمَجْرَدِ الْقَائِمِ بِذَاتِهِ¹¹</p>	<p>علمه تعالى هو التعقل والتعقل عبارة عن حضور الماهية المجردة عن الغواشي الغريبة واللواحق المادية عند الذات المجردة</p>

It is especially the term *al-ghawāshī al-gharībah* (lit. ‘extraneous concealments’) that sticks out in this passage (it can be traced back to at least Ibn Sīnā’s *Ishārāt*).¹² Another term used in ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s text which is not present in Khojazāda’s is *shā’ibah al-māddah*. It is apparently not present in the text by Ījī and Jurjānī. It does however appear in Taftāzānī’s *Sharḥ al-Maqāsid*. In a similar train of thought, Taftāzānī states that “an immaterial thing is devoid of the material defects (*al-*

¹¹ Ījī, Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, v. 2, p. 695.

¹² Ibn Sīnā, *Dunyā, Ishārāt*, v. 2, p. 344 [= namaṭ 3, faṣl 8].

shawā'ib al-māddīyah) and extraneous concomitants (*al-lawāḥiq al-gharībah*).¹³ From this passage it is not obvious that 'Alā' al-Dīn borrowed this term from Taftāzānī for 'Alā' al-Dīn uses it in the passage under discussion in the singular and moreover opts for Jurjānī's *ghawāshī* instead of Taftāzānī's *lawāḥiq* to go with the adjective *gharībah*. However, it does at least prove its use in the Kalām discourse.

Ibn Sīnā, Rāzī and Ṭūsī

As we saw in the previous chapter, the wider argument for God's knowledge of other things that involves this particular argument for self-knowledge relies on chapter 7, remark 15 of Ibn Sīnā's *al-Ishārāt*. The part concerning God's self-knowledge relies on chapter 4, remark 28, which was discussed in the earlier chapter on Ibn Sīnā and other predecessors. This remark relies, as Ṭūsī points out,¹⁴ on the treatment of intellect, intellectual apprehender, and intelligible from chapter 3 of Ibn Sīnā's *Ishārāt*.

Objections to the argument

The first and major argument the two Ottoman philosophers put forward is reminiscent of Plotinus critique on Aristotle: if knowledge is said to be the presence of the object in the subject, than there must be a distinct duality between the two.¹⁵ One might argue that this is a conceptual duality which does not constitute a real duality. But as Khojazāda replies, in such a case the argument applies only conceptually, not in the thing itself (*nafs al-amr*). 'Alā' al-Dīn uses this argument to immediately emphasize that such a problem does not occur if one accepts knowledge to be a relation or an attribute possessing a relation. Although Khojazāda rarely brings up this concept of knowledge explicitly, here he does indicate it as a solution to the problem (framed as his second objection). In contrast to 'Alā' al-Dīn, he does not use the phrase 'relation or an attribute possessing a relation' (*iḍāfah aw ṣifah dhāt iḍāfah*), but uses 'relational state' (*ḥālah nisbīyah*) which is much more reminiscent of Rāzī's *ḥālah iḍāfīyah* from his *al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqīyah*.¹⁶ Undoubtedly, Khojazāda was again partly inspired by Jurjānī's commentary on Ījī's *Mawāqif*. The next passage, solely Jurjānī's text, shows the correlation.

Sharḥ al-Mawāqif

Tahāfut al-Falāsifah

¹³ Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid*, v. 4, p. 114. The next sentence is the idea that an immaterial thing therefore does not require any work to be an intelligible, this is the line discussed in the previous chapter which recurs in several other books.

¹⁴ Ṭūsī, *Dunyā, Ishārāt*, v. 3, p. 482.

¹⁵ This is an oft recited argument, eg. Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqīyah : fi 'ilm al-ilāhīyāt wa-al-ṭabī'iyāt*, v. 2, p. 492; Ījī/Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, v. 3, p. 105; 'Abduh, M., ed. S. Dunyā, *al-Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abduh*, 2 vol., Cairo: Dār Iḥyā' al-Kutub al-'Arabīyah (1958), v. 2, p. 454 [in Dawānī's text].

¹⁶ Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqīyah : fi 'ilm al-ilāhīyāt wa-al-ṭabī'iyāt*, v. 1, p. 450.

<p>فإنّ التغيّير الاعتباريّ كافٍ لتحقيق هذه النسبة [...] ذات الشيء باعتبار صلاحيتها للمعلومية في الجملة مغايرة لها باعتبار صلاحيتها للعالمية في الجملة وهذا القدر من التغيّير يكفي¹⁷</p>	<p>وردّ بأنّ التغيّير الاعتباريّ يكفي في تحقّق النسبة وذات الجرد باعتبار صلاحيتها للمعلومية في الجملة مغايرة لها باعتبار صلاحيتها للعالمية في الجملة وهذا القدر من التغيّير يكفيها</p>
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In addition to this, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn points out that ‘knowledge’ is of the (Aristotelian) category of ‘quality’ (*ma‘qūlah al-kayf*), while ‘presence’ is of the category of ‘relation’. He does therefore not see how the two can be equated.

Another inconsistency he detects, and which is also presented by Khojāzāda, is that the reasoning of this argument proposes a different way of looking at knowledge than the previous argument. Here the argument seems to deny that knowledge-items have mental existence, while this was argued for before. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn blames this on the twofold classification of knowledge: knowledge by acquisition (*‘ilm ḥuṣūlī*), and knowledge by presence (*‘ilm ḥuḍūrī*). The first argument from this chapter (corresponding to the first argument from the previous chapter) relies on the first type of knowledge, while the second argument relies on the second type of knowledge. A choice between must therefore be made. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn opts to choose for the concept of knowledge by presence, but with the additional remark that to him it does not make a difference whether a thing is immaterial or material; if it is able to think, it is able to reflect on itself. Khojāzāda uses the argument (not present in the first but in the second chapter) in a different way. He points out that by one way of reasoning, knowledge of other things is first established and from there self-knowledge is inferred, while by another way of reasoning self-knowledge is first argued for, and from there knowledge of other things is affirmed. He also favours the second way of reasoning (using knowledge by presence, but Khojāzāda does not make this explicit) but argues in an opposite way from ‘Alā’ al-Dīn. Instead of proposing a positive argument, he closes the second chapter by reminding the reader of the negative argument connected to the first way of reasoning. In his view, to know other things does not imply that one thereby also knows oneself. Though Khojāzāda does not pursue the argument thoroughly, he thinks that it could be possible to know something for some special reason that excludes self-knowledge.

¹⁷ Ījī/Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, v. 3, p. 105, the citation skips almost 10 full lines.

Third proof: from nobility

This third proof is only used by 'Alā' al-Dīn in this chapter, just as Khojazāda used it in the previous chapter while 'Alā' al-Dīn does not. As it made more sense to discuss it in the context of the previous chapter, we will refrain here from going over it again.

Third discussion: on God's knowledge of particulars

Introduction

Khojazāda structures this discussion on the three different proofs from the first chapter. 'Alā' al-Dīn's text is close to this, though he omits an explicit discussion of God's knowledge of particulars in the context of the second proof (from being a cause). Just as the first proof received the most attention in the first chapter, so also the discussion of God's knowledge of particulars, framed according to that proof, is the most thoroughly discussed topic in this chapter. As the discussion framed according to the first proof is divided into two different topics (one being the issue of shape, the other the issue of time), they will likewise be treated separately here.

The introductions the Ottoman scholars give

Both scholars open this chapter by offering a very short statement of what the problem of knowledge of particulars is when applied to God, and then proposing a solution. By organizing their chapters in this way (giving this solution first, before the problems are properly discussed) it seems that both Ottoman intellectuals do this to show their appreciation of the solution they propose, or to help the reader by stating what the ultimate goal is.

Khojazāda

Khojazāda opens by saying (drawing from Jurjānī and Ījī¹) that particulars that have a shape are known by God in a universal way ('*alā wajh kullīy*'), regardless whether they are eternally stable or changing. This is Khojazāda's attempt to frame the issue of this chapter as clear as possible. He subsequently offers the solution of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, although he does not mention Quṭb al-Dīn.² The kernel of this theory that although God knows only universals, this does not mean He knows only the essences of particulars. Khojazāda argues:

“Rather, it means that He knows the universal essence, and also the universal attributes that are attributed to [it] and which combine in the external world only in one individual. So He acquires universal knowledge which applies to [each] particular individual in the external world.”

Therefore, His knowledge need not be qualified by temporal qualifiers like past, present, and future. Khojazāda explains:

¹ Ījī, Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, v. 3, pp. 108ff.

² Cf. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Muḥākamāt*, v. 2, pp. 399-400.

“Even though God knows all temporally occurring particulars and the appropriate times in which they take place, He knows them with a knowledge elevated from placing time under the aspect of its three descriptions [i.e. past, present, future].”

What exactly Khojazāda understands by this will be explained in the sections to come in this chapter. He does not give much of the later explanation here in the introduction, merely offering the reader the example of knowing an eclipse, which we noticed before.³

‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī

‘Alā’ al-Dīn openly relates his introduction to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*al-Imām al-Rāzī*). This in itself is not odd, but the fact that it is hard to trace a textual correspondence with any of Rāzī’s works may be considered so.⁴ His first sentence states that God does not know particulars that have a shape, even if they are unchanging. His reason for this is that such knowledge needs a bodily organ, which is of course absent from God as He is an immaterial entity. The first sentence is of course very similar to Khojazāda’s first sentence, though ‘Alā’ al-Dīn states that God does not know, instead of arguing that God knows in a universal way. This difference stems from the clause ‘Alā’ al-Dīn builds in: God would only not know if the concept of knowledge as the acquisition of a form were accepted. As a solution, he proposes that this concept should be dropped. He does not mention a different concept here, but as ‘Alā’ al-Dīn repeatedly reminds the reader of the concept of knowledge as a relation, which also happens to be the concept of knowledge Rāzī argued for, one cannot but accept that this is what ‘Alā’ al-Dīn had in mind in this introduction.

Khojazāda’s discussion of Ghazālī’s text

Right after this Khojazāda discusses some of Ghazālī’s arguments against Ibn Sīnā’s notion of God’s knowledge of particulars ‘in a universal way’. He first cites the passage from Ghazālī⁵ which holds that if one were to accept Ibn Sīnā’s notion, it would follow that God would not know if someone (e.g. Zayd) believes or disbelieves in Him. God would only know about belief and unbelief in general. Likewise He knows about prophethood. He would know that prophethood is applicable to humans, but He does not know that for example Muhammad is a prophet. These consequences are unavoidable, and therefore the theory must be disregarded.

Khojazāda considers this response weak.

³ See page 43 of this thesis.

⁴ The closest passage is: Rāzī, *Mabāḥith*, v. 2, p. 499.

⁵ Corresponding, with few (trivial) differences, to: Ghazālī, *Tahāfut*, p. 136, l. 18 to p. 137, l. 6.

“Even though (according to them) God does not know bodily particulars as we (i.e. human beings) know them by [using] our senses, He does know each of them (i.e. the bodily particulars) in a way that applies only to one of them, to the exception of all others. On this account, the differentiation (*al-tamyīz*) between the individuals comes about. Likewise does He know its (i.e. the bodily particular) states and affairs, in a way that differentiates each of them from the others.”

Clearly, he is repeating the theory of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī which he expounded earlier in response to Ghazālī's critique of Ibn Sīnā's notion of God's knowledge. Although Khojāzāda does not say explicitly in what way he wishes to solve the issue of God's knowledge, seeing him repeat Quṭb al-Dīn's theory here in response to Ghazālī gives the impression that Khojāzāda might agree with this theory.

Shaped particular things

The first major reservation in the context of the first proof is concerned with particulars that have a shape (*al-juz'īyāt al-mutashakkilah*). If we divide particular things into shaped or non-shaped (or spatial and non-spatial) things, it is argued that knowledge of shaped particulars is denied of God.

The argument

After this analysis of Ghazālī's text, Khojāzāda presents the first reservation the philosophers have in reference to the first proof of the first chapter. This is that regardless of whether particulars are eternally the same or changing, one needs a bodily organ to perceive the particulars that have a shape (*idrāk al-juz'īyāt al-mutashakkilah*). If something is completely immaterial, such as God, then by definition it has no bodily organ at its disposal. Therefore, God cannot comprehend shaped particulars.

‘Alā’ al-Dīn presents a similar argument (but chooses to present it as the second reservation, not the first). He adds that the bodily organ (such as the senses or the imagination, which is one of the inner senses, and thus lodged in a ventricle in the brain) that is necessary for imprinting something with a magnitude can only occur in something that also has magnitude. Therefore, as God possesses no magnitude, he is unable to perceive shaped particulars. This reservation of course leaves the possibility open that God knows immaterial particulars.

Objections to the argument

An objection both Ottoman scholars raise is that this argument relies on the definition of perception (used here in the sense of intellection) as the acquisition of a form. If knowledge would be allowed to be purely a relationship (*iḍāfah maḥḍah*), or a real attribute possessing a relationship (*ṣifah ḥaqīqah dhāt iḍāfah*), a bodily organ would not be needed.

Khojazāda relates a point that can be raised against this objection. This is, if that were accepted, God would not know temporally originated things before their origination in the external world, as no relationship can obtain if both of the related terms do not exist. He responds to this by arguing that a relationship indeed depends on the two related terms, but not in terms of their existence. Rather, it depends on the related terms in terms of their distinctiveness (*imtiyāz*), which does not depend on the existence of the things (neither external existence nor mental existence). For example, possible non-existents have a distinctiveness compared to other things by having a state of non-existence. They are therefore distinct, even though they do not exist. This aspect of distinction may remind us of the concept of a unique bundle of universals to distinguish one particular from another, as Khojazāda explained this in his introduction to this chapter.

ʿAlā' al-Dīn does not pursue his discussion in this direction, but proposes a second objection. This objection is related to involving magnitude, which he stipulated in the outline of the philosophers' argument. He objects to the idea that imprinting something possessing magnitude needs something possessing magnitude to be imprinted on. In his view, such an imprinting can also be understood as an imprinting in the mind (presumably as the imprinting of the form of a thing, abstracted from its matter) and things having mental existence do not have magnitude. As we have seen before,⁶ the objection rests primarily on the lack of correspondence between external and mental existence. Due to this lack of correspondence, ʿAlā' al-Dīn claims that magnitude differs in the two modes of existence. As an example he considers the perception of a big mountain. We know that a mountain (possessing a large magnitude) can be perceived by a human eye (possessing a small magnitude). Analogously ʿAlā' al-Dīn thinks that it is just as conceivable to argue that the mind can comprehend a mountain while itself having no magnitude at all.

Although ʿAlā' al-Dīn draws a lot of material from Rāzī and to a large extent agrees with Rāzī, in this discussion he brings in an argument of Rāzī in order to criticize it. Rāzī had maintained

⁶ See e.g. page 65 of this thesis.

that there is another objection to the claim that imprinting something possessing magnitude needs something possessing magnitude. For prime matter, by definition, has no magnitude at all, while it serves as the substrate for all things possessing a magnitude.

‘Alā’ al-Dīn thinks this is different from self-subsisting immaterial things (i.e., intellects). Prime matter may not have a magnitude in and of itself, but it does take on a magnitude the moment a form is imprinted on it. Intellects however, do not have magnitude from themselves, nor can they attain it from something else. The objection of Rāzī is therefore not useful in the context of God's knowledge.

Origins of the argument

Though most of the argument and objections can be found in Jurjānī's commentary on Ījī's *Mawāqif*,⁷ no exact citation is present in either Khojazāda's or ‘Alā’ al-Dīn's texts. Its origins however can be found in Ibn Sīnā's *Ishārāt*. More specifically, we encounter it in the third part (on the soul), in itself unrelated to a discussion of God's knowledge. Throughout the discussion of how the soul is able to understand, the argument is made that true knowledge (intellection) is of forms which are detached from matter and its extraneous, material configurations (*hay'āt gharībah māddiyah* as Ibn Sīnā phrases it in this connection⁸). In the eighth remark, he divides perception (*idrāk*) into three categories:

- Either this comprehension can be applied to many individual things (intellection)
- Or it applies only to one thing, but:
 - o it is not dependent on the external existence of the thing (imagination)
 - o it is dependent on the external existence of the thing (sensation)⁹

The last two modes rely explicitly on extraneous conceivements (*ghawāshī gharībah*). As Rāzī explains it, sensation and imagination are connected to particular matter, for otherwise it would be possible to apply this comprehension to many, which is only the case for intellection.¹⁰ This of course is also why an intelligible is called abstract, for it is abstracted from all these relations. As Rāzī later states: “Sensation can only obtain [the quiddity of] a human being in so far as he is in a position, quality, position, and quantity of an individual thing.”¹¹ In

⁷ Ījī, Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, v. 3, p. 108.

⁸ E.g. Ibn Sīnā, Ṭūsī, Dunyā, *Ishārāt*, v. 2, p. 386 [= namaṭ 3, faṣl 15].

⁹ Ibn Sīnā, Dunyā, *Ishārāt*, v.2, pp. 343-347; my interpretation relies on Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v. 2, pp. 236-244.

¹⁰ Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v. 2, p. 238.

¹¹ Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v. 2, p. 241. Rāzī is possibly referring to the Aristotelian categories.

that part of the *Ishārāt*, it is important to show the limitations of sensation, but we can of course also turn this statement around and argue that by the same token, it is only sensation that can supply a comprehension of the particular position, quality, etc. of an individual thing. Just as these three modes of comprehension can be applied to either one or many things, so they rely on a bodily organ or immaterial intellect to comprehend it. For example, in the sixteenth remark Ibn Sīnā argues that an intelligible cannot be inscribed or connected to a thing that possesses a position (*dhī waḍʿ*). An indivisible thing may be connected to many things, as long as those things are not spatially divisible themselves. The argument is again constructed to prove that due to the perception of intelligibles, we must assume a non-bodily aspect to the human soul; but we may notice that likewise a thing that has no bodily organs is only capable of comprehending intelligibles. “A thing that can be divided into many different spatial parts cannot be connected with a non-divisible thing,” as Ibn Sīnā argues.¹²

The last objection we discussed, the one only ‘Alā’ al-Dīn put forward, was explicitly related by him to Rāzī. We do indeed find a similar argument in Rāzī’s commentary on the *Ishārāt*.¹³ However, in Ṭūsī’s commentary on the *Ishārāt*, we find the exact same argument and the same response but interestingly enough, Ṭūsī relates this objection back to Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī.¹⁴

Temporal particular things

If any particular aspect of the discussion on Gods’ knowledge sticks out, it must be the problem of God’s knowledge of temporal particular things. It is this problem that receives the most attention from the Ottoman intellectuals. The issue is that these things change over time, which seems to indicate a change in the knowledge about these entities. As God is unchangeable, a reconciliation between His unchanging essence and His changing knowledge needs to be proposed.

A striking similarity in the set-up of this passage between the two Ottoman scholars (both based on Jurjānī’s commentary on Ījī’s *Mawāqif*) reveals that both felt committed to a discourse to which they could not stray very far. Were it otherwise, they could just as well have stuck more closely to Ghazālī’s text. Still, the overall approach to the problem by the two Ottoman scholars is different, which can already be distilled from their concluding remarks.

¹² Ibn Sīnā, *Dunyā, Ishārāt*, v. 2, pp. 379-383 [= namaṭ 3, faṣl 14].

¹³ Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v. 2, p. 295 [= namaṭ 3, faṣl 17].

¹⁴ Ibn Sīnā, Ṭūsī, *Dunyā, Ishārāt*, v. 2, p. 388 [= namaṭ 3, faṣl 15].

The argument

As introduced above, the issue involving temporal particulars (particular things that are connected with time, which are 'in' time) is that time constitutes the measurement of change; and since change is built in to temporal events or objects, the knowledge about a particular temporal thing necessarily changes. Change is impossible to attribute to God, so therefore God cannot have knowledge of particulars. That knowledge about a temporal thing has to change if that temporal thing changes, can be seen by considering for example a thing (x) which at t_1 is non-existent. At that moment, either God can know "x exists", or God can know "x does not exist". The former would make God ignorant, which is impossible, so obviously God knows that "x does not exist". If x comes to exist at t_2 , again two things could happen. Either God knows "x exists" or He knows "x does not exist". The latter would make God ignorant, which is impossible. However, if one opts for the former, than God's knowledge has changed.

So far, the texts of the two Ottoman scholars do not differ that much. The fact that 'Alā' al-Dīn opts to explain this argument in the form of an example (the two events of 'Zayd will enter the house' and 'Zayd has entered the house'), while Khojazāda keeps it more abstract like the argument given above, does not make that much of a difference. However, Khojazāda elaborates why a change in God's knowledge would be impossible, while 'Alā' al-Dīn thinks the above argument should suffice.

To argue that a change in God's knowledge is impossible, Khojazāda explains that (the philosophers want to argue that) a change in God's knowledge entails a change in God's essence. If this relation of entailment is established, it would indeed be impossible for God to have a knowledge that changes, because a change in God's essence is impossible. He is, after all, the 'Necessary of Existence' (*wājib al-wujūd*), being fully actual and perfect, and therefore having no aspects of potentiality which can change into actuality. Different types of predication are considered by Khojazāda, though not in a rigorous manner. One type of predication is a relation which does not change the essence (like 'x being on the left of y' changing into 'x being on the right of y': though x changed its position, y did not essentially change). But knowledge does not belong to this type, for if the object of knowledge changes, not only the relation changes but also the knowledge. It already looks more like power (*qudrah*), though still with a difference. For power, there is a real attribute involved, which has a relation towards its object. However, if the object of power changes, power itself does not change. Knowledge does change, for if something knows, it means that the attribute of knowledge has a relation to that object of knowledge, without having a connection to any other object of knowledge. If the object of

knowledge changes, it requires a new knowledge (*'ilm musta'nif*) with a new relation. This is how far the Ottoman intellectuals are willing to go with their explanation, but we will come back to investigate this idea in greater detail when we look into some of the sources of this argument. For now, it should be noted that the concept of knowledge used here implies an act or state of knowing, not the ability to retrieve something from memory. The many things we have stored in our memory are not related to us as object of knowledge, under this argumentation. They will come to be related as an object of knowledge if we set our minds to it, when we literally change our mind from one knowledge-item to another.

Origins of the argument

The argument stems from Ibn Sīnā's *Ishārāt* and its commentaries. In Section Seven, Remark Eighteen, Ibn Sīnā explains knowledge 'in a particular way', by using the example of the eclipse. Rāzī comments that on the one hand "due to this method all particulars, including all their details and states become knowable," while at the same time "this knowledge does not change according to change in the object of knowledge."¹⁵ That is, it remains fixed before, during, and after the event. The next two Remarks are then used by Ibn Sīnā to explain what kind of attribute knowledge is (a discussion that is missing from his other accounts of God's knowledge). In these two remarks Ibn Sīnā only makes mention of examples, and it is in the commentaries of Rāzī and Ṭūsī that we find a theoretical description of it. Rāzī proposes the following classification of attributes (in terms of their relationships and changeability):¹⁶

1. Real attributes devoid of a relationship (e.g., blackness/whiteness)
2. Attributes which are just relationships (e.g., being to the left/right)
3. Real attributes holding a relationship
 - a. Which do not change when the related thing changes (e.g., having power)
 - b. Which do change when the related thing changes (e.g., having knowledge)

An attribute such as power (i.e. the power to move something) does not change "because what is considered in [having power to move] is that [having power] is connected to the movement of a body, not the movement of *this* body, and this holds true no matter whether this body exists or not."¹⁷ Rāzī argues in two ways why knowledge is an example of option 3b. Both are styled as examples and rely on the knowledge of an event. In the first argument he argues that knowledge of the state of a thing before the event is different from the knowledge of the state

¹⁵ Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v. 2, p. 541.

¹⁶ Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v.2, pp. 542-543; repeated by Ṭūsī: Ibn Sīnā, Ṭūsī, Dunyā, *al-Ishārāt*, v. 3, p. 721.

¹⁷ Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v. 2, p. 543.

of a thing after the event. The second argument argues why the knowledge of a thing before the event cannot be a cause for the knowledge of that thing after the event. This is because the knowledge of a thing after the event becomes conditioned on the time of the event, and the knower must therefore possess knowledge of a third thing, which is the time. Only when knowing that the time of the event has passed can a knower deduce from his knowledge of the thing before the event that the thing is now such-and-such.¹⁸

Ṭūsī adds some insightful notes that deepen the discussion of Rāzī's examples. Ṭūsī explains that option 3a speaks of an attribute which relates essentially and primarily to a universal, and only in a secondary sense to all particulars which fall under that universal. In regard to 3b it is the other way around. Here it is essentially and primarily related to a particular, and only in a secondary sense to all universals which pertain to that particular. He gives an elucidating example which shows how exactly the universal/particular distinction he has set up works. If we say 'an animal (*al-ḥayawān*) is something corporeal', this does not mean instantly that we know that 'a human being is something corporeal', for we also need the knowledge that 'a human is an animal'. We see here that with knowledge, the relationship to a universal (e.g. animal) does not imply a relationship to any and all particulars which fall under that universal (e.g. human being). It is rather the other way around; by knowing that 'human being' is a species of 'animal' we also know that 'human being' is a species of 'bodily thing'.¹⁹ Power on the other hand works the other way around: if we agree that we have (or God has) power to act upon 'a bodily thing', this immediately implies that we have power to act upon 'a human being'. Further, if we knew merely that we have power to act upon 'a human being', we could not infer from this that we have power to act upon 'a bodily thing'. Because the relationship with power has in this sense an effect on every particular that falls under the object that power is related to, the object of power is called universal. Likewise, because the relationship with knowledge has in this sense an effect on everything that the object is a particular of, the object of knowledge is called particular.

Objections to the argument

An objection mentioned by both Ottoman scholars is that if it is agreed that knowledge is a pure relation or a real attribute holding a relation, change (of a particular) would only occur in the relation, having no effect on the one holding the relation. Only if knowledge were a form equal to the object of knowledge would the knower change, for it would only be able to know one

¹⁸ Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v.2, p. 544.

¹⁹ Ibn Sīnā, Ṭūsī, *Dunyā, al-Ishārāt*, v. 3, pp. 722-724.

thing at a time. And if knowledge were a real attribute holding a relation, one can imagine one attribute of knowledge, which has as many relations to as many objections as it wants. "Just like [the attribute of] power," Khojazāda adds.

From the many inferences that 'Alā' al-Dīn draws from construing knowledge as a relation, it may be clear that he feels comfortable with this last solution. Another hint can be found in this part of the text. Whereas Khojazāda moves on to discuss the Mu'tazilah, 'Alā' al-Dīn devotes more effort to making this objection as strong as possible. He presents a counterargument to the notion of the possibility of change in the relations. This counterargument holds that God's essence relies on its parts. Attributes are such parts, and we can conceive of three possibilities for these attributes. Either an attribute is in itself appropriate to be affirmed of God; it is in itself appropriate to be absent from Him; or neither affirmation or absence is appropriate (in itself). Since God is the Necessary of Existence, it may be clear that only the first category of attributes can be affirmed of Him. The second is ipso facto inappropriate, and the third is not attributable because it would need another thing to decide its appropriateness or non-appropriateness, and this in turn would make God dependent on something else, which is an impossibility. Again, because God is the Necessary of Existence, the attributes that are appropriate are affirmed of Him at all times. Were they attributed only after some time, this would again require a third decisive element on which God would be dependent. Here we also have to take into account 'Alā' al-Dīn's use of 'its affirmation' (*thubūtihā*), as it not only conveys the meaning of affirmation, but also its full actualization, meaning, being affirmed as a constantly existing state. This is tied up with the necessity of God's essence, which only allows fully actualized attributes to be predicated of it (at least in the opinion of this particular argument). Change in the attributes of God is therefore impossible, as this would interfere with God's perfection which is necessary to God (and therefore eternal).

As it turns out, this passage can also be found in Rāzī's *Arbaʿīn*, as is obvious from the following comparison.

<i>al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn</i>	<i>al-Dhakhīrah</i>
<p>الفلاسفة أقاموا البرهان المطلق على امتناع وقوع التغييرات في ذات الله تعالى وفي صفاته فقالوا كل صفة يفرض ثبوتها فذاًت الله تعالى من حيث هي إما أن يكون * كافية في ثبوتها * أو * كافية في انتفائها * أو لا تكون كافية لا</p>	<p>فإن قيل البرهان قائم على امتناع التغيير في صفاته تعالى مطلقاً وهو أن كل صفة تفرض فلا يخلو إما أن يكون ذاته تعالى كافياً في ثبوتها له أو يكون كافياً في انتفائها عنه أو لا يكون كافياً لا في</p>

في ثبوتها ولا في انتفائها فإن كان ذاته سبحانه كافية في
 ثبوتها وجب ثبوتها للذات أزلاً وأبداً حتى تكون تلك
 الصفة دائمة الثبوت بدوام ذاته وإن كان ذاته سبحانه
 وتعالى كافية في انتفائها وجب انتفاؤها عن الذات أزلاً
 وأبداً حتى تكون دائمة الانتفاء بدوام ذاته وأما القسم
 الثالث...²⁰

ثبوتها ولا في انتفائها فإن كان الأوّل
 وجب ثبوتها ما دام الذات
 وإن كان الثاني وجب انتفاؤها ما دام الذات وإلا لزم
 تخلف المعلول عن علته التامة وإن كان الثالث...²¹

As can easily be seen, wherever ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s text deviates from Rāzī’s text, it merely paraphrases it. To counter this argument, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn argues that the reliance of God’s perfection on His attributes is true, but only with respect to God’s real attributes. Given that knowledge is a relation or an attribute holding a relation, change can be delegated to the relation only, leaving the essence untouched.²²

The position of the Mu‘tazilah

A major part of this section is devoted to a solution which Khojazāda attributes to the Mu‘tazilite theologians.²³ The passage not only has historical value (to understand the Mu‘tazilah and the responses to them) but also contributes to a better understanding of the issue at stake. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that it seems to be the solution Ghazālī argues for in his *al-Risālah al-Qudsiyyah*, which is also known as *Qawā'id al-‘Aqā'id* (which is the second book of his *Ihyā' ‘Ulūm al-Dīn*), though this is not mentioned by the Ottoman

²⁰ Rāzī, *Arba‘īn*, p. 140.

²¹ ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, *Tahāfut*, p. 268.

²² Ibn Rushd has an opinion which is in sharp contrast with this whole discourse. He argues that “God’s knowledge cannot be divided into the opposites of true and false in which human knowledge is divided [...] this is a knowledge the quality of which nobody but God himself can understand.” And that this is foremost because “For all human sciences are passivities and impressions from the existents, and the existents operate on them. But the knowledge of the Creator operates on existents, and the existents receive the activities of His knowledge.”, Ibn Rushd, Van den Bergh, *Averroes’ Tahafut al-Tahafut*, v.1, p. 269. Ibn Rushd closes his last chapter on God’s knowledge by coming back to this point, stating that “he who believes this makes God an eternal man and man a mortal God” (p. 285). In other words, ‘knowledge’ is equivocally applied to God and human beings, according to Ibn Rushd. Needless to say, the idea that knowledge in relation to God has a completely different definition and meaning than knowledge in relation to human beings is in general not considered by Islamic philosophers of the late-medieval period, let alone accepted. A notable exception is Shahrastānī, cf. Shahrastānī, transl. by W. Madelung and T. Mayer, *Struggling with the Philosopher: A Refutation of Avicenna’s Metaphysics*. London: I.B. Tauris (2001), pp. 60-74.

²³ ‘Alā’ al-Dīn leaves it at a “some of them”. Khojazāda calls them Mu‘tazilites, citing Ījī’s *Mawāqif*. Jurjānī adds that it also applies to “a lot of Ash‘arites”, cf. Ījī, Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, v. 3, p. 108.

intellectuals.²⁴ This position argues for a constant knowledge, regardless of the change the object of knowledge undergoes. In Khojazāda's words (taken from Jurjānī and Ījī):

“Some of the Muṭazilites responded that before the specific thing comes about, God knows that ‘it is non-existent’ and that ‘it will be an existent’. Then when the thing comes to be, He knows because of the previous two knowledge-items that ‘it was non-existent’ and that ‘it is existent’.”²⁵

He later clarifies that in this way, the first knowledge is identical to (ʿayn) the second knowledge, as long as forgetfulness does not overtake the knower. Both Ottoman scholars give an example (not exactly the same one, but equivalent) to clarify the Muṭazilite opinion. For example, if we picture ourselves knowing that Zayd will enter the house tomorrow, and we keep this knowledge until the next day, then from this first knowledge we now know that Zayd has entered the house. As ʿAlā' al-Dīn puts it, “the knowledge before [Zayd's] entering the house that ‘he will enter’ and the knowledge after it that ‘he has entered’ are one. [This] first knowledge is eternal.” Thus, there is one knowledge which remains the same eternally.

The Muṭazilite opinion as related here is close to the view of Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī (which Khojazāda seemed to favour), namely, that God has an equal relation to all particulars and knows each of them in their own moments. It is at least closer to that view than it is to the view of Rāzī, which stated that knowledge is the relation between knower and known. This is because the former is like the Muṭazilite opinion, arguing for one knowledge lasting eternally, while the latter entails that knowledge can be both changing and multiple, while at the same time not ascribing these characteristics to the knower.

Source of the passage on the Muṭazilah

This passage is an excellent opportunity to see how the texts of the two Ottoman scholars relate to each other and how both of them relate to earlier texts. As we have seen before, especially in the case of Khojazāda, we are able to establish that a lot of his passages rely heavily on earlier philosophical texts. For ʿAlā' al-Dīn textual correspondence was harder to trace. However, if we compare the following passage, it is easy to see that although ʿAlā' al-Dīn rewrote much of the argument in his own words, it is still undoubtedly clear that it relies on

²⁴ Compare Tibawī, A. L., “Al-Ghazālī's Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalem”, *Islamic Quarterly* 9: 1/2 (January/June 1965): p. 108 [= second pillar, 8th fundamental principle].

²⁵ Ījī, Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, v. 3, p. 108.

Ījī's and Jurjānī's *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*. As usual, in bold are textual correspondences. Underlined are words that play a key role in the argumentation and closely resemble the other texts.

<i>Sharḥ al-Mawāqif</i>	<i>Tahāfut al-Falāsifah</i>	<i>al-Dhakhīrah</i>
(وقد أجاب عنه * مشايخ المعتزلة) وكثير من الأشاعرة بأن العلم بأن وجد الشيء	وأجاب عنه بعض مشايخ المعتزلة بأن الشيء المعين قبل حدوثه يعلم منه أنه معدوم وأنه سيكون موجوداً فإذا وجد يعلم بالعلمين الأولين أنه كان معدوماً وأنه موجود	وبعضهم مال في الاعتراض على أصل الدليل إلى منع اللازمة مستنداً بأن العلم قبل دخول الدار بأنه سيدخل والعلم بعده بأنه دخل واحد والعلم الأول أزلي فإذا لم يكن مغايراً للعلم الثاني فبعد الدخول لا ينتفي علم ولا يتجدد علم بل العلم الأول الأزلي يستمر فلا يلزم تغيير لا من وجود إلى عدم ولا من عدم إلى وجود وبين اتحاد العلمين بأننا إذا علمنا أن زيداً سيدخل الدار غداً واستمر لنا ذلك فبالعلم الأول نعلم أنه دخلها لا أن يتجدد لنا علم آخر إنما يحتاج عنها
(و) العلم * بأنه (سيوجد واحد)		
فإن من علم أن زيداً سيدخل البلد غداً فعند حصول الغد يعلم بهذا العلم أنه دخل البلد الآن إذا كان علمه هذا مستمراً بلا غفلة مزيلة له (إنما يحتاج أحدنا إلى علم آخر) متجدد يعلم به أنه دخل الآن (لطريان الغفلة عن الأول	فإن من علم بأن زيداً سيدخل البلد غداً فعند حصول الغد يعلم بهذا العلم أنه دخل البلد الآن إذا كان علمه هذا مستمراً بلا غفلة مزيلة له وإنما يحتاج أحدنا إلى علم آخر متجدد يعلم به أنه دخل الآن لطريان الغفلة عن الأول [...] والباري تعالى تمتنع عليه الغفلة فكان علمه بأنه يجد عين علمه بأنه سيوجد وعلمه بأنه كان معدوماً عين علمه بأنه معدوم فلا يلزم من تغيير المعلوم من عدم إلى وجود تغيير في علمه	فإن من علم أن زيداً سيدخل الدار غداً واستمر لنا ذلك فبالعلم الأول نعلم أنه دخلها لا أن يتجدد لنا علم آخر إنما يحتاج عنها فعلمه الأزلي بأنه سيدخل عين علمه بأنه دخل ²⁷
والباري تعالى تمتنع عليه الغفلة فكان علمه بأنه يجد عين علمه بأنه سيوجد)		
فلا يلزم من تغيير المعلوم من عدم إلى وجود تغيير في علمه ²⁶		

²⁶ Ījī, Jurjānī, v. 3, p. 108.

²⁷ 'Alā' al-Dīn, *Tahāfut*, p. 269.

As we can see from this passage, even though 'Alā' al-Dīn's text looks on the surface quite different, it is in fact not. The outline of the argument is the same, as well as some of the key words and phrases. Merely changing the example does not lessen his reliance on Ījī's and Jurjānī's texts.

Refutation of the Mu'tazilah

The view of the Mu'tazilah is taken care of delicately, with both Ottoman scholars trying their best to make convincing objections. Khojazāda lists three, all taken from Ījī and Jurjānī.²⁸ 'Alā' al-Dīn lists five, and while the origin of at least some of these probably lies with Ījī and Jurjānī, this is not entirely clear (at least the way they are presented here may be considered as something original to 'Alā' al-Dīn).

Difference between the two knowledge-items

The first and second objections that Khojazāda raises are very similar. They correspond to 'Alā' al-Dīn's fourth and third objections, respectively. These two objections are designed to attack the notion that these different events (e.g. 'before entering the house' and 'after entering the house') can be constructed as one knowledge-item. The first objection states that the reality (*ḥaqīqah*) of the event 'it will happen' is different from the reality of the event 'it has happened'. The difference in the objects of knowledge entails a difference in knowledge (or to be more precise, it entails a difference between the two knowledge-items of the two events). So in at least one sense the knowledge-item of the first event is different from the knowledge-item of the second event.

The second objection merely replaces 'reality' with 'condition' (*shart*). Just as the realities differ, so do the conditions differ, and from this difference there follows a difference in knowledge. That the conditions differ is easily seen. Khojazāda says: "the condition of the knowledge that 'it has occurred' is the occurrence, while the condition of the knowledge that 'it will occur' is the absence of the occurrence." The difference between the conditions therefore could not be clearer. If for the first knowledge-item the condition is x , the knowledge-item for the second event is $\neg x$.

Khojazāda relates a counterargument to these objections which seems informed by Rāzī's notion of knowledge as a relation. This counterargument argues that these differences may obtain just in the connection (*al-ta'alluq*), just as one attribute may possess many connections

²⁸ Ījī, Jurjānī, v. 3, pp. 110-111. Ījī relates them back to Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044), a Mu'tazilite theologian who was influenced by Peripatetic philosophy, cf. *El*², Supplement, 25a ff.

without affecting the oneness of the essence of which the attribute is a part. Considering the response of Khojazāda, who merely replies that the Muʿtazilah do not accept this because they do not accept knowledge as an attribute possessing a connection, we might even consider that Khojazāda included it here just to point out the difference between the Muʿtazilite idea and Rāzī's idea.

The first argument of ʿAlā' al-Dīn's text has a similar approach as the previous two. Here ʿAlā' al-Dīn considers the two different knowledge-items (e.g., 'it will occur' and 'it has occurred'). Before the occurrence, the proposition 'it will occur' is knowledge (i.e., true), while the proposition 'it has occurred' is believed to be ignorance (i.e., false). However, after the occurrence it is the other way around. Now 'it will occur' is believed to be ignorance and 'it has occurred' is believed to be knowledge. In a similar fashion to the previous two arguments, ʿAlā' al-Dīn now argues that since the beliefs about the knowledge-items are different, the knowledge-items must be different too. A very similar argument is put forward by Rāzī in his *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*.²⁹

Knowing the one without the other

The third objection Khojazāda raises is put by him in a very concise way. He merely states that it is possible to know that 'it will occur' at some point, while being ignorant that 'it has occurred'.³⁰ His conclusion is that "the not-known is other than the known" (*wa-ghayr al-maʿlūm ghayr al-maʿlūm*).³¹ As it turns out, Khojazāda took this passage from the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, but chose to include only Ījī's text. The same passage including Jurjānī's commentary reads: "the not-known, that is, what is not an object of knowledge in time, is other than the known, that is, different from what is an object of knowledge in time."³² More insight about Khojazāda's objections can also be gained by taking ʿAlā' al-Dīn's second and fifth objection into account. Importantly, just as in the first objection of ʿAlā' al-Dīn, 'knowledge-item' (*ʿilm*) is equivalent to 'true'. Only after accepting this does the passage become clear:

"It is possible that a person knows that it is true that 'Zayd will enter', without knowing that it is true that 'Zayd has entered', regardless whether it is true that Zayd has

²⁹ Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v. 2, p. 543.

³⁰ Rāzī uses the example of a person who sits in a pitch-black house: he cannot tell if the sun has risen or not and therefore does not know when Zayd enters the city when the sun rises. Cf. Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, v.2, p. 543.

³¹ A translation that makes more sense (but does damage to the sentence structure inherent in the Arabic) would be: "something being unknown is different from something being known".

³² Ījī, Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, v. 3, p. 110.

entered or not. Likewise is it possible that a person knows that it is true that 'Zayd has entered the house' without having known that it is true that 'Zayd will enter the house', regardless whether it was true that 'Zayd will enter the house'."³³

‘Alā’ al-Dīn does not provide a further argument in this objection, and the actual force of the argument is therefore somewhat weakened. Would not the Mu‘tazilites say that such a case can only occur when one is overtaken by forgetfulness? This was already ruled out in the exposition of the argument of the Mu‘tazilah and therefore the objection does not seem to go beyond the objection that Khojazāda argued for. However, the fifth and final objection of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn provides a similar argument but with a fuller substantiation. Here he plays into our own experience of our knowledge of certain effects. For we all know that it often happens that even though we know that ‘x will happen’, we afterwards never attain knowledge that ‘x has happened’, even though it could be that x already happened. Likewise, it does happen that all of a sudden we know that ‘x has happened’, even though we never knew before that ‘x will happen’.

All of these versions of the same argument point to the experience (man's experience) that one knowledge-item can be known without the other ever being known. Because of this, the knowledge-items have to be distinct and cannot be equivalent. Still, how well this argument holds up against the clause of the Mu‘tazilah that one may not be negligent is not considered by the Ottoman scholars. Nor do they discuss the permissibility of applying our experience of knowledge to God's knowledge.

‘Alā’ al-Dīn's conclusion

What ‘Alā’ al-Dīn does discuss is the applicability to God of the objections taken as a whole (drawing from Ījī and Jurjānī³⁴). He writes that a response could be that there is indeed a difference between the two events. However, one can still claim that the two knowledge-items are equivalent and only differ in judging one of them to be in the past and the other in the future. ‘Past’ and ‘future’ therefore come to mean ‘what is before the moment of judgment’ and ‘what is after the moment of judgment’ respectively. The judgment itself (i.e., a proposition regarding the object of knowledge) is essentially still the same. Since God's knowledge and

³³ The editor, al-Sa‘ādah, showed he understood the passage as he included critical parts of the argument in the main body of the text, against the evidence of some manuscripts.

³⁴ ‘Alā’ al-Dīn's text is a paraphrase with occasionally direct textual correspondence. Cf. Ījī, Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, v. 3, p. 109.

judgment is outside of time, to Him there is only the one knowledge-item, everlasting and unchanging.

To 'Alā' al-Dīn, this response is equal to Quṭb al-Dīn's theory (whom he refers to as "the writer of *al-Muḥākamāt*"). Interestingly enough, although he claims to supply a citation of Quṭb al-Dīn to substantiate his claim, his citation is actually from Jurjānī's *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, who in turn cites Quṭb al-Dīn (though not by name, merely attributing it to 'the philosophers' [*al-ḥukamā'*]). If we compare the relevant passages, this becomes evident. For convenience, the passages are formatted in order for the textual correspondences to line up.

<i>al-Muḥākamāt</i>	<i>Sharḥ al-Mawāqif</i>	<i>al-Dhakhīrah</i>
لا من حيث أن بعضها واقع الآن وبعضها في الزمان الماضي وبعضها في الزمان المستقبل فإن العلم بالجزئيات من هذه الحيشية يتغير بحسب تغير الماضي والمستقبل والحال	لا من حيث أن بعضها واقع الآن وبعضها في الماضي وبعضها في المستقبل فإن العلم بها من هذه الحيشية يتغير	لا يعلمها من حيث أن بعضها واقع الآن وبعضها في الماضي وبعضها في المستقبل *
بل * علماً متعالياً عن الدخول تحت الأزمنة ثابتاً أبداً الدهر ومثاله إن المنجم إذا علم أن القمر يتحرك كل يوم كذا والشمس يتحرك أيضاً في كل يوم كذا يعلم أنه تحصل بينهما مقارنة أو مقابلة حين وصولهما إلى نقطة الحمل في وقت معين فإذا مضى اليوم فإن علم بذلك كان جهلاً وإلا يلزم التغير والحاصل أن	بل يعلمها علماً متعالياً عن الدخول تحت الأزمنة ثابتاً أبداً الدهر وتوضيحه أنه تعالى لما لم يكن مكانياً كانت نسبته إلى جميع الأمكنة على سواء فليس فيها بالقياس إليه قريب وبعيد ومتوسط كذلك لما لم يكن هو وصفاته الحقيقية زمانية لم يتصف الزمان مقيساً إليه بالمضي والاستقبال والحضور بل كان نسبته إلى جميع الأزمنة * سواء *	بل يعلمها علماً متعالياً عن الدخول تحت الأزمنة ثابتاً أبداً الدهر وهذا كما أنه تعالى لما لم يكن مكانياً كان نسبته إلى جميع الأمكنة على سواء فليس * بالقياس إليه بعضها قراباً وبعضها بعيداً وبعضها متوسطاً كذلك لما لم يكن * زمانياً * كان نسبته إلى جميع الأزمنة على سواء فليس بالقياس إليه بعضها ماضياً وبعضها حاضراً وبعضها مستقبلاً وكذا الأمور الواقعة في الزمان فالوجودات من الأزل إلى الأبد معلومة له كل في وقته وليس في علمه كان وكائن وسيكون * بل هي *
الموجودات من الأزل إلى الأبد معلومة لله تعالى كل في وقته * ليس في علمه كان وكائن ويكون بل هي حاضرة عنده في أوقاتها	الموجودات من الأزل إلى الأبد معلومة له كل في وقته وليس في علمه كان وكائن وسيكون * بل هي *	الموجودات من الأزل إلى الأبد معلومة له كل في وقته وليس في علمه كان وكائن ويكون بل هي دائماً

<p>أزلاً وأبداً³⁵ حاضرة عنده في أوقاتها [...] لا يتغير </p>	<p>حاضرة عنده في أوقاتها بلا تغير </p>	<p>أصلاً³⁷ أصلاً³⁶ </p>
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What becomes clear from comparing these texts is that ‘Alā’ al-Dīn relied on Jurjānī’s text (this passage contains only Jurjānī’s commentary and does not borrow anything from Ījī’s lemma), not Quṭb al-Dīn’s text. Two arguments for this may be proposed. First, where Quṭb al-Dīn includes an example of the knowledge about an eclipse, Jurjānī (and following him, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn) deviates from Quṭb al-Dīn’s text and makes a comparison between this type of relation to time and the relation to space. Second, wherever Jurjānī emended Quṭb al-Dīn’s text (e.g. Quṭb al-Dīn’s ‘*ma^clūmah li-llāh*’ is changed into Jurjānī’s ‘*ma^clūmah lahu*’) ‘Alā’ al-Dīn follows Jurjānī’s emendation.

As a very last objection to this theory, which we now know comes from Quṭb al-Dīn, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn brings in the argument (mentioned by him in the very beginning of this chapter) that holds that the perception of a particular corporeal thing can only occur by means of a bodily organ. Because this argument contradicts Quṭb al-Dīn’s theory, it discredits the theory. This then could be the reason why ‘Alā’ al-Dīn stops discussing this first argument (pertaining to the first proof of the first chapter, the argument for God’s knowledge from being immaterial) against God’s knowledge of particulars, and instead moves on to discuss God’s knowledge of particulars in relation to the argument from God’s causation.

Khojazāda’s conclusion

Khojazāda concludes this section by returning to his original argument, stated at the beginning of this chapter (that is, Quṭb al-Dīn’s theory). He explains that being a temporal particular means to be connected to time, without being able to be without time. It can be temporal in two ways. Either it itself undergoes change over time, or it can be a locus in which something that changes inheres. The former can mean two things. It is either continuous (like locomotion), or it is discrete (like coming to be and passing away).

Khojazāda argues that things like the separate intellects and God are the opposite of this. They are things that do not change, nor are they a locus for change. For this reason, they are not connected with time. Because they are not connected with time, they cannot be related to past, present, and future. Khojazāda gives the example of space, which is similar to time in this

³⁵ Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, v. 2, pp. 399-400.

³⁶ Ījī/Jurjānī, v. 3, p. 109.

³⁷ ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Ṭūsī, p. 271. Khojazāda has a paraphrase of the same at page 21-22.

regard. No spatial things can exist without the three dimensions of space, while immaterial things do not have any dimensions and therefore cannot be related to any location in space (like close, far, and in between, which are analogous to past, present, and future).

Therefore, just as God has an equal relationship to all spatial locations, He has an equal relationship to all temporal moments. Khojazāda stresses that ignorance would only occur if He knows that some things are past (or present, or future) in relation to Him. But this is not the case, for no things are past, present, or future to Him, but each temporal moment has an equal relationship to God. Khojazāda further stresses that in terms of how specific God's knowledge can be, it would only be tantamount to ignorance if His knowledge of something could be applicable to several particulars. As argued before, this is not the case but it is rather the case that He knows a particular "inasmuch as it is a natural (*ṭabbī'īyah*) essence, characterized by attributes which together specify only one particular thing."

Particulars and universals in terms of God's causality

In comparison to the other issue discussed in this chapter, the discussion of knowledge of particulars in terms of the second proof of the first chapter is relatively small. Khojazāda merely adds it as an extra comment on the previous discussion on temporality. He comments that excluding particulars from God's knowledge contradicts what the second proof tries to establish. For "complete knowledge of the particularity of the cause (*khuṣūṣīyat al-ʿillah*) requires complete knowledge of the particularity of the effect." A similar argument was put forward by ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn in discussing the second proof of the first chapter, where it was related to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.³⁸

A few lines later, Khojazāda adds that even if this were accepted, knowledge of the effect would not include sensation of it, for this is different from knowledge. Since apprehension of particulars is sensation, it is therefore excluded. Although this argument is clearly related to the second proof of the first chapter, Khojazāda includes it in his discussion of the philosophers' reservation of the third proof (from nobility). We will discuss its use in that context shortly, but for now it is worth considering it in the context of the second proof. From the composition, it seems as though his former argument (the one that pointed out the inconsistency between excluding knowledge of particulars with the range of objects that God knows in the second proof) is an argument that Khojazāda himself agrees with. This would make this second argument (which argued that there is no 'knowledge' of particulars, only

³⁸ See page 77 of this thesis.

sense-perception of them) an argument he included on behalf of his intellectual opponents. But if this is so, it is odd that Khojazāda did not include a counter-argument. In fact, considering the argument's strength, it is a pity he did not give it a more prominent place in his text and did not go deeper into it. As we noticed in the chapter on God's knowledge from Aristotle to Ibn Sīnā, the question of whether sensation is knowledge or whether knowledge proper only deals with universals, is important, and it would have been interesting to see Khojazāda expand on it here.

Particulars and the argument from nobility

The argument

Khojazāda proposes a third reservation of the philosophers, which deals with the proof of knowledge from nobility. Here it is argued that knowledge of particulars is not an absolute nobility. For particulars are bodily and composite, which is inherently a shortcoming. Because of this shortcoming, knowledge of it cannot constitute a perfection.

In explaining this reservation, he also explains that even if the second proof (from causality) is considered, particulars would not be included. For the apprehension of them is through the senses, and is thus not knowledge proper. This last explanation was already discussed in the previous paragraph, but it is placed by Khojazāda in this discussion. He connects it to the discussion of the proof from nobility by concluding that "sensation – which is only possible by means of bodily senses – is not knowledge, so there is no inconsistency." The inconsistency referred to is most likely the tension between Khojazāda's own statement that the argument from causality demands an inclusion of particulars in God's knowledge, and the philosophers' exclusion of particulars based on their ignoble character. The claim that 'knowledge' of particulars is in fact not knowledge but sensation would therefore be a claim held by the philosophers, not by Khojazāda.

‘Alā’ al-Dīn, though raising the same reservation – that in taking the proof from nobility into account one has to exclude knowledge of particulars – can be seen to provide a completely different argument. In his view, this reservation is not based on the particulars' lack of perfection, but on the dependence (he uses 'subordinate to it' [*tābīʿ li-*]) on these particulars that it would entail in God's perfection. He makes the point that regardless of the definition of knowledge you settle on, knowledge will be a constitutive part of God's being, and hence will contribute to the perfection of His being. According to all definitions of knowledge, if we wish

to include particular things other than God Himself in His knowledge, then “something different from Him would enter in the perfection of His essence, which is impossible.”

Objections to the argument

Though ‘Alā’ al-Dīn did not previously mention the notions of ‘active knowledge’ and ‘passive knowledge’ in his text, he here introduces them to claim an objection to the philosophers’ reservation. As he states, “God’s knowledge is active knowledge, which means that it [consists of] the reason (*sabab*) of the existence of the possible things.” As God is the ultimate cause for everything other than Him, God’s knowledge need not be dependent on anything other than His own essence. The impossible result that God would be dependent on other things is therefore not the case, and therefore God’s knowledge of particulars would not be in danger in view of this argumentation.

Khojazāda only provided one cryptic objection to this. He says that “the apprehension of bodily particulars is in need of bodily organs in so far as our essences are concerned (*innamā huwa fi ḥaqqinā*), not in relation to the Necessary.” It seems that he means to propose a similar argument to that of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, yet emphasizing the result of a division into ‘active knowledge’ and ‘passive knowledge’, not the concepts themselves. For (as ‘Alā’ al-Dīn admits too) active knowledge is only properly ascribed to God, while we have to rely on passive knowledge.

Moreover, the argumentation as ‘Alā’ al-Dīn presents it makes for the obvious comment that this argument does not only pertain to particulars, but also to universals. In this sense, God could not know anything. Khojazāda does not relate such an objection for the obvious reason that he had set up his argument against the philosophers’ reservation in a way that makes clear why particulars are singled out.

A final discussion by Khojazāda

‘Alā’ al-Dīn ends his chapter (and thereby his discussion of God’s knowledge) with the aforementioned reservation of the philosophers on the basis of the proof from nobility. In his last paragraph, he repeats his own view, which is that knowledge is a pure relation or an attribute holding a relation. Khojazāda however did not conclude with the reservation based on the proof from nobility. He continues for several more pages, discussing some issues that we have discussed before from various angles.

He first summarizes what seems to be Rāzī's view.³⁹ This view starts by explaining that self-knowledge has no need of any form other than ourselves, and similarly, someone who causes the existence of something, has no need of any form other than himself to know that other thing. In this view, knowledge holds *to* the knower, not *in* the knower. That is to say, to know something does not mean that this object of knowledge enters the mind of the knower, but it can already be ascribed to the knower as an object of knowledge if it is an effect of something the knower caused. As all things are the effect of God, He knows them all, each in its moment, without the need of another form besides Himself, and without the knowledge of all these things being qualified as in the 'past', 'present', or 'future'.

Khojazāda attacks this view by stating that if such a concept of knowledge were accepted, "[its] absolute occurrence to an immaterial thing would be enough for comprehension, and this is not the case." It is not obvious what he means by this objection, and so the force of the argument is hard to evaluate. We learn a bit more about this objection when he states that the occurrence of a thing to a receptive thing (*qābil*) and to an active thing (*fā'il*) may perhaps have completely different effects and that they cannot be understood in relation to each other. What he points out here is that if we say that the occurrence of a thing (e.g. any intelligible) to a receptive thing (e.g. our intellect, which has the intelligible occurring to it qua receiver) constitutes comprehension, this does not mean that the producer of that thing (which has the intelligible occurring to it qua producer, not qua receiver) comprehends that thing.

Phrased as another refutation, he explains that if God's knowledge of other things depended on their existence, then He would not have prior knowledge of them. This would entail that He acts without knowledge (only knowing about it after He acts), which in turn means that He acts out of a natural disposition, not out of a free will. Clearly, this cannot be the case, as Khojazāda points out that even they (presumably Rāzī and other theologians with the same ideas) argue that God is all-powerful and capable of choosing (*qādir mukhtār*). To understand this objection in the context of the previously explained theory, we could imagine that if knowledge does not depend on the form of a thing, and does not occur *in* the knower, then it must be a relation between knower and object of knowledge. As such, to make this relation occur, both related terms must occur, and therefore the existence of the object of knowledge could be seen to be a precondition of the attainment of knowledge about it.

³⁹ E.g. Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqīyah*, v. 1, p. 450ff.

A solution to this could be that God's knowledge is the same as (ʿayn) His will. But, as Khojazāda argues, if we were to agree to this, then the solution that knowledge is one attribute with as many relations as there are objects of knowledge could not be accepted.⁴⁰ This in turn suggests that God only knows Himself, as the multiplicity of objects of knowledge would now already entail a multiplicity in God, which is impossible. Khojazāda ends on the note that this is an obstruction in the argumentation which Ibn Sīnā (*al-shaykh*) did not overcome, and therefore his reasoning is not solid. With this, we have completed our investigation into the three chapters on God's knowledge in the commentaries of Khojazāda and ʿAlā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī on Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*.

⁴⁰ Interestingly, this solution of knowledge as one attribute is ascribed by Khojazāda to Ghazālī.

Conclusion

The commentary tradition on Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* is indeed bigger than just the response of Ibn Rushd, since the two Ottoman studies by Khojazāda and 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, written in the second half of the 15th century, and the subsequent glosses, must be included in any list of direct commentaries on Ghazālī's book. Still, it may be one of the more remarkable facts which this thesis has uncovered that the Ottoman "commentaries" are only commentaries in a very loose sense. At least for the three chapters dealing with God's knowledge, they follow the general structure of Ghazālī's text and only deal with issues that Ghazālī brings up in his text. However, when it comes to the content of those issues, Khojazāda's and 'Alā' al-Dīn's texts do not follow Ghazālī's text that much but rather draw from the wider philosophical discourse that was at that time current. This means that their most important source was al-Sayyid al-Sharīf Jurjānī's commentary on Ījī's *al-Mawāqif fi 'ilm al-Kalām*. Next to that, Ibn Sīnā's *al-Ishārāt wa-al-Tanbīhāt* and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's commentary on it are clearly also central to this discourse. The influence of other texts (such as those by Iṣfahānī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī) is also evident, as indicated throughout this thesis.

It was Van Ess who argued that a text such as Ījī's should not be treated as a primary source but rather as secondary literature,¹ summing up the time after Ījī by saying that "Derselbe Stoff wird in sterile Wechsel aufgeladen und wieder abgeladen, ohne daß man sich an den Quellen erneuerte."² With the two texts under discussion in this thesis, this is indeed to a great extent true. Khojazāda did include some critical notes on Ghazālī's text, and 'Alā' al-Dīn's text does contain only a few literal citations, but from the previous chapters it is clear that the Ottoman scholars borrowed heavily from previous authors. In fact, through the argument-counterargument style they both adapt, it is hard to distinguish which solution the Ottoman scholars support.

However, if we need to give an answer to the question of which solution the Ottoman scholars argue for, it must be the following. Khojazāda's solution seems to be in line with Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's. This solution argues that God knows particulars in a universal way, which means that He knows the bundle of universals which make up the particular. Just as the particular is unique,

¹ Van Ess, J., *Die Erkenntnislehre des 'Aḍudaddīn al-Īcī: Übersetzung und Kommentar des Ersten Buches seiner Mawāqif*. Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur Veröffentlichungen der Orientalische Kommission, Band XXII. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag (1966), p. 12.

² Van Ess, p. 33.

so is the bundle of universals, and therefore God knows all details and states of a particular. Furthermore, because of this, He knows all events in a relative way, not in terms of their absolute time. But because He knows all of this, He knows eternally when each event happens. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī emphasizes Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s view that knowledge is a relation between knower and object of knowledge. The object of knowledge therefore belongs ‘to’ (*li-*) the knower, and is not contained ‘in’ (*fi*) the knower. As such, God is perfectly able to have knowledge of particulars, since change in particulars only affects the relationship but not His essence (the change happens ‘to’ Him, not ‘in’ Him).

Some readers of the last three chapters may have wondered how exactly this is a discussion of God’s knowledge. For even though it was mentioned in the introduction of this thesis that the Ottoman scholars do not deal with the classical theological discussion of God’s knowledge, the material they use which is not explicitly about God’s knowledge is very wide in scope. Indeed, the discussion is a discussion of how knowledge applies to God, and is not a discussion of God with respect to His knowledge. It is epistemology that is the core subject of the two Ottoman scholars in these chapters, not theology, and the concept of God seems to be brought in only to test larger epistemological theories and to see how well they do under extreme conditions. In this sense, it is not surprising that many mutually exclusive solutions are brought forward, argued for, and objected to. An important conclusion we can draw from this, is that in later medieval Islamic philosophy, intellectuals sought one concept and theory of knowledge which could equally well apply to human beings, God, and whatever other things would be permitted to have knowledge under the consequences of theory. Ibn Rushd’s argument that ‘knowledge’ and the other attributes of God can only equivocally applied to human beings and God would therefore not have resonated in this discourse.³

As for the fact that Khojazāda’s commentary won over ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s, we would need to assess their works completely to assess whether this victory was well deserved. All we can say from the three chapters under consideration in this thesis is that Khojazāda’s text is at crucial points more rigorous, and also includes direct objections to Ghazālī (whereas ‘Alā’ al-Dīn not once cites Ghazālī, let alone discusses his arguments). These two facts could very well be the reason why Khojazāda claimed the victory and why his text remained the subject of glosses for centuries to come.

³ See page 107, footnote 23, of this thesis. The distinction of two modes of knowing, one for a passive knower (*qābil*) and one for an active knower (*fā’il*), as described by Khojazāda on page 118, comes of course close to it but is conceptually different since it stems from one epistemological theory while Ibn Rushd seems to argue for two incompatible epistemological theories (one for God, one for all others) from the beginning.

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Appendices

Appendix: a list of names

Agnomen	Full name	Nickname	Date	GAL	Kashf
Al-Fārābī	Abū Naşr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ṭarkhān ibn Uzalāgh al-Fārābī	al-muʿallim al-thānī, Alfarabi	? – 339/950	I, p. 210	Vol. 6, p. 39
Ibn Sīnā	Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sīnā	al-Shaykh, al-Shaykh al-Raʿīs, Avicenna	370/980 – 428/1037	I, p. 452	Vol. 5, p. 308
Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Başrī	Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn al-Ṭayyib ibn al-Ḥusayn		?-436/1044	I, p. 459	Vol. 6, p. 69
Al-Ghazālī ¹	Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī	Ḥujjat al-Islām, Algazel	448/1056 – 505/1111	I, p. 420	Vol. 6, p. 79
Al-Shahrastānī	Muḥammad b. Abī al-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Abī Bakr Aḥmad al-Shahrastānī Abū al-Faṭḥ		469/1077 – 548/1153	I, p. 429	Vol. 6, p. 91
Ibn Rushd	Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Rushd	Averroes	520/1126 – 595/1198	I, p. 461	Vol. 6, p. 104
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī	Fakhr al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Khaṭīb al-Rāzī	al-Imām, al-Shāriḥ al-Fāḍil	543/1149 – 606/1209	I, p. 506	Vol. 6, p. 107
al-Rāwandī	Quṭb al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan Saʿīd ibn Hibah Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan al-Rāwandī al-Shīʿī		? – 573/1177	SI, p. 624	Vol. 5, p. 392
Ibn al-Ḥājib	Jamāl al-Dīn Abū ʿAmr ʿUthmān ibn ʿUmar ibn Abū Bakr ibn al-Ḥājib		570/1174 – 646/1249	I, p. 303	Vol. 5, p. 654
Naşīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī	Abū Jaʿfar Naşīr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad	al-muʿallim al-thālith	597/1201 – 672/1274	I, p. 509	Vol. 6, p. 131

¹ Some people insist on the name al-Ghazzālī, following the principle of *Lectio difficilior potior*.

	ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Ṭūsī				
Al-Zanjānī	Abū al-Faḍā'il Ibrāhīm ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb ibn 'Imād al-Dīn al-Shāfi' al-Naḥawī		? – 655/1257	I, p. 283	Vol. 5, p. 12
Abharī	Athīr al-Dīn al-Mufaḍḍil b. 'Umar b. al-Mufaḍḍil		- 663/1264	I, p. 464	Vol. 6, p. 469
Bayḍāwī	'Abd Allāh b. 'Umar b. Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Shīrāzī al-Imām Nāṣir al-Dīn Abū Sa'īd al-Qāḍī al-Bayḍāwī		- 685/1286?	I, p. 417	Vol. 5, p. 462
Maḥbūbī	'Ubayd Allah ibn Mas'ūd al-Maḥbūbī	Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah al-Thānī	- 747/1346	II, p. 214	Vol. 5, p. 649
Al-Qazwīnī	Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Qazwīnī	Khaṭīb Dimashq	666/1267 – 739/1338	II, p. 22	Vol. 6, p. 150
Iṣfahānī	Shams al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr b. 'Alī al-Iṣfahānī		674/1276 – 749/1348	SII, p. 137	Vol. 6, p. 409
Al-Ījī	'Aḍud al-Dīn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Aḥmad ibn 'Abd al-Ghaffār al-Ṣiddīqī al-Qāḍī al-Ījī al-Zafarī al-Shīrāzī		680/1281 – 756/1355 ²	II, p. 208	Vol. 5, p. 527
Quṭb al-Dīn al-Taḥṭānī	Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī		690/1291? – 766/1365	II, p. 209	Vol. 6, p. 163
Al-Taftazānī	Sa'd al-Dīn Mas'ūd ibn 'Umar al-Taftazānī		722/1322 – 791/1389	II, p. 215	Vol. 6, p. 429
Al-Jurjānī	'Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Alī Abū al-Ḥasan al-Jurjānī	al-Sayyid al-Sharīf	740/1340 – 816/1413	II, p. 216	Vol. 5, p. 728
Khiḍr Bak	Khiḍr Bak ³ ibn al-Qāḍī Jalāl al-Dīn ibn Ṣadr al-Dīn ibn Ibrāhīm		810/1407 – 863/1459	II, p. 229	Vol. 5, p. 346
Al-Khayālī	Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Mūsá	Khayālī al-Rūmī	? – 870/1465 ⁴	SII, p. 318	Vol. 5, p. 132
'Alī Qūshjī	'Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Qūshjī		? – 879/1474	II, p. 234	Vol. 5, p. 736
'Alā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī	'Alā' al-Dīn b. Muḥammad al-Batārikānī al-Ṭūsī		817/1414 – 887/1482	II, p. 204	Vol. 5, p. 737

² *Kashf al-Zunūn* gives a birth date of 700.

³ *Kashf al-Zunūn* gives Khiḍr Bayk (Vol. 2, p. 1248).

⁴ *GAL* gives death date of 862/1458.

Khojazāda	Muṣallaḥ al-Dīn Muṣṭafá ibn Yūsuf ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Būrsawī		? – 893/1488	II, p. 230	Vol. 6, p. 433
Al-Ījī	Muḥammad b. Ṣafī al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām al-Ījī Mu‘īn al-Dīn Al-Ṣafawī al-Shīrāzī		832/1428 – 906/1501 ⁵	II, p. 203	Vol. 6, p. 223
Afḍal Zādah	Ḥamīd al-Dīn Ḥamd Allāh ibn Afḍal al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī	Ibn al-Afḍal al-Rūmī	? – 908/1502	I, p. 418	Vol. 5, p. 334
Al-Dawānī	Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn As‘ad al-Dawānī al-Ṣiddīqī		830/1427 – 908/1502 ⁶	II, p. 217	Vol. 6, p. 224
Ḥakīm Shāh al-Qazwīnī	Muḥammad b. Mubārakshāh b. Muḥammad al-Harawī		? – 928/1521 ⁷	-	Vol. 6, p. 229
Ibn Kamāl Pāshā	Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Sulaymān ibn Kamāl Pāshā		? – 940/1534	II, p. 449	Vol. 5, p. 141
Tāsh Kubrá Zādah	Abū al-Khayr Aḥmad ibn Muṣallaḥ al-Dīn Muṣṭafá Tāsh Kubrá Zādah ‘Iṣām al-Dīn		901/1495 – 968-1560	II, p. 425	Vol. 5, p. 143
Mu‘īd Zādah	‘Abd al-Wahhāb b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Alī al-Amāsīhawī		? – 970/1562	-	Vol. 5, p. 642
Nū‘ī al-Rūmī	Yahyá b. Bayr ‘Alī Nuṣūḥ		940/1533 – 1007/1598	-	Vol. 6, p. 531
Ḥājjī Khalīfah	Muṣṭafá ibn ‘Abd Allāh Kātib Çelebī	Ḥājjī Khalīfah	1017/1609 – 1067/1657	II, p. 427	-
Al-Qarābāghī	Ṣāliḥ b. Ishāq al-Qarābāghī	Zuhūrī	? – 1073/1662	-	Vol. 5, p. 423
Al-Kūrānī	Muḥammad Sharīf b. Yūsuf b. al-Qāḍī Maḥmūd b. al-Munalā Kamāl al-Dīn al-Kūrānī		? – 1078/1667	-	Vol. 6, p. 291
Al-Uskudārī	Muḥammad Amīn b. ‘Abd al-Ḥayy al-Uskudārī		? – 1149/1736	-	Vol. 6, p. 323

⁵ GAL gives a date of death of 905/1500.

⁶ GAL gives a date of death of 907/1501.

⁷ *Kashf al-Zunūn*, Vol. 1, p. 208 gives a date of death of 920/1515

Appendix: an edition of Khojazāda’s chapters on God’s knowledge

The body of the text does not follow primarily one manuscript. It rather opts for the most likely word and sentences, with variants in footnotes. Footnotes have the following format: ‘manuscript with variant reading’ : ‘text in body that is subject to change’ = ‘different reading’. E.g.: $\text{المادة} = \text{المواد}$ means that all manuscripts read *al-māddah* except for manuscript *alif* (bayazid 1990), which reads *al-mawādd*. Variations in conjugation of a verb are silently corrected. Other variations which are common yet of little value - such as the addition of *ta‘ālā* after a suffix which indicates God, confusion between *wa-* and *fa-*, etc. - are also corrected without all variants being indicated.

Sources

Sign	Manuscript	Date
ا	Bayazid 1990	h. 919
ب	Feyzullah 1182	h. 989
ج	Eskisehir 145	h. 1222
ط	Printed volume	h. 1303

ثلاثة فصول من كتاب تمهات الفلاسفة لخواجة زاده - تحقيق للامبرثوس فان ليت

* * *

الفصل الثالث عشر في تعجيزهم عن القول بأن الأول^١ تعالى يعلم غيره بنوع كليّ

ولهم فيه مسالك

الأول أنه تعالى مجرد عن المادّة^٢ ولواحقها قائم بنفسه وكلّ مجرد كذلك يصحّ أن يكون معقولاً وكلّ ما يصحّ أن يكون معقولاً يصحّ أن يكون عاقلاً إذا كان مجرداً قائماً بنفسه

أما أنه تعالى مجرد عن المادّة ولواحقها فلمّا ثبت من أنه تعالى ليس بجسم ولا جسمانيّ

وأما أنّ كلّ مجرد كذلك^٣ يصحّ أن يكون معقولاً فلأنّ ذاته منزهة عن العوارض الجزئية اللاحقة للشيء بسبب المادّة في الوجود الخارجي المقتضية للإنقسام إلى الأجزاء المتباينة في الوضع وهي المانعة من التعقل فإذا كان مجرداً عنها لم يكن فيه مانع من كونه معقولاً بل يكون في نفسه صالحاً لأن يعقل من غير احتياج إلى عمل يعمل به حتّى يصير معقولاً فإن لم^٤ يعقل كان ذلك من جهة العاقل

وأما أنّ كلّ ما يصحّ أن يكون معقولاً يصحّ أن يكون عاقلاً إذا كان مجرداً قائماً بنفسه فلأنّ^٥ كلّ ما يصحّ أن يكون معقولاً يصحّ أن يكون معقولاً مع غيره وكلّ ما يصحّ أن يكون معقولاً مع غيره يصحّ أن يكون عاقلاً إذا كان مجرداً قائماً بنفسه

^١ ط: الأول = المبدأ الأول
^٢ ج: المادّة = الموادّ
^٣ ج: كذلك = -
^٤ ج: لم = -
^٥ ج: ط: فلأنّ = فإنّ

أما الصغرى فلأنّ كلّ ما يصحّ أن يعقل فتعقله يمتنع أن ينفكّ عن صحّة الحكم عليه بالوجود والوحدة وما يجري مجراها من الأمور العامّة والحكم على شيء بشيء^١ يقتضي تصوّرهما معاً فإذا كلّ ما يصحّ أن يعقل يصحّ أن يعقل مع غيره في الجملة

وأما الكبرى فلأنّ كلّ ما يصحّ أن يكون معقولاً مع غيره يصحّ أن يكون مقارناً لمعقول آخر لأنّ الشيء إذا كان معقولاً مع غيره كانا معاً حالّين في القوة العاقلة فيكون مقارناً له مقارنة أحد الحالّين للآخر وكلّ ما يصحّ أن يكون مقارناً لغيره من المعقولات يصحّ أن يكون عاقلاً إذا كان مجرداً قائماً بنفسه لأنّ كلّ ما^٢ يصحّ أن يكون مقارناً لغيره فإنّه إذا وجد في الخارج وهو قائم بذاته يصحّ مقارنة لذلك الغير لأنّ صحّة المقارنة المطلقة لا تتوقّف على المقارنة في العقل إذ هي استعداد المقارنة المطلقة واستعداد المقارنة المطلقة متقدّم على المقارنة المطلقة وهي متقدّمة على المقارنة في العقل لأنّ الأعمّ متقدّم على الأخصّ والمتقدّم على المتقدّم على الشيء متقدّم على ذلك الشيء فصحّة المقارنة المطلقة متقدّمة على المقارنة في العقل فلو توقّفت هي عليها يلزم الدور فإذا صحّ المقارنة المطلقة غير متوقّفة على المقارنة في العقل فإذا وجد في الخارج وهو قائم بذاته تكون صحّة المقارنة المطلقة ثابتة له

وهي حينئذ لا تمكن إلّا بأن يحصل فيه المعقول حصول الحالّ في المحلّ وذلك لأنّه إذا كان قائم الذات امتنع أن يكون مقارنته للغير لحلوله فيه وحلولهما في ثالث والمقارنة المطلقة^٣ تحضّر^٤ في هذه الثلاثة فإذا امتنع اثنتان منها تعيّن أن يكون الصحّة بالنسبة إلى الثالثة وهي صحّة مقارنته للمعقول الآخر مقارنة المحلّ للحالّ فثبت أنّ كلّ ما يصحّ أن يعقل فإذا وجد في الخارج وكان مجرداً قائماً بنفسه يصحّ أن يقارنه معقول آخر مقارنة الحالّ للمحلّ وكلّ ما كان كذلك يصحّ أن يكون عاقلاً لذلك الغير إذ لا معنى لتعقل ذلك الغير إلّا مقارنة ذلك الغير للموجود المجرد القائم بذاته مقارنة الحالّ للمحلّ فكلّ مجرد يصحّ أن يكون عاقلاً لغيره وإذا صحّ أن يكون عاقلاً له كان عقله له حاصلاً بالفعل لأنّ التغيّر والحدوث من توابع المادّة كما عرفت

^١ ج: بشيء = -
^٢ ج: ما = -
^٣ ب: المطلقة = -
^٤ ط: تحضّر = تحضّر

وجوابه أننا لا نسلم أن كل مجرد يصح أن يكون معقولاً وما ذكر لبيانه من أنه لا مانع من التعقل إلا المادة ولو احققها وهي منتقية عن المجرد ففي محل المنع ولم لا يجوز أن يكون للتعقل مانع آخر سوى العوارض الجزئية اللاحقة بسبب المادة وما الدليل على الخصار المانع فيها

ولئن سلمنا ذلك^١ لكن لا نسلم أن كل ما يصح أن يكون معقولاً مع غيره يصح أن يكون عاقلاً إذا كان قائماً بنفسه وما ذكر في بيانه غير تام لأن انتفاء توقف صحة المقارنة المطلقة على المقارنة في العقل لا يستلزم صحة كونه مقارناً لغيره إذا وجد في الخارج قائماً بذاته لجواز أن يكون وجوده العقلي شرطاً لصحة المقارنة فإن ماهيته المجرد وإن كانت متحدة في الذهن والخارج إلا أن الوجود الذهني والخارجي متخالفان فيجوز أن يكون الوجود الذهني شرطاً لصحة المقارنة فلا تصح المقارنة بينهما^٢ إذا كان المجرد موجوداً في الخارج قائماً بذاته لانتفاء شرطها فإن قلت لو كان الوجود العقلي شرطاً لصحة المقارنة المطلقة لزم الدور أيضاً لأن كل ما هو شرط لصحة المقارنة فهو شرط لوجودها فلو كان الوجود العقلي شرطاً لصحة المقارنة المطلقة كان شرطاً لوجودها أيضاً والوجود العقلي أحص من مطلق المقارنة إذ هو مقارنة المعقول للعاقل واشتراط الأعم بالشيء يستلزم اشتراط الأخص^٣ به فيكون الوجود العقلي الذي هو المقارنة المخصوصة مشروطاً بنفسه وإذا لم يجز كون وجود المجرد في العقل شرطاً لصحة المقارنة المطلقة بينه وبين الغير^٤ جازت المقارنة إذا كان المجرد موجوداً في الخارج

قلت ليس المراد بكون الوجود العقلي شرطاً لصحة المقارنة المطلقة أن يكون الوجود العقلي شرطاً لكل ما يطلق عليه المقارنة بالنسبة إلى المجرد سواء كانت تلك^٥ المقارنة مع^٦ العاقل أو المعقول حتى يرد ما ذكر^٧ بل المراد المراد أن المقارنة المطلقة بين^٨ المجرد والمعقول الآخر الذي اجتمع معه في العاقل مشروطة بوجود المجرد في العقل ولا يلزم من اشتراط المقارنة المطلقة بين المجرد والمعقول المذكور بوجود المجرد في العقل اشتراط المقارنة بين المجرد والعاقل بذلك حتى يلزم اشتراط الشيء بنفسه

١ ج: ذلك =
٢ ط: بينهما = بينهما إلا
٣ ج: به =
٤ ط: الغير = غيره
٥ ج: تلك =
٦ ج: مع = بين
٧ ج: حتى يرد ما ذكر =
٨ ط: بين = من

وأيضاً لو صحَّ ما ذكر لأمكن صيرورة الجوهر عرضاً^١ لقيام ما ذكر من الدليل فيها بأن يقال إذا تعقلنا ماهية الجوهر فلا شك في حصول ماهية في العقل فتكون ماهية^٢ الموجودة بالوجود العقلي قائمة بالموضوع^٣ ولا جائز أن يكون وجوده العقلي شرطاً لوجوده في الموضوع لأن وجوده العقلي نفس وجوده في الموضوع فصحَّ الحصول^٤ في الموضوع للماهية مطلقاً فصحَّ على الذات الخارجية الجوهرية أن تنطبع^٥ بعد كونها قائمة بنفسها في محل هو الذهن فيصحَّ انقلابها من الجوهرية إلى العرضية

والتحقيق أن يقال^٦ الوجود على قسمين

قسم يترتب عليه الآثار ويظهر منه الأحكام وهذا الوجود يسمى^٧ خارجياً وعينياً وأصيلاً

وقسم لا يترتب عليه ما ذكر من الآثار والأحكام وهو يسمى وجوداً ذهنياً وظلياً^٨ وغير أصيل وهما متمايزان بالحقيقة والوجود الظلي لكونه لا يحصل إلا في المدرك يستلزم المقارنة المخصوصة أعني مقارنة الحال للمحل لا أنه نفس تلك المقارنة أو نوع مندرج^٩ تحتها اندراج النوع في الجنس بل المقارنة لازم خارجي^{١٠} له فلا يلزم من اشتراط المقارنة به^{١١} اشتراط الشيء بنفسه فإن العرض المختص^{١٢} بشيء مشروط بذلك الشيء دون هذا^{١٣}

ولو سلم أنه لا يجوز أن يكون وجوده العقلي شرطاً لصحة المقارنة المطلقة لكن لا يلزم من عدم توقّف صحة المقارنة المطلقة على الوجود الذهني صحتها بدونه لجواز أن لا تتوقّف عليه ولا تنفك عنه فإن العلة غير مشروط بالمعلول ولا متوقّفة عليه مع أنها لا تنفك عنه أصلاً

^١ ج: عرضاً = غير عرضاً

^٢ ج: ماهية = الماهية

^٣ ب: بالموضوع = بالموضوع الذي هو الذهن

^٤ أ: الحصول = -

^٥ ج: ينطبع = ينقطع

^٦ ب, ج, ط: يقال = -

^٧ ط: يسمى = يسمى وجوداً

^٨ أ: ظلياً = كلياً

^٩ ب: مندرج = مدرج

^{١٠} ط: لازم خارجي = لازمة خارجية

^{١١} ج: به = -

^{١٢} ج: المختص = المحض

^{١٣} ب, ج, ط: دون هذا = دونه

والشيخ بعد ما أورد الاعتراض على الحجّة المذكورة بأنه يجوز أن يمكن مقارنة المجرّد للمعقول عند كون ذلك المجرّد في العقل ولا يمكن عند حصوله^١ في الخارج^٢ لانتفاء شرط أو وجود مانع أجاب بأنّ استعداد مقارنة المجرّد للمعقول إن كان لازماً لماهيّة المجرّد مطلقاً سواء كانت في الذهن أو في الخارج سقط الشكّ بالكلّيّة إذ يمكن حينئذ مقارنة المجرّد للمعقول^٣ إذا كان ذلك المجرّد في الخارج

وإن لم يكن لازماً لها مطلقاً بل إنّما يحصل لها استعداد المقارنة عند حصولها في القوة العاقلة وحينئذ إنّما أن يكون حصول الاستعداد مع المقارنة أو بعدها أو قبلها

والأوّلان باطلان لوجوب تقدّم استعداد الشيء على حصوله فإنّه لا يمكن^٤ أن يحصل صفة لشيء ويكون استعداد الشيء على^٥ حصولها معها وامتناع حصول صفة لموصوف غير مستعدّ لحصولها

فتعيّن الثالث وهو أن يكون استعداد مقارنة المجرّد للمعقول عند كون ذلك المجرّد في العقل حاصلًا قبل المقارنة فيكون الاستعداد لنفس^٦ ماهيّة المجرّد لأنّ ماهيّة المجرّد عند كونها في العقل قبل المقارنة معقولة والماهيّة المعقولة مجردة عن جميع اللواحق الغريبة فلا يكون هناك شيء غير الماهيّة يفيد الاستعداد

وفيه نظر ظاهر لأنّ الماهيّة المعقولة وإن كانت مجردة عن اللواحق الخارجة إلّا أنّها غير مجردة عن اللواحق مطلقاً فإنّه لا شكّ في كونها ملحوقة للوجود الذهنيّ فيجوز أن يكون ذلك شرطاً للاستعداد فلا يحصل الاستعداد عند كونها في الخارج هذا

ثمّ إنّ هذه الحجّة أعني المسلك الأوّل لإثبات كون المبدأ الأوّل عالماً بغيره على تقدير صحّة ينتج أنّ الواجب لذاته يعقل الأشياء بحصول صورها فيه وهذه النتيجة باطلة عند جمهور الفلاسفة فما هو نتيجة هذه الحجّة بمنعون صحّتها ويعترفون بفسادها وما يرمون إثباته بما فهي غير منتجة له

^١ ج: حصوله = فصوله
^٢ ط: الخارج = الجارج
^٣ ط: للمعقول = العقول
^٤ ب, ج, ط: لا يمكن = يمتنع
^٥ ا, ب, ط: الشيء على = -
^٦ ج, ط: حاصلًا = -
^٧ ج: لنفس = في نفس

إلا أن كلام الشيخ في كتاب^١ الإشارات يدل على أن علمه^٢ تعالى بالأشياء بحصول صورها فيه فهذه
الحجة على تقدير تمامها لا تصلح من الفلاسفة إلا له^٣

وقد يجاب عن هذا المسلك بوجوه آخر غير ما ذكر كمنع صحة التعقل بصحة المقارنة وغير ذلك إلا أن
استيفاء^٤ الكلام في ذلك بعد حصول الغرض^٥ مما لا يليق بالكتب المبنيّة على الاختصار

المسلك الثاني أنه تعالى مجرد قائم بذاته لما سبق^٦ وكل مجرد قائم بذاته فإن ذاته المجردة القائمة بذاته حاضرة
حاضرة له غير غائبة عنه وكل ما كان ذاته المجردة القائمة بذاته حاضرة له لا بد أن يعقل ذاته لأن التعقل ليس إلا
حضور الماهية المجردة للأمر المجرد القائم بذاته فثبت أنه تعالى لا بد أن يعقل ذاته وذاته علة لما عداه والعلم بالعلة
يوجب العلم بالمعلول فيكون عالماً بغيره من المعلولات

وقد يقرّر بوجه آخر وهو أنه إذا علم ذاته وذاته مبدأ لغيره فلا بد وأن يعلم أن ذاته مبدأ لغيره ومتى علم
أن ذاته مبدأ لغيره فلا بد وأن يعلم غيره^٧ لأن العلم بإضافة أمر إلى آخر يستلزم العلم بكل واحد من المضافين
ثم إذا علم ذلك الغير لا بد وأن يعلم معلول ذلك الغير وقد ثبت أن ما عدا واجب الوجود فإنه مستند^٨
إليه وتنتهي سلسلة علله بالأخرة إليه^٩ فإذا نزل من علمه تعالى بذاته^{١٠} علمه بكل ما عداه
وأجيب عنه بوجوه

الأول أننا لا نسلم أن كل مجرد قائم بذاته فإن ذاته المجردة القائمة بذاته حاضرة له فإن الحضور نسبة لا
تتحقق إلا بين المتغايرين وإذا لا تغاير بين الشيء ونفسه فلا إضافة

^١ ب: كتاب =
^٢ ج: علمه = عليه
^٣ ب: له = له إلى الشيخ
^٤ ب: استيفاء = استيقاب. ط: استيفاء = استيعاب
^٥ ج: الغرض = الذهن
^٦ ط: لما سبق = -
^٧ ج: غيره = -
^٨ ط: مستند = يستند
^٩ ج: علله بالأخرة إليه = علله إليه بالأخرة
^{١٠} ج: بذاته = -

وردّ بأنّ التغيرات الاعتباريَّة يكفي في تحقّق النسبة وذات الجرّد باعتبار صلاحيتها للمعلوميَّة في الجملة
مغايرة لها باعتبار صلاحيتها للعالمية في الجملة وهذا القدر من التغيرات يكفيها

وقد يقال التغيرات الاعتباريَّة إنّما يكفي بذاته^١ في تحقّق النسبة بحسب الاعتبار لا بحسب نفس الأمر فلا
يثبت كونه عالماً بذاته في نفس الأمر بل بحسب الاعتبار فقط والمقصود هو^٢ الأوّل فلتأمّل إلى هنا^٣

وثانيها أنّنا لا نسلم أنّ كلّ ما كان ذاته المجردة القائمة بذاته حاضرة له لا بدّ وأن يعقل ذاته

قولهم لأنّ التعقّل ليس إلّا حضور الماهية المجردة للأمر الجرّد القائم بنفسه ممنوع ولم لا يجوز أن يكون
التعقّل عبارة عن حالة نسبيّة تحصل في حقنا دون بعض الجرّدات

وثالثها أنّنا لا نسلم أنّ العلم بالعلّة يوجب^٤ العلم بالمعلول إن أريد أنّ العلم بالعلّة من حيث ذاتها

المخصوصة يوجب العلم بالمعلول كما هو الظاهر من التقرير الأوّل إذ لا دليل عليه يعتدّ به

وإن أريد أنّ العلم بالعلّة من حيث أنّه مبدأ وعلّة للمعلول موجب للعلم بالمعلول فذلك لا شكّ في بطلانه

لأنّ العلم بكونه مبدأ للمعلول موقوف^٥ على العلم بالمعلول ضرورة توقّف معرفة الإضافة على معرفة المضافين
فامتنع أن يكون موجباً له

وإن أريد أنّ العلم بالعلّة من حيث أنّه علّة للمعلول مستلزم للعلم بالمعلول وإن لم يكن موجباً له كما هو

ظاهر من التقرير^٦ الثاني فللخصم أن يمنع كون المبدأ عالماً بذاته من حيث أنّه علّة للمعلول فإنّ المبدئيّة والعلّيّة أمر

إضافي ولا شكّ أنّه مغاير لنفس ذاته المخصوصة فلم قلتم أنّه لا بدّ من تعقّله لذلك الأمر الإضافي حتّى يلزم^٧ أن

يكون عاقلاً لغيره من المعلولات فلا بدّ لهم من الدلالة^٨ على ذلك

١ ط: بذاته = -

٢ ج: هو = -

٣ ب, ج, ط: إلى هنا = -

٤ ج: يوجب = موجب

٥ ج: موقوف = يتوقّف

٦ ج, ط: من التقرير = تقرير

٧ ط: يلزم = يلزمه

٨ ا: الدلالة = الدلالة الأوّل

فإن قلت لما كانت العلة التامة^١ لذاتها المخصوصة موجبة للمعلول المخصوص كان العلم بحقيقتها^٢ موجباً

للعلم^٣ بالمعلول وهذا ضروري لا وجه لمنعه ولما ثبت أن المعنى بكون الماهية معقولة كون تلك الماهية حاضرة للجوهر المجرد القائم بذاته لزم كون المبدئية معقولة له تعالى لأن كون الباري تعالى^٤ مبدأ لغيره حاضر لذاته المجردة القائم بذاته لكونه وصفاً له تعالى ثم أنه يلزم من علمه بكونه مبدأ لغيره علمه بغيره وهو المطلوب

قلت المعلوم لنا هو أن^٥ عين العلة الخارجية مستلزمة لعين المعلول الخارجي وأما أن صورتها مستلزمة لصورته فليس معلوماً لنا لا بالضرورة ولا بالنظر إذ الأعيان مخالفة^٦ الصور^٧ في كثير من الأحكام ولا يلزم من استلزام عين أحدهما عين الآخر أن تكون صورة أحدهما مستلزمة لصورة الآخر وإنما يكون كذلك لو كان ماهية العلة من حيث هي مستلزمة لماهية المعلول وهو ممنوع

وبعد تسليم أن معنى كون الماهية معقولة كونها حاضرة للجوهر المجرد القائم بذاته لا نسلم أن المبدئية حاضرة له فإن حضور الشيء للشيء إنما هو بوجوده له إما وجوداً متأسلاً كصفاته الحقيقية الخارجية أو غير متأسل كما إذا حصل صور الأشياء الخارجية فيه والمبدئية وصف اعتباري ليس له وجود خارجي في ذات المبدأ حتى يحضر له باعتبار وجوده الخارجي فيه

ولم يثبت أيضاً حضورها له باعتبار وجودها الظلي فإن أتصاف الموصوف بالصفة لا يقتضي ثبوت الصفة لا في الخارج ولا في الذهن فلم يلزم كونها معقولة له^٨ فلا يثبت المطلوب بل الحاضر للموصوف المجرد القائم بذاته هو أوصافه الحقيقية ولو لم يعتبر في حضور الصفة للموصوف ذلك لوجب أن تعرف بالضرورة جميع الصفات الاعتبارية والسلبية التي لنفوسنا من تجردها وحدوثها وليس كذلك بالضرورة

^١ ج، ط: التامة = -
^٢ ج: بحقيقتها = تحقيقها
^٣ ط: للعلم = -
^٤ ج: لأن كون الباري تعالى = -
^٥ ج: أن = -
^٦ ب، ج، ط: مخالفة = يخالف
^٧ الصور = للصور
^٨ له = -

المسلك الثالث ما يخصّه بعض المتأخّرين وهو أنّ العلم كمال مطلق للموجود من حيث هو موجود وكلّ كمال مطلق للموجود من حيث هو موجود فهو لا يمتنع على واجب الوجود فيجب له

أمّا الصغرى فلأنّ معنى الكمال المطلق أن لا يكون كمالاً من وجه ونقصاناً من وجه كما إذا أوجب تكثراً وتركباً وجسميّة ونحوها والعلم مع كونه كمالاً لا يجب من حيث هو علم أن يكون بصورة وأثر فإنّ للنفس علوماً حضوريةً يكفي فيها مجرد حضور المعلوم عندها وعدم غيبته عنها

وأمّا الكبرى فلأنّ الكمال المطلق للموجود من حيث هو موجود كمال للموجود من حيث هو من غير أن يكون موجباً للنقص^١ وكلّ ما كان كذلك فهو لا يمتنع على واجب الوجود وهذا ضروريّ

و أمّا أنّ كلّ ما لا يمتنع على واجب الوجود فهو^٢ يجب له فلأنّ كلّ ما لا يمتنع على واجب الوجود فهو^٣ إمّا واجب أو ممكن بالإمكان الخاصّ لا سبيل إلى الثاني إذ لو^٤ أمكن عليه شيء بالإمكان الخاصّ لكان فيه جهة إمكانيّة فيلزم التكثر وهو محال في حقّه تعالى

وجوابه أنّنا لا نسلم أنّ العلم كمال مطلق للموجود فإنّ معنى الكمال المطلق أن لا يكون كمالاً من وجه ونقصاناً من وجه بل يكون كمالاً على الإطلاق من غير تقييد بجهة من الجهات

وما ذكره من الدليل لا يدلّ عليه فإنّه إنّما يدلّ على أنّه لا يوجب التكثر وهو نقص مخصوص وعدم إيجابه له لا يستلزم عدم إيجاب غيره من النقائص لجواز أن يكون فيه نقص من جهة أخرى وعدم الإطلاع لا يدلّ على عدم الوجود

وأيضاً قوله لكان فيه جهة إمكانيّة إن أريد به لكان فيه جهة^٥ إمكانيّة بالنظر إلى وجوده في نفس فممنوع

فممنوع

وإن أريد بالنظر إلى بعض عوارضه فمسلم ولكن^١ استحالته ممنوعة قوله فيلزم التكثر

^١ ج: للنقص = للتقصي
^٢ ج: ط: فهو = -
^٣ ج: فهو = -
^٤ ج: لو = -
^٥ ط: جهة = جهة أخرى

ممنوع إن أريد باعتبار ذاته

ومسلّم ولكنه غير مستحيل إن أريد باعتبارات وجهات^٢

ثم أعلم أن المسلكين الآخرين من مسالك الحكماء على تقدير تمامهما يفيدان^٣ العلم بجميع الموجودات

بخلاف المسلك الأول

وقرّر^٤ الإمام الغزالي المسلك الأول بأن الموجود الأول موجود لا في مادة وكلّ موجود لا في مادة فهو

عقل محض وكلّ ما هو^٥ عقل محض فجميع المعقولات مكشوفة له فإنّ المانع عن درك^٦ الأشياء التعلّق بالمادة والاشتغال بها ونفس الآدمي مشغولة بتدبير البدن الماديّ فإذا انقطع شغله بالموت ولم يكن قد تدّس بالشهوات البدنيّة والصفات الرذيلة المتعدّيّة إليه من الأمور الطبيعيّة انكشف له حقيقة المعقولات كلّها ولذلك قضى بأنّ الملائكة كلّهم يعرفون جميع المعقولات ولا يشدّ عنهم شيء لأنّهم أيضاً عقول مجردة لا في مادة

وأجاب عنه بأنّه إن أريد بالعقل^٧ أنّه يعقل سائر الأشياء فقله وكلّ موجود لا في مادة فهو عقل محض^٨

يكون نفس الدعوى فكيف يجعل^٩ من مقدّمات الدليل وإن أريد به^{١٠} أنّه يعقل نفسه فلا نسلم قوله وكلّ ما هو^{١١} عقل محض فجميع المعقولات مكشوفة له فإنّ هذه المقدّمة غير ضروريّة ولا قام عليها برهاناً^{١٢}

وما ذكر من أن المانع عن درك^{١٣} الأشياء التعلّق بالمادة والاشتغال بها وهو منتفٍ في المجرّدات المحضة

مدفوع بأنّه لم لا يجوز أن يكون مانع آخر غير التعلّق بالمادة يوجد في بعض المجرّدات

^١ ط: لكن = -

^٢ ب: باعتبارات وجهات = باعتبار ذاته وصفاته. ط: باعتبارات = باعتبار ذاته

^٣ ج: يفيدان = مفيدان

^٤ ب: قرّر = قد قرّر

^٥ ج: هو = -

^٦ ط: درك = إدراك

^٧ ج: بالعقل = بعقل

^٨ أ, ب, ط: محض = -

^٩ ج: يجعل = يكون

^{١٠} أ: به = -

^{١١} أ, ج: ما هو = -

^{١٢} ط: برهاناً = برهان

^{١٣} ط: درك = إدراك

وفيه بحث إذ لا يخفى^١ أنه إذا أريد بالعقل أنه يعقل سائر الأشياء لا تكون المقدمة القائلة كل موجود لا في مادة فهو عقل محض^٢ عين الدعوى كيف وهذه قضية كلية والدعوى جزئية مندرجة^٣ تحتها وإن مرادهم بالعقل بالعقل المحض ليس أحد ما ذكر في التردد بل ما^٤ من شأن أن يكون معقولاً^٥

وأيضاً قوله في تقرير الاستدلال وكل ما هو عقل محض فجميع المعقولات مكشوفة^٦ له ليس موافقاً لكلام لكلام المحققين منهم لأنهم ما^٧ استدّلوا بهذا الدليل على عموم علمه بجميع المعلومات بل على علمه بغيره في الجملة الجملة كما أشرنا إليه

ثمّ قوله ونفس الآدمي مشغولة بتدبير البدن فإذا انقطع شغلة بالموت ولم يكن قد تدنّس بالشهوات البدنية والصفات الرذيلة المتعدية إليه من الأمور الطبيعية انكشفت له حقيقة المعقولات كلّها لا تطابق ما ذكروا في أحوال النفوس البشرية بعد المفارقة حيث قالوا أن النفوس التي لم تكتسب الكمالات حال تعلقها بالأبدان فهي إن كانت عالمة بأن لها كمالاتٍ صارت معذبة باشتياقها إلى حصولها وعدم تمكّنها من تحصيلها سواء كانت متّصفة بأضداد الكمالات كالنفوس المعتقدة بالأباطيل المضادة للحقّ أو لا كنفوس المعرضين والمهملين الذين لم يحصل لهم الاعتقادات الحقّة ولا الباطلة

والفرق أن المتّصفة بأضداد الكمالات^٨ يكون عذابها مؤبداً^٩ بخلافهما فأنّهما معذبان ما بقى الاشتياق إلى الكمال لأنّها حينئذ تكون مشتاقة إلى ما لا تتمكّن من تحصيله وإن لم تكن عالمة بأن لها كمالاتٍ كنفوس البله والأطفال والجهّالين لم يكن لها ألم الشوق ولا لذة الكمال^{١٠}

وهذا الكلام منهم يدلّ على أن النفس إنّما يحصل لها^{١١} الكمالات بواسطة البدن الذي هو آلة لها في أفعالها فإذا تجرّدت عنها قبل تحصيلها بقيت فارغة عن الكمالات وكان استعداد النفس عندهم للعلوم والكمالات

١: يخفى = يخفى عليك

٢: ج: ط: محض = -

٣: ج: مندرجة = يندرج

٤: ج: ما = -

٥: معقولاً = معقولاً فله يتوجه ما أورجه من اللازمين

٦: ط: مكشوفة = منكشفة

٧: ج: ما = -

٨: ط: الكمالات = الكمال

٩: ج: مؤبداً = مؤبده

١٠: ج: الكمال = الكلام

١١: ج: لها = -

استعداد قاصر^١ يحتاج إلى تكميل استعدادها بواسطة الآلات البدنيّة حتّى يفيض عليها من المبادي المفارقة ما تمّ استعدادها له

ثمّ أنّه رحمه الله نقل عن الشيخ مسلماً آخر وهو أنّ العالم فعل الله تعالى والفاعل يجب أن يكون عالماً بفعله فيكون الباري تعالى عالماً بالعالم وهو المطلوب

ثمّ اعترض عليه بوجهين

أحدهما أنّ الفعل قسمان إراديّ وطبيعيّ وكون الفاعل عالماً بفعله إنّما يلزم في الفعل الإراديّ لا الطبيعيّ والعالم عندهم صادر عنه تعالى طبعاً واضطراً لا قصداً وإختياراً فلا يلزم كونه تعالى عالماً

وثانيهما هو أنّه^٢ وإنّ سلّم أنّ صدور الشيء عن الفاعل يقتضي علم الفاعل به لكنّ الصادر عندهم من الله تعالى ليس إلّا العقل الأوّل فلا يثبت بهذا الدليل كون الكلّ معلوماً له فإنّ علم الفاعل بما يصدر عنه بالواسطة لا يلزم في الفعل الإراديّ فكيف في الطبيعيّ فإنّ حركة الحجر من فوق جبل قد تكون تحريك المحرك^٣ الإراديّ يوجب العلم بأصل الحركة ولا^٤ يوجب العلم بما يتولّد منه بمصادمته وكسر غيره

قال رحمه الله فهذا أيضاً لا جواب لهم عنه

وأقول هذا الاستدلال لم أجده في كلام أحد من الحكماء ولا في كلام النقلة^٥ عنهم ولا يطابق أصولهم وقواعدهم أيضاً فإنّهم يسندون الأفعال إلى طبائع^٦ لا شعور لها^٧ أصلاً وأظنّ أنّه تغيير للمسلك الثاني^٨ الذي

١: قاصر = قاصراً

٢: أنّه = -

٣: ج: المحرك = -

٤: ج: يوجب العلم بأصل الحركة ولا = -

٥: ط: النقلة = النقل

٦: ج: طبائع = طبائع التي

٧: ج: لها = لهم

٨: ج, ط: الثاني = -

نقلناه^١ عنهم وهو أنه تعالى يعلم ذاته وذاته تعالى علّة لما بعده^٢ والعلم بالعلّة يوجب العلم بالمعلول بحذف بعض مقدماته أعني كونه عالماً بالعلّة^٣ وأن العلم بالعلّة يوجب العلم بالمعلول والاكتفاء في الاستدلال بمجرّد العلّة

ثم أنّ القول بأنّ صدور العالم عنه تعالى عندهم بالطبع والاضطرار لا بطريق الإرادة والاختيار ليس كما ينبغي لأنّهم لا يقولون بأنّ فاعليّته تعالى كفاعليّة المجبورين من ذوى الطبائع الجسمانيّة بل ذهبوا إلى أنّه تعالى قادر بمعنى إن شاء فعل وإن لم يشاء لم يفعل إلاّ أنّ مشيئة الفعل لازم^٤ لذاته وعدم مشيئة ممتنع وصدق الشرطيّة لا يقتضي وقوع المقدّم ولا إمكانه ومشيئته تعالى عندهم لا تزيد على علمه بوجه النظام الأكمل فلا يصحّ الاستدلال بها على علمه تعالى ولذلك لم يقع الاستدلال منهم على علمه تعالى بمشيئته كما وقع للمتكلّمين بناء على أنّ مشيئته زائدة على علمه ومرتبّة عليه

وما ذكره في جوابه الثاني من أنّ الكلّ لم يوجد من الله تعالى وفقه^٥ ابتداء بل بالواسطة وما يصدر عن الفاعل بالواسطة لا يلزم أن يكون معلوماً له في الفعل الإراديّ فكيف في الطبيعيّ مسلّم عندهم إذا لم يكن الفاعل عالماً بخصوصيّة العلة التامّة لكنّ هذا لا يضرّهم لأنّ الموجب بعلم المعلول عندهم ليس العلة^٦ الفاعليّة بل العلم بالعلّة التامّة وأمّا إذا كان عالماً بها فإنّهم يدعون لزوم العلم بالمعلول حينئذ^٧

وقوله فإنّ حركة الحجر من فوق جبل بتحريك إراديّ لا يوجب العلم بما يتولّد منه بواسطة من مصادمته وكسر غيره غير متوجّه عليهم لأنّ تمام العلة ليس بمعلوم ههنا للمحرّك فلا تكون الحركة بتمامها معلومة أيضاً فلا يعلم ما يتولّد منه^٩ من الحركة^{١٠} لأنّ ما يتولّد من الحركة إنّما يتولّد من خصوصيّة الحركة الواقعة في مسافة مخصوصة على وجه مخصوص وعلم الفاعل لم يتعلّق بهذه الخصوصيّة لعدم العلم بعلتها التامّة على أنّ حركة الحجر

^١ ط: نقلناه = نقلنا

^٢ ج: ط: بعده = عداه

^٣ ط: بالعلّة = العلم

^٤ ب: لازم = لازمة

^٥ ط: يصحّ = يصلح

^٦ ج: ط: وفقه = -

^٧ ج: ط: العلة = -

^٨ ج: ط: وأمّا إذا كان عالماً بها فإنّهم يدعون لزوم العلم بالمعلول حينئذ = -

^٩ ج: منه = - . ط: منه = منها

^{١٠} ط: من الحركة = -

ليس بفعل للمتحرّك المرید ولا^١ المحرّك المرید فاعلاً لها بل الفاعل لحركة الحجر من فوق جبل هو طبيعته بواسطة الميل الطبيعيّ والقسريّ المستفاد من المحرّك المرید والذي يفعله المرید بإرادته هو حركة أعضائه

نعم قد^٢ يقال في العرف أنّه فاعل لحركة الحجر لكنّ الكلام في الفاعل الحقيقيّ لا في الفاعل بحسب العرف بل الجواب عن قولهم منع المقدّمة القائلة بأنّ العلم بالعلّة يستلزم العلم بالمعلول كما أسلفناه^٣

الفصل الرابع عشر^٤ في تعجيزهم عن القول بأنّ^٥ الأوّل يعلم ذاته^٦

ولهم فيه طريقتان

الأوّل أنّهم يثبتون أنّه تعالى يعلم غيره بما ذكرناه من المسلك الأوّل في المسئلة المتقدّمة ثمّ يقولون كلّ من عقل^٧ غيره أمكنه بالإمكان العامّ أن يعقل كونه عاقلاً لذلك الغير وإلاّ جاز أن يكون أحدنا عالماً بالمجسطي والمخروطات وسائر العلوم الدقيقة الكثيرة المباحث المثبتة بالدلائل القطعيّة ولكن لا يمكن أن يعلم أنّه عالم به وإن التفت إليه وبالغ في الاجتهاد

وذلك سفسطة ظاهرة فواجب الوجود أمكن أن يعقل كونه عاقلاً لغيره وكلّ ما كان^٨ أمكن بالإمكان العامّ لواجب الوجود يجب له لما عرفت فواجب الوجود يجب^٩ أن يعقل كونه عاقلاً لغيره وذلك يتضمّن علمه بذاته فنبت كونه عاقلاً لذاته وهو المطلوب

الطريق الثاني هو ما ذكر في المسلك الثاني لإثبات كونه تعالى عالماً بغيره من أنّ^{١٠} ذاته تعالى مجرد قائم بذاته وكلّ مجرد كذلك فإنّ ذاته المجردة حاضرة لذاته^{١١} المجردة القائمة بذاته غير غائبة عنه وكلّ ما كان كذلك لا

^١ج: للمتحرّك المرید ولا = -

^٢ج، ط: قد = -

^٣ج: بل الجواب عن قولهم منع المقدّمة القائلة بأنّ العلم بالعلّة يستلزم العلم بالمعلول كما أسلفناه = -

^٤ج: الفصل الرابع عشر = فصل، ط: الفصل الرابع عشر = الفصل الثالث عشر

^٥ط: القول بأنّ = إقامة الدليل على أنّ (كذا في هامش ا، ب)

^٦أ: ذاته = ذاته أيضاً

^٧ط: عقل = يعقل

^٨ج، ط: كان = -

^٩ط: يجب = يجب له

^{١٠}ج: أنّ = -

^{١١}ط: ذاته = ذاتها

بدّ وأن يعقل ذاته لأنّ التعقّل ليس إلّا حضور الماهيّة المجرّدة للمجرّد القائم بذاته فثبت أنّه تعالى يعقل ذاته وهو المطلوب

والحاصل أنّهم

تارة يثبتون أولاً أنّه تعالى يجب أن يكون عالماً بغيره ثمّ يثبتون أنّه يلزم من كونه عالماً بغيره كونه^١ كونه^١ عالماً بذاته كما في الطريق الأوّل

وتارة يقلّبون الأمر فيثبتون أولاً أنّه يجب أن يكون عالماً بذاته ثمّ يثبتون أنّه يلزم من كونه عالماً بذاته كونه عالماً بغيره كما في الطريق الثاني

وقد عرفت الجواب من الطريقتين بما قدمناه في المسئلة المتقدّمة فتذكر والذي يخصّ الطريق الأوّل ههنا أن يقال لا نسلم أنّ كلّ من عقل غيره أمكنه أن يعقل^٢ كونه عاقلاً لذلك الغير ولم لا يجوز أن يكون من خاصيّة بعض الجردّات أن يعقل المعقولات ويمتنع عليه تعقّل^٣ أنّه تعقلها والقياس على ما يجده الإنسان من نفسه لا يفيد حكماً كلياً يقينياً

الفصل الخامس عشر^٤ في إبطال قولهم أنّ^٥ الأوّل لا يعلم الجزئيات على وجه

كونها جزئيات

قالوا أنّ^٦ الجزئيات المتشكلة سواء كانت دائمة كأجرام الأفلاك الثابتة على أشكالها أو متغيّرة كالمركبات كالمركبات العنصريّة التي تكون وتفسد لا يعلمها الأوّل تعالى من حيث هي جزئيات متشكلة بل يعلمها على وجه كليّ

^١ ج: عالماً بغيره كونه = -

^٢ ج: يعقل = يعقل غيره

^٣ ط: تعقّل = يعقل

^٤ ج: الفصل الخامس عشر = فصل. ط: الفصل الخامس عشر = الفصل الرابع عشر

^٥ ج: أنّ = -

^٦ ب, ج, ط: أنّ = -

لا على معنى أنه يعلم ماهيتها الكليّة فقط بل على معنى أنه يعلم الماهية الكليّة موصوفة بصفات كليّة أيضاً
لا يجتمع في الخارج إلا في شخص واحد فيحصل علم كليّ مطابق لشخص جزئيّ بحسب الخارج وإن لم يتمتع
فرض صدقة على كثيرين وكذا لا يعلم الجزئيات المتغيرة الزمانيّة سواء كانت متشكلة كالأجسام أو لا كالنفوس
على وجه كونها جزئيات ولا يلزم منه خلقة عن إدراك ما هو الواقع لأنّ الزمان ليس له بالنسبة إليه الأوصاف
الثلاثة وليس بعض الأزمنة بالنسبة إلى علمه تعالى حالاً وبعضها ماضياً وبعضها مستقبلاً حتّى يلزم من عدم علمه
هذا الوجه خلق عن إدراك ما هو الواقع^١ فإنه تعالى وإن كان يعلم جميع^٢ الحوادث الجزئية وأزمنتها الواقعة هي
فيها لكن يعلمها علماً متعالياً عن الدخول تحت الأزمنة باعتبار أوصافها الثلاثة ولا يعزب عن علمه مثقال ذرة في
الأرض ولا في السماء

مثلاً يعلم أنّ القمر يتحرّك^٣ كلّ يوم كذا درجة والشمس كذا درجة^٤ وبين منطقتي فلكيهما تقاطعاً على
التناصف فيحصل لهما بركبتيهما مقابلة يوم كذا بأن تكون الشمس في إحدى نقطتي التقاطع والقمر في الأخرى
فتتوسّط الأرض بينهما فتخسف القمر في عقدة الرأس مثلاً

وهذا العلم ثابت له حالة المقابلة وقبلها وبعدها ليس في علمه كان وكائن ويكون ولا يلزم منه خلوه
تعالى عن إدراك بعض ما هو واقع لأنّ الزمان ليس له^٥ بالنسبة إليه تعالى هذه الأوصاف الثلاثة وليس بعض الأزمنة
الأزمنة بالنسبة إلى علمه تعالى حالاً وبعضها ماضياً وبعضها مستقبلاً حتّى يلزم من عدم علمه بهذا الوجه خلوه
عن إدراك بعض ما^٦ هو واقع في الزمان^٧

وبهذا التحرير ظهر ضعف ما ذكره الإمام الغزالي من أنّ هذه القاعدة يعني عدم علمه تعالى بالجزئيات
على وجه كونها جزئيات يلزمها أن زيدا لو أطاع الله تعالى أو عصاه لم يكن الله تعالى عالماً بما يتجدّد من^٨ أحواله

^١ ج: ط: ولا يلزم منه خلقة ... إدراك ما هو الواقع = -
ج: جميع = -
ج: يتحرّك = متحرّك
ج: كذا درجة = درجة كذا
أ: له = -
ج: بعض ما = بعضها
أ: ب: في الزمان = -
ج: يتجدّد من = تجرّد عن

لأنه لا يعرف زيدا بعينه فإنه شخص وأفعاله حادثة بعد أن لم تكن وإذا لم يعرف الشخص لم يعرف أحواله وأفعاله بل لا يعرف كفر زيد وإسلامه وإنما يعرف كفر الإنسان وإسلامه مطلقاً كلياً لا مخصوصاً بالأشخاص ويلزم من^١ هذه القاعدة أيضاً أن يقال تحدى محمد^٢ عليه السلام بالنبوة وهو لم يعرف في تلك الحالة أنه تحدى بها وكذلك الحال مع كل نبي معين وأنه إنما يعلم أن من الناس من يتحدى بالنبوة وإن صفة أولئك كذا وكذا

وأما النبي بشخصي فلا يعرفه فإن ذلك يعرف بالحس^٣ والأحوال الصادرة عنه لا يعرفها لأنها أحوال تنقسم بانقسام الزمان من شخص معين ويوجب إدراكها على اختلافها تغيراً فيلزمهم^٤ استئصال الشرائع بالكلية وإنما قلنا أنه ظهر ضعف ما ذكره الإمام رحمه الله لأنه تعالى وإن لم يعلم الجزئيات الجسمانية عندهم كما نعلمها^٥ بجواسنا إلا أنه يعلم كل واحد منها على وجه لا ينطبق في الخارج إلا عليه^٦ دون ما عداه وبهذا القدر^٧ يحصل التمييز^٨ بين الأشخاص وكذا يعلم أحواله وأفعاله على وجه يتميز به^٩ كل منها عن الآخر وأوقاتها المعينة إلا أنه لما لم يكن بالنسبة إليه تعالى ماض وحال ومستقبل لم يعلم أن بعضها واقع الآن وبعضها في الماضي^{١٠} وبعضها في المستقبل لتعالیه عن الدخول تحت الأزمنة باعتبار ذاته وصفاته بل يعلم كلاً من الأشخاص وأحوالها وأفعالها بحيث يتميز عنده كل منها عن الآخر

وهذا القدر كافٍ في أجزاء أحكام الشرائع

١ ج: من = - . ط: من = على
٢ ج: محمد = النبي
٣ ا: الحسن = الجنس
٤ ج: فيلزمهم = فيلزم
٥ ا: ب: نعلمها = نقلهما
٦ ط: عليه = على معلومه
٧ ج: القدر = -
٨ ط: التمييز = التميز
٩ ج: به = -
١٠ ج: الماضي = الحال

واحتجوا على الأوّل بأن إدراك الجزئيات المتشكّلة سواء كانت دائمة أو متغيّرة إنّما يكون بآلات جسمانيّة متجزئة والأوّل تعالى مجرد بالكليّة والمجرد بالكليّ^١ لا يدرك بآلات جسمانيّة وإلاّ لكان^٢ مستكملاً بالمادّة بالمادّة كالنفس فلا يكون مجرداً عنها تجرّداً تامّاً وهذا محال

وأجيب بأنّ لا نسلم أنّ إدراك الجزئيات المتشكّلة لا يكون إلاّ بآلات جسمانيّة وإنّما يلزم أن لو كان إدراكها بحصول صورها عند المدرك وهو ممنوع ولم لا يجوز أن يكون العلم إضافة محضة أو صفة حقيقيّة ذات إضافة بدون الصورة فلا يحتاج إلى آلة جسمانيّة

وردّ بأنّه لو كان العلم^٣ إضافة^٤ محضة أو صفة حقيقيّة ذات إضافة بدون الصورة لزم أن لا يكون الأوّل تعالى عالماً بالحوادث قبل وجودها في الخارج إذ لا وجود لها في الخارج حينئذٍ وهو ظاهر ولا في العاقل^٥ لأنّ المفروض أنّ لا صورة ولا تحقّق للإضافة^٦ سواء كانت إضافة الذات أو إضافة الصفة^٧ قبل تحقّق المضاف إليه وأجيب بأنّ لا نسلم أنّ الإضافة متوقّفة على تحقّق المضاف إليه بل على امتيازه الذي لا يتوقّف على تحقّق المضاف إليه لا في الخارج ولا في العاقل^٩

وقد يعدّ هذا مكابرة

وعلى أصل الاعتزال لا إشكال لأنّ المعدومات الممكنة لها ثبوت وتمايز^{١٠} في الخارج حال عدمها^{١١} ويكفي في تحقّق الإضافة ثبوت المضاف إليه وتمييزه من غير أن يكون له وجود لا في الخارج ولا في الذهن على أنّ ما ذكر كلام على السند فليتامل

^١ ج: ومجرد بالكليّ = -
^٢ ج: لكان = كان
^٣ ج: العلم = -
^٤ ج: إضافة = الإضافة
^٥ ب, ج, ط: حينئذٍ = -
^٦ ط: العاقل = العقل
^٧ ج: للإضافة = الإضافة
^٨ ط: الصفة = الصفات
^٩ ط: العاقل = العقل
^{١٠} ج, ط: وتمايز = -
^{١١} ج, ط: عدمها = عدمها وتمايز

واحتجوا على الثاني بأن العلم بالأشياء الزمانيّة من حيث كونها زمانيّة يوجب التغيّر في علمه وهو على الله تعالى محال لأنّ من يعتقد في الشيء المعين قبل حدوثه أنّه حدث ولم يحدث بعد فإنّ اعتقاده ذلك يكون لا محالة جهلاً وإتّما العلم هو أن يعتقد في ذلك الحال عدمه لوجوده إذ هو حينئذٍ معدوم لا موجود

ثمّ إذا وجد فلا يجوز أن يبقى علمه الزمانيّ بعدمه بأن يعتقد أنّه معدوم في زمان هو موجود فيه إذ لو بقي ذلك العلم بعدمه لكان جهلاً أيضاً وإذا لم يبق ذلك العلم^١ وحدث علم آخر وهو العلم بوجوده الآن كان ذلك تغيّراً في علمه والعلم بهذه الزمانيّات ليس من الإضافات المجردة التي لا ترجع إلى هيئة وصفة في الذات مثل كونك يمينا وشمالاً حتّى يجوز التغيّر غير^٢ في حقّه تعالى بل هي هيئة وصفة لها إضافة إلى أمر خارج وهو المعلوم فإذا تغيّر المعلوم لم يكف في ذلك تغيّر^٣ الإضافة فقط بل بتغيّر صفة الذات العالمة^٤ وذلك لأنّ العلم يستلزم الإضافة إلى معلومه المعين ولا يتعلّق بغير ذلك المعلوم بل العلم المتعلّق بمعلوم آخر علم مستأنف له إضافة مستأنفة بخلاف القدرة فيكون التغيّر فيه تغيّراً في صفة حقيقيّة في ذاته تعالى وذلك مستحيل في حقّه تعالى

وأجيب عنه بأن العلم إمّا إضافة محضة وتغيّر الإضافات في حقّه تعالى غير مستحيل عندهم أو صفة حقيقيّة ذات إضافة ولا نسلم أنّه يلزم من تغيّر إضافته بتغيّر المعلوم تغيّر^٥ تلك الصفة وإتّما يلزم ذلك لو كان العلم العلم صورة مساوية للمعلوم فأنت حينئذ لا تتصوّر أن يتعلّق بمعلوم آخر ولا^٦ أن يكون علماً به بل كلّ صورة فإنّما فإنّما تكون علماً بما هي صورة له فقط دون ما عداه

وذلك أيّ كون العلم صورة مساوية للمعلوم ممنوع ولم لا يجوز أن يكون صفة واحدة لها إضافات وتعلّقات متعدّدة بحسب تعدّد المعلوم ولا يلزم من تغيّر^٧ المعلوم إلاّ تغيّر تلك الإضافات دون الصفة كما في القدرة القدرة

^١ ج: بعدمه لكان جهلاً أيضاً وإذا لم يبق ذلك العلم = -
^٢ ج: غير = - . ط: غير = فيه
^٣ ج: تغيّر = بغير
^٤ ج: العالمة = العالم
^٥ ج: تغيّره = بغير
^٦ ج: ط: لا = -
^٧ ج: تغيّر = غير

وأجاب عنه^١ بعض مشائخ المعتزلة^٢ بأن الشيء المعين قبل حدوثه يعلم منه أنه معدوم وأنه سيكون موجوداً فإذا وجد يعلم بالعلمين الأولين أنه كان معدوماً وأنه موجود فإن من علم بأن زيداً سيدخل البلد غداً فعند حصول الغدّ يعلم بهذا العلم أنه دخل البلد^٣ الآن إذا كان علمه هذا مستمراً بلا غفلة مزيلة له

وإنما يحتاج أحدنا إلى علم آخر متجدّد يعلم به أنه دخل الآن بطريان الغفلة^٤ عن الأوّل وكذا من علم أنّ زيداً ليس في الدار ودام هذا العلم إلى أن دخلها وعلم دخوله فيها يعلم بالعلم الأوّل أنه لم يكن فيها وإنما يحتاج أحدنا إلى علم متجدّد يعلم به أنه لم يكن فيها لطريان الغفلة عن الأوّل والباري تعالى تمتنع عليه الغفلة فكان علمه بأنّه يجد عين علمه بأنّه سيوجد وعلمه بأنّه كان معدوماً عين علمه بأنّه معدوم فلا يلزم من تغيير المعلوم من عدم إلى وجود تغيير في علمه^٥

وردّ هذا الجواب بوجه

الأوّل حقيقة أنه سيقع غير حقيقة أنه وقع بالضرورة واختلاف المعلومين يوجب اختلاف العلمين فيكون العلم بأحدهما غير العلم بالآخر

لا يقال المعلوم هو^٦ متعلّق العلم واختلاف المتعلّق لا يستلزم إلاّ اختلاف التعلّق دون اختلاف العلم لجواز لجواز أن يكون صفة واحدة تتعدّد تعلقاتها بحسب تعدّد المتعلقات

لأننا نقول ذلك لا يناسب رأي المعتزلة لأنّ العلم عندهم تعلق بين العالم والمعلوم لا صفة ذات تعلق فلا يستقيم حمل كلامهم على كونه صفة ذات تعلق

الثاني أنّ شرط العلم بأنه وقع هو الوقوع وشرط العلم بأنه سيقع هو عدم الوقوع فلو كانا واحداً لم يختلف شرطهما فضلاً عن التنافي

^١ ب. ج. عنه = -
^٢ ج. مشائخ المعتزلة = المشائخ
^٣ ج. دخل البلد = -
^٤ ط. الغفلة = الغفلة
^٥ ج. ط. والباري تعالى تمتنع عليه ... وجود تغيير في علم = -
^٦ ج. هو = -

الثالث يمكن العلم بأنه عالم بأنه سيقع في الجملة مع الجهل بأنه عالم بأنه وقع من جميع الوجوه وغير

المعلوم غير المعلوم

فلا يردّ ما يتوهم أنّ هذا الوجه إنّما يدلّ على تغاير العلمين بالاعتبار لا بالذات كما هو المراد إذ الشيء الواحد يجوز أن يكون معلوماً باعتبار مجهولاً باعتبار آخر

و تحقيق كلامهم في علمه تعالى بالجزئيات هو أنّ الأشياء الزمانية التي لها تعلق بالزمان ولا يمكن وجودها بدونها هو ما يكون تغييراً تدريجياً كالحركة وما يتبعها فإنّ لها هويّة منطبقة على الزمان يمتنع وجودها بدونها أو دفعياً كالكون والفساد أو ما يكون محلاً للتغيير على أحد الوجهين كالأجسام فإنّ الجسم^١ من حيث ذاته ليس مما لا يتحصّل إلا في الزمان أو في ظرفه كالمعلول الأوّل^٢ لكنّه لكونه محلاً للتغيير يستلزم الزمان ولا يوجد بدونه

وأما ما لا يكون تغييراً ولا محلاً له كالمبدأ الأوّل والعقول المفارقة فإنّها ليست^٣ تغييراً ولا محلاً للتغيير فلا تعلق لها بالزمان بوجه ولا ينقسم الزمان بالنسبة إليها إلى ماض وحاضر ومستقبل كما أنّ الأشياء المكانية التي لها تعلق بالمكان ولا توجد بدونها هو ما يكون له الامتدادات الثلاثة الطول والعرض والعمق أو ما يكون حالاً فيما له تلك الامتدادات وأما ما ليس له تلك الامتدادات ولا حالاً فيها^٤ كالمجردات فلا تعلق له بالمكان ولا تنقسم الأمكنة الأمكنة بالقياس إليه إلى قريب وبعيد ومتوسّط فذاته تعالى لما لم يكن تغييراً ولا محلاً للتغيير بوجه لم يتصوّر له اختصاص بجزئ من أجزاء الزمان لا بحسب ذاته ولا بحسب صفاته الحقيقية فلا يتصوّر^٥ في حقّه تعالى حال ولا ماض ولا مستقبل لأنّ هذه صفات عارضة للزمان بالقياس إلى ما تختصّ بجزئ منه

بل كان نسبته إلى جميع الأزمنة سواء فالموجودات من الأزل إلى الأبد معلومة له بحسب أوقاتها المعينة التي هي واقعة^٦ فيها لكنّ لا من حيث^٧ دخول الزمان في علمه تعالى بحسب أوصافه الثلاثة أعني الحالية^٨ والمضيّ

١ ج: الجسم = بجسم
٢ ج, ط: كالمعلول الأوّل = -
٣ ج: ليست = ليس
٤ ج: فيها = فيه
٥ ب: يتصوّر = يتصوّر الزمان
٦ ب: واقعة = الواقعة
٧ ج: حيث = -
٨ ج: الحالية = الحال

والاستقبالية^١ ولا يلزم منه خروج بعض الأشياء عن علمه تعالى لأنه لما لم يكن بالقياس إليه تعالى ماض وحال ومستقبل لم يتصور كون بعض الأشياء واقعاً في الحال أو الماضي أو المستقبل بالقياس إليه تعالى فعدم إدراك^٢ الأشياء على هذا الوجه لا يكون جهلاً وإنما يكون جهلاً لو كان وقوع بعض الأشياء بالنسبة إليه تعالى في الحال أو الماضي أو المستقبل ولم يعلمها على هذا الوجه

نعم ما ذكره من أنه تعالى لا يعلم خصوصيات الجزئيات بل إنما يعلمها من حيث أنها ماهية^٣ متخصصة بأوصاف تختص جملتها بواحد جزئي وإن لم يتمتع نفس تصورهما من وقوع الشركة يستلزم جهلها من بعض الوجوه تعالى عن قول المبطلين علواً كبيراً

مع أنه مناقض لما ذهبوا إليه من أن الكل معلول للواجب العالم^٤ بذاته والعلم التام بخصوصية العلة يستلزم^٥ العلم التام بخصوصية المعلول

وقد يعتذر عنه بأن إدراك الجزئيات الجسمانية من حيث هي جزئية جسمانية وإن كان كاملاً للموجود إلا أنه ليس كاملاً مطلقاً لأنه يوجب نقصاناً من وجه لاستلزامه التجسم والتركب فلا استحالة في عدم ثبوته للواجب تعالى

وإن العلم بالعلة إنما يوجب العلم بالمعلول لا^٦ الإحساس به وإدراك الجزئيات الجسمانية من حيث هي جزئية جسمانية إحساس لا يمكن إلا بالحواس الجسمانية لا علم فلا تناقض

ودفع^٧ هذا الاعتذار بأن كون^٨ إدراك الجزئيات الجسمانية محتاجاً إلى آلات جسمانية إنما هو في حقنا^٩ لا حقنا^٩ لا بالنسبة إلى الواجب

١ ب, ج: الاستقبالية = الاستقبال
٢ ط: إدراك = إدراكه
٣ ب: ماهية = ماهية كلية
٤ ج: العالم = القائم
٥ ط: يستلزم = يوجب
٦ ج: لا = لأن
٧ أ: دفع = قد يدفع
٨ ج: كون = يكون
٩ أ: حقنا = حقها

وقال بعض المتأخرين من فلاسفة الإسلام في تحقيق علمه تعالى المدرك لذاته كما لا يفتقر في إدراك ذاته إلى صورة غير صورة ذاته التي بها هو هو كذلك لا يفتقر في إدراك ما يصدر عنه إلى صورة أخرى غير صورة ذلك الصادر التي هو بها هو

وإذا كنّا ندرك كثيراً من الأشياء بالصور التي تتصوّرها ونستحضرها ولا يحتاج في تعقّل تلك الصورة وإدراكها إلى صورة أخرى من غير تضاعف الصور فينا بل ندرکها بذاتها كما ندرک غيرها بها مع كونها لم تصدر عنّا بانفرادها^١ بل بمشاركة من غيرنا فما يصدر عنه تعالى مجموع الموجودات الممكنة لذاته لا بمشاركة غيره الذي لم يصدر عنه أوّلى أن لا يفتقر في إدراك ما صدر عنه إلى غير ذاته المعيّنة فكون^٢ المدرك محلاً لصورة المدرك ومثاله ليس بشرط في إدراكه إياه ولو كان شرطاً لما أمكن لنا إدراك ذواتنا والأشياء الحاضرة لذواتنا

ولو أمكن حصول الصور لنا من غير الحصول^٣ فينا يحصل^٤ الإدراك أيضاً من غير حلول فإنّ الحلول إنّما إنّما كان لحصول تلك الصورة لنا الذي هو شرط في التعقّل والإدراك فاحتيج إليه بالعرض لا بالذات وحصول الشيء لعلته الفاعلية في كونه حصولاً لغيره ليس دون حصوله لعلته القابلية في كونه كذلك فالعقل الفاعل لذاته معلولات الذاتية حاصلة له من غير أن تكون حالة فيه فهو عاقل لها من غير أن تحلّ فيه فيذن^٥ الواجب لذاته كما لا يزيد عقله لذاته على ذاته في الوجود إن زاد بحسب اعتبار المعترين فكذلك وجود المعلول الأوّل وتعقّل الواجب إياه لأنّ ذاته علّة لذات معلوله الأوّل وعقله لذاته علّة لعقله لذات المعلول الأوّل و اتّحاد العلتين في الوجود مع تغايرهما الاعتباري يقتضي اتّحاد معلولهما في الوجود مع التغاير الاعتباري بينهما أيضاً فتعقّل الواجب لذاته للعقل الذي هو أوّل العقول لا يحتاج فيه إلى حصول صورة مستأنفة تحلّ في^٦ ذات الأوّل تعالى عن ذلك علواً كبيراً^٧

ثمّ لما كان لا موجود ممكن إلاّ وهو معلول الواجب^٨ وجب أن يعقل جميع الموجودات الممكنة الوجود بما فيها من الصور الحاصلة التي تدرك بها تلك الموجودات الممكنة ما ليس من معلوماتها^٩ ولا يكون تعقّل الواجب

^١ ط: بانفرادها = بانفرادنا
^٢ ج: ط: فكون = فيكون
^٣ ج: الحصول = الحلول
^٤ ط: يحصل = لحصل
^٥ ط: فيذن = فإذا
^٦ ب: ط: في = - ج: تحلّ في = عن
^٧ ج: ط: عن ذلك علواً كبيراً = -
^٨ ط: الواجب = لواجب الوجود
^٩ ج: ط: معلوماتها = معلولاتها

تلك الموجودات وما فيها من الصور بغير لزووم محال من المحالات التي تذكر في كيفية علمه تعالى هذا ما ذكره
والجزئية من الأزل إلى الأبد معلومة لله تعالى كل في وقته من غير أن يكون في علمه تعالى كان وكائن ويكون بل
هي حاضرة عنده في أوقاتها من غير لزوم محال من المحالات التي تذكر في كيفية علمه تعالى هذا ما ذكره

ويردّ عليه أننا لا نسلّم أنّه إذا أدركنا الأشياء بالصورة ولم نتحج في إدراك الصورة إلى صورة أخرى لكان
مصدر الموجودات أولّي بأن لا يفتقر في إدراك ما صدر عنه إلى غير ذاته المعينة وإنما يتم لو كان مطلق الحصول
للشيء المحرّد كافيّاً في الإدراك وهو ممنوع

ولم لا يجوز أن يكون الحصول للقابل والحصول للفاعل متخالفين في الحقيقة ويكفي في الإدراك الحصول
للقابل دون الحصول للفاعل وعدم كون حصول الشيء لفاعله في كونه حصولاً لغيره دون حصوله لقابله أو كون
حصول الشيء لفاعله أقوى في معنى الحصول للغير من حصوله لقابله إنما يفيد لو كان المعتر في الإدراك مطلق
الحصول لغيره دون خصوصيّة الحصول للقابل^١ وهو ممنوع

والحاصل أنّه يجوز أن يكون مفهوم الحصول للشيء أمراً عرضياً بالنسبة إلى ما يصدق عليه من الحصولين
ويكون المعتر في الإدراك هو أحد المعروضين لا الآخر فلا يلزم من كون مطلق الحصول للغير الذي هو العارض
حاصلاً في ضمن المعروض الذي ليس معتبراً في الإدراك حصول الإدراك

وقوله لو كان كون المدرك محلاً لصورة المدرك ومثاله شرطاً في الإدراك لما أمكن لنا إدراك ذواتنا والأشياء
الحاضرة لذواتنا

إنّما حينئذ^٢ يفيد عدم اشتراط حصول الصورة والمثال في المدرك على التغيّر لا كفاية^٣ الحصول مطلقاً في
في الإدراك لجواز أن يكون كل من حصول المحرّد لذاته وحصول الصفات القائمة به^٤ له وحصول الصورة والمثال
كافياً في الإدراك ولا يكون حصول المعلول للعلّة المحرّدة كافياً في إدراكها إياه لاحتمال أن تكون الحصولات
المذكورة متخالفة بالحقائق ويكون كل من الثلاثة الأوّل شرط على البدل في الإدراك كافياً فيه دون الرابع

١: الب: للقابل = -
٢: ج: ط: حينئذ = -
٣: ج: لا كفاية = لإكتفاء
٤: ج: مطلقاً = مطلق
٥: ا: به = -

وأيضاً لو كان علمه تعالى بالأشياء عبارة عن وجوداتها لم يكن علمه تعالى بها متقدماً بالذات عليها
لامتناع تقدّم الشيء على نفسه فلا يكون لعلمه تعالى بها مدخل في وجودها فيكون الأوّل تعالى فاعلاً بالطبع لا
بالإرادة مع أنّهم لم يذهبوا إلى ذلك بل ذهبوا^١ إلى أنّه تعالى قادر مختار إلا أنّ قدرته وإختياره لا يوجبان كثرة في
ذاته وأنّ فاعليّة ليست كفاعليّة المختارين من الحيوانات لأنّ أفعالهم تابعة لأغراضهم ولا كفاعليّة المجبورين من
ذوى الطبائع الجسمائيّة

وإنّ علمه تعالى هو^٢ عين إرادة وإنّما يصحّ جعل علمه تعالى إرادة إذا تقدّم على معلوله بالذات ومنشأ
لصدوره وأمّا إذا كان عينه فلا نسلم أنّ الإمام الغزالي رحمه الله قرّر الجواب عن احتجاجهم على^٣ الدعوى الثانية
بأنّه لم لا يجوز أن يكون العلم صفة واحدة لها إضافات متعدّدة وأن يكون اختلاف المعلول^٤ إنّما يؤثّر في اختلاف
الإضافات دون العلم نفسه

وأما قولهم أنّ الإضافة إلى المعلوم^٥ المعين داخله في حقيقة العلم ومهما اختلفت الإضافة اختلف الشيء
الذي الإضافة ذاتيّة له ومهما حصل الاختلاف فقد حصل التغيّر

فمردود بأنّه لو صحّ هذا لزم أن لا يعلم الأوّل تعالى إلا ذاته لأنّه لو علم^٦ الإنسان المطلق والحيوان المطلق
المطلق والجماد المطلق وهذه مختلفات لا محالة فالإضافة^٧ إليها مختلفة فلا يصحّ العلم الواحد لأن يكون علماً
بالمختلفات على ما سبق فيوجب ذلك تعدّد العلوم واختلافها^٨ لا تعدّدها فقط مع التماثل إذ التماثلات ما يسدّ
بعضها مسدّ البعض والعلم بالحيوان لا يسدّ مسدّ العلم بالجماد ولا العلم بالبياض يسدّ مسدّ العلم بالسواد فلا
ينطوي تحت علم واحد هو علمه بذاته مع أنّهم ذهبوا إلى أنّ علمه تعالى بالأشياء منطوق تحت علم واحد هو^٩ علمه
علمه بذاته الذي هو عين ذاته من غير مزيد عليه

^١ ج: إلى ذلك بل ذهبوا = -
^٢ ب: هو = -
^٣ ج: على = عن
^٤ ب: ج: المعلول = المعلوم
^٥ ط: المعلول = المعلوم
^٦ ج: علم = علم أنّ
^٧ ج: فالإضافة = فإنّ الإضافة
^٨ ج: واختلافها = داخلها فيها
^٩ ج: واحد هو = -

وأنت تعلم أنّ هذا الإلزام لا يردّ على الشيخ فإنّه ذهب إلى أنّ علمه تعالى صور متعدّدة بتعدّد المعلومات مع أنّه متمسك بهذه الحجّة على عدم علمه بالجزئيات الزمانيّة من حيث هي جزئية زمانيّة فما ذكره من التقرير غير تامّ في الجواب

وقوله فيوجب اختلافها لا تعدّها^١ مع التماثل غير صحيح قوله إذ المتماثلات ما يسدّ بعضها مسدّ البعض

إن أراد في جميع الأحكام فممنوع وإلّا لم يتصور تماثل بين اثنين أصلاً

وإن أريد في بعض الأحكام أو في الأحكام الواجبة والممكنة والممتنعة^٢ فيما يجب ويمكن ويمتنع

فمسلم

ولكن لا نسلم أنّ العلم بأحد الشئين لا يسدّ مسدّ العلم بالآخر فيه

* * *

^١: تعدّها = تعدّها فقط
^٢ ب، ج، ط: أو في الأحكام الواجبة والممكنة والممتنعة = -