Tibetan Mind Training : Tradition and Genre

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August, 2008

A thesis submitted to McGill University

in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of MA.

Your file Votre référence
ISBN: 978-0-494-66972-3
Our file Notre référence
ISBN: 978-0-494-66972-3

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Abstract

In response to Tibetan social pressures in the 11th century, Atiśa initiated a renewal of Buddhist monasticism that resulted in all Buddhist praxis outside of meditation being strictly framed by attitudes and behaviors informed by love and compassion. Atiśa's teachings are exemplified in pithy sayings that point to the heart of bodhisattva practice, and this mind training practice developed into a tradition in the period immediately following his passing. The success of the method, and of the emulation of Atiśa as exemplar of a perfect bodhisattva, led to the adoption of mind training throughout Tibetan Buddhism. "Tibetan Mind Training : Tradition and Genre" explains the relation between a native Tibetan literary genre and monastic Buddhist practice found in the 14th century compilation Mind Training : The Great Collection (*theg pa chen po blo sbyong rgya tsa*). The introduction provides context and presents methodology. Chapter one argues that 'blo sbyong' should be translated as 'mind training.' Chapter two has two broad arguments: a rebuttal of a conception of mind training as an essentially psychological preparation for other practices; and an explanation of its praxis as the interaction of mind and real objects. Chapter three explains the relation of mind training praxis and tradition, with reference to Atiśa's reforms. Chapter four explains some characteristics of the literary genre of mind training.

Abrégé

En réaction aux pressions sociales exercées par les tibétains au 11^{e} siècle, Atiśa a renouvelé le système monastique bouddhiste ce qui a eu pour résultat que toutes les pratiques bouddhistes à l'extérieur de la méditation ont été encadrées par des attitudes et des comportements strictement motivés par l'amour et la compassion. Certains enseignements d'Atiśa sont des exemples concis qui pointent directement au cœur de la pratique d'un boddhisattva, et cette pratique de l'entraînement de l'esprit est devenue une tradition dans la période suivant son décès. Le succès de la méthode, et l'émulation d'Atiśa en tant qu'exemple d'un boddhisattva parfait a mené à l'adoption de l'entraînement de l'esprit dans le bouddhisme tibétain en entier.

« Tibetan Mind Training : Tradition and Genre » explique la relation entre le genre littéraire tibétain indigène et la pratique bouddhiste monastique présentée dans la compilation du 14^{e} siècle Mind Training : The Great Collection (*theg pa chen po blo sbyong rgya tsa*). L'introduction fournit le contexte et la méthodologie. Le premier chapitre argumente que « blo sbyong » devrait être traduit par « entraînement de l'esprit ». Le chapitre deux comporte deux arguments : un rebut de la conception selon laquelle l'entraînement de l'esprit est essentiellement une préparation psychologique pour d'autres pratiques; et une explication de sa pratique comme une interaction entre l'esprit et les objets réels. Le chapitre trois explique la relation entre la pratique de l'entraînement de l'esprit et sa tradition en référence à la réforme d'Atiśa. Le chapitre quatre explique certaines caractéristiques du genre littéraire de l'entraînement de l'esprit.

Acknowledgements

I thank Dr. Thupten Jinpa for his support and encouragement throughout my academic career. I also thank Prof. Lara Braitstein for her kindness, and particularly for her assistance and guidance in preparing this thesis.

My family has played a crucial role in enabling me to take the time to pursue these studies. I particularly thank Hélène, Ariane, and Emma; and Tom, and Janet.

The support of the faculty and staff of Religious Studies has been exceptional. I especially thank Prof. G. Victor Sogen Hori, Prof. Katherine K. Young, and Prof. Davesh Soneji. I particularly wish to mention Mr. Philippe Turenne and Mr. Sanjay Kumar, who have supported me in my language studies. My fellow students have always been available and encouraging. I also thank Dr. Kate Crosby, Ven. Yifa, Dr. Andrew Skilton, and Dr. Robert Kritzer, who have all generously shared with me their insights into the career of a Buddhist scholar.

I have also received advice from many other teachers. I thank Geshe Dagpo Rinpoche who explained the Seven-Point Mind Training in the traditional way, Ven. Kyabje Dagom Rinpoche, Ven. Zawa Tulku, Ven. Geshe Losang Tenzin, Ven. Geshe Tsultrim, Ven. Geshe Losang Chöpel, and Ven. Geshe Sopa, all of whom have taken time to discuss mind training with me.

Introduction

Context

Mind training (*blo sbyong,* often anglicized as lojong) is one of the principal aspects of Tibetan Buddhist praxis. It presents various methods for the development of *bodhicitta*, the altruistic intention to attain the state of Buddhahood in order to accomplish the permanent well-being of all without exception. I characterize these methods as realistic for specific reasons detailed below. This state of mind is the entry to the Mahāyāna, and thus the psychological foundation for all other praxis in Tibetan Buddhism, which is universally and self-consciously asserted to belong to the great vehicle by its adherents. This short thesis seeks to explain how mind training literature arose from a tradition of practice, through the examination of the 14th century collection of texts Mind Training : The Great Collection (*theg pa chen po blo sbyong rgya tsa*) (hereafter *TGC*) as representative of a literary genre.

The foundation of this thesis is various short pithy sayings attributed to Atiśa, also known more fully as Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, the Indian pandit who renewed Buddhism in Tibet during the 11th century (Jinpa "Introduction" 10). These came to form the backbone of the Kadampa mind training literature. The earliest presentation of these sayings within an organized form is the "Seven-Point Mind Training" (*TGC* text 6) attributed to Chekawa (*'chad ka ba, 'chad ka wa ye shes rdo rje* 1101-75). The "Seven-Point Mind Training" was the most influential of the mind training texts (Jinpa "Introduction" 9), and it continues to be the most popular of Tibetan Buddhist texts in translation (Sweet and Zwilling 3). Jinpa traces the origins of the organization of pithy instructions of diverse

provenance into a seven point schema to Sharawa (*sha ra ba*) (Jinpa The Great Collection 578), who was the teacher of Chekawa, who in turn was the teacher of Sé Chilbu Chökyi Gyaltsen (*se chil bu chos kyi rgyal mtshan*) who wrote the earliest commentary on the "Seven-Point Mind Training." (*TGC* text 7). The seven points are: 1. Preliminaries; 2.Training in two *bodhicittas;* 3. Taking adversities onto the path to enlightenment; 4. Summary of a lifetime's practice; 5. Criteria of having trained the mind; 6. Commitments; and 7. Precepts. After the 15th century this became for many authors "almost equivalent to mind training itself" (Jinpa "Introduction" 9).

Atiśa's pithy sayings

Seven-Point Mind Training

I. Presentation of the preliminaries, the basis
First, train in the preliminaries.

II. Training in the awakening mind, the main practice
A. Training in ultimate awakening mind
Train to view all phenomena as dreamlike.

Examine the nature of unborn awareness.
The remedy, too, is freed in its own place.
Place your mind in the basis-of-all, the actual path.

In the intervals, be a conjurer of illusions.

B. Training in the conventional awakening mind
Train in the two—giving and taking—alternately.

Place the two astride your breath.
There are three objects, three poisons, and three roots of virtue.
In all actions, train by means of the words.

III. Taking adverse conditions onto the path of enlightenment
When the world and its inhabitants boil with negativity,
Transform adverse conditions into the path of enlightenment.
Banish all blames to the single source.
Towards all beings contemplate their great kindness.

With the three views and treasury of space,
The yoga of protection is unexcelled.
By meditating on illusions as the four buddha bodies,
Emptiness is protection unsurpassed.

The fourfold practice is the most excellent method.
Relate whatever you can to meditation right now.

IV. Presentation of a lifetime's practice in summary
In brief the essence of instruction is this:
Apply yourself to the five powers.
As the Mahayana's transference method is
The five powers alone, their practice is vital.

V. Presentation of the measure of having trained the mind
The intent of all teachings converges on a single point.
Of the two witnesses, uphold the principal one.
Cultivate constantly the joyful mind alone.
If this can be done even when distracted, you are trained.

VI. Presentation of the commitments of mind training
Train constantly in the three general points.
Transform your attitudes, but remain as you are.

Do not speak of the defects [of others].
Do not reflect on others' shortcomings.
Discard all expectations of reward.
Discard poisonous food.
Do not maintain inappropriate loyalty.
Do not torment with malicious banter.
Do not lie in ambush.
Do not strike at the heart.
Do not place the load of a dzo onto an ox.
Do not sprint to win a race.
Do not abuse this [practice] as a rite.
Do not turn the gods into demons.
Do not seek misery as a means to happiness.

VII. Presentation of the precepts of mind training
Accomplish all yogas through a single means.
Overcome all errors through a single means.
There are two tasks—one at the start and one at the end.
Forbear whichever of the two arises.

Guard the two even at the cost of your life.

Train in the three difficult challenges.
Adopt the three principal conditions.
Contemplate the three that are free of degeneration.

Be endowed with the three inseparable factors.
Train constantly towards the chosen objects.
Do not depend on other conditions.
Engage in the principal practices right now.

Do not apply misplaced understanding.
Do not be sporadic.
Train with decisiveness.
Be released through the two: investigation and close analysis.
Do not boast of your good deeds.
Do not be ill-tempered.
Do not be fickle.
Do not be boisterous.

Through this proliferation of the five degenerations
Transform [every event] into the path of enlightenment.

Because of my numerous aspirations,
I have defied the tragic tale of suffering
And have taken the instructions to subdue self-grasping.
Now, even if death comes, I have no regrets. (Jinpa The Great Collection 83-85)

This gives a taste of the style of the pithy sayings, which are the root text commented on in much of the mind training literature. Sentences are short, and make little sense without prior knowledge of their context. For example, "Be endowed with the three inseparable factors" immediately raises the question of what those three factors are. We can also immediately see two levels of text in our example: the pithy sayings, and the seven points which have served to organize them. Sé Chilbu's original text presents a commentary, and also a structure which unifies the diverse pithy sayings attributed to Atiśa. According Shönu Gyalchok (*gzhon nu rgyal mchog*), one of the compilers of *TGC,* the organization the pithy sayings into seven points was due to Sharawa (Jinpa The Great Collection 578, n.19). The seven-point structure has continued to be used until the present

day to organize explanations of mind training (Jinpa "Introduction" 11-12). It reveals immediately that the relation between text and praxis is the cultivation of *bodhicitta* in its two aspects, conventional and ultimate, which correspond with the two truths. Furthermore the text clearly outlines a program of study and practice. Having trained in the preliminaries, one trains in two aspects of the awakening mind, subsequently incorporating all obstacles from ordinary life into the training. This is a lifetime's practice which can be measured, and is supported by a number of attitudes and behaviors towards both one's own mental state and external objects, particularly persons.

The seven points: an early commentary

Sé Chilbu identifies the preliminaries of the first point as being reliance on a teacher in Atiśa's lineage, having trained one's mind in three scopes explained in Atiśa's *Lamp for the Path*, having generated the aspiring and engaging minds of *bodhicitta* explained in Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* and keeping one's precepts (Jinpa The Great Collection 89).

Then, having generated an enthusiastic motivation to attain Buddhahood for the benefit of oneself and others, one engages in the main practice of *bodhicitta.* This is subdivided into two meditations, named according to the Buddhist division of reality into two truths, and which continually alternate. Sé Chilbu describes the relation and order of these two as follows "Given the sequence in which meditative equipoise and post-meditation stages arise within a single person, these two [minds] are presented here in the following order" (Jinpa The Great Collection 90). He explains that training in the ultimate awakening mind has three parts:

1. Preparation: A seven-limb practice, supplications to meditation deities and teachers, calming of breathing and generation of "the conventional awakening mind accompanied by the beneficial qualities of meditative stabilization" (Jinpa The Great Collection 90).
2. Meditation session: One should meditate simultaneously on the emptiness all phenomena, including one's own self and the self of others, while free of conceptualization of subject-object duality. Each meditation session should be short but intense, and thus within one meditation period there can be many subsessions. The commentary simply says that the four sayings here sequentially present the absence of intrinsic existence of perceived objects, perceiving subjects, phenomena, and placement of the mind in "ease, lucidity, and vibrancy … The essential point is to avoid being tainted by a conceptualization of subject-object duality" (Jinpa The Great Collection 92). Then one dissolves one's visualizations of deities and gurus, cultivates great compassion with the wish to "place all beings in the undistorted truth of such ultimate mode of being," and again performs seven-limb practice. (Jinpa The Great Collection 91-92).
3. Subsequent practices: In all subsequent moments, even though things continue to appear as real, the practitioner maintains mindfulness that all objects are dreamlike, thus keeping the mind close to the "experience of the meditation session throughout all activities" (Jinpa The Great Collection 93).

Training in conventional *bodhicitta* consists of a meditation session followed by a subsequent non-meditative break. For the session one first contemplates the kindness of one's mother in this life in giving one birth, and thus the opportunity to engage in mind

training. Then one generates the wish to repay her kindness by protecting her from the sufferings and causes of suffering she has accumulated, and visualizes taking those from her. One also visualizes giving her all of one's virtuous roots in the form of wish-fulfilling jewels, which fulfill all her wishes, including the necessary conditions for mind training. This is then extended to all suffering beings, and even noble beings on the Buddhist path—all persons with the exception of fully enlightened Buddhas. With familiarity this meditation is placed on the inhalation (taking on suffering) and exhalation (giving roots of virtue) of the practitioner (Jinpa The Great Collection 94-96). This meditative practice is called taking and giving (*gtong len*).

Subsequently during non-meditative periods one purifies experience by contemplating how just as one generates negativities that produce suffering by reacting to pleasant, unpleasant, and indifferent objects, so too do all other beings, and one imaginatively absorbs their negative acts into one's own, with the wish to free them from the mental states which cause such actions. One maintains this by reciting inspiring words, such as Atiśa's pithy sayings (Jinpa The Great Collection 96-97).

Taken together these two aspects of training in *bodhicitta* indicate that mind training refers to a foundational transformation of the mind, a kind of "metanoesis" or turning around whereby one's mind is transformed from an "ordinary deluded state, whose modus operandi is self-centeredness, to a fundamentally changed perspective of enlightened, other-centeredness" (Jinpa "Introduction" 2). This turning around is developed by a continual alternation of training one's mind to appear in the two aspects of *bodhicitta* corresponding to the two truths. This alternation is evident from the fact that cultivating conventional *bodhicitta* is a preparation for meditation on ultimate *bodhicitta*,

the realization of emptiness, which in turn informs, or permeates, both conventional *bodhicitta* and its subsequent practice. The text thus incorporates the two truths into mind training practice by framing periods of meditation on emptiness within meditative sessions of taking and giving, which in turn alternate with periods of non-meditation.

Sé Chilbu explains the third point, "Taking adverse conditions onto the path of enlightenment" as methods to help a practitioner understand that his or her own suffering "is skilful means through which the teachers and the Three Jewels bestow their blessings" (Jinpa The Great Collection 97). When adversities arise, a practitioner engages in meditation on the awakening mind and practices to avert the harms arising from them. First one generates the awakening mind in dependence on the adversity. Within a practice of conventional awakening mind, one recognizes one's self as an enemy, and other beings and objects as friends. This is because the adversities are the result of one's own actions, while the virtuous minds of love and compassion leading to Buddhahood depend on one's relation with others. Impersonal adversities are imagined to be demonic persons, and thus also serve to further establish love and compassion despite their lack of a self. Within a practice of ultimate awakening mind one engages in an analytic meditation. One recognizes that all phenomena that arise "are only deluded perceptions of your own mind" and "will cease within moments, with no time to either injure or to engage in any negation or affirmation" (Jinpa The Great Collection 106), and thus do not exist even conventionally as agents of harm. Instead they possess the same empty nature as the four buddha bodies but due to grasping "concepts as real, as true, as something separate from the mind, and as fault-ridden" (Jinpa The Great Collection 107) all external problems arise. Thus the problem comes down to conceptualization, which is dependent on mind,

and when analyzed the mind is emptiness. As a result "when the thought arises spontaneously 'Oh, everything is my mind,' nonconceptuality dawns in its nakedness" (Jinpa The Great Collection 108). This analysis reveals adversities lack the quality of having arisen, which is the unborn *dharmakāya;* adversities having not arisen lack the quality of ceasing, which is the unceasing *saṃbhogakāya;* having neither arisen nor ceased lack the quality of abiding, which is the non-abiding *nirmānakāya;* and thus not existing in the three times lack the quality of substantial existence, which is the *svabhāvakāya.* When the absence of these four buddha bodies is seen in conceptualization, conceptualization is "the resounding signal of ultimate reality" (Jinpa The Great Collection 108), and thus adversities are transformed into the path. The conclusion of both these methods is generating gratitude to the adversity for two reasons: it has motivated the practitioner to train in the awakening mind, which will result in Buddhahood; and it has also encouraged him or her to avoid negative actions in the future, which will lead to liberation from suffering. This gratitude leads the practitioner to engage in four practices: the accumulation of merit, the purification of negative karma, making offerings in gratitude to the adversities, and reliance on dharma-protectors for support (Jinpa The Great Collection 97-112).

The fourth point is to continually engage in training in the awakening mind in five ways during this life: 1. Encouraging oneself to train in all periods in the future; 2. Continually cultivating the awakening mind as already described, 3. Practicing virtue to support the awakening mind; 4. Eradicating self-grasping as contrary to the awakening mind; and 5. Reciting prayers and making offerings to one's teachers, together with protectors and spirits for support in this practice. The order of these same practices,

together with their details, are altered slightly at the time of impending death (Jinpa The Great Collection 112-15).

The measure of having trained the mind is that one's mind training serves to undermine and overcome self-grasping, that one is not ashamed of oneself, that no matter what external conditions you are happy that you have the opportunity to train in the awakening minds, and that unexpected circumstances do not prevent you from applying the training (Jinpa The Great Collection 115-17). The commitments and precepts of the last two points are various pithy sayings that prescribe and exhort the practitioner to cultivate and maintain certain attitudes and behaviors in relation to various external objects and persons. These are always explained with reference to the elimination of self-grasping and the cultivation of the awakening mind (Jinpa The Great Collection 118-31).

Alternate arrangements of the pithy sayings.

The "Seven-Point Mind Training" eventually came to be considered the root text for Atiśa's mind training tradition. Jinpa identifies seven distinct commentarial traditions roughly contemporary with the time of our compilation presenting various interpretations of the pithy sayings, in seven points, and several more subsequent to it. These were divided into two lineages according to their interpretation of ultimate awakening mind. The northern lineage, exemplified by Radrengpa (*ra sgreng pa*), interprets the "basis of all" as emptiness, which entered into the ear-whispered lineage of mind training of Tsongkhapa (*tsong kha pa*). The southern lineage, exemplified by Thokmé Sangpo (*thogs med bzang po*), interprets it as the uncontrived natural mind (Jinpa "Introduction" 11-12).

However *TGC* also contains several texts with other structurings of these pithy sayings. The sayings included in each collection are different, and there are also variant

readings of several of the sayings (Jinpa "Introduction" 12-13). Furthermore, the others do not always divide the awakening mind into two aspects corresponding to the two truths. Jinpa identifies six collections of the root pithy instructions that were organized into seven points by the 15th century, 5 early redactions found in *TGC,* and a verse redaction by Shönu Gyalchok, compiler of *TGC* (Jinpa "Introduction" 9). The versions found in our text are:

1. "Root Lines of Mahāyāna Mind Training," (text 4) attributed to Atiśa by Shönu Gyalchok. Despite the formatting of the English into ten sections, this is a continuous text in the Tibetan original (Institute of Tibetan Classics 35). It contains no explicit reference to ultimate *bodhicitta*, nor the pithy sayings corresponding with that section in the "Seven-Point Mind Training."
2. "Annotated Root Lines of Mahāyāna Mind Training," (text 5) also attributed to Atiśa. This falls into two broad sections, and contains many variant sayings from what might be considered its root text, the "Root Lines of Mahāyāna Mind Training" which are interspersed with comments (See Jinpa The Great Collection 587-88, n. 133-53). It contains no explicit reference to ultimate awakening mind, but the sayings follow the same general order as in "Seven-Point Mind Training." The term 'training' refers first to the preliminaries, and secondly to taking and giving (Jinpa The Great Collection 75). This creates the impression that both the training in the preliminaries and meditation on emptiness are preparations to the practice of taking and giving.
3. The root lines found in "A Commentary on the 'Seven-Point Mind Training'," (text 7) attributed to Sé Chilbu (1121-1189) cited above.

4. The pithy sayings are found in "Mahāyāna Mind Training," (text 33), another continuous teaching. Jinpa speculates that, despite the absence of a seven-point structure, this was compiled by a student of Drakmarwa (*brag dmar ba*) and Chekawa which "we can confidently date the text in the latter part of the twelfth century" (Jinpa The Great Collection 697-18, n. 472). This contains no discussion of ultimate awakening mind, nor the sayings from that section.
5. The pithy sayings found in the "Public Explication of Mind Training," (text 34) composed by Sangyé Gompa (*sangs rgyas bsgom pa, seng ge skyab,* 1179-1250) which divides the pithy sayings into two parts, the body and branches (Jinpa "Introduction" 10). Although the division of *bodhicitta* into conventional and awakening minds is present, it occurs among a discussion of several sayings from the commitments and precepts of mind training entitled "The Purpose of Training" (Jinpa The Great Collection 402). The order of the discussion of the two minds is reversed from the "Seven-Point Mind Training"—conventional awakening mind precedes ultimate. The discussion is briefer, but in all important aspects the same as that contained in the Seven Points.

Jinpa suggests that this list is in chronological order, and the pithy sayings contained here were likely drawn from various instructional talks that Atiśa gave at various times (Jinpa "Introduction" 11). Various redactions and versions of these sayings were taken up and interpreted in the 12th-14th century, and this process has continued to the present day. All of this somewhat obscures the fact that there is no independent text of the "Seven-Point Mind Training" in the Tibetan version of *TGC*. For the comfort of English readers

Jinpa extracted it from Sé Chilbu's "A Commentary on the 'Seven-Point Mind Training'" (Jinpa The Great Collection 588-89, n.154).

This isolating of a root text is neither necessarily good or bad, and well attested in the tradition—I myself have received such an extracted text of seven-points from Dagpo Rinpoche, which again was a different redaction from any found in *TGC*. *TGC* also contains several teachings of diverse provenance, including Langri Thangpa's (*glang ri thang pa*) famous "Eight Verses of Mind Training" (*TGC* texts 29, 30), which has also been extracted from Chekawa's "A Commentary on "Eight Verses of Mind Training" for English readers, but for the most part examination of these other texts will be deferred for a more extensive study in the future.

The thesis

As I explored the various ways in which the sayings had been structured and commented on, I came to see that this literary process of organizing pithy and diverse sayings perhaps constituted one of the foundational activities of the assimilation of Indian Buddhism into a uniquely Tibetan form. Furthermore, it became clear that despite the great number of later commentarial texts, the mind training literature of the 12th-14th centuries was not principally organized around doctrinal issues of the interpretation of the two truths. Instead it was the practice of taking and giving which served to unite the pithy sayings in all their redactions. As Jinpa puts it:

> mind training refers to specific approaches for cultivating the altruistic awakening mind, especially through the practice of equalizing and exchanging of self and others as found in Śāntideva's eighth-century classic, *A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life.* When used in this sense, the term *mind training* represents an abbreviation of the fuller expression "mind training in the Mahayana (Great Vehicle)" or "Mahayana mind training." (Jinpa "Introduction" 2)

This thesis will explain how this method of practice was developed into a tradition in the period immediately following the passing of Atiśa, and how it generated the genre of literature we know as mind training. My thesis is that in response to Tibetan social pressures, Atiśa initiated a renewal of Buddhist monasticism by placing *bodhicitta* and the bodhisattva path in the central place. As a result all Buddhist praxis outside of meditation was strictly framed by the attitudes and behaviors found in the pithy sayings. As a result of this innovation, any teachings, doctrines, or praxis that seemed to contradict these were re-interpreted in order to fit the mind training model. The success of the method, and of the emulation of Atiśa as exemplar of a perfect bodhisattva, led to the adoption of mind training throughout Tibetan Buddhism. This is supported by evidence from *TGC* showing its influence on the Sakya (*sa skya*) school.

Theory and method

To demonstrate support for this thesis a model, theory, and method non-native to the tradition will be adopted. This is explained immediately below. It will show that, despite the importance of the doctrine of the two truths and its interest to commentators, mind training can be understood by means of a realistic model of the interaction of several worlds developed by Karl R. Popper. This model will help clarify understanding of the ways Buddhism is transformed by social context, while simultaneously transforming the social context. The first chapter will explain the translation of *blo sbyong* as 'mind training,' and critique an influential contemporary interpretation that translates it as 'purification of the mind,' or 'mental purification.' The second chapter will explain the relation of the mind and external objects, showing that a strictly psychological explanation of Buddhist practice is not tenable. The third chapter will then take that

model, combine it with a theory of tradition, and explain how mind training arose within the social transformation of Tibetan Buddhist institutions by Atiśa and his students. The primary motivation for this was the emulation of Atiśa himself. The fourth and final chapter explores definitions of mind training as a literary genre, and explains how the tradition that grew up around Atiśa's practical instructions and pithy sayings developed the multi-valent collection of texts we find in *TGC.* Issues of emulation are explored in relation to the development of a Sakya literature that shares qualities with the Kadam (*bka' gdams*) development of Atiśa's mind training.

A Pluralistic Interactionist Model

In terms of our actions and intentions, we all assume that everyday objects are real, and treat them as such. The argument of this thesis is based on the idea that all of us accept the truth of the things and people we encounter, and thus that Tibetan Buddhist mind training practitioners adopt a similar view in their mind training practice. Thus the question of whether things are, or are not, actually ontologically or epistemologically real in terms or views external to the mind training literature and tradition is not the issue explored in this thesis. Instead the thesis seeks to explain to explain how sayings such as "In the intervals be a conjurer of illusions" (Jinpa The Great Collection 83) are not appealing to the doctrine of emptiness in philosophical terms but rather in real and practical terms.

One way Indian Buddhists responded to the difficulty of reconciling emptiness and a common theory of objects and persons was to develop a theory of two truths. As shown above, the mind training in Seven-Points found in *TGC* rigorously frames training in the ultimate truth of the awakening mind within cultivation of conventional awakening mind.

While the remaining texts commenting on awakening mind do not deal with emptiness or the awakening mind in its ultimate aspects, except as ancillary to conventional awakening mind, they also frame ultimate awakening mind with conventional awakening mind. Furthermore, the texts argue that the purpose of mind training is overcoming self-grasping. It seems that for Atiśa the self which is grasped is a faulty conventional truth. This is clearly shown in his explanation of the conventional and ultimate in his "Introduction to the Two Truths." In this short text he says:

> [2] We hold the conventional to be of two kinds: Both a false kind and a correct kind. The former is two-fold: the water-moon (misperception) and the reasoning of faulty philosophy. [3] We hold correct conventional truth to be the phenomenon which arises and perishes, and is capable of producing meaning, and is attractive only when left unexamined. [4] There is only one Ultimate Truth; although others hold it is of two kinds; But if True-nature is not established anywhere, why would there be two, or three, or more? [5] One does use (conventional) words to show this, stating it is non-arising and non-perishing, etc.; but in the mode of undifferentiated Ultimate Truth, there is no phenomenality and no True-nature. [6] Differentiation in Emptiness itself has not the slightest possibility of existing; and when one realises this non-conceptually, it is described as "Seeing Emptiness." ... [16] If one does meditation on Emptiness, neglecting correct Relative (Truth), Then the world will deceive him on the other hand in Relative things like cause-effect, virtue-sin. ... [20] If one investigates with logical examination what this Relative Truth appears to be, the very finding of nothing (there) is the Ultimate (Truth): The True-nature that abides from eternity. [21] Since the producing of causal conditions is clearly how Relative Truth is established, how could we know water-moons are reflections, if Relative Truth could not be established? Therefore all appearances do exist, produced by their various causal connections. For if they were cut off from this stream of conditions, they could never emerge even as Relative Truth. (Atiśa 353-59).

This is obviously very close to Sé Chilbu's explanation of the ultimate awakening mind. The important points for our thesis here are that Atiśa argues that there are no conventional truths in ultimate truth, and thus no analysis or reliance on concepts is possible in the ultimate. However, the very failure of analysis and logical examination to establish a real ontological status of conventional truths is the ultimate truth. This does not lead to the non-existence of conventional truths themselves, but the realization of

their causal condition and efficacy. He cites Candrakīrti "[18] ... Relative Truth acts as the Means; From the Means arises the Ultimate Truth. Whoever does not know the difference between the two, and understands them wrongly, falls into bad Destinies" (Atiśa 357). Misunderstanding of causality leads to attitudes and behaviors that produce suffering.

From this we can conclude that for Atiśa, and thus also for the Kadampas, conventional truth was a necessary and real support for the liberating non-conceptual insight of ultimate truth, the means by which that insight was accomplished. Furthermore, any conceptualization, including every use of language, falls into conventional truth, which is either faulty or correct. Conventional *bodhicitta* is therefore a conventional truth, and can be analyzed and examined as a causally conditioned product of the mental states of love and compassion. All these mental states are the purpose of mind training, and the model proposed below is intended to help in the analysis of their causal establishment.

This thesis uses a model of four worlds that are simultaneously autonomous while interacting—a physical world, a world of mental states, a socially-determined world, and a religious world—to contextualize and explain the purpose and method of mind training. The source of this four world model is found in Karl R. Popper's work.

In "Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject" (1968) Popper first outlined his mature epistemology of 3 worlds:

> ... first, the world of physical objects or of physical states; secondly, the world of states of consciousness, or mental states, or perhaps of behavioral dispositions to act; and thirdly, the world of *objective contents of thought,* especially of scientific and poetic thoughts and of works of art. (Popper "Epistemology without a Knowing Subject" 106)

Later he expanded the objects of world 3 to include "a world of myths, of fairy tales and scientific theories, of poetry and art and music" (Popper and Eccles 15), and the products of the human mind (Popper and Eccles 38). This thesis analytically divides Popper's world 3 into two—a social world of such objects as the relation of child and mother, and a religious world which includes things like the Buddha of Compassion. Each of these four worlds affect and is affected by the others, hence our labeling the model pluralistic.

In "Two Faces of Common Sense" (1972) Popper uses with this 3 world model to rebut the position that knowledge is found only in the mind, and is due to the psychological digestion of data poured into it by the senses or by experience. He calls this the "bucket theory of mind" (Popper "Two Faces of Common Sense" 60-61), and points out that the theory posits things, or thing-like entities, existing in our heads corresponding with theory-free sense data or experiences. These theory-free objects are then assumed the basis of true knowledge. However physiology shows that such theory-free objects do not exist in our minds—they are all formed by sense organs, which have already sorted what appears to them. Thus, any theoretical appeal to a *given*, or to true theory-free data, is faulty (Popper "Two Faces of Common Sense" 64). They are produced, which shows that objects appearances in the mind are conditioned by both the mind and the objects, which are not the same as mind. This corresponds with Atiśa's position "Therefore all appearances do exist, produced by their various causal connections."

Later, in The Self and Its Brain (1977), he articulates this causal model in greater detail. For Popper, real things are those able to exert a causal effect upon those other obviously real things we learn about as infants—objects we can manipulate with our

hands, and put in our mouths (Popper and Eccles 9-10). Living beings possess bodies, and thus are bound by causal processes (such as physical or chemical laws) that apply to material things. Further, they also possess mental states, which exist in relation to and interact with those material processes. As an example of the interaction between the physical and mental worlds he gives a person who goes to the dentist in response to a toothache—the physical processes of tooth cavities in the body (world 1) cause a mental state of pain (world 2), which in turn causes the being to visit the dentist (world 1) (Popper and Eccles 36). As for interaction with the third world, he gives the example of a problem in a scientific theory (world 3), which is eventually understood by the mind (world 2), causes the production of a new modified scientific theory (world 3), which is then applied to the physical world, causing changes within it (world 1) (Popper and Eccles 39). Objects in all three worlds are at least partially autonomous, that is capable of producing unforeseen or unpredictable effects. Hence the theory is also interactionistic.

So much for a brief description of Popper's theory. The theory is robust, although an epistemic psychologism that considers mental states to be the sole locus of knowledge and experience, and a relativism that asserts that no objective reality may be found, continue to thrive as alternatives. The theory is also of use in Buddhist studies as it places psychological states in a mediate causal position between the physical world on the one hand, and the social and religious worlds on the other. Thus it accords well with the foundational Buddhist doctrine of the primacy of mind in creation of the conditioned suffering world, and in the liberation accomplished by religious practice. It also corresponds with Atiśa's model of the two truths, and provides a way to explain the

interaction of psychological states, social relations, and religious theories and doctrines that does not contradict his description of conventional truth.

The four world model also shows why it is relatively easy for Tibetan practitioners to distinguish between real objects of the various worlds, and imaginary representations of them—real objects have the power to effect a causal change. Thus the real foundation of Mahāyāna praxis would be real *bodhicitta*, a mental state having causal power. Similitudes to *bodhicitta* would lack such causal power, but may encourage the development of the actual state in a way similar to the power of words to bring to mind objects. For example, being hungry I may think to myself "I would like some peanut butter and toast." While the words are not peanut butter and toast, they enable me to at least try and get some. Without my having previously thought of peanut butter and toast, it is unlikely they will spontaneously appear in my stomach. Similarly thinking of *bodhicitta* may produce the effort to produce it, and so is likely necessary if we are to actually develop bodhicitta, or the capacity to possess it.

Thus this thesis explains conventional truths by means of a realistic model that describes complex conditioned causality as produced by the interaction of objects from multiple worlds, particularly the psychological, social, and religious worlds. In particular the psychological state of the individual is modified by the effect of real objects from the social and religious worlds, though throughout the mind training literature there many examples of an acceptance of the real character of objects from all four worlds.

The model applied to mind training: Examples

A clear example of all four worlds interacting may be found in "Atiśa's Seven-Point Mind Training" (*TGC* text 25). In the fourth section we find three yogic exercises of

body, speech, and mind. The method of mind training explained is as follows: The yoga of mind is the development of compassion towards beings of the six classes—hell, ghost-like, animal, human, demigod, and god. These six classes represent beings found within the social world (humans), the physical world (animals), and the religious world (the remainder). All are real, that is causally produced and producing causes. The practitioner contemplates their various sufferings, the harmful actions this suffering causes them to undertake, and considers each of them as if they were his or her own mother until an overwhelming wish they could be free is generated. Here the psychological world is being manipulated by the contemplation of real objects from both the social and religious worlds. In particular, existing social relations (mother-child) are used to transform the minds attitude toward others, particularly those only found in the religious world of hell etc.

When this psychological state has appeared the practitioner is instructed to engage in the yoga of body: "Place your two palms on your cheeks and your elbows on your thighs. Then, in a squatting position, hold your head down and contort your face into a somber expression" (Jinpa The Great Collection 250). Here the physical form of the practitioner is utilized to support the generation and maintenance of the psychological state.

Last comes the instruction of the yoga of speech: "Shout 'My mother, my mother'" (Jinpa The Great Collection 250). Clearly the three yogic exercises use multiple interactions from multiple sources to cause the generation of a psychological state, and then use that psychological state to encourage a transformation of the individual's conception of their social and religious reality. Of particular interest is the utilization of

the particular social relation of mother and child—it is universal among humans, at least until the present day.

Another clear example of the utility of this type of analysis to explain the process of mind training can be found by examining the 13th century "Public Explication of Mind Training" (*TGC* text 34), which incidentally is the text that brought mind training's pithy sayings to the mainstream of Tibetan Buddhism (Jinpa The Great Collection 620, n. 500). Here the preliminary to the main practice, corresponding with the first of the seven points, is expressed with the words "First, train in the preliminaries" (Jinpa The Great Collection 321). This refers to the mind training practitioner developing the conception that objects of the religious world are real (for example, inevitable rebirth in various realms such as hell, and that rebirth is actually due to the workings of karma), that is to say they function causally. Next the main practice, which corresponds with the second point, consists of generating a psychological state of great compassion by training in taking and giving, where the practitioner visualizes taking the suffering and causes of suffering accumulated by others onto him or herself, and giving all their own happiness and causes of happiness to all beings. This is commonly considered the special mind training practice (Jinpa "Introduction" 2), although the literature also presents many other methods. Subsequently, the branch practice of guarding mind training against degeneration, which corresponds with the sixth point, includes exhortations to control one's psychological state when interacting with society—"Do not dwell on others' shortcomings,"—and to behave certain ways in the social world—"Do not speak of the defects [of others]" (Jinpa The Great Collection 389). The interaction of the psychological, social and religious worlds is obvious.

Thus mind training is a realistic method because it is based upon an acceptance of objects from multiple worlds as real and having causal efficacy, and through the use of these objects sets out to transform the mind, and ultimately the practitioner, by manipulating physical bodies, psychological states, social relations, and religious conceptions.

Conclusion

Considering the two preceding sections together, we see the four world model reflects a world view acceptable to Atiśa's conception of reality as described in the two-truth theory. The world of Mahāyāna Buddhism is well-known to contain many references to multiple worlds which interact, so the theoretical conception of pluralistic interactionism is obviously harmonious with Buddhist thought. Throughout the rest of this thesis the idea that the practice of mind training depends on the interaction of the psychological, social, and religious worlds will be accepted without comment, although further examples will be presented

Review of previous literature

The principal textual sources informing this discussion are found in *TGC.* Texts from the collection other than those discussed above may from time to time be cited to support a point. Atiśa's works are also important, particularly his Commentary on the Lamp for the Path (Skt: *bodhimārgapradīpaṃpañjikānāma,* Tib: *byang chub lam gyi sgrom ma'i dka' 'grel*) and "Introduction to the Two Truths" (Skt: *satyadvayāvatāra,* Tib: *bden pa gnyis la 'jug pa*).

Secondary literature dealing with mind training remains sparse. Almost no academic work has been done here, although popular texts are numerous. The five principal

scholarly discussions are reviewed here. The first (chronologically) occur in R. A. Stein's Tibetan Civilization (1962) and Giuseppe Tucci's The Religions of Tibet (1970, revised edition 1980). Stein devotes about a page to mind training literature in a broader discussion of the assimilation of Buddhism into popular literature (Stein 266). Stein sees mind training literature as part of a larger group of texts in which Indian Buddhist literature and conceptions were absorbed into native Tibetan forms in the 11th-12th centuries. Stein's position will be particularly discussed in chapter four. Tucci devotes only a paragraph to mind training practice, which he calls "purification of the mind" (Tucci 23). He argues that mind training is an essentially psychological preparation for other practice. Tucci's position will be criticized in the first chapter.

The interpretation of mind training as a kind of "mental purification" (Sweet 244) is continued by Sweet and Zwilling in two articles, "Mental Purification (*Blo sbyong*): A Native Tibetan Genre of Religious Literature" (1996), which appeared in Cabezón and Jackson's volume Tibetan Literature : Studies in Genre, while their "Historical and Thematic Introduction" (2001) appeared in Geshe Lhundub Sopa's Peacock in the Poison Grove. Sweet and Zwilling first defended a strong thesis that mind training was a synthesis of Indian Buddhist doctrine to enable a practitioner to purify his or her own mind. They developed this by relying on two texts, the "Seven-Point Mind Training" (*TGC* text 6) and "Wheel of Sharp Weapons" (*TGC* text 8). These both were at that time poorly edited. In 2001 they modified their position, admitting that 'mind training' was a more usual translation, but still arguing strongly that mental purification was the principal aim of practice. Their new article, based on the "Wheel of Sharp Weapons" and "The Peacock's Neutralizing of Poison" (*TGC* text 9), argued strongly that mind training was

the ideological foundation of the Kadampa school, and that the historical sources of the genre had been falsified by early Kadampas. Sweet and Zwilling are criticized throughout the thesis, as their work is solid but mistaken.

Jinpa, in his "Introduction" to his translation of *TGC* (2006), presents a more sympathetic view of the tradition and literature. He argues that a 'turning around' of one's habitual attitudes and behaviors resulting in an altruistic intention to accomplish the well-being of others is a central theme of mind training literature. He identifies multiple texts and lineages that fall within the genre and practice, and discusses and explains some of the tensions that supported this flowering. In particular he discusses the variations found in the text and lineages of the "Seven-Point Mind Training." He also discusses two other variant compilation texts that correspond with *TGC.* He concludes, after checking with the texts and contemporary lineage holders, that it is difficult to determine what was the earliest version of this compilation.

Technical note for transliteration

Common Sanskrit Buddhist terms are italicized and written according to the IAST, except proper names, which are simply spelled with diacritics. For Tibetan I have adopted Jinpa's standard (Jinpa "Introduction" 17) and written Tibetan names as they are pronounced, but provide the THDL Wylie transliteration at their first appearance. THDL Extended Wylie is explained at http://www.thdl.org/collections/langling/tibetan-transliteration.html. Within citations I have naturally followed the convention of the source.

Chapter 1: Mind training (*blo sbyong*)

There are two distinct academic approaches to the translation of the term *blo sbyong*. The first treats the two-syllable compound as a unit, the second approaches it as a combination word. The first (chronologically) was introduced by Stein, who in his discussion of the genre simply translated *blo sbyong* as "mind-exercises" (Stein 267). Jinpa, using the same approach, prefers "mind training" (Jinpa "Introduction" 1)and this is the translation adopted here. We will call this the contextual approach. Tucci, Sweet, and Zwilling on the other hand consider its principal meaning only becomes clear by the analysis of its two parts, preferring "purification of the mind" (Tucci 23) and "mental purification" (Sweet 244; Sweet and Zwilling 17) as translations. This is the etymological approach.

This chapter considers these two approaches, and concludes that the correct translation is mind training. We will begin by examining dictionary definitions, continue with a critique of the etymological approach, discuss the context of mind training, and conclude by finessing the signification of mind training in this genre of literature.

Dictionary definitions

Mind training is our preferred translation of the Tibetan dyad *blo sbyong*. Three bilingual dictionaries have been consulted. The term *blo sbyong* itself appears under the entry for the Tibetan verb *sbyong ba* in both Jäschke's and Das's dictionaries, where it means "... to exercise, ... to train ones mind" (Das 940; Jäschke 405). This clearly is the primary source for both Stein and Jinpa. Goldstein gives "... improvement of the mind/intellect through training, ideological cultivation" (Goldstein 748). While a

discussion of the ideological implications of mind training will be deferred, this finesses 'training' to indicate that it is generally considered an improvement.

The Etymological Approach

Dictionary definitions

Analyzing the constituent parts of the dyad *blo sbyong* the situation becomes more complex. Jäschke gives the principal meaning of *blo* as "mind," particularly the mind's "understanding," "thought," "memory," "sentiment" and "disposition" (Jäschke 384-85). Das adds that it refers to "the mind, the heart, together with the primary mental operations" (Das 902). It is the most general word indicating our mental capacities, whereas *sems* refers more specifically to "mind," *rigs pa* to "intellect," and *shes pa* to "consciousness." *Blo* is placed before verbs to denote "all kinds of particular mental operations" (Das 902-03). This appears to be the usage here—*mind* training.

Turning now to the verbal *sbyong,* Jäschke gives five meanings: 1. "To clean, to remove by cleaning," which gives rise to the nominal forms "cleansing and purifying;" 2. "To remove, take away ... subtract, cease;" particularly in medical usage; 3. "To exercise," "train," "practice," "study," "perform," "recite," "repeat," "accustom," "familiarize;" which gives rise to the nominal forms "custom," "use," "habit;" 4. "To accumulate;" and finally 5. "To conjure, to call up by magic." (Jäschke 405-06). Das does not add anything to this. Here only the first and third seem relevant, although surely the others continue to color the signification of the word. The meaning invoking the mind is most suggestive.

Hence there are several possibilities, that we can organize into two main groups. The first is that *blo sbyong* may refer to a nominal form, such as mental cleansing or purifying; or mental training, practice, habit. The second is that it may be a verbal form with its object, such as purification of the mind; or training of the mind, familiarizing with the mind, habituation of the mind.

Tucci's translation

Tucci does not discuss the etymology of *blo sbyong*, simply translating it as 'purification of the mind', nor does he discuss why he did not use the common translation found in the dictionaries. He simply says "The [Kadampa] teaching aimed in the first place at the purification of the mind (*blo sbyong*), at the realization of the ethical and esoteric principles of Buddhism" (Tucci 23).

Sweet and Zwilling's translation

1996

In his 1996 article Sweet explicitly uses the etymological approach to justify "mental purification" as the translation of *blo sbyong*, saying that it "means literally '[the] purifying [i.e. , purification] (*sbyong [ba]*) of the mind (*blo*)" (Sweet 245). Sweet argues from an analysis of the use of the word *blo* in Tibetan translations from Sanskrit, and the use of the analogues of *blo* and *sbyong* in that same translated literature. His argument is as follows: 1. *Blo* is used principally to translate the Sanskrit *buddhi* which "has the meaning of 'mind' in general; as a technical term it means the intellectual faculty" (Sweet 245); 2. *Sbyong* translates the Sanskrit verbal derivative *śodhana* because it is "the present root of the Tibetan verb whose primary signification is 'to purify' or 'cleanse.' ...

it translates the Sanskrit *[pari] śodhana* as *yongs su sbyong ba"* (Sweet 245); and 3. Because the Sanskrit *citta*, translated by the Tibetan *sems,* "virtually synonymous with *buddhi*" (Sweet 245) is frequently encountered in combination with *sbyong* throughout Tibetan translations of Indian Buddhist literature to indicate mental purification, the signification of *blo sbyong* is mental purification. As supporting evidence he cites the Tibetan translation of Śāntideva: "we find the compound *sems sbyong ba* (*cittaśodhana*; 'mental purification') in the line 'One should always observe the practice [leading to] the purification of the mind'" (Sweet 245). He also cites Gampopa (*sgam po pa*, 1079-1153), who says that "the generation of universal love and compassion through empathic identification with all living beings ... is ... the very means by which the purification of the mind *sems sbyang ba* is brought about" (Sweet 246).

This appears to be a strong argument, particularly considering the citation of Śāntideva, a key Indian source for the mind training teachings, and Gampopa, an early Tibetan authority. Sweet's citation of Gampopa reveals that for Tibetan Buddhists of the 12th century one consequence of a practitioner generating love and compassion is the purification of their own mind, but it merely dodges the question of whether that is only, or even primary purpose of generating love and compassion. Whether or not love and compassion purify the mind is beside the point, the issue at hand being whether the specific term *blo sbyong* refers narrowly and specifically to 'mental purification', or whether it has the broader meaning suggested by the translation 'mind training'.

As for the reference to Śāntideva, a careful reading of Sweet's article reveals a few problems with the citation. In a footnote Sweet reveals that *sems sbyong ba* comes from 20th century commentarial literature. Kunsang Palden (*kun bzang dpal ldan,* also known

as *kun bzang chos grags*) and Shen Ga *([mkhan po] gzhan dga')*, students of the 19th century lama Mipham *('jam mgon 'ju mi pham rnam rgyal rgya mtsho,* 1846-1912) are the source. The canonical version of Śāntideva's text has *sems sbyang, sbyang* being the verb *sbyong,* but in another form. According to Sweet the canonical translation is unreliable because "the more correct perfect form would be *sbyangs*." Sweet suggests that the change he adopts may be attributed to Mipham "who was renowned for his philological expertise" (Sweet 253).

There is no doubt that Mipham was well-versed in Sanskrit, but as Verhagen points out :

> [N]inth century Tibetan translator-grammarians were primarily interested in creating Tibetan translations that faithfully reflected the meaning or intention(s) of the Sanskrit Buddhist text material as understood in their time, so they restricted their grammatical analysis of Sanskrit to semantical data. Later, in the 14th century, ... No longer was the semantically correct Tibetan translation of a Sanskrit term of paramount importance but the original Sanskrit was studied more from an Indian point of view. (Verhagen 11-12)

This suggests that while later work on Sanskrit treatises becomes more grammatically accurate as the Tibetans became more practiced at translation, the semantic material was well translated from the beginning. Given this, it seems that Śāntideva's meaning was well translated in the ninth century, and we can conclude that we have no evidence that a Tibetan prior to the 20th century would have read *sems sbyong ba* in Śāntideva.

At this point Sweet's argument—that the specific term *sbyong* appears in Tibetan translation of Sanskrit literature to mean purification—runs into serious difficulties. His argument is as follows: Although Tibetans of the 11th-14th centuries would have read in Śāntideva *sems sbyang,* they would have consciously corrected it to the 20th century version *sems sbyong ba,* although the correct perfect form is *sems sbyangs.* Furthermore,

since *sems* and *blo* are synonymous in Tibetan, the words *'sems byang'* would have contributed to their using *sbyong* in the dyad *blo sbyong* not in the usual way, but with a particular meaning known only to those versed in Sanskrit. Sweet seems uncertain whether Tibetan meanings or Sanskrit meanings have priority in reading the text.

I am not saying here that the verb *sbyong* does not mean purification (we have already seen that it does), but that such a convoluted process seems unlikely in a native Tibetan literary genre, whose writers may not even have been aware of this particular grammatical point. Furthermore, it is not clear how applying these back-formations from corrected Sanskrit translations to a later native Tibetan literature serves to clarify the meaning and usage of *blo sbyong* in a that literature. Sweet says that "As a named genre the mind purification literature appears to be a genuinely Tibetan innovation" (Sweet 245), but wishes to argue that its language and conceptions are essentially the same as earlier Indian Buddhism. It is possible that the late appearance of this literary genre is the source of some concern to him, which may explain following reference to purification of *citta* "such compounds and phrases are expressive of their origins in the earliest and most fundamental Buddhist practices, all of which 'aim(s) at purifying the *citta*' (Johansson [*The Psychology of Nirvana*]: 23)" (Sweet 246). However he cannot have it both ways—if it is an innovation, then it can stand on its own conceptual feet, while if it is simply a restatement of Indian conceptions, it is not an innovation. This thesis inclines to the view that mind training is indeed an innovation, and as such it presents a reconceptualization of Indian Buddhist doctrine, if only by means of a new articulation of that doctrine.

In conclusion then, Sweet's 1996 argument that *blo sbyong* means 'mental purification' is weak and possibly misleading. Certainly he is correct in pointing out that

mind training has a great focus on purification, but he has failed to show that it signifies uniquely the purifying of the mind. Furthermore we can see a tendency to a psychological models of an unchanging essence that characterizes Buddhist praxis.

2001

Sweet and Zwilling's later work in 2001 finesses their argument. They admit "Although it has become customary to render this word as 'mental/mind training,' a look at the history of the term shows it to be of some complexity" (Sweet and Zwilling 15). As we have seen from the dictionary definitions, it was customary to call *blo sbyong* 'mind training' long before Sweet's initial article appeared. In their defense they appeal to an obscurantist trend in Tibetan Buddhism, arguing that mind training was a "hidden teaching (*lkog chos*)" and

> that during the century following Atiśa's death, a process of sifting had taken place and many early lojong teachings had become neglected with the rise to dominance of one particular trend. Consequently, the recovery of the original sense of lojong becomes problematic. (Sweet and Zwilling 15).

While Sweet and Zwilling do not make explicit which particular trend that rose to dominance they are referring too, it seems likely that it was "The Seven-Point Mind Training." However, as we have seen in the "Introduction," the 15th century *TGC* contains varied examples of the arrangement in seven points, as well as a number of other mind training texts. Consequently the literature provides a great deal of evidence of varied approaches to mind training from which we can recover various subtler significations of mind training. While there are no Tibetan mind training texts extant from the century following Atiśa's death (Sweet and Zwilling 2), this seems evidence that the literature did not yet exist. Perhaps there is no earlier original meaning of *blo sbyong* to recover.

However Sweet and Zwilling's further research into Tibetan translations of Sanskrit literature may have contributed to enriching our understanding of the ways in which literature may contribute to subtler implications of words. They have shown that *blo,* when used to translate, occasionally refers to the Sanskrit *manas*, 'mind' or 'thought,' which is specifically is used to indicate *bodhicitta* by Śāntideva (Sweet and Zwilling 30, n.54). They say "without making too much of this, we should keep in mind the possibility that the term *blo* may have been understood as an abbreviation for 'the thought intent on enlightenment'" (Sweet and Zwilling 15). Recalling Jäschke's definition of *sbyong* as an invocation, it may suggest that there is a subtle implication that mind training is an invocation of *bodhicitta*, that is to say a bringing to mind of the thought of enlightenment.

In regards to *sbyong*, with its primary meaning of 'to clean, purify', they argue that purification has since the earliest times been the basic metaphor for Buddhist spiritual progress. They support their reading of purification as identical with spiritual progress in the Tibetan tradition by citing Könchog Bang (*dkon mchog 'bangs*) the 15th century junior compiler of *TGC*, who Sanskritized the *blo sbyong* as it appeared in the title of his mind training text blo sbyong legs bshad kun 'dus with *cittaśodhana* (Sweet and Zwilling 16).[1] In either case, this usage falls into the second phase of Tibetan Sanskritization explained by Verhagen above. It does not contribute to our understanding of mind training in the 11th-14th centuries , although it may contribute to our understanding of the usage and signification of the term later. Furthermore, in the period immediately preceding the appearance of mind training literature, purification was ancillary to the production of *bodhicitta*, which in turn preceded entering the path towards Buddhahood.

[1] There is some confusion in regards to this text, as Jinpa attributes it to Shönu Gyalchok, the 14th century senior compiler of *TGC* (Jinpa 677).

In Atiśa's reading of the Indian Buddhist tradition, *bodhicitta* is not produced through simple purification, although purification of the mind is required for its production. While aware if the various ways in which *bodhicitta* was interpreted by Indian pandits (Atiśa 73-75), he explained that for the initial generation of the mind it is first necessary to purify the mind according to Śāntideva's method in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (where the reference to *manas* cited by Sweet and Zwilling is found), to make offerings to the Guru, to cultivate the four immeasurable minds ritually, and only then will *bodhicitta* be produced (Atiśa 77). After that, the practitioner should generate *bodhicitta* again and again, either following the same procedure or a briefer one (Atiśa 95). Then to increase it the practitioner should undertake the conduct of the *prātimokṣa* and *bodhisattva* vows (Atiśa 113). This shows us that purification is distinct from *bodhicitta*, and that there is a necessary cultivation of the positive mental states of love, compassion, joy, and equanimity towards all beings prior to its arising. This suggests that mental purification and generation of *bodhicitta* may be distinct for Atiśa, although both are requisite for engaging in the Buddhist path through the prātimokṣa and bodhisattva vows.

As for the native Tibetan usage of *sbyong*, Sweet and Zwilling claim that the metaphorical meanings of 'study,' 'train,' 'cultivate,' and 'meditate' developed from the basic sense of purification (Sweet and Zwilling 16). This seems to be placing the cart before the horse. It seems more likely that *sbyong* was chosen to translate the Sanskrit *śodhana* because it already had the meaning 'to purify'. It did not receive that meaning from Sanskrit. As we have already seen, in the 9th century the verb also had the meaning of 'to train', as in the epithet "having a trained mind, ... *blo sbyangs,*" although they discount this usage because "this compound serves solely as an epithet and has no

doctrinal content" (Sweet and Zwilling 16). The fact however remains that both usages were current in Tibetan.

Sweet and Zwilling go on to discuss the term *blo goms*, which is closely related to mind training, often appearing in the same context. *Goms* is a translation of the Sanskrit *abhyāsa,* "frequent and repeated concentration or practice" (Sweet and Zwilling 16). They conclude that "mental-purification training ... is probably not far from the original understanding of *blo sbyong*" (Sweet and Zwilling 17). They support this with a citation from Atiśa regarding *bodhicitta*:

> Purifying it: one should constantly recall that mind (*sems, citta*) has no beginning from whence it has come, no end to where it goes, and no abiding anywhere; it is colorless, shapeless, unborn from the beginning, not obstructed at the end, empty of ownbeing, and of the nature of clear light. Or, love, compassion, and the thought directed to enlightenment should be made firm through repeated practice (*goms* [sic!]); it should be highly purified, it should be continually recalled at every mental moment; it should be made to continue through recollection, deliberation, proper thinking, and restraint. (Sweet and Zwilling 17)

This translation assumes Atiśa is using *sbyong* in the narrow sense of purification, and not with the more general signification of training. However we know that Atiśa was quite familiar with Tibetan language—he spent the twelve years of his time in Tibet in the company of well trained Tibetan translators and is credited with producing translations from Sanskrit to Tibetan (Chattopadhyaya 37-55). He was also extremely interested in presenting Buddhist thought and practice in a concise vernacular form—his masterwork The Lamp For the Path together with its Commentary were specifically composed for Tibetans and have determined several important features of Tibetan Buddhism until the present day (Chattopadhyaya 343-44). Given all this, I think that we can conclude that Atiśa was aware of the several usages of *sbyong*, and that he knew and approved of its use in the discussions of *bodhicitta.* Thus another legitimate translation of

the opening phrase could be 'Training it.' When he writes 'it should be highly purified, it should be recalled at every mental moment;' he may simply be using *sbyong* to mean continually present to the mind. Thus the phrase could read "it should be highly trained, it should be recalled at every moment" i.e. the mind should be continually familiar with love, compassion and *bodhicitta.*

Atiśa's discussion of training the mind falls into two parts—a discussion of the empty nature of the mind in general, and an exhortation to maintain love, compassion and *bodhicitta* in repeated meditation. This division into two parts, suggestive of two-fold division of *bodhicitta* into ultimate and conventional in the 'Seven-Point Mind Training.' It may reflect an early Kadampa method of meditating first on emptiness of the mind to purify it, and second on love, compassion and *bodhicitta* to prepare it for mind training in the two aspects of the awakening mind. The combination of these two, together with various supporting factors, came to be what was indicated by the term 'mind training.' Emptiness is commonly used in Vajrayāna practice to purify an object so it can be transformed.[2] Here we may detect a suggestion that as the practitioner's ordinary mind (*sems*) is purified, it transforms through repeated practice of love and compassion into *bodhicitta* (*blo*). The process is a movement and transformation from ordinary to awakened, and not simply the purification of some external object. Taken together then, this new evidence presented by Sweet and Zwilling suggests that *blo* does not necessarily signify simply mind, but in some contexts may hint specifically at *bodhicitta.* Repeated

[2] Evidence of this is found in many daily sadhanas containing the formula of recitation of a deity mantra, recitation of a mantra recalling the purity of all phenomena, and the words "It becomes emptiness" prior to the re-generation of whatever substance is to be purified. See Stephan Beyer, The Cult of Tara : Magic and Ritual in Tibet (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1973). for examples.

concentration and practice has an object, and in mind training that object is not simply the practitioner's mind in general, but the particular mental state denoted by *bodhicitta.*

Summary

Despite Jäschke and Das suggesting that 'mind training' is a simple and well-attested translation, Tucci quietly prefers the Sanskritized translation 'mental purification,' as do Sweet and Zwilling. This is a mistake due to a number of weaknesses:

1) Use of Sanskrit to explain Tibetan language. While it is true that Tibetan language was greatly developed and modified during the process of its encounter with Indian Buddhism and its Sanskrit texts, the argument that a native Tibetan term like *sbyong* developed metaphorically from a basic meaning identical to that used in translation from Sanskrit seems unlikely. It is more probable that *sbyong* was chosen to translate *śodhana* because it already had a meaning close to that of the Sanskrit term. Furthermore, use in translation reveals nothing about any native meanings of *sbyong.* More evidence, and a fully developed theory of language evolution, would be required to show that the meaning 'training' either necessarily evolves from 'cleansing', or did so accidentally in the Tibetan case.
2) Ignoring usage in Tibetan canonical texts. The verb *sbyong ba* does appear as a dyad with *blo* in the perfect, where it means 'trained mind,' and should not be summarily discounted
3) Use of late Tibetan to Sanskrit translation as evidence. The argument that *blo sbyong* was translated to *cittaśodhana* by a later Tibetan scholar tells us nothing about semantic meaning and Tibetan usage in the period of the development of the genre.

At its root, Tucci, Sweets and Zwilling's argument is that Sanskritized Tibetan usage is a more reliable indicator of meaning than native Tibetan usage. When we are examining a tradition or literature that developed in India with a Sanskritic primary language, such as the Canon, this certainly is true. If while examining native Tibetan literature we found prior usage of *blo sbyong* to translate specific Sanskrit terminology, this would be evidence that Sanskrit ideas could be considered primary due to its great authority. However Tucci, Sweet, and Zwilling instead of producing such clear evidence, actually show that *blo sbyong* does not appear in the canonical texts. This, combined with the fact that mind training is a uniquely Tibetan genre written by Tibetans in Tibetan, suggests that there is no prior authoritative usage to justify their position. As a result I think that more is required to prefer a special Sanskritized usage in place of a typical Tibetan usage.

Of course, none of this is enough to show that Tucci, Sweet, and Zwilling's translation and conclusions are wrong. It merely shows that more work is necessary to support them. Their discussion is also exemplary in bringing out the great importance of purification in mind training. However the mind training literature contains much more than a simple system of mental purification, and the translation 'mental purification' obscures this. Hence 'mental purification' as a translation of *blo sbyong* should be dropped, while the insight that purification plays a very important role maintained.

The Contextual Approach

The discussion here will be limited to Jinpa's comments, as Stein does not discuss his translation at all, limiting himself to the comment that the literature had barely been examined (Stein 267).

Jinpa's discussion of the meaning of *blo sbyong* draws more upon the contextual usage of the term than the other scholars. Jinpa says *blo* means "mind, thought, attitudes;" while *sbyong* has four significations: "training whereby one acquires skill or masters a field of knowledge;" "habituation or familiarization a with specific ways of being and thinking;" "cultivating specific mental qualities;" and "cleansing or purification" (Jinpa "Introduction" 1). Jinpa identifies as the salient idea unifying all of these as "transformation, whereby a process of training, habituation, cultivation, and cleansing induces a profound transformation" (Jinpa "Introduction" 2). We have already discussed this in some detail in the "Introduction." For Jinpa then, consideration of the native and common usage of words in context should be considered at least as important as their etymology and supposed psychological referent.

He also considers the literary culture that informs the authors and influences their usage, leading to the incorporation of several meanings into what appears to be a simple terminology. This culture is revealed in the story of Chekawa's requesting Sharawa for an authoritative source for Langri Thangpa's "Eight Verses of Mind Training." Sharawa replies that the source can be found in Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvāli* (Jinpa "Introduction" 2). According to Chekawa, the canonical sources for mind training include the *Ākāśagarbhasūtra,* the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra,* the *Avataṃsakasūtra,* the *Aksyamatinirdeśasūtra,* and *Udānavarga,* and he also cites from classical Indian Buddhist treatises by Nāgārjuna (*Ratnāvāli* and *Discourse on the Wish-fulfilling Jewel Dream*), Āryaśūra (*Jātakamālā*), Maitreya (*Mahāyānasūtralaṃkāra*), Asanga (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*), and Śāntideva (*Bodhicaryāvatāra* and *Śiksāsamuccaya*) (Jinpa "Introduction" 3). As already mentioned, Atiśa adopted a similar methodology in his

Commentary on the Lamp for the Path (*Bodhimārgapradīpaṃpañjikānāma*) to explain *bodhicitta*, where he briefly cites Indrabhūti, Nāgārjuna, Śāntideva, Asaṅga, Daṃṣṭrasena, Candragomin, Śūra, Śāntaraksita, before presenting his own position. He concludes that "my gurus taught me that one should hold the system presented him by his own Gurus" (Atiśa 75).

From this we can see that *blo sbyong* is a kind of short-hand for a constellation of texts, attitudes, and practices based on whatever instructions one has received, and its meaning is found through encountering all of them. Furthermore, while it serves to focus the practitioner's efforts by encouraging a reliance on the teachers one has personally met, it in no way denies the multiple approaches and perspectives found in Indian Buddhism. Indeed it suggests that mind training practitioners would expect others to follow slightly different presentations, according to their own history and teachers.

For the purposes of this thesis, this indicates the importance of considering the contemporary context of the literature in *TGC* if we are to identify the characteristics that make it a genre. It also allows more sensitivity to the historical and cultural contexts that formed it, and does not attempt to warp a uniquely Tibetan development of Buddhism into a schema that grants priority to earlier developments, whether they occurred in India or elsewhere.

Conclusions

Tucci, Sweet, and Zwilling begin their analysis of the meaning of mind training by asking themselves how it is related to purification (*sbyong*), because the term was used this way in Tibetan translations of Sanskrit texts. This is perhaps due to a conception that Sanskrit terminology, being earlier, better represents the spiritual and psychological

experiences that constitute the essence of Buddhism. Their discussion is clear, although they evidence they cite in support at times seems too weak to support their strong conclusions. It also has the salutary effect of bringing several more subtle significations of *blo sbyong* into focus, which allows a careful reader to deepen and broaden their thinking about mind training. In the end however, their argument lacks the strength to argue that the well-attested reading of 'mind training' should be replaced by 'mental purification.'

Jinpa's translation of *blo sbyong* as 'mind training' avoids obscuring the multiple approaches and techniques not be directly related to purification which are found within the literature. Thus *blo sbyong* is best translated as 'mind training'. This translation accurately represents that the term is made of two components, and respects native Tibetan usage. Usage of the term in the context of *TGC* indicates specifically training the mind of a practitioner to develop and maintain the psychological state of *bodhicitta*, indicating its exclusively Mahāyāna provenance. The term 'training' should be understood to carry strong overtones of 'cleansing', suggesting that mind training is a kind of refinement of the mind. However 'training' also indicates that mere cleansing is not intended as it also carries the connotations of repeated effort in the generation, habituation, and maintenance of mental states such as love and compassion.

Chapter 2: Mind and Praxis

This chapter has two broad arguments. First it presents a rebuttal of a conception of mind training as an essentially psychological preparation for other Vajrayāna practices. Second, it argues that praxis is the interaction of mind and real objects.

Mind training: Preliminary or principal?

Tucci's principal interest is doctrine and practice of the Vajrayāna, and this leads him to misinterpret some aspects of the mind training literature. This foreshadows some of the difficulties that also afflict Sweet and Zwilling. Because of this similarity with later work, and its brevity, Tucci's explanation of the mind training genre will be critiqued in some detail. However it should be kept in mind that Tucci was not attempting any kind of literary criticism in his book. Nor was he unaware of the limits of his knowledge. His book was intended to be a teaching aide, and as such no doubt he passed over more difficult points, in order to introduce a student researcher to the main themes of Tibetan religious theory, and in particular the unique Vajrayāna elements found within Tibetan Buddhism, his principal interest. In general the book succeeds in this.

However this very quality leads Tucci to read mind training literature as a mere preliminary to other more profound or important texts and practices drawn from the Vajrayāna. This is perhaps not so surprising. As stated above, *bodhicitta* is the entry to the Mahāyāna, and the psychological foundation of all praxis. Surely laying a foundation is no more than a preliminary to constructing a house?

However we have seen evidence within the literature suggests that the generation and maintenance of the attitudes and behaviors associated with *bodhicitta* are not merely a

preliminary practice but a continual activity, as in Sé Chilbu's explanation of the fourth point of *The Seven-Point Mind Training* (*TGC* text 6) "Presentation of a lifetime's practice in summary" (Jinpa The Great Collection 84) which clearly explains how the mind training practices are meant to be implemented throughout one's entire life. Further evidence are such pithy sayings as "Accomplish all yogas by a single means" from "Root Lines of Mahāyāna Mind Training" (Jinpa The Great Collection 72) and Langri Thangpa's "I will train myself to at all times cherish every sentient being as supreme" (Jinpa The Great Collection 277). The "Public Explication" comments on the first, saying

> Here ... all yogas ... are performed by the following meditative practice: When you have all the amenities, such as food, clothing, and so on, you think, 'Through this good fortune of mine may all beings enjoy happiness.' And if these are lacking, you think, 'May all the suffering that beings have due to lacking these amenities ripen upon me.' (Jinpa The Great Collection 380)

This is clearly a practice based on conventional truths, and relates the physical reality of the practitioner with their social world, as well as the future religious state of the liberation of all beings through the accomplishment of enlightenment, by the mediating factor of the psychological states of love and compassion induced by taking and giving. Thus these citations clearly show that the practices contained in mind training were not considered as mere preliminaries to some other practice. Rather they are meant to mediate and ground all of the individual's praxis, whether psychological, social, or religious.

Tucci's psychologism

Tucci argues for a psychological approach to religious language, saying "Tibetan words are symbols, which can evoke living experiences which the word as such can only suggest but not define" (Tucci vii). I will leave aside the question of whether this

represents Tucci's general theoretical position vis-à-vis language, or whether he considered this particular to Tibetan. Of interest here is that Tucci was principally interested in the psychologically transformative aspects of Tibetan religious aim and practice, and thus he translated *blo sbyong* according to the living psychological experience—the purified mind—he considered it to embody. Sweet and Zwilling continue this psychological approach, supplementing it with etymological and philological historical methods. However this psychological approach is not without its difficulties. As Tucci says "We are faced here with an extremely difficult, almost impossible task: to coin equivalent technical terms for experiences which take place within the spiritual realm, and which can radically modify our spiritual and psychic reality" (Tucci vii).

I suggest a solution to this problem is found in the pluralistic interactionist model of this thesis. In this interactionist model mind training entails a continuing effort to maintain a psychological state despite the influence of continuing changes in physical, social, and religious worlds. From this perspective, the problem is not to find the correct technical term for the experience, it is to describe the various factors which have interacted to produce it. Mind training then would be an ongoing and continual process that would continue in all activities, even during supposedly more advanced exercises such as Vajrayāna ritual.

Tucci's discussion of mind training

Tucci identifies the literary genre of the Kadampa teachers as discourses on Atiśa's condensed presentation of the Path or various responses to inquiries. These were

supplemented by stories, and were distinctively divided into three, five, six, or seven topics. Tucci says in regards to mind training:

> The teaching aimed at the first place at the purification of the mind (*blo sbyong*), at the realization of the ethical and esoteric principles of Buddhism. Much less time was devoted to Buddhism's highly developed theoretical side. Essentially this instruction was limited to leading the disciple to a better understanding of his own mind and to the achievement of insight into 'voidness' as the limiting state of things (*mthar thug*), together with compassion. The thought of Enlightenment from the point of view of ultimate reality is equated with 'voidness,' while compassion results from the same thought when considered from the standpoint of conventional truth [Tucci here cites as evidence *bKa' gdams kyi skyes bu dam pa rnams kyi gsung bgros thor bu ba rnams* , 161, 167]. 'Voidness' is the 'body of essence', compassion the 'body of form'.
>
> (Tucci 23)

Tucci reads *blo sbyong* as 'purification of the mind,' an interpretation whose limitations have already been discussed. His insight that the literature devoted little space to the developed theoretical side of Buddhist dogma is a clue towards identification of mind training as a literary genre. It is not a doctrinal literature, but a practical one applicable to the day-to-day world of the practitioner. However his subsequent discussion is mistaken on two points:

1. Mind training is not simply for the realization of principles.

Tucci seems unaware that mind training refers to a method for a foundational transformation of the practitioner's mind, the movement from the ordinary state of self-centeredness to *bodhicitta*. The practitioner does not set out to simply clear away mental impurities and mistaken conceptions, but also seeks to establish a habitual attitude of love and compassion towards all beings, no matter what their social status or worldly state. These are the habitual attitudes of both a Bodhisattva and a Buddha manifesting in the social and phenomenal world. Mind training literature and praxis support this by providing concrete guidance on the behaviors appropriate for a person entering the

Mahāyāna so that they may develop *bodhicitta*. Examples of such concrete guidance can be found in the sixth and seventh points of the Seven-Point Mind Training, the commitments and precepts of mind training, such as, "Do not seek misery as a means to happiness" (Jinpa The Great Collection 84) and "Do not be sporadic" (Jinpa The Great Collection 85).

2. Mind Training is not limited to producing a better understanding of emptiness.

Although Atiśa states that "the bodhisattva who engages in the practice of Mantra must first produce that unmistakable reality, the Thought of Enlightenment in its ultimate sense" (Atiśa 281), most mind training texts in *TGC* that contain the pithy sayings of the seven points spend very little time explaining ultimate awakening mind. Instead the literature consists of many pithy instructions of attitudes to hold and actions to take in relation to conventional truths, not ultimate truths. These behaviors are what support the Buddhist transformative project. This project is not limited to a spiritual realm, but includes the physical and social worlds. It assumes that the practitioner already has some familiarity with Mahāyāna Buddhist theory, while at the same time avoiding elaborate philosophical discussion. The practitioner is assumed to have already encountered a teacher who explains how to apply mind training instructions and exhortations. These mind training texts are not intended to teach or introduce formal structures of Buddhist doctrine or explain the rules of social institutions, they are intended to help the individual maintain a psychological state while alternately meditating and then participating in the social world.

Perhaps Tucci's misunderstanding is due to his great interest in the Vajrayāna aspects of Tibetan Buddhism. In the chapter from which this citation is drawn, he devotes only

three and a half pages to assumptions common to all schools, and forty-two pages to a discussion of tantric theories. He does not discuss why and how these common assumptions, attitudes, and behaviors evolved and are maintained, or contextualize ritual practice within a practitioner's life. After all, most Buddhist practitioners, even monks, do not spend most of their time performing tantric ritual, but are engaged in ordinary life. With his single-pointed focus on ritual, it is not surprising that Tucci considers mind training as a mere preliminary to the tantric aspect of Tibetan religions.

However as our examples show, mind training includes within it Vajrayāna ritual by its placement of meditation on ultimate awakening mind within a conventional practice within a "chamber of divinities" (Jinpa The Great Collection 90, 92). It also includes ordinary life within the practice of conventional awakening mind. The alternation and development of meditation and ordinary life leads to the transformation of the individual into a Bodhisattva and Buddha capable of transforming the world. This justifies the assertion that for Tibetan Buddhists all Vajrayāna is Mahāyāna, and thus all tantric theory and praxis is dependent on training the mind in the generation and maintenance of *bodhicitta* (Beyer 29-33).

Returning to the image of a foundation of a house from the beginning of this discussion, it is evident that the construction of a foundation precedes the construction of the building, but for the building to endure it is vital that the foundation be continually maintained. Correcting minor defects in the interior finishing while the foundation crumbles would be a mistake. Furthermore, regular inspection and maintenance of the foundation allow the inhabitants to continue to enjoy all the other benefits that come from use of the building.

Conclusion

Tucci, due to both his focus on Vajrayāna and his faulty translation of mind training, misinterprets the importance of the materials describing appropriate behavior that we find in mind training texts. Tucci mistakenly understands mind training as limited to leading the disciple to an understanding of the emptiness of the mind, which will then cause compassion. The essential point of mind training is not simply the realization of the emptiness of the mind, but the generation of the psychological state of *bodhicitta* while both meditating and interacting with the phenomenal world described in our model. *Bodhicitta* is not generated simply by meditation on emptiness, but rather by a complex interplay of the four worlds while the practitioner maintains an appropriate psychological state.

The focus of Tucci's book is the Vajrayāna, not mind training. His insight that mind training literature is not based theoretical explication does identify the pithy sayings of the Seven-Points. However this assumption that Vajrayāna represents the most important form of Tibetan Buddhism, while perhaps supported by Tibetan rhetoric, has led Tucci into an unsubtle explanation of mind training literature and practice. This is compounded by his faulty translation of *blo sbyong* as mental purification due to his psychological bias. This psychologism also left him indifferent to the importance of social relations in mind training literature. This will be discussed further below in regards to mind training as a tradition.

In conclusion then, we can clearly see that mind training is not merely a preliminary to other more advanced practice, although it is the first activity with which a practitioner should engage. Its priority comes from its importance as the support for all the other

activities of an individual who has adopted a Bodhisattva ideal. Not only is it important at the beginning, it remains of principal importance throughout both religious meditation and ordinary activity, and the practitioner is exhorted to make it a continual aspect of their mind, no matter what the situation: "Engage in the principal practices right now ... compared to all other meditative practices, the practice of training in the awakening mind is more important" (Jinpa The Great Collection 127).

The relationship between mind and praxis

The problem

My use of the four world model may seem to undercut the well-known emphasis Buddhism places on the mind as the ultimate causal force, replacing it with the causal explanation of the four world model. The explanation of the mind training literature presented here seems to be a vision of the mind being manipulated and transformed through the interaction of several objects, many of which explicitly are considered not to be mind, which is to say they exist not in the psychological world, but in the physical, social, and religious worlds. This may seem to in contradiction with Sé Chilbu's summary of the practice of ultimate awakening mind: "The essential point is to avoid being tainted by a conceptualization of subject-object duality" (Jinpa The Great Collection 92). Considering this citation, a psychologism such as Tucci's may seem to be faithful to Buddhist doctrine of mind as primary causal agent, because it maintains the primacy of mental states, and thus its rebuttal unsupported by Buddhist doctrine.

The relation between the mind and external objects is of course a long standing tension in all of Buddhism, including Tibetan Buddhism. We find it reflected in the

textual tradition of the pithy sayings. This tension is explicit in the interpretation of the root line "Place your mind on the basis-of-all, the actual path" (Jinpa The Great Collection 92, 415), which appears in both Sé Chilbu's 12th century "A Commentary on the 'Seven-Point Mind Training'," and Sangyé Gompa's 13th century "Public Explication." The 'basis-of-all' of course is a technical term that normally refers to the Yogacāra doctrine of a foundational or store-house mind (Skt: *ālayavijñāna,* Tib: *kun gzhi*) as one of eight consciousnesses. We have already discussed how this very tension is used to identify the southern and northern lineages of the Seven-point Mind Training. It is worth recalling however that this particular pithy saying does not appear in the other pithy sayings text of *TGC,* suggesting that perhaps this tension was not important to all Kadampas.

The commentarial tradition

Here, the method by which the mind training tradition contains this tension by the division of *bodhicitta* into the ultimate and conventional awakening minds will be explained. This will show how the tension is simultaneously included in mind training while prevented from interfering with development of virtuous minds and *bodhicitta* during social activity.

This tension occurs within the context of training in ultimate *bodhicitta*, which as we have seen is one of two aspects of the principal practice of mind training. The tension is not mentioned in the explanation of conventional *bodhicitta*, or any of the remaining six points.

For the training in ultimate *bodhicitta*, Sé Chilbu comments:

> all objects of knowledge are subsumed within the class of either objects or minds. ... you should think 'Certainly nothing is established primordially as possessing substantial reality.' ... You should identify the ordinary mind and place it in a state free of negation or affirmation. Since all seven types of consciousness are conceptual minds relinquish them (Jinpa The Great Collection 91-92).

Here we see a division of 'objects of knowledge,' which can be classed into the two groups of minds and objects. In terms of our four worlds, minds would correspond to the conventional truths of the psychological states *knowing* objects. All things in the physical, social, and religious worlds, together with *known* psychological states (such as the anger known in thinking "I am angry now,") would fall into the class objects. Thus 'objects' here includes persons, despite the usual division between objects and persons. Substantially real objects, which are not established, would correspond with Popper's givens, or theory-free data, which do not exist. Therefore the acceptance of objects of knowledge by Sé Chilbu corroborates the thesis that mind training is a realistic method.

To this Sangyé Gompa adds:

> (Since these seven classes are conceptualization derived from the mind, and since conceptual thoughts do not purify the subject by themselves, observe them with awareness and let them rest in the expanse of suchness.) In the future, ... observe them as one awareness observing another awareness, ... (Since the fundamental ground of all phenomena is ineffable, inconceivable, and free of conceptual elaboration, in concord with this natural state, discard [these elaborations]. Settle your mind in this manner and undertake the practice.)
> (Jinpa The Great Collection 415)

The commentarial instruction thus seems to indicate that a practitioner meditating on ultimate *bodhicitta* should cultivate a mental attitude wherein any grasping the substantial reality of any conventional object of the four worlds of our model is simply put aside. This practice can only be described as non-realistic, in the sense that it cannot be described in conventional terms. This rather startling conclusion is supported by Atiśa's discussion mentioned earlier:

> One does use (conventional) words to show this, stating it is non-arising and non-perishing, etc.; but in the mode of undifferentiated Ultimate Truth, there is no phenomenality and no True-nature. [6] Differentiation in Emptiness itself has not the slightest possibility of existing; and when one realises this non-conceptually, it is described as "Seeing Emptiness." (Atiśa 353)

This would include grasping at a subject who knows, an object known, both conventional and ultimate *bodhicitta*, and even buddhahood. However as already shown, cultivation of ultimate *bodhicitta* is placed in the context of an alternating approach to meditation and break, and furthermore is a preliminary to meditative seven-limb practice within a deity practice. Furthermore both commentators encourage short meditative sub-sessions within the cultivation of ultimate *bodhicitta* that alternate between effort and relaxation. We see then that mind training praxis consists of alternating cultivation of realistic psychological states such as love and compassion that interact with the ordinary physical, social, and religious worlds to create benefit, with a special non-realistic state that can be pointed to by words, but not described by them, and which serves to liberate from self-grasping.

Using our four world model and the citations above we can explain the cultivation of ultimate *bodhicitta* as a special psychological state that allows the practitioner to free themselves from the dominating influence of the four worlds by single-pointedly putting all appearances of them aside. At the same time there is recognition that such single-pointed participation will be followed by a return to the interaction of the four worlds, due to a causal power of real but unsubstantial objects over the practitioner. Thus mind training also includes realistic methods for the control of that causal power by maintenance and growth of psychological states such as love, compassion, and conventional *bodhicitta* that will encourage this return. These enable the practitioner to

participate in the reality of the four worlds, while supporting his or her cultivation of non-conceptual seeing of emptiness, by regarding objects as would a "conjuror of illusions" (Jinpa The Great Collection 92), and contemplating both their own and others' "person as illusionlike" (Jinpa The Great Collection 415). The liberation of self-grasping realized in ultimate truth but known in conventional truth then serves to generate a special compassion towards those beings who fail to recognize the absence of substantial reality. There is a movement from conventional truth to ultimate truth, followed by a return to conventional truth. This praxis unifying the conventional and ultimate truths within a framework that asserts the primacy of cause and effect when conceptuality is present is mind training.

How then is compassion explained in conventional terms? A simple example, drawn at random, will make this clear. Langri Thangpa's 11th century root text says "Whenever I interact with others, I will view myself as inferior to all, and I will train myself to hold others superior from the depths of my heart" (Jinpa The Great Collection 278). The commentary, Chekawa's 12th century "A Commentary on 'Eight Verses of Mind Training'" (*TGC* text 30), explains this with reference to the psychological world—the psychological state to be cultivated is a combination of humility and respect; with reference to the social world—others refers to members of the Tibetan and Buddhist monastic society, including those superior (spiritual teachers), equal (fellow monks) and inferior (beggars) to the practitioner; and with reference to the religious world—even noble Avalokiteśvara will compliment the practitioner. Clearly here the psychological state is of paramount importance, but the text recognizes that the desired state of humility may be absent. The solution is to rely on objects from the social and religious worlds as

well as such psychological objects as memories of the state 'humility,' to help generate, develop, and maintain the mind of humility. Thus to understand and explain mind training, we need to consider these social and religious worlds in relation with psychological states. A typology or terminology of psychological states will of course be of great use, but it will not reveal what is actually going on in the praxis of mind training.

Conclusion

Thus the relation between psychology and praxis in the context of mind training is one of mutual support. Realistic practice of the conventional awakening mind proceeds by the interaction of the psychological, social, and religious world in ways that do "not rely on other favorable conditions, ... only two conditions are indispensable—the common ethical discipline and the uncommon commitments of the Mahayana" (Jinpa The Great Collection 402). These govern behavior in the world, requiring the cultivation of a moral discipline in harmony with both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna (common ethical discipline), and the special return from liberation into the phenomenal because of love and compassion explained in the Mahāyāna scriptures. Non-realistic practices of the ultimate awakening mind, which undercut grasping at any substantially real mind or object, are contained within these two realistic practices.

Conclusion

This and the preceding chapter have shown what mind training practice is. To review, mind training is a realistic method which both purifies the mind and habituates it to the psychological states of love, compassion, and *bodhicitta* by utilizing objects from four worlds—the physical, psychological, social, and religious—as interacting causes. Taking

and giving is the classic example of mind training's realistic method. Non-realistic emptiness (ultimate awakening mind) is framed by realistic but insubstantial psychological states (conventional awakening mind), and the mind training practitioner moves between these two, always returning to the ordinary world accomplish the benefit of others. Meditation on the ultimate awakening mind wherein all ordinary objects are put aside by cultivation of a non-dual state is preceded by generation of conventional awakening mind. It is a preliminary to single-pointed participation in the religious world of Tibetan Buddhism during ritual, and its conventional aspect serves to bring adversities onto the Buddhist path in daily life. Realistic methods knowing and using objects from the four worlds to establish psychological states such as love and compassion are preliminary to conventional awakening mind. It frames all meditative practice of emptiness, and in ordinary life reduces and eventually eliminates negative mental states such as anger. Mind training is thus both a preliminary to ritual Vajrayāna practice, and an ongoing activity that can be applied to any situation in life.

Chapter 3: Praxis and Tradition

We now turn to the question of how mind training has been transmitted from one practitioner to another. Clearly texts such *TGC* have served as one way of explaining the practice. However we have shown that the foundation of the Seven-point mind training is the pithy sayings of Atiśa. This chapter will explain the connection between Atiśa as the source of the mind training literature, and the literature itself as compiled in *TGC,* as evidence of the arising of a tradition within Tibetan Buddhism. The first part explains a social theory of tradition developed by Popper, in which tradition mediates between individuals on one side, and institutions on the other, and its application to the historical situation in 11th century Tibet.

A theory of tradition

Popper's "Towards A Rational Theory of Tradition" (19) provides the basis for this discussion. He had earlier suggested that traditions "play a kind of intermediate and intermediary role between *persons* (and personal decisions) and *institutions*" (Popper The Open Society and Its Enemies 266, n. 7). These traditions contribute to what he calls the *atmosphere* of a social situation, and he rightly points out that this atmosphere contributes greatly to the ways individuals behave and the success of their endeavors. His article uses the scientific tradition as an example for the model.

Popper argues that traditions are difficult to establish and maintain, and difficult to restore when lost because they are myths. The word myth is not used pejoratively, but simply means the explanatory stories by which we structure our lives (Popper "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition" 126). He suggests that there are only two attitudes possible

towards mythic tradition—an *uncritical* acceptance, or a *critical* evaluation. Evaluation may lead to acceptance, rejection, or compromise. One must both know and understand a tradition before one can criticize it, but Popper further points out that the aim of a critical study of tradition is not to free ourselves of tradition entirely, because it is impossible in any case. Rather a critical attitude towards a tradition frees us from the *taboos* it embodies, and this is accomplished by accepting the tradition contingently so that we can think about it, and then judge whether we will accept or reject it (Popper "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition" 122).

For Popper the purpose of any social theory is to analyze the "existence and functioning of *institutions* (such as police forces or insurance companies or schools or governments) and of social *collectives* (such as states or nations or classes or other social groups)" (Popper "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition" 124-25) particularly their unwanted consequences. To be sure institutions and communities/collectives are maintained by factors such as discipline and rules and punishments, but they are also maintained by traditions, which fill a social role is similar to that of theories in science—they are "instruments by which we try to bring some order into the chaos in which we live" (Popper "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition" 131). They have the "double function of not only creating a certain order … but also giving us something upon which we can operate; something that we can criticize and change" (Popper "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition" 131). This dual function is accomplished by a process where "some [social traditions] are criticized with the help of others" (Popper "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition" 132).

Clearly there is some ambiguity here—it is difficult to sharply separate institutions and social collectives from the traditions that support them. Popper avoids a formal definition of the two terms, but distinguishes institutions as more socially instrumental than traditions: we speak of institutions wherever people observe certain norms or fulfill certain social functions (such as teaching) which serve social purposes (such as the propagation of knowledge), while we speak of traditions

> ... mainly when we wish to describe a uniformity of people's attitudes, or ways of behaviours, or aims or values, or tastes. Thus traditions are perhaps more closely bound up with persons and their likes and dislikes, their hopes and fears, than are institutions. (Popper "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition" 133).

For Popper traditions, being less instrumental than institutions, are less ambivalent in the use to which they may be put, even though they are as almost as impersonal as institutions. Thus they provide means of correction for institutions which are no longer serving their function in a society. He suggests that the proper functioning of institutions depends mainly upon such traditions. It is tradition which gives the persons (who come and go) "certainty of purpose which resists corruption. A tradition is, as it were, capable of extending something of the personal attitude of the founder far beyond his personal life" (Popper "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition" 134).

Thus traditions give persons the context from which they can evaluate institutions and communities according to their purposes, and compare those with the social good as well as personal aims. Traditions are real social objects that encourage a uniformity of individual attitudes and behaviors, but are not formalized as rules and regulations, which are of a more institutional nature. Traditions arise, are maintained, and continue to exist and function through *imitative* processes, where individuals emulate attitudes and behaviors, while institutions may principally rely upon other more formal processes and

factors. These imitative processes are praxis, and thus mind training praxis is the stuff of the mind training tradition. Using praxis as analytic tool indicates a greater focus on the individual, while using tradition suggests the object is social.

The mind training tradition in Tibetan Buddhism

Using Popper's thesis, I suggest that Tibetan Buddhism can be analyzed into at least three types of particular social entities—institutions and social collectives/communities, individual persons participating in these two, and traditions mediating between the persons and institutions. These all fall into Popper's world 3. This thesis does not explain the status of individual persons as such, but texts reveal persons as authors and readers.

We can identify two types of texts for each type of person. Authors can produce *institutional* texts that describe and explain institutions, perhaps as by explaining lists of rules and so forth for readers to follow, or they can produce *traditional* texts which describe and explain traditions by presenting mythic models for readers to emulate. Readers can read texts as traditional, that is as examples of attitudes and behaviors to emulate, or as institutional, say as rules and regulations to be followed and enforced. When examining any complex text one can expect to find a mixture of the two. Similarly any compilation of texts will likely contain texts of both categories, as well as mixed texts.

As Popper points out, traditions extend personal attitudes beyond the life of an individual person. The thesis here is that the attitudes and behavior of Atiśa towards Buddhist institutions and collectives were extended in just such a manner, principally through a tradition of mind training that produced the literature. In the tradition and in traditional literature Atiśa becomes a mythic social and religious figure rather than an

historical person. His function is to model and demonstrate the relation of the individual to Buddhist institutions. He and his life become greater than that of an ordinary individual. As a mythic model, he, his actions, and his instructions regarding the institutional doctrines, regulations, and collectives of Buddhism, provide the foundation for a living tradition that re-invents ways of maintaining the institution in a historically changing situation. This living tradition also encourages individuals to write for others, and thus a literature is produced. It encourages a critical evaluation of itself and the institutions it supports, and so the literature produced provides a historical record of changing attitudes and behaviors.

We have already seen an example of this in the change in mind training texts after the 15th century from emphasis on conventional *bodhicitta* to emphasis on doctrinal issues around mind emptiness. This may reflect increasing institutionalization in Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism at about this time, corresponding to the disappearance of the Kadam school, the rise of the Gelukpa, and the appearance of reincarnate lamas as centers of religious and social authority, but that is beyond the scope of this thesis. For our purposes, the mind training literature produced in the 12th-14th centuries principally provided further models for social emulation rather than imperatives to be obeyed. An example of this is the literature that developed around Atiśa's teachers of mind training. This is further discussed below.

Thus commentaries on earlier texts are evidence that mind training fulfils the critical function of a tradition, that is they perform the "double function of not only creating a certain order ... but also giving us something upon which we can operate; something that we can criticize and change" (Popper "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition" 131). We

have already seen an example of this process at work—the mind training presentation of the Yogacāra mind basis-of-all does not serve to explain the doctrine, an institutional component of Buddhism. Nor does it deny the authority and position of the canonical texts in which it is contained. Rather, it explains the way in which an individual interacts with mind basis-of-all, a real object in the religious world. It controls the doctrine by delimiting its place and function in the social life of the Tibetan Buddhist collective. It simultaneously enables an individual to emulate the way in which the great ancestor Atiśa incorporated and used Buddhist institutions to benefit all beings. This process also explains the variant orderings of the pithy sayings within a seven-point organization.

For these reasons we can say that mind training literature generally falls into the category of traditional rather than institutional text. It describes and explains Atiśa's attitudes and instructions for behavior in relation to Buddhist institutions, which was developed through a process of commentary by subsequent authors. Despite the brevity of this section, what is presented here is uncontroversial. Therefore it is enough to show that the thesis presented above is defensible.

Atiśa's mission

According to my thesis, some of the Tibetan Buddhist collective and institutions that the mind training tradition mediates for the individual are the monastery and the three vows. That the most important community of Tibetan Buddhism is the monastery is obvious and does not require support. The formal Buddhist institutions that inform the Tibetan monastery are the three sets of vows of the Prātimokṣa, the Bodhisattva, and the Vajrayāna. The definition of these three vows has been a major source of disagreement, and thus literature, during the entire existence of Tibetan Buddhism. A variety of ways

this occurred is explained by Jan-Ulrich Sobisch in his Three-Vow Theories in Tibetan Buddhism (2002), but in the mind training tradition Atiśa's explanation of their identity and function in his Commentary on Lamp for the Path is foundational.

Historical Context

Tibetans' contact with Buddhism was mediated by several formal institutions, particularly the Prātimokṣa, Bodhisattva, and Vajrayāna vows, which were contained within the multivalent social collective of the medieval Indian monastery. Each of these formal institutions was transmitted to the Tibetans in part by ritual, and in part by an institutional literature containing lists and explanations of regulations, vows, commitments, and so forth. These institutions had developed continually in India for over a thousand years, but it seems that their genesis was somewhat independent, and as a result they contain contradictory regulations. During the 10th century there developed in Tibet reservations about the interaction of these three institutions with Tibetan society, which led to the 11th century invitation of Atiśa to Tibet to counter anti-social behavior associated with tantric practice, as well as the separation of the three institutions into different social collectives (Sobisch 11-14). The 15th century Blue Annals, a historical text, describes the situation prior to Atiśa's arrival this way:

> Though many monks are found in the country of Tibet, there exist many wrong practices in respect of sByor (sexual practices) and sGrol (ritual murder) in the study of Tantra. Some, who had practiced these rites preached extensively that one could obtain Enlightenment through (the mere acceptance) of the principle of Relativity (śūnyatā, ston-pa ñyid) without practicing meritorious works. Though the doctrine of the Pratīmoksha had spread (in Tibet), those who practiced the precepts of the Path of the Bodhisattva had deteriorated.
>
> (Roerich 245)

Atiśa's explanation of the Three Vows

Atiśa's response to this problem was to renew the monastic community. The theory he used for this purpose is contained in Commentary on the Lamp for the Path. He re-interpreted Buddhist doctrine of three paths to make them correspond with three institutions. The Prātimokṣa corresponds with the path of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, the Bodhisattva corresponds with the path of bodhisattvas, and the Vajrayāna corresponds with the path of the yogi. All three paths are needed for a complete Buddhist practice, and they are sequential—the Prātimokṣa is necessary prior to the Bodhisattva, which in turn is prior and foundational to the Vajrayāna. The problem of the necessity of all three vows motivated not only the development mind training, but also Three Vow literature (*sdom pa gsum*) and graded presentations of the Buddhist Path (*lam rim*) (Sparham 12-15).

Thus the social Buddhist collective of the monastery that Atiśa wished to preserve was explained as embodying and embodied in the vowed behavior and ritual obligation of three institutions. Atiśa explained that there are seven classes of the Prātimokṣa vows, beginning with one day layperson vows up to the complete set of Vinaya vows maintained by a fully ordained monk (Atiśa 9). There is not space here to discuss these vows in detail, but it is clear in the text that the Prātimokṣa institution consists of all of these and not only the complete Vinaya vows of a fully ordained monk. That the Prātimokṣa institution was interpreted by the Kadam school as open to laity is shown by the historical fact of Atiśa's principal student Dromtönpa (*'brom ston pa*, 1005-1064) establishing the first Kadam monastery at Radreng (*ra sgreng*), although he only held five vows of a layperson and was not a monk (Sweet 1).

Following acceptance of Prātimokṣa vows a person of superior capacity adopts the Bodhisattva vows through a ritual. Atiśa's Commentary explains superior capacity as the psychological states of love, compassion, and *bodhicitta* (Atiśa 69-71). These vows lead a person of superior capacity through the Bodhisattva grounds and paths to Buddhahood by means of the three higher trainings of moral discipline, concentration, and wisdom. Lastly there are the mantra vows which make the perfection of enlightenment easy (Atiśa 9-17).

Atiśa's reform was intended to re-establish the monastery as the primary social community for these three formal institutions and the individuals who engaged with them, but it also greatly influenced how these institutions were navigated in practice by their members. The establishment of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries of the Kadam school by Dromtönpa is simultaneous with the genesis the mind training literature (Jinpa "Introduction" 2). Popper's theory leads us to expect that any institutional social collective will possess traditions explaining how individuals are to interact with it. This shows that the production of the new genre of mind training literature concurrently with the establishment of the new social collective and institution of the Kadam monastery, is neither accidental nor causal, but expected. Taken together, the monastic institutions, individual monks, and mind training tradition are co-determinant of a social reality. Further evidence that mind training literature is an interactive product of the mythic emulation of the attitudes and behaviors of Atiśa towards Buddhist institutions will be given below.

The mind training tradition

We can analyze Atiśa's method to accomplish his mission as follows. The Buddhist social collective of the monastery was splintering, due in part to contradictions among three formal institutions contained within it. To save the society, these contradictions were mediated by a dogmatic assertion that all three institutions were necessary, and a theory of psychological states (love, compassion, and *bodhicitta*) which were common to members of any of the institutions in the society. However, as we all know, identification of a social problem and a theory for its resolution are not sufficient to effect a solution. What is needed is that individuals accept and share common attitudes and behaviors within and across the social collective and its institutions, as well as an ongoing method to establish and maintain these attitudes and behaviors. What is needed is a tradition. That mind training is one of the traditions supporting Atiśa's renewal of the monastic community is supported by three observations:

1. As we have seen, mind training is a realistic method to generate and maintain the love, compassion, and *bodhicitta*, the very psychological states identified by Atiśa as principal for the persons in the monastic collective.
2. Mind training's use of interaction among the physical, psychological, social and religious worlds to maintain those psychological states is robust enough to permit both maintenance and transformation of the social collective, development of an individual Buddhist religious practice appropriate to each member of whatever different capacity, wishes, aims, and taste, while maintaining the structures and obligations of the three institutions of Prātimokṣa, Bodhisattva, and Vajrayāna. The social and physical manifestations of religious practice are sharply bound in

accordance with an ethical system common to the greater Tibetan community. In particular, intense Vajrayāna religious practice is isolated from interaction with the social world by a meditative practice that obstructs the application of deity mandala practice outside of the meditation session.

3. The intermediate state of a tradition between an individual and an institution is seen in the rather ambiguous state of the commitments and precepts of mind training. Although these have the name, and even the form of institutional rules and regulations, their transmission from one member of the community to another is different. Institutional rules and regulations are supported by rituals of entry and maintenance, a dogmatic literature of great authority that is meticulously interpreted, and a graded series of explicit rewards and punishments. The Vinaya presents the clearest example of this, being the principal institutional literature of the Prātimokṣa institution, but similar elements are found in both Bodhisattva and Vajrayāna paths. On the other hand mind training literature explains precepts and commitments in the sixth and seventh points. However these were not common to all members of the social collective, were not transmitted through a special ritual, were variously interpreted by different individuals, and had no explicit system of reward or punishment when kept or broken.

Atiśa's mythic status

We have discussed the elements constituting the complex social characteristic of Tibetan Buddhism—the social collective of the monastery, and the institutions within it. However Popper's theory also shows that traditions are principally mythic, that is they are maintained in great part through the medium of stories of greater-than-life ancestors,

who demonstrated by behavior and exhortation the way for an individual to achieve success through social institutions and collectives. In this tradition this clearly is the place occupied by Atiśa, and by extension those who taught him.

It is important to keep in mind that Atiśa himself may be explained as a mythic product of the interaction of four worlds. Furthermore, he stands in a liminal position between India and Tibet, making him a historical person of some complexity. From his participation in the social and religious worlds of Indian Buddhism we can conclude that he was committed to the Buddhist religious ideal of accomplishing individual liberation from suffering to undertake the liberation of all others. From his travelling to Tibet to undertake the revitalization of the monastic society, we can conclude that he was also motivated by a deep personal commitment to the social world of Buddhist monasticism from which he sprang, and which he obviously valued highly. His commitment to both these religious and social worlds motivated him to renew and transform the social and institutional aspects of Indian Buddhism in response to the existing Tibetan society, while maintaining the Buddhist project of individual transformation within a society as a cause of the transformation of all the world. At the same time, he was able to critique both the Indian model and Tibetan adaptations he encountered, while maintaining his position in both Indian and Tibetan Buddhism (Chattopadhyaya 1). Evidence of his importance to Buddhist institutions outside Tibet and India is found in the colophon to his "Introduction to the Two Truths" which says "The King of Suvarnadvīpa, Gurupāla, sent the monk Devamati to me" (Atiśa 359), while his continuing importance to Buddhist institutions inside Tibet was described by the current Dalai Lama as follows:

> Atiśa ... is held in special regard by Tibetans. ... Before coming to Tibet he was accepted in his own land as foremost authority on discipline, meditation, and

> Buddhist philosophy. … He sought to heal the division which threatened the spread of Buddhism in Tibet by emphasising the central Buddhist teachings and by showing clearly that each teaching was relevant at the appropriate time and for the appropriate person. (Gyatso xi)

Literary evidence

If mind training is a tradition as my thesis asserts, we should find ample support of the mythic status of Atiśa in the literature. Actually, the structure of *TGC* provides several examples of mythic individuals. This section will present some of them to prove that the mythologizing of great individuals is present in mind training, and cuts across sectarian divides within Tibetan Buddhism as a whole.

We can analyze the structure of *TGC* in the following way:

1. Atiśa and Kadampa texts
    a. Atiśa in Tibet.
        i. Text 1. Atiśa's description of the perfect bodhisattva.
        ii. Texts 2-3. Biography of Atiśa, founder of the mind training tradition.
        iii. Texts 4-7. Early mind training instructions believed to have come directly from Atiśa, including the "Seven-Point Mind Training."
        iv. Texts 8-12. Mind training texts attributed to Atiśa's mind training gurus Serlingpa (*gser ling pa*), Maitriyogi, and Dharmarakṣita.
    b. Kadampa mind training texts.
        i. Texts 13-33. Various short mind training instructions from a variety of lineages, including from Atiśa, but none following

the structure of the Seven-Point teaching. All seem to predate the next item.

ii. Text 34. "Public Explication of Mind Training."' The massive heart of the collection.

iii. Texts 35-36. Two more miscellaneous texts.

c. Text 37. The "Supplement to the 'Oral Tradition.'" This supplemental commentary to the "Public Explication" was written by the Sakya compiler Könchok Gyaltsen, also known as Könchok Bang.

2. Sakyapa mind training texts.

a. Texts 38-43. A cycle of six texts all commenting on the "Parting From Four Clingings," a Sakya pith instruction text.

This structure provides clear evidence of the importance of Atiśa. He appears first, and his biography, emphasizing his commitment to the renunciate life ("How Atiśa Relinquished His Kingdom and Sought Liberation," *TGC* text 2) and his search for the instruction on taking and giving ("The Story of Atiśa's Voyage to Sumatra," *TGC* text 3) function to provide an example of the level of commitment to the social institution of the monastery and the practice of mind training a bodhisattva should generate. Three compilations of his pithy sayings, together with the early commentary of Sé Chilbu, emphasize the importance of his instructions to the mind training practitioner.

However there are other important individuals who come to the fore in this structure. An individual of great importance to our compilers is the author of "Root Lines of 'Parting From the Four Clingings,'" (*TGC* text 38), attributed in *TGC* to Dragpa Gyaltsen (*grags pa rgyal mtshan*) (Jinpa The Great Collection 649, n. 1010). Lastly we have

several texts attributed to Atiśa's three mind training gurus, Serlingpa, Maitriyogi, and Dharmarakṣita.

The mere fact that these individuals appear in our compilation is not enough to show that they are mythic in Popper's sense. However there is ample evidence in the texts that Atiśa and Dragpa Gyaltsen are mythic rather than ordinary figures. Two obvious examples: "Two Yoginīs Admonition to Atiśa to Train His Mind" (*TGC* text 17) recounts the story of two women in the sky who, despite not being celestial are identified as Tārā and Bhrkuti, encourage Atiśa to train his mind according to secret mantra (Jinpa The Great Collection 207); and "Root Lines of 'Parting From the Four Clingings'" (*TGC* text 38) reveals that the four lines were revealed to the great Sakyapa by the bodhisattva yellow Mañjuśrī during a meditative retreat (Jinpa The Great Collection 517). This is sufficient to show that both Atiśa and the great Sakyapa were not ordinary persons trapped by the physical, psychological, and social worlds. They have liberated themselves, entered into the religious world in a real way, and thus become greater than life.

However Atiśa's gurus have also attained mythic status. There has also been some controversy over the historical accuracy of the existence of Atiśa's mind training gurus Maitriyogi, and Dharmarakṣita, and the Indian provenance of the texts attributed to Dharmarakṣita, but due to limitations of space I cannot discuss this at great length. We will briefly look at a controversy over Dharmarakṣita, reputed author of "The Wheel of Sharp Weapons" (*TGC* text 8) and "The Peacock's Neutralizing of Poison" (*TGC* text 9).

Sweet and Zwilling argue that because 1. There is no non-Tibetan evidence of the existence of Dharmarakṣita; 2. That literary evidence of him appears only about a

hundred years following Atiśa's death; 3. That his scriptural sources are unknown and not translated into Tibetan; and 4. That he is associated with a Hīnayāna sect, there are doubts that he was actually a teacher of mind training to Atiśa (Sweet and Zwilling 4). Furthermore the literary style of the two texts attributed to him is not Indian (Sweet and Zwilling 10). All of this leads them to conclude that there is no historical truth to his position as a mind training teacher of Atiśa in the mind training tradition, but rather he was a teacher of the Hīnayāna scriptures with whom Atiśa studied after ordination (Sweet and Zwilling 9). They argue that "one way of viewing" (Sweet and Zwilling 4) the tradition of Atiśa's mind training gurus is as an enhancement of Dromtönpa, Atiśa's principal student, and his assertion that Serlingpa was Atiśa's principal teacher. Their evidence supporting this is that Serlingpa is always considered superior to Dharmarakṣita in the texts (Sweet and Zwilling 25 n.11), whose name was then "appropriated to serve as a foil (like the shadowy figure of Maitriyogi) for those who advocated the lojong teachings attributed to gSer gling pa" (Sweet and Zwilling 9). It seems there was a sort of conspiracy among Kadampas espousing the seven-point mind training to promote Serlingpa at the expense of the others, in order to establish Dromtönpa.

In response, I first consider their four points regarding the biography of Dharmarakṣita. 1. As the question of corroborating historical evidence is complex, I hope to deal with it in a separate study in the future. Suffice it to say that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. 2. As for the delay between Atiśa's passing, and the appearance of the mythic story of his life, our discussion of tradition reveals that mythic stories of the ancestors of a tradition can only appear some time after the their passing away. As a result, the fact that mythic stories explaining how to emulate them appear

only some time later is expected. It is evidence of the establishment of a critical tradition by an important member of an institution. 3. The lack of translations of Dharmarakṣita's canonical sources is also suggestive but not more—again absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. 4. Lastly they suggest that Dharmarakṣita's association with a Hīnayāna sect while generating an

> understanding of the nature of reality through the practice of love, compassion, and *bodhicitta* would have resonated with many of the early Kadampas, for that was just the situation Atiśa encountered in Tibet: monks and laymen who adhered to a lower-vehicle tenet system but followed the Mahayana in their practice
>
> (Sweet and Zwilling 5-6)

This is simultaneously correct and incorrect. We have already seen that Atiśa instituted a reform of monastic Buddhism that placed the Bodhisattva practice of taking and giving at the center of its practice on the basis of acceptance of a discipline common to both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. However, this was not the situation which he encountered in Tibet, as shown by the Blue Annals above. However the example of a practitioner who was transformed by love, compassion, and *bodhicitta* despite lacking other qualities would have indeed resonated and provided an example to emulate. It is exactly what we would expect of a mythic ancestor of the mind training tradition. This also supports our thesis that for the Kadampas of the 12th-14th centuries conventional awakening mind was of greater import than the ultimate awakening mind, because it is presented here as primary over tenets. However it tells us nothing of the truth or falsity of the existence and transformation of Dharmarakṣita.

For these reasons Sweet and Zwilling's conclusion that there was a conspiracy to elevate Serlingpa by finding other, lower, teachers to denigrate seems premature. Indeed it seems hard to justify the attribution of such precise motivations to individuals across

such a great cultural and historical divide. In contrast our theory of traditions provides a simple explanation of how individuals are transformed in to myths, and for what purpose. Furthermore it does not require the attribution of particular psychological states to individuals. Instead we can see that the wish to emulate an individual's success in their social context is enough to lead to an elevation of their status—the denigration of others is not necessary. As Atiśa was elevated, so were all of his teachers, no matter what their individual status. When we further consider how the mind training tradition consistently teaches the elevation of others and the lowering of oneself, Sweet and Zwilling's conclusion seems to come close to suggesting that the tradition was founded on a lie. It is difficult to reconcile this with the importance Popper attributes to tradition for atmosphere, and perhaps is more indicative of the atmosphere in which Sweet and Zwilling find themselves. In any case, much further work would be needed to justify this conclusion. In the meantime, as there is no actual evidence contradicting the traditional histories, it seems prudent to simply remain neutral regarding their factuality, but accept them as accurately describing the state of affairs as it was understood by individuals within the tradition.

Sweet and Zwilling's conclusion of a conspiracy indicates again their reliance on a model of reality that is essentially psychologistic, and thus assumes intentional agency as the primary causal power in social and historical situations. In contrast our theory tradition leads us to assert that we do not need to determine the existence of Dharmarakṣita to explain his position, transformation, and the transformational and traditional function of his texts within the mind training tradition.

Conclusion

Atiśa was the principal source of the Kadampa renewal which institutionally unified the three vows into the social collective of the monastery. This was maintained by a tradition of mind training which mediated between individual attitudes and behaviors and Buddhist institutions. The result was concordant with both the religious aims of Buddhism, and the social aims of Tibetan communities. This led to the elevation of Atiśa to mythic status after his passing away as an exemplar of a perfect monastic bodhisattva. He was transformed from an ordinary human being into a participant in the religious world of Tibetan Buddhism. This elevation affected not only him, but also affected the status of those closely associated with him.

Conclusion

A tradition is a world 3 object that explains how societies and individuals allow simultaneous maintenance and criticism of their institutions. Its mediate position also explains and motivates change within individuals and social institutions through its flexibility and dependence on circumstances. Mind training texts are the products of a mind training tradition mediating between individuals and the social institution of the Kadam monastery, a new social collective established in the 11^{th}–12^{th} centuries. This social collective was a response to the earlier effort to adopt Indian Buddhist institutions into Tibetan society which had encountered difficulties. The tradition was embodied in a real but unsubstantial praxis of love, compassion, and *bodhicitta* that framed meditation on the non-real, and was informed by it. The realistic method of taking and giving also controlled the transgressive aspects of Vajrayāna practice which were rejected by the greater Tibetan society. It was transmitted by a mythic expansion of Atiśa, the tradition's

founder, as well as those associated with him. The similar mythic status of the great Sakyapa suggests this process is common in Tibetan Buddhism, and supports Popper's theory of tradition.

One consequence of this aspect of Popper's theory is that it reveals how traditions are midway between personal and social experience. The mythic forebear is undoubtedly a person, but that person is absent, having already passed away. As such they are an object found only in the psychological, social, and religious worlds, as their remains in the physical world are not the body of a living person. Perhaps even these remains would likely take on mythic status. Hence traditions only arise sometime after the passing of the individuals who will serve as their embodiment. This may help explain the gap that has often been noticed in Buddhist studies between the arising and development of a new tradition, and the texts that scholars use to discuss it.

Chapter 4: Tradition and Text

Atiśa, although source of the pithy sayings, did not write them down, organize them, or develop mind training as a literary genre. The term 'mind training' first appears in the texts of Langri Thangpa and Chekawa (Jinpa "Introduction" 6). We have already begun to explore the literary genre of mind training, showing how the literary genre arose from the mind training tradition. First we will discuss and critique the theory of literary genre of some recent work on Tibetan literature. The conclusion of this chapter will show how the genre contributes to the maintenance of mind training within the various social collectives of Tibetan Buddhism

Literary genres

Western scholars have long used literary genre to organize studies of Tibetan literature. We will examine two efforts, because both led directly to discussions of mind training. After the R. A. Stein's early work in Tibetan Civilization (1962), José Ignacio Cabezón and Roger R. Jackson developed a theory in Tibetan Literature : Studies in Genre (1996). We will begin by examining these two efforts.

R. A. Stein

Stein's Tibetan Civilization is the first work to examine Tibetan literature as a whole, and to discuss its genres. In 1962 mind training literature was "still almost unexplored" (Stein 267). Stein translated *blo sbyong* as 'mind-exercises,' and considered the texts as a subdivision of tales and maxims adapted by Buddhism as an edifying literature of anecdotes and moral maxims. These were collected together into compilations called

udders (*be'u bum*), presumably so-called because they contained milk which nourishes the reader. There is a continuity among several varieties of these edifying compilations, which include Brahmanical Indian legends such as the Vetāla tales interpreted by Atiśa in the 11th century, Potowa's (*po to ba*) 12th century Maxims (*dpe chos*) with its commentaries, and also Sakya Pandita's 12-13th century Well-Spoken Words (*Legs par bshad pa*), a collection of edifying and moral poetic stanzas. This poetic genre has been maintained up to the 20th century, as the 9th Panchen Lama's Story of the Monkeys and the Birds (*bya sprel gyi gtam rgud*) shows. Stein finds no development or adaptation in the genre since the period of the Kadampas, the 11-12th century (Stein 269).

Stein's work remains the best general introduction to the forms of Tibetan literature. Unfortunately the attention he showed to the importance of forms and structures of Tibetan literature, as well as its subject/content has not been maintained, at least within the American academic tradition of Tibetan Buddhist studies that will next be examined. His insight that the compilation of brief essential maxims forms an important part in the development of Tibetan literature is correct, and as we have shown this process can be clearly seen in the seven points and pithy sayings literature in *TGC.* However, he does not explain how the various pithy sayings came to be organized in the mind training literature.

Elaborating on Stein's theory of the organization of edifying tales and maxims, we can now see that this literary genre is the product of various members of the mind training tradition organizing recollections of Atiśa's advice and stories. We can also see the variable and critical nature of the tradition, as it re-organizes its source materials in ways which suit different individuals in differing times and places.

Cabezón and Jackson

In contrast to Stein's acceptance of genre as an organizing principle used by Tibetans in organizing their literature into 'udders,' Cabezón and Jackson take the view that among Tibetans a conception of *literature* as imaginative rather than factual writing never existed. Instead a conception of it as "that which is to be known," which was imported from classical Indian literary culture, has remained current (Cabezón and Jackson 18). They review various native and non-native taxonomies, but in the end claim to develop an independent typology of Tibetan literature because "neither 'literature' nor 'genre' is a concept natural to Tibetan thinkers and writers" (Cabezón and Jackson 29). However they assert in their next sentence that "it should be clear that Tibetans have developed *implicit* notions of both literature and genre—the former perhaps embodied in the concept of 'writings on the cultural sciences,' the latter inferable from the ways in which Tibetans have sought to organize their literary corpus" (Cabezón and Jackson 29). This leaves the reader rather confused—unnatural and implicit? In any case, they suggest that in place of a theory of genres scholars could adopt a typology possessing eight main categories (Cabezón and Jackson 30-31):

1. History and Biography; including letters and lists of lineages.
2. Canonical and Quasi-Canonical Texts; including Old and New translations of the Indian Buddhist scriptures and commentaries, Bonpo scriptures, and terma texts.
3. Philosophical Literature; all of Tibetan provenance, Indian works appearing 2.
4. Literature on the Paths; which includes mind training, and explanations of stages, vows, and practices.
5. Ritual; being the actual words of praxis.

6. Literary Arts; poetry and treatises corresponding with their definition of literature as imaginative rather than factual.
7. Non-literary Arts and Sciences; which includes grammar and drama.
8. Guidebooks and Reference Works; travel guides, catalogues, dictionaries, and encyclopedias.

These heuristic categories are intended to help a researcher organize Tibetan literature in its entirety, so that any particular text may be comfortably placed. Thus their project comes into clear focus—they wish to create a new map of Tibetan literature to guide research.

Critique

First Umberto Eco's comments on how to approach an object of study in his presentation of the field of semiotics will be explained. This will be compared with Cabezón and Jackson's project of a literary typology, to identify weak points in their method. Finally Sweet and Zwilling's work will be analyzed for evidence of methodological difficulties similar to those identified by Eco.

Eco's theory of research

As Umberto Eco explains in The Absent Structure, different methodologies are appropriate for studies in a *discipline,* which possesses a homogenous method and a precise object, and studies of a *field,* a collection of diverse and not completely unified objects of whatever type that has not been entirely catalogued (Eco 11). Thus while Eco's text deals explicitly with semiotics, his comments are equally relevant not only to the study of compilations such as *TGC,* which are diverse collections, but to all of Tibetan literature. That Tibetan literature has not yet been entirely catalogued is, I think, obvious.

As Cabezón and Jackson put it "Only a tiny portion of the vast Tibetan corpus has been translated into or discussed in Western languages" (Cabezón and Jackson 12). Thus this thesis is considered to be work in a field, rather than work in a discipline.

Eco argues that researchers working in a discipline proceed deductively, according to a model which determines what research falls within the discipline, and what falls outside it. Researchers in fields however proceed inductively, accepting whatever objects they find to exist within the field, and then analytically extract from within those objects characteristics that support a coherent model obtain a definition of the field (Eco 11). Thus for disciplined researchers, theory and method dominate the object of study—whatever does not fit is rejected. However, for researchers studying a field, the object of study must dominate the model. If an object is found which contradicts the model, the model must be modified. This is not to say that work in a field can proceed as if there is no theory or method—Popper has shown analytic identification and extraction of characteristics is clearly theory-based when he refutes the *given* as a source of knowledge. However in field-work theory and method must be dealt with in a critical manner, so that too rigorous an application of theory does not obscure the objects of study. Considering our theory of tradition, we can see that field work is more based on a tradition's practical guidelines, while work in a discipline is more governed by institutional rules and regulations.

Eco then sees his project to be like "a 'geographic map' which traces the frontiers of semiotics, delimits the territories which belong to it and those beyond which it should not continue[3]" (Eco 31). However he rejects the idea that it is more productive to proceed by

[3] ... une « carte géographique » qui trace *les frontières de la sémiotique,* délimite les territoires qui lui appartiennent et ceux aux bords desquels elle doit s'arrêter. My translation.

assuming the field is completely structured, and theoretically formulating the architectural model of the field's structure which "by its own rigor could guide research[4]" (Eco 33). He outlines several difficulties, but the one particularly applicable to this thesis is that such models are *a priori*. One effect of such *a priori* architectural models is that once adopted they obscure their own theoretical foundations, and thus the foundations of studies which scholars build upon them. As Eco puts it, "we run the risk of thinking some subdivisions as useless, which can later prove very important[5]" (Eco 34). Further, there is the danger that we may think of the structural foundation as real or objective, rather than of the field as an imprecise entity to be progressively and methodically approached (Eco 12). Eco identifies three negative characteristics which follow from this:

1. Research is completed even before it begins.
2. The structure (being absolute) excludes all subsequent structures.
3. The discipline is no longer a scientific study of its object, but an ideology (in the Marxist sense). (Eco 13)

Eco, desiring to avoid these problems, proposes that any system elaborated for the study of a field *emerge* from a *comparative* examination of objects found within the field[6] (Eco 12). Hence his title The Absent Structure, indicating that any study of a field must explicitly maintain that its system is not an objective reality.

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[4] … ne serait-il pas plus productif d'assumer l'existence d'un champ sémiotique complètement structuré, en en formulant théoriquement l'architecture? Ne serait-il pas plus utile en somme d'édifier une grille, un système de dépendance, une construction disciplinaire qui, par sa propre rigeur, pourrait guider la recherche? My translation.

[5] Ainsi l'on court le risque de juger inutiles des subdivisions qui pourraient s'avérer par la suite très important. My translation.

[6] Une recherche sémiotique n'a de sens que si la structure du champ sémiotique est assumée comme une entité imprécise que la methode se propose d'éclaircir (en l'amenant continuellement à se contredire), mais elle n'a plus de sens si cette structure, posée par déduction, est conçue comme « vraie », « objective », et « définitive ». My translation.

Cabezón and Jackson's approach to typology

Cabezón and Jackson have surveyed the field and generated a coherent model to describe it, in the heuristic aim of assisting students in their research (Cabezón and Jackson 31). Their proposed structure of the field is according to the subject (or content) of the texts (Cabezón and Jackson 30-31). They argue that genre "specifies the types or kinds into which a literary corpus may be organized" (Cabezón and Jackson 20).

They begin their project by greatly restricting the range of writing considered *literature.* They reject the dictionary definition of literature as "writings in prose or verse; esp. writings having excellence of form or expression and expressing ideas of permanent or universal interest" (Cabezón and Jackson 17) because they say that "there is an 'imaginative' element to the concept of literature in the West that narrows considerably the range of what may considered literary" (Cabezón and Jackson 17). This is due to the influence of university departments devoted to English or Comparative Literature (Cabezón and Jackson 17). This leads them to assert that Tibetans have not shared much the same conception of literature as we do (Cabezón and Jackson 20-21). However they are forced to admit that Sakya Pandita analyses literature into verse, prose, and a combination of the two, but dismiss this conception as restricted to the educated "few Tibetan writers steeped in Indian poetics" (Cabezón and Jackson 21). Unfortunately for their argument, the Tibetan educated few seem likely to correspond with those under the influence of English and Comparative Literature departments. So they seem to be asserting either that Sakya Pandita was like a modern populist uninfluenced by a university who used Tibetan words in a way very similar to the way Webster and his kin use English words, or the possibility that the conception of literature as works composed

in verse, prose, or a combination of the two is beyond the ken of an non-elite Tibetan, but not a modern Western person. I suggest instead that for the purpose of this thesis we accept that literature is simply works written in verse, prose, or a combination of the two of lasting interest—i.e. shopping lists, temporary contracts, and such like are excluded. This dictionary definition of literature seems acceptable for our thesis as it seems to cover the usage of both readers of this thesis, and those Tibetans who would have read *TGC*.

As for the conception of *genre,* Cabezón and Jackson build their structure after a review of several native Tibetan sources—the Kangyur (*bka' 'gyur*), the Tengyur (*bstan 'gyur*), and so forth (Cabezón and Jackson 22-23)—but principally on tables of contents (*dkar chag*) from the collected works of great writers, together with modern academic analyses of these tables of contents (Cabezón and Jackson 23-29). Despite an earlier assertion that they wish to avoid the emphasis on religious issues that has characterized Western approaches until the present day in order to present "the tremendous range of genres actually represented in Tibetan literature" (Cabezón and Jackson 13), the tables of contents they analyze are all from senior members of the various Tibetan religious orders. This seems likely due to the position of the monastery as the principal institution supporting writing. Thus it is possible that the acceptance of these tables of contents will naturally represent the Tibetan Buddhist worldview *tout court.* It will do little to lead us into an analysis of the literature that is significantly different from that of religious Tibetans.

This reliance on a pre-existing typology from Tibetan sources leads to another lacuna in Cabezón and Jackson's treatment of literary genre. They do not give serious weight, or even any weight at all, to multiple grammatical, rhetorical, semantic, pragmatic, or

occasional characteristics within the texts. Even if we accept that content is of principal importance in assigning genre to a text, this obscures the possibility that the subject/content of the text may have multiple signification, that is to say a text may have *thick* content, and thus the same text may be placed in several categories. This evidently causes them some concern. Cabezón and Jackson ask if long-life prayers should be included in Ritual (being recited on ritual occasions), or in Literary Arts (being among Tibetan's most beautiful poetic productions) (Cabezón and Jackson 32). They assert such problems are "endemic to genre-schemes everywhere, especially that of particular categorical assignments" (Cabezón and Jackson 32), before assigning them to Ritual (Cabezón and Jackson 31).

This categorization problem is precisely what Eco was referring to when he argued against the use of *a priori* architectural structures to make research more fruitful. A long-life prayer is of course of interest to both scholars of ritual and literary arts, and perhaps others as well—history comes to mind, as they may indicate the importance of a particular person in some particular historical period. Thus the structure proposed, while seemingly creating control over the diverse elements of Tibetan literature, may lead to the parceling of the land of Tibetan literature into the domain of particular scholars with particular interests, who then read several texts in a category for a particular aim, while simultaneously asserting that the texts' intention corresponds with the aim of the scholar who so categorized them. If we wish to study texts as cultural human products in a context, Cabezón and Jackson's system seems to present a real possibility of a deformation of those products due to a lack of consideration of the multiple purposes of those who produced, used, and categorized them.

I here suggest that a more fruitful approach would be to consider that the purpose of using the conception of genre and categories is, as Tzvetan Todorov puts it, "is to discover a rule which functions across many texts[7]" (Todorov 1), a unity with which we may compare and contrast them. Thus the question 'To which category does this text belong?' is, from the perspective of this thesis, a false problem. There is no need to assign texts to their appropriate category. Rather the problem is to explain how texts came to be categorized as they are despite all their particular differences, uses, and contexts. The solution to this new problem is to realize that the field of Tibetan mind training literature may contain many individual *genera,* even combined and transformed within one work, just like any other mature and sophisticated literature, but that these individual characteristics are not the crux of the rule which allows them to be compared.

Our thesis is that *TGC* provides us with a native (ready-made if you will) Tibetan literary genre, and that this genre is revealed in the structure of *TGC* itself. We have already seen the proposed analytic structure of the compilation, which revealed an over-arching two part structure: the Kadampa lineages of mind training instructions from Atiśa, and a Sakyapa lineage of instruction held to be equivalent. Shönu Gyalchok and Könchok Gyaltsen have then, by simply compiling these texts, provided evidence of context and use of a conception that corresponds with Todorov's genre.

Further evidence supporting this thesis is found within *TGC* itself. In the 15th century "A Key to the Profound Essential Points: A Meditation Guide to 'Parting from the Four

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[7] ... c'est découvrir une règle qui fontionne à travers plusiers textes et nous fait leur appliquer le nom d' « œuvres fantastiques ». I have only translated the first part, but the continuation shows clearly Todorov's meaning in his particular context.

Clingings" (*TGC* text 42) Goram Sönam Sengé (*go rams bsod nams seng ge*) writes "Every teaching of the perfectly enlightened Buddha ... falls into two categories [the Perfection vehicle and the Vajrayāna] ... within the first class are two kinds: practices based primarily on the major treatises and practices based on the essential pith instructions" (Jinpa The Great Collection 529). He goes on to identify several major treatises associated with great Indian Buddhist masters—Maitreya Asanga's *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra,* Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī,* Āryadeva's *Catuhśatakaśāstra,* Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* Atiśa's *Bodhipathapradīpa* (Lamp for the Path), and Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*—saying that they are meant for those individuals who have "trained their minds in the tradition of the major treatises" (Jinpa The Great Collection 530). As for the essential pith instructions, Gorampa says there are numerous approaches, but identifies as principal "the one conferred to master Atiśa by Serlingpa [Taking and Giving], and the one conferred to the Sakyapa teacher by Lord Mañjuśrī" (Jinpa The Great Collection 531). The equivalence of the Sakya and Kadam system is even explicitly mentioned by Gorampa: the Sakyapa lineage "in terms of its essential points of practice is similar to the practices referred to above [Atiśa's mind training of equalizing and exchanging self with others received from Serlingpa], but in terms of its division of the subject matter and its arrangements of the essential points, it is superior" (Jinpa The Great Collection 531). Gorampa explains that Atiśa transmitted the pith instructions to Dromtönpa, who in turn passed it to the three brothers. "After that, it spread widely and became, in this land of snows, a path as well known as the sun and moon" (Jinpa The Great Collection 531). This indicates that Tibetans were well able to read their literature across multiple categories. They categorized mind training literature

as a different genre from classical Indian texts explaining Mahāyāna Buddhist practice, at least in part due to its Tibetan provenance. The difference identified is one of rhetorical style, and perhaps even mood—pithy sayings vs. doctrinal treatises. However the division is not simply one between Indian and Tibetan writers, as Atiśa appears in both lists. This is another indication of his mythic and liminal status. Still, native Tibetan mind training texts are treated as equal with texts of similar genre by Indian writers. This brief discussion by Gorampa reveals that the Tibetan mind training literary tradition can both establish and critique sectarian boundaries, and that participation in such traditions is an important part of the Tibetan Buddhist world.

The concept of genre explained here then is an organizing structure that guided the compilers of *TGC,* and at least one author of a text included, and was accepted by subsequent readers. This compilation then, from one important point of view, *is* the mind training genre, and our project then is just that described by Eco—mind training literature as contained in *TGC* is the field, and through the inductive process by which we can understand and explain the rule (or rules) which guided its readers in their selection of its texts, we can place the texts within their context without needing to enter it. However this strong conclusion must be tempered by recalling that each text within the collection can be assigned to other genres, depending on the purposes for which we read it.

Critique of Sweet and Zwilling

Cabezón and Jackson's "Introduction" itself does not suffer from the problems mentioned above, although I believe that it can encourage them. As mentioned above, Sweet and Zwilling's work reveals just such deformation. The critique will be organized

following Eco's three negative characteristics that follow from uncritically accepting an architectural structure.

Eco first argues that when we take the structure as real, research is completed even before it begins. Hints of this problem are found at the beginning of Sweet's 1996 article, where he refers to mind training not as a genre, but as a "named genre" (Sweet 245). While it is not entirely clear what he means by 'named,' it may refer to the appearance of the term *blo sbyong* in the title of the two texts he examines in the article. These two texts are the "Seven-Point Mind Training" (*blo sbyong don bdun ma*) and the "Wheel Weapon Mental Purification" (*blo sbyong mtshon cha 'khor lo*) (Sweet 244). We have already mentioned that there are several different seven-point texts which contain varying sayings, or variants of a particular saying, and that no text entitled "Seven-Point Mind Training" appears in the Tibetan text. However Sweet does not even discuss this, simply saying that "Stylistically, the *LBDDM* [Seven-Point Mind Training] is a straightforwardly didactic, mnemonic text. ... The work's clarity of meaning and expression doubtless accounts for its enduring popularity among Tibetan Buddhist contemplatives" (Sweet 250). We have already mentioned several sayings that require interpretation—another is "Of the two witnesses uphold the principal one" (Jinpa The Great Collection 84). It is not of clear meaning, although the commentary in which it actually appears helps a great deal. But if one read *TGC* in Tibetan one would have previously encountered "Be upheld principally by the two witnesses" in the "Root Lines of Mahayana Mind Training," (Jinpa The Great Collection 587 n.132). The choice between these two readings is certainly not clear, and thus we can conclude that the clarity of the text is not why mind training literature has remained popular. Sweet seems to have simply uncritically accepted a text

entitled "Seven-Point Mind Training," without enquiring into its provenance and searching for variations. It may have been extracted from the 14th century commentary of Thokmé Sangpo Sweet mentions as the "earliest commentary" (Sweet 249). However Sé Chilbu's 12th century commentary is earlier (Jinpa "Introduction" 11-12). Sweet also cites Geshe Wangyal's The Door of Liberation (1973) saying that *bodhicitta* is comprised of "the conventional (*kun rdzob*) and the ultimate (*don dam*) attitude" (Sweet 250).

Second, Eco points out that that a real structure, being absolute, excludes all subsequent structures. We can see this process of uncritical acceptance of categorization at work in Sweet's article as well. He takes as his second mind training text the "Wheel Weapon Mental Purification," which at that time had only been translated "in a loose rendering with interpolated material" (Sweet 254 n.15). Jinpa however informs us that the term *blo sbyong* does not appear in the text, and he does not include it in the title (Jinpa "Introduction" 6). This is confirmed by Sweet and Zwilling in their later 2001 article, where they simply say that "Nowhere in the work itself is there mention of 'mind training,' and it only came to be denominated as such with the creation of the distinct genre" (Sweet and Zwilling 12). We have already seen that their article argues against the early provenance of the text, saying that its purpose was to elevate the Serlingpa as the teacher of the "Seven-Point Mind Training" above. From this we are justified in concluding that in 1996 Sweet simply accepted the categorization of the text as 'mental purification' (mind training) on the basis of Tibetan say-so. Despite this he remains, even in 2001, committed to the structure of mind training as mental purification. Furthermore, he believes that there was the creation of a distinct genre which in some way led to the naming of the text. However, the naming of the genre occurred in his own 1996 article

since, according to Cabezón and Jackson, genre is not a natural conception to the Tibetans, and remained implicit. If the Tibetans re-named a text because it belonged to the genre, this is evidence against Cabezón and Jackson's thesis that the concept of genre is Western. If not, Sweet is simply not dealing with the material actually contained in the literature presented to him, because he has accepted as absolute their structure.

Last, Eco points out that when the structure is taken as real the discipline is no longer a scientific study of its object, but an ideology (in the Marxist sense). We can see this process occurring when Sweet and Zwilling assert that the mind training tradition is "the means for inculcating and developing *bodhicitta*" (Sweet and Zwilling 2), suggest that mind training was originally "mental purification through repeated practice of the thought intent on enlightenment" (Sweet and Zwilling 17), and conclude that it was "not just a genre of religious literature, but a defining ideology (*lta ba*) of the Kadampa school" (Sweet and Zwilling 17). This conclusion may be due in part to Goldstein's definition "... improvement of the mind/intellect through training, ideological cultivation" (Goldstein 748), which is drawn from a dictionary of modern Tibetan.

One aspect of an ideology is that it denies the real existence of objects that contradict its theory of reality. We have seen that the mind training praxis instead accepts as real all ordinary objects of the physical, psychological, and social worlds. Indeed, its lack of developed doctrine permits it to simply incorporate whatever objects it finds into its method for generating love and compassion as a frame for meditative practice of *bodhicitta*. Sweet and Zwilling here seem to be doing little more than name-calling. The Tibetan *lta ba* is derived from the verb 'to look,' and usually translated as 'view.' It often refers to a philosophical position, and is likely best known from Tsongkhapa's 15th

century exposition of renunciation, *bodhicitta*, and correct view the three principal aspects of the path. We have already remarked on the absence of any prolonged philosophical exposition in the mind training literature. Indeed, our discussion up until now has shown that mind training can, as a tradition, provide a means for the criticism and adaptation of social collectives and institutions in changing circumstances. This function could continue to be provided by such instructions as "Recognize what is primary" (Jinpa The Great Collection 73), "Relinquish all bias" (Jinpa The Great Collection 80), and "Do not maintain inappropriate loyalty" (Jinpa The Great Collection 84).

We have also already seen that the mind training literature in *TGC* includes many types of texts—biography and hagiography (*TGC* texts 2,3), teacher's aids (*TGC* text 31), and instructions of behavior to cultivate during missionary activity (*TGC* text 12), to name a few. Limiting the literary genre to the sole purpose of ideology is not considerate of the many uses to which any text may be put, and the variety of contexts in which it appears. It also again suggests disrespect towards the goals of the tradition, and a suspicion of the motivations of its members that seems unwarranted. For these reasons, it seems more likely that Sweet and Zwilling's label of medieval Tibetan Buddhist literature and literary genres (mind training, great perfection, great seal, fruits and paths, and stages of the path) as ideology, a conception from 19th century Europe, is as likely to be the result of their own application of an ideology as any ideology that may be developed from the texts themselves.

Conclusion

Cabezón and Jackson's heuristic architectural project provides a good basis for understanding one particular structure that can be used to subdivide Tibetan literature—the division of an author's works according to their subject, or content. However its great reliance on tables of contents as foundation, rather than the actual texts collected together, hinders its use as a tool for comparison and explanation of any one genre. This tendency may be compounded by a too great reliance upon the architecture as given. Both these tendencies can be seen in recent work in the field of mind training literature.

In contrast, the methods used in this thesis correct some of these problems, while no doubt introducing others. Such is the nature of academic work. However, by relying on a loosely defined inductive method explicitly aware that it is theory based, it is hoped that this thesis will contribute to our understanding of the genre of mind training, and by extension pave the way for an understanding of other literary forms and genres.

The genre 'Mind Training'

What then can we say about the genre mind training? We have mentioned many times in the course of this thesis the importance of Atiśa's pithy sayings. We have shown that this was accepted by the compilers of *TGC* in the 15th century, as evidenced in Gorampa's text. We have seen how Stein, Tucci, Sweet and Zwilling, and Jinpa all accept them as a stylistic indicator of mind training texts. However we have also seen that several mind training texts do not contain the pithy sayings. Thus, if we accept Todorov's suggestion of genre, the pithy sayings do not constitute the mind training genre, although their organization into seven points may constitute a sub-genre of the literature.

We have also seen how mind training is a practice that places love and compassion at the center of Buddhist ritual and meditation, and how it uses them to control non-real elements that threaten to undermine ordinary morality. We have seen how mind training practice developed into a tradition that mediated between the individual practitioner and the social institutions of Buddhism.

Finally, we have seen a large structural division of the materials compiled in *TGC* into two parts, based upon the mythic characters Atiśa and the great Sakyapa. They both presented the essence of their teachings in the greatly abbreviated form of pithy sayings. We have also seen in the case of Atiśa that texts by other individuals closely related to him came to be included in the mind training, as did commentaries by his students.

Taking these three together, we can suggest a theory of the genre. The mind training genre consists of texts explaining how love, compassion, and *bodhicitta* are central to the practice of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and that their practice is based upon emulation of mythic founders of the traditions who accepted conventional objects as real. It also includes texts that comment on the tradition itself, explain the texts, and provide further models to emulate through a process leading to hagiography. By containing all this in literature, the tradition perpetuates itself by encouraging the adoption of similar attitudes and behaviors. It also encourages new practitioners by presenting them with the words of their great forebears, who point to the heart of Buddhism in a language which is simultaneously memorable and provocative. The maintenance of multiple interpretations, and even alternate readings, encourages the tradition to remain lively, by continually demanding interpretation of its members.

Conclusion

This thesis has shown how a robust four world model, combined with a theory of the production of mythic literature by a tradition, explains the arising and maintenance of mind training in Tibetan Buddhism through the ongoing production of a native literature. This approach to the field of Buddhist studies, and more generally religious studies, shows promise. In particular it clarifies how new attitudes and behaviors are adopted and spread throughout communities, and how religions and societies interact. It also clarifies how, over time, religions and societies can be transformed by mutual interaction. It avoids difficulties of terminology because it requires no commitment to an essential nature of the objects it studies. Lastly, it is appropriate to both the contemporary academic world, and the world of Tibetan Buddhism, as it is developed from common perspectives of both. All this suggests the method could lead to a better understanding.

As for mind training literature in particular, this thesis has shown that it is a multivalent and diverse literature that has up until now been approached principally through too narrow a focus. Despite good pioneering work by Stein and Tucci, recent work has become involved in rigid classifications, which have obscured important elements of the literature. In particular, the social and religious components of the mind training literature have been ignored in favor of discussions of psychological states. This thesis corrects this focus, and it is hoped will contribute to both more sympathetic and accurate studies in future.

Of course there remains much work to be done. Historical issues, while touched upon, have been dealt with summarily, or not at all. Points of rhetoric in Tibetan literature also need to be clarified. A theory of the function of language, while hinted at, has not been

critically examined. There also remains a great deal of mind training literature to read. This thesis's reliance on one compilation, while useful, should not be considered to be ideal. Rather it is contingent, particular, and flexible. Much literature remains to be read and analyzed before I can feel confident in the certainty of any insights found here. With future studies treating the literature outside the purview of *TGC,* they may be found to be impermanent as well.

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