

SPEECH ACT THEORY AND THE
ROLES OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

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ABSTRACT

John Searle's Theory of Illocutionary Force describes the logic of five basic types of thing that are done in the literal use of language. Jerrold Katz offers an opposing analysis in which one successful point is his correction of Searle's penchant for confusing meaning and use. Contrary to Katz's opinion, we demonstrate, Searle can make an adjustment to this such that his remains the more interesting and complete theory.

This demonstrated, we apply the theory as adapted to the domain of religious language. In doing this, we make clear the logic of religious language and do it as included in a general theory of language. We are able to show, for example, how the expressive utterance is the principal religious utterance, but it is the commissive which best characterizes the developed religious stance.

We then indicate how a full taxonomy of religious language might lead to a typology of religion.

RESUME

La Théorie de Force Illocutoire de John Searle démontre la logique des cinq genres d'actions fondamentales que nous employons dans l'usage littérale du langage. Jerrold Katz suggère une analyse opposée et son seul argument préférable à la théorie de Searle est la distinction qu'il fait entre la signification et l'usage. Contrairement à l'opinion de Katz, nous démontrons que la théorie de Searle est plus cohérente et complète.

Suite à cette explication, nous appliquons la théorie telle qu'adaptée au langage religieux. Ainsi, nous rendons évident la logique du langage religieux tout en appliquant la théorie générale du langage. Par exemple nous sommes capables de démontrer comment l'expressive est le principal énoncé religieux primitif mais que la commissive davantage caractérise l'énoncé religieux développé.

Finalement nous suggérons qu'une taxonomie complète du langage religieux peut nous amener à une typologie de la religion.

What we require is a theology of the verb,
rather than the noun or adjective.

- "A distinguished Barthian," quoted
by Donald Evans in The Logic of
Self-Involvement.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<u>Aspects</u>	Noam Chomsky, <u>Aspects of the Theory of Syntax</u>
<u>DTW</u>	J.L. Austin, <u>How To Do Things With Words</u>
<u>EFI</u>	Noam Chomsky, <u>Essays on Form and Interpretation</u>
<u>LLA</u>	John Searle, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts"
<u>Logic and Language</u>	Jerrold Katz, "Logic and Language: An examination of Recent Criticisms of intentionalism"
<u>LR</u>	Noam Chomsky, <u>Language and Responsibility</u>
<u>PSIF</u>	Jerrold Katz, <u>Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force</u>
<u>RL</u>	Noam Chomsky, <u>Reflections on Language</u>
<u>ST</u> or "standard theory"	The theory of <u>Aspects</u>
<u>Taxonomy</u>	John Searle, "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts"

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PREFACE

The point of this thesis is to demonstrate that a taxonomy of religious language is available to us and to say some things about that taxonomy. Our working assumption is that it would be helpful if such a taxonomy were not a special creature designed for a part of language that we might call religious, but were instead a taxonomy of language that when applied to a special part of language would provide a taxonomy of that part.

In such a case there would be at least two advantages for the philosopher of religion. First, there would be no appearance of "special pleading" on behalf of a purportedly unique status for religious language. Second, what is unique about religious language would be described in terms of roles and would be a part of a general theory of language roles.

Our claim is that this taxonomy is to be found in a developed and somewhat altered version of John Searle's "Speech Act Theory". Since that is the central claim, and since there is continuous development of the theory, and since there is nonetheless some alteration required from the outside, most of the work of this thesis will go into portraying and establishing a developed speech acts theory.

That will be begun by way of a presentation of Searle's precursor J.L. Austin, Searle's criticism of Austin, and Searle's own theory of Speech Acts and "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts". We next present Jerrold Katz's self-consciously opposing theory by way of generative grammar. Chomsky will be touched on inasmuch as his generative grammar forms the backdrop for Katz's theory of illocutionary force and because several of Katz's semantic notions seem to have developed in a tension with Chomsky.

At this point, we are in need of a critical arbitration between the two opposing claims, and we provide one that rules that illocutionary force is part of the meaning of some verbs and lies within the domain of both semantics and illocutionary logic. Insofar as we speak of speech acts or of illocutionary acts we therefore speak of them in the null context...a theory of meaning rather than use, of semantics rather than pragmatics.

Nonetheless, the logic of illocutionary acts is better portrayed through the symbolism of predicate calculus that Searle and Searle/Vanderveken use to involve matters of psychological state, state of affairs, and so on.

This established, and with our having worked repeatedly through the exercise of developing a taxonomy of illocutionary acts, we will apply what we have consolidated to specifically religious language. The result will be a typology of religious language that takes, as does all of what we are doing here, the verb to be the key to what language does.

In conclusion we will summarize the theory of illocutionary force and its general taxonomy of language, the taxonomy of religious language itself, and then offer some suggestions as to how such a work might lead to a general typology of religion. We will be able to conclude, in line with our central purpose, that there is a taxonomy of religious language available, and that we know something about it.

The special contribution of the thesis is, of course, not a limited substantiation of that claim. In the broader sense, we will also have described the taxonomy, its underlying theory, its antecedents. We will have defended it while at the same time allowing it to be altered in one important way. We will have applied it to religious language in such a way that the logic of religious language can both be better understood and appropriately be understood as part of the logic of language. And finally, we will have made suggestions toward a typology of religion.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to thank my advisor, Prof. J.C. McLelland, for his guidance in the process of writing this thesis. It has been the kind of guidance that has both encouraged its completion and improved its quality, and I am grateful for that. Along with gratitude, though, are years of affection....I want to express that too.

It is important to acknowledge as well stimulus provided me by Prof. Daniel Vanderveken and the group of students and teachers with whom I was associated in the research project "Recherche sur les Actes Illocutoires." It is that project that provided the impetus for defining such a thesis topic as this.

Finally, I want to offer personal thanks to my wife, Marion, who encouraged me to continue with this while working pretty hard on other things, and to our friend, Sandra Salameh, who typed it for me.

INTRODUCTION

Speech Act Theory now has enough of a popular tradition to be fairly well known. J.L. Austin is taken to be the founder of the tradition - mainly on account of the little book How To Do Things With Words,¹ which is based on notes for his William James lectures at Harvard University in 1955.

Insofar as Austin formalized a theory with regard to speech acts, it remains primitive and tentative. Austin himself characterizes it as such - claiming that, really, he has two things to offer. First, observations on actual use of language in doing things other than simply "saying something."

We name, we baptize, we greet, we promise...much is done by virtue of a speech act.

Second, Austin takes steps to identify and offer an initial classification of the kinds of things we do. One might presume that - had he lived longer - he would have pursued the project.

Instead, stage two in the history of speech act theory was taken up by John Searle. It is Searle's book Speech Acts² that is taken to be the central "text" of speech act theory, and it is Searle who is taken to be the leading exponent of the theory.

Searle develops, and alters, Austin's speech act theory both along the lines of further observation and examples and, more importantly, along lines of systematization. It is

Searle who establishes principles for the classification of types of speech act. 'Strictly speaking, by the time the classification begins, we are no longer talking about speech acts but rather illocutionary acts.

"Speech acts", we will see, is a more general term, including utterance acts, propositional acts, illocutionary acts, perlocutionary acts and others. The illocutionary act is the act that includes both an illocutionary force (carries the force of an assertion, or a request, or a promise, etc) and a propositional content. That is, we state something. We request or promise something. Regardless of the propositional content of a sentence, there is performed the act of stating, or promising, or requesting and so on.

So it is the illocutionary acts that are classified according to type. We will see that Searle diverges from Austin, both in his understanding of where the illocutionary act fits into the total speech act, and in the actual classification.

Now there is a certain intrinsic interest to the exercise of classifying illocutionary acts according to type, the type of act that asserts, the type of act that commits the speaker to future action, the type of act that expresses a feeling, and so on. There is interest to understanding how language works and what seems to fit where. But there is much more to it than that. In the analysis of the illocutionary act it becomes clear, for example, that in order for these acts to be successful certain special preparatory conditions must obtain. And this teaches us something about what is pre-supposed in the performance of a given illocutionary act.

In the analysis, further, it becomes clear that there is a special relationship between different states of mind and different illocutionary acts: belief with assertive, intention with commissive, desire with requestive... And the absence of the appropriate state occasions one of several kinds of "flaws" to which the illocutionary act is prone.

The other recent tradition that has come to bear directly on these matters is that of Generative Grammar. Noam Chomsky's contribution to linguistics, and through linguistics to philosophy (and to social action), is well known. Chomsky attributes an innate linguistic competence to our species, on the basis of whose "creativity" we can generate an infinite number of sentences... even with a rather "improvis^{ed}" input.

To understand that competence, our linguistic theory--our "grammar" in the sense of grammatical theory--will have to be able to generate all (and only) the sentences of a given language. Chomsky's "generative grammar" is an attempt to do this. His 1965 Aspects of the Theory of Syntax³ has taken center stage in this process... so much so that it is commonly referred to as the "Standard Theory" (ST) in generative grammar.

The Standard Theory proposes a grammar of three parts: a syntactical component is the central component in that it generates sentence structure; a phonological component relates sound to the structure produced; a semantic component describes the structure of meaning.

Part of what Chomsky had to say about semantics in Aspects was a result of the work of Jerrold Katz. But Katz continued to work independently on the role of semantics, still in the generative grammar tradition, in tension with the (still developing) semantics of Chomsky, and on to an extension of semantic theory to incorporate illocutionary force.

The resultant theory of illocutionary force stands within the generative grammar tradition, and is developed along those lines, in self-conscious opposition to much of what is central to Searle's thesis.

Both the Austin-Searle tradition and the Chomsky-Katz tradition claim insight into the many facets of a theory of illocutionary roles. Yet there are points in the conflict between them--an explicit conflict between Searle and Katz--where some decisions have to be made. Our attempt here to resolve some of these matters of dispute will focus on those taken to be central.

Katz for one thing accuses Searle of not understanding the difference between competence and performance, of consequently treating performance factors (matters of language use) as though they were matters of meaning. That is how, according to Katz, Searle gets waylaid from what should be a semantic investigation into a theory of action (speech acts, in particular). Our position will be that although Searle sometimes encourages this interpretation/criticism with moments of carelessness, the mistake can be worked out without endangering his overall speech

act theory. Moreover, the point Searle is making with regard to (elements of) use being a part of meaning is true and necessary to any theory of illocutionary force.

A second criticism Katz levels at Searle has to do with the generality of the rules given for establishing an illocutionary force. When Searle speaks of a factor necessary for the performance of such-and-such an illocutionary act, and Katz observes that this factor is necessary of any illocutionary act, then he concludes that Searle has not acknowledged the full generality of the rule. Katz gives a number of examples, and concludes that this error distorts Searle's analysis. The point, we claim, is correct but not devastating. Searle seems sometimes more and sometimes less aware of the varying degrees of generality of his rules. But it does his theory no harm to make certain (rather easy) adjustments.

The third point of contention is a trickier one. It has to do with the choice of symbolism, and in a way this could be portrayed as a choice between traditions. Searle, especially in his more developed theory (and particularly in his work with Daniel Vanderveken in illocutionary logic) makes use of a predicate--calculus symbolism. Katz uses the symbolism of semantic theory, and argues for its superiority. We will argue contrariwise: the proper choice will depend upon what it is one is trying to portray, and, with regard to illocutionary force, predicate calculus symbolism is preferable.

Once the theories have been presented, and the differences have been resolved, it will be clear that we will have opted in the direction of Searle, with a modified version of his illocutionary logic and with his taxonomy of illocutionary acts. We will then have a consolidated theory of illocutionary force for all of language.

So we move to apply what has been developed to religious language. In order to do this, we have to give some indication of what we will be meaning by "religious language". What we will mean, in a nutshell, is this: religious language is perfectly ordinary language that is "religious" insofar as its meaning and/or use has to do with phenomena or experiences that are taken to have a religious dimension. That is our working definition.

The relevance, to religious language, of a study of illocutionary force is that declared in the Preface as being the point of this thesis. This study will provide us with a taxonomy of language along lines of illocutionary force that includes information about types of illocutionary acts, relationships among the types, presuppositions, psychological conditions that are expected to hold, the relationship of language to "the world" and a number of other matters.

Religious language will be characterized as part of language in general and so these insights will be shared. Furthermore, the principles that guided the development of the theory of illocutionary force in the first place allow for further development in case there is something interesting about religious language that can inform the broader study.

Within this, there is a series of learnings for us. We learn, for example, not to be defensive about religious language. That is, here, in a context devoid of the threat "be constative or be judged meaningless" religious language will not need special pleading for some sort of meaning status. At the same time, "knowing where it stands"--sometimes with an assertive side, sometimes directive, sometimes expressive and so on--we will be much less liable to confusion as regards the act in question.

We gain further, of course, insight into religious language doing different kinds of things: sometimes making an affirmation, sometimes making a commitment, offering a request, making a declaration, expressing certain feelings. We will learn, among other things, that commitment words seem to best reveal what is central to religion and that expressives are probably the primal religious utterance.

A third interesting and important development has to do with the logic of religious language. Searle's theory makes significant contributions to the logic of illocutionary force:

the point, ways of being flawed, presuppositions, sincerity conditions and so on. Religious language, if it is not to be a series of non sequiturs, will follow the same form.

And then there is the question of what our taxonomy of language, and our taxonomy of religious language with the special ordering we give it, can say about a possible typology of religion.

So let us return to the matter of process. If the stated purpose of this thesis is one of improving our understanding of religious language by way of demonstrating a taxonomy of illocutionary force, then the process will be to first present, then defend, and then apply a theory of illocutionary force. An adequate understanding of speech acts/illocutionary force requires, as has been indicated, knowledge of two traditions who are in a sense competing for the territory.

The "ordinary language/speech act theory" tradition of Austin and Searle--the womb out of which issued the study of speech acts/illocutionary acts/illocutionary force--will be our point of departure. Part I of the thesis, entitled "John Searle" will show in two chapters the origin of the theory in the questions, comments and minimal theoretical scheme of Austin, and its subsequent development by Searle.

We concentrate, in the case of Austin, on a presentation of How To Do Things With Words.⁴ It is presented, not argued or defended, much in Austin's own spirit of offering something rudimentary but not uninteresting for further thought and development. The first chapter ends with a look at Searle's description of two central problems in Austin's analysis, and this commentary

functions as a bridge from Austin to Searle. The second chapter follows Searle's development of speech act theory. The first two steps derive from Speech Acts⁵ and provide the mature "speech act theory." A third step, derived essentially from "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts"⁶ introduces a more fully developed taxonomy.

Part II introduces the competing tradition under the title, "Jerrold Katz." The point of the third chapter lies in its illustrating, through an introduction to Chomsky's Aspects⁷ and some subsequent debate on semantics, the tradition in which Katz finds himself. It gives the background out of which (and, in part, against which) Katz further develops his own semantics to account for illocutionary force.

It is this latter that is the subject matter of the bulk of Chapter 4. His Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force⁸ is Katz's explicit attempt to replace speech act theory (that of Searle) with his own extended semantic theory. In order to do this, he offers a fairly direct critical analysis of Searle's perspective, summarizes and extends the essential of his own semantic theory, and proceeds to a detailed analysis of illocutionary force and its relation to the propositional content.

At this point, the thesis will consist of a portrayal of two detailed, and in some significant ways, competing theories of illocutionary force. The first task of Part III will be to sort out the ways in which these are and are not incompatible. Some indication of the points of contention, and of our resolution of these, has been given above. It can, perhaps, be summarized

thus: Katz succeeds in making a case for a development of semantic theory to account for illocutionary force. He does not succeed in making his case against speech act theory. Nor does he offer as convincing or as developed a theory or taxonomy as that of Searle. We are left preferring a modified version of Searle's position.

The rest of the thesis consists in the application of that which has been thus summarized to "religious language". We have already said something about what we would hope to gain. In terms of process we will move from the intuitive to the systematic and see if the results sound right. That is, we will take some intuitive examples of religious language and hold these up against the taxonomy and its related insights. The result will be not only a taxonomy of religious language, but an ordered taxonomy with significant theoretical underpinning.

Finally, our Conclusion will attempt to evaluate our having looked at Speech Act Theory and the Roles of Religious Language. The theory of illocutionary force, its taxonomy and our proposals around the taxonomy of religious language will be summarized. We will close with a question concerning the possibility of such a theory being the basis for a typology of religion.

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ENDNOTES FOR INTRODUCTION

- ¹ J.L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words, second edition, J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa, editors. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962, 1975.)
- ² John K. Searle, Speech Acts. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969.)
- ³ Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965.)
- ⁴ J.L. Austin, D.T.W., op. cit.
- ⁵ J.R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit.
- ⁶ J.R. Searle, "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts," from Language, Mind, and Knowledge- Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, K. Gunderson, ed. (Minneapolis: Univ of Minnesota Press, 1975.)
- ⁷ Noam Chomsky, Aspects, op. cit.
- ⁸ Jerrold J. Katz, Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force: a study in the contribution of sentence meaning to speech acts. (New York: Crowell, 1977.)

PART I.

JOHN SEARLE

Chapter 1. From Austin to Searle

a) Doing Things With Words

- i) The Performative; Its Infelicity
- ii) How Not To Go Wrong

b) The Grammatical Marks of the Performative and the Beginnings of Categorization

c) Doing Things With Words, revisited. A Tentative Taxonomy

- i) Doing Things With Words
- ii) A Tentative Taxonomy

d) Searle's Critique of Austin

CHAPTER I. FROM AUSTIN TO SEARLE

The William James lectures (Harvard University, 1955) are a drawing together of over a decade and a half of Austin's notes on "how to do things with words". The lectures are ordered to follow a process of development from the first through the twelfth. We do not have the same structural constraints, but will, in our own way, follow the same order in the development and presentation of the theory. When Austin's ideas have thus been presented, they will be criticized briefly by way of introducing Searle's development of Austin's work.

a) Doing Things with Words

i) The Performative; its Infelicity

Philosophers have noticed that what once might have been called "statements" may in fact not be. For example if statements have to be verifiable, we are left with a lot of pseudo-statements. These are of two kinds. First, many "statements" have a quite acceptable grammatical form and are nonetheless strictly nonsense.

And second, some kinds of pseudo-statements do not pretend to be statements at all. The job of ethical propositions might not be to record straightforward information about facts, but rather to prescribe conduct, evince emotion, and so on. This new understanding has led philosophers to name the error of preferring and presuming constative use the "descriptive fallacy".

Through this awareness, it now seems evident that "many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through... the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical, or else intended as something quite different."¹

Now, these views are "producing a revolution in philosophy."²

Austin wants to pursue this revolution by way of the second of these classes of utterance. They are not "nonsense". They appear to be statements but³

- a) They do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate anything at all, are not 'true or false' and
- b) The uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as, or as 'just', saying something.

For example⁴:

(E.a) 'I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)' -- as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony.

(E.b) 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth' -- as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stern.

(E.c) 'I give and bequeath my watch to my brother' -- as occurring in a will.

(E.d) 'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.'

In these, uttering the sentence is not to describe or to state one's doing something--it is, rather, to do it. Such sentences Austin proposes to call performative sentences.

It is true that there are other parts to the doing of these things than one's simply saying something. The performative sentence is part of what is necessary for the act to have been performed, but not all that is necessary.

"Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the words are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform certain other actions..."⁵

So not everyone can appropriately name a ship, baptize, etc. An act of marriage presumes something about the marital status of the partners. Betting presumes the bet is taken up. And so on.

A different kind of "circumstances" has to do with the intention of the speakers. A promise is made under the presumption of good faith. It is made even if the presumed good faith is not in fact there. But in this case it is flawed. The intention may in reality be absent, but its presence is presumed.

Now it is not really enough to say that circumstances seem to matter in the performing of performatives. The fact is, a number of things can go wrong such that the act, though not false (or true), is unhappy. Austin calls "the things that can be and go wrong," the doctrine of the infelicities."⁶

What things seem to be necessary for the happy functioning of a performative?⁷ There are three categories of condition: A, B and Γ .

(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,

(A.2) The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure involved.

(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and

(B.2) completely.

(Γ .1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further,

(Γ .2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.


Violation of one or more of these rules will yield a performative that is in some way "unhappy". If the offence is against rules A or B (that of an incorrect utterance, or of our not really being in a position to act that way, etc.) then the act is "not successfully performed at all." These Austin calls MISFIRES.

In the case of rule Γ , the act is achieved without sincerity. We call them ABUSES of the act. (That does not mean nothing is done...)

The distinction between the cases A and B lies in A being Misinvocation either because there is no correct procedure, or because the instance is a Misapplication of a procedure (A.2).

Class B is the class of Misexecution - by way of Flaws (B.1) or Hitches (B.2). Hence:

Infelicities



Certain things can be said with regard to this entire group of infelicities: For one thing, all conventional acts are liable to infelicity, and not just acts of uttering words. For another, there are kinds of problems other than the above to which the acts are vulnerable. As actions, for example, a speech act might be performed under duress or by mistake. As

utterances, they might be performed by an actor on a stage. Or they may simply not be heard and understood.

But these further flaws are not problems of the speech act per se.

Finally, it can be added that an utterance can go wrong in more than one way at one time. And that the nature of the infelicity may be unclear in borderline or overlapping cases.

ii. How Not To Go Wrong

Now the performative thus classified may be an explicit performative or an implicit performative. An explicit performative is an "unambiguous expression such as 'I bet', 'I promise', 'I bequeath' --an expression very commonly also used in naming the act which, in making such an utterance, I am performing."⁹

A performative can also be implicit. For example "go" can be as much an order to go as in the phrase "I order you to go." Similarly "There is a bull in the field" may or may not be a warning, and so on...

In either case, if the performative is not to be subject to one or more of the infelicities, the following six conditions must be met.

- A.1 There must be an understood and accented convention, having a conventional effect. Talk about betting or marrying and so on would be vacuous if there were no such convention. The convention must include the uttering of appropriate words.
- A.2 The persons and the circumstances must be appropriate to the needs of this convention. For example, "I appoint you" presumes that the person is not already appointed, that I am in a position to appoint, and so on...
- B.1 The correct procedure is to be followed (i.e., no wrong formulas...)

B.2 The procedure must be complete, including an uptake.

The act is void-effectively does not happen — if any of the above conditions is not met. The act, though, can happen but still be unhappy/abused.

□.1 The speaker must have the appropriate thoughts, feelings, intentions, or the act is abused by way of insincerity. To say 'I'm sorry' when I'm not, 'I advise you...' when I don't really think it best, 'I promise!' when I don't really intend to do it is to perform the speech act without sincerity.

□.2 Where future conduct is implied, the speaker must so conduct himself, or the act is abused by way of breach.

Now all of this is saying that certain conditions have to hold in order for a performative utterance to be happy. It also seems clear that, in order for the performative utterance to be happy, certain statements have to be true.

That is, admitting that 'I apologize' is not a (true or false) statement, still allows that it imply things to be so. In fact, it does imply things to be so. ¹⁰

It is true and not false that I am doing (have done) something - actually numerous things, but in particular that I am apologizing. It is true that certain conditions do obtain, in particular those specified in the Rules A. 1 and A. 2. It is true that other conditions obtain out of kind P (thinking, feeling, intending), and it is true that there is some kind of commitment to future action.

What this is is a case of sentences depending on one another. There are well-known varieties of inter-sentence dependency, and Austin reminds us of these.

1. Entailment. 'All men blush' entails 'some men blush'. Or, if p entails q , then $\sim q$ entails $\sim p$. The truth of one proposition can entail the truth (or falsity) of another proposition. This is not unlike the way in which 'I promise' entails 'I ought'.
2. Implication. If I say 'the cat is on the mat' it is implied that I believe it is. This is of course different from entailment in that my not believing the cat to be on the mat does not imply it is not on the mat. This assertion, by the way, could be uttered insincerely ...without the implied belief. In other words insincerity can effect assertions as well as it can promise and so on.
3. Presupposition. 'All Jack's children are bald' presupposes that Jack has some children. Again, this is not a matter of entailment. (If Jack has no children we are not obliged to presuppose they are not bald). It is rather a matter of the utterance being void since devoid of reference. This parallels the presuppositions with regard to formulas' being satisfied in conditions A and B above.

What this comes down to is that we simply cannot understand the ways in which statements can go wrong if all we look at is the proposition involved. The situation of the utterance must be considered. And if the total speech act in the total speech situation becomes the subject matter, then even the constative utterance might be better understood as a way (among others) of performing a speech act. The constative will become a kind of performative.

Austin wants ultimately to pursue this matter of statement-connection. In particular he wants to leave somewhat to one side the connection of entailment (which he considers to have been getting considerable treatment) and to concentrate on presuppositions (according to above rules A.1 and A.2) and implication (rules P1). He says that there are "two ways in which the truth of a statement may be connected importantly with the truth of another without it being the case that the one entails the other in the sole sort of sense preferred by obsessional logicians." ¹¹

This will follow further attempts to identify the performative (establish criteria for its identification) and a testing of the now dubious performative/constative distinction.

b) The Grammatical Marks of the Performatives and the Beginnings of Categorization

Austin wants now to ask whether there are grammatical criteria for identifying the performative. Examples of the performative to date have been of verbs in the first person singular present Indicative active: 'I name', 'I bet', 'I do' etc.

So, apart from the obvious parallel use of the first person plural, we ask: is this form essential for a verb to be a performative? What, for example, about the second and third person passive?¹²

(1) You are hereby authorized to pay...

(2) Passengers are warned to cross the track by the bridge only.

or the Impersonal:

(3) Notice is hereby given that trespassers will be prosecuted.

These all seem to function as performatives, person and voice fluctuating. Mood and tense also seem to break down as absolute criteria.¹³

(4) 'I order you to turn right'

'Turn right'

(5) 'I give...you off-side'

'You were off-side'

(6) 'I find you guilty'

'You did it'

Or, of course, there may be no verb at all: 'Done' 'Guilty' 'Out'.

Performative jobs are being done in all these grammatical instances. So we ask whether perhaps words (vocabulary as distinct from grammar) might best indicate the presence of a performative. Words like 'promise', 'authorize', 'off-side' and so on.

We readily see that the answer is no. This for the two reasons that we can have the performative without the operative words and we can have the operative words without having the performative.

For example:¹⁴

I. We get the performative without the operative words:

(1) In place of 'dangerous corner' we may have 'corner'...

(2) In place of 'you are ordered to...' we may have 'you will...'

II. We get the operative word without the performative:

(1) I may say 'you were guilty' or 'you were off-side' when I have no right to pronounce you guilty or off-side.

(2) In such locutions as 'you promised', 'you authorized' etc., the word occurs in a non-performative use.

Austin concludes that there doesn't seem to be a "single simple criterion of grammar or vocabulary" that will serve to identify the performative.

The matter must be more complex than that. So Austin suggests we return to the idea that a performative utterance is or is part of "the performance of an action." Actions are performed by persons and "In our cases the utterer must be the performers." And so despite our grammatical problems, there is something special about the role of the 'first person'. "There is something which is at the moment of uttering being done by the person uttering."¹⁵

If this person is not referred to by the pronoun 'I', then he is 'referred to' as:¹⁶

(a) In verbal utterances, by his being the person who does the uttering - what we may call 'the utterance-origin...'

(b) In written utterances by his appending his signature...

The first person singular (or plural) present indicative active form of the above examples makes this explicit. And verbs that seem to be performative serve to make explicit what action is being performed.

"Thus what we should feel tempted to say is that any utterance which is in fact a performative should be reducible, or expandible, or analysable into a form, or reproducible in a form, with a verb in the first person singular present indicative active (grammatical)."¹⁷

So 'out' is equivalent to 'I declare you out.'

'Guilty' is equivalent to 'I find you guilty.'

The explicit performative is explicit both with regard to the utterance's being performative and with regard to which act it is that is being performed.

Now all of this leads us to note that there is after all a (albeit inexact) grammatical mark of the performative. That is, there is an asymmetry between the first person singular present indicative active of performative verbs and other persons and tenses of the same verb. An asymmetry that exists in the case of 'I bet' (as opposed to 'I betted' or 'he bets') but not in the case of 'I run' (as opposed to 'he runs').

But as a hopeful grammatical criterion it is not exact. For example, we might say 'I promise only when...' or 'on page 49 I protest...' Some words ('I call') can be used in two or more ways. And so on.

Still, it seems that the asymmetry is more significant than the lack of exactitude.

We want, then, to attempt to list all verbs with this peculiarity. To do this we will have to suppose that all performative utterances which are not in fact in the preferred form ('I x that', 'I x to', 'I x') could be 'reduced' to this form and so rendered explicit performatives.

The explicit performative is not the 'primary' performative. The primary utterance is simply 'I shall be there.' Making it explicitly performative, we have 'I promise that I shall be there.' It is likely that "historically, from the point of view of the evolution of language, the explicit performative must be a later development than certain more primary utterances."¹⁸

Language evolves by becoming more precise - making clearer the meaning of what is said. It also evolves by becoming more explicit - making clearer the force of the utterance.

There are a number of speech devices to help with explicitness.¹⁹

1. Mood

'Shut it!'

'Shut it, if you like.'

'Shut it, if you dare.'

'You ought to shut it.'

2. Tone of voice

It's going to charge! (a warning)

It's going to charge? (a question)

It's going to charge!? (a protest)

3. Adverbs and adverbial phrases

'probably...'

'...without fail'

4. Connecting particles

'still' with the force of 'I insist that'

'therefore' meaning 'I conclude that'

5. Accompaniments of the utterance

• gestures (winks, pointings, shruggings...)

6. The circumstances of the utterance

'coming from him, I took it as an order, not
as a request'

The explicit performative goes in this same direction of ruling out equivocation. It goes in that direction, but it does not eliminate all doubt. That is because it is not always clear whether a formula is a performative formula. And even if it is, the formula may also function as a descriptive.

Austin illustrates this in three columns that could be labelled (from left to right). performatives, ambivalent performative/descriptive, descriptive.

I thank	I am grateful	I feel grateful
I apologize	I am sorry	I regret
I approve	I approve of	I feel approval

The ambivalent cases would have to be determined on the basis of what was happening in a given utterance. The explicit performative, to repeat, is an evolution in the direction of disambiguation.

At this point, Austin sets out a "test" for determining whether or not a word is performative.

—The test consists of a series of four questions. First, we ask of someone who for example says 'I welcome you', "Does he really?" And if it makes sense to doubt it, then 'I welcome you' is being used in a descriptive way, and not in the performative sense of 'I bid you welcome'. Second, we ask whether the action could be accomplished without one's actually saying anything. One can be sorry and describe or report that, but the performative act of 'I apologize' requires that something be said. Third, we ask whether an adverb like 'deliberately' or something of that sort might be inserted before the supposed performative. It makes more sense to say 'I deliberately apologized (which describes a performative) than 'I deliberately was sorry' (which does not describe a performative). Finally we might ask whether what is said could be literally false. If we say 'I am sorry', it could be. But the performative 'I apologize' would involve, rather, insincerity (unhappiness).

The examples Austin has been using for this testing process come from a type of performative he christens 'BEHABITIVES'. It is 'a kind of performative concerned roughly with reactions to behaviour and with behaviour towards others and designed to exhibit attitudes and feelings' ²⁰

The above test for the "pure explicit performative" is taken as a good guideline in separating the explicit 'I apologize', 'I criticize/censure', 'I approve', 'I bid you welcome', from the half descriptive 'I am sorry', 'I blame', 'I approve of', 'I welcome you'.

Austin suggests that what has been said about behabitives - the shifting from descriptive to performative, and the "wavering" between the two - can be said about a second class of performatives he names. Expositives, are expository performatives.

"Here the main body of the utterance has generally or often the straightforward form of a 'statement', but there is an explicit performative verb at its head."²¹ The job of this explicit performative is to show "how the 'statement' is to be fitted into the context."²² Examples of expositives are

'I argue (or urge) that there is no backside to the moon.'

'I conclude (or infer) that there is no backside to the moon.'

'I testify that there is no backside to the moon.'

'I admit (or concede) that there is no backside to the moon.'

'I prophesy (or predict) that there is no backside to the moon.'

Now this discussion - incomplete though it is as regards classification of performative utterances (and in fact preliminary to more complete classification) - brings Austin back to some fundamental questions.

For example, how does the difference between a performative and a descriptive relate to the supposed presumption of truth of the whole utterance? That is, when we say "I state that x" we are doing something that seems to be performative and that seems also to be making a (true or false) statement.

c) Doing Things With Words revisited. A Tentative Taxonomy.

i) Doing Things With Words

Austin suggests we backtrack and look again at the various "senses in which to say something may be to do something." After all, he suggests, "doing something" is a pretty vague expression.

So Austin proposes three types of sense or categories of act (A), (B) and (C).

(A) To say anything must always be to do something.

(A.a) always to perform the act of uttering certain noises (a 'phonetic' act), and the utterance is a phone;

(A.b) always to perform the act of uttering certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain types belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary, in a certain construction, i.e. conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar...this we may call a 'phonetic' act, and the utterance...a phone...and

(A.c) generally to perform the act of using that phone or its constituents with a more or less definite 'sense' and a more or less definite 'reference' (which together are equivalent to 'meaning'). This act we may call a 'rhetic act', and the utterance...a 'rheme'.

Austin calls the performance of such an act (A) the performance of a locutionary act. Utterances in this sense--the full units of normal speech--are locutions. And Austin describes his principle interest in locutions as that of distinguishing them from the other acts which constitute his primary concern.

To deal with the primary concern we need to go past the simple locution. To say, for example, "It is going to charge", and to make clear what we mean in the locutionary sense, might not tell us whether we are performing the act of warning or not. Or whether we are simply stating something. So

- (B) "To perform a locutionary act is in general...also -- and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act."²³

Questioning, informing, warning, announcing, pronouncing, appointing, identifying, and so on. An illocutionary act is the performance of an act not of saying something (locutionary) but in saying something. The act is an illocution and the study of types of such function is the study of "illocutionary forces".

Austin, in talking of the importance of this study of illocutionary force, underscores how lately we have "been realizing more and more clearly that the occasion of an utterance matters seriously", and that "the words used are to some extent to be 'explained' by the 'context'".²⁴

- (C) "Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of the persons."²⁵ Such an act is a perlocutionary act,

and the act a "perlocution". If a locutionary act is an act of saying something, an illocutionary act the performance of an act in saying something, a perlocutionary act is the performance of an act by saying something. 26

An example will illustrate these three acts.

Act (A) or locution -

He said to me 'Shoot her!' meaning by 'shoot' shoot and referring by 'her' to her.

Act (B) or illocution -

He urged...me to shoot her.

Act (C) or perlocution -

He persuaded me to shoot her.

Several things are to be noted in this analysis. First, when we speak of the "use of a sentence" it can mean these three different things. Second, we are sensitized to looking for other uses of language than these three and so we notice jokings, writing poetry, insinuating and so on. Third, insofar as this analysis deals with acts then we have to acknowledge that a speech act theory will share some features with a study of acts in general. There will be a difference between attempting to perform and successfully performing. A difference between intended and unintended effects, or between doing something freely or under duress.

Now, recall that the original distinction between the constative and the performative had to do with the former being "just" a matter of saying something whereas the latter was also doing something. And there was the matter of one being true or false while the other is instead happy or unhappy.

This distinction becomes a little dubious after an analysis like the above, which seems to lead to the conclusion that virtually any time²⁷ something is said one performs both locutionary and illocutionary acts. That is, something is both said and done on every occasion.

Austin wants then to reconsider the contrast, and in so doing he concludes that "to state is every bit as much to perform an illocutionary act as, say, to warn or to pronounce."²⁸

Consider the following:

In saying that it was raining, I was not telling or arguing or warning: I was simply stating it as a fact.

I state that he did not do it.

I argue that he did not do it.

"Stating" functions in the same way as arguing, betting, and warning. And seems to meet all the criteria of the illocutionary act.

It is, further, true that statements are not only true or false but also liable to the various kinds of infelicity described above in the doctrine of infelicities as it pertains to

performatives. For example, if 'I promise to be there' is liable to insincerity, so is 'the cat is on the mat' inasmuch as it implies I believe that the cat is on the mat.

The fact of the matter is that when we review the distinction in the light of the analysis of the kinds of acts that are performed, we see that a categorical distinction between performatives and constatives is out of order. "Once we realize that what we have to study is not the sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech situation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act."²⁹

While stating truly differs from arguing soundly, advising well, judging fairly, and the like, it is not obvious on what basis there could be a categorical distinction between the one and the rest. There are, for example, ways in which many performatives are related to truth. And there are ways in which constatives are related to contextual matters: what act one is performing in the circumstances.

In the normal case, though, we concentrate on the locutionary aspect of the constative (and abstract this from the illocutionary aspects) whereas we concentrate on the illocutionary force in the case of other performatives.

And so in moving to a hoped-for categorization of illocutionary acts, Austin leaves us with the following observations.³⁰

(A) The total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating.

(B) Stating, describing, etc., are just two names among a very great many others for illocutionary acts; they have no unique position.

(C) In particular, they have no unique position over the matter of being related to facts in a unique way called being true or false...

(D) By the same token, the familiar contrast of 'normative or evaluative' as opposed to the factual is in need...of elimination.

(E) We may well suspect that the theory of 'meaning' as equivalent to 'sense and reference' will certainly require some weeding-out and reformulation in terms of the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts...

And so the search for types will be a total theory of speech-acts.

ii) A Tentative Taxonomy

Our move now to an attempt to categorize these things we do with words has become, as the theory has developed, a categorization of illocutionary forces. We need not expect the sorting out to leave us with a series of pure categories. As a matter of fact, our initial look at performative verbs (in particular at explicit performative verbs) suggests we are more likely to find "families of related and overlapping speech acts."

Another thing we have noted is that the explicit identity of a given speech act is helpfully identified by the "simple test" of the first person singular present indicative active form of the verb.

So, Austin's proposal is to go through a dictionary ("in a liberal spirit") bringing out the verbs and seeking a preliminary classification, according to their illocutionary force. He distinguishes five general classes, which we will first list, then describe.

- (1) Verdictives. Have to do with giving a (final or tentative) verdict or finding on a matter which is probably not an obvious one.
- (2) Exercitives. Have to do with the exercise of power or influence.
- (3) Commissives. Commit one to a certain undertaking or intention.

- (4) Behabitives. Have to do with social behaviour and attitudes.
- (5) Expositives. Illustrate just how an utterance fits into the context of argument or conversation.

Austin is sensitive to the tentative nature of this classification. He offers it as something with which we can start. And he leaves us with only a few comments and some lists... something which we will see greatly developed by Searle. The comments and lists, in a summarized version, are these:

1. Verdictive. One is delivering a finding on the basis of certain reasons. There is a connection with truth and falsity, soundness and unsoundness, fairness and unfairness. Examples are:

acquit	convict	understand
reckon	rule	calculate
place	estimate	rate
grade	rank	describe
assess	diagnose	analyse

2. Exercitives. This is a decision, not a judgement. Something is to be so. It is "a sentence as opposed to a verdict". Examples are:

appoint	degrade	demote
dismiss	excommunicate	name
order	command	grant
sentence	pardon	nominate
bequeath	advise	resign
warn	announce	beg
pray	annul	recommend
proclaim	direct	veto

3. Commissives. One is committed to a course of action or to some sort of intention. Espousals are closely related to intention as, for example, "I dedicate my life to..." Examples are:

am determined to	covenant	contract
promise	bind myself	propose
undertake	intend	contemplate
guarantee	shall	swear
vow	engage	bet
dedicate myself to	oppose	consent

4. Behabitives. We react to our own and other people's behaviour and attitudes. There is here, along with other possible infelicities, a somewhat "special scope" for insincerity. Examples are:

apologize	resent	welcome
thank	criticize	bless
deplore	commend	curse

condole

defy

toast

applaud

protest

dare

5. Expositives. There are lots of sub-categories to expositives. And there are sometimes questions as to whether they might not also be verdictive, exercitive, behabitive, or commissive at the same time. But there seems to be a special use as expounding or clarifying that sets them apart. Examples are:³¹

1. affirm

6. postulate

deny

deduce

state

argue

describe

7. begin by

class

turn to

identify

conclude by

2. remark

7 a. interpret

mention

distinguish

3. inform

7 b. illustrate

tell

explain

4. testify

formulate

report

7 c. mean

5. accept

refer

concede

call

understand.

In sum, Austin has arrived at a theory of speech acts such that it is illocutionary force that provides a categorization of the kinds of things we do with words. It is Searle who is generally considered to have most developed this basis provided by Austin. And it is through Searle that we will proceed...both to evaluate Austin's suggestions and to develop them.

d) Searle's Critique of Austin

We will see throughout Chapter 2 that Searle's Speech Act Theory is in many ways based upon Austin's work. Searle clearly and self-consciously takes the groundwork of Austin and both changes and develops it. Chapter 2 will follow this development into Searle's characteristic Speech Act Theory and his work on taxonomy. For now, though, we will simply reflect upon Austin, with Searle, to see what might be challenged in the former's theory before development along Searle's lines can proceed.

The first point to be made is that Searle has problems with Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, and sees this as in need of a reworking before progress can be made in other matters.

How To Do Things With Words attempts to move from an original distinction between performatives and constatives to a general theory of speech acts that is inclusive of the two. The original distinction is supposed to be a distinction between utterances which are statements/descriptions and those which are acts (promises, bets, etc.). A distinction between "sayings" and "doings".

Austin at first tried to make this distinction precise. It was argued, for example, that constatives could be true or false while performatives were, rather, felicitous or infelicitous. But as he pushed this distinction, some performatives (e.g. warnings like "the bull is about to charge") could be seen to be true or

false. Further, constatives themselves were seen to have a felicitous /infelicitous dimension (e.g. "All John's children are asleep" is infelicitous if John has no children...).

Austin concluded that making a statement is also performing an act, and that constatives therefore turn out to be a kind of performative.

Along the way, Austin is seen to make a second distinction to replace the constative/performative distinction: a distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts. We have seen that this is a distinction between uttering a sentence with a certain meaning (characterized by sense and reference -- the locutionary act), and uttering a sentence with a certain force (the illocutionary act).

The two of course happen together. "I am going to do it" is at once a locutionary act (with one meaning, given sameness of reference) and one of several possible illocutionary acts (promise, warning, etc.).

Searle expresses specific difficulties with this distinction. Fundamentally, the problem is that the distinction cannot be completely general in that it does not (cannot) separate two distinct and mutually exclusive classes of acts. The reason is that in at least some sentences the literal meaning alone determines at least one illocutionary force. So when we say, as above, "I

am going to do it" and the illocutionary force cannot be determined without something "additional", the same is not the case in sentences where the meaning makes the force clear.

So in the sentence "I hereby promise that I am going to do it"³² (uttered seriously and literally) the illocutionary force is and must be that of a promise and that is contained in the meaning. In an instance such as this, locutionary and illocutionary become two different labels for the same act.

Austin has said that each is an abstraction from the total speech act, but here we see that where we have the performative use of illocutionary verbs "there is no way of abstracting the locutionary act which does not catch an illocutionary act with it."³³

There clearly remains a difference between the concept of an utterance with a certain meaning (a locutionary act) and the concept of an utterance with a certain force (an illocutionary act). But because of this missing determination of force, the classes overlap. There cannot be a general locutionary/illocutionary distinction.

Searle suggests we reconsider the components of the locutionary act to look for hints at a possible improved classification of acts.

Austin's locutionary act, we recall, has three parts:

phonetic act -- uttering certain noises

phatic act -- uttering certain words/vocables

rhetic act -- using these vocables with sense
and reference

This total act is differentiated from the illocutionary act, as follows:³⁴

locution: He said to me "Shoot her!" meaning by
"shoot" shoot and referring by "her"
to her.

Illocution: He urged (or advised, ordered, etc.)
me to shoot her.

locution: He said to me, "You can't do that."

Illocution: He protested against my doing it.

Searle remarks that here Austin uses direct quotation to identify locutionary acts and indirect quotation to identify illocutionary acts. But previously³⁵ when discussing the internal structures of locutionary acts, he distinguishes within the locutionary act between the phatic act and the rhetic act, and here he identifies the phatic act by using the oratio recta form of quotation marks and identifies the rhetic act by using indirect quotations."³⁶

He said "I shall be there" (phatic). He said he would
be there (rhetic).

He said "Get out" (phatic). He told me to get out (rhetic).

Note that in cases of the indirect form--the reports of rhetic acts--the verbs are illocutionary verbs. As a result, we see that Austin's characterization of rhetic acts gives them as illocutionary acts.

No wonder, then, that every sentence (constative included) has some illocutionary force potential for Austin. It is already built into its meaning.

It is for that reason, too, that the rhetic act, and the broader locutionary act, cannot be opposed to the illocutionary act.

Searle's conclusion is this: "There are indeed phonetic acts of uttering certain noises, phatic acts of uttering certain vocables or words (and sentences), and illocutionary acts, such as making statements, asking questions, giving commands, but it does not seem that there are or can be acts of using those vocables in sentences with sense and reference which are not already (at least purported) illocutionary acts."³⁷

At this stage it seems that locutionary and illocutionary acts cannot be separated even as abstractions. If an act is a complete locutionary act, it is already a complete illocutionary act...since some indication of force is part of the meaning.

And so we move from Austin's taxonomy

Locutionary

Phonetic

phatic

rhetic

Illocutionary

To Searle's

Phonetic

Phatic

Illocutionary

Searle mentions three principles that become evident in this and that underline his own taxonomy. The first of these is what he calls the Principle of Expressibility, namely, that whatever can be meant can be said. Second, meaning is compositional. That is, the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of all its meaningful components. Third, the illocutionary forces of utterances may be more or less specific. Further, there are different principles of distinction for distinguishing different types of illocutionary acts.

A closer look at these will give us a further refined taxonomy. The first principle tells us that for any illocutionary act one intends to perform this can be expressed in a sentence "the literal meaning of which is such as to determine that its serious literal utterance in an appropriate context will be a

performance of that act."³⁸ If we can intend a force, then we can say it literally. This, Searle suggests, when not understood, can lead one to overestimate (as in Austin's case) the distinction between meaning and force. While for Searle, a study of meanings and a study of illocutionary acts are but one study from two points of view.

The second principle allows us to see where sentence meaning "comes from". Austin was using the Fregean Terminology of "sense" and "reference". Searle suspects that this didn't allow him adequately to see the extent to which force is part of meaning...did not allow him to see the common elements of sentence meaning that have to do with its illocutionary force potential. Things like syntactic (deep) structure, stress, intonational contour. "If one thinks of sentential meaning as a matter of sense and reference, and tacitly takes sense and reference as properties of words and phrases, then one is likely to neglect those elements of meaning which are not matters of words and phrases, and it is often precisely these elements which in virtue of their meaning are such crucial determinants of illocutionary force."³⁹

Thirdly, Searle says that illocutionary acts fall on a continuum of specificity, but that they fall not only on this single continuum, but also under a number of principles of differentiation. So what? Well, for one thing, failure to notice this continuum may have led to Austin's failure to notice

that his supposed locutionary verb phrases like "say that", and "ask whether" are every bit as illocutionary as "state that" and "order to", but they are simply more general. (As for the matter of "differentiation", we will see more of that when it comes to Searle's principled classification of illocutionary forces.)

Well then if these are Austin's failures in general classification, was there perhaps something valid underlying his distinctions...something that we should note. In particular, Searle quotes Austin as follows:⁴⁰ "With the constative utterance, we abstract from the illocutionary (let alone the perlocutionary) aspects of the speech act, and we concentrate on the locutionary...With the performative utterance, we attend as much as possible to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and abstract from the dimension of correspondence with facts."

This, to Searle, looks like a distinction between content/proposition and force/type. "Thus, for example, the proposition that I will leave may be a common content of different utterances with different illocutionary forces, for I can threaten, warn, state, predict, or promise that I will leave."⁴¹ So we need "to distinguish in the total illocutionary act the type of act from the content of the act."⁴²

In terms of the typology under discussion, Searle suggests that we distinguish the illocutionary act (as force/type) from the propositional act (content/proposition). The propositional act is the act of "expressing" the proposition...and as such is neutral as regards illocutionary force.

The two acts, while part of the same speech act, are distinguishable in that their identity conditions are not the same. As has been shown, we might have the one propositional act being used and the performance of different illocutionary acts. And it is true that, as Austin said, we concentrate in the case of constatives more on the propositional content than on the force and contrariwise in the (usual) case of other performatives.

Symbolically, Searle gives the representation of the speech act as $F(p)$ where F is the illocutionary force and p the propositional content.

We are left with the topology

Phonetic acts
Phatic acts
Propositional acts
Illocutionary acts

Searle's second major difficulty with Austin's analysis has to do directly with the taxonomy Austin offers. We have outlined this taxonomy (in the third section, above) and we have mentioned that Austin presents it as a "tentative" beginning.

Searle has a series of criticisms aimed at Austin's classification. The first problem is that it is in reality a classification of English illocutionary verbs, not of illocutionary acts. It seems to have been presumed by Austin that the list is to be made by simply separating non-synonymous verbs. Not only does Searle see no reason to presume this to be the case, he in fact considers it clearly wrong. Some verbs mark, not a different illocutionary act, but rather the manner in which (different manners in which) such-and-such an illocutionary act is performed.

Similarly, Searle observes that not all the verbs listed by Austin are even illocutionary verbs. "Sympathize", "regard as", and "intend", for example, are not illocutionary. "Saying 'I intend' is not intending; nor in the third person does it name an illocutionary act: 'He intended'...does not report a speech act."⁴³ Expressing an intention is usually a speech act, but intending never is.

The third criticism Searle offers -- and the central one -- is that there is nothing behind Austin's classification to motivate the distinctions. "There is no clear or consistent principle or set of principles on the basis of which the taxonomy is constructed."⁴⁴ We will see more of the detail and the weight of this criticism when we look at Searle's own taxonomy.⁴⁵

Because of these problems, especially the first and third, there is an overlap in Austin's classification...an overlap among categories. This is not just a matter of a few borderline or unusual cases, but a matter of verbs (like "describe", for example) rather unsystematically "in the middle" of two competing categories. As a matter of fact, with Austin's definitions, virtually any expositive could as easily be a verdictive.

Conversely, there is the problem of too much heterogeneity within some categories. For example, behabitives include such variance as "dare", "defy", "challenge" at the same time as "thank", "welcome". But the former grouping alone has to do with the hearer's subsequent action.

The final point made is simply the observation that verbs listed within the classes do not always satisfy the definitions given. Acts of nominating, appointing, excommunicating and so on are not a matter of the "giving of a decision in favor of or against a certain course of action." Nor are they advocating a course of action. They are, instead, performing it.

These problems: the classification of speech acts (locutionary/illocutionary and so on) and the taxonomy of illocutionary forces (and especially finding a principled basis for the classification) will constitute an important part of Searle's own work.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 1

¹ J.L. Austin, D.T.W., op. cit., p.3.

² Ibid, p.3.

³ Ibid, p.5.

⁴ Ibid, p.5.

⁵ Ibid, p.8.

⁶ Ibid, p.14.

⁷ Ibid, p.14-15.

⁸ Ibid, p.18. At different times, Austin gives different names. For example, A.1 and A.2 are contrasted as Non-plays and Misplays. B is labelled Miscarriages, leaving the contrast Misexecutions and Non-executions for B.1 and B.2. C is alternatively labelled Disrespects, with C.1 as Dissimulations; C.2 as Non-fulfillments, Disloyalties, Infractions, Indisciplines, Breaches. The two in brackets () were left blank in the schema on p. 18...Names have been added from elsewhere.

⁹ Ibid, p.32.

¹⁰ Ibid, p.46.

¹¹ Ibid, p.54.

¹²ibid, p.57.

¹³(4)-(6) have been renumbered.

¹⁴J.L. Austin, D.T.W., op. cit., p.59.

¹⁵ibid, p.60.

¹⁶ibid, p.60.

¹⁷ibid, p.61-62.

¹⁸ibid, p.71.

¹⁹ibid, p.73ff.

²⁰ibid, p.83.

²¹ibid, p.85.

²²ibid, p.85.

²³ibid, p.98.

²⁴ibid, p.100.

²⁵ibid, p.101.

²⁶This is the gist of the difference. Austin is aware that the use of the prepositions per se is not an ironclad test for the type of act.

- 27 Possible exceptions being exclamations like "damn" or "ouch"...
- 28 J.L. Austin, D.T.W., op. cit., p.134.
- 29 Ibid, p.139.
- 30 Ibid, p.148-149.
- 31 Austin does not comment on these (incompletely reproduced) sub-categories.
- 32 J.R. Searle, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts," Philosophical Review 77, 1968, p.407.
- 33 Ibid, p.407.
- 34 J.L. Austin, D.T.W., op. cit., p.101-102. See also above, p.31.
- 35 Ibid, p.95.
- 36 J.R. Searle, L.L.A., op. cit., p.410-411.
- 37 Ibid, p.412.
- 38 Ibid, p.418.
- 39 Ibid, p.418.
- 40 J.L. Austin, D.T.W., op. cit., p.144-145. Quoted in Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit., p.419-420.

⁴¹ J.R. Searle, L.L.A., op. cit., p.420.

⁴² Ibid, p.420.

⁴³ J.R. Searle, Taxonomy, op. cit., p.352.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p.352.

⁴⁵ Below, 2,c, "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts."

Chapter 2. Searle's Speech Act Theory

- a) Expressions, Meaning and Speech Acts: some preliminaries
- b) The Structure of Illocutionary Acts
- c) A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts

CHAPTER 2. SEARLE'S SPEECH ACT THEORY

Searle follows Austin in certain central respects. He writes, for example, of the variety of acts involved in a given speech situation. Acts such as moving the jaw, making noises, informing, boring, making statements, asking questions, issuing commands, and so on.

One category of these acts, is the illocutionary act. We have seen, in the concluding part of Chapter 1, how Searle both adopts and adapts this part of Austin's speech-act theory.

Similarly, Searle reaffirms Austin's observation that it is the speech act that should be construed as being the basic unit of linguistic communication. It is the production of the symbol/word/sentence token in the performance of the speech act.

This production is not random; nor is it haphazard. It is formal and rule-governed. We can, in fact, determine both necessary and sufficient conditions for the performance of a particular kind of speech act. We determine the semantic rules for the use of such-and-such an expression. And we can expect to be able to group like-functioning acts into a common category while at the same time discussing several different categories of speech act.

Production of a speech act is not only rule-governed, it is also intentional. If it were not, we would exclude it from the class of linguistic communication.

Thus characterized, speech act theory is for Searle the point of intersection of a theory of language and a theory of action insofar as a theory of language is part of a theory of action. The formal features of language admit independent study. But this remains incomplete without study of their role in speech acts.

This does not leave us with two semantic studies, one for the meaning of sentences and the other for the performance of speech acts. It is the one study, for the semantics must take into account the total speech act. Meaning alone, that is, "does not in all cases uniquely determine what speech act is performed in a given utterance."¹ That is why a study of speech acts is a study of at least the literal meaning of sentences but also involves contextual factors.

It is important to note that the relevant contextual factors here are not independent of the meaning. They are tied up in it. So "a study of the meaning of sentences is not in principle distinct from a study of speech acts. Properly construed, they are the same study."²

The oft-competing theories concentrating on the use of expressions on the one hand and the meaning of expressions on

the other should, Searle says, be seen as complementary. Not only are both kinds of theory important, but they are necessarily related. "They are related because for every possible speech act there is a possible sentence or set of sentences the literal utterance of which in a particular context would constitute a performance of that speech act."³

(a) Expressions, Meaning and Speech Acts: some preliminaries

If what has been declared in the preamble is true, then we should be able to find the rules that govern speech acts. We will look for them by stating necessary and sufficient conditions for the performance of certain specific speech acts. From these conditions we should be able to draw out "sets of semantic rules."

Searle begins this process by looking with a little more detail at the different types of speech act, and by asking some further questions about notions such as 'proposition', 'rules', 'meaning', 'facts'.

Let us consider the following:

1. Sam smokes habitually.
2. Does Sam smoke habitually?
3. Sam, smoke habitually!
4. Would that Sam smoked habitually.
5. Mr. Samuel Martin is a regular smoker of tobacco.

Now in all of these the reference and the predication are the same, while at the same time being part of different speech acts. The first thing we do, then, is to detach the notions of referring and predicating from that of the total speech act.

Recall Searle's description of the speech act with which we concluded Chapter 1.

Phonetic acts.

Phatic acts.

Propositional acts.

Illocutionary acts.

We can now, because of what is more/less relevant to our present purpose, regroup and characterize these as follows:

- i. Utterance act The uttering of words.
- ii. Propositional act Referring and predicating.
- iii. Illocutionary act Stating, questioning, commanding, etc.

We are "allowed" to abstract these out of the one act because the identity criteria are different. The same propositional act can occur in different illocutionary acts. An utterance act can be performed without there being a propositional or an illocutionary act. An utterance act may, under different conditions, be different propositional and illocutionary acts. And so on...

Parenthetically we might add Austin's

- iv. Perlocutionary act. The speech act that aims at effect (persuade, convince, enlighten...)

Central to the present purpose is the propositional act/illocutionary act distinction and characterization. And correlative to this distinction, Searle points out, is the linguistic observation that it is sentences (the form of the illocutionary act) and not parts of sentences (the predicates, nouns, pronouns and noun phrases of the propositional act) that are used to say things.

But we need here to sharpen up the distinction between the proposition (something Searle will call "part of a sentence") and the act of which it is a part. Searle has said that the same predication occurs in 1 - 5 of the above example...not only in assertions. In this respect, then, assertions and other illocutionary acts are similar: various inflections of a common predicate expression can be used in different illocutionary acts.

Similarly, the reference was taken to be the same...because it consisted of an expression that served to identify the same person (in this case--it might have been a thing, process, action...).

Whenever there is sameness of reference and predication, Searle says, and if the referring expression means the same thing, then "the same proposition is expressed."

Thus "a proposition is to be sharply distinguished from an assertion or statement of it."⁴ Note:

6. If Sam smokes habitually, he will not live long.
7. The proposition that Sam smokes habitually is uninteresting.

Here, in 6 and 7, the same proposition is expressed as in 1 - 5, but is part of another proposition. In all seven, the same proposition occurs; only in 1 and 5 is it asserted.

The proposition per se, then, is not an act. Stating, asserting and so on are acts. So we distinguish clearly between the illocutionary act and the propositional content of the illocutionary act.⁵

These distinctions are reflected in various devices of natural language that serve to indicate propositions and illocutionary force. Illocutionary force indicators might, for example, be word order, stress, punctuation and so on. Symbolically, as mentioned above, Searle proposes to represent this as

$$F(p)$$

where "F" takes illocutionary force indicating devices and "p" takes expressions for propositions.

This becomes the general form for all illocutionary acts.⁶ Different kinds of illocutionary acts--to be looked at as the chapter progresses--take these more specific symbols of the same general form:

$\vdash (p)$	assertions
$\text{Pr } (p)$	promises
$! (p)$	requests
$\text{W } (p)$	warnings
$? (p)$	yes-no questions

The (p) can be unpacked, if we confine ourselves to simple subject-predicate expressions,

$F (RP)$

with a referring expression and a predicate expression.

It is important to note, in passing that immediately that we begin to make use of such symbolism light is shed upon grammatical realities that might otherwise have remained quite obscure. In this instance, we learn to account for what Searle takes to be a "generally overlooked" distinction: that between illocutionary negation and propositional negation.

$\sim F (p)$

$F (\sim p)$

Thus, "I promise to come" has the two negations: "I do not promise to come" and "I promise not to come."

Before we look more closely at the structure of illocutionary acts, we want to be clear on three prefatory matters.

i. Rules. Searle clearly distinguishes between regulative and constitutive rules. Regulative rules regulate a logically

independent, pre-existing activity (e.g. etiquette), whereas constitutive rules constitute (and also regulate) an activity that is logically dependent on the rules (e.g. chess).

Regulative rules can be paraphrased to the form "Do X" or "If Y do X". Constitutive rules may have this form, or they may have the form "X counts as Y".

The semantic structure of a language, Searle suggests, "may be regarded as a conventional realization of a series of sets of underlying constitutive rules."⁷ Speech acts are then performed in accordance with these rules.

It is important to differentiate here between what is "underlying" and what is "conventional". Searle clearly is suggesting that the rules are underlying and somehow intrinsic to language. It is when these are actualized in different languages that we find "different conventional realizations of the same underlying rules."⁸

So Searle can say that "the fact that an utterance of a promising device (under appropriate conditions) counts as the undertaking of an obligation is a matter of rules and not a matter of conventions (of a particular language)."⁹

It is these rules we refer to when we say that language is a rule-governed behavior. Needless to say, the agent need not be aware that the behavior is rule-governed.

ii. Meaning. Normally when one speaks one means something and what is said has a meaning. What is it for one to mean something?

Searle suggests we start with Grice.¹⁰ Grice can be summarized thus: "To say that a speaker S meant something by X is to say that S intended the utterance of X to produce some effect in a hearer H by means of the recognition of this intention."¹¹

The Grician definition is helpful in two ways. First, it shows the connection between meaning and intention. Second, it shows that H is to recognize my intention.

The Grician definition is, Searle claims, defective in two ways as well. For one thing "it fails to account for the extent to which meaning can be a matter of rules or conventions...(It) does not show the connection between one's meaning something by what one says, and what that which one says actually means in the language."¹² A second problem is that in defining meaning solely in terms of hoped-for effects, "it confuses illocutionary with perlocutionary acts."¹³

The critical points to be made are that the words uttered in connection with one's intention are not accidental. The recognition intended has a lot to do with the actual expression used and the rules that govern its use. And secondly, the relevant effect intended is understanding. Any additional effect is perlocutionary.

Searle speaks of a meaning bridge between speaker and hearer.¹⁴ "In the speaker's side, saying something and meaning it are closely connected with intending to produce certain effects on the hearer. On the hearer's side, understanding the speaker's utterance is closely connected with recognizing his intentions. In the case of literal utterances the bridge between the speaker's side and the hearer's side is provided by their common language."¹⁵

The "bridge" of a common language can work because understanding a sentence is knowing its meaning. It is a meaning that is determined by rules and that has to do with a speaker's intention that the hearer know the meaning both through the intention and through the rules. The actual sentence used is a conventional way of achieving the intention.

This yields a meaning-rule that is formulated S utters sentence T and means it (i.e. means literally what he says) =

S utters T and

- (a) S intends (i-1) the utterance U of T to produce in H the knowledge (recognition, awareness) that the states of affairs specified by (certain of) the rules of T obtain. (Call this effect the illocutionary effect, IE).
- (b) S intends U to produce IE by means of the recognition of i-1.
- (c) S intends that i-1 will be recognized in virtue of (by means of) H's knowledge of (certain of) the rules governing (the elements of) T.

III. Facts. Searle wants to distinguish between brute and institutional facts. He is concerned that we not take the "brute" facts of the natural sciences and out of them form a model for all knowledge. His point is that some apparently fact-stating language does not consist of "brute" fact concepts. In ethics and aesthetics, and also in ceremonies, games and so on... the physical events are only part of the whole event.

Institutional facts are facts that presuppose certain human institutions. These institutions--like a particular human language system--are systems of constitutive rules. So the fact that so-and-so might perform a speech act is an institutional fact.

(b) The Structure of Illocutionary Acts

Searle now feels prepared to look at a single illocutionary act--that of promising--and look for the necessary and sufficient conditions for its being successfully and non-defectively¹⁶ performed.

These (necessary and sufficient) conditions can be set forth as "a set of propositions the conjunction of which" entail the proposition that a speaker made a successful and non-defective promise (and vice-versa). Each condition will be a necessary one; the set, sufficient.

Once the conditions are determined, they can be re-stated as the rules for the use of the particular illocutionary force

indicating device. The conditions therefore serve the two-fold function of explicating the notion and preparing for the formulation of the rules.

In order to promise, then, we seem to need the following conditions:

1. Normal input and output conditions obtain. This means simply that both S and H know how to speak...both know what they are doing, and so on.

Condition 1 is a general condition on linguistic communication.

2. S expresses the proposition that p in the utterance of T. We isolate the proposition from the rest of the speech act.

3. In expressing that p, S predicates a future act A of S. Certain features of the proposition are relevant to the promising in that the act is predicated of the speaker, and it cannot be a past act.

Conditions 2 and 3 will be called propositional content conditions.

4. H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A, and S believes H would prefer his doing A to his not doing A.

This condition will help to distinguish, for example, between a promise and a threat. A promise is defective if the thing promised is not wanted.

5. It is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events.

This must be a reason for the act. As Searle says, this is "an instance of a general condition on many different

kinds of illocutionary acts to the effect that the act must have a point."¹⁷ If it is pointless, then it is defective.

Conditions 4 and 5 will be called preparatory conditions.

6. S intends to do A. This distinguishes sincere from insincere promises.

Condition 6 will be called the sincerity condition.

7. S intends that the utterance of T will place him under an obligation to do A. A promise is the undertaking of an obligation by virtue of the speech act itself...an essential feature of a promise.

Condition 7 will be called the essential condition.

8. S intends (i-1) to produce in H the knowledge (K) that the utterance of T is to count as placing S under an obligation to do A. S intends to produce K by means of the recognition of i-1, and he intends i-1 to be recognized in virtue of (by means of) H's knowledge of the meaning of T. This is in line with the above discussion of "meaning". The effect is produced by means of recognition of intention. Further, the meaning is understood to be the "bridge" between S and H.

9. The semantical rules of the dialect spoken by S and H are such that T is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if conditions 1 - 8 obtain. In such a case, it is by virtue of the semantical rules of the language that a promise is made.

Now we have to acknowledge that a promise can be made and yet be insincere. We can purport to have the requisite intention, but not really have it at all. Our conditions therefore have to allow for the speaker's "expressing" or "taking responsibility for" an intention without actually having it.

We therefore amend condition 6 with the condition,

6a. S intends that the utterance of T will make him responsible for intending to do A.

This replaces 6 as a condition of success for the illocutionary act, as it leaves the analysis neutral on the question of sincerity.

As was said above, we should now be able to regroup these conditions and turn them "the other way around" that they might lead to rules for the use of (such-and-such) an illocutionary force indicating device. The re-grouping seems to fall naturally into two categories. Conditions 1, 8 and 9 are general and not specific to the act of promising. They apply in fact to "all kinds of normal illocutionary acts."

The other conditions, conditions 2 - 7, are unique to promising¹⁸ and are likely to be helpful with the "promising" rules we are looking for. They translate as follows;

Rule 1. Pr is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of discourse) T, the utterance of which predicates some future act A of the speaker S...(Searle calls) this the propositional content rule. It is derived from the propositional content conditions 2 and 3.

Rule 2. Pr is to be uttered only if the hearer H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A, and S believes H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A.

Rule 3. Pr is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events...(Searle calls) rules 2 and 3 preparatory rules and they are derived from the preparatory conditions 4 and 5.

Rule 4. Pr is to be uttered only if S intends to do A...(Searle calls) this the sincerity rule, and it is derived from the sincerity condition 6.

Rule 5. The utterance of Pr counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A...(Searle calls) this the essential rule.

There are two things that are important about these rules. First, they shed some light on the logic of promising. Second, the distinctions found can be carried over (with some changes in content) to the analysis of other illocutionary acts.

Searle provides this comparative table:¹⁹

Types of illocutionary act

Request

Assert.

Types
of
Rule

Propositional Content	Future act A of H.	Any proposition P.
Preparatory	1. H is able to do A. S believes H is able to do A. 2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H will do A in the normal course of events of his own accord.	1. S has evidence for the truth of p. 2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H knows p.
Sincerity	S wants H to do A	S believes p.
Essential	Counts as an attempt to get H to do A.	Counts as an undertaking to the effect that p represents an actual state of affairs.

Thank (for)

Advise

Types
of
Rule

Propositional Content	Past act A done by H.	Future act A of H.
Preparatory	A benefits S and S believes A benefits S.	1. S has some reason to believe A will benefit H. 2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H will do A in the normal course of events.
Sincerity	S feels grateful or appreciative for A	S believes A will benefit H.
Essential	Counts as an expression of gratitude or appreciation.	Counts as an undertaking to the effect that A is in H's best interest.

Congratulate

Greet

Types
of
Rule

Propositional Content	Some event, act, etc., E related to H.	None.
Preparatory	E is in H's interest and S believes E is in H's interest.	S has just encountered H.
Sincerity	S is pleased at E	None
Essential	Express pleasure at E.	Recognition of H by

This is not taken to be a taxonomy of illocutionary acts--we will move to that shortly--but rather an initial testing of the usefulness of the conditions/rule-making process. It does seem clear that Searle is discovering some general rules, some rules that have a general form and yet specific constraints, and some formulas quite specific to one or another illocutionary act.

Pausing for a moment in our pursuit of a taxonomy, let me review, with Searle, the general observations/hypotheses that arise out of the above and that apply to all illocutionary acts. Searle lists nine such hypotheses.

1. "Whenever there is a psychological state specified in the sincerity condition, the performance of the act counts as an expression of that psychological state."²⁰ This state is "expressed", we recall, whether it exists or not...whether the act is sincere or not. We express belief, desire, intention, pleasure and so on.
2. The whole sincerity/insincerity question does not arise except when the act is an expression of a psychological state.
3. In the same way in which the sincerity conditions tells what the speaker expresses, the preparatory condition tells us what the speaker implies.
4. There is no need for using an explicit illocutionary force-indicating device, if the context and the utterance can "get

along without it." The point is that the essential condition must be satisfied. "I'll do it for you" counts as a promise if it is clear one is accepting an obligation.

5. A non-explicit illocutionary force can be made explicit.
6. When conditions, as on the above table, overlap for different illocutionary acts, one may be a special case of the other. Asking questions, for example, is a special case of requesting. One then asks: "Are there some basic illocutionary acts to which all or most of the others are reducible?"²¹
7. It seems to be the essential condition that determines the other conditions. And some of the conditions that follow the essential condition seem to be general across all illocutionary forces. If that is true, then they are to be eliminated as conditions upon particular illocutionary forces and taken to be general conditions upon all illocutionary forces. The non-obviousness preparatory condition might be an example of such a condition.
8. There are really a number of "principles of distinction" possible in the process of distinguishing and relating the variety of illocutionary acts: the point or purpose of the act, the relative positions of S and H, the degree of commitment, the propositional content, the interest of the proposition to S and H, the different possible expressed psychological states, and the relation of the utterance to the conversation. There are, therefore, different continua for locating an illocutionary act.

9. Some illocutionary verbs are, and others are not, definable in terms of intended perlocutionary effect. Thus, requesting and not promising is tied to an expected response.

On the basis of this sorting out of the kinds of things that illocutionary acts involve and depend upon, Searle considers it possible seriously to hope that a principled taxonomy of these acts can be constructed.

c) A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts

In the years following Speech Acts Searle pursued (among other things) this goal of establishing a taxonomy. We have seen some of the ways in which different types of illocutionary act vary. By the time Searle was ready to present "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts"²² this list had risen to "(at least) twelve significant dimensions."

Some of these differences seem more and some less significant. They remain, nonetheless, distinct. It is important for our model of understanding that illocutionary force not be seen as different speech acts occupying different positions on a single continuum of force. "What is actually the case," Searle says "is that there are several distinct criss-crossing continua."²³

The trick will be to discern--out of this wealth of differentiation--the relative importance, the interrelationships, and the significances for the task of taxonomy. We will outline Searle's

more developed "continua" because it is the development that is evidenced here that turns a series of observations, and an initial coordination of these observations, (the theory as developed in Speech Acts) into a structured and principled set of conditions for a taxonomy of illocutionary force. We can then turn to the taxonomy he proposes.

The continua are these:

1. Differences in the point (or purpose) of the (type of) act.

An order is an attempt to get the hearer to do something. The point of a description is that it be a representation of something. The point of a promise is that an obligation be undertaken.

These differences correspond to the essential conditions of the Speech Acts analysis, and these form the best basis for a taxonomy (as will be shown).

Searle names this point or purpose of a type of illocution the illocutionary point. Notice it is the point of a type of illocution. Searle is abstracting over a group of different illocutionary forces (request and command, for example, as both having the point of getting the hearer to do something). The illocutionary point, then, is part of the illocutionary force, and common to several/many illocutionary forces.

While the illocutionary force comprises several elements (here being enumerated), Searle believes illocutionary point to be "the most important" with regard to taxonomy.

2. Differences in the direction of fit between words and the world.

Assertions attempt to get the propositional content to match the world. Promises and requests attempt to get the world to match the propositional content.

This matching, Searle calls the direction of fit of the illocutionary act, and it is a consequence of the illocutionary point. Searle proposes to symbolize direction of fit with a downward arrow ↓ when the word has to adjust to the world (word-to-world direction) and an upward arrow ↑ for the world-to-word direction of fit.

3. Differences in expressed psychological states.

One expresses a belief (that p) in an act of stating, asserting and so on. An intention (to do a) is expressed in a promise or a vow. A desire is expressed in an order or directive. Pleasure is expressed in congratulation or welcome.

This is the sincerity condition of Speech Acts, and we recall from that discussion that we are talking about expressing the attitude, state, etc...not actually having it. The act is successful if the state is expressed insincerely.

Searle adds that, essentially, his taxonomy will be built around these three factors:

- illocutionary point
- direction of fit
- sincerity condition

Other factors can be quickly listed:

4. Differences in the force or strength with which the illocutionary point is presented.

"I guess..." and "I solemnly swear..." have the same illocutionary point, but significantly different degrees of strength.

5. Differences in the status or position of the speaker and hearer as these bear on the illocutionary force of the utterance.

A general may order a private to clean a room, but the private is more likely to, if anything, "suggest". This is one of the "preparatory conditions" of Speech Acts.

6. Differences in the way the utterance relates to the interests of the speaker and the hearer.

Congratulations and condolences, for example, relate to the context. Whether or not what is promised or requested is in the "best interests" of the hearer is, as we have already said, a factor in certain illocutionary acts. This, too, is one of the preparatory conditions of Speech Acts.

7. Differences in relations to the rest of the discourse.

"I object..." relates what follows to something of a continuous process. Similarly "I reply", "however", "therefore" and so on.

8. Differences in propositional/content that are determined by illocutionary force-indicating devices.

This is the difference between future and past tense in the cases, respectively, of a prediction and a report.

9. Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts, and those that can be, but need not be, performed as speech acts.

To "declare" one has to declare. But one can estimate or conclude, for example, without saying so.

10. Differences between those acts that require extra-linguistic institutions for their performance and those that do not.

Predicting and promising are linguistic acts that do not seem to require the extra-linguistic institutions that blessing, baptizing and declaring war require.

11. Differences between those acts where the corresponding illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where it does not.

Promising and boasting are both illocutionary acts. The former permits a performative use of the verb, as in the phrase "I hereby promise..." but we do not say "I hereby boast..."

12. Differences in the style of performance of the illocutionary act.

Announcing, preaching and confiding take different styles of performance.

Now that this list is more helpful than that offered in Speech Acts is clear in two ways. First, and less importantly, more factors have been discerned that serve to differentiate illocutionary acts. There is no pretense that the list is complete.

More importantly, this list highlights three of these as possibly able to provide us with a principled system of classification.²⁴ Searle's approach is to take these three--illocutionary point, direction of fit and expressed sincerity conditions--and see where these get us in establishing a taxonomy. Their role as determining principles will be evaluated on the basis of "what is accomplished" by using them.

Representatives. One point/purpose is "to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition."²⁵ In this "type", the assessment of truth and falsity is appropriate.

Symbolically $\vdash \downarrow B(p)$
 where $\vdash$ Frege's assertion sign
 $\downarrow$ word-to-world direction of fit
 B belief (expressed)
 (p) proposition

Note that, in accordance with the definition, B marks a dimension, allowing for gradation in intensity, of belief. For example, there is the difference between suggesting and insisting...

Note further that once we define this class on the basis of illocutionary point we can begin to understand performatives that are assessable in terms of truth and falsity and which are not simply "statements". "Assert" and "complain" for example are representatives (they share the illocutionary point) but they have added features (from the above list of features that differentiate performatives) in that they relate in a special way to the interests of the speaker. "Conclude" and "deduce" also share the illocutionary point, but relate in a special way to the rest of the discourse.

The class of representatives includes most of Austin's expositives and many of his verdictives--all with the same illocutionary point, and all with (among other things) truth conditions.

Directives. The illocutionary point is an attempt to get the hearer to do something. There is a range in intensity, (e.g. suggesting vs. insisting).

Symbolically $! \uparrow W (H \text{ does } A)$

where $!$ marks the directive illocutionary point

$\uparrow$ world-to-words direction of fit

W wish or desire

$(H \text{ does } A)$ propositional content is always that Hearer do Action (future).

Many of Austin's exercitives and some behabitives are in this class: order, command, beg, question, pray, invite, dare, defy, challenge...

Commissives. The point is to commit the speaker (in varying degrees of commitment) to future action.

Symbolically

C ↑ I (S does A)

where

C

commissives

↑

world-to-words

I

intention

(S does A)

proposition

One might like Commissives and Directives, since they have the same direction of fit, to be assimilable under the one category. But promises do not seem to be requests to oneself and requests do not seem to commit the hearer...and so we are left with "the inelegant solution of two separate categories with the same direction of fit."²⁶

Expressives. The illocutionary point is to express a psychological state. The psychological state expressed will be that of the sincerity condition vis-a-vis the subject matter of the propositional content. When I say "I thank you for such a gift," the sincerity condition is gratitude and expressing this gratitude is the point of the utterance.

In this type, there is no direction of fit. There is no attempt to get words to match the world or vice versa.

Symbolically $E \emptyset (P) (S/H \vdash \text{property})$

where E expressive illocutionary point
 $\emptyset$ null symbol for no direction of fit
 (P) variable over possible psychological states
 $(S/H \vdash \text{property})$
 the proposition ascribes some property to S or H

Declarations. This is Austin's original case of where "saying makes it so." A successful declaration brings about "the correspondence between the propositional content and reality."²⁷ When said in the appropriate circumstances, "you're fired" means you are fired. "I excommunicate you" means I excommunicate you. And it is done by virtue of the illocutionary act.

This conventional requirement seems to hold for most declarations.

Note that the saying brings about a two-way direction of fit.

Symbolically $D \updownarrow \emptyset (p)$

where D declarational illocutionary point
 $\updownarrow$ two-way direction of fit
 $\emptyset$ no sincerity condition
 (p) propositional variable

The central point of all of this is that there is a "rather limited number of basic things we do with language."²⁸ The typology is an attempt to understand these things, and how different utterances fit into this scheme.

By way of resumé, we can say that language is used in a variety of ways and we can make some headway, empirically, in categorizing these. The first step in the process is to take the question of the various uses of language to mean "how many kinds of illocutionary acts are there?"

In this way we can put to one side several other uses of language: joke telling, acting, writing poetry...

We now have a fairly good idea just what illocutionary acts are and what their components are. The general form of the illocutionary act is $F(p)$, where F is an illocutionary force and (p) a propositional content. Where there is no propositional content ("Hurray for me!") the form is $F(n)$ where (n) is a name (perhaps understood rather than stated).

There are several types of F . Before categorizing them, we must characterize them. The characteristics of F --the characteristics by virtue of which the F 's may differ--are those listed above (end section "b" and beginning section "c" of the present chapter).

The taxonomy is directed by three of these: the illocutionary point and its two corollaries--the direction of fit and the expressed psychological state.

These features tend to "cluster" illocutionary acts into the five categories described above:

Representatives or Assertives

Directives

Commissives

Expressives

Declarations or Declaratives

We will come back to evaluate the helpfulness and import of this after spending some time looking at Jerrold Katz's fairly different analysis of illocutionary force.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 2

¹ J.R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit., p.18.

² Ibid, p.18.

³ Ibid, p.19. Does this assimilate pragmatics and semantics in speech act theory? See below, chapter 5,b,i.

⁴ Ibid, p.29.

⁵ This tells us to read "propositional act" in the categorizing of speech acts as that part of the illocutionary act that consists in "presenting" (in abstraction from the illocutionary force) the propositional content.

⁶ A variation, where a name replaces the proposition (as in "Damn the torpedos") is $F(n)$.

⁷ J.R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit., p.37.

⁸ Ibid, p.39.

⁹ Ibid, p.40.

¹⁰ P. Grice, "Meaning," in Philosophical Review, 1977.

¹¹ J.R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit., p.43.

¹² Ibid, p.43.

13 Ibid., p.44.

14 What follows is quoted directly because of its special relevance to the debate in Chapter 5, below.

15 J.R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit., p.48.

16 "Defective" parallels Austin's "infelicitous".

17 J.R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit., p.59.

18 Some will in fact later be seen to be manifestations of more general rules.

19 J.R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit., p.66-67.

20 Ibid., p.65.

21 Ibid., p.69.

22 J.R. Searle, Taxonomy, op. cit.

23 Ibid., p.345.

24 Recall that the lack of such a principled system of classification was the central criticism of Austin's attempt at classification. Searle remarks of Austin that only in the case of commissives, for example, is the illocutionary point taken as the basis of definition. The others are identified in terms of fragments of

the other differentiating features from Searle's list of "differences".

²⁵ J.R. Searle, Taxonomy, op. cit., p. 354.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 356.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 358.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 369.

PART II

JERROLD KATZ

Chapter 3. From Chomsky to Katz

a) Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics: "The Standard Theory"

b) The Semantic Component and the Extended Standard Theory

c) Katz on Chomsky on Meaning

CHAPTER 3. FROM CHOMSKY TO KATZ

a) Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics: "The Standard Theory"

The work of Noam Chomsky is often referred to as having occasioned a "revolution" in linguistics. It is a work that is certainly ongoing. But already it is clear that Chomsky has brought new directions to linguistics. Not the least of these is a powerful and explicit contribution of linguistics to the field of philosophy...whence its interest to a study such as this.

In its application to philosophy it shares with Ordinary Language Philosophy of the Austin variety, with Linguistic Analysis, Positivism and other schools and trends the notion that language is somehow key to much (at least) of what goes on in philosophy.

The linguists of the Chomskian tradition (such as Katz) consider that linguistics can add a good deal to philosophy... partly, in fact, because some of the earlier preoccupations with language in philosophy lacked the basis in the scientific study of language that linguistics brings. And so the turn towards a study of language¹ in classifying, and even perhaps solving, philosophical problems is both affirmed and transformed by the work of Chomsky and those who have followed/developed/ altered/taken issue with the content and application he has given to linguistics.

Chomsky has argued that underlying speech performance there are a lot of things and one of these is linguistic competence per se. Linguistic competence is attained by the native speaker of a language on the basis of a rather poor (limited and imperfect) bit of language-learning experience coupled with a powerful inbuilt mechanism for language-learning. One of the things unique about humans is this mechanism--this universal grammar--which underlies and largely shapes specific natural language. Wouldn't it be interesting, Chomsky suggests, to find out all we can about this universal grammar?

Chomsky originally tried to use the conventional methods of structuralist grammar in his study of syntax. The story has often been recounted of his failure to do this and of his subsequent break with structuralism. Such problems as sentences containing unambiguous words and yet having several meanings ("I like her cooking"), the interpretation of internal relations within sentences ("John is easy to please" and "John is eager to please"), the matter of the infinity of possible sentences in a language...these did not seem explicable in structuralist terms.

A more powerful model was necessary, and this began with Chomsky's claim that what we see in the structuralist account of sentences is really just a surface description: lists of names, categories, relations, and a surface description of sentences as they stand when produced. To understand what we really have before us in a finished product (a sentence), we

have to understand something else...the underlying logic of the sentence, or its deep structure.

The notion of a language generating faculty which worked on linguistic elements to transform them, through a series of forms into a final (surface) product could provide both a generative grammar (that would generate all and only the grammatically acceptable sentences of a language) and a transformational grammar...since the end-product is a result of a series of (theoretically explicable) grammatical transformations.

In this way not only are (all real) sentences accounted for but it is also possible to obtain a grammatical description of the (deep and surface) structure of each sentence.

If structuralism took its goal to be the classification of elements from a body of utterances, Chomsky took as his goal--and that of his generative/transformational grammar--the specification of the universal rules that generate sentences and that comprise the speaker's linguistic competence.

This, as a description of syntax, underlines Chomsky's earlier works and in particular Syntactic Structures² of 1957. In the subsequent, more developed, theory (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, 1965)³ Chomsky goes on from this in a hope to explain all grammar...incorporating a more developed syntax (or structural description) into relationships with the sound system (the phonology) and the meaning system (the semantics).

What is still sometimes called the Aspects theory has come to be more generally called the Standard Theory and it underlies what, partly through the influence of Katz and others, has become the Extended Standard Theory and underlies as well Katz's work on illocutionary force. It is important to look briefly at the evolution of the semantic part of the Standard Theory through the changes of the Extended Theory. Upon this, we can see Katz's taking issue with Searle and developing his own study of illocutionary force.

Chomsky, then, gives an introductory portrayal of the three components of a linguistic theory (the syntactic, the phonological and the semantic)⁴, as follows.

It is the syntax of the grammar that specifies a set--an infinite set--of "abstract formal objects", "each of which incorporates all information relevant to a single interpretation of a particular sentence."⁵ That is, since a grammar is capable of generating unique sentences ad infinitum, then each sentence in that infinite series of sentences must be uniquely interpretable.

Syntax provides the "object" which gives this interpretation. And it is an abstract object...incorporating an information base, and a series of transformations which yield the "public" result: a sentence.

The two products, so to speak, of the process of syntax are the phonological and the semantic components. The phonological component determines, in accordance with certain rules,

the phonetic shape of the sentence that has been generated. The semantic component is said to determine the semantic interpretation of the sentence by relating the result of the syntactic component to a "certain semantic representation."

Both the phonological and the semantic components are "purely interpretive." They use the syntactic information to interpret what is going on in a sentence.

Whether we are talking about the surface structure or the deep structure of a given sentence, it is the syntactic component that specifies the structure. "(T)he syntactic component of the grammar must specify, for each sentence, a deep structure that determines its semantic interpretation and a surface structure that determines its phonetic interpretation."⁶ Then, these structures are interpreted: the first by the semantic component; the second by the phonological component.

We will see, when we talk about the syntax/semantics relationship, that there may be problems with this. Suffice for the moment to point out that Chomsky includes in syntax, a lexicon. In this lexicon, each lexical item is specified in terms of its intrinsic semantic features, whatever these may be.

The syntax, as Chomsky characterizes it provides the base component of the message (certain basic strings), and, a series of transformations which turn this component into a sentence. Let us briefly look at how the process works.


The base component is a system of rules. These rules generate a set of what Chomsky calls basic strings of phrases. The structural descriptions of these basic strings are called base Phrase-markers.

So, underlying a sentence there may be quite a series of base Phrase-markers. Each will have been generated by the base, and together they will constitute the basis of the sentence.

The transformational subcomponent operates upon this basis, once generated, and its concern is to generate a sentence out of the basis.

The basis of a sentence constitutes its deep structure. The finally generated sentence yields the surface structure. These two structures are interpreted, as has been said, by the semantic and the phonological components of the grammar.

John Lyons gives this sketch of the operation:⁷



Here we want to concentrate on the role of the semantic element, and on how it has had, in further discussion, to be extended. Then we can see how Katz insists an adequate semantics theory (and "speech act" theory) be founded. His point is not to accept Chomsky uncritically, but to affirm linguistic theory (and, in particular, transformational grammar) as the right place to look for a theory of illocutionary force.

b) The Semantic Component and the Extended Standard Theory.

Is semantics limited to an interpretive function at the level of deep structure?

That is the form the semantic component first took. The lexicon included semantic description (x is + or - animate, + or - female, etc.) And "projection rules" indicated meaning - related acceptable combinations of words within a sentence.

Even that, for a theory of syntax, was an innovation.⁸ But it gradually became clear that semantic contribution to a sentence might not be limited to this, and was in need of a more developed theory.

Katz and Fodor, for example, wanted to pursue such a more developed semantics within linguistic theory.⁹ Their semantics was meant to lead to something systematic in that they "developed an analogy between phonetics and semantics. Just as the phonetic representation is based on a universal

system of phonetic features, so the semantic representation would be based on a universal system of semantic categories, or semantic 'distinctive features'. The universal system is supposed to represent all possible conceptual thought."¹⁰

It is subsequently Katz who "takes the view that a semantic theory in his sense should aim to give a complete characterization of the semantic properties of all utterances of all languages, independent of all extralinguistic considerations--an account of whatever can be expressed in any language, whatever can be thought."¹¹

Chomsky seems willing to go at least part way in this. He agrees that "perhaps" there are such general, universal properties. It is "reasonable to suppose" that some traditional notions like "agent of action", "instrument", "goal" and so on could be part of such a universal semantics. It is also "reasonable to suppose that semantic relations between words like persuade, intend, believe, can be expressed in purely linguistic terms (namely, if I persuade you to go, then you intend to go; if I persuade you that today is Tuesday, then you believe that today is Tuesday. These are facts of language and not of the external world)."¹²

After several other such observations/concessions with regard to what we might be able to express in semantic representation and separate from extralinguistic considerations, Chomsky concludes:¹³

If so, then these aspects of the theory of meaning can be taken to fall within the "generative grammar," understood as the system of rules that specifies our purely linguistic knowledge of the sound and meaning of sentences. I might add that apparently divergent approaches tend to be in fairly close agreement, apart from their terminology, about such conclusions.

This being said, however, Chomsky expresses a deep skepticism concerning the possibility of a Katz-style universal semantics. It is important to understand this skepticism for two reasons. First, his problems are philosophically important and relate directly, as regards the present work, to some matters Searle associates with semantics in his speech act theory.¹⁴ Second, Chomsky and Katz seem to have different interpretations as to where and how their semantic theories diverge.

Chomsky's skepticism in this regard stems from his "doubt that one can separate semantic representation from beliefs and knowledge about the world."¹⁵ These play a part--although it is by no means obvious just what part--in our judgments of meaning and reference. He notes that Katz probably would take his own semantics to be a legitimate idealization of semantic elements independent of external, pragmatic matters.

Chomsky, admitting some force to such an idealization, is not totally convinced. "Whenever concepts are examined with care, it seems that they involve beliefs about the real world..."

(Several have noted) that our use of concepts is set within a system of beliefs about lawful behaviour of objects...thus when we use the terms chair or table, we rely on beliefs concerning the objects to which we refer. We assume that they will not disappear suddenly, that they will fall when they are let go, and so on. These assumptions are not part of the meaning of chair, etc.

"In studying semantics one must keep in mind the role of nonlinguistic systems of belief: we have our expectations about three dimensional space, about texture and sensation, about human behaviour, inanimate objects, and so on. There are many mental organs in interaction."¹⁶

It is true that there are analytic statements and truths which hold purely and simply by virtue of linguistic fact. In the case of the relationship between "I persuaded him to leave" and "He intends to leave" there are intentional semantic properties. Semantic properties that are determined by linguistic rules, Chomsky calls logical form.

But, despite all this, Chomsky believes that too little of what we ordinarily call "meaning" can be understood within the idealization "language".

Now, with this added attention to semantics, Chomsky and others have felt a need to extend the Standard Theory.

In sum, the resultant Extended Standard Theory is this: the base component generates, by way of its rewriting rules, a deep structure into which lexical items are inserted. Semantics

plays an important role here insofar as the thematic relations between the verb and the noun phrases are here defined. It is, however, rules that apply to surface structure that bring in other semantic properties. Co-reference of nouns and pronouns has to do with position in the surface structure. Similarly, the interaction of negatives and quantifiers are not without semantic elements.

Chomsky extends the role of semantics. He allows it a logical form, and he allows that it is intentional. There is just, so to speak, not enough of it. Too much of meaning is extra-linguistic...and involves us in matters of belief, attitudes, etc.

These play a role--a role worth studying--in linguistic behavior. But we don't want, on account of them, to reject the original notion of the idealization of language as a subject matter.

Chomsky goes on to develop this thought in an attempt to do away with the difficulties the semantics occasion.¹⁷ He effectively divides meaning into two components. He removes the broader "meaning" from grammar and places it in an extra-grammar melange of grammar and "other cognitive structures". At the same time the "logical form" component of semantics replaces the fuller semantics in the grammatical theory.

We will conclude this section with a summary of this. EST.¹⁸

Human language is, in many respects, genetically determined. Linguistic theory, including EST, must attempt to characterize this property of human mentality and this is in fact the central goal of universal grammar (UG). Specific grammars conform to UG, but are developed in a variety of ways by virtue of a variety of other factors.

Knowledge of language comes to be represented in the rules of a grammar that conforms to UG. The grammar, in its turn, can give a structural description of each linguistic expression.


The grammar shows us the grammatical competence of a speaker of the language. Such a speaker will also know how to use the language in a variety of ways for a variety of ends, and this knowledge so characterized is pragmatic competence. Both grammatical competence and pragmatic competence are part of one's "attained cognitive state" and both fit into "a richer complex of belief and knowledge."

This is why language use, in the broader sense involves competence systems (grammatical, pragmatic) and performance systems...these latter incorporating the former along with both further cognitive structures and matters of a physical and social nature that influence language use.

Grammatical competence interacts with other cognitive competences and with external (social, physical) factors.

The grammar, as described in the EST "assigns to each sentence a structural description consisting of a representation of each of a set of linguistic levels; specifically, on the level of phonetics, phonology, words, morphemes, higher level syntax, and... 'logical form' (LF)."¹⁹ Chomsky adds: "I use the latter term to refer to those aspects of semantic representation that are strictly determined by grammar, abstracted from other cognitive systems."²⁰

This is schematically represented as follows:²¹



The base rules (B) form the (deep or) initial phrase markers (IPM), upon which the transformational component (T) works to produce surface structures (SS). These are converted to logical forms (LF) by virtue of semantic rules of interpretation (SR-1 which includes thematic relations and others mentioned above). This constitutes the grammar (sentence grammar).

Line 2 of (37) shows the place of the logical forms within the overall cognitive system. Being interpreted by other semantic rules (SR-2) in ways that interact with other cognitive structures, we arrive at "fuller representations of meaning".

c) Katz on Chomsky on Meaning

Katz, while having been very much a part of the tradition and process just described, parts ways with Chomsky on this question of semantics/logical form/meaning. The difference is essentially this: Chomsky divides semantics into logical form (which is a part of grammar) and "meaning" (which is not, although logical form is a part of what constitutes the "meaning"). Katz, for his part, takes semantics to be the study of meaning, meaning to be identical with logical form, and semantics to be part of the grammar. It is true that there are matters external to grammar that affect language use. And these are matters for studies of pragmatics and/or performance.

But these factors are beside the point that semantics is a whole and is situated within the grammar.

The difference between their two positions affect what Katz takes to be central issues in the relevance of linguistics for philosophy (and which will be central to the ensuing chapters of this theses): the relation between logic and linguistics, the nature of logical form in natural languages, and the possibility of formal semantics of natural languages.²²

Katz claims that what Chomsky has done is to divorce meaning from grammar and to take a position "sympathetic to the extensionalist." His own position, on the other hand, is intensionalist. It has been set forth in several places,²³ and is summarized thus:²⁴

The intensionalist position that I have taken holds the following principles. Meaning is the proper subject of study in linguistic semantics. Linguistic semantics is part of grammar. The aim of linguistic semantics is to deepen our pretheoretic understanding of meaning by developing a formal, theoretic account of semantic structure, like that which a grammar gives of phonological and syntactic structure. On such an account, the meaning of a sentence and its logical form are identical. The notion of meaning identified with logical form is thus that aspect of sentence structure responsible for synonymy relations, meaningfulness, ambiguity, redundancy, and other semantic properties and relations in natural language. Linguistics describes the level of the grammatical structure of sentences that determines the application of the laws of logic. Together, linguistics and logic provide an account of the competence which underlies valid inference in natural language.

Katz claims that it is his theory that has the advantage that it accords with our pretheoretical notion of meaning.

His is an intensionalist position--unabashed--and he wonders why Chomsky, who has been so strong an opponent of empiricism and behaviorism, has taken the direction he has with regard to meaning. Katz claims that Chomsky's position now runs

between the agnostic and the skeptical, and that the more recent, more skeptical, position is a fairly active disbelief in the possibility of a universal semantics.

Katz quotes from the Chomsky-Ronat discussion:²⁵

It seems that other cognitive systems...intervene in our judgements of sense and reference...and it is far from clear that it would make sense, even in principle, to try to separate these different elements of...the 'sense of a linguistic expression'.

I believe that ONE CANNOT SEPARATE SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION FROM KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD.

Katz believes he can show a "natural way" of doing just this. He will place semantics within grammar as a study of meaning and will suggest ways of placing both pragmatics and various performance theories outside of but related to grammar. Katz does this in a number of writings on meaning, intensionality and so on. We will get at it through a study of his work on illocutionary force--to bring us back to the central theme of this thesis.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 3

- ¹ See Richard Rorty, The Linguistic Turn. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1967.)
- ² Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Structures. (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1957.)
- ³ Noam Chomsky, Aspects, op. cit.
- ⁴ Katz takes Searle to task on this matter, as Searle seems to want to replace semantic theory with speech act theory. See below.
- ⁵ Noam Chomsky, Aspects, op. cit., p.16.
- ⁶ Ibid., p.16.
- ⁷ John Lyons, Chomsky, Fontana Modern Masters, ed. F. Kermode. (London: Fontana/Collins, 1970.) p.79.
- ⁸ Noam Chomsky, Language and Responsibility. Translation by John Viertel of Dialogues avec Mitsou Ronat. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977.) p.141.
- ⁹ J.J. Katz and J. Fodor, "The structure of a semantic theory," Language 39, pp.170-210. Reprinted in Fodor and Katz, The Structure of Language. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964.)
- ¹⁰ Noam Chomsky, LR, op. cit.; p.141.

¹¹ ibid., p.141.

¹² ibid., p.142.

¹³ ibid., p.142.

¹⁴ That is, what are the semantic aspects of meaning, and what are extra-linguistic factors?

¹⁵ Noam Chomsky, LR, op. cit., p.142.

¹⁶ ibid., p. 143.

¹⁷ Katz refers to the result as REST (Revised Extended Standard Theory). Chomsky himself continues to refer to it as EST where, in Essays in Form and Interpretation he speaks of that book and of Reflections on Language as "falling within" EST. EFL, North Holland Studies in Linguistic Analysis. (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1977.) RL. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975.)

¹⁸ Noam Chomsky, RL, op. cit. and EFL, op. cit.

¹⁹ Noam Chomsky, EFL, op. cit., p.5.

²⁰ ibid., p.5.

²¹ Noam Chomsky, RL, op. cit., p.105.

²² J.J. Katz, "Chomsky on Meaning," Language 56, 1980. p.1.

²³Particularly in Katz's "Logic and Language: An Examination of Recent Criticisms of Intensionalism," in K. Gunderson, ed., Language, Mind and Knowledge. (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1975.)

²⁴J.J. Katz, "Chomsky on Meaning," op. cit., p.1.

²⁵Noam Chomsky, LR, op. cit., p.147-148.

Chapter 4. Katz: Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force

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Chapter 4: KATZ: PROPOSITIONAL STRUCTURE AND ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE

a) Katz on Searle

Because speech act theory and generative grammar theory have been going about their separate ways, and because Katz perceives serious flaws in present speech act theory, and because no generative grammar has yet taken account of the illocutionary force of sentences in natural language, Katz proposes a step in that direction. His book Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force is to be a joining of work on generative grammar with the work being done on illocutionary force... In particular, that of Searle. But it is to be a critical joining, in that Katz sees his extension of semantics as supplanting what he calls the "hybrid" speech act theory of Searle.

A specific task will be to expose Searle's theory as being this "hybrid"... an uncritical mixture of grammar and pragmatics.

Katz takes, as his first step, the delimitation of the field of semantics. It is not easy, within transformational grammar, even to distinguish semantics from the phonological and syntactic components.¹ Katz's specific task is summarized in his referring to an earlier work:² "In order to decide what linguistic phenomena should be represented in a semantic component, we proposed the principle that semantic phenomena were any that fall beyond the phonological and syntactic competence of a fluent speaker (as determined by phonological and syntactic theory)

but short of pragmatics."³

So Katz wants to draw the "upper limit"...the semantics/pragmatics boundary...as well as the other. If pragmatic phenomena are "those in which knowledge of the setting or context of an utterance" contribute to an understanding of a sentence, then semantic competence might be seen in terms of the meaning of the sentence as understood "in itself". That is to say, in abstraction out of any given context. Semantics, as Katz says, deals with the meaning of a sentence in the "null context".

Sentence meaning, then, is the meaning of a sentence in the language. Utterance meaning is the meaning of a sentence (token) in a particular context of utterance. The former is part of the subject matter of semantics. To analyse the latter, we must combine semantics with a study of contextual features in a theory of pragmatics.

Preliminary work on a pragmatic theory--both for its own merits, and to help delineate the field of semantics--runs like this. Pragmatic theory deals with the speaker/hearer's exploitation of the speech context in utterance meaning. Since the meaning may be more or less dependent upon the context, this suggests the metaphor of dimension (of greater and lesser degrees of dependence).

In the null context, sentence meaning is utterance meaning. In Katz's formalization, we take this to be the zero point. From this, we move to points of greater and greater dependency of the utterance meaning upon features of the context. This on

to a limit point in which the meaning is entirely contextual (e.g. codes).

Between the zero point and the limit point, we have interaction of sentence meaning with features of the context to determine utterance meaning. This can be formalized as in (1.16) taking pragmatic theory to be the function PRAG.

$$(1.16) \text{PRAG} (D(S_1), I(C(t))) = \{R_1, \dots, R_n\}$$

$D(S_1)$ is the (full) grammatical description of sentence S_1

$I(C(t))$ Information concerning the context C in which the token t of S_1 occurs that is relevant to t 's utterance meaning.

$R_1, \dots, R_n$ output as a set of readings. The set covers the range of ambiguity of S_1 . Katz proceeds to make the simplifying assumption that $n \leq 1$, so that either $n \neq 1$ means $n = 0$ (S_1 is meaningless in the context) or it means $n > 1$, which we can characterize as the case of equivocation.

The speaker/hearer of a language exploits both grammatical meaning and information about the context. And the resultant utterance meanings "are not equal in information to the grammatical meaning of the sentence that conveys them."⁴

In concluding this first step--the delineation of the field of semantics--Katz adds the following five observations.

1. On his model, it is semantics that is grafted onto phonetics and syntax to complete the grammar, with pragmatics made an independent adjunct. The grammar will supply sentence meaning; pragmatics yields sentence use.

He sees this as significantly different from Searle's conception, in which it is speech act theory...a semantics/pragmatics, meaning/use hybrid, that is grafted onto syntax.

2. Katz sees his model as offering a unification of the ordinary language philosophy and the generative grammar traditions. The one identifies meaning with use, and the other identifies meaning with the speaker/hearer's knowledge of the semantics.⁵ "Our conception of semantics and pragmatics finds these two accounts of meaning reconcilable on the thesis that meaning is the information that determines use in the null context."⁶
3. Further, Katz sees his model as giving a rationale for the competence/performance distinction. Searle, following Austin, sees speech act theory as a theory of action...of performance. And competence, for Searle, means "competence to perform"...irrespective, Katz would claim, of contextual matters. On Katz's model, it is pragmatics that is the performance theory...pragmatics is the performance theory at the semantic level.
4. One of the implications of this has to do with explicit formulas. Austin had said, for example, that in order to make our utterance quite unambiguously performative, "we can make use, in places of the explicit formula, of a whole lot of more primitive devices such as intonation, for instance, or gesture." Further, "and above all, the very context in which the words are uttered can make it entirely certain how they are to be taken."⁷ Here, Katz says, Austin is talking about performative use...not (grammatical) performative meaning.

Within Katz's framework, the explicit formula is "described as the case where the null context suffices for its tokens to perform the speech act."⁸ In the non-explicit formulas, the null context does not suffice.

An important implication of this is that only explicit formulas are taken, in Katz's theory, to be grammatical performatives.

5. Finally, illocutionary force information is to be represented in a grammatical theory of the structure of propositional types. That is, Katz makes the distinction between (1.30) and (1.31):

(1.30) The propositional type of a sentence (on a sense) is the information that determines the type of speech act that a token performs in the null context.

(1.31) The propositional content of a sentence (on a sense) is the information that determines the particular speech act (within the categories specified by its propositional type, and subtypes) a token performs in the null context.

Now, having given this initial semantic/pragmatic distinction, Katz develops this in some remarks on some rival theories... In particular, the work of Searle. Katz considers Searle's work the "most sophisticated and systematic" version of speech act theory, but he has some serious problems with it.

These problems arise not so much out of Searle's Speech Acts (where Katz sees the theory as being rather tentative, and much like his own) but rather from what Katz takes to be Searle's more developed, subsequent formulation in "Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics"⁹ and in "The Rules of the Language Game."¹⁰

It is in "Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics" that Searle makes the claim that generative grammar is a formal system (phonological, syntactic) to which speech act theory is added to account for the speaker's use of sentences in performing speech acts.

The limitations of Chomsky's assumptions become clear only when we attempt to account for the meaning of sentences within his system, because there is no way to account for the meaning of a sentence without considering its role in communication, since the two are essentially connected. So long as we confine our research to syntax, where in fact most of Chomsky's work has been done, it is possible to conceal the limitations of the approach, because syntax can be studied as a formal system independently of its use... But as soon as we attempt to account for meaning, for semantic competence, such a purely formalistic approach breaks down, because it cannot account for the fact that semantic competence is mostly a matter of knowing how to talk, i.e., how to perform speech acts.

The Chomsky revolution is largely a revolution in the study of syntax. The obvious next step in the development of the study of language is to graft the study of syntax onto the study of speech acts.¹¹

This is a major issue for Katz, who, as we have seen, sees semantics as being a part of the grammar and, in its turn, hooking up to a theory of use (the pragmatics). "The crux of the issue is whether there is a system of formal semantics in the grammar, which explicates the ideal speaker/hearer's knowledge of the meaning of sentence types."¹²

And so Katz attempts to rebut Searle's argument against a formal semantics. First, there is Searle's claim that the Chomsky-Katz semantics is uninformative. It gives us a model, Searle says, but it doesn't tell us what semantic skills amount to. "Either it gives us a sterile formalism, an uninterpreted list of elements, or it gives us paraphrases, which explain nothing."¹³

But Searle has no grounds for saying that the formalism is sterile, or that the elements are uninterpreted.¹⁴ In fact, the semantic theory of Chomsky-Katz interprets the formalism very systematically in terms of concepts and propositions. It deals with grouping and formation rules, and is no more formally sterile than is Chomsky's syntactic theory.¹⁵

Furthermore, the formal properties of the readings are misinterpreted if Searle thinks they must, somehow, "resemble" or in themselves "explain" what is formalized. As Katz says, one looks "not in the formal properties of the components but in the informal statements of the metatheory."¹⁶ These statements interpret the formalism.

Searle's second argument against a formal semantics is taken by Katz to be nothing more than a definitional trick. Katz claims that the phrase "semantic competence" is generally understood to mean "the ideal speaker-hearer's knowledge of the meaning of sentence types in the language."¹⁷

Searle defines it¹⁸ as follows: "...a person's knowledge of the meaning of sentences consists in large part in his knowledge of how to use sentences to make statements, ask questions, give orders, make requests, make promises, warnings, etc.... semantic competence is in large part the ability to perform and understand what philosophers and linguists call speech acts."

Katz "exposes" this trick in distinguishing two conceptions of semantic competence.

"semantic competence₁"

the ideal speaker-hearer's knowledge of the meaning of sentence types in the language

"semantic competence₂"

a person's knowledge of how to use sentences to perform speech acts

The former is taken to be the standard use. The latter is Searle's, and might better be called "pragmatic competence". The latter, as has been sketched in the preceding section, is taken by Katz to consist of a theory of pragmatics that include the former (plus whatever is added by the context...).

Searle's view, however, seems to be that there is no such thing as "semantic competence₁". He says that "competence

is ultimately the competence to perform", and for this reason "a study of the linguistic aspects of the ability to perform speech acts is a study of linguistic competence."¹⁹

That is, Searle seems to conflate grammatical and pragmatic competence.

And so Katz suggests that Searle's theory has seemed plausible until now, largely because there has been no sufficiently developed semantic theory to rival it in an account of the illocutionary potential of sentences. Katz proposes to do just that. But first, there are two further points to be made, in connection with Searle, on the necessity of a semantic description of illocutionary force.

Both arise out of this: semantics has developed under the general hypothesis that the meaning of a sentence is a function of the meanings and the compositional relations of its parts.

That being the case, Katz argues, we might reasonably expect performatives as well as nonperformatives to be amenable to semantic description. For example, if we look at semantic entailment:

(1.32) I promised you to see the movie.

From this can be predicted (in an adequate semantics) /

(1.33) The speaker referred to a future act of his own.

(1.34) The speaker undertook an obligation.

Now take

(1.35) I promise you to see the movie.

The only difference between (1.32) and (1.35) is that the tense of the former is past and the latter is present.

The difference does not concern aspects of the predicative meaning in the performative and nonperformative cases... It concerns only "when the action is supposed to occur."

The notion of futurity and of speaker's obligation that are illustrated in (1.33) and (1.34) are part of the lexical meaning of the verb "promise". And since there is no obvious reason to think that performative sentences are not just as compositional in the derivation of their meaning as are nonperformative sentences, we might reasonably expect the sentences (1.32) and (1.35) to have--apart from the difference in tense--the same meaning. And a difference in tense cannot create a difference in lexical meaning.

Katz concludes: "If the lexical meaning of 'promise' makes the same semantic contribution to performative sentences and nonperformatives and both kinds of sentences obtain their meaning compositionally, then a theory that describes the compositional meaning of the one must also describe the compositional meaning of the other."²⁰

The illocutionary rules that cover (1.35) must be part of the same overall semantic hypothesis that describes (1.32).

Finally, if it is true that "performative sentences exhibit the same properties and relations as nonperformative sentences", and that an explanation of these requires that lexical entries of performative verbs "contain significant

aspects of the illocutionary potential" they bring to a sentence, then "semantic theory may claim to be as much about the illocutionary potential of sentences as it is about other aspects of sentence meaning."²¹

It is this, the semantics, that will tell us what a sentence means in the language. A pragmatic theory will tell us what sentences will mean in various contexts.

To conclude this point, Katz returns to Searle. Searle's theory tries to do both the semantic work and the pragmatic work without distinguishing the two. As a matter of fact, this can be illustrated by parcelling out Searle's speech act rules into the two distinct "semantic" and "pragmatic" categories.

For example, promising (from Speech Acts, p. 63):²²

- Rule 1. Pr is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence...T, the utterance of which predicates some future action A of the Speaker S.
- Rule 2. Pr is to be uttered only if the hearer H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A, and S believes H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A.
- Rule 3. Pr is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events.
- Rule 4. Pr is to be uttered only if S intends to do A.
- Rule 5. The utterance of Pr counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A.

Katz suggests that Rules 1, 2, and 5 are appropriate to a lexicon; 3 and 4 are pragmatic principles. In fact, Katz dis-

misses Rule 3 as not applying, and labels Rule 4 of a special instance of a more general rule covering behavioral expectation. Searle, in fact, seems to have intuited this in Speech Acts, where he says (p.63):

Of course, the corresponding sincerity "rules" are not peculiar to this or that game but apply to competitive games generally.

And, again (p.69-70):

...In particular, the non-obviousness preparatory condition runs through so many kinds of illocutionary acts that I think that it is not a matter of separate rules for the utterance of particular illocutionary force indicating devices at all, but rather is a general condition on illocutionary acts...

And Katz takes this as not trivial, in that it is a case of obscuring the true generality of a rule.

b) Some Semantic Theory (Or, "what one has to know about propositional content to understand propositional type.") On this matter, Katz summarizes his theory of propositional content,²³ and summarizes and extends his theory of presupposition.²⁴

1. Propositional content.

Propositional content consists of the two parts, the "condition" and the "term sequence". The condition is the representation of predication. The reading of the predicate concept determines argument places, and the readings in these

argument places are the terms to which the predicate concept applies. The term sequence is the ordering of these terms to match the sequence of the argument places. These terms are characterized by virtue of their semantic role.

All of this happens within the semantic notation of readings. That is, a condition is not a predicate...it is a representation of predication in the notation of readings. Terms are the formulations, in the notation of readings, of semantic roles.

There is a parallel between the notation here used and the notation of predicate calculus. In predicate calculus, predicate constants and individual constants play part of the role of the condition and the terms. But not all, because the notation of semantic markers not only symbolizes an intension but at the same time affords "a description of the logical structure of the intension."

The two symbolisms are geared for two different kinds of things. Katz has argued elsewhere²⁵ for the superiority of semantic representation when it comes to the logical structure of natural languages.

What is impressive is what semantic notation reveals. We begin with (a finite list of) primitive symbols and recursive rules of combination. The symbols are either elementary (representing intensions as logical constants do) or complex (representing in their formal structure, the logical structure of

Intensions.) Primitive symbols may be either simple or complex.

The symbols--whether primitive or derived--are called "semantic markers." This is because their structure parallels that of the phrase markers in the representation of the constituent structure.²⁶ A reading, then, is a set of semantic markers...and is itself a complex semantic marker.

So the reading for "bachelor" in (3.1):

(3.1) Pat is a bachelor.

might be the complex semantic marker { (Physical Object), (Human), (Adult), (Male), (Single) }. Much is revealed. What is designated by the subject falls under the several concepts of the semantic marker. The logical structure of the predicate concept has been revealed to include five independent predications.


It is only by convention that the elementary semantic markers (within ordinary parentheses) are words or phrases in the natural language. But it is a mnemonically useful convention, since the word suggests the concept represented.

The complex markers can be shown as tree structures, with the logical structure of the concept unpacked as the tree branches. The logical relations are revealed both by the bracketing within the structure and by the labels on the nodes.

Katz illustrates this with the semantic marker for (one of the senses of) the English verb "chase".

(3,2)

((Activity)
[NP, S]
(X)
<>



The labels in the tree structure may be either primitive or defined²⁷ semantic markers. They may or may not have categorized variables in them. If they do have categorized variables, those are written slightly below and to the right of the component marker they accompany. Their presence indicates that they "represent argument places of the predicate for which the marker stands."

If we were to want a derived reading for the constituents of the sentence, then these slots would have to be filled, by means of projection rules, by "appropriate" readings. What sort of reading might be appropriate is told us by information above and below and around the categorized variable. That is, above the categorized variable, in square brackets, is syntactic in-

formation telling the projection rule where to look for the reading to be substituted. $[NP, S]$ ²⁸, for example, tells us to "consider the reading of the subject of the sentence," and $[NP, VP, S]$ tells us to consider the direct object. Below the categorized variable in angles $\langle \rangle$ are semantic symbols, which tell the projection rule under what conditions a reading is substituted for the variable. Such rules (this again goes back to Aspects)²⁹ are called selection restrictions.

Around the categorized variable may or may not be heavy parentheses, as: (X) or X. The presence of heavy parentheses indicates that the position is referential.

The general convention of interpretation for the readings follows the two steps of correspondence definitions and interpretive principles. The former state that "some elementary semantic marker is the formal symbol that stands for some concept in the theory."³⁰ The latter state "how the particular formal structures built up out of a set of elementary symbols by the recursive rules for combining them represent the internal structure of a complex concept or proposition."³¹

Now the above has introduced the condition: the reading for a predicate concept. "Chase" is the example used, and the reading is taken to reveal features of the concept. The reading also does something else, namely, shows the argument places of the concept we are talking about. "Chase" has the two argument places that we call "chaser" and "chasee". And so, as a general

rule, the placedness of a predicate concept is taken to be determined "in terms of the number of distinct categorized variables" that are represented in the reading.

The terms that take the argument places are the terms of the term sequence which, along with the condition, are the representation of propositional content.

The terms that can occur in those argument places are categorized in terms of semantic roles. And whereas Fillmore, for example, adopted a case approach to semantic roles, Katz adopts what he calls a relational approach. While it was Fillmore who raised the issue of semantic roles, Katz considers Fillmore's "case grammar"³² to be based upon a misunderstanding of how grammatical roles function in syntactic theory, ...and specifically in Chomsky's Aspects model.³³

Fillmore presumes that definitions of grammatical relations in an Aspects-type grammar are meant to directly predict semantic roles. Since it cannot in these terms adequately distinguish the roles "subject of" and "direct object of" (among other things), Fillmore decides the Aspects grammar is inadequate.

But Katz argues that the Aspects generalizations about syntactic relations among sentence constituents were meant to be sufficiently abstract to combine with the lexical readings whenever semantic considerations come into play. Katz insists that it is entirely consistent with Aspects grammar to include the "inherent meaning of lexical items" in a discussion of semantic roles.

More than that. The point is that semantic roles "have to be represented at the semantic level." This is the only way to take account of the lexical entries.

So, Katz proposes relational definitions that are modelled on Chomsky's grammatical relations.³⁴ They are specified, in the semantic markers, in terms of a configuration of symbols. We will look at the most pertinent examples.

Agent. Characterized by Fillmore and others as "the animate instigator of the action." "Assuming that this is correct, we have to explicate this concept in terms of formal features of readings, and to do this so that the explication will permit us to predict which of its constituents, if any, is the agent."³⁵ For example, it will have to differentiate

- (3.41) John killed a fly.
- (3.42) John chased Mary.
- (3.43) Mary slapped John.

where the agent is identified with the subject, from

- (3.44) John received a slap.
- (3.45) Mary suffered an insult.

where agent and subject are not identified.

Now although Katz is aware of the unfinishedness of this theory, he proposes that the intuitive concept of agentiveness can be picked out if we look at readings for action verbs... looking for the specification of such informal notions as "animate", "instigator", "action".

This is usually represented as in the label for the top-most node in (3.2):³⁶

((Activity),)

[NP, S]

(X)

<>

This associates an (Activity) with the topmost categorized variable.

"Animate" (or, perhaps preferably "sentient") would be specified in the reading that substitutes for this variable...by means of a selection restriction which contains the semantic marker (Living).

So far so good. We have looked at Katz's portrayal of propositional structure per se. That is, at the condition, and at the (term sequence of) semantic roles.

There is, however, more than this to propositional structure... and this is to be revealed in a theory of presupposition.

ii. Presupposition

The theory of presupposition begins with Frege. "On Sense and Reference"³⁷ is, in Katz's terms, "an attempt to explain the notion of the application of a predicate to a term sequence."³⁸ Developed only for assertions, Frege's theory "says that the terms pick out the objects or sets of objects that the proposition is about, the predicate expresses a concept, and the application of the predicate concept embodies the assertion that the objects picked out have the property or bear the relation in question."³⁹

The statement is true when the terms successfully refer and the objects referred to have that property or bear that relation.

- 4) The notion of presupposition can be extended beyond assertives to all propositional types. This is to be developed further to; as Katz says, "combine the Fregean conception of presupposition with an adaptation of Austinian conditions on the uses of sentences to perform speech acts."⁴⁵ It is not just a description but a formal explanation that Katz seeks: "formal explanations of how the presuppositions of sentences derive compositionally⁴⁶ from the meaning of their parts."⁴⁷

Before moving on to this, we must note a distinction between two kinds of definition⁴⁸ that are used:

structural definition - a definition that "explicates the structure of a semantic property or relation in a way that permits us to identify instances of it on the basis of their exemplifying the structure."⁴⁹

interpretive definition - a definition that "interprets exemplifications of a semantic property or relation in logical terms."⁵⁰

Structural definitions, then include such meaning structural definitions as semantic anomaly being the case of the absence of a reading, ambiguity being the case of two (or more) readings, analyticity, and so on. Structural definitions also include reference structural definitions. X is the reference of W is defined such that for every marker M in the reading for W, X has the property represented by M.

The interpretive definitions, in a sense, "follow" the structural definitions, ... and explain the logical significance of the properties and relations that have been described. So, the interpretive definition of semantic anomaly is simply that such sentences do not express a proposition, and so cannot enter into deductive relationships with other sentences. The interpretive definition of ambiguity says that a sentence declared ambiguous expresses more than one proposition, and can enter into more than one set of logical relations. And so on.

The account of presupposition requires both kinds of definitions. It must be said just how important this becomes in Katz's theory of propositional structure and illocutionary force. Katz--and he places himself in the Fregean tradition in this--has already said that it is the satisfaction of the presupposition that makes a referring sentence a (true or false) statement.

But we are involved in a study not just of assertives but of other propositional types as well. We will, then, have to understand the role of presupposition in these other types. We will have to be able to characterize whatever properties correspond to statementhood in these types. So Katz proposes to develop formally the notion of presupposition.

We begin, then, with an approximation of a structural definition (3.60).⁵¹

- (3.60) (I) A proposition P has a presupposition just in case there is at least one referring term in P.
- (II) The presupposition of a proposition P is the requirement that each referring term in P has its appropriate designation.

And this, still restricted to assertions, suggests the interpretive

definition (3.61):

- (3.61) The presupposition of an assertive proposition P is the condition under which P makes a statement, that is, under which P is a truth or a falsehood.

Now, to cover the non-assertives, Katz argues, it is not enough simply to extend this to something like (3.68):⁵²

- (3.68) The presupposition of the proposition P is the condition under which a sentence expressing P succeeds in performing (in the null context) the illocutionary act of the kind for which its propositional type qualifies it.

This cannot be done because "although in the case of assertives the presupposition of a proposition is the illocutionary success condition, in non-assertives the presupposition is not the whole illocutionary success condition."⁵³ The presupposition is a necessary but not a sufficient condition.

Katz takes this as a second aspect of the constative/performative distinction. "Not only do performatives not state anything, so that they are not true or false, their presupposition is, though necessary, not a sufficient condition for their illocutionary success."⁵⁴

So the question of presupposition broadens into one of illocutionary success condition.

c. Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force.

1. The Constative Side: The Concept of the Assertive Type

It is clear that Katz wishes to re-instate Austin's earlier distinction between the constative and the performative.

Two broad distinctions have just been mentioned. One might be forgiven a little uneasiness if these are meant to show a special quality of split between assertives and "all the rest". First, it has not been argued that truthfunctionality affords such a split, rather than being just one of several conditions of satisfaction.

And second, presupposition is a necessary condition of only some assertives. It is not, for example, a part of generic sentences like (3.78)-(3.80):⁵⁵

(3.78) Cows eat grass.

(3.79) A black hole exerts tremendous gravity.

(3.80) The man of perfect virtue is deceitful when it is to his advantage.

These make assertions whether or not there are cows, black holes, and so on. The truth conditions are intensional rather than extensional, and presupposition is not a factor.

And so if we ask "Do black holes exert tremendous gravity?" presupposition is neither necessary nor sufficient for illocutionary success.

We will, at any rate, pursue Katz's program in his terms... dealing only with assertives with extensional truth conditions. We will summarize his presentation of assertives... then his sketch of requestive and other performatives.

Propositional type is that about a proposition which determines the illocutionary act. It is the propositional type that makes the following, respectively, an assertion, a question, a request and a promise.

(4.1) Someone will drink the wine.

(4.2) Who will drink the wine?

(4.3) Drink the wine!

(4.4) I promise to drink the wine.

"The propositional type determines illocutionary potential by converting the condition of the propositional content into what we shall call a 'converted condition'."⁵⁶

The notion of "condition" then is extended such that, when the condition actually appears as part of the proposition, it is there as a converted condition...having been converted by virtue of the propositional types.⁵⁷ In the above examples, then, the converted conditions are the truth condition, the answerhood condition, the compliance condition, and the fulfillment condition.

The term "converted condition" simply stands for the abstraction covering the particular cases of conversion.

And note that it is an interaction between propositional type and propositional content that yields these conversions.

Now one of the things that can be asked of a converted condition is: what must be the case for this to be a statement... or a question, or a request, and so on? What "counts" for a statement to be judged true? What sorts of things count as

replies to questions or compliance with requests?

What tells us the answer to these questions is the illocutionary success condition.⁵⁸

Now Katz wants to begin his explication of propositional type by looking at the notion of assertive type. Given what we have just seen, the explication will have to include the information necessary to show the conversion of the unconverted condition of an assertive like (4.1) into the (converted) truth condition. The result will constitute the form of the assertive component.

It is here that the work done on propositional content comes into play. We have the (unconverted) condition, which as a predicate with a complex structure, is revealed in the semantic marker notation. We have the referring terms that are associated with the argument places of the unconverted condition...one to each distinct categorized variable. And we have the projection rule that both forms the readings that appear at times, and makes the substitution of the readings for the categorized variables.

When we look at this complex in the light of the core concept of assertiveness: "roughly, the attributing of something to something", we see that "assertions are composed of subassertions." And "each... (of these) coincides with an entailment of the proposition."⁵⁹

If we add to this the temporal and quantificational parameters of assertion, we will then be able to formalize the concept of the assertive type.

It is simply the case that attribution is over a certain extension of a term and at (over) a certain time. This is formalized in (4.10):

$$(4.10) \quad ((\text{Satisfies}) \begin{matrix} [Q_n] \\ X \\ \langle \rangle \end{matrix} \text{ of DES } (t_i), c_1^1, \dots, c_k^1 \begin{matrix} [T] \\ X \\ \langle \rangle \end{matrix})$$

This reads that some quantity (Q_n) of the designata (DES) of a term (t_i) satisfies the property or relation concept(s) $c_1^1, \dots, c_k^1$ at some specific time (T).

Since (4.10) represents only the one term (t_i) of a term sequence, we can expand the formula through n -terms with the help of a logical conjunction $\&$, as (4.40):

$$(4.40) \quad (((\text{Satisfies}) \begin{matrix} [Q_{n_1}] \\ X \\ \langle \rangle \end{matrix} \text{ of DES } (t_1), c_1^1, \dots, c_k^1, \begin{matrix} [T^1] \\ X \\ \langle \rangle \end{matrix}) \& \dots \& \\ ((\text{Satisfies}) \begin{matrix} [Q_{n_n}] \\ X \\ \langle \rangle \end{matrix} \text{ of DES } (t_n), c_1^n, \dots, c_m^n, \begin{matrix} [T^n] \\ X \\ \langle \rangle \end{matrix}))$$

With this, we can claim that "the truth conditions for a proposition is the logical sum of the truth condition associated with each of its terms".⁶⁰ And, as a structural definition of the notion of assertive proposition, Katz offers (4.41):

(4.41) A proposition P is assertive in type just in case one of the members of the reading of P is an instance of (4.40) in which each of the variables is replaced by appropriate readings.

This can fit the standard Aristotelian conception of truth, as follows:

(4.42) The proposition P is true just in case P is assertive, the presupposition of P is satisfied, and the objects satisfying the presupposition have the properties and bear the relations expressed in the condition of P at the time and in the numbers indicated.

(4.43) The proposition P is false just in case P is assertive, the presupposition of P is satisfied, and the objects satisfying the presupposition do not have all the properties or bear all the relations expressed in the condition of P at the time and in the numbers indicated.

Assertiveness, then, converts the unconverted condition into the specific converted condition called the truth condition, and it converts the presupposition into a condition for statementhood.

II. The Performative Side: The Distinction and the Concept of Requestive Propositional Type

Katz returns to the question of whether there can be a general distinction between the constative and the performative types. He proposes to pick one performative type--the requestive--and compare it with the assertive to see whether any sort of general distinction takes shape.

Note the two statements (5.3) and (5.4):

(5.3) I request that you chase the dog.

(5.4) I (Sally, they, and so on) requested (will request, and so on) that you chase the dog.

We will look first at sentence (5.4) to hypothesize concerning its truth conditions, and to work toward a lexical account of the word "request".

The embedded sentence "you chase the dog" is taken to come from "chase" and its lexical constituents, and is taken to describe an action (or inaction). If we term this action "A", we can make the following hypothesis about the truth condition of a sentence like (5.4), namely (5.5):


- (5.5)
- (i) That the agent (the speaker, Sally, and so on) produced an event having the form of communication.
 - (ii) That the agent produced this event with the intention of communicating to someone (the addressee).
 - (iii) That the utterance meaning of the event is a proposition.
 - (iv) That the propositional content of this proposition, in part, describes the action A.
 - (v) That the agent of A is the requester (the person of whom the request is made).
 - (vi) That the temporal specification for A puts it after the speech point specification for the request.
 - (vii) That the purpose of the agent's producing the event was to get the requestee to perform A.
 - (viii) That the addressee (the recipient in the agent's action in producing the communication) and the requestee are not necessarily the same.

Certain explanatory remarks are offered. For example, in (5.5) (i), the request can be made without being received. That is, it has the form of a communication, but there are ways of the addressee's not getting the message. And yet the request remains a request.

Still, as in (5.5) (ii), the agent's intention includes the notion of an addressee.

Now when this (5.5) is formalized, the result is (part of) a lexical reading for "request". Recall that we have been looking at a very straightforward assertive use of the word.

The lexical reading will contain a semantic marker of the same type as (3.2) (above, p.124). Namely, (5.14):



Note: 1) All but one of the categorized variables have the selection restriction that the relevant readings must contain the semantic marker (Sentient). The exception is the categorized variable in the place of what is requested.

- 2) The three occurrences of (Act) and the two occurrences of (Proposition) are understood as marking the same act and the same proposition. This is not the case with (Achievement)...there being both a comprehension and a compliance achievement. So we need, among the interpretive conventions for semantic markers, the coincidence convention:

(5.15) Whenever a semantic marker (M) contains two or more occurrences of the same component semantic marker, these occurrences are to be taken as standing for the same concept in the sense represented by (M) just in case no two of these occurrences have different subtrees.

- 3) (5.5) (vi) makes a distinction between the purpose of an act and the purpose (intention) of its agent. The purpose of the act is formalized as in (5.14); the intention in (5.16).

(5.16) (((Purpose.) (Act).)

[NP, S])

(X)

<(Sentient)>

- 4) We don't yet have a syntactic categorization for "addressee" (as differentiated from "requestee").

Now we have to remark on the question of reference as it applies in (5.14). If the reading of an embedded sentence is assigned to the main verb of the matrix sentence, we might end up with (referential) presuppositions we don't want, as in (5.24).

(5.24) John requested that you introduce him to the king of France.

Clearly there has to be an application of what Katz calls the heavy parentheses wipe-out rule (3.85).⁶¹ This is done by adding the condition (5.25) to the wipe-out rule.

(5.25) (3.85) applies to any heavy parentheses in a reading dominated (by) a semantic marker such as (Purpose) and (Intention).

By virtue of this, the statementhood of (5.24) does not depend upon the successful reference of the indirect object.

Furthermore, as Katz will go on to argue, "the lexical reading of every performative verb is similar to 'request' in containing such an occurrence of (Purpose), (so that) (5.25) automatically provides an explanation of the frequently noted fact that the meaning of the complement of a performative verb in a sentence like (5.24) does not contribute to the presupposition of the sentence."⁶²

Finally, we look at the representation of tense. Our assumption has been that the notion of futurity as regards "request" has to do with the meaning of the verb "request" together with the tense constituent of the matrix sentence.

It has nothing to do with the complement sentence, as

- (5.26) (I) Sally requests that you be a voter.
(II) Sally requested that you chase it.
(III) I requested that you have a swim.

We capitalize on the fact that the notions of effort and success--part of the concept of the purpose of a request--"are a species of cause and effect and as such inherently ordered in time."⁶³ Thus (5.27):

- (5.27) (i) (Effort)
 |
 [Tense, Aux., Pred. Phrase, S]
 (X)
 <>
- (ii) (Success)
 |
 [Tense, Aux., Pred. Phrase, S]
 (X /t(tn))
 <>

So, in the example (5.28):

(5.28) I request that you do it.

the matrix tense is present simple and the reading is the semantic marker (t⁽⁰⁾). Thus,

- (5.29) (i) (Effort)
 |
 (t⁽⁰⁾)
- (ii) (Success)
 |
 (t^(tn))

The illocutionary act is at the speech point, and the action requested is to be performed at some unspecified number of units beyond the speech point. These are seen, as was mentioned, as a species of cause and effect.

We might note, in this discussion, that Searle's non-obviousness preparatory rule⁶⁴ (to the effect that 'it is not obvious that the action will be performed anyway') is absent

from Katz's account. That is because it is one of the rules that Katz counts as pragmatic.

Within Searle's framework "that makes no distinction between semantics and pragmatics, oddities cannot be separated into conceptual anomaly, on the one hand, and situational inappropriateness, on the other."⁶⁵

Katz claims that this case is obviously pragmatic, and that it can be seen as obvious "once we note that such oddity disappears when the requestor is attempting to influence the requestee's reasons for performing the action."⁶⁶

Let us look at Katz's example:⁶⁷

For example a student might be sure to visit some friends in New York over the Christmas vacation and this may be obvious to both the student and the host (both know the student cannot stand staying around the empty campus during holidays, both know the student makes a practice of such visits, and so on) but nonetheless this knowledge does not make the host's asking the student to visit for the holidays an odd request...The request to the lonely student is issued in order that a request can be part of the student's real or apparent reason for acting, and this provides encouragement of the sort that makes the requestee feel wanted and not feel he or she is imposing. This is the point of the request.

Katz extends this criticism to nonobviousness conditions in general. "Promise", for example:⁶⁸

It may be perfectly obvious that I shall send your books to you--they are cluttering up my house; I can't stand to look at so many theological books; and moreover, the university has offered to pay the postage. Nonetheless, there is nothing odd about my promising you that I shall send them. I may do this because I know you wish to have a formal commitment on my part (because, say, you have sold some of them on the condition that you would get my promise.)

Katz has two criticisms here. One is that Searle and others confuse obviousness with pointlessness. This confusion is supposed to have been revealed by the above examples, in conjunction with a pragmatic Gricean notion of pointlessness. Grice's "maxim of relation", to the effect that contributions to a conversation be relevant, is taken as a prohibition against pointlessness.

The second criticism is that no such condition as obviousness can be "a necessary condition on the performance of illocutionary acts like requesting or promising, and therefore, none can be part of the meaning of such performative verbs."⁶⁹ In his examples he talks of pointlessness, saying sentences like (5.30) (i) and (5.30) (ii) "would be inconsistent if

nonpointlessness were a necessary condition."

- (5.30) (i) The man requested that the child buy the candy but his request was completely pointless.
- (ii) I made a pointless promise in promising to send the books.

Also, (5.31) (i) should be anomalous, and (5.31) (ii) analytic.

- (5.31) (i) It is not that I don't believe you will do it, but, just for the record, I request that you do it.
- (ii) John's request was not something that the requestee would do anyway in the normal course of events.

Katz says that the first two are not inconsistent, the third not anomalous and the fourth not analytic. So obviousness cannot be a necessary condition on the performance of the illocutionary acts of requesting and promising.

We are now in a position to give a structural definition of "requestive proposition"...after which we will turn to an account of "performative proposition".

- (5.32) A proposition P is requestive just in case P is performative and the propositional content of P has the form (5.14) except that the categorized variables are replaced by their values.

Now, recall

- (5.3) I request that you chase the dog.
- (5.4) I...requested...that you chase the dog.

These differ only in the nonperformativeness of the latter. The latter is true in just the situation in which the former is

used. (5.5)⁷⁰ expressed the illocutionary success conditions for the requestive, and this is clearly more complicated than the success conditions for making an assertive...namely, the satisfaction of the presupposition. The requestive requires not only the satisfaction of its presupposition, but also the satisfaction of its unconverted condition (communication; form of a proposition; future oriented, and so on). So we have (5.33):

- (5.33) The illocutionary success condition for a requestive proposition P is that P's presupposition be satisfied, and the sequence of objects that satisfies this presupposition also satisfies the unconverted condition of P.

Coupled with (4.5) and (4.6), we obtain the principles:

- (5.34) A sentence expressing an assertive proposition P performs (in the null context) the illocutionary act of stating if its presupposition in the sense of (3.106)⁷¹ is satisfied.
- (5.35) A sentence expressing a requestive proposition [one whose reading meets (5.32)] P performs (in the null context) the illocutionary act of requesting if its presupposition in the sense of (3.106) is satisfied and the objects satisfying it also satisfy the unconverted condition of P.

Now (5.33) can be extended, by virtue of the parallels in (5.36), to all performatives...as we see in (5.37) and (5.38):

- (5.36) (i) I promise you to go; Sally promised you to go.
 (ii) I warn you to go; Sally warned you to go.
 (iii) I apologize to you for going; Sally apologized to you for going.

- (5.37) The illocutionary success condition for a performative proposition P is that P's presupposition be satisfied, and that the sequence of objects that satisfies this presupposition also satisfies the unconverted condition of P.
- (5.38) A sentence expressing a performative proposition P performs (in the null context) the illocutionary act for which its propositional type qualifies it if its presupposition in the sense of (3.106) is satisfied and the sequence of objects that satisfies the presupposition also satisfies the unconverted condition of P.

Finally, the converted condition of such requestive propositions is a compliance condition. In the same way in which the truth condition of the assertive has a companion falsehood condition, so the compliance condition has a companion non-compliance condition. "If the illocutionary success condition is satisfied, no matter what the requestee does, the request that the proposition makes is either complied with or not."⁷² In such a case, either the compliance condition or the noncompliance condition is satisfied.

Further, a request is complied with, not simply because the requestee behaves "in a way that counts as a case of the act requested" but, further, that the performance is "at least in part for the reason that the requestor's communication had the purpose of getting the requestee to perform the act."⁷³

So a compliance condition may be defined as (5.39):

- (5.39) The compliance condition for a requestive proposition P is that (a) there is a requestee... (b) the requestee's behavior falls under the concept represented by the reading that substitutes for [VP, S, VP, S] in the instance

X
(State)

of (5.14) in the reading of P, and (c) the requestee behaves this way in part because it was the purpose of the request issued by the use of P to get the requestee to behave this way.

And noncompliance:

- (5.40) The noncompliance condition for a requestive proposition P is that at least one of the conditions (a)-(c) in (5.39) fail.

iii. The Competence Concept of Performativeness

We want now to draw a distinction between constatives and performatives. Katz claims that Austin blurred his initial constative/performative distinction in subsequent explication, because of a blurred competence/performance distinction.

In "How To Do Things With Words", Austin considers and then rejects a grammatical distinction for performative utterances. It seemed natural to Austin to expect performative utterances to be first-person singular, present indicative, active sentences...and when it became clear that there were obvious exceptions to this, he concluded that there could be no purely grammatical criteria.⁷⁴

Austin then decided that this "first person" is a person who is "uttering" something, and thereby performing an action. "There is something which is at the moment of uttering being done by the person uttering."⁷⁵

Study of the performative became part of the theory of action. And Katz claims that this move "was largely due to the

limitations of the grammar which he had to work with and the absence of a competence/performance distinction."⁷⁶

"It is the conception of traditional, surface structure-oriented grammar rather than the idea of a purely grammatical criterion of performativeness that is mistaken."⁷⁷

The counter examples which forced Austin back from a grammatical to a "theory of action" account of performativeness, do not trouble a transformationalist, semantic account.

With the theory framed in this way, Austin's syntactic terms become the semantic terms, as:

<u>Austin</u>	<u>Katz</u>
first-person singular	agent reading
present tense	speech point reading
indicative action sentence	action proposition reading

Thus, the structural definition of performativeness:

- (5.41) A proposition P is performative (that is, non-assertive) just in case (i) the reading of P contains a semantic marker of the form (4.40)⁷⁸ and also a semantic marker representing the propositional content of P either having the form shown in (5.14)⁷⁹ or one exactly like it except for some other semantic structure under (Purpose), (ii) the agent reading in the reading of P represents the concept of the speaker of the use of the sentence expressing P at the time specified in the temporal designation associated with the component semantic marker (Act), and (iii) the temporal designation associated with (Act) is (t⁰), and (iv) each of the other categorized variables are replaced with their values.

At this point, Katz remarks that the main reason for a fixed constative/performative distinction is Austin's observation "that it makes no sense to attribute truth or falsehood to

performatives."⁸⁰ And he adds that this has been disputed only without success.⁸¹

Now there are further Austin/Searle "corrections" to be made before turning to a typology. For example, negative sentences like

- (5.78) (i) I do not request that you go.
- (ii) It is not the case that I request you to go.
- (iii) I make no promise to go.
- (iv) It is not the case that I promise to go.

are supposed, by Searle, to be performatives. But since he gives no reasons, and since such sentences can be true or false, Katz takes Searle's supposition to be wrong.

A similar claim arises in the case of modals.

(5.79) I might request you to do it.

(5.80) It is possible that I would request you to do it.

The word that determines the overall logical form is not the performative but, in the first case, the antonymy operator, and in the latter, the modal.

This logical shift renders the total speech act non-performative. That is to say constative...perhaps a prediction.

It is also the case of course that explicit performatives like (5.102)

(5.102) I insist that you are guilty.

can be used as a constative. It is their semantic structure--their use in the null context--that has us treat them as performatives. But contrary to some arguments, including some of Austin's counter-examples, they are not at the one time both performative and constative. They are performatives, which can be used as constatives.

So, when Austin says "when we come to pure explicit performatives such as 'state' or 'maintain', surely the whole thing is true or false even though the uttering of it is the performing of the action of stating or maintaining" he is wrong. And he is wrong because of his failure to discriminate between use in a null-context and use in a non-null context...which is an example of his failure to make the competence/performance distinction.

In a further attempt to distinguish constatives from performatives, Katz tries the following. Take (5.105) and (5.106):

(5.105) I claim that George is a spy but he isn't.
 state
 acknowledge
 admit
 concede
 insist

(5.106) George is a spy but he isn't.

Katz says that (5.106) is a flat contradiction whereas (5.105) is not. This part of his portrayal of the difference between constatives and performatives, then, has to do with their ways of failing.

He suggests that what we have here is "a contrast between a propositional contradiction and a pragmatic oddity."⁸²

d) Prospects for a Theory of Propositional Type.

Here, in turning to other performatives, Katz's primary interest is to develop a classificational principle. A secondary interest will be the philosophical significance of this.

i. Classifying Performative Types.

When Austin could not find the classification principle in grammar (as we have just noted), he sought it in speech. But the purity of performatives was lost in actual speech, and so instead of a clear dichotomy of performatives and constatives, we find instead "more general families of related and overlapping speech acts."⁸³

Katz's principle will be based on the "purity of performatives", and the "dichotomy of performatives and constatives". "Instead of concerning speech behavior, as does Austin's classification of acts into Verdictives, Exercitives, Commissives, Behabitives and Expositives", Katz says, "our classification concerns the grammatical structure of sentences."⁸⁴

Now, Searle's revision of Austin accepts the concern with acts. In fact he takes Austin further along these lines. Searle writes:⁸⁵

The first thing to notice about Austin's categories is that they are not classifications of illocutionary acts but of English illocutionary verbs.

This is construed as criticism. And Searle goes on to say that the major failing of Austin's scheme is that "there is no consistent principle of classification."

But, Katz asks, what of Searle's own classification? His revision in "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts" is but a "slightly modified version" of that found in Speech Acts. And, Katz claims, it "fails to satisfy the requirement, whose importance Searle rightly stresses, that an adequate classification of illocutionary types be based on principles."⁸⁶ Searle presents the following:

Illocutionary Type	Classification			
	Illocutionary Point	Direction of Fit	Psychological State	Propositional Content
Representatives	T	↓	Believe	P
Directives	I	↑	Want	H does A
Commissives	C	↑	Intend	S does A
Expressives	E		(P)	S/H + property
Declarations	D	↓		P

Now, although these classifications are based upon "important conceptual distinctions", Katz claims that "there is no comprehensive doctrine that determines in general the kind of conceptual

distinctions that can be used to characterize illocutionary types and the kind that can be used to characterize their subtypes. There is nothing to prevent Searle from introducing any new conceptual distinction that may seem to describe a difference among illocutionary acts."⁸⁷

Katz wants to look for a classificational principle, and he wants to look for it in semantic structure. Look back at the requestive. This was characterized in terms of the semantic marker (5.14).⁸⁸ Performativeness was defined in (5.41)⁸⁹ such that the unconverted condition have the semantic structure of the left-hand branch. What varies is that under the branch headed (Purpose).

"Assuming that the reading of the unconverted condition of every other performative proposition is like the reading for 'request' in having two major branches, one of which describes the nature of the act and the other its purpose, we conjecture that...the information that determines the type of a performative proposition is that represented in the second major branch. Informally, the principle is that the purposes of illocutionary acts and these alone determine the types of illocutionary acts."⁹⁰ Formally,

- (6.1) The second of the two major branches in the reading whose first major branch marks a proposition P as performative, that is, the branch of the form ((Act)...)-(Purpose)-..., specifies the type of P. The full set of such semantic structures determines the categories in the classification of performative types.


- (6.2) The subtypes of a particular performative type T are specified by the semantic markers occurring as the predicate functions applied to the semantic markers in the structure determining T.



Katz proceeds to set up some parts of this classification. Austin lumped together the acts of warning and advising with requesting and ordering. But Searle is right (in Speech Acts, at least) in saying that advice is not a kind of request. Katz proceeds to distinguish Requestives ("request", "order", "command", "urge", and so on) from Advisives ("warn", "advise", "suggest", and so on).

Then the principle (6.1) will represent the difference between the two types, and the corollary (6.2) will distinguish the subtypes.

(5.14) has shown the lexical reading for "request".

(6.7) is a hypothesis about the lexical reading for "advise" (the second major branch only...)






Other advisive verbs contain more; for example, the notion that there might be danger in certain choices:

(6.8) I warn you not to stick your nose into other people's business.

This can be formally represented in the same lexical reading as (6.7), "but with the semantic marker (6.10) or something similar attached directly under the semantic marker (Best Choice) in (6.7).



The "A/..." is the antonymy operator, and it says that any choice is better than the one specified. This yields Negative Advisives as a subtype of Advisives.

So, if performative types are to be distinguished one from the other on account of differences of purpose, then it seems reasonable to look for subtypes to be determined by the shades of difference within each "kind" of purpose.

Not that every semantic difference between verbs occasions a new subtype. There will have to be a principle--which Katz is not ready to formulate--a principle "to determine which kinds of information about purpose create new subtypes and which kinds merely create new performative verbs."⁹¹

II. Further Definitions and Classifications

We have been talking about advisives, and we can now define them:

- (6.12) A proposition P is advisive just in case P is performative and the propositional content of P has the form (6.7) except that the categorized variables are replaced by the appropriate values.

We now look for a moment at two subtypes of the Requestive: Erotetics and Provocatives.

The verb "ask" is ambiguous:

- (6.13) She asked.

- (6.14) She asked, but he flatly refused to do it.

- (6.15) She asked, and he answered her question.

In (6.14), "ask" means to request something. In (6.15) "ask" is synonymous with "ask a question". It remains a request: it is a request for an answer. But since it is much more specific than requests generally, we introduce the Erotetic Requestive.

The reading for the erotetic sense of "ask" will consist of an elaboration of the second major branch of (5.14).

Provocatives, like the word "dare", request that someone try something in order to show that he can do it.

Another performative type is the Expressive.

- (6.31) (i) I thank you for giving me such a nice present.
 (ii) I congratulate you on your win in the chess match.
 (iii) I apologize to you for missing our appointment.

Katz says that these "performative propositions are defined in terms of the purpose of making the recipient aware (causing the recipient to realize) that the agent feels a certain way."⁹² He goes on to add that the agent feels this way "about something the recipient has done (or played a role in the doing of or is affected by)", and that part of the purpose is "attaining the goal of adequately compensating the recipient for the debt consequently incurred."⁹³


This latter is not commonly taken to be part of the purpose of the Expressive type, and, Katz says, "requires explanation". He limits his explanation to the three examples of (6.31), in which, he argues, some construal of effort spent,


honour due, and hurt done can be said to occasion payment of compensation by the speaker,

And he offers the definition (6.33):

(6.33) A proposition P is expressive just in case P is performative and the propositional content of P has the form (6.32) except that the categorized variables are replaced by their values.

(6.32) is the formal structure of the Expressive type (although there is no English verb for which it is the lexical reading):






The lexical reading of the expressive verbs in (6.31) can be written as expansions of (6.32).

For example, "thanks" might be expressed by adding (6.34)

(i) under the semantic marker that represents feeling as being relevant. And (6.34) (ii) will be a further specification of "reason for" and "relation".



Having elaborated the Requestives, Advisives, and Expressives, Katz introduces four more performatives: Permissives, Obligations, Expositives, and Stipulatives.

Permissives perform nothing causal, and consist in a license, under appropriate conditions, to act without penalty... the speaker assuming responsibility for the action. ("Permit", "authorize", "allow", "grant", and so on.)

Obligatives parallel Searle's Commissives. "Promise", for example, is treated "in terms of a purpose of the agent undertaking the obligation to perform the future act."⁹⁴ ("Promise", "vow", "swear", "pledge", "resolve", "guarantee", and so on.)

Proposives ("bet", "wager", "offer" and so on) are a sub-type of Obligatives. "They may be so treated because their purpose is the assumption of responsibility for some future act(s) contingent on the recipient's agreeing to assume responsibility for some related future act(s)..."⁹⁵

Expositives are a mixture of Searle's Declarations and Representatives. ("Declare", "claim", "insist", "state", "affirm", "concede".) The definition is put "in terms of the purpose of putting the agent on record as endorsing that something is the case."⁹⁶

Stipulatives cover a reduced area of Searle's Declarations. "These propositions are the senses of explicit performative sentences with main verbs like 'name', 'baptize', 'dub', 'christen', and 'call'."⁹⁷ Much of Searle's Declarations category is deliberately left out, because Searle's characterization is claimed to be too broad to exclude anything.

Searle:⁹⁸

Declarations bring about some alteration in the status or condition of the referred to object or objects solely in virtue of

the fact that the declaration has been successfully performed.

But won't this include promising, permitting, apologizing and all the rest? The state of affairs is altered in each case.

So Katz considers his narrower course the safer one... until, at least, a better characterization of Declarations can be found. Katz's Stipulative quite simply brings it about "that the recipient bears the name."⁹⁹

Katz notes that Stipulatives, like Permissives, gain their status in part from "the position of the agent..." that is, "whether or not the agent has the proper position of authority in the circumstances."¹⁰⁰

So much, then, for a non-complete classification of performative verbs. But insofar as we have succeeded in offering a classification of performative type and sub-type, we have also succeeded in classifying illocutionary acts.

"Each distinct illocutionary act corresponds to a distinct utterance meaning of the use of a performative sentence in the null context."¹⁰¹

iii. Advantages Over Speech Act Theory

Our next chapter will deal considerably with the relative merits of the competing theories of Searle and Katz. But let us end this chapter with Katz's own summary of the differences.

—Speech Act Theory from Austin through Searle is, Katz claims, a hybrid of semantics grafted onto pragmatics.

Katz tries to reduce this away in favour of two separate theories. He says, for example, that Searle's rules for the use of the illocutionary force indicating device divide into semantic rules that can be accommodated by extending Katz's own principles, and the pragmatic rules are essentially Gricean principles concerning the use of extragrammatical information. The main obstacle -- as has repeatedly been said -- is a failure to draw a clear competence/performance distinction.

So Katz took the semantic/pragmatic boundary to parallel the grammar/use boundary at the phonological and the syntactic levels:

- grammatical rules "comprise the idealized speaker-hearer's perfect knowledge of the language."¹⁰²
- performance rules "comprise part of their ability to exercise this knowledge of grammatical rules and performance principles in real speech situations."¹⁰³

Katz suggests that an extension of present semantic theory will do the first of those jobs...and that is the one at issue here. So, what advantages does Katz then claim over Searle?

First, he suggests that we attain a "uniform view of the relation between the structure of language and the use of language."¹⁰⁴ We have a uniform theory of phonological, syntactic and semantic competence within a grammar, while performance-theory will give a model "showing how sentence structure and contextual factors enable speakers to assign sentence tokens to grammatical types."¹⁰⁵

Second, we "are no longer forced to treat linguistic facts of the same kind as different."¹⁰⁶ The notion of undertaking an obligation is seen as part of the meaning of "promise" whether in an obligative proposition or in a report...

Third, we don't have to "treat essentially different linguistic facts as facts of the same kind."¹⁰⁷ In comparison, for example, "Searle's propositional content and essential rules expressed the kind of information that falls properly within the grammar's representation of the lexical meaning of performative verbs and other syntactic devices for indicating illocutionary force, whereas his preparatory and sincerity rules express essentially different information, that is, facts and guidelines that speakers use in working out utterance meanings..."¹⁰⁸ For example, Searle treats (6.49) and (6.52) as the same.

(6.49) Can you take this heavy log off my foot?

(6.52) I request that you remove this heavy log from my foot.

In Katz's theory, whereas (6.52) appeals to semantic principles, (6.49) appeals to both the semantic and pragmatic principles.

Fourth, Katz's theory will give us "a formal representation of any proposition." This is useful in connection with the artificial language/ordinary language debate. "The desirable feature of the artificial language tradition is its demand for a formal theory of logical structure. The desirable feature of the ordinary language tradition is its insistence that meaning is an inherent feature of natural language and that the test

of an account of meaning is how well it does justice to standard uses of words."¹⁰⁹ Katz sees natural languages as properly formal objects and semantics as the formal study of meaning (and not restricted to inference). "It is thus possible to obtain formal theories that do not achieve their formal status at the expense of saying nothing about performative uses of language."¹¹⁰

Finally, there is hope of replacing the present, restrictive theory of logic "which restricts the domains of logic to deductive relations among statements" with a new conception in which we take logic "to be about truth-preserving inferences between sentences that express them."¹¹¹

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

- ¹As we have seen. See above, Chapter 3.
- ²J.J. Katz and J. Fodor, "The Structure of a Semantic Theory," op. cit.
- ³J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.14.
- ⁴Ibid, p.20.
- ⁵With some exceptions, as we noted in Chapter 3. We will come back to this.
- ⁶J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.21.
- ⁷From J.L. Austin, "Performative-Constative," in Philosophy and Ordinary Language, ed. C.E. Caton. (Urbana, Ill.: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1963.) p.22-23.
- ⁸J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.24.
- ⁹J.R. Searle, "Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics," in The New York Review of Books, 1972, Reprinted in G. Harman, ed. On Noam Chomsky. (New York: Anchor Books, 1974.)
- ¹⁰J.R. Searle, "The Rules of the Language Game," in The Times Literary Supplement. September, 1976.
- ¹¹J.R. Searle, "Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics," op. cit., p.30.

- ¹² J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.26.
- ¹³ J.R. Searle, "Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics," op. cit., p.28.
For a full rebuttal, see J.J. Katz Logic and Language, op. cit.
- ¹⁴ See J.J. Katz, The Philosophy of Language. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966.); also J.J. Katz, Semantic Theory. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972.)
- ¹⁵ The Standard Theory and The Extended Standard Theory.
- ¹⁶ J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.28.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., p.28.
- ¹⁸ J.R. Searle, "Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics," op. cit., p.28-29.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., p.29.
- ²⁰ J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.31.
- ²¹ Ibid., p.31-32.
- ²² And above.
- ²³ First introduced in J.J. Katz, Semantic Theory, op. cit., c.1-4.
- ²⁴ Introduced in Ibid., c.4, part 2.

- 25 J. J. Katz, "The Advantages of Semantic Theory over Predicate Calculus in the Representations of Logical Form in Natural Languages," New Directions in Semantics, The Monist 60, no.3, 1977. See also Chapter 4, c, below.

- 26 See Noam Chomsky, Aspects, op. cit. See also above, Chapter 3, b.

- 27 A defined semantic marker is one introduced by definition such that it stands as an abbreviation for a complex semantic marker. For example, we might abbreviate (3.2) with

((Chase) _____).

[NP, S] [NP, VP, S]

(X)

(X)

<>

<>

- 28 See Noam Chomsky, Aspects, op. cit., and above Chapter 3, b.

- 29 Above, Chapter 3, b.

- 30 J. J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.63-64.

- 31 Ibid., p.64.

- 32 C. Fillmore, "The Case for Case," in Universals in Linguistic Theory, ed. E. Bach and R. Harms. (New York: Holt, Rinehard, & Winston, 1968.) Also, C. Fillmore, "Subjects, Speakers, and Roles," Synthese 21, no.3/4, 1970. pp.252-255.

- 33 See above, Chapter 3.

- 34 These definitions are first proposed in Semantic Theory, op. cit.

³⁵ J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.83.

³⁶ See above, p.124.

³⁷ G. Frege, "On Sense and Reference," in Philosophical Writings, trans, P.T. Geach and Max Black. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962.)

³⁸ J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.88.

³⁹ Ibid, p.88.

⁴⁰ "Conditions" as defined above, p.121ff.

⁴¹ See J.J. Katz and D.T. Langendoen, "Pragmatics and Presupposition," Language 52, no.1, 1976. Also J.J. Katz, Semantic Theory, op. cit.

⁴² J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.88.

⁴³ See J.J. Katz, Semantic Theory, op. cit., pp.127-150. See also, J.J. Katz, "Interpretive Semantics meets the Zombies," Foundations of Language 9, 1973. pp.268-274.

⁴⁴ J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.88.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p.90.

⁴⁶ What Langendoen and Savin call "the projection problem for presupposition." Studies in Linguistic Semantics, ed. C.J. Fillmore and D.T. Langendoen. (New York: Holt, Rinehard, and Winston, 1971.) pp.55-62. See also J.C. Morgan, "On the treatment of Presupposition in Transformational Grammar," Papers from the 5th Regional Meeting

of the Chicago Linguistics Society. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1969.)

⁴⁷ J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.92.

⁴⁸ There are other kinds and distinctions (eg. meaning definition/reference definition; expression definition/sense definition), but we will use only those most relevant to an account of pre-supposition.

⁴⁹ J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.93.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.93.

⁵¹ Ibid, p.95.

⁵² Ibid, p.96.

⁵³ Ibid, p.96.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p.97.

⁵⁵ Ibid, p.105.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p.120.

⁵⁷ One presumes that this is part of the normal process of generative transformation.

⁵⁸ The nature of the relation between illocutionary success condition and converted condition becomes clearer as we progress. In a nutshell: if the illocutionary success condition is satisfied,

then either the converted condition or its complement is satisfied...the complement to truth being falsity, the complement to compliance being noncompliance, etc..

59 J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.124.

60 ibid., p. 132.

61 This is an operator that serves as part of the lexical reading in the case, for example, of generics and hypotheticals. Katz proposes that it also be used here. It reads:

$$(3.85) \quad (M_1), \dots, (M_i) [\dots], \dots, (M_n) \rightarrow (M_1), \dots, (M_i) [\dots], \dots, (M_n)$$

62 J. J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p. 147.

63 *ibid.*, p. 148.

⁶⁴ See above, Chapter 2, b and elsewhere.

65 J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.150.

66 ibid., p. 150.

67 *ibid.*, p. 150-151.

⁶⁸ ibid, p. 151.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 151.

⁷⁰ Above, p. 138.

⁷¹ (3.106) states formally what we have discussed informally:

(3.106) The presupposition of a proposition P is the requirement that every reading enclosed in heavy parentheses appearing in the reading of P have its appropriate referent.

⁷² J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p. 155.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 155.

⁷⁴ See above, especially Chapter I, b.

⁷⁵ J.L. Austin, DTW, op. cit., p. 60. Also above, Chapter I, b.

⁷⁶ J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p. 158.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 158.

⁷⁸ Above, p. 136.

⁷⁹ Above, p. 139.

⁸⁰ J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p. 172. For discussion, see Chapter 4,

⁸¹ He "adds" this, but does not directly confute (for example) Searle's classification.

⁸² J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.183.

⁸³ J.L. Austin, DTW, op. cit., p.149.

⁸⁴ J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.196.

⁸⁵ J. Searle, Taxonomy, op. cit. Also above, Chapter I, d.

⁸⁶ J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.197.

⁸⁷ Ibid, p.198.

⁸⁸ Above, p.139.

⁸⁹ Above, p.149.

⁹⁰ J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.199.

⁹¹ Ibid, p.204.

⁹² Ibid, p.212.

⁹³ Ibid, p.212.

⁹⁴ Ibid, p.216.

⁹⁵ Ibid, p.217.

⁹⁶ Ibid, p.218.

97 ibid, p.220.

98 J. Searle, Taxonomy, op. cit., p.358.

99 J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.220.

100 ibid, p.221.

101 ibid, p.221.

102 ibid, p.223.

103 ibid, p.223.

104 ibid, p.223.

105 ibid, p.223.

106 ibid, p.224.

107 ibid, p.224.

108 ibid, p.224.

109 ibid, p.226.

110 ibid, p.227.

111 ibid, p.227.

PART III

A TAXONOMY OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

Chapter 5. Critique and Development: Our
Theory of Illocutionary Force

a) Katz and Chomsky: the place and role of
Semantics

- i. The Shape of the Disagreement
- ii. Conceptualism vs. Platonism

b) Katz and Searle: Semantics and Speech
Acts Theory

- i. Speech Acts Theory: Semantics
or Pragmatics
- ii. Rules and Classification
- iii. Semantics and/or Speech Act Theory

a) Katz and Chomsky: the place and role of Semantics.

i. The Shape of the Disagreement

We have described how the semantic theory of Katz-- and therefore the semantic theory in which we have been trying to include a theory of illocutionary force--comes out of the Chomsky tradition of generative/transformational grammar. We have seen, furthermore, that Katz takes his semantics to be consistent with this tradition and in need of no radical break. In fact, he sees his semantics as being a necessary part of an integrated linguistic theory within this tradition.


There is, however, some perceived divergence from Chomsky's own semantics. This has to be looked at both as a conflict in its own right and also because some of the issues involved put into question the model for the role of semantics within generative grammar.

The central question is: where is meaning to be placed in or in relation to linguistic theory? We know that Katz equates meaning with logical form and considers it to be the subject matter of semantics. Then a linguistic theory, along with logic, can reveal logical relations of entailment, implication and so on, that hold between sentences of the language.

We have seen Chomsky leaning in a different direction. Because of belief and attitudes concerning objects of the non-linguistic reality (the external world)...because of the involvement of a variety of human cognitive systems in what is taken

to be the "meaning" of something, Chomsky chooses to restrict semantics to that part of meaning that depends solely on grammar.

Recall the schema:



The base rules and the transformational component yield the initial phrase marker and then the surface structure, whereupon these are converted into logical forms by virtue of semantic rules. So much for sentence grammar. It is then another set of semantic rules--relating to other cognitive structures--that interact with logical form and yield the "fuller representations of meaning."

Now my contention here will be that what motivates Chomsky in this development is pretty much the same thing that motivates Katz in part of his critique of Searle, that to a great extent Chomsky and Katz share the same concern here, and that the differences between them are essentially two. First, given, roughly the same understanding of the data, they want to mean different things by the word "meaning".

Secondly, this stipulative decision is probably motivated by their different perceptions of the (ontological) status of language. Chomsky, a conceptualist, sees language as interacting in a variety of ways with other cognitive systems with "meaning" as part of the mix. Katz is a Platonist, and he views sentences

as abstract objects with an independent life of their own. This latter will be dealt with in the next section.

Let us look first at my contention that Chomsky and Katz give pretty much the same reasons for the positions they take. Chomsky, in ~~arguing~~ in favor of the model I have just shown, goes about it this way. Human language has universal characteristics and to characterize these is the goal of universal grammar. This grammar will yield a structural description of linguistic expressions. What the grammar shows is the grammatical competence of a speaker.

The speaker, because language is not the only cognitive function, will also know how to use language (as part of the person's pragmatic competence), and these competences will interact with social, physical and other performance factors.

Chomsky abstracts from this mix the grammatical competence to construct his linguistic theory. This abstraction/idealization has always been a part of his method of syntactic study, and he presumes the same process is in order in semantics.

For semantics, therefore, he wants to abstract out of the cognitive mix that contributes to meaning, that part of semantic representation that is "strictly determined by grammar". Hence, the schema described in Chapter 3 and repeated above.

It is clear that Chomsky is not quite sure just how to react to Katz's view. At times Chomsky hints that there is probably not much difference between them. We have quoted² his

suggestion that the "apparently divergent approaches tend to be in fairly close agreement."

At the same time, it is clear that he hesitates to follow Katz in the scope of his semantics.

Now the above outline of Chomsky's rationale for semantics is one that Katz surely would applaud. The difference lies in how they choose to deal with a boundary question.

	Chomsky	Katz
Linguistic Theory	phonology syntax semantics (logical form)	phonology syntax semantics (logical form = meaning)
Other Systems	meaning	use

Katz claims that his use of the word "meaning" is closer to our pretheoretical use than is Chomsky's. That is not obviously true. It seems commonly the case that we speak of words and sentences as meaning something and that we also speak of people meaning such-and-such in or by doing or saying something.

There is though (for me at least) an intuitive malaise with the latter. I would be happy to concede to Katz that meaning has to do with grammar and that the rest has to do with intention, belief, use, and so on. Chomsky's concern about

our beliefs that a chair will not disappear suddenly not being part of the meaning of the word chair does not mean that we cannot abstract from such matters a concept that is the grammatical meaning.

It might make sense to add the caution that such a grammatical abstraction should not be cast in stone. Concepts--because of their relationship with the rest of the cognitive system--evolve.

Our tentative conclusion in this matter then is to acknowledge that Chomsky and Katz seem to be in roughly the same place. We are accepting Katz's stipulative definition of meaning as identical to the logical form of a concept. And we are adding a stipulation, namely, that the meaning of a concept is not stagnant.

Now we say that they seem to be in much the same place, but we have hinted above that the real difference between them has to do with different perceptions of the ontological status of language. Let us look at that.

ii. Conceptualism vs. Platonism

In his book Language and Other Abstract Objects³, Katz presents two central theses, the one to the effect that linguistics is "about abstract objects" (sentences), and the other to the effect that only a Platonist philosophy can adequately account for this.

Katz is not shy in acknowledging that this is not obvious... he himself being a convert to a Platonist position. He sees

himself being a convert to a Platonist position. He sees himself as having been, so to speak, driven to platonism in order to account for the facts.

Katz takes Chomsky

- (a) to have effectively disposed of nominalism
- (b) to have the most developed and representative conceptualist position, and
- (c) to have qua conceptualist a problematic meta-theory.

This is because linguistic theory is, for Chomsky, an empirical science and its subject is the speaker/hearer's internalized rules underlying linguistic competence.

The difficulty with this is that it confuses psychological constraints with grammatical constraints. Explanation for Chomsky is psychological. But it need not be: "conditions cited in showing how or why something is the case...can be structural, the reasons mathematical or logical"⁴. This alternative way of explanation is important, for example, with regard to the perceived difficulties in the conceptualist treatment of necessary truth in natural languages (see below).

This pointed to, Katz outlines as acceptable and uncontroversial, certain aspects of Chomsky's formal linguistic theory...the theory of generative grammar, for example, and the non-taxonomic notion of linguistic levels. The point is that this can be separated from Chomsky's ontological commitments and maintained, leaving the conceptualist/Platonist question to be settled independently and on "a neutral basis".

This basis, it is argued, is the explicit version of the one implicitly assumed by Chomsky in moving beyond nominalism, and is two-fold:

1. Linguistics' chief concern is language. Evidence to support a theory will come from language, and not from "psycholinguistic experiment", "clinical studies of language disability" (or "experiments with glowworms or clinical studies of dandruff"...)

2. The most relevant evidence (in any scientific theory) is direct evidence...evidence about sentences and their grammatical structure. Indirect evidence--concerning language use, neurophysiological correlates of linguistic processing, and so on--is secondary and "depends on direct evidence for its legitimization as a relevant source of facts."⁵

The stage is thus set for the second step, the introduction and initial defence of Platonism. Katz wants to argue not only that linguistics is not an empirical science, but that it is, in fact, a study of abstract objects...and this because sentences and language are abstract objects.

Our knowledge of a language is one thing. The object of this knowledge, another.

Katz illustrates this point by means of the parallel

Mathematics

Ideal calculator's
knowledge of the
natural numbers

The natural numbers

Logic

Ideal reasoner's
knowledge of im-
plication

The implication
relations

Language

Ideal speaker's
knowledge of the
sentences (language)

The sentences
(language)

The schema is an interesting one, especially in the light of a follow-up comment. "The fact that there is no reason to explain why these parallel cases ought not sort out the same way puts the conceptualist in the awkward position of having to make the farfetched claim that a theory of numbers in mathematics is a psychological theory of human knowledge of number and a theory of implication in logic is a psychological theory of human knowledge of implication."⁶

This is a strong statement, of course. And we feel a somewhat weaker sense of assurance than Katz...as we will shortly explain.

The ensuing criticism of Chomsky's claim that grammars are theories of a certain kind of human knowledge is geared to support Katz's view that Chomsky "sees no distinction between knowledge of a language and the language itself".⁷

The discussion is an important one and part of the very central point that Katz hopes to make. Whether he succeeds in showing the "facticity" of there being "no reason to explain why these parallel cases ought not sort out the same way" is, as we will argue, doubtful.

In any case, Katz's hope is that we will have begun to understand that with the conceptually interpreted theories representing only the cognitive structures, they lack sufficient abstractness to represent objects on the other side of the "knowledge-of" relation...the sentence.

It is Platonism that, in dropping psychological constraints, can construct a grammar and a linguistic theory that is really a theory of the proper objects of study...the abstract objects, namely, the sentences and (thence) the language.

I alluded earlier to Katz's development of Platonism arising out of the felt failure of conceptualism adequately to treat certain issues. He focuses the general issue just described on the particular issue of explaining necessary truth. Necessary truth, Katz argues, is not properly understood when taken to be relative to ("relativized to") what are human cognitive processes. Real necessity, quite the contrary, itself sets absolute limits on all thought. Conceptualism has no way of touching that because it is stuck on the contingent side of the knowledge-of relation.

Katz sums up this thought: "If there are analytic sentences, then there are necessary truths, which owe their status solely to the grammatical structure of natural language, and, accordingly, a theory of the grammatical structure of natural language must account for such grammatically based necessary truth."⁸ This can only be done through a Platonist liberalization of conceptualist (and nominalist) constraints.

It is now time to say something about Katz's connecting the foundations of logic and linguistics as per the schema provided above. He does this by taking Frege's arguments against conceptualism in logic, and extending these to cover conceptualism in linguistics.

In order to do this, of course, Katz has to deal with Frege's own belief that the laws of grammar have to do with human linguistic ability and are relative in the ways Katz has just criticized. This is done by way of a four-point response to Frege's three problems with natural language.

If the problems are:

1. language disguises thought
2. word order can confuse conceptual content
3. there is ambiguity and failure of reference

Katz can argue:

1. If we distinguish surface and underlying grammatical form, logical form may in fact be the deep grammatical form
2. It is language users, not the language, that confuse conceptual content
3. ambiguity and failure of reference:
 - (a) can be human error
 - (b) are both, in any case, useful in language
4. It is not obvious that reconstruction into an "ideal language" would be
 - (a) wieldy
 - (b) equally rich
 - (c) infallible

Katz concludes both that Frege "had bad reasons for thinking that natural languages have a psychobiological status" and that "there are no grounds for putting them in a different ontological category from logic and mathematics."⁹

The positive reason for their being part of this ontological category is this: "The propositions between which the

laws of logic hold are the senses of sentences in natural languages."¹⁰

Propositions and senses correspond without exception and can best be said to be the one set of objects. This is not a new argument for Katz as we have repeatedly seen.

In the last part of Chapter 5, a section entitled "On Necessary Truth in Semantics, Logic, and Mathematics", Katz ties together the two central arguments to date. Platonism is the only ontological position that can explain necessary truth in the three domains of logic, mathematics and linguistics. It does this by "exhibiting the dependency of such necessary truth on the existence of abstract objects."¹¹

Various other attempts to explain the source of necessary truth have failed--largely by substituting natural necessity for logical necessity--and our options are two. We can, with Quine, say there is no such thing as genuine necessity. Or, with the Platonist, we can say that necessity is "a consequence of the character of abstract objects", namely:

1. They have no temporal or spacial properties.
2. They are objective (as are physical objects) while psychological objects are subjective.
3. They are changeless and cohesive (in that they have logically inseparable basic properties).

And these are the features of the category "abstract object".

How do we know anything about this abstract object? We know it by way of intuition. If perception and introspection are the sources of a posteriori knowledge, intuition is the source of a priori knowledge.

We can affirm this because, first, we are acquainted with its operation (we come to know things within its domain). Secondly, neither the other sources of information (perception and introspection) nor the faculties for constructing theoretical structures (reason and memory) can do the same job.

Knowledge gained from introspection is subjective, from perception is scientific, and from intuition is knowledge of abstract objects.

It is important to note that Katz differentiates here between his Platonism and traditional Platonism. The latter saw the knowing as relational...a causal relation between perceiver and object...an understanding built upon the model of perception.

But objective entities that are aspatial and atemporal cannot enter into causal relations. We know, instead, through what Kant called "pure intuition", an innate notion of the knowledge of relation, and an innate idea of an abstract object.

These three function together to receive and systematize information (grammatical, say), correct it, and depsychologize it...yielding a sentence modelled on an abstract object.

Intuition is, of course, a psychological process, but its import is an objective fact. It is likely that the same process of intuition systematizes such facts into the complexes of mathematics, logic, and linguistics.

Katz, finally, wants to show that Platonism yields a better understanding of linguistic universals than does conceptualism...in particular, that of Chomsky.

Conceptualist accounts are of two kinds. In the one case, linguistic theory is a metatheory showing the common structure of grammars. In the other (the Chomskian), the linguistic theory is a theory of the (ideal) language learner's initial competence.

Traditional linguistic theory, Katz claims, was more narrow than this in that linguistic universals were not simply "something common" to all languages, but conceived rather "as having this status in virtue of the nature of language itself and hence as revealing its nature."¹²

How might we determine universals? For the Platonist this is not a psychological question, but one of determining the essential properties of language. This requires the twofold distinction between pseudo-universals and significant universals and between accidental and essential universals.

Katz poses the question this way: "What is it about the way that the grammatical structure of natural languages correlates senses with sentences that makes someone with knowledge of such structure, in principle, able to express any thought?"¹³

Katz's answer is to state his "principle of effability." The sense-sentence correlation is "complete at both ends" so that (whatever the speaker's performance capabilities) the non-existence of a sense or a sentence will never be the reason for a thought's not being expressed.

The principle -

(E) Each proposition (thought) is expressible by some sentence in every natural language allows us to claim that "the essential property of natural languages is that their grammatical structure constitutes an effable correlation of sentences with senses."¹⁴ A linguistic universal, then, will be anything that is necessary for effability.

(LU) A grammatical feature F is a linguistic universal if every natural language has F and a natural language could not be effable without having F.

Examples are the feature of the recursiveness and the principle of compositionality...but both the full set of LU and the decision as to whether there are other conditions than LU that might determine linguistic universals, are left for future study.

Now in response to this Platonist argument, several questions rush to the fore. First, is conceptualism (esp. Chomsky) fairly treated? My sense is that the answer is "no".

Katz suggests that because Chomsky takes linguistic theory to be an empirical science with, as its subject, the speaker's internalized rules underlying linguistic competence.

he thereby confuses psychological constraints with grammatical constraints. I think that this presumption is false, and that it is this false presumption that animates Katz's entire Platonist thesis.

It is false because psychological constraints are only some of the constraints upon natural language. Others include the constraints of mathematical and logical truth. In other words language, human competence though it be, is one meeting place of the non-abstract with the abstract object.

In that sense (and in that sense only) language can be said not to be ontologically homoneneous. Language is one (among several possible symbolic forms) meeting place of the abstract object and the non-abstract.

That which can count as abstract object is mathematical and logical form. These meet the concrete object/state of affairs precisely in human conceptualization, of which language is a part. If this is so, then the abstract objects within language are the abstract objects of mathematical and logical form.

Further, we might add that the account of necessary truth is not convincing either. Insofar as truth that is analytic in language can be called necessary truth, it is as amenable to conceptualist as it is to Platonist interpretation. It has to do with the process of understanding, defining, naming. If an object, concrete or abstract, is understood as "x" and named "A", it need not be surprising that "A is (always) x". ("A bachelor is an unmarried male.")

A further difficulty can be found in Katz's Platonist argument. That is, we have acknowledged that meaning evolves, and that does not fit very happily with Katz's criteria for abstract objects:

But let us not digress any further into ontology. Our point in introducing this was to make sense of the differences Katz in particular found between Chomsky's account of meaning and his own. The difference now seems to lie in Katz's wanting to isolate language as a set of abstract objects in some sense out of the rest of human conceptualization and on a par with mathematics and logic.

We are now in a position to underscore the queasiness Chomsky showed when he hesitated over the degree of abstraction Katz was engaged in, and when he reminded us of the relationship of language with other aspects of human conceptualization.

We conclude--as should be clear from these comments--that conceptualism has in no way been shown to be incapable of dealing with grammatical fact.

Our position with regard to semantics, then, is this:

1. We retain the generative grammar model (in its evolved form) of linguistic theory, and this in a conceptualist interpretation.
2. Semantics lies within the grammar at both levels of deep and surface structure (and probably involved in transformation per se as well).
3. The semantics is the meaning component and it deals with meaning in the language. Contextual determinants of meaning we prefer to call pragmatic factors and to study them as aspects of language use. We

acknowledge, however, that there is a broader use of "meaning" in circulation. We acknowledge, further, that meaning changes.

4. This is where Katz's semantics and his theory of illocutionary force fit. We will see in the next section that there are both advantages and disadvantages to his way of dealing with illocutionary force.

b) Katz and Searle: Semantics and Speech Act Theory

1. Speech Act Theory: semantics or pragmatics

We move from a debate that involved primarily the context of a theory of illocutionary force to one that also involves, and primarily involves, the actual nature, shape and import of the theory.

As in the Chomsky-Katz debate, so here, it is Katz who has given the more systematic critique of the other. We have seen, in Chapter 4, that Katz rejects Searle's "hybrid" speech act theory out of hand. Searle's theory is hybrid, as we have seen, because it is what Katz calls an uncritical mixture of grammar and pragmatics.

Not so much in Speech Acts, but elsewhere¹⁵ Searle seems to say that generative grammar is a formal system of phonology and syntax onto which a theory of speech acts is to be grafted. That might be all right, and in accordance with what we have just spent so much time establishing (largely along Katz's lines), if the speech act theory in question were just another name for semantics / a theory of meaning / a theory of logical form.

Unfortunately--and Katz seems right in this--that is not the case. Although Searle sometimes suggests his speech acts theory and semantics are the one and the same study,¹⁶ at other times¹⁷ he leaves semantics out of the discussion... Labelling attempts at semantics (à la Chomsky and Katz) as inadequate. Not just "incomplete" or "faulty"...but somehow misguided in principle.

Now at first, Searle can be given the benefit of the doubt here. He does say that "a study of the meaning of sentences is not in principle distinct from a study of speech acts. Properly construed, they are the same study."¹⁸

In explaining just how they are the same study,^{however,} he says ~~though~~ both that meaning alone "does not in all cases uniquely determine what speech act is performed in a given utterance" and that relevant contextual factors are not independent of meaning. These seem to be conflicting statements.

It really looks as though Searle is doing one of three things. He might be using "meaning" in Chomsky's sense that is self-consciously combining the semantics/logical form with the "other systems" of conceptualization to yield a broader notion of meaning to be studied by speech act theory. That seems not to be his intention, though, given his comment to the effect that semantics and speech acts study the same thing.

A second thing Searle might be doing--and he certainly does say this¹⁹--is to say that certain contextual features are part of the meaning. That is, we simply do not understand the meaning of some of language, and therefore of language.

unless we acknowledge that meaning has contextual conditions/implications. Part of the meaning of saying "I command..." is that certain extra-linguistic conditions obtain.

It is this that I take Searle to be getting at in his explanation of the role of speech acts theory and its relation to semantics. And he is right.

Unfortunately there is something else that is going on as well. Namely, there really does seem to be confusion in Searle's theory at the point of the semantics/pragmatics border. There is not an adequate statement that distinguishes these two in the process of using sentences and performing speech acts. The reality is that there is a difference between saying that meaning "does not in all cases uniquely determine what speech act is performed in a given utterance" on the one hand, and that certain contextual features are part of meaning on the other.

The former places Speech Act Theory in pragmatics. The latter could place it in semantics.

There is no question, through Searle's apparently conflicting statements, that there is enough ambiguity there for Katz to target. The real question though is whether this ambiguity is an essential part of Speech Act Theory. It seems to me that it is clearly not. It would be very easy to understand Speech Acts Theory as the Theory of language use/speech acts in (to use Katz's phrase) the null context.

Searle's essential point would be protected by saying that although the theory has to do with the meaning of the words in the null context, the meaning nonetheless essentially implies a context and, in fact, tells us certain things (perhaps quite a lot) about this context.

A theory of use need not be pragmatic. A theory of use in the null context--as here described--is not.

It is important to say that there seems to be some cloudiness on both sides here. Searle's is essentially one of not always maintaining the appropriate semantics/pragmatics boundary. Katz's lies in his unwillingness to acknowledge Searle's point that (certain) contextual factors are part of meaning. This cloudiness is why they can accuse each other of not understanding the "competence-performance distinction".

It is a reality both that there is a semantics-pragmatic boundary (as per our discussion above) and that extra-linguistic factors are a part of meaning.

II. Rules and Classification

The purpose behind a study of illocutionary force is not simply to say there is something in language that can broadly be described as illocutionary force. The further purpose is to discern the rules that underlie its functioning, to classify the various types, and then to bring this study and classification to bear upon further selected portions of the corpus of the language to see what might be revealed.

In our next chapter, we will suggest ways of bringing such a study to bear upon parts of language that can be called "religious language".

Both Searle and Katz look for rules to motivate a classification of illocutionary forces. We have looked at these in Chapters 2 and 4. What we want to do here is to see what to make of Katz's criticisms of Searle's "hybrid" set of rules, how to evaluate their respective principles of classification and then to judge the relative adequacy of the taxonomies they provide.

Katz, in his attempt to demonstrate that Searle's Speech Act Theory is a hybrid semantics/pragmatics mix, points to Searle's speech act rules. These rules, Katz argues, can be parcelled out into "semantic" and "pragmatic" categories. He takes the following²⁰ from Searle:

Rule 1. Pr is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence ...T, the utterance of which predicates some future action A of the speaker S.

Rule 2. Pr is to be uttered only if the hearer H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A, and S believes H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A.

Rule 3. Pr is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events.

Rule 4. Pr is to be uttered only if S intends to do A.

Rule 5. The utterance of Pr counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A.

Rules 1, 2, and 5, Katz suggests, really do state principles relevant directly to the meaning of Pr (promise). They would, in the semantics, be appropriate to the lexicon. Rules 3 and 4, Katz argues, are pragmatic principles.

Now there are several things to say in response to Katz. First, let us use Rule 4 as an example--it may be true that there is a pragmatic principle to the effect that a given utterance, in a given context, is to be uttered only if the speaker has such-and-such an intention. That, though, in no way precludes a lexical entry for a word like "promise" to the effect that one who utters one intends to keep it. Moreover, this is not redundant since it gives the more general rule specificity, precession and application that can only come through a lexical entry.

A second point, along the same lines, is this: it would not be catastrophic for Searle or for Speech Acts Theory if certain rules were to be found not to apply. Searle is, after all, building a theory. He acknowledges that many aspects of it are incomplete.

This "parcelling" then does not touch the principle of what Searle is doing.

Neither does Katz's comment regarding generality. He suggests that some of Searle's rules are more general than others and that this generality is obscured. The non-obviousness preparatory condition, for example (Rule 3 above), runs through many illocutionary acts. And, as Katz notes, Searle acknowledges

that this seems to be so. Well, agreed that the true generality of a rule should be pointed to and accounted for in a list of rules. But this is easily accommodated in a Speech Act Theory, it is simply a matter of acknowledging that some rules are more general than others, stating just where and how they apply and then checking the implications of this for the rest of the theory.

This being the case, how do we evaluate Searle's and Katz's rules and subsequent categorization? The first thing to do is to make clear a distinction between what Searle and Katz are doing. We have compared Katz and Chomsky as both involved, as regards the present question, in semantics. Katz's study is a study in semantics and is an attempt to analyze illocutionary force in that context. For that reason it is important for him to distinguish between semantics and pragmatics.

Now he goes, rightly, one step further. He argues that any theory dependent upon a clear understanding of meaning and use--whether or not it is strictly speaking a semantic study per se--will also have to be clear on that distinction. And so we have been bringing Searle and Katz together in that light.

But the fact is that Searle is not doing semantics. Searle is trying to explicate the logical form of certain categories and relations. His approach and symbolism are those of predicate calculus. So although he clearly (he has declared this) wants his semantic information to be accurate, well-formed and so on,

and would presumably accept helpful semantic information, we still need not expect his rules to be semantic rules.

Searle and Katz are offering two different approaches to the study of illocutionary force: one in logic; the other in semantics. The two are not independent one of the other. The former depends upon adequate semantic information. The latter, at least in Katz's interpretation, is a study anyway of the logical form of semantics.

But the symbolisms are different, and what they reveal is different. So the question of rules and classification broadens into one of two different kinds of symbolism.

iii. Semantics and/or Speech Act Theory

In this section, we will want to look at the question of the relative merits of these two approaches to a study of illocutionary force. It is Katz who raises the question in a fairly systematic attempt to discredit speech act theory.

We have found that, the merits of semantic theory notwithstanding, speech act theory can in principle (and rather easily) withstand the criticisms that have so far been raised.

There is another. It is Katz's argument that semantic theory symbolism is to be preferred over predicate calculus symbolism.

It should be clear by now that Katz's preferred symbolism is that of semantic theory. We have gone to some length to put it in its context, show how it works and, of course, to show how it can help in a study of illocutionary force.

In the case of Searle, the symbolism has been less obvious. This is essentially because Searle has been struggling with something that had not been developed systematically and required a philosophical understanding--the beginnings of a metatheory--before the symbolism could be developed.

We have seen initial stages only, and essentially in two ways. First, $F(p)$ has been introduced with variants:

$\vdash(p)$

$\vdash(p)$

and so on.²¹

Second, classification-related criteria were introduced:²²

Representatives

$\vdash B(p)$

Directives

$\vdash V(H \text{ does } A)$

Commissives

$\vdash I(S \text{ does } A)$

Expressives

$E \emptyset(P) (S/H \text{ + property})$

Declarations

$D \emptyset \emptyset(p)$

It is important here to show that that symbolism is developing in a quite dramatic way. To show this we depend upon a draft copy of Foundations of Illocutionary Logic by John Searle and Daniel Vanderveken.²³

Illocutionary logic is logic as appropriate to and applied to illocutionary acts, illocutionary acts being construed pretty much in the terms of Chapter 2 above. The main objective is to "formalize the logical properties of illocutionary forces."²⁴

Nor is illocutionary logic limited to the case of acts as performed. As per our "defense" of Searle against Katz above, Searle and Vanderveken make it clear that regardless of whether or how an illocutionary act is performed it has a logical form. Further, this logical form relates it to other speech acts (performed or not).

This kind of independence of natural language is not total. As a study in logic it is independent of empirical linguistic facts, but the desire for relevance will demand a close attention be paid both to actual verbs and to other illocutionary force indicating devices (syntactic, for example: mood, word-order, and so on).

F. (p) is here taken to be the form of elementary illocutionary acts, which are expressed in such elementary sentences f. (p) as:

1. "Will you leave the room?"
2. "You, leave the room!"
3. "You will leave the room."
4. "If only you would leave the room!"

Complex cases are called complex illocutionary acts, and are expressed in complex sentences, a special case of which is the performative sentence. In the performative sentence, "the illocutionary force indicating device is a performative verb used in the first person present tense with an appropriate complement clause."²⁷ In the case of the performative, a named

Illocutionary act is performed, and a statement is made to that effect:²⁸

1. "I promise that I will come tomorrow."
2. "I apologize for what I have done."

and so on.

For the components of illocutionary force, Searle and Vanderveken take what is another evolution of conditions suggested by Austin, and Searle in Speech Acts and again in "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts."²⁹ They note and define seven interrelated components. We will simply list them here, since much of this has been discussed above, and move on to the formalization they subsequently present.

1. Illocutionary point. Searle's "Taxonomy", number 1.³⁰
2. Degree of strength of the illocutionary point. "Taxonomy", number 4.³¹
3. Mode of achievement. "Taxonomy", number 5.³²
4. Propositional content conditions. "Taxonomy", number 8.³³
5. Preparatory conditions. "Taxonomy", number 6.³⁴
6. Sincerity conditions. "Taxonomy", number 3.³⁵
7. Degree of strength of the expressed ³⁶ psychological state.

This is the difference between "requesting" and "begging". This is slightly different from anything in the previous list. Some other factors have been dropped.

Now it is not a renewed listing of the components of illocutionary force that is interesting about Searle-Vanderveken. It is how, on its basis, they construct a calculus of speech acts in order to define, formally, illocutionary forces and their components.

They move, first, to the question of possible contexts of utterance. Regardless of whether it is performed/used or not, the English sentence "I will come back in five minutes" has both a force and a meaning that will vary in different contexts. In terms of force, it could be either a prediction or a promise. And the content varies according to speaker a and time t. There are five distinguishable features of the context: a speaker, a hearer, a time, a place and "various other features" of these that may be relevant. Important in this last are the psychological states (intentions, desires, beliefs, etc.) of speaker and hearer.

These features are called the world of the utterance. If the set of possible speakers, hearers, times and places are identity conditions I_1, I_2, I_3, I_4 , and W is the set of all possible worlds of utterance, then C will be the set of possible contexts. $I \in I_1 \times I_2 \times I_3 \times I_4 \times W$.

Each context of utterance $i \in I$ will have the five constituents, which are the coordinates of the context. With the speaker a_i , the hearer b_i , the time t_i , the location l_i , and the world w_i , we have

$$i = \langle a_i, b_i, t_i, l_i, w_i \rangle$$

Within the context of utterance, the utterance $F(p)$ includes the set Prop of propositions and the set $\Diamond$ of illocutionary forces. Variables belonging to $\Diamond$ will be " F ", " F_1 ", " F_2 ", ..., " F_l ", " F_1^1 ", " F_2^1 ", ... and variables belonging to Prop will be " p ", " p_1 ", " p_2 ", ..., " 0 ", " p_1^1 ", " p_2^1 ", ..., " 0_1 ", " 0_2 ", ..., " 0_l ", " 0_1^1 ", " 0_2^1 ", ...

So an illocutionary act of form $F(p)$ consists of a $F \in \Diamond$ and a $p \in \text{Prop}$.

A formal structure is provided for I , Prop and $\Diamond$ (along with U , the union of the domains of all possible worlds; the universe of discourse in illocutionary logic).

Within $\Diamond$, each f of natural language expresses a certain force in a given context. The force, when being dealt with, will be named within the symbols $||$ with or without the index i . Thus, $||$ predict $||_i$, $||$ report $||$.

The following symbols are introduced for naming the illocutionary forces of assertion, commitment, promise, directive and declaration:

$\vdash$
 $\perp$
 P_r
 I
 T

The properties of illocutionary forces, already listed, are formalized (we summarize) thus:

1. Illocutionary point. The relation on $I \times \text{Prop}$ that determines the conditions of achievement of a given illocutionary point is the relation Π . If and only if a speaker a_i in context i succeeds in achieving an illocutionary point on P , then $i \Pi P$ holds. The name of a particular illocutionary point can replace F in $i \Pi_F P$, and the relationship will hold under the above conditions.

The five types of illocutionary point (assertive, commissive, directive, declarative, expressive) are the relations $\Pi_1, \Pi_2, \Pi_3, \Pi_4$ and Π_m . This last is over psychological states $m \in M$, and m can be replaced by Bel (belief) and other states.

2. Mode of achievement. The mode of achievement that is characteristic of an illocutionary point Π is determined by the function $\mu(\Pi)$. $\mu(\Pi) < 1, P \geq 1$ means that i succeeds in attaining force Π in mode μ over P . In a particular case, this can be rewritten mode $(F) < 1, P \geq 1$ or mode $\vdash < 1, P \geq 1$ or mode $(\Pi \text{ testifv}) < 1, P \geq 1$. In the last case, the person a_i is committed to the truth of P in his/her capacity as a witness.

3. Degree of strength. What is important is not so much the base point in degrees of strength in attaining a force, but rather the ordering in relation of greater

and lesser degrees of strength. Integers are simply assigned to mark the degrees of greater and lesser (always within the same illocutionary point). Degree will be symbolized by integer k in the set Z of integers. $i \Pi^k P$ means that speaker i succeeds in achieving Π on P with degree of strength k . If $\uparrow$ is $\llcorner \text{order} \llcorner$ and $\downarrow$ is $\llcorner \text{request} \llcorner$, then degree $(\uparrow) >$ degree $(\downarrow)$.

4. Propositional content conditions. A propositional content condition is determined by a function θ from I into $S(\text{Prop})$. For example, θ_{fut} represents a constraint to the effect that the proposition be future with respect to t_i .

5. Preparatory conditions. These specify what a_i must presuppose in w_i in performing an act $E(P)$ in utterance i . "To presuppose that a state of affairs obtains is tantamount to presupposing that the proposition that represents that state of affairs is true."³⁸ It is represented by the function $\Sigma \in (S(\text{Prop}))^{I \times \text{Prop}}$ "from possible contexts of utterance and propositions into sets of propositions having certain features."³⁹ Thus Σ might associate $\{\Diamond P\}$ ("it is physically possible that P ") with $\langle i, P \rangle$ in the case of an order or a request, since it is presupposed that it is physically possible to comply.

6. Sincerity conditions. The speaker a_i , in expressing, $F(P)$, will also be expressing a psychological state that counts as the sincerity condition of $F(P)$. This function from contexts of utterance and propositions $(I \times \text{Prop})$ into sets (S) of psychological states $(M \times \text{Prop})$ of certain types is written $\Psi \in (S \rightarrow (M \times \text{Prop})^{I \times \text{Prop}})$. Thus, for example, Ψ will associate $\langle I, P \rangle$ with the set $\{\text{Bel}(P)\}$ in the case of an assertion.

7. The degree of strength of the sincerity conditions.

This is another instance of an integer $k \in \mathbb{Z}$ indicating the characteristic degree of force (see 3, above). In this instance $\eta(F)$ is the characteristic degree of strength of the sincerity condition. If the degree of strength of the illocutionary point is the same as that of the sincerity condition, then, for example,

$$\begin{aligned}\eta(\vdash) &= \text{degree } \vdash \\ \eta(\perp) &= \text{degree } \perp\end{aligned}$$

What can make them unequal is that the mode of achievement might influence the degree of strength of the illocutionary point as in degree $(\|\text{testify}\|) > \eta(\|\text{testify}\|)$ since the act of testifying strengthens the assertive illocutionary point "without necessarily increasing the strength of the expressed belief."⁴⁰

With this formalism--and what has been here outlined is a simplified version--Searle and Vanderveken go on to describe the logical structure of the set of illocutionary forces, the logical form of components such as "direction of fit"⁴¹ and logical relationships among illocutionary forces.

What we here present, we present with some caution...we do not yet know just what final form this "foundations" in illocutionary logic will take. Two things, though, are clear. First, it takes speech act theory to a significant new stage of development. Second, it does this without radically disturbing Searle's earlier framework.

Seemingly, then, we find ourselves with two analyses of illocutionary force each with a developed and developing framework of understanding and interpretation, the one within a logical and the other a semantic theory (and formalism).

It might seem--out of everything that has gone above--that we cannot but gain insight by pursuing both directions. There is no evident reason for one to be spurned or castigated for not doing the job of the other. Searle acknowledges this,⁴² as does Searle-Vanderveken.⁴³


Katz is less clear in his acknowledgement of this. There is no question of his granting to both logic and semantics their own "working domains". It is clear, too, that logic pervades natural language...logical form and meaning being the same thing.⁴⁴ What is not clear is his valuing predicate-calculus in representing "logical form in natural language."

He, in fact, argues that it is inferior to semantic theory since--and this is what the argument seems to come down to--a semantic theory can yield descriptions and not just designations. A description describes the logical structure of the concept "on the basis of a convention that their parts and the formal relations among them mirror the parts and the logical relations among them in the concept."⁴⁶ A semantic marker mirrors the concept(s) represented.

As a result of that, semantic theory can represent logical form in natural language--implication for example--in one of two ways. As with predicate calculus, it can represent entailment as a consequence of meaning postulates. Or, semantic theory alone can represent implication as an instance of semantic entailment.

Meaning postulates (let such-and-such be the logical properties of so-and-so) are arbitrary. Semantic representation is part of the meaning of natural language. "The extra option thus enables us to write semantic representations that distinguish between definitionally valid implications and valid implications that are not definitional."⁴⁷

There are two problems, it seems to me, with Katz's argument. First, it does not follow that if semantics has some advantage over predicate calculus with regard to natural language that the reverse is not also true. It might well be, for example, that illocutionary logic will reveal much about



natural language that semantic theory either cannot do or cannot do with the same economy.

Second, Katz says that semantics--by virtue of its describing the logical form of a concept--is immune from the arbitrariness of meaning postulates. Instead of having "definitionally valid implications" we have "valid implications that are not definitional."

Although this may be true, it is not obviously true. That is, it is not obvious that a structural description of a concept is not precisely the formalization of a meaning postulate... albeit one that "came to be" in most instances through an informal evolution of the concept. And it can certainly be argued that in both instances the concept is defined and is defined as having the futures specified.⁴⁸

At this stage one might be tempted to say that the two traditions have their distinctive merits, their distinctive symbolism, and their distinctive contribution to a study of illocutionary force. While in part true, such a position would be weak in ways that would be disastrous to an attempt to progress in our understanding of illocutionary force. We can reveal this by looking at Katz's taxonomy.

Katz, in proffering a taxonomy, begins with a semantic description (by way of a semantic marker) of various verbs. He then suggests that his taxonomy will evolve in a straightforward and principled way out of this by our simply looking at the labels on appropriate branches.⁴⁹

- (6.1) The second of the two major branches in the reading whose first major branch marks a proposition P as performative, that is, the branch of the form ((Act)...)-(Purpose)-..., specifies the type of P. The full set of such semantic structures determines the categories in the classification of performative types.
- (6.2) The subtypes of a particular performative type T are specified by the semantic markers occurring as the predicate functions applied to the semantic markers in the structure determining T.⁵⁰

This, Katz claims, gives us a taxonomy that is principled and not simply, as is the case with the taxonomy of Searle, based upon "important conceptual distinctions."⁵¹

There are three problems, it seems to me, with what Katz is doing here. First, in his desire to have "objective" criteria for the taxonomy, he draws his attention away from what is uniquely illocutionary about illocutionary force and therein loses sight of the "important conceptual distinctions" that motivate the taxonomy of Searle. Nowhere does Katz demonstrate any intrinsic weakness or error in Searle's taxonomy.

Second, Katz does not deal with the fact that the information that goes into the semantic marker is precisely the same semantic information that Searle relies on in his "conceptual distinctions" and that choices are made in constructing the semantic marker. When Katz, for example, decides that assertives are not performative and justifies that decision on the basis of assertives not having a branch of the form ((Act)...)-(Purpose)-..., it could very easily be argued that the reason there is no such branch is simply that Katz fails to see the underlying

structure of the assertive. In its deep structure, it seems sensible to argue, a branch of the sort (Purpose)...(Assert)..., or something to that effect not only could be there but should be there. An assertive is not without purpose even though that might tacitly be assumed.

Third, Katz provides no principle for grouping! It is one thing to say that purposes have to be similar in categorizing types and sub-types and quite another to say what counts as relevant "similarity". Especially if there is a subtle element of decision that enters into the creation of the semantic marker in the first place. Katz admits that he is not yet ready to formulate the principle "to determine which kinds of information about purpose create new subtypes and which kinds merely create new performative verbs."⁵² If the truth be told, that confession should read that he is not ready to formulate the principle "to determine which kinds of information about purpose create types, subtypes or merely different performative verbs."

So when we get to Katz's actual taxonomy, it has the shape of an unstructured and relatively uninformative list...at least in comparison with the developing taxonomy we have seen through Austin, Searle, Searle/Vanderveken. As a matter of fact, Katz never exactly presents a taxonomy--he simply lists a series of probable types and subtypes. The types seem to be:

- A. Assertives, which are not performative.

B. Performatives.

1. Obligatives
2. Expressives
3. Advisives
4. Requestives
5. Permissives
6. Expositives
7. Stipulatives

This list is created out of intuitions around "Purpose". The intuitions do not seem more subtle than those of Searle, nor are they supported by observations concerning direction of fit, psychological state, or the other extra dimensions that constitute "important conceptual distinctions" in Searle's taxonomy.

The fact is that Searle, in looking at the logic of illocutionary force, is self-consciously highlighting what is uniquely interesting about it. His intention is not to simply have it find its place in a semantic theory.

Ultimately, there is no conflict between semantics and a logic of illocutionary force. Katz has contributed importantly in showing what semantics can demonstrate. And--central to progress in the study of illocutionary force and its application to, as in this case, religious language--he has shown how we must clearly distinguish the semantic and pragmatic elements of illocutionary force.

But the real information about illocutionary force comes out of the taxonomy of Searle, and the logic that has been developed in the process of discerning just what is unique to the types and what is shared.

With that understood, we choose to rely on what is essentially Searle and Searle/Vanderveken, informed by a semantic theory that may yet be conceptualist but that certainly sees meaning as the domain of semantics and illocutionary force as part of the meaning. With this taxonomy of illocutionary force thus established, we can proceed to reveal a Taxonomy of religious language.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 5

¹ Above, Chapter 3, p.102.

² Chapter 3, p.98.

³ J.J. Katz, Language and Other Abstract Objects. (Totawa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981.)

⁴ ibid, p.65.

⁵ ibid, p.71.

⁶ ibid, p.78.

⁷ ibid, p.78.

⁸ ibid, p.160.

⁹ ibid, p.166.

¹⁰ ibid, p.166.

¹¹ ibid, p.180.

¹² ibid, p.222-223.

ibid, p.225.

¹⁴ Ibid, p.229.

¹⁵ Above, Chapter 4.

¹⁶ Above, Chapter 2.

¹⁷ Above, Chapter 4.

¹⁸ J.R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit. Quoted above, Chapter 2.

¹⁹ Above, Chapter 2.

²⁰ See above, Chapter 4.

²¹ Above, Chapter 2, a.

²² Above, Chapter 2c.

²³ This draft served as the text in courses offered by D. Vanderveken at L'Université du Québec in 1979 and 1980. It was also part of the subject matter of a research project directed by D. Vanderveken, and with occasional visits by Searle. The book itself is recently published by Cambridge University Press. Here, we restrict ourselves to chapters I and II of the draft copy.

²⁴ J.R. Searle and D. Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985.) Page references are to above-mentioned draft copy.

²⁵ Ibid, p.2.

²⁶ J.R. Searle and D. Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic.
op. cit., p.3.

²⁷ Ibid, p.3.

²⁸ Ibid, p.3. Or maybe a statement is not also made. Searle and Vanderveken are "Inclined" toward the above interpretation (p.4).

²⁹ Above, Chapters 1 and 2.

³⁰ Above, Chapter 2.

³¹ Ibid, p.97.

³² Ibid, p.97.

³³ Ibid, p.98.

³⁴ Ibid, p.97.

³⁵ Ibid, p.96.

³⁶ Expressing statements and expressing feelings are disambiguated by way of the notation $express_1$ and $express_2$ respectively.

³⁷ J.R. Searle and D. Vanderveken. op. cit., Chapter II, p.14. I list only five. There are others.

³⁸ Ibid, Chapter II, p.24.

³⁹ J.R. Searle and D. Vanderveken. op. cit., Chapter II, p.24.

⁴⁰ Ibid, Chapter II, p.26.

⁴¹ See above, Chapter 2.

⁴² Above. Chapter 2, introduction and part a.

⁴³ As declared in the present section.

⁴⁴ Above, Chapters 3,d and 4. Also 5,b.

⁴⁵ J.J. Katz, "The Advantages of Semantic Theory over Predicate Calculus in the Representation of Logical Form in Natural Language," op. cit.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p.385.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p.394.

⁴⁸ This argument can go side by side with my arguments in section b, above, against Katz's Platonism. See also my review of Katz's Language and Other Abstract Objects, op. cit., in the Journal of Pragmatics 8, 1984. pp.411-417.

⁴⁹ See Chapter 4, above. pp.154-155.

⁵⁰ Above, pp.154-155.

⁵¹ See above, p.151.

⁵² J.J. Katz, PSIF, op. cit., p.204. Quoted above, Chapter 3, p.157.

CHAPTER 6. A TAXONOMY OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

a) Religious Language

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- i. The Illocutionary Point
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c) Extending the Analysis

CHAPTER 6. A TAXONOMY OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

a) Religious Language

In our introduction, we offered a working definition of religious language. We said that "religious language is perfectly ordinary language that is 'religious' insofar as its meaning and/or use has to do with phenomena or experiences that are taken to have a religious dimension." We are now in a position to make this definition somewhat more clear.

The increased clarity has to do with the phrase "meaning and/or use." Now we understand use to mean "use in the null context," and to be equivalent to meaning. Meaning, in its turn, is understood as having context-related features.

We simplify, then, in saying that "religious language is language whose meaning has to do with phenomena or experiences that are taken to have a religious dimension." The phrase "phenomena or experiences" is meant as a weak disjunctive that will leave open the question of the "objectivity" of religious experience (that discussion not being to the point here). These phenomena and/or experiences are "taken to have a religious dimension". This latter is left vague so as not to infer an orthodoxy of either power or creed.

Religious language is part of language in those terms. We do not suggest, though, that religious language is religious words. If speech acts are the minimal units of communication, then the object of our study is religious speech acts.

1. Precedent: Donald Evans' The Logic of Self-Involvement

Donald Evans, in his book The Logic of Self-Involvement, argues that part of the logic of language is to involve the speaker in what is being said. This "involvement" is taken to be logical connections between what a person utters and that person's "commitments, attitudes and feelings". Evans sees this as a reality of everyday language and of religious language. His book is an attempt to first portray the workings of this logic in general, and then to apply it to Christian language concerning Creation.

Our interest here is to see how Evans describes the problem of applying a version of illocutionary force theory to religious language. What he actually does with the concept of "Creation" will not directly affect us, as we will be taking another tack.

The first thing to say is that it is Austin's discovery of "performatives" that opens the door for Evans. Austin shows something of the ways in which language involves the speaker and his intentions, beliefs and so on. What Austin has given can be elaborated/altered/corrected in an analysis of "self-involving" elements in language.

Some examples are:

- 1a) In saying, "I submit to your authority", I commit myself to various future actions.
- 1b) In saying, "Thank you for your kindness", I imply that I have an attitude of gratitude.
- 2) In saying, "Glorious!", I express my feelings.

- 3) In saying, "I look on life as a game", I express my attitude towards life.

The second thing to say is that the reason Evans gives for an exercise such as this (his, or mine for that matter) is that theology is in need of "a new logic". "Older logics deal with propositions (statements, assertions); that is, they deal with relations between propositions and relations between terms of propositions. Modern biblical theology, however, emphasizes non-propositional language... (Whether dealing with revelation or religious language) the language or 'word' is not (or is not merely) propositional; it is primarily a self-involving activity".

That being the case, the various ways in which language functions must be understood.

Now certain further introductory comments are in order. Although it is the case that religious language is part of "ordinary" language and is to be understood as such, it has also to be understood that ordinary language for someone studying religious beliefs is the religious language that expresses those beliefs. For one to understand Christian belief, for example, "the ordinary language to which he should appeal is biblical language."⁴ For a broader understanding of religious language, if we may extend Evans' argument, one should study language as it holds its meaning in various religious traditions. Otherwise, one simply does not know what one is talking about.

The speech act has to be understood in its typical settings. Out of this can be extrapolated what we have come to call--following Katz--the meaning in the "null context".

With this extrapolation, though, we are getting ahead of Evans. We will see that when Evans talks about the "typical setting" of a word he seems not to distinguish meaning from use in the ways in which we have had to distinguish them. We will look at this in some detail.

The other relevant introductory comment is methodological. Evans assumes that a) there is an "essential" meaning of biblical words, which provides unity in the revelation and normativeness in relevance; b) there is a systematic connection between various biblical words; c) we can only approach these through a particular biblical theology. I take this last not to imply belief in such-and-such a theology, but simply that a theology provides access to the language in question.

These assumptions can probably be accepted as long as one is restricting oneself to one interpretation of a single, coherent tradition. In this respect, Evans' purposes and ours differ.

Let us, now, move to the content of Evans' analysis of performative force as relevant to religious language. He begins with a look at Austin's work on performatives. We have covered this in Chapter I above, and do not need to repeat it here. He then moves to an elucidation of what is self-involving in Austin's

schema. We will do three things with this "elucidation": summarize it, critique it (from the background of Chapters 2 - 5, above), and ask whether and how it might be helpful to us.

There are some performatives that have not only a content and a performative force but also something Evans calls "autobiographical reporting". We say:

I blame you for his unhappiness.

I agree with what you say.

I acknowledge Father Browne's authority in spiritual matters.

I submit to thee, O Lord.

I forgive you.

In these cases, although the utterance is performative, it also includes a report about myself. It is not a case of "I promise", "I order" but actually involves true or false reporting.

"In saying 'I blame you', I blame you; yet I may have been blaming you without saying anything, so that I report this fact now in the words, 'I blame you'. In saying 'I forgive you', I forgive you; but I also let you know what my attitude is toward you. In saying, 'I acknowledge his authority', I acknowledge it; yet if I have been failing to acknowledge it in practice, what I say is false."⁵

Now, in one sense it is probable that there is an autobiographical element to any verb in the first person singular. Evans, of course, is trying to say more than that since he excludes some verbs from the category. What is his point and on what

does it hang? He at first appears to be saying that some speech acts⁶ perform two illocutionary acts at the same time. They can be, say, commissive and constative in the one utterance.

The argument from our own thesis would have to say that this claim indicates a confusion of meaning and use. When we say 'I forgive you' and mean 'I forgive you' (that is, when we say it in the null context--where the sentence-meaning is the use-meaning), then we are forgiving someone, not reporting it. Evans says that "I also (in such an act) let you know what my attitude is toward you". But there is no "also" about it. Forgiveness has to do with the attitude in question and its being communicated. It is not an extra act at all.

Along slightly different lines, 'I blame you', if it is performative at all⁷ is constative. Because we do not blame someone (the performative act) by saying 'I blame you.' Or, to use Searle's example, we do not insult someone by saying 'I hereby insult you.' Instead, we blame by saying "(I state/claim/insist that) you broke the window." Saying 'I blame you for that' is always a report.

Now I said that Evans appears to be arguing that two distinct performative acts are being performed at the same time. Our thesis, though, will give us another way of getting at what may really be his point. What we would say is this: part of the illocutionary point of some verbs has to do with the expression₂ of something autobiographical. This is done along a gradation of degree of force, and there is some gradation not only within types of force but even within a single verb.

If we are reporting something autobiographical, then we are reporting and the speech act is constative. We can, though, in the context of other speech acts, express₂ something autobiographical..

This is how we will read Evans. It is crucial to have an understanding because he goes on to talk about the verb 'to acknowledge' as being "an important autobiographical-performative verb." And he refers to Karl Barth⁸ as regarding this word "as the key to Christian religious experience, faith and language, in so far as these are truly biblical."⁹

"To acknowledge" had "strands of meaning":

- i. I acknowledge receipt of your letter.
- ii. I acknowledge your authority in this matter.
- iii. I acknowledge my guilt.

Evans thinks that these "strands" demonstrate that 'to acknowledge' is both a Receptive and a Commissive. The problem here--and in all of Evans' analysis--is that he does not distinguish between meaning and use. Without dismissing out of hand the possibility that 'to acknowledge' has meaning strands that lie under different illocutionary forces, and acknowledging the blurry edges in the categorization of types of illocutionary force, we still have to say that Evans' examples could easily be accounted for in a totally different way. 'To acknowledge' might, for example, be analyzed as a constative that fits with the discourse in a particular way and that in use may function (as is often the case) with virtually any force.

We will come back to this. In the meantime, Evans suggests that 'to acknowledge' is also autobiographical. Here we can go a little further to bring Evans' account into line with our own. He claims that in saying 'I acknowledge that Jones saved my life', I do three things:

I perform the verbal act of acknowledging.

(performative element)

I report (perhaps falsely) my own state of mind in relation to Jones.

(autobiographical element)

I refer to the fact that Jones has saved my life.

(factual element)

"Similarly", he adds, "in saying 'I acknowledge the Holy Spirit as the source of life', I perform the verbal act of acknowledging, I report (perhaps falsely) my own attitudes, and I refer to something which presumably is a putative fact... (So) the discovery that much religious language is Behabitive or Commissive does not, by itself, show that such language lacks putative factual content. The same point (he adds) applies to the discovery of autobiographical elements in religious language; these need not be the only factual aspect to religious language."¹⁰

This, of course, is correct. Our analysis, though, would state it in slightly different terms. The first of the three above is, indeed, the performative element. We presume the null context, so just what type we have will depend on the embedded meaning. This will involve the illocutionary point, and may also involve a particular mode of achievement, degree of strength and

propositional content condition.¹¹ The second element, Evans' autobiographical, we have analyzed above in terms of what is expressed₂ and can be characterized as our sincerity conditions, along with their accompanying degrees of strength. Finally, the factual element is the preparatory conditions of our analysis.

Evans' observations in this regard, then, are already accounted for, systematically, and in ways that correct Evans' apparent conflation of meaning and use.

Evans goes on to argue that religious language--in particular religious language insofar as it is self-involving--lies essentially in the categories of Rehabitives and Commissives. In the case of the former, there are always implications of attitude. In the case of the latter, there are commitments to behaviour. Both implications and attitudes are subjected to a process of classification, but the process is rendered complex by the inclusion of both meaning and use factors.

For example, out of that analysis, Evans makes these generalizations over performatives:

- (I) The words. The utterance may, by itself... carry a performative force. This force is (what Evans calls) either Indefeasible or Prima-facie (that is, disclaimable).
- (II) The public context or conventional occasion. This is always relevant, if only to the extent of its not being exceptional. And sometimes a special context may give a particular utterance a force which it would not usually have, or set aside a force which it would usually have.

- (III) The speaker's intention. Sometimes an utterance has alternative performative forces, and the speaker can specify which force he intends his utterance to have.

Evans distinguishes meaning from use conditions in analysis of features of the performatives. He differs from us in two ways. First, he sees both meaning and use features as features of performatives. This seems subject to Katz's criticism that says that only the meaning elements are features of the performative per se and, herein, diverges from our analysis. Second, all of these features--semantic and pragmatic--are part of the ensuing analysis of biblical language. The analysis is, in fact, a pragmatic one with the (necessary) semantic elements. That is fine, but here again it differs from what we want to do.

Before putting Evans aside, it is important to note that he is not being dismissed. The analysis offered is both insightful and rich in semantical as well as pragmatic terms. But it is time to make clear what, in religious language, we want to look at, ...and to set about doing it.

II. Religious Language: Beginning at the Beginning

It is a bit of a trick to know just where to start in philosophy of religion and of religious language. David Lochhead attempts to set the stage in a paper entitled "Beginning at the Beginning: Remarks on Methodology in Philosophy of Religion".¹² One of Lochhead's central arguments is against that of Antony Flew, when Flew suggests¹³ that we "begin at the beginning" and

that the beginning is deciding upon and examining a "minimal definition" of "God".

Lochhead's intention is to show not just that that is not a proper beginning, but the stronger thesis that "there is no such thing as the beginning in dealing with the question of the truth and meaning of religious belief."¹⁴ There is no such thing as the beginning at all. Now in a trivial sense this is obviously true. There is no "revealed" map of the terrain of philosophy of religion with a square-marked START on it. Lochhead's thesis, if it is to be interesting, must show that there is no single preferred beginning to the enterprise.

This I think he fails to do, and he fails to do it because he is too preoccupied with Flew's error. Lochhead summarizes Flew's beginning as follows.

Taking his cue from the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, Flew proposes the following "minimal definition" of the word "God": God is "a Being which is unique, unitary, incorporeal, infinitely powerful, wise and good, personal but without passions, and the maker and preserver of the universe."
 ("God and Philosophy, 2.7). Religious belief, Flew suggests, stands or falls with the coherence of this definition--or something like it. The concept of God is logically fundamental to religious belief as a whole.

Lochhead's quarrel is not with the "words" of the definition. It is an understanding that is in some sense representative. The real problem is, first, that it is not really a definition but a description. It is a description of a (real or imaginary) individual named "God". Such a description is logically derivative out of a prior understanding that says, among other things, that no description of God is literally true.

Another part of the problem is that the word "God" is used ambivalently. As a common noun, it refers to a class of gods of various descriptions. A monotheist will hold that this class has only one member. As a proper noun, it names an individual. As Lochhead remarks, it is neither profound nor original to point out this dual logical role of the word "God".

He goes on from this to identify three types of statement about God. In the first, a meaning is given to the common noun. This turns out to be the definition. In the second, an individual is identified as being a member (perhaps the only member) of this class of divine beings. This is the identification statement. The third class of statements presupposes both of the above, describes attributes, and statements are called attributive statements.

Now we won't spend much time on this, but one comment must be made. That is, it is notoriously difficult to find unanimity on the question as to where definition ends and description begins. Many who believe the class is a class of one will take what Lochhead calls attributive statements to be logically necessary to

the concept "God" and therefore part of the definition. Flew, for example, could respond that way, and Lochhead's argument would be vitiated.

In any case, Lochhead then moves to the "constructive task" in which he argues that the most important statements in a study of religion are the meaning statements and the identification statements. He argues that the two are necessary in any theological system. And finally, there is overwhelming variety in both meaning statements and identification statements. So overwhelming that: "The conclusion that must be drawn is that there is no such thing as religious belief or the theistic position that can be evaluated philosophically for its coherence and validity."¹⁵

I will want to argue that he is right--given an important qualification--in applying this conclusion to the phrase "the theistic position" and totally and importantly wrong in applying it to the phrase "religious belief."

Very briefly, let us look at this overwhelming variety in meaning and identification statements that led him to this rather radical conclusion. He begins with Barth and Tillich, and moves to others. With regard to the meaning statement, we see such alternatives as: "A god is a power responsible for the existence of the universe." "A god is what a man worships." "A god is an ultimate concern." "A god is the ultimate basis of man's confidence and hope." The fact that the options could be

very greatly multiplied, he argues, "implies the possibility of an indefinite number of different types of theological endeavors."¹⁶

He adds: "It is not necessary, therefore, that any two theologians must be understood as being engaged in essentially the same enterprise. For one, theology may be the demography of heaven. For another it may be the study of the meaning of human existence."¹⁷

The same comment is repeated with regard to identification statements. We find: "The supremely perfect being" (Rationalism). "The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob" (Pascal). "Being-Itself" (Tillich). "The Thou which by its very nature cannot become It" (Buber). "He Who Is" (Aquinas). "The God who is revealed in Jesus Christ" (Barth)--and so on. Again, Lockhead says, "we have the possibility of an infinite range of theological systems."¹⁸

"To look for some common ideology under the description 'belief in God' is, to put it mildly, naive."¹⁹ Thence the conclusion quoted above: there is no such thing as "religious belief" or "the theistic position." Therefore, for the philosopher, there is no beginning at which to begin.

Now we grant as long evident the vast variety in meaning and identification statements. We grant as well that to look for a common theology as in some sense being the theistic position is naive. Or if not naive then the self-conscious pursuit of falsity and distortion. And further, we grant that there is

not--as we said before--a pristine ("revealed") starting point.

The condition that we promised to put upon this agreement is simply the condition that it doesn't matter that there is no such starting point. That is because entry into theology--and philosophical reflection upon theology--can come at a point chosen for its interest and/or representativity. One simply acknowledges what one is doing and goes on from there.

It is true that for someone to state that we can begin at the beginning and that the beginning is a theistic understanding of God and that the beginning in getting at a theistic understanding of God is to look at the Thirty-Nine Articles is strangely perverse. That is one of Lockhead's central points and, with the above condition (which we presume he would grant), we accept it.

Unfortunately, Lockhead's excess lies in his falling into the same kind of error. He presumes that because there is no common theology--nothing that can be called "the theistic position"--there is also no such thing as "religious belief." It is a tacit assumption that "if there were a beginning to understanding religious belief, it would lie in a central theistic position." Had he not this assumption, the absence of the latter would not imply the absence of the former.

It is a totally unwarranted assumption. This thesis, if it has shown nothing else, has shown that the roles of language (and religious language is language) are best understood in an analysis of how certain kinds of verbs work. It has become

apparent that the sense and reference of nouns are not only not all there is to meaning but that meaning cannot be discovered apart from the central role of the verb. The point of the utterance--and the other aspects of illocutionary force--lies there.

An implication of this is that trying to understand religious language by looking at the sense and reference of nouns (like "God", for example) is at best incomplete and, what is more likely, is grossly distorting of the attempt to philosophize over religion. Process theology and "Verbum" theologies and others go towards recognizing this. But the break from theology that is necessary for a philosophical understanding of religion has not yet gone far enough.

What creates of religion a field of human behaviour, and thence of study are not common terms of belief, but a common verb. Clearly this philosophical claim can find informal immediate support if we simply acknowledge public and visible realities. People with religious sensitivities not only have divergent theologies,...they may have none at all. No theology seems to reflect their religious experience. They may be thoroughly agnostic or thoroughly atheistic. All, of course, are atheist with regard to many "theologies". Further, there are significant trends in major religious traditions whose central identity might as readily be described as atheistic as theistic.

Now of course it is easier to show that there are not common objects of belief than it is to show that there is a

common verb. We do not need literally to find a common verb. Life and language aren't always that simple. But perhaps we can find a set (or "family") of similar verbs out of which we can abstract a commonality. Such a set readily presents itself for scrutiny.

I propose that we build this set around the verb "I bind (myself)". There are two reasons for this. First, it is common to understand the word "religion" as integrally (and perhaps etymologically) related to reliqare--to bind. Second, the word yoga is a non-peripheral non-Western word having connotations we can add to the set, such as "I yoke (myself)". Now there are others that could be added with slightly different nuance. Let us take one of these, namely islam: "I surrender (myself)".

Recall that what we are doing here is trying to demonstrate that there is in fact something that might reasonably constitute a beginning to the enterprise of philosophizing over religion and religious language. Our claim is this: the beginning lies with the verb, the commonality lies with the verb, there may be a fairly representative set of verbs out of which a common core can be abstracted and, finally, this common meaning may be rather close to "I bind (myself)".

We will at least start with that.

b) The Logic of Religious Language: The Commissive

i. The Illocutionary Point. The illocutionary point of the set of verbs we are taking to be the most reasonable starting point in a philosophy of religious language is commissive. It must

be made clear that although this is not surprising to someone who knows what religion is, it is nonetheless not an entirely trivial claim.

If true it would mean, among other things, that the basic religious stance /utterance is commissive rather than assertive. This is already implied in our choice of this starting point. That is not to say that it is empty of factual content. We will see that factual content is part of the various conditions to which this illocutionary point is subject. Furthermore, we will see plenty of religious language that is just plain assertive.

It might be said in passing that this seems to be the kind of distinction theologians often try to make between faith and belief. The former has to do with a special kind of life stance, while not being devoid of factual content. The latter is taken to be essentially tied up with the assertive.²⁰

Commissive, then, are verbs like "I bind (myself)", "I yoke (myself)", "I surrender", "I submit", "I commit (myself)". Pledge, vow, yield, confess (in one of its meanings), believe (in one of its meanings, that of belief in...) are commissive.

Notice that in terms of the typical religious "testimonial" in English one generally begins "I believe..." Since the predominant use of this verb is assertive, then such an utterance tends to distort the essential nature of what is said. This will not be surprising to those who have taken some trouble to study "theology" (we will come back to that word). They are,

presumably, aware of the danger. But in general, the use of "I believe..." leads to a widespread and deep misunderstanding of religion as a kind of belief system.

Probably the most important part of the difficulty is that we have not acknowledged reliqare. In doing it here, and in claiming that it gives the appropriate starting point in philosophy of religion, we are faced with the commissive nature of the central religious utterance. The point of a commissive is to commit the speaker to future action.

We have seen, in Searle's taxonomy, the symbolism

$C \uparrow I \text{ (S does A)}$

C is the commissive illocutionary point

$\uparrow$ is the world-to-words direction to fit

I is the psychological state of intention

(S does A) is the proposition

Searle has expanded this, both in Speech Acts and in "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts" in terms of the verb promise. In Searle/Vanderveken, we have seen the symbolism developed. If speaker a , in the context i succeeds in achieving an illocutionary point--in this instance the commissive--on proposition P , then the relationship $i \Pi^P$ holds. In this case, it is the relationship $i \Pi_2 P$...since Π_2 is the commissive illocutionary point.

The commissive point creates, as it were, a special relationship between the context (including speaker, hearer, time and so on) and the proposition. If the point is made, then the condition holds.

If one were to say (under other conditions that follow)

1. I bind my will to thine, O Lord.
2. I yoke myself to Thy Holy Will.
3. I submit my life to the lure of ease.
4. I commit myself to the pursuit of happiness.

one would, in each case, accomplish a commissive act.

ii. Mode of Achievement. The function μ (π) determines the mode of achievement that is characteristic of a given illocutionary point. μ (π) $\leq i$, $P \geq 1$ means that the speaker i succeeds in attaining force π in mode μ over P .

While there may be no obvious special mode of achievement in the general case of "I bind (myself)" there may be in special cases. If a religious group, for example, requires a public act of commitment from potential "members" then there may well be a ritualized process through which this occurs. In this special case, then mode (I bind) $\leq i$, $P \geq 1$ only if the person is committed to P in the appropriate performance of that role.

iii. Degree of Strength. It is clear that there is a variety of degrees of strength within the commissive illocutionary point. In one way it would seem unlikely that the religious use would occur at all if it were not with some significant degree of strength.

But there is an interesting surprise here. In actual fact we find

5. Thy Will be done.
6. I pledge allegiance to the flag...

7. I promise to do my best, to do my duty to God and the Queen...

8. I bind my life to thine.

where at least one thing is evident. That is, in general use, there seems to be no uniquely high degree of strength given to what could be construed as a religious context. We talk about idolizing someone, or having a quasi-religious commitment to the state. Commonly, people will express that degree of loyalty to a company, for example...much higher than they would express toward anything avowedly religious.

At the same time, there is a general understanding of religious commitment as being uniquely tied up with a high degree of strength. One thinks of religious fervour and fanaticism. One thinks as well of "he exercises religiously", "she votes/washes/dusts the house religiously".

The fact seems to be that in terms of "ultimacy" within the commissive illocutionary point--when one thinks of high degrees of strength for words like pledge, vow, confess, bind myself, submit, believe in, and the like--it would be quite common to acknowledge that there is a religious dimension to it.

This raises a question that cannot be fully answered yet: Can we corner the market of high-strength commissives for a type of religious commitment? At least four factors would have to be part of the answer. First, there clearly is a widespread understanding of religious commitment as being "the ultimate" in commitment...the all-embracing...the commitment that demands "my soul,

my life, my all." Second, religious commitment can probably be tentative and still be religious commitment. Third, strong commitment can be held toward virtually anything. If one were to give her/his commitment to a person, for example, or the state, then we would have to decide whether to call this religious (and hence idolatrous), or quasi-religious, or something else.

Fourth, as far as the actual degree of strength of the words goes, we have simply to say that there is a range in the degree of strength of these commissives, and where they fall in this range depends upon the meaning of the rest of the utterance. (It will also depend--in most actual utterances--upon features of the broader context as well.)

iv. Propositional Content Conditions. θ is the function from the context into the set of propositions. θ_{fut} represents, as has been seen, the constraint that propositions be future with respect to t_1 , and this constraint holds over the set of commissive propositions.

Although the symbolism comes from Searle/Vanderveken, we have seen explanation in both Speech Acts and "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts." Propositional content conditions are such that a future act is predicated of the speaker. Clearly, the word "act" is to be interpreted broadly...the speaker is committing him/herself to something: a relation, an attitude, an action, an act of refraining and so on.

v. Preparatory Conditions. This is very interesting in the case of religious language. These are what tell us what the speaker a_i must presuppose in w_i in performing the act $F(P)$. As quoted above:²¹ "To presuppose that a state of affairs obtains is tantamount to presupposing that the proposition that represents that state of affairs is true."

The function Σ relates possible contexts and propositions ($I \times \text{Prop}$) to sets of propositions having certain features ($\mathcal{S}(\text{Prop})$). We know that in the case of commissives, as in the case of orders (from the example in Chapter 5), the act to which one is committed must be physically possible. We see here that the words "physically possible" have to be interpreted rather broadly, but there is no difficulty with that. It works in the same way in which we interpret "act" broadly.

There are, of course, other things that are presupposed... or perhaps tied into that presupposition. We have seen that it is supposed that H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A. Certainly, too, a commissive act presupposes that S and H do not take it for granted that S will do A regardless.

Now we did not, in the context of either the propositional content condition or the preparatory condition, raise the question of the meaning of the proposition. That is because the meaningfulness of the proposition is not a special condition on the commissive illocutionary act. It is a general condition on speech acts that the embedded proposition be meaningful.

There are matters here of great significance for religion, though, and we will raise them in this specifically commissive context. First, although what is central to the act--its point, and the various conditions that effect the point--is what is commissive about it, it clearly does not happen without propositional content. Further, although the act is not the assertion of the propositional content, there are assertive propositions presupposed.

It makes no sense to say "I pledge thee my troth" unless there is an appropriate "thee" and some mutual understanding of the meaning of what is said...quite apart from the specific conditions on the commissive. Similarly, one is strongly inclined to suggest that in the act 5,

5. Thy Will be done.

one actually presupposes as true certain statements about the "Thou" and the "Will" of the Thou. This, again, quite apart from specific commissive propositional content conditions and preparatory conditions concerning one's ability to accomplish certain future "acts".

There is, of course, no reason to presuppose that all religious-commissive speech acts presuppose a clearly-defined Thou or, in fact, a Thou at all. If one were to say

9. I bind/yoke myself to the Way of Truth.

It is both commissive and religious, but in no way presupposes a pre-existing "Way of Truth." Understanding this kind of

religious utterance is understanding of a process.

VI. Sincerity Conditions. S intends to do A. The speaker a_1 expresses₂²² a psychological state, in this instance that of an intention, in expressing, F (P). This intention to do A is part of the set of psychological states intention, namely set {Intends (P)}. The function Ψ relates this set to the set of contexts and propositions (I x Prop).

We have, I would hope, made it clear that this state is expressed₂ whenever a commissive illocutionary act is performed. The question that arises is whether or not it was performed sincerely.

Recall, from our earlier discussion of Austin, how one category of Infelicity, Abuses, contains both Insincerities and Breaches. The sincerity condition does not deal with Misfires (in the process) or with Breaches (of trust) but only with the matter of the sincere or insincere expression of the psychological state.

In the act, the psychological state (intention, in this case) is expressed whether or not the person has the intention... whether or not he is sincere. To say

10. I commit myself to seeking peace
is to express the intention to do so. The person may be sincere or insincere.

Perhaps Austin's Abuses, in religious language, might be:

AbusesInsincerities

hypocrisy

deceit

Breaches

back-sliding

betrayal

vii. The Degree of Strength of the Sincerity Conditions. This is the same as the degree of strength of the illocutionary point, except in cases in which a special mode of achievement might influence (generally increase) the degree of strength of the illocutionary point. In our context of discussion, the confession of Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour (since confession of faith is generally taken to be a public act within a certain worship situation) may be said to gain a greater degree of strength by virtue of that mode of achievement.

Consequently, the degree of strength of illocutionary point, degree $\perp$ is greater than the degree of strength of the sincerity condition $\eta(\perp)$. degree $(\| \text{confess} \|) > \eta \| \text{confess} \|$.

While this is probably true of confess (one word in the set at which we are looking), it is probably not true of surrender, which does not ask for the additional mode of achievement.

Now here we have taken a cursory look at some common characteristics of a set of words--all within the commissive illocutionary force--that strike us as an interesting and appropriate beginning point in a philosophy of religion. Our approach seems to have some intuitive credibility.

First, it focuses the attention on the speech act which, as we have claimed, is the basic unit of communication. In this way we are able to distinguish the force from the content and deal with each in its own terms.

Second, on account of that, we know that the illocutionary point tells us what, essentially, the act is about. The propositional content is treated, for the most part, as (a series of) assertions whose truth is presumed.

Third, out of this, we can heighten our understanding of the distinction between faith and belief. It is possible, of course, that the word faith is misleading here because of its contamination in use: "faith is believin' what you know ain't so..." Some prefer the word trust to faith. We will persevere with the word faith, and we will tie it to the verb "I bind (myself)" and the rest of our set of religare verbs.

Although we will use that word, we will not use it dogmatically, and we will insist that we are talking about a set of words with different nuances (in particular, in different traditions) but with a common core of meaning.

Thus when we oppose

faith

belief

I bind (myself)

I believe

we are on the left hand side dealing with shorthand for a set of words that express the central religious act and we are clearly distinguishing them from belief.

The fourth thing we gain is a clearer understanding of just what relationship belief has to faith: If there are true assertions presupposed, then they are subject to the same truth conditions as any other assertion--presupposed or asserted. Therefore a relevant activity in understanding religious faith is one of looking at questions of the meaning and truth of these assertions.

The easy route would be to give that over to theology. It makes a certain intuitive sense to give to theology the task of discerning the content of religious belief. One problem with this is that, as we have said, a good deal of religious belief seems not to be belief in God (in any recognizable conception of "God").

There are several options for us here. One would be to invent a word--pistology, say--to do this job. Then we would restrict theology for that part of the territory where questions of a conception of and belief in God arise.

Another would be to use the word God anyway, while declaring open the questions of nature and "existence".

In any case, although I have a distinct preference for the former tack, my point here is not to locate disciplines..., rather simply to underscore the relationship belief is now seen to have to religious faith.

viii. Direction of Fit. Direction of fit, as we have seen, has to do with the relationship between language and the world. In the case of the assertive it is the job, we have said, of the

words to adjust to the world. In the case of both commissive and directive, the world is expected to adjust to the words... the words occasion the relevant adjustment. In the case of declaratives, the two realities are born together. And in the expressive, there is no question...no attempt to get the words to match the world or vice-versa.

This tells us, in the case of our set of commissives, that part of what is happening is that the world is to be adjusted by virtue of the commitment made. That in fact is central to what is happening and is part of the illocutionary point. It is also clear though, as a result of our analysis, that there is a dependency upon the world by virtue of the preparatory conditions. That is because the assertives, whose truth is presumed, have a word-to-world direction of fit.

One of the implications of this is that any attempt to introduce an "objective-subjective" dichotomy into the analysis of religious utterance would have to consider just how the two (constatives and assertives) are related. Once we understand the different roles of language, and the components that are at work in each case, there will be no motivation to oppose those elements to one another. We will say more about this when we look at expressive religious language.

c. Extending the Analysis

For reasons discussed, we have looked first at religious commissives. It is of course clear that religious language is not restricted to commissives. As a matter of fact, although

commissives are probably those religious illocutionary acts that best reflect the religious stance and that have both a force and a content that can give the proper direction to a philosophy of religion, they are probably not the primal religious utterance.

That place probably belongs to the expressive. To illustrate that, let us propose the following taxonomy of religious language.

Religious Language

<u>Illocutionary Point</u>	<u>Expressive</u>	<u>Commissive</u>	<u>Assertive</u>	<u>Directive</u>	<u>Declarative</u>
Typical Form	E(P) (S/H + property)	$\perp \uparrow$ (S does A)	$\vdash \downarrow$ B (p)	$\top \uparrow$ W (H does A)	$D \downarrow$ (p)
Illocutionary Point symbol	E	$\perp$	$\vdash$	$\top$	D
Direction of fit	$\emptyset$	$\uparrow$	$\downarrow$	$\uparrow$	$\downarrow$
Sincerity condition	variable (P) over psychological states	Intention	Belief	Wish/Desire	$\emptyset$
Propositional Content	S/H + property	S does A	(p)	H does A	(p)
Some associated verbs	exalt, laud, magnify, honour, dread, thank, praise, bless, curse, blame, defy, protest, wonder, marvel	surrender, submit, bind, yoke, commit, pledge, vow, swear, promise, covenant, dedicate (myself), give, yield	believe, tell, affirm, state, insist, guess, testify, swear, conjecture, concede	pray, beg, ask, beseech, order, urge, command, advise, plead, recommend	name, baptize, pronounce, excommunicate, install, ordain, appoint, damn, grant, proclaim, pardon, dedicate

I have ordered the above as I have in order to suggest another probable feature of the roles of religious language. That is, that although the commissive bespeaks the religious stance, it is the expressive that bespeaks the more primitive religious experience.

Religious language has its origin, motivation and ongoing undergirding of life not in Creeds, doctrine, ritual and such matters per se but in what is called, diversely, religious experience, mystical experience, encounter with God, the idea of the Holy, and so on. It is this more or less pristine religious experience--typified by expressives such as those listed, others that could be added, and still others that have no name--that keeps religion alive. And it does so because the experience/encounter is ongoing.

This need not be--should not be--construed as a defence of actual religious belief systems and social structures. That is not the point. The point is that as long as humans have this "spiritual encounter", and do not perceive it to be adequately explained in other terms, then the religious expressive will be uttered.

The commissive is either consequent or concomitant. Tied in with the wonder and the dread and the honour is a yielding and a binding. Certain commissives, such as covenanting, probably come later and depend on further development of propositional content.

That is to say, the encounter in which the expressive is uttered and out of which issues the commissive, is not an encounter devoid of content. It is not "pure experience", whatever that might be²³. It is, rather, an encounter with, an experience of...It is the working out of this content, in tension with the religious content of other people's experiences (and traditions), that yields the assertive content presupposed--perhaps in a fairly primitive way--in the commissives. This is further developed and systematized in assertive illocutionary acts, and can become a full-blown systematic pistology or theology.

The expressive begets the commissive with an assertive component that may be developed in different ways. The expressive also begets the directive in that what is perceived is generally taken to have something to do with Desire. There is something desired of, in and through the encounter/experience. This desire takes very different shapes. It may be the natural desire of two parties to a relationship seeking, for example, a binding. In that way, the directive and the commissive are two sides to the same coin. That is, Desire to do and Desire to have done may be the same desire and lead to the same act, but with different agents. This, in my view, is relevant to Searle's questions about the Commissive and the Directive, having the same direction of fit and yet not being reducible the one to the other.

There are both directives and commissives in religious language that have to do with following The Way. But this should not always be perceived as a two-party binding. Whereas it would be two-party in a binding between a Christian and The Way, it might not be two-party for a Taoist. And if it were, it would be very differently nuanced.

Directives, then, may originate in the religious experience and be perceived as "desire" directive. Needless to say, the line of directive can be reversed, and our own wishes can be expressed as well (as in prayer, for example). Finally, directives enter religious language in the everyday interpersonal and institutional usage.

The Declarative seems to be a process gesture. It is a way of ordering/structuring all of the above--freezing it in a knowable state, so to speak--in order that we might undertake a new beginning. This is why we engage in such activities as naming and defining. We identify something by fiat so that we can incorporate it into our understanding.

When "creation" of the universe is explained by way of "let there be light!"...and so on, it is almost a paradigm of the declarative--an ordering of reality, including an ordering of relationships (and status), is established.

Now we have gone to some length to describe the evolution of a theory of illocutionary force, defend it against its most serious criticism, offer some restructuring of the theory, and apply it to a philosophical study of religious language.

We began with the commissive, which we take to be the act that offers best access to one's religion...to one's faith stance, however defined. And this was followed by a look at other acts that turned out to precede, accompany and succeed the commissive--one would really have to acknowledge a continuing interplay, as we have, of course, been abstracting for purposes of defining our taxonomy.

It is now time to stop this process, summarize what has been accomplished and then suggest some directions for developing the basis that has been established here into a typology of religion.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 6

¹ Donald Evans, The Logic of Self-Involvement. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969.)

² Ibid, p.12.

³ Ibid, p.14.

⁴ Ibid, p.15.

⁵ Ibid, p.40.

⁶ In above terms, we talked about express₁ and express₂.

⁷ Evans and we agree that all utterances may be performative (although that would not be Katz's position), but that does not mean that all verbs are performative.

⁸ Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, I, 1. Reference in Donald Evans, op. cit., p.41.

⁹ Donald Evans, op. cit., p.41.

¹⁰ Ibid, p.43.

¹¹ See above, Chapter 5.

¹² David Lochhead, "Beginning at the Beginning: Remarks on Methodology in Philosophy of Religion," paper presented to the Canadian Learned Societies meeting in Montreal, 1971.

¹³ A. Flew, God and Philosophy. (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1966.)

¹⁴ David Lochhead, op. cit., p.1.

¹⁵ Ibid, p.17.

¹⁶ Ibid, p.16.

¹⁷ Ibid, p.16.

¹⁸ Ibid, p.16.

¹⁹ Ibid, p.17.

²⁰ There are a lot of ways of making this distinction. Probably the least helpful is the attempt to distinguish between religious belief and scientific belief. This leads to confusion if not special pleading.

²¹ Above, Chapter 5, p.207.

²² See above, Chapters 4,5. Expressing thoughts and expressing feelings are distinguished, recall, with the notation $express_1$ and $express_2$.

²³ Generally speaking. But this is arguably the goal of some religious experience.

CONCLUSION: A TAXONOMY OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

This thesis has perhaps demonstrated an intrinsic interest in the study of illocutionary force...an interest as well in the two great traditions that have shaped the theory of illocutionary force that has been adopted here. A long-standing interest in religion and religious language encouraged both the desire to apply a study of illocutionary force to religious language and the desire to deal with the conflict between these traditions as a necessary first step.

Our contention is that the illocutionary force analysis of religious language that has been done here can serve as a beginning taxonomy of religious language and that that is the central result of our having looked at Speech Act Theory and the Roles of Religious Language.

Our study has resulted in a taxonomy of religious language that gives us insight into the roles of religious language and the ways in which different roles may interact. It is done within a theory of language and a broad theory of illocutionary acts for all of language and this has two significant theoretical advantages. First, and this is something we have valued since the outset, language is seen as a unified

whole where no one part seeks a special status and an independent set of rules. We have not seen any reason to doubt our ability to succeed at this--no evident constriction of religious language or attempt to reduce it to something it is not.

The second theoretical advantage to our approach is our not having to re-invent the wheel. It is evident that successful work in the general study of illocutionary force will help our understanding of religious language without every analytical phrase having to be repeated ("and this is also true of religious language..."). In the context of this thesis that has helped us avoid redundancy at the stage of the application of illocutionary force theory to religious language. Also in this thesis, helpful observations around religious language (which we will shortly repeat and expand) will be relevant to the general theory of illocutionary force. Finally, ongoing developments will be of mutual relevance.

In this conclusion we want to recapitulate and then we want to pursue some of the matters raised in our taxonomy of religious language to see whether this might be of some help in the task of developing a typology of religion.

By way of recapitulation, let us first look at the taxonomy as charted in Chapter 6.

RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

Illocutionary Point	Expressive	Commissive	Assertive	Directive	Declarative
Typical Form	Eθ(P)(S/H + property)	↑↑I(S does A)	↑↓B(p)	↑↓W(H does A)	Dθθ(p)
Illocutionary Point Symbol	E	↑	↓	↑	D
Direction of Fit	θ	↑	↓	↑	↓
Sincerity Condition	variable(P) over psychological states	Intention	Relief	Wish/Desire	
Propositional Content	S/H + property	S does A	(p)	H ~~does~~ A	(p)
Some associated verbs	exalt, laud, magnify, honour, dread, thank, praise, bless, curse, blame, defy, protest, wonder, marvel	surrender, submit, bind, yoke, commit, pledge, vow, swear, promise, covenant, dedicate (myself), give, yield	believe, tell, affirm, state, insist, guess, testify, swear, con- jecture, concede	pray, beg, ask, beseech, order, urge, command, advise, plead, recommend	name, baptize, pronounce, excommunicate, install, ordain, appoint, damn, grant, proclaim, pardon, dedicate

This chart does two things. First, it lists verbs associated with different types of speech act. This in itself could be trivial. In fact, if that is all we had done then we would have been just as well off to have simply looked at Austin's lists of verbs as we have then in Chapter 1 and we would have noticed that religious verbs appear in all types of speech act.

It is important to reiterate that that is not the point of this taxonomy. The reality is that, although in our chart we have listed a number of verbs that are associated with each illocutionary point we have learned, with Searle, that illocutionary point is not a list of verbs. Illocutionary point has a describable logic (and that is what the typical form of our chart illustrates) and within that point and its various sub-types there may well be logical sub-types with no verb to express them. In other words, our taxonomy of religious language is not a taxonomy of lists of verbs but of logical types distinguished on the basis of illocutionary point and the other related and essential distinguishing criteria.

This then is the second thing such a chart does, and it is its essential role. It demonstrates the logic of types of religious language and adds illustrative examples. The chart is "explained" by the theory of illocutionary force.

The theory of illocutionary force that we have adopted lies, as has been said, within the "Speech Acts Theory" tradition of Austin and Searle. Our theory diverges from this only insofar as it accepts the significant criticism from Katz with regard to the meaning-use distinction.

Other information is taken from the Chomsky-Katz tradition of generative grammar, but in that we do not differ from Searle.

Our theory can be summarized as follows. What language does is analysable into if not Searle's five then at least certainly a limited number of types of act. Religious language,

takes on all these roles and is both subject to and explicable through the roles and characteristics of these types.

We have included the assertive in this typology. In this, we follow Austin/Searle/Vanderveken and oppose our position to that of Katz. Reasons have been given in Chapter 5, but there is one we did not pursue there and which is not irrelevant to an understanding of language. Recall how, in Chapter 1, we mentioned that Austin suggests that the explicit performative is a later development in the evolution of language than is the implicit. Austin's more general argument is to the effect that language evolves, and as it does it becomes both more precise (in terms of meaning) and more explicit (in terms of force).

Our analysis has followed Searle's development and would state this somewhat differently. We might say that the meaning becomes more precise (in terms of propositional content) and more explicit (in terms of force). We see the refinement of the assertive--in religious as well as in any other domain of language--to be within this process and not divorced from it.

We went on to apply the Searle-Vanderveken characterization of illocutionary acts to religious language, but in doing so not only explained how religious language functions in these types but also suggested a possible re-ordering of the types. We have argued that in terms of religious illocutionary acts--and this could probably be argued in at least some other areas of discourse as well--that there is a logical primacy to the expressive, that the commissive and the assertive have their

seeds there, that the directive is born in a kind of dialectic with the commissive, and that the declarative is a kind of ordering device.

There is an intuitive support for this re-ordering in Searle's characterization of both sincerity conditions and direction of fit. The expressive sincerity condition is the variable (P) over possible psychological states. Intention, Belief and Desire are the sincerity conditions of the commissive, assertive and directive and it is understood that these arise out of the set of possible psychological states. Further, the declarative sincerity condition is $\emptyset$.

We see a similar process, in reverse order, with direction of fit. In the case of the expressive the matter does not arise and the direction of fit is $\emptyset$. At the same time as the psychological state is becoming disambiguated so does the direction of fit. Hence word-to-world (belief) and world-to-words (Intention / desire). The declarative fixes a bi-directional reality by fiat.

There is no need to pursue this, or to be dogmatic about it. Perhaps the schema that best represents what we are saying would leave fairly flexible the ordering of assertive, commissive, and directive. But the general point is fairly crucial to philosophy of religion, and is portrayed as such in Chapter 5.

This is why our chart appears as it does running left to right from expressive to declarative. We do have two further points to raise in this regard. Recall how, this process not-

withstanding, we claimed that the Commissive is somehow more revelatory of the central religious stance. We also acknowledged that the holding of a "stance" presupposes certain things and so while central it is neither primal nor independent.

It is not primal in that religious experience is taken to have developed in the Commissive into specific intention. It is not independent in that there is a clearly developed Propositional Content. And yet it is the Commissive that is most revealing of a developed religious position because of the responsive and binding characteristics that are peculiar to this experience.

It seems clear that most religious dialogue as we have characterized it will be between the Expressive in its relation to religious experience and the Commissive in its relation to religious stance. More will be said of this shortly.

Our second "further point" with regard to the ordering of types has to do with the relationship between the Commissive and the Directive. Searle has suggested that they cannot be reduced one to the other despite their common direction of fit. We would argue that it is not only the direction of fit that is common but also the action required (albeit with a different agent).

It is at least arguable that there is sameness of sincerity condition as well...something for a type we might call Purposive. The Purposive sincerity condition would have to tolerate the sameness in direction of fit and in action purposed and at the

same time the variety in agent. After all, Wish and Desire which are at different times used to label the sincerity condition of the Directive are part of the condition of the Commissive as well. What could be argued then is that a single Purposive illocutionary point with a typical form more like that of the Commissive $\downarrow \uparrow D (x \text{ does } A)$ might replace the Commissive and the Directive as follows:

Purposive

$\downarrow \uparrow D (x \text{ does } A)$

$\downarrow$	Illocutionary Point Symbol
$\uparrow$	World-to-word direction of fit
D	Sincerity Condition Desire
x does A	Propositional Content: someone performs A

In this case, the Commissive would become a sub-type with a particular agent reading (speaker) and a desire that is developed to read intention. Directive, too, would be a sub-type, with the agent reading (hearer) and the desire developed to read Wish. This would be more a schematic difference than anything else, for while the two are subsumed under a common heading they are not reduced the one to the other.

We might simply redesign the chart along the lines:

Illocutionary Point	Expressive	Asservice	Purposive			Declarative
			Commissive	Directive		
ED(P)(S/H + Property)		↓ R(p)	↑D(x does A)	↑D(x does A)		D↓D(p)
			x = S		x = H	

It is our feeling that this maintains the logical distinctions we have noted while also acknowledging our claim that out of the set of psychological states where there is no question of direction of fit and whose utterance is expressive, there comes a differentiation motivated essentially by direction of fit and characterized by the dominant states of belief and desire. In the case of belief, assertives reflect the belief and the direction of fit is word-to-world. In the case of desire, the necessary world-to-word direction of fit can be actualized in different cases by different agents. In all cases, we are talking about a wish or desire, one that is deemed attainable, and in the best interest of those involved.

If this is the outline of our taxonomy, let us review some of the things we have said about it. We have said two kinds of things with regard to the Expressive. First, we have talked about its identity criteria. It has been identified as a speech act that expresses a psychological state (and the state expressed will vary) having to do with some property or other relating to the speaker or the hearer. It is expressive of this state and does not purpose to accomplish any "fitting" of either the words to a state of affairs or of a state of affairs to the words expressed.

We would also like explicitly to claim that the psychological state(s) expressed may or may not be identified and will be in varying degrees differentiated. These are rather

straightforward claims, the one to the effect that the expressive speech act need not be self-consciously expressive of such-and-such a psychological state. In actual fact, it is probably rarely identified.

It is nonetheless identifiable, upon retrospection, within certain important parameters. Those seem to be two:

1. Not all psychological states have names.
2. There are varying degrees of differentiation among psychological states.

The variety of psychological states become differentiated both unconsciously and consciously. As these become differentiated, there may be speech acts that are expressive of this varying degree of undifferentiation/differentiation.

We have claimed, in connection with religious language, that it is here in the language that is expressive of psychological states that are in varying degrees identified and in varying degrees differentiated that the religious language "has its origin, motivation and ongoing undergirding of life." (Above, Chapter 6, p.251.) It is religious experience, however differently conceived, that underlies the primal religious utterance.

That is not to say that all so-called religious experience is somehow "equal", or beyond critical discussion. There is much to be learned in pursuing the matter of more or less self-conscious differentiation of psychological states and the expression of these states in speech acts. Much of this has to do with what happens when self-consciousness includes critical thinking.

The expressive, then, is expressive of the more or less pristine religious experience that, it seems, keeps religion alive.

Out of that womb, and in the differentiation of psychological states comes a differentiation of illocutionary acts. The categorization of these is in line with the illocutionary point, a central psychological state, the direction of fit and other categorizing criteria.

The assertive is the illocutionary act whose intent it is to reflect some state of affairs. The psychological state is belief and there is a fitting of the words to the reality they are "about"... a word-to-world direction of fit.

The purposive illocutionary act has to do with adjusting the world to match a purpose (world-to-word direction of fit). The psychological state has been called one of desire. Since that word is nuanced in unhelpful ways, certainly in connection with religious language, we will prefer to talk of a purposive psychological state. This psychological state, depending on the agent, becomes immediately disambiguated into the states of intention and what we have called wish. This latter is probably not adequate, as the state itself is probably more agent and effect oriented than words like wish or desire allow.

It may in fact be better for now to talk of the Purpose psychological states as first purposive, and then intention and direction.

In any case the central point is the logic and not the name. The Commissive links the speaker to a more or less profound orientation. In the context of religious language with a high degree of strength it is the Commissive that demonstrates the commitment, or life-stance, faith or what have you of the speaker. It is in this sense that the Commissive is the illocutionary act that is most illustrative of a developed religious position. The language of faith is Commissive. That that is not divorced from or in opposition to any of the other types of illocutionary act has been argued above and should be emphasized.

We have seen its natural relationship to the Expressive. The relationship is one of dialogue wherein the one (The Commissive) is an extension, differentiation, delimitation and development of something whose seeds lie in the other. The Assertive is another, yet dissimilar, differentiation. Dissimilar though it be as an illocutionary act, assertive propositional content is presupposed in the Commissive and that propositional content can be both expressed as an Assertive and subjected to the same criteria of identity and adequacy.

The same is true of the Directive, which is the flip side of the Commissive within the Purposive illocutionary act. Whether our directive is given to a sibling, a friend, God, oneself...there are propositional content conditions along with the illocutionary point itself, the sincerity conditions and so on.

The Declarative, finally, has been understood as an ordering device that establishes (not necessarily permanent) parameters on social reality. Whether it is God creating ("Let there be..."), a minister pronouncing ("...husband and wife"), or the perverse uttering of an oath ("Damn you") there is a reality that is established by virtue of the act (except that in the third example the force is attenuated both by its jargon status and by the failure of appropriate authority).

This, then, is our taxonomy. It can be further developed most usefully at this stage by way of enrichment (examples and stories) and, perhaps, by way of looking toward possible contributions of such a taxonomy to a typology of religion.

With regard to this latter, there are two disclaimers that would have to be made in the beginning. First, it should be obvious that religion is not only language or not even essentially language. It is essentially a way of life typified by recurrent patterns of behavior, perhaps social organization (certainly if the religion is "a" religion), symbols, rites, rituals and really quite a variety of things done with words. It could in fact be argued that even creeds and theologies, as formalized at any rate, are fairly peripheral to actual religious behavior.

The second disclaimer is this: since religion is so many things, quite a number of typologies might be possible depending on the questions being asked. A psychological typology or a sociological typology clearly would not be our intent.

These disclaimers notwithstanding, there are reasons to think a philosophical typology might find helpful a taxonomy such as ours. First, the theory we have presented purports to be universal in the sense that it is a part of the study of language, not a language. If what we have presented is substantially correct, we have demonstrated something of the logic of religious language wherever it is part of any language.

Second, what is not linguistic in religion can at least in some measure be talked about. This point might be trivial were it not for our third point, namely that we have a taxonomy of religious language which already:

1. relates language to psychological states (belief, desire, intention, etc.)
2. relates language to the world (in differing directions of fit)
3. relates language to forms of action (through being purposive, and then through intention and direction)
4. demonstrates a relation between psychological states and action (e.g. intention and speaker action), along with sincerity conditions
5. shows relationships among types, and
6. has introduced the notion of differentiation (of psychological states, language types and their features).

I am not yet sure what kind of restructuring would be necessary to make the move into a typology of religion, but it seems to me that most of the necessary elements are present in the taxonomy of religious language we have here presented.

I suggest the following as a possibly fruitful course. The first thing to do might very well be to admit that the word "religion" is more likely to impede than it is to facilitate the process. We have too many informal stereotypes of what religions are and where their boundaries lie. The social structure of religions is something fairly high in peoples' consciousness, and this social reality may be the biggest present barrier to our understanding the elements of religion that we would want to categorize.

To get around this difficulty, I propose we seek instead a typology of religiosity. This allows us to get by the social conglomerations that are called "religions". It then allows us to note aspects of religiosity whenever they appear and further, to note different types of religiosity within what otherwise might be called a religion.

The second step toward a typology of religiosity would, we propose, be to lift up our taxonomy of religious language. This of course not only as types but as types described and understood with the features to which we have drawn attention. We will therefore be talking about "packages" of characteristics--linguistic, psychological, directional vis-a-vis word/world, related to courses of action ("action" broadly understood), and with relationships among the packages. We might call these characteristics of religiosity...and these characteristics would be grouped in types. We could easily make a grid of such characteristics, and this grid would resemble the schema of our taxonomy.

To move from packages of characteristics to a typology of religiosity we may very well need only two further notions. The first is the notion, already introduced, of differentiation. There will be variety in the degree of differentiation among and within the types of characteristics. Some religiosity has, for example, a relatively undifferentiated expressive character (we will, for now, label the sets of characteristics with the names of the types of illocutionary act). Others might be quite highly differentiated with a particularly developed assertive component, say, ... or perhaps declarative.

The other notion is the one we have just recently introduced, and it is that of integration. In cases in which there is some degree of differentiation there may or may not be integration among the different parts.

The question now becomes: how do we formalize a typology that is born out of a grid of types of characteristics of religiosity that are in varying degrees (and ways) differentiated and in varying degrees (and ways) integrated? Principles of grouping will have to be sought. When we have attained a principled grouping of characteristics along the scales of differentiation and integration the result will be a typology of religiosity.

One could then go on, if it were desired, to ask of a given "religion" what types of religiosity were exemplified within it, in what relations, with what uniqueness, what one(s) predominate, and so on.

Although I have not worked out the principles of grouping, it would not be unreasonable to think the vast variety of combinations can be sorted out into types and sub-types. Furthermore, because of the features of our Taxonomy of religious language that incorporate psychological states, relationship with external reality and so on, as we have listed, we might expect our Taxonomy to be significantly directive in establishing the principles of classification.

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